

TURKEY'S DELICATE POSITION
BETWEEN
NATO AND THE ESDP

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ABSTRACT

This study examines Turkey's recently emerging 'delicate position' between NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in a broadening security architecture in Europe. It rests on three arguments. Firstly, a new and broader security architecture has been established in Europe. In the process, while NATO has emerged as the most comprehensive and capable organisation in the establishment of a broader security structure in Europe, it has encouraged a division of labour among the NATO members and European institutions, the most important of which is the European Union. However, the EU's ESDP created such institutional and operational mechanisms that six non-EU European NATO members were 'marginalised,' if not totally excluded, from the ESDP process. This produced a serious debate and even a kind of rift among the NATO Allies due to its negative effects on the management of division of labour. Secondly, it will be argued that among the six non-EU European NATO countries, Turkey is the most negatively affected for two reasons. First of all, Turkey's current associate membership status in the EU's first and third pillars, as well as in the Western European Union, as the security and defence pillar of EU integration, was not matched by a similar status in the ESDP. Moreover, Turkey's very central/integral position in NATO was barely taken into consideration. This was a rather awkward and undesirable development because it created a number of 'complications' in NATO-EU relations and co-operation, in Turkey's relations with the EU, and in the realisation of the ESDP itself. As a result, these developments put Turkey into a delicate position between NATO and the EU's Security and Defence Policy. Because of those complications, it will be argued thirdly that a solution has been found to bring an end to Turkey's delicate position between NATO and the ESDP so that Turkey should be fully integrated into the European security architecture under the ESDP. Thus, the last part of the study focuses on the process of finding a solution to the crisis between Turkey and the EU, in particular on the Ankara Agreement and the Brussels Document, as well as on other possible alternatives and options which, I think, are feasible in this respect.

TURKEY'S DELICATE POSITION BETWEEN NATO AND THE ESDP

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ABBREVIATIONS

BLACKSEAFOR: Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force
BSEC: Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CFE: Conventional Forces in Europe
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF: Combined Joint Task Force
EAPC: Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ESDI: European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
EU: European Union
EUGAC: EU General Affairs Council
EUMC: European Union Military Committee
EUMS: European Union Military Staff
EUPSC: EU Political and Security Committee
IFOR: Implementation Force
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
KFOR: Kosovo Force
MPFSEE: Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe
NAC: North Atlantic Council
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OIC: Organisation of Islamic Conference
OSCE: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP: Partnership for Peace
SAM: Center for Strategic Research
SECI: Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
SEEBRIG: South-Eastern Europe Brigade
SEECPP: South East Europe Cooperation Process
SFOR: Stabilisation Force
UN: United Nations
WEU: Western European Union

1. INTRODUCTION

When the fifty-year-long Cold War ended in the early 1990s, not surprisingly a number of new developments, some positive and some negative, emerged. In the midst of these developments, although the old security and political structure in Europe collapsed, a new one has not yet been established. There is an ongoing process to create a new security order ‘in and around Europe,’ which can be called the ‘Broader European Security Architecture.’ Although there are a number of international organisations such as NATO, the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe for establishing a viable security architecture in Europe, two of them, NATO and the EU, have been playing a greater role in the process. While NATO has transformed itself internally and externally towards creating a new security order, the EU has also been trying to have a more capable and effective security and defence policy as the European pillar of NATO’s comprehensive security system.

And quite understandably, almost all of the European countries have been deeply affected, to varying degrees, by these developments and changes. One of them is Turkey. Indeed, Turkey’s Cold War position was radically influenced and modified by the new developments, along with some claims that Turkey is now out of the European security and political order.¹

The main objective of this study is to analyse the impact of very critical and significant developments in the European security architecture on Turkey’s position, including its security, defence and foreign policy. The project was motivated by the following questions: How has the European security architecture been shaped? What are the characteristics of the new European security architecture? Where is Turkey located within this architecture? What is Turkey’s policy toward the European security architecture? And why has Turkey’s position in the European security architecture come to a very ‘delicate point’?

To answer these questions, the project will evolve around three arguments. Firstly, it will be argued that NATO showed its prowess and dynamism by adapting itself to the new security environment following the end of the Cold War. NATO’s security agenda and arena were transformed in such a way that the new NATO came to encompass the whole of Europe and its surrounding areas as well as new kinds of security problems that are categorised as

¹ For instance, Edward Mortimer, “Is this our frontiers?”, *Financial Times*, 3 April 1990; Sedat Ergin, “Türkiye’nin stratejik önemi azalıyor”, *Hürriyet*, 15 June 1990.

non-Article 5 issues. As a result, as the security borders of the European geography broadened in geographical, functional and institutional senses, NATO acted as an umbrella organisation for the broadening security architecture under which other sub-formations, one of which is the EU, have also developed.

Secondly, Turkey has a rather ‘delicate position’ within the emerging security architecture.² This resulted from the fact that Turkey’s connection to the new security architecture has been multiplexed at various levels and degrees. Turkey has three levels/types of positions within the new security architecture in Europe: It is located, simultaneously, ‘at the centre’ through NATO, ‘at the midway’ through the EU/WEU and ‘at the margin’ through the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Such a multiplexed and multivaried ‘delicate position’ creates some complications not only for Turkey’s own security, defence and foreign policy, but also for the development of the security architecture in Europe. So the third part of the project will focus on the complications of Turkey’s delicate position. It will be argued that Turkey’s delicate position has had some negative outcomes and that it may continue in the future if unresolved. Because of that, there have been important efforts to find a viable and respectable formula to bring an end to Turkey’s delicate position.

The last section will focus on the efforts made, as well as other possibilities, to find a solution to the ‘delicate position,’ especially after the September 11 incident and its ensuing developments.

² For an analysis of Turkey’s uncertain position see Heinz Kramer, *Avrupa ve Amerika Karşısında Değişen Türkiye*, trans. by Ali Çimen (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2001), Chapter 12.

2. TOWARDS A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE UNDER NATO

In the post-Cold War era in which the old security order collapsed, the European continent and its surrounding regions have been passing through a critical period from the end of the Cold War towards a new system in which security, politics, economy and society are becoming increasingly interrelated. Like world politics in general, the European political and security order is in transition. A new European political and security order has been in the making for a long time and will continue to be so in the near future. The future structure of the European political and security order will determine the security situation not only of the European countries but also of those countries inside and outside the European geography. Above all, the concept of security, which is the most basic issue for human beings, has gained new definitions, understandings and applications.³

There is now an overwhelming consensus on the notion that the term ‘security’ has been broadened and multiplied in conceptual, geographical and functional senses in Europe and in the world as a whole.⁴ Conceptually, the term ‘security’ now implies not only the so-called ‘hard security,’ which can be defined as ‘feeling secure/safe from foreign military attacks, the invasion of foreign armies, the danger of strategic or tactical missiles, weapons of mass destruction and brutal aggressions, as was the case during the Cold War.’ It also includes the so-called ‘soft security,’ which can be defined as ‘feeling secure/safe from political oppression, hunger, environmental pollution, social fragmentation, human tragedy, immigration, unexpected effects of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) and so on.’⁵ Geographically, the borders of European security have broadened from the Western European region to other regions, towards Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean region and even towards the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Although Western Europe *per se* remains a secure island of peace and stability, it is influenced by developments around Europe.⁶ Thus, functionally, the concept of security

³ James Sperling and Emil Kishner, *Recasting the European Order: Security Architectures and Economic Co-operation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 2nd ed. 1991).

⁴ It is mentioned in several sources: For example, NATO’s Strategic Concept 1991 agreed by the Heads of State and Government, The North Atlantic Council, 8 November 1991, Rome, in *NATO Handbook Documentation* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999); Sperling and Kirchner, *op.cit.*

⁵ See Colin McInnes, “The military security agenda”, in G. Wyn Rees (ed.), *International Politics in Europe: The New Agenda* (London: Routledge, 1993).

⁶ See Barry Buzan, “Introduction: The Changing Security Agenda in Europe”, in Ole Wæver, et al., *Identity, Migration and the New Security in Europe* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993).

now includes social, economic and cultural issues. Not only state security but also societies and individuals are 'threatened' by ethnic nationalism and separatism, terrorism, refugee movements, religious and ideological fanaticism, fatal illnesses (e.g. AIDS), and so on. These security concerns and developments are not limited to certain countries or regions; most of the countries in the world are equally affected by such developments outside their borders.

In other words, security risks are now interdependent within the global arena. No country is totally immune from these security risks, be it 'soft security' problems or 'hard security' problems. There is also interdependence between the issues/problems and different parts of the world. Namely, classical regional borders have been blurred and eroded by the influence of worldwide economic, social, political and military problems. For example, the borders of the Middle East have been extended towards Central Asia and vice versa. The same is true for Europe's regional borders. It is now difficult to define Europe in Cold World terms because its borders have enlarged towards the east and the south. As result of these security interdependencies, there emerged a new security complex in Europe⁷ that can be called the 'Euroasian security complex with a transatlantic connection.' It includes the territories and peoples from the transatlantic area through the European continent up to the Mediterranean, Central Asian and Middle Eastern regions.

A number of pieces of evidence and indicators can be found to prove the existence of interdependence between Europe and the Euroasian security complex, but two of them are especially important. The first one is the pattern of wars during the new era following the Cold War. It can be argued that the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and the Balkan War of 1992-1995 affected not only the security of the Middle Eastern and Balkan countries but also that of most Western European countries in various ways. All of the regional countries directly or indirectly felt the impact of these wars on their own security to varying degrees. Almost all countries felt the negative consequences of the rise of oil prices and the costs of war during the Gulf War as well as the negative impact of refugee exoduses, immigrations and the fear of expansion of the wars to the borders of the European Union countries during the Balkan war. Furthermore, the September 11 incident has proved that even a superpower can come under a terrorist threat.

The second important indicator of the growing interdependence of security is the expansion of European international institutions towards these regions. In parallel and concomitant to the broadening security environment in Europe, new security understandings, arrangements and mechanisms emerged in order to manage and control the negative

⁷ For the term 'security complex' see Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear*, op.cit.

consequences of these multiple sources. Two of them, though interrelated, can be taken into consideration, particularly due to their conformity with the broadening security architecture in Europe. The first one is the approach called ‘common security,’ which suggests that “security could not be achieved by unilateral means, but only by co-operation on issues of common concern.”⁸ The second one is the theory of security community. Indeed, the security community is an outcome of diplomatic, institutional, military and political arrangements. It is a comprehensive framework for security in a certain area. The security community is defined as “a group of people that had become integrated to the point that there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other ways.”⁹ The idea of security community argues that “members of such a community not only do not fight each other, but also do not hold an expectation of war with each other, not that they are necessarily more secure against external attack inside than outside such a community.”¹⁰ These two theories have been put into practice by NATO and the EU in the broader European security architecture since the end of the Cold War.

2.1. Development of the Security Architecture within the NATO Framework

First of all, NATO, as the most experienced and capable organisation in the field of military security, has transformed itself and gained a new structure and role. In the light of the critical developments in the post-Cold War era, NATO adapted and transformed itself in order to cope with new security challenges in such a way as to create a kind of security community framework for a number of countries, ranging from the US to the borders of China in Central Asia and to the Middle East.

NATO’s security architecture can now be defined as a kind of security community because it is composed of “several sovereign states which have dependable expectation of peaceful change,” “expect no bellicose activities from other members” and therefore “consistently practice self-restraint.”¹¹ The participants are not only the full members but also all countries having a connection with NATO at various levels. It does not imply that there are no problems or disputes between the countries within the security community of NATO.

⁸ R. Vayrynan (ed.), *Policies for Common Security* (London: SIPRI / Taylor and Francis, 1985).

⁹ Emanuel Adler and Micheal Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.6.

¹⁰ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. *Contending Theories of International Relations* (New York: Harper & Row, Publisher, 3rd ed., 1990), fn.34, p.461-2.

¹¹ Adler and Barnett, *op.cit.*

Indeed, it is possible to see some crises, disputes, confrontations and conflicts of varying degrees between some members. The thrust of NATO has been to develop close co-operation and dialogue with all countries and to provide a number of opportunities and mechanisms for them to come together and resolve their problems by peaceful means. Thus, countries prefer talking with their opponent under the NATO umbrella rather than going to war.

Right at the beginning of the new era in Europe, after the end of the Cold War, NATO set its fundamental task in those terms: “To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate and coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.”¹²

Since then, NATO’s framework has been broadened towards the construction of a security community by the inclusion of new members, partnerships and dialogues.¹³ The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), formed in 1997, brings together 44 countries from Europe and Asia. By coming together and signing the EAPC Basic Document, the partners “reaffirmed their joint commitment to strengthen and extend peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area on the basis of shared values and principles which underline their co-operation, notably those set out in the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace.”¹⁴

The importance of the EAPC is that it brings together 44 European and Asian countries and provides a platform for them to resolve their problems by dialogue, co-operation and consultation. Indeed, the communication among so many officials within the framework of NATO is a great opportunity for improving peace and stability in the region. Its importance was strikingly expressed by Joseph W. Ralston, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who said: “As we sit around the table in Brussels, one of the more remarkable things is when we have a meeting with the partners. We not only have the 19 NATO nations, but 26 partner nations sitting around that table. Foreign ministers from 45 nations, the defence ministers from 45 nations and the chiefs of defence from 45 nations talk about common problems. That is a pretty remarkable accomplishment for our area and for the alliance.”¹⁵

¹² NATO’s Strategic Concept 1991, *op.cit.*, p.286.

¹³ For an analysis of NATO’s transformation see, David Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1998).

¹⁴ For details, *The NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition*, (Brussels: Office of Information and Press, 1998-1999), p.84-86.

¹⁵ Joseph W. Ralston, “The priorities for European Security”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.3, No.2, April-June 2001, p.99-100. When I (the author) visited NATO HQ in Brussels in June 2001, I had a feeling that NATO has been such a diplomatic and political forum of the Euroasian countries, that representatives of these countries gathered and formed a small miniature of the Euroasian General Assembly where they talk about their security and political problems.

In addition to political co-operation under the EAPC, the Partnership for Peace initiative was launched in 1994 and the Enhanced Partnership for Peace in 1997, bringing together 27 countries for joint military actions and other issues, fostering peace, stability and security in the Euroasian security complex with a transatlantic connection.¹⁶ Moreover, NATO's close dialogue with six Mediterranean countries launched in 1994 also aims to "contribute to security and stability in the Mediterranean and in Europe, whose security is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean."¹⁷ The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in 1997, the establishment of institutional connections between NATO and Russia in 2002 and the Charter for a Distinctive Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine signed in 1997 must be added to the above arrangements as indicators of broadening borders of the security community in the region.

The new NATO has defined its new role in these terms: "The peoples of North America and the whole of Europe can now join in a community of shared values based on freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As an agent of change, a source of stability and the indispensable guarantor of its members' security, our Alliance will continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace in Europe, a Europe of co-operation and prosperity."¹⁸

Such a community of states, if not of societies, throughout the region, has some common security values and expectations. The first and the most important of all is that there is no colossal military threat, such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War, to threaten NATO countries and other non-European parts of the world in general. Ideological and political-military confrontation between Western Europe and Eastern Europe no longer exists. Instead, there emerged more conventional and local security problems such as the Gulf War, wars, conflicts and crises in the Balkans and the Armenian invasion of Azerbaijani territory, etc.

The methods for resolving these problems have also been transformed. Now, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian rescue operations have gained greater importance than military fighting and build-up. The military confrontations as seen in

¹⁶ *NATO Handbook*, op.cit., p. 86-102.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p.105-106.

¹⁸ "The Rome Declaration on Peace and Co-operation", issued by the Heads of State and Governments Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), Rome, 8 November 1991, *NATO Handbook: Documentation* (Brussels: Office of Information and Press, 1999), p.300.

the Gulf, Bosnia and Kosovo lasted a short time and remained limited, focusing on making peace between the conflicting parties.

In view of the above changes, NATO also developed new military concepts and structures during the 1990s. NATO's new concept of 'Combined Joint Task Forces' serves this purpose: to conduct contingency operations, peacekeeping operations and crisis management operations in regions outside the Alliance area of responsibility. So it is designed to launch non-Article 5 operations as well as Article 5 operations if needed. Its composition reflects the nature and spirit of the security community because all the aforementioned countries have a right to contribute to its formation, as was seen in IFOR/SFOR and KFOR peacekeeping forces for bringing peace and stability to the Balkans. It was an important achievement for NATO to be of service for the peace and stability of the security community.¹⁹

NATO's main role is to provide a political platform as well as to launch military operations. However, NATO has suggested burden-sharing for the construction of the security architecture in Europe. Thus, NATO has divided some of its responsibilities with other regional organisations in the area.

2.2. Division of Labour in the Construction of the Security Architecture

NATO provides the overall framework and platform for the countries interested in joining the European security architecture. But NATO is not sufficient enough to handle all aspects of the security architecture; therefore, it prefers to have a division of labour among international institutions in the region to achieve the same objectives. "As the security of all Allies is indivisible ... The achievement of the Alliance's objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks, and responsibilities, as well as the benefits of common defence..."²⁰ In that respect, NATO declared its readiness and support for the division of labour among the OSCE, the WEU and the EU, and other international bodies interested in co-operation with NATO under the principles of the United Nations.

The OSCE combines the elements of both security interdependencies between the arena and the agenda: The OSCE territory, ranging from Vancouver to Vladivostok, comprises all of the Atlantic-European region but excludes the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean areas. Most importantly, the OSCE's security concept is a very comprehensive one: It focuses on the security interdependence among economic, humanitarian and military issues. During the

¹⁹ Yost, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

²⁰ NATO's Strategic Concept 1991, *op.cit.*, Article 36.

1990s although it involved in the resolution of territorial conflicts such as the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia, it did not have a great impact. The main reason for its failure is the fact that the OSCE does not have the developed and efficient military and organisational capabilities of NATO.

The EU plays double roles in the construction of the security architecture in Europe: The first one is to contribute to the economic, political and social integration of European countries that are eligible to be members of the EU within the framework of the European Union. Thus the EU is enlarging its amalgamated security community towards 13 Central, Eastern and Southern European countries at the moment. It has played a very positive role in the adaptation of the Central and Eastern European countries from a communist order to democratic one. With its political, economic, social and financial assistance, it integrated them into the so-called 'island of peace' or 'amalgamated security community,' where they developed democracy, human rights and freedoms, a market economy, social development and so on.²¹

The EU's second role is to contribute to the construction of the security architecture by becoming involved in the resolution of international crises, disputes, human tragedies etc. In the Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty on European Union) of 1991, the EU countries set out a new strategy initially called the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and designated the WEU as the organisation responsible for this objective and as a 'link' between the European Union and NATO. In other words, the implementation of the CFSP was to be carried out by the WEU in co-operation with NATO principles and members. The WEU then defined its security and defence tasks, known as the Petersberg tasks, at the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Petersberg in June 1992. They are non-Article 5 tasks such as 'humanitarian and rescue tasks,' 'peacekeeping tasks' and tasks assigned to combat forces in the context of 'crisis management' situations including peacemaking.²²

The process accelerated in the 1990s, especially due to the fact that the EU and WEU were not able to stop the war and bloodshed in the Bosnian-Serbian war and in the Kosovo war. Having seen that the US and other non-EU countries did not act decisively to stop the war, the EU started to speed up the process and create an autonomous military force and security and defence policy in order to acquire the capacity/capability to implement the

²¹ See Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogles, *The European Union as a Global Actor* (London: Routledge, 1999), Chapter 7.

²² For the reasons for the development of a EU security and defence policy, see Lord George Robertson, "Turkey and the European Security and Defence Identity", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.3, No.1, January-March 2001. The text is an edited transcription of the speech the Secretary-General gave at a conference organised by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) on 23 November 2000 in İstanbul.

Petersberg tasks.²³ In the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the EU noted its objective to ‘integrate’ its European Security and Defence Identity into the EU body by a decision to include the Petersberg tasks within the EU structure, to take steps towards a Common Defence Policy and to merge the WEU with the EU (Article 17). Then in 1998, when Britain and France agreed in St. Malo to implement the steps towards a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), a new process entered onto the European security agenda.

Soon after the EU Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999, the WEU merged with the EU, thus severing the institutional connection between the WEU and NATO and cutting the non-EU NATO members of the WEU out of the European security arrangements. Indeed, it was a step that also overlooked NATO’s Washington Summit Declaration that had been made just three months earlier in April 1999. Then, the EU’s advance towards an independent security and defence mechanism was hastened at the EU’s Helsinki Summit in December 1999. There the EU decided to develop a Headline Goal to create a European Rapid Reaction Force (the so-called European Army) with 60,000 troops by 2003. The WEU’s role in the ESDP was formally terminated by the EU Council at Nice in December 2000, and the EU created separate organs and mechanisms for the decision-making and operations of the ESDP. A result of that, the EU has set an autonomous path in the construction and operation of the security architecture with some complications for all European countries.

According to some observers and analysts, the ESDP could be a threat for ending NATO’s role in the region and an attempt that will not be able to achieve security.²⁴ According to the U.S. administration and officials, the ESDP poses the potential problem of creating the three Ds: duplication of the military forces, discrimination against the non-EU NATO countries and decoupling NATO from the ESDP.²⁵ As a result, it was feared that the ESDP might create risks for building a security architecture under NATO. In other words, some worried that the division of labour could lead to the demise of NATO’s role in the region. The ESDP could be seen as a rival to NATO. But is it really so?

²³ See Jonathan G. Clarke, “Silver Lining: Renewed Interest in European-Run Security Institutions,” in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed.), *NATO’s Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War* (Washington D.C.: CATO Institute, 2000).

²⁴ Bill Cash, “The European Security and Defence Policy: Threat to NATO,” *Perceptions*, Vol.V, No.3, September-November 2000.

²⁵ Stanley R. Sloan, *The United States and European Defence* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers 29, April 2000), pp.6-7.

2.3. NATO-EU Relations within the Security Architecture: Rivals or Partners?

The above developments oblige us to ask the question of whether the EU is trying to become an alternative or even a rival force to NATO. This would be against the spirit of all NATO documents issued in the post-Cold War era. Nor would it be practicably achievable in the foreseeable future. In other words, the ESDP can hardly be a ‘rival and alternative’ to NATO’s position in the European security order due to legal, political, military and institutional constraints.

From a legal perspective, when the documents concerned are assessed, it can be argued that the ESDP is supposed to act only for NATO’s non-Article 5 operations. NATO views the ESDP as an attempt to ‘share the burden’ of European security problems in such a way that there should be a division of labour. Indeed, it was clearly stated, “By assuming greater responsibility for their own security, the European member countries will help to create a stronger and more balanced transatlantic relationship that will strengthen the Alliance as a whole.”²⁶

In this respect, in January 1994, NATO heads of state and government reaffirmed that “the Alliance was the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of the Allies under the Washington Treaty.”²⁷

At their meetings in Berlin and Brussels in June 1996, NATO foreign and defence ministers decided that “*the European Security and Defence Identity should be built within NATO* as an essential part of the internal adaptation of the alliance. This would enable all European allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the alliance.”²⁸

From NATO’s perspective, as declared in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels on 14-15 December 2000, the EU’s recent decisions concerning the construction of the ESDP as part of the EU rather than the WEU did not change the essence of the division-of-labour spirit for the construction of a new European security architecture as long as two points are taken into account. Firstly, “The Alliance will remain the foundation for the collective defence of its members and continue actively to play its important role in crisis management as set out in the Strategic Concept.” Secondly, “[NATO] underlined, as it did at

²⁶ NATO Web page: <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0401.htm>

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.* Italic added.

the Washington Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings, the importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies to the issue of participation. It noted the provisions agreed by the European Council at Nice for dialogue, consultation and co-operation with non-EU European Allies on issues related to security and defence policy and crisis management as well as the modalities for participation in EU-led military operations ... which will also enable non-EU European Allies to raise their concerns when they consider their security interests might be involved.”²⁹

To sum up, the EU’s role in the construction and operation of a broader European security architecture in Europe can be categorised into the following points: First, acting as an organisation or model for boosting the economic, political and legal dimensions of the security architecture in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, and contributing to the development of democracy, market economy, civil government and social-economic reforms. Second, acting as a European pillar of NATO in the non-Article 5 military operations if NATO is not involved.

From a military-political perspective, too, the ESDP can hardly be a rival or alternative for NATO’s role in the security architecture. Four reasons can be shown: Firstly, the EU does not have enough military capabilities, assets or forces to launch effective operations that may be required for autonomous military operations. Indeed, it would take a long time and significant expense to build up a robust European army and operation facilities and assets for operations.³⁰ As Aybet concluded, “The WEU’s military capability in carrying out Petersberg-type operations is depending on NATO, and the implementation of this has been worked out in a NATO-WEU framework. This means that full NATO members and ex-WEU Associate members are fully and equally participating in the development of the ESDI, and the ESDI is being developed within NATO as suggested in the Berlin ministerial decisions of NATO in 1996.”³¹

Secondly, there is no overall consensus about the extent of the ESDP’s role in the European security architecture. Some countries, the so-called Atlanticist countries, prefer NATO to continue as the primary organisation and transatlantic connection essential for the maintenance of security in Europe, while others, the so-called Europeanist countries, prefer a

²⁹ Ministerial Meeting of The North Atlantic Council in Foreign Ministers’ Session, Final Communiqué, Brussels, 15 December 2000, points 28 and 32, *NATO Communiqués and Statements 2000* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), p.81 and 83.

³⁰ See Alistair J. Shepherd, “Top-Down or Bottom-Up: Is Security and Defence Policy in the EU a Question of Political Will or Military Capability”, *European Security*, Vol.9, No.2, Summer 2000, p.20.

³¹ Gülnur Aybet, *NATO’s Developing Role in Collective Security*, SAM papers, No. 4/99, (Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Center for Strategic Research, 1999), p.52.

more independent European rapid deployment force and army.³² Because of these different preferences, and because of the ESDP'S intergovernmental structure that requires 'unanimity' in its decision-making process, there needs to be a consensus between pro-NATO and pro-EU countries. Otherwise, it cannot be viable and effective.

Thirdly, there are some institutional complexities in the arrangements between NATO and the EU: There are actually six non-EU European NATO members (Turkey, Norway, Iceland, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary); and four non-NATO EU members (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden); and several countries that are partners in NATO but not in the EU. These varying connections can complicate the decision-making process in most cases.

Fourthly, the EU's potential operations area is not clearly defined. Because some EU countries, for example Germany, might have concerns and difficulties about 'out-of-area operations,' it should have close co-operation with all countries concerned. But if the ESDP is limited to EU members only, its operations in those regions can be very difficult. In particular, the position of the non-EU European NATO countries is very critical, not only for EU operations but also for NATO-EU relations. EU operations in areas close to these countries need NATO assets and capabilities and NATO's affirmative decision for their use.

One of these countries is Turkey; with its critical geographical position, it lies at the heart of the new security architecture.

³² For an analysis of this division see Tom Lansford, "The Triumph of Transatlanticism: NATO and the Evolution of European Security after the Cold War", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.22, No.1, March 1999, p.7-13.

3. TURKEY'S DELICATE POSITION IN THE NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

After the Cold War, Turkey found itself in an unstable and difficult international security environment stretching from the Balkans to Mediterranean, Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. As the Cold War security order collapsed and a new and broader security order has been built up, Turkey's security position has been deeply affected. Living in a difficult neighbourhood, Turkey's agenda has been dominated by inherently more serious and multiple security issues for the last 10 years. Unlike the Cold War security challenges, the new security environment brought about a range of opportunities and constraints and even risks for Turkish security and foreign policy.

NATO sources indicated that there are 16 potential crisis points around Turkey: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandjak, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, Nagorno-Karabagh in Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Abkhazia in Georgia, Georgia-South Ossetia, Northern Iraq, Iran, Syria, Cyprus, Vojvodina, Privilaka and Belarus. Moreover, it has been pointed out that 13 of them closely concern Turkey.³³

Some of these problematic areas were blown out on a great scale during the 1990s: the 1990-1991 Gulf War and its negative consequences in Northern Iraq, the Bosnia-Serbia war of 1992-1995, the Kosovo problem, the Armenian invasion of Azerbaijani territory, the Abkhazian problem in Georgia, the Russian involvement in the Caucasus problems, the Chechnya uprising, the Turkish-Greek crises in the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus, and (though not on the list) the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, Turkey has already come under the pressure of the crises and wars in the region.

As a result, at the end of the Cold War, Turkey's security position changed fundamentally from being at the southeastern flank of NATO to the heart of the new security architecture due to the multiplication of Turkey's security agenda and arena. Unlike the Cold War position, Turkey's security concerns increased, its security burden became overloaded, and its foreign policy was heavily influenced by security issues, problems and targets. Turkey's foreign policy adopted a purely Realist perspective, i.e. the prime importance of security over all other concerns due to security pressures. When all those crises and wars are viewed in retrospect, challenges to Turkey's security can be categorised into four groups.

³³ Personal interview with Serdar Kılıç, Turkey's Deputy Permanent Representative in NATO, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 05.06.2001; Hüseyin Bağcı, "Türkiye ve AGSK: Beklentiler, Endişeler", in İdris Bal (ed.), *21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Alfa, 2002), p.596. According to Turkish Foreign Ministry officials in Ankara, the number increased to 23, 21 of which are around Turkey.

First of all, challenges to Turkey's security and foreign policy have been *multi-directional*. During the Cold War years, Turkey's primary security concern emanated mainly from the north, that is, the Soviet threat. Therefore, the collapse of the Soviet-communist threat was a positive development due to two factors: firstly the disappearance of the Soviet threat, and secondly the emergence of new opportunities in the post-Soviet territories in Central Asia. In the new era Turkey's security perspective is influenced by developments from all directions: the Middle East and the Mediterranean in the south, the Caucasus and Central Asia in the east, the Balkans in the west and the Russian factor in the north.

Secondly, Turkey's security agenda has been *multi-functional*. This means that Turkey's security is influenced more by the soft security issues surrounding Turkey than by the existence of a direct military attack by an enemy. In other words, the soft security issues such as terrorism, ethnic nationalism, social and economic instabilities, refugees, weapons of mass destruction etc. occupy Turkey's security agenda more than ever before.

Thirdly, Turkey's security agenda has been *multi-levelled*, which means that Turkey's security concerns come from various levels, such as the international system, inter-state, domestic/national and individual levels. At the international system level, power politics relations among the US, the European Union, Russia, China and other powers closely influence Turkey's security. At the inter-state level, Turkey has special bilateral security problems/relations with some regional countries such as Syria, Iraq, Iran, Armenia, Russia, Greece and Israel. Turkey is influenced by the balance-of-power game in the region. At the domestic/national level, Turkey has faced critical challenges from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terror, radical-violent religious fundamentalism such as Hezbollah, and from social and economic problems. Finally, at the individual level, Turkey has had a deteriorating human rights record due to the growing number of applications made by ethnic, religious and other civil individuals to the European Court of Human Rights in the 1990s.

Finally, Turkey's security has been challenged by *multi-institutionalisation* of the international security architecture in Europe. During the Cold War years, NATO was the only security framework for protecting Turkey's security. In the new era, although it is still the most important one as will be analysed below, there emerged new organisations with security agendas in addition to NATO. Due to the above three points, Turkey paid close attention to every international organisation in the region, be it the OSCE, the WEU, the EU or any other. Turkey does not want to be out of any international organisation whose activities may have implications for Turkish security, defence and foreign policy.

These concerns and developments also brought Turkey's geopolitical and strategic position in world politics to a difficult point. As Turkey is involved heavily in European, Asian and Middle Eastern issues, Turkey's position in the European security architecture has been very delicate. The main reason behind this 'delicate position' is the fact that Turkey's connection with the European security architecture has been very multiplexed and multi-varied in recent years. In other words, Turkey's connection with the developing European security architecture has three channels and dimensions. Firstly, as a full member of NATO, Turkey is at '*the centre*' of the European security architecture through NATO. But, secondly, as an Associated Member of the European Union and an Associate Member of the WEU, Turkey is at '*the midway*' of this architecture. Thirdly, the worst has happened recently, and Turkey has been put at '*the margin of*' the architecture due to its marginal position in the European Security and Defence Policy. The following sections will examine these three channels and dimensions.

3.1. Turkey in NATO: The Central Position

Turkey has always been a *de facto* part of European security since the 19th century in terms of international security relations. Turkey's place improved within concrete, legal and organisational levels when it became a full member of NATO in 1952. This made Turkey automatically a part of the Western European security system. Since then, Turkey's security and defence policy has been designed mostly in line with its Alliance commitments. This was the case during the Cold War, and it continued after the Cold War during the 1990s.³⁴

The connection between Turkey and NATO has improved in such a way that Turkey has become an integral (central) member of European security through NATO. As a staunch member of the North Atlantic Alliance, Turkey has always been an essential and active actor of the European security order. There were indeed reciprocal interests and benefits between Turkey and NATO during the Cold War. While Turkey contributed to European security and defence against the Soviet Union in various ways, the Europeans as well as the United States extended security guarantees to protect Turkey's national and territorial integrity against the Soviets.

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet threat, there were some arguments that as NATO had lost its *raison d'être*, Turkey's role, importance and position for European security would also inevitably come to an end. However, the developments showed

³⁴ Nihat Ali Özcan, "The Changing Threat Perceptions and the Transformation of the Turkish Armed Forces", paper presented to ASAM International Conference on Globalisation, Security and the Nation-State", Sheraton Hotel, Ankara, 15-16 June 2002.

that neither NATO nor Turkey had lost their importance for European security. As mentioned above, NATO adapted itself to the new security environment in the region stretching from the Atlantic to Asia. Concurrently, Turkey's role, importance and position were promoted into the heart of the European security architecture under NATO. As always, Turkey has cherished great allegiance to NATO in the new era, just as NATO appreciated Turkey's contribution to the construction of the security order in Europe. It can be seen that there is a strong concurrence and similarity between the construction of the security architecture under NATO and Turkey's security perspective in the post-Cold War era.

As far as Turkey is concerned, NATO means several things for Turkey's security, defence and foreign policy. Its importance for Turkey can be summed up under the following points: Firstly, NATO has been the backbone of Turkey's security and defence policy since 1952. This was the case during the Cold War and continues in the new era. Situated in a rather unstable and turbulent geopolitical location, Turkey views NATO as an international actor contributing to its stability and security.

Secondly, NATO is the strongest linchpin for Turkey's vocation in the Western world. As the most important, powerful and influential international organisation in the world, NATO provides a political/security identity for Turkey in international politics. NATO is an international platform for Turkey to express its views and interests about international developments in a rather critical region. There, Turkey develops strong relations with European and transatlantic countries, manifests its interests about security issues in Europe and is now able to influence developments in the area from the Atlantic to Central Asia. Therefore, because of its institutional, military and political power, Turkey views NATO as the primary organisation for the region surrounding Turkey. Most importantly, because of NATO's intergovernmental decision-making structure in which each member has a 'veto' power in the North Atlantic Council and other organs, Turkey has a strong voice on issues of European security.

Thirdly, NATO's broadening security framework in the form of a quasi-security community is very much overlapping and in line with Turkey's security, defence and foreign policy. It can be seen that NATO's construction of the new security architecture through the establishment of partnership and dialogue with about 50 countries closely concerns Turkey's security perspective and interests. As can be seen in NATO's Strategic Concept 1999 and in

the Washington Summit Communiqué of 24 April 1999, NATO's security architecture is centred on Turkey's security environment and vice versa.³⁵

Fourthly, NATO provides Turkey with a transatlantic connection. Development of Turkish-American relations has been based partly on Turkey's NATO membership and partly on a bilateral level. It is a clear fact that in the post-Soviet era the US remained the only hegemonic power in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus it was the leading country in the military operations in the Gulf War of 1990-1 and the Bosnian operation, and continues to be there as well as in the Arab-Israeli peace process and now in Afghanistan. As can be seen, Turkey and the United States' security agenda and area overlap in many respects. And in most of these issues Turkey supports the U.S. policy and vice versa.³⁶ Furthermore, Turkey and the US share similar perspectives on the construction of the European security architecture. Both prefer NATO as the main and leading platform for the security arrangements within the security community; both wish that the European Security and Defence Identity/Policy would act as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

Moreover, NATO continues to be an important security guarantee for Article 5 cases for Turkish security, though the possibility of an Article 5 threat is very small in this day and age. In that regard, Turkey's continuing problems with Russia closely concern the NATO Allies as well. In particular, the development of close relations between NATO and Russia finally drew Russia into the security architecture within NATO. This rapprochement has had positive implications on Turkey's security interests, such as the implementation of CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) arms reduction in the Caucasus. Both Turkey and NATO as a whole would like to see Russia withdraw its troops from the region. As stated in Article 36 of NATO's Strategic Concept 1999, "A strong, stable, and enduring relationship between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area".³⁷ Such developments would have positive effects on Turkish security.

From NATO's perspective, Turkey has been a very crucial asset for the organisation during and after the Cold War. As NATO's former secretary-general, Javier Solana, stated, "Turkey, as an active and valued member of the Alliance, has contributed to the shaping of our common security. Its proximity to the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle

³⁵ NATO's Strategic Concept 1999 and The Washington Summit Communiqué, in *NATO Communiqués and Statements 1999* (NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels, 2000).

³⁶ For example, see Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri* (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınevi, 2000); and George S. Harris, "ABD-Türkiye İlişkileri", in Alan Makovsky ve Sabri Sayarı (eds.), *Türkiye'nin Yeni Dünyası: Türk Dış Politikasının Değişen Dinamikleri*, translated by Hür Güldü (İstanbul: Alfa, 2002).

³⁷ Also in the Washington Summit Communiqué, Points 27 and 33, *op.cit.*

East and the Mediterranean puts Turkey in the epicentre of change. ... It is this new role of Turkey that makes this country a major asset in NATO's new co-operative approach to security. As a country with unique historical and cultural links and as a promoter of regional co-operation, Turkey actively contributes to NATO's collective defence as well as to its new missions in crisis management and peace support. And, in contributing significantly to the Alliance's outreach and co-operative activities with non-NATO countries, Turkey has a particular importance in developing the new co-operative security architecture in Europe."³⁸

One of Turkey's major contributions to the construction of the European security architecture and to the development of the security community is to act as a 'mediator' and 'model' for the adoption of the ex-Soviet countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia into the political, cultural, military and economic structure of the Western world. By these means, Turkey's contribution to the construction of the new European security architecture under NATO has taken various forms, including developing diplomatic and political dialogue and co-operation, military training and educational activities, economic and trade co-operation, and social and cultural exchanges with the newly independent Turkic states. Turkey has played a crucial role in guiding the ex-Soviet countries in Central Asia, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean and the Middle East to establish co-operative relations with the Western world.³⁹ Mentioning just a few such projects will illustrate Turkey's active and hard work for the alignment of these countries into the framework of the new security architecture under NATO.

First of all, Turkey has concluded agreements of co-operation on military training and technical and scientific issues as well as within the defence industry with almost 60 countries, including NATO and non-NATO countries in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Southern Mediterranean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Far East and even South America. All of these agreements aimed at military security co-operation with a view towards developing interoperability.⁴⁰ By these agreements, Turkey has been a 'security bridge' between NATO and non-NATO countries.

Moreover, Turkey developed a number of multilateral security projects with countries in the region. The main objective of these projects was to enhance Turkey's foreign security,

³⁸ Javier Solana, "NATO in the Twenty-First Century", *Perceptions*, Vol. IV, No. 1, March-May 1999, p.21.

³⁹ For example, Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to the Western China* (Boulder: Westview Press, RAND Study, 1993); Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey in a Changing Security Environment", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.54, No 1, Fall 2000.

⁴⁰ Turkish Foreign Ministry, "Turkey's Security and Its Relations with NATO", Web page: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>

defence and political relations as well as promote co-operation and dialogue in the region. Turkey's involvement in these projects serves the growth of the security community by developing intimate political, economic, military and institutional transactions. A brief mention of some of them will prove Turkey's high and active contribution.

In the Balkans, Turkey initiated and/or was involved in a number of bilateral and multilateral political, economic, military and social projects such as the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR) in April 2001, the South East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECF) in February 2000, the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) and the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) in September 1999, the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) in 1996 and the Balkan free-trade zone initiative in October 1988. In the Middle East and Central Asia, Turkey pioneered the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in 1992, and allowed the enlargement of the Economic Co-operation Agreement into the Caucasian and Central Asian countries in the 1990s.

In addition to these initiatives and efforts for the promotion of peace, security and stability in the region, Turkey played an active role in international peacekeeping operations (Peace Support Operations) in several crises within the framework of the U.N. and NATO missions: in the U.N. Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (1988-1991), the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (1991-present), Operation Provide Comfort/Northern Watch after the Gulf War of 1990-1991 (1991-present), the U.N. Operation in Somalia (1992-1994), the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia (1993-present), the U.N. Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1993-1995), the Implementation Force and Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996-present), the Combined Police Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), the U.N. Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia (1995-present), the International Police Task Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1997-present), Operation Alba in Albania (1997), the Temporary International Presence in Hebron in Israel-Palestine (1997-present), the Kosovo Verification Force (1998-1999) and the Kosovo Force (2001-present).⁴¹ Currently, the Turkish Armed Forces participates in and leads the ISAF forces deployed for the purpose of Afghanistan's reconstruction after the September 11 tragedy. All these peace support operations in several areas surrounding Turkey prove that the Turkish military forces had an active participation and role in non-Article 5 operations under the mandates of the United

⁴¹ Turkish General Staff, *PIF Training Centre Course Guide 2000 & 2001*, Ankara, Chapter 1. Also, Web page: <http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkurmay/uluslararasi>.

Nations and NATO. They are Turkey's valuable support in peacekeeping, crisis management, search-and-rescue and humanitarian operations in the region.

Moreover, and more to the point concerning Turkey's contribution to the construction of the European security architecture under NATO is Turkey's involvement in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council operations. In light of NATO's PfP initiative, as enshrined in the fifth paragraph of Point 25 of the Washington Summit Communiqué, Turkey established a PfP Training Centre in Ankara on 9 March 1998. Its principle objective is "to provide qualitative education and training support to military and civilian personnel of Partner nations to reach Interoperability Objectives." All courses are open to all partners as well as to allies. PfP and non-PfP-country personnel are trained and educated at the centre for adaptation to NATO's doctrine, principles, tactics, procedures and standards.⁴²

The PfP Training Centre activities comprise military visits, military school, college and academic training and education or field training and education; various short-term courses on a number of topics for interoperability; job training at units, headquarters and institutions; unit/personnel exchange; co-operation in the field of military history, archives and museology; and joint exercises and sending observers to exercises.⁴³

Since its establishment the Centre has hosted 1,200 participants from 14 NATO, 21 Partner and 2 Mediterranean Dialogue countries,⁴⁴ most of whom were educated and trained in different places around Turkey. The courses/lectures were given by Turkish personnel with NATO and PSO experience as well as by experts and speakers from NATO and the PfP and other national and international institutions. Thus, there has emerged a small miniature of the new security community in which military, academic, technical and political personnel have close communication and exchanges leading to nurturing common understanding and values, just like in the EAPC and PfP meetings at the ministerial level within the NATO framework. Indeed, it is important to mention that "in every course, importance is paid to social-cultural activities to help 'to bridge the cross-cultural differences'."⁴⁵ Also, Turkey and PfP countries hold joint military operations every year. For instance, from 1995 to 1999 Turkey and the PfP countries held a number of joint military exercises in different countries such as Bulgaria,

⁴² Ibid., p.1-19, 22.

⁴³ Ibid. p.1-18.

⁴⁴ Turkish Foreign Ministry, "Turkey's Security and Its Relations with NATO," *op.cit.*

⁴⁵ Turkish General Staff, *PfP Training Centre Course Guide 2000&2001*, *op.cit.*, p. 1-26.

Romania, Italy, Albania, the Republic of Macedonia, the United States, Slovakia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Canada, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Slovenia.⁴⁶

In addition, Turkey has placed great importance on NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue.⁴⁷ Being a Mediterranean country and part of the Mediterranean Dialogue, Turkey believes that the Mediterranean dimension is one of the security components of the European security architecture. In that respect, Turkey developed good and friendly relations with the Dialogue countries, signing various technical co-operation agreements in the military field, assuming the task of Contact Point Embassy in Jordan for the period of 2001-2002, and training and educating officers from Dialogue countries at the PfP Training Centre in Ankara.⁴⁸ Indeed, Turkey participates in the formation of NATO's decision-making processes regarding Mediterranean security. This is a great advantage and power for Turkish interests in the Mediterranean, unlike Turkey's sidelined position within the EU's European Mediterranean Policy.⁴⁹

To sum up, Turkey and NATO members have been closely interdependent on each other in the construction of the new security architecture in a broader Europe. On the one hand, Turkey has further elevated its international position and increased its advantages by using its membership power in NATO's decision-making, strategy and operations. On the other hand, NATO has further increased its influence over the broader security environment in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Caucasus and Central Asia by using Turkey's strong geopolitical, historical, socio-cultural, economic and even military influence over the region.

If NATO were the only organisation for constructing the security architecture in Europe, Turkey's position would have been clear-cut and definite, not 'delicate.' But, as we have already stated above, the EU's quest for building up a security and defence community in Europe closely concerns Turkey due to its important implications for Turkey's position in Europe. It makes Turkey's position delicate due to Turkey's asymmetrically multiplexed connections with the European security architecture. The following section will look at 'the midway' positions of Turkey's security relations with the new security architecture in Europe.

3.2. Turkey and the EU/WEU: The Midway Positions

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.1-19.

⁴⁷ For NATO's Mediterranean Initiative, see Ian O. Lesser *et al.*, *The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative* (Washington D.C.: Rand, 2000); and Ian O. Lesser, *NATO Looks South: New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean* (Washington D.C.: Rand, 2000).

⁴⁸ Turkish Foreign Ministry, "Turkey's Security and Its Relations with NATO," *op.cit.*

⁴⁹ M. Fatih Tayfur, "Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean", *Perceptions*, Vol.V, No.3, September-November 2000, p.138-143.

Turkey pays close attention to developments in the European security order that are taking place within the framework of the EU. Turkey's security perspective regarding the EU is made up of two dimensions: The first one is Turkey's wish to have full integration with the EU's economic, political, institutional and legal structures, thus becoming a full member of the EU's amalgamated security community, and, like the Central and Eastern European countries, being a member of the European family-order in which democracy, market economy, human rights and freedoms, civil society and pluralism are prevalent.

The second dimension is Turkey's wish to have full integration with the developing security, defence and foreign policy structure of the EU. Indeed, as we stated above, Turkey is already an integral part of European security through NATO, where Turkey shares the security and defence perspective of the other European countries, members and non-members of the EU. However, since the EU countries have initiated development of a European security and defence policy as a European wing of the Atlantic Alliance and as a pillar of EU integration, not surprisingly Turkey wants to join such a formation at a respectable and convenient level and degree. This is a target for Turkey in order to match its associated partnership status in the first and third pillars of the EU with a similar status in the second pillar. In other words, Turkey wants to be part of this aspect of the European Union, too. Just like its objective to be part of the EU's economic, legal and political structures by fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey wants to be part of the EU's security and defence initiative/policy. Just as Turkey has a 'customs union' in the economic and trade fields with the EU, Turkey wants to establish, so to speak, a 'security and defence union' in security and defence policy, but with a better deal than that in the customs union, where Turkey has no role or participation in the decision-making mechanisms.

3.2.1. Security Dimension of Turkey's Membership in the European Union

Like NATO, the European Union has also been adapting its internal and external system to the new security environment since the end of the Cold War. Its admission of Finland, Austria and Sweden in 1995 enlarged the European security community in terms of the 'soft security' approach, contributing to the growth of the security architecture in Europe. The EU's more important and substantial contribution to the development of European security came through its developing relations with the ex-Soviet Bloc countries in Eastern and Central Europe and its policy of admitting 13 Central, Eastern and Southeast European countries as candidates for full membership into the EU structure. It is expected that 10 of them will have been full members by May 2004.

In the light of the EU's guidance and encouragement, a number of radical and impressive reforms were implemented by most of these countries in line with the Copenhagen criteria of 1992. All these reforms resulted in the development of democracy, market economy, human rights, pluralism, the rule of law and freedom of thought and expression in those European countries. In the end, all these contributed to the development of peace, stability and security, not only in those countries but also in and around Europe as a whole.

Turkey's full integration into the European Union and adherence to the values of the Copenhagen criteria would also contribute to Turkey's development in the sense of soft security. Just as the Copenhagen criteria contributed to the development of security conditions in Central and Eastern European countries, increasing their political, economic and social standards to the level of EU countries, Turkey also aims to become an integral member of the EU's security community. These are the values at the heart of the European Union that are aimed at by NATO as well.⁵⁰ So, Turkey's drive for full membership is motivated not only by the goal of entering the EU as an organisation, but also by the desire to improve Turkey's economic and political security in general. Thus Turkey's integration into the EU should be regarded as one of Turkey's security and strategic choices.⁵¹ As Ambassador Alptuna stated, "Since the beginning, membership in the EU has been a strategic objective of Turkish foreign policy and must be seen as an integral part of Turkey's modernisation process..."⁵² If security means 'feeling safe and secure in every aspect of life,' Turkey's security can be improved by its accession to the EU thanks to the following advantages:

* Psychological/Identity:⁵³ Feeling and living in a developed European-Western world. If and when the Turkish people improve their condition in the way the EU countries have achieved, it will elevate the Turkish people's feelings and identity from the category of underdeveloped country to that of a developed society.

* Political: Democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedoms, civil society and pluralism are the values by which the Turkish people will improve their political condition and solve their problems more quickly and more satisfactorily.

⁵⁰ NATO is determined to "contribute to building a stronger and broader Euro-Atlantic community of democracies - a community where human rights and fundamental freedoms are upheld, where borders are increasingly open to people, ideas and commerce; where war becomes unthinkable." The Washington Declaration 1999, Paragraph 3, in *NATO Handbook, Documentation*, op.cit.

⁵¹ Ali Bulaç, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: Feza Gazetecilik, 2001), p.34, 39-40.

⁵² Akın Alptuna (Ambassador, Deputy Under-Secretary, the Turkish Foreign Ministry), "Turkey's European Perspective", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.3, No.2, April-June 2001, p.65.

⁵³ For a study of Turkey's search for identity in the European Union, see Şaban H. Çalış, *Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri: Kimlik Arayışı, Politik Aktörler ve Değişim* (Ankara: Nobel, 2001).

* Economic: Once the items mentioned in the EU's Maastricht criteria such as low-level inflation, controlled budget deficits, state spending and so on are achieved, Turkey's level of economic development and prosperity will be increased to EU standards.

* Military-Strategic: When Turkey and the EU countries come within the framework of the same security community, old enmities and disputes will be more easily eliminated. In the likelihood of emerging problems, for example, between Turkey and Greece, they will have to use peaceful means and dialogue to solve these problems.

* Foreign Policy: Turkey will become an island of peace, security and stability in the midst of its bordering regions and will feel more secure from the problems surrounding it.

As a partner of the EU since 1964 and having entered a customs union in 1996, Turkey is getting closer to the European Union. At the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey was declared one of the 13 candidate-countries for full membership in the European Union. After that, Turkey and the EU took important steps in Turkey's preparation for full membership: In reply to the EU's demands in the Accession Partnership Document of December 2000 to enact reforms in several areas, Turkey presented its National Program in 2001, in which Turkey agreed to implement several reforms in order to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria.

Since then, Turkey has taken important steps in economic, political and legal areas in light of its National Program. Although there is still more time for Turkey to complete these reforms, it is believed that with the realisation of Turkey's full membership in the EU "...there will be closer co-operation in the field of foreign and security policy. Along with other candidate countries, Turkey has already begun the process of integration into the consultation mechanisms established to enable its policies to align with those of the EU as far as possible. In this instance, Turkey has participated in more than 80 percent of EU statements on political issues since Helsinki."⁵⁴ Thus Helsinki marks a qualitative new beginning and a process of mutual strategic transformation for both Turkey and the EU.

Yet, as we will see below, the Helsinki Summit also started an awkward process in the field of security and defence policy regarding Turkey and five other non-EU European NATO Allies. Turkey's connection with the ESDI under the WEU was halted. So before analysing this process, Turkey's security and defence relations with the WEU will be looked at.

3.2.2. Turkey and the Western European Union

Turkey participated in the construction of the EU's security and defence identity within the framework of the WEU as the second pillar of EU integration as stated in the Maastricht

⁵⁴ Alptuna, *op.cit.* p.72.

Treaty. Just like its application for accession to the EU, it applied for full membership in the WEU in 1991. But, just like the response given to Turkey's application for full membership in the EU, Turkey was offered an 'associate membership,' a position parallel to its EU membership level. The EU decided that full membership in the WEU would be contingent upon full membership in the EU.

When Turkey, along with Norway and Iceland, became an 'associate member' of the WEU on 20 November 1992 (becoming effective in 1995),⁵⁵ a parallel position was instituted for Turkey's memberships in the EU and in the WEU.⁵⁶ However, that was also an inevitable outcome of Turkey's 'integral' position in NATO: As the WEU was to act as the European pillar of NATO in order to implement Petersberg tasks and develop the ESDI, the non-EU European NATO countries were given 'associate member status' within the WEU mechanism. Though not a perfect and fully desirable position for Turkey,⁵⁷ it provided a respectable connection for Turkey in the development of the ESDI by the WEU within NATO.

The WEU associate membership provided Turkey with a place and some institutional rights in the WEU's decision-making processes as well as in the WEU's non-Article 5 operations. Turkey's status in the WEU system granted Turkey the right to become closely involved in the European security architecture. Most importantly, Turkey had the right to participate in the meetings of the WEU Council and its working groups and subsidiary bodies under certain conditions. During meetings, Turkey also had the right to speak and submit proposals, but not the right to block a decision that was the subject of consensus among the full member states; however, Turkey could adhere to such decisions later if it wanted. Furthermore, Turkey was associated with the WEU Planning Cell through special arrangements and could nominate officers to the Cell. Moreover, Turkey could take part on the same basis as full members in WEU operations (as well as in exercises and planning) to which it committed forces. Turkey could also nominate Forces Answerable to the WEU (FAWEU) on the same basis. Therefore, by virtue of its NATO membership, it had a say in WEU operations, and it was directly involved in the planning and preparation of WEU operations in which NATO assets and capabilities were to be used within the framework of

⁵⁵ Turkish Foreign Ministry, "Document on Associate Membership of WEU of the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway, and the Republic of Turkey," Web page: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/afweu.html>.

⁵⁶ For a brief history of the emergence of the WEU and Turkey's membership story, see Aybet, *op.cit.*, Part Four.

⁵⁷ Hüseyin Bağcı, "Turkey and the European security and defence identity- a Turkish view," in *Studien und Berichte Zur Sicherheitspolitik*, GASP, 3 Oktober 2000, p. 3-5. For more about the disadvantages of the associate membership status, see Turkish Foreign Ministry, "Document on Associate Membership of WEU of the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway, and the Republic of Turkey," *op.cit.*

the CJTF. This was an aspect of NATO-WEU co-operation and the joint efforts for strengthening NATO's European pillar and the ESDI within NATO.⁵⁸

All these were very important for Turkey because they ensured that Turkey's security interests were taken into account. The decisions reflecting the above-mentioned arrangements were well balanced and took into account the concerns of NATO members who were not members of the EU.⁵⁹ Indeed, Turkey actively participated in the work of this organisation and contributed to its efforts aimed at establishing a system wherein Europeans could undertake Petersberg-type conflict prevention and crisis management operations.

There were several reasons for Turkey's interest and willingness to be part of the WEU and to be involved in the ESDI. First of all, Turkey was already part of the European security order by means of its NATO membership. As most EU countries are also members of NATO, sharing the same platforms, policies etc., it is inevitable that Turkey and these EU countries will have common security concerns in the European landscape. Secondly, Turkey, as a candidate for accession to the EU 'family,' possesses the same values as the European countries: Turkey as well as the EU countries agree that there should be peace rather than war; that states should have modern regimes; and that differences should be resolved by peaceful means and not by resorting to war. Thirdly, Turkey and the EU countries share the same geography, i.e. the Balkans, Southeast Europe, the Mediterranean, and even the Middle East and the Caucasus. As stated above, any crisis or war in this geography concerns both Turkey and the EU. Fourthly, Turkey tried to improve its position in this field by being a member of the WEU. Fifth, the WEU, by making Turkey an associate member and not giving security guarantees and defence commitments for disputes between member states of the WEU and NATO, tried to strike a balance between Turkey and Greece.⁶⁰ Thus, as stated in the Document on Associate Membership, the WEU took into consideration the interests of the associate members. Indeed, Greece tried to block Turkey's full participation in WEU decision-making when the WEU wanted an operation using NATO's operational assets to which the associate members would be contributing. The Greek block was removed by the French government's compromise proposal in April 1997, making the associate members part of the WEU's decision-making process.⁶¹ Finally, Turkey saw the WEU as an essential

⁵⁸ Münevver Cebeci, *A Delicate Process of Participation: The Question of Participation of WEU Associate Members in Decision-Making for EU-led Petersberg Operations, with Special Reference to Turkey*, Occasional Papers, Western European Union, Brussels, 1999, p.3-4.

⁵⁹ Onur Öymen, "Turkey and its role in European Security and Defence", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.3, No.1, January-March 2001, p.53-54.

⁶⁰ Cebeci, *op.cit.* p.5; Aybet, *op.cit.*, p.48.

⁶¹ Cebeci, *op.cit.*, p.6-8.

dimension of NATO's broader security architecture. Thus Turkey's membership in the WEU was part of its general security perception in NATO.

An important NATO document that details Turkey's position as well as the relationships between NATO and the WEU on ESDI is the Washington Summit document of 1999. The Allies meeting in Washington to celebrate the 50th anniversary of NATO reached a historic agreement/consensus on the evolution of the security and defence mechanisms in NATO. Some points of this agreement/consensus were very important in showing Turkey's position within the European security and defence system. Moreover, the Washington agreement/consensus laid down some important bases of the security community.

However, an awkward process has recently developed in Turkish-EU relations in the 'military-defence aspect' of security since the St. Malo accord and the ensuing developments: That is, Turkey's associate membership position in the WEU, though not perfectly satisfactory, was ended as a result of the EU's decision to terminate the WEU's role in the ESDI and the ensuing development of the ESDP since then. This development has the potential of marginalising Turkey's position in the European security system in an institutional sense, and, probably, in substance in the future. So the following section will focus on the process of Turkey's marginalisation from the institutional dimension of the European security architecture.

3.3. Turkey and the ESDP: The Marginal Position

Turkey's position in the European security architecture became troublesome when Turkey was placed at the margin of the ESDP in the wake of two important developments along with their legal documents in 1999: The first one was the Washington Summit and its legal documents of April 1999, which, as will be later analysed in detail, is actually a milestone not only for the Atlantic Alliance as a whole and the European security architecture, but also for Turkey's (and other non-EU European NATO Allies') position in the ESDP. The second development was the Helsinki Summit and its legal documents of December 1999, which started a new process not only for the European Union but also for Turkey's candidacy process. At the Helsinki Summit, the EU Council accepted Turkey as one of 13 candidate countries for the EU, thus restoring Turkish-EU relations, which had been worsening since the 1997 Luxembourg Summit where Turkey had almost been taken off the list of the next EU enlargement. The Helsinki Summit was a big step forward in Turkey's integration into the first and third pillars because it confirmed Turkey's integration process in the political, economic and legal fields in line with the Copenhagen criteria. As stated above, these had

positive security implications for Turkey and the EU. However, in a rather paradoxical way, in the very same Helsinki Document, Turkey was interestingly distanced from the second pillar of the EU, the ESDP. Turkey's associate membership in the WEU, which had been underlined at the Washington Summit, became surprisingly worse than before, leading to increasing disagreements and tensions between Turkey and the EU on security and defence issues.

After these two events, in a sequence of steps taken by the EU in the field of ESDP, Turkey's standing within the European security architecture moved from 'the midway' to 'the margin,' going from 'bad' to 'worse' due to the termination of Turkey's participation in the WEU decision-making mechanism and of its exclusion from the ESDP's decision-making process.⁶² So in the period from the end of the Washington Summit up until now, Turkey-EU relations have experienced rather strange ups and downs as a result of the development of the ESDP. While the ESDP process spilled over negatively into the economic/legal/political integration efforts, Turkey-EU integration relations gave a picture of contrasts: rapprochement on the one hand and alienation on the other, or aligning with, while distancing from, the EU. Thus we can argue that an awkward process has developed in two dimensions: The first one is within the institutional dimension, i.e. Turkey's exclusion from the institutionalisation of the ESDP; and the second one is on the substance of political-security relations, i.e. tensions in Turkish-EU relations in general. The two-dimensional process created some complications in Turkey's domestic politics, foreign policy and in NATO-EU dialogue and co-operation, which will be analysed later.

In order to see the development of Turkey's position in the second pillar, a brief summary of the development and structure of the ESDP is given below.

3.3.1. Development of the ESDP

The EU Council declarations in Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki (December 1999), Feira (June 2000), Nice (December 2000) and Laeken (December 2001) took important steps to develop the ESDP. All these decisions paved the way for an autonomous European Army, along with institutional arrangements and mechanisms. With that, the EU aims to complete its three-pillar integration. They are 'First Pillar: European Communities/Economic and

⁶² For brief look at this process see Bağcı, "Turkey and the European Security and Defence Policy", *op.cit.*, p.9-14; and Bağcı, "Türkiye-AGSP: Beklentiler, Endişeler", *op.cit.*

Monetary,’ ‘Second Pillar: Common Foreign and Security Policy’ and ‘Third Pillar: Justice and Home Affairs.’⁶³

As a result of these developments, the ESDI has changed its characteristics from being an ‘Identity’ within the WEU to a ‘Policy’ within the EU. This was mainly due to the fact that Article 5 of the EU Cologne Declaration urged the taking of a “new step in the construction of the European Union” towards a Common European Policy on Security and Defence, also named the “European Security and Defence Policy.” But that ‘Policy’ was of course to be based on the European ‘Identity’ in terms of politics and security.

The EU declared that the ESDP was to be functional only for Petersberg tasks, i.e. non-Article 5 tasks of NATO and the Brussels Treaty. To fulfil these kinds of operations, it started to build up a new institutional, political, and military structure, leading to some problems in the existing mechanisms concerning NATO, the WEU and the EU. In other words, the EU’s start of a new institutional, political and military process for the construction of the ESDP had implications for those countries that were not members of the EU, the so-called non-EU European NATO Allies (Turkey, Norway, Iceland, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary), particularly for Turkey, for NATO’s position *vis-à-vis* the European security architecture (in the view of the Washington Summit Document) and finally for the construction and development of the security architecture under NATO in general. All these developments can be categorised into three groups: First, the decision-making mechanism; second, military capabilities and operations as well as non-civilian military crisis management; and third, modalities to include the non-EU European NATO Allies and the modalities to establish transparent dialogue and co-operation between the EU and NATO.

3.3.1.1. ESDP Decision-Making Mechanism⁶⁴

As far as the decision-making mechanism and process is concerned, the EU, having merged the WEU into its ‘Second Pillar,’ terminated the WEU’s role in the European Security and Defence Identity. The WEU’s decision-making mechanism concerning the ESDI was put aside. Instead, the EU Council was designated as the supreme organ to take decisions to implement the ESDP for Petersberg tasks. As stated in the EU’s Cologne Summit on 4 June 1999, “The Council of the European Union will be able to take decisions on the whole range of political, economic, and military instruments at its disposal when responding to crisis

⁶³ For example, Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, *The ABC of Community Law* (Brussels: European Commission Directorate-General for Education and Culture, 2000).

⁶⁴ All information in this part regarding the arrangements about decision-making was received from the EU Council Documents in the Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, Nice and Laeken Summits.

situations ... and have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the Petersberg tasks.”⁶⁵

With this decision at the Cologne Summit to merge the WEU with the EU, not only did Turkey *de facto* lose its WEU associate membership, but also the NATO-WEU co-operation and dialogue as stated in the Washington Summit became void. With this absorption, the EU took over WEU functions and started to set up a new organisational framework in order to develop the ESDP.

With this resolve to have an autonomous decision-making structure⁶⁶ at the Helsinki Summit, the EU offered, as a consolation prize, “the necessary dialogue, consultation, and co-operation” with NATO and its non-EU members, other countries that were candidates for accession to the EU as well as other prospective partners in EU-led crisis management. Thus the EU’s decision-making was limited to the EU’s full members only, while all others, irrespective of their importance, acquisitions and connections with the European security architecture, were put at the margin of the ESDP decision-making mechanism. Meanwhile, the non-EU countries were categorised into three groups: non-EU European NATO members; candidate countries waiting for full membership in the EU; and those countries that were related to the European security architecture such as the non-EU PfP countries. In other words, the ESDP decision-making mechanism created a structure that put EU members at the centre and the others at the margin, the latter serving only as a “contributors” to the ESDP. Most importantly, the EU emphasised that those at the margin should have “full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and the single institutional framework of the Union.”⁶⁷

The marginal countries were connected to the ESDP with a “consultative function.” During the Feira Summit, the EU defined “a single, inclusive structure in which all the 15 countries concerned (six non-EU European NATO members and 13 candidates for accession to the EU)⁶⁸ can enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation and co-operation with the EU.” At the Nice Summit, the EU set up “permanent consultation arrangements” designed in

⁶⁵ Cologne European Council, *The European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence*, 3-4 June 1999.

⁶⁶ The ESDP’s decision-making organs are the General Affairs Council, the Political and Security Committee in Brussels, the Military Committee, and the Military Staff, all coming under the EU Council.

⁶⁷ Helsinki European Council, *Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence*” and on “*Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union*”, 10-11 December 1999.

⁶⁸ The 15 countries are non-EU European NATO members (Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic) and the candidate countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic*, Estonia, Hungary*, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland*, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Turkey*). “*” refers to the duplicate countries.

consideration of “non-crisis periods” and “crisis periods.” Thus, the 15 countries will have varying positions within the EU decision-making process.

During non-crisis periods, the consultation on ESDP matters will be held at “a minimum of two meetings in the EU+15 format during each Presidency,” and also “a minimum of two meetings in EU+6 format” with six non-EU European NATO members. Furthermore, one ministerial meeting will be held with all of the 15 and the six together. Similar consultation arrangements were conceived at the Military Committee level as well as exchanges at the military expert level. Those countries wishing to be involved in EU military activities may appoint an officer accredited to the EU Military Staff (EUMS) who will serve as a contact. A minimum of two information meetings will be held during each Presidency for these officers from the 15 and the six countries, which could, for example, address the question of how the follow-up of crisis situations should be handled. But depending on the requirements, extra meetings may be organised for each case. But all of these meetings are seen as “consultations” and as a “supplement for those meetings held as part of CFSP enhanced political dialogue.” The only credit for the non-EU countries is their right “to submit proposals” during the meetings, but with no guarantee of consideration.

During periods of crisis, which are divided into “pre-operational phase” and “operational phase,” the same pattern was maintained more or less, with some exceptions. In the pre-operational phase, as agreed at Helsinki and Feira, “in the event of a crisis, dialogue and consultation will be intensified at all levels, including ministerial level, in the period leading up to the EU Council decision.” When a crisis develops, these intensified consultations will provide an opportunity for exchange of views on situation assessment and discussion of the concerns raised by the countries affected, particularly when they consider their security interests to be involved. When the possibility of an EU-led military crisis management operation is under consideration, the aim of these consultations, which could be held at the politico-military expert level, will be to ensure that the countries potentially contributing to such an operation are informed of the EU’s intentions, particularly with regard to the military options being envisaged. In this respect, once the EU begins to examine in depth an option requiring the use of NATO assets and capabilities, particular attention will be paid to consultation of the six non-EU European NATO members.

In the operational phase, *once the EU Council has chosen the strategic military option(s)*, the operational planning work will be presented to the non-EU European NATO members and the other candidate countries that have expressed their intention in principle of taking part in the operation to enable them to determine the nature and volume of the

contribution they could make to an EU-led operation. Once the Council has approved the operation concept, having taken into consideration the outcome of the consultation with third countries likely to take part in the operation, these countries will be formally invited to take part in the operation according to the arrangements agreed to in Helsinki. That means that the non-EU European NATO members will participate, if they wish so, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. Where the EU does not use NATO assets, they will, upon a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations.

Thus, the involvement in the operations of the non-EU European NATO members depends first on the EU's use of NATO assets and second on an invitation by the EU Council. In operations requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, operational planning will be carried out by the Alliance's planning bodies, and the non-EU European Allies will be involved in planning according to the procedures laid down within NATO. In autonomous EU operations, operational planning will be carried out within one of the European strategic-level headquarters. In autonomous operations in which they are invited to take part, the candidate countries and non-EU European Allies may send liaison officers to the European Military Staff bodies at the strategic level for exchanges of information on operational planning and the contributions envisaged. The states concerned will provide the EU with an initial indication of their contribution, which will then be further specified during exchanges with the Operation Commander assisted by the EUMS.

The Committee of Contributors is composed of all the contributing countries. It will play a key role in the day-to-day management of the operation. It will be the main forum for discussing all problems relating to the day-to-day management of the operation. The deliberations of the Committee of Contributors will constitute a positive contribution to those of the PSC. The PSC, which exercises the political control and strategic direction of the operation, will take account of the views expressed by the Committee of Contributors. All of the EU member states are entitled to be present at the committee's discussions irrespective of whether or not they are taking part in the operation, but only contributing states will take part in the day-to-day management of the operation. Non-EU European NATO Allies and candidate countries deploying significant military forces under an EU-led operation will have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation as EU member states taking part in the operation. The work of the Committee of Contributors will be conducted without prejudice to consultations within the framework of the single structure including non-EU European NATO members and EU candidate countries.

To sum up, while the EU created “an autonomous decision-making structure for the ESDP,” the non-EU countries were put at the margin where they are entitled only to become involved as “consultant” countries, and whether or not their views, interests, and participation are taken into consideration depends on the decision of the EU decision-making institutions. In some cases it might be expected that because of the intergovernmental nature of the EU’s decision-making regarding the ESDP pillar, the participation of non-EU countries even in the consultation process will be contingent upon a unanimous vote in the EU Council. This may be a problem and concern for non-EU European NATO members in such operations where the EU does not use NATO assets and capabilities. As will be shown below, this is one of the points that causes Turkey concern regarding the ESDP process.

3.3.1.2. ESDP’s Military-Operational Capabilities

The Cologne Summit stated that the EU Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the ‘Petersberg tasks.’ To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.

In order to strengthen its military capability, the EU chose two ways: one by the member states’ efforts to improve their military capability; and the other by using NATO assets and capabilities in their Petersberg-task operations. As regards military capabilities, member states need to develop further forces (including headquarters) that are also suitable for crisis management operations without any unnecessary duplication. The main characteristics include deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility and mobility.

In this respect, the member states have set themselves the Headline Goal from the Helsinki Summit: By the year 2003, co-operating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements.

However, despite the member states’ efforts, the EU will need NATO resources for the following reasons. Firstly, most of the EU members’ assets and capabilities are assigned to NATO; therefore, their assets and capabilities have to be “double-hatted.” Secondly,

construction of similar military capabilities creates duplication; therefore, the duplication of military forces has to be prevented in order to save money and time. Thirdly, in any case it would take a long time, would be very costly and would be difficult for the EU countries to achieve. Therefore, the EU will have to use NATO assets and capabilities for its autonomous EU-led Petersberg-type operations.

The Cologne European Council Declaration put forward two alternative ways with which the EU could implement Petersberg tasks: First, EU-led operations with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities in accordance with the Berlin decisions of 1996; second, EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.⁶⁹ While in the first alternative the decisions regarding the operations have to be made through the involvement of the NATO members in the North Atlantic Council, in the second alternative, as there would be no recourse to NATO assets, the decision to start, conduct and end an EU-led operation would be made by the EU Council. That meant that the EU could undertake autonomous operations without the participation of the NATO members.

In the EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, the EU could use national or multinational European means pre-identified by member states. This would require either the use of national command structures providing multinational representation in headquarters or drawing on existing command structures within multinational forces. Further arrangements to enhance the capacity of European multinational and national forces to respond to crises situations will be needed.

In EU-led operations having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, including European command arrangements, the main focus should be on the following aspects: Implementation of the arrangements based on the Berlin decisions of 1996 and the Washington Summit decisions of 1999. In those decisions, NATO had extended its support to EU-led operations under certain conditions as stated above.

3.3.1.3. The EU-NATO Co-operation

As the EU countries terminated the role of the WEU and the possibility of the previously decided NATO-WEU co-operation, the EU asked NATO to develop a co-operation between the two organisations and to replace the NATO-WEU co-operation mechanisms. In this respect, the EU approached NATO in order to benefit from the Alliance's assets and capabilities as well as from its force planning expertise at the military/technical level for the materialisation of the EU's Headline Goal. In addition, four ad hoc working

⁶⁹ Cologne European Council, *op.cit.*; and Aybet, *op.cit.* p.53.

groups were developed with the participation of representative of member states of both organisations.

The main issue at those joint gatherings was to make the necessary arrangements for the materialisation of the ESDP, for the modalities of EU access to NATO's assets and capabilities adopted at the Feira and Nice summits. During the Nice Summit, the EU Council requested "permanent arrangements" from NATO in light of EU-NATO consultation and co-operation on the implementation of Paragraph 10 of the Washington Summit Communiqué in 1999.⁷⁰ The Nice Summit stated: "On the basis of decisions adopted by the Alliance at the Washington Summit on 24 April 1999, the European Union suggests that the arrangements between the two organisations for the implementation of Berlin Plus should be as follows [in headlines]:

1. The European Union will have guaranteed permanent access⁷¹ to NATO's planning capabilities...
2. Presumption of availability of pre-identified assets and capabilities...
3. Identification of a series of command options made available to the EU..."⁷²

Right after the Nice Summit where the aforementioned regulations were made, the EU Council informed the North Atlantic Council of its Nice decisions and in December 2000 demanded the above three points for the realisation of the ESDP. The issue was then deliberated in the North Atlantic Council meetings from December 2000 onwards and in the joint meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the EU's Political and Security Committee from February 2001 onwards in Brussels.

These institutional developments aside, the main issue was the position of the non-EU European NATO Allies in NATO-EU co-operation. Although the EU demanded "full respect to its autonomous organisation as different from NATO," it was seeking "military assistance" from NATO. In other words, the non-EU European NATO Allies were asked for "military participation and contribution to the EU-led operations" but denied "political participation and contribution to the decision-making side of the EU-led operations." That was a rather unjust approach to them.

⁷⁰ Nice European Council, *Presidency Conclusions on European Security and Defence Policy*, Appendix To Annex VII To Annex VI, Annex To The Permanent Arrangements On EU/NATO Consultation And Co-operation On The Implementation of Paragraph 10 of The Washington Summit Communiqué, 7,8,9 December 2000.

⁷¹ In the Cologne European Council Declaration it was worded as "assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations", *The European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence*, 3-4 June 1999.

⁷² Nice European Council, *Presidency Conclusions on European Security and Defence Policy*, Appendix To Annex VII To Annex VI, *op.cit.*

That is why the way that the EU constructed its institutional structure regarding the decision-making process and military capabilities in order to plan and implement the Petersberg tasks in view of its ESDP was opposed by those countries whose position in the ESDP and in the implementation of the Petersberg tasks had been marginalised. Most of the non-EU European NATO members that had been part of the WEU were to be influenced negatively by these developments. But, of these countries, Turkey is the most affected for two reasons: 1) Unlike Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, Turkey is unlikely to become a member of the EU in the near future. Thus unlike them Turkey is unable to participate fully in the aforementioned decision-making process of the ESDP under these circumstances. On the other hand, given that Turkey is already an associate member of the EU, why should Turkey be put fully out of the second pillar of European integration? 2) In contrast to Norway and Iceland, Turkey plays a very important role in the heart of a very unstable region in support of Western interests as well.

3.3.2. Turkey's Policy Towards the ESDP

In general, Turkey gave a 'positive' response to the EU's attempts to have a security and defence identity. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, "If the European nations require arrangements in security and defence matters, it is a choice that Turkey would only respect."⁷³ "Turkey, as a European member of NATO, believes that Europeans should shoulder their responsibility better in the Alliance for the security of the continent. Thus, Turkey from the outset has supported the ESDI developing within the Alliance through the WEU."⁷⁴ And "Turkey, as a candidate for EU membership, has also supported this organisation's ambitions and indeed historical goal of acquiring a security and defence dimension through its ESDP."⁷⁵ As a manifestation of this support Turkey has informed the EU of its readiness to participate and extend military forces in the realisation of the Headline

⁷³ Turkish Foreign Ministry, "European Security and Turkey", Web: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.html>, point B-1.

⁷⁴ Turkish Foreign Ministry, "Turkey's Security and Its Relations with NATO," Web: <http://mfa.gov.tr>. Also, Uğur Ziyal, Turkish Ambassador, Under-Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey and European Security", speech made at EU-NATO Co-operation and the Participation of Third Countries in the ESDP, Venusberg Group Autumn Session, Ankara, 27-28 November 2001.

⁷⁵ Turkish Foreign Ministry, *ibid*; Ziyal, *ibid*.

Goal. Turkey pledged 6,000 troops, supported by necessary air and maritime support. This contribution made Turkey the fifth largest contributor to the Headline Goal.⁷⁶

As Ambassador Öymen argued, Turkey's policy or approach towards the ESDI is based on four points: protecting Turkey's national interests (national); respecting and honouring the legal documents in principle, i.e. the documents adopted by NATO in the 1990s but in particular the Washington Summit documents (principle); preserving NATO's position and integrity in the European security architecture (institutional); and strengthening European security (substantial).⁷⁷

In other words, Turkey believes that the ESDP should take into consideration the following points: Firstly, Turkey's integral position in the European security architecture as well as Turkey's national security, defence and foreign policy concerns should not be harmed in any way. Here the most important issues are the so-called 'participation issue,' Turkey's multidimensional security problems and Turkey's relations with Greece. Secondly, it should take into consideration the future of NATO and its important role in the construction of the European security architecture and its *acquis*. Thirdly, it should ensure that the European security architecture is constructed "whole and free." In light of these preferences, Turkey's perspective of the ESDP is based on some reservations.

NATO First: As a staunch and dedicated member of NATO, Turkey believes that NATO's role, effectiveness, coherence and solidarity should never be put at risk by the EU or any other institution, and that NATO should remain the effective alliance for European security with a transatlantic connection. Indeed, the indivisibility of the security of the Euro-Atlantic area still calls for a strong transatlantic link. "[The] leading role of NATO as a core organisation in Euro-Atlantic security should be preserved. In any emerging crisis situation NATO has to have a determining and prominent role."⁷⁸

In the words of Ambassador Öymen, NATO "will continue to be the primary organisation of Europe and the wider Euro-Atlantic area. In the event of a future crisis on our continent, NATO should always be the first option. That is to say, the EU can intervene and take leadership of a peacekeeping operation in Europe only when NATO chooses not to do

⁷⁶ Turkish National Defence Ministry, "Turkey's viewpoints on NATO, the Western European Union and the European Security and Defence Identity," Web: <http://www.msb.gov.tr/genpp/white/p2c1.pdf>, and Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Crucial ESDP talks to start in Ankara today", *Turkish Daily News*, 25 October 2001.

⁷⁷ Öymen, *op.cit.*, 2001, p.57.

⁷⁸ Öymen, *op.cit.*, 2001.p-57.

so.”⁷⁹ This is not a surprising view because Turkey, as an integral member of NATO, wishes it to maintain its influence and activities.

Nevertheless, Turkey is concerned that the way the ESDP is being constructed, especially as regards the arrangements concerning the position of the non-EU European NATO members within the ESDP, has the potential to put aside the guiding principle of ‘inclusiveness’ that existed in the construction of the security architecture within NATO.

Turkey is concerned that if the EU’s autonomous decision-making mechanisms and operations create a division leading to a decline in NATO’s role in the region, this would bring not only the demise of NATO but also of Turkey’s position in the region. As stated above, because NATO membership provides several advantages for Turkish foreign and security policy, NATO’s declining position would create a kind of uncertainty and vacuum for the Turkish security perspective. Given that Turkey is not a full member of the EU and not an actor within the ESDP, Turkey’s connection with the European security architecture could be damaged to a great extent. That is why Turkey looks at the ESDP process from where it is, that is, from its NATO membership and advantages.

The Washington Summit Consensus: In line with the ‘NATO First’ attitude, Turkey believes that the allies should respect the NATO *acquis* adopted during the construction of the European security architecture in the 1990s. This demand is based mainly on the legal foundation of the Washington Summit consensus, the aspects of which were reflected in the documents adopted at the Summit (*the Communiqué, the Declaration and the Strategic Concept*). The important aspects of this consensus included all of the aforementioned three points: i.e. Turkey’s position, NATO-WEU co-operation and the characteristics of the European security structure.

On the eve of the Washington Summit Turkey was afraid of being excluded from the developments in European security and defence matters, which had emerged particularly after the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. It anticipated that the EU was about to set up an autonomous institution for EU members only and that such a formation could and would marginalise Turkey’s position. In addition, before the Washington Summit, Turkey knew that the EU would demand from the Allies guaranteed access to NATO assets and capabilities and that the United States would accept it for the sake of the maintenance of the division of labour and burden-sharing.

⁷⁹ Onur Öymen, “*The Future of European Security and NATO*”, paper delivered to the Twelfth International Antalya Conference on Security and Co-operation, 11-15 April 2002.

Fearing that such a possibility would have a negative outcome for Turkey's position within the European security architecture, Turkey waged a hard diplomatic struggle to convince the Allies at the Washington Summit to take Turkey's (and the other non-EU European NATO Allies') position into consideration. Turkey's tough diplomacy played an important role in persuading the Allies to reach a consensus. As a result, they used careful wording in the documents so that Turkey's interests as well as NATO's role in the future could be upheld.⁸⁰ As Öymen noted, "This mutually satisfactory result could only be attained because of the flexibility shown by Turkey in the Summit."⁸¹

At the end of the Summit, Turkey was satisfied with the documents and gave consent to the collective decisions made by the Allies. Turkey's tough diplomatic struggle produced an 'acceptable consensus' among the Allies. From the Turkish perspective, the Washington consensus provided important support and a basis to Turkey's claims concerning the ESDP: Turkey's position within the European security architecture was confirmed by the Allies. As a member of both organisations (NATO and the WEU) Turkey's connection to the ESDI was also recognised. Participation of the Allies in EU-led operations was underlined. As Turkey also had an associate membership in the WEU, even if not as strong as full members, Turkey could participate in the strategic planning, operations and command of EU-led Petersberg-type operations in the areas surrounding Turkey. Turkey had the right: 1) to take part in a WEU-led operation with NATO support, including its preparation and planning with full and equal rights; 2) to participate in an autonomous WEU operation with equal rights if it declared its readiness to take part by making available a significant troop contribution; and 3) to participate, as a member of both NATO and the WEU, in the organs the EU would set up, since NATO-EU mechanisms would be built on existing NATO-WEU mechanisms. In short, the Washington Summit consensus recognised the WEU *acquis* as the basis of future work for the European security architecture.⁸² It accepted that the development of the ESDI would be constructed on the existing mechanisms of NATO-WEU cooperation.

As the EU started to build up the ESDP in the manner stated above, most of the points of the Washington Summit were not taken into consideration. In other words, we can say that the EU and Turkey disagree on the way the Washington Summit consensus should be put into practice. The main disagreement emerges from differences between Turkish and EU officials' interpretation of the Washington Summit documents. They have different approaches to the

⁸⁰ *Hürriyet* (Turkish daily newspaper), 27 April 1999.

⁸¹ For more see Öymen, *op.cit.*, 2001, p.54-55.

⁸² Turkish General Staff, "The Turkish General Staff View on ESDP", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.3, No.2, April-June 2001, p.87-8.

Washington documents: The EU Council concentrated on Paragraph 10 of the Washington Summit Communiqué where the Allies declared that they “stand ... for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily” and so on. However, Turkey argues that that article should be read in view of Paragraph 9 (subparagraph d.) of the Washington Summit Communiqué and Article 30 of NATO’s Strategic Concept 1999, where “the full participation of all European Allies” and the use of NATO assets and capabilities by the EU “on a case-by-case basis and by consensus” were formulated. The EU’s arrangements for the participation of the non-EU European Allies in its crisis management process did not comply with these articles.

Thus, Turkey views the process from the Cologne Summit onwards in the construction of the ESDP as a divergence from the spirit of the Washington Summit agreements. Moreover, the EU’s approach to the Washington Summit documents was seen by a Turkish official as a violation of “...principle in terms of respecting and honouring the agreements reached at the level of heads of state and government.”⁸³ In this way, the EU made a one-sided interpretation of the Washington documents, trying to “secure assured access to NATO planning capabilities *without* fulfilling the EU’s own responsibility to make the relevant arrangements for participation.” Therefore, “the crisis-based participation model, covering only consultation as foreseen by the Nice Summit, is not suitable for Turkey.”⁸⁴

Indeed, the Washington Summit documents should be taken as an important ‘agreement’ or ‘consensus’ among the Allies to continue the division of labour and the arrangements to be followed by the Allies for the management of security affairs in Europe. It is possible to draw conclusions about Turkey’s position in and relations with the WEU in particular and the security architecture in general from the points in the Washington documents.

Turkey’s claims were based on the following points in the Washington Summit documents:

* NATO will continue to be the “essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty” (NATO’s Strategic Concept 1999, Article 25). Thus the decisions concerning European security should be decided by the NATO Council because under Article 41, “the security of all Allies is indivisible.”

⁸³ Öymen, *op.cit.*, 2001, p.57.

⁸⁴ Turkish General Staff, *op.cit.*, 2001, p.88.

Therefore, the EU's plan to have autonomous decision-making institutions and processes and EU operations excluding any of the NATO Allies is not in line with the above. Creating such non-NATO institutions will start a 'divergent path' in the construction of the European security architecture. This would create divisions on both institutional and practical levels.

* NATO welcomes and supports the development of the ESDI within the Alliance on the basis of the decisions by the Allies in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, "The ESDI will continue to be developed within NATO" (NATO's Strategic Concept 1999, Article 30). The development of a CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) by the EU includes a common defence policy. Such a policy, as called for in the Amsterdam Treaty, will be "compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the Washington Treaty" (NATO's Strategic Concept 1999, Article 17). NATO "acknowledges the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged" (The Washington Summit Communiqué of 1999, Paragraph 9, a.). "The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests. ... Both organisations make decisive contribution to peace and stability on the European continent. Co-operation between the two organisations on topics of common concern, to be decided on a *case-by-case basis*, could be developed when it enhances the effectiveness of action by NATO and the EU" (The Washington Summit Communiqué, Paragraph 40).

According to the above paragraph, the EU's demand for "guaranteed access to pre-identified assets" is not in line with the condition of a "case-by-case basis." Thus Turkey believes that NATO can extend such assets and capabilities for EU-led operations on the "case-by-case basis," i.e. depending on the type, magnitude and location of the crisis and on Turkey's own interests.

* The ESDI will be built in such a way as to develop co-operative arrangements and mechanisms between NATO and the WEU and *the EU if necessary* (NATO's Strategic Concept 1999, Article 30). "As this process goes forward, NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU" (The Washington Summit Communiqué, Paragraph 9, b.).

Thus the NATO Summit documents acknowledged that the EU might at some point take over the role of the WEU within the existing NATO-WEU framework planning

capabilities.⁸⁵ But such an eventuality should be “built on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU.” Accordingly, the ESDP is supposed to accept the WEU *acquis* into its EU structure. But as seen in the above analysis of the WEU and the ESDP, this is not the case.

* NATO’s support for the development of the ESDI will be in the form of “making available assets and capabilities for operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed” (NATO’s Strategic Concept 1999, Article 45). “It will enable all European Allies to make a coherent and effective contribution to missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities” (NATO’s Strategic Concept 1999, Article 30).

Thus, while the ESDI should be developed as a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, all European Allies should be included into such a formation for the sake of ‘division of labour,’ provided that all the European Allies are obliged to contribute to EU operations with or without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.

* Even the provision of assets and capabilities to the ESDI process is conditional upon the following points:

- They will be made available for “operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily ... under the WEU” (NATO’s Strategic Concept 1999, Article 30). If, and once, the Alliance takes up an issue on its agenda, then the EU will have to leave the matter for NATO’s decision-making process.

- Because the “EU’s development of security and defence dimension will have implications for the entire Alliance, all European allies should be involved in it, building on arrangements developed by NATO and the WEU” (NATO’s Strategic Concept, Article 17). As stated above, the ESDP should take into consideration that any EU-led operation will have “implications for the entire Alliance.”

* “[T]aking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were to choose” (NATO’s Strategic Concept, Article 30), “We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations...”(The Washington Summit Communiqué, Paragraph 9, d.).

This is the most important point for Turkey and other non-EU European Allies because it clearly states that they should be entitled to “full participation.” As a result, the EU’s new “arrangements” proposed by the Nice Summit are totally in contradiction with this point.

⁸⁵ Aybet, *op.cit.*, p.53.

* The provision of such support will be made “on the basis of separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities” (NATO’s Strategic Concept, Article 49; The Washington Summit Communiqué, Paragraph 9, e.).

* “It will reinforce the transatlantic partnership” (NATO’s Strategic Concept, Article 30).

* The assistance and contribution to the European allies will be made on a “case-by-case basis” and “by consensus” (NATO’s Strategic Concept, Article 30) within NATO. This is the article that legitimates Turkey’s veto in the North Atlantic Council. Turkey argues that the “guaranteed access to pre-identified assets” can be made only on a “case-by-case basis” by a “consensus” in the NAC.

* NATO was prepared to adopt “the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for [the WEU-led] operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily,” and “the Council in Permanent Session will approve these arrangements” (The Washington Summit Communiqué, Paragraph 10).

Thus, the decision concerning access by the EU to Alliance assets and capabilities will be made by NATO’s political decision-making organ. This is in compliance with the primacy of NATO and with the spirit of the division of labour. However, there appears to be a paradox between the concept of a “case-by-case basis” and the concept of “ready access.” The paradox is that whereas the former ties the use of facilities to individual decisions to be made in each case, thus depending on the requirements of the case, the latter refers to the use of facilities automatically irrespective of the situation.

The paradox can be resolved only in such a way that the NATO Council and the WEU Council determine the range of arrangements and mechanisms for deciding about the use by the EU of NATO’s assets and capabilities because the entire campaign will be based on the co-operation between NATO and the WEU. Since the WEU Council was merged with the EU, such arrangements and mechanisms are supposed to be decided jointly by NATO and the EU in the view of the WEU *acquis*.

* Finally, the Allies agreed that “The Strategic Concept will govern the Alliance’s security and defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture ... the Alliance will also continue to ... help build an undivided continent by promoting and fostering the vision of a Europe whole and free” (NATO’s Strategic Concept 1999, Article 65).

In conclusion, the Washington Summit documents reflect the spirit of ‘division of labour’ in non-Article 5 operations in and around Europe. Therefore, their arrangements confirm the agreements and decisions made by the Allies since the end of the Cold War. Most of the points in the Washington Summit documents rely on and build up over the previous documents. However, the adoption of a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance for the 21st century can be regarded as a milestone for the future of the Alliance. Secondly, the documents also reiterate the fact that NATO is interested in building up a security architecture in and around Europe, including the Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Thirdly, all the documents should be regarded as ‘sources of international law’ through which the signatories committed themselves to a new NATO Strategic Concept.

Europe, Whole and Free: One of Turkey’s objectives as regards the ESDP is concerned with the nature of the European security architecture. As was also mentioned in the Washington Summit documents, Turkey is in favour of ‘a whole, undivided and free Europe.’ There should not be groupings, blocks or fragmentation between the Allies. Thus, as Ambassador Orhun stated, “Our concept of security should be an all-embracing one, taking into account the security needs of all countries, and taking care not to create new divisions, zones of influence or grey areas.”⁸⁶ Turkey believes that this can be achieved only by broad security conception and overarching institutions such as NATO. According to Ambassador Öymen, it is a vital instrument for an effective, strong transatlantic link that will enable the indivisibility of security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We should preserve the link. Thus NATO should play a leading role as a core organisation in the area in any emerging crisis.⁸⁷

From this perspective, Turkey supported, though having some reservations, the expansion of NATO towards Central and Eastern Europe⁸⁸ and now towards the Balkans, (Romania and Bulgaria).⁸⁹ In that spirit, Turkey has improved its dialogue and co-operation with Central and Eastern European countries over the years since the end of the Cold War. At the end of a conference in Ankara participated by official representatives of these countries, a remark by made Ambassador Yiğitbaşıoğlu reflects Turkey’s broad security perspective very well: “This seminar pointed out that we share common economic, political and security

⁸⁶ Ömür Orhun, “The Uncertainties and Challenges Ahead: A Southern Perspective”, *Perceptions*, Vol.IV, No.1, March-May 1999, p.24.

⁸⁷ Öymen, *op.cit.*, 2001, p.56-57.

⁸⁸ Ali L. Karasmanoğlu, “NATO Enlargement: Does it Enhance Security?”, in Foreign Policy Institute (ed.), *Turkey and the European Union: A Nebulous Nature of Relations* (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1996).

⁸⁹ Öymen, *op.cit.*, 2002, p.2.

interests that actually unite us in our search for prosperity, peace, security and stability. ... We don't want new divisions, new influence zones and second class citizenship in the emerging new Europe.”⁹⁰ To achieve this objective, “there should be a congruence between the enlargements of NATO [and] the European Union since these organisations have many things in common. No country should be excluded from these organisations. Turkey objects [to] the understanding that it should remain an integral member of NATO, but only an associate member of the EU.”⁹¹

Participation Issue: Turkey's main policy objective vis-à-vis the ESDP is to participate in its formation and decision-making process. Turkey should not be put aside or excluded from the central mechanisms of the ESDP process for three reasons: The legacy of the WEU, i.e. the WEU *acquis*; being an integral part of NATO, i.e. the NATO *acquis*; and Turkey's geostrategic importance in the region.⁹²

Due to its marginalisation from the construction of the ESDP process and decision-making institutions, Turkey is not satisfied with the EU's “permanent arrangements for consultation and dialogue with the non-EU European NATO Allies,” which were developed in Cologne, Helsinki and Feira and finalised in Nice, for the following reasons:

Firstly, the model is not satisfactory because Turkey is not given the right to participate in the main decision-making units such as the General Affairs Council (at the ministerial level), the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Staff, where the EU will decide where, when and how it will conduct operations. Instead, Turkey and other non-EU European Allies are offered two consultations per presidency in peacetime and “deep consultations” in times of crisis. That is not a satisfactory formula because, as one Turkish general argued, “Actually, we don't have any restrictions on consultations with any of our European allies. So it is not a privilege for Turkey.”⁹³

Secondly, the EU's consideration of Turkey's participation in Petersberg-task operations is important and positive. But it will be only within the framework of the Committee of Contributors, which does not bear any responsibility for the strategic control and political direction of the operations, which in turn are decided by the Political and

⁹⁰ Erhan Yiğitbaşoğlu, *Minutes of Seminar on Integration Process within a Changing European Structure*, 1-2 June 1997, Antalya, SAM Papers, No. 5/97, (Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Center for Strategic Research, 1997), p.125.

⁹¹ Onur Öymen, *Minutes of Seminar on Integration Process within a Changing European Structure*, *ibid.*, p.9.

⁹² Ali Yıldız, *Turkey and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): Anatomy of a Problematic Relationship*, unpublished MSc thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 2002.

⁹³ Turkish General Staff, *op.cit.*, 2001, p.88.

Security Committee and the EU Council, in which Turkey is not a full participant. Furthermore, the non-EU Allies were offered only a day-to-day conduct of operations through the ad hoc Committee of Contributors. This is not a substantial involvement, and such a position gives Turkey only a ‘sub-contractor role for the ESDP,’ which is totally unacceptable.⁹⁴

Thirdly, and interestingly, such decisions will be made by the EU Council, in which the non-NATO EU members (Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden) will have a role and a say. Indeed, that might create some complications within the Alliance and for EU-led operations because of their ‘neutral’ positions, non-involvement and lack of experience in security and defence issues during the Cold War and after.

Fourthly, even when a EU-led operation uses NATO assets and capabilities (in Turkey), the EU does not provide Turkey with the right to participate in the strategic control and political direction of the operations.⁹⁵ The Feira model of EU+6 and EU+15 (at the PSC and ministerial level, later improved by the Nice model) negates the inclusiveness principle for European security and the indivisibility of the security of all Allies on the basis of NATO-WEU arrangements as decided at the Washington Summit. It offers regular and permanent participation for non-EU countries; however, their participation is limited to a few occasions.⁹⁶

Turkey would like the EU to develop this model in such a way that the EU-6 should cover daily consultations on a more frequent, permanent and regular basis. This would provide Turkey with a role in decisions taken by the 15 full members of the EU, which is consistent with what Turkey had within the WEU. Indeed, “participating without a right of veto in the decisions taken by the EU does not upset the EU’s legality.”⁹⁷

Finally, the EU does not offer any role for the non-EU Allies in the non-military aspects of crisis management. Indeed, Turkey is very active and keen in this field as was seen in Turkey’s contribution to the Bosnia and Kosovo crises and in the re-construction of Afghanistan after September 11. Indeed, as stated above, Turkey would like to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management in political, military and non-military terms. So it is not satisfied with the EU arrangements for dialogue, consultation and co-operation with the

⁹⁴ Ömür Orhun, “European Security and Defence Identity - Common European Security and Defence: A Turkish Perspective”, *Perceptions*, Vol.V, No.3, September-November 2000.

⁹⁵ Turkish General Staff, *op.cit.*, 2001.

⁹⁶ For a detailed analysis of the Feira decisions, see Orhun, *op.cit.*, 2000.

⁹⁷ Turkish General Staff, *op.cit.*, 2001.

non-EU European NATO members. It would like to have participation in decision-making as well as in the preparation and planning of EU-led operations.⁹⁸

Turkey's 'Near Abroad': Turkey is highly sensitive and interested in the EU's Petersberg-task-type operations in Turkey's 'near abroad,' with or without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. As stated above, in the post-Cold War era, Turkey's own security faced a number of challenges in multiple ways. Turkey is located at the centre of unstable regions: the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. It has historical, socio-cultural, political-strategic and military connections with all these trouble spots. Because of that, any crisis in the 'near abroad' influences Turkey's security.

Turkey's role and power in the region is well known: No operation in the region would be possible without Turkey. Ambassador Balanzino underlined Turkey's position very well: "I cannot imagine a scenario for EU-led crisis management operations that does not involve Turkey in one way or another. Simply put: If the crisis is very serious, NATO will be involved including Turkey [in which the ESDP will not have a role]. If the crisis is less prone to escalation, but still requires a significant amount of force, then the EU may lead, but only with the help of NATO -- again Turkey will be involved. If the crisis is at the lower end of the spectrum, the EU may act autonomously, but if it is an operation that affects Turkey's security or Turkey's vital security interests, it will obviously be in the interest of the EU to at least solicit Turkey's views and most importantly to seek its active contribution in resolving the crisis."⁹⁹

Now let's look at the possibilities regarding Turkey's position in EU-led operations: In the first alternative where NATO will have both strategic and political control of the operation, like those in the Kosovo and Bosnia cases, Turkey's participation in both dimensions is not questionable. That is, Turkey will be involved in both decision-making and operations due to its NATO membership and voting rights in the North Atlantic Council.

But there may be problems in two other scenarios in which the EU will have strategic and political control of the operation because NATO as a whole is not directly involved. The heart of the problem lies, from Turkey's perspective, in the management of such operations.

⁹⁸ Orhun, *op.cit.*, 2000, p.120.

⁹⁹ Sergio Balanzino, "The State of the Alliance - A Good News Story", speech delivered at the 11th International Antalya Conference on Security and Co-operation, Antalya, Turkey, 29 March-2 April 2001, (Ankara: Turkish Grand National Assembly publication, 2001), p.51. The same argument was stated by Lord George Robertson, "Turkey and the European Security and Defence Identity", *op.cit.*, p.49-50.

In the second scenario wherein the EU has a Petersberg-type operation using NATO assets and capabilities, thus requiring Turkey's NATO assets and capabilities, what will Turkey's position be? According to the EU documents, if Turkey wishes, it can participate in such an operation, assign its forces to the operation and have consultation with the other contributors during the operation, but it cannot participate in the EU decision-making process concerning the conduct of the operation, including the decision to terminate the operation. So Turkey will not be in the 'kitchen where the food is cooked.' This is what makes Turkey's position rather delicate. Therefore, if the EU is to use Turkey's NATO facilities and to have co-operation with Turkey, Turkey should be involved not only in the operations but also in the military and political decision-making process. That was the position that Turkey partly enjoyed in the WEU and that was confirmed at the Washington Summit.¹⁰⁰

This position resembles Turkey's position in the customs union with the EU, opposed by many Turkish experts because of Turkey's lack of participation in the determination of customs union rules, regulations and decisions and because of its negative implications on Turkey's economic and political interests.¹⁰¹ Here Turkey is on the implementation side of EU Commission decisions concerning the customs union such as the Common External Tariffs, the Common Commercial Policy and preferential trade concessions towards third countries, etc. All these policies, regulations and laws regarding the customs union were originally devised by the EU's decision-making institutions such as the EU Commission, in which Turkey is not involved. Turkey is entitled to express its opinions on these issues in the Common Association Council and the Customs Union Common Committee, which convenes every six months. However, Turkey is not one of the EU's full members that makes decisions or offers modifications to the EU's customs union system. Nor does Turkey have a role in the determination of the common external tariff rates towards third countries.¹⁰²

Moreover, the EU Council meeting in Nice decided that Turkey, as one of the six non-EU European Allies, should provide "guaranteed (assured) access" to Turkey's NATO planning capabilities for EU use during an operation. The issue of "guaranteed access" to Turkish facilities is something like 'giving a blank cheque' to your supplier for unpredictable

¹⁰⁰ Personal interview with Serdar Kılıç, Deputy of Turkey's Permanent Representative to NATO, 05 June 2001, NATO Headquarters, Brussels.

¹⁰¹ For example, see Erol Manisalı, *Gümrük Birliği'nin Siyasal ve Ekonomik Bedeli* (Ankara: 1996).

¹⁰² For more about the Turkey-EU customs union see, for example, Nevzat Saygılıoğlu, "Avrupa Birliği Yolunda Gümrük İdaresi", *Yeni Türkiye*, Special Issue on the European Union Vol.II, November-December 2000, Year 6, No.36, pp.1118-1125; Çınar Özen, "1/95 Sayılı Ortaklık Konseyi Kararı Çerçevesinde Türkiye'nin Yükümlülükleri Üzerine bir Değerlendirme", *Yeni Türkiye*, Special Issue on the European Union Vol.II, November-December 2000, Year 6, No.36, pp. 1143-1155.

and uncertain deals in the future. In particular, if you don't know what the supplier will deliver to you in return for the cheque, it would be a very risky payment. So it is better to make the payments 'by cheque, purchase-by-purchase,' so that you don't lose money or lose your relations with the supplier. This analogy resembles Turkey's argument for providing the EU with Turkey's NATO assets on a case-by-case basis, as stated in NATO's Strategic Concept 1999. In the words of İsmail Cem, former Turkish Foreign Minister, it would put Turkey into an 'observer position.'¹⁰³

Furthermore, in any operation around Turkey, the EU will need to use Turkey's assets and capabilities such as air bases, airspace, military infrastructure and, last but not least, intelligence facilities. These facilities are assigned to the NATO command structure and are useable by Allies under NATO Treaty regulations. But all of these operations must always take Turkey's own national interests into consideration. Because of this precondition, Turkey should be part of the decision-making regarding EU operations around Turkey. Turkey can allow the use of these assets only if it is suitable for its own national interests. That is why Turkey would give such permission on a "case-by-case basis and by consensus" as stated in Article 30 of NATO's Strategic Concept 1999.

Turkey would not give permission for use by the EU or any other organisation of its assets and capabilities in such operations that would harm Turkey's security interests. In order for Turkey to give such permission to the EU, it is essential and vital that Turkey should 'participate' in the preparation, conduct and control of the operations. That is the principal reason behind Turkey's insistence on participating in the decision-making mechanism and the military capability of the Headline Goal. Indeed, Turkey would not like to make such a commitment that might create problems in the future.

In the third scenario of EU-led operations, the EU launches the operation with the contribution of the EU member states and by using the Headline Goal forces. In such operations, which will be led by a Framework Nation, the EU will lead the operation at all levels but will invite the others to contribute to the EU-led operation by providing facilities and forces. The invitation to the operation will be made by a unanimous vote of the EU Council. This has the possibility that if one of the members of the EU Council 'vetoes' the participation of any non-EU country, that country cannot participate even in the operational side of the ESDP.

¹⁰³ İsmail Cem, interviewed by Murat Akgün of NTV Television, 15 May 2001.

The Greek and Cyprus Factor: When and if the EU has autonomous operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, Turkey might be totally excluded from such operations because the EU Council may fail to *invite* a non-EU country. More clearly, there is always the possibility that Turkey's participation in such operations might be 'vetoed' by Greece or even by the Greek Cypriot government after it becomes a full EU member in May 2004. Such operations might be directly related to Turkish-Greek problems or to other crisis situations in the region. In each case, there is the possibility that Turkey might be excluded from an EU-led Petersberg-type operation in or around Turkey's security environment, even if Turkey wishes to participate. Indeed, this worries Turkey due to the fact that Greece and even the Greek Cypriot government may attempt to veto Turkey's participation in EU-led autonomous operations and that Greece might wish to use the ESDP to increase its influence over Turkey. That is why Turkey uses its 'veto' in the North Atlantic Council now, before Greece or the Greek Cypriot government uses their 'veto' in the EU Council in the future.

There is evidence supporting such a Greek attitude towards Turkey: Greece blocked Turkey's membership in the WEU until 1997.¹⁰⁴ As will be seen below, Greece has reiterated its policy to block Turkey's securing of a place in the ESDP. As a result, the current problem can be seen as a replay of the traditional Turkish-Greek competition to have a counter-balance towards each other within international institutions and platforms.

It has even been argued that Greece might try to press the EU to conduct a Petersberg-type operation on Turkish-Greek problems in Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. It can use the ESDP as leverage on Turkey. Greece doesn't want to see Turkey as part of the ESDP process in either dimension but may wish to use it against Turkey in order to 'protect Greece against Turkey.' In this respect, Greece wished to use Turkey's ESDP participation issue as a 'card' for the resolution of the Cyprus problem in its favour.

So far we have looked at the issue from the Turkish perspective. Now we should also look at it from the EU's side. This will be helpful in understanding why the EU devised such an institutional structure that excluded Turkey and other non-EU European NATO Allies from the process.

3.3.3. EU's Response to Turkey's Policy towards the ESDP

The EU's arguments about the position of the non-EU European NATO members, Turkey in particular, were based on the following points:

¹⁰⁴ Cebeci, op.cit.

EU-Only Institutionalisation: First of all, the EU developed the ESDP as a part of the EU integration process, thus it believes that only EU members can have full participation in decision-making institutions and process. The same problem is valid for the other five non-EU NATO Allies as well as for other groups of countries. But as stated above, Turkey's case is different from the others. Norway and Iceland do not want to be full members of the EU, while Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic will be part of the Union and the ESDP decision-making process in the near future. Unlike them, Turkey wants to be part of all pillars of the EU integration process but is not ready yet.

The heart of the problem here is whether European security can be limited by institutional arrangements. Can European security be confined to EU-only members? As stated above, it is not easy to realise a EU-only security and defence project because there is an interdependence of security between the arenas and agendas in the broader European security architecture. The Balkan wars clearly showed that the EU countries and Turkey were all affected by the Bosnian tragedy. Although Turkey and some of the EU countries had differences and different interests in the Balkan wars, both Turkey and the EU countries were interdependent on each other for the resolution of the war. Thus they got involved in the peacekeeping forces of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR and in the regional schemes to establish peace in the region. The same is true for other problems surrounding Turkey.

In other words, Turkey and the EU are bound to come together, particularly for dealing with those crises or problems in the regions surrounding Turkey. As mentioned above, Turkey's 'near abroad' is full of crisis spots with security implications for both the EU and Turkey.

European Identity: The ESDP is not simply a security and defence project but rather a planned construction of the European identity. So, EU officials argue, the primary legitimacy for being a member of the ESDP is to have the required 'European identity.'¹⁰⁵ Turkey's failures in the Copenhagen criteria and Helsinki Summit decisions delayed Turkey's attainment of the European identity. The EU countries criticise Turkey for not implementing reforms in domestic politics and for not resolving its problems with Greece in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. According to the EU, if Turkey fails to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria in order to resolve its domestic political, economic and legal problems, Turkey cannot become a full member of the EU-led security community. Moreover, Turkey does not try to create a

¹⁰⁵ Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri", *Doğu Batı*, No. 14, February-March-April 2001, p.162-165.

peaceful, stable and secure environment in the region and to eliminate EU fears about the soft security threats in and around Turkey. In short, Turkey is not ready to enter the EU's European security 'identity.' Instead it is a burden for the ESDP.

Security Consumer: Thus, Turkey is seen not only as 'unsuitable' for the European identity but also as a 'security burden or consumer' country.¹⁰⁶ By 'security consumer' is meant that Turkey is overburdened by a number of hard security problems in and around it. And this creates, rather than solves, problems for the EU's security community. Turkey's overemphasis on military security (hard security) and under-emphasis on the social-economic-cultural-political aspects of security (soft security) could have negative implications for the construction and realisation of the ESDP. That is why Turkey is not yet ready to fully participate in ESDP deliberations, at least until it is part of the other pillars of the EU integration.

In that respect, one of the EU's soft security concerns is the migration issue and its negative impact on EU societies. The EU's prosperity is attracting other people into the EU market in various ways, be it as legal workers, refugees, asylum-seekers, illegal smugglers, and so on.¹⁰⁷ In the wake of growing migration into EU markets from Eastern and Central Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, EU societies have been facing a social-security syndrome.

So the EU fears that Turkey's own democratic deficit, human rights problems, problems with the expression of the Islamic identity and uncontrollable migration are problems that can spill over into, and threaten, the EU's social structure.¹⁰⁸

Another EU concern is thus about Turkey's geopolitical location. Some argue that because the EU views Turkey as a Middle Eastern country, Turkey will never be accepted as a full member of the EU.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, it is argued, Turkey's eastern border should not be the EU's eastern border as well. They argue that Turkey's participation in ESDP decision-making

¹⁰⁶ See Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, *Europe's Security Parameters*, paper delivered at the Conference on Turkey and Central and Eastern European Countries in Transition: A Comparative Study with a View to Future Membership to EU, Bilkent University, Ankara, 9 March 1996.

¹⁰⁷ For an analysis of this kind of threat see Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993).

¹⁰⁸ These were the problems that were discussed in a conference on "Turkey at the Gates: Possibilities and Problems of the EU Entry," Potsdam Spring Dialogues, organised jointly by the Development of Peace Foundation and Welt Trends, 11 April 2001.

¹⁰⁹ For example, Ian O. Lesser, "Türkiye'nin Batı'yla Gelişen Güvenlik İlişkileri" in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.) *Türkiye'nin Yeni Dünyası: Türk Dış Politikasının Değişen Dinamikleri*, trans. By Hür Güldü (İstanbul: Alfa, 2002).

could dilute the decision-making process and overextend the EU's security borders and concerns up to the Gulf region and Asia as a whole.

All these arguments imply, among other things, that Turkey's approach to security issues is not fully consistent with the EU's approach to creating a security community on the European continent based on a soft security understanding. They also imply that unless Turkey completes its reforms and pursues a soft security approach to the problems surrounding it, it can neither be a part of the ESDP nor enjoy 'participation' in the decision-making process of autonomous EU-led operations.

4. COMPLICATIONS OF THE DELICATE POSITION

Turkey's 'delicate position,' particularly in the wake of the ESDP process and the marginalisation of the non-EU European NATO Allies, produced, not surprisingly, some complications. They can be categorised into three different points: Firstly, NATO-EU co-operation was disrupted; secondly, Turkey-EU relations were paralysed; and thirdly, the ESDP could not be put into operation.

4.1. NATO-EU Co-operation Disrupted

The most important aspect of the ESDP is establishing co-operation, dialogue and transparency between NATO and the EU. However, this could not be achieved because of divisions and problems among the NATO members regarding the 'operationalisation' of the ESDP. The main reason is the differences of opinion among the member countries about NATO-EU co-operation.

Turkey believes that such co-operation should be based on respect towards national interests and views of the member countries. So Turkey's demands for NATO-EU co-operation are mainly to make necessary modifications concerning the formation and operation of the ESDP, in particular about the participation of the non-EU NATO Allies *vis-à-vis* the EU request to have 'guaranteed access to NATO assets and capabilities.' Indeed, because NATO was established for the protection and promotion of the national interests of its member countries, which is reflected in the working procedure of NATO's decision-making system, it is quite obvious that every NATO member will raise its national security concerns in the NATO platforms. In this respect, Turkey fears that its national security might be harmed if it is marginalised from the formation and operation process of the ESDP, as stated above. NATO is the only important international platform in which Turkey can express its demands and objectives on the ESDP issue. Thus Turkey became assertive in order to preserve its place in the European security architecture. Turkey's assertiveness came to the point that it blocked the NATO decision-making process so as to obtain a decision meeting Turkey's demands of the EU.

Turkey has been the most assertive ally in putting forward some conditions concerning EU-NATO co-operation for the realisation of the ESDP project; however, Turkey is not the only country seeking a review of the ESDP arrangements. They are divided into two groups similar to the way the ESDP should be constructed and operationalised. On the one hand,

there are those countries, called Atlanticists, that argue that NATO should preserve its priority for European security over the ESDP. They are led by the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway and Turkey. On the other hand are those countries, called Europeanists, that believe that the ESDP should be more independent from NATO's decision-making, operations and strategic control. They are led by France and Germany.

Thus, Turkey's position was mainly supported by U.S. and U.K. officials. The U.S. officials have expressed their support for Turkey's views and position. For instance, U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld opposed the exclusion of the non-EU European Allies from the ESDP, fearing that it would destabilise NATO's existing position and stability and risk Alliance solidarity.¹¹⁰ Former U.S. Secretary of Defence William Cohen argued that the non-EU European NATO Allies should have full participation in the planning of those ESDP operations that involved their national security interests. Another Atlanticist, U.K. Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Sir Charles Guthrie, argued that French insistence on the full autonomy of the European Rapid Force from NATO's command and control would bring risks that would create divisions within the Alliance and would start the process of U.S. withdrawal from NATO. He also warned that in such a case the UK could possibly withdraw its troops from the European Rapid Force.¹¹¹ And needless to say, the non-EU European NATO Allies have similar opinions about the ESDP process. Nevertheless, among these countries only Norway has the same opinion as Turkey.¹¹²

On other hand, the Europeanists, particularly France, argued that the European Army would maintain its autonomous identity with its own command and planning capacities. France is the most ardent supporter of the ESDP's autonomy from NATO, and thus the exclusion of the non-EU European NATO Allies from the ESDP. That is why Turkey and France went 'head-to-head' in the NATO-EU co-operation meetings throughout the year 2001.

But it must be stressed that Turkey also came under U.S. pressure not to procrastinate with its veto over the NATO-EU co-operation. It was reported that U.S. President Bill Clinton asked Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit to avoid using the veto on NATO-EU co-operation. The US fears that if the problem is prolonged and a formula cannot be found for the 'operationalisation' of the ESDP, then the EU countries will break away and try to build

¹¹⁰ http://www.haber.superonline.com/CDA/Haber/haber_search/1,2342,35762.html.

¹¹¹ http://www.nethaber.com/haber/haberler/0,1082,33629_6,00.html.

¹¹² http://www.haber.superonline.com/CDA/Haber/haber_search/1,2342,3390,00.html; and Frederick Bull-Hansen, "Non-EU members of NATO within European Security: Role and Expectations of Norway", *Foreign Policy*, Vol. XXI, No.1-2, 1997.

up their own military capabilities, resulting in the much-feared “duplication, decoupling and discrimination.”¹¹³ The Turkish prime minister did not accede to such a demand because the participation issue has aspects other than the NATO-EU co-operation *per se*: One of them is Turkey’s concern that it would have greater risks if it were to be totally excluded from the ESDP decision-making process.

One of these risks is related to the Turkish-Greek disputes with its negative impact on a division within NATO. Due to their long-lasting and unresolved disagreements in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus, etc., Turkey and Greece try to gain superiority over each other by using NATO and the EU platforms respectively. In the case of Turkey-ESDP relations, Greece uses the EU as an ‘instrument’ to improve its interests over Turkey by exercising its veto advantages in the EU. On the other hand, Turkey uses NATO as a ‘counter-instrument’ to protect its interests in the ESDP process against Greece by utilising its veto advantage in NATO. In other words, one, if not the only, of the critical reasons behind the lack of NATO-EU co-operation on the ESDP issue is the classical Turkish-Greek political rift.

Such divisions and disruptions, if unresolved, could have negative effects on the construction of the European security architecture, on the efficient use of military assets and capabilities, and on the implementation of EU-led operations in the area around Turkey. Furthermore, in such a case, the Turkish General Staff pointed out, “[T]he EU cannot use NATO assets and capabilities in an automatic and unlimited fashion.”¹¹⁴ One such disruption occurred in April 2002, when the EU wanted to deploy EU forces within the framework of an EU-led operation in Macedonia, code-named ‘Amber Fox,’ to take over the task of NATO forces by using NATO assets and capabilities. This was the first attempt by the EU to operationalise the ESDP. Turkey refused to allow this to happen unless and until a solution was found and Turkey’s concerns were eliminated.¹¹⁵

Moreover, a division within the Alliance along these lines, i.e. the Atlanticists and the Europeanists, would inflict serious damage to the transatlantic connection and solidarity with its economic, political and strategic costs. In the extreme possibility, if NATO’s cohesion and solidarity during the Cold War years had disappeared and turned out to be a competition and rivalry among the Allies, that would have been the worst scenario, not only for the Alliance and the Allies themselves but also for world politics and security in general. To think the unthinkable, the possibility of an emerging rivalry between the United States and the EU

¹¹³ *Hürriyet*, 16 December 2000.

¹¹⁴ Turkish General Staff, *op.cit.*, 2001, p. 94.

¹¹⁵ *Radikal* (Turkish daily newspaper), 6 April 2002.

would push international society towards the balance-of-power politics of the Cold War years and even back to the 19th century. Of course, however unlikely, all this would mean increasing armaments and polarisation between the nation-states, resulting in economic, social and human costs.

4.2. Turkey-EU Integration Process Paralysed

There are more reasons and issues other than technical/institutional ones in the development and formation of Turkey's views about the ESDP and the use of its veto in the North Atlantic Council, and in the EU's putting Turkey at the margin of the ESDP process. These are related to the substance of Turkey's security, defence and foreign policy as well as to that of EU's perception of Turkey in particular.

Since the start of an awkward process after the end of the Helsinki and Washington summits, the Turkey-EU integration process seemed to have drifted away from its main course, even causing damage to the achievements made over the last 40 years. Turkish-EU relations have been facing a number of difficulties and tensions. Turkey's integration process has been paralysed, if not blocked altogether, by inter-subjective perceptions, understandings, priorities and interests. The inter-subjective misperceptions went so far that both sides started to engage in negative thinking towards each other.

On these points, Turkey's understanding of security differed from that of the EU. Turkey looked at the issues more from the hard security perspective, while the EU looked at them from a soft security perspective, insisting on the primacy and validity of the values of the EU's security community. Turkish public opinion referred to its special conditions and problems after the end of the Cold War.

Some Turkish observers in official positions perceived that Turkey's marginalisation from the ESDP meant that the EU never wanted to see Turkey as part of EU integration. In response, some EU officials perceived that Turkey didn't want to reform itself towards EU standards but only used 'excuses' to avoid the reform process as indicated in the National Program and that Turkey was not 'serious and willing' to be part of the EU security community and its values. The following paragraphs will take a brief glance at the most important items of growing inter-subjective misperceptions of Turkish public opinion in recent years: the Cyprus problem, the terror/PKK problem, the Armenian problem and Turkey's domestic reforms for full EU membership.

On the Cyprus problem, the EU is determined to accept Cyprus as a full member under the leadership of the Greek Cypriot government even before the Cyprus problem is resolved.

On the contrary, an overwhelming majority of the Turkish public views such a membership as a violation of international law as well as disrespect to Turkey's national interests regarding the Cyprus problem. The EU and Turkish views on the Cyprus problem differ so radically, that while the EU views the Greek Cypriot government's EU membership as part of the expansion of its security community into the Mediterranean region, Turkey views it as an attempt to unite the island with Greece, the longstanding Greek dream of 'enosis.' This is mostly true because Greece insists that unless the island is accepted into the EU, it will block the membership of other countries. Thus, as stated above, Greece is using the ESDP issue and Turkey's position as leverage on both the EU and Turkey.¹¹⁶

On the PKK/terrorism problem, some EU countries gave indirect support to the PKK terrorists in various ways, in the form of providing shelter to PKK militants -- even to Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, in 1999 by Italy -- and criticising the way Turkey fought against the PKK terrorists during the 1990s. Moreover, the EU Council hesitated for a long time to include the PKK on the EU's list of terrorist organisations. All these EU actions created ill-feeling in Turkish public as respects the EU and some opposition to Turkey's full membership in the EU. Some people even think the EU is playing a dirty game to 'divide and rule' the Turkish state, just as in the case of the Treaty of Sèvres after World War I.

On the Armenian issue, the European Parliament adopted resolutions recognising the alleged Turkish genocide of the Armenians in 1915, thus condemning Turkey's past. Similarly, this was also negatively reacted to by Turkish public opinion, similar to the reaction shown to the EU's approach to the PKK/ terrorism problem.

Finally, on the Turkish reforms for full membership, the EU increased its pressure on Turkey to complete fundamental reforms in its political, economic and legal systems. Here again, some of the reforms are concerned with the terror/PKK problem. At the heart of this problem are issues of abolishing 'capital punishment,' which would include Öcalan, allowing 'education and publication rights in native languages,' in Kurdish in particular, and abolishing martial law in southeastern Turkey.

Indeed, all these are very sensitive issues for the Turkish people at both the state and societal levels because most of these demands clash with Turkey's Realist perception of international politics and national interests. First of all, each of the above issues has historical and negative connotations. The Turkish people are disturbed by the EU's -- or any other country's -- interference in these sensitive domestic issues because such interference would

¹¹⁶ Gündüz Aktan, "Sorun Yunanistan mı?", *Radikal*, 14 May 2002, p.8; and A. Papayiannidis, "Atina'yı Anlamak", *To Vima*, 12 May 2002, excerpted in *Radikal*, 15 May 2002, p.8.

bring back the Turks' negative memories from World War I and after. Secondly, the Turkish people have suffered great losses because of terrorism. Turkish families lost their own or their relatives' sons and daughters during the 1980s and 1990s in the fight against terrorism. Turkish public opinion, mainly due to both these historical and recent problems, views the EU's assertive policy behaviour towards these sensitive issues as 'attempts to interfere in Turkish domestic politics, to weaken Turkey from within, and to eventually divide Turkey into parts and create independent states in the region.'

As a result of these inter-subjective misconceptions, the development of the awkward process between Turkey and the EU due to the ESDP and the ensuing problems produced negative outcomes that have undermined the long-ongoing integration process between Turkey and the EU. As a result, anti-Western views and reactions appeared in Turkey.

In the midst of the growing opposition towards Turkey's membership in the EU, there emerged radical views such as arguing that the EU poses a threat to Turkey's own security. A retired general argued that Turkey's integration with the EU was against, and contrary to "Turkish history and to the Turkish Revolution formed by Kemalist thought. If full independence and sovereignty are separated from Republicanism, there will remain a corps, and this is not Kemalism."¹¹⁷ Some accused the European countries of clearly supporting PKK terrorism and Armenian allegations against Turkey.¹¹⁸ Some accused the EU of exerting pressure on Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to give concessions for the full integration of all of Cyprus under the leadership of the Greek Cypriots even before the dispute is resolved. The great majority of the Turkish public is against such a happening. In reply to these and other crisis points between Turkey and the EU during the awkward process, some argued that Turkey should look for alternative foreign policy orientations in the East, including even Iran, Russia and so on.

This kind of overture shows how Turkish-EU relations became tense. If these were to go to further extremes, it would indeed cause a worse crisis for Turkey and for the EU countries. Moreover, if these radical reactions were to spread to state-to-state relations, then the whole structure of Turkey-EU relations would come to a very dangerous point.

Then, one should ask, if Turkey-EU relations are strained and the awkward process gets worse, can European security and defence ever be attained and achieved?

¹¹⁷ Retired General Suat İlhan, speaking at a conference, *Yeni Şafak*, (Turkish daily newspaper), 25 March 2002.

¹¹⁸ General Yaşar Büyükanıt, Genelkurmay İkinci Başkanı, speech at a conference on "Developments after September 11 and Turkey", *Radikal*, 29 May 2002, p.8.

4.3. European Security and Defence without Turkey?

Turkey's marginalisation from the ESDP process in particular and from the European/Western world in general creates serious setbacks in the maintenance of European security and defence for various reasons. Given the aforementioned problems in NATO-EU co-operation and the estrangement in Turkey-EU relations, Turkey's radical turn in foreign policy would create larger problems, not only for NATO's construction of a security architecture in a broader Europe but also for the proper operationalisation of the ESDP.

The above question can be answered in two ways. Politically speaking, Turkey could be reluctant to co-operate with the allies in a future crisis in the areas surrounding Turkey. Militarily speaking, Turkey would be hesitant to allow the use of Turkish military assets and capabilities by the European allies in such crises. Turkish officials have declared their determination in this respect: As Turkish Defence Minister Çakmakoğlu bluntly stated, those who plan to have European security without Turkey should take into account the risk that Turkey would not permit the use of NATO assets and capabilities and would continue to use its veto in NATO to prevent such an occurrence. Moreover, former Foreign Minister Cem stated that Turkey's contribution to the ESDP would be proportional to its participation in the decision-making of the ESDP.¹¹⁹

Therefore, given the fact that Turkey is a very influential actor playing a political and military role in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey's standing in any crisis is essential. In these regions the EU could have serious problems in launching even non-Article 5 military operations without using Turkey's planning and intelligence assets. Nor can the European allies be very successful when and if Turkey plays a resisting role in crisis management operations and peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.

Furthermore, European security and defence are not limited to non-Article 5 problems only but also include Article 5 problems. Turkey's marginalisation from non-Article 5 operations would have negative effects on Turkey's contribution to Article 5 operations. As stated above, there is not much possibility of an Article 5 threat (i.e. a colossal direct military threat) today, but any of the 16 crisis hot points could escalate in such manner that NATO might have to use the collective defence mechanism, requesting Turkey's contribution. In those situations, Turkey could be reluctant to act together with the European allies.

Turkey's resistance and negative position might even prevent a resolution of the crisis. It is appropriate to mention that if Turkey had not acted together with the allies against the

¹¹⁹ *Hürriyet*, 07 December 2000.

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf coalition could hardly have functioned. Turkey's suspension of very vital Turkish-Iraqi oil pipelines and the use by the allies of Turkish air bases played a great role in Iraq's defeat and the coalition's victory in 1990-1991 crisis.¹²⁰

Finally, Turkey's multilateral approach to international security and defence problems can be changed into a unilateral approach. That would mean the re-nationalisation of Turkish military forces and policy and a unilateral approach to its own security and defence problems in the region.

All of the above actual and potential complications reflect the dark side of the awkward process. The actualisation of these complications would, of course, not be good for Turkey or for the European Union or for the Atlantic Alliance because it would definitely be to the detriment of the European security architecture in particular and to the broader Euroasian security in general.

Presumably this point was taken into consideration by officials in Turkey and in the Atlantic Alliance, convincing them to find a solution to end the awkward process. Therefore in 2001 there were serious attempts towards this end, and quite important developments and steps initiated by Turkey and the Allies have taken place in this respect. The following section will deal with alternative ways of resolving the awkward process in particular and bringing an end to Turkey's delicate position in the European security architecture.

¹²⁰ See Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kıskaçında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı ve Turgut Özal* (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2000).

5. TOWARDS THE SOLUTION AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

The September 11 affair has shifted the cards in the broader European security architecture in such a way that Turkey's delicate position should be done away with and a viable solution should be found for Turkey to have a more secure position in the broader European security architecture. The September 11 tragedy created such a new situation, that while the international security environment was challenged by terrorism, the Allies realised the importance of co-operation and collective defence against terrorism in the world. In particular, a new kind of international operation came into being in such areas as Afghanistan, where international terrorism enjoyed shelter and support. Hence, while the concept of a broader security arena and agenda re-emphasised its validity and continuity, the allied co-operation, in particular the NATO-EU co-operation on security and defence, had to be completed sooner rather than later. At that point, the Allies, in an unprecedented uniting against the threat coming from terrorism, showed their support and solemn solidarity for the United States under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The U.S.-led military operation was then launched in Afghanistan to fight against the Taliban regime and to catch al-Qaeda terrorists. After the military operation ended, the United States and most of the NATO Allies including Turkey, Germany, the UK and France, collectively acted to rebuild Afghanistan and bring order to the country. Thus, although it was a not a formal and institutional NATO-EU co-operation, it can be seen as *de facto* co-operation among NATO and EU members.

In the midst of all these developments, Turkey came to the forefront of international security due to its special position.¹²¹ Both the US and the EU members realised Turkey's critical importance and position in the fight against terrorism in an area where Turkey has influence and involvement due to its geostrategic, geopolitical and geocultural connections. Turkey, along with EU allies such as Germany, the UK and France, gave quick support to the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan. Like some EU countries, Turkey provided logistical, political and intelligence support during the military operation by allowing the use of Turkish assets and capabilities by U.S., German and British aircraft. Furthermore, Turkey got involved in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan by dispatching forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as well as by extending assistance to the social, cultural, and technical reconstruction of Afghanistan. It should be mentioned that

¹²¹ For a critical analysis, see Şaban Kardaş, "The strategic importance of Turkey after Sept 11", *Turkish Daily News*, 24-25 May 2002.

Turkey acted at all times in co-operation with both the EU countries and the United States. That was similar to NATO solidarity in Bosnia and Kosovo. Despite some differences of opinion and the lack of a full consensus on the definition of ‘terrorism’ and about the way to solve the security problems, the Allies have an overall agreement on the fight against terror.

In the wake of this new situation in which the Allies needed Turkey’s support and contribution for fighting against terror in the region, it was inevitable that Turkey’s delicate position had to be eliminated and turned towards a more positive and proper path. Thus the attempts that had started prior to September 11 were speeded up so as to satisfy Turkey’s expectations and remove its veto on the EU’s demand for “guaranteed access to pre-identified NATO assets and capabilities.” This would consequently help the Allies realise NATO-EU co-operation for a successful implementation of the ESDP process. Before going into the details of this attempt and other alternative solutions in order to eliminate Turkey’s delicate position, let’s reiterate Turkey’s expectations from the ESDP:

- * Having the WEU *acquis* back again;
- * The EU+6 should have daily consultations on a permanent and regular basis and provide Turkey with a role in decisions taken by the EU;
- * Full participation in the decision-making process of operations with NATO assets and capabilities;
- * Respect for Turkey’s national interests and security concerns in such operations without NATO assets;¹²²
- * The right to raise Turkey’s concerns in the decision-making mechanisms of EU-only operations in Turkey’s geographic proximity and areas of national interest such as the Aegean Sea, Cyprus, etc.; and
- * Insurance that the ESDP will not be involved in disputes among the Allies.

There were a number of proposals, suggestions and models put forward by different writers, politicians and strategists in this respect, such as “transferring the WEU *acquis* into the EU,” “concluding a bilateral agreement between Turkey and the EU,” “occasional full participation when concerning Turkey’s national interests,” “concluding a Schengen-type security agreement between Turkey and the EU”¹²³ and a comprehensive proposal called the “European Security and Defence Planning System.”¹²⁴

¹²² Foreign Minister İsmail Cem’s statement, *Hürriyet* 25 May 2000.

¹²³ Yıldız, op.cit., Chapter 5.

¹²⁴ This was proposed by US Secretary of Defense William Cohen, on 10 October 2000, cited in Halil Şimşek, *Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2002), p.179.

Only one of these attempts produced a concrete formula, that is the so-called Ankara Agreement, which was accepted at the end of the diplomatic negotiations among Turkey, the United States and the United Kingdom in 2001 and finalised in 2002. Then, due to Greek opposition, the Ankara Agreement was slightly softened in the ensuing negotiations that took place on two fronts: one among Turkey, the UK and the US on the one hand, and the other among Greece and other EU countries on the other. Through the negotiations that took place in the NATO Summit in Prague on 21 November 2002 and in the EU Council meeting in Brussels on 24-25 October 2002, the parties finally reached a compromise to end the deadlock. According to the compromise that was expressed in the EU Brussels European Council Document dated 24-25 October 2002, Greece and the EU accepted Turkey's reservations on the use of NATO assets and capabilities in EU-led operations. In turn, Turkey withdrew its veto on the operationalisation of the ESDP. It seems that the Ankara Agreement and the Brussels Document finally and formally settled Turkey's delicate position regarding the ESDP process and opened the way to the conclusion of EU-NATO co-operation regarding the use of NATO assets and capabilities in EU-led operations. Both the Ankara Agreement and the Brussels Document will be explained below. However, because they can hardly be the ultimate solutions for Turkey's long-term interests, we will suggest three more formulas as our opinion for a full resolution of the problem.

5.1. Minimal Solution: The Ankara Agreement

The diplomatic negotiations among the US, the UK and Turkey during the period 2001-2002 produced the Ankara Agreement¹²⁵ for finding a solution to Turkey's veto on EU-NATO co-operation. The Ankara Agreement was an important formula for finding a solution to the problem. According to this agreement, apart from previously given rights in the Nice Declaration, Turkey was provided with additional assurances and rights in return for Turkey removing its veto on EU-NATO co-operation, i.e. the EU's 'guaranteed access to pre-identified NATO assets' under the following conditions:

Firstly, in EU-led operations for Petersberg tasks without NATO assets and capabilities, the Nice formula was maintained. Thus the non-EU European NATO members could participate in such operations only after an invitation by the EU Council for consultations. But in any case, according to the Ankara Agreement, the EU assured Turkey that it wanted to eliminate Turkey's aforementioned fears by giving security guarantees on the following points:

¹²⁵ Analysed by Öymen, *op.cit.*, 2002.

* The EU will pay due attention to Turkey's serious concerns and supreme national interests primarily in areas of proximity to Turkey: the Balkans, the Aegean Sea, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey will be invited to the preparation stage of EU-led operations in these regions, and the EU Council will take Turkey's views and concerns into consideration during the decision-making process;

* Petersberg-type operations will not be launched for the resolution of disputes between the Allies, nor will the ESDP be involved in such cases where a NATO country has vital interests. That means the ESDP will not interfere in the disputes between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea, Cyprus etc. In other words, Greece will be unable to use the ESDP as leverage on Turkey in their relations and problems.

Secondly, in EU-led operations with NATO assets and capabilities, the operations will be able to use NATO assets and capabilities depending on two categories, strategic and non-strategic.

* If, in an EU-led operation, non-strategic assets are to be used, the EU will have guaranteed/automatic access to NATO assets and capabilities. In this case, as stated in the Nice formula, Turkey, as one of the EU+6 countries and as part of the EU+15, will be entitled to participate in the operations as well as in the meetings of the Committee of Contributors.

* But if, in a EU-led operation, strategic assets are to be used, EU demands for the use of these assets will be decided by the NATO Council on a case-by-case basis. Thus, as a full member of the NATO Council, Turkey will be directly involved in the making of final decisions on EU-led operations.

* Furthermore, in such cases, the Ankara Agreement provided Turkey with the right to have enhanced consultations in peacetime and active participation in the operational phase in operations where NATO assets are used. This supports the Washington Summit decisions.

The Ankara Agreement was given support by the NATO and EU members¹²⁶ except for Greece. Greece vetoed the document at the EU's Laeken Summit and at NATO Council meetings held in December 2001.¹²⁷ During the Seville Summit of June 2002, Greece continued its veto over the EU-NATO co-operation.¹²⁸ Greece explicitly stated that the EU should not give guarantees for non-EU countries and that non-EU countries should never participate in the ESDP decision-making process, fearing that Turkey might be allowed rights

¹²⁶ In a joint press conference by George Robertson on behalf of NATO and Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel, Javier Solana and Chris Patten on behalf of the EU expressed their support of the Ankara Agreement. *Yeni Şafak*, 7 December 2001.

¹²⁷ For example, *Radikal*, issues 4-7 December 2001.

¹²⁸ *Turkish News* (Turkish daily newspaper in English), 21-22-23 June 2002.

that would give it influence in ESDP decision-making. Greece insisted instead that it should be given 'security guarantees' by NATO. Thus, NATO-EU co-operation was locked into the Turkish-Greek competition, and this in turn prevented the operationalisation of the ESDP. Hence, because the Ankara Agreement could not be fully put into practice, it was slightly changed and formally put into operation only after a compromise was reached in the Brussels process in the second half of 2002.

5.2. The Formal Solution: The Brussels Document

In the wake of the deadlock created by the Greek opposition to the Ankara Agreement, the EU countries and the United States continued negotiations with Greece and Turkey from about the middle to the end of 2002. In the NATO Summit in Prague, the Allies conceded Turkey's security concerns as stated in the Ankara Agreement in return for Turkey's removal of its veto on the EU-NATO co-operation for the use of NATO assets and capabilities. At the EU Council meeting in Brussels, on the other hand, the EU countries finally persuaded Greece to remove its objection to the Ankara Agreement in return for some modifications to the agreement. Hence came the so-called Brussels Document, which formally ended the deadlock, not only in the relations between the EU and Turkey, but also in the implementation of EU-NATO co-operation.

The Brussels Document, which was accepted by the EU Council meeting in Brussels on 24-25 October, was endorsed by the Copenhagen European Council meeting on 12-13 December 2002 and by the NATO Council on 13 December 2002. The Brussels Document declared "...under no circumstances, nor in any crisis, will ESDP be used against an Ally, on the understanding, reciprocally, that NATO military crisis management will not undertake any action against the EU or its members."¹²⁹ Furthermore, the EU accepted Turkey's policy in the following decision: "In the case of any EU-led operation not requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, non-EU European Allies will be invited, upon a decision of the [EU] Council, to participate. In taking decisions on participation, the Council will take account of the security concerns of the non-EU European Allies. In a specific case when any of the non-EU European Allies raises its concerns that any envisaged autonomous EU operation will be conducted in the geographic proximity of a non-EU European Ally or may affect its national interests, the Council will consult with that Ally and, taking into consideration the outcome of

¹²⁹ Brussels European Council, *Presidency Conclusions on European Security and Defence Policy, Annex II: ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the Involvement of the Non-EU European Allies*, Point 2, 24-25 October 2002.

these consultations, decide on the participation of that Ally.”¹³⁰ In addition, the Copenhagen European Council decided that “the Berlin Plus arrangements and the implementation thereof would apply only to those EU member states which are also either NATO members or parties to the Partnership for Peace, and which has consequently concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO.”¹³¹ Thus, “Cyprus and Malta will not take part in EU military operations conducted using NATO assets once they have become members of the EU...”¹³² But this will not affect the right of their representatives to participate and vote in the EU institution and bodies. As regards the other arrangements agreed to in the Nice European Council on the preparation and operation of the ESDP, the EU maintained its position as stated in the above discussions.¹³³

The Ankara Agreement, the Brussels Document and the ensuing EU decisions in the Copenhagen European Council have had a positive impact on the elimination of the complications of Turkey’s delicate position. Although it is too early to see the optimal results, it is possible to say that the agreements opened a new era in the resolution of complicated issues, namely the future of Turkish-EU relations, EU-NATO co-operation and the implementation of the ESDP.

Firstly, the Copenhagen European Council meeting on 12-13 December gave Turkey an encouraging, if not fully satisfying, response to the future of Turkey’s full membership in the EU. In Turkey’s long journey towards becoming a full EU member that began in 1964, the EU for the first time mentioned a date: December 2004. Although it was not as satisfying as what the Turkish people and the new government led by Abdullah Gül had expected, it put a concrete target before Turkey to speed up its preparations. As has been popularly stated, it can be considered “a date for date” to formally start the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU. Indeed, the Gül government has already taken important steps to get a “definite date” to start the formal negotiations. It is expected that at the conclusion of the implementation of reforms in the domestic and foreign policy realms that have been ongoing over the last few years, and if things go as planned, Turkey will be a full member of both the EU as well as the ESDP.

Secondly, both the Ankara Agreement and the Brussels Document were big and important steps forward towards the fulfilment of EU-NATO co-operation. They finally

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, Point 12.

¹³¹ Copenhagen European Council, *Presidency Conclusions on European Security and Defence Policy*, 12-13 December 2002.

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ See, *ibid.*, Points 3, 5, 8, 9 and so on.

opened the way for EU-NATO co-operation on the use of NATO assets and capabilities in EU-led operations. Soon after the NATO Council accepted the Brussels Agreement on 13 December 2002, the EU and NATO leaders, Javier Solana and Lord Robertson, issued a declaration on 16 December 2002 to start closer military and political co-operation between the two organisations in the areas of crisis management and conflict prevention. The declaration outlined the political principles for EU-NATO co-operation and gave the EU assured access to NATO's planning and logistic capabilities for its own military operations.¹³⁴

The declaration also noted that EU-NATO co-operation would have "respect for the interests of the member states of the European Union and NATO" and ensure "the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Members of NATO within the ESDP" by implementing the relevant Nice arrangements. Moreover, NATO's support to the ESDP will be made in accordance with the relevant Washington Summit decisions.¹³⁵

Thirdly, with the elimination of Turkish and Greek vetoes and the conclusion of the NATO-EU agreement, the EU was able to put the ESDP into practice in 2003. Firstly, the EU took over command of the U.N. Police Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the cessation of the U.N.-led International Police Task Force at the end of 2002, the first ESDP operation that will last until 2005. The EU Police Force, which is made up of 900 staff members from 15 EU countries as well as from non-EU countries including Turkey, will train the Bosnian police forces.¹³⁶ In addition, the EU took over the NATO-led Amber Fox peacekeeping mission in Macedonia on 31 March 2003 by using NATO assets and capabilities. Moreover, the EU Council stated the EU's willingness to lead a military operation in Bosnia following SFOR (now run by NATO).¹³⁷

As a result, as Turkey achieved most of its objectives in the Ankara Agreement it should be seen as a positive outcome for Turkey and Turkish foreign policy. In the end, Turkey managed to make some important modifications in EU arrangements on the ESDP that had been decided at the Cologne, Helsinki and Nice councils. With these modifications, Turkey seemed to ensure its security interests until it becomes a full member of the ESDP through full EU membership. It also provided important progress in meeting Turkey's fundamental concerns relating to Turkey's national interests in the broader European security

¹³⁴ *NATO-EU Declaration on the ESDP*, www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/12-december/e1216a.htm.

¹³⁵ www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm

¹³⁶ www.euobserver.com/index.phtml, *Radikal*, 28.12.2002 and 02.01.2003.

¹³⁷ <http://euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=8885>.

region. This can be considered an important achievement because of Turkey's increasing security burden after the end of the Cold War, as stated above.

However, in our opinion, the Formal Solution cannot be considered the 'final' solution to end Turkey's delicate position between NATO and the ESDP in the long term. Some evidence can be shown for this pessimism. First of all, despite assurances given to Turkey, it does not make Turkey and the other non-EU European Allies an actual part of the ESDP process. It is still far from Turkey's status as associate member in the WEU. In other words, it can be seen as a 'political and compromise solution' but without 'institutional arrangements.' Although it made 'promises and assurances' to Turkey, it cannot be seen as 'concrete solutions for the future' unless institutional connections are established and unless Turkey is made an institutional part of the ESDP process. The most critical problem -- Turkey's participation in the ESDP decision-making process -- remains unresolved. Turkey is not allowed to participate in the ESDP decision-making process in operations with NATO assets and capabilities, nor is Turkey guaranteed that it will be 'invited' to EU-led operations without NATO assets and capabilities. So it can only be a transitional solution for the short term to assure Turkey that EU-led operations using NATO's strategic assets will be decided by the NATO Council on a case-by-case basis and that Turkey will be raising its demands for this kind of operation.

Therefore, Turkey's delicate position will continue in the foreseeable future, until a more concrete and durable solution is found. In the following pages, we will suggest three more alternative solutions in this respect.

5.3. Satisfying Solution: Making Turkey an Associate Member of the ESDP

That is to simply establish a kind of parallelism between Turkey's associated membership in the first and third pillars of EU integration and the second pillar. In other words, Turkey's acquisitions in economic and legal issues can be transferred to the ESDP decision-making structure. This has many advantages. First of all, this would end Turkey's marginal position that developed starting in 1999. Turkey's integration with the EU would proceed at all levels, and that would encourage Turkey to speed up its work towards full membership in the EU. At least it would end the complications that, as stated above, have emerged since the Helsinki Summit.

Secondly, Turkey would fully contribute to EU-NATO co-operation, thus allowing the EU guaranteed access to pre-identified NATO sources in a much easier manner than what Turkey accepted in the Formal Solution. In other words, unlike the case of the Ankara and

Brussels agreements in which Turkey's permission for EU access to NATO assets and capabilities is only conditional on some details, in the event of its associate membership in the ESDP Turkey would be more willing to co-act with the EU. As a result, Turkey would be involved in the decision-making process at the associate-membership level. Though unable to block any EU decisions or operations, it would be able to express its opinions and table its proposals so as to contribute to the formation of the decisions.

Thirdly, it would bring the Washington Summit arrangements and perspective back to life. The Allies would have dialogue, co-operation and transparency under the common and mutual frameworks of the EU and NATO. This would not do any harm to the EU's autonomous institutional character because it would continue to maintain its autonomy in the ESDP decision-making process.

Fourthly, the division-of-labour system within NATO, i.e. the EU as the sub-contractor for the European security architecture under NATO, would work more efficiently. The aforementioned institutional complexities of the European members' positions, including such divisions as the non-EU European NATO Allies (Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic), non-EU NATO Allies (+ the US and Canada), the non-NATO EU countries (Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland), the EU+15 arrangement and the EU+6 arrangement, would end to a great extent. If the two institutions can establish common platforms where they can promote dialogue, co-operation and transparent relations, there would emerge what the U.S. secretary of defence called the European Security and Defence System, leading to a 'whole and compact Europe' with a transatlantic connection.¹³⁸

When one mentions that Turkey should be made a part of the ESDP's institutional dimension, even at the associate membership level, there is a view that Turkey is trying to enter the EU from the 'back door' through the ESDP mechanism. So, the argument continues, Turkey is using its veto power in NATO in order to achieve this objective.

This is an unjustified accusation for several reasons: First of all, Turkey was already a part of the EU institution through its WEU associate membership before the awkward process started after the Helsinki and Washington summits in 1999, and now asks no more than a continuation of that position. In other words, the satisfying solution is only to 'satisfy' Turkey that it is still part of the European security and defence policy and not excluded from the system. With that, Turkey is neither asking for 'full membership' in the EU nor trying to

¹³⁸ The Turkish General Staff agrees and calls it a "unitary system for crisis management". It would prevent the creation of dividing lines within the EU and NATO. Turkish General Staff, *op.cit.*; also by Foreign Ministry, Orhun, *op.cit.* 2000, p.121.

secure veto power in the EU Council to block the ESDP process. Turkey only asks that the EU take Turkey's security concerns and policies into consideration as stated above.

Of course, Turkey would definitely like to be a full member of the EU's second pillar as well as the other two pillars. But it is clear that it cannot be a part of it unless it completes its reforms in economic, political and legal issues. Only then can Turkey be a full member of the ESDP. That would be the optimal solution for Turkey's 'delicate position' between NATO and the ESDP in general.

5.4. Optimal Solution: Full Integration into the ESDP

This is the ultimate solution for ending both Turkey's delicate position and the awkward process that started in 1999. This would open the way for Turkey to be a part of the security community that has been under development by the EU for so many years. However, this is indeed a medium-term project that is contingent upon Turkey's full integration into the EU. So it is neither a dream nor a utopia. Once Turkey speeds up its reform process in light of the Copenhagen criteria, having genuine integration in the economic, political and legal fields, Turkey will upgrade its soft-security agenda and arena to the level of the EU countries.

Such an eventuality could have positive security implications for Turkey's foreign, defence and security policy. Turkey's improvement of its standards in line with modern/contemporary values and policies would spill over into the region in proximity to Turkey: the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Turkey's export of soft-security values such as democracy, human rights, market economy, pluralism, freedoms etc. would improve the conditions in the regions surrounding Europe.

Indeed, Turkey has such potential. As a bridge between civilisations and communities, Turkey's attainment of EU values would increase the level of securitisation not only for Turkey itself but also for the European Union as a whole. An important piece of evidence for that was the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)-EU Joint Forum on 12-13 February 2002 in Istanbul after the September 11 incident. The forum, code-named "Civilisation and Harmony: The Political Dimension," was organised by the Turkish Foreign Ministry. A total of 89 countries from EU and OIC institutions participated.¹³⁹ During the forum, being the broadest international gathering after the U.N. General Assembly meetings, the EU and the OIC countries sought to create a harmonious connection and understanding between the two worlds following September 11. It was depicted as the "Istanbul Spirit."¹⁴⁰ The Istanbul Spirit

¹³⁹ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/OIC-EU-Forum.htm>

¹⁴⁰ Murat Yetkin, columnist, in *Radikal*, 14 December 2002.

reiterated the fact that Turkey has the potential to act as a melting and meeting point, or bridge, between two geographies, political systems and cultures, and to contribute to international security by reducing the level of conflicts and misperceptions between the European world and the Islamic world. Thus, that event can be seen as evidence that Turkey can play a ‘security provider’ role in the region and contribute to the expansion of the EU’s security community into the Islamic world in general and to the Euroasian region in particular. According to Ambassador Bozkır, no other country could manage to bring these two worlds within the same framework. Turkey sent an interesting message to both the European countries and the Islamic world: Turkey, as a democratic, secular and market-economy country, could be a model for the Muslim world and bring both worlds within the same framework.¹⁴¹

Similarly, Turkey, the EU allies and the United States have been involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan since September 11. Turkey displayed a positive reaction to the Bonn Agreement in which the EU and the NATO Allies agreed to eradicate the sources of terrorism by getting rid of the remnants of the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda. In this respect, Turkey showed its readiness to co-operate with the EU/NATO Allies in building up modern social and technical institutions such as schools, television stations, hospitals, infrastructure, police and military service systems. In addition, as stated above, Turkey participated in ISAF and even took over command of the force from the UK for six months from mid-June 2000 onwards. All those should be seen as indications of how Turkey could act as a ‘security provider’ for the European Union’s security community in the broader European architecture.

True, the EU has differences with Turkey on the approach to international politics and foreign policy. But that does not mean that the EU harbours enmity, secret agendas or conspiracy towards Turkey. One should realise that the EU’s perception of security is different from that of Turkey. Karaosmanoğlu has rightly argued that whereas the EU turned *inwards*, trying to build up a security community in Europe per se, Turkey has turned *outwards*, trying to improve its security in Euroasia.¹⁴² But this does not mean that the Turkish and EU security perceptions cannot be reconciled: While Turkey becomes a part of the European security community by fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and completing

¹⁴¹ Interview with Volkan Bozkır, Deputy Secretary-General of Turkish European Union General Secretariat, 3 May 2002, Ankara.

¹⁴² Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, “Turkey’s Security Policy in Connection with the USA and the EU”, in Hasan Celal Güzel et al., (eds.), *The Turks*, Vol.5, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Publications, 2002); Ali Karaosmanoğlu, “Türkiye Açısından Avrupa Güvenlik Kimliği: Jeopolitik ve Demokratik Ufuk” in Şaban Çalış, İhsan Dağı ve Ramazan Gözen (eds.), *Türkiye’nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik* (Ankara: Liberte, 2001).

integration with the EU in all fields, the EU and Turkey collectively extend the borders of the security community to a broader Europe where Turkey and the EU have mutual interests.¹⁴³

5.5. Perfect Solution: Turkey as Multidimensional Security Provider

The perfect solution for Turkey is to act as a European actor in the region, endowed with both hard security and soft security capabilities and policies. In other words, like many of the European Union countries that are integral members of both NATO and the EU, Turkey can develop its own military-security power as well as its economic-political-technical-cultural power. Turkey, having NATO and the EU's support and advantages, could be the 'rising star' of the region, acting as a source of stability in all aspects. Such an eventuality would bring many advantages. First of all, the Turkish nation would improve its power and security in all dimensions. Turkey's attainment of the EU's political, economic/financial/commercial, legal and technical standards would improve the soft-security aspect of the Turkish nation. Secondly, an economically developed Turkey would enhance its military-strategic capabilities, positively contributing to burden-sharing in the Atlantic Alliance. Turkey could sustain its own military spending much more easily and efficiently than when Turkey receives foreign aid from the Allies all the time. Thirdly, Turkey's attainment of soft and hard military security capabilities would make it a more credible and influential power in the region. Turkey could get involved in, and contribute to, not only military-strategic operations but also the economic-political-legal operations in all these places. As a result, Turkey could increase its potential to change the region towards a modern, stable and peaceful environment.

¹⁴³ See Rosemary Hollis, "Turkey and the Geo-political Consequences of EU Enlargement," in Christian-Peter Honelti *et al.* (ed.), *Future Prospects for European-Gulf Relations* (Munich: Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research, 2000).

6. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND TURKEY

At the end of this work, we can put forward two conclusions, first about the future of the European security architecture and second about Turkey's position in future developments.

We live in a world in which security can be achieved only through the co-operation of countries because security problems are common and interdependent all over the world. The September 11 tragedy has shown this very clearly. The events since the end of the Cold War as well as September 11 have also shown that the borders of security agendas and arenas have been broadened in all dimensions. That poses a challenge for the European countries and their organisations such as NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. All these organisations have roles to play for the management of security relations. As stated at the beginning, each has its own peculiar function and role in the division-of-labour spirit.

This study has argued that the EU's attempt to break up this division of labour and a narrow approach to the management of the security problems in a broader Europe has created and might create more complications in the Atlantic Alliance in general and in Turkey's relations with the EU in particular.

Therefore, the European security architecture should not be based on a 'narrow perspective' but rather on a 'broad perspective,' simply because the realities on the ground cannot be understood by and dealt with through 'narrow security arrangements,' but only with 'broad security arrangements.' To put it more clearly since we are living in the age of globalisation where borders are much weaker, problems affect most of the world population and countries and peoples are thus more interdependent on each other; the conception of security should also be globalised. As a result, all countries, regardless of their level of development, prosperity and status, are facing the impact of the security implications of globalisation. Due to such a broad concept of security in the age of globalisation, arrangements and solutions in the regions that were the most strongly affected by the end of the post-Cold War period, i.e. a broader Europe, should be based on broad perspectives. Thus, the borders of the European security architecture do not end at the borders of the EU countries per se, but definitely encompass the surrounding regions. As a result, both the EU and NATO should work not only for the security and stability of their own regions but also for that of the surrounding regions. And both organisations should act in co-operation within the spirit of

division of labour and work to find viable, long-term and durable solutions for both hard security and low security problems.

In the construction process of the new security order, some countries have key positions due to their multidimensional, namely broad, security connections with the regions in their proximity. They are a kind of ‘overarching regional power’ having a considerable amount of influence and involvement in the region. Russia and Turkey constitute this sort of country. Turkey’s important position in its own region is well known. But this work has argued that Turkey is a country whose contribution to European security should be multidimensional, ranging from military-political-diplomatic to economic, social-cultural and technical. Turkey is situated at a delicate point that can be both an ‘asset’ and also a ‘burden’ for the European security architecture in particular. It can be an asset only if Turkey is fully and substantially integrated, not only into the military and strategic structure but also into the political, economic and social structure of the Western/European security community. Then, Turkey can be a more influential country within its geography in such a way as to project durable stability, peace and prosperity. Turkey could act as a model country for the countries in the region. As a country having the characteristics of both worlds, Turkey could play a more fundamental and effective role than just acting as a military force.

Achieving such a role necessitates hard work by both Turkey itself and the Western allies. First of all, Turkey should complete its reforms to become a full member of the European Union and thus develop its economic, commercial and technical capacity. And then, Turkey should approach and become involved in the region in order to expand the borders of the security community by employing soft security policies for the resolution of social, political and economic problems in and around Turkey. That would create a more peaceful, secure, and stable region around the EU. So it is advantageous and beneficial not only for Turkey and the region itself, but also for the EU and the NATO Allies as well.

Thus, secondly, the Western allies, particularly the EU, should take into consideration Turkey’s positive contribution to the creation of a peaceful, stable and secure environment in its own region. In that respect, the EU should clear the way for Turkey’s full integration into the security community, give positive and constructive response to Turkey’s genuine attempts to complete its reforms in light of the Copenhagen criteria and, of course, find a viable solution for Turkey’s delicate position. If the EU wants to become a global actor and involved in security and defence issues, it should have close institutional links with Turkey as well as with other non-EU European NATO countries. This is necessary for its operational capabilities. In any case, the EU will need Turkey’s contribution and assistance, especially in

the Euroasian region. As Bretherton and Vogles conclude “The EU’s dismal failure of policy towards Turkey represents the nadir of EU actorness. Inability to address this issue may ultimately undermine the EU’s broader strategy of close association with its near abroad.”¹⁴⁴

As for NATO, the Allies should understand Turkey’s delicate position and display sympathy towards Turkey’s insistence and use of its veto for achieving its objective to become part of the ESDP process. This is indeed for the benefit of all the Western allies.

Finally, the future of the broader European security architecture closely depends on where Turkey is, and vice versa. The closer Turkey is to the EU security community, the more secure and peaceful Turkey, as well as the EU, NATO and the Euroasian region, will be.

¹⁴⁴ Bretherton and Vogles, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, op.cit. ‘EU actorness’ can be described as the EU’s ability and policy to act as a single entity in international relations on behalf of the member countries.

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