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THESIS

SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE RECRUITMENT OF AL-QAEDA SOURCES: LESSONS DERIVED FROM COUNTER-IDEOLOGICAL PROGRAMS AND THE TARGETING OF TYPE B TERRORISTS

by

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March 2006

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How can the FBI improve the recruitment of sources within terrorist groups, specifically al-Qaeda? First, counter-ideological programs have application in source recruitment. Second, a framework for recruiting terrorist sources is found in the work of Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins. They suggest terrorists can be usefully categorized as internalists or externalists, or Types A and B. Type A terrorists have insatiable appetites and display emotional aggression. Type B terrorists have instrumental aggression and "pragmatic world goals." Significantly, research suggests terrorists displaying instrumental aggression, the Type B terrorist, should be more "sensitive" to "objective rewards and punishments."

Two case studies demonstrate how to determine if a potential terrorist source is either a Type A or Type B individual. This is accomplished by examining a potential source's background to determine if they have instrumental or emotional aggression, their levels of risk and ideological commitment, their part-time or full-time commitment to jihad, and if they have high or low Social Intensity Syndrome. The conclusion of this thesis is that the FBI should concentrate recruitments on the more pragmatic Type B terrorists.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The present FBI process for attempting to recruit terrorist sources is largely left to the success or failure of agents acting individually on their instincts, experiences and personal abilities. How can the FBI organizationally improve the recruitment of human intelligence sources within terrorist groups, especially al-Qaeda? This thesis examines two interconnected tracks for improving source recruitments. First, counter-ideological programs applying techniques causing terrorists defections and dissension have application in source recruitment. Second, a cognitive framework for recruiting terrorist sources of intelligence may be found in the work of Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation. They suggest terrorists can be usefully categorized as internalists or externalists, or Types A and B. Type A terrorists "are all driven by the action and passion itself. Even when they clothe themselves in ostensible political objectives, their appetites for action have proven insatiable and they have changed objectives as necessary to continue." Type B terrorists have "pragmatic world goals" and "will cease terrorism when it is no longer needed." Al-Qaeda is largely comprised of Type As according to Davis and Jenkins. The authors argue that Type A terrorists display emotional aggression, while Type B terrorists have instrumental aggression. "Emotional aggression is associated with anger and does not calculate long-term consequences." Instrumental aggression is for a purpose. Significantly for this thesis, psychologist Clark McCauley writes that the "response to the individual behavior of terrorists may be linked to differences between emotional and instrumental aggression: 'emotional aggression should be less sensitive to objective rewards and punishments, and instrumental aggression more sensitive." Two case studies demonstrate how to determine if a potential terrorist source is either a Type A or Type B individual.

This is accomplished by examining a potential source's background to determine if they have instrumental or emotional aggression, their levels of risk and ideological commitment, their part-time or full-time commitment to jihad, and if they have high or low Social Intensity Syndrome (SIS). SIS, the emergent work of renowned psychologist Phil Zimbardo, is primarily concerned with the need for men to be associated with other

men in "certain male dominated social groupings," of which a terrorist group would be included. The more recruitable Type Bs, when compared to their Type A counterparts, display instrumental aggression, have lower levels of risk and ideological commitment, have part-time commitment to jihad, and display low levels of SIS. The conclusion of this thesis is that FBI source recruitment efforts against al-Qaeda terrorists will be more successful when they are focused on the more pragmatic Type B terrorists. Type B terrorists are found in the peripheral functions of terrorist organizations, consistent with their comparatively lower levels of risk and ideological commitment (as compared to their Type A counterparts). However, their access to intelligence is not necessarily inferior. As a consequence of their attachment to the peripheral functions of terrorist groups, they are also more physically accessible than their Type A counter-parts.

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I.   INTRODUCTION

> The events of September 11th have forever changed our nation and the
> FBI.   Since that terrible day, the FBI's overriding priority has been
> protecting America by preventing further attacks. (2004, p. 1)
>
> Director Robert Mueller on FBI Strategic Plan 2004-2009

How exactly will the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) prevent further terrorist attacks, especially by al-Qaeda?[1] How will the FBI find potential al-Qaeda sleeper-cells in the United States? How will the FBI successfully counter the transition by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to less hierarchical organizational structures and boundaries? How will the FBI contend not just with al-Qaeda the group, but with al-Qaeda the movement—a movement which can inspire Muslims without previous records of jihadist activity to process into terrorists and metastasize into deadly terrorist cells?

An argument can be made that a tremendous amount of the FBI's energy since 9/11 has been geared to re-structuring the organization to be more responsive to combating al-Qaeda and other terrorist threats, reflective of Director Mueller's focus on the FBI's new "overriding priority" to prevent further attacks. There are new counter-terrorism units within the FBI, new agent career paths focused on counter-terrorism, new intelligence groups within each FBI division, new counter-terrorism training, new computer systems to handle counter-terrorism intelligence, more agents working terrorism, better cooperation with the CIA and more agents working overseas, to mention but a few of the laudable changes from the pre-9/11, FBI environment. But, as one recent RAND report noted, "Whatever else it achieves, reorganization does not predictably yield better analysis and operational decision making, which depend on how and how well people think rather than how their bureaus are organized" (Gompert, 2007, p. 14). As David Gompert of the RAND Corporation noted:

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[1]The transliteration of "al-Qaeda" leads to many spellings. "Al-Qaeda" will be the transliteration used in this thesis, unless contained within a quote.

Recognition of the centrality of cognitive performance in insurgency and COIN (counter-insurgency) is also a reminder of the limits of organizational 'solutions.' Confidence in structuring for success is a product of the United States' corporate mentality and its 20th-century success in organizing to win industrial-territorial war, especially World War II and the Cold War. Already, it is apparent that restructuring to counter global insurgency is at best insufficient and at worst a distraction. There is no denying that after 9/11, U.S. homeland security needed to be organized for better focus on global counterinsurgency and that U.S. intelligence agencies needed to be connected for better information sharing. However, when countering a dynamic threat, faith in structure is faith misplaced. (2007, pp. 13, 14)

While some FBI reorganization and change are appropriate, an alternative and arguably more focused, approach to improving the FBI's counter-terrorism capacity with respect to al-Qaeda is to advance the FBI's successful recruitment and handling of human intelligence sources (HUMINT). Having more HUMINT within al-Qaeda is an obvious path to knowing in advance the intentions and the capabilities of this group. How is this desirable end-state to be accomplished? The solution is not as simple as mandating that agents recruit more terrorism sources.

For veteran MI-5 counter-terrorism professional Paul Smith, (2008) improvements in the capability to infiltrate al-Qaeda via human sources are critical to the early detection and prevention of future terrorist attacks and the eventual demise of this threat. Defense commentator Shawn Brimley wrote in his article, "Tentacles of Jihad: Targeting Transnational Support Networks," that "human intelligence is the *sine qua non* of victory against al Qaeda and its affiliates…"(2006, p. 40).

With its long-history of using sources to combat other types of sophisticated criminal organizations, the FBI also understands the value of this method to combat al-Qaeda. As an organization, the FBI recognizes the need to have more terrorist sources, but has given less thought to how this process really works and limited practical guidance to field agents to assist them in their recruitment efforts. Agents acting instinctively, based upon years of experience, involving as many failures as successes, are the backbone of the FBI's current efforts to recruit these invaluable terrorism sources. Unfortunately, when an agent with successful experiences recruiting and operating

quality terrorism sources retires, leaves the FBI, moves into management, or other jobs within the FBI not connected to counter-terrorism, their expertise is lost. As it stands, there is no clear understanding within the FBI of the underlying principles or processes for recruiting al-Qaeda sources. And, there is equally no process for taking the experiences of agents successful in this critical arena and teaching it to others. This may be because it is difficult to teach an art or instinct, especially one that is so imprecisely understood, even by those who have demonstrated some success. At some level, what works for the individual FBI agent who successfully recruits terrorist sources must be better understood organizationally, so the process can be measured, improved, and ultimately taught to future generations of counter-terrorism professionals.

Far more effort is currently expended organizationally on providing training to agents on the legalities of source recruiting and the processing of bureaucratic paperwork associated with this complicated and crucial endeavor than on planning recruitment operations or teaching agents how to recruit terrorism sources.[2] There is not an existing replicable recruitment process, a formalized "post-mortem" of successful and failed recruitment efforts, or a set of metrics to determine how well the FBI is performing in this critical area.

If improved human intelligence through better source recruitment is the answer to preventing future attacks, where should the FBI begin to look for improvements? The broad focus of this thesis is to initiate an academic discussion in search of practical answers to the tyranny of an immediate counter-terrorism need. In essence, this thesis addresses this question: How can the FBI improve the recruitment of human sources of intelligence within terrorist groups, specifically al-Qaeda?

The recruitment of a human source shares some of the properties of a "wicked problem" (Rittel and Webber, 2004). Each potential recruitment target is an individual whose different nature and nurture have shaped a unique identity. Similarly, "Every wicked problem is essentially unique" (Rittel and Webber, 2004, p. 164). Consequently, each recruitment effort is a unique affair, regardless of similarities in ethnicities, religion

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[2]Based on the author's experience as an FBI agent assigned to counter-terrorism investigations since January 1998.

or language. Another characteristic of wicked problems is that the cost of failure is high. "Every solution to a wicked problem is a 'one-shot operation;' because there is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly" Rittel and Webber, 2004, p. 163). This characteristic of a wicked problem is certainly true in attempts to recruit terrorism sources. In a failed recruitment attempt, the FBI's interests in that individual and his associates are exposed. This may lead that person to alert others to the threat posed by the FBI and to take security steps to further obfuscate his past, current and future activities.[3]

Any FBI agent or CIA case officer who has attempted recruitments on known or suspected terrorists or their associates is aware that the recruitment approach used so successfully in one instance is no guarantee of future success. To believe, then, that a cook-book approach to source recruitment is possible (or even desirable) is unrealistic; that is not the intention of this paper. Nor is this paper a detailed study of al-Qaeda or its affiliates, but some familiarity of al-Qaeda and terrorism is assumed of the reader. This paper is also not intended to be a purely academic exercise on the study of the psychological or sociological underpinnings of radical Islamic terrorism.

What this thesis does intend to accomplish is to suggest the application of important lessons learned from various areas to improving how the FBI thinks about terrorism source recruitment in four areas:

- Developing better comprehension concerning whom the FBI should target as potential al-Qaeda source recruitments.

- Understanding why recruitment efforts against certain individuals are more likely to succeed or fail.

- Providing practical guidance to FBI agents on where they should begin their search for promising recruitment candidates, which is enhanced by an understanding of points one and two.

- Providing practical suggestions for approaching the recruitment target.

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[3] Based on the experiences of the author working with terrorist source recruitment for the FBI from 1998-present.

Following this introduction, this paper proceeds by first defining what is meant by the term "al-Qaeda" and what constitutes a "recruited source." Next, lessons are drawn from four case-studies of on-going counter-ideological programs in non-Western countries targeting al-Qaeda or groups associated with al-Qaeda. The discussion then turns to lessons drawn from the fields of psychology and sociology that are applicable to source recruitment. Specifically discussed are the differences between Type A and B terrorists, instrumental and emotional aggression, risk and commitment, lessons from the Madrid train bombings, and Social Intensity Syndrome. One explanation for recruitment failures of the right terrorists, Correspondent Inference Theory, is also discussed. The applicability of these lessons is then demonstrated through two case studies of individuals with known connections to al-Qaeda.

The conclusion of this thesis, predicated on these lessons and illustrated by the case studies, is that FBI recruitment efforts against al-Qaeda should be focused on a particular type of terrorist—the Type B. Indicators associated with Type B terrorists are discernable to agents through existing investigative methods, as opposed to impractical clinical observations and testing. Type B terrorists are more accessible (both physically and mentally) to the FBI and are more likely to cooperate as sources. Their Type A counterparts are predicted to be more inclined to reject an FBI recruitment approach, even when this is against their best interests and self-preservation.

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II. DEFINING AL-QAEDA AND RECRUITED SOURCES

Before proceeding with a review of the academic lessons which are posited in this thesis as having practical applications for field agents in identifying the Type B terrorists who are more susceptible to recruitment, it is necessary to provide two key definitions. First, what or who is an "al-Qaeda" terrorist? Second, what constitutes a "recruited source" for the purposes of this discussion?

A. WHO IS AN AL-QAEDA TERRORIST?

Renowned terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman has delineated al-Qaeda into four categories reflecting a decreasing level of sophistication (2006). Hoffman's categories are as follows:

1. Al-Qaeda Central

This is the al-Qaeda which many probably think of when the name of this group is mentioned. It is Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and those full-time al-Qaeda members who existed with the organization prior to 9/11 (Hoffman, 2006). This category is the most sophisticated because it is home to the group's "professional cadre: the most dedicated, committed, and absolutely reliable element of the movement" (Hoffman, 2006). The professional cadre is responsible for the signature terrorist attacks of the organization on the scale of 9/11 and the simultaneous bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Hoffman, 2006). This cadre may employ local terrorists in support roles in these "spectacular" attacks, but it is this cadre that is in charge (Hoffman, 2006, p. 286). In many instances, but not always, full-time members have secretly pledged their *bayat* or fealty to Usama Bin Ladin (National, 2004, pp. 67, 470). The access of these full-time al-Qaeda members to insider information about the group's activities is based upon their direct participation in these activities and through communications with other full-time members.

2. Al-Qaeda Affiliates and Associates

For Hoffman, this category "embraces formally established insurgent or terrorist groups who over the years have benefited from Usama Bin Laden's largess and/or spiritual guidance and/or have received training, arms, money, and other assistance from al-Qaeda" (Hoffman, 2006, p. 286). Hoffman lists over ten terrorist groups from across the globe that fall within this category such as Jemaah Islamiya and Laskar-e-Tayyiba (2006, p. 286.)

3. Al-Qaeda Locals

This "amorphous" group represents "al-Qaeda adherents" who are likely to have had terrorism experience and who may have participated in one or more jihads around the world (Hoffman, 2006, p. 287). The unique aspect of this group is that its members have a connection to al-Qaeda, even if these connections are "tenuous" or "dormant" (Hoffman, 2006, p. 287).

4. Al-Qaeda Network

This category represents "homegrown Islamic radicals" (Hoffman, 2006, p.287). They may be from the Maghreb, Middle East, Europe, or even North and South America. Converts to Islam are found in this category (Hoffman, 2006). Individuals in this category have no direct connection with al-Qaeda or any other identifiable terrorist group (Hoffman, 2006). Examples might include the attackers in the March 11, 2004 Madrid train attacks (Hoffman, 2006). These individuals may see themselves as extensions of al-Qaeda, which is "more inspirational than actual" (Hoffman, 2006, p. 288). However, they may not be able to provide any intelligence or access to formal al-Qaeda members. Still, as the Madrid attack demonstrates, they can act with deadly effect and are ignored or underestimated at great risk. Al-Qaeda expert Rohan Gunaratna supports this view. In his article, *Al Qaeda's Ideology*, he noted that "…Al-Qaeda's real strength lies not in its

global infrastructure and membership per se but in its overarching and highly appealing ideology" (Gunaratna, 2005, p. 59). This is the least sophisticated of Hoffman's al-Qaeda categories.

Other useful characterizations of al-Qaeda also exist, which demonstrate the diverse nature of this group and the threat it poses. The British government, for instance, has developed a practical, easy to understand three tier system used to "describe the varying degrees of connection between targets and the Al Qaida leadership" (Murphy, 2005, p. 27).

> 'Tier 1' describing individuals or networks considered to have direct links with core Al Qaida; 'Tier 2', individuals or networks more loosely affiliated with Al Qaida; 'Tier 3', those without any links to Al Qaida who might be inspired by their ideology. (Murhpy, 2005, p. 27)

Throughout this paper, when referring to "al-Qaeda," this refers simultaneously to one or more of Hoffman's categories, unless a specific category is otherwise noted.

B.   WHAT IS A RECRUITED SOURCE?

To posture that an individual has been "recruited" is to say that they are witting of a cooperative arrangement, formal or informal, between themselves and the FBI for the purpose of providing useful intelligence to the FBI on a specific target or issue.[4] Usually, the recruited source is tasked with collecting or providing intelligence on particular matters. Cooperation can occur for numerous reasons. A terrorist or other type of recruited agent may agree to cooperate for short-term, pragmatic reasons, through a complete rejection of his or her previous ideology, for money, revenge, adventure, avoidance of criminal prosecution or deportation, or even recognition that his or her goals can be met through non-violent means, among countless other reasons. Generally, this cooperative agreement is secret, allowing the source to continue simultaneously providing intelligence to the FBI while maintaining his or her access to the source of the intelligence as a loyal member.

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[4] The bureaucratic FBI formalities of recruiting and vetting sources are outside of the scope and interest of this paper.

On occasion, an individual will be recruited as a witness in a criminal trial. Intelligence professionals accustomed to only working with "true" intelligence sources might scoff at the thought of a witness being referred to as a recruited source, but the FBI has both intelligence and prosecutorial responsibilities.[5] In many instances, the use of criminal prosecutions is one of the few legal, efficient, and lasting remedies for neutralizing a suspected terrorist member or supporter who is an American citizen or permanent legal resident. Court witnesses, for purposes of this paper, can still be considered recruitment sources if they provide intelligence. In many instances, their relationship with the FBI as a witness can be protected for long periods of time before exposure through judicial processes, although their future access to intelligence is largely curtailed by their public association with the FBI when they fulfill their witness role. However, even if a terrorist source cooperating as a witness provides nothing more than historical information about al-Qaeda, this intelligence can still be exceptionally valuable in generating leads to identify and uncover hidden al-Qaeda members, activities, and *modus operandi*.

A successfully recruited al-Qaeda source may provide exceptional, actionable intelligence, but will almost certainly disagree with U.S. foreign policy, Western culture and norms, the perceived treatment of Muslims around the world, and any other number of social, political, and religious issues. A key, universal point to all al-Qaeda terrorist sources is that their willingness to cooperate with the FBI should never be confused with the conversion of that individual's religion, values, or way of thinking. Professor Zachary Abuza, who was commenting on his study of a promising Indonesian government program to rehabilitate captured *Jamah Islamiyah* terrorists (al-Qaeda affiliates and associates by Hoffman's categorization), which is discussed later, captured this point. He noted, "At the end of this program, you are probably still going to have someone who is committed to the establishment of sharia, who is probably still going to be less than friendly toward non-Muslims and ethnic minorities" (as cited in Bennett, 2008). A successful recruitment, then, is not equivalent to a wholesale ideological

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[5] Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, identifies the intelligence elements of the FBI as part of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

conversion of an individual, but nor is conversion either necessary or the goal to source recruitments. What counts is the potential source's pragmatic willingness to engage in a cooperative arrangement to provide accurate, useful intelligence. For these reasons, even a detained prisoner or witness may be regarded as a valuable recruited source for the purposes of this paper.

As Hoffman's categories above and the ensuing discussion might suggest, for this thesis, what is counted as an al-Qaeda terrorist and source, are intentionally broad. This is because the intent of this paper is to discuss the recruitment of individuals with potentially valuable intelligence in meeting the FBI's overriding priority of "preventing further attacks against the United States" (FBI, 2004, p. 1). Whether these individuals are the "professional cadre" (Hoffman, 2008, p. 286) of al-Qaeda Central, part of the al-Qaeda network of "homegrown Islamic radicals" (Hoffman, 2008, p. 287), long-term intelligence sources in the traditional, U.S. Intelligence Community sense, or witnesses for criminal prosecutions is important, but not the most important element in the development of a cognitive process for source recruitment. What is more important for this thesis is if an individual has access to actionable intelligence and if he exhibits factors suggesting that he can be successfully recruited so that this intelligence can be obtained and applied to the prevention of future terrorist attacks or the demise of a terrorist group.

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III.   RECRUITMENT LESSONS DERIVED FROM CURRENT COUNTER-IDEOLOGICAL PROGRAMS

The future survival of the Islamist networks will depend on the continuing appeal of its radical ideology that sustains a fledgling global support network. In the virtual absence of counterpropaganda, both literate and illiterate Muslims view the global jihad ideology as being compatible with Muslim theology. (Gunaratna, 2007, pp. 182-183)

Rohan Gunaratna

Within the rubric of the widely-applied term "al-Qaeda" are groups and individuals with differing levels of terrorism sophistication and connectivity to the pre-9/11 al-Qaeda terrorist group personified by Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman Zawahiri (Hoffman, 2006). What links all of these al-Qaeda manifestations, regardless of their level of sophistication or connectedness to al-Qaeda Central, is an adherence to violent radical Islamic ideologies expressed in acts of terrorism.

This chapter examines the counter-ideological programs currently underway in Singapore, Indonesia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. This author prefers the term "counter-ideological" over "de-radicalization" or "rehabilitation" to express the intent of these programs. All of these terms are used to refer to essentially the same intended efforts of changing mind- sets and preventing terrorism from developing. But de-radicalization and rehabilitation seem more specifically geared to addressing incarcerated terrorists while "counter-ideological" is broader in its potential applications, including source recruitment. The counter-ideological programs discussed in this chapter, have to varying degrees, been publically touted as successful models in combating the radical Islamic ideologies which provide a violent voice for perceived anti-Muslim injustices.

Radical Islamic ideologies are generating what terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman has classified as the "Al-Qaeda Network" (2006, p. 287). Because these home-grown radicals act more out of inspiration than any connectivity to bona-fide al-Qaeda cells (Hoffman, 2006) and even after the current idols of al-Qaeda Central are eventually cast down, new generations of terrorists nurtured on this global jihadist ideology are likely to

perpetuate the terrorism cycle until the jihadist message is repudiated. Even for individuals who are not counter-terrorism specialists, it is easy to see the logic behind arguments suggesting that al-Qaeda has become more and more a decentralized organization held together with ideological glue (Brafman and Beckstrom, 2006).

The New York City Police Department, in its analysis of five terrorism cases within the United States, concluded that "the potential terrorist or group of terrorists begin and progress through a process of radicalization" (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, p. 5). A component of this process is a reliance on the influence of radical ideologies. Drawing on open-source biographies of 172 participants in what he calls the "global Salafi jihad," Marc Sageman (2004, pp. vii-ix) concluded the following regarding the "recruitment" of terrorists in this movement:

> I have described the process of joining the jihad, rejecting the common notions of recruitment and brainwashing to account for the process. Instead, I argue for a three-prong process: <u>social affiliation with the jihad accomplished through friendship, kinship, and discipleship, progressive intensification of beliefs and faith leading to acceptance of the global Salafi jihad ideology</u> [underscore added]; and formal acceptance to the jihad through the encounter of a link to the jihad. (Sageman, 2004, p. 135)

According to the noted scholar Gilles Kepel, "In academic parlance, the term *salafism* denotes a school of though which surfaced in the second half of the nineteenth century as a reaction to the spread of European ideals. It advocated a return to the traditions of the devout ancestors (*salaf* in Arabic)" (Kepel, 2002, p. 219). But beyond its academic meaning, it meant more:

> In the eyes of the militants, the definition of the term was quite different: salafists were those who understood the injunctions of the sacred texts in their most literal, traditional sense. Their most notable exponent was the great fourteenth-century ulema Ibn Taymiyya, whose work served as the primary reference for the Wahhabites. The salafists were the real fundamentalists of Islam; they were hostile to any and all innovation, which they condemned as mere human interpretation. (Kepel, 2002, p. 200)

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Other counter-terrorism commentators concur with al-Qaeda expert Rohan Gunaratna's at the opening of this chapter that the ideological underpinnings of the radical Islamic jihadist threat must be undercut (2007). Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan of Nanyang Technical University in Singapore had two significant points related to the significance of counter-ideological work.

First, in his paper, "Key Considerations in Counter-ideological Work against Terrorist Ideology," Hassan noted that "Counter-ideological work is also important in minimizing the threat of potential freelance terrorists, who may not be members of any group, but drawn into terrorism because they share the ideology or common grievances" (2006, p. 532).

Second, he also noted the following:

Terrorism is committed when opportunity, motivation and capability meet and ideology is one of many important elements that motivates a person to commit terrorism. Muslim terrorists and Al Qaeda especially, are not excluded. In fact, the role of ideology is especially significant for Al Qaeda and its associates. Prevention of terrorism requires the elimination of at least one of the three elements mentioned. One is motivation, which may be driven by ideology. (Hassan, 2006, p. 535)

Hassan identified five key goals for a counter-ideological response to the global salafi jihad. These goals provide a framework for understanding the objectives of a counter-ideological program, yet are sufficiently broad to accommodate varied national approaches to this problem which must encompass the reality of local societal, legal, economic, cultural, and other considerations impacting the practicality of its application. The key goals are as follows:

- Immunize general Muslims from extremist ideology

- Persuade less fanatic members of terrorist groups to abandon the ideology

- Create doubt and dissension within terrorist organizations,

- Rehabilitate detained terrorist members, and

- Minimize non-Muslims' anxiety and suspicion by presenting alternatives to terrorist ideology (Hassan, 2006, 535).

Examined for this thesis were the counter-ideological programs currently underway in Singapore, Indonesia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Through a comparative review of how these mostly Muslims countries are addressing their own radical Islamic threats, methods were identified which could be modified for application in the context of al-Qaeda source recruitment.

Although there are other nations with counter-ideological approaches outside of these selected programs in this admittedly truncated review, including more politically and culturally akin Western nations, these particular countries were selected for several reasons.

First, as a counter-ideological program of this nature invariably involves interpretations of the Islamic religion, a largely non-Western perspective, from largely Islamic countries, was preferred. The rationale for this is straightforward, as noted by Muhammad Haniff and Kenneth George Pereire cogently stated:

> As al Qaeda and JI do not believe in Western Philosophy and ideals, it should be recognized that the 'conventional lens' originating from the West would not be able to prescribe the best refutation of their theological and juristic arguments. Any meaningful approach should take into account the nature of their ideals, couched in juristic and jurisprudential pronouncements. (2006, p. 466)

Second, several of the countries in this comparison have scored notable program successes, at least according to publically available information. For that reason alone, they deserve closer examination.

Third, it is the author's contention that program examples from allied Western nations in the Global War on Terrorism are more likely to be examined and known than those of non-Western nations. This position is asserted based on the historic level of intelligence and police cooperation between the U.S. and its Western allies and the propensity for academics and the media to conduct research in Western languages.

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Although the identified best counter-ideological practices of Western nations are probably correctly perceived to be more immediately miscible in a U.S. model, it also may lead to ignorance and missed opportunities of valuable lessons from lesser known, non-Western counter-ideological programs.

The four countries of this study include the most populous Muslim nations in the Arab and Islamic World in Egypt and Indonesia, respectively. The study includes Saudi Arabia, which is arguably the most influential state in Sunni religious matters, as al-Qaeda and its offshoots are obviously Sunni groups. And this study includes a non-Muslim, multi-cultural country in Singapore. How are the countries of Singapore, Indonesia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia combating the ideology of the global salafi jihad and what lessons might be extracted for improved al-Qaeda source recruitment?

A.   SINGAPORE—THE COMMUNITY APPROACH

The Singaporean counter-ideological program is encompassed in Dr. Stephen Biddle's views of terrorism as expressed in his article, "War Aims and War Termination." Biddle is of a mind that "the center of gravity in the war against terrorism lies in the hearts and minds of politically uncommitted Muslims" (2006, p. 531).

As a result of this view, the main thrust of Singapore's program is aimed at insulating or "immunizing" the mainstream Muslim population within its borders from radical ideologies. This is accomplished by providing Muslims with a "correct understanding of Islam so that they will not be easily influenced by the terrorists' propaganda" (Hassan and Pereire, 2006, p. 466). The Singaporean aim is not an attempt to convert Muslims religiously or even to re-shape their views of the world through a non-Muslim lens, but rather to prevent fringe, radical ideologies from taking root within the community (Hassan and Pereire, 2006).

In the Singaporean program, the messenger for interpreting and projecting the "correct understanding of Islam" and the centerpiece of the country's counter-ideological program is the "moderate" [6]Singaporean Muslim Community (Hassan and Pereire, 2006). Haniff and Pereire were right to quickly assert the potential pitfall of the term "moderate." They said, "Nevertheless, policy makers must note that while the broad moderate—radical categorization is a useful means of essentialising differing tendencies among Muslim leaders and scholars, one should be aware of the difficulty of distinguishing between "moderate" and "radical" because in reality such a neat dichotomy does not exist" (Hassan and Pereire, 2006, p. 468).

As Ustaz Mohamed Bin Ali wrote, "…the [Singaporean] government was of the view that the primary responsibility of combating Al-Qaeda and JI's ideologies should fall squarely on the shoulders of the [Singaporean] Muslim community" (Ali, 2009, p. 2). The result has been that the Singaporean Muslim Community has led the charge in combating extremism in the country via methods and organizations largely created within the community.

The main organizational body representing the community's efforts is the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) (Ali, 2009). The RRG was created when the Singaporean government approached the Muslim community in 2003, shortly after the arrests of the first cell of *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) terrorists in Singapore, when the government sought the community's assistance in counseling these terrorists (Hassan, 2008). The RRG is comprised of Islamic religious scholars, a judge from the Singaporean Islamic *Sharia* Court, Muslim volunteers from domestic Islamic groups, and Muslims serving as religious counselors (Ali, 2009).

Broadly speaking, the RRG was tasked by the government to police its own community and to "speak out against the false ideology of hate being disseminated by al Qaeda and JI" (Ali, 2009, p. 461). More specifically, the RRG accomplishes this mission by examining the ideology of the JI, (Singapore's primary Islamic terrorist threat) to

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[6] "Moderate" is only to be outdone as a manipulated word based on one's political views by the word "terrorist."

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point out and correct religious misinterpretations via an education program for the Muslim community based on materials produced by the group (Ali, 2009). This aspect of the Singaporean program was recognized as the "direct" element.

The indirect element of Singapore's counter-ideological efforts revolved around an attempt to rehabilitate detained terrorists, which includes counseling them and simultaneously providing assistance to their families. In January of 2006, the program claimed the successful limited release of four detainees and the complete return to society of two additional detainees (Hassan, 2006). In January 2008, the program cited that 19 of 51 individuals, or 37 percent of individuals detained for their affiliation with the JI, have been returned to society after an average detention of only three years (Hassan, 2008). These figures imply Singapore's program is moving in a positive direction.

The terrorist group HAMAS, although not within the sphere of al-Qaeda, places a premium on ensuring group loyalty by providing assistance to the families of its prisoners and martyrs.[7] The Singaporean government works in a similar manner with local Muslim groups to ensure the needs of the families of its incarcerated terrorists are met:

> These initiatives are important in helping to win over the hearts and minds of the detainees and their family members and to integrate them back into society. It is particularly important to minimize the risks of the children being radicalized in the future by the detention of their fathers or by economic marginalization arising from disruptions to their education and loss of financial security. (Hassan, 2006, p. 3)

Muslims counselors also serve to provide counseling to these detainees and families and to act as communication channels between the families, the incarcerated terrorists, and the government (Ali, 2009). It can be argued, that by interposing themselves in this fashion, the government, through the RRG, is creating a direct dependence of the terrorists on the Muslim community and an indirect dependence on the government for the livelihood of their families. This orchestrated dependence has potential applications for source recruitments.

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[7] Based on the author's experiences via an investigation of HAMAS' U.S.-based *daw'a* fronts, particularly the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development.

One scenario envisioned, which is patterned after the Singaporean model, involves FBI agents interposing themselves or even other already recruited sources between the terrorists (incarcerated or otherwise) and their families as a way of creating that direct dependence.[8] One method for testing if this direct dependency is taking root would be for the FBI to make small, individually insignificant requests of the targeted terrorist concomitantly with support provided to their family. At first, the provision of assistance to the terrorist's family and the insignificant requests should not have any connections to obvious FBI intelligence needs. The first goal should be to simply create dependency and comfortableness within the relationship. Over time, the FBI's requests would become incrementally more significant, corresponding to equally more significant support to the terrorist's family. When the terrorist is making requests (not demands) of the agent or the recruited source interposed between he and their family, this might be an indication that dependency has been established. This process would culminate with a formal FBI request for cooperation when the relationship has moved into a comfortable pattern of simultaneously discussing potentially sensitive topics with the terrorist, such as past activities and associates, and meeting the needs of their family.

Another interesting effort by the Singaporean community was a joint program established by the association of Muslim scholars in Singapore (PERGAS) and Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) to create the Asatizah Recognition System (Hassan, 2006). This system, established in 2005, created a registry and set standards for teaching Islam by the country's Muslim teachers (Hassan, 2006). Those teachers straying from propagating approved versions of Islam are struck from the registry (Hassan, 2006).

This Asatizah Recognition System has obvious application for FBI source recruitment. Through existing FBI community liaison programs, U.S.-based Muslim teachers and other community leaders could be requested to act in the best interests of their religion to identify imams and individuals teaching and following unacceptable, radical standards of Islam as they define radical, but certainly encompassing those

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[8] The author has personally observed the effectiveness of this orchestrated dependency on two occasions. These involved an admitted al-Qaeda member and an admitted HAMAS member. Details are omitted for security purposes.

individuals inciting violence. This approach would be significantly more focused than current requests of domestic Islamic communities to report to the FBI "suspicious activity," "terrorism," or unfounded suspicions of the affiliation of individuals with specific terrorist groups.

Instead, the FBI would harness the energies of friendly religious and community leaders to identify potentially important theological differences and fault-lines within their communities which could be exploited by radicals. A request of this nature should be much more palatable for community partners to support. Through this more focused approach on ideological differences, community partners are being removed from the FBI's unintentional, but uncomfortable requests to label their fellow Muslims as possible terrorists based upon their differing Islamic views.

The community's reporting criteria would no longer be which individual is suspected of being a member or supporting al-Qaeda (which may be impossible for them to factually support), but who is teaching and following unacceptable, radical standards of Islam which incite terror. Again, what constitutes "radical" Islam is measured by cooperating religious and community leaders, who are most knowledge about what is "normal" in their religion and community, not by FBI-defined standards.

But surely a common element to be requested of the cooperative is the identification of those individuals who use their radical interpretations of Islam to ideologically support military or economic jihad. Through this change, young impressionable men gravitating to the call of radicalized imams or those already under their "discipleship" could be identified and considered for source recruitment sooner, before they are fully incorporated into the terrorism process. An added benefit would be improved placement of existing sources to focus sooner on the purveyors of the radical ideologies which breed jihadists.

To a lesser degree, the objectives of Singapore's program include three other elements which are focused outside of the mainstream Muslim community. It includes

attempting to persuade the less committed members of the global jihad movement to reconsider their views, to "rehabilitate" incarcerated terrorists, and to reach-out to non-Muslims to allay their suspicions.

The thought behind addressing the non-Muslim population is that improved understanding and communications across different segments of the Singaporean population will create a more united country. A more united Singapore, one with fewer tears within its social fabric, will be more difficult for terrorists and their ideologies to penetrate (Hassan and Pereire, 2006).

Viewed through the lens of defeating al-Qaeda's ideology, Singapore's counter-ideological approach has an admirable and unique quality. By taking a community approach to this problem, this generates community buy-in, especially when locally derived solutions are enacted. In turn, the government and Muslim community are creating a hostile environment for jihadist ideologies and possible terrorists amongst, "the center of gravity in the war against terrorism...politically uncommitted Muslims" (Biddle, 2006, p. 531). As Audrey Kurth Cronin noted, "Terrorist groups generally cannot survive without either active or passive support from a surrounding population" (2006. p. 27).

Key then to understanding the Singaporean approach is to appreciate the centrality, if not the control, of the counter-ideological program by the Singaporean Muslim Community. In essence, Singapore's response to the jihadist message has been to defer its judgment to the Muslim Community in identifying its own problems and allowing it to create its own solutions.

B. INDONESIA — REHABILITATION OF TERRORISTS

The focus of the Indonesian counter-ideological program stands in contrast to the community-focused Singaporean model. Indonesia's focus is specifically aimed at incarcerated terrorists, including those with blood on their hands for involvement in major terrorist attacks (Bennett, 2008).

The Indonesian effort is very direct in its efforts to "de-program" hardened terrorists (*The Age*, 2006). According to Indonesia's Ambassador to the United States, the objectives are "rehabilitation and treatment" of terrorists, aiming to return them to a pre-terrorism life, and to eliminate their return to terrorism upon their release (Parnohadiningrat, 2007).

The messengers in this program are co-opted terrorists, who are used to influence their former associates to renounce their views (Bennett, 2008). *Boston Globe* journalist Drake Bennett, who has studied this issue, believes the use of co-opted terrorists as the government's messengers is advantageous as "…former extremists have much more credibility with current extremists than the relatively moderate imams brought in to talk to inmates in programs like Singapore's and Saudi Arabia's" (2008).

Indonesia's program has obtained noteworthy successes in the use of credible, convicted, high-profile terrorists like Nasir Abas and Ali Imron as co-opted terrorist messengers. On October 12, 2002, JI's bombings of two nightclubs and in front of the U.S. Consulate on the island of Bali killed 202 people and wounded another 209 (Australian Federal Police, 2002). Imron played a key role in these horrific attacks by loading and driving the explosives-laden van which was parked in front of one of the nightclubs that was attacked (O'Brien, 2007). Imron is now reportedly cooperating with Indonesian authorities from his prison cell to prevent future JI attacks by producing cassette recordings of sermons for use in his family's East Java *madrassa.* These recordings address how his actions were a mistake and the "wrong kind of jihad" (O'Brien, 2007). What other intelligence he is providing cooperatively to the Indonesian authorities and others, such as the identity of other members, is open to speculation in the absence of information on such a potentially sensitive matter. Whether or not Imron's current behavior is genuinely reflective of his remorse, or more cynically, an effort to obtain prison privileges, an early prison release, or even an effort to prevent his execution will undoubtedly be questioned. But his true motivation may be overshadowed by the results of his cooperation. Even if he has not truly renounced his actions or the ideology supporting them, what is important is that this former JI terrorist is cooperating with authorities. Imron could just as easily have refused to cooperate with authorities on any

level, despite any inducements, benefits, or threats. The success of this method is still far from certain, but is promising. In addition to notable successes such as Abas and Imron, approximately 30 other terrorists are cooperating with the Indonesian government (O'Brien, 2007).

Admittedly, Indonesia's counter-ideological effort is neither unique in its program focus on incarcerated terrorists, nor its efforts at de-radicalizing these terrorists. What makes the Indonesian program unique among similar programs is the Indonesian police unit known as Detachment 88. This anti-terrorism unit, comprised of deeply religious Muslims who pray with the incarcerated terrorists, is used in conjunction with co-opted terrorists like Abas and Imron (O'Brien, 2007). Co-opted terrorists like Abas and Imron first spend as much as a week with newly arrested terrorists, breaking down their ideologies, before the police speak with them (O'Brien, 2007). According to a senior Indonesian counter-terrorism official, "When their Islamic argument is already defeated, then it is easy for us. Then we enter" (O'Brien, 2007).

Indonesian's counter-ideological approach hints at several potential beneficial practices for improved FBI source recruitment of al-Qaeda sources. First, greater use could be made of individuals with former terrorist connections like Imron and Abas, who carry more credibility with active terrorists, to directly attempt the recruitment of sources or to lay the groundwork for the recruitment by FBI agents. The FBI should extend this practice to include not only the use of terrorists in the United States or under U.S. government control as recruiters and ice-breakers, but also to the use of terrorists cooperating with friendly foreign governments.

For instance, if an FBI source candidate were traveling to Jakarta, the FBI, in cooperation with the CIA and the local intelligence services, could attempt the recruitment of that candidate at that location using credible and possibly well-known rehabilitated local terrorists like Imron or Abas. These rehabilitated terrorists could be involved to varying degrees in the process. At the less aggressive end of the spectrum, the rehabilitated terrorist could mentally soften the resolve of the targeted terrorist before the introduction of the recruiting agents.

The rehabilitated terrorist could perform limited but valuable assistance by speaking to some of the following issues: Introducing and vouching for the integrity of the recruiting agent(s) and the sincerity of the government's offers; advising the target that they were being offered a unique opportunity to extract themselves from their terrorist activity; addressing the benefits to themselves and their family of cooperating with the government; speaking of the guilt he feels for having committed murderous acts and the need for the targeted terrorist to withdraw from this activity before it is too late for them; or he could work to defeat the logic of the radicalized Islamic arguments underlying their cause. The rehabilitated assistant might even facilitate his own introduction and efforts with the source candidate by first sharing a meal with the target or praying with him, as is the practice of Detachment 88, as a way to break the ice before proceeding with more substantial discussions. It is these rehabilitated terrorists who are most likely to be armed with credible answers to the most pressing questions a terrorist, who is even remotely contemplating defecting from his group, might have. They also provide an example in the flesh of someone cooperating with the government; this will be hard for the source candidate to ignore.

Anecdotally, the author has seen evidence of clumsy FBI attempts at recruitment through a misguided version of this process. The FBI's mistake is to believe that the use of foreign language speaking agents or even agents who are Muslim (who are not necessarily adept at recruiting or operating human sources) creates instant or greater credibility with the source candidate. But if credibility were derived from either a common language or religion, the recruitment of sources in Muslim countries by native police and intelligence agents would be a foregone conclusion, which is obviously not the case. As the Indonesian counter-ideological program would suggest, source recruitment is more likely if the messenger is first trusted and the ideology underlying the targeted individual's rationale is refuted. This, in turn, is much more likely to occur with individuals who have been within the source candidate's in-group or who supported a similar cause.

C. EGYPT—REVISING JIHADIST IDEOLOGIES AND SOWING DISCORD

The target of Egypt's counter-ideological program is similar to that of Indonesia in its focus on incarcerated, hard-core terrorists. However, the Egyptian effort is different from the Indonesian program in significant ways. First, although not a stated objective, it appears to be focused beyond de-radicalizing individual terrorists. It is an effort to revise entire jihadist ideologies, primarily through co-opted jihadist ideologues and luminaries, who are involved in repudiating the very logic of the religious and political underpinnings which were once used to justify and inspire murderous acts of terrorism and which brought them to personal prominence (O'Brien, 2007).

Second, either as an intentional objective or fortuitous consequence of its approach, the Egyptian effort is reputedly sowing great discord amongst the terrorists and their group structure. While the Indonesian program appears to be more concerned with the progression of individual de-radicalization and the acquisition of tactical intelligence from co-opted terrorists, the Egyptian program is more strategic in its apparent purposes. It seeks to destabilize entire groups by sowing ideological dissension. The Egyptian government, for instance, participates in this dissension with "the financing of the publication of revisionist books written by jihadists in prison" (O'Brien, 2007).

Cronin (2006) noted that "capturing or killing of the leader," is one of seven broad historic reasons for the demise of terrorist groups in the modern era (this is discussed further in the conclusions). In support of her position, she cited examples including the capture of the Shining Path's leader Guzman and the Real Irish Republican Army's Michael McKevitt, both of whom urged their followers from behind their prison bars to cease their activities (Cronin, 2006). The Egyptian effort to use co-opted terrorist ideologues to undermine the ideological pillars of the jihadist cause is an intelligent variation of one of these seven identified reasons. As Cronin (2006) would reason, Guzman and McKevitt could appeal to their followers to lay down their arms based on the rigid organizational structure of their terrorist groups, and, in the case of Guzman or Abdullah Ocalan of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), their cult-like followings. But with radical Islamic groups like al-Qaeda, the strength behind their jihadist message is

not in a rigid organizational structure or cult of personality; al-Qaeda's strength is in its ideology. Therefore, it is the ideology which must be repudiated, not simply the group's leadership. This seems clear when considering possible scenarios following the death of Usama Bin Ladin. There will still be jihadists long after he is dead, spawned from the thoughts of individuals like Sayid Qutb and others, until their radical ideals are rejected as erroneous.

The Egyptian program's most notable success is the cooperation of former al-Qaeda ideologue and Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, more commonly known as Dr. Fadl (Wright, 2008). Fadl was so influential within the jihadist movement that his teachings were part of the indoctrination program for al-Qaeda recruits (Wright, 2008). Reflecting on his own prominence, he is reputed to have said to the Arab newspaper *Dar al-Hayat* that "For years after the launching of Al Qaeda, they would do nothing without consulting me" (Wright, 2008).

The application of the Egyptian counter-ideological approach of using jihadist ideologues and luminaries to undercut the very logic of entire groups is clearly a complementary process to the possible benefits to source recruitment already suggested from the Indonesian counter-ideological approach. Rather than just using former terrorists as intermediaries in a recruitment operation, the FBI could also use respected rehabilitated imams, theologians, and ideologues in the Egyptian manner.

But the Egyptian model also suggests another alternative to improved source recruitment. When the FBI can identify formal cells or even less structured groups of radical individuals linked by the glue of a common cause or ideology, it might consider the Egyptian model of attempting to sow ideological discord amongst these groups before ever attempting a recruitment approach. And how would the FBI identify these cells and less structured groups with which to ply this Egyptian approach of sowing ideological discord?

The community-based Singaporean model discussed above would be a logical choice. Cooperative leaders from the Islamic communities, who are more attuned to

subtle indicators of radical Islamic teachings in their own mosques, schools, and homes, can identify the imams and youths coalescing into potential harmful groups much faster and with more accurately than the FBI can through its own individual efforts.

Sowing the seeds of ideological discord amongst these groups could be orchestrated through very direct measures, as well as more indirectly. As an example of a direct method, reformed ideologues could be invited to the United States by local community leaders, quietly supported by the FBI. These ideologues would give speeches and lectures at troubled mosques and communities and could leave behind their revisionist materials in mosques and Islamic book stores. Through their elevated status as former jihadists and prepared in advance with intelligence on the radical ideological positions of the groups of concern to the FBI and local Islamic leaders, they would be in the best position to refute these beliefs and to provide ideological backing to local, supportive imams and leaders.

Ironically, the suggested use of reformed ideologues to shore-up ideological positions and causes is simply a reversal of precisely what radical groups in the United States have been doing successfully for years. HAMAS, as an example, through its front groups including the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development and the Islamic Association for Palestine, sponsored well-known HAMAS and Muslim Brotherhood leaders to come to the United States for speaking tours (Trahan, 2008). These speakers often addressed communities about issues of great concern to their groups, which were expertly packaged and communicated in Islamic terms and historical symbols from Islam's past, which supported their radical interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence. Through these methods, they were able to mold and influence the positions of Islamic communities on various topics, such as why they believed supporting the Oslo Peace Accords was wrong.[9] Closer to the topic of al-Qaeda, Usama Bin Ladin's well-known mentor, Abduallah Azzam, also came to the United States in the 1980s to drum up support for jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan.[10]

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[9] Based on author's investigation in *U.S. v Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development*.

[10] Video footage of Azzam lecturing in the United States for jihad was also presented at the Holy Land Foundation trial.

Indirectly, the FBI in-concert with other governments could create "chance" encounters between members of a targeted group and reformed ideologues, particularly if the U.S.-based terrorists travel overseas. Controversial materials from these reformed jihadist luminaries (such as Imron's cassette recordings of sermons for use in his family's East Java *madrassa*) can also be introduced into the group through other means. Given the extensive use of the Internet by jihadist groups, it would not be difficult to send the messages of reformed ideologues such as Dr. Fadl to the email accounts of entire groups of individuals or jihadist websites in an effort to cause group dissension. These messages can be sent as streaming videos containing clear identification of the speaker, possibly in a collegial or religious setting, in order to dispel disbelief that the message is fraudulent or coerced. Moreover, working in conjunction with foreign governments controlling these jihadist luminaries, messages could be crafted to address specific theological issues, doubts, or questions which intelligence might indicate are important to a targeted group or individual. Even if these messages are believed to be coerced, they may still create the desired affect by initiating discussions on controversial religious or political topics which could lead to group splintering or abandonment of the cause by some individuals. Those individuals who do respond to these messages in a positive manner or who even engage in further dialogue about the subject would be obvious candidates for further investigation as recruitment candidates, possibly using the previously discussed Singaporean or Indonesian methods. In short, theological discourse ensuing from the planting of revisionist seeds could serve to identify those most individuals most receptive to recruitment.

For its concentration on co-opting ideologues, the Egyptian program is to be commended. But, as with the Indonesian approach, it begs the question are these counter-ideological programs are too narrowly focused on incarcerated terrorists?

D.   SAUDI ARABIA—THE BROAD APPROACH

Saudi Arabia's counter-ideological efforts are by far the most ambitious and complete efforts examined in this limited review. This assessment is based in terms of its national scope, purpose, and application of varied approaches. It is certainly a mixed

program, incorporating components similar to those from Indonesia and Singapore, but it far exceeds these programs with respect to the efforts of the Saudi government to reach all residents of the country, not simply individual sympathizers or terrorists, or specific groups such as incarcerated terrorists. According to one ambitious Saudi government statement, they are waging "a program to eradicate the roots of terrorism" (Saudi-US Relations Information Service, 2005). The Saudi counter-terrorism program is composed of three broad areas: Targeting terrorists within the Kingdom for capture or elimination; targeting financial support for terrorism with the Kingdom; and targeting the messengers of terrorism and the recipients of the message (Saudi-US Relations Information Service, 2005).

The third area of this program, targeting the messengers and the recipients, is arguably the most important for the purposes of this thesis as it contains activities not already employed in the U.S. (Saudi-U.S. Relations Information Service, 2008). Within this third step, the Kingdom's counter-ideological program can be further broken down into several areas of focus worthy of discussion: The Central Security Project; Moderating the Imams; and the Al-Sakhinah Project.

1.   The Central Security Project

The Central Security Project is the centerpiece of the Kingdom's counter-ideological program (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008). Whereas Indonesia's program, as well as those of other countries such as Egypt, are focused on hard-core terrorists of the ilk of Imron and Abas (individuals who have participated in deadly attacks), the Kingdom's program prohibits these types of terrorists from participating; it focuses on terrorist sympathizers (Boucek, 2007). The project appears to dismiss violent terrorists as incorrigible.[11] Instead, the Kingdom concentrates its resources on the marginal supporters whom it believes are yet worth saving—those who have not participated in violence (Boucek, 2007). This is a significant departure from other national programs, particularly Indonesia's and Egypt's.

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[11] The Saudis' decision to exclude violent terrorists from their program's efforts may speak to a belief on their part that certain types of terrorists or individuals cannot be reformed. This point is relevant later in this thesis when the issue of Type A and Type B terrorists is discussed.

In the United States, what triggers the labeling of an individual as a "terrorist" or terrorist sympathizer" is most likely to be a judicial or administrative finding of criminal involvement in terrorist activities. The litmus test in Saudi Arabia is primarily ideological. Those holding *takfiri* beliefs, or even caught with *takfiri* propaganda are subject to being labeled as terrorist sympathizers (Boucek, 2007).

By subscribing to the *takfiri* position, a Muslim can declare other Muslims or the state as impious unbelievers who can be killed. This is a necessary ideological prop for jihadists to "legally" kill other Muslims. Noted political scientist Gilles Kepel said the following about *takfir*:

> In Islamic doctrine, this is a very serious accusation, called takfir. The term derives from the work kufr (impiety), and it means that one who is, or claims to be, a Muslim is declared to be impure…For those who interpret Islamic law literally and rigorously, one who is impious to this extent can no longer benefit from the protection of law. According to the consecrated expression, 'his blood is forfeit,' and he is condemned to death. (2002, 31)

Unlike the Indonesia program which uses co-opted terrorists as its primary tools or messengers, the Kingdom's program is based on intense religious and psychological discussions with the terrorist sympathizers. The organizational structure for this purpose is the Advisory Committee, which reports directly to the Ministry of Interior (Boucek, 2007). The Advisory Committee is comprised of Islamic scholars, academics, psychologists, and others. The thrust of the program clearly lies with the Islamic scholars, however, who "re-educate" the sympathizers on Islam and attempt to convince them that they were misled into following false and corrupted practices (Boucek, 2007). One of the key points of the Kingdom's program is the belief that "those who have fallen prey to jihadist influences are victims" (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007).

Sympathizers in the Central Security Project are eventually offered an opportunity to re-integrate into society if they successfully complete the re-education program, which lasts several months. Reminiscent of elements of U.S. drug treatment programs, these sympathizers re-integrate through half-way houses (International Institute for Strategic

Studies, 2007). Currently, the Kingdom has space for about 3,000 people in these half-way houses, but is planning to accommodate 6,700 individuals (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007).

A unique aspect of the re-integration of these sympathizers to society is their continued monitoring, encompassing clear Saudi cultural aspects; "Participants are released into society against guarantees from both their family and tribe, who jointly provide an informal round-the-clock surveillance capability…" (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007). Given the role ascribed by Sageman and others to "Friendship, kinship, and discipleship" (Sageman, 2004, p. 135) in jihadist recruitment, the use of family and tribal affiliations in a positive manner to prevent recidivism seems an enlightened move (unless the family was originally responsible for introducing the sympathizer into the jihadist process).

The U.S. Department of Defense has recognized the value of courting traditional organizational structures, such as tribes, in their fight against the insurgency in Iraq. Saudi Arabia's use of families, clans and tribes to combat recidivism amongst terrorist sympathizers should be carefully followed to determine if traditional Arab patterns of societal organization are effective in dampening terrorism recruitment. Similarly, it would be interesting to know if there is a positive correlation between terrorism recruitment in the U.S. and Western Europe and a breakdown of family, clan, and tribal ties in these locations. As correctly pointed out, the Saudi's use of family and clans to police released sympathizers of the Central Security Project would be difficult to replicate in other countries without a similar societal structure, such as the United States. (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007). Nevertheless, this is just one element of the Central Security Project.

2. Moderating the Imams

The Saudis have attempted to reengineer the ideological message from the Kingdom's *ulema* "to promote what by Saudi standards are moderate interpretations of Islam" (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008). At an official level, there is some recognition of the dangers posed by the imams' backing of violence. For instance,

in 2007, the Saudi Interior Minister publicly stated, "These preachers are more dangerous that the terrorists themselves" (Ottaway, 2006). This part of the Saudi program involves moderating the official religious establishment of the country, but also of former outspoken opponents of the regime, such as Salman al-Ouda and others (Ottaway, 2006). It involves the straightforward idea of moderating religious-backed ideas of hate. For instance, the Saudi *ulema* has issued *fatwas* prohibiting jihad in Iraq, urging caution with money so it does not end-up in the hands of terrorists and stating that suicide bombers are "condemned to eternal suffering in Hell" (Glass & Yeoshua, 2008).

3. The Al-Sakhinah Project

This project is the Saudi effort to address the vexing binary poison of jihadist ideology and the Internet. This aspect of the program is multi-pronged. It involves both a public awareness effort about the dangers of jihadist Internet sites and an effort to shut down these sites. In support of the latter, the Saudis enacted the "Statute for Fighting Information Crime." This law penalizes "anyone who sets-up terrorist websites and/or uses them to communicate with leaders of terrorist organizations, spread terrorist ideology, raise funds for terrorist organizations, or disseminate information on manufacturing explosives" with a ten year prison sentence and $1.3 million dollar fine (Glass & Yeoshua, 2008).

How effective has the Saudi program been? To date, it would be fair to describe the nascent program as a qualified success. At least with regards to the Central Security Project, the Saudi government claims that only 20 percent of those who pass through the program are re-offenders (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008). Also telling is a November 2007 capture in the Kingdom of several terrorist cells which were preparing for attacks, including targeting senior Saudi clerics who were speaking out against the terrorists (Glass & Yeoshua, 2008).

Critics of the Saudi program contend that the Central Security Project fails to change the attitude of terrorist sympathizers and that it simply uses "a combination of pressure and generous financial inducements to persuade individuals to renounce the use of violence inside the kingdom, while ensuring they will be unable to export it

elsewhere" (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008). This criticism may be accurate, but if it nevertheless succeeds in removing terrorist sympathizers from progressing further down the jihadist radicalization process, it may be acceptable, at least as a start.

With respect to practices from the Saudi counter-ideological program, which have potential application in source recruitment, the FBI should consider closely examining individuals holding *takfiri* beliefs. This is not to suggest that FBI investigations be predicated strictly upon First Amendment rights. However, among those individuals who are already under investigation or under consideration for source recruitment based upon other legitimate investigative predications, those holding *takfiri* beliefs should be given additional consideration. For the Saudis, *takfiri* beliefs are clearly a marker of pre-terrorist thinking. The FBI should consider evaluating with Saudi assistance the ideological components of *takfiri* beliefs and its visible identifiers, such as books or *fatwas* written by *takfiri* proponents or other propaganda, as a way to identify *takfiri* believers in the United States. *Takfiri* believers would then form a pool from which the FBI could concentrate its search for potential sources. Likewise, the FBI's understanding of the components of this radical belief system would allow it to enhance the credibility of existing non-*takfiri* sources attempting to infiltrate jihadist groups and the understanding of agents privy to intercepted conversations amongst individuals who might be under consideration for recruitment. The identification of *takfiri*-practicing imams and believers would be a natural task for community leaders under the Singaporean model.

In conclusion, weakening the ideological motivation of individuals who hold promise as recruited sources, by such methods as establishing dependency on the government, using reformed terrorists or ideologues to refute their own ideologies, and using *takfiri* beliefs as a marker of pre-terrorist thinking, is a logical step to a successful recruitment. If, as Sageman argues, social affiliation with the jihad includes "an intensification of beliefs and faith leading to acceptance of the global Salafi jihad

ideology" (Sageman, 2004, p. 135) or as Hassan (2006) argues, motivation is driven by ideology, especially for al-Qaeda, then counter-ideological programs need further consideration for the lessons they hold in recruiting terrorist sources.

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IV.   THREE COMPELLING PSYCHOLOGICAL FINDINGS ABOUT TERRORISTS

> Even today, a primary reason for Western failure in the War on Terror is this same cause: an innate inability to understand the Islamist psyche. (Husain, 2007, 153)

> Ed Husain, former Islamist

What does the extensive body of psychological, sociological, and political science studies of terrorism spanning over 40 years suggest for the reasons why some terrorists are recruitable as intelligence sources? Much of the work in the field of psychology, especially that which was conducted in the 1960-1980's, was often Eurocentric and focused on nationalists and leftists terrorist groups like the Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades, or the IRA. The studies of this period were reflective of the intelligence community's focus on the Soviet/communist threat, not on radical Islamic groups akin to al-Qaeda (Victoroff, 2005).

For both counter-terrorism pundits and practitioners, one must ask if the prior Eurocentric focus in the field of psychology on nationalists and leftists terrorist groups does not present a potential pitfall of "carryover?" Are the results of studies on religiously-inspired groups such as al-Qaeda judged by assessments made from the studies and counter-terrorism experiences against terrorist groups which proceeded al-Qaeda, particularly those that were European and not religiously inspired? (Heider, 1988).

Culture is "A particular form of civilization, esp. the beliefs, customs, arts and institutions of a society at a given time" (Webster, 2008, p. 104). When al-Qaeda is thought of as a culture, in the anthropological sense of the word, or even a sub-set of the broader culture of terrorism, it appears inevitable that many of the same potential problems which plague ethnographical field studies, what has been termed the "Rashomon Effect," are also present in past and current examinations of al-Qaeda. As Karl Heider wrote in *American Anthropologist*:

Most of us first go to the field at young and impressionable ages and our notions of culture (as well as our theories) are often strongly shaped by the first cultures we study… It is surely time to think about these matters [the Rashomon Effect] systematically. With few exceptions anthropologists have lagged behind other scholars, most notably psychologists. (1998, pp. 73-81)

If one strips away some of the non-applicable ethnographical aspects of earlier terrorism studies and concentrates on the widely-accepted psychological commonalities amongst terrorists garnered from these studies in general, this previous body of work still retains its applicability to this discussion on recruiting al-Qaeda sources, with less danger of carry-over. What are these terrorists' commonalities?

While Jeff Victoroff of the Department of Neurology and Psychiatry at the University of Southern California, School of Medicine, warns against looking for a single type of "terrorist mind;" the particular psychological findings to be used in this thesis appear to be universal to all terrorists, regardless of their motivations, ethnicity, or other classifications (2005). An appreciation of these compelling base-line psychological findings, devoid of particular terrorism cultures (i.e. group affiliation), are therefore assessed to be useful as elemental building blocks, constants, and assumptions in the development of a recruitment model targeting al-Qaeda sources.

The first of the three compelling findings about terrorists for the purposes of this paper is that they are not anymore psychologically disturbed or "crazy" than the rest of society as a whole (Horgan, 2003). They are neither psychopaths, nor in other ways mentally disturbed (Borum, 2004). According to Victoroff (2005), Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) is the term now used in place of sociopathy, which, in turn, replaced the term psychopathy. APD is a "pattern of remorseless disregard for the rights of others" (Victoroff, 2005, p. 10.) The difference between the insane and a sociopath, according to Victoroff, is that "a psychotic or 'insane' person is so mentally disordered as to not know right from wrong, while a sociopath knows right from wrong and chooses wrong for selfish reasons without pangs of conscience" (2005, p. 10).

As terrorism expert and forensic psychologist Dr. Randy Borum (2004) noted, "In reality, psychopathology has proven to be, at best, only a modest risk factor for general violence, and all but irrelevant to understanding terrorism." Andrew Silke, a forensic psychologist who has written extensively about counter-terrorism matters similarly remarked, "Many myths surround terrorists and terrorism, but surely one of the most widely held is that terrorists are crazed fanatics…Like many myths, this one is easy to believe yet is almost always completely untrue" (Silke, 2003, p. 29). Other "pioneers" in the psychology of terrorism, such as Martha Crenshaw, are even more direct on this matter. She noted, "…the idea of terrorism as the product of mental disorder or psychopathy has been discredited" (Crenshaw, 1992, p. 30).[12]

The second finding, which may simply be the converse of point one, and the most profound with respect to recruiting terrorists as intelligence sources, is that terrorist are rational actors (Victoroff, 2005). Rational actors exhibit certain behaviors. They seek preferences and consistency in preferences and how they rank them, for instance. They are also aware of their alternatives and choices, can calculate consequences, and can assess the probability of getting their preferences (Tucker, 2007).

The third finding is that no "terrorist profile" or "terrorist personality" has been identified. Some researchers argue more emphatically that a profile does not exist (Victoroff, 2005). Looking for a potential terrorist via a profile or personality, therefore, is fallacious. Dr. Borum, quoting Andrew Silke, made this point in the following manner:

> Silke warns 'the belief that profiling can provide an effective defence also seriously underestimates the intelligence of terrorist organizations' (Silke, 2003). Indeed, sophisticated terrorist groups, such as al Qa'ida, actively seek to know the 'type' of person who will attract suspicion and then scout and use operators who defy that preconception. Al-Qa'ida expert, Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, has documented that the organization recruits members from 74 different countries and among at least 40 different nationalities. If the profile is the gatekeeper of who poses a threat, defenders will be soundly defeated by a known, but unfamiliar-looking enemy. (2004, p. 37)

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[12] "Pioneers" is Borum's description of Crenshaw.

How do these three findings support the development of a cognitive process or model for development of al-Qaeda sources? At the broadest level, the field of psychology has established that terrorists, in general, are approachable as fellow rational actors who can logically discern what is in their self-interest and weigh options affecting their well-being. Even those terrorists who may never agree to cooperate with the FBI will do so from the perspective of being rational actors. Their choice not to cooperate with authorities may ultimately lead to their imprisonment or other negative consequences, for instance, but it is a choice not to cooperate they rationally make, as opposed to having an inability to weigh their options through some psychosis or lack of rationality. Finally, the field of psychology warns against using the fallacy of a terrorist profile as an organizing principle for source recruitment.

V. TWO POSSIBLE FRAMEWORKS FOR RECRUITING AL-QAEDA TERRORISTS

> The response to the individual behavior of terrorists may be linked to differences between emotional and instrumental aggression: "emotional aggression should be less sensitive to objective rewards and punishments, and instrumental aggression more sensitive. (McCauley, 2007, p. 22)

> Psychologist Clark McCauley

Making distinctions between types of terrorists for counterterrorism purposes and not merely academic reasons is already in practice. The Internal Security Department of Singapore, which faces a terrorism threat from the al-Qaeda affiliate Jamah Islamiyah distinguishes between terrorists who were involved in operational activities from those who were involved in missionary or *Dawa* work (Hassan & Pereire, 2006).

In hostage negotiations, typologies used include the "traditional," "contingent," or "instrumental" terrorists, as opposed to the "absolute" terrorists (Zartman, 2003). The traditional terrorists will use hostages to leverage their goals (Zartman, 2003). Violence by the traditional terrorists is contingent. In contrast, the absolute terrorist is one "…whose action is non-instrumentalist, a self-contained act that is completed when it has occurred and is not a means to obtain some other goal…Suiciders—bombers and hijackers—are absolute terrorists, and so are beyond negotiation (Zartman, 2003, p. 2).

Since the negotiator's practice of making distinctions among terrorists at the individual level is already grounded in practical applications, involving the highest stakes, it seems logical to extend the negotiator's practice to the theory of terrorist source recruitment. In a sense, the search for the "right" type of terrorist to recruit (or not recruit) might be thought of as a negotiation for cooperation, as opposed to the relatively ephemeral, contingent cooperation encompassed in negotiations linked to terrorism crises, such as hostage taking or aircraft hijackings.

A.   TYPE A AND B TERRORISTS

One element in the development of a cognitive framework for recruiting terrorist sources of intelligence may be found in the work of Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation. They suggest that terrorists can be usefully categorized as internalists or externalists, or Types A and B (see Figure 1) (Davis & Jenkins, 2002). The Type A terrorists "are all driven by the action and passion itself. Even when they clothe themselves in ostensible political objectives (as does bin Laden), their appetites for action have proven insatiable and they have changed objectives as necessary to continue" (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 11).

Type B terrorists, on the other hand, have "pragmatic world goals" and "will cease terrorism when it is no longer needed" (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 11).   Type B terrorists have succeeded in transitioning from "terrorist" to civilian leaders (Davis & Jenkins, 2002). Type B terrorists "may be equally ruthless and destructive, but they will fade into the 'normal world' when they have achieved their aims" (Davis & Jenkins, 2002).

Figure 1.   Davis and Jenkin's Type A and Type B Terrorists (2002, p. 11)

Davis and Jenkins (2002) claim al-Qaeda is a group or network composed more of Type A terrorists than Type Bs. This can be represented in the form of a Venn diagram, with a larger circle for the Type A terrorists within the al-Qaeda box, as in Figure 2. Expressed another way, the number of "internalists" with "insatiable" goals is larger than those connected to the group with "pragmatic world goals." However, as noted earlier, this should not be seen as a judgment on the rationality of either the Type A or Type Bs. As discussed, terrorists in general, and therefore both Types A and B, are rational actors.

Significantly, for the development of a cognitive recruitment process for al-Qaeda terrorists, "The al-Qaeda system (among others) includes both types, even if al-Qaeda itself is clearly Type A" (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 11). If one were to depict al-Qaeda in a simple Venn diagram as a representation of Type A and Type B members, it might look like the following:

Figure 2.   Al-Qaeda is comprised of both Type A & B terrorists

B.   EMOTIONAL AND INSTRUMENTAL AGGRESSION

But if psychological studies support the position that all terrorists, in general, are rational actors, and Davis and Jenkins' theory also suggests that both Types A and B

terrorists are rational, and that al-Qaeda is comprised of both sets, how does this apparent equality of rationality among terrorists assist in the progression of a source recruitment model? What insight, if any, does this provide to an FBI agent attempting to secure the cooperation of a terrorist knowing that there are two types of terrorists and that all terrorists, in general, are rational?

The work of Davis and Jenkins is supported by work on the two forms of aggression recognized in the field of psychology, these being emotional and instrumental aggression (McCauley, 2007, p. 8). As Clark McCauley notes, "Emotional aggression is associated with anger and does not calculate long-term consequences. The reward of emotional aggression is hurting someone who has hurt you. Instrumental aggression is more calculating—it involves the use of aggression as a means to other ends" (2007, p. 8).

Of course, it is not necessary that the "hurt" experienced in emotional aggression be personal or even physical. This hurt may also be related to perceived insults or frustration. Dr. Fathali Moghaddam supports this point. He wrote the following:

> Osama bin Laden was a millionaire when he masterminded the tragedy of September 11…captured members of Al-Qaeda have tended not to be from the lower economic and educational backgrounds. Indeed, Al Qaeda sympathizers and activist are often from "surprisingly" high economic and educational backgrounds. These facts highlight an important point: terrorism is explained by *perceptions* of deprivation, by *feelings* of being treated unfairly, by a *subjective* sense of injustice, rather than by objective conditions, including poverty and low education. (Moghaddam, 2006, p. 46)

Reformed Islamist Ed Husain, who participated in three separate anti-Western Islamist organizations in the United Kingdom, independently recognized Dr. Moghaddam's point about the subjective sense of injustice versus objective conditions as a basis for terrorism. Among Husain's terrorists associations was Asif Hanif, a British Muslim who died as Britain's first suicide bomber in a Tel Aviv bar in April 2003 (Husain, 2007, pp. 262-263). As Husain noted, Asif Hanif emerged from a middle-class background in the United Kingdom, not from "an unemployed, disenchanted inner-city Muslim community" (2007, p. 264).

Furthermore, perceived injustices cannot be necessarily redressed by improving material conditions as these injustices are relative to perceptions to how one or one's group is doing in comparison to others (Moghaddam, 2006). This may be one explanation for understanding why recruitment approaches based largely on the offering of money in exchange for cooperation are not a panacea to recruitment attempts.

Key to understanding the anger of terrorists is that this anger is perceived through the group's interests, not necessarily on an individual level (McCauley, 2007). As McCauley noted, "Group identification makes sense of sacrifice by people who are not personally frustrated or insulted. The mistake is to imagine that self-sacrifice must come from personal problems, rather than identification with group problems" (McCauley, 2007, p. 17).

Returning then to Davis and Jenkins' work and applying McCauley's thoughts on the two forms of aggression, it is not difficult to now see that of the two terrorist types, the Type B terrorists expresses instrumental aggression, which involves the use of violence as a "means to other ends." When these "other ends" are met, the purpose for continuing terrorism ceases. The Type A terrorists, on the other hand, are clearly fed by emotional anger, which may never be satiated sufficiently to make them cease their activities. There is no "ends" for the Type A terrorists.

Significantly for this thesis, McCauley suggests that the response to the individual behavior of terrorists may be linked to differences between emotional and instrumental aggression: ***"emotional aggression should be less sensitive to objective rewards and punishments, and instrumental aggression more sensitive"*** [bold and italics added] (2007, p. 22). In consequence, Type B terrorists, those influenced by instrumental aggression, should be more approachable to cooperation with the FBI by the types of objective rewards and punishments FBI agents might logically offer during a recruitment attempt. In contrast, the Type A terrorists, with their emotional aggression, should be less sensitive to the positive rewards of cooperating with the FBI or the negative consequences of not cooperating with the FBI.

One proposition in answering "who" should be targeted as an intelligence source thus lies in identifying the Type B terrorists, who although may operate within the context of a Type A organization, such as al-Qaeda, nevertheless approaches the use of violence on an instrumental basis. As Type B terrosits approach to violence through instrumental aggression, their aggression is in support of achieving practical ends which can be relinquished when their ends are met.

In contrast, the Type A terrorists will include individuals who, through the lens of emotional aggression, hold on dogmatically to insatiable goals. They use or support the use of violence, which is probably exaggerated and incongruent with their stated objectives, and whose overriding need is retaliation for perceived injustices to their in-group. If Type As are "driven by action," and emotional aggression, then the rational option for a Type A terrorist, when confronted between the choices of cooperating as a source for the FBI or facing negative consequences such as prison (or even positive incentives), will likely be an unwillingness to cooperate, regardless of the long-term consequences. As one study which reviewed Singapore's terrorist reform program noted, "It could almost be impossible to persuade any hardcore members of terrorist groups to give up their ideology" (Hassan & Pereire, 2006, p. 466). Arguably, what are described as "hardcore" terrorists in this statement might now be better understood as Type A terrorists, who are led by their emotional aggression.

Conversely, Saudi Arabia's reported success with aspects of its counter-ideological program to rehabilitate *takfiri* sympathizers who did not yet commit violence may be partially explained by understanding these individuals as Type Bs. Although a careful study of this matter is required, it may be that the Saudi Arabian program, accidentally or otherwise, identified through the *takfiri* ideological fault-line its society's Type Bs. In turn, these believers of *takfir,* as products of instrumental and not emotional aggression, have responded better to the Saudi counter-ideological program's rewards and punishments to exit from the path of terrorism. In the end, Type A terrorists, although rational, should not respond as well as their Type B counter-parts to the influence of rewards and punishments, which are a pillar of source recruitment.

Returning to the negotiator's terrorist typology, one glimpses the Type A terrorist as that individual with "absolute" and "impossible demands," which are "immediate, unconditional and universal," is "not willing to enter into political discourse" and which make "direct negotiations infeasible" (Hayes, Kaminski, & Beres, 2003, pp. 9-15). Therefore, with one exception to be discussed later, individuals assessed to be Type A terrorists are less suitable as source recruitment candidates because their goals are unlikely to be satisfied by the recruiter and they are less likely to be influenced by "objective rewards and punishments."

According to Davis and Jenkins, "Type A terrorists, by and large, must be eradicated" (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 12). On the other hand, if the aims or elements of the aims of Type B al-Qaeda terrorists are addressed, then it should be possible to reason and negotiate with them. This naturally suggests that any principle for the recruitment of al-Qaeda terrorists should be structured against targeting the more pragmatic Type B who uses or supports violence as an instrument or a means to an end and who are more likely to respond to the types of positive and negative incentives which FBI agents might apply during the recruitment process.

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VI.   THREE CATEGORIES OF TYPE B TERRORISTS

Defining terrorists as Type A or Type B is a good starting point for an organizing principle to broadly assess an individual's recruitment potential. It is encompassing enough to accommodate the heterogeneous nature of terrorists, not established on ethnic or cultural factors (which are broad when speaking of al-Qaeda), yet simple enough to be applicable by FBI agents in the field. As Victoroff noted, "Terrorists are psychologically extremely heterogeneous. Whatever his stated goals and group of identity, every terrorist, like every person, is motivated by his own complex of psychosocial experiences and traits (2005, p. 35). Defining terrorists as Type As or Type Bs also comports with the results in the field of psychology regarding the general rationality of terrorists, the two types of recognized aggression, and it avoids the fallacy of the terrorist profile.

But, is the placement of al-Qaeda terrorists in these two categories actually too narrowly defined to capture all the terrorists connected within this complex group and movement? Is it accurate to suggest that al-Qaeda terrorists are immutably either strictly Type A or Type B sets, or can these terrorists migrate from one type to the other? This author would suggest that there are three categories of Type B al-Qaeda terrorists.

A.   CATEGORY 1: SOLIDLY TYPE B

This category represents a terrorist as previously described by Davis and Jenkins who exhibits Type B characteristics, is influenced by instrumental aggression, and is neither migrating into or out of this category. The solidly Type B terrorist has occupied this category for some time and is stable.

B.   CATEGORY 2: "PROCESSING" FROM TYPE B TO TYPE A

This category represents the Type B terrorist who is migrating to Type A status. An example of this transition might be contained in the life of Paul Hall. In 1997, former United Parcel Service (UPS) employee Paul Hall converted to Islam and adopted the name Hassan Abu-Jihad (Holestege, 2008). He was by the accounts of his associates, an

average man (Holestege, 2008). In 2007, Hassan Abu-Jihad was convicted on terrorism and espionage charges related to passing classified information in 2001 to individuals linked to al-Qaeda while serving as a signalman in the U.S. Navy (Holestege, 2008). Prior to 1997, it seems inconceivable that Abu-Jihad/Hall would be located anywhere within the al-Qaeda box described in Figure 1. By 2001, Hall was arguably somewhere within either the Type B or Type A sets if he is judged simply by his actions of passing classified information to al-Qaeda.

Substantial evidence suggests that becoming a terrorist is a process. As Marc Sageman concluded, the "recruitment" of terrorists into a movement is a social process, "accomplished through friendship, kinship, and discipleship" (Sageman, 2004, p. 135). Sageman provides examples of this process, including Ahmad Ressam and the Hamburg Cell of the 9/11 terrorists, detailing their lives before they were terrorists. These examples make a strong case from their processing from Type B to Type A.

The New York City Police Department, in its analysis of five terrorism cases within the United States, also concluded that "the potential terrorist or group of terrorists begin and progress through a process of radicalization" (Silber & Arvin, 2007, p. 5). In its study, the radicalization process involves four steps: Pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination and jihadization (Silber & Arvin, 2007). This New York City Police Department study also concluded that "All individuals who begin this process do not necessarily pass through all the stages and many, in fact, stop or abandon this process at different points" (Silber & Arvin, 2007, p. 19). Their study represented this process in Figure 3.

Jihadi-Salafi Ideology

ATTACK

Jihadization

Indoctrination

Self-Identification

Pre-Radicalization

Figure 3.　　　NYPD's Four-Step Radicalization Process (Silber & Arvin, 2007, p. 5).

　　　The works of the New York City Police Department and Sageman would therefore support what otherwise seems logical—Type A terrorists are not born or made overnight. They come to exist over time, through a radicalization process. If this is the case, then it would seem logical to assume there is generally a stage at which individuals are Type B before becoming Type A. Applying it to the earlier Venn diagrams, the result is Figure 4.

Al-Qaeda

Type A al-Qaeda

Type B al-Qaeda

B to A

Figure 4.　　　Terrorist Radicalization: Processing from Type B to Type A

Aspects of the Saudi Arabia counter-ideological program discussed earlier might also be examined as potential evidence supporting the argument that individuals can process from Type B to Type A terrorists, as well as from Type B status out of terrorism completely. In particular, the author would posit that the Kingdom's concentration to rehabilitate *takfiri* sympathizers and its program's exclusion of hardened terrorists (those who have committed acts of violence) incorporates logic similar to that supporting the work of Davis and Jenkins. The *takfiri* sympathizers would represent the Type B who must be "suppressed" and offered "inducements" (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 11).[13] These "inducements," such as Saudi financial support, are used to encourage them to forego the path of terrorism with the larger goal that they be re-integrated into society. When successful, this essentially removes these former Type B terrorist sympathizers from the al-Qaeda box surrounding the Venn diagram in Figure 1. Those individuals who have blood on their hands, which the Saudis exclude from their efforts to re-integrate into society, are the Type A terrorists who must be "eradicated, deflected or isolated." (Davis & Jenkins, 2002, p. 11). The fact that the Saudi counter-ideological program exercises its efforts and resources on these *takfiri* sympathizers speaks to an underlying belief that these individuals can be ideologically prevented from moving further down the path of terrorism, or what has been described as migrating from Type B to Type A status.

C.   CATEGORY 3: MIGRATING FROM TYPE A TO TYPE B

The defections of violent al-Qaeda terrorists around the world into cooperative arrangements with their host governments also suggest that there are migrations of Type A terrorists into Type B. The case of Jemaah Islamiah terrorist Ali Imron is instructive on this point (O'Brien, 2007). Although experts can debate whether the JI is formally a part of al-Qaeda or its own actor, the links between JI and al-Qaeda are extensive and well within the boundaries previously established in this paper for what constitutes an al-Qaeda terrorist.

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[13] For purposes of clarity, suppressing and inducing Type Bs are Davis and Jenkin's conclusions; they did not address *takfiri* sympathizers.

On October 12, 2002, JI's bombings at two nightclubs and in front of the U.S. Consulate on the island of Bali killed 202 people and wounded another 209 (Australian Federal Police, 2002). For Australians, who took the brunt of the casualties, the devastation of the Bali Bombings has been referred to as their 9/1 (Australian Federal Police, 2002). Given Imron's key role in these horrific attacks, it would be difficult to image a higher level of knowledge and direct involvement in an attack than Imron's activities in this instance, short of serving as a suicide-bomber.

Using the definitions of Davis and Jenkins to describe a Type A terrorist, Imron could be placed within this set at the time of the attacks as an example of one of the "self driven seekers of action, causes, or religious commitment" (2002, p. 11). It would be difficult to think otherwise how an individual who directly participated in such a murderous attack could be interpreted as a terrorist who didn't need to be "eradicated" (Davis & Jenkins, 2002). Years later, he is now reportedly cooperating with Indonesian authorities from his prison cell to prevent future JI attacks (O'Brien, 2007). As an individual who fit easily into the Type A category at one point, he is now admittedly constantly attempting to persuade others to forgo the option of terrorism and "will never stop asking for forgiveness" from his victims and their families (O'Brien, 2007). It is now difficult to see how he is not classified as a Type B terrorist, if not somewhere even outside of the Type B set entirely. It appears with Imron that this arguably former Type A al-Qaeda terrorist is cooperating with authorities and is exhibiting Type B pragmatic behavior which reflects prioritization of his own self-interests above his former group's interests and which has led to cooperation with the authorities. Imron could just as easily have refused to cooperate with authorities at any level, despite any inducements, benefits or threats. At some point in time and for reasons which can only be guessed at without more details, Imron's pragmatic view of his situation made him migrate from the Type A set to or through the Type B set, as reflected in Figure 2.

A similar story occurs with former top JI commander, Nasir Abas (O'Brien, 2007). Abas is a former JI cell leader with authority over parts of northern Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (O'Brien, 2007). He was also employed with JI as the commander of its Hudaibiyah training camp, where he trained hundreds of fellow

terrorists (O'Brien, 2007). Nasir Abas is a weapons specialist and is the brother-in-law of Mukhlas Abas, the alleged mastermind of the October 2002 Bali bombings (O'Brien, 2007). Nasir Abas' sensitive organizational positions and immediate familial ties to another violent, top terrorist would provide exceptional intelligence on JI's membership and activities and might be interpreted as a sign that he is a Type A al-Qaeda terrorist. Unlike Imron, however, Nasir Abas was arrested only on a minor immigration infraction and spent just 10 months in prison (O'Brien, 2007). This is hardly the type of lengthy imprisonment Imron received or what one would expect would be conducive for cooperation of an individual with such impeccable terrorist credentials. Yet, like Imron he is assisting authorities in de-radicalization of members of his former terrorist group (O'Brien, 2007).

U.S. terrorism expert, Zachary Abuza, who is following the radicalization of JI members in Indonesia, noted that of the more than 300 JI terrorist arrested, 50 members or approximately 17 percent come from the JI's leadership. Of the 50 or so terrorists captured from the JI leadership, approximately 30 individuals (60 percent) have been rehabilitated (O'Brien, 2007). A key to this remarkable turnaround is the authorities' use of Nasir Abas to first speak with detained terrorists before they are interrogated by the police (O'Brien, 2007).

Is this migration of perceived Type A terrorist to Type B, as exemplified with the JI terrorists, replicable outside of the JI example? The answer appears to be yes. Omar Ashour, a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at McGill University in Canada, observed that "The phenomenon of 'de-radicalization' is not only confined to Egyptian militants. It has also been undertaken by Algerian, Saudi, Yemeni, Jordanian, Tajik, Malaysian, and Indonesian armed Islamist movements, factions and individuals" (Ashour, 2008, p. 1).

What this information suggests is that becoming a Type A terrorist is not an irreversible process for all Type As. An individual once in this category, can still become more pragmatic and migrate back to the Type B set, where he is presumably more likely to be successfully recruited. This important shift must be accompanied by a shift in aggression from emotional to instrumental. This migration from Type A back to Type B

can be reflected in the Venn diagram of Figure 5. This information also suggests that if a Type A terrorist must be the target of a source recruitment, a counter-ideological effort tailored against that individual aiming to destabilize his ideological motivation and lessen his emotional aggression should be conducted prior to the recruitment approach.

Figure 5.　　　Migrating from Type A to Type B

Returning now to Davis and Jenkins' work as a possible organizing principle for initially assessing an individual's recruitment potential, one sees that any cognitive process or model for the recruitment of al-Qaeda terrorists should encompass several categories of Type B individuals.

In Category 1, the focus is on recruitment of those individuals assessed to fall solidly within the Type B set. Individuals in this set may have been involved with al-Qaeda for years, but are unlikely to migrate to becoming Type A terrorists. In Category 2 (Figure 4), there are those individuals who should be considered for recruitment who are still within the Type B set, but who may be in danger of moving towards the Type A set if the radicalization process discussed by Sageman and the New York Police Department study is allowed to continue. This process may lead to Type A terrorists if the process is neither internally rejected, abandoned, nor externally disrupted. Approaching these individuals as potential intelligence sources is one possible method for externally short-

circuiting completion of this process. And finally, in Category 3 (Figure 5), a focus on recruitment should include those individuals who were at some point (possibly incorrectly), assessed to be Type A terrorists, such as Ali Imron, Nasir Abas, and Dr. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, but who are migrating back to the Type B set.   All three categories of Type B terrorists are represented in Figure 6.

Figure 6.   The Three Categories of Type B Terrorists

VII. ONE EXPLANATION FOR RECRUITMENT FAILURES OF THE RIGHT TERRORISTS: CORRESPONDENT INFERENCE THEORY

The findings of several decades of psychological studies speak of terrorists as rational actors. But how does this compare with what is known about these terrorists from their behavior, specifically their violent attacks, which often appear so devoid of rational thinking? How, after all, is beheading an individual the action of a rational actor? Mark Lilla summed-up this apparent contradiction in his September 2007 editorial to *The New York Times*. He wrote:

> Islamists, even if they are learned professionals, appear to us primarily as frustrated, irrational representatives of frustrated, irrational societies, nothing more…The case of contemporary Islam is on everyone's mind, yet is so suffused with anger and ignorance as to be paralyzing. All we hear are alien sounds, motivating unspeakable acts. (Lilla, 2007)[14]

Insight on the anecdotal disparity between the psychological studies supporting the rationality of terrorists and their irrational actions may be found in an appreciation of Correspondent Inference Theory (CIP).

Doctoral candidate Max Abrahm's article, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," discussed how Correspondent Inference Theory "explains the cognitive process by which an observer infers the motives of an actor" (2006, pp. 57-58). According to Abrahm, (2006) CIP was developed by social psychologist Edward Jones who, in turn, built upon the work of the father of attributional theory, Fritz Heider:

> Heider saw individuals as "naïve psychologists" motivated by a practical concern: a need to simplify, comprehend, and predict the motives of others. Heider postulated that individuals process information by applying inferential rules that shape their response to behavior. In laboratory experiments, he found that people attribute the behavior of others to inherent characteristics of their personality—or dispositions—rather than to external or situational factors. Correspondent inference theory attempted to resolve a crucial question that Heider left unanswered: How does an observer infer the motives of an actor based on its behavior? Jones

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[14] Mark Lilla is a professor of humanities at Columbia University.

showed that observers tend to interpret an actor's objective in terms of the consequence of the action [underscore added]. He offered the following simple example to illustrate the observer's assumption of similarity between the effect and objective of an actor: a boy notices his mother close the door, and the room becomes less noisy; the correspondent inference is that she wanted quiet. The essential point is what Jones called the "attribute-effect linkage," whereby the objectives of the actor are presumed to be encoded in the outcome of the behavior. Levels of correspondence describe the extent to which the objectives of the actor are believed to be reflected in the effects of the action. When an action has high correspondence, the observer infers the objectives of the actor directly from the consequences of the action. With low correspondence, the observer either does not perceive the behavior as intentional or attributes it to external factors, rather than to the actor's disposition. (Abrams, 2006, p. 58)

CIP explains several factors which may negatively impact al-Qaeda source recruitment, even when the right Type B terrorist is available and targeted. First, CIP may interfere with the acceptance of recruitment as a viable option amongst a range of counter-terrorism options. Expressed another way, CIP provides a rationale for the reluctance and doubts some FBI agents, FBI non-agent personnel making policy decisions, prosecutors, and other policy makers have regarding the practicality of attempting to recruit an individual known as an al-Qaeda member or suspected group associate. If an individual is assessed by the effects of their actions to be a zealot, radical, or beyond the reach of reasoning, the option for attempting to recruit that individual is less attractive than other options, such as his arrest and incarceration, which might be regarded as a form of "eradication."

Second, CIP provides an understanding for the cognitive difficulties in discerning the differences between Type A and B terrorists, which is significant when considering that the three categories of Type B terrorists form the best recruitment pool. As an example, if al-Qaeda, "the group," is responsible for horrendous attacks on civilians and grizzly acts of barbarity such as beheadings, arguably acts of high correspondence, then the perception to counter-terrorism professionals of the consequences of these actions may be that anyone involved with this group, even if they did not participate in these acts, must subscribe to this behavior.

Conversely, CIP might also provide an understanding for how potential al-Qaeda sources, even Type B, might incorrectly interpret the actions of a recruiting FBI agent as threatening and designed to incarcerate them or worse. This may limit their ability to see their own cooperation as a real possibility. Whether CIP affects the perceptions of the agent or source candidate to correctly assess the rationality or intentions of the other player, it is an impediment to successful source recruitment.

Although al-Qaeda is comprised of both Type A and B, a review of media sources will confirm that it is the "group" which receives the credit for a terrorist act taken or claimed in its name. Even when attacks are more closely ascribed to individual actors within the group, like Usama Bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, those individuals had, arguably, already become icons of the group. And, although the group may not sanction the particular attacks or actions of subordinates, and when elements or individuals within the group might disagree with an attack, these distinctions are generally transparent to the public. It is "al-Qaeda" which is responsible for a barbarous attack. For instance, seized documentation in Iraq discussed how al-Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri recognized that al-Qaeda in Iraq's beheadings were negatively affecting their reputation with the indigenous Iraqi Sunnis, presumably their largest pool of potential supporters (Shapiro, 2008). As "al-Qaeda" is known to be responsible for particularly "spectacular," cruel and wanton attacks, which often appear to be irrational outside of the calculus of committing mass murder of non-combatants, CIP provides an explanation for why observers, including those involved in recruiting sources, infer that the "group's" attacks or actions reflect the intentions and beliefs of its individual members. Even for agents accustomed to working counter-terrorism matters, it is hard not to infer that an individual al-Qaeda member's objectives are not supportive of the "group's" actions to destroy Western civilization, particularly when al-Qaeda's actions are memorialized in powerful images such as commercial aircraft being flown into skyscrapers. Victoroff made a similar, albeit non-CIP argument, for one reason why studying terrorism is difficult: "in both the scholarly and counterterrorism realms, one must acknowledge the possibility that terrorism excites passions that erode logical discourse, leading to responses that are reactive and enraged rather than proactive and

analytical (Zulaika and Douglass 1996)" (Victoroff, 2005, p. 33). When FBI agents and others investigate suspected "al-Qaeda" members, these members are seen as a cohesive part of the group whose leaders called upon Muslims in the name of Allah to "kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it" (Laquer, 2004, p. 412). They are certainly not seen as individual actors, some of whom are more pliable Type Bs with instrumental aggression.

The terrorists, on the other hand, do not see their behavior as irrational, immoral, or anti-social. Jeff Victoroff believes that it is plausible that terrorists view themselves in a very positive light, "believing themselves to be serving society and judged by their in-group to be acting in its interest" (2005, p. 14).

The problem with lumping terrorists together as noted by Princeton's Shapiro, is that "members of terrorist groups…often disagree on what the cause is, and rarely see eye-to-eye on the best tactics to achieve their strategic end" (Shapiro, 2008, p. 10) This is true even within al-Qaeda, where Abu Musab al-Zarqawi gained the moniker *al Gharib* (the stranger) for his "extreme views," as well as a letter rebuking his strategy by Ayman Al-Zawahiri (Reidel, 2007).

CIP theory suggests that FBI agents working recruitments of al-Qaeda sources must, therefore, consciously work to make the distinctions which the public, including the media, does not. They must attempt to discern a potential al-Qaeda source's objectives by his individual behavior and not infer the individual's objectives through the behavior of the collective al-Qaeda group.

Jeff Viktoroff essentially concluded the same thing. He said:

While behavioral scientists may recognize marked psychological heterogeneity and even prosocial features of terrorists that might be exploited in the development of policy, counterterrorism forces and even policy makers may resist such conclusions due to cultural bias, cognitive inflexibility, or attribution error. (Victoroff, 2005, p. 35)

It is an agent's sensitivity to detecting when a disagreement or strain that might exist between the prospective recruitment candidate and his affiliated group which is one suggested method to identify Type A terrosits possibly migrating to Type B categories.

Referring again to CIP, what the potential recruitment candidate might infer from the approach of an FBI agent is what he knows of the "FBI's" involvement in arresting and prosecuting terrorists. Or, worse yet, his experience with "law enforcement" may be shaped with direct or personal brutal encounters with other police and intelligence services or with indirect experiences of such encounters by others within his in-group.

In other words, just as agents may mistakenly infer that a potential source's ability to be recruited is unlikely because of his association with a group which commits such horrendous attacks, the recruitment candidate is just as likely to incorrectly attribute an agent's interest in him through the image of the "FBI's" collective behavior of arresting and prosecuting criminals, or group perceptions such as perceived unjust arrests of Muslims. These perceptions on the part of the prospective source can be a serious hindrance to the recruiting agent's establishment of trust with the source candidate.

The difficulty in establishing trust between a recruiter and a source candidate as explained by Correspondent Inference Theory, therefore, can be tied to the need for several earlier recommendations for source recruitment. First, recruitment efforts should be concentrated on Type B candidates who are more likely to be influenced by positive and negative inducements. Second, agents might consider using a trusted intermediary in some capacity to facilitate the recruiting agent's introduction or offer. This intermediary could be someone recognized by the source candidate as being affiliated with the in-group, such as a jihadist luminary or ideologue, whose motives or objectives are less likely to be inferred incorrectly by the source candidate. Third, agents should consider attempting to soften the ideological resolve of the source candidate before ever attempting to make contact. This can be accomplished by sowing the seeds of ideological dissension with the introduction of materials produced by former respected ideologues and terrorists which confront his ideology and motivation. And fourth, if possible, the agent conducting the recruitment may consider attempting to have several instances of incidental contact over an extended period of time with the source candidate wherein no negative action ensues, as a way to dispel or soften perceptions that the agent's motives are inherently harmful. This incidental contact could occur in neutral locations such as schools, grocery stores, or even the subject's business.

Oddly enough, it appears the avoidance of CIP must be accomplished through acceptance of a contradiction. Avoiding the pitfalls of CIP and identifying the potential Type B individuals within a Type A organization requires focus on individual behavior and not group behavior in order to infer individual motives. In short, a source candidate's individual behavior should suggest his classification as a Type A or B terrorist. Yet, as noted earlier by McCauley and Moghadam and the observation of Husain, it is group identification and subjective perceptions of frustration of how one's group does relative to others, not necessarily personal issues, which helps explain the weak causality between those joining terrorist groups and low socio-economic conditions.

To summarize this section, in order for terrorists to be judged properly as Type A or B's their assessment must be based on the consequences of their individual behaviors, not by the consequences of their group's actions. But the frustration of terrorists, their perceptions of injustices which must be righted or revenged, must be understood at the group level and not necessarily at the individual level.

Clausewitz famously wrote of the friction or fog of war, "This tremendous friction, which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured…One, for example, is the weather. *Fog can prevent the enemy from being seen in time*[italics added]…" (As cited in Paret, 1986, pp. 22-203) In the effort to recruit al-Qaeda sources, CIP may be the fog.

VIII. DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN TYPE A AND B TERRORISTS

> Murphy (2004)…emphasizes that an important vulnerability of terrorists is not the technical wizardry of intelligence services but rather that fact that terrorists always depend on others—other members of their group, members of allied groups, the societies in which they live and operate, family, friends, acquaintances—and are therefore open to attack via the social networks that sustain them. (Bongar, 2007, p. 8)

Psychologist Bruce Bongar

Recapping key points of this paper to this point, the work of Davis and Jenkins led them to conclude that al-Qaeda is comprised of both the action-oriented Type A and the more pragmatic Type B terrorists. Studies in the field of psychology have also led to the generally accepted principles that terrorists are, as a whole, not crazed madmen but rather rational actors. Furthermore, no terrorist profile exists. As rational actors, terrorists are capable of making decisions calculated to be in their best interests. This is a necessary and important faculty when a terrorist is placed in the position of selecting among contrasting positive and negative consequences stemming from an FBI recruitment approach. The Type B, however, is more likely to employ terrorism as a "means to an end" which can be discarded when appropriate; their aggression is instrumental or intended to bring about a specific end. When these ends are met, the purpose for continuing terrorism ceases.

The action-oriented Type A terrorists are less likely to compromise as their goals are "insatiable," or possibly simply an excuse for actions motivated by other factors, which are fed by emotional aggression. There is no "ends" for the dedicated Type A terrorists. The Type A terrorist who does not slip into the Type B set will continue his path until he is either jailed or killed. The Type Bs are divided into three sets: 1) The solidly Type B; 2) Those individuals advancing along the jihadi-radicalization process from Type B to Type A and; 3) The Type A who is slipping or slipped into the Type B set.

Psychologist Clark McCauley suggests that the response to the individual behavior of terrorists may be linked to differences between emotional and instrumental aggression: "emotional aggression should be less sensitive to objective rewards and punishments, and instrumental aggression more sensitive" (McCauley, 2007, p. 22). In consequence, Type B terrorists, those influenced by instrumental aggression, should be more approachable to the idea of cooperation with the FBI via their sensitivity to objective rewards and punishments. Of both Type A and Type B terrorists, it is the Type B which is the best candidate for source recruitment.

Accounting for the possible confusion described in Correspondent Inference Theory (CIP), in which the source candidate may incorrectly infer the recruitment attempt by the behaviors of the FBI as a trap to arrest them or worse, the Type B terrorist should be more influenced than their Type A counter-parts to the objective rewards and punishments of cooperation as an intelligence source. But, as Dr. Fathali Moghaddam warns, these objective rewards offered as inducements for cooperation, even to Type B terrorists, cannot always be comprised of financial or material offerings: "terrorism is explained by *perceptions* of deprivation, by *feelings* of being treated unfairly, by a *subjective* sense of injustice, rather than by objective conditions, including poverty and low education" (2006, p. 46). McCauley (2007) touches on a related point when he counsels that perceived injustices cannot be redressed necessarily by improving material conditions as these injustices are relative to perceptions to how one or one's group is doing in comparison to others. In consequence, it is not only important to select a Type B terrorist as the recruitment candidate, but also to offer objective rewards and punishments which address (as much as possible), the subject's *perceptions*, *feelings* and "*subjective* sense of injustice" (Moghaddam, 2006, p. 46).

As a consequence of the above, it has been proposed that the "who" of al-Qaeda source recruitment lies in concentrating efforts on the Type B terrorists. The thesis will now turn the discussion to "where" to look for Type B and "How" to distinguish the Type B terrorists from the solidly Type A terrorists, who are less recruitable.

A.   RISK AND COMMITMENT

What drives an individual to live a stressful, clandestine life as a member of a terrorist organization? (Ansary, 2009, p. 5). Although the New York City Police Department's study of the four-stage radicalization process provides a convincing model, it begs the question why some individuals progress further down the path of radicalization to involvement in armed attacks and even suicide missions, while others regulate their involvement to participation along the fringes of the group. Assuming that two individuals have exactly the same exposure to the elements of the four-stage process and share Sageman's (2004) factors of friendship, kinship, discipleship, and even the same link to the jihad, what factors explain why certain individuals fall short of full commitment to terrorism expressed through violent acts? How can some individuals who are connected or have access to Type A terrorists and who remain immersed for years in a culture glorifying heroic martyrdom and even participate at some level in the support structure of al-Qaeda not progress completely through all four stages of radicalization? Others, it would seem, are swept-up in a relatively short period of time to deadly actions. Still others reverse course, moving from Type A to Type B status. These questions speak to the differences between Type A terrorists and the three variations of Type B terrorists.

The answers to such complex questions are also likely to be complex and multifaceted. However, one possible explanation worth serious consideration is available in the theory of Princeton's Dr. Jacob Shapiro (2008) involving the positive correlation between the willingness of terrorists to accept risks and their ideological commitment. In addition to the work of Davis and Jenkins and Clark McCauley's insights on differentiating between the two forms of aggression, Shapiro's work can also be interpreted to shed insight on the "who" of terrorism recruitment, but also the "where."

Shapiro writes, "Substantial evidence indicates that members of terrorist groups are not uniformly motivated by the cause, are not equally willing to sacrifice for the cause, often disagree on what the cause is, and rarely see eye-to-eye on the best tactics to achieve their strategic end" (Shapiro, 2008, p. 10). In essence, there is a disparity in the preferences between the leaders and middlemen in a terrorist organization, which is

reflected in the variance of their commitment (Shapiro, 2008). Shapiro (2008) believes this ensures that the most ideologically committed, what the author would argue are the Type A, are most likely to volunteer for the most dangerous missions (Shapiro, 2005). While the less committed, what the author would argue corresponds to the Type B, survive within the organization longer because they employ themselves in less risky manners. As Dr. Shapiro said:

> Terrorist groups face two adverse selection problems. The first is that those likely to survive long in terrorist networks tend to be less ideologically committed as they are less likely to volunteer for the most dangerous missions. The second is that because participation as a financier or logistician is less risky than participating as a local leader or operator, middlemen in terrorist organizations will tend to be less committed. (2008, 5)

By this convincing logic, the most ideologically committed individuals will progress further through the four-stages of radicalization and gravitate to those positions within their organization attached to the highest risks. Risk implies they have the greatest chances of being pursued, captured, or targeted for elimination by counter-terrorism forces. As their commitment to an ideology wanes, this also provides at least one explanation for the migration of former Type A to Type B terroists. Friedrich Nietzsche might have described the more committed terrorists as "the ambitious" (as cited in Kaufmann & Hollingdale, 1967). These were "other men who want power even accompanied by obvious disadvantages and sacrifices in happiness and well-being" (Nietzsche as cited in Kaufmann & Hollingdale, 1967), such as the stress of a clandestine life and attachment to the most dangerous jobs with the greatest risk of lengthy imprisonment or death.

The higher, risk-inclined organizational positions occupied by these ambitious terrorists would obviously include those directly involved in the conduct of deadly attacks. The ideological commitment of these particular terrorists is readily inherent in the knowledge of their fate should they be captured or identified as targets for

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government elimination. Examples of the positions owned by the more committed terrorists include the leadership posts, bomb makers, and members of a group's armed faction.

Fulfillment of these higher-risk positions, in which arrest or death is a daily possibility, may only help to further reinforce ideological commitment and group-think through the affects of mortality salience. As political scientist Dr. Rose McDermott and world renowned psychologist Dr. Philip Zimbardo state, "…human behavior is significantly affected by anything that makes people aware of their own potential death or sensitizes them to their mortality" (McDermott & Zimardo, 2007, p. 363). One of the results of this sensitization is reinforcement of existing worldviews. As McDermott and Zimbardo report:

> When mortality is made salient, people find others who conform to their own worldview to be more attractive, while judging those who threaten their worldview to be less so (Greenberg et al., 1990). In particular, subjects evaluate those who praise their cultural worldview especially positively and assess those who criticize it especially negatively. (2007, p. 363)

Not only does mortality salience increase group-think and increase negative perceptions of those holding non-conforming worldviews, but it also "induces a preferential search for confirmatory evidence" and affects aggression (McDermott & Zimardo, 2007, p. 365). Dr's McDermott and Zimbardo (2007, p 364) also note that "Subjects whose mortality is made salient show increased aggression toward those who threaten their worldview." This suggests that those holding the most risk-prone positions within a terrorist group receive the benefit (or curse) of ideological confirmation—yet another reason why the Type A terrorists are less likely to be successfully recruited.

A logical inference in Shapiro's theory on risk and ideological commitment is that a positive correlation exists between an increased ideological commitment and the willingness of certain terrorists to discard their anonymity and accept the greater risks of public self-identification and confirmation of their terrorist associations. Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri are obvious examples of this commitment, but are certainly not the only examples of this behavior.

Conversely, the less committed terrorists therefore are more likely to be involved in risky, albeit far less dangerous, support functions. This answers the question of "where" to look for the Type B terrorists. The Type B is to be located in the support elements of the organization, befitting their comparatively lower levels of risk and commitment. Shapiro (2008) noted that these less risky positions include financiers or logisticians. The author would add to the list such diverse jobs as media and propaganda personnel, political-front members, recruiters, and especially individuals in *dawa* elements of an organization engaged in charitable enterprises. Whether a terrorist group resembles a more traditional hierarchical business model or a more dispersed, flatter, less top-down command structure, it makes sense that the less committed terrorists are more likely to be near the safer edges of the organization rather than at its dangerous core.

According to Steve Ressler (2006), "The basis of social network analysis (also known as network science or network sociology) is that individual nodes (which, depending on the type of network, can be people, events, etc.) are connected by complex yet understandable relationships that form networks. These networks are ubiquitous, with an underlying order and simple laws. Networks form the structural basis of many natural events, organizations, and social processes." Dr. Gordon Woo, who has applied social network analysis to the study of terrorist groups, has drawn conclusions from his work which complements Shapiro's logic and provides further support for targeting the Type B terrorists. Woo argues that the individuals furthest from the hub of a terrorist network are more vulnerable and accessible: "Furthermore, it may be easier to detain and get information about a person more at the periphery of a terrorist organization, than from someone at a hub, who has extra identity protection and is more security-conscious" (Woo, 2008, p. 7).

Arguably, one counter-reason for not concentrating recruitment efforts on the Type B individuals at the periphery of al-Qaeda would be a belief that they are not as informed of the details of specific plots as the Type A individuals involved in planning violent actions, such as the professional cadre of al-Qaeda Central. But the recruitment of Type B terrorists on the periphery of the group is still a valuable exercise which can lead to the identification of the professional cadre and the Type As who must be eradicated.

Furthermore, al-Qaeda's support functions cannot be assumed to be staffed exclusively by Type B terrorists. Al-Qaeda's Benevolence International Fund, an alleged humanitarian relief organization which operated in the United States and elsewhere, for instance, was used as cover by several al-Qaeda terrorists for travel and obtaining identification documentation. (Burr & Collins, 2006, p. 268). There is certainly nothing that would preclude a Type A terrorist with involvement in the preparation of acts of terrorism from being employed full-time in an al-Qaeda-associated business, including an alleged humanitarian organization on the periphery of the group. Examples within other Sunni terrorist groups of Type A terrorists obtaining cover as employees of humanitarian organizations while being simultaneously involved in terrorist attacks are known.

The HAMAS cases of Jamal Abd al-Shamal Abu Hija and Ibrahim Hassan Ali Jaber are particularly instructive on this point. By day, Abu Hija and Jaber appeared to be members of HAMAS' ubiquitous *dawa* structure, as evidenced by their employment on the Jenin Charitable Committee. Furthermore, Abu Hija was a supervisor for a Koran memorization center (Levitt, 2006, p. 96). But according to Israeli authorities, Abu Hija headed groups which forwarded suicide bombers into Israel, while Jaber "was involved in planning attacks, transporting explosive devices, giving military training and possessing weapons" (Levitt, 2006, p. 96). As Nietzsche noted, "One should be aware of assessing the value of a man according to a single deed" (As cited in Kaufmann & Hollindale, 1967, p. 392.)

Ironically, although the more risk-inclined individuals are also eventually more likely to be publicly identified as terrorists through their activities, notoriety, and public statements, they are by the necessity of security also more insulated, more likely to live clandestine lives and the most difficult to find and access. The paragon example is Usama Bin Ladin. As the most wanted terrorist on the planet with an incredible bounty on his head, he nevertheless regularly addresses the world through public announcements while being able to remain concealed. Consequently, these risk-inclined terrorists are less likely to be accessible for source recruitment, in addition to the other drawbacks they bring to source recruitment as probable Type A terrorists. Paul Pillar of the Brookings Institute succinctly noted the problem this way:

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Those who are closest to the center of decision making in a group (and thus most likely to be witting of all its operations) are the ones least likely to betray it and thus most resistant to recruitment as intelligence sources.

Besides this problem of motivation, any attempt to recruit such individuals also faces a problem of access—of getting to them and cultivating relationships with them. (2001, p. 111)

B.   LESSONS FROM THE MADRID TRAIN BOMBINGS

Research accomplished on the terrorist network which conducted the March 11, 2004 bombings of the Madrid trains uncovered some interesting points with applicability for differentiating Type A and Type B terrorists. For researchers Javier Jordan, Fernando Manas and Nicola Horsburgh (2008), the terrorists involved in the Madrid bombings are part of the "grass root jihadist network," or GJN. They defined the GJN as follows:

A group of individuals that accept the strategic objectives (top-level goals and aims) of the Global Jihad Movement and attempt to contribute to these from their country of residence. The leaders and members of a GJN do not belong formally to the hierarchical structure of Al Qaeda or other associated GJMV [Global Jihad Movement] organizations, although generally they might have links to members of these organizations. (Jordan, Manas, Horsburgh, 2008, p. 18)

This definition of GJN corresponds to a combination of Hoffman's al-Qaeda locals and al-Qaeda network. The Madrid GJN included 45 individuals by the standards of the researchers, who narrowed substantially the total number of persons associated with the GJN to focus only on those persons who "presumably participated or collaborated in the bombings" (Jordan et al., 2008). The vast majority of these 45 individuals had no connections to al-Qaeda or other recognized terrorist groups (Jordan et al., 2008). This fact alone should serve as a warning to investigating agents not to narrowly target either their investigations or source candidates strictly to those individuals with established links to al-Qaeda. However, there were several links amongst a few individuals to terrorists in al-Qaeda and other recognizable terrorist groups within the GJMV (Jordan et al., 2008).

Significantly, amongst the Madrid GJN, the researchers determined through a study of the employment characteristics of these 45 individuals that there existed "part-time militant jihadism" and "full-time militant jihadism" (Jordan et al., 2008, p. 22). These two characterizations correspond well with the Type B and Type A terrorist sets, respectively, as well as the discussion on risk and commitment.

The part-time jihadists were unremarkable in their daily lives. (Jordan et al., 2008). Echoing what Jacob Shapiro noted about risk and commitment, the researchers of the Madrid GJN noted that the "commitment" of the part-time jihadists "was principally based on attendance to meetings, discussing the *Jihad*; frequent contact with members of the group; or illicit funding activities" (Jordan et al., 2008, p. 22). Indeed, many of these activities would be difficult to prosecute in most Western-style democracies, which was a problem noted by the authors (Jordan et al., 2008). Aside from some illicit criminal activities, the part-time jihadists remained engaged in society. They may have had one foot in the culture of jihad, but the practical side of these individuals kept them rooted to their jobs as well and limited the extent of their involvement to what can only be described as peripheral activities.

In contrast, the full-time jihadists within this GJN comprised a smaller number of the total of 45 individuals. The full-time jihadists were characterized as the "leaders and seriously committed" (Jordan et al., 2008). Some of these individuals quit their jobs before the attack and subsisted on money provided by others within the GJN, as well as money garnered mostly from petty crime (Jordan et al., 2008). In this description, one can see the Type B terrorist severing his practical ties to society, dedicating himself to his cause, and moving into the Type A set. And, as a matter of practical necessity, these full-time, Type As survive, in part, from donations provided by their part-time, Type B counterparts.

Could the preservation of employment by the part-time jihadists be viewed as essentially an unwillingness to detach themselves from their host society and existing life style? If so, is it also possible that this unwillingness to go the next step and quit their employment, unlike the full-time jihadists, is an attempt to retain a symbolic grip on their

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unremarkable lives, to which they would retreat from terrorism if given the assistance to gracefully extricate themselves from the network? These seem wholly plausible possibilities when considering two facts about these GJN's.

First, contrary to the image or characterization of these terrorists as maladjusted immigrant youths with little attachment to their host society and without hope for a future, the researchers found that social marginalization was not a major determinant in adherence to militant jihadism (Jordan et al., 2008). This seems consistent with what was noted earlier by both Dr. Moghaddam and Dr. McCauley regarding perceptions, feelings, and the subjective determination of injustice and the measurement of grievances based on how well one's group, such as the Islamic community or *ummah*, does in comparison to others. In order for these terrorists involved in the Madrid train bombings to be embroiled in these attacks, it is not necessary that they be personally marginalized by society.

As one measure of social integration, the 45 terrorists in the Madrid GJN were split almost 50 percent in terms of being married, with many having large families (Jordan et al., 2008). The evidence of social integration was actually noted by researchers of the Madrid GJN as a surprising characteristic of this network. Therefore, if many of these socially integrated terrorists were only participating on the fringes of the network as part-time jihadists, were not socially marginalized, and were unwilling to sever their unemployment, then it seems difficult to argue that they could not be returned to their pre-jihad lives given the influence of rewards and punishments matched to their needs or fears.

The second point involves the nature of how one joins a GJN, which matches well with Sageman's earlier insights. Researchers cited several examples of strong social bonds amongst this network including childhood friendships, siblings and relationships through marriage (Jordan et al., 2008). When one couples the importance of "friendship, kinship and discipleship" (Sageman, 2004) with the fact that many of the Madrid GJN were socially integrated, part-time jihadists who maintained their employment and participated only on the fringes of the network, what emerges is a picture of some

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individuals within the GJN who are ideologically uncommitted or under-committed. They might arguably have been swept along in the network's activities by the strength of their social bonds.

An important point from the Madrid GJN is that while some of these uncommitted, fringe participants may have contributed little to the bombings, as participants within this group they nevertheless had access to intelligence through their inclusion in discussions and contacts with other part-time and full-time jihadists. This makes them valuable potential intelligence sources.

Operationally speaking, it seems it would have made more sense for these full-time jihadists to maintain their employment, if only for the sake of cover and for a more reliable, less risky source of funds for their jihad. This possibly rash behavior might reasonably be interpreted not only as a personal act of devotion or ideological commitment, but also as a public signal to their fellow GJN members of their seriousness and intent. Like Cortez burning his ships on the beach so that his fellow conquistadors had to march forward, the full-time jihadists in this GJN symbolically, at least, also signaled that their only course was forward when they turned their back on their host society by terminating their employment. At least within the Madrid grass-roots jihad network then, differentiating between the Type A and B terrorists appears to be measureable by the "commitment" of these terrorists to partially or fully commit themselves to their jihad.

C.   SOCIAL INTENSITY SYNDROME (SIS)

Recently, psychologist Dr. Philip Zimbardo conceptualized a series of male-oriented behaviors he calls Social Intensity Syndrome (SIS) (Zimbardo, 2008). This emergent work may have practical applications for terrorist source recruitment. Some possibilities of SIS application include differentiating between Type A and B al-Qaeda terrorists, providing further insight into the psychological and social forces which support terrorist recruitment and in determining which terrorists might be more susceptible to influences which can be used to separate them from their terrorist-based social attachments. What makes SIS attractive with respect to this thesis are the conceptual

assumptions underlying SIS, which match well and provide additional understanding for Sageman's findings on "friendship, kinship and discipleship" as the compelling force behind terrorism recruitment, the findings regarding part-time and full-time jihadists, and Dr. Shapiro's work on risk and commitment.

Social Intensity Syndrome is primarily concerned with the need for men to be associated with other men in "certain male dominated social groupings" (Zimbardo, 2008). Zimbardo posits eight conceptual assumptions of SIS:

1. Men, more than women, are attracted to social settings that involve the ubiquitous presence of a group of other men, over an extended period.

2. That attraction is greater the more intense the nature of the relationship, the more exclusive it is of tolerating "outsiders" or those who have not qualified for that group membership, and the more embedded each man is perceived to be within that group.

3. Examples of such social groups are the military, especially during boot camp and deployment, gangs, contact team sports, fraternities, prisons, some cults, and bars.

4. Men experience a positive arousal, such as cortisol, adrenergic system activation (or testosterone increase) when they feel they are part of such an all male social group.

5. Men adapt to that level of social intensity contact as an optimally desired personal and social state.

6. Over time, that degree of social intensity becomes a "set point" of desirable functioning, operating at a non-conscious level.

7. Men experience a sense of isolation and then boredom immediately following their separation from such socially intense group settings.

8. Men experience withdrawal symptoms when removed from such socially intense group settings, which are greater the longer the prior duration of their group participation.

Social Intensity Syndrome "SIS" is the descriptive term for this complex of values, attitudes, and behaviors organized around personal attraction to and desire to maintain association with these male dominated social groupings (Zimbardo, 2008).

A terrorist group, Zimbardo agrees (2008), would definitely be inclusive of the male oriented social groups to which men are attracted**.** Independently, political psychologist John Horgan of Pennsylvania State's International Center for the Study of Terrorism provided his rationale for the attraction of men to terrorist groups, which bolsters Zimbardo's work on Social Intensity Syndrome. In an interview with the *New York Times*, Horgan said,

> We're finding that they don't generally join for religious reasons. Terrorist movements seem to provide a sense of adventure, excitement, vision, purpose, camaraderie and involvement with them has an allure that can be difficult to resist. But the ideology is usually something you acquire once you're involved. (Zoepf, 2008)

While many terrorist groups include females, even other radical Islamic groups, there are good reasons to believe that al-Qaeda is a male-dominated, misogynistic group. This is not to suggest that women have neither been connected to al-Qaeda nor that al-Qaeda is not willing to pragmatically use women as tools, even in attacks. But, aside from the obvious Islamic imperatives separating the sexes and denigrating women to subservient roles, (Moghadamm, 2008) which is demonstrably taken to extremes with al-Qaeda allies like the Taliban, where is the evidence suggesting that female al-Qaeda operatives hold senior or even influential positions within the group or that female terrorists have constituted the inner circle of a clandestine, mixed-sex, al-Qaeda cell? Interestingly, one of Dr. Zimbardo's behavioral predictions for high levels of SIS is that "These men are more likely to develop generally negative attitudes toward women as 'the other' who do not understand them, and prefer pornography and sex with prostitutes over consensual sexual relationships with equal status female mates (Zimbardo, 2008).

The terrorist group or a subset of the group, such as a cell, also coincidently exhibits other tendencies reflective of the underlying assumptions of SIS. For instance, in Zimbardo's third underlying assumption, his description of an intense social grouping, such as the "military, especially during boot camp," is largely analogous to attendance at a jihadist training camp. And, inclusion in a clandestine element of al-Qaeda, in all of Dr. Hoffman's categories, must qualify as both "intense" and "exclusive," elements mentioned in point two. In fact, al-Qaeda arguably exhibits at least two factors which

indicate it thinks of itself as an elite organization, which must further increase its draw and importance within the framework of Social Intensity Syndrome to jihadists-inclined males who subscribe to the veracity of these factors.

First, at least the category of al-Qaeda Central envisions itself as the "vanguard" of a larger Islamic movement capable of destroying Western civilization (Hart, 2008). Second, al-Qaeda's *takfiri* influenced version of Islam is also a possible marker of elitist thinking, (which as noted in the counter-ideological program of Saudi Arabia is a marker for potential terrorism proclivities) as it provides al-Qaeda with the ideological basis to justify itself as an arbiter of Islamic righteousness and piety with a divinely derived mandate to remove and kill "un-Islamic" rulers and other fallen Muslims. Central Intelligence Agency analyst Martin J. Hart eluded to both of these points when he wrote, "As a result, al-Qaeda has remained an elitist movement that draws general Muslim approval for trying to reduce U.S. power, but it fails to attract participation from most Muslims because of its hardcore fundamentalist message" (Hart, 2008).

Dr. Zimbardo's perspective of SIS is mainly concerned with predictions of negative behavioral tendencies associated with individuals with a high-level of SIS who are separated from their intense, male-dominated social groupings. An example would include soldiers returning from war to comparatively boring and pedestrian jobs and home lives, who consequently find great difficulty in adjusting (Zimbardo, 2008).

Two indicators of a high-level of SIS identified by Dr. Zimbardo have potential application for this thesis. First, he believes that an individual's willingness to place greater value on their male dominated in-group over family is probably a very strong SIS indicator (Zimbardo, 2008). Second, he believes it more probable than another indicator of high SIS is that males are willing to minimize the danger of being within their particular male-ubiquitous social grouping (Zimbardo, 2008). A compelling example is the willingness of soldiers who were anxious to return home while in combat who become equally anxious to return to their combat units after the boredom and anxiety of separation from their social group sets in (Zimbardo, 2008).

The author would suggest these two indicators of high SIS are supportive of the findings of the GJN in Spain regarding part-time versus full-time jihadis, as well as Dr. Shapiro's work on risk and commitment. The part-time members of the GJN, as an example, were on the periphery of the organization which bombed the Madrid trains. Their part-time jihadism reflected a loose attachment to this terrorist group, which would logically correspond with a lower level of SIS. As the researchers of the GJN noted, these part-time jihadists were unremarkable in their daily lives. They had not separated from their jobs or extricated themselves from society. It would not follow logically to expect then that these part-time jihadists placed greater value with belonging to the terrorist group than with their families, which as argued earlier was recognized by Dr. Zimbardo as a very strong indicator of high levels of SIS.

Similarly, for the second of these two indicators of high levels of SIS, if Type A terrorists are more ideologically committed and likely to be involved in group positions entailing greater risks, might one possible explanation for this willingness to accept these greater risks rest not only in greater ideological commitment, but in a correspondingly higher level of SIS? Is it possible that high-levels of SIS and the attractive pull of the group, might, in fact, enforce an individual's willingness to accept the group's ideology?

Consequently, what SIS suggests for improving source recruitment is intriguing. Terrorist source candidates who exhibit indicators of low SIS should feel less of an attractive pull by their terrorist groups. Therefore, these candidates should be easier to recruit than those candidates who have a high level of SIS; they should, like Type B terrorists and those displaying instrumental aggression, be more sensitive to influence measures. One analogy which might be useful in highlighting this point is military re-enlistment. Those soldiers who demonstrate high levels of SIS should be easier to re-enlist, especially back into their intense, exclusive social groupings, such as combat units, than those who had low levels of SIS when they departed their units.

At the practical level, what SIS should suggest for the recruiting agent is to look for signs that a recruitment candidate's terrorist associations are comprised of weak social bonds. Indicators should include "part-time jihadism," but should concomitantly include indicators of strong attachments to other social groupings and activities unconnected to

their terrorist associations, such as family, business, and hobbies. Additionally, recruitment candidates who are not misogynistic may be correspondingly less affected by SIS and should be better recruitment candidates than those that demonstrate negative attitudes towards women. This can be possibly detected by observing if the candidate is willing to participate in activities or social groupings which involve women outside of their immediate family as equal or near-equal partners, or it may be tested via staged female contact and interviews. However, it should be obvious that cultural considerations must be accounted for in this area.

Finally, the author has two thoughts regarding SIS and Marc Sageman's work. Sageman (2004, p. 180) concluded from his study that "The best avenue for penetration lies in recruitment from the pool of those who went through the training but decided not to join the jihad." This statement makes exceptional sense against the backdrop of Dr. Zimbardo's SIS. Interpreted in this light, those individuals for whom the pull of an intense, exclusive social grouping, as one would expect in a terrorist training camp, is insufficient to keep them involved are probably not affected with high levels of SIS. If they quit such a camp, this may be a strong indicator that they are not cut-out to be full-time jihadists, possibly not as ideologically committed as their counterparts, and, consequently, not destined for positions of high-risk; they are Type B terrorists.

Second, SIS provides depth in understanding to Sageman's work (2004, p. 135). on jihadist recruitment being a factor of "kinship, friendship and discipleship." SIS provides a tool with which to examine and better understand why some male terrorists succumb to kinship, friendship and discipleship, while others are seemingly less affected. Although SIS is in its nascent stages, its logical underlying assumptions and complementariness with previously discussed findings make it another tool to be considered when gauging an al-Qaeda terrorist's recruitability.

IX. ACCESS TO THE TERRORIST NETWORK THROUGH THE TYPE B

> …'like a thread unraveling a sweater.' Terrorists will be mindful that the initial dangerous loose thread might be a raw recruit, or peripheral affiliate. (Woo, 2008, p. 6)
>
> Dr. Gordon Woo

Are Type B terrorists worth the effort of recruitment? If accessible, vulnerable, yet less ideologically committed Type B terrorists are to be found on the periphery of the organization, does their peripheral involvement lessen the argument that they are valuable potential intelligence sources, especially in comparison to the Type A terrorists?

Gordon Woo points out through his research applying social network analysis to terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, that even the least important member of a terrorist group can be instrumental in developing significant intelligence on other more important members of the organization through their links (2008). In Woo's work, he notes the experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram and others which demonstrate the interconnectedness of individuals and provides a terrorism example:

> It is a small world, as much as for terrorists as for everyone else. A human chain of six links should be about sufficient to connect anyone on the planet to anybody else. The intelligence services required a chain of just three links to get to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. First, Jordanian intelligence officers captured one of Zarqawi's junior operatives, Ziad Khalaf al-Zerbouly, who was working as a customs official, helping in smuggling money and materiel. Although ignorant of Zarqawi's whereabouts, under interrogation, Kerbouly revealed the name of Zarqawi's new spiritual advisor: Sheikh Abdel Rahman. A US special forces team located Rahman, placed him under surveillance, and tailed him to a house near Baqubah, where he had his fatal meeting with Zarqawi. "As in the manhunt for Zarqawi, the interrogation, or surveillance, of any known network operative, even a lowly foot-soldier, can be instrumental in providing sequential leads for tracking down senior leaders in the terrorist hierarchy." (2008, p. 8)

The British government, in its report on the July 7, 2005 bombings in London came to a similar conclusion in its lessons learned from this major attack which killed 52 and injured hundreds (Murphy, 2006, p. 2). Although the terrorists in this attack where not "al-Qaeda Central" or even "al-Qaeda affiliates or associates," as a result of these attacks, the British government revised their intelligence requirements. The result was more priority placed on the terrorists who are, by an assessment of their risk, commitment, and organizational responsibilities, more likely to be Type B terrorists, involved in "facilitating or funding terrorist activities" (Murphy, 2006, p. 32). This stemmed from the British government's belief that "the activities of facilitators can be critical to identifying the next plot, and also in recognition of the speed at which individuals can move from facilitation to attack planning" (Murphy, 2006, p. 32).

P[Other terrorism experts would agree that de-valuing terrorists because they are linked to the support or peripheral elements, versus the operational or military wing of terrorist organizations, is unwise. Even when terrorist organizations have well-developed social and military wings, such as HAMAS, the reality is that these wings are at best separated by a semi-permeable membrane, not a solid wall. According to Dr. Mathew Levitt (2008), an expert on HAMAS, the social wing of HAMAS has often been used as a way to support the operational activities of the military wing, including the provision of respectable day jobs as cover for night-time killers. In reality, there is no separation of the social and military wings (Levitt, 2008). And when speaking more directly about al-Qaeda, Dr. Rohan Gunaratna also agrees that it is necessary to attack these support elements, where it has been argued in this thesis that Type B terrorists of lesser commitment and risk are more likely to be found and accessible as recruitable sources. He noted, "When fighting terrorism, it is essential that governments and the public understand that operational cells cannot survive without support cells" (Gunaratna, 2007, p. 186). Finally, on this point, research on the Madrid GJN noted that the full-time jihadists subsisted, in part, from the assistance of their still employed, part-time counterparts, what the author argues are Type B terrorists. For the support networks to

be so critical to the operational elements, which are the locus of the Type A terrorists, the support networks must be connected to the operational elements. It is within these support networks where the Type Bs are most likely to be found.

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X. TESTING THE TOOLS

A. TWO UNIQUE CASE STUDIES

How can the ideas presented in this thesis be discussed and tested in an unclassified manner to determine their utility as tools to improve the recruitment of al-Qaeda sources? The author's approach is to examine, in detail, two former al-Qaeda-linked individuals with whom the author had personal dealings. Contact with these two individuals occurred from approximately 1998–2006, in the author's official capacity as a special agent of the FBI, which was known to the subjects. Contact with the first subject was more investigative and brief. Contact with the second subject was more extensive, spanning several years. Neither subject was under arrest or incarcerated at the time of the author's contact. All discussions with these subjects occurred in English, which they speak fluently.

This personal contact arguably allows for greater insight and reflection on the application of the suggested tools than through a study purely comprised by reviewing documents. Although these two case studies involved individuals with confirmed links to al-Qaeda and contact with the FBI, they can, fortunately, be sourced academically to unclassified documents. This is possible in these two instances because the activities of these individuals were publicly exposed through the judicial process.

These two case studies have several interesting dynamics in common, which makes their comparison more meaningful. One key dynamic is that each man knew the other very well. They knew each other many years before the existence of al-Qaeda; both cut their jihadist teeth in the anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad. They were also both associates and contemporaries at the same point in time within al-Qaeda and had verifiable access to some of the same al-Qaeda Central figures. In fact, they cooperated on several al-Qaeda-linked issues. They are also approximately the same age, both grew-up in Kuwait, are both family men, are both naturalized U.S. citizens, and were both inspired by the jihadist ideologue Abdullah Azzam. If these two men were examined for their potential to be recruited as sources, their similarities in background might lead to the mistaken belief

that they were either both recruitable or both un-recruitable. In spite of these similarities, one individual refused to cooperate with FBI, while the other individual helped to convict the other man of al-Qaeda-related crimes.

B.   CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY

The first of the two individuals analyzed in these case studies represents a solid Type A terrorist, who did not cooperate with the FBI. The second individual represents a Type B individual, who may have been migrating at one point to Type A status, but ultimately did not. This assessment is predicated on the known outcome of their responses to requests for cooperation on al-Qaeda matters when approached by the FBI and a retroactive review of their backgrounds and personalities as compared to Davis and Jenkin's descriptions of Type A and B terrorists. The Type A individual did not cooperate with the FBI, even when it was in his best interests to do so and the stakes were personally very high. The Type B, on the other hand, cooperated extensively and publicly in court with the FBI. Labeling these individuals in this manner is consistent with McCauley's work about the sensitivity to rewards and punishments. As noted, it would be expected that the Type A terrorist would be less sensitive and the Type B terrorist more influenced by the rewards and punishments which FBI agents could offer in seeking an individual's cooperation. However, knowing the outcome to the question of cooperation (whether an individual did or did not cooperate with the FBI as a source) as the means to determining if they are the more approachable Type B terrorist would be circular logic. Since an individual's terrorist type cannot be practically assessed based on their cooperativeness, what is the method to determine terrorist type in advance of a recruitment effort?

The solution to assessing whether an individual is a Type A or Type B terrorist is to examine details of that individual's background through the lenses of other factors already presented in this thesis. These lenses include risk and commitment, instrumental or emotional aggression, full-time or part-commitment to jihad, and high or low levels of Social Identity Syndrome. Assessments made through these lenses can provide an

assessment as to whether an individual is a Type A or B terrorist, and can made upon background information about the potential source acquired from existing investigative techniques.

C.   CASE STUDY CRITERIA

Both case studies are reviewed using the same criteria. However, since contact with these individuals was in the course of work predating this thesis, the information about each individual's background and activities is admittedly not uniform for each criterion. But non-uniformity is a reality of any field work in this subject, particularly as agents will have greater access and observation of some individuals than others, and some subjects will be more successful in concealing their backgrounds, feelings, intentions, and histories.

Strict tests or measurements from the fields of psychology or other academic fields were not used when this author originally interacted with these individuals, nor when the author examined them through the criteria to be discussed.   This is not a detractor. On the contrary, one of the important, unstated assumptions of this thesis is that any suggestions for improving the recruitment process of terrorist sources needs to be simple, practical, and applicable by the numerous non-specialist agents in the field investigating and having contact with terrorist-linked individuals on a daily basis. Most agents are not professional psychologists, sociologists, or blessed with the subject's cooperativeness. As such, it would be impractical if suggested tools attempted to mimic exacting clinical assessments. Furthermore, most agents will only observe their potential recruitment targets from afar or indirectly. These tools must be applicable to agents who know about their potential recruitment targets from conducting surveillance of them, listening to their legally recorded conversations, reviewing open source and government documents about them, having indirect or fleeting contact with them, or by reviewing information about them provided from co-workers, family members, or even other recruited sources. Creating tools which are too clinical, cumbersome or which require academic or medical expertise would destroy their practicality. With that said, these are the criteria used to examine these two subjects:

1.   **Is the Subject Type A or Type B Terrorist?**

Was the subject cooperative with the FBI by providing useful intelligence on al-Qaeda? Or, as would be predicted by McCauley, was the subject less sensitive to rewards and punishments? Did the subject attempt to protect individuals associated with his al-Qaeda in-group, even at his own personal expense? What was the ultimate result of the FBI's approach to this individual in terms of their recruitment potential? This question establishes if the individual is a Type A or Type B terrorist.

2.   **What is the Subject's Background?**

What are his ethnicity, age, marital status, education, and economic status?

3.   **With which Category of Al-Qaeda, Using Hoffman's Definitions, did the Subject have an Association?**

Al-Qaeda Central, al-Qaeda associates and affiliates, al-Qaeda locals, or the al-Qaeda Network?

4.   **What was the Subject's Level of Risk and Commitment with Their Al-Qaeda Category?**

Did the subject hold a formal or informal position within an al-Qaeda category and, if so, how much subjective risk did this involve? Was the subject loosely affiliated within their category? Was the subject's position or association within their al-Qaeda category covert or provide some level of anonymity, or did it expose him publicly to police and intelligence agencies by directly connecting him to other known al-Qaeda figures or activities?

5.   **Did the Subject Display Instrumental or Emotional Aggression?**

Did the subject engage in activities, discussions, or provide other reasons to suggest he engaged in aggression which "does not calculate long-term consequences" or "aggression as a means to other ends" (McCauley, 2007, p. 8). Was the subject engaged in anger directed to hurt someone? If he was offered positive incentives or advised of the

negative consequences of not cooperating with the FBI or other police or intelligence agencies, how did this compare to McCauley's suggestion on instrumental and emotional aggression: ***"emotional aggression should be less sensitive to objective rewards and punishments, and instrumental aggression more sensitive"*** [bold and italics added] (2007, p. 8).

6. Was the Subject a Part-time or Full-time Jihadist?

As learned from the lessons of the Madrid bombings, did the subject have meaningful employment outside of the jihad, or was his employment simply cover? Did the subject essentially sever his societal ties to fully commit themselves to their cause or did they remain attached in meaningful ways to society outside of their terrorist in-group?

7. Did the Subject Exhibit Signs of Low or High Social Intensity Syndrome?

Did the subject demonstrate a willingness to place greater value on his male dominated in-group over family? Was he involved in other, non-male, social groupings, such as legitimate business activities? Did he minimize the danger of being within his particular male-ubiquitous social grouping? Is his a history of the subject being attached to an intense, exclusive. male-dominated social groups or rejecting such groups, such as a training camp? Is there a history of involvement in one or more jihads (Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, Somalia, etc)?

8. Case Study Conclusion

What conclusion can be draw about the subject's terrorist type from an analysis of the subject through the lenses of risk and commitment, instrumental and emotional aggression, full-time or part-time commitment to jihad, and high or low levels of Social Intensity Syndrome? Is this consistent with the subject's assessment as a Type A or B terrorist based on their established cooperation with the FBI, or lack thereof?

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XI.   CASE STUDY ONE: WADIH EL-HAGE

A.   WADIH EL-HAGE

U.S. citizen; al Qaeda operative; Bin Ladin's personal assistant (National Commission, 2004 p. 435), convicted in embassy bombings trial.

1.   Is the Subject a Type A or Type B Terrorist?

El-Hage is a Type A terrorist based upon his failure to seize upon opportunities to assist the FBI and, by doing so, help himself. This is discussed below.

2.   What is the Subject's Background?

Wadih El-Hage was born in Sidon, Lebanon in 1960 (Zill, 2001). His is married to an American convert named April Ray and has seven children.[15]El-Hage was raised Catholic, but according to his mother-in-law (also a convert to Islam), he accepted Islam when he was 14 and living in Kuwait, where his father was employed (Zill, 2001). His conversion led to his ouster from his home (Zill, 2001). According to his mother-in-law, El-Hage was supported by a sheikh in Kuwait from the time of his conversion until he graduated from college, and during this period became very devout (Zill, 2001).

In 1978, at the age of 18, he moved to Louisiana where he pursued a degree in urban planning at the University of Southwestern Louisiana (Zill, 2001). While in university, he was not remembered for being particularly political (at least not openly) or academically gifted, but as already noted, he was religious (Zill, 2001).

Towards the start of the Soviet Union's invasion and war in Afghanistan, the outward signs of El-Hage's devotion to his new religion and his long series of associations with jihadists became evident. El-Hage left the United States at some point after the jihad in Afghanistan started and moved himself, for the first of several times, to Pakistan to participate in the jihad (Zill, 2001). El-Hage's birth defect, a withered right

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[15] Personal observations by author during his investigation of El-Hage.

arm, supposedly limited his ability to fight (Zill, 2001). His mother-in-law said of him, ”
He cannot physically do a lot of things a soldier could do…His heart may have been in it
(referring to the jihad), but he was more of a teacher, translator, go-between…He was a
peacemaker” (Zill, 2001).   This description of his earliest jihadist activities would
logically seem consistent with his birth defect and meek appearance; El-Hage stands
maybe five feet, six inches in height and possibly weighs 130 lbs.

In 1985, El-Hage left Pakistan, returned to school and then moved to Tuscon
Arizona, where he met April Ray. While in Tuscon, El-Hage remained involved in the
Afghan jihad by working for the magazine *Bunyan al Mahrsous*. This magazine was
dedicated to furthering the jihad in Afghanistan (Zill, 2001). In 1986, after an arranged
marriage, they both moved to Pakistan where El-Hage again participated in the jihad
(Peraino & Thomas, 2002). According to El-Hage's wife, he assisted the jihad on this
occasion "…carrying a gun and riding a motorcycle, he smuggled money, supplies and
what Ray vaguely described as 'stuff' over the Pakistan border" (Peraino & Thomas,
2002). Some of this "stuff" El-Hage smuggled was probably military related, including
night-vision goggles for use by the mujahidin (Al-Ridi, 2001).

April Ray's description of El-Hage's activities is at odds with his mother-in-law's
portrayal of him as a physically incapable individual (and therefore she also seemed to be
intimating, not a legitimate terrorist). Smuggling money and "stuff" into a war zone
presents El-Hage as a more militant and determined individual. In fact, El-Hage, in spite
of his physical limitations, may have actually participated in fighting in Afghanistan (Al-
Ridi, 2001). Whatever the truth may be of his exact involvement in Afghanistan, the
benign description of El-Hage's early jihadist activities by his mother-in-law, when
coupled with his physical deformity and meek façade, should serve as a warning of
assessing a potential source upon their appearance.

At some point, prior to 1989, El-Hage returned to the United States from Pakistan
and became a United States citizen. Still, El-Hage continued to be involved with
committed jihadists and his new citizenship provided him with additional benefits for his
activities.

In December 1989, at an Islamic conference in Oklahoma City, El-Hage was contracted by future convicted terrorist Mahmud Abouhalima to purchase weapons for Abouhalima's use against the Jewish radical Rabbi Meir Khane, who was murdered in November 1990. (Zill, 2001). El-Hage's defense in this matter was that the weapons he did purchase for Abouhalima were never picked up (Zill, 2001). Abouhalima, a fellow jihadist from Afghanistan, escaped prosecution for his role in Khane's murder, but was later convicted for his key involvement in the first attack on the World Trade Center on 26 February 1993 (Reeve, 1999).

In early 1990, El-Hage hosted an unknown individual at his home in Tuscon and drove him to mosque (Zill, 2001). This unknown man was there to observe a controversial imam named Rashad Khalifa (Zill, 2001). Khalifa drew the ire of some Muslims by his Islamic practices, which included allowing men and woman to pray together (Zill, 2001). Shortly after the visit of this mysterious man whom El-Hage assisted in Tuscon, Khalifa was found murdered in his mosque (Zill, 2001). Contrary to El-Hage's meek appearance and demeanor, "Prosecutors have repeatedly implied El Hage knows who committed the murder and may have been involved" (Zill, 2001).

On March 1, 1991, El-Hage traveled to New York City to allegedly assist in the running of the AlKifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn (Zill, 2001). This center was part of the international network which assisted aspiring jihadists to travel to Afghanistan and was known informally as "al-Jihad" (Cooley, 2002, p. 69). The AlKifah Center was also associated with offices in Tuscon, where El-Hage was living, and Arlington, Texas, where he would eventually live. AlKifah in Brooklyn was itself part of the Mektab al-Khidmat (Bureau of Services), the world-wide network established by Usama Bin Ladin and his mentor Abdallah Azzam to support the jihad in Afghanistan (National Commission, 2004). El-Hage was also a follower of Azzam. His wife admitted that when Azzam was assassinated, El-Hage had been "jolted," by his death, although apparently not enough to remove himself from his jihadist associations and activities (Peraino & Thomas, 2002).

Al-Qaeda eventually emerged from the Mektab al-Khidmat (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1988). The day El-Hage arrived in New York, the Center's director, Mustafa Shalabi, disappeared (Zill, 2001). The following week Shalabi's "mutilated body was found in the apartment he and Mahmud Abouhalima shared" (Zill, 2001). This was the same Abouhalima who asked El-Hage to provide him weapons.

On March 8, 1991, El Hage signed in to visit El Sayyid Nosair at the Riker's Island (prison). Nosair was serving a sentence for gun charges stemming from the Meir Kahane murder case" (Zill, 2001). Nosair, like El-Hage's other associate Abouhalima, was convicted for his role in the first World Trade Center bombing (Zill, 2001).

In early 1992, El-Hage and his family were living in Arlington, Texas (Zill, 2001). But, by the spring of 1992, he moved the family to Khartoum, Sudan to work directly for Usama Bin Ladin (Peraino & Thomas, 2002). He was paid a salary of $1,200 per month, (Peraino & Thomas, 2002) which was the salary Usama Bin Ladin paid to his "highest officers" (Al-Ridi, 2001). According to El-Hage, he was hired to work in the various companies in Khartoum by Usama Bin Ladin because he had an American passport, which allowed El-Hage to travel freely and purchase items for Usama Bin Ladin (Miranda, 2001). "These companies were operated to provide income to support al Qaeda and to provide cover for the procurement of explosives, weapons and chemicals and for the travel of al Qaeda operatives" (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998, p. 13).

One of El-Hage's job titles was "Director of International Marketing and Purchasing," (Peraino & Thomas, 2002) but he really served as Bin Ladin's personal assistant (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998, p. 13). Usama Bin Ladin's front-company, known as Wadi al-Aqiq, is where the terrorist leader had his office as chairman and Wadih El-Hage's own office was just down the hall (Al-Ridi, 2001).

In 1994, El-Hage was transferred to Nairobi, Kenya for al-Qaeda's purposes (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998, p. 13). He was the group's most senior person in Kenya (Reeve, 1999, p. 198). While there, he helped establish other al-Qaeda front companies in support of the plans to attack the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. These

companies included an alleged charitable group called Help Africa People and a gemstone trading business called Tanzanite King (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998, p. 13). Help Africa People provided him and another al-Qaeda operative a convenient excuse to range throughout Africa. Tanzanite King was an alleged gem-stone business dealing in the semi-precious stone named after that country. As Help Africa People's alleged purposes would provide scant reason for him to travel or have contacts to Pakistan and Afghanistan, Tanzanite King provided him with the other half of his necessary cover to travel to these regions on al-Qaeda business, this time under the guise of buying and selling semi-precious gems. Years later, when El-Hage was living in Arlington, Texas, Tanzanite King "business" was still being used by El-Hage's associates to explain questionable money transfers associated with this terrorist.[16]

Under these covers, he was assisting al-Qaeda operatives like U.S. Embassy Nairobi bomber Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, also known as Harun Fazul, who lived occasionally in El-Hage's residence and was employed by him at Help Africa People (Miranda, 2001). Fazul rented the house where the al-Qaeda cell assembled the truck bomb used against the embassy and also drove one of the vehicles during the attack (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998)

In the summer of 1997, under pressure by the FBI and Kenyan Police, El-Hage and his family left Kenya and returned to Arlington, Texas, but the operation to destroy the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and in Tanzania continued (Peraino & Thomas, 2002). In Texas, El-Hage worked in a run-down tire store in Fort Worth, Texas. In September and October 1997, El-Hage was questioned by both a federal grand jury and FBI agents about al-Qaeda's activities, to which he provided false answers (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998). Even under this scrutiny, El-Hage maintained contact with other al-Qaeda operatives (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998).

On August 7, 1998, the East Africa al-Qaeda cell El-Hage helped to establish bombed the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Al Salaam, Tanzania (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998).

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[16] Author's recollection based upon investigative activities involving El-Hage when he lived in Texas.

On August 20, 1998, El-Hage was twice interviewed by the author regarding his connections with al-Qaeda, to which he provided numerous false answers.

In September 1998, El-Hage was arrested by the FBI for his perjures testimony and lies to FBI agents, including the author. He was later indicted on charges related to the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi.

In May 2001, he was tried, and convicted for his role in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, which killed at least 212 people and injured more than 4,500 (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998). El-Hage is now serving a life sentence at the "Supermax" prison in Florence, Colorado.

3.   With which Category of Al-Qaeda, Using Hoffman's Definitions, did the Subject have an Association?

Wadih El-Hage was a member of al-Qaeda Central. El-Hage had direct access to Usama Bin Ladin (UBL)and other top military leaders of al-Qaeda's "military committee," such as Muhammed Atef and Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998).

He served as UBL's personal secretary in Khartoum, Sudan from approximately 1992-1994, coinciding when the group's activities were headquartered there from 1991-1996 (Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998). He later played a lead role in organizing al-Qaeda's East Africa Cell, which was responsible for one of the group's most successful attacks. As Hoffman noted in his description of al-Qaeda Central, "The professional cadre is responsible for the signature terrorist attacks of the organization on the scale of 9/11 and the simultaneous bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania" (Hoffmann, 2006, p. 286). As a member of al-Qaeda Central, his value as an intelligence source would have been extremely high, assuming he could be recruited.

4.   What was the Subject's Level of Risk and Commitment with His Al-Qaeda Category?

The brief background provided of El-Hage's life is filled with evidence that he was fully committed to the cause and was willing to engage in activities of great risk for

his cause. Starting with his conversion to Islam as a teenager, his commitment to his new religion resulted in his ouster from his immediate family. He seemed to continually meet with individuals who were active militants engaged in various crimes, including murder, or had associations with individuals who were murdered. It could be argued that these close brushes with murdered individuals, Khalifa and Shalabi, and at least two of the first World Trade Center bombers, Abouhalima and Nosair, would have been sufficient cause for most people to question the direction of their life. Yet, El-Hage's subsequent activities only deepened into more nefarious activities.

Later, he is noted repeatedly traveling to the Afghan jihad, undertaking activities, such as smuggling, which would have involved greater risk, even if not in a war-zone. One quote from his wife's interview with *Newsweek* seems to sum up his high level of commitment during the Afghan jihad, when considering he was an alleged volunteer: "He told his wife that he had shaved his head to keep bugs out while he slept in caves" (Peraino & Thomas, 2002).

El-Hage continued this path of taking great risks and being fully committed to his cause when he was formally involved with al-Qaeda Central. He is widely regarded as having assisted in the development of al-Qaeda's East Africa network and was directly involved with other al-Qaeda terrorists who bombed the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, such as Harun al-Fazul, whom he regularly had over to his home. He was trusted with other sensitive projects by Usama Bin Ladin, such as arranging for the purchase of his personal jet aircraft and the transfer of the group's stinger missiles when al-Qaeda moved from the Sudan back to Afghanistan. (Al-Ridi, 2001). He admitted that he traveled the world on behalf of Usama Bin Ladin as a purchasing agent because of the freedom of movement afforded him as an American Citizen and passport holder. El-Hage's direct connections to Usama Bin Ladin and other top al-Qaeda figures ensured that he was exposed to police and intelligence agencies soon after Usama Bin Ladin's became identified as a terrorist threat. Nevertheless, this did not curtail El-Hage's association with al-Qaeda Central or its activities.

El-Hage had ample opportunities to extract himself from this jihadist lifestyle, while still being fully capable of claiming that he had his done his part for his religion. Instead, he continued to accept positions and assignments of increasing risk, which would only have been entrusted to someone fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin's plan and fully trusted by him personally. El-Hage, as an American citizen with a college degree from the United States, had other life options which he choose to ignore, even when it created discomfort to himself, his wife and seven children (Peraino & Thomas, 2002).

5.   Did the Subject Display Instrumental or Emotional Aggression?

El-Hage was very aware that he was under the scrutiny of the U.S. government and a possible target of criminal prosecution. This would have been apparent by his multiple interviews with the FBI and his summons to testify before grand juries, to say nothing of any possible surveillance or investigative activities he may have been able to detect on his own conducted by the FBI or other police or intelligence agencies. The U.S. government sought El-Hage's assistance on al-Qaeda matters, which may have substantially extricated him from criminal liability. Even his wife and mother-in-law saw this as a path for him to extricate himself from his problems. One intercepted conversation from El-Hage's mother-in-law (Brown) to April Ray is particularly telling: "You know," said Brown "if they [the FBI agents] were smart they would have tried to enlist El-Hage's help. If they were smart" (Peraino & Thomas, 2002).

He chose to remain committed to al-Qaeda and continuously lied to the FBI about the extent and nature of his al-Qaeda contacts and al-Qaeda's activities, at great peril to himself. Based on the role he played in establishing al-Qaeda's East Africa cells, including associations with al-Qaeda wanted terrorist Harun al-Fazul and others, it is certain he was aware of the planning behind the bombing of the U.S. Embassies in East Africa. Yet, he provided no information to prevent these attacks.

When examined in the light of McCauley's suggestion that **"emotional aggression should be less sensitive to objective rewards and punishments, and instrumental aggression more sensitive,"** (McCauley, 2007, p. 22). El-Hage is assessed to have displayed emotional aggression. This is based on his intransigence to accept rewards

and/or avoid punishments which had been made to him by the FBI related to his potential intelligence value. If El-Hage had been motivated by instrumental aggression, it seems he would have reconsidered his options to "cut a deal" with the FBI once it was clear that he had been identified as al-Qaeda and that he was facing indictment in the murders of over two hundred people. This option does not appear to have swayed him, in spite of the fact that he had a wife and seven children dependent on him, which he might never see again if convicted. This author would argue that this is an example of an individual failing to calculate the long-term consequences, which is associated with emotional aggression. Interestingly, the author is unaware of any personal incident in El-Hage's life which could explain his emotional aggression and the need to strike out to hurt someone, in this case, the United States via the attacks on the U.S. Embassies. As a Muslim convert, does this possibly suggests that his anger and need to belong to al-Qaeda, and then to protect al-Qaeda at great personal cost to he and his family, was fueled by adopted "perceptions," "feelings," and "subjective sense of injustice" to his new religion as explained by Fathali Moghaddam (2006, p. 46)?

One portion of the author's discussion with El-Hage is insightful of the impractical, Type A goals he seemed to be pursuing:

Q. During the interview, did you ask Mr. El Hage why it was that Bin Laden hated Americans?

A. Yes. His answer was, he said that any true believing Muslim, it was the duty of any true believing Muslim to drive out the US from the Saudi peninsula because the Koran had reserved the Saudi peninsula only for Muslims. He also said that the US government unfairly supported Israel, and by that he described his statement by saying that the US was quick to come to the aid of Israel if something happened to it but that if Israel did something illegal that the US was slow to act.

And then he also said that Israel was expanding to take control of the entire Middle East. And finally in response to that questioning, he said that many people wanted to make the world live according to the Koran, but that they don't have the resources, but Bin Laden has the resources to make the world live according to the Koran.

During that answer, he often switched between using he for Bin Laden and we when describing the hatred to the US and the West. (Miranda, 2001, pp. 3057-3058)

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This statement may have been hyperbole on El-Hage's part, but based on his seriousness when making this statement, it occurred to this author to be reflective of El-Hage's genuine feelings and desires; this must be rated as a rather nebulous and un-pragmatic goal, which is characteristic of Type A terrorists.

6.   Was the Subject a Part-time or Full-time Jihadist?

While conducting al-Qaeda's business in Khartoum or Nairobi, El-Hage was unquestionably a full-time jihadist. In fact, as noted earlier, he received a full-time salary of $1,200 from Usama Bin Laden, which was the highest paid to anyone in the Khartoum-based front companies. When he moved to Nairobi with his family, at the directions of Usama Bin Ladin, his employment cover was with the alleged charity, "Help Africa People," for which it is not known if he received a salary. He also was allegedly involved in the sale of tanzanite, a semi-precious stone. Both activities provided cover for El-Hage's presence and movements in East Africa, as well as abroad. It is therefore difficult to describe him at this time also as being simply a part-time jihadist. Both El-Hage's work with Help Africa People and Tanzanite King must not have provided very much income, if any at all, as his described socio-economic status and residence in Kenya were poor and abysmal.[17] Similarly, when he was forced to return to the United States by the U.S. government and Kenyan authorities, which occurred prior to the bombings, his socio-economic status and residence in Arlington, Texas, where he settled, could equally be described as poor and abysmal.[18] Although fluent in English and college educated, El-Hage settled for menial under-employment changing and repairing flat tires at a third-world style, cinder-block business in an impoverished area of Fort Worth, Texas. His apartment, likewise, was notably dingy and impoverished. When he was forced by the authorities to leave Kenya and he returned to Arlington, Texas he did not sever his ties with individuals linked to al-Qaeda. His in-group still was compromised of individuals linked directly to al-Qaeda, individuals with a

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[17] Author's recollection of conversations with FBI agents present during the search of El-Hage's Nairobi residence.

[18] Author's observations of El-Hage's Arlington Apartment from his August 20, 1998 interview.

history of supporting armed jihad or individuals suspected of supporting the aims of al-Qaeda. For many years then, El-Hage's "employment" is assessed as being a full-time jihadist.

7.   Did the Subject Exhibit Signs of Low or High Social Intensity Syndrome?

Based on observations of El-Hage and knowledge of his background, he is assessed as having a high-level of SIS. One factor in this assessment is his involvement in multiple jihads. Even after his marriage in 1986, El-Hage returned to Pakistan to again participate in the jihad (Peraino & Thomas, 2002).

His assignments from one difficult third-world country to another (Pakistan, Sudan, Kenya) on behalf of his ideological beliefs are suggestive of a pattern which placed his loyalty to his male dominated social group (al-Qaeda Central) over the comfort and safety of his growing family.

One interesting note in this pattern is what occurred while he was residing in Tucson. As noted, he was employed there assisting the jihad by working for the magazine *Bunyan al Mahrsous*. As a mouthpiece for the Afghan jihad, this magazine had an important fundraising and propaganda role in the United States to draw Muslims into the jihad (Al-Ridi, 2001). However, working for the jihad's cause in this manner must not have been fulfilling to el-Hage, for he subsequently returned to Pakistan for a second tour, this time with his bride in tow. This vignette seems to be very consistent with Dr. Zimbardo's (2008) description of the soldier who returns home from combat duty, quickly becomes bored with home life and is draw back to his intense, dangerous former lifestyle and the male-grouping he shared this lifestyle with. Finally, as predicted in one of Zimbardo's (2008) behavioral predictions for high levels of SIS, he is known to have visited at least one business specializing in pornography.

8. **Case Study Conclusions**

As stated initially, El-Hage is a Type A terrorist. He was not migrating to the Type B set at the time of his arrest, which coincided with the author's contact. This assessment is based upon his unwillingness to cooperate with the FBI, even when not to do so was obviously ruinous.

When examined by the lenses discussed above, these also lead to an assessment of El-Hage as a Type A terrorist, which is consistent with his assessment based on what is known of his ultimate failure to cooperate when it was in his interests to do so. First, El-Hage had a long history of positions of great risk and commitment within al-Qaeda (Usama Bin Ladin's personal secretary and establishment of the group's East Africa cells). Second, his rather un-pragmatic goal of making the whole world Muslim through the efforts of Usama Bin Ladin speaks of emotional and not instrumental aggression. This is a goal without ends. And, as one can see from Usama Bin Ladin's track records, fatwas, and public threats, this goal could only be met by hurting others. It would be inconceivable that El-Hage did not know Usama Bin Ladin's position on violence. Third, he has a long-history of full-time participation as a jihadist, even pre-dated al-Qaeda's existence. His full-time jihadist positions included not only under-employment in menial positions suited to his cover and below his education level, but even as a salaried employee of Usama Bin Ladin's front companies. Fourth, he exhibited factors suggesting high levels of Social Identity Syndrome, such as his multiple returns to dangerous jobs in dangerous and generally perceived undesirable places in the world, which placed his group-affiliation above his family's comfort and health.

Based on these criteria, it would have been possible to assess El-Hage as a Type A terrorist prior to any recruitment attempt. El-Hage had excellent access to intelligence, but consistent with his Type A status, he was uncooperative and was probably not recruitable as an intelligence source, in spite of the suggestions by his mother-in-law to his wife that he should be recruited.

XII. CASE STUDY TWO: ESSAM AL-RIDI

A. ESSAM AL-RIDI

U.S. citizen; jihadist; associate of Wadih el-Hage; pilot for Usama Bin Laden; witness for the U.S. government.

1. Is the Subject a Type A or Type B Terrorist?

Al-Ridi is a Type B individual. As will be discussed, he was very cooperative with the FBI when approached for assistance.

2. What is the Subject's Background?

Essam al-Ridi is an American citizen who was born in Cairo, Egypt in 1958 (Al-Ridi, 2001). When he was approximately five years of age, he moved to Kuwait and remained there for approximately 23 years (Al-Ridi, 2001). While technically an Egyptian, he thinks of himself as Kuwaiti.[19] After completing high school there, he moved to Karachi, Pakistan for approximately three to four years to study for a degree in electrical engineering, which he did not complete (Al-Ridi, 2001).

In 1979, he traveled to Fort Worth, Texas to obtain his pilots license, which he completed in 1981. For many years thereafter, both inside and outside of the United States, al-Ridi worked as both a flight instructor and a pilot for various commercial airliners.[20]

In approximately 1982, while attending a Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA) convention in Fort Worth, he heard Abdullah Azzam speak on the individual Islamic duty of Muslims to participate in the jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union (Al-Ridi, 2001). At approximately this same time, al-Ridi met Wadi el-Hage, while the latter was still a student the University of Southwest Louisiana. (Al-Ridi, 2001).

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[19] Based on author's interaction with Al-Ridi from approximately 2000-2006.

[20] Ibid.

Inspired by Azzam, al-Ridi took his family and left to join the Arab contingent of the anti-Soviet jihad in Peshawar, Pakistan in either 1982 or 1983 (Al-Ridi, 2001). While there, in 1983, al-Ridi again ran into El-Hage (Al-Ridi, 2001). For approximately the next 18 months, al-Ridi assisted the jihad as a purchasing agent, traveling around the world buying supplies for the mujahidin including night vision goggles, scuba gear, and range finders (Al-Ridi, 2001). It was during this time that he also met Usama Bin Ladin on several occasions.

In approximately 1985, al-Ridi decided to return to the United States (Al-Ridi, 2001). One reason he returned was because his Egyptian passport he was using extensively to travel with on behalf of procuring materials for the mujahidin was about to expire (Al-Ridi, 2001). The other was more personal. Al-Ridi opposed the decision making role Usama Bin Ladin was appropriating for himself in the jihad. He openly expressed his beliefs that Usama Bin Ladin, as essentially someone who was uneducated and untested in military matters, should not be entitled to make military decisions which could cost lives simply because he was wealthy (Al-Ridi, 2001).

Upon his return to the United States, al-Ridi did not totally divorce himself from supporting the jihad. He continued to serve the cause essentially as a procurement specialist. On one occasion, in approximately 1987 or 1998, he provided night vision goggles to El-Hage, who returned with them to Pakistan in his passenger luggage (Al-Ridi, 2001). In another instance, he purchased and shipped 25 Barrett-brand .50 caliber sniper rifles, some of which ended in the hands of Usama Bin Ladin (Al-Ridi, 2001). Al-Ridi later returned to Afghanistan in approximately 1989 at the request of the mujahidin to sight-in the scopes mounted on these weapons (Al-Ridi, 2001).

In approximately 1992 or 1993, al-Ridi was requested to provide assistance, this time by Wadih El-Hage, while the El-Hage was living in Khartoum as an employee of Usama Bin Ladin (Al-Ridi, 2001).[21] El-Hage contracted with al-Ridi to purchase a jet aircraft with an unrefueled flying range of two thousand miles on behalf of Usama Bin Ladin (Al-Ridi, 2001). El-Hage was later to explain to al-Ridi that the plane was

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[21] Al-Ridi originally described the time frame as 1993, but upon cross-examination agreed he may have begun his search for an aircraft in 1992. See page 613 of his testimony.

necessary for shipping Usama Bin Ladin's stinger missiles from Peshawar to Khartoum (Al-Ridi, 2001). In 1993, after purchasing and refurbishing a jet aircraft, al-Ridi flew Usama Bin Ladin's jet to him in Khartoum, Sudan (Al-Ridi, 2001). On the day of his arrival in Khartoum, al-Ridi turned over the keys to the plane to Usama Bin Ladin during a dinner with him at his guest house, which included other key members of al-Qaeda, many of whom were armed with assault weapons (Al-Ridi, 2001).

The following day, al-Ridi had a private meeting with Usama Bin Ladin in his office at the Wadi Al-Aqiq company during which al-Ridi was offered a full-time position with the company at a salary of $1,200 per month (Al-Ridi, 2001). Al-Ridi's job responsibilities would have included working as Usama Bin Ladin's pilot, establishing a crop dusting operation for his agricultural interests, and establishing a cargo shipping company to ship produce from Usama Bin Ladin's agricultural interests to other countries (Al-Ridi, 2001); he declined the offer because he thought the salary was insufficient (Al-Ridi, 2001). Al-Ridi then returned to the United States. Several months later, however, he returned to Khartoum at the request of El-Hage to fly Usama Bin Ladin's jet to Nairobi with five Arabs associated with the al-Qaeda front company, Wadi al-Aqiq, for a purpose unknown to al-Ridi (Al-Ridi, 2001). These five Arabs subsequently traveled from Nairobi on a smaller, shorter range aircraft to another destination unknown to al-Ridi (Al-Ridi, 2001). The government's indictment against Usama Bin Ladin, El-Hage and the other conspirators in the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in East Africa noted that during the same time frame as the travel of these five mysterious Arabs, al-Qaeda operatives were operating in Somalia to provide military assistance and training to the tribes opposed to the U.S. military presence there (Al-Ridi, 2001). Still in 1993, El-Hage requested al-Ridi's assistance piloting the aircraft again. On this occasion, during a test flight, the plane was destroyed when al-Ridi had a hydraulic failure which caused the brakes to fail during landing (Al-Ridi, 2001). Upon crashing the aircraft, al-Ridi immediately left the country, concerned by the possible consequences of a public association between himself and Usama Bin Ladin. As al-Ridi said the following in his testimony at the trial of the U.S. Embassy bombers:

I'm the only one who flew this aircraft. Everybody knows that is Usama Bin Laden's aircraft. Everybody knew then that I'm Egyptian. The Egyptians (Intelligence) are heavily available in Khartoum and I wouldn't like to be seen in association with Usama at the time. So I was very concerned to leave. (Al-Ridi, 2001, pp. 591-592)

In 1994, he became an American citizen (Al-Ridi, 2001). In 1998, al-Ridi met with El-Hage in Arlington, Texas while al-Ridi was in the United States on vacation with his family; this was their last meeting (Al-Ridi, 2001). Among other issues discussed, El-Hage warned al-Ridi about the FBI's raid of his residence in Nairobi in which his computer was seized, which might lead the FBI to question al-Ridi.

In 1998, the FBI contacted al-Ridi while he was residing overseas and negotiated his return to the United States where he was interviewed regarding his association with Usama Bin Ladin, Wadih El-Hage, and other matters.[22]

3. With which Category of Al-Qaeda, Using Hoffman's Definitions, did the Subject have an Association?

If Al-Ridi was ever a member of al-Qaeda, which he has always denied, then he would be regarded as a member of al-Qaeda Central. This assessment is established based upon his direct connections to known al-Qaeda Central figures, especially El-Hage and Usama Bin Ladin.

However, if he was never a member of al-Qaeda, his description under Hoffman's categories becomes more problematic. He might be considered an "Al-Qaeda local." As described earlier in this paper, Al-Qaeda locals represent:

'al-Qaeda adherents' who are likely to have had terrorism experience and who may have participated in one or more jihads around the world. The unique aspect of this group is that its members have a connection to al-Qaeda, even if these connections are "tenuous" or "dormant. (Hoffman, 2006, p. 287)

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[22] Recollection of author as one of the individuals who contacted and assisted in Al-Ridi's return to the United States.

Al-Ridi is qualified under this description as having participated in the Afghan jihad, and through his on-call assistance to El-Hage and Usama Bin Ladin, which might be interpreted as "tenous" or "dormant" connections. The problem with this description is that al-Ridi did not appear to be an ideological adherent of Usama Bin Ladin. Had he been, it seems less likely he would have refused Usama Bin Ladin's employment offer. Nevertheless, if al-Ridi was not an ideological adherent, it seems unlikely that Usama Bin Ladin would have offered al-Ridi such a sensitive job, in what amounted to al-Qaeda's headquarters at that time, had there not been some level of trust and affinity between the two men. After all, Usama Bin Ladin was already involved in terrorist activities by the time the job offer was made. Likewise, El-Hage certainly would not have divulged to al-Ridi that the terrorist leader required assistance transporting stinger missiles from Pakistan to the Sudan had he not trusted al-Ridi to some extent.

This difficulty raises an important point. To the outside observer, such as an FBI agent working from scraps of intelligence reporting, al-Ridi almost certainly would have appeared to be an al-Qaeda Central figure. This would be a good assessment based upon al-Ridi's participation in the Afghan jihad and his repeated contacts with top al-Qaeda figures including Usama Bin Ladin and El-Hage. From this assessment, it would have been logical to assume he was an adherent to al-Qaeda's ideology or another fawning member of Usama Bin Ladin's troop. The result of this logical path may have been to see al-Ridi as unapproachable and someone unlikely to assist. In fact, prior to contacting al-Ridi, the author and his FBI partner were advised by other counter-terrorism investigators that Al-Ridi was a "hard core" al-Qaeda member who would never cooperate. This incorrect assumption about al-Riddi's hard core nature is a good example of Correspondence Inference Theory at work. But, this assessment was obviously not the case. Individuals in contact with known al-Qaeda members then, including former jihadists, cannot be automatically assumed to share al-Qaeda's ideology, commitment, or beyond the ability of the FBI to establish a cooperative arrangement.

4. What was the Subject's Level of Risk and Commitment with His Al-Qaeda Category?

While al-Ridi was in contact with key al-Qaeda figures and had great access to activities which would have been of exceptional intelligence value to the U.S. Intelligence Community, his level of commitment never approached his Type A associate. El-Hage's commitment to his Islamic cause brought him back to the Afghan jihad several times, for extended periods. Al-Ridi, by contrast, spent 18 months in Pakistan, in arguably a less risky job than El-Hage, and returned to the United States to assist the jihad in less direct, certainly less risky and more comfortable surroundings. It wasn't that al-Ridi wasn't committed to jihad, but his risk level was much more akin to a Type B individual, not a Type A terrorist like El-Hage, who was willing to sleep in bug infested caves for his cause. Al-Ridi's point on this matter in his testimony is instructive:

> A. Let me clarify. The fact that I left physically from Peshawr was not in any mean or shape would remove me feeling a commitment to the cause.
>
> Q. Right. But there were just things that were happening in Peshawr, and this you did not agree with?
>
> A. Absolutely.
>
> Q. And you did not want to participate?
>
> A. Yes.
>
> Q. But you still felt dedicated to Jihad?
>
> A. Yes. (Al-Ridi, 2001, p. 606)

5. Did the Subject Display Instrumental or Emotional Aggression?

Al-Ridi displayed instrumental aggression. His involvement with the nascent al-Qaeda organization was primarily through his participation in the anti-Soviet jihad and then on a contractual and financial basis via El-Hage, who was an associate from this jihad. Unlike the Type A terrorists, who would be expected to roll from one jihad into another, never satisfied with any results, al-Ridi played his cameo roles and would then return to his normal life as an airline pilot and father.

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Al-Ridi calculated the long-term consequences of his actions, which were evident in small events. He did not stay with the jihad in Pakistan when his passport was about to expire; he knew to leave the Sudan when his association with Usama Bin Ladin might be exposed after the plane crash; and he knew cooperation with the FBI was better than running.

If al-Ridi was ever motivated by emotional aggression, it is hard to determine what it was. Certainly, his aggression was not sufficient to generate a willingness to take great risks. And, as discussed, his commitment was much more akin to a Type B individual who is happy to participate and contribute from the periphery and not the center of activity.

Finally, as predicted by McCauley, the emotionally aggressive El-Hage did not respond to potential rewards and punishments, even when others like his mother-in-law and wife saw the value in his cooperation with the FBI. Al-Ridi, as predicted by McCauley for someone assessed to be motivated by instrumental aggression, was obviously much more receptive.

6. Was the Subject a Part-time or Full-time Jihadist?

Aside from 18 months in al-Ridi spent in Pakistan, he was never a full-time jihadist, unlike his friend El-Hage. Al-Ridi was always gainfully employed and was always very social; he never severed his ties with Western society.[23] Although it was El-Hage who had the college degree, it was Al-Ridi who was employed in a respected profession, dressed in tailored western clothing, and was not adverse to the benefits of money. Al-Ridi was unlikely to commit himself full-time to the jihad (unlike El-Hage) because this would force him to sever ties to a Western society he actually enjoyed, a prestigious job, wealth, and stability for his family. Again, al-Ridi contributed in the manner of a Type B individual. That is, it was from the periphery, with less risk and only occasionally when it was of benefit to him.

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[23] Author's observations of Al-Ridi from 2000-2005.

7. Did the Subject Exhibit Signs of Low or High Social Intensity Syndrome?

Al-Ridi placed greater value on his family and career than on inclusion in the intense, elitist, male-dominated al-Qaeda or the jihad in Afghanistan. This was clearly demonstrated in his denial to work for Usama Bin Ladin, but it was also shown by his return to the United States after his 18 months in Afghanistan. Even after he was re-exposed to jihadist training camps, during the time he was sighting-in the .50 caliber sniper rifles, this experience did not reinvigorate his return. Had he been experiencing high levels of SIS, exposure to these intense male-dominated social settings should have presumably impacted him more significantly, but they did not.

Al-Ridi's return to these camps over a period of time, some of which were in active war zones, might be argued to be a sign of SIS. And, when discussing his jihadist participation in the 1980's, a similar argument could be made that he was more involved in intense male-dominated social groupings and may have had high levels of SIS at that time. Overall, however, he did not stay involved with the group, was never a full-time jihadist, and most importantly, he chose to leave the group when others did not. After his 18 month experience in Peshawr on behalf of the jihad, he never again apparently placed jihad above his family comfort or even his career.

Al-Ridi was only partially committed to the jihad, was involved with al-Qaeda indirectly in relatively low-risk activities, did not display a high level of Social Intensity Syndrome and declined to advance his association with al-Qaeda over both money and ideological disagreements. When asked to assist the FBI, he did.

8. Case Study Conclusions

As stated initially, al-Ridi is a Type B terrorist. This assessment is based upon his willingness to cooperate with the FBI, even publicly, against his former associates. When examined by the lenses discussed above, these also lead to an assessment of al-Ridi as a Type B individual, which is consistent with his assessment based on what is known of his cooperation, which was in his interests. First, with respect to the issue of risk and commitment, al-Ridi took some risks, but generally stayed on the periphery of the

group's more dangerous activities. He openly declined to accept positions of greater risk, such as being Usama Bin Ladin's salaried employee at what amounted to al-Qaeda's headquarters at the time. Even during the pre-al-Qaeda, anti-Soviet Jihad, al-Ridi's involvement was one generally of procurement. When compared to the involvement of El-Hage, it was not nearly as extensive or risky. Second, al-Ridi displayed instrumental aggression. He assisted in the anti-Soviet jihad and then returned home. He would take-on jobs contracted by El-Hage and would then return to his normal life. His involvement then had a defined purpose, which did not lead continually from one cause to another. This leads to the third point. Al-Ridi could only possibly be considered a full-time jihadist for a brief period of time in the early 1980's, which pre-dated al-Qaeda's existence. This more dedicated involvement in Pakistan apparently did not fit him well and he left after approximately 18 months. Since that time, he has always been employed full-time in work outside of supporting jihadist activities, mainly as an international airline pilot. Unlike El-Hage, there was no employment with jihadist newspapers, jihadist recruitment centers, or al-Qaeda front organizations in the Sudan or Kenya. Al-Ridi had real attachments to society through his real profession. Fourth, al-Ridi exhibited factors suggesting low levels of Social Identity Syndrome. These are highlighted by his peripheral positions with the anti-Soviet jihad, his ability not to be sucked back into jihadist activity after visiting jihadist camps to deliver procured materials, and even his ability to turn-down Usama Bin Ladin's offer of paid employment.

Based on these criteria, it would have been possible to assess al-Ridi as a Type B individual prior to any recruitment attempt, in spite of his reputation as being a "hard-core" terrorist beyond reasoning. Finally, as demonstrated by al-Ridi's testimony, even as a Type B, he also had excellent access to intelligence which made him a valuable recruitment target.

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XIII. CONCLUSIONS

> Human intelligence can provide some of the most useful actionable intelligence. But it requires painstaking work in recruiting informants who are already in terrorist organizations or placing informants not yet in them. (Jones & Libicki, 2008, p. 129)
>
> Seth G. Jones & Martin C. Libicki

The elimination of terrorism is a noble endeavor which must be pursued, but the historical record on terrorism supports the argument that it is perpetual and enduring. Terrorism has existed for several thousand years and has even been interpreted as "a modern form of primitive warfare" (Wheeler, 1991, p. 19). It is, therefore, ironic that although terrorism as a phenomenon has existed since ancient times, most modern terrorist groups are fragile and ephemeral. Audrey Kruth Cronin, in her article "How al-Qaida Ends; The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," citing David Rapoport, noted that "90 percent of terrorist organizations have a life span of less than one year; and of those that make it to a year, more than half disappear within a decade" (Cronin, 2006, p. 13).

In data examined by Dr. Seth Jones and Dr. Martin Libicki, "two-thirds of all terrorist groups active since 1968 have fewer than 100 members" (Jones & Libicki, 2008, p. 31). The paucity of membership in most groups, therefore, allows for only so many setbacks, arrests, deaths or defections. Nevertheless, Al-Qaeda has bettered these percentages and continues to evolve from a comparatively fragile, hierarchal organization, to a more resilient, dispersed network and movement. Bruce Reidel, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, expressed this sentiment in his article for *Foreign Affairs* in 2007:

> The challenge of defeating al Qaeda is more complex today than it was in 2001. The organization is more diffuse, and its components operate more independently. Bin Laden continues to influence its direction and provide general guidance and, on occasion, specific instructions. But overall the movement is more loosely structured, which leaves room for independent and copycat terrorist operations. (p. 5)

Expressed organizationally, al-Qaeda is becoming less and less like a vulnerable "spider" with a head and body and more like a decentralized and resilient "starfish" which does not have a head and which has the added ability to regenerate lost appendages (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006).

Seth Jones and Martin Libicki (2008) write that modern terrorist groups come to their demise through policing, military force, splintering, politics, or victory. They define "policing" as "the use of police and intelligence units to collect information on terrorist groups, penetrate cells, and arrest key members" (Jones & Libicki, 2008, p. 11).

Martha Crenshaw concluded years earlier that terrorism declines because of three factors: "Physical defeat of the extremist organization, by the government, the group's decision to abandon the terrorist strategy, and organizational disintegration" (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 70).

And Audrey Kruth Cronin provides seven critical elements leading to the demise of modern terrorist groups: "(1) capture or killing of the leader, (2) failure to transition to the next generation, (3) achievement of the group's aims, (4) transition to legitimate political process, (5) undermining of popular support, (6) repression, and (7) transition from terrorism to other forms of violence" (Cronin, 2006, pp. 17-18).

These three independent reviews of the broad reasons for the demise of modern terrorist groups are clearly consistent. Jones and Libicki's factor "politics," for instance, is essentially encompassing of Crenshaw's "decision to abandon the terrorist strategy," and Cronin's "transition to legitimate political process." Likewise, Jones and Libicki's "policing" could be included in Crenshaw's "physical defeat of the extremist organization," and Cronin's reasons "(1) capture or killing of the leader," "(6) repression," and possibly reasons (2) and (5), depending on their interpretation.

Most importantly, for purposes of this thesis, of the ways terrorist groups end, analysis of data on terrorist groups since 1968 by Jones and Libicki supports their demise primarily through two of these processes (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Forty three percent of terrorist groups end through adoption of nonviolent means and inclusion in the political process and 40 percent cease to exist through policing (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Based on

these finding, Jones and Libicki suggests a departure from combating al-Qaeda via the current military-centric strategy to one which plays to several existing and developing strengths of the FBI:

> Based on our analysis of how terrorist groups end, a more effective approach would be adopting a two-front strategy. <u>First, policing and intelligence should be the backbone of U.S. Efforts</u>. [underscore added] In Europe, North America, North Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, al Qa'ida consists of an amorphous network of individuals who need to be tracked down and arrested. In Pakistan, for example, the most successful efforts to capture or kill al Qa'ida leaders after the September 2001 attacks-such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Binalshibh, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, and Abu Zubeida-occurred because of careful police and intelligence work, not military force. This strategy should include careful work abroad from such organizations as the CIA and FBI, as well as their cooperation with local police and intelligence agencies. (Jones & Libicki, 2008, p. 124)

Jones and Libicki's conclusions that policing and intelligence are the strategy for success against al-Qaeda are also supported by Marc Sageman's work on this group. He argued the most effective tools to defeating al Qa'ida and the global Salafi Jihad "simply amount to good police work" (Sageman, 2004, p. 175 as cited in Jones and Libicki, 2008, p. 128).

A key to good police work has always been the collection of intelligence. As Jones and Libicki noted, "Human intelligence can provide some of the most useful actionable intelligence. But it requires painstaking work in recruiting informants who are already in terrorist organizations or placing informants not yet in them" (Jones & Libicki, 2008, p. 129).

The FBI is well positioned as both a "policing" organization and an intelligence organization to contribute to the demise of terrorist groups like al-Qaeda through the recruitment of terrorist informants. Thinking, however, that any organization can simply mandate or will itself to improve the recruitment of terrorist sources, without a deeper understanding of the enemy's psychology, is neither realistic, nor a true path to improvement. This thesis argues that the FBI can turn to two overlapping arenas for practical guidance in improving terrorist source recruitments.

One arena from which to draw guidance is the study of counter-ideological programs from around the world. The war against radical Islamic ideologies fought abroad by U.S. allies through successful counter-ideological programs is of benefit to U.S. homeland security. When a reformed ideologue like Dr. Fadl or recalcitrant terrorists like Nasir Abas or Ali Imron, speak against radical ideologies, it is good for security in the United States, even when the message is delivered in Cairo or Jakarta. Since the Indonesian or Egyptian programs are succeeding in disrupting and disintegrating groups previously supportive of violence against allies and the United States, the FBI should support these efforts with the understanding that one less terrorist in Cairo or Jakarta might be one less terrorist attempting to travel to New York or Los Angeles.

More directly for purposes of this thesis, the FBI should see these counter-ideological programs as potentially destabilizing the ideologies of groups and individuals in the United States, from which it may benefit in terms of source recruitment. In principle, the same counter-ideological techniques which force a terrorist to defect should be similar to the techniques used for source recruitment. The dissension and doubts created by counter-ideological programs against adherents of terrorism may cause subtle but important shifts in thinking affecting an individual's risk and commitment for their group, their full-time commitment, their aggression or even the bonds to their terrorist in-group. Efforts of this kind may be useful in helping to prevent Type B individuals from becoming stable Type As.

The counter-ideological programs of the countries discussed in this thesis derive their success in some part from advantages in their legal, cultural, and religious makeup, which the United States does not necessarily possess or replicate. But, the United States can nevertheless benefit from their successes if it extracts and applies what is miscible within the U.S. context.

The second arena which can provide guidance is from academic work focused on the understanding of terrorism from the fields of psychology, political science, and sociology. Accepting the argument that terrorism is a perpetual and enduring threat and

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that policing, with the use of human intelligence, is vital to defeating al-Qaeda, what is necessary to meet the demands of this threat is a new, long-term view of thinking about processes for the recruitment of terrorist sources.

A cognitive process provides several advantages benefiting the FBI and the larger U.S. Intelligence Community beyond the current instinctual and individual approach to source recruiting, or those benefits which may be derived from changes to the organization's bureaucratic structure. First, although there are individual agents successfully recruiting and operating terrorism sources, they do so via intuition and experience; they are un-replicable artists. But unfortunately, the Rembrandts and Picassos of the FBI are rare. The development of human intelligence (HUMINT) must be improved at the organizational level if the FBI is to keep pace with lone-wolves, autonomous cells, increasing decentralization, and groups with admirable histories of organizational learning, such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda (Trujillo, 2005).

Second, a cognitive model for recruitment, unlike the current approach, can be taught, analyzed, compared, measured, adjusted, and become part of the FBI's organizational learning process. A cognitive approach can be principled upon measurable evidence and scientific principles, as opposed to the current individual and instinctual approach.

The result of the two case studies, summarized in Table 1 below, illustrate how one such cognitive model may exist in assessing potential terrorist source recruitments as either Type A or Type B terrorists.

As proposed earlier in this thesis, it is the Type B individual who should be the primary focus of recruitment efforts. Even though they may operate within the context of a Type A organization, such as al-Qaeda, the Type Bs nevertheless approach the use of violence on an instrumental basis, which is predicted to be more responsive to rewards and punishments.

This is precisely what was observed in the behaviors of Al-Ridi and El-Hage. In spite of El-Hage's handicap and meek appearance, as the Type A terrorist, he proved to be uncooperative and committed to the very end. On the other hand, Al-Ridi, the Type B

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individual who was once viewed as "hard core" and unapproachable, proved to be very cooperative. Agents recruiting sources comprehend the utility of rewards and punishments, but they will have greater success when they can discern the behaviors which point them to the individuals who are geared psychologically to be more responsive to these rewards and punishments.

Table 1.   Summary Results of al-Qaeda Case Studies

Case Study Subject	Subject's description	Subject's al-Qaeda Category	Subject's assessed risk & commitment?	Subject's assessed aggression: Instrumental or Emotional?	Was the Subject a part-time or full-time jihadist?	Subject's Assessed level of SIS?	Is Subject assessed to be Type A or B?	Did subject cooperate?
Wadih El-Hage	Al-Qaeda operative; UBL's personal assistant	Central	High/High	Emotional	Full	High	A	No
Essam al-Ridi	Jihadist; pilot for UBL	Central or local	Low/Med	Instrumental	Part	Low	B	Yes

Type B individuals, like Al-Ridi, have instrumental aggression, which is intended to bring about a result; it is purposeful. As McCauley concluded, those terrorists displaying instrumental aggression should be more "sensitive" to "objective rewards and punishments" (McCauley, 2007, p. 22). When the "purpose" for these Type B individuals is obtained, these individuals can move off to non-terrorist pursuits. This was observed with Al-Ridi. When he chose to end his active participation with the jihad in Afghanistan, he did not move into another jihad or cause, instead he returned to the United States to pursue his aviation career. When he did assist on occasions in the future, it was for a limited purpose and partially financially driven.

The Type A terrorists, such as Wadih El-Hage, are possessed of emotional aggression, which "…is associated with anger and does not calculate long-term consequences. The reward of emotional aggression is hurting someone who has hurt you" (McCauley, 2007, p. 22). The Type A terrorists may never be satisfied and are unlikely to be satiated of the need to hurt someone. This description is very appropriate for El-Hage. This Type A terrorist moved from one front-line jihad tour to another, one suspicious murder to another, and one serious terrorist affiliation to another; this continued without a

significant pause for almost two decades. This may be what the Saudis recognized when in their counter-ideological program they eliminated *takfiris* who crossed the threshold of violence from participation in their programs, and while Davis and Jenkins saw that ultimately, Type A terrorists had to be arrested or eliminated.

The Type B terrorists are more likely to display lower levels of risk and commitment than their Type A counterparts, often placing them on the periphery of the organization. This was also observed with the two case studies. At the periphery, within front groups or *dawa* organizations, they are more accessible to investigating agents. This provides agents with starting points in their search for Type B candidates. As social networking analysis demonstrates, peripheral involvement within a terrorist organization does not equate to inferior access to important intelligence or denial to the interior workings of an organization. The access that Essam Al-Ridi had, for instance, could have provided superior intelligence on al-Qaeda activities leading-up to the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, had he been recruited in time. As it were, his cooperation as a witness against El-Hage was still very valuable.

In addition to viewing source targets through the lens of Type A and B classifications, greater insight into the predicted cooperativeness of potential al-Qaeda source candidates can be gained when they are simultaneously evaluated by other parameters discussed in this thesis. They must also be examined by their levels of risk and commitment, their part-time or full-time commitment to a jihad or their terrorist cause, and if they display signs of high or low Social Intensity Syndrome.

As the analysis of the jihadi network responsible for the Madrid bombings demonstrated, the Type B terrorists are also more likely to be the part-time jihadists, not the fully committed individuals who sever their ties to society in support of their cause. This was consistent with the two examples. The first, Al-Ridi, was a professional airline pilot. A generous description of his activities might be that he dabbled in supporting the jihad early and made money from it later. The second, El-Hage, was a professional jihadi. His career path was to move from one "job" supporting the jihad or al-Qaeda to another. These are worth quickly recapping:

- He worked in Afghanistan allegedly providing medical and religious items.

- H served as an armed courier of "stuff" in Afghanistan.

- H may have fought in Afghanistan.

- He purchased guns for one of the future World Trade Center bombers.

- He is tied to three murders within the United States.

- He worked for a jihadist-propaganda magazine in Tucson.

- He worked for the Maktab al-Khidimat in New York.

- He worked as Usama Bin Ladin's personal secretary in Sudan.

- He traveled the world as a purchasing agent for al-Qaeda.

- He worked for two front organizations which provided cover to himself and at least one other member of the East Africa al-Qaeda cell which destroyed the embassies in Nairobi and Dar al-Salaam.

When reviewing the career paths of El-Hage and Al-Ridi under this full-time/part-time lens (something agents may not be aware of), it seems almost ridiculous to ask who the better candidate was for cooperating with the FBI.

Social Intensity Syndrome should also be applied in reviewing potential sources. Type B terrorists may feel the pull of belonging to an intense, male-dominated in-group, as surely a terrorist group must be, but they can overcome the attractions of these groups. They can attend or visit a training camp, such as al-Ridi did, but decide to forgo further involvement and retreat to their prior existence. The Type B individuals can be involved with these in-groups, but on the periphery and not to the extent that their need to be with the terrorist in-group overcomes their commitment to family and society at large. Al-Ridi managed to decline an offer to work for Usama Bin Ladin. Would many Type A terrorists have done the same? El-Hage certainly failed that test.

As there is a demonstrable unwillingness of these part-time terrorists to fully extricate themselves from society, it seems illogical to conclude that they have fully committed themselves to a revolutionary restructuring of these same societies through a plan of violence. This would require a higher level of personal risk and commitment than they appear to posses.

Through the application of the suggestions in this thesis, FBI agents can gain a deeper insight into the histories and behaviors of their potential sources and the subjects of their investigations. They can take facts about their targets and interpret their value. It is known now, for example, that there is value in information that an individual with access to suspected terrorists maintains his full-time job and societal contacts, while his suspected terrorist associates do the opposite. There is value in knowing that an individual's risk for his organization never trumped his commitment to family or work. There is value in knowing that amongst a terrorist cell, one member believes acts of violence are for a specific purpose and reason, while his counter-parts simply want to lash-out and hurt someone. All of these examples are clues about who is more likely to cooperate if approached by the FBI, and who is more likely to reject potential rewards and punishments, like Wadih El-Hage.

In conclusion, those individuals who demonstrate traits leading to their classification as Type B terrorists are suggested to be more likely to cooperate in providing intelligence on terrorism matters, while their Type A counterparts are more likely to carry their cause with them to the jail or grave. It is among the Type B terrorists that FBI agents should concentrate their hunt for terrorist sources.

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