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Turkish Accession to the EU in Comparative Perspective

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in Comparative Perspective**

Paul Kubicek

May 2004

University of Oxford

Paul Kubicek is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Oakland University, Rochester Michigan. From 1995 to 1998, he taught at Koç University in Istanbul and has published several works on Turkish politics. Comments on the paper are welcome at kubicek@oakland.edu.

Abstract

While the European Union has recently added ten new states, the status of Turkey's bid to join the organization remains in doubt. This paper seeks to compare the Turkish experience with two other states, Slovakia and Romania, that also had initial difficulties in meeting the criteria for membership in the EU. It argues that all three countries can be labeled "reluctant democratizers," and looks at EU efforts to promote democratization in each case. In East-Central Europe, one can see that EU political conditionality can work, as the incentives to join the EU are quite strong. However, the EU must work with domestic actors to overcome resistance and even then, as Romania demonstrates, it requires time to root out entrenched problems such as corruption. In the Turkish case, there has been substantial progress since the door to membership was opened to Turkey in 1999, and the election of the moderately-Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 has given more impetus to domestic political reform. It is clear that the EU has a significant impact on the course of reform in Turkey, involving political parties, non-governmental organizations, and the public at large. The paper is guardedly optimistic that democratic institutions and norms can take hold in Turkey, and that Turkey can meet the criteria necessary for membership.

Introduction

The long-discussed eastward expansion of the European Union is now a fact. Ten countries, mostly in post-communist Europe, joined on 1 May 2004, and Romania and Bulgaria aim to join by 2007. As if this was not enough, Turkey stands at the back of the membership queue, and formal accession talks with Turkey may begin by the end of 2004. This last development is not something that many would have foreseen. While membership for Poles, Czechs, or Hungarians was largely seen as logical and inevitable, the case for the Turks was and is far more awkward, despite the fact that Turkey has been an Associate Member of the European Community since 1964. For those opposed to Turkish membership, Turkey is too big, too poor, too agricultural, too authoritarian, too nationalist, and too Muslim to qualify for membership.[1] As recently as December 1997, the European Union rejected Turkey's candidacy. However, it re-opened the door to Turkey at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, and the Turkish government has passed through a series of reforms with the goal of meeting the EU's Copenhagen Criteria for membership. One question, however, is whether the EU and Turkey can stay the course and push through all the necessary reforms so that Turkey can qualify for EU membership.

This paper addresses this issue by examining the Turkish bid to join the EU in broader perspective. It compares the Turkish case with others in the most recent round of expansion. True, certain factors are unique to Turkey: it is by far the largest of the aspiring member states, it has a different experience with modernization under Kemalist ideology, and it is overwhelmingly Muslim, meaning that the financial and cultural costs of accepting Turkey could be high. For the moment, however, we focus on the political, namely Turkey's democratic shortcomings and chronic human rights problems. These were invoked in 1997 to reject Turkey's membership bid. An important point to note,

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[1] For works that detail many of the past problems of the Turkish bid to join the EU, see Meltem Müftüler-Baç, *Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); Paul Kubicek, "Turkish-European Relations: At a New Crossroads?" *Middle East Policy Journal*, 6:4, June 1999: 157-173; Ziya Öniş, "Luxemburg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards and Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations," *Government and Opposition* 35, Autumn 2000: 463-483; Gamze Avcı, "Putting the

however, is that Turkey is not the only "reluctant democratizer" among the states hoping to join the EU.[2] Democratic shortcomings were also pronounced in such countries as Slovakia and Romania in the 1990s, and yet these states have made substantial headway with reforms. The primary question I examine in this paper is whether the experience of these states has relevance for the Turkish case, both in terms of EU strategy to promote reforms and domestic political conditions that make reform adoption and implementation more likely.

This paper is composed of four sections. The first contends that Slovakia, Romania, and Turkey have all been, for different reasons, reluctant democratizers. The second, drawing in large measure on international relations theory but also on the experience of the EU, looks at how democratic norms and behavior can be promoted by outside actors. The third section briefly reviews the measures undertaken by the EU with respect to Slovakia and Romania and their effect on domestic political reform. The final section seeks to apply the various lessons learned to the Turkish case, looking for parallels and incongruities that may (or may not) make the experience of these states relevant for Turkey as it seeks entry into the EU.

Bases for Comparison

Studies that compare the experiences of post-communist states are legion, whereas the Turkish case, because of its special features and singular status at the very end of the queue of potential EU members, might be viewed as too distinctive to be examined together with the states of Central and Eastern Europe.[3] Turkey is unique, especially for its size[4] and its religious and cultural traditions. Moreover, although not the poorest of the countries aspiring to membership, its GNP per capita is lower than that of

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Turkish EU Candidacy into Context," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 7, 2002: 91-110, and Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, eds., *Turkey and the European Union* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

[2] For a comparative look at several of these cases, see Paul Kubicek, ed. *The European Union and Democratization* (London: Routledge, 2003).

[3] For a study that explicitly makes this comparison on the question of democratization, see Paul Kubicek, "The Earthquake, Civil Society, and Democratization in Turkey: An Assessment with a View Toward Eastern Europe," *Political Studies*, 50:4, June 2002: 759-776.

[4] With a population of 67 million people, Turkey is almost twice as large as Poland, the largest post-communist state to join the EU.

the countries of Central Europe.[5] These factors alone might make member states apprehensive about admitting Turkey to the EU. *The Economist*, for example, analyzing the EU's candid opinion toward the aspiring members, asked in Turkey's case: "do we have to?"[6] Finally, one might note that the road to democracy in post-communist Europe was cleared with the demise of the *ancien regimes*, whereas in Turkey old statist habits (the "father-state" or *devlet baba*) rooted in Kemalism may still persist, thereby fostering practices that stress "republicanism over democracy, homogeneity over difference, the military over the civilian, and the state over society."[7]

One might add, however -- as many Turks would -- that Turkey does or at least should have advantages over the post-communist states. It was an important member of NATO throughout the Cold War, became an Associate Member of the European Community in 1964, and has a longer (if chequered) experience with democracy than the post-communist states that threw off the yoke of communist rule only in 1989. For these reasons, many Turks were outraged that the post-communist states essentially cut ahead of Turkey in the membership queue in 1997.[8]

Officially, the EU applies the same criteria to all aspiring members. The 1993 Copenhagen Criteria specify that any state that wants to join the EU must enjoy stable democratic institutions, the rule of law, respect for human rights and minorities, a functioning market economy, and have shown progress in adopting the EU's legal corpus, the *acquis communautaire*. While Turkey has had shortcomings in all three arenas, it was the deficiencies in Turkish democracy -- including human rights abuses, the role of the military in politics, and restrictions on speech and political participation -- that attracted most attention from the EU when it rejected Turkey's membership bid in

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[5] According to the World Bank, in 2002 the per capita income in Turkey (Atlas method) was $2500, about one-tenth of the current EU average. In comparison, Slovenia was the richest post-communist state ($9810), with Hungary ($5820), the Czech Republic ($5560), and Slovakia ($3950) further behind. Romania, at $1850 per person, was poorer than Turkey. Data available at www.worldbank.org.

[6] The Economist, November 17, 2001, p. 47.

[7] M. Hakan Yavuz, "Turkey's Fault Lines and the Crisis of Kemalism," *Current History* 99, January 2000, p. 34. For comparative data on values between Turkey and post-communist Europe, see results from the World Values Survey published in Ron Inglehart, *Modernization and Post-Modernization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

[8] The headline of the liberal Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet* (13 December 1997) read "Go to Hell, Europe," in wake of the EU's rejection of Turkish candidacy.

1997. Moreover, it is these political issues that remain the most significant obstacles to Turkish membership.

The point most relevant for this article is that Turkey was not the only state criticised for its democratic shortcomings. In 1997, Slovakia was not included in the group of potential entrants for failing to meet the Copenhagen Criteria on political grounds. The EU's *avis* noted that Slovakia's government did not respect the powers established in the constitution, disregarded the rights of the opposition, had a poor record with respect to its Hungarian and Roma minorities, exerted too much control over the media, and made improper use of police and secret services to intimidate and harass opponents.[9] US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright even labeled the country as a "hole in the [democratic] map of Europe."[10] Much of the blame was laid at the feet of Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar, who led two governments from 1992-94 and 1994-98. One observer noted:

> "A series of analyses of Mečiar's governments in comparison to those that preceded and followed them indicate that Slovakia's problems with democracy stem almost entirely from systematic efforts to dismantle externally imposed restraints on the power of government and parliament. Furthermore, the destruction of …horizontal accountability can be traced almost entirely to the initiative of Mečiar or one of his immediate subordinates."[11]

Specifically, Mečiar and his allies attempted to undermine the powers of the President, Michal Kováč, removed opponents from the parliament, resorted to bombings and kidnappings to attack their rivals, engaged in electoral shenanigans and tailored a new election law to suit their purposes. While much obviously depended upon Mečiar, some noted that he did not operate in a vacuum. Throughout the 1990s, he had substantial public support and was able to take advantage of a "nationalist-authoritarian" political

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[9] European Commision, *Agenda 2000: The Opinions of the European Commission on the Applications for Accession*, July 1997, report on Slovakia.
[10] Quoted in Kevin Krause, "Slovakia's Second Transition," *Journal of Democracy* 14:2, April 2003, p. 66.
[11] Kevin Krause, "The ambivalent influence of the European Union on democratization in Slovakia," in Kubicek, ed., 2003, pp. 57-58.

culture and justify his policies with the need to defend and develop the nascent Slovak state.[12]

Romania suffered from what might be called "incomplete democratization" in the wake of the ouster of Nicolae Ceauşescu in 1989.[13] Romania's first post-communist President, Ion Iliescu was a former Politburo member who had substantial ties to the Ceauşescu regime and enjoyed support from many former communists as well as many in the military and security services. In 1990, Iliescu's National Salvation Front (FSN) won parliamentary and presidential elections that were widely criticized as fraudulent and marred by intimidation of opponents and unequal access to the media. Afterwards, the country's democratic record did not immediately improve, as the government was accused of being behind violence against student demonstrators in Bucharest and against the Hungarian minority in Tîrgu Mureş. These events "ended the democratic honeymoon and substantially damaged the international credibility of Romania's new leaders" while putting Romania into a democratic "grey zone of stagnancy and irresolution."[14] The Council of Europe even delayed Romania's entry due to problems with its domestic politics and the EU suspended aid. Until a change in government in 1996, Romania was mired in a quasi-democratic system in which political elites had ill-defined power, exploited patron-client relationships, and used control over state resources, including the intelligence services, to intimidate and marginalize the opposition. In 1997, Romania (like Turkey) was left off the list of countries eligible to join the EU, thanks in part to its democratic track record in the 1990s.

The details of the ups and downs of Slovakia's and Romania's democratic transformation need not concern us here. Rather, the point is a very basic one: each state has made substantial progress since the mid-1990s. Slovakia's fortunes changed dramatically in 1998, when Mečiar's government fell in parliamentary elections and was replaced by a coalition government that was eager to repair Slovakia's relations with Europe and un-do much of the damage done by Mečiar. Thus, despite the handicaps of

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[12] Michael Carpenter, "Slovakia and the Triumph of Nationalist Populism," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 30:2, June 1997: 205-220.

[13] William Crowther, "The European Union and Romania," in Kubicek, ed. 2003, p. 90.

[14] Aurelian Craiuţu, "Light at the end of the tunnel: Romania, 1989-1998," in Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher, eds. *Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 169.

Mečiar's rule, Slovakia joined the EU at the same time as such unambiguous success stories as Poland and Hungary. In Romania's case, Iliescu was defeated in 1996 in presidential elections by Emil Constantinescu, who was "determined to make up for lost time in gaining entry into Western political and economic structures."[15] While economic reform floundered, Romania's democratic record significantly improved, particularly with respect to civil liberties and treatment of minorities, so that by 1998 Romania was judged to have met the political criteria for EU entry.[16] The 2000 presidential elections brought Iliescu back into the Presidency and yielded a second place finish to the extreme nationalist Corneliu Vadim Tudor, but Iliescu has re-affirmed Romania's European vocation and reform. At present, while economic issues are holding up Romania's application—membership by 2007 is by no means assured—democracy seems solidly established.[17]

The rationale for comparing these states with Turkey, particularly on the issue of EU accession, should now be clear. Like Slovakia and Romania, Turkey in the 1990s qualified as a reluctant democratizer, a state whose leaders were unwilling to enact measures to consolidate liberal, substantive democracy. True, as in Slovakia and Romania, there were significant elements of democracy in Turkey -- notably elections and opposition parties -- but for a variety of rather well-known reasons (human rights abuses, refusal to recognize Kurdish rights, the military's pronounced role in politics, limits on speech and bans on Islamic and Kurdish political parties) Turkey's democracy was deemed inadequate by European standards.[18] Like Slovakia and Romania in the 1990s, Turkey was ranked by Freedom House as a "partly free" country.[19] More recently, Slovakia and Romania have made real progress, and the Turkish governments since 2000 have shown a real willingness to push through a number of reforms both to

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[15] Crowther, 2003, p. 100.

[16]   Michael Shafir, "The Ciorbea Government and Democratization: A Preliminary Assessment," in D. Light and D. Phinnemore, eds. *Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), and "Romania's Road to Normalcy," *Journal of Democracy* 8, April 1997: 144-158.

[17] Annette Freyburg-Inan, "Which Way to Progress? Impact of International Organizations in Romania," in Ronald Linden, ed. *Norms and Nannies* (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield ,2002). She notes, however, concerns about corruption and the need to continue improvements in minority rights, especially for the Roma.

[18] Useful summaries of the problems can be found in Thomas Smith, "The politics of conditionality: The European Union and human rights reform in Turkey,' in Kubicek, 2003, and in William Hale, "Human Rights, the European Union, and the Accession Process," in Çarkoğlu and Rubin, 2003.

strengthen Turkish democracy and meet EU political criteria. These will be elaborated below in more detail. The questions that I want to focus on, however, are how important was EU pressure in the Slovak and Romanian cases and, to the extent that the EU can be regarded as a successful promoter of democracy in those countries, could the EU do the same for Turkey, culminating in eventual Turkish membership of the EU?

In order to provide a framework to help address these questions, let us briefly examine how external pressure and the spread of international norms might contribute to democratization in a reluctant democratizer.

External Promotion of Democracy: Useful Strategies and Conditions

In recent years a substantial literature on the spread of international norms and external promotion of democracy has developed, some of it specific to the EU's democratization agenda.[20] Many notions have been advanced to label and define mechanisms through which international influence may shape domestic democratization. These include contagion, diffusion, adaptation, complex interdependence, convergence, *Zeitgeist*, socialization, learning, and conditionality. For our purposes, however, we are most interested in the *active* and *purposeful* policies -- as opposed to more passive factors such as contagion or diffusion -- adopted by international actors such as the EU and in those domestic political structures and conditions that are most amenable to outside influence. In other words, we need to look both at what the EU does and at whether domestic conditions allow EU norms and standards to resonate or, alternatively, whether they work against or water down EU efforts to promote democracy.

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[19] *Freedom in the World Country Ratings*, available at www.freedomhouse.org.
[20] The literature on international norms is quite voluminous. In my view, one of the most useful contributions is Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For works specific to the EU, see, in addition to Kubicek, 2003, and Linden, 2002, Laurence Whitehead, ed. *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas* (expanded edition). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), and Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Organization* 55, Winter 2001: 47-80.

Some would argue that conditionality is the most effective approach the EU can adopt.[21] Aid or persuasive tactics alone do not offer enough incentive for states to make necessary reforms. Instead, the very tangible carrot of EU membership must be on the table, and the EU must be willing to employ the stick of denying a state membership if it fails to meet EU criteria.

There are, however, problems with applying conditionality. One is that states must already have demonstrated at least some progress on political and economic questions to be eligible for EU membership and hence subject to conditionality. If membership is -- at best -- a very distant prospect (as may be the case for Ukraine, for example), the motivation to make immediate reforms is not as pronounced as if membership is imminent.

Secondly, conditionality depends upon the readiness and willingness of elites in applicant countries to respond. While the simple model of conditionality might suggest that domestic elites roll over in the face of international pressure, they may be reluctant to do so, particularly if reforms such as democratization jeopardize their hold on power. This was clearly the case with Slovakia under Mečiar in 1994-98, since "democratic conditionality has negligible influence when a government is really determined to pursue its own deviant transition trajectory."[22] "Hard dictatorships" may thus be impervious to EU pressure. However, quasi-democratic "hybrid states" may be easier to crack, in part because external actors can make alliances with domestic actors so that the government is subject to both inside and outside pressure. Risse and Sikkink label this a "boomerang effect" in which domestic opponents of the regime become empowered by use of an international norm (thus gaining legitimacy) and transnational links to external actors who can provide training, socialization, and material support.[23]

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[21]   See Kubicek, 2003, and Alexander Cooley, "Western Conditions and Domestic Choices: The Influence of External Actors on the Post-Communist Transition," in *Nations in Transit 2003* (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).

[22] Geoffrey Pridham, "Complying with the European Union's Democratic Conditionality: Transnational Party Linkages and Regime Change in Slovakia, 1993-1998," *Europe-Asia Studies* 51:7, November 1999, p. 1238.

[23] Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction," in Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 1999.

Finally, the materialistic orientation of conditionality (e.g. do X in order to get Y) appeals only to what Schimmelfennig calls the "logic of consequentiality."[24] In other words, actors follow the prescriptions of the EU more out of a crude calculation of costs and benefits than due to an internalization of the norm or policy as legitimate or morally correct. The issue is therefore one of motivation -- what are the real causes of the policy shift brought about by the use of conditionality? One might argue that this is not crucial, as all that matters is whether the targeted state adopts the appropriate policy. However, motivation may affect the depth of change. If state elites only acquiesce to the norm, they may create only "Potemkin" institutions that meet formal criteria but fail to ensure that policies are implemented in a manner that really brings about substantive change.[25] This issue points to the need for concerted monitoring of the targeted state and the need to look beyond declarations or formal legal changes to how policies are actually implemented.

 Given these problems, when can we be more confident that conditionality and the spread of international norms will work? As an external factor, one concern is whether the targeted state has access to alternatives to the carrots and sticks of the EU. If a targeted state can draw on another powerful state (e.g. Russia or the United States) for aid or protection if it is shunned by the EU, the less likely it is that EU conditionality will work.

Internally, within the targeted state, one needs to take into account the domestic structure, in particular state-society relations. As noted, to the extent that domestic society matters and is not completely subjugated to the state, one can create transnational networks of political parties, non-governmental organizations and individuals within the targeted state. In this circumstance, one might imagine that conditionality should be more effective as the reluctant democratizers will be under pressure from an alliance of international and domestic actors. These networks, however, are more likely to emerge if the norm has a high degree of salience in the targeted state. By salience -- or what

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[24] Frank Schimmelfennig, "Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern European States—Conceptual and Theoretical Issues," in Linden, 2002, pp. 12-13.
[25] Schimmelfennig, 2002, p. 13.

Checkel calls "cultural match"[26] -- one refers to the degree to which the norm resonates with the culture of society and can claim some degree of domestic authorship. The more the norm matches pre-existing values, interests, practices, and identity and the less it faces domestic or even regional competitors, the easier it will find adherents within the targeted state and the harder it will be for entrenched elites to oppose the norm. In the case of EU membership, groups in a state which identifies strongly with Europe (and indeed the mantra of 'return to Europe' has been prevalent throughout post-communist Europe), will find it harder to oppose the EU (even on nationalistic grounds) and it will thus be easier for the EU and its norms to gain traction. Moreover, one might add that if the international norm enjoys domestic salience and legitimacy, it may be adopted more out of the "logic of appropriateness" (e.g. we do this because it is the proper thing to do) rather than the "logic of consequentiality."[27]

This last point leads to an obvious question: how can we identify the logic under which a democratic norm or policy is adopted? Do elites truly get "converted" and become democrats out of a sense of moral commitment or obligation? Or, are elites more calculating and change course only to receive tangible benefits (e.g. aid from the EU or political credit for leading their country into the EU)? Given the EU's interest in substantive democracy -- that is, factors such as political participation, functioning political parties, pluralism of media, and active civil society -- the EU would like the former to prevail in order to assure the depth of democracy, but this is, in the short term at least, arguably the less likely outcome. Risse and Sikkink, for example, maintain that international socialization typically begins with rhetorical change, followed by formal legal/political modifications, and finally a transformation of values occurs.[28] Of course, it bears mentioning that the genuine internalization of democratic norms may occur with the political opposition or even the mass of the population before it occurs within an elite that has demonstrated reluctance to democratize.

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[26] Jeffrey Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," *International Studies Quarterly* 43, 2001: 83-144. See also Andrew Cortell and James Davis, "Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda," *International Studies Review* 2, 2000: 65-87.

[27] Schimmelfennig, 2002, pp. 12-13.

[28] Risse and Sikkink, 1999.

The question remains, though, how we, as outside observers, can tell if a norm has been internalized? The best means of doing so is to look at who sanctions those who violate the norm. If it is up to the "nanny" international organization to intervene and sanction those who violate the norm, then one is likely witnessing a case in which there is a low level of internalization of the norm within the targeted state. If, on the other hand, norm violators are sanctioned primarily from within the state (e.g. by courts, voters, the media), then one can argue that the norm has taken hold within the state and be more confident that the government will be less able to pursue policies that deviate from international democratic standards.

The EU and Political Change in Slovakia and Romania

The factors developed in the preceding section help us to analyze both EU efforts to promote democratic change in Slovakia and Romania and the future prospects of similar aims in Turkey.

Turning first to Slovakia, several points deserve mention. The first is that the Slovak government did not directly challenge the EU norm of democracy, reflecting both the fact that the norm (if not practice) of democracy had taken hold in Slovakia and that the EU enjoyed status as a credible, legitimate institution. However, the Mečiar government did all it could to resist EU conditionality, maintaining at various times that EU demarches had been misinterpreted, that Slovakia's accession was assured regardless of frequent criticisms, that EU membership was not really worthwhile since it would be costly and threaten the country's sovereignty, and that the EU would not accept Slovakia no matter what it did.[29] This last strategy may have been the most plausible, as by the mid-1990s there was in fact mounting concern that EU expansion would in fact be long in coming and, if this was so, the logic of conditionality would not apply since there was no clear incentive to reform. At the December 1997 summit in Luxemburg, however, this position became untenable, as the EU finally committed to begin accession negotiations with several states -- although not Slovakia. Moreover, by this time, EU frustration with

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[29] Krause, " The ambivalent influence," 2003.

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Mečiar was mounting, with one European representative directly challenging the Slovaks to "change the government."[30]

This raises another key point: the electoral option was available to voters, and by 1998 various Slovak political parties had taken advantage of network links with European parties and institutions to enhance their organizational capacity and "provide an important opening for European pressures on Slovak politics."[31] The September 1998 parliamentary elections thus became a matter of great international interest, with both the future of Slovak democracy and European ambitions on the line. The actual impact of international influence on these elections is debatable[32], but there is no doubt that matters quickly turned around under the new Prime Minister, Mikulaš Dzurinda. By December 1998, the European Parliament announced, "The basic obstacles preventing Slovakia from integrating into the European Union have been removed."[33] This reflects another important consideration: Slovakia's deficiencies were tied more to a single person than to institutional defects. Once Mečiar was removed, progress was quick, and Slovakia was added to the queue of prospective members and judged to have met the political criteria. Elections in 2002 further solidified democratic consolidation in Slovakia, as Mečiar's comeback bid was defeated, so that "the nationalist-authoritarian experiment is effectively over."[34] In May 2003, 92% of Slovaks approved EU membership in a referendum -- the highest level of support among the countries that voted on membership.

The Romanian case shares many similarities with the Slovak. First, the state was formally a democracy, even if practice fell short. There was an opposition that could both criticize the government and forge links with external actors, and the elites could not directly attack the norm of democratic governance. Transnational party links -- particularly between the Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe and the

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[30] Krause, 2003, "The ambivalent influence," p. 73.
[31] Pridham, 1999, p. 1238.
[32] Pridham 1999, p. 1238 says they "should not be underrated," whereas Krause (2003) is more ambivalent about the issue and Schimmelpennig (2002, p. 21) labels the election results as a "coincidental positive effect."
[33] Quoted in Krause, "The ambivalent influence," 2003, p. 69.
[34] Krause, "Slovakia's Second Transition," 2003, p. 65.

National Peasants Party (which was one of the main victors in 1996 elections) -- were important in accelerating the democratic process in Romania.[35]

Second, the Iliescu regime -- despite the fact that it had poor democratic credentials -- was committed to the European project. It signed an Association Agreement as early as 1993 and submitted a formal application to join the EU in 1995. Moreover, all political parties approved the Snagov protocol in 1994 in which they pledged their support for EU membership, which has generally been viewed as a means to "escape" the Balkans and all its negative connotations.[36] These factors have assured the EU of almost universal legitimacy and support across the Romanian political spectrum and prevented the emergence of a pronounced anti-EU movement.[37]

Third, as in Slovakia, there is evidence to suggest that as voters recognized the disjuncture between the goal of EU entry and the democratic shortcomings of the government, they "learned" the necessary lesson to put an end to the regime of the reluctant democrats and push beyond cosmetic or superficial political changes.[38] In other words, there was some degree of internal sanctioning of norm violators, suggesting that European norms had been internalized by a sizeable portion of Romanian society. Finally, as Tom Gallagher notes, the ebbs and flows of democracy in Romania have been tied to how open the door has been to European institutions, so that when prospects for integration have faltered, Romanian elites have lost taste for a "post-nationalist agenda."[39] In other words, as in Slovakia, conditionality has worked best when the carrots have been clearly visible.

There are two important caveats to note, however, with respect to the Romanian case. As noted, in 2000 Ion Iliescu returned to the Romanian presidency, as voters registered their disappointment with the performance of President Emil Constantinescu. Nevertheless, Iliescu, despite his record in the 1990s, named the reform-oriented Adrian Nastase as prime minister, relied on backing from an ethnic Hungarian party, adopted

[35] Valentin Stan, "Influencing regime change in the Balkans: The role of external forces in the transition," in Pridham and Gallagher, eds. 2000, p. 155.
[36] Geoffrey Pridham, "Romania and the European Union Accession: The Domestic Dimension," *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics* 1:2, 2002, p. 33.
[37] Even Corneliu Vadim Tudor of the Greater Romanian Party says he is in favor of EU membership.
[38] Craiuțu, 2000, p. 184.
[39] Tom Gallagher, "Nationalism and Democracy in South-East Europe," in Pridham and Gallagher, 2000, p. 104.

several long-delayed reforms, and pushed ahead with accession negotiations with the EU. Although Romania still falls short on economic grounds, by the end of 2003 it had closed negotiations on 23 of the 31 chapters of the *acquis communautaire.*

The second caveat is that the EU is still not entirely pleased with Romania's progress on a number of political questions. In other words, there are still bumps in the road in Romania's path to EU membership. Despite the fact that the European Commission has consistently noted in its yearly reports that Romania meets the Copenhagen political criteria, in February 2004 the European Parliament (EP) issued a blistering report that noted that accession to the EU would be "impossible" unless there was progress on a number of fronts, including corruption, harassment of journalists, and treatment and adoption procedures of Romanian orphans.[40] The implication is that at least one body of the EU (the EP must approve any accession) does not think that Romania completely fulfills the political aspects of the Copenhagen Criteria. Unlike Slovakia, Romania, which has a variety of entrenched problems, has not been able to turn its political system around quickly and thoroughly enough to satisfy all actors within the EU, and membership, which had been held up primarily on economic grounds, is now threatened by political difficulties.

What does this development reveal? One crucial point with potential relevance for Turkey is that EU pressure cannot remove deep-seated problems. As one pair of observers noted:

> "…observations made year after year concerning weaknesses in the implementation of reforms related to political criteria for accession, and, indeed, for the democratic functioning of the country itself, have now accumulated the weight to slow down Romania's advances."[41]

It is one thing to have elections that bring in new leaders and embrace the rhetoric of reform. It is something else to implement reforms, and on this front Romania has lagged. Moreover, the imperative to reform might have dissipated once the EU judged Romania

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[40] Anette Freyberg-Inan and Andrei Ogrezeanu, "Transnationalization Dynamics in Southeast Europe: The Case of Romania's Progress toward EU Accession," Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, Montreal Quebec, March 17-20, 2004.
[41] Freyberg-Inan and Ogrezeanu..

to have met Copenhagen's political criteria, but now lingering concerns have caught up with the country and it is hard to achieve a real democratic breakthrough by *fiat*. One might also suggest that the EP hopes to use this report to influence Romanian domestic politics by bolstering the prospects of more liberally-oriented parties ahead of the 2004 elections. Regardless of whether this is an explicit aim, there is little doubt that the EU is, in a sense, upping the ante, trying to apply additional conditionality to make Romanian leaders address festering problems. While the charges in the report are serious, there are grounds for optimism. Pridham notes, "outside impetus from the EU is crucial in maintaining pressure for change [in Romania] whether in terms of state capacity or policy reform. It is likely to be slow but in the end political will on the part of governments is increasing and prolonging momentum over accession will be just as decisive."[42]

Again, while the parallels with the Turkish case may not be exact, the important point in both cases is that EU efforts, coupled with favorable domestic conditions, can produce change in reluctant democratizers. With Turkey now on the edge of starting accession talks with the EU, the question is what lessons these experiences hold for the Turkish case.

The Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective

After a rather undiplomatic rebuff in 1997, Turkey was in 1999 accepted as a candidate for EU membership. Although accession talks did not immediately begin, in December 2002 the EU announced that it could begin these negotiations as early as December 2004 if Turkey met the political criteria for membership. Prior to 1999, as with Slovakia in the mid-1990s, the carrot of membership had not been on the table, and the EU's "declaratory diplomacy" over Turkey's democratic shortcomings and poor human rights record had had only a limited impact, as "none of the major political parties [in Turkey]…actively pushed for the kind of reforms needed -- notably in the political arena

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[42] Pridham, 2002, p. 39.

-- to satisfy the conditions set by the EU."[43] After the Helsinki summit of 1999, however, membership became a real possibility and the ball was pushed into Turkey's court.

The results have been quite dramatic and, at first glance, Turkey appears to be moving along the path of Slovakia and Romania. In March 2000, the EU put forward -- in an Accession Partnership -- a number of short-term and medium-term goals for Turkey to meet in order for its application to proceed. These demands included legalization of broadcasts in Kurdish, Kurdish-language education[44], a ban on capital punishment, lifting restrictions on speech and assembly, training for police officials and the judiciary, a reduced role for the military in politics, and progress on the Cyprus problem (this last point falling outside the Copenhagen Criteria applied to other states). In response, the Turkish government pushed forward the National Programme for the Adoption of the *Acquis*, unveiled in March 2001. The Programme's language on political questions closely followed that of Brusssels, but the actual content was clearly a compromise between the EU's demands and the concerns of conservatives within the Turkish establishment on issues such as rights for the Kurdish minority.[45] In October 2001, the government pushed through 34 constitutional amendments in line with EU recommendations, and in August 2002 further reforms on the most sensitive issues (e.g. the death penalty, Kurdish-language media) were passed by the Turkish parliament. All told, the Turks have tried to address all the issues raised by the EU.

In November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), with Islamist roots but a decidedly pro-EU agenda, swept to victory in parliamentary elections, while the anti-EU Nationalist Action Party (MHP), a coalition partner in the government, was soundly defeated. The AKP government, responding both to EU efforts and a wish to re-define itself to Turkish voters, has accelerated the pace of reform. The government has passed a variety of measures, including ending the state of emergency in all provinces of the (largely Kurdish) southeast, abolishing the infamous Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Act (which prohibited propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state), establishing an EU Harmonisation Commission, and adopting the UN Covenants on Civil and Political

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[43] See Ziya Öniş, "Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era," in Çarkoğlu and Rubin, 2003, p. 17, and Smith, 2003, pp. 116-118.
[44] The issue is not Kurdish as the medium of instruction in schools, but instruction of Kurdish as a language suitable for study, similar to the status of Corsican in France.

Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Meanwhile, polls consistently reveal that approximately two-thirds of Turks would vote in favor of EU membership,[46] and the government's reforms have enjoyed significant public support. In addition, many very visible organizations, most notably the Economic Development Foundation and TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) have taken up the cause of democratization and joining the EU, and have forged transnational alliances with partners in the EU. One hundred and seventy-five non-governmental organizations founded in 2002 the *Avrupa Hareketi 2002* (Movement for Europe 2002), and the EU could use this initiative to its advantage to create the "boomerang effect" in Turkey.[47]

These facts support the change of course in Turkish politics, and have provided cause for optimism for the EU that Turkey could meet the political criteria by 2004. As one observer noted, since 2000, Turkey has witnessed a "period of profound and momentous change in Turkish history…[A] change of this magnitude would have been impossible in the absence of a powerful and highly institutionalized EU anchor in the direction of full membership."[48] Guenther Verheugen, the EU's Commissioner for Enlargement, noted in 2003 that "the passage of reforms through parliament shows the strong determination of the Turkish government to get in shape for EU membership."[49] Given the strong role of the EU in Turkish politics, a new leadership committed to adopting the EU reform package, and incentives for change firmly in place, one has hopes that Turkey can in fact follow in the footsteps of Slovakia and Romania.

However, sceptics continue to suggest that Turkey's path to the EU will be problematic. One concern is that these reforms are all relatively new and many have encountered resistance from the military and/or some parties in parliament. Hence implementation -- a major concern for the EU -- will require monitoring. Some outside observers argue that Turkey has established little more than a Potemkin human rights regime, with bureaucratic offices (e.g. High Human Rights Board, Human Rights Investigation Board) but little follow-through. Indeed, one of Turkey's leading voices for

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[45] Öniş, 2003, p. 13.
[46] A majority of Turks in almost all sub-strata, including the highly religious, favor EU membership. See Ali Çarkoğlu, "Who Wants Full Membership? Characteristics of Turkish Public Support for EU Membership," in Çarkoğlu and Rubin, 2003.
[47] Öniş, 2003, p. 20.
[48] Öniş, 2003, p. 13.

human rights, Sema Pişkinsüt, who chaired a parliamentary human rights committee and uncovered numerous types of abuses, was removed from her post in 2001 for her zealousness.[50] On the Kurdish issue, the study of Kurdish is now technically legal, but observers note the presence of bureaucratic and extra-legal harassment that frequently prevent courses from actually being taught.[51] On freedom of speech issues, while there have been constitutional amendments to strengthen individual rights, the language of the constitution (Article 13) still notes that rights and freedoms "may be restricted" and penal codes that penalize those who would "insult or deride" the moral character of the Republic, state bodies, or the military (Article 159) or those that provoke religious or ethnic hatred and enmity "in a manner dangerous to public order" (Article 312, revised) are still in effect.[52] These laws have been the basis for many trials and imprisonments that have been criticized by the EU. As for political participation, in June 2001 the Turkish Constitutional Court banned the Islamist *Fazilet* (Virtue) Party and in March 2003 closed the largely Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HADEP). True, the European Court of Human Rights rejected the claims of those who protested against the ban on *Fazilet*, but the fact that this party -- which had attracted sizeable (15%) support -- was closed troubled many. The AKP government's reluctance to address purely "Islamic" issues (e.g. the ban on the headscarf) is an indicator that the government may still worry about outside intervention in politics. On the question of the military's role, Ziya Öniş rightly notes that reducing the military's power cannot "be achieved solely by institutionally limiting the presence of the military in executive circles [e.g. the National Security Council]."[53]

These problems are recognized by the EU, which, despite the reforms of the AKP government, has yet to declare that Turkey has met the Copenhagen political criteria. Indeed, in its 2003 regular report, the European Commission, while noting progress on several fronts, also stated that the "reforms have produced limited practical effects….[and] implementation has been slow and uneven." It highlighted problems with the courts and with the establishment of Kurdish education and media, and "inconsistent

[49] From *The Turkey Update*, 4 August 2003, available at www.csis.org/turkey/TU030804.pdf.
[50] Smith, 2003, pp. 124-125.
[51] *The Economist* (US edition), 13 December 2003, p. 46.
[52] Hale, 2003, p. 114.

use of articles of the Penal Code when applied to cases related to freedom of expression."[54] Human Rights Watch has also noted that torture remains widespread and human rights activists continue to be harassed and prosecuted.[55]

Nevertheless, while conceding that a major turnaround will not occur overnight, one might expect that Turkey will be able to meet the EU's political criteria, perhaps by the fall of 2004. While there is greater cause for optimism than perhaps ever before, one needs to add some important caveats. The first, as noted in Romania, is that political reforms to meet the demands of the EU may do little to solve the most pressing daily problems for most Turks -- lack of housing, underemployment, unequal access to education, entrenched local corruption, and poverty. Moreover, efforts to meet the economic criteria -- worthy of a prolonged discussion in their own right[56] -- may produce economic and social pain. In other words, while the AKP government may curry favor with Brussels, this is no guarantee that it will be able to maintain its support over the long-term within Turkey. Indeed, this problem will be exacerbated by the fact that regardless of what Turkey does, it is hard to imagine that the EU will admit Turkey before 2010. In the meantime, patience may wear thin and the logic of conditionality may be less potent if the benefits of meeting EU demands are not immediately realised. This is especially true if the EU refuses to begin accession negotiations with Turkey in 2004.

One might argue that this would not matter as long as there is a firm consensus in Turkey about the need to reform and meet the EU criteria. In other words, Turks may be willing to wait since they recognize the advantages and necessity of gaining EU membership. Yet while the support for joining the EU amongst the public is high -- although one must wonder how informed or deep this sentiment truly is -- the fact is that Turkey has not reached, as Slovakia and Romania had, a consensus on joining the EU. As noted, in the recent past the MHP stood in the way of numerous EU-backed reforms (e.g. banning the death penalty, Kurdish media), equating EU demands with those of "terrorist organizations." Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the MHP, stated in 2000 in response to the EU's

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[53] Öniş, 2003, p. 15.
[54] European Commission, *2003 Regular Report on Turkey's progress toward accession*, available at europa.eu.int/comm./enlargement/report_2003/pdf/rr_tk.final.pdf.
[55] Report on Turkey available at www.hrw.org.
[56] See Mine Eder, "Implementing the Economic Criteria of EU Membership: How Difficult is it for Turkey," in Çarkoğlu and Rubin, 2003.

Accession Partnership that, "It is impossible to say that the European Commission is making a goodwill approach. It is not possible for Turkey to look warmly at cultural and ethnic rights that can fuel ethnic clashes and division."[57]

Powerful voices within the military have also grumbled over the wisdom of implementing an EU agenda that is "not in line with Turkey's reality." The former Turkish Chief of Staff even suggested that the EU is intent upon achieving an independent Kurdistan and the dismemberment of Turkey.[58] According to some, the root of the problem is that while the EU is pushing for shared or pooled sovereignty among its members and a post-modern state that recognizes multiple identities and minority rights, Turkish nationalism is fundamentally modernist and authoritarian based upon a single identity.[59] Opponents of the EU can argue that democratic norms are "foreign" and cannot be applied to the complex Turkish reality -- as if no other state has ever had to deal with restive ethnic minorities! Notably, Eurobarometer surveys from 2003 reveal that Turks are the most distrustful (38%) of the EU out of all those in the current membership queue, showing that there is strong potential for an anti-EU backlash.[60]

The EU did not face such problems in either Slovakia or Romania, where support for the EU was and remains high. In the former case, Mečiar did try to play the nationalist card, but the pull of Europe was far too strong and Slovak nationalism was not well-entrenched.[61] In Romania, Iliescu flirted with nationalism, but Ceauşescu's prior use of nationalism had left it a relatively compromised force and the revolution of 1989 had helped to create a new playing field in which the discourse of Europe prevailed. Turkey, which is not a new state and has not experienced a regime change, may find it more difficult to dispense with its nationalist past, and this legacy may prove a barrier in its relations with Europe.

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[57] Originally in *Turkey Update*, 14 November 2000, quoted in Kubicek, "The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political Change in Turkey," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 5:2, June 2001, available through www.meria.idc.ac.il.

[58] Smith, 2003, p. 124.

[59] See Kubicek, 2002, and Öniş, 2003.

[60] Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, 2003, available through website of EU at europa.eu.int.

[61] Some may dispute this claim. However, I would note that by 2002, four years after Mečiar fell from power, the nationalist discourse in Slovakia had been cast to the political sidelines (see Krause, "Slovakia's Second Transition," 2003, pp. 65-79), revealing that it was a rather ephemeral phenomenon.

This aspect of Turkish politics is important when one turns to the questions of the motivations underlying Turkish compliance with EU demands. In the end, perhaps, the most obdurate resistance to political reform may be overcome so that the necessary laws will be adopted[62], but this may not mean that all or most Turks recognize the "logic of appropriateness" of these reforms. Instead, one could rather argue that the "logic of consequentiality" has been at work, as the primary body that sanctions would-be violators of democratic norms is the EU, not Turkish parties or institutions. One Turkish commentator summed up the situation neatly, arguing in 2000 that Turks are following the dictates of the EU like students doing their homework only because the teacher told them to do so, not because they recognize the intrinsic value of the work itself.[63] Indeed, the fact that in 2001 thirty-four constitutional amendments were pushed through so quickly and with so little debate may lead one to worry that the Turks are simply ticking off boxes and doing little to internalize the norms or put real domestic authorship behind them.[64]

Fortunately, many of these concerns are less relevant today than they were before, demonstrating, perhaps, that Turkey has responded in profound ways to EU conditionality. First, has been a change of government, with the pro-EU AKP government replacing an unstable coalition government that contained the anti-EU MHP. The leaders of AKP are deeply committed to the integration project, viewing accession as part of a historical mission to prove that Islam and democracy are compatible. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has declared that the EU is "not a Christian club" but a "community of values...the values that Turkey has committed itself to are the values that form the basis of Western democracies."[65] The change in discourse surrounding EU accession has been marked. In Erdoğan's view, the EU is not just a set of opportunities to be looked at from a cost-benefit approach, but a civilizational project,

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[62] Notably, some reform measures, on, for example, Kurdish language policy, in June 2003 were vetoed by the President, Ahmet N. Sezer, but the National Assembly, controlled by the AKP, was able to override this veto.

[63] Cüneyt Ülsever in *Turkish Daily News*, 18 July 2000.

[64] I would only note anecdotally that in numerous conversations with Turks in the 1990s, I was told that the Turkish Constitution (adopted in 1982 while the country was under military rule) was virtually sacrosanct and that the restrictions on various freedoms were necessary given the Turkish reality. The fact that the Constitution was changed so quickly, after the door to EU membership was opened, is hardly coincidental.

[65] *Deutsche-Welle*, September 3, 2003.

one in which Turkey can and should play a role. Thus, to those who would suggest Turkey has other alternatives (e.g. ties with the United States, NATO, or even Central Asia), Erdoğan and his government would disagree, arguing not only that the EU brings trade, investment, and other tangible benefits, but also that membership is a historical necessity on political and cultural grounds.

Erdoğan's path was been cleared with the "retirement" of several EU critics in the military, and his government also received a major boost in March 2004 when AKP overwhelmingly won in local elections. The government has even pushed through controversial social reforms including a ban on discrimination against homosexuals and harsh punishments for "honor killings," both surprising those who considered AKP "Islamist" and revealing the party's willingness to take political risk for the sake of social reform. This points to some evidence that the new Turkish government may be responding to the "logic of appropriateness." Moreover, with the passage of time, one might argue that even if some reforms have been adopted initially out of cost-benefit considerations, once the government is forced to take responsibility for them and defend them, they internalize European norms and persuade voters that these are real and important achievements. Over time, what was once controversial (e.g. the ban on the death penalty), may be accepted as "normal."

Two final issues remain, neither of which confronted any post-communist state. The first is that even if Turkey meets the political criteria, it will still be big and Muslim. The former may not be an intractable problem, but the cultural divide between Turkey and Europe deserves attention, as most Turks believe that Turkey will not be allowed to join the "Christian club" of the EU regardless of what the country does.[66] This concern, of course, undermines the logic of conditionality (e.g. the question becomes 'why reform?'). Unfortunately, this is not an unfounded fear, as several prominent European politicians have noted, among other things, that the EU is a "civilizational project" in which "Turkey has no place" and that admitting Turkey to the EU would be the "end of

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[66] From 2002 survey of 3060 respondents conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), available at www.tesev.org.tr/eng.

Europe."[67] In the post-9/11 world, Europeans have been less enthusiastic about admitting Turks than about any of the other peoples applying for entry to the EU.[68] While one can argue that the fears on each side are exaggerated or based upon unfair stereotypes, the fact is that they exist and that they complicate Turkish-EU relations. The refusal of the EU to immediately begin accession negotiations with Turkey in 1999 or confirm in subsequent years that Turkey has met the political criteria is seen by some Turks as either prejudice or insincerity, evidence that the EU is merely playing a game with Turkey by keeping it on the doorstep of the EU but not intending to let it in. If this goes on much longer, the momentum for reform in Turkey will likely waver, as the Mečiar-style argument that "they will never take us" will become the accepted wisdom. At present, there are more hopeful signs, as Turkey has secured important allies in Europe, with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and British Prime Minister Tony Blair supporting the Turkish membership bid, and the Greeks no longer actively oppose Turkish membership. However, France still seems at best skeptical of the Turkish bid, and Turkey has become a major issue in the European Parliament elections of June 2004.

Secondly, Turks note that they are subject to unfair standards not applied to any other state. The primary evidence of this is that the EU demands progress on the Cyprus problem before Turkey can enter the EU. As noted, this is not part of the Copenhagen Criteria, and, for many Turks, this has been nothing less than "Greek blackmail", as Athens, arguably, tried to use its position within the EU to force Turkey to make concessions on the long-standing division of the island. Full discussion of the Cyprus issue is beyond the scope of this paper.[69] However, while it has been an intractable problem for almost three decades, there are significant actors in Turkey (among them the leaders of the AKP) that have accepted the Annan Plan of the United Nations as a basis

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[67] These are by former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (*The Guardian*, March 7, 1997)and former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (*Le Monde*, November 8, 2002). Similar statements have been made by other, less prominent officials.

[68] Eurobarometer surveys in 2002 revealed that only 31% of Europeans favor Turkish membership in the EU. See Faruk Şen, "The Way Europe Sees Turkey and Turkey Sees Europe," *Zaman* (Istanbul), June 10, 2003. Slovenia, at 56% approval, ranked the highest. Respondents in Luxemburg (12%), Austria (14%), Denmark (16%) and Germany (18%) were least enthusiastic about Turkish membership. Those in Mediterranean countries (Spaniards [48%], Portuguese [45%], and Italians [41%]) were the most supportive, and Greek support was at 28%.

[69] For more, see Semin Suvarierol, "The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the European Union," in Çarkoğlu and Rubin, 2003.

for negotiations. Negotiations and referendums in the spring of 2004 have shown that the Greeks -- not Turkey or Turkish Cypriots – have put up the main roadblocks to reunification of the island, as Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of a reunification plan. Turkey has thus scored a public relations victory, winning praise and rewards from the EU, and the AKP government has shown that it can stand up to some opponents (mainly in the military) who in the past had refused to consider reunification or a Turkish pullout.

Conclusion

Turkey is now subject to the requirements of EU conditionality. Past application of conditionality in other reluctant democratizers has led to political change and fulfillment of the political criteria for entry to the EU. Some might hope that this past success can be replicated in the Turkish case, and certainly in the past three years there has been substantial political reform in Turkey, much of it attributable to the direct influence of the EU. Thus, there is good reason to believe that conditionality can work in the Turkish case. However, as the Romanian example demonstrates, EU conditionality cannot solve every problem. Turkey will carry a lot of baggage into accession talks, and the scope of needed reforms is very large. True, the new government is committed to making the necessary reforms, but implementation will take time, and the EU may be in no hurry to admit Turkey quickly, as it will be dealing with the consequences of the 2004 enlargement. At minimum, it is safe to say that the accession negotiations with Turkey will be more difficult than they have been with other recent applicants. However, all is not lost. If the EU keeps the door open for Turkey, thereby providing clear incentives for reform, as well as forging more links with Turkish actors to help spread its influence and norms, the EU can create conditions more auspicious for the adoption and implementation of democratic reform in Turkey.