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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION - A QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT**

by

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March 2008

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A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT**

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ABSTRACT

Since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom nearly seven years ago, Afghanistan has made only very limited progress towards reconstruction. While they have experienced limited political progress under the framework agreed to in Bonn Agreement, the development, reform, and progress in other sectors of the society have predominantly fallen short of expectations. After several years of relative calm, the Taliban reemerged in 2004 significantly increasing their operations and territorial control each year. The influence of the Taliban was accelerated, in part, by the dissatisfaction of the population due to the lack of progress in post-conflict development. In response, the international community and the United States are increasing the money and manpower dedicated to the reconstruction effort. This thesis quantitatively analyzes the number, type, and location of reconstruction projects, the localized Taliban risk level, and the number, type, and location of Taliban attacks from January 2004 to June 2007. The goal of the analysis is to assess the effectiveness of the reconstruction effort at decreasing Taliban attacks and to uncover which sectors have the greatest impact and act as the key leverage points. Through statistical calculations, it was determined that reconstruction projects targeting rural development, agricultural development, and natural resources development had the greatest effect on decreasing the Taliban presence. Local, small-scale security projects, rather than decreasing attacks, actually increased Taliban attacks, in some cases accounting for an amazing 76 percent of the increase. Additionally, the \$10.3 billion in strategic-level security and infrastructure improvements had no measurable impact on decreasing the level of Taliban attacks. These trends, that direct aid to the livelihood of the population decreased attacks, and aid aimed at direct military confrontation with the Taliban actually increased attacks, reflects a classic counter-insurgency pattern. This supports the position that the struggle against the Taliban in Afghanistan will not be won kinetically and a more counter-insurgency focused approach is required.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PREFACE - WHY AFGHANISTAN MATTERS

America is currently at war, a war against terrorism, world-wide. The key elements to winning this war are two-fold; not only fighting and winning battles, but also “promoting freedom as the alternative to tyranny and despair.”¹ By expanding and encouraging the forces of freedom, democracy, and human dignity, more nations will naturally tend toward peace, making the world a safer place for America. As such, the first of two pillars that form our national security strategy includes promoting democracies, free and fair trade, development, accountable and effective governments, and economic policies that benefit individual citizens.² The recovery of Afghanistan from 25 years of civil war involves all of these elements. The Taliban have been replaced by a constitution, free elections, and civil liberties, however, much work remains to be done. According to President Bush, not only do they deserve the support from the US and international community, but the success in Afghanistan is a vital to national security interest to ensure terrorists cannot use it as a base of operations and launching pad for terror.³

America’s stated goal in Afghanistan is to help the people of Afghanistan defeat the terrorists, and establish a stable, moderate, and democratic state that respects the rights of its citizens, governs its territory effectively, and is a reliable ally in the War on Terror.⁴ Key elements in accomplishing this goal include increasing the size and capabilities of the Afghan security forces, improving governance, developing the rural economy, by building irrigation, roads, power

¹ George W. Bush, “Introductory Letter” *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: White House, March 2006).

² Bush.

³ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: White House, March 2006), 12.

⁴ *Fact Sheet: Goals for Afghanistan*, (Washington, DC: White House – Office of the Press Secretary, 15 February, 2007) and *Total US Security and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Department of State-Office of the Spokesman, 31 January 2006).

production, and micro-credit.⁵ How well we deliver on these promises will have a significant impact, not only on the life of Afghans, but also on our national security.

B. PURPOSE

We are approaching seven years since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom and the military effort to eliminate the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. At the five year mark in Operation Enduring Freedom there was a slew of analysis documenting the popular landmark, most noted the limited progress in the political, security, and reconstruction efforts, advances by the Taliban over the summer of 2006 and the pending “spring offensive”. While the territorial gains of the Taliban in 2007 may have been less than feared, they have certainly consolidated their hold in the south and east.⁶ As a result, portions of the country have transitioned from fragile or weak government with sporadic insurgent activity to a nearly failed state with a full-fledged insurgency. In response, the international community in general, and the US in particular, plan to greatly expand their commitment to Afghanistan, by requesting an increase in aid money to \$11.8 billion for the next two years and deploying additional military forces to the country.⁷

When a similar “surge” was proposed for the war in Iraq it was accompanied by a comprehensive strategic review which resulted in a new counterinsurgency strategy. While this new strategy received less media coverage, it was, in fact, a significant shift in how the war was being fought. As a result, the surge of men and materials were not simply put in the field doing more of the same, but rather part of an entirely revamped approach.

Is the same analysis required in Afghanistan? Are more soldiers and more money the answer, or does the strategy itself need to be adjusted? Has the

⁵ *Fact Sheet: Goals for Afghanistan*, (Washington, DC: White House – Office of the Press Secretary, 15 February 2007).

⁶ A recent report by the Senlis Council states the Taliban have a permanent presence in 58 percent of Afghanistan, predominantly in the south and east. See: *Stumbling into Chaos – Afghanistan on the Brink*, (London: Senlis Council, November 2007), 6.

⁷ *Fact Sheet: Increasing Support to Help the People of Afghanistan Succeed* (Washington, DC: White House – Office of the Press Secretary, 15 February 2007).

current effort had any impact whatsoever, and if so, how can that be best capitalized? What can we learn from the success and failures of the first six years as we move forward? This thesis is a comprehensive examination of the entire reconstruction effort in terms of numbers, cost, types, and locations of projects while at the same time assessing the risk posed by the Taliban both in the general sense and in terms of the number, types and locations of attacks. The quantitative analysis presented of the interaction between these two factors will highlight which types of reconstruction projects are most effective in reducing the Taliban threat.

C. IMPORTANCE

One of the critical lessons from the terrorist attacks on September 11th is that failed states matter. We can no longer ignore or remain disinterested in failed states with little geo-political significance. The question is on longer whether or not to become involved, but rather the degree and characterization of our involvement. As such, defining the challenges and developing successful strategies for our involvement is vitally important. Much has been written in both the theoretical sense and use of case studies on the consistent challenges and possible strategies to employ, and specific strategies are being utilized in Afghanistan today. This paper will identify what aspects of the current reconstruction project strategy are working, which aspects are not, and what can be modified for future use.

Almost all indicators of the tactical military situation with relation to the Taliban in Afghanistan have gotten progressively worse since 2004; from 2005 to 2006 attacks on coalition forces increased by 250% and attacks on Afghan forces increased by nearly 400%, with the trend continuing into 2007.⁸ At the same time there is growing acceptance among some policy makers and regional experts that the fight against the Taliban is not going to be won through kill ratios and body

⁸ Anthony Cordesman, *Winning in Afghanistan: How to Face the Rising Threat*. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006).

counts. In fact, in many respects, killing a Taliban foot soldier can be counterproductive “When you kill a person it’s a multiplication factor. It demands that all the male relatives join the fight.”⁹ Additionally, collateral damage is having a devastating effect on the US effort. “Killing one innocent Afghan civilian can turn a village against the Afghan government and coalition.”¹⁰ The situation in Afghanistan is no longer a protracted “mop-up” operation against lingering Taliban and al-Qaeda elements where killing the few remaining “bad-guys” is a plausible strategy, it has developed into a full blown insurgency against the Karzai government and as such requires a completely different strategic approach. As with most insurgencies, this one can best be countered by gaining the “trust and confidence” of the Afghan people.¹¹ This is achieved primarily by fulfilling your promises and meeting their expectations, notably, establish law and order and create the environment for economic growth and reconstruction.

Unfortunately, our ability to fulfill promises and meet expectations was severely hampered for the first several years after the fall of the Taliban. For a variety of political and policy reasons the administrations initial reaction to Afghanistan was to avoid the large-scale nation-building model used by President Clinton in Bosnia and Kosovo, instead opting for a smaller, lighter “footprint”. As a result, “Afghanistan was the least resources of any major American led nation building operations since the end of WWII.”¹² The administration is dramatically increasing its efforts at stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan. After spending

⁹ Thomas H. Johnson quoted in: Ron Moreau, Sami Yousafzai, Zahid Hussain, and Rod Nordland. “Into Thin Air” *Newsweek*, 150, No 10 (3 September 2007): 24.

¹⁰ Seth G. Jones. *Afghanistan’s Local Insurgency* (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2007).

¹¹ Others may equate this to “winning the hearts and minds” of the Vietnam era, but they are actually quite different. “Hearts and minds” implies a population that likes us and thinks like we do. “Trust and confidence” means that the population does not have to like us, or become westernized, but they need to have faith in us as honest brokers, a stabilizing force in a corrupt environment, and can depend on us to follow through to completion on promises and commitments.

¹² James Dobbins. *Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War* (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2007) CT-271.

only \$0.5 billion in the first year and \$10.3 billion in the first six years, the President is planning to increase spending more than three-fold to \$11.8 billion in the next two years.¹³

An increase in funding is only half the picture, just as important is how that money will be spent. What will be built, where, when, and for whom? Money is not the end-all, it is a tool that must be carefully applied to maximize its effectiveness, and if used incorrectly it can have damaging effects. Analyzing the current strategy, though under funded, will shed light on its effectiveness and help determining the utility of the current course of action. Are reconstruction priorities properly set and just require additional resources, is another approach required? Is a single national strategy still relevant, or should two separate policies be adopted, one for the South and East regions where Afghanistan is closer to “failed state” and requires a counter-insurgency approach and a second for the North and West regions which are holding steady at “weak state” status, and where post-conflict reconstruction theories and approaches are still applicable? Certainly these are important questions to ask as we increase our commitment.

After several years of stalled progress in meeting the expectations of Afghans, the country is at a critical juncture in reducing the growing influence of the Taliban. In an era of limited budgets and limited resources the United States can ill afford wasted efforts.¹⁴ We need to get it right, emphasizing the areas that are cost effective and provide the most leverage against the Taliban. Before simply increasing the volume of resources dedicated to our current approach it

¹³ *Fact Sheet: Increasing Support to Help the People of Afghanistan Succeed* (Washington, DC: White House – Office of the Press Secretary, 15 February 2007) and *Total US Security and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Department of State-Office of the Spokesman, 31 January 2006).

¹⁴ US efforts are also diluted by the fact that 86 percent of US aid comes in the form of “phantom aid” according to *Real Aid - An Agenda for Making Aid Work* (June 2005 page 30) and *Real Aid 2 – Making Technical Assistance Work* (2006) both reports written by ActionAid International. They define phantom aid as aid that never materializes in the target country because it is diverted for other purposes. Some examples include aid that must be spent on overpriced US goods and services and technical assistance, aid counted as debt relief, and aid used to cover excessively high transaction costs, immigrations charges and administrative fees.

needs to be more closely analyzed. We may find out that not only do we need more money, but a completely different strategy.

D. PRIMARY THESIS ARGUMENT

Quantitative and statistical analysis often results in completely new insights and disproves previous assumptions. By comparing the overall level of the stabilization and reconstruction effort and the emphasis levels on specific sectors of that effort, with the level of risk posed by the Taliban and the level of Taliban attacks, the data reveals some counterintuitive results. The \$10 billion effort to rebuild major elements of the national infrastructure and improve security at the strategic level is having no measurable effect on the number of Taliban attacks. On the contrary, an increase in security projects actually leads to an increase in Taliban attacks. Clearly, the current reconstruction effort is not having the intended effects and a new approach is required.

E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

1. General Approach

This study will attempt to measure the effectiveness of the current stability and reconstruction strategy in reducing violence through a series of extensive quantitative analysis of the aid programs themselves, and comparing that to increased (or decreased) levels of security as assessed by the United Nations and the number of Taliban attacks. Analysis will be conducted at both the province and district levels, using a variety of timeframes and analytical perspectives. This approach facilitates the inclusion of multiple sources of data, thereby increasing the overall confidence level of the results, and eliminates some of the difficulties in focusing either too narrowly or too broadly.

Studying an element of current history always poses unique challenges as the situation on the ground can change dramatically in a very short period. This is especially true when undertaking a quantitative analysis such as the one presented here. A dramatic bombing, or assassination, or tide-changing event

can be easily accounted for and included in a more subjective study. Statistics, databases, and budgets, while more objective, present the inherent problem of lagging behind reality. By definition, a monthly summary of attack data, or a USAID monthly field report includes data that can be thirty days old. Add to that the time required for bureaucracies to, in varying degrees, process, verify, consolidate, incorporate, screen, and publish, and there is often a time lag of several months before data are available to the public.

Since the situation is constantly evolving as events on the continue to unfold and even the most current statistical data available is often two to six months old, the requirement to clearly state the time period of analysis becomes essential. For this study data on the reconstruction effort and the level of Taliban violence will only be considered between 1 January 2004 and 30 June 2007. These dates are not arbitrary. There is a general consensus that the Taliban resurgence began in earnest in 2004, which provides a logical start date. The end date was determine primarily by the availability of reconstruction and attack data.¹⁵ Naturally, this means all events in the latter half of 2007 and the winter of 2008 are not included. Any impact from cabinet secretaries visiting Afghanistan, NATO defense ministers debating Afghanistan, a new wave of spectacular suicide bombings, and recent ISAF offensives, which may eventually result in shifts in the data trends are not represented in this study.

2. Sources

The data used to measure and asses the international stabilization and reconstruction effort is the Afghanistan Country Stability Picture (ACSP), version VII, with and effective date of 30 June, 2007. Other databases are available and

¹⁵ When this study was undertaken in earnest in its current form in September 2007, the latest edition of the reconstruction database used in the study included events up to 30 June 2007. The next edition was not scheduled for widespread release until January 2008 (according to email correspondence with ACSP project officer in Afghanistan). Likewise, the attack database was only updated on a quarterly basis. When the majority of the attack data was gathered in November 2007, the most current event in the database was 30 June 2007 (results of queries on 21 November 2007). As late as February 2008, the database only contained attack information up to 30 September 2007 (results of queries on 19 February 2007). It was therefore, out of necessity that 30 June 2007 was selected for the end date of analysis.

more widely known but each represented limitations that would affect either the quality of the data, or the utility of the formatting. For example the United Nations maintains separate Donor Assistance Databases for numerous countries, including Afghanistan.¹⁶ Another database consider for the study was the product published by the Afghanistan Ministry of Finance.¹⁷ The ACSP was initially developed by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) but is used extensively throughout the government of Afghanistan and international donor community to track, monitor and de-conflict all reconstruction and stabilization efforts countrywide. It consists of over 47,000 individual projects with projected costs of over \$14 billion, ranging from small-scale reconstruction projects and Provincial Reconstruction Team efforts to larger strategic efforts such as rebuilding the “ring road”. Additionally, the reconstruction efforts are categorized according to the eight pillars of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).¹⁸

The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) is the primary database used to track attack data because it possessed the best and most comprehensive, unclassified Afghanistan dataset.¹⁹ Additionally, it contains complete categorization of victims and targets, which allows accurate comparison to reconstruction and stabilization sectors. However, in order to verify the information, additional sources were used. In addition to the raw number of attacks, the United Nations risk assessment maps, developed by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security will also be utilized.

¹⁶ Access on-line via: <http://aacadad.synisys.com/idmafg/idmMain/loader.asp> (accessed 27 June 2007).

¹⁷ Access on-line via: <http://203.215.43.35/html/dad/msaccessdad.html> (accessed 16 March 2008).

¹⁸ *Afghanistan National Development Strategy – Summary Report*, (Government of Afghanistan), 20. <http://www.and.s.gov.af/ands/I-ANDS/ands-documents.asp?page=883736&numbpar=css&lang=eng&cont=right&class=dari> (accessed 16 March 2008).

¹⁹ Access on-line via: <http://wits.nctc.gov/Main.do> (accessed 16 March 2008).

3. Methodology

While the sites identified above provided the initial sources for the quantitative data, each database was subjected to extensive screening, modifications, and further categorization to meet the needs of this study. As a result the multiple datasets analyzed in each chapter differ greatly from the original data, in some cases reflecting more detailed information, new distinct categories and fields of data, and screening procedures developed specifically for the study.

Because the datasets that are used in the statistical calculations are significantly different than those retrievable from the sources listed, there is a heavy emphasis on the methodology employed in each chapter. Detailing the specific modifications made to each dataset will ensure the results are repeatable and will increase the overall confidence level in the data and ultimately confidence in the results. Where appropriate, based on time and space constraints, summarized versions of the datasets used in the chapters were included as appendixes.

F. ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS

1. Chapter II - Post-Conflict Reconstruction – Theory and Reality

Chapter II examines the area of post-conflict reconstruction, both from a theoretical perspective and the realities experienced in Afghanistan. The major theoretical approaches are reviewed, addressing various perspectives on the definitions, goals, challenges and sequencing of restoring failed states. This section highlights the lack of consensus within the academic community on the best methods, overall strategies and even disagreement on whether post-conflict reconstruction should be attempted. Moving from theory to reality, the situation in Afghanistan is presented in stages. First, relevant details surrounding the end to the war and the immediate challenges thereafter are discussed. Second, the initial strategies employed and shortfalls in the political, military, and reconstruction arenas are discussed. Third, an updated review of the current

situation and current threats is presented. Lastly, a summary of the various theories presented and the effectiveness of the theories employed in Afghanistan.

2. Chapter III - District Level Analysis

Chapter III is the first of three chapters dedicated to statistical analysis. In each chapter a different approach is employed and the methodology behind the approach is discussed. Chapter III focuses on twenty two different districts, using the UN Risk Assessment maps as a measure of Taliban influence, and modified portions of the ACSP to measure the reconstruction effort. The analysis showed a negative correlation between the overall number of projects and the level of risk, with infrastructure projects and agriculture and rural development projects having the greatest effect. Security projects were shown to have no impact on the level of risk posed by the Taliban.

3. Chapter IV - Provincial Level Analysis - Part I

Chapter IV introduces changes in the level of analysis and the type of data studied. The level of analysis is shifted from the district to fourteen provinces. The ASCP is still used to measure reconstruction, but includes strategic projects whose impact can only be measured at the province level, for the first time. Additionally, a dataset based on the information from WITS is used instead of the UN Risk Assessment maps. Analysis between the total numbers for reconstruction and attacks were conducted, in addition to the relationship between specific sectors of the reconstruction effort and specific Taliban targets.

The approach in this chapter reveals some significant findings, among them, the \$3.7 billion investment in strategic projects had no effect on reducing the level of Taliban attacks, an increase in security projects actually resulted in an increase in Taliban attacks, and lastly, other than security projects, efforts in certain areas of reconstruction did not result in a corresponding rise in Taliban attacks against that sector. In other words, building more schools did not result in more Taliban attacks against schools.

4. Chapter V - Provincial Level Analysis - Part II

Chapter V presents the last set of analytical data. Various approaches are described, each an attempt to test previous results while addressing some of the inherent limitations of the very detailed approaches utilized in the earlier chapters. Most notably is the inclusion of every province, making this the first nation-wide analysis. Additionally, data was analyzed over an aggregated four year period, instead of the year-to-year approach in Chapters II and III, and the introduction of an attack “intensity” metric. The results of these calculations primarily confirmed earlier conclusions, namely the positive correlation between security projects and Taliban attacks, and the lack of any influence from the strategic project efforts on reducing levels of violence.

5. Chapter VI - Conclusions

Chapter VI reviews the approaches and methodological procedures employed in each chapter. The results of each section are compared and contrasted and possible causes are addressed. Finally, the implications of the results and possible causes are discussed.

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II. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION – THEORY AND REALITY

A. REVIEW OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION THEORY

There is little consensus in current operational and academic literature on post-conflict reconstruction. In fact, there are wide variations on everything from definitions and terminology, goals, key challenges, and best practices. One of the few points of consensus are that too little is written on the subject, many gaps in our collective knowledge remain, failed states are important, and establishing security first is essential.²⁰

1. Definitions

With respect to definitions, it is safe to say there is a fluid spectrum within the international system of strong, weak, fragile, failing, failed, and collapsed states.²¹ Each end of the spectrum is relatively easy to define. Strong states are those that “unquestionably control their territory and deliver a full range and high quality of political goods to its citizens.”²² At the other end is the rare and extreme version of a state where the central authority fails to exist. It is no longer a state, but rather a geographical area with a complete vacuum of authority.²³ Warlords, strongmen, or other non-state actors exert control over specific regions of the territory, continually fighting each other. Currently experts cite Somalia as the sole remaining such state, with Afghanistan, Lebanon, Bosnia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone among those that have recently recovered from such a state.²⁴ However,

²⁰ Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren, “The Challenges of Postconflict Development,” in *Postconflict Development – Meeting New Challenges*, Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren. eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 2-5 and Robert I. Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair,” in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Robert I. Rotberg. ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2.

²¹ Rotberg, 1.

²² Ibid., 4.

²³ Ibid., 9.

²⁴ Ibid., 10.

there is a difference of opinion on what this extreme end of the spectrum is called. As Brinkerhoff points out, some refer to such an extreme case as Somalia as a “failed state”. In his opinion, “failed” is an overused term to address states that are beyond “failed” and fall into the “collapsed” category and others that are “more appropriated called fragile, and are very similar to many poor counties suffering from institutional weakness and capacity gaps.”²⁵

Between strong and collapsed states there are weak, fragile, failing, and failed states. While there are variations between scholars, generally, in weak states internal discord is not openly violent, but the capability of the government to provide for the common good of its citizens is “diminished or declining.”²⁶ In fragile, failing and failed states, several forces are at work: a general breakdown of law and order, open conflict between state and insurgent or criminal forces, and inability to protect the citizens or provide for their basic needs and public goods, inability to extend state control throughout the entire territory. Additionally, citizens start to turn to non-state actors to provide security and basic necessities. The subjective interpretation these elements and their intensity, duration, and pervasiveness can place a state in one category or another.²⁷

Another alternative conceptualization of the spectrum is presented by the Fund for Peace in their annual Failed State Index. Using numerical values for twelve social, economic and political criteria, they rank 177 countries into four categories: Sustainable, Moderate, Warning, and Alert.²⁸ While this approach provides a quantitative ranking structure the downside is that the use of only four categories is too broad. While other experts reserved the “collapsed” label for

²⁵ Derick W. Brinkerhoff, “Introduction – governance challenges in fragile states: re-establishing security, rebuilding effectiveness, and reconstituting legitimacy,” in *Governance in Post-Conflict Societies – rebuilding fragile states*, Derick W. Brinkerhoff. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 3.

²⁶ Rotberg, 4.

²⁷ Brinkerhoff, 2 and Rotberg, 5-9.

²⁸ Fund for Peace – Failed State Index Rankings http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366 (accessed 13 March 2008).

only one state, Somalia, the Failed State Index has 32 states in the Alert category, grouping Somalia with established democracies such as Pakistan and Kenya (prior to the recent post-election violence). Likewise the United States and the United Kingdom and not currently considered Sustainable, but rather, rank in the Moderate category, a category they share with countries such as Mongolia, Latvia, and Estonia, and Panama.²⁹




Figure 1. Spectrum of State Strength

Figure 1 provides a rough correlation between the categories used in quantitative methodology of the Failed State Index and the more subjective terms and methodologies of the reviewed literature. While some experts think the differentiation between fragile and collapsed are critical, the Failed State Index lumps them into the same category. At the other end of the spectrum, however, the more subjective analysts would group more countries into the Strong category, arguing that both the United States and the United Kingdom exercise control of their territory and deliver goods and services to the population, while the Failed State Index takes a more critical look, subdividing Strong into Sustainable and Moderate.

Just as “failed state” can be interpreted different ways, so to can “post-conflict.” In the context of post-conflict reconstruction, the societies are usually not violence free, nor are they very far removed from conflict. Scholars may differ on the specifics, but generally, post-conflict does not mean an absence of violence throughout the country, but more likely a situation “where conflict has

²⁹ Fund for Peace – Failed State Index Rankings.

subsided to a greater or lesser degree, but is ongoing or recurring in some parts of the country.”³⁰ Or put another way, where “open warfare has come to and end.”³¹ Likewise, even if the open warfare has subsided, societies rarely put the conflict behind them. In fact, according to the World Bank, 44 percent of post-conflict situations revert back to open warfare in the first five years.³² This creates and reinforces a desperate cycle where “pervasive poverty makes societies more vulnerable to violent conflict, while conflict itself creates more poverty.”³³ In a sense, post-conflict reconstruction, at its core, is an attempt to break this cycle.

2. Post-Conflict Reconstruction – A *Negative* Trend?

Not only are the goals of post-conflict reconstruction debated, but there are various arguments given against the entire idea of post-conflict reconstruction. There is a school of thought that says the Westphalian system of nation-states is not a universal fit. While acknowledging that some failed or collapsed states can be returned to functioning status, the international community must accept that some cannot. These scholars suggest we must consider a return to an older system where states “co-existed with areas of less government structure than meets the statehood criteria.”³⁴ Other scholars offer a slightly different perspective, emphasizing the differences between *de facto* states and *de jure* states. *De jure* states they argue “exist by fiat of the international community which recognizes them as sovereign entities whether or not they have a

³⁰ Brinkerhoff, 3.

³¹ Junne and Verkoren, 1.

³² *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development*. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), 8; and P. Collier, L Elliott, H. Hergre, A. Hoeffler, A. Reynol-Querol, and N. Sambanis. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Quoted in Derick W. Brinkerhoff. “Introduction – governance challenges in fragile states: re-establishing security, rebuilding effectiveness, and reconstituting legitimacy” in *Governance in Post-Conflict Societies – rebuilding fragile states*. Derick W. Brinkerhoff, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 3.

³³ *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development*. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), 14.

³⁴ Christopher Clapham, “The Global-Local Politics of State Decay,” in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Robert I. Rotberg, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 78.

government which can effectively control or administer the territory.”³⁵ While *de facto* states are the institutions and power bases that actually administer a territory.³⁶ States that are recognized internationally and can control their territory are both *de jure* and *de facto*.³⁷ However, there are numerous states that are only *de jure* states, that is, they are states in name only. Afghanistan is an example of a *de jure* state with very weak central government institutions and limited military control over much of the country, especially in the south and south-east.³⁸ Typically, the goal of post-conflict reconstruction is to, in the broad sense, help the transition towards a *de jure* and *de facto* state. This is often doomed to failure, they argue, because the major power brokers in the country operate in both worlds and have nothing to gain by seeing them consolidated; they owe their *de jure* position to their *de facto* power, and influence *de jure* policy to maintain *de facto* power.³⁹

Still others suggest changes to the international system that acknowledges that failed states are not an anomaly, but rather, a natural step in developing a fully functioning nation-state, noting it took 300 to 500 years to formalize France’s modern borders.⁴⁰ They propose that we should decertify states that no longer maintain sovereign control over their territory and in a manner consistent with the philosophy that inclusion in the political process “normalizes” behavior; we should establish new procedures for recognizing new states that acknowledges gains made by sub-national groups.⁴¹ Another alternative approach states that the

³⁵ Sarah Lister and Andrew Wilder, “Subnational Administration and state building: lessons from Afghanistan” in *Governance in Post-Conflict Societies – rebuilding fragile states*, Derick W. Brinkerhoff, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 243.

³⁶ Lister and Wilder, 243.

³⁷ Ibid..

³⁸ Lister and Wilder, 243; It should be noted, however, that in the hinterlands the traditional tribal institutions are very prominent, effective and enduring.

³⁹ Lister and Wilder, 243.

⁴⁰ Malcolm Anderson. *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World*. (Cambridge, 1996), 23. quoted in Jeffrey Herbst, “Let them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice” in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Robert I. Rotberg. ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 303.

⁴¹ Herbst, 312-315.

current efforts at post-conflict reconstruction are actually overly ambitious nation-building projects, placing western institutions, values, and procedures on societies that lack the history, experience and civil society to support such systems; in the end, they may do more harm than good. The end goal should not be a perfect westernize society, but rather a government that is just *good enough*.⁴²

3. Post-Conflict Reconstruction - Very *Similar* to Development

Alternative solutions aside, there is a growing, although still limited, number of scholars addressing how to best restore collapsed and failed states into functioning governments.⁴³ Some scholars believe that post-conflict reconstruction has a lot of similarities, and lessons to be learned from, traditional development efforts in peace-time third world countries. They argue the keys to success in both cases are the same: a long-term time requirement and

⁴² John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, "Toward Postconflict Reconstruction" *The Washington Quarterly* 25, No 4, (Autumn 2002): 85-96; and Michael Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace," *International Security*, 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 87-112.

⁴³ For theoretical holistic approaches see: Francis Fukuyama. ed. *Nation-building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren. eds. *Postconflict Development – Meeting New Challenges*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005); Ho-Won Jeong. *Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies – Strategy and Process*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005); Robert I Rotberg. ed. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

For detailed sector specific studies see: Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-George Ehrhart. eds. *Security Sector reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*. (New York: United Nations University Press, 2005); David M. Law. "Conclusion: Security Sector (Re) Construction in Post-conflict Settings." *International Peacekeeping* 13, No. 1 (March 2006); 111-123; Derick W. Brinkerhoff. ed. *Governance in Post-Conflict Societies – rebuilding fragile states*. (New York: Routledge, 2007); also John Hamre, Gordon Sullivan, Scott Feil, Robert Orr, and Johanna Mendelson Forman in a series covering economics, security and government in *The Washington Quarterly* 25, No 4, (Autumn 2002): 85-152.

For a greater operational and policy focus see: Craig Cohen. *Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace. March 2006); Garland H. Williams. *Engineering Peace – the Military Role in Postconflict Reconstruction*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2005); James Dobbins, John McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina. *America's Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq*. (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2003); James Dobbins, Seth Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga Timilsina. *UN's Role in Nation-Building from the Congo to Iraq*. (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2005.); *Play to Win*. (Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Association of the US Army (AUSA), January 2003); Robert I. Rotberg, ed. *Building a New Afghanistan*. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2007); Robert C. Orr. ed. *Winning the Peace – an American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004).

commitment, slow incremental change, importance of locals “in the driver’s seat”, need for donor restraint on projects beyond the need or capacity of the local conditions, and the importance of what international partners do, with whom, and how.⁴⁴ Additionally, both endeavors face the same three dilemmas or constraints: 1) Time – trying to accomplish too much too fast usually results in nothing getting done well (if at all), but too slow and methodical risks alienating the population; 2) External Influence – too much conditionality, or outside influence in governance can lead to a backlash from the population, but too little international influence and the country may not develop the civil society and institutions required to support the international community’s ideal versions of governance; 3) Government Transition – the international community cannot be sure that open elections in unstable society will not bring religious radical or political extremists into power.⁴⁵ Also, three instrumental lessons from development should be considered in post-conflict reconstruction. First, patience – maintain a long time horizon and expect setbacks; second, be adaptable – maintain flexibility on sequencing and content of reforms keeping the focus on outcome not process; lastly, start small – concentrate on do-able projects that matter to the community, keep modest expectations and accept incremental progress in some areas, while accepting a flawed system in other areas.⁴⁶ In summary, these experts argue that both development and post-conflict reconstruction share the same keys to success and constraints. Additionally, the key lessons from successful development efforts also apply to post-conflict reconstruction.

4. Post-Conflict Reconstruction - Very Different from Development

The more dominant school of thought, is that post conflict reconstruction is not simply traditional development, but rather something completely new, drawing

⁴⁴ Brinkerhoff, 13 -14.

⁴⁵ Arthur A. Goldsmith, “Does nation building work? Reviewing the Record,” in *Governance in Post-Conflict Societies – rebuilding fragile states*, Derick W. Brinkerhoff. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 41.

⁴⁶ Goldsmith, 41.

elements from multiple aid sectors. Civilian aid agencies can be organized into three categories depending on their focus: peace building (such as Search for Common Ground), Emergency assistance (Doctors Without Borders), and long-term development (Oxfam). While all three have their unique focus and advantages, separately none of them are well suited to post-conflict reconstruction. Peace builders often lose interest after the fighting has stopped, emergency assistance groups are typically not interested in the origins of the conflict, or the resolution, just the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all, and developers often find the post-conflict arena too violent and chaotic.⁴⁷

Despite acknowledgement from the international community and aid organizations as far back as 1995 that there is a significant difference between peacetime development, or what was traditionally called development, and post-conflict reconstruction, there is still a lack of consensus on strategy and no agreement on best practices.⁴⁸ The need to resolve these shortcomings has been the subject of UN reports and scholars papers for nearly ten years. One report in 2001 notes “it is now generally accepted that international organizations should be aware of conflict and, where possible, gear their work towards conflict resolution and helping rebuild war-torn societies in a way that will avert future violence.”⁴⁹ Despite the identified need, very little progress has been made, or even ideas proposed on how to accomplish this transformation.⁵⁰ As another expert noted, the development-security nexus is “under researched and has yet to establish its own conceptual language.”⁵¹

While the procedures and programs for handling the development-security nexus are debated (or ignored), the revolutionary notion of using the development community to “fix” societies cannot be overlooked. The idea that reconstruction

⁴⁷ Junne and Verkoren, 5.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 2.

⁴⁹ Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars - the Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed Publishing, 2001), 1.

⁵⁰ Junne and Verkoren, 4.

⁵¹ Duffield, 9.

must be done in a manner to prevent war is a new concept in the development community, with some proposing direct action where “Societies must be changed so that past problems do not arise.”⁵² This is a far cry from the counter arguments already presented to either let states fail or make governments that are just “good enough.” This philosophy is championed by other experts who point out that post-conflict development must be conflict-conscious development, whose primary goal is sustaining the peace and that simply be rebuilding or reconstructing the old society structures will most likely just recreate the same grievances that led to conflict in the beginning.⁵³

Just as restoring the political institutions to pre-conflict setting can be counter-productive; the same can be said for the economic sector. Further highlighting the differences between traditional development and post-conflict reconstruction, the traditional goal of “jumpstarting the economy” is a dangerous objective and the aid community must be careful not to simply restore the “politico economic problems that contributed to state failure in the first place, as well as any new ones...economic policy must be formulated and implemented in politically sensitive way.”⁵⁴ In contrast to conventional economic thinking, when operating in a post-conflict reconstruction environment, rather than simply erecting, or employing, the most expedient methods and actors to deliver goods or collect revenue, the larger, long-term political ramifications of who is used and how they are used must be considered.⁵⁵ Or put another way, political-economic considerations must take precedence over economic efficiencies.⁵⁶ Additionally, post-conflict situations place additional strains which are not a factor in peacetime

⁵² Duffield, 15.

⁵³ Junne, 6.

⁵⁴ Donald R. Snodgrass, “Restoring Economic Functioning in Failed States,” in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Robert I. Rotberg, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 260.

⁵⁵ Lister and Wilder, 242.

⁵⁶ Snodgrass, 260, 267.

development projects, namely the resources required to rehabilitate, resolve and prevent conflict and violence and strife within the community.⁵⁷

Under this approach, even the most benign projects can have significant impact. Rebuilding a road becomes a major political and conflict sensitive endeavor when you consider who the road connects, and who it does not connect, where it starts and stops, which section of the road will be repaired first, and the fact that roads inherently give advantage to those with modern transportation and expand the reach of the central government. As such, building a road, even repairing the previously existing road, may only serve to ignite tensions and a return to violence.

5. Post-Conflict Reconstruction - No Clear Strategy

Since there is little agreement on what post-conflict reconstruction is, or is not, or even whether the international community should be involved in such projects, it should not be surprising there is a lack of consensus on how to execute post-conflict reconstruction. There are differences on which sectors of the society should be considered, their relative importance and the sequencing of the overall effort. For example, Junne and Verkoren use infrastructure, education, health, economic, and aid as the key elements, but they caveat that these sectors must be considered in relation to the root causes of the initial conflict. They breakdown the causes into four primary clusters: external / international, characteristics of the state (too weak or too strong), characteristics of the society (economic inequalities, ethnic cleavages), and individual orientations (religion, ideology, cultures).⁵⁸ The degree to which these four clusters represent the root causes of the conflict will dramatically alter how post-conflict reconstruction should proceed. An alternative approach is presented by Rotberg which focuses on economy, rule of law and civil society.⁵⁹ Jeong, on the other hand, examines

⁵⁷ Brinkerhoff, 3.

⁵⁸ Junne and Verkoren, 7.

⁵⁹ Rotberg (2004), 32.

the “social and psychological factors” of political transition, development, and reconciliation and social rehabilitation.⁶⁰

While there is no consensus on best practices, some scholars cite the work by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Association of the US Army (AUSA), as “perhaps the most well-elaborated framework...including attention to governance...on post-conflict reconstruction.”⁶¹ This approach focuses on four “pillars” of post-conflict reconstruction: security, justice and reconciliation, economic and social well-being, and governance and participation, in addition to four critical “enablers”: strategy and planning, implementation infrastructure, training and education, and funding.⁶²

6. Security – an “Absolute Prerequisite”

Perhaps the one, and seemingly only, area where the experts are almost unanimous is the prerequisite for security. As Rotberg notes, and other agree, “a lasting cease fire must be achieved first, before any other improvements can be introduced” and “without fundamental law and order, resuscitation and nation building are chimera.”⁶³ At the most basic level, even within peacetime, developed nations, the primary function of a state is to provide security (from external and internal threats). Only after security is reasonable assured can the state deliver second-tier public goods.⁶⁴ Few, if any, states can provide public goods in the absence of security. As such, Dirk Salomons considers security an “absolute prerequisite” to recovery process.⁶⁵ Security is considered the one key precursor to stabilization, without it there will be little progress in the fields of

⁶⁰ Jeong, 6.

⁶¹ Brinkerhoff, 19. and Junne and Verkoren, 2.

⁶² *Play to Win*, 6.

⁶³ Rotberg (2004), 32-33; Brinkerhoff, 5; Dirk Salomons, “Security: An Absolute Prerequisite,” in *Postconflict Development – Meeting New Challenges*, Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren, eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 19; Nicole Ball, “Democratic governance and the security sector in conflict-affected countries,” in *Governance in Post-Conflict Societies – rebuilding fragile states*, Derick W. Brinkerhoff. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 85.

⁶⁴ Rotberg (2004), 3.

⁶⁵ Salomons, 19.

politics and economic recovery.⁶⁶ In this context security is not just the protection from wanton killing, but it encompasses the military, militia, police and other state security forces; not only must they provide protection to the society, but they must not victimize the society. Issues such as corruption, discipline, accountability, reform and oversight are key elements to security. As one of the most visible arms of the government, rouge and corrupt security elements delegitimize the government, impede basic services and lead to the return of violence.⁶⁷

As discussed, the need for security does not mean completely free of violence, but rather an end to open warfare. It should be pointed out, however, that as disparate the theories and approaches on post-conflict reconstruction may be, they can only be utilized in areas where the majority of violence has subsided.

In summary, there is a broad range of opinions among the experts in the field of post-conflict reconstruction. The differences go far beyond two competing schools of thought, but rather range the entire spectrum from “let them fail” to make them “just good enough” to full-blown social engineering and “fixing” societies. Experts that can agree post-conflict reconstruction is something worth doing cannot agree on the best methodology to accomplish the goals, or even the most appropriate paradigm for analyzing the problem. Some argue this should be treated similarly to traditional development, while others contend this is an entirely different problem requiring a more integrated holistic approach. While the latter is gaining prominence, they can agree on the importance of security, but little else. Questions of which other sectors are most important, the proper sequencing of reforms, centralized or decentralized control, proper levels of external influence and countless others have yet to be definitively answered.

Although there is no record of national policy makers reaching out to the epistemic community for assistance on the initial post-conflict reconstruction strategy for Afghanistan, if they had, they would not have received any consensus

⁶⁶ Brinkerhoff, 5.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

opinions on a roadmap. As a result, faced with some daunting challenges, the initial post-conflict reconstruction program achieved very limited success.

B. THE REALITY OF AFGHANISTAN

1. Initial Challenges – The End of the War

On 14 November 2001 the United Nations passed United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1378 calling for the United Nations to play a central role in the establishment of a transitional government in Afghanistan and calling for member states to assist with security, stability and reconstruction efforts.⁶⁸ The task ahead was daunting. Nearly twenty five years of continuous civil war had ravaged the entire country. Roads were in disrepair, buildings mostly destroyed, water and electricity sporadic and mostly non-existent. Economically, there was no national currency, only various regional currencies printed by regional warlords, no central bank, no treasury, no tax collection system, no civil service, and the judicial system was either weak or non-existent, and almost always corrupt. Afghanistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2002 was between \$150 – 180 per capita, excluding poppy and narcotics. Between 60 and 80 percent of the population lived below the United Nations severe poverty line of \$1 a day.⁶⁹ In 1996, the last year of accurate measurements in Afghanistan for the United Nations' Human Development Index, it ranked 169 out of 174, and things have only gotten worse. The average life expectancy is just above 40, over half of children under five are malnourished, and infant mortality, and literacy rates are among the worst in the world⁷⁰ Additionally, the many years of conflict revitalized the traditional tribalism and resistance to strong central governments, widespread banditry, multiple and competing militias and severe ethnic tension and hatred.

⁶⁸ Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security and U.S. Policy*. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006), RL30588. 7.

⁶⁹ Dobbins, et al. (2003), 144.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

After the fall of Kabul to the Northern Alliance and Operation Enduring Freedom forces, the United Nations held a conference in Bonn, Germany. The major western powers, Afghanistan's neighbors and countries within the region, and representatives from the major groups in Afghanistan attended. Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and historically most powerful, were not received favorably at Bonn.⁷¹ This was primarily because many of the Pashtuns supported Taliban, in fact the Taliban was made-up almost exclusively of Pashtuns. The fact that the Taliban were mostly Ghilzai Pashtuns and the Pashtuns at Bonn were Durrani, their arch rivals, was a nuance that many did not yet understand.⁷² Northern Alliance, on the other hand, were primarily was Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara, all ethnic minorities in Afghanistan, but they were on the winning side of the war. As a result of their "victor" status, and their clear anti-Taliban credentials, they were over represented and supported by international actors at Bonn⁷³

At Bonn, for various reasons, it was decided to support a new government in Afghanistan rather than temporary put the country under UN control as in Kosovo and Bosnia. This approach required significant resources to rebuild government immediately. As such, the United States and the international community decide to focus on building the capacity of Afghanistan government, to empower it to control countryside and do its own work, rather than providing the services themselves. Major western powers would take responsibility for specific sectors and provide training for the government. The United States was assigned the Afghan National Army (ANA) and border forces, the United Kingdom trained and equipped the counternarcotics forces, Italy was put in charge of the judicial system, and Germany the national police.

⁷¹ Thomas H. Johnson, "Afghanistan's post-Taliban transition: the state of state-building after war," *Central Asian Survey* 25 (March-June 2006): 2-8.

⁷² Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan," *Orbis* (Winter 2007): 76-79.

⁷³ Dobbins, et al. (2003), 132.

Procedures for establishing a transitional government and the process for a more permanent establishment were also developed at Bonn. A 30-member interim administration, headed by Hamid Karzai would run the country temporarily. In June 2002 there would be a nation-wide *emergency loya jirga* which would pick a follow-on government until a constitution was written and approved and national elections were held.⁷⁴

The participants at Bonn, requested the UN to “monitor and assist implementation in all aspects.” In response the UN Security council passed UNSCR 1378 on 20 December 2001 which created a framework for international assistance to post war Afghanistan. The resolution committed the UN to establish an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the capital region of Kabul and to assist the government in rebuilding and reestablishing government institutions and national structures and rebuilding the economy.⁷⁵ This was followed by UNSCR 1401 on 28 March 2002 which instructed the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) told to oversee “all UN activities in the country, promote national reconciliation, fulfill Bonn taskings, and manage UN humanitarian, relief and reconstruction activities.”⁷⁶

2. Political Sector

Since the overthrow of the Taliban regime over seven years ago, Afghanistan has started a process of political development and reform through a program of state-building. Through the process described in the Bonn Agreement, the government of Afghanistan has made significant accomplishments.⁷⁷ A 30-member interim administration was established, an international peacekeeping force was authorized, and an interim constitution was established. Since then, a permanent constitution was adopted by a United Nations administered national

⁷⁴ Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security and U.S. Policy*. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006), RL30588, 7.

⁷⁵ Dobbins, et al. (2003), 130.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 134.

⁷⁷ Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security and U.S. Policy*, 7.

convention, establishing a president and a bi-cameral legislature with presidential impeachment and veto powers over cabinet officials.⁷⁸ Peaceful presidential elections in October 2004 and parliamentary elections in November 2005 resulted in Hamid Karzai winning 55.4% of the vote, and his closet rival assuming the speaker position in parliament. President Karzai, a Pashtun tribal leader who draws his support historically from the Pashtun south, and initially faced “loyal opposition” from the Northern Alliance political leader, and pre-Taliban President Burhannudin Rabbani.⁷⁹

However, flaws within the political system, namely the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) resulted in a parliament that is not responsible and accountable to the constituents. Additionally, the presidential elections were structured in such a way that President Karzai was not elected by over half of the Afghans, but rather, nearly 100% of the Pashtuns. In other words, he is not a national candidate, but the candidate supported by the largest, solidified voting bloc.⁸⁰ After Bonn, the Pashtun felt underrepresented. As the traditional rulers, they maintained the presidency with Karzai, but many felt the key important positions in his government went to other ethnic groups.⁸¹

After the Bonn agreement, the government of Afghanistan failed to extend its control over regional and provincial government organizations in all parts of the country. As a result, local police, administrators, and the judicial system are more responsive to the regional warlords, criminal elements, and power brokers than to the central government. This serves to decrease government capability, the

⁷⁸ Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution, and Government*. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 2.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

⁸⁰ Johnson (March - June 2006), 10-20. For more on the flaws and unintended consequences of the Afghan electoral system see Thomas H. Johnson, “The Prospects for Post-Conflict Afghanistan: A Call of the Sirens to the Country’s Troubled Past.” *Strategic Insights* (February 2006) and Thomas H. Johnson, “Democratic Nation Building in the Arc of Crisis: The Case of the Presidential Election in Afghanistan.” Naval Postgraduate School.

⁸¹ Dobbins, et al. (2003), 130 and Johnson (March – June 2006) 4, 7.

delivery of goods and services, reduces security, all of which decreases the legitimacy of the central government, public confidence in government, and reconstruction and development efforts.⁸²

3. Military Sector

Unfortunately, the relatively successful, albeit flawed, political sector was not accompanied by economic, social or security advances. Arguing that an abundance of international aid to Bosnia and Kosovo made those societies reliant on foreign money and troops, the US administration promoted a limited footprint in the reconstruction phase.⁸³ The US sought to limit the manning, geographic responsibility and functions of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), discouraged NATO involvement, and rejected peacekeeping roles for the US military forces which were conducting counterterrorism operations.⁸⁴ Responsibility for security was given to regional warlords, many of whom were used to fight the Taliban forces in the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, until a permanent, professional Afghan army was established.⁸⁵

Initial ISAF was approximately 5,000 troops under the command of the United Kingdom, and stationed in Kabul. They were restrained by their limited mandate from the United Nations and rarely ventured out of the capital. The United States and remaining coalition forces from Operation Enduring Freedom number around 8,000, and continued anti-Taliban and al Qaeda operations. The United States resisted any stabilization and reconstruction role for their military forces initially for several reasons. Primarily the President and his advisors wanted to break the pattern of larger and larger nation building projects of past administrations. Additionally, there were the difficulties of logistical support for

⁸² Lister and Wilder, 252.

⁸³ Dobbins (2007), 3.

⁸⁴ Dobbins, et al. (2003), 131.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

nation-wide deployment, and the concern that the country did not want to tie down a lot of troops, there was going to be more to come in the 'war on terror.'⁸⁶

Another concern of the United States leaderships was a justified fear that the "legendary xenophobia" would cause resistance to US troops nation-wide, as was experienced by the Soviet Union after their initial control of the urban areas. However, experience showed the US and international forces were accepted and well received throughout the country. So to, were the 5,000 ISAF troops keeping the peace in Kabul, in fact, they were trusted more than Afghan police in some cases.⁸⁷

In terms of comparison, in the Spring of 2002, the ISAF forces equated to 0.18 peacekeepers per 1,000 Afghans, which is more than 100 times less than the force used in the Balkans. In Bosnia the ratio was 18.6 peacekeepers per 1,000 and in Kosovo it was 20 peacekeepers per 1,000.⁸⁸ In the case of Afghanistan, even if Operation Enduring Freedom forces are included in the numbers, the international peacekeeping force was still 50 times less than used in the recent past.

Initially, the ANA and Karzai's central government were perceived as legitimate, although they held little real power throughout the countryside. The ANA had little presence outside the capital, as did ISAF. The US forces were deployed in the eastern half of the country, but they had a different focus altogether. As a result of the government's limit capability, and no international support to maintain security nation-wide, the task was left to the regional strongmen. Not only were the militia commanders and local warlords not been disarmed, but they were employed to provide security. Even the major players retain their own private armies. For example, Fahim Khan, at one time, the Minister of Defense and senior vice president had officially pledged his support to

⁸⁶ David Rohde and David E. Sanger and Carlotta Gall. "How the 'Good War' in Afghanistan Went Bad." *New York Times*, 12 August 2007.

⁸⁷ Rohde, Sanger and Gall.

⁸⁸ Dobbins, et al. (2003), 136.

the ANA, but refused to divert resources or disband his Tajik dominated militia who remain loyal to him, not to the state.⁸⁹

The decision to empower regional strongmen not only eroded the support and legitimacy of the government, it restricted the flow of aid and reconstruction. Despite pressure to expand security operations into countryside, the US refused to alter the mission of its OEF forces and would not send troops as part of ISAF, so no one else in the international community did either. As an alternative they deployed the first Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) in December 2002. PRTs comprised of military civil affairs troops and Special Forces teams were sent into major cities with the mission to gain influence with financial and humanitarian assistance, building small-scale projects in an attempt to build good will and hopefully increase stability in countryside.

In 2004 the administration started to realize the minimalist approach was not working and started to alter their policies; ISAF deployed into countryside, NATO was invited to join and eventually lead the effort, and US manning and funding increased, but two years were already lost.⁹⁰

4. Reconstruction Sector

The costs of reconstruction have been adjusted over time, but the international community has consistently fallen short of what was required. The initial needs assessment was placed at \$15 billion over four years.⁹¹ However, at the Tokyo donor conference in January 2002 only \$1.8 billion was pledged for 2002 and \$4.5 billion for the next five years, a shortfall of \$10 billion. The EU pledge \$500 million for 2002 and the US pledged \$297 million. Japan and the World Bank pledged \$500 million over the next two and a half years while Saudi

⁸⁹ Dobbins, et al. (2003), 137.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Peter J. Middlebrook and Sharon M. Miller, "Lessons in Post Conflict Reconstruction from the New Afghanistan Compact," (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, 27 January 2006), 3. <http://www.fpif.org/fpifxt/3094> (accessed 26 February 2008).

Arabian pledged \$220 million over three years.⁹² Calculations vary between organizations, but its clear that despite being the most war-ravaged country in the post-conflict reconstruction phase, the per-capita expenditures on Afghanistan's reconstruction and stabilization are by far the lowest. One report cites that for first two years of post-conflict, expenditures in Bosnia were \$1390 per capita, and \$814 for Kosovo, but in Afghanistan expenditures were only \$52 per capita, with some countries not meeting pledges at Tokyo conference.⁹³ This number is further decreased when the effects of "phantom aid" are considered. Reports estimate that on the global average, at least 61 percent of aid is wasted in the form of "phantom aid" meaning only 39 percent, or less than \$21, was actually spent assisting Afghans.⁹⁴ As a further means of comparison, the United States' pledge of a mere \$500 million in first full year of Afghanistan's redevelopment pales in contrast to \$18 billion for Iraq's initial redevelopment effort, a country that is smaller, less populated, and has significantly more infrastructure and suffered less damage than Afghanistan.⁹⁵ In fact, in the critical 2002-2004 time frame, Afghanistan was the US's least funded and manned state-building operation since WWII.⁹⁶

Despite additional donor conferences in Berlin in April 2004 and Kabul in April 2005, donations continued to fall short of the average requirement of \$4 billion per year.⁹⁷ For example, in 2005 Afghanistan received a combined total of only \$2.8 billion in aid.⁹⁸ By some accounts the support felt by Afghans actually

⁹² Dobbins, et al. (2003), 134.

⁹³ CARE International in Afghanistan, "Rebuilding Afghanistan: A little Less Talk, a Lot More Action," Policy Brief, October 2002.

⁹⁴ *Real Aid - An Agenda for Making Aid Work* (Johannesburg, South Africa: ActionAid International, June 2005), 17.

⁹⁵ Dobbins, et al. (2003), 134.

⁹⁶ Barnett R. Rubin, "Saving Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs* (Jan/Feb, 2007): 57-78.

⁹⁷ *Afghanistan National Development Strategy – Summary Report*, 72.

⁹⁸ Dobbins, et al. (2003), 134.

decreased. By the end of 2006, after subtracting the cost of building the “ring road” from Kabul to Kandahar, the average US aid to Afghanistan over the five year period was only \$13 per capita.⁹⁹

In February 2006 key donor countries met in London. There the government of Afghanistan presented the Afghanistan Compact which was to replace the Bonn Agreement in describing revised political benchmarks, and also presented the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). This document, for the first time, tied each individual requirement, as determined by the Afghan government, to specific “pillars” of long and short-term development.¹⁰⁰ The ANDS also puts a dollar cost on addressing the issues. The previous costing exercise, summarized in *Securing Afghanistan’s Future* in 2004, put the seven year cost at \$27.6 billion.¹⁰¹ Two years into that projection, the ANDS with its significantly more specific and detailed approach, fine-tunes the requirements to \$19.8 billion for the remaining five years.¹⁰² The ANDS specifies three “pillars” to the country’s overall progress, which are further divided into eight sectors: Security, Good Governance, Economic and Social Development, Infrastructure and Natural Resources, Education, Health, Agriculture and Rural Development, Social Protection, Economic Governance and Private Sector Development.¹⁰³

Not only was international monetary assistance in short supply, but the personnel and expertise needed to successfully coordinate and execute the effort were never provided. Unlike Bosnia’s Office of the High Representative or the robust UN presence in Kosovo under UNMIK there is no overarching international agency managing Afghanistan’s recovery. Additionally, with no dominant military presence with nation-wide responsibility for security to fill the coordination role,

⁹⁹ Johnson and Mason, 85.

¹⁰⁰ Middlebrook and Miller, 1.

¹⁰¹ *Afghanistan National Development Strategy – Summary Report*, 71.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 72.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 30.

the job fell to the Afghan government. Although its capabilities have increased dramatically in the past year, initially the interim and follow-on governments of Afghanistan were ill-equipped and ill-trained to oversee such a large effort. UNAMA, who was officially tasked with the overarching coordination effort, was initially very small, and it spent the first six months organizing the *Loya Jirga*. Even now the size capability and scope of responsibility pale in comparison to UNMIK.¹⁰⁴ As a result of no overarching framework or lead organization on the civil assistance side, coordination became very ineffective, inefficient, ad hoc, and dependent on personal relationships.

5. Current Challenges and Threats

Due to a lack of resources and infrastructure, the Karzai government is unable to expand security, redevelopment, and rule of law into the countryside. Additionally, the authority that does exist is generally seen as corrupt. In general, the US effort to increase the capacity of Afghanistan's government has failed in several critical areas, including roads and infrastructure, redevelopment projects, health, electricity, and justice.¹⁰⁵

Afghanistan has not seen a relapse into war country-wide, but potentially war-weariness among the population may be a factor of stability in the country. Despite this war-weariness, the absence of the central government has fostered the reemergence of the Taliban to the point that currently a low intensity conflict rages in eastern and southern Afghanistan between the government and its allies and a reconstituted Taliban and other *jihadi*.

Post-conflict recovery of Afghanistan remains precarious and the increase in violence in certain regions makes reconstruction efforts even more difficult. In the southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan, the continuing insurgency has seen an increase in tactics borrowed from Iraq such as suicide bombing and attacks on police and army targets with an ever increasing disregard for collateral

¹⁰⁴ Dobbins, et al. (2003), 142.

¹⁰⁵ Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security and U.S. Policy*, 14.

damage.¹⁰⁶ The ever-present low-intensity conflict and the insecurity it generates forms a formidable challenge to peace and stability in both direct and indirect ways.

Increasing the pace of improvements in the political, security and reconstruction phases of redevelopment are of critical importance when considering the emerging threats to the country. After several years of relative calm, the Taliban has re-emerged to challenge the strength of the government.¹⁰⁷ The significance and power of the Taliban are debated, but it cannot be denied.¹⁰⁸ In fact, U.S. National Intelligence Director, at the time, John Negroponte cited the rise of the Taliban as the biggest threat US interests in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁹ While 2004 is often used as the initial re-emergence of the Taliban, significant gains were made in 2006 and 2007. Prior to 2006 engagements with the Taliban were fairly limited and Taliban violence was at relatively low levels. However, Lt Gen Karl Eikenberry, at the time, the senior US commander in Afghanistan reported that between 2005 and 2006 suicide attacks quadrupled, armed attacks tripled,

¹⁰⁶ "Afghanistan – Conflict History" International Crisis Group.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=1
(accessed 16 March 2007).

¹⁰⁷ Extensive analysis of the causes of the reemergence of the Taliban see James Dobbins, *Ending Afghanistan's Civil War*. Arlington, VA: RAND, 2007, CT-271; Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security and U.S. Policy*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006, RL30588; Anthony Cordesman, *Winning in Afghanistan: How to Face the Rising Threat*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006; Ghufuran Nasreen "Afghanistan in 2005: The Challenges of Reconstruction" *Asian Survey* 46 (2006) 85-94; Esther Pan, *Afghanistan's New Security Threat*. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006; Larry Goodson, "Afghanistan's Long Road to Reconstruction" *Journal of Democracy* 14 (2003).

¹⁰⁸ For analysis on the threat the Taliban currently poses for Afghanistan see Barnett R. Rubin, "Saving Afghanistan" *Foreign Affairs*. New York: January/February 2007: 57-78; Stephen Zunes, *The Taliban is Back* Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, 13 October 2006; Ahmed Rashid, "A Taliban Comeback?" *Yale Global*, 23 May 2006 and "Letter from Afghanistan: Are the Taliban Winning?" *Current History*. 1 January 2007: 17-20; Eben Kaplan, *The Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan*, Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006; *Afghanistan Five Years Later: the Return of the Taliban* London: The Senlis Council, September 2006; Barnett Rubin, *Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition from Turmoil to Normalcy*. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006; Seth Jones, *Afghanistan's Local Insurgency*. Arlington, VA: RAND, 2007.

¹⁰⁹ *Washington Post*, 2 December 2006 A1; John D. Negroponte, *Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence*. Washington, D.C.: 2007

remotely denoted bombings doubled. This increased violence resulted in over 4,000 deaths, the worst casualty rate since 2001.¹¹⁰

The missteps by the international community and the United States that led to the Taliban resurgence are well documented and focus primarily the commitment of too few personnel (military forces and civilian facilitators and coordinators) and too few resources.¹¹¹ It is therefore, the correction of these previous flawed approaches that is receiving the greatest attention.

Addressing the previous shortcomings in stabilization and reconstruction strategies is also crucial when considering where the base of the Taliban support stems from and how to best counter the Taliban appeal. Current resurgence of the Taliban does not stem from widespread hatred for the central government among the population. In fact, people do not want the Taliban to come back, but they feel increasingly disappointed and disillusioned by the government's inability to protect them and deliver on reconstruction.¹¹² "We have been with the Taliban and have seen their cruelty. People don't want them back." says a tribal elder, who was also angered by corruption within the government and its distance from the needs of the people.¹¹³ Despite their frustration, they still consider President

¹¹⁰ Dobbins, 5.

¹¹¹ See: *Afghanistan Reconstruction*. (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, June 2004) GAO-04-403; Anthony Cordesman. *Winning in Afghanistan: How to Face the Rising Threat*. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006); Barnett Rubin. *Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition from Turmoil to Normalcy*. (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006); Barnett Rubin. "Saving Afghanistan." *Foreign Affairs* (1 January 2007): 57-78; *Counter Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes*. (International Crisis Group, 2 November 2006), Asia Report No 123; David Rohde and David E. Sanger and Carlotta Gall. "How the 'Good War' in Afghanistan Went Bad." *New York Times*, 12 August 2007; James Dobbins. *Ending Afghanistan's Civil War*. (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2007), CT-271; James Dobbins, et al, (2003); James Dobbins, et al, (2005); Kenneth Katzman. *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security and U.S. Policy*. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, June 2007) RL30588; *Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan – Key Issues for Congressional Oversight*. (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, May 2007); Thomas H. Johnson. "On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 5, No 2, (2007): 93-129; Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason. "Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan," *Orbis* (Winter 2007): 71-89.

¹¹² Anthony Cordesman, *Winning in Afghanistan: How to Face the Rising Threat*, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006): 42.

¹¹³ Rubin, 57.

Karzai the country's best leader in 30 years.¹¹⁴ Rather than direct support, the villager–Taliban relationship is one of pragmatic acceptance. When the Taliban infiltrates a village the incentive for the villagers is to tolerate their presence, rather than risk their lives defending a central government that can neither protect them nor advance their well-being.¹¹⁵ Likewise the growing implementation of Islamic law, or sharia, is out of necessity rather than conviction. The government's judicial system is either non-existent or corrupt and cannot administer justice. Community leaders are demanding sharia, not as an alternative to secular law, but to corruption and lawlessness.¹¹⁶ In general, the lack of the government presence and services, inability to provide adequate security, improve living conditions and fight corruption is creating a vacuum power and level of apathy in which the Taliban is not yet garnering direct support but is allowed to operate.¹¹⁷

The heart of the Taliban network is actually in Pakistan, primarily the Tribal Areas safe haven, from which they received most of their funding, personnel, armament and logistical support.¹¹⁸ Afghan people, like most, simply want peace and stability, preferably provided by their own central government, or US/NATO forces, unable to provide these basic necessities will increase their acceptance of, if not support for, the Taliban.¹¹⁹

C. SUMMARY

The United States, and the international community, in general, are increasingly finding themselves faced with states that can be considered failed or failing, or in the midst of recovering from failure. In the past, the typical reaction

¹¹⁴ Rubin, 58.

¹¹⁵ Dobbins (2007), 5.

¹¹⁶ Rubin, 63.

¹¹⁷ Cordsman, 7.

¹¹⁸ Steve Coll (author: *Ghost Wars*) and Peter Tomsen (U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan 1989-92) Interviewed by PBS Frontline "Return of the Taliban".

¹¹⁹ Dobbins (2007) 8.

was minor humanitarian assistance, usually through NGOs. Since these states posed little, if any, threat to national security, or national interests, little attention was paid to them. In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, failed or failing states have become very prominent in national security calculations because of their possibility of degenerating into terrorist states or safe-havens. How to prevent a state from failing, and how to rebuild those that have failed are now considered vital national security interests. Unfortunately for policy makers, planners, and soldiers in the field, there is little consensus within the various academic and epistemic communities, who have been studying the problem long before, on how to best accomplish these goals.

There is a long list of varying opinions on how to best handle issues such as selecting critical sectors, sequencing of development, central or local control, foreign or domestic execution, foreign or domestic priorities, desired end-state, etc. Although the list of what experts do agree-on is relatively small, it can be useful. There is general agreement that successful post-conflict reconstruction requires a holistic effort, encompassing many sectors of society (exactly which ones and their relative importance is open to opinion). Additionally, there is a general consensus that security must come first. Some studies also list unity of command, or at least an overarching coordination agency, and a strong initial commitment of manpower, materials and dollars as key components to success.

In Afghanistan various theories are being put to the test with mixed results. First, and perhaps most importantly, the state was put under local control, instead of a UN protectorate through its transition period. Additionally, political recovery was initiated at the national level first, creating a central government with no provincial or local administrative structures to support it. With respect to resources, not only did the US military elect to pursue a “light footprint” strategy, national governments individually tried to “go cheap” with limited pledges and collectively did the same by not providing the resources, manpower, or mandate to any one single international organization to manage and oversee the entire effort. As a result, the interim government, with no civil-service corps or

infrastructure after 25 years of civil war, was given the task to manage the international reconstruction effort by default. The secondary effect of limited international presence is the reliance on warlords and regional strongmen, which have delayed the restoration of security, eroded the legitimacy of the central government and restricted the flow of aid and reconstruction.

As the United States and the international community as a whole, attempt to address some of the mistakes in their initial strategy by committing more military forces, expanding their mandate, and adequately funding the overall reconstruction effort, it is important to assess whether the earlier approaches were valid and just undermanned and underfunded, or the increased resources need to be accompanied by a wholesale change of strategy.

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III. DISTRICT LEVEL ANALYSIS

A. INTRODUCTION

This study employs a variety of databases, assessments, and products to compare the overall reconstruction effort with levels of security, prosperity and increased development. This chapter will attempt to measure the effectiveness of the current stability and reconstruction strategy through extensive quantitative analysis of the aid programs themselves, and comparing that to increased (or decreased) levels of security. Twenty two different districts nation-wide were selected as the units of analysis. The quantitative measurements used in this chapter include the Afghanistan Country Stability Picture (ACSP) and the United Nations Threat Assessment Map series, both of which are explained below. By comparing the risk level in individual districts as assessed by the United Nations over time, and the level of the stabilization and reconstruction effort over time as measured by the ACSP, the chapter discovers some clear correlations, although causation is not yet substantiated.

The majority of the analysis conducted stems from the use of these databases, and therefore significant attention is dedicated to detailing the specific analytical steps taken along the way to reach each conclusion. Without these detailed explanations reproducible results would be impossible because the data used in the analysis differs in significant ways from the original sources.

1. Background on ACSP

In order to measure and assess the international stabilization and reconstruction effort in the specific districts, the Afghanistan Country Stability Picture (ACSP), version VII, with an effective date of June, 2007 was utilized. Despite the availability of other more widely known databases, they all contained inherent limitations that would affect the quality of the data and the utility of the formatting. For example, the United Nations maintains separate Donor

Assistance Databases for numerous countries, including Afghanistan.¹²⁰ While this product is very interactive, it provides limited details as to the location of specific projects. As a result, using this database to track the number or type of projects within a specific district was not feasible. Additionally, when searching for activities funded and started in 2006 and 2007 the database returned only 30 projects and \$6 million for the entire country; which was clearly not representative of the actual effort.¹²¹ Another potential database is the product published by the Afghanistan Ministry of Finance.¹²² While this database provided a useful overview and macro-level assessment of the effort, it also did not have detailed geographical information that would facilitate the measuring of the level and type of reconstruction effort at the district level.¹²³

The ACSP was initially developed by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and is designed to pull data from various databases and display them geographically on regional maps of Afghanistan. According to the highly respected Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit the ACSP is a “geographic database of over 45,000 reconstruction and development projects across Afghanistan.”¹²⁴ The ACSP “merges data from Afghan government ministries, donors, IO/NGOs and provincial reconstruction teams across the full spectrum of the Afghan National Development Strategy Sectors.”¹²⁵

Aside from its many mapping functions and interactive utility, the ACSP VII reconstruction and development data is stored within three separate databases:

¹²⁰ Access on-line via: <http://aacadad.synisys.com/idmafg/idmMain/loader.asp> (accessed 27 June 2007).

¹²¹ Results of queries run on 25 July 2007. E-mail inquiries to the listed webmaster and six different UN points-of-contact at various offices to resolve this discrepancy went unanswered.

¹²² Access on-line via: <http://203.215.43.35/html/dad/msaccessdad.html> (accessed 16 March 2008).

¹²³ Additionally, the data was only retrievable through individual queries, in a sense, only the end-user interface was available. This format prevented access to the master database, which was required in order to accomplish the desired type of analysis and the level of detail.

¹²⁴ *Afghanistan Research Newsletter*. (Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit) no 13, (April 2007): 5.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

Small-scale Projects, PRT Projects, and Strategic Projects. Combined, these databases provide extensive details on the location, status, timeline, and involved agencies on over 47,000 projects and over \$14 billion in aid money.¹²⁶

2. Background on UN Risk Assessment Maps

The United Nations risk assessment maps, developed by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), are considered some of the best, unclassified, unbiased, judgments of the level of Taliban influence, (or at least the level of violence). They are used by “newspapers of record”, international research and policy NGOs, and individual Afghanistan scholars alike.¹²⁷ They utilize a consistent methodology from 2002 to the present, characterizing the risk, and therefore level of Taliban control, for each district, nation-wide into one of three categories: Low Risk / Permissive Environment, Medium Risk / Unstable Environment, and High Risk / Volatile Environment. In 2005, as a response to the deteriorating situation in parts of the country, the UNDSS made the addition of the Extreme Risk / Hostile Environment category.

The maps used were obtained from either the Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS) or the New York Times website and track the increase in violent districts from 2002 to the present, measured in annual intervals, typically in June or July.¹²⁸ The 2006 map is shown in Figure 2.

¹²⁶ The ACSP allows access to the raw data relating to reconstruction from three different Microsoft Excel files. This access made the data more easily manipulated and presented with greater utility. This chapter utilized only data from the small-scale projects and PRT projects. As such, the methodology section focuses primarily on those databases. Later chapters utilize the strategic projects data and discuss it at length in the methodology sections.

¹²⁷ See David Rohde, David E. Sanger, and Carlotta Gall, "How the 'Good War' in Afghanistan Went Bad." *New York Times*, 12 August 2007 and *Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes*. International Crisis Group, 2 November 2006, Asia Report No 123. and Thomas H. Johnson, "On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 5, no 2, 2007, 93-129.

¹²⁸ <http://www.aims.org.af/> and NY Times on-line at: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2007/09/01/world/middleeast/20070901_AFGHAN_GRAPHIC.html




Figure 2. 2006 UN Risk Assessment Map

A visual inspection of the risk assessment map reveals some interesting trends. First, it clearly shows the greatest concentration of Taliban strength is in the East and South, which corresponds to the traditional Pashtun homelands. Additionally, most of the Extreme risk districts are either on the border or are in close proximity to Pakistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The combination of popular support in the FATA and extremely rugged terrain make these ideal bases for operations. The risk level surrounding the major roadways are also interesting. In the south east, specifically the section of the ring road connecting Kandahar and Kabul, the risk levels are usually less than the surrounding areas, presumably because of the greater concentration of ISAF forces in this region. In the northwestern part of the country, where ISAF has a more limited presence the roads and major transit routes from Turkmenistan

represent a source of funding for the Taliban through tolls and charges for safe-passage. As a result the threat on the roads in the west and north are typically higher than the surrounding areas.

Additionally, in 2007 the UNDSS defined a High Abduction Risk Area (HARA). This was in response to a high number of kidnappings of NGO workers and specific threats from Taliban leaders. Mullah Dadullah, the Taliban's senior commander in the south is quoted as saying "We certainly target all those who work for the UN, the US, and Karzai. We are attempting to target everyone that works for the UN and are determined to target all UN organizations and branches, considering them similar to US organizations."¹²⁹ Mullah Dadullah was killed by a United States air strike on 12 May 2007 and was replaced by his older brother, Mansur Dadullah, who continues the kidnapping strategy, noting "Of course, kidnapping is a very successful policy and I order all my mujahideen to kidnap foreigners of any nationality wherever they find them and then we should do the same kind of deal."¹³⁰ According to UN figures within the HARA there were 70 attacks, 69 abductions and 41 workers killed in the first seven months of 2007.¹³¹ The risk is so great in these areas the UNDSS recommended increasing the security requirement from two escort vehicles (and in some cases no escort vehicles), to include two additional armored vehicles for movement of UN staff.¹³² Because the HARA is a new development, it does not provide a historical comparison to track over time. The August 2007 HARA map is shown in Figure 3.

¹²⁹ C.S. Harrison, *Half-Year Review of the Security Situation in Afghanistan*. (New York: UN Department of Safety and Security), 13 August 2007, Afghanistan - Topic Assessment 02/07, 5.

¹³⁰ Harrison, 5.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 5.




Figure 3. 2007 UN HARA Map

When compared to the risk assessment map in Figure 2 the overlap with Extreme Risk / Hostile Environment is clear and serves to highlight the increased Taliban presence and threat posed by these areas. Again, the use of the Ring Road is evident in the east as a means to move troops and security forces resulting in a few patches of low risk. In the west, however, where there are less troops, the Taliban are clearly using the road to expand their influence into Farah and Herat provinces in the south west, and using other major arteries and trading routes to control the Badghis province in the north west.

B. METHODOLOGY

1. Selection of Districts and Risk Assessments

In order to accurately measure the effects of the stability and reconstruction effort throughout the country, several assumptions were

incorporated into the study. It was assumed that government control is at its highest within the capital of Kabul and inordinately strong in the key urban centers. Likewise, the concentration of NGOs and international aid organizations would also be greatest in these cities. Additionally, the effects of PRTs and military bases on the number and scale of projects and security levels would be non-representatively high within their immediate geographical area. It was assumed these nodes represent uncharacteristically high levels of government control, increased wealth, and successful reconstruction efforts. As a result, all districts are outside the capital region of Kabul and districts in the north and west regions were also considered in reference to their proximity to PRT bases, and regional urban and capital centers. These districts are, in some cases, close to, but not the actual districts housing the capital, urban center, or PRT. Additionally, districts were selected to represent a cross-section of ethnicity, Taliban influence, regional affiliations, urban/rural mix, and in general terms, the overall conditions in Afghanistan outside the capital district of Kabul.¹³³ The districts selected for this analysis were: Wor Mamay, Wazeh Khwah, Tarwah, Nish, Shah Vali Kowt, Khowgiani, Pachir va Agam, Daychupan, Nari, Kamdesh, Gizab, Bar Kunar, Ghaziabad, Naveh-ye Barakza'l, Rig (Helmand), Almar, Khvajeh Sabz Push, Pashtun Kowt, Navor, Shahrestan, Shulgareh, and Tulak. Figure 4 illustrates the location of the selected districts on the 2006 UN Risk Assessment map. The complete time series from 2002-2007 of UN Risk Assessment maps, are included as Appendix A. The maps have the specific districts of study outlined to increase the geographic awareness of the districts in question, and facilitate the annual comparisons.

¹³³ See "District Profiles" on AIMS website: <http://www.aims.org.af/sroot.aspx?seckeyo=52&seckeyz=38> (accessed 16 March 2008).




Figure 4. UN Risk Assessment Map and Subject Districts¹³⁴

After utilizing the district selection methodology discussed above, each district's UN risk assessment level was tracked on an annual basis from 2002 to 2007. A numerical value was assigned to each threat level with Low Risk / Permissive Environment receiving a value of 1 and Extreme Risk / Hostile Environment receiving a value of 4. Each district received an annual point value based on its UN risk assessment. The point values for the six year period were combined to develop and aggregate risk value and the districts were ordered from those with the highest value, or longest history of high risk, to those with the

¹³⁴ NY Times on-line at: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2007/09/01/world/middleeast/20070901_AFGHAN_GRAPHIC.html (accessed 16 march 2008). District overlay is a relative approximation and solely the work of the author who bears responsibility for any inaccuracy.

lowest value, or shortest (or zero) history of high risk. Table 1 illustrates the UN risk assessment and its point value by year for each of the districts.

District	Region	UN Risk Assessment Values 1 = Low 4 = Extreme					
		2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Wor Mamay	East	3	3	3	4	4	4
Wazeh Khwah	East	3	3	3	4	4	4
Tarwah	East	3	3	3	4	4	4
Nish	South	3	3	3	4	4	4
Shah Vali Kowt	South	3	3	3	4	4	4
Khowgiani	East	1	3	3	3	4	4
Pachir va Agam	South	1	3	3	3	4	4
Daychupan	South	1	1	3	4	4	4
Nari	East	1	1	3	4	4	4
Kamdesh	East	1	1	3	4	4	4
Gizab	East	1	1	1	3	4	4
Bar Kunar	East	1	1	1	3	4	4
Ghaziabad	East	1	1	1	3	4	4
Naveh-ye Barakza'l	South	1	1	1	1	4	3
Rig (Helmand)	South	1	1	1	1	3	4
Almar	North	1	1	1	1	2	2
Khvajeh Sabz Push	North	1	1	1	1	2	2
Pashtun Kowt	North	1	1	1	1	2	2
Navor	East	1	1	1	1	1	1
Shahrestan	East	1	1	1	1	1	1
Shulgareh	North	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tulak	West	1	1	1	1	1	1

Table 1. UN Risk Assessments by District

Sorting and displaying the results in this manner highlights three primary trends. First, all of the Extreme risk districts are either in the south or east. Second, the overwhelming majority of the Low and Moderate risk districts are in the North or West. Thirdly, with the exception of Naveh-ye Barakza'l in the south, the risk level in every district has become progressively worse, no districts show an improvement in the situation. Combined, these observations objectively

support the assessment that the Taliban is strongest in the south and east and are moving to consolidate their control of those regions and slowly expanding into the north and west.

After utilizing the district selection methodology discussed above, each district's UN risk assessment level was tracked on an annual basis from 2002 to 2007. A numerical value was assigned to each threat level with Low Risk / Permissive Environment receiving a value of 1 and Extreme Risk / Hostile Environment receiving a value of 4. Each district received an annual point value based on its UN risk assessment. The point values for the six year period were combined to develop an aggregate risk value and the districts were ordered from those with the highest value, or longest history of high risk, to those with the lowest value, or shortest (or zero) history of high risk. Table 1 illustrates the UN risk assessment and its point value by year for each of the districts.

2. District-Level Reconstruction Data

a. Small Scale Projects and PRT Projects

The ACSP data is divided into three parts: PRT projects, small-scale projects, and strategic infrastructure projects. Both PRT projects and small-scale projects contain relatively small-scale efforts such as digging a well, repairing a building, conducting limited health care outreach. The primary differentiation between the two is that "PRT projects" are those completed by Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and small-scale projects include efforts by the government of Afghanistan, foreign governments, international NGOs, and countless aid organizations. These projects are often focused on specific villages and typically only affect the Afghans that live in the immediate vicinity. The strategic project database is comprised of extremely large projects dedicated to security and infrastructure, such as building the "Ring Road" or equipping portions of the Afghan National Army. Projects from this database are much larger in scope and often affect the entire province or region. As a result, less than 45 percent of the projects list a specific district. This is not unexpected and

represents one trade-off when analyzing the influences at the local level; how do you measure the impact of a new ANA regional headquarters, or new provincial police station on a specific district? For these reasons, in order to more accurately measure the impact of stability and reconstruction at the district level, the strategic project database was not utilized. It is used, however, and discussed at greater length in later chapters covering provincial-level analysis.

b. Quality Control Methods

In the analysis, only the ACSP small-scale projects and PRT projects databases were used to create unique spreadsheets and graphs by further refining the data. Despite coming from a variety of sources and manually entered and tracked, the databases proved to have a very high degree of accuracy and fidelity. In its entirety the small-scale project database contained 38,836 projects valued at \$3,031,632,896 while the PRT database contained 8,707 projects valued at \$699,592,997. First, and most obviously, the data was sorted by specific district, resolving various spelling errors and irregularities and repeated or duplicated data entries due to software anomalies. Any project not associated with a specific district was excluded from the dataset.

Since tracking the reconstruction and stabilization effort over time is vitally important to the study, each project had to be placed within a specific calendar year, or “List Year.” On the premise that a project had the most impact once it was completed, the List Year category, developed for this study, is based on the completion date, when available. If a completion date could not be determined and the project status was listed as Complete or Ongoing, then the start date was used to set the List Year. If no start date or end date was available then the List Year for that project was assigned as “M”; signifying multiple and/or unknown. For calculations in this chapter addressing the aggregate effort between 2004 and 2007, projects with a List Year value of M are included; however, for year-to-year comparisons they are excluded since they cannot accurately and reliably be associated with any specific calendar year.

Additionally, the databases were screened for unreliable entries, and those that contained incomplete or inaccurate data were eliminated. Projects that contained obvious inaccuracies or lack of information in the District, Status, Start Date and End Date fields were considered unreliable. These entries while not actually deleted from the database, are identified by an “X” in the “List Year” category, so they are easily identifiable and easily eliminated from representation and analysis. Using a unique quantitative and qualitative matrix, each specific project in both databases (over 47,000 entries) were assigned a specific “List Year” value representing either a specific calendar year, or an “M” if a specific calendar year could not be determined, or an “X” if the data was deemed too unreliable (as discussed above). Some examples of the key data points used and the resultant ‘List Year’ are shown in Table 2.

Determination of List Year Values			
Status	Start Date	End Date	List Year
Blank	Blank	Blank	X
Complete or Ongoing	Blank	Blank	M
Complete or Ongoing	Blank	2005	2005
Ongoing	2006	Blank	2006
Complete	2006	2007	2007
Ongoing	2008	2010	M

Table 2. List Year Matrix

As mentioned previously, the databases proved remarkable accurate and complete. Only 6.7 percent of the projects in the PRT database proved unreliable (List Year value of X) representing only 3.1 percent of the cost, while only 6.1 percent of the projects and 1.9 percent of the cost of the small-scale reconstruction projects were unreliable. Likewise, of the usable data that remained, a specific calendar year was determined for 68.0 percent of the PRT projects and 89.7 percent of the small-scale projects.

In addition to screening for district identification and specific dates of the work, projects were analyzed based on their status. It was assumed that reconstruction projects in various stages of the paperwork process (identified, planned, funded, etc.) at the provincial headquarters have no effect on the population and the situation on the ground, and thus were not considered in the analysis, only projects where the status was labeled as “Complete” or “On-going” were considered, in other words, projects that the people could actually see and use. Unless otherwise stated the data presented is for complete or ongoing projects only, however, throughout the attached analysis there is often the delineation between “Complete or Ongoing” with values of “Y” (yes) or “blank” (no). These are included primarily because most of the figures concerning the reconstruction effort in current literature do not differentiate between the two, and by including these figures, we can compare the reliability and fidelity of our overall database with other projects. In other words, the research does not become so specialized in cannot be contrasted with other efforts to ensure its validity. The volume of complete or ongoing projects does not reflect on the validity of the databases, but rather on how much is actually getting accomplished in the field. According to the PRT database, of the usable data (entries with a List Year other than X) 87.5 percent were listed as either complete or ongoing while the small-scale project database listed 86.5 percent of the usable data as complete or ongoing.

In summary, the district level reconstruction and stabilization data presented in this chapter and used for the district analysis contains only entries that were positively identified within the specific district, labeled as “complete” or “on-going”, and associated with either a specific calendar year, or over a series of multiple years.

c. Number of Projects as a Metric

Measuring the level of effort in the stabilization and reconstruction within a specific district can be very subjective and open to interpretation. A

critical question is what metric is the most accurate – the number of projects, the cost of projects, or the total man-hours, for example – to measure the level of effort, and what metric is widely available? The databases contained values only for the cost and specific numbers of projects. Statistical analysis supported using the *number of projects* as the measure of reconstruction when utilizing the PRT and small-scale project databases. It is reasonable that charity workers, NGOs, aid organizations and others involved in the reconstruction effort, have little to no cost for specific small-scale projects such as digging a well or repairing a marketplace. A significant amount of their inputs are manpower and utilizing donated equipment and supplies. Likewise, the projects by the PRTs incur little to no cost, especially if the materials are already on hand or donated. Statistically, the number of projects also proved the most illustrative metric. After eliminating unreliable data, of the 4,910 projects in the PRT database listed as Complete, 25.3 percent had zero cost. In the small-scale database, 34.2 percent of the 15,030 completed projects are listed as zero cost. Whether the cost was actually zero, or the data was inadvertently omitted, is secondary to the fact that in the data set presented, if cost was used as a measure of effort, it would ignore anywhere from 25 to 34 percent of the projects. Additionally, this trend was projected to continue as 24.5 percent of the planned PRT projects were listed as zero cost and 20.6 percent of the small-scale projects were projected to have zero cost. As a result, for the smaller projects, such as those in the PRT and small-scale project database, the *number* of projects, not the cost of projects is used as the metric to measure the effort.

d. Combining the Databases

The projects measured by the PRT and small-scale databases are very similar, the primary difference being who is doing the reconstruction. Since this study is concerned with what type and to what level the reconstruction is being accomplished and is not concerned with which actors are actually doing the reconstruction, there was a theoretical basis for combining the two databases. Statistically, this proved to be a sound approach. Both databases had very similar

levels of accuracy and fidelity. In the PRT database 93.3 percent of the project entries were considered reliable, and of those, 71.2 percent could be traced to a specific calendar year, resulting in 28.8 percent of the projects being assigned a List Year value of M. In the small-scale projects, 93.9 percent of the total list was usable, and a specific calendar year was assignable in 95.2 percent of the entries. By combining the databases a more accurate picture of the overall reconstruction effort is created without corrupting the dataset or introducing decreased levels of accuracy. The combined dataset results in 38,657 individual projects, nation-wide that are either complete or ongoing, of which 90.8% are attributed to a specific calendar year. In this new, combined dataset, the decision to use the number of projects and not the cost of the projects as the measure of the reconstruction effort is still valid. If the cost of projects was utilized, 21.3 percent of the projects would be ignored due to zero cost, and specific calendar year accuracy would drop to 73.9 percent.

e. Final Dataset

A condensed table showing the scope of the combined database by ISAF Regional Commands and List Year is included as Table 3. An expanded version of the database showing the individual provinces is included as Appendix B.

ISAF Regional Commands	Status Complete or Ongoing	List Year								Total
		2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	M	X	
RC Capital	Yes	47	97	316	515	301	197	707		2180
	No			20	25	8	16	120	226	415
RC Capital Total		47	97	336	540	309	213	827	226	2595
RC East	Yes	61	597	3101	5974	4588	1597	638		16556
	No	1	6	123	214	226	142	352	800	1864
RC East Total		62	603	3224	6188	4814	1739	990	800	18420
RC North	Yes	18	286	1777	2852	2677	1191	599		9400
	No		1	90	104	107	172	317	609	1400
RC North Total		18	287	1867	2956	2784	1363	916	609	10800
RC South	Yes	104	166	675	1133	882	588	934		4482
	No	76	9	120	134	190	69	1303	1011	2912

RC South Total		180	175	795	1267	1072	657	2237	1011	7394
RC West	Yes	32	139	1085	1828	1647	550	590		5871
	No	3	16	70	121	999	87	125	255	1676
RC West Total		35	155	1155	1949	2646	637	715	255	7547
Grand Total		342	1317	7377	12900	11625	4609	5685	2901	46756

Table 3. Combined Dataset of Small-Scale Projects

The table clearly shows an overwhelming effort in the eastern regional command. As the last region that to come under ISAF/NATO control, it remained under sole US control the longest and while currently under the ISAF command, the regional command is run by the US and the outposts are almost exclusively manned by US forces. Additionally, this region has the most PRTs, the most manpower, and the concentration of US Operation Enduring Freedom forces which operate outside of ISAF control. In sum, the eastern region represents the earliest, longest, and largest concentration of US forces. Outside of the eastern region the reconstruction effort is strongest in the north and west regions and weakest in the south. This reflects both the permissive environment in the north and west, which attracts more NGOs and aid agencies and also explains why the Pashtuns in the south feel their needs are not being addressed and therefore are more receptive to the Taliban.

This revised and edited reconstruction database, was scanned for all the projects located within the specific districts under study in this chapter. The data was then collated by year, status, and specific ANDS sector. Table 4 shows the results of the searches for all ANDS sectors combined. A total of 894 projects across all the ANDS sectors are listed as either complete or ongoing between 2002 and 2007. This highly detailed and refined dataset data formed the basis of the statistical and graphical analysis of the reconstruction effort.

District	Region	List Year						M	Total
		2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007		
Wor Mamay	East					3		4	7
Wazeh Khwah	East			7	1	6		7	21
Tarwah	East							3	3
Nish	South				7			9	16
Shah Vali Kowt	South		4	1	5	11	1	6	28
Khowgiani	East		14	11	8	9	1	7	50
Pachi va Agam	East		7	8	4	16		3	38
Daychupan	South							6	6
Nari	East				2	8	10	3	23
Kamdesh	East				6	12	4	1	23
Gizab	East				3	1		4	8
Bar Kunar	East					2		1	3
Ghaziabad	East				4	5	2	3	14
Naveh-ye Barakza'l	South	3	2	1	9	8		6	29
Rig (Helmand)	South	1	3	4	25	1		7	41
Almar	North		1	25	52	38	32	7	155
Khvajeh Sabz Push	North		1	4	8	8	4	1	26
Pashtun Kowt	North		1	35	44	36	33	12	161
Navor	East		10	1		13	31	1	56
Shahrestan	East			20	16	56	8	1	101
Shulgareh	North			3	3	3	12	5	26
Tulak	West		3	18	5	25		8	59
Grand Total		4	46	138	202	261	138	105	894

Table 4. Dataset for District Analysis

3. Population Calculations

Utilizing the district as the unit level of analysis introduces numerous variables such as terrain, population density, weather, arable land, accessibility, local history, etc. all of which influence the appeal and effectiveness of the insurgent forces and reconstruction efforts. In order to minimize some of the variables, “total population” was chosen as a normalizing factor. Among other factors, this statistic can account in a partial manner for terrain, arable land, “ruralness”, accessibility and weather. Population figures in Afghanistan as a whole, are somewhat unreliable, as a comprehensive census has not been conducted since the 1970’s, before two decades of warfare. Reliability, increases somewhat

when considering district populations, which can be assessed via local shuras and other means. In order to further increase reliability of the figures, population estimates were gathered from three different sources (ACSP, AIMS district profiles, and the government of Afghanistan's Central Statistic Office) and averaged together.¹³⁵ Population calculations were utilized to develop the projects-per-capita figures that are employed in some of the later analysis. The results of this research and calculations are shown in Table 5.

District	Region	Population Figures (1,000)			Average
		ACSP Estimates	AIMS Estimates	Combined Statistical Office Estimates	
Wor Mamay	East			3	3.0
Wazeh Khwah	East	21		19.4	20.2
Tarwah	East			1.7	1.7
Nish	South			11.3	11.3
Shah Vali Kowt	South	36		36.4	36.2
Khowgiani	East	106	146.8	108	120.3
Pachir va Agam	South	31	39.2	31.7	34.0
Chaparhar	South	44	54.8	44.2	47.7
Daychupan	South	45	52.8	33.1	43.6
Nari	East	14	15.1	13.8	14.3
Kamdesh	East	13	17.1	11.1	13.7
Gizab	East	54		55	54.5
Bar Kunar	East	14	15	16.4	15.1
Ghaziabad	East	13	14.8	7.5	11.8
Naveh-ye Barakza'l	South	77	93.4	78	82.8
Rig (Helmand)	South	2	13	22.1	12.4
Almar	North	55	116	55.8	75.6
Khvajeh Sabz Push	North	58	84	39.9	60.6
Pashtun Kowt	North	157	277	159.3	197.8
Navor	North	76	91.7	77.1	81.6
Shahrestan	East	107		108.9	108.0
Shulgareh	North	106	124.1	105.5	111.9
Tulak	West	41		41.3	41.2

Table 5. Population by District

¹³⁵ "CSO 2003 - 2004 Population Statistics - 388 Districts" on-line at: <http://www.cso-af.net/cso/index.php?page=1&language=en> (accessed 16 March 2008).

This table refutes the perception that Taliban support is confined to sparsely populated mountain districts. Wazeh Khwah has over 20,000 people and Khowgiani is the second largest district in the study with over 120,000 people, both of which show the highest Taliban risk for over two years. The results also highlight the difficulties in accurately assessing the population numbers. The AIMS estimates were almost always higher than the other two, in the case of Almar, it was more than double. There were also significant discrepancies between the ACSP figures and the CSO numbers, in some cases by over 20,000 people.

4. Limitations and Benefits of District-Level Approach

There are some natural limitations to the district level analysis and the overall approach which must be acknowledged. First, is that every district is treated as a distinct, uniform entity, there is no account for any spill-over effects from the neighboring areas, nor is there any differentiation or accounting for variables within a specific district. Additionally, only reconstruction efforts within a specific district are considered. As mentioned previously, the impact of strategic reconstructing efforts, such as the construction of a new provincial police headquarters are not measured at the district level. Thirdly, by using the number of projects as the metric by which the reconstruction effort is measured, there is an inherent assumption that all projects have the same effect. Every project is considered equal, both the resources required to complete it and in the scale and scope of its impact. Lastly, as this study is concerned solely on the effect of reconstruction, several factors that are clearly relevant to the influence of the Taliban have been eliminated from the majority of the analysis, such as tribal and ethnic affiliations, Taliban recruiting, financing, and non-violent methodologies, and the effect of ANA, ISAF, and US counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations, to name a few.

C. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS

1. Analysis Between Risk Assessment and Projects

When comparing the districts in order of risk and the reconstruction effort within each district there are some clear correlations. First the districts were placed along and X-axis with the highest risk districts on the left and the lowest risk districts on the right. Then the total numbers of reconstruction projects for all ANDS sectors, by year, were plotted along the Y-axis. There is an undeniable trend illustrating that the number of projects increased and the risk assessment decreased. The resultant graph is included as Figure 4.




Figure 5. Small-Scale Projects for 22 Districts by Year

Statistical analysis of this relationship resulted in an R-squared value of 0.319, a Multiple R value of .565, and a significance factor of 0.0061. Further

detailed analysis of the reconstruction effort sought to determine which sector of the ANDS had the greatest correlation with decreased risk level. The Agricultural and Rural Development sector proved to have the greatest effect, with an R-squared value of 0.343, a Multiple R value of .585 significant at .0041 level. Infrastructure and Natural Resources sector had the second most with an R-squared value of 0.337, a Multiple R value of .580 significant at .0045 level. Intuitively the Security sector might be assumed to have the greatest impact; however, the majority of the security effort is focused at the strategic level. There were only 21 security projects categorized as complete or ongoing in the 22 districts, make that variable statistically insignificant.

As mentioned, the results above were for the aggregated values of both risk assessment and reconstruction projects for the time period of 2004 to 2007. Further analysis was conducted to examine the relationships on an annual basis, comparing each district's risk assessment and the total number of projects for each year between 2004 and 2007. The calculations illustrated that correlation was much weaker on an annual basis, resulting in an R-squared of only 0.201, a Multiple R value of .449 significant at .001 for all the ANDS sectors combined and even lower for individual sectors.

2. Analysis on a Per-Capita Basis

Additionally, duplicate analysis was conducted on a project per-capita basis as a means to normalize certain geographic and environmental factors between districts. Projects per-capita were measured for all ANDS sectors combined and for each sector individually and were compared with risk assessment levels in the aggregated form and for individual years. In all cases there proved to be no correlation between risk assessments and projects per-capita with R-squared values of less than 0.1.

3. Conclusions

The strongest relationships discovered were the aggregated values for risk assessment and the reconstruction effort in the Agriculture and Rural

Development sector followed by the Infrastructure and Natural resources sector, and the combination of all ANDS sectors. In all three cases, there is strong correlation showing that the number of projects increased and risk assessment levels decreased.

Also significant is that these three relationships grew remarkably weaker when analyzed on an annual basis. One explanation is a time-lag factor affecting one or both variables. In other words, for a specific year the risk assessment level may decrease, but there is a time lag (in this case more than one year) before projects in that district increase; or just as likely, the number of projects may increase, but there is a lag before the projects result in a lower risk district. Although causation and the length of the time lag is not clear from this analysis, what is clear is the presence of a time lag and a strong inverse correlation between risk assessments and the number of projects focused on agriculture and rural development and infrastructure and natural resources.

These results support several conclusions and policy implications. The strong relationship between the number of projects and Taliban risk means that the level of effort in reconstruction can account for over 56 percent of the variations in risk level. Additionally, the most important types of projects are those relating to agriculture and rural development and infrastructure and natural resources, which can explain 58 percent of the risk variations. Clearly these two sectors represent very effective leverage points in reducing Taliban presence and influence. Considering that the vast majority of Afghans are rural farmers, the impact of these sectors is not surprising. Obviously agriculture and rural development is clearly targeting the average Afghan's livelihood and a further analysis of the infrastructure and natural resources category shows in involves digging wells, and irrigation improvements, both vitally important to the rural farmer. Projects such as health clinics, schools, good governance, and social development, may benefit the population over time, but show no effectiveness in reducing the Taliban threat and presumably have no effect on gaining the trust and confidence of the Afghan people. These results indicate that the average

Afghan is primarily concerned with his daily subsistence and livelihood and if we focus on assisting him in those areas we will have the greatest effect in gaining his support and reducing his acceptance and tolerance of the Taliban.

Additionally, the fact that there was, on average, less than one security project per district illustrates the implications at the local level of an under resourced reconstruction effort. It has been said that in a counter-insurgency operation security forces only control the ground they stand on, meaning they need to maintain a long-term and far reaching presence into the countryside. Roaming patrols that come through a town periodically are ineffective, even daily patrols cannot get the job done if the Taliban are allowed to maneuver unchallenged at night.

Lastly, this data illustrates the need for patience and a long-term outlook when it comes to policy making. The correlation values between projects and risk on the year-to-year basis was weaker than over the entire four year period. This shows that it is the cumulative effect of continued good will, and effective projects that can slowly gain the confidence of the Afghan people. One irrigation project will not garner a town's support overnight; neither will a one or two month concentrated "surge" in a particular area. Success is slow in coming and requires a continued presence. In order to gain the trust and confidence of the people, we cannot exercise hit-and-run reconstruction.

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IV. PROVINCIAL LEVEL ANALYSIS – PART I

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter takes a slightly different analytical perspective in the treatment of reconstruction and risk assessment. First, in order to address some of the potential limitations of analysis at the district level, this chapter focuses on the provincial level. Shifting the unit of analysis to a larger geographical region allows for the inclusion of data from the strategic projects database. Additionally, the number of small-scale projects increases dramatically, which may eliminate any anomalies at the district level. Secondly, rather than relying on the UN Risk Assessment maps this chapter uses the number of Taliban attacks as the metric of Taliban control. This approach has three key benefits. First, it offers a second source of data to track the trends of Taliban control, which, if it confirms the district level analysis, will serve to increase the reliability of those results. Second, using the number of attacks allows for a much more incremental approach to measuring Taliban control in contrast to the four levels used in the UN Assessment maps. Lastly, by tracking individual attacks, it is possible to analyze relationships and trends between specific targets and specific reconstruction projects and ANDS sectors.

The analysis in this chapter relies on the ACSP combined small-scale and PRT project database described in Chapter 3, with the addition of the ACSP strategic projects database which is addressed in the methodology section. Additionally, the Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) is utilized to gather and sort data on Taliban attacks. Both data sources, reconstruction and attacks, provide enough detailed information to compare trends within specific sectors of the overall effort, over time, and within the provinces.

1. Background on ACSP - Strategic Projects Database

For reasons addressed in Chapter III, the ACSP version VII was selected as the database from which reconstruction and stabilization information was

gathered. Because the level of analysis of this chapter is at the provincial level, all three elements of the ACSP are utilized: reconstruction data; small-scale projects, PRT projects, and strategic projects. Small-scale and PRT projects, essentially track very similar, locally centered projects such as repairing a village school or digging wells and local irrigation systems. Since the actors involved in accomplishing the reconstruction is not a concern of this analysis, small-scale projects and PRT projects are once again combined into one database for study. The strategic projects database, however, tracks major undertakings, such as supplying and equipping portions of the Afghan National Army, repairing and building power generation and distribution systems, and repairing key lines of communication. In the PRT dataset, 24.5 percent of the projects had zero cost, and the average cost of the remaining projects is \$82,122. In the small-scale dataset, 20.6 percent of the projects had zero cost and the average cost of the remaining projects was only \$27,066. In contrast, the strategic project database shows a zero cost for only 12 percent of the projects, with an average project cost of \$26,386,381 nearly a 100-fold increase over the small-scale project average. It also includes 76 projects valued at over \$50,000,000 and one project worth \$440,000,000. Clearly projects of this size cannot be compared on an equal basis and therefore, because of its unique nature, the strategic projects database is treated separately.

2. Background on WITS

It is extremely difficult to gather accurate, detailed, and consolidated information on the number, location and type of violent incidents in Afghanistan. It is widely assumed the best source of such information is the various intelligence functions within ISAF and USCENTCOM, however, such data is classified. As a result of the focus on Iraq, and recent pressure from think-tanks, researchers, and regional scholars, the classified incident reports maintain by the United States military organizations in Iraq were released with the classified elements removed. Similar reports, covering the Afghanistan area remain classified.

There are two widely known unclassified sources of information on terrorist and violent attack data, the National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) and the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism's (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Database (TKB).¹³⁶ The methodology of tracking events, as well as, the fidelity of the information with each database varies greatly. For example, in a preliminary search of both databases for Taliban related incidents committed within Afghanistan from 1 January, 2004 to 1 January, 2007, the WITS lists 764 incidents committed by "Muslim Extremists – Sunni" while the MIPT lists 336 incidents by the "Taliban." Based on the scope, volume and fidelity of information available, the WITS database was utilized as the source for Taliban attack data. To ensure accuracy and increase confidence in the data, this database was cross-referenced to avoid duplication and compared to data from the Open Source Center, Afghan News Center, BBC monitoring, and the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, located at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California.¹³⁷

The focus of this study is on the lives of everyday Afghans, the reconstruction they see and experience on the ground, and the violence they are subjected to. In light of that focus, elements of the Taliban and ISAF and USCENTCOM military-on-military campaigns are not considered. The key indicator of violence is the number of Taliban attacks on the government, security forces, and general population. As a result, using the terrorist incident database is appropriate. Exactly what constitutes a terrorist or a terrorist incident has long been debated with no clear consensus. For the purposes of this study, the methodology of the WITS database was acceptable. The database "consists of incidents in which subnational or clandestine groups or individuals deliberately or

¹³⁶ For the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System see: <http://wits.nctc.gov/> (accessed 16 March 2008) for the Terrorism Knowledge Database see: <http://www.tkb.org> (accessed 16 March 2008).

¹³⁷ For the Open Source Center see <https://www.opensource.gov/> (accessed 16 March 2008), for the Afghan News Center see <http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/index.html>, for BBC Monitoring see <http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk/index.shtml> (accessed 16 March 2008), for the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies see <http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/index.html> (accessed 16 March 2008).

recklessly attacked civilians or noncombatants (including military personnel and assets outside war zones and war-like settings).”¹³⁸ In order to be listed in the database, the attack must have been “initiated and executed,” hoaxes, failed attacks and defused attacks are not included.¹³⁹

Critical to the analysis was the database’s depth of information relating to the attacks. First, there is a clear delineation between the perpetrators, not in the sense of a defined named group as in the Provincial Irish Republican Army, but rather the “defining characteristics” such as Christian Extremist. Second, the database lists the number of killed, injured, and hostages for each attack, which was used later in the analysis to measure “intensity” of the attacks. Lastly, the database included defining characteristics of the target of the attack such as government officials, religious leaders, and population at large. This categorization allowed for the analysis of trends and relationships between specific reconstruction sectors and the targets of Taliban attacks. The database also contains information relating to the tactics used in the attacks; however, this was not considered relevant to the study and was omitted from the analysis.

B. METHODOLOGY

The same methodological procedures relating to the small-scale project database and the PRT database were employed in this study as described in Chapter III. That is to say, the databases were combined and the metric used to measure the level of effort is the number of projects. Additionally, only projects that are listed as complete or ongoing were included. Lastly, projects were categorized into specific calendar years, whenever possible. This allows for a year-by-year analysis of the trends and relationships. Projects that could not be placed within a specific calendar year, but otherwise contained reliable information were still included by under a List Year value of “M.” These projects are included in the aggregated 2004 to 2007 calculations but not the year-to-year

¹³⁸ WITS methodology description: <http://wits.nctc.gov/Methodology.do> (accessed 16 March 2008).

¹³⁹ Ibid.

analysis. M-year projects accounted for only 9.2 percent of the combined total of complete or ongoing projects, meaning over 90 percent of the projects were accurately placed within a specific year, increasing the confidence level of the year-to-year analysis.

One aspect of the database used to a great degree in this chapter is the differentiation between the eight pillars of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Every one of the over 36,000 reconstruction projects were identified with one of the eight pillars, or sectors of development: Security, Good Governance, Education, Health, Infrastructure and Natural Resources, Private Sector Development, Agriculture and Rural Development, and Social Protection.¹⁴⁰ A summary of the number of projects by sector is included as Table 6.

ANDS Sector	Number of Projects					Grand Total
	List Year					
	2004	2005	2006	2007	M	
Agriculture & Rural Development	1160	1961	1684	567	126	5498
Education	527	1358	1638	867	738	5128
Good Governance	219	407	289	123	301	1339
Health	47	385	511	208	347	1498
Infrastructure & Natural Resources	4701	6487	4881	1924	603	18596
Private Sector Development	13	182	33	8	237	473
Security	24	102	247	168	301	842
Social Protection	263	1407	779	258	800	3507
Grand Total	6954	12289	10062	4123	3453	36881

Table 6. Projects by ANDS sector and Year

The table shows that the peak of the reconstruction effort, in terms of number of projects completed, was in 2005. Despite an increase in funding projects were lower in 2006 and are on-pace to decrease even more in 2007. The overwhelming concentration of effort in Infrastructure and Natural Resources is a positive sign because the analysis in Chapter III showed this sector

¹⁴⁰ *Afghanistan National Development Strategy – Summary Report*, 20.

accounted for 58 percent of the decrease in the risk level posed by the Taliban. Chapter III would also indicate the effort in Education would be better applied to Agriculture and Rural Development which explained over 58 percent of the decreased Taliban threat at the district level. Counting the number of schools opened and the number of girls being educated may play well with the American public, and provides an easy metric for Congress to measure, but ultimately represents western values superimposed on the Afghan countryside. Just as American farmers in the dust bowl era were more concerned with simply feeding their kids than worrying if they would get into college, the Afghans are placing greater importance on the projects that help them maintain or increase their daily existence.

1. Strategic Projects – Cost of Projects as a Metric

The ACSP database containing strategic projects is significantly smaller than the small-scale and PRT databases. It contains only 543 projects, nationwide, but has an overall value of over \$10 billion. This database was subjected to the same quality control procedures used on the small-scale and PRT databases and detailed in the previous chapter. When screening for incomplete, inaccurate or otherwise unreliable entries, only 1.1 percent of the entries were eliminated. In keeping with the consistent philosophy that the average Afghan is only effected by reconstruction projects that are either completed and being used, or at the very minimum, under construction, only strategic projects with a status of complete or ongoing were included in the analysis. This new criteria reduced the dataset to 266 projects, or 49.5 percent of the total database, valued at over \$7 billion, which accounted for 66.8 percent of the total database value of over \$10 billion. The concept of “List Year” was also used in refining the strategic project database. Whenever possible a project was assigned a list year value that corresponded to the calendar year in which it was completed. If a specific completion date could not be determined, the project was assigned a list year value through a qualitative and quantitative matrix described in Chapter III. As in earlier analysis, if a project data was considered reliable, but a specific date could not be determined then it

was assigned a list year value of M. Unlike the combined small-scale and PRT database, where every one of the eight pillars or sectors of development are represented, in the strategic projects database, all the projects are categorized as either security or infrastructure and therefore represent only two of the eight sectors.

As with the other databases, either the number of projects or the costs of projects were presented as possible metrics to measure the level of the reconstruction effort. Unlike the small-scale and PRT databases, where the number of projects proved to be the most accurate and useful metric, in the strategic project database, the cost of projects was the metric of choice. The first factor in this determination was the issues of project imbalance. The projects included in this database, although almost all were significantly larger than the other two databases, they differed dramatically in scope and size. For example, there are 283 projects listed with costs between \$1 million and \$50 million such as regional police centers, counternarcotics equipment and supplies, and secondary roads and transmission lines. But there are also 76 projects listed over \$50 million such as rebuilding sections of major highways, expanding the electrical power grid, gas and hydro electric power generation, and army garrisons, and the most expensive project was listed at \$440 million for the repair and expansion of power distribution systems in Kabul and Herat. With such a wide disparity, clearly the assumption applied in relation to the other databases, that all projects are equal and counted the same cannot be applied to the strategic projects list. Additionally, when using the fund allocated to each project as the metric, the database proves to be more accurate. Of the \$7,018,777,303 listed for projects that were complete or ongoing, 91.6 percent of funds can be attributed to a specific calendar year, and only 8.4 percent labeled as "M." This high level of dating accuracy serves to increase the confidence and relevance of the year-to-year calculations. In contrast, when using the number of projects as the metric, only 86.5 percent of the complete or going projects can be traced to a specific calendar year, decreasing the relevance of year-to-year calculations. Lastly, of

the 266 complete or ongoing projects, only 12 percent are listed with zero cost. Admittedly using the cost of projects will result in this 12 percent of the projects being ignored, but this is significantly less than the zero cost figures for small-scale and PRT databases. It could also be said that the risk, or inherent inaccuracies of ignoring 12 percent of the data is less than the inaccuracies of equating projects valued at \$1 million with projects valued at \$440 million. In summary, the reconstruction and stabilization effort captured by the combined small-scale and PRT database will continued to be measured by the number of projects; however, strategic projects, in order to increase accuracy and relevance, will be measured by the cost of projects.

2. Strategic Projects – Final Dataset

At the end of this comprehensive database analysis unreliable data was eliminated and the remaining entries were categorizing based on List Year and project status. The resultant dataset of dollar values of complete or ongoing strategic projects per year for each province in the entire country is shown in Table 7. This represents the dataset utilized in the strategic project analysis in this and following chapters.

PROVINCE	List Year						Grand Total
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	M	
Badakhshan				\$25,000,000		\$25,000,000	\$50,000,000
Badghis			\$101,000,000	\$55,000,000	\$10,000,000		\$166,000,000
Baghlan			\$131,000,000			\$83,100,000	\$214,100,000
Balkh		\$68,400,000	\$3,500,000	\$87,151,601	\$6,000,000		\$165,051,601
Farah			\$86,300,000	\$1,940,000		\$19,200,000	\$107,440,000
Faryab			\$101,000,000	\$155,000,000	\$20,000,000	\$4,500,000	\$280,500,000
Ghazni		\$26,500,000		\$22,484,289	\$48,985,450		\$97,969,739
Helmand			\$315,705,587	\$80,096,533			\$395,802,120
Herat		\$189,544,761	\$267,300,000	\$42,500,000	\$40,000,000	\$96,000,000	\$635,344,761
Jowzjan			\$15,400,000	\$80,000,000		\$45,990,000	\$141,390,000
Kabul (Kabul)		\$68,900,000	\$184,355,059	\$380,453,774	\$191,818,881	\$65,400,000	\$890,927,713
Kandahar		\$218,678,145	\$11,146,740	\$101,800,000	\$195,861,115	\$102,000,000	\$629,486,000
Kapisa			\$23,000,000				\$23,000,000
Khowst			\$77,622,540	\$800,000	\$20,000,000		\$98,422,540
Konar (Kunar)			\$45,000,000	\$15,362,359			\$60,362,359
Konduz (Kunduz)			\$46,264,126	\$30,000,000		\$22,300,000	\$98,564,126
Laghman	\$124,000,000		\$9,179,388	\$38,988,000			\$172,167,388
Lowgar			\$6,020,000				\$6,020,000
Multi		\$350,000,000	\$63,100,000	\$216,000,000			\$629,100,000
Nangarhar		\$27,600,000	\$63,000,000	\$54,300,000	\$6,000,000		\$150,900,000
Nimruz		\$88,750,000					\$88,750,000
Nurestan				\$45,237,404			\$45,237,404
Nuristan					\$291,000,000		\$291,000,000
Oruzgan (Uruzgan)				\$34,300,000			\$34,300,000
Paktia		\$65,200,000	\$10,767,369	\$67,725,593			\$143,692,962
Paktika				\$124,384,688	\$34,580,000		\$158,964,688
Panjshir				\$15,000,000	\$108,000,000		\$123,000,000
Parvan (Parwan)		\$73,700,000	\$65,600,000	\$12,800,000	\$99,600,000		\$251,700,000
Takhar					\$85,000,000	\$25,000,000	\$110,000,000
Vardak			\$110,000,000				\$110,000,000
Zabol (Zabul)		\$147,000,000		\$800,000	\$63,742,780		\$211,542,780
(blank)		\$142,600,000	\$111,951,122	\$80,000,000		\$103,490,000	\$438,041,122
Grand Total	\$124,000,000	\$1,466,872,906	\$1,848,211,930	\$1,767,124,241	\$1,220,588,225	\$591,980,000	\$7,018,777,303

Table 7. Final Strategic Project Dataset

By analyzing where and when money was spent, and was not spent, we can see some interesting trends. The largest recipient is, not surprisingly, the capital region of Kabul. The second largest is Herat, on the western border with Iran, most of their funding came in 2004-05 when regional leaders held more influence over the national government. Since 2005 their funding has decreased

significantly. Kandahar's prominence as the number three recipient can likely be explained by the large concentration of US forces in that province and the critical importance of the Kandahar airfield to US operations. Also striking is where money was not spent. Tracking the Taliban expansion out of Kandahar, in the past two years, they moved primarily into Helmand, Nimroz, Farah and Uruzgan. In the 2006 and 2007 timeframe these four provinces received only a combined \$116.2 million in reconstruction. This represents only 3.9 percent of the more than \$2.9 billion spent nation-wide, further supporting the perception held by Pashtuns in the south that the central government is not responding to their needs.

3. Processing of WITS Data

Unlike the reconstruction and stabilization data, where the actual database was available for screening and modification, in order to achieve the fidelity and accuracy required, the data from WITS had to be accessed through a user-interface and multiple individual user queries. The results of these multiple inquiries, were then combined into a new and separate database, derived from, but not maintained by, or found on the WITS website. It is this new database, created specifically for this study that was the core of the attack data used in the analysis.

A preliminary query in the WITS system for attacks within Afghanistan, committed by "Islamic Extremist – Sunni" (WITS does not use named groups as searchable criteria, but rather the "defining characteristics" of the perpetrators) between 1 January 2004 and 30 June 2007 returned roughly 2100 incidents. However, it was not possible to categorize the events by province as required for the intended analysis. Instead, separate queries were run for each individual province which provided the required fidelity. Due to spelling anomalies and duplications, over fifty different queries were run, the results of which were combined into one master database. Further analysis of the data available on the WITS website discovered 87 incidents within Afghanistan where the province was

not reported. The various locations for these incidents was researched, properly coded and added to the master database. Additionally, ten incidents within Afghanistan that the WITS database listed as perpetrator unknown were researched and verified as likely Taliban attacks, and therefore were added to the database. Lastly, five incidents were removed from the database due to unreliable or obviously inaccurate data.

Using a “List Year” methodology similar to that employed in the reconstruction databases, each event was categorized into a specific calendar year, to enable year-to-year and time-lag analysis. Since the reconstruction databases are an ISAF led project, all the entries are coded within a specific ISAF Regional Command. The WITS data, however, is run by the National Counterterrorism Center and does not use the same methodology. In order to facilitate accurate regional comparisons, every entry was coded with the appropriate ISAF Regional Command based on the geographical location of the incident. After countless queries into the WITS system, combining the results, screening for errors, omissions and duplications, and extensive modifications, the resultant dataset contains 2099 attacks, sorted by target, year, and province, that were either definitely or most likely committed by the Taliban. It was this stand-alone dataset, specifically developed for this study that formed the basis of the attack analysis. A summary of the events by province and year is included as Table 7. As a reminder, the data for 2007 only lists attacks occurring on or before 30 June of that year.

Attacks per Year by Province

ISAF Regional Command	Province	List Year				Grand Total
		2004	2005	2006	2007	
Capital	kabul	11	28	48	16	103
Capital Total		11	28	48	16	103
East	Daykondi		2	3		5
	ghazni	3	22	106	64	195
	kapisa		1	14	4	19
	khowst	15	38	79	38	170
	Kunar	9	18	20	21	68
	laghman		8	23	17	48
	lowgar	4	8	18	14	44
	nangarhar	18	30	40	17	105
	nuristan	1	8	5	7	21
	paktia	9	8	36	32	85
	paktika	2	8	40	24	74
	parvan	1		3	4	8
	vardak			10	30	10
East Total		62	161	417	252	892
North	badakhshan	3	3	10	4	20
	baghlan	1	4	12	4	21
	balkh	2	10	20	10	42
	faryab	1	2	7	4	14
	jowzjan		2	2		4
	kondoz	3	1	7	8	19
	samangan		1	2	2	5
	sar-e pol		1	3	4	8
	takhar		2	6	1	9
North Total		10	26	69	37	142
South	helmand	10	68	125	45	248
	kandahar	24	94	124	66	308
	uruzgan	8	34	17	17	76
	zabul	7	51	61	26	145
South Total		49	247	327	154	777
West	badghis	1	2	8	4	15
	farah	5	10	37	22	74
	ghowr			4		4
	herat	8	13	33	13	67
	nimruz	1	2	14	8	25
West Total		15	27	96	47	185
Grand Total		147	489	957	506	2099

Table 8. Final WITS Dataset

As expected, this data closely mirrors the trends in the UN Risk Assessment Maps. The greatest numbers of attacks are in the east, with the south a close second. Additionally, there is a huge increase between 2004 and

2005 and again in 2006. The 2007 figures are on pace to slightly exceed the 2006 totals, with the east seeing the greatest increase in attacks. In 2005 it is clear the emphasis was in the south which saw a 5-fold increase in attacks. In 2006, the south continued to see increased attacks, but with their gains relatively secure the Taliban shifted focus to the other three regions, where attacks either doubled or tripled.

Using a “List Year” methodology similar to that employed in the reconstruction databases, each event was categorized into a specific calendar year, to enable year-to-year and time-lag analysis. Since the reconstruction databases are an ISAF led project, all the entries are coded within a specific ISAF Regional Command. The WITS data, however, is run by the National Counterterrorism Center and does not use the same methodology. In order to facilitate accurate regional comparisons, every entry was coded with the appropriate ISAF Regional Command based on the geographical location of the incident. After countless queries into the WITS system, combining the results, screening for errors, omissions and duplications, and extensive modifications, the resultant dataset contains 2099 attacks, sorted by target, year, and province, that were either definitely or most likely committed by the Taliban. It was this stand-alone dataset, specifically developed for this study that formed the basis of the attack analysis. A summary of the events by province and year is included as Table 7. As a reminder, the data for 2007 only lists attacks occurring on or before 30 June of that year.

4. Matching Development Sectors with Targets

A major goal of this section of the study was to compare trends between specific reconstruction sectors and the targeting trend of the Taliban. Are the battle plans of the Taliban influenced by the ongoing reconstruction effort? In other words, if more schools are built in the reconstruction effort, does the Taliban respond by attacking more schools? Every project in the reconstruction data was already attributed to one of the eight ANDS sectors, but the attack data was

sorted according to twenty four different pre-existing WITS criteria. In order to accurately compare the elements of reconstruction and attacks a common method of characterization had to be developed. First the twenty four different victim or target characterization from the WITS database was consolidated into five different attack categories developed specifically for this study, according to the table below.

<u>Attack Data Categories</u>	<u>WITS Victim Categories</u>
Security	Military Paramilitary/Private security Peacekeeper
Government	Police Diplomatic Electoral/Polling Fire and Rescue Government Employee/Contractor Government Official Non Official Public Figure Political Affiliated Top Government Officials
Humanitarian/NGO	Clergy/Religious Worker Educator Health Care Humanitarian/NGO Journalist/Publisher/Reporter United Nations
Business	Student Business Infrastructure
Population at Large	Civilian Refugees/IDPs

Additionally, each of the eight ANDS sectors were matched with a specific attack category according to the table below and combined when appropriate. When analyzing the data for trends within the attack patterns of the Taliban and between reconstruction efforts and Taliban attacks, associations described in the table below were used. As such, a rise in the number of small-scale reconstruction projects addressing the ANDS sectors of education or health would be compared to a change in attacks targeting “Humanitarian/NGO” which is

comprised of educators, students, health care workers, aid workers, NGOs, reporters, clergy and religious figures, and humanitarian organizations.

<u>Attack Data Categories</u>	<u>Small Scale Projects</u>	<u>Strategic Projects</u>
Security	Security	Security
Government	Good Governance	N/A
Humanitarian / NGO	Education	N/A
	Health	
Business	Infrastructure & Natural Resources	Infrastructure
	Private Sector Development	
Population at Large	Social Protection	N/A
	Agriculture & Rural Development	

5. Selection of Provinces

When determining which provinces to study in greater detail several factors were considered. First, the pool of provinces studied had to be large enough to provide a statistically relevant sample. Each province was going to be analyzed on an annual basis from 2004 to 2007, providing 4 individual data points per province for every regression calculation. In order to have a large enough “N” in the calculations at least ten provinces had to be studied. Additionally, there had to be a relevant amount of reconstruction data and attack data for each province. While every province has experienced some violence and some reconstruction, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the relationship between the two with respect to individual sectors, not the aggregated amounts. In other words, there had to be a significant number of attacks to accurately reflect trends in the targeting of different sectors; a province with only three attacks cannot be used to confidently measure trends and focus areas among the five different target sets. In contrast, Kandahar, with 308 attacks, has experienced attacks in every sector and in significant volume to overcome the impact of any anomalies in the Taliban attack strategy. As a result, the provinces selected had to have a high level of attacks to accurately reflect the Taliban strategy and not simply the actions of outlier cells or rouge Taliban commanders.

Combining the different factors of selection, every province with 50 or more attacks between 1 January 2004 and 30 June 2007 were included in the analysis. Only fourteen provinces met this criteria: Farah, Ghazni, Helmand, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Khowst, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Uruzgan, Vardak, and Zabul; their location within Afghanistan is highlighted in Figure 5.




Figure 6. 14 Provinces Studied

6. Limitations and Benefits of Provincial-Level Approach

There are some inherent limitations and assumptions in this approach which must be acknowledged. First, is that just as with the district level analysis, every province is treated as a distinct, uniform entity, there is no account for any spill-over effects from the neighboring areas, nor is there any differentiation or accounting for variables within a specific province. Additionally, several factors that are clearly relevant have been eliminated from the majority of the analysis, such as tribal and ethnic affiliations, Taliban recruiting, financing, and non-violent

methodologies, and the effect of ANA, ISAF, and US counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations, to name a few. Also, for this study there was no distinction between the types of attack. Arson was considered as an equal to suicide bombing and a machine gun attack in the market was considered the same as burning an empty government building. The analysis does not distinguish between the tactics used or the impact or the casualties created by the attack. Lastly, by attempting to compare and link reconstruction efforts with specific groups of targets a certain level of consolidation was required. The twenty four different victim categories were condensed into five, as where the eight ANDS development sectors. Anytime data is combined or aggregated in this manner a certain level of detail is lost.

This methodology also does not consider variations in Taliban targeting due their overall battle plan and existing level of influence with a specific province. In other words, if the Taliban did not consider the province strategically important to their overall campaign, there may not be as many, or the same type of attacks. In some sense this problem is mitigated by the requirement of fifty attacks or more to be included in the study, however, even with these criteria, certain provinces may be considered of more importance, or the next step in their advancement strategy, and thus be subjected to different targeting priorities. Additionally, once a province is firmly in the grips of the Taliban, there is a strong probability that a different strategy is employed. For example, Zabol is one of the longest and strongest Taliban strongholds. In this province, attacks against the population, most of whom are Taliban supporters, if not active Taliban members, would be counter-productive. In more closely contested areas, however, where the Taliban is attempting to intimidate the villagers not to cooperate with the government and international organizations, attacks against the population and aid workers is more common. Kandahar serves as an example of this shifting strategy, where despite a large security effort and large numbers of reconstruction projects, the attack data shows far less attacks against the security forces, or the projects, but a much greater emphasis on attacks against the general population. This may

indicate a problem with controlling the population and the corresponding Taliban response, regardless of the reconstruction efforts.

C. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS

After retrieving extensive data from both the ACSP and WITS databases and then performing custom modifications and improvements, the result is a dataset that lists each of the fourteen provinces under study, with the number of attacks and reconstruction projects by year that were associated with one of five different categories developed for this project; Security, Government, Humanitarian/NGO, Business, or Population at large. A full copy of the dataset is included as Appendix C.

From this dataset, regression calculations were performed to determine the relationships between specific reconstruction sectors and the targeting trends of the Taliban across the fourteen provinces on a year-to-year basis between 2004 and 2007. A summary of the findings are listed in Table 9.

	R-Squared Values						
	Total attacks	Security attacks	All non-security attacks	Government attacks	NGO Attacks	Business Attacks	Population attacks
\$ Strategic security	0.020	0.005	0.038	0.009	0.006	0.000	0.076
\$ Strategic Infrastructure	0.002	0.007	0.000	0.014	0.007	0.014	0.001
\$ Strategic Total	0.017	0.011	0.020	0.020	0.011	0.005	0.028
Security projects	0.314	0.408	0.204	0.036	0.133	0.022	0.323
Government Projects	0.168	0.140	0.166	0.072	0.157	0.035	0.175
Humanitarian / NGO Projects	0.033	0.015	0.047	0.051	0.067	0.004	0.022
Business Projects	0.000	0.020	0.008	0.007	0.062	0.002	0.000
Population at Large Projects	0.040	0.020	0.057	0.020	0.062	0.017	0.049

Table 9. Results of Project Sectors and Taliban Targets

Additionally, the calculations involving security projects resulted in a Multiple R value of .561 significant at .001 when correlated with total attacks, and when correlated with security attacks resulted in a Multiple R value of .639, also

significant at .001. With respect to population attacks, the Multiple R value was .569 significant at .001. In other words, the increase in security projects can explain an amazing 56 to 64 percent of the increase in attacks, with less than a 1 in 1,000 chance of pure coincidence.

Some very interesting observations can be drawn from these results. First, the strategic level reconstruction efforts, both in the security sector and the infrastructure had essentially zero impact on both the overall level of violence in the provinces and the number of attacks directed at specific sectors. For the fourteen provinces in the study, the strategic effort was valued at over \$3.7 billion, which accounts for over half of the completed or ongoing projects nationwide. Of the total amount, nearly \$1.4 billion was spent on security. While these results cannot support the dramatic claim that the money was wasted, it does statistically speaking, show there is no relationship, positive or negative between the amount of money spent on security and the number of attacks as a whole, or within specific target groups.

When comparing the impact of specific reconstruction efforts with the corresponding sets of targets, with the exception of security projects, there was also no relationship. The level of government projects in no way related to the number of attacks against government targets, the same can be said for Humanitarian/NGO projects, business projects, and population at large projects. This analysis was intended to test the notion that as soon as a school, or market, or government outpost is built, the Taliban destroys it. If the Taliban targeted their attacks primarily on recently completed projects, then there would be a strong correlation between reconstruction efforts and Taliban attacks within the same category, and this proved not to be the case.

A significant example of the limited impact of specific reconstruction sectors is the money spent on strategic infrastructure improvements, over \$2.3 billion for the fourteen provinces. The level of effort in this sector of the reconstruction program had no impact on the number of attacks or the targets. That is to say that the projects themselves were not targeted, and the general

population was not targeted (no correlation with population attacks) as punishment for cooperating with the government. The causation for this relationship, or lack thereof is debatable. Perhaps the projects are of such high value and significance that they were heavily defended against attack. Perhaps, as in the case of the “Ring Road” the benefit of ease of travel not only benefits the government and business communities, but is also seen as an advantage to the Taliban, and therefore is not contested.

The strongest relationship, by far, between any sectors of the reconstruction effort and Taliban attacks is the positive correlation between security projects and security attacks. This regression analysis produced an R-squared value of 0.408 and Multiple R value of .639. A scatter plot of the data points is included as Figure 7.




Figure 7. Small-Scale Security Projects vs. Security Attacks

The figure illustrates and the calculations confirm that the number of attacks is closely tied to the number of projects, in fact the increase in the number of projects accounts for almost 64 percent of the increase in attacks. This data

does not support any conclusions regarding causation, however. It cannot quantitatively be determined if an increase in security projects provoked an increase in Taliban attacks against security targets, or if security projects were increased in response to a high level of Taliban security attacks.

In an effort to determine which aspect was increasing first, and therefore increasing the case for causation, a time lag analysis on this dataset was applied. Because the data is categorized on an annual basis, a twelve month time lag interval was the smallest possible. When a time lag was applied to the security projects, in other words 2005 security project data was compared to 2004 attack data, the R-squared value dropped to 0.159, illustrating that projects were not undertaken in response to Taliban attacks. When similar methodology was applied to attack data (2005 attack data compared to 2004 security project data), the R-squared value dropped to 0.029, showing essentially no correlation between the amount of Taliban attacks that targeted security forces and the number of security projects undertaken in the previous year. To summarize, the time lag interval of twelve months produced significantly weaker relationships. This however, does not rule out the likely scenario that either the attacks or the number of projects increases first and the other follows, but simply illustrates that the planning cycle for either the Taliban or the reconstruction effort is less than twelve months.

In sum, the quantitative analysis proves an increase in security projects accounted for 56 to 64 percent of the increase in total attacks, attacks on security targets and attacks against the population. Additionally, the increase in security projects and attacks occurred in the same twelve month period. Deductively we can analyze three possible causation relationships. First, is that the increases are purely coincidental. This is possible, but the calculations illustrate the likelihood of a coincidental relationship of this type as less than 1 in 1,000. Second, is that the increase in attacks occurred first and the reconstruction community responded with an increase in completed security projects within the same twelve month window. This is possible, but not plausible given the timeline

and bureaucratic process required to identify, plan, approve, fund and build reconstruction projects. The third possible explanation is that the security projects were completed first and then there was a rise in attacks. This would imply that either the reconstruction community correctly predicted future Taliban offensives and purposefully increased the security presence in those areas, or more likely, the Taliban saw what they perceived as the central government and ISAF forces challenging their authority and responded with an increase in attacks. The end result is that the increase in security projects at the very least precedes, and possibly causes the increase in total attacks, population attacks and security attacks.

Clearly the traditional approach to eliminating a conventional force by increase security presence and security operations is not working against the Taliban. At the strategic level the \$2.3 billion spent on security and infrastructure had zero impact on decreasing Taliban operations. The security effort at the local or small-scale level did not decrease attacks, but actually accounted for over 54 percent of the increase in attacks. This would appear counter-intuitive if considering actions against a conventional opponent; however, it fits the model when considering the Taliban as an insurgency. Very few counter-insurgency operations are won kinetically, in other words, by attempting to kill all the insurgents. In fact, most direct military action targeting insurgents can actually increase their strength. It is usually much more effective to address the needs of the population or support them directly, thereby winning their allegiance and eliminating the recruitment and support base for the insurgents.

The applicability of the counter-insurgency model in Afghanistan is further supported by the results in Chapter III. At the District level projects aimed at addressing the immediate needs of the Afghans, namely assistance in farming and rural livelihoods had the greatest impact on gaining the support of the people and reducing their support for, and the threat from, the Taliban. This is a classic example of draining the proverbial sea in which insurgents operate.

Why the district level results on the effectiveness of agriculture and rural development and natural resources were not duplicated at the provincial level is unclear. One possible explanation is with the selection of provinces. Because each province had to meet the 50 attack criteria, it could be argued that these provinces are key to the Taliban strategy, hence the high number of attacks. If the Taliban did see these areas as strategically important, it is likely they would continue operations there even without the support of the local residents, importing supplies and manpower if necessary in order to oppose the government presence. Under such conditions, no amount of aid in the short term would decrease the level of Taliban attacks.

In conclusion, the results of this chapter and Chapter III show that projects focusing on security at the local level is actually increasing attacks, while projects focusing on rural farming and irrigation are decreasing risk levels, and strategic-level security projects are having no effect on the Taliban. This evidence supports the perspective that the battle in Afghanistan is not an extended mop-up operation that should target Taliban forces in the field, but rather a classic counter-insurgency struggle, where the best chance for success lies with the trust and confidence of the people.

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V. PROVINCIAL LEVEL ANALYSIS – PART II

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the last round of statistical analysis conduct for this study. It attempts to provide further insight into trends already discovered, reinforce previous trends through the use of alternative data sources, and compensate for, and mitigate some of the inherent limitations of the previous methodologies.

1. Previous Analysis and Results

The analysis in Chapter III was focused at the district level and compared the impact of small-scale reconstruction projects, both in overall numbers and individual development sectors, on the level of Taliban risk as assessed by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security on a year-to-year basis between 2004 and 2007. One significant finding from this analysis was that as the overall number of projects and especially those focused on agriculture and rural development and infrastructure development increased, the risk assessment level decreased. Additionally, the number of security projects within a specific district proved to have no effect on the risk assessment levels.

Chapter IV presented analyses conducted on a larger geographical area and utilized a different set of data in an effort to either confirm or refute the district level findings. Fourteen different provinces were selected as the unit of analysis, which allowed for the inclusion of the strategic project database valued at over \$3.7 billion in ongoing or completed projects within the fourteen provinces. Instead of relying on the UN assessments, data on the number, location, type, and targets of Taliban attacks were used. Analysis was conducted comparing the impact of each of the eight sectors of the reconstruction plan on the overall number of Taliban attacks, and the targeting trends of the Taliban, on a year-to-year basis. The results showed that an increase in the number of small-scale security projects had a strong correlation to an increase in overall attacks and

attacks focused on both security forces and the general population within each district. The conclusions of the district level analysis, that increases in infrastructure, agriculture and rural development corresponded to a decrease Taliban threat, could not be confirmed at the provincial level. Additionally, the \$3.7 billion spent on complete or ongoing strategic security and strategic infrastructure projects in the provinces had zero effect on the number or targets of Taliban attacks.

2. Focus of Chapter V

This chapter also uses the province as the unit of analysis, but it is the first to include every province in the nation. It compares the reconstruction effort, both strategic and small-scale to Taliban attack patterns and intensity in every province in the country. This approach was specifically designed to counter some of the methodological limitations addressed in previous chapters. First, by using provinces as the level of analysis, the data from the strategic project database can be utilized. Using every province in the study results in the largest pool of reconstruction data and attack data, limiting the corrupting effect of outlier attacks. Additionally, by analyzing the entire country, provinces where the Taliban are historically strong, or call their “heartland” are combined with provinces where they are historically and currently weak. Likewise, it will include provinces that represent the next phase of the Taliban battle plan and therefore receive an inordinate number of attacks, with perhaps a different targeting strategy; and it will also include provinces that are not, or were not key elements of the Taliban strategy from 2004 to 2007. This approach should address any possible skewing of the data by focusing on specific provinces.

By measuring every province there are enough individual data points to conduct a variation on the previous analysis. All the analysis in Chapters III and IV were conducted on a year-to-year basis, providing four data points per province or district for every different calculation. Using all the provinces creates a large enough pool to measure trends on an aggregated level from 2004 to 2007

between provinces. In other words the total number of attacks and reconstruction projects within a specific sector between 2004 and 2007 can be combined for each individual province and compared between provinces. This four year aggregation can overcome for anomalies or outside factors influencing either the reconstruction data or attacks trends for a specific year. In addition, the larger pool of data enables a more detailed analysis of the impact of strategic projects by studying only those provinces that were the direct beneficiaries of the projects. This chapter also attempts to compensate for the previous assumption that all attacks were equal, both in their impact and their multiple costs to the Taliban. By introducing a measurement of “intensity” larger attacks are given a larger value to emphasize their greater effect.

By altering some of the previous methods and scope, and introducing new analytical techniques this chapter attempts to answer several questions:

Will the dollars spent on strategic security projects and strategic infrastructure projects continue to show no correlation to the level of Taliban attacks?

Will security projects continue to have a positive correlation with the number of attacks?

Will infrastructure, rural and agricultural development have an inverse relationship with attacks on the national level as they did at the district level?

Will the introduction of attack “intensity” produce any new relationships, or strengthen the ones previously discovered?

Lastly, will comparison between the four year aggregated values for each province hold any new insights?

B. METHODOLOGY

1. Selection Area

This chapter analyzes the reconstruction and attack levels for the entire country, using the province as the unit of analysis. As such, all thirty four provinces are included in the study and are treated with equal weight in all analysis.

2. Reconstruction Databases and Modifications

As with previous chapters the reconstruction data used for the study comes from the ACSP version VII. The small-scale project database and PRT project database were combined, modified, and screened as described in Chapter III. The number of projects is used as the metric to measure the level of the small-scale reconstruction effort within specific provinces. The strategic project data was extensively modified and screened as described in Chapter IV. For this chapter the cost of projects continues to be the most accurate metric to measure the strategic reconstruction effort, as explained in previous chapters. This chapter is the first time the databases are used in their entirety. For the combined small-scale and PRT project database, this represents 44,601 projects (valued at \$3.6 billion) and for the strategic database, this includes 537 projects valued at over \$10.5 billion. In both the combined database of small-scale projects and strategic level projects, only ongoing or completed projects will be utilized for the study, which equates to 36,935 small-scale projects and nearly \$6.9 billion worth of strategic projects. Lastly, because the focus is on overall attack numbers and intensity, not the specific targeting trends, there was no requirement to condense the reconstruction data into the previously use five categories. Instead reconstruction data will be analyzed according to the eight different sectors of development as outlined in the ANDS and utilized in Chapter III.

3. Processing of WITS Data

Data on the number, location, and timing of Taliban attacks were gathered from the WITS database, and modified, screened, and edited as described in Chapter IV. The significant change in this analysis is the use of an “intensity” scale. One potential downfall of the methodology described thus far is the assumption that all attacks are the same. Just as using the number of projects as the metric to measure reconstruction efforts mandates that every project be considered equal in scope and impact, simply counting the number of Taliban attacks assumes they all have the same impact and represent the same level of training, planning, cost, and logistical effort to the Taliban. To help minimize this oversimplification, a measure of intensity was developed and applied to each of the 2099 attacks in the dataset. The “intensity” level is simply the combined number of victims – either dead, injured, or held hostage. Attacks that resulted in a higher number of casualties have a higher intensity level, and attacks where a large number of hostages were captured have a high intensity level. This helps differentiate between a car bomb in the market square that kills scores of people and an attack on an empty government building. The intensity levels for each attack were averaged over the calendar year for each province. As a result, this analysis uses a total number of attacks and average intensity for each province per year for each year between 2004 and 2007.

C. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS

1. Initial Reconstruction Analysis

When the final modifications of the combined small-scale and PRT database, the Strategic Projects database, and the WITS data results are combined the result is a single dataset that for every province in the country lists by year, the overall number of projects, the number of projects for each of the eight ANDS sectors, the total value of strategic projects, and individual values for strategic security projects and strategic infrastructure projects, and list the number of Taliban attacks and their average intensity. Additionally, the same data is

presented by each province in an aggregated form combining the data from 2004 to 2007. This final dataset provided the basis for the statistical analysis describe below. A copy of this complete dataset is included as Appendix D.

The first series of calculations were intended to test the previous results that security projects were positively correlated with overall attacks, and that the overall number of projects, and especially agriculture and infrastructure projects were negatively correlated with the level of risk posed by the Taliban. A summary of the initial regression tests and the resultant R-squared values are listed in Table 9.

	R-squared values	
	Attacks	Intensity
Total projects	0.066	0.000
security projects	0.363	0.042
social projects	0.000	0.004
Privatization projects	0.020	0.006
Infrastructure projects	0.008	0.000
health projects	0.053	0.000
Good governance projects	0.200	0.002
education projects	0.009	0.000
agriculture projects	0.140	0.002
Security \$	0.080	0.045
Infrastructure \$	0.014	0.009
Total \$	0.065	0.038

Table 10. Results of Project, Attack, and Intensity Analysis¹⁴¹

The results primarily reinforce earlier trends noted at the provincial level, and further discredit results from the district level analysis. The strongest relationship is the positive correlation between security projects and the overall level of attacks. The district level finding that total projects, agriculture projects, and infrastructure projects were all negatively correlated with overall level of Taliban risk is not supported by these results.

¹⁴¹ The analysis of Security Projects and Attacks also produced a Multiple R value of .603 significant at the .001 level.

The inclusion of an “intensity” factor failed to uncover any correlation between the scale of the attacks and the reconstruction effort. One possible explanation for the statistical independence of the Intensity level with respect to this analysis is that the intensity level is determined primarily by the Taliban strategic battle plan. That is to say, those provinces that make-up the next phase of Taliban expansion garner the majority of the Taliban resources in men and materials and technical expertise, and therefore experience the most intense attacks. Based on this premise, unless the international community is correctly predicting the Taliban’s future operations and purposefully emphasizing reconstruction efforts in the same areas, there would be no direct correlation between reconstruction and intensity.

Another significant “non-relationship” is the continued lack of impact the strategic security sector and strategic infrastructure sector have on the overall number of attacks. This result, which was also seen in the earlier provincial analysis that focused on the fourteen provinces where the Taliban was the most active, apparently holds true nation-wide.

2. Refinement of Strategic Reconstruction Analysis

As discussed in the methodology section, the larger data pool of all thirty four provinces allowed for variations in the statistical analysis. One nuanced approach applied to the calculations involving the strategic project data. Previous calculations in earlier chapters and the results described thus far in this chapter measured the level of strategic projects in every province within the study, regardless of whether there were actual strategic projects located within the provinces. In other words, there were numerous provinces included in the analysis where the value of strategic projects was zero. The larger data pool allows for an analysis of only those provinces that experienced some level of strategic-level reconstruction.

In certain contexts the inclusion of cases where the value of one variable, like strategic projects, is zero is essential, and the removal of these cases could

be construed as corrupting the data. However, when measuring the impact of strategic reconstruction, this refinement of the data may actually produce more relevant results. First, if we consider the true goal of the analysis, measuring the impact of strategic dollars spent, including cases where zero dollars were spent hardly seems relevant. The case for excluding provinces with no strategic projects is strengthened when considering the external factors. It could be argued that provinces that have not received any strategic reconstruction are in either one of two categories. The first are those provinces that are so strongly controlled by the Taliban that the threat of attack and project security is so great that a conscious decision was made to bypass that province. The second likely scenario are provinces that are relatively well-off and rank lower in the national priorities than those provinces in dire need. Such provinces are likely to have a much more limited Taliban presence. Based on this premise, provinces that did not receive any strategic reconstruction funds are just as likely to be strong Taliban strongholds and subject to frequent attacks, as they are to be relatively free of Taliban, and relatively free of Taliban attacks. As a result, a zero value for strategic aid can be linked to both extremes of the attack level spectrum, and will likely skew the data, or at a minimum cover any trends. In order to more accurately measure the impact of strategic reconstruction effort, a second series of calculations were performed, this time only including the provinces that had experienced some level of strategic aid. A summary of the analytical results are presented in Table 11.

	R-Squared values	
	Attacks	Intensity
Security \$	0.048	0.015
Infrastructure \$	0.001	0.050
Security \$ + Infrastructure \$	0.005	0.002

Table 11. Results of Refined Strategic Reconstruction Analysis

The results above clearly show that when considering only those provinces that received some level of strategic reconstruction, either security or

infrastructure, there is no relationship between the amount of dollars spent and the level of attacks on a year-to-year basis. Additionally, there was no relationship between the dollars spent and the level of intensity of the attacks. Rather than contradicting the previous nation-wide results as expected, these results reinforce the conclusion that the strategic effort, worth over \$6.9 billion, has no correlation with the level or intensity of Taliban attacks.

There are at least two possible explanations for this result. First is that the majority of these programs are targeting long-range development goals. The refurbishment of the power generator in a dam is going to have little effect on the average Afghan including those that live within the same district. Repairing the generator is just one small part of the overall electrical power grid development plan, which requires new high-capacity power lines, substations, local power lines, and finally, electrically run motors and equipment before the impact of the repaired generator is felt in the rural village. The same scenario can be made for the majority of the infrastructure projects; they are in a sense, setting the stage for future development and growth but have little immediate impact.

One explanation for the seemingly ineffective strategic security projects lies in the counter-factual; there may not be a decrease in areas with security projects, but it is difficult to say if attacks would have risen, and if so, by how much, if there was no money spent on security projects. In a sense strategic security projects may not be reducing attacks, but may be limiting their expansion. There are several examples where a dramatic decrease in security funding resulted in a large increase in attacks.¹⁴² It is unclear, and impossible to know for certain, if these attacks would have increase regardless of security spending, but in the four cases described, the largest increase in attacks over the four year period occurred in the same year security funding was cut.

¹⁴² Comparing the data in Appendix C provides the following examples: Kandahar (2004–2005) funding dropped from \$66.7 million to \$5.6 million; attacks rose 390% (24 to 94) Zabul (2004-2005) funding dropped from \$64.2 million to \$0; attacks rose 728% (7 to 51) Helmand (2005-2006) funding dropped from \$135.7 million to \$5.9 million; attacks rose 183% (68 to 125) Khowst (2005-2006) funding dropped from \$77.6 million to \$0.8 million; attacks rose 207% (38 to 79).

3. Aggregation Analysis

In another attempt to maximize the benefits of the larger data pool and provide alternative approaches to either strengthen or refute previous findings, a series of analysis was conducted on an aggregated set of data. For each province the year-to-year data between 2004 and 2007 for overall number of projects, projects in each specific ANDS sector, overall strategic funding, strategic funding by sector, overall number of attacks, and average attack intensity, were combined into single values for each category encompassing the entire four year period. This methodology shifts the points of analysis from year-to-year within specific provinces, to the overall four year period between provinces. Additionally, using the aggregated data for the four years, should minimize the effects of unknown anomalies or outside factors that may have placed significant influence on particular provinces during specific years, in both the reconstruction effort and the Taliban attack strategy. This has the effect of reducing the number of data points for every analysis from four per province to only one. Naturally this reduces the total observations, or N for each calculation, which is why the aggregation analysis was only performed on the national level, with all thirty four provinces under study. A summary of the calculations are included as Table 12.

Aggregated 2004-2007 total values		
	R Squared values	
	Attacks	Intensity
Total Projects	0.256	0.031
Security projects	0.585	0.076
Security \$	0.157	0.095
Infrastructure \$	0.130	0.052
Security \$ + Infrastructure \$	0.217	0.109

Table 12. Results of Aggregated Analysis

Additional analysis revealed that security projects and attacks had a Multiple R value of .765 significant at .001 level while total projects and attacks had a multiple R value of .500 and a significant at .003. In other words, over the

four year period the increase in security projects can account for an incredible 76 percent of the increase in the number of attacks, with a less than 1 in 1,000 chance the results were coincidental.

This analysis revealed several interesting results. Most notably, the positive correlation between the number of security projects and the number of Taliban attacks proved to be even stronger when assessed over the entire four year period than it was on a year to year basis. A scatter plot of these data points are included as Figure 8, to further illustrate the strength of the relationship.




Figure 8. Aggregated Security Projects vs Total Attacks

As the figure illustrates and the data confirms, the relationship between the number of security projects and the number of attacks is very strong. Considering all the possible influences on Taliban attacks (resources, funding, recruitment, ISAF actions, tribal struggles, regional warlords, etc.) for any one factor to have a significant relationship is surprising. The fact that an increase in security projects accounted for more than 76 percent of the increase in attacks is amazing. One might expect recruitment or funding to have such a close relationship to attacks,

but for an external measure, and one designed to decrease attacks, to have such a strong relationship to increasing attacks is very surprising.

These results further emphasize the conclusions of Chapter IV that the struggle against the Taliban is a counter-insurgency operation where attempts to kill the Taliban and establish “strategic hamlets” or safe areas by high levels of security only bring more attacks and increased Taliban presence. Rather than trying to kill the Taliban, our strategy should be to gain the trust and confidence of the people, eliminating the base of support for the Taliban.

Unfortunately, the relationship at the district level between increasing agriculture and rural development and decreasing risk levels was not duplicated at the national level. Some possible explanations for this were discussed in Chapter IV, namely the selection of provinces were of such strategic importance to the Taliban that they would fight there with, or without, public support. The nation-wide analysis was intended to overcome this shortcoming; however, the results were also inconclusive.

The aggregated data also refutes the earlier findings that the overall number of projects had a negative correlation with the level of the Taliban threat. This data illustrates there is a significant positive correlation over the four year period between Taliban attacks and the number of projects. Additionally, the strategic reconstruction effort, both as a whole and its individual parts continue to show little-to-no impact on the level of Taliban attacks. With respect to the level of intensity of the attacks, no element of the reconstruction effort, neither small-scale projects of any type, nor strategic reconstruction efforts, showed any significant impact.

4. Conclusion

This chapter employed slightly different analytical approaches in an effort to either refute or strengthen prior findings and address some of the potential shortcomings inherent in the more detailed analysis of previous chapters. The unit of analysis was the provincial level, but for the first time, data from the entire

country was used. Attack data was refined to include a measure of intensity for each attack in the analysis. Additionally, analysis was performed on the aggregated data from 2004 to 2007 for each province and compared between provinces.

This varied approach proved successful in addressing some of the questions proposed at the beginning of the chapter. Despite including the entire country, and running analysis only on provinces that received strategic reconstruction projects, the \$6.9 billion effort continued to show no measurable effect on the level of Taliban attacks. The number of security projects continued to have a positive correlation with the number of attacks. This proved true on the national level and the correlation was especially strong when studied over a four year aggregation period. The results of the district analysis could, once again, not be replicated at the national level. Unlike the district analysis, projects dedicated to infrastructure and rural and agriculture development had no significant impact on the level of Taliban attacks. Furthermore, the total number of projects, which had a negative correlation with attacks at the district level, showed a positive correlation at the national level, when data was study over the four year period. Unfortunately, the attempt to overcome the limitation of considering all attacks as equal by introducing an intensity factor produced no significant relationships or new trends. Likewise, with the exception of security projects and the total number of projects, the aggregation methodology produced no new insights.

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VI. CONCLUSIONS

It is safe to say that in the world after 11 September 2001 failed and failing states have taken on greater importance. Because there is a risk these states will become safe heavens for terrorists, or actually run by terrorists or their proxies, the disposition of failed states, failing states and states on the verge of recovery have become high-priority national security items. For these reasons, Afghanistan remains a critical national security issue for the United States, and why we continue to focus our attention there. A review of the reporting and analysis on Afghanistan and the United States' effort there very quickly focuses on several factors; the country is still important, progress has stalled and in some cases regressed, the Taliban are making resurgence, and our initial strategy to accomplish nation building with limited manpower and money is failing. What is not very well addressed is the root cause of the regression; was the reconstruction strategy correct but poorly resourced and therefore doomed to fail from the start, or was the reconstruction strategy misguided to begin with? As there is no shortage of opinions on the proper strategy for post-conflict reconstruction, the question is not merely academic. If the wrong strategy was implemented, it would have failed regardless of the amount of resources, the fact that resources were limited was merely a coincidence. We cannot assume that simply adding more men and materials will produce a successful outcome if the strategy itself was flawed. This study attempted to answer some of these questions by analyzing an admittedly very small piece of the overall post-conflict reconstruction effort through a quantitative method.

A. THEORY AND REALITY

After first clarifying some overly used terms, a review of various post-conflict reconstruction strategies were presented. It quickly became clear that despite studying the concepts for over ten years, there were no clear schools of thought or ideological dividing lines. This was not simply import-substitution

supporters countering “Washington Consensus” proponents, the ideas ran the complete spectrum from post-conflict reconstruction was a waste of time to we should make governments just “good enough” to full-blown social engineering to make the society “better” than it was before. Likewise, the implementation and policy recommendations were also very diverse. Of those experts that did agree that post-conflict reconstruction was at least worth trying, one of the few points of agreement was that a holistic approach is required, and security must come first.

With all of the disagreement within the epistemic communities, the international community and the United States cannot be completely to blame for a thus-far floundering recovery effort in Afghanistan because as a whole there is no clear road-map or success story on how to restore a war-ravaged third-world country into a functioning democracy. With that acknowledged, the choices that were made must be acknowledged and judged on their own merit. For example, a new domestic government was put in charge of the state from the very beginning, rather than an interim international body; the democratic process was started at the national level with no structures in place at the sub-levels of governance; the overwhelming majority of aid and funding was funneled outside of the new governments control; and finally, the linchpin of security – a Disarm Demobilize Reintegrate (DDR) program was never truly implemented, in fact the warlords were empowered and task with maintaining security in the countryside. Additionally, the United States military, international governments, and international civilian aid agencies all followed a minimalist approach. No one single organization had the mandate or the resources to oversee, manage and coordinate the post-conflict reconstruction effort and as a result it became a very ad-hoc, inefficient and ineffective campaign.

However, some progress has been made. Not only is there a political system in place, but roads, schools, water wells, health clinics, power grids, irrigation systems and countless other projects have been completed. Since there was no overarching strategy relating to most of these projects, they to were mostly an ad-hoc endeavor. What was the effectiveness of these projects, what

impact do they have on reducing the level of violence, and thereby increasing the quality of life (in some respects) of the average Afghan? The analysis that was presented attempted to fill that gap of knowledge by quantitatively measuring the level of reconstruction within specific sectors and overall, and comparing those results with various measurements of Taliban control and violence.

B. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Chapter III presented analysis focused at the district level, measuring various factors within twenty two different districts, nation-wide. The work utilized the UN Risk Assessment maps to measure the level of Taliban control on a scale from one to four. Additionally, the modified ACSP small-scale projects and PRT projects database was used to measure the level of reconstruction efforts within each district. The reconstruction effort was further divided in the analysis by specific sectors of the overall ANDS plan.

The major finding of this analysis was that, at the district level there was a significant negative correlation between the total number of projects and the level of risk. That is to say the more projects undertaken in a specific district, the lower the risk assessment tended to be. Specifically projects in the agriculture and rural development sector and infrastructure development sector had the greatest impact in lowering the risk level. Additionally, at the district level, the number of security projects had neither a positive or negative relation to the level of risk, making them statistically irrelevant.

With the intent to verify and confirm the trends discovered at the district level with an alternate approach and different sources of information, Chapter IV changed both the level of analysis and the type of data studied. Chapter IV changed the level of analysis from the district level to the provincial level, selecting a statistically significant group of fourteen provinces. Altering the level of analysis allowed for a new series of reconstruction data to be employed in the analysis, namely the strategic project database, representing over \$10 billion worth of projects, nation-wide. The combined small-scale projects and PRT

projects were also used, but aggregated into provincial level data. In addition to varying the level of analysis and the reconstruction data used, a new criteria was used to measure the level of Taliban control and influence in the provinces. Through a series of modifications and quality control measures, data from the WITS database was used to track the number, location, timing, and targeting of individual Taliban attacks nation-wide. The reconstruction and attack data was sorted and categorized into five different sectors to facilitate for side-by-side comparisons on a year-to-year basis.

The results of these comparisons produced significant results both in the relationships that were discovered, and the lack of relationships in certain sectors. First, the inclusion of strategic projects dedicated to either infrastructure development or security, utilized for the first time due to the larger unit of analysis, had remarkably little effect on the data. In the fourteen provinces covered in this section, the strategic projects described as current or ongoing, represented \$3.7 billion on international investment, which is over half of all complete or ongoing projects currently funded. Despite the high level of investment, these projects, statistically speaking, zero impact on the number of attacks or the targets of those attacks. The second significant non-relationship discover by this analysis was, with the exception of security projects, the interaction between specific development sectors and the targeting trend of the Taliban. For example, the level of government or education projects had no impact on the number of Taliban attacks against similar targets. This would appear to disprove the common perception that schools and government facilities are attacked and destroyed by the Taliban as soon as they are completed. There was also no correlation, positive or negative, between attacks and infrastructure projects or population at large projects. At the provincial level, this refutes the findings from the district analysis that infrastructure and population at large projects had a negative correlation on the UN assessed risk levels. The primary relationship that was uncovered by the analysis in this chapter was the significant positive correlation

between an increase in security projects and an increase in overall attacks and attacks targeting security forces and the general population.

Chapter V presents the last set of analytical data. Various approaches are described, each an attempt to test previous results while addressing some of the inherent limitations of the very detailed approaches utilized in the earlier chapters. Most notably is the inclusion of every province, making this the first nation-wide analysis. Additionally, data was also analyzed over an aggregated four year period, in addition to the year-to-year approach in Chapters III and IV. The introduction of an attack “intensity” metric attempted to overcome the previous shortcomings of assuming all attacks were equal. The results of these calculations primarily confirmed earlier conclusions, namely the positive correlation between security projects and Taliban attacks, and the lack of any influence from the strategic project efforts on reducing levels of violence.

C. SUMMARY

This study admittedly covers only a small portion of the national reconstruction effort; elements such as anti-corruption, counter-narcotics, judicial reform, political accountability, etc. are not included. However, it does cover security, the one item almost all experts cite as the “absolute prerequisite” to post-conflict reconstruction. Additionally, it contrasts security with some of the most visible elements of the international effort – reconstruction projects that are either completed or on-going that the villagers can either use or see being built.

Unfortunately the results are not encouraging. Perhaps the most significant finding in terms of dollars was that the \$10.7 billion strategic reconstruction program, both in infrastructure and security had no effect on the level of violence and Taliban attacks. The most prominent relationship was the positive correlation between security projects and the overall number of attacks, the number of attacks against security targets and the number of attacks against the population as a whole. In one analysis, the increase in security projects accounted for an amazing 76 percent of the increase in attacks. Additionally,

through time lag analysis, it was determined that the increases occurred in the same year. It is possible, however, highly unlikely that this was simply coincidental, which means that an increase in one brought a response and led to an increase in the other. In trying to theorize about the causation cycle, it would seem the Taliban decision making process on target selection at the local level would be much more responsive and quick to react than the international community in identifying, planning, designing, funding and building specific projects. It can be said, therefore, in a surprising and counter-intuitive finding that an increase in security projects actually caused an increase in attacks within a certain area.


Two significant trends uncovered in this thesis, when combined, offer insight into the real undercurrents of the conflict in Afghanistan and new policy alternatives. First, agriculture development, rural development, and natural resources development aid which directly targeted the livelihood of most Afghans, namely rural farming produced the greatest results in decreasing the localized risk from the Taliban. Second, the localized aid which was designed to either target the Taliban directly or increase the capacity of the Afghan security forces to confront the Taliban, rather than decreasing attacks, was responsible for an incredible 76 percent of the increase in attacks. In the more generalized sense, these results can be characterized as addressing the needs of the population decreased Taliban presence and attacking the Taliban directly actually increased their presence. From the perspective of a conventional military operation designed to eliminate the remaining Taliban elements, these results are incongruous. From a counter-insurgency perspective, however, where winning the trust and confidence of the population is the key to success and direct military action is secondary, these results fit the model perfectly. This analysis clearly shows that in Afghanistan we are in the midst of an insurgency – counter-insurgency struggle, whether we realize it or not. In order to succeed, we must

first recognize this and secondly, tailor operations and expectations to a counter-insurgency approach where the emphasis is not on the number of Taliban killed, but rather on the number of Afghans directly assisted.

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APPENDIX A. UN RISK ASSESSMENT MAPS

UN Risk Assessment Maps from 2002 to 2007 are provided below.¹⁴³ The districts subject to analysis in Chapter III are outlined to help increase the geographic awareness of the districts in question, and facilitate annual comparisons of the Taliban's growing influence.¹⁴⁴



UN Assessment of High Risk and Extreme Risk Areas - 2002

¹⁴³ <http://www.aims.org.af/> (accessed 16 March 2008) and NY Times on-line at: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2007/09/01/world/middleeast/20070901_AFGHAN_GRAPHIC.html (accessed 16 March 2008).

¹⁴⁴ District overlay is a relative approximation and solely the work of the author who bears responsibility for any inaccuracy.


United Nations assessments of the safety of travel within Afghanistan.

Danger zones 2003

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

High risk, volatile areas

Extreme risk, hostile areas
Category introduced in 2005



Sources: United Nations Department of Safety and Security; International Crisis Group

UN Assessment of High Risk and Extreme Risk Areas -


United Nations assessments of the safety of travel within Afghanistan.

Danger zones 2004

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007


High risk, volatile areas

Extreme risk, hostile areas
Category introduced in 2005



Sources: United Nations Department of Safety and Security; International Crisis Group

UN Assessment of High Risk and Extreme Risk Areas - 2004



UN Assessment of High Risk and Extreme Risk Areas - 2005

Dangerous Areas Expanding Across Southern Afghanistan - The New York Times


United Nations assessments of the safety of travel within Afghanistan.

Danger zones 2006

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

High risk, volatile areas

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
United Nations assessments of the safety of travel within Afghanistan.

Danger zones 2007

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

High risk, volatile areas

Extreme risk, hostile areas
Category introduced in 2005



Sources: United Nations Department of Safety and Security; International Crisis Group

UN Assessment of High Risk and Extreme Risk Areas - 2007

APPENDIX B. RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS DATASET

Below is the combined dataset of small-scale projects and PRT projects used in the analysis for this study. The data was derived from the ACSP database and extensively modified as described in Chapter III. It lists the number of projects in each province by year and ANDS sector.

PROVINCE	List Year	Agriculture & Rural Development	Education	Good Governance	Health	Infrastructure & Natural Resources	Private Sector	Security	Social Protection	Grand Total
Badakhshan	2002	1	5						2	8
	2003	1		2	3	7			1	14
	2004	17	29	5	4	107	2	1	1	166
	2005	69	64	12	44	117	7		4	317
	2006	104	56	5	17	179	1	5	9	376
	2007	11	34	1	1	43		8		98
	M			4	5	19		4	27	59
Badakhshan Total		203	192	30	69	472	10	18	44	1038
Badghis	2002		5	1		1			1	8
	2003	1	15	1	2	21			2	42
	2004	8	1	5	9	71			3	97
	2005	51	34	9	14	232	3	3	137	483
	2006	19	85	18	48	141		6	46	363
	2007	11	54	2	62	83			8	220
	M	4	13	2	28	6		5	13	71
Badghis Total		94	207	38	163	555	3	14	210	1284
Baghlan	2003	1		1		3			1	6
	2004	20	27	5	2	92		1	23	170
	2005	13	35	10	6	93	7	2	49	215
	2006	72	77	7	16	191	2	5	65	435
	2007	14	79	8	7	109		3	11	231
	M	6	45	8	1	17	1	7	19	104
Baghlan Total		126	263	39	32	505	10	18	168	1161
Baghlan,Kabul	2006					6				6
Baghlan,Kabul Total						6				6
Baghlan,Kunduz	2006					6				6
Baghlan,Kunduz Total						6				6
Balkh	2003	3	3	6		18			1	31
	2004	9	40	14		161	2		2	228
	2005	12	66	13	8	202	11	4	34	350
	2006	13	50	2	2	128	6	6	4	211
	2007	5	21	1		77		3	1	108
	M		1	7		3	5	3	48	67
Balkh Total		42	181	43	10	589	24	16	90	995
Balkh,Kabul	2004					9				9
	2006					2				2
Balkh,Kabul Total						11				11

Bamian	2002	1	6	4	1	6			1	19
	2003	1	13			46				60
	2004	98	14	7		171		1	5	296
	2005	88	29	9	13	189	8		48	384
	2006	47	46	3	26	223	4	9	13	371
	2007	1	10	1	3	49		2	5	71
	M			9	1	8	11	1	17	47
Bamian Total		236	118	33	44	692	23	13	89	1248
Bamian,Balkh	2006					2				2
	2007		2							2
Bamian,Balkh Total			2			2				4
Daykondi	2002					1				1
	2003					4				4
	2004	8	2			79				89
	2005	8	38	2		30			7	85
	2006	22	30			109			2	163
	2007	4	3			27		1		35
	M			1	3			9	1	14
Daykondi Total		42	73	3	3	250		10	10	391
Farah	2002		1							1
	2003	4		1	1	17				23
	2004	29	32	5		187	1	1	1	256
	2005	37	53	10	5	195	2		5	307
	2006	24	96	6	4	116		3	8	257
	2007	4	1	4	2	51			2	64
	M	1	64	40	13	33	6	24	58	239
Farah Total		99	247	66	25	599	9	28	74	1147
Faryab	2002	1	1			2				4
	2003	2	2	3	2	30				39
	2004	7	18	7		73			19	124
	2005	28	45	9	6	113	3	5	32	241
	2006	3	2	3	32	144		4	29	217
	2007	5	1			139		1		146
	M	6	24	14	30	29	7	20	25	155
Faryab Total		52	93	36	70	530	10	30	105	926
Faryab,Nangarhar	2005					2				2
Faryab,Nangarhar Total						2				2
Ghazni	2002		2			2				4
	2003	2		3	1	55				61
	2004	94	23	5	3	199			13	337
	2005	63	47	18	39	257	8	3	15	450
	2006	93	25	13	40	161	3	4	19	358
	2007	67	22	5	9	93		2	14	212
	M			7		6	8	5	16	42
Ghazni Total		319	119	51	92	773	19	14	77	1464
Ghowr	2003	1	2	2		29				34
	2004	48	10	4	1	182			7	252
	2005	37	42	7	3	138	3		36	266
	2006	63	109		17	152		5	15	361
	2007	3	56			14			9	82
	M	5	13	2	20	17	11	7	7	82
Ghowr Total		157	232	15	41	532	14	12	74	1077

Helmand	2002	19						11		30
	2003	2	4	1		36				43
	2004	38	9	12	2	182		3	5	251
	2005	37	86	18	38	173	12	15	44	423
	2006	75	29	16	5	55	1	30	16	227
	2007	25	3	8	1	61	4	14	13	129
	M	24	22	27	48	36	7	28	48	240
Helmand Total		220	153	82	94	543	24	101	126	1343
Helmand	M								1	1
Helmand Total									1	1
Helmand, Kondoz	2006					4				4
Helmand, Kondoz Total						4				4
Herat	2002	2	6	1	3	5			3	20
	2003	3	4	1	5	10			1	24
	2004	54	59	14	7	198	3	5	10	350
	2005	101	96	19	23	204	9	16	15	483
	2006	41	204	16	70	197	3	29	37	597
	2007	37	84	1		49		4	2	177
	M	3	19	12	13	29	19	11	46	152
Herat Total		241	472	64	121	692	34	65	114	1803
Jowzjan	2003	2		11	1	24				38
	2004	4	28	5		120			18	175
	2005	12	20	8	13	210	3		30	296
	2006	2	21		15	118			24	180
	2007	1	8			9			2	20
	M	1	1	1		1	3	11	10	27
Jowzjan Total		21	78	25	29	482	6	11	84	736
Kabul (Kabul)	2002	9	11	4	2	21				47
	2003	3	3	5	3	78		1	4	97
	2004	13	10	9	2	268		3	11	316
	2005	60	19	18	2	289	3	2	122	515
	2006	34	14	6	9	205		9	24	301
	2007	21	18	11	9	93		22	23	197
	M	1	418	8	72	48	9	15	136	707
Kabul (Kabul) Total		141	493	61	99	1002	12	52	320	2180
Kandahar	2002	37	5	1		13				56
	2003	3	4	2		67	1			77
	2004	73	16	7		233	1	1	2	333
	2005	90	55	15	13	293	7	7	6	486
	2006	164	31	29	24	119	4	77	18	466
	2007	141	32	19	8	132	4	70	20	426
	M	16	8	14	36	183	15	45	54	371
Kandahar Total		524	151	87	81	1040	32	200	100	2215
Kandahar,	M	1								1
Kandahar, Helmand & 3		1								1
Kapisa	2002	1				4				5
	2003		5	1		25				31
	2004	50	27	7		163		1	18	266
	2005	49	52	9	3	241	3		67	424
	2006	48	79	12	2	167		1	84	393
	2007	12	87	2	23	48		1	9	182
	M	1	1	2		1	3	2	8	18
Kapisa Total		161	251	33	28	649	6	5	186	1319

Khowst	2002	1								1
	2003	3		5	2	33			2	45
	2004	37	1	4	2	128	1		1	174
	2005	159	68	16	4	436	7	4	45	739
	2006	65	13	6	13	145		11	35	288
	2007	41	17	16	18	31		21	7	151
	M	1	4	10	1	4	3	6	1	30
Khowst Total		307	103	57	40	777	11	42	91	1428
Kondoz (Kunduz)	2002	1								1
	2003	2		1		83				86
	2004	12	31	9	4	175	1	2	7	241
	2005	12	70	17	36	197	5	1	28	366
	2006	16	104	4		197		1	13	335
	2007	3	85		1	184		3	1	277
	M	1	12	10	1	6	2	2	26	60
Kondoz (Kunduz) Total		47	302	41	42	842	8	9	75	1366
Kunar	2002	1								1
	2003			1		44				45
	2004	47	20	4	2	132		2	4	211
	2005	51	22	9	5	109	7	3	11	217
	2006	29	16	5	5	68		1	8	132
	2007	18	5	5	6	66			6	106
	M	1		10		23	1	12	9	56
Kunar Total		147	63	34	18	442	8	18	38	768
Laghman	2002	1								1
	2003	2	3	1	1	32				39
	2004	64	20	10	2	119			10	225
	2005	226	54	12	4	306	4	1	39	646
	2006	71	56	5		129			13	274
	2007	20	7		1	32			1	61
	M		1	5		4	3	8	17	38
Laghman Total		384	141	33	8	622	7	9	80	1284
Laghman	2004								1	1
	M								1	1
Laghman Total									2	2
Laghman, Kabul	2006					2				2
Laghman, Kabul (Kabul)						2				2
Laghman,	2006		1							1
Laghman, Nangarhar Total			1							1
Lowgar	2002		1			2				3
	2003	1		3		16			1	21
	2004	22	5	4	2	118		1	10	162
	2005	24	36	10	16	195	4	1	5	291
	2006	35	24	8	8	139		3	10	227
	2007	7	4	2		40			1	54
	M		6	4		1	5	2	6	24
Lowgar Total		89	76	31	26	511	9	7	33	782
Nangarhar	2002					1				1
	2003	1	2		3	103				109
	2004	61	1	13	1	209	1			286
	2005	216	75	23	8	336	12	6	226	902
	2006	98	73	21	10	255	1	1	14	473
	2007	23	19	4	1	69		1	6	123
	M	1	6	13	1	16	23	7	50	117
Nangarhar Total		400	176	74	24	989	37	15	296	2011
Nangarhar, Kapisa	2004					10				10
	2006					8				8

Nangarhar,Kapisa Total		18								18	
Nimruz	2002	1				2				3	
	2003	1		1		14				16	
	2004	14	23	4		87			2	130	
	2005	28	44	7	7	196	3		2	287	
	2006	18	2			46		1		67	
	2007					7				7	
	M		1	1	12	3		5	23	45	
Nimruz Total		62	70	13	19	355	3	6	27	555	
Nimruz	M								1	1	
Nimruz Total									1	1	
Nuristan	2002					1				1	
	2003	4	3	2	2	10				21	
	2004			4	1	11				16	
	2005	29	17	7	6	74	3	2	3	141	
	2006	32	9	3		82	2		1	129	
	2007	1	1		1	40		1		44	
	M		1	3		9	8	4		25	
Nuristan Total		66	31	19	10	227	13	7	4	377	
Pakistan	2006								1	1	
Pakistan Total									1	1	
Paktia	2003	3	2	1	3	22				31	
	2004	37	6	12		183		2	15	255	
	2005	96	47	18	19	306	7		16	509	
	2006	62	70	18	22	191		17	7	387	
	2007	15	21	7	14	45		2	3	107	
	M		2	4	1	4	2	9	1	23	
	Paktia Total		213	148	60	59	751	9	30	42	1312
Paktia	2005								1	1	
Paktia Total									1	1	
Paktika	2003	1		1		22				24	
	2004	110	2	3	1	202			1	319	
	2005	76	12	12	7	157	5		145	414	
	2006	46	76	26	23	311			10	492	
	2007	15	46	11	17	49		1	8	147	
	M		2	23	22	11	25		9	4	96
	Paktika Total		250	159	75	59	766	5	10	168	1492
Panjsher	2007					9				9	
Panjsher Total						9				9	
Panjshir	2003	5	2			6				13	
	2004	18		3		19			2	42	
	2005	40	3	13	2	61	5		10	134	
	2006	59	5	8		146		2	12	232	
	2007	4	8	5		18		2	4	41	
	M		1	4			4	2		11	
	Panjshir Total		127	18	33	2	250	9	6	28	473
Parvan (Parwan)	2002	1	11		1	6				19	
	2003	4	6	2	1	52				65	
	2004	19	21	12		161	1		17	231	
	2005	41	28	13	5	128	6	2	45	268	
	2006	55	64	2	13	173		2	163	472	
	2007	17	58	1	3	81			83	243	
	M		4	15	9	5	12	5	1	25	76
Parvan (Parwan) Total		141	203	39	28	613	12	5	333	1374	

Parvan	2006					2				2
Parvan (Parwan), Takhar						2				2
Parvan	2007					2				2
Parvan Total						2				2
Samangan	2003			8		5				13
	2004	21	11	4		171			21	228
	2005	12	8	8	5	145	8	1	95	282
	2006	16	66	1		101			25	209
	2007	3	38			26				67
	M		1	2		1	10	1	7	22
Samangan Total		52	124	23	5	449	18	2	148	821
Sar-e Pol	2003			1	1	5				7
	2004	31	2	4		121			27	185
	2005	63	13	9	2	275	2		29	393
	2006	19	11	1		96			8	135
	2007	2	13			12				27
	M			5			3	5	2	15
Sar-e Pol Total		115	39	20	3	509	5	5	66	762
Sar-e Pol	2005		1							1
Sar-e Pol Total			1							1
Sar-e Pol, Ghazni	2006					1				1
Sar-e Pol, Ghazni Total						1				1
Tajikistan	2006					1				1
Tajikistan Total						1				1
Takhar	2002		4			1				5
	2003	2		1		49				52
	2004	11	10	9	1	207			4	242
	2005	9	34	10	19	187	5	1	32	297
	2006	38	68	3	51	93			10	263
	2007	6	20			34				60
	M		5	7		1	17	1	13	44
Takhar Total		66	141	30	71	572	22	2	59	963
Takhar	2005								1	1
Takhar Total									1	1
Takhar, Helmand	2004					1				1
	2006					2				2
Takhar, Helmand Total						3				3
Vardak (Wardaq)	2002					5				5
	2003		1	1	1	25				28
	2004	26	25	5		124			1	181
	2005	73	12	13	4	242	7	5	17	373
	2006	65	1	2		117		1	13	199
	2007	13	3			40				56
	M		1	5		1	10		2	19
Vardak (Wardaq) Total		177	43	26	5	554	17	6	33	861
Wardak	2007					4				4
Wardak Total						4				4

(blank)	2003		1			1				2
	2004					3				3
	2005		1			39				40
	2006	2				14		6		22
	2007							9	1	10
	M	9				22		60		91
(blank) Total		11	2			79		75	1	168
Farah, Kunar	2006					1				1
Farah, Kunar Total						1				1
Kunar, Kondoz	2006					4				4
Kunar, Kondoz (Kunduz)						4				4
Zabul	2002	5	4			5				14
	2003	3				29				32
	2004	59				22				81
	2005	28	9	9	4	20		1	3	74
	2006	18	6	17	10	39	2		3	95
	2007	6	1	4		10		1		22
	M		1	7	17	4	12	5	30	76
Zabul Total		119	21	37	31	129	14	7	36	394
Uruzgan	2002	3	1							4
	2003			2	1	11				14
	2004	1	4	4	1	6			2	18
	2005	22	25	15	2	139	3	17	3	226
	2006	118	19	23	29	105	4	13	21	332
	2007	11	6	5	21	48		5	19	115
	M	47	26	21	33	53	24	25	48	277
Uruzgan Total		202	81	70	87	362	31	60	93	986
Uruzgan,	2006					2				2
Uruzgan, Badakhshan Total						2				2
Grand Total		5655	5267	1421	1538	19784	474	929	3528	38596

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APPENDIX C. DETAILED PROVINCE DATASET

Below is a copy of the dataset used in the analysis in Chapter IV. After extensive modifications and improvements to the data from both the ACSP and WITS databases, the dataset lists each of the fourteen provinces under study, with the number of attacks and reconstruction projects by year that were associated with one of five different categories developed for this project;

ATTACKS									
Province	List Year	Business	Government	Hum / NGO	Population	Security	Unknown	Grand Total	Non - Security
farah	2004	2	0	0	0	3	0	5	2
	2005	0	1	1	3	5	0	10	5
	2006	2	5	3	8	19	0	37	18
	2007	2	0	1	6	13	0	22	9
ghazni	2004	0	1	1	0	1	0	3	2
	2005	0	1	9	7	5	0	22	17
	2006	16	23	4	18	44	1	106	62
	2007	8	8	2	18	26	2	64	38
helmand	2004	0	2	1	3	3	1	10	7
	2005	1	13	11	12	30	1	68	38
	2006	4	16	17	25	63	0	125	62
	2007	1	4	6	17	17	0	45	28
herat	2004	1	3	1	2	1	0	8	7
	2005	1	4	0	5	3	0	13	10
	2006	1	3	6	10	11	2	33	22
	2007	0	4	0	4	5	0	13	8
kabol	2004	1	2	1	4	3	0	11	8
	2005	0	3	2	15	7	1	28	21
	2006	3	5	3	22	12	3	48	36
	2007	2	3	0	6	5	0	16	11
kandahar	2004	4	3	5	3	8	1	24	16
	2005	12	13	12	25	25	7	94	69
	2006	8	7	8	42	58	1	124	66
	2007	1	2	4	13	44	2	66	22
khowst	2004	2	4	2	5	2	0	15	13
	2005	3	7	10	7	11	0	38	27
	2006	4	5	10	21	34	5	79	45
	2007	1	2	6	15	14	0	38	24
Kunar	2004	1	2	0	5	1	0	9	8
	2005	1	2	1	6	7	1	18	11
	2006	2	2	0	13	3	0	20	17
	2007	1	0	2	12	6	0	21	15
nangarhar	2004	2	4	4	6	2	0	18	16
	2005	3	4	3	12	7	1	30	23
	2006	8	2	3	15	12	0	40	28
	2007	1	1	4	5	6	0	17	11
paktia	2004	0	2	5	1	1	0	9	8
	2005	0	1	1	3	3	0	8	5
	2006	5	3	4	12	12	0	36	24
	2007	4	4	4	6	13	1	32	19

ATTACKS CONTINUED									
Province	List Year	Business	Government	Hum / NGO	Population	Security	Unknown	Grand Total	Non - Security
paktika	2004	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	2
	2005	0	3	3	0	2	0	8	6
	2006	0	8	5	10	15	2	40	25
	2007	1	5	0	9	9	0	24	15
uruzgan	2004	0	5	0	1	2	0	8	6
	2005	4	10	2	6	12	0	34	22
	2006	1	1	2	2	11	0	17	6
	2007	0	1	1	7	8	0	17	9
vardak	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2005	0	0	3	3	4	0	10	6
	2006	5	3	5	5	12	0	30	18
	2007	3	0	0	0	7	0	10	3
zabul	2004	1	1	1	4	0	0	7	7
	2005	2	8	3	14	24	0	51	27
	2006	8	1	2	17	33	0	61	28
	2007	1	2	0	6	16	1	26	10
Grand		134	220	185	496	700	33	1768	1068

PROJECTS						
PROVINCE	List Year	Security	Good Governance	HUM/NGO	BUSINESS	POP AT LARGE
Farah	2004	1	5	32	188	30
	2005	0	10	58	197	42
	2006	3	6	100	116	32
	2007	0	4	3	51	6
Ghazni	2004	0	5	26	199	107
	2005	3	18	86	265	78
	2006	4	13	65	164	112
	2007	2	5	31	93	81
Helmand	2004	3	12	11	182	43
	2005	15	18	124	185	81
	2006	30	16	34	60	91
	2007	14	8	4	65	38
Herat	2004	5	14	66	201	64
	2005	16	19	119	213	116
	2006	29	16	274	200	78
	2007	4	1	84	49	39
Kabul (Kabul)	2004	3	9	12	268	24
	2005	2	18	21	292	182
	2006	9	6	23	205	58
	2007	22	11	27	93	44
Kandahar	2004	1	7	16	234	75
	2005	7	15	68	300	96
	2006	77	29	55	123	182
	2007	70	19	40	136	161
Khowst	2004	0	4	3	129	38
	2005	4	16	72	443	204
	2006	11	6	26	145	100
	2007	21	16	35	31	48
Kunar	2004	2	4	22	132	51
	2005	3	9	27	116	62
	2006	1	5	21	72	37
	2007	0	5	11	66	24
Nangarhar	2004	0	13	2	220	61
	2005	6	23	83	348	442
	2006	1	21	83	264	112
	2007	1	4	20	69	29
Paktia	2004	2	12	6	183	52
	2005	0	18	66	313	113
	2006	17	18	92	191	69
	2007	2	7	35	45	18

PROJECTS CONTINUED						
PROVINCE	List Year	Security	Good Governance	HUM/NGO	BUSINESS	POP AT LARGE
Paktika	2004	0	3	3	202	111
	2005	0	12	19	162	221
	2006	0	26	99	311	56
	2007	1	11	63	49	23
Uruzgan	2004	0	4	5	6	3
	2005	17	15	27	142	25
	2006	13	23	48	109	139
	2007	5	5	27	48	30
Vardak (Wardag)	2004	0	5	25	124	27
	2005	5	13	16	249	90
	2006	1	2	1	117	78
	2007	0	0	3	44	13
Zabul	2004	0	0	0	22	59
	2005	1	9	13	20	31
	2006	0	17	16	41	21
	2007	1	4	1	10	6
Grand Total		436	621	2599	8882	4171

STRATEGIC PROJECTS				
PROVINCE	List Year	Infrastructure & Natural Resources	Security	Grand Total
Farah	2004	0	0	0
	2005	\$86,300,000	\$0	\$86,300,000
	2006	\$1,940,000	\$0	\$1,940,000
	2007	\$0	\$0	\$0
Ghazni	2004	\$26,500,000	\$0	\$26,500,000
	2005	\$0	\$0	\$0
	2006	\$22,484,289	\$0	\$22,484,289
	2007	\$48,985,450	\$0	\$48,985,450
Helmand	2004	\$0	\$0	\$0
	2005	\$180,000,000	\$135,705,587	\$315,705,587
	2006	\$74,140,000	\$5,956,533	\$80,096,533
	2007	\$0	\$0	\$0
Herat	2004	\$120,000,000	\$69,544,761	\$189,544,761
	2005	\$267,300,000	\$0	\$267,300,000
	2006	\$27,500,000	\$15,000,000	\$42,500,000
	2007	\$30,000,000	\$10,000,000	\$40,000,000
Kabul (Kabul)	2004	\$60,000,000	\$8,900,000	\$68,900,000
	2005	\$35,130,000	\$149,225,059	\$184,355,059
	2006	\$20,520,000	\$359,933,774	\$380,453,774
	2007	\$35,060,000	\$156,758,881	\$191,818,881
Kandahar	2004	\$151,990,000	\$66,688,145	\$218,678,145
	2005	\$5,546,740	\$5,600,000	\$11,146,740
	2006	\$20,000,000	\$81,800,000	\$101,800,000
	2007	\$159,877,282	\$35,983,833	\$195,861,115
Khowst	2004	\$0	\$0	\$0
	2005	\$0	\$77,622,540	\$77,622,540
	2006	\$0	\$800,000	\$800,000
	2007	\$20,000,000	\$0	\$20,000,000
Konar (Kunar)	2004	\$0	\$0	\$0
	2005	\$45,000,000	\$0	\$45,000,000
	2006	\$15,362,359	\$0	\$15,362,359
	2007	\$0	\$0	\$0
Nangarhar	2004	\$27,600,000	\$0	\$27,600,000
	2005	\$63,000,000	\$0	\$63,000,000
	2006	\$54,300,000	\$0	\$54,300,000
	2007	\$0	\$6,000,000	\$6,000,000
Paktia	2004	\$65,200,000	\$0	\$65,200,000
	2005	\$7,667,369	\$3,100,000	\$10,767,369
	2006	\$1,262,797	\$66,462,796	\$67,725,593
	2007	\$0	\$0	\$0

STRATEGIC PROJECTS CONTINUED				
PROVINCE	List Year	Infrastructure & Natural Resources	Security	Grand Total
Paktika	2004	\$0	\$0	\$0
	2005	\$0	\$0	\$0
	2006	\$117,634,688	\$6,750,000	\$124,384,688
	2007	\$34,580,000	\$0	\$34,580,000
Oruzgan (Uruzgan)	2004	\$0	\$0	\$0
	2005	\$0	\$0	\$0
	2006	\$34,300,000	\$0	\$34,300,000
	2007	\$0	\$0	\$0
Vardak	2004	\$0	\$0	\$0
	2005	\$110,000,000	\$0	\$110,000,000
	2006	\$0	\$0	\$0
	2007	\$0	\$0	\$0
Zabol (Zabul)	2004	\$82,800,000	\$64,200,000	\$147,000,000
	2005	\$0	\$0	\$0
	2006	\$0	\$800,000	\$800,000
	2007	\$0	\$63,742,780	\$63,742,780
Grand Total		\$2,334,580,975	\$1,390,574,688	\$3,725,155,662

APPENDIX D. WITS DATASET

Below is a copy of the dataset used in the analysis in Chapter V. It combines the final modifications of the combined small-scale and PRT database, the Strategic Projects database in addition to the WITS data as described in the methodology section of the chapter. For every province in the country it lists by year, the overall number of projects, the number of projects for each of the eight ANDS sectors, the total value of strategic projects, and individual values for strategic security projects and strategic infrastructure projects, and list the number of Taliban attacks and their average intensity.

PROVIN	LIST YEAR	Agg & Rural Develop	PROJECTS								Unknown	TOTAL	STRATEGIC PROJECTS (\$1,000's)			TALIBAN ATTACKS	
			Education	Good Governance	Health	Infrastructure & Resources	Private	Security	Social	Infrastructure & Natural Resources			Security	Grand Total	Total	Intensity	
Kabul (Kabul)	2004	13	10	9	2	268	0	3	11	0	316	\$60,000	\$8,900	\$68,900	11	6.3	
	2005	60	19	18	2	289	3	2	122	0	515	\$35,130	\$149,225	\$184,355	28	2.2	
	2006	34	14	6	9	205	0	9	24	0	301	\$20,520	\$359,933	\$380,453	48	6.7	
	2007	17	9	1	6	93	0	22	9	0	157	\$35,060	\$156,758	\$191,818	16	11.8	
Bamian	2004	98	14	7	0	171	0	1	5	0	296	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0	
	2005	88	29	9	13	189	8	0	48	0	384	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0	
	2006	47	46	3	26	223	4	9	13	0	371	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0	
	2007	1	10	1	3	49	0	2	5	0	71	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0	
Daykondi	2004	8	2	0	0	79	0	0	0	0	89	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0.0	
	2005	8	38	2	0	30	0	0	7	0	85	\$0	\$0	\$0	1	15.0	
	2006	22	30	0	0	109	0	0	2	0	163	\$0	\$0	\$0	2	1.7	
	2007	4	3	0	0	27	0	1	0	0	35	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0.0	
Ghazni	2004	94	23	5	3	199	0	0	13	0	337	\$26,500	\$0	\$26,500	3	3.7	
	2005	63	47	18	39	257	8	3	15	0	450	\$0	\$0	\$0	22	2.4	
	2006	93	25	13	40	161	3	4	19	5	363	\$22,484	\$0	\$22,484	106	1.7	
	2007	67	22	5	9	93	0	2	14	0	212	\$48,985	\$0	\$48,985	64	2.8	
Kapisa	2004	50	27	7	0	163	0	1	18	0	266	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0.0	
	2005	49	52	9	3	241	3	0	67	0	424	\$23,000	\$0	\$23,000	1	1.0	
	2006	48	79	12	2	167	0	1	84	0	393	\$0	\$0	\$0	14	2.0	
	2007	12	87	2	23	48	0	1	9	0	182	\$0	\$0	\$0	4	0.8	
Khowst	2004	37	1	4	2	128	1	0	1	0	174	\$0	\$0	\$0	15	2.3	
	2005	159	68	16	4	436	7	4	45	1	740	\$0	\$77,622	\$77,6220	38	1.8	
	2006	65	13	6	13	145	0	11	35	5	293	\$0	\$800	\$800	79	4.8	
	2007	41	17	16	18	31	0	21	7	0	151	\$20,000	\$0	\$20,000	38	6.3	
Kunar	2004	47	20	4	2	132	0	2	4	0	211	\$0	\$0	\$0	9	1.6	
	2005	51	22	9	5	109	7	3	11	0	217	\$45,000	\$0	\$45,000	18	2.4	

	2006	29	16	5	5	68	0	1	8	1	133	\$15,362	\$0	\$15,362	20	5.9
	2007	18	5	5	6	66	0	0	6	0	106	\$0	\$0	\$0	21	4.3
Laghman	2004	64	20	10	2	119	0	0	10	0	225	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0.0
	2005	226	54	12	4	306	4	1	39	3	649	\$9,179	\$0	\$9,179	8	1.5
	2006	71	56	5	0	129	0	0	13	0	274	\$38,988	\$0	\$38,988	23	0.9
	2007	20	7	0	1	32	0	0	1	0	61	\$0	\$0	\$0	17	4.0
Lowgar	2004	22	5	4	2	118	0	1	10	0	162	\$0	\$0	\$0	4	1.0
	2005	24	36	10	16	195	4	1	5	0	291	\$6,020	\$0	\$6,020	8	1.6
	2006	35	24	8	8	139	0	3	10	1	228	\$0	\$0	\$0	18	0.6
	2007	7	4	2	0	40	0	0	1	0	54	\$0	\$0	\$0	14	1.1
Nangarhar	2004	61	1	13	1	209	1	0	0	0	286	\$27,600	\$0	\$27,600	18	4.3
	2005	216	75	23	8	336	12	6	226	0	902	\$63,000	\$0	\$63,000	30	2.0
	2006	98	73	21	10	255	1	1	14	1	474	\$54,300	\$0	\$54,300	40	2.6
	2007	23	19	4	1	69	0	1	6	0	123	\$0	\$6,000	\$6,000	17	4.3
Nuristan	2004	0	0	4	1	11	0	0	0	0	16	\$0	\$0	\$0	1	3.0
	2005	29	17	7	6	74	3	2	3	0	141	\$0	\$0	\$0	8	2.9
	2006	32	9	3	0	82	2	0	1	0	129	\$45,237	\$0	\$45,237	5	2.4
	2007	1	1	0	1	40	0	1	0	0	44	\$291,000	\$0	\$291,000	7	2.4
Paktia	2004	37	6	12	0	183	0	2	15	0	255	\$65,200	\$0	\$65,200	9	5.0
	2005	96	47	18	19	306	7	0	16	1	510	\$7,667	\$3,100	\$10,767	8	2.1
	2006	62	70	18	22	191	0	17	7	1	388	\$1,262	\$66,462	\$67,725	36	3.5
	2007	15	21	7	14	45	0	2	3	0	107	\$0	\$0	\$0	32	2.7
Paktika	2004	110	2	3	1	202	0	0	1	0	319	\$0	\$0	\$0	2	4.0
	2005	76	12	12	7	157	5	0	145	0	414	\$0	\$0	\$0	8	2.1
	2006	46	76	26	23	311	0	0	10	1	493	\$117,634	\$6,750	\$124,384	8	3.4
	2007	15	46	11	17	49	0	1	8	0	147	\$34,580	\$0	\$34,580	24	3.3
Panjshir	2004	18	0	3	0	19	0	0	2	0	42	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0
	2005	40	3	13	2	61	5	0	10	0	134	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0
	2006	59	5	8	0	146	0	2	12	2	234	\$15,000	\$0	\$15,000	0	0
	2007	4	8	5	0	18	0	2	4	0	41	\$108,000	\$0	\$108,000	0	0
Parvan (Parwan)	2004	19	21	12	0	161	1	0	17	0	231	\$73,700	\$0	\$73,700	1	2.0
	2005	41	28	13	5	128	6	2	45	0	268	\$29,200	\$36,400	\$65,600	0	0.0
	2006	55	64	2	13	173	0	2	163	0	472	\$0	\$12,800	\$12,800	3	2.0
	2007	17	58	1	3	81	0	0	83	0	243	\$99,600	\$0	\$99,600	4	13.0
Vardak (Wardag)	2004	26	25	5	0	124	0	0	1	0	181	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0.0
	2005	73	12	13	4	242	7	5	17	0	373	\$110,000	\$0	\$110,000	10	1.2
	2006	65	1	2	0	117	0	1	13	2	201	\$0	\$0	\$0	29	1.0
	2007	13	3	0	0	40	0	0	0	0	56	\$0	\$0	\$0	10	3.3

Badakhshan	2004	17	29	5	4	107	2	1	1	0	166	\$0	\$0	\$0	3	4.0
	2005	69	64	12	44	115	7	0	4	0	315	\$0	\$0	\$0	3	0.3
	2006	104	56	5	17	179	1	5	9	0	376	\$25,000	\$0	\$25,000	10	1.5
	2007	11	34	1	1	43	0	8	0	0	98	\$0	\$0	\$0	4	1.8
Baghlan	2004	20	27	5	2	92	0	1	23	0	170	\$0	\$0	\$0	1	0.0
	2005	13	35	10	6	93	7	2	49	0	215	\$131,000	\$0	\$131,000	4	2.0
	2006	72	77	7	16	191	2	5	65	0	435	\$0	\$0	\$0	12	2.0
	2007	14	79	8	7	109	0	3	11	0	231	\$0	\$0	\$0	4	0.8
Balkh	2004	9	40	14	0	161	2	0	2	0	228	\$68,400	\$0	\$68,400	2	0.5
	2005	12	66	13	8	202	11	4	34	0	350	\$0	\$3,500	\$3,500	10	2.3
	2006	13	50	2	2	128	6	6	4	0	211	\$17,747	\$69,404	\$87,151	20	2.0
	2007	5	21	1	0	77	0	3	1	0	108	\$0	\$6,000	\$6,000	10	2.7
Faryab	2004	7	18	7	0	73	0	0	19	0	124	\$0	\$0	\$0	1	1.0
	2005	28	45	9	6	113	3	5	32	0	241	\$101,000	\$0	\$101,000	2	4.0
	2006	3	2	3	32	144	0	4	29	0	217	\$155,000	\$0	\$155,000	7	1.4
	2007	5	1	0	0	139	0	1	0	0	146	\$20,000	\$0	\$20,000	4	3.5
Jowzjan	2004	4	28	5	0	120	0	0	18	0	175	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0.0
	2005	12	20	8	13	210	3	0	30	0	296	\$15,400	\$0	\$15,400	2	15.5
	2006	2	21	0	15	118	0	0	24	0	180	\$80,000	\$0	\$80,000	2	2.0
	2007	1	8	0	0	9	0	0	2	0	20	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0.0
Kondoz (Kunduz)	2004	12	31	9	4	175	1	2	7	0	241	\$0	\$0	\$0	2	7.3
	2005	12	70	17	36	197	5	1	28	0	366	\$35,164	\$11,100	\$46,264	0	1.0
	2006	16	104	4	0	197	0	1	13	0	335	\$30,000	\$0	\$30,000	7	5.6
	2007	3	85	0	1	184	0	3	1	0	277	\$0	\$0	\$0	8	9.9
Samangan	2004	21	11	4	0	171	0	0	21	0	228	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0.0
	2005	12	8	8	5	145	8	1	95	0	282	\$0	\$0	\$0	1	1.0
	2006	16	66	1	0	101	0	0	25	0	209	\$0	\$0	\$0	2	4.0
	2007	3	38	0	0	26	0	0	0	0	67	\$0	\$0	\$0	2	1.0
Sar-e Pol	2004	31	2	4	0	121	0	0	27	0	185	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0.0
	2005	63	13	9	2	275	2	0	29	0	393	\$0	\$0	\$0	1	5.0
	2006	19	11	1	0	96	0	0	8	0	135	\$0	\$0	\$0	3	0.0
	2007	2	13	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	27	\$0	\$0	\$0	4	1.8
Takhar	2004	11	10	9	1	207	0	0	4	0	242	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0.0
	2005	9	34	10	19	187	5	1	32	0	297	\$0	\$0	\$0	2	2.5
	2006	38	68	3	51	93	0	0	10	0	263	\$0	\$0	\$0	6	0.7
	2007	6	20	0	0	34	0	0	0	0	60	\$85,000	\$0	\$85,000	1	0.0
Helmand	2004	38	9	12	2	182	0	3	5	0	251	\$0	\$0	\$0	10	4.0
	2005	37	86	18	38	173	12	15	44	1	424	\$180,000	\$135,705	\$315,705	68	3.5
	2006	75	29	16	5	55	1	30	16	4	231	\$74,140	\$5,956	\$80,096	125	4.1

	2007	25	3	8	1	61	4	14	13	0	129	\$0	\$0	\$0	45	4.3
Kandahar	2004	73	16	7	0	233	1	1	2	0	333	\$151,990	\$66,688	\$218,678	22	5.6
	2005	90	55	15	13	293	7	7	6	1	487	\$5,546	\$5,600	\$11,146	94	4.5
	2006	164	31	29	24	119	4	77	18	7	473	\$20,000	\$81,800	\$101,800	124	6.6
	2007	141	32	19	7	132	4	58	20	0	413	\$159,877	\$35,983	\$195,861	66	4.3
Uruzgan	2004	1	4	4	1	6	0	0	2	0	18	\$0	\$0	\$0	1	4.4
	2005	22	25	15	2	139	3	17	3	0	226	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	3.3
	2006	118	19	23	29	105	4	13	21	1	333	\$34,300	\$0	\$34,300	1	8.1
	2007	11	6	5	12	48	0	5	19	0	106	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	7.5
Zabul	2004	59	0	0	0	22	0	0	0	0	81	\$82,800	\$64,200	\$147,000	7	4.9
	2005	28	9	9	4	20	0	1	3	4	78	\$0	\$0	\$0	51	3.5
	2006	18	6	17	10	39	2	0	3	1	96	\$0	\$800	\$800	61	2.4
	2007	6	1	4	0	10	0	1	0	0	22	\$0	\$63,742	\$63,742	26	3.3
Badghis	2004	8	1	5	9	71	0	0	3	0	97	\$0	\$0	\$0	1	5.0
	2005	51	34	9	14	232	3	3	137	0	483	\$101,000	\$0	\$101,000	2	0.0
	2006	19	85	18	48	141	0	6	46	0	363	\$55,000	\$0	\$55,000	8	2.8
	2007	11	54	2	62	83	0	0	8	0	220	\$10,000	\$0	\$10,000	4	2.5
Farah	2004	29	32	5	0	187	1	1	1	0	256	\$0	\$0	\$0	5	5.6
	2005	37	53	10	5	195	2	0	5	2	309	\$86,300	\$0	\$86,300	10	3.9
	2006	24	96	6	4	116	0	3	8	1	258	\$1,940	\$0	\$1,940	37	3.1
	2007	4	1	4	2	51	0	0	2	0	64	\$0	\$0	\$0	22	6.4
Ghowr	2004	48	10	4	1	182	0	0	7	0	252	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0.0
	2005	37	42	7	3	138	3	0	36	0	266	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0.0
	2006	63	109	0	17	152	0	5	15	0	361	\$0	\$0	\$0	4	0.8
	2007	3	55	0	0	14	0	0	9	0	81	\$0	\$0	\$0	0	0.0
Herat	2004	54	59	14	7	198	3	5	10	0	350	\$120,000	\$69,544	\$189,544	7	6.5
	2005	101	96	19	23	204	9	16	13	0	481	\$267,300	\$0	\$267,300	13	2.8
	2006	41	204	16	70	197	3	29	37	0	597	\$27,500	\$15,000	\$42,500	33	3.8
	2007	37	84	1	0	49	0	4	2	0	177	\$30,000	\$10,000	\$40,000	13	3.9
Nimruz	2004	14	23	4	0	87	0	0	2	0	130	\$88,750	\$0	\$88,750	1	8.0
	2005	28	44	7	7	196	3	0	2	0	287	\$0	\$0	\$0	2	9.5
	2006	18	2	0	0	46	0	1	0	0	67	\$0	\$0	\$0	14	4.1
	2007	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	7	\$0	\$0	\$0	8	3.1

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