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The Network Governance Approach and the Activities of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Turkey

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit: BMZ

Christian Democratic Union: CDU

Christian Social Union: CSU

European People's Party: EPP

European Union: EU

Free Democratic Party: FDP

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: FES

Friedrich Naumann Stiftung: FNS

Hanns Seidel Stiftung: HSS

Heinrich Böll Stiftung: HBS

Justice and Development Party: JDP

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: KAS

Party of Democratic Socialism: PDS

Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung: RLS

Social Democratic Party: SDP

Union of Turkish Municipalities: UTM

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the globalization era, the terms via which we understand the world in which we live are on the way of a crucial change. The social and political life is now explained by new concepts. Whilst concepts such as hierarchy and formality have been descending, concepts such as partnership, network and informality are on the rise.

It is claimed that the classical mode of organization centered around the principle of representation is deficient for the governing of such complex societies of a globalizing world. Because in such complex societies, the demands addressed to decision-makers are quite varied, so are the problems and their solutions. Hence, it is assumed that political authorities can not deal with these demands and problems on their own, since they transcend the boundaries of the nation-state. In such a complex world, all actors and institutions, including the state, are deemed much more inter-dependent and inter-penetrated at not only national, but also at the international level. Hence, the interactions between various actors and institutions, let them be formal actors/institutions or civil society organizations, intensify to a great extent. Various international, national and local actors find the opportunity to challenge the monopoly of the central authority on deciding and imposing policies. As these actors have begun to demand a broader arena of influence in the process of policy making, the political authorities and other non-state actors have become to be accepted as *partners* in the policy-making process, which is understood in a broader sense including the negotiation of policies prior to their

formulation. Hence, policy-making is no longer a *mono-directional* process in which the government is the sole policy-maker from the beginning to the end of the policy-making process imposing the decisions or policies on the society from top to down. Thus, the monopoly of the state actors as the hardcore authority-holder is gradually replaced with 'levels of authority'.

Such a change in statehood has brought about a paradigm shift from government to *governance*, a new approach in the political science discipline and an allegedly new governing model which came into the fore in the 1990's. Challenging the traditional governing model in which governing is carried out by government itself or by government intervention; the paradigm of governance suggests *governing together*, that is by the joint act of state and non-state actors. Hence, governance implies interactions amongst various actors, including political authorities, which go beyond classical representation mechanisms. In this way, it paves the way for the rising weight of informality on policy-making processes.

In addition to informality, the governance approach deems such interactions different from the ones in the classical mode of governing also in terms of the position of actors in relation to each other. Even it is accepted that state actors are naturally not just like other actors due to their power resulting from the legitimation bestowed upon them by representative democracy, they are still reckoned equal to the other parties in these interactions. This crucial change in the understanding of the mode of policy-making has necessitated a new concept to explain these interactions; the *network* concept has come into the foreground in the political science literature in this way. It is used more and more in the academic circles to understand the policy-making processes of our times.

The network concept, as a metaphor, connotes such other metaphors like interdependency, partnership, mutuality, informality etc. Hence, it is contradicted with hierarchy which refers to other metaphors such as division of functions, authority, formality etc. In this way, the two concepts refer to two alternative models of policy-making. In the network model, policies are made within networks through links between actors in a particular policy domain using the tools of interaction, negotiation and bargaining while the classical hierarcial model implies policy-making through act of government itself.

The incorporation of the network metaphor into governance is explained by different concepts by different scholars. The network approach to governance is named *network governance* by some scholars (Sørensen, 2005; Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004; Üstüner, 2003) while others call it *policy networks* (Rhodes, 1997b; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Marsh, 1998; Kickert, Kljin and Koppenjan, 1997). Even both these concepts are synonymous; the concept of *network governance* - or *governance networks* in the words of Sørensen & Torfing (2005) - is preferred in this paper because it expresses the two dimensions of the phenomenon, the 'governance' dimension, as a model and a theory and the 'network' dimension, as a metaphor, as well as the relationship between these two dimensions. The notion of governance networks reveal the fact that 'governance networks' is a particular subset of the broader set of governance mechanisms without ignoring that it is also a particular subset of the broader set of networks (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 202). For this reason, I prefer to use the concept of *governance networks* in this paper, interchangeably with its synonym, 'network governance'.

However, it should be underlined that the theory of network governance is highly debatable rather than established. It can not be said that there is a consensus in the literature on the theoretical value of 'network governance'. In the literature, network governance is either conceptualized as a theory or model capable of explaining policy outcomes (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 1997b and Marsh, 1998a & 1998b) or as a metaphor, which is heuristically useful, but deprived of explanatory power (Dowding, 1995; Üstüner, 2003; Üstüner, 2008). Thus, on the one hand, the network governance model is based on a slippery ground. On the other hand, this provides an advantage; the emphasis on the metaphorical value of the network concept by scholars such as Dowding and Üstüner enables one to use the network concept metaphorically at different contexts. Hence, the network metaphor provides an analytical tool at different contexts albeit not an integrated and generalized theory (Üstüner, 2008: 63). In this paper, the phenomenon of network governance is taken as an approach rather than a theory or a model as well. This paper does not deal with providing a network picture or demonstrating a network model. Rather, the paper scrutinizes whether the theoretical framework of the network governance approach provides an analytical tool in analyzing the activities of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Turkey which constitutes the subject of the paper. It is believed that some tools in the network governance approach can be helpful in elaborating the relationships of the Stiftung in the Turkish political terrain. Hence, the objective of the paper is not to provide a general picture of networks in Turkey in the sense of networks as structures to be mapped. Rather, the paper focuses on *networking as a practice*. It also focuses on *actors* in elaborating these networking practices. I think that this is an important contribution of this paper to the examination of the governance practices in

Turkey in the academic circles. The studies on the governance practices in Turkey mainly focus on the changes at the institutional-judicial levels, which are very important for understanding the restructuring of Turkey according to the governance paradigm. However, the processes of the preparation of these changes are not that much elaborated in the literature. I believe that this paper contributes to shedding light on these processes by focusing on several key actors involved in these processes.

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) is one of the German political foundations working in Turkey together with the HBS, the FES and the FNS. In the literature, German political foundations are generally handled in terms of their role as an actor in international democracy assistance. Hence, the role they undertake in the political life of various countries is appreciated in the literature as well. In this paper, I deal with their political role as well, but in the context of the role of a specific foundation, that is the KAS, in the networking practices in Turkey rather than in the context of international democracy assistance in order to shed a light on policy-making processes in Turkey.

These foundations are called ‘political foundations’ since they are affiliated with a German political party.¹ For instance, Christian Democratic Party (CDU) affiliated Konrad Adenauer Stiftung is committed to the Christian democrat ideology which it defines at the right of the centre of the political spectrum (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007a). Strictly ideologically-oriented, German political foundations act in the light of several policy goals determined by their ideological values. They deal with several issues and policy fields in compliance with their ideological stances. As regards the KAS, its

¹ However, the foundations themselves reject the label of ‘party-foundation’, which is used to call them by the Turkish public, since it has repercussions that imply these foundations work like the external branch of German political parties (Interview with Dirk Tröndle, 2006).

office in Turkey carries out facilities about various issues including mainly subsidiarity, decentralization and democraticization. In this sense, it is interested in a broad issue arena which encompasses many of the current policy fields in Turkey. In this way, it gets into touch with various actors within the civil society terrain as well as the political terrain. In fact, among the political foundations in Turkey, it is the one with closest contacts with the political authorities and decision-makers.² This is why I prefer to deal with the KAS instead of other German political foundations in this paper. I assume that the KAS is one of the key players in the networking practices in Turkey within the policy-making processes in particular fields which correspond to its ideological tenets.

Within this framework, this paper consists of two main chapters. The first main chapter consists of the theoretical background of the paper; it elaborates the network approach. The theoretical chapter begins with an overview of the *governance* model because the approach of governance networks has its grounds on an ongoing debate on governance which intensively interrogated the role of government on governing the society. In this part, the conditions which brought about the emergence of governance as well as the main premises of this approach are presented. In the theoretical chapter, the approach of governance networks is elaborated subsequently. Here, I make a distinction between the network metaphor and governance networks; the network approach is elaborated within two parts, one including the network metaphor, the other including governance networks since the network concept as a metaphor is used in many fields of life beyond the policy-making process, i.e. in natural sciences and at the organizational level as an alternative

² This is the reason why the main office of the KAS in Turkey is located in Ankara, the capital city, rather than in İstanbul, the largest metropolitan city of Turkey. As Jan Senkyr, the representative of the Turkey Office of the KAS says, “our main counterparts like governments, parliaments, ministries, the main institutions and also main civil society organizations are usually based in the capital city, Ankara” (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007).

model of organizational structure. In the first part, I pay attention to through which concepts the network metaphor is conceptualized. This helps to understand the premises upon which the network governance approach rests. In the other part, the approach of governance networks is scrutinized. For this aim, the origin and the main characteristics of governance networks are illustrated firstly. Subsequently, different types of governance networks according to the closeness of relations between the actors as well as comparison of governance networks with other approaches to interest group representation are put in order to evaluate the networking practices of the KAS from these aspects in the subsequent chapter. Lastly, the controversial issues in the literature on governance networks will be explored in order to provide the basis for a critical evaluation of the network governance approach, which is added to the end of the theoretical chapter as concluding remarks.

In the second main chapter, information about the German political foundations in general and about the KAS specifically is given in terms of mission, organization and activities. The subsequent part investigates the activities of the KAS within the context of the network approach. In this part I concentrate on networking practices in which the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung takes place with specific reference to the relations of the KAS to the Union of Turkish Municipalities and to the Justice and Development Party. While doing so, I attribute special attention the relationship between the KAS, the UTM and the JDP in the policy field of local government, since in the policy issue of local government reform, all these actors are engaged in the making of the new regulations through negotiation and bargaining. I do not claim that the relations between these actors denote to a network model; as mentioned before I concentrate on networking as a practice.

However, I believe that one can benefit from some tools in the network governance approach such as informality³ and resource dependency to understand this relationship. In addition, with the analysis of this relationship, I aim to shed light upon the role the KAS undertakes in these networks of interaction. I also evaluate this relationship in terms of its correspondence to different approaches to interest group representation in this part.

In the attempt of analysis explained above, I basically benefit from the evaluation of the research results of the interview I conducted with Jan Senkyr, the representative of the office of the KAS in Turkey. The points stated below are the main points asked in the interview for the sake of operationalization:

- the societal sector which is the most prior to the KAS in its activities,
- the way by which it gets in touch with the Turkish public in its activities,
- its relations with national and local Turkish public authorities or decision-makers.

This interview constitutes the major methodological tool of the study. The reports of the two conferences on the policy field of local government conducted jointly by the KAS and UTM with the participation of the officials from the Ministry of Interior of the Turkish Republic are the other major tools in the evaluation of the relationship between the KAS, the UTM and JDP.

In the conclusive chapter of the paper, the overall arguments and the conclusions reached are mentioned briefly.

³ Informality is generally referred to either economic activities that are not registered before state institutions or face-to-face, personal relationships in studies on social sciences. However, I use the terms, 'informal' and 'informality', in a different sense in this paper; these terms refer to non-governmental mechanisms/ interactions that rely on ideational factors such as trust and common values rather than formal rules/procedures and that highly involve non-state actors in this paper.

CHAPTER II

NETWORK APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE

2.1. Governance

The theory of governance has emerged in a world marked by the transformation of the state under the globalization process. Globalization also reshapes the lenses by which we perceive the world through redefining phenomena such as nation-state and governing. By globalization states are being increasingly caught up in restructured *webs of power* that limit or transform their tasks, roles and activities by altering the context within which states exist and operate (Cerny, 2000: 22 – emphasis original). Factors such as boost in transnational operations due to technological innovations, and internationalization of politics and economy led to the crisis of the so-called interventionist state model of the Cold-War era. Neo-liberal policies came into the fore from 1980s on claiming that the state had to withdraw from its role in the economic sphere. Hence, with the implementation of neo-liberal policies, many social duties of the state were delivered to the private sector. Neo-liberal process has been marked by the commodification of many areas which were considered public affairs beforehand such as education and health services.

With this partial ‘de-statization’ process as Jessop (1997) calls it;⁴ various issue areas which were previously under the domination of state sovereignty started to be considered

⁴ Jessop (1997) acknowledges that globalization has two more impacts on nation-states in addition to the partial de-statization of politics: *internationalization* of policy regimes and the *denationalization* of statehood, which all have paved the way for the interrogation of the state’s traditional central role in governing.

to concern various actors besides the state at both the national and international levels. The change in statehood has brought about the paradigm shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’. The monopolization of authority by a single central entity, the state, is the most prominent aspect of traditional government model from which the governance model distinguishes itself through suggesting a ‘redistribution of power through a network of actors’ (Briatte, 2006: 2). In the same vein, according to Jessop,

There is a movement from the central role of official state apparatus in securing state-sponsored economic and social projects and political hegemony towards an emphasis on partnerships between governmental, para-governmental and non-governmental organizations in which the state apparatus is often only *first among equals*. This involves the complex art of steering multiple agencies, institutions and systems which are both operationally autonomous from one another and structurally coupled through various forms of reciprocal interdependence. Governments have always relied on other agencies to aid them in realizing state objectives or protecting state power beyond the formal state apparatus. But this reliance has been reordered and increased. The relative weight of governance has increased on all levels... (Jessop, 1997: 574-5 – emphasis added)

While showing the changes in statehood due to globalization, Jessop (1997: 576) warns us that these changes do not exclude a continuing and crucial political role for the national state but it is a role which is redefined as a result of the more general rearticulation of the local, regional, national and supranational levels of economic and political organization. Jessop (1997: 576) adds that “perhaps the most important role for the national state in this context is that of meta-governance, i.e. coordinating different forms of governance and ensuring a minimal coherence among them”. In the same line, Dunsire (1993) explains the function of government in governance as follows: “Government with a minimum use of power and resources may intervene when a group infringes upon the rights of others but this will be a temporary support to the party in

need” (Dunsire, 1993: 28, quoted in Özkan 2007, 27). Hence, as regards the problematic of *sovereignty*, it can be argued that the sovereignty of the nation-state remains as an institution; but its content has changed at the level of regulative rules in the sense that a transformation away from governance in the context of national government towards multilevel governance at overlapping national, local and international levels is under way (Sorensen, 2004: xiii-xiv).

The building mentality of the governance approach relies upon the idea that political power should be used not solely by government, but jointly with civil society and market actors. In this sense, the governance approach does not suggest putting the state out of action like the proposals of neo-liberal policies; it is different from neo-liberalism from this aspect (Büyükkoray, 2007: 8). Rather, it suggests the abolishment of the distinction among state, society and market who ought to be equal partners. In this way, it redefines the role of the state at not only economic, but also at political and societal spheres. As Kooiman (2003) states, “the state in modern society is very much alive, although its traditional position of being elevated above its subjects, either as individual citizens or groups, is being eroded, either unwillingly or on a voluntary basis” (Kooiman, 2003: 130). In this vein, governance theory assumes that *heterarchy* replaces bureaucratic hierarchy in the global age; society is *co-governed* by equal partners composed of civil society, market and state actors, which leads to replacement of the distinction between the ruler and the ruled in co-governance. Kooiman argues,

It seems quite clear that most of the traditional or primary public responsibilities are solidly under the umbrella of the state. However, there is also a range of governing tasks where we see shift towards *co-governance*, such as in responsive and interactive policy making, or by self-governing either by privatizing them or leaving them to profit or non-profit parties (Kooiman, 2003: 130 – emphasis added).

However, to my concern, an absolute distinction between ‘government’ and ‘governance’ is not plausible. The answer to the question of ‘who governs’ has not changed; still it is the government who governs. The change which came about with governance is, as Briatte (2006: 3) expresses, essentially in the ways in which governing is carried out rather than in terms of the governing agent.

Within this framework, concepts such as “partnership”, “cooperation” and “interaction” come to the fore as key words. For instance, Kooiman (2003: 5-11) emphasizes “a shared set of responsibilities” among actors in a society who have become more conscious of their *inter-dependencies* on each other with globalization.

The concept of governance is used in various fields with various meanings. Hence there are many types of governance. The most widespread use of the concept of governance is found in the field of development studies with the label of *good governance*. This term, mainly used by international organizations like the World Bank and the United Nations, assumes a linear and positive link between development, democracy and governance (Bayramoğlu 2005: 129). The *good governance* approach advocates the so-called ‘second-generation reforms’. These reforms are generally recommended for developing/under-developed countries by international organizations and consist of recommendations such as reducing public spending, investing in primary health, education and social protection, promoting the private sector by regulatory reform, reinforcing private banking, reforming the tax system and promoting the principles of ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ in government and corporate affairs (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004: 145). According to a report of World Bank published in 1992 with the title of “Governance and Development”, good governance model recommends “respect

for the law and human rights at all levels of government as well as a pluralistic institutional structure and a free press” (Leftwich, 1993: 610, quoted in Rhodes, 1997b, 49). In this respect, as Leftwich (1994) puts “good governance means a democratic capitalist regime presided over by a minimal state” (Leftwich, 1994: 370, quoted in Akdeniz, 2001: 1).

The adaptation of good governance to the field of public administration brings us to another type of governance: *new public management* which aims to introduce the premises of good governance into public organizations. New Public Management, which deems the market a model for the public sector, distinguishes between “steering” on the one hand, a term related to German sociology which implies ‘policy decisions’ in its use in the governance literature, and “rowing” on the other hand, which implies ‘service delivery’. On the grounds of a new term, *entrepreneurial government*, it is argued that the role of government should be more concerned with steering than rowing (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, quoted in Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004: 148).

When ‘good governance’ is introduced into the private sector, we encounter with the term, *corporate governance* which refers to the system of direction and control of business corporations (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004: 147).

The type of governance which belongs to the societal sphere is called *self-governance*. This approach attributes communities within civil society the ability to self-organize. The ability to self-organize implies the capacity of social formations to create the tools by which they maintain their own identity. Hence, actors in a society are highly autonomous from each other (Bayramoğlu, 2005: 136-8). Within this context, Kooiman (2003), one of the prominent names of this approach, has developed his theory on the grounds of the

concepts of *interaction* and *autonomy*. For him; governance is about the regulations of interactions. Face-to-face participatory interactions give way to self-governance, reciprocal interactions leads to co-governance whereas intervention paves the way for hierarchical governance (Kooiman, 2003: 23-4).

The societal organizational mode that is expressed by the “co-” prefix in the governance literature is called *co-governance* (Bayramoğlu, 2005: 148), in other words, “co-phenomena” or “co-modes of modern governance”. Co-governance focuses on organized forms of interactions: Various autonomous actors with their own identities and hidden agendas communicate, collaborate or co-operate without a central or dominating governing actor within the confines of an agreed-upon mission or strategy (Kooiman, 2003: 96-8).

The last type of governance, *network governance*, is based on similar premises with co-governance. This approach will be elaborated in detail in the third part of this chapter. Hence, it is not explained here.

2.2. The ‘Network’ Metaphor

Since 1990s, the term, *network*, has been more and more extensively pronounced in studies in the disciplines of political science and public administration. The policy making processes and structures have been frequently explained in the light of this term. Hence, in the governance literature, ‘network’ is used as a generic term. Networks are considered a different governing structure in addition to markets and hierarchies (Rhodes, 1997b: 47). As Kersbergen & Waarden note,

networks are explicitly conceptualized as plucentric forms of governance in contrast to multicentric [and related to this atomistic and anarchic] (market) and

unicentric or hierarchical forms (state, firm hierarchy) (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004: 148).

Networks, as an alternative mode of societal and political organization, challenge traditional societal organization and traditional mode of governing. To understand the political implications of networks, one should firstly understand the generic term of 'network' which has societal connotations in addition to political connotations. In the sociology discipline, there are important scholars like Castells and Kooiman. Castells (1996) argues that we live in a *network society* composed of automatic, not planned or structured networks due to technological innovations in the field of communication and informatics. In line, Kooiman (2003) considers governance not solely related to policy-making, but also as the regulation of all interactions at societal and political spheres.

The *network* metaphor has its roots in sociology, in the *autopoietic and self-referential systems theory*. Developed by the biologists Maturana and Varela in 1970s to explain some biological systems that can reproduce themselves, this theory has later been adapted to sociology by the prominent social systems theorist Luhmann. According to this theory, self-referential systems refer only to themselves while coping with disturbances from outside. They are self-referentially closed (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997: 54). Social systems of this kind are autonomous and have the capacity of self-formation, self-organization and self-reproduction. They can keep their authentic characteristics, or in other words, internally closed identities while responding to external factors (Üstüner, 2003: 54-5; Bayramoğlu, 2005: 140).

Networks are associated with several notions. Hay (1998: 39) presents the visual and spatial metaphors as well as the counter-metaphors depicting the network concept in a list which demonstrates the synonyms, antonyms and universes (the groups of which the

concepts form a subset) of the network concept. In this way, this list provides greater insights about the implications of the network concept:⁵

Table 1. Synonyms, antonyms and universes of the network concept

<i>Synonyms</i>	<i>Antonyms</i>	<i>Universe</i>
nexus	hierarchy	collective action
web	market	structure
linkage	dissensus	relationship
association	disorder	coordination
mutuality	atomism	order
coalition	rigidity	governance
community	struggle	organization
consensus	individualism	-

Source: Hay, 1998: 39.

As shown in the table, there are crucial similarities between the structure of networks and the internet. Internet can be perceived as the umbrella of a plenty of communication nodes. Each node can be perceived as a single network. Each network in internet has its own mission and characteristics due to their peculiar communication languages. These networks are connected to each other by an operating system. Hence, whereas each local network is self-referentially closed, there is also a fluidity of information and opinion amongst networks between users in a local network who are equal to each other as such in heterarchy in the network approach (Üstüner, 2003: 61-2). Furthermore, the internet system is resistant to external influences; like the network systems, it has the capacity to maintain its integrity in the face of external pressures. For instance, lack of connection between some nodes does not interrupt the whole internet system unless either the server

⁵ However, Hay underlines that he talks about the network discourse within the context of this list; different from the discourse, both metaphors expressed as synonyms and antonyms can exist together in actual networks in social practice (Hay, 1998: 39).

which connects one region to another or richest nodes in terms of linkage with others are blocked, since such a blockage leads to the disruption of the character of the system (Erzan, 2005: 18).

2.3. Network Governance

As a result of critical changes that affected the shape of government, the act of governing shifted from ‘governing by government’ to ‘governing by network’. Goldsmith & Eggers (2004: 10-24) defines four trends that emerged with the 1990s and brought about such a change in the public sector:

- *Third-party government*: the rise in the use of private firms and non-profit organizations to do government’s work of delivering services and fulfilling public policy goals.
- *Joined-up government*: the increasing tendency for multiple government agencies, sometimes even at multiple levels of government, to join together to provide integrated service.
- *The digital revolution*: the recent technological advances that reduce the costs of partnering.
- *Consumer demand*: increased citizen demands for more choices in public services.

As seen, the paradigm of network governance did not evolve in a vacuum, but in a specific historical-societal context. Therefore, the expansion of the so-called governance networks is not the outcome of a wholesale or ineluctable process but the outcome of the change of the wider (global) structural context itself (Cerny, 1997: 2 – parenpaper

original). As a result of this change, in our age, policies are more or less made through networks which encompass various supra-national, national and sub-national actors – public, semi-public or civil- who participate in a process of bargaining and negotiation. This alternative model of governing can be described as a “more complex, multilateral, bargaining relationship in which the various interest groups interact among themselves, as well as directly with government” (Peters, 1998: 28, quoted in Marsh, 1998). Hence, in our age, “government does not perform all the governing itself” (Kickert, Kljin and Koppenjan, 1997: 2).

The theoretical roots of the network approach to governance lie beneath the disciplines of policy science, organizational science and political science. With the evolution of the policy science discipline from ‘rational actor’ model to the conceptualization of *policy as a multi-actor process*, the idea that policy processes can be steered by or at least be analyzed from the perspective of a single actor was abolished. Constituting a break with the traditional approach, the process model drew the scholars’ attention to variety of actors with conflicting interests and problem definitions as well as the highly dynamic and unpredictable nature of the policy processes. With the introduction of the *interorganizational theory* to the organizational science discipline, the organizations began to be considered as not a unity, but as a structure consisting of subsystems which need to be coordinated. In addition, the concept of *resource dependency*, the core idea of interorganizational theory, had a considerable influence on the network approach to governance. Lastly, in the political science discipline, the evolution of the approaches to interest group representation from the literature on pluralism and corporatism to the

literature on subsystems/policy communities contributed substantively to the network approach to governance (Klijn, 1997: 15-29).

‘Governance networks’ can be defined as:

1. a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors;
2. who interact through negotiations;
3. which take place within a regulative, normative and cognitive framework;
4. that is self-regulating within limits set by external agencies; and
5. which contributes to the production of public purpose (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007a: 9).

Unpacking the elements in this definition reveals the features attributed to governance networks. First of all, governance networks, like self-producing and self-referential systems in the nature, are considered to be sensitive about protecting their *autonomous* structure throughout their interactions with government in the policy-making process (Üstüner, 2003: 56 – emphasis added). Different from the classical modes of governing in which the central authority is the prime actor and the struggle for access to contact with political authorities is of central importance, governance networks are considered to have a central role in the outcome of ultimate decisions/policies since they “resist government steering, develop their own policies and mould their environments” (Rhodes, 1997b: 52). Since governance networks are autonomous, they are also *self-organizing*: “networks are not accountable to the state: they are self-organizing” (Rhodes, 1997b: 53). Hence, they are *self-governing*. As Kooiman puts,

When corporate actors, both the governing and the governed, coalesce, governance becomes complicated. This happens when private corporate actors combine forces with fragmented political-administrative authorities to pursue their own interests. At such points actor constellations may arise in the form of networks, in which state and corporate actors participate, often with cross-alliances between them... Wherever corporate governing actors, representing different societal domains, are able to organize networks in which they combine

resources from those domains for common purposes, these networks will show strong self-governing tendencies... In these networks, the distinction between governing object and subject becomes practically impossible to define (Kooiman, 2003: 83).

In the network model, all actors are *interdependent* on each other -in terms of knowledge, innovative ideas, funding, formal authority etc. (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007b: 98) – in order to achieve their goals no matter how self-sufficient they are. It can be said that governance networks develop and exist because of the interdependency between actors which results from the fact that resources are distributed over various actors rather than accumulated in the hands of a single agency. According to the network governance approach, in societies as complex as ours, which is determined by the resources possessed by an actor (Klijn, 1997: 33), power is distributed rather than monopolized because:

No single actor, public or private, has all knowledge and information required to solve complex dynamic and diversified problems; no actor has sufficient overview to make the application of needed instruments effective; no single actor has sufficient action potential to dominate unilaterally in a particular governing model (Kooiman, 1993: 4, quoted in Rhodes, 1997b: 50).

Due to these factors, non-state actors are increasingly involved in policy-making processes, which leads to the fact that the boundaries between public, private and voluntary sectors become shifting and opaque (Rhodes, 1997b: 53). Hence, network governance approach acknowledges that government is explicitly dependent on its social environment in today's world. Government is no more able to steer society from a position above and detached from society; government itself is only a part of the social system (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997: 5) The position of the government in policy-making has changed from authoritative allocation 'from above' to the role of

'activator' (Eising & Kohler-Koch, 2000:5, quoted in Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004:

150). Kickert (1993) presents a good explanation of this so-called change:

The control capacity of governments is limited for a number of reasons: lack of legitimacy, complexity of policy processes, complexity and multitude of institutions concerned etc. *Government is only one of many actors that influence the course of events in a societal system.* Government does not have enough power to exert its will on other actors. Other social institutions are, to a great extent, autonomous. They are not controlled by any single superordinated actor, not even the government. They largely control themselves. Autonomy not only implies freedom, it also implies self-responsibility. Autonomous systems have a much larger degree of freedom of self-governance (Kickert, 1993: 275, quoted in Rhodes, 1997b: 52).

In the other side of the coin lies the fact that government can make advantage of such its incapacity to govern alone to bestow more legitimacy on the decisions and policies by integrating various actors into policy-making/decision-making processes. Governments may confront self-governing networks or may consider networks as an instrument to increase *output legitimacy* (success of policies; Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004: 158) and *input legitimacy* (political representation of different interests; Kersbergen Waarden, 2004: 158) since the consultation mechanism in networks help legitimize decisions. Hence, "governance networks are seen as important instruments for the aggregation of information, knowledge and assessments that can help qualifying political decisions" (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007a: 13). To conclude, as Briatte (2006) puts, "the creation of a more participatory style of governing does not mean that government is in reality less powerful" (Pierre & Peters, 2000:49, quoted in Briatte, 2006: 2).

Interdependencies between actors bring about the need of *interaction*, *concertation* and *cooperation* among actors in order to benefit from the opportunity to exchange resources and negotiate the policy goals and expected outcomes. The negotiations in governance

networks are carried out through bargaining between particularistic interests in the pursuit of advantage-maximization and through *deliberation*. Bargaining in networks must be embedded in a wider framework of deliberation, which facilitates learning and common understanding, so that a rough consensus on a certain proposal, albeit not a unanimous consensus, is reached within the network despite the existence of disagreements (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007a: 10).

The interactions in governance networks are rooted in ‘trust, reputation, reciprocity and mutual interdependence’ (Larson, 1992, quoted in Rhodes, 1997b: 52). As Sørensen & Torfing (2007d: 312) note, the network actors might have conflicting preferences and interests, might come from different cultures, and might use different linguistic and behavioural codes. However, they still consent to pursue a common goal and objective rather than seeking for merely self-interests. The network actors’ compliance with common decisions is ensured not through a stick such as legal sanctions, but through the generalized trust and political obligation (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007a: 12). The actors trust that the other actors will also play their part and feel an obligation to contribute to the realization of common goals and objectives (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 202). As Marsh (1998a) quotes from the thoughts of German scholars on networks, “networks, because of the frequent interactions involved and the consequent development of *shared values* and *trust*, develop a problem-solving capacity in which actors do not narrowly forward their self-interests” (Marsh, 1998a: 9). In this respect, the aim of the network is to reach a so-called ‘common good’ beyond the singular interests of network members. Governance networks contribute to the production of public purpose -which is an expression of visions, values, plans, policies and regulations that are valid for and

directed towards the general public- within a certain area. Network actors are engaged in political negotiations about how to identify and solve emerging policy problems (Sørensen & Torfing (2007a: 10-1). In this way, networks are assumed to contribute to deliberation in public life and to societal problem-solving. In this sense, network means more than the sum of its parts but it does not constitute a homogeneous and completely integrated whole (March & Olsen, 1995: 27, Scharpf, 1997: 47, quoted in Sørensen & Torfing, 2007a: 10). Whilst the network governance model conceives civil society, bureaucracy and market as structures of umbrella networks at a macro-scope, it does not conceive the network structures as a homogeneous unity like the classical governance model, but as a heterogeneous structure composed of various *sub-networks* (Üstüner, 2003: 50- emphasis added).

Interactions in governance networks are mainly of a *horizontal* nature, although minor hierarchical elements can also develop (Kooiman, 2003: 104). This fact is a result of another characteristic of governance networks: *heterearchy*. Heterearchy implies the absence of a central or dominating actor and any a priori given goals of one central actor. Hence, it replaces hierarchy that is found in traditional governing models. In the network model, the relationship between state and other actors takes place between equal parties; “government is only first among the equals” (Jessop, 1997: 574) or in other words “government is only one of many actors that influence the course of events in a societal system” (Kickert, 1993: 275, quoted in Rhodes, 1997b: 52). Nonetheless, one should not conceptualize the so-called ‘equal status of network actors’ in an absolute sense. The interdependency in networks is ‘asymmetric’; the network actors are unequal in terms of authority and resources. For instance the central government has more legal resources

than any other domestic actor (Rhodes, 1997b: 15). Nonetheless, no actor can determine another actor's strategy, to put it differently; no actor can use his/her power to exert hierarchical control over another actor without risking ruining the network. This can be explained by the interdependency among network actors and by the fact that participation and exit is voluntary in networks (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007a: 9-10).

Heterarchy means that network governance means much more than interactive and participatory policy-making. Interactive policy making as a governing style can be found in traditional governing models intensively and at as early a phase as possible in relative openness (Kooiman, 2003: 128). Interactive policy making is also a tenet of classical governance approaches. However, network governance is not synonymous with the governance approach albeit it is considered one of the types of governance. Though the role of the state is confined to 'steering' rather than 'rowing' in the classical governance approach, still it is the state that decides the direction of policies (policy objectives) as well as policy tools. The policy-making discretion of state authorities is neither delegated nor shared actually; only non-state actors are incorporated to 'steering' in the process of the exercise of this discretion; the state permits non-state actors to have a voice in the policy-making process. In addition, the functions of actors in the policy-making process are strictly pre-determined; hierarchy which still has a considerable weight in traditional governing model implies a strict division of functions. However, heterarchy does not take such a pre-determined functional division as a basis (Üstüner, 2003: 52). In a similar vein, Kooiman (1993) who conceptualizes governance as co-governance on the grounds of interaction and heterarchy in line with the network governance approach, acknowledges that governance differs from governing (or goal-directed interventions) in

the sense that governance is the result (or the total effects) of social-political-administrative interventions and interactions (Kooiman, 1993: 258; quoted in Rhodes, 1997b: 50). Governance through networks entails steering and guiding rather than coercion, commanding and controlling. There exists the act of management in the network governance model; but it is not a mono-directional authority relationship, rather it is a multi-dimensional relationship based on 'coordination of various interests and agendas', 'being steered while steering' and focuses on 'inputs required for the network rather than policy outputs'. Within this context, the aim of the act of management is not to command or control, but to solve singular problems as a facilitator and based on *adhocracy* (Üstüner, 2003: 58). Management activities are directed to a greater extent at improving and sustaining interaction between different actors involved and at uniting the goals and approaches of those actors. Furthermore, in contrast to the classical model, in the network governance model, the management role of governmental actors is no longer self-evident. In principle every actor involved can perform an issue-based management role (Klijn, 1997: 33). The steering agency emerges automatically as an outcome of spontaneous processes of interaction and cooperation (Üstüner, 2003: 52).

Therefore, the production of complex interaction and bargaining processes within networks is *unpredictable*, in the sense that it can not be pre-estimated. As Klijn (1997) notes,

Policy processes in networks are unpredictable and complex. Not only are many actors involved but actors' preferences change in the course of the interaction. As a result of a situation where there are many actors with different strategies and a wide variety of goals, actors cannot know in advance which outcomes are likely to occur and which targets they can meet in the process. They have to learn this partly during the process itself (Klijn, 1997: 32).

By the same token, Kooiman underlines that “unintended as well as intended consequences are inherent in governing interactions due to tensions within and between roles of actors and situational factors” (Kooiman, 2003: 14).

Associated with these tenets explained above, namely heterarchy, horizontality, unpredictability, another crucial concept in the network governance approach is *informality*. As Kenis and Schneider (1991) put, “an important advantage of the network concept is that it helps us understand not only formal institutional arrangements but also highly complex *informal relationships* in the policy process” (Kenis and Schneider, 1991: 27 – emphasis added, quoted in Blom-Hansen, 1997: 672). In line, governance “embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes *informal, non-governmental mechanisms*” which do not “derive from legal, formally prescribed responsibilities” (Rosenau, 1992: 4 – emphasis added) and which “function effectively though they are not endowed with formal authority” (Rosenau, 1992: 5). The informalisation of policy formation also implies the opening up a greater space for social and political forces outside the state to become involved in new modes of governance (Overbeek, 2002: 7). In conclusion, with the increase of governance practices, formal authority is being supplemented by an increasing reliance on informal authority, e.g. public-private coordination (Pierre, 2000: 3).

Despite informality, processes of institutionalization occur in networks more or less, owing to the fact that interactions in networks are frequently repeated; shared perceptions, relational patterns and interaction rules are institutionalized. *Network characteristics* come about in this way (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997: 6). Networks exist to routinize relationships (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992: 261; quoted in Rhodes,

1997b: 12-3); in other words they produce relational patterns. Networks do not correspond to a so-called 'state of nature' without any rule or regulation. Patterned linkages involved in networks are characterized by mutuality and this implies certain orderliness -or, at worst, regulated disorder- (Hay, 1998: 39). In this sense, there exist network rules that govern the bargaining process within networks (Rhodes, 1997b: 24). Sørensen & Torfing (2007a: 10) delineate these network rules as an *institutionalized framework* within which the negotiated interactions between the network actors proceed.

They state that:

The institutionalized framework is amalgam of contingently articulated ideas, conceptions and rules. As such it has a *regulative* aspect since it provides rules, roles and procedures; a *normative* aspect since it conveys norms, values and standards; a *cognitive* element since it generates codes, concepts and specialized knowledge; and an *imaginary* aspect since it produces identities, ideologies and common hopes (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007a: 10- emphasis added).

By the same token, Kickert (1997), who prefers to use the concept of 'policy networks', conceives policy networks as "(more or less) stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or policy programmes" (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997: 6). He states that policy networks form a certain institutionalized context in which policy processes take place (Klijn, 1997: 14). Similarly, according to Blom-Hansen, policy networks may be understood as 'institutions' (Blom-Hansen, 1997: 690) or 'action arenas' (Ostrom, 1986: 18, quoted in Blom-Hansen, 1997: 690), i.e. as rules, mainly informal, constraining the actions of the participating actors. Rules define the way the game is played according to the institutionalist perspective (North, 1990: 4-5, quoted in Blom-Hansen, 1997: 677). A contract forms as an outcome of the game; Lake, who adopts the perspective of 'new

institutionalism', claims that "governance is synonymous with making [both formal and informal] contracts" (Lake, 1999: 33, quoted in Bayramoğlu, 2005: 126). Actors make cost-benefit calculation and bargain in the pursuit of distributional advantages. Contracts serve to ensure the conclusions of bargaining (Lake, 1999: 36, quoted in Bayramoğlu, 2005: 127). Overall, it should be kept in mind that the institutionalized frameworks of networks, or the network rules, are not stable since they are embedded in a particular political and institutional environment which itself is not stable, but dynamic.

Researchers can distinguish between American, British and European literatures within the literature on governance networks.

The American literature is particularly concerned with 'sub-governments' and 'iron triangles' which were explained above. The *sub-governments* literature is developed by Ripley & Franklin (1987) on the grounds of the literature on 'sub-systems' which emerged in the 1960s to refer to the patterns of interactions or clusters of actors involved in the decision-making process in a certain policy area in the political system of United States (Klijn, 1997: 25). A critique of pluralism, the sub-government literature emphasized the role of a limited number of sectoral-oriented privileged groups with close relations with government. Thus, in the sub-government system, access to policy-making is restricted to certain groups and government makes policies through exclusion of other interests and compromise between important actors. Hence, policy-making process is integrated and institutionalized (Klijn, 1997: 28). A more rigid derivative of the idea of sub-governments is the term, 'iron triangle'. This concept stresses the triangular nature of the relationships involved in the policy-making structure in the United States, composed of three powerful actors enjoying an almost symbiotic interaction - the administrative

agency, the congressional committee and the producer-oriented interest group (Marsh, 1998a: 4).

The studies of British scholars constitute a distinct literature, though the British literature is a part of the European literature, owing to the contribution of the British-origin studies to theorizing governance networks. The British literature prefers to use the term, policy networks. The first names in the British literature who studied policy networks, e.g. Heclo & Wildavsky (1974) and Richardson & Jordan (1979), drew on the American sub-government approach. According to Heclo & Wildavsky (1974), policy is made within a community of personal relationships by a limited number of actors who interact often and share common values (Rhodes, 1997b: 35). Similarly, from Richardson & Jordan's point of view (1979), "policy making takes place within a variety of policy networks characterized by close relations between particular interests and different sections of government" (Marsh, 1998a: 6).

Rhodes (1981), one of the most prominent names of the British literature, differs from these scholars since he draws on the European literature on interorganizational relations. For this reason, as Marsh (1998a) states, he emphasizes the structural relationship between political institutions as the crucial element in a network rather than the interpersonal relations between individuals within those networks. In addition, he argues that networks exist at the sectoral rather than sub-sectoral level (Marsh, 1998a: 7).

The European literature, too, prefers the term, policy networks. In the European literature, German and Dutch schools can be identified. Both schools share significant similarities with the British school. Like the British school, the European school believes that modern society is characterized by functional differentiation; thus governance

networks have a significant influence on policy outcomes. However, there is a fundamental difference between the European and British literatures. The German and Dutch schools attribute a much broader significance to policy networks. For the British school, policy networks are a model of interest group representation whereas they are utterly a new form of governance for the German Max Planck school and Dutch scholars such as Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan (Marsh, 1998a: 7-8).

The German school constitutes the most radical network view in some ways (Kooiman, 2003: 105). This school underlines the diminishing steering capacity of governments which paves the way from hierarchical control to network governance. German school even claims that the distinction between state and civil society has been dissolved, which necessitates a new form of societal and political governance (Marsh, 1998a: 8). In line, this school suggests that “network thinking will have considerable impact on future social theory building” (Kenis & Schneider, 1991: 27, quoted in Blom-Hansen, 1997: 672).

The Dutch school rejects both the rational central rule model and the “policy as a multi-actor process” model since it claims that central role of government is considered as the point of departure in both models. In the face of these models, the Dutch school advocates decentralization and the increasing role of local actors (Bayramoğlu, 2005: 149, quoted in Kooiman, 2003: 105). Moreover, this school draws attention to the institutional aspect of networks like the German school; however it primarily emphasizes the critical role of strategy on network management (Marsh, 1998a: 10).

One of the important contributions of the British school is found in the classification of governance networks. The literature on governance networks essentially adheres to the model of Rhodes, one of the leading names of the British school, in classifying

governance networks (Blom-Hansen, 1997: 671). Rhodes (1981, 1986) developed his typology to analyze British central-local government relations. Recognizing the weaknesses of this initial typology (1997: 36-9), later, together with another scholar, David Marsh, he revised this typology and built a schema known as Marsh & Rhodes (1992) typology.

Marsh & Rhodes (1992) treat policy networks as a generic term explaining types of relationships between interest groups and government. In this sense, ‘policy network’ is a meso-level concept (Rhodes, 1997b: 43). As Marsh (1998) puts,

Networks can vary along a continuum according to the closeness of the relationships within them. *Policy communities* are at one end of the continuum and involve close relationships; *issue networks* are at the other end and involve loose relationships (Marsh, 1998a: 14).

The Marsh & Rhodes typology can be depicted in a table as follows:

Table 2. Types of policy networks: characteristics of policy communities and issue networks.

<i>DIMENSION</i>	Policy Community	Issue Network
<i>Membership:</i>		
Number of Participants	Very limited number, some groups consciously excluded	Large.
Types of Interest	Economic and/or professional interests dominate.	Encompasses range of affected interests.
<i>Integration:</i>		
Frequency of Interaction	Frequent, high-quality, interaction of all groups on all matters related to policy issue.	Contacts fluctuate in frequency and intensity.
Continuity	Membership, values and outcomes persistent over	Access fluctuates significantly.

Consensus	time. All participants share basic values and accept the legitimacy of the outcome.	A measure of agreement exists, but conflict is ever present.
<i>Resources:</i> Distribution of Resources Within Network	All participants have resources; basic relationship is an exchange relationship.	Some participants may have resources, but they are limited and basic relationship is consultative.
Distribution of Resources Within Participating Organizations	Hierarchical; leaders can deliver members.	Varied and variable distribution and capacity to regulate members.
<i>Power:</i>	There is a balance of power among members. Although one group may dominate, it must be a positive-sum game if community is to persist.	Unequal powers, reflecting unequal resources and unequal access. It is a zero-sum game.

Source: Rhodes, 1997b: 44, adapted from Marsh & Rhodes, 1992: 251.

For the moment, it should be noted that this schema depicts ideal types. In reality, no governance network is likely to conform completely either to the type of an ‘issue network’ or a ‘policy community’. A network might correspond to a policy community from the aspect of certain characteristics, and to an issue network from the aspect of some other characteristics. In this respect, Rhodes (1997b, 45) states that a network can be located at some point along the continuum which begins with ‘policy communities’ and ends with ‘issue networks’ rather than fitting to either ends of the continuum.

2.3.1 Comparison of Governance Networks and Other Approaches to Interest

Group Representation

Governance networks analysis has its theoretical basis in earlier traditions of studies on interest group politics. It builds on and grows out of the literature on ‘sub-governments’, ‘pluralism’ and ‘corporatism’ (Jordan, 1990; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Smith, 1993, quoted in Blom-Hansen: 1997, 670). According to Rhodes (1997b: 11), who adopts the policy networks term, “policy networks is a meso-level concept, focusing on patterns of interest group intermediation”, that is relations between interest groups and government. Thus, it can be acknowledged that governance networks are one of the models of interest group representation as well.

The American literature on interest group politics served as a foundation for the body of research on networks (Peters, 1998: 21-2). The studies on ‘sub-governments’ and ‘iron triangles’ are substantively distinguishable in the American literature. Since these two concepts were elaborated in the previous sub-chapter on different geographical approaches to governance networks, the sub-governments literature is not mentioned here again.

The pluralist approach holds two basic tenets that contrast with the sub-government approach: the potential independence of government from the pressures of particular interests; and the existence of actual, or potential, countervailing power alliances which prevent the dominance of economic interests (Marsh, 1998a: 5). Power is dispersed widely among various actors (Klijn, 1997: 28). Rhodes (1997b) expresses the crucial elements of pluralism as below:

There are many groups, competing with one another for influence over policy in which the leadership is responsive to its membership. Here the ‘government’ –not

the 'state'- has a largely passive role, merely authoritatively allocating scarce resources, with its decisions reflecting the balance within the interest groups within society at a given time (Rhodes, 1997b: 30).

The *corporatist* approach can be considered as the antonym of pluralism. It differs from pluralism in several respects: First, it stresses that, similar to the sub-government approach, interest group intermediation is limited to a few groups. The interest groups mainly represent capital or labour, since corporatism emphasizes cooperation between classes rather than conflict, in contrast to Marxism and capitalism. Second, the interest groups are hierarchically structured; group leaders can deliver their membership. Groups also constitute non-competitive, functionally differentiated categories. Third, the links among the corporations and government are close. This unity results from a basic consensus on the functioning of the political and economic system. In the corporatist model, the 'state', not the 'government' has an active role; the state recognizes or licenses certain interest groups and grants upon them a representational monopoly in exchange for observing certain control on them (Rhodes, 1997b: 30-1).

The network approach is similar to pluralism in some respects:

Pluralism as well as network models assume a number of groups all attempting to influence government [in other words, lobbying] in a relatively unstructured manner... The presumed openness of both systems of influence means that no group can expect to win on every decision (Peters, 1998: 23).

On the other hand, there is a critical difference between pluralist and network approaches from the aspect of *interest aggregation*, a term developed by Almond and Powell (1965):

In the pluralist model of interest group interactions, there is little or no aggregation within the interest group universe. All groups attempt to place their views before government directly and uncompromised and to find some official organization that will be receptive to their demands. On the other hand, groups in

a network may be expected to engage in a certain amount of mutual bargaining and aggregation of views (Peters, 1998: 28).

The participation style in a pluralist system resembles the market structure. Pluralism is characterized by 'free association', 'free admission' and 'free exit' (Klijn, 1997: 28). Actors organize on the basis of interest groups. Participation to a pressure group is open to stake-holders. However, as mentioned earlier, in network governance, actors do not narrowly forward their self-interests; the aim of the network is to reach a so-called 'common good'.

There is another crucial difference between the network approach and the pluralist approach in terms of the problem of 'concentration of power'. In pluralism, there is a competition for influence over policy, with government itself setting the rules of the game. Hence, power is concentrated on the hands of the centre, which is detached from the rest of the society. The interest groups compete with each other in a quasi free-market environment and try to affect some of the members of the government through lobbying. Therefore, 'hierarchy' exists among the parties in the policy-making process. Policy decisions are the result of group struggles and dominant coalitions. Government is the central actor who ratifies decisions (Klijn, 1997: 28). In contrast, the network approach assumes that each party is equal and unprivileged in terms of distribution of power. The aim is not to have an influence on the centre in the policy-making process but to enable decisions and policies to emerge spontaneously as a result of the natural interactions among networks. (Üstüner, 2003: 50-1). Therefore, public policy making in networks is about co-operation and consensus-building (Marsh, 1998a: 9).

The last difference between the network approach and the pluralist approach which can be mentioned concerns the problematic of ‘flexibility’ or, in other words, ‘permanence’. In the pluralist approach, the pressure groups are organized on the basis of flexibility or, in other words, temporality. With the accomplishment of the goal in question, the pressure group is disintegrated. The constant reproduction of the disintegration and formation of pressure groups on the grounds of singular demands, to put in a different way, shifting coalitions on different decisions, is an inherent component of the pluralist systems. However, ‘permanence’ is an intrinsic trait of networks. It is not the self-interests or goals of the components of a network that determine the formation and reproduction of networks. Networks, which are inherently self-referential (in terms of a closed identity), organize and reproduce themselves spontaneously. The reason behind the existence of networks is not seek for influence on policies; rather policies emerge as a result of the existence of networks, that is interactions amongst networks (Üstüner, 2003: 51).

From these aspects, it is assumed that “the network’s approach is an alternative to both the pluralist and the corporatist models” (Rhodes, 1997b: 32). However, it should be noted that this argument is exposed to some critiques. For instance, Peters (1998: 24) asserts that no criteria exist to differentiate networks and communities from other aggregations of groups and organizations. In addition, for Peters (1998), the differentiation of networks from alternative structures of interest groups is totally descriptive and does not provide satisfying guidance in comparative case studies of networks (Peters, 1998: 24).

2.3.2. Problematic/Controversial Aspects of Governance Networks

2.3.2.1. Structure versus Agency

The term, 'structure', has two connotations: Firstly, within the frame of the network itself, it implies the structure of the network. Secondly, beyond the frame of the network itself, it implies the broader macro context. The structural dimension of networks is a controversial matter. The studies of Marsh & Rhodes (1992) on policy networks as well as Rhodes' separate studies on the issue can be deemed emblematic for the *structuralist* approach, for they concentrate upon network form through structure-centred analyses (Hay, 1998: 40).

In terms of the network structure, Marsh & Rhodes (1992) see networks as structures of resource-dependency and emphasize the structural links between the interests involved in the network (Marsh, 1998a: 11). Similarly, Rhodes (1997b) emphasizes the structural relationship between political institutions as the crucial element in a policy network rather than the interpersonal relations between individuals within those institutions. Rhodes (1997b: 11) considers networks "as political structures which both constrain and facilitate policy actors and policy outcomes".

Focusing upon the structure, these scholars pay attention to the network characteristics. They claim that networks affect policy outcomes from the aspects of existence, membership and characteristics of a network. The distribution and type of resources within a network demonstrate the relative power of network members. The different patterns of resource-dependence constitute one of the causes of the differences between policy networks as well. The differences between networks affect policy outcomes. For example, the existence of a tight policy network, which can be called as a 'policy

community' on the basis of Marsh & Rhodes typology described earlier, constrains the policy agenda and tends to result in policy continuity. In this sense, policy communities are much more likely to affect policy outcomes (Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998: 53).

On the other hand, policy outcomes also affect policy networks; there is a reciprocal causal link between policy outcomes and policy networks. In the view of Marsh (1998) policy outcomes may affect networks in at least three ways: First, they may affect the shape of the policy network directly; a particular policy outcome may lead to a change in the membership of the network or to the balance of resources within it through disadvantaging certain actors within a network while advantaging others. Second, policy outcomes may have an effect on the structural position of certain interests in civil society. The effect of a policy outcome on the broader social structure might weaken the position of particular interests in relation to a given network through changing the balance of power within society. Finally, policy outcomes may affect agents owing to the 'strategic learning', that is learning by experience, of agents in the network (Marsh: 1998, 197). As Hay (1998) states, since actors in the network are knowledgeable and reflexive, they routinely monitor the consequences of their action assessing the impact of previous strategies, and their success or failure in securing prior objectives. If certain actions within a network fail to produce an outcome beneficial to an agent within the network, or more broadly to the network as a whole, or those agents perceive that action as a failure, then that agent is likely to pursue other strategies and actions. Hence, strategic learning enhances the actors' awareness of structures and the constraints or opportunities structures impose on actors, helping, by this way, subsequent strategies become more successful (Hay, 1998: 43).

The 'agency-centred' analyses constitute a second approach to networks apart from the structuralists. This approach concentrates upon interpersonal and/or group interaction within networks (Hay, 1998: 40). Dowding (1994) is one of the prominent representatives of this approach. He claims that policy networks are patterns of interaction and resource exchange. Thus, he privileges *network interaction*, the pattern of resource exchange between agents within the network, over network structure (Marsh, 1998b: 194). Dowding underlines the 'bargaining' process between the actors within a policy network, because, he suggests that 'bargaining' is the factor which affects policy outcomes. Hence, in his view,

...the driving force of explanation, the independent variables, are not network characteristics *per se* but rather characteristics of components within the networks. These components explain both the nature of the network *and* the nature of the policy process (Dowding: 1995: 137 – emphasis original).

In terms of the second implication of structure, the broader context, again two approaches can be identified: According to the Marsh & Rhodes (1992) approach, network change primarily results from factors exogenous to the network since these factors undermine the certainties and values within networks although the network's capacity to minimize the effect of a certain change influences the extent and speed of that change (Marsh, 1998a: 11). For them, the main dynamic behind the network change, and thus, policy change lies in change in broader economic and political situation and changes in knowledge (Marsh, 1998a: 12). Marsh (1998b: 196) adds two other factors that affect network change: the role of other policy networks, which are an important feature of the context within which particular networks operate and thus, affect the rise and decline of networks; and the

influence of political authorities, which is one of the most important external constraints on networks.

In contrast, Dowding (1995) develops a different approach in terms of the relationship between networks and broader context. He supports the integration of 'rational choice theory' to the policy networks discipline; however he has not yet provided a fully-developed agenda for the accomplishment of his suggestion. He believes that the internal dynamics of networks have a more important impact on networks rather than the broader social, political and economic context. As such, network change is associated with changes in the behaviour of strategically calculating agents within the network. It is the bargaining between actors which goes on within policy networks which affects policy outcomes. In line, change in policy outcomes must be explained in terms of 'endogenous change' in the pattern of resource dependencies within the network. (Marsh, 1998a: 12)

A dialectical approach should be developed in order to advance further beyond these distinctions. For instance, the policy networks approach, which is a meso-level concept, needs to be integrated with micro-level analysis, which deals with "individual actions and the decisions of actors within the networks" (Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998: 54), to transgress the dualism between structure and agency, namely the distinction between network structure on the one hand and interpersonal relations within actors in a network on the other hand. Such integration is crucial, because albeit conditioned by structure, it is agents in a network who interpret and mediate the constraints structures impose upon them, who attempt to minimize the constraints and maximize the advantages and who, more broadly, aim to renegotiate and change the decision-making scheme. Policy networks are constructed and reconstructed through the actions of agents (Daugbjerg &

Marsh, 1998: 70). Agents are bearers of certain positions in policy networks; their strategic decisions, or as Hay (1998: 43) points out, their strategic actions have direct effects upon the structured contexts within which these actions and future strategy is embedded by partially transforming the context in question. As Marsh (1998b: 195) expresses, “it is agents who choose policy options, bargain and conflict and break up networks”. So the strategic context constantly evolves through the consequences of –both intended and unintended- strategic actions.

The relationships in policy networks are both structural and interpersonal. The interpersonal aspect of these relationships is explained above. This explanation should be integrated with the structural aspect to understand, with the words of Hay (1998: 42), “the dialectical interplay of structure and agency in real contexts of social interaction”. Marsh (1998b: 195) presents a good explanation of the structural aspect of networks:

The relationships within the network are structural because they define the roles which actors play within networks; prescribe the issues that are discussed and how they are dealt with; have distinct sets of rules; and contain organizational imperatives, so that at the very least, there is a pressure to maintain the network (Marsh, 1998b: 195).

Therefore, it can be said that policy networks, as structures, shape the preferences of actors within the networks (Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998: 70).

Furthermore, the meso-level framework of the governance networks approach should be integrated with the macro-level analysis to elaborate the dialectical relationship between networks and the broader context within which they are located.

Governance networks are not given; they are embedded in a certain social-political structure; hence they embody other social, economic and political relations. As Marsh (1998b) elaborates, networks “reflect exogenous structures; for example class and gender

structures. So, the structure of networks often reflects the broader pattern of structured inequality within society” (Marsh, 1998b: 195).

Therefore, Daugbjerg & Marsh (1998: 55) advocates that state theory must be integrated with the policy networks approach because it is the state theory that explains the patterns of inclusion and exclusion within which networks are embedded. State theory deals with the relationship between the rulers and the ruled; between state and civil society; and “policy networks [encompassing elements of civil society] are crucial political structures through which we are governed or ruled” (Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998: 55). The parliamentary support of certain interest groups as well as the organizational structure of state, e.g. the internal division of authority within state actors and institutions has an influence on the formation and success of policy networks. The structuring of states affects the position of state actors in the face of civil society actors. Likewise, the sympathy of a parliamentary group for a certain societal segment may make particular networks advantageous and contribute to their persistence. Nevertheless, policy networks should not be conceived as the natural allies of political parties or some state actors. ‘Autonomy from the state’ is a major feature of networks. Correspondingly “as a result of their claims to democratic legitimacy, political parties generally enjoy some autonomy from interests groups” (Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998: 64).

Another factor can be added to the factors resulting from the broader context that have an impact upon networks: “the role of *public opinion* in shaping the context within which networks operate” (Marsh, 1998b: 188- emphasis added). As an issue begins to cover a large part of the agenda of the public debate, meanwhile, new networks can be formed around it or that issue begins to enter into the agenda of some existing networks.

Overall, it should be underlined that the exogenous factors resulting from the broader context do not have an effect on the network independent of the structure of, and interactions within the network: “All such exogenous change is mediated through the understanding of agents and interpreted in the context of the structures, rules/norms and interpersonal relationships within the network” (Marsh, 1998b: 197).

2.3.2.2. Network Governance versus Hierarchy

Though markets and hierarchies are conceived as the antonyms of networks, for Hay (1998), markets, hierarchies, networks, each can be seen as different modes of coordination which do not exist in isolation, but are necessarily articulated. Hay distinguishes between the ‘network discourse’ and ‘actually existing networks’. Networks are contradicted with markets and hierarchies in the network discourse; however, in actually existing networks, both hierarchical and market characteristics can be observed. Hay argues that in advanced capitalist formations, every network displays hierarchical and/or market traits (Hay, 1998: 39). In line with this argument, for instance, Scharpf (1994) contends that “governance networks are operating in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ as the formation, functioning and development of governance networks are shaped and reshaped by the strategic interventions of government officials at different levels” (Scharpf, 1994, Sørensen & Torfing, 2007d: 299).

Within this context, as Aygül (2006: 151) underlines, the power relations and hidden hierarchies within networks should not be ignored. Since the actors in the networks do not have equal powers, some are posited at the centre whereas others are posited at the

periphery of network. As Marsh (1998b: 195) notes, “the structure of networks often reflects the broader pattern of structured inequality within society”.

In this respect, it can be said that networks might not hold *positive* traits like the synonyms enlisted above in Table 1. To Hay (1998), networks can be listed in an entirely opposite discursive code which conceives them as exclusionary cliques closed to outside that selfishly pursue self-interests by obtaining access to power-holders through illicit, sub-terranean channels (Hay, 1998: 40-1). In such a perception, networks, rather than being democratic and open, serve the undermining of democracy, for they by-pass democratic channels of voice and representation. Hence, depending on whose interests are being represented in networks, networks are conceived within one of the two opposite ends of a continuum, either in an entirely positive sense or in an entirely negative sense. For the ones whose interest the network agenda serves, ‘network’ metaphor has positive repercussions; for the ones whose interest the network agenda threatens, it has negative repercussions. However, one should think of networks within a framework which transcends such a dualism. In this way, it is possible to recognize the numerous points that can be identified in the continuum beyond the utterly positive end or the utterly negative end.

2.3.2.3. Network Governance and Democracy

Whilst the rise of governance networks is seen as a chance for the enhancement of participation in politics, hence a contribution to a democratic life; governance networks are construed as a danger to democracy from other aspects. Such a critique to governance

networks are rooted in the perspective of liberal democratic model of parliamentary democracy, which argues that governance networks undermine the sovereign position of elected politicians and the autonomy of civil society from the (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 197). As seen from the perspective of liberal democratic theory, governance networks challenge the fundamental institutions of liberal democracy because they undermine the crucial borderlines

1. between territorially defined political communities;
2. between the legislative and executive powers;
3. and between the political system and civil society (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 217).

According to the liberal theory of democracy, democracy is assumed to be embedded in territoriality as the defining principle for a political community. Within this context, it is thought that the existence of transnational governance networks undermine the borders between sovereign nation states and the notion that a 'demos' must be founded on the nation state (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 215). As such, governance networks challenge the privileged status of the nation state concerning decision-making and point of identification for citizenry (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 217). Hence they constitute a threat to the authority of the state in a society through diffusing the authority of the state to decision-making within the society (Üstüner, 2008: 78).

As regards the second side effect of governance networks on democracy, liberal theory argues that "networks between politicians and administrators undermine the separation of legislative and executive powers" (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 217). In addition, the delegation of decision-making competence to governance networks undermines electoral democracy because it "weakens the ability of elected representatives to control political

processes and outcomes” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 214-5). In this way, governance networks are conceived as a threat to the principle of ‘equal representation’. In line with the negative conceptualization of network metaphor as closed cliques, it is assumed that governance networks create channels of influence with restrictive and unevenly distributed access which the elected politicians can not control, thereby increasing the possibilities of an asymmetrical distribution of power between citizens (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 214). In this way, governance networks are considered to be inclined to favour elite participation and further empower those who are already strong (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 216).

Another result of the undermining of the relations between elected representatives and their constituency by governance networks is with regard to the question of accountability. The notion of accountability implies that “decision-makers can be called upon by those whom they represent to explain and assume responsibility for their decisions” (Esmark, 2007: 276). Hence, it is a norm of primary concern for the idea of *proper representation* (Esmark, 2007: 295), hence a question of democracy. Problems regarding accountability may occur in network governance, because in networks “it is less easily to locate *loci* of power, to identify where decisions are being taken and who is responsible” (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004: 158) in comparison to the traditional model of governing based on separation of powers and the democratic accountability of representatives whose mandate is derived from the general elections system. Since authority and responsibility is diffused within a network; it is not possible to address a certain agency for accountability; “it is difficult to identify who is responsible for policy outcomes” (March & Olsen, 1995: 158, quoted in Esmark, 2007: 274). Governance

networks turn actors who can not be called to explain and assume responsibility into de facto decision-makers (Esmark, 2007: 277).

Liberal democratic theory supposes a sharp borderline between state and society for the sake of democracy (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007c: 235). In this vein, the theory of liberal democracy argues that governance networks lead to the extension of the private sphere to the public sphere by carrying particularistic interests within the private sphere to the public sphere. Governance networks can be general-purpose, but often they are issue-specific (Dryzek, 2007: 262). In this vein, it is argued that governance networks “tend to bring the particularistic interests to the fore and facilitate the construction of strong particularistic alliances between actors within a certain policy field” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 217). Thereby, networks, with their narrow scopes and narrow objectives, obstruct the development of democratic citizens instead of promoting it (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007c: 235). For these reasons, governance networks are regarded as a threat to the notion of ‘common good’ (Hansen, 2007: 248). Indeed, governance itself is criticized on this ground. It is asserted that the allocation of power from political authority to civil society, in other words, to stake-holders, as anticipated by governance implies the delivering of policy-making processes from the public sphere in which citizens of equal status participate to the private sphere which is composed of the private interests of stake-holders. Such a change enables particularistic private interests represent themselves as ‘common good’ or ‘public interest’ (Ataay, 2006: 138-9).

However, in today’s world, understanding of democracy has transgressed the scope of the nation-state as a territorial domain within which the idea of democracy is realized. In this respect, the possibility that network governance undermines the nation-state structure

through transnationalization has no relation to jeopardizing democracy. Correspondingly, post-liberal theories of democracy challenge the idea that democracy is confined to decision-making within a given polity, namely within the framework of a well-defined homogenous nation-state (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007c: 236). Besides, democracy is no longer restricted to representative democracy, in other words, to the traditional mechanisms of representation and voice. Governance networks might function as mechanisms of representation and participation in public life together with traditional mechanisms such as elections as long as they are not understood within the framework of the negative conceptualization of the network metaphor as closed cliques selfishly pursuing particular self-interests. Correspondingly, post-liberal theories of democracy, which call for new ways of institutionalizing democracy that is radically different from the institutions of representative democracy (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 218), believe that networks might provide a mechanism “to increase the number of citizens who participate actively in processes of political decision-making” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007c: 245). Hereby, governance networks contribute to representation since they “establish a vertical link between top-down representative democracy and bottom-up self-governing democracy” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 228). They also “construct a balance of power between the people and the political elite(s)” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 228) by serving “as a means to recruit and nurture political sub-elites capable of functioning as a countervailing power vis-à-vis the established political elites, and as a means to promote mobility between political elites and ordinary citizens” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 221). Governance networks serve as the medium for the enhancement of political empowerment and engagement, not only of sub-elites, but of all actors, through the

development of political capacities and political identities (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 221). In addition, governance networks “produce a more just outcome of policy processes through the inclusion of all affected actors”. (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 228).

Furthermore, the argument that governance networks undermine accountability is valid only from the liberal perspective of representative government. In contrast, according to the post-liberal thought of representation, affected stakeholders –rather than citizens- are the legitimate accountability holders, the ones in a position to hold their representatives accountable (Esmark, 2007: 280). In this sense, “the network is not a unified collective with a common set of stakeholders, but an array of network members, each with their own set of stakeholders to whom they are accountable” (Esmark, 2007: 284). Overall, within the framework of post-liberal thought, “network governance and accountability are not necessarily adverse” (Esmark, 2007: 275). Esmark (2007) contends that, as long as networks are in compliance with procedures of publicity, which is to say procedures of openness, transparency and access to information (Esmark, 2007: 284-5), and as long as each network actor is adequately responsive to the set of stakeholders it represents (Esmark, 2007: 293), networks can even contribute to democratic accountability.

Post-liberal theories do not take “a sharp demarcation between state and society as their starting point” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007c: 236) like liberal theories of democracy. In the contemporary understanding of democracy, the notions of public sphere and common good are understood in a substantively different way from the traditional liberal theory of democracy. The contemporary democratic theory of the public sphere has “long since abandoned the notion of a single common national public sphere in favour of several multi-layered and loosely-coupled public spheres” (Habermas, 1996, quoted in Esmark,

2007: 284). Correspondingly, the contemporary participatory theory of democracy has reformulated the notion of a substantial, pre-political ‘common good’ which represent the singular right solution on policy issues, or in other words, the ‘general interest’ (Hansen, 2007: 249-51). According to the contemporary participatory theory of democracy,

The common good is not a matter of the existence of *one* just result, but rather democracy itself: allowing all parties and interests to have a say in the democratic struggles and accepting all democratic positions as legitimate opponents or ‘adversaries’ in ongoing ‘agonistic’ struggles and exchanges (Connolly, 1995; Mouffe, 2000a, b; Mouffe, 2000; quoted in Hansen, 2007: 250 – emphasis in original).

In this context, the notion of common good “remains empty and contested” (Mouffe, 2000b, quoted in Hansen, 2007: 250) due to its political and contingent character (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 226).

Given such a plural conceptualization of common good, governance networks can make valuable contributions to democracy. Within a plural arena of deliberation, governance networks can help transform antagonistic relations into agonistic ones by creating the basis for a negotiated agreement between highly different actors so that they no longer perceive each other as enemies but as legitimate opponents or adversaries (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 227). All in all, governance networks widen the scope of political contestation within a relatively stable, but permanently contested institutional and discursive framework (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 228). Handled especially within the framework of ‘talk-centric democracy’ rather than vote-centric democracy, contributions of governance networks to democracy become more self-evident. Governance networks, owing to their polycentric character, rest on relatively *egalitarian communication*, that is much more symmetrical than hierarchies, across different actors (Dryzek, 2007: 266). As

such, discursive theories of democracy see networks as a site for discursive contestation where multiple discourses (with their own conceptualization of policy problems, political values and feasible solutions) meet, though there are networks characterized by a single discourse as well (Dryzek, 2007: 271). In this way, networks enhance possibilities for inclusion of and deliberation between different points of view; “multiple discourses mean multiple points of entry for different sorts of actors” (Dryzek, 2007: 272). However, it should be pointed out that the existence of multiple discourses in a network is not sufficient for the contribution of that network to democracy; what is more determinant in contributing to democracy is whether engagement across different discourses within a network proceeds according to principles of respect, reciprocity and equality to raise and challenge points (Dryzek, 2007: 273).

From these aspects, it can be thought that governance networks have the capacity to function as public spheres in themselves (Esmark, 2007: 284). In this way, governance networks can make considerable contributions to democracy. However, the contribution of networks to public life, and hence democracy is still contingent on another factor. As Hansen (2007) acknowledges,

A democratic ethos demands that the network participants are willing to argue their case with reference to a broader perspective than that of their own particular interests. When evaluating the democratic quality of governance networks, one must then look for forms of argumentation that establish links between particular points of view and the wider interests of the society in which the network is a part. Such interests could include that of justice and defending the weak, or at least the concrete aims of the network as something that goes beyond the spontaneous interests of the different members (Hansen, 2007: 251).

In other words, Hansen suggests that networks should “take broader societal aims into consideration or reflect on its own (possible) ‘externalities’ and the like” (Hansen, 2007:

251 - emphasis in original). This insight about the linking of a network with such higher aims is crucial to my concern, since it verifies that particularistic interests do not need to clash with public good inherently as long as they are flexible to some extent so that they do not insist on remaining strictly particularistic.

On these grounds, as Sørensen & Torfing (2007c) suggests, while it is evident that governance networks represent a threat to representative democracy, they do not necessarily threaten democracy as such (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007c: 233). All in all, governance networks are neither a democratic panacea, nor an outright enemy of democracy (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 198). They can even make a positive contribution to democracy from some aspects whereas they can bring about some problems for democracy from some other aspects.

To conclude, it can be said that governance networks contribute to democracy not automatically, but potentially. The realization of networks' potential contribution to democracy while avoiding the problems is contingent upon "anchorage of governance networks in representative democracy" through meta-governance exercised by elected politicians (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005: 228-9). In this sense, as post-liberal theories underline,

...governance networks can not stand alone. They should rather be seen as a supplement to the traditional institutions of representative democracy and thus as making way for the development of a political system that combines territorially and functionally organized democratic institutions (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007c: 245).

In other words, networks and representative democracy are not two alternative models of democracy, but rather complementary mechanisms for a participatory democratic life. This insight also refutes the assumption that anti-statism is a prerequisite for participation

and democracy. Rather it verifies that the state should inevitably undertake a role for the sake of a robust democracy. Indeed, according to me, one of the advantages of the approach of network governance is that it attributes specific importance to the phenomenon of democracy while it refrains from anti-statism at the same time.

2.4. Concluding Remarks

Though network governance is considered one of the types of governance, to my concern, network governance can not be evaluated as identical to governance. In the governance model, the category of ‘citizenship’ is replaced with the category of ‘stakeholders’ and decision-making is conceptualized as a relationship not between government and citizens, but amongst stake-holders of which government is also a component.⁶

However, as illustrated in the previous part, the network governance approach shows parallelism with the contemporary theories of democracy. It is grounded on the concept of stakeholders, but it is more open to the notion of participation, because it does not put forward a strict division of citizens on the basis of stakeholder groups. Participation in networks is defined on the basis of the concept of ‘inclusion of the affected’ (Hansen 2007). However, there are not strict accession criteria to networks: “Whose conditions are significantly affected remains an open question, and with it, who should therefore be included in the decision-making processes” (Hansen, 2007: 256). Hence, the

⁶ Furthermore, the governance model subsumes the category of classes under the umbrella of the blanket term, stake-holders, which are located in a triangular model composed of ‘state’, ‘civil society’ and ‘market. Another aspect of this conceptualization is, as Güler (2005b) claims, the privileged position of capitalist class due to its multiple-representation in the model; it can engage in the two components of the model, firstly as a representative of the ‘civil society’ component with its professional organizations and then, as the agency of the ‘market’ component. Therefore, the model assumed by governance does not take the balance of power within classes in a society into account; which proves that governance is a regression from the former welfare state/social state model (Güler, 2005b: 158-9). In this respect, the governance model might be participatory; but it is obviously anti-democratic in the sense that it does not take a more or less equal or, in other words, balanced representation of participants into account (Güler, 2005a: 42).

determination of the affected is based on flexibility: Affectedness is subjectively-defined; it is more important for an actor to believe he/she is affected. To my concern, especially the linking of particularistic interests in networks with broader societal aims as mentioned above enable one to participate in networks on the grounds of being a citizen, namely a member of the public whom those societal aims concern. Moreover, the concept of 'affectedness' "opens the possibility of moving beyond the boundaries of the nation-states that (so far) constitute citizenship" (Hansen, 2007: 261, parenpaper original). It paves the way for bringing actors together at not only national, but also at transnational levels. For these reasons, it can be said that networks hold a broader "actual opportunity to be included" (Hansen, 2007: 256).

However, it should be underlined that the network governance approach is not utterly, say, *innocent*. In addition to implications regarding democracy and participation, the network governance approach is used within the context of neo-liberal governance approach in the literature as well (Üstüner, 2008: 68-71). For instance, Rhodes (1996) uses the term of 'policy networks' to refer to the neo-liberal 'new public management' practices, the inclusion of the private and the voluntary sectors not only in policy-making processes, but also in service production and delivery: "...Networks are now a pervasive feature of service delivery in Britain" (Rhodes, 1996: 652). This is in compliance with the neo-liberal governance approach directed at the retreat of the state from the public sphere on behalf of the private sector.

Another point that should be underlined is that governance networks do not influence a society regardless of the broader context of that society, i.e. the democratic quality of the judicial and political system of the country, the economic and other power relations

within a society and the extent of the internationalization of a democratic ethos of the network actors, in other words, the self-perception of democracy by network actors. For this reason, I assume that, rather than anticipating democratic benefits from governance networks inherently, it is more plausible to think that, as Üstüner (Üstüner, 2008: 79) expresses, governance networks are more prone to provide a more equal and broader participation under *convenient* contexts.

To my concern, such a potential tendency of governance networks to democracy stems from the intrinsic qualities of the network metaphor rather than that of the governance model, given that I mentioned my critiques to the governance model above. In this sense, I think the network metaphor is not identical and confined to governance networks. Owing to the tenets of the network metaphor, as Üstüner (2008: 64) puts, a network approach can be applied under different contexts. In other words, the network approach has an analytical power as a management metaphor at the micro-level beyond the macro-level of governance networks (Üstüner, 2008: 66). One can also benefit from the network approach as a management model within an organization at the micro-level. The network approach can provide broad opportunities for participation in the decision-making and management mechanisms of an organization through sub-networks within the organization (Üstüner, 2008: 66). On the other hand, when used in service delivery, governance networks might serve neo-liberal reforms in the public sector as well. Overall, it can be put that the outcomes of networks depend on the context under which they are used.

CHAPTER III

NETWORKING AND GERMAN POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS: THE CASE OF THE KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION

3.1. Overview of German Political Foundations

The system of political foundations—a system in which each foundation is affiliated with a certain national political party— is peculiar to Germany with the possible exception of Austria, The Netherlands and to a lesser extent France, where small and -in comparison to Germany- under-funded party foundations exist (Thunert, 2000: 193). This system is rooted in the German political structure and political context. It has emerged in the wake of the Second World War within an atmosphere affected by the memory of the Nazi period. Within this atmosphere, the idea that one of the reasons for the failure of the first German democracy after the First World War (the Weimar Republic) was the lack of a democratic political culture and the small number of committed German democrats was highly common (Mair, 2000: 131). Within this context, the objective of educating German population in favour of a democratic life through the methods of social learning and civic education came into the fore so that the masses would not back any anti-democratic rule any more, thereby the foundations of democracy would be strengthened. In this respect, the system of political foundations was originally established to provide the German people with civic education and to assist political parties in the fulfilment of their functions (Mair, 2000: 129). It was also assumed that foundations (stiftungen) would help in the establishment of a common ground on belief in democracy at all cost

amongst political parties with different ideological positions. Since in Germany, special importance is attributed to political parties in the flourishing of a democratic political culture. Political parties are attributed a determinative role in the formation process of political will. They are considered as intermediary institutions reinforcing communication between citizens and the state (Okuyuz, 2007: 221).⁷ Political parties and political foundations thereby are actively engaged in processes of bargaining that is a common feature of German political structure especially in fields of social policy as well as in debates on division of competencies between the Länder and the central government (Okuyuz, 2007: 210).

Each political foundation is affiliated with, or to put differently, close to one of the political parties represented in the German parliament. Social Democratic Party (SPD) affiliated Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) is the oldest of the political foundations. It was originally founded in 1925, but banned by the Nazis in 1933. It was rebuilt in the wake of the end of the Second World War in 1947 (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 33). Classical partners of the FES are trade unions, women's and farmers' associations and the media. FES stresses issues of social justice and decentralization. Its main target groups are the more underprivileged groups (Mair, 2000: 134). It primarily deals with providing advisory help for trade-unions (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 37-8).

In 1964, The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) affiliated Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) was founded with the transformation of a Christian Democrat political academy which was established in 1955. As for in 1967, Bavarian sister-party of the CDU, the Christian Social Union (CSU) affiliated Hanns Seidel Stiftung (HSS) was founded

⁷ For this reason, German political system is occasionally named as *political party democracy* (Okuyuz, 2007: 221).

(Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 33). The KAS and the HSS are both committed to federal democratic values. They prefer partnerships with civil society organizations as well as business associations and promote issues of social market economy and federalism (Mair, 2000: 134). The HSS specifically focuses on training public administrators (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 37).

In 1958, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) affiliated Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (FNS) was set up. The FNS is committed to liberal values. It mainly cooperates with business associations, but also with law circles, legal resource centres and human rights groups. It concentrates on constitutional questions and the rule of law and promotes the label of 'social market economy' (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 33).

As regards the post-Cold War era, two new foundations were established. The first of them is the small-scale Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung which was founded in 1990. It is close to the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). The other is the Green Party affiliated Heinrich Böll Stiftung (HBS). It was founded in 1997 by the merging of the three foundations that were founded in the late 1980s. Committed to emancipatory and ecological values, it emphasizes women's emancipation, ecological issues and human rights (Mair, 2000: 134).

Although each foundation works in the light of some peculiar themes accordant with the ideological orientation of the foundation, promotion of democracy constitutes the common objective between different political foundations affiliated with different ideologies (Interview with Bettina Luise Rürup, 2007). In this sense, it can be said that political foundations do not compete against each other. They act as a supplementary to the German state's international cooperation. Working in the international arena in

cooperation with partner organizations or civil society organizations that hold ideological stances similar to theirs, German foundations back different, but equal interests in the international sphere (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007a).

As regards the domestic work of political foundations, the main financial source is the Federal Ministry of the Interior Affairs. For the realization of their original aims, providing German people with civic education and assisting political parties in the fulfilment of their functions, foundations receive global, that is all-purpose subsidies from the ministry as long as they are officially recognized by one of the parties in the parliament which gained representation in the parliament in at least two consecutive elections (Mair, 2000: 129).

As to the international work of political foundations, the main financial source is the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, to say in German Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (BMZ) (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 34). The German historic experience -the rebuilding of a democratic Germany by the help of the victors of the Second World War who made massive investments in civic education- has led to the idea that a democratic culture can be exported and imported (Mair, 2000: 131). Within this context, it was decided that a system in which non-governmental organizations are financially promoted so that they can take place in development aid should be established which led to the foundation of BMZ in 1961 (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 35). Yet, as Pinto-Duschinsky (1991) puts, “it is a broader German practice to pay non-governmental organizations –churches, as well as parties and cultural bodies to carry out governmental functions in the domestic and foreign fields”

(Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 34). Apart from political foundations who receive the largest part of the overseas development budget, the main Catholic and Protestant Church relief agencies, and some other German non-governmental bodies also benefit from the German government's international development assistance.⁸

The second source of fund for the international work of foundations is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide foundations a certain amount of grant for the maintenance of offices in the capitals of important German partner organizations or at the headquarters of important international organizations as well as for supporting the foundations' scholarship programmes abroad. The purpose of these grants is to foster international dialogue and cultural exchange. In addition, the Ministry for Education allocates a certain amount of grant for supporting the foundations' scholarship programmes in Germany (Mair, 2000: 131).

The amount of money that is allocated for a foundation is determined by the size of the parliamentary group it is affiliated with. The parties negotiate a quota system in which the proportions are determined by the long-term representation of the parties in the parliament, namely over four terms (Mair, 2000: 129). The ratio of this quota system is a third each for the FES and the KAS and about ten per cent for the FNS, HSS and HBS respectively (Mair, 2000: 130). According to the figures of the year 2005, the FES receives 35%; the KAS receives 31.5%, while the FNS, the HSS, and the HBS receive 11.17% each. The RLS receives a baseline global subsidy of 4% of the total estimate in the federal budget (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007).

⁸ In 1998, the ministry's funding of non-governmental organizations had amounted to 9.3. per cent of total spending on development aid, 4.2 per cent of which the four political foundations –KAS, FES, FNS and HSS- received (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 35). For detailed information, see Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 35-6.

In this way, political foundations are dependent upon the federal government in terms of funding.⁹ Since a huge proportion of their funds come from public remittances, they are accountable to the German public. Reviews which scrutinize whether the funds delivered to foundations are used in compliance with legal regulations as well as economically and efficiently are carried out by funding ministries, the Federal Court of Audit, the Land courts of audit, the Internal Revenue Office, and chartered accountants (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007c).

The official mandate of the political foundations has been defined by the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development as “providing support to partners who have a structurally important contribution to make to the realization of social justice, the promotion of broad political participation and to the strengthening of national political independence in accordance with the aims laid down in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights” (Mair, 2000: 131). Within this context, there are some common values shared by all political foundations regardless of their ideological distinctions. These values constitute the fundamental political consensus in Germany: peaceful conflict resolution, democratic rule, rule of law, horizontal and vertical division of powers, protection of human rights, pluralistic society, social market economy and integration into transnational bodies. Within this broad set of values, each foundation sets its own focal points in line with the basic political views of the affiliated party (Mair, 2000: 133-4). They give partisan support to specific sections of the social and political realm whose existence and functioning are –in their opinion- necessary ingredients for the viability of a pluralistic democracy (Mair, 2000: 140). However, there are some more commonalities

⁹ Even so, they receive private contributions and some payments from state (*Länder* in German) governments (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 35).

among all foundations apart from promotion of democracy. All foundations consider the promotion of regional cooperation and regional integration as one of their substantial objectives. Besides, according to a survey carried out by Mair in 1997 among FES, FNS, HBS and KAS on their international democracy assistance works, all foundations concentrate their work on non-governmental organizations (Mair, 2000: 134). This survey also reveals the regional concentrations of the foundations included. As a part of the survey, the FES mentioned sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and South-east Asia as regional priorities, the KAS Latin America, the FNS East Europe and South-east Asia, the HBS East Europe and sub-Saharan Africa (Mair, 2000: 135). Pinto-Duschinsky's quantitative research on the foreign expenditures of foundations on a continental basis between the years 1983-1988 (1991: 37) verifies these statements as well. (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 37).

German political foundations are among the oldest, most experienced and biggest actors in international democracy assistance (Mair, 2000: 128). For instance, they have had a key role in transition to democracy in Portugal and Spain in the 1970s and Chile in the late 1980s (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 33). They have responded very quickly to the collapse of the Socialist Bloc in the end of the 1980s as well. For instance, in 10 November 1989, just the day after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the KAS has opened an office in Warsaw, Poland. German foundations also helped the formerly socialist countries in transforming their political structures in the transition period in the 1990s. The KAS "has been an indispensable consultant in countries such as Lithuania and Croatia in creating modern administrative structures" (Thunert, 2000: 204).

In addition, the contribution of political foundations to transnational communication between political actors at the European Union level and at the candidate country level has played a crucial role in the candidate country's integration with European Union in, for instance, the Polish case (Dakowska, 2002).

The international work of foundations is officially characterized as 'socio-political education', and 'support for social structures' (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 34). With the first category, socio-political education, foundations aim to motivate citizens to concern themselves with political matters and provide a platform for the discussion of political issues that is accessible to all citizens. In the German political culture, it is believed that freedom can be asserted responsibly only by persons educated along lines open to democratic deliberation in the public sphere, thus political education is deemed a necessary counterpart of political freedom (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007d). The latter category, support for social structures, implies a seemingly non-political support for self-help groups like rural initiatives or fishing cooperatives (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 39). Foundations conduct various types of activities in which they work together with trade unions, media, human rights groups and other civil society organizations, academic circles as well as public authorities. They act as transnational mediators by organizing visits to Germany by distinguished foreigners such as parliamentarians, journalists, political authorities or civil society leaders. They also carry out 'think-tank activities' which are found within their in-house research and policy units, consulting divisions, within in-house political academies, and also on the level of the programme director, the chief of staff as well as in some international offices (Thunert, 2000: 194). They sponsor and organize researches, discussions and publications on political and social topics.

Furthermore, they organize party-to-party contacts or, maybe networks between parties at EU level and at the candidate country level. They try to incorporate political parties of candidate countries to the model of transnational contact between EU parties. They build networks between the affiliated parties of the foundations and the parties of the candidate countries as well as among different national parties within political party federations at the EU level. Based on the Polish case, Dakowska (2002: 286) argues that these networks function as a channel of transmitting European norms and values as well as the political culture to the political actors of candidate countries. By this way, Dakowska (2002) believes that German foundations are deemed a transnational actor in the Europeanization of political parties as well as the democraticization of the political culture in the candidate countries. The network-building practices of German political foundations also function as intermediaries and mediators in contacts between political actors of candidate countries and European institutions (Dakowska, 2002: 288). By facilitating access to the European political sphere, foundations also promote the idea of EU as an arena of interest representation (Dakowska, 2002: 286). Hence, they contribute to the publicity and legitimacy of EU in candidate countries.

As Thunert (2000: 195) states, *networking* is perhaps the most important component of the international work of political foundations. Political foundations help building and fostering transnational networks. They have great influence within the party federations at the international and European level. Each of the foundations backs a separate party international. For instance, The FES has been a major force in the Socialist International; the KAS in the Christian Democrat International thanks to their financial support for the activities of the Internationals and for the membership of national parties to the

Internationals (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 42-3). Such a support is provided for the party federations at the European level. For instance, the KAS cooperates with the European People's Party, a federation of the so-called conservative democrat parties at the European level. It helps building direct and informal contacts between national parties of the conservative democrat ideology and the European People's Party (Dakowska, 2002: 282).

An important feature of the mode of operation of German political foundations is the long-term presence of field representatives. These German field representatives usually stay for a period of three to five years in a country before they return to the headquarters or are deployed to other offices. The resident representatives head a local staff up to ten employees. The resident representative is the cornerstone of a foundation's international engagement. The profile of these resident representatives has changed considerably throughout the 1990s. Instead of active party members, the majority of the newly deployed resident representatives are young technocrats usually with an academic background in economics or social sciences. They enjoy a high degree of autonomy in their daily work though they are monitored by a counterpart in the headquarters who have to be kept informed and with whom they have to reach agreement on all important decisions (Mair, 2000: 136-7).

In their activities, political foundations benefit from not only a single method. Whilst they heavily relied on cultivating intensive and long-lasting partnerships with a few core partners who were supported in every possible way during the Cold-War era, nowadays, they are increasingly resorting to cooperating with a greater variety of partners on an *ad-*

hoc basis in micro-projects which are embedded in comprehensive country programmes and, increasingly into transnational regional programmes (Mair, 2000: 138-9).

Political foundations are too sophisticated to be positioned with one single step. It is impossible for them to be completely free from the attempts of governments to use them as foreign policy instruments. Their work is subject to considerable governmental control. They do not receive block grants for their foreign projects; but on a programme- and project-basis. Each project must be approved by the BMZ as well as the Foreign Ministry (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 46). Nonetheless, as Thunert (2000) maintains, they can not be reckoned agents of governmental foreign policy even though they are not totally independent. I agree with this view. To me, foundations should be considered as *actors* rather than agents. Otherwise, one makes the fault of reductionism. By the same token, Thunert thinks that political foundations are clearly rooted in the world of non-state actors as well as in NGO network. Mair (2000) holds a similar view; he suggests that the political foundations' role in international politics is not that of a homogenous foreign policy instrument of the German government (Mair, 2000: 133). He illustrates that the foundations did not always or utterly function in line with the framework of German foreign policy. Depending on their ideological positions, the foundations took very different stances towards several political events. For instance, whereas the Christian Democrat KAS tended to support the conservative governments in Central America, the social democrat FES sympathized with Nicaragua's Sandinistas and other revolutionary forces in the region in the 1980s (Mair, 2000: 132).

Furthermore, it can not be argued that political foundations make party-politics. They are legally distinct from the German political parties and "they can not pass money to a party

or to a union” (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991: 34). In its judgement in July 14, 1986, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that political foundations are indeed institutions which are legally and materially independent who address themselves to their tasks autonomously. The Court also judged that foundations need to maintain a proper distance between themselves and their respective political parties in their practical work (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007d). Indeed, they are autonomous in selecting their executive officers and staffing their committees (Heinrich Böll Foundaton, 20081). As Thunert (2000) assumes, political foundations “... are neither willing external affairs instruments of the party leadership nor are they extended arms of the parties’ in-house research departments” despite their close personal and ideological links to their affiliated party (Thunert, 2000: 195). Conflicts might occur between senior party figures and foundation figures. The representatives of foundations can hold a much more radically value-oriented stance regarding issues such as human rights violations of some countries in comparison to the pragmatic and cautious stances of political party leaders especially if the party in question is in power.¹⁰

3.1.1. Overview of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation

The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung was established in 1964, having evolved from a political academy called ‘Society for Christian Democratic Education Work’ that was established in 1955. The KAS is affiliated to the Christian Democrat Party (CDU). The Stiftung bears the name of Konrad Adenauer, the first Federal Chancellor of Germany after the end of the Second World War, and one of the leading figures of the Christian Democrats ever (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007a).

¹⁰ For a good example, see Thunert, 2000: 195.

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung operates two education centres and 16 education institutes in Germany, including a political academy in Berlin which provides a forum for discourse about issues of future relevance in politics, the economy, the church, society, and science. Through these agencies, the KAS develops scientific background information and current analyses, breaking the ground for political action. The KAS offers knowledge and expertise, develops studies and discussion papers, and organises workshops and expert round-tables. The Archive for Christian Democratic Policy within the body of the KAS explores and provides access to the history of Christian Democracy in Germany and Europe. From all these aspects, the KAS functions as a think-tank and consulting agency (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007a).

The KAS addresses its key concerns as consolidating democracy, promoting the unification of Europe, intensifying transatlantic relations, and development-policy cooperation. In the light of these concerns it employs political education to promote peace, freedom, and justice (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007a). Within the context of political/civic education, it aims to empower citizens to promote liberal democracy and to assume an active role in politics and society. Towards this end, it provides background knowledge in politics and economics and serves as a forum for current debates with a value-oriented perspective through activities such as conferences, seminars and workshops (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007b).

Promotion of international dialogue is another concern of the KAS. Within the context of international cooperation, the KAS works in the field of 'democracy assistance' pursuing the aims of fostering democracy and the rule of law, implementing social market economy and promoting human rights. With its worldwide networks to the political and

social elites and with its long-term partner structures, it participates in shaping policy in developing and emerging countries. Through annual reports, the international offices of the KAS evaluate the overall political situation of the country in question. To quote from the Stiftung's official website, "the KAS offices worldwide provide a constant flow of political background information from the respective regions and thus create momentum for political discussion and decision-making processes in Germany; by training and educating young professionals, the KAS promotes the developing process in social groups and political parties". One of the specific concerns of the KAS in international cooperation is fostering decentralisation processes by preparing or supporting projects for public institutions in order to enhance their technical and administrative performance. Another objective of the KAS regarding international cooperation is to deepen transatlantic partnership as well as dialogue with the European Institutions and the European People's Party, the federation of conservative democrat parties at the European level. Furthermore, the KAS has been carrying out EU-funded projects and actively participating in European programmes in the fields of democracy promotion, governance and development cooperation since 1990 (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007d).

The KAS also awards scholarships for outstanding students and graduates who endorse Christian Democratic values not only from Germany, but also from the developing countries, especially Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, the KAS supports young artists and young journalists through prizes. Also since 2002, the Social Market Economy Prize of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung has been awarded to personages of outstanding merit in preserving and developing social market economy (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2008e).

The KAS has 67 offices abroad on four continents which look after more than 200 projects in more than 120 countries (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2008c). The KAS has held offices in Turkey -a head office in Ankara, and a small one in İstanbul- since 1983 (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Tanıtım Broşürü, 2007).

In its activities, the KAS office in Turkey works in many fields. Given the existence of a large Muslim community in Germany, the debates in Turkey on Islam is of great concern for Germany. Hence, a programme called 'Dialogue with Islam' has been initiated by the Centre Office of the KAS. The office of the KAS in Turkey participates actively in this programme (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2008a). It has contributed to the education of Turkish imams to serve in Germany as public officials on German society (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007b). The Turkey Office of the KAS also strives to promote inter-cultural dialog, especially between German and Turkish societies in order to overcome the prejudices within the Turkish and German societies against each other. Another major field of interest of the Turkey Office of the KAS is the promotion of the practices of decentralization as well as local government which the KAS deems the democratic decision-making unit at the lowest level. The activities of the KAS in this field are grounded on the principle of subsidiarity which is one of the basic tenets of the KAS.¹¹

The KAS also fully supports Turkey's reform and democratization process within the

¹¹ Subsidiarity is defined as "a principle in social organization which suggests that functions which subordinate or local organizations perform effectively belong more properly to them than to a dominant central organization" (<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/subsidiarity>). According to this principle, "matters ought to be handled by the smallest (or, the lowest) competent authority" (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subsidiarity>). Subsidiarity is inherently in contradiction with centralization. It supposes that "a central authority should have a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more immediate or local level" (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subsidiarity>). It is also a part of the legal body of the European Union. The Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the European Community is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens (http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/subsidiarity_en.htm).

context of EU negotiations. It tries to provide accurate and thorough information for the Turkish public about EU, EU integration process and European values. It works to promote relations among Europe, Germany and Turkey (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2008a).

Towards these ends, the KAS brings the prominent figures of the Turkish public and their German counterparts together such as in symposiums, conferences, visits of delegations and of groups from Germany to Turkey and vice versa for the construction of a dialogue and exchange of experiences and opinions. (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2008a). In its work, the KAS permanently cooperates with certain partner organizations. Among the partners in Turkey, there are three 'institutional partners', Turkish Community of Journalists (Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti), Turkish Democracy Foundation (Türk Demokrasi Vakfı) and Turkish Foundation for Small and Medium Business (Türkiye Orta Ölçekli Sanayici ve Serbest Meslek Mensupları ve Yöneticileri Vakfı). Institutional partnership means that the partnership is based on a contract between the KAS and the partner organization and that the KAS contributes to the material infrastructure of the partner organization for instance via contributions to the rent of the room, technical equipment, computers etc (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007). The KAS works together with Turkish Community of Journalists to promote local media, particularly in the field of the enhancement of the vocational quality of local journalists and of the relations between the Turkish and German media. The KAS has been awarding a national prize for local journalism in cooperation with Turkish Community of Journalists since 2002. Together with the Turkish Democracy Foundation, the KAS works in the promotion of democracy and rule of law and the empowerment of civil society through political

education facilities. Together with the Turkish Foundation for Small and Medium Business and the Permanent Secretariat of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Daimi Sekreteryası), the KAS tries to enhance medium and small enterprises to which it attributes a critical role in the development of social market economy and dialogue on economic policies (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2008d).

3.2. The Investigation of the Networking Activities of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation within the Context of the Network Governance Approach

Networking can be considered the most important component of the international work of German political foundations (Thunert, 2000: 195). Hence, the foundations are clearly rooted in the world of non-state actors as well as in NGO networks. In this section, I investigate the networking activities of the KAS by using several tools of the network approach to governance.

The KAS identifies its target group as a category it calls *multiplicators*:

Our target group can be described in general as so-called multiplicators. People who have a position, certain influence, you can call it decision makers, but not only decision makers. If we want to attain a certain goal, we have to look with whom we can achieve this or who has certain influence or competence to work in this direction. Therefore I can not say that is bureaucrats or politicians, scientists or journalists. It is the entire group altogether (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007).

Thus, for the KAS, access to decision-makers comes first: "...So we have access to decision makers and this is very important in our work" (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007). For instance, the KAS has a very good, established dialogue with the currently ruling Justice and Development Party (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007). The

conservative democrat ideology of the JDP constitutes a crucial advantage for the KAS since it is committed to the same ideology. Utilizing this ideological commonality, the KAS plays an important role in the *internationalization* of the politicians from the JDP: “We also frequently invite or accompany parliamentarians from Germany or from the European parliament to TR or vice versa” (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007). For instance, the KAS organizes “visit programmes” in order to bring parliamentarians and politicians from Germany and Turkey together. For example, within the context of a visit programme, five politicians from the JDP made a visit to Berlin for a workshop organized with parliamentarians from the parliament group of CDU/CSU on the subjects of migrant integration and women as well as the role of women in society and politics (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007b). Besides, the government officials and parliamentarians from the JDP attend many activities of the KAS. For instance, the Turkish Minister of Labour and Social Security made the keynote speech of the conference, “Social Security Reforms in Germany and Turkey”, organized by the KAS in 2005 (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2005). The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs attended a dialogue meeting between the Turkish and German journalists organized by the KAS and the Turkish Association of Journalists in 2005 (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2005). In 2007, the Chief of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Turkish Parliament attended as a speaker in an activity of the KAS on the German term-presidency of the EU (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007b). In 2006, the Turkish Prime Minister came together with the Chairman of the KAS in his visit to Berlin (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2006). I assume that the anticipated gain of the JDP from such close relations with the KAS is access to the CDU. The singular JDP politicians and parliamentarians aspire to establish

international contacts through, for instance, the visit programmes of the KAS. However, above all, the JDP aims to establish a robust dialogue with the CDU via the KAS. Moreover, the JDP wants to establish strong links to the European conservative democrat parties. It is currently an observer member of the European People's Party, the party federation of centre-right parties at the European level (European People's Party, 2008a) and wants to become a full member (Interview with Dirk Tröndle, 2006). Given that one of the vice-presidents (European People's Party, 2008b) and one of the Deputy Secretary-Generals of the European People's Party (European People's Party, 2008c) is from the CDU, the importance of a robust dialogue with the CDU for the JDP can be grasped better. As Dakowska (2002: 282) states, one of the international activities of the KAS is to build direct and informal contacts between national parties of the conservative democrat ideology and the European People's Party. The KAS supports the relations between the EPP and the JDP. Moreover, one should take into account the fact that the JDP is the ruling party in Turkey since 2002. Thereby, a robust dialogue with the CDU, the ruling party of Germany is crucial in terms of relations between Turkey and Germany as well as acquiring the support of Germany, the term-president of the EU, for Turkey's membership process to the EU. The KAS has an important role in establishing the links between the JDP and the CDU as mentioned above. Overall, it can be acknowledged that the KAS helps building and fostering international networks.

It can be observed that the contacts established between the politicians and government officials from the JDP and the CDU by the KAS accompany formal contacts, contacts established by formal procedures. I think this can be accepted as an evidence of the *informalisation* of politics (Overbeek, 2002: 7), the rising weight of informal networks of

interaction in politics. These informal relationships do not rely on formal institutional arrangements, albeit function effectively; for they are backed by strong ideational factors, i.e. ideological commonality, shared values and goals among actors. As seen from this example, in addition to formal events organized by formal authorities, such informal networks of interaction constructed by the intermediary role of the KAS contribute to the socialization of Turkish political elites with European and especially German political elites. For all these reasons, it can be argued that governance in Turkey “embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms” (Rosenau, 1992: 4) which open up a greater space for the involvement of non-state actors like the KAS.

Such an opportunity of access to decision-makers enables the KAS to participate in policy-making processes in certain policy fields. Within this context, I would like to assess the relations between the KAS, the Union of Turkish Municipalities and the Ministry of Interior of the Turkish Republic in the policy field of local administration within the frame of two conferences organized jointly by the KAS and the UTM and with the participation of government officials from the Ministry of Interior of Turkish Republic in 2005 and 2006. I do not argue that this relationship constitutes an example of governance networks as elaborated in the governance network approach. However, I think some tools in the network governance approach might be useful in understanding the relationship between the KAS, the UTM and the Ministry.

The KAS collaborates with the Union of Turkish Municipalities (Türkiye Belediyeler Birliği), a professional organization operating under the status of association, in order to promote local government, decentralization and subsidiarity (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung,

2005). The KAS and the UTM have been in close cooperation since 1983 (Spengler, 2006: 3). Together they organize regularly vocational and on-the-job education programmes for local authorities and the local personnel within the municipalities, not only in the metropolitan cities, but also in the Anatolian cities (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2005; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2006; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007b). The joint-activities of the KAS and the UTM are primarily directed at administrative reform process in Turkey with special reference to local government reform. The KAS supports this process since the reforms involve the delegation of a part of the central government's authority to the sub-governmental level, from governorships to special provincial administrations (Şengül, 2003: 2). In this sense, this reform is directed at decentralization, one of the tenets of the KAS. Hence, it serves the interests of the UTM as well, which aims a more decentralized administrative system in Turkey. In this sense, the ideological orientation of the KAS and the professional interests of the UTM coincide within the context of this reform. Thus, the two organizations collaborate to support this reform process. For instance, they have organized some conferences in this field together. One is the international conference on local government reforms organized in 2005 in order to inform Turkish mayors on the recent legal reforms and to provide a forum for the comparison of the administrative system models in Turkey, Germany and France with the participation of representatives of municipality unions from Turkey, France and Germany (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2005). Another one is the "European Union and Local Governments" conference that was organized in 2006. The ex-Turkish Minister of Interior, the ex-representative of the Turkey Office of the KAS and the vice-president of the UTM made the keynote speeches of this conference together (Konrad Adenauer

Stiftung, 2006). The recent one is the conference of “Municipality Unions within the Context of the Examples of France and Germany” that was organized in 2007. Similarly, an undersecretary from the Turkish Ministry of Interior, the representative of the Turkey Office of the KAS and the chairman of the UTM made the keynote speeches of this conference together (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007b).

As seen from these conferences, the KAS plays a significant role in the *Europenization* of policy debates in Turkey. The KAS tries to bring together the Turkish stakeholders within a policy area with their European, especially German, counterparts for the sake of exchange of views and experiences. For instance, the representatives of the municipality unions from Turkey, France and Germany participated in the conference of “Municipality Unions within the Context of the Examples of France and Germany” in 2007 and in the international conference on local government reforms in 2005 (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2005; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007). In this sense, the KAS adds a European dimension, i.e. the perspectives of European actors, to policy negotiations and political debates in Turkey. Thus, it links policy debates in Turkey to those in Europe which provide a channel between the networking practices in Turkey and in Europe.

Within the context of this example of the relationship between the KAS, the UTM and the ministry, another thing that can be said is that in Turkey too, policies are made with the participation of various actors in a “multi-actor process” as Kljin (1997: 29) calls it. Hence, policy processes can not be analyzed from the perspective of a single actor, that is the government, in Turkey as well. In addition governance in Turkey “embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms” (Rosenau, 1992: 4). The relationship between the KAS, the UTM and the Ministry can be

identified as 'informal networks of interaction' because it is not based on formal institutional arrangements and it involves both non-state actors, the KAS and the UTM, and state actors, the Ministry. This informal relationship does not "derive from legal, formally prescribed responsibilities" (Rosenau, 1992: 4) but it is rather backed by ideational factors such as the long-lasting partnership and trust between the UTM and the KAS, the ideological linkage between the KAS and the JDP. This relationship shows that in Turkey, too, policy is not a mono-directional process, formulated from the beginning to the end at the parliament and the cabinet and then imposed on the society and the implementers. Complex informal relationships are engaged in policy processes in Turkey as well as formal mechanisms. There exists a place for at least, the attempts of different groups to influence policy outcomes by expressing and advocating their opinions and demands. With the contribution of the KAS, platforms are provided for the negotiation and bargaining of policy issues between the decision-makers and the affected parties. For the moment, one can put that the decision-makers are receptive to at least taking these demands into account albeit to what extent the policy outcomes reflect the demands of different groups at what degree is a subject that requires further field researches.

According to the network approach, the interactions between autonomous actors result from the fact that the actors are independent on each other in order to achieve their goals no matter how self-sufficient they are. The reason of interdependency is the fact that resources are distributed over various actors rather than accumulated in the hands of a single agency. To put it in another way, power is distributed rather than monopolized. Likewise, the KAS, the UTM, the Ministry, all are autonomous actors with their own resource bases, but they still need to exchange each others' resources to attain their goals.

They benefit mutually from the exchange of resources. Concordantly, the network approach suggests that negotiations produce a positive-sum game in which all benefit rather than a power game which concludes in winners and losers.

Resources held by different actors may be of various kinds such as “money, authority, information, expertise” (Rhodes, 1997a: xii). Among these, as regards the resources of the KAS, one can first mention funding resources, namely the power deriving from the ability to raise, award or withhold money. But more importantly, I assume that its proximity to the JDP –both at the level of government and parliamentarians- in terms of ideological commonality and its close contacts with the JDP as well as with various European political and social elites are the most valuable resources of the KAS.

I think access to the government officials and JDP politicians via the KAS is the primary resource which the UTM benefits from its interaction with the KAS. However, as the network approach suggests, resources are entered into bargaining and negotiation processes in return for an anticipated benefit. Thus, the KAS anticipates benefiting from the *expertise* of the UTM in the field of municipalities thanks to its partnership with the UTM. Founded in 1945, the UTM has a long history and it is the oldest municipality association in Turkey (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2003). As mentioned before, together with the KAS, it gives educational seminars for the local government authorities and their personnel. Technical information about municipal business such as certain legislations, technical procedures etc. is also supplied on its web page (Türkiye Belediyeler Birliği, 2007). Additionally, since its foundation, the UTM publishes a journal called “Journal of Cities and Municipalities”. Lastly, it publishes several articles and books written by experts within and outside the UTM (Türkiye Belediyeler Birliği, 2008). The KAS needs

this expertise to have a better understanding of the administrative system of Turkey as well as the ongoing developments in the system so that it can advance successfully in the promotion of decentralization in Turkey.

Furthermore, a foreign foundation, domestic partners are of great importance for the KAS. The KAS gets in touch with the Turkish public through its partners:

Our principal is we are not doing these activities by ourselves. We basically cooperate with Turkish partners because we think that local partners are much more capable of reacting to local conditions and local requirements etc. So they can do better than us... Our main principle of partnership is that we don't work in a country with the aim to implement our ideas without regard to local conditions or situations... We do it in dialogue and cooperation with local partners. We don't come with our concepts and state that the only one that is right is our ideas and these should be implemented. We say we have good experience in this and this, we can offer you this experience but of course it must be implemented according to local conditions (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007).

Moreover, the partnership of the KAS with the UTM and its contacts with the JDP has one more significant benefit to the KAS. The organization of activities such as the conferences mentioned above with the UTM as well as the attendance of government officials and parliamentarians to these events enable the KAS to gain *publicity* and *prestige* before the public, which is very valuable for a foreign organization. In this sense, as Dowding (1995: 146) expresses, *reputation* is one of the resources entered into bargaining games. Reputation can be considered the most important gain which the KAS gains in return for this resource-pooling.

As regards the UTM, partnership with the KAS provides it the opportunity to come together with government officials in events such as conferences, which creates the opportunity for addressing the professional demands and opinions of the UTM to decision-makers. In his keynote speech in the "EU and Local Governments" conference

conducted jointly with the KAS and the UTM, the vice-president of the UTM, Osman Gürün expressed the gratification of the UTM about the legal reforms directed at the adaptation of the local government system to the EU acquis. However, despite appreciation of the significance of these reforms, he also addressed the complaints of the UTM about the lack of complementary legal regulations directly to the Turkish Minister of Interior who was present there to make the other keynote speech:

But currently, municipalities in Turkey are in a very awkward position, and they believe that steps to carry municipalities to the position at which they ought to be are not taken quickly enough. For example, though an act in this field was enacted, no development has been made yet about other complementary acts. We are closely following my distinguished Minister's and the Ministry's works about these problems. We hope that these acts are enacted as soon as possible so that municipalities can take important steps forward (Gürün, 2006: 6).

As can be seen, such conferences provide an opportunity for *lobbying* for the UTM. This approximates the relationship between the KAS, the UTM and the Ministry to the pluralist model of interest group representation. In pluralism, the interest groups compete with each other in a quasi free-market environment and try to influence government through lobbying. Whereas public policy making in networks is about co-operation and consensus-building (Marsh, 1998a: 9), policy decisions are the result of group struggles and dominant coalitions in pluralism. Government is the central actor who ratifies decisions (Klijn, 1997: 28) and sets the rules of the competition game. Its decisions reflect the balance within the interest groups within society at a given time (Rhodes, 1997b: 30). Similar to the pluralist model, addressing of demands to the Ministry in the case of the "EU and Local Governments" conference demonstrates that government is the central actor in Turkey in policy-making processes no matter how policies are made interactively. In contrast to the network approach which assumes that the aim of

interactions in the policy-making process is not to have an influence on the centre but to enable decisions and policies to emerge spontaneously as a result of the natural interactions among networks, (Üstüner, 2003: 50-1), the gain which the UTM anticipates from the interaction with the Ministry is access to the centre, that is the government, in order to have an influence on the centre. In this case, the Ministry of Interior Affairs took the demands of the UTM into their agenda of law-making. As a reply to the complaint of the representative of the UTM in his speech about the lack of complementary regulations despite important legal reforms, in his speech, the Minister of Interior, Abdülkadir Aksu said:

...In this reform process, we will of course enact other needed acts. For example, the Bill on Special Administrations and the Revenues of Municipalities has been prepared and submitted to the cabinet; it is soon going to be put on the agenda of the Parliament. In addition, we are currently working on the Bill on Village Act which we aim to enact during this term of the Parliament. Besides, we are working on the enactment of some regulations to overcome the shortcomings and the ambiguities in implementation. We have also completed working on the principles and standards of the permanent staff of municipalities and provisional special administrations and submitted the draft bill to the Prime Ministry; to which the local authorities have been looking forward (Aksu, 2006: 8-10).

However, in the last instance, the Turkish government is free to be receptive to these demands or not. Regarding another issue field, the government might not take the demands of the UTM into account. All in all, there still exists hierarchy instead of heterarchy in the policy processes in Turkey though a more interactive mode of policy-making exists. The policy-making discretion of the state authority is not shared with other actors; to be more precise, non-state actors are incorporated to 'steering' in the process of the exercise of this discretion; the state permits non-state actors to have a voice in the policy-making process. Hence, the government is not only "first among the equals" with

Jessop's term (Jessop, 1997: 574). Rather, it is the central or dominating actor in policy processes though it is less autonomous and more attached to other actors. For these reasons, all in all, the policy-making process in Turkey is still closer to the pluralist model of interest group representation rather than the network model.

In its facilities, the KAS works on the basis of the principle of "long-lasting, permanent collaboration" with both institutional partners, with whom partnerships contracts are signed, and non-institutional partners, rather than on project-basis collaboration. The KAS sometimes cooperates temporarily with other actors on the basis of certain activities who have experience or expertise in a field in which the KAS is interested (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007). But after all, permanent collaboration is still the main operational mode of the KAS (Mair, 2000: 138-9). For example, Turkish Democracy Foundation, an institutional partner, has been a partner of the KAS for more than ten years (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007). Similarly, as noted before, the UTM and the KAS have been partners for fifteen years, since 1983 (Spengler, 2006: 3).

Owing to such a fashion of interfix, the KAS is prone to establish network-type relationships, relationships which are in accordance with the premises of the network approach, given that the network approach emphasizes *permanence* of relationships (Üstüner, 2003: 51). Unlike the pluralist approach, the KAS does not establish cooperations, in other words, coalitions on the basis of singular demands. Hence, the cooperations or coalitions do not disintegrate with the accomplishment of a single goal. Based on *shared values*, the cooperations/coalitions are permanent. As the representative of the Turkey Office of the KAS, Jan Senkyr (2007) states, the KAS collaborates with organizations who share their ideas and values (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007). Within

this context, one can exemplify the cooperation between the UTM and the KAS. The partnership between them is based on ideological commonality. They both agree upon a common tenet, *decentralization*. They consider the reinforcement of local governments a prerequisite for an efficient administrative system. With regard to this ideational commonality, it can be assumed that the relationship between the KAS and the UTM approximates a *policy community*, the type of policy networks that involve close relations (Marsh, 1998a: 14). As Dowding (1995) expresses, policy communities imply “a common culture and understandings about the nature of the problems and decision-making processes within a given policy domain” (Dowding, 1995: 138). In the same line, within the framework of the policy issue of the role of local administrations within the administrative system, the KAS and the UTM share a common identification of the policy problem as the overwhelming competences of central government in face of local governments. Thus, they agree upon the same policy solution, decentralization. As Rhodes (1997b) suggests, policy communities are characterized with consistency and persistence in values, membership and policy outcomes as well as consensus with the ideology, values and broad policy preferences shared by all participants (Rhodes, 1997b: 43-4). In a similar vein, the KAS and the UTM have been partners for fifteen years (consistency and persistence in membership) and they share common ideological, value-based and political preferences (consensus), namely decentralization. What’s more, these preferences have remained stable from the inception of their partnership (consistency and persistence in values), since they are grounded on the professional interests of the UTM and the ideological stance of the KAS, which are inherently stable for they are the primary reason of the existences of the KAS and the UTM.

Further, another characteristic of policy communities is that all participants have resources; basic relationship is an exchange relationship (Rhodes, 1997b: 44). The relationship between the KAS and the UTM approximates a policy community from this aspect too. The KAS prefers to collaborate with actors who have a position or a certain influence (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007). Hence, the actors with which the KAS cooperates in its networking activities each have their own resource bases already and the relations between them and the KAS are characterized with exchange of resources rather than a mono-dimensional giving relationship. Yet, the target group of the KAS is the actors “who have a position or a certain influence” (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007). The networking activities of the KAS are not directed at the inclusion of all of the affected, but the actors who are already resourceful: The actors with which the KAS collaborates are actors who either hold a significant political position in the sharpening of policies or who are already among the strong civil society organizations of Turkey; yet the partners of the KAS are already resourceful and reputable organizations. Thus, the networking activities of the KAS carry the risk of further empowering those who are already strong rather than opening up opportunities for equal representation. Further, although the network approach defines stakeholders on a flexible basis, which opens up the opportunities of participation, the addresses of the networking activities of the KAS are strictly predefined, either several partners ideationally close to the KAS with some of whom partnership contracts are signed or stable and permanent actors with whom policy-community relations, which are based on the commonality of policy goals and policy priorities, are established. For this reason, the networking activities of the KAS do not open up opportunities for broader and equaler participation. With regard to these

statements, it can be put that the contribution of the networking activities of the KAS to democracy is questionable.

Networks are embedded in a certain social, political and economic context. Therefore, the networking activities of the KAS are influenced by the broader socio-political structure. In this sense, the legal rules of Turkey affect the networking activities of these foundations.

The German political foundations work in Turkey under the legal status of ‘association’. They are registered before the Department of Associations (Dernekler Dairesi Başkanlığı) to the Ministry of Interior according to the Turkish law of Associations (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007). Therefore, in their activities, they are subject to the Turkish Law of Associations enacted in 2004. Article 10 of this Law permits the associations to receive financial contribution from other associations which pursue objectives similar to theirs (Dernekler Dairesi Başkanlığı, 2006). Thereby, there is no legal obstacle that can prevent the KAS from funding the projects of NGOs or, as in the case of the institutional partners of the KAS, from contributing financially to the infrastructure of NGOs. What’s more, it is lawful for the KAS to establish platforms or join into the existing platforms where different NGOs come together. According to Article 25 of the Law of Associations, associations can establish platforms between each other or with civil society organizations like foundations, trade unions etc. in the fields relevant to their objectives in order to realize a common goal (Dernekler Dairesi Başkanlığı, 2006). All in all, there seems no limitation on the networking facilities of the KAS within the frame of the Law of Associations. With this regard, the macro-context has no negative impact on the networking facilities of the KAS.

However, it should not be assumed that the KAS has always operated in an utterly friendly environment. In 2002, the Attorney General of the State Security Court sued against the German political foundations -the HBS, the KAS, the FES and the FNS- as well as the prominent figures of the Turkish public including the ex-President of the Bar Association of İstanbul, Yücel Sayman, the leader of the peasants of Bergama, Oktay Konyar and the ex-Mayor of Bergama, Safa Taşkın. In the indictment, they were accused of establishing a secret alliance against the security of the state with German political foundations at stake which were also accused of espionage against the Turkish state (Radikal, 2002).¹²

The German political foundations and the others accused were acquitted in 2004 owing to lack of evidence (Interview with Dirk Tröndle, 2006). Nevertheless, this trial had a negative impact on the approaches of the Turkish public authorities to German political foundations:

Prior to this lawsuit, we [German political foundations] never had a problem in our work in Turkey. But with this lawsuit, as though Turkey had become informed about us for the first time, there emerged curiosity about us. However, we were working in Turkey with the permission of the Treasury from the inception. But in the wake of this lawsuit, they [the state] tried something different. We were made subject to the new Law of Associations enacted in 2004. So, though we are branch offices of Germany-based associations, we were accepted as a newly-established Turkish association; hence we had to re-fulfill bureaucratic procedures. Unlike the Turkish associations, our bureaucratic burden increased with this law¹³ (Interview with Dirk Tröndle, 2006).

¹² Yücel Sayman was accused because of an activity jointly conducted by the HBS and the Bar Association of İstanbul (Radikal, 2002). The accusations about Oktay Konyar and Safa Taşkın was based on Dr. Necip Hablemitoğlu's report, which was also the mainstay of the indictment. In the report, Hablemitoğlu alleged that in the struggle of the peasants of Bergama against gold-mining by cyanide, Konyar and Taşkın were financed by German political foundations, who wanted to prevent Turkey from benefiting her gold reserves due to the economic interests of the German state (Hablemitoğlu, 2002).

¹³ Subject to the Law of Associations, German political foundations have to submit an affidavit which comprises their facilities and their financial accounts to the civilian administration authority at the end of each year according to the Article 19 of this law. Article 19 also states that the Minister of Interior or the civilian administration authority can monitor whether the associations work in compliance with the

However, it is noteworthy that this lawsuit did not lead to permanent negative impacts which hamper the work of the KAS. In the interview I conducted with Jan Senkyr, the representative of the Turkey Office of the KAS, I asked him to evaluate the relationship between the KAS and the public authorities, in other words, the decision-makers. He replied that the relations were correct and mostly the public authorities were very interested in their work (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007) Similarly, when I asked him if there were any problems or any clashes on the approaches of the public authorities to the KAS; his answer was 'no' and he added that they felt that in general the government as well as the state institutions were welcoming their work (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007). By the same token, in an interview, Wulf Schönbohm, the representative of the Turkey Office of the KAS during the lawsuit, interpreted the indictment as an act of some sections of the Turkish political terrain who were against the EU reform process, not as a reflection of the attitude of the state toward German political foundations (Schönbohm, 2004).

The suspicions against the German political foundations did not come to an end with the acquittal. There still exists several similar allegations about the German political foundations in newspapers. Such allegations are influential mostly in the stance of the public opinion on German political foundations rather than that of decision-makers. For instance, as Altınay (2003) reports, according to a survey conducted by a web site called "gazetem.net", in which several Turkish intellectuals write columns read mostly by the

objectives submitted in their charters and they keep their records and account books in compliance with the acquis on the condition that the association is notified about the supervision earlier than at least twenty-four hours (Dernekler Dairesi Başkanlığı, 2006).

well-educated segments of the society, the 71 % of the attendants believe that the allegations about the German foundations are true (Altnay, 2003: 55).

However, exogenous factors resulting from the broader context do not influence the network directly: “All such exogenous change is mediated through the understanding of agents and interpreted in the context of the structures, rules/norms and interpersonal relationships within the network” (Marsh, 1998b: 197). For instance, despite all such negative impressions about German political foundations within the society, the participants of the 11th NGO Symposia objected to this investigation with a press release (Silier, 2002: 164–5). Within the context of this case, the participants of the NGO Symposia interpreted the exogeneous factor, the investigation, as a part of the repressive attempts which aimed to detach Turkey and Turkish NGOs from the outside world (Silier, 2002: 164). Hence, they preferred to act with solidarity in the face of the repressions which they deemed being against not only German political foundations, but to the civil society. Overall, such allegations about German political foundations did not result in permanent negative impacts on the work of the KAS. I think this results from mainly the close contacts between the KAS and governmental authorities as well as the long-lasting cooperation of the KAS with its partners which fosters trust.

During this study, it is observed that the networking facilities of the KAS are directed at the same goal: providing *platforms* for bringing those concerned together and enabling them to exchange views. As the representative of the Turkey Office of the KAS, Jan Senkyr (2007), explains, “platform-building means that we try to bring together different groups to provide or initiate an internal discussion or dialogue for exchange of ideas between people from different positions or of different opinion” (Interview with Jan

Senkyr, 2007). This method of platform-building can give insight about the role, or in other words, the position of the KAS within networks. I deduce that this method makes it possible to think that the position or the role of the KAS within networks is about network management. Network management can be considered as steering efforts aimed at the improvement of cooperation between involved actors (O'Toole, 1988; quoted in Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000: 140). Unlike the classical management understanding in which the manager is a central actor or director, the network manager is rather a mediator and stimulator (Forester, 1989, quoted in Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000: 142). Hence, "management activities [in the network governance model] are directed to a great extent at improving and sustaining interaction between different actors involved and at uniting the goals and approaches of those actors" (Klijn, 1997: 33). Concordantly, the KAS explains its mission as "in meetings and congresses we bring people who have something to say together" (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007a). Thus, it can be claimed that the KAS is engaged in enabling conditions for interaction and deliberation between different actors involved.

There are two types of network management: *process management*, in other words, *game management* (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997: 46), and *network constitution*, in other words, *network structuring* (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997: 46–7). Process management, intends to improve 'the interactions between actors in policy games' (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000: 140). On the other hand, network constitution is focused on realizing changes in the network (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000: 141). It can be defined as "building or changing the institutional arrangements that make up the network" (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997: 46–7). In this sense, when the network management role of the KAS is

mentioned here, *process/game management* is referred given the explanations above about the platform-provision activities of the KAS which is concerned with establishing networks rather than bringing about changes in existing networks.

Process/game management can take various forms:

- *Network activation* is about “initiating interaction processes or games in order to solve particular problems or to achieve goals” (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997: 47).
- *Arranging interaction* implies “establishing *ad-hoc* organizational arrangements in order to solve particular problems or to achieve goals” (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997: 47).
- *Brokerage* involves “bringing together solutions, problems and parties” (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997: 47).
- *Facilitating interaction* implies promoting favourable conditions for joint action (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997: 47).
- *Mediation and arbitration* is about conflict management (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997: 47) and is implemented by a party which is not involved in the conflict, and which maintains no direct ties with either of the disputing parties concerned (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997: 50).

As Kickert & Koppenjan (1997: 48) note, brokers deal in ideas and solutions and link up actors who would not have found each other by themselves. In this sense, “a broker is an intermediary, a go-between” (Mandell, 1990: 47, quoted in Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997: 44). Within this context, it can be argued that the KAS takes on the role of a *broker* in their networking activities. The *internationalization* activities of the KAS -such as the visit programmes in which JDP politicians meet with CDU politicians- are worth to note

in terms of brokerage role. In all these examples, the attendant parties needed the help of the KAS to come together.

Brokers can be of three kinds (Mandell, 1990: 47, quoted in (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997: 48-9) :

- The *orchestra leader* who can envisage exactly how the product of concerted action should look;
- The *laissez-faire leader* who is solely focused on bringing parties together and who has no interest in the content of the outcome of the interaction;
- The *film producer* who is highly involved, but due to his dependencies on others is intent upon keeping them involved in the process.

I assume that the brokerage role of the KAS can be of the second kind, the *laissez-faire leader*. Because one of the observations of this study is that the KAS do not participate in networks like other actors who explicitly manifest their own preferences of policy outcomes. The KAS prefers to “remain one step back”. Despite expressing their opinions, the KAS generally tries to “stay *neutral*” (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007 – emphasis added):

We provide platforms because it is neutral, we are a neutral institution in this case, we let them discuss among each other. Platform means that we try to bring together different groups to provide or initiate an internal discussion or dialogue where we don't interfere from our side. We are not actively involved in discussions... We don't come with our concepts and state that the only one that is right is our ideas and these should be implemented. We say we have good experience in this and this, we can offer you this experience but of course it must be implemented according to local conditions (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007).

The preference to hold a so-called ‘neutral’ or a ‘self-effacing’ position does not mean that the KAS has no interest in the content of the outcomes of the interactions. Rather,

unlike other actors, its preference of outcomes are not explicitly manifested and concretely-defined. What is important for the KAS is the compliance of the policy outcomes with its ideological tenets, such as compliance with the principle of decentralization. In order to realize such outcomes, the KAS of course expresses its own policy priorities for the policy issue in question. For instance, in the conference of “EU and Local Governments” in which the reform process in Turkish local government system within the EU negotiations was debated, the KAS emphasized the importance of the principle of subsidiarity within the EU system. Given that the principle of subsidiarity is one of the ideological tenets of the KAS, one can deduce that the KAS strives to draw the attention of actors to a certain point, in this case, subsidiarity, and canalize the policy negotiations in a direction in line with its policy recommendations.

Such a method makes it possible for the KAS to remain one step back, to play second fiddle. Yet, that’s why it undertakes the role of *laissez faire broker* because this role enables an actor to engage in bringing parties together rather than being directly engaged in discussions as a party. However, one should not assume that this role is of secondary importance. In fact, brokerage denotes that the parties need the help of a broker to come together, which constitutes the vital prior stage of discussion and concerted action.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

In this paper, the activities of the KAS in Turkey were analyzed within the context of the network governance approach, one of the rising concepts of the recent years.

The network governance approach is rooted in the ongoing debate on governance. Governance is considered the new governing model of the globalization era. The process of globalization has had considerable impacts on the states. The dynamics of globalization -such as the increasing flow of capital worldwide and thus, the integration of national economies to world capitalism in a more penetrated sense, the transnationalization of a host of demands and problems- captured the nation-states and de-limited their authority: By globalization “states are being increasingly caught up in restructured *webs of power* that limit or transform their tasks, roles and activities by altering the context within which states exist and operate” (Cerny, 2000: 22 – emphasis original). Hence, while the authority of nation-states has been delivered upwards, to international and supra-national units and downwards, to the sub-governmental units as a result of the limitation of state authority, the role of the state within the society has been redefined at the same time. Such a transformation of state authority/sovereignty has brought about the paradigm shift from government to *governance*. Governance is conceptualized as *governing together* with the partnership of state, market and civil society who are reckoned equal partners in the act of governing rather than governing by government itself or by government intervention. This notion of ‘equal partnership’

between the state actors and non-state actors is the most original insight of governance which corresponds to a fundamental change compared with the hierarchical model of governing by the act of government. In this sense, this insight required a new concept to understand this new mode of policy-making: the *network* concept has been more and more used in the understanding of policy processes in this way.

The network concept as a metaphor is linked with some other metaphors like informality, partnership, heterarchy, interaction etc. Hence, it is contradicted with the concept of hierarchy. In this sense, the incorporation of the network metaphor into the policy-making processes has led to the discovery of an alternative governing approach for the hierarchical governing model, that is the *network governance* approach.

Network governance is one of the types of the governance model (Bayramoğlu, 2005: 129-51). However, I do not consider network governance as identical to governance. I criticize the governance model on the grounds of the replacement of the category of 'citizenship' with the category of 'stakeholders'. I believe that such a strict division of citizens from each other can encourage the participation of the affected groups into policy-making processes in policy-issues which concern their interests; on the other hand, the overall conclusion of this model is the contracting of the possibility of various stakeholders' coming together and striving for a common goal that aggregates and transcends their specific interests in the public sphere, which I consider more vital for a democratic public life. However, though grounded on the concept of stakeholders, the network governance approach is potentially more open to the notion of participation, because it does not offer a strict division of citizens on the basis of stakeholder groups. It defines the affected stakeholders on a broader, flexible and transnational basis rather than

on the basis of strict inclusion and exclusion criteria. Hence, the network approach has the potential to foster equal and broad participation.

Another argument of this paper is that the network concept has a metaphorical value which enables the network approach to be applied under different contexts. Network governance is just one of the usages of the network approach. Hence, in this paper, network governance has been handled as an approach rather than a theory or a model. The theoretical chapter of the paper has been divided into two parts; I have scrutinized the network metaphor in the first part and the network approach to governance in the second part. Thereby, I have tried to show that there exists a network approach beyond the theory of network governance owing to the metaphorical value of the network concept.

This paper has not dealt with providing a network picture or demonstrating a network model. Rather, the network governance approach has been applied in the context of the activities of the KAS. The paper has scrutinized whether the theoretical framework of the network governance approach provides an analytical tool in analyzing the activities of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Turkey. It is concluded that several tools in the network governance approach provide heuristic tools to analyze the relations of the KAS in the Turkish political terrain. As a result of this study, I have discovered that the network approach has two major benefits in analyzing the relations of the KAS. One is that it conceptualizes policy-making process in a broader sense, comprising not only decision-making and imposition of decisions on the society and the implementers, but also the discussion and negotiation processes of policy issues and policy problems. Indeed, the KAS is engaged mostly in this pre-policy formulation process.

Another benefit of the network approach is that “it helps us understand not only formal institutional arrangements but also highly complex informal relationships in the policy process” (Kenis and Schneider, 1991: 27, quoted in Blom-Hansen, 1997: 672). By the same token, I claim that the concept of *informality* is one of the most useful concepts in understanding the relations of the KAS. As regards the relations of the KAS to the JDP, one can observe that the KAS is engaged in establishing contacts between the politicians and government officials from the JDP and the CDU. Hence, formal contacts, established by formal authorities via formal procedures, go hand in hand with informal networks of interaction that are backed by ideational factors such as permanence of relationships, trust and shared values and goals and intensively involve non-state actors. These informal networks play a considerable role in the socialization of the Turkish political elites, specifically from the JDP, with their ideological counterparts in Europe, specifically in Germany.

The relationship between the KAS, the UTM and the Ministry of Interior of the Turkish Republic can be identified as ‘informal networks of interaction’ as well. In this relationship, the KAS helps to build platforms for the negotiation and bargaining of policy issues between affected parties, the government officials and a professional organization, the UTM. Thanks to this platform, both parties, the UTM and the Ministry, bargain over policy outcomes, i.e. over the shape of legal regulations. Within the context of this relationship, I argue that in Turkey too, policies are made within a multi-actor process which comprises not only formal institutional arrangements but also “informal, non-governmental mechanisms” (Rosenau, 1992: 4) with the intensive involvement of non-state actors. I think this example –together with the above example of the relations

between the JDP, the CDU and the KAS- can be accepted as an evidence of the *informalisation* of policy processes in Turkey.

As shown from the above examples, the KAS contributes to the informalisation of politics in Turkey. Another contribution of the KAS to policy-making process in Turkey is its role in the *Europenization* of policy debates. The KAS tries to bring together the Turkish stakeholders within a policy area with their European, especially German, counterparts for the sake of exchange of views and experiences. In this sense, it adds a European dimension, i.e. the perspectives of European actors, to policy negotiations and political debates in Turkey.

Another argument of this paper is that the policy-making process in Turkey is still closer to the pluralist model of interest group representation compared with the network model. Taken within the context of the relationship between the KAS, the UTM and the Ministry of Interior, I deduce that government is the central actor in Turkey in policy-making processes whose conviction and consent are sought by interest groups. No matter how policies are made interactively in Turkey, policy outcomes do not come about as a result of interactions as in the network governance approach, but as a result of the government's decisions.

As seen from the case of the KAS, the approach of network governance can not be considered a universal model. There are numerous factors that affect the practices of network governance within a society. Yet, there are not strict borderlines between pluralism and the network governance in practice. Hence, rather than seeking to fit the mode of policy-making within a country to a certain model, one should look to find out which tools within those models can be useful in the analysis of policy-making processes

within that country. These statements are all valid for Turkey as well. In Turkey, the government is still the central steering actor partly¹⁴. Nevertheless, interactive policy-making processes characterized with informality are on the way in Turkey as well, in which the KAS plays a crucial role owing to its international broker role. This is a fact which has the potential for opening up opportunities for participation in policy-making processes.

However, the critical point is that the doors are not equally open to everybody. Especially as regards the networking activities of the KAS, one observes that the resourceless, disadvantageous sectors of society are excluded from the policy-making processes. Access to policy-making are not recognized to them whether deliberately or because they do not have enough resources to get into action. The networking activities of the KAS aim to comprise not all of the affected groups, but the groups which are ideologically similar to the KAS as well as the actors who hold a position with the power of shaping policy outcomes. The relations of the KAS with the Turkish actors are based on shared values and ideological commonality. In addition, the target group of the KAS is the actors “who have a position or a certain influence” (Interview with Jan Senkyr, 2007). In this sense, the networking activities of the KAS are not directed at the inclusion of all of the affected, but only inclusion of the stakeholders whose policy goals are close to the KAS or who hold an important structural position in the sharpening of policies. Thus, the networking activities of the KAS carry the risk of further empowering those who are already strong rather than opening up opportunities for equal representation. For this reason, the networking activities of the KAS do not open up opportunities for broader and

¹⁴ Why it is so requires further research and I hope that the seek for answer to this question tempts further academic studies.

equaler participation. With regard to these statements, it can be put that the contribution of the networking activities of the KAS to democracy is questionable. This verifies one more time that despite its potential for an equal and participatory political and organizational life, the realization of this potential of the network approach is dependent upon the improvement of the socio-political conditions within which networking practices are embedded.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Rürup, B. L. (Head of the Turkey Office of the FES) Interview by author, Turkey Office of the FES, İstanbul/Turkey, 2007.

Senkyr, J. (Head of the Turkey Office of the KAS) Interview by author, Turkey Office of the KAS, Ankara/Turkey, 2007.

Tröndle, D. (Vice Head of the Turkey Office of the KAS) Interview by author, Turkey Office of the KAS, Ankara/Turkey, 2006.