Greek-Turkish Relations and the European Union: A Critical Perspective

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Available online: 08 Apr 2010

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The article seeks to place Turkish and Greek relations with the European Union in historical perspective. A certain dose of realism is introduced to the debate concerning the future of Greek–Turkish–EU relations following the initial wave of optimism generated by the Helsinki summit. The highly entrenched positions held by key actors in the domestic politics of the two Aegean countries constitute formidable barriers to progress. The asymmetry caused by Greece's early incorporation into the EU as a full member continues to pose a major obstacle to the resolution of long-standing tensions between the two countries in such key spheres as the Aegean Sea and the Cyprus disputes.

Two developments during the second half of 1999 represent the dawn of a new era: Greek–Turkish *rapprochement* followed by the European Council decision at Helsinki in December to categorize Turkey as a candidate for full membership. For the first time for many years, there exists considerable optimism concerning the future of the Greece–Turkey–EU triangle. The prevailing mood in Turkish domestic policy circles is that Turkey will steadily move towards full membership even though the transition period may be somewhat longer than initially anticipated.

It is undoubtedly the case that the recent improvement in Greek–Turkish relations and the perspective of full membership granted to Turkey at Helsinki constitute striking developments, whose favourable impact are clearly evident in the economic sphere. A conducive external environment has allowed domestic policy-makers in Turkey greater room for manoeuvre in implementing a far-reaching programme aimed at stabilization and structural public sector reform, with a serious prospect of breaking down the chronic inflationary pattern that has characterized the Turkish economy over the past two decades. None the less, it is fair to say that a certain underestimation may be detected on the part of the Turkish political elites concerning the obstacles that remain both on the road to Turkey's full EU

membership and a durable improvement in Greek–Turkish relations, the two processes being intrinsically interlinked in any case.

While the success of economic reforms and sustained progress in economic performance are likely to play an important role in Turkey's progress towards full membership, the real obstacles will be more in the political than the economic realm. In the political sphere, two issues, namely protection of 'minority rights' – the so-called 'Kurdish problem' – and a mutually acceptable resolution of the Cyprus dispute, are likely to dominate the agenda. This is not to suggest that other issues, such as the commitment of state elites in Turkey to a strict or authoritarian version of secularism and the long-standing dispute between Turkey and Greece over the Aegean continental shelf, are not significant. Clearly, such issues also constitute serious barriers on the path to full EU membership and have to be seriously addressed as well. The point to emphasize, however, is that the issues of minority rights and the Cyprus dispute are the two critical issues, which rouse deep emotions and national sentiments in Turkey on the part of the political elites and the public at large.

Given the dominance of nationalism throughout the Turkish political spectrum, the type of solutions proposed by Greece or the EU with respect to these underlying sources of conflict are likely to generate widespread resistance in Turkey, in spite of the incentives provided by the prospect of full EU membership. An important objective of the present article, therefore, is to introduce a certain dose of realism to the debate concerning the future of Greek–Turkish–EU relations in the post-Helsinki context, by highlighting entrenched positions on Turkey's domestic politics as a considerable constraint to progress while at the same time being highly critical of the policies pursued by Greece and the European Union. Hence, the approach adopted may be considered as rather unusual or controversial in so far as it seeks to be even-handed in its criticisms of all the major actors under analysis. The article will also try to suggest some possible avenues for building and capitalizing upon the optimistic and the co-operative environment that exists currently in order to facilitate further and lasting improvements in Turkey's relations with both Greece and the European Union in general.

The Greece–Turkey–EU Triangle in Historical Perspective

In retrospect, the positions of Greece and Turkey with respect to the emerging European Community in the early 1960s reveal remarkable similarities. Both countries had established themselves as important NATO partners in the south-eastern Mediterranean in the US-dominated post-war international order. From the Community's point of view, both countries

were important due to their geostrategic location and as natural barriers against possible Soviet expansionism in the cold war context. Both wanted to diversify their external economic and security ties and reduce their over-dependence on the United States; hence, both were among the earliest applicants in the Community's initial process of enlargement.[1] In 1959, just a couple of months after a similar application had been submitted by Greece, Turkey approached the Community, its ultimate objective being full membership. Both countries emerged as associate members of the European Community, Greece in 1961 and Turkey, following the signing of the Ankara Agreement, in 1963. Given the low per capita incomes and limited industrial development of these countries by Community standards, the association agreements established recognized the need for long transition periods, before full participation in a customs union and eventual full membership would be possible. Moreover, in both national contexts, the political debate concerning relations with the EC was dominated at the time by considerations of whether Turkish and Greek industry would be able to withstand competition from European firms. Inevitably, much discussion centred around the issue of how much protection would be needed and for how long before satisfactory integration with the Community, on equal terms, would become a feasible option.

Considering that both countries pursued inward-oriented development strategies in this period, their attitude towards relations with the Community was necessarily defensive. Both countries sought to capitalize on possible long-term advantages offered by membership of the Community without jeopardizing prospects for industrial growth by exposing themselves to excessive competition in the short to medium term. A defensive attitude was also evident in Turkey's relations with the EC at this time, in a different sense of the term. Certainly, a major motive underlying Turkey's application in 1959 was not to be left out or left behind Greece, given the long-standing disputes between the two countries over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. In other words, by simultaneously applying for membership in 1959, Turkey wanted to prevent Greece from deriving an unfair advantage through privileged association with the EC, in its bilateral dealings with Turkey.

The year 1973 represented the climax of Turkey's relations with the EC. As a result of the signing of the 'Additional Protocol' during that year, the EC market in manufactures (with the notable exception of textiles) was opened up to Turkish exports. Furthermore, a definitive time-table, involving a transition period of 22 years, was laid down for Turkey's full participation in the customs union.[2]

The Divergent Fortunes of Greece and Turkey in the Post-1974 Era

1974 proved to be a crucial year for Greek–Turkish bilateral relations as well as their relations with the EC. Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974, legitimized by the need to protect the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot minority, and followed by the collapse of the military regime and the return to democracy in Greece under the premiership of Konstantinos Karamanlis, sparked off a remarkable chain of events resulting in Greece's full membership of the EC, in an unexpectedly short period of time, by the beginning of 1981. Hence, the positions of the two countries, which had enjoyed a broadly similar standing with respect to the Community up to that point, experienced a drastic and dramatic reversal by the beginning of the 1980s.

Greece formally applied for full membership in 1975. Political and security considerations rather than purely economic concerns appeared to be at the heart of this decision. What Karamanlis hoped for was the consolidation of the nascent, fragile democratic order through closer integration with the EC. Turkey's intervention in Cyprus during 1974 also played a decisive role in pushing Greece towards closer union with the Community as a source of security in the face of the Turkish threat. The response of the Community to the initial application was lukewarm. The Commission Report on the Greek application was certainly negative, stressing the backwardness of the Greek economy as well as the problem of discrimination that Greek membership would entail for the EC's other major NATO partner, Turkey.[3] None the less, through a series of events, in which France as a key EC actor played a central role, the Commission's report was rejected by the Council. Consequently, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Greece. The decision was justified by the need to consolidate the nascent democratic regime in Greece and thereby prevent a return to authoritarianism and instability. In retrospect, the European Council's over-ruling of the Commission's view on this matter and its insistence on a positive reply to the Greek application clearly demonstrates a powerful tendency in the EC at the time, namely to use membership of the Community as a critical external anchor to prevent Greece, and Spain and Portugal for that matter, from sliding back to authoritarianism. It is fair to say that this degree of commitment to using Community membership as an instrument of consolidation of an otherwise fragile democratic regime has been absent in relation to the Turkish case both historically and in the current context.[4]

What is rather surprising and paradoxical at this juncture is why Turkey failed to apply for full membership at the same time as Greece in 1975, duplicating the earlier pattern in 1959. Several factors may account for this phenomenon. Certainly, there was an element of miscalculation on the part

of the Turkish political elites concerning the speed whereby Greece would be incorporated into the orbit of the Community. Moreover, there was another element of miscalculation on Ankara's part concerning the potential problems that would be posed by Greece, if it were to be incorporated into the Community as a full member. The perception of Greece as a weak and peripheral member of the EC, coupled with the strategic and economic importance of Turkey, suggested that the position of the EC towards Turkey would not change fundamentally following Greece's accession to full membership.[5] In any case, it was unequivocally assumed that the Ankara Agreement, as a binding agreement, guaranteed an inevitable graduation to Turkish full membership at some future date.

By 1979, however, with Greece's approach to full membership gathering momentum and following further applications from the newly democratic Mediterranean states, Spain and Portugal, a clear change of direction also occurred on the part of the Turkish political elites concerning the costs of delaying an application for full membership.[6] Yet, domestic political instability and civilian unrest in Turkey under weak coalition governments resulted in delays in Turkey's application. Finally, the collapse of democracy in Turkey in September 1980 put an end to any likelihood of a Turkish application for EC membership in the foreseeable future. Many researchers have viewed Turkey's decision not to apply for full membership as a serious missed opportunity in the course of Turkey–EU relations.

Greek–Turkish Relations Following Greece's Accession to the European Community in 1981

The early 1980s constituted an historical low point in Turkey–EC relations. Following the end of the military interlude and the return to representative government with the elections of November 1983, however, relations began to improve. The 1980s represented a period of rapid and dramatic change for Turkey on the economic front, involving a radical shift away from the protectionist, domestic market-oriented model of the 1960s and the 1970s to a much more open and export-oriented economy. Parallel to these developments, Turkey's attitude towards the European Community was also transformed from the rather negative or defensive attitude of the early 1960s to a more positive approach which tended to emphasize the benefits of participation and taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the EC, particularly in the economic realm. It is in this mood that Turkey under the premiership of Turgut Özal applied for full membership of the Community in 1987.[7]

Turkey's application, however, met with an extremely unfavourable response. The Commission report prepared in response to the Turkish application claimed that, given the emphasis on further deepening and the

completion of the Single Market by 1992, further enlargement of the
Community was not on the agenda at the time of application, at least until
1993. But more specifically, the report pointed towards a number of
deficiencies in Turkey's record both on the economic and the political fronts
which rendered the country an unlikely candidate for full membership.[8] In
addition to underlining Turkey's economic weaknesses, the report drew
attention to the country's democratic deficits with a strong emphasis on the
issue of minority rights. The Commission report was also important in
illustrating the difficulties that Greece's inclusion in the Community would
pose for the subsequent course of Turkey–EC/EU relations in the context of
the 1990s. Indeed, the report explicitly stated the reservations of the
Community with respect to the Greek–Turkish conflict and the dispute over
Cyprus in particular:

> Examination of the political aspects of the accession of Turkey would
> be incomplete if it did not consider the negative effects of the dispute
> between Turkey and one Member State of the Community and also the
> situation in Cyprus, on which the European Council has just expressed
> its concern once again. At issue are the unity, independence,
> sovereignty and territorial identity of Cyprus in accordance with the
> relevant resolutions of the United Nations [Commission of the
> European Communities, 1989].

During the 1960s and early 1970s, the EC had maintained an equidistant
approach with respect to its two major NATO partners and the resolution of
their bilateral conflicts. Following Greece's incorporation into the
Community in 1981, however, the Community's approach towards
Greek–Turkish bilateral conflicts underwent a dramatic transformation.
Bilateral conflict between the two countries was no longer viewed as a
conflict between two major external partners which the EC would view
from outside with a certain distance. Rather the conflict was now between
an 'insider' and an 'outsider' and of direct and profound interest to the
Community itself. From Ankara's point of view, it was unambiguously clear
that, with Greece included in the Community, Greek–Turkish bilateral
disputes in general and the Cyprus problem in particular would be one of
the central obstacles to a deepening of relations with the EC.

**The Low Point of Greek–Turkish Relations During the 1990s: The
Customs Union and the Candidacy of Southern Cyprus for Full EU
Membership**

Whilst the Turkish political elites realized by the late 1980s the indirect
difficulties that Greece's inclusion in the Community would pose for

Turkey's aspirations, they seem to have underestimated the problems that Greece would pose directly through its own actions and initiatives within the Community in the context of developments in the 1990s. For the Community itself, Turkey appeared to pose special problems, absent in the case of the other peripheral countries involved in the enlargement process, both historically and currently, largely because of its size and doubts concerning its true European identity. From the EC/EU perspective, the key difficulty arose over the question of whether to treat Turkey as a 'natural insider' or an 'important outsider'.[9] The Community did not appear to favour the idea of incorporating Turkey as a 'natural insider', but was nevertheless keen to expand its relationships with a country considered to be significant in terms of its economic potential and geostrategic position.

Consequently, reviving the Customs Union proposal, involving an objective already present in the original Ankara Agreement, became the focal point and the principal mechanism, on the Union's part, for expanding relations with Turkey in the 1990s.[10] At this point, however, Greece started to exercise a key influence. First, Greek approval of the Customs Union in March 1995 was made conditional upon acceptance of Southern Cyprus or the Republic of Cyprus as a candidate country for the European Union. Secondly, the Greek veto prevented Turkey from capitalizing on financial aid which had been promised as part of the creation of the Customs Union which effectively started at the beginning of 1996.[11] Furthermore, Greece effectively exploited its bargaining position within the Union by threatening to block the eastern enlargement process if the Republic of Cyprus, claiming to represent the whole of the island, failed to be incorporated into the Union. A serious qualification, however, needs to be introduced here. Whilst it is true that Greece has tried to block the momentum of EU–Turkey relations, its success in this respect should not be exaggerated. What also appears to be at work is a tendency on the part of the core group of EU countries to use Greece as a scapegoat. Successive Greek governments obliged in this game because they could capitalize on it in terms of domestic political support by presenting it as a success for Greek diplomacy.

The beginning of accession negotiations with Southern Cyprus in March 1995, effectively ignoring the rights of the Turkish Cypriots in the north, resulted in a further deterioration in Turkish–Greek relations. The climax of the Greek–Turkish conflict was reached with the Imia-Kardak crisis of 1996, bringing the two countries to the brink of war in the Aegean. Subsequently, there was the S-300 crisis and the discovery that Greece was directly involved in the escape to Kenya of Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdish separatist PKK movement, prior to his capture in February 1999.[12] The latter was interpreted by Ankara as a sign of direct interference by Greece in Turkey's domestic politics, in support of the terrorist activities of the

Kurdish separatist movement, thus creating a great deal of resentment on Turkey's part.

Hence, at the beginning of 1999 relations with Greece appeared to hit a particularly low point. Similarly, a deep sense of isolation and disillusionment appeared to characterize Turkey's relations with the EU following the decision of the EU Council at Luxembourg to exclude Turkey from candidate country status, earlier, in December 1997.

The Underlying Logic of the Greek–Turkey *Rapprochement* Leading to the Helsinki Summit

In retrospect, 1999 was a remarkable year in terms of the steady improvement in Turkey's relations both with Greece and the European Union. How do we explain the Greek–Turkish *rapprochement*, leading up to Greek support for Turkey's candidacy for full EU membership at Helsinki, certainly a surprising and paradoxical development considering the events that had taken place earlier in the decade?[13] Clearly, several influences were at work. The traditional Greek–Turkish antagonism, as is typical in most long-standing conflicts, embodies an important psychological dimension.[14] A major event in the course of 1999, namely the earthquake in Turkey and the subsequent reactions to it on the part of the Greek public, constituted an important psychological counter-shock. This in turn precipitated a movement from below, resulting in self-questioning and self-criticism in both societies, helping to pull the two societies together and to undermine psychological bases of conflict in the process.[15] Thus, the recent Greek–Turkish *rapprochement* has an important romantic or idealistic dimension, marking the start of a new relationship based on mutual trust and co-operation, originating from civil initiatives in both countries and signalling the path through which co-operation could be built in the future.

Whilst the earthquake occurred in August 1999, the roots of *rapprochement* were already evident in the forced resignation of hard-liner Theodoros Pangalos, from his position as foreign secretary, and his replacement by the moderate George Papandreou. This event clearly signalled the beginning of self-questioning and self-criticism within PASOK and the government of Costas Simitis following the Öcalan affair in early 1999.[16]

A balanced interpretation, however, would also need to introduce an important realist dimension to the analysis. In retrospect, the Greek leadership increasingly realized that it would not be in a position to settle its long-standing bilateral disputes with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea if Turkey was left isolated and outside the orbit of the European Union.

Certainly, Greece's bargaining power with respect to Turkey depends critically on the intensity of Turkey's aspirations to become part of the EU and, hence, the degree of pressure which could be exerted by the EU on Turkey itself as part of a broad package of conditions and incentives. Stated somewhat differently, Greece's capacity to bargain with Turkey would decline dramatically if Turkey was left with no prospect of EU membership, which is certainly what happened in the aftermath of the Luxembourg summit.

One should also recognize that there exists an important external dimension to the recent improvement in Greek–Turkish relations, constituted by growing pressure on the part of both the United States and the European Union. The US, in particular, since the Imia-Kardak crisis of 1996, has exerted growing pressure on the Greek leadership to engage in dialogue with Turkey as a means of settling their bilateral disputes.[17] One has to recognize that American pressure was a vital if not the only influence upon the EU's decision to include Turkey as a candidate country at the Helsinki summit, thus reversing the decision reached at the earlier Luxembourg summit of December 1997. The US pressure on the EU leadership to incorporate Turkey into the orbit of the EU prior to Helsinki may also reflect, in part, an attempt to exert pressure for a solution to the longstanding Greek–Turkish bilateral conflict. Growing US and EU pressure also illustrated the actual limits to Greece's bargaining power within the Union. Certainly, Greece had displayed a poor economic record relative to other Mediterranean newcomers during the 1980s, although its record improved by a substantial margin during the 1990s.[18] Furthermore, its record as a problematic member started to generate resentment on the part of the core members of the Union who, for economic and security reasons at least, were reluctant to exclude Turkey totally from the ongoing enlargement process.[19]

The Emergence of a Post-Helsinki Equilibrium: A Sustainable Equilibrium?

The intense mood of optimism concerning the nature of Greek–Turkish–EU relations in the post-Helsinki period appears to have generated a kind of temporary equilibrium. Both Ankara and Brussels seem reasonably content with the present state of affairs and are not in a hurry to accelerate the path towards Turkey's full membership, but for quite different reasons. Brussels is clearly not very receptive to the idea of Turkey's early entry into the Union given the traditional concerns over Turkey's size, identity and the fact that the first-tranche central and eastern European countries are already in the queue for an initial early round of enlargement.

In the case of Ankara, the main problem originates from the fact that the

fulfilment of certain aspects of the Copenhagen criteria would meet with major resistance in the domestic political arena, with nationalism being the dominant force across the whole of the political spectrum. To be more precise, there appear to be two principal obstacles on the way towards Turkey's full EU membership: (a) the granting of the cultural rights of the 'Kurdish minority', and (b) a satisfactory resolution of bilateral disputes with Greece and the Cyprus problem.

While minority rights and the Cyprus issue are indeed the two major issues in relation to Turkey's accession, one should also draw attention to other aspects of the Copenhagen political criteria, namely stability of institutions, guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law and human rights. In Turkey's case, this clearly relates to the role of military, also a crucial player in the Cyprus and Kurdish problems. If one examines the political agendas of the major, nationally-based political parties in Turkey, both on the left and the right of the political spectrum, it is possible to identify only one, social democratic, political party, namely the Republican People's Party (CHP), that has been willing to give serious attention to the issue of cultural pluralism and 'minority rights', at least as an extension of individual rights and democratic deepening. Yet, this particular party has been marginalized and deprived of parliamentary representation following its defeat in the general elections of April 1999.[20] All other political parties are quite impervious to any idea of making progress on this particular issue.

Concerning the conflict with Greece, and the Cyprus dispute in particular, all political parties of national standing as well as key institutions of the state such as the military are unambiguously and vehemently against the type of solutions proposed by Greece or the EU concerning the creation of a formula for Cyprus in which the Turkish Cypriot community would be incorporated as a mere minority without any kind of political autonomy. The solution proposed by Ankara and broadly subscribed to by all major political parties in the case of Cyprus is an extremely loose confederation of essentially two independent ethnically-based communities on the island.[21]

It is extremely unlikely, however, that the temporary equilibrium following the Helsinki summit will be a long-lasting, sustainable equilibrium. Indeed, the main impediment to such a state of affairs comes from the conclusions of the Helsinki summit itself, which set a deadline of 2004 for the settlement of bilateral disputes between Greece and Turkey.[22] The EU has repeatedly made its case unambiguously clear that a candidate country cannot hope to become a full member of the Union so long as bilateral conflicts with an existing member persist. In other words, insofar as Ankara is keen on full membership, it will face severe pressure from the EU to settle its bilateral disputes with Greece. A natural corollary of this proposition is that the solution proposed by Turkey regarding the Cyprus

problem, which effectively means legitimizing the current *status quo*, established after the creation of an independent Turkey Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, has no chance of being accepted as a mutually satisfactory solution. The current state of affairs is clearly not acceptable from the point of view of Greece, the EU and the international community at large. One should also recognize that the current *status quo*, based on the existence of a separate state in the northern part of the island which is only officially accepted by and totally dependent economically on Turkey, constitutes a sub-optimal state of affairs which would only be sustained if Turkey had no serious interest in becoming part of the European Union.

The opening up of accession negotiations by the EU with the Republic of Cyprus has complicated the matter further. Clearly, judged in terms of various features such as its high per capita income and its small size, Southern Cyprus appears to have a strong case for full membership, more so than the potential entrants from central and eastern Europe. The entry of the Cyprus Republic, as the sole representative of the island as a whole, however, would be met by severe resistance from Turkey, thereby contributing towards a deep reversal of the current Greek–Turkish *rapprochement* in the future.[23]

Hence, the existing situation represents a stalemate. Deeply entrenched positions on both sides and the very distance between those positions render the achievement of a mutually acceptable solution extremely difficult. Progress will only be possible if Ankara accepts the case for the creation of a genuinely independent and united Cyprus. At the same time, what Ankara should strive for is a type of independent Cyprus in which the Turkish minority would enjoy considerable but not complete autonomy in government as part of a broad confederal structure. The degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Turkish minority would be the subject of a bargaining process. Such an entity would then apply for and be considered for full membership of the EU as a legitimate representative of both ethnic communities on the island. Clearly such a solution would represent a significant improvement upon the existing state of affairs.

From the point of view of Turkey's longer-term national interests, as well as the longer-term interests of the Turkish Cypriot population on the island, it is quite obvious that the current *status quo* does not constitute a desirable equilibrium. Hence, a solution in this direction would represent a major step in resolving long-standing tensions between Turkey and Greece and would help to remove a major obstacle on the path to Turkey's full EU membership. Such a solution would also help to overcome the perennial state of isolation faced by the Turkish population in the northern part of the island and would help to alleviate the striking differences in income and wealth which currently exist between the southern and the northern parts of the island. Likely consequences of international recognition, such as a

significant expansion of revenues from tourism, EU funds and the free
mobility of resources from one part of the island to another, could make an
enormous difference to the well-being of the Turkish population in the north
as well as the well-being of the island as a whole.

Having said this, however, any solution that fails to provide firm legal
guarantees for the Turkish minority on the island right from the inception of
EU membership for the island as a whole would fail to generate any kind of
endorsement from Turkish society at large, whatever the benefits of
potential EU membership might be. It is quite clear, therefore, that the
European Union itself has a vital role to play in this respect if a smooth
transition of a united Cyprus to full membership is to be accomplished with
the appropriate set of guarantees and if the Turkish minority is to receive the
kind of security it requires.

Concluding Observations

The recent Greek–Turkish *rapprochement* undoubtedly represents an
extremely favourable development. There is a growing realization on both
sides that there exist significant incentives for co-operation in the fields of
economic development and mutual arms reduction. The approach adopted
by the respective foreign ministers, İsmail Cem and George Papandreou,
has been to institutionalize co-operation from below by initiating dialogue
on low intensity issues such as trade, investment and tourism, leaving the
big disputes to be settled in the future. Whilst being on the optimistic side
concerning the future of co-operation between the two states, one should not
underestimate the difficulties involved in resolving the serious conflicts
over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, with the former likely to be more
controversial and, hence, more difficult to resolve then the latter.

The existence of a stalemate on these issues is a double-edged
phenomenon. On the Turkish side, there appears to be a certain
underestimation of the obstacles that lie on the road to full membership and
of what membership of the EU actually entails, leading to the frequently
made assertion that Turkey's domestic problems should be settled in the
sphere of domestic politics without explicit reference to global or EU
norms.[24] On the EU side also, deeply influenced by the position of Greece
as a member state, there exists a certain lack of sensitivity concerning the
Turkish position in conjunction with the rights of the Turkish minority in
Cyprus and Turkey's claims over the Aegean Sea. Hence, a serious
readjustment of positions is needed if progress is to be made concerning
both the resolution of Greek–Turkish bilateral tensions and Turkey's future
entry into the European Union.

NOTES

1. On Greece's early dealings with the European Community after 1959 leading to full membership in 1981, see Preston [1997] and Tsoukalis [1981]. On Turkey–Community relations in historical perspective and the Greece–Turkey–Community triangle, see in particular Birand [2000], Eralp [1993, 1994], Öniş [2001], Preston [1997] and Tekeli and İlkin [1993a, 1993b].

2. On the nature of the association, agreements signed by Greece and Turkey with the European Community during the early 1960s and their underlying similarities, see Preston [1997]. On the evolution of economic relations between Turkey and the Community from the Ankara Agreement to the Customs Union and beyond, see Balkır [1998].

3. For evidence on this matter and the negative reception of the Greek application for full membership in the immediate post-1975 period, see Commission of the European Communities [1976] and Preston [1997].

4. On the role played by France, with whom Karamanlis had developed close relationships in the pre-1974 era, and the arguments concerning the need to incorporate Greece in order to stabilize and consolidate its nascent democracy, see Preston [1997].

5. Concerning the explanations for Turkey's decision not to apply for EC membership in 1975, see Eralp [1993] and Güvenç [1998–99].

6. For a detailed documentation of the gradual recognition concerning the need to apply for full membership towards the end of 1970s, see Birand [2000] and Tekeli and İlkin [1993a].

7. On Turkey's more positive attitude towards EC membership in the 1980s, in the context of a liberalizing economy under Özal, see Tekeli and İlkin [1993b].

8. See Commission of the European Communities [1989].

9. For a detailed discussion of Turkey–Community relations from an historical perspective with a focus on the Union's reservations concerning Turkey's incorporation as a full member, particularly with respect to the question of identity, see Öniş [2001].

10. For details of the Customs Union agreement between Turkey and the European Union, which became effective from the beginning of 1996, see Balkır [1998] and the Association Council [1995].

11. In fact Greece vetoed EC financial aid to Turkey from 1983 until very recently. See Balkır [1998].

12. On the Imia-Kardak crisis of 1996 and its consequences, particularly with respect to the involvement of third parties such as the US and the EU, see Athanassopoulou [1997]. For a good discussion of the Öcalan crisis and its ramifications for Turkey–EU relations, see Alpay [2000]. Concerning the implications of the Öcalan crisis for Greek–Turkish bilateral relations, see Ayman [2000].

13. For a detailed examination of the forces leading to a reversal of the earlier decision to exclude Turkey from candidate country status, see Öniş [2000a].

14. For a penetrating analysis of the deep psychological roots of the Greek–Turkish conflict, see Volkan and Itzkowitz [1994].

15. For an excellent discussion of the psychological processes and self-criticism in both societies following the earthquake in Turkey and the subsequent course of Greek–Turkish *rapprochement*, see Ayman [2000].

16. On the consequences of the Öcalan affair and its significance as a starting point for the improvement in recent Greek–Turkish relations, see Ayman [2000].

17. See Athanassopoulou [1997] on the question of how pressure from the US, in particular, but also from the EU resulted in a change in the position of the Simitis government towards bilateral relations with Turkey following the Imia-Kardak crisis of 1996.

18. On Greece's poor economic record during the first decade of EC membership and the growing tensions and debate within PASOK between 'populists' and 'modernizers' concerning the need to reform the Greek economy and to overcome the 'fiscal crisis of the state', a term highly familiar to students of Turkish political economy, see Fouskas [1997] and Thomadakis [1993]. On the steady improvement of the Greek economy under increasing pressure from the EU during the course of the 1990s, see OECD [1998].

19. For a useful discussion of contrasting perspectives on the Cyprus problem, see Nugent

[2000]. For criticisms within the core of the EU (especially from France) concerning the problems that the candidacy of the Republic of Cyprus would pose, without a satisfactory resolution of the dispute involving both sides, see Kramer [1997].

20. Whilst the CHP values pluralism more than other mainstream parties, one ought to emphasize that its version of a pluralistic Turkey does not extend to the Islamists. Indeed, the party is zealously secular in its orientation, very much subscribing to a narrow or strict version of secularism which is clearly rather problematic within the present parameters of the European Union. For a detailed account and an attempt to categorize the policy agendas of the principal political parties in Turkey following the general elections of 1999, see Öniş [2000b].

21. On the 'official' Turkish perspectives on the Cyprus dispute and the problems surrounding the Aegean Sea, see the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs [2000a, 2000b]. Also relevant in this context is Dodd [1999].

22. See European Council [1999].

23. For valuable discussions concerning the problems that would be posed for the future of Greek–Turkish–EU relations by premature incorporation of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU without an adequate resolution of the Cyprus dispute in the first place, see Kramer [1997], Dodd [1999] and Nugent [2000].

24. A recent article by McLaren [2000] reporting on the result of a survey undertaken to discover elite perceptions in Turkey concerning the specific obstacles that lie on the path to full EU membership is rather illuminating. The survey results indicate a rather paradoxical tendency, namely that the Turkish political and business elites severely underestimate the difficulties posed by the bilateral disputes with Greece, and the Cyprus issue in particular, concerning the future prospects of full EU membership.

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