

Pan-Turkist Dreams and Post-Soviet Realities:

The Turkish Republic and the Turkic States in the 1990s

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I. Introduction

On 4 August, 1996, seventy-eight years after the 'Unionist triumvirate' escaped from Turkey in great secrecy on the German Torpedo submarine U-67,¹ the remains of Enver Pasha were laid to rest at Istanbul's Eternal Freedom Hill. The remains of the former Ottoman minister of war arrived from the plains of Central Asia, where he died in 1922, while pursuing his pan-Turkist ideals at the head of an indigenous movement (the Basmachis), which was fighting against the Bolsheviks' oppressive policies. Many prominent figures of Turkey's political and military establishment attended the funeral ceremonies of the former Unionist leader, who was reburied with full military honours. Moreover, hundreds of members of Turkish ultra-right groups marched behind Enver Pasha's hearse, waving flags and chanting the slogan: 'Turkey will become the great Turan', thus referring to the imaginary union linking all ethnic Turks in the vast area stretching from the Adriatic Sea to China.

The official reburial of Enver Pasha indicated a marked break with the historical dogma of Kemalism, which had discarded Enver's pan-Turkist activities as mere 'adventurism'. This departure became most evident in President Süleyman Demirel's ceremonial speech, in which he stated that Enver Pasha was 'a nationalist, an idealist and an honest soldier who loved his country'. Demirel further declared the strong man of the Unionist regime a 'hero in the eyes of the Turkish nation whose exile has ended'.² Given the fact that Enver Pasha's remains arrived on board a C-130 of the Turkish Air Force from Tajikistan at 'Kemal Atatürk' airport in Istanbul, his exile ended in an historical irony. It was the Unionist leader who had strongly opposed Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the last years of the Empire and during the War of Independence. Precisely this rivalry between the two men later led to the condemnation and demonisation of Enver's memory by the official Kemalist historiography.³

Taking this Kemalist denigration of Enver Pasha into account, his funeral ceremony marked the rehabilitation of one of the most controversial figures in Turkish history. In the 1990s, Enver Pasha's record in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia as well as his pan-Turkist ideas appealed to Turkey's newly emerged ambitions to extend its influence over the Turkic republics of the former Soviet periphery. In the new geo-political environment after the demise

of the Soviet Union, the contradictions of Kemalist nation building and the unsettled questions of the late Ottoman Empire again came to the fore. Therefore the development of new relations between the Turkish Republic and the five Turkic states – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – elucidates the challenges and opportunities with which Turkey in general has been confronted in the 1990s.

On the occasion of the second Turkic summit in Istanbul (1994), President Süleyman Demirel interpreted this new geo-strategic situation as follows:

Our history, which was divided by various events, has overcome the obstacles in its path and has returned to its natural course. The inevitable was realized in 1991 and these five brotherly republics have re-emerged as independent and sovereign states. We welcome this rebirth with great enthusiasm.⁴

This paper sets out to inquire into this ‘natural course’ of Turkish history and will question the ideological assessments made by Süleyman Demirel and Turkey’s former President Turgut Özal, who claimed that with the end of the Cold War ‘the shrinking process that began at the walls of Vienna’ had been reversed.⁵ In order to understand the ideological dimension of Turkey’s relationship with the newly independent states of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, we will first give a brief account of the origin and development of Pan-Turkism. Then, the political euphoria and the subsequent disappointments of Turkish initiatives will be analysed. This analysis leads us to an assessment of the economic and cultural ties that have been established between Turkey and the five Turkic states. The paper will conclude by putting the revival of Pan-Turkism in Turkey into a historical and theoretical perspective.

II. The Ideological Background: Islamic Modernism, Pan-Turkism and Turkish Nationalism

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the four Central Asian Turkic Republics and Azerbaijan as independent states brought the

dream of the 'Grey Wolf' (*Bozkurt*), i.e. the union among all people of Turkic origin, back into the centre of Turkey's public debate.⁶ Originally, the idea of a union of the Turkic people evolved in the late nineteenth century among the Turkic-speaking communities in the 'soft underbelly' of the Russian Empire. In the revolutionary atmosphere of that time, some Tatar intellectuals responded to the pressures of Pan-Slavism with the development of pan-Turkist ideologies (Landau 1995: 8).

One of the founding fathers of this national awakening of Russia's Muslim population was the Crimean Tatar Ismail Gasprinsky (1851-1914).⁷ Educated in Odessa, Moscow, Paris and Istanbul, Gasprinsky shared a social and intellectual background comparable to the Young Ottomans and, his thoughts were part of the same general stream of Islamic modernism.⁸ He published articles in Russian and in Crimean dialect pertaining to Muslims in general and to the Tatar communities in particular. In 1883, Gasprinsky founded the newspaper *Tercüman* (Interpreter), whose purpose was to disseminate the ideas of Western civilisation among the Muslims of the Russian Empire. Its central message combined the imperative of a cultural revitalisation of the Islamic community with a cautious advocacy of a secular nationalism that had very definite pan-Turkist nuances. Due to its double language format, being published in Russian along with a simplified Turkic translation, the *Tercüman* found a wide circulation, reaching not only southern Russia but also Central Asia and eastern Turkestan.⁹

In addition to his publications, Gasprinsky devised, and subsequently established, a 'new system' of education (*usul-i jadid*), conciliating Islam and modernisation, whose ultimate aims were to enlighten the Muslim population of the Russian Empire and to give birth to the awakening of national self-determination and cultural renaissance. With the establishment of the first *usul-i jadid* school (1883 or 1884), Gasprinsky initiated educational reforms which, through Tatar missionaries who spread his ideas in Central Asia, would eventually affect thousands of Muslim students within the Russian Empire. By the time of the Russian revolution in March 1917, more than 5.000 schools had been established,¹⁰ and *Jadidism*, the reform movement inspired by Gasprinsky's ideas, became the uniting force of the Central Asian intelligentsia,

who were beginning to strive for cultural and social reforms in the major cities of what was Tsarist Turkestan.

Probably the most influential ideologue of Pan-Turkism in the Russian Empire was Yusuf Akcura (1876-1935), a Tatar of the Volga region whose reputation in 1913, according to the prestigious Paris-based periodical *Revue du Monde Musulman*, was equal to that of the famous Islamic modernist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (Landau 1995: 43). In 1904, Akcura published in the periodical 'Türk' the article 'Üç ter-i siyaset' (Three Systems of Government), which various scholars define as the key manifesto of Pan-Turkism (Landau 1995: 14; Poulton 1997: 72). In this pamphlet, Akcura firmly came out in favour of an ethnically defined Turkish nationalism (*Türkcülük*). In deviating from Gasprinsky's Islamic perspective, he presented his pan-Turkist ideology as a coherent political alternative to Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism and was thus in line with the ideological shift that at the same time took place among the Ottoman intelligentsia under Hamidian rule.¹¹

While the traditional Ottoman elite viewed Akcura's new Turkish nationalism as inappropriate, it was later adopted by the Unionist regime. For them Pan-Turkism was a 'way to offset the Empire's African and European losses by intense Turkification at home as well as a purposeful orientation towards the Turkic groups in Asia' (Landau 1995: 48). Enver Pasha, in particular, was largely responsible for making Pan-Turkism a state policy (Landau 1995: 51) and, specifically, for pursuing pan-Turkist aims on the military field. It was under the inspiration of the idea of liberating and uniting the Turkic peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia that Enver embarked on ill-fated military schemes such as the late 1914 offensive against the Russians in the Sarikamish region, the invasion of the Transcaucasus in 1918, which led to the short take-over of Baku,¹² and his later personal adventures in Central Asia alongside the Basmachis.¹³

In 1923, Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) published his 'Principles of Turkism' in which he based his version of Turkish nationalism mainly on cultural bonds, thus replacing Akcura's racial and ethnic criteria (cf. Berkes 1959 and Gökalp 1968). Pointing at the unifying force of the nation in education and culture, Gökalp became the champion of a cultural nationalism that was adopted by the

founders of the Turkish Republic. Shifting the focus onto the doctrine of the Turkish nation and Turkish nationalism, Atatürk replaced the old ideas of empire, dynasty, and even religion as an ideological basis for the newly established state. The rationale behind Atatürk's nationalism was that of creating national cohesion among Turkish citizens with different ethnic (Turk vs. Kurd), religious (Muslim vs. non-Muslim) and sectarian (Sunni vs. Alawite) backgrounds (Heper 1999). Most relevant, Atatürk defined the Turkish Republic strictly in territorial terms and firmly rejected pan-Turkist assertions: 'I am neither a believer in a league of nations of Islam, nor even in a league of the Turkish peoples. (...) Neither sentiment nor illusion must influence our policy. Away with the dreams and shadows! They have cost us dear in the past.'¹⁴

Atatürk's rejection of Pan-Turkism entailed a refusal to become involved in any way in the fate of other ethnic Turkic groups living outside the national boundaries of the Republic as well as the repudiation of any irredentist aspiration linked to them. This was in line with his general approach applying the modern nation-state discourse of his time and promoting not the integrity and sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, but the national rights of the Anatolian Turks. Thus, Atatürk was able to salvage the territorial rest of the Ottoman state and to fully integrate the Turkish Republic into the system of states. The Lausanne Peace Treaty (1923) marked this establishment of a Turkish nation-state after more than a century of violent struggles and territorial losses.

However, within the confines of the territorial state, the Kemalists incorporated certain elements of cultural Pan-Turkism in order to construct a new and cohesive nationalist ideology. This was most evident in the role of two institutions that, under the personal leadership of Atatürk, served the purpose of national identity building: the Turkish Historical Society (1931) and the Turkish Linguistic Society (1932). The Turkish Historical Society's task was to write a national history in order to enable the people to imagine a common historical culture. This national history was grounded on the universal thesis that all civilisations are based on the ancient Turkic civilisation. The 'Turkish Historical Thesis' holds that the Turks had been forced by natural disasters to leave their ancient homelands in Central Asia and migrate to different parts of the world. In the Middle East the Sumerians and the Hittites should be considered as

predecessors of the Anatolian Turks, linking the history of their ancient empires with the national history of the Turkish Republic. In keeping with these universal claims, the Turkish Linguistic Society invented the so-called 'Sun Language Theory'. This theory proposed that 'pure Turkish', as an ancient language that was not influenced by Middle Eastern cultures, had been the foundation stone for the development of many, if not all, other languages.¹⁵

Particularly the manipulative writing of Turkish history constituted Central Asia as the motherland of all Turks, and that as a part of official schoolbook history has remained very influential until the present days (Alici 1996: 225).¹⁶ Given this romantic attachment to Central Asia, it is not surprising that Turks' perception of their own identity has remained much broader than the territorial boundaries of the Turkish nation-state. In this way, Kemalism itself prepared the ground for the new phase of euphoria that characterised in late 1991 Turkey's 're-discovery' of more than fifty million Turkic people in the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan.

III. Euphoria and Disappointments: A Turkish Century?

III.1 The Re-emergence of Pan-Turkism

The political independence of the five Turkic republics unleashed a feeling of excitement and euphoria throughout Turkey. At the same time, some circles in the West began to raise high expectations about Ankara's future geo-political role in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. The general idea was that the independence of the five former Soviet Turcophone states would pave the way to a new union of Turkic states in which Turkey itself was going to occupy the leading role. Addressing the Turkish parliament upon the end of the Cold War, President Turgut Özal declared that the disintegration of the Soviet Union offered Turkey 'the historic opportunity to become a regional power'. Özal appealed to the assembly not to 'throw away this chance which presented itself for the first time in 400 years'.¹⁷ Under the prevailing atmosphere of euphoria, Turkey's cultural, linguistic, historical and religious bonds with the newly independent states were frequently mentioned as the basis for Ankara's

influential future role in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. Moreover, in the emphatic atmosphere the talk of a 'Turkish-speaking community of states stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China' increasingly became a part of the official discourse.¹⁸

A number of Western politicians, particularly representatives of the United States, encouraged these exaggerated expectations. They identified Turkey with its secular democratic system and its commitment to a liberal market economy as a crucial regional force that could prevent the northern expansion of Iranian influence. Thus various sides presented the Turkish Republic as an acceptable and viable role model for the Turkic republics, which in these early days of their independence were engaged in significant and demanding processes of self-identification and state building.¹⁹ In February 1992, US President George Bush, for instance, pointed at Turkey 'as the model of a democratic, secular state which could be emulated by Central Asia'. A similar view was later re-stated by both the British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and Catherine Lalumière, then secretary general of the Council of Europe. Furthermore, the 'Turkish model' developed into a favourite topic of important Western media.²⁰

Desperately searching for political and economic support, the leaders of the newly independent republics happily took up the idea and lavished extensive praise on Turkey. When visiting Ankara in December 1991, both the Uzbek and Kyrgyz presidents gave emotional speeches and declarations emphasising Turkey's leadership role in the Turkic world. Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan stated that 'our example is Turkey, we will establish our state according to this example'.²¹ A few days later, the President of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akayev poetically defined Turkey as 'the morning star that shows the Turkic republics the way'.²² Similar statements could be heard from key statesmen of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

Consequently, the beginning of the post-Soviet era was characterised by a feeling of elation in Turkey. Boosted by the exaggerated expectations which officials of both Western states and the Turkic republics had raised, Turkish policy makers announced grandiose goals for Ankara in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. The new Turkic cooperation was supposed to bring about

further growth and development in Turkey, to enhance its regional influence and to increase Turkey's international standing in the eyes of its Western allies. At the first Turkic summit in Ankara (30-31 October, 1992), Turgut Özal captured well the spirit of the moment. In his inaugural speech, the Turkish president announced that 'if we can exploit this historic opportunity in the best possible way, if we do not make any mistake, the twenty-first century will be the century of the Turks'.²³

However, in marked contrast to Özal's optimistic scenario, the first Turkic summit ended with a major disappointment for Turkish officials. In fact the summit constituted a turning point, prompting Ankara to realise that it had to re-evaluate and significantly scale back some of its policy objectives toward the former Soviet republics. Turkey entered the summit with rather ambitious expectations, such as the establishment of a common market, the foundation of a Turkic development and investment bank, as well as the request for firm pledges from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to build oil and gas pipelines to Europe via Turkey. However, the first multilateral meeting of the presidents of the six Turkic states ended with a vaguely worded declaration that did not entail any specific commitment, but only loose political statements.

Suddenly, Ankara had to discover that the links between the Turkic republics and Russia were far more solid than suspected and that the Central Asians and Azerbaijanis were neither willing to stray too far from the policies of Moscow nor to bind themselves exclusively to Turkic bodies. Moreover, it became apparent that the Turkic states, by that time aware of Turkey's limited financial and technological means, were not interested in developing a 'privileged partnership' with Ankara. Instead, they were eager to cultivate direct ties with other states in the region and, particularly, with the Western industrialised nations. As a result, Turkish policy toward the Turkic republics shifted from 'fanciful notions of ethnic solidarity' to a more explicit notion of self-interest (Robins 1993: 610), thus replacing the excessive emphasis on commonalities by a more sober and realistic attitude based on inter-state relations.

Although these early perceptions, assessments and expectations surrounding Turkey's activities in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus were gravely disappointed, the development of closer political cooperation and

enhanced economic relations has remained Ankara's long-range goal (Turan and Turan 1998: 202). In order to expand its political, economic and cultural ties with the Turkic republics, Turkey launched a series of initiatives, particularly in promoting a variety of educational and cultural programmes in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Therefore, it is possible to argue that following the phase of euphoria, Turkey's foreign policy in the region has been characterised by a major emphasis on cultural and economic relations rather than on political ones. In addition, there has been a clear shift in Ankara's policy from the initial multilateral to a more bilateral approach in dealing with the former Soviet republics.

III.2 The Political Realities of Pan-Turkism

After the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan gained their independence, Turkey provided them with considerable diplomatic support in their search for membership in international institutions. Thus Ankara was able to successfully facilitate their entry into the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later re-named OSCE), in the North Atlantic Coordination Council (NACC), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Sayari 1994: 182). Similarly, Turkey was instrumental in getting the five Turkic states (Kazakhstan only as an observer) to join the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1992.²⁴ In this context, Turkey's political support for the participation of the five Turkic republics in international and regional organisations was 'based on a strategy (...) to end their isolation and to facilitate economic recovery and political stability in Central Asia and the Caucasus' (Sayari 1994: 182).

Regarding Turkish leadership attempts, Ankara's highest profile initiative was to spur a series of summits in which the Turkish president met with his counterparts from the five republics. Although these Turkic summits, also known as T6, have become a regular forum for discussion,²⁵ they have by far fallen short of Ankara's initial plan to significantly institutionalise the ties between the six states. Their main outcome has been decisions to implement similar periodic gatherings on ministerial levels, to support inter-parliamentary cooperation and to create a permanent secretariat of the summit.²⁶

Looking at concrete political measures taken, bilateral relations have clearly dominated multilateral approaches (Kramer 1996: 119). By December 1996, Ankara had concluded more than 470 bilateral agreements of various natures with the five republics, whereas the number of multilateral agreements was only 43.²⁷ The grave disappointment at the first Turkic summit was a key experience for Turkish policy makers, who since then have taken a more hard-headed view of Ankara's interests. The shift from multilateralism to bilateral agreements was further spurred by the growing awareness of Turkish officials that they were not dealing with an homogeneous whole but with five distinct states, each pursuing its own national interests.

Concerning Turkey's bilateral relations with the Turkic states, Ankara's relationship with Azerbaijan – the closest of its foreign policy partners from the former Soviet Union – is a good example to highlight the limits of Turkey's quest for regional influence. The centrality of Azerbaijan for Turkey's expansion into the Transcaucasus and Central Asia has been well summarised by Sezer:

Among all the Turkic languages, Azeri Turkish comes closest, after Gagauz, to the Turkish spoken in Turkey. The republic's proximity to Turkey; its position as a bridge to the other countries of Central Asia; its abundant oil reserves, and its pro-Turkish orientation until the overthrow of nationalist President Abulfaz Elchibey in mid-1993 have all contributed to Turkey's special focus on Azerbaijan in the early post-Soviet period (Sezer 1997: 16)

In spite of this special focus on Azerbaijan, it did not take long until Turkey's relations with Azerbaijan fell victim to the inflated expectations that both sides harboured about the other. In particular Ankara's clear determination not to become directly involved in the bloody conflict between Armenians and Azeris over Nagorno-Karabakh was a major source of tension with Baku. In April 1993, Ankara turned down President Elchibey's repeated pleas for Turkish helicopters to evacuate trapped Azeri civilians during the Armenians' Kelbejar offensive. According to official statements this happened because of the technical impossibility of sending helicopters from Turkey to Azerbaijan.²⁸ In reality,

however, 'Prime Minister Demirel refused to help, believing that this could draw Ankara into the conflict, and into confrontation with Russia' (Bolukbasi 1997: 85).

In order to keep the 'delicate balance' in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (cf. Cornell 1998), Turkey only closed its airspace to Western relief aircraft bound for Yerevan and concentrated a higher number of troops at its border with Armenia.²⁹ This rather symbolic reaction was neither appropriate for a country portraying itself as a regional power nor a satisfactory response to Azeri requests for help. Instead, Ankara well exemplified its determination to stay out of a conflict that may have brought it into a confrontation with Russia. Only two months later, the Turkish authorities reconfirmed their reluctance to intervene in times of crisis. On 18 June 1993, renegade military forces, allegedly supported by Moscow, toppled the legitimately elected Azeri President Elchibey.³⁰ Ankara's failure to unequivocally condemn the ouster of the enthusiastically pro-Turkish Elchibey badly affected Turkey's standing in the eyes of the other Turkic states (Robins 1998: 141).³¹ Furthermore, it proved Russia's undiminished ability to intervene in the domestic and political affairs of the former Soviet republics.

Besides Turkey's imperative to keep good relations with Moscow both for political and economic reasons, Ankara has faced historical constraints in the formulation and implementation of its policies towards the Transcaucasus. With the independence of Armenia, the Ottoman legacy of the alleged Armenian genocide of 1915/16 re-emerged. Turkey had to balance its desire to support Azerbaijan militarily and logistically in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict against the risk of being accused of 'planning new atrocities against the Armenians' (Cornell 1998: 66). More determined action from the Turkish side inevitably would have sparked the reaction of the powerful anti-Turkish Armenian lobbies in the United States and France, probably causing severe damage to Turkey's international standing. Then Prime Minister Demirel made this very clear in his rejection of repeated demands from both the extreme right and left in Turkey to give active military support to Baku: 'one step too many by Turkey would put the whole world behind Armenia'.³² At the same time, the dangers of a Turkish intervention were stressed by the CIS Commander-in-Chief Marshall

Shaposhnikov, who warned that Russia could not 'remain indifferent' to such an action.³³

In a way, Turkey's bilateral relations with Azerbaijan fully exemplify Ankara's limits in pursuing a truly independent policy in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. Turkey's geo-political location, its insufficient power resources and the still not digested Ottoman past have visibly contradicted the exaggerated pan-Turkist rhetoric of the early 1990s and, moreover, have constrained Turkey to present itself as an able security provider for the region. To a certain extent, the dismantling of the Soviet Union brought the 400-year old rivalry between the Russian Tsarist and the Ottoman Empires once again to the fore. As in the past, the Russian-Turkish rivalry of the 1990s entailed civilisational aspects of conflicting Christian/Slavic and Muslim/Turkic blocks. As suggested by Baev, in the post-Soviet Russian political establishment the categories of 'eternal hostility' and 'creeping aggression' are often used when dealing with Turkey (Baev 1997: 13).

Likewise the Turks have not forgotten imperial Russia's ambitions toward the Ottoman Empire and its policies of expelling the Ottomans from the Black Sea, the Balkans, and some parts of the Caucasus (Mufti 1998: 41). This historical memory of constant adversity is at least partially responsible for the reawakening of Russian-Turkish tension following the demise of the Soviet Union. It therefore came as no surprise that Ankara soon got into more routine inter-state relations with the five Turkic states after the initial euphoria had evaporated. Since then, realism has increasingly replaced nationalistic lyricism and Turkey has been showing a greater deal of respect for the sensitivities of Russia's relations with the Turkic republics.

IV. Economic and Cultural Cooperation between the Turkish Republic and the Turkic States

IV.1 Economic Cooperation: Aid, Construction, Telecommunications, Transportation and Energy

The quick evaporation of early signs of political adventurism is also linked to the fact that the emergence of new states in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia

seemingly offered unprecedented economic opportunities for the Turkish Republic. By forging close economic ties with the Turkic republics, it was hoped to open up new markets and investment areas for Turkey at a time when the country was facing an increasing foreign trade deficit. The economic ventures between Turkey and the former Soviet republics have so far been concentrated in four major fields: the allocation of developmental assistance, trade and construction, transport and telecommunications, and the energy sector.

Turkey has become one of the leading countries in the allocation of economic and humanitarian aid to the five Turkic states. The extension of humanitarian aid for over 78 million US dollars, of technical assistance for 50 million US dollars and credit offers for one billion US dollars made Turkey one of the main donors of economic assistance in the region. Aiming at enhanced economic cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic republics, Ankara's programmes have been largely planned and implemented by the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), an agency established within the ministry of foreign affairs in January 1992. In its first six years of activity, TIKA has carried out 150 bilateral and 60 multilateral projects, mostly of an educational and advisory nature.³⁴

Alongside TIKA, the Eximbank is another public organisation in charge of promoting economic relations with the new republics, though not exclusively oriented towards them. In particular, the Eximbank has opened credits to assist Turkish exports to and to finance the works of Turkish construction companies in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Despite the initial pledge to open a credit line of one billion US dollars in favour of the five Turkic states, Turkey could not, both for financial and bureaucratic reasons, raise all the promised funds. As of April 1999, the Eximbank had allocated a total of 850 million US dollars, of which more than 776 million had already been disbursed (Aras 2000: 46).³⁵

Between 1992 and 1998, the trade turnover between Turkey and the Turkic states registered a growth of around 472 per cent, moving from just 275 million to almost 1.3 billion US dollars.³⁶ However, compared to the total amount of Turkish trade, the exchange with the five Turkic states is still quite unsubstantial, ranking by a percentage of less than two per cent. A major part of Turkey's economic involvement in Central Asia took place in the field of

construction: building and restoring hotels, airports, hospitals and small factories. At the end of 1999, the total economic value of construction projects reached three billion US dollars. Other Turkish firms established and operating in the Turkic markets are active in the food-processing, textile, automotive and retail sectors. Yet reliable data about their activities is scarce and many of the joint-venture agreements remained on the drawing board. According to TIKA and the Turkish Foreign Economic Board (DEIK), in late 1999, more than 1,400 Turkish firms were operating in the five Turkic states, generating a total volume of investment of around twenty billion US dollars. Turkish firms are mainly operational in Kazakhstan (more than 320)³⁷ and Azerbaijan (450),³⁸ whereas 200 firms were active in each of Turkmenistan,³⁹ Uzbekistan⁴⁰ and Kyrgyzstan⁴¹. Aiming at becoming the geo-economic pivot between the West and the southern region of the former COMECON, Turkey has devoted a massive economic effort in the field of telecommunications and transportation since 1991. Thanks to the prompt donation (to the value of some 25 million US dollars) of digital telecommunication exchanges to each of the five republics, Ankara has been able to 'create a dependent relationship at an early stage, which made the republics reliant upon Turkey for access to international lines' (Robins 1998: 145). Since then, other Turkish companies, notably Netas and Türkcell, have assumed an important profile in the strategic sector of providing the necessary infrastructure for telecommunications. In 1999, Netas was operating in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan through its subsidiaries Ültel and Vesnet, respectively. In the growing sector of mobile telecommunications, Türkcell plays a leading role, running GSM services in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia.⁴²

In order to ameliorate the geographical disadvantage of the absence of territorial contiguity between Turkey and Central Asia, Turkish Airlines (THY) initiated direct flights to Baku (1991), Tashkent (1992) and Almaty (1992). Later, regular flights were added to Ashgabad (1993) and to Bishkek (1996).⁴³ Land transport, however, could not be improved with similar ease. Turkey has mainly focused its attention on Georgia, which, bordering with Azerbaijan, could provide the Anatolian Turks with a land bridge to the Turkic world. To this end, Ankara has adopted a plan laid down by the EU's Transport Corridor Europe

Caucasus Asia programme (TRACECA) to build a highway along the Black Sea coast joining with the Caucasian corridor Sarp-Supsa-Tblisi-Baku.⁴⁴ Additionally, Ankara and Tblisi signed several agreements for the opening of a third border crossing facility, as well as for the restoration and joint use of Georgia's Batumi airport. Even more important is the intended construction of a direct rail link between the Turkish and Georgian cities of Kars and Tblisi, which once completed will be connected to the railway to Baku and, through the provision of train-ferry services, to Central Asia.⁴⁵

The single most critical determinant of the future nature of economic relations between Turkey and the Turkic Republics will be, as suggested by Robins, 'the energy export routes chosen by the main fuel producer states in the latter area [Central Asia]' (Robins 1998: 145).⁴⁶ Basically there are three main goals being pursued by Turkey: economic benefits deriving from transit fee income; the reduction of Turkey's dependence on Russian gas and Middle Eastern oil; and employment opportunities that pipeline constructions would create in the less developed east of Turkey.

At least as important as these economic goals are strategic considerations linked to Turkey's involvement in the extraction, transportation and consumption of Central Asian energy resources. In fact, the exploitation of Caspian oil and gas resources became a grand strategic game with the United States, Russia, Turkey and Iran as its most important players. From an economic point of view, pipeline projects through Turkey such as the Baku-Ceyhan or the Trans Caspian pipelines are politically determined rather than economically. They play a crucial role in US strategies to enhance Western and to balance Russian influence in Central Asia, as well as to maintain the US containment policy against Iran. In particular Iran could provide an existing network of pipelines, easily expandable to transport oil and gas from Central Asia to Europe and South Asia. International oil companies are strongly pushing towards this cheaper solution and thus the pipeline issue has developed into a 'case of grand geo-strategic designs versus dollars and cents' (Gorvett 2000: 31). It is therefore highly questionable whether the treaty about the distribution of Central Asian oil that was signed at the Istanbul summit of the OSCE in November 1999 will ever be converted into action. Evidently, the Caspian oil

saga has become another case of showing the limitations of Turkey's role in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia (Altunisik 1998: 157).

Two other economic factors have contributed to limiting Turkey's regional influence. In the first place, there are the economic ties that link both the former Soviet republics and Turkey to Moscow. Concerning the Central Asian countries, excessive economic specialisation and geographical isolation are a part of the economic legacy of the Soviet past.⁴⁷ None of the former Soviet Republics enjoyed any degree of economic and agricultural diversification. This has resulted in an exceptionally high degree of regional interdependence in trade, as well as in the maintenance of the structural dependency of Central Asian economies on direct links with Moscow. This handicap has been further aggravated by the fact that the existing rail and road networks, as well as pipelines, are predominantly directed towards Moscow, which has remained for Central Asia the main outlet to potential markets.

The second factor relates to the role that Russia plays in Turkey's economy. It has to be noted that, despite its marked economic interests towards the Turkic republics, Ankara has an important economic relationship with the Russian Federation, which it aims to retain and to develop (Turan and Turan 1998: 189). Turkish-Russian economic relations in the 1990s were much more profitable than the business deals between Turkey and the Turkic states. In the period between 1992 and 1998, the official trade volume between Russia and Turkey was, on average, at least three times higher than that registered between Ankara and the Turkic republics.⁴⁸

Yet, these figures do not include the extensive 'suitcase trade' between the two countries. Russian 'tourists' taking goods back home from Turkey and selling them on the Russian market. According to figures of DEIK this suitcase trade had an annual volume of 5-6 billion US dollars between 1992 and 1997.⁴⁹ Another important source of income for Turkey is provided by the contracting services of Turkish companies in Russia which have risen to record levels, reaching almost 9 billion US dollars in 1997. Between 1992 and 1997, Russia alone covered 42 per cent of the total volume of business transactions registered by the companies affiliated to the Turkish International Contractors Union.⁵⁰ Well aware that the potential for cooperation with Russia is still greater

than that with the Turkic republics, Ankara has been compelled to make sure that its policies in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus do not harm its important economic relations with Moscow. As put by Fuller, 'deciding if and when to give priority to Russian concerns in these areas, over Turkey's own interests, will be critical for Ankara' (Fuller 1993: 86).

Finally, the early declarations and initiatives of Washington that promoted and supported the 'Turkish model' as an ideal development path for the new republics and elevated Turkey to the role of a channel for Western economic aid turned out to be hollow. Ankara received the promised economic and political support neither from the US nor from its European partners. Consequently, virtually no international aid was channelled through Turkey to the new republics (Robins 1998: 142; Pope and Pope 1997: 290-291). It soon became clear that Ankara was not able to act, as promised during the initial euphoric phase, as an engine for the economic development of the Turkic states. Turkey's financial collapse of spring 1994, followed by the imposition of a draconian austerity pack, further eroded the already limited Turkish capability to provide loans and credit facilities to the cash-stripped Turkic republics. As suggested by Mayall, '...Turkey increasingly found that it [economic weakness] thwarted attempts to exert regional influence. The appeal of ethnic and religious solidarity in Central Asia could not compete with the financial clout of the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Western Europe' (Mayall 1997: 74-75). As it became apparent that Turkey did not have the necessary capital for large-scale investment, the Central Asian Turks increasingly turned their attention towards other partners.

IV.2 Cultural Cooperation: Language, History, Television and Education

Given the focus on culture and education of both the pan-Turkist movement and Kemalist modernisation, it is understandable that Turkish initiatives for enhanced cooperation with Central Asia and Transcaucasus have been explicitly numerous in the cultural realm. Most of these initiatives, which the Turkish State and Turkish non-state actors have launched in the fields of education and the media, have concerned linguistic, literary and historical matters. Yet similar to the political and economic realms, the initially high

expectations on the Turkish side have been disappointed. Also in terms of cultural cooperation, pan-Turkist ideals and the realities of the post-Soviet Turkic societies have been difficult to synchronise. It became apparent that the euphoria of Turkish politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals was based on ideologies and romanticism rather than on knowledge about the 'other Turks'. The efforts to create a common Turkish language are a good example to demonstrate this lacking sense of reality.

The elevation of Istanbul Turkish to a *lingua franca* for the new republics has been one of Ankara's main objectives. Since the establishment of relations with the Turkic republics, the official Turkish language policy has promoted the idea of a unified linguistic area within the 'Turkic world'. This bold scheme was based on the alleged linguistic homogeneity that, according to a wide-spread and very popular assumption in Turkey, characterises the entire 'Turkic world' and specifically Turkey and the five Turkophone Republics of the former Soviet Union (Bal 1988a: 61). Yet this vision did not take into account that though related, the Turkic languages are not all mutually intelligible and that the historical experiences of the various branches of Turkic peoples have created further differences. Contrary to the enthusiastic declaration of the Turkish authorities, the 'Turkic world' does not share the same mutual-intelligibility that distinguishes the Hispanic or Anglo-Saxon worlds.⁵¹ The blatant ignorance about the reality of post-Soviet Central Asia and, above all, the ideological bias that has initially characterised Ankara's policies has led Turkish diplomats and politicians to underestimate the importance that the elite of the Turkic republics attribute to their own national languages, which were erected as symbols of a national and cultural renaissance already during the last phases of the Soviet regime (Carrère D'Encausse 1979 :195).

This was clearly visible in Ankara's vigorous campaign for the adoption of the Turkish form of the Latin script. A final agreement among the six Turkic states on the so-called 'joint Latin alphabet' (*Ortak Latin alfabetes*) could only be reached after a plethora of heated discussions. These came to an end in March 1993, with a compromise formula under which five letters were added to the 29 characters normally used in modern Turkish. The fact that these five letters of the joint Latin alphabet are totally alien to the Anatolian Turks was strongly

criticised by Ankara whose representatives further deplored the idealist and absolutist negotiation attitudes of its counterparts.⁵² Turkey's promotion of the Latin alphabet has only achieved mixed and from Ankara's perspective rather disappointing results. Being aware of the sensitivities of their Russian minorities, the governments of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan still retain the Cyrillic alphabet. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have decided to switch to the Latin script, but each country has adopted its own national version of the alphabet, making them relatively distant from both the endorsed 'joint Latin alphabet' and the modern alphabet of the Turkish Republic.⁵³

Language problems also contributed to limiting the success of the Eurasia television network system (*TRT Avrasya*), which the Turkish State launched in spring 1992. Broadcasting in simplified Turkish and often with Latin subtitles to Central Asia and Azerbaijan, the programmes were designed to convey a sense of community among Turkic peoples and to promote familiarity with the Latin script (Turan and Turan 1998: 183). In order to ensure that the transmissions could reach a wide Central Asian audience, Turkish technicians of the Directorate of Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) built earth stations in each republic able to receive the signals transmitted from Ankara via satellite. Although initiated with great excitement, Turkish satellite television has never gained much popularity in Central Asia. It turned out that even the simplified version of Turkish used was for many in Central Asia too difficult to understand. Furthermore, the poor quality of the programmes did not meet the taste of its audience. Additional problems were created by the aversion of authoritarian governments such as those in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to allowing neighbouring states to broadcast directly to their citizens without scrutiny (Robins 1998: 144). Similarly, the project of the Turkish ministries of education and culture to introduce standardised history textbooks in schools throughout the Turkic states had to face the firm opposition of the respective governments.

Despite this reluctance of the Turkic states to fully endorse Turkish cultural policies, Ankara has established a number of institutions promoting its pan-Turkist agenda. In 1993, the Turkish ministry of culture sponsored the founding of the Turkic Cultures and Arts Joint Administration (TÜRKSÖY), which brings together cultural officials from the Turkic states (Uzbekistan excluded), the

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Russian republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. According to its first director, the primary aim of TÜRKSOY is 'to increase cultural relations among the Turkish speaking countries and communities, to do research on Turkish culture, to improve and protect it, make it known in the world and to agitate [blend] it with the world culture' (Bülbüloglu 1996: 45). Yet in spite of its bold agenda, this organisation has so far distinguished itself mainly by its poor management rather than by the quality and quantity of its activities.⁵⁴

Another Turkish state institute with a marked Turkist and nationalist orientation is the Institute for Research of the Culture of the Turks (TKAE). This institute, which reached the peak of its activities and success in the late 1960s,⁵⁵ has greatly benefited from the spatial revolution of Turkey's geopolitics following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Being essentially moribund in the late 1980s because of its strong pro-military and official character, in the 1990s, TKAE went through a revival thanks to the renewed interest in the Turkic world. The main 'scholarly' work of the institute remains the tome entitled 'Handbook of the World of the Turks' (*Türk dünyası el kitabı*), published originally in 1976 and then re-printed in an enlarged version in 1992. As suggested by Landau, the most revealing part of the book is 'The Contemporary World of the Turks', a substantial block of articles committed to the proposition of the essential unity of the world of the Turks (Landau 1995: 162). In addition to the TKAE, there are several other Turkish institutes that have increasingly focused on the 'Turkic world' and that are either linked to the ministry of culture or to various universities. Amongst them are such traditional Kemalist establishments as the Turkish Historical Society (TTK) and the Turkish Linguistic Society (TDK), the research institutes on Turcology of the Universities of Marmara and Istanbul, as well as the recently founded Research Centre on the Turkic World of Ege University.⁵⁶

Providing professional training and developing the human resources of various agencies of the newly independent states has from early 1992 served as a further channel for cultural interaction and transmission. Since then, the Turkish foreign ministry, for instance, has been providing vocational training courses for diplomats of the Turkic republics.⁵⁷ By October 1998, over 1,600

high-ranking officials from various republics of the former Soviet Union had been trained at the Multilateral Training Centre on Taxation in Ankara, thanks to the economic and organisational support of TIKA, the Turkish ministry of finance and the OECD.⁵⁸ TIKA, in close cooperation with international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the OECD, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the German Institute for Technical Assistance (GTZ), shared the responsibility for designing and implementing developmental activities in the private and public sectors.⁵⁹

At the heart of Turkey's educational policies has been a scholarship programme at Turkish high schools and universities for a total of 10,000 students, 2,000 from each of the five republics. According to official figures, in December 1998, more than 7,700 of the scholarships offered had been taken. Yet problems linked to the chronic overcrowding of Turkish universities, the economically insufficient amount of these government scholarships and linguistic obstacles have seemingly caused a relatively high drop-out rate.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, taking into account the importance of elite ties for long-lasting relationships, it is plausible to argue that in the long run the scholarships scheme may turn into an asset for Turkey's relations with the Turkic republics (Behar 1996: 9).

Finally, Turkey has financed the opening of a network of elite public high schools, of four universities, as well as funded the posting of teachers and school administrators to the same institutes.⁶¹ These schools, modelled after elite public schools in Turkey, offer both English and Turkish classes, thus filling a foreign language gap that the local educational systems are, apparently, not able to close. In addition to these state initiatives, different Turkish non-state actors – associations (*dernek*), foundations (*vakif*) and, especially, Muslim brotherhoods (*tarikât*) – have been most active in the educational field. One of the most impressive examples of non-state activities are the more than 70 schools which have been founded and run by the missionaries of Fethullah Gülen.⁶² In contrast to the distinct religious orientation of the schools that Fethullah Gülen runs in Turkey, the schools opened in the former Soviet republics rather emphasise the importance of a common language and culture

for the Turkic people.⁶³ The curriculum also appeals to common Turkic ethnic ties and includes the teaching of traditional Anatolian customs and manners.⁶⁴

In the light of the above analysis, it is possible to argue that Turkish activities for enhanced educational contact and language reforms in the Turkic Republics have been strikingly reminiscent of the initiatives undertaken by *Jadidism*, the reform movement inspired by Ismail Gasprinsky a century earlier. In particular the activities of Fethullah Gülen, and the importance that his organisation attributes to the dissemination of education, information, rational discourse, Western sciences and modern technologies, are close to a revitalisation of the cultural heritage that the different facets of Islamic modernism had left behind. Even the secular Turkish state seems to have acted in line with this heritage which since the times of the Young Ottomans has been an essential part of the intellectual life of Turkic Muslim peoples. More striking, however, is the fact that the demise of the Soviet Union also brought the hidden pan-Turkist legacy of Kemalism again to the fore.

Yet this revival of Pan-Turkism does not mean that Turkish governments have been engaged in irredentist, expansionist or even racist pan-Turkist policies. Contrary to the dreams of some activists of Turkey's extreme right rekindled upon Enver Pasha's return, Ankara has been pursuing what Landau defined as 'cultural Pan-Turkism', i.e. a variant of political Pan-Turkism purged of its irredentist component (Landau 1988: 179; Winrow: 1992: 109). If the Turkish authorities had pursued this cultural policy without a 'big brother attitude', with a less missionary zeal and with greater regard for the distinctive national and cultural identities of each country, the outcome of this pan-Turkist revival might have been even more successful.

V. Conclusions

Despite the fact that the Sublime Porte never ruled over Central Asia, the legacy of the Ottoman past has exerted a profound and sustained influence on Turkish policies toward the former Soviet republics. This Ottoman legacy has survived in the contradictions of Kemalist nation building. On the one hand, the Kemalist rulers of the early Turkish Republic resolutely rejected all forms of Pan-Turkism and placed prime emphasis on the development of a strictly territorially bound nation-state. On the other hand, they adopted in the 1930s an official history that up to now has told romantic narratives about the Turks' historic homeland in Central Asia and their affinities with other Turkic peoples. Indeed, the Kemalists propagated a concept of national identity with a latent tendency to transgress the territorial delimitation of the Turkish State and which was deeply influenced by the ideas of the Ottoman intellectual debates of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Dumont 1984: 30).

Particularly, the linguistic approach of the Kemalists in conceptualising Turkish national unity and identity clearly shows the influence of well-known intellectuals such as Ismail Gasprinsky and Ziya Gökalp.⁶⁵ The pan-Turkist leanings of Kemalist nationalism have thus led to a retention of a strong sense of 'kin' with Turkic people living outside Anatolia (Poulton 1997: 287).

This explains the emotional outburst of sympathy and friendship, as well as the short revival of imperial political attitudes, that characterised the Turkish reaction to the initial establishment of political, economic and cultural relations with Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Yet neither had the 'shrinking process' of the Ottoman Empire been reversed, nor could the Turkish Republic long maintain its claim to be the role model for the future development of the newly independent states. The enthusiastic schemes of Turkish veteran politicians such as Süleyman Demirel or Turgut Özal were proven wrong.

Besides the previously discussed political and economic obstacles, there was another historical legacy that re-emerged with the end of the Cold War, laying down the limits of Turkey's role in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. The demise of the Soviet Union and the reawakening of Russian nationalism

marred Turkish-Russian relations with historical passions and legacies of mistrust that both countries had inherited from the imperial competition between the Tsarist and the Ottoman Empires. As Sezer suggests, the pan-Turkist activities of Enver Pasha in Turkistan in 1921/22 appear to have instilled among the Russians a lasting mistrust about Turkey's aspirations in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia (Sezer 2000: 62).

Therefore it is not surprising that in the 1990s Moscow repeatedly criticised Ankara for pursuing an allegedly pan-Turkist and neo-Ottomanist policy in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Specifically, radical Russian nationalists viewed Turkey's interests in the region as a 'foreign conspiracy to split Russia along a Turkic line from Kazakhstan to Yakutia and to obstruct the "rebirth" of Russia' (Zviagelskaya 1994: 137-138). Together with the eminent political and economic role that Russia plays in Turkish politics, this historical legacy added further constraints to Turkish ambitions.

There is no doubt that with the emergence of a Greater Middle East several 'demons' of the Ottoman past have resurrected. In a new historical context, these suppressed Ottoman legacies have challenged the inflexible structures of Kemalist modernisation and call for a redefinition of Turkey's political and cultural identity. Freed from the straitjacket of Cold War politics, Turkey suddenly had to realise the dire necessity to develop new political directions for which the Kemalist dogmas can no longer serve as guidelines. The short history of relations between Turkey and the Turkic states has proved that these new guidelines need a sober balance of Turkey's political and economic power resources, as well as an open reflection about its Ottoman and Kemalist history. In the context of these findings, former President Süleyman Demirel was wrong. Turkey's history has not returned to its natural course, but the 1990s have shown that the country is in an apparent need to rethink some of its historical dogmas and to open a new chapter of its history.

In 1992, Aydin Yalcin wrote that Pan-Turkism was an ideology whose time had arrived, and the collapse of the Soviet Union had 'finally given a public expression and support to Pan-Turkism'.⁶⁶ This time only lasted for a short and disappointing moment. Turkish decision-makers had soon to adjust their policies to the geo-political and economic realities of the post-Cold War era.

Their approach to Central Asia and the Transcaucasus therefore turned into a policy of economic penetration and cultural diffusion setting aside outmoded irredentist and hegemonic aspirations that may have embroiled the country in conflicts with its neighbours (Landau 1995: 222).

Thereby, Ankara's new strategy of expanding cultural, scientific and economic relations with the Turkic republics has shown an interesting mixture of old pan-Turkist schemes and motivations with truly modern transnational interactions. This strategy has not been entirely without success and has so far been able to guarantee Turkey a position as *primus inter pares* among the Turkic states (Dannreuther 1994: 60; Cornell 1998: 69). In the light of Turkey's new geo-strategic position, its traditionally Western-oriented foreign policy priorities and its crucial interest in maintaining an economically rewarding relationship with Russia, this could be defined, at least, as a fair result.

VI. References

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¹VII. Notes

The Unionists were members and followers of the 'Committee of Union and Progress', an organisation within the Young Turk movement. Contrary to the more liberal faction of the Young Turks, the Unionists aspirations were directed against the bureaucratic establishment of the Ottoman Empire and towards radical and centralised reforms. The typical Unionist belonged to the lower middle class of civil servants, officers and young intellectuals. In January 1913, the Unionists launched a coup d'état and under the leadership of the so-called triumvirate of Enver, Talat and Cemal Pasha, they ruled the Empire until the end of the First World War under a dictatorial regime that left the Ottoman sultan only with formal responsibilities. (Ahmad 1993: 33ff.; Zürcher 1984 and Zürcher 1993: 113ff.).

- ² Quoted from *The Guardian*, 'Reburial Restores Enver Pasha to His True Glory', 5 August 1996.
- ³ For a short analysis of the personal rivalry between the two Turkish leaders, see Sonyel (1989: 506-515).
- ⁴ Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), DR-WE, 20 October 1994.
- ⁵ Interview in *Der Spiegel*, 23 December 1991.
- ⁶ The 'Grey Wolf' is the totemic animal of the pre-Islamic Turks of Central Asia and serves together with the crescent and the star as the distinctive symbols of the pan-Turkist doctrine.
- ⁷ For in-depth analyses on Gasprinsky, see the various chapters focused on his life and activities in Allworth (1988).
- ⁸ The opposition movement of the Young Ottomans was rising in the late Tanzimat period and it was a driving force behind the Ottoman constitutional movement which finally brought about the first Ottoman constitution in 1876. The ideas of the Young Ottomans were characterised by an attempt to synthesise Islam with the ideals of the Enlightenment and to replace the traditional political loyalty to the *millet* by the *vatan*, the fatherland. They also promoted the introduction of a constitutional order and of representative institutions (Karpát 1972 and Mardin 1962).
- ⁹ As reported by Landau, the circulation was 'of about 5,000 in the 1880s, and 6,000 some twenty years later, an impressive figure for that time', see Landau (1995: 10).
- ¹⁰ Quoted by Abduvakhitov (1994: 69) from Fisher (1988).
- ¹¹ In the period under Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) the political opposition shifted from promoting an Ottoman constitutional state towards a more narrow Turkish nationalist definition of the state.
- ¹² The Turkish advance in the Caucasus is well analysed in Gökay (1997).
- ¹³ For a brief account of Enver's campaign in Central Asia, see Sonyel (1990).
- ¹⁴ Quoted by Poulton (1997: 93).
- ¹⁵ See Alici (1996), Zürcher (1993: 98-199) and Mardin (1981: 211-212).
- ¹⁶ Winrow explains this widely shared romantic attitude of Turks to Central Asia as follows: 'From an early age almost every Turkish schoolchild learns how, many centuries ago, Turks migrated in waves from the depths of Eastern Asia to spread civilization across central Asia, the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent' (Winrow 1995: 5).
- ¹⁷ Minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, term 19-1, vol.1, no.3, p.25.
- ¹⁸ This slogan was used for the first time by the then Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and then adopted by both Özal and pan-Turkist organisations.
- ¹⁹ The question of the 'Turkish model' of development is analysed by Bal (1998b: 105-129).
- ²⁰ Bush's statement is quoted from Rashid (1994: 210) and Hurd's from Robins (1998: 135). The declaration of the then secretary general of the Council of Europe is reported in Mango (1993: 726). For samples of editorials and articles in the Western media supporting the idea of a 'Turkish model', see *The Economist*,

'Turkey: Star of Islam', 14 December 1991; *The Times*, 'The Sick Man Recovers', 28 January 1992; *Newsweek*, 'The Turkish Model on Display', 3 February 1993; *Corriere della Sera*, 'La Turchia "ombelico del mondo"' (Turkey: The Underbelly of the World), 31 July 1992.

²¹ Quoted from Bal (1998b: 118).

²² Quoted from Smolansky (1994: 299).

²³ Özal's speech is reported in Summary of World Broadcast (SWB), ME/1527 E/1-3, 2 November 1992.

²⁴ The potentialities and limits of ECO are well analysed in De Cordier (1996: 47-57).

²⁵ So far the summits have taken place in 1992 (Ankara), 1994 (Istanbul), 1995 (Bishkek), 1996 (Tashkent), 1998 (Astana) and 2000 (Baku).

²⁶ The Turkic presidents pledged to create a permanent secretariat during the 1998 summit, see FBIS-WEU-98-161, 10 June 1998.

²⁷ Authors' estimate according to the data provided by Kanbolat (1997: 1103-1138).

²⁸ See the statement released by Erdal İnönü, then acting Turkish foreign minister, reported in SWB ME/1657 C/1, 7 April 1993.

²⁹ *Turkish Probe*, 6 April 1993.

³⁰ The toppling of Elchibey is well described by Goltz (1994: 409-445).

³¹ In this regard, it is interesting to quote some parts of the debate that took place, on 5 July 1993, during the TV program '32nd day' between the Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand and then Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin. Birand: 'Turkey does not wield the same influence in Azerbaijan now as it did in the past'. Cetin: 'I believe it would be wrong, however, to tie Turkey's relations with Azerbaijan to a specific individual. Our peoples are relatives and brothers', as reported by SWB ME/1736 C/1-2, 9 July 1993.

³² *New York Times*, 7 March 1992. See also Pope (1992).

³³ Cited in Harris (1995: 17).

³⁴ *Eurasian File*, Special Issue, October 1998, p.2.

³⁵ It should be mentioned that a substantial confusion regarding these figures still prevails. Winrow indicates that 'of the 666 million US dollars of credits the Turkish Eximbank had offered to these states, around 500 million had been opened', see Winrow (1998: 102). According to Turan and Turan (1998), in late 1995, the Eximbank had allocated a total of 936 million US dollars, but only 55 per cent of this total had been disbursed.

³⁶ **Tab. Turkey's Export to the Turkic Republics (US dollars million).**

Country	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	Azerbaijan	102.868	2132.1161	3216.3319	7325.3	Kazakhstan	19.467	8131.7	150.816	4210.6213	Kyrgyzstan	1.817	16.938	247.149	441.5	Turkmenistan	7.383	884.456	364.811	7.595	6	Uzbekistan	54.421	3.564	5.138	5.230	5.210	6.156	TOTAL	185.745	0.3429	6545.1722	7907.8831	4
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Source: DEIK, 'Türkiye' nin ülkelere göre dış ticareti' available at www.deik.org.tr

Tab. Turkey's Imports from the Turkic Republics (US dollars million)

Country	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	Azerbaijan	35.134	8.921	839.258	350.2	Kazakhstan	10.543	732.386	6100.11	65.325	4	Kyrgyzstan	1.43	54.35	55.87	67	Turkmenistan	21.276	865.511	1.810	07442	Uzbekistan	2131.978	661.5
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58.19596TOTAL89.2189.9189.6287.2303.2400.2449.2Source: DEIK, 'Türkiye' nin ülkelere göre dis ticareti'
available at www.deik.org.tr

³⁷ *Eurasian File*, no.90, January 1998, p.3.

³⁸ *Eurasian File*, no.103, July 1998, p.6.

³⁹ *Eurasian File*, Turkmenistan-Special Issue, November 1997, p.5.

⁴⁰ *Turkish Daily News*, 14 April 1998.

⁴¹ *Eurasian File*, Kyrgyzstan-Special Issue, July 1997, p.5.

⁴² *Turkish Probe*, 7 March 1999, p.7.

⁴³ *Eurasian File*, no.120, May 1999, p.5-6.

⁴⁴ The TRACECA programme was launched in 1993, for further information see the homepage:
www.traceca.org.

⁴⁵ *Monitor*, 1998 'Historic Georgian-Turkish Summit', 4, 51, 16 March.

⁴⁶ It is beyond the scope of this study to analyse in great detail the questions related to the energy resources of the Turkic states. These topics are well analysed by Altunisik (1998) and Blank (1999).

⁴⁷ On this subject, see Kaser and Mehrotra (1992).

⁴⁸ **Tab. Turkish-Russian Trade Volume and Turkish-Turkic Rep.s Trade Volume**

YearTurkey-Russia

(US dollars million)Turkey-Turkic Republics

(US	dollars	million)
19921,47927519932,04164019941,86562019953,32083219963,3941,02619974,0971,30819983,5031,281Sou		

rce: DEIK (1999) 'Rusya ekonomisi ve Türkiye ile ilişkileri', Istanbul.

⁴⁹ *Turkish Daily News*, 'Istanbul's Suitcase Trade', 30 June 1996.

⁵⁰ See TÜSIAD (1999: 128).

⁵¹ Alongside the previously mentioned wrong assumption, it is also interesting to note that in Turkey, some politicians, journalist and even scholars, reserve for the Turkic languages the second-class definition of dialect (the terminology used is *Kazak Lehcesi*, *Özbek Lehcesi*, etc...) while Republican Turkish is commonly designated as language (*Türkçe*). This is a formulation that, as wrong as it is from the scientific point of view, well reflects the Turks' general presumption of their superiority over the more backward 'outside Turks'.

⁵² See the statement of Turkish Ambassador Bilam Simsir reported by *Turkish Probe*, 'Erasing Signs of the Cyrillic Past', 23 March 1993, p.15; and also Öner (1998: 74).

⁵³ This complex issue is well analysed by Tryjarski (1998: 109-117).

⁵⁴ Interview with an official of TİKA, Ankara, 23 June 1996.

⁵⁵ The genesis of the TKAE is described by Key (1967).

- ⁵⁶ Details on the activities of these institutes are available on the Internet. See www.marun.edu.tr/turkiyat/; www.istanbul.edu.tr/enstituler/turkiyat.htm; <http://bornova.ege.edu.tr/~orkunt/tdae> respectively.
- ⁵⁷ For more details see *Eurasian File*, no.107, September 1998/2, p.8.
- ⁵⁸ This figure was indicated by the Chairman of the TİKA in his speech on the occasion of the ceremony marking the sixth anniversary of the establishment of the agency, Ankara, 30 September 1998. The speech is reported in *Eurasian File*, Special Issue, October 1998.
- ⁵⁹ The various projects conducted are described in TİKA's 1995 Annual Report.
- ⁶⁰ These problems were indicated to the authors by Central Asian students in informal discussion that took place in Ankara in March 1999.
- ⁶¹ The four universities are in Simkent and Turkistan (Kazakhstan), in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) and Ashgabad (Turkmenistan).
- ⁶² Fethullah Gülen is a follower of Said Nursi (1873-1960), whose revivalist ideas are documented in an extensive collection of Koran exegesis, making him the founder of a powerful text-based religious movement. Far from being a traditional religious teacher, Fethullah Gülen presides over a large empire of business networks, educational institutions and private media in Turkey and a network of schools on the Balkans, in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. In his teaching he gives priority to the community over individual rights and propagates a pragmatic merger of Turkish nationalism and Islam (Hermann 1996 and Yavuz 1999a and 1999b).
- ⁶³ A substantial confusion prevails about the number of schools opened by Gülen's followers in the Turkic republics (cf. Hermann 1996: 637; Winrow 1996: 138 and Yavuz 1999: 124). According to the Turkish ministry of education the exact number is 79, as reported by Aras (2000: 50).
- ⁶⁴ For a short analysis, see *Briefing*, 'Hodja's Schools and Model Students', Issue 1195, 8 June 1998, p.6.
- ⁶⁵ The language reforms implemented in the early Turkish Republic are well analysed by Lewis (1984: 195-213).
- ⁶⁶ Quoted from Hunter (1996 : 138).