THE MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF REBELLION AND REPRESSION:

RENTS, PATRONAGE, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN TAJIKISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN

Lawrence Markowitz
University of Wisconsin-Madison

The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research
2601 Fourth Avenue
Suite 310
Seattle, WA 98121

TITLE VIII PROGRAM

Project Information[*]

Principal Investigator:	**Lawrence Markowitz**
NCEEER Contract Number:	**821-09g**
Date:	**July 24, 2008**

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[*] The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, funds which were made available by the U.S. Department of State under Title VIII (The Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended). The analysis and interpretations contained herein are those of the author.

Executive Summary

Why do some governmental agents of violence – law enforcement and internal security services – defect to join independent militias, while others remain loyal to the regime? What effects do these shifts in authority have on state collapse? This working paper examines the conditions under which local elites mobilize state units of violence, prolonging state decline in some countries but driving weak states into failure in others. Empirically, the report examines how these processes have reinforced the rise of a rent-seeking, repressive state in Uzbekistan while residing at the center of state failure and civil war in Tajikistan.

Introduction

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In May 1992, Tajikistan's newly-created coalition government was rejected by local elites in several regions, who rapidly formed "united defense forces" of volunteers and local police units. Early revolts set in motion a fundamental shift in local state capacities within law enforcement and security forces in the country. Over the next three months, in district after district, law enforcement bodies armed and joined independent militias across Tajikistan. By August, rebellion had descended into civil conflict, sweeping through Tajikistan's southern and western provinces, overwhelming the central government, and producing a five-year civil war in which 50,000 people died and 800,000 people were displaced.

In Uzbekistan by contrast, the state has become increasingly repressive, built on a powerful internal security apparatus that has remained loyal to the regime. But that loyalty has depended on the consistent availability of rent-seeking opportunities. Repeatedly used to repress political dissent and support the extraction of rents by local elites, the mobilization of state violence in Uzbekistan culminated in the bloody crackdown on a grassroots uprising in Andijan Province in May 2005. What are the influences on agents of internal security and law enforcement in these countries that account for such different outcomes? How can the same state institutions in two highly similar countries be mobilized for such different political objectives?

Social scientists studying the state offer little insight into these questions or into the micropolitics of state failure generally. In his initial assessment on the subject, William Zartman argued that state failure is defined by "the absence of clear turning points, warning signals, thresholds, or signal spots,"[1] leaving little room for the systematic study of the causes, mechanisms, and processes that turn a declining state into a failed one. Cross-national studies identifying various causal factors have fared no better. Many of the factors proposed – the weight of imperial legacies,[2] myopic political leadership,[3] geographic and demographic conditions[4] – have been used to explain state decay as much as state failure. Single-country studies, by contrast, provide in-depth analysis sufficient to pinpoint thresholds at which a declining state is driven into failure, but rarely do so because they do not evaluate sub-national patterns of state failure.[5]

There is, however, good reason to assume that across cases "a clear turning point" of state failure is reached when state agents of violence have joined or aided independent militia forces. Far from a “slippery slope” or a “descending spiral”, state failure is, in fact, an aggregate of numerous individual moments when state agents of violence are transformed into independent militias and agents of rebellion. As Charles Tilly has noted of violent specialists in society, “they vary systematically in their proximity to (and sponsorship by) governments…and no sharp line separates their politics from those of armed forces belonging to established governments.”[6] Empirical studies of “state violence”, moreover, have demonstrated that government offices of law enforcement and public security often blend into paramilitary, militia, and private police forces.[7] Yet, there is surprisingly little discussion of this dynamic of violence within contexts of state failure. In contrast to the micro-comparative study of violence in insurgency, genocide, and civil war, we still know little about how units of violence are mobilized within failing state apparatuses.[8]

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[1] I. William Zartman (ed.), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1995), p. 9.

[2] Alexander Cooley, *Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States, and Military Occupations* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005); Mark R. Beissinger and Crawford Young, eds., *Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002).

[3] Robert Bates, *When Things Fall Apart: State Failure in Late-Twentieth Century Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Robert I. Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, 3 (2002), pp. 85-96.

[4] Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); David Laitin and James Fearon, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', *American Political Science Review* 97, 1 (2003), pp. 75–90.

[5] Barnett Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), Luis Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War, 1990–1998*. Translated by Jonathan Derrick (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); William Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Francis Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in Sudan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995).

What, then, promotes different strategies of mobilization? This working paper argues that rent-seeking and patronage pressures critically influence how local elites use their leverage over local offices of state violence. Extending theoretical insights from sociological institutionalism to the study of state failure, it specifies the top-down (coercive) and lateral (competitive) pressures that patronage exerts on political elites in infrastructurally weak states. While coercive pressures encourage state agents of violence to pursue rent-seeking and apply repression in the service of central state power, competitive pressures can push those same actors toward processes of state failure that challenge central political authority. The involvement of local law enforcement and security bodies in rent-seeking activities common to weak states is predicated on the same set of relationships that make them susceptible to paramilitary mobilization and state failure.

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[6] Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 28.

[7] James Ron, *Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., “The Post-Communist Wars,” *Journal of Democracy* 6, 4 (1995), pp. 18-34; William Stanley, *The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996).

[8] Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Scott Straus, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* (Ithaca:

Within a most similar design, this study uses process tracing to infer the causal paths by which variation in patronage pressures promote different strategies of mobilizing governmental agents of violence within declining state apparatuses.[9] Relevant indicators were carefully selected to weigh evidence of variables identified in the argument.[10] The bulk of the evidence for this report was collected during two field research trips to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in 2007 and 2008. The evidence gathered from this field research consists of various printed sources (local newspapers, ministry publications, political memoirs, international organization reports), individual interviews, and a survey of 50 specialists on legal issues in each country.

The rest of the report consists of three sections. First, I outline an explanation of why local organs of state violence are mobilized so differently within weak states. I argue that different patronage pressures on local elites lead them to mobilize local law enforcement and security bodies in ways that promote state failure in some cases and state decline in others. Second, I use case study material from Tajikistan to illustrate those pressures and the

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Cornell University Press, 2006); Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[9] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 205-232 especially.

[10] Evaluation of the dependent variable, the mobilization of state agents of violence, was conducted along two dimensions—the enforcement of government policy decisions and the monopoly of violence. Enforcement of government policies were analyzed by examining law enforcement activities in debt recovery, dispute settlement, and contract enforcement. The monopoly of violence across regions was indicated by the mobilization of local law enforcement and security bodies in support of non-state (militia, paramilitary) militarized action.

mobilization of state agents of violence in incidents of state failure across the country. Third, I briefly discuss how patronage pressures in Uzbekistan have led to the mobilization of local law enforcement actors in patterns of state decline.

I. Rent-Seeking and Patronage Pressures

I argue that rent-seeking and patronage pressures critically influence how local elites mobilize law enforcement bodies in weak states. I lay out the argument in three parts. First, I explain why local elites in countries defined by limited or unlootable wealth are more likely to be influenced by rent-seeking opportunities and patronage pressures. Second, I describe how top-down patronage pressures encourage local elites to preserve a monopoly of violence but use instruments of state coercion to advance their rent-seeking activities. Dependence on top-down patronage, in turn, supports state repression. Third, I explain how competitive pressures displace top-down patronage and promote disorder and civil war. Under conditions of intensified competition between local elites, the rise of state failure in one locality (e.g., the mobilization of law enforcement or security bodies into paramilitary formations) compel other elites competing with that locality to adopt similar strategies – thereby diffusing state failure.

a. Why Unlootable Resources Matter

To explain the effects of patronage pressures on rent-seeking elites, I focus on the set of weak states that command limited or unlootable wealth. Ascendant political economy approaches to state collapse have identified a close relationship between national wealth and intra-state conflict, but they have emphasized the availability of exploitable resources.

Countries possessing easily-extracted, transportable resources (e.g., gems, timber, and narcotics) – particularly in states with weak, ineffective institutions of extraction – are vulnerable to state collapse and disorder.[11]

Some cases of state failure, however, can be tied to wealth that is unlootable – natural resources or agricultural commodities that (1) have high economic barriers to entry (and require government assistance and investment) and (2) that are difficult to transport (and require the complicity of state agents to ship to market).[12] In these cases, rents, not resources, matter: elites cannot exploit forms of unlootable wealth without gaining influence in government. Since unlootable resource wealth limits exploitative elites to rents obtainable through political office, these elites are dependent on patronage to access those public avenues of rent-seeking.[13]

While patronage always produces social and political inequalities,[14] rural elites commanding unlootable wealth are particularly vulnerable to shifts in patronage politics that determine their inclusion or exclusion from state rents. Like clients elsewhere, these elites view political patronage as a “problem-solving network” from which information, resources, and social mobility can be obtained.[15]

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[11] Richard Snyder, "Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of Extraction Framework," *Comparative Political Studies* 39, 8 (2006), pp. 943-968; P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, 4 (2004), pp. 563-596; William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1998).

[12] James Fearon, "Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, 4 (2005), pp. 483-507; Michael L. Ross, "Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil War," in Karen Ballentine and Jack Sherman (eds.), *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2003), pp. 47-70; Philippe Le Billon, "The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts," *Political Geography* 20 (2001), pp. 561-584.

[13] Patronage is defined here as "the instrumental use of positions of power to distribute jobs, goods, and other public decisions to partisan supporters in order to maintain and strengthen positions of political power." Simona Piattoni, "Clientelism in Historical and Comparative Perspective," Simona Piattoni, ed., *Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 6.

[14] Conor O'Dwyer, *Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Kanchan Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Richard A. Joseph, *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); James Scott, "Patron-client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review* 66 (March 1972), pp. 91-113.

These relationships of dependence open elites to specific coercive and competitive pressures.[16] As I elaborate below, these two types of patronage pressures have very different effects on how elites mobilize agents of state violence in their localities: coercive pressures promote the use of state violence to sustain rent-seeking and repression, while competitive pressures promote the mobilization of state violence for rebellion. Although coercive and competitive pressures exist simultaneously in weak states at any given time, one application of state violence emerges at the expense of the other when one set of patronage pressures prevails over another.

Within weak states, variations in local economic power and in access to state rents determine whether coercive or competitive pressures prevail over local actors. I generate the following propositions to assess systematically how these factors influence the mobilization of agents of state violence for rebellion or repression.

b. When Coercive Pressures Prevail

In localities with high concentrations of productive wealth and continued access to state rents, top-down patronage pressures will prevail on local elites. Where local elites commanded significant economic resources, the balance of power in the locality favors them over local state officials. This in turn forces rulers to cede parts of the state apparatus to local elites in order to gain their compliance.[17]

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[15] Javier Auyero, “From the Client's Point(s) of View. How do Poor People Perceive and Evaluate Political Clientelism,” *Theory and Society* 28 (1999), pp. 297-334.

[16] On the susceptibility of peripheral actors to isomorphic pressures, see Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,” *American Sociological Review* 48 (April, 1983), pp. 147-160.

Local elites' access to resources and protection distributed through lines of patronage, however, make them susceptible to coercive pressures from above. This is particularly so when patronage ties open provide opportunities for rent-seeking that would not otherwise be available (or so lucrative). As the conduits along which "jobs, goods, and other public decisions" are distributed to "partisan supporters" on the periphery, these patronage ties facilitate coercive pressures from above and constrain the options of local elites. At the same time, dependence on patronage forces local elites to remain supportive of the regime. As long as resource-rich local elites retain access to state rents, conditions will favor the subordination of state violence to rent-seeking activities and repression. An extensive literature in Soviet studies has shown how these coercive pressures have been essential sources of support among national-level elites vying for power.[18]

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[17] Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Local agricultural enterprise heads in the Soviet system (collective farm chairs) similarly translated economic resources into political influence. Olivier Roy, *The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2000); Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).

[18] Pauline Jones Luong, *Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); James Critchlow, "Corruption, Nationalism, and the Native Elites in Soviet Central Asia," *Journal of Communist Studies* 4, 2 (1991), pp. 142-161. David Woodruff, *Money Unmade, Barter and the Fate of Russian Capitalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Michael E. Urban, *An Algebra of Soviet Power: Elite Circulation in the Belorussian Republic 1966-1986* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); D. Carlisle, "The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938-83)," *Central Asian Survey* 5 (1986), pp. 91-132; Joel C. Moses, *Regional Party Leadership and Policy Making in the USSR* (New York: Praeger, 1974); Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia, The Case of*

c. When Competitive Pressures Prevail

Competitive pressures will prevail in resource-poor regions where local elites are excluded from state rents. As constricted access to centrally distributed resources intensifies competition among peripheral elites, the emergence of state failure in one locality will lead elites competing with that locality to pursue similar strategies of mobilization. While rent-seeking elites certainly contribute to state decline, it is the effect of competitive pressures – generating imitative actions among them – that leads them to mobilize law enforcement and security bodies in their localities to rebel. This tendency among dependent actors to adopt their own political forms of others has been shown to be a durable feature of state development and institutional change elsewhere.[19]

A corollary to the mobilization of state failure concerns the outbreak of conflict. Because the mobilization of state violence in peripheral localities stems from competitive pressures – on top of rent-seeking motivations that foster privatized protection services – the potential for violent conflict is heightened. This added layer of competitive pressures helps explain why state failure ushered in civil war in Tajikistan, while states such as Colombia, that have large swathes of territory manifesting state failure, have avoided such a full-scale conflict.

Tadzhikistan (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).

[19] Hendrik Spruyt *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); see also, John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," *American Journal of Sociology* 103, 1 (1997), pp. 144-181.

II. STATE FAILURE IN TAJIKISTAN

How did Tajikistan's progressive decline descend so quickly into state failure and civil war? While sudden and unanticipated, the rise and spread of state failure across the country's localities was in fact highly patterned. As Figure 1 shows, most incidents of localized state failure – in which local state officials armed or merged into independent militias – occurred early and in a tightly compressed period. The highest concentration was in early May, with incidents of state failure in approximately 20 localities. By late June, the number of incidents involving law enforcement and security officials leveled off, averaging 10-12 per week, then dropping to 5 per week between August and December (except for a spike in early September).

As political disorder deepened and the country slid into civil war, however, the number of deaths in incidents that involved local officials escalated gradually. From May to August, when those in local law enforcement and security bodies were being mobilized, the number of deaths in incidents of state failure remained quite low. Between September and December, however, levels of violence escalated dramatically, reaching 200, 300, and ultimately 500 deaths per week. Before Tajikistan was torn apart by violent civil war, independent militia formations were organized, funded, and armed by local elites. A crucial component involved mobilizing local governmental agents of violence.

Figure 1: Law Enforcement Involvement in State Failure in Tajikistan (1992)



NUMBER OF VIOLENT INCIDENTS
PER WEEK INVOLVING LAW
INVOLVING ENFORCEMENT

NUMBER OF DEATHS
IN INCIDENTS
LAW ENFORCEMENT

To see whether standard accounts explain state failure in this case, I assess several explanatory variables to see if there are meaningful relationships between them and the onset of state failure in 40 localities in which local law enforcement and security bodies were first mobilized into independent militias. I categorize state failure onset by date and I run a simple multivariate regression analysis (see the results in Appendix table 1.1). Weak state capacity (measured by high crime rates), clan divisions, and proximity to Afghanistan have no statistically significant relationship with the initial onset of state failure. The highest levels of crime in 1991, for instance, were in Kuliab District where 71 highway patrol officers had not been paid in three months and 25 percent of the police force had not obtained appropriate housing.[20] Yet, Kuliab's law enforcement bodies were mobilized into regional militias only in response to incidents of state failure in other localities. Clan divisions were prevalent in Kurgan-Teppe Province,[21] but law enforcement officials in its localities were mobilized relatively late (well after their counterparts in more homogenous regions). Contrary to spillover accounts, proximity to Afghanistan has no consistent relationship to the onset of state failure.

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[20] O. Rustamov, "Lyudi hotyat poryadka, zakonnosti," *Kuliabskaia pravda*, February 1, 1992, pp. 1-2; R. Odinaev, "Prestupnost' rastet, a militsiia…," *Kuliabskaia pravda*, March 28, 1992, pp. 1-2.

[21] Kathleen Collins, *Clan Politics and Regime Change in Central Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Bushkov, V.I. and D.V. Mikul'skii. 1996. *Anatomii grazhdanskoi voiny v Tadzhikistane: etno-sotsialnye protsessy i politischeskaia bor'ba: 1992-1995*. Moskva: Institut.

Two factors were statistically significant with state failure onset: distance from the capital and low resource wealth (measured as irrigated land). This suggests that state failure in Tajikistan began in resource-poor regions (characterized by little arable land) that were far from Dushanbe and worked inward toward more centrally-located resource-rich regions. Localities vulnerable to early onsets of state failure were geographically and economically marginalized, possessing limited (or inaccessible) wealth and thus highly dependent on political patronage to access state rents.

Since several regions experienced a second onset of state failure (in which law enforcement and security actors in a locality that did not initially join paramilitary militias did so later), I run a second linear regression analysis to determine any relationships between these explanatory variables and this onset (see Appendix table 1.2).[22] While a region's weak state capacity, resource wealth, proximity to Afghanistan, and distance from the capital were not statistically significant, clan cleavage was highly significant, indicating that clan divisions became increasingly important as state failure spread across Tajikistan. This is simply because a second onset of state failure occurred due to competitive pressures *within*, not across, regions – when local law enforcement bodies defected to militias in opposition to armed formations that had emerged earlier within the region. While state failure was, to some degree recursive, existing evidence suggests that the date of prior state failure onset was not statistically significant.

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[22] An attempt to run a logistic regression failed because there was not enough variance.

What story, however, do these findings tell? Tajikistan's state failure occurred over four phases in which competitive pressures promoted local revolts, encouraged reactions against those revolts, drove violent conflict, and were overtaken by forces arising from violence of civil war. In the first phase, the reforms of *glasnost'* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring) under Mikhail Gorbachev took shape across the USSR, their application in Tajikistan brought forth competitive pressures that were largely hidden during the late Soviet period.[23] These pressures – that had been exacerbated by ongoing mass demonstrations in Dushanbe throughout early 1992 – generated localized revolts in Garm District. Merging law enforcement and security forces into paramilitary formations, an Opposition militia first emerged in Garm on May 1st, armed and aided by local law enforcement. Traveling toward Dushanbe the following day, the militia rapidly expanded as local police stations joined and armed it in districts of Jirghatal, Kofarnihon, and Komsomolobod.[24] It was initially organized to block roads into Dushanbe from Tajikistan's southern regions.

In the second phase, old guard elites' calls for restoring their access to rents were transformed into calls for self-defense, particularly in Kuliab and Leninabad. After several days of violence in Dushanbe, Tajikistan's ruling hardliners had attempted to mitigate rising competitive pressures by establishing a coalition government. This initiative was immediately rejected in Kuliab and Leninabad, whose elites saw the new government as solidifying their exclusion from political power. In Kuliab, regional authorities assembled "a united defense force" out of the district's various police units and a special account was established for contributions to fund these forces.[25]

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[23] In particular, purges opened many of the republic's top posts—long-held by old guard elites from provinces of Leninabad, Kurgan-Teppe, and Kuliab—to cadres from the Karategin Valley and Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO). Author's collection of biographies; Hikmatullo Nasriddinov, *Tarkish* (Dushanbe: Afsona, 1995), pp. 33-34; A.Sh. Niiazi, "Tadzhikistan: konflikt regionov," *Vostok* 2 (1997), pp. 94-107.

[24] Kirill Nourzhanov, "Saviours of the Nation or Robber Barons? Warlord Politics in Tajikistan," *Central Asian Survey* 24, 2 (2005), pp. 109-130.

Driving this mobilization, however, were competitive pressures that led Kuliab's elite to view itself under attack. As one leader in Kuliab declared, "The opposition not only stands against the people of our province. It is against Ozodi Square, where the heads of 54 districts of Tajikistan gathered on the side of the government. Kuliabis were the first to go out on the square, and that is why the opposition considers them their main enemy."[26] The rise of militia formations in Garm and its neighbors, moreover, was intensified by the mobilization of personnel and arms in neighboring Kurgan-Teppe Province, where fragmented Opposition forces were attacking pro-government protestors returning from Dushanbe[27] and targeting local prokurators for assassination and kidnapping to deter investigations into their illegal arms collections.[28] Against a backdrop of competitive pressures, localized revolts in individual localities produced a sense of isolation and vulnerability that was particularly acute in Kuliab Province.

By early June, Tajikistan entered the third phase of state failure in which competitive pressures were driving conflict between regional civil authorities. Across the country, "self-defense units" were being established, patterned after those established in Kuliab. Along lines of organization, geography, and mobilization these self-defense units were highly similar. Organizationally, they were all formed under the authority of civilian administrators – district administrators, farm chairs, and religious leaders (mullahs) – with armed formations led by field commanders made up of assorted security service and law enforcement officials, local administrators, and leaders of criminal groups. Moreover, self-defense units typically were centered on district political offices or other institutional centers such as mosques and collective farms. In fact, locations of mobilization on both sides tended to reflect which patronage group had occupied the district apparatus—and which had not.[29]

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[25] "Defense Force Formed in Kulyabskiy District," *Interfax* as cited in FBIS-SOV-92-109, May 29, 1992.

[26] Igor Rotar, "Kommunist mozhet byt' pravovernym musul'maninom, schitaet imam hasib Kuliabskii mecheti Khaidar Sharifzoda," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (June 5, 1992), p. 3.

[27] Gholib Ghoibov, *Ta'rikhi Hatlon az oghoz to imro'z* (Dushanbe, Donish, 2006), p. 695.

[28] Safarali Kendzhaev, *Perevorot v Tadzhikistane* (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1996), pp. 237-238.

The patterns by which each side armed itself also reflected the shape of patronage ties. In one standoff in Kurgan-Teppe City, for instance, "self-defense" divisions in Kuliab's Moscow District sent weapons to their fellow opponents of the GNR in Kurgan-Teppe City.[30] In other localities, police stations in Kurgan-Teppe handed over weapons to local armed formations or to armed groups from Kuliab entering the province in late June of 1992.[31] The flow of weapons from local police into the hands of independent militia forces closely tracked patronage ties extending from district political offices and other local institutions outward.[32]

As Tajikistan descended into civil war in the fall of 1992, a fourth and final shift in authority within law enforcement and security bodies occurred when field commanders and militia leaders displaced civil authorities' control over armed formations on the ground.

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[29] In localities where the old guard elites remained in control of district political offices (such as in Vakhsh, Kolkhozobod, Kommunist, Kumsangir, and Jiliqul) supporters of the Opposition organized mostly around mosques and farms. Opposition forces in these localities organized around "Turkmenistan" Sovkhoz in Vakhsh District, the Kurgan-Teppe Province mosque, district mosques of Kolkhozobod, Kumsangir, and Jiliqul Districts, and in various points surrounding the center of Kalininabad District. Kendzhaev, *Perevorot v Tadzhikistan*, pp. 251-53, 262; Author's database; Roy (2000).

[30] Kendzhaev, *Perevorot v Tadzhikistan*, p. 267.

[31] In particular, weapons were ceded to "pro-Nabiev" supporters in two localities where Kuliab had long had connections through its patronage ties—Kolkhozobod and Vakhsh Districts. "Buildup of Weapons Marks Drift Toward War," *Komsomolskaya Pravda* as cited in FBIS-SOV-92-119, June 19, 1992. In Pyanj District police forces previously believed to be neutral vacated the district police and national security committee buildings and handed over their weapons "without a single shot being fired" to Kuliab-based forces. They then "went into hiding fearing reprisals against them". Panfilov, Oleg. 1992. "Tadzhikistan blizok k grajdanskoi voine, chitaet predsedatel' komiteta vs Abdullo Habibov," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (June 20), p. 3; "Buildings Captured by Rakhman's Supporters," *Postfactum* as cited in FBIS-SOV-92-119, June 19, 1992.

[32] Christina Wille, Stina Torjesen, and S. Neil MacFarlane, "Tajikistan's Road to Stability: Reduction in Small Arms Proliferation and Remaining Challenges," *Occasional Paper No. 17* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005).

By October and November 1992, all civilian institutions were literally signed over to the militias in each region.[33] While this allowed pro-government militias to be united under a single command and (with foreign assistance) defeat Opposition forces, it represented a point at which the conflict was transformed from one driven by competitive patronage pressures to one propelled by regional and clan identities that become salient amidst the violence of civil war.

Since the end of the war, the regime has sought to renew top-down coercive pressures on local elites. In some localities, where it has succeeded, local law enforcement bodies "have become a weapon in the hands of government for the elimination of those commanders, businessmen, and politicians that do not ingratiate themselves."[34] In other localities, where rent-seeking opportunities have not bound local elites to the regime, law enforcement agencies "openly serve the interests of commanders [chinovnikov]."[35] The limited success in applying top-down patronage pressures on these elites is partly because Tajikistan's 1997 peace agreement integrated former militias without demobilizing or disarming them; as a result, today's local elites are thinly disguised former militia commanders.[36]

Specialists on local and legal issues surveyed in Tajikistan on how local prokurators enforce the extraction of crop yields (especially grain and cotton) and collect debts owed to the center, found that regions associated with the Opposition – Kofarnihon, Faizabad, Varzob, Tavildara, Garm, Tajikabad, Darband, Jirghatal, and (to a lesser extent)

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[33] Nourzhanov, "Saviours of the nation".

[34] Interview #11 with specialist on local and regional legal issues, Dushanbe, August-September 2007.

[35] Interview #2 with specialist on local and regional legal issues, Dushanbe, August-September 2007.

[36] Stina Torjesen and S. Neil McFarlane, "R before D: The Case of Post Conflict Reintegration in Tajikistan," *Conflict, Security and Development* 7, 2 (2007), pp. 311-332.

GBAO – all performed their duties at a much lower level (see Appendix tables 3.2 and 4.2). Cross-regional differences in performance between these regions and those associated with pro-government forces during the war are statistically significant, highlighting the continuing salience of postwar regional politics.

III. STATE DECLINE IN UZBEKISTAN

Despite large-scale purges of Uzbekistan's political elite and anti-corruption reforms from the mid-1980s onwards, local law enforcement continued to be mobilized in support of rent-seeking activities in ways that had crystallized during the late Soviet period.[37] By dramatically expanding local elites' access rents, the central government was able to retain their compliance, despite the rise of competitive pressures similar to those in Tajikistan.

But this internal cohesion was achieved at the price of weakened law enforcement capacity, which would become increasingly captured by enterprise managers and farm chairs and the political elite in many of Uzbekistan's provinces. Patronage networks within and across provinces of the republic were renewed in the late 1980s, which bound local elites to the regime by effectively subordinating the law enforcement and security apparatus to the exploitation of rent-seeking opportunities by local elites.

In 1992, procurement quotas were lifted, and independent retail shops were opened in each district, allowing district and regional governors to extend their control over this retail trade.[38] Starting in 1994, government subsidies to agricultural enterprises were distributed through two state banks, "Pakhtabank" (for cotton) and "Gallabank" (for grain), whose local branches came under the influence of local elites. A massive outflow of delinquent loans followed, amounting to more than 20 billion Uzbekistani so'm (over US$500 million) in two years.[39] Moreover, many loans were disbursed based on pressure from district governor offices.[40]

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[37] See P. Lukyanchenko, "Ochishchenie pravdoi," *Pravda Vostoka* (September 17, 1988), p. 2.

[38] The World Bank, *Uzbekistan: An Agenda of Economic Reform* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1993), p. 120.

[39] Estimations are far higher, and a 1994 audit of Pakhtabank conducted by Arthur Andersen estimated that 40 percent of the bank's loan portfolio had defaulted. The World Bank (1997: 52); Interview, Professors of finance, Tashkent, March 2003; Interview, TACIS staff member, Tashkent, April 2003.

Tax incentives and liberalized foreign trade was a third set of concessions from the center. A presidential decree in 1992 abolished the value added tax on agricultural enterprises and exempted them from income tax for five years if they obtained foreign investment.[41] At the same time, local enterprises were given more freedom to negotiate sales of portions of their crops directly with commercial clients.[42] This commerce fell under the control of regional governors in February 1994 when the Ministry of Trade was turned into a state stock association (called *Uzbeksavdo*) and its regional branches placed under regional governors.[43]

By the mid-1990s, these and other concessions had created a rising class of rural elites, whose continued access to rents depended on patronage from the central government. As local elites took advantage of these opportunities, however, the capacities of local law enforcement diminished. In the immediate term, concessions to the periphery resulted in significant losses of state revenue, the retrenchment of economic reforms, and the forfeiture of IMF loans in 1996. Over the longer term, the outflow of state funds provided many collective farm chairs, state company heads, and district governor staff members with wealth necessary to establish themselves in the new economic environment. Disposable income provided a means to illegally farm state land with impunity, purchase large tracts of land

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A 1999 audit of Pakhtabank found that very few loans were paid. Arthur Andersen. 1999. *Specialized joint stock commercial bank 'Pakhta bank,' Financial Sector Development Agency Long Form Audit Report* (31 December).

[40] The World Bank, *Uzbekistan Rural Finance Project Interim Report*. Draft copy (July 30, 1997), p. 52; Interviews with staff of district governor offices in Ferghana, Navoii, Namangan, Kashkadarya and Samarkand Provinces, April-August 2003.

[41] Gregory Gleason, *Markets and Politics in Central Asia, Structural reform and political change* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 125-126.

[42] Alisher Ilkhamov, Divided Economy: Kolkhoz System vs. Peasant Subsistence Economy in Uzbekistan. *Central Asia Monitor* 4 (2000), p. 7.

from district governments and start small plantations, or enter into favored business arrangements with local authorities.[44]

Specialists in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan asked to assess the overall effectiveness of local prokurators in their country across four time periods between 1987 and 2007 found a significant decline in Uzbekistan. As Figure 2 shows, Tajikistan's local prokurators' drop in effectiveness during the civil war reflects the fact that prokurators and other law enforcement offices lay at the center of violent contention during the heady moments of Tajikistan's state collapse and civil war.

Figure 2: Local Prokurator Effectiveness in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan



Note: The five-point scale rated local prokurator effectiveness as follows: 5="well above average", 4="somewhat above average", 3="average", 2="somewhat below average", and "1=well below average".

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[43] Gleason, p. 123.

[44] Interviews in Ferghana and Samarkand Regions, April-July 2003.

In Uzbekistan, however, local prokurator performance has steadily declined, reaching a point ("somewhat below average") nearly even with prokurator performance in Tajikistan during its civil war. This assessment illustrates the extent to which local state capacities have diminished in Uzbekistan as a result of the central leadership's reliance on the distribution of patronage to keep local elites loyal to the regime.

The regime's expansion of rent-seeking opportunities across all regions has reduced differences between regions. While most regional differences in how prokurators carry out their responsibilities were not, for the most part, statistically significant, there are discernible patterns in how specialists in Uzbekistan rated local prokurator performance across provinces. Local prokurators were generally less likely to adhere to central directives in those regions where coercive pressures are less likely to take hold – in Kaskadarya, Syrdarya, Khorezm, and Karakalpakistan, which have low concentrations of productive wealth and limited access to state rents. Conversely, local prokurators in resource-rich regions enjoying greater access to centrally distributed rents – Tashkent, Ferghana, Andijan, Samarkand, Bukhara, and Surkhandarya – were rated slightly higher since local elites in those areas have more rent-seeking opportunities and are more susceptible to top-down patronage pressures.[45] These patterns provide a context for recent developments amidst local politics in Uzbekistan.

On one hand, these findings emphasize the difficulties of the central leadership in applying patronage pressures on local elites in those areas where access to rents is low and resources are sparse. Regional elites in Kashkadarya, Karakalpakistan and Khorezm have been less willing to mobilize local law enforcement actors to implement government policies such as privatization and defending the rights of independent farmers and entrepreneurs.[46] While it is increasingly doubtful that state failure might emerge in Uzbekistan today as it did in Tajikistan in the early 1990s, these are areas in which competitive pressures are most likely to arise in the future.

On the other hand, the effectiveness of patronage pressures on local elites who have much to gain from the rent-seeking opportunities provided to them, has led them to willingly use highly repressive methods of resource extraction and social control. This has led to rising popular discontent that not only targets these elites but also local law enforcement and security bodies. The latter have been targets of numerous riots and protests over the last several years, including violent confrontations in Ferghana Province (November 2004), in Jizzax Province (March 2005), and, most notably in Andijan Province (May 2005).[47]

A defining feature of these protests and opposition to the state is the targeting of both local elites (district and provincial governor offices) and local law enforcement and security bodies (offices of the prokurator, police, and internal security). As long as the regime relies on rent-seeking and top-down patronage pressures to retain its influence over its regions, the mobilization of local government agents of violence will continue to support the rent-seeking agendas of local elites – and income disparities will continue produce discontent that focuses on the avarice of local elites and the repression of law enforcement and security forces.

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[45] The major outlier is Navoii Province, which is largely run by political elites transplanted from the neighboring provinces of Samarkand and Bukhara. Author’s database of political appointments in Uzbekistan from 1960-1991.

[46] Interviews of specialists on local and legal issues in Uzbekistan, January 2008.

[47] Cory Welt, “Uzbekistan: The Risks and Responsibilities of Democracy Promotion,” *PONARS Policy Memo 365* (Washington, CSIS, 2005); International Crisis Group, “Uzbekistan: The Andijan Uprising,” *Asia Briefing*

V. CONCLUSION

Mobilizing violence in state apparatuses of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan took very different forms in the 1990s. In Tajikistan, state agents armed and joined independent militias and paramilitary units amidst competitive pressures unleashed by anti-corruption reforms in the late Soviet period. In Uzbekistan, similar reforms did not allow these pressures to displace the effects of top-down patronage. New rent-seeking opportunities opened to local elites bound them to the regime and they mobilized law enforcement and security bodies in their localities to exploit those opportunities. The predominance of different patronage pressures have helped shape the trajectories of state development in these countries, contributing to the rise of state apparatuses that are regionally-divided in Tajikistan and highly repressive in Uzbekistan.

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APPENDICES

Appendix table 1.1: Regional Level Factors Determining the *First* State Failure Onset in Tajikistan.

[Multivariate regression with *first* state failure onset as the dependent variable]

Variable	*Estimated Coefficient*
Distance from the capital	.136 (.061)**
General crime rates	.164 (.593)
Irrigated land	-.017 (.008)**
Clan cleavages	.058 (.081)
Proximity to Afghanistan	.040 (.086)
Constant	4.378 (.397)***
R squared	.391

Significance levels: *=.10, **=.05, ***=.01

Appendix table 1.2: Regional Factors Determining the *Second* State Failure Onset in Tajikistan.

[Multivariate regression with *second* state failure onset as the dependent variable]

Variable	*Estimated Coefficient*
Distance from the capital	-.018 (.050)
General crime rates	-.095 (.460)
Irrigated land	.001 (.007)
Clan cleavages	.297 (.063)***
Proximity to Afghanistan	.024 (.071)
First state failure onset	.182 (.135)
Constant	1.879 (.666)***
R squared	.516

Significance levels: *=.10, **=.05, ***=.01

Appendix table 2.1: Regional Differences in How Local Prokurators Settle Land Tenure Disputes, Uzbekistan

	Tashkent	Navoii	Samarkand	Ferghana	Jizzax	Bukhara	Andijan	Sirdarya	Surkhan.	Namangan	Kashka.	Khorezm	Karakalp.
Tashkent	---	.12	.22	.24	.24	.26	.26	.16	.22	.26	.39*	.24	.33
Navoii		---	.10	.12	.12	.14	.14	.04	.10	.14	.27	.08	.21
Samarkand			---	.02	.02	.06	.06	.06	0	.04	.17	.02	.11
Ferghana				---	0	.04	.04	.08	.02	.02	.15	0	.09
Jizzax					---	.04	.04	.08	.02	.02	.15	0	.09
Bukhara						---	0	.12	.06	.02	.11	.04	.05
Andijan							---	.12	.06	.02	.11	.04	.05
Sirdarya								---	.08	.10	.23	.08	.17
Surkhan.									---	.04	.17	.02	.11
Namangan										---	.13	.02	.07
Kashka.											---	.15	.06
Khorezm												---	.06
Karakalp.													---

Significance levels: * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .01

Appendix table 2.2: Regional Differences in How Local Prokurators Settle Land Tenure Disputes, Tajikistan

	Sughd	Tursunz.	Lenin	GBAO	Hissar	Hatlon	Kofarn.	Shahrinau	Faizabad	Varzob	Tavildara	Garm	Tajikabad	Darband	Jirghatal
Sughd	---	.20	.26	.19	.22	.34**	.36**	.29*	.37**	.50***	.36**	.41**	.38**	.48***	.48***
Tursunz.		---	.06	.01	.02	.14	.16	.09	.17	.30*	.16	.21	.18	.28*	.28*
Lenin			---	.07	.04	.08	.10	.03	.11	.24	.10	.15	.12	.22	.22
GBAO				---	.03	.15	.17	.10	.18	.31*	.17	.22	.19	.29*	.29*
Hissar					---	.12	.14	.07	.15	.28*	.14	.19	.16	.26	.26
Hatlon						---	.02	.05	.03	.16	.02	.07	.02	.12	.12
Kofarn.							---	.07	.01	.14	0	.05	.02	.12	.12
Shahrinau								---	.08	.21	.07	.12	.09	.19	.19
Faizabad									---	.13	.01	.04	.01	.11	.11
Varzob										---	.14	.09	.12	.02	.02
Tavildara											---	.05	.02	.12	.12
Garm												---	.03	.07	.07
Tajikabad													---	.10	.10
Darband														---	0
Jirghatal															---

Significance levels: * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .01

Appendix table 3.1: Regional Differences in How Local Prokurators Collect Debts Owed to the State, Uzbekistan

	Tashkent	Navoii	Samarkand	Ferghana	Jizzax	Bukhara	Andijan	Sirdarya	Surkhan.	Namangan	Kashka.	Khorezm	Karakalp.
Tashkent	---	.25	.23	.44*	.42*	.20	.35	.34	.35	.34	.36	.49**	.50**
Navoii		---	.02	.19	.17	.05	.10	.09	.10	.09	.11	.24	.25
Samarkand			---	.21	.19	.03	.12	.11	.12	.11	.13	.26	.27
Ferghana				---	.02	.24	.09	.10	.09	.10	.08	.05	.06
Jizzax					---	.22	.07	.08	.07	.08	.06	.07	.08
Bukhara						---	.15	.14	.15	.14	.16	.29	.30
Andijan							---	.01	0	.01	.01	.14	.15
Sirdarya								---	.01	0	.02	.15	.16
Surkhan.									---	.01	.01	.14	.15
Namangan										---	.02	.15	.16
Kashka.											---	.13	.14
Khorezm												---	.01
Karakalp.													---

Significance levels: * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .01

Appendix table 3.2: Regional Differences in How Local Prokurators Collect Debts Owed to the State, Tajikistan

	Sughd	Tursunz.	Lenin	GBAO	Hissar	Hatlon	Kofarn.	Shahrinau	Faizabad	Varzob	Tavildara	Garm	Tajikabad	Darband	Jirghatal
Sughd	---	.25	.35**	.31*	.41**	.33**	.39**	.56***	.49***	.58***	.62***	.62***	.68***	.64***	.68***
Tursunz.		---	.10	.06	.16	.08	.14	.32**	.24	.34**	.37**	.37**	.43***	.39**	.43***
Lenin			---	.04	.14	.02	.04	.21	.14	.23	.27*	.27*	.33**	.31*	.31*
GBAO				---	.10	.02	.08	.25	.18	.27*	.31*	.31*	.37**	.33**	.33**
Hissar					---	.08	.02	.15	.08	.17	.21	.21	.27*	.23	.27*
Hatlon						---	.06	.23	.16	.25	.29*	.29*	.35**	.31*	.35**
Kofarn.							---	.17	.10	.19	.23	.23	.29*	.25	.29*
Shahrinau								---	.07	.02	.06	.06	.12	.08	.12
Faizabad									---	.09	.13	.13	.19	.15	.19
Varzob										---	.04	.04	.10	.06	.10
Tavildara											---	0	.06	.02	.06
Garm												---	.06	.02	.06
Tajikabad													---	.04	.10
Darband														---	.04
Jirghatal															---

Significance levels: * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .01

Appendix table 4.1: Regional Differences in How Local Prokurators Enforce the Extraction of Crop Yields, Uzbekistan

	Tashkent	Navoii	Samarkand	Ferghana	Jizzax	Bukhara	Andijan	Sirdarya	Surkhan.	Namangan	Kashka.	Khorezm	Karakalp.
Tashkent	---	.02	.04	.15	.06	.01	.17	.02	0	.23	.02	.12	.15
Navoii		---	.02	.13	.04	.01	.15	0	.02	.21	0	.10	.13
Samarkand			---	.11	.02	.03	.13	.02	.04	.19	.02	.08	.11
Ferghana				---	.09	.14	.02	.13	.15	.08	.13	.03	0
Jizzax					---	.05	.11	.04	.06	.17	.04	.06	.09
Bukhara						---	.16	.01	.01	.22	.01	.11	.14
Andijan							---	.15	.17	.06	.15	.05	.02
Sirdarya								---	.02	.31	0	.10	.13
Surkhan.									---	.23	.02	.12	.15
Namangan										---	.21	.11	.08
Kashka.											---	.10	.13
Khorezm												---	.03
Karakalp.													---

Significance levels: * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .01

Appendix table 4.2: Regional Differences in How Local Prokurators Enforce the Extraction of Crop Yields, Tajikistan

	Sughd	Tursunz.	Lenin	GBAO	Hissar	Hatlon	Kofarn.	Shahrinau	Faizabad	Varzob	Tavildara	Garm	Tajikabad	Darband	Jirghatal
Sughd	---	.20	.18	.44***	.24	.24	.26	.34**	.36**	.40**	.52***	.42**	.56***	.50***	.54***
Tursunz.		---	.02	.24	.04	.04	.06	.14	.16	.20	.32**	.22	.36**	.30*	.34**
Lenin			---	.26	.06	.06	.08	.16	.18	.22	.34**	.24	.38**	.32**	.34**
GBAO				---	.20	.20	.02	.10	.12	.04	.08	.02	.12	.06	.10
Hissar					---	0	.02	.10	.12	.16	.28*	.18	.32**	.26	.30*
Hatlon						---	.02	.10	.12	.16	.28*	.18	.32**	.26	.30*
Kofarn.							---	.08	.10	.14	.26	.16	.30*	.24	.28*
Shahrinau								---	.02	.06	.18	.08	.22	.16	.20
Faizabad									---	.04	.16	.06	.20	.14	.18
Varzob										---	.12	.02	.16	.10	.14
Tavildara											---	.10	.04	.02	.02
Garm												---	.14	.08	.12
Tajikabad													---	.06	.02
Darband														---	.04
Jirghatal															---

Significance levels: * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .01

Appendix table 5.1: Regional Differences in How Local Prokurators Support Privatization, Uzbekistan

	Tashkent	Navoii	Samarkand	Ferghana	Jizzax	Bukhara	Andijan	Sirdarya	Surkhan.	Namangan	Kashka.	Khorezm	Karakalp.
Tashkent	---	.12	.22	.24	.24	.26	.26	.04	.22	.26	.39*	.52**	.63**
Navoii		---	.02	.07	.27	.01	.03	.08	.10	.01	.16	.27	.38*
Samarkand			---	.05	.29	.01	.01	.10	.12	.03	.18	.29	.40*
Ferghana				---	.34	.06	.04	.15	.17	.08	.23	.34	.55**
Jizzax					---	.28	.30	.19	.17	.26	.09	0	.11
Bukhara						---	.02	.09	.11	.02	.17	.28	.39*
Andijan							---	.11	.13	.04	.19	.30	.41*
Sirdarya								---	.02	.07	.08	.19	.30
Surkhan.									---	.05	.06	.17	.28
Namangan										---	.15	.26	.37
Kashka.											---	.11	.22
Khorezm												---	.11
Karakalp.													---

Significance levels: * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .01

Appendix table 5.2: Regional Differences in How Local Prokurators Support Privatization, Tajikistan

	Sughd	Tursunz.	Lenin	GBAO	Hissar	Hatlon	Kofarn.	Shahrinau	Faizabad	Varzob	Tavildara	Garm	Tajikabad	Darband	Jirghatal
Sughd	---	.28*	.38**	.22	.36**	.40**	.42**	.44**	.52***	.46***	.50***	.52***	.46***	.52***	.54***
Tursunz.		---	.10	.06	.08	.12	.14	.16	.24	.18	.22	.24	.18	.24	.26
Lenin			---	.16	.18	..02	.04	.06	.14	.08	.12	.14	.08	.14	.16
GBAO				---	.14	.18	.20	.22	.30*	.24	.28*	.30*	.24	.30*	.32**
Hissar					---	.04	.06	.08	.16	.10	.14	.16	.10	.16	.18
Hatlon						---	.02	.04	.12	.06	.10	.12	.06	.12	.14
Kofarn.							---	.02	.10	.04	.08	.10	.04	.10	.12
Shahrinau								---	.08	.02	.06	.08	.02	.08	.10
Faizabad									---	.06	.02	0	.06	0	.02
Varzob										---	.04	.06	0	.06	.08
Tavildara											---	.02	.04	.02	.04
Garm												---	.06	0	.02
Tajikabad													---	.06	.08
Darband														---	.02
Jirghatal															---

Significance levels: * = .10; ** = .05; *** = .01

Appendix table 6.1: Specialists’ Ratings of Local Prokurator Performance, Uzbekistan

	Dispute Settlement	Debt Collection	Extraction of Crop Yield	Support of Privatization
Tashkent	3.20	3.92	3.82	3.39
Navoii	3.08	3.67	3.80	3.14
Samarkand	2.98	3.69	3.78	3.16
Ferghana	2.96	3.48	3.67	3.21
Jizzax	2.96	3.5	2.76	2.87
Bukhara	2.92	3.72	3.81	3.15
Andijan	2.92	3.57	3.65	3.17
Sirdarya	3.04	3.58	3.80	3.06
Surkhandarya	2.98	3.57	3.82	3.04
Namangan	2.94	3.58	3.59	3.13
Kashkadarya	2.81	3.56	3.80	2.98
Khorezm	2.96	3.43	3.70	2.87
Karakalpakistan	2.87	3.42	3.67	2.76

Note: Prokurator ratings: 5=“well above average”, 4=“somewhat above average”, 3=“average”, 2=“somewhat below average”, and “1=well below average”.

Appendix table 6.2: Specialists’ Ratings of Local Prokurator Performance, Tajikistan

	Dispute Settlement	Debt Collection	Extraction of Crop Yield	Support of Privatization
Sughd	2.90	3.31	3.42	2.86
Tursunzade	2.70	3.06	3.22	2.58
Lenin	2.64	2.96	3.24	2.48
GBAO	2.71	2.90	2.98	2.64
Hissar	2.68	2.90	3.18	2.50
Hatlon	2.56	2.98	3.18	2.46
Kofarnihon	2.54	2.92	3.16	2.44
Shahrinau	2.61	2.75	3.08	2.42
Faizabad	2.53	2.82	3.06	2.34
Varzob	2.40	2.73	3.02	2.40
Tavildara	2.54	2.69	2.90	2.36
Garm	2.49	2.69	3.00	2.34
Tajikabad	2.52	2.63	2.86	2.40
Darband	2.42	2.67	2.92	2.34
Jirghatal	2.42	2.63	2.88	2.32

Note: Prokurator ratings: 5=“well above average”, 4=“somewhat above average”, 3=“average”, 2=“somewhat below average”, and “1=well below average”.