A Prime Minister for Afghanistan? : Historical Precedents, Constitutional Design, and Policy Implications

Abstract

This paper examines the constitutional, historical, and political dimensions of introducing a prime ministerial office in Afghanistan. Drawing on Afghanistan’s constitutional evolution from 1923 to 2004 and comparative insights from the French semi-presidential system, it argues that re-establishing a premiership would risk institutional paralysis, political fragmentation, and renewed ethnic division. The study highlights that Afghanistan’s past experiments with dual executives—whether under monarchy, republicanism, or the post-2014 “unity government”—produced instability and blurred accountability. A strong, directly elected president, accountable to the electorate and constrained by a vibrant opposition and an independent judiciary, is deemed more consistent with Afghanistan’s socio-political realities and Islamic traditions. The paper concludes that constitutional integrity, national unity, and state functionality are best preserved through a singular executive, complemented by strengthened democratic institutions to ensure transparency, accountability, and the rule of law.