

POLITICAL GENERATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

EVIDENCE AND INSIGHTS FROM ALGERIA

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Abstract The socialization literature has examined whether individuals who pass through their formative years during definable historical eras constitute political generations characterized by shared dispositions or collective memories that outlast the eras themselves. Drawing upon 1995 public opinion data from Algeria, we ask whether political generations are discernible in a non-Western society in which the government and politics have undergone fundamental transformations in character and normative orientation. We find evidence that shared attitudes characterize Algerians who came of age during the regime of President Houari Boumedienne—a stable 13-year period from 1965 to 1978 marked by centralized political leadership, low grassroots political participation, and state-led socialism. Other cohorts are not similarly distinguishable, however, nor does the Boumedienne cohort differ from others with respect to a number of political, economic, and cultural orientations. Like other studies, this research indicates that some historical periods produce durable generation effects while others do not and that some attitudes acquired during the formative years of late adolescence and early adulthood persist over time while others do not.

Introduction

The replacement of one generation by another with new experiences and attitudes is a common explanation for sociopolitical change. According to this view, historical events define the boundaries of identifiable eras that produce distinct and durable attitudes among individuals who pass through their formative

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years during this period. These age cohorts constitute political generations, and their shared predispositions are described as generation effects or cohort effects. While intuitively appealing, empirical research on political generations has produced mixed findings. Moreover, with few exceptions, this research is based on data from the United States and Europe and focuses on partisanship and other political orientations that are most relevant in democratic polities.

Improving our understanding of generational dynamics is an important task for scholars of developing countries, particularly those who study the Islamic world. There have been dramatic changes in politics and society in many of these countries. Older individuals grew up under colonialism, those who came later passed through their formative years during the period of Third World solidarity and socialism that often followed independence, and those younger still were educated in a climate marked by the political formulae that are today competing for primacy. Moreover, in Muslim-majority countries, Islam has been a prominent part of the political landscape in recent decades and occupies an important place in what are often intense debates about governance, public policy, and cultural norms.

Against this background, the present study inquires into the existence of generation effects in Algeria, a country marked by several distinct historical periods in the last half century. First, after briefly reviewing the literature on political socialization and historical memory, we summarize recent Algerian history and develop a series of propositions about the predispositions around which cohort effects may have formed. Second, using survey data collected in 1995, we test our expectations about predispositions that may be the focus of cohort effects by comparing the attitudes and values of Algerians who were 18 to 25 years of age during each of five historical periods. We find that cohort effects are not common but do emerge during certain historical periods and with respect to certain types of issues. In concluding, we consider the theoretical implications of our findings and suggest areas for future research on political socialization and political generations in countries like Algeria.

Theoretical Background and Previous Research

Social scientists have sought to test systematically whether certain attitudes, after being formed in late adolescence and early adulthood, persist throughout life, above and beyond whatever political learning continues during later years. Most studies begin with the classic 1928 essay of Karl Mannheim, in which he posits that political socialization during youth is heavily influenced by the prevailing historical circumstances (Mannheim [1928] 1952; Newcomb 1947; Newcomb et al. 1967; Ryder 1965). Shared attitudes should be discernible among men and women who experience the same events during what Mannheim calls their “formative years”—between the ages of 18 and 25—such

that a distinguishable political generation emerges and remains identifiable despite the confounding influences of later periods.

According to this “impressionable years” thesis, important political events define what is salient and significant for young people as they first encounter the larger political world. Such events, however, are less important for adults, who tend to assimilate new experiences into an attitudinal framework that is already well developed. This socialization process produces distinct cohorts, or “political generations,” who thus respond attitudinally and behaviorally in a similar fashion to new political events. When this occurs, the resulting cohort may be distinguished from earlier or later generations who passed through their formative years under different circumstances. A related area of inquiry has focused on shared memories among cohorts (e.g., Rubin, Rahhal, and Poon 1998; Schuman and Corning 2000; Schuman and Rieger 1992a, 1992b; Schuman, Rieger, and Guidys 1994; Schuman and Scott 1989). This literature views generational replacement, whereby one birth cohort is replaced by another with different dispositions, as an engine of gradual social and political evolution (DiMaggio 1997; Inglehart 1977; Inglehart and Baker 2000).

Although findings from empirical research on political socialization and attitude stability over the life span are inconsistent, there is at least some evidence that late adolescence and early adulthood is a formative period for individual socialization. Tests of the “impressionable years” hypothesis, while mixed, suggest that some attitudes probably do fluctuate most during youth and tend thereafter to be relatively stable (Alwin 1993, 1994; Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Krosnick and Alwin 1989; Sears 1983), with some possibility of increased fluctuation in old age, described as the “mid-life stability” hypothesis (e.g., Sears 1981). There is also evidence that attitudes (Jennings 1996) and memories (Rubin, Rahhal, and Poon 1998; Schuman and Scott 1989) about salient political events acquired during pre- and early adulthood are most likely to be remembered and imbued with importance, thereby contributing to shared characteristics among the members of a birth cohort. Different studies lend support to different hypotheses, indicating that attitudes are in fact influenced by complex combinations of factors (see Baltes, Staudinger, and Lindenberger 1999; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Sears and Valentino 1997).

While intuitively appealing, the existence of cohort effects has thus received only moderate support from empirical research. In addition, several analytical perspectives challenge the proposition that early adult socialization gives rise to political generations. First, some argue that while individuals acquire political attitudes during the impressionable years of youth, exogenous national or international political events may not be the most influential factors. Other considerations, such as family structure, educational attainment, race, class, and economic circumstances, may create a degree of intracohort variability that makes it difficult or even impossible to distinguish intercohort patterns (e.g., Shanahan 2000).

Second, the “lifelong openness model” suggests that attitude change occurs continuously throughout adulthood. Some scholars view attitude change primarily as a function of aging, or life-stage. As individuals mature, they encounter new social and personal circumstances, including college, employment, marriage, child-rearing, and retirement. Each life-stage brings new roles and responsibilities, altering interests and experiences and modifying attitudes as a result. Moreover, the ages at which such transitions occur may differ across or even within societies because of dissimilar laws and norms (Cooper and Denner 1998; Settersten and Mayer 1997; Shanahan 2000).

Another challenge posits that major historical events have a similar impact on people of all ages, possibly overwhelming any previously formed cohorts with “period effects” (see Baltes, Reese, and Nesselroad [1977] 1988; Baltes, Staudinger, and Lindenberger 1999; Magnusson, Bergman, and Rudinger 1991).

Finally, a complication arises if the circumstances of a particular period do not have the same impact on all members of a political generation. Events may divide a birth cohort into two or more groups, what Mannheim calls “generation units,” making it difficult to identify a given cohort (see Jennings 1987; Mannheim [1928] 1952; Sears and Valentino 1997).

These competing perspectives notwithstanding, empirical research provides a measure of support for the existence of cohort effects. This support is limited and inconsistent, however, and several factors can help us understand why political generations are only found in some instances. First, many political events are not highly salient, particularly for young people (Schuman and Scott 1989; Sears and Valentino 1997). Although national politics may play an important role in political socialization, available research suggests that memories and attitudes formed around national events may persist only with respect to high visibility issues that are discussed frequently during an individual’s formative years. Such issues attract strong information flows or are subject to continually reproduced interaction and interpretation (DiMaggio 1997; Monroe, Hankin, and Van Vecten 2000; Moscovici 1988). For example, Jennings (1987) finds that nationally prominent events related to the Vietnam War fostered similar attitudes among a “protest generation” that came of age during the 1960s in the United States. On the other hand, young people are unlikely to form lasting opinions about low visibility issues, such as government spending priorities or foreign policy decisions, unless they happen to be made unusually salient by a war or some other major event (Sears and Valentino 1997).

A related consideration is that even if political events and issues are highly salient, they may not have a lasting impact on young people if future periods are marked by dramatic change or extended instability. In this instance, continuing upheaval may decrease the salience and influence on attitudes of any event or events that had high visibility during an earlier period and thereby overwhelm cohort effects (e.g., Holland et al. 1986).

Socialization, then, appears to be episodic. Shaped by the irregular nature and salience of political circumstances, distinguishable cohorts may be formed during certain periods but not during others. To the extent this is the case, political generations may be relatively rare. Further, because major political events occur episodically and discontinuously, one generation may be characterized by similar and stable attitudes pertaining to one set of concerns, while a very different set of concerns may characterize another generation. The particular concerns for which the concept of political generation is salient may also vary from one culture to another (see Triandis and Suh 2002). It is necessary, therefore, to identify the specific predispositions that may define each individual cohort, recognizing that the same issues and concerns may not be salient across all cohorts. As Schuman and Scott write, “only where events occur in such a manner as to demarcate a cohort in terms of its ‘historical-social’ consciousness should we speak of a true generation” (1989, p. 359).

These observations have implications for cross-national research on political socialization. More specifically, they caution against generalizing results across national boundaries without considering the historical context within which a political generation is formed. Available research supports this caution. For example, the few studies to explore political generation hypotheses outside the United States and Europe suggest that patterns differ from those observed in Western democracies (Schuman and Corning 2000; Schuman and Scott 1989). Similarly, a study comparing 7 different birth cohorts in 60 societies using World Values Survey data finds stronger evidence for intergenerational differences in advanced industrial societies than in countries that have experienced collapse and turmoil in their economic, political, and social systems, presumably because period effects supersede cohort effects in such environments (Inglehart and Baker 2000).

Despite these theoretical and empirical challenges, we believe that if the concept of political generation has value it should be possible to identify and distinguish birth cohorts in non-Western societies, including those that have experienced regime changes or other important political and social transformations. At the same time, as others have also argued, we believe that hypotheses both about the nature of salient political dispositions and about intergenerational differences in attitudinal expression and predisposition must be based on culture- and context-specific analysis. Accordingly, we expect that cohort effects may be present only for certain attitudes and only under certain circumstances and, most importantly, that the issues and concerns around which political attitudes form and persist may not be the same in Algeria as those reported to be important in research carried out in Western democracies.

In developing countries, especially in those that have experienced political instability, we believe that the most promising areas for an investigation of socialization and the formation of political generations include views about national leadership and the preferred type of political and economic system. Furthermore, and particularly in societies with Muslim majorities, attitudes

about culture, including religion and its political role, the status of women, and the desired level of Western influence, may also be highly salient. Our analysis of the Algerian data is thus guided by assessments that specify both the types of attitudes and the particular historical periods for which we do and do not expect to find generation effects.

The Algerian Case and Empirical Expectations

The Algerian case presents an important opportunity to test hypotheses about socialization and the formation of political generations. Algeria has experienced major political, social, and economic transformations, which provide an opportunity for exploring the extent to which significant political events and the periods they define affect the political and social orientations of citizens. Yet, only certain periods stand out as most likely to give rise to a recognizable and distinct political generation. These periods are characterized by a broadly consistent political and ideological orientation of substantial duration.

We note five periods in Algeria's history since World War II, each characterized by events of major national importance. These are intense colonial rule prior to 1954 ("Colonialism") and a brutal war for independence between 1954 and 1962 ("Independence War"), followed by three distinct political periods since gaining independence in 1962: the presidency of Houari Boumedienne from 1965 to 1978 ("Boumedienne"); the presidency of Chadli Benjedid from 1979 to 1988 ("Benjedid"); and the most recent period, which began with a short-lived political opening in 1989 and then gave way to intense political violence involving clashes between government security forces, paramilitary forces aligned with the regime, and armed Islamic groups ("Contestation and Violence").

Algeria's colonial experience under the French was longer and more intense than most, lasting over 130 years. Approximately one million French citizens came to live in the territory, expropriating property and suppressing traditional institutions and values. As one scholar notes, "No Islamic society has been so thoroughly pulverized and sociologically deconstructed as Algeria during the nearly century-and-a-half of European occupation, oppression and occultation" (Entelis 2001, p. 417). Subsequently, from 1954 until 1962, Algerians waged a war of national liberation, ultimately winning independence from France but at a very high price. Roughly one million Algerians died—one-tenth of the Muslim population—and much of the country's infrastructure—hospitals, schools, factories—was also devastated (Ciment 1997; Horne 1979). The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) led the revolution and emerged after the war as the dominant political force in the country (Connelly 2002). Under the FLN, Algeria became a single-party state.

From its independence in 1962 through the 1970s, socialist development policies, including state-driven industrialization, and a relatively egalitarian

and effective program of mass education, health care, and social services marked Algeria's political economy. The political system was highly centralized, with a cadre of military and civilian leaders running the country and little grassroots political participation. On the international scene, Algeria identified strongly with the Non-Aligned Movement and became one of its leaders. The first leader of independent Algeria was Ahmed Ben Bella, whose three-year tenure saw the introduction of the country's populist and socialist policies, as well as its single-party political system. Of particular note during this period was a program of self-management through which Algerian workers directed former French farms and factories.

Following a bloodless coup in 1965, Houari Boumedienne took power and held it until his death in 1978. His presidency marked the longest period of political continuity in the history of independent Algeria, and it is also the period with the most consistent set of state policies. The Boumedienne regime relied on the military for support and implemented policies typical of authoritarian and socialist-oriented developing countries at the time, especially those that followed the Soviet "vanguard party" rather than the Chinese and Cuban mass mobilization model. These policies included the nationalization of industry, import-substitution, state funding of the industrial sector at the expense of agriculture, and social welfare policies that provided mass education and health care (Ruedy 1992, pp. 207–30). Cultural policies emphasized the country's Arab and Islamic identity. Also, as noted, Algeria was an active and militant member of the Non-Aligned Movement (Bennoune 1989, pp. 121–22; Malley 1996).

After Boumedienne's death in 1978, the civilian and military leaders of the FLN selected Colonel Chadli Benjedid, a senior military officer, as his successor. Within a few years and throughout the following decade, spontaneous challenges to the Benjedid regime emerged in many quarters: Berbers, Islamists, workers, students, women's groups, and human rights activists. These communities called for an end to the political silence of the Boumedienne era and, above all, for attention to mounting economic problems, most notably widespread unemployment and a critical shortage of housing. Benjedid responded with modest political liberalization and economic policies that allowed for more autonomy from the state. Discontent continued to mount, however, with a growing gap between rich and poor adding to the complaints of ordinary citizens (Ruedy 1992, pp. 231–37). In 1988 this discontent exploded in rioting throughout the country, and in response Benjedid initiated a bold experiment in democratization. As reported by one scholar, Algeria's government was "suddenly the most free, most pluralistic, and most enthusiastic defender of democracy in the Arab world" (Quandt 1998, p. 5).

Algeria's democratic opening was short-lived. The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) won the 1990 and 1991 elections, whereupon the military voided the results and suppressed the FIS. An increasingly brutal civil war followed, with both Islamists and forces aligned with the regime committing atrocities

and contributing to the death of more than 100,000 civilians (Martinez 1998). Order has for the most part been restored at the time of this writing, with power exercised by the military despite the return of some measure of democracy. Thus, a mixture of violence, disorder, authoritarianism, and little progress on pressing economic problems characterized the 1990s.

Given this political history, as well as prior research on political socialization, we used the following propositions about the extent and locus of cohort effects in Algeria to guide our analysis of the survey data collected in 1995.

1. *Political Efficacy and Trust.* We think it unlikely that historical circumstances have a significant and lasting impact on political efficacy and political trust in Algeria. Nevertheless, given the importance of these dimensions of political culture, as well as the fact that they have received attention in studies of political socialization in the United States, this expectation deserves to be tested. Our expectation is based in part on findings from research in the United States, which suggest that immediate social and economic circumstances have much more influence on political efficacy than do historical events (e.g., Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Sears and Valentino 1997). Similarly, the extent to which individuals believe that leaders and institutions can be trusted to act for the good of the country appears to be influenced primarily by the response of these leaders and institutions to immediate problems rather than by the performance of past regimes. This pattern is also suggested by studies of Algeria, which report that the accomplishments of those in power during one time period have little influence on the evaluation of political leaders during subsequent time periods. In the 1980s and 1990s, for example, several observers reported that Algerians were no longer impressed by accounts of their leaders' contribution to the struggle for independence. The younger generation in particular, these observers noted, "feels let down and marginalized by the post-independence regimes" (Quandt 1998, p. 31; Tessler 1997, p. 102; Vandewalle 1988, p. 2).
2. *Political System Preference.* Questions about how the country should be governed are highly salient in developing countries, especially in the years following independence and during subsequent periods when many citizens are dissatisfied with prevailing patterns of governance. Accordingly, attitudes about models of government, or political system preference, represent the kind of political orientation with respect to which cohort effects may be found. Democracy more or less along Western lines and Islamic governance following the experience of countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia are the models of government that have received most attention in recent years in Algeria and other Arab countries (Tessler 1999). Each model has its supporters and detractors. In addition, some have a positive view of both political formulae, perhaps envisioning a political system like that of Iran or even Indonesia,

rather than that of Saudi Arabia. Finally, some do not find either model appealing, presumably believing the country would be best served by a strong civilian or military leader. Should generation-linked attitudes with political content be discernible, they may well involve judgments about one or both of these models of government.

3. *Economic Outlook.* Algeria's serious economic problems, which have persisted for well over a decade, make it difficult to be optimistic about the country's economic future. On the other hand, the country is rich in land and natural resources, has an overburdened but still relatively well developed infrastructure, and has a comparatively well educated population. Thus, there is room for differing assessments about Algeria's economic prospects. The possibility of cohort effects associated with economic outlook in such circumstances is suggested by research in post-Communist societies. More specifically, this research finds that present-day economic troubles are more likely to lead to low subjective well-being among individuals who reached adulthood during a period of economic growth (Inglehart and Baker 2000). If cohort effects are present, they may thus be found among individuals who have shared memories of times that were either significantly better or significantly worse than the present economic situation.
4. *Cultural Values.* As in other societies experiencing rapid social change, where traditional and nontraditional norms and behavior patterns exist side by side, cultural values have been subjects of debate and disagreement since Algeria became independent. Values and practices pertaining to religion, women, and the appropriate degree of Western influence have been especially salient in this context. Accordingly, these and similar cultural concerns may be the kind of high visibility issues that attract strong information flows and thus give rise to cohort effects.

While we do not expect to find cohort effects associated with political efficacy or political trust, we suspect that a number of concerns that are central preoccupations in Algeria may give rise to distinctive views among one or more political generations. Among these, in our judgment, are political system preference, specifically relating to democracy and political Islam; economic outlook; and cultural values, such as those pertaining to the status of women.

It is unlikely that every distinguishable period in Algerian history has given rise to cohort effects. Indeed, the existence of cohort effects is probably the exception rather than the rule. In the Algerian case, we believe such effects are most likely to be present among the Boumedienne generation—those who passed through late adolescence and early adulthood during all or most of the years Houari Boumedienne was in power, 1965 to 1978. As noted, this was the period with the greatest degree of ideological salience and coherence and the highest level of political continuity. Coming shortly after independence, it also occupied a critical temporal position in the history of modern Algeria.

Data

The data for the present study are from a survey of 1,000 men and women in Oran, Algeria, conducted in mid-1995 under the auspices of the American Institute for Maghrib Studies. An international research team composed of fifteen social scientists from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and the United States designed and carried out the project in Algeria as well as other countries in North Africa. Each country had approximately equal representation on the overall research team, and all national groups included scholars from at least three different academic disciplines. Professor Abdelbaki Benziane, then vice-rector of the University of Oran, directed the team carrying out fieldwork in Oran.

The timing of the survey should be noted. Since interviews were carried out during a period of turmoil and violence in Algeria, it is almost certain that contemporary events would in some way affect virtually all members of society and thus give rise to period effects. Should generation effects nonetheless be discernible, despite the prospect that they might have been washed away by the dramatic events taking place at the time the survey was conducted, evidence for the existence of political generations will be even stronger than it would have been had the data been collected during a less turbulent period.

Oran had approximately 850,000 inhabitants at the time of the survey, being the second largest city in the country. An important industrial and trading center, the city is the principal focus of urban life in western Algeria. It thus has a significant number of wealthy and middle-class professionals. At the same time, it also has sprawling working-class neighborhoods and *bidonvilles* inhabited by the urban poor, including at least 100,000 migrants from the surrounding countryside. In this respect, Oran replicates the economic, cultural, and lifestyle diversity that exists in most of the country's large urban centers.

The research team developed a multistage procedure in an effort to construct a representative sample of Oran's population. To begin, it employed area probability sampling involving the successive random selection of districts, neighborhoods, and households. Thereafter, interviewers conducted three separate interviews within each randomly selected household: first, they gave a battery of demographic questions to the household head; second, they administered another interview schedule, composed of questions dealing with political, social, and economic attitudes, to another adult member of each household, selected randomly through use of a Kish table; and finally, they presented a third battery of questions, pertaining to fertility and family planning, to all women of child-bearing age residing in the household. The present study employs data from the 1,000 randomly selected household members who answered questions about their political, social, and economic attitudes.

The team took extensive care in the training of interviewers, most of whom were university students, and provided a lengthy and detailed "interviewer manual" for use in each country. The language of the interviews was either French or Arabic, depending on the preference of the respondent. In general,

better-educated respondents preferred French and less well educated respondents preferred Arabic. Nonresponse was very low; only about 2 percent of the households or respondents selected did not agree to the interview and there were about an equal number of households in which respondents could not be contacted (using the American Association for Public Opinion Research's [2000] standard definition RR5, the response rate for the combined first two waves of the study is 95.7 percent). This result is partly due to the careful preparation of interviewers and also, perhaps, because the initial interviews with household heads reduced any potential distrust. Additional information about the study appears in several publications (Tessler 1998, 2000, 2002). Despite the care taken in drawing the sample, it is not a perfect microcosm of Oran's population. Census data below the provincial (*wilaya*) level are limited, but information about the distribution of age and sex in the *commune* of Oran are available and suggest some discrepancy between the sample and the population on these variables. With respect to the former, population versus sample percentages across the age categories of 18–24, 25–34, 35–49, and over 50 are as follows: 23 versus 18; 29 versus 25; 25 versus 32; and 23 versus 25. This means that individuals under 35 are slightly underrepresented in the sample. There is also a discrepancy with respect to sex. Although 1987 census data report an approximately equal number of men and women in Oran, only 41 percent of the sample is male. In part, this may be attributable to the large number of Algerian men who work abroad and send funds to their families who remain at home. Nevertheless, it is clear that men are also underrepresented in the sample.

Commune level information is not available with respect to education, but the sample is very diverse in this respect. The distribution is as follows: no schooling, 19 percent; primary school only, 28 percent; intermediate school, 24 percent; high school, 20 percent; postsecondary schooling, 9 percent. Education levels are considerably higher among younger Algerians, but this distribution is probably quite representative of Oran's adult population.

Discrepancies between the sample and the population of Oran indicate that findings from the present study should be generalized with caution. This would be the case even were there no discrepancies, however, since Oran is only one city in one developing country. Nevertheless, data about the attitudes and orientations of 1,000 individuals who are generally, albeit imperfectly, representative of a large and heterogeneous Third World city provide a solid empirical foundation for an attempt to determine whether cohort effects can be discerned in countries like Algeria and, if so, to contribute to an incremental and cumulative research effort concerned with the formation of political generations.

Methods

Regression analysis has been employed to test for generation effects. The analysis asks whether generation effects are discernible among Algerians who

passed through at least six of their eight formative years during any of the five historical periods outlined earlier. Dependent variables are a series of political, economic, and social attitudes relevant to Algeria, some of which resemble those examined in other studies of political socialization. The independent variables, discussed in more detail below, are dummy variables representing each of the five hypothesized political generations, with each respondent assigned to a particular cohort based on his or her age when interviewed in 1995.

Four additional variables have been included in the analysis for purposes of control. These are age, education, gender, and standard of living, the last measured by the number of conveniences and luxury items in a respondent's household. As reported in other research on social and political attitudes, and as the analysis to follow shows for the present study as well, each of these variables is at least sometimes related to one or more of the dependent variables to a statistically significant degree. Some are also related to one or more of the age cohorts. In particular, as expected given the steady expansion of education since Algerian independence, education is disproportionately high among the younger generations and disproportionately low among the older generations.

The political orientations treated as dependent variables include political efficacy, measured by a question asking whether political affairs are too complicated to be understood by ordinary citizens; political trust, measured by a question asking whether national leaders care about the needs of ordinary citizens; and political system preference, based on assessments of democratic and Islamic political systems and with attitudes toward these two political formulae considered both separately and in combination. The first two orientations are similar to dimensions of political culture that have been explored in previous studies of socialization (see Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Sears and Valentino 1997). The third dependent variable—political system preference—represents an evaluation of the most important models of governance competing for support in Algeria and many other Arab and Muslim countries.

Dependent variables concerned with economic and occupational predispositions include an economic outlook index composed of two very strongly correlated items. One asks about the degree to which the national economic situation is improving or deteriorating, and the other asks for a similar assessment of the respondent's personal economic situation.¹ Another dependent variable asks whether hard work at one's job is recognized and rewarded.

The social and cultural orientations examined include personal religiosity, measured by the regularity of prayer; attitudes toward women and gender equality, measured by an item that asks whether it is acceptable for a married woman to work outside the home; and whether or not the respondent likes

1. This orientation, measured in a similar fashion, has also been explored in previous research (Inglehart and Baker 2000).

Western popular music. Although selected because of their relevance to Algeria and other postcolonial societies, determinants of attitudes toward the status of women and other cultural norms have also been examined in previous research on intergenerational differences (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Tessler 2000). An appendix gives the exact wording in both French and English of the questions used to measure each of these attitudes, as well as those measuring the political and economic orientations listed above.

Informed by previous studies, we use current age to locate cohorts in relation to historical periods. There is no consensus in the literature on precisely what age span is critical, however, making efforts to operationalize the concept of “formative years” at least somewhat arbitrary (Settersten and Mayer 1997, p. 239). Studies have defined the critical years as the age span between 10 and 30 (Rubin, Rahhal, and Poon 1998), between 10 and 17 (Sears and Valentino 1997), between 18 and 25 (Mannheim [1928] 1952; Schuman and Rieger 1992a; Schuman, Rieger, and Guidys 1994; Schuman and Scott 1989), and the college years (Jennings 1987). Moreover, further complicating the situation, some suggest that there are cross-cultural differences in age structuring and, consequently, in the years most relevant for political socialization (Settersten and Mayer 1997).

Against this background, we have chosen to define an individual’s “formative years” as 18 to 25, not only because this is the age range most frequently used by scholars of socialization, but also because, in Algeria as elsewhere, it spans such important life events as the end of secondary schooling, college where relevant, first voting, and first employment. Marriage frequently occurs during this age span as well.²

We thus define each cohort as those men and women for whom at least six years of the eight-year span between ages 18 and 25, the “formative years,” fall within a given historical period. In the case of the 1965–1978 Boumedienne period, for example, the cohort is composed of men and women between 40 and 50 years of age when the survey was conducted in 1995. At least six of the eight years during which these individuals were between 18 and 25 coincide with the 1965–1978 period. We operationalized membership in each of the four other cohorts in the same way. This method resulted in 72.5 percent of the respondents being assigned to a cohort, with the remainder falling in between two cohorts and not assigned to either. Given the very high birth rate in Algeria, as well as the fact that nearly 10 percent of the Algerian population died in the war for independence, cohorts associated with earlier historical

2. We also carried out an empirical test of our decision regarding the definition of formative years. We sequentially ran regressions with cohort membership defined by nine different eight-year age spans during the years associated with each of the five historical periods discussed above. These began with 10–17 years of age and then proceeded to 11–18, 12–19, and so on through 18–25. The results of this analysis, which are not presented, can be easily summarized: although generally similar across all older age spans, the models in which cohort effects stand out most clearly and consistently are those in which the 18–25 age span was employed. This lends additional validity to our operational definition of formative years.

Table 1. Influence of Cohort Membership on Political Trust (Logit) with Gender, Education, and Living Standard Held Constant

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Cohort Membership:					
Colonialism (pre-1954)	.41 (.34)				
Independence War (1954–1962)		-.65** (.27)			
Boumedienne (1965–1978)			.02 (.18)		
Benjedid (1979–1988)				.15 (.18)	
Contestation and Violence (1989–1995)					-.30 (.21)
Age	-.01* (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.01* (.01)
Higher Education Level	.01 (.06)	.01 (.06)	.02 (.06)	.02 (.06)	.02 (.06)
Gender (Male = 1)	-.02 (.14)	-.03 (.14)	-.01 (.14)	-.01 (.14)	-.001 (.14)
Higher Standard of Living	.09* (.05)	.10** (.05)	.09* (.05)	.09* (.05)	.09* (.05)
Constant	-.09 (.39)	-.26 (.36)	-.23 (.36)	-.30 (.37)	.02 (.26)
Number of observations	885	885	885	885	885
Log-likelihood	1200.00	1195.16	1201.37	1200.64	1199.33
χ^2	9.70	14.56	8.35	9.08	10.40

NOTE.—Variables marked (Logit) denote logit coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. 1 = Respondent agrees that politicians care for citizens.

* Significant at the .10 level (two-tailed test).

** Significant at the .05 level.

periods are the smallest. The number of respondents assigned to each cohort are as follows: Colonialism, pre-1954, $N = 76$; Independence War, 1954–1962, $N = 67$; Boumedienne, 1965–1978, $N = 193$; Benjedid, 1979–1988, $N = 184$; and Contestation and Violence, 1989–1995, $N = 205$.

Findings and Implications

Tables 1–5 present the results of regressions in which political trust, political efficacy, and political system preference are dependent variables. The tables

Table 2. Influence of Cohort Membership on Political Efficacy (OLS) with Gender, Education, and Living Standard Held Constant

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Cohort Membership:					
Colonialism (pre-1954)	-.14 (.12)				
Independence War (1954–1962)		-.11 (.10)			
Boumedienne (1965–1978)			-.02 (.06)		
Benjedid (1979–1988)				.02 (.06)	
Contestation and Violence (1989–1995)					-.0004 (.07)
Age	.004 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.002 (.002)
Higher Education Level	.06** (.02)	.06** (.02)	.06** (.02)	.06** (.02)	.06** (.02)
Gender (Male = 1)	-.05 (.05)	-.05 (.05)	-.05 (.05)	-.05 (.05)	-.05 (.05)
Higher Standard of Living	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)
Constant	1.17*** (.13)	1.22*** (.13)	1.22*** (.13)	1.22*** (.13)	1.22*** (.14)
Number of observations	893	893	893	893	893
R ²	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01

NOTE.—Variables marked (OLS) denote unstandardized linear regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. 0,3 = Respondent's intensity of agreement that politics is intelligible to ordinary citizens.

** Significant at the .05 level.

*** Significant at the .01 level.

show the relationship between these variables and each one of the five generational cohorts described above. As noted, age, education, sex, and standard of living are included as control variables.

The tables show that cohort membership is very rarely related to a statistically significant degree to any of the dependent variables. Cohort effects are discernible in only three instances: members of the Independence War generation are disproportionately likely to be low in political trust, members of the Benjedid generation are disproportionately likely to have an unfavorable attitude toward political Islam, and members of the Boumedienne generation are disproportionately likely to have an unfavorable attitude toward *both*

Table 3. Influence of Cohort Membership on Support for Democracy (OLS) with Gender, Education, and Living Standard Held Constant

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Cohort Membership:					
Colonialism (pre-1954)	-.06 (.10)				
Independence War (1954–1962)		-.06 (.09)			
Boumedienne (1965–1978)			(-.03) (.05)		
Benjedid (1979–1988)				.006 (.05)	
Contestation and Violence (1989–1995)					.02 (.06)
Age	.0009 (.002)	.0006 (.002)	.0005 (.002)	.0004 (.002)	.0007 (.002)
Higher Education Level	.05** (.02)	.05** (.02)	.04** (.02)	.04** (.02)	.04** (.02)
Gender (Male = 1)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.04)
Higher Standard of Living	-.03 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)
Constant	1.28*** (.12)	1.29*** (.11)	1.30*** (.11)	1.30*** (.11)	1.28*** (.12)
Number of observations	839	839	839	839	839
R ²	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01

NOTE.—Variables marked (OLS) denote unstandardized linear regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. Index of respondent’s support for democratic institutions and diverse political ideas.

** Significant at the .05 level.

*** Significant at the .01 level.

democracy and political Islam.³ By contrast, although not of concern in the present study, each of the dependent variables is related to at least one of the control variables to a statistically significant degree. More specifically, education is positively related to political efficacy and to a favorable attitude toward democracy; standard of living is positively related to political trust and

3. A follow-up regression analysis was carried out in the case of these three statistically significant relationships. Dummies for all five cohorts were included in the analysis, followed by a Wald test of the difference between the cohort related to the dependent variable and each of the other four cohorts. This was done in order to be sure that the orientations of the cohort in question differed not only from those of all other cohorts taken together but from those of each other individual cohort as well. It may also be noted that we considered an alternative to defining political generations on the basis of historical context, using instead an *ahistorical*, age-based definition that resembles the method employed by Schuman and Scott (1989). To assess the explanatory utility of

Table 4. Influence of Cohort Membership on Support for Islam (OLS) with Gender, Education and Living Standard Held Constant

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Cohort Membership:					
Colonialism (pre-1954)	.11 (.15)				
Independence War (1954–1962)		.10 (.14)			
Boumedienne (1965–1978)			-.05 (.08)		
Benjedid (1979–1988)				-.19** (.08)	
Contestation and Violence (1989–1995)					.18 (.09)
Age	.003 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.004* (.003)	.003 (.003)	.007* (.003)
Higher Education Level	-.001 (.03)	.0003 (.03)	-.0001 (.03)	.002 (.03)	-.0005 (.03)
Gender (Male = 1)	-.08 (.06)	-.08 (.06)	-.08 (.06)	-.08 (.06)	-.08 (.06)
Higher Standard of Living	-.06** (.02)	-.06** (.02)	-.06** (.02)	-.06** (.02)	-.06** (.02)
Constant	1.95*** (.18)	1.92*** (.17)	1.91*** (.16)	1.98*** (.17)	1.76*** (.18)
Number of observations	763	763	763	763	763
R ²	.02	.02	.02	.02	.01

NOTE.—Variables marked (OLS) denote unstandardized linear regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. Index of respondent's support for active role of religion in public life.

*Significant at the .10 level (two-tailed test).

**Significant at the .05 level.

***Significant at the .01 level.

inversely related to support for political Islam, and men are disproportionately likely have an unfavorable attitude toward both democracy and political Islam.

“context-free” cohort categories, we divided respondents into seven ascending eight-year age categories, beginning with those who were 18 to 25 years old at the time the survey was conducted, followed by those who were 26 to 33, and so on through those respondents who were 66 to 73 at the time of the 1995 survey. An indicator variable representing each one of the age groups was included in a single regression for each dependent variable. Schuman and Scott describe this approach as “working backwards,” such that “cohorts defined initially in arbitrary age terms [are then] redefined generationally by . . . qualitatively distinct events and changes” (1989, p. 360). This method did not show distinguishable effects for most age groups and most dependent variables, the only exceptions being instances where membership in an age group overlapped with membership in a cohort defined in terms of historical era.

Table 5. Influence of Cohort Membership on Joint Support for Democracy and Islam (Logit) with Gender, Education, and Living Standard Held Constant

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Cohort Membership:					
Colonialism (pre-1954)	-.68 (.45)				
Independence War (1954–1962)		-.66 (.44)			
Boumedienne (1965–1978)			.64** (.20)		
Benjedid (1979–1988)				.19 (.20)	
Contestation and Violence (1989–1995)					-.34 (.25)
Age	-.004 (.008)	-.01 (.007)	-.02** (.007)	-.01 (.007)	-.02** (.008)
Higher Education Level	-.13* (.07)	-.14** (.07)	-.14** (.07)	-.14* (.07)	-.14** (.07)
Gender (Male = 1)	.31* (.17)	.30* (.17)	.31* (.17)	.31* (.17)	.31* (.17)
Higher Standard of Living	.09 (.06)	.10 (.06)	.09 (.06)	.10* (.06)	.10 (.06)
Constant	-.90** (.46)	-.66* (.44)	-.65 (.44)	-.74* (.44)	-.38 (.48)
Number of observations	757	757	757	757	757
Log-likelihood	902.97	905.28	895.82	904.49	903.35
χ^2	9.53	7.22	16.68	8.012	9.15

NOTE.—Variables marked (Logit) denote logit coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses; for Boumedienne cohort, $p=.002$. 1 = Respondent supports neither democratic nor Islamic principles for guidance in public life.

*Significant at .10 level (two-tailed test).

**Significant at the .05 level.

*** Significant at the .01 level.

In addition, our findings provide a basis for informed speculation about connections between the character of political life during a given historical period and any cohort effects exhibited by the generation whose early political learning took place at that time. Three possibilities are deserving of further study, both in Algeria and in other developing nations. First, disproportionately low political trust among members of the Independence War cohort suggests that coming into adulthood during a prolonged and violent decolonization struggle predisposes individuals to be particularly critical of those who lead the independent state, especially during times of political and economic

crisis. Second, disproportionately low support for political Islam among members of the Benjedid cohort suggests that passing through pre- and early adulthood during a period of market-oriented economic liberalization fosters among individuals in developing countries such as Algeria a dislike for radical and ideologically oriented political formulae. Last, disproportionately unfavorable attitudes toward both democracy and political Islam among the Boumedienne cohort suggests that if early political socialization occurs during a period of socialist-oriented and state-driven development under a highly centralized and at least somewhat authoritarian government, and especially if this takes place in the early postcolonial period and national leaders enjoy considerable popular approval, cohort effects in developing countries such as Algeria involve lower levels of support for alternative models of government.

With respect to political attitudes, then, our findings indicate that generation effects are uncommon in Algeria, a country that has experienced frequent regime change and significant political instability. These findings also suggest that when cohort effects do form, they are disproportionately likely to involve views about the character of the political system.

Tables 6 and 7 present the regressions for dependent variables concerned with economic and occupational predispositions. These include views about whether the economic situation is improving or deteriorating and judgments about whether society recognizes and rewards hard work.

The tables show that members of the Boumedienne generation are disproportionately likely to have a negative economic outlook. There are no other statistically significant relationships involving cohort membership and views about economic prospects, and there are none whatsoever involving cohort effects and views about whether hard work is recognized and rewarded. With respect to control variables, both education and standard of living are inversely correlated with negative economic outlook, and standard of living is positively correlated with a belief that hard work will bring recognition and reward.

As with political orientations, cohort effects pertaining to economic orientations are rare. An exception, however, is that members of the Boumedienne generation tend to have a gloomy economic outlook. These disproportionately negative economic assessments by the Boumedienne cohort suggest that passing through pre- and early adulthood while a country is emerging from colonialism and newly governed by its own political leaders—and especially if the regime is judged at the time to be honest, hardworking, and making meaningful economic progress—predisposes individuals in developing countries such as Algeria to be particularly disappointed by the disparity between early expectations and the serious economic problems confronting their society at a later time.

Tables 8–10 display the results of regressions for dependent variables concerned with social and cultural orientations. These include religiosity, appreciation of Western popular music, and attitudes toward women working outside the home.

Table 6. Influence of Cohort Membership on Economic Outlook (Logit) with Gender, Education, and Living Standard Held Constant

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Cohort Membership:					
Colonialism (pre-1954)	-.30 (.34)				
Independence War (1954–1962)		.17 (.30)			
Boumedienne (1965–1978)			.68*** (.18)		
Benjedid (1979–1988)				-.14 (.18)	
Contestation and Violence (1989–1995)					.17 (.21)
Age	.002 (.007)	-.002 (.006)	-.004 (.006)	-.001 (.006)	.002 (.007)
Higher Education Level	-.18** (.06)	-.19** (.06)	-.18** (.06)	-.18** (.06)	-.19*** (.06)
Gender (Male = 1)	.24 (.15)	.23 (.15)	.25* (.15)	.22 (.15)	.22 (.14)
Higher Standard of Living	-.34*** (.05)	-.34*** (.05)	-.35*** (.05)	-.34*** (.05)	-.34*** (.05)
Constant	.92** (.39)	1.06** (.37)	1.02** (.37)	1.09** (.37)	.90** (.40)
Number of observations	937	937	937	937	937
Log-likelihood	1199.90	1200.33	1187.14	1200.09	1200.05
χ^2	89.14	88.88	102.17	89.22	89.26

NOTE.—Variables marked (Logit) denote logit coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. 1 = Respondent believes both personal and national economic situations have worsened.
 **Significant at the .05 level.
 ***Significant at the .01 level.

There are three statistically significant relationships involving cohort membership and social and cultural orientations: members of Boumedienne cohort are disproportionately unlikely to enjoy Western popular music; members of the Contestation and Violence cohort are disproportionately likely to have a favorable opinion of such music; and members of Boumedienne cohort are disproportionately likely to favor greater opportunities and equality for women. Although not a focus of the present inquiry, there are also many significant relationships involving control variables. Older individuals and women are disproportionately likely to be religious; a taste for Western popular music is related to a statistically significant degree to younger age, male gender, higher education, and a higher standard of living; and support for gender equality is

Table 7. Influence of Cohort membership on Society's Value for Hard Work (OLS)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Cohort Membership:					
Colonialism (pre-1954)	.18 (.20)				
Independence War (1954–1962)		-.07 (.18)			
Boumediene (1965–1978)			-.08 (.10)		
Benjedid (1979–1988)				.02 (.11)	
Contestation and Violence (1989–1995)					-.08 (.13)
Age	.005 (.004)	.007** (.003)	.007** (.003)	.007** (.003)	.006 (.004)
Higher Education Level	.05 (.04)	.05 (.04)	.05 (.04)	.05 (.04)	.05 (.04)
Gender (Male = 1)	.02 (.09)	.02 (.09)	.02 (.09)	.02 (.09)	.02 (.09)
Higher Standard of Living	.07** (.03)	.07** (.03)	.07** (.03)	.07** (.03)	.07** (.03)
Constant	2.20*** (.23)	2.12*** (.22)	2.14*** (.22)	2.13*** (.22)	2.20*** (.24)
Number of observations	910	910	910	910	910
R ²	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02

NOTE.—Variables marked (OLS) denote unstandardized linear regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. 1,4 = Degree to which respondent believes society rewards hard work.

** Significant at the .05 level.

*** Significant at the .01 level.

related to a statistically significant degree to older age, female gender, higher education, and a higher standard of living.

Despite controlling for age, it is likely, or at least possible, that the youth of the Contestation and Violence cohort accounts for the fact that its members are disproportionately likely to appreciate Western popular music. The men and women in this cohort were between 18 and 25 years old when the survey was conducted and are the youngest individuals in the sample. It is also possible that their tastes have been influenced by the turbulent events taking place during their formative years. Perhaps they blame Muslim extremists for Algeria's recent troubles and thus, rejecting militant Islam, embrace a symbol of the West. This is not reflected in their other attitudes, however; and in any

Table 8. Influence of Cohort Membership on Religiosity (Logit) with Gender, Education, and Living Standard Held Constant

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Cohort Membership:					
Colonialism (pre-1954)	.92 (.61)				
Independence War (1954–1962)		-.36 (.63)			
Boumedienne (1965–1978)			-.10 (.26)		
Benjedid (1979–1988)				.16 (.19)	
Contestation and Violence (1989–1995)					.19 (.24)
Age	-.08*** (.01)	-.07*** (.01)	-.07*** (.01)	-.07*** (.01)	-.07*** (.01)
Higher Education Level	-.05 (.07)	-.04 (.07)	-.04 (.07)	-.05 (.07)	-.04 (.07)
Gender (Male = 1)	.53** (.17)	.54** (.17)	.53** (.17)	.54** (.17)	.53** (.17)
Higher Standard of Living	-.03 (.06)	-.04 (.06)	-.04 (.06)	-.04 (.06)	-.04 (.06)
Constant	.93 ^a (.49)	.72 (.48)	.74 (.48)	.73 (.48)	.53 (.56)
Number of observations	979	979	979	979	979
Log-likelihood	904.38	905.99	906.21	905.65	905.74
χ^2	126.35	124.73	124.52	125.08	124.98

NOTE.—Variables marked (Logit) denote logit coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

* Significant at the .10 level (two-tailed test). 1 = Respondent never prays.

** Significant at the .05 level.

*** Significant at the .01 level.

event, it is only to the extent that their predispositions and preferences will persist and distinguish their generation in the future that it will be possible to speak with confidence about the existence of cohort effects.

By contrast, the findings about the Boumedienne generation probably do reflect cohort effects resulting from early socialization. Moreover, they involve both personal orientations, such as musical tastes, and societal norms, such as the role of women outside the home; and they also involve, within the same cohort, a *more* traditional orientation in the sphere of personal affairs and a *less* traditional orientation in the sphere of societal affairs. Linking these patterns to the characteristics of the Boumedienne era suggests that in countries such as Algeria that have had an intense colonial experience, those

Table 9. Influence of Cohort Membership on Western Influence (OLS) with Gender, Education, and Living Standard Held Constant

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Cohort Membership:					
Colonialism (pre-1954)	.17 (.11)				
Independence War (1954–1962)		.03 (.10)			
Boumedienne (1965–1978)			-.14** (.06)		
Benjedid (1979–1988)				-.05 (.06)	
Contestation and Violence (1989–1995)					.17** (.07)
Age	.009*** (.002)	-.007*** (.002)	-.006*** (.002)	-.007*** (.002)	.004** (.002)
Higher Education Level	.09*** (.02)	.09*** (.02)	.09*** (.02)	.09*** (.02)	.09*** (.02)
Gender (Male = 1)	.15** (.05)	.15* (.05)	.15** (.05)	.15*** (.05)	.15** (.05)
Higher Standard of Living	.04** (.02)	.04** (.02)	.04** (.02)	.04** (.02)	.04** (.02)
Constant	-2.96*** (.13)	-3.02*** (.12)	-3.02*** (.12)	-3.01*** (.12)	-3.16*** (.13)
Number of observations	991	991	991	991	991
R ²	.1	.1	.12	.1	.12

NOTE.—Variables marked (OLS) denote unstandardized linear regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. 1, 3 = Degree to which respondent listens to Western music.

*Significant at the .10 level (two-tailed test).

**Significant at the .05 level.

*** Significant at the .01 level.

individuals whose early socialization takes place shortly after independence will be less likely than others to adopt nontraditional habits and cultural preferences in their personal lives. This is particularly likely if the period is also characterized by a national concern with reasserting the country's cultural identity after years of colonial domination. The findings also suggest that in developing countries such as Algeria, those individuals whose early socialization takes place during a period that emphasizes socialist development and mass education, and that possibly also recognizes women's contribution to the achievement of national objectives, will be more likely than others to possess nontraditional values in matters pertaining to societal organization.

Table 10. Influence of Cohort Membership on Women's Empowerment (Logit) with gender, Education, and Living Standard Held Constant

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Cohort Membership:					
Colonialism (pre-1954)	-.44 (.34)				
Independence War (1954–1962)		-.24 (.30)			
Boumedienne (1965–1978)			.34* (.2)		
Benjedid (1979–1988)				.15 (.19)	
Contestation and Violence (1989–1995)					-.10 (.22)
Age	.02*** (.01)	.02*** (.01)	.02** (.01)	.02*** (.01)	.02*** (.01)
Higher Education Level	.26*** (.06)	.26*** (.06)	.26*** (.06)	.26*** (.06)	.26*** (.06)
Gender (Male = 1)	-.99*** (.15)	-.99*** (.15)	-.99*** (.15)	-.99*** (.15)	-.99*** (.15)
Higher Standard of Living	.11** (.05)	.12** (.05)	.12** (.05)	.12** (.05)	.12* (.05)
Constant	.11 (.40)	.26 (.38)	.27 (.37)	.24 (.38)	.38 (.42)
Number of observations	989	989	989	989	989
Log-likelihood	1160.37	1161.39	1158.88	1161.42	1161.85
χ^2	69.61	68.60	71.00	68.56	68.14

NOTE.—Variables marked (Logit) denote logit coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. 1 = Agree that women should work outside the home.

*Significant at .10 level (two-tailed test).

**Significant at the .05 level.

*** Significant at the .01 level.

Conclusions

Our data present evidence that generation effects are discernible in a country like Algeria, yet these effects are relatively rare. There are cohort effects associated with several historical periods, but in only one case are they discernible for more than a single issue. This is the Boumedienne period. In four different instances, including at least one in each of the substantive areas considered—political, economic, and social—men and women whose early political socialization coincided with the presidency of Houari Boumedienne display attitudinal tendencies that set them apart from other Algerians.

Thus, if we want to identify the attributes of a historical period that would seem to be those most likely to produce cohort effects, we must examine the Boumedienne era. The attributes of this period include substantial duration; centralized political leadership; a coherent socialist orientation; an emphasis on industrial development, mass education, and social welfare; regime legitimacy; and an important temporal position as the period following independence. Yet, it is only possible to speculate about more specific causal linkages and about the relative utility of each of these attributes in accounting for particular cohort effects. For example, were some of the distinctive dispositions of the Boumedienne cohort shaped largely by the ideological orientation that prevailed when its members passed through their formative years, or were they influenced to an equal or even greater degree by the forward-looking and hopeful national mood that prevailed immediately after independence?

The present study also demonstrates that generation effects are limited in substantive scope. They help to account for variance in some normative orientations but are not present in many other instances. It is possible that disaggregation might have yielded additional significant relationships, revealing cohort effects for some time periods or orientations among only one sex, only one educational level, and so forth. Nevertheless, while this is another subject for future research, it seems clear that in countries like Algeria, as in the West, the concept of a political generation has only limited explanatory and predictive power.

Our findings demonstrate the importance of contextual knowledge in formulating and testing hypotheses about political generations. With respect to both historical periods and the content of period effects, familiarity with the Algerian case has informed what was expected and, equally important, has been essential in understanding what was actually observed. The present study has also been informed, and to an extent inspired, by research on political socialization and political generations carried out in the United States. Nevertheless, the concerns of this research could not have been meaningfully pursued in Algeria without knowledge of the country's history and the issues confronting its citizens.

Additional research is needed not only to reduce uncertainty and shed light on causal pathways; it is also needed to assess the generalizability of insights derived from our study of Oran. To what extent is our sample representative of Algeria's urban population; would data from Algerians living in small towns and villages lead to different conclusions; and how representative is the overall Algerian experience? We believe that in the areas of politics, economics, and culture, Algeria resembles many of the Third World countries that became independent in the 1950s and 1960s. Other scholars agree. Quandt, for example, argues that Algeria is similar to many postcolonial countries and should be examined in comparative perspective (1998, p. 3). We also believe that the demographic and economic heterogeneity of Oran makes it at least reasonably representative of the country as a whole. Nevertheless, propositions

derived from the study of one Algerian city cannot be assessed without research in other locations. Furthermore, having emphasized the importance of contextual knowledge, we would add that an understanding of the history, politics, and culture of any society in which scholars investigate generation effects must inform such research.

Finally, as illustrated by relationships involving the control variables of age, education, gender, and standard of living, it should be emphasized that generation effects are only one determinant of variance in political, economic, and social attitudes. Moreover, the amount of variance for which they account is relatively modest. A different kind of study would be needed if accounting for attitudinal variance were the primary objective. The focus of the present investigation, by contrast, is an inquiry into the existence and character of generation effects. Although many questions remain unanswered, the Algerian case offers evidence that political generations do emerge in response to certain conditions, that their characteristics are discernible, and that the content of cohort effects can be plausibly linked to the characteristics of the time period during which members of the generation passed through their formative years.

Appendix

The following is the exact question wording and response choices in the French language version of the Oran survey, with an English language translation.

Political Orientations

POLITICAL SYSTEM PREFERENCES

Support for democracy

(1) Classez dans l'ordre de leur importance (de 1 à 4), *selon votre opinion*, les besoins des citoyens qu'un gouvernement doit chercher à satisfaire:

1. Conditions matérielles (travail, logement)
2. Paix civile
3. Sauvegarde des traditions et valeurs culturelles
4. Développement des institutions démocratiques
9. Pas d'opinion

Place in the order of their importance (from 1 to 4), *in your opinion*, the needs of citizens that the government should satisfy [coded 1 according to whether or not respondent selected #4, 0 otherwise]:

1. Material conditions (work, lodging)
2. Civil peace
3. Protecting cultural traditions and values
4. Developing democratic institutions
9. No response

(2) Classez dans l'ordre de leur importance (de 1 à 5), *selon votre opinion*, les qualités que doit posséder un homme politique:

1. Expérience (compétence)
2. Intégrité morale
3. Sens de la justice
4. Sensibilité humaine
5. Esprit ouvert aux idées politiques diverses
9. Pas d'opinion

Place in the order of their importance (from 1 to 5), in your opinion, the qualities a politician should possess [coded 1 according to whether or not respondent selected #5, 0 otherwise]:

1. Experience (competence)
2. Moral integrity
3. A sense of justice
4. A humane sensibility
5. Openness to diverse political ideas
9. No response

Support for political Islam

(3) Selon vous, la religion doit-elle guider les décisions dans la vie administrative et politique?

1. Beaucoup
2. Un peu
3. Non
4. Ne sait pas
9. Ne répond pas

In your opinion, should religion guide political and administrative decisions?

1. A lot
2. Some
3. None
4. Don't know
9. No response

(4) Selon vous, la religion doit-elle guider les décisions dans la vie économique et commerciale?

1. Beaucoup
2. Un peu
3. Non
4. Ne sait pas
9. Ne répond pas

In your opinion, should religion guide economic and commercial decisions?

1. A lot
2. Some
3. None

4. Don't know
9. No response

POLITICAL EFFICACY

(5) Selon vous, la vie politique est-elle trop compliquée pour être comprise par les citoyens ordinaires?

1. Oui, trop compliquée
2. Un peu compliquée
3. Non, pas trop compliquée
4. Ne sait pas
9. Ne répond pas

In your opinion, is politics too complicated for ordinary citizens to understand?

1. Yes, too complicated
2. Somewhat complicated
3. No, not too complicated
4. Don't know
9. No response

POLITICAL TRUST

(6) À votre avis, les décideurs du pays se soucient-ils des besoins des citoyens?

1. Souvent
2. Parfois
3. Rarement
4. Jamais
9. Ne répond pas

In your view, do politicians care about the needs of citizens?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never
9. No response

Economic Orientations

NATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

(7) Par rapport aux 5 dernières années, la situation économique du pays:

1. S'est amélioré beaucoup
2. S'est amélioré un peu
3. N'a pas beaucoup changé

4. S'est dégradé un peu
5. S'est dégradé beaucoup
8. Ne sait pas
9. Ne répond pas

In the last 5 years, the economic situation of the country has:

1. Improved a lot
2. Improved a little
3. Hasn't changed
4. Deteriorated a little
5. Deteriorated a lot
8. Don't know
9. No response

PERSONAL ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

(8) Par rapport aux 5 dernières années, votre niveau de vie personnel:

1. S'est amélioré beaucoup
2. S'est amélioré un peu
3. N'a pas beaucoup changé
4. S'est dégradé un peu
5. S'est dégradé beaucoup
8. Ne sait pas
9. Ne répond pas

In the last 5 years, your standard of living has:

1. Improved a lot
2. Improved a little
3. Hasn't really changed
4. Deteriorated a little
5. Deteriorated a lot
8. Don't know
9. No response

THE REWARD OF HARD WORK

(9) Selon vous, l'effort dans le travail paie-t-il (sur le plan moral et matériel):

1. Souvent
2. Parfois
3. Rarement
4. Jamais
8. Ne sait pas

In your opinion, hard work is rewarded (morally and materially):

1. Often
2. Sometimes

3. Rarely
4. Never
8. Don't know

Social and Cultural Orientations

WOMEN AND GENDER EQUALITY

(10) Êtes-vous pour le travail de la femme (hors domicile)?

1. Oui, en général
2. Oui, avant le mariage
3. Oui, avant la naissance des enfants
4. Absolument contre

Do you favor women working (outside the home)?

1. Yes, in general
2. Yes, before marriage
3. Yes, before having children
4. Absolutely against

PERSONAL RELIGIOSITY

(11) Où faites-vous d'habitude vos prières?

1. À la mosquée
2. À la maison
3. Au travail
4. Ne fait pas la prière
9. Ne répond pas

In general, where do you pray?

1. At the mosque
2. At home
3. At work
4. Do not pray
9. No response

PREFERENCE FOR WESTERN MUSIC

(12) Quel genre de musique aimez-vous?

Arabe classique

1. Beaucoup
2. Un peu
3. N'aime pas

Variété du pays

1. Beaucoup
2. Un peu
3. N'aime pas

Occidentale classique

1. Beaucoup
2. Un peu
3. N'aime pas

Occidentale populaire

1. Beaucoup
2. Un peu
3. N'aime pas

What kind of music do you like?

a. Classical Arabic

1. A lot
2. A little
3. Don't like

b. Algerian music

1. A lot
2. A little
3. Don't like

c. Western classical

1. A lot
2. A little
3. Don't like

d. Western popular

1. A lot
2. A little
3. Don't like

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