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University of California, Santa Cruz • 232 College Eight • Santa Cruz, CA 95064

<http://www2.ucsc.edu/cgirs>

831.459.2833 (Voice) • 831.459.3518 (Fax)

global@cats.ucsc.edu

Antinomies of Islamic Movements under Globalization

Paul Lubeck

University of California, Santa Cruz

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GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

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SHIRIN M. RAI

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THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL

ANTINOMIES OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS UNDER GLOBALIZATION

PAUL M. LUBECK
(lubeck@cats.ucsc.edu)

ANTINOMY-

1. A contradiction in a law, or between two equally binding laws. 1592 DEE in Chetham Misa. ...
2. A contradictory law, statutes, or principle; an authoritative contradiction. Obs. 1643 MILTON Divorce II. iii. (1847) 139/2 That his holiest people might as it were by his own antinomy, or counterstatute, live unproved. 1649 JER. TAYLOR Gt. Exemp. Add. iv. 48 The signes which the Angel gave...are direct antinomies to the lusts of the flesh. 1656--Deus Justif., An Antidote, and Antinomy of their great objection.
3. A contradiction between conclusions which seem equally logical, reasonable, or necessary; a paradox; intellectual contradictoriness. (After Kant.) 1802 H.C. ROBINSON Diary I. 144 The antinomies of pure reason. 1857 T. WEBB Intell. Locke ix. 175 The imagination was distracted on every side by counter inconceivabilities, the Mind was divided against itself; Antinomy was its very law. 1877 CAIRD Philos. Kant II. svi. 566 Criticism must discover the nature and extent of the antinomies of reason, and must show that they are dogmatically insoluble; or that, whichever of the alternative solutions we adopt, we are led into absurdity and contradiction.

-The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition

That we are on the cusp of entering the second millennium under a ruthless, unregulated, polarizing regime, one that simultaneously integrates the more advanced and marginalizes the weaker regions of the world, is surely now indisputable. Like it or not, **globalization** is

the determinant material and social force of our time. To be sure, as a long-term historical process global integration originated in the 15th century. But globalization is never linear, for its impact is always mediated by specific, historically situated local institutions. Thus globalization reflexively suggests *localization* of the global. Nor is globalization continuous: rather it is characterized by rapid spurts of growth, followed by tension, resistance and stagnation. In its current phase, dating from the early 1970s, globalization is characterized by the hyper-competitive integration of finance, production, trade, communications and culture across the boundaries of once hegemonic national states – themselves creations of earlier moments of Western European expansion.

Well, then, what's new? Contemporary globalization compresses time-space relationships creating what Castells calls 'the space of flows': that is, intense networked interaction among geographically dispersed groups, occurring in immediate 'real time'. Accordingly, everyday life human interaction communicated over vast distances now becomes routinized, indeed even 'natural' for the minority of actors communicating within this new globally integrated sector (Castells, 1996). What's new, therefore, is the micro-electronic revolution and the global networks – production, cultural and social – which drive the deepening and geographical reach of globalization processes.

Indeed, global economic integration and time-space compression across increasingly porous national boundaries exists only because of the rapid innovation cycle constantly generated by the electronic informational infrastructure. What is the new global electronic infrastructure? The electronic infrastructure is a multi-layered web of firms, services and networks: that is, transnational computer networks, micro-electronic-driven production linkages, 'on-line' financial systems, fast and cheap air travel, and satellite-based telecommunication systems like the multi-satellite Iridium system. The latter system ranks as the apotheosis of 'spacelessness'. Systems like the Iridium link any geographical location on the globe with immediate, direct, satellite access to the global communications and information system. This is radical change by any standard.

Critics often conflate globalization processes driven by the micro-electronic revolution with neo-liberal economic and social policies implemented by economic and political elites from dominant states and multi-lateral organizations (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). While neo-liberalism is the hegemonic policy in this conjuncture, the micro-electronic revolution is the technological force that renders the neo-liberal version of globalization a feasible economic and social policy, albeit since the Asian financial crisis increasingly questioned by less dogmatic and more realistic economists (i.e. Krugman, Rodrik and Sachs). True, neo-liberalism and the micro-electronic revolution emerged on our consciousness simultaneously and are obviously interwoven especially in the global financial industry. Nonetheless, the two should not be conflated nor merged as critics often do. If, to stretch one's imagination, we were to abolish neo-liberal economic and social policies, global integration would continue, for the global is now institutionalized within the new electronic infrastructure which an increasing proportion of all actors now must utilize. Indeed, the global communications infrastructure is critical for democratic reform. For it must be mobilized in order to resolve global social, economic and environmental problems whose solutions lie outside the sovereignty of any single national state.

Daunting as the new global regime may be for social movement theorists and activists concerned with social justice, equality and environmental sustainability, critical social theorists must never forget that the material structures of globalization were, in fact,

predicted by Marx, Weber and other Enlightenment-inspired social theorists. To be sure, the structural logic and tendency of global capitalist expansion – commodification, deregulation, rationalization, transnational integration and social polarization – is inherently world-historic, expansive and universal in impact. However disconcerting the cruel facts of globalization may be for those social movement theorists committed to the nation-state as a foundational concept for social mobilization, global technical and economic integration now appears irreversible, barring some unforeseen catastrophe. Yet, while the structural and material consequences of globalization correspond to the predictions of Enlightenment social theorists, the social and cultural movements resisting globalization fail to fulfill the Enlightenment profile of increasing secularism, rationality and evolutionary progress.

What was not predicted by Enlightenment theory, of course, is the startling degree of weakness and fragmentation now so evident among secular, emancipatory social movements inspired by the Enlightenment, most of whom are valiantly trying to oppose the polarization, insecurity and misery wrought by the hyper-competitive logic of global neoliberalism. To be sure, ‘hard times’ now reign for Enlightenment-inspired social movements in Western societies, where large segments of the population tolerate, vote for or even embrace enthusiastically the fruits of globalization. Looking elsewhere in the non-Western, periphery – regions formerly providing inspiration (i.e. Third Worldism) for social movement activists elsewhere – do not offer much solace to ‘progressive’ social movement theorists.

Nowhere are standard Enlightenment expectations dashed more severely than in Muslim majority countries, or what Hodgson (1974) calls ‘Islamdom’: a diamond-shaped geographical agglomeration extending across Eurasia and Africa, forming what Ernest Gellner called the ‘Qur’an belt’. Muslim majority states stretch from Southern Russia to Tanzania on the North-South axis and from Morocco to Indonesia on the East-West axis. Viewed in global terms, Islam is the world’s fastest growing religion, accounting for approximately a quarter of the world’s population, one concentrated in some of the world’s poorest countries (i.e. Sudan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Mali, and Tanzania). And, fueled by global immigration, Islam is growing rapidly in European and North American cities.

Even more challenging to Enlightenment theory is the fact that the triumphal expansion of global forces appears to be *correlated* with the intensification of Islamic practice as well as the simultaneous migration of Muslim communities into new states and regions via the new global infrastructure. In turn, this gives rise to Islamic social movements of great diversity, complexity and contradictoriness. Spatially, these movements are concentrated in the exploding cities of Islamdom and their Diaspora networks. Yet, neither theories inspired by liberalism nor Marxism, the contested children of the Enlightenment, predicted the correlation between globalization and the strength of the militant Islamic revival. More difficult for progressives anchored in the West to accept is the stark fact that at the global, national and local level, Islamic social movements have increasingly become the most militant expression of anti-imperialist nationalism. By becoming the voice and assuming the leadership of anti-imperialist nationalist movements – what Wallerstein (1983) calls ‘anti-systemic’ ethno-nationalist movements – Islamic movements have now largely displaced secular nationalist and leftist movements as the primary mobilizing force of resistance against real and imagined Western political, economic and cultural domination.

Accordingly, given this unexpected shift in social movement leadership at the global level, the central problematic of this paper is to explain the paradoxical correlation between the intensification of globalization processes and the rising power – discursive, organizational and political – of Islamic social movements. This outcome, however, was not predetermined, nor entirely derived from the strategic and ideological orientation of secular movements. For, as Zubaida and Beinun emphasize repeatedly, the discursive and leadership shift in Muslim majority states was possible for two reasons: internally, the repression of democratic leftist forces by authoritarian regimes, and externally the lavish financial and political support given to Islamic movements by the USA and its client states (Saudi, Gulf States, Brunei) as a counterweight to advances made by the secular left. The case in point is Afghanistan, but elsewhere, too, Islamist groups were fostered Israel, Egypt and Algeria before they became threats to the dominant powers. According to Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State under two Reagan administrations: ‘We did spawn a monster in Afghanistan’ (Hiro, 1998: 20). Bin Laden and the Taliban confirm the adage that the enemy of my enemy is *not* always my friend.

THE PARADOXICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GLOBALIZATION AND ISLAM

Viewed from the perspective of Western Enlightenment theory, the strength and practices of Islamic social and intellectual movements display rampant contradiction, absurdity and paradox, suggesting the term ‘antinomy’. Confronting what Burke (1998) insightfully calls a ‘discursive shift’, i.e. from Enlightenment-inspired secular national to Islamic inspired social movements, critical social movement theorists must deconstruct the paradoxical correlation between the Islamic revival and the deepening of globalization.

Thorny questions arise ubiquitously. Why, given the claim of post-cold warrior spin-doctors like Fukuyama that globalization is the embodiment of rationalism, efficiency, material abundance and liberal democratic values, are Islamic movements thriving under the extension and deepening of globalization? Alternatively, if these movements are merely backward, vestigial, reactionary movements inspired by 7th century patriarchal values mostly attractive to marginalized and *lumpen* groups, then one responds with the question: why are Islamic movements so prominent in urban-industrial centers and not in the countryside? Furthermore, why have Islamic movements been able to recruit the best educated: the natural science graduates, the engineers, the urban professionals and even the women of many Muslim majority states? If Islamic movements are essentially and invariably authoritarian and anti-democratic, what explains their sustained popular support and why have they won elections in Turkey and Algeria, only to be kicked out of office by the military to the applause of Western democrats? Continuing our query, why is the Islamic presence so visible in the infrastructures of the new global system, that is, in the commercial networks, electronic communication systems and migrant communities within the global cities of Europe and North America? Haven’t these Muslims read Fukuyama’s *End of History* (1992)? Don’t they understand his *pronuncio* declaring that the only route to modernity is the neo-liberal democratic path under global capitalism? If we turn to Kant, who coined the term ‘Enlightenment’, the paradoxical correlation between globalization and Islamization that has produced ‘**global Islam**’ is nothing less than an *antinomy*: ‘A contradiction between conclusions which seem equally logical, reasonable, or necessary; a paradox; intellectual contradictoriness’.

ANTINOMIES ON THE STREETS OF ISLAMDOM

Let's explore the antinomies and paradoxes of "global Islam" by turning the ethnographic dial to the rapidly growing cities where Islam and globalization confront each other. The general term for these new social movements is "Islamism", or integralism, or "political Islam" (Beinin and Stork, 1997). On the streets, rebellious, unemployed urban youths are shouting a Hegelian-sounding teleology: 'Islam is the future.' Or 'Islam is the solution.' In Turkey, one of Islamdom's most industrialized states – and its first secular nationalist state – a young female medical student attempting to take a surgery exam was expelled for wearing a head scarf (New York Times, 3.17.98:A4). Elsewhere in Islamdom, especially in comparatively industrialized Malaysia, younger middle and working class women are voluntarily covering themselves in opposition to the dictates of authoritarian, secular-minded regimes. Faced with gerontocratic, arbitrary rulers, political activists are calling for *shura* – the Islamic right to be consulted by rulers – and usually insisting on the opportunity to compete in democratic elections. Kramer's study (1993: 80) of Islamist notions of democracy does not support Western conceptions of Islamist political practice:

The moderate pragmatic Islamists whom I consider to be the mainstream of the 1980s and early 90's have come to accept crucial elements of political democracy: pluralism (within the framework of Islam), political participation, government accountability, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights.

Islamism represents the emergence of a new intelligencia and leadership stratum in Muslim majority states. Note that Islamists are not recruited from the traditional, clerical status-honor group, the *ulama*, nor from Sufi brotherhoods (*tariqa*), two social groups who led earlier periods of Islamic renewal. Instead leaders and followers are recruited from graduates of modern national, or even Western, universities. Unlike the *ulama* who are accused of rote learning, imitation and stagnation, Islamist intellectuals embrace science and are constructing new political discourses and disseminating them on audiocassettes, videotapes, email and web pages. (Cyber-Islam is a reality, see: www.ou.edu/cybermuslim.) Not only do they employ modern organizational tools and 'cell' structures borrowed from Western anti-systemic movements, but they also assert that they are pursuing an alternative route to modernity, one that self consciously intends to 'Islamize modernity' (Ghamari-Tabrizi, 1998).

WHO THEN ARE THE "ISLAMISTS"?

For those navigating these waters for the first time, it may clarify the paradox to empirically describe the social structural base from which the new Islamist social movements recruit their followers. The social base is generally middle class, often from provincial towns, and employed in, or seeking employment in, the service sector, not the manufacturing nor the entrepreneurial sectors. Beginning with Mitchell's study of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers in the fifties, virtually all research confirms that most Islamists originate from the lower middle to mid-middle class fractions, with remarkable strength from the professional classes in large cities like Cairo (Mitchell, 1969, Davis, 1984). Indeed, paradoxically, when allowed to compete in open elections, Islamists tend to win the leadership posts in that bastion of modernist activism: urban professional associations (engineers, lawyers, doctors, teachers and university students) (Wickham, 1997).

Again, paradoxically, the Western-origin University is the bastion of Islamic activism. According to Roy (1994), secondary school and university students whose aspirations for security and social mobility are frustrated by economic stagnation, widespread corruption and bureaucratic incompetence, form a 'lumpen intelligencia' poised for easy recruitment. Richards and Waterbury paint a grim picture of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. MENA is second only to Africa in rates of population growth; the region's population is expected to double in 27 years; and Islam and fertility are positively correlated universally (Richards and Waterbury, 1996:80-85). 'Most Middle Easterners are less than twenty years old' (89). 'Everywhere in the region the labor force is growing faster than the demand for labor' and in most cases exceed 3 % a year (91). State educational budgets are biased toward tertiary and secondary education, geared to the state employment of males. In Egypt, for example, increases in secondary school enrollments average 14 % annually; tertiary enrollments roughly doubled between 1971-84 and; universities consumed 38 % of the education budget in 1984-85, while nearly a quarter of the girls were not enrolled in primary school (119). Nor is this phenomena limited to the Islamic world. Muslims attending universities overseas, especially Malaysians discover that militant Muslim organizations, like branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, dominate international Islamic student associations at Western universities. Hence, in practice, exposure to Western education often links Muslim students to the communication networks fueling the global Islamic revival.

Consider Algiers, now a site of a brutal civil war. A survey found that 75% of youth aged 16-29 were seeking work while, at the same time, "the educational system produced 270,000 unemployed diploma holders. Some 80% of this age group continued to live with their families, often eight persons to a room" (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996:116). Richards and Waterbury (1996) confirm the universality of this pattern elsewhere in the Middle East: high population growth, bloated secondary and university enrollments, stagnant state-managed economies and dismal employment opportunities for new entrants into the labor force. In general, the failed developmental policies articulated by repressive regimes in the region will generate an endless supply of new recruits from the middle classes for the Islamist programs. To be sure, less privileged strata---the unemployed, migrants and fractions of the urban working classes and informal sector---are also recruited into Islamist organizations, especially in Algeria, Turkey and Iran, or gratefully accept valuable health, educational or welfare services. Nonetheless, the heart of the Islamist social base and its leadership arises from the service sector, that is, the middle strata structurally located in government, schools and markets.

To return to our antinomy theme, observe the challenge to Enlightenment assumptions when one tries to explain the paradoxical fact that a high proportion of Islamists were formerly militant members of Marxist organizations. For instance, a survey of *Hamas* activists in Gaza found that 60% acknowledge prior membership in Marxist organizations (Eickelman, 1997:34). This antinomy suggests great similarity to Latin American liberation theology, where the left and the popular church overlap significantly. According to Burgat, from Cairo to Tunis the "leftists" and Islamists have been for a few years now sending signals that effectively opened the door to approaches that are quite different from the open warfare that has existed up to recently. Thus, '...part of the secular intelligencia has already begun to reposition itself in a way that brings it much closer to the cultural preoccupations of the Islamist approach' (Burgat and Dowell, 1993:83).

Grasping the profound significance of the discursive shift toward Islamic culture, leadership and organizations is crucial for understanding the paradox presented by globalization and the Islamic resurgence. This discursive shift enables Islamists to assume the mantle of what has proved to be the most powerful anti-systemic discourse in post-colonial, Muslim majority states: populist, anti-imperialist nationalism. Among the politically active population, this discourse remains the most powerful lever for mobilizing oppositional social movements. Formerly, until the rise of the Islamists, the nationalist, anti-imperialist discourse had been the property of secular nationalists: Nasserites, Ba'athists, Marxists and other Western-inspired movements. As global restructuring intensified, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989) removed it as a model and threat to globalization, secular nationalist ruling groups lost what little shred of legitimacy these gerontocratic regimes once possessed. Indeed, Islamism surged once these regimes accepted global neo-liberalism's dictate to implement structural adjustment programs (SAPS), thereby smashing living standards, increasing unemployment and privatizing national industries. Of course, SAPs are an ideological windfall for Islamists, like manna from heaven. For they confirmed the illegitimacy of the regimes implementing SAPs, while allowing Islamists to consolidate their control over the mantle of populist, anti-imperialist nationalism within civil society. Let us now turn to explanations for the correlation between the deepening of globalization, experienced most acutely as neo-liberalism, and the consolidation of Islamic social movements as Islamdom's most influential social movement.

CULTURAL EXPLANATIONS WHY ISLAMISM THRIVES UNDER GLOBALIZATION

Antinomies and contradictions abound both within and among Muslim beliefs and movements as well as between globalization processes and Islamic movements. Space not permitting an elaboration, suffice to say that a wide spectrum of Islamic movements, not only Islamists, now compete for a following. Recalling that the problematic to explain is the rise of the Islamist movements under the structural condition of rapid globalization, let us turn to some theoretical tools to explain this contradictory movement.

Wallerstein's (1983) concept, "reactive ethno-nationalism", is valuable for situating Muslims in a broader global context. By assuming that anti-imperialist social movements are a dialectical combination of new identities formed in reaction to world systemic forces, reactive ethno-nationalism explains how subject peoples simultaneously invent new identities, in order to contest the costs exacted by the accumulation processes of the capitalist world economy. Islamic identities, while subject to these processes, are more complex. In practice, Muslims are socially constructed, multiply situated subjects.

Historically, in the broadest sense, individuals could claim and benefit from a global identity as members of a universalistic community of observant believers---the *umma*---a trans-ethnic identity that neither privileges ethnicity or nation among Muslims. Over the long historical *duree*, the networks of the global *umma* are renewed annually by the pilgrimage to Mecca and, in the contemporary era, by the infrastructure of global capitalism. At the level of the territorial political unit, the emirate, sultanate or the nation-state, Muslims have an identity defined by the polity that administers Islamic law, *Shari'a*. While the ideal is the abstract norms governing the universal *umma*, once symbolized by the Caliphate that ended in 1924, Muslims recognize that state administered political institutions are necessary to enforce Islamic law. In practice, at the national and regional

level vast differences of interpretation and proposed solutions prevail; largely because of sectarian differences and four legal schools among the majority Sunni there is an absence of a unified code of Islamic law. Remember that Islamdom does not possess a centralized authority like the Roman Catholic Curia to rationalize and enforce a consistent and universal code of (canon) law. And finally, Muslims may have a locally- or family-derived identity based upon membership in a sect, a brotherhood affiliation, and local Saints (*wali*) or particular local traditions.

Membership in a universalistic, global community of observant believers---the *umma*---is the broadest possible boundary of the Muslim national identity. Globalization, quite ironically, stimulates a militant reactive ethno-nationalist opposition to the hegemonic state responsible for the management of global structures (i.e. the USA). In a contradictory way, however, the new global infrastructure actually integrates the disparate members of the global *umma* by encouraging Muslims to communicate, study, trade and travel to fulfill the diverse Muslim obligations.

Bryan Turner (1994: 86), a theorist of global civil society and social citizenship, correctly perceives the relationship between globalization and Muslim self-conception of communication within the global *umma*:

It is the availability in modern times of effective global communications systems which makes possible for the first time a globalization of Islam ... While Islam had always claimed universalistic status, it was, prior to the emergence of contemporary communications systems, actually unable to impose this type of uniformity and universalism. The paradox of modern systems of communication is that it makes Islam simultaneously exposed to Western consumerism and provides the mechanism for the distribution of a global Islamic message.

STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE GLOBAL ISLAM: THE POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL

Thus far we have reviewed the multiple situational identities available to Muslims and the tensions generated by their contradictory relationship to globalization processes. Having outlined the cultural basis of identity and social action, let us now turn to the central problematic of this paper: explaining why Islamic social movements thrive under a regime of intense globalization. Although paradoxical from the Enlightenment perspective, this correlation must nevertheless be explained theoretically. Accordingly, after reviewing the analytic power of several explanatory models, it is readily apparent that the *political process model* pioneered by Doug McAdam offers a cogent framework to explain the relationship of globalization and Islam. Indeed, McAdam (1982) and Smith (1991), writing on the American civil rights movement and Latin American liberation theology movements respectively, make a convincing case for the explanatory power of the political process model (PPM) for all social movements. Distilling key factors from a complex explanatory theoretical schema is, of course, always difficult to accomplish in a short paper. But six essential factors drawn from McAdam and Smith's use of the PPM suggest some key factors, analytical concepts and underlying processes that explain why Islamic movements thrive under globalization. Briefly, the PPM provides six sequential factors.

1. *Broad socio-economic changes*: These refer to large-scale structural economic, political and social changes that disrupt social continuity and generate social tension. In turn, these create social instability, disrupt existing power arrangements, create status inconsistencies and thus offer opportunities for new actors desiring to restructure existing power relations, i.e. urbanization, industrialization, booms, busts, wars, state centralization and new political transformations. For Islamdom, the seminal changes are national independence and the petroleum boom of the seventies.
2. *Expanding political opportunity*: In turn, given the disruptions associated with socio-economic changes, new political opportunities emerge for an aggrieved group; this change is measured by, first, the increased awareness of and, second, assertion of claims by insurgent groups for real political power. Sooner or later insurgents mobilize themselves in order to seize rewards and advantages arising from the increase in social space for them to exercise leverage with lower risk of punishment.
3. *Strength of indigenous organizations*: To develop a successful, anti-institutional social movement, however, aggrieved groups must mobilize indigenous organizational resources by creative incentives of "either a solidarity or material nature" (McAdam, 1982:46). In the Islamic context, this refers to mobilizing the vast networks of mosques, schools, teachers and "pious foundations" (*waqf*) to heighten communal solidarity, to provide welfare services and to support the Islamist political program.
4. *Linkage of organizational resources to insurgency*: Long standing, strong indigenous organizations offer insurgent movements unparalleled resources: a membership base, a veneer of legitimate cover, communication networks, established leaders, incentives for solidarity and "enterprise tools" such as telephones, staff, meeting places (mosques or schools) and the material means for publicizing their message. Islamic organizations and institutions possess vast, multi-layered resources that are invaluable for insurgent movements.
5. *Cognitive liberation*: Mobilization must simultaneously construct an oppositional, insurgent consciousness, one that can be reinvented as a meaningful oppositional culture liberated from the constraints imposed by the ongoing institutionalized discourse. Once a new discourse is constructed, aggrieved groups are able to dismiss the authority of existing rulers and institutions, inculcate memberships with a new discourse, and reduce fatalistic reasoning in favor of asserting legitimate rights. Ideally, insurgents convince members to believe that, if they act collectively, they can create, to some degree, highly desired outcomes. "Insurgent consciousness is a collective state of understanding which recognizes that social change is both imperative and viable" (Smith, 1991:62).
6. *Social control response*: Once mobilized as a threat to the existing institutionalized order, the social movement's viability and ultimate success will be shaped by the capacity of the now threatened institutionalized groups (i.e. secular elites, the post-colonial state, the Western powers) to respond effectively either by concession or repression to the demands of the insurgents.

In the remainder of this essay, we shall apply these concepts to explain the rise of Islamic social movements in the late 20th Century, the era of rapid globalization. Historically, this period consists of three distinct phases. As we apply PPM theory to each phase, one must focus on how global structural change, state capacity and Islamist insurgency interact and shape one another. Above all, the following analysis focuses on the reasons why insurgent Islamists were able to mobilize their organizational and cultural resources, networks and alternative vision in spite of the triumph of neo-liberalism and global integration under US military and economic hegemony. The first phase begins with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the Caliphate at Istanbul.

PHASE I: SECULAR NATIONALISM AND STATE-CENTERED DEVELOPMENT

The end of World War I, the establishment of Attaturk's model of a secular state and his abolition of the Ottoman controlled Caliphate (1924) mark the commencement of a wave of secular nationalist movements in Muslim majority states. Although aspiring to achieve the 'modern' ideal of a secular national state, support for this project was largely limited to urban centers, the western-educated intelligencia and other politically active groups. Above all else, the nationalist political project called for the construction of a modern, quasi-secular nationalist state. The euphoria of this phase promised an end to the humiliation of European colonialism, the implementation of a modern, secular-national, state-centered economic development program, and assertion of an authentic modern nationalist identity. Furthermore, the nationalist discourse promised a bevy of distributional benefits associated with Enlightenment-sponsored modernity such as freedom, democracy, health, education and rising incomes. The Gulf States, Pakistan and, to some degree, Malaysia, are exceptions to the secular nationalist model.

In terms of economic change and the disruption of the existing social order, largely because under Fordism the international oil firms administered petroleum prices, state intervention into society and culture was the most disruptive feature of Phase I. Islamic education was displaced by modern secular education while the state institutionalized a security apparatus that intruded into family and household relations to a degree unprecedented in Islamic history. Oppositional Islamic groups were repressed with impunity as long as the secular modernist discourse was unchallenged by disruptive political events or major social dislocations. The defeat of 1967 and the loss of the Muslim shrines at Jerusalem, together with the crisis of state centered import substitution industrialization, generated widespread disillusionment, thus setting the stage for the transition to the second phase. The OPEC initiated petroleum boom served as the disruptive structural force for Islamic social movements.

PHASE II: THE DEFEAT OF 1967, CRISIS OF ISI AND THE PETROLEUM BOOM

The second phase emerges under the shadow of the Muslim defeat in the 1967 war – marked by the loss of Jerusalem and the Islamic shrines – and the generalized crisis of import substitution industrialization. With the onset of the petroleum boom of 1973-74, Phase II is in full swing. One cannot overestimate the disruptive effect wrought by the petroleum boom: it distorted the economies of both oil producers and regional suppliers of labor and materials to oil exporting states. Unlike Fordism, Phase II is marked by international economic instability, a crisis of global hegemonic leadership, rampant inflation and a surge in petro-dollar financed state industrial development projects, especially in oil exporting states. Initially, at least, the OPEC price revolution was a windfall for the political elites of OPEC states. Recall that nine of the original fourteen OPEC states had Muslim majorities with the Saudis possessing a veto. Indeed, petroleum rents now funded Saudi and other Gulf states' support for their vision of the Islamic revival at the expense of the more populated and poorer secular states. Indeed, the nationalization of the oil industry and the price revolution shifted unprecedented economic power to the elites managing the state sector. Unfortunately, the petroleum boom not only increased the autonomy of state elites, it

reinforced their propensity to favor large scale, state-controlled, non-competitive, Fordist industrial projects and unrealistic macro-economic policies (i.e. exchange rates).

Rents granted state elites not merely control over the national economy, but also personal wealth through kickbacks, bribes and vast resources used to sustain a profligate rentier coalition around the petro-state. Hence, at a time when the East Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) were restructuring their economies and societies toward state-guided, but market-augmenting, export-oriented industrialization, thereby adjusting to increased internationalization and global competition, the euphoric elites of oil exporting states were institutionalizing an inflexible, centralized statist model of industrial development--- peripheral Fordism. Sadly, once the petroleum boom crashed in the mid-eighties the social dislocation was even greater for Muslim majority states dependent directly or indirectly on petroleum rents. These states had so far to fall because the rents were an unearned windfall like manna from heaven, rather than arising from a disciplined social structure of accumulation like East Asian export-oriented industrialization. In contrast to East Asia, states dependent on petroleum rents pursued classic peripheral Fordism: highly protected, centrally managed, state-owned enterprises such as refineries, steel mills, and deep import substitution industries like autos. Of course, none of these industries achieved competitiveness, typically requiring subsidies from the public purse after falling prices and global neo-liberalism reduced the relative autonomy of the rentier petro-state.

Given the swollen city as incubator of Islamism, the truly destructive urban bias of the petroleum boom deserves emphasis. Focusing on dislocation in the highly populous agrarian sector, Alan Richards (1987) reminds us that oil booms (i.e. the Dutch disease) raise urban incomes, stimulate construction booms, spike inflation rates and encourage rent seeking behavior. In turn, these changes encourage a decline in the terms of trade for rural producers, increase rural to urban migration, tighten rural labor markets and raise rural wages in order to compete with the booming urban wage rates. Food production must decline. Cities, meanwhile, absorb enormous numbers of unskilled, rural migrants attracted by higher wages; these workers then often labor on vast construction projects overseen by the rentier elites (who then profit from the kickbacks associated with construction contracts). Subsequently, food imports rise as a result of the change in tastes in favor of imported food (i.e. sugar, white rice and white bread). In response, a regime awash with petrodollars typically initiates capital intensive, state managed irrigation schemes and encourages its allies (the urban merchant-bureaucrats-military officer stratum) to invest in luxury food production such as poultry and meat. Aided by their connections to the state, they are allocated state subsidized capital intensive machinery, imported fertilizer at subsidized prices (the Green Revolution) and, in Nigeria, even privileged access to state financed agricultural development projects managed by the World Bank.

Over time, the petro-boom produced a highly combustible social cocktail in Muslim majority states. Key factors include: widespread official corruption, organizational indiscipline, rent seeking, the expansion of higher education regardless of demand for graduates, and the intensification of state intervention into society. All of this erodes the legitimacy of secular states even before the crisis of the eighties. Elsewhere, labor shortages in the Gulf states brought the migration of Arabic-speakers and other Muslims into contact with the radical discourses of a highly politicized Islam while, at the same time, internationalizing the labor forces and economies of the non-oil producing countries. All of which generated instability and change, severely disrupted existing power arrangements and laid the foundation for the social forces exploding as the Iranian Revolution.

PHASE III: URBAN REVOLUTION, THE PETRO-BUST AND GLOBAL NEO-LIBERALISM

After the collapse of oil prices, i.e. from a high of \$41/barrel in 1981 to less than \$8/barrel in 1986, societies already disrupted by the petroleum boom entered the wrenching phase of the petro-bust. Multilateral institutions soon administered structural adjustment programs, (SAPs), a neo-liberal prescription that continues more or less until today. Before elaborating the changes associated with neo-liberal structural adjustment, the political effect of the Iranian Revolution must be put into perspective. The volcanic political event, of course, was the urban insurrection known as the Iranian Revolution (1978-82). Not only did the Revolution exert a powerful "demonstration effect" on other Islamic insurgents, it thoroughly transformed a Muslim's imagination regarding what was politically possible to construct from an innovative Islamic discourse as articulated by Khomeini. It was, in short, a hegemonic rupture for Islamism of global proportion. Here was an authentic Islamic revolutionary transformation, yet one of the few that ever survived the active belligerence of the global hegemon, the USA, who, together with Saudi and other patrimonially governed Gulf states, financed and supported Iraq's attack on the Islamic Republican government of Iran. Ironically, despite the ravages of the First Gulf War, Iran has survived and is liberalizing its institutions, while authoritarian, secular Iraq is isolated and in ruins.

Zubaida (1989: 40) captures superbly the electrifying effect of the Iranian Revolution on Muslim popular consciousness:

Here was an Islamic Revolution which was populist and anti-imperialist, which had sported some of the vocabularies and slogans of the left. For some it seemed that, unlike the 'imported' ideologies of Marxism or nationalism, Islam in its political and progressive form is more accessible to the people, springing as it does from their historical cultural roots. Political Islam acquired many recruits, a political respectability and viability, it became firmly established in the mainstream.

Concurrent with the institutionalization of the Iranian Revolution, yet much more important for stoking the flames of Sunni Islamic movements, are the petro-dollar surpluses distributed by conservative, royalist Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE). Patronage distributions from the Saudis throughout Islamdom shifted discursive power away from the urban modernist thinkers living in secular states and toward very conservative interpretations of Islam favored by the Saudis, i.e. the royalist, Wahabbi-Hanabali interpretations. Al-Azmeh (1993), for example, asserts that "Petro-Islam ... has broken the secularist and nationalist cultural, mediatic and, to a lesser extent, the educational monopoly of the modern Arab state." Again, once petroleum rents crashed and thereby reduced the secular states' leverage on Islamic actors, Saudi patronage became even more influential among Islamic groups for funding mosques, schools, universities medical clinics and welfare services.

Turning to the implementation of neo-liberal structural adjustment in Muslim majority states, the decision of Federal Reserve Chief, Paul Volker, to restrain credit in order to rediscipline the world economy soon led to the Mexican default in 1982 and the onset of the Third World debt crisis. The IMF and the World Bank aggressively advocated a transition from a regime of state-led import-substitution industrialization to privatized export-led

development and integration into the world capitalist market. The economic conditions of the early 1980s allowed the IMF and the World Bank to promote this program – the neo-liberal Washington consensus – even more forcefully by attaching conditions to the loans it offered to ease the debt crisis. The typical IMF/World Bank debt relief and structural adjustment program raised the cost of food and other basic consumer goods, cut government spending on social, health, and educational services, diminished the role of the public sector, and promoted integration with the world capitalist market through export-oriented development.

By emasculating state capacities, structural adjustment provided a windfall of new political opportunities for Islamist movements as well as an infusion of insurgent consciousness, enabling Islamists to don the mantle of nationalist resistance to foreign domination without rival, thanks to the suppression of the secular left. The social disruption caused by structural adjustment cannot be overstated. As a result of structural adjustment, state capacity to co-opt oppositional movements declined and services were increasingly restricted to urban middle class and elite areas. Income distributions polarized. Structural adjustment meant that states were unable to provide previously established levels of services or to insure adequate supplies of commodities to all sectors of their territory and population, undermining the terms of the social compact established during the Fordist phase of secular nationalist and populist authoritarian state-led development. The political and moral vacuum opened up great political opportunities that were seized by the Islamists, who established a social base by offering social services that the various states have failed to provide (Wickham, 1997). Insurgent Islamists reshaped the populist nationalist content of their insurrectionist discourse. Most importantly, they linked the corruption, authoritarianism, human rights abuses and moral degeneracy (associated with the importation of western cultural commodities such as television serials) of the existing state elites to their inability to provide adequate social services and economic opportunities for new entrants into the labor force. Triumphant neo-liberal economic and social policies, to the chagrin of informed observers, became the midwife to Islamist ascent in civil society.

Popular resistance to SAPs has been common in a number of Muslim states with widely varying political ideologies, i.e. Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Nigeria, Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal, Pakistan and Jordan (Seddon and Walton, 1994). Neo-liberal restructuring of Muslim economies has enraged populist sentiment and rallied moderates to support the radical Islamic opposition to the deflationary policies forced upon secular elites by their global paymasters. From the Muslim perspective, by reducing state subsidies and curtailing state investment for employment, SAPs impoverish the most vulnerable in the Muslim community, i.e. the poor, aged and weak. The latter is perceived as an outrageous intrusion and challenge to Islamic principles of charity. Furthermore, not only do SAPs violate Muslim prohibitions against paying interest on debt, as well as the state's obligation to provide alms to the poor (*zakkat*), typically understood as state subsidies for basic needs, the transparently foreign management of the SAPs rapidly evaporates any residual fig leaf of legitimacy retained by secular political elites.

Imagine empathetically, for a moment, the anxiety of a treasury official from a Muslim majority state who has just signed off on an IMF debt restructuring agreement at IMF headquarters in Washington. Upon returning he must justify administering a program that militant Muslims perceive as usury-driven, foreign controlled and mired in a dependency

that merely reproduces a corrupt, illegitimate, secular state. Equally important, SAPs not only limit the state's ability to co-opt adversaries, but they also encourage the economically weak in urban centers to rely on redistribution of basic needs (food, medicine, etc.) dispensed by Islamic charities rather than state social service agencies. In some situations the Islamic organizations have become a parallel state welfare service. The Islamist mobilization of civil society under SAPs can only confirm to the popular classes the abysmal failure of the post-colonial secular state to meet their aspirations. Most of all, the Islamist discourse is global as well as local, authentic and accessible, for there is no need for militants to teach the foundational concepts of Hegel, Marx or Locke. All know the vocabulary of the Islamic alternative, which they already understand as a local culture. An avowed antagonist of Islam, the conservative Samuel Huntington, recognizes the power advantage of indigenous organizational resources for Islamists as compared to liberals.

The latter [Islamists] can operate within and behind a network of mosques, welfare organizations, foundations, and other Muslim institutions which the government feels it cannot suppress. Liberal democrats have no such cover and hence are more easily controlled or eliminated by the government. (Huntington, 1996:112)

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, NEO-LIBERAL DOGMA AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY

Despite truncation due to space limitations, our analysis confirms how global economic and social changes articulate with the Islamic revival during three distinct phases. Islamists took advantage of the political opportunities offered by the multiple crises of the post-colonial secular state and the petroleum boom and bust cycle. It's readily apparent that Islamist groups are adept at mobilizing indigenous organizational resources, from schools to mosques, and providing both material and moral incentives to their followers. Of course, Islamist power has received an enormous boost from global financial managers and multi-lateral policy makers who have failed to heed Polanyi's (1944) warnings regarding the way unregulated market forces generate insecurity and extreme social movements (Polanyi, 1944). The latter's unrealistic insistence on implementing deflationary structural adjustment programs worldwide, regardless of their failure to deliver policy goals (i.e. Indonesia), suggests a dogmatic theology rather than a falsifiable social science. For, as we have demonstrated, SAPs function as a veritable recruitment campaign for the Islamist movement. Locally, efforts by secular state officials to license mosques and to exert social control over insurgent Islamist groups have proved extremely ineffective and very costly in terms of human lives.

Despite lacking the hierarchical organization associated with Western churches, Islamic movements are organizationally adept and pragmatic. They rely on networks often created by scholarly and student affiliations. And they construct the dense webs of Muslim associations connecting mosques, schools, welfare associations, pilgrimage associations, clinics, missionary activity, community development associations, student associations, and Islamic versions of most kinds of organizations found in the West (Sullivan, 1994). When Islamic social movements mobilize these associations and networks, they fulfill the criteria advanced by McAdam and Smith to explain social movement success. On the political front, it's readily apparent that, when repressed by authoritarian regimes, Islam's civil society organizations form a parallel organizational alternative to the state, and when

allowed to compete, they are very successful in pluralist democratic elections. When Western powers support authoritarian regimes (i.e. Algeria, Egypt and Turkey) the obvious hypocrisy fuels ultra-nationalism and undermines democratic tendencies within the Islamist movement.

When these parallel organizations of civil society are allowed to compete in elections, i.e. Jordan, Algeria, Turkey and Malaysia, Islamists have succeeded beyond most expectations. Since Islamists combine modern organizational discipline, a protean communal identity and pragmatic tactics, their effort to convert their strength in civil society into electoral power has been remarkably successful. In Algeria and Turkey, achieving power by liberal democratic means was blocked by the secular military alliances with tragic results in the former. When blocked from participating in electoral politics, as in Egypt, Islamists shifted to organizations within civil society and won control of many professional associations, only to be put under judicial control by the state.

In Tunisia, despite affirming democratic pluralism and agreeing to abide by the rules of Western democracy, the Islamist party (MTI) was banned and its leader, Ghannushi, arrested for treason, sentenced to life imprisonment and later forced to leave the country. And the recent Iranian municipal elections confirm the generational thrust for democratic change. Note that in the Tunisian, Egyptian and Algerian cases, the French government supported the authoritarian regime, even awarding Mubarak of Egypt an honor: a prize for democracy and human rights (Burgat, 1997: 37). Citing human rights reports, Burgat observes that torture is customarily used against political prisoners in Algeria and Egypt, numbering at least 34,000 in Algeria and probably more in Egypt. Finally, Burgat asserts acerbically that if the Algerian state's tactics were employed against a Western political party, 'I will transform it into the Armed Islamic group within weeks....' For Burgat, despite the role of Islam, the crux of the conflict is a very ordinary one between a generation that has been in power for the last thirty years and a new political generation that is not permitted to gain access to political power.

CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL ISLAM

Islamic affiliations and networks have global implications beyond insurgent social movements. Compared to rivals, Islamic cultural practices, ritual obligations, and institutions encourage and support an unusually high degree of geographical mobility, arising largely from trading and religious networks simultaneously engaged in commerce, pilgrimage service and missionary activity. Historically, migration undertaken to acquire religious knowledge was an honorable, prestigious and common practice. In general, religious practices stimulated mobility and dispersed Muslim communities across trading and pilgrimage networks (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1990). Most importantly, the obligation to undertake the pilgrimage to the Hijaz (*hajj*), required of all Muslims who are capable, constructed a dense network of Muslim trading and pilgrimage communities throughout Asia, Europe and Africa prior to the modern age. For readers in the West, the global message is 'Islam is coming to your neighborhood soon', if it's not there already. Historically, such networks institutionalized a distinct tradition of Muslim global 'cosmopolitanism' and encouragement of geographical mobility prior to the era of globalization. Thus the way in which globalization processes articulate with this tradition of Muslim cosmopolitanism in a given social context contributes to the formation of wider, more inclusive identities among Muslims. All such cosmopolitan dimensions of Islam, now interwoven within the infrastructure of globalization, have established a parallel network of

international Muslim associations; one result was the mobilization to support Muslim victims in Bosnia. While it may be counter-intuitive to most observers, globalization has actually increased communication and associative opportunities for the once isolated and differentiated Muslim communities of the global *umma*.

The best measure of cognitive liberation and insurgent consciousness is found in the vast, innovative literature now produced by Muslims on modernity, justice, governance and, increasingly, human rights. It's clear that Muslims are shaping the political agenda in many states. In response to efforts by states to exert social control, Islamists are very active. Their actions include: organizing demonstrations, mobilizing civil society against structural adjustment, building and staffing schools, medical clinics and employment centers, protesting American military adventures in the Muslim world, demanding charity (*zakkat*) for the poor, denouncing repression and torture, and, most importantly, constructing parallel institutions to dispense material, social and emotional support to those marginalized by the relentless march of global neo-liberalism.

By strategically seizing the mantle of anti-imperialist nationalism, a discourse formerly controlled exclusively by secular nationalist and leftist movements, Islamism has become the world's most extensive and militant anti-systemic social movement. Yet, Islam has the advantage of being simultaneously an ethno-nationalist identity as well as a resistance movement to subordination to the dictates of the capitalist world economy. Seizing the space left by the shrinking state, Islamists have become the best organized political force in an urban milieu marked by declining state capacity to deliver services and/or any other alternative developmental model, i.e. state socialism.

In the cultural domain, on the other hand, Islamism reinterprets and elaborates on already existing discursive practices integral to the everyday life of Muslims. It captures and mobilizes for essentially modern ends a deeply felt desire to belong to a transcendental community—the global *umma*. Here is a subjectivity that can be articulated and identified with at many different levels: local, national or even global. Hence, in contrast to the secular left, Islamist organizers don't have to teach Hegelian logic to recruits, for the recruits already know the basic tenets of the discourse as lived experience. Finally, we conclude with an insightful comment from one of Burgat's interviewees, an explanation from a former North African leftist who made the discursive shift to Islam. Burgat's informant tells him that he has to understand 'that there is no way for the state to communicate efficiently with society, without the medium of religious culture' (Burgat, 1997: 44). Just how the medium of Islamic culture will articulate with essentially modernist projects and problems becomes a pivotal issues for students of global social movements.

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