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Social Security in Turkey

An Example of the Southern Model?

**The Role of State, Market, and the Family
in Welfare Provision**

Daniel Grütjen
gruetjen@hotmail.com
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1. Introduction

At the beginning of the 21st century, Europe is actively discussing whether Turkey should become a full member of the European Union. While Turkish critics fear the threat of uncontrolled liberalization and the loss of national sovereignty from such membership, those in the EU member states argue that Turkey is politically and economically underdeveloped and emphasize the alleged cultural identity of the Occident. At the same time, those in favor of a full membership highlight the possible advantages for both sides. The heated debate is and remains highly polarized: while one side stresses the differences, the other side points at the similarities between Turkey and the EU.

This thesis aims to advance this ongoing debate by focusing on a highly neglected aspect of Turkey, namely, its welfare regime. It also emphasizes the differences and similarities between Turkey and some of the EU member states but does not intend to give a normative answer for the membership question. Instead, it highlights the key characteristics of the Turkish welfare regime through cross-national comparison.

At first glance, the issue of the Turkish welfare regime appears only to be loosely related to the public debate on Turkey's EU membership. Under closer scrutiny, however, it becomes apparent that this issue lies at the heart of this debate. The division of social responsibilities among the state, the market, and the family within a welfare regime reflect the predominant perception of statehood and citizenship in general. It will be shown in this thesis that the question of democracy and political participation do not fall outside of, but are deeply intertwined with, the realm of welfare.

In particular, the main hypothesis of this thesis is that Turkey falls within the Southern Model of welfare regimes. As such, the "regime approach" will be employed to highlight and compare the key characteristics of the Turkish welfare regime. While a number of scholars highlight the similarities between the Turkish and the Southern European welfare arrangements (Gough 1996; Saraceno 2002; Bugra/Keyder 2005), a comparative classification of Turkey has not been offered so far.

An adequate analysis of the current social policy reforms in Turkey and their possible outcomes must be based on comprehensive empirical knowledge of the Turkish welfare regime, its key characteristics, historical origins, and the main actors involved. Social policy analysis in Turkey is still in its infancy. While significant progress in such analysis has been made in the recent years, the public debate in Turkey and in Europe on such matters is nevertheless still predominantly based on speculation rather than on empirical facts. This thesis shall attempt to

address this shortcoming by offering a classification of the Turkish welfare regime, although owing to the lack of scientific studies and literature on Turkish social policy, questions of welfare change and development can only be sketched. This said, to compensate for this lack of available information, this thesis will present the results of interviews with Turkish social policy experts conducted in May 2007 in Istanbul. Without the theoretical and empirical insights provided by the interview partners, this thesis would have been impossible to complete.

This thesis consists of seven parts. Chapter Two presents the theoretical guidelines used to examine the Turkish welfare regime. It outlines the key assumptions of the classical approaches to the analysis of welfare state development and summarizes the main criteria of Gøsta Esping-Andersen's "regime approach". In this context, the contributions of feminist scholars and others who argue for the existence of a distinct Southern Model of welfare are discussed in detail, and it shall be demonstrated that their findings are of major importance to the analysis of the Turkish welfare regime.

In Chapter Three, the main research question and methodology are outlined. Chapter Four compiles a historical analysis of the Turkish welfare regime by tracing the historical origins of contemporary Turkish welfare institutions and legislation. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the main steps in Turkey's economic and political development, the core actors involved in the development, and the similarities and differences of Turkey's development to that of Southern European countries. As such the historical analysis will focus on matters of class relationship, institutionalization, and gender.

Chapter Five presents a case study of the contemporary Turkish welfare regime. It first considers the measures of social protection institutionalized in the central state. It next delineates the role of Civil Society Organizations, municipalities, the market, and the family in the Turkish welfare regime. It will become apparent in the analysis how the activities of the various providers of welfare, the state, the market, and the family, are interdependent in the case of Turkey.

Grounded in the empirical findings of Chapters Four and Five, Chapter Six then investigates the question whether Turkey falls within the Southern Model of welfare. First, the main characteristics of the Southern Model are operationalized and used to compare Turkey and the other Southern European countries. A key question addressed here is whether the role that the family plays in the Turkish welfare regime is similar to that of the other Southern European countries. As reference points, statistical data from Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom will be also used as part of the comparison.

The concluding Chapter Seven will then evaluate the findings of the historical analysis, the case study, and the comparative analysis and it will offer an outlook on possible developments of the Turkish welfare regime.

2. State of Research

2.1 Terminology

This study is based on the theoretical assumption that the holistic employment of ideal-types of welfare regimes helps to bring different trajectories in welfare state development into focus. Hence, “welfare regime” and “welfare state” are nominalistic categories to be used for comparatively analyzing the activities of modern nation states (Schmid 2004).

The term “welfare state” describes those institutionalized forms of social protection that secure its citizens from the risks of modern society on the basis of social rights. Furthermore, these rights granted on the basis of citizenship shape and determine the individual’s position within society. In cross-national comparisons, the activities of the welfare state, the policies embraced, its level of protection, as well as its linkage to the market’s and the family’s role in social provision vary significantly. In relation to this definition of the term “welfare state”, the term “welfare regime” denotes the fact that legal and organizational features of the welfare state, the family, and the economy are systematically interwoven. As a result, the term “welfare regime” stresses that cross-national clusters in welfare arrangements unveil not only regarding social policies but a variety of social structures (Esping-Andersen 1990).

2.2 Classical Approaches of Welfare State Analysis

Contemporary studies on welfare states predominantly employ ideal types of regimes to descriptively and heuristically order social policy development. While the “regime approach” has dominated the academic discussion since the 1990s, the first cross-national comparisons of systems of social protection can be traced back to the 1960s. Hence, scholars arguing for the theoretical and empirical value of typologies based on ideal types can resort to a rich history of comparative welfare state analysis (Alber 1982; Bislev 1997). The early scientific debate on welfare state formation was dominated by three different approaches.¹

¹ For further readings: Alber 1992; Schmid 2004; Esping-Andersen 1987; Kohl 1999; Schmid 2004, 101; Czada 1989.

Elaborating on theories of Modernization, the “functionalist approach” explains welfare state formation as a reaction to the socio-economic outcomes of the industrial revolution and processes of urbanization. The traditional providers of welfare, families and local communities increasingly lacked the capacity to secure its individual members and the state had to develop strategies to protect the new working class. At the same time, processes of capitalization and industrialization led to growing state income, establishing the financial basis for social security institutions. According to the functionalist logic, a combination of social pressures and access to resources predetermine the development of welfare states. Comparing cross-national social expenditure with indicators of modernization, functionalist scholars such as Phillipps Cutright and Harold L. Wilensky came to the conclusion that modern welfare states are in a process of convergence, developing similar political, economic, and social structures (Cutright 1965; Wilensky 1975; Wilensky 2002).

In contrast, authors in favor of the “power resources approach” argue that the trajectory of the welfare state is not predetermined by economic developments but heavily depend on the capacity of societal groups, especially the labor movement, to mobilize political power. According to Walter Korpi, two types of power resources exist in capitalist democracies: the power over means of production and the power resources that are based in the organizations of wage earners. As such, the level of state intervention in the distributive process between labor and capital, manifested in the form and function of welfare institutions, is determined by the distribution of power resources within a society. Comparing the level of social expenditure of industrialized countries with their level of labor movement organization, measured by the percentage of unionization and the strength of left wing parties, Korpi comes to the conclusion that high levels of decommodification and welfare support correlate with a strongly organized left (Korpi 1980).

The third classical approach on welfare state formation, the “historical institutionalist approach”, is based on the premise that social policy outcomes largely depend on institutional arrangements within the state apparatus. Scholars, such as Hugh Heclo, Theda Skocpol, and Roland Czada, claim that state institutions are not only objects of convergence or passively follow pressures of societal groups but actively shape policy outcomes. Hence, they make two broad claims about welfare state development: first, strong states with large administrative capacity and institutional cohesion produce strong welfare systems and second, preexisting structures of welfare provoke a policy feedback and are expected to be path-dependant. Accordingly, institutional barriers limit and shape policy change and reform (Pierson 1996). Hence, historical institutionalists argue that the historical legacy of institutional development has

to be taken into account to understand contemporary social policy outcomes (Skocpol 1979; Skocpol 1987; Czada 1989; Hecló 1974).

2.3 Esping-Andersen's "The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism"

Few studies influenced social policy analysis to such a degree as Gøsta Esping-Andersen's pathbreaking work „The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism“. Focusing on cross-national variations in social legislation and welfare-state configuration in 18 OECD countries, he observes that qualitatively different arrangements between state, economy, and family are not distributed linearly, but clustered by different regime-types (Esping-Andersen 1990).

At the heart of Esping-Andersen's work lies the intention to reveal through comparative research the properties that unite or divide modern welfare states (Ibid. 1990, 2f.).² Demanding contemporary social science to be a positive science, he criticizes the classical approaches to welfare development for being based on universal laws and the normative question of the ideal division of state and market.³

The central question [...] for the entire contemporary debate on the welfare state is whether, and under what conditions, the class division and social inequalities produced by capitalism can be undone by parliamentary democracy (Ibid. 1990, 11).

Unlike the mono-causal explanations of his theoretical forbears, Esping-Andersen applies an interactive approach, combining the three essential elements of welfare state development: the nature of class mobilization (especially the working class), class-political coalition structures, and the historical legacy of regime institutionalization (Ibid. 1990, 29).⁴ Focusing on these factors,

² Esping-Andersen's approach is based theoretically on Richard Titmuss' classification of welfare states. Titmuss opened the black box of the welfare state and focused on its content: the kind of social programs it launches, its conditions of eligibility, the quality of its services and benefits, etc. Being one of the first scholars to develop a typology of welfare states, Titmuss distinguishes between the residual welfare state, in which the state only assumes responsibility when the family or the market fails, and the institutional welfare state, which addresses the entire population, is universal and embodies an institutionalized commitment to welfare (Richard Titmuss 1958).

³ According to Esping-Andersen, the predominant theoretical explanations of the welfare state, stemming from the classical schools of political economy, Marxism, Liberalism, and Conservatism, laid their primary focus on state-market relations and, as a result, have been motivated by theoretical concerns about questions of power, industrialization, capitalist contradictions, etc. (Esping-Andersen 1990, 11).

⁴ „In summary, we have to think in terms of social relations, not just social categories. Whereas structural functionalist explanations identify convergent welfare-state outcomes, and class-mobilization paradigms see large, but linearly distributed, differences, an interactive model such as the coalition approach directs attention to distinct welfare-state regimes“ (Ibid. 1990, 18).

three different ideal-typical trajectories closely linked to political mobilization and political philosophy are unveiled in the Western world: Liberalism, Conservatism, and Social Democracy (Ibid. 1990, 26f.).

Prior comparative studies on welfare state development basically derived the state's commitment from its social expenditure.⁵ In contrast, elaborating on Thomas Humphrey Marshall's definition of social citizenship Esping-Andersen defines three main principles of the welfare state: first, its level of decommodification; second, its system of stratification; and third, the degree to which state activities are interlocked with the market's and the family's role in social provision (Ibid. 1990, 21).⁶ These three dimensions enable Esping-Andersen to compare modern welfare states without historical analysis and to classify them into ideal types of welfare regimes.

The first dimension of the welfare state, its level of decommodification, encompasses the social rights granted to citizens. According to Esping-Andersen, social rights detach (or decommodify) the individual from market-forces if they have the legal and practical status of property rights, if they are inviolable, and if they are granted on the basis of citizenship rather than performance.⁷ "De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person maintains a livelihood without reliance on the market" (Ibid. 1990, 21f.).

The second dimension characterizing welfare states is the kind of stratification system promoted by social policies. The services and benefits provided by welfare states have a direct impact on the social solidarity, divisions of class, and status of differentiation within a society. As such the status of citizenship competes with or even replaces the class position of the individual.⁸

⁵ Esping-Andersen argues that spending as an indicator does not show the complexity of welfare regimes as it neglects the inequality of expenditure in general (for example excessive financing of civil servants in some countries) and the existence of other forms of expenditure (for example tax privileges) that do not show up in statistical accounts. As such, studies determining a state's commitment to welfare via its social expenditure try to validate models of political economy, but fail to explain cross-national differences in welfare arrangements (Ibid. 1990, 12f.).

⁶ Marshall claims that modern citizenship historically developed in three steps over the last three centuries. The first step was the implementation of equal legal rights for every citizen. As a second step, citizenship was interlinked with political rights, such as the passive and active right to vote. Finally, as the last step in the evolution of citizenship, it was extended by social rights. According to Marshall, this element of social citizenship constitutes the core idea of the welfare state (Marshall 1950).

⁷ By concentrating on social benefits in the fields of pensions, sickness, and unemployment, Esping-Andersen operationalizes the term decommodification by comparing three elements of social policy: a state's eligibility rules and its restrictions on entitlements, its level of income replacement, and finally, the range of entitlements Esping-Andersen 1990, 54).

⁸ Esping-Andersen determines certain characteristics of different systems of stratification. The corporatist model shows a highly fragmented system of social insurance and large variations in benefits. Etatism is characterized by distinct privileges for civil servants. Liberal ideas on the contrary reflect in a social system with a strong private-sector and a high emphasis on the financial responsibility of the individual. Socialist ideas manifest in a universal system of social security with little benefit differentials (Ibid. 1990, 69).

The welfare state is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of social relations (Ibid. 1990, 23).

Comparing the level of decommodification and stratification and taking the third element, the market's and the family's role in social protection, into account, Esping-Andersen observes that the countries he examined fall within three ideal types of welfare regimes (Ibid. 1990, 26f.).

In the liberal welfare regime, as represented by the Anglo-Saxon countries, entitlement rules for social services are strict and benefits are modest. Encouraged by the state, the market plays a significant role in the provision of welfare. As a result, the liberal regime keeps the level of decommodification low, contains the realm of social rights and erects a system of stratification that is characterized by a relative equality in poverty of welfare-recipients, market-differentiated welfare among the majority and a class-political dualism between the two.

A central characteristic of the Corporatist Regime, predominantly found in continental Europe, is its emphasis on the preservation of status differentials. Social rights and services are attached to the individual's class and status and their redistributive impact is limited. The state functions as the main provider of welfare services and, as such, the market plays a marginal role. Besides, the Church was a major shaping force of the Corporatist Regime, preserving traditional perceptions of family and gender.

The social democratic regime enforces highly decommodified and universal programs also extended to the new middle classes. The entitlement to services and benefits granted at a very high level is based on citizenship. A strong policy of emancipation has a great impact on the role of the family and the market in the provision of welfare. As a result, the costs of familyhood are cushioned by welfare programs, the level of labor participation of women is high, and the state outweighs the market as a provider of welfare.

2.4 Ideal Types and Real Types

Esping-Andersen stresses that in the real world welfare states exhibit hybrid forms. Although some countries match the characteristics of the ideal type regimes better than others, there is no single pure case (Ibid. 1990, 1949). This raises the question to what extent typologies, such as Esping-Andersen's, have theoretical and empirical explanatory power in general (Arts/Gellisen 2002, 138).

This thesis argues that as welfare is provided by a complex interaction of state, market, and family, ideal types allow us to identify the key characteristics of welfare states. Max Weber

shows that ideal types are important instruments for social policy analysis. The relative stability of ideal types enables the identification of social and cultural changes via systematic analysis. “Idealtypen sind gleichsam “Nothäfen”, um sich auf dem ungeheuren Meer der empirischen Tatsachen zu orientieren“⁹ (Weber 1995, 9).

The employment of ideal types runs the risk of neglecting details of the examined systems of social protection (Esping-Andersen 1990, 2). But it is the simplification and generalization of ideal types that allow a bird’s eye view on welfare arrangements. Using the ideal types and their essential traits as a template, the deviation of the actual regimes found in the real world come into focus.

It is the simultaneous knowledge of both the ideal-type and the real-type that enables holistic ideal-types to be used as conceptual instruments for comparison with and measurement of reality (Arts/Gelissen 2002, 139).

2.5 Welfare States under Siege!?

Since the end of the 20th century, processes of economic, political, cultural and social transformation have provoked a scientific debate about the future of the nation state and its systems of social protection.¹⁰ The alleged instability of the preexisting structures of welfare also led to a shift in the welfare state literature. While previous studies tried to explain growth and variation, the new debate focuses on welfare state retrenchment. Furthermore, the strong economic performance of former developmental countries and the erosion of predominant class relations raised the scientific interest in the adjustment and trajectories of emerging welfare arrangements (Green-Pedersen/Haverland 2002).

A number of often Marxist-inspired scholars argue that the emergence of a single unbound global market leads to new forms of social organization challenging the authority and legitimacy of the traditional nation state (Held/McGrew/Goldblatt/Perraton 1999).¹¹ According

⁹ “Ideal types are harbors of refuge to help one navigate the enormous ocean of empirical facts”.

¹⁰ These processes are triggered and amplified by a number of factors, such as the aging of population, changes in family structures, slowdown of economic growth, high unemployment rates, rising budget deficits, resistance to high taxes, ascendancy of market forces, privatization, increasing competition on the national and international level, accelerated globalization and rapid technological change (Ghai 1996, vii)

¹¹ David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton explain that the contemporary debate on Globalization is influenced by three different schools of thought: first, “hyperglobalizers” argue that nation states are transforming into competitive states; second, “globalization skeptics”, such as Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson claim that globalization is a myth and national governments are still the main actors in international economic activity; and third, scholars in favor of the “transformationalist thesis” stress that there is no empirical reason to assume that globalization has a predetermined end condition. Nevertheless, they recognize that globalization is a major driving force behind social, political and economic changes, which leads to a reconstitution and reconstruction of state sovereignty. As a result, governance and authority no longer are bound to the nation state only, but diffused

to these scholars, the Western welfare states currently experience a process of transformation towards a “competitive state” (Altvater/Mahnkopf 1997; Cerny 2000). In a nutshell, these scholars understand globalization as a process of convergence with a predetermined ending: a race to the bottom of the welfare states.

The crisis of the national Industrial Welfare lays in its decreasing capacity to insulate national economies from the global economy [...]. Today, rather than attempt to take certain economic activities out of the market - to ‘decommodify’ them as the welfare state was organized to do - the Competition state has pursued increased marketization. This ‘commodification of the state’ itself aimed at making economic activities located within national territory, or which otherwise contribute to national wealth, more competitive in international and transnational terms (Ibid. 2000, 30).

In contrast, basing his study on the findings of “historical institutionalism”, Paul Pierson’s starting point in his well-respected article “The New Politics of the Welfare State” is the opposite: the durability of welfare states. Compared to other political institutions, welfare institutions show a remarkable durability, according to Pierson. He explains this phenomenon with the qualitative difference between politics of expansion and politics of retrenchment. He argues that in times of welfare expansion, governments can take credit for popular reforms. On the other hand, in times of welfare crisis unpopular reforms in form of welfare cuts and retrenchment are much harder to implement. Hence, decision makers in democratically elected institutions have to find strategies of avoiding the voters’ blame.

The contemporary politics of the welfare state is the politics of blame avoidance. Governments confronting the electoral imperatives of modern democracy will undertake retrenchment only when they discover ways to minimize the costs involved (Pierson 1996, 179).

Pierson’s argument implies that those theoretical approaches which were used to explain welfare state development and growth cannot be employed to explain processes of retrenchment as they neglect qualitative differences in politics of change.

In contrast, Esping-Andersen claims that his regime approach is capable of explaining both: growth and retrenchment. He argues that as a result of the post-industrial challenges all European welfare states face the same risks, needs and trade-offs. But, although European welfare states face similar problems, three different trajectories of welfare retrenchment are found in the Western World (Esping-Andersen 1997; Ibid. 2002).

between public and private actors on the regional, national and global level (Held/McGrew/Goldbaltt/Perraton 1999).

Since the early 1970s, we can identify three distinct welfare state responses to economic and societal change. Scandinavia followed until recently a strategy of welfare state employment expansion. The Anglo-Saxon countries [...] have favored a strategy of deregulating wages and the labor market, combined with a certain degree of welfare state erosion. And the continental European nations [...] have induced labor supply reduction while basically maintaining existing social security standards. All three strategies were intimately related to the nature of their welfare states (Ibid. 1997, 10).

At the dawn of the new millennium, the ongoing social policy reforms in the OECD countries have generated numerous subjects for academic research and suggest that the scientific debate on welfare states has not yet come to an end. At this point, especially the discussion on questions of welfare retrenchment appears promising for further theoretical and empirical findings (Green-Pedersen/Haverland 2002). In addition, while little empirical proof could be found to support the thesis for a collective “race to the bottom” of the welfare states, the question whether processes of welfare development and retrenchment are convergent or divergent still engages the scientific community, especially in the context of Europeanization (Bouget 2003, Bislev 1997).

Nevertheless, the recent academic discussion will not be included in the theoretical framework underpinning this study. Social policy analysis in the Turkish context is still in its infancy and studies on the Turkish welfare state are rare. Hence, the central concern of this study is to outline the key characteristics of the Turkish welfare regime. Esping-Andersen’s regime approach and its enhancements provide an adequate theoretical guideline to accomplish this goal.

2.6 Enhancements of the Regime Approach

While most scholars acknowledged its findings, “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” has also triggered negative criticism. In this section, two points of criticisms will be discussed in detail as they are of major importance for the analysis of the Turkish welfare regime: first, the argument that Esping-Andersen’s criteria of classification neglect the gender dimension in social policy and the role of the family in welfare provision; and second, the claim that Esping-Andersen misspecifies the Southern European countries (Arts/Gelissen 2002).

2.6.1 The Role of Gender and Family

Esping-Andersen emphasizes the role of the family as a central actor in every welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1990, 21). In his typology, the family takes a prominent position

especially in the “Corporatist Welfare Regime”. Its formal structures of social security are committed to the preservation of traditional family life, manifested in the “Male Breadwinner Model” and the prevalence of the “principle of subsidiarity”¹².

Social insurance typically excludes non-working wives, and family benefits encourage motherhood. Day care, and similar family services are conspicuously underdeveloped; the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ serves to emphasize that the state will only interfere when the family’s capacity to service its members is exhausted (Ibid. 1990, 27).

Feminist critics argue that Esping-Andersen’s typology implies that class-related dimensions of welfare regimes determine gender relations. As such, his typology misses the chance to promote an explicitly gendered analysis of welfare states (O’Conner/Orloff/Shaver 1999, 20). The core feminist criticism of “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” is that it neglects women’s work unless it is significantly visible in the formal labor markets. Although women are guaranteed full political and civil rights, they are still discriminated with regards to their social rights, as their position in the labor market is gendered (Arts/Gelissen 2002, 147).

Jane Lewis and Ilona Ostner argue that the focus on the relationship of state and economy, and respectively the relationship between work and welfare, implies an a priori perception of labor as paid work and of welfare as policies that protect labor from the influence of the market. Furthermore, they claim that the “level of de commodification” as an indicator for welfare analysis disregards the importance of women’s unpaid labor, especially within the family, as a structuring element of every welfare regime. This division of unpaid labor remains static although a greater number of women entered the labor market.

While Esping-Andersen (1990) writes of de commodification as a necessary prerequisite for workers’ political mobilization, the worker he has in mind is male and his mobilization may depend as much on unpaid female household labor. De commodification for women is likely to result in their carrying out unpaid caring work; in other words ‘welfare-dependency’ on the part of adult women is likely to result in the greater independence of another person, young or old (Lewis/Ostner 1994).

Lewis and Ostner suggest an alternative categorization of welfare regimes based on the gender division of work and the dominance of the male breadwinner/ family wage model as a proxy measure. According to their typology, which basically takes the division of unpaid work and the female participation in formal labor markets as an indicator, three different gender arrangements exist: In those countries with a strong male breadwinner ideology, such as Britain

¹² The principle of subsidiarity, as a part of Catholic social teaching, argues that political authorities should only interfere in the private sphere if individual or small communities like the family are incapable to act independently (Misra/Moller 2004, 6).

and Germany, women are basically perceived as carers; in the moderate male breadwinner state, such as France, female participation in the formal labor market is accepted to a certain degree; and in the weak male breadwinner states, such as Sweden, paid and unpaid work is split equally between men and women (Lewis/Ostner 1994).

Lewis and Ostner's findings triggered a rich academic debate on the role of gender in welfare states. Elaborating on the claim that gender relations are encoded in social policies and that "all institutions are gendered" (O'Conner/Orloff/Shaver 1999, 13) several studies focused on the cross-national variations in gendered social policies.¹³

Another feminist criticism of welfare literature claims that most comparative studies focus on state-market relations and neglect the importance of the family as an actor and a provider of social services (Daly/Lewis 1998; Daly/Rake 2003; Ostner 2004; Orloff 1993). Esping-Andersen acknowledged this criticism by including the concepts of defamilialization and familialism in his typology. Defamilialization applies to "the degree to which households' welfare and caring provisions are relaxed – either via welfare provision or market provision". Familialism describes a system of "public policies [that] assumes – indeed insists – that households must carry the principal responsibility for their member's welfare" (Esping-Andersen 1999, 51). Hence, familialism is strongly influenced by the Catholic social teaching and its "principle of subsidiarity". Esping-Andersen argues that taking the level of defamilialization and familialism into account, welfare states in Europe are still grouped around the same regime types. In the "Scandinavian Welfare Model" welfare arrangements have been defamilialized, intending to strengthen the family by unburdening it from obligations and increasing individual independence. As a result, the Scandinavian countries were able to adjust the labor market to the higher participation rates of women and buffer the social consequences of changing gender arrangements. In the "Liberal Welfare Regime", state support for families is low and defamilializing services and benefits are often commodified and work-conditional. In consequence, families with low incomes are left without state support, excluded from care services and at a higher risk of poverty. Finally, the highly familialistic "Continental Model" puts

13 Focusing on care as a core element of welfare provision, Mary Daly and Jane Lewis identify different arrangements in welfare states evolving around how care work is organized and supported (Daly/Lewis 1998). Alan Siaroff focuses on the question how welfare structures enforce engagement of women in the formal labor market. He identifies four different female mobilization regimes: a Protestant Social Democratic, a Protestant Liberal, an advanced Christian Democratic and a Late Female Mobilization welfare state regime (Siaroff 1994). Jane Millar outlines that welfare states might treat mothers differently, depending on their marital status. She argues that three different welfare arrangements exist regarding the treatment of single mothers: First, countries who encourage both, married and single mothers, to engage in the formal labor market via the providence of childcare, employment rights, parental leave periods, equal pay policies and benefits. Second, countries that prevent married and single mothers from fully entering the labor force by providing lower levels of support and benefits and forcing women into part-time workers. And finally, countries that lack any kind of services or benefits, and as such force single mothers to enter the labor market (Millar 1996).

a strong emphasis on the security of the male breadwinner. Its social insurance system amplifies this role, as it secures those with stable and lifelong employment, but leaves those with a discontinuous work history, which traditionally applies to women, as dependently insured. In short, the familiarity model of welfare found in continental Europe is less prepared to face the challenges of the post-industrial world. The outcomes of demographic change, shifts of employment structures, rising marital instability and non-conventional households leave a growing number of citizens out of social protection schemes. Nevertheless, as the family has absorbed many risks of social exclusion little efforts have been made to allow women to leave their traditional roles within the family (Ibid. 2002).

2.6.2 The Southern Model of Welfare

“The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” includes Italy and France and groups both as the “Conservative Regime” (Ibid. 1990). From the early 1990s onwards, a number of scholars focused on the similarities of welfare arrangements in the Mediterranean countries. The first scholar who stressed the similarities of the Southern European countries was Stephan Leibfried. Instead of three, he identifies four different “social policy regimes” in the European Community: the “Scandinavian Welfare States”, the “Bismarckian Countries”, the “Anglo-Saxon Countries”, and the “Latin Rim” (Leibfried 1991, 16).¹⁴ According to Leibfried, the “Latin Rim”, which he also labels as the “Rudimentary Welfare State”, is characterized by a lack of social rights. Although most of these countries proclaim a right to welfare in their constitutions, social rights are rarely institutionalized and implemented on a very low level. Instead, certain social security programs, such as disability pensions in southern Italy, function practically as basic income measures. In addition, these countries lack a full-employment tradition, show a dominance of agricultural labor, and a discrimination of women in terms of access to the official labor market. Finally, Leibfried stresses the role the church plays in the provision of social services and benefits. In conclusion, Leibfried foresees a development of the “Latin Rim” towards the “normal welfare systems” (Ibid. 1991, 21f.).

Accordingly, Francis G. Castles argues that the rising social security expenditures of the Mediterranean countries suggest a harmonization with the “corporatist welfare-regime”.

[T]he countries of Southern Europe must be seen as quite typical members of the Conservative family of nations, which happen to spend less than others in the grouping only because they are poor and have relatively youthful populations (Castles 1995, 311).

¹⁴ The latter comprises Spain, Portugal, Greece, to some extent Italy and, to the least degree, France.

A more comprehensive definition of a “Southern Welfare Regime” was offered by Maurizio Ferrera in the mid 1990s. He argues that the emphasis on the rudimentary character or the strong impact of the Church on the welfare regimes in the southern OECD countries is misleading, as certain common traits in social policy in Southern Europe can not be explained with the “stage of development” argument only. Ferrera does not deny that similarities between countries in the south and in continental Europe exist. As in the “conservative” countries, income maintenance is based on occupational status, the degree of institutional fragmentation is very high, and cash benefits, especially pensions, play a significant role.

Nevertheless, in contrast to the continental welfare regimes the Southern Model is characterized by a “polarized” scheme of protection. While for certain groups in society, such as state officials, the level of protection is very high, other groups cannot claim social benefits at all.¹⁵ According to Ferrera, the existence of an “Iper-grantismo”, a highly protected core in the labor market, constitutes a distinctive characteristic of a Southern Model.

The second characteristic outlined by Ferrera is the existence of universal health systems. Since the 1970s, the Southern European countries have implemented their constitutional commitments to universal health care by establishing national health services. In the early years of their existence, these national health systems were based on individual contributions and only slowly shifted towards stronger reliance on taxes.

Unlike Britain and Scandinavia, the state-provided health care in Southern Europe did not result in a clear separation of the public and the private medical care. Hence, the Southern states render a high degree of health services to private providers. This combination of public and private actors and institutions, which becomes especially visible in the health sector and goes hand in hand with a low level of state penetration in the social sphere in general, constitutes the third distinct trait of the Southern Model.

Finally, the Mediterranean countries stand out regarding their high degree of clientelism and corruption. In this context, social benefits and services are often hijacked and misused by officials to serve clientelist interests. Especially during times of election, welfare is often used to trade votes for individual benefits.

The weak sectors of the southern European labor markets [...] have offered a favorable ground for the emergence and expansion of a ‘clientelistic market’ in which state transfers to supplement

¹⁵ This contrast becomes especially obvious in retirement benefits. While the pensions of typical wage earners with a full-employment career are far higher in Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain than in the other OECD countries, the minimum retirement benefits are much lower. Unemployment benefits in Southern Europe correspond to those in the continental European countries, but entitlement depends on contribution periods that are far longer than European average. As a result, the majority of workers in Southern Europe are not entitled to unemployment benefits since workers in the informal labor market and those without a long record of formal employment are excluded. In Greece, Spain, and Italy, young unemployed have no right to unemployment benefits at all.

inadequate work incomes are exchanged for party support, often through the mediation of trade unions, at the individual level (Ferrera 1996, 25).

According to Ferrera, the Southern European countries show similar traits in socio-economic and cultural-political development. Welfare rights in Southern Europe are not embedded in a mature political culture of institutional autonomy, transparency, and universalism. Ferrera explains the emergence of a distinct model of welfare as the outcome of “power games” resulting from the structure of Southern European polities, which he argues are characterized by weak state-institutions in terms of bureaucratic professionalism and autonomy, the predominance of parties as political actors, the lack of an influential civil society, and finally, a highly polarized party system and a fragmented left (Ibid. 1996, 31).

Ian Gough points out that all Southern states lack national income safety nets and an institutionalized commitment to full employment. According to Gough, this can not be explained with the “stage of development” argument, as the Southern European nations show a large diversity regarding their level of industrialization. Instead, he argues along with Ferrera that a mixture of socio-structural and political-institutional factors determine policy outcomes in Southern Europe and slow down the development of rights-based assistance schemes (Gough 1996; Ibid.1997).

Although Ferrera’s categorization prompted ongoing research on the distinct characteristics of the Southern Model, it did not remain unopposed. Esping-Andersen himself remained skeptical about the existence of a distinct Southern European Model (Esping-Andersen 1997, 1f.). George S. Katrougalos and Gabriella Lazaridis claim that Ferrera’s categorization is inconsistent with his own theory, as it does not employ Esping-Andersen’s criteria of typology, but a different framework of socio-political data. They argue that Southern European countries are rather a subcategory of the Corporatist Welfare Regime than a distinct model. Furthermore, they stress that corporatist fragmentation, a strong influence of the Church, selective generosity and gaps between high and low protection are characteristics of the conservative model as well. The apparently universal health system still features elements of occupational and contribution-based services. Additionally, they outline differences between the four Mediterranean countries with regards to clientelism and their lack of an autonomous administration. While clientelism and weak state institutions dominate in Italy and Greece, which are dominated by a shorter period of authoritarian rule, fairly autonomous administrations prevail in Spain and Portugal. As such, Katrougalos and Lazaridis describe the Southern European countries as:

[U]nderdeveloped species of the Continental model, welfare states ‘in their infancy’ with their main common characteristics the immaturity and relative inefficiency of the social protection systems [...] and some comparable social and family structures. Not only are their founding principles undeniably Bismarckian, but also their current institutional, organizational and economic features bear the ‘signature’ of the Continental state-corporatist model. [...] we will treat them not as a fourth model in the Esping-Andersen classification, but rather as the ‘discount edition’ of the Continental one (Katrougalos/Lazaridis 2002, 17).

This thesis argues that the Southern Welfare States cannot be classified as an underdeveloped subcategory of the Continental Model. At the heart of this thesis lies the assumption that the ideal type of the “Continental Model”, as described by Esping-Andersen, cannot be employed to sufficiently filter the key characteristics of Southern European welfare. As discussed in the following section, especially the role the family plays in the Southern Welfare Regime vis-à-vis the state and the market differs in distinctive traits from the role of the family in the Continental Regime and its Male Breadwinner Model. Instead of focusing on state- or market-centered provisions of welfare only and reducing family services to an indicator of underdevelopment, this thesis considers the role of the family and the unpaid work of women within as a central element in Southern welfare arrangements and an important subject of research.¹⁶

2.6.3 Family Solidarity as a Distinct Feature of the Southern Model

The outstanding role of the Southern European family in providing social services has been acknowledged by the vast majority of scholars. Nevertheless, its importance has led to different interpretations. Ferrera stresses the role of the family as a social safety net and underlines the necessity that at least one family member has access to social services and benefits through employment in the formal labor market. Furthermore, he argues that the family’s role should not be overemphasized. In his view, a focus on the family would neglect the complexity of the Southern welfare arrangements and simply suggest underdevelopment (Ferrera 1996, 18f.).

In contrast, since the end of the 1990s the contributions of feminist scholars to welfare analysis also had an impact on the examination of the Southern welfare states. A growing number of scholars stressed the role of the family, highlighting its importance as a main element

¹⁶ “Familialistic interpretation is to be regarded as the crucial element characterizing welfare arrangements and outcomes in Southern Europe” (Moreno 2006, 3).

of the Southern Welfare Regime itself (Moreno 2006; Flaquer 2000; Trifiletti 1999; Naldini 2003).

Elaborating on Lewis' and Ostner's classification, Rossana Trifiletti argues that the Southern European states differ in specific traits from the Male Breadwinner Model. While the Southern European state does not support families via benefits and services at all, it tolerates that they develop own strategies, such as intra-family or informal employment, to guarantee the household income. In addition, Trifiletti argues that the principle of subsidiarity of the continental model has to be modified in the Southern European context. The incapability of the individual to act independently does not necessarily result in the interference of the state in the private sphere. The state only protects its citizens from certain risks. With regards to labor legislation the Southern European countries also differ from the Male Breadwinner Model predominantly found in continental Europe. While the latter is characterized by a legal framework, which treats women on the basis of a traditional family role and furthermore preserves this role by mechanisms that protect women from the market, the Southern European state treats women on the basis of traditional family roles but leaves them unprotected. Southern labor legislation does not create opportunities for part-time labor and as such denies women the access to social security. As a result, in the case of economic necessity a large number of women have to work under harsh conditions, often in the informal market, and in addition have to fulfill their traditional role in the family (Trifiletti 1999).

Moreno argues that the socio-economic changes in Southern Europe result in a diminishing role of the male head of the household as the only breadwinner and a higher participation of women in the formal and the informal labor market. As this transformation has not been accompanied by a cultural rearrangement of gender-roles or social policies, so-called "superwomen" emerged in Southern Europe.

[...] Mediterranean 'superwomen' have been able to manage a situation where increases in the number of paid professional activities outside the household have been carried out simultaneously with the demanding unpaid tasks to be provided to the family (Moreno 2006, 4).

Another common trait of the Southern European states in terms of state-family relations was highlighted by Lluís Flaquer. He argues that the Southern European countries differ from the familialism of the "Corporatist Regime" in their absence of a distinct family support policy (Flaquer 2000, 14). Accordingly, the Southern EU member states' expenses for child-benefit packages are the lowest within Europe.¹⁷ Income transfers to families via income tax benefits are

¹⁷ In 2000, Spain spend 0,2%; Italy and Portugal 0,5% and Greece 1% of their GDP on cash benefits, while the EU average lay at 1,4% (Gonzalez 2006).

even lower and ineffective for families with no formal income.¹⁸ While Southern European parents are often entitled to relatively long parental leave periods, the compensation rates are low.¹⁹ Childcare coverage and benefits for the elderly are equally low (Flaquer 2000; Gonzalez 2005).²⁰

Analyzing social policies targeting the family in Italy, Chiara Saraceno outlines distinct discrepancies between the classical breadwinner model of the “Corporatist Regime” and the Italian case:

[T]he Italian familist welfare regime is not exclusively nor even primarily based on a strong breadwinner model, but on the family as perceived as a unit of income and resources, to which everyone contributes according to his/her opportunities, although they may differ from gender. What is assumed is not the figure of breadwinner but family solidarity – including kin – and the primary responsibility of women – married and mothers – in the provision of care (Saraceno 1995, 279f.).

Similar observations are made by Manuela Naldini in her study “The Family in the Mediterranean Welfare States”. Naldini argues that the way in which responsibilities in the field of reproduction and care work are balanced between state and family is elementary to understanding cross-national variations in welfare arrangements. Furthermore, she claims that the current theory of gender and welfare state fails to acknowledge that in certain states not only gender relations are affected by state policies, but that intergenerational and kin relations also have to be taken into account in welfare state analysis (Naldini 2003).

Naldini’s study examines the role of the family in Italian and Spanish welfare regimes from a historical and comparative perspective. According to her findings, state policies towards the family were embedded in the development of general national social policies. Naldini points out that although the Mediterranean states were confronted by a similar set of challenges as the other European states, the policy outcomes in Southern Europe differed from its neighbors’. Accordingly, she argues that state-family relations are interactive.

Welfare provisions were introduced on the basis of a set of assumptions about gendered division of roles within the family and in the labor market; assumptions about the ‘ideal’ role of women and of men in society; and assumptions about the functioning of the kin system. These assumptions in turn have contributed to strengthening specific family/kin systems (Ibid. 2003, 202f.).

¹⁸ In Italy only dependant workers and families with three children or more are entitled to benefits. In Greece only civil servants, single parents or families with more than two children are entitled (Matsaganis 2004).

¹⁹ In Spain parents are entitled to a full-time leave until their children reach the age of three, but without benefits. In Portugal parental leave is 6 month per parent, likewise without payment.

²⁰ In 2004, the percentage of children below the age of three, which were sent to daycare was 15% in Spain, 16% percent in Portugal, 3% in Greece; and 5.5% in Italy.

Analog to the processes of industrialization, in most of the European countries labor legislation and social policies during the dictatorial periods were aimed at supporting male industrial workers. Nevertheless, the socio-economic structure, the cultural traits of the family systems, and the persistent legal definitions of family and kin obligations resulted in the emergence of a family and kinship model instead of a Male Breadwinner Model. Hence, social policies in Italy and Spain reflect a family model which assumes that the male breadwinner is not only responsible for the nuclear, but also for the extended family. In the post-fascist period this family model was preserved and strengthened. According to Naldini, the key characteristics of the two models, the Male Breadwinner Model and the Family and Kin Solidarity Model, can be described as follows:

The Male Breadwinner Model prescribes the role of the father as the breadwinner for the nuclear family and the role of the mother as the housekeeper and carer. This division of duties is encoded in the social security system and the full-employment tradition in the labor market. Entitlement to social benefits is based on premiums. Only workers who actively contributed to the social security schemes are entitled to benefits and services. Full entitlement to pensions is based on a full-employment career and lifelong contributions. The social protection of the nuclear family, i.e. mother and children, is based on “dependency”. The role of the male breadwinner as the provider of the household income is awarded by the state via family allowances. Furthermore, within the tax system, the family is considered as one unit and tax cuts are granted to families. Women are encouraged to fulfill their traditional roles within the family through long maternal leave periods with high benefits and gendered insurance schemes, such as widow pensions, which treat surviving men and women differently. If women enter the labor market, they are given the opportunity to combine employment with their traditional family role by taking advantage of special regulation for part-time employment. Women working part-time often do not pay into the social security system and therefore retain their dependency status with regards to insurance. The level of defamilialization is low and care services for children and the elderly are left to the family in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity (Ibid. 2003).

While the Family and Kin Solidarity Model is based on similar gender roles and also includes the concept of dependency, it differs from the Male Breadwinner Model to the extent that social insurance schemes also cover the extended family. The labor market is not based on the ideal of full employment. Instead, the state tolerates informal strategies of family income maintenance. In exchange, the family is hardly supported by family allowances and tax assessments are made on an individual basis. Tax cuts for married couples or families with children do not exist. While women are traditionally perceived as the housekeeper and carer, the state does not endorse this role through paid paternal leave periods. If women enter the labor

market, they have to combine full employment with their duties in the family, as regulations for part-time employment do not exist. Finally, the level of defamilialization is very low. Care services for children, the elderly, and disabled are almost inexistent and left to the women. While in the Male Breadwinner Model care work is left to the mother in particular, in the Family and Kin Solidarity Model care work is shared by female family members. Furthermore, the state does not act according to the principle of subsidiarity as it does not intervene in the private realm if the individual or the family is incapable to act independently. Accordingly, public social assistance schemes and safety nets are non-existent and the family functions as the only safety net (Ibid. 2003).

2.6.4 The Southern Model in Transition

In accord with their European neighbors, the Mediterranean countries underwent major socio-economic changes since the 1980s. Family structure and female participation in the formal labor market are moving towards the EU average. This development can neither be explained with a change in gender relations nor with a paradigm shift in family policy.²¹ Instead, it appears highly probable that higher educational attainment, the progressive delay in family formation and low fertility rates, but also the impact of global and regional feminist movements are important factors for the growing number of women finding employment in the formal labor market. Additionally, the dual-earner family has proven to be the best protection against severe poverty in Southern Europe. Economic need and the risk of poverty appear to be a central motivating factor for women who enter the formal labor market (Moreno 2006, 5f.; Trifiletti 1999, 55).

The demographic changes and the higher participation of women in the labor market led to an increasing incapacity of the family to socially secure its individual members and provide them with the required care work. Accompanied by the absence of public safety nets and family policies, certain societal groups, especially families with children, are threatened by poverty. While the most endangered group in the Mediterranean countries, similar to the rest of Europe, are children in single-parent households, the high share of poor children living in large families is alarming. Besides children, unskilled workers and labor market entrants are threatened by poverty and social exclusion. In this context, not only the missing safety nets and unemployment programs for young workers and the inability of the family to cover for social risks, but also the diminishing role of the family as an employer has to be taken into account (Moreno 2003).

²¹ In terms of time spent, the average father's contribution is still marginal in Southern Europe. In a Southern European double-earner household, where both parents work full time, the average time a father spends on caring is 7-13 hours a week, whereas a mother spends 27 to 39 (Gonzalez 2006, 199). Although most scholars agree that explicit family policy is still absent in Southern Europe, certain reforms reflect a degree of acknowledgement for her women's position in the family (Trifiletti 1999, 57-61).

Despite the gradual retreat of the family as a provider of social services, its role in the Mediterranean societies is still outstanding: the household size and the proportion of multi-generational household lies way above EU average, while the percentage of single households is still marginal. Compared with the rest of Europe, young Mediterraneans within their twenties or elderly above the age of 70 are much more likely to live with their parents or children, respectively. The rates of non-marital cohabitation, the number of children born out of wedlock, and divorce rates are accordingly low. Furthermore, the family is still the main guarantee for employment. About 69% of Greeks and 65% of Italian found employment within the family or via family connections (Flaquer 2000, 6; Berthoud/Iacovou 2002).

In the last decades, Southern European countries have followed a convergent path in social policy development, which differs from their continental European neighbors. While many scholars feared a process of “social dumping” in Southern Europe, as a consequence of to the pressures of Globalization, the recent reforms in social policy paint a different picture (Guillen/Alvarez 2000). Since 1980, the public social expenditure in all Mediterranean countries has grown constantly and now has stabilized at EU average. A number of social policy reforms have been aimed at the generalization or even universalization of benefits and services (Moreno 2003, 275). In this context, it has to be emphasized that the universal health systems have been established out of an occupational tradition from the late 1970s on.²² Furthermore, in the fields of education and pensions recent developments suggest a detachment from the occupational character of social security. Especially sub-national and regional forms of welfare provision systems have been gaining importance. In Italy and Spain for example health care has been decentralized to various degrees. New forms of safety nets have been developed in Portugal on the national and in Spain on the regional level (Ibid. 2006, 14; Ibid. 2003).

Welfare state expansion in Mediterranean countries cannot only be understood in the context of centralized state structures. As a matter of fact, the growth of ‘institutional stateness’ - defined as state penetration of the welfare sphere in the framework of multi-level governance - is an observable trend in Mediterranean countries, mainly in Italy and Spain (Ibid. 2006, 13).

Besides processes of decentralization, the Southern European countries show convergence in their high levels of privatization and liberalization. A high number of third-sector and religious charity organizations carry out services that are no longer provided by the state or the family. Furthermore, low-cost assistance, such as care work, is provided by workers in the informal sector, often migrants (Ibid. 2006, 5).

²² Italy was the first Mediterranean country to implement a National Health Service in 1978, followed by Portugal 1979, Greece 1984 and finally Spain in 1986.

From an academic perspective the ongoing policy reforms in Southern Europe still leave an ample room for further theoretical and empirical research. The factors that triggered and shaped welfare development in the Mediterranean countries are still subject of the academic debate. In this context, the decreasing capacity of the family to buffer the socio-economic changes, the high unemployment rates and the ageing of the population, but also the growing influence of the EU on social policy making have to be taken into account. The latter led, on the one hand, to social policy reforms, pushing the decision makers in Southern Europe towards more budgetary discipline, bureaucratic rationalization and the containment of non-wage labor to ensure competitiveness (Ferrera 1996, 31-34). On the other hand, EU policies, fostering processes of decentralization and enforcing programs to fight social exclusion, had a deep impact on Southern European social policy. In this context, the European Commission's encouragement of national action plans to implement social minima programs should be highlighted (Moreno 2006, 14).

In summary, the Southern European countries not only show distinct historical analogies in welfare configuration and social policy legislation but also resembling trajectories in social policy reform. Although the Continental and the Southern European Welfare Regimes face similar challenges at the dawn of the 21st century, they follow different paths of welfare development. As outlined above, the theoretical debate on questions of welfare growth and retrenchment, as well as convergence and divergence, is still continuing and has not yet offered any final explanations. Nevertheless, in compliance with Esping-Andersen's thesis that welfare regimes determine the outcomes of social policy reform, the convergent development of the Mediterranean welfare states could be interpreted as evidence for the existence of a distinct Southern European Model.

2.7 Previous Classifications of the Turkish Welfare Regime

While Turkey has been included in the family of Southern European welfare states by several scholars (Saraceno 2002), little scientific effort has been made to compare empirical data from Turkey with the theoretical findings presented above. One of the few who included Turkey in a cross-national comparison of welfare arrangements was Ian Gough in his study on means tested income schemes in Southern Europe. In his comparison, Turkey takes a singular position as it lacks the multiplicity of group-specific or categorical schemes found in other Mediterranean countries. Instead, he argues, the regional or local forms of charity, often in form of one-off emergency payments, play a prominent role. However, Turkey's regulations regarding means-tested income schemes resemble those of the rest of Southern Europe (Gough 1996).

The most sophisticated classification of Turkey within the Southern Welfare regime was compiled by Çağlar Keyder and Ayşe Bugra, whose expertise had a great influence on this study. They argue that many properties associated with the Southern European welfare regime are also characteristic of the situation in Turkey. In detail, these properties include a labor market, in which employment provided by small employers, self-employment and family employment is of outstanding importance and a large proportion of the employment structures lay in the informal sector; a social security system with corporatist tendencies, constituting a fragmented system in which social rights are unequally distributed according to occupational status; a limited role of the state in the formal security system and a strong impact of patronage relationships; a lacking safety net and policies to combat poverty and social exclusion; and finally, an outstanding role of the family, local governments, and local institutions in providing welfare. However, they argue that Turkey does not show the trend towards social policy reform that is common in the other Southern European countries (Bugra/Keyder 2003). A distinct classification of the Turkish welfare regime through comparative and historical analysis has not been offered so far. Additionally, the role of the family in the Turkish welfare regime has been neglected in previous studies. This thesis aims to help filling this empirical gap.

3. Research Question and Methodology

3.1 Research Question

The research question underpinning this study is: *can the Turkish welfare regime be classified into the Southern European Model of welfare?* A sufficient answer to this question needs to consider a number of other matters: what are the historical origins of the contemporary social security institutions and legislation? Who were the main actors involved in their development? How were the provision of welfare distributed between the state, the market, and the family? And finally, how does Turkey compare with the other European countries?

To answer these questions, this study employs an integrative approach as proposed by Esping-Andersen and presents empirical findings in three different parts. In the first part, the Turkish welfare regime will be analyzed from a historical perspective; the second part consists of an empirical case study of the Turkish welfare regime; and the third part classifies the Turkish welfare regime into the Southern Model via international comparison. At the end of every part stands an interim conclusion that summarizes the key findings.

The historical part focuses on the emergence of class relationships, welfare institutions, gendered social legislation, and the current perception of citizenship. The chapter is subdivided

in different sections, in congruence to the chronological steps of Turkey's political economy. Subsequently, the emergence of gendered social security legislation will be traced.

The case study of the Turkish welfare regime is subdivided in two sections. The first focuses on the legislations and institutions of Turkey's social security system and the social services and benefits institutionalized within the central state. At this point, Turkey's social insurance schemes, and their regulations regarding health and pension insurance will be discussed in detail. Additionally, the unemployment insurance and the institutionalized forms of poverty alleviation will be described. The second part examines the relevant actors in the Turkish welfare regime who are organized outside the central state. In detail, the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), municipalities, the market, and the family will be shown. As little research has been conducted on the role of municipalities and CSOs, these sections significantly profit from the findings of interviews conducted with local experts on social security. The analysis of the role of the family stands apart from the rest of the chapter, as it entails a comparative element and methodologically leaves the realm of a pure case study.²³ It is based on Esping-Andersen's criteria of familialism and defamilialization. Accordingly, the section compares Turkey with data from the other Southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal). Furthermore, Germany, Sweden, and the UK, as typical representatives of the "classical" welfare regimes, as outlined by Esping-Andersen, will be included in the comparison. Familialism is operationalized by the size of household, the number of 18-34 year old living with their parents, the crude divorce rate, the average marriage age of women, the percentage of elderly cared for at home, and finally the hours spend for unpaid care work. Turkey's level of defamilialization is detected by its expenditure on non-health care services, the enrollment of children below the age of three in day-care, the expected years in education for the three to five year old, and the percentage of the elderly population in care.

The third part finally tests the hypothesis that Turkey falls in the group of the Southern Model of welfare in cross-national comparison. Accordingly, the key characteristics of the Southern Model highlighted in the theoretical literature are operationalized. In detail these characteristics are: first, the polarization of the social security system and the existence of peaks of generosity; second, the level of universalism of the health system; third, the low level of state penetration and the lack of social assistance schemes; and fourth, the existence of a Family and Kin Solidarity Model in the Turkish context. The lack of data and the inability to transfer findings made in the interviews into indicators to operationalize the criteria clientelism, the role

²³ The analysis of the family and its role in the Turkish welfare regime bears two problems: first, the difficulty to gather empirical data on family matters. Turkey is missing in most of the OECD and Eurostat surveys on matters of family and household; second, the inability to transfer affective categories into qualitative information for statistical purposes. Hence, in most analysis of Southern Welfare the family is treated as a "black box" (Moreno 2002, 3).

of CSOs, a high public-private mix, and decentralization made a comprehensive cross-national comparison of Turkey impossible. Hence, this study does not present a comparative analysis of these four criteria. Accordingly, the key findings of Chapter Four and Five will be highlighted shortly.

The characteristics included in the international comparison are operationalized as follows: level of polarization and peaks of generosity are detected by the OECD's Pension Gini Coefficient and Pension Progressivity Index.²⁴ Additionally, the replacement rates and the minimum benefits granted by the Turkish pension system are compared. The universalism of the health system is measured by the percentage of the population covered by the public health scheme. The low level of state penetration is tested by the general social expenditure, the social expenditure on health, and the old-age expenditure related to the GDP. The lack of social assistance schemes is operationalized by the deviation of the population under the risk of poverty before and after social transfers. Finally, the existence of a Family and Kin Solidarity Model in Turkey is detected by the degree of kinship of dependently insured, the public expenditure on family services, the existence of tax cuts granted to families, the length and the benefits for parental leave periods, and the percentage of Turkish women working part-time.

As the traits of Turkish welfare regime will be clarified in international comparison with the Southern European countries, Germany, Sweden, and the UK, this study faces two problems: first, the possible divergence of empirical data from the Mediterranean countries with the ideal type; second: the implicit changes in the Turkish welfare regime itself. This study focuses on a classification of the Turkish welfare regime. Questions of welfare change and retrenchment, closely interlinked to the theoretical debate on convergence and divergence, can only be addressed but not analyzed in detail. In summary, this study wants to lay the empirical grounds, arouse possible research questions, and shift the focus of further research on the Turkish welfare regime and its development.

3.2 Methodology

The historical part is methodologically based on the secondary analysis of the scientific literature on social policy, welfare development, gender relations, the Turkish nation state and citizenship.

²⁴The OECD measures the strength of the link between pre-retirement earnings and post-retirement pension entitlements by a summery indicator, the Progressivity Index. The index is designed so that a pure basic pension scheme would score 100% and a pure insurance scheme 0%. The calculation is based on the Gini Coefficient. The higher the Gini Coefficient, the more unequal the distribution. Formally, the Progressivity index is calculated as 100 minus the ratio of the Gini Coefficient pension entitlements divided by the Gini Coefficient of earnings (Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungsträger 2005, 44).

The second part, the case study of the Turkish welfare regime, employs a combination of methods. It offers an analysis of the main documents of Turkish social legislation, the “Social Security Act” (Law No. 506) and the related amendments. To compensate the small amount of academic literature on Turkish social policy, a number of expert interviews were conducted in May 2007 in Istanbul. The majority of these experts (Ayse Bugra, Sinem Adar, Basak Ekim, and Çağlar Keyder) are scholars working on matters of social policy at the “Social Policy Forum” in Istanbul. Furthermore, interviews were conducted with Kemal Ülker, a representative of the Turkish Labor Union “Hava Is”, Ümit Aydogmus, a representative of the biggest Turkish Civil Society Organization “Deniz Feneri”, and Cüneyt Danar, consultant lawyer of the “Turkish Employer’s Association of Metal Industries” (MESS). The interviews were conducted with the help of a guideline and later transcribed (Annex II). As the position and the function of the interviewed experts vary, the interviews consist of “operational knowledge” (Betriebswissen) and “contextual knowledge” (Kontextwissen). Finally, the case study uses statistical data from the World Bank, the OECD, Eurostat, the “First European Quality of Life Survey”, the “2003 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey”, and the Turkish Statistical Institute.

The classification of the Turkish welfare regime is based on a comparison of statistical data attained from the above mentioned studies and the expert interviews.

4. The Historical Development of the Turkish Welfare State

The emergence of the Turkish welfare regime, the development of social security institutions, and the evolution of the current discourse of statehood and citizenship are closely connected with Turkey’s political economy, class mobilization and class-political coalition struggles. This chapter traces the evolution of the Turkish welfare state from a historical perspective. The last section of this chapter will focus on the development of gendered social policy in Turkey. Since the role of the family in the Turkish welfare regime is deeply intertwined with women’s position in society, this study also traces the origins of contemporary gendered legislation in history.

4.1 Welfare in the Late Ottoman Era and the Early Years of the Republic

In Ottoman times, welfare policy was closely interlinked with the so-called Waqf, which represented an important Muslim institution for the provision of charity and poverty relief of the Empire. Waqf were semi-formal philanthropic foundations, which provided the population of the Ottoman cities with the most essential public services. They were of importance for the

building and maintenance of mosques, cultural and educational centers but also hospitals, soup kitchens and orphanages (Peri 1992). The Waqf were financed by generous acts of the Ottoman rulers and voluntary contributions of private individuals and associations. Hence, they represented an institutionalized fusion of public and private resources in the field of welfare provision. This emphasis on private responsibility in the provision of welfare has to be seen as one of the most important legacies of the Ottoman times in the field of social policy (Bugra 2007).

From the mid 19th century on, the Ottoman state followed the path of the Western industrializing countries and introduced a number of “Retirement Funds” (Tekaüd Sandıkları) for the military, civil state officials and workers in the public sector. These were succeeded by “Special Funds” (Teavün Sanidkları) in the Young Turk era, providing assistance to civil servants, employees, and their families in case of illness, invalidity and death. Parallel to the creation of first social security institutions, the Ottoman state tried to respond to the high numbers of war orphans and rising social problems with the foundation of the “Ministry of Orphans” (Eytam Nezareti) and the establishment of “Orphan Funds” (Eytam Sanidkları), which provided services for orphans, widows, the senile, and mentally ill (Kiliç 2006, 37f.). Another important step towards the institutionalization of social security was the establishment of the “Ministry of Health” in 1920 (Agartan 2005, 2).

Focusing on class relations in the late Ottoman Empire, Çağlar Keyder outlines two developments as essential for the social origins of Turkish politics. The absence of large-scale land ownership in the agrarian realm and the expulsion of the vast majority of the Christian bourgeoisie during and after World War I. Both developments perpetuated the unchallenged predominance of the ruling Ottoman military-bureaucratic elite, which derived its power from its position in the state structure and was unchallenged by a landed class with an autonomous social base or an urban bourgeoisie pushing for capitalist development (Keyder 1987, 2). After Mustafa Kemal Atatürk announced the Turkish Republic in 1923, the first two decades of the new-born country were politically dominated by a triple alliance consisting of the military, the bureaucracy, and the centralist “Republican People’s Party”, CHP, (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) implementing a rigid course of socio-economic transformation.

This bureaucratic alliance was the vanguard of the Kemalist revolution: westernist and secularist in its outlook, authoritarian in its style of governance, and etatist-nationalist in its strategy of economic development (Sunar 1990, 746).

The authoritarian character of the early Republican years has had a major impact on the genesis of statehood and citizenship in Turkey. On the one hand, the Kemalist revolution laid

the legal and institutional foundation for the establishment of a nation state designed after its Western forebears, constituting a secular legal system, which formally recognized gender equality, a secular system of education, and a modern bureaucracy. On the other hand, the construction of this nation state was accompanied by an authoritarian nationalism, which emphasized unity and collective purpose as the basis for citizenship. The etatist elite, as the agency of this modernization and nationalization from above, tried to impose its perception of a modern nation state on its object: the people of Turkey. As a result, the Turkish state derived its legitimacy from a constructed collectivist nationalist identity rather than a citizenship constituted around universal civil and social rights (Keyder 1997).

The dominance of the etatist elite also manifested itself in new social policies. New social legislations and institutions first targeted civil servants and the military and later workers in larger state-controlled enterprises. In 1930, the “Law of Military and Civil Retirement Fund” (Askeri ve Mülki Tekaüd Kanunu) united the Ottoman retirement funds under one law. Six years later, the Turkish government passed the first Labor Law of the Turkish Republic, containing regulations on working conditions, strikes, and protective measures for enterprises with more than ten employees. In 1945, the “Law on Work Accidents, Occupational Diseases and Maternity Insurances” (Is Kazalari ve Meslek Hastaliklari ve Analik Sigortalari Hakkinda Kanunu) introduced a social insurance scheme for those workers covered by the Labor Law, which was elaborated with an old-age pension scheme with the “Old-Age Insurance Law” (Ihtiyarlik Sigortasi Kanunu) of 1949. In the same year, the “Law of Pension Fund” (Emekli Sandigi Kanunu) united the pension funds for the military and civil servants under a single scheme. The establishment of social assistance schemes for workers and civil servants was accompanied by the establishment of new ministries in the post World War II period: the “Ministry of Labor” (Çalışma Bakanligi) and the “Workers Insurance Agency” (Isci Sigortalari Kurumu) in 1945 and the “Employment Agency” (Is ve Isçi Bulma Kurumu) in 1946 (Kiliç 2006, 36-53).

The early years of the Republic were characterized by a sharp contrast between a modernist bureaucratic state and a non-industrial society dominated by a large stratum of petty producers in agriculture, commerce and industry. While the CHP government established social security institutions and passed social legislation covering the military personnel and civil servants and employees working in larger companies, the vast majority of the Turkish population was excluded from any form of social security. Only 500,000 out of a working population of 14.5 Million were covered by the Labor Law passed in 1936 (Bugra 2006, 42).

4.2 Clientelism as a Substitute for Social Rights in the Years of Agricultural-Led Growth, 1947-1962

By the end of World War II, the majority of the Turkish population became dissatisfied with the single-party regime of the CHP. Coinciding with a closer economic and militarist cooperation with the United States, the government reacted to the protests with a partial policy change towards more reliance on private capital and emphasis on agriculture. Although this policy change paved the way for an era of agricultural growth from 1947 to 1962, the introduction of the multi-party system with the elections of 1950 resulted in a victory of the new “Democratic Party”, DP (Demokrat Partisi). The DP government faced a political dilemma: on the one hand, it had to please the interests of the bureaucratic elite, while, on the other hand, it had to compete for electoral support of the rural population. The solution to this dilemma was a political strategy based on clientelism.²⁵ In order to overcome the state-society gap, the DP had to shift away from the politics of imposed cultural change. As an alternative, the new government tried to facilitate and assist private initiative with the aim to create a climate for cultural change as an outcome of economic development. The DP involved Turkey’s non-industrial population through a clientelist distribution of resources, in particular agrarian subsidies, in exchange for political support. While in the early years of the DP government this practice was made possible by strong agricultural growth favored by various factors, in the later years the patronage coalitions were supported by a state-sustained capitalist economy (Owen/Pamuk 1998; Sunar 1990; Ibid. 1994).²⁶ Although the government was overthrown by

²⁵ Nicous Mouzelis defines Clientelism as a “distinct and, from the point of view of maintaining the status quo, rather safe solution to the problems created by political mobilization and enlarged political participation in peripheral and semi peripheral countries is the use of vertical networks of patron-client relationships for bringing lower-class strata into national politics. Indeed, existing clientelist networks cutting across and hindering the direct producers’ horizontal organization along class lines, were a typical form of organization in oligarchic parliamentary politics. [...] even in its modern, centralized, and diversified forms, clientelism continues to operate as a means for the vertical inclusion of the working population into active politics. To the extent that it successfully cuts across the weakened horizontal modes of political integration, it safeguards the status quo against any serious threat from below, drawing the new political participants into conflicts in which fundamental class issues are systematically displaced by personalistic and by squabbles over the distribution of spoils” (Mouzelis 1985, 332f.) Populism in modern democratic societies is defined by Margaret Canovan as “an appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society. This structural feature in turn dictates populism’s characteristic framework, political style and mood” (Canovan 1999, 3). Mouzelis stresses that both strategies result in “a break-up of the political monopoly of small number of powerful families, the entrance of new men into the power game, the transition from political clubs or coteries of notables to more extensive forms of political participation, and the introduction of reforms in labor rights, education, and so on” (Mouzelis 1985, 334). The main difference between the two approaches of participation is that in a clientelist transformation, “the new men of power manage to break the oligarchic stranglehold by activating, extending, and reorganizing to their own benefits already existing patronage networks; [...] in a populist mobilization, the new men enter into and consolidate their positions of power in a way that both ideologically and structurally makes a more radical break with ancient regime politics” (Ibid. 1985, 334).

²⁶ From 1947 to 1962 Turkey experienced a massive agriculture-led growth. While various factors, such as ideal climate, a high international demand in agricultural goods related to the Korean War, a massive usage of Marshall Fund’s aid for agricultural machinery and the existence of large areas of uncultivated land favored high growth rates

the first military coup in 1960, its political heritage of clientelism survived its demise and still has a major impact on contemporary Turkish politics and the public perception of the statehood and citizenship.²⁷ In short, to win the electoral support of the rural population the DP substituted political participation based on a modern concept of citizenship and social rights with a path of clientelist incorporation.

The Demokrat Party shaped deeply the nature and course of post-authoritarian politics in Turkey. The clientelist incorporation of the rural population, the patronage-induced private initiative, and the great haphazard societal dynamism fueled by populism – all of these have not only outlived the DP, but have become permanent features of center-right politics, dominant in Turkey since 1950 (Ibid. 1990, 753).

4.3 Import Substitution and Occupational Social Security, 1963- 1977

The military regime ruling after the 1960 coup imposed a shift in economic policies towards the protection of the domestic market from international competition and an import-substituted industrialization (ISI). A “State Planning Organization” was established and five-year plans to organize Turkey’s industrial development were introduced. The Turkish industrialization was characterized by strong “State Economic Enterprises”, SEE, investing into large-scale intermediate goods industries, while large private firms, protected from international competitors, focused on consumer goods. As a result, during the times of economic growth from 1963-1977 large segments of the population, including civil servants, workers, and to a lesser extent agricultural producers profited from the expansion of the domestic market for consumer durables. Another side effect of the ISI was the emergence of an urban bourgeoisie in the Western metropolis, which was closely interlinked with the etatist elite and profited considerably from the protective measurements of the government (Owen/Pamuk 1998, 110-114).

In the long run Turkey’s ISI did not lead to an internationally competitive industry, producing high-class products. The export-orientated sectors of the Turkish industrial economy remained insignificant and Turkish companies mainly manufactured goods for the domestic

in agriculture, from 1953 agricultural growth stagnated and could only be upheld by agricultural credits, support programs, and infrastructural investments financed through inflationary financing. While these programs were in favor of the two third of the Turkish population living in the countryside, those living in the urban areas suffered from a decline of living standards and social status. This development also included state and military personnel, which has to be seen as a major factor triggering the military intervention of 1960 (Owen/Pamuk 1998; Sunar 1990; Ibid. 1994).

²⁷ It has to be pointed out that the DP’s approach to political integration lacks the specific characteristics of political populism as defined by Nicous Mouzelis and Margaret Canovan. It did not imply a radical break with the oligarchic politics of the CHP and did not intend to construct an entity of “the people” against the ancient structure of power, manifested in the dominance of the military and the bureaucracy, but held on to the Kemalist idea of collectivist nationalist identity as the basis for citizenship.

market. Accordingly, Turkey needed foreign exchange to invest into capital intensive industries. While this capital was obtained from agricultural exports and workers' remittances at first, in the mid 1970s the system of external borrowing could only be upheld under inflationary conditions. The drawback of foreign lenders in early 1977 resulted in a severe balance-of-payment crisis in 1978/1979. At this point, a new group of actors entered the political realm of Turkey who is still of major significance today: the Bretton Woods Institutions. The International Monetary Fund, IMF, incorporated the rescheduling of Turkey's foreign debts and new credits into a full-scale stabilization program, consisting of the devaluation of the Turkish Lira, the reduction of state subsidies, and liberalization of exports and imports. After the second Oil Crisis in 1979, the IMF program's implications resulted in a shortage of the most basic goods in the Turkish market. This development amplified the critical political situation in Turkey and led to the third military coup in Turkish history in 1980 (Ibid. 1998; Barkey 1990).²⁸

Roger Owen and Sevket Pamuk argue that the basic lesson to be drawn from the Turkish experience is that an ISI regime becomes difficult to dislodge, owing to the power of vested interest groups, which continue to benefit from the existing system of protection and subsidies. To shift towards export promotion in a country with a large domestic market requires a strong government with a long-term horizon and considerable autonomy. These were exactly the features lacking in the Turkish political scene characterized by weak and fragile coalitions during the 1970s (Owen/Pamuk 1998, 115).

The ISI phase brought fundamental changes in labor and social legislation. The constitution of 1960 and subsequent laws passed by the military regime changed the legal framework for class relationship in Turkey. They specified the mode of unionization and collective bargaining and granted the right to strike. The new legal framework for capital-labor relation in Turkey socially embedded the emerging working class right from the beginning. Hence, social policy change in 1960s' Turkey was not a result of class struggle, but part of an industrialization imposed from above (Keyder 1987, 149). In 1964, the "Law of Social Insurances" (Sosyal Sigortalar Kanunu) united existing insurance schemes for workers as one institution. In 1967 and 1971, new Labor Laws were passed and in 1971, the "Social Security Organization of Craftsmen, Tradesmen and other Self-Employed" (Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar ve Diger Bagimsiz Çalisnlar Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu, Bag-Kur) was founded. In 1976, Turkey's first means-tested social assistance scheme, the "Social Disability and Old-Age Pension" was introduced (Karadeniz 2007, 2; Bugra/Keyder 2007, 222).

²⁸ In 1971, for the second time after the coup of 1960, the Turkish military intervened in politics and forced the government to step down. The second coup was a response to the growing strength of the Left and increasing political violence (Toprak 1996, 93).

While civil servants and workers profited greatly from this period of growth in terms of legal status and income, other groups in society were left behind the economic development.²⁹ The Turkish population grew from 21 million in 1950 to 44.7 million in 1980 in total and the urban population from 5.2 million to 22 million (Keyder/Öncü 1993, 16). Only a small percentage of these migrants found employment in the highly protected industrial sector, while the majority was forced to work in the informal labor market (Keyder 1987, 153).

By the end of 1960s almost half of the urban Turkish population lived in shanty towns called “Gecekondu”. These irregular settlements on occupied state property have played a significant role in the integration of the rural migrants into urban Turkey and have to be recognized as an important component of the Turkish welfare regime. Gecekondu, which can be literally translated as “placed overnight”, were tolerated by the Turkish authorities, formally owing to Ottoman legal practice. Neighborhoods usually consisted of families originating from the same rural area. Accordingly, Gecekondu are deeply interlinked to village associations called “Hemseris”, which function on a basis of solidarity and patronage relationships. In fact, rural migration to urban Turkey was often made possible by financial support from those family members, who stayed behind. In this context, the remittances from workers who went abroad have also to be stressed as important mechanisms to support the new urban lower class.

[N]ew migrants in urban centers could continue to rely on in kind, if not pecuniary, income supplements received from their relatives who had remained in the village. Small landownership has also defined a situation where urban workers could seasonally leave their jobs to participate in agricultural production on their family farms. [...] The rural hinterland could support family strategies which have successfully mixed different livelihoods (Bugra/Keyder 2005, 20).

Gecekondu not only functioned as a shelter for rural refugees. They promoted intra-family employment in the informal market, the provision of care services and neighborhood assistance to the poor (World Bank 2003, 33). Initially, a typical Gecekondu settlement consisted only of small houses. With growing social importance, they soon became object of clientelism. National and regional political authorities promised legal ownership or the inclusion in the official infrastructure by building streets and connecting the settlements to water, gas and electricity supply, in exchange for political support in elections. In 1966, the government enacted the “Gecekondu Law” (Gecekondu Kanunu) that legalized already existing buildings and enabled Gecekondu to become an official part of the municipal order, including access to municipal services. This process of legalization was not only motivated by clientelist aims but also by the growing concern of the Turkish public for the worsening living conditions and the

²⁹ Between 1964 and 1978 the average wage in Turkey’s formal labor market almost doubled (Keyder 1987, 160).

threat of epidemics in the Gecekondu areas (Bugra 2007, 44). This incorporation into official city planning and infrastructure, in combination with patronage and clientelism, triggered a transformation process of some Gecekondus from shanty towns to working class suburbs. Many of the small shanty town houses over time expanded to multi-level buildings, opening new sources of income for the house owner and leading to a relative possession of valuable property (Keyder 1983, 162-163; Bugra/Keyder 2005, 22; Burkay 2006).

In a nutshell, the social outcome of the ISI phase was the emergence of a highly protected working class, known for their high wages, employed either by private large-scale manufacturing concerns or State Economic Enterprises. These workers were legally protected by labor rights and represented by labor unions on the political level. Nevertheless, the industrial working class representation on the political level was not the result of class struggle, but part of an organized industrialization planed by the central government. Workers in small-scale factories or rural workers did not benefit from the new labor laws or social security mechanisms and as a result were pushed into the informal market without social protection. Furthermore, the exceeding rural emigration from the 1950s on led to the establishment of a new urban lower class. This class developed its own mechanisms of social protection and employment creation, which relied on family and neighborhood networks and were tolerated and facilitated by the authorities in the central and municipal governments.

4.4 Economic Liberalization and Emerging Social Conflicts in the 1980s

With the military coup of 1980, the Turkish Republic entered an economic era of liberalization and stabilization. The military regime installed Turgut Özal as Deputy Prime Minister responsible for economic affairs. Özal had formerly served as chief of the State Planning Organization. Under his leadership, Turkey launched a number of economic reforms, which were continued after Özal was elected prime minister in 1983. The main aim of the reforms was to put Turkey's economy on an outward oriented course. It key features consisted of a flexibilization of the exchange rate, subsidies for export oriented companies, a privatization of the State Economic Enterprises, financial liberalization, import liberalization, and the promotion of foreign investment (Aricanli/Rodrik 1990). These reforms were financially and ideologically backed by the World Bank and the IMF. Between 1980 and 1984, Turkey received five "Successive Structural Adjustment Loans" from the World Bank, giving the political authorities the financial autonomy to implement their program (Önis 1991, 38). The political shift towards export orientation led to an impressive economic performance of the Turkish

export sector by the end of the 1980s. The Turkish merchandise exports grew from 2.3 billion US Dollars in 1979 to 11.7 billion US Dollars in 1989 (Arıcanlı/Rodrik 1990, 1347).

While the Özal period could be called a success in terms of export growth and the management of the economic crisis, the social outcomes of its reforms were dramatic. Formulating economic policies in favor of private, export-oriented companies located in Western Turkey, the military regime and the Özal government neglected the agricultural sector, cutting down state subsidies and price-support programs. As a result, agricultural production and employment opportunities declined, making life in rural Turkey even more difficult. The result was a new wave of migration to the metropolis. In 1950, about 84% of the Turkish population and 80% of the labor force lived in rural areas. In 1988, about 60% were of the total population and 47% of the labor force lived in urban Turkey (Ergüder 1991, 71).

The growing number of peasants migrating to urban Turkey undermined the informal networks of Hemseris and family support in the Gecekondus. As mentioned before, many migrants relied on family support from their relatives in the rural hinterland. With the decline in agricultural productivity many families were no longer able to support their relatives in the cities. The situation further deteriorated, when the violent conflict between Kurdish separatists and the Turkish military triggered a massive exodus towards the cities of Kurds living in rural South-East Anatolia. This process, which started in the mid-1980s and continued throughout the 1990s, added an ethnic dimension to the social conflicts in the urban livelihood. For the Kurdish migrants, integration into the Turkish cities was even more difficult because they could not rely on assistance provided by family networks (Bugra 2007, 46).

Living conditions also became worse for those in formal employment. During the ISI period, employment and social insurance of those working in the formal labor market was guaranteed by state subsidies and protectionist policies. The new economic policies of liberalization and export orientation put an end to the state employment via the SEEs. As a result, real wages declined by 34% between 1977 and 1987 and employment rates in the formal sector dropped (Owen/Pamuk 1998, 117-122).

Hence, urban families had to find new ways of income to ensure the well-being of those living in the household. This necessity led to a drastic change in the Turkish labor market. While in pre-1980s Turkey, unemployment and informal employment were temporary phenomena for the individual, they became permanent in many Turkish households. In 1988, informal employment accounted for estimated 58% of the Turkish economy in total (OECD 2006, 89). The use of family labor, self-employment and street vending gained importance not only for those living in Gecekondus. In addition, women and school aged children also had to contribute to the household income.

As informal employment becomes more important, irregular employment conditions and falling pay lead men to leave their places in the job market to women and children, sometimes because they do not wish to work in these conditions, sometimes because employers prefer docile women and children to troublesome men (Bugra/Keyder 2003, 28).

Nevertheless, this feminization of work was not reflected in the numbers of women employed in the formal labor market. It was basically restricted to informal domestic production and take-home work, i.e. in textiles and apparel sectors (Ibid. 2003, 19-30; Ibid. 2005, 11; Boratov 1990, 224).

The Özal reforms resulted in a dramatic shift in income distribution in favor of the capital and at the expenses of labor in the 1980s (Boratov 1990). Furthermore, the structure of the Turkish bourgeoisie was affected significantly. While industrial and financial capital was traditionally located in urban Western Turkey and closely connected to the etatist elite, in the 1980s, new manufacturing industries in Anatolia showed an impressive economic performance. These small or medium-sized firms, the so-called “Anatolian Tigers”, stood in sharp contrast to the large-scale manufacturers in urban areas with their highly protected industrial working class. They were organized by strict hierarchical family rule and their workforce basically consisted of unskilled employees. The new Anatolian bourgeoisie was not only of economic importance. With its work ethic based on Islam, it also paved the way for the success of religious parties in Turkey (Cizre-Sakallioğlu/Yeldan 2000, 500f.).

The policies of the military regime and the Özal government did not only aim at export orientation and elimination of state subsidies. They also rearranged the legal framework for labor representation. While the economic reforms were financially backed by the Bretton Woods Institutions, the repression of labor rights guaranteed the authority’s autonomy from societal pressures. Immediately following the coup, the military regime prohibited all labor union confederations and made strikes illegal. The constitution of 1982 and legislation on trade unions made illegal any kind of political activities of labor unions outside their own socio-economic interests, and prohibited labor unions’ support of political parties. As such, the reforms under the Özal government represent a shift away from the protective legacy of the ISI period. Prior to 1980, the Turkish government aimed to include workers, organizing their representation in labor unions from above. In contrast, the Özal government intended to exclude organized labor from the political sphere by restricting workers rights (Sakallioğlu 1991).

Significant reforms of the existing structures of social security were not implemented, with the exception of the inclusion in 1983 of self-employed farmers in the Bag-Kur through the Law of Social Insurance for the Self-Employed in Agriculture (Tarimda Kendi Adina ve

Hesabına Çalışanlar Sosyal Sigortalar Kanunu). However, the growing social tensions and the exposure to poverty of the new urban lower class forced the political authorities to respond to the societal changes (Kiliç 2006, 43). In 1986, the “Fund for the Encouragement of Social Cooperation and Solidarity”, SYDTF, (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışmayı Teşvik Fonu) was established. In its early conceptualization, the Fund, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, was intended to mobilize private donations and organize the distribution of charitable funds to the poor (Bugra 2007, 46).

While the central state basically reacted hesitantly to the growing threat of poverty in Turkey, new actors entered the social realm. A growing number of “Civil Society Organizations”, CSOs, and municipalities became active in the social arena, focusing on poverty alleviation and care services (Bugra/Keyder 2005; Boratov 1990, 224; Toprak 1996).

In summary, the 1980s were characterized by a rigid course of economic liberalization and growing social conflicts. A new wave of rural migrants and the reduction of state subsidies for industry and agriculture led to a new dimension of social conflicts. Parallel to this development, new issues dominated Turkey’s political agenda, such as the advent of political Islam and the Kurdish question. Focusing on labor-capital relations, the organized left was weakened significantly, while the financial and industrial capital profited from the economic growth and the influx of foreign capital. In the social realm, new actors such as CSOs and municipalities became more relevant in the fight against the new threat of poverty, while the central government hardly reacted to the new challenges. It neither reformed the existing structures of social security nor did it implement new forms of social security based on citizenship.

4.5 Crisis and Reform since the 1990s

At the end of the 1980s the political arena became more competitive again. As a result, the Özal government slowed down the course of liberalization and returned to old-style clientelism, manifested in the rise of wages for civil servants and subsidies for the agricultural sector. Real wages almost doubled between 1987 and 1990.

Nonetheless, social conflicts erupted and the living conditions in urban Turkey deteriorated. Prior to 1980, those living in urban Turkey could rely on a number of informal mechanisms of social security, such as informal housing in Gecekondu, the close connection to migrants from their rural origins, the support of the extended family and neighborhood assistance. Through the 1990s, these informal safety nets collapsed (Bugra/Keyder 2005).

As the internal migration continued, Turkey's cities were overburdened with the drastic increase of citizens. Istanbul's population more than doubled between 1980 and 2000 (Ibid. 2003, 25). Accordingly, the percentage of employees in the agricultural sector declined from 50% in 1980 to 34% in 2004 (OECD 2006III, 8). The early waves of rural migrants could rely on the availability of public land close to the city centers to settle down and established mechanisms of social protection in the networks of family and neighborhood solidarity. Since the 1980s, the transformation of the Turkish economy undermined this "flexible solution to urban poverty" (Bugra 2007, 44). The influx of international capital, the erection of suburban middle-class settlements and the mushrooming of commercial building led to a growing interest in the urban real estate market. Hence, the *laissez-faire* attitude of the political authorities towards the irregular settlements on financially attractive grounds changed.

These new pressures have led to a new commodification of land and have reinforced capitalist property rights, thus limiting an important space of opportunity hitherto available to urban masses. For a long time *gecekondu* had enjoyed the moral legitimacy based on the recognition of the need for shelter as a basic need [...], but this legitimacy was pretty well lost by the late 1990s (Bugra/Keyder 2006, 221).

The end of "Gecekonduization" continues to affect the informal labor market, which employs about 50% of the Turkish labor force. With the end of Gecekonduization, the opportunities for un- and low-skilled workers have declined dramatically, given that the construction sector is the second biggest market for informal employment (OECD 2006II, 89). This process has been amplified by a decrease in migration to Turkish cities and a surplus in housing resulting from the upgrading of former shanty town buildings to multi-floor houses, the erection of middle-class settlements in the suburbs and greater sensitivity to safety regulations. The decreasing demand for low-skilled labor in the construction sector led to a drop in wages across the entire informal sector (Bugra/Keyder 2005).

A series of events in the late 1990s led to a drastic deterioration of the social situation of large parts of the Turkish society: the Marmara earthquake in August 1999 killed more than 15,000 people, caused severe damage in the Marmara region, and had enormous economic consequences. Between October 1999 and April 2000, the employment rate decreased by 10.5% (World Bank 2003).

In terms of economic and social consequences the financial crises of 1994, 2000, and 2001 were even worse.³⁰ Unemployment rates almost doubled from November 2000 to the first

³⁰ While economic policies in Turkey until 2001 were characterized by a further liberalization of the Turkish market, debt-led growth and a low commitment to fiscal stability created a very fragile financial system, which resulted in three economic crises in 1994, November 2000, and February 2001. Due to IMF assistance, the impact of the first

quarter of 2002. In 2001, the GDP declined by 9.4% (Ibid. 2003, 8). Real wages dropped sharply: in the manufacturing sector by 14.4%, in the public sector by 12%, and in the private sector by 15.2% (Senses 2003, 101). While official numbers only include those workers in the formal labor market, it is highly probable that the informal sector was hit disproportionately hard. Agriculture and the construction sector, in which most of the informal workers were employed, were shocked by the crisis (World Bank 2003, 8).

As a result of the socio-economic development and the impact of the economic crises and the Marmara earthquake, urban poverty increased dramatically since 1994. While World Bank data shows that extreme poverty did not change between 1994 and 2001,³¹ urban food poverty increased significantly. In 1994, 6.2% of the urban population had equivalent incomes below the imputed value of a food basket; in 2001 it was 17.2% (Ibid. 2003).

Focusing on the development of social security institutions and social legislation in the 1990s, the renaissance of clientelism at the beginning of the 1990s became visible especially in the pension system. In 1991, the government abolished the minimum retirement age for all three social security institutions (Ibid. 2005I, 102). Furthermore, it launched early-retirement programs, so called “Super Pensions” (Süper Emeklilik), which in some cases permitted retirement after 15 years of contribution. While these measurements intended to lead to a decrease in unemployment, the outcome was an increasing maladjustment in the active-passive ratio and a growing deficit of the social security institutions (Owen/Pamuk 1998, 121; OECD 2006II, 134; Askin 2004, 56-57). The growing deficits and the increasing influence of the IMF since the 1994 crisis forced the political authorities to reform the pension system. In 1999, a major pension reform determined equal retirement ages for all three social security institutions (TÜSIAD 2004; Bugra/Keyder 2006, 214-215).

The growing threat of poverty also triggered the implementation of new instruments of social protection. Especially the role of the SYDTF was strengthened. Since 1992, the Fund finances Turkey’s first health assistance scheme for people not covered by the public health insurance system: the so called “Green Card” (Yesil Kart) (Ibid. 2005).

In the recent past, Turkey experienced an era of economic and political reforms. In 2000, Turkey’s first unemployment insurance was established. Since the “Justice and Development

crisis was fairly limited and the political authorities ignored the warning sign and continued the economic course of heavy domestic borrowing and dependence on inflows of short-term capital. In 1999, the IMF interfered when Turkey’s external debts threatened to destabilize the entire economy. As a precondition to further loans, Turkey had to implement a program, aiming at fiscal stability, banking sector regulation, pegged exchange rates and structural reforms. Nevertheless, amplified by external factors, such as the earthquake of 1999, the worldwide economic instability following the economic crisis in Asia and Russia, the high oil prices and the strong US Dollar, Turkey experienced two further financial crises. In 2000, the private banking system collapsed, followed by a full-blown currency crisis in 2001 (Önis 2006; Önis/Alper 2004; Akyüz/Boratov 2003; World Bank 2003).

³¹ In 2001, less than 2% of the Turkish population had per capita consumption and only 3% had a per capita income below one US Dollar per day (Ibid. 2003, 11).

Party”, AKP, (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) was elected in 2002, a number of laws were passed that led to significant changes in the Turkish welfare state. The role of the new actors in the Turkish welfare regime, municipalities and Civil Society Organizations, was legally and financially strengthened.³² In 2006, the AKP government led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan passed a reform, which would result in a comprehensive restructuring of the traditional social security institutions and significant changes in the health and pension system. While the law was stopped by a veto of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and a decision of the Constitutional Court, the landslide victory of the AKP in the parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007 makes its implementation highly probable (Bugra; Keyder; Adar). It has to be emphasized that the recent reform is not only a result of the growing social conflicts in Turkey, but also of the high budget deficit of the social security institutions. Although the government changed the regulations on retirement age in 1999, the deficits of the health and pension system are still growing (Table I).

In this context, the influence on social policy reform of external actors, such as the EU and the IMF, should be highlighted. While the IMF played a big role in Turkish politics since the late 1970s, its influence on social policy gained importance since the economic crisis of 1994. Turkey is under the close supervision of the IMF and the World Bank, which are pushing the Turkish government to achieve a primary fiscal surplus of 6.5% of GDP. The constantly high deficits of the social security system undermined this goal. In response, the Bretton Woods Institutions put a great effort in the reform of the health and pension sector, offering substantial loans in exchange for social policy reforms (World Bank 2004; World Bank 2005I; Adar 2007; Ülker 24f.).³³

The EU has gained significance in influencing social policy since 1999, when Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate for full membership. As part of the negotiations and the implementation of the “*acquis communautaire*”, Turkey adopted its first National Program in correspondence with European Law in 2001. Social affairs and matters of employment, encoded in the “*Social Dialog*”, are central elements of the accession process. In this context, the EU pushes for a strengthening of labor unions and an adoption of European standards in labor legislation, gender equalization, decentralization, and the support of the civil society (EFILWC 2007). In 2005, the EU officially opened accession negotiations with Turkey. In 2006, the European Commission observed mixed results in adapting European standards in the social realm. According to the Progress Report, the development of civil society was positive while

³² See Chapter 5.2.

³³ The World Bank amplified the reform process in Turkey with a number of loans, i.e. in 2004 with a loan of 49.4 million Euros for a first health transition project and one year later with a second loan worth 150 million US Dollars for a second health project (Ibid. 2004; Ibid. 2005II).

little progress was made in the fields of decentralization and the adoption of EU labor legislation (European Commission 2006).

4.6 The Gendered Social Security System from a Historical Perspective

Like the Turkish social security system in general, the origins of gendered social legislation can be traced back to the late Ottoman period. Benefits granted by the Ottoman Orphan and Retirement Funds were based on gendered entitlements. While male orphans were entitled to pensions until the age of 20, female orphans and widows were entitled until (re-)marriage. The gendered distinction in survivor insurance was continued by the social legislation of the early Republican years and remained more or less unchanged until today. When the “Law of Military and Civil Retirement Fund” united the Ottoman retirement funds under one law in 1930, its regulation on survivor pensions was similar to prior legislation.³⁴ However, some changes were made. The law gave entitlement not only to orphans and widows, but also to the surviving mother of the deceased and, in case of invalidity and destitution, to the widower and father. Additionally, male invalid or disabled orphans were entitled to life-long pensions, while female orphans who were unable to support themselves were eligible until marriage. The early Republican legislation on survivor insurance not only extended the circle of beneficiaries, it also aimed at the encouragement of widows and female orphans to get married by offering the choice between a lump-sum payment and a pension. The “Law of the Pension Fund” of 1949, which still regulates the survivor insurance of civil servants, determines that survivor pension should be paid to widows depending on their marital status, to male orphans until the age of 18, 20, or 25 years, depending on their educational status, to disabled male orphans and unmarried daughters irrespective of their age, and, on a means-tested basis, to the parents of the deceased. Additionally, the law arranged marriage boni for female beneficiaries.

Survivor insurance for dependants of workers were introduced with the “Law on Work Accidents, Occupational Diseases and Maternity Insurances” in 1945 and extended by the “Old-Age Insurance Law” of 1949. While in the early years, relatives of deceased workers were clearly disadvantaged compared to those of deceased civil servants, the gendered norms of survivor benefits were gradually transferred to the social assistance schemes for workers, and later to the schemes for the self-employed.³⁵

³⁴ The law gave the entitlement to male orphans below the age of 21 and to unmarried female orphans below the age of 26 and above the age of 45 (Kiliç 2006, 52).

³⁵ The 1949 legislation entitles widows from the age of 50 and orphans until the age of 18, regardless of their sex (Ibid. 2006, 54). In 1957, with the “Law of Invalidity, Old-Age and Death Insurance” (Maluliyet, İhtiyarlık ve Ölüm Sigortalari Kanunu) pensions were granted to orphans until the age of 25, in case of higher education. The 1964 “Law of Social Insurances” introduced lifelong entitlement for invalid orphans and, since 1973, female orphans are

In 1985, the SSK and the BK, and in 1986, the ES equalized the regulations on widow benefits. As a result, widowers no longer have to go through a means test to gain entitlement. Furthermore, since 2003, as a result of EU membership negotiations, disabled and invalid daughters gained the right to lifelong entitlement to survivor pensions, regardless of their marital status.

Gendered differentiation between dependants not only developed with the schemes for survivor pensions, but also in health insurance. The benefits for dependants of civil servants were regulated first in the “Law of Civil Servants” (Devlet Memurlari Kanunu) in 1965. Sons of the actively insured are insured until the age of 18, 20, or 25, depending on their level of education and unmarried daughters until marriage. Sons who are disabled or invalid also have the legal claim for lifelong insurance. In 1973, a by-law was passed, which introduced a means test and an age limit of 65 for the male spouse in case of a female breadwinner. This law was abolished in 2004. The conditions of insured dependants of workers were determined in 1957, granting health insurance to spouses, children until the age of 18 or 25 years and cared-for parents. With the founding of the SSK in 1964, the conditions for dependant husband were tightened. In order to be insured through the wife, the husband had to prove his inability to work. Along with the end of gender differentiation in survivor insurance this rule was cancelled in 2003. The developments in the Bag-Kur system correspond to these to these changes. With the introduction of health insurance, sons were entitled to benefits until the age of 18, 20, or 25, and disabled sons for life. Daughters, also in case of invalidity or disability, again were entitled until marriage. The latter was changed in 2003, when disabled daughters were granted the same legal claims as disabled sons (Kiliç 2006, 47ff.).

Regulations on maternity leave periods and discriminating labor market regulations can be traced back to the early Republican years. The “Labor Law of Public Hygiene” (Umumi Hifzisiyya Kanunu) of 1930 banned pregnant women from hard work three months before their delivery. The Labor Law of 1936 excluded women from a number of occupations and night work and introduced a six-week period of maternity leave paid at 50% of the salary. Maternity insurance became part of Turkish social law in 1945 with the “Law on Work Accidents, Occupational Diseases, and Maternity Insurances”. According to the law, maternity allowances equaled 70% of the daily wage and were paid for the first six weeks after delivery. In 1950, this period was extended to nine weeks. In 2003, with the new Labor Law, maternity leave was extended to 16 weeks. Additionally, the law abandoned some of the gender specific labor regulations, such as the ban on night work for women (Ibid. 2006, 88ff.).

entitled to a lifelong pension depending on marital and occupational status. Since 1978, the SSK also grants marriage boni to daughters (Ibid. 2006, 61-64).

The maternity insurance for civil servants was regulated in 1965 with the “Law on Civil Servants” which entailed a fully paid maternity leave period of nine weeks and an optional unpaid maternity leave of 12 month. Additionally, the law entitled married civil servants to family allowances. It should be pointed out that in the case where both spouses are civil servants the husband has the legal entitlement to the allowance payments. In accordance with to the maternity leave reform of the SSK insured, the maternity leave was extended to 16 weeks in 2004 (Ibid. 2006, 96)

Gender based differentiations are also found in regulations of retirement ages. Until 1975, employees insured through the ES old-age insurance scheme were entitled to pensions after 55 years of age and 30 years of employment, regardless of gender. The SSK introduced later retirement ages for male workers in 1964. According to the new law, men were entitled to old-age pension at the age of 60 and women at the age of 55. This practice was integrated into the Bag-Kur system as well. When the ES introduced the option of early retirement for civil servants, the minimum of working years was set at 20 years for women and 25 years for men. Under current law, men, who took up employment after 1999 will retire at the age of 66, women at the age of 58 (Ibid. 2006, 81ff.).

4.7 Interim Conclusion: The Historical Origins of the Turkish Welfare Regime

The historical analysis of the Turkish welfare regime highlights the origins of contemporary class relations, unveils trajectories in social policy institutionalization, and accounts for gendered social legislations. It also explains the development of a notion of citizenship and statehood, which in many respects contradicts Marshall’s concept of a citizenship based on social rights.

Focusing on contemporary class relations in Turkey, the lack of organized labor is striking. This low level of organized labor can be explained by the way in which were established and developed. Organized structures of labor representation were imposed by the central state and did not emerge as the result of class struggles. Turkey’s left lacked the resources to mobilize political power and it was prevented from gaining political strength by the Turkish military, which interfered in the political realm and imposed restrictive labor legislations. Hence, a labor movement with the capacity to participate in the political decision-making process and shape the outcomes of social policies never developed in Turkey.

On the contrary, the absence of an urban or rural bourgeoisie in the early years of the Republic enabled the Kemalist elite to create a modern nation state, built on a nationalistic discourse of unity as the basis of citizenship. Industrial and financial capital was a byproduct of

the state-led industrialization and deeply intertwined with the etatist elite. The processes of liberalization in the 1980s had a great influence on the Turkish bourgeoisie. While the traditional urban capital profited significantly from the Özal reforms, a new Islamic capital emerged in Anatolia, paving the way for new religious parties and shifting the political agenda.

The institutionalization of the Turkish welfare regime was deeply influenced by the Ottoman legacy according to which poverty alleviation is perceived as a matter of the private realm, the family in particular. The establishment of institutionalized forms of social security, modeled after the example of Western welfare states, focused on the protection of workers and employees connected to the state apparatus. The majority of the population was excluded from social security and bound to the political system via clientelist politics. While the social security system was erected with the intention to protect the urban population, processes of urbanization, the collapse of informal structures of social security and the social outcomes of unbound liberalization resulted in a fundamental crisis of the Turkish welfare regime, leaving large groups of society exposed to a high risk of poverty. While state-led social policy reforms were rare in Turkish history, in the recent past a number of institutional and legal changes are significant. However, it has to be recognized that the latter were influenced to a certain degree by external actors, such as the EU and the Bretton Woods Institutions. The gendered social legislation in Turkey shows a large extent of path dependency. The gendered regulations of social insurance and labor policies dating from the Ottoman and early Republican periods remained unaltered until the recent changes were implemented under pressure of external actors.³⁶

The obvious challenges in the realm of social policy are closely related to questions of statehood and citizenship. The Kemalist elite legitimized the authoritarian socio-economic transformation necessary to erect the Turkish nation state with a nationalist discourse and a perception of citizenship based on ethnicity and unity. The implementation of this authoritarian transformation was supervised by an omnipotent centralist government based on a paternalistic perception of statehood and personified in the supreme leader of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This perception of citizenship and statehood left little space for political participation and organization outside the central state apparatus. While the Turkish state interfered in the political and economic realm to implement its perception of a “modern” nation state, matters of social protection were essentially left to the family.

Comparing Turkey’s historical legacy with that of Southern European countries, some significant differences appear. Since gaining EU membership, processes of political and social

³⁶ The Turkish social policy reforms would be an interesting object to test Pierson’s concept of “blame avoidance”. Accordingly, it could be analyzed in how far the IMF and the EU are blamed for the recent reforms.

reform have had a major impact on the Southern European welfare regimes. In the Turkish context, social policy reform was significantly shaped by the Bretton Woods Institutions and a byproduct of fiscal supervision. Another core difference is the small role religious organizations played in the Turkish context. Unlike the Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese Catholic, and the Greek Orthodox Church, religion has always been under strict state control in Turkey. Hence, little effort was made by religious organizations to lobby for social policy reform and more equality in income distribution.

Despite these differences, a number of similarities with regards to historical development of the states are striking. Corresponding with the Mediterranean countries, the main political actor in Turkey is the central state. In this context, parallels in the historical legacies of authoritarian nation building and the development of paternalistic perceptions of statehood in Turkey and Southern Europe, especially in Spain and Portugal, have to be highlighted. A strong central state, based on a powerful bureaucratic elite appears to be the major encumbrance for the participation of civil society in social matters. Similarities are also found with respect to class relationships. As in other Southern European countries, a strong working class, organized through left-wing parties and powerful labor unions, never developed in Turkey.

In summary, the historical development of the Turkish welfare regime shows differences but also striking parallels to Southern Europe's welfare regimes. The following chapters analyze to what extent this historical development resulted in social policies in Turkey and how similar these were to the rest of Southern Europe.

5. A Case Study: The Turkish Welfare Regime

5.1 The Turkish Social Security System

The Turkish social security system organized by the central state includes pension and health insurance schemes that are provided by the three social security institutions. The "Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu" (SSK) provides services to more than 35 million blue- and white-collar workers in the private sector, blue-collar workers in the public sector, unemployed, employers in the private sector, pensioners, and the dependant of the actively insured just mentioned. Additionally, there is an optional insurance for invalidity, old-age, and burial costs for those who are not covered by social insurance. For the voluntarily insured workers in the agriculture sector the SSK also provides occupational accident and health insurance. The "Emekli Sandigi" (ES) provides services for more than 10 million white-collar workers in the central government, in public finance or economic enterprises, and in state-owned enterprises, as well as their

dependants. Finally, the “Bag-Kur” (BK) provides compulsory insurance for 15 million self-employed and artisans, voluntarily insured farmers, as well as their dependants (Table II; Askin 2004).

Since 2003, workers insured with the SSK are also covered by an unemployment insurance organized by the “Turkish Labor Agency” (Is-Kur). Furthermore, social assistance is provided by the “General Directorate for Social Assistance and Solidarity”, SYDGM, (Sosyal Yardimlasma ve Dayanisma Genel Müdürlüğü) its affiliated 931 “Social Insurance Solidarity Foundations”, SYDV, (Sosyal Yardimlasma ve Dayanisma Vakiflari) and the “General Directorate for Social Services and Child Protection”, SHCEK, (Sosyal Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Karumu) (Askin 2004).³⁷

5.1.1 Pensions

SSK, ES, and BK offer different compulsory and voluntary pension schemes to insurants and their dependants on a pay-as-you-go basis. The 1999 pension reform defined new entitlement ages for pensioners in all three branches. While early drafts of the law aimed at a retirement age of 65 for male and 63 for female insurants, the new bill no. 4447 determines that all male workers who took up employment after 8 September 1999 will retire at the age of 65, all female workers at the age of 58. While the modification of the early plans of the Turkish government were basically due to massive protest from labor unions and interest groups, the law was changed again in 2002 after the Constitutional Court revoked the plans for the transition period. Besides the increase of the entitlement age, the reform extended the indexation period of the calculation of pension benefits to the entire period of employment, increased the minimum period of contribution necessary for entitlement, and adjusted the amount of pension benefits to the inflation rate (TÜSIAD 2005; Bugra/Keyder 2006, 214f.).

5.1.1.1 Pension of the SSK

The SSK grants pensions in case of work accidents and occupational diseases, invalidity, old-age, as well as pensions for surviving dependants. Pension contributions equal 20% of the insurant’s gross income (World Bank 2005I, 102).

The 1999 reform not only changed the entitlement age, but also the benefit parameters for the SSK old-age pension. Retirement age for insurants who took up employment after 8

³⁷ The services provided by the SHCEK will be discussed in the next chapter.

September 1999, is 58 for female and 60 for male workers. Workers have to contribute 7000 days and to be formal SSK members for 25 years if male and 20 years if female, in order to be entitled to full pension, which equals 54% of the lifetime career average. A partial retirement pension is available after a minimum of 4,500 days of contribution, which equals 40% of the of the career average income. However, the minimum entitlement age for early retirement is also 60 for men and 58 for women (Ibid. 2005, 103; Askin 2004).

The regulations of the benefits and entitlement ages for those workers who became SSK members before 8 September 1999 are a gradual combination of the pre- and post-reform arrangements. In this section, only the pre-reform parameters will be explained in detail. Before 1999, workers had to contribute 5,000 days in order to be entitled to full pension, which equaled 60% of the average income of the last 5 years and an additional 1% for every additional period of 240 days. Analog to the modern legislation, workers had to be SSK members for 25 if male and 20 years if female for full entitlement. As no minimum retirement age existed, women could technically retire at the age of 38 (Table IX). Additionally, male workers who had reached the age of 55 and female workers over 50 could retire after 3,600 days of contribution. In this case the pension equaled 54% of the last salary (Social Insurance Act 506, Chapter VI; World Bank 2005I; Askin 2004).

The SKK also offers survivor insurance to the dependants of its members. The pension, which equals 60% of the pensions of the deceased, is awarded to the spouse, children, and parents. 50% of the pension is granted to the spouse, 25% to the son if he is under the age of 18, 20, or 25 depending on his educational status, and 25% to the daughter if she is not married or not officially employed. If the spouse does not have children, she is entitled to 75% of the pension. In case of remarriage, the spouse's pension is suppressed. Disabled children are entitled to pensions irrespective of their age or marital status. Until 2003, only disabled sons were entitled to lifelong pensions irrespective of their marital status. Nevertheless, as part of the adoption process of EU law, this was changed. If a son becomes unable to work after his pension has been repressed, the payment is reinstated. Accordingly, widows or daughters who lost entitlement status because of (re-)marriage, are reentitled after divorce or if they lose their legal employment. Daughters, but not widows, are encouraged to get married by "marriage boni" (Kiliç 2005, 64). The parents of the deceased are entitled to pensions if the sum distributed to the spouse and the children is less than 60% of the monthly pensions. The difference is distributed equally between the father and the mother, but shall not exceed 25% of the monthly pensions (Social Insurance Act 506, Chapter VII).

Invalidity pension is granted if the insurant loses two thirds of his or her ability to work after a minimum of 1800 days of contribution. The amount of the pension equals 60% of the

average year salary. If a pensioner requires medical treatment or care the amount can be raised up to 70% (Ibid. Chapter V, Art. 52-54).

Insurance against work accidents and occupational diseases also includes a pension if the insurant's incapacity to work is permanent. The amount of the pension equals 70% of the insurant's average annual earnings. Corresponding with the regulation and criteria of distribution of the survivor's insurance, dependants of a SSK member whose death is caused by a work accident or an occupational disease are entitled to a monthly pension that equals 70% of the deceased's income (Ibid. Chapter II).

5.1.1.2 Pensions of the ES

The ES manages the old-age, invalidity, and surviving dependants pension funds of the white collar workers employed by the state. ES's contributions equal 36% of the worker's salary of which 20% are paid by the employer and 16% are paid by the worker himself. In contrast to SSK and BK regulations, the contributions are not calculated on the basis of the entire cash remuneration of the insurant. Depending on the employment status of the worker, the salary might only represent 60% of the worker's total income. The 1999 reform only changed the retirement age but not the benefit parameters of the ES insurants. Due to pre-reform regulation retirement age for men was 43 for men and 40 for women after a minimum of 25, respectively 20, years of contribution (World Bank 2005I, 104).

The old-age pension equals at least 75% of the insurant's last income. Additionally, state employees who worked more than the required minimum have the right to higher pensions. Employees who worked less than the required years at the age of their retirement are bound to interim arrangements. Finally, pensioners insured via the ES receive extra boni at the date of retirement (Ibid. 2005I, 104).

The ES surviving pension is granted after 10 years of contribution and equals between 50% and 75%, depending on the kind of pensions the insurant was entitled to (Askin 2004, 42). The regulations for surviving dependants insurance equal the ones of SSK, with one exception: widows are also encouraged to get remarried via "marriage boni" (Kiliç 2006, 62).

Invalidity pensions distributed by the ES fall into three different groups. Those insurants whose incapability to work is caused by a handicap or illness not related to the work itself receive the "Regular Invalidity Pension" (Adi Malüllük Ayligi). Pensioners whose invalidity is related to an occupational disease receive the higher "Disability for Service Pension" (Vazife Malüllüğü Ayligi). Those state employees whose incapability to work is related to military service have the legal claim to "War Invalidity Pension" (Askin 2004, 39-42).

5.1.1.3 Pension of the BK

The BK offers old-age, invalidity; and survivor insurance to its members. The monthly contributions equal 40% of the insurant's income, 20% for pensions and 20% for health insurance. As the insurants are self-employed, they have to pay the entire contributions. Insurants classify themselves in a minimum earning step system, determining pension and monthly contributions. Prior the 1999 reform, farmers and self-employed were entitled to 70% of the last earning step after 25 years of contribution. The option for early retirement after 15 years of contribution existed for men above the age of 55 and women above 50. While the 1999 reform raised the retirement age to 60 and 58, for men and women respectively, it only changed the benefit structure of the self-employed. Analog to SSK regulation, self-employed have a legal right to claim 65% of their last income step after 25 years and 45% after 15 years of contribution (World Bank 2005I, 104). Those insurants who are incapable of establishing a claim for 15 years can apply for outpayment of the contributions paid so far. The surviving spouse, children, and parents are entitled to pensions if the insurant contributed more than three years to the pension's fund or was already entitled to an old-age or invalidity pension before his death (Askin 2004, 34-36).³⁸

Invalidity pensions are granted if the insurants incapacity to work is below two thirds of his full capacity. If the invalidity status is caused related to a disease or accident not related to the insurant's occupation, five years of contribution to the BK's fund are mandatory for claiming invalidity pension. If the invalidity is related to an occupational disease or accident, the pension is granted without precondition. As such, the invalidity pension of the BK also functions as an occupational accident or occupational disease insurance. The amount of the invalidity pension equals 70% of the last income of the insurant (Ibid. 2004, 35).

5.1.1.4 Non-Contributory Pensions

In 1976, the Turkish parliament passed Law 2022, which introduced a small flat rate pension for elderly above the age of 65 and disabled above the age of 18 managed by the ES. According to Bugra and Adar, the pension is not well known among the Turkish public. In 2004, noncontributory pensions were paid to approximately one million elderly and 200,000 disabled. The sum is paid four times a year and equals 6% of the average wage.³⁹ As a

³⁸ Data about criteria for distribution and the amount of survivor's pension was not available.

³⁹ 54.64 million Turkish Lira in March 2004. (World Bank 2005I, 105)

precondition for entitlement, applicants have to prove that they are not covered by any other social insurance, without income generating property or have any other sources of income. Additionally, the income of close relatives will be taken into account. If a close family member has sufficient income, the applicant disqualifies for the pension (World Bank 2005I, 105; Bugra/Keyder 2005, 25).

5.1.2 Health Insurance

Health insurance in Turkey is provided by the three social security institutions. The main providers of health services are the Ministry of Health, the SSK, and university hospitals. Prior to 2004, the access to healthcare facilities and services was highly fragmented and interlinked with the insurance scheme. Today, health insured can chose the healthcare facility at which they want to be treated (World Bank 2005I, 70). In 1992, the Turkish government introduced the Green Card (Yesil Kart), which covers health services on a means-tested basis. It is organized by the SYDGM and financed by the Ministry of Health and will be discussed in paragraph 5.1.4. According to World Bank data, one third of the Turkish population is still not covered by health insurance (World Bank 2005I, 72).

The SSK covers the costs for medical treatment in case of illness, pregnancy, and occupational accidents or diseases. The 1999 reform reduced the entitlement period from 120 days of contribution within 12 month to 60 working days within six month. The healthcare expenses for the dependants are covered after 12 month and a minimum of 120 days of work. Since the foundation of the Is-Kur, unemployed are covered by a compulsory health insurance through the SSK. The SSK's benefits cover, in detail, the treatment of illnesses as well as medically advised services provided by health institutions, the costs of medication and adjuvants, costs related to abortions, and illness benefits. Medical support is covered by the health insurance for a period not exceeding six month. Subsequently, the insurant has a legal claim to benefits from the invalidity insurance. Sick payment is granted for a period not exceeding 18 month. In case of ambulant treatment, 20% of the costs of medication have to be paid by the insurant. Benefits in case of pregnancy and maternity include medical treatment throughout pregnancy and childbirth, as well as the payment of nursing and maternity benefits. Entitlement to motherhood benefits depends on a minimum contribution of 90 days of work in the year before childbirth. Men are only entitled to benefits if they are married to the mother of the child and have made a minimum contribution of 120 days in the year before birth. The occupational accident or disease insurance covers all medical treatment and medication costs related to occupational accidents or diseases.

The ES medical insurance only covers treatment for pensioners and their relatives. Active insurants do not contribute to ES health insurance, as public institutions are responsible for the financing of medical treatment or their employees. The benefits for pensions include all costs for ambulant and stationary medical treatment, the full costs for medication and adjuvant, dental care, and travel expenses.

Since 1985, the BK provides medical treatment for those insurants who have been contributing for at least eight month. Coverage for medical treatment ends after six month. In contrast to the SSK, the BK does not run medical facilities but calls on external providers of medical care. The insurance covers ambulant and stationary medical treatment, as well as the costs of medication and adjuvants. In case of ambulant treatment, the latter are covered up to 80% for active insurants and 90% for pensioners (Askin 2004, 42f.; Hekimler 2006).

Entitlement of dependants is regulated according to the survivor pension insurance in all three schemes. Spouses, children (sons up to the age 18, 20, or 25 depending on their educational level, daughters until marriage, and disabled sons and daughters for lifetime), and uninsured parents are co-insured (Kiliç 2006, 69).

5.1.3 Unemployment Insurance

In June 2000, the “Law on Unemployment Insurance” (Issizlik Sigortasi Kanunu) came into effect. For the first time in Turkish history, workers insured at the SSK have compulsory insurance for unemployment. Nevertheless, the law was strongly criticized by the labor unions as it terminates the traditional system of severance payments in Turkey (World Bank 2006I, 102; Ülker 24f.). According to the law, those insurants who lose employment after a minimum of 600 days of contribution within three years, are legally entitled to unemployment payments, occupational training, and institutional assistance in finding new employment. Furthermore, health and maternity insurance contributions are covered. The unemployment payment equals 50% of the average income of the last four month and is not supposed to be higher than the minimum wage (Askin 2004, 45-48). The monthly contribution for the unemployment insurance equals four% of the insurants income of which two % are paid by the employer and one % by the employee. For the first time, the state contributes to an insurance scheme with one % of the insurant’s monthly income to the unemployment insurance (Hekimler 2005, 461f; Akin 2004, 49).

5.1.4 The General Directorate for Social Assistance and Solidarity

In 2004, the “Fund for the Encouragement of Social Cooperation and Solidarity”, SYDTF, was reorganized as a constitutional obligation in the “General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity”, SYDGM. The SYDGM is the largest provider of social assistance in Turkey and also provides a number of services. When the SYDTF was established, its original intention was to mobilize and distribute private donations (Bugra 2007, 46). As such, its main goal is the provision of social assistance to needy and vulnerable citizens. Hence, it tries to ensure fair income distribution by taking additional measures for social justice and by promoting social solidarity (Prewitt 2005, 2).

The SYDGM provides social assistance via a network of 931 local “Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations”. 81 Foundations on the provincial level are run by a board consisting of the governor, the highest health official, the chair of the Social Services and Child Welfare Institution, and the highest religious official. 850 Foundations on the district level are headed by a board consisting of the district governor, the police chief, the comptroller, the district education director, the highest Health Ministry official, the highest religious official, and prominent members of the local community (Bugra/Keyder 2005, 37). Hence, the SYDGM functions as an umbrella organization and cooperates closely with the local authorities on the district or provincial level in the provision of social services. The SYDGM is financed by a number of sources, such as traffic penalties, advertisement income, and other public revenues (Prewitt 2005).

As shown in Table III, throughout the 1990s the amount of assistance distributed and the number of recipients accommodated increased constantly. In 1997, 25.8 billion Turkish Liras were distributed to more than 2.3 million people. Five years later, in 2001, 286.8 billion were spent on more than 9.2 million beneficiaries. Between 1997 and 2001 an average of 375 million US Dollars were distributed. Today, the SYDGM annually distributes goods, services and cash worth approximately one billion US Dollars.

While the SYDGM is financing measures of social assistance in a variety of fields, three developments between 1997 and 2001 stand out: first, the Solidarity Fund was an important instrument to buffer the social impact of the Marmara Earthquake in 1999; second, the importance of the Fund in the provision of health services is significantly; third, the amount of money spent on educational programs and scholarships also gained outstanding importance.

The Solidarity Fund also supervised a conditional cash-transfer program of the World Bank called “Social Risk Mitigation Project”, which was financed by the World Bank with an annual sum of 375 million US Dollars between 1997 and 2001. Today, the project is fully financed by the Turkish government and organized by the SYDGM. The SYDGM focuses its activities today on the fields of health and education. In recent years, it increased the spending

on employment-creation programs, although they still play a rather minor role. Transfers in forms of cash are mainly distributed within the framework of the “Social Risk Mitigation Project”. Most of the assistance given to poor people is provided in form of goods such as fuel, food, and clothes (Bugra 2007, 223; Bugra/Keyder 2005, 26).

For the distribution of these goods, the Foundations on the provincial and district level cannot rely on formal records of people in need as they do not exist to date. As a result, they collaborate with the local muhtars (Head of Districts). The muhtars play an outstanding role in the distribution of SYDGM aid, as they determine the beneficiaries. It has to be stressed that formal criteria to define poverty or neediness do not exist. Accordingly, assistance by the SYDGM is not based on social rights, but lies in the muhtar’s discretion. Hence, social assistance provided by the SYDGM does not surpass charity (Table III).

Since 1992, the SYDGM also organizes Turkey’s first means-tested medical assistance scheme in cooperation with the Ministry of Health. The “Green Card” (Yesil Kart) grants health services to people who are neither actively nor passively covered by the public health insurance system. While entitlement is managed by the SYDGM’s structures, the Ministry of Health covers the expenses. The Green Card program is financed via general taxes and health expenditures are covered from the Ministry’s budget (Ministry of Health 2004, 67f.). Since 2004, the Green Card covers the expenses for walk-in-treatment, medicine, prostheses, hearing aides, ambulant medication, costs for laboratory-analysis, dental care, and glasses (Hekimler 2006, 265f.).⁴⁰ Additionally, the Green Card gives access to free medical treatment in state and university hospitals and in public health centers (World Bank 2005I, 111; Bugra/Keyder 2003, 38f.).

Precondition for an application for the “Green Card” is the insurant’s Turkish nationality and a permanent residence in Turkey. While the Green Card is granted on an individual basis, in correspondence to the “Social Disability and Old-Age Pension”, entitlement is only granted if no close relative has the financial capacity to cover the expenses. In effect, the family income has to be less than one third of the minimum wage. In 2005, approximately 11 million were holders of the “Green Card” (Bugra/Keyder 2005, 215).

5.1.5 The 2006 Reform: An Outlook

⁴⁰ Before 2004, ambulant medication was only partially covered. If the illness required expensive medicine or medication on an on-going basis, the patient had to apply for special medicine aid. As the fund’s budget was limited and predetermined at the local level, competing claims limited the chances for the individual patient to receive adequate ongoing medication (Bugra/Keyder 2003, 38-39).

In 2006, the Turkish parliament passed the “Social Security and Health Insurance Law”, SSGHI, (Sosyal Sigortalar ve Genel Sağlık Sigortası Kanunu) and the “Social Security Institution Law” (Sosyal Sigortalar Güvenlik Kanunu Kanunu). The reform was supposed to be enacted on 31 May 2006, but it was vetoed by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer. After a second debate in the Parliament the SSGHI was passed again in its original version and was supposed to come into force on 1 January 2007. After the Constitutional Court decided that the law violates the constitutional rights of the civil servants insured in the ES, the AKP government planned to enact a revised version of the law on 1 January 2008. At the time this thesis was written, it was uncertain whether the law will be implemented as the political developments in spring/summer of 2007 eclipsed matters of social security in Turkey. For this reason, the reform will not be taken into account to classify the Turkish welfare regime. Nevertheless, as the AKP was reelected on 22 July 2007 and an implementation is highly probable, the main changes of the law will be outlined.

The two laws imply three major reforms of the Turkish social security system. First, the three institutions SSK, ES, and BK are joined under the “Social Security Institution” (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu) under the auspices of the “Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs”. All discriminations and differences in terms of benefits, contributions and extra boni would be eliminated. Second, as a result of the reform the state would contribute permanently to the social security system. 3% of the contributions for health and 5% for pensions will be covered by the state (Adar 15). Third, if the law will be implemented a universal health system would be created. In contrast to the universal health system of Southern Europe, the Turkish system would be based on contributions only. The reform calls for the creation of a fund, which would function as the main resource for all health expenditures. Contributors would be classified in three different categories. Those citizens working in the formal labor market and as such are already health insured in the current system would be classified in the first category. The second category consists of those who work informally, but have a regular income above one third the minimum wage. The insureds in this category would have to pay the contributions out of pocket. The third category includes those who are unemployed or work in the informal market but do earn less than one third of the minimum wage. The contributions of the latter would be paid for by the state (Adar 16). The state would also cover the contributions for all children below the age of 18 (Keyder 12; Karadeniz 2007, 2; Adar 2007; Bugra/Adar 2008, 15).⁴¹

The 2006 reform would also bring about some changes regarding the entitlement of co-insured relatives, as daughters are only entitled to lifelong health insurance as a part of survivor

41 The status can be extended until the age of 25 in case of higher education (Kiliç 2006, 70).

insurance but not regular health insurance. Additionally, marriage boni will be extended to male survivors as well (Kiliç 2006, 69f.).

An early version of the 2006 reform also included a draft on “Social Assistance and Non-Contributory Payments”, which would have introduced a social assistance component based on civil rights. However, the draft was neither brought to parliament nor discussed in public (Adar 2007, 168; Bugra 7; Adar 15).

According to the reform, medical services will be provided on two levels. Sick persons first have to consult a specific family doctor who decides if additional treatment in a different facility is necessary. Health services provided by the “Social Security Institution” would only cover a minimum in treatment and services. As such, insurants would be forced to get additional private insurance or to pay for supplementary services out of pocket (Ibid 17f.).

The political debate about the implementation of the law reflects the complexity of Turkish social policy. While the political debate focuses on the social rights of those already insured, the obvious technical and structural problems of the law in terms of financing and organization are neglected (Ibid. 2007, 167). The representative of the Labor Union “Hava Is”, Kemal Ülker, who was one of the interview partners for this study, argued that the reform would only lead to a further privatization of the Turkish health sector and would worsen the rights of the workers in Turkey. According to Ülker, the main driving forces behind the reform were the IMF and the World Bank along with the “Turkish Industrialist’s and Businessmen’s Association” TÜSIAD (Ülker 24f; Danar 26). Other interview partners highlighted the importance of universal health coverage in Turkey. In particular the fact that the reform calls for the state to cover the contributions of all those under the age of 18, was acknowledged as an important step towards social assistance on the basis of citizenship. The organizational structure, especially the financing of the health fund, was put questioned by the experts interviewed for this study (Keyder 12ff.; Bugra 8; Adar 16).

5.2 Actors in Welfare Provision outside the Central State

5.2.1 Civil Society Organizations: The Example of Deniz Feneri

The role of CSOs in the Turkish welfare regime cannot be separated from the realm of civil society in general and the predominant perception of statehood and citizenship. Larry Diamond defines civil society as the

[...] realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared values. It is distinct from “society” in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable (Diamond 1994, 5).

While the example of Ottoman Waqf shows that organizations with a social agenda existing outside of state structures have a long tradition, it was not until the 1980s that a civil society, as defined by Diamond, emerged in Turkey. The elite-driven modernization from above, deeply intertwined with a paternalistic perception of statehood, left little room for social activities outside the state apparatus. In addition, the overpowering bureaucracy continues to be a major obstacle for the development of a civil society in Turkey. It undermines individual initiative and collective pursuit of interests within autonomous domains free from state interference (Toprak 1996, 91).

Since the 1980s, a number of developments led to the growing importance of CSOs in Turkey. The path of economic and political liberalization amplified the emergence of new social movements, such as the Islamist, Feminist, and Kurdish groups. These new entities of collective identity laid the ideological ground for participation of various groups in social matters (Ibid. 1996). In the recent past, three factors have had a deep influence on the strengthening of the organization of civil society. First, the incapacity of the state to deal with the consequences of the Marmara earthquake. The growing awareness of the Turkish public that the state alone could not deliver solutions to the social problems in Turkey led to a major mobilization of private initiatives (Bikmen/Meydanoglu 2006, 14). Many of the voluntary helpers who organized emergency relief for the victims of the earthquake later founded CSOs (Ekim 6). Second, the membership negotiations with the EU and the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* are paving the legal ground for more participation of CSOs (Bikmen/Meydanoglu 2006, 14). Third, the contemporary social policy of the governing AKP is embedded in a discourse which places private benevolence and voluntary initiatives on poverty alleviation within a religious context. The Ottoman Waqf is often used as an example of a successful system for mobilizing private initiative to address social needs (Bugra 2007). The AKP currently puts great effort into the support of CSO's work. The “Law on Association” passed in 2004 improved considerably the legal status of CSOs, limits government control, raises internal auditing standards, and allows the government to co-finance social projects (Prewitt 2005, 3). The government also tries to encourage private firms and companies to finance social projects. A government project called

“100% Support for Education” (Egitime % 100 Destek) promises tax cuts to companies that donate money for educational programs (Adar 19; Bugra/Adar 2008, 17). The AKP established so-called “Food Banks” to support the work of those CSOs working in the field of poverty alleviation. They offer tax cuts to companies that donate comestible goods to be distributed by CSOs (Aydogmus 22). Recently, the AKP came forward with a draft proposal that would give CSOs the right to create their own social service institutions in Turkey (Ekim 2).

In response to these developments, especially in the urban area CSOs are evolving from loose networks to more organized institutions. A handful of CSOs already show an impressive ability to respond to social needs in Turkey. It gets obvious that CSOs aim at filling the gap created by the growing incapacity of the family to protect its individual members. Many CSOs offer services for children, disabled, and the elderly (Ibid. 2).

The most successful Turkish Civil Society Organization today and an example for a new dimension of poverty alleviation organized outside the state structures is “Lighthouse” (Deniz Feneri). Deniz Feneri started off as a TV program during Ramadan of 1996 on the Turkish “Channel 7”. The basic concept of the program was to present the donor and the beneficiary of private charity on the same show. Following the great success of the format, the show became a permanent part of the program and Deniz Feneri was established as an association in 1998. What started out as a small program is today a large scale CSO. Approximately 300 full-time employees and 40,000 volunteers, of whom 1,000 can be considered as an active core, work for Deniz Feneri (Aydogmus 23). While the estimated budget of Deniz Feneri was two million US Dollars in 2000, in 2005, it climbed to 25 million US Dollars (Prewitt 2005, 3). Deniz Feneri no longer works on Turkish soil only but also runs projects in the Balkans and Asia and has opened a fund-raising branch in Frankfurt/Germany (Aydogmus 23). The original idea of the TV show not to offer help in form of cash but in forms of aid-in-kind, such as food and clothes, has not changed significantly. Deniz Feneri mainly distributes goods to poor people. Only a small amount of its budget is spend on monetary emergency relief. Besides, Deniz Feneri also runs educational and occupational training projects and rural development programs, offers medical support, and assists with applications for social services, such as the Green Card or old-age and disability pensions. Recently, Deniz Feneri opened a research center focusing on poverty and social policy (Ibid. 20ff.).

The most remarkable aspect of Deniz Feneri’s program is its registration system. While the CSO defines poverty broadly as the “personal inability to meet one’s own fundamental needs”, it uses a sophisticated registration system to allocate benefits. As soon as an individual applies for benefits, Deniz Feneri opens a case in the name of the family of the applicant.⁴² As

⁴² Alternatively, a neighbor, a family member, a muhtar etc. can open a case in the name of the individual.

entitlement is based on the income of the entire household, the applicants have to fill out questionnaires on the social and economic situation of the entire family. The results are entered into a computer program, which generates the benefits granted to the family. These benefits are always given to the head of the household (Ibid. 20).

Deniz Feneri has a highly centralized structure. The CSO is managed from a headquarter in Istanbul, and there are two major branches in Izmir and Ankara. While the individual cases are opened by local employees or volunteers, every application is sent to Istanbul for approval in order to limit the risk of corruption (Ibid. 21f.). According to Ümit Aydogmus, Deniz Feneri is ideologically close to the AKP but its connections to state institutions are limited. While some representatives of Deniz Feneri are members of the boards of the SYDGM, it does not receive any public funding (Prewitt 2005, 3). Deniz Feneri tries to bypass municipalities whenever possible, in order to reduce the risk of clientelism and corruption at the local level (Aydogmus 22).

Aydogmus states that it is the self-prescribed mission of Deniz Feneri is to reemphasize the role of the family in the Turkish welfare regime. The perception of the family as the main institution of welfare provision determines the regulations for entitlement. Poverty is defined along the household's and not the individual's needs. Hence, inequalities within the family are not taken into account (Ibid. 23).

However, Deniz Feneri is a great exception in the Turkish context. CSOs still play a very limited role. According to Basak Ekim they constitute "the weakest pillar of the Turkish welfare system" (Ekim 2). In 1999, only 7.8% of the Turkish population was members and only 1.5% of the Turkish population volunteered in CSOs (Bikmen/Meydanoglu 2006, 45). While some are very active in certain fields of social policy, the impact on matters such as unemployment and poverty alleviation is still negligible (Ekim 2ff.; Prewitt 2005, 5). According to Ekim, the main weakness of CSOs in Turkey to date is their lack of advocacy for social policy reform. Only a small number of CSOs lobby for legal change and try to push social reforms. One example of a CSO that successfully gained public and political attention is the "Home Based Women's Network" (Ev Eksen). With the aim to create public awareness of the situation of women working informally at home, they financed research on issues of informal employment and recently came forward with a proposal for a minimum income for women working domestically in the informal sector. While there have not been any legal changes so far, Ev Eksen succeeded in placing the issue of underpaid women in the informal sector on the political agenda (Ekim 4).

5.2.2 Municipalities

Since the 1980s, municipalities have become important actors in the Turkish welfare regime. In the beginning this role was basically restricted to charity and aid-in-kind poverty relief. Municipal governments opened soup kitchens, provided food and fuel, and to a low degree offered financial assistance, i.e. in terms of rent support (Bugra/Keyder 2003, 33). Since 1986, municipalities are represented on the boards of the SYDVs and as such are engaged in the provision of assistance by the SYDGM. In recent years, they have come to play a more active role and offer additional social services and benefits. This changing role was emphasized by most of the experts interviewed for this study although little empirical data exists on the matter. According to the experts, municipalities are socially engaged in fields traditionally left to the realm of the family. They provide care services for the elderly, disabled, and children. In the years, eight disability centers were opened in Istanbul by different municipalities. Furthermore, a number of community centers and clinics are run by municipalities (Ekim 3; Keyder 14).

The changing role of municipalities so far has not been followed by a significant transfer of political and institutional power (Ibid. 14). The “Framework Law on Public Administration”, which would have given more autonomy to local governments and municipalities, was vetoed by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in 2004. In 2006, the AKP government amended the “Law on the Associations of Local Governments”, which allows villages, municipalities and social provincial administrations to undertake joint projects (European Commission 2006, 7). These projects could lead in the future to greater responsibility of municipalities in care services and similar social matters. Nevertheless, in the social realm the central government continues to be the policy maker, holding on to its legislative and budgetary authority (Ibid. 2006, 7; Bugra/Adar 2008).

Most experts agreed that the central government intends to strengthen the social responsibilities of local governments and municipalities. This process was regarded with much criticism. While the recent reforms enable municipalities to act more independently, they do not imply legal guidelines for entitlement. Hence, social services provided by municipalities are still granted on the basis of charity, which bears a high risk of corruption and clientelism.

Public-private partnerships are very important on the municipal level. So, there are these relations between actors on the municipal level: local businessmen, local government, NGOs. This is happening in a legal vacuum. It leaves a lot of room for corruption and little room for accountability. It can not be a substitute. In Europe’s developed welfare regime, decentralization can take place with different implications. In Turkey, where the welfare system is very underdeveloped, especially in terms of its social assistance component, this really provides a lot of room for charity dominating over rights-based social assistance (Bugra 10).

5.2.3 Commodified Welfare

In 2001, the Turkish Parliament passed the “Individual Pension Savings and Investment Law” (Bireysel Emeklilik Tasarruf ve Yatırım Sistemi Kanunu), which opened the Turkish market to private providers of pension funds. Prior to the law, which came into force in October 2003, additional old-age benefits and pensions were only offered to employees of a small number of companies. The law is aimed at enabling and controlling forms of old-age insurance outside the public system. As such, it intends to attract individual investment to private pension funds. The third paragraph of the amendment appoints an ‘Advising Council’, who will advise on matters of private pension policy in the future. In particular, the law sets guidelines for the financing and disbursement of private pensions, defines a minimum contribution period of ten and an entitlement age of 56 years, and specifies the criteria for outpayment in case of the insurant’s drop out and the surviving dependants’ status in case of the insurant’s death. The law also enables private insurance companies to offer accident and life insurance (Kirca/Kaya 2005, 29-30). While the legal framework has now been established private pension schemes still play a negligible role (Bugra 8). Less than 1% of the Turkish population has private pension insurance.

The role of commodified health insurance in the Turkish welfare regime is similar. Although private health insurance is Turkey’s fastest growing insurance branch, in 2002 less than 1% of the Turkish population was privately insured. Accordingly, the expenditure in the health sector afforded by private insurance companies was only 4.4% in 2000. In 2001, about 40 insurance companies provided health care for 655.703 insurants and had a premium-income of 188 Million US-Dollar (Agartan 2005, 9).

Compared to private insurance schemes, private providers in health services play a far more significant role, especially in the urban areas of Western Turkey. Private services are offered in a number of settings: private doctor’s offices, polyclinics, medical centers, private and foundation hospitals, and in large-scale companies. In 2004, 24.2% of the hospitals in Turkey were run privately. The fact that they only provide 6.3% of Turkey’s hospital beds suggests that mainly higher income groups benefit from private health services. Additionally, public hospitals and municipalities started to outsource services to private companies. Almost all medical tests and diagnostics of state hospitals had been outsourced by 2005 (World Bank 2006II, 127ff.). In the recent past, private providers also gained importance in the field of care services.

These private rehabilitation centers, they grow like mushrooms. They have contracts with the state. If you are ensured at SSK you can go to the private rehabilitation centers and the state will pay for it. [...]
Many local authorities contract out their social services, i.e. in the social care area, there are a lot of

private actors providing care for the elderly, for the sick [...]. They have contracts with the local authorities. We haven't followed this process closely, but from what we can say, private services are filling the gap rapidly (Ekim 5).

5.2.4 The Family

According to the World Bank, it is “difficult to overstate the importance of marriage, family and extended family ties” in the Turkish context (World Bank 2003, 33). As shown earlier, this prominent role has been undermined by the socio-economic developments of the last two decades. In addition, demographic trends such as lower fertility rates and higher life expectancy, which can be observed in the rest of Europe, have also become visible in contemporary Turkey. Between 1990 and 2004, the fertility rate fell from 3.7 to 2.21. Simultaneously, Turkey saw one of the greatest gains in life expectancy in the OECD in the last decades, with an increase by 23 years since 1960. In 2005, the average life expectancy was 71.4 years, only seven years behind OECD average (Ibid. 2007). Nevertheless, Turkey's population is the second youngest in OECD comparison. In 2004, 29.5% of the Turkish population was below the age of 15, while only 5.4% were above the age of 65 (Ibid. 2006III).⁴³ This demographic structure is also reflected in the composition of Turkish households. In contemporary Turkey the majority of the population lives in households consisting of the nuclear family. 66% of Turks live in households with children, 18% live in households with elderly and children, 4% live with only elderly, and 12% live in households with only one generation (Ibid. 2005I, 27). While the structure of the Turkish family is changing, its social role is also changing. The fundamental socio-economic changes described earlier, such as the processes of urbanization, transformation of the formal and the informal labor market, and detachment of the urban population from their rural family members led to an increasing incapacity of the family to secure its individual members. This incapacity manifests itself in high poverty rates among large households. Especially the number of children has a significant impact on a household's risk of poverty (Ibid. 2005I, 24ff.).

Despite the changes in structure and social function, the family still has an outstanding position in Turkish society. This prominent role becomes apparent in Turkey's high level of familialism. The size of Turkish households is significantly larger than in other European countries. In 2002, the mean household size in rural Turkey was 4.3 and 4.07 in urban areas

⁴³ Among the OECD countries only Mexico has a younger population with 31.6% below the age of 18 years and 5.2% above the age of 65. Southern Europe's populations stand in sharp contrast. Due to the decline of birth rates and the increase in life expectancy Italy (14.1%), Spain (14.3%), and Greece (14.4%) are among the World's top five countries with the lowest percentage of citizens below 15. Portugal ranks 18 with 15.9%. Accordingly, the highest percentage of the elderly is living in Italy (19.7%), Greece (18%) ranks fourth, Portugal (16.9%) eighth, and Spain (16.5%) ranks 12th place (World Bank 2006III).

(Ibid. 2005, 31). Other Southern European households are also bigger than European average, but to a lesser extent. In 2001, an average of 2.9 persons were living in a Spanish, 2.6 in an Italian and Greek, 3 in a Portuguese household. In comparison, a German household consisted of 2.2, a Swedish of 1.9, and a British of 2.3 members (Table IV)

The importance of the family is underlined by the high percentage of young Turks living with their parents. In 2003, 49% of the Turkish men and 29% of the Turkish women between the age of 18 and 34 were still living with their parents and only 6% of men and 1% of women were living alone. In Southern Europe similar results were found. Only the number of single-living Greeks stands out. Compared to Germany, Sweden, and the UK, Turkey clearly falls in one group with the Southern European countries (Saraceno/Olagnero/Torrioni 2005, 11).⁴⁴

The institution of marriage is still of fundamental importance. In 2003, the crude divorce rate in Turkey was 0.71 (Turkish Statistical Institute 2005, 26). Compared to the rest of Europe, the Southern European countries again fall into one group, while Germany, Sweden, and the UK have much higher divorce rates (Table IV).⁴⁵ In 2004, the crude marriage age of Turkish women was the lowest in the OECD. This does not seem to be a trend shared by the other Southern European countries. Compared to the OECD average, Greek and Portuguese women marry early. Spanish and Italian women, on the other hand, marry at similar ages as German and British women. Only Sweden stands out, with a crude marriage age for women of 31 (Table V).

The percentage of ill, disabled, and elderly cared for at home in Turkey is among the highest in Europe. According to the "European Quality of Life Survey" in 2002, 18% of the Turkish ill, disabled, or elderly were looked after by their relative. The other Southern European countries were close to the EU-15 average of 11%.⁴⁶ Overall, the level of home care in Southern Europe has approximated EU average over the course of the last decade. In 1997, the Mediterranean countries were well above the average EU level. While the number of persons cared for at home decreased in Southern Europe, it increased in Germany and the UK. In 2002, 15% of the Germans and 11% of the British ill, elderly, or disabled were cared for at home. Sweden clearly stands out with only 7% (Table IV).

The actual hours Turkish women and men spend on caring for the elderly is only marginally higher than in the rest of Europe. While Turkish men spend approximately one hour per week on care for the elderly, other European men spend less. Turkish women spend

⁴⁴ The percentage of men and women living at home at the age of 18-34 years (men/women): Spain (45%/34%), Portugal (48%/33%), Greece (39%/19%), Italy (67%/60), Germany (21%/14%), Sweden (12%/10%), and the UK (19%/12%). The percentage of young people living alone (men/women): Spain (5%/5%), Portugal (7%/5%), Greece (33%/24%), Italy (11%/6%), Germany (40%/26%), Sweden (44%/31%), and the UK (33%/14%). (Saraceno/Olagnero/Torrioni 2005, 11).

⁴⁵ Crude Divorce Rate 2003: Greece (1.1), Spain (1.1), Italy (0.7), Portugal (2.2), Germany (2.6), Sweden (2.4), and the UK (2.8).

⁴⁶ In Portugal (12%), Spain (11%) Greece (12%), and Italy (6%), Bulgaria (20%) or Poland (18%)

approximately two hours per week looking after elderly adults. Again, no clear pattern becomes visible. On average, European women spend less than two hours per week on care for the elderly. Focusing on childcare, a different picture emerges. Turkish men and women spend less time caring for children than most other Europeans. Turkish women spend little more than 10 hours, while Turkish men spend the least time on childcare, at ca. 2.5 hours per week. In contrast, men in the other Southern European countries spend four hours looking after children and women spend 12. In Germany, men spend three and women nine. In Sweden, the hours spent on childcare are surprisingly high. Swedish men spend between seven and eight hours, and women 17 hours caring for children. In the UK, men spend four and women 14 hours, caring for children (Table VI).

Not only the time Turks spend on childcare work, but also the overall unpaid working hours in Turkey are less than half of the European average (Table VII). An explanation for the comparatively few hours spent on childcare and unpaid house work could be the high level of intergenerational division of housework. Unfortunately, little data exists on matters of the division of housework between generations. While in the Turkish case no data exists on intergenerational division of housework in general, the “2003 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey”, conducted by Hacettepe University in Ankara, includes data on childcare in households with a working mother. In urban areas 7.4% of the respondents claimed that childcare is provided by another female child while the mother is at work. In 13.4% of the households the mother’s mother and in 16.5% the father’s mother looked after the children. 7.6% hired an external carer and 8.9% gave their child in institutional care. In rural areas 13.5% of the respondents declared that an older female child, 4.8% the mother’s mother, and 26.2% that the father’s mother was looking after the child. Only 0.5% relied on paid and 0.3% on institutional care services. Nevertheless, as comparable data is not available, it can only be speculated that the level of intergenerational work division in Turkish families is high (Çelik/Çelik 2001).

Focusing on decommodification of family services in Turkey, not surprisingly the level of state penetration in fields traditionally left to the family is very low. Services to reduce the social risks for vulnerable groups, such as women, children, the elderly, and disabled are institutionalized in the “General Directorate of Social Services and Child Protection” (SHCEK). In 2003, the SHCEK ran a network of 381 social service facilities, including community centers, special houses for women, the elderly, and disabled, orphanages, family information centers and centers for street children and youth (World Bank 2003, 41). With a budget of 266,667 YTL in 2004, the group of children, elderly, and disabled cared for by the Directorate is small. While compulsory primary education includes those children between six and 14, only 6.9% of children in Turkey participate in public, private, or community-based preschool programs (UNICEF

2003, 6). As costs for private kindergartens are very high, they not an option for most families. While every private kindergarten in Turkey is required to offer free attendance to at least two children coming from poor families, only 448 children were offered this opportunity in 2006. In the field of care for the elderly the situation is similar. In August 2006, 18,849 elderly people in Turkey were cared for in public institutions (ESI 2006, 29). Although reliable data does not exist, the provision of care facilities for the disabled appears to be insufficient as well. While the United Nations estimate that there are a total of 7.5 million disabled people in Turkey, the exact numbers and degrees of disabilities are not monitored. Care services for the disabled are basically left to the family, as few schools catering to disabled children or facilities for disabled adults exist.⁴⁷

In recent years, the AKP government introduced a number of draft proposals, some of which have been implemented already, that assign care responsibilities to regional governments and municipalities (Bugra/Adar 2008, 16f.). Furthermore, the SHCEK implemented a program to reintegrate children in state care into families. The “Return to Family Project” (Aileye Dönüş Projesi) grants cash transfers to families if they integrate children who are in state care. The project aims to reintegrate children into their biological families, or, if this is not an option, into foster families. As the SHCEK lacks the capacity to monitor the integration process closely, the project has been criticized by the Turkish public (Ekim 2; Keyder 14).

As discussed earlier, financial assistance to elderly and disabled people above the age of 18 is provided through the means-tested minimum pension embedded in the institutional structure of the ES. Additionally, the so-called Social Risk Mitigation Project run by the SYDGM grants conditional cash transfers to poor pregnant women and children. The project was initiated and financed by the World Bank in 2001 and organized in cooperation with the SYDGM. Since 2006, the project is fully financed by the Turkish government. It grants financial assistance to poor families on the basis of school attendance of children and regular visits to health centers (Bugra/Keyder 2006, 222). In this context, it appears noteworthy that most of the in-kind aid provided by the SYDGM is provided to disabled and women (Bugra 10). Besides the institutions mentioned above, Turkey has no explicit family policy. In 2003, the Turkish government spent less 0.2% of the GDP for family care services and did not grant any remarkable family allowances in form of cash or tax cut (Table XIV; Table VIII Ekim 4).⁴⁸

⁴⁷ The Turkish government launched a number of initiatives to integrate the disabled into the formal labor market. In 1997, Law No. 571 introduced a 3% compulsory quota for disabled in enterprises with more than 50 employees, Law No. 573 introduced an occupational training for the disabled (UNICEF 2003). The AKP government initiated “Project Rainbow” (Gökkusagi Projesi) to enhance private initiatives to increase the employment rates of the disabled (Bugra/Adar 2008).

⁴⁸ Data on the family allowances provided by the ES and the services and benefits services provided by the General Directorate for the Disabled was not available.

In OECD comparison, Turkey's level of defamilialization is remarkably low. In 2003, Turkey spent 0.2% of its GDP on non-health related social services, while the OECD average lay at 2.1%. The Southern European countries show a less extreme but similar performance. Italy spent 0.8%, Portugal 1.4%, Greece, 1.5%, and Spain 1.1%. Other EU countries spent more: Germany 2.2%, Sweden 6.8%, and the UK 1.8% (Table XIV; OECD 2006I, 77).

The participation rates of Turkish children in daycare and preschool are the lowest in the OECD. In Turkey, the percentage of children below the age of three who are enrolled in daycare is negligible. The Southern European countries show mixed results. In Spain 20.7%, Portugal 23.5%, Greece 7.0%, Italy 6.3% of the children below the age of three are enrolled in daycare. On average, Turkish three- to five-year-old spend 0.3 years in education. In contrast, in Southern Europe the preschool attendance rates are among the highest in the OECD (Italy 3 years, Greece 1.4 years, Portugal 2.3 years, Spain 3.1 years) (Table IV).

While the percentage of the elderly in Turkey cared for in institutions is negligible, data on Southern European institutions for the elderly is only available for Italy. Only 1.5% of Italians above the age of 65 are cared for in professional facilities. In contrast, 3.4% of the German, 4.2% of the British, and 7.5% of the Swedish population above the age of 65 lives in institutions (OECD 2006I, 97).⁴⁹

In summary, Turkey shows an extremely high level of familialism and an extremely low level of defamilialization. In comparison with the other countries included in this study, Southern Europe in general still shows a very high degree of familialism. On average, Southern European households are bigger, young people become independent at a later age, and divorce rates are low. Focusing on these indicators, Turkey clearly falls within one group with the other Mediterranean countries. With regards to marriage ages of women and the percentage of the elderly, ill, and disabled cared for at home, the Southern European countries are comparable to the rest of Europe while Turkey clearly stands out. In all European countries the traditional gender division of housework prevails. Women spend much more time caring for children and the elderly. However, the little time Turkish women spend on unpaid house and care work is surprising. At this point, further research on the intergenerational division of unpaid work is necessary. In summary, with regards to the level of familialism Turkey is in line with the Southern European countries, but shows rather polarized results.

Focusing on Turkey's level of defamilialization, the grouping is less obvious. Turkey has decommodified only few services traditionally left to the family. While the Mediterranean countries again can be classified as one group with Turkey regarding the expenditure on social services, the high enrollment of children in daycare and preschool programs clearly separates

⁴⁹ Germany 3.5%, Sweden 7.5%, UK 4.2%.

Southern Europe from Turkey. Only Greece shows a comparably low level of public childcare. A comprehensive analysis of the level of the elderly in care is not possible. Nevertheless, Italy shows similarities to Turkey in this respect, with both countries providing institutional care for only a marginal number of the elderly. In general, Southern Europe, including Turkey, shows a higher-than-average degree of familialism and a much lower level of defamilialization. In other countries, including the traditionally familialist Germany, the family plays a less significant role in society and the level of state penetration is much higher.

5.3 Interim Conclusion: The Turkish Welfare Regime

Focusing of the relationship between state, market, and the family in the Turkish welfare regime, the predominance of the state and family in social provision appears striking. The market has played a negligible role so far. Only a small number of social services, especially in the realm of medical services, have been commodified. Furthermore, civil society and municipalities have played a minor role compared to the state and the family. Nevertheless, the recent legal reforms, the emphasis on private initiative in the political discourse, and the emergence of welfare providers in the Turkish market suggest that actors beyond the state and the family will gain more significance.

The defining trait of the state's social provision is its unequal character. While some groups are covered by social legislation and institutions, others remain unprotected. Social protection outside this Turkish "Iper-grantisimo" consists of medical care for the poorest and benefits in form of in-kind aid. Hence, those who are not entitled to social insurance benefits and services rely on charity. They are not entitled to social services on the basis of social rights.

While the importance of the family could be explained with the low involvement of the market and the unequal protection by the state, its real significance becomes apparent in international comparison. On the one hand, Turkey's level of familialism is much higher than that of the rest of Europe. Only the Southern European countries show similarly high levels. On the other hand, the Turkish state takes very little responsibilities for those social services that have been traditionally been provided by the family. In international comparison, Turkey only resembles Southern Europe with regards to some of its policies. Other areas, such as daycare and pre-school programs, are considered to be the state's responsibility in Southern Europe, while this is not the case in Turkey.

While this chapter focused on the key characteristics of the Turkish welfare regime, the next chapter will examine to what extent these characteristics correspond with the Southern Model of welfare.

6. Classification of the Turkish Welfare Regime

6.1 Polarization and Peaks of Generosity

The Turkish pension system currently covers only 41% of the population above the age of 65. About 22% are entitled to the minimum old-age pension and 37% have no pension income at all (Table X). While occupational groups in the formal labor market are covered, other groups are unprotected. About 98.5% of the workers receiving their income from casual agricultural work do not have old-age insurance (Karadeniz 2007). Those entitled to the means-tested old-age pension which equals 6% of the average income are not even protected from the risk of food poverty. In 2005, the pension was equivalent to 65 YTL (approx. 40 €), while the food poverty line was fixed at 85 YTL (World Bank 2006II, 148).

While a large number of the elderly is excluded from the pension system, those covered are insured under a wide range of conditions. The of the ES equals 75% of the last income, SSK insurants are entitled to 54% of their average lifetime income, and BK pensioners to 65% of their last income level. The maximum insurable earnings for ES members are based on the full wage, while SSK insurants maximum old-age pension is not supposed to exceed 6.5 times the minimum wage. Civil servants insured through the ES are also granted special privileges, such as additional boni and family allowances. The accrual rates of the ES are even higher than those of the SSK (World Bank 124). Finally, the premiums paid for the three schemes differ to a great extend. While civil servants only have to contribute 16% of their salary for both, health and pension insurance, SSK insurants' premiums equal 15% of their income. BK insurants have the highest premiums, contributing 40% of their income (Table XI).

The Turkish social security system grants its insurants the shortest eligibility periods in the OECD. Fixed retirement ages determined in the 1999 reform will not come into effect until 2048. At present, the average pension eligibility age for women is 44 and 47 for men. With a life expectancy of 76 for women and 75 for men, periods of pension eligibility equal 32 or 28 years. In addition, the accrual rates, i.e. the benefit paid for each year of contribution, are the highest in the OECD (World Bank 2006II).

Not only the pension system, but also the Turkish unemployment insurance shows a high level of polarization. Only those workers insured through the SSK are entitled. Those 50% of the Turkish labor force working in the informal market and the more than two million BK insurants are left without any form social assistance in case of unemployment. Furthermore, the

minimum contribution of 600 days of work as the precondition for entitlement is well above OECD average (OECD 2004II).

The polarization of the Turkish pension system becomes visible in international comparison. The Pension Gini Coefficient of Turkey is fixed at 25.1, while the OECD average is 17.2. The other Southern European countries also vary widely with regards to pre and post-retirement earnings.⁵⁰ Sweden's Pension Gini is comparably high at 23.7, as is Germany's at 20. The UK stands out with only 5.1. A similar picture emerges when focusing on the Progressivity Index. Turkey's index is 7.8, while the OECD average is 37.5. The Southern European countries fall into one group with Sweden (12.9),⁵¹ while Germany (26.7) and especially the UK (81.1) are closer or above OECD average (Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungsträger 2005).

Turkey's replacement rates of 125% for an average earner insured through the SSK are the highest in the OECD. Again, Turkey falls into one cluster with the other Southern European countries. In all four Southern European countries average earners have higher replacement rates than the OECD average of 70.2%. Especially higher income groups have very high replacement rates. In comparison, the German, Swedish and British replacement rates are much lower (Table XII). While Southern Europe's replacement rates are among the highest in the OECD, its minimum protection schemes for the elderly vary. Italy does not offer a basic or a minimum pension and Turkey, with 6% of the average income, has the lowest minimum pension in the OECD. Greece's minimum pension equals 34%, Portugal's 33%, and Spain's 30% of the average income.⁵² The minimum overall benefit for a full-career worker in Turkey amounts to 28% of the average income, 34% in Greece, 22% in Italy, 44% in Portugal, and 30% in Spain, while the OECD average is below 29%. The German (19%) overall benefit is the lowest in the OECD, while Sweden (34%) and the UK (20%) are above average (OECD 2007II, 24f.).

In summary, with regards to polarization and peaks of generosity, which are reflected in a very unequal distribution between pre- and post-retirement income, very high replacement rates and low minimum benefits, Turkey clearly shares the characteristics of Southern European countries.

6.2 Universal Health System

⁵⁰ Greece (26.5), Italy (26.4), Portugal (22.1), and Spain (22.1)

⁵¹ Greece 2.6, Italy 3.1, Portugal and Spain 18.8.

⁵² In the case of minimum and basic schemes, the benefit entitlement is shown for a worker who enrolls at the age of 20 and works until he reaches retirement age (OECD 2007II24f.).

Under the current legislation, Turkey's health insurance and health services appear as polarized and dependant on occupational status as the pension system. While official data suggest that 84.5% of the population is covered by health insurance, the World Bank estimates that only 67% of the Turkish population is covered by public health care programs, including the non-contributory "Green Card" (World Bank 2006II, 130). Like the pension system, health insurance in Turkey is linked to occupational status. About 80% of casual agricultural workers are not entitled to any kind of health protection at all (Karadeniz 2007). In addition, the fact that 27.6% of the total health expenditure are covered by of out-of-pocket payments suggest insufficient coverage by the social security institutions (Table XIII). Poor people in particular are excluded from access to health care. About 58% of the poor and 68% of the extremely poor did not have any kind of medical protection in 2002 (World Bank 2003).

The 2004 reform eliminated the unequal access to treatment within the three insurance schemes. As a result, those with health insurance can freely choose the facility at which they want to receive. However, inequality still exists in form of co-payments that insurants are required to contribute. While ES and SSK insurants are exempted from co-payments, those insured at the BK have to pay 20% per visit (World Bank 2006II, 131).

As a result of the polarized health system, a large proportion of the Turkish population does not seek medical assistance even in the case of severe illness. Only 55% of those without coverage and 75% "Green Card" holders, in contrast to 97% of privately insured and 87% in the ES scheme, tend to seek medical assistance in case of illness (Ibid. 2005I, 78). The characteristics of Turkey's health system again become visible in international comparison. Infant and maternal mortality are among the highest in the OECD: 33 infants and 70 mothers out of 1000 die during birth or shortly after (Ibid. 2006II, 128).

An OECD comparison brings to light the particulars of the Turkish health system: only the highly commodified USA, with a public health insurance coverage of 24.7%, and Mexico, with a coverage of 45-55%, show a less universal performance. While the Turkish public system only covers 66% of the total population, the Southern European, Swedish, and British universal health systems cover the total population. In Germany 90.9% are covered by the public system (OECD 2004III).

6.3 Low Level of State Penetration and the Lack of Social Assistance Schemes

The data provided in the latest OECD and EUROSTAT reports on Turkey's social expenditure dates back to 1999 (OECD 2006II). This section takes into account estimates published in April 2007 by Social Policy Watch (SPW), which is embedded in the Social Policy

Forum of Bogazici University (Bugra/Adar 2007).⁵³ According to SPW data, Turkey spent 11.6% of its GDP on measures of social protection in 2003.⁵⁴ The biggest share, 5.5% of the GDP, was spent on old-age coverage, and 4.8% on health expenditures (OECD 2006I; Bugra/Adar 2007).

In OECD comparison, Turkey trails behind in terms of social expenditure. In 2003, only Mexico (6.8%) and South Korea (5.7%) spent less on social protection. The Southern European countries are above the OECD average of 20.7%. Greece spent 21.3%, Portugal 23.5%, Spain 20.3%, and Italy 24.2%.⁵⁵ While the UK (20.15%) spent less than average, in Germany (27.6%) and Sweden (31.3%) expenses were higher. Focusing on the 2003 expenditure for old-age in the OECD, Turkey spent 5.5%, while the EU average was at 7.1%. The Southern European countries (Italy 13.8%, Greece 12.3%, Spain 8.2%, and Portugal 23.5%) were above the average. Germany spent 11.5%, Sweden 8%, and the UK 5.6% on old-age benefits and services. With regards to the expenditures in health, Turkey spent 4.8%, while the OECD average lays at 5.9%. The Southern European countries show mixed results. While Italy (6.2%), Greece (5%) and Spain (5.2%) had similar expenses, Portugal spent only 1.4% of its GDP on health. Germany (8%), Sweden (7.1%), and the UK (6.7%) were slightly above OECD average (OECD 2006I, 77; Bugra/Adar 2007).

The lack of means-tested income schemes in Turkey, which was described by Gough in 1996, continues to be an issue. The only assistance granted on the basis of a means test is the minimum old-age and disability pension. Cash transfers and aid-in-kind assistance provided by the SYDGM are neither based on social rights nor distributed according to clear criteria. Hence, they may be more appropriately classified as charity. The low level of state protection becomes apparent when considering the minimal capacity of social transfers to alleviate the risk of poverty. While 31% of the Turkish population is at risk of poverty before receiving social transfers, 26% are still at risk of poverty after social transfers. In the Southern European countries state assistance also does not lead to a significant reduction of the risk of poverty. In Greece the percentage decreases from 23% to 20%, in Spain from 24% to 20%, in Italy from 24% to 19%, and in Portugal from 26% to 20%. In contrast, social assistance in Germany reduces the percentage from 24% to 13%, in the UK from 31% to 18%, and in Sweden from 29% to 9% (Eurostat).

⁵³ The data of the Social Policy Watch employs three different methods of measuring social expenditure in order to make its findings comparable with EU, OECD, and ILO data. Accordingly, the European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics (ESSPROS), Social Expenditures (SOCX) and the ILO methodology are used. The data is based on the annual expenditure of Turkish social security institutions. Hence, social expenditure of municipalities, the World Bank and the EU are not included in the results. The OECD data is based on the 1999 results from Turkey (Bugra/Adar 2007)

⁵⁴ Data excludes education expenditures.

⁵⁵ Data based on SOCX.

In summary, while Turkey resembles the Southern Model in its low social expenditure, it stands apart from the Southern European real types. Focusing on the lack of social existence schemes, the Southern European countries and Turkey clearly fall into one group and stand apart from the rest of Europe.

6.4 Clientelism, the Role of CSOs, the Public/Private Mix, and Decentralization

The cross-national comparison does not include an analysis of the traits clientelism, the role of CSOs, decentralization and the combination of public and private resources. The information on these traits was gathered predominantly through interviews with experts, who confirmed that empirical research on these issues barely exists. For this reason, it was impossible to incorporate the findings into the comparative analysis. Accordingly, only the findings of the interviews will be presented in this part. As the role of CSOs, municipalities, and the market has been already discussed in detail in Chapter Five, this section focuses on the impact of clientelism on the Turkish welfare regime.

In the Turkish context little data or studies exist that would provide an insight on the role of clientelism and patronage relationships in the field of social policy. Clientelism and patronage relationships have played an important role in Turkish politics since the DP period. Although comparable data does not exist, it can be assumed that clientelism and patronage, closely related to corruption, still represent a major challenge for Turkey. Accordingly, the European Commission highlights the importance of further anti-corruption measures in Turkish politics (European Commission 2006, 10). Turkey currently ranks 60th out of 162 countries examined in the Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International (Transparency International 2006).⁵⁶

In the realm of social policy, the lack of data makes a comprehensive comparison of Turkey's level of clientelism impossible. Clientelism played a significant role in the historical development of the Turkish welfare regime. The formalization of Gecekondu settlements and agricultural subsidies was part of a political strategy to gain electoral support. However, to what degree clientelism affected the social security system in particular has yet to be examined. Ayse Bugra argues that in the Turkish context, pension benefits have played a minor role in election campaigns. She further suggests that welfare clientelism, as described by Ferrera, does not play a significant role in Turkey (Bugra 8f.; Keyder 13; Bugra/Adar 2008, 15). According to the findings of this thesis, this assumption needs to be reconsidered. The reduction of retirement

⁵⁶ Spain 23rd, Portugal 26th, Italy 45th, and Greece 54th. Sweden 6th, UK 11th, and, Germany 16th.

ages and the special retirement programs introduced at the end of the Özal period, suggest that clientelism did indeed play a role in social policies.

Recent developments in Turkish social policy highlight the need for further academic research on the matter. As long as the ongoing transfers of social services and benefits to the municipal and the private level are not embedded in a legal framework, much room is left for the development of clientelist relationships between voters and political authorities. In this context, the example of Deniz Feneri, which excludes local authorities from its organizational structure, is exemplary (Aydogmus 22). However, the lack of regulation for entitlements to services financed by the central government, such as the Green Card and the benefits provided by SYDGM, is highly problematic (Adar 19; Bugra 10).

As shown in Chapter Five, civil society only plays a limited role in social matters. Only a few organizations, such as Deniz Feneri, show remarkable success in poverty alleviation. While CSOs recently gained political strength, their function is not comparable to the role of civil society in Southern Europe (Ekim 2; Adar 19).

The capacity of the market as an actor in the Turkish welfare regime is also marginal compared with Southern Europe. The coexistence of public and private providers is so far only characteristic of the Turkish health service sector, while it is negligible in the care sector. Private services are essentially only available to the upper class. For the majority of the Turkish population, they are unaffordable. Private pension and health insurance schemes play a negligible role. People covered by private health and pension insurance represent less than 1% of the population (World Bank 2006II, 130). The OECD average spent by private health insurance is 6.3%. Turkey (4.4%) and the Southern European countries, owing to their universal health systems, are below the average. In Italy and Spain, 0.9% and 3.9% respectively, of the total health expenses are covered by private insurance companies (Table XIII; OECD 2004II; Ibid. 2007II; Keyder 13; Bugra 8f.).

Finally, in its level of decentralization Turkey clearly stands apart from the other Southern European countries. While the Turkish government has begun to emphasize the role of municipalities, some of which have been engaged in poverty alleviation since the 1980s, their function is not based on legal grounds. To this day, the benefits and services provided by municipalities have been based on charity (Ekim 4f.; Keyder 14).

Regarding the characteristics analyzed in this section, Turkey stands apart from the Mediterranean countries and the ideal type. CSOs and regional governments still play a negligible role. Private health- and care services are still of minor importance and unaffordable for the majority of the Turkish population. While examples of clientelism can be found in Turkey's

social history, this thesis cannot determine its impact on the Turkish social security system in general, owing to the lack of empirical data.

6.5 The Family in the Turkish Welfare Regime: Male Breadwinner or Family and Kin Solidarity Model?

At the dawn of the 21st century, gender discrimination appears to be one of the most challenging problems for the Turkish society. Analyzing female economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival and political empowerment, the World Economic Forum ranks Turkey 105th out of 115 examined countries (Hausmann/Tyson/Zahidi 2006). In 2005, only 23.7% of Turkish women were in employment. Although the employment rates of women in other Southern European countries are much higher (Greece 46.2%, Italy 45.3%, Spain 51.9), they also fall behind the OECD average of 57.7%. Only Portugal (61.7%) lies above the average (OECD 2006I, 53).⁵⁷

The low participation of women in the formal labor market can be explained by a number of factors, such as the extremely low level of defamilialization described earlier. Only 32.6% of employed women in urban areas and 41.8% in rural areas have children under the age of six (Hacettepe University 2004). In contrast, the ratio of women with children between the age of three and five in Southern Europe (Greece 50.9%, Italy 51.7) is still below the OECD average of 64.1%. Again, only Portugal stands out with an employment rate of 81.9% of mothers with children between the age of three and five (OECD 2006I, 57).⁵⁸ The cultural dimension of this issue should not be underestimated. As Lluís Flaquer points out, “[...] a family-centered welfare-system, a family-biased production system, and a family oriented value system go hand in hand. Such an ‘economics of the family’ cannot work unless it is sustained by a set of widely shared cultural values” (Flaquer 2000, 12).

This section examines to what extent the capacity of women to combine formal employment and their work within the family is not only affected by the lack of care services and the traditional separation of gender roles, but how this issue is amplified by Turkish labor law and a gendered social security system. Congruently, it will be discussed whether the Turkish welfare regime can be classified as a Male Breadwinner Model or a Family and Kin Solidarity Model.

As shown in the historical analysis, gendered social legislation can be traced back to the Ottoman times. In the contemporary social security system, entitlement to a number of services

⁵⁷ Germany 59.6%, Sweden 66.8%, UK 66.8%

⁵⁸ Germany 58.1%, Sweden 82.5%, UK 56.9%

and benefits is still based on sex.⁵⁹ Gender discrimination, which is related to the status of dependency, becomes visible in pensions and health insurance. Dependent daughters are entitled to health insurance and survivors' pension until employment or marriage. In contrast, sons lose their entitlement status after they complete their education. In 2003 (SSK/ES) and 2005 (BK), the regulations of entitlement were reformed with the aim of greater gender equalization. Prior to the reform, survivor pensions for widowers were based on a means test: disabled daughters lost their entitlement to survivor insurance and health care at the time of marriage, while disabled sons were entitled for lifetime. A further step towards equalization was taken in the 2006 reform. According to the draft, sons now also receive marriage boni. Furthermore, dependent daughters lose their entitlement to health insurance after they complete their education. However, daughters are still entitled to survivor pension and health insurance if the father dies. Gendered entitlement rules with regards to labor manifest themselves in the different retirement ages. Since the 1999 reform, women retire at the age of 58 after 20 years of contribution, men at the age of 63, after 25 years of contribution (Social Insurance Act 506; Kiliç 2006, 81).

Azer Kiliç argues that the Turkish social security regime is based on a normative family model according to which women and unmarried daughters are dependent on the status of the male head of the family. This ideal type of a male-breadwinner is also reflected in the survivor pension, which favors female over male survivors. Accordingly, women left without a male breadwinner are protected by the state, until they get (re)married. Kiliç argues that as the Turkish state also encourages women to (re)marry, marriage is perceived as the "real social security mechanism for women" (Kiliç 2006, 125). This understanding of dependency is also reflected in the fact that disabled daughters are entitled to survivor pension until marriage while disabled sons have life-long claims.

While Kiliç classifies the Turkish welfare regime as a Male Breadwinner Model, this thesis argues that the state-family relationship in Turkey resembles the Family and Kin Solidarity Model. In the Turkish social security system, spouses, children, and the parents of the insurant are dependently health insured and entitled to survivor pension and health. Other members of the family are not covered. The protection of parents, disabled children and unmarried daughters is remarkable. No country in the EU grants insurance and pension entitlement to daughters and disabled children for life. In Turkey, the parents of the insurant are only entitled to health insurance if they are not insured themselves and they are entitled to survivor pension if the sum distributed to spouse and children does not exceed 60% of the insurant's pension. With regards to survivor pension, Turkey is in line with other Southern European countries.

⁵⁹ For a comprehensive analysis of the gendered social security legislation see: Kiliç 2006.

Dependency status is granted to parents and siblings in Spain and Italy, and in Portugal to parents (MISSOC).

While Kiliç highlights that the state encourages women to marry and fulfill their traditional roles within the family via early retirement schemes and the repayment of contributions and severance payments, Turkey does little to support families in terms of benefits or tax cuts. Benefits and services are only provided by the central government's "Social Risk Mitigation Project" and the SYDGM. Social expenditures in form of family cash benefits were negligible in 2003. Again, Turkey falls within the clusters of Southern European countries, which are below OECD average. Spain spent less than 0.5% of its GDP on cash benefits for families and Italy, Greece, and Portugal between 0.5% and 1%. Germany spent 1.2% of its GDP, Sweden 1.6% and the UK 2.2% (Table XIV). Moreover, Turkey and Mexico are the only OECD countries that do not grant any tax cuts to families. The other Southern European show mixed results. Greece (0.3%) and Spain (3.3%) give small tax breaks to families, while Portugal's (9.7%) and Greece's (6.1%) breaks are higher. Germany (16.3%) gives much higher tax cuts to families than Sweden (6.1%) and the UK (9.7%) (Table VIII).

Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Greece are also similar as they do not offer any paid parental leave periods. Italy offers 12 weeks, but only pays 30% of the allowances. While unpaid parental leave periods do not exist in Turkey, Portugal offers 24, Greece 28, Italy 24, and Spain 156 weeks. In comparison, Germany grants 104 weeks of parental leave with 11% allowance, Sweden 51 weeks with 80% allowance, and the UK offers 26 weeks of unpaid parental leave (Table XVI).

While prior to the recent reform women were "protected" by labor laws and regulations and excluded from specific occupations, the percentage of employed women who work less than 20 hours per week lies below 5%, while close to 60% of women in the formal labor market work more than 45 hours. The percentage of employed women who work less than 20 hours per week is also low in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. All three countries are below the OECD average of 20%. Only in Italy, with approximately 26%, more women are in part-time employment. In contrast, Germany (37%) and the UK (39%) show very high and Sweden (20%) average numbers of part-time employment of women (Table XV).

In summary, the empirical data confirms Kiliç's argument that the Turkish social security regime is established around a normative family model, in which women and unmarried daughters are dependent on the status of the male head of the family. Nevertheless, certain traits of the Turkish and the Southern European social security systems differ from the Male Breadwinner Model. First, dependency status is granted to not only the nuclear family; second,

and most importantly, the state does not interfere with the realm of the family but perceives the latter as the main institution of welfare.

In this context, the significance of the informal labor market in Turkey also needs to be emphasized. While the state established social security mechanisms for certain occupational groups, it accepts that large groups in society develop their own mechanisms of protection. Women play an active role in the informal market. As described by Moreno, in the Southern European context, a form of “superwomen” emerged in Turkey who were able to combine employment with their work in the family. As highlighted in the historical part of this thesis, domestic labor in particular gained significance in the last decade. The ideal of the family as the main pillar of the Turkish welfare regime also becomes visible in the entitlements to old-age and disability pension and the Green Card. Only applicants who do not have family members to rely on are entitled to these benefits. It is remarkable that the predominant role of the family is also reflected in the program of Deniz Feneri. Its self-prescribed mission to reemphasize the role of the family, and the fact that it perceives the extended family as a unit and grants benefits on a collective basis, confirms the outstanding importance of the family in Turkey.

6.6 Interim Conclusion: Turkey as an Example of the Southern Model?

The comparative analysis of the Turkish welfare regime reveals remarkable similarities but also some differences between the Turkish real and the Southern European ideal type. Turkey differs from the ideal and the real types as its health system is far from universal. Nevertheless, its social security system is highly polarized and characterized by peaks of generosity. Compared to the other Southern European countries, which also show a very high level of unequal distribution, Turkey’s level of polarization is even higher. Furthermore, Turkey and the other Southern European countries differ from the rest of Europe in their lack of minimum protection in form of social assistance schemes. Compared to the other countries, social transfers in Southern Europe offer less protection from the threat of poverty. While Turkey’s low level of state penetration in the social realm corresponds to the ideal type, the discrepancy between the Turkish case and the Mediterranean real types becomes apparent. The current level of social expenditure in the Mediterranean countries is comparable to the rest of Europe.

With respect to the characteristics that have been included in the international comparison, Turkey matches the criteria of the ideal type to a very high degree. A different picture emerges, however, regarding the characteristics of clientelism, the intermixture of public and private resources, decentralization and importance of CSOs. According to the findings of

the interviews, the market, CSOs, and municipalities still play a minor role in welfare provision. At the present time, Turkey clearly differs from the ideal type and real types found in Mediterranean countries. The role of CSOs is still very limited in Turkey. However, as the example of Deniz Feneri demonstrates, some organizations have begun to contribute significantly to poverty alleviation. While the Southern European countries have decentralized their social security systems and delegated a significant degree of social responsibility to the regional level, the Turkish central government continues to be the policy maker. Although municipalities have gained importance in the last two decades, the assistance they provide does not extend beyond the realm of charity. Turkey's level of clientelism is difficult to detect and even harder to compare. During the course of Turkey's social history, a number of examples can be found that suggest a high level of clientelism, such as the legalization of Gecekondu and agrarian subsidies. However, the question to what extent clientelism affected the social security system in Turkey requires further research. While the interviewed experts argued that little evidence exists for a strong influence of clientelism, the phenomenon of the early retirement schemes at the end of the 1980s suggests a different conclusion.

Turkey and the other Southern European countries are also connected through the distinct traits of the Family and Kin Solidarity Model which is characterized by the dominance of the family in the social sphere and differs from the Male Breadwinner Model predominantly found in the Corporatist Welfare Regime. As the comparison to Germany showed, the Turkish state does not act on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity. Instead it leaves entire policies to the realm of the family. The Turkish social security system is also based on a normative family model in which women depend on the male head but the male breadwinner also takes responsibility for the extended family. In addition, the Turkish state does not support the family with cash benefits and high tax cuts but tolerates alternative strategies of family income that include the participation of other breadwinners.

In summary, focusing on the role of the state and the family in the Turkish welfare regime, cross-national comparison shows that Turkey matches the key criteria of the Southern Model. Only the lack of a universal health system sets it apart. Turkey is also unique with respect to the role played by the market and actors in civil society. Welfare in Turkey falls into the realm of the family and the state. The role of CSOs, municipalities, and commercial providers is negligible. Taking these findings into account, the Turkish welfare regime can be classified as a polarized example of the Southern Model of welfare, distributing social responsibilities only between the state and the family, while assigning little importance to the market.

7. Conclusion

The historical and comparative analysis of this thesis proves the hypothesis that the Turkish welfare regime matches the key characteristics of the Southern European Model of welfare. Focusing on the historical legacy of the Turkish welfare regime, significant parallels to Southern Europe become apparent. In correspondence with the Mediterranean countries, class coalition in Turkey is characterized by a weakly organized labor movement. Additionally, Turkey shares with the Mediterranean countries an authoritarian path of nation building and an overpowering bureaucracy, which appear to be major obstacles for civil society participation and democratic representation. Despite these similarities, Turkey differs from the Southern European welfare states regarding its resistance to social reform. While in Southern Europe processes of decentralization and privatization and a strong impetus of civil society can be observed in the last decades, the central government in Turkey is only slowly adapting to the socio-economic changes. Not until recently did the Turkish government begin to place an emphasis on civil society and regional concepts of poverty alleviation.

The classification of the Turkish welfare regime via cross-national comparison made clear that Turkey not only shares similar trajectories in historical development with the Mediterranean countries but also fits the key characteristics of the ideal type of the Southern Model. Focusing on the role of the state, the main difference to the ideal type is the lack of a universal health system in Turkey. Besides this, the similarities are remarkable. The Turkish social security system strongly protects an occupational core, the level of state penetration in the social realm is extremely low, and a safety net in form of a social assistance scheme is absent. The existence of a high degree of clientelism could neither be proven nor disproven owing to the lack of empirical data. Further research on this aspect will be necessary.

The most significant common trait of the welfare regimes in Turkey and the rest of Southern Europe is the importance of the family as a main institution of welfare. This role is reflected in a high level of familialism and an extremely low degree of defamilialization. Furthermore, the state endorses the family's status by modeling its social policies after a Family and Kin Solidarity Model, which differs in distinct characteristics from the Male Breadwinner Model. In summary, for a significant part of the Turkish population the family is the main and often the only safety net and provider of social services.

The most striking difference to the Southern Model is the low impact of civil society, the market, and regional authorities in Turkey. In this respect, Turkey clearly stands apart from the ideal type and the Mediterranean real types.

Despite the differences, this thesis argues that Turkey is an example of the Southern Model of welfare. The question that follows is whether Turkey will choose a similar path of

welfare development in the future. According to Esping-Andersen, social policy outcomes are determined by the existing arrangements of welfare. Hence, the challenges and traits of the welfare system that Turkey shares with the other Southern European countries are likely to result in a progress of convergence. The recent social policy reforms in Turkey suggest similar developments at least to a certain degree. Corresponding with Southern Europe, the 2006 reform might lead to the establishment of a universal health system. While the draft introduces a system based on contributions, all Turkish citizens under the age of 18 will be covered by the state. As a result, for the first time in Turkish history the state would grant benefits on the basis of social rights and independent of the capacity of the family to take responsibility. Turkey has also followed the path of the Mediterranean countries with recent reforms of the AKP government, according to which more responsibilities will be delegated to the market, regional authorities, and civil society.

While the AKP emphasizes the importance of new actors in the social realm, it also strives to develop the capacities of the family as the central actor of welfare provision in Turkey. Programs such as Aileye Dönüş Projesi and the Social Risk Mitigation Project aim at the empowerment of the family as the main institution of welfare. Nevertheless, support for families is only provided in the form of financial assistance and not on a universal basis. A delegation of services to the state and the provision of state services for the elderly and children on the basis of social rights are a distant prospect.

Despite the similarities, there are significant differences between Turkey and Southern Europe. The main obstacle to social policy reform appears to be the predominant perception of statehood in Turkey which is deeply affected by the authoritarian character of nation building. The central state is still perceived as a paternalistic leader rather than a platform for political participation of different societal interest groups and classes. Accordingly, citizenship is still based on ethnic unity rather than civil and social rights.

In a nutshell, this perception of statehood and citizenship lies at the heart of most conflicts in Turkish society today. Questions of multiple identities in Turkey, such as the Kurdish, the Alevi, or the Christian; the low degree of civil society organization; the role of women in society; the political power of the military; the control of the state over matters of religion; all these cleavages and conflicts are related to questions of statehood and citizenship just described in the social realm.

Ayşe Bugra argues that the recent social developments are part of a “cognitive change” in Turkey (Bugra 11). To what extent this cognitive change will lead to a shift in the discourse of statehood and citizenship remains to be seen. Turkey certainly needs this cognitive change to face the challenges of the 21st century.

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