

THE CAUCASIAN INSTITUTE FOR PEACE,  
DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

## Developing a National Security Concept for Georgia

Proceedings of the International Conference  
(Tbilisi, 1-2 April 1996)



**FRIEDRICH  
EBERT   
STIFTUNG**

Tbilisi 1996

The following is the proceedings of the international conference which took part in Tbilisi on 1-2 April, 1996. The publication is based on the tape recordings made during the conference. The views expressed belong to individuals only and do not represent positions of any organization or a government.

Editor: Ghia Nodia  
Preparation of materials: David Darchiashvili, Tamar Pataraya,  
with participation of Natia Tevzadze  
English translation: Elvan Gurabanidze  
English editing: Maria Barlett

Holding the conference and publishing this brochure has become possible thanks to financial assistance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Office for Information and Press and Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Germany). The United States Information Service has provided for travel and accommodation of Kenneth Brower (USA).

## The Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development

89/24 David Aghmashenebeli, Tbilisi, Georgia.

Mailing address: P. O. Box 4 (158), Tbilisi 380008, Georgia.

Telephones: 995 32 954723, 953287, fax: 954497, e-mail: cipdd@access.sanet.ge.

საქართველოს ეროვნული უსაფრთხოების კონცეფციის განვითარება.  
საერთაშორისო კონფერენციის მასალები.  
ინგლისურ ენაზე.

მშვიდობის, დემოკრატიისა და განვითარების კავკასიური ინსტიტუტი  
თბილისი, ღამთა აღმაშენებლის 89/24

# CONTENTS

List of participants ..... 4

## *Day One*

The Plenary Session ..... 7

1. Defence and Society ..... 17

2. Building an Army in an Economically Weak Country ..... 27

## *Day Two*

3. National Structures of Command and Control ..... 34

4. National Security Problems in the Regional and International Context;  
Ethnic-Territorial Conflicts and Security Regimes in Georgia ..... 48

The Brainstorming Summary and Closing of the Plenary Session ..... 60

## **LIST OF PARTICIPANTS**

1. Revaz Adamia, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Defense and National Security, Georgia.
2. Besarion Aladashvili, National Security Council, Georgia.
3. Irakli Aladashvili, “Shvidi Dge” (Seven Days) newspaper, Georgia.
4. Levan Alapishvili, Association for the Atlantic Co-operation, Georgia.
5. Zaal Anjaparidze, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Georgia.
6. Nugzar Babutsidze, National Security Council, Georgia.
7. Ioseb Barnabishvili, National Democratic Party, Georgia.
8. Jürgen Beiche, German Embassy in Georgia.
9. Mamuka Bichashvili, Public Center of Economical and Political Studies, Georgia.
10. Ambassador Dieter Boden, Head of the OSCE Mission in Georgia.
11. Alexander Boicharov, OSCE Mission in Georgia.
12. Kenneth Brower, Spectrum Association, USA.
13. Loris Chesquire, NATO HQ.
14. Kakha Chitaia, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of International Relations, Georgia.
15. Major Gen. Valeri Chkheidze, Head of the Department of Border Defense, Georgia.
16. Ambassador William Courtney, Ambassador of the USA in Georgia.
17. David Darchiashvili, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and development, Georgia.
18. Ali Reza Eihlim, Embassy of Iran in Georgia.
19. Prof. Charles H. Fairbanks, School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, USA.
20. Andreas Farner, University of German Armed Forces, Germany.
21. Revaz Gachechiladze, Tbilisi State University, Georgia.
22. Paata Giorgadze, National Security Council, Georgia.
23. Dieter Glitza, George C. Marshall Center, Germany.

24. Lt Col. Freiser Haddow, Ministry of Defense, UK.
25. Lt Col. James R. Howcroft, US Embassy in Georgia.
26. Ivliane Khaindrava, Republican Party of Georgia.
27. Irakli Khartishvili, Parliamentary Research Service, Georgia.
28. Janri Kashia, Georgian-European Institute, France.
29. Kakha Katsitadze, Public Center of Economical and Political Studies, Georgia.
30. Laurence Kerr, US Embassy in Georgia.
31. Omie Kerr, US Embassy in Georgia.
32. Col. Friedrich W. Kriesel, NATO HQ.
33. Mamuka Kudava, Foreign Ministry of Georgia.
34. Gela Khutsishvili, Dpt. Of Border Troops of Georgia.
35. George Khutsishvili, International Center for Conflicts and Negotiation, Georgia.
36. Ivan Lancharich, OSCE Mission in Georgia.
37. Dimitri Lezhava, National Security Council of Georgia.
38. Omar Lekveishvili, National Security Council of Georgia.
39. Ina Lepel, German Embassy in Georgia.
40. Lt. Col. Linz, Federal Ministry of Defense, Germany.
41. David Losaberidze, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Georgia.
42. Vakhtang Maisaia, Georgian Parliament.
43. Wolfgang Manig, NATO HQ, Belgium.
44. Guram Manjgaladze, independent expert, Georgia.
45. Giorgi Manjgaladze, independent expert, Georgia.
46. Irakli Mchedlishvili, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Georgia.
47. Irakli Melashvili, Association for Atlantic Co-operation, Georgia.
48. Vasili Melnik, Embassy of the Ukraine in Georgia.
49. Nino Nanava, Georgian Parliament.
50. Temur Nergadze, Republican Party of Georgia.
51. Ghia Nodia, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Georgia.

52. Tamar Pataraya, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Georgia.
53. Zaza Pataridze, Association for Atlantic Co-operation of Georgia.
54. John Wright, TACIS Program, Georgia.
55. Alexander Rondeli, Tbilisi State University, Georgia.
56. Cpt. Edward Rogers, NATO HQ.
57. David Sikharulidze, Association for Atlantic Co-operation of Georgia.
58. Ia Tikanadze, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Georgia.
59. Beso Tsilosani, Parliament Research Service, Georgia.
60. David Tsintsadze, Ministry of State Security of Georgia.
61. Mamuka Tsurtsunia, "Mkhedari" (Warrior) magazine, Georgia.
62. Niko Vashakidze, Foreign Ministry of Georgia.
63. Phil Wasielewski, US Embassy in Georgia.
64. Col. Herman van der Weijden, NATO HQ.
65. Ambassador Hans Georg Wieck, retired, Germany.

## Day One

### The Plenary Session

*Opening the session, Dr. Ghia Nodia, the chairman of the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD), greeted the participants of the conference, with a very special welcome to the foreign guests.*

Dr. Nodia pointed out the outstanding contribution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, singling out Mr. Chris Donnelly, Special Adviser for Central and East European Affairs to NATO's Secretary General, and his office for their contribution to the arrangements for the conference. Mr. Donnelly's office is making great efforts to extend the experience gained by western democratic countries in the field of the organization of defense and security to former communist countries. It was three years ago that the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Development, and Democracy, first planned, with Mr. Donnelly, to hold this kind of conference, but failed to carry it out due to the then unstable situation in Georgia. The current situation is quite different and, therefore, a number of experts from NATO member-states have honored us with their presence here to discuss with Georgian specialists the ways through which Georgia is to solve key problems associated with national security. The conference has been sponsored by NATO Office for Information and Press, and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

The CIPDD, which has been directly involved in the organization of this workshop, is a non-governmental organization. In the process of democratic transition, the society should develop a new perspective towards its own security problems as well. The problems of state security represent quite a popular topic in Georgia, and Parliament has dedicated much time addressing these issues; thus far, however, these problems have almost been reduced to one issue - under whose or which influence should or should not Georgia be and, respectively, which external force is to take care of its security. In our opinion, the proper approach of a democratic society to security problems consists in our own care for our own security. This does not imply that just one specially designated department of the government, or the army, or the police should have sole responsibility, but rather the entire society, including NGOs as well. It is our, i.e. society's, right to know how our government wishes to safeguard our society, in what way it intends to build our security system, and how it disposes of the money allocated for this purpose. It is our responsibility to consider these questions instead of assigning them to someone else. And it is the purpose of this workshop to discuss these issues.

The conference coincided with the visit of Russia's Defense Minister, Mr.

Grachev, to Georgia. Therefore, some government officials who were willing and preparing to participate in it found themselves unfortunately unable to attend. This involves a planned speech of a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs at this plenary session. Here is a vivid contradiction between theory and practice: we are considering the concept of Georgia's national security while they are designing Georgia's security, in reality.

*Ms. Inna Lepel, the Deputy Ambassador of Germany to Georgia, expressed the Embassy's support of the objectives of the Conference and congratulated the CIPDD for this initiative.*

This is the first seminar which provides the opportunity to discuss the policy of Georgia's security. The participation of so many foreign guests and the fact that the Georgian side is represented so well, is most impressive. The German Embassy as a NATO contact point Embassy works on Georgia's individual partnership program within the framework of the NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Ms. Lepel pointed out Georgia's success in democratic development which has created beneficial external conditions for ensuring the country's security and re-establishment of its territorial integrity. The OSCE mission is ready to render any assistance in achieving this goal as well. Georgia's democracy, economic reforms and financial security command the attention of the governments of the North Atlantic Coordinating Council member-states and the OSCE. We do not wish to strengthen the security of one state at the expense of others, neither do we wish to see the re-emergence of new divisions between military blocks.

*Dr. Wolfgang Manig, representing the Office of the Special Adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs to the NATO Secretary General, pointed out that prior to working in NATO Headquarters, he dealt with Georgia's problems in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has been familiar with Georgia since 1992. Comparing the situation in the country to that of those days, he admitted that a lot of progress has been made, although the political environment still remains complex and the conflicts have not been resolved.*

The present workshop will contribute to the development of a national security concept. Although the discussions are for the most part going to be theoretical, practical examples will be given of the ways national security problems are resolved in NATO. Comparing the experiences of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, we will see that the NATO member-state first develops its own security concept and then tries to find a balance with its partners, while in the Warsaw Pact all member-states had to comply with certain general directives. In the end it is the Georgians that should find the ways for developing their own national security themselves. No experts will be able to do that for them.

No security concept can be developed by a small circle of experts. At this



stage our objective lies in facilitating the creation of a strategic community. The same applies to the objective of this seminar. It is this community which will develop the national security concept.

The first question is: what is a strategic community? The structure of the former Soviet society was quite different. According to the Soviet military doctrine the General Staff was the brain of the Army and enjoyed a monopoly on the resolution of military problems. The military developed the defense policy, while the CPSU exercised control over the army and maintained its obedience. That was not, however, truly civilian control since the Party lacked adequate military expertise. The Politburo enjoyed privileges but it lacked necessary knowledge. The KGB and the military together made the analyses of security issues. In theory, the CPSU set military policy, but in fact the General Staff had the upper hand.

In any open society the army carries out orders, while the responsibility for issuing those orders lay with the civil government. In the open society a defense minister is to provide sound arguments justifying the share of the national income to be used for defense purposes. In the open society the military should prove that their demands are reasonable. It is the military that needs the partnership of civil institutions - the government, media and academia. On their part, civil servants should have a competent knowledge to provide adequate partnership and be able to control the military. The members of respective parliamentary committees should know how much a tank costs and to what extent and for what purposes the given tank is needed. Maybe, some other equipment is better purchased instead? This question must be asked by politicians and not by the General Staff.

The development of a strategic community is required so that civilians can learn the particulars of military affairs. Far from including only current experts, the strategic community shall comprise politicians, journalists, academicians. It is highly commendable that we find representatives of all these circles at this conference today.

The second issue to be addressed in this workshop is the essence of the national security concept. It is not a military doctrine. Security today is far more than a purely military issue. The security system is not limited to the armed forces only. It includes social security, the economy, civil society and internal stability. In short, the problem requires a comprehensive approach. Moreover, the assessment of risk and the elements which constitute an anticipated threat create the basis of the national security concept. It is this assessment of risk that the armed forces depends on.

Our seminar will also focus on assessing the standing of the armed forces in a civil society. In our working groups we are going to discuss civil-military rela-

tions, parliamentary oversight, and political risk assessment.

This seminar cannot, however, provide final answers to all these questions. The Georgian participants, in fact, are the experts. All we can do is help you to identify the problems. I would like to repeat that the objective of our meeting consists of bringing together the Georgian strategic community - the military and the civilians. Foreign experts will make some introductory statements, present the approaches of different NATO states to security issues which quite often differ from one another. And it is up to the Georgians to assess which model can best meet Georgia's demands. Finally, we will discuss future plans. Debates with regard to these issues should continue. We must develop specific projects for further co-operation.

*Mr. Lawrence Kerr, the deputy chief of mission of the United States, delivered a statement from US Ambassador William H. Courtney, who was in Baku, and unable to attend. Ambassador Courtney's statement was as follows:*

The "national security" of a state is a broad concept, and depends on a range of factors. These include democratic development, economic reform, the rule of law, defense, and regional relations. From the US perspective, Georgia is gaining in many areas. These positive trends differ from the experience after independence when civil conflict split apart Georgia, and in the process destroyed infrastructure and delayed reforms. In many ways recovery since then has been remarkable. Yet Georgia remains poor and vulnerable. Parts of the country - Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or the Tskhinvali region - are under separatist control. Adjara lags in reforms, and the Azeri and Armenian enclaves exhibit some unease.

Let us take a look at key aspects of national security, and see how Georgia is doing in each category.

The first is democratic development. Elections for president and parliament last November were relatively free and fair in most areas. They have enhanced the legitimacy of Georgia as a state, and of the parliament and president, which are among the most reformist in the New Independent States. Through open hearings and new laws, parliament is laying a basis for deeper reforms and more honest government. Internal tensions are lower than at any time since independence. Democratic changes are not threatened by hard-line minorities, communist and nationalist.

Georgians are debating whether to establish federalism. Many democracies have found that elected local governments decentralize decision-making and are more responsive to the electorate. Local elections also help lessen separatism by showing that local control over local issues is a reality. Many in the former Soviet Union believe local elections can spur unrest or separatism. Our experience is the

opposite. The civil rights movement in the 1960s reminded Americans that the best way to lessen minority tensions is to seek to assure that everyone can participate in the democratic process on an equal basis.

A second area of national security is how economic opportunity makes a state more stable and its people more prosperous. Georgia still faces weakness; it will depend on humanitarian aid for another year or two. In the first nine months of 1994, inflation averaged over 60 per cent per month - hyperinflation. But Georgia gained courage to kill this disease, and did so faster than expected. The new currency, the Lari, is stable, backed by tight monetary and fiscal policies. The economy is beginning to rebound. Small business is now largely private.

Georgia is undertaking more economic reforms. With most industry in dire straits, over 80 per cent of the economy derives from agriculture. Georgia will benefit enormously if land can be freely bought, sold, leased, and mortgaged. This will spur substantial private investment in the country's rich agriculture potential. It will also better enable minorities to protect their rights, just as private land did in America after our civil war. Inefficient and corrupt state monopolies burden economies. Their segmentation and privatization, as is happening with Georgian bread corporation, is critical to future economic growth. Tax reform, instituting moderate and predictable rates and a wide tax base, increases economic opportunity by fostering investment and bringing more activity into the legal economy. Tax reform enhances stability by making the tax burden fairer and generating more revenues for legitimate government activities. Commercial law and banking reforms are also valuable. These steps will help unleash private investment to build a dynamic and productive economy. The World Bank, IMF, USAID, EBRD, Germany, and the European Union, among others, are working with Georgians in these areas.

Georgia has an ideal location and ports to transport and ship goods for an entire continental area. A new "Eurasian Corridor" reaches from the Black Sea across the Transcaucasus, the Caspian Sea by barge, and Kazakhstan and Central Asia to China. Last year, tens of thousands of trucks crossed from Turkey to Georgia. Many continued eastward through the Eurasian Corridor. This represents a phenomenal shift in transport patterns in just a few years. Railway and truck transport from Russia to Georgia and vice-versa has dried up because of the Abkhazia and Chechnya disputes. The Western oil pipeline, which America strongly backs as one of multiple routes, will reinforce the Eurasian Corridor by spurring competitive export routes for Caspian energy.

A third aspect of national security is the rule of law. In contrast to the early post-independence years, the security situation is much better. After the bombing attempt against Eduard Shevardnadze last August, the Mkhedrioni, an official

but lawless gang, was finally neutralized. Streets and small businesses have come to life, and people feel safer. Reform of law enforcement bodies, however, remains a challenge. Human rights observance has improved, but more should be done to protect detainees and assure that police functions are carried out under the rule of law. Establishment of strong and independent courts is indispensable.

A fourth aspect of national security is defense. Georgia's fledgling military was shattered by the defeat in Abkhazia. Since then progress has been made in building a better force. A successful military must have professional skill and discipline and be accountable to civil authority. Georgia is acquiring from Russia military training and equipment. On a small scale, Georgia has begun collaboration with others. We look forward to coast guard and other military cooperation, including ship visits, the first of which took place last August. Our activities aim not to supplant, but to complement Georgia's ties with others. Any agreements on military basing and other issues should be voluntary and mutually beneficial.

Georgia is becoming more active in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PFP). Its Individual Partnership Program was signed in December. The door is open for even more activities. In addition to encouraging cooperation on defense planning and strategy, PFP addresses civil-military relations and the issue of civilian control over the military. Attention to these matters can bolster public support for a sound defense posture.

A fifth aspect of national security is regional relations, a key factor in helping Georgia to reestablish its territorial integrity. Through skillful diplomacy and leadership, Georgia has developed good and balanced ties with its neighbors - Russia and Turkey, and Azerbaijan and Armenia. Despite some voices in the Duma, Russian leaders seem to be searching for negotiated solutions to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia appears to be eager to reopen long-standing trade and transport routes to Georgia and Armenia, closed since the Abkhazia war. Thus far, however, Russia has not managed to induce separatist leaders to negotiate realistically.

France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States comprise the "Friends of Georgia" group on Abkhazia. Like other "Friends," America is looking at how the negotiations can be enhanced, with the United Nations playing a leading role along with Russia. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe facilitates the South Ossetia negotiations. Russia and Georgia bear the main responsibility for achieving solutions, but the Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatists must act in good faith. Once solutions are found, international participation in implementing them will be easier to obtain. A wide consensus exists that solutions must be consistent with Georgia's territorial integrity. The safe return home of internally-displaced persons and refugees is a humani-

tarian priority. Negotiated solutions are the best hope for this.

In conclusion, although Georgia still faces major separatist obstacles and internal vulnerabilities, it has made notable gains. Democratic advances, economic reforms, safer conditions, establishment of an independent military with parliamentary oversight, and regional cooperation are all strengthening national security. America strongly supports this progress. It is the best way to assure the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Georgia.

*Ambassador Dieter Boden*, the Head of the OSCE Mission in Georgia presented his views on ethnic conflicts in Georgia and their relations to national security issues:

The OSCE has been active in Georgia since December 1992, at the invitation of the Georgian government. The principle objective of the Mission consists in rendering assistance in the resolution of ethnic conflicts. It conducts its activities mainly in South Ossetia, representing one of the five parties involved in the negotiations. The said five parties include two Georgian parties: Georgia and South Ossetia, also Russia, North Ossetia and the OSCE facilitators. The OSCE also participates in the settlement of the Abkhaz conflict along with the UN. At this seminar Mr. Boden presented his personal consideration as an example of academic analysis of the situation.

What does Georgia need for defining its security policy? I think, at least two things are required: first, Georgia's interest in immediately resolving both conflicts and, secondly, a long term strategy for the prevention of such conflicts in the future must be elaborated. As to the first question, OSCE cannot be expected to provide any ready-made concept for the resolution of the conflicts. With both of the conflicts frozen, the immediate threat of military flare-up is gone, but this does not minimize the urgent need to reach a political solution. A conflict might heat up anew at any time as long as no agreed settlement exists. Therefore, it is imperative to accelerate the process of political negotiations in both conflict zones - South Ossetia and Abkhazia. At present we are at the initial stage of such a process. As to South Ossetia, we started a new negotiation in October 1995 which will focus on confidence-building measures, then proceed to the status issue. On Abkhazia, political negotiations it seems are in a deadlock.

One thing, however, is clear: we need a sustained, conscious political effort on behalf of Georgia who is the key party in both conflicts. OSCE can only act as a mediator. In close co-ordination, we must develop creative, constructive approaches to the main political problems, including the status issue. Resources in this regard are far from exhausted. Arranging football matches between Georgia and North Ossetia and holding administrative meetings on practical problems in

the border zone are certainly important, but they will not suffice. Also required are fresh ideas on the future status of South Ossetia within the framework of the Georgian state. There is little hope that a simple return to the past model will find general acceptance. A new creative effort is needed to overcome the present situation.

There are those who allege that Russia is not greatly interested in the settlement of Georgian conflicts. This argument certainly requires careful examination given the pivotal role that Russia is playing in the Caucasus. In fact we may easily agree on the view that the settling of these conflicts will hardly be possible without Russia. Some people tend to exaggerate Russia's influence. Russia may have security policy considerations of its own as much as Georgia has specific security concerns. Both may not coincide in every detail. On the other hand, there is definitely a large area of common interest. As much as Georgia, Russia must be interested in the peaceful Caucasus and a speedy settlement of conflicts in the region. It is imperative that this aspect is given deeper consideration.

Let me now address the second point which I have made: the elaboration of a long-term strategy. It implies the prevention of ethnic conflicts in the future. In my judgment, and on this I share the opinion of my American colleague, Georgia should remain a multi-ethnic state. As you are well aware eighty ethnic minorities live on the territory of your state, among them such important communities as the Armenian and Azerbaijanian minorities. We agree with the idea that this variety of minorities which is one of the wealths of Georgia, should be preserved. How is that to be safeguarded? The answer is both simple and complicated: building a state with the rule of law, consolidation of democratic institutions, participation of all in the democratic process, strict protection of ethnic minorities and protection of people's human rights in general, will represent Georgia as a model of inter-ethnic co-existence and of constitutional rule. All of this will contribute to making Georgia a stable democracy. This is my idea of a long-term strategy and I realize fully that the task will not be an easy one.

Let me add that an encouraging process is already underway. The new Parliament has embarked on a multitude of key law projects, among them laws on national minorities, on the creation of a Constitutional Court, and on an Ombudsman for human rights. This process has to be carried on and eventually include a law on Georgia's federal structural organization, which is still missing. It is here, on the domestic level, where the future status for the now separatists conflict areas South Ossetia and Abkhazia must be determined.

In conclusion, let me offer a few thoughts on the role international organiza-

tions can play. As you know the OSCE and the UN are presently involved in the settlement of conflicts in Georgia. Some might consider this interference into your internal affairs. I certainly think that they are mistaken. Let us put a question differently: is there any such thing as a pure national security policy today? I believe there is not. On the contrary. What we have today is a still increasing trend toward interdependence in interstate affairs, which consequently leads to collective action in conflict management. Increasingly, we live in an age of common security. Therefore, a conflict in Georgia is not merely a Georgian problem, but concerns the region, the continent as such. So international organizations justly consider themselves obligated to assist Georgia in the resolution of conflicts. This is why OSCE has been invited to operate in this country, supported by all of its 55 member states, among them Georgia and Russia as well.

*Major General Valeri Chkheidze, Commander-in-Chief of the Georgian Border Guards, was the sole Georgian state official who addressed the plenary session.*

The development of the concept and the system of national security is as necessary and important an attribute as the Constitution and the involvement of state institutions in this system. Georgia obtained its independence as a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union but the concept and the system of the state security has yet to be developed. For this purpose, the geopolitical condition of the state, national and social conditions of its population, conflicts that emerge on national, religious, social and other grounds should, by all means, be taken into consideration.

Much has already been said of ethnic conflicts here and this is the very result of the chain reaction caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. No protective instruments capable of halting ethnic conflicts had been developed by that time. We often use the word 'separatism'. This problem has acquired international significance. Therefore, it is highly commendable that these issues are considered at such a high level. The active involvement of international organizations will greatly contribute to the neutralization of all the separatist movements and, in the end, to the establishment of peace on all continents.

Separatism as a phenomenon always tends to narrow political visions, encourages political ambitions and provides a favorable ground for terrorism. International terrorism has become a grave problem about which the world community is concerned. The development of political and state structures requires scientific forethought and assessment, consideration of international traditions and other aspects. It is necessary to develop such a concept of national security which would cover all of these issues. This concept should comprise the protection of human rights as its major element. Today, this is the key point which takes

the lead in the resolution of all problems whether foreign or domestic; the issues related to defense, security, intelligence, counter-intelligence or social and economic problems.

The key problem which Georgia faces consists in the complicated process of developing new institutions. With regards to the protection of national interests along the state border, I would say that any state begins at its border to safeguard territorial integrity and national interests. This is one of the major principles of the defense of state frontiers. Besides, the national security concept shall provide a system which, along with other international institutions and organizations, will deal with all the problems in order to prevent the occurrence of possible conflicts in the future. These can be domestic political issues, foreign political, economic or any other kind of problems. It is necessary to make a realistic assessment of the country's potential. A specific and actual direction of the process of co-operation and integration shall be defined during the collaboration with international institutions and organizations. I share the idea of one of the speakers that, unfortunately, old stereotypes remain, and that some of us are yet mesmerized by Russia's power. Democratic processes are taking place all over the world and gradually we are being liberated from this hypnosis. Hence, the consideration of international practice would be expedient; perhaps a strategic research center should be set up in our country as well, which would provide our authorities with its perspectives, proposals and predictions.

Given Georgia's geopolitical situation, we have no right to disregard regional issues. I myself have participated in three conflicts: in Afghanistan, Tskhinvali and Abkhazia. No serious analyses or political assessments of these conflicts have been made to this day. Perhaps this should also be considered and we can work on it too. Five years is a short period of time for a perfect state structure to develop. Seminars like this should, therefore, be regularly held, and we welcome the opportunity to hear the estimations and proposals of conflicting parties. The Department of Border Guards also has certain ideas. Of course, we do not claim to possess an ideal vision of how things should be. I would, however, appreciate it if the document outlining our concept could be examined by experts. Their remarks and suggestions would be of great value.

*In the end, the chairman thanked the speakers and the participants and expressed his confidence that Mr. Valeri Chkheidze's participation in the conference would contribute to the co-operation of non-governmental organizations and state structures in security matters.*



# **The First Working Group**

## **Topic: DEFENCE AND SOCIETY**

### **Chairman - Dr. Alexander Rondeli**

*Ambassador Hans-Georg Wieck opened the discussion.*

Over the last decades the issue of defence and the society was alien to Georgia, because defence policy was directed by the party and everything was kept secret. Soviet society was only involved in defence issues in the sense that it contributed to financing defense, and provided soldiers. Nobody explained to people why any of it all this was. The society which cares about its defence requires dialogue, and not the kind of dialogue in which one side says what is to be done and the second side merely listens and implements the directives of the first.

According to the experience of Western countries, the parliament is the meeting place of the executive authorities and the public. It is here that defence issues are addressed, and for this very purpose the so-called “White Papers” tradition was developed. “The White Papers” determine the national security policy and the principal directions of the development of the armed forces.

Herein, a concept is developed by the government and then submitted to the parliament for consideration. It contains the state security situation and the analysis of relationships with neighbouring countries. This document presents the situation with regard to the strategic powers of the region, relations with them and describes the responsive actions in view of the possible changes in the regional environment. It implies a description of the development of the country’s armed forces, their financing, their structures, internal system of behaviour, their conduct. This document is to be considered by the parliament and made widely known to the public. It is to be followed by the government and at the same time is to be reviewed once a year, or once every two years.

After World War II, defence issues became less popular in Germany. The government faced great difficulties in gaining public support for the re-establishment of armed forces. The academic strata of society had a hostile attitude towards the establishment of armed forces in Germany as well.

It is by the “White Papers” mechanism that you compile a reference book for the parliament, as well as for academic and journalistic circles, by means of which you inform the society of the state of affairs in the armed forces to which its members are to be drafted.

The armed forces, their financing, and international agreements to which the country is acceding, are still rarely discussed in Georgia. At the same time the

security of Georgia largely depends on the involvement of international powers. The Georgian authorities need public support for defence expenditures, and this can be obtained only through transparency and accountability. To begin with, Georgian “White Papers” can be non-governmental, since there still are a number of problems which have been pointed out by the Commander-in-Chief of the Border Guards today. To begin with, it can be a kind of discussion paper, which may be produced by a non-governmental institute - like the one which has invited us here today. Parliament, Society, as well as political and academic institutions can gradually get involved in the discussion. This will help to clear the way for the debates about defence and society.

The discussion is open. I would like to call on everyone to present his or her ideas.

**Janri Kashia:** I think we should first of all address the society issue. There was no society in the Soviet Union. The second should be the security structure. We have to comprehend various aspects of security and their interrelation. The security structure is a highly complex formation. It covers human rights, also social, cultural, and state frontier security. At the same time we have to think of the ways of safeguarding the security of any nation in the present open world. Europe serves as a good example for realising what problems the transparency of borders can create nowadays.

**David Losaberidze:** In any society, the establishment of a security system and, in particular, the building of an army is connected with general conditions of the society. In this respect the situation in the post-communist space is most complex. The transition of the former Warsaw Pact member-states to a new, democratic system is greatly hampered by remnants of the old mentality. The situation is particularly grave in the states that have emerged as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. None of them with the exception of Russia had enjoyed actual statehood, and at present are facing great difficulties in the development of national security structures. With the old ideological base dismantled and the society’s poor knowledge of liberal values, nationalism has turned into a leading ideological factor. This process has resulted in mono-national states, which have been created most painfully.

In this respect, the Caucasus represents one of the most troubled regions. Here the ideal of democracy appears to have substituted, to a certain extent, by the nationalist idea which is a major unifying force. It can be said with certainty that the process of the development of state institutions, including those of security, has proved most successful in those countries which conducted it under the banner of nationalism (the Baltic States, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Chechnya), while in those countries, in which, for various reasons, the factor of nationalism

was neglected (Georgia, Russia, Central Asian States) the development of the security system has been delayed. And these are the countries that experience permanent failures on foreign or domestic policies. The development of security systems in newly emerged states to a certain extent depends on due application of the factor of nationalism.

In conclusion I would like to stress that during the development of the security system, the factor of nationalism cannot be discarded. The security system on Central and Eastern Europe shall be guided by national state forces; and while there exist serious contradictions among these states, any attempt to develop a collective security system is to be considered most unrealistic.

**Natia Tevzadze:** An independent state requires the existence of various institutions and, in particular, the military. Like all over the post-Soviet space, solving this problem is far from a smooth process. Almost all of the characteristics of an independent state, including the armed forces, had to be re-assessed. No national motive had ever been predominant in the former Soviet military. It was the Communist, internationalist ideology that had always been most important. The state consciousness of the former Soviet Union had always opposed national consciousness since the Soviets had never been mono-national. That opposition incited the annoyance of an individual, a citizen, and encouraged the avoidance of military service. The break-up of the Soviet Union brought about a new stage of building national armed forces. In Georgia, this process was accompanied by internal unrest, civil wars and ethnic conflicts, in which Georgia got involved without any trained army or any developed national security concept. There was no civil society and the law on general military service was merely symbolic. The situation was further aggravated by hard economic conditions. These new factors created new difficulties on the path of building Georgian national armed forces. However, there was an encouraging feature as well - volunteering against a background of challenges facing the nation.

I would like to point out another significant aspect in the establishment of the armed forces - army authority and prestige. It is a good thing to be a soldier when the state cares for you. It is a good thing to be a soldier when he serves the interests of his homeland. But this service becomes unagreeable when the military policy is of little importance to the state, when the economic situation is grave.

The rudimentary Georgian Army failed to maintain the country's territorial integrity. This failure changed the Georgians' traditionally favourable disposition to the military service and many young people chose to avoid the army - this time with a new motivation: "The state did not duly assess ethnic, territorial or civil wars that we experienced". On the other hand, society was also at a loss, not

knowing whether to call the fighters heroes or criminals.

No care was taken of the volunteers returning from conflict areas or for their rehabilitation. The memory of those killed in the battles was not paid due attention. That is why military service has once again lost prestige in Georgia. A uniform state policy and a strong legislative and economic basis is required for improving society's attitude toward military service. In my opinion, nationalism will only assist in promoting military service, though it should be based on civic rather than ethnic principle.

**Charles Fairbanks:** The prestige of military service is an extremely important question in all modern countries. There is no state like Sparta in the world at present. Even Israel is not like Sparta. Most of the people in modern societies no longer lead a military life. Therefore, the military is becoming more and more separated from civilian life. The end of the Cold War has made this situation even more obvious. But the problem is far greater in newly emerged independent states, in particular in Georgia, with a desperate lack of resources for armed forces. Besides, under the Soviet rule military service was not a traditionally prestigious profession in these countries, and the army in the minds of the people is still, to a certain extent, associated with service in Soviet forces. Moreover, the events which occurred some time ago in the same Georgia identified military service with criminal activity.

If we move from the discussion of the problem to the discussion of possible solutions, it should be pointed out that the western experience, where military affairs are completely separate from those of the civilian, is less suitable for Georgia and it will not contribute to raising the prestige of the military service in this country. One of the reasons for this, among others, is lack of funds since Georgia cannot afford to pay officers adequate salaries. I do not think that any Georgian who has a chance of becoming a businessman or a scientist would rather become an army officer. This is a problem of great importance to a country like Georgia. Under the conditions of market economy and democracy no one, except for a small number of patriots, will take up a military career. Therefore, we must consider not only the establishment of a professional military service, which is so often recommended to post-Communist countries by western experts, but of an army which would attract middle class people on a part-time basis, so that while being in military service, one is able to continue civil service as well. This principle is far less expensive and besides, a lot more people can be trained that way. The post-Soviet states should pay more attention to this alternative.

**Paata Giorgidze:** I would like to return to Mr. Losaberidze's remark that nationalism should constitute the basis of the state and its security system. This kind of approach is unacceptable to me. A democratic state shall be open, this is

what our foreign colleagues are recommending too. We should act in the interests of a citizen and not in the interests of the state. In my opinion all of the institutions dealing with security shall be developed on voluntary basis.

**Temur Nergadze:** At present the state is directly charged with defence and the army-building, while the state itself is just starting to develop. The society has but little influence upon the establishment of the army, which might be explained by the fact that the society has not yet developed either and the inter-relation between the state and the society is still to be identified. We say that we are building a civil society but it seems to me that we do not clearly understand its essence. The issue of defence and the army in Georgia is further complicated by the defeat suffered by our army. The army and the society are estranged. Some of the fighters first got decorations and then found themselves in prison. This fact occasioned the society's indifference to the army and thus the army failed to become a part of the society. Acting in the interests of an individual is an inadmissible luxury when building the armed forces. Some kind of equanimity between state interests and those of an individual shall be found.

**Ambassador Wieck:** Several speakers have pointed out that due to the existing gap between the Georgian society and the armed forces it would be more advisable to establish a professional army of volunteers, which would exclude the draft. In my judgment, this is too simple a way out of the too complex situation in which Georgia is found. At a time when the country is facing the task of re-defining its own national identity, it is very dangerous to allow a complete separation of the nation, the society and the armed forces. However, certain efforts on the part of the society, for instance the introduction of the above-mentioned tradition of "White Papers" might relax this inter-estrangement.

Having a professional army is dangerous in a state which is in poverty and thus cannot ensure the financing of its military, since under these circumstances there is a danger that the armed forces could attempt to impose their own control over the state. Therefore, I cannot agree with those who are of the opinion that drafting is to be rejected due to the difficulties in the state and the society. It would, however, be desirable to distinguish a nucleus of the armed forces which could be used in international crisis management on the one hand, and the national defence forces on the other, the objective of which shall be territorial defence. This kind of a mixed system would link the principles of the draft system with those of the professional army.

**Friedrich Kriesel:** I would like to strongly support Ambassador Wieck's remarks. In Germany we have a conscript army and it is necessary for maintaining a contact between the army and the entire society. Under these conditions, the opinion of the army and the perspectives of the military reflect the perspectives

and the opinion of the entire society. A conscript army is of great importance to your country. You have experienced a civil war; you have ethnic minorities. It is very important that through conscription your army will include the representatives of all the ethnic minorities, while you will never be able to achieve that with a wholly volunteer army. In my opinion the army in your country can be an example, a school of the co-operation of different ethnic groups. After the re-unification of Germany the army played an important role in bringing together and adjusting the consciousness and views of the East and West German populations. I am not an American, but I would like to point out that the American armed forces have played a similar role. They have provided the representatives of various races and ethnic groups with the opportunity to establish close links and make their career on an equal basis.

**Edward Rogers:** I fully agree with the remarks of Colonel Kriesel and Ambassador Wieck. You are on the crossroads now. The present situation in Georgia must be changed. If you maintain the conscript notion you will have to improve the soldiers' living conditions, take care of their families. If you introduce the principle of volunteering, you will have a much smaller army but you will have to pay them well. In an ideal case, you will have a situation like the one in Germany with the citizen-soldiers principle. After the Vietnam war we, in America, faced the problem of the army being discredited and we shifted to the principle of volunteering. At the same time the army provided representatives of the lower classes the chance of being trained and educated. And after they complete military training, they return to the society better skilled and educated. Georgia must hold a public discussion as to the possible directions of the development of its armed forces.

**Lawrence Kerr:** I would like to say a few words about war funding organisations and their relations to society and culture. Today there are talks in Europe about the end of wars and history in general. They say that democratic countries will never declare war on one another. In the previous speech my German colleague noted that if you have a modern army, it could participate in international peacekeeping operations. This is where the world is going. But we must remember that in this region we are dealing not with the end of history but with its middle. This region has missed a very important period of development - from the end of the 18th century 'til now. The present stage of Georgia's development is analogous to the bloodstained past of Western and Central Europe. This is a dangerous time, the time when the army is considered to be a badly needed institution for national survival. Not long ago, there were clan and village armies in Georgia, i.e. armies usually organised around a clan, an ethnic group, village (or villages), or around some concrete individuals. World history has given a number

of examples of this type of army or para-military force having successfully fought in various battles, as was the case during the Civil war in America, when different armies fought on the side of the confederates. They were not united by a myth or an idea coming from the Centre. Every one of them had its own myth for which they fought. However, during the war against Japan the Americans put aside all regional differences and shared the central myth.

What is a Georgian myth around which a Georgian army can unite and fight? Georgia needs a new set of multi-ethnic heroes. The army also needs them. One of the key functions of the Georgian army should be its ability to unify the country. I joined the army before the war in Vietnam started and I witnessed the integrating role of the army there. People from Iowa who had never seen a Negro before were meeting people from Philadelphia who had seen very few whites. People, who had known Jews only by hearsay, now met them face to face - and had a nice time with them.

In short, the development of a Georgian army needs a central myth of what Georgia represents today. This myth shall integrate in itself ethnic, cultural and regional diversities of Georgia.

**Kashia:** I think it is wrong to consider Georgia a particularly multi-ethnic country. Making an emphasis on the multi-ethnicity of Georgia is a common mistake of the West. We have to speak of the civil society and the solution of security issues in the process of its development. If we go back to Stalin's ethnocentric concept we will never end the deadlock. I would like to stress that Georgia is the unity of citizens. Peoples of all the nationalities are first of all citizens of Georgia. The development of the security concept also requires the consideration of the principles of a civil society. If we consider Georgia a certain multi-ethnic formation, then neither the army nor life, in general, will have any sense whatsoever.

**Lawrence Kerr:** I am an American and I come from a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society and when I referred to culture as being multi-ethnic I meant it as a compliment. If we have a national character it has been developed through the reciprocity of various nationalities. I would also like to say that I have spoken as an interested person and a scientist and not as a government official. And, in general, whatever we say or think shall be based on the realities of the time.

**Giorgi Khutsishvili:** The security of Georgia lies in the system of state and social guarantees; it is the state of the society, when every individual, living on the territory of Georgia, the state's spiritual and material values, territorial integrity, constitutional system and sovereignty are protected. Abkhazia is an inseparable part of Georgia and in the process of developing the security concept, the interests of all the people living there must be taken into consideration. I think we

should reject the practice of telling soldiers they were the soldiers of the Georgian National Army. This has a different impact on any soldier of non-Georgian ethnicity. His attitude towards military service will be entirely different if he is told that he is a citizen of this country and the army belongs to the State and not to any particular nationality. There were talks here about civil control and social relations. In the present situation it would be wrong to give up conscription. It should be pointed out that the principle of volunteering is also observed in the Georgian army. The majority of our citizens - who are no military experts - join the army with great enthusiasm under the pressure of present economic hardships. Unfortunately, they have not got the makings of good officers, and the deficiency of professionals is one of the most critical problems of our armed forces. This deficiency is so great that we find it difficult to even talk about building the armed forces.

Social links with the army are quite close, since every one of us has a relative or a son in the army. So the interest in the army is not shallow, though the academic circles show but little interest in it. The co-operation of the parliament with military structure can be considered a remarkable example of the exercise of civil control. All of the laws or important decisions are adopted through this co-operation.

It is particularly difficult to speak about nationalism and patriotism. Maybe, our concepts of nationalism are not uniform. In my opinion nationalism should refer to the State. The issue of confessional relations is also very complex. Since Christianity has not been declared a state religion, all the representatives of different confessions in the army have, to a certain extent, found themselves in equal conditions. There are over 50 different confessions in Georgia and therefore we need serious recommendations as to what kind of work should be carried out in the army in this respect. Low political culture is another key problem in our army. While developing a security concept we should consider a kind of structure which will be the bearer of the State policy in the army.

**Nino Nanava:** Mr. Lawrence Kerr has stated that we have lost the image of a hero, a mythological image which unifies the nation. In this respect I would like to cite Samuel Huntington's words: "the development of a national security concept and powerful state structures calls for the existence of a charismatic leader". This was the situation in Georgia under the reign of Queen Tamara. Today we have neither a leader nor an idea to unite the entire Georgia. People have to find the way out of the situation by themselves. What we need is the efforts of the society; no leader is going to help us unless and until the national idea is perceived by the society.

**Ambassador Wieck:** I would like to return to the issue of maintaining control



over the armed forces. Let us consider presidential control. In Georgia, the president is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. He is also vested with executive power. However, the Constitution restricts and is to restrict this power.

In a presidential system the parliament constitutes the major means of control. It is the parliament which approves the appointment of high military officials. It is the parliament which approves the defence budget, and it is important that the budget is detailed and has been considered by the defence and budget committees in advance. If the budget is too general and contains only the amount of money to be allocated and the number of soldiers in the army, the executive power and the defence ministry get an unlimited authority to spend funds for this or that purpose.

In my country, civil control is usually referred to as the political control, and covers three vast areas. The first is the money, which is allocated for the armament. The second area is the prerogative of legislators to approve or reject a nominee to a military post. The third is the use of armed forces in war, peace or in a crisis.

**Fairbanks:** What I have to say might be unconventional, but if we take a look at the recent history of Russia we may find a potential danger in the notion of civil control. This is the view of the Russian intelligentsia, which considers that the use of armed forces in October of 1993, and in Chechnya today, served and is serving personal, rather than national interests. Therefore, we must make sure that the civil control over the military does not lead to the willful use of armed forces by the politicians.

**Guram Manjgaladze:** At the end of January 1996, a representative of the Georgian Ministry of Defence reported at a special meeting that the 1995 draft had been successfully carried out. However, he also pointed out that out of the planned 80,000, only a small part had been drafted. It was also said that our military registration and enlistment offices and military-medical services were to be changed, since their methods were remnants of the Soviet period. The multinational and multi-confessional composition of the army greatly complicates military service today. Besides, a great number of rank and file are from low-income families of workers and peasants. We greatly suffer from the deficiency in officers; we have no officers experienced in the issues of morale and ideology. In all of the armed forces all over the world, many funds are expended on moral and ideological training, while with us, posts of this kind are either entirely vacant or staffed with unskilled personnel.

The topic of desertion was also discussed. This is the most critical problem for the Georgian army. There are many reasons for this, but one of the most important is the very low level of discipline in the army.

**David Darchiashvili:** I would like to draw your attention to one aspect of the civil control which was discussed by Ambassador Wieck. It refers to the instrument of approving the defense budget. Georgia's defense budget is far behind the analogous expenditures of other countries, and yet, it amounts to 50 million dollars. Therefore, its effective expending is of great importance. The Georgian parliament has recently approved a new defense budget, but the way of its approval or the structure of the budget itself cannot be considered an example of civil control. The budget consisted of just a few items. It said that a certain part of the total amount was to be spent on wages, another - on the equipment. There was an item called "other expenditures", which contained several millions but nobody knew what "other expenditures" meant. A legislative body should have demanded a more precise explanation. I know, I will not sound too original to say that the detailing and the efficiency of the budget would further the security as well as the harmonizing of military-civil relationships.

**Nergadze:** In the Newly Independent States, the security issue comes to the foreground. But the national security concept and its system cannot be developed without the consideration of this state's global objectives and the relationship of this state with the outside world. Only after this kind of document is developed will it be possible to speak of any parliamentary or social control over the defense institutions, to determine whether the funds, allocated for defense are sufficient or not, and whether they are expended properly.

Thus, no control can be exercised without first identifying global and specific objectives of our state.

**Herman van der Weijden:** I also think that you should first formulate your message to the society, and next, actuate the mass-media - then arrange a public discussion. In a democratic country mass-media statements are of political expressiveness. When developing the national security concept, discussions shall be held with all of the political parties or with the participation of their majority. Later on a political message to the public is to be formulated and the entire society is to be involved in the discussion on security issues. Remember that information messages bear political responsibility.

**Rogers:** There are too many critical remarks with respect to the Georgian government at this conference, and most of the criticism comes from Georgians themselves. I would like to remind you of some remarkable achievements. The struggle for democracy has proved to be very painful. Elections, however imperfect, have still been held. Certain advancement in the economy is remarkable. The country has managed to develop working relations with all of the powers represented in the region, be it Turkey, Iran, Russia, NATO or other neighbours. During my meetings with your minister of foreign affairs and other diplomats, I

have felt that Georgia is anxious to develop the concept of its own national security and to have the freedom of its development without any external pressures. Although all of this does not always appear in writing, this is what your diplomats are constantly thinking about. And so my last question is: is it impossible to develop Georgia's national security system which will be free from any kind of external pressure?

**Kriesel:** One of our Georgian colleagues has referred to the issue of desertion. Unfortunately, he has not elaborated this idea. I think if there is no national concept from which a security concept could be derived, we should consider the reasons for desertion. And that will constitute the basis for any further consideration of what the Georgians really want, what kind of national security concept could be suitable for them.

**Gela Khutsishvili:** I must state that the problem of a willful desertion of the army is gradually slackening. Do not forget the five years we have gone through. Our armed forces have been developing under the conditions of ethnic conflicts and the opposition of various groups within our society. Old values were being re-assessed while the new ones had not been yet established. The new generation appeared ill-prepared for the military service. As for the social and cultural conditions in the army they are no different from the present conditions in general. It is necessary to develop a solid legal framework and the state military system in consideration of the Georgian mentality. Unfortunately, lack of professionalism is notable in all the areas of State development.

**Second Working Group**  
**Topic: BUILDING AN ARMY**  
**IN AN ECONOMICALLY WEAK**  
**COUNTRY**  
**Chairman - Ghia Nodia**

*Kenneth Brower opened the discussion:*

It is quite feasible for a small country to have relatively powerful military forces. However, for the time being, Georgia has not got adequate funds to invest in military forces. The country's resources do not yet enable it to produce or purchase adequate quantities of high quality military equipment.

The resources allocated by any country to its self-defence consist of both

manpower and capital. In the NATO member-states only 2 to 10 percent of 18 to 38 year-old males are utilized by the military services during wartime. This is because some of them are large countries which did not deploy adequate conventional forces. By comparison to the NATO countries Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Singapore and Israel utilize up to 100 percent of the males of the same age in a state of emergency. What does this mean? Following NATO manpower practices, a country with the population of five million people could mobilize only 60 thousand for wartime military service, while in reality, well over 550 thousand can easily be mobilized out of 5 million people. This is a great force. The defence issue is not seriously addressed by the European members of NATO, because they consider American nuclear weapons their warrant. They allocate between 2 to 2.5 percent of their gross national product to defence, while the USA allocated 5 to 6 percent during the Cold War. In some countries, for instance in the Soviet Union, the country itself served the army and not vice versa. But in general, in many other countries more than 5 percent of the gross national product is allocated to national defence, and still their economic results are good. The Israeli defence budget currently amounts to 9 percent of its GNP. Georgia currently lacks financial resources but possesses sufficient manpower for self-defence.

There exists a ratio between the total replacement value of a country's current military inventory of armored vehicles, artillery, aircraft and ships and its annual defence budget. This ratio is between one to two for the NATO countries. If the military budget amounts to 1 billion dollars, the replacement cost of the inventory of major weapons should be 2 billion dollars. However, this ratio is much higher in Israel, since this country has obtained a proportion of its equipment free of charge. Therefore at present the replacement value of its inventory of major weapon systems amounts to 6 billion dollars, for each one billion of its defence budget. Hence, if we know the annual defence budget amount we can easily define how many tanks, aircraft, guns or ships a given country's inventory can include.

However, we face another problem, that of the rapid advancement of technology. Today, in combat a bad tank is a dead tank, an old aircraft - a mere target. The result of the USSR-USA competition in combat aircraft since 1977 is approximately 165 to 1, which means 165 Soviet-made Syrian, Iraqi or other aircraft shot down for the loss of 1 American made aircraft. Therefore, it does not make any sense to procure obsolete equipment. The Iraqi armed forces were the fourth in the world in size but they proved just a target for America. If you wish parades, purchase the scrap which create illusion and impress those who lack knowledge. However, the majority of soldiers are realists and illusions will not protect you from them.

What does all this mean for Georgia? It can only have one way out. No other alternative is feasible. During my visits to the Baltic States I said that a poor country's defence problem should be resolved through the use of a small cadre of professional personnel and a conscription-based reserve system, similar to that of Sweden, Switzerland, Israel and Singapore. Everyone shall be subject to conscription. However, the goal should not be to generate a large standing army, but rather to train individuals and generate unified, coherent reserve formations whose members will serve in the same units for the next 20 years. As a result Georgia will get a layer-cake-like military structure. The upper layer will comprise young fit people - the commandos. The next layer will also consist of relatively young people, but perhaps married ones with families. They will make up efficient first line units capable of regional defence. In the end, aged people can defend various buildings and facilities. The same kind of division of individuals can also be applied to their equipment. The best personnel shall be equipped with the best weapons. This is the way the military is organized in Finland. The best units are equipped with 700-dollar rifles, while the oldest reserves use 35-dollar Chinese rifles. The Lithuanians have preferred to buy one new gun rather than twenty old ones, but this does not make sense and is a tremendous mistake.

When, despite the lack of financial resources for air forces, air defence forces, or funds for armoured fighting vehicles, you still attempt to purchase these systems, you will receive only low quality technologies. You will turn your armies into nothing more than targets. For Georgia it is the land forces that are of vital importance. They do not require vast funds if they are based on high quality light infantry. You cannot follow Russia's example. Russian infantry is only capable of fighting at the platoon level, while you need infantry fighting at the fire team level within squads, as it is practiced within NATO and as the Finns fight in forests. God has provided you with mountains and no tank can climb up a difficult mountain.

My argument is very simple. My concept for Georgia consists in a professional cadre, conscription-based reserve light infantry, citizen-soldier military. Now the floor is yours.

**Ivliane Khaindrava:** I would like to know whether the ratio between the downed American and Soviet aircraft would have been the same if the latter had also been manned by American pilots.

**Brower:** 20 years ago I was also of the opinion that it was the pilots that mattered first. Since then, I have changed my mind. The MIG-29 is a remarkable aircraft but it has too many buttons in the cockpit. It's situational awareness is unacceptable. At present, electronic technology has a lead in air-to-air combat, and if you want to win you should have electronics of high quality. However, this

is extremely expensive, and one should be realistic about it. A F-16 Falcon fighter costs 20 million dollars. With spare parts test and maintenance equipment, training simulators and weapons the price doubles. A good pilot should make at least 180 flight hours a year. An F-16 aircraft burns 1,000 gallons of fuel per hour. The fuel costs 5,000 dollars an hour at European oil prices. If a pilot flies less - he is doomed. But fuel cost is nothing compared to that of the weapons themselves!

A small country can afford to purchase guns, radio transmitters, light mortars and anti-tank weapons. Victory for a small country means the avoidance of defeat. A small country should avoid any decisive combat with the enemy and should maintain its communications open to the outside world.

In any military service, a truthful and good relationship between an officer and a soldier play a powerful role.

**Unidentified participant:** It is clear that a small country should concentrate on light infantry formations. But how should they man the army? Is it better to form small units on the basis of the principle of professionalism or a conscript army of 30-40 thousand?

**Brower:** Neither. A small army is inadequate in wartime. I do not believe in a regular army for a country like Georgia. The standing army is a preparatory school in small countries. It is the reserve which is the real military force. All of the conscripts should be trained well. I understand that every commander-in-chief needs an operational force. For this purpose an 18-month conscription will probably suffice. During the first six months a soldier is trained individually, the next six months are devoted to training in a military unit and during the remaining six months the newly formed unit will be in the commander-in-chief's operational service. Then the soldier and his unit will pass into the reserves but he and his unit will be replaced by a new one. This is a continuous chain, and in 5-6 years there will be a high-quality army consisting of many cohesive reserve units.

**Zaza Pataridze:** We are interested in the example of those countries which are at the initial stage of building their armed forces. We must determine what kind of army we need. For this purpose we must establish a regulatory base: the security concept, the military doctrine. And it is these documents with which the defence budget should correlate later on. If the state has not got financial resources, alternative means should be procured. Our military registration and enlistment offices are the remains of the Soviets in which corruption is predominant. We need to introduce an alternative service. The establishment of a military-industrial complex is necessary as well. The fact is that Russia has not given us anything. If we wait for Russia, we will have an army without any armament.

**Brower:** Israel and Singapore are the most interesting examples from the point of view of building an army from an initial stage. Singapore started to build up its

armed forces in 1963 without any foreign financial aid. In 1956, Israel only possessed 100 aircraft and 300-400 tanks. Besides, even in 1956 most of its equipment was outdated. But it is the system that matters, not the armament, for the system permits systematic growth.

The Singapore example was not followed by the Baltic states. They have not set up appropriate ministries of defence and adopted appropriate legislation. Georgia needs just Xerox copies of these Singapore documents. If it follows my advice the army will be built according to the principle of an upside-down pyramid. Georgia start with a small nucleus and in 20 years you will have a 500, 000-men reserve. And I hope you will also have the money by that time to equip this force with first class weapons.

**Kakha Katsitadze:** The Center for Economic and Social Research which I represent has developed a draft of Georgia's military doctrine. We agree with Mr. Brower. Georgia has joined the CFE Treaty. It cannot deploy more than 220 tanks, the same number of armoured vehicles, 50 helicopters and 100 combat aircraft. These numbers is so scanty that it is not worth purchasing outdated equipment. We'd better think of procuring high-quality equipment even if it delays the entire process.

**Brower:** The inventory of equipment you have described has a replacement value of well over 3 billion dollars. In NATO this amounts to an annual defence budget of at least one and a half billion dollars or, even following the Israeli example, 500 million dollars a year. Equipment lasts on the average perhaps 20 years. But in the West only about 20% of the annual defence budget is allocated to the procurement of major weapons. It will not be economically feasible to build your own weapon system in small quantities, so your armored vehicles, aircraft and helicopters will have to be imported at an annual cost of over 150 million dollars a year. The brutal economic truth is that Georgia cannot afford even a minimal amount of high-quality equipment. The CFE Treaty sets material inventories that you cannot afford. That is the simple truth you must face. Very small quantities of high quality equipment are unaffordable and militarily meaningless. Remember that 3 billion dollars is Georgia's entire GNP for three years.

**Katsitadze:** But this is a program calculated for 10-15 years.

**Brower:** In 10 or 15 years, a tank may not be required at all. All outdated equipment will become obsolete by then.

**Katsitadze:** We may purchase new weapons in small lots.

**Brower:** If the lots are too small, purchasing loses its sense. And your entire military budget would today purchase only one F-16, but no fuel for fly it, and no weapons for it to use. Georgia must face financial reality.

**Katsitadze:** The second issue I wanted to mention is political. It refers to the

officers' cadre. This issue has not been discussed in public. A substantial number of the officers comes from the Soviet Army and their quality is low. Officers' training takes time. Therefore, the provision of security within the transition period is a great challenge.

**Brower:** The situation with you differs from that of Singapore. They acquired officers from England and Israel on a contractual basis. At the same time it is common knowledge that a volunteer, clever patriot is often capable of doing far more than a professional foreigner. Personally, I believe enthusiastic amateurs are preferable to well educated professional officers for newly emerging countries. In my judgment officers who grew up in a different culture are victims of paradigm paralysis.

**Ioseb Barnabishvili:** Unfortunately we are building a low-quality army after the Russian model. I have my own doctrine of building a Georgian army which I would like to share with you.

At present the law on universal military service is in force in Georgia. There are roughly 300 thousand conscripts who should all be drafted according to this law. However, all we need is 30 thousand. Therefore, we can draft only every tenth of the available conscripts and employ the rest in an alternative service. They will pay a military tax, but it will be the State that will profit rather than an individual "commissar" (head of a call-up station). Those who can afford will pay in cash; those, who cannot will pay the tax through physical labour. Later on, they will all be enlisted in the reserve as private soldiers, while the selected ones will make up a professional army. If three hundred thousand conscripts bring in a thousand dollars each, the State will procure three million dollars. This amount is already presently expended on corruption.

If my concept is implemented, the conscripts will be found and the needed 3,500 dollars for each of them will be procured. A conscript will be admitted into a training centre. A special instructor will be in charge of ten conscripts. Maybe three of them will not keep up and refuse to continue the service. But the remaining seven are sure to complete the course. All of the graduates will continue the service in a military unit and later on will train the reservists themselves. In this way Georgia will build up its own armed forces by itself.

**Lawrence Ghesquire:** In almost in all countries, military service is compulsory. Military taxation or the principle of recruitment is unjust. It practically means that the poor should fight and the rich should not. Equality is a must. For instance, in Switzerland it is considered an insult not to be drafted.

**Brower:** During the American Civil War, the practice of acquiring an exemption from the army by paying a special tax almost caused a rebellion. I believe imposition of a military tax is undemocratic and morally wrong. It places a wealthy



individual in a privileged position. I am not a sociologist but I would say that national military service can help shape a nation. It unifies the nation. The Finns and the Swiss are proud of being soldiers. In Israel those who were released from the army often left the country for shame.

**Ghesquire:** I will speak about the principles of making a military budget. It is connected with the determination of expenditures. No budget can be determined without knowing what you want. First you have to decide what kind of armed forces you need and this should be calculated for 10 years. Then all of this shall be converted to monetary terms. This includes the infrastructure, service, displacement and all the rest, which we often forget. A defence budget should be determined like a family budget. Permanent expenses and the costs of desirable goods shall be defined and all this shall be correlated to the income and priorities shall be identified. A defence budget shall be accessible to the public. How we manage to do that is another issue. Everything should be estimated for a long-term period and we have to know what the GNP will be in 10, 15, or 20 years.

Briefly, the main thing is to identify general priorities which is quite difficult in itself. A budget is but an identification of priorities and correct planning. This is the technique of budget-making.

**Besik Aladashvili:** We must first note the difference between Georgia and Israel or Singapore. Unlike them we are very weak economically, while defence industry cannot be imagined without an economic basis. Moreover, we will not be able to solve economic problems without an army either. I mean the defence of our territorial integrity. In short, this is a kind of vicious circle. We have to decide what is better: to depend on free but old weapons as we currently do, to purchase them or to produce our own.

**Brower:** When I speak about the Israeli model, I do not at all mean that you will have 500 modern aircraft, 4,000 tanks and so on. The main thing is philosophy here: the principle that sweat does not cost any money. You can follow other countries in infantry formations. Training a good soldier requires just 800 bullets. A conscript in Israel gets 25 dollars monthly. Georgia does not need more than 2-3 thousand professionals. The salary of a conscript shall differ from that of a professional.

**Irakli Melashvili:** It was a mistake on Georgia's part to confine itself to the above-mentioned three ways of building its defence system. We did not determine our potential accurately. There were some areas which we could have undertaken. Any plant in the Soviet Union could easily change over to military production. We could also have managed to produce individual weapons without any problems. Relevant documentation was available at the plants.

Georgia has lost four years. We have concentrated upon receiving actually

obsolete weapons from Russia. Mr. Brower is right. We have procured scrap. Late as it is, we have to assess what we can and cannot afford. It is a crime to purchase high cost military uniforms in Russia while we can produce them ourselves much cheaper. We have to determine what we can purchase, what we can produce and what to take as a present.

**Mamuka Tsurtsunia:** It is true that the Iraqi outdated weapons were but a target for America, but to what extent will our outdated weapons be a similar target for our neighbours? Sooner or later we will have to fight. I cannot agree with Mr. Brower - outdated weapons will also be useful to us. In the 1930's German officers were trained on dummy tanks, while Israel still uses Soviet T-55-s.

**Brower:** Israel uses T-55s as armoured vehicles and not as tanks. Suppose you are given tanks free of any charge today, who is going to repair them in three years? The Ukraine deploys 4,500 tanks. Their maintenance alone will ruin their budget. Whenever you procure military equipment free of charge, you should first consider what your economic and military potential is going to be in five years. However, I agree that even outdated weapons and equipment will do for a small-scale war against an equally ill-equipped opponent. Still I prefer very high quality infantry in your terrain to very low quality armor.

## **Third Working Group Topic: NATIONAL STRUCTURES OF COMMAND AND CONTROL Chairman - Ghia Nodia**

*Kenneth Brower began the discussion.*

He presented some international models of the military command and control system which differ from one another according to the division of responsibilities.

The first model is an internal balance of power such as is practiced in Saudi Arabia. The King there is the commander-in-chief and his brothers have their own armies. The second model is control by dictatorship. This system exists in Syria and Iraq. The commander-in-chief, the defence minister, the chief of general staff are from the same clan or town. The third model is the constitutional monarchy where a king or a queen is the commander-in-chief. In peacetime there is a united staff headed by the prime minister whose policy is implemented by the minister of national defence. The fourth model is the constitutional dictatorship,

an example of which is Singapore. Here the prime minister is elected, but there is only one primary political party. The prime minister commands the armed forces and there is long-term political stability. The fifth model is the most complicated of all. Here the command and control system of national security consists of the elected president and the parliamentary government. The president is the supreme commander-in-chief. Finland is the most successful example of this system. It depends on both formal and informal links.

In many cases the post of the commander-in-chief is more of an honourable nature and the person holding it does not possess any real administrative or operational power. In democratic countries a commander-in-chief is always a civilian. In Finland it is the president and in Israel it is the prime minister. If the president is the supreme commander-in-chief, then the responsibilities of the prime minister, military authorities and the military council must be clearly determined by law.

In most countries the ministry of internal affairs exercises the police functions in peacetime. It is also responsible for the frontier troops. But in the state of emergency the general command for the police and the frontier troops passes over to the ministry of defence.

In most countries the ministry of defence is directly placed in the command chain between the supreme commander-in-chief and the general staff. As a rule, the reserves - be it in the national guards, territorial army or something else - are subordinate to the same general command. This is very important. For political reasons, in the Baltic States there has been a tendency to separate the National Guards with their own command. I think this was an error. In the majority of countries, the command, conscription, training and mobilisation of all personnel are centralised and are not subordinated to military districts as was the practice in the Soviet Union. In my opinion you should separate responsibilities and functions according to peacetime on the one hand, and war time on the other, since no combat situation can be planned in advance. I believe there is no sense either in vesting someone with the power of commander-in-chief without developing relevant instruments of responsibility and control. And responsibility first of all implies fiscal control of the defence budget.

In my opinion, a small and poor country needs a small and united general staff, which will be charged with the direction of combat operations. The civilian ministry of defence should be entrusted with all other functions including the supply and procurement. Defence offices shall be directly accountable to the supreme commander-in-chief. The supreme commander-in-chief also needs an independent information network, which cannot be fettered by the bureaucratic system.

The supreme command shall monitor the fiscal procedure. I believe that both the peacetime and wartime command chains should be identical. The defence minister should stand between the supreme commander-in-chief and the general staff.

When planning a system you should distinguish between the military-administrative and tactical-operational functions. For example, in many countries there is a commander-in-chief of infantry, which is responsible for the organisation and training of military units and the selection of equipment, but he does not exercise any operational control over them.

I believe that the national security council should report to the supreme commander-in-chief. The council should have at least three functions. It provides advice on the issues of political, fiscal and trade-industrial activities. As to the net assessments and intelligence functions - this is the responsibility of the supreme commander-in-chief.

I believe that in small countries the air-force and the navy shall be treated as combat units like the infantry and artillery with but one difference in wartime their headquarters are turned into tactical-operational centres. This is entirely different from the US system. The number of commanders should not be large. Georgia cannot afford to deploy a numerous professional cadre. Any officer, working in a military school, should be able to serve as a combat commander in wartime. It is possible to combine various posts. For instance, in the Israeli Air-Force the personnel commander, who is a brigadier-general, is also a pilot of a F-15 in wartime. The command structure shall reflect the primacy of land forces. In a small country which is facing great danger, tactical control should be decentralised in wartime.

**Unidentified participant:** I would like to add that a young democracy needs a special contact and oversight through the parliamentary commission. Two commissions are needed: those of defence and the budget. If you consider the budget you will maintain authority over the entire armed forces. All of the parliamentary parties shall be represented in these commissions. This will make their decisions more effective.

**Ambassador Hans-Georg Wieck:** Georgia has had the Constitution for six months now, which has already determined a number of issues in the field of national security. Therefore, the area for alternatives is limited. I expect the Georgian colleagues to consider the alternatives within the Georgian Constitution. A balance of forces shall be divided between the Parliament and the President. All of the other institutions shall depend on them. But I know that the parliamentary control is weak here. I have a question: how is the Parliament to control the President with respect to national security issues? What do the Parliament's terms of

reference cover: the taking of decisions on declaring war or peace, or the approval of nominees to military posts? These instruments of control are not available in Georgia yet. The third issue refers to the budget. A draft budget should be very detailed. In this respect, the experience of the countries governed by Moscow greatly differs from Western practice. The defence budget control was much looser in the Soviet Union.

As to parliamentary control over the intelligence agencies, they still doubt in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe whether to bring them under control or not. But if societies do not disapprove of lack of control over intelligence agencies, renaming them will not change anything. Parliamentary control should extend to the activities of the security agencies as well. And first of all, this control should extend to those steps of the intelligence agency aimed at surveillance of private citizens.


There is another important dimension of the reform which security services in the former communist countries should undergo: intelligence work both within the country and without should be conducted by two independent agencies.

**Philip Wasielewski** *then made his presentation to the working group:*

In most modern democracies, command and control of the Armed Forces are shared between the executive and legislative branches. In a federal system, command and control responsibilities are strictly divided between a President and a Congress. In a parliamentary system this division is less defined but, as a rule, the Prime Minister, who is elected from the party which has won in the elections, exercises the command and the control functions of the executive branch, while the parliamentary majority has the responsibility for its legislative side. Generally, the main command and control responsibility rests with a Commander-in-Chief. He appoints the Minister of Defence, senior civilian advisors, all the officers of the Armed Forces. He is responsible for approving military and security strategy, for giving direction to the military. He also responsible for creating a relevant budget. And finally, the Executive, as a rule, declares war or the state of emergency and orders the use of military force.

The command and control responsibilities of the legislative branch are financial and supervisory. The Parliament determines all military expenditures. It also exercises oversight on how the money, allocated to defence, is spent. It investigates the matters of corruption in the armed forces. In many countries the parliament is to approve all the appointments to military posts. The parliament passes the laws and rules governing the Armed Forces, including those concerning their internal discipline. Finally, the parliament is required to approve the act on the declaration of war, adopted by the Executive. As a rule, the responsibilities of both branches of power are detailed in the Constitution.

Peacetime Chain of Command  
Country X  
Chart 1



The more concrete and day-to-day command and control responsibilities for the Armed Forces are found in the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence provides advice to the executive branch on a national military strategy. It submits requests for funding the implementation of this strategy to the parliament. Then it receives the strategy and funding from both branches and engages in their implementation and utilisation. The Ministry of Defence supervises the different services of the Armed Forces. It determines common procedures for recruitment, pay, training, supply, communications, medical service, purchasing weapons, maintenance of discipline, discharging personnel. It may itself control the purchasing of fuel, food or military clothing.

The individual military services such as the army, navy, air force and air defence forces perform those command and control functions that are directly related to specific war fighting tasks. This is achieved through both administrative and operational chains of command.

Command and control at the individual unit level is simplified with a chain-of-command from senior to junior officers and then to the senior non-commissioned officers to the individual soldiers.


This is an outline of command and control systems in most democracies. Militaries are at peace the majority of their time, therefore, the above-discussed structure is designed for peacetime. This structure, as a rule, is one way, vertical. Decisions flow from the Executive and Legislative branches down to individual soldiers.

The first chart, which I have here, represents the command structure for peacetime. It is similar to what you have in Georgia today. Although this chart does not reflect the reality of any specific country.

A different, more responsive and more flexible command and control structure is required for wartime. The main reasons why the peacetime command and control structure cannot be used in wartime consist in following: the field command structure must be close to the battlefield and mobile. It must be able to combine different weapons, the units of one branch as well as the units of different services. This structure must have a fast pace of performance. However, it must still maintain a vertical structure of command and ensure the primacy of the civilian leadership. The civilian leadership must set the war aims and strategy and then delegate the authority to the field commanders to carry out this strategy. Field commanders need a different command and control structure. They cannot work through their individual services and the ministry of defence.

In peacetime leading command authorities are in the capital, far from the fighting. Besides, new demands are likely to arise in wartime which will not be met by the peacetime structure. But the peacetime structures, specifically the Ministry of

Waritime Chain of Command  
Country X  
Chart 2





Defence, must continue their normal functions. People must still be recruited and trained. They must still be paid even when a war is going on.

Therefore, two separate but simultaneous command and control structures are needed: one to fight the war and the other - to keep the military running. The peacetime structure must be able to support the wartime structure.

Field commanders need separate staffs for planning their actions and communications with both their subordinate units and the peacetime structures in the capital. As it has already been noted, a special control mechanism is required in wartime - be it the General Staff of the Field Command. Chart 2 represents a wartime command and control structure. It is more like an American model, in which operational forces are subordinate to different field commanders. Tactical units from each of the separate services are allocated to the field commander. He maintains direct operational control over them through the representation of those services at his headquarters. His staff assists him in his relations with the peacetime structures (the ministry of defence).


The manning of these wartime or peacetime structures is a great problem even for large countries. In some countries the nucleus of the wartime command and control structure is maintained manned even in the peacetime and then in wartime they are replenished from the peacetime structures and the Reserves. The most essential billets are manned with professionals. In wartime some people assume new responsibilities in addition to their peacetime activities. In some countries wartime personnel is reinforced by Reserve officers.

In any case, the wartime command and control structure must have two features. First, it must be under civilian control and carry out the decisions of the civilian leadership only. Second, it must be prepared for co-operation with civilian decision makers. Whatever command system you use, be it the General Staff or the Field Command, these two requirements remain valid.

In the end, let us discuss the crisis management and control structure. It serves the cause of counter-terrorism. Because of the political nature of terrorism this structure must include the highest levels of the government. Its operating procedures must be practiced ahead of time and in realistic exercises.

The National Crisis Management Team should include the President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence, Minister of Justice, representatives of the police and the Intelligence. This Team should have a small cadre of administrative and communications personnel. During a crisis this Crisis Management Team will communicate with the on-the-scene Incident Management Standing Team. The latter will directly handle the terrorist incident. The Incident Management Team must have an overall commander who will control the local police, fire and medical services, the national counterterrorism team and the national hostage

Chart 3  
National Crisis Management Team



negotiation team. Chart 3 represents the mentioned structure.

The Incident Management Team should follow a standard set of command and control procedures, which may be quite complex. Look at Chart 4. All the participating agencies must constantly be involved in them. Once a terrorist act occurs there will be very little time to plan. 90 per cent of all preparations must be done in advance.

Newly emerging democracies have many challenges, especially in directing the use of force by the government. Only if a permanent and established command and control system is in place will the civilian government be able to control the use of force. Otherwise, war and terrorism will control the government.

*David Tsintsadze spoke on behalf of the Georgian Ministry of Security.*


The Ministry comprises functions of both intelligence and counter-intelligence. We understand it is still far from the world standards that Mr. Wieck described. Currently, following the President's instruction, the Ministry is engaged in struggle against organised crime, although this kind of work is not within its usual mandate. As for the civilian control it is exercised by the President and the Parliament. Besides, there is a Security Council, the Procurator's Office and the Court. In its operational activities our agency is guided by the laws on human rights, for example, when listening in telephone conversation. Currently in cooperation with the Security Council we are developing a national counterterrorism program, for which we take into consideration western experience.

In the future we will return to the performance of intelligence functions in full. The ministry will once again be transformed into an "Information and Intelligence Agency" as it was in 1992-93. The present structure is most appropriate for a country in democratic transition.

**Chairman:** How real is parliamentary control over the Ministry of Security?

**Tsintsadze:** The Parliamentary defence commission has considered a draft law on State Security Service which was developed by the National Security Council. This is unprecedented in the history of Georgia. Every provision is thoroughly examined in the Parliament and the Security Council. The only issues that are inaccessible for the Parliament are those related to secret agents. In case of an insistent request they can obtain some information, though very limited.

**Ambassador Wieck:** I do not quite understand the functions of your agency. Are you dealing with internal affairs only or are you charged with foreign intelligence as well? How do you co-operate with Army Intelligence? And with respect to terrorism, do you collect the information or are you also charged with taking measures against it? This is the responsibility of the police and Internal Forces,



HHQ = Higher Headquarters of the Police/Gendarmerie  
 CMT = Crisis Management Team  
 HRF = Hostage Rescue Force  
 I.P. = Inner Perimeter  
 C.P. = Command Post  
 ..... = Coordination

isn't it?

**Tsintsadze:** There is no independent agency in charge of intelligence. We have a Ministry of Security, which includes both intelligence and counter-intelligence. I do not think it quite appropriate to discuss the directions of our intelligence; as for counter-terrorism activities we are entrusted with this by law. It is rather difficult to understand this, as our legal system is different. We have special, quite strong and skilled sub-units to handle terrorism. They are inferior to none within the CIS. As a matter of fact, the United States has largely contributed to this.

As for the Army Intelligence, we receive information from them. We process it and submit to the President.

**Wieck:** Who gives you sanctions to listen in private conversations?

**Tsintsadze:** The Procurator does. We have a special legislation which regulates criminal investigation activities. If, in the process of listening in, it turns out that the conversation has nothing to do with the matter of inquiry, the recording ceases. We have never disclosed any private life details. This is set forth in the law.

Under the same law the people who assist the security system are to be rendered assistance in return. But the public consciousness is inadequate. People do not understand that it is their civic duty to assist the Security Agency. Of course, I do not mean reporting on a drunk neighbour.

**Irakli Khartishvili:** How efficient would it be to divide the Security Ministry into counter-intelligence and intelligence agencies?

**Tsintsadze:** This kind of division will not be proper at present. Here is Russia's example: the division of these two spheres has brought about the disruption of centralisation there.

**Chairman:** Is this because division is costly and therefore unwelcome, or is it inconvenient in general?

**Tsintsadze:** Besides being costly it creates personnel problems. It is difficult for a small country to set up and staff two agencies.

**Wieck:** If you continue to maintain the Soviet framework of the security institutions, you will not gain people's confidence. If you want their confidence everything must be open. Besides, the security service should not have any punitive functions. This is most essential. The Western European approach is not very different from American one. Operational intelligence is the prerogative of a military structures - the General Staff, though there is no General Staff in Germany. Declaration of war is Parliament's concern.

**Khartishvili:** In the United States' system, the Defence Department is charged with administrative functions - training, procurement, and so on. The USA has

rejected a General Staff; as for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it does not exercise any command but provides recommendations for the President. This is one of the ways of maintaining civilian control. However, this system is too costly; therefore, a General Staff is more preferable for us. What are the protective mechanisms from the General Staff?

The second issue refers to the declaration of war. In the United States the President is entitled to wage war for 60 days. In exceptional cases it can be prolonged for 30 more days. After that the Congress sanction is required. This is too great a luxury for us, since ours is a small country. In Israel the right to declare war is vested in the Defence Council and not the President. What is your opinion in this connection?

Mr. Brower has stated that the emphasis should be made on infantry troops. This is all very clear but how efficient will that be? We have a good example of the Korean war when the North Korean tanks smashed the South Korean infantry in three days. There can be no doubt in the efficiency of tanks, though currently anti-tank equipment may be better.

**Brower:** Different countries have different approaches to the Defence Ministry and the General Staff. In some countries both of them are functioning, with one department headed by a civilian leader and another - by a military commander. In some countries the Chief-of-Staff and the General Director of the Ministry report to the Defence Minister. It is impossible to make a sweeping generalisation. In a country which gives priority to the civilian control these structures are integrated. In some countries both of these structures share the defence responsibility. In some countries the General Staff and the Defence Ministry are separated. Both of these approaches to organization work.

As for the question which was asked concerning the role of tanks I will answer with two one-word arguments. There arguments are: a) mountains, b) money.

**Chairman:** Dr. Revaz Adamia, the chairman of the Parliamentary Defence Commission has just joined us. His participation is doubly interesting. According to what the representative of the Ministry of Security has said, the Defence Commission exercises efficient control over the agency. And besides, the commission is concerned with the development of defence legislation.

**Dr. Revaz Adamia:** We had a remarkable sandwich of civilian control yesterday. What I want to say is that we were holding our seminar on the first floor, Mr. Grachev and Mr. Nadibaidze were negotiating on the second and another seminar was held on the third floor. Thus, various control mechanisms are available. And now in all seriousness. To say that our commission controls law-enforcement structures would be grossly exaggerated, though we try to. Co-ordina-

tion with the executive branch has been improving lately; however, it does not mean that we no longer have any impediments. As for legislation, we have enormous work to do. We have to develop laws, do a lot of institutional work. The Soviet legacy must be fundamentally changed. You were talking about intelligence here. I share Ambassador Wieck's pathos; if we are building a democratic country, Intelligence cannot be a unified structure. However, we should act sensibly. We have our bitter experience: KGB was dissolved and separated in 1991, but this entailed the paralysis of Security. A number of special services were set up which did not co-operate with one another. Their re-unification was, among others, dictated by the desire to improve control. This kind of control may not be good or perfect, but it is still control. In our reality, everything depends on individuals rather than institutions. This is because the State institutions are still too amorphous. The Soviet legacy also plays its part, people have been brought up in an old manner. As for the division of Intelligence into Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence we are already working on it at the President's instructions. Since our Constitution is after the American model these structures are also likely to follow the American pattern.

Referring to the command structure of the Defence Ministry and in the Armed Forces, I would like to agree with my honourable colleague who expressed in two words the limiting factors on the basis of which our military concept is to be developed. Unfortunately, under the circumstances one of the factors is available and the other - is not. We have mountains but lack the money. But even these two factors are not taken into account properly. Of course, lack of money does not need much thinking, but the significance of mountains should be thoroughly considered. Meanwhile, we are building a typical Soviet army. I recall an old joke: a combat operation was being planned in a Chinese General Staff. The Commander-in-Chief was doing the planning and said that the first Army of 30 million men was to be placed on the right flank, the second Army of 45 million was to take its position on the left flank, a 70-million third Army was to be in the centre and they were to be followed by tanks. Someone asked him: "All the tanks at once?" - "No", the Commander-in-Chief said, "first one tank, then the other". We do not dispose of vast manpower resources like the Chinese do, but the situation with out tank resources is quite similar to the one described in this joke.

**Fourth Working Group**  
**Topic: NATIONAL SECURITY**  
**PROBLEMS IN THE REGIONAL AND**  
**INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT; ETHNIC-**  
**TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS AND**  
**SECURITY REGIMES IN GEORGIA**  
**Chairman - Revaz Gachechiladze**

*Ivliane Khaindrava began the discussion by singling out two basic aspects of the national security problem: 1) The defence potential of the state and its armed forces; 2) International guarantees of the State security, and pointing out that the latter aspect is often considered more important in today's world, though, the former should not be neglected..*

International mechanisms are still inert, they need time to become active. Meanwhile a country should manage to utilize the maximum of its capacities.

As for the first aspect, according to the Defence Law of Georgia (Article 2), “Georgia defends its independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty throughout the country by means of its own Armed Forces. Georgia should not lag behind any other country of equal territory and manpower resources in terms of its Armed Forces. The Georgian Armed Forces must be able to stop the enemy’s advancement at Georgia’s frontiers, as well as to beat off any missile, air and artillery attack throughout the territory of Georgia. The Georgian Armed Forces must be able to strike a retaliatory blow against any aggressor”.

This quotation shows that a certain, though incomplete outline of Georgia’s national security concept already exists. However, it is not concrete, and not only because our military has failed in the past to accomplish this task. Article 1 of the same law says that Georgia has undertaken to refrain from producing, stockpiling and shipping nuclear and mass destruction weapons on its territory. In Item ‘A’ of Article 2, Georgia’s stand is defined as that of “active neutrality”. But can one speak of a country’s neutrality when its President signs an agreement on the deployment of the military bases of another country, which is not quite neutral, on Georgia’s territory for 25 years. Especially since we do not possess any effective mechanisms to control the different kinds of weapons on these bases, among them weapons of mass destruction.

The Republican Party of Georgia, which I represent here, believes that Georgia’s strategic objective consists in the development of relations with NATO and



finally the integration in this organization. But due to the current internal political situation in Georgia and international circumstances, the declaration of active neutrality may be the first and indispensable step in getting away from the Russian military-political space. This policy would also correspond to Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski's "Security Belt" concept. Unfortunately, the Georgian government did not or could not implement this policy in spite of the Parliament's repeated resolutions on the withdrawal of the Russian Army from Georgia. That is why our security system is not resolved any better now than it was in 1992. Let's recall the development of further events. In 1993, the Head of State made a unilateral decision to join the CIS. Then Russian military detachments were awarded a status of peace-keeping forces in Abkhazia and finally an agreement on the deployment of the Russian Federation military bases on the territory of Georgia for 25 years was initialed at the Defence Minister's level. Later on, the Head of State signed this agreement as well. So, the vector of activities of the Georgian government moved towards the reintegration into Russian military-political space, which in our opinion was detrimental to Georgia's strategic interests. Every counter-argument is repealed by the experience, which shows that it is futile to hope that Russia will help solve problems which she had inspired in the first place. Such a policy can only be called a policy of weakness or self-deceit.

How a so-called collective security will be carried out within CIS is evident after the examples of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and even Russia itself. And above all, there is no prospect for any improvement, because in general and in every specific case, the area of contradiction between different interests is greater than that of their coincidence. The legitimization of military bases in Georgia needs just one last step - the ratification of the agreement by the Parliament. We hope that at least this step will not be made, because the outlines of certain changes for the better seem to have appeared in Georgian foreign policy.

Of the four neighbours with whom Georgia shares borders, the coincidence of our geopolitical interests is clear with two. The vector of economic interests of Turkish and Azerbaijanian non-fundamentalist Islamic states is directed to the West. One of the prospective geostrategic lines connecting the regions of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans passes through Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and then Central Asian countries. In the Caucasus, it is crossed by the Russia-Armenia-Iran line, which is less prospective but, nonetheless, worth considering. It is clear that it is Georgia's position that determines which of these lines is going to be the stronger at this stage. Our agreements regarding the oil pipeline make us believe that the alliance with the West is going to become the priority in the Georgian policy. I am confident that the foundation of international guarantees of Georgia's security will be laid as soon as the sum of multilateral interests in Georgia reaches

critical mass.

**Alexander Rondeli:** I completely agree with you, but what about our being within the “Big Brother’s” terrible magnetic field?! All that you are saying is an ideal. The reality is a little different and you are well aware of this.

**Khaindrava:** I do not suppose there was anything idealistic in what I said. Yesterday our guests also noted that fear makes mountains out of molehills. The events in Chechnya prove that we overrated the danger. Chechnya, the Baltics, and Moldova have proved that quite a lot depends on one’s inner disposition. Perhaps we are mesmerized. I think we must have self-respect, we have to clearly define what we want. At the very least, we should have another defence minister.

**Rondeli:** I am also mesmerized. Bismarck said that Russia always seemed stronger or weaker than it really was. When we speak of David and a Goliath, we should be David. A small country, which is not coherent internally, will dare nothing - this is the trouble with us. It would be different if we were unified like the Baltic nations.

**Janri Kashia:** You have talked about Azerbaijan-Georgian-Turkish and Russian-Iranian intercrossing axes. What are our prospects in this regard?

**Khaindrava:** In my opinion these two axes compete. We would benefit by integrating in the West-East line. But if Georgia fails to make the right choice and the Western position is not firm enough, we might find ourselves integrated in the North-South line, which is neither in Georgia’s nor the West’s interests.

**Irakli Melashvili:** When speaking of idealism or pragmatism let us consider how much realistic and pragmatic the policy of Georgia’s current leadership is. After the turmoil that Georgia has experienced, in particular after the Abkhaz conflict, Georgia has been pursuing a policy which might be described as that of regaining the territory at the expense of ceding its sovereignty. How promising and practically implementable is this policy? Over the last three years, Georgian leadership has been rejecting the one essential principle on which a public consensus had almost been reached, which consisted in Georgia’s being free from Russian military bases. Georgia was not to be a part of any military-political block. The change of policy has not brought about the resolution of any of the conflicts; during the activities of peace-keeping forces about 1,200 Georgian citizens were killed within their control zone, and just a couple of days ago, peaceful civilians were kidnapped from the Zugdidi Region. Yesterday, the Defence Ministers of Russia and Georgia had a meeting. What can that mean at a time when none of the political decisions have been taken? I do not speak of the economic situation which we currently have in Georgia with Turkey accounting for 53 percent of Georgia’s foreign trade and Russia only 17-18 percent. The promise of our authorities as to the economic prosperity to be gained through the integration

with the North has proved to be fiction. We can really ask: where is realism and where is idealism?

**Charles Fairbanks:** Allow me to give you a view of how this issue is seen from the outside. As it was pointed out in Mr. Khaindrava's quite intelligent observations, Russian power might be reduced to a minimum by joint efforts of the Transcaucasian states. It strikes me as an American observer that there is a lot of discussion of Russia and the Western countries at this conference and very little attention is paid to the Caucasian states. I do not find it altogether correct, since the Caucasian states are quite important to Georgia's security. I do not believe that any Western state will ever have as big military power in Transcaucasia that Nagorny-Karabakh now has. On the other hand I do not believe that the military power that Russia has now is as great as that of Armenia which is south of the Greater Caucasus Chain. Over the last three years I have heard from many Georgians that Georgia cannot exist independent from Russia because Russia is so powerful and this makes me uneasy. There is some abstract truth in this but not concrete truth. I think that the Georgians have an abstract feeling of a danger coming from Russia and this feeling might turn into a real danger.

Russian policy and Russian power are very complex. There are some people in the Russian elite who want to restore the Soviet Union. Some are simply speculating in this issue for political advantage; there is also a third group which uses the issue of Russia's integration and the issue of Russians abroad as a cover for their criminal activities. If we do not make these kinds of distinctions and if we are not able to distinguish between the attitude of the Russian political elite to this issue and the attitude of the Russian public, we will not be able to understand the Russian motives and deal with them effectively. In short, more attention should be paid to regional powers, the Transcaucasian countries and Chechnya, and less to Western countries and Russia. It seems to me that the links among non-Russian republics have broken since 1991 and have been replaced by the orientation towards Washington, Bonn and London. And yet many Georgians have strong personal friendship with important figures of other republics, which can be used for the revival of intra-Caucasian contacts.

**Niko Vashakidze:** We had no option whatsoever at the time when Georgia joined the CIS, since after the defeat in the Abkhaz war there arose a real danger of the aggression to be spread deep into the country. It could have happened just in a couple of days.

**David Darchiashvili:** It is a common truth that a security structure constitutes a certain mixture of domestic and foreign factors. It has repeatedly been emphasized within the Georgian political elite, that the foreign factor and in particular the relationship with Russia is of vital importance if only for the country's

internal stabilization. Georgian political consciousness emanates from the fact that it is Russia which poses a major danger, and the security system implies the development of steps against this imaginary or real danger. Consequently, Georgia's political choice was determined relative to this danger. At times, it became the Georgian policy to try escaping this danger by opening the door to it or appeasing it, but at times the ways of neutralizing Russia's influence were also sought. We can recall the joining of the CIS, steps towards the formation of Georgian-Russian army, attempts to regain Abkhazia by means of Russian bayonets. At the same time certain attempts were made to search for alternative guarantees. The Georgian political elite still remains at the crossroads and cannot yet decide on the way of facing what it deems to constitute the major danger. This is one of the reasons for the absence of Georgia's security concept to this day.

**Kashia:** Mr. Fairbanks has reviewed the situation in the Caucasus. In my opinion we cannot evade the Russian problem because the problem of the Caucasus is a Russian problem in general. It is clear today that the Chechen problem is not just a Caucasian problem but a Russian problem as well. It would have been very easy to resolve all the problems in the Caucasus without a Russian factor. In real politics, however, Russia has its own interests in the Caucasus. As to inter-Caucasian interests, they do not coincide with those of Russia. That is why we are discussing Russia and not the problems of our Caucasian neighbours. Theoretically the situation can be discussed without Russia, but not in terms of a real situation and not in terms of the Caucasian security. The danger comes from the North as well as from the Western attitude towards Russia and the Caucasus.

**Fairbanks:** The Chechen problem is a Caucasian problem as much as it is a Russian problem. Certain forces in Russia vested Dudaev's regime with power in order to take Abkhazia from Georgia. But this was done without paying any regard to the considerations and needs of Russia's integrity. Therefore, Chechnya and Abkhazia are interrelated. I also believe that the beginning of the war in Chechnya was directly connected with the signing of the Azerbaijan oil consortium agreement, and it is mainly aimed at resolving the problem of the Northern oil pipeline route. I think my argument has been misinterpreted. I certainly agree that Russia is the biggest potential security problem. But I also know other problems of a similar degree and significance for other Transcaucasian states. Russian forces in Georgia will be able to operate effectively only through Ossetian and Abkhazian separatism. I want to make a fundamental distinction between security problems and the solution of these particular problems. Russia is the biggest security problem - and a very complicated one - but I think that other Transcaucasian and Caucasian powers are no less important part of the solution of problems.

**Melashvili:** I would like to agree with Mr. Fairbanks that it is very complicated to consider Georgia's security without discussing the Caucasian problems. The Georgians did pay considerable attention to this issue. However, as a result of our errors at the beginning of the 1990's, Russia managed to direct those forces in the Caucasus who were guided by national sentiment against Georgia instead of herself, thus creating great danger for us. It is common knowledge that Bassaev's units were trained by the Russian military not far from Gudauta.

On the other hand the Chechen problem is directly connected with the oil pipeline. Just at the beginning of the conflict, the Georgian Parliament came across a document according to which Georgia's oil refineries and gas pipelines were to be privatized and the Russian "Gasprom" was to become the holder of the control package of shares. Russia tried to do away with the Chechen issue through waging a war against Dudaev, thus making it easier for a decision on the oil pipeline route to be made which would best suit Russian interests and at the same time deprive Georgia of a similar chance. We do give priority to the settlements of relations with our North Caucasian neighbours. Without this it will be very difficult to solve Georgia's security problems, because Russia will always have a chance to promote the syndrome of permanent tension in Georgia - in which she will appear to be a supreme arbitrator instead of an interested party. In 1921, Lloyd George stated that they would rather tolerate Russian dominance in the Caucasus than accept a permanent unrest in the region. We have fallen prey to our inability to solve the Caucasian problems, as well as to certain people's preference to see the Caucasus peaceful rather than another hotbed of unrest.

**Alexandr Boicharov:** Having met with both Georgian, South Ossetian, and Abkhaz leaders, including Ardzinba himself, I have the impression that all of the parties want to resolve the existing dilemmas. At the same time, arguments which they use when talking to one another resemble those used in family feuds. In my opinion, this does not signify the inexperience of these leaders. It has its roots in your history. This concerns all the other CIS countries. I do not know how old your Defence Ministry is - two, three years old? What could we expect from a three-year-old ministry? It is like a three-year-old child, it cannot walk properly. The same applies to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has never dealt with any security problems; everything was decided by Moscow. It is not that these people do not want to discuss the Abkhazian and Ossetian problems in geopolitical or scientific terms, but because they have never had any experience of doing so.

The initiative of the Georgian government on Peaceful Caucasus indicates that the country is getting away from this kind of communal approach. It has presented Georgian problems in a broader context. The country is trying to involve not only its neighbours but also international organizations in order to

create guarantees for safeguarding peace in the Caucasus Region. Quite recently, a Georgian delegation made a presentation at the Governing Council of OSCE in Prague. A decision is being taken now on considering the Peaceful Caucasus initiative as part of a regional aspect of the model of European security for the 21st century which is to be discussed at the summit meeting of the Heads of European States in Lisbon this December.

The Peaceful Caucasus initiative could be one of the strategies for the national security concept of Georgia, but it should be formulated not just as a set of ideas but as a contingency plan which will be comprehensible for strategic and military analysts. If this plan is approved by your neighbours this will be the best contribution to your national security concept.

**Chairman:** You have had an opportunity to get to know ethnic problems in Georgia. I wonder if the Georgian-Ossetian conflict could have been avoided without the interference of any third party?

**Boicharov:** It is a rather difficult question. I am no expert of the origin of these conflicts. We see these conflicts the way they are at present.

**Chairman:** Can they be settled by Georgia itself?

**Boicharov:** No, they cannot.

**Khaindrava:** I agree with all those who put the stress on the co-operation in the South Caucasus and the Caucasus in general. I have an impression that after the Balkan problem is settled Western interest will logically move towards the Caucasus if only for the same oil pipeline. It must be said that Russia is also making arrangements: the agreement on deeper integration of Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan is nothing else but an attempt to shift this West-East continental line to the North. Later on, Russia will either open this line or close it, or, which is more dangerous, will first open and *then* close it. This must be taken into account.

I cannot help responding to Mr. Vashakidze's remark, that there was no alternative to Georgia's joining the CIS. Of course what happened in Abkhazia was a clear-cut aggression, but I wonder, who was going to take Tbilisi - the Abkhaz fighters? It is obvious that the conflict that was under way at the time of joining the CIS was among Georgians, and that it was a matter of seizing power, not of occupying Tbilisi. It seems to me that one of the major shortcomings of the Georgian authorities' mentality consists of placing Russia's interests in Georgia as well as in the South Caucasus in the spotlight and then trying to bring Georgia's interests in line with them. Naturally, Russia's interests should also be considered but it is Georgian interests that should matter in Georgia above all. We should try to balance the interests of Russia, Turkey, London, Bonn or any other country in accordance with these interests. Unless the Georgian authorities change their

approaches this way, there will be no sense speaking of any coherent policy. I understand that both the Defence Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are young, but that is no excuse for not having developed a program of action.

**Mamuka Kudava:** The restoration of our territorial integrity is the principal problem among our other security problems. We have tried to achieve this through neutrality, co-operation with international organizations, signing agreements with various countries, but all proved an illusion. The history of Georgia has demonstrated that we are unable to defend ourselves on our own. A military force is needed but our security policy should not be confined to army-building only.

It is necessary to: a) work out a regional policy and develop contacts and institutional cooperation not only within the South Caucasus but in the entire Caucasus; b) balance Russia's policy with Western and other countries' policies, or, to be more precise, not just balance Russia's policy but those of Russia and the West together. In my opinion these are two main ideas of Georgia's national security concept.

I will try to substantiate what I have said. The Caucasus lacks a security architecture at present. The cornerstone of our security policy lies in our realization of being an integral part of the Caucasus. The more weighty we become on the regional scale, the more attention the world will pay to us. The Peaceful Caucasus initiative is going to play an important part in the security of the region.

The West has been paying more attention to the southern flank of Europe lately - not only to avoid the danger of fundamentalism but also to control natural resources. This is the Western model of security. A new term "pivotal state" has appeared in US foreign policy. There is a tendency of growing attention to us on the part of the United States. This tendency will result in NATO and the United States becoming the guarantors of our security. Georgia can be a leader and a "pivotal state" in this region.

Another cornerstone of our security consists in democratic reforms and economic prosperity. World trade routes may pass via Georgia. This proves once again how badly we need regional co-operation.

Neo-imperialism poses the greatest danger to Georgia's security. That is why we have to balance Russia's impact. The struggle for the Caspian oil has intensified since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Georgia has a chance of becoming a transit country. This is the reason for the growing desire of various countries to gain an influence here. Turkey is ready to fund the Georgian section of the oil pipeline. At the same time Russia is striving to maintain its authority in any decision-making on this issue.

Georgia has signed the CIS Collective Security Agreement. However, the contradiction of interests of the CIS member-countries renders this agreement value-

less. On the other hand, if undemocratic processes continue in Russia this collective system might be activated against the West. This will revive the Cold War. Therefore, Georgia's balanced policy is correct and coincides with Western approach.

Another component of Georgia's security policy is the acceptance of the Ukraine's initiative on the Development of Confidence and Security within the Black Sea region. In the future this initiative might become instrumental in the Black and Baltic Seas interregional cooperation. The cooperation of the Baltic countries is under way and these two regional initiatives will be able to neutralize Russia's negative impact.

Next comes the cooperation within the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative. It can be considered a certain form of NATO enlargement. This initiative supports the development of the armed forces of its participants. It might be helpful in our obtaining independence from Russia's military assistance. "Partnership for Peace" shall also be considered a balancing factor in our security policy. None of the steps taken by Georgia shall be directed against the West. In the future we must try join NATO and the European Community. That will be a major guarantee of our future security.

And finally, our security is not only our problem. It might cause a challenge to all.

**Edward Rogers:** It seems to me that out of the eight countries that I have dealt with in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Georgia has made the greatest progress towards true democracy. But there is certain danger in it too, because democracy encourages open debate on every issue. And debates in Georgia often cause an undesirable type of pluralism. It is my personal opinion that those among the countries of the former Soviet Union that were faster in shaping a national vision were more successful. They held the debates but came to a national consensus in forming a national vision of their countries, or a myth which Mr. Kerr spoke of yesterday. In some of the CIS countries, formation of a national visions is still under way. These visions comprise political, economic and military elements into a single whole. I think that the countries which are guided by this kind of vision will be most successful in obtaining what they desire. There are many paths that Georgia could follow; but you must choose the one direction you are going to follow and do it quickly.

**David Sikharulidze:** The agreement on Russian military bases contains a number of negative points. Russian bases are located in complicated regions in terms of ethnicity and Russia controls the developments there through its military forces, while the Vaziani base provides Russia with a good chance to stir up trouble in Tbilisi. This was the case during the 1991-92 war in Tbilisi, and this was



the case in connection with the August 1995 terrorist act. Besides, Russian troops in Georgia outnumber the Georgian Army itself - thus limiting our sovereignty. By the revision of quotas of conventional weapons allocated to Georgia, Russia reduces Georgia's due share of equipment and weakens our defence potential. It is also worthy of note that with Russia's military bases on its territory, Georgia might get involved in the joint security system which tomorrow may become the cause of confrontation with the countries of the Atlantic region. Russia's predominance is quite obvious in the CIS security system. This system is serving Russia's interests and that makes it different from the NATO security system. That is why all the peace-keeping forces found in Georgia consist of Russians only. We have witnessed their inefficiency in practice. Besides, it is obvious that Russia views the peace-keeping forces as a mechanism for defending its own interests.

**Chairman:** We keep talking of Russia's interests and forget that other countries also have *their* interests in Georgia, that other countries also interfere in our affairs.

**Rondeli:** The state is central to the concept of security. In the post-Soviet space, the problem of statehood is of primary importance. All of the post-Soviet states, with the exception of Russia, are essentially quasi-states. State-building is primarily a domestic affair and international organizations can only assist in this. A state has first to develop its own concept of national interest, the objectives and priorities of the national security policy. This task is quite difficult for small, weak powers. In the case of a newly emerged quasi-state, national security often means the defence of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Security for a small country simply means survival. The national security of small powers is essentially of regional dimension, but they are mainly concerned about their internal security. It is the internal insecurity that constitutes the main source of weakness. Unstable state institutions encourage internal turmoil and interference of external forces.

An internal weakness may stem from multi-ethnicity, regionalism, insufficient social and political cohesion of its population. In the case of the former Soviet Union these weaknesses create particular danger to the very existence of the states which have emerged on its territory.

Fortunately, the modern international system does not allow these quasi-states disappear completely. They cannot be deprived of their sovereignty as a result of war. At the same time we still live under the conditions in which the behaviour of the states is determined by their national interests and power factor. The experience of Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union has proved that small countries should not rely on international norms only. They should seek their own security within the framework of alliances and collective security. All of the three South

Caucasian republics differ as to their geographic, demographic, cultural, political and economic conditions. Consequently, their security interests are also different. However, being weak quasi-states they have much in common. All three must identify the sources of their internal and external weaknesses and national security priorities. They are facing the task of developing security institutions. The four years of independence did not suffice for the accomplishment of these tasks.

Who is to identify the security interests and the tasks of the Transcaucasian republics? In developed states, this is the responsibility of the ruling elite, which is represented in the government, parliament, political parties. Public opinion also contributes to this process. The disintegration of the Soviet Union brought a great number of inexperienced and incompetent people to power, which resulted in aggravation of already existing problems, especially in the area of inter-ethnic relations. Under the cover of populism and nationalist slogans, irresponsible elites triggered (not without external “assistance”) bloody conflicts.

The Transcaucasus is of a special challenge to the regional power triangle of powers comprised of Russia, Turkey and Iran. Their rivalry is further intensified by their long-standing opposition. Russia considers the Transcaucasus its “near abroad” and tries to establish its own sphere of influence here. Using the “divide and rule” policy, it is aggravating the disputes among Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia fears the formation of any regional alliance without its participation. It also fears the possibility of the creation of buffer states and a security vacuum in the Transcaucasus which might be filled by some other great power. Russia’s ruling elite views the Transcaucasus as a sphere of its own vital interests.

Transcaucasian republics operate in Russia’s magnetic field. Armenia is openly allied with Russia, and is making use of Russian forces against Azerbaijan. The two other Transcaucasian republics which perceived their interests as delimited from Russia have, as a result, put themselves on the brink of territorial disintegration.

The security problems of these weak states of the Transcaucasus can be divided into four components: 1) military-political; 2) economic; 3) ethnocultural; 4) ecological. These trigger intrastate and interstate conflicts, which may spill beyond the boundaries of the region.

The ethno-cultural component of security seems to be the most important for the Transcaucasus. A number of conflicts have stemmed from the ethnocultural mosaic of the region. These problems spark military-political confrontation. The economic component is also essential. None of the Transcaucasian states is economically independent. Each of them is undergoing an economic

crisis. The Caspian oil transportation issue is also contributing to regional tensions.

The security problems of the Transcaucasus are of a regional nature. We cannot consider the entire Caucasus a unified security complex at the present stage, since a part of the region constitutes Russia's integral part. On the other hand, the consideration of only Transcaucasian security complex might be an oversimplification of the matter; a rudimentary structure cannot be called "a complex". For the time being, the security perspectives of these three Transcaucasian states are mainly domestically directed. There is not enough security interaction among them.

Powerful neighbours greatly influence the dynamics of Transcaucasian security. With the growth of the importance of Caspian oil, the role of the powerful neighbours in shaping regional security might increase. Each of them has its own interests. One of them - Russia - has managed, to a certain extent, to subordinate regional security concerns to its own orientation. It has managed to reinforce its influence through stationing its armed forces in the region. Thus, an external power is playing a much greater role in the regional security dynamics, than the countries of the region itself.

Russia's efforts to create a collective security framework within the CIS and to form a military alliance, if successful, can postpone the formation of the Transcaucasian regional security complex for an uncertain period. On the other hand, the rudimentary Transcaucasian security complex may be transformed into a Caucasian complex if independent states emerge in the North Caucasus.

**Melashvili:** The best thing to be done for the settlement of conflicts is to subordinate the peace-keeping forces to the United Nations.

**Kakha Chitaia:** National security must be based on democratic principles. The reliance solely on a military forces without a thorough security system will make things worse. The priority here should consist of developing of a regional security system with the closest neighbours. The Parliament can play a very special role in this. We have already begun making use of our contacts though we have faced many obstacles on the way. The oil pipeline is one of the bases for the extension of this co-operation. We have to get our neighbours interested. Our neighbours' security provides for our security. It would be most interesting to hold a similar seminar on a regional scale in the future with the participation of Russia, Turkey and Iran.

**Kudava:** It can be logically concluded from NATO's involvement in Bosnian affairs that the West would pay greater attention to the Caucasus, and this is just what is happening. I have already mentioned that the West cannot very actively interfere in Caucasian affairs. Besides, the West cannot ignore the Russian neo-

imperialism, because regional conflicts might well have their impact outside the region. Therefore, the only thing to be done is that the West pay more attention to Russia's activities in the Caucasus and within the entire CIS.

**Friedrich Kriesel:** Democracy provides individual freedom for people and conditions for economic well-being. You need foreign investors to achieve economic well-being. But no foreign investor will take chances and invest his capital unless stable conditions are created. You must put an end to confrontation with South Ossetia and Abkhazia by all means with the exception of use of force. You must stop discussing who started the war and who is entitled to what rights. None of this will contribute to the improvement of the existing situation. You should channel all your efforts towards reaching a certain level of your economy, stabilizing the situation and making Georgia attractive to both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. I assure you, and this is my last statement, that you will have to do all this by yourselves. Neither the West nor the East will help you in this. It is to be accomplished by you and the population of Georgia.

*After the working groups concluded, a brainstorming session was held at which the participants, divided in small groups, put forward their ideas on ways to develop Georgia's national security concept. Later on, the participants gathered at a plenary session to hear the results of working groups activities and the brainstorming.*

## **THE BRAINSTORMING SUMMARY AND CLOSING OF THE PLENARY SESSION Chairman - Wolfgang Manig**

*The Chairman invited the rapporteurs from brainstorming groups to give a short summary of its results:*

**Ghia Nodia:** As a result of our discussion, we created a list of major problem areas of Georgia's security. At the same time we agreed that internal problems are far more important to Georgia's security than the external ones. In our opinion major problem areas are the following:

- *The social-human factor* - Being a multi-ethnic country Georgia lacks the sense of citizenship; national identity and the sense of civil society are not fully developed. The development of the sense of citizenship is the only way to create a Georgian unity.
- *Lack of public discussions of security issues* - It implies the necessity of

security issues to be discussed by special government bodies, non-governmental organizations and independent mass-media. The majority of the population considers that the responsibility for providing security rests with the state and do not care how and in what way it will be provided.

- *Social-psychological area* - Following the military defeats and internal turmoil of the last years the greater part of the general public has lost its national confidence. It has become a popular notion with us that Georgia is unable to ensure its own security and has to entirely rely on an external force. Some view this force in Russia, for others help should come from NATO. Confidence building, whatever it might mean, is the most critical task for Georgia.

- *The style of governance* - There exists no coherent and publicly declared policy concept. We still have the kind of leadership which considers that political doctrines should better be kept secret. This means that not only the public but also the government should be kept in ignorance as to the unified concept of the state policy. As a result, every minister may pursue his or her own policy. The same applies to the security area as well.

- *Building state institutions* - This group of problems comprises the necessity to fill in the gaps in the still incomplete constitution, army-building and the establishment of a clear system of responsibilities, which will strictly define what is required from every institution. Under the present system everyone is responsible for everything, while no one knows exact area of his or her responsibility.

These are major problems. However, there are issues of less importance but, nevertheless, worthy of attention. One of them is the lack of a proper public relations policy. No coherent efforts are made to improve Georgia's image. This does not involve only the West; Georgia's image needs improving in the neighbouring regions as well, for instance in the south of Russia. Insufficiency of competent military, economic or legislative personnel in spite of a relatively high educational level of Georgia's population is another challenge. There is no clearly defined governmental policy to improve the situation.

**Kenneth Brower:** The discussion started by defining the basis of national security and the elements of the security mechanism. We have identified seven elements: defining the threat; joining international organizations; creating a legal framework; assessing the country's military and political capabilities; conducting public education; developing the planning system and mechanisms of its control; upgrading the country's military and scientific capacities.

Then we singled out two key issues - provision of the legal framework for the national security and educational programs in the domain of national defence. The parliament should require the Ministry of Defence to provide the assessment of an external threat and its own military capabilities, to develop the concept of the

Armed Forces, short and long-term financial planning. It is necessary to hold national debates on national security issues and come to a consensus, because the national security concept must be stable and must not change along with the changes of governments or policies.

Georgia should follow in other countries' footsteps and consider developing a small elite high quality force that would be designed for peace-keeping operations. That would bring in tactics, concepts and qualification from foreign countries. It was also suggested that NGO's could also be used for the development of the security system.

**Irakli Mchedlishvili:** We have addressed the following issues:

1) The essence of a security concept; who should develop it and what procedures should be used when developing it.

2) Georgia's international and domestic strategies; the role and the future of the Russian Army in Georgia.

As a result of our discussions we have concluded that the national security concept should be developed by the state institutions, including all the sections of the executive branch, as well as independent organizations and individuals. The Security Council, headed by the President, might perform the functions of a coordinating body which will gather various suggestions and ideas and put the document into final shape. Then the produced document has to be assessed. This is once again to be done by various power structures but the Parliament and its commissions shall take the lead. Later on the document should be finally examined by the Security Council and the President's advisors and signed by the President. The question whether the parliament should approve the document after the President has signed it or just take it into consideration was extensively discussed. In the end, the majority of the group agreed upon the latter. The development of the concept will take from 6 to 12 months, and it is to be calculated for a five-year period, because five years are required for building stable armed forces. The sovereignty of Georgia is the major principle that should serve as the basis of this document. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the factors and forces which may threaten the sovereignty and develop the ways of neutralizing these threats.

We differed on the principle of building Georgian armed forces, whether it should be territorial or centralized. The priority of the territorial principle lies in its inexpensiveness which for Georgia, as a weak country, is greatly important. The supporters of the centralized principle emphasized that some regions of Georgia are compactly populated by ethnic minorities which are under Russia's influence. Their provision with armament and territorial unification might jeopardize Georgia's stability. We have discussed a kind of territorial system which would exclude this threat. We cannot delimit ethnic groups from one another when speak-

ing of a country's unity. Everyone should serve in the army together and the territorial principle does not at all imply the creation of ethnic armies.

As for the presence of the Russian Army in Georgia the results of our discussion can be summed up as follows: it is acceptable at the current stage of our development, but in the future they should withdraw from Georgia.

**Edward Rogers:** First I would like to thank Mr. Glitza for proposing a systematic approach to this problem. We have agreed that the present national security policy of Georgia should be of a transitional nature and should not cover a long time frame. Thus we have selected a two-year period. The systematic approach involves five steps. The first step was to identify the interests of Georgia. We have identified twenty interests. Then we attempted to divide them into categories. The first category comprised wider interests, or the interests for which Georgia would go to war. The second category was very important interests, the next was important and the last category was simply interests.

We have come up with three wide interests. They are: preservation of independence and sovereignty of Georgia, the national defence of Georgia, and the regaining of lost territories. Then we moved to the third stage and attempted to define what was required to achieve these particular wider interests. Our primary concern was the first interest - that of the preservation of sovereignty and independence. The presence of foreign military bases was considered to be the primary threat to the sovereignty. The second threat was thought to be lack of national consensus and self-consciousness.

We did not discuss the issue of national defence in detail because it is common knowledge that a country's borders must be defended. Therefore, we quickly moved to the third wide interest - the regaining of lost territories. It was noted that this process might stretch beyond a two-year period. We agreed that the reorganization and reinforcement of the army should be conducted in parallel with peaceful negotiations.

The essential conclusion is that national security strategy can be developed provided that a systematic approach is undertaken by the government or NGO's.

**David Losaberidze:** Our discussion mainly covered two aspects: definition of general problems and the outlines of concrete steps to be made. As to the general problems, we singled out foreign and domestic factors. We considered the development of Eurasian corridor through which Georgia will become a junction between Central Asia, which is rich in natural resources, and highly advanced Europe, our priority in foreign policy. The development of a coherent collective security system in the Caucasus shall be the second priority.

The West will not pay sufficient attention to Georgia unless attempts are made to develop a unified stability system in the Caucasus. However, it was also

pointed out that currently, with intense opposition among the peoples of the Caucasus which is based not only on ethnic but also on geo-political and strategic interests, no rapid solution of this issue is realistically possible. All that should be done now is to reinforce Georgia's state institutions and achieve the greatest stabilization of the state system. It is the factor that a stable Georgia that must become the unifying force for the entire Caucasus. The unity of the Caucasus must be an ideal and not tomorrow's short-term plan.

Of domestic factors, the attention was concentrated on the problem of estrangement between the authorities and the population. A certain part of our population maintains a hostile attitude to the authorities for political reasons while another greater part has entirely lost any interest in the state policy due to economic hardships. Therefore, reforms must be accelerated to overcome this problem. The interests of the development of powerful state structures might come into collision with economic reforms. In that case the development of economy should come first. In the future, an advanced economy will be instrumental in setting up powerful state institutions. At present these institutions must be as flexible and inexpensive as possible. We also considered the sentiments of disappointment and loss of self-confidence which is widely spread in Georgian political circles. The political will of the state, the nation and its leadership is a greatly important factor which can be critical in the solution of a number of problems.

With respect to the prospects of western assistance, it was stated that it could not be a purely military assistance, though the West could greatly contribute to setting up Georgian state institutions and training highly qualified personnel. This applies to the building of a military as well.

When discussing specific issues of building a military, the supporters of the principles of volunteering and conscription came to an agreement that a small elite unit of the army should be formed on the basis of volunteering principle which would act as a Rapid Reaction Corps, while the problem of the numerosness of the army should be solved through conscription. The terms of service should be reduced and the army should be formed on the basis of a territorial principle but in such a way as to avoid ethnic-regional divisions.

The intelligence services need profound reforms. The objective of the military intelligence should be to study the military situation of neighbouring states. Counter-intelligence should primarily deal with ethnic conflicts which are quite often directed from outside. Counter-intelligence shall not only be engaged in gathering information, and should by no means be considered a law-enforcement agency, since this would most certainly engender people's resentment.

**David Darchiashvili:** Discussions in our group referred for the most part to the legal status of the security concept, outlining two distinctly opposing stands.



The majority of the participants considered that the national security concept should be a political declaration to be adopted after broad discussions with the participation of the country's political parties and respective state institutions, as well as the broad public. This will be a manifestation of a general political will which should not be violated. However, this kind of violation does not entail any punishment since such a concept cannot have the force of a law. Some Georgian participants had their doubts as to whether this kind of document could carry any weight in Georgia, where respect for the law is very low. The Constitution and our laws are often violated, more than in countries with considerable experience in democracy. Therefore, they considered it preferable to adopt the constituent parts of the national security concept as a package of laws.

This divergence of opinions led the discussion to a general issue as to what kind of state we were building. Some expressed their doubts that in spite of a general pro-western orientation, a part of our political elite was unconsciously guided by the model of a totalitarian state and therefore, we had to primarily define what kind of state Georgia wanted to be. We arrived at a conclusion that if we were speaking of a stable, far-reaching strategy, a civil, open society was a better guarantor of our national security. Citizens can be more easily rallied in a society where citizens enjoy greater liberties.

In the second half of the discussion we identified the factors which would be instrumental in upgrading the efficiency of the national security system. These factors are: developing political and military education, creating a real and effective budget, re-structuring the intelligence agency, namely, separating the information service from law-enforcement levers, pursuing a more principled foreign policy and providing institutions responsible for the security policy, with fuller information.

**Nino Nanava:** Our group agreed upon the initial principle that the national security concept should be based on the interests of an individual. This is the feature which distinguishes the national security concept in democratic countries from that of the former Soviet empire, which used to subordinate everything to state interests. National mentality and traditions should also be taken into account. It is critical to establish the principles of tolerance and equality between ethnic and confessional groups of the society, which should be achieved through education.

As for the principle of building a military in Georgia, under present conditions it is the conscription system that should have the priority and not the creation of a professional army. Economic progress and the establishment of democratic institutions are of paramount importance for the development of the security system. Georgia is not lacking in specialists who will be able to develop the

security concept. They need intellectual rather than financial assistance.

**Chairman** noted that the brainstorming had resulted not only in the identification of problems related to the development of the national security concept, as it was initially the objective, but also the foundation was laid to the search of answers to raised problems, to the very development of the national security concept.

*After a short break, **Chairman Manig** summed up the results of the seminar.*

According to Georgian participants, three basic problems are to be addressed for the formulation of the national security concept. The first, as it has been mentioned on several occasions, is lack of transparency of government actions and plans, which entails a disregard of civilian, namely parliamentary control on the part of law-enforcement structures. The second problem is lack of loyalty. The building of the state is not fully accomplished and loyalty is very important for the development of civic consciousness. Lack of loyalty is clearly visible in young people's avoidance of the draft and their unwillingness to serve in the army. The third problem is the reluctance on behalf of the government to accept public engagement in forming the security policy. Quite often, the wrong people are found in high positions which indicates lack of control mechanisms.

Besides these three major problems, the brainstorming session has resulted in the outlining of three major ideas:

Strengthening of civic consciousness - This will diminish ethnic separatism and develop the sense of loyalty. This is not only the loyalty of the military but also the loyalty of civil servants.

Loyalty to the State - Public servants remain in their offices despite economic hardships.

Regional co-operation - Georgian sovereignty and independence will be strengthened by the co-operation with other countries of the region. And all of this will finally become a precondition to the establishment of civilian control.

How are these ideas to be implemented? I would like to call on the Georgian participants to continue their activities in different ways: in Parliament, in governmental structures, through publication of articles. We have witnessed complete openness of the participants of this conference which has enhanced the formation of a "strategic community" which I mentioned at the beginning of our seminar. Another means for implementation of the ideas set out here is the active role of non-governmental organizations. They can arrange further meetings and communicate with the government and the Parliament. This will contribute to the development of mutual confidence and the public will take greater interest in security problems.

***Ia Tikanadze**, Head of the Georgian office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation concluded by speaking of the tasks and future plans of the Foundation with respect to the national security problems.*

