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**GREAT BRITAIN
AND
PALESTINE
1915—1936**

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


INFORMATION DEPARTMENT PAPERS.

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The Information Department wishes to acknowledge its indebtedness to all those who have assisted with their advice in the preparation of this Paper.



I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PALESTINE

Perhaps the most serious aspect of any disturbance in Palestine is the fact that the two communities chiefly concerned—the Jews and the Arabs—are not local entities, but form part of two groups with religious and racial affinities all over the world. Any trouble in Palestine, therefore, at once takes on international dimensions. It affects 15,000,000 Jews dispersed throughout most countries in the world ; it is a matter of intimate concern to the new Arab States and to Egypt ; it is a vital problem for Great Britain as Mandatory Power and for the whole British Commonwealth with its tradition of friendship to both communities and its Moslem population of 100,000,000. Further, Palestine, under whatever régime it is governed, is as important as Egypt from the point of view of British imperial communications. Strategically, it is the eastern outpost against any potential threat to the Suez Canal ; it is the outlet of the oil pipe line from Mosul ; it is a halting place on the international air route to India and beyond, and it is a starting point for the desert motor road to Asia.

The fact that the recent disorders coincided with a period of tension in the Mediterranean has led rather too freely to the assumption that they were engineered from outside Palestine. Now that the trouble has abated, it is possible to gain a perspective and to see that the root cause is to be found in Palestine itself, and that any intervention from abroad was mere fishing in troubled waters.

For though the strike is over, the problem persists ; moreover, it is something more fundamental than the mere fulfilment of British promises made during the world war or under the terms of the Mandate. It has become the psychological problem of how to reconcile two powerful movements—the time-old yearning of the Jews to return to the Promised Land and to possess a home which is theirs as of right, and the Palestinian Arab desire for promotion to national status. This last has received impetus from the emancipation of Iraq and, more lately, from the Anglo-Egyptian and Franco-Syrian treaties. The Arabs do not demand Jewish withdrawal ; their aim is a stoppage of further immigration in order to dispel their growing fear that the Arab population of Palestine is about to be overwhelmed by sheer force of numbers and by the superior wealth, organisation and economic power of the newcomers. This fear can without exaggeration be regarded as the primary cause of the recent six months' strike of almost the entire Palestinian Arab nation.

II. THE WAR-TIME PROMISES TO JEWS AND ARABS

The Arab fear of Jewish predominance which was so evident during the recent disturbances is not a new development ; it is an intensification of unrest and resentment which have simmered for years, and which date back to undertakings given by the Allies during the world war.

*The Pre-war
Situation*

Jewish colonisation was known to the Palestinian Arabs long before the war. The Holy Places have always held their special significance for many creeds. Zionism is as old as the Captivity, and even before the foundation of the Zionist Organisation in 1897¹ Jewish agricultural colonies were being planted in different parts of the country. The first estate, near Jaffa, was bought as early as 1855 by Sir Moses Montefiore ; and from then until the end of the century colonisation " was carried on by young Jews from Russia and Rumania, enthusiastic Zionists who came to Palestine without sufficient means or knowledge, but found a patron in Baron Edmond de Rothschild," who helped them with money and expert guidance and gave their work a definite direction.² After 1900 the administration was entrusted by Baron Edmond to the Jewish Colonisation Association³, and independent settlement was conducted by the Zionist Organisation. These agricultural settlements, which were self-governing, accounted for some 12,000 of the 85-90,000 Jews in Palestine in 1914 ; a full half of these lived in Jerusalem for religious reasons, next in importance being the communities in the " holy cities " of Safed, Tiberias and Hebron.⁴

There are two fundamental differences between the pre-war and the post-war situation. The first is that the pre-war settlement of Jews in Palestine was dictated by religious motives, whereas post-war Zionist immigration is essentially a political movement. The second is that the war awakened a spirit of nationalism throughout the Near East, and that the post-war Arab population is fired with sentiments to which the pre-war generation did not aspire.

(1) See below, p. 24.

(2) For further details of the types of colonisation practised, see Ruppin, *The Jews in the Modern World*, pp. 173-77, from which the passage is quoted.

(3) This Association, usually known as the I.C.A., was founded in 1881 by Baron Maurice Hirsch for the purpose of settling Jews in agriculture all over the world.

(4) Revusky, *The Jews in Palestine*, pp. 19-20. The number is approximate; there was no census under Turkish rule; the total population of what is now Palestine was at the time about 650,000.

In 1915 the Allies, bent on harrying the Turks from every possible quarter, held out to the Arabs the hope of becoming an independent nation. Advances were made both by the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force and through the authorities in Egypt,¹ but by 1915 the differences between the various Arab elements in Arabia had rendered the efforts of the former abortive, and the task of securing Arab co-operation was left to the Cairo authorities.²

The question of Arab independence was chiefly discussed in a long-drawn out correspondence in 1915 between Sir Henry McMahon, High Commissioner in Cairo, and Sharif Hussein of Mecca. The British authorities have never published the correspondence, but its gist is widely known; it has been much discussed, and is summarised and even quoted by well-informed authors.³

The area over which independence should function was the Sharif's main concern, and acting on behalf of that nebulous political entity "the Arab people," he made a very comprehensive demand in a letter dated July 14, 1915. The area, he said, should be bounded:

"On the north by Mersina-Adana up to the 37th degree of latitude, on which degree fall Birejik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Amadia, Jezira, as far as the borders of Persia. On the east by the frontiers of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra. On the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the colony of Aden, which is excepted from these boundaries. On the west by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina."

i.e., the whole of the Arabian peninsula (except Aden) and all of what is now Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan and Syria, running up to the borders of Persia on the east and slightly into the present Turkish State on the north.

Sir Henry's reply, dated October 24, 1915, contains the passage which was regarded by the Arabs as their Magna Carta:

"The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries.

(1) For a summary of the negotiations carried on by Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, Sir Henry McMahon, High Commissioner in Cairo, and Sir Reginald Wingate, the Sirdar of the Egyptian Army and Governor-General of the Sudan, see Philby, *Arabia* (Modern World Series), pp. 231-260.

(2) For an interesting account of the energy and imagination which they applied to this task see T. E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*.

(3) e.g. Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference, Vol. VI, p. 14*; Graves, *Land of the Three Faiths*, pp. 50-51; Philby, *Arabia*, pp. 242-3; Loder, *The Truth about Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria*, pp. 19-20; Stoyanovsky, *The Mandate for Palestine*, pp. 5-7.

With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arabs chiefs, we accept those limits and boundaries and, with regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances, and make the following reply to your letter :

Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sharif of Mecca."¹

Since the " boundaries proposed by the Sharif " had mentioned the Mediterranean as the western limit, and since Damascus (which is in Syria) was the southernmost point mentioned in the first paragraph, the Arabs rather understandably took it that Palestine was included in the independence area. The point was made by Hussein's son, the Emir Feisul, to the British authorities in 1921, and though he personally withdrew it in face of their explanations,² the Palestinian Arabs do not accept this view and have since always brought the original argument forward in their petitions and complaints.³

The British Government contended that their intention had from the first been to exclude Palestine from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge ; this was stated by Mr. Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a memorandum on the Palestine Mandate dated June 3, 1922,⁴ and in a letter also written in 1922 Sir Henry McMahon placed on record the fact that he had intended to exclude Palestine.⁵

It should be noted that in 1915, when Sir Henry was in correspondence with the Sharif, there was as yet no question of a promise to the Jewish people. Nevertheless the Allies were alive to the importance of the Holy Places—the question is raised in many of the secret treaties between them—and it is regrettable that the British negotiators did not from the start make the point clear to the Arabs.

The Secret Treaties

The two first of these secret agreements—in March 1915, between Britain, France and Russia, and in April 1915, between

(1) Text as quoted by Graves, *Land of the Three Faiths*, p. 51.
(2) For an account of the interview, see *Hansard*, July 11, 1922, col. 1033.
(3) Notably in 1922 and 1930. See Appendix II, p. 111, and *Statement by the Palestine Arab Delegation*, London, May, 1930.
(4) *British White Paper*, Cmd. 1700. For text see Appendix II.
(5) Graves, *Land of the Three Faiths*, p. 53.

the three Allies and Italy¹—did not specifically mention Palestine ; they merely referred to future definition of the “ rights ” or “ spheres of influence ” to be allocated during any subsequent negotiations over the Asiatic territories of the Ottoman Empire.

The task of definition was delicate. The British Government had to inform its French allies of its undertakings to the Sharif, and to obtain their support for its action. “ At this time the clash of interests between France and the Arabs and, therefore, between France and Britain, threatened to become acute ”;² hence the secret negotiations towards the end of 1915 between Sir Mark Sykes and M. Georges Picot which culminated in the agreement of May 1916 which is usually known by their names.

The Sykes-Picot agreement provided for the division of the land bridge between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf into five distinct regions. Part of the area was to be under British control, part under French, part to be a British sphere of influence, part a French sphere of influence.³ Palestine was to fall into neither of these categories ; the agreement stated that

“ With a view to securing the religious interests of the Entente Powers, Palestine, with the Holy Places, is separated from Turkish territory and subjected to a special régime to be determined by agreement between Russia, France and Great Britain.”

Secrecy was regarded as the essence of this agreement, which was communicated neither to the Sharif nor to the Italians. It did not become known to these until the Bolsheviks, in November 1917, published⁴ a secret memorandum dated March 6, 1917, and covering the negotiations which had taken place “ in London and Petrograd ” in the spring of the preceding year.

The Balfour Declaration

The claims of a world-wide movement such as Zionism meant that the Sykes-Picot ruling could not be regarded as the final word on the subject of the future of Palestine.

(1) The texts of all these treaties were found by the Bolsheviks in the secret archives of the Russian Foreign Office and published by them in the Russian press. The collected texts in English, in the form of translations from the Russian press, are to be found in F. S. Cocks's *The Secret Treaties and Understandings* (Union of Democratic Control, 1918). For later publication of official texts see *inter alia* A. Giannini, *Documenti per la Storia della Pace Orientale*, Rome, 1933 ; for the Secret Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, *British White Paper*, Cmd. 671, published in 1920.

(2) Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference*, Vol. III, p. 15.

(3) For an excellent map, see Bowman, *The New World*, p. 102. (1922 edition).

(4) In *Isvestia*, November 24, 1917 ; reprinted in the *Manchester Guardian*, January 19, 1918, and in Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference*, Vol. VI, p. 16. The contents of the agreement were revealed to the Sharif by the Turks ; Italy, who was apparently acquainted with its terms by the beginning of 1917, was compensated by the St. Jean de Maurienne agreement of April 17, 1917, which later proved abortive.

Attempts to provide a home for the Jewish people had already been made by the British Government; in 1903—when it was seemingly impossible to obtain from the Sultan of Turkey a concession which would enable the Jews to return to the Promised Land—it had offered them territory in Uganda. But Palestine—the historic Jewish Land—was the only place which could fulfil Jewish desires, and the 1905 Zionist Congress rejected the offer.¹

The Zionist cause was not furthered by the Allies in the early years of the war for the obvious reason that Russia was one of their number, and Zionism was not viewed with favour by the Imperial Russian Government.

But in February 1917, the Russian revolution had begun. During that month Sir Mark Sykes entered into close relations with Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a leading Jewish intellectual, who was Reader in Chemistry at Manchester University, but had been seconded to the Admiralty for special purposes.² As early as 1906 Dr. Weizmann had interested Mr. Balfour in the possibility of a Jewish national home in Palestine, and these two men were the leading figures in the negotiations between the Zionist Organisation and the British Government which were carried on throughout the summer of 1917. These, which had the full approval of the United States Government,³ culminated on November 2, 1917 in the so-called Balfour Declaration, which was in point of fact a letter written by Mr. Balfour to Lord Rothschild which contained the following statement:

“His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish Communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country.”

The French Government expressed its approval of the scheme on February 14, 1918⁴; the Italian Government also approved it, and the sentiment which prompted it received the warm support of public opinion in the United States.

The suggestion is often heard that the declaration was made to induce the rich American Jews to use their influence to make the United States Government enter the war. Dr. Weizmann denies this, ascribing the promise to “recognition of the yearning of an old race” and to motives of redress for the position of Jews

(1) See Melchett, *Thy Neighbour*, pp. 112-116.

(2) He had, while there, invented an important process yielding the acetone required for manufacturing cordite. See Melchett, *Thy Neighbour*, pp. 120-122.

(3) See Stein, *Zionism*, pp. 90-91.

(4) Hunter Miller, *Diary at the Conference of Paris*, Vol. V, p. 20.

in the world. He also disclaims the suggestion that the British made the offer for imperialist reasons, pointing out that "when the British Government agreed to issue the famous Balfour Declaration, it agreed on one condition: that Palestine should not be the charge of Great Britain."¹

Undoubtedly altruistic motives, stimulated by deep feelings on the subject of the Holy Land, contributed to the British Government's decision, for they inspired the enthusiasm and energy of men like Lord Balfour.² But at a time when victory at all costs was a paramount consideration it is hardly likely that the War Cabinet would have taken the decision from wholly disinterested motives. "It was important for us to seek every legitimate help we could get. We came to the conclusion from information we received from every part of the world³ that it was vital we should have the sympathies of the Jewish community."⁴

The value of the Declaration as a war measure is obvious if one studies the concern it caused among the enemy Powers, Germany and Turkey, the former being affected not only because of the large Jewish population within the Reich but also because of the high percentage of Jews in the parts of Eastern Europe—Ukraine, Poland and Rumania—occupied by German troops.

Rival offers were therefore contemplated. On December 31, 1917, Talaat Pasha told a correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung* that he was prepared to offer German Zionists some form of chartered company with local self-government of a limited character and rights of immigration into Palestine; the resultant negotiations in Berlin yielded a new combination of Jewish societies called *Vereinigung Judischer Organisationen Deutschlands zur Wahrung der Rechte des Ostens*, the German Government finally securing the concessions in Constantinople in July 1918. But by this time Palestine was in the hands of the Allies, and a Zionist commission which had begun work in March was, thanks to the tact of Dr. Weizmann, already on good terms with the Arab leaders.⁵

(1) "Palestine To-day," *International Affairs*, September-October, 1936, p. 673.

(2) For an account of the role he played, see Blanche E. C. Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour*, Vol. II, Chapter XI; for his personal feelings on the subject, see in particular a speech quoted on p. 217.

(3) For proof that the Allies were exercised as to the attitude of the Jews of the United States, see the reports of the British Ambassador, *Letters and Friendships of Cecil Spring Rice*, Vol. II, pp. 420-422.

(4) Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons. *Hansard*, June 19, 1936, Col. 1343.

(5) The first meeting between Dr. Weizmann and the Emir Feisul took place at the latter's camp at Gueira, between Aquaba and Maan, at the beginning of June, 1918.

Meanwhile Arab hopes were raised by a joint Anglo-French declaration of November 7, 1918, which defined the war aims of the Allies in the East and promised "administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations, in Syria and Mesopotamia."¹ This was felt among Arabs to supersede or at least to qualify the Sykes-Picot agreement.

It is often pointed out that this declaration omits Palestine; to this the reply of the Palestinian Arabs is that they did not take it as such, the main reason which they give for their interpretation being that they did not use the name Palestine, and knew the whole region as Syria, and that the declaration was distributed throughout the whole of Greater Syria, (*i.e.* including what is now Palestine) and Mesopotamia.

The
compatibility
of the
promises

There seem to have been high hopes at the Peace Conference that the promises to Jews and Arabs could be implemented simultaneously. The Jews were fully prepared that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."² The Arabs, represented by the Sharif's son, the Emir Feisul, and by Colonel T. E. Lawrence, were equally conciliatory.

"In Palestine the enormous majority of the people are Arabs. The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood, and there is no conflict of character between the two races. In principles we are absolutely at one. Nevertheless, the Arabs cannot risk assuming the responsibility of holding level the scales in the clash of races and religions that have, in this one province, so often involved the world in difficulties. They would wish for the effective super-position of a great trustee, so long as a representative local administration commended itself by actively promoting the material prosperity of the country."³

According to Dr. Hunter Miller's notes, Feisul also stated, at the meeting of the Supreme Council to which he presented the Arab demands for fulfilment of the promises of the Allies, that "Palestine, for its universal character, should be left on one side for the mutual consideration of all parties interested. With this exception he asked for the independence of the Arabic areas enumerated in his memorandum."⁴

An incident of January 1919 illustrates the cordiality and optimism prevalent on all sides.⁵ Feisul, then in London with

(1) For text of main passages, see Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference*, Vol. VI, p. 141.

(2) "Statement of the Zionist Organisation regarding Palestine," Hunter Miller, *Diary at the Conference of Paris*, Vol. V, p. 15.

(3) "Memorandum by the Emir Feisul," Hunter Miller, *op. cit.* Vol. IV, p. 297.

(4) Hunter Miller, *op. cit.* Vol. XIV, p. 230.

(5) Described by Dr. Weizmann in *The Times*, June 10, 1936.

Lawrence, met Dr. Weizmann, of the Zionist Organisation. They had met several times in the previous six months, but this time committed to paper an agreement¹ promising "the most cordial goodwill and understanding." Both were convinced that this was possible, for Article IV read :

"All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants on the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking such measures the Arab peasant and tenant farmers shall be protected in their rights, and shall be assisted in forwarding their economic development."

Looking back upon this incident, it seems unfortunate that neither party represented a body sovereign in Palestine. Feisul, as the son of the Sharif, doubtless felt entitled at the time to speak for the Arab peoples of Asia. But as their lands were subsequently divided he came, in spite of his and Lawrence's hopes, to represent Iraq only. It would seem from the wording of a reservation to the agreement that he and Lawrence foresaw this possibility ; it runs :

"If the Arabs are established as I have asked in my manifesto of January 4 addressed to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I will carry out what is written in this agreement. If changes are made, I cannot be answerable for failing to carry out this agreement ;
(Signed) Feisul ibn Hussein."

As things turned out, Feisul could not be "answerable" ; his agreement with Dr. Weizmann therefore becomes a personal document of purely historic interest.

*The
allocation of
the Mandate*

Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations established the mandates system, the guiding principle of which is that "the well-being and development" of the inhabitants of certain enemy colonies and territories shall be a "sacred trust for civilisation" under the tutelage of a mandatory on behalf of the League.

The reception of this arrangement by the Jews and Arabs is interesting. Feisul's willingness to accept "the effective superposition of a great trustee" was doubtless due to the influence of Lawrence, who held this view. Not all Arabs thought likewise, and President Wilson, realising this, attempted to fulfil the clause in the Covenant which lays down that "the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory" by securing the appointment of an Allied commission to ascertain their wishes. When the British and French failed to fall in with his plan, he sent a private American commission—under H. C. King and C. R. Crane—

(1) The text was quoted at length in *The Times* of June 10, 1936.

which received petitions and interviewed delegations all over Palestine and Syria in June-July 1919.¹

The chief points in the report affecting Palestine were (i) "Strong sentiment favourable to complete independence for a united Syria (including Palestine) but if supervision was necessary, the United States was preferred, then Great Britain . . . (ii) Strong opposition to the Zionist proposal was also indicated."² But the King-Crane report was not published until 1922 and was in any case unofficial, so Feisul's was the last word for the Arabs.

The Zionist Organisation was more specific :

"We ask that Great Britain shall act as Mandatory of the League of Nations for Palestine. The selection of Great Britain as Mandatory is urged on the ground that this is the wish of the Jews of the world, and the League of Nations in selecting a Mandatory will follow, as far as possible, the popular wish of the people concerned."³

The allocation of the mandate was for several reasons a slow process. In the first place it hung upon Anglo-French agreement as to the validity of the Sykes-Picot arrangements for the whole of the ex-Turkish territories, and this was held up by discord over Syria and Mosul, involving discussions *très vives de ton*⁴ between Clémenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. As a result of the compromise Palestine, which had under the Sykes-Picot plan been destined for international administration, in the end passed by mutual consent into British tutelage. The next delay was caused by the United States, which through "participation in the victory" asserted its right to an equal voice in deciding the mandates over Turkish territory,⁵ but at the same time was not participating in the League meetings upon the subject. Finally, Italy objected to the confirmation of the Palestine and Syrian Mandates until title was cleared through ratification of the peace treaty with Turkey.

These obstacles account for the late date of the completion of the Palestine negotiations. The Supreme Council, sitting at San Remo, allocated the Mandate to Great Britain on April 25, 1920, adding a rider to the effect that the Mandatory Power should be responsible for giving effect to the Balfour Declaration.

(1) For details see Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, Vol. II, pp. 205-222, and also "the important minutes of March 29, 1919, in which the whole noisome business of the partition of Turkey was poured out in a secret session of the Heads of States," Vol. III, pp. 1-19.

(2) Quincy Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations*, p. 45.

(3) Hunter Miller, *op. cit.* Vol. V, p. 21.

(4) The description is Monsieur Tardieu's; see *L'Illustration*, June 19, 1920.

(5) Note from Secretary Hughes to the Allied Powers, August, 1921, quoted in Quincy Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations*, p. 54. This book deals fully (pp. 48-56) with the whole incident of American delay.

The terms of the Mandate were the next problem ; the long discussion involved included a bitter controversy as to the composition and functions of the International Commission to which it was proposed to refer certain questions relating to the Holy Places, and the draft suggested called forth criticisms from the Papacy and from various Moslem organisations for being too pro-Jewish, from Jewish organisations as imposing too rigid a limit on Jewish privileges, and from the British House of Lords as being contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants of Palestine.

The final draft was tentatively confirmed by the League Council on July 22, 1922. But it was felt undesirable to promulgate it in advance of the French Mandate for Syria, and since this was held up pending the composing of certain Franco-Italian differences, the final entry into force of the two Mandates did not take place until September 29, 1923.

The provisions of the Mandate

The terms of the Mandate¹ endeavoured to fulfil the promises made :

Article 2.—The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

The Balfour Declaration to the Jews was further implemented by the promise of a recognised Jewish Agency to advise the Administration on the establishment of the national home, and by undertakings to facilitate immigration and encourage close settlement of Jews on the land, subject to the rights and position of other sections of the population. The Mandatory also promised the encouragement of local autonomy and undertook all responsibility with respect to rights and access to the Holy Places.

The only complication arising out of the wartime promises and the Mandate seemed to be the fact that the Mandatory differed from the Palestinian Arabs as to the meaning of the McMahon undertaking, and that many Arabs therefore denied the validity of the Mandate. Apart from this, there appears to have been every hope that the Mandatory would implement its triple promise under the Mandate : namely, to safeguard Arab rights, to provide a national home for the Jews, and to secure for the joint community self-government

(1) For the full text of the Palestine Mandate, see Appendix I.

NOTE ON TRANSJORDAN

Under the terms of Article 25 of the Mandate,¹ Transjordan was included in the Mandated Territory of Palestine, but by virtue of a saving clause in the article the Mandatory was empowered to withhold application of any clauses of the Mandate which he might consider to be inapplicable to Transjordan, and to provide it with such administration as he might think fit.

In the British view, Transjordan did (whereas Palestine did not) fall within the area in which the McMahon promise of independence applied, and in September 1922 the British Government therefore secured the League Council's approval of a memorandum² proposing that Transjordan should be exempted from all those clauses dealing with the Holy Places and the Jewish national home. On the strength of this, Jews have been refused the right to acquire land in Transjordan, a step which they resent as being an infraction of the article of the joint Mandate which provides against discrimination on grounds of race, religion or language.³

Transjordan is therefore somewhat detached from the problems with which this memorandum deals, and apart from the brief outline of its subsequent history given below, is not further dealt with.

There had been no British occupation of Transjordan after the Armistice, and no supervision except in so far as local chiefs were loosely guided by a handful of British political officers. The first step towards fulfilment of the independence promise was taken in February 1921, when the British authorities in Jerusalem negotiated an agreement under which the Emir Abdullah—son of the Sharif and elder brother to the Emir Feisul—was recognised as "administrator" under the Mandate. This arrangement was confirmed by a Conference which met in Cairo under Mr. Winston Churchill, and, in 1922, by the British Cabinet. It was followed in 1923 by the recognition of an "independent Government" under British tutelage, as in Iraq.⁴ In 1928 the British Government signed with the Emir Abdullah a treaty⁵ laying down the principle of indirect administration :

Article 2.—"The powers of legislation and of administration entrusted to His Britannic Majesty as Mandatory for Palestine shall be exercised in that part of the area under Mandate known as Trans-Jordan by His Highness the Emir through such constitutional government as is defined

- (1) See Appendix I.
- (2) See *British White Paper*, Cmd. 1785.
- (3) See Weizmann, "The Palestine White Paper," *Week End Review*, November 1, 1930. Article 15 is the article in question.
- (4) See Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, Vol. I, p. 362.
- (5) *British White Paper*, Cmd. 3069.

and determined in the Organic Law of Trans-Jordan and any amendment thereof made with the approval of His Britannic Majesty."

In matters such as foreign relations, financial and fiscal policy, jurisdiction over foreigners and freedom of conscience, the Emir agreed to be guided by British advice. This advice is exercised through the representative of the Mandatory in Transjordan—the British Resident appointed under Article 1 of the 1928 Treaty, who acts under the direction of the High Commissioner for Transjordan (who is also High Commissioner for Palestine.¹) The 1928 Treaty was, in June 1934, supplemented by an agreement² which enabled the Emir to appoint consular representatives in neighbouring Arab States.

(1) The Annual Reports of the Mandatory for Transjordan to the Council of the League of Nations are bound in with the reports for Palestine, in which they form a separate section. For collected information, see Luke and Keith Roach, *Handbook of Palestine and Transjordan*, Third edition, 1934.

(2) *British White Paper*, Cmd. 4999.

III. THE CONTRASTING COMMUNITIES

A pitfall to be avoided when weighing up the issues in Palestine is the assumption that each community is an unmixed entity. Actually the social, political or economic differences within both sections of the population often account for the development of events ; so, sometimes, do their religious or political connections with communities outside Palestine. It is therefore worth while to describe the two communities before embarking on the history of Palestine under the Mandate, in spite of the drawback that to do so breaks the sequence of the chronological story.

I. POLITICAL CONTRASTS.

(a) THE ORGANISATION OF THE JEWS.

The bulk of the Jews in Palestine belong to or are in agreement with the Zionist Organisation—the world-wide body whose membership is open to all who advocate the creation of a Jewish Home in Palestine secured by public law.

General and
Orthodox
Zionists

An influential group in Palestine is that formed by the General and Orthodox (*Mizrachi*) Zionist Parties, which account for perhaps 40 per cent. of the community and which consist mainly of middle-class settlers, of intellectuals and of the professional classes. Of the Jewish parties, they are two of the readiest to co-operate with the British Government, but towards the Arabs their policy is as a whole uncompromising.

The Labour
Party

At present the largest group supporting the Zionist Organisation is the Labour Party—colloquially known as the Poalim—which now comprises at least 50 per cent. of the total Jewish population¹. Its activities are in great part directed by the *Histadruth*, or Jewish Federation of Labour, whose membership of 54,429 in 1934 comprised at least 80 per cent. of the Jewish workers of Palestine, and included farmers and members of the professional classes as well as labourers and industrial workers. The *Histadruth* is far more than a trade union ; besides managing co-operative societies and organising labour banks and credit unions it also acts as a colonising agency, and helps to train young settlers ; it also at times acts as a contracting undertaking.

As originally conceived, the *Histadruth's* policy departed on two points from that of the General Zionists. In the first place, its aim was a civilised labour policy, that is, the combination of social reform with any settlement scheme :

(1) The party is growing in influence not only in Palestine but throughout the world. At the Eighteenth Zionist Congress in 1933 Labour had for the first time more delegates than any other party.

“ The *Histadruth* considers it its duty to create a new type of Jewish worker and to see to it that, while colonisation is developing, the Jewish worker, who came into being as a result of this very colonisation process, shall be assured the place which is his due.”¹

In the second place, it stood for a policy of comparative moderation towards the Arabs ; its leaders at one time tried to organise trade unions among them, partly in the hope of raising the Arab standard of living and thereby removing the threat to Jewish labour.² But events in 1935-6 show that this second characteristic has disappeared. Indeed, in contrast to it, the Labour Leader, Mr. Ben Gurion, in 1934 entered into negotiations with the extreme Right Wing (the Revisionists whose policy is described below) and reached a provisional accord. In March 1935 the *Histadruth*—in a referendum—turned down the project, but “ nevertheless, differences between the Revisionists and the *Histadruth* have been much less marked during 1935.”³

Apart from the Zionists there are only two groups of any importance. The first are the Right Wing Revisionists under the leadership of Vladimir Jabotinsky, who have since 1935 withdrawn from the Zionist Organisation. The size and influence of this party has tended to vary in inverse proportion to the rate of immigration ; at present they claim to constitute about 17 per cent. of the Jews in Palestine. They also hold (and probably with truth, in view of the rapprochement with Labour described above) that their ideas are shared by many who are not in their organisation. The Revisionists fiercely and constantly attack any policy of moderation ; they hold that the promise embodied in the Balfour Declaration is one of a Jewish state, and aim at setting this up as speedily as possible in both Palestine and Transjordan. Their proclaimed objective is the production of a Jewish majority in Palestine and they therefore look upon immigration as transcending all other issues ; only when the Jews are in a majority is Palestine to receive self-government, “ so that under a democratic rule the Jewish point of view shall always prevail.”⁴ The claims of the Revisionists have undoubtedly aggravated Arab fears.⁵

(1) Revusky, *The Jews in Palestine*, p. 237. The quotation is from the programme adopted at the first *Histadruth* Convention in November, 1920.

(2) Revusky, *op cit.* pp. 239-40.

(3) *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1935*, p. 18.

(4) Statement by Mr. Jabotinsky, quoted in Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1930, p. 265.

(5) This is hardly to be wondered at when one reads the extravagances of Revisionist extremists, which the Zionist Organisation is the first to deplore ; for instance, the Arab paper *Palestine and Transjordan* recently quoted the following statement as coming from a Revisionist leader : “ Our Zionist imperialism will flourish under the protection and support of any Power on condition that that Power will show no mercy to the Arab population and uses an iron fist under which the Arabs shall not be allowed to move.” This instance is quoted by Sir Ernest Bennett in the *Nineteenth Century*, September, 1936, p. 335.

Non-Zionist
Jews

The second group outside the Zionist Organisation is the *Agudath Israel*, comprising the strictly religious and wholly non-political Jews opposed to Zionism. These now represent at the most 5 per cent. of the total Jewish population and are in part the remnants or offspring of the 55,000 Jewish inhabitants of Palestine at the time of the Armistice, many of whom were non-Zionist. They have so far remained outside the jurisdiction of the General Council of the Jews of Palestine,¹ and at their own request do not form part of the community as recognised under the Ordinance of 1927. Indeed, they have at times felt so strongly about Zionism that they have appealed unsuccessfully to the Mandatory and to the League for official recognition as a separate community.² Their appeal failed, and their relations with the newcomers for years remained very bitter. But there seem to be some signs that this separation is breaking down; negotiations for the inclusion of the *Agudath Israel* within the recognised Jewish community took place in 1934-5 and the Administration has since reported that "the differences between the two bodies have been notably less acute . . . Political and economic unity may without much difficulty be achieved between them."³

The World
Zionist
Organisation

Since at least 80 per cent., if not more, of the Palestinian Jews endorse the policy of the Zionist Organisation, no description of the Jewish community there is complete without some indication of the views held by this important world-wide body.⁴

The ideal of a return to the Promised Land has long been cherished by Jews:

"The Jews have always hoped—it was an article of faith for religious and even for non-religious Jews—that a day might come when they would be allowed to return to the land of their ancestors. They have never given up this claim. They prayed for it. They fasted for it. And events have proved that it was not merely a romantic attachment on the part of a dispossessed people to a country of which they were deprived two thousand years ago."⁵

But the Zionist Organisation proper was not founded until 1897, when the founder, Herzl, was stimulated to the idea of an organised movement for a Jewish home by the anti-Jewish outbreaks which occurred at the time of the Dreyfus case. His

(1) See below, p. 27.

(2) Petition from the Council of the Ashkenazic Jewish Community of Jerusalem, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the 7th Session*, pp. 181-3.

(3) *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1935*, p. 18.

(4) For a short account of the movement and its relation to the Palestine situation, see Israel Cohen, *The Progress of Zionism*, Third edition, 1936. For a popular history, see Leonard Stein, *Zionism*, 1932. See also Lord Melchett, *Thy Neighbour*, 1936.

(5) Weizmann, "Palestine To-day" *International Affairs*, September-October, 1936, p. 671.

conception found its strongest support where persecution was severest, that is to say in Eastern Europe,¹ but the more moderate practical Zionism prevalent elsewhere has always dominated the movement.

At the time of the allocation of the Mandate in 1922, the General Zionist Party—a moderate centre group under Dr. Chaim Weizmann—was in control, claiming no less than 306 out of a total of 445 delegates at the Twelfth Zionist Congress of 1921.

But since that date the moderates have not always held the field. Briefly, the history of support for Dr. Weizmann is as follows: from 1921 onwards he lost some supporters to both Right and Left, but his personal prestige continued to stand high for he was known to command the confidence of the middle class Jews, on whose generosity the colonisation of Palestine depended. But he lost authority in 1930 when the publication of a British White Paper² on policy in Palestine convinced many Jews that moderation did not pay, and that the Revisionists had been right after all. The disappointment of the Jewish people as a whole was reflected in Dr. Weizmann's temporary eclipse, his place as head of the Organisation being taken by his friend Dr. Sokolov.

The failure of the Revisionists, both in and outside Palestine, to retain the support they had won as a result of the 1930 White Paper can be accounted for in part by the prosperous and comparatively peaceful condition of Palestine between 1930 and 1935, and in part by the growth of the Zionist Labour movement during that period. The Revisionist movement also undoubtedly lost sympathy when, in 1933, Dr. Arlosoroff, a Labour member of the Zionist Executive, was murdered at Tel-Aviv. Although the three Revisionists who were put on trial were all acquitted, many Jews continued to believe that it was the Revisionists who were responsible for the murder. Relations between the Revisionists and the other Zionist parties became more strained during 1934, and finally in 1935 the former withdrew from the Zionist Organisation altogether. Their recent rapprochement with Labour has already been described.

At the nineteenth Zionist Congress in September 1935, Dr. Weizmann was reinstated as President of the World Organisation.

Under Article IV of the Mandate "an appropriate Jewish Agency" was to advise and co-operate with the Administration on the establishment of the National Home, and from 1922 until

*The Jewish
Agency for
Palestine*

(1) For the effect of this upon immigration into Palestine, see below pp. 65-67.
(2) See below, pp. 54-6.

1929 the Zionist Organisation acted as such. But the same Article IV also provided that steps should be taken to secure the co-operation of *all* Jews who were willing to assist in the establishment of the National Home, and Zionism did not represent the whole of Jewry—particularly not the Jews of Western Europe and America who, being assimilated to the countries of their adoption, were mainly non-Zionist.

Negotiations towards the creation of an enlarged Jewish Agency proceeded from 1924 onwards,¹ and in 1927 the President of the Zionist Organisation visited the United States, where he reached agreement with the head of the non-Zionist American Jews. After consultation with the Mandatory Power, the two branches of Jewry set up a Joint Palestine Survey Commission to report on the conditions in Palestine, and to draw up a programme of development. Finally, in 1929, after the report of the Commission had been examined, the new Agency came formally into being. It consists of a Council on which Zionists and non-Zionists are equally represented, and of a standing executive in Palestine. The President of the Zionist Organisation is *ex officio* President of the Jewish Agency.²

Although it was satisfactory both to the Mandatory and to the Jewish people that there should now be a Jewish Agency which represented the whole of Jewry excepting a few extremist groups, this did not mean that there was any great practical change. Non-Zionist Jews had contributed large sums to the development of Palestine long before 1929. Indeed, it is estimated that from 1921 to 1932, 50 per cent. of the receipts of the Palestine Foundation Fund were contributed by American Jews. Nor has the presence of the non-Zionists on the Council appeared to exercise much influence on the policy of the Agency. This has been mainly determined, as it was before 1929, by the various parties of the Zionist Organisation.

*The Work of
the Agency*

The powers of the Jewish Agency are considerable. Not only does it carry on all negotiations with the Palestine Government on matters which concern the Jewish community ; it also controls to a very large degree the work of colonisation and settlement. Its officials estimate the demand for labour which forms the basis of the Government's labour immigration schedules. It trains and selects the immigrants admitted under the schedule ; it governs the policy of the two most important Jewish colonisation funds, the Jewish National Fund for buying land, and the

(1) See Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, Vol. I, p. 385.

(2) For full details see Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1930, pp. 245-251.

Palestine Foundation Fund (*Keren Hayesod*) for the establishment of settlers.¹ The Jewish Agency and its branch organisations have founded schools, hospitals and agricultural and medical research stations, and in this way have maintained a far higher standard of living for the Jewish community in Palestine than would otherwise have been possible. This policy has been criticised by the Revisionists, who consider that it is the Government who should provide these services, and that the whole funds of the Jewish Agency should be devoted to immigration and colonisation. The falling off of subscriptions to the *Keren Hayesod* in the slump years, and the consequent embarrassment of the Jewish Agency in carrying out the work it had begun, lent point to the Revisionist argument, but since 1934 these subscriptions have revived and have consistently proved greater than was estimated.

Some of the social services established by the Jewish Agency are now run by the Palestinian Jews themselves; for example, the education service which was transferred from the control of the Jewish Agency in 1933. The Jewish community in Palestine has its own assembly of representatives elected on a wide franchise and which appoints yearly the Jewish General Council (*Vaad Leumi*). In 1927 these organisations were officially recognised² and the Jewish community was granted a certain measure of self-government, including the right to levy taxes for education and other communal purposes through the *Vaad Leumi*.

(b) THE ORGANISATION OF THE ARABS.

As opposed to the orderly picture afforded by the Jewish political organisation, the Arab community presents a shifting scene. It has for various reasons always been far less developed intellectually and therefore politically. A great change has taken place in the last two years, and is still in process, but clear cut political divisions and doctrines have yet to be evolved.

*The Rise of
Nationalism*

But though the radical change is only now taking place, the impact of Western civilisation—which began long before the war, but was increasingly felt under the Mandatory régime—from the start influenced Arab political and religious life, for it awoke the social force “ which convulsed and devastated the Ottoman Empire in its latter days . . . — the Western conception and

(1) The total amount spent in Palestine out of these two funds between 1917 and June 1936 was £9,409,000, of which £6,214,000 came from the *Keren Hayesod*. The total expenditure of funds from Jewish sources by the principal Zionist institutions over the same period, was £14,037,000; this figure does not, however, represent total Jewish expenditure in Palestine, since it is exclusive of certain non-Zionist funds, notably the P.I.C.A.

(2) Jewish Community Regulations, 1927.

consciousness of nationality."¹ The importance of this profound and widespread movement in the countries of the Near East—not only in the Mandated Territories but in Egypt and the autonomous States of the Arabian peninsula—has been described by Hans Kohn in his *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East*.

*Effect upon
Religion*

In Palestine, as elsewhere, the rise of the spirit of nationalism vitally affected the status of religion. Religious feeling was not necessarily weakened, but it was altered and no longer remained supreme. The deep division between Christian and Moslem Arabs which existed under Turkish rule in Palestine disappeared, and Christian and Moslem began to work together, sharing the same aims of independence and unity. "To-day the Mohammedan is primarily a member of his nation or a citizen of his State, and only afterwards a Mohammedan."² Religion, however, has at times been a useful rallying cry.

*Upon
Politics*

But in spite of this trend, the Arab leaders in Palestine did not succeed, or had not until recently succeeded, in creating such a solid nationalist movement as has existed in Egypt. Although religious barriers had broken down, the old feuds between the leading families of the Arab aristocracy still persisted; they were often waged so bitterly as to transcend all other political issues. For instance, during the period when representatives of the two leading families—the Husseini and the Nashashibi—were Mufti and Mayor of Jerusalem respectively, family considerations often took precedence of national interests.

This dominance does not mean that the rank and file take no interest in politics; on the contrary:

"No less than fourteen Arabic newspapers are published in Palestine, and in almost every village there is someone who reads from the papers to gatherings of those villagers who are illiterate. The Arab fellahin and villagers are therefore probably more politically-minded than many of the people in Europe."³

It is therefore perhaps surprising that the national movement in Palestine was not translated at all quickly into a political party form.

"It was only at times of the most violent disturbance, when the nationalist movements concentrated in armed revolts, that a powerful united front was created and the agitation penetrated far into the masses, and long continued to operate. But the lack of strong organisation

(1) Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1930, p. 252.

(2) Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East*, p. 24; c.f. the analogous movement in Turkey which culminated in the Bill of April 9, 1928, which brought about the final disestablishment of Islam as the State religion.

(3) Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929, *British White Paper*, Cmd. 3530, p. 129.

and persistent efforts in the pursuit of an aim—weaknesses still characteristic of the country's Oriental mediaeval phase of development and only slowly to be overcome—made themselves felt again and again."¹

*The Arab
Parties*

This was written of the riots of 1929; it is less true of the 1936 disturbances. For already in 1935 one of the pointers to growing Arab uneasiness was the tendency of the Arab political organisations to crystallise into regularly constituted parties. The consolidation of six of these was reported to the Permanent Mandates Commission by the Mandatory Power.² By the autumn of 1935 these had in a quite unprecedented way sunk their differences in the interests of nationalism, and five of them³ had approached the High Commissioner with certain national demands.

This crystallisation continued under stress of the happenings of 1936, but as the scene is still changing it is difficult to describe the process.

At the end of April 1936 the party leaders combined to form an Arab Higher Committee which, throughout the disturbances, conducted negotiations on behalf of the whole population. The Arab Higher Committee would appear to have been in closer touch with the rank and file than any previous Arab body, contact being maintained by means of a new organisation in the form of local Arab national committees. These, which constituted cells of the national movement, attended to strike action and relief⁴ with a competence which convinced some observers that the handiwork of a new type of young and educated Arab was discernible. By September 1936 the organisation was sufficiently formed to allow of the calling of a Congress of Local Committees,⁵ but there is up to the time of writing so little constitutional regularity in these new developments that one

(1) Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East*, p. 115.

(2) The names of the parties and their leaders given in the Mandatory Power's Report for 1935 (pp. 14-15) are:

(a) The Palestine Arab Party under the leadership of Jamal eff. Husseini.

(b) The National Defence Party under the leadership of Ragheb Bey Nashashibi (formerly Mayor of Jerusalem).

(c) The Reform Party, with no president; of which one member of the Committee is Dr. Khalidi (Mayor of Jerusalem).

(d) The National Bloc under the leadership of Abdul Latif Bey Salah of Nablus.

(e) Congress Executive of Nationalist Youth, led by Yakub eff. Ghusein.

(f) The Istiqlal (Independence) Party under the leadership of Auni Bey Abdul Hadi.

(3) The exception is the Istiqlal, which is affiliated to the Pan-Arab Istiqlal (Independence) movement; it had for some time been inactive and disorganised, but towards the end of 1935 the High Commissioner reported that it became more active, associating with independent extremists in its denunciations of the Administration. For details of the demands of the five parties, see below p. 80.

(4) For a description of their work, see *Daily Telegraph*, September 21, 1936.

(5) For details, see below, pp. 82 and 86-87.

can do no more than point out that they are in process of formation. But if they mean that a young and educated generation is beginning to make its influence felt with the older leaders, the movement is one which may have far-reaching results.

In the light of these new and obviously important happenings the earlier political organisation of the Arabs becomes largely of historic interest.

*Organisation
of the
Community*

The Arab community has never been organised on a basis comparable to that of the Jews. The Mandatory Power is often blamed for this¹, in the Mandates Commission and elsewhere, but it is not altogether for lack of effort on its part that there is no Arab Agency to match the Jewish Agency². The Arabs do not enjoy any equivalent of the Jewish General Council (*Vaad Leumi*).

The body which was until 1936 at the head of the nationalist movement in Palestine, and which has usually handled the Arab case against the Government, was the Arab Executive elected by the Palestine Arab Congress. The first Congress was held in 1920 as a result of the growth of the joint Moslem-Christian associations led by leaders of the Husseini family. Until 1925 the Arab Executive, which denied the validity of the Mandate, pursued a policy of non-co-operation with the Government, but since then the aim has changed. The 7th Arab Congress held in Jerusalem in 1925, at which all the chief Arab political parties were represented, issued a memorandum demanding the establishment of a democratic parliamentary system of government, and they have held to this demand ever since, adding to it, as circumstances came to require, their claim for the cessation of Jewish immigration.

*Religious
Organisation*

The religious organisation of the Arabs also needs a word of mention. Of the 100,000 Christian Arabs the majority are members of the Greek Orthodox Church under the leadership of the Orthodox Patriarch; their only organisation is in their own religious communities. The affairs of the Moslem Community, which numbers 740,000, are governed by the Supreme Moslem Council, which is the outcome of regulations drawn up by an Arab Assembly in 1921 and approved by the High Commissioner. The Council consists of a President, and of four members elected for four years, two of whom represent Jerusalem, the other two Nablus and Acre. But when the term of office of the original members expired in 1925, the results of the fresh

(1) See, e.g. *Minutes of the 29th Session*, pp. 148-9.
(2) See below, p. 42.

elections were annulled by the Government on account of irregularities, and since then there has been a provisional council nominated by the High Commissioner. The fact that the Council is nominated, not elected, and is therefore not composed of "men enjoying the confidence of their own community," has more than once been criticised by the Permanent Mandates Commission,¹ but this does not alter the fact that the Council wields considerable power and influence. This is to some extent due to the permanency of tenure enjoyed by its President, who has since its inception been Haj Amin El-Husseini—the dominant figure who is Mufti of Jerusalem. But the chief power of the Council lies in its control, subject to Government approval, of the Moslem Religious Courts which have sole jurisdiction in matters of personal status of Moslems, and in the valuable patronage which it derives from its powers of administration and control over the Moslem *waqfs* (private or public endowments); tithe from *waqf* lands "forms 55 per cent. of the revenue of the Moslem religious endowments in Palestine, and the *waqf* tithe is approximately 12.75 per cent. of the total tithe revenue of the country. The revenue department collects the *waqf* share of the dedicated tithes, handing over the proceeds, now commuted for £23,000 per annum, to the Supreme Moslem Council."²

2. CONTRASTS IN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE.

(a) THE ARAB COMMUNITY.

Though the impact of the West is now profoundly influencing the Arab political scene, it has so far little affected the social structure of the Arab community; the economic structure it has only affected in parts.

The life led by the community is not unlike that of medieval Europe; it is a feudal organisation consisting of a small number of landowning families and a backward peasantry, partly nomadic (*bedawi*) and partly settled (*hadari*) and chiefly engaged in agriculture. This situation is in the main a legacy of Turkish rule,³ under which the Arab aristocracy, principally on the strength of their long-established local position, were taken into the governing class (the so-called *effendi* class) of the Ottoman Empire.

To-day the Palestinian Arab community is still predominantly agricultural, about 64 per cent. of the total Moslem population

Nature of
Population

(1) See *Minutes of the 29th Session*, p. 148.

(2) Luke and Keith-Roach: *Handbook of Palestine and Transjordan*, Third edition, p. 44.

(3) The Turks won Palestine from the Mamluk dynasty of Egypt in 1516-17. The Arab invasion had taken place in the seventh century.

being dependent on agriculture.¹ The nomadic element survives but is probably dwindling. The Beduin were estimated at 103,331 in the 1922 census, and though this is thought to have been an over-estimate, the number recorded had fallen to 66,553 in 1931.

The backwardness of the agricultural population can be put down to a number of factors, among them the barrenness of much of the country², and the heavy indebtedness of the peasants,³ but up till now one of the fundamental obstacles to agricultural development has been the Arab system of land tenure⁴ and the prevalence of the system known as *Mesha'a*.

Bars to
Development
(1) Land
Tenure

Under *Mesha'a*, which is the Arab equivalent of the Open Field System in feudal England, the whole of the village property is held in common. Each cultivator has a right to a fraction of the whole, but has no separate parcel of land allotted to him permanently. Within each tribal division of the village, the shares are as a rule re-allotted every two years. This is the great evil of the system; for no cultivator is likely to improve land simply for the benefit of his successor. But this situation is improving; in recent years considerable progress has been made with the partitioning of *Mesha'a* land.⁵

(2) Insecurity
of Tenure

Another serious bar to development is insecurity of tenure. Here the lack of detailed statistics (which has been strikingly evident in many departments of Palestinian life until quite recently)⁶ makes it hard to be precise, for the relative proportions of land held by owner-occupiers and by tenants are not known. But it is clear that "very large areas are held by resident and non-resident landlords."⁷ As a rule the Arab holds his land on a yearly tenancy, terminable by the landlord at will. The danger of this situation in view of the large Jewish demand for

(1) 1931 census figure; the (approximate) 90,000 Christian Arabs are predominantly engaged in industry and commerce. See 1931 Census Report, Vol. I, Diagram 44. For further statistics regarding the predominance of agriculture, see below, p. 50.

(2) See below, pp. 51-2.

(3) See below, p. 75.

(4) This view was held by both the experts who have reported on land development, Sir John Hope Simpson in 1930 and Mr. Lewis French in 1931. For the circumstances in which these reports were issued, see below, Chapter V.

(5) It was estimated by Mr. French (*French Report*, p. 12) that the proportion of *Mesha'a* villages had fallen from 56 per cent. in 1923 to 46 per cent. in 1930 and to less than 40 per cent. in 1931. The system is being further broken up in the course of the present Government Land Settlement Survey, which has achieved the amicable partition of further villages; the remainder will be partitioned as the Land Settlement Ordinance (1928-32) comes into operation.

The progress made with this is recorded each year in the *Report of the Mandatory Power*.

(6) A Department of Statistics was established in 1936.

(7) *Hope Simpson Report*, p. 34.

land was soon obvious; early attempts to remedy it¹ proved more or less abortive, but recent legislation has improved matters,² and a measure has lately been promised guaranteeing to all cultivators the inalienability of a minimum holding (*lot viable*).³

In respect of land tenure, therefore, it would seem that improvement, though it must be slow, is on the way. The next question is: How capable is the fellah of profiting by the change? Opinions differ as to his industry and intelligence. Sir John Hope Simpson, for instance, maintained that the Arab cultivator was endowed with both qualities and that "were he to be given the chance of learning better methods, and the capital, which is a necessary preliminary to their employment, he would rapidly improve his position;"⁴ others do not agree that a capacity for application is a characteristic of the whole of the Arab population.

But however this may be, two further drawbacks are bound to retard Arab development, the first a lack of capital, the second a shortage of educational facilities.

(3) *Lack of Capital*

The Arab community enjoys no land improvement funds with which to improve conditions; here it is at a great disadvantage as compared with the Jews, for without funds it cannot surmount another obstacle to development—the lack of irrigation. The Government has taken some steps to promote this, and in the case of the Huleh concession⁵ Arab cultivators have been allocated land irrigated with Jewish funds, but it would appear that the Arab community must for many generations be at a disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the Jews in this respect. Lacking capital, the Arab cultivator inevitably resorts to the money-lender and thereby aggravates his difficulties. Credit and thrift societies are the obvious remedy and a beginning has been made with these, though the Arab co-operatives, seventy-four in all, are as yet small in number and influence by comparison with the 688 societies in the powerful and self-reliant Jewish movement.

(4) *Lack of Educational Facilities*

The Arab is, and will be for some time to come, at an educational as well as a material disadvantage compared with the Jewish settler. Practically 100 per cent. of the Jewish children are educated, almost entirely with funds provided from Jewish

(1) The Transfer of Land Ordinance of 1920-21, and the Protection of Cultivators Ordinance of 1929.

(2) See below, p. 59.

(3) For the circumstances of this promise and its importance in view of the Arab demands, see below, p. 80.

(4) *Hope Simpson Report*, p. 66.

(5) See below, p. 79.

sources, whereas the Arabs are dependent on the Government schools, which in 1930 sufficed only for 13.2 per cent. of the Arab children, but had by 1935 come to accommodate 65,647 out of an estimated school-age population (non-Jews) of 237,634.¹

The Mandatory spends more on Arab than on Jewish education²; nevertheless, 40 per cent. of the Arab applicants for admission to the schools in 1935 were turned away for lack of room.³ This fact was strongly criticised by the Permanent Mandates Commission at its Twenty-Ninth Session,⁴ especially in view of the large surplus of revenue.⁵ Both sections of population are anxious to obtain greater education facilities, and the Arabs who cannot offer financial help have shown their eagerness to co-operate in many cases by building the school houses themselves; but progress is hampered by a shortage of funds due to "the claims of other Government services,"⁶ and by a lack of teachers.

*Economic
Changes*

The two chief changes in the economic structure of the Arab community have occurred: (i) among a slowly forming and still small middle class, consisting chiefly of better-to-do owner-cultivators in the plains, and of the commercial and professional element in the larger towns, and (ii) among the industrial population. But compared with the numbers engaged in agriculture the figures here are insignificant. According to the 1931 census, about 3 per cent. (25,000) of the total Moslem and Christian population gained a livelihood in industry (as compared with 19,000 Jews, although the Jews formed then only one quarter of the total population). The example of Western capitalism is only just beginning to work a change; but it is interesting to note the germs of a middle class and of a proletariat as yet almost unorganised, but whose numbers and influence will certainly increase in the years to come.

The effect of Jewish immigration upon the prosperity of the Arab population, both rural and urban, is surveyed in a subsequent chapter on immigration and economic development.⁷

(1) *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1935*, p. 134.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 134. "The net expenditure of all departments was distributed as follows:

Arab education	... £P168,193
Jewish education	... £P 33,958."

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 137.

(4) *Minutes*, p. 162.

(5) The relevant figures for 1934-5 are: Total spent on education £P200,000 (representing an increase of £P22,000 on the previous year)

Total Government expenditure £P3,230,000

Budget surplus £P2,223,000

(6) Reply by the Accredited Representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission; *Minutes of the Twenty-Ninth Session*, p. 162.

(7) See below, Chapter VI.

Material advantages over the Arabs

(b) THE JEWISH COMMUNITY.

The post-war Jewish population has one or two characteristics unusual among immigrants. One is the remarkably high percentage of newcomers of independent means¹; this, together with the funds provided by the central Jewish organisations, places the Jewish settler at an advantage which has already been referred to, and which is bound to have psychological repercussions upon Arabs who are confronted with the irritating spectacle of improvements they themselves cannot afford. A second unusual characteristic is the predominance of a far higher intellectual standard than is common among settlers; the percentage of immigrants who have received a secondary education is striking. This fact, coupled with the enthusiasm stimulated by the ideal motive of a return to the soil of the Promised Land, explains the following quotation:

“The great majority of early settlers were youthful idealists of both sexes, many of whom had abandoned their Universities or professions in Central or Eastern Europe to devote themselves to manual labour in Palestine. As time went on the *Halutzim* (Pioneers) no longer played as predominant a part as they had done at the outset, but they still formed the backbone of the Jewish immigrant population and especially of the new agricultural settlements.”²

Though this high intellectual standard has not been maintained throughout, a new stimulus has been the influx of highly educated refugees coming from Germany since the inauguration of the Nazi régime.³ In Palestine itself the level tends to be maintained owing to the high level of education already referred to.

Jewish Land Tenure

Besides material and intellectual advantages, the Jewish cultivator enjoys far greater security than does the Arab. He secures a long lease from his colonisation society, and in the case of the oldest organisation—the P.I.C.A.—is allowed to purchase his land.

The agencies responsible for Jewish colonisation in Palestine fall into four main classes:

1. The Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association (P.I.C.A.).
2. The Colonisation Department of the Zionist Organisation.
3. Commercial Land or Settlement Companies. e.g. Palestine Plantations, Limited.
4. Private societies. e.g. Benei, Benjamin.

(1) For statistics, see below, p. 67.

(2) Stein, “Development of the Jewish National Home,” *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, Vol. I, p. 374. Cf. also Report of Sir John Campbell, one of the experts employed by the Jewish Joint Survey Commission in 1927, quoted and endorsed by Mr. Snell in his reservation to the Shaw report, p. 179.

(3) For figures showing the increase in the number of refugees coming from Germany, see below, p. 67.

Of these, the P.I.C.A. is the most important, holding nearly half of the Jewish land in Palestine. It is the legacy of the work begun in 1882 under the guidance of Baron Edmond de Rothschild,¹ and it had by 1930 established thirty-four colonies, chiefly in the Maritime Plain, and Upper and Lower Galilee. The P.I.C.A. is not a political organisation, and the relations of the P.I.C.A. colonists with their Arab neighbours and workmen have always contrasted very favourably with those of the Zionist settlers.

The P.I.C.A. itself buys land and instals settlers. The Colonisation Department of the Zionist Organisation simply acts as a settlement agency, the land being purchased for the Jewish National Fund (*Keren Kayemeth*) by the Palestine Land Development Company. The Zionist colonies also differ fundamentally from the P.I.C.A. colonies in their relations with the Arabs. This is partly due to the "principle of self-labour." For whilst the P.I.C.A. colonies employ Arab as well as Jewish labour and have helped to develop Arab land, Zionist settlers are limited to the quantity of land which the individual or the group concerned can cultivate. Some of the Zionist settlements are *Kvutsoth* or communal farms. In these the land is held in common, and the adult population live in communal houses with a separate children's house run by nurses; the produce belongs to all the members collectively, and is shared out in kind. The other Zionist settlements are mostly made up of small holdings. It is argued by the Zionists that financial reasons make peasant settlements of this type essential, and that even the P.I.C.A. can no longer afford to settle the "planter" type of colonist.

However this may be, two other principles of Zionist colonisation, both incorporated in the constitution of the Jewish Agency, are deeply resented by the Arabs. These are: (i) the principle that Jewish property is inalienable; no Zionist settler may dispose of his lease to anyone but a Jew; (ii) the principle, carefully safeguarded by the powerful Jewish Federation of Labour, that only Jewish labour may be employed in Zionist colonies. The net result is that, when the Jewish National Fund makes a purchase, the Arabs lose not only the land, but also any chance of being employed on it.

Finally, there is a fundamental distinction between the Zionist and the P.I.C.A. colonies in the matter of financial independence.

"Of the agricultural settlements it may be said that none of the Zionist settlements are self-supporting in the sense that they would be able to maintain themselves without further assistance and pay back

(1) See above, p. 10.

to the *Keren-Hayesod* a reasonable amount towards satisfaction of their debts, and to the *Keren-Kayemeth* an economic rent. It is indeed admitted that no such consummation is anticipated. Many Zionist settlements would cease to exist if further support were not forthcoming. The P.I.C.A. colonies include in their number several old colonies which are radically established, and which will unquestionably flourish in the future. Even of the P.I.C.A. colonies, however, there are a number, including some of the older colonies, which still require support and in some cases reorganisation. I understand that this reorganisation is in progress."¹

In 1936 a few of the Zionist colonies for the first time made small repayments of loans.

*Jewish
Co-operatives*

Another factor which assists Jewish development and which contrasts strongly with the situation among the Arabs is the highly organised nature of the Jewish co-operative movement. There are 688 Jewish co-operative societies in Palestine,² connected with every branch of agriculture and industry. There are co-operative societies for banking, credit and insurance, producers' and consumers' societies, co-operatives for contracting, transport, marketing, irrigation and land purchasing. Among the most important are the *Tnuva* which markets Jewish agricultural produce and whose sales totalled £290,000³ in 1934, and the *Pardess*, the largest co-operative society of orange growers, which sells over a million cases annually. A great many of these co-operative societies are managed by the *Histadruth*, the Jewish Federation of Labour.

*Contrast in
Methods of
Cultivation*

It is evident that there are wide divergences in the methods of cultivation employed in Palestine. The Jewish colonisers all practise intensive farming, and an increasing number of Arabs are following suit. But the great majority of Arabs still cultivate their land extensively. Obviously the more intensively the land is farmed, the larger the agricultural population which it can maintain, although ultimately the agricultural capacity of the country must depend on the amount of cultivable land available.

3. SOME FUNDAMENTAL DIFFICULTIES.

Even these brief facts about the two communities are enough to show how difficult is the Mandatory's task—how hard it is to deal with two such different entities simultaneously or to explain policy to them in the same terms. Nor can the situation be remedied at any speed on account of the material and educational divergences which must persist for some time to come.

- (1) *Hope Simpson Report*, pp. 48-49.
- (2) *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1935*, p. 271.
- (3) *Jewish Agency Report for 1934*, p. 163.

It is often mistakenly supposed that religious animosity between the parties is another of the factors which aggravate the Mandatory's task. This is not so, for two reasons. On the one hand modern Zionism is not a religious but a political movement. On the other, among the Arabs nationalism has come to transcend religious feeling; for instance, Moslem and Christian Arabs now work together. The antagonism is one between national, not between religious movements¹; nor is it racial, for both Jews and Arabs belong to the Semitic race.

Perhaps one reason for the difficulty experienced by British observers in understanding the Palestine problem is a profound psychological difference between the Anglo-Saxon and the Semitic races. The former, unlike most others, admires a capacity for compromise; for instance, a newspaper would not tend to sell in London with the title "*L'Intransigeant*." But with the latter an uncompromising nature is the ideal. "The Semites had no half tones in their register of vision. They knew only truth and untruth, belief and unbelief, without our hesitating retinue of finer shades."² These words were written of the Arabs, and are obviously not true of the whole of the Jewish branch of the Semitic race. But they are truer of the Jews of Eastern Europe than of the "assimilated" Jews of the west, so many of whom are non-Zionist; and it should be noted that the "eastern" Jews form the bulk of the Palestinian immigrants.³

This reasoning may explain why the Mandatory contemplates fulfilment of its obligations to both parties as so much more easily feasible than do the communities themselves.

(1) The only serious show of fanaticism—the Wailing Wall disturbances—was designed to annoy politically, not religiously.

(2) Lawrence, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, 1935 edition, p. 38.

(3) See below p. 66.

IV. THE WORKING OF THE MANDATE, 1920-1930

*1918-1920
The Military
Occupation*

For nearly two years after the Armistice, Palestine, pending the allocation and confirmation of the Mandate, was under British military authority. The arrangement was a legacy of the situation at the cessation of hostilities against the Turks.¹ The supreme power lay with Lord Allenby; General Sir Arthur Money was appointed Chief Administrator, and much was done to organise a government of the occupied territory, to restore the essential services, to relieve distress and, as far as the limitations of an occupation allowed, to begin the work of reconstruction.² The military administration also promoted the first recognised body for the relief and organisation of the Jewish community.

*The 1920
Disturbances*

The contemporary happenings in Syria, where the French and the Arabs were struggling for control, were the chief grounds for Palestinian unrest during this period. When (by an agreement of September 1919) the British garrisons were replaced by the French in Syria, and when all hope of the United States as mandatory for both territories waned with the withdrawal of America from participation in the peace settlement, Arab nationalism grew into a demand for a united and independent Palestine and Syria. In the circumstances,³ the Emir Feisul and other Arab leaders supported this claim, which was enhanced, among Palestinian Arabs, by fear of being swamped under a wave of organised Jewish settlement. This fear accounts for the first clash of Arab and Jew, which took place on Easter Sunday 1920, when the Arabs looted the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem with some loss of life. The Report of the Military Commission of Enquiry on these disturbances was never published.

*Inauguration
of Civil
Adminis-
tration*

Following the allocation of the Palestine Mandate to Great Britain⁴ the military régime was superseded by a civil administration as from July 1, 1920, with Sir Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner.

*Jewish
Immigration
and the 1921
Disturbances*

The task of implementing the Balfour Declaration now began in earnest. The first Immigration Ordinance was enacted in September 1920, and the High Commissioner authorised the admission of Jews in accordance with a first year's quota of

(1) By the Armistice of Mudros, October 30, 1918.

(2) For further detail see Bentwich, *Palestine* (Modern World Series) pp. 82-84.

(3) For a summary of the friction with the French in Syria, see Stoyanovsky, *The Mandate for Palestine*, pp. 14-18, and (in greater detail) Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference*, Vol. VI, pp. 134-169.

(4) See above, p. 18.

16,500¹ fixed by the Administration. The Arabs at once began to manifest considerable alarm. It was popularly supposed among them that their land was to be expropriated for purposes of Jewish colonisation and that large-scale immigration would render the population of Palestine overwhelmingly Jewish; land and immigration, the two vexed questions upon which almost all subsequent trouble has hung, were prominent stumbling blocks from the first.²

These Arab fears were reflected in propaganda which was at its most violent during the visit of the British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Winston Churchill, to the territory early in 1921; some of it can be put down to the efforts of the Arab *effendi* class, which feared that it would lose its feudal position in the course of the social change which was likely to accompany the Jewish influx. A few months later, the orthodox Easter Sunday—a moment of fervour among the Arabs—unfortunately coincided with Labour Day, May 1. A collision between rival demonstrations of Jewish Communists and Jewish Socialists occurred in Tel-Aviv. Arabs from the neighbouring suburbs of Jaffa joined in the fray and “when the disturbance had once begun, an already acute anti-Jewish feeling extended into an anti-Jewish riot” in which the Arabs were “generally the aggressors.”³

The trouble did not spread. Martial law was declared, and Jewish immigration stopped for a short period, while a Commission of Enquiry reported that the cause of the disorders was Arab hostility “connected with Jewish immigration and with their conception of Zionist policy as derived from Jewish exponents.” After detailing the grounds for this hostility the report adds:

“But for the considerations set forth above we feel convinced that there would be no animosity towards the Jews as such; that there is no inherent anti-Semitism in the country, racial or religious. We are credibly assured by educated Arabs that they would welcome the arrival of well-to-do and able Jews who could help to develop the country to the advantage of all sections of the community.”⁴

This account of the 1921 disturbances is set out at some length because of the similarity of its causes with those of the disturbances of 1929, 1933 and 1936.

To reassure the Arabs and to make the position clear to both parties, the Colonial Office on June 3, 1922, published a state-

*The Churchill
Memo-
randum
1922*

- (1) *Report of the Mandatory Power, July, 1920—December, 1921*, p. 127.
- (2) For a full discussion of these problems, see Chapters V and VI below.
- (3) *Report on the Disturbances. British White Paper*, Cmd. 1546, p. 59.
- (4) *Ibid.*, p. 54.

ment of British policy¹ giving a more precise interpretation of the Balfour Declaration. This statement, which since Mr. Winston Churchill was at the time Colonial Secretary, is usually known as the Churchill Memorandum, stressed :

(i) That His Majesty's Government did not contemplate either the creation of a wholly Jewish Palestine or the disappearance or subordination of the Arab population, language or culture in Palestine ;

(ii) That the terms of the Balfour Declaration did not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine ;

(iii) That, for its development on these lines, it was essential that it should have in Palestine a status of right rather than of sufferance and that it was for this reason that it should be formally recognised in the Mandate ;

(iv) That, for the fulfilment of the policy, the Jewish Community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration, it being understood that such immigration should not exceed what might at the time be the economic capacity of the country, that the immigrants should not be a burden on the people of Palestine as a whole and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment.

The Zionist Organisation formally accepted the policy set forth in the memorandum ; the Arabs, through the mouth of the Palestinian Arab Delegation which was at the time setting forth their case in London, declined to concur in it.²

*Attempt to
promote self-
government,
1922*

One of Sir Herbert Samuel's early measures, in October 1920, had been to set up a nominated Advisory Council to function pending the establishment of some elected body. This consisted of ten British officials and ten Palestinians, of whom seven were Arabs (four Moslems and three Christians), and three were Jews. It sat for two years and with some success, for "on no occasion did the Government find itself unable to accept the considered opinion of the non-official members."³

When the promulgation of the Mandate was at hand, "it was thought advisable to confer upon Palestine a constitution of a more representative character";³ in August 1922 Sir Herbert Samuel therefore propounded a constitution⁴ which, as a first step towards self-government, would have substituted for the Advisory Council a Legislative Council consisting of the High Commissioner and twenty-two members, ten official and twelve

(1) *British White Paper*, Cmd. 1700. For text see Appendix II.

(2) The relevant correspondence is published in *British White Paper*, Cmd. 1700, pp. 21-29, and is summarised on p. 111 below.

(3) *Report of the High Commissioner on the Administration of Palestine*, 1920-25, p. 44.

(4) Palestine Order in Council, 1922. *British Government publication: Statutory Rules and Orders No. 1282* of 1922. Reprinted in Stoyanovsky, *The Mandate for Palestine*, pp. 363-384.

ected, of whom eight were to be Arabs. The elected members were also to form a standing committee to advise the Government on all questions of immigration.

But the Palestinian Arab Executive opposed this, refusing to participate unless the Council contained a clear majority of Arabs over all others. They boycotted the elections to the Council, and Sir Herbert was obliged to abandon the proposed constitution. He returned to the nominated Advisory Council system, but composed in the same proportions as had been intended for the elected Council. But the Arab members appointed were induced one by one to resign within a very short time. The Government, therefore, abandoned the idea of non-official participation; since 1923, therefore, legislation has been effected by the High Commissioner in consultation with an Advisory Council composed entirely of British officials; but except where immediate action is judged to be in the public interest, all ordinances are published sufficiently in advance to enable the various interested committees to discuss them and, if necessary, to request amendment.

Refusal of an Arab Agency, 1923

At the same time a further effort was made to secure Arab co-operation. Recognising that the special position accorded to the Jewish Agency under Article 4 of the Mandate placed the Jews upon a footing which the Arabs did not enjoy in dealing with Arab matters, the Government offered the Arabs a parallel Arab Agency. The offer was put to a "fully representative meeting of Arab notables" by the High Commissioner on October 11, 1923. "After an interval for discussion, they expressed themselves unable to accept the proposal, as falling short of the demands of the Arab population."¹ This attitude was explained to the High Commissioner in a letter from the President of the Executive of the Arab Congress:

"The object of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine is not an Arab agency analogous to the Zionist Agency. Their sole object is independence. The Arab owners of the country cannot see their way to accept a proposal which tends to place them on an equal footing with the alien Jews."

It had become obvious that the Arab objection was not to the way in which the Mandate might be worked, but to the whole policy of the Mandatory, however exercised, and that by no concession, however liberal, were the Arabs prepared to be reconciled to a régime which recognised the implications of the Balfour Declaration. The British Government gave up heart. "Towards all these proposals the Arabs have adopted

(1) For a full statement of the proposal and an account of the interview, see *British White Paper*, Cmd. 1989.

the same attitude—refusal to co-operate. His Majesty's Government have been reluctantly driven to the conclusion that further efforts on similar lines would be useless and they have accordingly decided not to repeat the attempt."¹

Period of
appeasement
1923-1928

Despite these rebuffs, the Mandate began to work fairly smoothly in the hands of successive High Commissioners,² and the six years 1923-1928 were a period of appeasement and development during which it seemed legitimate to hope that the two communities would settle down side by side. The best indication of the prevailing optimism is the Mandatory Power's policy in regard to security. In 1926 the British armed forces in Palestine were reduced to one squadron of the Royal Air Force and two companies of armoured cars; the police force was simultaneously reorganised and reduced.³ These conditions, which continued until the disturbances of 1929, did not receive the entire approval of the Permanent Mandates Commission. At its Ninth Session in 1926 it drew the attention of the Mandatory to the "danger of not maintaining adequate local forces"⁴; at its Sixteenth Session, in July 1929, the High Commissioner reassured it that the "resources at the disposal of the Government" were sufficient to deal with any situation that was "likely to arise";⁵ at its Seventeenth Session—the special session on the 1929 disturbances—it was therefore in a position to reprimand the Mandatory for the "inexplicable fact" of failure to heed its "increasing warnings."⁶

Apart from the reduction of the armed forces, perhaps the most striking feature of the period was the severe economic depression which lasted from the end of 1925 until 1928. This was later put down both by the Shaw Commission on the 1929 disturbances and by the Government to the exceptional volume of immigrants in the preceding years, and can in part be attributed to the collapse of the Polish currency in 1925 which stranded many immigrants without resources.⁷

The calm which prevailed enabled the Mandatory to proceed with administrative reforms, the chief of which, so far as the

(1) The concluding paragraph of *British White Paper*, Cmd. 1989.

(2) The full list is as follows:—

1920-1925 Sir Herbert Samuel.

1925-1928 Lord Plumer.

1928-1931 Sir John Chancellor.

1931-1935 Sir Arthur Wauchope.

1935- Sir Arthur Wauchope.

(3) For full details see Report on the 1929 Disturbances (*British Blue Book*, Cmd. 3530), pp. 13-14.

(4) *Minutes*, p. 184.

(5) *Minutes*, p. 80.

(6) *Minutes*, p. 28.

(7) See below, pp. 64-5.

fulfilment of the Mandate was concerned, was the Municipal Franchise Ordinance of 1925; the resultant municipal elections took place in 1927, and "aroused keen popular interest and, in many places, a factious spirit, but were carried out in an orderly manner."¹

In 1928, and again in 1929, Arab delegations petitioned the High Commissioner for the establishment of an elective parliament, and during the summer of 1929 Sir John Chancellor returned to London to discuss the matter with the Colonial Office.

*Disturbances
of 1928 and
1929*

It was during his absence that there took place the really serious disturbances—the first since 1921—which put an end to the illusion that all was going well.

The immediate result of the outbreak was the abandonment for the time being of all progress towards self-government; the long term result was the ventilation of sentiments which showed clearly that the conflicting claims of Arabs and Jews and the difficulties of the Mandatory in carrying out the dual trust had grown greater rather than less with the years.

*The Wailing
Wall incident*

The first obvious sign of unrest was the so-called Wailing Wall incident, which took place on the eve of the Day of Atonement, September 24, 1928. The Wailing Wall represents Holy Ground for Jews and Moslems alike—the Jews pray at one end because it formed part of the western wall of the Temple; the Arabs venerate the other because it is the part of the Haram-al-Sharif where El Burak, the winged horse of the Prophet, was tethered in the night of his travelling. Under Turkish rule the Jews had established a certain limited right of access, and the Palestine Government felt bound to maintain the *status quo ante*. The Arabs complained that the Jews were attempting bit by bit to extend the bounds of this limited right, and their complaints caused the Administration to remove some Jewish innovations on the Day of Atonement itself, an act which engendered high feeling all round.²

*The
Disturbances
of August,
1929*

The incident was the prelude to much more serious disturbances which took place in August, 1929. Looking back, many people have criticised the Mandatory for having failed to read the signs of the times, and for being so unready for what took place.

On August 15 a Jewish demonstration, organised by enthusiasts from Tel-Aviv, was held at the Wailing Wall. On the next day, Arab demonstrators, led by enthusiasts from Nablus did likewise. Tel-Aviv and Nablus are the strongholds

(1) *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1927*, p. 4.

(2) For a full report on the incident, see *British White Paper*, Cmd. 3229.

of Jewish and Arab nationalism respectively, and the demonstrations took place in an atmosphere of considerable excitement, stimulated by the protests against Jewish action in connection with the Wailing Wall which the Supreme Moslem Council, through the mouth of its President, the Mufti of Jerusalem, had been making for some months past.¹ Disturbances subsequently took place all over the country, the most serious outbreaks occurring at Hebron, Jaffa and Haifa, where the Arabs attacked Jewish hospitals and synagogues. These were countered by Jewish attacks on mosques in Jaffa and Jerusalem, the whole finally resulting in 133 Jews killed and 339 wounded, and the total destruction of six Jewish colonies. There were 116 known Arab deaths. During the subsequent proceedings before the court of final instance, 26 death sentences were confirmed, 25 of them upon Arabs, one upon a Jew. All but three of these sentences—all on Arabs—were commuted to terms of imprisonment.

The two disturbances caused a long and complicated series of enquiries by the British Government, both on its own initiative and at the request of the Permanent Mandates Commission, and ink flowed from the Government and the League, the Jews and the Arabs all through 1930.

*The Shaw
Commission*

On September 1 the High Commissioner, who had been on leave when the disturbance took place, but had returned in haste to Palestine, issued a proclamation deploring the outbreak and announcing the suspension of the discussions on constitutional changes which, in accordance with an undertaking given to the Arab Executive, he had initiated with the Secretary of State.

On September 14, the Colonial Office announced that a Commission of Enquiry, with Sir Walter Shaw as chairman,² would at once proceed to Palestine "to enquire into the immediate causes of the recent outbreak and to make recommendations as to the steps necessary to avoid recurrence." It was stressed that the terms of reference of the Commission did not extend to considerations of major policy.³

*Shaw Report
Findings*

With regard to the past, the Commission found that the outbreak had its fundamental cause in the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility towards the Jews arising from the fear that, by Jewish immigration and land purchase under the Jewish

(1) For details see *Report on the Disturbances*, pp. 31-34.

(2) Sir Walter Shaw had been a prominent colonial Chief Justice; the other members were Sir Henry Begg, Bt., M.P. (now Lord Rushcliffe); Mr. M. Hopkins Morris, M.P. and Mr. H. Snell, M.P. (now Lord Snell). Their report (*British Blue Book*, Cmd. 3530), was published on March 12, 1930.

(3) By Mr. Henderson at the Labour Party Conference on October 2, 1929.

National Home project, the Arabs might be deprived of their livelihood and eventually pass under Jewish domination; the similarity with the findings of the Commission on the 1921 disturbances is interesting.¹

The Report explicitly stated that in the opinion of the Commissioners the Arab attack was "neither provoked, premeditated nor directed against the British administration." It found that the Mufti of Jerusalem and the Arab Executive in their collective capacity did not plan or incite the disturbances, that the Mufti should not have launched his campaign on the Wailing Wall issue, and that he and his Executive should have controlled their followers before the explosion (Mr. Snell, in signed reservations annexed to the Report, attached greater blame to the Mufti.) It also exonerated the administration from blame in its handling of the dispute before reinforcements arrived from Egypt and Malta. Certain of these findings were later to be peremptorily questioned by the Permanent Mandates Commission.

*Shaw Report
Recommendations*

As to the future, in the light of the disturbances and of its extensive enquiries in Palestine, the Shaw Commission's chief recommendations were:—

1. That the British Government should issue a clear statement of policy defining the meaning it attached to the passage in the Mandate concerning the safeguarding of the rights of non-Jewish communities and laying down more explicit directions as to the conduct of policy on such vital issues as land tenure and immigration;

2. That the Government should make a clear statement regarding Jewish immigration, and should review the machinery for its regulation and control with the object of preventing a repetition of the "excessive" Jewish immigration of 1925 and 1926.² That non-Jewish interests should be given some voice in the discussions on immigration;

3. That a scientific enquiry should be held into land cultivation and settlement possibilities. That pending this enquiry the eviction of peasant cultivators from the land should be checked;³

4. That as regards the Zionist Organisation the Government should reaffirm the statement made in 1922 that the Organisation's special position did not entitle it to share in any degree in the Government of Palestine. That the Government should if possible lay down some precise definition of the meaning of Article 4 of the Palestine Mandate;

5. That it was essential to the peace and security of Palestine that a Commission should be appointed to determine the rights of both parties at the Wailing Wall.

6. That the Government should introduce press legislation enabling them to obtain convictions on articles tending to a breach of the peace.

7. That appropriate advisers of His Majesty's Government should advise as to the most suitable form of garrison for Palestine. That no

(1) See above, p. 40.

(2) See below, p. 65.

(3) See below, pp. 58-9.

reduction should be made till then in the existing garrison. That an independent enquiry should be made into the Department of Police. That the Palestine Government should be instructed to enquire into and report on the possibility of forming a reserve of Special Constables.

*The Wailing
Wall
Commission*

By the time the Shaw Report was published, in April 1930, the recommendation regarding the Wailing Wall had already been put into effect.

In November, 1929, the British Government had delivered to the League for communication to the Permanent Mandates Commission a proposal for a Commission appointed under Article 14 of the Mandate "to study, define and determine the rights and claims of Jews and Moslems at the Western or Wailing Wall" (An earlier attempt to implement Article 14 by the appointment of a Holy Places Commission had failed in 1922, when the League Council had—owing to failure to secure agreement as to the representation of the confessions upon such a Commission—turned down the British proposal). But with reference to the immediate issue of the 1928-9 disturbances, the plea was more successful, and on May 15, 1930, the Council approved the appointment of MM. Löfgren (Sweden), Barde (Switzerland), and van Kempen (Netherlands). Their report, which, generally speaking, confirmed the *status quo*, was published in June 1931¹; their recommendations were implemented by an Order in Council in accordance with which order at the Wall has since been maintained.

*1929-1930
Jewish and
Arab
demands*

Throughout the period of composition and presentation of the Shaw Report, it was clear that every move would draw the fire of one or both sides.

On September 23, 1929, immediately after the disturbances, the British Prime Minister had received through Dr. Weizmann the main demands of the Zionist Organisation and Jewish Agency. These included a demand that the persons and property of Jews in Palestine should be safeguarded, and the suggestion that an adequate number of Jews should be introduced into the Defence Force of the country.² Further it suggested that the Mandatory, in order to fulfil the promise contained in the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration, should

(1) Published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London. 58-9096. 1931. For a full summary of the appointment and proceedings of the Commission see Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1930*, pp. 284-286.

(2) As early as 1921 the Revisionists had drawn up comprehensive plans for an exclusively Jewish defence force to form part of His Majesty's forces in Palestine, but the Government was always averse to passing legislation permitting this. After the 1929 disturbances sealed armouries were permitted in Jewish colonies, the key being entrusted to a responsible leader of the community, and during the 1936 disturbances some 2,800 Jews were enrolled in the Special Constabulary in order to defend Jewish settlements. See below, p. 83. See also Melchett, *Thy Neighbour*, pp. 249 and 255-6.

take economic steps to allow for increased Jewish immigration and colonisation for which a further economic opening up of the country was necessary.

The Arab demands were put forward by a delegation selected by the Palestine Arab Executive and consisting of four Moslems and one Christian, which arrived in London on March 30, 1930. On May 12, 1930, the Delegation issued a statement to the effect that the British Government had rejected its demands, namely: (i) cessation of immigration; (ii) a declaration that Arab lands were inalienable; (iii) the establishment of democratic government with representation on a population basis.

On May 13 the British Government declared that the "sweeping constitutional changes" demanded by the Arabs were incompatible with the requirements of the Mandate.

On April 3, 1930, the Prime Minister (Mr. Ramsay MacDonald) made a statement of policy in the House of Commons¹ which was no more than a reiteration of the terms of the Mandate. He added that the Government was studying the Shaw Commission's recommendations, and was in the meantime immediately providing adequate police forces.²

*Criticisms of
the
Permanent
Mandates
Commission*

As is its practice when unusual occurrences disturb the peace in a Mandated Territory, the Permanent Mandates Commission decided to hold an extraordinary session on the Palestine disturbances in June, 1930, and to this meeting the British Government submitted a special statement with regard to policy,³ reiterating the Mandatory's intention to fulfil the triple pledge inherent in the Mandate, but pointing out the difficulties of promoting self-government in current circumstances.

The Permanent Mandates Commission, which had before it this statement, the Shaw Report and the supplementary information supplied in committee, strongly criticised the British Government's execution of its task. As regards the Shaw Report, it rejected the view that the outbreak was unexpected and unpremeditated, and that it was not directed against British authority. It held that with a little foresight many incidents could have been avoided, and that the inaction of the Mandatory Power was the fundamental cause of a disturbance of such dimensions. It substantiated this accusation with some more general criticisms of British policy. Insufficient attention had been paid, it said, to "the social and economic adaptation

(1) See *Hansard*, coll. 1466-7.

(2) See below p. 49.

(3) *British White Paper*, Cmd. 3582.

of the Arab population to the new conditions due to Jewish immigration;” the Arabs had every cause for dissatisfaction on this score. Moreover, despite its warnings, the Mandatory had maintained forces so inadequate as to fail to secure “the essential condition for development of the Jewish National Home, security for persons and property.” It also argued that more might have been done to bring about that economic “fusion of interests which is the best possible means of developing a sense of solidarity and blunting the edge of antagonism.”

The report embodying those “somewhat serious criticisms of British policy” was published in London and Geneva on August 25, 1930, together with the British Government’s reply.¹ The latter stated that the Commission scarcely appreciated the complexity of the problem as encountered on the spot, and that its previous comment on British policy could not be said to have foreshadowed these serious charges. It was doubtless to atone for some rather heated wording in this document that Mr. Henderson, speaking on Palestine before the League Council in the following September, stated that the British Government fully appreciated it was “the duty of the Permanent Mandates Commission to criticise.”

*Re-
organisation
of Police*

Meanwhile, two important steps had been taken to put the Shaw recommendations into effect; between January and March 1930, the Palestine Police Force was reorganised under the supervision of Mr. (now Sir Herbert) Dowbiggin of the Ceylon Police. Substantial increases were made in the British personnel, and special steps were taken to protect exposed Jewish settlements. Two British infantry battalions were for the time being retained in Palestine; in fact the garrison remained at this strength until the disturbances of 1936.

*Enquiry into
land
settlement*

The second important step was the appointment in May 1930, of Sir John Hope Simpson, formerly of the Indian Civil Service, to enquire into land settlement, immigration and development. Pending the publication of his report, the undistributed balance of immigration certificates under the 1930 schedule was suspended. This last measure was strongly resented in Zionist circles, the Jews appealing to the British Government “to reopen the Gates of Palestine and thus reaffirm the rights of the Jews to return to their National Home.”

(1) *League of Nations Document*, C.355, M.147, 1930, VI.

V. THE LAND SETTLEMENT CONTROVERSY, 1930—31.

*The Hope
Simpson
Report
and ac-
companying
White Paper*

Sir John Hope Simpson spent three months in Palestine, and his Report,¹ together with an accompanying Government Statement of Policy² based on its conclusions, was published on October 20, 1930.

The contents of the Hope Simpson Report are only to some extent important, for its basic premise was questioned, and only a few of its recommendations have been acted upon. But it is interesting to summarise its main points; (i) because it was the first detailed attempt to assess the population capacity of Palestine, and (ii) because a knowledge of its points is essential to an understanding of the controversy which followed, and which is an illustration of the problem facing the Mandatory Power.

*The
geography of
Palestine*

The arguments on both sides in this controversy cannot be properly assessed without some conception of the geography of Palestine.³

“ Within the limits of a province, it offers the varieties of soil and climate of a continent. It is a country of mountain and plain, of desert and pleasant valleys, of lake and sea-board, of barren hills, desolate to the last degree of desolation, and of broad stretches of deep, fruitful soil.”

The country is approximately 160 miles long and at no point more than 70 miles wide. It is therefore slightly larger than Wales and slightly smaller than Belgium.

*Continued
predominance
of agriculture*

It is still predominantly agricultural. There are only four large towns—Tel-Aviv (130,000), Jerusalem (91,000), Jaffa (52,000) and Haifa (50,000); Nablus, the Arab centre, which is the next on the list, has a population of only 17,000. Although the towns have grown rapidly—particularly Tel-Aviv, the all-Jewish town, which contained only 15,000 inhabitants in 1922 as compared with 130,000 to-day—the rural population has expanded equally rapidly, and at the 1931 census still represented roughly 60 per cent. of the total, the same proportion as in 1922.

*Geographical
Divisions of
Palestine*

The country is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the east by the river Jordan, these two being divided

(1) *Palestine: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development*, by Sir John Hope Simpson, *British Blue Book*, Cmd. 3686 of 1930.

(2) *Palestine: Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom*. *British White Paper*, Cmd. 3692 of 1930.

(3) For general details see Luke and Keith-Roach, *Handbook of Palestine and Transjordan*, Part I, in which the passage which follows is quoted from a Government report.

by a range of hills running from north to south for practically the entire length of Palestine. Geographically it falls naturally into four main divisions :

- (1) The Hill Country of Galilee (in the north) and of Samaria and Judaea.
- (2) The Five Plains.
 - (a) The Maritime Plain between the coast and the hills.
 - (b) The Acre Plain between Acre and the hills.
 - (c) The Vale of Esdraelon (south-east of Haifa).
 - (d) The Huleh Plain (extreme north-east).
 - (e) The Plain of the Jordan.
- (3) The Beersheba area (the south-west).
- (4) The arid desert areas in the south-east.

(1) *The Hill Country*, which covers roughly one-third of Palestine, offers very limited possibilities for the future. Indeed, the eastern part of the hills, running steeply down to the Jordan, are an uninhabited wilderness. The soil is almost all poor, and irrigation for the most part out of the question. There is room for some improvement by the use of manure and better seeds, and by some substitution of fruit-growing for cereals. But the possibility of any considerable expansion of the present population here is extremely doubtful; the standard of life of the inhabitants is extremely low, and the area is probably already suffering from over-population.

(2) (a) *The Maritime Plain* covers the whole area between the coast and the hills except the small section north of Haifa. In the south it is about twenty miles wide but gradually narrows to a few hundred yards near Haifa. This is the great orange producing district, having a mass of the wind-blown sand suitable for this purpose. All but a small part is not only cultivable, but irrigable.

(b) *The Acre Plain*, which includes the land between the coast and the hills north of Haifa, is also irrigable. Here, however, the soil is heavy and black, suitable for mixed farming, but not for oranges.

(c) *The Plain of Esdraelon*, which runs south-east from Haifa towards the Jordan Valley in the shape of a triangle, is mostly cultivable, and is probably the most fertile part of Palestine. Its alluvial clay is particularly suitable for cereals.

(d) *The Huleh Plain* in the extreme north-east consists partly of rich alluvial land. But over one-third of it is undrained marsh, of which the greater part is included in the Huleh Concession.¹

(1) See below, p. 79.

(e) *The Plain of the Jordan* is perhaps rather more than half cultivable. The land in the north is very fertile; that in the south could be so if irrigated. The average width of this plain is about three miles.

(3) The possibilities of the *Beersheba region* (about one-tenth of Palestine) are at present unknown. Given irrigation, it could provide a large supply of cultivable land. But it remains to be seen whether fresh water can be found there; so far only salt water has been obtained.

*Distinction
between Hill
Country and
Plains*

The distinction between the Hill Country and the Plains (where the great bulk of the Jewish colonies are established) is quite fundamental to the problem of land settlement in Palestine; for it is only in the Plains that irrigation is possible on any large scale, and irrigation is an essential condition for that intensive form of cultivation introduced by the Jews which provides the only hope for any real expansion of the agricultural population of Palestine. Even in the Plains, however, irrigation depends on water being available; there is the possibility of an exhaustion of the existing supplies. According to Sir John Hope Simpson, the suggestion that the water-table in the Maritime Plain had fallen was disposed of by an expert Committee; but Mr. French, the Director of Development appointed in 1931, was unable to find that any expert Committee had ever investigated the matter; a survey of the water supply nearly complete at the end of 1936 appears to show that there is no diminution.

*Likely
fields for
development*

Intensive development on any considerable scale is likely to be chiefly concentrated in Beisan (in the north of the Jordan Valley), Huleh and Beersheba. With irrigation, the Beisan lands might accommodate 2,500 families in addition to the 950 there already.¹ The development of Huleh depends on drainage of the marsh, which should now be accomplished, since the Arab concessionaires who lacked the necessary capital have at last disposed of their concession to the (Jewish) Palestine Land Development Company.² Huleh and Beisan are of importance in that they alone of all the State lands referred to in Article 6 of the Mandate as suitable for Jewish settlement offer any possibilities of further development; the remainder are already fully occupied by Arab tenants or squatters. Finally, the considerable possibilities of the Beersheba region must remain unrealised unless fresh water is discovered there; and "even if good fortune attend this (well-boring) experiment,

(1) *French Report*, p. 28.

(2) See below, p. 79.

years must elapse before we should be in a position to place settlers on the land."¹

*The Hope
Simpson
Conclusions*

The basic premise of the Hope Simpson Report was its estimate of the total cultivable area of Palestine; the figure accepted by Sir John represented a drop of almost 40 per cent. on most previous estimates—6,544,000 dunums² as opposed to the 10,592,000 dunums² arrived at a few months earlier by the Commissioner of Lands—not to mention the 16-18,000,000 dunums estimated by Mr. Jabotinsky, the leader of the Revisionists.

Starting from this premise, Sir John dealt with the immediate course to be pursued under three heads: land settlement, development and immigration.

(1) *Land Settlement*: Sir John stated that even if the land not occupied by Jews were divided equally among the Arab population there would not be enough to support each Arab family at a decent standard of life; that "it is an error to imagine that the Government is in possession of large areas of vacant lands which could be made available for Jewish settlement," and that with the exception of the large reserve of undeveloped land held by the Jewish authorities, there was "at the present time and with the present methods of Arab cultivation" no margin of land available for agricultural settlement by new immigrants.

(2) *Development*: Sir John's basic conclusion was that the only way in which the Mandate could be carried out was by the agricultural development of rural Palestine by means of:

(i) Large-scale irrigation, combined with a thorough survey and regulation of water supplies.

(ii) The partition of the considerable quantity of Arab land still communally held into permanent individual holdings, *i.e.* the abolition of the *Mesha'a* system.³

(iii) The substitution of intensive for extensive methods of cultivation (*e.g.* grapefruit and tobacco in place of cereals).

(iv) Education: "The educational budget is far too small for the requirements of the country"; the report emphasises that it is useless to expect the Arab to benefit from agricultural education unless he has previously received elementary education.⁴

(1) *French Report*, p. 29.

(2) Excluding Beersheba.

(3) See above, p. 32.

(4) pp. 79-82. See above pp. 33-4.

(v) The encouragement of Arab as well as Jewish Co-operatives, particularly Credit Co-operative Societies.

This policy was to be executed under the supervision of a Development Commission, consisting of a British Chairman, one Arab and one Jew. "It is my personal belief," Sir John concluded, "that with thorough development of the country there will be room, not only for all the present agricultural population on a higher standard of life than it at present enjoys, but for not less than 20,000 families of settlers from outside."

3. *Immigration*: Broadly speaking, therefore, Sir John's conclusion was that, taking a short view, agricultural immigration should not be permitted, but that taking a long view, there should be room for 20,000 families.

As regards other immigrants, he maintained that "if there are suitable Arab workmen unemployed it is not right that Jewish workmen from other countries should be imported to fill existing posts." But Sir John made one important exception to this general rule, which loomed very large in subsequent discussions: he pointed out that since Jewish capital was only imported with the definite object of employing Jewish labour, the Arabs had nothing to gain by stoppage of the inflow of the labour and therefore of the capital. In fact they were better off if they allowed it to continue, "as the expenditure of that capital on wages will cause, ultimately, a demand for the services of a portion of the Arab unemployed."¹

*British
Statement
of Policy,
October 20,
1930*

The Government Statement of Policy accompanying the Report, which was published as a White Paper,² was divided into two parts. The first, which dealt with general principles, stressed the necessity for co-operation and pointed out that the British Government had received no assistance from either Jews or Arabs in its attempts to achieve this; it also reiterated the statements in the Churchill Declaration of 1922 regarding the Jewish National Home, the Jewish Agency, and immigration, and argued that the promises to the two sections of the population were of equal weight and were not irreconcilable.

The second part considered "the practical problems to be faced" and stated policy as regards: (i) *Security*: "His Majesty's Government have decided to retain in Palestine, for the present two battalions of infantry; in addition to these, two squadrons of air-craft and four sections of armoured cars will be available in Palestine and Transjordan"; (ii) *Constitutional Development*:

(1) *Hope Simpson Report*, p. 136.
(2) *British White Paper*, Cmd. 3692.

"The time has now come when the important question of the establishment of a measure of self-government in Palestine (*i.e.* the Legislative Council envisaged in the Churchill Memorandum of 1922) must . . . be taken in hand without further delay"; and (iii) *Economic and Social Development*: This section, which covered the vexed questions of land, immigration and unemployment, was largely an almost verbatim recapitulation of Sir John Hope Simpson's conclusions, with one or two notable omissions.

*Storm of
Criticism*

Both the Hope Simpson Report and the White Paper, but particularly the latter, provoked a storm of protest, primarily from the Jews, but also from Conservative Opposition leaders and others.

*Criticism of
Hope
Simpson
Report*

The fundamental objection to Sir John Hope Simpson's Report related to his estimate of the area of cultivable land, which was regarded as based on entirely inadequate evidence.¹

It was pointed out that the differences between his figures and those of the Commissioner of Lands related chiefly to the Hill Country, where Sir John's estimate was based on aerial surveys of only one-tenth of the total area. The assumption that the relative proportions of cultivable and uncultivable land in this one-tenth were the same throughout the whole area was more than arbitrary. In any case, though it might be possible to distinguish cultivated land from an aeroplane, it would hardly be possible to distinguish the cultivable but as yet uncultivated tracts. Moreover, Sir John himself had given examples of the successful cultivation of "rocky hillsides" such as he dismissed as uncultivable in other parts of his Report.

*Criticism
of the
White Paper*

The White Paper was naturally attacked for accepting Sir John's figure and the deductions drawn from it, particularly as it omitted his reservations. But two of its other principles met with equal criticism:

(i) It stated that "in estimating the absorptive capacity of Palestine at any time account should be taken of Arab as well as Jewish unemployment in determining the rate at which Jewish immigration should be permitted." But it did not except as Sir John had done, the "special case" where Jewish capital was imported solely for the employment of Jewish labour—which, as the Jews pointed out, was not so much a "special case" as the general rule.

(1) See e.g. Stein, *Memorandum on the Palestine White Paper of October, 1930*, Jewish Agency for Palestine, November, 1930.

(ii) It laid down that any State lands becoming available should be reserved for the settlement not, as prescribed in Article 6 of the Mandate, of Jews, but of landless Arab cultivators. But it made no qualification that these should have been dispossessed as a result of Jewish purchases, or even that they should previously have possessed any land.

The Jewish authorities accordingly argued that the White Paper of October, 1930, was "inconsistent with the terms of the Mandate, and in vital particulars marks the reversal of the policy hitherto followed by His Majesty's Government in regard to the Jewish National Home."¹

*The
fundamental
objection*

Fundamentally, however, the Jewish objections were directed against the tone and temper of the document, and what was regarded as its implied criticism of all previous Jewish activities in Palestine.

*Political
consequences
of the
White Paper*

The publication of the Hope Simpson Report and White Paper had immediate and serious consequences. Dr. Weizmann, the President of the Zionist Organisation and of the Jewish Agency, informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Passfield, that he had resigned on the issue. Both the late Lord Melchett and Mr. Felix Warburg also resigned, the former from the chairmanship of the Council and of the Political Committee of the Jewish Agency, the latter from the chairmanship of the Administrative Committee. On October 30, 1930, three leading members of the Opposition—Mr. Baldwin, Sir Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Amery, writing to *The Times*, deplored the Government's failure to fall in with Dr. Weizmann's proposal for a Round Table Conference between Jews and Arabs and accused the Government of abandoning the policy embodied in the Mandate. General Smuts telegraphed a protest to the Prime Minister, and on legal grounds Sir John Simon and Lord Hailsham² also declared the Statement to involve a departure from the Mandate.

*Mr.
MacDonald's
Explanatory
Letter*

It was evident that some attempt at conciliation must be made; and on November 14, 1930, it was announced³ that "doubts having been expressed as to the compatibility of some passages of the White Paper of October with certain articles of the Palestine Mandate, and other passages having proved liable to misunderstanding, His Majesty's Government" had "invited members of the Jewish Agency to confer with them on these matters." As a result of these discussions there was

- (1) Dr. Weizmann's second letter to Lord Passfield, October 29, 1930.
- (2) *The Times*, November 4, 1930. A reply from Lord Passfield was published on November 6.
- (3) *The Times*, November 14, 1930.

published¹ on February 14, 1931, a letter from Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, to Dr. Weizmann, which completely changed the whole situation.

This letter, which was published "in order to remove certain misconceptions and misunderstandings which have arisen as to the policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to Palestine," was to be regarded as the authoritative interpretation of the White Paper "on the matters with which it dealt." "A good deal of criticism has been directed to the White Paper upon the assertion that it contains injurious allegations against the Jewish people and Jewish Labour organisations. Any such intention on the part of His Majesty's Government is completely disavowed." On specific points, the "landless Arabs" who by the White Paper were given first claim on the state lands previously pledged in the Mandate for "close settlement by Jews" were now limited to "such Arabs as can be shown to have been displaced from the lands which they occupied in consequence of the lands passing into Jewish hands, and who have not obtained other holdings on which they can establish themselves, or other equally satisfactory occupation." "Further, the statement of policy of His Majesty's Government did not imply a prohibition of acquisition of additional land by Jews. . . . What it does contemplate is such temporary control of land disposition and transfers as may be necessary not to impair the harmony and effectiveness of the scheme of land settlement to be undertaken." "His Majesty's Government did not prescribe and do not contemplate any stoppage or prohibition of Jewish immigration in any of its categories." Finally, "His Majesty's Government do not in any way challenge the right of the Agency to formulate or approve and endorse" the principle that in all works or undertakings carried out or furthered by the Agency, only Jewish labour should be employed.

Ultimately the real "difference between the new document and its immediate predecessor lay not in its statements of fact or in its pronouncements upon policy, but in its concentration upon those particular facts and those particular points of policy which were agreeable to Zionists, and in its replacement of the phraseology which had given offence to the Jews by a phraseology which was courteous and considerate in its tone towards them almost to the point of being ingratiating."²

Upon the publication of Mr. MacDonald's letter the roles of the Jews and of the Arabs were immediately reversed. Dr. Weizmann announced that "this statement of policy . . . has,

*Jewish and
Arab
Reactions*

(1) *The Times*, February 14, 1931.

(2) Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1930*, p. 302.

in my opinion, re-established the basis for that co-operation with the Mandatory Power on which our policy is founded." On the other hand, the President of the Palestine Arab Executive denounced the letter as a breach of faith, in which the policy of the White Paper had been thrown over.¹

*Attempts to
implement
the Hope
Simpson
recom-
mendations*

Meanwhile the Mandatory Power was already taking steps to implement the policy of the "agricultural development of rural Palestine" recommended by Sir John Hope Simpson and adopted in the White Paper.

*Development
Loans*

On November 17, 1930, it was announced that the British Government would guarantee, and for the first few years provide the service of a £2,500,000 loan, designed primarily to increase the general productivity of Palestine, £250,000 being reserved for the settlement of up to 10,000 Arab families. In fact, owing to the subsequent financial crisis in Great Britain, this loan was never floated. The project was reopened in 1934, when by the Palestine Loan Act the British Government guaranteed the service of a £2,000,000 loan; but largely, no doubt, owing to the series of budget surpluses enjoyed by Palestine in recent years,² no loan has yet been issued.

*Appointment
of Director of
Development*

In July, 1931, Mr. Lewis French, formerly of the I.C.S., was appointed as the promised Director of Development. But the potential importance of this step was largely nullified by the refusal of both the Arabs and the Jews to co-operate with Mr. French. The Arabs demanded an assurance that the development scheme would not be based on the principles laid down in Mr. MacDonald's letter to Dr. Weizmann;³ whilst the Jewish refusal represented a protest against the tightening up of the Protection of Cultivators Ordinance designed to restrict Jewish purchases of Arab land.⁴ In consequence, the Jewish and Arab advisers contemplated were never appointed; both parties refused to accept the proposals contained in the French Reports and Mr. French resigned at the end of 1932.

*The "Land-
less Arab"
investigations*

The most important part of Mr. French's work was his investigation of the problem of "landless Arabs." The claims of this "discontented landless class," whose position was attributed to Jewish purchases of land, had been emphasised by the Shaw Commission. According to its Report:

"Of the land purchased by the Jews, so Dr. Ruppin informed us, relatively small areas not exceeding in all 10 per cent. were acquired from peasants. The other areas have been acquired from the owners of large estates most of whom live outside Palestine."¹

(1) Communication to the British High Commissioner in Palestine, February 17, 1931.

(2) See below, pp. 69-70.

(3) See above, pp. 56-7.

(4) *Jewish Agency Report for 1933*, p. 33.

Broadly speaking, the Arabs who sold land to Jews, almost always at good prices, fall roughly into three classes: the landlord, (very often an absentee) the sale of whose land raised the problem of ejected tenant occupiers; the industrious peasant who sold part of his land and worked up the remainder on the profits; and the type who sold all his land, at prices beyond his dreams of avarice, and who failed to use the substance thus acquired in a way that would keep himself and his family.

The French investigations, if they did not quite, as is sometimes suggested, dispose of the "landless Arab" as a "myth," certainly established that far fewer Arabs had been dispossessed than had been suggested.² Of 3,271 claims up till the end of 1935 (of which only 35 were lodged in that year) 2,607 were disallowed, and 664 heads of families were admitted to the Register of Landless Arabs.³ Including dependants, this meant that perhaps 3,000 or 4,000 persons had become "landless" owing to Jewish purchases. By 1936, some 300 heads of families had accepted the holdings offered them upon Government estates, the remainder (and also, no doubt, a certain number who never put in their claims), having secured alternative employment elsewhere.

But the fact that Jewish land purchases have not so far created a "landless" class of any dimensions is, of course, no guarantee that they will not do so in the future. It was to guard against this possibility that Mr. French, like Sir John Hope Simpson before him, recommended the passage of an Occupancy Tenants Ordinance to guarantee security of tenure, and a Homesteads Protection Ordinance to guarantee the inalienability of a minimum holding (*lot viable*) for every cultivator. Of these proposals, the first was implemented in 1933, whilst legislation along the lines of the second was promised early in 1936.⁴

(1) p. 114.

(2) It may be noted that in investigating the landless Arab problem Mr. French "thought it inadvisable to request Government to issue public proclamations inviting applications, since such notifications are apt to lead to idle claims. Accordingly, the District Officers were instructed to ascertain in what villages displacement of Arab cultivators had occurred. . . ." Before any claim was finally approved by the Director, the Jewish Agency was given an opportunity to raise objections.

(3) *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1935*, p. 62. It is perhaps interesting to give here the view of a critic of the Administration on this score: "The rejection of the remaining 2,607 applications appears to have been due to the Government's refusal to include in its definition of "landless Arab" any head of a family (a) who still retained enough land to provide him (in the Government's opinion) with a livelihood; (b) who, though he had lost all his land, had found work elsewhere. That is to say that landless Arabs who had drifted to the towns and become proletarians were left to the fate of proletarians: to have a job at two or three shillings a day when there was work going, and when there was none, to be destitute." *Labour Monthly Pamphlets*, No. 7; by a British Resident in Palestine, 1936.

(4) See below, p. 80.

VI. IMMIGRATION AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The account in the preceding chapter goes to show that land settlement, which is one of the two basic problems of the future of Palestine, should not be an insoluble question ; immigration, which is the other, raises more fundamental difficulties.

*Economic
Absorbive
Capacity*

Since 1922 the criterion for the regulation of immigration into Palestine has been the "economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals."¹ But how is it possible to determine economic absorbive capacity? First and foremost the decision must depend upon whether the development of an agricultural or of an industrial country is envisaged. So far as the agricultural capacity of Palestine is concerned, no more need be said ; the subject has already been examined in the chapter on land settlement. But it is already clear that Palestine is not going to remain a purely agricultural country. For the Government "places its hopes for the future in the development of Palestinian industries."² Clearly, the more highly the country is industrialised, the larger the population which it can carry. "It is quite incorrect to believe that Jewish immigration is dependent on a market being already available ; it is before all things Jewish immigration that creates the home market and conquers the foreign market."³ On the other hand, it is clear that even though it has been decided to encourage the partial industrialisation of Palestine, the "optimum population" must still be a "complex product of many factors : the material assets of the country ; the energy and enterprise and skill of its inhabitants, including future immigrants ; the economic demand of the world at large for the economic assets which Palestine could offer ; and the general level of world prosperity, on which the extent and effectiveness of this demand would depend."⁴ The foreign market for oranges, grapefruit, and manufactures, the *entrepôt* trade in oil and other products, and the inflow of capital, religious gifts, tourist receipts, and *rentier* income are the vital factors affecting Palestine's economic future.⁵

(1) Statement in the Churchill Memorandum of that year. For text see Appendix II.

(2) Statement of the British Accredited Representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission, June, 1936, *Minutes of the Twenty-Ninth Session*, p. 156.

(3) Jewish Agency Memorandum quoted in the *Hope Simpson Report*, p. 114.

(4) Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1930, p. 230.

(5) See below, pp. 69-74.

The immigration statistics must be considered in relation to the population of Palestine, and to its natural and total rate of increase.

POPULATION OF PALESTINE¹

Year	Total	Moslems	Jews	Christians	Others
1922 ²	752,048	589,177	83,790	71,464	7,617
1923	778,989	609,331	89,660	72,090	7,908
1924	804,962	627,660	94,945	74,094	8,263
1925	847,238	641,494	121,725	75,512	8,507
1926	898,902	663,613	150,040	76,467	8,782
1927	917,315	680,725	149,789	77,880	8,921
1928	935,951	695,280	151,656	79,812	9,203
1929	960,043	712,343	156,481	81,776	9,443
1930	992,559	733,149	164,796	84,986	9,628
1931 ²	1,035,821	759,712	164,610	91,398	10,101
1932	1,052,872	771,174	180,793	90,624	10,281
1933	1,104,884	789,980	209,207	95,165	10,532
1934	1,171,158	807,180	253,700	99,532	10,746
1935	1,261,082	826,457	320,358	103,371	10,896
1936	1,336,518	848,342	370,483	106,474	11,219

These figures represent official estimates for June 30 of each year except 1922 and 1931, in which two years a census provides complete statistics; they exclude members of His Majesty's Forces, but include the nomadic Beduin population (66,553 in 1931).

Rapid
Expansion of
Population

It is estimated that between 1922 and 1936 the population of Palestine expanded from 752,048 to 1,336,578, representing an increase of 78 per cent., which is probably the highest rate of increase of any country in the world during the period. In absolute figures the non-Jewish increase (297,777) was slightly larger than the Jewish (286,693); but while the Moslem and Christian populations expanded by 44 per cent. and 49 per cent. respectively, the Jewish population increased by no less than 343 per cent. On the other hand, the remarkably high rate of natural increase of the Moslem population is in striking contrast both with its stationary character under the Ottoman régime and with the comparatively slow post-war expansion of the population of Transjordan.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the Jews were steadily gaining ground even before 1931; and since that date their position has advanced very rapidly. The Jewish population, estimated at

(1) Source: Government of Palestine, *General Monthly Bulletin of Current Statistics of Palestine*, September, 1936, p. 1.

(2) Census.

55,000 in 1918, is now approximately 370,000. The Jewish proportion of the population has risen from 11 per cent. in 1922 to 28 per cent. in 1936.

*Proportion
due to
Immigration*

At least 40 per cent.¹ of this remarkable increase in the population of Palestine in the past fifteen years is accounted for by immigration. In the case of the Jews, particularly since 1931, the proportion has been far higher. In the case of the Arabs, the expansion of population primarily represents a very rapid natural increase. For this there are three main reasons: (i) the cessation of conscription, which is said, under the Turkish régime, to have removed between 10,000 and 20,000 youths annually from the Arab villages²; (ii) the lower death rate due to the activities of the Public Health Department; and (iii) the stoppage of emigration due to the exclusion of Asiatics from Latin-American countries in recent years.³

*Authorised
Immigration*

That the Palestine Government's estimates of the country's economic absorbing power have varied considerably from year to year is clear from the statistics of authorised immigration between 1920 and 1935⁴:

Year	Recorded Immigration		Recorded Emigration	
	Jews	Non-Jews	Jews	Non-Jews
1920 (September-October)	5,514	202	*	*
1921	9,149	190	*	*
1922	7,844	284	1,451	1,348
1923	7,421	570	3,466	1,481
1924	12,856	697	507†	604†
1925	33,801	840	2,151	1,949
1926	13,081	829	7,365	2,064
1927	2,713	882	5,071	1,907
1928	2,178	908	2,168	954
1929	5,249	1,317	1,746	1,089
1930	4,944	1,489	1,679	1,324
1931	4,075	1,458	666	680
1932	9,553	1,736	*	*
1933	30,327	1,650	*	*
1934	42,359	1,784	*	*
1935	61,854	2,293 ⁵	396	387
1936 (January-August) ...	21,738	1,252	—	—

* No statistics of emigration by race were compiled.

† Figures for July to December.

(1) As compared with a rise in population of approximately 585,000, net immigration, as shown in the table above, amounted to about 230,000.

(2) *French Report*, p. 19.

(3) *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1930*, pp. 36-7; for 1933, p. 37.

(4) Sources: *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1935*, p. 214; and for 1936, Government of Palestine, *General Monthly Bulletin of Current Statistics*, September, 1936, p. 4.

(5) Of these, only 903 were Arabs.

Of these recorded immigrants, the great majority were persons authorised to enter the country as permanent residents. The remainder, who in 1935 numbered 3,804 Jews and 625 non-Jews, entered Palestine in the first place as travellers or by evading the frontier controls, but were subsequently registered as immigrants.

*Illegal
Immigration*

Apart from the authorised immigrants there is a considerable volume of illegal immigration. This reached its peak in 1933, and it was estimated that in the two years 1932-33 the number of unauthorised settlers rose to 22,400.¹ Two main classes of immigrant are involved: (i) those who evade the frontier controls; and (ii) a far larger number who enter the country as travellers and stay without regularising their position. In 1934 intensified efforts were made by the Government to check these developments, and on December 1, 1934, the High Commissioner claimed that the numbers in the first class had been materially reduced to less than 100 per month, whilst the numbers in the second class had been reduced by at least half.² Later statistics are now available covering the second class—the “travellers” staying beyond the period authorised:

NUMBER OF “TRAVELLERS” REMAINING ILLEGALLY IN PALESTINE.

	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Non-Jews</i>
1933 ³	10,376	2,653
1934 ⁴	2,907	3,022
1935 ⁴	4,618	3,256

The number of persons deported from Palestine in the past two years for immigration offences is as follows:

	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Non-Jews</i>	<i>Total</i>
1934 ⁵	772	1,635	2,407
1935 ⁶	293	2,152	2,445

*Arab
Immigration*

It appears to be impossible to secure separate Arab statistics before 1935, as it was only in that year that the categories of “Jews, Arabs and others” were substituted for “Jews, Christians and Moslems.” Nevertheless, the figures for total authorised non-Jewish immigration and emigration are of considerable interest, since they show that until 1931 non-Jewish emigrants exceeded non-Jewish immigrants in every year except 1924. In subsequent years there has probably been a net balance of immigrants. But in the peak year, 1935, only 903 of 2,293

- (1) *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1933*, p. 15.
- (2) *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1934*, p. 11.
- (3) *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1933*, p. 34.
- (4) *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1935*, p. 49.
- (5) *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1934*, p. 44.
- (6) *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1935*, p. 50.

authorised non-Jewish immigrants were Arabs¹; moreover, as against these, some of the 387 non-Jewish emigrants in 1935 must have been Arabs.

Thus, amongst legal immigrants, non-Jews are completely out-numbered by Jews. In the case of illegal immigrants, the two categories are more nearly balanced. Indeed, in 1934 3,022 non-Jewish "travellers" remained illegally in Palestine as against 2,907 Jews, although in the following year the position was again reversed. Here again, however, many of the non-Jews are not Arabs. Of the 3,256 non-Jewish travellers who remained illegally in Palestine in 1935, only 1,662 were Arabs.²

As regards the other type of illegal immigrant—those who evade the frontier controls—it is impossible to give statistics. Some of these are certainly Jews, but it may be that the proportion of Arabs is higher in this category than in the other two.

It is frequently alleged that the Hauran, in Southern Syria, and Transjordan are important sources of Arab immigration. As regards the first, *La Syrie* published on August 12, 1934, an interview with the Governor of the Hauran, in which he stated that in the last few months 30,000 to 36,000 Hauranese had entered Palestine and settled there. Questioned on the subject before the Permanent Mandates Commission, the British Accredited Representative maintained that the figures "must be grossly exaggerated, because the Palestine Government had taken special measures on the eastern and north-eastern frontier with a view to keeping out undesirable people."³

At the same session a question was asked as to the number of Transjordanians who enter Palestine for seasonal work. As regards these, the official answer is that "no reliable statistics are available, but it is believed that few remain in Palestine permanently. Most seek to make a little capital in Palestine with which to return to Transjordan and assist their livelihood there."⁴

Since 1934 there has been a tendency, which has been exaggerated in some quarters, for cheap Arab labour to be imported into Palestine; no reliable figures are available.

From the statistics quoted above, it is evident that there have been two periods of intensive immigration, of which the first reached its peak in 1925 (31,000 net recorded) and the second in 1935 (63,000 net recorded). The first of these peaks was followed by an economic crisis which lasted until 1928. This crisis was definitely caused, according to the Shaw Com-

*Economic
Consequences
of
Immigration*

- (1) Many of the others were dependents of Army and Air Force officers.
- (2) Palestine, Department of Migration, *Annual Report*, 1935, p. 61.
- (3) *Minutes of the Twenty-Seventh Session*, p. 47.
- (4) *Report of the Mandatory Power, for 1935* p. 50.

mission, by immigration "in excess of the economic absorbing power of the country,"¹ which was also admitted by the Mandatory authorities to have been a contributory factor;² although it should be noted that a Jewish authority attributed the depression, not to the acceleration, but to the subsequent slowing down of the rate of middle-class immigration.³ In this latter connection an important factor was the collapse of the zloty and the imposition of currency restrictions in Poland and other Eastern European countries.

In the second peak period, which culminated in 1935, a far larger number of immigrants were admitted even than in 1924-6. Indeed, more than half of the Jewish immigrants into Palestine since 1919 have entered the country since the beginning of 1933. It might therefore have been expected that the economic structure would by now be showing still more serious signs of strain. In actual fact, however, the recent inflow has been accompanied by a wave of prosperity without parallel either in the previous history of Palestine or in the contemporary experience of the rest of the world.⁴ This apparent paradox can easily be understood if recent changes in (i) the origin, and (ii) the status of the Jewish immigrants are examined.

260,000 Jewish immigrants entered Palestine between 1919 and the end of 1935, as against perhaps 30,000 to 35,000 emigrants. These immigrants came from the following countries:

*Jewish
Immigrant
(i) Countries
of Origin*

JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE. 1919-35. ⁵					
<i>Nationality</i>				<i>Number</i>	<i>Per Cent.</i>
Poland	110,000	42
U.S.S.R.	30,000	12
Germany	22,000	9
Rumania	13,000	5
Lithuania	9,000	3
Yemen	8,000	3
U.S.A.	8,000	3
Greece	6,000	3
Iraq	5,000	2
Latvia	4,000	1½
Czechoslovakia	3,500	1
Austria	3,500	1
Turkey	3,500	1
Others	34,500	13½
TOTAL ...				260,000	100

(1) *British White Paper*, Cmd. 3530, p. 106.
 (2) Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1930, p. 244.
 (3) Stein, "The Development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, 1918-1926," *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, Vol. I, p. 373.
 (4) It is true that this prosperity has not extended to the Arab hill peasants, who have suffered exceptional hardships in the past few years. But their difficulties have definitely not been caused by the increase in immigration. See below, pp. 75-76.
 (5) Jewish Agency provisional figures given in *Palestine Economique*, special number of *Cahiers Juifs*, Paris, 1935, p. 119.

The predominance of these countries is largely explained by two main facts. In the first place, two-thirds of the world's Jews are to be found in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. In 1914, out of an estimated world total of 14,900,000 Jews, just under 7,000,000 were in Russia (including present-day Poland and the Baltic States), 2,250,000 in Austria-Hungary and nearly 250,000 in Rumania ; of the remainder nearly 3,000,000 were in the United States, about 600,000 in Germany, and about 500,000 in the British Empire, including 250,000 in Great Britain and Ireland.¹

In the second place, the "emancipated" Jews of the United States, France and Great Britain are rapidly becoming "assimilated," whereas the position of many Eastern European Jews was still further worsened by the general upheaval caused by the Great War and the consequent territorial changes. It is to these Eastern European Jews that Zionism naturally makes such a strong appeal.

POST-WAR JEWISH POPULATION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES²

Poland	3,500,000
U.S.S.R.	3,000,000 (2,000,000 in the Ukraine)
Rumania	1,000,000
Hungary	500,000
Czechoslovakia	350,000
Austria	350,000
Lithuania	250,000
Latvia	100,000
Estonia	8,000

Except in one important respect, the percentage of immigrants coming from each country has not greatly varied with the years. Nearly half of the immigrants have always come from Poland, but whereas in the earlier years the U.S.S.R. provided the second largest contingent, recently, owing partly to the difficulties created by the Soviet Government (for instance, £100 is demanded for permission for each adult emigrant to leave the country³), but still more to the anti-Semitic policy of the Nazi régime, the second place has regularly been taken by Germany ; between January, 1933 and June, 1936, about 29,000 Jews came into

(1) *Encyclopædia Britannica*, (14th Edition, 1929) Vol. 13, p. 62.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 61. Countries in order of Jewish population in 1935 were U.S.A., Poland, U.S.S.R., Rumania, Hungary, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Palestine. *Report of the Executive of the Jewish Agency*, 1935, p. 61.

(3) *Jewish Agency Report*, 1935, p. 67.

Palestine from the Reich. The following table illustrates this change of source :¹

Country of Previous Abode	Percentage of Total			
	1922-29	1934	1935	1936 (8 months) ²
Poland ...	46	43	46	40
U.S.S.R. ...	20	—	1	—
Germany ...	—	16	14 ³	27
Rumania ...	6	5	6	5
Lithuania ...	5	3	3	3
U.S.A. ...	3	3	3	1
Others ...	20	30	27	24

(ii) Status of
Immigrants

The remarkable feature of recent immigration has been the wealth of the Jews entering the country. This is strikingly shown by the increasing number and proportion of Jewish immigrants with a capital of £P.1,000⁴ or more—and usually considerably more :⁵

Year	Number (excluding dependents)	Percentage of Total Jewish Immigration
Capital of at least £P.500 :		
1926	553	4
1927	139	5
1928	173	8
1929	207	4
Capital of at least £P.1,000 :		
1930	178	4
1931	233	6
1932	727	8
1933	3,250	11
1934	5,124	12
1935	6,309	10
1936 (8 months) ²	2,388	11

Approximately one-third of these wealthy immigrants were German Jews, 18 per cent of the immigrants from Germany in 1935 being "capitalists" with over £P1,000. The bulk of the remainder came from the United States (no less than 53 per cent of the U.S. immigrants in 1935) and Poland (4 per cent of the Polish immigrants in 1935).⁶ Some of those coming from Poland and other countries were German refugees.

- (1) Palestine Department of Migration, *Annual Report*, 1935, p. 10.
- (2) Government of Palestine : *General Monthly Bulletin of Current Statistics*, September, 1936, p. 5.
- (3) "The number of immigrants arriving from Germany as their country of previous residence is 14 per cent. of the whole distribution, but only 10 per cent. of the immigrants claim Germany as their country of birth, and less than 9 per cent. claim Germany as their country of citizenship. The departmental records show that a proportion of immigrants from Germany were either born in Poland or were Polish citizens." Palestine Department of Migration, *Annual Report*, 1935, p. 23.
- (4) The Palestine pound (£P.) is equivalent to the pound sterling.
- (5) Palestine Department of Migration, *Annual Report*, 1935, p. 11.
- (6) *Ibid*, p. 73.

The total quantity of capital imported by immigrants into Palestine has been estimated at £10,000,000 in 1934¹ and £16,000,000 in 1935.²

*The Labour
Schedule*

“Capitalist” immigrants and their dependents³ account for nearly a quarter of the total immigration. Another quarter consists of dependents³ of Palestine residents. Practically the entire remainder are “persons coming to employment” and their dependents.³ Their numbers are determined by the Labour Schedule authorised by the Government for every six months beginning April 1st and October 1st. The Labour Schedule represents the Government’s estimate of the country’s absorptive capacity, less its estimate of the likely volume of illegal immigration over the period.⁴ Once the Government has decided the total size of the Labour Schedule, the allocation of the great majority of immigration certificates is left to the Jewish Agency. This policy was criticized by the Shaw Commission on the ground that immigrants were selected by the Jewish Agency on political grounds.

Even during the exceptional immigration year of 1935 the Jewish Agency maintained that a far larger Labour Schedule was required in order to meet the unsatisfied demand for labour, as the following figures show:—

ESTIMATES OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY.

<i>Period</i>	<i>Jewish Agency's</i>	<i>Government's</i>	<i>Net Schedule less deductions</i>
Oct., 1933–March, 1934 ⁵	24,490	6,500	5,500
April–Sept., 1934 ⁵ ...	20,100	7,600	6,800
Oct., 1934–March, 1935 ⁵	18,600	9,700	7,500
April–Sept., 1935 ⁵ ...	19,160	10,800	8,000
Sept., 1935–March, 1935 ⁶	10,900		3,250
April–Sept., 1936 ⁷ ...	11,000		4,500
Oct., 1936–March, 1937 ⁸			1,800

(1) *Economic Conditions in Palestine*, Department of Overseas Trade Report, 1935, p. 77.

(2) Cohen, *Points about Palestine* (Zionist Federation of Great Britain), p. 9.

(3) The rise in the number of “dependents” has been a feature of recent Jewish immigration. In 1935 they represented 61 per cent. of the whole as against 52 per cent. in 1933. One reason for this is the growing practice on the part of both immigrants and Palestinian Jews of marrying outside Palestine and separating or divorcing on arrival.

(4) This policy has been criticized by the Permanent Mandates Commission, which “cannot but ask itself whether the effect of the Mandatory Power’s action in reducing in advance the authorised immigration quotas—in which express allowance is made for illicit immigration—has not been to render the prevention of such immigration more difficult.” *Minutes of the Twenty-Ninth Session*, p. 208.

(5) *Report of the Executive of the Jewish Agency*, 1935, p. 15.

(6) *Report of the Mandatory Power*, 1935, p. 48.

(7) *The Times*, May 19, 1936.

(8) *Hansard*, November 5, 1935, col. 251.

It is the increased entry of German Jews, and the consequent larger imports of capital into Palestine, that largely explain the paradox referred to earlier in this chapter—the fact that the inflow of immigrants in 1924-6 precipitated an economic crisis, whereas the recent inflow has caused an unprecedented trade boom.

The Trade Boom of 1932-5

The remarkable extent of this boom is shown clearly by various indices in the table overleaf. Government revenue more than doubled between 1931 and 1935, rising from £2.3 to £5.7 millions, thanks largely to the expansion in customs receipts. Expenditure meanwhile rose only from £2.4 to £4.2 millions, and on September 30, 1936, in spite of extra expenditure on defence since April of over £130,000 the Government still had a surplus of £6.2 millions.¹ The same story is told by the rise in the reserves and the note circulation of the Currency Board from £2.3 to £5.0 millions and from £2.3 to £4.7 millions respectively between the end of 1931 and the end of 1934. Solid justification for this currency expansion is provided by the doubling of railway goods traffic and the trebling of overseas shipping between 1931 and 1935. The consumption of electricity, as shown in the statistics given by the Palestine Electric Corporation, has expanded still more rapidly.

First and foremost the boom has been a building boom. It is estimated that £6 millions were invested in buildings in 1934, as compared with £2½ millions in agriculture and £1-1½ millions in industry.² In 1936, however, there were clear signs that the building boom had passed its peak.³ The demand for houses and other buildings since 1932 has sent land values soaring.

Expansion of Trade Deficit

But the most striking indices of all are the foreign trade figures. Both imports and exports nearly trebled between 1931 and 1935. But as the value of imports has always been three or four times that of exports from Palestine there has been a remarkable rise in the adverse balance of trade, from £4.3 millions in 1931 to £13.7 millions in 1935. Hitherto the trade deficit has presumably been covered by such "invisible exports"

(1) Government of Palestine, *General Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, September, 1936, p. 24.

(2) "The Progress of Palestine," *Midland Bank Review*, November-December, 1935.

(3) The monthly average floor area of new buildings authorised in Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa and Tel-Aviv has been as follows:—

1931	27,000 sq. metres.
1932	27,000 " "
1933	58,000 " "
1934	76,000 " "
1935	1,214,000 " "
1935 (January-August)	901,829 " "
1936	"	"	"	"	541,095 " "

Government of Palestine, *General Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, August, 1936, p. 28, and September, 1936, p. 28.

PALESTINE.

(Figures are in £P millions unless otherwise stated.)

	Imports	Exports	Import Surplus	Revenue	Expenditure	Surplus	Currency Board Reserves	Note and Coin Circulation (End of year)	Railway Goods Traffic (in million ton kilometres)	Overseas Shipping Tonnage cleared (in millions)
1927	6.2	1.9	- 4.3	*	*	*	0.8	1.5	77	1.6
1928	6.8	1.5	- 5.3	2.6	3.4	-0.8	1.4	1.8	68	1.8
1929	7.2	1.6	- 5.6	2.3	2.1	-0.2	1.9	2.1	78	2.0
1930	7.0	1.9	- 5.1	2.4	2.6	+0.2	2.3	2.3	82	1.9
1931	5.9	1.6	- 4.3	2.3	2.4	+0.1	2.3	2.3	66	1.9
1932	7.8	2.4	- 5.4	3.0	2.5	-0.5	3.0	2.5	73	2.0
1933	11.1	2.6	- 8.5	4.0	2.7	+1.3	4.2	3.6	86	3.2
1934	15.1	3.2	- 11.9	5.4	3.2	+2.2	5.0	4.7	103	4.2
1935	17.9	4.2	- 13.7	5.7	4.2	+1.5	—	6.6	133	5.4
1935 (8 mths.)	11.6	3.4	- 8.2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1936 (8 mths.)	8.6	2.4	- 6.2	1.9 (6 mths.)	1.9 (6 mths.)	—	—	6.0 (Sept.)	—	—

* Figures available for 9 months only.

Sources : *League of Nations Statistical Year Book, 1935-36.*
Government of Palestine, *General Monthly Bulletins of Statistics.*

as religious subventions, tourist receipts, British Government expenditure and interest on foreign securities. But the huge recent deficits must obviously have been chiefly covered by imports of capital.

In the autumn of 1935 a definite check to the Palestine boom was caused by the tension in the Mediterranean arising out of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. The disturbances since April 1936, and particularly the Arab strike, have caused more serious damage; it is even said that "the country has been set back in its economic development for at least a couple of years."¹ The trade figures for the first eight months of 1936 show a pronounced decline in both imports and exports; the latter is due chiefly to last season's poor citrus crops. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that the economic consequences of the recent burst of immigration were very different from those of 1924-25 expansion. So far from depressing the country, the recent immigrants stimulated its economic life to an unprecedented extent, and the reason for this is clearly the large volume of capital which they have brought with them. Indeed, from a purely economic standpoint, it would seem that a suspension at any rate of "capitalist" immigration would certainly be of no benefit to the country and might easily, if applied too suddenly, cause definite harm.

The reality of the boom cannot be doubted. The only questions that remain to be answered are: (i) Does it represent a healthy form of economic development which can be maintained? (ii) Has it benefited every section of the population? It is in affirmative answers to both these questions that the Government's recent immigration policy must find its economic justification.

*Has the
Economic
Development
been sound?*

In the normal course of events dependence upon such heavy imports of capital would be exceedingly dangerous, since these would involve a large addition to the external debt and a serious problem of future repayment. But the case of Palestine is unique, in that the great bulk of the capital imported is being provided by the immigrants themselves.

The rise in the import bill might also appear to be dangerous. But it should be noted that a great part of the expansion of imports consists of capital goods—notably building materials and machinery—which will not need replacing for some time; moreover, immigrants from Germany are only allowed to transfer their capital on condition that goods of an equivalent value are exported from Germany to Palestine.

The rapid development of heavily protected industries—

(1) *Great Britain and the East*, September 17, 1936.



nearly one-quarter of the £6½ millions sunk in industry was invested in 1934¹—should gradually reduce the dependence upon some imported manufactures. On the other hand, it is clear that a larger population will require more imports; and it would be rash to count on a permanent stream of capital into the country with which to pay for these. Hence it is essential that the country should develop its export trade and other sources of foreign exchange.

*Exports of
Citrus
Fruits*

At present exports are dominated to a dangerous degree by citrus fruits, which regularly account for over 80 per cent. of the total value. Of these the bulk are Jaffa oranges, though the production of grapefruit, which matures more quickly and grows on heavier land, is being rapidly developed. It is interesting to note that the Arab orange groves are very nearly as extensive as the Jewish.

EXPORTS OF CITRUS FRUITS.²
(in thousand cases)

	1932	1933	1934	1935
Oranges	3,525	4,200	5,129	6,879
Grape-fruit	150	251	420	889

So far there have been no serious difficulties about marketing the increased export; the setback in 1936 was due to the prolonged sirocco of May 1935. But orange trees take some years to mature; and the serious problem created by the very extensive recent plantings is only just beginning to become evident. The orange crop is expected to rise by 2 million cases a year from the present 6 or 7 millions to something like 20 million cases in little over five years. Where will they be sold?

There are complaints that the United Kingdom, which takes two-thirds of the crop, gives no preference to Palestine produce, the duty on grape-fruit being particularly heavy. The difficulty is that, Palestine not being a colony, any preference given to her would have to be extended to every nation enjoying most-favoured-nation rights in their trade with Great Britain. Still greater obstacles are met with in Germany, which had been relied upon to provide a greatly expanded market. Germany's share of Palestine's citrus fruit exports fell from 24 per cent. in 1933-34 to 7 per cent. in 1934-35, owing largely to exchange regulations.³ On the other hand, a favourable factor for Palestine orange-growers in 1936 was to the Spanish Civil War. For Spain is Palestine's great rival in the production of oranges. For instance, up till 1935, in spite of Palestine's rapid advance, Spain regularly secured a clear half of the British orange market.

(1) D.O.T. Report on Palestine, 1935, p. 53.
 (2) *Ibid.*, p. 44; *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1935*, p. 222.
 (3) D.O.T. Report on Palestine, 1935, p. 49.

*Export of
Manufactures*

Apart from citrus fruits and small quantities of other agricultural products (e.g. melons), a wide range of local manufactures are exported on a modest scale, notably potash and bromine, soap, wearing apparel, artificial teeth, olive oil, other edible oils, and wine. The exploitation of the Dead Sea potash deposits by the Palestine Potash Company is of growing importance; the manufacture of soap is a traditional Arab industry. In recent years the export of local manufactures has remained more or less stationary at rather less than £500,000. The question is whether it can be expected to expand materially. This is evidently the hope of the Mandatory Power, which "fully appreciates the seriousness of the possibility" that the inflow of capital may cease, but "places its hopes for the future in the development of Palestinian industries."¹

There are certain favourable factors. Both management and labour can be of high quality in Palestine, and the country is well placed to compete in the considerable Near Eastern market. On the other hand, Palestinian costs are relatively high, and the markets of neighbouring countries are heavily protected. But perhaps the main difficulty with which Palestine is faced in the development of her trade is the Open Door provision in Article 18 of the Mandate, which prevents her from discriminating in her trade relations between States Members of the League. This excludes the possibility either of granting reciprocal trade concessions or of using the weapon of retaliation against such countries as Japan, which supply Palestine with a considerable quantity of produce, but take very little in return. It might seem that there is nothing to prevent discrimination against Japan, or indeed Germany, which are no longer Members of the League. On the other hand, it is uncertain whether Japan has not the legal right to claim economic equality in the Mandated territories as a Principal Allied and Associated Power. In any case, relations between Palestine and Japan are governed by the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911, which contains the most-favoured-nation clause.

*Palestine
as an
Entrepôt*

The expansion of Palestine's exports of citrus fruits and of manufactured goods is clearly essential. But of almost comparable importance is the restoration of her historic position as an *entrepôt*.² It has even been suggested that "Palestine's economic future depends on its development as a meeting-place of steamship lines, air routes, oil pipe lines and railways."³

(1) Statement to the Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of Twenty-Ninth Session*, p. 156.

(2) Cf. the vivid discussion in Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934, pp. 263-6.

(3) *The Economist*, June 27, 1936.

A harbour for ocean steamers at Haifa—the third largest harbour in the Eastern Mediterranean—was opened on October 31, 1933; but, as ocean shipping calling at Palestine ports trebled between 1931 and 1935, there is already a demand for an expansion of the harbour at Haifa and the construction of a full-size port at Jaffa or Tel-Aviv. Palestine is traversed by railways connecting Egypt with Europe via Syria and Turkey. Gaza is used as a stopping place by both Imperial Airways and the Royal Dutch Air Lines in their Far Eastern service, and a new international aerodrome, more convenient for Palestine itself, is being constructed at Lydda. Oil is already arriving at Haifa from Iraq (the Iraq Petroleum Company's field at Kirkuk) through the pipe-line opened on January 22, 1935; and it will presumably also come eventually from the British Oil Development Company's concession in Mosul.¹ Even more significant is the authority secured by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to build a pipe-line across Palestine from its Khuzistan oil field in southern Iran. Finally, there is the desert-motor route from Haifa to Baghdad and on to Iran, which will presumably become of considerable importance when the road has been completed.

The importance of these developments is obvious; but from a strictly economic point of view it can easily be exaggerated. As sources of foreign exchange, capital imports, tourist receipts, income on foreign investments, religious gifts, and military expenditure, still more than the factors mentioned above, are likely to remain the vital "invisible exports" upon which Palestine will depend.

Has the Boom had any harmful effects?

Whether the country can stand the rapid economic development to which it has been subjected in recent years depends, therefore, upon the very considerable expansion of the market for her citrus and other exports and on the maintenance of her invisible exports: in particular, a sudden check to her imports of capital would cause serious difficulties. It remains to examine whether this development has been achieved without detriment to any sections of the population.

The demand for labour has caused Jewish wages to rise by as much as 40-50 per cent. in the building and allied industries, and by smaller amounts elsewhere. Arab wages have also

(1) The output of petroleum in Iraq has risen as follows:

1933	115,000	metric tons
1934	1,031,000	" "
1935	3,550,000	" "

This output passes through the pipe-line via its two branches to Haifa and to Tripolis (Syria); at present the quantities pumped through to each port are about equal.

increased in the building and some other trades.¹ As a result of the boom unemployment was virtually non-existent in 1934 and the early part of 1935; but in the autumn of that year the Italo-Abyssinian dispute caused some check to prosperity, and by the end of the year Jewish unemployment was estimated at 6,000; Arab unemployment had also increased, but no reliable statistics are available.² On the other hand Jewish immigration has caused a phenomenal rise in land values and also a rise in protective duties designed to assist local industries. As a result, rents and the prices of some commodities have been forced up.

The position has been far more serious in the rural areas, which included, both in 1922 and 1931, 60 per cent. of the total population, and a considerably higher proportion of the Arabs.³ "The prosperity of the country was not reflected in the rural population, and that applied to Jews and Arabs alike, both of whom were suffering as a result of four years drought. . . . The winter months and the early spring of the year 1934 found a large proportion of the fellahin in a state of destitution, approaching starvation in some cases, and their livestock dying in large numbers."⁴ The situation was particularly acute in the hill country, which is scarcely remarkable when the Director of Development's estimate of 130 dunums as the minimum holding of unirrigated land required to support an Arab cultivator and his family at a reasonable standard of living is compared with the actual holding in the (unirrigated) hill country of 88 dunums. In order to relieve the situation the Government was compelled for several years to remit taxes and to grant short-term loans for the purchase of seed. In 1935 circumstances took a definite turn for the better, but in 1936 agricultural taxes were again remitted in Southern Palestine.

The fundamental causes of these hardships were clearly the succession of droughts and bad harvests in 1931, 1932 and 1933, and the catastrophic fall in agricultural prices⁵ on top of the Arabs' permanent handicaps of capital shortage and heavy debts bearing a rate of interest of 30 per cent. or more. For these

(1) "The difference between Arab and Jewish rates in unskilled labour may be 100 per cent. or more, but in skilled labour is not nearly so great." D.O.T. Report, 1935, p. 77.

(2) *Report of the Mandatory Power, 1935*, p. 117.

(3) Only 18 per cent. of the Jews were in rural areas in 1922, and 27 per cent. in 1931.

(4) Statement by the British Accredited Representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission, 1934; *Minutes of the Twenty-Fifth Session*, pp. 14 and 18.

(5) The fall in prices was the more serious since the tithe had recently been commuted to a fixed money value.

factors the Jews cannot in any way be held responsible. Moreover, "the boom which Jewish activities in Palestine were now producing had manifestly relieved the pressure upon the Arab agricultural population by opening to it new urban markets, as well as a more lucrative alternative field of employment."¹

In fact, on balance the immigration boom has probably slightly relieved the position of the rural population as well as considerably benefiting the urban workers.

But there are factors which mitigate the benefits. One thing which prevents the Arabs from appreciating the advantages derived from the country's greater prosperity is Zionist exclusiveness, both economic and cultural. Nor can prosperity alone be expected to appeal to Arabs as a final argument in favour of Jewish immigration :

"Prosperity and economic improvement are not everything of worth in life. There are other phases of life which are more dear to the Arabs than money and gold. 'Man cannot live by bread alone,' said Jesus Christ. The Arabs appreciate and understand this golden saying. Their case could not and should not be discussed or argued as a case of 'bread and butter.' They desire to enjoy the right of every people to live in peace of mind as well as of body, now and in the future, in their own country, as seems best for them. They prefer to be destitute and poor, but independent and free, in their country, than prosperous and rich in a country which will in a few years time be theirs no more."²

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- (1) *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934, p. 276.
 - (2) Letter from E. A. Ghory in *The Observer*, October 4, 1936.

VII. THE WORKING OF THE MANDATE, 1931-6.

The social and economic facts set out in the preceding chapters throw light upon the subsequent history of the Mandate, and help to explain why, though comparative calm prevailed throughout the boom period, an underlying tension continued, manifested in the disturbances of 1933 and 1936. In the words of Sir Herbert Samuel: "Everyone in Palestine agrees that the economic development is astonishing; no one thinks that the political situation shows any appreciable improvement."¹

*Progress
towards Self-
government*

Nevertheless, by comparison with the turbulence of 1929, the next six years were a peaceful period. The High Commissioner endeavoured to "bring the two peoples of Palestine and the Administration into closer touch with each other,"² and succeeded in getting Jewish and Arab unofficial members to work together on the Agricultural Council, the Road and Railway Boards, the Labour Legislation Committee and the Standing Committee for Commerce and Industry, the co-operation being at its best among government officials, particularly among postal and railway employees.

A representative institution in the shape of the promised Legislative Council³ seemed as far away as ever, but the Mandatory began to work towards it along a new line of approach—municipal autonomy. In 1932 the High Commissioner announced to the Permanent Mandates Commission that the Council would be established "when the new Local Government Ordinance has been brought into working order . . . I hope . . . early in 1933."⁴ But owing to subsequent condemnation of the Ordinance by both Jewish and Arab bodies—partly as placing them in leading-strings and partly on old scores connected with national antagonisms—the Ordinance did not finally enter into force until January 12, 1934. The municipal elections, which had been due to be held in 1930, but which had been postponed because of the 1929 disturbances, were held during the year, and by the beginning of 1935 twenty newly-elected councils were in being, "wherein representative Palestinians of all communities and races might acquire training in the common management of public affairs under a modern code of municipal

(1) *Observer*, July 8, 1934.

(2) Statement to the Permanent Mandates Commission, December, 1932; *Minutes of the Twenty-Second Session*, p. 80.

(3) See Shaw Report Recommendations, p. 46 above.

(4) *Minutes of the Twenty-Second Session*, p. 82.

legislation."¹ Haifa and Tiberias were the places in which this worked first and most satisfactorily, and by June, 1935 a council composed of Arabs and Jews in equal numbers was operating in Jerusalem, owing, chiefly, to the moderation of the new mayor, Dr. Khalidi, who had been elected in 1934.

*Relations
between Jew
and Arabs*

But the Jews and Arabs actively working for co-operation were few in number,² and there was plentiful evidence of continued high feeling. Perhaps the most reliable indication of this is the Government's security policy; between 1929 and 1936 it did not see fit to reduce either the garrison or the police forces.

The unrest took various forms; in August 1930 there was a minor Arab outbreak at Nablus, and the years 1930 and 1931 were marked by a series of terrorist murders of Jews. The rejection of the French Report on Development³ and the holding up of the entry into force of the Local Government Ordinance⁴ were in part due to mistrust of the Administration, but can also in fact be ascribed to racial feeling. The rank and file of the Arabs showed their animosity by resort to agrarian crime—the uprooting of trees, the wounding of cattle, and trespass in the form of squatting and grazing as a method of obstructing the sale of land to Jews. Arab scouts also patrolled the coast in order to defeat illegal immigration, claiming that the steps taken by the police to that end were designedly inadequate.⁵

*The
disturbances
of October,
1933*

The disturbances of October 1933 were the first serious manifestation of high feeling. The immediate cause of the riots, shooting and strikes which took place in that month "was the resolution of the Arab Executive calling upon the Arabs to hold demonstrations to protest against the policy of Government, the ground for which was prepared by a general feeling of apprehension amongst the Arabs engendered by the purchase of land by the Jews and by Jewish immigration."⁶ A vigorous campaign against immigration was launched in the Arab press, and "Arab spokesmen found material to hand in press reports of arrivals of Jewish immigrants at the ports; the Jewish press displayed no reticence in the publication of this kind of news,

*Arab
1935*

(1) *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1934*, p. 7.

(2) The best known Jewish group was the *British Shalom* or Covenant of Peace, a group of intellectuals and younger men inspired by the ideas of the Chancellor of Jerusalem Hebrew University.

(3) See above p. 58.

(4) See above p. 77.

(5) For these and other instances see the "Public Security" chapters of the *Reports of the Mandatory Power* for the years 1931-5.

(6) *Report of the Murison-Trusted Commission of Enquiry*, published as a supplement to *Palestine Gazette*, February 7, 1934, p. 104.

and at the Zionist Congress at Prague immigration was discussed in such terms as to inspire alarm in the minds of the Arab population."¹ The result was the declaration by the Arab Executive of a general strike on Friday, October 13; subsequent rioting, which was confined to urban Arabs, took place in Jaffa, Jerusalem, Haifa and Nablus. But the Administration proclaimed emergency measures under the Palestine Defence Order in Council of 1931, and the disturbances never assumed the dimensions of the 1929 disorders. Nevertheless, they constitute a milestone, for they were for the first time a manifestation of Arab feeling against the Government as well as against the Jews. The cause of this seems to have been despair in face of what the Arabs regarded as the entrenched Jewish influence in London, of which they saw evidence in the White Paper controversy and in the MacDonald letter of 1931.²

The history of 1934 provides good evidence of the difficulties with which the Administration is faced in framing its immigration policy. In the first months of the year, adjusting supply to demand, it drastically cut down the number of Jewish labour immigration permits asked for by the Jewish Agency; the step occasioned protests and strikes amongst the Jewish communities. In December, an Arab delegation to the High Commissioner submitted that sales of land to Jews and Jewish immigration had reached such an extent as to be contrary to the promises to preserve Arab rights given in the Mandate. The High Commissioner (Sir Arthur Wauchope) replied with a statement that the Government's policy was to increase the productivity of the country and that Jewish immigration (36,000 in ten months) was not excessive. At the same time he announced that the concession for draining some 40,000 dunums in the Huleh basin had been transferred from the original Arab concessionaires (who had obtained it before the War) to a Jewish group which had agreed to increase the area reserved for Arab settlement from the 9,200 dunums under the old concession to 15,000 dunums.

*Arab unrest
1935*

Throughout 1935 the Arabs showed restlessness and dissatisfaction, a chief indication of this being the tendency of the parties to crystallise,³ and to combine in the interests of making strong representations. Inflammatory articles appeared in the press, and in November, 1935, following an arms-smuggling incident at Jaffa, all the Arab leaders united to present a memorandum to the Administration calling for :

- (1) *Report of the Mandatory Power for 1933*, p. 5.
- (2) See above pp. 54-58.
- (3) Cf. above p. 29.

1. The establishment of democratic government ;
2. Prohibition of the transfer of land to Jews and the enactment of a law similar to the Five Feddan Law in Egypt ;¹
3. (a) The immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and the formation of a competent committee to determine the absorptive capacity of the country and to lay down a principle for immigration ;
- (b) Legislation to require all lawful residents to obtain and carry identity cards ;
- (c) Immediate and effective investigation into illicit immigration.

*Proposal of
a new Con-
stitution
1935*

In the meantime, the Administration had been making some progress with a proposal for the promised Legislative Council. The High Commissioner had announced in December 1934 that he would shortly be ready to discuss the matter with the leaders of the various parties. In December 1935 he judged that the municipal councils were working well enough to warrant the next step. He therefore communicated to the Jewish and Arab leaders respectively a new constitution representing a practical step towards representative institutions.² The proposal was for a Legislative Council with a large unofficial majority ; the twenty-eight members were to be made up as follows : 5 officials, 2 commercial representatives, 8 elected and 3 nominated Moslems, 3 elected and 4 nominated Jews, and 1 elected and 2 nominated Christians, plus an impartial president from outside Palestine who would neither debate nor vote. But, just as happened in 1929, the outbreak of serious trouble was once again to cause the postponement of further progress towards self-government.

*British reply
to the Arabs
1936*

On February 1, 1936, the Colonial Office, through the mouth of the High Commissioner, replied to the Arab demands of the previous November : (i) that its offer of a new constitution made in December, 1935 represented a practical step towards democratic government in that it proposed a Legislative Council with a large unofficial majority ; (ii) that as regards sales of land, it intended to enact a law prohibiting these unless the Arab landowner retained a " viable minimum "—*i.e.* sufficient land to afford a means of subsistence to himself and his family ; and (iii) that the rate of Jewish immigration was carefully gauged according to the country's capacity, and that a new Statistical Bureau was being established for estimating this.

*Reception of
the proposed
Constitution
1936*

The views on this reply were various. Those of the Arab leaders differed ; some, and notably Dr. Khalidi, the Mayor of Jerusalem whose moderation has already been mentioned, were for adopting a policy of co-operation without racial bias,

(1) Lord Kitchener's Homestead Exemption Law of 1912, which gave the small cultivator protection against expropriation for debt.

(2) Published as a *British White Paper*, Cmd. 5119, in March, 1936.



and for accepting the proposed Legislative Council ; others demanded drastic alterations in the plan, contending that it was farcical to describe as democratic a document which left such excessive powers to the High Commissioner.

The Jews were unanimous in condemning the proposed constitution and the Government's reply to the Arabs. An influential delegation protested in London, and the Jewish Agency issued a memorandum on the subject. The gist of their argument was that the proposed Arab majority on the Council precluded the establishment of the promised National Home, and that the suggested "interference" with the free disposal of land by its owner was an infraction of the clause in the Mandate which bound the British Government to encourage Jewish land settlement. The non-Zionist Jews of Palestine, through the mouth of the spokesman of the Agudath Israel, expressed equal disapproval of the scheme.

The question aroused feeling in England ; it was discussed in debates in the House of Lords on February 28 and the House of Commons on March 25, 1936 ; considerable opposition was manifested, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. J. H. Thomas) was forced to defend the High Commissioner against criticism levelled from all sides of the House. One of the chief points made in his reply was that the Council would have very limited powers ; it would not, for instance, be permitted to discuss the Mandate or the Jewish Agency or to interfere with immigration. He contended that the representation proposed on the Council was fair in proportion to the population of 825,000 Moslems, 100,000 Christians and 320,000 Jews.

The proposal was also criticised at the meeting of the Permanent Mandates Commission in June, 1936, disapproval being expressed in particular by M. Rappard and Lord Lugard. The latter viewed as "extremely inadvisable" and as "a fertile source of friction" a system in which the majority was unable to enforce a majority decision, and did not control the executive staff.¹

*Growing
Arab unrest*

The debates in the two Houses of Parliament in February and March, 1936, had caused a new wave of despair among the Arabs, who saw in them fresh evidence of Jewish influence in London, and proof that the self-governing institutions for which they were asking were as far away as ever. Until this feeling was manifested in open disorder, its extent was little realised in Great Britain. The visit to London of the Arab delegation invited by the British Government to discuss the Legislative

(1) *Minutes of the Twenty-Ninth Session*, p. 145.

Council proposal never materialised on account of the outbreak of the disturbances.

The actual disorders had their beginning in a hold-up of Jews by Arabs on the road from Nablus to Tulkarm on April 15. A Greek Jewish immigrant was killed, and his funeral was the occasion of more serious riots in Jaffa and Tel-Aviv.¹ Curfew regulations were imposed in both towns and an emergency decree was issued prohibiting dealings in arms, ammunition and explosives.

By the end of the month it was clear that the trouble was of more than normal dimensions. On April 26 the Arab party leaders met and united to form a Higher Arab Committee and once more formulated the demands issued in the previous November.² A strike committee was set up; a general strike was declared, and a series of local committees—an important new development³—representing Arab views all over the country, gave the Higher Arab Committee authority to maintain this strike pending the granting of the demands.

The strike, which began among shopkeepers in Jaffa and Jerusalem, soon spread to the ports and to other Arab workers, and before long it was impossible to retain any illusion that it was confined to the leaders, or to a few extremists; the other towns were soon affected, and then the country districts, until by May 20 disorder was general throughout the country. Peasant cultivators inaugurated sabotage, and attacks on troops and police and on Jewish colonies, while small organised bands carried on a guerilla warfare from the hills. The prohibition of the sale of arms does not seem seriously to have affected Arab supplies, for the damage was done with pre-war and war rifles which had never been surrendered, and with arms acquired during the summer by gun-running from Transjordan.

On May 11, at the request of Sir Arthur Wauchope, a battalion of the Royal Scots Fusiliers arrived from Egypt, the beginning of a steady stream of reinforcements from Egypt and Malta, which continued throughout June and July. But the presence of the troops and the action of the Government in extending the curfew, imposing collective fines, interning Arab agitators in concentration camps and taking other emergency measures were alike unsuccessful in restoring order. Reports of acts of violence

(1) The High Commissioner's official communiqué regarding the events of April 19 runs as follows:—"Owing to false rumours, which were at once officially contradicted, that Arabs had been killed, crowds assembled about 11 o'clock in the Manshia quarter of Jaffa, and disturbances arose, in the course of which several attacks were made upon Jews."

(2) See above pp. 79-80.

(3) See above p. 29.

against the Jews and the police, of the destruction of crops and property, the cutting of telegraph wires, the blowing-up of railway tracks and bridges, and the ambushing of trains and car convoys succeeded each other almost daily.

There was a lull in hostilities at the beginning of August, but after a week of comparative calm the situation deteriorated again. Towards the middle of August came the first reports of acts of reprisals by Jews, but these were by comparison few and quickly checked; indeed, the Mandatory publicly acknowledged the self-restraint of the Jewish population, giving concrete evidence of this in its decision to enrol 2,800 Jews as supernumerary constables, and in its issue of a number of licences for rifles in addition to the supplies in the sealed armouries which it had for some years past permitted in Jewish settlements.

Against this background of disorder negotiations for a settlement were carried on. Sir Arthur Wauchope, who had already on May 6 appealed unsuccessfully to the Arab Strike Committee to help the Government in maintaining order, interviewed the leaders again on May 15; it was subsequently learnt that he had stated that, if the strike were stopped, a Royal Commission would be set up to examine the conditions in Palestine and enquire into Arab and Jewish grievances. In their reply the Arabs stated that from past experience they had no confidence in a new enquiry.¹ They would continue the strike until Jewish immigration was suspended. This the High Commissioner refused to do, and on May 18 a Labour Schedule of 4,500 immigrants for the next half year was approved. The negotiations thus early reached a deadlock, the Arabs insisting on the stoppage of immigration before the strike was called off, the Government making all inquiry into the question of immigration dependent on the restoration of law and order.

*Feeling
among Arabs
of all classes*

Attempts to solve the dilemma were not confined to the discussions between the High Commissioner and the Arab Strike Committee. On June 30, a memorandum was submitted to Sir Arthur Wauchope, signed by 137 Arab Government officials, including all the senior members of the Judiciary and the Administration. It stated that the Arab population had been driven into a state bordering on despair, and that this feeling was largely traceable to loss of faith in official pledges and alarm at the extent to which the British Government had given way to Zionist pressure. The signatories believed that the Arabs' complaint under this head was substantially justified. The

(1) For some years past Arab spokesmen have been at pains to point out that the British Government has appointed no less than six commissions of enquiry but that little or no action has been taken on their findings.

unrest could not be crushed by force, and the document recommended the stoppage of immigration as the only fair, humane and honourable solution.

Judging by the statements on Palestine made by the Government in the House of Commons during the summer, it would seem that the British authorities for some time ignored or discounted the determination which was inspiring all sections of the Arab population, and remained hopeful that the trouble would die down. In reply to a question on May 18, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. J. H. Thomas) stated that the Government had decided that the suggested Arab delegation to London would no longer meet the case. The Government had therefore decided, as soon as order was restored, to appoint a Royal Commission which, without bringing into question the terms of the Mandate, would investigate the causes of unrest. Again on June 16 and 20, and on July 2, it was emphasised that the Commission would not be sent till all was quiet. On July 22, in answer to a question on Jewish immigration, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (now Mr. Ormsby-Gore) announced that there could be no change of policy until the Royal Commission's report was issued, but added:

"As regards, however, the suggestion that there should be a temporary suspension of immigration while the Commission is carrying out its enquiry, I am not at present in a position to make any statement as to the intentions of the Government."

The names of the members of the Royal Commission¹ were announced on July 29; its terms of reference, announced simultaneously, were as follows:

"To ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances which broke out in Palestine in the middle of April; to inquire into the manner in which the Mandate for Palestine is being implemented in relation to the obligations of the Mandatory towards the Arabs and the Jews respectively; and to ascertain whether, upon a proper construction of the terms of the Mandate, either the Arabs or the Jews have any legitimate grievances upon account of the way in which the Mandate has been, or is being, implemented; and if the Commission is satisfied that any such grievances are well founded, to make recommendations for their removal and for the prevention of their recurrence."²

These various items of news were received without enthusiasm in Palestine. Arab feeling had gone too far to be checked by anything less than an announcement of the cessation of immigration; the Jews were apprehensive at what they regarded as a

(1) The Right Hon. Earl Peel, G.C.S.I., G.B.E. The Right Hon. Sir Horace Rumbold, Bt., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., M.V.O. Sir Laurie Hammond, K.C.S.I., C.B.E. Sir Morris Carter, C.B.E. Sir Harold Morris, M.B.E., K.C. Professor Reginald Coupland, C.I.E.

(2) *The Times*, July 30, 1936.

concession to Arab fears and Arab violence, and feared that the guarded reply with reference to immigration during the Commission's sittings foreshadowed unwelcome restrictions.

One of the most serious aspects of the trouble was the possibility that it would inflame feeling elsewhere in the Moslem world. The increasing consciousness of the bond between the Arabs in the states of the Near East is evident from the efforts at mediation made by all neighbouring Arab rulers.

On June 6 the Emir of Transjordan invited the Arab Higher Committee to a meeting at Amman. When questioned as to whether they were in a position to stop the disorders if they wished, the Arab leaders replied that this would only be possible if certain definite concessions could be promised. The minimum was the suspension of Jewish immigration during the period of the Royal Commission's enquiry.

On August 7 the Emir again invited the Arab leaders to Amman and endeavoured to persuade them to call off the strike, urging the probability that this would be followed by a gesture on the part of the British Government respecting immigration. The Arab Committee stated that they were summoning a congress of town committees to discuss the situation, but fresh outbursts of violence which followed showed that the extremists were not willing to accept this proposal.

On August 30 the Arab Higher Committee unanimously accepted the intervention of the King of Iraq—a move initiated, it is said, by the King of Saudi Arabia¹ and the Imam of the Yemen. The Palestinian Arabs welcomed this general interest; they felt that they were calling in the Moslem world to redress a balance which they had long felt to be unfair. The negotiations were placed in the hands of General Nuri Pasha es-Said Foreign Minister of Iraq.

The exact proposals made by Nuri Pasha were never known, but for several days the Palestine press was full of rumours. The Arabs were optimistic as to the outcome of the negotiations and believed that the British Government would concede to Nuri Pasha what it had hitherto withheld, and that a suspension of Jewish immigration was at hand. There was a widespread belief that, following a proclamation by the Arab Kings, the strike would be called off in the next few days, although the announcement on August 30 in which the intervention of Iraq had been welcomed contained the words: "In the meantime the

(1) This seems likely from the statement made in the British Government's statement of policy of September 8, 1936, (see below, p. 87), that he had offered to "use his good offices."

country will continue the strike with the same steadfastness and conviction as heretofore."

The elation of the Arabs was reflected in a corresponding depression among the Jews, many of whom believed that the Government's resistance to the Arab demands had been broken, and that Nuri Pasha had British approval for the proposals he was making. So strong was this feeling that on September 1 Dr. Weizmann sent a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies enclosing a report from the *Palestine Post* containing the terms alleged to have been accepted by the High Commissioner.

But during the interval of awaiting the reply, two incidents took place which prejudiced the attempts of the moderate Arabs to reach a settlement. Firstly, the Arab Higher Committee met on September 2 to discuss whether the country should be consulted, through the local committees, on the subject of Nuri Pasha's proposals; it decided to postpone calling the Congress of National Committees—a body which would have formed, as it were, the Parliament from which the Higher Arab Committee derived its authority—until it had received confirmation of Nuri Pasha's authority to mediate, and, pending this, it issued a proclamation exhorting continuance of the strike. Secondly, on September 3 one of the most serious encounters of the whole campaign took place between Arabs and British troops near Tulkarm. Most of the Arabs killed in this engagement were from Syria and Transjordan, and there were rumours, subsequently confirmed, that the well-known Syrian revolutionary Fawzi Kawkji¹ had transferred his activities to Palestine.

These events foreshadowed two shattering blows to Arab hopes which followed in the next few days. The first was the publication of Mr. Ormsby-Gore's reply to Dr. Weizmann stating not only that the alleged terms had never been accepted by the High Commissioner or by the Government, but also that Nuri Pasha had not been authorised to give any assurances regarding the suspension of immigration; the second was the report of the cancelling of the manoeuvres of the First Division, followed, on September 4, by the announcement from the War Office that

(1) Fawzi el-Din Kawkji is a Syrian who served with distinction in the Turkish Army during the Great War. After the French occupation of Syria he entered the French service as intelligence officer and was decorated with the *Légion d'Honneur*, but on the outbreak of the Druze Revolt he joined the rebels. He was sentenced to death by the French authorities, but when the revolt was finally crushed he escaped to the Hejaz and became military adviser to King Ibn Saud. Later he obtained a commission in the Iraqi Army, being appointed instructor at the Iraq Staff College. He resigned his commission in the summer of 1936.

the Government had under consideration the question of reinforcing the military garrison in Palestine. The division in question was despatched during the third week in September.

On September 8 the British Government issued a Statement of Policy.¹ This, after describing the course of the disturbances, gave its reasons for sending the reinforcements. It was stated that "all efforts to introduce a reasonable spirit of accommodation" had hitherto failed, and that the discussions initiated by Nuri Pasha had led to no satisfactory result; the Arab determination to continue the strike pending the stoppage of immigration, together with the continued outrages, had rendered the use of force inevitable. The statement also referred to the British aim of maintaining relations of friendship and confidence with the Moslem peoples. It reiterated the affirmation made to the League in 1930 that Great Britain viewed her obligations to the two sections of the population as "of equal weight," and that she felt the two obligations to be "in no sense irreconcilable."

*Arab decision
to end strike*

The Arab leaders were in a quandary. The strike had not achieved its objective, yet it was obviously useless to continue it in the face of overwhelming force. They decided to consult the country on the issue and summoned the postponed Congress of National Committees for September 17, meanwhile issuing a proclamation protesting against the British Statement of Policy. But the Government prohibited any joint meeting of the Congress, stipulating that the local meetings must confer individually; this they did. The period of consultation gave prominence to a sentiment which had been cherished by most Arabs throughout the strike. Both "the Arabs who understand what it will mean to go forward . . . and the common people always return to the same point and ask: 'Can we trust the Government to implement the findings of the Royal Commission, if they should be in our favour, when on so many previous occasions results favourable to us have been set aside?' It is unfortunate that confidence in the British sense of fair play should have been so undermined."²

The strike, which is remarkable amongst other things for the length of time the Arabs held together, was called off on October 12. This decision was due to three main factors—one military, one economic and one political.

*The Military
Factor*

The most important consequence of the strengthening of the British force in Palestine from under 10,000 to nearly 30,000 was that the military authorities were enabled to adopt an

(1) *The Times*, September 8, 1936.

(2) Jerusalem correspondent in *The Times*, September 17, 1936.

offensive as well as a purely defensive policy. This was immediately apparent; the first reinforcements arrived on September 24, and on September 25 the first offensive action against Arabs was taken. Moreover, although martial law was never actually declared, the Palestine Martial Law (Defence) Order in Council issued on September 29 authorised the High Commissioner to make any regulations which he might consider necessary for public safety, or to delegate such powers to the G.O.C. Palestine Forces. In fact, it was made quite clear that any further Arab terrorism would be forcibly suppressed.¹

*The
Economic
Factor*

But a no less urgent incentive prompting the Arab leaders was provided by the growing restlessness of the Arab rank and file at the economic hardships caused by the strike. This became particularly evident with the approach of the orange export season, which normally opens in November. Even if the strike was officially prolonged, it was clear that many Arabs would be unable to resist the prospect of an excellent orange season made probable by the civil war in Spain, the chief rival producer.

*The
Political
Factor*

In fact, the one thing needed was an excuse for ending the strike in spite of failure to secure its proclaimed object—the cessation of Jewish immigration. This excuse was opportunely provided by the continued attempts at mediation on the part of the Arab kings. On October 11 an appeal to the Arabs of Palestine from the rulers of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and the Yemen was published as follows:

“Through the President of the Arab Higher Committee to our sons the Arabs of Palestine:—

We have been deeply pained by the present state of affairs in Palestine. For this reason we have agreed with our Brothers the Kings and the Emir to call upon you to resolve for peace in order to save further shedding of blood. In doing this, we rely on the good intentions of our friend Great Britain, who has declared that she will do justice. You must be confident that we will continue our efforts to assist you.”²

The Arab Higher Committee published with the message a manifesto stating that the “noble Arab nation in Palestine” had carried on the strike because of the dangers which beset

(1) The figures for total casualties up to October 15 were announced as follows in the House of Commons on October 29, 1936:—

Civilians:—Moslems, 955, including 187 deaths; Jews, 388, including 80 deaths; Christians, 65, including 10 deaths.

Navy, Army and Air Force—British, 125, including 21 deaths.

Palestine Police and Transjordan Frontier Force—British, 47, including 7 deaths; Palestinians, 49 Moslems, including 8 deaths; 13 Christians (wounded); 9 Jews, including 1 death.” The known Arab deaths recorded above are certainly less than the total number killed; this has been estimated at 800.

(2) *The Times*, October 12, 1936. In the appeal from the King of Iraq the word “ally” is substituted for “friend.”

it as the result of British policy. The Committee believed, however, that the Arab rulers would not have bidden their sons to abandon that struggle unless they believed that it was in their interest to do so. Realising, therefore, "the great benefit to accrue from their intervention and support" it called upon the community to comply with these orders which had no aim except the welfare of the Arabs.

With the calling-off of the strike, the tension in Palestine visibly relaxed. Isolated sniping still occurred, but there were few further large-scale acts of terrorism. Under the guise of manœuvres British troops closed in on Fawzi Kawkji's armed band and drove him over the Transjordan frontier.

*Departure of
Royal
Commission*

The improvement in the situation was regarded as sufficient to justify the departure of the Royal Commission for Palestine on November 5. On the same day it was announced in the House of Commons that the Government had rejected on economic grounds, and as likely to prejudice the work of the Royal Commission, the view that immigration should be suspended. The Government had therefore accepted the High Commissioner's recommendation that the labour schedule for the six months to come should be fixed at 1,850, as compared with 4,500 in the previous April. The Higher Arab Committee saw in this decision the defeat of its objective, and accordingly decided to boycott the Royal Commission. At the time of writing, therefore, the deadlock as between Jewish and Arab demands remains.

VIII. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM.

A statement was made in the introduction of this paper that, though some observers have tended to attribute the 1936 disorders to foreign influence, this was not the fundamental cause, and that "any intervention from abroad was mere fishing in troubled waters."

*New element
in 1936*

The details in the body of the memorandum should make it clear that the domestic problem amply explains the trouble—but there is one new element which distinguishes the 1936 disturbances from those of the earlier years and which may perhaps be put down to outside influences—namely, the stiffened nature of the Arab resistance.

*Effect of
Italo-
Abyssinian
Dispute*

The Mandatory Power stated in its Report for 1935 that "a certain restlessness was engendered by the Italo-Abyssinian war."¹ This restlessness was common to all the Near Eastern States, as they watched with interest a clash between an European and a non-European people. Further, the comments in the vernacular press of the Arabic-speaking world on the more general aspects of the dispute make it clear that a number of new convictions were instilled by the failure of the League's attempt, led by the British Government, to stop the Italian aggression.

*Foreign
Propaganda*

The fact that the Arab resistance crystallised at a moment when Great Britain was busy with other complications provoked considerable comment in the British press, and there were statements and insinuations that the trouble had been directly fostered by foreign Powers.² Questioned on the subject in the Permanent Mandates Commission in June 1936, the British Accredited Representative did not reply,³ but the question was doubtless taken as referring to 1936, on the subject of which there was no call to do so. Arab representatives deny the allegations.⁴ So do the Italians; the *Giornale d'Italia* put down the Arab agitation "neither to the Abyssinian dispute nor to events in Europe, but to a situation which began to develop during the European war and which is due to the then British policy" which, as a result of promises to both Arabs and Jews, "juxtaposed two contrasting and unassimilable races who hate one another and can never collaborate."

(1) p. 5.

(2) See e.g. *The Times*, May 26, 1936.

(3) *Minutes of the 29th Session (May-June, 1936)*, p. 70.

(4) See Emile Ghory, "An Arab View of the Situation in Palestine," *International Affairs*, September-October, 1936, p. 692. "The disturbances in Palestine are not fomented by any foreign propaganda, and they have no foreign finance."

But this does not mean that there were no foreign factors at work. For instance, a detailed report in the *New York Times* of June 4 gave some "carefully verified extracts" from Italian broadcasts delivered in Arabic from the wireless station at Bari, one of which "would advise every Arab to understand how to get rid of the British incubus." The same paper reported that these talks grew less violent following a protest by the British Ambassador in Rome.

Arabs from abroad also contributed arms and recruits,¹ not to mention expert leadership in the person of Fawzi Kawkji, whose escape over the Palestinian frontier "with honour and without surrender" probably spared the Government an awkward arrest.²

*Effect of the
Emanci-
pation of
Neighbouring
States*

But a far more potent factor than the influence of foreigners or broadcasts is the constantly recurring news of the emancipation of neighbouring States. The Palestinian Arabs attribute the enviable independence of Transjordan to the absence of the Jews; they have witnessed the British treaty with the Emir in 1928,³ that with Iraq—"the least mature of all the Arabic-speaking Mandated Territories"⁴—in 1931, and that with Egypt in 1936. But the treaty which drives the contrast home most bitterly is, perhaps, that of September 9, 1936, between France and the neighbouring Mandated Territory of Syria. The Palestinian Arabs do not feel that the events of the last few years in Syria⁵ justify so marked a differentiation from themselves, or that a country is ready for self-government when the signing of the treaty is accompanied by the despatch of reinforcements.⁶

The following statement by a Palestinian Arab reflects the repercussions of the recent treaty-making and the consequent despair:—

"When does the minor become of age? That is not shown. Unless the Mandate is intended to make the minor remain a minor, I do not see why that provision was not put in. Syria has passed that age; Iraq has passed that age; Transjordan has grown up to that age, but Palestine does not seem to be getting anywhere."⁷

(1) See above, pp. 82 and 86.

(2) For further details, see "An Arab Leader got rid of," *The Times*, October 27, 1936; *Daily Telegraph*, October 22, 1936; *Daily Herald*, October 29, 1936.

(3) See above, pp. 20-21.

(4) Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs for 1934*, p. 285.

(5) See *Survey of International Affairs, 1934*, pp. 284-301; see also an article in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, September 12, 1936, which argues that recent events have proved "qu' à Damascus, jusqu' à ce jour, les institutions occidentales n'avaient été assimilées ni par les dirigeants ni par la masse."

(6) For details of the French reinforcements sent to Syria, see *The Times*, September 11, 1936.

(7) Emile Ghory, "An Arab View of the Situation in Palestine." *International Affairs*, September-October, 1936, p. 688.

It is doubtless for fear lest this despair should react back upon the other Arab States that the neighbouring Arab rulers of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and the Yemen have been at such pains to bring the Palestinian trouble to an end.

*Foreign
pressure
upon the
Mandatory*

Nor are the Arab States the only outside Powers to take a personal interest in the policy framed by the Mandatory. They press the claims of the Arabs, but other foreign States are almost equally insistent upon the claims of the Jews; of these, Poland is perhaps the chief. At the 1936 Assembly of the League of Nations the Polish delegate, after referring to the 3,000,000 Jews in Poland for whom emigration was the best hope of a higher standard of living, "trusted" that the Mandatory would not find it necessary to suspend immigration into Palestine—a view in which he was supported by other Eastern European States.¹ Of almost equal importance is a view expressed on February 1, 1936, by the President of the United States of America in a message of greeting to the National Conference for Palestine which had met "to mobilize American Jewry behind a constructive effort to further the rebuilding of the Jewish homeland in Palestine." The President said:

"... The American people, which has, by the action of Presidents and a Joint Resolution of Congress, attested its sympathy with the great purposes of a national Jewish home in Palestine will, I am persuaded, be ready to co-operate generously with the United Palestine Appeal which aims to provide a home for the homeless Jews. . . ."²

In fact, no step can be taken by the Mandatory without repercussions over a wide and varied field.

(1) See League of Nations, Seventeenth Assembly, *Minutes of the Sixth Committee*, Fifth meeting, October 6, 1936. See also Melchett, "European Jewry: the Polish Problem," *Spectator*, November 13, 1936.

(2) *New York Times*, February 2, 1936.

IX. CONCLUSION.

The ingredients of the present trouble in Palestine are some old, some new. Broadly speaking, the root causes are old, but the adamant stand taken by the Arabs is a new factor.

The Mandatory's task has always been difficult, and contemporary events unconnected with Palestine seem to be making it more so in that they seem to strengthen the Jewish and the Arab case. For instance, it is hard to refuse the Jews large immigration quotas when they are being banished from the territory of certain States and when they are prepared to bring in the capital that means prosperity for themselves and for others. It is equally hard, because of friction with the Jews who are immigrating through no fault of the Arabs, to deny the Palestinian Arabs the self-government towards which neighbouring States are progressing.

It should be noted that the Arabs do not demand Jewish withdrawal; neither their demands of 1930 nor those of 1935 asked for this; nor do they wish it now. "We are simply opposed to the political ambitions of the Zionists. . . . We are perfectly willing to accept the Jews already in the country, but we object to any more."¹ The cause of their unrest is fear lest not the Jews but political Zionism will reduce them to the level of a minority; it is hard to see how the Mandate can be executed unless this fear can somehow be dispelled.

*General views
on
Mandatory's
policy*

The discussions and memoranda on the subject of the disorders tended to ventilate a good deal of opinion on the general policy of Great Britain as Mandatory. As far as Jewish and Arab opinion is concerned, it is fair to state that what pleases the one automatically displeases the other, and that their criticisms, which have so far only too often been based on the policy of the community rather than on the possibility of working the Mandate in the interests of both parties, generally speaking cancel out.

The criticism of disinterested parties is of a different type; both in the British and foreign press and in the Permanent Mandates Commission the British Government has been accused of such deficiencies as (i) "restoring an outward peace and leaving the fear and bitterness smouldering and suppressed

(1) Interview given to the *Manchester Guardian*, July 14, 1936, by two members of an Arab delegation sent to London, Mr. Shibly Jamal and Dr. Izzat Tannous; c.f. also Ghory, "An Arab View of the Situation in Palestine," *International Affairs*, September-October, 1936, p. 692; and Miss Nabiha Nasia, "The Palestine Situation," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, October 1936, p. 574.

until the fever comes on again ;”¹ (ii) unsatisfactory “ hesitation between a system of separating the two categories of the population and a system of encouraging them to co-operate ;”² (iii) failure to read the signs of the times and attribute the proper significance to the demonstrations of Arab feeling which have been in progress since 1935. It is held that when the announcement of a Royal Commission in May 1936 had no effect whatsoever on the course of the disturbances, the Government should have realised that the matter was more serious than usual, and should have prevented further bloodshed either by ceding to the Arab demands or by taking the strong measures it did not take until September.

*The
Mandatory's
Reply*

The Mandatory's reply to the criticisms of its administration is that its policy has contributed to the well-being of both communities. It is providing educational and public health services which the Arabs lacked, and it is endeavouring to solve the land problem by its cadastral survey and by the promised enforcement of Arab retention of a “ viable minimum,” both of which will improve the situation with regard to Arab permanency of tenure. It has also sought to extend the cultivable area of the country and to obtain the best results from the land available by increased irrigation, by the intensification of cultivation through seed loans, and by the establishment of Government agricultural stations and colleges where the fellah is trained in modern methods—all of which steps are improving both stock and crops, and fast reducing the size of the “ viable minimum ” required for the subsistence of a family. As regards the Jews, it points out that it is endeavouring to fulfil its promise by facilitating immigration on a scale commensurate with the country's well-being, and that it has promoted this by such means as its cadastral survey, its drainage and reclamation schemes and its policy of protection for infant industries. To sum up, it argues that it has done its best to implement its pledges in exceedingly difficult conditions.

*Some recent
proposals for
Solution*

From statements by the British Government it is clear that no further progress will be made until the report of the Royal Commission is issued. Pending this, it is perhaps useful to summarise the solutions so far proposed both in past reports and in the considerable volume of constructive criticism which first the proposed new Constitution, and later the disturbances, have provoked in the correspondence columns of the British press.

(1) Mr. Archer Cust in *Great Britain and the East*, July 23, 1936, p. 117. C.f. also below p. 100.

(2) Count de Penha Garcia to the Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the 29th Session*, p. 142. His illustration of this was the encouragement of co-operation on the municipal councils but of segregation in the public works policy, which aimed at sending Jewish workmen to Jewish areas, Arab to Arab.

At the two extremes there are (i) those who support *in toto* the three basic demands of the Arabs—cessation of immigration, stoppage of land sales and establishment of a national constitutional government—and (ii) those who support the Revisionist Zionists in their claim for a Jewish state.¹

The many proposals advocating variants of the views which favour one community rather than the other cannot, for reasons of space, be summarised here. But between the two extremes come a series of proposals the object of which is to find a policy which will simultaneously achieve for both communities the maximum possible degree of contentment. The proposals cannot all be set out in full, but some of the main points lately made are given below ; for convenience they have been divided under four heads.

1. *Some economic suggestions*

The first head covers the suggestions which are based on the view that economic factors are the real cause of Arab discontent, and that the remedy is a more progressive policy of educational and agricultural development among the Arab community.

The proposals cover the three problems of land settlement, development and immigration :

(1) *Land Settlement*.—Whatever the answer to the basic question of how many people Palestine can be made to hold, the inevitable problem arising here is : what policy is to be adopted as regards the sale or transfer of land to Jews and as regards the racial considerations which often govern the employment of labour.

The Hope Simpson report, it will be remembered, condemned the policy of the Zionist colonisation agencies who incorporated in their lease agreements provisions prohibiting the sale or transfer of the land to non-Jews, or the employment of non-Jewish labour upon it. The opposite view is taken by Mr. Neville Barbour, in a recently issued pamphlet called " A Plan for Lasting Peace in Palestine,"² where he proposes that, in the interests of forming a genuine Jewish peasantry, official recognition should be given to the rules forbidding employment of non-Jews on Jewish National Fund lands. (On the other hand, he is not in favour of complete segregation, for he suggests that all Arab and Jewish industrial and business enterprises employing more than 20 persons shall be required to have at least 20 per cent. of the other race in their employ.)

(1) Perhaps the most extreme view on these lines is the letter from Mr. Edwyn Bevan in *The Times* of September 11, 1936, suggesting that the Palestinian Arabs should emigrate *en masse* to Iraq.

(2) Privately printed in Jerusalem, 1936. For a full review and summary see *The Times*, September 9, 1936.

Considerations of this kind, however, barely touch the important question of land sales. Here there is general agreement that the position of the Arabs must be safeguarded; the Government admitted as much when in February, 1936, it announced its intention of providing for the retention by each Arab family of a "viable minimum."¹

Mr. Barbour favours the fixing of certain zones within which land could only be sold to Arabs, and others within which it could only be sold to Jews. A variant of the same principle is suggested by Mr. Amery and Lord Lugard. "All experience of the contact between more highly developed and backward communities" writes Mr. Amery,² "leads to the conclusion that the one effective safeguard for the permanent interest of the backward community, pending its development, lies in retaining for it an adequate share of the land itself." And further, "the least we can do for the Arab is to recognise his present cultural and economic inferiority, and to impose such safeguards on his behalf as will in the long run assure his equal status in the national life of Palestine." Mr. Amery's practical suggestion is a guarantee of the inalienability, as from Arab to non-Arab, of an area, or areas, large enough for all present requirements, and, with improved cultivation, for a steady expansion of their numbers. Lord Lugard supported this proposal,³ which he believed should form the basis of a ten-year agreement during which period "the further proposals of the Royal Commission would have time to mature."

(ii) *Development.* Here again constructive critics are agreed that the Government must take more drastic steps than hitherto to educate the Arab (a) in order to reduce the size of the "viable minimum" and (b) in order to equalise the standard of development of the two sections of the population. The proposals in the Shaw, Hope Simpson and French reports to this end have been summarised in the body of the memorandum⁴; so has the suggestion made in the Permanent Mandates Commission that some of the unexpended budget surplus should be devoted to education.⁵

Sir Flinders Petrie recommends⁶ a system of loans to individual Arab farmers, conditional upon "following directions." The land would thus "be controlled by proper safeguards and fit

- (1) See above, p. 80.
- (2) *The Times*, August 8, 1936.
- (3) *The Times*, September 2, 1936.
- (4) See Chapter V above.
- (5) See above, pp. 33-4.
- (6) *The Times*, August 10, 1936.

inspectors," and in this way there would be room for three or four times the present population; Mr. Nevill Barbour, in the pamphlet already mentioned, proposes the diversion of one-fourth of the Government revenue from imports to the promotion of Arab industry for as long as the adverse trade-balance should continue.

(iii) *Immigration.* Here the suggestions fall under two heads: those relating to the rate of immigration advisable and those relating to the composition of the body fixing this rate.

As regards the first, Professor W. K. Hancock suggests a new approach to the problem;¹ he points out that quite apart from economic considerations, the political effect of immigration at the recent rate must be to "produce an explosion:"

"I have not worked out exact proportions but roughly speaking the 60,000 recorded immigration into Palestine in 1935 would be equivalent to an immigration of 500,000 into Canada or 350,000 into Australia."

He goes on to argue that the contrast of standards aggravates the problems created by this unusually large volume:

"It is also a national conflict, a conflict between different cultures and conceptions of life, and the values, ambitions and dreams which go with these."

the inference being that the rate of immigration allowed should be governed by political as well as by economic "absorbitive capacity."

As regards the second head, there are many recommendations that the Arabs should be represented on the body determining the rate of entry. (At present the labour schedule is fixed by the High Commissioner after consideration of the recommendations of the Immigration Department, which cover and comment upon those of the Jewish Agency.) Mr. Barbour² suggests that the Government should be assisted by a joint committee of Jews and Arabs, subject to the proviso that should the Jewish population at any time reach 85 per cent. of the Arab population, Jewish immigration should be automatically suspended unless the Joint Committee unanimously recommended otherwise. This would apparently permit the immigration of some 450,000 more Jews, even if the number of Arabs remained stationary and no Jews emigrated.

There have also been numerous suggestions for the temporary

(1) *The Times*, October 14, 1936.

(2) In his pamphlet already quoted; see above, p. 95.

2. Some
"Political"
proposals

cessation or reduction of Jewish immigration, mainly as a conciliatory measure directed towards ending the strike. Sir Stafford Cripps, for instance, proposed the temporary limitation of both Jewish and Arab immigration to the average figure of 1925-29 inclusive.¹ But the Zionists strongly condemn such a measure, and have frequently pointed out that it would constitute a capitulation to violence on the part of the Government.

Under the second head are set out some of the suggestions of those who feel that economic remedies alone are not enough, and that they must be reinforced by changes in the political system.

The views of the Jewish and Arab communities as to the proposed Legislative Council, as well as those expressed in the British Houses of Parliament and in the Permanent Mandates Commission, have already been summarised.² But some interesting ideas have also been put forward in press correspondence and elsewhere.

In *The Times* of August 8, 1936, Mr. Amery made some proposals which were subsequently endorsed by Lord Lugard.³ Mr. Amery argued that to give majority control to the Arabs, whether in the Legislature or the Administration, was simply to invite them to defeat the policy to which Great Britain was pledged; on the other hand he pointed out that it was equally impossible to go on refusing representative government indefinitely so long as the Jews were in a minority, or to contemplate handing over the Arabs to the unfettered discretion of an eventual Jewish majority. "Equality, and not mere numerical strength, is the basis for international relations," he wrote, "it is also the only workable basis for inter-community relations in a country like Palestine." He therefore proposed that any future constitutional development should be based on equality of representation, or at least of voting power, so that neither community could hope to pass legislation directly aimed at injuring the other. He elsewhere suggested⁴ that no vote on any issue should be valid unless it secured a majority from the representatives of each community.

Professor Norman Bentwich⁵ feels that a large official representation on a Legislative Council in which the Arabs outnumber the Jews will produce the objectionable position of forcing the Government to side with the Jews whenever it is necessary to counter or modify an Arab proposal. He advocates equal representation of Jews and Arabs with two or three Government officials to direct legislation and prevent deadlocks.

(1) *Manchester Guardian*, September 8, 1936.

(2) See above p. 81.

(3) *The Times*, September 2, 1936.

(4) *The Times*, January 10, 1936.

(5) *The Times*, August 22, 1936.

Mr. Nevill Barbour¹ takes rather a different view. He advocates the establishment of an Arab Agency on a parity with the Jewish Agency, to which should be invited permanent representatives of the adjacent Arab States, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and possibly also Egypt, who would rank as members of the Agency whenever any subject directly affecting their countries was discussed. He proposed that legislation should be the prerogative of the High Commissioner, but that a Joint Committee of the two Agencies should consider and report on all proposed legislation, and should also have the right to initiate legislation, which, however, the High Commissioner would not be bound to accept.

3. Some
"psychological"
proposals

Under the third head come the suggestions of those who feel that no action, political or economic, can be successful unless accompanied by a growth of economic and political co-operation between the Jews and Arabs themselves. An alternative view held by some of those who feel that the psychological element must be taken into account is that what is wanted is a firm statement of the British Government's policy, in one direction or another.

The view that nothing can be done without the co-operation of the two communities has been stressed in the findings of all the Commissions which have so far reported upon Palestine, and it has recently been endorsed by the various people who have suggested a conference between Arabs and Jews, either unofficial or under the aegis of the British Government, which might appoint a neutral chairman "to maintain harmonious relations."²

Others suggest that feeling on both sides is at present such that a lead is necessary from the Mandatory Power. "Each (community) has confession and restitution to make, but we British must begin," writes Mr. Thornton Duesbury from St. George's School, Jerusalem.³ He suggests that the first step is a "mutual admission of past wrong doing"; Lord Edward Gleichen, in the same issue of *The Times*, points out the psychological effect of "the British Government acknowledging that many of its promises have not been kept."

4. The
Cantonal
Solution

Finally, there is the "Segregationist" or "Cantonization" theory, the most radical solution so far propounded, which, dismissing the psychological solution of co-operation as impossible, and the mere modification of the *status quo*—whether by

(1) In his pamphlet already quoted; see above, p. 95.

(2) See letters in *The Times*, from Lord Lugard (September 2), Lord Winter-
ton (August 31 and September 7 and 28), and Mr. Israel Sieff (August 28 and
September 26), 1936.

(3) *The Times*, September 30, 1936.

economic or constitutional reform—as in itself inadequate, suggests the drastic step of dividing Palestine into two regionally distinct and practically autonomous States, one Jewish and one Arab, under a Palestinian Federal Government.

The two chief exponents of this policy are Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr. Archer Cust.¹ The former proposes² the division of Palestine into two independent autonomous States, one Jewish and one Arab, federated together in a Palestine Federal Government. Acquisition of land in, and immigration into each State should be controlled by that State itself, and not by the Federal Government, which should concern itself primarily with foreign relations, posts, telegraphs, transport and similar services, provided that other matters might be referred to it by agreement between the two States. Freedom of trade and transport should be guaranteed as between the States, and he suggests that the Arab State should be provided with a loan by the British Government for purposes of bringing standards of education and agriculture up to those which have been made possible for Jews by the capital provided by Jews.


In this scheme no suggestions are made as to the precise geographical position to be occupied by the Arab and Jewish States. Mr. Cust, on the other hand, has provided a fairly detailed description of their possible boundaries.³ The Jewish canton would comprise the maritime plain from north of Gaza, in the south, up to Acre, in the north, the plain of Esdraelon, and the Huleh Basin, and would include the Jewish cultural centres of Safed and Tiberias. The Arab canton would consist of the hill country of Judæa, Samaria and Galilee, and would be combined with the present State of Transjordan. An Arab corridor would have to be provided through the Moslem districts of Ramleh and Lydda to the sea at Jaffa, and some special arrangement might have to be made for the Beersheba district, where the population is still nomadic. Jerusalem and Bethlehem “which are world possessions,” and the port and oil area of Haifa would be reserved to direct administration by the High Commissioner. The obvious Arab objection to this plan is that it allots all the best land—except possibly the Jordan valley—to the Jews.

The plan would give the two “cantons” the fullest local autonomy, similar to that enjoyed at present by Transjordan.

(1) Mr. Archer Cust is an ex-official; he was Sir Herbert Samuel's A.D.C. when the latter was High Commissioner, and in all served for fourteen years in the Administration.

(2) *Manchester Guardian*, September 8, 1936.

(3) See *The Times*, May 19, 1936, and *Great Britain and the East*, July 23, 1936, p. 117.



A central Federal Government controlled by the Mandatory Power would be set up in Jerusalem, to which the two administrations would send representatives. Mr. Cust claims that the scheme would merely establish on a political basis a state of affairs which has to a large extent already come about by natural processes—since the Jews are now concentrated in the plains, where alone it is possible to introduce the intensive form of cultivation essential to their standard of living—and that it need entail no forcible exchange of persons or property, since there would be nothing to prevent Arabs from residing in the Jewish, or Jews in the Arab "canton."

Perhaps the most striking feature of the foregoing summary of the various plans proposed is the scarcity of comprehensive suggestions so far made for the solution of the problem. For this reason the report of the Royal Commission will be awaited with exceptional interest.

CHATHAM HOUSE.

December, 1936



APPENDIX I.

THE MANDATE FOR PALESTINE.¹

The Council of the League of Nations :

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them ; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country ; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country ; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine ; and

Whereas the Mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval ; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the Mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions ; and

Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations ;

Confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows :

ARTICLE 1.

The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this Mandate.

ARTICLE 2.

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

ARTICLE 3.

The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

(1) *British White Paper*, Cmd. 1785.

ARTICLE 4.

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

ARTICLE 5.

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any foreign Power.

ARTICLE 6.

The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

ARTICLE 7.

The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

ARTICLE 8.

The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the Mandate, be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

ARTICLE 9.

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ARTICLE 10.

Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.

ARTICLE 11.

The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

ARTICLE 12.

The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.

ARTICLE 13.

All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this Mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

ARTICLE 14.

A special Commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council.

ARTICLE 15.

The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

ARTICLE 16.

The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

ARTICLE 17.

The Administration of Palestine may organise on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine.

The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.

ARTICLE 18.

The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the Mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

ARTICLE 19.

The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of Palestine to any general international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property.

ARTICLE 20.

The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

ARTICLE 21.

The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nations of all States Members of the League of Nations.

(1)

“Antiquity” means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year A.D. 1700.

(2)

The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorisation referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(3)

No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said Department.

(4)

Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5)

No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorised by the competent Department.

(6)

Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

(7)

Authorisation to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorisations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8)

The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

ARTICLE 22.

English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

ARTICLE 23.

The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

ARTICLE 24.

The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the Mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

ARTICLE 25.

In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this Mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

ARTICLE 26.

The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 27.

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

ARTICLE 28.

In the event of the termination of the Mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council or the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the Mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Members of the League.

Done at London the twenty-fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.



APPENDIX II.

THE CHURCHILL MEMORANDUM, June 3, 1922.¹

PREAMBLE—The Secretary of State for the Colonies has given renewed consideration to the existing political situation in Palestine, with a very earnest desire to arrive at a settlement of the outstanding questions which have given rise to uncertainty and unrest among certain sections of the population. After consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine the following statement has been drawn up. It summarises the essential parts of the correspondence that has already taken place between the Secretary of State and a Delegation from the Moslem-Christian Society of Palestine, which has been for some time in England, and it states the further conclusions which have since been reached.

The tension which has prevailed from time to time in Palestine is mainly due to apprehensions, which are entertained both by sections of the Arab and of the Jewish population. These apprehensions, so far as the Arabs are concerned, are partly based upon the exaggerated interpretations of the meaning of the Declaration favouring the establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, made on behalf of His Majesty's Government on November 2, 1917. Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become "as Jewish as England is English." His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded *in Palestine*. In this connection it has been observed with satisfaction that at the meeting of the Zionist Congress, the supreme governing body of the Zionist Organisation, held in Carlsbad in September, 1921, a resolution was passed expressing as the official statement of Zionist aims "the determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing community, the up-building of which may assure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development."

It is also necessary to point out that the Zionist Commission in Palestine, now termed the Palestine Zionist Executive, has not desired to possess, and does not possess, any share in the general administration of the country. Nor does the special position assigned to the Zionist Organisation in Article 4 of the Draft Mandate for Palestine imply any such functions. That special position relates to the measures to be taken in Palestine affecting the Jewish population, and contemplates that the Organisation may assist in the general development of the country, but does not entitle it to share in any degree in its Government.

Further, it is contemplated that the status of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and it has never been intended that they, or any section of them, should possess any other juridical status.

So far as the Jewish population of Palestine are concerned, it appears that some among them are apprehensive that His Majesty's Government may depart from the policy embodied in the Declaration of 1917. It is

(1) *British White Paper*, Cmd. 1700.

necessary, therefore, once more to affirm that these fears are unfounded, and that that Declaration, re-affirmed by the Conference of the Principal Allied Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sèvres, is not susceptible of change.

During the last two or three generations the Jews have re-created in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers on the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact "national" characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic connection.

This, then, is the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the Declaration of 1917, and, so understood, the Secretary of State is of opinion that it does not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews.

For the fulfilment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment. Hitherto the immigration has fulfilled these conditions. The number of immigrants since the British occupation has been about 25,000.

It is necessary also to ensure that persons who are politically undesirable are excluded from Palestine, and every precaution has been and will be taken by the Administration to that end.

It is intended that a special committee should be established in Palestine, consisting entirely of members of the new Legislative Council elected by the people, to confer with the Administration upon matters relating to the regulation of immigration. Should any difference of opinion arise between this committee and the Administration, the matter will be referred to His Majesty's Government, who will give it special consideration. In addition, under Article 81 of the draft Palestine Order in Council, any religious community or considerable section of the population of Palestine will have a general right to appeal, through the High Commissioner and the

Secretary of State, to the League of Nations on any matter on which they may consider that the terms of the Mandate are not being fulfilled by the Government of Palestine.

With reference to the Constitution which it is now intended to establish in Palestine, the draft of which has already been published, it is desirable to make certain points clear. In the first place it is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation, that during the war His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that an independent national government should at once be established in Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated October 24, 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sherif of Mecca, now King Hussein of the Kingdom of the Hejaz. That letter is quoted as conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the district of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir H. McMahon's pledge.

Nevertheless, it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to foster the establishment of a full measure of self-government in Palestine. But they are of opinion that, in the special circumstances of that country, this should be accomplished by gradual stages and not suddenly. The first step was taken when, on the institution of a civil Administration, the nominated Advisory Council, which now exists, was established. It was stated at the time by the High Commissioner that this was the first step in the development of self-governing institutions, and it is now proposed to take a second step by the establishment of a Legislative Council containing a large proportion of members elected on a wide franchise. It was proposed in the published draft that three of the members of this Council should be non-official persons nominated by the High Commissioner, but representations having been made in opposition to this provision, based on cogent considerations, the Secretary of State is prepared to omit it. The Legislative Council would then consist of the High Commissioner as President and twelve elected and ten official members. The Secretary of State is of opinion that before a further measure of self-government is extended to Palestine and the Assembly placed in control over the Executive, it would be wise to allow some time to elapse. During this period the institutions of the country will have become well established; its financial credit will be based on firm foundations, and the Palestinian officials will have been enabled to gain experience of sound methods of government. After a few years the situation will again be reviewed, and if the experience of the working of the Constitution now to be established so warranted, a larger share of authority would then be extended to the elected representatives of the people.

The Secretary of State would point out that already the present Administration has transferred to a Supreme Council elected by the Moslem community of Palestine the entire control of Moslem religious endowments (Wakfs), and of the Moslem religious courts. To this Council the Administration has also voluntarily restored considerable revenues derived from ancient endowments which had been sequestrated by the Turkish Government. The Education Department is also advised by a committee representative of all sections of the population, and the Department of

Commerce and Industry has the benefit of the co-operation of the Chambers of Commerce which have been established in the principal centres. It is the intention of the Administration to associate in an increased degree similar representative committees with the various Departments of the Government.

The Secretary of State believes that a policy upon these lines, coupled with the maintenance of the fullest religious liberty in Palestine and with scrupulous regard for the rights of each community with reference to its Holy Places, cannot but commend itself to the various sections of the population, and that upon this basis may be built up that spirit of co-operation upon which the future progress and prosperity of the Holy Land must largely depend.

THE JEWISH AND ARAB REPLIES.

The British White Paper in which this statement of Policy is published also contains the replies of the Jews and Arabs to it.

The Jewish reply, in the form of a letter from Dr. Weizmann to the Colonial Office, transmitted the following resolution :

“ The Executive of the Zionist Organisation, having taken note of the statement relative to British policy in Palestine, transmitted to them by the Colonial Office under date June 3rd, 1922, assure His Majesty's Government that the activities of the Zionist Organisation will be conducted in conformity with the policy therein set forth.”

The Arab reply, on the other hand, declined to concur in the British Statement. It pointed out that the British document contained some mis-statements of fact to which those with local knowledge could not subscribe, notably that the Zionists did not “ possess any share in the general administration of the country.” It went on to claim that the Arabs of Palestine, who formed 93 per cent. of the population, had as much right as had the Jews to be “ confirmed in their national home.” After reiterating that the McMahon promise included independence for Palestine, the Arab reply concluded by pointing out that the Mandatory was wrong in thinking that its policy was acceptable to all sections of the population. On the contrary, it caused discontent among 93 per cent. of the whole, who feared the Zionists, who “ enter Palestine by the might of England against the will of the people who are convinced that they have come to strangle them. Nature does not allow the creation of a spirit of co-operation between two peoples so different. . . . The fact is that His Majesty's Government has placed itself in the position of a partisan in Palestine of a certain policy which the Arab cannot accept because it means his extinction sooner or later.”



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