

40600



YOUTH IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS: FROM RISK TO OPPORTUNITY




Gloria La Cava and Sarah Michael



Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development
(ECSSD)
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) Region
The World Bank

2006





Copyright © 2006
The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development /The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433, USA

The World Bank enjoys copyright under protocol 2 of the Universal Copyright Convention. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this document are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations or the members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent.

Published in Russia by Alex Publishers
ISBN 5-9618-0035-0

Youth in the Northern Caucasus: From Risk to Opportunity
Gloria La Cava and Sarah Michael
ECSSD/ ECA
2006








TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword	5
Acknowledgements	6
Acronyms	7
Executive Summary	8
Chapter 1: Promoting the School-to-Work Transition and Youth Inclusion – Context, Concepts and Objectives	17
<i>Youth Development in the Russian Federation: A Challenging Context</i>	<i>17</i>
<i>Study Rationale</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Objectives and Audience</i>	<i>19</i>
<i>Analytic Framework</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>Structure of the Report</i>	<i>20</i>
Chapter 2: The Evolving Socioeconomic Situation of Youth in the Russian Federation	21
<i>The School-to-Work Transition</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>Education issues</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>Employment issues</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Healthy Lifestyles</i>	<i>26</i>
<i>Youth Participation</i>	<i>29</i>
Chapter 3: Risks and Opportunities Facing Youth in the North Caucasus	31
<i>The School-to-Work Transition</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Education issues</i>	<i>32</i>
<i>Employment issues</i>	<i>34</i>
<i>Healthy Lifestyles</i>	<i>37</i>
<i>Youth Participation</i>	<i>40</i>
<i>Recreation</i>	<i>40</i>
<i>Political awareness and participation</i>	<i>41</i>
<i>Participation in religious and ethnic communities</i>	<i>42</i>
<i>Security and Conflict</i>	<i>44</i>
<i>Youth Needs and Strategies for Addressing Youth Priorities</i>	<i>45</i>
Chapter 4: Institutional Framework for Youth Policy Development and Implementation	47
<i>Youth Policy at the Federal Level</i>	<i>47</i>
<i>Youth Policy at the Regional Level</i>	<i>50</i>
<i>Youth Policy in the North Caucasus</i>	<i>52</i>
<i>Strategy for State Youth Policy in the Russian Federation</i>	<i>55</i>
Chapter 5: A Policy Roadmap for More Effective School-to-Work Transition and Youth Inclusion in the North Caucasus	57
<i>Education and Lifelong Learning</i>	<i>58</i>
<i>Active Labor Market Programs</i>	<i>61</i>
<i>Healthy Lifestyles</i>	<i>63</i>
<i>Youth Participation in Decision Making</i>	<i>64</i>



<i>Security and Conflict Prevention</i>	66
<i>The Building Blocks of More Effective Youth Policy</i>	66
<i>Bibliography</i>	72
<i>Appendix A. Youth Indicators: Summary Table for the Russian Federation and North Caucasus</i>	78
<i>Appendix B. Profiles of Selected North Caucasus Regions and Republics</i>	81
<i>Appendix C. Summary of Interview Statistics</i>	84



FOREWORD

This study, *Youth in the Northern Caucasus: From Risk to Empowerment*, examines the socioeconomic situation of young people in the North Caucasus and the Russian Federation as a whole. The North Caucasus is the most disadvantaged region of Russia, characterized by high poverty levels, a large youth population, high youth employment, poor educational preparation for the job market, and numerous security risks.

Given the rapid aging of the Russian population, the North Caucasus has a precious asset for the future: young people. It is the youngest region of the country in terms of population. The path that young people in this region follow in transitioning from school to work — their educational preparation, ability to integrate into the labor market and success in meeting emerging and evolving labor demands — will significantly affect their ability to contribute positively to the economy, as well as to the social cohesion of the country as a whole.

The Russian Federation, both on a federal and regional government levels is increasing its attention to youth policy issues. This report builds on the positive experience of youth policy and programming in the country and recommends a comprehensive approach to youth inclusion and empowerment, including larger and better-targeted investments for youth. The study emphasizes the need to build capacity for youth programming at municipal and republic levels to effectively address the needs of young people. It is encouraging to note that a critical mass of young people and youth champions exist in the North Caucasus who are highly motivated to overcome the challenges before them. Immediate progress can be made on many fronts—education, the school-to-work transition, health, and the security environment—by engaging these young people as partners in the development process. This report is an important step in this direction.

Kristalina Georgieva
Country Director, Russian Federation
World Bank

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was designed and written by Gloria La Cava and Sarah Michael (ECSSD), with the support of Isak Froumin. The team benefited from the overall support and guidance of Kristalina Georgieva (Country Director, Russian Federation) and Maninder Gill (Sector Manager, Social Development). Lola Ibragimova provided important research assistance and administrative support throughout the study. A background paper for the study was commissioned from the Social Policy Team of the Institute for Urban Economics in Moscow. Vladimir Krasnoslobodtsev (Moscow State University) and Vladimir Najman provided useful research background materials.

Many World Bank colleagues also contributed to the research and analysis contained in this report. We are particularly grateful to: Andrei Markov, Tatyana Leonova, Maria Zhorova, Andrei Salnikov and Marina Vassilieva. Peer review comments on the report and the project concept note were provided by Andrei Markov, Linda McGinnis, Jean Fares, Patricio Marquez, Joana Godinho and the Council of Europe (Dr. Galina Kupriyanova).

The support provided to the study team by colleagues in the North Caucasus was crucial – this study would not have been possible without their efforts on our behalf. The team would particularly like to thank Carel De Rooy, Tullio Santini, Oyunsaihin Dendevnorov, Fatima Yandieva, Marina Dzaurova, Satsita Eskieva, Murad Tangiev, Murad Shishkanov (UNICEF Russia), Stanislaw Sliwak, Maxim Kamarzaev, Vladimir Petrov, Olga Komarova and colleagues (UNDSS), Ute Enderlein (WHO) and Christine Ash (CARE Canada).

The Ministry of Education (Department of Youth Policy) and the President's Envoy to the Southern Federal District were the main government counterparts for this study in the Russian Federation. The team is also grateful to all senior officials at the Ministry of Youth of the Republic of Ingushetia and the Ministry of Youth of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria for their overall support and open information sharing.

The design of the study was also enriched through a March 2005 in-country consultation that included Natalia Shorikova and Elena Lenskaya (British Council), Sergey Khaikin (Institute of Social Marketing), Vladimir Zhurko and Olga Divnenko (Institute of the International Socio-Humanitarian Links), Yuri Gavrilov (International Center of the Financial Economics Development) and Lyubov Babaitseva (New Eurasia Foundation).

Field work was diligently carried out by a local research team led by Eitan Trabin (Center for Peacemaking and International Development) and Alexander Dzadziev and included regional coordinators Gul'nara Akhmedova, Marina Zhaboeva, Mir Khadzhimuratov, Khanifa Nal'gieva, Maya Astvaturova and Igor Dulaev. Without their exceptional commitment to the project, this study could not have been completed.

The team would like to especially thank the hundreds of young people, youth organizations, local government officials, civil society and donor representatives and other stakeholders throughout the Russian Federation and the North Caucasus region who so generously shared their opinions, experiences and time through interviews with our research teams. Their contribution to this report is the most significant of all.

ACRONYMS

APO	All-Union Pioneers Organization (Vsesouznaya pionerskaya organizatsiya)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
EU	European Union
FTP	Federal Targeted Programs
GONGO	Governmental non-governmental organization
GOSKOMSTAT	Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation (Federalnaya sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki Rossiskoi Federatsii)
GTZ	German Agency for International Development
GRP	Gross Regional Product
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
IDP	internally displaced person
IDRC	International Development Research Center
ILO	International Labour Organization
IRC	Innocenti Research Center (of UNICEF)
KOMSOMOL	Communist Union of Youth
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PISA	Program for International Student Assessment (of the OECD)
QED	quality education data
RF	Russian Federation
RUBL	ruble
USD	United States dollar
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Scientific, Education and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
WHO	World Health Organization

Executive Summary

This report explores the evolving socioeconomic situation and needs of young people in the Russian Federation from the point of young people themselves, particularly those in the North Caucasus region. Young people are an asset for the social and economic development of their communities, but supporting them in this role requires a multi-dimensional holistic approach to youth inclusion and the transition to adulthood.

The North Caucasus is the most disadvantaged region in the Russian Federation. The region is characterized by high levels of poverty (over 40 percent in Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan);¹ large youth populations (21 percent in Southern Russia and 36 percent in the Republic of Ingushetia);² poor educational preparation for the job market and low youth employment rates (26.5 percent in the Southern Federal Region as a whole³); significant linguistic and ethnic diversity; and the presence of numerous security risks, including that of violent conflict and religious extremism.

In addition to unsuccessful school-to-work transitions, youth nationwide, as well as in the North Caucasus face an array of growing health risks that include substance abuse, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), the spread of infectious diseases (including HIV/AIDS), lack of knowledge about health issues, and, in Ingushetia, malnutrition.

Despite acute development gaps, the North Caucasus has a major asset that Russian Federation as a whole does not: young people. It is the region of the country with the youngest population. The Russian State Committee for Statistics estimates that the population of the Russian Federation in 2006 is 142.5 million,

down from almost 148.3 million in 1996—a decrease of roughly 5 million over a ten-year period.⁴ The population is, moreover, currently decreasing by approximately 700,000 a year.⁵ Not only are fewer people being born in Russia—the current fertility rate is below the replacement level—but many working-age members of the population are dying at young ages due to a catastrophic rise in non-communicable diseases (especially cardiovascular disease) and injuries.⁶

Given these demographic trends, young people are a precious human asset for national development. Effective health practices that assure longevity, education that prepares young people for the job market, and peace and tolerance initiatives that improve regional security must, however, begin at an early age. To address the interrelated educational, health and livelihood needs of young people in the North Caucasus and the Russian Federation as a whole, this report advocates a multidimensional youth policy, implemented through greater support to the school-to-work transition, non-formal education and youth participation in decision-making processes.

Due to the economic limitations of the region, strengthening youth policy will require significantly greater funding. This report demonstrates, however, that a critical mass of young people and youth champions exist in the North Caucasus who are both aware of its social, economic and political problems and highly motivated to overcome them. Immediate progress can be made on many fronts—education, the school-to-work transition, health, and the security environment—by engaging young people as partners in the development process.

¹ World Bank (2004a).

² GOSKOMSTAT (2004a).

³ Agranovich et al (2005).

⁴ Russian Federal State Statistics Service (2006).

⁵ Chivers (2006).

⁶ World Bank (2005c), 9.

Key Findings

The analytic framework used by this report assumes that youth risks are not evenly distributed across the life cycle. Left unaddressed, these risks can have prolonged and irreversible consequences later in life. The key findings of the study are:

Federal level

- The federal government was ranked first by young people in the Russian Federation in terms of the institutions whose assistance would be most useful to them (ahead of parents, local authorities, etc). However, young people identified unemployment, substance abuse and a lack of leisure opportunities as priority youth problems of which the government is either unaware or has failed to adequately address.⁷
- All young people identified the lack of opportunities to participate in decision-making processes as a major constraint. More than 80 percent of young people think that the government should provide support to youth organizations. This finding indicates that there is fertile ground to productively engage young people in the design and implementation of youth policy and, more broadly, the decisions that affect their lives.
- Local youth experience and needs remain at the margins of federally funded youth programs. Existing federal youth programs favor large, interregional programs that serve 40 or more subjects of the Federation; these programs require regional and local governments to shoulder the lion's share of funding.
- To date, Federal Targeted Programs for youth have proven ineffective and have failed to channel funds to the poorest and highest-need regions of the North Caucasus.

North Caucasus

- Youth in the North Caucasus have the highest rate of idleness (percentage of youth neither in school nor work) in the country, ranging from two to seven times the national average of 10 percent.
- The biggest obstacle to youth employment is the skills mismatch between the educational sys-

tem and the job market, together with corruption in the educational system. Too many youth are being trained in professions in which there are no jobs. As a result, young people desperately need practical job experience and skills.

- Young people are interested and motivated to pursue self-employment, but require additional support and training to do so.
- Whereas most young people in the region strongly identify with their religious traditions, they clearly recognize the threat of Islamic extremism. They advocate higher-quality private religious education and better training of religious leaders as potential means of combating extremism.
- In addition to Islamic extremism, young people consider the corruption of republic and local authorities, including local police forces, an important security threat to their communities.

An integrated youth policy requires greater levels of funding, more effective and better-targeted investments, and additional innovative instruments. The federal government in particular has a unique role to play in balancing the limited resources of poorer subjects of the Russian Federation, where youth needs are high. To build an integrated youth policy, Russia needs to establish:

- More substantial investments. Increasing the magnitude of youth investments is vital, particularly in poorer regions. The US\$12 million allocated to the last Federal Targeted Program for youth is a marginal sum for a country as large and diverse as the Russian Federation.
- Better-targeted and implemented programs. Programs should be explicitly targeted to poorer and conflict-affected regions.
- Strong monitoring and evaluation systems to oversee the expenditures and outcomes of youth programs.
- More transparent national funding of regions, based on a youth index comprised of demographics, conflict levels, and health and living standards. Priorities and procedures for allocating national funds need to be clearly established in order to expand regional government access to these funds.
- Decentralization. Overly centralized programming will reinforce inadequate participation by

⁷ Public Opinion Foundation (2002g).

- local stakeholders and make it difficult for regional administrations to access federal funding, particularly in the poorest areas.
- Enhanced governmental capacity for youth programming at all levels. The capacity building need is particularly urgent at local levels due to the weakness of municipal administrations.
 - Greater inclusion of youth stakeholders. Capacity building of youth organizations, consultative committees and youth NGOs is needed to develop channels through which youth can participate in the creation and implementation of youth programs.
 - Funding accessibility for local youth NGOs and foundations. Current youth programming precludes funding local organizations with substantial expertise on youth issues, including local NGOs.
 - Multipurpose youth centers. An integrated youth policy can be best implemented via youth centers that offer life and livelihood skills development; preventive and mental health services; social and cultural services; and opportunities for youth to participate in public life.
 - Targeted investments are needed in non-formal education, second-chance education, as well as job training and internship programs, to reduce the mismatch between education and the job market.

Problems Youth Face

High unemployment, poor educational preparation and corruption shape the school-to-work transition of many young people in the Russian Federation. Young people in the North Caucasus face many of the same issues, as well as increasing poverty and worsening health status. In fact, the Southern Federal Region (which includes the North Caucasus) consistently has the lowest youth development indicators of any federal region. Youth in the region also face a unique set of contextual challenges, including socioeconomic inequalities, political marginalization, ethnic and religious tensions and conflict.

Difficult school-to-work transition

Youth unemployment rates nationwide (26 percent in 2001) remain more than double adult

rates. There is wide disparity across regions, but rates of idleness in the North Caucasus—that is, being unemployed and not in school—run two to seven times the national average. Overall employment of 15–24-year-olds in the Russian Federation was 34.1 percent in 2002, but only 26.5 percent in the Southern Federal Region—the lowest proportion of employed youth nationwide.⁸

The three regions of the country with the worst youth employment rates are all located in the North Caucasus: Ingushetia (5.8 percent), Dagestan (13.1 percent) and Chechnya (15 percent). Gender differences are higher in both education and employment in the North Caucasus, with only 61 percent of 17-year-old girls enrolled in school and the female labor activity rate in several republics below 50 percent.

Unfortunately, education does little to change the employment picture. Like their peers nationwide, young people in the region feel that neither secondary nor tertiary education is giving them the skills and experience needed for the contemporary job market. The mismatch between education and the job market is greatest for young people who had completed tertiary education.

Throughout the region, resource constraints at the republic level have resulted in insufficient facilities and unmotivated and underpaid teachers. Teacher quality at all levels is reported to be low. Secondary school students in particular complain of poor skills, inappropriate teaching methods, and unprofessional behavior. Interregional and rural-urban disparities in school completion rates and attainment levels are high. The scale and depth of corruption in the educational system in the North Caucasus surpasses that of the country as a whole, with personal connections, bribes and unofficial payments needed to ensure entrance to university and, thereafter, to pass exams.⁹

⁸ Agranovich et al (2005).

⁹ With respect to higher education, the pervasive need for bribes may result from the shortage of student places in the North Caucasus. The national average of 1.2 college seats per high school graduate across the Russian Federation falls to 0.6 seats in Chechnya and Kabardino-Balkaria, 0.7 in Ingushetia and 0.8 in Dagestan (Agranovich et al 2005).

Among unemployed youth in the North Caucasus, lack of contacts or money with which to bribe employers was cited as the greatest obstacle to finding a job, followed by skills mismatch and lack of experience. Few young people use job notices to find employment; most rely on personal networks. Given the bleak outlook for the job market in the North Caucasus, the majority of young people surveyed were willing to relocate in order to find a job. Rural youth were particularly focused on relocating to urban centers within the region.

Young people across all regions were interested in pursuing self-employment. When asked how they would spend additional income, large numbers of young people said that they would use such monies to start their own business (e.g., 89 percent of respondents in Stavropol and Ingushetia).

Unhealthy lifestyles

Apart from sports and exercise, young people in the North Caucasus have little awareness of what healthy lifestyles entail and few opportunities to consult with health professionals in confidential settings. Health education in schools is severely constrained, often by cultural inhibitions, leaving television and mass media (such as magazines) the main source of young people's knowledge on health issues. Youth in the region clearly express interest in learning about a wide range of health issues, including cancers, reproductive health, substance abuse and, most especially, HIV/AIDS and sexually-transmitted diseases. Their inability both to access and trust medical professionals has serious repercussions, such as failing to seek medical treatment for tuberculosis.

Young people consistently identified substance abuse, particularly drug abuse, as an important health problem in their lives and cited unemployment and idleness as the major cause. This finding highlights the need for an integrated approach to education, employment and health issues. Although domestic violence was not highlighted as a health problem by a significant number of interview respondents, it was identified as a seri-

ous problem in focus groups with young women on gender issues.¹⁰

Lack of youth participation in decision-making processes

Young people nationwide identified the lack of avenues and/or vehicles through which they could participate in the political system as a key challenge. While young people in the North Caucasus are interested in local happenings and politics, for example, their participation in local decision-making and politics is negligible.¹¹ The majority of respondents surveyed for this report did not know of a single organization, which worked with young people in their communities.¹² Young people also felt that the youth departments of political parties were ineffective in reaching out to young people and that the region overall lacked youth unions capable of training youth leaders and interacting with decision makers.

Security and conflict

Young people in the North Caucasus perceive the corruption of police and other authorities, terrorism and religious extremism as equally serious threats to their security. This finding suggests that authorities can promote security not simply by policing actions, but also by committing to higher standards of police integrity and transparency. Despite tensions in the region, the majority of young people interviewed felt safe in their local communities. However, a recent survey in Chechnya and Ingushetia, for example, found that 70 percent of people have experienced emotional or physical trauma related to conflict.

The vast majority of young people surveyed in the region identified themselves as belonging to a religious faith, but with the exception of Ingushetia, considered their ethnic or geographic community as their primary identification. In focus groups in

¹⁰ Focus Groups: June 5, 7, 10, and 13, 2005.

¹¹ This mirrors the overall trend of low Russian youth participation in politics (see Chapter 2).

¹² Interestingly, however, young people's awareness of youth organizations was higher in several North Caucasus republics than in Russia overall, where only 33 percent of 18-35 year olds knew of the existence of a local youth organization. Public Opinion Foundation (2005b).

Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria, young people saw the potential for religious values to provide a new foundation for more honest relationships in their republics, replacing the current crime- and corruption-ridden system. Although religion is of growing importance to young people, many youth were quick to point out their aversion to religious extremism. Some young people also pointed out that the methods used by authorities to address the threat of the extremism often resulted in the oppression of Muslims by the state.

Solutions Governments Should Offer

Current Federal Targeted Programs for youth in the Russian Federation are insufficiently funded, require hefty regional and local contributions, and focus on large, interregional implementation. Such programs do not adequately address regional disparities, nor do they encourage local stakeholders to participate in the design and implementation of youth programs.

Youth in the North Caucasus, as elsewhere in the country, consistently request programming for employment services; investments are also urgently needed in both formal education and non-formal learning opportunities. Other programming frequently requested by young people in the region included recreational opportunities (particularly programs accessible to girls), health outreach, greater opportunities to interact with government, and new youth organizations.

Increase federal funding and transparency

Youth policy financial resources are extremely scarce and fail to match the scope of youth needs in the country. If Russia is to address the serious issues of the school-to-work transition, financially more ambitious, better targeted, and more effective programming is needed. While all Russian regions allocate funds for youth policies and programs, the poorer North Caucasus republics receive no federal funding and have the lowest per-capita spending on youth. The ability of these republics to generate local resources for youth investments is very limited.

Because regional and local allocations make up the greatest proportion of funding for Federally-

Targeted Programs (FTPs) aimed at youth, poorer regions and localities are at a distinct disadvantage. Competitions for program funding, moreover, favor large-scale, inter-regional activities involving 40 or more subjects of the Russian Federation. Smaller-scale, community-based youth initiatives are essentially left out.

Overall implementation and coordination of Russian youth policy should be the responsibility of an autonomous governmental body responsible for youth issues on federal level. The FTP *South of Russia* program could become an important source of financing and support for youth policies in the region if it could incorporate earmarked funding and transparently monitor results.

Improve targeting and implementation of federal funding

Several of the 53 FTPs active in 2005 relate to young people in the Russian Federation. *Youth of Russia*, for example, assisted young families, encouraged youth enterprises, supported sports and leisure, and disseminated information to youth. However, the program's effectiveness and impact was limited because it did not have a clear strategic policy framework, a well-defined and prioritized set of objectives, transparent mechanisms of regional targeting, or demand-driven mechanisms and selection criteria to ensure adequate and equitable implementation of youth investments.

The new Strategy for State Youth Policy may give youth policy development higher visibility and more adequate financial resources, if it can correct current lack of transparency and regional gaps. In particular, federal youth programming should consider using a regional youth index based on the percentage of youth population and indicators such as the security situation, health and living standard indicators (e.g., incidence of HIV/AIDS and regional poverty index). A similar index could be applied to regional allocations to municipalities and youth-related organizations.

Youth strategy implementation needs a clear institutional development component to address capacity building needs at all levels, particularly

the local level. Capacity building should enable regional and local authorities to effectively use allocated youth resources in a transparent and participatory way, as well as enable local youth organizations to absorb and manage those funds. It would be similarly beneficial to finance a youth fund that could support proven local NGOs with a strong thematic focus (e.g., HIV/AIDS, drug abuse prevention, environmental awareness, rehabilitation of young offenders, etc.), putting federal funding in the hands of knowledgeable local stakeholders. Such a fund could be used to scale up and make innovative, small-scale initiatives funded by international organizations and regional administrations more locally sustainable.

Finally, the government needs a rigorous monitoring and evaluation system for expenditures and outcomes of regional youth investments, based on indicators such as the proportion of young people completing full upper secondary education; young people's level of knowledge and skills at the end of the school-to-work transition phase; idleness and unemployment rates of teenagers and young adults; equitable distribution of outcomes by gender, social background and region).¹³

Improve education and promote life-long learning

Given significant regional disparities in secondary and tertiary educational attainment in the Russian Federation, specifically tailored education investments should be aimed at disadvantaged areas in the Southern Okrug that have overcrowding and low educational outcomes (e.g., Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, where secondary school completion rates are substantially lower than the national average).

Greater investment in these regions should also incorporate several measures to increase the relevance of secondary education to the skills required by the contemporary job market: less strictly vocational education, stronger links between general and vocational education, and new combinations of school and work-based

¹³ OECD (2000).

learning. Investments in poorer regions should also fund additional school facilities, improved teacher training, educational subsidies, targeted scholarships (especially for rural students and girls), conditional cash transfers, student loans programs and, where malnourishment is widespread, school lunches.¹⁴

In addition, improved transparency and reduced corruption are crucial to improving the educational system in the North Caucasus. Greater student participation in school/faculty life in institutions of higher education, along the lines of the *Education Innovation Loan* piloted in the Russian Federation, should be replicated in the region to increase the accountability of teachers and school administrators and give students greater influence over the allocation of merit-based student stipends and curriculum design. Finally, an external university entrance examination should be introduced in the North Caucasus republics.

Although improving the formal education system is crucial, non-formal ethnically integrated learning programs are also needed to give young people work experience and job skills. Multipurpose youth centers that offer life and livelihood skills, non-formal education and second-chance learning programs, health services, and peace and tolerance programs can be especially beneficial for idle youth in the Northern Caucasus.

Fund active labor market programs

Given the financial challenges of local governments and the very limited presence of large corporations in the North Caucasus, state-funded first employment programs are essential to increase the employability of low-income youth. The high demand for manual skilled workers (i.e. electricians, mechanics, metalworkers, and construction workers) lends itself to a program that could help young workers develop marketable job skills without necessarily guaranteeing them permanent employment in a specific firm.

¹⁴ The well-known secondary school stipend program for girls in Bangladesh extended their schooling and may also have delayed marriage. Stipends are being sent not to parents but to the girls through bank accounts opened in their names.

Better-targeted formal support to young job seekers is also urgently needed. Existing employment centers and training programs also need to improve their outreach to young people, especially those outside the formal education system; new services need to be extended to under-served areas. Unemployment services should better publicize the availability of unemployment benefits, as well as the rules and regulations, which govern their distribution.

Internship, apprenticeship and even volunteer programs are highly attractive to young people as a way to ease the school-to-work transition. A public program that would enable unemployed young people to learn job skills and earn nominal salaries while providing useful services to their communities has considerable potential in the region, especially in Chechnya and Ingushetia. Entrepreneurship and small business development programs are another clearly defined need. Pilot programs could target small loans and business training to young people with innovative, practical ideas. These types of programs could become especially attractive for unemployed university graduates.

Encourage healthy lifestyles

As noted earlier, the interrelated educational, employment and health needs of young people in the North Caucasus are best served through multi-purpose youth-friendly spaces. Social mores in the region restrict, for example, public and inter-generational discussions of certain health issues (e.g., reproductive health, HIV/AIDS and drug abuse prevention). Youth centers could address preventative health and provide a place where young people could receive confidential counseling and advice on a broad range of health and well-being issues. Given widespread trauma among adolescents and youth directly exposed to conflict in the region, psychosocial support should be a key pillar of the services offered by such centers.

Eventually, health programming targeted at young people must go beyond issues of substance abuse and sexually transmitted infections to address questions of nutrition, psychosocial and mental health, fitness and the full range of health prob-

lems faced by young people in the North Caucasus.

Promote security and conflict prevention

Given that young people in the North Caucasus perceive police corruption as an important a security threat as terrorism and religious extremism, it is urgent to establish some level of trust between youth and police in the region, particularly in communities perceived to be at risk of extremism and terrorism. Such initiatives would require the strong backing of federal authorities and should be targeted at areas where conflict could escalate, such as Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia.

Young people's suggestions for tackling the danger of religious extremism include strengthening the skills of the Islamic clergy; more stringent training requirements for teachers in Islamic schools; increasing public education campaigns on religious and ethnic tolerance; and better training of state authorities to prevent religious discrimination against young people. In addition, interfaith dialogue and dialogue between Muslim leaders should be promoted throughout the region.

Broaden youth inclusion in decision making

Russian youth policy should formally recognize youth organizations, in particular youth councils or other forms of umbrella youth coordination structures, as social and civil partners in the development of youth policy at all levels of government. Clearer legal, administrative and financial mechanisms need to be created to promote the growth of these youth organizations. Particular emphasis should be given to building youth organizations at the republic and municipal levels, where the needs and interests of young people should be addressed in the first place.

Consultative youth committees comprised of local government representatives and youth NGOs should also be established at all levels of government to give young people a voice in youth-related issues, programs and funding.

In sum, multidimensional youth programs targeted to the conditions and needs of regions can

improve the school-to-work transition for Russia's young people. Possible interventions involve key institutions at all levels (see Table A-1). With

effective, targeted, and transparent investments, youth programming can generate high social, economic, and political returns for all regions.

Table A-1. A Multidimensional Approach to Youth Policy and School-to-Work Transition in the Russian Federation and North Caucasus

Key institutions	Policy issue	Possible interventions and investment options
Federal entity on youth/Ministry of Education	Result-oriented implementation of national youth policy across diverse regions	<p>Russia-wide multisectoral youth investment program, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional capacity building plan for youth policy development for line ministries, federal/ regional/republic level, All-Russia and other local youth organizations • Horizontal (inter-ministerial and cross-sectoral) and vertical (federal, regional/republic, municipal) coordination of national youth policy implementation through the National Youth Policy Steering Committee • Decentralized assistance to oblasts/republics based on transparent and participatory ranking of youth population needs and opportunities • Robust monitoring and evaluation system • Community-based, multidimensional approaches, including risk prevention and management, non-formal education, and active labor market programs (including apprenticeships and first employment programs) <p>Sub-national multisectoral investment for youth in North Caucasus initially targeted to Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, North Ossetia and Karachay-Cherkessia, then Dagestan and Chechnya</p>
Southern Federal Okrug	Ensure greater impact of existing instruments and those under preparation; build greater trust and participation with youth stakeholders	Re-orient <i>South of Russia</i> FTP to emphasize labor-intensive public works aimed at young workers
Oblast/republic level	Increase trust and participation of young people	<p>Participatory youth design and programming, involving youth organizations and students/graduates</p> <p>Better outreach to youth in disadvantaged and rural areas</p>
Municipal level	Municipal youth policy development (only where basic administrative functions and capacity already exists)	Participatory youth design and programming

Table A-1 (continued)

Key institutions	Policy issue	Possible interventions and investment options
Ministry of Education and Science	Improve quality and relevance of secondary and tertiary education for more effective transition from school to work	Develop regionally based investments to improve quality and relevance of secondary and tertiary education Develop links between formal and non-formal education; recognize certificates obtained through non-formal education programs
	Decrease the high incidence of drop-outs from secondary and tertiary education	Second-chance education programs
	Decrease corruption at tertiary level (universities)	Competitive grant schemes both for universities and student/youth organizations to introduce student participation, anti-corruption and good governance initiatives
Ministry of Regional Development	Develop federally targeted programs (FTP) with measurable outcomes for local communities and youth stakeholders	Southern Russia FTP to provide income-generation opportunities for low-income youth through labor-intensive public works, among other local multisectoral investments
Justice and Interior Ministries	Increase security and support conflict prevention	Favor restorative justice programs over prison sentences
		Anti-corruption measures in police forces
		Open Police Day with youth stakeholders
Health Ministry	Decrease health-related risks among young people	Support youth-friendly health services and primary and secondary prevention programs, including harm reductiona
Ministry of Culture	Increase intercultural awareness among young people	Promote youth subcultures and cultural identities of different ethnic groups within an overall social cohesion framework
		Promote intercultural mobility of young people between regions
		Support multicultural events with young people from different regions
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs	Increase youth-friendliness of employment services	Improve transparency of employment services and provide clearer information on employment benefits and opportunities to young job seekers

Chapter 1. Promoting the School-to-Work Transition and Youth Inclusion – Context, Concepts and Objectives

“A system of youth awareness and inclusion will not only allow young people to make better use of their potential, but will also help youth strengthen confidence in their own abilities and in their future.”¹⁵

This study presents key findings on the socioeconomic situation of young people in the Russian Federation, particularly in the regions of the North Caucasus¹⁶. It focuses on the school-to-work transition and highlights findings that can support the development of youth policies to increase young people’s social and economic opportunities and enhance security for individual young people and their communities. The school-to-work transition refers to the transition of young people from formal secondary or tertiary education, non-formal education or vocational training to working life.

Successful transitions are characterized by the availability of educational and employment opportunities commensurate with young people’s knowledge, skills and experience; failed transitions are characterized by high dropout rates, youth unemployment and underemployment, idleness and brain drain. The OECD study *From Initial Education to Working Life: Making Transitions Work*¹⁷ highlights that the school-to-work transition is a broad concept “concerned not only with education policies, but with employment and labour policies and welfare and social policies, as well as with the interaction between these policy domains.”

¹⁵ Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation (2005), 9.

¹⁶ Throughout this study “youth” refers to people aged 15 to 24 and the “school-to-work transition,” the transition of young people from formal or non-formal education and training to working life.

¹⁷ OECD (2000), 3.

This study responds to requests for increased support to youth issues in the country and builds on recent studies and reports on youth in the Russian Federation, while contributing specifically to a more detailed understanding of youth needs in the North Caucasus. It highlights youth perspectives and motivations, as well as priority opportunities and obstacles identified by young people themselves – exploring gender and regional dimensions to youth experiences where possible. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the main themes of the study and describes the study’s background context, objectives, key analytical concepts and framework.

Youth Development in the Russian Federation: A Challenging Context

Poverty has a distinct age dimension in the Russian Federation. While the number of people living in poverty was halved between 1999 and 2002, poverty among young people has remained consistently high.¹⁸ About 1 in 5 people were poor in Russia in 2002, but this number jumped to 1 in 4 for those under the age of 15. Older children (aged 7–5) are particularly affected, and by 2002, the incidence of poverty among older children was the highest of any demographic group.

¹⁸ World Bank (2004a).

Nationally, youth unemployment rates have risen from 16 percent in 1990 to 26 percent in 2001; they have consistently remained more than double the adult rates.¹⁹ Youth unemployment and underemployment, and related idleness, disenfranchisement and social exclusion present serious challenges to growth and stability. The Russian government's target of halving the number of poor people in the country by 2007, which the World Bank estimates will require a uniform per capita growth in consumption of at least 5 percent per year,²⁰ is unlikely to be achieved without tailored and sustained investments to address the employment needs and labor potential of young people.

Significant regional disparities in youth development exist in the Russian Federation, with more advanced regions showing better overall youth indicators than poorer regions. The gap between the best- and worst-off regions is often more than double. The Southern Federal Region, which includes the North Caucasus, consistently has the lowest youth development indicators of any federal region. This region also faces a challenging socioeconomic context, including high levels of poverty (over 40 percent in Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan);²¹ large youth populations (while 18 percent of the country is under age, this number climbs to 21 percent in Southern Russia and 36 percent in the Republic of Ingushetia);²² substantial linguistic and ethnic diversity and the presence of numerous insecurities, including conflict.

Interventions targeted at youth are seen as a key mechanism for promoting ethnic reconciliation and preventing outbreaks of conflict in the sub-region. The September 2004 terrorist attack in Beslan, North Ossetia²³ (in which 331 people, including 172 children, died in a school) and the violent outbursts in Nalchik in October

¹⁹ UNICEF (2004 a), ILO (2003).

²⁰ World Bank (2004a).

²¹ Ibid.

²² GOSKOMSTAT (2004a).

²³ While the formal name of the republic is North Ossetia-Alanya, its common abbreviation of North Ossetia will be used throughout this paper.

2005 (which involved young people aged 17 to 20 years) have drawn greater attention to the Northern Caucasus and the need for more effective youth policy development throughout the country. Poverty, intolerance and risky youth behaviors cannot be viewed in isolation from each other and investments targeted at youth are urgently needed in the social, cultural and economic spheres.

Study Rationale

Demographic trends of aging populations and declining birth rates have placed increasing pressures on the youth of the Russian Federation. The path that young people follow in transitioning from school to work — their educational preparation, ability to integrate into the labor market and success in meeting emerging and evolving labor demands — will affect the strength of the country's economy and the large social welfare system that it supports.²⁴ A well-functioning system that supports young people's education and employment and creates opportunities to include youth in decision-making processes in social, political and economic spheres will help young people to shoulder the social burden that their generation will soon carry.

The linkages between poor economic prospects for young people and social unrest are increasingly recognized²⁵. Unemployment is linked to both income poverty and non-income dimensions of poverty, from a lack of capabilities to an erosion of human and social capital.²⁶ It can also contribute to psychological stress, reduce social cohesion and strain social institutions, which in turn often results in political exclusion, violence and extremism. The socioeconomic impact of unemployment on youth is not limited to uneducated young people. Where employment opportunities for the well-educated are limited, a high incidence of conflict can also result from unmet expectations and foregone

²⁴ Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation (2005a), President of the Russian Federation (2004).

²⁵ See, for example, Yousef (2003).

²⁶ World Bank (2004b).

²⁷ Urdal (2002).

opportunities.²⁷ These trends are of particular concern in regions where there is a large youth population as “youth bulges” — large youth cohorts relative to the general population — can strain the capacity of labor markets, educational systems and community institutions and increase the potential for conflict.²⁸

The costs of not adequately investing in the youth school-to-work transition and its related issues are high in economic, social and political terms. A lack of adequate economic opportunities can result in the out-migration of highly skilled young people, critical to Russia’s economic growth. With fertility rates below replacement levels, even the out-migration of low-skilled workers can have deleterious economic impacts. Other negative youth outcomes related to youth unemployment with high social and economic costs are highlighted in Chapter 5.

Mitigating social and environmental risk is one of the three central pillars of the World Bank Russian Federation Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). This study was designed to provide insight into the social risks posed by youth unemployment, idleness and destructive behaviors, as well as potential strategies for mitigating these social risks. The study is of particular relevance to policies targeting education, youth unemployment and regional economic and institutional development. It is also closely linked to other aspects of the Bank’s work program in Russia, such as the newly developed *North Caucasus Youth Empowerment and Security Grant*²⁹ and existing programming with youth aspects, such as the Tuberculosis and AIDS Control project. The study will inform and support wider World Bank initiatives in the Southern Federal District.

²⁷ Urdal (2002).

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ The grant addresses the needs of vulnerable youth with pilot interventions in the Republics of Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria. It adopts a strategic approach that incorporates life-long learning for skills and competencies, healthy behaviors and livelihoods. Grant activities will be designed for young people aged 11 to 20, with gender-sensitive modules for each age subgroup.

Objectives and Audience

The overall objective of this study is to provide a policy road map for supporting youth development in the Russian Federation, particularly in the North Caucasus area of the Southern Federal District.³⁰ The study has four specific analytical objectives:

- identify recent youth trends in the Russian Federation, including regional and gender dimensions, complemented by comparisons to youth trends in OECD countries;
- assess priority youth needs and risks in the North Caucasus, focusing on the importance of easing the transition from school to work, reducing idleness, encouraging healthy behaviors and promoting social cohesion;
- examine existing methods and incentives, as well as challenges to youth participation in community processes and services; and
- review current youth policies and instruments nationally and in the North Caucasus specifically, as well as international best practices, to identify ways to better support effective implementation of such policies.

The study aims to achieve two operational objectives:

- assist the Government of the Russian Federation to prepare interventions on youth in the North Caucasus and in other priority regions with concrete data and analysis; and
- provide an analytic foundation for policy dialogue with the Government of the Russian Federation, youth representatives, donors and other relevant stakeholders.

This report is intended for two main groups of stakeholders:

³⁰ This study focuses on six regions and/or republics in the Southern Federal District: Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia and Stavropol Kray. Of these regions, the first five were included because of their high levels of poverty and proximity to security risks. As a wealthier, more stable, Russian-dominated region, Stavropol Kray provides an interesting contrast to the ethnic republics. The findings of this study are also of great relevance for Stavropol, however, as it shares a border which Chechnya and has witnessed the influx of numerous IDPs during conflict in the region. A profile of these six regions is provided in Appendix B.

- (1) *national, district and regional and/or republican government bodies working on youth issues* in the Russian Federation, including the Ministry of Regional Development and its Department of Regional Development Strategy; the Ministry of Education and its Departments of Youth Policy and Education Policy; the Ministry of Labor and Social Development; the apparatus of the President's Envoy in the Southern Federal District; Republican Ministries of Youth and other relevant authorities and agencies; and
- (2) *other organizations working on youth, employment and peace-building activities in Russia* including civil society groups, such as the Russian Youth Union and the National Youth Council of Russia, development partners, NGOs, private foundations, research and academic organizations and relevant actors in the business sector.

Analytic Framework

The analytic framework adopted in this study is founded on the World Bank's recent Children and Youth Framework for Action, which identifies "key vulnerabilities and strategic opportunities for scaling up investment in children and youth across sectors and along the life-cycle."³¹ The framework highlights risks that are not evenly distributed across the life cycle and, if left unaddressed, can have prolonged and irreversible consequences in later life. Key risk factors associated with young people include unemployment and idleness; poor access to, and retention in, education programs; risky behaviors, including violence and substance abuse; and a lack of participation in development and decision-making processes.

To address and mitigate these risks facing young people, the framework proposes a four-pronged, multidimensional strategic approach that promotes: (i) secondary and tertiary (formal) education; (ii) life-long learning for skills and

³¹ World Bank (2005c), 7.

competencies (including informal and non-formal education); (iii) healthy behaviors and; (iv) livelihoods. These elements build on investments at earlier stages of the life cycle and require an enabling environment of supportive policies and institutions, mechanisms for participation in decision making and the involvement of families and communities. Collectively, these elements can be considered the building blocks for integrated youth development.

This framework for youth inclusion links closely to the World Bank's strategic approach to addressing poverty. The *World Development Report 2000/01* highlights three approaches to combating poverty: promoting opportunity, facilitating empowerment and enhancing security.³² Each of these anti-poverty strategies is promoted by formal and non-formal education, support for the school-to-work transition and youth inclusion in education, labor and health systems.

Structure of the Report

This study is divided into five chapters. This chapter explained the background for the study and introduced the foundational themes and concepts on which the remaining chapters are built. Chapter 2 explores the evolving socioeconomic situation of young people in the Russian Federation. It provides an overview of youth trends in the country since transition, highlighting inter-regional comparisons and contrasts in youth development. Chapter 3 focuses more specifically on the experiences and needs of young people and youth stakeholders in the North Caucasus. Chapter 4 analyzes the constraints and opportunities of current youth policies at national and regional levels. Based on the analysis presented in Chapters 2–4, Chapter 5 identifies feasible strategies and entry points for increasing support to youth development and strengthening the effectiveness of youth policies. Recommendations are focused on relevant investment options.

³² World Bank (2001).

Chapter 2. The Evolving Socioeconomic Situation of Young People in the Russian Federation

“In Russia, one in 30 young men who were aged 15 in 1993 did not survive until the age of 25.”³³

How do young people in the Russian Federation today transition to adulthood? How has this transition changed during the 1990s and what aspects of the transition do policymakers need to be most aware of? This chapter examines key dimensions of youth well-being in Russia today and highlights recent trends in education, employment, health and participation. It explores nationwide data and benchmarks, with a focus on inter-regional disparities in youth experiences³⁴. The chapter also places the situation of young people in the Russian Federation within the global context, noting how they compare to their peers in EU and OECD countries. The chapter does not provide comprehensive analysis of all youth-related trends in the Russian Federation, rather, it focuses on provid-

³³ UNICEF (2004 a), ix.

³⁴ Data on youth in the Russian Federation is constrained with respect to comprehensiveness, precision and consistency. For certain indicators, young people are included within child or adult groupings, from which they cannot be disaggregated. Where youth-specific data does exist, it is often impossible to disaggregate by gender or region. The lower and upper limits of the youth demographic also differ among data sources (some use the United Nations standard, while others use the age of majority or age of high-school graduation). While this report focuses on young people aged 15–24, it also presents figures for subsets or an extended range of ages, depending on available data. Finally, in certain cases formal data may over- or under-represent actual youth trends, such as for the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and drug use (many young people do not seek treatment because of the social stigma) or unemployment (young people decline to register with state unemployment agencies because of the small size of benefits or the difficulties of formal registration).

ing insight into key aspects of the school-to-work transition and youth inclusion.

Young people comprise a large and diverse segment of the population of the Russian Federation. Twenty-four million youth aged 15–24 live in Russia, making up 17 percent of the population.³⁵ Males and females are represented in almost equal proportion (50.6 percent male; 49.4 percent female). Reflecting overall population trends in the country, over three-quarters of young people live in urban areas.³⁶ Declining birth rates in the country (over 30 percent between 1989 and 2002³⁷) have resulted in an aging population, the median age of which now rests at 37.1 years.³⁸ Demographics differ considerably throughout the country, however, with a 20-year gap between the regions with the youngest and oldest populations, as illustrated in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1. Youngest and Oldest Regions in Russia

	Youngest Regions			Oldest Regions		
	Ingushetia Republic (Southern Federal Okrug)	Chechnya Republic (Southern Federal Okrug)	Dagestan Republic (Southern Federal Okrug)	Tver Oblast (Central Federal Okrug)	Ryazan Oblast (Central Federal Okrug)	Tula Oblast (Central Federal Okrug)
Median age of the population	37.1	22.2	22.7	25.2	41.1	41.7

Source: GOSKOMSTAT (2004a).

³⁵ GOSKOMSTAT (2004a).

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ UNICEF (2004 a).

³⁸ GOSKOMSTAT (2004a).

Significant inter-regional differences, such as these in the relative size of the youth population, characterize youth development in the Russian Federation and will be highlighted throughout this chapter.


The School-to-Work Transition

Education issues

“The worsening financial situation is having adverse effects on the opportunity afforded to intellectually competent but poor students to stay in school or to benefit from the courses that would lead to a better lifelong situation.”³⁹

Over the last decade, the proportion of young people enrolled in tertiary education in the Russian Federation has risen while the number in upper secondary and vocational education has fallen. Enrollment in basic education, meanwhile, has remained unchanged. Educational attainment among young men and young women is roughly similar at the national level, although young women have an edge over their male peers, particularly at the tertiary level.⁴⁰

Figure 2.1. Education Enrollment



Source: UNICEF IRC 2004.

The rise of tertiary education amidst the decline of secondary education, illustrated in Figure 2.1, may be traced to two opposing developments in the education sector. In the case of falling second-

³⁹ Canning, Mook and Heleniak (1999), 23.

⁴⁰ Young women, for example, comprised 49.5 percent of 15–29-year-olds in 2002, but accounted for 56.9 percent of young people who had completed higher education. Agranovich et al. (2005), World Bank (2004a).

ary school enrolments, pervasive problems of quality and access may encourage young people to leave the school system after completing basic education. A 1999 analysis of educational reform needs in the Russian Federation highlighted the issue of declining educational quality in the country, personified by schools with demoralized and untrained staff and inadequate learning materials and facilities.⁴¹ Half of the population thinks that the quality of high school education is lower today than in Soviet times, compared to only 21 percent and 11 percent who think it has improved or remained consistent, respectively.⁴² Students in Russia themselves feel little enjoyment from the current education system. In a survey of over 50,000 15-year-old students in 35 European and American countries in 2001–2002, Russia placed 24th among countries in which students liked school a lot.⁴³

Financial difficulties in the education system have also impaired access for many young people from poor or moderate-income backgrounds who are unable or unwilling to pay high formal (school fees, tuition, supplies, transport) and informal (bribes, entrance and exam payments, “tutoring” payments) education costs.⁴⁴ In 2002, for example, three-quarters of young people in the Russian Federation aged 18–5 believed that getting a higher education would cost a lot of money.⁴⁵ Despite the declaration that education is free, many informal payments occur at all levels of the system. This creates invisible barriers for moving through the education system. Payments are highest in larger towns and cities, for more prestigious schools and universities and for students from wealthy families (who are often specifically pressured by their teachers).⁴⁶

Despite existing quality and cost concerns, many young people turn to higher education because of the difficulties they face in gaining entry to the job market. A study of 2,500 gradu-

⁴¹ Canning, Mook and Heleniak (1999).

⁴² Public Opinion Foundation (2005a).

⁴³ Currie et al. (2004).

⁴⁴ Canning, Mook and Heleniak (1999), Cherednichenko (2001), Independent Institute of Social Politics (2004), Roshina (2004).

⁴⁵ Public Opinion Foundation (2002a).

⁴⁶ Galitskiy and Levin (2004), Independent Institute of Social Politics (2004).

ating high school students in the spring before and the autumn following their graduation found that many more young people were full-time students in higher education than had originally intended to be.⁴⁷ This mirrors the trend throughout much of the OECD, including countries such as Australia, Canada, Portugal and Sweden, where young people are also spending longer periods of time in post-secondary education before entering the world of work.⁴⁸ In the Russian Federation, most young people make this choice because of the difficulty of finding part-time or full-time employment.⁴⁹ The most prestigious educational opportunities still remain limited, however, and fewer students are able to gain entrance to universities than would wish to. Interestingly, young people increasingly perceive higher educational qualifications as a necessity to meet their future goals, while at the same time finding the quality of the knowledge gained through higher education and the opportunity to enter institutions of higher learning to be falling.⁵⁰

A second prominent trend in education is high inter-regional disparities in young people's education. More than twice as many 16–17-year-olds have completed secondary education in the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya), for example, than in Ingushetia.⁵¹ And while 4.3 college seats exist for every one high school graduate in Moscow, graduates in Leningrad Oblast and the Autonomous Regions of Nenets, Komi-Perm, Taimyr and Aginsk Buryat each have fewer than 0.5 places.⁵² Disparities are particularly striking along the urban-rural divide. In Penza oblast in the Volga Federal Region, for example, 70 percent of the urban population has completed high school, compared with only 7 percent of the rural population.⁵³ Similarly, while over half of high school graduates from Moscow and St. Petersburg go on to university study, only 21 percent of students who graduate from rural schools have ever studied in a university.⁵⁴

⁴⁷ Cherednichenko (2001).

⁴⁸ OECD (2000).

⁴⁹ Cherednichenko (2001).

⁵⁰ Williams, Chuprov and Zubok (2003).

⁵¹ Currie et al. (2004).

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Roshina (2004).

Compared to the majority of their urban counterparts, rural schools face teacher shortages, declining facilities and poor access to learning materials and technology (such as the Internet). These inequities can manifest themselves in student's results. A recent international study found that Russian students' standings in reading, mathematical literacy, scientific literacy and problem-solving ability were related directly to the size of their community.⁵⁵ Young people in megacities (of over 1 million people) scored best, followed by those in big cities (between 100,000 and 1 million), those in medium-size cities and towns (between 15,000 and 100,000), those in towns (between 3,000 and 15,000) and, finally, those in villages of less than 3,000 people.

A final national trend in the Russian education system is the mismatch between the educational system and the current job market. As a 1999 World Bank report highlighted, "Neither general secondary education nor vocational education is well equipped to respond to market signals and to reflect the rapidly changing conditions in Russia today."⁵⁶ Career guidance and counseling in schools, for example, are limited by poor access to updated career information, a lack of reference materials for teachers and counselors, outdated approaches to guidance which focus on assessment and testing approaches rather than wider explorations of young people's career interests, as well as a counseling focus on educational rather than vocational options.⁵⁷ As Table 2.2 illustrates, university enrolment in prestige fields is increasing, a trend discussed in detail in Chapter 3, while the number of young people graduating with many key vocational and technical skills is falling.

The shift towards prestige fields is moving young people away from precisely the fields where the majority of jobs available to them are found, as detailed in the section on employment below. A survey of young people's integration into the labor market in 2000, moreover, concluded that the vocational education system had failed to

⁵⁵ The 2003 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) Study, as cited in Currie et al. (2004).

⁵⁶ Canning et al. (1999), 9.

⁵⁷ Zabrodin and Watts (2003).

Table 2.2. Graduates of State and Municipal Post-secondary Education Institutions by Profession (000s)

	1990 r.	2003 r.	% Change
Total Graduates	401.1	860.2	+114.5%
<i>Professional</i>			
Economics and Management	55.5	248.2	+347.2%
Human and Social	48.8	185.6	+280.3%
<i>Technical</i>			
Machinery and Metal Working	14.0	13.5	-3.6%
Electronic technology, radio engineering and communication technologies	14.2	12.9	-9.2%
Technology of Consumer Goods	8.9	4.2	-52.8%

Source: GOSKOMSTAT (2004b).

adapt to the new realities of the economy and now produced young people ill-prepared for success in Russia's labor market.⁵⁸ This trend persists today. The World Bank recently noted that the vocational education system has been largely neglected by educational reforms and needs to be transformed into an accessible, demand-driven system that develops transferable skills in response to current and future labor market needs.⁵⁹

Employment issues

*"Youth unemployment and underemployment impose a heavy cost. Prolonged unemployment in early life may permanently impair employability, earnings and access to quality jobs... For governments, youth unemployment means that investments in education and training are wasted... Moreover, high and rising unemployment levels among youth may be a source of social instability, increased drug abuse and crime."*⁶¹

The three most common sectors of youth employment in the Russian Federation today are: (1) the processing industry (19 percent of employed youth), (2) trade (19 percent of employed youth), and (3) administration and national security (8 percent of employed youth).⁶¹ The sector with the greatest share of youth workers is trade, where young people account for 18 percent of

⁵⁸ Chuprov and Zubok (2000).


⁵⁹ Canning et al. (2004).

⁶⁰ ILO (2005), 6–7.

⁶¹ GOSKOMSTAT (2004a).

the workforce. As detailed above, however, fewer and fewer young people are pursuing educational opportunities in these sectors. Financial and service-related industries, meanwhile, are less frequent employers of young people. Youth are also less represented in state and local governments and in public organizations, which the government notes could, "lead to the loss of staff continuity, make reforms impossible and result in a system-wide crisis in the social welfare sector."⁶²

Figure 2.2 Employment Trends



Source: ILO (2003).

Young people in the Russian Federation are more likely to be unemployed than either adults in their own country or young people in other industrialized countries. A survey of 1,500 respondents in 44 regions across the country in 2002 ranked unemployment as the most important contemporary youth problem.⁶³ Since the early 1990s, the rate of youth unemployment has grown (to 25 percent in 1999) and remained more than double that of adult unemployment, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.⁶⁴ This unemployment rate is considerably higher than the 1999 rates in most OECD countries – 7 percent in the Netherlands, 9 percent in Japan, 15 percent in Turkey, 10 percent in the United States and a mere 3 percent in Mexico.⁶⁵ The proportion of young people in the country's unemployed population has also risen, from 16 percent in 1991 to 21 percent in 2001.⁶⁶

⁶² Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation (2005a), 5.

⁶³ Public Opinion Foundation (2002b).

⁶⁴ ILO (2003). Russia experienced a dramatic decline in GDP during the 1990s, together with a continuous decline in the employment ratio between 1990 and 1999. Since then, the economy has recovered, with strong growth rates averaging 6.5 percent annually during the period 1999–2002. This pattern of growth has not been labor-friendly, however, with employment stagnating until 2001 and increasing only slightly in 2002. Youth unemployment continues to stand out as a particular problem. UNICEF (2004a).


⁶⁵ ILO (2003).

⁶⁶ UNICEF (2004a).

Gender differences in overall youth unemployment in the Russian Federation tend to be small.⁶⁷ In 1999, for example, young women in Russia faced an unemployment rate of 26 percent, only slightly higher than the 24 percent average for young men. In this respect, the Russian Federation reflects the OECD trend of increasing convergence between male and female youth employment rates, as reflected in almost identical unemployment rates for 15–24-year-old men and women in countries such as Norway, Switzerland and the United States.

Inter-regional differences in youth employment, however, can be extreme with outlying regions, such as Siberia and the Southern Federal Region faring especially poorly. As detailed in Chapter 3, for example, youth employment rates in the North Caucasus republics of Ingushetia, Dagestan and Chechnya are less than half the national average.⁶⁸ Idleness — the at-risk combination of being out of education and out of work, also varies regionally, with estimates suggesting a greater than four-fold difference between idleness rates in the North Caucasus and those in other parts of the country.⁶⁹ While the precise number of idle youth in Russia is difficult to measure, the 2003 NOBUS survey suggested that there could be as many as three times more many young people not in the labor force and not in education than the number of unemployed youth alone.⁷⁰

Figure 2.3a. Reasons young women are not looking for a job



Source: GOSKOMSTAT (2003).

⁶⁷ ILO (2003).

⁶⁸ Agranovich et al. (2005).


⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ GOSKOMSTAT (2003).

Unemployment is often a long-term state for youth in the Russian Federation. In 2003, over 25 percent of young jobseekers had been searching for employment for more than one year, with 45 percent having searched for more than six months.⁷¹ On the other hand, the average long-term unemployment (greater than 6 months) among young people in OECD countries in the same year was 33 percent, with lows of only 3 percent in Mexico, 6 percent in Korea, 7 percent in Canada and the Netherlands and 9 percent in Denmark.⁷² To reduce long-term youth unemployment, since 1997 the European Community has required that member countries provide assistance to young people within six months of their becoming unemployed.⁷³ In Russia, however, an increasing number of young people have not held a single job since completing their education — a stark contrast to the Soviet system, in which all new graduates were assigned to a job by the state.⁷⁴

Unable to find a job, many unemployed young Russians eventually stop looking for work altogether. Figures 2.3a and 2.3b illustrate the most common reasons why unemployed youth stop actively seeking employment. Lack of skills and qualifications is the most common reason at younger ages (16–18), but by age 22, becoming discouraged is the most common factor for young men and the second most common reason for young women.

Figure 2.3b. Reasons young men are not looking for a job



⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² OECD (2003).

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Chuprov and Zubok (2000).

After age 19, caring for a family and household becomes the most significant factor in young women's decision not to seek employment.

Young people's discouragement may lie in the difficulties of the job search process, which is dominated by the need for informal, personal connections. Fewer than 10 percent of young people in the Russian Federation turn to employment notices and advertisements to search for a job. In Estonia, by contrast, 90 percent of youth use advertisements in their job search.⁷⁵ In the Russian Federation, however, over 30 percent of young people use their social networks — including friends, relatives and acquaintances — to search for employment; only 20 percent approach employers directly.⁷⁶ In such a system, most young people (three-quarters of 18–35-year-olds polled in 2002) believe that it is difficult for a hard worker to find a good job.⁷⁷

Unemployment in Russia affects well-educated young people as well as the unskilled and uneducated.⁷⁸ In 2000, for instance, young graduates accounted for one-third of youth unemployment. Many young people with higher education and specialized degrees who do work are underemployed: two-thirds do not have a job in their area of expertise, and 60 percent work in low- or unskilled labor.

For assistance with their job search, young people rely only infrequently on government employment agencies, from which the most common services are training and positions in public works programs.⁷⁹ Registering as unemployed is not common among young people; data from the 2002 NOBUS survey suggests that only 22 percent of young people looking for a job were registered as unemployed.⁸⁰ This low propensity to register as unemployed indicates that the actual number of unemployed youth in the Russian Federation is

⁷⁵ UNICEF (2000).

⁷⁶ GOSKOMSTAT (2003).

⁷⁷ Public Opinion Foundation (2002c).

⁷⁸ Chuprov and Zubok (2000).

⁷⁹ GOSKOMSTAT (2003).

⁸⁰ Ibid. Many of the reasons why young people fail to register as unemployed are discussed in Chapter 3. They include bureaucratic obstacles, the need for bribes and the small amount of unemployment benefits.

considerably higher than official estimates. Young people who do register as unemployed estimate their average monthly benefits at 442 rubles/month (US\$15.51),⁸¹ less than one-sixth the average monthly income of employed youths (2,975 rubles or US\$104.39 per month) and less than 80 percent of the 573 rubles/month (US\$20.11) on average, that they are eligible to receive.⁸²

Social protection for youth workers is of serious concern in Russia, as it is in many industrialized and developing countries around the world.⁸³

Informal contracts, unpaid jobs, unregulated work hours, low and irregular wages, and lack of legal recourse for issues related to hiring, firing and promotion are all common problems faced by youth workers, especially those only able to find employment in the informal sector.⁸⁴ Young people in the Southern Federal District, for example, are particularly likely to be employed by individual entrepreneurs in the informal sector,⁸⁵ where they do not benefit from legal labor protections. A 1998 survey suggested that young people are especially vulnerable to exploitation by employers, since over 60 percent of state and private enterprises do not, or only partly, follow youth labor protection regulations.⁸⁶ In addition to exploitation by legitimate employers, many young people in the country increasingly find themselves in jobs related to criminal enterprises.⁸⁷

Healthy Lifestyles

“A liberalisation of sexual attitudes and behaviour, particularly among young people, alongside a lack of knowledge and use of preventive measures, and dramatic increases in rates of drug injection and prostitution, are all associated with an increase in STIs.”⁸⁸

⁸¹ Throughout this report, an exchange rate of US\$1 = 28.5 rubles is used.

⁸² GOSKOMSTAT (2003).

⁸³ Young people in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia, for example, are far more likely than their adult counterparts to be working in unprotected jobs without contracts or social contributions, as outlined in a recent report, Youth in South Eastern Europe. World Bank (2004b).

⁸⁴ Chuprov and Zubok (2000).

⁸⁵ Center for Strategic Research (2005).

⁸⁶ As cited in Chuprov and Zubok (2000).

⁸⁷ Chuprov and Zubok (2000).

⁸⁸ Lowndes et al. (2003), 55.

Young people in the Russian Federation today find themselves facing unprecedented and growing health risks in terms of substance abuse, sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and the spread of infectious disease.


In a recent survey, young people in the Russian Federation ranked second only to the Ukraine in the proportion of youth who rate their health as poor or fair.⁸⁹ A similar poll found that almost half of young people aged 18–35 rated their health as not so good or bad.⁹⁰ Mortality rates among young people, especially young men, have risen since 1989, as has the incidence of suicide, as illustrated in Figures 2.4a and 2.4b.

Substance abuse begins early in the lifecycle of young Russians, with alarming consequences for both youth and adult mortality.⁹¹

Surveys conducted in Moscow and Sarov in

1999 and 2002, respectively, suggest that over one-third of Russian students in grades 7–10 are current smokers.⁹² Worryingly, 20 percent of the boys and 15 percent of the girls surveyed thought that people who smoked had more friends. Over 20 percent of young people in the Moscow survey had begun smoking before the age of 11 and a survey of the health of 15-year-olds in Russia found that the average age of smoking onset was 13 for girls and 12.5 for boys.⁹³ Smoking prevalence increases with age, with 53 percent of 18–35-year-olds regular smokers, up from 47 percent in 2002 and the highest in any age category.⁹⁴ Alcohol use is also widespread: one quarter of 15-year-old boys and one-fifth of 13-year-old boys are weekly drinkers.⁹⁵ More young people drink at least once per week than do their parents' or grandparents' age groups.⁹⁶

Figure 2.4a. Youth Mortality Rates (Young People aged 20–24)




Sources: (a) UNICEF (2004a), (b) UNICEF (2004b).

⁸⁹ Currie et al. (2004). In a 2002 survey of over 50,000 15-year-olds across 34 countries in Europe and North America, respondents were asked to rate their health as excellent, good, fair or poor. Over 40 percent of boys and 27 percent of girls aged 15 in the Russian Federation rated their health as fair or poor — double the proportion in countries such as Canada, Finland, Spain and Greece. Russia also placed second out of the 34 countries for the proportion of 13-year-olds who rated their health as fair or poor.

⁹⁰ Public Opinion Foundation (2002d).

⁹¹ Substance abuse (including alcohol, tobacco and drugs) is highlighted among the main causes of death and ill health across the adult population in Russia. World Bank (2005d).

Figure 2.4b. Youth Suicide Rates (Young People Aged 15–19)



Drug use is more common among young people in the Russian Federation today. Twenty percent of young people have tried illegal

⁹² WHO (1999) and (2002).

⁹³ Currie et al. (2004).

⁹⁴ Public Opinion Foundation (2004a), Public Opinion Foundation (2002d).

⁹⁵ Currie et al. (2004).

⁹⁶ Public Opinion Foundation (2002e). The most common drinks among young people are beer and wine, while vodka is the most popular drink among older populations.

drugs — double the proportion of 36–50-year-olds and triple the rate among over 50-year-olds.⁹⁷ The use of intravenous drugs is particularly alarming. A 2003 study suggests that drug use in Russia tends towards hard drugs, with opium-related drugs accounting for 90 percent of drug use.⁹⁸ Seven percent of 16-year-old students in Moscow, for example, have a history of heroin use, a significantly higher rate than among their peers in Western Europe.⁹⁹

The high level of sexual activity among youth is risky because of low levels of contraceptive use. Russia ranked third out of 30 European and American countries for the rate of sexual activity among 15-year-old boys; 41 percent have had sexual intercourse, compared to the survey average of 28 percent.¹⁰⁰ Among 18–19-year-olds surveyed in Moscow, 77 percent of men and 66 percent of women were sexually active.¹⁰¹ Yet young people have little exposure to sex education¹⁰² and awareness and use of contraception remains low. In a 2000 survey in Moscow, for instance, only 43 percent of sexually active young people used a condom regularly, and only 49 percent had used one during their most recent sexual experience.¹⁰³ The 2001 Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey similarly found that 44 percent of sexually active 14–20-year-olds had not used a condom during their last sexual experience.¹⁰⁴

Young people thus account for a large proportion of sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS. The incidence of STIs among Russian youth aged 15–19 in 2002 was 378 per 100,000, compared to only 213 for the

⁹⁷ Public Opinion Foundation (2002f). Across age groups, over 80 percent of respondents believed that the rate of drug addiction is increasing.

⁹⁸ Koshkina (2003). According to the same study, cannabis accounts for only 4 percent of drug use, and synthetic stimulants, 3 percent.

⁹⁹ As cited in Lowndes et al. (2003).

¹⁰⁰ Currie et al. (2004)

¹⁰¹ MSF-FOCUS (2001.)

¹⁰² Grisin and Wallander (2002). This is also a widespread trend in the North Caucasus, as detailed in Chapter 3.

¹⁰³ MSF-FOCUS (2001).

¹⁰⁴ As cited in World Bank (2003a).

¹⁰⁵ UNICEF (2004a).

general population.¹⁰⁵ HIV/AIDS is particularly worrying for its disproportionate effect on Russian youth through both sexual transmission and intravenous drug use. In 2004, for example, 79 percent of HIV-infected men and 80 percent of HIV-infected women were between the ages of 15 and 30.¹⁰⁶ Young people with risky sexual or drug use patterns are highly susceptible to HIV infection, yet there are few youth-friendly, destigmatized health clinics and outreach programs for addressing high-risk youth behaviors.

Several health risks have a strong gender dimension. Smoking, drinking and drug use are more common and begin earlier among young males in the Russian Federation, who also have much higher suicide rates than their female peers.¹⁰⁷ Men aged 20–24 in the country have the highest mortality rate out of 24 countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States — 30 percent higher than the next highest country, Kazakhstan.¹⁰⁸ Among young women, sexual and reproductive health issues are especially serious. The incidence of syphilis, a common marker for overall trends in sexually transmitted infections, among 15–17-year-old girls increased more than 60 times between 1990 and 1997, to the point that the rate among 15–17-year-old girls was more than double that of the overall female population, and more than three times the rate for boys of the same age.¹⁰⁹ In terms of reproductive health, the proportion of births to teenage (aged 15–19) and young (aged 20–24) mothers has declined steadily since the early 1990s.¹¹⁰ While abortion rates have also declined during the past decade, they remain worryingly high. Abortions outpace live births for women under 20 and, as illustrated in Figure 2.5, teenage abortion rates in Russia are the highest in the region. This trend highlights the urgent need for greater information about, and access to, contraception for young women.

¹⁰⁶ As cited in Agranovich et al. (2005).


¹⁰⁷ Currie et al. (2004), UNICEF (2004b).

¹⁰⁸ UNICEF (2004a).

¹⁰⁹ Vinokur et al. (2001).

¹¹⁰ UNICEF (2004b).

Figure 2.5. Abortion Rates among Young Women in Central and Eastern Europe (2002)



Source: UNICEF (2004b).

Youth Participation

“The rate of Russia’s progress on the democratic reform path will depend on the position that youth will take in public affairs and political life, and also on its stability and initiative.”¹¹¹

Young people rarely take part in youth organizations and activities and generally profess to be uninterested in politics. A survey of young people across the country in 2002 revealed that less than one-quarter of young people aged 14–30 had ever taken part in a youth organization, and only 3 percent were currently doing so.¹¹² Similarly, only one-third of young people knew of the existence of a youth organization (whether oriented towards recreation, politics, education, etc.) in their locality.¹¹³ Youth in the Russian Federation are equally uninvolved in formal political activity, such as joining a political party or taking part in political demonstrations or rallies, and are quick to

¹¹¹ Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation (2005a), 6.

¹¹² Public Opinion Foundation (2002g).

¹¹³ Public Opinion Foundation (2005b).

express their disinterest in, and distrust of, politics.¹¹⁴

Yet at the same time, young people see the importance of engaging with political issues in the country.

A majority of youth believe that people under age 25 should take part in the country’s political life and are capable of establishing political movements.¹¹⁵ While in slightly lower proportions than older generations, young people do follow the news and find it interesting. Most 18–35-year-olds, for example, follow political and economic news daily through television, radio or print media, with a full 80 percent following the news at least 3 times a week.¹¹⁶ Prior to legislative elections in 2003, almost half of the young people in this age group reported an interest in watching televised debates between the representatives of different political parties.¹¹⁷

The federal government and its apparatus was ranked first by young people in terms of the institutions whose assistance would be most useful to youth in the Russian Federation

(ahead of parents, local authorities, etc.) and over 80 percent of young people think that government should provide support to youth organizations.¹¹⁸ A majority of Russians, across all age categories, believe the state should develop youth-specific programs, especially in the areas of unemployment and education.¹¹⁹ Young Russians, however, identify unemployment, substance abuse and a lack of leisure opportunities as priority youth problems of which the government is unaware or has failed to adequately understand (although many young people believe that the government is aware of

¹¹⁵ Public Opinion Foundation (2005e), Public Opinion Foundation (2005f). The greatest proportion of young people believes that they are better off creating their own political organizations than joining groups created by older people.

¹¹⁶ Public Opinion Foundation (2002h).

¹¹⁷ Public Opinion Foundation (2003).

¹¹⁸ Public Opinion Foundation (2002g), Public Opinion Foundation (2005b).

¹¹⁹ Public Opinion Foundation (2002b).

these problems, but unwilling to address them).¹²⁰ Trust in authorities has increased in recent years, however, a sign that the potential for young people to become more actively engaged with politics — whether to advocate on behalf of their needs or to participate in decision making around youth issues — may be growing.¹²¹ Interestingly, almost three-quarters of Russians think that the Soviet experience of working with youth can be a useful model for contemporary government youth programming, particularly in terms of youth organizations, education and recreation.

¹²⁰ Public Opinion Foundation (2002g).

¹²¹ Chuprov (2003).

Young people represent a particular programmatic and policy challenge in the Russian Federation. As illustrated throughout this chapter, a targeted youth approach will be necessary to adequately address such issues as youth unemployment and healthy lifestyles — possible elements of which are outlined in Chapter 5. Chapter 4 follows the findings of this chapter to consider the context for youth policymaking in Russia and the extent to which it is configured to address the priorities identified here. However, the report turns first to consider the experience of young people in one of the poorest and most marginalized areas of Russia: the North Caucasus.

Chapter 3. Risks and Opportunities Facing Youth in the North Caucasus

*The roots of terrorism in the North Caucasus lie in “unemployment, in insufficiently effective socioeconomic policy, and in insufficient education ... The district’s unemployment rate is several times higher than Russia’s average ... All of this provides fertile soil for extremism to grow.”*¹²²

— President Vladimir Putin, September 13, 2004

The North Caucasus is the most disadvantaged region in the Russian Federation, as highlighted in Chapter 2. Young people in the North Caucasus face many of the same issues as their peers — from increasing poverty to worsening health status — as well as a unique set of contextual challenges, including socioeconomic inequalities, political marginalization, ethnic and religious tensions, and conflict. These issues are magnified by the size of the youth cohort in the North Caucasus, which makes it the youngest region in the country.

This chapter presents a multidimensional analysis of the situation of youth in this region, identifying and exploring youth needs, risks and opportunities around the issues of school-to-work transition, healthy lifestyles, security and conflict, and voice and participation. It focuses on five North Caucasian republics (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia) and one adjacent region (Stavropol Kray).¹²³ The findings of the chapter are based on an original qualitative survey of young people and youth stakeholders in the region.¹²⁴

¹²² The Guardian (2004).

¹²³ Appendix B includes a brief description and data summary for each of these regions.

¹²⁴ Over 600 young people, aged 12–27 were involved in the research (320 took part in semi-structured one-on-one interviews, and an additional 300 participated in focus groups), which also included 60 youth stakeholders, such as parents, teachers, government officials, employment professionals, religious and ethnic leaders and youth organization representatives. All research was conducted between May and July 2005. A minimum of 5 focus groups, 50 youth interviews and 10 youth stakeholder interviews were undertaken in each of the 6 study sites, as detailed in Appendix B. Purposive stratified sampling was used to select respondents and ensure diversity by gender,

The School-to-Work Transition

“Youth themselves don’t see the importance of knowledge yet. The system of values found today teaches them different lessons — jobs are open not to those who are skilled specialists and industrious students, but to those who have profitable connections and money for bribes”.

— Director, Youth NGO, Dagestan¹²⁵

“I would want to receive a higher education and then find a job, but I have neither money nor connections.”

— 17-year-old, North Ossetia¹²⁶

Across the Russian Federation in 2002, approximately 10 percent of 15–24-year-olds were neither employed, nor in education.¹²⁷ An idleness rate of one-tenth of the country’s youth population is ample cause for concern — until the figures for the North Caucasus are considered. As illustrated in Table 3.1, every one of the six regions and republics included in this research has a youth idleness rate more than double that of the country as a whole, a figure that reaches almost seven times the national average in the worst-off republic. Better understanding of the difficulties

age, ethnicity, religion, urban/rural location and level of education, employment and poverty. Questions were piloted in the field prior to use and were predominantly conducted in Russian, although, at the discretion of the interviewer or request of the respondent, were also administered in local languages. All interviews were confidential and quotations referenced in this study are not attributed by name, but by demographic data.

¹²⁵ Stakeholder interview, July 14, 2005.

¹²⁶ Stakeholder interview, June 5, 2005.

¹²⁷ Agranovich et al. (2005).

Table 3.1 Youth Idleness in the North Caucasus (2002)

Region	Russian Federation	Chechnya	Dagestan	Ingushetia	Kabardino-Balkaria	North Ossetia	Stavropol Kray
Estimated % of 15–24-year-olds who neither work nor study	10.3	54.9	40.7	70.5	35.1	21.4	21.0

Source: Agranovich et al (2005).

that young people in the North Caucasus face in the school-to-work transition is thus of crucial importance — to young people and their families, as well as to the stability of their communities.

Education issues

Across demographic categories and geographic regions, young people surveyed for this research collectively pointed to two major problems with primary, secondary and tertiary education in the North Caucasus today: cost and quality. These problems are not unique to the North Caucasus and mirror general trends throughout the Russian Federation. A recent World Bank policy note, for example, highlights nationwide quality problems in education, including the mismatch between the curriculum, common teaching methods and desired educational outcomes; a lack of modernity in the educational system; and the lack of opportunities for teachers to develop new skills.¹²⁸ However, substantially lower than national average secondary school completion rates in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia make youth in those republics especially disadvantaged.¹²⁹ As illustrated throughout this chapter, the depth and breadth of these problems is often far more pronounced in the North Caucasus region, as are their impacts on young people's hopes and possibilities.

¹²⁸ Canning et al. (2004)

¹²⁹ Agranovich et al. (2005). An additional issue for respondents in Chechnya was the impact of conflict on young people's ability to pursue secondary (at times even primary) education. Low education levels and poor Russian language skills have made it especially difficult for these young people to find work or to be involved in productive enterprises.

Cost

“Money is the main precondition for entering and studying. It is very hard to enter and pass exams having no money, even though a student can have good intellectual capabilities and good results”.

— 17-year-old, Kabardino-Balkaria¹³⁰

Across regions and levels of education, students in the North Caucasus face a similar set of costs for education, including transport, books, supplies and school fees. Tuition fees are largely limited to tertiary education institutions, but are quite common among respondents, as more young people subscribe to commercial institutions. The highest tuition fees paid by young people in the survey were in Stavropol Kray, and averaged between US\$700–1,000¹³¹ per year.

The most onerous cost of education, often at both secondary and tertiary levels, is the necessity of bribes and unofficial payments.

Corruption in education in the North Caucasus mirrors national trends described in Chapter 2, yet surpasses them in terms of scale and depth. Secondary school students interviewed in the region regularly mentioned gifts for teachers and informal payments to schools among the major costs of attending school and lamented the need to pay bribes in order to secure a place in university (including “free” state schools). In a focus group on higher education in Ingushetia, 11th form pupils agreed that a student's performance was not enough to ensure his or her entrance into university.¹³²

Since there is no standardized entrance exam for merit-based entrance into universities in the North Caucasus yet, bribes and connections become necessary. As an 18-year-old university student in North Ossetia explained, “Being able to bribe and bear further expenses exempts you from knowing anything.”¹³³ The cost of entering a faculty are directly proportional to its level of prestige; the amount of bribes needed to enter

¹³⁰ Focus group, June 21, 2005.

¹³¹ 20,000–30,000 rubles.

¹³² Focus group, June 4, 2005.

¹³³ Stakeholder interview, May 12, 2005.

medical and law faculties, for example, is higher than those for other subjects. This practice persists even once students are enrolled, in the form of gifts and unofficial payments to teachers to pass exams. Young people enrolled at the university level in Dagestan reported paying exam payments ranging from US\$70–175;¹³⁴ and as much as US\$1,000 at the law faculty.

Informal payments and bribes make access to education largely dependent on a family's resources (rather than a young person's will). Access is beyond the means of many families in the region. Surprisingly, young people are very willing to talk about these practices and children as young as 13 were well aware that their secondary educational achievements and tertiary education goals would be predicated on mobilizing contacts, making informal payments and bribes. Stakeholders, including parents and educational officials, were similarly open about these practices. Within higher education, the pervasive need for bribes may result from the shortage of student places in the North Caucasus. While there is a national average of 1.2 college seats per high school graduate across the Russian Federation, this falls to 0.6 seats in Chechnya and Kabardino-Balkaria, 0.7 in Ingushetia and 0.8 in Dagestan.¹³⁵

The high cost of education in the region often makes it more difficult for young women to enter higher education institutions than their brothers. In Ingushetia, for example, a teacher described how families are reluctant to invest large sums in the education of a girl who will eventually marry and remain at home, usually that of her husband's family.¹³⁶ Indeed, across the North Caucasus as a whole, the enrollment of girls in education is far lower than in the Russian Federation or even the Southern District. In 2003, 86.3 percent of 17-year-old women were enrolled at school in the country as a whole and 73.8 percent in the Southern Federal Region, but only 61 percent in the North Caucasus.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ 2,000–5,000 rubles.

¹³⁵ Agranovich et al. (2005).

¹³⁶ Stakeholder interview, June 14, 2005.

¹³⁷ GOSKOMSTAT (2003).

Quality

What would I like to see changed at the educational institutions I attended? "Absolutely everything: the system of instruction, staff policies, knowledge of teaching methods for children and youth, increasing the level and widening the outlook of teachers meticulous selection process for teachers. In higher education, extermination of bribery and improving the qualifications of teachers."
— 22-year-old university graduate, North Ossetia¹³⁸

Dissatisfaction with the standards and quality of education was common among young people surveyed in the North Caucasus at both secondary and tertiary levels. A Ministry of Education official in North Ossetia noted that the quality of secondary education in the republic was lower today than 10–15 years ago, particularly in village schools.¹³⁹ Throughout the North Caucasus, resource constraints at the republic level have resulted in insufficient facilities, combined with unmotivated and underpaid teachers. Across Ingushetia, for example, secondary schools had 92 percent more students than their capacity during the 2004–2005 school year, with schools in some districts accommodating more than three times the number of students for which they were built.¹⁴⁰ In Chechnya, where students far outnumber school places, many schools operate in shifts to accommodate as many students as possible. School overcrowding in the region can also have dimensions of ethnic exclusion — in the contested district of Prigorodny in North Ossetia, for example, Ingush and Osset children are segregated and attend separate schools. Yet as a local NGO working in the area explained, while the Osset schools are not full, the Ingush schools are crowded to well over capacity.¹⁴¹ Overall separation among the Ossetian and Ingush communities, also reflected in greater school segregation, has been exacerbated since the Beslan school massacre.

Teachers are the most commonly cited difficulty in education (among both current and past secondary school students), and were said to have

¹³⁸ Stakeholder interview, August 6, 2005.

¹³⁹ Stakeholder interview, May 25, 2005.

¹⁴⁰ Ministry of Education of the Republic of Ingushetia (2005).

¹⁴¹ Stakeholder interview, March 18, 2005.

poor skills, a lack of knowledge of appropriate teaching methods, unprofessional behavior, and a lack of respect for students. Indeed, a school director in North Ossetia complained that he often had to close his eyes to teacher's shortcomings as, with the low pay offered to them, teachers were in short supply.¹⁴² The difficulty of getting a high-quality secondary school education makes the transition to higher education difficult, especially outside of a student's local community and often necessitates paying for additional tutorials or bribes to enter tertiary institutions. Young people interviewed for this study felt that their secondary school education was equally ineffective in equipping them with the necessary skills and knowledge to enter the job market.

Table 3.2. Expenses in the Russian Federation Consolidated Budget per Student (2001)

Region	General Education	Higher Education
Russian Federation	5,843	11,958
Chechnya	1,526	–
Dagestan	3,005	4,450
Ingushetia	2,742	4,526
Kabardino-Balkaria	–	6,922
North Ossetia	2,585	6,520
Stavropol Kray	3,400	7,236

Source: Agranovich et al (2005).

Tertiary students were equally dissatisfied with the quality of their education, especially in light of its high cost. According to another Ministry of Education official in North Ossetia, 60 percent of young people studying in higher education institutions in the republic deem the education they received as poor.¹⁴³ Cost and quality problems may be tied to regional inequities in educational funding, as illustrated in Table 3.2. Many young people surveyed were thus interested in leaving the North Caucasus for their education. Yet this option was inaccessible for most due to the high costs of entering such institutions, or the lack of places for out-of-region students.

¹⁴² Stakeholder interview, June 4, 2005.

¹⁴³ Stakeholder interview, May 26, 2005.

Despite young people's lack of faith in the educational system, when it came to identifying the factors that respondents believed would best help them find employment, the most frequent response was: (i) educational qualifications (exam results or degree certificates), closely followed by: (ii) contacts (through family or friends); (iii) bribes (and unofficial payments to employers); (iv) obtaining additional skills and training and (v) relocation.

Employment issues

“Our republic is a labor-rich, job-poor region. I think that our higher educational establishments should be closed. Every year they graduate young people that are useless in the labor market.”
— State Placement Service Official, Dagestan¹⁴⁴

The Southern Federal Region of Russia, which includes the North Caucasus republics, has the lowest proportion of employed youth in the country. While the average percentage of employed 15–24-year-olds for the country as a whole was 34.1 percent in 2002, this figure was only 26.5 percent for the Southern Federal Region.¹⁴⁵ The bottom three regions in the country for youth employment were all in the North Caucasus: Ingushetia (5.8 percent), Dagestan (13.1 percent) and Chechnya (15.0 percent). Comparing youth unemployment rates in the North Caucasus with those in the rest of the country, the older the youth, the greater the discrepancy. At age 18, for example, 12.4 percent of young people in the North Caucasus were employed in 2003, compared to 18.5 percent of their peers in the rest of the Russian Federation.¹⁴⁶ At age 24, however, the employment rate in the North Caucasus, 35.2 percent, was less than half that in the rest of the country (70.7 percent). Young people in the North Caucasus also remain unemployed for longer than their counterparts in the rest of Russia. More than 40 percent of youth job seekers in the North Caucasus have been looking for a job for over one year, compared to only 27 percent for the country as a whole.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ Stakeholder interview, June 20, 2005.

¹⁴⁵ Agranovich et al. (2005)

¹⁴⁶ GOSKOMSTAT (2003).

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

Gender differences in employment are also more pronounced in the North Caucasus.

While unemployment rates were similar for young women and young men in Russia as a whole, as detailed in Chapter 2, in the North Caucasus young men are 30 percent more likely than young women to be unemployed.¹⁴⁸ Strong cultural barriers, meanwhile, often limit young women's entry into formal labor markets. Rates of labor activity among women in the North Caucasus republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria, for example, are all below 50 percent — markedly lower than in other parts of the country.¹⁴⁹

Of all of the priority youth issues discussed by the young people surveyed in the North Caucasus, employment was identified as the most serious. Young people who were employed often had only part-time or seasonal jobs. Many others were drastically underemployed and would have preferred to be doing other jobs with greater relevance to their interests or skills, or which offered better salaries and benefits.

The most common way through which young people in the North Caucasus find a job is through contacts and connections among family and friends. More universal approaches to the job search — such as answering advertisements, referrals from employment centers and internships or apprenticeships — are rare. In Chechnya and Ingushetia, not a single employed interviewee had found their job through an advertisement. Of the six regions included in the survey, it was only in Stavropol that young people had found jobs through their educational institutions or college internship programs. And of all the young people interviewed, only two cited employment offices as the means through which they found their jobs.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ GOSKOMSTAT (2003). However, young women are more likely than young men to be idle (i.e., not in education, not in employment).

¹⁴⁹ Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in Russian Federation (2005).

¹⁵⁰ One state placement service official in Dagestan noted the limitations and lack of relevance of employment services in a job market completely dependent on contacts and bribes. There is little transparency about vacancies, even to the placement service such that, “very often the information that comes into the placement service is old or inauthentic; as a result people go to already occupied vacancies under our direction” (Stakeholder interview, June 30, 2005).

Among unemployed youth, a lack of contacts or money with which to bribe employers was cited as the greatest obstacle to finding a job.

One 21-year-old law student in Kabardino-Balkaria believed he would be able to find a job upon graduation, but “only because my family has contacts with necessary people.” Without the contacts, “I would have to pay a big amount for a workplace.”¹⁵¹ This story was echoed across ages, genders and regions where respondents lived. An employment service official in Dagestan similarly explained, “It isn't a secret that the main factors in finding a job in our region are connections, acquaintances, and the possibility to stimulate the employer materially.”¹⁵² For young people in Chechnya, the closing of businesses and factories, the destruction of infrastructure and the presence of ongoing conflict has limited the availability of employment and made the police force one of the most desirable employers.¹⁵³ But such jobs were said to be impossible to access without large bribes and contacts.

The second main obstacle experienced by young people in their job search was skills mismatch and lack of experience. Many young people lacked job experience or relevant job-related skills (such as computer experience), but the mismatch between education and the job market was greatest for young people who had completed tertiary education. Well-educated youth, as well as education and employment officials, noted that as a result of the high value placed on “prestige” subjects by families and society, many young people choose university specialties for status rather than employability. This has resulted in an overabundance of lawyers and economists ill-prepared for the region's job market, even while vacancies persist for rural teachers, agronomists, electricians, machinists, metalworkers and builders. Because of the high cost of having acquired these prestige educational degrees, however, young people are unwilling to retrain to acquire a new profession that is not as highly remunerated as would be a position in the justice

¹⁵¹ Focus group, June 16, 2005.

¹⁵² Stakeholder interview, June 30, 2005.

¹⁵³ Employees of the police receive a regular salary, a gun and the right to carry a firearm.

system or taxation authority. Jobs in labor are particularly stigmatized.

This problem is especially pronounced in North Ossetia,¹⁵⁴ which produces more specialists than the other republics in the region.¹⁵⁵

The national average of college-level graduates as a proportion of the unemployed is only 1.1 percent, yet college-level graduates account for 11 percent of the unemployed in North Ossetia (the highest proportion of any region in the country).¹⁵⁶ One Ministry of Education official in the republic noted, “Every year about 80 percent of the graduates [of secondary school] enter the numerous Institutes of Higher Learning. Every year no less than 80 percent of these Institutes’ graduates become unemployed youth.”¹⁵⁷

These graduates are very difficult to place, given the oversaturation of applicants in the job market with their skills. According to the head of the State Placement Service in the republic, about 40 percent of those receiving unemployment payments in the republic are between the ages of 16 and 29.¹⁵⁸ This figure rises to 60 percent in the capital city, Vladikavkaz. Yet only 20 percent of young people who attend the placement center are willing to retrain to get a new specialty. This trend highlights the need for much better analysis of job vacancies, and a planning effort involving education and employment officials to better match education and training incentives and investments to the job market.

Unemployed youth were asked specifically about their work interests, including their interest in: (i) manual labor; (ii) community service work involving a volunteer component; and (iii) apprenticeship. In North Ossetia and

¹⁵⁴ Stakeholder interviews, May 25, 2005 and May 26, 2005. Officials interviewed from the Ministries of Education and Youth highlighted unemployment as the most serious problem affecting youth in that republic.

¹⁵⁵ Stakeholder interview, June 8, 2005.

¹⁵⁶ Agranovich et al. (2005). The socioeconomic impact of unemployment among educated young people can be devastating. Yousef (2003) details how high incidences of conflict can result from unmet expectations and foregone opportunities when employment opportunities for well-educated young people are limited.

¹⁵⁷ Stakeholder interview, June 14, 2005.

¹⁵⁸ Stakeholder interview, June 2, 2005

Kabardino-Balkaria, where the majority of unemployed respondents had some higher education, young people were interested only in high-paid, high-status jobs and generally unwilling to entertain any of the three proposed options.¹⁵⁹ In Chechnya and Ingushetia, however, respondents were willing to entertain all three options and were overwhelmingly interested in taking part in community service work, such as environmental clean-up or taking care of cultural sites, for which part of their time would be paid and part of their time would be volunteered.

While not strictly apprenticeship, many young people across all regions felt stuck in the difficult situation of needing experience to find a job but having no means of getting experience because of the depressed job market. Internship programs through which young people could learn skills on-the-job, or a renewal of historical programs of assigning work placements for young specialists after graduation, were commonly identified by young people as possible strategies for assisting with their search for employment.

Young people across regions were very interested in pursuing self-employment. People regularly cited a self-run business among the kinds of jobs they were interested in finding. More tellingly, when asked how they would spend additional income (the expected answers being on entertainment, clothes, telephones, etc.), large numbers of young people across all republics said that they would use such monies to start their own business. These proportions were highest in Stavropol and Ingushetia, where a staggering

¹⁵⁹ There was a wide divergence by region in terms of the expected salary of young people. In a focus group in Ingushetia for example, US\$105 (3,000 rubles)/month was identified as the minimum expected monthly salary, with one young man willing to work for US\$70 (2,000 rubles)/month. Similarly, a majority of interview respondents in Dagestan, Chechnya and Kabardino-Balkaria were willing to accept daily wages of less than US\$10.55 (300 rubles)/day for seasonal or temporary jobs, with many even willing to work for US\$5.25–7.00 (150–200 rubles)/day. In Stavropolsky Kray, by contrast, the majority of respondents identified 600 rubles as their minimum daily wage. The average wage (net of tax) for young people in the North Caucasus tends to increase with age, ranging from around US\$70 (2,000 rubles) for 16-, 17-, 18- and 19-year-olds to in excess of US\$105 (3,000 rubles) for 23-, 24- and 25-year-olds. GOSKOMSTAT (2003).

89 percent of respondents said that if they had additional income, they would invest it in opening a business. Their ideas included clothing stores, Internet cafes, gyms, auto repair shops, gardening and food processing (poultry, dairy and soft drinks). Few respondents had taken business development or employment preparation courses, most often because such courses were not available or not publicized. Such training was seen as an important means of being prepared for the job market and courses in computer skills, languages and technical and/or vocational skills (including accounting, mechanics and tailoring) were often requested.

Few unemployed young people in the North Caucasus are registered with their local or republic unemployment agencies. Those who are receive only modest benefits, usually in the range of US\$24.60–28.25 (700–800 rubles)/month.¹⁶⁰ Being “too young” was a common reason cited for not registering. In Ingushetia, for example, applicants need to be a minimum of 17 years old and have completed secondary school in order to qualify for benefits. Most often however, young people deemed that the low benefits were not worth the administrative and financial burden (including bribes) required to register. An unemployed 24-year-old man in Dagestan explained, “It may sound silly, but to get the dole, you have to give a bribe.”¹⁶¹ A 17-year-old girl in North Ossetia similarly explained her reasons for not applying, “I would spend much more on paper work than I would receive benefits.”¹⁶²

A surprising number of young people in the North Caucasus are also completely unaware of the existence of unemployment agencies and unemployment benefits. Given that young people account for such a large proportion of the unemployed who are currently registered or receiving benefits (40 percent of young people receiving unemployment benefits in North Ossetia are between 16 and 29; over 30 percent of people

¹⁶⁰ Monthly unemployment benefits in Ingushetia, for example, are US\$25.33 (720 rubles).

¹⁶¹ Stakeholder interview, June 20, 2005.

¹⁶² Stakeholder interview, June 5, 2005.

registered as unemployed with the Nazran employment office in Ingushetia are between 17 and 29),¹⁶³ one can only imagine how much more significant the proportion of unemployed youth would be if all unemployed young people were registered.

Given the bleak outlook for the job market in the North Caucasus, the majority of young people surveyed were willing to relocate in order to find a job. Rural youth were particularly focused on relocating to urban centers within the North Caucasus. With the high cost of housing and living in urban centers, however, many echoed the argument of focus group participants in Perevalni Khutor village in Stavropolsky Kray,¹⁶⁴ that relocating to the city is connected less with the desire to move, than with financial opportunities to move. Moreover, while young people generally wished to live and work in their home republics, a majority of respondents were willing to leave their republic or region to find employment if such a possibility should arise.¹⁶⁵

Healthy Lifestyles

How do young people learn about health issues?
“Accidentally”
 – Pediatrician, Dagestan¹⁶⁶

“Senior pupils have some fear for their future. They do not know where to continue their education and where they can find a job... Out of idleness they do silly things – start drinking and smoking”
 – School Headmaster, Ingushetia¹⁶⁷

What does it mean to be a healthy young person in the North Caucasus? For the majority of young people surveyed, the main element of a healthy lifestyle is sports and exercise. Physical

¹⁶³ Stakeholder interviews, March 22 and June 2, 2005.

¹⁶⁴ Focus group, July 13, 2005.

¹⁶⁵ The exception to this trend was Chechnya, where the majority of unemployed respondents were unwilling to travel outside the republic for work. This trend could relate to the hostilities faced by Chechens outside of their republic (which are addressed further in Section IV of this chapter).

¹⁶⁶ Stakeholder interview, May 25, 2005.

¹⁶⁷ Stakeholder interview, June 8, 2005.

fitness was cited more than twice as often as avoiding drug or alcohol abuse and more than three times as often as not smoking. Yet when asked about the most common health problems confronting young people in their community, substance abuse featured far more prominently in respondent answers, as seen in Table 3.3 below. Cigarettes, alcohol and drugs were all said to be easily accessible by young people throughout the North Caucasus.

Table 3.3. Most Common Health Problems of Youth in the North Caucasus

Region	#1 Most Common Health Problem	#2 Most Common Health Problem	#3 Most Common Health Problem
Chechnya	Smoking	Drugs ¹⁶⁸	HIV/AIDS and STDs
Dagestan	Smoking	Drugs	Alcohol
Ingushetia	Smoking	Drugs	Malnutrition
Kabardino-Balkaria	Smoking	Drugs	Alcohol
North Ossetia	Drugs	Smoking	Alcohol
Stavropolsky Kray	Smoking	Drugs	Alcohol

Source: World Bank (2005f).

Smoking, in particular, was very common and often began at a very young age. One 17-year-old young man, for instance, had been smoking a pack of cigarettes a day since he was 11 years old. In 2003, one-quarter of young people aged 15–25 in the North Caucasus were daily smokers.¹⁶⁹ Yet despite identifying smoking as a health problem, few young people in the survey had made attempts or intended to quit smoking.

Drug abuse was also cited as an issue by young people themselves, as well as by adult stakeholders who interact with youth, particularly parents and education professionals.

¹⁶⁸ Interviewees were not asked about which specific drugs they, or their contemporaries, used. However, a 2003 study suggests that opium-related drugs accounting for 90 percent of drug use. See Koshkina (2003).

¹⁶⁹ GOSKOMSTAT (2003).

A police major in Ingushetia suggested that drug addiction has become an urgent problem for youth in the republic and noted that drug trafficking is now one of the most prevalent crimes in the republic (drugs are connected with roughly 70 percent of crimes in Ingushetia).¹⁷⁰ Yet despite the need, the republic currently lacks a center for drug abuse prevention and education for young people.¹⁷¹ Unemployment and idleness were identified as the number one cause of substance abuse by young people in the survey, highlighting the need for an integrated approach to education, employment and health issues.

Domestic violence was not highlighted as a health problem by a significant number of interview respondents, yet anecdotal evidence suggests that it is a serious problem in the North Caucasus. In a recent survey on gender-based violence in Chechnya and Ingushetia, 30 percent of respondents reported witnessing domestic violence, and more than 60 percent of the women polled did not know of any support centers that could help them with issues of domestic violence.¹⁷² Domestic violence and violence against women were also identified as serious problems in the region during focus groups with young women on gender issues.¹⁷³ Participants noted the rise of psychological violence against women – most commonly the controlling behaviors of male relatives, husbands and boyfriends or verbal abuse and propositions from strangers on the street or in entertainment venues – as well as physical violence, of which sexual assault is increasingly frequent. Yet because such incidents are often thought to be caused by inappropriate dress or the comportment of the victim, and because a woman shamed by such an assault is said to bring shame upon her extended kin, women remain silent about abuse. As one 17-year-old focus group participant in Kabardino-Balkaria explained, “I know of several people who were the victims of attempted rape. Naturally, they did not report it to the police or testify, so as

¹⁷⁰ Stakeholder interview, June 6, 2005.

¹⁷¹ Stakeholder interview, June 7, 2005.

¹⁷² CARE (2004).

¹⁷³ Focus groups, June 5, 7, 10 and 13, 2005.

to avoid disgrace. And those rascals are left unpunished.”¹⁷⁴

Malnutrition was highlighted among the most serious health problems faced by young people in Ingushetia. These findings are borne out by a recent survey of over 6,000 households in three districts in Ingushetia, which explored families’ ability to consume meat, fresh vegetables and fresh fruit.¹⁷⁵ Over 90 percent of respondents consumed meat and fresh fruit once a week or less while over 80 percent consumed fresh vegetables once per week or less. Over 40 percent of respondents consumed meat and fresh fruit only once per month.

Television and mass media are young people’s main source of knowledge on health issues. As one 23-year-old young woman noted, “I do not think that anyone is applying purposeful efforts, even though it is necessary. All that young people know about health originates from TV, though such programs are few in number.”¹⁷⁶ As a source of health information for the young people surveyed, television is followed by parents, friends, medical professionals and schools (which were cited less than one-fourth as often as television). Health education in schools was admitted to be severely constrained by both medical and education professionals in the region. An infectious disease specialist in Dagestan noted that “the sanitary-educational work conducted in schools is insignificant”¹⁷⁷ and teachers themselves regularly complained that they were severely handicapped by their own knowledge, as well as by social customs when it came to discussing issues like HIV/AIDS (see discussion below).

Health professionals are also rare sources of health information for young people, who highlighted issues of trust and access and noted the lack of youth-friendly health facilities. Medical consultations at local health points are free, yet informal payments and bribes are regularly required. A 23-year-old young man in a

¹⁷⁴ Focus group, June 5, 2005.

¹⁷⁵ Danish Refugee Council (2005).

¹⁷⁶ Stakeholder interview, August 2005.

¹⁷⁷ Stakeholder interview, June 28, 2005.

rural village in Kabardino-Balkaria noted that “good treatment is earned with gifts.”¹⁷⁸ A recent survey by the NGO CARE in Chechnya and Ingushetia found that books, magazines, television and movies were the chief sources of sexual knowledge for 14–18-year-olds, not one of whom cited a doctor as a source of knowledge on sexual issues.¹⁷⁹ The inability of young people to access and trust medical professionals has had serious repercussions. According to the head of a TB dispensary in Ingushetia, the number of young people affected by tuberculosis is increasing, but about a quarter of those infected do not seek medical treatment and become chronically ill.¹⁸⁰

Young people are interested in knowing more about a wide range of health issues, including cancers, reproductive health, substance abuse and, most especially, HIV/AIDS and sexually-transmitted diseases. However, young people had few outlets to which to turn for such information. As one 20-year-old woman explained, “I am interested in diseases and infections transferred sexually. The problem is that I cannot ask my parents, because my breeding does not allow me to discuss such issues with my parents.”¹⁸¹ A mother in Chechnya similarly discussed her desire for young people to be educated about HIV/AIDS while noting that “this is a forbidden theme for discussion within the family.”¹⁸²

Educational professionals seem to be similarly restricted. One teacher in Chechnya explained “As a teacher, I see that we should hold seminars on the theme. However our traditions do not let us speak about sexual differences during lessons; I may be reproached for doing this.”¹⁸³ This is a gap that medical professionals should strive to fill, both to promote better linkages with young people and to prevent the rampant misinformation about HIV/AIDS that currently predominates in the region. In fact, a 2004 survey of over a thousand young people in Chechnya found that 60 percent

¹⁷⁸ Stakeholder interview, May 17, 2005.

¹⁷⁹ CARE (2004).

¹⁸⁰ Stakeholder interview, June 14, 2005.

¹⁸¹ Stakeholder interview, June, 2005.

¹⁸² Stakeholder interview, June 20, 2005.

¹⁸³ Stakeholder interview, June 17, 2005.

of them wished to receive more information on HIV/AIDS through the medical community.¹⁸⁴

Youth Participation

There is a "Youth Affairs Committee, but I do not know what they do. I have not heard anything about them except for negative comments"
— 22-year-old, North Ossetia¹⁸⁵

Recreation

The most common recreational activities enjoyed by young people are free and informal pastimes: both home-based (e.g., watching TV, reading, listening to the radio, entertaining friends); and outdoor (e.g., going for walks and visiting parks). For many young people, these activities are their only real options for recreation, given the high cost and lack of access to other recreation alternatives. Sporting activities, which can often also be enjoyed at little cost, are the second most common form of recreation. Most regions did have some entertainment facilities, such as cinemas, discos and cafes where young people also passed their time. These were much more common in urban centers than in rural areas (where there might be a monthly disco organized in the local school), although even then, these facilities were limited in number.

A majority of respondents did not know of a single organization that worked with young people in their communities.¹⁸⁶ In many cases, this was due to the absence of youth-related groups (such as in rural communities), while in others, it was due to a lack of market development, publicity and public activities on the part of existing organizations. In Dagestan, the Head of the Youth Department at the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Tourism himself was unable to name a single youth group or NGO or discuss the work that they do.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ WHO (2004).

¹⁸⁵ Stakeholder interview, August 6, 2005.

¹⁸⁶ Interestingly, however, young people's awareness of youth organizations was higher in several North Caucasus republics than in the Russian Federation overall, where only 33 percent of 18–35-year-olds knew of the existence of a local youth organization. Public Opinion Foundation (2005b).

¹⁸⁷ Stakeholder interview, June 30, 2005.

As illustrated by Table 3.4 below, young people's awareness of youth organizations varied considerably by republic, as did the nature of such groups. In terms of youth role models and opinion-shapers, the group most often cited was not youth organizations, teachers or community leaders, but rather parents and older relatives. Similarly, when young people have a problem or question, they most often turn to their parents, followed by their friends, for advice.

Table 3.4. Awareness of Youth Organizations

Region	Young People who Know of a Local Group Working with Youth	Most Commonly Identified Youth Groups
Chechnya	52%	NGOs
Dagestan	33%	Student Committees
Ingushetia	59%	NGOs, Ministry of Youth, Youth Affairs Committee
Kabardino-Balkaria	52%	Sports Sections
North Ossetia	24%	Youth Affairs Committee
Stavropolsky Kray	43%	Stavropol Youth Union

Source: World Bank (2005f).

Like their peers around the world, young people in the North Caucasus are interested in information technology; mobile telephones and the Internet are important means of communicating and accessing information. Access varies greatly by region however, with Stavropol Kray the most technologically "hooked-up" and Chechnya the least, as illustrated in Table 3.5.

Travel is a common youth recreational interest, and a majority of respondents have traveled outside their republic. Youth travel was most commonly for holidays and visits to friends and family, but young people also left their regions as refugees during conflict, to participate in conferences and competitions or to seek employment. A majority of those respondents who had traveled faced difficulties in doing so, particularly with respect to ethnic prejudices against Caucasians and resultant mistreatment by law enforcement,

Table 3.5. Young People's Access to Communication Technology

Region	% of Respondents with a Mobile Telephone	% of Respondents with Access to the Internet	Cost of 1 hour of Internet Access in Urban Internet Caf�
Chechnya	28%	21%	2.10 USD (60 Rubles) (Grozny)
Dagestan	52%	34%	0.60 USD (17 Rubles) (Mahachkala)
Ingushetia	69%	31% ¹⁸⁸	1.40 USD (40 Rubles) (Nazran)
Kabardino-Balkaria	64%	14%	1.40 USD (40 Rubles) (Nalcik)
North Ossetia	60%	38%	1.05 USD (30 Rubles) (Vladikavkaz)
Stavropol Kray	86%	53%	0.60 USD (17 Rubles) (Pyatigorsk)

Source: World Bank (2005f).

border officials and federal troops. As a 22-year-old woman from Kabardino-Balkaria explained, "I had problems with authorities when the second Chechen war started and Russian Federation authorities would not differentiate Chechens from other North Caucasian peoples. Often you had to explain who you are, and that not all Caucasians, including Chechens, are killers and Wahabbists."¹⁸⁹

Experiences of discrimination and feelings of isolation were frequently described by young people when talking about travel and the world beyond their immediate regions. The difficulty of travel formalities, the cost of travel and other institutional and political barriers had limited the opportunities for young people to travel. Youth mobility in the North Caucasus is considerably lower than in the rest of Russia. In 2003, only 7.7 percent of young people in the region were away from home (whether for study, employment, leisure, etc.), as opposed to 13.5 percent of their peers in the rest of the country.¹⁹⁰

Respondents felt that the experiences and opportunities available to their peers in the rest of Russia and other parts of the world

¹⁸⁸ The closing of public Internet cafes in Ingushetia after incidents of violence in the republic (such as the June 2004 attacks on government and police facilities) has also affected local young people's access to the Internet.

¹⁸⁹ Stakeholder interview, August 2005.

¹⁹⁰ GOSKOMSTAT (2003).

were not available to them and that their perspectives suffered because of it. Very few young people in the region, for example, have ever spent time outside of the Russian Federation. The lack of opportunities to travel was most pronounced in Chechnya, where young people felt that their only opportunity to communicate with youth from other backgrounds and see what lies beyond the borders of Chechnya was as a refugee.

A focus group in the

Okruzhnaya district of Chechnya concluded that for young Chechens today, the majority of interaction with other nationalities takes place at checkpoints, and these bring little pleasure.¹⁹¹ As one 20-year-old young woman explained, "In recent years, Chechens are thought and spoken of in a negative context, but we would want to communicate with youth of other ethnicities; only though communication can negative stereotypes be erased."¹⁹²

Political awareness and participation

The news — particularly items related to politics, science, sports and entertainment — was of great interest to the young people surveyed. Local- and/or republic-level news was rated as the most interesting, followed by international news.¹⁹³ Youth in the North Caucasus paid little attention to Russian national news, except in Stavropol Kray, the one majority Russian region included in the research.

Television and word of mouth were the most common sources of news across all regions.

Radio and print media were also cited, but far less frequently. Radio had its greatest number of

¹⁹¹ Focus group, June 4, 2005.

¹⁹² Stakeholder interview, May 29, 2005.

¹⁹³ This is an interesting contrast to the media habits of youth in the rest of the Russian Federation, the vast majority of which learned their news from central- and/or federal-level broadcasting. Cited in Agranovich et al. (2005).

users in Dagestan;¹⁹⁴ newspapers were uncommon and used most often in Stavropol Kray.¹⁹⁵ In fact, more respondents in Chechnya and Ingushetia got their news from the Internet than from print media sources.

While interested in local happenings and politics, young people's participation in local decision making and local politics was negligible.¹⁹⁶ Three-quarters of respondents had never taken part in a meeting or forum in their town or village. The participation of the majority of the remaining quarter was limited to festivals or sporting events. Only a handful had actually ever participated in meetings or discussions on local issues or in local decision-making processes. Yet at the same time, young people were quick to voice their dissatisfaction with their leaders and highlight injustices in society. As one 16-year-old girl in Kabardino-Balkaria expressed, "Unemployment in the whole republic leads to the disintegration of identity, nation, person — for which I blame our politicians."¹⁹⁷

As commonly expressed by their peers around the world, many young people in the North Caucasus felt that there were few opportunities to take part in local meetings on political issues because of their age, or believed that such participation was futile. As one 22-year-old woman in Kabardino-Balkaria explained, "I believe there is no sense in attending those because they do as they want with or without our support"¹⁹⁸. The lack of avenues or vehicles through which young people could participate in the political system was also identified as a key challenge. Respondents felt that the youth departments of political parties were ineffective in reaching out to young people

¹⁹⁴ Dagestan has the highest rural population of the regions in the sample and has a mountainous geography in which radio may be a more effective means of information gathering than television, newspapers or word of mouth.

¹⁹⁵ Perhaps this is because the cost of newspapers is most easily borne in Stavropol Kray, which has the highest average income of the study regions.

¹⁹⁶ This mirrors the overall trend of low Russian youth participation in politics, as discussed in Chapter 2.

¹⁹⁷ Stakeholder interview, August 2005.

¹⁹⁸ Stakeholder interview, August 2005.

and that the region lacked youth unions capable of training youth leaders and interacting with decision makers.

Participation in religious and ethnic communities

The vast majority of young people surveyed identified themselves as belonging to a religious faith, but for them religion was often more cultural than spiritual. Participation in organized religious activities varied greatly by region, but averaged only about one-third of respondents across the whole sample, as illustrated in Figure 3.6. Unexpectedly, it is only in predominantly Orthodox Christian Stavropolsky Kray that a majority of respondents claimed to take part in religious activities, most of which were based around religious holidays.

Table 3.6. Young People's Participation in Activities Sponsored by Their Religious Community

Region	Yes
Chechnya	26%
Dagestan	24%
Ingushetia	37%
Kabardino-Balkaria	18%
North Ossetia	8%
Stavropolsky Kray	69%
Survey Average	32%

Source: World Bank (2005f).

Religiousness among youth was on the rise in several of the regions in the sample, however.¹⁹⁹ In Ingushetia, the ten 18–24-year-old men and women who participated in a focus group on religion in the republic saw a need for a more religious society and felt that an expansion of Islam would provide a new foundation

¹⁹⁹ Most notably Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria. An official with the Department of Cooperation with Religious Groups in Kabardino-Balkaria noted that the number of religious organizations in the republic is rapidly increasing. Stakeholder interview, June 15, 2005.

for more honest relationships in the republic — a replacement to the current system of connections and bribery.²⁰⁰ At the same time, however, these young people had no desire to live in an Islamic state and believed in the separation of church and state, particularly as they saw the state as a force that could corrupt the values of Islam.²⁰¹ Participants in a similar focus group in Kabardino-Balkaria were also interested in a more religious society in their republic as a means of reducing crime and immorality.²⁰²

The rise of religious extremism and the increasing presence of new religious sects — such as the sect referred to as the Wahabi²⁰³ — was mentioned by people surveyed in all of the study regions.²⁰⁴ Wahabbists were said to be successful in attracting young people because they had money and were able to help young people who felt alone to form social networks. Young people in the survey who talked about Wahabism saw it as a real threat in their republic — both to security and to true Islam.²⁰⁵ As a result, many young people were quick to point out their aversion to religious extremism, and many now treat-

²⁰⁰ Focus group, July 27, 2005.

²⁰¹ In fact, young people criticized religious authorities in the region for being overly politicized and connected to republican authorities.

²⁰² Focus group, June 26, 2005.

²⁰³ In her detailed study of Islam in Russia, Hunter (2004), 458, describes Wahabism as a radical form of Islam which originated in Saudi Arabia and can be characterized by, “(1) rejection of basic traditions of Islam, including four historically developed mazhabs and Shiism; (2) the idea of exclusive righteousness that enables adherents to declare others ‘non-Muslims,’ including Muslims who disagree with such interpretation; and (3) arbitrary infringement of others’ rights, including killing ‘infidels’ and Muslims who do not share this viewpoint.” However, in Russia, the label “Wahabbist” is often indiscriminately applied to strict observers of Islam as well as to extremists and militants, regardless of their sect.

²⁰⁴ But again, most often in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria

²⁰⁵ Republican officials who are similarly concerned with religious extremism have initiated a range of innovative programming. In Ingushetia, for example, young imams have been working with the ministry responsible for youth affairs to distribute messages of peace and tolerance. And in Kabardino-Balkaria, the government, in cooperation with the Islamic Institute in the republic, recently supported a three-month long training course to better equip imams to address such movements.

ed any religious devotion with suspicion. In Kabardino-Balkaria, for example, one 23-year-old young woman, when asked about her participation in religious activities responded, “No, I do not take part in suspicious activities.”²⁰⁶ Another 22-year-old woman in the republic explained that she didn’t take part in religious activities since her “parents are afraid of me becoming a Wahabi.”²⁰⁷ Yet young people in Kabardino-Balkaria were also wary of the methods used by authorities to address the threat of Wahabism and felt that these often resulted in an oppression of Muslims by the state: Closure of mosques, harassment of young men wearing beards or difficulties for devout Muslims to get jobs.²⁰⁸

Despite the rise of religion among youth, religious identity was rarely the strongest one professed by young people. Interestingly, Ingushetia, in which only one-third of young people participated in formal religious activities, was the only region in which the majority of respondents identified themselves most closely with their religious community. Youth in other republics more commonly considered themselves a member of their ethnic or geographic community (as detailed in Table 3.7) or no community at all, as in Chechnya and North Ossetia. Other communities with which respondents commonly identified included: the North Caucasus, student communities, communities of gender, and local town or village communities. Where ethnic identities are strongly asserted in public venues, for example, in the case of Chechen and Kabardinian students within Nalchik University, these identities can give rise to violent clashes. This factor, however, was not openly acknowledged by young respondents.

²⁰⁶ Stakeholder interview, August 2005.

²⁰⁷ Stakeholder interview, August 2005.

²⁰⁸ Including the closing of mosques and creation of a special police unit to deal with Wahabbists.

Table 3.7. Youth Identification with a Community

Region	Community with which the most young people identify
Chechnya	None
Dagestan	Republic of Dagestan
Ingushetia	Religious Community
Kabardino-Balkaria	Ethnic Community
North Ossetia	None
Stavropolsky Kray	Russian Federation

Source: World Bank (2005f).

Security and Conflict

“The main threat [to security] is corruption of police and terrorism, which are closely interrelated”
 – 24-year-old woman, Nalcik, Kabardino-Balkaria²⁰⁹

In terms of inter-personal relationships, most young people found their peers generally tolerant and willing to socialize with people of different ethnicities and religions. The only regional exception was in North Ossetia, where a majority felt that ethnic prejudice was common.

Prejudice was particularly pronounced against the Ingush, with whom Ossets fought a war in 1992, and who were among those implicated in the 2004 Beslan school massacre in North Ossetia.²¹⁰ The perception of this 18-year-old young woman in Vladikavkaz is largely representative of her peers: “The attitude is normal towards all the ethnicities save for Ingush. [...] Everyone lives in peace and friendship, except for the Ingush, who are not being tolerated and are troublesome in general.”²¹¹

Despite tensions in the region, the majority of young people interviewed felt safe in their local communities, with few differences across regions. In Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia and Stavropolsky Kray,

²⁰⁹ Stakeholder interview, August 2005.

²¹⁰ This event was often mentioned by respondents from North Ossetia as a catalyst for decreasing levels of tolerance in the republic.

²¹¹ Stakeholder interview, May 12, 2005.

approximately 60 percent of respondents reported feeling safe in their community. In Chechnya, however, where many young people have experienced conflict throughout their lives, less than 15 percent of respondents reported feeling safe in their community. Many young Chechens felt that the war in their republic had not yet ended. As an 18-year-old young woman from the village of Gekhi described, “I do not feel the war is coming to an end yet. We live in constant tension.”²¹²

Yet an experience of violence, insecurity or conflict was also common. The majority of the young people interviewed had witnessed (or themselves participated in) violence involving other youth, ranging from school fights to inter-ethnic conflicts to violent sexual assaults to a terrorist takeover of a bus to war.²¹³ A recent survey in Chechnya and Ingushetia found that 70 percent of people have experienced emotional or physical trauma related to conflict,²¹⁴ while a similar Medecins Sans Frontieres survey of people displaced by the wars in Chechnya found that over 70 percent of interviewees had experienced aerial bombings, mortar fire and attacks on their homes or village, and had witnessed people being wounded since the start of the conflict.²¹⁵ Over half of the respondents of this survey in Chechnya and one-third in Ingushetia had lost at least one member of their nuclear family in the conflict, with more than one-quarter of these respondents having witnessed their actual death.

Young people perceived a wide range of threats to the security of their communities, as presented in Table 3.9. Terrorism was prominently cited, as was the corruption of the police and

²¹² Stakeholder interview, June 22, 2005.

²¹³ The emotional toll of the conflicts in Chechnya is still palpable among young people in the republic. About half of the participants in the survey from Chechnya did not answer the question of whether they had ever witnessed violence involving young people in their community. Many of those who did answer the question were understandably reluctant to discuss the specific incidents which they had witnessed. Some young people did want to talk about the violence which they had witnessed and gave accounts of explosions, the deaths of family members and young people being detained during military sweeps or “clean-ups.”

²¹⁴ CARE (2004).

²¹⁵ de Jong et al. (2004).

other authorities. This was an unexpected finding and suggests that authorities can promote security not just by policing the actions of external agents (such as religious extremists), but also by committing themselves to higher internal standards of integrity and transparency. As one 21-year-old young man in Kabardino-Balkaria noted, “I do not think there will be order and safety as long as high officials accept bribes and steal from their own people.”²¹⁶ Another 21-year-old in Ingushetia explained, “I witnessed a young person being beaten up by police officers. Since then I do not trust law-enforcement agencies.”²¹⁷ Corruption was noted across all branches of authority — but was most often mentioned with respect to law enforcement. A police major in Ingushetia himself noted that “today the police force does not serve as an example for young people...people do not trust police men, do not respect them” and that “there should be a more thorough selection of the staff.”²¹⁸

as one of the chief benefits of work in the military or police. In Stavropol, on the other hand, researchers reported respondents regularly laughing at the notion that they might carry weapons. Similarly, some threats to security were perceived as more significant in particular regions, such as Wahabism in Dagestan.

In Stavropol, Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia — relatively well-off regions into which there has been an influx of outsiders from the North and South Caucasus — a degree of xenophobia was relatively common and many respondents identified the presence of refugees and/or illegal immigrants as a threat. Crowded labor markets, competition over social services and perceptions of refugees having access to special resources have inflamed resentment towards “outsiders” in these regions.

Table 3.8. Most Commonly Cited Threats to Security

Region	Threat #1	Threat #2	Threat #3
Chechnya	War/Actions of the Russian Military	Presence of Weapons	Corruption
Dagestan	Terrorism	Corruption	Presence of Weapons
Ingushetia	Corruption	Military Actions	Presence of Weapons
Kabardino-Balkaria	Potential for War (tensions between Kabardins and Balkarians, Balkarian separatist movement)	Corruption	Terrorism
North Ossetia	Terrorism	Corruption	Presence of Weapons
Stavropolsky Kray	Terrorism	Drugs	Spread of Conflict

Source: World Bank (2005f).

Security issues vary considerably by region.

The presence of weapons was identified as a serious threat in some regions, with many young people admitting to carrying weapons themselves. In Chechnya, young people cited the right to carry a gun and thereby ensure one’s own safety

²¹⁶ Stakeholder interview, June 12, 2005.

²¹⁷ Stakeholder interview, May 26, 2005.

²¹⁸ Stakeholder interview, June 6, 2005.

Youth Needs and Strategies for Addressing Youth Priorities

“Probably nobody is as familiar with youth problems as we are. There are too many to count. The most important problem is that young people here do not have all the opportunities that their peers in the rest of Russia have. We do not have such wide choices in work, education and entertainment.”

— Youth Committee Member, Chechnya²¹⁹

Giving a voice to young people in the North Caucasus and seeking their advice on the kinds of youth services and programs that would be of the greatest benefit in their communities was a priority for this research study. Programming related to employment was the most commonly requested service, as detailed in

²¹⁹ Stakeholder interview, June 8, 2005.

Table 3.9. This included youth employment services, job creation programs, internship opportunities, small business start-up support and job training. The idea that “the most important thing is to provide workplaces,”²²⁰ as expressed by a 20-year-old in a rural village in Kabardino-Balkaria, was repeated countless times by young people in all regions of the study.

Table 3.9. Most Commonly Requested Services/Programs for Young People

Region	# 1	# 2	# 3
Chechnya	Employment Assistance	Sports Activities and Facilities	Entertainment Activities and Facilities
Dagestan	Sports Activities and Facilities	Entertainment Activities and Facilities	Educational Support and Opportunities
Ingushetia	Employment Assistance	Sports Activities and Facilities	Entertainment Activities and Facilities
Kabardino-Balkaria	Employment Assistance	Entertainment Activities and Facilities	Educational Support and Opportunities
North Ossetia	Employment Assistance	Sports Activities and Facilities	Entertainment Activities and Facilities
Stavropol Kray	Sports Activities and Facilities	Employment Assistance	Entertainment Activities and Facilities

Source: World Bank (2005f).

Recreational opportunities, whether sports or entertainment related, were also a consistent

²²⁰ Stakeholder interview, August 6, 2005.

request. The varied suggestions within this category regularly included sporting facilities, parks, cinemas, discos, museums and libraries. Of particular note were requests to provide sports programs accessible to girls, such as aerobics centers and girls’ sports teams. Other frequent youth programming requests included health outreach, internet access, cultural events, housing for young families, greater opportunities for youth to interact with government and new youth organizations.

This chapter has highlighted the experiences of young people in the North Caucasus: their aspirations and fears, the obstacles they face today and the opportunities they see for the future, and their place in their families, communities and republics. It has sought to both explore the greatest youth needs in region as well as to identify openings through which youth development priorities can be addressed. Specific strategic and policy options for better supporting youth in the region will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. Included among these options are some of the detailed suggestions and innovative ideas put forward by survey respondents themselves. First, however, Chapter 4 will consider the political economy of youth issues and youth policy making in the Russian Federation and identify ways in which legal and institutional arrangements for youth can best support the emergence of innovative and relevant programming for young people in the North Caucasus and throughout the country.

Chapter 4. Institutional Framework for Youth Policy Development and Implementation

“The improvements made by legislation in the Russian Federation over the past decade have enabled the creation of standard regulations reflecting the rights and interests of young people”²²¹

This chapter explores the emergence of youth-related institutions and practices in the Russian Federation, particularly the Federally Targeted Programs “Youth of Russia” and “South of Russia.”²²² Building on the context of youth needs presented in Chapters 2 and 3, this chapter will focus on current policies relevant to the school-to-work transition and youth inclusion, with a regional focus on the North Caucasus.

Youth Policy at the Federal Level

Youth Policy has developed as a self-standing area of social policy in the Russian Federation, with its own policy framework and body of active institutions (and range of programs). In 1999 a draft Federal law “On the Foundations of the Government Youth Policy in the Russian Federation” was developed. Although it has not officially been approved, the draft law has provided a basic policy framework for youth issues and specific measures to support the school-to-work transition, such as provisions for first-employment options for secondary school students during holiday times and incentives for firms to hire young people. The draft law also addresses the inclusion of young citizens in the formulation and implementation of state youth policy in the Russian Federation, with provisions for young people and youth- and children-focused public unions to make propositions about the state youth policy

²²¹ Council of Europe (2003), 3.

²²² This chapter draws extensively on “Background paper on school-to-work transition and youth inclusion in Southern Russia: Institutional analysis” (Institute for Urban Economics 2005).

and participate with state authorities in consultations on youth policy issues.

The “Concept of State Youth Policy in the Russian Federation” (2000) outlined an “opportunity-focused youth policy.” That concept continues to provide guidance to current youth work.²²³ An inter-ministerial Government Committee for Youth Affairs was established in 2000, with representatives from both houses of the federal Parliament, as well as regional and districts authorities and non-governmental youth organizations. A Public Youth Chamber associated with the State Duma that is composed of regional representatives has also functioned as a national consultative body on youth since 2001.²²⁴ Within the Ministry of Education and Science, the Department of Youth Policy, established in May 2000, is responsible for youth policy coordination, and the Agency for Youth is responsible for the implementation of federally targeted programs related to youth.

In terms of national-level youth programming, several of the 53 Federally Targeted Programs

²²³ Siurala (2006). The Russian “Concept of State Youth Policy” was established in line with Council of Europe principles on youth policy. A “Framework programme for cooperation in the youth field for the period 2006–2008” has been recently signed by the Ministry of Education with the Council of Europe, continuing a long-established collaboration.

²²⁴ The oblasts of Novosibirsk, Kaliningrad, St.Petersburg, Ryazan and Moscow are the most active participants in national youth parliamentary activities through their so-called youth parliaments, from which they continually delegate their representatives to national youth parliamentary bodies and organizations. Some municipalities also report on participation in national parliamentary work, among them, Arkhangelsk, Vologda and Togliatti.

(FTPs) active in 2005,²²⁵ are directly or indirectly related to young people. However, their performance outcomes with respect to young people are not adequately measured. Chief among these are: (i) the sub-program *Provision of Housing to Young Families* within the federal program “Housing”; (ii) the program *Children of Russia*, which also covers adolescents; (iii) two sub-programs *On Protection from HIV-AIDS* and *On Protection from Sexually Transmitted Diseases* within the program “Fighting Social Diseases”; (iv) the program *Reforming the System of Military Education*; and (v) and the program *Youth of Russia*, on which this chapter will focus.²²⁶

The *Youth of Russia* program has focused on assisting young families, encouraging youth enterprises, supporting sports and leisure and promoting information access to youth. The first two earmarked programs took place in 1995–1997 and 1998–2000. The main result of these programs was the formation of youth policy authorities in most regions and municipalities. The programs also stimulated the development of public youth organizations and the creation of certain new directions in state youth policy. In December 2000, the *Youth of Russia 2001–2005* program was approved by the government. Its purpose was to promote citizenship consciousness and personal self-actualization among youth. It included elements ranging from “patriotic” education to information access, youth clubs, sociological research, the prevention of risky behaviors (e.g., crime, drug addiction and alcoholism) and the promotion of healthy lifestyles. Given concern over population aging in the Russian Federation, the program also assisted young families to acquire housing. In the area of professional development and the school-to-work transition, the federally targeted program provided useful work-related opportunities to youth through summer work camps, seasonal and part-time jobs, designated workplaces for adolescents and young people and youth business development.

²²⁵ Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation (no date).

²²⁶ A brief overview of the FTP “South of Russia” is provided in Section III of this chapter.

Yet the lack of a clear strategic policy framework, a well-defined and prioritized set of objectives, as well as transparent mechanisms of regional targeting have all limited the effectiveness and impact of the *Youth of Russia* program. Systematic monitoring and evaluation has also been a shortcoming of the program. With respect to other programs, progress has not been measured according to a rigorous system of input, output and performance indicators. The reporting system lacks rigor and often relies on data that are not comparable. Moreover, youth statistics are not systematically collected by any department in public administration. These same constraints are also present in regional and municipal-level youth programming.

The process of regional participation in the FTP *Youth of Russia* program lacks clarity and transparency. Regional youth policy authorities are responsible for preparing draft financial proposals for youth programs that are submitted to the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade or the federal agency in charge of a given program. These drafts are considered as proposals for financing, but the regions are often unaware of the exact formal procedures by which proposals are approved and selected. Regional officials interviewed highlighted multiple reasons for not participating in the *Youth of Russia* program and for failing to compete for federal financing, including:

- lack of information about the regulations of the competitions;
- the need to co-finance the corresponding projects from regional budgets at a level that would exceed the federal grant several times;
- difficulties induced by competition with other regions; and
- the requirement to carry out large inter-regional projects and cooperate with other regions in order to receive program funding.

A representative of Rostov Oblast also noted that program regulations make only big and costly projects feasible in the context of the “rules of the game.” Meanwhile the deputy head of the youth policy department of Ryazan Oblast felt that the federal program allocates so little money that the

value of participation for regions was low compared to the administrative costs.

The lack of transparency about decision making in the program's competition-based financing structure is an additional constraint to the full participation of all regions in the country. In particular, it is unclear whether the purpose and priorities of competitions relate to the level of need in a given region, the technical strength of proposals or the price of proposed activities. According to a representative of Perm Oblast, price competition is inappropriate for youth projects because the state does not purchase a service but co-finances it. It is also not clear how the level of federal funding allocated to a project is corrected and changed during or after the implementation of a project.

Although the program resources of *Youth of Russia* are formally allocated on a competitive basis, its institutional practices have not allowed for balanced coverage of youth needs among communities and youth stakeholders. Each call for proposals is announced by the Ministry of Education (often jointly with the Ministry of Economic Development) according to the procedures defined for all state procurement processes. Competitions are targeted according to centrally defined thematic areas and favor large, inter-regional activities involving 40 or more subjects of the Russian Federation.

The Statute on competitions for the “Youth of Russia” program 2001–2005 allowed the following types of organizations to apply: regional youth policy and educational authorities, regional budget establishments, educational institutions, public unions and individual researchers. Around 100 public unions at the national, inter-regional, and regional level have received financial support from the Youth of Russia 2001–2005 target program.²²⁷ Some examples of organizations with the status of “resource centers” that received federal funding in 2004 are:²²⁸

²²⁷ Department of State Youth Policy, Childrearing and the Social Protection of Youth (2005).

²²⁸ Ibid.

- the republic-level childrens' public organization, “Pioneers of Bashkortostan;”
- a Ryazan Oblast association of child and youth public unions, “Youth Council;”
- the National Council of Youth and Child Unions of Russia;
- the public union, “Institute of Parliamentarism;”
- the Youth Parliament Assembly of Kaliningradskaya oblast.

Meanwhile, smaller-scale, community-based youth initiatives are essentially left out. This means that local experiences and needs remain at the margins of federally funded youth programs.

The total allocation for the *Youth of Russia* FTP has progressively increased since 1995, although local, and especially regional, allocations make up the greatest proportion of youth investments. For the 2001–2005 program, regional and municipal allocations outpaced federal allocations by more than a factor of ten, as illustrated in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1. Budget Allocation for the Youth of Russia Targeted Program

Time Period	Federal Allocation (million rubles)	Federal Allocation (million dollars)	Regional and Municipal Allocation (million rubles)	Regional and Municipal Allocation (million dollars)
1995–1997	159.9	5.9	603.2	22.3
1998–2000	155.5	5.7	1337.2	49.5
2001–2005	334.9	12.4	3680.3	136.3

Sources: President of the Russian Federation (1994), Government of the Russian Federation (1997), Government of the Russian Federation (2000), Government of the Russian Federation (2001).

Nevertheless, federal financial resources for youth policy are extremely scarce and fail to match the scope of youth needs. The *Youth of Russia* (2006–2010) program, initially budgeted at 4.5 billion rubles (approximately US\$166 million) and subsequently cut to a few hundred million rubles, was declined by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade due to some of the abovementioned design and

monitoring limitations.²²⁹ But the need for a financially more ambitious, albeit better designed and implemented program, remains if Russia is to address the serious issues of school-to-work transition and youth inclusion highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3. The imperative to act is even stronger today, when the Russian Federation's financial capability allows for such social investments.

The imperative to act is even stronger today, given that the Russian Federation's central financial capability allows for such social investments, thanks to large oil revenues. Even with the recent fiscal decentralization reforms that give greater fiscal autonomy to local governments, the Federal government has a unique role to play in balancing the limited resources of poorer subjects of the Russian Federation, where youth needs are high. As illustrated in Chapter 5, central financing should be based on transparent targeting criteria and, most importantly, on performance outcomes.

Youth Policy at the Regional Level


Regional institutions have been instrumental in developing and implementing youth policy. Youth policy legislation has been passed in over 50 regions of the Russian Federation.²³⁰ Regional public youth chambers, also known as Youth Parliaments, are relatively widespread (see in Figure 4.1), and work in partnership with regional parliaments.

While statistics on the number of young people involved in youth parliaments and the level of activity and impact of such groups is lacking, many youth representatives believe they are a

²²⁹ In August 2005, the official website of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade posted a quote from the Deputy Minister V. Saveliev who, speaking at a meeting of the federal government that focused on the federal target programs, said "Taking into account poor quality of policy analysis and lack of holistic approaches and adequate policies regarding young people, the federal target program 'Youth of Russia' for 2001 – 2005 will not be continued in 2006 and the draft program 'Youth of Russia 2006–2010' developed for future financing will not be included in the draft federal budget for 2006."

²³⁰ Council of Europe (2003).

Figure 4.1. Youth Parliaments in the Russian Federation



Source: Youth Parliament of Russia (n.d.).

valuable step forward and should be further promoted.²³¹ Novosibirsk, Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg, Moscow and Ryazan Oblasts (detailed in Box 4.1 below) all have active youth parliaments, which send delegates and representatives to national youth parliamentary bodies and organizations.

Youth ministries or youth departments under Regional Ministries of Education have been established in most Russian regions and republics.

In order to accumulate non-budget sources of financing assigned to youth policy, certain regions (including Volgograd Oblast, Mariy El Republic, Orenbourg Oblast and Hanty-Mansiysky Autonomous District) have created regional youth funds. Such funds are used to finance grants, scholarship premiums, contests, exhibitions, festivals, concerts and other activities of children and youth public unions. Youth policy at the regional level has also benefited from inter-regional coordination. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, several inter-regional Coordination Councils were established by different inter-regional cooperation and other agreements concerning such areas as Central Russia, Siberia, the "Big Volga" and the "Black Soil Area". Such partnerships do not finance policy activities nor develop or implement legislation, but may serve as a forum to discuss and voice important policy issues, including youth.

Some regional administrations have been especially proactive in youth programming

²³¹ Sokolov (2005), Trapkova (2005).

Box 4.1 The Ryazan Youth Parliament

Following a competition held by the Ministry of Education and Science in 2002, Ryazan Oblast was chosen as the first district in Russia to receive the status of experimental center for youth parliamentary development. Ryazan has a Youth Parliament attached to the oblast Duma, which is a consultative body on youth state policy. Its members are representatives from youth and child public unions, as well as education institutions in the region. The main activities of the Youth Parliament are:

- participation in developing legislative drafts and programs (amendments to the regional earmarked youth program, the draft law “On Human Rights Commissioner;” the draft law, “On the state support of the child and youth public organizations of Ryazan Oblast;” etc.);
- participation in, and presentation to state and municipal organs, programs and plans for the development of regional youth policy (e.g., the programs “Youth Parade,” “Basic election rights for schoolchildren,” “Don’t miss your future by sleeping,” etc.);

- organization of conferences, roundtable discussions on youth matters (e.g., “Youth and sport,” “United state exam: pro et contra,” “Problems of inter-ethnic communication among youth in Ryazan oblast,” etc.);
- development of methodological, information and other materials promoting the activity of youth; and
- knowledge sharing with other youth structures across Russia.

The Ryazan Youth Parliament website states that during the first half of 2004, about one-third of member electoral programs were implemented, including a program on developing labor unions among students; setting up a youth newspaper; and a program to increase legal awareness among students. The Parliament also provides legal consultations to young people on army draft procedures and to young families on obtaining housing and mortgages on preferential terms.

Source: Youth Parliament of Ryazan Oblast (n.d.).

and have developed institutional and financial capacity on youth issues, but there is a need to further strengthen that capacity and disseminate best practices to and from other regions. Youth programs implemented at the regional level through various youth organizations encompass a range of school-to-work transition and youth inclusion activities, such as: (i) rehabilitation programs for young people who have returned from military combat zones in Permskaya, Orenburgskaya, Volgogradskaya and Kostromskaskaya regions; (ii) peer education programs to prevent drug abuse in Kemerovskaya, Novgorodskaya, Novosibirskaya and several other regions; (iii) over 50 regional information centers for young people established through partnerships between the Federal Youth Policy Department and regional committees of youth affairs; (iv) youth centers that provide

extra-curricular activities in former youth palaces and culture houses; and (v) youth employment services in Ryazan Oblast.

For example, summer youth recreation combined with practical work experience has attracted thousands of teams of secondary school and university students in several regions. These programs could be replicated more widely. Authorities from the Ministry of Education refer to the development of student work brigades — once very popular under the Soviet *Komsomol* — as one of the most successful features of the *Youth of Russia* program regarding the school-to-work transition. A work brigade unites several hundred students, usually aged 16–22 and is divided into labor detachment teams of 10–20 people with a supervisor. These brigades have become increasingly popular;

2,577 student labor groups comprising 110,000 people were formed in 2003.²³² Brigade participants receive technical and safety training enabling them to work in factories, construction sites, farms, railways and health facilities.

Building brigades and pedagogical teams are especially active in the region of Sverdlovskaya (where these types of programs date back to the early 1960s), as well as Smolenskaya (where pedagogical teams work out of the regional center of social health and occupation of young people). Other regions active in these types of summer activities include Orlovskaya, Saratovskaya, Penzenskaya and Yamalo-Nenetskiy Autonomous District.²³³ The explicit targeting of young people with low incomes, unemployed youth and youth with disabilities is an important aspect of these programs. Although no formal evaluations of the work brigades exist, youth organizations have indicated that they have had a very positive social impact on young people.

The process of forming youth bodies at the municipal level is advancing at a slow pace, if at all, reflecting the limited capacity of many municipal administrations. Promising examples of municipal-level commitment to youth policy do exist and their replication, especially in municipalities in less advanced areas, should be encouraged. The Association of Siberian and Far Eastern cities and the association “Great Urals,” for example, established a coordination mechanism for their respective municipal youth policies that dates back to the 1990s. Municipalities, including Arkhangelsk, Vologda and Togliatti, have also reported on participation in national parliamentary work. However, due to the limited capacity of municipal administrations, particularly in marginalized areas such as the North Caucasus, technical assistance efforts should initially be concentrated at the regional and/or republic level, where some capacity to address youth issues already exists.

²³² Council of Europe (2003).

²³³ Ibid.

Youth Policy in the North Caucasus

Funding and institutional capacity for youth policy implementation in Russia’s poorest regions – including the North Caucasus – is weak and requires corrective measures at the Federal level. Existing mechanisms of the federally targeted *Youth of Russia* program do not ensure that available funds are distributed according to regional criteria such as poverty, demography and local youth needs. Moreover, as noted earlier, the mechanisms by which regional proposals are selected for federal funding often lack transparency and are not fully understood by regional policy authorities. Table 4.2, which compares youth policy financing in five North Caucasus republics with five other districts of the Russian Federation in 2004, illustrates the lack of correlation between the availability of *Youth of Russia* funding and regional poverty levels, the size of the local youth population and per-capita spending on youth.²³⁴

While all Russian regions allocate funds for youth policies and programs, the poorer North Caucasus republics receive no federal funding and have the lowest per capita spending on youth. The largest per capita expenditure on youth policy in North Caucasus is observed in Northern Ossetia (148 rubles). This is less than half the spending level in Novosibirsk Oblast, which has the greatest annual youth investment of the regions shown in Table 4.2, at 336 rubles per capita (less than US\$13). The lowest youth policy allocations were in Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, and Rostov Oblast. Interestingly, Kabardino-Balkaria, which is currently emerging as a new epicenter of violence in the North Caucasus, has the lowest per capita spending on youth among the sample regions for this study.

The ability of the North Caucasus republics to generate local resources for youth is very

²³⁴ Information was gathered through interviews with youth policy officials from selected regions of the North Caucasus and comparator subjects of the Russian Federation. Heads and deputy heads of youth policy committees, departments and ministries were asked about financing from the Federally Targeted Programs Youth of Russia, South of Russia, and Housing.

Table 4.2. “Youth of Russia” Funding for the North Caucasus Republics and Selected Regions Across the Country

Region	Regional poverty rates ^a	Youth Population (thousands)	Sources of Financing for Youth Policy	Federal transfers from the Youth of Russia Program (+/-)	Regional Budget/ Municipal Budget and Extra-budget Spending (2004, 000s of rubles)	Total Regional and Local Spending on Youth (2004, rubles per capita)
Dagestan <i>(North Caucasus)</i>	55.6	556.5	Regional and municipal budgets, non-budget	–	12993/6730	35.4
Ingushetia <i>(North Caucasus)</i>	46.7	99.8	Regional budget	–	2000/-	20.0
Chechnya <i>(North Caucasus)</i>	n/a	237.6	Regional budget	–	18179/—	76.5
Kabardino-Balkaria <i>(North Caucasus)</i>	41.7	173.8	Regional and municipal budgets, non-budget	–	2777/52	16.3
North Ossetia <i>(North Caucasus)</i>	25.6	128.6	Regional and municipal budgets, other sources are scarce	+	15625/3369	147.7
Rostov Oblast	21.2	749.7	Federal, regional and municipal budgets, non-budget	+	8050 / 6798	19.8
Ryazan Oblast	17.5	181.5	Federal, regional and municipal budgets, non-budget	+	7343 / 3646	60.5
Novosibirsk Oblast	25.2	473.9	Regional and municipal budgets, non-budget	–	40652 / 118550	335.9
Perm Oblast	20.0	476.1	Regional and municipal budgets, non-budget	–	14901/ 53239	143.1
Archangelsk Oblast	11.3	213.2	Regional and municipal budgets, non-budget	–	7226/ 3670	51.1

Notes: (a) World Bank (2004a), based on data for 2002. The higher the rate, the poorer the subject of the Russian Federation; (b) A “+” sign implies that the region received financing from Youth of Russia, a “-” sign means that it did not. The exact amount of federal financing of the Youth of Russia was not cited by regional youth authority representatives.

Sources: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation (2004), GOSKOMSTAT (2004a).

²³⁵ According to the estimates of the Deputy Minister of Youth Policy, Sports, and Tourism.

limited. Unlike wealthier regions of the Russian Federation, business donations are entirely absent in the North Caucasus.

Regional budgets are the main source of financing and are rarely, if ever, complemented by local or other resources. The decline of local economies amidst conditions of conflict and insecurity and growth of a largely informal economy have all limited the resource base of regional and local governments in the area, let alone contributions from the private sector. By contrast, Perm Oblast, which did not participate in the federally targeted program, was able to generate significant regional resources and almost four times as much funding at the municipal level. Perm's success in generating resources for youth policies can be attributed to the active role of the region's private businesses in supporting public social initiatives. Large and successful enterprises such as Perm Motors and the Lukoil are, for example, known for their philanthropic activities in the social sector.

Nevertheless, innovative small-scale initiatives are emerging in the North Caucasus that could be scaled up and made more locally sustainable with adequate support from the federal level. Numerous national and international organizations working in North Caucasus also carry out activities involving youth (including UNICEF, Care Canada, The Agency for Rehabilitation and Development, Chechen Refugee and Displaced Persons Council, Let's Save the Generation, MINGA, Serlo, New Education, Voice of the Mountains, and numerous others).²³⁶ These organizations mainly work in Ingushetia, Dagestan, Chechnya and North Ossetia. Their varied activities are directed at decreasing young people's vulnerabilities by providing recreation and creative opportunities, assisting in physical and psychological rehabilitation and development, creating youth-friendly education and health centers, promoting small business development for young people, among others. However, these initiatives tend to be concentrated only in emergency areas (Kabardino-Balkaria, for example, is not covered at all) and have not developed adequate

²³⁶ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Russian Federation (2004).

local sustainability plans. Box 4.2 illustrates two examples of promising initiatives undertaken by and with religious leaders.

Box 4.2 Inter-faith Dialogue for Peace and Tolerance

Given the rising influence of religious values among youth in the North Caucasus, a congress of Muslim and Christian youth in the region is currently being prepared at the initiative of the Orthodox Church of Stavropol Kray. The purpose of the congress is to strengthen mutual understanding and interaction between young people of different backgrounds. Within the Ministry of Youth Policy, Tourism, and Sports in Ingushetia, a team that supports spiritual and moral education and the values of peace and tolerance has been created with young Muslim theologians and is reaching out to adolescents and youth of the republic. These types of initiatives are a valuable contribution to peace and tolerance work in the region and would benefit from additional support to achieve wide social impact in terms of conflict prevention.

The FTP *South of Russia* does not effectively address youth issues, but could become an important source of resources and support for youth policies in the North Caucasus, provided that it can integrate earmarked funding and transparent monitoring of results.²³⁷ This FTP strives to: (i) create the socioeconomic conditions for sustainable development; (ii) reduce social tensions; (iii) reduce unemployment, and (iv) increase the living standards of the population. Youth are included within these broad objectives, for example, with respect to employment assistance initiatives, for which the program document states that women, youth, people with disabilities and retired military servants are the target priority groups. The FTP indicates that "special attention is being paid to upgrading of their skills,

²³⁷ Government of the Russian Federation (2001).

learning complementary or entirely new professions, retraining.”²³⁸

Employment programs of this kind aim to improve the mobility of the labor force and reduce the so-called “negative phenomena and trends of the labor market.” However, the *South of Russia* FTP does not specify the precise mechanisms through which it will address the special needs of each of these groups, nor how many people have participated in program activities and how the program benefited them, particularly in terms of securing sustainable employment. The only quantitative data available, which stated that the federal budget contribution to the program led to creation of 6,099 jobs in 2003, was supplied by the participating regions to the Ministry of Economy in 2004.

The program is equally vague on priorities for building educational and social infrastructure.

The program only envisages that support and development of educational units (e.g., schools, vocational colleges) will strengthen their material and technical foundations and help achieve modern levels of youth education. According to program documents, funding is also to be used to upgrade the skills of education specialists and improve the methodology and organization of schooling — a valuable goal given the education quality issues raised in Chapters 2 and 3. However, the program documents do not specify and support for the school-to-work transition or youth inclusion. Youth officials from the southern regions interviewed during this research were unable to recall whether such activities had ever been discussed in the context of the program and their participation in it.

Strategy for State Youth Policy in the Russian Federation

The new *Strategy for State Youth Policy in the Russian Federation* may result in higher visibility and more adequate financial resources for youth policy development, provided that it can correct the current lack of transparency and regional gaps. The strategy, to be presented

²³⁸ Ibid.

by the Ministry of Education and Science to the Council of Ministers for approval in mid-2006, provides a sharper strategic framework and a longer time frame for implementation than the FTP *Youth of Russia*, which the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade recently recommended be discontinued. The new strategy articulates three relevant priority areas: (i) youth awareness of potential development opportunities and social inclusion (e.g., support to information networks, youth-friendly spaces, student work brigades, etc.); (ii) developing innovation efforts among youth (e.g., youth participation in local governance, youth leadership development, business development, etc.); and (iii) the social integration of vulnerable and at-risk young people (e.g., support to Volunteers of Russia in conflict-affected areas, targeted mobile social work, support to young people with disabilities, etc.). These priorities are expected to be implemented through approximately six nationwide large-scale projects administered by an equal number of national providers, which would in turn sub-contract components to regional and local youth organizations.

The concept of nationwide programming, which understandably aims at ensuring certain standards and homogeneity throughout the Russian Federation, may prove risky in terms of its potential rigidity, top-down nature and exclusionary factors. The implementation mechanisms described in the new strategy currently lack a regional and/or community level, or bottom-up dimension, of youth programming. Overly centralized programming would reinforce the lack of, or inadequate, participation of local stakeholders and limit access to federal funding by regional administrations, particularly in the poorest areas — concerns which have been voiced by several policymakers in the North Caucasus. An additional concern voiced by non-governmental organizations and foundations relates to the fact that large contracts would be assigned to the largest public unions, resulting in the *de facto* exclusion of NGOs and foundations that have substantial expertise on youth issues.

Under current practices, only youth public unions have access to public financing,

while NGOs are *de facto* discouraged. While there are not formal legal preventing NGOs from accessing budget funding, in practice NGOs are not encouraged to directly participate in state budget allocations. Public unions in the Russian Federation, internationally known as GONGOs (governmental non-governmental organizations), are large nationwide bodies that have a special status as all-Russian organizations. According to the Ministry of Justice, 79 all-Russian and international public unions were registered as of the beginning of 2004, of which the largest were:

- the public organization “Russian Youth Council,” created June 1, 1990, which unites around 220,000 members aged 14 to 30 years in 70 territorial organizations in 70 districts of the federation;
- the public organization, “Children and youth initiatives,” created 1995, which unites 10,700 members in 40 branches in 36 districts of the federation;
- the public organization “National Youth League,” created in 1995, with activities in 75 regions;
- the public organization for childrearing assistance, “Going together,” which unites more than 57,000 members in 57 districts of Russia;
- the international council of children’s public associations, “Union of Pioneer Organizations – Federation of Children’s organizations,” created in 1990, which is a successor to the Young Pioneers Organization (APO) of Soviet times. The organization provides social services to more than 300,000 children; and
- the public organization “National Organization of Scout Movement of Russia,” created in 1993; the all-Russian public organization, “Organization of Russian Young Scouts,” established in 1998; the inter-regional public children and youth organization, “Russian Scouts Council,” established in 1999; and the children’s inter-regional public organization, “Association of Girl Scouts,” established in 1999. These Scout organizations have a total

membership of 9,000 people in 58 subjects of the federation.

The new *Strategy for State Youth Policy in the Russian Federation* does highlight the urgent need to introduce amendments to the Russian legislation to establish provisions for government grants to NGOs. A detailed legal analysis is also required to address the differences in registration policies and statutory requirements for public unions and not-for-profit agencies, as well as to harmonize the status of NGOs and foundations with that of public unions. The reason for changing existing laws is not, however, simply to assure the equitable access of NGOs and foundations to federal funding, but to ensure that these funds are used efficiently. The existing field presence, local knowledge and expertise and relationships of local and regional NGOs, particularly in the North Caucasus, will be invaluable in helping implement youth programs more quickly and efficiently, and at a potentially lower cost, than centrally located all-Russian NGOs.²³⁹

Strengthening youth policy development in the Russian Federation, particularly in the North Caucasus, will require additional investments of knowledge, resources and commitment. As illustrated in this chapter, however, the foundation for youth programming already exists in the country and provides a springboard from which more effective and equitable policies can be developed. The final chapter of this report connects priority youth needs identified in Chapters 2 and 3 with youth policy structures examined in this chapter to highlight feasible options and investments that could better support the school-to-work transition and social inclusion of youth in the country.

²³⁹ An important characteristic of the post-1991 youth public movement is its uneven geographic distribution in the country. The majority of children and youth councils are concentrated in large cities, including Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, Volgograd, Saratov and certain large economic centers.

Chapter 5. A Policy Roadmap for More Effective School-to-Work Transition and Youth Inclusion in the North Caucasus

“An effective state youth policy is one of the major instruments for a country’s development, improvement of its citizens’ welfare and development of social relations.”²⁴⁰

This report has explored the evolving socioeconomic situation and needs of young people in the Russian Federation, particularly in the North Caucasus region. Young people are an asset for the social and economic development of their communities, but supporting them in this role requires a multidimensional holistic approach to youth inclusion and the transition to adulthood. The previous chapters in this study identified many of the greatest challenges facing young people in the Russian Federation today. This chapter concludes the study by examining the opportunities that exist to better support youth in responding to these challenges, particularly youth inclusion at entry points in the school-to-work transition.

The analysis presented here argues in favor of larger and better-targeted investments for youth, particularly in conflict-affected areas, and highlights the high costs of *not* making such investments. Successful transitions are crucial to young people’s social and economic well-being. Failed transitions, increasingly common among poor Russian youth, especially in poorer and marginalized regions such as the North Caucasus, are costly in terms of high school dropout rates, youth unemployment, idleness, risky behaviors and societal violence. A recent World Bank study quantifies the economic cost of failed youth transitions in South Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the loss of human life and overall

²⁴⁰ Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation (2005), 3.

social insecurity are immeasurable. In Kosovo in March 2004, for example, some 50,000 young people frustrated over poor economic and political opportunities rioted in the streets. The damage from the riot has been estimated at US\$75 million, with the overall costs of youth violence totaling more than 200 million euros (one-third of the government budget).²⁴¹

Similar calculations estimate the discounted per capita cost of a young person infected with HIV in the sub-region as high as US\$400,000; that of a young career criminal and/or heavy drug user, US\$49,000; and of a high school dropout, US\$9,000. The costs of insufficient investments in youth in the Russian Federation could be equally high and take the form of failed citizenship, antisocial behaviors, conflict, declining economic productivity and insufficient social security systems for the aging population.

Preventive policies in both formal and non-formal education, health, and first-chance active labor market programs appear to be more cost-effective than curative policies. Policies directed at youth—whether focused on education, social security, quality of life, culture, sports, justice and/or active labor markets—produce a greater impact if they adopt a comprehensive approach to youth inclusion and empowerment. Reviews of international youth employment programs, for example, have found that the most effective programs integrate youth employment

²⁴¹ La Cava et al. (2004).

measures with community-based services tailored to youth needs.²⁴² Young people are both a resource and target of preventive youth policies. Whereas curative policies tend to be short-term and address young people as a problem in society, preventive policies are intended for the long term and count on the active participation of young people in their design, implementation and evaluation. Such policies consider youth a principal resource for societal development and have a more significant impact on youth empowerment when they involve stable, long-term support from the wider community.

This study suggests that the new national youth policy adopt several additional, high-level instruments and implementation arrangements, including: (i) an institutional development component to address capacity-building needs at federal, regional and local levels; (ii) a newly designed regionally targeted program to address, in a multisectoral way, the needs of youth in poorer, younger and less-developed regions and republics; (iii) depending on whether legal changes can be introduced into current legislation, a youth fund that would directly finance proven NGOs – whether local, regional or national – with a strong thematic focus (e.g., HIV/AIDS, drug prevention, environmental awareness, rehabilitation of young offenders, etc); and (iv) a rigorous monitoring and evaluation system. Transparent regional targeting, demand-driven mechanisms, specific selection criteria, procedures and capacity-building modules are essential to ensure adequate and equitable implementation of youth policy.

Education and Life-long Learning

Given lower-than-average secondary school completion rates in the North Caucasus,²⁴³ the skills imparted by secondary education must be made more relevant to the job market. As pointed out in a recent World Bank policy study on secondary education, developed countries have been experimenting with more flexible educational pathways in order to respond to the

²⁴² QED (2003).

²⁴³ GOSKOMSTAT (2003).

decreasing status of this level of schooling. These pathways involve: (i) a reduction of vocational education *per se*, (ii) stronger linkages between general and vocational education, (iii) developing combinations of school and work-based learning.²⁴⁴ Interestingly, a head master in Ingushetia proposed the creation of vocational education centers and internship programs within secondary schools so that students could obtain work experience and professional skills before entering the job market.²⁴⁵ The box below illustrates the most successful strategies adopted by countries of the European Union to improve the quality and relevance of their education systems.

Serious regional disparities in secondary and tertiary educational attainment in the Russian Federation should be addressed by specifically targeted education investments, including second-chance programs, in disadvantaged areas of the RF (particularly the Southern Okrug). In addition to targeted educational programs, these investments should provide additional school facilities to address current overcrowding, as well as educational subsidies, targeted scholarships (especially for rural students and girls), conditional cash transfers, student loans programs,²⁴⁶ and, where malnourishment is widespread, school lunches. Finally, such investments should support the introduction of remedial and/or second-chance education opportunities, which could be offered through non-formal venues (e.g., youth friendly centers).

More transparency and reduced corruption are crucial to improving education. Many young people and youth stakeholders interviewed in the North Caucasus identified corruption in the education system as a priority problem, one that they are eager to help resolve. Opportunities for local communities, students and student organizations to voice their concerns can be an important factor in curbing corruption in the school system, partic-

²⁴⁴ World Bank (2005a).

²⁴⁵ Stakeholder interview, June 8, 2005.

²⁴⁶ The well-known secondary school stipend program for girls in Bangladesh extended their schooling and may also have delayed marriage. Stipends are sent not to parents, but to the girls themselves through bank accounts opened in their names.

Box 5.1. European Country Policies in support of the School-to-Work Transition

Overall improvement of the quality of the education system has been a major strategy pursued by all countries of the European Union (EU), especially at times when the youth population has been at high risk of failing to complete the transition from school to the labor market. Various instruments have been adopted by EU countries, including the redefinition of curricula, new recruitment and on-the-job training of school instructors, modernization of teaching techniques and styles, introduction of information technologies and other innovative approaches. By early 2000, the percentage of youth who were simultaneously engaged in both education and/or training or work was higher (e.g., 20–35 versus 10 percent of older teenagers) in countries with apprenticeship programs, a dual system or widespread part-time employment (e.g., Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). In addition, cross-country assessments indicate that school systems that incorporate local decision making — involving employers, political authorities and school officials — are more efficient and egalitarian than those directly ruled only by central governments.

Source: Schizzerotto and Gasperoni (2001).

ularly at the tertiary level, restoring student and employer confidence in the system and reinstating the value of educational qualifications. The World Bank-funded project *Education Innovation Loan* has already successfully piloted several models of university student co-management in various faculties in the Russian Federation. Such experiences should be replicated in North Caucasus universities. Apart from its immediate value to anti-corruption programs, greater student participation in school and/or faculty life in the Russian Federation is increasing the accountabili-

ty of teachers and school administrators, while providing students with greater opportunities to influence how universities allocate local merit-based student stipends and how curricula are designed. For example, faculties are adding leadership skills training and special workshops of interest for the job market upon student request.

According to figures of the Ministry of Education and Science, 30 percent of higher education institutions in the Russian Federation currently have student self-governance bodies, i.e., assemblies, student councils and student departmental councils, including monitors and department activists. Finally, the introduction of an external university entrance examination, which significantly improved access to higher education throughout the Russian Federation, should be introduced in the North Caucasus republics without delay.

The regional anti-corruption initiative in tertiary education led by several student NGOs in South Eastern Europe may have relevance to the Russian Federation (see box below).

Schools are critical, but so are non-formal learning opportunities. Historically, summer work brigades have played a valuable part in youth development in Russia. These experiences can be built on to offer young people contemporary learning opportunities. Non-formal education and non-formal venues can be especially beneficial for idle youth, helping them develop important values, including a work ethic. In South Eastern Europe, for example, youth-friendly spaces with well-designed life and livelihood skills programs have successfully helped school dropouts to return to formal education and fostered social cohesion in countries where the formal school system remains segregated on an ethnic basis.²⁴⁷ Non-formal preventive education programs that offer ethnically integrated programs of life-skills training, together with sports and recreation, appear to be economically beneficial investments for local communities.

²⁴⁷ International Youth Foundation (2005).

Box 5.2. A Youth Initiative to Combat Corruption in Tertiary Education

In 2003, a regional network of student NGOs from Macedonia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, Moldova and Albania was formed with the aim of decreasing the level of corruption in higher education. In particular, the student NGO network has focused on (i) changes in present regulations for tertiary education through assessments conducted by legal experts and respected research institutes; (ii) introduction of student rights and mechanisms for their protection; and (iii) drastically decreasing the high level of corruption in tertiary education, which is common in all participating countries. As a result of this initiative, more effective student ombudsmen are being instituted in several universities, the monopoly of old-time student unions is coming to an end and dialogue to introduce governance changes have been initiated with parliaments, education ministries, university administrators and faculties. Similar initiatives, especially at the regional and/or okrug level, could be supported by the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation through a competitive grant scheme to which student and youth organizations could apply.

Source: Arsovksi (2005).

The Babylon Youth Centers of Macedonia (part of the Macedonia Children and Youth Development Project), for example, are particularly cost effective because of increasing financial and in-kind community contributions. Start-up costs to develop the first youth centers are usually much higher than for subsequent centers, which can benefit from tested know-how, higher numbers of volunteers and community contributions. In the case of the Macedonian project, for example, the per-beneficiary cost of the Babylon

Centers dropped from US\$54 to US\$13 between March 2002 and June 2005.²⁴⁸

Non-formal, part-time schooling based in mosques and Islamic private schooling is reported to be increasingly prevalent and in high demand throughout Islamic societies.

Young people from the North Caucasus proudly celebrate their ethnic and religious backgrounds, but also fear the rise of extremism. Youth suggestions for tackling such extremism include strengthening the skills of Islamic clergy to teach young people the true canons of their faith and interpret religious doctrine, increasing public education campaigns on religious and ethnic tolerance, and better training of state authorities to prevent religious discrimination against young people.

A World Bank study on the Middle East that is currently under preparation posits the need to (i) consider Islamic schools as partners in improving access to education, (ii) improve the quality of curricula in private religious schools, (iii) ensure better training of religious education teachers, (iv) accredit schools and recognize their diplomas, and (v) recognize their distinctive qualities as being complementary to the public system. These directions could potentially be relevant to the North Caucasus republics, where similar issues related to Islamic education have emerged.

Peace and tolerance programs should be developed for the North Caucasus Republics and target both young people and adult decision-makers and opinion leaders. Such programs enhance the role of youth stakeholders as assets for social cohesion and conflict prevention. They should become an integral part of youth-targeted interventions, particularly non-formal education programs. Programs like those currently supported on a small scale by UNICEF, the Education Ministry and the World Bank include activities related to (i) youth information and communication programs; (ii) joint summer programs and student work brigades for young people, NGOs

²⁴⁸ World Bank (2005b).

and youth workers of the North Caucasus; (iii) inter-republic youth gatherings and social cohesion activities, such as workshops, conferences, trainings, camps, social, art, cultural activities and exchange visits, and (iv) inter-university peace and tolerance programs for students and teachers. In addition to inter-youth exchange, programs should promote capacity building and dialogue with government representatives, religious leaders (e.g., imams, Orthodox priests etc.), journalists, teachers, government officials, civil society and other opinion shapers. Of particular relevance would be the initiation of dialogue between representatives of different religious communities.

Active Labor Market Programs

Better-targeted formal support to young job seekers is needed. As indicated in Chapter 3, young people lack awareness of employment opportunities, job training courses and unemployment services. Placement services lack credibility and success. Existing employment centers and training programs need to improve their outreach to young people, especially those outside the education system; new services are also needed in under-served areas. Unemployment services often lack transparency and legitimacy when it comes to serving young people. Efforts should be made to better publicize the availability of unemployment benefits, as well as the relevant criteria, rules and regulations (including age minimums) by which these benefits are distributed.

Internship programs and volunteer programs are also highly attractive to young people.

A public program through which young people could learn job skills and earn nominal salaries while providing useful services to their communities has considerable potential in the region. Young people in the region are also very interested in entrepreneurship and small business development. Pilot programs that target small business loans and training, as well as planning support, to young people with innovative and practical ideas could start to address this need. These types of programs could become especially attractive for unemployed university graduates. Support should also be given, both in the education and employ-

ment sectors, to programs that improve access to information regarding opportunities in higher education, vocational training, business training and job opportunities. Greater information access should be closely linked to career counseling. In Sweden, for example, schools, universities, companies and employment services provide students and young people with promotional materials, making their education and/or career choices easier and directly linked to labor market needs.

Programs that provide apprenticeships in the workplace have proven more effective than vocational education.²⁴⁹ Several models and best practices exist for apprenticeship programs (see Box 5.3). One of the most successful youth employment programs in Latin America is *Chile Joven*, which offers effective programming for the school-to-work transition, is of potential relevance to the Russian Federation. *Chile Joven* was launched in 1991 to provide unemployed and underemployed young people (aged 16 to 30 years) from low-income households with skills development training. The program supports their integration into the labor market and has cost US\$107 million to date.²⁵⁰ It offers a mixture of classroom education and practical experience through in-class training, on-the-job experience, remedial skills development and training for self-run businesses.

Participants in *Chile Joven* generally receive an average of 250 hours of classroom instruction and three-month internships in local firms. The program brings young job seekers together with a wide range of relevant stakeholders, including central and municipal governments, employers, educational facilities (e.g., high schools, universities and public and private training institutions). Young participants benefit from opportunities to take on responsibility at their internship placements, interact with employers and improve their access to information on job opportunities. Evaluations suggest that 50 percent of program participants were employed six months after graduation, a large proportion by the company in which they undertook their internships.

²⁴⁹ OECD (2000).

²⁵⁰ Aedo (2002), Bravo and Contreras (2002).

Box 5.3. School-to-Work Transition in Latin America: Success Factors

Experience from Latin America suggests that several factors enhance the success and impact of school-to-work transition programs:

- **Focus on long-term employability and productivity.** Effective school-to-work transition programs address all aspects of the transition. Programs that put high priority on long-term employability and productivity of youth are more successful than those that target short-term job placement.
- **Develop effective targeting for different groups.** Targeting specific youth groups is critical to policy and program success. In most cases, completely different designs are needed for different age and income groups. Targeted programs should also reflect gender sensitivities.
- **Use community-based outreach models.** Programs targeting low-income unemployed youth are more effective if they are integrated into community-based outreach models.
- **Differentiate between programs for the competitive skilled labor force and low-income unemployed youth.** The success potential of school-to-work transition programs is increased by distinguishing

between policies and programs that address economic growth and competitive skilled labor force issues and those that address the social inclusion of low-income unemployed youth.

- **Extend education to non-formal programs that grant certification.** Non-formal education provided at community and youth-friendly centers encourage young people to go back to school without the stigma of failure associated with the formal education system.
- **Rethink expensive unemployment training programs for youth.** In designing training programs, emphasis should be put on generic and basic business skills, rather than expensive training that excludes low-income youth. Remedial education emphasizing the basic skills that are used in the informal sector, which is the main point of entry into labor market, should also be incorporated into training curricula.

Source: Fawcett (2003).

Given the high demand for manual skilled workers (e.g., electricians, mechanics, metalworkers and construction workers) in the North Caucasus, first-employment programs for young people could be launched with local employers by introducing adequate incentives on both sides. The main objective of such programs should be to increase the employability of low-income youth, not necessarily their ultimate employment in a given company. Incentives could include public subsidies for training costs and social benefits extended to newly hired young workers. Tax reductions relat-

ed to the number of young workers hired should also be considered. The very limited presence of large corporations that directly invest in young laborers in the North Caucasus, which does occur in richer regions of the Russian Federation, makes state-funded first-employment programs essential. Within this framework, labor-intensive public works programs could be incorporated into the *South of Russia* FTP or the Local Initiatives FTP under preparation. Such programs should aim in particular at providing income-generation opportunities for young laborers.

Healthy Lifestyles

Services targeted at young people's health are too often limited to sports and fitness activities, not health information and preventive practices. There is a widespread need for broader health education with youth-friendly messages and methods that can successfully reach youth audiences. As highlighted in Chapter 2, young people's knowledge of health issues is largely ad hoc, gained via television and word of mouth. Social mores in the North Caucasus, moreover, restrict public and inter-generational discussions of certain health issues (e.g., reproductive health, HIV/AIDS and drug abuse prevention). Yet young people in the region are eager to know more. Greater opportunities for health professionals to interact with young people, including through educational institutions, should be promoted. Teachers also have a role to play in health education and should be trained accordingly. Brochures and posters designed for young people should be distributed in schools, universities, recreational facilities and health information sessions.

Multipurpose youth-friendly spaces should address preventive health issues and increase young people's interface with the formal health sector, providing a place where youth can receive confidential counseling and advice on a broad range of health and well-being issues. Trained peer counselors and youth outreach workers would be valuable health educators in youth centers, particularly in the North Caucasus. Youth telephone help-lines, a common youth suggestion, as well as psychosocial support services (see below), could also be housed in such spaces. Finally, health programming targeted at young people must go beyond issues of substance abuse and sexually transmitted infections to address questions of nutrition, mental health, fitness and the full range of health problems faced by young people in the North Caucasus.

Given widespread trauma among adolescents and youth directly exposed to conflict in the North Caucasus, psychosocial support should be a key pillar of youth programming. Such

services should be made available through multipurpose, youth-friendly centers and integrated across sectors.²⁵¹ At the moment, selected psychosocial counseling is offered through various relief programs in Chechnya, Beslan (mainly to survivors of the school massacre, their families and other affected children), and in a few areas of Ingushetia. These programs should, however, be expanded to cover the youth population (and their families) more systematically in Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria, particularly in Nalchik, where recent violence led to human losses. Such therapies should also be integrated into the school and health systems. In a recent survey on psychosocial rehabilitation in Ingushetia and Chechnya, the WHO pointed out that the most successful therapies include art, drama, creativity, play, music and/or dance in a multi-ethnic context.²⁵²

Secondary prevention measures for drugs and HIV/AIDS should be gradually incorporated into the health services targeted at youth. In the Netherlands, where the majority of intravenous drug users fall into the 20-to-24-year-old age group, preventive strategies are used to help to reduce the demand for drugs, while professional care limits the harm drugs cause to users, the people with whom they associate and the public in general. This strategy is referred to as the "principle of harm reduction." For instance, to prevent the spread of HIV and Hepatitis B through infected needles, Dutch policy employs a carefully administered syringe distribution program.²⁵³ Accessible care, counseling and information have resulted in fewer addicts utilizing used needles and fewer injecting drug users. As a result, the incidence of HIV infection among drug users remains low. Free condom and needle distribution programs have effectively reduced sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS contagion. Such programs could be adopted in several regions of the Russian Federation. In the North Caucasus, this type of program could be intro-

²⁵¹ World Bank (2005d).

²⁵² WHO (2004b).

²⁵³ Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport of the Netherlands (2002), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (2003).

duced selectively in areas where community demand and cultural support exists for them.

Youth Participation in Decision Making

Successful and effective implementation of youth policy in the Russian Federation requires active youth participation in decision making at all levels of government. Young people must play an active role as initiators and implementers of youth programs. Despite young people's interest in youth issues, youth involvement in local decision making in the Russian Federation is very low. Russian youth policy should recognize the value of youth participation for the development of young people, both as individuals and as active citizens of society, and devote special emphasis to building youth organizations, training youth leaders and peer educators and developing a Russia-wide legislative and financial framework for voluntary youth work. The engagement of young people, either through youth NGOs or directly in government-funded youth projects (e.g., as volunteers, youth leaders, peer educators, staff or management) will stimulate youth initiative, creativity and innovative approaches, while increasing the overall outreach of youth programs.

Clearer legal, administrative and financial mechanisms should be created to promote the growth of youth organizations at republic and municipal levels, where the needs and interests of young people should be addressed in the first place. For example, authorities could create a legislative framework that grants full formal recognition to youth organizations and youth umbrella structures (at the all-Russia, regional, republic and municipal levels) as social and civil partners in the development of youth policy. **To more effectively participate in decision-making and consultative processes, however, youth organizations need greater capacity-building support.** Current institutional capacity needs are very high among youth organizations, including the All-Russia public unions. Youth policy should accordingly provide financial support to youth organizations in the form of operating space and resources for activities, training and basic operating functions.

Box 5.4 European Principles for National Youth Policy

“There is a long tradition in Europe for involving non-governmental youth organizations and youth councils (“umbrella organizations” of non-governmental youth organizations) in government decision making. Youth organizations have for more than 30 years had a strong influence on programs and activities in the youth sector in the Council of Europe through the principle of “co-management.” Youth organizations at all levels took active part in the consultation process that preceded the White Paper on Youth Policy that has been adopted by the European Union. Active involvement of non-governmental youth organizations on issues concerning young people is practiced in most European countries. Youth organizations also play an important role in involving young people, making them active citizens in their own society. Encouraging and facilitating the active participation of young people in non-governmental youth organizations should be a central element of a youth policy.”

Source: European Youth Forum (2003).

Youth NGOs and regional youth ministries could also work together to facilitate opportunities for young people to influence the political process in their communities (e.g., through the many youth parliaments that currently exist in the country). Youth awareness of existing NGOs and associations with youth programming also remains low, as detailed in Chapters 2 and 3. Such groups could benefit from training on how to improve their publicity, awareness creation and outreach to young people.

The recently introduced Youth Policy Steering Committee, comprised of representatives of the Russian government and all-Russia youth organizations, represents a good start-up

model for youth participation that could be successfully decentralized to other levels of government.²⁵⁴ Consultative youth committees should be established at all levels of government with representatives from both relevant government authorities and youth NGOs. These committees would have the power to influence the government on all youth-related issues, particularly the creation and funding of youth policies and programs. In parallel, especially at the local level, additional mechanisms should be developed (e.g., public fora, Internet discussion groups, local discussion groups, etc.) to achieve greater outreach of youth programming and directly involve young people who are not members of youth organizations (non-organized youth) or have less access to information and communications (i.e., youth in remote rural areas, conflict areas, etc.).

The culture of active youth participation in decision making should be introduced at an early age. Young people should be given the opportunity to be involved in participatory decision-making structures from their early school days (e.g., in pupil or student councils, teacher-student consultations and discussions, etc.). Among the approaches adopted by the European Union and outlined in its *White Paper on the European Youth Policy* are the introduction of citizenship education in school curricula and ongoing support to youth organizations for the development of youth leaders (part of the non-formal education offered by these groups). Citizenship education, volunteer work and peer education focusing on youth participation in public life has been also introduced as part of the life-skills curricula for teenagers and young people in the Children and Youth Babylon Centers of Macedonia.

Security and Conflict Prevention

A recent study analyzing the dynamics of youth in organized armed violence in ten countries (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Nigeria, Northern

²⁵⁴ The European Charter on Participation of Young People in Local and Regional life represents a good standard for the development of such mechanisms.

Box 5.5. Youth Engage in the Macedonian Youth Policy Development Process

A baseline study on youth trends in Macedonia in 2003 highlighted the needs and the interests of young people in the country. It was developed with the participation of local youth stakeholders, such as municipal officials, schools, parents, formal and non-formal youth services, youth NGOs and young people themselves. The results of the study were then integrated in the 2004 nationwide youth consultation process to develop the National Youth Policy. The consultation process involved “Youth Fora” in which some 100 youth organizations and youth wings of political parties representing over 100,000 young people discussed national youth policy with governmental officials and donors. The final draft of the strategy and a Youth NGO Declaration were subsequently presented to the Macedonian Government for adoption and implementation.

In parallel, several major youth NGOs conducted additional consultation processes in more than 30 municipalities across the country. The National Youth Action Plan developed by the youth NGO coalition SEGA raised the voice of young people to the central and local governments. An important challenge in developing the National Youth Strategy was the inclusion of young people who were not members of youth NGOs. These youth were directly involved in the process through the Babylon Children and Youth Centers, Internet forums developed by different youth NGOs (e.g., Youth Education Forum, Young European Federalists, etc.), an Internet-based NGO resource center (MANGO-NET), interactive radio programs (e.g., Radio Ravel) and direct participation in local discussion groups.

Source: World Bank (2005b).

Ireland, Philippines, South Africa and USA) reveals the central role of state violence and corruption in creating fertile ground for organized youth violence. In all countries investigated, the study found that the state had either a direct or indirect role in such violence. In three countries, the state supported gangs and other organized violent groups (direct role) and in the remaining seven, certain state representatives,

such as policemen or low-level officials, were found to be corrupt (indirect role). Many local governments were found to have a close relation with such violent groups, for example, using them to collect bribes and local taxes.²⁵⁵ The most worrisome finding was that in eight out of the ten case studies, such groups did not start as criminal organizations but became so as a result of repressive measures, including imprisonment, torture and summary executions, which further escalated the violence.²⁵⁶ The report concludes with a series of recommended interventions to support young people involved in organized violence, including community-based prevention and rehabilitation programs. Such programs tended to be limited in scope, under-funded or nonexistent in all the countries that were reviewed. Restorative justice is being increasingly recognized as a more effective intervention to manage security and conflict risks than long prison sentences for young offenders, let alone more violent means of punishment directed at young militants involved in violent confrontation with the state.

The finding presented in Chapter 3 is in line with the report on youth violence: young people in the North Caucasus perceive the corruption of police and other authorities as a major threat to security, along with terrorism and religious extremism. The immediate policy implication of this finding is that it is urgent to restore (or establish for the first time) some level of trust between the youth constituency and state authorities, particularly those involved in enforcing security in communities perceived to be at risk of extremism and terrorism. In addition to inter-faith dialogue and dialogue between various Muslim leaders, a dialogue between communities (especially between youth representatives and police forces) should be encouraged. In Macedonia, for example, a country that is successfully recovering from conflict between its Albanian and Slavic Macedonian communities, the Interior Ministry recently instituted an *Open Police Day* to promote greater transparency of police forces and expose them to open debate with civil society across the nation. In the North

²⁵⁵ Dowdney (2005).

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

Caucasus, these types of initiatives would require the strong backing of Federal authorities and should be thoughtfully targeted at areas where there is a risk of conflict escalation, such as Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia.

The Building Blocks of More Effective Youth Policy

Given the dynamic and comprehensive issues of Russian youth policy and the diverse nature of the Russian Federation, the policy needs an overall framework that defines overall objectives, values, concrete steps and strategies and ensures the cross-sectoral approach required by youth programming. The policy cannot, however, be genuinely effective without addressing youth needs at the local level.

Overall implementation and coordination of Russian youth policy should be the responsibility of an autonomous governmental body responsible for youth issues at the federal level. This body should be responsible for horizontal coordination and implementation of federal programs (to overcome current fragmentation), while facilitating vertical cooperation between different levels of government, as well as securing donor coordination in the youth field. In order to fulfill this role, the body should develop specific communication channels and instruments (explained below) and offer capacity building and training to other stakeholders in the youth field, including ministries and youth bodies at the district, oblast and local levels. The Steering Committee foreseen by current youth strategy should be given an advisory role to the Ministry of Education with specific responsibility for defining specific youth policy priorities and strategies, ensuring horizontal inter-ministerial and cross-sectoral coordination and facilitating the co-management of youth issues by government and youth organizations.

Both horizontal and vertical communication channels should be developed and coordinated to ensure that young people, their organizations and government authorities at all levels

benefit from exposure to different experiences and best practices. At the horizontal level, the Steering Committee should advise governmental bodies responsible for youth and establish inter-ministerial communication channels as part of a monitoring and evaluation system for youth policy. At the vertical level, recent training sessions for local authorities in Macedonia revealed that building communication channels horizontally between municipalities and vertically between municipalities and the central government is of highest priority to ensure coordination and a constant flow of information between the principal stakeholders in youth policy implementation.²⁵⁷ These communication channels should include regular consultation sessions, open Internet forums, special hearings on specific topics and municipal representation on republic-level Steering Committees.

The institutional development of youth work should follow similar patterns at all levels of government. Recent developments in the youth field in the Russian Federation show that focal points on youth issues are being designated at the regional level. These focal points should be responsible for (i) defining, together with young people and youth organizations, specific youth priorities essential for a given region, (ii) ensuring full implementation of common standards for youth work as set out in the national youth strategy, and (iii) coordinating regional cross-sectoral cooperation in the form of advisory bodies.

The current capacity of municipalities is not sufficiently robust to develop fully diversified youth work. One specific long-term action of national youth policy should therefore be to build local capacity for youth programming and ensure its adequate development in the near future. **Once local capacities are more sustainable, municipalities should designate a focal point for youth issues within local administrations, create a budget for youth programs and establish a joint committee comprised of civil servants and youth representatives to advise local administrations on youth-related issues.** While

²⁵⁷ Macedonia Agency of Youth and Sports and Open Society Institute (2005).

the objectives and programming of local youth work will most probably be diverse, reflecting specificities on the ground, common approaches to such issues as youth leadership, empowerment, equal access to programs, social inclusion, volunteer work and non-formal education can be established within the framework of the national youth policy.

Regional targeting is a key feature of successful national youth action plans. In particular, allocations from the federal government to the regions should be prioritized on the basis of a regional youth index comprised of a few simple, measurable indicators. These indicators should include measures of demography (e.g., percentage of youth population), conflict (e.g., security ratings) and education, health and living standards (e.g., secondary education completion rates, youth unemployment rate, incidence of HIV/AIDS and regional poverty index). A regional index would provide an objective mechanism for broad earmarking of resources by region, making resources predictable across years. The same amount of resources should be allocated per year for the life of a program. Penalties should also be introduced for improper use of funds (e.g., no allocations in future budget cycles). Federal targeting on the basis of a regional youth index will also allow for more accurate monitoring of impact outcomes.

Regional targeting could involve the inclusion of specific allocations for school-to-work transition programs for young people in the *South of Russia* FTP, which are entirely missing in that program at the moment. The box below examines the key design features of Spain's Integrated Youth Plan, which has provisions regarding institutional development and decentralized assistance that are relevant to the Russian Federation.

Given widespread regional differences in the Russian Federation, indicators of youth development should be disaggregated at the regional level, but remain under the oversight of a federal body responsible for youth policy implementation. Disaggregation will allow the impact of national youth strategy

Box 5.6 Youth Policy Development in Spain: The Integrated Youth Plan

The Integrated Youth Plan of Spain uses a comprehensive approach to reduce social exclusion in the country. The plan focuses on improving access to and systematizing education and training, housing and employment by devolving control over youth programming to local governments. As part of the Spanish government's "decentralized aid" process, funds are made available to regions and municipalities, who assume policymaking power on youth issues in order to make these levels of government, especially municipalities, more responsive to their respective young citizens.

Beginning in 1983, Spain's youth policy approach included dialogues with youth associations and organizations and the legal establishment of a Council of Spanish Youth. In 1985, the Institute for Youth and the creation of an Inter-ministerial Committee for Youth and Infancy led to the development of the Integrated Plan for Youth. In November 1991, the Council of Ministers endorsed the plan, which was first implemented on a municipal level and in certain Autonomous Communities.

Nationwide, the plan was succeeded by two additional three-year efforts, the Youth Plan of 1994–1997 and the Global Action Plan on Youth of 2000–2003.

Key program components included:

(i) **participatory youth policy development** at the national, regional and municipal levels, with contributions from youth organizations, associations and local governments; (ii) **institutional development**, including the creation of the Spanish Youth Institute, Council of Spanish Youth and inter-ministerial committees on youth affairs; and (iii) **provision of decentralized aid** in the areas of education, quality of life, equal opportunities, participation and association and international cooperation. Among the plan's concrete achievements is the creation of local youth centers and youth councils. Notably, the plan's methodology was later replicated to address issues of other groups, including the elderly, disabled, women, children and immigrants.

Source: QED (2003).

implementation to be measured for different regions, while maintaining national standards and allowing for inter-regional comparability and federal aggregation of youth trends. Use of a youth development index that measures life expectancy and health and living standards (as developed in a recent UNESCO/GTZ report²⁵⁸) is considered too aggregated to be able to accurately measure trends in the school-to-work transition in different regions of the country.

The prioritization established by the regional youth index should also govern resource allo-

cations from regions to municipalities and youth-related organizations. However, such funding should not be treated as an entitlement. For example, a managed competition could be introduced, especially if resources are insufficient to provide credible sums to all municipalities every year. Each year, a new crop of municipalities would thus receive funds from the annual earmarked regional allocation as the result of an open competition. Competition would also provide incentives to municipalities and youth-related NGOs to strongly commit to program objectives and modalities. In order to ensure that poorer and conflict-affected areas are not excluded from such allocations, first-come-first-served policies on competition should be balanced by targeting cer-

²⁵⁸ Agranovich et al. (2005).

tain capacity-building and mobilization support to areas at risk.

An additional recommended measure is the establishment of a rigorous monitoring and evaluation system at the federal level to scrutinize the expenditures and outcomes of regional youth investments, as well as ongoing monitoring of overall youth trends in the Russian Federation. Multiple indicators are required to judge the effectiveness of transition policies in a given region. A recent OECD policy study highlighted indicators such as: (i) the proportion of young people completing full upper secondary education with a recognized qualification; (ii) the level of knowledge and skills among young people at the end of the school-to-work transition phase; (iii) the proportion of teenagers and young adults neither in education nor employment; (iv) the proportion of young people remaining unemployed for lengthy periods after leaving education; and (v) equitable distribution of outcomes by gender, social background and region.²⁵⁹

Donations from both international and Russian private companies should be attracted, especially to disadvantaged regions of the Russian Federation, in return for good visibility. At the moment, the only company that has committed to assist youth development in the North Caucasus is

²⁵⁹ OECD (2000).

Microsoft, which is working in partnership with the World Bank through the latter's *Unlimited Potential* program of corporate social responsibility. Microsoft's assistance is particularly relevant because it involves the donation of software packages for different user levels (from basic computer literacy to web design) that are specifically designed for disadvantaged youth and conflict-affected populations. The company is also offering free testing to young beneficiaries to attain an international certificate, which is particularly attractive for North Caucasus youth because they have limited mobility and access to international education institutions.

Youth policy implementation that takes into account the above principles and ensures transparency and accountability is more likely to be strongly endorsed by regional and local governments, youth stakeholders and the donor community. The World Bank in particular would be ready to assist its Russian counterparts in developing an implementation framework, both technical and financial, along the lines described in this study, building on the initial *North Caucasus Youth Security and Empowerment* grant. The present study is only a first step toward developing an integrated approach to youth policy, a process that will benefit from the full participation of the wide range of local, regional and national youth stakeholders in the Russian Federation and North Caucasus, as illustrated in the table below.

Table 5.1. A Multidimensional Approach to Youth Policy and School-to-Work Transition in the Russian Federation and North Caucasus

Key institutions	Policy issue	Possible interventions and investment options
Federal entity on youth/Ministry of Education	Result-oriented implementation of national youth policy across diverse regions	<p>Russia-wide multisectoral youth investment program, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional capacity building plan for youth policy development for line ministries, federal/ regional/republic level, All-Russia and other local youth organizations • Horizontal (inter-ministerial and cross-sectoral) and vertical (federal, regional/republic, municipal) coordination of national youth policy implementation through the National Youth Policy Steering Committee • Decentralized assistance to oblasts/republics based on transparent and participatory ranking of youth population needs and opportunities • Robust monitoring and evaluation system • Community-based, multidimensional approaches, including risk prevention and management, non-formal education, and active labor market programs (including apprenticeships and first employment programs) <p>Sub-national multisectoral investment for youth in North Caucasus initially targeted to Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, North Ossetia and Karachay-Cherkessia, then Dagestan and Chechnya</p>
Southern Federal Okrug	Ensure greater impact of existing instruments and those under preparation; build greater trust and participation with youth stakeholders	Re-orient <i>South of Russia</i> FTP to emphasize labor-intensive public works aimed at young workers
Oblast/republic level	Increase trust and participation of young people	<p>Participatory youth design and programming, involving youth organizations and students/graduates</p> <p>Better outreach to youth in disadvantaged and rural areas</p>
Municipal level	Municipal youth policy development (only where basic administrative functions and capacity already exists)	Participatory youth design and programming
Ministry of Education and Science	<p>Improve quality and relevance of secondary and tertiary education for more effective transition from school to work</p> <p>Decrease the high incidence of drop-outs from secondary and tertiary education</p>	<p>Develop regionally based investments to improve quality and relevance of secondary and tertiary education</p> <p>Develop links between formal and non-formal education; recognize certificates obtained through non-formal education programs</p> <p>Second-chance education programs</p>
Ministry of Education and Science, cont'd	Decrease corruption at tertiary level (universities)	Competitive grant schemes both for universities and student/youth organizations to introduce student participation, anti-corruption and good governance initiatives

Table 5.1 (continued)

Key institutions	Policy issue	Possible interventions and investment options
Ministry of Regional Development	Develop federally targeted programs (FTP) with measurable outcomes for local communities and youth stakeholders	Southern Russia FTP to provide income-generation opportunities for low-income youth through labor-intensive public works, among other local multisectoral investments
Justice and Interior Ministries	Increase security and support conflict prevention	Favor restorative justice programs over prison sentences Anti-corruption measures in police forces Open Police Day with youth stakeholders
Health Ministry	Decrease health-related risks among young people	Support youth-friendly health services and primary and secondary prevention programs, including harm reduction
Ministry of Culture	Increase intercultural awareness among young people	Promote youth subcultures and cultural identities of different ethnic groups within an overall social cohesion framework Promote intercultural mobility of young people between regions Support multicultural events with young people from different regions
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs	Increase youth-friendliness of employment services	Improve transparency of employment services and provide clearer information on employment benefits and opportunities to young job seekers

Bibliography

- Aedo, Cristian. Job training programs: The cases of Chile Joven and Argentina Proyecto Joven. Paper prepared for "Seminar on the social protection of the poor in Asia and Latin America" of the Asian Development Bank, October 21–25, 2002, Manila, Philippines.
- Agranovich, Mark, Natalia Korolyova, Andrei Poletaev, Igor Sundiev, Irina Seliverstova and Anna Fateeva. 2005. Youth development report: Condition of Russian youth. UNESCO and GTZ, Paris, France and Eschborn, Germany. Mimeo.
- Arsovski, Todor. 2005. Studentite za sebe. Mimeo. Information also available on the website of Studentite za sebe, Macedonia, www.studentitezasebe.org.mk. Accessed November 15, 2005.
- Bravo, David, and Dante Contreras. 2000. The Impact of financial incentives to training providers: The case of Chile Joven. Mimeo. Department of Economics, University of Chile.
- Canning, Mary, Maree Bentley, Johanna Crighton, Isak Froumin, Martin Godfrey, Dorota Holzer, Stephen Kerr, Andrei Markov and Kirill Vasiliev. 2004. The modernization of education in Russia. Mimeo. World Bank, Moscow office.
- Canning, Mary, Peter Mook and Timothy Heleniak. 1999. *Reforming education in the regions of Russia*. Washington DC: World Bank.
- CARE. 2004. Gender-based violence: Baseline survey of Chechen IDPs and private residents in Chechnya and Ingushetia. Mimeo. Care International, Chatelaine, Switzerland.
- Center for Strategic Research. 2005. Labor Market in the SFO: Current state and major trends (1992–2004). State University – Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. Mimeo.
- Cherednichenko, Galina. 2001. Lichnye plany vypusnikov srednii uchebnyi zavedenii. (Personal plans of secondary school graduates). *Sotsiologiya obrazovaniya* 12:108–115.
- Chivers, C.J. Putin calls for steps to end drop in population. *The New York Times*. May 11, 2006.
- Chupro, Vladimir, and Julia Zubok. 2000. Integration versus exclusion: Youth and the labor market in Russia. *International Social Science Journal* 52(164):171–182.
- Council of Europe. 2003. Youth policy in the Russian Federation. *Forum 21– European Journal on Youth Policy*, no. 1. Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France, http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Co-operation/Youth/5_Information_services/Forum_21_No1.asp#TopOfPage. Accessed August 30, 2005.
- Currie, Candace, Chris Roberts, Antony Morgan, Rebecca Smith, Wolfgang Settertobulte, Oddrun Samdal and Vivan Barnekow Rasmussen. 2004. Young people's health in context. Health behaviour in school-aged children (HBSC) study: International report from the 2001/2002 survey. *Health Policy for Children and Adolescents*, no. 4. WHO Europe, Copenhagen.
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC). 2005. Sample household economic and integration survey of the populations residing in pilot recovery areas within Malgobekskiy, Nazranovskiy and Sunzhenskiy districts of Ingushetia. DRC, Copenhagen, Denmark. Mimeo.
- De Jong, Kaz, Saskia van der Kam, Nathan Ford, Sally Hargreaves, Richard van Oosten, Debbie Cunningham, Gerry Boots and Elodie Andrault. 2004. The trauma of ongoing war in Chechnya. Amsterdam: Médecins Sans Frontières.
- Department of State Youth Policy, Childrearing and Social Protection of Children. 2005. Podderzhka molodezhnykh i detskikh obshchestvennykh ob'edineniy, konsultativno-soveshatel'nykh struktur molodezhi, organov molodezhnogo samoupravleniya. (Support of youth and children's public unions, youth consultative-achievement structures and youth self-management bodies.) Department of State Youth Policy, Childrearing and Social Protection of Children, Moscow, <http://www.mon.gov.ru/children/anob/strmol.doc>. Accessed November 12, 2005.
- . 2003. Detskie organizatsii i ob'edineiya. (Children's organizations and unions.) Department of State Youth Policy, Education and Social Protection of Children, Moscow, <http://www.vidod.edu.ru/infos/kidorgs/230>. Accessed September 2, 2005.
- V. Dobrynina, T. Kukhetvich and S. Tumanov. 1999. The young people of Russia — 97. *Russian*

Social Science Review 40, no. 1 (January–February): 34–40. M.E. Sharpe, Inc., Armonk, New York.

Dowdney, Luke. 2005. *Neither war nor peace: International comparisons of children and youth in organized armed violence*. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Children and Youth in Organized Armed Violence (COAV), <http://www.coav.org.br>. Accessed July 2005.

Du Bois-Reymond, Manuela. 2003. Study on the links between formal and non-formal education. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, Directorate of Youth and Sport.

European Youth Forum. 2003. 11 Indicators of a (national) youth policy. European Youth Forum, Brussels, http://www.youthforum.org/en/our_work/balkan/0762-02%2011%20indicators%20of%20a%20youth%20policy.pdf. Accessed September 1, 2005.

Fawcett, Caroline. 2003. Building a bridge for the road too far: Policy analysis for the school-to-work transition in Latin America. In Blair Ruble, Joseph Tulchin, Diana Varat and Lisa Hanley, eds. *Youth Explosion in Developing World Cities*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Fuller, Liz. 2005. Dagestan: Anatomy of a Permanent Crisis. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). July 13, 2005. http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=07&y=2005&id=A66DE1B3-065C-47CE-8CC0-4CF0C9E61D58. Accessed July 20, 2005.

Galitskiy, E. and M. Levin. 2004. Monitoring ekonomiki obrazovaniya. (Monitoring the education economy.) *Korrupsiya v sisteme obrazovaniya* (Corruption in the education system) 4, no.6:4–28.

GOSKOMSTAT (State Committee on Statistics of the Russian Federation). 2003. Russian household welfare and participation in federal programs survey – NOBUS 2003. Moscow: GOSKOMSTAT.

———. 2004a. Russian census 2002. Moscow: GOSKOMSTAT, <http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id=11>. Accessed July 31, 2005.

———. 2004b. Russian statistical yearbook. Moscow: GOSKOMSTAT.

———. N.d. GOSKOMSTAT, Moscow, Russian Federation, http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b05_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/05-01.htm. Accessed May 18, 2006.

Government of the Russian Federation. 1997. Government resolution no. 746: Youth of Russia (1998–2000), June 18. Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow.

———. 2000. Government resolution no. 1015: Youth of Russia (2001–2005), December 27. Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow.

———. 2001. Government resolution no. 581: South of Russia Federal Program, August 8. Program Document. Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow.

Grisin, Sarah and Celeste Wallander. 2002. Russia's HIV/AIDS crisis: Confronting the present and facing the future. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Holland Peter. 2005. *Reducing Risky Behavior: A Survey of Approaches to Working with Youth*. Washington DC: World Bank.

Hunter, Shireen. 2004. *Islam in Russia: The politics of identity and security*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

ILO (International Labour Organization). 2003. *Key indicators of the labor market (KILM)*. Third edition. Geneva: ILO.

———. 2004. Starting right: Decent work for young people. Background paper for tripartite meeting on youth employment: The way forward. ILO, Geneva.

———. 2005. Youth: Pathways to decent work, report VI. International Labor Conference, 93rd Session. ILO, Geneva.

Institute for Urban Economics. 2005. Background paper on school-to-work transition and youth inclusion in Southern Russia: Institutional analysis. Institute for Urban Economics, Moscow. Mimeo.

International Youth Foundation (IYF). 2005. *What works in youth engagement in the Balkans*. Baltimore, Maryland: IYF.

IWPR (Institute of War and Peace Reporting). 2005. Map of Russia (North Caucasus). IWPR website, London, http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?caucasus_profile_northcau.html. Accessed September 31, 2005.

Johnson, Mark. 2003. A generation in crisis and the prospects for community-based learning in Russian higher education. A revised paper prepared for the Ford Foundation Russia. Mimeo.

Kasaev, Alan. 1996. Ossetia-Ingushetia. In Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, eds., *U.S. and Russian policymaking with respect to the use of force*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF129/CF-129.chapter1.html. Accessed August 10, 2005.

Kingkade, Ward. 1997. *Population Trends: Russia. International Brief*. U.S. Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration, IB/96-2. Bureau of the Census, Washington, DC.

Koshkina, E. 2002. Rasprostrannost' alkoholisma i narkomanii sredi saseleniya Rossii. (The extent of alcoholism and drug among the Russian population.) *Psikhiatriya i psikhofamakoterapiya* (Psychiatry and psychopharmacology) 4, no. 3.

La Cava, Gloria, Paula Lytle, Alexandre Kolev and Carine Clert. 2004. From risk to empowerment: Young people in South Eastern Europe. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Layton, Katherine. 2004. 'The emperor carries a gun.' Capacity building in the North Caucasus. *The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution* 6, no.1: 241–271, www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/6_1layton.pdf. Accessed August 31, 2005.

Lowndes, Catherine, Adrian Renton, Michel Alary, Tim Rhodes, Geoff Garnett and Gerry Stimson. 2003. Conditions for widespread heterosexual spread of HIV in the Russian Federation: Implications for research, monitoring and prevention. *International Journal of Drug Policy* 14: 45–62.

Macedonia Agency of Youth and Sports and Open Society Institute. 2005. Developing local youth policies. Macedonia Agency of Youth Sports and Open Society Institute, Skopje, Macedonia. Mimeo.

Markowitz, Fran. 1999. Not nationalists: Russian teenagers' soulful a-politics. *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 7: 1183–1198.

Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation. N.d. Informatsionny server po materialam federalnykh tselevykh programm (Information server on federal targeted program materials), Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation, Moscow, <http://www.programs-gov.ru/cgi-bin/index.cgi>. Accessed September 15, 2005.

Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. 2005a. Strategy for state youth policy in

the Russian Federation. Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, Moscow. Mimeo.

———. 2005b. Implementation of basic directions of state youth policy in the Russian Federation. Moscow: Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation.

Ministry of Education of the Republic of Ingushetia. 2005. The capacity and congestion of Ingushetian schools in 2004–2005. Ministry of Education, Republic of Ingushetia, Magas, Ingushetia. Mimeo.

Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. 2004. Website, Moscow, Russian Federation, www.budgetrf.ru. Accessed July 2004.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands. 2003. *Q and A drugs 2003: A guide to Dutch policy*. The Hague, The Netherlands: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=6D389503422F4A58867070C835BCF837X1X55968X17. Accessed September 1, 2005.

Ministry of Health Welfare and Sport of The Netherlands. 2002. *Progress Report on the drug policy of the Netherlands, 2001–2002*. The Hague, The Netherlands: Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, http://www.minvws.nl/images/progress-report-drugpolicy_tcm11-45330.pdf. Accessed August 31, 2005.

Mishkina, Svetlana, Vadim Pokrovsky, Mashkilleyson Nikolai and Pomazkin Dmitri. *A model of social policy costs of HIV/AIDS in the Russian Federation*. Geneva: ILO, <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/trav/aids/publ/rpa2.pdf>. Accessed October 13, 2005.

Morrison, Stephen and Celeste Wallender. 2005. Russia and HIV/AIDS: Opportunities for leadership and cooperation; A report of the CSIS Task Force on HIV/AIDS Brookings/CSIS joint delegation to Russia. CSIS, Washington, DC.

MSF (Medecins sans frontières)-FOCUS. 2001. This little thing will protect both of us. Mass media campaign KAP/B and evaluation report. Telephone interview survey of 15–25-year-olds from Moscow, Russia, regarding 2000 mass media campaign and HIV/STI knowledge, attitudes, practice and behavior. Moscow: Foundation for Civic Initiatives and Medecins Sans Frontieres.

Nezavisimyi institut sotsialnoi politiki (Independent Institute of Social Policy). 2004. *Higher education in*

Russia: Rules and reality. Moscow: Nezavisimyi institute sotsialnoi politiki.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development). 2000. *From initial education to working life: Making transitions work.* Paris: OECD.

———. 2003. Online labour force statistics database. OECD, Paris, <http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/lfsdataauthenticate.asp>. Accessed October 3, 2005.

Office of the U.N. Resident Coordinator in Russian Federation (Moscow office of UNDP/UNFPA/UNESCO/UNIFEM). 2005. *Gender equality and extension of women's rights in Russia in the context of the Millennium Development Goals.* UNDP, Moscow.

O'Higgins, Niall. 2003. Trends in the youth labor market in developing and transition countries. Social Protection Discussion Paper Series, no. 0321. Human Development Network, World Bank, Washington DC.

Pilkington, Hilary. 1994. *Russia's youth and its culture: A nation's constructors and constructed.* London and New York: Routledge.

President of the Russian Federation. 1994. Youth of Russia federal program (1995–1997). Edict of the President of the Russian Federation, no. 1992. September 15, 1994. Moscow: The Kremlin.

———. 2004. Address to the Federal Assembly of the Federation. May 26, 2004. Moscow: The Kremlin.

Public Opinion Foundation. 2002a. Entering a university. Population poll, August 3–4, 2005. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/obrazovanie/high_education/etb023107/. Accessed October 15, 2005.

———. 2002b. Youth policy. Population poll, July 13–14, 2002. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/dominant/dominant2002/306_2885/2595_2913/ed022809. Accessed October 15, 2005.

———. 2002c. Labor values. Population poll, December 28–29, 2002. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, <http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/man/valuable/etb030109/>. Accessed October 15, 2005.

———. 2002d. Smoking and the health of Russians. Population poll, January 26–27, 2002. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, <http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/health/smoking/etb020406/>. Accessed October 15, 2005.

———. 2002e. Alcohol and Russians. Population poll, February 12–14, 2002. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, <http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/health/alkohol/etb020709/>. Accessed October 15, 2005.

———. 2002f. Drugs and drug addiction. Population poll, March 23–24, 2002. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, <http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/health/drugs/etb021208/>. Accessed October 15, 2005.

———. 2002g. Problems of youth. Population poll, July 18–23, 2002. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, <http://bd.fom.ru/map/projects/youth>. Accessed October 15, 2005.

———. 2002h. TV news. Population poll, February 9–10, 2002. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/mass_media/news/etb020608/. Accessed October 15, 2005.

———. 2003. Election campaign. Population poll, October 25–26, 2003. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/mass_media/election_feature/etb034306. Accessed October 15, 2005.

———. 2004a. Smoking. Population poll, June 5–6, 2004. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, <http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/health/smoking/etb042307>. Accessed October 15, 2005.

———. 2005a. The quality of high school education. Population poll, August 20–21, 2005. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/obrazovanie/high_education/etb053407/. Accessed October 15, 2005.

———. 2005b. “Moving Together” and “Nashi.” Population poll, May 21–22, 2005. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, <http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/etb052109>. Accessed October 15, 2005.

———. 2005c. Participation in mass political rallies. Population poll, May 28–29, 2005. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/nation/demography/distrib_ans/

elect_age/molodezh/ed052212. Accessed October 15, 2005.

———. 2005d. The political potential and activity of young people. Population poll, May 28–29, 2005. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, <http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/ed052222>. Accessed October 15, 2005.

———. 2005e. Should young people take part in politics? Population poll, May 28–29, 2005. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/nation/demography/distrib_ans/elect_age/molodezh/ed052210. Accessed October 15, 2005.

———. 2005f. Membership in political organizations. Population poll, May 28–29, 2005. Moscow: Public Opinion Foundation, http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/nation/demography/distrib_ans/elect_age/molodezh/etb052210. Accessed October 15, 2005.

QED Group, LLC. 2003. *Good Practices in Social Inclusion and Active Labor Market Programs for Youth*. Washington DC: QED Group, LLC.

Riordan, James, Christopher Williams and Igor Ilynsky, eds. 1995. *Young people in post-communist Russia and Eastern Europe*. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Group.

Roshina, Y. 2004. Who has access to higher education in Russia? In *Dostupnost vysshego obrazovaniya v Rossii*. Moscow: Nezavisimyi institut sotsialnoi politiki.

Ryazan Youth Parliament. N.d. Website, Ryazan, Russian Federation, <http://www.molparlament.ryazan.ru:8101/activity.htm>. Accessed July 2005.

Schizzerotto, Antonio and Giancarlo Gasperoni. 2001. Study on the state of young people and youth policy in Europe. IARD, Milan.

Siurala, Lasse. 2006. *A European framework for youth policy*. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe.

Sokolov, Alexander. 2005. Interview with the Chairman of National Council of Youth and Child Unions of the Russian Federation, conducted May 23, 2005.

The Guardian. 2004. "Putin tightens grip on regions and MPs." September 14, 2004.
Trapkova, Anna. 2005. Interview with the youth of Russian Democratic Party "Yabloko" and with

"Liberal Mission" Foundation, May 26, 2005.

UNICEF (United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund). 2000. Young people in changing societies. Regional Monitoring Report, no.7. UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre, Florence.

———. 2001. A decade of transition. Regional Monitoring Report, no. 8. UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre, Florence.

———. 2004a. *Innocenti Social Monitor 2004: Economic Growth and Child Poverty in the CEE/CIS and the Baltic States*. Florence: UNICEF, Innocenti Research Center.

———. 2004b. TransMONEE 2004 database. UNICEF, Innocenti Research Center, Florence.

United Nations Department of Safety and Security in Russia (Vladikavkaz Office). 2005. *UN Security Phases in the North Caucasus*. UNDSSR, Vladikavkaz, Mimeo.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the Russian Federation. 2004. Consolidated inter-agency appeal for Chechnya and neighboring republics (Russian Federation). United Nations, OCHA, Moscow.

Urdal, Henrik. 2002. The devil in the demographics: The effect of youth bulges on domestic armed conflict, 1950–2000. *Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction*, no. 14 (July), ECSSD, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Vinokur, Anatoly, Joana Godinho, Christopher Dye and Nico Nagelkerke. 2001. TB and HIV/AIDS epidemics in the Russian Federation. *World Bank Technical Paper*, no. 510. Washington DC: World Bank.

Williams, Christopher, Vladimir Chuprov and Julia Zubok. 2003. *Youth, risk and Russian modernity*. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate.

World Bank. 2001. *World development report 2000/01: Attacking poverty*. Washington DC: World Bank.

———. 2003a. Averting AIDS crises in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: A regional support strategy. World Bank, Washington DC.

———. 2003b. Youth employment policy in developing and transition countries — Prevention as well as cure. *Social Protection Discussion Paper Series*, no. 0320. World Bank, Washington DC.

———. 2004a. Russian Federation poverty assessment. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Network, Europe and Central Asia Division (PREM/ECA), Report No. 28923-RU. World Bank, Washington DC.

———. 2004b. Young people in South Eastern Europe: From risk to empowerment. World Bank, Washington DC.

———. 2005a. *Expanding opportunities and building competencies for young people: A new agenda for secondary education*. Washington DC: World Bank.

———. 2005b. Macedonia Children and Youth Project aide memoire – Mid-term review. July 8, 2005. World Bank, Washington DC. Mimeo.

———. 2005c. Children and youth: A framework for action. Human Development Network, Children and Youth Unit (HDNCY), no. 1. World Bank, Washington, DC.

———. 2005d. *Dying too young: Addressing premature mortality and ill-health due to non-communicable diseases and injuries in the Russian Federation*. Vols. I and II. Washington DC: Human Development Department, World Bank.

———. 2005e. Youth in post-conflict settings: Some emerging lessons. *Youth Development Notes* 1, no. 1. World Bank, Washington, DC.

———. 2005f. Qualitative survey of youth and youth stakeholders in the North Caucasus. Background survey for Youth in the North Caucasus: From risk to opportunity. ECSSD, ECA, World Bank, Washington, DC.

WHO (World Health Organization). 1999. Russian Federation – Moscow. Global Youth Tobacco Survey (GYTS) fact sheet. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, <http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/>

[global/gyts/factsheets/pdf_files/russia.pdf](http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/global/gyts/factsheets/pdf_files/russia.pdf). Accessed July 17, 2005.

———. 2002. Russian Federation – Sarov. Global Youth Tobacco Survey (GYTS) fact sheet. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/global/gyts/factsheets/pdf_files/russia.pdf. Accessed July 17, 2005.

———. 2004a. Results from the WHO 2004 youth knowledge attitude and practice (KAP) survey on HIV/AIDS in Chechnya. WHO, Geneva, Mimeo.

———. 2004b. Small-scale survey on psycho-social rehabilitation in Ingushetia and Chechnya in the year 2004. WHO, Geneva. Mimeo.

Yousef, Tarik. 2003. Youth in the Middle East and North Africa: Demography, employment and conflict. Paper presented at the “Youth Explosion in Developing World Cities” symposium, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, February 10, 2003.

Youth Parliament of Russia. N.d. Website, Moscow, Russian Federation, www.mparlament.ru. Accessed July 2005.

Zabrodin, Yuri and A.G. Watts. 2003. Public policies and career development: A framework for the design of career information, guidance and counseling services in developing and transition countries. Country report on Russia. World Bank, Washington, DC, http://www1.worldbank.org/education/lifelong_learning/pdf/Russia%20Reort%20Final.pdf. Accessed January 15, 2006.

Zubok, U.A. 2003. Problemy sotsialnogo vospitaniya molodezhi v osloviy riska. (Problems of the social upbringing of youth in conditions of risk.) *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya* (Sociological research) 4:42–51.

Appendix A. Youth Indicators: Summary Table for the Russian Federation and North Caucasus

	Russian Federation	Ingushetia	Kabardino-Balkaria	Dagestan	Chechnya	North Ossetia	Stavropol	North Caucasus
Demographic Indicators								
Total Population in the country	145,166,731	467,294	901,494	2,576,531	1,103,686	710,275	2,735,139	–
North Caucasus Poverty level	–	Over 40%	Over 40%	Over 40%	–	–	–	–
Percentage of 15-24 year olds	17%	21%	19%	21%	21%	18%	18%	–
Number of males aged 15 in 1993 who did not survive until the age 25	3.3%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Male youth 15-24 years old as percentage of total population	9.14	9.85	9.4	10.48	11.04	9.83	9.14	–
Female youth 15-24 year old as percentage of total population	9.02	11.03	9.76	10.73	10.15	8.13	9.02	–
Trend in decline in birth rates 1989-2002	–30%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Employment								
Total number Graduates of State and Municipal Post-Secondary Education Institutions (% of change between 1990 and 2003)	+114.5%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Young people looking for a job and registered as unemployed, 2003	22%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Graduates of State and Municipal Post-Secondary Education Institutions – Professional (% of change between 1990 and 2003 in profession) Economics and Management	+347.2%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Graduates of State and Municipal Post-Secondary Education Institutions - Professional (% of change between 1990 and 2003 in profession) Human and Social	+280.3%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Graduates of State and Municipal Post-Secondary Education Institutions – Technical (% of change between 1990 and 2003 in profession) Machinery and Metal Working	–3.6%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

* This table summarizes some of the key youth indicators presented in this study. Only available statistical data is listed.

Appendix A (continued)

	Russian Federation	Ingushetia	Kabardino-Balkaria	Dagestan	Chechnya	North Ossetia	Stavropol	North Caucasus
Graduates of State and Municipal Post-Secondary Education Institutions – Technical (% of change between 1990 and 2003 in profession) Electronic technology, Radio engineering and connection technologies	-9.2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Graduates of State and Municipal Post-Secondary Education Institutions – Technical (% of change between 1990 and 2003 in profession) Technology of Consumer Goods	-52.8%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Percentage of youth employed in processing industry	19%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Percentage of youth employed in trade	19%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Percentage of youth employed in administration and national security	8%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Percentage of unemployed youth between years 1991–2001	16% (in 1999) – 21% (in 2001)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Females unemployment rate, 1999	26%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Males unemployment rate, 1999	24%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Young people searching for jobs for more then a year, 2003	25%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Young people searching for jobs for more then six months, 2003	45%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Percentage of young people turning to unemployment notices and advertisements	10%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Average percentage of employed 15–24 year olds, 2001	34.1%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Likelihood of young men being unemployed compare to young women	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30%
Unemployment of college level graduates as proportion of all unemployed	1.1%	-	-	-	-	11%	-	-
Average youth unemployment benefits, USD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24.6–28.25
Youth Unemployment, 1990–2001	16– 26%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Education								
Percentage of 15-24 year old who are neither employed nor in education	10.3%	70.5	35.1	40.7	54.9	21.4	21.0	-
Enrollment of 17 year old women in school, 2003	86.3%	-	-	-	-	-	61%	-
Percentage of population which completed secondary school in 2002 (rural)	58	35	69	63	41	60	50	-

Appendix A (continued)

	Russian Federation	Ingushetia	Kabardino-Balkaria	Dagestan	Chechnya	North Ossetia	Stavropol	North Caucasus
Percentage of population which completed secondary school in 2002 (urban)	56	37	57	41	30	61	47	–
Percentage of students which exceed the norm for the school occupancy, year 2004–2005	–	92%	–	–	–	–	–	–
National average of college sits per high school graduate	1.2	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.6	–	–	–
Expenses in the Russian Federation Consolidated Budget per Student for higher education (2001)	11958	4526	6922	4450	–	6520	7236	–
Expenses in the Russian Federation Consolidated Budget per Student for general education (2001)	5843	2742	–	3005	1526	2585	3400	–
Youth 18-35% who believe that getting higher education will cost a lot of money	75%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Health								
Youth 15-25 who smoke daily, 2003	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	24%
Incidence of STIs among Russian youth aged 15–19, year 2002	378 per 100,000	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Use of condom among 14–20 year old during last sexual experience, year 2001	44%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Percentage of HIV infected men, age 15-30	79%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Percentage of HIV infected women, age 15-30	80%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Percentage of young people who wish to receive more information HIV/AIDS	–	–	–	–	60%	–	–	–
Increase in the incidence of syphilis (years 1990–1997) among 15–17 year old girls	in 60 times	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Participation								
Percentage of youth, who never taken part in the meeting or forum in their town or village	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Percentage of youth with mobile telephones	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Conflict / Security								
Percentage of youth with access to internet	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Percentage of youth feeling safe in their communities	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Percentage of youth experiencing physical or emotional trauma related to conflict	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Young people's participation in the activities sponsored by their religious community	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Other								
Population below poverty line (as % of total population)	45.1	89.7	61.6	85.2	н.д.	41.0	52.4	–
Youth Mobility, 2003	13.5%	–	–	–	–	–	–	7.7%

Appendix B. Profiles of Selected North Caucasus Regions and Republics

	Russian Federation	Chechnya	Dagestan	Ingushetia	Kabardino-Balkaria	North Ossetia	Stavropolsky Krai
Population ^a	145,166 731	1,103,686	2,576,531	467,294	901,494	710,275	2,735,139
GRP per capita ^b (Rbl, 2002)	66,111	n/a	19,330	8,173	29,877	24,685	32,053
Population below poverty line ^c (%, 2002)	45.1	н.д.	85.2	89.7	61.6	41.0	52.4
Unemployment rate ^d (%)	8.6	70.9	20.1	53.1	22	10.1	10.3
Median Age ^e	34.1	22.7	25.2	22.2	30.9	33.8	38,1
Population aged 16 or under ^f (%)	17%	35%	30%	35%	23%	21%	18%
Rural Population ^g (% of total)	26.7	66.2	57.3	57.6	43.4	34.6	44.1
Ethnic composition ^h (%)	79.8 Russian 3.8 Tatar 3.0 Ukrainian 13.4 Other	98.0 Chechen 2.0 Other	29.4 Avar 16.5 Dargin 14.2 Kumyk 13.1 Lezghin 5.4 Lakt 4.6 Russian 4.2 Tabasaran 3.4 Chechen 9.2 Other	77.3 Ingush 20.4 Chechen 2.3 Other	55.3 Kabardinian 25.1 Russian 11.6 Balkarian 8.0 Other	62.7 Ossetian 23.1 Russian 2.4 Armenian 11.8 Other	81.6 Russian 5.5 Armenian 12.9 Other

Sources: a, e, f, g: GOSKOMSTAT (2004a).
b, d, f: GOSKOMSTAT (2004b).
c: World Bank (2004a).

Summary of Regions of the North Caucasus included in the Study



Source: Institute for War and Peace Reporting.

Chechen Republic (Chechnya)

Chechen Republic remains highly unstable and is the epicenter of conflict in the North Caucasus. Two protracted wars have been waged in the republic over its independence, the first between 1994–1996 and the second from 1999–2002. Sporadic violence and a strong Russian military presence continue in the republic, though rehabilitation and reconstruction of much of the republic is already underway. The majority of Chechens are Sunni Muslim. Chechnya is currently classified as Security Phase Five: Evacuation by the United Nations, its most serious security classification.²⁶⁰

Dagestan

Dagestan is the eastern-most of the North Caucasus republics, and borders Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Caspian Sea. It continues to be one of the least urbanized republics in the region. Ninety eight percent of the population is Muslim and with 50 ethnic groups (of which 14 have the status of titular nationalities²⁶¹), Dagestan is the most ethnically diverse republic in the North Caucasus. Since 2004, there has been a sharp increase in violence and political assassinations in the Republic, particularly of government officials and police officers.²⁶² Dagestan is currently classified UN Security Phase Four: Program Suspension.

Ingush Republic (Ingushetia)

Ingushetia was created on July 4, 1992, after the split of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic, and is the newest republic of the Russian Federation. The majority of the population is of Ingush and Chechen ethnic origin and of Muslim faith. Since its establishment, Ingushetia has been affected significantly by conflict on both its Western and Eastern borders:

²⁶⁰ United Nations Department of Safety and Security in the Russian Federation (2005). Travel to all countries under Security Phases 1–5 requires clearance for all UN personnel.

²⁶¹ Fuller (2005).

²⁶² Fuller (2005).

the ethnic conflict between Ingushetia and neighboring North Ossetia over the administrative status of the Prigorniy region in 1992 led to a large influx of Ingush refugees from North Ossetia and persisting tensions between Ingush and Ossets; the two Chechen wars saw an even larger influx of Chechen refugees into the Republic. Estimates suggest that in 1999 over 200,000 Chechen refugees were given refuge in Ingushetia; today over 30,000 refugees remain. Ingushetia is classified as UN Security Phase Four: Program Suspension.

Kabardino-Balkar Republic (Kabardino-Balkaria)

The two titular ethnic groups: Kabardinians (50 percent) and Balkarians (10 percent) compose the majority of the population of this republic. Both groups are Sunni Muslim. The potential for conflict in the republic is seen to be growing amidst increasing inter-ethnic tensions between Kabardinians and Balkarians, the rise of radical religion and high levels of corruption. (Radio Free Europe article). Economic decline is also fueling tensions as the once strong mining, forestry and tourism sectors in Kabardino-Balkaria have floundered in recent years. Kabardino-Balkaria holds a Phase Two: Restricted Movement security classification from the UN.

North Ossetia-Alaniya

North Ossetia borders South Ossetia, Georgia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Chechnya, Stavropol Kray and Ingushetia. It is a predominantly Christian republic, with a Muslim minority. In the early 1990s North Ossetia experienced two armed conflicts — the Georgian-South-Ossetian conflict from 1989–1992 and the Ossetian — Ingush conflict in 1992, which resulted in the movement of large numbers of refugees and IDPs. Groups of ethnic Ingush residing in North Ossetia (40,000–60,000)²⁶³ moved to Ingushetia while Ossetian refugees from Georgia and South

²⁶³ Kasaev (1996).

Ossetia relocated to North Ossetia. The United Nations has classified North Ossetia as Security Phase Three: Relocation.

Stavropol Kray

Stavropol Kray is the most developed of the regions and republics of Southern Federal Okrug. The population is predominantly Russian. Half of

the urban population lives in four cities with populations greater than 100,000 – and migration from rural to urban areas is increasing. Stavropol has a well-developed infrastructure including numerous commercial and educational institutions. The majority of the Kray has been classified as Security Phase Three: Relocation by the United Nations. However, districts bordering Dagestan are rated Phase Four, and districts bordering Chechnya have received the most serious Phase Five Classification.

Appendix C. Summary of Interview Statistics

Republic	Number of Interviews	Number of Focus Groups and Themes	Number of Stakeholder Interviews and Positions	Localities Represented
Chechnya	59	Employment Ethnic Identity Gender Equality General youth issues Higher Education <i>5 Focus Groups</i> <i>56 Participants</i>	– Platoon head, Chechen administrative police – School teacher – Mosque clergy – Youth committee official – Sports coach – Youth NGO worker – The head of a building organization – School Teacher – Father of Grozny youth – Mother of Grozny youth <i>10 Stakeholder Interviews</i>	Grozny, Shalinsky, Urus-Martansky, Achkoy-Martansky
Dagestan	50	Employment Ethnic identity Gender Equality Higher Education Religion <i>5 Focus Groups</i> <i>37 Participants</i>	– Pediatrician – Director, Youth camp – Youth Journalist – Medical University Professor – Director, Student Environmental NGO – Director, Rural Secondary School – Director, Youth Department, Ministry of Youth Affairs and Tourism – Specialist, State Employment Service – Director, Rural Youth Organization – Businessman <i>10 Stakeholder Interviews</i>	Makhachkala, Hasavyurt, Babayurt, Kaytagsky, Sanchi
Ingushetia	52	Employment Inter-ethnic relations Gender Equality Higher Education Religion <i>5 Focus Groups</i> <i>60 Participants</i>	– Deputy Chief, Security Department, Ministry of Internal Affairs – Deputy Minister, Ministry of Sport, Tourism and Youth Policy – School Director – Director, Conflict Resolution NGO – Coordinator, Women's Health Center – University Professor – Deputy Minister of Education – Director, Republic TB dispensary – University Professor <i>9 Stakeholder Interviews</i>	Nazran, Malgobek, Alyurt, Nesterovskaya, Karabulak, Akhazhevo, Altievo

Appendix C (continued)

Republic	Number of Interviews	Number of Focus Groups and Themes	Number of Stakeholder Interviews and Positions	Localities Represented
Kabardino-Balkaria	50	Employment Ethnic Identity Gender Equality Higher Education Religion <i>5 Focus Groups</i> <i>47 Participants</i>	– College of Art Teacher – Psychologist, Internal Affairs Department – Employee, Student center of the Ministry of Education – Physician – School teacher – Specialist, State Committee on Culture and Sport – Official, Ministry of Culture, Department of Cooperation with Religious Groups – Representative, Culture NGO – Business Owner – Representative, Conflict Resolution NGO <i>10 Stakeholder Interviews</i>	Nalchik, Tirniauz, Chegem, Argudan, Belaya rechka, Nartkala
North Ossetia	50	Employment Ethnic Identity Gender Equality Higher Education Refugees <i>5 Focus Groups</i> <i>49 Participants</i>	– Psychologist, Ministry of Education – Leading specialist, Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sport – Chief, Office of the Federal State Placement Service – Member, Youth Affairs Committee – School director – Director, Juvenile Department, Ministry of Internal Affairs in North Ossetia – Faculty of Social Science Professor – Deputy head, Village Administration, Prigorodny district – Superintendent, Inspection Department, Ministry of Education – Chairman, Interregional youth organization <i>10 Stakeholder Interviews</i>	Vladikavkaz, Beslan, Kadgaron, Alagirsky, Ardonsky, Kirovsky, Prigorodny
Stavropolsky Kray	59	Employment Gender Equality Higher Education Social and Political participation Violence and terrorism <i>5 Focus Groups</i> <i>45 Participants</i>	– Organizer, Youth Performance Club – Stakeholder, Youth Social Initiatives and Education – Chair, Red Cross – Social Philosophy and Ethnology Professor – University Dean of Extracurricular Activity – School Teacher – Member, Ethnic Council of City Administration – Physician, Adolescent Health Specialist	Stavropol, Pyatigorsk, Mineralnie Vody, Perevalny, Andjievsky, Progress, Novotersky, Zmeyka, Konstantinovskaya, Etoka, Inozemtsevo, Goryachevodsky

Appendix C *(continued)*

Republic	Number of Interviews	Number of Focus Groups and Themes	Number of Stakeholder Interviews and Positions	Localities Represented
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Physician, Endocrinologist – Chairman of Interethnic Relations NGO – University Professor 11 Stakeholder Interviews	
TOTAL	320 Youth Interviews	30 Focus Groups 294 Participants	60 Stakeholder Interviews	

Interview Break-downs by Age and Gender

