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Introduction

James R. Schlesinger, the current chairman of the Mitre Corporation, and former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as a former Secretary of Defence, spoke at the Fourth Public Hearing on Intelligence and the War on Terrorism in mid 2003. He said: "Intelligence is highly successful in dealing with routine developments. It is, however, particularly prone to failure at the turning points of history. It is perhaps obvious that the problems of intelligence become even harder when we deal with non-Western cultures, amplified when we are attempting to understand those who regard us as infidels. Nonetheless, I believe that we can do better in responding to terrorism. Until now we have not been sufficiently strategic and long term in our analytical efforts. We have relied too much on secret intelligence and too much on country expertise".¹

Schlesinger, as you can see, is concerned with two trends. Firstly the trend towards an over-reliance on country experts in lieu of 'strategic and long term analytical forecasting'. Secondly the dismissal of Open Source Intelligence (OSI) in lieu of an overt and the often dubious, reliance on secret intelligence. Neither Schlesinger, nor myself for that matter, are presenting an argument that advocates one form of analysis over another. Rather, there is a need to keep intelligence agencies diverse in the rigour and scope of their analysis. By now, such recruitment criteria should have responded to such claims, but many allege they have not. During Schlesinger's appearance before the panel on 'Intelligence and the War on Terrorism' he affirmed that 'recruiting the best and the brightest into intelligence positions may mean departing from recruitment criteria used in law enforcement recruitment'. Intellect and diversity is surely the answer.

Country analysts often bring specialist language skills to a job, yet they tend to have an inadequate grasp of strategies and theories of conflict. For this reason a 'linguist', a likely candidate for a country analyst, needs specialist training in 'intelligence analysis and strategic forecasting'. It is crucial for them to be able to

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¹ Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Fourth Public Hearing -- Intelligence and the War on Terrorism, (Tuesday, October 14, 2003, 9:00 a.m).

liaise with international relations (IR) specialists and to understand macro analytical problems stemming from a country or a region. Country analysts must also be alert to tactics such as black-flag operations, and other corrupting counter-intelligence methodologies. And of course, terrorist attacks, terrorism financing, and weapons acquisition are global phenomena, and are rarely isolated within the neat boundaries of a particular country or region. Therefore, intelligence gathering and analysis must be pluralised.

The greater part of this article from this point on, was researched before the invasion of Iraq, and shows the valuable contributions that IR specialists such as John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt could make to security and intelligence.² As both Walt and Mearsheimer stated correctly before the war, Iraq was not a WMD threat to the US. By implication, OSI has demonstrated its worth to intelligence agencies and academics alike. In presenting this analysis, the IR theory known as 'realism' was used to construct a forecast on the likelihood of Iraq posing a WMD threat to the United States (US), prior to the invasion.

Since World War II "realism" in one form or another, has been the dominant way of viewing and understanding the world, to which US foreign policy responds.³ Realism has emerged as the description of the anarchic condition of world politics, where the state is the key actor, where the United Nations (UN), the Papacy, and multinationals like Shell, Bechtel, Raytheon, and the activities of The Rendon Group (TPG) are relatively unimportant compared with the status of state actors. A corollary of the state being a unitary actor is that it acts in a consistent way, without any sign of divided aims. Realism is based on the assumption that states act rationally and that any two states in a similar situation will act in a similar way, regardless of internal politics. Realism holds that the priority of state leaders is to ensure the survival of their state. Realism relies on the use of force to achieve the desired ends only after 'deterrence has failed', for realism is not about war, realism seeks security and order.

Prior to September 11, 2001, realism was the dominant lens through which the George W. Bush Administration viewed the world.⁴ However post-September

2 Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renee Professor of International Affairs and Faculty Chair of the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. John J. Mearsheimer is currently the Professor and the Co-Director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago

3 Ian Wing, Refocusing Concepts on Security: The Convergence of Military and Non-Military Tasks, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 111, November 2000, pp. 7-9.

4 Stephen M. Walt, Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy, *International Security*, V. 26, No. 3, (Winter 2001/02), p. 56.
Aston B. Carter, The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism, *International Security*, V. 26, No. 3, (Winter 2001/02), pp. 5-6.
Aston B. Carter is the Professor of Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and Co-director of the Preventative Defense Project.

11, eminent strategists like John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt in their article "An Unnecessary War" contend that the Bush Administration has changed tactics and has abandoned dominant realism in lieu of an irrational behaviour.⁵ Mearsheimer and Walt contend that the Bush Administration is acting contrary to realist logic in dismissing the merits of deterrence and containment theory, in lieu of an unnecessary use of force against Iraq. They claim that there is simply no compelling strategic rationale for a war on Iraq. This article examines whether Mearsheimer and Walt were correct in asserting that the Bush Administration has abandoned realist logic by dismissing deterrence theory in pursuing the war on Iraq. This article concludes with a methodology to assist intelligence agencies provide 'accurate' advice to Government.

Defining deterrence theory and containment theory

Deterrence is premised on the psychological tactic of a state making credible threats to use a pre-emptive attack, in order to deter an attack from another.⁶ During the Cold War, many realists considered the balance-of-power to be the key to maintaining world order and at the core of this notion was the effectiveness of deterrence and containment theory. The greatest deterrent in the many models of deterrence theory, is considered to be the ability of one state to annihilate another, the desire of the weaker state to ensure their survival thus curbs their aggression toward the vastly more powerful state. Containment theory often runs in parallel with deterrence theory. Containment theory, whilst somewhat outside the scope of this article, is broader than deterrence theory. Containment seeks to contain a state within its existing limits through military, economic and technical assistance to the state's neighbours. Both deterrence and containment became core elements of realist logic during the Cold War, and both strategies are said to have averted nuclear war during the Cold War.

Arguing whether the George W. Bush Administration is realist

The G.W. Bush camp, claims that containment and deterrence have been tried and tested but that these methods have ultimately failed. Kenneth Pollack in supporting a pre-emptive attack on Iraq goes so far as to claim that Saddam Hussein is "unintentionally suicidal".⁷ By this logic the use of force against Iraq is arguably a last resort and adheres with realist logic.

5 John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, An Unnecessary War, Foreign Policy, (January-February 2003).

6 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, London, Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 23.

7 John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, Can Saddam Be Contained? History Says Yes, November 12, 2002, Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, p. 2. Kenneth Pollack is the former director for Gulf affairs at the National Security Council.

Michael Mandelbaum, the author of "The Ideas that Conquered the World" claims that deterrence and containment only worked against the Soviet Union because 400,000 US and allied troops were stationed in Germany.⁸ Thus we should not overstate deterrence.⁹

Proponents of attacking Iraq also claim that Saddam Hussein had defied numerous UN resolutions and had demonstrated that he would not comply with international law. The Bush camp claims that Iraq harbours terrorists, and that Saddam might furnish terrorists like Osama bin Laden with WMD. Furthermore, it was argued that a successful war against Iraq would trigger a wave of democratic reform in the Middle East and in the so-called Axis of Evil countries.¹⁰ These arguments were used to support a preemptive strike against Iraq. They claim that deterrence has failed and, in any event, deterrence will not work on madmen. In order for a claim that the war on Iraq is a last resort, the factual matrix of the Saddam Hussein regime and recent examples of a comparable quality must also be examined.

Saddam can be contained and deterred

Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq from 16 July 1979. Since then, Saddam has been involved in the Iran-Iraq war 1980-88, Iraq unilaterally invaded Kuwait in 1991, Iraq did not fully comply with all demands made in the Gulf War, 1990-91 and Iraq had arguably not complied with US demands in the conflict in 2003. Yet there are six examples by which to demonstrate that the current war is an unnecessary war and that the Bush Administration has abandoned realism.

Firstly, the Iran-Iraq war can hardly be viewed by the George W. Bush Administration as an irrational or an unnecessary war, as the US, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and France all supported Saddam Hussein during this early conflict.¹¹ The Iraqi attack on Iran on September the 22nd of 1980 was a response to a significant threat posed by Iran, who was stronger in military personnel and who was instigating border conflict with Iraq. Iraqi efforts at deterrence had proved ineffective, and lacked the military "annihilation" strength. The Ayatollah

8 National Public Radio, Analysis: Experts Disagree on Whether Containment Would Work in Iraq. Recorded on the 12th of February 2003.

9 With all respect, Mandelbaum's view can be dismissed in a footnote. US response to the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates the effectiveness of deterrence theory and praxis outside of the European theatre. Also, Iraq even with a small WMD arsenal will lack MAD, plus Iraq are lacking in ICBM technology.

10 George W. Bush, 2002 State of the Union Address. Axis of Evil states – Iraq, Iran, North Korea.

11 John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, Can Saddam Be Contained?, as above n7, p. 4.

Khomeini was set to expand revolutionary Islam into Iraq and the region, intelligence suggested that Iran was set to assassinate senior Iraqi officials and Khomeini's propaganda was encouraging the Kurdish minority in Iraq to destabilise Iraq. The war was horrific in its cruelty but was not an attempt at regime change, nor was it irrational in contemporary global equivalent behaviour to border threats. Moreover, how could the US argue otherwise? The US supported Iraq during this conflict.¹²

Being suicidal and/or irrational is an argument for pre-emptive strike in lieu of war as a last resort in the realist repertoire. The logic is that true madmen will not heed the deterrence of their potential annihilation, for they are irrational. Yet if Saddam is insane and/or irrational why was no mention made of this when the US were arming him during the Iran-Iraq war? Surely if Saddam Hussein was mad, then the US could calculate that a madman may attack an ally and would be capable of terrorism in the near future.

Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq conflict but there is a significant feature that distinguishes this event from any conclusion that he would have used WMD against the US.¹³ Iraq did not use chemical weapons against a state which possessed an arsenal capable of annihilating Iraq. This point is crucial to an understanding of the effectiveness of deterrence theory. Iraq's use of chemical weapons has never been tried against a superpower capable of destroying Iraq. The mere possession of a far greater military capability can prevent another state from resorting to an unprovoked or WMD armed-attack.

Secondly, the Kuwait invasion on the 2 August 1990 occurred in circumstances that breached international law. However these circumstances were not irrational. Following the costly Iran-Iraq war, Iraq suffered severe economic downturn due to eight years of funding the war. Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi government believed that Kuwait was obliged to pay Iraq \$10 billion dollars worth of reimbursement to Iraq and was obliged to write off Iraq's debts.¹⁴ The Iraqi premise, held that a vulnerable Kuwait had benefited from the security blanket afforded to Kuwait, in Iraq's effective restraint of the expansionist Iranian regime

¹² John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, *An Unnecessary War*, as above n5, p. 4.

¹³ Aside from conventional weapon aid and intelligence sharing with Iraq, the Reagan Administration allowed and facilitated Iraq's efforts to import and develop Anthrax, West Nile virus, and Botulinal toxin.

UN Resolution 582(1986) *The Situation Between Iran and Iraq*, and also March 1986 – UN Report confirms that Iraq has used chemical weapons,

¹⁴ John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, *Can Saddam Be Contained?*, as above n7, p. 4.

The Iran-Iraq war lasted eight years, and cost the two protagonists (Iran and Iraq) over 1 million casualties and at least \$150 billion.

and should therefore compensate or reimburse Iraq. This logic influenced the invasion of Kuwait. Furthermore, Kuwait was overproducing oil beyond OPEC's quotas and this exacerbated the damage to the Iraqi economy.¹⁵ Saddam Hussein's diplomacy with Kuwait had proved to be ineffective in securing compensation, and thus, to some extent, the invasion of Kuwait served a rational purpose to reboot the Iraqi economy and cannot be considered irrational or insane. Whilst the benefit of hindsight depicts this invasion as doomed to failure, it must be remembered that the US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie was consulted by Saddam prior to the conflict. The US Ambassador showed no alarm regarding the Iraqi intention to invade Kuwait, Glaspie reiterating that the US had no security arrangement with Kuwait. ¹⁶ Thus, when US resistance is taken out of the Kuwait invasion strategy (as per Saddam's plan) then Iraq's actions are not irrational, given the intelligence and assurances available to Saddam Hussein.

Deterrence and containment were never tried by the US prior to the Kuwait invasion, despite US forewarning of the invasion. Thus it is erroneous to use the Kuwait invasion as evidence that Saddam Hussein could not be contained or deterred, as it was never tried. Rather it should be viewed as a US endorsement of the Iraqi strategy to invade Kuwait.

Thirdly, the Gulf War conflict (Operation Desert Storm) in 1991 was an aggressive conflict void of any legitimate attempt of the US towards the using of force as a last resort. US diplomacy was non-existent after Saddam Hussein was misled by the US Ambassador into

invading Kuwait. Thus aside from the significance of the Glaspie incident discussed earlier, Saddam Hussein was obviously aware that he was no match for the US and allies. It is significant that Iraq had strongly indicated an intention to withdraw in compliance with UN Resolutions 660 and 662.¹⁷ Or more accurately, the Gulf War withdrawal is evidence that Saddam was deterred when confronted with the threat of overwhelming military assault by the US. Once again, when history is read in this context, it demonstrates that deterrence theory works against Saddam. Iraq did withdraw, and did not resort to the use of WMD against Israel or the US. The actual military force that was used by Iraq was merely a gesture to avoid Saddam's classification as weak in the face of US imperial power.

A crucially important tactic, to ensure conflict in the first Gulf War, was the lack of opportunity for Iraq to withdraw on neutral terms. That is, demanding an

¹⁵ Adel Darwish, Gregory Alexander, *Unholy Babylon: The Secret History of Saddam's War*, 1991, London, Victor Gollancz Ltd, pp. 254-6.

¹⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, *Can Saddam Be Contained?*, as above n7, p. 5.

¹⁷ Adel Darwish, Gregory Alexander, *Unholy Babylon: The Secret History of Saddam's War*, as above n15, pp. 308-310.

immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. The US complicated this ultimatum with the demand that Saddam leave all military equipment behind and then leave Kuwait. This inflexible ultimatum placed Saddam in the dilemma where he could not withdraw without losing face to a loathed imperial power. Thus, to some extent it could be calculated that Saddam did not comply entirely and used some conventional methods of attack in an attempt to inflict several thousands US casualties, so that he might be able to negotiate an honourable retreat.¹⁸ To this end, Iraq fired conventionally armed SCUD missiles at both Saudi Arabia and Israel whilst retreating. Yet, if Saddam was a truly a madman (and therefore could not be contained nor deterred for madmen are irrational), then Saddam would then have resorted to using the chemical and biological weapons which Iraq supposedly possessed. An irrational Saddam would also have used nuclear weapons if he still possessed them. Yet history shows that Saddam did not use WMD against the US or Israel. It thus seems that deterrence in the form of a US nuclear strike if Iraq resorted to using WMD, was a sufficient deterrence to Saddam in the first Gulf War.

In passing it must also be noted that no conflict negotiator could seriously contend that tabling an overt lose/lose scenario to an invading state in a volatile region like the Middle East, is an effective tactic to secure an immediate compliance to peacefully withdraw. This was not a model effort at US deterrence.

Fourth, Saddam's propensity to violence is no worse than many of his regional neighbours. Egypt has fought six wars between 1948 and 1973, Mearsheimer and Walt claim that Egypt played a crucial role in starting four of them. Israel has initiated war on three occasions, has been in breach of international law since 1967 and treats the civilian Palestinians in a manner comparable to the Iraqi treatment of Kurds in Iraq.¹⁹ It can be extrapolated that if Saddam was as irrational as those endorsing pre-emptive strike insist upon then Iraq would be vastly more belligerent than its neighbours. Iraq would also have a vastly worse record of human rights abuse than the regional neighbours. Saddam is a heinous serial violator of human rights, but Iraq's human rights record is comparable to those in Iran, or Saudi Arabia for example. Iraq was considered regionally socially progressive as a welfare state. Fifth, in February 1998, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan negotiated an agreement with Iraq to resume weapons inspections. In quid pro quo terms Iraq

18 Daryl G. Press, *The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare*, *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2, MIT Press, (Fall 2001), pp. 15-16.

19 Three interstate attacks initiated by Israel: The Suez War 1956, the Six Day War in 1967, and the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon on the 6th of June 1982.

UN Press GA/9793, General Assembly Demands End to Violence In Occupied Palestinian Territory: Urges Action To Implement Sharm El-Sheikh Accord.

received promises that the UN would consider removing its economic sanctions. Inspections continued until August when Iraq then severed ties with weapons inspectors, claiming that the UN had not moved towards lifting sanctions. There is evidence that the UN was taking an extraordinary amount of time to lift these sanctions which were devastating the Iraqi people. Yet the significance of the 1998 agreement is once again illustrative that diplomacy could draw concessions from Saddam Hussein. Saddam did not resort to blackmail through the threat of using WMD in order to get sanctions lifted.

Sixth, how likely was it really that Saddam would supply WMD to Osama bin Laden? Prior to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, Bin Laden was warning the Middle East that Saddam was going to invade, and offered to use his army to fight Saddam after Saudi Arabia was attacked.²⁰ On the 11 February 2003, Reuters published a message believed to be from the fugitive Osama bin Laden, warning Arab nations against supporting a war on Iraq (as threatened by the United States), and branding Saddam Hussein an infidel.²¹ If this intelligence is to be believed then there was little reason to fear that Saddam would supply Bin Laden with WMD, Bin Laden wanted to kill Hussein!²² Similar analysis demonstrates how unlikely it was that Saddam would arm other terrorist organisations with WMD.²³ Unlike Khomeini and Osama bin Laden, Saddam was not a radical religious fundamentalist, he was a secular leader. Iraq has at times harboured terrorist organisations but has traditionally shown little aggression towards the US.²⁴ Thus, unless US pressure pushed radical fundamentalists and Saddam into a coalition camp, then Saddam was unlikely to fund state terrorism or independent terrorist organisations who inherently despise secularism. Furthermore Saddam is a realist, deterrence theory dictates that Saddam would fear that any WMD transfers to terrorists might be detected by the US.²⁵ This would expose Iraq to total annihilation from the US. Realist logic dictates that a rational Saddam would not facilitate an arms transfer of WMD to terrorists.

20 Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*, 2001, London, Orion Publishing, pp. 84-86.

21 Samia Nakhoul, Bin Laden labels Saddam an Infidel – Jazeera TV, AWSE, 'Bin Laden' calls for Iraqi resistance,

22 Scott Ritter, William Rivers Pitt, *War: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You To Know On Iraq*, NSW, 2002, Allen & Unwin, p. 45.

23 Ibid. pp. 23-40.

24 John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, *Can Saddam Be Contained?*, as above n7, p. 1.

25 John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, *An Unnecessary War*, as above n5, p. 7.

Conclusion

By using OSI and IR theory, Mearsheimer and Walt contend by analogy that if the USSR could be contained during the Cold War through implementing mutually assured destruction (MAD), then the unilateral destruction of Iraq with minimal Iraqi retaliation, would surely be a greater deterrent than MAD.²⁶ It wasn't so difficult to contain and deter Saddam, he was not that powerful and he was not that aggressive.²⁷ There was no need to conquer and occupy Iraq to ensure that Iraq did not acquire WMD, as Saddam never has, and probably never will, attack the US with WMD, whereas the US has demonstrated that it can annihilate Iraq. They figured that the only foreseeable action that would result in Saddam using WMD (assuming he had not destroyed them as many analysts believed was the case) was in response to US efforts at regime change or during a serious attempt to kill him.

The Bush Administration claims that deterrence would not work, as Saddam was too irrational for deterrence to be effective. Saddam's own history demonstrates that this claim is inaccurate. Despite US propaganda to the contrary, the US cannot trick realism, and history now reflects the accuracy of this assertion. For the logic of realism dictates that the US is only tricking itself, at its own possible peril, by acting against logical parameters such as "realism". In its self-delusion, the flawed Bush Administration's vision has created hatred towards itself around the world. Much of the world perceives the US aggression as being constituted of hidden agendas. There are many examples and many failures. The original agenda of the US war against terrorism, to capture Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, was unlikely to succeed. Apolitical intelligence suggested Bin Laden would not be found in Afghanistan; the US failed to ratify to the International Criminal Court (ICC); the US intention to withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty; the failure to find WMD in Iraq despite the war being conducted for this purported purpose, breaching international law in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter in attacking Iraq; the arrogant claims of "if you're not with us you're against us", and facilitating Israel's atrocities against Palestinian civilians.²⁸ All these collectively

26 James M. Lindsay, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Correspondence: Limited National and Allied Missile Defense, International Security, No 1.26, Vol. 4, MIT Press, (Spring 2002), pp. 190-1.

27 National Public Radio, Interview: John Mearsheimer discusses the policy of containment and how it should be applied by the US with regards to Saddam Hussein, February 9, 2003, National Public Radio, www.npr.com.

28 Stephen Zunes, United Nations Security Council Resolutions Currently Being Violated by Countries Other Than Iraq, Foreign Policy in Focus, October 2, 2002, - Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, Second Edition, 2000, Oxford University Press, p. 169.

- United Nations Economic and Social Council, Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, including Palestine, Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2003/6, E/CN.4/RES/2003/6; E/CN.4/2003/L.11/Add.1 15 April 2003, "Expressing its grave concern at the continued Israeli refusal to abide by the resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights calling upon Israel to put an end to the violations of human rights and affirming the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, occupied by Israel since 1967."

amount to a confusing and widely hated US foreign policy.²⁹ Such behaviour fuels resentment and breeds terrorism in failed and failing states, it creates sympathy in developed states towards Iraq and is more likely to create a clash of civilisations than an invasion and regime change is likely to prevent.³⁰ This creates a severe problem for any democracy. Democracies are especially vulnerable to terrorism and sleeper 'terrorist' cells, as the chance of detection is less likely in a democracy and the penalties for terrorist acts are normally less severe.³¹ Yet the most disappointing aspect of the Bush Administration's departure from realism, is that, prior to the 2000 election, George W. Bush seemed to understand the merits of using force as a last resort. In the second debate of the 2000 presidential campaign, Bush had declared that other states would be attracted to a United States that was strong but humble; they would be repulsed, if the nation were to use its power in an "arrogant" fashion.³²

Mearsheimer, Walt and many others seek to prevent civilian deaths and avoid nuclear, chemical or biological destruction, just like the misguided pre-emptive strike advocates search for security. Yet when the Bush Administration misread history and keenly dismiss realism's deterrence theory and its praxis, this then inevitably fuels threats to innocent lives and breeds the non-state al-Qaeda style terrorism that (non-realist) pre-emptive strike strategies will fail to combat.³³ Serious attempts at deterrence through using war only as a last resort, will save on unnecessary billion dollar wars, like that currently occurring in Iraq.³⁴ And the less imperialist realist notion of deterrence in lieu of invasion, can avert more high, medium and low level terrorism than pre-emptive strikes void of serious attempts at diplomacy, ever can or will.³⁵ Finally and to reiterate my earlier point, the use of IR theory and OSI, such as that developed in this article, should not occur at the expense of secret

intelligence and constant country specific and regional analysis. For instance, Arab language skills, used in country specific analysis are invaluable

29 John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, Can Saddam Be Contained?, as above n7, 23-24. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Protocol to the Treaty, Manuel Perez-Rivas, U.S. Quits ABM Treaty.

Adel Darwish, Unholy Babylon, as above n15, p. 57.

BBC News, Blix: 'US Undermined Inspectors', BBC News (World edition).

30 Reference drawn to Samuel P. Huntington's theme in his book the "Clash of Civilizations". Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and The Remaking of World Order, 1996, New York, Simon and Schuster.

31 Paul Medhurst, The Phenomenon of Terrorism: Global Terrorism training manual, UNITAR Training Programme, 2000, UNITAR, p. 24.

32 Stephen M. Walt, American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls, Naval War College Review, Vol. LV, No. 2, (Spring 2002), p. 21.

33 Graham Allison, "Saddam's Oil", Wall Street Journal, (15 September 2002).

Carl Kaysen, Steven E. Miller, Martin B. Malin, William D. Nordhaus, John D. Steinbruner, War with Iraq, 2002, Committee on International Security Studies.

34 Stephen M. Walt, John J. Mearsheimer, Keeping Saddam in a Box, New York Times (02 Feb 2003).

35 Graham Allison, as above n33.

and are also deserving of urgent attention by intelligence recruitment branches. Thus, IR theories and OSI should complement secret intelligence and should serve to provide a logical framework against which country experts should test their analysis. After all, by mid 2004, there has been a failure to find WMDs in Iraq, the link between Al-Qaeda has never been substantiated, and when Saddam Hussein was finally caught in his spider hole in Adwar, no remote WMD detonating device was found with him. This article, researched before the war demonstrates that in all likelihood no WMDs would be found in Iraq. Or at the very least, Saddam Hussein posed no threat to the US. Many realists expected such an outcome to occur.

The Bush Administration's resulting embarrassment stems directly from their own effort to politicise the intelligence community. Thereby, the intelligence community either misread much of the intelligence on Iraq or facilitated the politicisation of that intelligence. Those few strong characters who provided accurate apolitical risk assessments were simply not taken seriously.

For those who are concerned with national security based on intelligence rather than partisan politics, the path to security lies in ensuring efficient intelligence collection and assessment, with appropriate quality controls in place. Such quality control will help to ensure that intelligence is as 'apolitical' and 'accurate' as possible. Quality control methods, of which "realism" is an example, should be provided by either IR specialists working in unison with country analysts, or by country analysts trained in the application of IR theories. A failure to pursue serious quality control in intelligence and, the tendency of governments to politicise their own intelligence agencies' methodology and advice, should be accepted as an insult to the nation they are employed to protect, and a costly waste of time, resources and potentially innocent lives.