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The Turkish-U.S. Strategic Partnership: *Broadening and Deepening in the 21st Century*

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Turkey and the United States are engaged in a strategic partnership whose agenda encompasses such critical issues as energy, trade, finance, investment, defence, regional issues and democracy. Yet, speculating on the future course of this ever diversifying relationship is not easy because most forward-looking assessments, particularly those pertaining to Turkey, might turn into a thing of the past due to the often unexpected and swiftly changing events. This article is an attempt to take stock of the Turkish-American relations that have evolved into a “strategic partnership” over the past century, elaborate five major tenets of this relationship, and finally visualize how a mutually serving balance of political, economic and security interests could be achieved between these two allies in the first decades of this century.

Looking Back

The Turkish-U.S. relations date back to early 19th century. There was a trade agreement of 1830 between the Ottoman Empire and the United States, but relations in the 19th century and even in the early 20th century remained largely confined to the activities of American religious missionaries as well as to limited trade. Even with the onset of the First World War, the Balkans and the Middle East were not considered as the traditional areas of American national interest². A ten-year (1917 to 1927) rupture in diplomatic relations between the two countries witnessed the U.S. Senate’s refusal to ratify a bilateral “Treaty of Amity and Commerce”, which was concluded in Lausanne in 1923. Diplomatic relations could be resumed only in 1927.

The broad outline of the ensuing history of Turkish-U.S. relations are well-known: Stalin's threats; the Truman Doctrine; the Korean War; NATO membership; close relations throughout the 1950s; and then disaffection and deterioration resulting from the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles in 1962, the Johnson letter warning Turkey against intervention in Cyprus in 1964, and, most dramatically, the arms embargo that followed Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. The arms embargo was lifted in 1978, but the chill remained, and it wasn't until the mid-1980s that Turkish officials would begin again to speak of Turkish-American "friendship."

The Turkish-American relations during the entire Cold War period were mainly based on military co-operation, although there was a fairly strong economic assistance component as

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² See for further details “Ataturk, the Turkish Nationalists and the United States: A Neglected Prospect for Peace in 1919, Howard A. Reed, p.99-111, *Journal of the American Institute for the Study of Middle Eastern Civilizations*, Autumn-Winter 1980-1981, Vol.1, No: 3&4.

well. During the Cold War, Turkey defended the southern flank of NATO, hosted the American military at its jointly operated bases, and served as a valuable listening post for monitoring Soviet activities. In turn, the U.S. provided about \$16 billion in military and economic aid into Turkey. U.S. influence remains high in Ankara, which counts on Washington as its primary supporter in the international arena. It is still the U.S., almost alone in the Western world, which has backed Turkey's efforts to host Caspian Sea energy pipelines, its effort to gain EU membership, its contention that the PKK is a terrorist group, its right to send troops and aircraft into northern Iraq to fight the PKK, and its capture of PKK leader Ocalan in Kenya. Traditionally, the executive branch of the U.S. government, which tends to take a *realpolitik* approach to international affairs, has strongly supported close ties with Turkey, with the U.S. Congress sometimes applying the brakes. But this is not to say that the bilateral ties are tension-free.

The New Context for the Turkish-U.S. Relationship

Relations have entered a new stage after the bipolar world ended and the Soviet Union dissipated. Many political observers thought that Turkey's security value for the Western countries had been considerably diminished; but, as a world power, the U.S. saw the facts earlier than most European countries that on the contrary the geopolitical importance of Turkey have increased more in international politics and economics³, and Ankara has continued to play a central ally and partner of the US in the region.

Clinton's "Turkey Vision"

The high point of Turkish-U.S. relations was no doubt President Clinton's five-day visit to Turkey in November 1999. It is worth recalling a few of the things he said in his November 15 speech to the Turkish Parliament because his messages contained strong indications for the future path of Turkish-American partnership.

The first is Turkey's importance to the U.S., but also, Turkey's importance to the region and to the world as a whole, and his conviction that this importance is growing, has grown and will grow as Turkey's natural advantages in terms of location and in terms of demographics and in terms of strategic importance play out. He believes that whatever happens in Turkey will "affect not only Americans, but also citizens of the entire world in the 21st Century". Turkey's ability to play a positive role will be maximized to the extent that it is fully integrated within Europe. And the U.S. is solidly behind that objective: that was clearly a recurrent theme whenever President Clinton spoke, that "Turkey's destiny is as part of Europe, as a member of the European Union".

President Clinton pointed to the "strategic partnership", as reflected in Turkey's contribution to NATO's victory in Kosovo, its ongoing use of Incirlik airbase, and the common efforts to build an East-West Energy Transportation Corridor. Bilateral relationship is called "strategic", because it involves such a wide range of overlapping interests between the two countries. He noted that the bilateral trade has increased 50 percent in the last five years. He expressed confidence that Turkey's macro-economic reforms since summer 1999 have set the stage for a major influx of foreign investment and sustained growth in the years ahead. "Our task on the eve of the new millennium", he said, "is to forge a relationship for the 21st century that will be as relevant to our respective interests as the one we have built over 50 years". And he made clear that Turkey would remain every bit as important to the U.S. in the years ahead as it has in the past.

³ "The End of the Cold War and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior", Kemal Kirisci, *Foreign Policy*, p.1-44, 1993, Vol.18 No.34.

The Five-Part Agenda: Strategic Partnership

Against the background of this visit should be seen the state visits to Washington by President Demirel in April 1999 and by Prime Minister Bulent Prime Minister Ecevit in September 1999. They all smoothed the way for further enhancement and deepening of Turkish-U.S. relations. They consolidated the co-operation, which was carefully termed as "strategic partnership" as from September 1999. We wish to focus on five major components that feed into this partnership:

1. *Energy Co-operation in the Forefront*

Energy co-operation serves twin purposes: First, bringing the energy resources of Central Asia and the Caspian to Turkey, and via Turkey to world markets; and secondly, meeting Turkey's own growing needs for electrical power. Each purpose is closely related to a web of inter-related geopolitical, economic and security relations involving Turkey and the United States.

Especially with respect to Central Asian and Caspian energy, Turkey and the U.S. have made significant progress in coordinating their efforts. These contacts have resulted in a common strategic commitment to establish a new "East-West Energy Transportation Corridor". That corridor will include a Baku-Ceyhan main oil pipeline and a parallel gas pipeline across the Caspian from Turkmenistan. Both countries share the view that multiple sources of energy are necessary. Negotiations to make this a reality are approaching a decisive stage.

World energy prices have improved from their historic lows a year ago, dispelling fears that there will be insufficient Caspian investment to justify the Baku-Ceyhan route⁴. Problems with alternative routes are confirming the wisdom of the East-West Corridor. Based on current trends, there is every reason to expect that by summer 2000, commercial agreements on both projects are likely to be signed, financing secured, and final engineering studies well advanced. By 2002, the first Turkmen gas should reach Erzurum via the Caspian⁵, (but the conclusion of the Blue Stream deal with Gazprom might postpone this project to a later date) and by 2004, Ceyhan could be shipping Caspian oil (if the necessary financing and volumes could be obtained).

Strategic Objectives. The Caspian region is the epicenter of major geopolitics. It contains vast energy resources and poses national security interests for Turkey and the US. All the energy-consuming countries of the world have an interest in stable, continuous and diversified sources of energy from the Caspian region. Common Turkish-U.S. strategic interests in the region are:

⁴ Volatile oil markets – the roller coaster ride of high prices to low, low prices to high – create a climate of uncertainty for investors and energy producers, who can expect neither long-term price stability, nor plan for rational investment of capital. The extreme volatility we are witnessing today is testament to the folly of artificial production quotas by OPEC. Markets, not cartels, should set the price of oil. The Caspian oil is expected to add to the non-OPEC supply increase, thus helping stabilise world oil markets.

⁵ Washington keenly supports the \$2-2.5 billion Turkmenistan-Turkey pipeline because it bypasses Russia and Iran—two rival players in the Caspian, and agreed to submit detailed financial proposals for a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Turkey by the end of March 2000 in a bid to boost the troubled project's viability. President Niyazov, frustrated at the lack of progress in this U.S.-backed plan to pump Turkmen natural gas to Turkey, cast the project's future in doubt in late February by agreeing to supply vast volumes of gas to Russia over 30 years. But he has already pledged to supply the Turkish line with an eventual 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year. Turkmenistan would be unable to meet that demand while at the same time pumping 50 bcm to Russia annually. (Turkmen gas production last year was only 23 bcm.)

- First, to strengthen the independence and prosperity of the new Caspian states and to encourage political and economic reform;
- Second, to mitigate regional conflicts by building economic linkages among the states of the region;
- Third, to enhance commercial opportunities for Turkish, U.S. and other companies; and
- Fourth, to bolster the energy security of Turkey, the U.S. and other IEA Member countries, and the energy independence of the Caspian region by ensuring the free flow of oil and gas to the world market place.

Each of these objectives is closely inter-related. Enhancing commercial opportunities means increasing foreign investment in the region. Higher levels of investment by foreign companies supports sustained economic growth in the Caspian states. Establishment of free-market economic institutions reinforces the development of democratic institutions. That, coupled with economic growth, will strengthen the Caspian states as independent and sovereign countries. Turkish-U.S. policy in the Caspian does not see building oil and gas pipelines as ends in themselves. Rather, the objective is to use those pipelines as means for building a political and economic framework that will strengthen regional co-operation, enhance stability and stimulate further reforms for decades to come.

Another important component of the Turkish-U.S. energy co-operation is Washington's persistent efforts to take a substantial share for American businesses in the *Turkish power* project tenders. The passage of the arbitration amendment, and related legislation in summer 1999 has been warmly welcomed within the American investment community. This is something that Turkey been talking about for many years, and was a major obstacle to foreign investors' actually coming to Turkey. Now that Turkey is over that primary constitutional hurdle, the foreign companies want to see what the implementing legislation will look like.

Particularly important will be what kind of a regulatory scheme would be set up in Turkey's energy sector, how would it be administered, what kind of reporting requirements there would be. With the passing of the constitutional amendment, as many as 20 major projects representing \$5 billion in new investment, and now stalled due to inability to obtain financing, are expected to move forward. Movement on this first tranche of projects will establish a momentum that will help meet Turkey's power needs well into this century. The power plants and the other energy projects that were signed or initialed during President Clinton's November 1999 visit, amount to almost \$ 1.5 billion, which is obviously very important both in terms of Turkey's long term energy requirements and in terms of the bilateral commercial relations and American investment in Turkey.

Yet, one should bear in mind that Turkey's energy and regional geopolitical interests also need to be satisfied if a long-term balance of interests will be maintained between Ankara and Washington. The US policy vis-à-vis Iran and Russia over the next few years will be closely watched by Turkish strategists.

2. *Expanding and Diversifying Economic and Trade Ties*

The bilateral trade volume has more than tripled since 1980 – indeed, from \$1.6 billion in 1985 to the \$6.4 billion in 1999 -- due to the growing awareness of American businesses of the economic opportunities in the Turkish market. However, current trade and investment trends between the two countries clearly disfavour Turkey. The U.S. has gained a significant foothold in almost every sector of the Turkish economy, while the Turkish investors and

traders' penetration to the world's largest export market remains very limited. Turkey is one of the few countries with which the U.S. has a favorable trade balance: the imports to exports ratio is 2 to 1.

As one of 10 major countries formally designated as "Big Emerging Markets" (BEM) by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Turkey will no doubt continue to be the focus of U.S. efforts to expand bilateral trade and investment. While there was a dip in 1999 as both economies had to digest the financial turmoil, the long-term trends remain highly favorable. Prospects have been enhanced by the U.S. decision to give Turkey more flexibility in certain textile quota categories. As a result, Turkish clothing exports to the U.S. rose by over 50 percent in the first quarter of 1999, at a time when they contracted in other traditional markets. In return, the Turkish government has paved the way for the imports in summer 1999 of the first American live cattle to Turkey in four years.

There are already increasing efforts to maximize the exposure and awareness the American business sector has of the economic opportunities available in Turkey, be it through the organization of trade missions or conferences and information networks. The Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSIAD) opened an office in Washington, aiming to establish channels to exchange information between Turkey and the U.S., and alert public opinion back home to developments that have a direct or indirect bearing on Turkey.

Clearly, the opportunities for foreign investment in GAP are untold, be it in urban planning and construction, or in agribusiness that will dominate the region once the massive irrigation projects are completed. There are major investment opportunities concerning infrastructure projects that are essential to supporting Turkey's economic growth. Impressive, yet vital highway and rail projects have been designed in order to connect Pan-European transport corridors to Central Asia. There are plans for new container ports on northern Marmara, Aegean locations, and east Mediterranean in Mersin and İskenderun. The construction of seven new marinas is planned on a BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) basis. New terminals are needed for various airports including Ankara-Esenboğa. Huge infrastructure projects are not the only opportunities for U.S. businesses. From fashion to foodstuffs, Turkey is producing large quantities of goods that can be exported throughout the world. The Customs Union with the EU is an added incentive for American companies that wish to invest in the production of goods destined for European markets.

How to Improve the Trade Balance?

Most of Turkey's export expansion in the U.S. took place primarily in traditional sectors, which were already well developed. Textiles and apparel, for example, accounted for 30% of the \$4.6 billion increase in exports between 1995 and 1997. Agriculture and food products accounted for a further 20%. Although there are some exceptions, like electrical machinery and appliances, which increased nearly 50%, Turkey's exports remain concentrated in the same core areas as before the EU-Turkish Customs Union⁶. The easy steps towards increasing exports have already been taken.

Let's now consider what more can be done to realize the full potential for growth in the bilateral trade and reduce the large trade deficit currently in favour of the U.S.:

⁶ While the Turco-American trade volume is currently only 20% of Turkey's trade with the EU, Turkey's trade with the U.S. has grown more rapidly than trade with other important Turkish markets.

- *Eliminating Trade Barriers.* Turkey and the U.S. have made some progress in reducing trade barriers over the last 15 years. Turkish restrictions on agricultural product imports has become a problem case for the U.S., while Turkish textile exporters seek wider market access in the U.S. Given that textiles account for roughly half of Turkey's exports to the U.S., the simplest way to expand bilateral trade would be for the U.S. to abolish its quotas on textile imports from Turkey. And the U.S. did make a decision to provide additional flexibility in a number of categories of goods manufactured by Turkish producers. Eliminating agricultural and textile trade barriers will therefore dramatically increase “win-win” opportunities for both Turkish and U.S. businesses, at least under the present circumstances.
- *Diversification within Existing Industries.* However, the fact is that, even if the U.S. domestic politics allowed Washington to remove these trade barriers, the total elimination of quotas would be a short-term gain for Turkey at best. In fact, quotas are on their way out as the U.S. will eliminate textile quotas in 2005 under its WTO obligation. Then, Turkish producers will no longer face statutory limits in supplying the U.S. market. But they will no longer be sheltered from the full force of international competition. Turkey will have to compete with the entire world (think of China, India, Indonesia and Pakistan!) to meet the demands of U.S. customers⁷. To meet the demands of global competition after 2005, the Turkish textile industry should begin diversifying NOW into more products, particularly higher-quality, higher-value-added products. A rejuvenated textile sector would generate new jobs and enhance bank balance sheets from Denizli to Adana, not to mention increasing tax receipts. Conversely, delay in restructuring will only make adjustments harder down the road.
- *Diversification into New Sectors.* Textile industry cannot carry Turkey into the 21st century's “New Economy”. A quantum leap in bilateral trade will require diversification of Turkish exports into new sectors. Right now, there are too many industries, which simply are not participating in trade with the U.S. One of the most important is the information industry. In most OECD countries, expansion of information-based companies over the last several years has outpaced growth in all other sectors. American companies' sales of computers and software to Turkey are miniscule. Many companies are reluctant to bring their most advanced equipment and industrial processes to joint ventures in Turkey. One of the key reasons is Turkey's immature framework for research and development, and insufficient protection of intellectual property rights. Foreign companies have little incentive to invest or trade in markets where their products could be pirated⁸.
- *Investment as the Basis for Trade.* The area of intellectual property rights leads us to a broader theme: the importance of foreign investment to the development of trade. While a couple of decades ago, many people saw foreign investment and foreign trade as somehow competing forces; today it is widely recognized that the two go hand in hand. Maintaining an open foreign investment climate offers access to the capital necessary to modernize and meet the demand of competition across all sectors. Foreign investment also provides human capital development and access to new technologies. Turkey's

⁷ This will require high quality products, produced in bulk, at the lowest possible price. Turkey has some of the world's best producers of knit and woven products. Unfortunately, most producers are small- and medium-sized firms, struggling to compete with East Asian producers solely on price.

⁸ Turkey has made improvements since 1995, but much remains to be done. Key steps will include ratification of several international IPR conventions, passing amendments to make copyright and patent laws fully compatible with WTO standards.

ability to attract foreign investment will be critically important to the country's ability to expand and diversify its export industries.

- *Improving IPR protection* is one way Turkey can attract more foreign investment. A second way is to improve the rules governing foreign investment in so-called concessions. The concessions issue particularly affects foreign investment in energy and telecommunications, two key sectors which underlie the competitiveness of virtually every other sector of the Turkish economy. If Turkey has high-cost, inefficient energy and telecom sectors, how can other industries, which depend on their services ever hope to compete in the global marketplace? The need for new investment in the energy sector is staggering - some \$4 billion per year according to the government. But American and other foreign energy companies are ready to commit such funds if a fair, reasonable investment climate is established⁹.
- *Good Governance Essential.* Investors and lenders are using their financial muscle to demand high standards of corporate governance in what has become a market-based global movement against corruption. The movement is no longer being driven mainly by public policy makers, academics or consultants. In making decision whether to invest in Turkey or any other country, capital providers are now more intently considering such factors as adequacy of disclosure, minority shareholder rights, board structure, as well as corruption, cronyism and bribery.
- *Support in International Financial and Capital Markets.* Turkey has actively sought, and obtained, the U.S. support in its dealings with the IMF and other international lending institutions. The Turkish government has signalled that it will address over the next two years a series of macro-economic stability measures. By implementing this agenda, Turkey hopes to lower inflation to manageable level and to secure continued IMF support. This way, the door is likely to be opened to new inflows of foreign capital. Cheaper access to funds, in turn, will mean more profitable investments for businesses, more employment for Turkey, and bigger tax revenues – with smaller budget deficits. Thus, Turkey will firmly be on track for vigorous growth and broad-based prosperity. The continued support to Turkey from the White House and the Treasury is critical in that process.
- *Tourism potential from the U.S.* appears promising. However, Turkey's share in the American travel market does not do justice to the country's natural and historical appeal. In 1997, 350,000 Americans visited Turkey. This figure was 200,000 in 1990. The U.S. ranked 10th among Turkey's major tourist markets in 1990, it is now in the fifth place. Average annual increase in the number of Americans visiting Turkey has been about 10 % since 1990. This steady increase and trends are promising but plainly nowhere near the potential volume.

3. Greater Co-operation and Convergence on Regional Issues

For Turkey, the world of the 2000s is a place of far fewer constraints and far greater possibilities than the era of the Cold War. Within the means its resources have allowed, Turkish diplomacy has been quick to exploit new opportunities. Regional co-operation

⁹ The attraction of Turkey as a place to invest is not limited to the size of its market or the institutional guarantees that minimize risks to investors. Turkey has a modern, efficient banking industry, a fast-developing stock exchange and a business friendly environment where the American investor can operate with peace of mind.

between Turkey and the U.S. has been enhanced by frequent, detailed consultations between senior policymakers on regional issues of common concern, as well as on transnational problems such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime.

In the post-Cold War era Turkey's manifold strategic roles are now widely recognized: a moderate, pro-Western state in an unstable area; a rare, probably unique, example of democracy, however flawed, in a Muslim-majority state; a supporter of Israeli-Palestinian peace; a base for Operation Northern Watch, which enforces a no-fly zone in northern Iraq; an ideological counterweight to Iran; a buffer against resurgence of Russian aggression; a forceful but peaceful and anti-separatist advocate of the causes of besieged Muslims in its region (Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kosovo), all of whose kin are liberally represented in Turkey's population mix; an important, non-Russian line of communication with the West, and to some extent a role model, for the still-unsteady Turkic states of the former Soviet Union; and a potential outlet for Caspian Sea energy resources as an alternative to Russian and Iranian routes.

Russia is the dominant power in the former Soviet geography, but, over time, as a Turcophone elite inevitably replaces the current Russophone elite, Turkish gains are likely to be considerable. As nearby neighbor to a Russia (about whose peaceful, democratic evolution Washington is becoming increasingly doubtful), Turkey provides insurance for the U.S. as a land buffer, a sea-lane bottleneck, a forward base, and an intelligence-gathering post, as in Cold War days. As an alternative line of communication, literally and figuratively, for the Turkic states of the former Soviet Union over which Russia seeks continued dominance, Turkey reinforces American policy to support the independence of those states and to draw them more closely to the West (and to "lightly contain" Russia's imperial ambitions).

Ankara and Washington see eye-to-eye on Russia in the sense that it is clearly a critically important country in any evaluation of how to ensure peace and prosperity and instability in this region. It is obviously critically important for Turkey, in terms of its economic relations with Russia, to say nothing of its security relations in this part of the world. From the U.S. standpoint, Russia is also a strategic partner --albeit of a different sort. Getting that relationship right is of vital importance for Turkey and the U.S.¹⁰ The Turkish-Russian relationship of today is far more relaxed than it has been for decades. Commerce has boomed. In the 1990s, bilateral trade and Turkish investment in Russia have shot upward. The official trade volume has more than doubled, from \$1.9 billion in 1992 to \$4.1 billion in 1997, with unofficial trade, the so-called "suitcase trade," worth several billion dollars more. In 1997, Russia was the second-largest market for "official" Turkish exports.

The Turkish-Russian conflict of interests is more visible in the *Caucasus*. The continuing closure of Armenian border with Turkey due to its occupation of the Azerbaijani territory is hurting both sides economically and retarding the development and integration of the region as a whole. President Aliyev of Azerbaijan emphasizes the need to resolve conflict with Armenia peacefully by providing the Nagorna-Karabakh with the highest degree of autonomy in return for the Armenia withdrawal from the occupied Azeri land (20% of the total Azerbaijan territory) and return of more than one million refugees to their homes.

¹⁰ The Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire fought more than a dozen wars over a quarter-millennium from the late seventeenth century until First World War. In 1945, Soviet claims on the Turkish Straits and portions of eastern Turkey impelled Ankara's decision to seek the protection of membership in the Western alliance. During the Cold War, Turkey anchored NATO's southern flank against the Soviet Union. Throughout the Cold War, however, and particularly after 1962, Turkish strategic planners questioned how much NATO, with its primary focus on the central front, would do to deter a Soviet attack on eastern Turkey

President Aliyev also proposed the establishment of a land corridor linking the Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia in exchange for a similar corridor between the Nakhcivan enclave and Azerbaijan. As a former Politburo member and the first deputy Prime Minister in the Soviet government, he believes that Moscow could have prevented this conflict back in 1984, but instead added salt to old wounds in order to widen the rift between Azerbaijan and Armenia for maintaining its strategic interests in the region¹¹. Azerbaijani leaders hope that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict might be solved through U.S. intervention.

Armenia is predictably resentful of Washington's cordial relations with Azerbaijan. The U.S.-Azerbaijan "rapprochement" will most likely decrease Russian and Iranian influence in the Caucasus.¹² If the U.S. is going to reap anything but troubles from southern Eurasia, it would have to deny the Russians forward deployment of troops on the southern rim of the Caucasus whose radial arc would be 500 miles or less to the oil fields of Iraq and the Gulf. Preventing the Russian-Iranian entente from flowering into an alliance in which China might also take part should also be a major Turkish-U.S. strategic objective in the region.

Turkey established working relations with all the states of the *former Yugoslavia*, including Serbia. It developed close ties with Muslim Albania and with Macedonia, to the initial annoyance of Greece. Turkey took on Bosnia and its sufferings as a special cause. Uniquely a member of both NATO and the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO), Turkey played a role in convincing NATO to step up its pressure on Serbia, while urging restraint upon ICO members unhappy with the West's initially hesitant approach.

Turkey raised its regional profile and value to the U.S. through its expanding co-operation with Israel. Whereas sympathy for the Palestinians (along with other considerations) had stifled prospects for *Turkish-Israeli* relations for decades, recent peace process gains in the early 1990s threw open the door of opportunity. Within three years, both partners had concluded three significant agreements, on military cooperation and training, on defense industrial cooperation, and on free trade. Israeli and Turkish air forces now exercise in one another's air space; Israel is upgrading older-generation Turkish jet fighters, with other arms deals in the works; senior-level visits, both civilian and military, are frequent. Bilateral trade was expected to exceed \$1 billion in 1999, with Israel having emerged as virtually Turkey's leading export market in the Middle East.

Turkey's status as a bulwark against adventurist countries on its borders will continue to place Turkey at the center of international efforts to maintain regional peace and stability. Within the framework of the *Operation Northern Watch*, US military airplanes take off daily from the Turkish base of Incirlik to patrol the no-fly zone in the Iraqi sky. Attention has not focused on the issue in Turkey lately, but the flights are continuing. Many in Turkey do not believe that U.S. policy towards Iraq is going to succeed in overthrowing Saddam Hussein any time soon, and would like to see the sanctions, which harm Turkey's commercial

¹¹ Azerbaijan also complains of Russia's attempts to militarize the Caucasus by supplying Armenia with SS-300 missiles and MIG fighters. Another evidence is the signing of a military alliance in mid-February 2000 between Belarus and Armenia in addition to the one that already exists between Russia and Armenia as evidence of the anti-Azerbaijan coalition.

¹² But the Americans are cautious, afraid to mar relations with the Kremlin. True enough, Moscow and Washington are still rivals in international affairs. But the U.S., while not minding penetrating into the south Caucasus, would rather do so through economic means. Also, unlike in the Cold War years, its rivalry with Russia is not of the confrontational quality any more.

interests, lifted. Yet, it is argued that there is far more that Turkey and the U.S. have in common vis-a-vis Iraq than divides them, either in policy or in practical terms¹³.

The Turkish economy was hit very badly after the Gulf crisis. Before the Gulf crisis, Turkey's economic and trade relations with Iraq were substantial, and Iraq was one of Turkey's largest trading partners. But, the economic embargo imposed on Iraq after the Gulf War disrupted the Turkish-Iraqi trade and investment. According to some modest estimates, Turkey has lost during the past nine years more than \$35 billion on that account. This excludes the losses that have been incurred in the Gulf region because of the increased transportation difficulties as a result of the restrictions on Iraq. So, Turkey's partnership with the U.S. cost it a heavy price,

One of the most pressing issues of this millennium will be the management of the limited *freshwater resources* of the world, particularly in the Middle East. An important number of these resources are found in transboundary rivers, lakes and aquifers. The natural availability of water has decreased as a result of many different factors, and suddenly a number of regions are experiencing water scarcity, many for the first time. The problem can now be seen to be making itself felt at the level of international politics, as water scarcity leads to disputes between states, often resulting in violent conflict. As a result, water has taken on a strategic role for many states. Since the likelihood of discovering new sources of water for exploitation is slim, the alternative and perhaps the only way ahead must be the formulation of an international legal framework governing the use and allocation of scarce water resources, allowing for the equitable and efficient utilization of shared watercourses¹⁴.

While lasting solutions to issues that have plagued Turkey's relationship with *Greece* for years remain elusive, channels remain open. President Clinton made clear during his meetings with Prime Minister Ecevit and Prime Minister Simitis the priority that the U.S. continues to give to a just, lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. And it is encouraging to see recent cooperation between Turkey and Greece in responding to the earthquake disasters and Kosovo humanitarian crisis. The "earthquake diplomacy" opened the way for a partial Turkish-Greek rapprochement. The *Cyprus* issue has been a particular problem that involved (for strategic reasons and under the pressure of ethnic lobbies in the Capitol) the U.S. for the last forty years. Cyprus remains a potential threat to stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, which could lead to renewed confrontation between Greece and Turkey, threatening security in the Mediterranean and possibly spilling into other areas, particularly the Balkans. The greatest obstacle in Cyprus is the denial of equal status to the Turkish Cypriot community¹⁵.

4. Turkish-U.S. Defense Relationship

¹³ Both countries are insistent on preserving the territorial integrity and independence of Iraq. Both insist that there should be no Kurdish State established in the north. Both insist that the PKK should not be able to take advantage of the situation there. Both agree that everything possible should be done to meet humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. Both agree that the military threat that Saddam Hussein has represented in the past must never be allowed to be reconstituted, either in conventional or in non-conventional terms. Both agree that Iraq should meet the obligations that it assumed at the end of the Gulf War, and which it has avoided since.

¹⁴ Turkey's control over the supply of rich fresh water sources could affect the politics of the region, shape inter-Arab alliances, and even alter the substance and outcome of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In addition, conflicts over water could combine with other underlying forces of instability, serving as a catalyst for region-wide violence.

¹⁵ If there is to be a federative solution then the fact that this cannot happen between a community and an independent state ought to be recognized. The *de facto* situation is such that there are two democratic states on the island. These two states are supposed to get together and form a bi-zonal, bi-communal Cyprus federation. The sine qua non of this is political equality. So long as the Greek Cypriot community does not accept this equality, no solution to the Cyprus problem is possible. Finding a way to move this problem off dead center remains a priority for Ankara and Washington.

The security aspect of the bilateral relationship today does not seem to be as prominent as in the Cold War era, although ties are still very close. Washington's military influence has fallen somewhat in Ankara, mainly because of a steady decrease in levels of U.S. security and economic assistance, which was ended completely in the 1999 fiscal year. Although the economic and political costs of assistance for Turkey had grown in recent years -- security assistance was offered only as market-rate loans and Congress often tried to attach political conditions to economic assistance -- many Turkish foreign and security policy-makers are concerned that termination of aid sends a wrong signal that the U.S. is downgrading its military relations with Turkey.

The Turkish military foresees a spending of over \$30 billion on arms in the next eight years and up to \$150 billion by 2030. Among the big-ticket items to be contracted over the next decade are 1,000 main battle tanks, 145 attack helicopters, and four airborne early warning aircraft. Over the past decade-plus, Turkey has acquired the building-blocks of a modern conventional force. Probably the most important addition to its arsenal has been the highly regarded F-16 fighter aircraft, which Turks co-produce with the U.S. firm Lockheed Martin. Turkey has acquired more than two hundred F-16s since they began rolling off the assembly line in 1989. Ankara has also contracted with Israel to modernize more than one hundred of its F-4 and F-5 fighters.

Turkey's arsenal also received a major boost in the early 1990s as a result of "cascading," a process that resulted from the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) limiting the military equipment that states of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact are allowed to maintain¹⁶. In addition to F-16s and M-60s, Turkey now has multiple-launch rocket systems, Cobra attack helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and a counter-battery radar system. It has also undertaken modernization of its navy, significantly increasing the number of modern submarines, frigates, and anti-ship-missile-capable combatants.

A more significant reason for the decline in U.S. military aid to Turkey is the politicization of arms sales. Turkey prefers and depends on U.S.-origin military equipment -- 80 percent of its military inventory is U.S.-made -- but it has found the U.S. an increasingly less reliable source of arms in recent times. For example, a group of pro-Greek Congressmen held up the transfer of three frigates to Turkey for over a year in 1996 to 1997. Human rights concerns in the U.S. have so far stifled Turkey's ability to purchase attack helicopters. In ending foreign aid and withholding arms sales, Washington forsakes means of influencing Turkey¹⁷.

On the other hand, if recent events are any guide, the importance of a strong U.S.-Turkish defense relationship will not diminish in the 21st century. The vitality and strategic importance of Turkey's military alliance with the U.S. is manifested in the presence of thousands of U.S. military personnel at bases in Balikesir, Bandirma and Incirlik, as well as in the joint operations undertaken within the framework of the NATO or the U.N. The signing in February 1999 of a \$517 million agreement to purchase Sikorsky helicopters underscored Turkey's continuing appreciation of the value of American defense equipment.

¹⁶ As a result of the CFE, Turkey received the excess top-of-the-line equipment formerly owned by the U.S. and, to some extent, its European allies, who were paring down to meet CFE-required limits. In turn, Ankara substituted this equipment for its older equipment as it satisfied its own CFE-required limits. The most important gain for Turkey in this process was its acquisition of nearly a thousand U.S.-made M-60 tanks to replace M-47s and M-48s dating back to Korean War and early-1960s-era.

¹⁷ FMS (foreign military sales) loans initially started as 3 %, and now it has reached the level of 10.8 %, which is, of course, a rather heavy burden. The growing Turkish discontent has been repeatedly brought to the attention of the White House, but no progress was made on this matter.

Co-operation is expanding into new areas like ballistic missile defense. Turkey's deployment of F-16's for the Kosovo crisis underscored the U.S. interest in finding ways to ensure that the Turkish armed forces use the same equipment as the U.S. military.

The Turkish-U.S. strategists are concerned about the new European defense strategy, which was adopted during the December 1999 EU Summit in Helsinki. By establishing the capacity to field military forces of up to 60,000, and the political and military structures needed to direct them, the EU leaders have finally moved to create a proper security arm. It is less than a European army is, but the nucleus will be there and it will have far-reaching implications for the character of the EU. No matter what the verdict on their full membership candidacy, Turks remain unhappy about the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Ankara and Washington believe that ESDI could marginalize Turkey's role in European defense in the future.

5. *Human Rights and Democracy*

A consensus has emerged among Turks that their standards of democracy, human rights, and rule of law should be on a par with the highest standards internationally. It is a source of concern to many of them -- as it is to their friends in the U.S. and elsewhere. The current Turkish government is giving high priority to human rights and the expansion of democracy. A generation ago Turkey was an overwhelmingly agricultural country. Today it is an industrial one with average economic growth of 5 % a year over the last three decades. Majority of Turkish people lives in urban areas. One interesting sign of this is the existence of 20 national and 300 local TV channels, and over 1,000 local private radios around the country. When a society moves towards becoming an advanced industrial economy as fast as Turkey does, there is always a price to be paid. The social costs can be high. Institutions, laws, rules often lag behind¹⁸.

Many of Turkey's legal arrangements were made several generations ago for a traditional agricultural society. They basically derive from the Napoleonic code. Since then the world has moved on and so has the Turkish society. Many other countries have gone through a parallel legal administrative revolution in the course of their journey into Europe, moving away from the Napoleonic system designed to regulate a centralized agrarian society. Turkey's similar transition occurs in a part of the world where democracy is relatively a recent phenomenon. That is why although changes are being made, they do not always happen at the speed, which everyone would wish.

Turkey is seen as a model for Islamic countries for the sake of its democracy and modernization. Of course, some circles try to subvert its secular regime, but it has been solidly entrenched, and its influence is becoming wider in the world. There are, today, a greater number of Islamic countries progressing towards democracy or practicing a degree of democracy than a decade or two earlier. Turkey's example has played an important role in this respect, because the Turkish experiment has proven that Islam can be compatible with modernity, with secularism, and with democracy.

The issue of democracy and human rights surfaced in President Clinton's statements in Ankara, but the criticism was carefully candy-coated as the U.S. president spoke of "an impressive momentum in the last few years" and expressed hope of "continued progress, especially in the area of freedom of expression." The Americans, who focus mainly on

¹⁸ "Latest Developments Regarding Human Rights in Turkey", Mesut Senol, p.130-142, *Perceptions*, December 1998-February 1999, Volume III No.4.

Turkey's strategic importance, as a gateway to the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Balkans, have been less vocal about human rights than the Europeans.

Of course, the continued existence of a separatist, terrorist campaign puts a brake of some degree on human rights or democratization developments, but still there is considerable progress. The fact that even Kurdish terrorist groups have acknowledged that separatism is no longer an option, that the arms struggle should be abandoned, does represent a qualitative change in the situation, and one that Turkey may be able to exploit to its advantage to put this chapter behind it. It is not easy to prescribe solutions to a problem as complex as this. But this is clearly a time when imagination, innovation, flexibility will be important, as Turkey seeks to take advantage of all of these developments, and produce a situation in the southeast which is a lasting and a just one, and which will lead to the prosperity and integration of all the citizens of Turkey who live there.

By accelerating the steps towards greater democracy and respect for human rights, Turkey will be able to tap the full potential of its rich, multi-ethnic society and traditions; exploit the recent, favorable turn of events precipitated by Ocalan's capture; and refocus international interest in Turkey to more favorable and profitable ground. Through steps such as restructuring state security courts, early passage of a repentance law, ending the state of emergency in provinces where the security situation warrants, and concrete action to improve socio-economic conditions in the southeast, Turkey will launch a process of healing that can begin to close the chapter of its long struggle with terrorist separatism.

What About the Triangle of Turkey, the EU and the U.S.?

Keeping Turkey tied tightly to the West remains a strong American priority. That is the principal reason why the U.S. worked very hard behind the scene to support Turkey's joining the E.U. There are suggestions that Turkey's presence in the EU might not be in Washington's interests. Yet, Washington stresses that it is inconceivable to imagine a Europe that moves into the 21st century increasingly peaceful and stable, and secure and prosperous, without Turkey being an integral part of that process as well.

U.S. officials argue that this is not a zero-sum game. Washington will compete as effectively as it can with its European rivals for commercial and geopolitical advantages in Turkey. In the eyes of Washington, Europe and Turkey are inextricably linked by history, by geography, by economics and by destiny, and that Turkey will be part of Europe fully and completely at some point, as the logic of these realities plays itself out. A deepening of Europe's strategic and cultural reservations has long reinforced economic and practical bars to Turkish integration with Europe. U.S. officials repeatedly warned that a Turkey rejected by the EU would be a strategic loss for the West and urged the EU not to exclude Turkey for religious or cultural reasons.

Although Turkey was included as an official candidate in December 1999 to the EU enlargement process, the E.U. views Turkey in a markedly different context than the United States. Non-strategic factors, especially human rights and the Kurdish issue, have led to increasing strains in Turkey's relations with the EU. If Turkey does not join the EU in the near future, Ankara could find itself excluded from the key decisions that affect Europe's--and its own--security. This in turn could further estrange Ankara from Europe and deepen the discord between Europe and the U.S., which strongly supports Turkey's bid for EU membership.

Indeed, the December 1999 decisions in Helsinki will have profound consequences for Turkey and the EU. They could transform the character of the EU. By including Turkey, it would accept a frontier well beyond the borders of what used to be called Christendom. The acceptance of Turkey as a candidate for the E.U. is fuelling expectations that the move will create the impetus needed to solve the country's problems ranging from human rights violations to double-digit inflation.

Prime Minister Ecevit confirmed this view by saying that the prize of candidacy, denied it two years ago at an EU summit in Luxembourg, opened "new horizons" for Turkey. He also served notice that Turkey would meet the membership criteria faster than many in the EU expected – by 2004. However, Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem was more realistic in spelling out a 15-year perspective for achieving full membership. Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis said Turkey's EU candidacy marked "a historic shift towards peace, security and development in our region. Greece and Turkey had the "basis for a new relationship". In the longer-term, Greece would be able to pull back troops from the Aegean islands opposite Turkey and cut defense spending. However, euphoria in Turkey has been tempered by recognition that the path to EU membership would require a big adjustment.

Candidacy designation may soothe--but probably will not heal--Turkey's breach with Europe. First of all, many Turks see a decision on candidacy as a result more of U.S. pressure rather than European change of heart. Second, Turks understand that the designation "candidate," whatever its psychological and symbolic impact, is only the first step in a very uncertain membership process. Actual negotiations for membership, which would take years, would not begin any time soon, at least not before Turkey meets certain political expectations¹⁹. Given Turkey's economic and human rights problems, nobody expects its full membership to become a serious prospect for a decade or more.

Even that is a significant statement, if one considers the deep misgivings many Europeans harbor about letting in a nation of 65 million Muslims with a population growing faster than any EU state. Some Europeans are concerned that Turkey within the EU is likely to act like the United Kingdom – as a close and trusted ally of the U.S., not only on security issues, but also on economic and trade disputes. However, the possibility of closer ties with Brussels eventually bringing Turkey closer to the EU positions is equally strong.

Yes, Differences Exist

The extent to which Turkish and U.S. strategic policies and views have merged since 1995 is striking. Surprisingly, this trend has mostly involved the movement of American positions towards Turkish positions, rather than the other way around. The U.S. has largely abandoned its early-to-mid 1990s hopes of smoothly integrating Russia into the Western family of democratic nations²⁰; instead, it has come to share many of Turkey's doubts about the future stability and peaceful regional intentions of that nation. (Ironically, the U.S. has even warned Turkey against the danger of becoming too energy-dependent on Russia.)

In 1995 (and again in Kosovo), the U.S. shed its earlier squeamishness about the use of force against Slobodan Milosevic's Yugoslavia, as Turkey had long encouraged. The American government shows appreciation for Azerbaijan's strategic energy importance in a way it did not five years ago. For its part, Turkey has softened its view of Russia since the former superpower has emerged as an important Turkish market and its army proved nearly

¹⁹ "Dreaming of Europe", Dominique Moisi, p.44-62, *Foreign Policy*, summer 1999, No.115.

²⁰ "Russia and the West: Changing Course?", Richard F. Staar, p.63-80, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.6 No.4, Fall 1995.

incompetent in the Chechen war. On Iraq, Turkey seems to have accepted, though grudgingly, that Baghdad will not restore its authority over northern Iraq and that sanctions will not be fully lifted until Iraq complies with all UN resolutions.

The U.S. strongly lobbied for the customs union between Turkey and the EU and for Turkey's inclusion in the list of candidates for membership in the EU. American intelligence services are widely believed to have assisted Turkey in the apprehension of Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya. Turkey continues to allow the "Operation Northern Watch"²¹, while Washington gives Turkey almost unqualified support in the fight against separatist terrorism. These facts, however, tell only part of the story. Of course, convergence has not been total. But, even where some differences of vision, policy, or emphasis exist - whether on Russia, Nagorno-Karabagh, or Iraq - these differences seem less emotive today than they were five years ago and less threatening to the overall health of Turkish-American relations. Washington's rising appreciation of Turkey's value in the 1990s does not mean that all is, or will be, smooth sailing in bilateral ties.

Although American-Turkish dialogue on energy, trade, and security issues has expanded considerably since the beginning of 1998, the list of achievements leaves much to be desired. The two countries have not seen eye to eye on Cyprus and Aegean issues; and Turkey's human rights record had long been a major concern for Washington. Yet it was usually possible for Turkey and the U.S. to address these problems without much public friction. Something changed in 1996. Washington cautiously watched former Prime Minister Erbakan's overtures to Iran and Libya, but was relieved to see Turkey's foreign policy would not be significantly tilted away from its alliances with NATO, Israel, and the West.

It is not uncommon to hear Turkish diplomats complaining publicly about "the alien factors that harm Turkish-American relations". In the Turkish media, one can often find references to "evil lobbies" in Washington. The target, of course, is the Greek American, the Armenian American, and as a more recent phenomenon, the pro-Kurdish lobbies. There is no doubt that all three are groups taking an adversarial approach to Turkey's past and present policies. They tend to work together in their campaigns against initiatives aimed at improving American-Turkish cooperation. They reflect the strong feelings of ethnic and religious pride and nationalism typical of any diaspora. Occasionally, these lobbies persuade the U.S. Congress to adopt decisions that do not serve Turkey's best interests. Yet these lobbies are essentially what American democracy is about. What Turkey has called "an alien factor," is in fact "an indigenous factor" of American policy-making for Americans.

How Much Do We Know Each Other?

Although this is difficult to quantify (and somewhat sensitive to discuss), Turkish-American relations still suffer from the fact that most Americans see Turkey as an unfamiliar terrain, culturally and politically. In part, this situation is a function of the fact that Turkish-Americans are relatively few in number, an estimated 300-400,000. Moreover, those who have been visibly successful are not widely known as Turkish-Americans. Turkey can compensate significantly for this disadvantage in two ways: through stepped-up people-to-people contacts and through reforms that lead to what Americans will more readily recognize as a Western standard of democratic performance. On the first, there have been steady

²¹ The difficulty in reconciling the respective national interests of Turkey and the US vis à vis Iraq continued as an ever-present source of friction. Although Turkey continues to support "Operation Northern Watch", and the US has been tolerant of Turkish incursions into northern Iraq, the two allies differ in their regional threat assessments. For the US, Saddam Hussein is the primary threat to stability and peace in the region. For Turkey, the biggest source of instability is a self-governing Kurdish entity in northern Iraq.

improvements. Increasing numbers of Turkish students have been studying in the U.S. over the past two decades - currently, an estimated 15,000²².

Many Turks know the U.S. through American pop culture, but few have even a rudimentary grasp of its complicated political machinery. For example, decisions taken by a sub-committee of one house of Congress are often misconstrued as decisions of the Congress itself. Not all policy makers in Turkey understand how Washington works. After so many years of close alliance and friendship, politicians in Ankara still have a hard time grasping that the executive and legislative branches in the U.S. is not a monolith. The Administration and the Congress may differ, and sometimes even the Pentagon and the State Department may differ in their approaches to Turkey. It takes a long process of discussion, lobbying, and more often than not tough negotiations to finalize policies in Washington. Clearly both sides need to improve mutual understanding and dialogue in order to better appreciate each other's interests and sensitivities.

Looking to the Future

True, there is a huge potential for co-operation between the two countries, but realism should prevail because high expectations breed deep frustration and might not be so healthy for a lasting relationship. The vision of a Turkish-U.S. strategic partnership is, in our opinion, a realistic one if crafted in a mutually serving fashion. While Washington has a clear vision of Turkey in its 21st century strategies as articulated by President Clinton in Ankara, it is difficult to say the same for Turkey. Ankara will do well if it redefines its long-term economic and geopolitical interests (of course, without putting all its eggs in the same basket). Also, Turkey should not let Washington perceive it as a country to be taken for granted or lightly when it comes to articulating and jealously defending well-defined national interests.

It is certainly not the U.S. think-tanks or government organisations, which should provide Turkey with a roadmap regarding its future strategic directions. The momentum must come from within - the Parliament, the relevant government departments, the private industry, the independent think-tanks, the media, and academics, which are all major stake-holders in the future of the Turkish-U.S. strategic partnership. What will the relationship look like in the first quarter of the new century? That will in large measure be determined by Turkey's own course in the years ahead. Turkey today faces a genuine window of opportunity. Its location, demographics, natural resources and national character have long given it strong advantages - both in its region and globally. The new factors enhance and highlight the strong helping hand Turkey has been given for the 21st century. If Turkey plays its cards right in the years ahead, there is every reason to believe it could take off. Clarity of purpose and decisiveness are necessary to play it to a successful conclusion.

What is Good for the U.S.: Stronger or Weaker Turkey?

Perhaps the biggest issue in the relations for the years ahead is one to which American policy-makers have so far probably given little consideration: How will Washington view a Turkey that is stronger, more prosperous, more regionally assertive, and more foreign - policy - independent - in short, the Turkey that is already emerging?

²² In the end, they can prevail because, unlike the anti-Turkey circles, they do not have a negative agenda driven by destructive impulses like hatred and prejudice. They are pursuing positive objectives that are clearly in the interest of both countries, such as building new cultural bridges of friendship, enhancing mutually beneficial economic ties and protecting our defense and security cooperation. In short, they are trying to preserve and cherish what is good for both Turkey and the U.S.

The reasons for Turkey's greater assertiveness in recent years are various and overlapping: more prosperity; a better-equipped and more experienced military; the decline of neighboring states; greater regional opportunity; and a greater sense of policy independence marked by the ending of restraints imposed by the Cold War²³. This increased independence is also influenced by the loosening of politically dependent ties and allegiance to Western Europe, and, to some extent, by the declining reliability of the U.S. as a source of sophisticated armaments. The notion of increased Turkish foreign policy activism is not new. This activism represents a trend resulting from structural factors in Turkey's domestic, regional, and international environment and, as such, that this trend is likely to grow in the years ahead.

Though no doubt gratified to see Turkey shaking off decades of chronic economic problems and political instability, American policy-makers are probably ambivalent about the prospect of Turkey's emergence as a genuine regional power. The U.S. might show little interest in building Turkey into a strong regional power capable of enforcing common bilateral interests²⁴. On the other hand, one should not forget that the possibilities for cooperation with a stronger ally are far greater than with a weaker one. Plus, the EU is waiting in the wings to increase its leverage on Turkey. Whatever U.S. attitudes on these questions, a stronger, more activist Turkey is emerging. Doubts Washington harbors about the reliability of a powerful Turkish ally may be assuaged by Turkey's track record of support for most major U.S. policy initiatives since late 1940s. It would therefore be in the best interests of Turkey and the U.S. to broaden and deepen the existing relations on a clearly defined path and with an eye to the future architecture of the world geopolitics and economy.

Then it will be a truly “win-win” situation for both sides.

²³ Throughout the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was believed to be passive. Turkey focused its energy on internal development and sought to avoid foreign tensions that could divert it from that goal. Traditionally, Turkey viewed itself as an underdeveloped state, its military ill-equipped and focused strictly on protecting borders and maintaining internal order, not projecting power.

²⁴ This reflects constraints on U.S. resources; domestic political considerations, particularly with regard to U.S. supporters of Greece and Armenia; skepticism regarding Turkey's regional image, which is still colored by age-old rivalries and an imperial past; concerns about Turkey's human rights shortcomings; and a certain wariness among some officials as to whether a strong Turkey able to act as an independent regional force would necessarily regularly behave in ways that enhance U.S. interests.