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Dissertation

MILITIA POLITICS

THE FORMATION AND ORGANISATION OF IRREGULAR ARMED FORCES IN SUDAN (1985-2001) AND LEBANON (1975-1991)

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You have to know that there are two kinds of captain praised. One is those who have done great things with an army ordered by its own natural discipline, as were the greater part of Roman citizens and others who have guided armies. These have had no other trouble than to keep them good and see to guiding them securely. The other is those who not only have had to overcome the enemy, but, before they arrive at that, have been necessitated to make their army good and well ordered. These without doubt merit much more praise…

Niccolò Machiavelli, The Art of War (2003, 161)

Abstract

This thesis provides an analysis of the organizational politics of state supporting armed groups, and demonstrates how group cohesion and institutionalization impact on the patterns of violence witnessed within civil wars. Using an historical comparative method, strategies of leadership control are examined in the processes of organizational evolution of the Popular Defence Forces, an Islamist Nationalist militia, and the allied Lebanese Forces, a Christian Nationalist militia. The first group was a centrally coordinated network of irregular forces which fielded ill-disciplined and semi-autonomous military units, and was responsible for severe war crimes. Equally responsible for war crimes, such as the Sabra and Shatila massacre of Shi'a and Palestinian civilians in 1982, the second group, nonetheless, became an autonomous military formation with an established territorial canton with a high degree of control over military units. After first analysing the political and institutional context of formation of these two groups, detailed case study analysis illustrates how political-military leaderships consolidated internal authority over combat units. At first, this authority relied on a bricolage of norms, motivations and institutions, as highly diverse, loosely coordinated actors mobilised in response to insecurity. As key leadership figures emerged, these groups evolved into hybrid organisations, divided between central organisations and locally embedded units operating according to localised security arenas decoupled from central military or political strategy. Central authority was then consolidated through a process of progressive institutionalisation and expansion, as centralised control was established, often violently, over resources, recruitment and discipline. This thesis shows, how militias, formed in allegiance with the state evolved into organizations rivalling state sovereignty and exploiting the communities which they claimed to defend.

Sudan

Lebanon

armed forces

formation

organisaition

militia politics

civil war

armed conflict

violence

state

guerrilla warfare

tribal mobilisation

Abstract (German)

Die vorliegende Arbeit zielt darauf ab, zwei Forschungslücken in der Literatur über Bürgerkriege zu schließen. Erstens, die Analyse der Strukturen nicht-staatlicher bewaffneter Gruppen. Zweitens, die Untersuchung der Politik von Milizen, als Form nicht-staatlicher Gruppen, denen in gegenwärtigen Bürgerkriegen eine zunehmende Bedeutung zukommt. Diese beiden Bereiche werden mit Hilfe einer historisch vergleichenden Analyse am Beispiel von zwei Milizen, die im sudanesischen und libanesischen Bürgerkrieg kämpften, untersucht. Die "Popular Defense Forces", 1989 von der Regierung des Sudan mobilisiert, wurden zum Sammelbecken für undisziplinierte und teilautonome militärische Einheiten, die schwerste Kriegsverbrechen begingen. Die "Lebanese Forces", eine maronitisch-nationalistische Miliz, wurde von einer Koalition konservativer christlicher Parteien gegründet. Nach dem Zusammenbruch des Staates 1975-6 wurde diese Miliz zu einer autonomen politischen Einheit mit einem territorial abgegrenzten Kanton im Osten von Beirut. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Prozesse und Strategien, die diesen Milizen die Etablierung von Herrschaft ermöglichte. Die beiden Gruppen entwickelten sich zu Organisationen, die die zu verteidigenden Gebiete beherrschten und mit staatlichen Geldgebern verbündet waren, aber auch in Konkurrenz zu ihnen standen. Diese Arbeit identifiziert drei Mechanismen, die die Entwicklungen von Milizen im Laufe ihrer Zeit bestimmen. Der Erste erklärt die Formierung von Milizen als ein Bricolage von politischen und nicht-politischen Antworten auf Unsicherheit. Der Zweite erklärt, wie sich Milizen in hybride Organisationen, von zentraler Mobilisierungseinheit und lokal eingebettete Organisationen, entwickeln. Der Dritte führt die Kontrolle des Zentrums über die lokalen Organisationen auf die Macht über Ressourcen zurück. Die Arbeit schließt mit dem Entwurf eines alternativen analytischen Modells für die Untersuchung von Bürgerkriegen.

Sudan

Lebanon

bewaffnete Einheiten

Entwicklung

Organisation

Miliz

Bürgerkrieg

Konflikt

Gewalt

Staat

Guerilla

Stamm

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Note on Transliteration

No specific system of Arabic to English transliteration has been used in this thesis. Instead the most commonly used English variants of Arabic words have been used consistently throughout. With regard to most Sudanese Arabic words, this is unlikely to provoke any confusion, Lebanese Arabic, however, has developed various styles of transliteration. As a guide to the usage in this thesis Gemayel is used instead of Jumayyil, Ashrafieh is used instead of Ashrafiyyah and Geagea is used instead of Ja'ja. All transliterated and foreign words, except place and personal names, have been italicised.

Abbreviations

Sudan

GoS	Government of Sudan
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
NIF	National Islamic Front
PDF	Popular Defence Forces
PPF	Popular Police Force
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SPLA/M	Sudan People’s Liberation Army/ Movement

Lebanon

ADF	Arab Deterrent Force
FSI	Forces de Sécurité Intérieure
GoC	Guardians of the Cedars
IDF	Israeli Defence Force
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
LF	Lebanese Forces
NLP	National Liberal Party
PRM	Palestinian Resistance Movement (collective name for the diverse Palestinian guerrilla movements)
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

Sources

AI	Amnesty International
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group

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1 Introduction

Where commands are no longer obeyed, the means of violence are of no use; ...

Everything depends on the power behind the violence.

Hannah Arendt, On Violence (1973, 117)

In 2003 I interviewed two men, both veterans of militias with a reputation for brutality and atrocity. One was a Sudanese Muslim who had followed the call to *Jihad* issued by an Islamist regime; the other, was a Lebanese Christian who had fought in the service of a right-wing political party. They had fought thousands of miles apart, in different continents and in different wars. When asked why he returned to civilian life, the Sudanese Muslim replied with disgust that in the first few years all had "fought with one heart", bound by a shared faith in their religious duty. But as the war dragged on, he said, the combatants became corrupt and fought only for "food and money". When I asked the Lebanese Christian why he had stayed with the militia, fighting continuously for 15 years of civil war, he seemed confused by the question. In response, he repeated, with pride, the party political diatribes that I had read and heard many times before. Through these answers two things became clear to me. Firstly, that the reasons most of those I interviewed gave for joining the militias were different from their reasons for staying or leaving. Secondly, I realised that few of my interviewees cited self-interest in explaining these choices.

In the most poignant case, an interviewee in Lebanon talked at length about the centuries of conflict between Christians and Muslims. He then described in detail the role his militia played within this history. After listening to his account I remarked that these were very developed ideas for a boy who enlisted aged fourteen. He laughed and said he had not learnt any of this until, over ten years later, he had become a commander and had to convince others to fight. Only then did he read books to find out why he was doing what he was doing. Ultimately, he was not quite sure why he had joined; it may have been because some of his friends, all members of a band, had been killed by artillery fire, or perhaps because his father supported a particularly conservative political party. He then shrugged, as if to say that in the end it didn't really matter now. Others I spoke to joined almost by accident, transformed from bystander to participant in a moment's decision. Many admitted that, in retrospect, they had been very young and not fully aware of the implications of their actions. In any case, when the militia and its surrounding community were linked by private ties, shared fears and common leadership, the boundaries between the two were porous. Nevertheless, all of these men remained affiliated, often for years, with groups that in both cases were seen by the outside world as little more than disordered gangs of religious fanatics and murderers.

At the time I was carrying out research on the original topic of this dissertation, namely a comparative investigation into participation in armed groups; why people chose to take up arms and fight either for or against the state. This quickly became impossible. Without massive surveying, hardly feasible in sensitive research arenas, the diversity of responses was unmanageable. As one interviewee in Sudan put it: "One man joined because of his business failing, one because his wife hit him, another because he was in love, a fourth because of his religion. Everybody has their own reasons for joining." In Lebanon I received the same answer from many people: "Why ask that question? Everybody had their personal reasons for joining." After the interviews mentioned above, I began to consider this question from another angle, from the perspective of the group – how did they get people to join and stay loyal, establish discipline and control, and maintain cohesion, hierarchy and direction? And how did these groups change over time?

These are the questions, asked not of armed groups generally, but specifically of militias in civil war[1], which form the subject of this thesis.

[1] As Sambanis (2004b, 816) argues it is "difficult to study civil war without considering how groups in conflict shift from one form of violence to another" and that therefore it is better to identify clear types of groups " … rather than cut across that complex social phenomenon with arbitrary definitions."

1.1 Armed Conflict and Organisations

There is an heroic narrative of war. It has endured throughout history and is still thriving today[2]. In it, from Homer's Iliad and Plato's discussion of the Guardians to the embedded reporting of Operation Iraqi Freedom and CNN's 'Heroes of War', war is described through the eyes of the individual. As in the Napoleonic paintings of 18-19th century or the verse of Rudyard Kipling, the warrior in battle is at the centre of analysis, accumulating through their actions glory or shame.

This account is appealing. It hides from view our powerlessness when faced with war and lessens our instinctive horror. But for those who have fought or come close to war it "is a travesty of reality" (Holmes 2003, 62). War is only partially constituted by actual battles and, although war is fought by individuals, it is waged by organisations. The myth of the warrior is perpetuated because it disguises the reality that war uses individuals "not as men mainly, but as machines" (Thoreau 1996, 3). The myth of war deflects attention from those that wish it fought (Hedges 2003).

In ancient times David remarked unwittingly upon this relationship between war, the warrior and authority when, after defeating Goliath, he chastised the fainthearted in Saul's armies and reminded them that "the Lord saveth not with sword and spear; for the battle is the Lord's" (1 Samuel 17:47). In the modern age, this was expressed by Carl von Clausewitz with his remark that war was no blind act of passion but "a mere continuation of policy by other means," (1989, 119). But in the analysis of modern civil wars it appears this insight has been forgotten.

This thesis analyses modern civil wars from an organisational perspective. It seeks neither to attribute blame nor to provide a voyeuristic understanding of violence by studying individual motivations or actions. Furthermore, it does not study civil war as a generalised phenomenon. Instead it forms a comparative analysis of the formation and organisation of state-supporting militias in two Middle Eastern civil wars.

This approach is based on the belief that the 'new war' narrative, which has emerged in the post-Cold War era is, in reality, just a reversed or anti-heroic variant of the 'warrior's myth' of war. Rather than drawing inspiration from bellicose values, this myth reflects the pacifist normative ideals of Western modernity in which violence is not merited by any cause. In its many guises it portrays sub-state political violence as individual venality or atavism stripped of teleology. The disciplined and reluctant combatant, assumed to be present in Western state warfare, is compared to the uncontrolled bandit or atavistic terrorist of ethnic or irregular war.

This thesis does not seek to deny that modern civil wars are barbaric and senseless but suggests that they are not ontologically different from 'normal' inter-state warfare. Historical accounts suggest that, rather, it is the popular depictions and imaginations of 'old' wars that are frequently idealised. Anthony Beevor's (1998) descriptions of *Rattenkrieg* in Stalingrad as "savage intimacy" in which the inviolability of medical staff, white flags and civilians were routinely ignored; Christopher Browning's (1993) account of the "ordinary men" in Police Battalion 101 responsible for the Final Solution in Poland; the detailed accounts of the horrific events of the 105 US soldiers who mutilated, raped and killed around 500 civilians at My Lai in Vietnam (Belknap 2002) – these all bear witness to the brutality of state warfare. War, whoever fights it, as General Sherman famously told cadets from Ohio in 1880, is "hell", "it is cruelty and you cannot refine it" (Sherman 1990, 601).

By studying two specific cases in detail this work seeks to avoid facile categorisations of 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' types of war. It seeks instead to shed light on the internal structure of the armed groups that fight, and argues that it is through such an organisational analysis that the fundamental differences between civil wars and inter-state wars become clear. This is an empirical study of how militias establish authority over and regulate the behaviour of their members and how they relate to the societies they recruit from and the states that sponsor them.

The investigation rests on a comparative analysis of the processes of organisational change within the life-spans of two state-supporting militias; the Lebanese Forces operational in the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), and the Popular Defence Forces, operational in the Sudanese (1983-2005) civil war.

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[2] See http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq/heroes/index.html, (accessed February 2006).

Identified externally as primarily religious and extremist organisations, the actions and structures of these organisations are disaggregated into different operational levels and chronological stages. This allows us to analyse the interrelations between tactical and strategic decision-making within the organisations, and dissect the changing relationships of a militia with the state and society.

The two militias are shown to be evolving organisations trying to manage competing interests in violence with few resources and weak hierarchies. As a result, they gain only partial control over combatants, creating hybrid structures divided between centralised core units and a decentralised network of defensive forces. These structures are elite driven, and pursue political objectives through armed conflict, but leadership authority is mediated by powerful middle ranking and local leaders, prolonged crises of legitimacy, internal fragmentation, and elite corruption. Nevertheless, taking advantage of the opportunities of civil war, these militias transform from state-supported defensive forces into extremist political-military organisations. Through these transformations, these militias' relationships with the state, their integration into state resource chains and their ideological affiliation to the state, change radically. As resource revenues were institutionalised, recruitment regulated and internal authority secured, the militias sought and gained increasing autonomy from both state and society. They became self-interested organisations in direct or open competition with the state military and dominated the social groups they claimed to protect.

1.2 Methodology

There are enormous difficulties facing any researcher intent on gathering accurate and sufficient data in war-torn countries (see appendix two): primary archival sources are either non-existent or extremely difficult to access; surveying is largely impossible and participant observation of combatant areas is restricted. Even when research is limited to the study of visible outcomes (the events of a war), chronologies are often incomplete and geographically biased towards 'grand' events or urban areas[3].

As a result, many theoretic accounts of civil war are founded on highly aggregated analytic categories or excessively anecdotal evidence. These data deficits have resulted in small observation samples being generalised to justify exaggerated descriptions of, for example, rising global anarchy (Kaplan 1994) or criminally motivated rebellions (Collier 2000a). And many of the theoretical results rely on ambiguous, constructed categories, such as 'warlord' or 'identity', whose analytic utility or causal relevance are questionable[4].

This thesis seeks to minimise these problems in two ways. Firstly, by focusing on organisational, rather group or individual behaviour, this thesis focuses on an actor with a genuine influence over the structural environment of armed conflict. It proposes that a theoretically informed empirical analysis of the formation and internal structure of organisations can provide exploratory insights into how individual and structural behaviour are related in civil war. This study does not treat organisations analytically, as discrete units influenced by reified variables, but studies their empirical reality as fluid collective actors whose boundaries and regulations are fluid and porous. The results of such a study should be seen as complimentary to existing studies of individual behaviour in war. Secondly, by using a *comparative historical* method this thesis respects the integrity of individual cases and provides an analysis of probablistic outcomes and causal mechanisms. Comparative history analyses the historical processes of two or more cases to develop hypotheses about the causes and patterns of change. It is often the only social scientific method able to capture 'macro-dimensional, interdimensional and institutional processes' (della Porta 1995, 15). Whilst the paucity of accurate time-series and micro-level data on civil wars is slowly being remedied[5], comparative history permits the building of theory using fragmented and partial data.

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[3] Of course as King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 6) state "an important topic is worth studying even if little information is available…so long as we honestly report our uncertainty".

[4] For a critical discussion of the utility of 'identity' as a concept see Brubaker and Cooper (2000); for a similar treatment of 'warlord' see Nissen and Radtke (2002).

[5] For example see the Armed Groups project at the University of Calgary, www.armedgroups.org; the Micropolitics of Armed Groups project at Humboldt University, http://www2.rz.hu-berlin.de/mikropolitik/?area=projekt; and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at Prio, http://www.prio.no/page/CSCW/PRIO_menu_buttons/9195/9220.

In consequence, this thesis cannot pretend to be a work of 'barefoot empiricism'[6]. The truth or falsehood of invariant and homogenous causal laws of social phenomena is not established. Instead this thesis emphasises the importance of respect for the case studies (Vaughan 1992, 178) over parsimonious generalisations. Whilst statistical methods seek concomitant variations to build social scientific laws, this thesis seeks genetic explanations rooted in richer and more complete interpretations of the case studies.

By analysing the organisational biographies of the two militias, established from existing literature, archival and over six months of field research, we can observe, in some detail, the processes of organisational development over time. Whilst insight into militia decision-making or the grass roots perspective of participation remains elusive, through comparison of these processes it is possible to inductively hypothesise generalised mechanisms of change. These are conceptualised as short causal paths linking the macrosociolocial observations of structure with the microsociological study of change. These mechanisms (Tilly 2001; Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998; Stinchcombe 1991; Elster 1989) are presented as the 'switches' explaining variance in organisational change[7]. Less formally, they are variables that operate in sequence (Sambanis 2004a, 263) or micro-correlations (Roberts 1996).

There are very few small-n comparative studies of armed groups, although numbers are growing[8]. The requirements in time and resources in gathering the data for just one case can be exceedingly high. Because of these difficulties this thesis may dissatisfy some disciplinary purists. This research seeks to balance original empirical research with the development of theoretical results under extremely difficult research conditions. It seeks to present new case studies and propose directions of research and theory, rather than substantiate or test explanations.

With regard to sources, where ever possible, information has only been accepted when corroborated by independent witnesses or primary literature or previously published in secondary literature. In some cases of particular importance to the narrative or analytic content single sources have been used. These have, however, generally been from respected and independent observers, such as Human Rights Watch, and are indicated in the text by long quotations.

1.3 Case Selection

Due to the particular difficulties of research on armed groups it was impossible to select cases known from the outset to have identical outcomes[9]. In many cases, outcomes themselves could only be

[6] This thesis, by implication, rejects the supposedly revolutionary call for the study of 'analytic narratives' in social science (Bates et al, 1998) – the application of the analytical tools of economics and political science to the analysis of historical narratives (ibid., 10). Despite the fanfare surrounding this project scholars of comparative politics have long been involved in the fusion of process-based methods and social theory to build generalisations (for example Roberts 1996). According to Peter Evans this basic fusion of approaches constitutes the "messy eclectic centre of comparative politics" (see his contribution to the symposium on the role of theory in comparative politics in Kohli et al. 1995). There have as a result, been a number of excellent rebuttals to the analytic narratives project coming from a wide range of sources, see Elster (2000), and Bennett (2001).

[7] A "mechanism can be seen as a systematic set of statements that provide a plausible account of how I and O [two variables] are linked to one another" (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998, 7).

[8] For the most important exceptions see Clapham (1998) and della Porta (1995).

[9] An idea of the difficulties in this research are are best expressed by describing the material available on the cases studied here. Of the two cases the LF has been, by far, the better researched. A number of analytic articles on the LF have been published in the academic press (cf. Snider 1984; Stoakes 1975). None of these accounts, however, provides a comprehensive historical account of the LF, and most study the LF's ideology (Aulas 1985) or provide a static analysis of its economic activities without examining either its internal politics or development (Picard 2000). For the PDF there is almost no literature, academic or non-academic, beyond the occasional media report, and mention in human rights documents (most importantly see HRW 1996). No history of the PDF has been written and as far as this author knows this thesis provides the first analysis of the PDF in English. This difficulty is further complicated by the great difficulties of doing research in Northern Sudan since 1989, and a consequent lack of reliable scholarship on the internal politics of the NIF.

established by original research. Therefore a 'comparison of difference' approach was taken. The intention is not as suggested by J.S. Mill to identify "two instances differing in nothing but the presence or absence of a given circumstance" (Mill 1987, 68) or even to compare "two classes of instances respectively agreeing in nothing but the presence of a circumstance on the one side and its absence on the other" (ibid. 1987, 69; cf. Przeworski and Teune 1982, 38-40). Instead it is to locate and compare points of divergence in processes within cases starting from similar conditions and leading to different outcomes (cf. George and Bennett 2005).

The two cases selected, Sudan and Lebanon, are both multi-ethnic countries that have faced protracted social conflicts as defined by Azar (1984) – deep-seated cleavages between racial, religious, cultural or ethnic groups which have been characterised by continuing hostility and sporadic outbreaks of violence. In Sudan two major ethnicities, Arab and African, were ranked hierarchically[10] with the former dominating the latter in access to the state, resources and opportunities. In Lebanon the major religious confessions were ordered in parallel, with hierarchical class structures inside each ethnic group and with all ethnic groups possessing an elite class present and powerful within the state. In both cases political militias were formed asserting not only protection of the state but also of specific ethnic groups and identities and became major actors in the countries' civil wars.

The main criteria for the selection of Lebanon and Sudan (beyond the essential 'interest' factor) were the range of difference in organisational outcomes in the militias formed (demonstrated in chapter five) and that the two militias presented prototypical characteristics relevant to current policy concerns (cf. Evera 1997, 77-88).

In Sudan, tribal militias were institutionalised under an Islamic nationalist organisation, the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), founded by the government as a project of the National Islamic Front party. Founded in 1989, this militia still formally exists as a paramilitary wing of the army, but has changed fundamentally from the revolutionary citizen's army envisaged by its founders. In the early 1990s the PDF served as an umbrella institution for coordinating with numerous autonomous nomadic and Islamic militias fighting in south Sudan. After internal political conflict in 1997 the PDF was largely integrated into the military and nowadays operates as a locally recruited auxillary force for military operations. The PDF resembles many of the state-affiliated militias mobilised to defend ideological regimes, such as the *Basadji* in Iran and the Soviet *Partisanen*, as well as the often nameless ethnic militias that have fought in a number of wars such as the Sierra Leoneon *Kamajoi* or the pro-Jakarta East Timorese militias.

In Lebanon, the outbreak of civil war in 1975 saw military and security agents tacitly delegate authority to a collection of pro-state Christian parties. Shortly afterwards the Lebanese army fragmented, and the state largely failed, causing these parties to coalesce and form the Lebanese Forces (LF). The LF, foreign armies and different militias emerging from other Lebanese confessional communities took control of cantons within the country's borders and waged a static war of attrition until a peace treaty was signed in 1989. Although fragmented and disorganised for much of its existence the LF by the end of the civil war in 1990 was a highly centralised bureaucratic informal military. The Lebanese Forces are an extremely organised case of the militias formed in weak or collapsing states,. Their leaders are often labelled warlords by the international community, and are much in evidence in Afghanistan (e.g. the Jumbesh Militia of General Dostum) and Somalia.

1.4 Definitions

Before we enter into the main body of the research a number of definitions must be clarified.

Ethnic Group

The intention in this thesis is not to focus more than necessary on the ethnic dimensions of these wars. However, the terms ethnicity and ethnic group will be used to refer to empirically evident 'we-groups' (Elwert 1989). In Lebanon, the divisions are commonly labelled as confessional (Muslim/Christian), whilst in Sudan they are normally assumed to be racial (Arab/Africa). In both cases all such labels refer simultaneously to fluid cultural communities, personal identities and political blocs. These groups were

[10] For a detailed discussion of ethnic ranking, defined as the coincidence between ethnicity and class, see Horowitz (2000, 21-36).

often unified more by economic ties, shared histories and kinship networks than by primordial identities. For this reason ethnic groups are not considered to be static population groups, defined by a consistent set of descriptive variables, but fluid categories based upon a recognised boundary of differentiation, shared myths of descent and kinship networks (cf. Harff and Gurr 2004, chapter 2). Ethnicity encompasses groups differentiated by physical characteristics, language and religion but more importantly groups that recognise and self-identify with such differences[11].

Tribe

Following conventional and governmental usage throughout this text a number of population groups in rural Sudan are referred to collectively as tribes. However, as Douglas Johnson (2003, 51) notes, the notion and vocabulary of tribe in both administrative and anthropological usage in the Sudan is political, rather than cultural. It is not possible to speak of a Dinka, Nuer or Misseriya *tribe* as a cohesive blood relationship. Throughout Sudan tribal identities, like ethnicity, "were complex and overlapping. Individuals and groups could shift from one category to another" (de Waal 2005, 14). This concept of tribe refers, and is used throughout this thesis, to the *administrative* division of the Dinka, Nuer or Misseriya *peoples* established originally by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium and maintained by successive governments after independence.

War/Civil War

Most definitions identify war solely by orders of magnitude and thresholds in combat mortality rates, most commonly 25 deaths per event or 1,000 deaths per year (Henderson and Singer 2000; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000). Beyond the great difficulties in defining and gathering reliable casualty numbers (Gantzel and Schwinghammer 2000, 3-8), these definitions obscure the *interactive history* of a war. By focusing solely on the substantive outcome of violent *events,* without regard for either historical or systematic conditions (Sambanis 2004a), a quantitative definition overvalues and misrepresents acts of violence that cause high casualties. For example, for such a definition the 9/11 terrorist attacks constitute a war. Terrorist attacks and other forms of violent action, although intended to kill or inflict damage, are not wars. They are committed by very different organisations, seek different effects[12] and produce different externalities and responses. Whilst an order of magnitude is essential for coding conflicts when using quantitative methods (Sambanis 2004b); a qualitative process based definition should not identify magnitude but rather the relative degree of structural variance from a peacetime order. Civil war in this study, is therefore,

> A violent conflict, in which a state and one or more non-state collective actors, or multiple non-state actors, contest the monopoly of exerted force in a territory legally controlled by a single state. It is characterised by the mobilisation of resources to strategically and continuously use violence to diminish the opponent's hegemony over territory.

This broader definition has other benefits for it allows for sub-categories identifying a typology of warfare rather than solely degrees of magnitude. These characteristics are essential for categorising the strategic conditions within a war and comparing such conditions between wars (cf. Kalyvas 2005b).

Militia

Although a much greater discussion of the term militia will take place in chapter two, a brief definition can be given here.

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[11] For further discussion of this term see amongst others Rothschild (1981); Horowitz (2000, 51-64); Anderson (1991).

[12] Although both seek to alter the political actions of an opponent, war does this by confronting the opponent's physical manifestation directly, whilst terrorism seeks to attack the opponent's popular support and rally supporters for further attacks. An excellent example for distinguishing between terrorism and warfare is that of the purposeful shooting of an old man in broad day light. If the old man was a military or security general, this would be an act of war. If, on the other hand, he was a civilian, this would be an act of terrorism. As such it is clear that within most wars many acts of terrorism take place alongside normal warfare.

> Militias are sub-state armed groups autonomous from but supplied by or allied with that state's political institutions or agents with de jure sovereignty over their area of operation. Militias use military violence to control or alter a social context in order to preserve, rather than reform, existing economic and political hierarchies.

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

This introduction has provided an overview of the questions and approach of this thesis as well as presenting some brief definitions.

Chapter Two gives an overview of the literature on both militias and the organisation of sub-state armed groups in modern civil wars. It presents the analytic and terminological problems of using the word 'militia' and breaks the category down into three types, military, political and self-defence, and then problematises these differentiations. Due to the dearth of literature focusing on militias and their organisation, this review then addresses the insights yielded by the dominant school of civil war analysis, the 'economy of war', and seeks to identify how three key authors within this school have described the organisation of armed groups.

Chapter Three presents an analytic framework rooted in historical institutionalist models of state-society relationships. This framework is divided into two parts. The first details the formation of militias as either the privatisation or the informalisation of state functions. This approach illustrates the role of intermediaries between state and society in the initial organisation of militias and how their subsequent actions are controlled. The second part of this framework analyses how the outbreak of civil war represents a structural change from the peacetime order in which new cognitive and material opportunities and constraints define the demands on, and supply of, militia organisations. Weberian insights are used to define the criteria by which the organisational and institutional capacity of the militias can be judged.

Chapters four, five and six describe the empirical case material. Chapter four undertakes a parallel comparison of the two militias in Sudan and Lebanon. Firstly, it compares the conditions of formation of the two militias and then it contrasts the final organisational forms and characteristics of the two militias by the end of the civil wars. This chapter examines both the starting conditions of the two cases and attempts to capture the degree of divergence between the two cases. Chapters five and six provide individual empirical accounts of the 'life-stories' of the two militias from the moment of their inception until their decline and/or the end of the civil wars. This section of the work provides both a history of these militias and an analysis of the processes of organisational selection by the two militias.

Chapter seven presents the analytic and comparative results of the research. These findings are divided into three parts. The first describes an alternative model for analysing civil war which encapsulates multiple levels of conflict – as opposed to a Clausewitzian clash of unitary organisations. The second identifies three mechanisms within the life-spans of the two militias. These mechanisms define the militia's ability to establish organisations that could enforce centralised decision-making, professionalize combatants and control potential rivals within their own ranks. The final part of this chapter looks more closely at the linkages between the militias and the states with which they were affiliated. This analysis concludes that the state military saw the institutionalisation of irregular forces as a direct challenge to their military hegemony.

Chapter eight presents the conclusions of this thesis. It summarises the case-specific and theoretic results, and seeks to introduce some of the most important developments within Sudan since the outbreak of war in Darfur in 2003. This chapter concludes by indicating the importance of 'disillusionment' within civil wars as a future direction of research. Whilst the wars in Sudan and Lebanon began as often euphoric but ill-planned attempts at institutional reform they were waged by organisations without the capacity to pursue or achieve realistic political goals. As result, these wars rapidly became unrelenting tragedies in which combatants, disillusioned with their sacrifices, began to resort to predation and abuse to gain at least marginal benefit from their actions.

2 Literature Review

In the delirium, in the crisis, there is an extraordinary reversal of the roles played in normal times by the real and the ideal. Here briefly and at last the blind – or the seer – is king; plain earthly seeing, the kind that concerns the oculist, is for once of very little use. The seers have just enough of it to keep their positions of leadership.

Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (1965 [1938], 158-159)

Not only are sub-state armed groups rather than professional armies a primary military agent of modern war, but these groups are wildly diverse. Whilst the Eritrean People's Liberation Front was a paradigm of discipline and hierarchical command, the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army is little more than a collection of uncoordinated predators. Although Mozambique's RENAMO was dependent on the Rhodesian and South African states for supplies, Angola's UNITA, at least from 1990 onwards, was self-supporting through the sale of diamonds on the international market. The Palestinian HAMAS has mainly used bombings and light weapons, Ahmad Shah Massoud's Northern Alliance integrated heavy artillery and tanks into mixed arms tactics. These variances represent not only the intentions of the different leaderships, but also the range of opportunities available to leaders. The precise structure of an armed group's organisation is one of these constraints, as it determines the organisation's ability to recognise and exploit opportunities. Organisations dictate, in other words, the 'institutional proclivities' of individual armed groups. Another is the armed group's relationship and ability to exploit the relatively immense resources of the state, whether nationally or internationally. Understudied as an explanatory variable for the existence of variance between insurgencies, the study of institutional proclivities and their emergence is entirely ignored when studying the behaviour and structure of state-supporting militias in civil wars.

This chapter seeks to provide depth to the later analysis by reviewing the existing literature on militias and on civil warfare. There is a two-fold difficulty in doing this. Firstly, this literature is scattered across different disciplines. This makes a comprehensive review difficult. Beyond the problems of locating relevant publications, analysis is often presented in incompatible formats – from highly academic quantitative analyses to the descriptive work of human rights reporting. This complicates the synthesis of the current body of knowledge and the identification of a relevant gap in analysis. Secondly, the literature on how militias organise and fight is restricted to military manuals and a few, unsystematic first hand accounts. Most academic literature is more concerned with a general analysis of the nature of civil warfare. In order to respond to these problems this review is divided into a review of the existing literature on militias, followed by a critical analysis of the content and emergence of the currently dominant economic paradigm of civil war and its implications for the organisations of militias.

This review seeks to make evident two lacunae in the existing paradigm that civil warfare results from the economic interests of armed groups. The first is its inability to describe in detail how armed groups, as complex actors in which private and collective interests coexist and an internal heterogeneity of organisation, discipline and discourse is the norm, maintain themselves as organisations. The second is the inability of economic approaches to explain how armed groups interact with the societies from which they emerge and the states with which they are affiliated. Both of these lacunae can be filled, I argue, by analysing not the actions but the organisational form and development of militias.

2.1 Militias

In 1977, Morris Janowitz showed that between 1966 and 1975 paramilitary growth in the developing world had outstripped the growth of regular armed forces (1977, 5). In a more recent study, this rise has been shown to have continued, with a doubling of paramilitary numbers globally since Janowitz's

calculations were completed (Dasgupta 2003), peaking at 22 million in 1990[13].

This growth of delegated, privatised or sub-contracted violence has many causes, but is attributable in large part to the rise of irregular conflicts[14] as the primary security threat to most countries since 1945.



Abbildung 1: Figur 1: Wars peryear (from 1945 to 2003)
Source: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF), Universität Hamburg

Although the number of wars globally has been declining since 1993[15], forms of war and its relation to the international system have been changing. Since 1945 two-thirds of all wars have been 'internal' or civil (Gantzel and Schwinghammer 2000, 105)[16]. These wars last, at eight years on average, almost five times as long as inter-state war (Genschel and Schlichte 1998, 108) leading to an accumulation of protracted costly conflicts (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In the 'Global North' this rise of irregular threats has triggered an increased dependence on so-called Private Military Companies and Paramilitary Gendarme-like security forces[17]. In the developing world, unwilling to invest resources in international businesses, the response has been for weakened and often already illegitimate rulers to privatise violent functions to non-state armed groups.

Militias are a sub-set of such forces. They are cheaper, more mobile and less legally restrained that the professional military. But unlike other paramilitaries, however, militias are self-organising military organisations. They operate semi- or fully autonomously from but, in affiliation with, regular state militaries. This extremely weak executive control of militias, often both at the strategic and the tactical levels, constitutes not just a deregulation of military force, but an active delegation of the state's coercive hegemony and a partial suspension of the state's sovereignty. Militias are allied with, but not necessarily controlled by the state. They have, as a result, produced some of the worst war crimes of the last fifteen years. In Sudan's Darfur province, ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, for example, extremist militias, including the infamous *Janjaweed* and the *Interahamwe*, were co-opted by threatened regimes

[13] This figure is based upon figures obtained form the International Institute for Strategic Studies *Military Balance* from the relevant years.
[14] The emergence of insurgency as the primary form of war led Morris Janowitz (1960, 418) to argue that the military in developing countries would develop into 'constabulary forces' structured around small police-like units embedded within society and able to bridge the gap between policing and military functions.
[15] Despite the controversial debates between different calculations of war frequency other databases display a similar trend of decreasing conflict after 1992, with a slight rise in numbers around 1996 and 1998 (cf. Human Security Report 2005; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000, 638).
[16] In 2003 the Iraq war was, according to one measurement, the sole inter-state war; the other 35 conflicts were all internal wars. Cf. Armed Conflict Report 2004, Project Ploughshares. http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/ACR/ACR00/ACR04-Introduction.html (accessed June 2005).
[17] For examples of the importance of such forces in border control and peace keeping operations see Lutterbeck (2004).

and with the impunity of state protection became the direct agents of policies of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

Yet despite the rising importance of militias in war, with the exception of certain regions[18], rebels, guerrillas and insurgents[19] have attracted far more scholarly attention. This is a reflection of what Jeffrey Herbst has argued is a generalised absence of an analysis of the state and its varied responses to civil war[20] (cf. Herbst 2004). For example, a search on the *International Bibliography of the Social Sciences* (IBSS) between 1981 and November 2005 reveals only 100 entries for 'militia', the majority of which entries refer to the U.S.A's 'militia' political movements[21]. Meanwhile a similar search found 315 entries for 'guerrilla' and 632 for 'insurgency'[22]. The effect of this neglect of militias has been compounded with theoretical work that is often superficial and inaccurate.

In many studies militias are stripped of political agency. They are identified with an anomic "disaffection with an established order or cultural norms, a lack of skills, and an acceptance of … the utility of violence" (Hills 1997, 42). Organisationally they are described as simple, gang-like, "autonomous groups of young men generally centred around an individual leader" (Kaldor 1999, 93).

These connotations of apolitical, undisciplined thuggery have become so widespread that many functioning militias forcibly and explicitly reject the use of the term. For example, in Sudan the Southern Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), identified as a government militia since allying itself with the state in 1997, refuses to use the term and has demanded recognition as a 'politico-military institution' (cf. *SSDF Position Paper*, 30th June 2005). In Algeria government officials refused to refer to local defence forces as militias, protesting that "there are no militias in Algeria... there are only Algerians, former Moudjahidin, children of Moudjahidin, and patriots who have joined the security forces" (Martinez 2000, 151, ft. 11).

A more abstract problem with the identification and analysis of militias lies in the numerous antecedent definitions of the term. The Oxford English Dictionary gives the 16th century the first known use of the word to describe any body of soldiers in the service of a sovereign or state[23]. For example, in Niccolo Machiavelli's treatise on the *Art of War* (2003, 29-33), written in 1520, the term militia distinguished any body of soldiers recruited from the state's own population from those of the foreign mercenary armies common in Renaissance Italy. By the mid to late 17th century the term was used to refer specifically to those military auxiliaries raised from a civilian population to supplement the regular military, often in local defence. Since the 20th century, however, 'militia' has been used to describe ideologically motivated party militants of far-right and left wing parties. Militias have been, and still are, defined less by their inherent characteristics than they are by the emergence of and their relation to

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[18] There is a much larger and often excellent literature on 'parainstitutional violence' in Columbia and Latin America, see Fernando (1999), Romero (2000), Manwaring (2002) and for a relevant review see Jones (2004), and to a lesser extent in the limited literature on 'paramilitary vigilantism' in Northern Ireland, see Monaghan and Shirlow (ed. 2004). Neither of these fields, however, directly says much about militias, understood as a subcategory of paramilitary. A number of other fields are also related to the study of militias, for example, the literature on vigilantism, see Huggins (ed. 1991) and Abrahams (1998); political banditry, see Barkey (1994) and Sanchez and Meertens (2001).
[19] A rich empirical literature on insurgency is growing as accounts of anti-colonial and reformist rebellions during the last 50 years are published, existing works ranges from participant accounts, see for example Shityuwete (1990), Lawrence (1991), Museveni (1997), Akol (2001), to historical narratives, see for example Taylor (1997), Pool (2001).
[20] There is, of course, an extensive and useful literature on counter insurgency doctrine both by government and private scholars. This, however, focuses largely on the tactics, strategy and organisation of conventional military forces as opposed to the array of options available to the state beyond the military (cf. Nagl 2002).
[21] Understudied prior to 1995, the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City in that year has produced a rapid expansion of the literature on the American militia movement. Cf. O'Brien and Haider-Markel (1998, 1997); Kenneth (1997); Rowady (1997); Halpern and Levin (1996).
[22] Search carried out at IBSS online database, http://arc.uk.ovid.com/webspirs/start.ws?customer=war, on 6 January 2006.
[23] Etymologically militia is derived from the Latin *militia*, the collective noun for soldiers (cf. http://www.oed.com/, accessed January 2006).

professional military forces of a modern state (cf. McNeill 1984). In this way militias in modern civil wars have been defined by their varying degrees of autonomy from and loyalty to state control (cf. Scobell and Hammitt 1998, 222). As result, in areas of state collapse frequently all armed groups are referred to as militias, often without regard for their historical or ideological relationship to state power.

In comparison to these definitional problems a review of the empirical literature suggests, however, a relatively clear sub-division of militias according to the functions such forces serve – military, political or self-defence[24].

As a *military* force, militias, like all paramilitaries, serve to break down the organisational barriers separating the military from society. Semi-autonomous and locally embedded they provide the embattled state with new sources of information and recruitment that cumbersome military institutions cannot efficiently mobilise. The Nazi *Volksturm*, for example, mobilised in the final months of the Second World War, sought to unify people and army in a final struggle for the Reich (Yelton 2002). In Afghanistan the U.S. military, unwilling to commit vulnerable ground forces, recruited up to 15,000 Northern Alliance militia forces to wage the land war against the Taliban (Hanlon 2002). Military militias are also, however, traditional elements of counter-insurgency strategies, in many cases recruiting from the same communities as insurgents. They are used as a potentially devastating threat to dissuade civilians from supporting rebels and carrying out retribution when they do. In rural areas, they act as mobile irregulars to prey on rebel supply networks, harass rebel units and locate rebel strongholds. During the 1970s and 80s a number of Latin American militaries relied extensively on counter-insurgency militias, recruited frequently from a conservative land owning class, to suppress left-wing rebellions (Petras 1989). Military militias are used extensively as forces able and willing to act in physical, social or moral spaces in which regular security forces cannot enter or are unable to effectively control. They obfuscate chains of command and are inherently disownable. For example, in East Timor pro-Jakarta militias acted when the Indonesian army had been withdrawn (Robinson 2001). In Serbia multiple militias carried out the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia that Yugoslav national army recruits refused to commit (Mueller 2004, 88).

Military militias are not a new phenomenon. The 18-19th Century Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz argued that they were useful as an instrument of last resort in inter-state warfare[25]. Their combination of moderate strength and weak executive control was effective when the regular military was defeated on the battlefield and retreating within home territory (1984, 578-585) or, in rare cases, when superior numbers were needed to counter an opponent's superiority in artillery (ibid, 342). The massed ranks of the Iranian *Basidji* served just such a function when using human wave attacks to overwhelm Iraqi military superiority during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war (Khosrokhavar 2002). In direct conflict, however, these units were recognised by Clausewitz to be ineffective and prone to dispersal. Their diffusion throughout society was "like smouldering embers" that, unless closely monitored, risked creating a "state of legalised anarchy that is as much of a threat to the social order at home as it is to the enemy" (Clausewitz 1984, 578).

Political militias, on the other hand, are not specifically military formations but provide extra-institutional policing, security or paramilitary capacities to political parties. Morris Janowitz saw such militias, like paramilitaries for the state, as an instrument for increasing a political group's penetration into society (Janowitz 1977, 45). In Maurice Duverger's classic study of political parties, party militias were described as a means of breaching the barriers dividing popular mobilisation, 'street politics', and electoral or parliamentary action, 'procedural politics' (Duverger 1954). Political militias are obedient

[24] Hills (1997) proposes instead a distinction between personal, clan and freelance militias in Africa. This, however, fails to capture to the role of the state in the mobilisation of most militia forces. Furthermore, Hills' terminology does not share a consistent logic of differentiation – i.e. militias can be both personally led and freelance.

[25] Clausewitz does draw a distinction between 'militia' (1984, 445-6) and the more extreme 'arming of the people' (ibid, 575-585) involving both militias and partisans when fighting defensively within a state's territory. Clausewitz points out that Prussia was able to organise a militia able to fight abroad and offensively, but that the more a militia resembled a regular army, and thus the more effective it would be in offensive warfare, the more it countered the militia's very strength: "a reservoir of strength that is much more extensive, much more flexible, and whose spirit and loyalty are much easier to arouse...Its organisation must leave scope for the participation of the populace. If it does not, any great hopes one may have from it are mere delusions." (ibid. 445)

to a politician or ideology above a bureaucracy and use violence to shatter the boundaries protecting the private lives of citizens and state administration from politics. The best known examples of political militias are the European *Sturmabteilung* (SA) of the German National Socialist Party and Mussolini's *Fasci di Combattamento*; the Brown and Black shirted militias used to beat Fascist and Nazi ideologies into the heart of social-political life (cf. Evans 2004, 310-327). However, throughout the 20th Century numerous extremist movements and parties have relied on party militias. Perhaps most famous, are the myriad U.S. citizen militias (e.g. Michigan Militia, Kentucky state militia and the Tri-States militia) which emerged out of the right-wing National Socialist and Christian Identity movements of the 1970s (Kaplan 1997). Other prominent examples of party militias include the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's *Nizam al-Sirri* (the Secret Organisation) (Mitchell 1969); the Zionist movement's *Haganah* (the Defence) (Golan 2003) and the African National Congress *Umkhonto We Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation).

In many ethnically divided countries, such political militias have taken on a more disturbing form. Disguising their affiliation with political parties or movements, numerous militias have mobilised romantic ethno-nationalist ideologies and claimed to represent entire ethnic groups. These militias purport to defend the rights of their ethnic groups and in particular, to rectify perceived exclusion, political domination and injustice. In reality, as did the Nazi militias, they serve as enforcers and agents of undemocratic parties or demagogues. Good examples are the *Shi'a* militias (*Badr* army and *Mahdi* army most importantly) that have emerged in U.S. occupied Iraq (Ackerman 2005; Bull 2005) and the numerous Nigerian militias formed since the mid-1990s (Sesay et al. 2003). The most deadly of such militias have, however, been the 50,000 strong *Interhamwe* and *Impuzamugambi* militias that carried out the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (Prunier 1995, 243).

A final variation of the militia is seen to emerge when a failure of state security either totally or in specific regions of a country leads communities or individuals to organically form self-defence units. In the 'Nanjing Decade' (1927-1937) in China, for example, community defence militias were mobilised by local elites to suppress popular rebellion (McCord 1999). The *Rondas Campesinas* in Peru emerged as a seemingly spontaneous response to the *Sendero Luminoso's* attempts to violently restructure peasant society (Fumerton 2002). The *Bakassi Boys* were formed by traders in Aba, South-East Nigeria, after one of the largest markets in East Africa became vulnerable to a ''veritable colony of criminals'' (Harnischfeger 2003, 23). The *Kamajoi* in Sierra Leone emerged as local defence forces from the traditions and guilds of the secret hunting societies in Mende society (Muana 1997). Such militias are rarely described as the expression of new structures in a society but are frequently embedded within and emergent from existing organisations and institutions.

Although the above differentiation is useful as a means of classifying the literature almost all militias are fusions or hybrids of these ideal types. From the bottom up the *Kamajoi*, for example, appear to be locally embedded self-defence forces, however, from the top-down they were a state supporting network of local auxiliaries. The Serbian military militias involved in campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo were on closer observation an agglomeration of diverse political and self-defence militias. Furthermore, as the case material also suggests, militias change form over time. Very commonly localised defensive units embedded within communities mutate into aggressive, auxiliary forces seeking retribution or advantage against local competitors[26]. For example the *Shi'a* militia that emerged after the coalition invasion of Iraq evolved from neighbourhood defensive forces, responding to extensive insecurity, to become political ethnic militias. In some cases, such as the Sudan Liberation Army in Darfur, organically forming self-defence units transform into full-scale rebellions against the state (De Waal and Flint 2005, 34). As the case material of this thesis suggests, militias rarely have the formal institutional coherence and capacity to exist autonomously either from state or society. Most borrow structuring characteristics from their social context to guarantee cohesion and order and even highly localised forces are interlinked into the networks of national power through their need for weaponry, ammunition and supplies. Militias are often forced to exist as hybrid organisations simply to survive.

As a result of these complexities the term 'militia' is itself best defined vaguely. Militias may or may not be controlled by the state, but, unlike other forms of paramilitary, they are semi-autonomous sub-state military groups that are formed and controlled outside of the formal military chain of command and frequently sponsored by private actors. They have, however, close links with, or strong commonalities of interest, with formal political authorities or state agents. Militias do not generally

[26] See for example the historical roots of the Sudanese *Janjaweed* (Morton 1992) and the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria (Reno 2002).

seek to overthrow an established order or achieve secession from a state. They are not, as a rule, instruments of social justice. Instead, they are sub-state armed groups using popular mobilisation to preserve existing economic and political hierarchies (Duverger 1954, 38), by circumventing formal, constitutional and legal regulations on the use of force.

The literature on militias, although valuable in its own right, provides little useful information on their organisation. Furthermore, the specificity of a review of the literature on militias disguises the fact that the literature on civil war and armed groups more generally has boomed in the last decade. This second body of literature has developed into a rich theoretic seam for those seeking an analysis of sub-state military violence and has numerous implications for the organisation of militias. Because of the importance of this literature the following section provides an overview of its emergence, and then focuses on three separate analyses of how this literature reflects on the organisational dynamics of delegated and sub-state violence.

2.2 'New' and 'Old' Wars:

In the 1990s a spike in the number of civil wars, particularly on Europe's borders, coincided with the end of the bipolar international standoff to feed a media and policy focus on civil war (Lacina 2004). These wars, in Yugoslavia, the Caucuses and Afghanistan – stripped of the distortions of Cold War ideologies – seemed more brutal, more pointless and, above all, more alien than had wars moulded by the dynamics of the Truman and Brezhnev doctrines.

As elsewhere in society, within the academy the renewed prominence of internal conflict was met with confusion. Existing academic analysis of armed conflict had relatively little explanatory value when neither states, nor global politics, were determinants of violence. Classic studies of political violence (cf. Skocpol 1979; Gurr 1971) could not explain the perceived systemic change visible in the techniques of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Conceptual categories from strategic studies – such as asymmetrical war (Mack 1975) or low-intensity warfare – were irrelevant when states had obviously collapsed, and contributed only to the obscuring of the political roots and military dynamics of the conflicts (Smith 2003). Even the methods of international relations, the disciplinary doyenne of war, produced only disturbingly ahistorical paradigms when applied to these conflicts; for example, the concept of the 'balance of power' (Posen 1993), or the essentialist confusions of political and cultural categories, such as the 'Clash of Civilisations' (Huntington 1993). Without reliable frameworks for understanding events, the resultant perception of these civil wars was as seemingly inevitable breakdowns of weak states under the weight of ethnic rivalries. The determinism implicit in this view discouraged international intervention and fostered the impression that the post-Cold War world was one of rising 'anarchy'[27]. The response was to argue that a renewed study of civil war was essential (cf. David 1997).

The conclusion of this study was that the post-Cold War world was witnessing an ontologically original form of warfare. These were 'New' or 'Postmodern' wars fought not for political but for economic interests by a cornucopia of decentralised, ethnically mobilised armed groups. These wars were not an inevitable breakdown of order but the depoliticised, private, and predatory pursuit of Machiavellian interests.

This view was pioneered by the Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld in his book *The Transformation of War* (1991). For Creveld, wars increasingly fought not by state armies but by sub-state armed groups made the Clausewitzian divisions between government, army and people

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[27] The journalistic version of this basic idea was most famously expressed in Robert Kaplan's (1994) travelogue reporting on the rise of a *new barbarianism* in Africa and the post-Soviet states. The descriptions in his infamous Atlantic Monthly article 'The Coming Anarchy', describing the supposedly uncontrollable conflicts in Liberia, Rwanda and Somalia, were of senseless Malthusian conflict, uncontrolled population growth, environmental degradation and disease in which states were a collapsing backdrop to atavistic hatreds and greed. This perspective offered little optimism and no possible policy directions for those who wished not to ignore the world, but to integrate, understand and co-operate with it. However, Kaplan's article, published shortly after the Mogadishu tragedy was profoundly influential amongst foreign policy professionals, with a copy faxed to every U.S. embassy in Africa (Richards 1996, ft. 4 xiv).

meaningless[28]. Such wars could not be a rationally calculated instrument of politics, as no realm of politics separate from war remained. Modern armed conflict, or as Creveld had it, post-Trinitarian war, had, therefore, become an end unto itself (1991, 171). Numerous scholars have adopted this basic conclusion. Herfried Münkler (2002) and Mary Kaldor (1999) contended that the 'new wars' of the 1990s, unlike those in European history, blurred the distinctions between war and other forms of violence such as criminality or terrorism. Others, such as Mark Duffield (2001; 1998), went further, proclaiming that 'post-modern' wars, in a world-historical epoch defined by globalised resource flows and a retreating state, were fought by self-interested warlords relying on predatory asset transfers (Duffield 1994) and the selling of primary resources and illegal commodities on global markets[29]. For all these analysts, however, these wars represented simultaneously the cause and symptom of a fundamental global redefinition of the nature of governance and sovereignty[30].

Inspired by the rising spectre that inaction could be legitimised by faulty analysis, scholars bridging disciplinary boundaries have since refined these hypotheses by seeking to identify order and regularity in civil wars. Their solution was to study the beneficiaries of war; to argue 'a rational individual and an irrational society'[31] could explain action in these wars. They asked, for whom is war good. It is this literature that has produced the most interesting results for the analysis of organisation in militias.

2.3 The Economy and the Econometry of War[32]

In a seminal text backed by extensive field work, archival research and theoretic development, David Keen (1994) analysed the economic interests of war actors in the 1980s famine of Western Sudan's Bahr al-Ghazal region. Keen demonstrated that the catastrophe was not simply a natural disaster but the result of a politically constructed military strategy using resource allocation to serve the interests of specific actors. His argument, developed theoretically in a later book (Keen 1998), was that in many modern wars actors become more interested in self-enrichment through violent predation than ending the war. This approach initiated a school of analysis focusing on the profits, rather than the victims, of war (Berdal and Malone 2000; Keen 1998, 1997; Jean and Rufin 1996). This school of thought argues that war should not be understood as the breakdown of a country's political and economic system but as the emergence of a new economic order. War is a 'violent market' (Elwert 1999) in which perceived chaos is actually a 'rational madness': the immoral pursuit of rational economic interests by violent means (Keen 1997).

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[28] See Jung (2005) for a discussion of Crevald's influence on several scholarly works that contribute to the current debate on 'new' wars.

[29] Despite its methodological failings, the New Wars debate sowed political, humanitarian and academic interest in the interaction between national conflicts and the international realm. Resultant policies have attempted to regulate the interface between the national and international realms in containing and pacifying civil wars rather than attempting direct interventions, such as the failed 'Operation Restore Hope' in Somalia. For example the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme for halting the trade in 'blood' diamonds excavated in West African war zones (Campbell 2002; Tamm 2002).

[30] For many academics, closer observation made it clear that many of these claims were inflated. Quantitative studies demonstrated that the prevalence of civil war in the 1990s was not caused by the end of the Cold War and the resultant change in the international system, but "from a steady, gradual accumulation of unresolved civil conflicts that had begun immediately after World War II" (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75). Historical research showed that the supposedly new characteristics of post cold war conflict could be found in older civil wars (Newman 2004; Kalyvas 2001). The fundamental problem was that although the New War proponents offered numerous insights, as one critical review asserted: "The main methodological instrument [of new war theories] is an appeal to logic and common understanding of events. … No formal models are provided, nor data. Case examples are given to illustrate a point hardly ever to investigate a thesis (Brzoska 2004, 108)".

[31] Or more appropriately, "Although each step may be rational in a procedural sense of relating means to ends, the substantive outcome may be so distorted that one should refer to it as irrational." (Nye 1988, 588).

[32] There are numerous excellent annotated bibliographies of the Economy of War approach, see Le Billon (2000) for an emphasis on the development studies biais, and Macartan Humphreys (2003) on the econometric approaches, and Berdal and Malone (2000) for an edited volume containing the broad array of approaches. Another good general review can be found in Murshed (2002).

Within the wide literature on the economy of war four key texts have presented analytic insights into the organisational behaviour of sub-state armed groups that are relevant to militias. The first is David Keen's original theoretic study of the *Economic Functions of Violence in Civil War*, the second is a series of studies by William Reno analysing the emergence of predatory armed groups. The third and fourth are similar contributions by Michael Ross (2004a/b) and Phillipe le Billion (2001) on the role of resources and their materiality in defining the structures of armed groups.

David Keen's organisational hypotheses are the least sophisticated of the four, but are potentially the widest ranging. For David Keen modern war is defined by 'economic violence' in which armed groups are created not around shared political ideologies or grievances but around the economic interests of individual members. Armed groups, militia or rebel, do not seek public goods. They are vehicles for select interests. All armed groups are, therefore, defined by three basic organisational traits. Firstly, the absence of clear political goals behind the use of military force, secondly, a discontinuity between the top-down and the bottom-up motives for violence and thirdly, the existence of a 'culture of impunity' within the armed groups. Within this model wars are instigated by elites pursuing top-down interests, not in victory, but in carving "out a sphere of economic and political influence within collapsing, frequently impoverished states" (Keen 1998, 24). These elites, unable or unwilling to call upon the ideologies or resources of the Cold War, must resort to "violence that is effectively self-financing" (ibid. 1998, 23). This is done by instigating ethnic conflict within society and by identifying population groups with bottom-up interests in the rewards of violence. These interests may be political, but more frequently they "meet other, more immediate or mundane needs" (ibid. 1998, 45) security, revenge or, most importantly, in economic goods or rights. Thus with increasingly cheap, light weaponry:

> warfare is more likely to involve an arrangement between elites and the civilians they wish to recruit… the nature of the resulting violence will reflect the priorities of social groups, as well as the state. All civil wars reflect shifting coalitions between military organisations and the civilian population (ibid. 1998, 45).

Rather than collective actors seeking public goods, militias, regular soldiers, rebel groups, mercenaries and criminal organisations, become in Keen's vision a homogenous category of apolitical, unstructured, semi-anarchistic bands unified by the shared self-interest of their members.

Militias within this model are a primary instrument of warfare employed by enfeebled state elites. Within militias impunity must exist in order to allow separate actors to pursue their own interests. As a result, violence is not employed for progressive ends but merely reproduces and serves itself. Instead of military victory as a means of guaranteeing power, militia leaders guarantee power through the continuous accumulation of economic goods and rights through war. Instead of defeating rival forces militias opportunistically pursue sources of revenue and resources. Instead of investment in training or professionalisation they rely on the replacement of casualties with forced recruitment and the rewards of combat. These militias are defined not by their publicised intentions, or their social context, but only by the profits of pillage, protection rackets, illegal trade, theft and profiteering.

Following in David Keen's footsteps William Reno took the concept of economic violence further. Rather than founding his arguments on assumptions of rational interest, Reno has sought instead to build more specific hypotheses regarding the organisation of economic violence. Through empirical studies in West Africa, the ex-Soviet Union and the Balkans Reno determined that it was not the economic incentives of individual actors that were the key structuring element producing predatory armed groups. More importantly, in his view, was the nature of pre-war political-economies in distributing power within a society. Of interest for Reno was the manner in which patrimonial networks assumed to have been destroyed in war, survived "the corruption and the destruction of state agencies to shape the character and aims of insurgencies" (Reno 2002, 838). The defining characteristic of armed groups for Reno is their absence of organisational autonomy from the existing networks of power. Reno's basic thesis, developed in numerous articles, was that in states dominated by clientilistic, "Warlord" politics (Reno 1999) patrimonial networks competing for control of the state persist as competing patrimonial militias and insurgents in war. These groups, requiring resources to feed their own support base, seek only private, as opposed to public, goods (Reno 2004a, 2002).

Unlike Keen, Reno perceives a degree of endogeneity in this process. It is not that economic motives drive or cause war, but that war itself creates and magnifies the importance of economic resources. In the initial stages of armed conflict, ideological actors promoting mass reform mobilise constituencies. But lacking resources they are crowded-out by unsavoury politicians exploiting existing national and transnational networks to guarantee weaponry to potential rebels or militias. Thus rebellions such as the RUF in Sierra Leone, or militias such as the *Bakassi Boys* in Nigeria, are transformed from movements, which although not representative, sought to address popular grievances, into organisations serving private interests.

> Commercial connections, developed in corrupt, patronage-based pre-conflict regimes, become central political and material resources, for leaders who use armed youths, often from the plethora of the corrupt regime's paramilitary and army units, to fight their war to power. (Reno 2002, 842)

Whether rebels or militias and regardless of their rhetoric, patrimonially structured armed groups thus develop into 'warlord' formations that

> neither articulate clear ideological alternatives as a group, nor administer conquered areas, that do not mobilise lasting popular support, and are unable to control individual predation among members. (Reno 2002, 838)

War is thus, as it is in David Keen's analysis, a new order, but rather than one emerging from the collective interests of individuals, war is controlled by Machiavellian warring patrons who, circling like vultures around weak states, subvert social movements and armed groups as vehicles for their own power.

The final, and most recent, contribution of the economy of war school to the organisation of armed groups, comes from an alternative strand within its ranks. Whilst the two economy of war studies above are representatives of a body of literature that is rooted upon field research and the use of best-fit methods of theory building, econometrically inclined scholars have studied organisation differently[33]. This 'econometric' school of war studies has focused not on the international or local markets surrounding civil wars but on the statistical analysis[34] of the macro-economic and social indicators of war. For these scholars, the assumption that action coincides with preferences, ignored the confusion surrounding why people act and asserted that new wars have no ends, only means.

> When the main grievances – inequality, political repression, and ethnic and religious divisions – are measured objectively, they provide no explanatory power in predicting rebellion. These objective grievances and hatreds simply cannot usually be the cause of violent conflict….Rebellions either have the objective of natural resource predation, or are critically dependant upon natural resource predation in order to pursue other objectives.

[33] This approach was spearheaded by a coalition of scholars based at the World Bank (cf. Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2000b). These scholars were seeking, it should be noted, to develop a response that would place civil war firmly on the mainstream economic development agenda. The latter of these two goals has been admirably fulfilled. A renewed security discourse combined with economic development has promoted a 'security-first' approach to peace-building operations and development, see for example Mack (2002).

[34] The econometric debates about the indicators determining the incidence of civil war have been both contentious and irresolute. Much of the debate has focused on methods of data analysis, selection of proxies and measurement of units rather than on qualitative empirical testing (cf. Sambanis 2004a; Fearon and Laitin 2003).

(Collier 2000, 21)

Unsurprisingly, the results have emphasised materialist variables over historical or constructivist considerations. Hypotheses focused on the role of inequality, poverty, democracy and natural resources (Fearon 2004; Collier, Hoeffler and Söderborn 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2000a) in triggering civil war. Some scholars have, furthermore, begun to use mixed methods to individuate the causal mechanisms linking these correlations. The organisational hypotheses here do not focus on individual motives or the political economy of power but on the political ecology of resources within a country and their structuring influences on armed conflict. Most relevant of the few authors in this vein have been articles by Michael Ross (2004a/b) and Phillippe le Billion (2001) analysing the materiality and geography of resources in the structuration of armed groups.

> While it would be an error to reduce armed conflicts to greed-driven resource wars, as political and identity factors remain key, the control of local resources influence the agendas and strategies of belligerents. This influence is played out through local resource exploitation schemes, involving the production of territories based on resource location, control and access to labour and capital, institutional structures and practices of resource management (Le Billion 2001, 580).

These authors have used both statistical and small-n analysis to test hypotheses correlating the specific qualities of natural resources, i.e. whether they are 'lootable' or 'non-lootable' (Ross 2004a) and their 'diffusion' or 'concentration' (Le Billion 2001)[35], to the organisations and aims of armed groups. The conclusions of these studies suggest that the more unlootable and concentrated a natural resource (oil as opposed to cattle for example), the higher the need for and the greater the possibility of an armed group developing into a hierarchical organisation waging a secessionist conflict. On the other hand, when resources are diffusely scattered across a territory, armed groups are

> characterised by a high degree of fragmentation or destructuration. These are not so much secession conflicts in a political sense, but rather the expression of a phenomenon of armed warlordism in which areas of de facto sovereignty are often defined by commercial interests, such as the control of a mine, forest, or drug production valley, in association with geographical/military factors (Le Billion 2001, 575)

Despite the interesting potential of such research, this search for causal mechanisms remains at an early stage, with no significant research undertaken on these linkages. Furthermore, none of these authors specifically addresses the question of militias specifically.

2.4 Response

The economy of war and its various organisational hypotheses have been essential and insightful in explaining the observable regularities of modern civil wars. Emerging in a decade dominated by a focus on the identity and irrationality of armed groups, this model emphasised the importance of studying the strategic interests, actions and environment of an armed group rather than simply accepting its rhetoric or self-identification. By taking this approach, scholars were able to move beyond simple description to develop theoretical explanations of behaviour in civil war.

Nevertheless, despite its successes the war economy school is limited. The hypotheses above suggest essential avenues but provide only an extremely general analysis of the organisation of militias. Keen's emphasis on the divergent interests of elite and non-elite actors is insightful, but arguably true within

[35] Le Billion uses the slightly different terminology 'point' and 'diffuse' to distinguish between concentrated and diffuse resources.

most large organisations. As Mancur Olson (1965) has carefully argued, large collective actors are rarely cohesive solely due to a shared conceptualisation of 'collective goods', but must also offer 'non-collective goods' (salaries, promotions, punishments etc) to convince members to join and pursue the goals of their leaders. Over half a century before Mancur Olson, Max Weber also noted that

> Only the members of the small group of enthusiastic disciples and followers are prepared to devote their lives purely idealistically to their call… Hence, the routinisation of charisma also takes the form of the appropriation of powers and economic advantages by the followers or disciples, and of regulating recruitment. (1978, 249)

Thus, organisations, whether ideological or not, are defined by the intersection between the controlled private incentives of individuals and the collective goods they pursue. Reno's correlation of pre-war patrimonial politics and wartime predation by armed groups suffers from a lack of methodological testing. Too frequently, Reno's analysis ignores or fails to explain the numerous counter-factuals, both within single cases and between cases. Le Billion's and Ross' hypotheses, on political ecology, rely on vague categories of resources that are often scattered with equal measure within a single country.

Behind these criticisms are hidden two important logical lacunae in the Economy of War analysis. Firstly, by excluding all analysis of non-material incentives these approaches cannot accurately explain how armed groups interact with the societies from which they emerge and recruit. Secondly, by relying on individual level observations these approaches cannot explain or differentiate between armed groups as complex organisations. The rest of this chapter will address each of these points in turn.

The focus on economic profits in armed conflict obscures the structuring effects of, amongst other aspects of social life, ideology, imagination and myth. The exclusion of these 'immaterial' variables leads inevitably to the portrayal of armed groups as criminal organisations with only perpetrator-victim and predatory relationships with communities. In a devastating critique on the econometric approach, upon which Michael Ross' and Phillipe le Billion's work is based, two French scholars have noted that "la légitimité ne se mesure pas ... et la question de légitimité d'une rébellion ne se pose même pas. Sa lecture ne peut être qu'economique," (Marchal and Messiant 2002, 62)[36]. Yet ample evidence suggests that in civil wars, where resources are weak, it is precisely these relationships that can define the structures of resource-poor groups. As Christopher Clapham (1998, 11) has said of African guerrillas:

> Insurgent organisations must nonetheless be created on the ground, to an appreciably greater extent than any other form of African political organisation, and it is plausible to assume that they must be constructed in large part from the social materials that they find there.

A similar argument is made by Roger Petersen (1993, 41) in identifying the strategic importance of 'community' in organising rebellion.

> In general, rebellion is dependent upon formal or informal, community-based organisations linking armed, mobile resistance movements to the towns and villages. Without some clandestine organisation supplying food and information, providing a mobilisable reserve for military action, retaliating against local collaborators, and existing as a basis for future recruitment, the mobile rebels occupying the forests and hills would be readily eliminated even by very weak state regimes.

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[36] 'Legitimacy is not measured … and the question of the legitimacy of a rebellion is not even asked. His interpretation can only be economic.' (author's translation).

These two arguments, based on widely different methods and assumptions, concur in the fundamental, analytic importance of collusion and cooperation between host communities and an armed group.

Many area specialists and anthropologists, recognising this deficit, have objected to the Economy of War analysis. Most argued that the wars in the countries they had studied, often for decades, were not structured solely by economic variables. Many, extrapolating from classical anthropological accounts of tribal warfare (Haas 1990; Balandier 1986), proposed that these wars must be understood as much as individual practice, performance and discourse as they were goal orientated collective action (Hage 2003; Richards and Vlassenroot 2002; Macek 2001; Beck 1998; Richards 1996). This response stressed that by examining the subjective and symbolic continuities from peace to war (Ellis 1999), the modalities and organisations of civil war could be linked to the societies in which they are fought. In other words, these scholars have asserted that supposedly economic wars were, as Clausewitz had stated, actually the continuation of politics by other means. But politics expressed through local discourses and by groups embedded within observable histories and modalities of conflict (Larzilliere 2003; Johnson 2001; McKenna 1998; Geffray 1990; Seurat 1985).

The other failure of the hypotheses proposed by Keen, Reno and Ross is that, by attributing action to individual economic motivations, deeper questions about the agency of combatants and the coordination of organised behaviour are simply unanswered. As Reno himself remarks, whilst questioning the overemphasis of economic agendas in recent work:

> The possibility that individual motives cannot be reliably pinned down over time suggests that there is a large element of social construction of individual participation in conflicts. If this is true, individual motives may not matter that much in determining root causes of conflicts. …. (Reno 2004a, 5).

Are looting, profiteering and exploitation the causal motors of war or a consequence of continued ad-hoc forms of production in war? Is predation an individual action or the coordinated behaviour of an organisation? Are self-supporting rebels identical in structure to state-supported militias? By focusing on individual intentions rebels and state militaries, mercenaries and self-defence units, militias and eventually terrorists are indistinguishable. It becomes impossible to analyse the internal organisation of particular armed groups and variations in the way which actors fight or use resources either within groups or between them. These hypotheses do not seek to disaggregate the different kinds of organisation that operate within civil war but group them together as 'warlords' and contradict the ample evidence that conflict and predation do not necessarily go together. The Economy of War hypothesis ignores, as this thesis argues, that it is the organisation of violence, not what Vincent Brome has been called the "dark forest of motives" (1965, 33) behind it, that determines the outcomes of warfare.

A response to this literature must identify a different focus of investigation for the study of civil wars. A return to the country or case level generalities of the original 'new war' debate risks reinforcing the perception that conflict is inevitable and atavistic, whilst the focus on economic variables and motivations ignores the structuration of violence. A unit of analysis must be identified that possesses genuine causal influence on the structural environment of civil war. To do so we can turn to an older generation of political theorists.

In her essay 'On Violence' Hannah Arendt argued that violence was not an aspect of power, an attribute possessed only by organisations. It was merely a tool of power, a means "by which man rules over man" (1973, 113). For Arendt the study of violence, its targets, consequences and motivations, could, therefore, only partially explain the political dynamics of conflict[37]. Instead in such

[37] Interestingly, Arendt's arguments are backed up by an unexpected source. A recent International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) report studying empirical data on behaviour in civil war concluded that the most effective way for the ICRC's delegates to introduce respect for International Humanitarian Law in armed groups was not to educate individual combatants, but to induce organisational change. Organisational rules, even when often broken, and penalties, even when only

explanations the focus of study should be on the organisations that mobilise and coordinate violent individuals. The focus for any academic study of armed conflict thus, following Arendt, moves back from the dramatic event of violence, and even back beyond the violent actor himself, to a study of the structures guiding, co-ordinating and propelling violence[38]. Collective violence is not simply aggregated individual violence.

The cases of Sudan and Lebanon will show that the militias studied here back up Arendt's assertions. Most importantly, in neither of the cases were natural resources primary causes of war. In Lebanon, there are no natural resources to speak of, and whilst drugs, particularly hashish and poppies, became an important source of profit for the armed groups this occurred only after the outbreak of the war in 1976. In Sudan, oil has been cited as a primary cause of the civil war (cf. Collier and Hoeffler 1999). However, once again oil only became a significant determinant of the targeting of violence since 1999-2000 when the government launched a scorched earth campaign to regain control of the Upper Nile oil fields (cf. Gagnon and Ryle 2001)[39].

Furthermore, in both cases instances of order in unstable areas were common and did not necessarily correlate to the materiality of the resources within these areas. In East Beirut, an area with highly lootable resources in port warehouses and bank vaults, as chapter five will show, the Lebanese Forces established stable command hierarchies and regulated taxation systems that funded welfare provision and territorial administration. In Sudan, as we shall see in chapter six, economic violence was constrained to specific territories of semi-controlled impunity linked to the traditional territories of nomadic tribes. Oil-rich areas were no less hierarchically organised than cattle rich areas, instead the boundaries on tribal raiding and militias were drawn in such as way as to preserve productive enclaves around oil plants.

Finally, although the Lebanese Forces and Popular Defence Forces varied significantly in structure and action from each other both invested substantial moral and material resources in propagating, mobilising and enforcing ideologically and culturally informed symbolic discourses (see appendix three). Although economic violence was undeniably common, these discourses were not simply window dressing for unpalatable profiteering. They served to standardise preferences and coordinate behaviour within the militia, and gain support for the actions of the militia from outside communities and observers. In other words, discourse served to legitimise the use and techniques of violence, the organisational hierarchies and the aims of the armed group. These discourses were necessary, precisely because the confusion of warfare and the availability of new sources of revenue from loot or predation destroyed the enforcement and oversight capacities of existing patrimonial leaders. Although antecedent networks of power controlled the initial years of armed conflict over time it was a new group of leaders and organisations, emerging from the street or tribes, which took control of the armed groups.

Napoleon is apocryphally attributed with the statement that 'behind every war are people who fight for belief and those who fight for profit'. A response to the economy of war school must conclude that civil wars are not mono-causal, and that macro-explanations extrapolated from micro-level assumptions disguise rather than elucidate the dynamics and causes of such wars. Economics has always been a part

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sporadically applied, were found to repeatedly to be most effective in altering behaviour. As a result, the report concluded that

the priority for the ICRC is not to persuade [a] combatant to behave differently or abide by his personal convictions, but to influence those who have ascendancy over him, beginning with the instigators of this 'excessive' violence. (Frésard 2004, 110).

[38] Other scholars from the political sociological tradition have arguably already followed Arendt's advice by, for example, studying the radicalisation of social movements in European politics (Tilly et al. 2003; Tilly 1978; della Porta 1995) or identifying how banditry operates as part of a political system (Barkey 1994).

[39] Whilst oil was discovered in Sudan in the late 1970s, SPLA actions had forced Chevron to abandon its operations and prevented further exploration and production throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s. In 1996 the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) was formed, and the first tanker load of crude oil was delivered to Port Sudan in 1999 after the completion of a pipeline from Bentiu to Port Sudan in 1998. In 2002, production was 200,000 barrels a day (b/d), estimated to double by 2005, already by 2000 this translated to a revenue of $500 million (cf. Seymour 2002; Christian Aid 2001).

of war, but only part of it. That it has become the sole focus of analysis is less to do with the changing nature of warfare than with the breakdown of reliable frameworks for analysis in the post-Cold War epoch.

Despite its failings, the economy of war approach is correct in one important regard. Descriptive or relativist explanations do not produce the transferable concepts and frameworks essential for policy formulation or theoretic development. Contextually specific understanding risks explaining only circumstances as they stand today rather than analysing the mechanisms of change for predicting the difficulties of tomorrow. Whilst area or regional experts are essential for the formulation, assessment and implementation of such frameworks (and are too often denigrated in the generalist culture of social sciences) they are too few and their subjects too specialised to be accessible to the non-expert. Explicit and empirically embedded theorisation is needed.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the current literature both on militias as a particular sub-set of armed groups and on research into the organisation of armed groups in civil war. Although the theoretical literature on militias is largely weak, and unsuitable to either categorise or analyse militias, the empirical case studies of militias suggest a division into three types: military, political and self-defence. These categories, although able to provide a basic typology of militias, potentially disguises the importance of perspective in defining how a militia is categorised. Furthermore, these typologies provide no means of analysing the processes by which militias change from one form to another.

The economy of war literature offers an analytic model providing insights into the actions and mechanisms of change within militias. This is done, however, through the founding of analysis on assumptions of individual motivation. By excluding the structuring effects of non-economic motives or resources, armed groups are presented as a homogenous category of predatory ‘warlord’ formations. This disguises the relationships of such groups to society, and tells us very little about the diversity of groups and their internal structuration.

The argument of this thesis is that only by studying empirically how militias establish and maintain organisations is it possible to identify how militias operate as complex organisations. The research question of this work is, therefore, not to ask why individual actors behave as they do, but rather to ask how and why disparate private motives are disciplined into a single organisational form (Sambanis 2004b, 263). An account of civil war based on these foundations emphasises a deeper understanding of how armed groups are formed, are structured and decay – in other words how leaders establish authority over followers and what constrains, motivates and controls leaders and combatants in armed groups.

As Joel Migdal has pointed out in discussing a similar question with regards to state authority, it is far from inevitable that “leaders achieve predominance” (1988, 31). It is expected that these forms of authority will represent accommodations between the militias and other powerful interests and organisations within society. Furthermore, it is to be expected that the forms of authority found within the militias will be a fusion of symbolic configurations intimately tied to rewards and sanctions. It is these two aspects that I argue cannot be predicted using macro-level observations and the building of agent-level assumptions about behaviour.

The following chapter presents the analytic framework for the case analysis by using an institutional theory inspired approach to the state to identify the starting conditions of militia formation and some observations on the regulation of violence within organisations. Chapter four begins the empirical analysis of the cases by comparing the starting and ending states of both militias. Chapters five and six then undertake the historical comparison of the trajectories of the two militias themselves.

3 Delegated Violence: between State and Society

In such a condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building ... no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan (1946, 82)

Militias, unlike many other forms of armed group in civil wars, including the professional military, are rarely formed in a stage prior to armed conflict in order to perpertrate political change through violence. More frequently, militias are formed as a *reaction* to conflict and violence. They emerge as state weakness and political opportunity combine to create incentives for sub-state responses to security failure. Because of this militias are defined by two specific characteristics, which differentiate them from other sub-state armed groups. Firstly, that their emergence is intimately related to the power of the state. Secondly, that the form of their mobilisation is directly shaped by the patterns of violence in a civil war.

This chapter presents a two-part framework for analysing the organisation of the Lebanese Forces and the Popular Defence Forces. Part one seeks to investigate, using existing theory, the complex relationship between militia formation and the state. This section seeks to explain how and why coercive authority is delegated to non-state actors. By building from Joel Migdal's model of state-in-society and Beatrice Hibou's concept of privatisation, this framework posits two ideal-typical mechanisms of militia formation. The first occurs when the state intentionally retracts its sovereignty and allow militias to form in the periphery of state competence. The second occurs when competing informal networks subvert state agencies and form militias to defend their authority. This approach emphasises the importance of analysing militia formation, not as isolated responses of either state or society to insecurity, but as a political process defined by intermediating organisations and networks. This framework suggests that militias are a contested domain in which both state and society pursue mutual interests or negotiate differences.

In part two of this chapter, a framework for understanding the organisation of militias during a war is presented. This is not a deductive organisational model but rather a framework for understanding militias as organisations forced to operate in a specific structural environment defined by the presence of mass violence. Firstly, a brief discussion of the effects of violence and a model for understanding violence in war is presented. Secondly, this section seeks to identify the nature of formal organisation in war. This chapter is intended as a guiding discussion identifying the categories through which militia formation and organisation can be dissected in the cases.

This chapter argues, tacitly, that when dealing with sub-state armed groups, and specifically with militias, the standard vocabulary of political science obstructs more than it reveals. Focusing upon substantive, or typological, definitions of the state (as 'collapsed', 'failed' or 'quasi'), or emphasising the Weberian ideal type of statehood (defined by the state's hegemonic and unitary character), obscures the political bargains in the interstices between the state as institution, the *de jure*, and the state as organisation, *de facto*[40]. Perhaps worse, this vocabulary, by making the state the pivot for examining political life, distracts observers, often entirely, from the study of alternative forms of substantive authority and social order that emerge in the state's absence. To effectively analyse militias, with their

[40] Such portrayals serve the ends of the state itself. In the words of Joel Migdal, "those social scientists, who, wittingly or unwittingly, exaggerate the capabilities of the state become part of the state's project to present itself as invincible. State sovereignty … has simply too often been taken for granted." (Migdal 1994, 14).

apparent janus-faced relationship to state power, a language neutral of the state, yet able to analyse order, competition and regulation, must be found.

3.1 Militia Formation

With insurgency set to remain the most important security concern for developing countries in the 21st century, militias and other forms of delegated violence will continue to increase in numbers. Yet in many countries, the formation of militias has initiated processes of 'reverse statisation' in which fabrics of localised militia forces have emerged and replaced the hegemony of state authority. These 'collapsed' or 'failed' states resemble, in many regards, the fragmented territorial sovereignty described as the epigones of the European state (cf. Tilly 1992, 52-53; McNiell 1982, chapters 3 & 4). Why, when faced with this risk, would states, designated by their functions of extraction and coercion, delegate their sovereign right to use violence and permit the formation of militias on their territory? This section argues that militia formation is a political, rather than security, decision to replace state provision with non-state collective action. It represents a reinforcement of alliances between the state, or agents of the state, and non-state networks over the reinforcement of state institutions.

Popular explanations emphasise two divergent mechanisms of militia formation. The first, promoted mostly by state sponsors of militias, argues that militias are spontaneous responses by local elites to insecurity and their actions are culturally determined. The second, emphasised mostly by critical observers, argues that militias are formed to aid in military operations and are strategically controlled by military commanders. These explanations present a readily apparent paradox. Because the formation of militias within its sovereign territory diminishes the state's hegemony and autonomy, militias are assumed to be agents of the state. Simultaneously, militias are recognised to emerge outside of state institutions and are constructed from the mobilisation of non-state, rather than state, resources and interests. The state, thus, appears to be simultaneously a central and peripheral actor.

These confusions rely implicitly on a dichotomous understanding of the state, defined by Hobbes' vision of an ordering state and a disordered society. The state is assumed to be a realist instrument characterised, one-dimensionally, by its capacity to coercively regulate a given territory. State and society are autonomous from each other with a linear relation between a state's weakness, as a measure of its coercive capacity, and the emergence of sub-state armed groups (Posen 1993). Militias, in this model, can only be instruments of the state or symptoms of its weakness.

This model is excessively reductive. It diminishes the state to a static and unitary institution, analytically suspended above society, and by doing so obscures the complex causality behind militia formation. To dissect the phenomenon of militia formation a less parsimonious model of state-society relations is necessary.

3.1.1 The State in Society

To explain militia formation, the state must be envisaged not solely as an enforcing agency, but as a rule-making one. The state, when seen holistically, is constituted of a fabric of territorial and social boundaries defining and sanctioning legal and illegal behaviour, exclusion and inclusion and the separation between formal and informal fields of power. Its institutions, and the practices of its agents and ruling elite, define the procedures by which these boundaries can be altered. In this model, the state's actions are determined not only by its capacities but by its intentions; a uniquely complex field of normative contestation and agenda-setting. The state is not isolated from society; it is simultaneously an agent on and an agent of a society, penetrating and penetrated by society. *In extremis* the two can be analysed as a single, inseparable system of interwoven formal and informal regulatory institutions, ranging from culture to the aggregated interactions shaping resource allocation (Williamson 2000).

Following this basic approach, Joel Migdal's 'state-in-society' school of thought recognises the state, in the modern era, as a uniquely powerful organisation. But it is an actor whose autonomy and hegemony are, nevertheless, in a constant fluid contest with non-state organisations and actors (Migdal 1988). The state, in this vision, is neither a static nor a hegemonic organisation. It is penetrated and influenced by social organisations, norms and actors seeking to gain control over and define the rules that govern individual lives. On one hand, churches, states, families, civil society, and companies, coexist and compete in defining what moral, legal and informal behaviour is and how it should be

enforced. On the other hand, individuals and their decisions, "are routinely the target of intensive ideological contestation, as government leaders, parents, religious clergy, movement organisers, and others compete for the 'hearts and minds' of their constituents," (Rosefsky Wickham 2002, 15). The conflicts between these competing actors are the central mechanism of social change (cf. Knight 1992), and are as much over the rules themselves and who controls them as they are over substantive issues. In these processes, of contestation and competition, "power can flow from state actors to non-state actors, or the opposite, as when non-state actors induce state personnel to accept or bend certain rules." (Migdal and Schlichte 2005, 15).

Migdal's vision of the state, and the importance of the ebb and flow of its authority, allows us to analyse individual states, not as Realist units, but as the specific and unique construct of their history and society. They are holistically defined by the decades or centuries of both competition and cooperation with non-state organisations, which have established contextually specific boundaries on state power and relationships between state and society. In the maintenance of these boundaries and relationships, powerful groups within the state and society, mostly those who profit from a particular definition of the rules, cooperate in thwarting challengers and maintaining the status quo.

The formation of militias, in this approach, can be described as more than just a static weakness in the state's coercive capacity. It can represent a purposeful and intended strategy by the state designed to benefit allied organisations or groups within society. This strategy can be termed *delegation*. The delegation of state functions is not a simple weakening of functional *capacity* within state agencies. It is a recognition and legitimation, by the state, of centres of functional *authority* outside of the state. Rather than perceiving militias as an organic response to violence, which occurs without reference to the state, or violent instruments of state authority, militias must be conceptualised as a transfer of the state's authority to use violence to a non-state actor.

It is possible to break down this process of delegation into two ideal typical mechanisms. Both imply a transformation of the state's authority but identifies different loci and vectors of change.

3.1.2 The Privatisation of the State

In an influential edited volume, published in the late 1990s, Beatrice Hibou (1999) deconstructed the concept of state privatisation in developing countries. Whilst others had seen privatisation as a simple outsourcing of state capacity to private actors, Hibou conceptualised it as a tactical means of contesting and defining state boundaries. Rather than a relinquishing of state power, Hibou described privatisation as a means by which a ruling class could selectively distribute rents to allies or opponents within society.

Privatisation is the retraction of the state's bureaucratic management of a sector, service or resource, and its replacement by private actors. It is a controlled and functional exchange of power, defined by a formal or informal contract, between state agents and non-state organisations. It is not the failure of the state. The state maintains competency in the core functions of rule making, enforcement and oversight. Furthermore, depending on the terms of the contract, the state may identify the beneficiaries of privatisation. Privatisation is, therefore, neither necessarily permanent nor imposed, but renegotiable and voluntary (ibid, 29). It provides the state with a means of reducing demands on its military, administrative and extractive instruments, and thus frees up resources that can be reinvested in consolidating core functions. The resulting system is thus not a static picture of 'failure' but an often fluid realm of transactions between state and non-state actors.

> La privatisation de l'État est le résultat de stratégies multiples, parfois contradictoires, qui traduisent notamment une absence de confiance dans les institutions étatiques et la primauté accordée à la loyauté sur les relations functionelles. De fait, la privatisation de l'État est moins le fruit de la stratégie de ce dernier pour survivre ou se consolider, que le fruit de nombreux acteurs et de multiples logiques d'action. (Hibou 1999, 60)[41]

[41] "The privatisation of the state is the result of multiple, sometimes contradictory, strategies that translate notably as an absence of trust in the institutions of the state and the primacy accorded to the

Privatisation is, therefore, characterised, following Hibou (ibid. 58), by three common elements. First, the intermittent, and even arbitrary, presence of the state in social-economic life. Second, the decentralisation of political power from the administrative instruments of the state to a more fragmented set of actors or institutions. Third, the importance of intermediaries as the negotiators and managers in processes of privatisation.

By combining Migdal and Hibou's models, privatisation can be seen as a bargained shift in the boundaries demarcating the realms of the state and social organisations. The state may retain the capacity to intervene to reverse privatisation, but it cannot directly control the actions of a privatised service. Instead a private actor is selected to manage a function or agency. This actor may do so in a manner which produces benefits for itself, within the constraints imposed by the specifc contract with the state. The state may even permit and coexist with, potentially multiple, actors using violence within its territories. These actors do not even need to appeal to the legal framework of the state. They are constrained by the threat of state suppression if they overstep their mark. A good example is that of the Sicilian Mafia which existed in a balanced, if corrupt, symbiosis with the Italian state until the profits of the drug trade upset the equilibrium in the 1990s (Gambetta 1993). Through privatisation a central state may manage its own deficiencies by, firstly, distributing the costs and demands of provision away from its own institutions; and, secondly, by exploiting the incentives and capacities of non-state actors. When privatisation aligns with the ruling elite's goals of distribution, regulation and penetration, it is a strategy that can contribute to the reinforcement of state authority.

For Hibou, privatisation is, as the above quotation indicates, both temporary and renegotiable. However, in certain states, such as Somalia or Afghanistan, a fragmented ruling class introduced competitive processes of privatisation managed by opposing elites. In such circumstances the state itself, as an analytically relevant organisation, can rapidly disappear as its assets and protection are diffusely distributed to opposing private forces. As Christopher Clapham points out, "some states [in Africa] have been so thoroughly privatised as to differ little from the territories controlled by warlords" (1996, 273).

3.1.3 The Informalisation of the State

In 1999 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz identified 'disorder' as a key political process in countries of sub-Saharan Africa commonly labelled as 'collapsed' or 'failing'. These scholars identified how institutional coherence had been transformed by corruption, conflict, and poverty into functional systems of complex and interrelated informal ties that no longer, however, had clear centres of authority. This process was not necessarily qualitatively different from Hibou's privatisation. It is constituted by the accumulation of informal contracts between state agents and society. When aggregated the scope and depth of these contracts subvert the state's capacity to monitor or enforce the terms of privatisation. Informalisation constitutes a more permanent shift in the loci of power from a central unitary actor to an array of fragmented private actors.

In privatisation bargaining surrounds and emanates from the state, in informalisation a complex, competitive market of functional state-society bargains is formed. Fluid alliances and patrimonial networks interlink levels, sectors and localities of the administration, both with each other and with multiple different groups, individuals and organisations whose powers are rarely discernable. The state is, itself, thus transformed from a central authority into a field of multiple diverse and competing private power centres. These centres rely on informal networks to fuse economic, administrative, political and social power and produce a realm of the "informal, uncodified and unpoliced" (Chabal and Daloz 1999, xix).

A number of elements can be defined as fundamental in this process of informalisation. First, the functional replacement of formal institutions with vertical and horizontal infra-institutional relations mediated through informal networks. Second, these networks are fluid and unknown, and authority, therefore, uncertain and exclusive. Third, the boundaries between the political and other spheres of social life are illusory as events and actors removed from the political arena directly influence political

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loyalty of functional relationships. The privatisation of the state is less the fruit of its strategies of survival or consolidation, than the fruit of numerous actors and multiple logics of action." (author's translation).

outcomes.

When facing divisive crises, informalised systems do not possess a unitary centre. Instead of the consolidation of administrative or military capacity, through the partial and temporary retraction of formal authority, informal networks seek to consolidate authority within their own ranks. Because of this instead of consolidating central competence, a crisis in informalised state systems can result in the rapid disintegration and fragmentation of state authority. State action against informal networks risks retaliation from private military forces or violent conflict between the institutions of state, as military units may hold loyalties to different social actors; security agencies may operate as private enterprises; and companies' may run or dispose of core state assets. The state is, thus, forced to withdraw from social life or, able to penetrate society only through informal channels, it fragments into competing agencies. It often remains as either a formal mirage of authority, or as a privatised executive instrument controlled by one of many competing actors.

3.1.4 Two Ideal Types of Militia Formation

Militia formation is, according to the above types, potentially defined by these two ideal types of delegation from state to society.

When applied to the study of organised violence privatisation theorises the continuum, already noted by historical sociologists such as Charles Tilly and Fernand Braudel, between the authoritative control of violence and the need for a bureaucratic administrative structure (Tilly 1992). According to Hibou, when such an administrative capacity is lacking or weak, as it is in many developing and postcolonial states, the delegation of the authority to use violence to private actors can, as Keen envisaged, co-opt social conflict and divert it against the opponents of the state.

In privatisation state agents appoint or permit a social actor, or actors, to act as its proxy. The state may not actively form militias but grants its sanction to groups that form autonomously within society. The state amy constrain militias but does not control their actions. These groups may, therefore, autonomously collect protection rents, identify legitimate targets or engage in armed conflict, but may be limited to specific territories or operations by the presence of regular armed forces. As a result, privatised militias can be expected to be formed mostly in rural or periphery areas far from the central instruments of power. Privatised militias suggest short-term decision-making by state elites; but they also imply a territorial separation of the spheres of governance and war.

In an 'informal system' pre-war political authority is already diffuse and multi-centred. Militias may already exist as the core instruments guaranteeing the security and autonomy of informal networks, and may be more powerful than the state. They represent a bargain, similar to that of privatisation, between one specific power or group, able to draw on significant private revenues or able to divert the revenues and resources of the state, and non-state allies. In moments of crisis militias do not require state sanction and are not limited by the regular military, infiltrated by informal networks. As a result, the state's core capacities are eroded, fragmented or politically paralysed and multiple sub-state militias may emerge simultaneously. These militias frequently emerge at the centre of state power as defensive forces in the service of powerful parties or individuals. The boundaries between war and governance are shattered as new forces seize the state's sources of revenue and control of territory.

Two examples each of privatisation (the Ottoman Empire and Columbia) and informalisation (Sudan and ex-Soviet republics) in the formation of militias will help to depict the mechanics of these processes.

Karen Barkey (1994) describes how during the 1600s the Ottoman Empire, undergoing a nascent process of statisation, undertook a simultaneous process of military centralisation and the formation of banditry within rural areas.

> For all intents and purposes, the state invented and manufactured banditry… This is not to say that the state created banditry per se, ordering shady individuals to become bandits. Rather, it created disenfranchised groups with access to weaponry, whom it directed towards actions

> consistent with the state's goals of increased coercion and control at the central and regional levels (ibid. 141)

These groups were, partly, a product of the conflictual modernisation process of the central authority and society that could have focused its anger on the regime in Constantinople. Rather than confronting them, or risking the formation of broader class based movements, state elites forged links with such groups, transforming them into pseudo-threats encouraging society's consolidation around state security or employed them as direct instruments of the state machinery against distrusted communities. In a more modern case, Gonazalo Sánchez and Donny Meertens (2001) describe how during *la Violencia* in Columbia, social bandits emerged "as rebels against the social system" but as they acquired economic and political power were transformed into "pillars of the established order" (ibid. 4). These 'bandits' emerged from the land and class conflicts but became over time dependent on the dominant powers for protection from central state repression and were transformed into direct instruments of state authority in remote areas. Whilst social conflict at the periphery acted as a blunt and abusive form of enforcement, it bought time for the state to develop more efficient capacities of periphery control. As the state expanded its "'coercive and modernising presence in the most remote areas, it [put in place] more effective channels of communication and its means of exacting punishments." (ibid. 185)

In Sudan, in the lead up to the Darfur war, multiple political and social networks were able to penetrate and manipulate the state's military and security forces. Decades of informalisation, encouraged by the regime as a means of consolidating its own power, had established competing groups within these services able to protect the activities of competing political factions and economic interests. In 1999, whilst Arab Janjaweed groups in Darfur were receiving weapons and training from the government's formal leadership seeking to suppress a rebellion, the nascent Fur rebel movements were purchasing weapons from the same sources through relatives in the Sudanese military (Flint and de Waal 2005, 70). Edmund Herzig describes how in the Caucuses post-Soviet states emerged "that were lacking many of the necessary attributes of statehood" (1999, 16). The result was that when facing political or military conflicts leaders were forced to rely on informal military structures whose interests diverged and subverted the agendas of the nascent governments. These militias were frequently criminal and adhered to extremist ethnic ideologies, but furthermore they were able to entrench themselves at the heart of eroding state power and institutions.

3.1.5 Intermediaries and Militia Formation

The important advantage of the above model is that neither Hibou's model of privatisation, nor Chabal's and Daloz's model of informalisation depict militia formation as simply an organic or security response to violence. This is important in two ways.

Firstly, although initial mobilisation might originate from security gaps or disorder, the *acceptance* of the authority of militias, within a state's sovereign territory, results from the political decisions of state agents. If such a decision were not made, tacitly or explicitly, militias would be identified, accurately, as a threat and treated as a rebellion. Militia formation, therefore, indicates a selective suspension of the state's sovereignty and protective obligations; a redrawing of the boundaries demarcating inclusion and exclusion, and the empowerment of alternative sources of power within society. These decisions may not represent a preferred strategy, or even a desired strategy, but they represent a purposeful decision to reduce the homogeneity of state authority to increase the power of particular non-state groups. The dichotomous Hobbesian model of state-society is not applied.

Secondly, both approaches suggest that the act of delegation and militia formation is, by its very nature, not a process fully controlled by either state actors or social organisations. Instead it is a process mediated by various interests and vaguely defined intercessors standing between and able to link the two. For Hibou these are the intermediaries of privatisation, able to gain the state's tacit or explicit permission to form militias and to influence the contracts of defining the extent and constraints on privatisation. For Chabal and Daloz these are the informal networks that penetrate state institutions. What this implies for the nature of militia formation is unclear, precisely because in both discussions

the precise nature of these intermediaries is unclear[42]. These intermediaries, their relationships with political elites, state agents and communities, will be a key focus of the empirical material. It is impossible to identify the directions of causality linking state and those mobilised for collective action from theory, without empirical knowledge of these actors. What is certain is, that, as Reno suggests, pre-war patterns of power and authority must not be ignored when analysing the structuration of militias.

As we shall see in the cases these intermediaries are key actors not because they are necessarily able to *control* the formation of militias, but because the mobilisation of militias is not an ephemeral phenomenon. Militia formation creates enduring social units with new leaderships, loyalties and goals. They, therefore, empower those actors serving in the militia or able to gain control over it and create a new instrument of authority independent from the state. Militias provide a vehicle for a partial or potential reconstruction of the state or society according to the image of the militiamen and those intermediaries instrumental in their mobilisation.

Let us turn now away from the question of formation to address the nature of organisation within a war-time environment. This second part moves the focus of discussion away from the state and its penetration of society to look more closely at how militia organisation is related to the context of civil war.

3.2 Militia Organisation

The descent into war represents a decision by actors to opt out of the contractual restraints of institutionalised interactions. It is a resort to a direct contest whose logic, resources and arenas are separate from that of peacetime politics. At the core of this contest is the exertion of violence. War, to paraphrase Joanna Bourke (1999, 1) is about killing, and not dying.

Part two of this chapter focuses not on the strategies of militia formation but introduces a preliminary framework for understanding how in the organisation of violence militias are as much slaves as masters of the fragmented disordered environment they create. After presenting a discussion of the cognitive and social distortions produced by armed conflict this section uses Weberian Sociology and Military Psychology to deduce certain categories with which the Lebanese Forces and the Popular Defence Forces' organisations can be dissected. This analysis forces us to focus our investigation into those structures linking the strategic and tactical levels of a civil war. It is these structures that must provide the disciplinary oversight, the strategic direction and the political goals that elevate the actions of individual combatants above the immediacy of violence and allow violence to be employed for organisational, as opposed to private, goals.

3.2.1 Violence in Civil War

To understand the behaviour of agents, we must understand the structural environment in which they act. Armed groups, are not isolated by drill, barracks and uniform from society, but are groups both from and operational in society. They patrol the same street corners from which they were recruited, confront friends across front lines, are fed by their families and often fight in locally recruited units. In civil war these societies are defined by the presence of violence.

Violence, according to the Cambridge dictionary of philosophy, is "the use of force to cause physical harm, death, or destruction" (1999, 959)[43]. Its primary direct utility is to grant actors the power to transgress and enforce boundaries, physical or symbolic, autonomously[44]. The violent can kick through

[42] Supposition allows us to imagine various actors that might function as intermediaries, through for example, the direct militarization of existing non-violent organisations such as the mobilisation of party cadres or social groups tied by kinship networks to the political class. In others militias might be established by the formation of new organisations within society, for example the founding of vigilante groups by moon-lighting military officers, security agents or other state employees. In any case, these are actors with the organisational ability to link local communities to elite decision-making.

[43] Violence here refers to the physical act of force and coercion against a person or property, and does not include 'structural violence' (Galtung 1972).

[44] It is remarkable that whilst much theoretical discussion has focused on war's impact on societies and institutions, following Charles Tilly's (1992) work on the development of states, the effects of *violence*

doors, seize land and murder even the most powerful of individuals; they can make even the most intimate of possessions their own. As a base form of power, destroying opposing force, violence is used because it works. But it is essentially inefficient. Violence often destroys the object it seeks to control, disturbs its observers and all too frequently evokes an opposing and countervailing violence. Violence produces disorder in its wake.

Violence does this not solely due to the immediate and personal implications it has for its victims but, because by increasing the level and awareness of risk and uncertainty in everyday life, violence reduces the time and geographic horizons of those who witness it. When facing violence uncoordinated actors respond individually and immediately to "an elephantine fear that grabs us like a massive bouncer who comes up from behind" (Hedges 2003, 38). In these responses the normal codes of human behaviour are often ignored, ideologies are forgotten and even the most basic of loyalties can break down; private protection becomes paramount and in the confusion trust is undermined and norms are degraded. Because of these impacts, mechanisms of peaceful conflict resolution are swept aside and second-tier, apolitical, conflicts abound. Information flows are disrupted and distorted, newspapers are closed down, television is censored and radio is blanketed with music. Transport and travel halt, as movement around, in and out of regions is restricted by road blocks and permission requirements. Even at distances far beyond the range of mass violence, its secondary effects causes markets to contract, political authorities to collapse and regional insecurity to expand.

Mass violence, therefore, has the capacity to not only destroy lives and property. It can holistically destroy the institutional order of a society – from respect for traffic lights to constitutional procedure[45] - producing, over time, not only state collapse, but social collapse: "the extended breakdown of social coherence: society as the generator of institutions of cohesion and maintenance, can no longer create, aggregate, and articulate the supports and demands" of a population Zartman (1995, 6). It seeds hopelessness and cynicism and destroys the willingness of actors to even contemplate investment in extended projects or fixed assets[46]. "Victor and victim alike stand not only on a charred battleground, but upon charred hopes and dreams" (Nordstrom 2004, 69). It creates cultures of impunity as violent abuses go unrecorded and unpunished.

As Paul Collier has affirmed these social changes caused by war cannot be controlled or even predicted by armed groups. They result from the survival strategies of numerous individual actors as societies attempt to continue economic production, maintain political representation and preserve security in conditions of diffuse violence. They form a series of concentric 'rippling' costs expanding out from the fighting itself to contaminate surrounding areas (Collier et al. 2003 48-49). What is certain, however, is that these structural changes alter the context and organistion of the militia itself. It is key, therefore, to understand how the actors of civil war intersect with the changes produced by civil war. As Marchal and Messiant (1997, 16) have noted about the economy of war, the problem is "moins celui du développement d'une économie de guerre ... que celui de l'articulation entre l'économie *de* guerre et l'économie *dans la* guerre." (author's emphasis).

The solution proposed here is that civil war must be simultaneously conceptualised as a *strategic game* between cohesive sides and a *social order* in which violence that was intended 'politically' is lost in the 'noise' of abusive behaviour, the routine tragedies of combat and the genuine mishaps and mistakes of actors.

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on institutions or an institutional theory of violence has not, as far as this author knows, been developed. Such a theory would, I propose, be founded on the effects of uncertainty and risk on disrupting the enforcement mechanisms of formal institutions and the uncoordinated equlibria of informal institutions.

[45] These are examples taken from interviews in Lebanon.

[46] This author came to learn of one of the more disturbing secondary effects of the war in Sudan through a conversation with an international aid worker in the Nuba Mountains. Whilst describing the effects of a recent peace treaty successfully implemented in the area, she mentioned in passing that in many areas this hadn't changed the ability of farmers to sell their produce. When I asked whether this was because they were not being permitted to travel to the markets she remarked that to the contrary the agreement explicitly contained a provision permitting this. The problem was that so many of the inhabitants of the region had become numbed by the effects of war that, even after over a year of a successful cease fire, they refused to plant crops, sold all their farming instruments and preferred to eat the seeds themselves considering anything else a futile investment in an uncertain future.

As a *strategic* game the mechanics of force and counter-force rule over the specificities of ideology, justice or honour. As a German soldier in World War II asserted "Nazism begins ten miles behind the front line" (quoted in Van Doorn 1975, xxiv). Armed groups, including the military, guarantee their own survival whilst pursuing the defeat of rivals and, when it exists, the capture of state authority. There is no implication, however, that in this competition that violence will be limited or channelled solely against the military opponent. Only the organisations and the opposing forces can place constraints on the means used in this process. "There can be no imaginable act of violence, however treacherous or cruel, that falls outside of war, that is not-war, for the logic of war simply is a steady thrust toward moral extremity. That is why it is so awful …" (Waltzer 1977, 23). In irregular warfare the autarkic control of society of interstate warfare gives way to multi-faceted, networked structures interlinking local arenas (Duffield 2001, 75). In these local arenas of conflict, or what Stathis Kalyvas (2003) has called 'cleavages', civilians are essential informants, providers, porters and couriers, they are audience and actor in roles that both directly and indirectly can result in the death of combatants. Violence, in such an arena, is not only constrained and concentrated for periodic confrontations and defence against regular troops but becomes a rational technique in the repertoire of actions available to armed groups to alter a population's incentives[47].

> Periods of intense military conflict (as opposed to calmer periods) reduce the availability of benefits, turning survival into the key benefit; during such periods, political actors are likely to resort to terror in order to shape civilian behavior and reduce the probability of defection.[8] In other words, they will try to alter the expected (dis)utility of defection (the probability that an individual defection will be sanctioned and the intensity of the sanction). (Kalyvas 1999, 251)

Violence, whether termed abuse or terrorism, is thus an organisational strategy employed to increase an armed group's control over society. In civil war "war itself … spills across the landscapes and cityscapes of prosaic life. The image of the complete battle, separate from the civilian life around it, is antiquated, unreal," (Nordstrom 2004, 58).

As a *social order*, however, violence is no longer employed to serve the strategic interests of organisations and commanders. Instead violence serves the individual incentives of combatants. David Keen (2002) has described how violence in war transforms from a contest between opponents into a system. This transformation takes place as a process defined by three stages. In the first some elements of the military factions turn away from their ideals and begin to engage in self-centred violence. In the second civilians turn away from military actors associated with the abuses of stage one. In the final stage the military factions

> turn with renewed intensity on the civilians, accusing them of being disloyal, ungrateful and a threat to the fighters' own security. Naturally, the escalating abuse of civilians tends to produce further disillusionment among the civilians, and the cycle may be renewed and deepened. (Ibid. 8)

In this system combatants, even from opposing sides, begin to place themselves in opposition not with rivals but with the 'rear enemy', "all those who were perceived as having shirked the fighting and thus having excluded themselves from that community of battle increasingly celebrated by the fighting troops." (Bartov 2000, 95). In this way, violence that is mobilised to defeat a military opponent begins to be subverted from organisational goals and is employed for private ends. The Lebanese sociologist,

[47] Without being flippant, this is the basis of Kurtz's final speech in Stanley Kubrick's cult film Apocalypse Now in which after years fighting, with a supposed 'purity of arms', against the Vietcong, Kurtz recognises the power of a movement that is willing not to obey the moral constraints of a just war, but to commit appalling acts against their own civilians in the name of an ideal they hold to be "Perfect, genuine, complete, crystalline, pure."

Samir Khalaf, in his book *Civil and Uncivil Violenc*e has similarly described how in Lebanon violence was unleashed from its root causes to become a self-perpetuating force in society.

> civil violence is not, or does not always remain, 'civil'. When inflamed by the atavism of reawakened tribalism, enmity and deep-seated suspicion of the 'other', internecine feuds, and unresolved regional and global conflicts, collective violence could readily degenerate further into the incivility of proxy wars and surrogate victimisation. It is here that violence acquires its own inherent self-destructive logic and spirals into that atrocious cycle of unrelenting cruelties. (Khalaf 2002, 284)

Khalaf, rightly, captures how violence transformed from an act of rational policy into something else. By creating new pressures and interests violence became self-propelling.

In attempting to separate these two models of violence it rapidly becomes apparent that it is difficult to identify when actions serve individual or organisational goals *post facto*. Actors will impose organisational legitimations to disguise personal motives and formal histories are biased towards such accounts. Rather it is better to assume that organisational and private motives may be permitted to co-exist in the targeting and forms of violence. Violence can serve multiple purposes simultaneously. At a higher level of analysis, violence does not follow strategic vectors from escalation to deescalation but nor is anarchic. It diverts into numerous sub-systems and forking paths that distort attempts at simple aggregation into sides or battles. "Violence is … nonlinear, productive, destructive, and reproductive… We can rightly speak of chains, spirals, and mirrors of violence - … a continuum of violence" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004, 2). In this way, civil warfare is no different from modern interstate warfare, *except* in the level and form of organisation.

These two models of violence in civil war emphasise the importance of organisation as the intermediary between these two uses of violence. Without organisational discipline and control, violence in civil war can only indirectly serve to progress an ideal or political agenda. War does not require that militias establish *hegemonic* control over the violence they unleash. Organisations are able to exploit actions that in themselves are motivated by external incentives. But nonetheless if armed conflict was not propelled by organised or semi-organised forces it would be either defeated by emergent organisations or would fizzle out as costs mounted.

We can dissect the intersection between organisational and private motives for violence by developing more accurate categories of analysis. We need to focus less on the act of violence itself, and develop an understanding of how the organisational structures of armed groups interlink the tactical and strategic levels of violence.

3.2.2 The Organisation of Violence

In interstate wars massive resources are committed to the restraining, containing and conditioning of violence to suit a specific contest – despite the rhetoric of 'overwhelming force' and 'shock and awe' used to intimidate adversaries. This principle is endowed with international legal authority in the 'doctrine of proportionality', requiring the mitigation of means in relation to ends. This doctrine "is embedded in almost every national legal system and underlies the international legal order" (Fischer 1999, 294). Police violence, similarly, is predicated on the supremacy of information-gathering and the restriction of force to limited confrontations. Organised crime again, although illegal, does not generally seek social disorder, but rather uses violence to distort market forces by contravening property rights and other laws regulating an economy.

It follows therefore, that armed groups must create boundaries on the destructive powers of their combatants. If they do not the organisational goals of a group will be lost amongst the immediate demands on private decision-making. We must understand more of the processes through which armed groups become regulatory bodies within civil wars. Armed groups must,

> Provide an institutional framework – organised largely around the interconnected tasks of coercion and predation – that nonetheless aspire to consolidate practices of economic and political governance that would have legitimacy, predictability, and integrity. (Picard 2000, 292)

In part, this can be expected to resemble the process by which all organisations proceed from the mobilisation to the institutionalisation of collective action. In part however, this process must be considered as specific to organisations whose members wield violence.

The changes of entering a civil war are felt differently at two levels, the strategic and the tactical. At the strategic level politics becomes a military rather than discursive struggle. Comparative advantage is sought not solely through political deal making but on the field of battle through the destruction of rivals. With the outbreak of civil war the strategic commanders of militias have incentives to increase their military efficiency by improving their regulation of the environment, followers and resources. Military actors require that the impulse to violence be ordered and continuous.

> For wars to be fought most effectively, combatants must be able to let their passions go only on command, and they must be able to rein them in when ordered even when severely provoked… Indeed hatred … often seems to be more the result than the cause of violent conflict… (Mueller 2004, 15)

At the tactical level, on the other hand, war is a violent, immediate micro-reality of individuals and communities - in the words of a political scientist currently enlisted in the U.S. Army "War is intensely personal..." (Burgos 2004, 552). Periods of immense risk are punctuated with weeks of boredom; great hardship intermixed with moments of relative richness, and imaginably joy with despair. Without strategic organisation the tactical level, defined by limited horizons, would determine action. Without control, as van Creveld remarked, violence can only serve itself.

The linkage of these two levels is that ability of an organisation to kill on demand. According to a unique study by military psychologist Dave Grossman three organisational variables[48] determined this ability of an organisation to "turn killing on and off like a faucet" (1996, 187) at the tactical level. To be most effective these organisational characteristics must combine to diffuse the responsibility of killing from the individual onto a group. This diffusion can either deflect or delay the natural reluctance of ordinary individuals to kill and postpones the effects of trauma caused by killing on individuals.

- The *demands of authority*: Individuals who are respected and considered legitimate leaders by combatants and who directly observe and encourage combatants are the most effective in demanding obedience in killing. Grossman sums up the relationship between combatant and commander as one of "our blood and his guts". It is the leader's determination and the combatant's willingness to kill and die that determines the resilience of individual units.
- The *absolution of a group*: Groups provide individuals with the anonymity and absolution that facilitate killing. The physical proximity and emotional bonds within a group intensifies the desire of individuals to conform to group actions and preferences, even when this promotes a dissonance with individual preferences.
- The *physical and emotional distance* of the killer from the victim. For Grossman the establishment of distance between killer and victim is defined by the physical distance imposed by technology but

[48] Grossman lists a total of five variables defining a willingness to kill by individuals, two of these, the cost-benefit analysis of killing to the individual and the predisposition of the indidivual, are not relevant to a discussion of the organisation of killing.

more importantly by the emotional distance. Emotional distance is defined by the dehumanisation and demonisation of the opponent in order to identify them as fundamentally different from the combatant.

These categories should indicate how at the tactical level of organisational development organisations become effective at controlling the violence they unleash. What is necessary is to understand how these categories intersect with the processes of organisational institutionalisation at the strategic level of analysis.

Rather than entering into an unnecessary discussion of organisational institutionalisation, this process will be modelled here according to the insights of Weberian sociology. For Weber it was the ideal and material interests of both followers and staff in the reproduction and regularisation of their positions that drove processes of institutionalisation. It occurs "when the tide that lifted a charismatically led group out of everyday life flows back into the channels of workaday routines…" (1978, 1121). For Weber the ability of a collective actor to institutionalise, or to use his terminology 'routinise', is defined by the promotion of organisational survival over the interpersonal relationships to a charismatic ideology or individual. In this process, an organisation elevates itself above a community or group and seeks to centralise decision-making and promote functional differentiation in internal exchanges. This process can be analysed within three categories.

- *Recruitment*: institutionalised organisations create a boundary between group members and society by regulating recruitment into the organisation and by establishing a 'staff' that transmit and enforce orders. The staff makes its living from the organisation.
- *Resources*: institutionalised organisations "adapt to the conditions of the economy" (1978, 254) and seek to regularise the flow of resources into the organisation.
- *Discipline*: institutionalised organisations require above all, however, the elevation of group discipline above the individual incentives of group members.

The precise content of the transformations within these categories determine the nature of the organisation that emerged. These could be patrimonial, traditional or bureaucratic, but each represents a more permanent form of authority than that of charisma.

These twofold criteria, firstly Grossman's analysis of diffusion of responsibility and secondly, Weber's discussion of institutionalisation, can be combined to bring to light the precise content and changing nature of organisation with two militias studied in the cases. They allow the analyst to dissect the general differences and linkages between the strategic concerns of leaders and the tactical concerns of combatants. In this way it is possible to examine the extent and form of command and control of the militias as organisations.

3.3 Conclusion

To study civil war is to study how violence initiates ripple and spillover effects that may be neither predicted nor controlled by actors. In the discussion of privatisation and informalisation the act of forming a militia is presented as a rational strategy of power in contexts when the state is weak. Militias are formed according to the opportunities perceived by actors seeking to subvert the rules or alter the boundaries of state competence to their own benefit. In privatisation the central authority of the state regulates and places boundaries on this process; in informalisation the central authority of the state itself is undermined. Nevertheless, both the processes of civil war and militia formation must be seen as an intended, although perhaps not preferred, strategies. The descent into war introduces into the political, social and economic fields a level of violence that alters the social order and reconstructs it around the actions of the coercive organisations.

In civil war violence is not constrained to a competition of arms between opponents but is employed against society. This occurs in two ways, firstly as a rational organisational strategy, but secondly as a war system emerges in which violence is employed by individuals against a civilian population for private motives, whether rational or emotional. If the violence of civil war is to be employed for political ends, it must imply a renewed formalisation of the control of violence unleashed by armed

groups, including militias. This control must enable militiamen to kill but should be controlled by commanders. Thus whilst militias represent a delegation of violence, they simultaneously represent the beginning of a new process of formal organisation.

This chapter has sought to develop categories through which the levels and forms of the militias in the cases can be differentiated. It has presented a number of observations firstly on the political origins of the delegation of violence and secondly, attempted to express analytically the nature of violence in civil war and what exactly is meant when it we say that violence is organised. This chapter does not pretend to present a deductive model of militia formation and organisation. It offers a conceptual framework with which to contextualise and structure the observations made from the case studies. Throughout the empirical chapters the categories and foci developed above will provide the guiding logic of comparison.

In an attempt to combine these multiple levels of analysis within the historical narratives of the militias an empirical eye will, whereever possible, be placed on the strategic and tactical levels of analysis. Most importantly, several ‘cut-out’ sections describing particular acts of violence within the cases will present in depth cases that allow us to perceive key violent events in context. When available these cut-outs will be an analysis of several sources, however, when not they shall be presented as long quotations from single sources.

4 Militias in Sudan and Lebanon

The Sea of Faith
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furl'd.
But now I only hear
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,
...
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.

Matthew Arnold, Dover Beach (1994 [1867])

Although it is aimed at a specific objective, generally the disarming of the enemy, progress in war is mostly spasmodic and often elusive[49]. For civil wars this assertion is particularly relevant. The extremely limited organisational capacity of armed groups, the 'means' in civil war, often make the analysis of civil war as an instrument of policy bewildering. Conflicts appear to be driven solely by chance and hatred, with warfare cyclical and self-propelling, rather than progressive. Media reports focusing on the ahistorical presentation of events portray wars as if fought without conception of a 'tomorrow', with daily horrors repeated in perpetuity. This portrayal is only partially accurate. As this chapter intends to show change does occur in civil wars. This chapter describes the historical origins of the militias in Sudan and Lebanon and compares their initial forms to their institutionalised forms 15 years later[50].

Prior to their descent into armed conflict, Sudan (1983-2005) and Lebanon (1975-1990) were multiethnic societies in which economy and state were perceived to be dominated by members of one ethnic group. When, after decades of political debate, the demand for reform erupted into violence, parties and networks within these dominant ethnicities formed militias as a means of bolstering the state, reinforcing their control of it, and defending their communities from rival armed groups.

As military forces the militias were initially weak and disorganised. They lacked not only strategic direction, but the organisational capacity to pursue strategy. Violence, instead, served multiple functions, most of which were not political, and many of which were not military. It was, for example, a way for young men[51] to express their disgust with the 'corrupt' status quo and for impoverished nomads to survive the dry season; it was also a source of enrichment for criminals and a means of protecting one's life. These tactical level interests were powerful determinants of violence in the first years of armed conflict, and intersected only indirectly or intermittently with the strategic interests of

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[49] The Iran and Iraq war (1980-88), for example, drastically altered the strategic balance in the Persian Gulf and left Iran alone with 1.5 million casualities and $350 billion dollars in debt, but the war ended with no change to the borders of either country, despite this having been its main political objective.

[50] It is not possible in this chapter to give anything more than a representative overview of the extensive and contentious literature on the causes of the civil wars in Lebanon and Sudan. The intention has been to guide the reader to key topics relevant to the outbreak of war and the formation of militias, for further information please refer to the bibliography.

[51] See Bazenguissa-Ganga (1996) for a discussion of the importance of 'youth' as both role and constituency in political violence, with the example of Congo-Brazzaville.

political actors. The militias were networks of semi-organised self-defence units, levées and vigilantes without any central coordination. Political parties controlled only small units and their diffuse networks were mainly occupied in supplying resources to local arenas. Nevertheless, these parties' basic organisational capacities allowed them to use the breakdown of social order to take control of the population groups in whose name they subsequently claimed to fight. Fifteen years later, the disparate militia forces that emerged with the outbreak of violence had evolved into institutionalised semi-centralised organisations controlled by partisan political elements affiliated, or autonomous, from the state. They had, in the process, come to adopt different recruitment strategies, different disciplinary structures and different techniques of violence from each other.

This chapter compares the pre-war and early war emergence of these militias in Sudan and Lebanon. It seeks to elucidate the mechanisms of militia formation by studying the early years of the militias' organisations, taking the analysis up to the point in which formal organisations were founded. The second part of this chapter compares the final organisations of the two militias using the categories developed in chapter three.

4.1 Lebanon

The political conflict that led to civil war in Lebanon is best described not as a rivalry between confessional communities, but as a competition over the reform of state institutions. This competition was waged between a diverse set of political groups divided between a traditional and patrimonial ruling class and competing modernist left-wing and right-wing ideological parties. These actors appealed in their mobilisation strategies both to political platforms and to the diverse and overlapping ethnic and cultural affiliations of Lebanon's population. The Lebanese civil war originated from the concurrence of this competition with a security crisis induced by Palestinian guerrilla groups. When war broke out in 1975, state authority fragmented and diverse militant parties and local defence groups replaced state security agencies.

The Lebanese Forces was one of the primary instruments of this process. It emerged in 1976 as a confederation of right-wing Christian parties working in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

4.1.1 Background

Lebanon is a small country (10,400 sq km) on the Eastern Mediterranean coast. It is divided by a North to South ridge of mountains that drop down, in the East and South, to fertile farming land, and to the sea on the West.

Under Ottoman rule (1516-1920), these mountains were a refuge for minorities fleeing from the sporadic repression and inter-communal tension of the Sunni empire[52]. By 1920, Lebanon was a patchwork of 17 religious confessions annexed, at the San Remo conference, from Syria as a French protectorate (Longrigg 1958, 113-118). The Lebanese nation emerged, however, not as an 'imagined community' but as a cooperative venture[53] between Christian and Muslim communities seeking independence from France (cf. Akarli 1993, 6-31; Cobban 1985, 35-59). Whilst these communities intermingled, each had identifiable territorial heartlands (see table 5.2) within Lebanon.

[52] In the words of one of Lebanon's intellectual fathers, Michel Chiha, "C'est en même temps un pays 'refuge' et un pays d'émigration, un pays de montagnes et de plaines, de climates variés et de cultures différentes; on y peut voir toutes les formes de l'espèce humaine et du travail humain." (1964, 16)

[53] A cooperative venture marked, it must be said, by a history of sporadic violence, the most important example being a civil war between the Christian and Druze communities of Mount Lebanon in 1860 (Fawaz 1994, 47-77).

Tab. 1: Table 1: Main Confessional Groups in Lebanon

1984 – Minority Rights Group estimates in 'The Crisis in Lebanon', Financial Times, 17 February 1984, p. 16.

1982 – Census figures from A. H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay, London 1946, p. 121.

Source: Johnson (1986, 32)

Sect	**Population 1984**	**Percentage 1884**	**Percentage 1932**
Shi`ites	1,100,000	30.8	19.6
Sunnis	750,000	21.0	22.4
Druze	200,000	5.6	6.8
Total Muslim	**2,050,000**	**57.4**	**48.8**
Maronites	900,000	25.2	28.8
Greek Orthodox	250,000	7.0	9.7
Greek Catholics	150,000	4.2	5.9
Armanian Orthodox and Catholics	175,000	4.9	3.9
Other Christians	50,000	1.4	1.6
Total Christians	**1,525,000**	**42.7**	**49.9**

Tab. 2: Table 2: Place of Residence by Sect and Region, (percent in 1974)

Source: el-Khazen (2000, 58)

	Beirut	**Suburb**	**Other Cities**	**Mount Lebanon**	**North**	**South**	**Beqaa**
Sunni	35,5	8,7	36,7	1,3	42,8	0,4	16,9
Shi`a	16,1	32,9	16,6	0,3	0,0	50,9	40,4
Druze	5,2	1,4	5,1	16,8	0,0	0,0	1,0
Maromites	22,6	26,2	20,4	66,5	32,0	31,4	27,3
Greek Orthodox	17,2	8,9	10,6	5,2	24,1	0,0	1,0
Greek Catholic and Armanians	15,2	21,6	10,3	9,6	0,9	17,1	13,1

The Christian community within Lebanon is made up of 11 distinct religious groups: Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Syriac orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Nestorian, Chaldean, Protestant and Latin. The most important, both numerically and historically, were the Maronites (Salibi 1988, 87-167; Aulas 1985, 2-17; Harik 1966) mostly resident on Mount Lebanon and around the Qadeisha valley in the North. The Muslim community, on the other hand, is divided between a highly urbanised Sunni community, the *Shi'a*, mostly resident in the south and the Bekaa valley, and the Druze[54], whose villages are concentrated in the Chouf Mountains.

Before the civil war (1975-1990), Lebanon was a liberal democratic country with a capital intensive

[54] The Druze are an esoteric sect that reside in Syria, Lebanon and Israel and do not accept converts. Whether they are Islamic or even Arab is disputed within the community itself which keeps its religious texts and beliefs largely secret. The Druze faith is monotheistic and displays many of the symbols and tenets of Islamic faith (Betts 1988).

service economy[55]. It absorbed money from both the oil-rich Arabian Gulf and the West. Its economic growth was driven by trading and financial sectors (Gates 1998, 150-1). It was the only country in the Arab Middle East with a tradition of freedom of speech, association and press. It boasted a number of excellent universities, including the best in the region, the American University of Beirut. Whilst Lebanon's neighbours were committed to the military struggle against Israel, provoking wars in 1967 and in 1973, Lebanon had avoided direct confrontations with the Zionist state since 1948. With the exception of an outbreak of civil violence in 1958, before the 1960s Lebanon remained seemingly immune to the coups and repression of the Arab world. In other words, before 1975 few scholars predicted a descent into civil war.

These symptoms of stability, whilst by no means illusory, disguised social pressures for institutional reform. The co-existence of Lebanon's many communities was founded on an informal 'National Pact' (*mithaq al-watani*) (cf. el-Khazen 1991) signed in 1943 by representatives of leading Sunni and Christian land-owning families. This pact established the principle that confessional representation within the state should be institutionalised, rather than renegotiated every electoral cycle. This pact distributed parliamentary proportions, and executive and bureaucratic positions amongst the confessions, according to the demographic percentiles of Lebanon's first and only census in 1932 (cf. Maktabi 1999). The borders of Lebanon had been drawn by France to make the Maronites the largest confession, and, as the ethnic majority at this time, they were granted control of the presidency, a six to five majority in the distribution of parliamentary seats and civil service appointments, and held the position of the head of the army[56].

Whilst effective in managing the coalition of interests and the transition to independence, this pact created an elitist and static socio-political order. It secured the authority of a multi-confessional traditional elite which interacted moderately as a class, but was dependent upon their control of confessional constituencies for parliamentary power (Hudson 1976, 113). Originally beneficiaries of Ottoman land grants and colonial co-option policies, these ruling families (*zu'ama* or *za'im*) maintained confessional governance by monopolising the distribution of state resources and the opportunities created by the capital economy to reward supporters. Patronage – exchanging access to contracts, services and representation (including welfare, education and health services) for votes or economic opportunities (Johnson 1986; cf. Gilsenan 1977, 168) – was melded to historically determined norms of honour, status and reciprocity[57] (cf. Khalifah 2001, 74-75; Picard 2001). Through these networks the *za'im* became the brokers between the state and its citizens.

The exclusionary dynamics of the confessional system affected all. An individual's birthplace and parentage would determine his life-chances. Within this system relative inequality also emerged between and within confessions, shaped by a historically evolved political economy dominated by an urban, Maronite class. The largely rural *Shi'a*, 'represented' by quasi-feudal, land-owning *za'im* manipulating honour codes, fealty, and land grants, were most severely constrained. Their traditionalist *beys* ignored the demands, particularly of a generation of *Shi'a* émigrés with money or education, for improved provision of services in *Shi'a* areas (cf. Ajami 1986, 52-73). As a result, the *Shi'a* were underrepresented in higher educational, professional and business circles. Throughout the 1950s and 60s, the urbanisation of these "victims of the centripetal economy of the country" (Khalaf 1976, 43) created a 'Belt of Misery' in Beirut, which was inhabited almost entirely by *Shi'a* migrants. These slums bordered similarly depressed neighbourhoods of working class Christians, many of

[55] Whilst overall growth between the 1960s and 1973 remained fairly stable, at between 6.0 and 6.6%, estimates show that the economy was marked by a gradual shift away from agriculture to industry, trade and services. Whilst the former decreased 3% in its share of the economy between 1964 and 1973, the other sectors increased by around 4-3%. Trade continued to dominate the economy in 1974 at around 30% of the economy (cf. Makdisi 2004, 15-16).

[56] The Sunni community was granted control of the Premiership, whilst the Shi'a controlled the Speaker of the Chamber.

[57] In her memoire Soha Bechara, a communist participant in the resistance against Israel, captures the logic of this governance when she recalls the words of one of these *za'im*, Ahmed al-Assad, when villagers in his land in Southern Lebanon petitioned him for the opening of a school. His reply was that "my son Kamel attends school, and I consider that quite sufficient." (Bechara 2003, 5)



Abbildung 2: Map 1: Political Map of Lebanon
Source: ICG, 2004.

which were recent migrants from Mount Lebanon. Furthermore, by the 1970s and 80s, most estimates suggested that the *Shi'a*, with a higher birth-rate than Christian and Sunni communities, had become the largest confession, overall, in Lebanon (see table 4.1).

The grievances produced by economic and political exclusion produced, in turn, political demands that could not be represented within the static confessional system (Hudson 1976) or pacified by patrimonial distribution (Gilsenan 1996, 265-269).

By the 1950s, a socially mobilised[58] generation of Lebanese emerged from the disenfranchised urban working classes and universities, which had become centres of contentious politicisation (Barakat 1977)[59]. Multiple modernist parties, many descended from the anti-colonial movements of the 1930s, recruited these constituencies to lobby for formal institutional change[60]. Though unified in opposition to the *za'im*, these parties disagreed fervently on whether reform should express Arab nationalist or Western liberal aspirations, and, in turn, whether reform should dismantle or maintain confessional proportionality. Whilst left wing parties embraced the former of both options, conservative parties, with large Christian memberships fearing dissolution within an Arab-Islamic state, sought the latter. These groups were experts at mobilising the street; in the words of the Lebanese journalist Clovis Maksoud:[61] "The ferment of the popular classes expressed itself as though they and the regime were living in two different and mutually contradictory worlds." In 1975, the year that civil war broke out, the *zu'ama* still controlled two thirds of parliamentary seats (Hanf 1993, 79).

But the debate over whether these internal pressures alone would have led to civil war continues today, for they did not occur in isolation. Lebanon was not a neutral observer to the Middle Eastern Cold War; it was enmeshed in a regional security system that it was too weak to influence[62]. This system was defined, on one hand, by the political struggle for dominance between Arab Nationalist and Conservative countries (Kerr 1971), and, on the other, by the Arab military struggle against Israel. Flanked by Syria and Israel, and of no strategic interest to the superpowers[63], Lebanon became an arena for the indirect competition of regional rivals.

After 1967, the dynamic balance between regional and internal actors, required for the stability of the Lebanese polity, was fundamentally undermined by the reformation of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) as an organisation of direct struggle against Israel (cf. Hudson 1972)[64]. After 'Black September'[65] in 1970, large numbers of Palestinian refugees in Jordan were expelled into

[58] Social mobilisation is defined by Karl Deutsch (1961, 494) as "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialisation and behaviour."
[59] Each University in Lebanon was affiliated not only to a particular confession, but also to a particular political perspective – except the AUB which made it the battleground of divergent views. St. Joseph was the pro-European path for Maronites into high positions in the civil service; the Lebanese University was an Eygptian funded Arab Nationalist Instititution, frequented largely by Muslims; Hazagian an almost entirely Armenian institution (Barakat 1971).
[60] For more on political parties in pre-war Lebanon see Yamak (1966) and Suleiman (1967).
[61] *Shu'un Filastiniya*, October-November 1975
[62] In the words of Pierre Gemayel, who shall be discussed later: "It is perfectly plain that the defence of our country is a diplomatic not a military problem. If Israel attacks, we shall respond – as Belgium did in 1939. We can never withstand an Israeli invasion," (quoted Hanf 1993, 373).
[63] In the words of Raymond Eddé, a respected moderate Christian politician: "In the balance between us and Israel, we don't weigh more than a feather. You know what a feather is? Ultimately America is very interested in Israel and oil. She is not interested in apples [a well known Lebanese product]." (*Al-anwar*, December 28, 1975)
[64] See the special edition of the Journal of Refugee Studies (1996), edited by Weighill and Shehadi for a detailed discussion of Palestinian community inside Lebanon both pre and post war.
[65] Between September 1970 and July 1971 the Jordanian army faced down the Palestinian movement after the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked four planes and declared a part of Jordan a liberated area. This conflict significantly reshaped the Middle East forcing the PRM to withdraw from Jordan, allowing Hafez al-Assad to seize power in Syria and almost provoking a regional war.

Lebanon, and the *fedayeen*[66] guerrillas of the PLO made Lebanon the staging base for their operations across the Lebanese-Israeli border and internationally. In 1948, fewer than 150,000 Palestinians had sought refuge in Lebanon; by 1972 the Palestinian presence had swelled to almost 400,000, backed by between 10,000 and 19,200 commandos of the Palestinian Resistance Movements[67] (PRM) (Khazen 2000, 299; Wallach 1991, 244). Refugee camps were constructed close to urban areas, often close to key transit routes (for a map of camp locations see Hanf 1993, 254). The PRM, as they had in Jordan, demanded autonomy in their camps and their military struggle, warning the Lebanese army not to interfere. They established a 'state within a state' – 'Fatahland', as certain areas of Hermon in the South-East became known. Unauthorised road blocks appeared around refugee camps and kidnappings of Lebanese activists were common. More dangerous still, was that PLO operations were carried out and celebrated openly, often leading to clashes with neighbouring, particularly Christian, youths and the Lebanese security services.

For both ideological and pragmatic reasons, Palestinian guerrillas supported left wing Lebanese parties demanding the renegotiation of the National Pact. Both causes were presented within the discursive frames of Arab nationalism and anti-colonialism. Furthermore, a genuine rapport existed between the dispossessed of Lebanon and the powerful refugees of Palestine who were a symbol of the global revolution that the PLO represented (cf. Candar 2000).

In May 1972, the Israeli government announced its intention to hold the Lebanese government responsible for all PLO operations. In December 1968, Israeli commandos destroyed thirteen aircraft of the Lebanese national airline (Middle East Airlines) in retaliation for an El Al airplane hijacking, and in April 1973, Israeli commandos killed three high ranking Palestinian commanders in Beirut. Israeli reprisals for Palestinian attacks were costly to the Lebanese themselves (Kimmerling and Migdal 1993, 231-239). By instigating accusations that the Lebanese army was purposively failing to protect Palestinians, Israeli actions resulted in confrontations between the Lebanese army and the PRM. Each time these were inconclusively interrupted following demonstrations of international and national support for the Palestinians by left wing and Arab Nationalist groups (Hanf 1993, 160-171).

This violence intensified the fierce internal debates over the capacity and loyalties of a Lebanese state. Representatives were forced not only to mediate between demands for internal reform but to represent both Arab nationalist Muslims and Western orientated Christian populations internationally. For example, after Israeli reprisals in 1968, Prime Minister Rachid Karame resigned and left the country in a deadlock between a coalition of largely Muslim, left wing, pro-Palestinian groups, and conservative largely Christian, parties. As a result of this paralysis the country remained without a cabinet for seven months. Without strong executive, and institutional, capacity the security of the state risked being overwhelmed by Israeli reprisals, Palestinian actions and left-wing demonstrations. In a brief civil war in 1958 the military had refused to intervene over fears that it would fragment[68] (cf. Jabbour 1989). Similarly in the 1970s, the army increasingly withdrew when faced with demonstrations and internal violence. State security institutions had been undermined by '*za'im* governance' unwilling to support the state over factional interests[69].

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[66] 'Fedayeen', originally from the Arabic *Fida'i*, means 'he who is willing to sacrifice his life for the cause'. The feday were only one of the heroic myths that have inspired and motivated the Palestinian resistance since its birth, after the withdrawal from Lebanon in 1982. It gave way to the 'children of the Stone' during the first Intifada (1987-1993), and finally to the '*Shaheed*' the martyr of the Al Aqsa Intifada. For two fascinating studies of the formation and importance of these myths of the resistance see Kimmerling and Migdal (1993, 232-235, 262-275) and Larzilliere (2001).

[67] I adopt this term from Barakat (1977) as it provides a suitable generic vocabulary with which to refer to the diversity of Palestinian groups that constituted the Palestinian's guerrilla and political struggle for independence. This term has the added benefit that it captures some of the fluidity between these groups.

[68] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), despite being under the command of a Maronite general staff, was divided both between and within battalions according to confessional quotas.

[69] For example, during the 1960s a powerful security apparatus, the *Deuxieme Burea*u (G2) had been established by President Fu'ad Shihab (1958-64) to counter foreign interference in Lebanon and monitor extremist organisations on Lebanese soil. After making enemies amongst the traditional elite, these agency was dismantled in 1970 by Suleiman Frangieh, a conservative Christian *za'im* from North Lebanon.

For right wing parties[70], which had emerged from Christian milieus of a similar class as their left wing opponents, the increasing insecurity caused by military failure was conflated with demands for the renegotiation of the Lebanese consociational democracy. Institutional change was not seen by extremist members as a necessary realignment of the formal 'rules of the game' to a changed society but as an existential threat to the guarantees of protection for Christians in Lebanon. Opposition to the PLO became a defining cause for political parties committed to defending capitalism, the integrity of the Lebanese state and Christian hegemony.

4.1.2 The Mobilisation of Militias

Whilst these political sentiments were widespread, only a minority of Christians participated in and organised for violence before the civil war broke out. These party militants turned out, however, to be the detonators that triggered much broader escalations of violence and, correspondingly, mobilisation.

The Lebanese Kata'ib Party (*Hizb al-Kata'ib al-Lubnaniyya*), a popularist *partie de masse* with around 70,000 members in 1974 (Entelis 1974, 84) and disciplined branches in almost every part of Lebanon, was the most organised of the largely Christian, right-wing parties. It was the descendant of an apolitical 'boy scout' movement, the 'Phalange' founded on November 21st 1936[71], and had repeatedly emerged to represent Christian Lebanon during national crises (Stoakes 1975).

After a period as a militant nationalist movement, the Phalange, in 1952, accepted constitutional politics and a role as a democratic party. However, membership remained almost entirely Christian, roughly 85% (ibid. 216), and strongest amongst newly urbanised Maronites[72], particularly the urban working class excluded from the traditional networks of patrimonial distribution. According to a study carried out in 1973, 13.9% of Kata'ib followers were unemployed, 46,1%, factory workers, 13,5, students, 13,3%, civil servants, 10,6%, business men, and 2,6%, professionals. Furthermore, around 50% of all Kata'ib votes came from Mount Lebanon, compared to 20% from Beirut, 15% from the North, 11% from the South, and 4% from the Bekaa (Boustani and Abboud 1973, 25 and 37). Kata'ib party networks offered new migrants to Beirut, and rural entrepreneurs, unable to make claims on their *za'im*, protection and opportunities. The party was highly organised and demonstratively effective in implementing a corporate political program, seeking its references in European modernity rather than Lebanese or Ottoman history. By 1975, although the party had never held more than nine of the ninety-nine parliamentary seats, it had guaranteed itself one or two cabinet seats in every government since 1958.

The Kata'ib belief-system was an integrated appeal to the communitarian and nationalist values attractive to politically conservative Christians (Entelis 1974). Whilst ideologically it affirmed a modern and rationalist program of political reform and redistribution within the country, the Kata'ib emphasised Lebanon as the Maronite refuge in the Middle East (Khalaf 1976, 45) and fought to preserve the confessional dimensions of the Lebanese polity. Despite its professed confessional neutrality, the party was led by an extremely homogenous group of long-term position holders centred on the party's autocratic leader, Pierre Gemayel[73]. Over 75% of the Political Bureau was Maronite

[70] Competition between political parties and *zu'ama* over constituents had led to the recipricol emulation of political strategies and organisation (Salamé 1986). Whilst certain traditional leaders, for example Camille Chamoun, the head of the National Liberation Party, had adopted the rhetoric of right wing political ideology, the political parties had exploitated the gaps in the provision of patrimonial opportunities and created resource networks of their own.

[71] Its patriarchal leader Pierre Gemayel, like other anticolonial nationalist leaders in the Middle East, was inspired by nationalist Fascist movements in Europe. Gemayel attested to his desire to emulate the discipline he witnessed at the German 1936 Olympics, and when visiting the Czechoslovakian *Sokol* youth movement.

[72] This was expressed famously by the Middle Eastern scholar Albert Hourani: "We can see the expression of a community never fully at home in Beirut, still rooted in the villages, uneasy with the compromises of the political system, appealing against the ideologies of the city to those of the Maronite Mountain." (Hourani 1976)

[73] Interestingly, the decision to appoint Pierre Gemayel as the sole leader of the Kata'ib had come about after a political disagreement between two of the three initial leaders of the party that had risked causing a devastating split between factions. The least politicised of the leaders of, what was at the time

(Pakradouni 1987, 139). By the 1960s the Kata'ib had developed into a party integrating its original appeals of '*Allah, al-Watan, al-A'ila'* (God, the nation, the family) into a political program which overtly opposed any form of Arab unification and the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. It upheld the principles of a 'disciplined' democracy, religious freedom, and private ownership and opposed Marxism and the 'feudal' clientilist politics of the Lebanese *za'im* (Entelis 1973). The Kata'ib emphasis on Lebanon as a refuge placed the defence of the state and, implicitly, the Maronite community above all projects of social or political change (Stoakes 1975).

Since 1936 the Kata'ib had relied on party militants for physical force when political compromises failed. The party was structured around vertically integrated neighbourhood *Bayt Kata'ib* (House of the Kata'ib), each of which was constituted by both a paramilitary *firqah* (squad) and a civilian *qism* (section), with a section head acting as local military commander. These were, in turn, paralleled by occupational *khaliyah* (cells) for students, workers, and professionals. The Kata'ib's pro-state attitude and extensive capacity, with 356 sections nation-wide, created a mutually supportive relationship between the party and elements within both the security services and the army. For example, during the 1967 Arab Israeli war, the majority of the Lebanese army was committed to defending against an eventual Israeli invasion of the South. As this left the rest of Lebanon without security coverage, President Charles Helou requested that the Kata'ib militia cooperate with security forces in the areas under their control and the party agreed (Stoakes 1975, 228). The party was, in the eyes of many Maronite security and military officers, an instrument that could take direct action on behalf of the system without being bound by the formal and ideological constraints imposed by a divided executive (Entelis 1974, 160). By the early 1970s, the Christian officer corps of the Lebanese army and the Deuxieme Bureau's security forces had begun to openly fraternise with the leadership of the Christian parties (Hiro 1993, 24).

This perception was reinforced by the Kata'ib's actions and statements in reaction to the rising tension of the 1960s. After escalating outbreaks of violence in the late 1960s, and in response to bloody clashes between the army and the PRM in March 1971, the Kata'ib restructured their youth branch into a more effective military structure. This envisaged that upon any outbreak of serious violence local militants would be reinforced by trained, regular militia units recruited from militant student or military cells. In winter 1971, the P.G. (Pierre Gemayel) troop, a 30 person paramilitary elite of trained, equipped and dedicated men, was formed, many of whom would later find their way into leadership positions in the Lebanese Forces (Moumne 1996, 68). Other such groups were also formed, such as *al-Sakha* (the Rock). This reorganisation was promoted as a means of assisting the Lebanese army against "the enemies of the country"[74]. Many members of these units were young men who were not only prepared for violence, but, in light of state failures, considered it inevitable. In February 1973 the party submitted a memorandum to the President of the Republic, the most striking passage of which can be rendered as follows.

> We thank God that the state has decided to take firm action to meet this challenge, and we support you and support your stand. But should the state fail in its duty or weaken or hesitate, then Mr. President, we shall ourselves take action; we shall meet demonstrations with bigger demonstrations, strikes with more extensive strikes, toughness with toughness, and force with force. (cited Stoakes 1975, 222)

These units received information, and occasionally supplies, from sympathetic elements within the state security apparatus. After widespread outbreaks of violence in May 1973, Pierre Gemayel claimed the absolute right of his party to continue training and mobilising Kata'ib militiamen. The Lebanese minister of Defence, Nasri Maalouf, endorsed this right (Cooly 1979, 33). According to various sources, one relying on Lebanese Army Intelligence Reports, by 1975 the Kata'ib party had between 6,000 and 8,000 militiamen under its control, although the division between local and elite units is not given (el-Khazen 2000, 303; Stoakes 1975, 224).

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only a youth movement, Pierre Gemayel, was chosen as the man least likely to cause the movement's fragmentation. For a biography, see Nantet (1986).

[74]Law of the Organisation of the Regular Forces in the Party, Kataeb political bureau decision n 2893, quoted in Moumne (1996, 68).

Three other right-wing groups began organising militias prior to the civil war: the National Liberal Party (NLP), the Guardians of the Cedars and the *Tanzim*. The NLP, headed by ex-President Camille Chamoun, mobilised their supporters in the *Numuur* (Tigers) militia under the command of his son, Dany Chamoun. The *Numuur* militia was founded in the summer of 1968 and was about half the size of the Kata'ib. It recruited more frequently from the middle classes than the working class Kata'ib, and had a reputation for disorganisation and patronage – merited or not. The *Numuur* militia recruited retired army officers to provide the basic military training of volunteers in Saadiyat, and was not organised, prior to the war, into regular military units. The *Tanzim* ('Organisation') was a shadowy movement with links to the Order of Maronite Monks, the Christian controlled military and internal security agencies. It was committed to the military training of Lebanese nationalists, regardless of confession, and was founded in April 1969. And lastly, the *Hurras al-arz* ('Guardians of the Cedars' - GoC), a small extremist Lebanese nationalist group inspired by the Phoenicianist[75] writings of the poet Said al-Akl (cf. Nisan 2003). The GoC opened military training in 1973, but made its first military appearance only on April 13, 1975.

4.1.3 The Outbreak of Civil War[76]

By April 1975 the prediction of war amongst these parties and their subsequent preparations had become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Militants, believing in an inexhorable descent towards violent conflict, had begun instigating sporadic escalations of violence, provoking, in turn, reactive mobilisation and further skirmishes. It was, however, an unexpectedly direct confrontation between the Palestinian Resistance Movement and the Kata'ib party, on April 13, 1975, that marks the beginning of the war.

In response to an assassination attempt against Pierre Gemayel that morning, Kata'ib party militiamen opened fire on a bus carrying Palestinian *fedayeen* and civilians through Ayn al-Remmeneh, a working class and predominantly Christian area of East Beirut, killing 27[77]. Left-wing and pro-Palestinian politicians, rallying behind Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, called for the banning of the Kata'ib party. Divided by coalitional loyalties the governing cabinet dissolved and the president resigned. Without any conclusive executive decision the army refused to intervene. Pierre Gemayel announced a general mobilisation of the Christian community: universities were closed and fighting between Palestinian and Christian militants in Beirut escalated and then expanded throughout the country, following the contours of party affiliation and confessional identification.

The first months of combat are extremely confusing and best pieced together by newspaper reports. Conflict spread from the poorer East Beirut neighbourhoods (Haret Hreik, Chiyah, Dekwaneh, Nabaa) to Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyre before a ceasefire was signed in July. This lasted two months before a bar fight in Zahle escalated into a gun battle, closely followed by a traffic accident in Tripoli that renewed fighting there and in Zghorta.

Combat at first was immediate and local. Although demonstrably instigated, on many occasions, by ideological organisations, their means of intervention were blunt: snipers took up positions in high rise buildings and opened fire on passers-by; small, mobile units launched sporadic assaults into neighbouring areas; and individuals sought to identify the potential moles within their own communities. Behind these actions, however, spontaneous and uncoordinated responses to violence were common: flying checkpoints were established for neighbourhood 'security', looting of the port and banking areas was rife (Endres 2002, 127-132; Messara 1989, 86), and vigilante groups were often free to act as they pleased. Gun battles between small groups would expand into large confrontations

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[75] The extreme right wing Christian fringe denied any Arab heritage in Lebanon, claiming instead that the Lebanese were descendents of the Phoenician nation.

[76] Whilst much has been written on the subject for a short but excellent technical summary of the differents levels of causality leading up to the civil war cf. Barakat (1977, epilogue). Also see (Salibi 1976; Hudson 1976; Deeb 1978).

[77] This event has recieved concentrated interest in the literature as there has never been a convincing explanation for why the bus took this route. For years such buses had purposively circumvented Christian areas to avoid conflict. In 1979 Abu Iyad, the head of the PLO's Intelligence section assassinated in 1991, accused the Military Intelligence of the Lebanese Army of planning the incident (Hanf 1993, 204). For the most detailed, if partisan, account of events see Khazen (2000).

between organisations or locales, and then, without strategic direction or tactical goals, fizzle out. The prevalence of unclaimed sniper, rocket, and car bombing attacks fuelled rumours of a fifth column sent from a foreign country to destabilise the country[78]. Newspapers reported repeated *ébranlements* (tremors, shocks) in neighbourhoods without being able to identify causes and fighting seemed often to be more theatre, or reaction, than policy. Abu Lutf, a PLO spokesman, remarked dismissively in an interview: "for the most part these forces want to win military victories for reasons of morale rather than for the achievement of radical change in the social and political situation."[79]

The 'militias' that emerged had no genuine corporate form and relied on spontaneous solutions to functional problems. The over-all preparedness of the party's cadres was distinctly uneven (Entelis 1974, 98) and the size and equipment of units varied substantially. They were, furthermore, matched by many groups that weren't formed around party structures but were rooted in localities around local strongmen.

In Lebanon norms of honour and revenge structuring the disordered rural social-economy had been transferred to control distribution and property rights in the urban economy. The resultant social 'role' as strongman able to provide protection was at the core of 'eating and feeding' (Khalaf 1976, 44) in Lebanon's clientelist system descended from the semi-feudal governance of the *zu'ama* (Johnson 2001, 54-60). Violent *qabadays* (street lords), analytically descendent from the rent collectors and enforcers of land-owners, were used in the city to break up the formation of social movements and class based politics (Johnson 1986, 82-97). For poor urbanites the *qabaday* was a neighbourhood protector and a communal champion. For the *za'im* he was an enforcer and popular mobiliser[80]. The *Qabaday* thrived in the intersection between state and society and was able to use force to gain influence over both (Johnson 1986, 82-96).

With the outbreak of civil war the *qabaday*, surrounded by a group of young followers, became one of the most important structuring elements of conflict. On the one hand, a number of patrons turned themselves into leaders of armed groups (for example the feudal Franjieh family's *Marada* (Giants) militia based in the rural areas surrounding Zghorta, and Amine Gemayel's, the son of Pierre Gemayel, 'Brigade 75' militia based in Metn north). On the other hand, *Qabaday* themselves became intrinsic elements in the fighting forces in any areas in which the larger parties were weak. For example, in Dikwaneh, where political allegiance had traditionally gone to Raymond Eddé[81], the LF was dependent on the influence of Maroun al-Khoury and his Movement of Lebanese Youth (Kassir 1994, 117-119). The patrimonial networks and state agents that had controlled qabaday activity were broadly severed by institutional failure. By relying on these actors, pre-existing norms of honour/revenge and enrichment through violence, originally means of ordering a competitive and disordered rural environment, informed heuristics of behaviour in the civil war.

When fighting erupted, volunteers could come 'on to the street', in taxis, buses and on foot, often alerted by nothing more than the sound of gunfire or radio announcements. This organisational structure, later termed, rather dramatically, the 'urban swarm' (Edwards 2000), was effective at providing defensive response. But it massively complicated the coordination and distribution of forces across fronts, making offensive operations practically impossible beyond the small unit level.

In Beirut, despite this confusion, identifiable, albeit nascent, 'front lines' were established within three days. These did not lie between organisations, but on the boundaries of communities, most importantly between the poor Christian neighbourhoods and the Shi'a 'Belt of Misery'/Palestinian refugee camps flanking them (Kassir 1994a, 104; Hanf 1993, 204). Over time these fronts were fortified and violence shifted into a confrontation between West and East Beirut, destroying the entire commercial and banking centre of the city. However, it was only two and half months after the out break of violence that organisational lines of conflict became clear. The military struggle settled into a confrontation

[78] According to newspaper archives it was only after a number of months and the detention of a number of snipers of Lebanese origin by Lebanese security forces that political parties admitted publicly that the rumoured 'fifth column' was a myth.
[79] Palestine News Agency Wafa (November 16, 1975).
[80] For a brilliant description of how such hierarchical and normative dynamics played out in the modernising rural area of Akkar and nearby Tripoli cf. Gilsenan (1996).
[81] A moderate Christian politician who refused to mobilise armed forces to participate in the war.

between the Christian party militias against the Palestinian and their Lebanese allies in the Lebanese National Movement.

In early 1976 these organisational lines were given formal names, on one hand, the 'Joint Forces' of the PLO, Muslim defectors from the Lebanese army and the militias of the National Movement, and on the other hand, the 'Lebanese Forces'. The LF's name was first used to refer to the coalition of Christian militias that responded to a coordinated attack by the 'Joint Forces' against Northern Metn in March 1976. The Joint Forces seized a number of villages before being checked by Christian units of the Lebanese army supported by the militias of the Kata'ib, NLP and Tanzim. Despite having a name, however, the 'Lebanese Forces' did not possess any organisational structure.

4.2 Sudan

Like Lebanon, Sudan's modern political history is most accurately characterised as a multi-faceted competition between reforming parties and traditional elites; with war emerging from institutional deadlock and disenfranchisement. The most important faultline has been between regional/ideological political movements of the South and a succession of governments dominated either by Northern religious parties or authoritarian military dictatorships.

4.2.1 Background

Sudan, the largest country in Africa, follows the Nile from the fertile plains of Equatoria, bordering Congo, Uganda and Kenya, to the deserts of the Sahara and the Egyptian border in the North. It stretches to the Red Sea Coast, and has immense land borders with Ethiopia and Chad.

Like many countries bridging the Sahel, Sudan is a vastly multi-ethnic territory containing over 360 tribal groups and around 120 distinguishable languages. The main ethnic division is between the Northern Arab and Southern African populations, but sub-divisions within these communities create an overlapping, fluid, and often contradictory fabric of ethnic, religious, and political identities[82].

The Northern population has been historically unified by a common Arab and Islamic identity. However, in the North-West, Centre, and East, Muslim Africanised communities, like the Fur, Nuba, Fellata and Beja, amongst many others, live alongside Arabs. In the South, divided between Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic and Sudanic tribes, the largest population groups are the Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk[83].

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[82] See Lesch (1998a, 17) for a more complete breakdown of the larger ethnic sub groups within the Arab and African categories.

[83] Each of these peoples are differentially structured and follow distinct belief systems. Whilst the Shilluk have been historically ruled in a centralised kingdom under their *Reth*, the Nuer and the Dinka are divided into autonomous sub-tribes and herding units following a transhumant lifestyle.



Abbildung 3: Map 2: Ethnic Geographic Map of Sudan
Source: Lavergne (1989, 25).

The Southern Sudanese, despite being divided in most other ways, share a history of slave raiding by Arab traders during the 18-19th centuries. They also share a recent history of repression and the exploitation of their natural resources (first gold, then water and more recently oil). This has forged a distinctly African identification opposed to the Arab and Islamic identity of the North.

Tab. 3: Table 3: Main Ethnic Groups in Sudan

Source: 1955/56 Population Census, Sudan; quoted in Deegan (1999, 89)

Arab	39
Southerners	30
West Dar Fur	9
Beja	6
West Africans	6
Nuba	6
Nubian	3
Funj	2

(% of total population)

These racial divisions are overlaid with religious divisions. About 50-60% of Sudan's population is Islamic whilst around 5-15% is Christian (comprising both Copts in the North and other denominations in the South). The remainder hold to traditional faiths[84]. The Islamic population has historically been divided by the adherence to different Sufi brotherhoods (*tariqat*). These are variably centralised religious movements founded in the 16th century (cf. Karrar 1992) by migrant scholars seeking to formalise a heterodox 'folk' Islam in Sudan. Of the five main Sufi sects[85] (the Mahdiyya, the Khatimiyya, the Hindiyya, the Tijaniyya, and the Qadiriyya) the Mahdiyya and the Khatimiyya are the largest – with the *Ansar* (an alternative name for the followers of the Mahdiyya) alone numbering over 3 million on the eve of independence in 1956 (Warburg 1990, 631). In the South, on the other hand, education before independence was almost entirely driven by Catholic and Presbyterian missionaries. This created a Christian 'elite' suspended above a non-Christian, non-English speaking population. Since independence, Christianity in South Sudan is estimated to have grown significantly, although no reliable figures or censi are available.

Upon independence, in 1956, Sudan's formal political institutions were constructed, and subsequently controlled, by a coalition of powers forged in the pre-colonial and colonial era (cf. al-Safi ed. 1989). The Anglo-Egyptian condominium had offered the heads of the aforementioned Sufi brotherhoods licenses and land rights in exchange for their political quiesence vis a vis rural rebellions[86] and, from the 1920s on, the nationalist movement[87] (Niblock 1987, 50-54; Collins 1976). Upon their release from

[84] These faiths are often erroneously dismissed as animist. In reality they have complex prophetic traditions and socio-political influences. For example, see Johnson's (1994) excellent book on the history of Nuer prophecy.

[85] The term sectarianism in Sudan was used during colonial times to describe the power base of the main religious political Sufi groups. In modern Sudan it has been identified explicitly with the Umma-Khatimiyya brotherhoods control of power and conflict over resources (Warburg 2003, 143 ft. 2). This thesis similarly uses the term to refer to these parties and the nature of the governance.

[86] The Umma party is originally the political extension of the *Ansar* Sufi *tariqa* (brotherhood) whose founder Muhammad Ahmad ibn 'Abdallah led a succesful religious rebellion against the British (1881-1898). This revolt defeated the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, killed London's most famous general, Gordon of Khartoum, and established a religious state over Northern Sudan stretching down into what is now Bahr al-Ghazal province. The *Baggara* Arab nomads, who would later form a key constituency of the PDF, were an essential element in the Mahdi's armies, famously leaving their cattle herds to fight in the campaign (Holt 1970; Holt and Daly 2000, 75-85). The allegiance between the party and the Baggara has endured to the present day. Colonial fears emphasised the importance of avoiding repetitions of such events and first punished then co-opted the Sudanese brotherhoods.

[87] The anti-colonial struggle, though begun by a Westernised educated independence movement. This educated class was represented by the Graduate's General Congress, founded in 1938. The first general secretary was Isma'il Azhari who had studied at the American University of BeirutBy the 1940s,

colonial restrictions, the al-Mahdi and al-Mirghani families, heading the Ansar and the Khatimiyya respectively, transformed into vast business conglomerates aimed, not at capital accumulation, but the exchange of opportunities for votes.

Significantly less economically developed during the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1899-1955) the South, seen by the British as 'a problem child' (Gray 1961, 203), was isolated by a 'Closed Districts' policy designed to shield it from Arab enduced marketisation and Islamic proselytism. Whilst the North received Egyptian technology, secular education and mechanised farming, the South was limited to contact with a small number of merchants and missionaries (Burton 1985). By the 1947 Juba Conference, established to bring Southerners into the political system, neither an educated professional class nor a modern political class had emerged and the Sudanisation of colonial administration proceeded with an almost total absence of Southerners (Howell 1973, 164-170). This is illustrated in the patronising, but indicative, words of one colonial officer attending the conference:

> the Southerners were like children in their relations with the grown up Northerners and that, as children must drink milk before they eat kisra, so the Southerners must first study self-government before participating in governing. (Proceedings of Juba Conference 12/13 June 1947, 6)

Southern representatives chosen at the conference had almost no popular base, limited political experience and, despite an emerging concept of 'Southerness', remained divided and easily manipulated.

The result of these political bargains was a state based upon a self-replicating political economic system that reinforced and protected Arabism and Islamism.. Firstly, it created a traditional governing elite that was exclusively Muslim and dominated by *Jaaliyun* Arabs. This dominance was formalised by the formation of religiously affiliated political parties controlling vast rural constituencies. The Mahdiyya formed the Umma party, based on a constituency overwhelmingly located in the Western provinces of Darfur and Kordofan, and the Khatimiyya formed the People's Democratic Party (from 1968 the Democratic Unionist Party) with strong support in the Eastern provinces and in Khartoum (Becthold 1990). Secondly, it created a political logic of authority in which exclusive patrimonial networks overshadowed the functional étatism required to consolidate the state's authority (Tignor 1987, 196-7). Perhaps the most ominous result of this system was that the largely autonomous, tribally administered populations of rural Sudan were neither integrated nor modernised by state programs. They remained isolated from social change by colonial-style native adminstration and employed as key resources in the state's strategies of intervention and governance (el Zain 1996, 525).

Rural majorities, based upon widespread tribal block voting, guaranteed the Umma and Khatimiyya parties electoral majorities, whilst patronage provided sectarian partisans the education, bureaucratic and financial opportunities required to dominate the business and professional classes. This system was immutable by democratic channels. In the five multiparty elections for parliament – 1953, 1958, 1965, 1968, and 1986 – no single party has ever obtained more than 51% of the vote, but the two sectarian parties rotated as the dominant partners of parliamentary coalitions.

Tab. 4: Table 4: Literacy, Education and Medical Statistics for Regions in Sudan

Source: M.Z.Abdulla and K.M. Suliman in Federalism in the Sudan, Hassan M. Salih (ed.). Khartoum University Press, 1995, (quoted Deegan 1999, 95)

Region	Illiteracy Rate	Enrolment Ratio School Age 7-9	Population per Doctor
Khartoum	31.8	58.7	3,200

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however, this movement isolated from the rural masses of Sudanese society was carried to victory only after having forged an alliance with Sudanese traditional elite (Holt and Daly 2000, 124-128; Abdin 1985).

Blue Nile	48.3	44	25,500
Kordofan	74	30	45,300
Dar Fur	76.4	29.5	43,900
Northern	40.6	60	20,300
Eastern	56.2	36.5	18,800
Red Sea	N/a	46	46,800
Equatoria	71.2	27.5	62,200
Bahr el Ghazal	85.9	5.3	79,600
Upper Nile	86.3	17	63,300

Sudan's economic modernisation reflected its centripetal political system[88]. Although none of Sudan's communities can claim any objective ethnic purity[89], a complex ethnic political-economic ranking emerged. At the top were the riverine, sedentarised *Jaaliyyun* that, as the political elite, had access to Sudan's modern economic sector. Beneath them, were the pastoral *Juhayna* of Western and Eastern Sudan, increasingly marginalised and restricted tothe traditional economy (see Map 3.2; cf. MacMichael 1922, 197-306), they were governed by local traditional elites allied to the central government. Beneath both of these groups were the African, Islamic populations of Sudan, most of whom lived in either undeveloped periphery regions, such as Darfur, or through urbanisation became concentrated in urban slums. The Africanised Southern population was at the very bottom of this ranking.

Throughout this system periphery resources (water, agricultural produce and minerals) and labour were extracted to finance economic investment in the 'golden triangle' – Khartoum, Kosti and Sennar – as is suggested by table 3.4 (cf. Woodward 2003, 42). For example, in 1978 Chevron discovered oil[90] north of Bentiu town on the Southern edge of the transitional area[91] (now Unity province). After announcing that the oil would be refined, but for 'technical reasons' not in the South, plans were made to pump it to the central town of Kosti. In response, massive Southern protests broke out. After a contentious political and popular debate, it was determined that unrefined oil would be exported directly from Port Sudan[92] – contributing, as a result, nothing to the development of the surrounding area. Similarly, modernisation and infrastructure programmes for the periphery have been mismanaged, corrupt and sporadic. They acheived little lasting impact.

[88] One anecdote provides an insight into the centripetal political-economy of Sudan. In late 1969 and early 1970, Nimieri, who had recently seized power in a Nasserist inspired coup, undertook a number of trips to remote regions of Western Sudan, for example the Nuba Mountains. In these areas he was received as the first Sudanese Head of State to visit since independence in 1956. During his trip to the Nuba Mountains, Nimieri denounced the 'Khartoum elite' who were luxuriating in ideological hair splitting, and added that the revolution needed no patronage, from anybody, "The Sudan shall no longer be ruled from the Khartoum clubs" (Khalid 1990, 295 ft. 33, 34)

[89] Of all the Arab communities, only one group, the Rashaayda of Eastern Sudan, can potentially claim a pure Arab descent. This nomadic Bedouin tribe is a relatively recent migrant to Eastern Sudan, coming originally from the Arabian Peninsula. It still maintains strong affiliations with various social groups in the Gulf states. Giving lie to the Arab-Africa dichotomy that has governed most interpretations of the Sudanese civil war in 2004 this tribe formed the *Free Lions* rebel movement operating on the Eastern Front in the Red Sea and Kassalla states.

[90] Another prominent example is the controversial Jonglei Canal project designed to divert 20 million cubic metres of water from the Sudd swamp in the South to irrigate land in central Sudan and Egypt (cf. Tvedt 1986). John Garang, the late commander in chief of the SPLA, completed a PhD in Agricultural Economics with a study of the potential environmental effects of the Jonglei Canal.

[91] The transitional areas are the accepted term of reference for Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Upper Nile that include both African and Arab populations, lie on the boundary between the geographic North and South and have historically associated themselves variably with the political blocs of the North and South.

[92] Since this time, the ownership of oil has been dominated by the Northern elite in Khartoum using symbolic repetoires, deceit and violence to vertically integrate Southern oil reserves into the Northern economy. A metaphorical example of the unity of Northern economic, political and cultural exploitation of the South occurred in 1978 when the Southern-manned garrison guarding Bentiu was replaced by a larger garrison of Western Arab soldiers, who then changed the official Dinka name for the area, Pan Thou, to the Arabic equivalent, Igligi (Alier 1991, 239-240).

Unable to bring about change through institutional channels, many modernist[93] parties formed alliances with explicitly regional or ethnic constituencies seeking either the protection or recognition of particularist cultural identities in the state. The result has been a polarisation of Sudan's Islamic and African identities, with each finding expression within revolutionary organisations, and social movements seeking to end traditional domination of formal institutions (cf. Deng 1995). Southerners opted for rebellion – first between 1955 and 1972 (see Heraclides 1987), and again from 1983 until 2005 – whilst Communist and Islamist[94] parties in the North infiltrated the state and allied themselves with the sectarian parties or participated in coups.

4.2.2 The Formation of Militant Political Parties

These parties emerged initially from the mobilisation of new urban constituencies[95] which had begun to emerge in the 1960s. Within this sector, paralleling the emergence of an extremely influential Communist party (cf. Warburg 1978), culturally conservative, but reformist, Muslims called for the overthrow of sectarian leaders and the (re)Islamisation of state and society. This *Islamist* movement appealed to religion, not just as an identity, but as an ideology of political change. Although a multi-faceted and diverse phenomena that spawned a number of political factions, the Islamists in Sudan will be referred to as the National Islamic Front (NIF), after the political party founded in 1985 that came to dominate the Islamist milieu. The typical NIF recruit was a recently urbanised rural and lower middle class student, attracted to the liberationist appeals of the Communist party, but rejecting the secularism this ideology implied (Marchal 1995, 5).

The origins of the NIF lay in cells of the anti-colonial Egyptian 'Muslim Brotherhood' (cf, Mitchell 1969) formed amongst Sudanese students studying in Cairo in the mid-1940s. Upon returning to Sudan, these students formed an elite Muslim Brotherhood-styled party, not intent primarily on the capturing of political power, but committed to the renewal of an orthodox Islamic faith in Sudan. This would, they argued, unite state and society in an indigenous project of social and technological modernisation and resurgence[96].

Successive periods of repression under two military governments, first in 1959-1964 under General Abboud, and then in 1969-1977 under Jaafar Nimieri, caused the movement to alter this strategy. In 1964 the movement emerged from hiding in a period of multi-party democracy and founded the Islamic Charter Front led by the University of Khartoum Law Professor Dr. Hassan al-Turabi. Recognising the vulnerability of its previous approach, the charismatic Turabi adopted a highly pragmatic political

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[93] 'Modernism' is used here to describe the array of Communist, Democratic and Islamist inspired factions who, although disagreeing absolutely on the goal and ideological content of modernity, were united in their demands for the reform of state institutions, the rationalisation of political discourse, and the redistribution of economic opportunities.

[94] The term Islamism is used here to refer to the Islamic political philosophy that emerged from the 19th century decline of the Ottoman empire (Hourani 1962) and seeks to combine religiousity and Islamic social principles, with political mobilisation, ideological collective action and the state. For an excellent discussion of the differentiation of different trends within Islamic political thought and the relation of different strands to the key principle of *jihad* see Abdel Salam and de Waal (2004), and for an understanding of the complexities of interlinking transcendental beliefs with the practice of state power see Tripp (1996).

[95] Like other African countries, Sudan witnessed rapid urbanisation during the 20th century, causing in consequence the growth of large slum and informal populations around formal urban areas. Urban populations in the largest 10 towns tripled to 1,5 million inhabitants between 1955 and 1973. Khartoum in the same time period rocketed from about 245,000 inhabitants to almost 780,000 (Barbour 1980, 81), and was estimated to be around two million in 1982 (el-Affendi 1991, 133).

[96] As is probably clear from this description, a precise identification of Turabi's and the NIF's politics is extremely difficult due to the multiple contradictory tendencies the NIF has demonstrated and Turabi's mercurial and opportunistic character. The central tenet of Islamism can perhaps be best expressed in the words of one of the most influential Islamist thinker, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, "Why don't people in what we call the 'Muslim World' take count of their spiritual capital and the intellectual heritage before dreaming of importing the principals and moeurs, the systems of government and laws, borrowed from countries from across vast plains and the other side of the seas?" (author's translation, Qutb 2003, 9)

strategy based upon his concept of the *fiqh al-daroura* (the 'logic of necessity').

The primary logic of this strategy was the development of a network of Islamist agents able to resist repression and exploit opportunities for increasing its influence and penetration of the state. Rather than consolidating its cadre, however, Turabi sought to form alliances with existing political powers and simultaneously cultivated a diffuse agglomeration of professional, political, and cultural networks, movements, and groups (Ali 1995, 187-199). These movements, though not centrally controlled, were unified around the goal of establishing *shari'a* (Islamic) law in Sudan as the keystone of a frequently unclear project of Islamification.

The movement's epicentre was Khartoum's university system, a highly politicised arena suspended above society, where, until the 1980s, Islamists won "all the union elections" (Barbour 1980, 88)[97]. Islamist professors such as Turabi, appointed for their academic achievements[98], sought to recruit successive generations of Sudan's emergent middle class. In return for electoral and political support, the party provided these students with the networks and opportunities necessary for advancement outside of sectarian patronage[99]. From this arena, politicised graduates were scattered throughout Sudan taking up technical, professional and bureaucratic positions. Simultaneously, Islamic social welfare activities extended opportunities for education, basic services and political participation into poor and recently urbanised populations (Thomas 1990).

Another important focus for recruitment were those African Muslim communities excluded by the Sufi brotherhoods for reasons of ethnicity. The NIF, emergent from an orthodox rejection of 'folk' Islam, publicly equated the communality of orthodox faith with the foundation for inclusive citizenship and national identity (Kevane and Gray 1995, 271-3). Fur, Berti and other African Islamic groups joined the NIF in droves, seeing it as an organisation promising both economic modernisation for periphery provinces and a ratification of their Islamic faith. Particularly responsive to this message were the several million Sudanese of West African origin, the Fellata, settled in Western Sudan. Followers of West African Mahdist Islam, these groups had migrated to Sudan in the previous centuries but were never granted citizenship until the NIF came to power in 1989. Simultaneously, concerted recruitment campaigns were also directed at women, the urban poor and expatriates (Khalafallah 2004, 119).

The bond between the NIF's different constituencies was a rejection of the traditional parties in favour of an Islamically defined project of local and technological modernisation. This bond was reinforced by the NIF's extensive charitable and business connections funded by petro-dollar flows from the Arabian Gulf and the tremendous expansion of an Islamic banking sector. On one hand, this created a highly lucrative source of party funding through donations and expatriate remittances. On the other hand, it created an indigenous Islamist business class staffed by NIF supporters[100]. Islamic credit institutions offered preferential terms and opportunities for investment to NIF sympathisers, who in return gave both the movement and its followers access to capital (Stiansen 2002; Ahmed 1997; Medani 1997). Islamist recruits supported both by their education and the Islamist network rose rapidly to influential positions without the help of the traditional leaders.

This recruitment strategy was clearly seen to be a success after the party's second period of dissolution and Turabi's imprisonment from 1969 until 1977. The NIF's educated cadre emerged from hiding with

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[97] Like the American University of Beirut, Khartoum possessed one of the best universities in the region with a particular reputation in the social sciences. Both Sudanese scholars Francis Deng, Mansour Khalid, Mohamed Omer Bashir, Haider Ibrahim) and non-Sudanese (Talal Asad, Ahmad al-Shahi) lectured and researched there in the 1960s and 70s. (cf. de Waal and Abdel Salaam 2004, 78).

[98] Hassan al-Turabi, for example, had an MA in Law from the University of London, and a PhD in Law from the Sorbonne in Paris.

[99] See Rosefsky-Wickham (2002, chapter 7) for an excellent social movement analysis of the micromechanisms of interest and ideas in Egyptian Islamist mobilisation that can equally be applied to Sudan's NIF.

[100] Most famous here is Abdulrahim Hamdi, former Minister of Finance in the current Sudan government. A member of the National Islamic Front since his student days, Hamdi had a high-flying career with al-Baraka Islamic Bank that took him to live in London. When NIF regime made him Minister of Finance after the 1989 coup, he held on to his old post as an al-Baraka representative, commuting between London and the Khartoum Hilton.

its increasingly decentralised social and political organisations intact. As a result, the leadership was able to simultaneously strike a public 'National Reconcliation' with Nimieri and undertake a rapid membership drive. The NIF was, by this time, a highly organised, extremely committed movement with a reputation for honesty and intellect. This reputation was used to expand its influence through many sectors and social organisations. For example, in the late 70s and 80s, movement members founded the Society of Women Vanguards of Renaissance, the Youth Society for Reconstruction, the Association of Southern Muslims, the Association of Sudanese Ulama, the Islamic Da'awa (Missionary Organisation), the Namariq Literary and Artist Society, and the Union of Muslim Literary Men. Although these groups were not directly controlled by the NIF, they would rally around key Islamist issues (el-Affendi 1991, 115).

Whilst individual figures and groupings were affiliated with more radical ideologies the movement ensured that participant's efforts focused on constructing functional homogeneity (Khalafallah 2004, 109). The NIF's discipline, intellectual status and networks meant that by the 1970s it had become extremely influential in key debates, most importantly over the role of Islamic law in the in the constitutional, legal and political system. Backing various factions strategically, the Islamists became pragmatic partners of democratic coalitions and military governments alike. Having left the government only weeks before, after the overthrow of Nimieri in 1985, the movement formed the National Islamic Front at a national congress attended by almost 3,000 people (including women and Southerners). This was the political party that in 1989, in cooperation with the army, seized power and established the Popular Defence Forces.

Whether the NIF controlled a party militia in the 1980s is unclear. In 1976 many NIF members participated in a coup attempt with Libyan-trained militiamen[101], and many others received military and security training in Libya and Iran. It is also certain that the inspiration of the NIF, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, first founded and then became extensively controlled by its 'secret organisation' (*al-nizam al-sirri*) during the 1950s (cf. Mitchell 1993, chapter 5). However, the NIF itself claims to have disbanded its militia after 1976[102].

Although it arguably did not possess a continuous system of military training, NIF student sections and youth organisations, such as *Chabab al-Watan* (Youth of the Nation), were able to mobilise militant members willing to use violence against other student groups and against the security forces in demonstrations. These were not gentle skirmishes. One the movement's most infamous security hardliners, Tayeb al-Khair, was nicknamed *Sikha* (the Iron Bar) after his favoured weapon during his university days. In 1985, the government blamed the NIF directly for three days of rioting in which, at one point, a crowd 2,000 strong marched on the US embassy in Khartoum (Abdelkarim et al 1985, 20). In April 1989 the NIF again filled the streets of Khartoum with its 'Revolution of the Qur'an' directed against government plans to freeze Islamic Laws.

These student movements were bolstered by military cells established by the NIF, after 1977, when President Nimieri introduced Islamic education into the army. From 1983 onwards NIF members, put in charge of courses on ideology for army officers, encouraged their graduates to join the officer corps and sought to mobilise NIF alumni and their kin working in the army. By 1989, the NIF had formed cells within disaffected middle and lower ranking members of the military and security organs (Warburg 2003, 189-190), particularly within military intelligence and the 'morale orientation

[101] A number of the NIF's current cadres, for example Ghazi Salahudin, were described in interviews as having 'crossed the desert' in 1976, as a reference both to individual commitment to the National Islamic Front, but also to indicate their agreement with the party's change of policy towards a forcible seizure of power. The desert was both symbolic and material, referring to the difficulties of the Islamic movement under Nimieri's regime and the Libyan desert that participants in the 1976 coup attempt sought to cross to link up with their allies in Khartoum.

[102] This has been disputed both in interviews and in the secondary literature. Denials normally rely on the claim that a number of armed plain clothes individuals were seen taking part in the 1989 military coup alongside military personnel. None has, however, presented any proof that these were in fact elements of an NIF militia. One author that goes further than this is Gabriel Warburg, who claims in his most recent study of Islam in Sudan that from 1972 onwards the NIF ran a 'secret organisation' under the coordination of Ali Osman Taha: "members of the secret organisation received military, security, propaganda, intelligence and other training … led by expert *mujahidin*, who had participated in the Iranian, Lebanese, Libyan, or Afghani *jihad*." (2003, 207)

department' (Akol 2001, 48). With such structures in place the mobilisation of a militia, commanded by NIF military men and staffed by student militants, would have required limited prior organisation[103]. In March 1985, Nimieri imprisoned 200 NIF leaders in el-Fasher prison, stating that information had been received claiming they had received arms from Iran and were creating paramilitary structures, battalions, companies and cells in strategic areas (Thomas 1990).

Despite their best efforts, as the 1986 election results show (Table 5), the NIF remained a largely urban party, able to dominate the seats reserved for graduates and in Khartoum, but unable to break the sectarian parties hegemony in their rural heartlands.

Tab. 5: Table 5: Sudanese Election Results 1986: Geographic Constituencies Plus Graduate Seats[104]

Source: Sudan News Agency election booklet, 25 May 1986, (quoted in Lesch 1998a, 72)

Party	Khartoum	East	North	Central	Kordofan	Dar-Fur	Upper Nile	Bahr al-Ghazal	Equat-oria	Graduate
Umma	6	7	2	29	20	34	1	1	0	0
DUP	9	17	11	15	9	2	0	0	0	0
NIF	13	2	4	4	3	2	0	0	0	23
Other	3	2	1	2	7	1	5	2	18	5

4.2.3 The Outbreak of Civil War

After decades of mismanagement Sudan, by the 1970s, was afflicted by a devastating economic decline provoked by poorly conceived, central economic planning. Importing Western technology and international capital in the 1970s (Tignor 1987, 201-212), a nationalist military regime, under Jaafar Nimieri, undertook a series of massive development projects that, despite certain successes in extending the rural penetration of the state, produced devastating foreign debts. Simultaneously, the expansion of short sighted private extraction, such as mechanised farming in central Sudan, had the effect of 'strip mining' Sudan's resources (Barbour 1980, 80). By 1985, Sudan was rocking in an 'Economic Nightmare' with over $9 billion of external debt, a large trade imbalance, and a drought that had produced a grain harvest 1.9 million tons short of consumption and desolated large areas of Darfur, Kordofan and the Red Sea Hills (Niblock 1985, 15).

Economic crisis led to political disentegration as the periphery was starved to feed the productive areas of the centre (Niblock 1985, 18). In response, Sudan fractured along the fault lines of politicised ethnicity and modern social movements turned to extremist rhetoric and violence in their demands for regional or ideological solutions.

The second Sudanese civil war began in 1983 when Southern units of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), refused orders to transfer to the North, and were attacked by largely Northern battalions sent from Juba. The mutineers withdrew to the Ethiopian border (Alier 1992, chpt 15) and joined with the remnants of the previous *Anya Nya* insurgency (1955-1972). They publicly announced that the Addis Ababa peace treaty, signed in 1972, had been definitively violated[105]. Shortly after, a Southern officer from the Bor Dinka tribe, John Garang, defected and set about organising this disparate rebellion into a

[103] My thanks to John Young for pointing this out.

104 Graduate seats were seats reserved in parliament for university educated Sudanese.

[105] Similar events had occurred and been diffused repeatedly after the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972 as ex-rebel units of the army refused to move out of the South or integrate with old units. In a number of cases only the intervention of high ranking ex-rebel commanders was able to diffuse the tension (Kasfir 1977, 149-152)

cohesive military organisation, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and its political wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)[106]. Unlike its predecessor, the *Anya Nya*, the SPLA aimed, not to secede the South from the North, but to build an "armed struggle in the South [that] must of necessity eventually engulf the whole Sudan" (Garang 1992, 23). The intention was to create a 'New Sudan', in which would promote nationwide development and modernisation, and in which ethnic identities and traditional Northern elites did not control the reins (and returns) of political authority.

This program, however reasonable, was a threat to the cultural dominance of Arabs in Sudan, and for militant Islamists it was a threat to their identity as Muslims. Within Islam the concept of the separation of religion and state is disputed and controversial. The notion of a righteous Islamic life is considered by orthodox Islamists to be that of the individual *governed* by a community following both the spirit and the word of the Qur'an and the example of the prophet (Esposito 1987). This is expressed in the words of Hassan al-Turabi:

> It is unfair and unjust that Garang alone should determine the law of the country; he can determine what his personal law should be for his family or his region, but that also would have to be determined by election, and not by Garang. He and the sectarian leaders said, 'No Shariah' … We were a different people altogether: we did not look back at history, we looked forward. .. God does not only inhabit the religious school or the mosque. God is found everywhere: in the market, in the public offices, in the battlefield. So we thought we should continue to believe in God this way…" (Turabi 1998, 101-102)

Shortly after the announcement of the SPLA's foundation, Nimieri signed the 'September Laws', based upon *Sharia* law, into being, and introduced the *hudud*, which involved the amputation of limbs as punishment for crimes. This Islamification of Nimieri's politics, guided by his attorney general Hassan al-Turabi, led increasing numbers of Southern students and political activists to follow the SPLA's path to Ethiopia and armed insurrection.

Much of the initial violence was confused and disorganised, although, unlike Lebanon, a strategic direction was evident – largely as the state and its agents were the primary focus of SPLA activity. The SPLA spent the first year raiding police quarters, military outposts, and infrastructure[107] projects whilst expanding their recruitment base. Small units would be dispatched to peaceful areas to carry out guerrilla raids on key installations and communication/transport routes, and alongside these attacks local politicisation campaigns would mobilise support. New recruits were sent back to Ethiopia to undergo a year of training, returning to their home provinces in battalion size strength (Johnson 1998, 58). In this way, the SPLA could steadily increase both their military capacity and popularity in local communities. At the elite level the SPLA attracted a continuous trickle of regional politicians[108] and intellectuals, who defected often after they were excluded from positions of national influence. The SPLA rapidly expanded their area of operations out of the South and stretched the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) across multiple fronts. By the mid-1980s the SPLA was confining the majority of government forces to garrisons in the Southern provincial towns, and, by 1987, was able to seize minor garrisons from the Sudanese army.

[106] Both the SPLA and SPLM will be referred to under the acronym SPLA/M.
[107] In December 1983 guerrilla attacks halted the French company digging the Jonglei Canal, and in February 1984 Chevron was forced to halt oil exploration, altogether ending any hope that Sudan could stage a short-term economic recovery.
[108] For example Nuba politician Yusuf Kuwa Mekki defected to the SPLA in 1984 taking with him numbers of Nuba intellectuals who had long led a political struggle for autonomy and redistribution. In 1989 the Darfuri politician Daoud Bolad defected from the NIF after being excluded from the distribution of positions in the central state and emerged as the political commander of the failed SPLA rebellion in Darfur in 1991.

4.2.4 The Mobilisation of Militias

In 1985 the SPLA expanded out of areas that could be, and were, dismissed as 'Southern' and moved into regions traditionally considered to be part of Central and Northern Sudan: the Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordofan and Abyei in Bahr al-Ghazal. This not only threatened the popular base of the sectarian parties but aggravated existing tribal tensions in these transition areas where Dinka and Arab tribes overlapped[109]. The final catalyst for the formation of militias was a bloody SPLA attack on a *Baggara* village, el-Gardud, in 1985. A government delegation, headed by Misseriya General Fadlallah Burma Nasser, was told by tribal leaders that unless something was done to improve security the *Baggara* would have to join the rebellion[110]. In response, Umma party members in the government began arming its constituents – the *baggara* (cattle herding) nomads that migrated seasonally from Kordofan and Darfur provinces into the Nuba Mountains and Bahr al-Ghazal.

Despite waves of attempted statisation (*verstaatlichung*), in 1965 and 1971, the state had avoided modernising the political economy of rural Sudan, due to the risk that this would create a class of disenfranchised and detribalised peasants. Instead an enduring system of native administration, created an alliance between central political elites and conservative rural leaders. Tribes were rewarded for their collaboration with the central state (El Zain 1996) and in large parts of rural Sudan the norms and political economy of tribal life remained intact. Within this system, tribal raiding had historically provided the means of survival in times of scarcity (Cunnison 1966, 1960). Islamic regulations on blood-money (*diya*) and revenge dictated legitimate boundaries for the consequent violence between social groups (Cunnison 1972).

The formation of militias was designed to provide the nomads with the means of self-defence from SPLA raiding parties. But it aggravated the local resource conflicts between the Arab and Dinka tribes over grazing and water rights. In 1984 many herds had been devastated by famine (de Waal 1997, 86-105) and the nomads rapidly discovered the tremendous advantage state support gave them over their neighbours. Equipped with automatic weapons the Arabs resorted to raiding the Ngok Dinka of Kordofan and along the nomad's watering routes southeast, through Western Upper Nile. Raids took place during the migration season, entering from the westerly direction of Abiemnon, when the roads were dry enough for the nomad's horses.

Militarily these irregular militias effectively countered the rebel's informational and mobility advantage[111]. The arming of tribal forces, however, created indistinct organisational boundaries and distorted the interdependencies within local communities. Simultaneously, the peace conferences and impartial tribal leaders essential for maintaining balance between tribes broke down in environments of increasing disorder[112]. Within months of militia formation violence was targeted according to ethnicity, rather than against political or military organisations. The militias failed to distinguish between SPLA sympathisers and Dinka villagers, and often destroyed decades of localised cooperation between specific Arab and African tribes in a single attack. The result was a rapid division of society as individuals observed the failure of political institutions and sought safety in personal and kinship networks. The resultant semi-autonomous, tribally recruited units became known as the *murahileen*[113].

[109] Relations between the Baggara and the Dinka tribes, which are explained in more detail later, had remained civil during the previous civil war due to the efforts of tribal leaders who established and maintained reconciliation mechanisms between the groups. Drought, social modernisation, state atrophication, and the expansion of the second civil war made such resolutions extremely difficult to enforce and created a pool of dispossessed nomads that was rapidly exploited by politicians (Jok 2001, 21-23).

[110] Interview with Umma party member and military general, Khartoum January 2003.

[111] Western Sudan lacks all but a basic transport infrastructure, enabling SPLA units travelling by foot to easily evade the mechanised army.

[112] For an excellent article describing the history and mechanisms of tribal reconciliation in Western Sudan see Battahani (2002).

[113] This term originally described the Baggara cattle guards of young unmarried armed men who traveled with the herds to protect against animals and rustlers. *Muraheleen* is the Misseriya Baggara word for travelers, which now refers to all Baggara militias of southern Darfur and Kordofan. The Rizeigat word for this group of young men is *fursan*, or cavalry, although they are all called muraheleen.

In the lead up to the summer of 1989, National Islamic Front (NIF) newspapers challenged the Umma party's commitment to preserving the state and the NIF leadership accused Sadiq al-Mahdi of being politically supine in face of the war. NIF militants organised rallies in Khartoum and South Kordofan and lobbied for the creation of a 'tribal belt' across Sudan to defend Arab and Islamic culture from the SPLA and to bolster the weakened army (Khalid 1990). Simultaneously, fund raising for such a force was begun at conferences in the oil rich Gulf amongst NIF affiliated expatriates.

On 30 June 1989 a coup brought a military junta led by Omer al-Bashir, but allied with the NIF, into power. On November 1st 1989 the Popular Defence Forces were formed as an organisation unifying the tribal and NIF militia forces.

4.3 Militia Formation: A Preliminary Comparison

Before turning to the description of the organisations that the Lebanese Forces and the Popular Defence Forces evolved into it is useful to draw some preliminary comparisons between the conditions from which they emerged and their initial form.

Militia mobilisation, in both countries, reflected, and was instigated by, the social and political fractures created by the pre-war political systems. This occurred on two levels. On one hand, militia formation was a social response to institutional failure and security vacuums. In response to violence communities mobilised the means of survival or security, and self-defence and vigilante movements were formed amongst Christian neighbourhoods and Arab tribes. On the other hand, political parties with networks extending into these communities and penetrating state institutions established linkages between the self-defence formations and the political class. These parties sought to control the militias by acting as their representatives and organising their cadres into supply networks.

As a result, militia formation was not solely a process of privatisation or informalisation as it was not controlled by any single actor. Most importantly, the state was notable only in its absence. Militias emerged in arenas in which the state had failed to provide security. The state did not control either the formation or actions of the militias. Faced with the break down of its authority and rising conflict between social and political groups the state co-opted and legitimised one of these groups in an attempt to reduce the demands on its security and military apparatus. In other words, militias were formed as the state transformed itself from an impartial arbiter of social life into a partisan actor in the civil war. The state did not delegate the means to use violence, as it had already lost this authority, but managed the breakdown of security by delegating the *right* to use violence.

In doing so the state was not implementing an innovative strategy in either country. It reflected the fact that prior to the outbreak of war, the state had largely been controlled by an exclusive political class. This class belonged to and depended upon specific ethnic groups for the electoral or political power. The legitimisation of milita formation was, therefore, structured by the alliances between the state and its society[114]. It was not, as Reno suggests, however, a controlled mobilisation of patrimonial groups.

Organisationally, militias did not emerge as coherent structures. They came to life as simultaneously heterogeneous responses to insecurity. Violence was largely reactive and defensive, weaponry highly diverse and mobilisation ad-hoc. Central organisations managing resources, discipline or recruitment were either non-existent or weak, and most groups managed autonomously either as self-governing units or through spontaneous coordination (such as the organisation of neighbourhood front-lines and swarming tactics in Beirut).

Within these inchoate groupings acts of offensive violence are visible, but are related to both political and apolitical interests. In Lebanon, party militants launched assaults against rival party HQs and

[114] On top of this, both states had inherited colonial policies of 'divide and conquer' that had sought to minimise the administrative costs of domination in multi-ethnic societies (see Willis 2000; Khoury 1993). But whilst in the colonial period the state had coopted individual ethnic or tribal leaders, and recruited militias for temporary campaigns, in the post-colonial era the state was forced to rely on militant political parties. These actors sought to develop a response to social violence that extended beyond the demands of security, to one that would consolidate and entrench their authority and influence over the state.

neighbourhoods and, through their strike forces, were able to loosely determine the targeting and timing of violence. The most important example was the so-called 'Hotel War', launched at the end of 1975 as an attempt to push back the front lines from the borders of East Beirut. In Sudan, on the other hand, tribal groups suffering from drought and dispossession used insecurity as an excuse for raiding parties designed to capture cattle from Dinka populations. These operations were the escalatory mechanisms of these wars. They caused the escalation and expansion of violence that would led to retaliation. Furthemore, they instigated apolitical or second tier conflicts or security fears, and encouraged reactive mobilisation. All of these factors meant that the descent into war was not controlled by any single actor, but was the uncoordinated and, perhaps, unintended consequence of multiple interests. The *descent* into war was a largely self-propelling. The following section shows, however, that, in both cases, the *maintenance* of war was not. The co-ordination, supply and recruitment of organisations able to wage war over decades required extensive institutionalisation.

4.4 Militia Institutionalisation: The Popular Defence Forces and The Lebanese Forces

By 1989 the Lebanese Forces had established a regulated and bureaucratised pseudo-state in its canton in East Beirut – 'Marounistan'. Its forces wore official uniforms identifying not only the militia, but particular units and ranks. Combatants took orders from a military command wielding multiple security and disciplinary assets, battalions were barracked in regional commands and resources were administered centrally.

On the other hand, by 2004, the PDF had become a structure defined by a network of localised units, reflecting the material and immaterial interests of its recruitment base, rather than organisational ideals. Many members wore no uniforms at all, and the boundaries between militiamen, vigilantes, bandits, and mercenaries were unpoliced, porous, and vague. Rather than containing the conflict, the PDF provided an institutional channel for supplying and instigating conflicts revolving around local resources or political interests.

In this period the two militias, the Popular Defence Forces and the Lebanese Forces, had undergone contested and difficult processes of institutionalisation. A brief look at three specific categories of regulation by the two militias emphasises the variance in each group's organisational form, and the depth of institutionalisation. Firstly, the capacity to strategically control violence; secondly, the recruitment and training of followers; and, thirdly, the accumulation and distribution of resources.

4.4.1 Military Capacity and Abuse

The most striking difference between the PDF and the LF lies in their divergent use and abuse of violent means.

Whilst initially much of the LF's military equipment was either personal or had been obtained from military facilities, as of 1976 the LF relied upon foreign support, mostly from Israel, and direct purchases from South Africa and Bulgaria[115]. The LF controlled around ten thousand men in centrally commanded units, hundreds of armoured vehicles (tanks and armoured personnel carriers), heavy artillery (155mm, 135mm), around 100 'Stalin organ' multiple rocket launchers, and some small warships. Within this main group around 2500 elite troops provided the core of its infantry capacity (Phares 1995, 166). These were mostly recruited from Christian populations displaced into the Christian canton from the North and South of Lebanon during the war. As late as 1989 the LF received 40 helicopters, 20 frigates and enough missile launchers from Iraq to set up a third artillery battalion (Picard 1999, 22).

During the 'War of Elimination', beginning January 31st 1990, between the militia and the substantially larger state military, the Lebanese Armed Forces, the militia fought a multi-dimensional manoeuvre battle capturing an entire helicopter fleet and defeating a number of regular and elite army units. It fought and supplied multiple frontlines and ground the army to a standstill and into an attrition war in fortified and mined urban battlefields (Hanf 1993, 598-601). What the LF demonstrated was

[115] This same network of traffickers was used to sell the LF's heavy weapons arsenal on to Karabakh warlords in Armenia, various groups in ex-Yugoslavia, and possibly even Algeria, when they disarmed in 1991 (Picard 1999, 22).

remarkable, both for its military capacity, and for its brutality. Whilst this conflict, fought largely in built up civilian areas and was one of the most costly in the civil war, see chapter six for mortality rates and cost, it also showed the LF surpassing the irregular tactics that had been become the favoured means of waging a stalemated conflict. The LF had launched offensive operations against a state military, defended its territory and coordinated both multiple dimensions of single operations and simultaneous operations, behaving in many ways as a professional force.

The PDF's capacity since 1997 has degraded. By the late 1990s it was supplying local militias that were effective in limiting the expansion of the rebels only to the degree that they rendered areas ungovernable by any side. Whilst reports, confirmed by the author, exist of PDF battalions trained in the use of both artillery and armoured cavalry, they have played a minor role in the war. The PDF never attained the military proficiency of an army, and acted as politicised amateurs to draw the professional military into combat or to stage disorganised assaults against civilian targets. Human wave attacks, suicide attacks against tanks and machine gun emplacements, and the clearing of land mines by Islamist volunteers, whilst impressive in terms of ideological committment, do not attest to the military capacity of an organisation[116]. In fact, a debate over the continued existence of the PDF has been running since 2001, when doubts over their loyalty to the regime were added to the long standing military complaints of professional officers. Only warnings and demonstrations within the PDF seemed to have guaranteed its continued existence.

Local militias equipped by the PDF have been heavily involved in raiding against distrusted civilian groups, with the excuse of conducting combing and search and destroy missions. Whilst such attacks, and other operations, are undertaken under the umbrella of the Government of Sudan (GoS) counter insurgency attrition strategy[117], their primary tactical rationale for participants has been economic. As such, individual interests intervene in organisational goals, and a warning issued ten years ago is as valid today.

> As with attacks on the Ngok Dinka in southern Kordofan and on the Uduk and other groups in Blue Nile …, sympathy for the SPLA was as much a consequence as a cause of attacks on the Nuba[118], while the alleged threat of the SPLA served to justify the violence and exploitation. This pattern of exploitative violence, with raiders moving from one victimised ethnic group to another in search of scarce economic resources, could be expected to exacerbate internal divisions, even within the North of Sudan (Keen 1994, 216)

An anecdote given during an interview in Khartoum 2003 emphasises the nature of the violence unleashed by the PDF. The interviewee was an employee of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) during the 1990s when a *baggara* militia, supplied by the PDF, raided the ICRC depot at Chelko. When he raised the problem with the local Sudanese army commander in Aweil the officer told him that in the town he had command over 1,500 soldiers whilst the PDF had equipped 3, 500 militiamen over which no one had real control. His response was that "Everything that has been stolen is now being sold in Obeid or Nyala as there is no money currently in Aweil… I can do nothing as I am using my best tactics just to stop the militia from taking control of Aweil itself."[119] A few days after the incident the militiamen occupied the airport and withdrew only after payment arrived from

[116]According to remarks passed on by Lee Seymour in a personal communication, this is precisely how the SPLA feel about the PDF as well.
[117]Bulloch (1996) identifies two general strategies used in counter insurgency operations, attrition and maneouvre, which move counter insugency warfare out of a specialised rubric and back into the mainstream of military doctrine. Whilst the first is less effective in most situations, ie Vietnam, it has often been resorted to by militaries that are unwilling, or unable, to adopt the decentralised and surgical operations required for maneouvre tactics against insurgents.
[118]Nuba is the common collective name given to more than fifty tribal groups who live in and around the range of Massifs known as the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan. Numbering one million people, the Nuba are extremely religiously and linguistically diverse, with neighbouring villages frequently speaking unintelligible languages.
[119]Interview Arthur Poole, Khartoum, February 2003.

Khartoum.

Unsurprisingly, with this weakness of command and control, the PDF has been repeatedly identified by foreign observers as a major human rights abuser. Its role in the ethnic cleansing of civilian communities (African Rights 1995), the use of scorched earth tactics against minority ethnic groups (Sudan: Minorities in Conflict 1995), and the revival of forced abduction and slavery in Sudan (Report of the International Eminent Persons Group 2002, 26-28) provide ample examples of PDF involvement in severe abuses.

4.4.2 Recruitment and Organisational Structure

Both militias adopted significantly different strategies for replacing and training recruits.

By the late 1980s the LF had established a functionally differentiated organisation that relied on routinised recruitment and training[120]. They had also developed an official discourse legitimising participation in the militia and recognising that without such legitimacy desertion and resistance would undermine recruitment, morale and loyalty. This discourse did not, however, determine the military actions or the training of the militia. The military forces of the LF were employed repeatedly, not only against opponents, but against disobedient or potentially rebellious members of the LF itself. Whilst a draft of university students was implemented in 1980-1, it was subsequently abandoned due to resistance from Christian families, and because it brought the LF into direct competition with the state army[121]. Since then, recruitment was voluntary, with the organisation forming registers of potential recruits by locality and contacting them personally when campaigns were launched in specific areas. By 1987, the LF had formed its core brigades through the recruitment of Northern Christians, who had been displaced from the Akkar in 1978 and had settled in Batroun and Jbeil. Low ranking members received both basic and specialised training abroad and in locally run camps. Alongside indoctrination and basic training, the lessons of over a decade of civil war were passed on in seminars held by veterans for new recruits. After 1986 officers were required to have at least one or two years of university education and to have attended a year long training academy in Harissa, staffed by non-political military and academic experts, including scholars of sociology, history, geography and philosophy[122]. By 1990, 600 such officers had graduated and been integrated into the LF command structure, often replacing veteran LF combatants. The LF was thus able to staff and manage, not only military units, but an effective military and security intelligence apparatus, and sections for logistics, foreign representation, Special Forces, public services, strategic studies and computing.

In contrast to the LF’s continuity and investment in staff, the PDF by 2000 were focusing on short term volunteering and mercenary motivations. Combat in the militia became known for its often futile high risks. From the beginning, the PDF was a hybrid organisation, on one hand, rooted in local issues and contexts, on the other mobilising an extremist Islamic ideology. However, as the war dragged on, both of these mobilising strategies began to fail; tribal leaders recognised the inevitability of coexistence with neighbours and refused to mobilise PDF recruits, whilst the PDF’s ideology was stained by increasing disillusionment with the NIF’s project of social transformation. The PDF has increasingly adopted a policy of forced recruitment and recruited from the extremely poor urban slums and IDP camps where even the offer of food or lodging for can be attractive[123]. Despite, the PDF has faced continuous difficulties in attracting recruits since 1995, particularly high calibre recruits with educational or professional education. In the words of a Northern Sudanese observer had this to say: “Khartoum’s major disadvantage is in manpower. With no volunteers, the government has to rely on forced recruitment. ‘New recruits have to be forced to fight,’” (International Crisis Group, 27 June

[120]The Lebanese Forces website, http://www.lebanese-forces.org/, (accessed February 2006) offers a number of promotional and documentary style video clips of LF militiamen on drill, at parade and in combat. Whilst these clips exaggerate the degree of discipline, they are give an impression both of the LF’s desired image and level of organisation.

[121]Interview Fouad Abu Nader, Beirut, October 2003.

[122]Interview Michel Awad, Beirut, October 2003.

[123]In 2003 this recruitment strategy was made apparent to this author. Whilst waiting for an interview at Khartoum Islamic African University, I was shown a celebratory calender of the PDF and its sister organisation the Popular Police Force. The pictures of PDF and PPF units in this calendar showed recruits with visible symptoms of malnourishment and poverty despite the clean and pressed uniforms they were wearing.

2002, 5). What remains of the PDF has been amalgamated into the Sudanese military system and is used as an institutional means of recruiting mercernary forces and as support staff for the military.

4.4.3 Regulation of Resources

All numbers given in this section must be considered with some caution, as it is impossible to give a fully reliable account of the LF's and PDF's budgets. This is particularly true as the majority of militiamen were not necessarily full-time combatants but part-time volunteers and numbers quoted for demobilisation purposes are massively inflated[124]. However, estimates both of their budgets and their main sources of revenue, can be combined with identified means of distribution and accumulation to identify the capacity of the respective organisations.

In 1977 the LF militia had established the *Sunduq al-Watani* (the National Chest). This administered the substantial resources accumulated through the levying of internal customs, external tariffs and taxes. In 1990, *al-hayat* newspaper estimated that the revenues from these sources amounted to some $300 million a year, with $15-25 million dollars a year from Beirut's fifth dock alone (2 February 1990; 13 March 1989). These numbers seem, initially, remarkably high, and in 1989 Roget Dib, the Lebanese Forces' second in command, announced that the current costs of the militia lay at $40 million a year (Interview, *Le Commerce du Levant*, June 26 1991). Essentially the LF taxed all sources of revenue, except salaries, with customs and real estate providing largest sources of income. A system of welfare and salary for the combatants of the LF had also been established. Within this system around 65% of full-time salaries were paid to combatants, and, including families, the LF supported around 300,000 people[125]. The militia maintained 22,000 people on its fulltime payroll, whilst supporting another 18,000 on welfare payments[126].

In Sudan, the story is both more obscure and convoluted. Official finances for the PDF were never released so the story must be pieced together from interviews and other sources. In 2001, *Jane's Intelligence Review* estimated that the PDF contained around 15, 000 people[127], with recruits being offered around 15,000 Sudanese *Dinar* (roughly $60) per month to join up. As a rough indicator, a yearly budget of 15,000 members, at $60 a month, would be around $10-11 million (SD 2.7 billion). This estimate ignores the costs of food, transportation, weaponry, uniforms and ammunition. Resources are currently allocated to the PDF from other institutions of state and from periodic appeals for donations. The overall defence expenditure of the Sudanese government in 1999 was around $156 million (SD 40 billion)[128].

Like the LF the PDF had established a welfare organisation, the Martyrs Organisation (*munathima al-Shaheed*), that distributed educational, social and medical grants to the families of those injured or killed whilst fighting with the PDF[129]. Like its parallel organisation in Iran the Organisation managed business assets, as well as government allocations and donations, but its precise budget is unknown.

4.5 Conclusion

In both Sudan and Lebanon militia formation resulted from the failure of state institutions and was shaped by the pre-war patterns of political governance. State institutions, formed by post-colonial political bargains, formalised the static hegemony of ethnic and patrimonial and reinforced the functional utility of ethnic networks. On the eve of civil war both Sudan and Lebanon were led by

[124]In 2005 the GoS stated that 1.1 million Northern Sudanese were currently under arms. In 1991 the LF requested that alone 8600, and 650 officers be integrated into the Lebanese Armed Forces (Picard 1999, 22).

[125]Interview Roget Dib, Beirut, October 2003.

[126]The families of LF members that died in combat received $100 each month from the welfare organisation.

[127]Hailes Janney, "Oil reserves transform the Sudanese civil war," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June 1, 2001.

[128]Statistical Appendix, IMF Staff Country Report No00/80, 2000, p21

[129]The author was detained for two weeks by Sudanese Internal Security in 2003. A notebook containing extensive interview material on the Marytrs' Organisation's finances and activities was confiscated and the material presented here is unfortunately the result of what has been remembered from these interviews.

many of the same families and individuals who had taken power upon independence. These systems not only produced unrest and insurgencies seeking the reform of state institutions, but also structured the state-soceity alliances that were mobilised to defend the state.Within these systems modernist opposition parties, emphasising ethnic norms and religious identities, mobilised individuals isolated from patrimonial benefits, largely students, professionals and the urban working class. These parties demanded distributory reforms of the state, but, simultaneously, they understood the state to be the formal guarantor and protector of particularistic rather than national identities. When state institutions failed, elites and social groups alike turned to these parties for protection.

Nevertheless, the privatisation and informalisation dichotomy presented in chapter three appears problemative. Most importantly, because militias were not formed by the strategic agency of any single actor, but were the outcome of the aggregated strategies of different actors: the state seeking to manage security failures by coopting actors in social conflict, communities reacting to insecurity by forming self-defence militias and political parties mobilising political networks to interlink these two actors. The state's role in militia formation was indirect. It did not mobilise or equip militias directly, but instead legitimised and recognised their right to wield violence. In this environment the descent into war was partly self-propelling as institutional failure led to diverse, uncoordinated responses to violence and security threats.

By the end of the civil wars, the two militias had both institutionalised. In comparison with their original structures both the PDF and the LF had formed some form of central organisation, resource management, and strategic direction. The Lebanese Forces, however, developed significantly more depth and scope in their recruitment of combatants, control of environmental resources and creation of hierarchical discipline. Within the LF's central units, recruits were commanded by trained officers integrated into vertical command and control systems. It possessed a sophisticated economic management system, which extracted and produced revenue, and regulated its dispersal. Furthermore, it employed violence to achieve the goals of the organisation, as opposed to simply satisfying the individual interests of combatants. As the following chapters demonstrate in more depth, in Lebanon militia leaders had struggled to create a regulated organisation able to elevate hard interests in military survival above ideological or private interests. The Popular Defence Forces consisted of a central body employed to mobilise resources and recruits through sporadic call-ups and siphoning from state institutions. In urban areas this mobilisation was dependent on coercion and the mythologisation of an ideological and unpopular program of social change and Islamification. Rather than discipline and regulation, the PDF permitted economically motivated local proxies to act with impunity. Without central control, looting was the main incentive for combatants, and the organisation never superseded 'raids' against civilian or weak insurgent targets in their military repertoire.

The differences in organisation within the LF and PDF portray two different forms of military institutionalisation. In the first the loyalty and material dependency of combatants extends vertically from the tactical unit into a central organisation. In the second the combatant's primary rewards for combat are the result of war itself, whether they be through economic predation or an ideological commitment to *jihad*. In chapter seven this thesis argues that these two models of organisation create, in turn, two very different patterns of civil war.

What this chapter has sought to demonstrate is that at the beginning of the war it is questionable whether the majority of participants knew what they were fighting for. Most, this author would argue, knew only what they were fighting against. This created extremely localised, fluid, and heterogeneous environments in which militias were not unitary actors, but inchoate groupings. Organised party and patrimonial hierarchies existed, but were not dominant. Weaponry and behaviour were highly diverse, and offensive operations were rare in comparison to defensive or uncoordinated clashes. Nevertheless, the eruption of civil war left the combatants, and more importantly their leaders, with the opportunity to determine how the new order would appear. The following chapters show how in using violence to free themselves from the constraints of normal political life, militia leaders created new organisations with which to reshape the social order.

5 The 'Lebanese Forces': From Political Militia to National Resistance

We are not for, nor against anyone. We are for Lebanon
Pierre Gemayel, quoted Khalaf (1976, 48)

We were Lebanese fighting Lebanon
Nabil, Muslim militiaman, quoted in Chamoun and Masri (1992)

The mobilisation of party militants had begun years, if not decades, before the outbreak of violence in Lebanon. Right-wing and Left-wing parties alike had prepared for violence, but the former had largely envisaged a brief war focusing on the defence of East Beirut and Mount Lebanon[130]. Unlike the short outbursts of violence in 1958 and 1969, on which this strategy was based, in 1975 intermittent rounds of fighting continued to escalate as political solutions were not found and the executive paralysed. In early 1976 the army fragmented and the coercive instruments of the Lebanese state collapsed, abandoning the nation to a civil war that lasted until 1990.

The men that had taken to the streets in 1975 were an ad-hoc, disorganised medley of self-defence forces, vigilantes and party militants. Prepared to defend Christian quarters from Palestinian attacks, until the Lebanese army intervened, they had to rapidly adapt their expectations and organisations when the scattered confrontations of 1975 became the front lines of an attritional war. Party officers were forced to find sources of revenue, weapons supplies and recruits. In the process hierarchical military organisations wielding heavy weapons (such as tanks and artillery) emerged, regional armies moved into the war and the profits of militia predation gave way to a regularised system of production and extraction. This process of destructive transformation created a war system that was distinct from the peace time social order of Lebanon. It was defined territorially by a series of boundered militia-controlled cantons, and socially by the militarization of Lebanon's confessional identities. Whilst militias claimed to represent Lebanon's confessional communities the war empowered a heterogenous variety of actors who became influential through their ability to mobilise and control violence. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to describe this transformation with regard to all combatant forces[131] (cf. Picard 2000), or even to provide a complete history of the Lebanese Forces (cf. Moumne 1996). This chapter, instead, will focus on the process of institutionalisation in the Lebanese Forces.

This chapter is structured around a four-fold division of the history of the Lebanese Forces, described below, and attempts to show how its development related to the overall emergence of the war system. Most importantly, it seeks to demonstrate how the antecedent organisations and external opportunities of the militias influenced their internal structuration. It shows how the militias that formed as a collective militarised expression of political activism, self-interest or security fears developed into organisations with hard interests in war – security, autonomy and, to a degree, enrichment.

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[130]See Snider (1984) for a description of the pre-war Kata'ib military strategy developed after the 1969 clashes with Palestinians.

[131]It is common amongst Middle Eastern scholars to propose the Lebanese civil war as one of the most complex wars of the 20th century and this is perhaps not an excessive exaggeration. Zahar (1999, ft 152) counts seven major internal factions (Lebanese Forces, the Kata'ib Party, the National Liberal Party, the Progressive Socialist Party, al-Murabitun, Amal and Hezballah) and six minor internal factions (the Guardians of the Cedars, the Tanzeem, the Marada, Jund Allah, Islamic Amal and the Habashi militia). The conflict also involved at least five Palestinian guerrilla factions (Fatah, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), PFLP-General Command, and al-Sai'qa), and two regional actors, Syria and Israel. Furthermore, three international forces (UNIFIL, Arab Deterrent Force, and the Multi-National Force (MNF) and external mediators from among others France, the Vatican, the U.S., the Arab League and Saudi Arabia were also influential.

5.1 The Lebanese Civil War and the Lebanese Forces

Beyond its simple chronology, the history of the Lebanese civil war can be studied as two distinct analytic phases – a period of rapid institutional collapse and social cleavage (1975-1976) followed by an extended period of military stalemate (1977-1990). The mechanics of these two periods are distinct. In the first stage, a combination of locally recruited and party-affiliated gun-men, mobilised within Christian neighbourhoods, replaced the state in defining the territorial and social boundaries of coercive authority. In the second stage, a multidimensional balance of power between different militias led to the consolidation of confessional cantons, and internecine conflict within these cantons.

Tab. 6: Table 6: Chronological Summary of The Lebanese Forces

LF	*1975-76*	*1976-82*	*1982-1985*	*1987-1989*
Organisations	Kata'ib Party 'Tigers' Guardians of the Cedars (GoC) Tanzim 'Marada' Local recruits	1978 – separation of *Marada* militia 1979 – Formation of integrated units 1980 – integration of *Numuur*	1985 - independence from the Kata'ib party	Lebanese Forces
Recruits	Existing militants and neighbourhood based units, cutting across classes	Locally recruited frontline units, area command reserves, and part-time periodic recruits for specific campaigns	Reinforced area command units, esp. rural displaced from Damour, Chouf, Bekaa the North and	Core units from IDPs from North Lebanon positioned throughout LF territory, Creation of officer School, Retraining of all forces,
Strategic Orientation	Allied to Lebanese Armed Forces	Protection of East Beirut and Mount Lebanon	Expansion into Chouf Mountains and East Sidon	Consolidation of Christian Canton
Tactical	Small ad-hoc units backed by party militants; cooperation on particular operations	Formation of Area Command Units, and the organisation of front line defence	Separation and isolation of Area Units from Local Defence Forces, offensive operations possible	Offensive, multi-dimensional mobile war by barracked central units against the state
Ideological Orientation	Nationalist/ Heterogeneous	Nationalist – anti-Syrian	Uncertain	'Maronitism'
Political Goal	Reassertion of the Lebanese State	Lebanese Presidency	Changing and unclear – Tripartite Agreement,	Federalism/ Christian Canton

			Presidency, federalism.	
Military Leader	Multiple Party militia leaders	Bashir Gemayel	1. Fadi Frem 2. Fouad Abu Nader	Samir Geagea
Political Leadership	Divided	Lebanese Front From 1980 Bashir Gemayel	Division b/w Kata'ib, Presidency and Lebanese Forces	Samir Geagea
Foreign Support	Unclear	Israel		Iraq

From the perspective of a history of the Lebanese Forces, the war is divided into four sections. Firstly, between 1975 and 1976, a genuine Lebanese civil war in which an array of right-wing Christian militias fought Palestinian and left wing Lebanese militias. Secondly, between 1977 and 1982, a centralised Christian militia emerged, the Lebanese Forces, and became increasingly involved in conflicts with the Syrian state and Christian rivals. Thirdly, between 1982 and 1986, a period of coalitional breakdown and internecine conflicts between rival commanders after the death of the LF's founding, and most charismatic leader, Bashir Gemayel. And finally, from 1986 until 1990, when a unified leadership under Samir Geagea heralded a renewed consolidation of the Lebanese Forces, and a devastating confrontation with the Lebanese army, that led to the signing of the Ta'if peace agreement.

5.2 1975 – 1976: Social Cleavage and Confessional Mobilisation

The confessional cantons that emerged during the Lebanese civil war were not organic products of widespread resentment or even political differences between social groups. In the first few months of war there were no fixed battle lines or organised armies. The creation of a Christian canton, instead, reflected the secondary effects of violence in consolidating communities and groups against an external threat. Lebanese society divided not by class, or even by politics, but by locality and kinship – and in consequence largely by confession.

The early months of the war appear to be a strangely private confrontation between the militant factions of Palestinian and Lebanese politics. After the bus shooting, in April 1975, fighting surrounded the Christian neighbourhoods of East Beirut: between the Palestinian camp Tal al-Zaatar and the adjacent neighbourhood of Dikwaneh, around Ein al-Rummenah and Furn eh-Chebak, and the largely *Shi'a* areas of Karantina and Maslakh (see map 5.1)[132]. Small combatant units of Palestinian or Christian youths, riding in cars or trucks, launched sporadic assaults against the physical infrastructure of rival parties. Whilst the Christian militias attacked the Palestinian refugee camps, the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies turned their rockets and gun fire against Kata'ib and National Liberal Party offices and the business premises and factories of the Maronite population. For many Lebanese, if we rely on newspaper and other archival sources, it was not necessarily clear who was fighting or what they were fighting for. Rumours of international intrigue, regional interference and genuine confusion were rife and violence was not easily linked with particular factions within the rival political blocs. Unattributed sniper attacks were common; gun battles and bombings killed private citizens seemingly at random; looting became rampant and hastily erected barricades were thrown together on main streets and manned by unidentified gunmen.

This breakdown of civil order caused a flourishing of second-tier security threats, which instigated a much broader mobilisation of combatants than the parties themselves could organise. In the North, for example, violence between competing street gangs, from the towns of Tripoli and Zghorta, escalated into months of fierce confessional conflict, in which local Christian and Muslim recruits were

[132]These areas in which violence originally broke out formed a 'triangle of resistance' that was later symbollised in the LF's Delta symbol.

reinforced by party militias and volunteers from the neighbouring region. In this way, as interlinking institutions and an effective military force vanished, extremely disorganised, low-intensity and often apolitical violence spread rapidly throughout the country. Much of this violence, however, took place in the absence of any socially legitimate strategy or goal for which it was employed.

When they existed, the mobilising discourses were simplistic and extreme; mythical rather than ideological[133]. They served little in explaining the conflict or its aims, but focussed on providing combatants with the cohesion and understandings needed to wage the war and identify the opponent. As one Maronite parliamentary deputy commented at the time, these young militiamen "don't have any clear political concepts: simplistic anti-communism, a few vague ideas on federalism, and nothing else. At least Pierre Gemayel was clever enough to speak of love as his militias murdered." (quoted by Hanf 1993, 386) For a generation disillusioned with the traditional order, the calls for peace by members of the established political class seemed hypocritical; designed less to resolve issues than preserve a corrupt system. The few recorded testimonies of combatants speak of a personal desire to act, rather than reflect, and to shrug off the oppressive layers of familial, social and political control. "Au départ, je voulais combattre, tout simplement combattre. J'en avais marre des discours. Il nous était donné l'occasion, pour une fois, de prendre notre destin en main."(de Freige and Baghdadi. 1979, 7) Violence was an eschatological action, and a way of severing the Gordian knots of Lebanese politics. "We were a generation that wanted to do something… we saw it as an opportunity to change the system." (Adoud Christian Militiaman, interviewed in Masri and Chamoun 1988). By embracing violence its users lay claim to a role and function within their communities. "Je crois avoir liquidé en un jour tous mes problèmes d'identité… Au moment même où je me suis posté derrière cette barricade, c'était à 4 hr de l'après-midi, j'étais devenu parfaitement intégré, définitivement lié." (de Freige and Baghdadi 1979, 1)

But in the process of asserting themselves these young men[134] seized *de facto* power from the institutions of the Lebanese state and polity. Their prejudices and fears about the threat from Lebanon's Palestinian population, the corruption of the pre-war system, and an enthusiasm for the redemptive and constructive value of war itself, propelled Lebanon's descent into war.

This confusion over the goals of combat was mirrored in a pattern of recruitment that was not organised around any central structure, but took place simultaneously on four levels. Firstly, the party militias of the Kata'ib and the NLP, both the local squads and the central units, began rapidly increasing their intake and training during the repeated lulls in the fighting. Secondly, the ideological organisations unaffiliated to any formal party – most importantly the *Tanzim* and the 'Guardians of the Cedars' – recruited military forces and manned battlelines without political representation. Thirdly, neighbourhood defence groups, financed by private citizens, organised patrols and the security of their home areas. Fourthly, autonomous gun-men with either vigilante or criminal intentions formed within the disenfranchised and dispossessed urban populations. These four groups overlapped significantly. On one hand, many self-defence units were dependent on party networks, with connections to other neighbourhoods and the party leadership, for ammunition and information. On the other hand, party militants were dependent on ad-hoc neighbourhood groups and vigilantes in manning local barricades, launching small scale operations and controlling neighbourhoods where party presence was weak. Furthermore, these groups were surrounded by an eddying population of part-time combatants, often teenagers, who participated in violence informally or temporarily. In these conditions the boundaries between combatant and community were highly fluid and permeable; no established staff or formalised system of rank existed. One example indicates how this coordination was organised. On 17th April 1975, shortly after the outbreak of violence, church bells were rung throughout the Kesrowan to summon all residents to gather in the central square of Jounieh in support of the combatants in Beirut. Over the course of the day around 5000 people turned up, with about 3000 weapons of all kinds and a couple of trucks with larger weapons. At 11.00 am party members arrived to organise the new recruits

[133]In his landmark volume on the politics of revolution Crane Brinton talks of the rise of the extremists able to capture the illegal government, and of the strength extremists gain from confronting complex and confused situations with simple ideals proscribing action whilst more reasonable or moderate actors remain inactive. His words, quoted as an epigram to chapter three are particularly fitting for describing events in Lebanon: "… in this crisis there is an extraordinary reversal of the roles played in normal times by the real and the ideal. Here briefly, and at last, the blind – or the seer – is king;" (Brinton 1965, 158-9).

[134]By 1979, around 30% of all Christian youths had carried arms in the war. (cf. de Freige and Baghdadi 1979).

and transport them to Beirut where they were distributed to man specific battle lines for a period of days or weeks[135].

Command of these diverse militias was heterogeneous and complex. Units of combatants often established their own leadership and most were reliable only in the defence of their home territories[136] whilst extremely timid in offensives into unfriendly territory. Party leaders controlled very few trained and disciplined units and lacked the ability to geographically redistribute forces according to need. Furthermore, neighbourhood units from different regions differed substantially in training and commitment.

> Compared to a regular army it was a mess. Say we need now combatants now for the front of down town. So they send the people of this village to go there now for two days and then they would replace them by another people of another village. And it was not organised because some villages were very well armed some were not armed at all; some villages had a lot of fighters some did not have. And their weapons were different, there was no organisation. We stand before the sand bags and start shooting, we shoot on them, they shoot on us, it was like arguing with arms but without any organisation.[137]

More dangerously, bottom-up and popular mobilisation created militia units, not integrated into disciplinary structures, which were not only reluctant to obey party leaders but used violence for reasons that diverged completely from party policies. The disorder of the civil war meant that gunmen were held accountable by their peers and, to a degree, by local communities, rather than vertically to political leaders struggling to keep up with events. Local leaders were in the words of one journalist "modest heroes" in that they had to identify with the inhabitants of their quarters simply in not to become their prisoners[138]. Widespread mobilisation may have granted combatants group absolution for their acts of violence but it came at the cost of undermining the strategic organisation of violence. Extremist and criminal motives, exceeding party lines, found their unchecked expression in the infamous acts of 'undisciplined elements'. Kidnappings, identity-card executions and rampant looting were all condemned or denied by a leadership powerless to stop them.

For example, on the 25th July 1975 a series of steadily escalating gun battles broke out after a 22 year old, Jacques Maalouf, was kidnapped from Ashrafieh in Beirut. Numerous direct and public interventions, by politicians, party leaders and local *qabaday,* were unable to halt the violent demonstrations of Maalouf's friends and family that continued, almost daily, for two and half weeks. Piling into convoys of cars, these supporters would drive around Christian neighbourhoods and into neighbouring Muslim areas before opening fire on buildings or into the air. The episode culminated in a shoot out between a *fifteen* car convoy of Maaloof's supporters and the *Forces de Securité Interieur* (FSI)[139].

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[135] *L'Orient le Jour* 18 April 1975

[136]The best description of this form of moblisation and its effects for the war comes not from the Christian sector of East Beirut but from the Muslim Bâb Tebbâné area of Tripoli. The French scholar Michel Seurat, who died tragically as an Islamic Jihad hostage in 1986, wrote an excellent discussion of the dynamics in this area using Ibn Khaldoun's *'assabiyya* (group feeling) concept. ".. la stratégie militaire de ces '*assabiyyât* – évidemment pré-clauswitzienne en ce sens qu'elle ne vise pas à la destruction de la machine de guerre de l'adversaire, et encore moins à l'occupation du terrain – n'intègre pas dans ses schémas l'idée d'une 'fin de guerre', laquelle supposerait en plus, et en toute logique, leur propre disparition. " (1985, 55).

[137]Interview Raymond Nader, Beirut, October 2003.

[138]"Ces modestes héros, que la guerre civile a secretés se sont trop identifié aux habitants des quartiers dans les combats qu'ils livrent ensemble pour ne pas en devenir les prisonniers." *l'Orient le Jour*, 10 January 1976.

[139] *L'Orient le Jour*, 27, 29, 31 July and 4, 7 August 1975

Another more disturbing example is the Black Saturday massacre[140], carried out whilst Pierre Gemayel was in Damascus in December 1975, in which Christian gunmen spilled into downtown Beirut and began kidnapping and killing Muslims. The massacre ended only after an elite[141] unit of the Kata'ib militia intervened to protect the lives of Muslims working for the electricity company, a sector deemed vital to all sides (Randal 1990, 84-5).

In some cases, furthermore, locally recruited militias were not only disobedient but directly opposed to the interference of other Christian parties within their territory. Some, such as Suleiman Frangieh's *Marada* and Amine Gemayel's 'Brigade 75', of which more later, existed in uneasy cooperation with Kata'ib and PNL militias. Others were more adamant. The most important of these were the various Armenian militias who, early on in the war, declared themselves a non-Lebanese community and opted for a policy of positive neutrality. Barricading the Armenian area of Bourj Hammoud with their own party militias – the Tashnag, the Hentchag and the Ramgavar (cf. Tufenkjian 1988) – these militias opposed, and suffered from their opposition, to any attempt of other militias to enter or to raise revenue within their territory.

[140]The market and port area where Black Saturday took place was traditionally visited by all confessions and lay between central Christian areas such as Gemayze and Ashrafiayeh and Muslim areas such as Bachoura. A newspaper report from the day after the massacre reported 50 dead and over 300 missing, presumed kidnapped (*L'Orient le Jour*, Beirut, 7 December 1975) .
[141]'Special units' in the Lebanese civil war often refer not only to the level of training and equipment but also importantly to their reliability and loyalty to important leaders.



Abbildung 4: Map 3: Beirut Fighting 1975/6
Source: Hanf (1993, 195)

Case Two: Black Saturday, December 6, 1975

On the 6th December 1975, the bodies of four young Kata'ib members, first shot in an ambush whilst returning to Beirut on a rural road and then killed with axes, were discovered in their car outside the state owned electricity company in East Beirut. The brother of one of the dead was found still alive but seriously wounded under the bodies. Upon hearing the news tens of Kata'ib militiamen spread into the central market and port area from neighbouring Christian neighbourhoods. One of them opened fire on a crowd gathered near the adjacent mainly Muslim area of Bachoura. Chaos broke out as bystanders fled and the Christian militiamen began to summarily kill Muslims, particularly port workers, and take hostages from the crowds shopping at the markets. As news of the massacre spread checkpoints were established at entrance points into Christian areas and some Muslims who were passing through East Beirut, a relatively common occurrence in the early months of the war, were killed or taken hostage. Whilst international journalists and local historians report 200-300 dead (Fisk 2001; Randal 1990; Kassir 1994) a local media report published the day after put the number of dead at 50, whilst up to 350

hostages were taken (*L'Orient le Jour*, Beirut, 7 December 1975)[142]. Although reliable quantative data does not exist, most observers confirmed, that the vast majority of those killed were men, and women were generally permitted to pass unmolested in the early stages of the war (Sharara 1978, 12).

Years later Kata'ib officers insisted that Bashir Gemayel, the young commander of the LF, had ordered forty Muslims to be killed as retaliation for the killing of the four Kata'ib (Fisk 2001, 79). A more detailed version, described by an international journalist at the scene (Randal 1990, 84-87), confirmed by local newspaper reports from the day after and a resident Lebanese historian (Kassir 1994a, 134), focuses on the role of a respected militiaman, Joseph Saad, in command of the Section 104 unit that had been involved since the of 20 October 1975 in the heavy fighting of the Hotels War. Joseph's son was one of the bodies in the car. Having very recently lost his only other son, also a Kata'ib militiamen, in similarly horrific circumstances Joseph rallied a group around him and set off to take vegeance – an act, not uncommon in the early months of the war. According to a Kata'ib communiqué from a day after[143] revenge was supposed to have been limited to the taking of hostages, but was turned into a massacre by "des miliciens au comportement frisant l'hysterie et qui refusaient même d'écouter les ordres de leurs chefs dont certains d'ailleurs ont été molestés et malmenés."[144] When the killings risked extending beyond limits sanctioned or tolerated by Kata'ib leadership, a central unit of the militia forces was dispatched to encircle and protect the lives of Muslims working for the electricity company, a sector vital to each side. They were particularly concerned for Fouad Bizri, the company's well-connected Muslim director, as those committing the massacre seemed intent on gaining access to this relatively high 'value' figure. A few hours after the massacre began militia units from West Beirut arrived in the area and combat started, lasting until the 22nd of January 1976.

In an environment in which central organisations did not control violence, they simultaneously did not possess the ability to control the extraction of resources from the external environment. The break down of law and order created vast opportunities for looting and protection rackets. First against small businesses and petrol stations, a surprising number of which were bombed at the beginning of the war, and then later against the large commercial enterprises in the centre of town. Within six days of violence breaking out, 400 million Lebanese Lira (roughly $170 million) worth of goods and cash were reported to have been stolen[145]. By the end of 1975 the losses were immense. The silos and warehouses of the Beirut harbour had been ransacked, the vaults of several international banks[146] were looted and the market areas of downtown Beirut were gutted.

Qabadays (street lords), semi-criminal youths previously employed as extra-institutional enforcers by the traditional political *zu'ama,* used the outbreak of war to become involved in a rapidly expanding criminalisation of the economy. Whilst perhaps justifying their actions in the discourses of popular Maronitism or neighbourhood defence (Khalaf and Deneoux 1988, 184), these leaders became powerfully entrenched within their localities through the exploitation of protection rackets and looting.

> These people over a certain period of time started to build their own interests… this was a way for them to benefit from the security void and increase their privileges. You know they had their own turf, they can make their own money, they can have their own clientele.[147]

[142] In all of the Lebanese massacres the numbers killed is uncertain as not all bodies were recovered. The Lebanese Forces often preferred to kill hostages and discard or bury bodies in the mountains or into rivers rather than return them to families.
[143] Published in *L'Orient le Jour*, Beirut, 8 December 1975.
[144] "Militiamen whose behaviour approached hysteria and who refused even to listen to the orders of their leaders, some of whom were molested and beaten." (author's translation), *L'Orient le Jour*, 7 December 1975
[145]*L'Orient le Jour*, 18 April 1975.
[146]This has been estimated to include the largest bank robbery in the world after the Guinness Book of Records claimed that one bank alone, the British Bank of the Middle East lost probably $50 million (cf. http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/, 17 January 2004).
[147]Interview Charles Chartouni, September 2003, Beirut.

Clashes between competing *Qabadays* affiliated to different parties or localities were not uncommon. On the 15th September 1975, for example, Kata'ib militiamen confronted a local *qabaday*, Elias Awad, over the distribution of petrol in Ashrafieh. This spilled over into fighting with the PNL in Sin el-Fil and Ayn al-Remmeneh.

Within this disorderd environment actual combat was divided into rounds by both official cease-fires and uneasy truces[148], each broken by seemingly spontaneous violent incidents or blockages in political negotiations[149]. Rather than diminishing the conflagration each cease-fire gave the party militias an opportunity to reequip, recruit and train. Each round marked an intensification of violence as the conflict spread both into the centre of Beirut (Ashrafieh, Nasra, Tabaris) and out into the provinces (the centre of Tripoli, the Bekaa valley and the Chouf). The fourth and final real 'round' began in the Bekaa at Zahlé, a Christian town surrounded by Muslim villages, during the end of August 1975. In the conflagration that followed fighting spread into the centre of Beirut, as first Christian then Muslim militias launched assaults into and torched the downtown market areas (Suq Abu al-Nasr, Suq Sursouk, and Suq al-Nouriyeh). Then, during fighting in Tripoli between the Christian Zghorta Liberation Army and Palestinian and Sunni commandoes, the Lebanese army killed 13 Sunni militiamen. State institutions, seen as affiliated to the Christian militias, lost Muslim backing as national demonstrations against its involvement in the war broke out. After this point, whilst the FIS would occasionally attempt to reimpose order, the army remained on the side lines until its fragmentation in 1976. Despite three further ceasefires, none of which lasted longer than ten days, Lebanon was now in a state of continuous war.

In October, disorganised Christian forces were pushed back from territory they had captured in the centre-west of Beirut. After a long fierce battle over control of four luxury hotels (the Saint-George, the Holiday Inn, the Phoenicia and the Hilton) on the 6 December 1975 Christian militias were forced definitively into East Beirut. After this territorial shifts slowed and the militias began to consolidate their control of specific cantons. The Green Line[150], that stretched vertically from the Hippodrome in the South to the old Market in the North, would not be breached until 1986 and then only by the invasion of a rival Christian faction.

Christian forces survived the first six months of combat but "were outnumbered approximately three to two, were not as well armed [as the PRM], and had miscalculated about army intervention. Although the fronts around their heartland had held, the Christian islands outside this area had been in dire straits." (Hanf 1993, 206) Violence had been largely immediate in time and space and strategically disorganised. In late December 1975 the Christian military situation deteriorated further when Syrian equipped Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) and *Saiqa*[151] forces crossed into Lebanon to support PLO forces surrounding the mainly Greek Catholic town of Zahlé. Shortly after, in 1976, the Lebanese army fragmented and Muslim soldiers formed the Lebanese Arab Army led by Lt Ahmed Khatib, expelled Maronite units from downtown Beirut and bombarded the Presidential Palace (Hiro 1993, 37). In response, Kata'ib party units moved, without resistance, into the LAF barracks on the periphery of Beirut, taking over not only military equipment, particularly heavy weaponry, but also recruiting a number of the Christian soldiers stationed there. From this time, only a facade of the Lebanese state's political authority endured (Kisirwani 1992, 32-34), a mirage[152] suspended above militias controlling new and diverse forms of authority.

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[148]Norton and Schwedler (1994, 64) count between 150 and 200 ceasefires during the entire civil war.
[149]See for example the escalation of fighting in Zahle in September 1975, which reportedly began between two people over a dispute in a pinball hall , and whether due to confessional loyalty or the lack of clear information developed into a protracted conflict between political and patrimonial militias.
[150] The term 'Green Line' referred originally to the colour of the trees and bushes that grew up amongst the destroyed buildings and abandoned squares along the division between Christian East and Muslim West Beirut.
[151]*Al-Saiqa* (the Thunderbolt) was a Syrian supported left wing Palestinian nationalist elite strike force.
[152]This myth or dream of stability and power that the state represented repeatedly and tragically misled both national and international actors seeking rapid solutions to the Lebanese conflict. The international community continued to bolster failed institutions rather than taking the less palatable option of negotiating with extremist leaders or recognising the constituencies they represented. The list of those misled is large: Israel in 1982, a Multi National Force in 1982-4, the Lebanese Forces in 1982, General Aoun in 1988-90, amongst others.

The first attempt to organise the Christian forces came in February 1976 when political leaders from the Kata'ib, National Liberal Party and other political and intellectual groups formed the 'Lebanese Front'[153] to coordinate a unified political stance to the crisis. The Front was led by Camille Chamoun (NLP) and Pierre Gemayel (Kata'ib), and its meetings were attended by Said Akl (Guardians of the Cedars), Dr. Fouad Chemali (*Tanzim*), Suleiman Frangieh (head of the *Marada* (Giants) militia in the North), Father Charbel Kassis (Maronite Order of Monks), historian Jawad Boulos, orientalist Fouad Boustani, and the philosopher Charles Malek.

This new organisation, recognising the importance of continued control of East Beirut and the futility of the capture of territory after the state collapsed, developed a new strategy. Led by the party militias, Christian forces went on the offensive in 1976. This time, however, the intention was not to capture territory outside of East Beirut, but to consolidate control of and fortify the Christian heartland (Snider 1984). The Christian militias assaulted Palestinian and Muslim forces in Tal al-Zaatar, Dubaya, Karantina and Maslak[154] – all zones that threatened supply routes into East Beirut (see map 5.1)[155]. Collective reprisals, massacres and kidnappings against resident non-Christians or left-wing Christians drained distrusted populations and allogeneous pockets of *Shi'a* and Bedouin in East Beirut were deported. Strongpoints and guardhouses were established along the 'Green Line', supplementing the existing barricades. The total number of Muslims and left wing Christians who left East Beirut in the first two years of the civil war because of fear or coercion is estimated to lie between 115,000 and 135,000 (Hanf 1993, 345; Labaki and Abou Rjeily 1993, 49). Palestinian guerrillas and their allies retaliated in the northern Akkar and the eastern Bekaa. In January 1976 the Christian towns of Jiyeh and Damour fell and were ethnically cleansed, followed shortly after by the Tiger militia and NLP leader Camille Chamoun's hometown of Saadiyat.

This homogenisation of territory was not driven by ethnic resentment. But by an ethnic nationalist ideology which saw the creation of a contiguous border as a security measure. Ethnic cleansing reduced the costs of internal surveillance and security for Christian militias; it reduced the number of crossover points between East and West Beirut to less than ten and left potentially invading troops without social support or cover and no community to legitimise an attack[156]. Most importantly, however, the territories controlled by the militia had been altered to match the rhetoric of the militia itself. The spaces of intercommunal exchange in central Beirut were transformed into "treacherous barriers denying any crossover." (Khalaf 2002, 248) and the downtown area became a burnt out battlefield for the militias. As a side effect, the rhetoric of the 'defence' of the Christian community had become partially true, but only through the expulsion of dissenters.

As the conflict wore on similar institutionalisations of violence occurred within the fighting organisations. Effective military units began to emerge under young military leaders, more efficient supply chains were developed, training was increasingly regulated and looting was giving way to resources from international backers and more sophisticated black market activity. Throughout the territory of East Beirut this transformation secured the power of a young generation of party militants. The most important of these is Bashir Gemayel, the youngest son of Pierre Gemayel the leader of the Kata'ib party.

Bashir[157], born in Beirut in November 1947, embodied the characteristics of the *shaykh al-Shabab*, a

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[153]The Lebanese Front was initially known under the name "Front de la liberté et de l'Homme".
[154]The latter three attacks took place in January 1976 and were won in a matter of days.
[155]Thousands were killed after the fall of each of these areas, often openly on the street as reporters looked on (Fisk 2001, 99; Randal 1990, 88-90). This use of massacres was turned against the LF in Damour, and during the battle of the Mountain in 1983, when the Druze used massacres to drain the Christian population from the Chouf. Damour, as Tal al-Zaatar for the Palestinians, became a banner for the LF, held up as proof of both the desperation of their struggle against unremitting foes.
[156]Interview Fouad Abu Nader, Lebanese Forces Commander in Chief 1984-5, October 2003, Beirut
[157]Whilst we know that Bashir's trajectory was not unique those of others are less well reported. An exception is that of Etienne Sakr (*Abu Arz*) formerly of Lebanese internal security and then military head of the Guardians of the Cedars (*Hurras al-Arz*) which has been depicted in a recent book by Mordechai Nisan (2003, 17-39). An alternative descriptive source for the original formation of militia

leader of young ‘guys’. Whilst studying law at the mainly Christian University of St. Joseph in Ashrafieh during the 1960s, Bashir had come into contact with a number of militant Christians. Many of them, often those studying at the American University of Beirut (cf. Ghusayni 1974), saw the export of Arab nationalist ideologies to Lebanon as a threat to both the stability of the state and the Christian community. Student politics and battles between right and left wing student associations were the preparatory ground for this group[158]. Whilst the older generation debated a revision of the National Pact, Bashir’s student network saw this as short sighted. They referred to the rising violence and the evident incapacity of the state as evidence that Christians needed a more forceful response. In 1970, at the age of 23, Bashir began commanding militant units in sporadic clashes with Palestinian guerrillas and their supporters. Like his brother before him, appointed head of the North Metn Kata’ib branch[159], Bashir was appointed second in command of an influential Kata’ib branch HQ in Ashrafieh. From this position Bashir began gathering his supporters around him, and in 1974 under his command this small group formed the P.G. (Pierre Gemayel) unit of Kata’ib volunteers that bought their own weapons and trained at the weekend (Abou 1984, 124)[160].

Abbildung 5: Picture 1: Bashir Gemayel on a Memorial Poster in Beirut
Source: photograph taken by author (2003)

Upon the outbreak of war Bashir, with his powerful connection to his father, Pierre Gemayel president of the Kata’ib party, became a charismatic figurehead for many young Christian combatants. He

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groups is that of an ex-LF combatant and aide to Elie Hobeika, Robert Hatem (1999, chapter 1). Both sources suffer from extreme biais and should be read with caution.

[158]The American University of Beirut was the meeting place of these different political persuasions, normally divided between scattered between confessional universities, and the political exiles from other Middle Eastern countries.

[159]Like Bashir and other Kata’ib leaders, Amine Gemayel used his supporters as a personal guard and militia, ‘Brigade 75’. Through this group Amine consolidated his power in North Metn and attempted occasionally to expand. This force was left unchallenged in its enclave until in 1988 when Samir Geagea, then Commander in Chief of the LF, responded to a snub from Amine by seizing all military and civil positions held by Amine (Sneiffer-Perri 1995, 137-8).

[160]Shortly after he was kidnapped by Palestinian forces and released only after direct intervention by Yassir Arafat.

promised those who obeyed him, not only victory in the war, but a material stake and a political voice in a new Lebanon no longer ruled by old men and feudal families.

> En tant que combattants *nous* avons droit à la parole et à l'action pour décider de l'avenir de Liban. Je dirai même plus, c'est *nous* qui déciderons du Liban nouveau en coopération avec les hommes sincères et les technocrates du pays. [my italics][161]

Only 27 in 1975, his political style was stubbornly pragmatic and he "had a gift for those quick, simple formulas that excite the spirit and lend purpose to action." (Aulas 1985, 21) In the first years of the war he was rarely photographed in anything but military fatigues and in most pictures is surrounded by young militiamen, working, or himself carrying arms[162]. Christian youth, concerned with the vacillations of the elder leadership of the political parties, identified with the 'strong' stance Bashir was taking (cf. Randal 1990, 104-107 for a discussion held with a militiaman about these choices). In the words of one excombatant describing Bashir's attraction:

> Avant tous son charisme, deuxièmement son pouvoir de réalise plusieurs exploit. Mais troisièmement ses idées. Mais a cette age c'étais ça l'hiérarchie de ce qui ma séduit. Avant tous a l'age de 15-16 ans j'avais pas la maturité ni le pouvoir intellectuelle des l'acquisition politique pour pouvoir analyse les idées profondément. … Son pouvoir pendant trois ans a réalisé plusieurs exploits au niveau militaire et politique[163].

Bashir used his influence and his connections to transform the Ashrafieh branch of the party. Already a central hub of the Kata'ib's militia forces, under Bashir's control it gained a reputation for the calibre of its recruits and Bashir himself.

> J'ai essaye de rejoindre un autre commandement des Kata'ib. Mais en ma dit … écoute des étudiants ici. Vous avez intérêts d'aller à Ashrafieh lá où on te comprendra mieux, c'est à votre niveau. Il y a le fils de Pierre Gemayel, Bashir Gemayel, un jeun homme pas mal. Vous avez intérêts d'aller le voir. [164]

Simultaneously, other key figures, like Dany Chamoun or Etienne Sakr, were acting like Bashir in expanding their units of combatants. Within the mass of mobilised combatants powerful, well connected young *fighting* men surrounded by highly loyal supporters began taking the party structures, resources and rhetoric out of the hands of their elder *political* generation. By 1976 the words and faces of these young men began to be seen and heard in newspaper reports, first alongside, then autonomously, and finally instead of the party leaders.

The offensive campaign against Tal al-Zaatar, in 1976, brought these central figures together into one organisation. One of the largest Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, Tal al-Zaatar was a fortified and militarised PLO stronghold honeycombed with bunkers and tunnels. It controlled the high ground that dominated East Beirut and the Eastern road out of Beirut. The resultant battle altered not only the social geography of war time Beirut, but defined the future organisation of the LF.

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[161]Bashir Gemayel at his first press conference reported in *L'Orient le Jour* 26 July 1976.
[162]For an overview of the images captured of Bashir's life see Abou (1984), or the archive of the Lebanese Forces webpage, http://www.lebanese-forces.net/cgi-bin/album/emAlbum.cgi?cmd=show_thumbs&path=Bachir%20Gemayel&img=0&page=1&tn=1 (11 January 2003).
[163]Interview Jean Aziz, Beirut, October 2003.
[164]Interview Asaad Chaftari, ex-deputy head of LF Intelligence Section 1975-86, Beirut, November 2003.

The offensive required the coordinated participation of all Christian forces in the area. The operation was carried out by six militias – the *Tanzim*, the Kata'ib, the NLP, the Guardians of the Cedars, a local militia (the Lebanese Youth Movement) and units from the Akkar Brigade of the Lebanese Army (Snider 1984, 7). The siege and assault were planned by LAF career officers, the NLP and the *Tanzim* commanders, independently of party political leaders[165], and their militias were joined by locally recruited gunmen and numerous Kata'ib units. The bulk of these forces were untested and the resultant high casualties created a call to pool funds for purchasing armaments and increase the intercoordination of the different military organisations, for example through the establishment of common radio frequencies.

Tal al-Zaatar was completely besieged and under Lebanese Army artillery fire from June until August before it was taken. After it fell the camp was bulldozed, the Palestinians evicted and up to 3,000 civilians killed (Kimmerling and Migdal 1993, 237). During the siege the head of the Kata'ib Security Council, William Hawi, was killed and Bashir rose to his position. A permanent and unified command structure of all the Christian militias was formally established on August 30, 1976, with the creation of the 'Joint Command Council of the Lebanese Forces' (*al-quwwât al-lubnâniyyat)*. The LF was originally seen, by many, as the military wing of the Lebanese Front, and like the Front, it included representatives of the Kata'ib, the *Tanzim*, the PNL and the Guardians of the Cedars. As head of the largest militia in the coalition Bashir Gemayel became its first Commander in Chief (cf. Snider 1984). The announcement was marked by the ceremonial formation of 2,500 Kata'ib into ranks of the Lebanese Forces (LF), divided between commandos, navy, telecommunications (including intelligence) and administration[166].

The first year and a half of combat in Lebanon were defined by ad-hoc solutions to immediate problems. Local units, mobilised around neighbourhoods or social networks, were neither integrated into any disciplinary structure, nor regulated in their recruitment. Party militias were overstretched and often ill-prepared, and apolitical, criminal and highly localised violence the norm. But within this confusion an initial enthusiasm for the conflict amongst combatants granted many the group absolution and cohesion suggested by Grossman as necessary for killing. A Christian community mobilised by its fears, both real and imagined, rallied behind their presumed defenders and the scope and depth of mobilisation was remarkable. Party organisations helped provide the authoritative legitimation of war, through their discourses or ideologies, but they could only intermittently control the external environment or combatants. This period was the destruction of the old order and its institutions. This ended with the consolidation of organisational and territorial boundaries replacing those of the state, and the formation of organisations committed to and willing to wage war for the long term.

5.3 1977– 1982: Stalemate, Institutionalisation and Foreign Intervention

By 1977 the Lebanese civil war had stalemated across the 'Green Line' stretching throught the centre of Beirut. On the one hand, the consolidation and ethnic cleansing of confessional territory had created a defensive cordon beyond which any invading force confronted not only hostile forces but a deeply hostile population. On the other hand, the collapse of a credible state security force had removed the locus and impetus for the strategic military conflict. Although other conflicts broke out in the South, the Lebanese conflict had become, as the then London *Times* reporter, Robert Fisk, described another Lebanese encounter, "'une guerre triste', a dreary war; and it was one which neither side had at present much interest in winning," (Fisk 2001, 190). The militiamen had destroyed the old order with neither the means nor vision to create something new in its place.

Within this stalemate two processes took place. Firstly, Lebanon became a field for proxy wars between members of an intransigent Middle Eastern security bloc dominated by Syria and Israel, each in turn relying on their alliances with the US-USSR blocs for international support (Salamé 1986, 25). Secondly, the Lebanese Forces began to institutionalise and regularise their authority over recruitment, resources and discipline within the Christian canton. These two processes were unified in Israeli support for the LF.

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[165]The Kata'ib only joined the assault around six days after it began having previously argued for moderation or at least a delay. According to a pro-Guardians of the Cedars source, Pierre Gemayel had actually reached an agreement with Yasir Arafat over Tal al-Zaatar on the 18th July, and was in favour of reconnecting the water supply to the camp when the attack started (Nisan 2003, 43).
[166]*L'Orient le Jour*, 1 September 1976.

In January 1976, as territorial division progressed in Lebanon, Syria announced its willingness to annex the entire country if partition were to occur[167]. Then, in June 1976, 27,000 regular Syrian troops crossed the border (Weinberger 1986). In October 1976 these forces were ratified as a member of a peacekeeping Arab Detterent Force (ADF) established by the Arab League alongside Sudanese, Libyan, Yemeni and Saudi forces. In the following years the Syrian military rapidly extended its authority and checked any side from gaining a decisive advantage, supporting first the Christians in the defence of Zahle against Palestinian and allied forces and then turning against them in 1978.

This development was met with concern not only in the Christian Lebanese camp but also in Israel. In response, Israel began to offer substantial support to the various Christian militias who opposed Syrian presence on Lebanese soil. Israel had old ties with the Kata'ib party (Morris 1984) and the Lebanese Maronites, and had its own security interests in denying Lebanon as a sphere of Syrian influence. But, furthermore, many within Israel sympathised with the concerns of a religious minority 'threatened' in a sea of Muslims. Already in 1976, Israel had supplied Kata'ib and NLP militias with weaponry and ammunition, maintaining separate channels of communication with each militia. In May 1977 Menachim Begin's *Likud* party defeated the incumbent Labour party and announced its willingness to adopt a more forceful policy in Lebanon. Beginning in 1977, Israel began inviting selected groups of LF militiamen to train in military tactics and strategy with the IDF, and had dramatically increased the LF's capacity by equipping it with heavy weaponry captured in the 1967 and 1973 wars against its Arab neighbours[168]. By 1978 Israel was investing more heavily in the LF, first by establishing tacit political red lines with Syria, but then, increasingly, through the intervention of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF); first in symbolic and then in direct military operations. In March 1978 Israel took another step into the Lebanese civil war when it launched 'Operation Litani', invading Southern Lebanon to enforce a security cordon up to the Litani river. After the IDF's withdrawal this was patrolled by a Lebanese client militia the South Lebanon Army (SLA) led by Saad Haddad. The United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established by Security Council resolution 425, entered Lebanon shortly after to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the restoration of 'international peace and security'.

This support of an international patron gave Bashir the means and autonomy required to directly contradict his elders and superiors within the Kata'ib party. Initially the Christian militias, funded by Lebanese businesses at home and abroad and the Maronite monastic foundations, had relied on private weaponry, weapons passed to them by the Lebanese army, and purchases from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany (Hiro 1993, 36). This required the cultivation of support amongst the wealthier and more traditional classes within the Christian community. From 1976 onwards, Israeli aid severed the LF's dependency on these sources. After the fall of Tal al-Zaatar, in August 1976, Bashir opposed almost the entire Christian political elite, including his own father Pierre Gemayel[169], by siding with Israel and organising the LF for and warning publicly of an impending conflict with the regular Syrian army. Bashir began vocally demanding the expulsion of all foreign forces from Lebanon (Syrian and Palestinian) and saw the LF and its blossoming relationship with Israel as the tool for achieving this. Throughout Lebanon international support rapidly became essential to all militias; first as large-scale suppliers of ammunition and light weapons; then to provide the heavy weapons accrued by other Lebanese factions and influence international reactions to the conflict; and finally as agents of direct military intervention[170].

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[167]Syria had long feared a Christian micro-state on its borders whose natural ally would be Israel, it furthermore had never relinquished its historical claim to Lebanon as part of the territory of Syria.
[168]See Schiff and Ya'Ari (1984, chapter 1) for a dramatised description of the original encounter between the Christian militias and the Israelis. According to this version Abu Hilal, a leader of the Lebanese Kata'ib party, sailed in a pleasure craft off the coast of Lebanon until encountering an Israeli missile boat and then asked to be taken to Haifa.
[169]Whilst radical solutions were proposed by intellectual members of the Front, political leaders such as Suleiman Franjieh, Camille Chamoun and Pierre Gemayel had always seen cooperation with Syria and coexistance with other confessions in Lebanon as essential to the future of the Christian community in the Middle East.
[170]Particularly in relation to air power and establishing balances of power with the state supporters of opponents.

The Arab Deterrence Force (ADF) was, in Bashir's eyes, simply a way of mediating the international tension over Syria's role inside Lebanon[171]. Syria contributed 25,000 of the 30,000 troops. In response, Bashir adopted a strategy of escalation against the Syrian military. This was designed to test its commitment to operations within Lebanon, but also to force the Israeli military into the war as a counter-balance to Syria. In 1978 the Lebanese Forces, in alliance with the remnants of the Lebanese army, drove Syrian troops out of East Beirut. Soon after, LF militants again forced Syria to back down when it demanded the release of Bashir after he was arrested at a checkpoint. Forced to humiliate itself in front of a "young man of 30 years who was playing at being the little Napoléon" (Abou 1984, 143) Syria unleashed days of artillery bombardment of residential areas in East Beirut. On the morning of the 6th of June, Israel responded to this threat to its Lebanese ally and seven Kfir fighter jets broke the sound barrier flying low over Beirut; the next day the Syrian bombardment stopped. Despite the human cost of his policy, Bashir Gemayel had established the Lebanese Forces as a political force independent from the Front, brought Israel into the war on his side and successfully faced off a state army.

Bashir's confidence emanated not only from his external allegiances, however, but also his internal successes in reorganising the Christian militias. In 1976 the LF could have, at best, been described as a citizen's army, but at worst it was an ill-disciplined, brutal and often incompetent network of militias.

> … there was a lot of small leaders. Let say every village has its own leader, that is not very competent, that is a kind of *za'im*. And they refuse to go to military school and have military studies. The military is something very complicated. So most of those leaders who were raised during the beginning of the war were illiterate they don't know even how maybe to read…[172]

Furthermore, as fighting extended the direct rewards and enthusiasm for combat diminished. Lootable assets were exhausted or guarded, dynamic gun battles gave way to artillery duels and the communal unity of the first years of war became jaded. Whilst in the first two years of the conflict the Christian militias were able to mobilise a broad swathe of the Christian population, by 1978 only "young people were prepared to make a career of militia service" (Hanf 1993, 332)[173]. The fluid destructive freedom of fighting in 1975 was giving way to a static amd demoralising war which required an integrated military-political organisation.

> At that point we were not any more confined to our local problems but we were trying to work out a system that can be helpful to everybody. So we became more of an integrated system, we were not any more isolated entities we are people dealing with specific problems in different locales but trying to coordinate at the central level the different services we could provide to each other… it is not only military it is more than military[174].

Whilst the principle of a network of local militias supported by centrally commanded regional forces remained in place, Bashir began a process of transferring the backbone of the LF's military strength from the former to the latter. Israeli support gave the LF the resources to establish much larger and better equipped regular units. In 1978 Israeli trained and equipped units were placed directly under the control of centrally appointed regional LF Commanders, under the supervision of a Commander-in-Chief. In 1979 the military recruitment of all militias within the Christian canton became the

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[171]Beyond the tensions between Syria and Israel, after Syrian troops had entered Lebanon in force in June 1976 they had clashed with the PLO and National Movement combatants provoking a backlash against Syria from the Arab world.

[172]Interview Raymond Nader, LF veteran and head of LF officer Training College, Beirut, November.

[173]Randal (1990, 112) reports a macabre joke current in West Beirut at the time. 'Why is their no barbershop opposite the phalange [Kata'ib] HQ? Because they all leave before they're old enough to shave.'

[174]Interview Charles Chartouni, Beirut, September 2003.

responsibility of the Joint Command Council, rather than the military wings of the parties. The replenishment of these units was also regularised. Comprehensive demographic records were established and used to target potential recruits for specific fronts or units: engineering students were recruited to form an artillery command, refugees and migrants were recruited to return to home areas in either offensive or defensive teams and radio or communications skills exploited by an intelligence section.



Abbildung 6: Figure 2: Changes in the Structure of the Lebanese Forces (1976-80)
Source: Snider (1984, 9)

As the Lebanese Forces institutionalised and integrated its authority it came into direct conflict with two other groups. Firstly, an 'Old Guard' from the *za'im* class whose power lay in the political parties and patrimonial networks established during pre-war Lebanon. These men, many of whom habituated to the ease of power and with powerful connections with the Lebanese Front, were resentful of the LF's emerging political authority. Secondly, a 'New Guard', for want of a better term, constituted of both the party and the local militias that had come onto the streets within the Christian canton in 1975. These forces had been empowered by the breakdown of law and order and were unwilling to allow a recentralisation of authority from which they would be at worst excluded and at best minor parties. As a result, this period was marked by increasingly violent disputes that culminated in two intra-communal outbreaks of violence in 1978 and 1980.

1978 - Ehden and the Marada

After 1976 the Kata'ib had extended their influence into the Northern Christian regions of Lebanon, controlled by Sulieman Franjieh, where its stance against the feudal and clan politics of local *za'im* found many supporters amongst the poorer section of the population. The response was a steady escalation of violence and tit for tat killings between Kata'ib and Frangieh supporters. After the killing of a Kata'ib sectional head, Joud el-Bayeh, on the 13 June 1978, a small LF commando led by Samir Geagea, himself a Northerner whose home town was traditionally at odds with the Frangieh family, infiltrated Ehden in North Lebanon and shot to death Suleiman Frangieh's son, his wife and children, and 31 *Marada* militiamen at the Frangieh summer residence[175].

[175] Bashir and other members of the LF declared that their intention had been to capture the Frangieh's compound which was sheltering the presumed murderers of el-Bayeh and served as the *Marada's* operational headquarters. They professed ignorance of the presence of Frangieh's family and argued that according to their information he and his family should have returned to Beirut the night before and had been delayed only by a mechanical fault in their car.



Abbildung 7: Map 4: Lebanese Forces Territory, 1976-1982
(Territory lost in 1978 in black)

Most accounts pinpoint a dispute over the control of the protection rents from the *Chekka* cement factories south of Tripoli, however more structural issues were also at stake. Firstly, the decision of Bashir to accept Israeli support contradicted the Frangieh family's longstanding business relationships with the Syrian president, Hafez al-Assad, and his family[176]. Secondly, the semi-bureaucratic functional professionalisation that Bashir saw as the future of the LF as a military , and Bashir's personal popularity, undermined the traditional 'feudal' ties which bound the Frangieh family to the *Marada* militia (Dakroub 1981, 133)[177]. Frangieh's supporters were the rural middle class and farmers from his same region; his militia was essentially a civil guard recruited on kinship and local attachments (Hanf 1993, 235).

The attack backfired with outrage amongst traditional Christian leaders who had not been consulted. Many perceived Geagea's action as violence against one of their own. Bashir attempted unsuccessfully to deny any involvement. On the 18 June 1978, Suleiman Frangieh responded as the traditional patron he was and declared a feud with the Gemayel family, refusing to complete the burial rites for his son until Bashir was dead. He then called in local Maronite priests and announced that all Kata'ib party members would be killed unless they left the Akkar region within a month or resigned from the party and handed in their weapons (Randal 1990, 118-132). Thousands of Kata'ib members fled the north and resettled in Batroun and Jbeil. Many of these men, expelled from their land and with little hope of returning, went on to form the elite troops of the LF. Unswavering in their loyalty to Samir Geagea, who was appointed Northern commander of the LF, these troops were some of the first of the LF's militiamen to be barricked, meanwhile in East Beirut most were still free to return home everyday. Frangieh turned irrevocably to Syria[178] and the Syrian equipped *Marada* created a permanent frontline in the North (see map 5.2).

1980 - "Unification of the Christian Gun"

The split between the *Marada* and the Lebanese Forces did not solve the problem of autonomy for the LF. Within East Beirut and other parts of the Christian canton the LF co-existed with the Tigers (*Numuur*) militia of the National Liberal Party (NLP). Although small at the beginning of the war, this militia had rapidly expanded after 1975. The NLP was less centralised and autocratic than the Kata'ib, who it should be remembered drew its inspiration from the European Fascist movement, and was dependent on a network of localised strong men. After Syrian troops withdrew from Beirut in 1977 friction and local clashes between the two militias became more frequent, often killing both militiamen and bystanders. Furthermore, from an organisational perspective, the existence of the *Numuur* obstructed any hope of establishing a monopoly over force or resources within East Beirut. Individuals, or economic networks, opposed to Bashir could escape retaliation by allying themselves with the *Numuur* and many profited from playing the 'rackets' against each other. After deliberation within the Kata'ib political bureau, Bashir, characteristically, opted for a military solution as the only effective response.

On July 7 1980, integrated LF forces attacked the Tiger's barracks, the NLP controlled ports, offices

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[176] The origins of these ties are both dramatic and illustrative. In 1957 Suleiman Frangieh had been implicated in the murder of several members of a rival family in Northern Lebanon. Threatened with arrest he had fled to Syria where he had become acquainted with Hafez al-Assad, at the time a military officer and later to become the President of Syria. After the charges were dropped Suleiman returned to Lebanon in 1960 to take over his retired brother's seat in parliament. During his subsequent decade in parliament he served in a series of ministerial posts (Post, Telegraph and Telephone; Agriculture; the Interior; Justice; the Economy and Public works) with multiple economic opportunities attached. In 1970 Suleiman Frangieh was elected as President of the Republic after on the third ballot split 49/49 gunmen led by his son Tony forced their way into the parliamentary building and forced the Parliamentary Speaker to cast his ballot in favour of Suleiman.

[177]The importance of this issue is evident in the attempt Bashir made to legitimise the attack by claiming that Frangieh and his son had demanded tributes and *droit de seigneur* with a client's fiancée.

[178]Interestingly, Frangieh's involvement with a state power, Syria, did not, and most likely, prohibited internal change within the Akkari clan system which lay at the root of his power.

and other strong points, killing up to 500 people[179]. Dany Chamoun the *Numuur's* military leader withdrew from politics. The attack was legitimised by publicising the criminal activities of the militia, including drug running and their control of illegal gambling dens – operations the LF promptly took over. The NLP was portrayed as disorganised and run by warlords. The key to the success of the military strategy was, however, that Camille Chamoun, the leader of the National Liberal Party and father of Dany Chamoun, was convinced to return to the LF War Council (*Majlis al-Harb*) after receiving guarantees that he would still act as the chairman of the Lebanese Front and received the revenue from the port. In other words, he was denied the right to control military force, but not the means to maintain the client base essential for political and military protection or influence. Bashir proclaimed that he had "unified the Christian gun" in Lebanon, and publicly demanded the 'merger' of all remaining militias of the Christian fighting forces, raising the discursive banner of "political pluralism, military unity". Some of the remaining Tigers joined LF brigades, and both Georges Adwan and Etienne Saqr, leaders of the *Tanzim* and the Guardians of the Cedar respectively, announced that they would integrate their forces into the LFs united army. Unlike the Ehden debacle, the destruction of the PNL left the Christian community within East Beirut militarily unified under the LF and Bashir. After a series of mopping up operations against NLP remnants in September and October 1980 the LF extended its authority through the Christian enclave[180].

The destruction of rivals in the Christian canton allowed Bashir to complete his project of military centralisation. In 1980 the existing members of all Christian militias were absorbed into central units, and a huge military training camp was established in Qahmaz. This was followed by the formation of the elite 'Adonis' and 'Beirut' units in the same year. In July 1981 a draft of all military age men and women was instituted[181], with training beginning in the last two years of secondary school. In 1982 the reorganisation extended from new forces to a rehabilitation of existing members of the LF. All locally recruited forces and Special Forces were required to attend retraining programs[182], refusal resulted in their dismissal from the organisation. The LF now controlled around 6,000 full-time militiamen and 10,000 reservists that could be mobilised at short notice (Hanf 1993, 248).

The LF's increasing unitary control of military force facilitated its ability to regulate recruitment, the discipline of its followers and the extraction of resources from the external environment. This, in turn, transformed the LF from the representative of the collective mobilisation of a community in response to violence, into an organisation that demanded and sought to legitimise its right to represent the Christian community politically.

As early as 1975 "sections de discipline" were established to hand over criminals to the *Forces de Securité Interieur*. By 1978 this had developed into a department investigating "killings, thefts, monopolies on foodstuffs, drugs, and aggressions on persons, private and public property."[183] In 1980 the LF made it illegal to carry a weapon without a permit, established a division of military police and began forcing full-time LF militiamen to live in barracks.

Most dangerous for the central organisation, at this time, were those rivals for local authority that had established their power during the 1975-6 period and the infamous 'undisciplined elements' blamed for the abuses of the war. Both groups resented the oversight and authority of a central organisation and in many cases actively resisted LF command. However, without the ability to appeal to the NLP or the *Marada* for protection, these attempts were often futile. When possible these groups were either co-opted or their influence over militiamen was reduced. When this was impossible such leaders remained in control of villages, neighbourhoods and even regions. In response, the LF intelligence services under

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[179]As claimed by Dany Chamoun, the real number is certainly lower, the LF itself later claimed to have counted only 94 dead, including 18 of their own fighters, a Numuur officer later claimed that the death toll was 150 (Randal 1990, 136).
[180]The sole exception was North Metn which remained under the control of Bashir's brother Amine Gemayel until 1988.
[181]This was abandoned a year later, for all but medical students, after a rise in desertion rates and protests from parents and the army. The army's complaint was that conscription placed the LF directly in competition for Christian recruits, creating in consequence either a potential Islamification of the army or an infiltration of the army by LF trained officers (Moumne 1996, 107-8).
[182]Interview Fadi Shemati, LF Veteran, Beirut, October 2003.
[183]*An-Nahar* (Beirut), 30 November 1978

Elie Hobeika began identifying and 'stopping', either by cooption or corporal and capital punishment, local leaders who refused to obey the centre's regulation of resources. This was, according to many of his contemporaries, a brutal business in which Elie Hobeika established a reputation for extreme violence and a particular coldness when dealing with petty and more serious criminals as well as political competitors[184]. At this time the LF established a network of informers, often recruited through religious or civilian administration, to monitor the behaviour of commanders in rural or periphery areas. The success of this strategy was evident when comparing the crime statistics of East Beirut to West Beirut, still controlled by an array of localised and factional militias (see table 5.2).

Tab. 7: Table 7: Comparative Summary of Crime in LF-controlled territory vs other Forces' territories (January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1981).

Source: Republic of Lebanon Internal Security Forces (quoted Snider 1984, 21)

Type of Crime	**Other Forces (Pop. Est. 2.75 Mil)**	**Lebanese Forces (Pop. Est. 1 Mil)**
Murder	417	35
Attempted Murder	323	15
Theft	430	34
Armed Robbery	356	8
Kidnapping	33	6
Fraud and Cons	22	2
Drug Smuggling/Dealing	89	3
Terrorism and Explosives	568	51
Armed Clashes	206	2
Dead	722	47
Wounded	978	54
Automobile Theft	211	2

The regularisation of recruits, command and discipline was funded by a similarly institutionalised expansion of an autonomous sphere of economic activity. This occurred progressively from an initial request for donations in 1975-76, to the halting of the looting, then regulation of the ports in 1976, to the taxation of petrol and flour and finally the establishment and manipulation of banks and holding companies in the 1980s. As mentioned in chapter 4, in 1977 the LF founded a central financial administration, the *Sunduq al Watani*. After the military operations in 1980 the main sources of revenue began to be centralised through this body. In July 1980 it announced the closing down of all illegal harbours and the creation of a Port Authority which collected substantial revenue in tariffs. In August of that year it imposed a house tax and a series of taxes on luxury goods (restaurant bills, cinema tickets, amusement centres, casinos…). LF members also began to get involved and to a degree cooperated in a large black-market economy. Often such ventures were done indirectly, as business men sought protection from elite leaders of the LF in exchange for money. The cultivation, processing and smuggling of drugs[185] became an extremely lucrative source of foreign currency with many local units of the militias cooperating across the front line to establish growing, distribution and selling channels.

By the 1980s the LF levied taxes and external customs ($60 million/annum), organised transport and internal customs ($15 million/annum) and controlled Beirut's fifth port ($15-25 million/annum) (Picard 2000). By 1982 the LF admitted that its yearly revenues had reached $100 million (Randal 1990, 134) and it was purchasing, rather than receiving, weapons from Israel (Schiff and Ya'ari 1984, 28). From 1982 onwards the LF began to expand its economic activity into the production of legal and illegal goods. In 1982 it founded the so-called 'Gamma Group' with the purpose of developing an economic

[184]He was described by interviewees who knew him well as a man with neither faith nor law, who would as willingly shoot you as look you in the eyes.

[185] Poppies are said to have been introduced to Lebanon by Kurdish experts in 1984, beginning with an initial cultivation of 60 hectares, which expanded to around 4,000 hectares during the war (Couvrat and Pless 1993, 66). Hashish production was estimated by Elizabeth Picard to have quadrupled between 1976 and 1988 (1996, 67) and by 1988 had reached about 25,000 hectares (Marchal and Messiant 1997, 14).

scheme to rekindle the Christian enclave's economy. Following this group's advice the LF began to not only invest in legitimate businesses, but also to purchase businesses outright, ranging from maritime transportation to the management of parking lots[186] (Zahar 1999, 124).

The *de facto* authority of the LF in East Beirut established the LF's monopoly of representation over the Christian community (cf. Hage 1992, 26-27)[187]. In response, the LF sought to simultaneously legitimise itself and monitor society by regulating the media and civilian institutions providing for the Christian population. In 1978 the LF established a radio station, *Radio Liban Libre* and a television station (later to become the still existant Lebanon Broadcasting Corporation), and a weekly magazine, *al-Massira*. In 1975/6 volunteers had begun to clean streets and drive the idle municipal rubbish trucks. In 1976, a close advisor of Bashir Gemayel, George Freyha, the director of the AUB's off-campus program in East Beirut, established a network of Popular Committees (*al-hay'aat al-shabiyya*)[188]; first in Ashrafieh and then throughout the LF's territory. This popular administration embodied the LF's adherence to grass-roots and idealistic governance and created a network of cadres throughout LF territory. These committees paralleled that of the state's service agencies. The Civil Defence Department co-ordinated wartime emergency operations such as repairs to utilities and the shelter of displaced peoples. The Health Committee distributed free medicine when it was available and made sure that pharmacies stayed open, and a Judiciary committee established a network of military and civil courts (Harik 1994, 16). All of these committees relied directly on specifically assigned units of 30-40 LF militiamen to counter interference from local leaders and protect them from predatory elements. At their height 141 PCs were operating with over 10,000 volunteers[189]. Whilst they received small grants from the LF, the PC's resources came mostly from local taxation and it aimed to be self-sufficient.

By 1981 the rivalry of Syria and Israel in Lebanon had led both countries into a spiral of augmentation. In May 1981, the Israeli air force shot down two Syrian helicopters attacking LF forces seeking to link up with combatants under siege in Zahle. In response, Syria positioned advanced SAM-6 surface-to-air missiles, supplied by the Soviet Union, in the Bekka valley in full view of aerial reconnaissance. An international outcry over Syria's actions elevated Bashir Gemayel to international prominence and forced Syria to lift the blockade.

Bashir Gemayel exploited this opportunity to embark on a national political project in the name not only of a powerful militia, but as the voice of now 'unified' Christian community. As Bashir put it in an interview with *Le Monde*, he was able to pass from a 'phase technique' to a 'phase politique' in 1980. This transformation was formalised by his formal election to the Lebanese Front and the publication on December 3rd 1980 of a detailed manifesto entitled "The Lebanon we want to Build Up" (see appendix 3.1). Bashir shed his military fatigues for suits, adopted a more tolerant public discourse and initiated contacts with Muslim politicians and the state. In November 1981, at the 45th anniversary of the Kata'ib party, Bashir announced in veiled words his candidacy for the Lebanese Presidency.

On the 6 June 1982 in response to an assassination attempt by the Palestinian *Abu Nidal* group, Israel fundamentally altered the structure of the Lebanese war, with an invasion that reached Beirut's suburbs in just eight days. Operation 'Peace for Galilee'[190] was designed not only to secure Israel's border[191],

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[186] These businesses were also used to provide a pension and benefits system to retired and injured militiamen. Parking lots, established in empty lots created by the war, thus came to offer jobs to the injured combatants who had fought in the war.

[187] The LF had expelled not only non Christian populations but also Christian political opponents. Most famous of these was the self-imposed exile of Raymond Eddé, leader of the non-militarised National Bloc party, after an assassination attempt widely attributed to Bashir Gemayel. In describing the introspective effects of the closure of interconfessional spaces Elizabeth Kassab (1994, 36) describes how the elements shaping the face of the city imposed themselves [on individual identity] very strongly. This led to the discovery and development of a new social life within one's immediate spatial environment; but it also led to the loss or disturbance of another social life, based on familial, personal, professional, intellectual or other affinities.

[188] For more information on the Popular Committees cf Harik (1994), or for the most complete discussion of their development available cf. Freiha (1994, in Arabic).

[189] Interview with George Freyha, Popular Committee Coordinator, November 2003, Beirut.

[190] The literature on the Israeli invasion and its immediate aftermath (the killing of Bashir Gemayel, the Sabra and Shatila massacres, and the arrival of the MultiNational Force) is extensive and cannot be

as had the 1978 'Litani' incursion, but to destroy the PRM's presence in Lebanon. After 70 days of siege and bombardment, denying 500,000 Lebanese civilians food, water and fuel (Korbani 1991, 79), the PLO agreed to withdraw to Tunisia in August 1982, and Syrian troops would withdraw from Beirut.

Despite this immediate military success, the IDF found itself sinking into a morass of 'operation creep' that led it to reach in two opposing directions for an exit option. Firstly, to its main international backer, the US, in the form of an 800 strong contingent in the Multi-National Force (MNF)[192] that entered Beirut to guarantee the security of the remaining Palestinian refugees and buttress the supposedly renewed Lebanese state. Secondly, to its main client in Lebanon: the Lebanese Forces. On the 23 August 1982, Bashir Gemayel was elected president of the Lebanese republic with the blessing of both Israel and the U.S. Both tactics seriously misjudged the political commitment of Israel's opponents in Lebanon.

On September 14 1982, 22 days before taking office, Bashir Gemayel was killed in a large explosion in the Ashrafieh headquarters of the Kata'ib party and was replaced as President by his brother Amine Gemayel. On October 23 1983, two huge truck bomb explosions destroyed the U.S. Marines barracks and the French Paratrooper barracks in Beirut, killing 299 people. Behind these two actions lay inexhorable logic. The invasion of Lebanon, despite Israel's military victory, did not destroy Israel's opponents but demanded and obtained their deeper engagement in Lebanon. Previously a periphery actor, Iran, since the Islamist revolution in 1979, had seen the Lebanese *Shi'a* as its bridge into the Arab Middle East. Over the next decade it would rise to be a defining arbiter in Lebanese politics through its massive support for the *Shi'a* response to Israel – the revolutionary Islamic guerrilla force Hizballah[193].

Case Two: Sabra and Shatila Massacres

On the morning of September 15, 1982, the Israeli Defence Forces, at the time beseiging West Beirut, moved into the Muslim sectors of the city from the South and the North East. They claimed that their intervention was necessary to avoid Christian retaliation for the killing of Bashir Gemayel. But the IDF also believed that up to 2000 Palestinian guerrilla (*fedayeen*) had remained in Beirut after the evacuation of the 15,000 Palestinian guerrillas between August 21 and September 1. According to the 'Maya Agreement', signed in 1980 by Bashir Gemayel and Ariel Sharon, then the Israeli Minister of Defence, all responsibility for clearing the camps of 'terrorists' in the event of an Israeli invasion was to lie with the LF. This was officially due to their having the expertise and local knowlegde to do this effectively. On the 16th September at 6.00pm, three Lebanese Forces units (150-200 men) under the overall control of Elie Hobeika, the head of LF intelligence, entered the enclosed refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila from the South and West under covering small arms and artillery fire. Elie Hobeika, along with his second in command Asaad Shaftari, remained outside of the camps, stationed on top of a nearby building and in radio communication with the units inside. These were reportedly constituted of recruits from four specific groups: Deb Anastas' 'Military Police', Joseph Edde's 'Black Beret Commandos', Elie Hobeika's 'Special Security Unit', and the 'Damour Brigade' (recruited from members of a Christian village South of Beirut that had been ethnically cleansed in January 1976). Each had been recruited by Hobeika personally, and statements from ranking officers serving in other areas at the time credibly claim ignorance of the operation. Eyewitness accounts of Palestinians report that a few of the militiamen were under the influence of drugs or alchohol and this is confirmed in the

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covered here, for eyewitness accounts see Fisk (2001, 199-401), Lamb (1984), Schiff and Ya'ari (1984, 97-299). For secondary sources see Hanf (1993, 256-264), Jansen (1982).

[191]In pursuit of this goal Israel skirmished briefly with Syrian forces, destroying 100 MIG-23s and MIG-21s, destroyed 20 antiaircraft missile systems, and destroyed around 400 battle tanks, losing in the process only 2-3 aircraft, 1-2 helicopters and around 100 tanks (Sienkiewicz 1985, 85-87).

[192]The MNF consisted of U.S., British, French and Italian forces and intervened twice in Lebanon. The first time beginning August 25th and were withdrawn with haste 18 days later on September 10. After the assassination of Bashir Gemayel and the Sabra and Shatila massacres, for which many blamed the absence of the MNF, they were reinserted and reinforced with an open-ended mandate (cf. Korbani 1991, 79-100).

[193]Whilst many books on Hizballah have been published since 2001 the best are Jaber (1997) and Saad-Ghorayeb (2002), see also articles by Kramer (1990) and Harik (1996).

account of an LF intelligence officer on the scene (Hatem 1999, chpt. 8)[194]. Over the next two days between 460[195] and 3,500 people were killed with guns, knives and hatchets. Whilst the majority were Palestinian a number of Lebanese refugees, mostly *Shi'a*, who had taken shelter in the camps, and other foreigners were caught up in the massacre.

The most reliable documentation of those killed was carried out by Bayan al-Hout, a Lebanese academic, who, using field research carried out between 1983 and 1984, identified 1,390 victims by name, of which 906 were killed and 484 were missing (Hout 2004). The ICRC counted 2,750, the Israeli Mossad between 700-800, and Palestinian sources around 5000. All of these numbers are unreliable as a number of mass graves have never been unearthed. Al-Hout estimates that as many as 3,500 were killed.

Events inside the camps are highly contested and participants in the massacre still do not talk. Nevertheless, certain facts are known. Firstly, that the massacre was most intense around the South-West entrances of the camp (*Le Monde*, 14 February 2001; Fisk 2001). Secondly, that the Israeli army sent up flares during the night of September 16th. Thirdly, that there was only limited evidence of actual combat inside the camps, (Shahid 2002, Fisk 2001), but that two LF soldiers were wounded or killed in the first few hours (Schiff and Ya'ari 1984, 262; Kahan Report 1983). On this point, the testimony of a young Palestinian involved in the resistance asserts that almost all full-time guerrillas had left the camps with the departure of the PLO and that a token resistance was organised by a group of youths using personal and collected weapons (al-Shaikh 1984)[196]. Fourthly, that in the early afternoon of the 17th a much larger group (around 1,200-1,500) of LF arrived at the camp led by the LF's overall military commander, Fouad Abu Nader. At this point, inhabitants began to be escorted towards the Cité Sportive, and bulldozers were requested from the IDF to bury bodies. At the Cité Sportive inhabitants were interrogated by the IDF, with the help of hooded informers, and some subsequently disappeared. The majority of those killed, however, died on the night of the 16th and the morning of the 17th, before the larger LF group arrived. This is confirmed by al-Hout's data in which, using a representative sample of 430 victims, she concludes that 56.51% of the victims died within those six hours of the first day. This is further supported by two independent interviews I conducted with LF members in Beirut (2003), the location of the bodies close to the LF's entrance points to the camp and that by 20.00, two hours after the entrance into the camps, on the 16th the LF liason officer announced to Israeli officers that already about 300 had been killed, "including civilians" (Kahan Report 1983). Many of the dead had been found hiding in the houses and shelters in which they had taken cover and were either killed in house to house searches or were taken outside where the men were executed. After the larger LF group entered the camps the number of abductions compared to executions began to rise. As information of the massacre leaked out, a committee of Israeli officers gave the LF until 5am Saturday morning to leave the camps; however this withdrawal was only completed at 10.00am.

From the testimony of survivors, reports of journalists and independent investigations we can piece together further details. It appears that what began as an intelligence, or combing, operation transformed into a massacre. Eye-witness accounts state that men and women were often seperated (cf. Lamb 1984, 567-8) and that some men, of all ages, were accused of membership in the PRM and were executed in groups. Other men and women were killed more systematically, in houses and in the street. The killing of young children and infants, and rape were also common. A number of the male bodies appear to have been marked on the neck or wrist before being executed (Fisk 2001, 364) whilst those killed in houses were apparently indiscriminately murdered. When news of this events began to leak out to the IDF other units of the LF were summoned to take control, and hide what had taken place. No reports or interviewees suggest that any disciplinary proceedings were held against the LF members involved in the massacre. There is a distinct possibility, furthermore, that although the instigation of the massacre was informal, commanders of the LF saw the massacre as a means of encouraging all Palestinian refugees to leave Lebanon.

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[194] Robert Maroun Hatem, aka Cobra, wrote a vindictive memoir condemning Elie Hobeika's actions during the civil war and the account is not fully credible. However within this report he identifies Maroun Machalaani, the head of the Damour Brigade, as the leader most involved in the massacre.
[195] From the Lebanese army report, 328 Palestinian men, 109 Lebanese men, 7 Syrians, 2 Algerians, 3 Pakistanis and 21 Iranians.
[196] Another reference also notes that whilst these few Palestinian fighters retreated in front of the advance of the LF, civilians, who were hiding in houses and in shelters, didn't. It was civilians, therefore, that bore the brunt of the violence (Schiff and Ya'ari 1984, 264).

Sabra and Shatila has gone down in history as one of the most horrific events of the Lebanese war.

Through two assaults on Christian allies, by 1980 Bashir had created a stable internal powerbase. Although military units were still recuited by locality, the LF was no longer a network of individual militias but was, by 1982, an increasingly integrated military force. Discipline and recruitment were monitored by centrally administered institutions that were able to direct violence according to strategic needs. Operations, as proven by the 1978 and 1980 assaults on Christian allies, obeyed the strategic demands of authority rather than ideology or private motives. This control of force within the Christian canton translated into an increasingly hegemonic regulation of the external environment and the controlled accumulation and distribution of economic revenue. As we will see in the next section, however, the death of Bashir revealed a new reality behind the LF's formal structures. Although the centralisation of authority by Bashir had stripped the Old Guard of much of its authority, it had done so only by empowering a new group of leaders whose authority extended directly from their affiliations and positions within the LF. With Bashir's death the cohesion of this group broke down as each sought to consolidate his position and capture overall control of the organisation.

5.4 1983 – 1986: 'We fight and don't know why': Leadership Competition

As Joel Migdal (2000) has noted war, by rapidly changing social boundaries, can produce unsettling changes not only within institutional arrangements, but also in the relationships between institutions and society. "Boundary flux [caused by war] changes the calculus of incentives; it undoes the understanding of an institution's reach and, with it, the whos, whichs, and whats that provide the parameters for behaviour in the society," (2000, 188). Between 1982 and 1986 the LF and its institutions were forced to drastically realign itself to a changed reality.

In August 1982 the Israeli invasion, the departure of the PLO and the election of Bashir as Lebanese president, granted the Lebanese Forces a whirlwind of relatively costless victories over the PLO, Syrian and Lebanese rivals. For many Christians it allowed them to dream again of the Christian dominance of the Lebanese state within a majority Muslim country – their refuge within the Middle East. Under Bashir's presidency, Lebanon was to be transformed into a federalised system and the LF would be absorbed into the state, providing a praetorian guard for the Maronite presidency[197]. However, within less than a month of his election, these dreams were crushed. Observed objectively, the killing of Bashir Gemayel was a supreme act of political strategy. It severed in one blow all of the linkages that had unified and empowered the Christian community behind the LF and caused massive ripples throughout Lebanon and regionally.

The following epoch of the Lebanese war, from 1982 until 1986, was defined by two concurrent processes. Firstly, the Israeli invasion had altered the front lines established in Lebanon between 1975 and 1982, and upon its withdrawal conflict was reignited within East and West Beirut, the South and in other parts of the country. Secondly, Bashir's death fragmented the legitimate 'Christian' voice between the Lebanese presidency of Amine Gemayel, a reinvigorated Kata'ib party and the Lebanese Forces – all previously represented by Bashir.

These two processes caused a massive expansion of the war system as almost all internal economic flows, social spaces and political powers within Lebanese territory fell under the control of the militias. Whilst the LF, like other militias, had initially been dependent on the support of a community, the reverse now became true. "No civil activity, whether lawful or unlawful, could escape the control of the LF" (Picard 2000, 313). The following section analyses these two processes, and shows how they intertwined to lead to a reformation and recentralistion of the LF under Samir Geagea.

The LF, having avoided direct confrontation with other Lebanese factions since 1977, became involved from 1983 onwards in a series of failed expansionist offensives into Christian areas of the Chouf, the Western Bekaa valley and the South. Using the IDF's occupation of the Chouf Mountains as cover, during 1982-3 the Lebanese Forces had infiltrated an infantry presence into this area, inhabited by both Druze and Christians, but dominated by the Druze Popular Progressive Socialist (PSP) militia. In doing

[197] According to Moumne (1996, 141), referring to an interview conducted with Fouad Abu Nader, this was to be constituted under a "National Guard" units staffed, at least rhetorically, by veterans of all the Lebanese militias.

so, however, a divided Druze population had unified around their fear of the LF, not only with each other but with Syria. In 1982 Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the PSP, demanded the immediate withdrawal of all LF units from the Chouf and threatened an impending war over control of the region. When Israel withdrew its checkpoints in 1983 the simmering tension between these groups erupted into the 'Mountain War'. The LF, without Israeli or Lebanese Army support, fought first to a standstill and then began withdrawing village by village until surrounded in Deir al-Qamar. Within a fortnight of the LF's military defeat the Chouf was cleansed of its Christian inhabitants, who had prior to its arrival lived in relative harmony with their Druze neighbours. In 1983 alone more than one hundred thousand displaced persons moved into the Christian zone after being expelled from the Chouf Mountains.

This defeat was not solely military, but also political. Whilst Bashir had created a corporate identity for the LF, defined by a grassroots rejection of the traditional order, his death had reempowered the 'Old Guard'. Many powerful members in the political parties and state wished to replace the LF with a renewed Christian controlled presidency. Amine Gemayel, Bashir's traditionalist brother, who was elected to the presidency with the backing of the *za'im* class, became the prime agent of this policy. Between 1982 and 1985 the Kata'ib leadership and Amine cooperated in repeatedly outmanoeuvring LF leaders. Firstly, by taking possession of the LF's centralised treasury, the National Fund (*sunduq al-watani*), and by forcing the LF to surrender control of Beirut's fifth harbour to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Secondly, by forcing the LF's new commander in chief, Fadi Frem, to surrender the LF's positions in East Beirut to the LAF. Thirdly, by rejecting Bashir's original plans for absorbing the LF into the LAF and by severing ties with Israel. And finally, by not honouring previous promises to replace LF units in the Chouf with LAF units prior to the Israeli withdrawal. On October 31st 1983, the Saudi Government arranged a Lebanese conference of 'National Reconciliation' which met in Geneva. The Lebanese Forces were not invited to the conference. President Amine Gemayel, in an act indicative of his stance, invited instead the heads of the Lebanese Front, Pierre Gemayel and Camille Chamoun, ignoring in the process the very real decline in authority these figures had undergone in the last five years.

These actions, coordinated by traditionalist politicians controlling Lebanon's formal party and state institutions, created tremendous resentment amongst LF veterans, particularly those who were not Kata'ib party members. These pressures reached boiling point when in 1984 two further events severed the ties between the LF and Lebanon's traditional elite. The first was Amine Gemayel's final outmanoeuvring of the LF and his use of supporters within the Kata'ib to have his nephew, Fouad Abu Nader, appointed to replace Fadi Frem as the Commander-General of the LF. Though a respected military leader the nepotism of this act disgusted many of the LF's grass-roots supporters. The second, was the death on August 29th 1984 of Pierre Gemayel of a heart attack at the age of 79, and his replacement with Elie Karameh as president of the Kata'ib party. 'Sheikh Pierre', as he had been known, was the doyen of the conservative movement in Lebanon and one of the few members of the old elite who had maintained authority over the LF, partly through his son but equally through his own great personal charisma. Until his death he had participated in all of the festivals and celebrations of the LF.

The crushing defeat in the Chouf left many blaming Amine Gemayel for not supporting the LF with LAF units and for rejecting a compromise with Israel. Samir Geagea publicly announced his frustration with what was seen as the reassertion of patriarchal politics and prepared a rejectionist trend within the LF. Shortly afterwards, the Lebanese Armed Forces, seeking to establish control of West Beirut, was forced to withdraw to East Beirut after assaults lauched simultaneously by the *Shi'a Amal* (Hope) militia and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) militia. First *Shi'a* and then Druze units deserted, and the U.S. $1 billion of military aid provided by the USA (Corm 1994, 218) found its way into the stockpiles of the militias. Lebanon's capital was once again divided and Amine's project was visibly in ruins. In February and March 1984 the British, French and Italian units of the Multi-National Force, unwilling to lose further troops in a Lebanese civil war, withdrew.

The successes of Amine and the Kata'ib were not solely the result of their strength but a signal of the LF's disarray. Without Bashir's charismatic legitimacy and authority the façade of the LF's much vaunted institutionalisation had become tarnished and the political comprises established within the LF between 1976 and 1982 began to collapse. Throughout the defeat in the Chouf, it became apparent that the LF had replaced a coalition of militias with a network of powerful individuals who were now able to use their positions to carve out realms of tremendous authonomy within the LF leadership. Powerful leaders, most importantly Elie Hobeika and Samir Geagea, concerned with Amine Gemayel's policies

set about reinforcing their existing fiefdoms within the organisation – cultivating private resource flows, securing control of military force and reinforcing overseas connections independently of the central structure. Functional differentiation within the organisation meant that each was best able to do this within certain fields – Elie Hobeika through his personal 'empire' within the intelligence services of the LF whilst Samir Geagea focused on consolidating the LF fighting elite, composed of 1,500 – 2,000 troops recruited from the Lebanese expelled from the North. By 1985, Fouad Abu Nader found himself at the head of an organisation that no longer had central control over either finance or security.

The rejectionist strand within the LF leadership required not only a shift in organistional power but equally the reinvention of a political goal for the LF with which to unify LF combatants now bereft of the vision of a return to the 'old' Lebanon. As Samir Geagea pointed out in an interview with el-Amal:

> The Lebanese Forces today are in a state of loss… they suffer from blurred political vision and the absence of a political program…. The fighter has become today uncertain of his political orientation… The absence of 'the Leader' [Bashir Gemayel] is one of the reasons of this state of loss[198].

Amine legitimised his actions with an appeal to the 'Bashir project' of confessional coexistence, the expulsion of international forces from Lebanese soil and the reestablishment of the Lebanese state. The LF leaders, on the other hand, began to legitimise their actions through an increasingly spiritualist appeal to a Christian and separatist discourse (cf. Phares 1995) that had long existed amongst extremist elements and the Christian population. Samir Geagea, a genuinely ascetic figure, could quietly point at the repeated failure of the Lebanese state, the defeats and massacres of the Chouf, the rise of an Iranian funded Islamic fundamentalism and the increasing influence of Syria when rallying support for an ill-defined Christian 'entity' that could at least guarantee Christian security in Lebanon (Sneifer-Perri 1995, 75-92). Within this transformation Bashir's 'project' was replaced with Bashir's *rissala*, a quasi-spiritual mission to lead the Christians to salvation. His reality replaced with a sanctification of his martyrdom as a powerful symbol of the LF's vocation (Hage 1992). This discourse, clashed with that of the Kata'ib and the pre-war Christian elite who had recognised that the refuge found by Christians in Lebanon had depended upon coexistence, not separation, with regional powers and Lebanon's other confessions. Amine Gemayel, Patriarch Antoine Khreich, Abbot Boulos Na'aman and prominent Christian families refused to support this ideology and the clique that promoted it. However, it was embraced by a new generation[199] of militiamen, many of whom had little knowledge of pre-war Lebanon and after a decade of fighting and dying for the LF rejected the Gemayel's feudal transfer of power within the family.

What this ideology disguised was, however, the chilling pragmatism of certain LF leaders, particularly Elie Hobeika. Hobeika controlled a diffuse network of informers and security men dependent on him personally. At one point there were twenty-six security agencies operating within the Christian canton, almost all of which had been co-opted and subverted by Hobeika's network[200]. These networks were used as willingly against Christian rivals as external opponents and extended throughout Lebanon. Interviewees described Hobeika as a distinct creation of the war; a man, without pre-war connections to the traditional political class, who had risen to power through conspiracy and extreme violence. He tapped the phones of LF leaders, threatened members of the *Za'im* and would off-handedly dismiss rivals in meetings[201]. Hobeika's fellow commanders knew very little of the extent of his authority, particularly the negotiations he carried out independently of the central command council with foreign states. Furthermore, Hobeika was not bereft of military force. Since 1978, in the process of suppressing the 'undisciplined elements', he had purposively recruited a series of local leaders and 'indisciplined elements' into his networks arguing that they posed less danger under him than outside the organisation. As can be seen from the case of Sabra and Shatila, these forces could, when necessary be used to serve his military ends.

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[198] *El-Amal*, 1 January 1984.
[199] In 1989 the average age of LF members was only 31, *Le Nouvelle Reveil* (Beirut), 15 January 1989.
[200] Interview with Asaad Chaftari, Beirut, November 2003.
[201] Interview with Charles Chartouny, Beirut, October 2003.

The Intifadah - March 12 1985 - January 15 1986:

The trigger for the resultant conflict between LF leaders was the decision by the Kata'ib party to support LAF demands that Samir Geagea remove his lucrative road block at Barbara. This roadblock offered by far the most profitable enterprise controlled directly by Geagea and the revenues equipped and maintained his troops. He refused and was expelled from the Kata'ib party[202]. In response on March 12 1985, Samir Geagea and Elie Hobeika ordered their troops against those loyal to Abu Nader. Within a few hours Abu Nader called a ceasefire and the diumvirate controlled all of East Beirut except Ashrafieh and North Metn, which was still in the hands of Abu Nader and Amine Gemayal respectively. Indicative of the nature of authority within the LF Nader also maintained control of his birthplace Ghazir in Kessrouan. The coup removed Kata'ib influence from the decision-making and coordination of the militia and consolidated the LF's independence from the presidency.

For the next few months, whilst unified within a collegial decision making body, Hobeika and Geagea, each with markedly different political styles and backgrounds, continually competed within the LF for political advantage. In mid-1985 Hobeika successfully outmanoeuvred Geagea, blaming him for a military defeat near Sidon at Iklim al-Kharrub[203], and was voted in as sole Commander in Chief. Hobeika, however, found himself alienated within the FL, unwilling to trust anyone apart from his internal networks, he himself was not trusted by even supposedly loyal supporters, and was popularly isolated by his political direction. In December 1985, Hobeika, supposedly in reaction to a security review acknowledging LF weakness in the face of the Syrian army[204], signed the Tripartite agreement with the PSP and *Amal* with Syria's blessing. This agreement went directly against the anti-Syrian discourse that lay at the heart of the Christian nationalist rhetoric used by Geagea and Hobeika in justifying the Intifada.

Samir Geagea replied by making an alliance with a coalition of forces that opposed Hobeika. Six groups were ranked against Hobeika when Samir Geagea led a rebellion against him on January 15 1986: the *za'im* and traditionalist leaders, the Phalange old guard, Amine Gemayel's personal troops in Metn Nord ('Brigade 75'), local Kata'ib forces distanced by 12 March 1985 uprising and Samir Geagea's personal troops. Four battle groups, comprising both Geagea's loyal LF and 'Brigade 75' forces, were launched against Hobeika's HQ in Tabarja under the command of Nader Succar.

Between 1982 and 1986 the Lebanese Forces went through a series of transformations. Firstly, as Israel reduced its support after the Sabra and Shatila massacre and Amine Gemayel's refusal to sign an Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty, the LF increased its local extraction. The taxation, tariffs and illegal trade expanded to provide militia leaders with ample sources of revenue, whilst in 1982 the state deficit rocketed to 71% of estimated actual expenditure (Makdisi 2004, 54). Similarly, as had the IDPs from Northern Lebanon, the refugees from the Chouf and Sidon provided an immediate supply of recruits. These 'refugee units', increasingly formed the hard core of the LF. Isolated from and foreign to the surrounding community in the Christian canton, often personally victims of violence from other militias and impoverished, many became incredibly loyal to their immediate commanders. Furthermore, most, alienated from the peacetime elite of a Lebanon of which they had little knowledge, vehemently rejected the attempt to force the LF out of politics by the 'Old Guard' of Lebanese politics. As a result, however, by 1986 the LF found itself in an ironic situation. With plentiful resources and recruits but with no clear political direction the Lebanese Forces became functionally autonomous from its social origins. Samir Geagea would lead the LF into a process of extensive bureaucratisation and professionalisation, however one that failed precisely because it had lost its primary reason for existence – the defence of the Christian community.

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[202] One of the motives for this action was that Samir Geagea had, in defiance of Fuad Abu Nader, been negotiating independently with the separate leaders of the LF's central military units. Ironically, and yet typically, both the Kata'ib and Fuad had consulted Elie Hobeika before taking this action considering him an ally in their opposition to Geagea.

[203] The events of Iklim al-Kharrub were remarkably similar to those of the Chouf. Facing an IDF withdrawal back to the lines of its 'security zone' the LF had infiltrated central infantry units to support the locally recruited LF of the area. This led in turn to clashes between the LF and a PSP-Amal-Palestinian alliance. The LF was defeated and the Christian populations of the surrounding area withdrew to Jezzine.

[204] Interview with Asaad Chaftari, Beirut, November 2003.

5.5 1986 – 1991: Centralisation and Warlordisation: Samir Geagea

Between 1986 and 1988, under Samir Geagea the Lebanese Forces completed the processes of autonomisation and domination, achieving a level of bureaucratic centralisation unmatched by any other militia in Lebanon. The determinant factor was that rather than institutionalisation being shaped by competing networks Samir Geagea controlled a single network that had established the means of almost complete autonomy from the community itself. Roget Dib, a management consultant, was brought in to centralise and formalise LF accounting and budgeting. An officer's school, teaching both military and academic disciplines, was established and all combatants refusing to be rehabilitated through attendance were dismissed or demoted. Large numbers of Geagea supporters, mostly from North of Lebanon, were appointed to high-ranking positions. Dissatisfied local forces that refused rehabilitation were absorbed into a 'Popular Defence' force (*difa'a as-shaabi*) of around 18,000 men. These forces received benefits through LF social insurance programs and some local influence but they were effectively excluded from exerting genuine power. Similarly, January 1986 saw the reformation of the Lebanese Front as a body that could represent the interests of the political parties and Christian community to the LF, without, however, having any power over decision making or appointments within LF institutions themselves.

This thorough institutionalisation of the LF consolidated the internal authority of Samir Geagea. It also, however, isolated the LF from the Christian community of the canton in which it acted (Marchal 1997). Geagea led a militia by now largely recruited from the refugees and IDPs of the war, with its core coming from the mountain areas of the Akkar. These recruits had lost their livelihoods and had no chance of returning and were fiercely loyal to the LF. Samir Geagea, not trusting Beiruti recruits, used his personal troops to patrol East Beirut. After an unsuccessful rebellion in August 1986 by the LF old-guard and an invasion of Elie Hobeika from across the Green Line in September 1986, he furthermore instigated security networks staffed by non-Beiruti's to round up individuals believed to be loyal to Christian rivals. The LF in 1988 became a closed organisation highly efficient in military action but staffed by 'foreigners' that purposively excluded and discriminated against local forces and Beiruti civilians. The LF no longer fulfilled its own discursive *raison d'etre*.

If the LF between 1975 and 1976 was parasitic on the Christian community, and had progressed, between 1977 and 1982 to a symbiotic relationship with the community, from 1986 until 1988 the LF dominated the Christian canton. The professionalisation and formalisation of the LF had occurred without offering a genuine political project that could reproduce its previous legitimacy. Political symbolism relied on a transcendental focus on Christianity, Samir Geagea as a prophetic leader and the value of Bashir's virtuous sacrifice. This rang hollow to many that had suffered and learnt during 15 years of war. When an interviewer, in 1989, asked in what sense the LF under Samir Geagea was the continuation of the 'Christian Resistance'?[205] The answer should have have been that it was not. Before 1982, the Christian camp had rallied behind the LF against a Palestino-Muslim opponent that after the Israeli invasion was no longer there. On the 21 August 1982 the Palestinian *fedayeen* had embarked for Tunisia, followed on the 27 August by Syrian soldiers leaving for the Bekaa. After the defeat in the Chouf and then around Sidon, the signing of the Tripartite agreement by Elie Hobeika and the death of Bashir, "notre guerre" was increasingly seen as "guerre pour les autres" (Kovacs 1998, 329-40). As in other civil wars (Geffray 1990) the Christian community in Lebanon, increasingly isolated from the LF, realised that the institutional self-interest of the militia and its leaders had been elevated above the interests of those it supposedly represented.

Michel Aoun, Commander of the Army since 1984 and elected president in September 1988, was in some ways the mirror of Geagea. He was no *za'im* discredited by the descent into war but had political authority; he was not a militia leader but controlled military force, he was a Christian that opposed both Syrian and Israeli presence on Lebanese soil. Perhaps, more importantly, like the most successful military leaders during the civil war; he offered a voice for those who had remained voiceless since the final collapse of the state. Aoun announced that he intended to end the war, expel all foreign troops and dismantle the control of all militias. In February 1989 he used the army against the LF to force the return of the Beirut port to state control. Shortly after he declared war on Syria. In winter 1989-90, facing imminent defeat in a multipronged attack, he called many thousands of ordinary Lebanese, forgotten by the likes of Geagea, those who did not control violence, to show their support for him in a

[205] *La Nouvelle Reveil* (Beirut), 15 January 1989

demonstration outside the presidential palace. For weeks a non-violent human shield was formed around Ba'abda against which neither the militias nor the Syrians were willing to fire.

The LF and the Lebanese army, long competitors for resources and strategy turned at that point on each other (Phares 1995, 165-8; Salem 1991) when the army's forces seized a school that the LF had transformed several years earlier into barracks for its Popular Defence Units. In response, the Lebanese Forces launched simultaneous successful counter assaults against garrisons and bases down the coast and attempted to encircle Aoun's units in East Beirut[206]. A UN report accounted for 1,500 killed, 3,500 wounded, 25,000 houses damaged and 300 industrial complexes damaged. Furthermore the conflict caused a 50% devaluation of the Lebanese Lira and around $1 billion left the country (quoted in Laurent 1991, 89).

This was the last act of the Lebanese war. Exhausted and with the dawn of a new era internationally, the various Lebanese factions found that they had more to gain through the institutionalisation of their wartime authority in a peaceful compromise, than could be gained through violence. The civil war was ended with the implementation of the Ta'if agreement passed by the remaining members of the Lebanese parliament on the 23rd October 1989. In the opinion of this author, the devastation of these fifteen years of war are best captured not in a calculation of mortality or economic losses, but in a study carried out by Mona Maksoud, director of psychosocial research for the Children and War Project at Columbia University in New York. According to Maksoud, 90.3% of the sample of children had been exposed to shelling or combat, 68.4% had been displaced from their homes, 54.5% had experienced extreme poverty, 50.3% had witnessed violent acts such as the intimidation, injury or death of someone close to them, 26.0% had lost someone close to them, and 21.3% had been separated from their families (Anderson 1999, 94).

[206]Within the fighting forces Theodor Hanf in his definitive analysis of the civil war notes that the LFs losses were three to four times as high as those of the army (1993, 600-1)



Abbildung 8: Map 5: Military Control of Lebanon mid-1990
Source: Hanf (1993, 606)

The Lebanese Forces went through four stages of organisational change between 1975-1990. The first period, between 1975 and 1977, was an inchoate and disorganised mobilisation of militias concerned with the defence of the Christian region. The second period, between 1977 and 1982, saw the rise of Bashir Gemayel and the institutionalisation of the LF's regulation of recruitment, its control of resources and its enforcement of discipline within the organisation. During this period the central organisation of the LF faced down two rivals within the Christian community, the *Marada* militia, dominant in North Lebanon and controlled by the Frangieh family, and the NLP militia in East Beirut. The third period, between 1982 and 1986, began with the assassination of Bashir Gemayel and the fragmentation of the Christian voice between the LF, as the main military actor of the Christian community, and pre-war political elites, represented in the Kata'ib party and the Presidency. This period ended with the emergence of Samir Geagea as the formal and *de facto* leader of the LF. Between 1986 and 1990, Samir Geagea established his control throughout the organisation, relying on the refugees created by the war and the LF's hegemony within East Beirut to create an organisation that was autonomous from all of the forces within Lebanon, including the Christian community. This period ended with the war between the LF and the Lebanese army, seeking to re-establish its control, and the negotiated settlement of the war.

5.6 Conclusion

The Lebanese Forces was formed around the communal mobilisation that resulted from the outbreak of civil war and the breakdown of law and order. But it persisted by developing institutional interests in maintaining its own autonomy security and survival. In the process of protecting these interests, however, the LF isolated itself progressively from the state and its communal base. Firstly, by confronting the older class of political leaders from whom it sought political autonomy; secondly, by confronting the new militia leaders empowered by the civil war, from whom it sought military autonomy; and finally by confronting the Christian community of Lebanon, considered a security threat, from whom it sought 'social' autonomy. In the process of consolidating their control of military force, these new leaders sidelined the non-violent political leaders of their community as well as the civil society actors and the majority of the population that did not desire violence. The war left the majority of the population with no means of redress or voice against the militia.

This process could be defined, from the top-down, as a redefinition of leadership endogenous to civil war. Whilst the pre-war elite sought to control the LF, as Reno suggested, they considered it a military organisation for the expression of individual or party policy, and the war as a Clausewitzian militarization of politics. The LF on the other hand, developed into an organisation expressing the opinions and power of a new generation who had emerged with the breakdown of the traditional order. These were the combatants, but more importantly the commanders and representatives that through their military force, and international connections, became the 'war elite' of Lebanon. Their authority was rooted not in legitimacy, but in coercion – they were the pure creations of war. These 'war leaders' controlled physical force rather than party organisations, political respect or tested political programs. Through their actions, the self-propelling dynamics of the initial descent into violence were institutionalised in the structures of the Lebanese Forces whose primary function was the efficient wielding of violence. But in the process, they lost sight of the original political objectives, and the means became the end as they sought to repoliticise the military struggle after the death of Bashir Gemayel. By the mid-1980s the LF was an organisation without a clear political program. As a result, the short-term demands of war, for security and power, overrode political considerations and the LF found itself, at the peak of its military capacity, isolated and illegitimate.

This process was a prolonged competition over the redefinition of leadership and the scope and depth of authority in times of war. The initial violence instigated with a, perhaps, naïve enthusiasm destroyed the social and political institutions of Lebanon. It was followed by an extremely slow reconstruction of authority within the institutions of the LF. One of the constant frictions in this reconstruction was not the LF's military opponents, but its supposed ally, the state. Jealous of its sovereignty, the state resented the LF's autonomy at any time in which it was partially resurrected from the flames of war: the tension over the LF's establishment of a draft; the constant tension over the control over tariffs from the ports and at the Barbara crossing; the conflict over the determination of military strategy; the political conflict between Amine Gemayel's presidency and the LF and finally the war between Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea are just a few of the most evident examples of this conflict.

Shortly before the Ta'if agreement was signed in Saudi Arabia, a coup in Khartoum brought to power

the National Islamic Front, a party who would use militias not just to fight a civil war but to capture the state and revolutionise society.

6 The 'Popular Defence Forces': From Political Militia to Rural Rebellion

Sudanese youth are fighting in the war zone, while other youths in the world are busy with discos and parties. We thank God that we have prepared these youths as the future of Sudan. God is Great.

President Omar al-Bashir, eleventh Anniversary speech to the PDF, June 2000

As in Lebanon, the mobilisation of militant collective action was not a new phenomenon in Sudan. Since the birth of the nationalist movement, in the early 20th century (Holt 2000, 123-143; Abdin 1985, 52-76), it had often been a strategy used by political parties competing against a traditional elite opposed to institutional reform (cf. Sanderson 1989). Popular uprisings and coup d'etats have been used in at least three attempts to seize power[207], and multiple rebellions in the South have demanded social justice and development. Rarely before the 1980s, however, had the state resorted to this strategy or delegated its authority to militias[208]. Militias were formed only when a second civil war, beginning in 1983, coincided with a military, fiscal, and executive crisis that constricted the *de facto* boundaries of state competence.

The Sudanese civil war is a story of evolving stalemate in conditions of extreme scarcity. Since 1983, the civil war in Sudan has cost an estimated US$1-3 million per day and halted the exploitation of lucrative natural resources, e.g. oil. By 2004 around 3,700,000 Sudanese were internally displaced[209] and up to 2,300,000 had been killed or died because of the effects of war (cf. Burr 1998). According to some stastistics, over 80% of Southern Sudanese are refugees or internally displaced (Adar 2000, 18). In 2003, around 500,000 were refugees in neighbouring countries[210]. Whilst neither Khartoum nor most urban areas have been involved in fighting, the civil war in Sudan has delegitimised and crippled the state.

As a result, as resources have been exhausted, without either side gaining decisive advantage, political-military leaders have resorted to increasingly short-term and destructive strategies of mobilisation and

[207] In March 1970, the Sudanese government, backed by Egyptian airpower, suppressed a rebellion on Aba Island involving various parties but led by the followers of the *Ansar* Brotherhood . In July 1976, a coalition of political militias trained and equipped in Libya were smuggled into Western Sudan and launched a complicated coup attempt against the autocratic regime of Jaafar Nimieri. In April 1985 an *Intifada* (popular uprising), directed by supporters of left wing and religious political parties, forced General Nimieri out of power. This latter act has maintained a particular importance within Sudanese political imagination.

[208] The tradition of delegating local policing operations to tribes was, however, inherited from colonial tactics (cf. Willis 2000) of indirect rule; 'loyal tribes' were rewarded with rights and positions for their aid in suppressing recalcitrant neighbours in a system of rural governance maintained by subsequent Sudanese governments. For example, a local guard force (*haras el- watan*) was established amongst the Southern tribes during the first civil war (1955-1972). They were, however, rarely armed and unlike the militias of the 1990s served largely as a network of informants for the army (Alier 1992, 278).

[209]Sudan IDPs Summary Table January 2004, UN STARBASE Population Report, http://www.unsudanig.org/STARBASE/statistics/Statistical-reports/North/Population/IDP-Summary-Table-1.pdf, (accessed 16/02/05.) For a history of IDPs and the responses of both the combatants and the international community see Ruiz (1998).

21021 Apr 2005 (IRIN), 'UN refugee agency highlights needs of IDPs from south and Darfur', http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=46740&SelectRegion=East_Africa&SelectCountry=SUDAN (accessed April 2005).

extraction to fuel attrition warfare[211]. The formation of militias was a fundamental element of these strategies.

Tab. 8: Table 8: Sudanese Refugees in Neigbouring countries

Source: United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2003 Statistical Yearbook[212]

Year	Uganda	Ethiopia	Kenya	Democratic Republic of Congo	Other
1994	180,000	51,800	27,194	111,872	34,178
1998	189,840	58,580	48,162	31,100	53,630
2003	198,280	94,899	63,197	45,060	94,805

Whilst a previous civil war in Sudan, the 'Anya Nya I' rebellion (1955-1972), preserved, to a degree, the local equilibrium between ethnic groups; in the second civil war political factions, in the SPLA and the government, have exploited and polarised ethnic affiliations and religious identities. As a result, the multi-ethnic social order of Sudan has been savaged, and the Southern and Northern blocs have fragmented along regional lines. By December 2004, the Government of Sudan (GoS) was fighting in the West, East, and South against forces whose social complexity belie categorisation as just Muslim, Christian, African or Arab, Northern or Southern (Johnson 2003, 127-143). The result has been the destruction, throughout large parts of rural Sudan, of institutionalised life. Not state collapse, but social collapse; as society, the economy and the ecosystem, have been plundered to fuel internecine violence.

This chapter will look at the processes of this war system, by analysing the Popular Defence Forces, particularly its origins and its institutionalisation within the civil war[213].

6.1 The Sudanese Civil War and the Popular Defence Forces

The development of this war system can be described as a two stage process. In the first stage (1983-1991), the SPLA extended its control rapidly throughout rural Southern Sudan before faltering at the Transitional Areas and Equatoria. In the second stage (1991-2003) inconclusive contestation of these regions led to extremely brutal seasonal campaigns, aerial bombardments and ethnic tactics of 'divide and conquer'. In this stage, the government increasingly substituted the regular army with military, self-defence and political militias.

The history of the Popular Defence Forces can be divided into four periods. The first, between 1985 and 1989, was characterised by the mobilisation of counter-insurgency militias amongst Arab nomads from Western Sudan. The second, from 1989-1992, saw the institutionalisation of these militias into a

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[211]Bulloch (1996) argues convincingly that counter-insurgency can, and has, regularly been fought using the principles of attrition warfare, often considered only to be relevant to conflicts between state armies. Attrition counter-insurgency warfare is characterised by a focus on military rather than political means, and the use of repression, reconcentration of populations and the capture and control of territory to subdue insurgents. It goes without saying that such tactics are both extremely costly and often produce an escalating and indiscriminate use of firepower that benefits the insurgent. See Sheehan (1989, 267-387 for a description of the perverse incentives that led to the use of attrition strategy by the US army against the Vietcong in Vietnam.

212http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics/opendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=41d2c19a0&page=statistics (accessed July 2005).

[213]The Sudanese civil war has been fought between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army since 1983. Within this conflict minor factions have repeatedly changed sides (i.e. SPLA-United led by Riek Macher and the so called Nasir Faction led by Lam Akol); different ideological regimes have taken control in Khartoum (Arab Nationalist, democratic and then Islamist); and multiple client militias (i.e. Anya Nya II, Equatoria Defence Force) and tribal forces (Baggara, Fertit, Nuer, etc…) have fought along side the main actors. Unlike Lebanon, the fluidity between these factions and organistions, the lack of reliable documentation and the prevalence of internal fragmentation makes it extremely difficult to even identify cohesive actors within the conflict.

national paramilitary force subordinate to and defending an ideological and authoritarian regime. In the third stage, from 1992-1997, the Popular Defence Forces expanded in capacity through the mass mobilisation of the Sudanese nation, using an extremist Islamist rhetoric and the manipulation of local resource conflicts. During this period the PDF became a network of militias and large PDF campaigns were mounted in the furtherance of the armed conflict as a *jihad*. The fourth period, between 1997 and 2003, is defined by internal conflict within the ruling coalition, the re-emergence of the institutional authority of the state, and an increasing side-lining of the PDF. This final phase witnesses the almost complete integration of the PDF into the military hierarchy.

This chapter outlines the history of the PDF following this fourfold division (see table 9). Part one outlines the antecedent organisations of the PDF, the tribal militias formed in the 1980s. Part two focuses on the founding of the PDF as an instrument of Islamic revolution. Part three captures the dynamics of the PDF as a network of locally recruited political and self-defence units. Part four follows the PDF's decline as the the state itself turned upon the organisation and sought to limit its activities.

Due to the tremendous difficulties of gathering data on the Northern Sudanese war machinery, the material presented here often focuses on the elite and organisational changes within the PDF.

6.2 1985-1989: Guerrilla Warfare and Tribal Mobilisation

After its formation in 1983, small mobile units of the SPLA carried out raids on police outposts and grand infrastructure projects. These were not only military operations, but recruitment and equipment campaigns intended to capture weaponry and publicise the existence of the rebellion. Despite its Socialist rhetoric, the SPLA's support relied less on political indoctrination (Young 2002, 111-115; Johnson 1998, 54), than on the mobilisation of Southern anger provoked by decades of exploitation, corruption and underdevelopment. By the mid-1980s, however, the SPLA began to expand its area of operations outside of Southern Sudan into areas that were not exclusively populated by Southerners, and by 1986 it began a series of incursions beyond the Bahr al-Arab/Kiir river into areas considered by the government to be Northern territory (Simone 1994, 55).

Tab. 9: Table 9: Chronological Summary of the Popular Defence Forces

	1985-1989	*1989-1992*	*1992-1997*	*1997-2003*
Recruits	Baggara nomads Ex-Armed Forces officers	Tribal Militias NIF Party Militants	All men between 16-45 forced for training; Volunteers	Volunteers
Strategic Orientation	Local Defence Forces	Pretorian Guard	Jihad	Support of Sudanese Armed Forces
Tactical	Small tribal groups	Tribal militia Urban security force	Formation of large PDF companies Rural defence units	Army reserve and support staff
Ideological Orientation	Local; UMMA loyalists	Islamist	Islamist	Nationalist
Political Goal	Support of Umma party	Defence of NIF regime	Islamification of Society	None
Military Coordinator	General Burma Fadlallah Nasser	Abu Gisseisa	Various	Ali Karti
Political Leader	Umma Party	Hassan al-Turabi	Hassan al-Turabi	None
Location	Transitional Areas	Khartoum; Transitional Areas	Northern Sudan	

These Transitional Areas of Sudan, most importantly the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and Blue Nile, are multi-ethnic territories defined by histories of co-operation and conflict. They are regions shared by Arab and African tribal groups managing an ecosystem providing simultaneously for pastoralists and farmers (cf. Deng 2000). The former, ranging from the fully nomadic to the transhumant, migrate in a complex seasonal tide without which their cattle would die during the dry season. These migrations are layered within a complex social-ecological chronology that allows multiple usages of the same land; for example, it ensures that harvesting and grazing occur at different times. In the far North, closest to the desert expanses of the Sahara, camel herders, such as the *Hamar,* migrate southwards into South Kordofan. Further South the cow-herding *Rizeigat*, *Misseriya*, and smaller Arab groups, collectively known as the *Baggara* (cow herders), move with their cattle from South Darfur and South Kordofan into the majority Ngok Dinka areas around the Bahr al-Arab/Kiir river and the *Ruweng*, *Twic* and *Raik* Dinka areas in Northern Upper Nile and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal provinces.

Over time this material reciprocity between these different communities was institutionalised through inter-ethnic alliances, intermarrying, defensive pacts and symbiotic exchanges of goods. These created numerous strong ties between communities and individuals that broke up ethnic divisions in favour of the gains of cooperation[214]. However, these migrations have also produced conflict: tribal wars, revenge-killings, cattle raiding and hostage-taking of women and children. These were most common when ecological, demographic or political changes required the renegotiation of access to shared resources. The redrawing of boundaries, the allocation of nomadic trails, the returning of abductees and the satisfaction of blood-money (*diiya*) all took place at large seasonal conferences regulated by tribal leaders seeking to maintain the dynamic and profitable stability between groups[215]. Such mechanisms have proved extremely resilient. During the 1955-1972 civil war, despite tension, unarmed *Baggara* were able to continue to seasonally migrate into the Dinka grazing lands in Bahr al-Ghazal. Hostilities between the groups were occasional but the economic interrelations between the two ethnicities and even between the *Baggara* and the Anya Nya rebel forces[216] demanded cooperation.

In 1985, when the SPLA moved into the Transitional Areas, Arab tribes were already caught in a scissor effect. On one hand, the devastating Sahelian drought of the 1980s was forcing earlier migrations than in previous decades. On the other hand, the expansion of mechanised farming throughout Kordofan had reduced the levels of available resources (de Waal 1997, 93-98; Keen 1994). Independently of the war, water and grazing shortages had led to escalating violence as *Baggara* fought for access or preyed on Southern resources for survival. Between 1984 and 1987, SPLA commands skirmished with a number of *Baggara* raiding parties and migratory groups on the border of Bahr al-Ghazal, Southern Darfur and Southern Kordofan. In response the SPLA established local defence committees and Dinka communities pushed the pastoralists back from their borders. Simultaneously, after encountering foraging raids from SPLA units unwilling to pillage from Southerners, the *Baggara* began purchasing modern automatic weapons from the overflowing Chadian arms market[217] to defend their cattle[218].

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[214]This socially constructed system of land regulation creates what Alex de Waal (2005) has termed a 'moral geography' unifying customary and economic institutions throughout much of Sudan.
[215]Certain of these chiefs achieved almost mythical status for their justice, wisdom and relationships with their peers; for example that between the Misseriya Nazir Babo Nimr, and the Ngok Dinka Makok Deng in the early 20th century. Or between Chief Arop Biong of the Dinka, and 'Azoza' of the Missiriyya Humr who, to halt slave raids in the area in the 19th century, bled themselves and ritually established kinship ties that are still recognised today by their descendents (cf. Deng 2000, 137-156).
[216]The Anya Nya I (distinguished from Anya Nya II, a Southern militia operational in the second civil war), unlike the SPLA, was predominantly formed of highly localised groups (Eprile 1974, 97-99; Wakosan 1984) who were more likely to defend the inter-tribal peace vital to their own and their families livelihoods. Similar initiatives emerged between the Nuba brigades of the SPLA and local Arab tribes, and resulted in a number of peace treaties between Baggara, Dinka/Nuba and SPLA, about which more will be said later.
[217]Sudan's Western Darfur province has frequently hosted Chadian rebel groups with ties to cross border tribal groups such as the Zaghawa. These ethnic groups have provided a conduit for a trade in weapons that have crossed and recrossed the border fueling the repeated civil wars in each country (cf. Balencie et al. 1999, 481-514; 2005, 171).
[218]Interview with ex-military officer and Umma party leader, Khartoum, January 2003.

These tensions escalated as the SPLA increased its area of operations into Kordofan. In July 1985 a surprise attack by a SPLA advance unit on al-Gardud village in Southern Kordofan killed 60 and wounded 82 Misseriya Arabs[219]. Unwilling to redeploy the army, the Misseriya[220] Minister of Defence, Major General Fadlallah Burma Nasir, began distributing modern weaponry to the *Misseriya-Humr* and *Rizeigat*[221].

Mubarak al-Fadl, an Umma party stalwart largely seen as the architect of the militia policy in the 1980s, relied on both personal and political national networks to equip the *Baggara*. Acting without the authorisation of the national Constituents Assembly, Umma partisans in the local administration and security forces transferred weapons and ammunition to South Kordofan. Locally, distribution was organised under ‘Ali Nimr el Muglad, the paramount chief of the Misseriya (AC 1986 27, 10), using the existing native adminstration tribal structures. Tribal *Nazirs* (roughly chief) and *Omdas* (sub-chief) collected weapons and distributed them to the *Baggara*[222]. Local Umma militants, such as the merchant and party leader Abdel Rahman Abu al-Basher in Kadugli, coordinated with military intelligence who, in turn, maintained contact with the Minister of Defence General Nasser during the Transitional Military Council period (1985-6). During the parliamentary period between 1986-9, Misseriya Umma party stalwarts took control, more overtly, of the Ministry of State, Ministry of the Interior, and the governorship in the Nuba Mountains in Kordofan province (African Rights 1995). In a region in which their influence was traditionally strong, Umma-supporting *Baggara* were appointed to the military command of the 18th Brigade stationed in South Kordofan and to Military Intelligence in the same region.

These early militias recruited from two constituencies: recent migrants to urban areas, and impoverished nomads without cattle. Modern rifles were mostly given to the groups of unmarried men[223] who had traditionally acted as cattle guards for the herds. Traditionally these were young men without herds of their own[224], and many exploited their newfound military advantage to increase their seizures of cattle from Dinka civilians. Simultaneously, social modernisation and urbanisation had created a recently settled constituency who where alienated from native administration systems and seeking political representation, economic opportunities and modern services (Keen 1994, 53-63); this constituency was made up of previously nomadic peoples now bereft of their livelihood and forced into

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[219]Believing that the Nuba SPLA commander Yusuf Kuwa led the attack, Misseriya girls lamented the the breakdown of cooperation and friendship between the Nuba and the *Baggara*, singing “Yusuf Kuwa has forsaken Brotherhood and entered el-Gerdud by force.” (Suliman 2002, 175). In reality, however, the attack is contested, whilst the government claimed that the SPLA was responsible, the SPLA blamed renegade Dinka tribesmen retaliating for a previous Baggara cattle raid by residents of el-Gardud (Salih and Harir 1994, 186)

[220]The tribes of Sudan are broken down into tribal and sub-tribal units. The Misseriya, a large Arab tribe based in South Korodofan, for example, are broken down int the Zurug and the Humr subsections. These, in turn, are broken down into lower units until the level of direct kinship and migratory groups. The adjudication of conflicts and the rules of loyalty within these tribes and between tribes are highly complex institutions based upon histories of interactions and are locally specific. This makes generalisations both difficult and frequently misleading. (cf. MacMichael 1912, 141-164; Cunnisson 1966)

[221]The formation of tribal militias was more widespread than the presentation here suggests. Militias were known to be operating amongst the Baggara (Misseriya and Rizeigat) of South Kordofan and South Darfur, the Fur of South Darfur, the Rufa’a of White Nile, Fertit in Bahr al-Ghazal and the Toposa and Mandari in Equatoria. However, the actual numbers and origins of these militias are unclear, and therefore the focus here is on the Baggara militias on which more information is available. It should, however, be pointed out that not all of these militias were allied with the government: the Fur militia, established to force Arab nomads onto new pastures in Darfur in the early 1980s-90s, were actively opposed by the government (cf. Salih and Harir 1994, 186).

[222]Interview General Burma Fadllalah Nasser, ex Lt-General and Umma party Member, Khartoum January 2003.

[223] In *Baggara* Arab society, social hierarchy, respect, and opportunity are all dependent on the ownership of cattle (cf. Cunnison 1960). The resources seized on raids possessed not just material value but were essential for marriage, adulthood and influence within nomadic society.

[224]See Cunnison (1972, 114-6) for an excellent anthropological account of the mechanisms and institutions traditionally surrounding and limiting theft and abductions amongst the tribes.

towns and cities for survival (Beck, 1998). Ecological and social change had thus simultaneously aggravated tribal disputes over resources and created a pool of unemployed young men seeking both relief from economic pressures and political representation[225]. Some of the youngest and poorest of both groups were willing to seek an income and influence through violence[226] (Johnson 1988, 10).

[225]These combined pressures were expressed violently against the government and traders before being channelled against the SPLA and non-Arab communities. On May 2, 1982, for example, gangs in Kadugli, in the Nuba Mountains, assaulted warehouses, shops and administration buildings.

[226]In a fascinating article by Kurt Beck (1998), the economic incentives created by drought are coupled with the powerful cultural incentives provoked by the domination of a 'folk' Islam in rural areas by a 'high' ideological Islam of the Nile valley. Whilst economic deprivation created material incentives for raiding, cultural dynamics created a discursive attraction to Islamism amongst Arab herders seeking to adhere to 'orthodox' beliefs. This created a constituency readily mobilised by the calls for jihad that erupted in the early 1990s.

Abbildung 9: Map 6: Political Map of Sudan
Source: International Crisis Group (2004)

By early 1986 militia raiding had expanded in scale and could no longer be seen as an escalation of tribally regulated raids; it had become the work of autonomous semi-military organisations (Keen 1994, 98-100). In December 1985, a large joint Misseriya- Rizeigat raiding operation killed a number of Dinka *soldiers* before being chased off by a military patrol. In February 1986, and again in March, large, well armed raiding parties of 500-1000 men began systematically chasing the Ngok Dinka of Abyei into northern Bahr al-Ghazal. Substantial cattle markets, tied into national and international networks, were established in Obeid to facilitate the trade in the results of looting and raiding (ibid. 1994, 109-125). In response, the SPLA began militarily confronting these raids. Large clashes between SPLA and Rizeigat militias took place in March 1986 and 1987. By 1989 the SPLA was able to secure the border of Bahr al-Ghazal from raiding parties. This, however, blocked the nomadic Misiriyya and Rizeigat access to dry-season grazing and water along the Bahr al-Arab.

The closure of territory and the confusion of military and tribal forces created a militarised fear of an ethnically identified 'other'. Violence between the government and the SPLA was repeatedly understood within the cognitive frames of tribal conflict between *Baggara* and Dinka, with the names of rebel groups and tribal groups frequently interchanged. Moreover, the arming of young men undermined the authority of traditional leaders and destroyed tribal conflict resolution mechanisms. The rewards of militia service granted militiamen independence from the material interdependencies of nomadic life. Furthermore, it undermined those elders recognising the importance of inter-tribal cooperation and convinced leading individuals within the Rizeigat that the militias were a means of gaining favour with the government and a gateway for appointments in the native administration. The breakdown of effective interconnecting institutions in an increasingly chaotic environment led to extreme and perverse forms of revenge. In April 1987, Rizeigat Arabs massacred over 1000 Dinka refugees at al-Daein (Ushari and Baldo, 1987) under the eyes of police forces unable or unwilling to act. The *Murahileen* justified their actions by referring to a massacre carried out in the Rizeigat village of Safaha, close to the Bahr al-Arab/Kiir river, by the SPLA in the same month (Alier 1992, 277). Traditionally accepted abduction was also revived, however, on a scale unprecendented since the slave-raiding of Arab tribes in the 19th century. Abducted Southerners were used as unpaid labourers on mechanised farms, enrolled into religious schools and, in some cases, sold as domestic servants through networks that passed through Khartoum[227].

CASE ONE: Al-Daein Massacre

In response to the events at Al-Daein, two Arab Sudanese academics, Drs. Ahmad Mahmud Ushari and Suleyman Ali Baldo, published a detailed account of the massacre (1987) constructed from eye-witness testimonies of both Arab and Dinka survivors. Although the numbers of casualities and cause for the massacre are widely disputed, the events are not. The following description draws heavily on this account.

Al-Daien is a railroad town in the East of the South Darfur province. In 1987 it had a population of around 60,000 people, the majority of which were Rizeigat Arabs, with around 17,000 Dinka IDPs and residents. Due to the closeness of al-Daein to the Bahr al-Arab/Kiir river and its location in an Umma controlled Rizeigat territory, the town was a centre for militia recruitment and the distribution of weaponry and monies for funding of the militia. Despite this, although the town possessed a police presence no military presence was maintained in the town.

During evening prayers on Friday 27 March 1987, around 32 Dinka came to attend a service at a church in the Hillat Fog neighbourhood. On Fridays the young men in the neighbourhood, the majority of which were Arab Riezeigat, regularly met in front of the Church. On this particular evening, a group of around 50 Rizeigat attacked the church in which 25 Dinka had remained after the service. These Rizeigat were armed with knives, sticks and one gun, but nobody was killed. Shortly afterwards a larger assault began against neighbouring Dinka homes, in which inhabitants were beaten and a number of homes were set alight. The crowd of Rizeigat barricaded the road, stopping both the police and the fire trucks, and killed between five and seven Dinka. In response the Dinka in al-Daien fled, and many thousands gathered together at Hilat Sikka Hadid close to the train station under the protection of the police. That evening a number of merchants in al-Daein recommended that the Dinka be evacuated immediately from the town for their own safety, but this advice was ignored. The next morning at 8.00am, government functionaries moved the Dinka towards the station with the intention of loading them on trains and getting them out of the town. Only between six to eight carriages were available and once these were full many Dinka were left standing under trees around the station. As this was underway, Rizeigat inhabitants of al-Daein began converging on the station armed with sticks, spears, swords, axes and a number of guns, including Kalishnikovs. After first blocking the train with logs, they began insulting and harassing the Dinka, some of whom who were now armed with spears. In

[227]The debate over a revival of slavery in Sudan, mobilised by pro-SPLA lobbies in the US, has been perhaps the most contentious of the Sudanese civil war. For the most persuasive and detailed investigation into its realities cf. Report of the International Eminent Persons Group (2002), for a well researched version of the account largely accepted in the US see Jok (2001). For an example of the version propogated by the government see the various reports and updates released by the European Sudanese Public Affairs Council, (http://www.espac.org/, accessed 20 February 2005)

response, members of the local ‘Security Committee’ held a conference with administration and Rizeigat tribal officials. During this conference a number of the assailants interjected, demanding that the Dinka be left to them. Shortly after 10.00am this meeting was abruptly adjourned, and all ranking government officials departed. Once they had gone, the crowd began attacking the Dinka, first throwing burning mattresses and sacks into the open doors and windows of the flammable carriages, and then attacking around 500 Dinka who were taking refuge in the police station.The reaction of the remaining police officials was confused. According to the report of the Dinka officer Diyu Bak Diyu, who survived the massacre, whilst some withdrew, others, including a Riqeigat officer, Abdel-Rahman al Fideili, opened fire in an attempt to defend the Dinka. Over 1000 Dinka were killed before the crowd dispersed at 7.00pm on the evening of the 28 March. Once the sun set the train departed for Nyala carrying the survivors to safety.

In 1990, the Sudan army was 90, 000 strong. The bulk of its officer corps came originally from Central Sudan, the Three Towns and the Northern Region, but its ranks came largely from the Western and Southern Sudan (Alier 1992, 281). Despite its reputation for professionalism, by the late 1980s it was massively underfunded and repeatedly scapegoated in Northern political infighting[228]. In 1989, Rt. Lt. General Abd al-Majid Khalil embarked on a secret tour of Arab countries to beg for military aid. Upon returning, he resigned in disgust after publicly announcing that the armed forces required half a billion dollars just to remain functional (Simone 1994, 60-62).

Unable or unwilling to commit resources or men to intelligence-guided counter-guerrilla operations, the Sudanese military instituted a policy of collective punishment against communities seen to be helping the SPLA. In Western Sudan the tribal militias were recruited, and granted impunity, to rape, loot, kill and abduct during ‘operations’ within determined free-fire zones. Villages whose sons had joined the rebellion, or through which SPLA units had passed, were looted and burnt to the ground; often along with the communities through which troops and militia passed, despite the occasional disciplinary efforts of commanding officers. The government, halting all attempts to resolve tribal conflicts over grazing rights and water resources, began using native administration positions as rewards for loyal tribes and leaders. Opposition to this systematic destruction of tribal interdependence in Western Sudan, by any ethnic group, Arab or African, could result in the disenfranchisement of entire communities and their administrative division into multiple fragments with no influence.

However, the militias were undermining order in these areas more effectively than the SPLA. Recruits would collect ammunition from the state, store it and use it for their own purposes, often easily outgunning local police forces[229]. The result was a steady increase of apolitical violence (Mahmoud 1992) between communities[230]. Whilst the government defended its actions with reference to its evident incapacity, the tribes justified the militias as their only means of self-defence. This justification, however, relegated attributions of guilt and innocence to local arenas (Salih 1989, 68). Whilst the military maintained offensive superiority, it was increasingly sacrificing its regional hegemony to multiple defensive and raiding militias.

In 1987 tribal militias were partially institutionalised under the national army. Retired soldiers were enlisted into Local Defence Forces and offered the benefits of regular military employment whilst

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[228]As one general put it sardonically in an interview “there was a very large gap between the people and the army” (Khartoum January, 2003), before describing how after losing friends in combat he would return to Khartoum to face the abuse of political activists of parties that were actively attacking the army and the war in the South.
[229]Interview ex-police chief, Khartoum, January 2003.
[230]It is a misconception that such conflicts were solely between ethnic groups. Tribal groups used weapons in conflicts not only between Arab and African groups, but equally between nomadic Arab tribes in competitions over access to grazing and water. For example, the Rizeigat in Darfur, the largest of the Arab tribes, have fought non-Arabs (Dinka and Zaghawa), and Arabs (the Kordofan Humr and Habbaniya) (cf. el-Battahani 2002, 393). See the same reference for an excellent discussion of the political-economic origins of such conflicts arising from tribal landholdings and conflict over leadership positions between tribes.

serving only in their home areas[231]. These units assumed the name '*murahileen*' and by April 1989 around 15, 000 were equipped (African Rights 1995). Their primary responsibility was keeping the nomadic trails into the South open (Harir 1994, 59). These units were embedded in disciplinary systems that were dysfunctional, corrupt and circumvented by personal connections in the local administration and Khartoum. Needless to say, the disciplinary record of these militias did not improve.

With the closure of the border into Bahr al-Ghazal by the SPLA, violence was increasingly turned on the Nuba communities in government controlled Southern Kordofan. A Nuba inhabitant of this area, speaking about the earliest raids during the migration season, desribed what it was like:

> In the beginning, we had no guns. . . . The muraheleen were shooting at people, who scattered. Then the muraheleen took the cows and left. Sometimes they captured children playing in the forest. Those children never returned. The muraheleen wore long white robes, and had guns. They came once a year but our people did not move.[232]

By early 1988 relief workers estimated that 52,000 Nuba had been displaced. Facing criticism in February 1989, President Sadiq al-Mahdi proposed that the *Murahileen* be institutionalised into Popular Defence Committees.

The tribal militias could not, at first, slow the SPLA's consolidation. In 1986, the SPLA had been strongest in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile provinces. By 1989, the now 40,000 strong SPLA controlled nearly 90% of the rural south (Lesch 1998a, 91) and had captured two provincial towns and over 19 village council towns. In one dry season offensive alone, in 1990, it captured Nasir, Torit, Nimule, Gemmaiza, Mongalla, Akobo, Bor and Waat (Johnson 1998, 200-201). In 1988-9, the SPLA introduced battalion size units into the transition areas, the New Kush division of six battalions in the Nuba Mountains, and the New Funj into southern Blue Nile (Johnson 1998, 59). The commander of the New Kush battalions, Yusif Kuwa Mekki, established an area of operation around the provincial capital Kadugli[233].

Despite these advances, within the Transition Areas, the SPLA became bogged down and territory began to be exchanged seasonally with the armed forces[234]. In this arena, despite causing huge non-combatant casualities, the militias did manage to restrict SPLA activities; in 1990 an SPLA communiqué stated:

> SPLA presence in the BSC Phase 2 area (sectors II and III) [Northern Upper Nile] is very thin. This area has been devastated by enemy tribal militias, other bandits, and natural disasters. As a result it has been very difficult for the SPLA to maintain any effective presence in this area…Enemy morale and confidence is so high in the BSC phase 2 area that they have declared NUN free of rebels, and they plan to start what they call development projects and resettlement of displaced Southerners between Renk and Melut. (Akol 2001, 311).

[231]Interview with a military officer, Khartoum February 2003. In 1987 Mohamed Salih witnessed the return of a Kadugli army column in which almost half of the combatants were Baggara volunteers (Salih and Harir 1994, 198).
[232]Former Nuba combatant, Human Rights Watch interview, Kenya, August 3, 2000 (HRW 2003, 103).
[233]Shortly before dying of cancer in the UK in 2001, Yousif Kuwa Mekki granted a long interview describing his life and career with the SPLA in which this campaign is described in depth. This was previously available from http://go.to/NubaMountains (accessed May 29, 2003), but whilst a printed copy is in the hands of this author, the webpage has been taken down.
[234]According to Harir (1994, 60) towns would be destroyed twice as they were exchanged: first in the fighting to capture the town and the looting that followed, and secondly as retreating forces destroyed everything that might be of use to the advancing forces.

The war descended into a war of attrition with the two sides controlling core territories, but without strict territorial demarcations or contiguous borders (Khalid 1990, 389). Areas contested by the warring parties, particularly in Bahr al-Ghazal, Nuba Mountains, and the oil rich provinces around Bentiu, became environments of generalised insecurity. Policing and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms failed, and proxy, client and mercernary militias raided villages, towns and transportation routes with impunity. As one observer noted:

> Whereas the first war involved Government soldiers in uniform or Anya Nya fighters, the South is now a scene of a war of all against all. Arms are carried almost by every and any person who can afford to purchase or acquire them by illegal means. (Salih 1989, 66).

In remote areas the army rarely left its garrison towns, relying on resupply by air or seasonal convoy. In any case, it had few incentives in constraining militias who were fighting the SPLA, and were protected by politicians in Khartoum[235].

The initial stage of militia formation in Sudan was a reaction to violence in which Umma party networks mobilised a tribal constituency, seeking to address local security threats and local resource conflicts. Violence rapidly expanded beyond these local issues, and even beyond the political competition between the SPLA and the government, creating, in turn, a much broader mobilisation of militia forces. From anecdotal evidence, such as that of the al-Dein massacre, discipline was not only poor but absent, with government officials entirely unwilling or unable to enforce central authority on the inchoate mass of gun-men. Furthermore, recruitment was neither regulated nor entrenched within a command hierarchy. The militias were not formal organisations; gunmen had neither uniforms, nor membership within a formal structure. Violence was neither ideological, nor political, and pursued no clear strategic direction. This permitted entire regions of Western Sudan to drift into diffuse situations of social collapse and insecurity in which units, level incentives, and tactical considerations determined action.

6.3 1989- 1992: Formal Institutionalisation: The PDF as a Praetorian Guard

On June 30 1989, a group of middle ranking officers[236] led by Brigadier Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, overthrew the democratically elected government and took power in Khartoum. The coup leaders declared a state of emergency, banning "any political opposition by any means to the regime of the Revolution of National Salvation" (Amnesty International 1991). The leadership of all political parties were imprisoned, newspapers banned, trade unions dissolved and a curfew imposed.

The coup was not unexpected. Discontent in the military had been professed openly as Southern garrison towns began falling rapidly to the SPLA[237]. The democratic period, from 1986-89, had turned into a game of musical chairs in which the Umma party led a succession of six coalition governments[238]. In December 1988 a coup plot had been disrupted, and in March 1989 the Commander in Chief of the armed forces, General Fathi Ahmad Ali, had issued the government an

[235] A number of interviewees questioned whether military control of the militias was even actually possible. At times regional military forces were outnumbered by militiamen who, according to one aid worker, were able to hold towns to ransom when the government was reluctant to resupply and pay them.

[236] For short biographies of the military officers that took part in the coup, cf. FBIS-NES-89-129; according to Marchal (1992, 59), the coup was conducted by 40 officers and only around 150-300 men who secured the inaction of other regiments by declaring that the seizure of power had been ordered by the military high command. This aligns with reports that a number of garrisons, particularly in the East, were extremely ambiguous about the coup, with the possibility of an immediate counter-coup or even insurgency from Umma supporting militias in the West an imagined possibility.

[237] Omar al-Bashir had, very shortly before the coup, returned from a tour of Southern garrisons deeply shocked by the level of morale and combat readiness.

[238] Between August 1987 and May 1988 the government operated without a cabinet and the ministries performed their daily tasks under the administration of their undersecretaries (cf. Bechtold 1990, 84-86).

ultimatum signed by 150 officers. He criticised the war strategy, including the use of tribal militias, and called either for political, financial and military support for waging the war or a genuine attempt to find peace. The implications of a failure to comply were clear and observers tell stories of competing plots being rushed to completion before June.

However, the June coup was not a technical intervention motivated by military discontent, as it was initially portrayed, but an ideological seizure of power. It was planned and operationalised in coalition with the NIF[239], via Hassan al-Turabi's second in command and the head of the militant party youth wing, Ali Osman Mohammed Taha[240]. The alliance between the military and the NIF rested on a shared Islamism, and on the military's need for a civilian base to avoid isolation within the institutions of the state. President Bashir declared to the *Sawt al-Sha'ab* newspaper in 1993:

> We upheld the Islamic trend from the beginning. An Islamic organisation was created in the Armed Forces when the Communists tried to overthrow the Numairi regime in 1971. When the revolution began [in July 1989] … the leadership of the NIF met and decided to… join the authorities. We needed a number of cadres… We are trying to apply the [Islamic] texts gradually and intend to establish an Islamic state in Sudan. (quoted Lesch 1998, 113)

On 31 December 1990, Lieutenant-General Omar Hassan al-Bashir announced that *Shari'a* law[241] was to be implemented, with immediate effect, in northern Sudan.

In November 1988, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) had signed an agreement that included provisions for a cease-fire, the freezing of *sharia*, the lifting of the state of emergency, and the abolition of all foreign political and military pacts[242]. In April 1989, NIF deputies, at the time in coalition with the Umma party, had stormed from the chamber after a vote on suspending the Islamic penal code. NIF supporters demonstrated, often violently, almost daily in Khartoum's streets for over a month. Despite the NIF's protests, a peace deal, based upon the November 1988 document, was negotiated between the GoS and SPLA. The coup took place the day before its ratification.

The origins of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) (*Qu'at Dafa' as-Sha'bi*) are murky. The name originally refers to Sadiq al-Mahdi's project[243] to institutionalise the existing tribal militias as a para-military institution with improved coordination and discipline[244]. By law, meanwhile, the PDF was directed "to train citizens on military and civil capabilities, to raise security awareness and military discipline among them, in order to act as a support force to the other regular ones on request" (Popular

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[239]Although the NIF, like all political parties, was disbanded after the June coup and formally disassociated itself from the coup's leaders, it is has since been acknowledged by Turabi and others to have been a political force behind the coup. After the coup Turabi remained in prison, along with the heads of other political parties, whilst the higher ranks of his followers were appointed to staff the non-essential ministries of the Revolutionary Command Council's government. More importantly, a shadowy body of pro-NIF Islamist intellectuals, led by Turabi, was formed, called the 'Council of Forty', it was intended, not to dictate daily policy, but to determine and protect the ideological orientation of the regime. I shall therefore use 'NIF' as a short hand for referring to the regime.
[240]During the first six months Taha took over the task of coordinating between the NIF and the military rulers. In doing so he isolated a whole generation of Islamist leaders, who were his seniors in the movement, in favour of mobilising young activists (el Affendi 1999, 22).
[241]In comparison to other Islamic movements within the Middle East, the NIF has followed a pragmatic political program that has increased its mobilising capacity at the cost of doctrinal ambiguity (cf. Kepel 2000). The overall orientation of the NIF is extremely difficult to pin down beyond the rhetoric of Turabi and a belief in the unnegotiable role of Sharia and Islam in defining national identity.
[242]These referred, most importantly, to existing pacts with Egypt and Libya.
[243]Sadiq al-Mahdi prior to the coup proposed to parliament the legalisation of tribal militias as Popular Defence Forces, but the bill was resoundingly rejected.
[244]Interview Dr. Mohamed el-Mukhtar Hassan Hussein, Director Information, Research and Studies Dept of the Peace Advisory at the Sudanese Presidency, Khartoum, December 2002.

Defence Forces Act 1989). In October 1989, however, the PDF acted as a praetorian guard for the new regime. In the early days of the 'Revolution of National Salvation' the most serious threat to the regime came from within the army and from Umma party partisans[245], not the SPLA. Initial members of the PDF were recruited through established NIF party networks, university-based Islamic organisations and NIF affiliated youth associations, such as *Shebab al Watan* (Youth of the Nation). In March 1990, 5000 recruits were enrolled in the al-Qitaina training camp, the majority of them Islamist students from the University of Khartoum (Kok 1993). In November 1990, PDF militia units in land cruisers were deployed throughout key areas in Khartoum close to the leadership of the NIF's residences and around the main military bases[246]. Shortly after, military units in Khartoum centre were redeployed out of the capital.

On the 30 November 1990, Colonel Muhammad al-Amin Khalifah, an Islamist officer of Berti background, declared that the war was a "clear ideological and cultural issue, tantamount to a conflict between truth and falsehood" and would be ended only by an imposition of peace by force[247]. To muster this force from a demoralised and crumbling army, the new regime radically altered the institutional landscape of the state. After an attempted coup in April 1990, 28 high ranking officers were executed by NIF security forces. Their trials were held without a defence counsel and lasted only minutes (Human Rights Watch 1994, 96)[248]. Four months after the coup, 400 police officers were dismissed, including the Inspector General of the Police[249]. Many others were quietly retired, or detained and tortured; but in all cases, replaced by young Islamists (Winter 1991, 56). In 1989 alone, 14,000 civil servants and staff of public sector companies lost their jobs (Woodward 2003, 54; Amnesty International 1991). By October 1993, the RCC had fired 1,500 officers, just short of a third of the total officer corps, and continued to do so despite the fighting in the South. In early 1995 another 227 were dismissed, including 57 brigadiers and generals (cf. Lesch 1998, 134-135).

To replace the weakened army, the PDF began to be trained for field operations. Legally responsible to a SAF brigadier-general, originally Brig. Babiker Abd el-Mahmoud Hassan, answerable directly to President Bashir, the PDF began to receive funding diverted from Sudan Armed Forces resources. Its recruitment was voluntary, and service in the PDF contributed towards National Service requirements. The Commander General dictated regulations of remuneration, period of service and recruitment procedures, as well as determining the annual intake of the forces. Underneath this central structure, however, the PDF became a decentralised network, recruiting from, and reflecting, local environments. Whilst the inner circle of the PDF, recruited prior to (or just after) the coup d'etat, was tasked with security, local PDF units were controlled by local commanders and elite *mujahideen* units operating autonomously from the army.

The first focus for recruitment in rural areas was the Misseiriya militia in El Muglad and the Rizeigat in Kordofan in December 1989 (Human Rights Watch 1996). Tribal leaders, initiated as PDF coordinators in their area, mobilised volunteers autonomously and limited their operations to traditional raiding areas[250]. Many of the older militias were not officially disbanded. The PDF was simply established as a parallel structure. Some groups, such as the seasonal militia recruited to guard the al-Muglad to Wau military supply train, remained outside of the PDF structure. As before, rewards, ie cars and houses, were distributed to encourage tribesmen to enlist. Even so, a number of *Baggara* militias seeking

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[245]The new regime faced four coup attempts in less than a year, and several reported invasions from Egypt by opposition parties (Kok 1996).
[246]The PDF took up these positions after complaints issued from within the army became public. Units deployed to the Manshiyyah district (close to Turabi's house), the Nuqtat Kawbar neighbourhood, the surrounding areas of the officer's club, and the Armed Forces Kubri neighbourhood (FBIS-NES-90-226).
[247]SUNA Radio, 30 November 1990, FBIS-NES-90-236.
[248]These trials and executions were deeply shocking. Whilst Sudanese politics had a history of violence, this was normally played out in rural areas. Never before had violence been turned, so convincingly and dismissively, on members of the elite in Khartoum, or against bureaucrats manning the apparatus of the state. The NIF had, however, a history of breaching this convention of political moderation. In January 1985 NIF leaders had precipitated the execution for apostasy of Mahmud Mohammed Taha, an elderly and highly respected Sufi politician, to the revulsion of many Sudanese.
[249]BBC World Service 26 October 1989, FBIS-NES-89-209.
[250]Interview military officer Khartoum February 2003.

access to traditional grazing lands (or keeping their loyalty to the Umma party), defected, with commanders and tribal leaders signing a truce with the SPLA in February 1990. Shortly afterwards, economic activity across the frontline began to appear as *Baggara* discovered the financial rewards of trading with rebel territories – by the mid-1990s these were institutionalised as 'Peace Markets' administered by the SPLA[251].

In urban centres the PDF was controlled by Islamists who set about mobilising volunteers for *jihad* in the South and setting up camps in which indoctrination, with Islamic lectures, religious songs and chants, ran alongside basic military training. In the eyes of Islamist intellectuals, the PDF was not only a security structure, but a means of spreading the new regime's revolutionary ideology beyond the university cadres of the NIF to the rural areas, and into the institutions of the state[252] (Marchal 1994). Within three years of the coup, the NIF had established networks of government appointed Popular Committees in every part of Sudan. These committees used the rationing of sugar and other essential produce to gather information on local residents. This was then used in the identification of potential opponents and, later, in the selection of individuals for PDF training. Shadowy, unofficial and ideologically-motivated security agencies such as the 'Security of the Revolution' (*Amm al-Thawra*), with roots in the pre-coup security apparatus of the National Islamic Front, acted as enforcers responding to this extended network of informers.

One of the first tasks of the PDF was to establish a cordon around the Heglig oil-field in Southern Kordofan. The expected revenue from this oil was seen as a means of releasing the government from dependency, not only Western aid, but on the Gulf States[253]. The oil fields, promising around 10,000 barrels per day, had been operated by Chevron before being closed down by SPLA attacks in 1985. The first reported sighting of an active unit of the PDF, not including tribal forces, was in May 1991 in Malakal, Upper Nile province, when, under the command of its then leader, Abu Giseissa[254], the PDF was sent to preach *Da'awa* (the call to Islam) and consolidate NIF power in the town[255] by identifying military and administrative staff to be replaced. By 1992 available estimates of PDF numbers range between 15,000 and 80,000 members.

On the battlefield, the NIF's policies appeared to pay off. In 1991, the SPLA's very survival was threatened after its main regional backer, Mengitsu's regime in Ethopia, was toppled. Shortly after, three leading commanders (Riek Macher, Lam Akol and Gordon Kong Cuol) defected, blaming Garang's authoritarianism, and formed the SPLA-Nasir movement. This triggered a bloody Southern civil war between Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups (Hutchinson 2001; Johnson 1998, 2001; Kok 1996, 558-560). Contemporaneously, the new regime in Khartoum had revitalised the army and, in 1992, led successful campaigns against the SPLA in the Nuba Mountains and down the Juba-Torit-Kapoeta road. Behind these developments lay a new strategy of mobilisation by all parties – the politicisation of ethnicity. With the outbreak of conflict between SPLA commanders, rivals sought, as did the government in recruiting the PDF, to manipulate tribal groups into alliances with political factions.

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[251]The following example gives an idea of how complex the arena became. In 1987-8 Misseriya of the herding group (*Hazan Bayt*) Ajarah, were detained for trading in an SPLA camp after being discovered during an SAF military assault. Whilst such activities were normally punished with the death penalty, these men were released, as their execution would, the commanding officer feared, invite retaliation against government forces from the Misseriya. Interview, Adminstrator Nuba Mountains (1987-1995), Khartoum March 2003.

[252]Interview Khartoum, February 2003.

[253]Whilst the Gulf States were not on the governments black list, as were countries such as Uganda and Ethiopia, relations has soured after Khartoum's public support for Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War.

[254]Despite the importance of this figure there is almost no information on his background or subsequent actions. According to one interviewee he was originally a professor at a Sudanese University. In September 1993, he became a lead government negotiator and shortly after died in a plane crash in southern Sudan, together with his negotiating team. Some have speculated that Abu Gisseissa was killed because he had overstepped his mandate by signing a document with Lam Akol promising self-determination to the South for the first time.

[255]Interview with Nuer politician and militia leader, Khartoum, February 2003.



Abbildung 10: Map 7: South Central Oil Fields, including Displaced Population Movements
Source: Sudan Update, Raising the Stakes: Oil and Conflict in Sudan,
(*http://www.sudanupdate.org/REPORTS/Oil/oiltop.htm, accessed February 2006).*

Each assault polarised and consolidated opponent groups whilst the ethnic targeting of violence invited retaliations in kind[256].

Reflecting its Islamist stance, the NIF regime turned for international backing from the West, and conservative Arab states, to the radical international Islamist networks, focusing on Iran and Afghanistan, that had emerged during the 1980s. In December 1991, 'Ali Akbar Rafsanjani paid a four day visit to Khartoum, bringing with him 157 officials, including military and security advisors. Iran and Sudan signed a military cooperation deal under which Iranian advisors would come to Sudan and Sudanese would be trained in Iran. Beyond Iran, however, Sudan turned to a more pernicious ally for support. In December 1991, Osama bin Laden, described as a 'moving bank' for the regime in interviews conducted by *al-quds al-arabi*[257], came to live in Khartoum, and in 1990 visa requirements for Arabs were dropped, facilitating the travel of many other international militants[258] (cf. Lesch 2002). Bin Laden launched a variety of businesses, starting with a construction company (*al-Hijra*) that built a 500-kilometer road from Khartoum, north to Shendi and Atbara, and constructed a new airport outside Port Sudan. On top of this, Bin Laden reputedly used his personal foreign currency assets, of up to $350 million, to underwrite the regime's wheat and oil purchases.

More relevantly, Bin Laden spent $2 million to fly Arab *mujahideen* to Sudan, from Pakistan, establishing a headquarters in the *Riyadh* neighbourhood of Khartoum, not far from Turabi's house. He equipped 23 training camps for Palestinian, Kashmiri, Chechen, and Algerian *mujahideen* at his own expense (Lesch, 2002, 204). Many were later rumoured to have fought in the Nuba Mountains and the South[259]. Not only did these Islamist linkages provide resources to the regime, but they also discursively connected Sudan's internal struggle to the broader struggles along the borders of the Islamic world[260].

Nevertheless, the failure of the SPLA was short lived. By the end of 1992 the military conflict between the two factions of the SPLA began to stalemate, with Machar's forces holding most of Upper Nile, and Garang's controlling Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal. Between 1992 and 1996, Machar's faction became increasingly unstable, owing to internal power struggles and defection[261]. Contemporaneously, the regime in Khartoum began to flounder as the initial enthusiasm for the NIF's Islamic revolution

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[256]See Hutchinson (2001) for an anthropological account of how SPLA leaders transferred both resources and authority from tribal leaders to themselves, through the manipulation of concepts of 'homeland war' and 'government war', to create a hybrid 'war of the educated' that was simultaneously personalised, unavoidable and irrational in the eyes of Nuer community leaders.
[257] 24 November 2001.
[258]Abdel Salam and de Waal (2004, 69) are right when arguing that a fundamental difference existed between the Sudanese Islamists, committed to a nationalist Islamic cause, and the Internationals attached to a fundamantalist global jihad. The allegiance between the two groups, facilitated by the most hardline security officials of the NIF regime, was transient. As Penelope Larzillière (2003) has astutely remarked, alliances between national and international Islamist causes are legitimised by religion, but are actually motivated by the formers need for resources, military experience and symbolic capital in fighting a guerrilla war, and the latters need for causes with which to attract recruits and resources. Overtime these alliances breakdown as the transcendentalism of the latter contradicts, fundamentally, the secular responsibilities and local variants of Islam of the former.
[259] That international *mujahidin* fought in the Sudanese civil war is heavily disputed. Yet that this took place is consistent with the previous activities of the international jihadist network.The majority of the 'internationals' trained in the Afghan camps in the late 1990s and, similarly, in Chechnya during the 1990s were not recruited for international terrorist operations, but were employed as a supplement to indigenous forces fighting in these countries' civil wars (cf. Gunaratna 2002, 58-60). There is, therefore, no reason to believe that internationals did not serve this function in Sudan.
[260]Many of the causes of these countries, particularly those related to Palestine, have an almost a priori legitimacy in Islamic countries. The PDF exploited this connection with brigades named after international and historical struggles; for example the al-Aqsa Martyrs brigade, named after those who had been killed by Israel after Ariel Sharon's walk on the Holy Mount in Jerusalem in September 2000.
[261]Originally known as the SPLA-Nasir Faction, Machar's faction changed names first to the SPLA-United in 1993 (after he was joined by Kerubino Kwanyin Bol) and, in 1994, to the Southern Sudan Indpendence Movement/Army in 1994.

faded and began to invite international and regional condemnation[262], more often than not expressed as support for the SPLA. The regime responded, not by moderating its Islamism, but by increasingly using its 'new' institutions to force compliance from Sudanese society.

Between 1989 and 1992 the PDF began the initial process of institutionalisation through the founding of a central coordinating organisation. This structure interlinked the network of localised militias recruited tribally in rural areas, and amongst Islamic militants within urban populations. The central organisation was supported by the diversion of funds from government institutions and through international aid from Iran, and Osama bin Laden. This process was not, however, regulated by the PDF itself, but by the political institutions of the NIF. Similarly, in urban areas at least, the PDF began a process of regulating recruitment. It sought to establish a reliable security guard for the regime and, in the process, created an 'inner circle' of active PDF and PDF affiliated cadres who were directly controlled by members of the NIF. Within the wartorn rural areas, the PDF continued the open recruitment and impunity of the Umma party for tribal recruits.

6.4 1992-1997: PDF Expansion as an Open Organisation

By the end of 1992 the regime's control of central institutions was secure and the state, already purged, initiated an NIF inspired process of holistic Islamification. Arabic was made the sole language of instruction, crippling a once thriving higher education sector. Public companies replaced qualified and long serving staff, including technical and medical personnel, with NIF students. A 'Sharia High Supervisory Board over Banks and Financial Institutions' oversaw the imposition of Islamic banking practices[263]. International NGO's were increasingly restricted and replaced by Islamic NGO's, the less ethical of which combined proselytism with humanitarianism (cf. Bellion-Jourdan 1997).

This policy shift resulted from the NIF's emergence from the shadows of the Revolutionary Command Council and from an increasingly public control of governmental position. Since the military coup, Islamists of the NIF had ruled behind the scenes with a network of special advisors, appointed to 'assist' governors and senior administrators, who turned to Turabi and Taha for instructions. In January 1992, however, an all appointed Transitional National Assembly was formed, replete with NIF politicians (Lesch 1998, 115-120). Hassan al-Turabi, wielding influence through his chairing of the the *majlis al-shura* (consultative council)[264], placed high ranking NIF politicians into key positions as non-Arab and moderate officers were sidelined or lost their RCC cabinet position in reshuffles in January 1993 and July 1993[265]. On the 15 October 1993, the RCC itself was dissolved, after warnings from Turabi about its persistence, and replaced by a council of ministers with Bashir as President.

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[262]Khartoum's first warning from the U.S. about possible repercussions for the harbouring of terrorists came in 1991. For a further account of the decline of Sudanese-US relations between 1992 and 1995 see Pettersen (1999).

[263]The reality was that Sudan's patrimonial political-economy had not changed, but only the actors controlling the system. Between 1992 and 1994 the government undertook a drastic privatisation of state controlled assets, giving NIF loyalists preferential bids, including Osama bin Laden's consortium the El-Higra Construction and Development Company, for public assets. The Martyr's Organisation at this time took possession of the Khartoum Dairy Company, the Oil Seeds Company, the National Cinema Company, Wafra Chemicals Co, and the National Distilling Company (Mahjoub 1999, 87-88). The Islamic regime imposed tarifs, granted credit, and carried out audits selectively and subjectively in favour of its supporters. According to one observer, during the privatisation of the early 1990s, "from the available material on privatised public sector assets and corporations, not a single undertaking has passed to a non-Arab Northerner" (Battahani 1995, 250).

[264]Turabi's authority was not bureaucratic but charismatic. In his own words "I advise our politicians, who want to rule Sudan on the basis of Islamic principles. I do my best so that the Islamic movement fully permeates our society." He added in another interview, "I guide and direct because I have knowledge of the activities of all the departments." (Quoted Lesch 1998, 115)

[265]Ali Osman Muhammad Taha, the NIF co-ordinator of the coup, created a new 'super-ministry' for social planning, controlling Islamic charities, religious affairs, youth, sports, women, and relief activities. By incorporating parts of the information, education and local government portfolios Taha became one of the most influential Islamists in government. Other changes saw Brigadier Abd Al-Rahim Muhammad Hussein, a NIF military officer, become interior minister, and Ali al-Hajj became minister of economic planning and investment (Lesch 1998, 117-8).

For the war, the announcement of the NIF's capture of power took an altogether more galling form. In 1992 a series of fatwas were issued declaring the war with the rebels to be a *jihad*. The most famous declaration was made in El-Obeid by seven provincial pro-government Imams[266] in April 1992:

> The rebels in South Kordofan and Southern Sudan started their rebellion against the state and declared war against the Muslims. Their main aims are: killing the Moslems, desecrating mosques, burning and defiling the Qur'an, and raping Moslem women. In so doing they are encouraged by the enemies of Islam and Muslims: these foes are the Zionists, the Christians and the arrogant people who provide them with provisions and arms. Therefore, an insurgent who was previously a Muslim is now an apostate; and a non-Muslim is a non-believer standing as a balwark against the spread of Islam, and Islam has granted the freedom of killing both of them according to the following words of Allah…

This concept of *jihad*, despite the legal and stylistic weakness of the text itself, was a powerful appeal to individual duty and personal religiosity and made explicit the NIF's ideological ontology of Sudan's civil war[267]. The regime began to saturate public policy and political rhetoric with religious symbols and discourse, emphasising a quasi-Iranian, *Shi'a*-Islam inspired cult of martyrdom[268] (Burr and Collins 1995; Burr 1998). Contemporaneously, the PDF was transformed into an explicitly military organisation. Urban recruits of the PDF were no longer restricted to propaganda, moblisation and security duties, but were dispatched to the front. A massive recruitment and then military campaign, 'The Summer Crossing' (*Seif al Ubur*), was launched in 1992, with 40,000 PDF and regular army troops committed to Southern Kordofan alone (Bradbury 1998, 465). By June 1993, 70,000 PDF were estimated to match Sudanese army numbers in the South, with many more rotating through militias for shorter periods of time[269].

The mobilising power of Islamic accreditation was that it could convince many, even non NIF, of the personal religious duty of participation in the struggle (*jihad*) against the SPLA. The PDF emphasised the mystical symbols of Islamist discourse and Islamic history, rather than the potentially dissenting voices of Islamic legal interpretation. The Hour of Sacrifice (*Sahat al-Fida*) was nightly broadcast reporting the miraculous feats of the PDF and celebrating its 'martyrs'. Prophetic dreams, sweet smelling corpses of martyrs, and supernatural help from animals were all reported in government controlled newspapers in the early nineties (al-Mubarak 2001, 87).

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[266]They included a former mufti, two imams, one from the army mosque in the town and three employees of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. None were individuals of significance and not even the imam of the al-Obeid mosque participated (de Waal 2004, 74).

[267]In a review of the meaning and importance of jihad in the four schools of Islamic law, Edgar Weber (2002, 149-51; my translation) comes to the folloing conclusion: "The Jurists are unanimous in underlining that jihad is a duty for the believer, relying on the text of the Qur'an, which is explicit on this point…It is in all the cases amongst the first line of religious imperatives and obligations of the believer to his God." The powerful appeal of jihad lies in this transcendental identification of authority, regardless of the individual identification of an actor with a political party, regime or Islamist ideology.

[268]The similarities between Sudanese and Iranian symbolism are perhaps not accidental. Hassan al-Turabi is credited anecdotally with being the intellectual and physical bridge between Osama bin Laden's Sunni Salafism, and Iran's revolutionary Shi'ism during the former's sojourn in Sudan. Normally radically opposed, the two strands of political Islam were introduced to each other by Turabi in Khartoum who argued that a pooling of resources between Islamic revolutionaries was more important than doctrinal differences. This argument similarly justifies Turabi's Sunni Islamist state, borrowing from the Iranian model.

[269]Cf. 'Big Turnout in Northern Sudan to Fight in South', *Reuters*, 27 June 1993. The same source quotes a government official stating that recruitment figures into the PDF were not known, and that, more chillingly, nor were casualty numbers.

Abbildung 11: Picture 2: PDF Recruits in Kadugli, Nuba Mountains.
Source: African Rights (1995, 113)

For example, N. Rudwan of the An-Nasr newspaper June 4, 1994 reported:

In the early days of the Popular Defence Force, that a pious man came to me and said that his Sheikh saw a "ruya" [prophetic dream] in his sleep that the PDF was [fighting] under a green flag, led by the Master of Humans [Mohamed] (al-Mubarak 2001, 88)

Furthermore, Islamic myths were rendered into performances for local consumption:

> Members of the PDF refuse to marry in the expectation of marrying in paradise; that is after they become martyrs. They reject marrying earthly women, *huur al dunia* (dark-eyed virgins of the earth), in their eagerment to marry *huur al-jinana* (dark-eyed virgins of paradise). Families are expected to treat the death of their loved ones in the jihad with jubilation, and should not mourn, since death is *urs al-shaheed* (the wedding of the martyrs) which should be celebrated. (Salih 1998, 76)

Despite this publicity, the logic of war dominated – no fewer than fourteen mosques were confirmed destroyed, damaged or looted in the Nuba Mountains between 1993 and 1997 (de Waal and Abdel Salaam 2004, 73).

Employing local recruitment centres, the PDF became a heterogeneous organisation reflecting the surrounding environment and developed into an organisation containing multiple internal strands and tendencies. These can be divided into four:

- An Islamic jihadist section, the *mujahideen*, comparable to the Iranian *Basadji* volunteers[270].
- Students and civil servants forced into training in closed camps.
- Military officers and civil servants forced to go through PDF reeducation and indoctrination.
- Localised rural militias supplied through local PDF offices and coordinators.

In rural areas, the nomadic militias absorbed into the PDF were now paralleled by PDF militias recruited locally from more urbanised and settled tribesmen, particularly from the Hawazma in the

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[270]These were also subdivided into sections of different military ability and training. Some elite units received tank and artillery training while others were only trained on small and medium arms.

Nuba Mountains, and Islamic members of non-Arab tribes[271]. These forces carried out one of the most devastating campaigns of the Sudanese civil war. In 1989, Khartoum had closed South Kordofan to NGO operations. In 1992, Gen. al-Huseini, the governor of Kordofan state and local head of the PDF, asked the Arab tribes to provide him with 40,000 fighters with which to drive the SPLA from the province. A combination of tribal, PDF and military forces were used to drain the Nuba population from rural areas, whilst security and administrative networks were subverted to undermine moderate leaders and inter-connecting institutions maintaining stability between tribal and ethnic groups.

PDF forces were instrumental in reconcentrating the Nuba population of Southern Kordofan[272] into 'Peace Villages' under the auspices of the Peace and Rehabilitation Adminstration of South Kordofan. Flying columns of *murahileen*, PDF, and military would comb through rural areas, burning and looting villages[273] to force civilians into secure government areas. By September 1992, the government of South Kordofan announced that it had formed 91 'peace villages' with over 160,000 people and planned to resettle a further 500,000 (UN Secretary General 1993, 19). Presented internationally as reception camps for internally displaced Nuba, these 'villages' through underfunding, corruption and a state-legitimised Islamic chauvinism, rapidly became centres of Islamic *da'wa*, PDF conscription and captive labour for surrounding farms (Bradbury 1998, 464). As the war in the Nuba continued, militias flourished and military institutions broke down under the weight of NIF purges, politicisation and corruption. In exchange, abuses of all kinds (economic, sexual and military) were institutionalised, creating a system that progressively destroyed the Nuban social order of South Kordofan[274].

Human Rights Watch (cf. HRW 1994) came into possession of a diary written by a resident of el-Obeid, Kordofan, that describes the mobilisation of PDF just North of the Nuba Mountains. It is a unique account and worth quoting at length:

NOVEMBER 1992 - A certain Farouk, a former SPLA fighter, was captured in Kadugli in early 1992. In due time he resolved to cooperate with the government forces. He was entrusted to form and lead the new militias whose training camps are near Rashad and Dilling. … With the end of the rainy season, preparations are underway for a new offensive. Radio Kordofan proclaims that this offensive will be the "final blow to the rebellion." The largest secondary school in El Obeid, Khor Tagga, was closed and turned into a PDF and Islamic training center. More training grounds were added and are now being filled with new recruits, in many cases collected from the nomadic Arab tribes. Special camel and horse-mounted battalions are being formed. …Reports indicate that not all the new recruits are enthusiastic. Seven are said to have been killed in training and a good number to have run away.

JANUARY 1993 - The flow of displaced is uninterrupted. Today seven trucks arrive with over 300 Dinkas from Aweil/Abyei and four trucks with about 200 Nubas from Tulisci. They speak of a large and ruthless cleansing operation by the militia and mujahidin along the railway [south] to Wau to ensure the safe passage of a train from Babanusa, to refill the army stores in Wau. They say many people were killed and large herds of cattle seized and moved to Wau.

JANUARY 1993 - About 130 people arrive from Habila, a major agricultural area. They were seasonal workers in the durra cultivations. They were accused of helping the SPLA by the militia, who were called in by the Arab farmers for protection. One Dinka and one Nuer were killed while fleeing. All who fled lost their wages and have no way to make any claim.

- The thirteen-year-old nephew of neighbors, and his friend, are missing. Their fathers went to look for

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[271]See Kadouf (2002) for an extremely interesting account of the use of Islam as a means of detaching volunteers from kinship groups and integrating them into 'orthodox' Islamic structures such as the PDF.

[272]For an excellent historical account of the political, economic and cultural interactions of the Nuba, both locally and with Khartoum from 1950 to the 1990s, see Saavedra (1998).

[273]This is not solely justified by economic motives but also abides by a mutation of the history of Islamic warfare justifying fighting whilst living off the land. Similarly, the presence of many child soldiers within the PDF accords to the ruling by most Islamic legal scholars that an individual has the capacity to legally participate in jihad from the age of 15 (cf. Aboul-Enein and Zuhur 2004, 13).

[274]It is not possible to go into details here; however, African Rights (1995) have produced an exhaustive report detailing the abuses of government forces in the Nuba Mountains.

them and were told by the police station to check with the army and the PDF. The following day they go to the army barracks where other people started gathering, also parents and wives of youth who have disappeared. Finally some trucks from the PDF training camps arrive and unload the new recruits, among them the boys who had disappeared. Their heads had already been neatly shaved. After some discussion, those who could prove to be students or married were released; all the others were returned to the camps. The day before, all buses were stopped by armed soldiers. The passengers were made to dismount and all boys were compelled to get into army trucks and were taken to enroll in the PDF. The same thing happened to all boys that were found along the roads and in the market places. The need is high for the PDF for new recruits to replace their heavy losses among their ranks.

MARCH 1993 - Seven trucks of PDF, all young boys, depart from the central mosque square to the battle areas.

NOVEMBER 1993 - By the end of November, a new wave of arrests is reported in El Obeid, Dilling, Kadugli. Large contingents of PDF and mujahidin are seen departing for the mountains. Unlike the previous years, their departure is without fanfare and fuss. Many of them are mere children of around fourteen, almost collapsing under the weight of their military gear.

Wrd from Abyei is that the population now numbers about 200,000, including the displaced. The majority are non-Muslims and a good number of Muslims are "Fellata," immigrants from West Africa. The situation in the town is a strange mixture of war and peace. It is the headquarters of an important army garrison and large PDF and mujahidin camps, but is surrounded by the SPLA, who are only five to ten kilometers away. Rebels come to town half naked for shopping. Arabs are allowed to take their herds to pasture if unarmed. The most dangerous elements are the unruly militias, whose highest aspirations are robbery and rape.

FEBRUARY 1994 - At the beginning of the month, Dr. [Hassan] Turabi is in El Obeid. He is staying in Khor Taggat, just outside El Obeid, in a former, once famous secondary school, now converted into a PDF camp. It is rumored that he has come to open a new training center run by Iran/Sudan. He also visits a second PDF camp and arms/ammunition store in Malbes (about ten kilometers south of El Obeid) where he is said to have met with the state minister of education and Vice Governor Habib Maktoum, the newly appointed governor of the new state of South Kordofan.

After the ravages of 1992-1993, in late 1993-1994, a new policy was adopted. The intention was to oppose Nuba in government controlled areas against Nuba in SPLA controlled territory (*Nuba Vision* November 2001). Frontal assaults against SPLA strongholds, which had caused immense casualties among the PDF and military, were replaced with the co-option of prominent Nuba and tactics of 'divide and conquer' in enticing SPLA commanders to defect. Under *Salaam min al-Dakhil* ('Peace from within'), PDF recruitment was expanded to include village self-defence groups amongst the Nuba. As were the *Baggara* leaders before them, Nuba *Mek* (tribal leaders) were appointed as military leaders in exchange for access to resources and representation. Under a 'popular mobilisation' (*Nafir al-Sha'abi*) programme these self-defence militias were supplemented by Nuba military militias, recruited, in part, as Misseriya militias became increasingly unreliable.

These new tactics were more effective than the full frontal *jihad*. The main military campaign in 1993-4, *Misk al-Khitam* (the final seal) was a heavily publicised two-prong offensive aimed at Buram. The victory was lauded as a military miracle; in reality, however, it resulted from a deal struck with SPLA Alternate Commander Telefon Kuku Abu Jelha[275]. In 1994-5 the *Seif al-Salaam* (Sword of Peace) offensive captured Fariang (the link between the Nuba Mountains and the South) due to the defection of the SPLA Commander Meyik Jau.

These policies, however, militarised and politicised local administrative structures. The regulation of tribal land, access to services, and interactions with the state all became bargaining chips with which to co-opt local interests. This took place in an environment in which the informal institutions regulating

[275]In an interview with the Nuba SPLA Commander Yousif Kuwa Mekki in 2001, he decribed how by 1992 the mainly Nuba SPLA movement in the Mountains was increasingly split between those, such as Telefon, who were in favour of a localised peace treaty with the government and those who wished to maintain an allegiance with the SPLA. At a 1992, Advisory Council however, Nuba delegates had voted to continue fighting, despite the objections of Telefon.

social order were already collapsing under the strain of unregulated violence. Diverse irregular formations were hard to distinguish from armed robbers, feuding groups and disaffected gangs of young men alienated from the tribal system. Guns were plentiful and rarely registered, with ammunition so abundant that nomads were stockpiling the supplies given to them by the PDF[276]. As one interviewee who had been a local administrator in government-controlled Kadguli from 1987 to 1995 pointed out: "'The army did not know who was an armed robber and who was militia. The situation was so bad that the *Murahil* (nomads – lit. those that travel) were raiding the houses at the edge of town to steal salt and clothes"[277]. The cumulative result of this strategy was disastrous, not only for the Nuba, but equally so for the state's ability to regulate the rural environment and offer services, even to Arab tribes. In the words of one aid worker "the population in South Kordofan is primarily women and children and old people. The modern structure of government is breaking down, as are the traditional structures" (quoted in Bradbury 1998, 472).

This process of deinstitutionalisation was not restricted to local environments but, as ideology and loyalty overrode competence, had spread throughout Sudan's state institutions. For instance, within Sudan's professional military army officers were promoted outside of the strict guidelines dictating experience and training according to NIF allegiance; PDF units increased their recruitment and began to receive increasing shares of the military resources[278].

As a result, the character and organisation of the PDF changed significantly, taking increasingly the form of a national 'citizen's army'. In late 1993 – early 1994, the government launched PDF conscription for all Sudanese citizens over the age of 16 and resident in Sudan. Local PDF co-ordinators were appointed to decide recruitment levels, training camp placement, and rules of conduct. Closed camps were established where conscripts spent 2-3 months in physical, basic military and ideological training. NIF military men commanded these camps, and conditions were basic, often harsh, particularly for those identified as Christian or with left wing tendencies (Human Rights Watch, 1996). But abuse was heterogeneous and much depended on the camp leaders and groups being trained[279]. They followed a regime of entwined socialisation (indoctrination) and practical military training. This involved regular prayer, lectures on the foundations of *Jihad* and the dangers of 'Dinka domination' by well known NIF intellectuals but little actual military education. (Human Rights Watch, 1996). According to an NIF defector, the PDF was to replace the armed forces and the NIF control all sovereign and constitutional positions by 2003.

Whilst training was obligatory, with names announced regularly on university billboards, recruitment for combat was organised in periodic calls for volunteers by radio stations, posters, megaphones on pick up trucks, television announcements, and at the end of every training camp. The elite battalions of *Mujahideen* served for longer and received artillery and armoured cavalry training. Volunteers for the regular PDF would, however, often serve for three months, or little more, before being rotated back to their place of residence to resume their previous employment or studies. Interviewees stated that only around 5% volunteered for combat after training at the camps in Khartoum[280], a figure matched by the numbers of students recruited for combat. According to one study this was a significantly lower number than those actually willing to pariticipate in Islamic militancy of a less risky nature (see Table 10).

Tab. 10: Table10: University Student Participation in Moderate/Milititant Activities and 'Jihad'

Source: Khalafallah (2004, 187)

[276]Interview Joint Military Commission official, Kadugli, March 2003.
[277]Interview with Nuba Mountains local administrator, Khartoum, February 2003.
[278] 'Soldiers Out, Militiament In', *Indian Ocean Newsletter*, 20 November 1993.
[279]Whilst there are numerous reports of abuse, particularly against those identified as communists and Christians, I have also interviewed X (Southern Sudanese ex-PDF conscript, Beirut, November 2003), a devout Christian from Juba, who was permitted, along with 40 other Christians, to conduct mass and abstain from Islamic prayers and rituals during PDF training. Whilst X reported disapproval and peer pressure from both camp leaders and other recruits he said that there was no actual discrimination.
[280]This figure is based upon two independently trained Sudanese estimating the number that consequently volunteered from their camps. I have been unable to obtain any official figures of actual volunteering for combat.

Sex	Moderate Action	Militant Action	'Jihad Convoy'
Total	25.3 %	35.3%	5.2%
Male	19.5%	40.2%	7.5%
Female	16.5%	27.8%	1.7%

It was the Arab, urban middle class, traditionally exempt from the vagaries of political conflict in Sudan, who were most affected by PDF patterns of recruitment. Whilst initially it was promised that students would be permitted to finish studying, in 1994, faced with low recruitment numbers, foot dragging and rebellion, this promise was rescinded. Students were unable to graduate from or enrol in university or high school without a certification of PDF camp attendance. Most large companies, and all government institutions, required that actual and potential employees had evidence of PDF training. Travel abroad was denied to those without PDF training. As is now the case with military service regular sweeps (*kasha*) took place and flying checkpoints looking for PDF enrolment or exemption cards were established. Those found without such cards would be loaded onto trucks and driven to training camps.

These schemes met with opposition and at one point a number of universities and high schools were closed by rioting. In 1994, 700 students receiving training at el-Merkhiyat camp, broke out of the camp and demonstrated in Omdurman[281]. In April 1998, up to 260 PDF secondary student conscripts, demanding permission to spend the Islamic *Eid al-Adha* holiday with their families, were killed by security forces after breaking out of Eilafoun PDF training camp 25 km from Khartoum (AC 1 May 1998). Shortly after, the government was forced to admit that it did not know the names of all the conscripts. 'Eilafoun' provoked a media black out and nervousness inside the regime, increasingly shown to be confronting with force a population that rejected and mocked its claim to Islamic legitimacy. Shortly after, another rebellion at the same training camp saw 76 recruits escape[282].

One of the main reasons for these rebellions was that PDF losses on the battlefield were huge. Rumours of planeloads of bodies landing in the middle of the night accused the government of disguising the death toll. Included in the dead were many of the NIF's own student cadres and leaders. In a February 1996 assault on Kit Labonok front near Malakal, PDF casualities included President Bashir's younger brother, and three other key NIF student leaders, Muhammad Hasan al-Hajj, Ibrahim Harun, and Adam Ya'aqub Musa[283]. The symbolic hypervaluation of martrydom through *jihad* and little mitilary training created troops who committed serious military errors. For example, a soldier interviewed in Khartoum described watching in horror as PDF volunteers were urged over the top of trenches they had spent two days building and made to charge in 'human wave' attacks at dug in SPLA machine gun positions[284]. Military officers told of high levels of friendly fire, communication breakdown and cowardice by urban PDF. SPLA soldiers are reported to have stated their respect for the bravery of the PDF but dismissed them as fighters[285].These losses created two problems: Firstly, they sapped the popular will to join the PDF and mobilised many students and mothers to demonstrate against PDF conscription. Secondly many of those killed were the charismatic ideologues and student leaders[286] essential for continual mobilisation.

It appears that there many in the regime had misjudged the effectiveness of the PDF. One NIF Major-General argued that:

> The PDF have provided strong and real support to the armed forces… This has made the armed forces' mujahidin really grasp the meaning of the citizen's participation in military action

[281] *Sudan News and Views*, 25 April 1994
[282] *SUNA News Agency*, 12th June 1998, BBC Monitoring, Record Number: 0D614F95C9B765F5.
[283] BBC Monitoring, record number: 0D6F8B28BDAE8275.
[284] Interview ex-private SAF, Khartoum, December 2002.
[285] Personal communication with Lee Seymour, January 2004.
[286] Personal communication with Roland Marchal, April 2004.

> everywhere. This has greatly boosted the armed forces' morale. .. The defence of the homeland is everyone's responsibility[287].

Meanwhile within the Army complaints increased. Many officers stated clearly that the army could not be replaced "by the kind of accelerated training courses being doled out to the peculiar mix of ideologically motivated volunteers, jobless and pressganged students"[288]. Furthermore, when such forces were under the direction, of NIF commanders they were committed to battle "without due consideration for conventional methods of planning and adminstation of battles. [The government] gave political gain priority over proper war planning[289]."

Whilst the PDF was never well equipped (and at the beginning seemingly offered no material benefits except perhaps a rifle) as the PDF's Islamic legitimacy was undermined and casualties rose, benefits rather than symbolic blessings began to be offered to recruits. These benefits were often diverted from other institutions or communities, but an unknown amount also came from donations from key Islamist businesses and figures. For example, in Damazin in Blue Nile province, agricultural land was set aside for the families of Martyrs (de Waal and Abdel Salaam 2004, 91), and an Iranian style foundation, the Martyr's Organisation (*Munathama as-Shaheed*), gave educational, medical and vocational grants to PDF volunteers. As late as December 2001, President Bashir promised free education, health care, and housing for the families of the martyrs of the PDF[290]. Other para-statal organisations, such as the Diwan al-Zakat, the Shari'a Support Fund, the Islamic Pious Endowments organisation and the Social Solidarity Fund, were granted the right to collect religious *zakat* contributions that were then distributed for various Islamic projects, including the PDF (de Waal and Abdel Salaam 2004, 92). Over time, these benefits came to dominate individual motivations for participation in the PDF. One ex-combatant, quoted in the introduction of this thesis, described his two stints as a *mujahid*: "When I first joined [1992] we fought with one heart … last time [late 1990s] they all were just fighting for food and money". By the mid-90s many recruits came from the poorest strata of society - internally displaced, the recently urbanised and rural poor – for whom service with the PDF was a guarantee of a basic living for a few months. Salaries, but more often indirect benefits such as health care, education and business opportunities began to be offered.

By 1995 President Bashir was calling for a million men capable of bearing arms in the PDF[291]. All Sudanese citizens over the age of 16 and resident in Sudan were required to attend PDF training. By 1997 troop numbers in the South were estimated to be 30,000 in Juba alone, of which 20,000 were PDF units, including militias, urban recruits and mercenaries (Johnson 1998, 59 ft.14). However, despite the failures of these tactics in consolidating the regime's control of rebellious regions, the NIF government remained tactically conservative. Politically disastrous and militarily indecisive campaigns using an array of militias against civilian populations were launched: in 1992-4 against the Nuba; in 1997 against Shilluk and Nuer living near the Upper Nile Oil fields; and finally again in 2003 against the African populatins in Darfur.

By 1997 the military itself was becoming increasingly wary of the Islamist social project it had mobilised, partly due to the internal failures of the ideology and its ineffective military results, and partly out of increasing recognition of the advantages forthcoming from readmittance into the international system: In response, the military began investing in alternative organisations to the PDF. Whilst *jihad* was never formally abandoned (and often reemerged, as we shall see in the next section, when the regime was questioned on its Islamic legitimacy), the PDF was quietly replaced with an emphasis on building the war-making capacity of the state using oil resources and counterinsurgency forces recruited from rebellious communities.

Furthermore, the PDF's manipulation of Islam had alienated many devout Muslims who recognised the

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[287]Staff Major-General Muhammad Abd al-Qadir Muhammad Idris, director of the Sudanese Armed Forces Moral Guidance Department, interview *al-Sharq al-Awsat* 3rd February, 1996.
[288]Lt-Gen. Fathi Ahmad Ali, *Indian Ocean Newsletter*, 20 November 1993.
[289]Lt-Gen. Fathi Ahmad Ali, SAF Commander in Chief before 1989 coup, Radio Voice of Sudan 1st February 1996; (BBC Monitoring Record Number: 0D6F8C33E303152A).
[290]Sudanese TV, 26 Dec 2001.
[291]Sudan steps up 'popular defence' force training', *AFP,* 3 February 1995.

PDF as a political, rather than religious, project; moreover, a project that contradicted and offended the often tolerant, diverse Islamic currents that constituted Sudanese religious life. This was particularly true of the intrusive symbolic propaganda of the PDF, for example the 'Martyrs Wedding' processions that celebrated the at the funerals of PDF casualties', even against the wishes of the mourners. Despite the use of coercion in forced recruitment, participation in the PDF remained low, particularly because of the high costs the *jihad* had inflicted on Northern youth. Recruitment amongst the larger Arab tribes began to die out by the end of the 90s, as tribal leaders, recognising the inevitability of co-existence, began to refuse to help recruit the 'sons of the tribe' for the PDF.

CASE TWO: Babanusa-Wau Train

In 2001, an International Committee was appointed to investigate the allegations of slavery in Sudan. One of the acts of this committee was to carry out the first open and independent study of the so called 'slave-train', travelling between Babanusa and Wau. The results of this study were released in a study entitled *Slavery, Abduction and Forced Servitude in Sudan* (2002). As this is a single source it is quoted at length:

> Large numbers of *murahaleen* raids on villages in Bahr al Ghazal are associated with the seasonal movement of the military supply train that travels between Babanusa and Wau. As *Baggara* pastoralists move north with their livestock to wet season pastures, the military train prepares to move south. The purpose of the train, which is run by the military, is two-fold: to supply government garrison towns along the railway line, and to destabilize northern Bahr al Ghaza1. The government recruits *murahaleen* in South Darfur and West Kordofan to protect the train. The recruits are registered and provided with guns and often with horses. The horse-mounted *murahaleen* create a security cordon several kilometers wide on either side of the line. The cordon is created by raiding and burning villages deep into Dinka and Jur Luo territory. The raids are brutal, with killing, rape and amputations reported in addition to the looting of cattle and other property and the abduction of civilians. Abduction is generally worst as the train returns north.
>
> In the past, tribal leaders have clearly participated in mobilizing forces for the government. In part this was seen as protecting their tribe against the SPLM/A. As recently as late 2001, Rizeigat leaders participated in the mobilization of *murahaleen* in Abu Matariq to re-take Raja from the SPLM/A. In the past two years, however, many of the Misseriya and Rizeigat leaders have sought to distance themselves from the *murahaleen* and discourage their youth from joining militias that escort the train. The gains to be had, however, from looting property and abducting people have proven too strong. Since late 2000, there has been substantive evidence that the Ministry of Defense has also begun to pay incentives to militia members to escort the train.
>
> … The blurring of regular and irregular forces enables those in authority to deny responsibility for the actions of these armed forces. This denial has been used particularly in relation to the military supply train. Government military commanders interviewed by the Group denied that *murahaleen* were used to protect the train, or any responsibility for their actions. Other government officials placed responsibility on tribal leaders. In turn, Rizeigat and Misseriya

> tribal leaders interviewed by the Group were adamant that the *murahaleen* are irresponsible elements that they were unable to control and who are attracted by the incentives offered by the government. It is after all, they explained, a "government train".

Expressed in another way, whilst strategies of delegation and ideological mobilisation by the NIF had mitigated the effects of the war on central competence, it was able in the final analysis only to slow state failure, as religious appeals proved weaker than local security needs, resource conflicts and kinship/communal affiliations. In the North, overlapping patrimonial networks, parallel popular organisations, and powerful rural elites had, in reality, made the homogenous and continuous instititutional regulation of society increasingly difficult. To compensate the state was forced to defend its hegemonic image with sporadic and violent demonstrations of force: crackdowns and suppression of political opponents, regular raids and harrassment[292] against distrusted internal communities, such as the unoffical IDP camps on the outskirts of Khartoum[293], and regular purges of the civil service.

Expanding the policies adopted in the Nuba Mountains, the military began seeking alliances with Southern factions and movements. For the leaders of these, an alliance was not solely a question of personal enrichment, but also often of survival. The predominantly Dinka component of the SPLA was ill-disciplined and its practices of living off the land, forced recruitment and a history of forceful elimination of local leaders had caused resentment. According to one source, fighting between Southern factions had caused more deaths amongst the Nuer and the Dinka than the conflict with the government (Jok and Hutchinson 1999, 127). The result was the creation of numerous local militias, particularly amongst tribes in Equatoria that were tactically linked to Khartoum. These groups were divided between rival movements with political goals, normally seccession of the South from the North, and militias, often unaffiliated to political groups but willing to cooperate in specific operations[294]. The SPLA-Nasir section, headed by Riek Macher, handicapped by an inadequate supply of arms and ammunition, had ended their hostilities with the main body of SPLA as PDF units begin advancing on Nasir in 1995. Shortly after, a number of mainly Nuer leaders, under the name of the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), signed secret agreements with the GoS. In 1997 Riek Macher, Kerubino Bol and several others in the UDSF formalised this relationship by signing the Khartoum Peace Agreement[295] (cf. Young 2003, 430-433).

In signing this agreement, the government, whilst maintaining a more than rhetorical Islamism, revealed an increasing pragmaticism. In 1998, in response to the Khartoum Peace Agreement, a new constitution was passed that represented a compromise between Islamism and secularism (cf. Deegan 1999). The constitution announced a form of multi-party democracy that, however, maintained a ban on all parties opposed to *shari'a* and was weighted massively in favour of the government.

Between 1992 and 1997 the PDF reached both its peak and began its decline. The rapid expansion of PDF recruitment with the announcement of *jihad* in 1992 took place without improving either the disciplinary or economic conditions of the militia. As a result, although able, at least initially, to recruit large numbers of Islamically inspired Sudanese the PDF was a poorly equipped and trained force. Casualties were devastatingly high and frequently unnecessary as ideological enthusiasm outstripped

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[292]These are carried out by security services and state institutions seeking the detention of alcohol sellers or forced enlistment into the army; they are however a symptom of the state's inability to regularly and constantly police these areas (cf Shadid 2000). As one interviewee in Mayo, a slum outside of Khartoum, stated "We can be poor everywhere but at least here we are also free." Interview Mayo resident, Khartoum, February 2003.

[293]In 1989, the Sudanese Relief and Displaced People's Minister, Rev. Peter Orath, estimated that around one million IDPs were resident in these slum areas. (cf. FBIS-NES-89-209)

[294]Little is known about these militias. One of the most important is the *Jeysh Mabor* (White Army), recruited from amongst the Nuer populations of Upper Nile province and lead by local religious/tribal leaders.

[295]The UDSF represented the South Sudan Indepdence Movement (SSIM, leader: Riek Macher), the Union of Sudan African Parties, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM, a separate faction from the SPLA), the Equatorial Defence Force (EDF) and the South Sudan INdendents Group. The agreement did not include the main rebel movement the SPLA or the NDA.

the professionalisation of violence. As time passed the regime became illegitimate, not only in the eyes of many ordinary Sudanese, but within the military, tribal groups and amongst the Islamist constituency. In response, volunteers for the PDF declined and the PDF was met with increasing social opposition in the form of demonstrations and riots. The response was to replace legitimacy with coercion and rewards. The PDF began forceful recruitment, particularly from the IDP and dispossessed populations created by the war, and began offering substantial benefits for those willing to 'volunteer'. However, these recruits were still not disciplined into a cohesive organisation. The death of large numbers of the PDF's student cadre had left the organisation without a veteran command structure, and the short-term contracts of the majority of PDF volunteers meant that most lessons learned were lost. The PDF became a fluid mass of combatants, many of whom were interested solely in economic rewards, without effective coordination or control.

6.5 1997- 2001: Leadership Competitions and the Reassertion of the State

Political power, economic opportunity and the extended war had antagonised factionalism amongst the collegial elite of the NIF. The conflict was less between Islamic hardliners and moderates, as it has often been portrayed, than between factions that disagreed over the supremacy of national over Islamist interests; but more importantly it was over power (cf. el-Affendi 1999). Whilst the latter still believed in the predominance of ideology, expressed as an Islamic 'revolution', as the motor of change and revival, the latter emphasised the return to pragmatic politics and *raison d'etat*. These differences compounded existing power struggles between an old guard of the NIF, like Turabi, who possessed moral authority and popular appeal, and a younger generation in the government, such as President Bashir and Ali Osman Taha. As Africa Confidential noted "most dissidents were Turabi's bright young men but are now middle-aged and tired of waiting for him to relax the leash," (AC, 7 January 2000). In 1995 these political differences erupted into confrontation after radical elements in Khartoum backed a failed assassination attempt against Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa[296]. The regime was forced to choose between national interest and their investments in supporting international *jihadi* Islam. The regime split over their reponse and a number of ministers, such as the interior minister Nafi' Ali Nafi', temporarily lost their positions. At the time rumours were reported that due to tensions within the party Turabi had called on supporters to carry arms in case of a showdown with the army[297]. The consequences of the regime's choices were again violently underlined when in August 1998 the US launched a Scud missile against the al-Shifa factory in Khartoum in retaliation for the bombings of US embassies in Dar al-Salaam and Nairobi. In December of the same year, ten senior NIF members signed the 'Memo of Ten' against Turabi. By December 1999, President Bashir had declared a 'state of emergency' dissolved parliament, was manoeuvring for reconciliation with opposition parties, and openly discussing an end to the civil war[298].

This split over internal politics was expressed in part by two different conceptions of the PDF; for the ideologues of the NIF the PDF was a replacement for the army, whilst for the army it was as an auxillary force. Whilst the military and President Bashir saw the Islamic volunteers as:

> The legitimate child of the Armed Forces…which have become a school contributing effectively in restructuring the society and in purifying the society of numerous flaws, such as laxity, irresponsibility, and indifference. The People's Defense has become a school that prepares all the members of the Sudanese people… to build a healthy Muslim society freeof all illnesses and short comings.[299]

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[296]For the consequences of this attack on Sudan's international relations see Young (2002).
[297]FBIS-NES-95-187.
[298]This possibly presents the regime's turn around as more radical than it actually was. The reality appears to point to an isolated and autocratic regime seeking, at least in part, to preserve its power and the Islamist project it initiated through compromise rather than conflict. One of the main criticisms of the Machakos process and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005 is that it has guaranteed this, by formalising the consolidation of the GoS and the SPLA as autocratic hegemons in the North and South, whilst ignoring other opposition parties or regional interests.
[299]Sudan Television, October 1993, FBIS-NES-93-199.

For Turabi, the PDF was the legitimate form of a Sudanese military organisation, not dependent on colonial "Sandhurst" military traditions, but on Islamic history and the individual imperatives of *jihad*[300]. The 'Islamic' model of army is based upon a flat hierarchy and a mass of volunteer *mujahideen* (Aboul Enein and Zuhur 2004). This however, contradicted the secular hierarchies and training of the military. Nevertheless, pervasive rumours[301] since the early 1990s said that Turabi's faction saw the PDF, not as a means of bolstering the army, but as an organisation designed to replace it entirely with a force of *mujahid* – Islamic citizen soldiers.

The 'group of ten'[302], gathered behind the second vice president Ali Osman Taha. were exhausted with Turabi's reliance on a shadow government and popular mobilisation with which he circumvented institutional procedure and powers. For example, as Speaker of the National Assembly, Turabi had frequently undermined its representative role by directly resolving problems through personal discussions with the executive (el-Affendi 1999, 23). In 1997, Ali Karti, State Minister for Justice and a supporter of Taha's, became the PDF coordinator and allowed the SAF to take de facto control of internal appointments in the organisation[303]. In January 1997, Bashir established a higher authority for mobilisation, which reported directly to him; it was headed by Maj. Gen. Zubayr Muhammad Saleh one of Bashir's closest allies within the army. This body stood above all existing military organisations, including the PDF, in local and national mobilisation of popular forces[304], and had the ability to "seek the help of an official, body or individual" in performing its functions (Sudanese Radio 26 January 1997). In 1997-8 Compulsory National Service with the professional military of two years was reinstated, whilst the regulations concerning training and recruitment of the PDF were increasingly less strictly adhered to.

In December 1999, President Bashir dissolved the National Assembly, declared a state of emergency and dismissed Turabi from his positions as speaker in the Assembly and secretary general of the National Congress. National Security and Intelligence Services were centralised and reformed, by a National Security Act. Rumours reported that the regime was recruiting members of Nimieri's security services as a way of undermining Turabi's influence throughout the hydra headed body[305]. In July 2000 Bashir appointed ten senior military officers to the cabinet. Shortly after, according to the *Rai al-Am* newspaper in Khartoum, Turabi warned of a third force emerging from either "the armed forces or the street to fill the gap."[306] Despite the tension between the factions, physical confrontations were limited: in June 2000 police broke up a pro-Turabi rally by the NIF Youth Union; in September Turabi's supporters rioted in a number of Sudanese towns; and in October pro-Turabi student demonstrators were accused by the government of opening fire on the police. The government's response was a swift rounding up of Turabi's supporters and the breaking up of pro-Turabi cells. The ease with which this was done attests less, to the legitimacy of Bashir or Taha, than of the extremely limited legitimacy of the Islamist movement as a whole.

During the fragmentation with Turabi, Ali Karti and President Bashir were careful to renew the call for PDF volunteers and the path of "jihad and martyrdom"; however, this would no longer be an autonomous sector. In the words of Bashir, "We are calling for freedom in Sudan, but those who think that freedom is a call to anarchy and abuse to the martyrs are under illusion."[307] But as the NIF fragmented, the ideology and discourse they had introduced into the public sphere was contested and

[300]Interview Sadiq al-Turabi, Popular Congress member and son of Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, Khartoum, February 2003.
[301]See SPLA Radio broadcast 3 September 1990, FBIS-NES-90-171.
[302]The group behind Turabi's deposal is known as the 'Group of Ten'; whilst not all names are known the following are all members: Bakri Hassan Salih – security; Ibrahim Ahmed Omer – Education Minister, Osman Khalid Modawi – businessman and financier, Nai'I Ali Naf'I – security, Ali Ahmed Karti – PDF Co-ordinator; Ghazi Salah Eddin.
[303]Interview Sadiq al-Turabi, Popular Congress representative, Khartoum, January 2003.
[304]Republican Decree No 42.
[305] Sudan Focal Point Briefing 25 January 2001.
[306]*Rai al-Amm* website, Khartoum 10 March 2000.
[307]Republic of Sudan Radio, 18 October 1999; BBC Monitoring Record Number: 0E03178EAC6272AA.

turned against them[308]. The effect of this on the regime's mobilisation was direct. In a secret letter in 2002, Ghazi Salah al-Din Attabani, the government's Peace Advisor, acknowledged that "following the schism, the movement had lost its appeal to the students, women and young professionals who had provided it with a steady stream of recruits for more than two decades" (ICG 2003, 12). This illegitimacy of the regime was consolidated as respected Islamic intellectuals, who had lost their positions after the split, opted for martyrdom fighting for the PDF. In an attempt to recoup the damage done, two of these Dr Muhammad Umar, ex-minister of Industry, and Mahud Sharif, a scientist, were celebrated by President Bashir at the 11th anniversary of the Salvation Revolution.

On the 20 February 2001, Hassan al-Turabi's opposition Popular National Congress party signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the SPLA, promising the South the right to self-determination and federal system in Sudan in exchange for shared opposition to Bashir. The next day he was imprisoned. Today, few volunteer for the PDF and those that do are most often state employees who would otherwise lose their jobs or local auxillaries. Donations have increasingly come from a small circle of supporters and recruits from groups the government can easily coerce. This recently has become farcical with government departments offering 'donations' to the government sponsored PDF[309].

Nevertheless, despite its illegitimacy the PDF has not been disbanded. In the summer of 2003 the PDF warned the government against yielding and abandoning *Shari'a* in the peace talks[310] and marched against rumours of its impending disbandment[311]. The government was forced to defend and protect the select interests that exist through the organisation by amalgamating it into the official Sudanese military system.

During the *'Eid* celebrations in 2003 PDF recruits could be seen carrying out the distinctly unmilitary function of collecting sheep skins. Weapons distributed are now registered, and PDF forces have little autonomy. In Darfur this control has been used to demonstrate to foreign observers the good faith of the government in disarming militias. In August 2004, 500 PDF members handed their weapons in a staged demobilisation ceremony observed by foreign dignitaries. The commander of their unit was careful to stress: "We did not arm them for ethnic cleaning or genocide but so that they might maintain security and stability in their areas... There are no outlaws or Janjaweed amongst them". The men chanted: "We have not worked for Janjaweed, we have not worked for tribalism. We are sacrificers for our religion, we are sacrificers for our nation."[312]

This chapter has described the four periods of organisational transformation in the PDF. In the first, between 1985 and 1989, no central organisation existed and a series of localised tribal militias were formed in response to insecurity. These were linked to central resources and interests by the patrimonial networks of the Umma party. In the second period, between 1989 and 1992, the PDF emerged as a central organisation under the revolutionary regime of the National Islamic Front. Whilst maintaining the network of tribal militias in rural areas, the PDF also began recruiting Islamist cadres from within the universities and the military to act as a praetorian guard for the regime. The PDF developed into a military apparatus, linked into a local administration and security system designed to monitor and control society. In the third stage, between 1992 and 1997, the PDF was radically

[308] The most visible sign of this vicious circle of legitimacy was after Dr Turabi's signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the SPLA in 2001. This split from the regime's official policy not only threatened its political stance but also bought into question the retrospective status of the many PDF dead. Under Turabi's edict and the heavily publicised fatwas declaring *jihad*, PDF casualties had fallen in the path of their personal Islamic duty and hence were *shaheed* (martyrs) with an appropriate status in heaven. When Turabi, a prime proclaimer of *jihad*, made his separate peace with the SPLA their status became ambiguous – its dead were no longer clearly martyrs but possibly merely casualties in a political rather than religious war.

[309] In an appeal in 2004 the PDF co-ordinator Kamal al-Ibrahim requested "money and other types of assistance for the *mujahidin* (fighters of the holy war)," from grand institutions and companies. A week later the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Tropical Diseases Hospital donated a convoy of food to the PDF.

[310] *Al-Sahafa*, 27 June 2003.

[311] PDF parades in Khartoum in favour of holy war'. *Deutsche Press Agentur*, June 27.

[312] *Reuters*, 27 August 2004.

transformed. With the ascendance of the NIF, complete by 1992, a nationwide *jihad* was proclaimed and the PDF expanded to act as a citizen's army, often outnumbering the regular military. During this stage, however, rather than a regulated recruitment of combatants and a disciplinary structure, the PDF relied on the mobilisation of a popularist Islamic discourse. Recruits were neither effectively trained nor regulated, resulting simultaneously in grave human rights abuses and military failures. This strategy backfired as volunteer numbers declined and the PDF was forced to use coercion and rewards to motivate combatants. In the final stage, between 1997 and 2001, the PDF became an increasingly corrupt and dissolute organisation. The death of numerous cadres, and its inability to establish durable command and disciplinary institutions, resulted in the PDF's failure in the eyes of its main constituencies. As a result, when the state executive, led by President Bashir, initiated a revival of state institutions, over the NIF's popularist structures, the PDF was sidelined.

6.6 Conclusion

There has long been a need for scholars to disaggregate 'Islam' in Sudan into its varied ideological/communal and political/social trends. For example, Islam in the hands of PDF recruits is very different from the Islam of NIF elites, such as Turabi; or even soldiers, such as Bashir. The PDF never propagated a specific Islamist or *Jihadi* ideology but was a screen against which various imaginations of *Jihad,* and more material interests, could be projected. As such it produced an extremely heterogeneous organisation – ranging from the predatory abuses of the tribal nomads, to the martyrdom of sincere believers; attracting Nuba seeking a more orthodox expression of their faith and rejected by *Ansar al-Sunna*, followers of Wahhabism who dismissed Turabi as excessively Western. The PDF was also in its more self-sacrificial variant, a way for many Sudanese Islamists to express a desire for a pure choice where few if any other options existed and disillusionment was endemic. Many have, in this way, come to participate through the PDF in the imagined defensive clash between the *Dar al-Islam* (the land of Islam) and the *Dar al-Harb* (the land of war) that is commonly recited in many Islamist discourses. The result is that whilst Turabi may represent one of the most 'moderate' and modern forms of Islamism, his followers often applied an Islamically inspired barbarism in fighting.

Change in the PDF has been both endogenous and exogenous. The Popular Defence Forces rose to prominence on the back of the revolutionary project of the National Islamic Front, and declined as this revolution lost direction and the costs of the war mounted. Whilst institutional goals remained vague, cooperation between competing interests were easily managed through the allocation of positions and the granting of freedom to individual actors. However, as the institutional structure of the Islamist state became more clearly defined, further reforms challenged both vested interests and the specific visions of particular actors. The fragmentation of the NIF elite and growing international disapproval of Khartoum convinced many in the elite to abandon the revolutionary Islamist path. On the other hand, casualties on the battlefield and disillusionment with the NIF led to declining popularity and volunteers for the PDF. Whilst this decline was delayed by increasing resources and the use of force, without support from the top such a strategy was doomed.

The inability of the PDF to significantly institutionalise is the result of its inability to reconcile these different conceptions of itself. Whilst tribal militias have been able and willing to transfer loyalty between multiple organisations capable of providing logistical support without compromising their own goals, simultaneously, for many Islamists, the PDF has failed to achieve the transcendental goals the NIF proclaimed. Formed as a heterogeneous mix of local interests and Islamism, the attachment to locality has dominated over the strategic autonomy and enforcement capacity required for a viable military organisation. As a result, defection from the PDF has been common. On April 16th 2000, Misseriya and Rizeigat signed a peace treaty with the Dinka, the terms of which have not been breached. In 2001, Arab tribes in Kordofan independently signed a peace treaty with Southern tribes and refused to mobilise troops for the taking of Gogrial. As a result, an assault on Gogrial in 2002 did not contain a *Murahileen* component.

The PDF managed to mobilise two political constituences that could, in future, still prove hazardous to stability in Sudan. Firstly, Islamic extremists who support a Salafi Islamism that is genuinely fundamentalist and has the potential to mount a violent opposition to an increasingly pragmatic and corrupt regime. Secondly, Islamic communities who invested in the NIF and the PDF in return for promises of regional development and national modernisation. The failure of Khartoum to fulfil the interests of these groups, has created diverse actors, with the networks, training and resources

necessary to turn against the state. In 2000, a group called *Tafkir wa al-Hijra*, with an ex-PDF member at its head, attacked the normally peaceful *Ansar al Mohamidiyya* Sufi order, killing 25 and injuring 60[313]. On the other hand, throughout Sudan, the latter of the two groups has been influential in fragmenting the Northern identity and seeking regional solutions. The most evident example of this is in the recent events in Darfur (see appendix 4).

The heartland of the NIF, the University of Khartoum, is a good place to measure popular sentiment. In July 2003, opposition candidates beat pro-government candidates in student elections for the first time in over a decade[314]. However, like the SPLA, the regime is caught between what remains of its grass roots support, mobilised over 15 years to defend faith and the nation, and international pressure for peace (Justice Africa Briefing, 7 August 2003). The risk exists that as the leaders accept a settlement as inevitable, the rank-and-file, mobilised and indoctrinated in 20 years of struggle and perceiving limited peace dividends, try and spoil an eventual agreement. Hope lies with the quiet but vast majority of the Sudanese population who have, for too long, had no voice with which to make their wishes heard.

[313] *Al Ahram Weekly*, December 14 2000
[314] *Reuters* July 17

7 The Structure of Militias and Civil War

Wars and other kinds of human relationships with few or no rules are proof enough [that] … it is perfectly possible for relationships between people to be structured even though they are played without rules.

Norbert Elias, What is Sociology? (1984, 75)

In Sudan, where a dominant Islamic-Arab ruling class controlled the state, self defence militias formed amongst Arab tribes were coopted as counter-insurgency instruments in rural and periphery areas. In 1989 these militias were institutionalised as a militant Islamist citizens' army. In Lebanon, where the ruling class was divided by multiple confessional elites, armed parties formed political militias to defend Lebanon's Christian confession. In 1980 these separate militias coagulated into a hierarchical, governing and extractive organisation promoting a militant Christian conservative ideology. In both cases, militias transformed from defensive units co-opted by political actors into institutionalised political-military organisations.

During these transformations militias centralised decision-making, regulated the recruitment of combatants and moderated the private incentives of their members. But nevertheless, central control was often indirect and variable – highest when communities and the militias were unified by the threat or presence of insecurity; weakest when disorder at the centre or opportunities at the periphery encouraged the autonomy of local leaders. The militias also developed 'hard' interests in security and autonomy; necessary to survive periods of factional fragmentation, international isolation and military defeat. As a result, they persisted even once their political goals had become unobtainable, their legitimacy had dissipated, and their civilian support base grew to oppose them.

Through these transformations the PDF and the LF developed into very different organisations. Whilst the PDF became a network of locally recruited militias heavily involved in raiding and punitive operations against civilians, the LF developed into a 'state within a state' with disciplinary and extractive instruments penetrating, and in its final years dominating, society. These differences indicated different patterns of organisational development and different scopes and depth of institutionalisation.

This chapter attempts to identify some of the comparative differences and similarities between the Lebanese Forces and the Popular Defence Forces. The intention is not to be exhaustive. The PDF and LF developed into very different organisations rendering a close comparison of outcomes unsuitable. Instead the intention is to comparatively trace the processes of organisational development within the militias. This will be done by identifying those mechanisms within the Weberian categories of institutionalisation outlined in chapter three. A second intention of this chapter is to discuss the relationships of the LF and the PDF to the state. A final intention, which will be presented first, is to outline a model for analysing civil war that avoids aggregating such conflicts into unitary or Clausewitzian organisational competitions.

Two caveats must be made. Firstly, the empirical material was neither fine nor robust enough to support conclusions about the intentions of the leaders of these militias. These intentions were only identifiable through public statements and post-facto private interviews, and it is, therefore, impossible make firm conclusions about the limits of strategic agency in the militias. This analysis can bring us no closer to opening the 'black box' of militia decision-making. The question of whether or not these organisational outcomes were intentional policies cannot be answered.

Secondly, it is not possible to develop general conclusions based upon only two case studies. The conclusions presented here can apply only to the cases of Sudan and Lebanon until further testing is undertaken. They are presented in an analytic form not to mislead the reader but rather to make explicit the intention to identify theoretic results about processes within empirical cases.

Tab. 11: Table 11: Comparative Summary of the LF and the PDF

	LF *Qu'at Lubnaniya*	PDF*Qu'at Difa'a as-Sha'abi*
Predecessors	Kata'ib Party 'Tigers' NLP Militia Guardians of the Cedars Tanzim	*Baggara* Tribal Militia National Islamic Front Party Militia
Duration	1976-1991	1989-
Political Organisation	Lebanese Front	National Islamic Front/ Government of Sudan
Ideological Orientation	Maronite Nationalist	Islamist Nationalist Islamist Jihadi
Political Goal	Control of State Defence of Christian Community	Control of State Defence of NIF
Cohesion	Bureaucratic	Ideological
Control	Discipline	Impunity
Tactical Orientation	Static and Defensive Warfare	Mobile Warfare Skirmishing with enemy Human Wave attacks
Military Leader	Bashir Gemayel † 1982; Fuad Abu Nader; Elia Hobeika and Samir Geagea; Samir Geagea	Local Military Commanders National Coordinator ('Abu Gissena' † 1990-1; ?; Ali Karti 1997- ;
Political Leader	Pierre Gemayel † 1984;	Hassan Al-Turabi until 2001
Location	Home Territory	Non-Home Territory

7.1 War Systems and the Different Levels of Armed Conflict

One of the intentions of this thesis was to analyse the linkages between the strategic and tactical levels within militias. To understand, through a study of organisational structures, how violence as a private act was conditioned by collective goals in civil wars. This was extremely complex when looking at the case studies. Not only do the previous chapters describe the LF and the PDF as organisations that were both simultaneously centralized and heavily local, but they emphasise that the interlinkages between these levels were often fluid. This observation indicates a broader truth essential for the study of civil wars.

Unlike interstate wars, civil wars are not solely conflicts between organisations. They represent the partial or total breakdown of the institutions that coordinate, protect and mediate a society's interactions. As a result, they produce individual reactions that when aggregated entail a systemic environment different from that of interstate warfare. This environment is, on one hand, fragmented into multiple localised arenas whose processes and actors are not necessarily linked with larger phenomena or organisations. On the other, the boundaries separating different levels of national and international action are sundered. This suggests that civil conflicts are best conceptualised not as competitions between unitary organisations, but as an overlapping of different levels of aggregation that require distinct analysis. If we extend this observation into an analytic model a brief comparison reveals four common levels of competition in civil wars (portrayed in table 8.2).

Tab. 12: Table 12: Levels of Conflict in Civil War

International	Competition within regional and international security blocs
Political	'Elite' conflicts over bargaining power, the control of state institutions and the distribution of goods and resources.
Socio-Economic	Inter-ethnic – confessionally or ethnically determined exclusion. Intra-ethnic – class based and patrimonial exclusion
Local	'Small groups' – resource, environmental and security conflicts

Each of these levels was distinct in the goals, means and rhetoric of the actors, but none were isolated or autonomous from the others. Actors sought to manipulate the opportunities provided by the levels above and below them in the pursuit of 'victory', 'security' or other goods. Thus regional competition was an essential source of heavy weaponry for armed groups, armed groups a source of ammunition for local and resource conflicts and local conflicts a resource for individuals.

The fact that modern civil wars are integrated into global economic markets, a fact emphasised by new war scholars, is merely a reflection of this more generalised phenomenon. The destruction of the institutional arrangements governing society in civil wars transforms the formal boundaries defining the state, including those separating the state from its neighbours. Thus highly localised groups, such as the LF, were able to establish foreign missions in Israel, Washington and Paris; purchase weapons from Bulgaria and manipulate the engagements of the MultiNational Force.

The other side of this globalisation of war was a parallel 'localisation' of war as local conflicts became violent due to the endogenous effects of violence. Thus resource conflicts that may have been resolved by legal or customary adjudication in peace-time became the source of widespread intra-communal violence in war. The minor political disputes that were resolved by negotiation in peace-time became the focus of violent signalling (through tit-for-tat kidnapping or artillery duels, for example) in war. The inter-ethnic competition of peacetime transformed into extremist groups killing according to ethnic origin. The presence of violence encouraged the reproduction of violence and civil war created violent conflicts, violent ideologies and violent actors motivated by reasons entirely separate from those which led to the breakdown of law and order.

Within these complex systems war, as a violent competition between military opponents, continued. An 'inner circle' of full-time security networks, elite military units, organisational staff and ideological or

personal loyalists was obedient to the direct commands of central organisations. Political figures, such as Hassan al-Turabi or Bashir Gemayel, legitimised the use of violence. Military commanders directed units to particular fronts or regions. Party structures established recruitment and mobilisation structures. However, the modalities and strategies of these leaders were mediated and obscured by second-tier interests (in resources, security threats, power and autonomy). Tribally recruited PDF or neighbourhood LF units were often reluctant to accept the authority of a national leadership. Weak central organisations were easily co-opted as proxies for state interests, and extremist fringes, whether *jihadi* Islamists or the members of the 'Guardian of the Cedars', were able to kill without official sanction or control.

This model asserts that modern civil wars differ ontologically from interstate war primarily in the differing ability of sub-state armed groups to co-ordinate these multiple levels of conflict. The breakdown of civil war initiated unforeseen and unintended conflicts at levels beneath and above that of the armed groups. The consequences of these secondary conflicts depended on an armed group's ability to control or co-opt these conflicts. This makes the processes of organisational formation, coalitional consolidation and generational change within the armed groups of central concern for the academic study of civil war.

The results of this thesis, outlined in this chapter, analyse the interactions between these different levels of aggregation. Most importantly, they compare the means by which the Lebanese Forces and the Popular Defence Forces established central control over local forces.

7.2 Militia Formation and Antecedent Organisations: Socio-Military Groups

In chapter three this thesis rejected the notion that militias were formed and controlled autonomously by either state or society. It suggested instead, using Beatrice Hibou's concept of privatisation and Joel Migdal's state in society approach, that militias represented a delegation of state authority to non-state groups, and was thus a strategy mixing the interests of both actors. This process was defined by two ideal types, privatisation, in which a central state retracts the boundaries of its sovereignty and permits allied groups to form militias, and informalisation, in which informal networks subvert and dissolve the state's control of coercive instruments and form militias to defend their authority.

In Sudan and Lebanon it appears that the processes of militia formation lay somewhere in between these two mechanisms. Self-defence, military and political militias were formed by delegation, with state agents and social actors cooperating, but this was neither solely a privatisation nor an informalisation of violence. There are two reasons for this, the first is the absence of a single dominant actor in militia mobilisation, and the second is the nature of state-society relations in both countries.

The first reason for the failure of the privatisation/informalisation dichotomy is that militias were not formed by a unitary actor outside of the state but emerged as a variety of responses to the break down of law and order. The original formations of the militias were uncoordinated, reactive and defensive military units structured as much by existing norms surrounding violence (tribal raiding, honour killings), social organisations and the secondary effects of violence as by any formal actor. For example, after the SPLA attack on el-Gardud in 1985, Arab nomads, regardless of political affiliation, sought weapons to establish their own defensive forces separate from the government. These weapons were then employed in revenge killings and cattle raiding against Dinka populations. Similarly, in Lebanon, the flurry of assaults by the Palestinian *fedayeen* and by Christian parties initiated a process of communal mobilisation. This was structured not only by the right wing political parties, but by the militarization of *qabadays* and neighbourhood groups. In this way, villages, tribes, religious groups, gangs and parties, amongst many others, entered the war without any affiliation to the state. Delegation was not a transfer of power, for no single actor received this power, but the fragmentation of authority. Security gaps were filled by a diversity of uncoordinated self defence militias and political militias – collectively termed 'socio-military groups' here.

The second reason that the informalisation and privatisation dichotomy fails is that the nature of governance in Sudan and Lebanon makes the analytic distinction between state, government and society problematic. Political actors competed in all fields of formal and informal power wielding economic networks, social movements and state institutions against rivals. As a result, political elites maintained open affiliations with particular ethnic constituencies and the state bureaucracy, in both countries, was penetrated by political parties. The Sudanese and Lebanese states, therefore, were in

many ways already ‘private’ bodies and their capacities for violence were *already* privatised. In Sudan, the SAF was controlled by the Arab and Islamic ruling class, but, furthermore, was extensively penetrated by NIF cadres. In Lebanon, the head of the state’s most important military and intelligence agencies were, according to the terms of the National Pact, Maronite[315]. State agents balanced their professional obligations with their loyalties to their communities and politicians. When stated in this manner, the delegation of violence-making was the confirmation of existing alliances between powerful members of the state and particular social groups.

This pattern of mobilisation had two effects in structuring the civil war.

Firstly, at the outbreak of war the militias were not cohesive organisations. Militia units were localised, self-learning, defensive, and reactive; recruitment was uncontrolled and resource management ad-hoc. Diverse groups were united by functional, although highly fluid, alliances between political, security and economic interests. Networks and organisations existed but were not dominant. Militia behaviour was not controlled by any single collective actor but represented the unintended consequence of multiple parallel interests.

Secondly, because the mobilisation of militias did not follow any unified agenda the initial social cleavages caused by violence did not reflect the political conflicts that had led to civil war. The diverse units mobilised for war represented a broad range of interests in violence; some of which were entirely apolitical, for example in security or loot, others represented the extreme fringe of the political spectrum, such as the ‘Guardians of the Cedars’ in Lebanon. The targeting of violence by these actors determined a structure of insecurity and reactive mobilisation that was not defined by the political program or intentions of any single actor. Thus the conflict between left-wing and right-wing groups in Lebanon transformed rapidly into a conflict between Christian and Muslim confessions as violence expanded to take place between neighbourhoods rather than organisations. Similarly, in Sudan, conflicts between SPLA and the government were transformed into a militarization of nomadic and Dinka societies and the aggravation of resource conflicts between these groups.

This analysis of militia formation could be termed ‘spontaneous mobilisation’: violent movements formed in the name of the state, and were subsequently legitimised with state cooperation and approval, but they acted autonomously from the state. But such an analysis would be misleading. Whilst volunteers and previously peaceful organisations were mobilised, it was the NIF and the Kata’ib parties who transformed the militias from epiphenomenon of violence into the perpetuating and prosecuting agents of war. In both cases these groups had prepared extensively for the predicted breakdown of civil order. In the Lebanese case the Kata’ib and other Christian party militias had recruited and trained openly for decades prior to the outbreak of war with the full knowledge and often cooperation of state security services. In Sudan, although these structures were not formal militias, the extension of patrimonial and party networks into militant Islamist student groups, the military and the tribal nomads of Western Sudan represented an equally consequent capacity. These cadres and networks were the essential coordinating agents in the process of militia institutionalisation[316]. These parties emerged as the self-proclaimed defenders of ethnic identities and provided the essential linkages between the state and the diverse local units of mobilised combatants. Delegation was an attempt to recapture power,

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[315] This is a, necessary, simplification of a more complex phenomenon. Both Sudan and Lebanon were multi-ethnic societies that had, in the post-colonial era, histories of division and conflict in times of crisis and over questions of national identity. This in turn had created a complex of fears linked to the control of state institutions, most importantly the military. Firstly, professional fears, bolstered by prior cases of disobedience and desertion, that the deployment of the military against internal uprisings would lead to its fragmentation or would be insufficient to halt rebellion. Secondly, fears amongst local communities that the military would not or could not provide adequate protection for property or persons. Thirdly, fears amongst a political leadership that the professional military could act as a vehicle for a seizure of power or a reduction of their authority. Whilst ethnic political elites may not have directly controlled the state security apparatus they were able to manipulate these fears to guarantee a substantial influence over these institutions actions and budgets.

[316] Ideal typically this process of militia formation might be divided into three functionally separate processes. Weapons were offered by state agents in exchange for support of the state army against a common enemy. Coordination was provided by political parties in exchange for protection and increased power vis à vis political rivals. Manpower was provided by threatened communties in return for the ability to organise self-defensive forces.

already lost, by conferring legitimacy on these non-state initiatives.

The first mechanism of militia structure is, therefore, that of 'institutional bricolage', the solving of new problems and the structuring of collective behaviour through the recombination of antecedent informal institutions.

Inspired by Levi-Strauss' concept of "intellectual bricolage" (1966), institutional bricolage describes how existing symbolic formulae are used repeatedly in the construction of institutions, thereby economising on cognitive energy by offering easy classification and legitimacy (Cleaver 2002, 15; cf. Douglas 1986, 76). Bricolage enables inefficient organisations to reproduce themselves by building upon and reconfiguring antecedent social materials and organisations. Thus militias adopted tribal structures, neighbourhood self defence units absorbed the *qabaday* and his followers, and party militias employed military recruits and equipment. Militias were mobilised even when politicians and commanders lacked the basic infrastructure to control recruits and institutional bricolage provided a bridging solution to more permanent organisations.

This stage of pure bricolage appears from the two cases to be transient, fading shortly after it emerged. Such socio-military groups could not successfully manage the prolonged demands of war fighting. Bricolage creates conditions that "inhibit long range commitments and investments, make long run solutions impossible to instate, and indefinitely postpone serious institution building" (Lanzara 1998, 7). Fragmented, dislocated and self-supporting units were inefficient and solved none of the logistical problems of warfare. Furthermore, the 'enthusiasm' and solidarity required to maintain the cohesion of these units faded as the wars stalemated. Within a year or less the political parties involved in the formation of militias had developed centralised command structures, supply networks and training that either absorbed or restructured these local forces. In the process these militias became explicit instruments of power and authority for political actors. These actors were empowered by their ability and willingness to use violence and reconfigure society.

7.3 The Establishment of Central Control

These organisations originated in both cases with actors seeking to institutionalise the means of authority that had been created by war. This took place at two levels. Firstly, local leaders took control of neighbourhood units; secondly, militant members of political parties began to establish centralised supply networks, political connections and decision-making instiutitons. Both groups used violence to reconstruct their social-economic landscape to their benefit. Political moderates were undone by their reluctance to use violence, territorial spaces of exchange (markets, transition zones etc.) became spaces of violent contention and distrusted populations were attacked and their possessions looted.

This process was a multifaceted transformation of society, which created new opportunities and constraints for those that controlled violence. Perhaps one of the most important effects of this transformation was the centrifugal effect it could have on local commanders. Within the chaos produced by war local issues and resources often became more immedetialy important than the strategies and demands of central organisations. The effects of this change on the organisation of the militias were defined, in large part, by the extent to which central organisations established the capacity to dominate local forces. Whilst in Lebanon the LF under Bashir Gemayel sought to extend his authority throughout the Christian canton and into the diverse militias, in Sudan the PDF did not and permitted tribal militias to act with impunity. This process of establishing central domination over local units was complex and conflictual, but two elements were of key importance. The first was whether or not commanders were able to establish 'central' military units with relative superiority over local forces. The second was whether or not central organisations were able to control protection and resources.

7.3.1 Central Units

Both the PDF and the LF emerged as hybrid structures recruiting both from local communities and and from politicalyl motivated constituencies. Within these structures, central units were the direct instruments of organisational authority. They were often full-time members of the militia and were more experienced, better trained and better equipped than local units, often profiting from military aid provided by state sponsors. In both cases these units were initially recruited from the youth or militant movements of party organisations, although, as we shall see later, over time IDPs and refugees became important sources of recruits. Within the LF these units were used not only to reinforce local units on

the battlefield, but were used as disciplinary forces, for example in halting the 'Black Saturday' massacre and stopping local leaders from interfering in the work of the popular committees. Within the PDF an inner circle of cadres, was recruited, between 1989 and 1992, from amongst the NIF students groups and social movements. This cadre was, however, not formed into regular, full-time units, but instead was staffed the mobilising structures through which PDF's local and volunteer formations were recruited.

Regulated recruitment and training was essential in forming central units. It created a functional cohesion amongst combatants both as units and as elements of the central organisation. Existing military studies research tells us that common training ensure that the "values which prevail in most civilian societies are replaced by the group spirit and group loyalties which underlie all military organisations," (Holmes 2003, 36). The process of training required, however, that combatants be taken out of their environments and supported for weeks or months at a time without participating in combat. As a result, in neither case did the creation of central units occur simultaneously across the militia's forces. Instead it was a gradual process of training and often retrainin. The LF progressively centralised the command of military units from 1976 onwards by building up the 'BG' units, then recruiting individuals directly into LF controlled regional commands by 1978, and finally by establishing the elite 'Adonis' and 'Beirut' units in 1980.

Alongside central units the bulk of the PDF's and the LF's manpower was recruited through extensive sporadic or local mobilisation. These recruits were often recruited for specific campaigns and were employed temporarily. They were generally much less well equipped and trained than central units. Nevertheless, they had a number of advantages for central organisations. Most importantly, by living at home or off of a community they acted as a cheap reserve of combatants with tacit and detailed knowledge of their area of operations. In both cases these units provided the defensive backbone of the militias and were largely contained to operations within their home localities. Furthermore, in many cases these units could establish extensive local authority underneath their own leaderships. On one hand, central commanders were often depended on local leadership in recruitment campaigns and as such in many parts of Beirut, and perhaps even more so in Western Sudan, these local commanders could exert a decisive influence over their areas. On the other hand, these units often used violence to grab land, expel distrusted communities and close off their neighbourhoods in the name of security. On numerous occasions it is questionable whether either the state in Sudan or the LF could have controlled local forces without extensive punitive violence. It is clear that when such violence was employed there was a risk of alienating many combatants and supporters, as it did with the *Marada* in 1978 and with some brigades of the *Numuur* in 1980.

In both the PDF and the LF central and local units cooperated in periodic campaigns and specific operations. The LF's 'Mountain War' in 1983-4 consisted of regional units fighting alongside recruits from the Chouf villages. The PDF's urban Islamist recruits served alongside tribal militias in the various campaigns in the Nuba Mountains. In these campaigns, central units were often responsible for instigating violence in an area and then recruiting from the reactive mobilisation of local volunteers. One interviewee in Lebanon[317] described how, in the Chouf campaign, mobile LF central units would purposefully instigate a conflict with the PSP and then manipulate the resultant insecurity to recruit local Christians into defence forces. This inhibited the localised truces and power balances that emerged informally on specific frontlines or regions as the war progressed.

Insurgency theory shows such hybrid structures can provide an immediate combat advantage by creating a movement able to call upon multi-dimensional levels of force (Metz 1993). Whilst groups tightly controlled by the centre are best for fighting set-piece strategically important battles, independent groups are best for counter-guerilla campaigns in local arenas or the carrying out of specific operations – such as kidnapping or car bombing. Nevertheless, these hybrid structures in the militias also created a number of long term problems. Firstly, the formalisation and enforcement of a central leadership and political platform often risked alienating local members who did not follow a specific interpretation of the conflict[318]. Individuals that could be motivated to participate in combat to

[317] Interview with Ziad al-Masri, Beirut, November 2003.

[318] Much of the central organisation's authority may have derived from its ability to identify units or leaders able and willing to carry out specific operations for private or local incentives. For example, the massacres of Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila in September 1982 by Lebanese Forces units was carried out by Deb Anastas' Military Police, Joseph Edde's Black Beret Commandos, Elie Hobeika's Special

address local problems were simply unwilling to risk their lives for ideological goals that they did not share. Secondly, local leaders could become significant threats to the centre's legitimacy or autonomy. Over time these leaders were able to consolidate their authority through predation, the capturing of important resource flows and the building up of loyal military forces. These could either directly challenge central command, as in the case of Samir Geagea, or undertake actions contradicting the centres desired strategy. Thirdly, local commanders occassionally defected entirely from a central organisations and either adopted an armed neutrality or actively supported opponents of the central organisation. This was often done in order to protect local interests. The management of local units along front lines often resembled a perpetual negotiation in which the threat of defection could be constantly used to escape the threat of punishment – for example, the defection of the *Marada* militia in 1978, or the defection of the Rizeigat in 2003.

7.3.2 The Control of Protection

By following the hybrid strategy of vertical and communal recruitment, over time the militias became two track structures. On one hand, a central organisation, recruiting vertically and establishing institutionalised oversight of combatant units. On the other hand, locally recruited forces that remained within home territories, and operated largely autonomously. When the interests of these two levels were in equilibrium this situation persisted often for decades without significant change. However, when these interests diverged they could cause a dramatic loss in central capacity. In this system the militias faced continuous incentives to reduce their losses and maximise their military capacity. One of the most important means of doing this was the capacity of a central structure to establish a monopoly of resources and supply routes, forcing local units into a material dependence on the central structure. This was not necessarily done directly, but by establishing the central organisation as the primary source of protection agency within a territory. This protection could be granted to economic actors, in exchange for rents, or welfare projects but it served to extract revenue from the private sector as well as legitimise militia activity.

In stalemated war zones the LF's and PDF's autonomous capacity to control protection had numerous benefits. Firstly, it increased their access to resources, and therefore their bility to equip, reward and transport recruits. Furthermore, it allowed such activities to be regularised and reduced the uncertainty connected to the sporadic revenue of looting or predation. Secondly, it determined the militia's ability to forgo supplies from third parties, particularly state sponsors. In the two case studies such supplies, from Israel, Iran and Bin Laden, were granted in exchange for ideological or strategic concessions to the supplier. Over time these concessions either in content or form contradicted the organisational goals of the militia. Perhaps the most evident example of this is Israel's insistence on a Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty from Bashir Gemayel. Finally, when the militias were able to monitor the management of resources throughout a territory the militias was able to deny supplies to potentially rebellious commanders, and reduced the exit options for internal dissidents. When protection was fragmented amongst a plethora of actors, individuals or local units could 'play the rackets' in seeking to avoid punishment or control.

As with the central units, the control of protection was not established immediately in either case. Instead militia commanders used centrally recruited units to progressively capture, defend and regularise the use of lucrative resources. This process, when it occurred, transformed the economic base of the militia from an extractive to a productive economic base.

1. Firstly, the transfer of assets from existing capital stores, weaponry from the military, money from banks and businesses, goods from warehouses, and so forth to the control of the militia's central units.

Security Unit, and the Damour Brigade, recruited from members of a Christian village South of Beirut that had been brutally cleansed in January 1976. In Sudan, the Popular Defence Forces delegated raiding missions to particular units who were restrained to their traditional areas and had histories of antagonism with the surrounding Dinka and Nuba tribes blocking Baggara access to grazing and watering grounds.

2. Secondly, the establishment of checkpoints on transport routes and the establishment of tariffs on imported/exported goods. For example, the capture of the ports in Beirut and the key highway 'borders' at Barbara.
3. Thirdly, the establishment of a 'protection tax' to extract revenue from businesses and civilians in the area controlled by the militia.
4. Finally, the recycling of capital into productive enterprises, both legal (construction, real estate and so on) and illegal (drugs and smuggling) in order to guarantee and regularise the flow of revenue into militia coffers.

Profitable sources of revenue were, as Ross suggested, most easily controlled when they were concentrated and fixed assets, when resources were diffuse and 'lootable', as in looting or cattle rustling in Sudan, central actors faced great difficulties in regulating their extraction and distribution. In the final stages of this process, the militias were themselves directly approached by individuals seeking protection for activities.

The Lebanese Forces fought within the static canton in urban and in peri-urban areas surrounding Beirut. The PDF fought in remote rural areas which were often sparsely inhabited and rarely integrated into a national communications network or road system. It is, therefore, perhaps unsurprising that whilst the former established a central control of protection, the latter did not. In Beirut the LF progressively took control of existing economic goods firstly through the regulated looting of the banking sector, warehouses and market area of Beirut, but afterwards by appropriating the protection rents of the state on, for example, the electricity companies and real estate. With a formal infrastructure, such as Beirut's ports, in place and the existence of main transport routes, gaining access to these resources was often simply a case of replacing state with militia agents. The Sudan, on the other hand, was a much more complex regulatory market. The distances and lack of development throughout rural Sudan massively complicated information feed back and enforcement of the control of resources. Furthermore, the Sudanese state resisted any transfer of its rents to the militia and the control of resources in many combat areas was limited to the rewards of looting. As a result whilst LF combatants over time became dependent on their commanders for economic rewards, PDF tribal recruits were rewarded directly by the profits forthcoming from military operations.

In neither of the two cases did the final result of these strategies produce a homogenous result. Within these organisations, political, military and self-defence militias co-existed and cooperated and heterogeneous levels of central control persisted throughout both organisations until the end of the civil wars. In some cases, local units gained almost total autonomy from the centre through the payment of a military or financial 'tribute' to the centre. The most evident examples of this were area commanders, (such as Amine Gemayel or even Samir Geagea in the LF) who were permitted to collect resources and control territory at their own discretion. In other cases, centralised regulated systems of policing and enforcement directly controlled key assets or strongpoints, as was practiced by the LF over the official Port Authority or certain bunkers overlooking the Green Line.

7.4 The Organisation of Militias: Networks or Hierarchies

In many ways the advantages and problems of the hybrid military structures which emerged within the LF and the PDF, can be compared with the similar problems facing the state in choosing to use strategies of indirect or direct rule. In the words of James Scott (1998, 77)

> Indirect rule required only a minimal state apparatus but rested on local elites and communities who had an interest in withholding resources and knowledge from the centre. Direct rule sparked widespread resistance and necessitated negotiations that often limited the centre's power, but for the first time, it allowed state officials direct knowledge of and access to a previously opaque society.

Similarly, in the LF, where central control was established, this was a conflictual process in which the centre had to face down a series of rivals violently. Similarly to the process of state modernisation, perhaps, it appears to have been genuinely traditional groups, possessing robust authority over group members, such as the fiercely independent Rizeiygat tribe in Sudan and the feudal families in north Lebanon, which were unwilling to accept central militia authority. These groups instead focused upon mobilising strong social ties and the formation of defensive forces, rather than participation in 'urban' ideological projects of social transformation.

By comparing the LF to the PDF it is possible to identify how through these mechanisms the militias transformed from disordered networks of local recruits into more centralised organisations able to coordinate mobilisation, deployment and supply of combatants. This process was complicated and disjointed and institutionalisation often stalled or broke down. On some occasions, such as the death of Bashir, in the face of serious political or military crises institutionalisation was even reversed or nullified. Nevertheless, the cases of the Lebanese Forces and the Popular Defence Forces indicate two ideal typical patterns for militia organisation: the centralisation and professionalisation of an organisation or the formation of a network of forces.

In the first a militia maximises direct control of individual violence through the institutionalisation of the control of resources, recruitment and discipline. Loyal units, command hierarchies, training programmes and supply chains connect individuals to each other and to a central strategic agency. Information and resources flow between local units and the centre, and the protection of economic activity is controlled by organisational agents.

In the second pattern the militias are loosely interconnected networks of local units in which the control of any central organisation is mediated by powerful local intermediaries. Resources or information gathered in particular arenas are exhausted or lost in these areas. Central units either don't exist or are weak in relation to local commanders, and are spread thinly throughout the local territories. These militias are highly localised and fragmented organisations possessing little cohesion or strategic direction.

Both of these models depict actors able to mobilise and employ violence, but whilst the former has the capacity to discipline combatants and progress towards political aims, the latter does not. Instead, it remains, as did the PDF, embedded within local conflicts and contexts that combine to create repetitive cycles of violence without either a goal or progression.

7.5 Militia Reform and Path Dependency

The final mechanism within the militia's organisational processes was that of path dependency – the persistence of historically determined but inefficient strategies and organisations due to self-reinforcing mechanisms (cf. North 1990, 100). Path dependency describes how 'history matters' in the study of armed groups. It explains how socially destructive paths produced selective benefits and in the process created "organisations and interest groups with a stake in the existing constraints. They will shape the polity in their interests." (North 1990, 99)

Once the basic outlines of the militias were institutionalised, they often remained with sub-optimal organisations and even self-defeating strategies for years. In Sudan militia raiding parties were not only ineffective at identifying and halting SPLA supporters but could drive entire villages into supporting the rebels. Similarly, the use of coercion to recruit in urban areas contributed to delegitimising the regime and drive down volunteer numbers. In the LF the system of regional commands and a divided leadership established by Bashir Gemayel created patrimonialism and tension throughout the 1980s until reformed by Samir Geagea. These strategies were maintained in part, due to the difficulties the militias faced in genuinely achieving reform.

There are many causes of these perverse patterns of behaviour and organisation, one of the most important of which being the previously mentioned interests of local leaders, but three further examples are interesting: clientilistic networks, the prevalence of resources created by war, and finally the importance of legitimising discourses. It is not possible to discuss these mechanisms in any detail within the constraints of this thesis, instead the intention is to indicate future areas of interest for research on the organisation of armed groups.

Vertical clientilistic networks: Decentralised command structures amongst the leaders of the militias led to extensive patrimonial networks extending throughout the formal structure. These networks competed internally for resources, enforced private over organisational goods and in some cases led to violent fragmentation of the organisation. For example, under Bashir Gemayel the LF developed into a structure in which local, sectional and central commanders were linked by strong bonds of loyalty to key individuals. Similarly in Sudan reports abound of PDF units being diverted to provide defence for charismatic members of the regime. These patrimonial chains created fault lines extending throughout the organisation that resisted the professionalisation of the organisation and threatened the authority of central leaders.

Resources created by war: A second mechanism that permitted the militias to perpetuate inefficient paths was the possibility of exploiting resources produced by the effects of war itself. The militias were able to recruit IDPS, take control of economic production and kill political rivals. As such their military operations were able to become autonomous from political control and legitimacy and the militias followed strategies that were directly damaging to their community. The militias were thus able to continue fighting long after the social value of armed conflict had dissipated and the war had become a repetitive spiral of atrocities. These resources, created by war itself, allowed the militias to become functionally independent from political accountability.

Legitimising Discourses and Martyrdom: The final mechanism does not address the question of organisation directly but is concerned with the specific problem of legitimising change within the militias. When change went against an established ideology for which young men had fought and died[319] the militias faced tremendous opposition from their popular base. In both cases the question of 'martyrs', their status and the validity of their deaths was raised when the militias attempted to negotiate peace treaties. The issue of war dead provided a powerful emotive argument for internal coalitions opposed to settlement. In Sudan the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Turabi and the SPLA created ripples felt throughout the PDF[320], whilst in Lebanon the signing of the Tripartite Agreement between Elie Hobeiqa and rival militias created a similar effect. In Lebanon, posters on the walls of Christian neighbourhoods, commemorate the names of those who died in war to this day. These state powerfully that 'Our Martyrs did not Die'. In many ways they did not for they projected an enduring influence over the organisation, its goals and its leadership.

But whilst these mechanisms identity key causal paths within the processes of organisational development, they do not provide theoretical explanations for the final variance in the final forms of organisation adopted by the militias. Although no definitive answers can be established from a binary comparison, it is possible to hypothesise on this variation by identifying the boundaries imposed on a militia's development by the levels above and below it. This thesis suggests that the most important boundary on militia institutionalisation was the strength of the state in the territories in which militias were operating.

7.6 The State and Militia Institutionalisation

Mechanisms may describe the key causal moments in the process of organisational development in the two militias, but they do not provide conclusive explanations for the variation in the final forms of organisation. The following section returns to one of the original questions of this thesis by analysing how the institutionalised forms of the PDF and the LF related to the state with which they were affiliated and the societies from which they recruited.

The strength of the state, i.e. its institutional coherence and capacity, dictated at each stage of the militia's existence the most important external boundary on institutionalisation. Many of the opportunities for extensive institutionalisation within the militia arose from the possibility of its taking control of state rents (taxes and tariffs), using state equipment, recruiting state professionals, and legitimising themselves through the provision of state-like services. For this reason, when the state

[319] This is of course true not only for civil wars. Think, for example, of John Macrae's famous World War I poem 'On Flanders Field', read in most British Rememberance day ceremonies, and its warning to the living to "take up the quarrel with the foe", and never to "break faith with us who die."
[320] Whilst addressing PDF members in 2002, President Bashir was careful to stress that nothing "was worth more than the blood of the martyrs the country has shed so far"(*Khartoum Monitor*, November 17, 2002).

remained, as it did in Sudan, state agents curtailed the extent to which militias could institutionalise.

This was not simply a passive limit on the militia. In both Sudan and Lebanon state agents objected materially and ideologically to the sharing of coercive hegemony and resources with irregular armed forces. Whilst the militias remained fragmented and localised, they were supported or at least tolerated by the military. But as and when the militias attempted national institutionalisation the state objected to the military and political costs caused by organisations whose combatants were unreliable and the results often contradictory to overall strategic objectives. The military actively contested and in both cases eventually confronted, either by political or military means, the militias as a means of reaffirming the authority of the institutions and executive authority of the state.

This attitude by the state military was mirrored by the militia's genuine confusion over their relationship to the state. Originally founded as armed groups seeking to defend and increase the authority of the state, both the PDF and the LF developed into self-interested institutionalised organisations that resented state interference in their internal affairs. In Lebanon the combatants and commanders of the LF resented Amine Gemayel's attempts to reduce LF power, despite his official position as President of the Lebanese Republic. Similarly, in Sudan the PDF has shown signs of accepting the imprisonment of Turabi in return for guarantees of its own continued existence. This stance risked placing the militias in opposition not only to the state but brought into question the legitimacy of the militias continued existence.

This transformation of the militia's relationship to the state may be related to a similar transformation in the militia's symbolic and political discourse. In both the LF and the PDF discourses emphasising the transcendental value of communal defence and the 'reconstruction' of the state in the name of such values emerged during the civil wars. These discourses, of Islamic revolution in Sudan and the Christian *rissala* in Lebanon may have provided a legitimising basis for organisations whilst providing frequently few or unclear concrete political objectives. In both cases these discourses were also used to legitimise the transformation of the militias into regular institutions of a reconstructed state. Whilst in the LF this was evidenced in Bashir Gemayel's aborted project to create a Praetorian guard for the Maronite presidency. In the case of the PDF this has resulted in their transformation into a formal auxillary of the state military charged with preserving the Islamic revolution and the status of *shari'a* in the constitution.

The militias were thus constrained and contested by the very authority that had facilitated their formation, they were thus suspended above society and whilst the state remained monitored by its agents.

7.7 Conclusion

Due to the constraints of this thesis the intention has been to present exploratory hypotheses about militia organisation. The mechanisms and hypotheses presented above satisfy this claim, offering numerous avenues of fruitful further study. Nevertheless, these results cannot be assumed to apply across all cases without further testing and analysis. This chapter has presented a summary of some of the comparative results of this thesis. These results have come in three forms.

The first is the identification of three mechanisms of militia organisation. These mechanisms serve two functions; firstly they illustrate the complexity of that exists within the organisations of sub-state armed groups. A comparison of the PDF and LF suggest that militias, if not all armed groups, are divided between the interests of central organisations and local units. Secondly these mechanisms suggest explanations for why the PDF and LF developed into either hierarchical organisations or networks of highly localised forces. The concept of *bricolage* explains how through uncoordinated mobilisation the PDF and the LF developed into hybrid organisations divided between a central political authority and local units. The relative dominance of the latter over the former depended significantly on the ability of the militias to form and equip central units, and to establish monopolies of protection. The final mechanism defining the organisation of these militias, explains how previous structures significantly defined future organisational forms. Path dependency is a self-enforcing condition in which the private interests of local leaders, clientilistic commanders and ideology subvert and obstruct the rationalisation of the organisation.

A second result of this chapter is the identification of the state as a structural limit on the extent of a

militia's potential institutionalisation. Militias, like all armed groups, are limited by the ability of the state to enforce its authority within its own territory. But unlike other groups, militias are rivals for recruits and resources with the professional military and, as a result, were confronted and neutralised when they became excessively powerful. The relationship between the militia and the state reflects back onto the militias own self-identification. As the militia became autonomous from the state it sought alternative symbolic and material resources that would permit its continued existence when its primary legitimising discourse, the defence of the state, was no longer valid.

A final result of this thesis is the brief model of the levels of conflict in civil war. This model provides a significantly more effective template for analysing civil wars than do the transfer of conceptions of Clausewitzian models of war. It provides a description of the actors and the opportunity structures both beneath and above them, that might be effectively used in 'time-series' or institutional studies of armed groups. However, the value of this model rests most importantly in the emphasis it suggests in studying the interlinkages and connecting mechanisms between these different levels.

8 Conclusion

The edge of war like an ill sheathed knife

No more shall cut his master

William Shakespeare, Henry IV, Act I, Scene 1

The armed conflicts in Lebanon and Sudan were neither anarchic fields of uncoordinated self-interest, nor Clausewitzian competitions between unitary organisations; these wars were endogenous and multi-level processes that changed not only the societies within which they were fought, but also the armed groups that fought in them. Violence not only destroyed the existing social order, but created new leaders, new discourses, new opportunities and new resources. Through these changes violent actors restructured economic flows, political representation and social institutions in order to finance and legitimise armed conflict. The institutionalisation of the Lebanese Forces and the Popular Defence Forces was a fundamental element within this transformation.

These militias emerged as heterogeneous reactions to insecurity, co-opted and legitimised by the state, but they became self-interested organisations. In the final years of these wars, both militias valued autonomy over ideology, and organisational survival over the defense of state or community. They recruited from IDP populations, clashed with the military, and used security forces to control their constituencies. The conflicts in Sudan and Lebanon were settled only when the strategic and organisational interests of these groups were resolved. Over time, in other words, the means of war-fighting contradicted, rather than contributed to, the resolution of war as a political conflict.

This conclusion returns to the main arguments of this thesis. It summarises the methods, questions and results presented in previous chapters and emphasises the utility of an organisational analysis of civil war. The chapter concludes by proposing a final mechanism of behaviour in civil war, dillusionment, which suggests a further important avenue through which the level of individual action relates directly to that of organisational behaviour.

8.1 Militias in Civil War

Before entering into a discussion of the benefits of the results of this thesis it is fruitful to review chapter by chapter the progression of the argument in the thesis.

Chapter one introduced the central question of this thesis by confronting an analysis of war as an organisational conflict with the 'myth' that war is largely conducted and shaped by individuals. This latter explanation, often presented as a heroic narrative, has reemerged since the end of the Cold War within a discourse focusing on the atavistic or economic motives of combatants. Whilst individual level behaviour is extremely important in explaining civil war, this chapter argues that it is only part of the story. It argues that only through organisational analysis is it possible to develop an understanding of how this behaviour emerges and how individual behaviour aggregates to influence the structural environment of a war. The second part of this chapter introduced the comparative historical method and discussed the selection of the PDF and LF as case studies.

Chapter two had two aims. Firstly, it identified the study of militias as an independent topic of academic inquiry and, secondly, it presented three explanations of the organisation of armed groups in civil war. The first part of this chapter used existing empirical accounts to establish a typology of militias as military, political and self defence forces, and presented a working definition of 'militia'. This discussion correlated the rising importance of militias in modern conflicts with the changing nature of warfare in the 20th century. The second part of this chapter identified three important accounts of the organisation of armed groups within the current economically inclined academic debate and then identified two lacunae present within these accounts: The first was the inability of 'economy of war' studies to explain how militias functioned as complex organisations and coordinated collective action; the second was the difficulty 'economy of war' studies had in identifying how militias interacted with their social context and state sponsors. This chapter concluded by arguing, with an

appeal to Hannah Arendt's observations on violence, that the coordination of organised behaviour in war was a primary determinant of the nature of an armed conflict.

Chapter three was a theoretical attempt to bridge the gap between the study of peace-time politics, with its clear categories of analysis, and the study of war as an environment distorted by pervasive violence. This chapter separates the formation of armed groups, and the beginning of civil wars, from the structural environment and organisational constraints that define the progression of war. It borrows from Joel Migdal's state in society approach, Béatrice Hibou's concept of 'privatisation', and Chabal and Daloz's concepts of 'disorder' and 'informalisation' to present a preliminary analysis of the political dynamics of delegation in militia formation. Delegation is analysed as a process by which groups within the state recognise and legitimise centres of authority outside of the state, and in doing so create, or reinforce, alliances between state and non-state actors. This analysis identifies two potential paths of militia formation. Under privatisation a single centre of authority, the state, contracts non-state actors to fulfil security functions within specific contexts. Under informalisation, multiple centres of authority emerge underneath the state and establish private military forces. This chapter then turns to an analysis of the organisation of violence in war-time, by contrasting Kalyvas's model of strategic violence and Keen's model of irrational violence in civil wars. This section argues that the central ontological difference between these two models is the degree to which the strategic and tactical levels of violence are coordinated by military organisations. This chapter concludes by presenting, briefly, some descriptive categories that facilitated the measurement of the scope and depth of military organisation. These categories are deduced through a discussion of Grossman's analysis of 'organised violence', and Max Weber's categories of recruitment, resources and discipline to define the institutionalisation of organisation.

Chapter four compares the Lebanese Forces and the Popular Defence Forces, from their emergence to their final organisational structures at the end of the civil wars. Chapters five and six detail the processes of development of the two militias whilst relating these processes back to the discussion in chapter three. Rather than respecting the artificial divisions of these chapters it is more fruitful to provide a brief summary of the two case studies.

In Lebanon, the 'Lebanese Forces' emerged as a coalition of party and self-defence militias responding to the outbreak of civil violence and the paralysis of the state. As a result, the initial years of civil conflict were defined by the chaotic overlapping of multiple militias lacking central organisation or control. By 1976, conflict between neighbourhood units had, however, become a war of static fronts dividing Lebanon into cantons and cutting Beirut into Christian East and Muslim West. Within the stalemate that developed across this divide, young and combatative leaders emerged and changed the LF into an organisation providing military force to a program of political change. In the process of forming this organisation, the Lebanese Forces confronted, first, the existing political elite, and secondly, the military groups within the Christian community. These conflicts led to the killing of Tony Frangieh and the alienation of the Marada militia in 1978, and to the forceful incorporation of the Tigers militia into the LF in 1980. In 1982 the LF's commander in chief, Bashir Gemayel, was briefly elected as Lebanese President. His assassination, shortly after, fragmented the Christian elite and caused the relapse of the Lebanese Forces into factional conflicts. In 1986 Samir Geagea emerged as overall commander. Geagea bureaucratised the LF by recruiting displaced populations into its central and security units. In 1989 a simmering conflict with the Lebanese Army leader Michel Aoun erupted into violence. The resultant 'War of Brothers' altered the strategic arena of the Lebanese civil war and led to the ratification of the Ta'if peace agreement in 1990.

In Sudan, the 'Popular Defence Forces' was established, from 1985 onwards, as a network of self-defence militias in the Transitional Areas dividing North from South Sudan. The militias, created by arming tribal recruits and granting them immunity to raid against distrusted Dinka and Nuba groups, were employed as military militias by the state. In 1989, after the seizure of power by the National Islamic Front, local militias were centralised under a national institution controlled by the Presidency. The PDF was transformed into an Islamist political militia modelled on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. This force sought firstly to defend the regime, and then to indoctrinate Sudanese society. In urban areas it relied on waves of popular mobilisation to field battalions of volunteers, whilst in rural areas it absorbed the existing tribal raiding militias. In 1992 and 1995 the PDF launched major campaigns deep into SPLA held territory and suffered tremendous losses. In 1997 the army responded by seizing control of appointments and decision-making within the organisation and set about substantially weakening its ability to act independently. In 2000 the PDF's figure-head Hassan al-

Turabi was ousted from the government and the PDF was transformed into a support and auxillary force for the military.

Chapter seven describes the comparative results of the case studies. Most importantly it sketches an alternative model for analysing civil wars. This model reflects the fact the civil wars in Sudan and Lebanon were neither Clausewitzian contests between organisations nor a generalised breakdown of civil order. Instead they were multi-dimensional processes in which different levels and arenas of conflict coexisted, exploiting opportunities above and below them. The degree to which these conflicts coalesced was defined by the organisational capacities of the armed groups. When central authority was weak, civil wars eroded into centrifugal conflicts dislocated from central strategy; when central authority was strong, localised violence was commanded and employed for strategic purposes.

The second part of this chapter analyses the mechanisms by which the Popular Defence Forces and the Lebanese Forces developed their central capacity to manage the extended demands of civil war. It presents analytic explanations for how militias, which emerged as socio-military groups, developed into hybrid structures that, despite being centralised, remained essentially local.

- *Bricolage* explains how militias are related to the powers, norms and social organisations of peacetime. This mechanism argues that these relations are not relations of control but of structure; militias are constituted around existing actors responding to insecurity. On the one hand, these responses to insecurity were political, as militant parties established coordinating and supply networks penetrating local communities; on the other hand, these responses were apolitical, as networks of diverse socio-military groups took over security functions from the state. Militias emerged as alliances between the state and non-state responses to violence.
- The *techniques of recruitment* explains one of the fundamental mechanisms behind the establishment of centrally controlled military units. Through central recruitment militias were able to enforce the strategic goals of a central policy and discipline private or localised interests within the organisation. The existence of central units was essential for averting the centrifugal effects of civil war.
- The *hegemony over protection* explains how militias were able to not only increase central capacities but reduce the threat of internal fragmentation or dissipation. The extent to which central units controlled important sources of revenue determined the degree to which these resources were channelled to the central organisation rather than to semi-autonomous local leaders.

These mechanisms explain how militias, as uncoordinated responses to insecurity, were able to establish institutions which were able to police and enforce control across the multiple levels and arenas of violence. This chapter concludes by returning to the question raised in the discussion on militia formation: asking how militia institutionalisation influenced the state. It shows how, in both cases, institutionalised militias were perceived as a threat to the state and were absorbed or challenged by the regular military in an attempt to reduce their authority.

The central theme of these different chapters has been a study of how power and authority are transferred from the state and maintained by sub-state armed groups in civil war. In addressing this question this thesis has raised two key theoretical issues of general importance for the study of civil wars.

- Firstly, the identification of two separate processes: Distinguishing between the costs and benefits of *militia formation (*as a strategy of political actors competing over institutional authority and change); and the costs and benefits of *militia maintenance* (as the management of organisation in a society

transformed by violence). These processes identify a separation between the nature of the political competition leading to war, and the forms of violence that occur in war.

- Secondly, the identification of two conflicts: Firstly between the militias and pre-existing authorities (e.g. army, police, and the existing political elite); and secondly, between the militias and new authorities created by the war. These conflicts fundamentally defined the extent to which the militias were able to establish an autonomous authority over military and political force.

By focusing on individual intentions, current research ignores such processes. It is, however, only by analysing these and similar processes that we can analyse the 'micropolitics' of civil war. In fluid environments, characterised by the break down of law and order, organisational structures explain the constraints on individual behaviour and, therefore, the modalities of civil war.

8.2 Methodological Critique

This thesis used a comparative historical method to mediate between the difficulties of gathering accurate data on armed groups and the intention of developing theory. In exchange, it has accepted that this analysis cannot treat organisations as discrete units or analyse the vectors of change as the product of reified variables. Instead, the intention has been to analyse the organisations through in-depth empirical process tracing designed to produce probabilistic outcomes and causal mechanisms.

In the last few years, an emergent school of disaggregated civil war research has formulated an alternative methodological solution to the problems involved in studying civil wars (Kalyvas 2005a; Weinstein forthcoming; Policzer and Capie forthcoming). Raising similar criticisms as this thesis, these scholars have rejected the International Relations, Econometric and Development Studies debates sketched in chapter two[321] and sought to identify causal agents beneath the level of the state. But rather than studying organisations, this body of research has emphasised the gathering of quantitative, individual level data. The analysis of this data has undermined many of the hypotheses surrounding the discussion of violence (Kalyvas 2003, 1999; Varshney 1997) and predation within civil war (cf. Humphreys and Weinstein 2004; Weinstein 2002). By disaggregating groups and actors, they have shown how the cognitive and material constraints on individuals aggregate in war to produce apparently irrational outcomes. By applying the methodological standards of scientific research to the study of civil war, this research has thrown into question not only theses about behaviour in civil war, but also many of the assumptions made about how research on difficult topics can and should be done.

Another important contribution made by this group of war researchers has been in the field of case selection when studying civil war. Civil war creates an environment in which the extreme levels of variance and diversity between cases creates great difficulties for comparative studies. Understanding this, these scholars have emphasised the identification of different cases within single conflicts, the comparison of different periods within cases, and the study of well documented historical cases. These methods of case selection and disaggregation would definitely have a place in the verification of the results of this thesis.

Nevertheless, these scholars still have problems at the intersection between individual and organisational interests. Organisations, if they are studied, are considered as abstract entities managing resources and information with little relation or interlinkage with their surrounding context. Individuals are identified as discrete rational units acting out of self-interest or as the reliable agents of collective action. Their research does not addresss the importance small groups can have in defining individual behaviour and organisational strategies in weakly institutionalised environments. The advantage of this thesis' more constitutive explanatory approach (Wendt 1998) to the study of organisation has been its ability to propose exploratory hypotheses about these linkages. By focusing on processes of organisational change it has been possible to explain, not only the static outcomes of decision-making,

[321] For the first review of some of the literature emerging from this innovative research see King's (2004) social movement theory based discussion of what he has called the micropolitical turn in the study of social violence.

but the emergence of the institutions that define the opportunity structures through which decisions are expressed.

8.3 The Benefits of Organisational Explanations

Although it would be wrong to over-emphasise these results, this thesis has a number of repercussions relevant to the ending of civil wars. Two of these repercussions are of particular importance. The first concerns the negotiation of peace settlements; the second concerns the defeating of irregular forces on the battlefield.

With regards to the first, this thesis suggests that the primary variable defining the duration of the armed conflicts in Lebanon and Sudan was the perpetuation of military stalemate. Neither side could defeat its opponent, but similarly neither was willing to settle on terms imposed by compromise. This thesis suggests that this condition was significantly complicated by the disorder, fragmentation and internal factions within the armed groups. Much of the difficulties of achieving a settlement did not concern the root causes of these wars. In 1976 the LF rejected a peace treaty that resembled in many ways the Ta'if Agreement, similarly the 1997 Khartoum Agreement was little different from the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. But the strategic realities created by the war itself combined with internal factionalism to disrupt or sink these attempts at resolution. Throughout these wars, balances of power or peaceful resolutions might emerge between opposing forces but in the absence of effective coordinating structures, actors at the levels both beneath and above these resolutions could reinstigate the conflict. Tribal groups would reconcile; militias would seek to negotiate a cease fire or regional actors would seek to mutually limit their involvement; but 'spoiler' factions or unexpected violence would reinstigate conflict.

Prior to the final settlement of the two wars, this thesis discussed at least two previous attempts at peace that failed because peacemakers lost internal power struggles. In the first, Elie Hobeika, in Lebanon, signed the 'Tripartite Agreement' shortly before being toppled by an anti-Syrian rejectionist trend led by Samir Geagea. In the second, in Sudan, the National Assembly was to have ratified a DUP negotiated peace treaty with the SPLA one day after the NIF's coup. In both cases, leadership coalitions fragmented when faced with the peace negotiations. The resolution of the wars in Lebanon and Sudan came about only after the defeat of powerful internal factions within the warring communities. Both the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan and the Ta'if Agreement in Lebanon became realities, mainly because single unified groups or leaders were able to establish their hegemony over the fighting organisations. The fragmentation of the Islamist coalition of the National Islamic Front empowered President Bashir to negotiate, in good faith, with John Garang of the SPLA. In Lebanon, the renewal of the logic of the state under Aoun and the devastation of the LF in the war of extermination meant that a political process was inherently less risky than a return to civil war.

Turning now to the second repercussion of this thesis; the importance of confronting organisational integrity, rather than individuals, when fighting civil wars. Most military machines calculate success on the battlefield with quantative assessments (opponents killed, territory captured or, more recently, the numbers of people voting). But none of these measures can assess the degree to which an organisation is incapacitated. In the wars in Lebanon and Sudan, fighting was only one of the actions with which the armed groups were concerned. Much more time was invested in mobilising resources, recruitment, and training than in actual fighting against an opponent. To defeat such opponents required not that their physical manifestation was destroyed, but that their capacity to replace and coordinate combatant forces was destroyed.

In light of these remakrs, in both Sudan and Lebanon, it is remarkable the effect the dismissal or killing of single leaders could have over an entire organisation. Bashir Gemayel's death and Hassan al-Turabi's imprisonment disrupted these militias' ability to recruit and strategise, often for years after the event. These militias were fundamentally dependent upon the charisma of their leadership and the foundations of their popular support. Without these leaders, the two militias faced crises of legitimacy, internal power struggles and, in consequence, political confusion. Particularly in the case of Bashir, factional competition, military defeat (in the Chouf, and Sidon battles), and political disarray could all be linked to his assassination.

8.4 Disillusionment – 'War going nowhere'

Throughout this thesis, the emphasis has been on identifying the mechanisms of organisational change in war. It is appropriate, therefore, to conclude with a mechanism that returns to the relationship between the combatant and the military organisation in civil war: "disillusionment".

As in all wars the combatants in Sudan and Lebanon were sold a myth of war. Many sought imagined futures and better lives, but had only vague understandings of what these futures were or how they could achieve them. Many, it was clear were willing to accept radical action out of disillusionment with peaceful politics; after, for example, the failure of the military to suppress violent raids by pro-Palestinian youths into Christian areas, the loss of a relative or property to SPLA actions, and the failure of democratic elections to elect representative officials. Politicians and militia leaders played on these fears and dreams, and manipulated their followers' ignorance and pride to give these wars a cause; whether as a route to religious salvation or as a means of communal salvation.

But in groups lacking coordination and training, unable to implement political programs, combatants learnt very rapidly of the reality of war; the frustrations of military stalemate, the unpredictability of death and the horror of killing. As a result, the combatants began to "dimly, sometimes agonizingly, perceive the gap between what they see with their own eyes and what they are told to believe" (Ignatieff 1998, 38). One interviewee in Sudan described volunteering twice for the PDF and because participation was his personal religious duty. This belief persisted until the day he was hit by an artillery shell fired from the Sudanese army. This shell killed every man in his five man patrol except himself. When I asked why he hadn't joined up for a third time, he laughed nervously and replied that after that experience he had suddenly lost all his belief in a duty to fight.

This process of disillusionment in the myth of war, had a direct effect on the organisations. Many interviewees suggested that the corruption of combatants began with the moment in which they became 'disillusioned' with the transformative power of war. Modern military studies have shown that soldiers's skills increase with experience, but only to the limit of 20-30 days of continuous combat or six to eight months of intermittent combat (Holmes 2003, 214). Beyond this, they know too well the risks which combat entails, and either avoid frontline duty or enter a traumatic state. When asking a Lebanese Forces military commander about the abuses committed by the LF he made only one point: In modern militaries troops rarely serve more than 7 months in combat zones. Some members of the LF fought for fifteen years *continuously*. His answer was characteristically blunt – "of course they committed abuses, wouldn't you?" [322] Without effective organisations, training or adequate equipment the militiamen discussed in this thesis destroyed their countries. Only after this destruction did they discover that they were fighting for myths; that war does not create but can only destroy.

> During the early days of the war we had a sense of purpose we fought in the mountains, in the hotels district we couldn't see the problems to come. We still thought the war would fulfill our dreams. But then a stalemate developed on the frontline after the fall of Tal al-Zaatar and Nabaa'. This was when the problems really started. The fighters were just sitting around taking potshots at one another. When factions began competing to win new recruits, the use of hashish spread, armed robberies, intimidation. We began to see the war going nowhere,
>
> (Chamoun and Masri 1988)

When combatants no longer believed the meanings given to war by their leaders, they sought to escape. When they could not escape they gave war its own meaning through profit, sadism or oblivion. And in response their leaders blamed them for war's excesses. "When I was a militiaman, I didn't make the war myself… but the leaders … they will put the accusations of the war on the militia guys. Just to give it a meaning..."[323].

[322] Interview Fouad Abu Nader, Beirut, 2003.
[323] Interview Raymond Nader, Beirut October 2003.

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Major Military Confrontations of the LF

Year	Name	Participants
1975	'Hotel War'	Kata'ib vs Palestinian and Lebanese militias
1976	Seige of Tal al-Zaatar	Kata'ib, NLP, GoC and LAF
April 1978	'War of Annihilation'	LF against Syrian Regular Forces
	Ehden Operation	LF unit led by Samir Geagea assassinates Samir Frangieh and family.
June 1980	'Unification of the Christian Gun'	Defeat of National Liberal Party
1982	Sabra and Shatila Massacres	LF massacre of Palestinian and Shia civilians in Beirut
1983-84	'War of the Mountain'	LF, LAF against PSP.
April 1985	Battle for Iqlim and Eastern Sidon	Palestinians, Sunni Militia and PSP against LF
July 1985	'July Corrective Movement'	Samir Geagea and Elie Hobeika against Fouad Abu Nader
Jan. 1986	The eviction of Elie Hobeika	Samir Geagea, Kata'ib, etc.. against Elie Hobeika
Aug. 1986	Failed uprising	Conflict breaks out between factions of the LF
Sept. 1986	Pentration attempt by Hobeika	The LF and LAF repulse Hobeika's attempt to cross the Green Line and regain control of E. Beirut.
1989	'War of Liberation'	LAF and LF against Syria army
1990	'War of Brothers'	LF against the LAF

Appendix 2: Field Work in Sensitive Areas

Too little of what I have learned about war has anything to do with war.

Russell Burgos, 'An N of 1: A Political Scientist in Operation Iraqi Freedom'. (2004)

A field methodology for research in conflict areas has yet to be written; very little is published at all on the practice of such research and often the topic is only indirectly addressed out of fear of criticism. As a result, instead of authoritative texts, students must learn what they can from conference-table war stories and peer experience,[324] extrapolating from literature on research on sensitive topics (Raymond 1993) and the rare anthropological accounts of fieldwork in extreme circumstances (Rodgers 2001). Whilst on one hand "rigorous frameworks for understanding and explaining"[325] are perhaps useless in arenas in which events and actors intrude and disrupt any formal process, more guidance and awareness would improve both the rigour of the research and the safety of the researcher.[326] The intention here is not to fill this academic gap but rather to contribute observations towards such a project.

What follows is a descriptive and reflected overview of some problems faced during field research in Sudan, an environment where difficulties in archival access and unreliable interview information are compounded by concerns for the security of both the researcher and his contacts. It looks briefly at orthodox questions concerning research design, access to sources, and informational problems as well as the distinctly unorthodox question of human error and its consequences.

This chapter is based on three months field research in Northern and Central Sudan with some references to a similar stay in Lebanon. Unlike much research undertaken into difficult areas this thesis did not focus on the 'floating world' surrounding international engagements or programs ín 'complex emergencies' but on the social dynamics of a conflict. Affiliation and contact with international organisations was not sought and in some instances actively avoided as it was felt that the normative assumptions, organisational frameworks and the lure of sectorial demand could distort results. In other words, apart from the perhaps extraordinary subject matter the reseach was framed by the classical scholarly dialectic of the student alone with the material.

The Position of the Researcher

The genesis of this thesis was the belief that the currently dominant 'economy of war' school of analysing civil war, and the circular debate it has produced between 'greed' and 'grievance', never represented more than part of the picture[327]. It focused excessively on contextless and monocausal explanations of behaviour that at best confused individual and organisational action and at worst suggested racist implications when most civil wars so analysed were in Africa. Without sufficient material to rebut these explanations, field work was used to gather empirical descriptions of the internal politics of a small sample of militia groups with which to build prospective generalisations.

Explanations were not sought by studying formal institutions or organisations suspended above society but by deducing causal explanations based upon a constitutive understanding of actors as emergent and

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[324] A great help here was the workshop on Field Research organised by the DVPW Ad-Hoc Group Ordnungen der Gewalt, held in Berlin 12 December 2002.

[325] Interview with Will Reno by Pablo Policzer, http://www.armedgroups.org/BREAKING%20NEWS/willreno.htm (accessed November 2004)

[326] Unlike journalists, there is little public interest in the numbers of researchers and academics killed or abused as a result of their work. However, the numbers are not insignificant. The best database I know of is that of the Network for Education and Academic rights founded in 2001(http://www.nearinternational.org/, accessed June 2005).

[327]See David Keen's (2002) excellent working paper for an autocriticism of the dominance of the war economy perspective by one of its founders. Keen rightly states that although rationality and strategic interest is certainly a determinant variable in structuring modern civil wars an understanding of micro-dynamics and their influence on the character of a war must seek explanations 'beyond the rational actor'.

embedded within society (cf. Wendt 1998)[328]. Rather than aiming simply for parsimony or analytic clarity, the research focused on identifying genuinely causal mechanisms within the processes and emphasised the development of theory from in-depth empirical study. By necessity this approach was multi-disciplinary; demanding that the researcher be political scientist in outlook whilst historian or ethnographer in approach.

A result of the combined theoretical and empirical development that this project entails is the risk that neither shall be satisfactory to the partial reader. Whilst for the positivist political scientist the theoretical inductions will be criticised as descriptive or insufficiently 'robust', for the area specialist or historian the level of empirical description risks being too superficial. It is, furthermore, difficult to include the degree of theoretical and empirical development that would do justice to this topic within the constraints of a PhD thesis. The structure of the dissertation itself has attempted to address this by allowing theoretical and empirical conclusions to be discussed seperately at the end of each chapter. Nevertheless, the recognition of the importance of theoretically informed empirical research has been growing in a number of disciplines and with this a broader acceptance and understanding of its limitations.

Choosing Risk

The political interest surrounding the academic study of instability, and particularly of violence and war, creates responsibilities for the researcher that should be reflected not only in the selection of questions but also in methodology[329]. The researcher is torn between unambiguous hypotheses (good for policy-relevant conclusions) and detailed explanations of single cases (that help avoid the 'frameworking' of complex social problems). Furthermore, she must choose between case studies that are known to provide 'data', and have generally been heavily studied before[330], or cases about which little is known and research possibilities are perhaps uncertain or inconclusive. The former will certainly lead to more robust research, yet it risks merely replicating structural deficits in our knowledge of both countries and topics that are difficult to study[331].

When selecting my research design I opted for a combination of all options. I agreed with the anthropological sentiment that the study of war is a cynical exercise unless one goes to where violence takes place (Nordstrom and Robben 1995, 4). On the other hand, local observation alone makes it difficult to accumulate and amplify the generalisations necessary when building explanatory theory or formulating policy. Having decided therefore to attempt a political sociological study of the Sudanese civil war, I hedged the risk of studying this very fluid case by using Lebanon, a well studied civil war, as a comparative case.

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[328]More explicitly the research group's analytic approach is based upon the German 'World Society' (*Weltgesellschaft)* school of international relations. This approach theorises the world not as quilt of distinct state-dominated territories, but as a fabric of different societal characteristics (values, organisations and economic systems) and systems of authority. At present most of the theoretical literature is only in German, for an exception see Jung (2001) more relevantly, for an empirical application of this approach see Schlichte ed. (2005).

[329]Furthermore, in the current competitive arena of academia it is often difficult to find the security to approach research topics that will produce uncertain results, particularly for younger researchers. It is often forgotten that "an important topic is worth studying even if little information is available. The result of applying any research design in this situation will be mainly uncertain conclusions, but so long as we honestly report our uncertainty, this kind of study can be very useful." (King et al. 1994, 6).

[330]For example many of the dominant hypotheses of greed-driven war and resource wars, that purport to explain all or most civil wars, have in reality been developed and tested almost entirely on relatively few African conflicts – notably Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia and DRC (cf. Ballentine and Sherman 2003, 10).

[331]For example, it is disturbing how much more is written on development and relief issues in an African context, than is expended on studying how African societies and polities actually function. It is legitimate to ask whether in those societies where much more historical and societal understanding exists, say Europe or the Middle East, such simplistic materialist explanations would be considered legitimate.

Sources: Of Politicians, Adminstrators and the Military

I landed at Khartoum airport on December 20th 2002 with few contacts and little beyond a house lined up. I first set about cultivating different arenas: various universities, the (I)NGO/UN sector, the neighbourhood in which I lived and the government's Peace Advisory, as well as calling the telephone numbers I had and asking friends for potential leads. One of these, a pro-government Sudanese expat, used his connections to arrange passes and interviews that would have been difficult if not impossible to procure alone. These strategies slowly bore fruit, but only after almost one and a half months filled with dead end interviews, no-shows and trying to establish trust with highly sceptical interviewees. In this venture I was twice given great leaps forward by influential expats willing to open their address books to a PhD student. However, even armed with telephone numbers access was difficult – one influential figure resident in Khartoum repeatedly answered my phone calls with his name and then politely denied his own existence when I asked for an interview.

Another successful means of finding interviewees was through cold calling – dropping in on certain institutions and houses unexpected , and asking if they were willing to grant an interview. Whilst this might not work in other contexts in Sudan where coordination and communication can be 'difficult' it was acceptable to 'drop by' when seeking an audience with people. Alternatively, I would be invited to turn up at a person's house around a certain time of day without prior warning and join other visitors who were often also seeking favours.

In such meetings I openly stated my research interest, whilst avoiding discussions about my precise question, and whilst I conducted my interviews in private, did little to disguise my activities. The intention was to use my openness as a foil against suspicion and make myself, rather than any of my contacts, the focus of any security officials[332]. This practice exploited the vagueness of the researcher's position to gain information, as interviewees would talk to me whilst trying to establish what I was doing.

In the first three weeks in Sudan I frequently found myself talking for hours to politicians, academics, or international workers with palably little knowledge of my subject and with particular political agendas. Most were resident in Khartoum and rarely came into contact with people outside of personal networks defined by background, neighbourhood, profession or political affiliation. Some openly recognised that there was a lack of understanding that was crippling policy formulation, and willingly directed me in more fruitful directions. Particularly helpful in this regard, were those Sudanese academics, frustrated with a financial situation that forced them into repeated international consultancies to the neglect of academic research. I was embarrassed by their willingness to hold lengthy insightful discussions for which I could give very little in exchange. However, my most reliable sources were functionaries concerned more with the jobs they were doing than prefabricated explanations of events – both amongst the international and national sectors. Retired military officers, policemen, local adminstrators and INGO field workers provided more concrete information through their personal narratives and observations than the assortment of long winded explanations of experts in the capital. I am, for example, still grateful to the philosophically inclined rural administrator in a crumbling office who lectured me for four hours, very patiently, on the histories of tribal relations in the Nuba Mountains.

Similarly, and somewhat surprisingly, some high ranking government supporters were willing to talk and could be surprisingly honest about their trajectories and frustrations. For some, once convinced that I was genuinely an academic researcher, I represented an opportunity to understand Western reactions to events in Sudan. To others I was an opportunity to present views and arguments that they felt were ignored by Western media and activists. Other enlightening discussions came about through interviews with disgruntled government officers and political activists unconcerned with the potential repercussions of their testimonies[333].

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[332]There appear to be two basic strategies for approaching sensitive field work, 'parachuting in' and getting out quickly, or establishing a long term presence in a neighbourhood or region that can guarantee a degree of trust and protection.

[333]Some because they had been in and out of prison already, others because they had powerful protection and others still who just wanted for once to say what they thought. Although I do not use names in my research I was surprised by the number of interviewees who insisted that I quoted them and gave their names.

Perspective: Passing Poison from your Hands into your Blood

A problem with studying the internal politics of an armed group is that, inevitably, you understand the conflict from its perspective. This does not imply that actions are forgiven or that trust is established, but that clear moral judgements are obfuscated by a recognition of the constraints, obstacles and misconceptions faced by both leaders and combatants – that in other words you are forced to accept the humanity of those demonised by an international 'moral' community determined by adhesion to human rights and non-violence. You go from shaking hands with 'the violent' to beginning to understand their actions.

The higher ranks of the armed groups or the politicians, to which they were attached, were often charming, European-educated, anglo or franco-philes. Some had attempted to atone for their sins, some refused to accept any responsibilty and others defended their actions firmly[334]. Many lied repeatedly and blatantly about their involvement, whilst a few were painfully honest either out of shame or anger. Most described their participation not as an action but the result of a process of involvement and acculturation to violence and a growing distance between themselves and the communities and values for whom they had picked up arms. There were others who were not of this mold. Some of my interviews were conducted with politicians and demagogues whose ideological views were simply repulsive, but they were the minority.

This was not solely a moral problem; it created problems crossing political, ethnic and physical boundaries to hear the other side of the story. In one town in the Nuba Mountains, I overheard that I was referred to, with disgust, as the 'White Arab', due to my visible contact with a number of local adminstrators and military officials. In most cases, I was asked immediately who I had previously talked to and who I intended to interview in the future. Interviewees would establish the picture I was building from the perspectives I had heard before providing me with information. Using this information they attempted to build partisan explanations.

Information: When Everything is True Nothing Is

Having arrived in Northern Sudan I discovered that not only were the National Records Office, newspaper archives and various libraries difficult to access, but also the Bank of Sudan's economic reports had been 'tidied', and the University of Khartoum (UoK) had been cordoned off after a series of anti-regime demonstrations. Archival obstructions were not solely political – a vigilant librarian at one UoK library refused me access to MA theses for copyright reasons after finding me photocopying some pages from one.

Furthermore, the history of the conflict was simultaneously fiercely contested and rigidly controlled. Repression by the regime has encouraged the Sudanese to abandon political debate and many Northerners, were much better informed about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than the war in their own country. I was forced to establish not only an explanation for actions, but simultaneously to try and extract, from a mass of multi-faceted, fragmented and subjective information, a historical account of events. In both tasks public or recorded facts were often as or less relevant than rumour, suspicion and superstition in determining behaviour. Furthermore, this contestation was not solely national. International explanations of events were frequently biaised by powerful lobbies and a pervasive, subtle anti-Khartoum resentment present in many sectors of the aid, development and journalistic world. Local explanations often diverged strongly from international reports and often demonstrated a respect for local dynamics and national histories than did the amnesiac expats.[335]

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[334]Somewhat disturbingly it was the former, not the latter, who appeared to bear most psychological scares as a result of their actions. One, the deputy of a much-feared intelligence service in Lebanon, trembled violently whilst explaining one particular event for which he was responsible, and then described the hate letters he had received after having confessed and apologised publicly for his actions.

[335]For example, in a number of cases I heard Southerners or Nuba blame the SPLA for government reprisals, arguing not wrongly that the SPLA had on occasion consciously instigated actions intended to trigger a brutal government response in order to benefit in terms of recruits and international attention.

A more serious obstacle was the Sudanese government's reliance on apparent disorder as a means of maintaining comparative advantage over political rivals and a step ahead of international pressure[336]. As in many weak states the formal institutions of government were of only secondary importance to the informal networks of power. But furthermore, the reality of politics was not of a cohesive shadow-state but rather of institutions subverted by multiple, competing clientilistic and personal networks. Competition between rival networks did not focus solely on the accumulation of resources (cf. Reno 1999), although this played an important role, but more importantly on the distribution of positions, powers and reputations. The result was an almost infinitely complex web of personal and pragmatic relations creating vast networks extending throughout the country in a state of near constant flux. Alliances were ideological, strategic and economic, often divided between networks consolidating central power and alliances with and between regional or local power holders (cf. Boone 2003). Disorder provokes confusion, confusion leads to doubt, doubt obfuscates responsibility; and for many actors responsibility is much better left unclear. Academic research in such environments, aiming at clarity or understanding, was in no way a neutral or objective project but deeply challenging to a logic of governance for which information is a key commodity used to weaken and empower.

To complicate matters further, the logic of disorder requires that the issues evoking a response from the multiple internal security agencies, are both unspoken and, to an outsider, unpredictable. Topics deemed sensitive changed according to who one was speaking too and in what context. I was frequently tripped up in discussions of the war in the South by red lines that I was not aware were there, for example whilst a discussion of Southern militias was acceptable to many of my interviewees, government officials became much more elusive when the discussion turned to militias in the West or to particular names or dates. Frequently, only in retrospect and with greater knowledge did it become obvious why certain, even seemingly mundane, topics were sensitive[337].

The result of security concerns was that interviews often glided between structured and unstructured as I skirted away from sensitive topics and allowed interviewees to lead me away from sensitive prepared questions. Similarly, questions were often vaguely phrased and asked both for facts and opinions, allowing the interviewees themselves to choose the limits of what they wished to say and whether to discuss their role or that of a third party. This strategy, however, often led to equally vague answers, and the most successful interview style was the asking of concrete factual questions about general events – did this happen?– that in themselves led to more specific questions about events or opinions, but would not necessarily incriminate the interviewee. Although I designed a survey for university students, this was abandoned after I became concerned about the security of the research assistants that would have been necessary for its implementation.

What to do when it all goes wrong

One aspect of fieldwork that has received almost no attention is that of the eventual consequences of error – not in method but in judgement. Most texts on methods reflect an ideal situation in which risks and uncertainty are assumed away, and researchers possess near impossible foresight and judgement. Reactions to admitting that much of what is done in the field is ad-hoc and reactive differ between disciplines, depending on their dependence on field study, and the disciplinary/institutional attitudes to risk.

Whilst conducting interviews in the Nuba Mountains in Sudan I was detained by internal security officers whilst applying for a travel permit. Whilst the direct cause of my detention was that one of my notebooks was opened and a joke about Osama bin Laden was spotted, illegible except for the name, deeper reasons were to blame. Of all of these my increasing insensitivity to risk was most instrumental. For example, the travel permit I had requested was for a village that lay very close to the front line. I had heard that this village had remained ethnically mixed throughout the war, and had wanted to interview residents about their personal experiences and perceptions of the fighting. What I find surprising in retrospect is that I was more relaxed contemplating this trip, than almost any of the trips to interviews I had taken in Khartoum. After two and a half months conducting field research, sometimes

[336]See Chabal and Daloz (1999) for a discussion of disorder as a strategy of governance in weak states.
[337]For example, the discussion of Western militias was tense due to events in Darfur that in the early months of 2003 had yet to attract the massive attention they have since achieved.

in places where the first question asked would be – do you realise where you are? – I had become incautious and clumsy.

After three days of reporting to the local security offices for tea and questioning I was escorted in a two day journey to Khartoum where I was detained for two weeks in the political section of Khober prison. An emergency contact number had been established in Berlin that I called during a rest-stop whilst being taken back to Khartoum, and that combined with the political climate of March 2003 would see me released sooner than later.

After being escorted to various offices and questioned for first four days, I convinced my case officer that I was indeed a researcher and was left largely alone until my release was negotiated by the British Embassy. I was held in a very loose version of solitary confinement and denied the right to contact my embassy but was otherwise treated well in that I was allowed to excersise and fed three times a day. It is not an exaggeration to say that conditions in that particular section of the prison were substantially better than the living standards of most Sudanese, and were almost better than those of the local adminstrators I had met whilst travelling in rural areas. At no point was I in any way physically molested, although others around me had been, but never were any of my statements investigated outside of the interrogation room suggesting that coercion was the primary technique of information gathering[338]. The main trauma of the experience was the confiscation of an important research notebook, largely due to the claim that it contained a military map[339]. When I was released all my money and belongings except this notebook were formally returned to me.

Whilst well treated, never was I told what I had done or what was happening. All of my questions, even the most banal, were met with credible lies (you are being released tonight/tomorrow/soon, all you need is another permit which is being sent for as we speak, it is all ok). However, the security services also had a problem. They were holding a foreign researcher with his prime interviewees, the highest ranks of political prisoners in Sudan, and were understandably nervous about any interaction I had with other inmates.

During questioning, I would not mention contacts unless my questioners had deduced the information first. I then determined who I could speak of and in what context. As a result I felt that I was able to account for my activities in Sudan without endangering those I had contacted, it was however, I think apparent that I was not telling the whole story.

After two weeks, and around five days after the beginning with the invasion of Iraq, I was released. Very shaken and unwilling to endanger contacts by continuing to do research I changed my ticket to fly out of Khartoum. What saddened me most was that after the bombing of Baghdad for the first time during my stay in Sudan, I felt, as a white man, a vague aggression from people on the street.

Conclusion

My experiences in Sudan met with two distinct reactions from other academics: from African/Middle Eastern scholars some concern about my well-being and often a deep interest in the impressions drawn and the characters encountered whilst detained. A number of scholars recounted similar tales that had happened to friends or themselves. On the other hand, political scientists more accustomed to the comforts of the armchair, often responded with both disbelief, and often admonitions. I was told, as were colleagues of mine whilst attending a conference that research 'was not worth' the risks I had taken.

I was forced to formulate both academic and moral arguments for why I held such research to be essential to maintain the vitality of social science research and the veracity of more 'clinical' studies of civil war. In my mind it seemed absurd to make such criticisms when every day Sudanese activists, academics and journalists, more so than any foreigner, took risks far greater than my own in pursuit not

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[338]See Rejali (2005, 2004) for a fascinating analysis of the effects of torture on the investigative capabilities of police and security agencies.

[339]Only later, did I deduce that they were referring to a spider diagram of the different social actors I considered relevant to the civil war. Ironically, I was given back the highly detailed UN map of the Nuba Mountains detailing the location of all known mine fields and roads in the area.

of political causes but of their own conscience or interests. It is also apparent to me that the academic search for ‘truth’ has only recently become some sanitised history of innocuous exploration, and for much of its history has been both dangerous and challenging. I was reminded of the words of Australian philosopher John Keane damning a professional political science that “has forgotten the experience of pain” (1996, 6-7). In exchange, I willingly concede that my research would not meet the edified standards established for research in other fields, and furthermore that this is a goal towards which research within difficult areas should seek to reach. Methodological weakness should not be considered merely the norm of such studies, but a cost which should be minimised and defrayed as effectively as possible.

Appendix 3: Political Manifestos of the Lebanese Front and the National Islamic Front

'The Lebanon We Want To Build'

TEXT OF THE DOCUMENT ISSUED BY THE LEBANESE FRONT ON THE 23rd OF DECEMBER 1980 AT DEIR AOUKAR

FOREWORD

Three issues are decisively at stake today: the survival of the state of Lebanon as a free, independent and sovereign state; the survival of the society of Lebanon as a free, open and pluralist society; and the survival of the Christian community of Lebanon a free and secure, enjoying complete mastery over its own values and destiny. How to avert these three dangers is precisely what is meant by the term "the Lebanese Cause".

If the political independence of Lebanon should be overwhelmed or undermined, if its free society should be altered so as to conform to the pattern of the other societies of the Middle East, and if its Christian community should cease to be master of itself and its destiny, as it has been in the past, a major transformation in the balance of forces in the Middle East would result.

This fate is not inevitable; it can still be warded off. The first requirement towards that end is a full knowledge of the facts of the case. So far as the will and the views of the Christian community of Lebanon are concerned, the present document, which is intended to be an historic one, can meet this requirement.

Lebanon cannot save itself by itself. It needs help from outside. When have nations in great peril in modern times saved themselves without the aid of their friends? The destruction of the free, open and genuinely pluralist society of Lebanon, and the disappearance of the only remaining free Christian community in the Middle East, while the rest of the world is merely looking on, are not simple events: they are world events.

Not only moral, human and spiritual values are at stake, but precisely because this is the case, other factors of a material and concrete nature are involved. The mountains of Lebanon are, physically speaking, the most strategically impregnable part of the Middle East; whoever gets firmly entrenched in them can significantly help in defending the Eastern Mediterranean. Nor can the peoples of America and the West find more reliable and lasting friends in the Middle East than the people of Lebanon. Moreover, there are some who affect to seek in the Middle East and who think they have found a substitute for the free and open society of Lebanon so far as affording facilities for international finance, commerce and communication and for free exchange of ideas is concerned. Given the realities of the Middle East, there can never be an adequate substitute for Lebanon. Again, it is not in the best interests of Middle Eastern, and indeed world, stability for tire peace loving Lebanese, who are passionately attached to their freedoms and land, to get radicalized, There are enough disaffected and embittered people around to add to them now tire Lebanese. And there is absolutely, no need for that. Finally, care should be taken lest the tide of world subversion engulf Lebanon and lest Lebanon become a permanent base for international terrorism.

Consequently, the arguments to be urged are not only sentimental and moral, but of 'the most practical arid hardheaded order. The truth imposes itself once it is known.

The Lebanese Front is composed of Christian leaders who assumed, arid continue to assume, great responsibilities in their life. Its forces withstood a formidable onslaught of strangers and mercenaries upon Lebanon. The aim of this assault has been to overrun arid subjugate Lebanon. But tire Lebanese Front arid tile heroic Forces of Resistance associated with it continue to control the larger part of Christian Lebanon. The Front, therefore, can claim that it speaks in tire name of the Christians of

Lebanon.

The present document sets forth the basic principles and objectives of tire Front. Many of the non Christians would also openly subscribe to it if they were free to express their opinion. But they are not free.

The document sets in motion a fundamental debate among the Lebanese themselves. Tile Christians have formulated their views with the utmost sense of, responsibility. Let tire others now put forward theirs. A fruitful dialogue should then ensue. One hopes that it will also provoke an examination of conscience by tire governments and peoples oj' the world, both East and West. No one responsibly concerned for the great events unfolding in the Middle East today can afford now to ignore the convictions of the Christians of Lebanon, as authoritatively expounded in this document, about their freedoms arid the destiny and place of their own country.

January 5, 1981
Charles Malik

At this moment of decision in the history of Lebanon and the Middle East, the Lebanese Front wishes to make clear, before the people of Lebanon, before world public opinion, and for history, its fundamental positions and objectives.

I

In the Name of Our Heritage, Our Values and Our People

The Lebanese Front is fully conscious that it speaks in the name of a cumulative Lebanese heritage relatively uninterrupted for 6,000 years. Although the continuity of this heritage has been somewhat checkered, its discontinuity cannot be compared with other discontinuities in the Middle East. There is no continuity in the Eastern Mediterranean comparable to that of the Lebanese heritage.

The Lebanese Front is also fully conscious of the value of this heritage at once to Lebanon, to the Middle East and to the world. Only in the light of this value in which the Front believes and to which it firmly clings can its fundamental positions be understood. The Front is most anxious to preserve the customs, values and freedoms of Lebanon's way of life, and to serve as a bulwark against all perils besetting it today. Its faith in Lebanon and its unique values, and its absolute determination to defend them, explain all the positions of the Front. The Front is fully aware of the fact that Lebanon is entrusted with a treasure than which nothing is more precious or holy, and it refuses to permit any particle of this trust to fritter away.

The Lebanese Front also knows that it speaks in the name of an overwhelming majority of the people of Lebanon, although it recognizes that part of this majority is not in a position to express its opinion freely. Therefore the Lebanese Front is honored by the feeling that it represents not only those who can express their opinion freely, but also the others who do not at present enjoy this freedom.

II

The Political Structure

The Lebanon we want to build is what has been unique and constant about Lebanon down the ages; a Lebanon that refuses to be absorbed by any other entity or to be qualified by anything other than itself; a state, therefore, independent, sovereign and free.

We oppose any attempt at dissolving Lebanon in its environment or in something other than itself, a dissolution that will cause its distinctive characteristics to disappear.

The borders of the Lebanon we want to build are its present borders as determined by its Constitution and as internationally recognized.

The political system of the Lebanon we want to build is republican, democratic, parliamentary, pluralist, free and open, in the technical senses of these terms as universally recognized.

While preserving its total sovereignty and independence, Lebanon establishes relations with other states on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect.

The rule governing these relations shall be the common interests, culturally, economically and politically, between Lebanon and the other states, be they Arab, Middle Eastern or other.

We shall not build up the free, sovereign and independent Lebanon we want alone, but all its children, both here in Lebanon and abroad all over the world, will also participate with us in this process, *together we* shall all be responsible for its defense, the orientation of its policy and the organization of its administration.

The Lebanese Front believes in the necessity of reconsidering the structural formula which has *determined the* politics of Lebanon since 1943, with a view to modifying it in such a way as to prevent any friction or clash between the members of the same Lebanese family.

This reconsideration might issue in an alteration of the structural formula into some kind of decentralization or federation or confederation within a comprehensive framework of a single unified Lebanon. Such has been the trend of the modern constitutional systems throughout the world. The aim of the alteration is to ensure that no disaster like the many disasters which befell Lebanon since 1840 will recur in the future. The new formula will be agreed upon among the Lebanese themselves in a climate devoid of compulsion or intimidation, whether arising from within or without.

In the determination of the principles of its existence, Lebanon will be guided by the terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, especially with respect to the fundamental rights and freedoms of man.

III

Religious Freedoms

Lebanon's principal concern is to ensure individual and group freedoms for all its children and institutions.

Owing to the fact that the first fundamental problem of the Middle East, as indeed of all Asia and Africa, nay even of more than.

Asia and Africa, is the problem of minorities; and owing to the fact that the fundamental minorities in the Middle East are religious minorities; for these two reasons Lebanon is compelled, having regard to its composition and history, to pay special attention to its religious communities with a view to ensuring their freedoms.

Our aim is that Lebanon enjoy the clear distinction of being the only country in the Middle East in which the problem of minorities has received its complete resolution.

There shall not be in the Lebanon we propose to build up any discrimination or inequity against any one of its communities.

The Lebanon which has revolted against the perennial problem of minorities in the Middle East shall not permit this problem to lift up its head in it.

The Christian society in Lebanon occupies a special position owing to the fact that it has been free and has enjoyed a continuous history down the centuries. For this reason the Lebanon we want to build up is anxious that the Christians in it remain in fact free, secure and masters of themselves and of their own values and destiny, exactly as Christians are in any country in the world where they are in fact free, secure and masters of themselves and of their own values and destiny. Lebanon considers this charge as one of its most sacred trusts.

The Christians of Lebanon do not want more for themselves than they want for others, but at the same time, they do not accept less for themselves than others want for themselves.

The freedom of the Christians in Lebanon is not to be confined to a particular section of Lebanon only, but it must extend to every Christian and every Christian society in all Lebanon.

The freedom and security of the Christians in Lebanon, and their mastery over themselves, their values and their destiny, do not depend on any demographic consideration or any political orientation.

Most certainly the Lebanese Front does not understand by the Christians of Lebanon the Maronites only, but all other Christian communities which, by reason of their deeply rooted traditions and their free development, since the days of Christ and since some of them took refuge in this hospitable mountain, have contributed so much to the flourishing of this special, distinctive civilization.

As to the lacerative winds blowing upon the Maronite community today, the Lebanese Front, while anxiously preoccupied with them, does not consider them a concern that can possibly last.

For in the face of the grim dangers now threatening us, the Front believes that when every one of us rises above his own wound, we will then turn, all of us, to the healing of Lebanon's wound. And we shall succeed in healing it.

Moreover, the Lebanese Front believes that the Christians, all of them, cannot part from their brethren of the other minorities who have, for hundreds of years, contributed with them to the formation of this homeland, so unique and brave and with such a distinctive personality of its own in the Middle East.

The Lebanese Front believes that Lebanon is not a meeting place of two great religions huddled together against their will, and therefore forced to resort to all sorts of ruses and stratagems in order to maintain a precarious mode of coexistence always subject to collapse as each of them sharpens its own craving to dominate and rule. It views Lebanon rather as a federation of communities comprising sixteen minorities, all bent in a spirit of mutual trust and cooperation on preserving, in the face of the overwhelming majority surrounding them in the Middle East, the freedom, dignity and equality they all enjoy in Lebanon, regardless of demographic and social inequalities that may exist among them.

The maxim of the Lebanese Front in its impartial and just view of all Lebanese is: no Lebanese is superior to another except on the basis of his loyalty to Lebanon and to its freedoms and values.

For it holds the firm conviction that the guarantee of the survival of Lebanon is not mere loyalty to Lebanon, but a loyalty infused with love for Lebanon.

IV

The Peace of the Middle East is Determined by the Peace of Lebanon, and the Peace of Lebanon is Determined by the Peace of the Christians of Lebanon

The peace of Lebanon is one of the keys to the peace of the Middle East. Peace and stability cannot prevail in the Middle East so long as Lebanon is shattered, politically and spiritually, and its peace shaken, troubled and precarious. The instability of Lebanon means precisely the instability of the Middle East.

If the peace of Lebanon is one of the keys to the peace of the Middle East, the fundamental key to the peace of Lebanon is for all the religious societies of Lebanon to be free, happy, secure, at ease in their own minds, and masters of themselves, their values and their destinies.

Whoever imagines that free Christianity in Lebanon can be oppressed without producing a tremendous world reaction and tremors of a fundamental revolutionary character all over the Middle East, is misled and mistaken. Such a person does not know either the power of freedom, or the truth of Christianity, or the actual state of affairs and the histories of the peoples of the region, or the inevitable development of

their relations among themselves in the future.

The future does not belong to oppression but to liberation. The future will not bring about a contraction of existing freedom but a widening of its scope. The future will not conduce to the enlargement and grounding of slavery but to diminishing its scope and getting rid of it altogether. The future does not belong to discriminating against the religious minorities but to these minorities themselves winning complete equality in their responsibilities, rights and obligations. The future does not belong to the realm of darkness but to the realm of the light which shone and continues to shine in Lebanon.

If Christianity has been present and active in the Eastern Mediterranean for 2,000 years without interruption; if it is living and active, and shall remain living and active, in the West; and if the Mediterranean has been throughout history a living space for the West or the West for the Mediterranean; then it is not reasonable for active Christianity to disappear today from the Eastern Mediterranean. On the contrary, what is reasonable, nay what is inevitable, is that Christianity shall deepen itself and become more authentic in its action and freedom in the Eastern Mediterranean.

V

Total Liberation from the Two Occupations

The Syrian occupation must be lifted. Every agreement of whatever kind arrived at under the shadow of the bayonet cannot be a free agreement, and therefore we consider it null and void.

Certainly No to settling the Palestinians in Lebanon. This absolute rejection has been embodied in all the previous statements of the Lebanese Front, and in particular in the statement it issued on Tuesday, May 20, 1980, in which it declared:

> "The Front hastens to declare its total rejection of any settlement of foreigners, particularly of Palestinians, on any Lebanese territory, no matter how small in size and wherever the settlement should take place. It intends to resort to all means, no matter how onerous, to prevent this act of aggression from taking place, an act that will have the effect of sealing the fate of Lebanon from now."

The Lebanese Front has been pleased to note that the position expressed by the Foreign Minister in the Government's statement before the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 2, 1980 conformed to its views; we quote the following passage from this statement:

> "We wish to emphasize here what the President of Lebanon said on more than one occasion: We absolutely reject any project for the settlement of foreigners on Lebanese territory, as well as every measure that may lead to such settlement, whether directly or indirectly. We shall oppose any disguised project of settlement in all its phases with every means at our disposal. This opposition springs from our faith in our sacred right to our homeland, a right which nobody shares with us. The land of Lebanon is not free for all, neither is it a commodity offered for sale in auctions held in some international bazaar."

It is precisely this absolute rejection which every Lebanese shouts from the housetops with his deepest, firmest and most strenuous voice.

From the outset we were determined to nullify at any cost every project aiming at settling the Palestinians in Lebanon.

All the sales or transfers of real estate which occurred here and there with a view to enabling Palestinians, whether directly or in some roundabout way, to own Lebanese property, shall be

abrogated.

For the land of Lebanon belongs to the Lebanese only and there is no land in Lebanon for non Lebanese.

Likewise every illegal acquisition of Lebanese nationality, regardless of who has acquired it, shall be abrogated. Certainly No also to partition.

But with the same strength and certainty, No to every measure that conduces, or that might conduce, to the weakening of personal, existential, human, responsible freedom.

The reconciling of these two Noes, No to partition and No to the erosion of responsible freedom, is the fateful desideratum at this critical moment in the history of Lebanon.

VI

The Existence of Lebanon an Imperative Necessity

Lebanon is a necessity for itself, an Arab necessity, a Middle Eastern necessity, and a world necessity.

In all the sectors of its society, Lebanon fought, is now fighting, and shall continue fighting; Lebanon stood firm, is now standing firm, and shall continue standing firm; all in defense of its existence and freedoms, and all for the protection of its own values. Lebanon will not accept any encroachment upon its freedoms and values, even if the whole world stood in its face. And when the world wakes up from its slumber, it will appreciate the greatness of Lebanon's dogged attachment to its values even to the point of death, not only for itself, but indeed for the entire world.

And because Lebanon is an Arab necessity, owing to the fact that its climate is the climate of freedom, it devolves upon the Arab world to appreciate its situation and do everything in its power, not to enfeeble it, or oppress it, or curtail its vitality, or absorb it, but to vouchsafe for it the assurance, in truth, that it is totally secure from any Arab or Islamic peril, and to leave it to itself to develop in its own way according to the pleasure and will of its own peoples.

The thought that the good of the Arabs and Islam consists in assimilating and absorbing Lebanon, and that "Lebanon is a thorn in the side of the Arab world" which must disappear, is a false thought, let alone the fact that the realization of this thought is impossible.

Again, because Lebanon is a Middle Eastern necessity, owing to the fact, first, that the emergence of an order of peaceful interaction among the peoples of the Middle East is an inevitable development, and, second, that Lebanon is destined to play an effective role in the midst of this order, it behooves all the countries of the Middle East, including Turkey, Israel and Iran, to reassure free, sovereign, independent, secure and healthy Lebanon that, in truth, it is not in danger of extinction.

Finally, because Lebanon is a world necessity, owing to the fact, first, that Lebanon in the essence of its being is human and universal, as it has made, and continues to make today, many contributions of a universal and human character, principally in the domain of thought and of material and human intercourse; second, that Lebanon serves as an authentic window at once of the Middle East to the world and of the world to the Middle East; and third, that Lebanon is a moderating and reconciling factor among the peoples and civilizations of a region, the Middle East, which has always displayed, and all the more displays today, a universal world character, in relation to world religions, the economy of the world, world strategy, and world history:

For all these reasons the whole world must concern itself with Lebanon; it must even protect it; it must realize that should Lebanon lose its freedom and its distinctive identity with its universal character, its contribution would dry up and the world itself as a result would lose a value unique and irretrievable.

Consequently the Lebanese Front holds that the interest of the whole world requires the world to rise to the duty of providing this small-great country, Lebanon, with formal, actual and effective guarantees, to the end that Lebanon be assured a firm existence in which it will be at once free and master of itself, and therefore able to continue to carry out the message with which it has been charged since the dawn

of history.

If Lebanon is given these guarantees, its mind will be set at ease, and it will then be free to act and create; and if it is not given them, it will still act to be free in order to create; and in any event, Lebanon will remain a distinctive civilization by itself.

VII

Lebanon Universal and Human

In the essence of its being, Lebanon is authentically rooted in the one universal human civilization. It therefore rejects and resists every attempt at tearing up its deep roots in this civilization. Indeed its continuous historical existence is itself the expression of a firm will to this rejection and resistance.

We likewise reject every attempt at attenuating Lebanon's traditional existential relations with Europe and the Western world in general. For down the centuries and generations Lebanon has always acted on this world and interacted with it, and we shall not accept in these last days cutting Lebanon off from this world. Every attempt at this act of cutting Lebanon off from the West we shall categorically reject.

The Lebanon we want to build will not admit that any summit of thought or spirit in history and in the world be not accessible to its children. Therefore Lebanon will design its system of education on the basis of complete responsible openness to all sources of reason and truth and spirit in history and the world.

We also reject every attempt at weakening Lebanon's traditional free and creative interaction in all fields with its Arab and Middle Eastern environments.

Finally, we reject every attempt at severing the Lebanese overseas, whether sentimentally or culturally or economically or politically or administratively, from Lebanon, their fatherland. We aim, on the contrary, at making the relations between Lebanon and the Lebanese overseas as intimate, solid and firm as possible.

On the occasion of the convening of the recent annual conference of the American Lebanese League in Washington between October 18 and 20, 1980, we commend the felicitous endeavors undertaken by the League with the United States Government and the public opinion of America. We also laud the constancy of its sound view of everything that pertains to the essence and destiny of Lebanon.

We wish also to express on this occasion our pleasure in the Second World Maronite Congress which was held in New York between October 8 and 12, 1980, and to welcome the decisions it took and the recommendations it formulated, notably:

the affirmation of world Maronitism of its attachment to free, sovereign and independent Lebanon;

the affirmation of its rejection of every settlement of the Palestinians on Lebanese territory; and

the affirmation to His Holiness the Pope of the supreme human-world value of free Lebanon.

Four factors appearing on the horizon threaten, whether or not by design, to rupture one or another of Lebanon's essential features:

rupturing Lebanon from its deep and relatively unbroken roots throughout history;

rupturing Lebanon's intimate ties to the one human world civilization;

rupturing Lebanon's creative interaction, or curtailing this interaction, with its Arab and Middle Eastern environments, and

rupturing Lebanon's organic and living ties with its children abroad throughout the world.

The Lebanon we want to build rejects categorically all these four rupturings.

VII

The New Lebanese Society

The new society of the Lebanon we want to build shall be characterized by the following features:

lofty morals; responsible freedom; truthfulness; respect for others; placing the common good above the individual good; curbing material greed; the supremacy of law; promoting community spirit and cohesiveness; social justice; enlarging the scope of social security, and the example of the leaders.

We shall endeavor to implant these virtues, and all that goes with them, through the family, the school, popular literature and art, the public media of information, social intercourse, and the law.

IX

Addressing the World

In the past the West used to understand the reality of Lebanon and to take it seriously, but the West of today either does not understand it or, if it does, turns its gaze away from it.

Owing, however, to the splendid steadfastness manifested by all sectors of Lebanese society, the West lately appears to have renewed its readiness to understand it.

It is this indifferent, if not unfriendly, West whom we wish now to address.

We address the states and peoples of the West, both west and east.

We address France and the French people.

We address West Germany and the West German people.

We address Britain and the British people.

We address Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg and their peoples.

We address Italy, Spain, Greece, and Ireland and their peoples.

We address the Scandinavian states and their peoples.

Then we address the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Latin American world, all of which include great Lebanese communities - we address them all, governments and peoples.

We address these states and peoples in a spirit of confidence and hope, because the systems, outlooks and values of all of them are the same as our system, outlook and values here in Lebanon. Their systems are democratic and free; our system, too, is democratic and free. Their values are the values of freedom and man, ours, too, are precisely the same.

We say to them all:

"We are persuaded that part of the responsibility for the havoc that has afflicted Lebanon falls on your shoulders. You were for the most part spectators and unconcerned, while it was within your power, if you mustered the will, to contribute effectively to sparing us this ordeal, or at least to reducing it to one tenth of its magnitude.

"We believe in the same values in which you believe.

"These values are integrated into our being as they are into yours.

"We fought and are fighting and we died and are dying for the same outlook on life for which you

fought and are fighting and died and are dying.

"Our war is your war and if we are overcome in it, we shall not be overcome alone: you too will be overcome.

"Our survival is your survival, and if we survive with our values in these parts, you and your values will survive with us.

"We presume to feel that we love the peoples of this region more than you do, for we resolutely cling to the values we have been tending, values which were ours before they became yours, and because the peoples hereabout are in the most dire need for our unwavering living witness to them.

"The narrow and grudging eye appears to have succeeded, in one of your uncritical moments, in impressing upon you, falsely, the thought that your interests cannot be safeguarded except by sacrificing our life of dignity and mastery over our own destiny.

"The liberating of yourselves from the sway of this grudging and sickly eye is indeed your problem.

"Who painted to you that our continuing to enjoy the fife of freedom in which, far from inflicting any harm on anybody, we live, as we have been living all along, at peace with everybody, conflicts with your interests?

“Where is your freedom, where is your ancient and venerable tradition, where are your authentic values, where is your foresight, where is the lofty discrimination between spirit and matter which adorned the thinking of your forefathers for centuries and centuries?

"We are certain that the capabilities of your diplomacy can, provided the will were forthcoming, felicitously and quite easily reconcile between preserving all your vital interests in the Middle East and our continuing to live a life of freedom, dignity and mastery over our own values and destiny.

"Nay our continuing to enjoy such a life serves to bolster up at once the interests of the Middle East and your own interests in the Middle East.

"We do not believe that your diplomacy which succeeded in the past by its resourcefulness and skill in overcoming a thousand and one conflicts, cannot now, quite easily, discern and cancel out the spurious conflict between your interests and our living a life of dignity and freedom,

Indeed, we may have more confidence in you than you have in yourselves, for we believe that someday you will wake up and appreciate the heroism of our eternal tragic struggle in the defense of values which are exactly your values as they are ours.

Then we turn, again with confidence and hope, to the Soviet Union and the states which revolve in its orbit, and address them as follows:

"Our system is different from your system and our outlook is different from your outlook.

"But this difference need not inhibit our interest in and understanding of one another.

"How can you be harmed if we preserve our system and values and do not threaten in the slightest your systems and values?

"How can you be harmed if we conduct transactions with you on the basis of mutual respect, taking into account your and our interests, despite the differences that may subsist between your and our systems and values?

" You conduct transactions with systems other than your own precisely on this basis.

"Some of your values coincide with some of ours, and it is on the basis of this common fund of values that we can meet.

"We are confident we can understand your situations, and we trust it will be possible for you also to understand ours. On the basis of this mutual and tolerant comprehension we should be able, together, to build up free, creative and sound relations with one another.

We shall never forget all those who stood by our side in the tribulation that has befallen us.

And as we belong to the group of states and peoples that labor in the vineyard of man for the good of man and we are permanently committed to this task, we shall persevere in cooperating intimately and energetically with any state belonging to this group, until we pay every man our debt to him, and every state the obligations we owe it, and until we earn and justify our rightful place in the world.

X

A Call to the Lebanese People:

Total Confidence in the Future.

The Lebanese Front wishes to stress its total confidence that the Lebanese people will overcome all adversities and obstacles, no matter how complicated or tortuous or obscure the path still before them may be. It bases this confidence on the sturdiness manifested by our people throughout history, and on the remarkable steadfastness which has characterized the Lebanese Resistance, in all its sectors. in the ongoing events. This resistance has offered, and shall continue to offer, almost superhuman sacrifices. The Lebanese Front reaffirms its faith that Lebanon will emerge from the fiery furnace in which it is being tried an oasis of freedom, humanism, prosperity, openness, concord, joy and peace, as it has always been in the past.

We now address the Lebanese people of all persuasions:

"Doubtless you recognize the voice addressing you. You are accustomed to hearing ft. The same voice is now calling you.

"The Lebanon we want to build up belongs both to you and to US.

"It is equally your home and our home, regardless of who builds more in it, you or we.

"We have willed it, both to you and to us, a sanctuary of pride, honor and dignity, and a pasture in which freedom and well-being can bask.

"You and we are sick and tired of a foreigner who intrudes on our privacy, helps himself to our livelihood, and violates our sacred honor;

“a foreigner who destroys our institutions, our property and the sources of our welfare and happiness, and who darkens what looms ahead of our days;

“a foreigner who tries to topple our traditions and do away with our history;

“a refugee who wants to reduce us, under his aegis, to refugees in our own country, strangers in it and enemies unto himself.

"Finally, you and we are sick and tired of a usurper who tries to add his name to ours on the billboard of accomplishments which our efforts and sacrifices and sufferings have pinned on the brow of Lebanon.

"The Lebanese cause, which is your cause and ours, is a world cause. Its events unfold themselves on Lebanese soil. While its solution can only be a world solution, yet, whatever the solution might be, it can only be effected through Lebanese hands.

"These hands are your hands. They can convulse the *entire* world if they determine to organize the vast Lebanese potential here and abroad methodically, meticulously and responsibly, without allowing a single particle of it to be dissipated.

"History is our witness that every time we set our heart on something we attain it.

"We reap according to the abundance of our heart, and our heart is full of matter and determination.

"No man full in his heart as we are can be excused if he is overcome with fear or irresolution or even the frustration consequent upon failure.

"Unite, and you shall overcome.

“And, with God's help, we shall overcome."

Camille Chamoun
Pierre Gemayel
Abbot Boulos Naaman
Charles Malik
Fouad Afram Boustany
Edouard Honein

'Sudan Charter: National Unity and Diversity'

Issued by National Islamic Front,

January 1987

KHARTOUM

Religious Affiliation and the Nation

The People

A*) Sudanese are one nation:*

- United by common religious and human values, and by the bonds of coexistence, solidarity and patriotism,
- And diversified by the multiplicity of their religious and cultural affiliations.

B) *The Bulk of Sudanese are Religious:*
The following principles shall therefore be observed in consideration for their dignity and unity:

1. Respect for religious belief, and for the right to express one's religiousness in all aspects of life. There shall be no suppression of religion as such, and no exclusion thereof from any dimension of life.
2. Freedom of choice of religious creed and practice, and sanctity of religious function and institutions. There shall be no coercion in religious affiliation, and no prohibition of any form of religious practice.
3. Benevolence, justice, equality and peace among different religious affiliates. They shall not prejudice or hurt any another by word or deed. There shall be no hostility in religion - none shall excite antagonism, impose domination, or commit aggression among religious individuals or communities.

C) *The Muslims are the majority among the population of the Sudan:*
The Muslims are Unitarian in their religious approach to life. As matter of faith, they do not espouse secularism. Neither do they accept it politically. They see it as a doctrine that is neither neutral nor fair, being prejudicial to them in particular: it deprives them of the full expression of their legal and other values in the area of public life, without such detriment to those non-muslim believers whose creed is exclusively relevant to private and moral life. Historically, the Muslims are not familiar with secularism, which developed from a peculiar European experience - arising from the conflict between the Christian Church and secularists in politics, economics and science. The doctrine is, therefore, of little relevance to the historical development or the legacy of the Islamic civilization.

The Muslims, therefore, have a legitimate right, by virtue of their religious choice, of their democratic weight and of natural justice, to practice the values and rules of their religion to their full range - in personal, familial, social or political affairs.

D) In the Sudan there is a large number of those who adhere to African religions, a substantial number of Christians and a few Jews:
These have their particular beliefs, and do not believe in Islam, and should in no way be prejudiced or restrained only for being in minority. That is their due by virtue of their own creed, in concurrence with

the Islamic Shari'a and the fundamental rights of all men to freedom and equality.

Non-Muslims shall, therefore, be entitled freely to express the values of their religion to the full extent of their scope - in private, family or social matters.

The State

The State is a common affair among all believers and citizens of the Sudan. It observes the following principles:

a) *In the Sphere of Freedom and Equality*:
Freedom of creed and cult for all is guaranteed, (in a context of the prevalence of general freedom, of the supremacy of the constitution, of the rule of law and of government that is judicially and religiously responsible).

The privacy of every man is also guaranteed; his intimate personal affairs are immune against the powers of government; every one may conduct his devotional life in the manner he chooses.

None shall be penalized for any act or omission, if such is a recognized ceremonial or mandatory practice of his religion.

None shall be legally barred from any public office only because of his adherence to any religious affiliation. But religiousness in general may be taken into consideration as a factor of the candidate's integrity.

The freedom of religious dialogue and propagation is guaranteed; subject to any regulation that may ensure social tranquillity and regard for the respective religious sentiments of others.

b) *In the Sphere of Law:*
The state shall establish a legal system in full consideration of the will of the Muslim majority as well as the will of the non-Muslims. Wherever the entire popular mandate is harmonious, a basis of national consensus is thereby provided for all laws and policies. Where mandates diverge, an attempt shall be made to give general, if parallel, effect to both. In common matters where it is not feasible to enforce but one option or system, the majority option shall be determinative, with due respect to the minority expression.

The Sudan does not conform to the doctrine of centralism or absolute universality of law. (Its people have in fact been simultaneously governed by various legal systems, Islamic, civil or customary, applied according to person, subject matter or district). The scope of some laws can be limited as to particular persons or places - such that a general legal order is established intersected by personalized or decentralized sub-orders.

Thus:
Islamic jurisprudence shall be the general source of law:

- It is the expression of the will of the democratic majority.
- It conforms to the values of all scriptural religions, its legal rules almost correspond to their common legal or moral teachings.
- It recognizes, as source of law, the principles of national justice and all sound social customs.
- It specifically recognizes the principles of religious freedom and equality in the manner mentioned above; and allows for partial legal multiplicity in regard to the religious affiliation of persons or to the predominance of non-Muslims in any particular area, in the manner detailed below.

Family law shall be personal, as rules of conduct intimately relating to a person's private religious life, where in a variable legal system can be practically administered with reference to the specific religious affiliation of the parties in a limited, stable social unit: the family.

Thereby the privacy and the religious and cultural autonomy of the family are safeguarded.

Thus:
a) Every parent is entitled to bring up his issue in the religious manner of his liking. The freedom of religious education and its institutions is ensured.
b) The rules relating to marriage, cohabitation, divorce, parenthood, childhood and inheritance shall be based on the religious teachings of the couple. To the Muslims shall apply the *Shari'a*. To scriptural religious denominations shall apply their respective church laws. To the followers of local cults shall apply their special customs. Any of these or others can of course choose to be governed by *Shari'a*.

The effectiveness of some laws shall be subject to territorial limitations, considering the prevalence of certain religions or cultures in the area at variance with the religion dominant in the country at large, and regarding matters where an exception can be made from the general operation of the legal system - not according to each person's or family's choice but to the dominant choice in the area. In these matters exclusive local rules can be established in the area based on the local majority mandate - any local minority remaining subject to the democratic principle.

Thus the legislative authority of any region predominantly inhabited by non-Muslims can take exception to the general operation of the national law, with respect to any rule of a criminal or penal nature derived directly and solely from a text in the *Shari'a* contrary to the local culture. The said authority can instead opt for a different rule based on the customs or religion prevailing in the area.

The general presumption, otherwise, is for law to be effective country-wide over all persons and regions, except for any limitation deriving from the requirement of the constitutional decentralization system or from the very letter and purpose of a particular law.

Ethnicity and nationhood

The Sudan is one country:

- Whose people are bound by one common allegiance to nation and land.
- But are diverse as to ethnic origin, local custom or cultural association.
- Wherein Arab origin is mixed with African origin, Arab culture with African culture, with inputs from other origins or cultures.
- Ethnic and tribal origin shall be duly respected. Customary rules of solidarity and conduct, special to a specific tribal or local precinct may be observed. But ethnicity is a natural trait not deriving from human attainment and no good as a basis for discriminating between people or citizens in socio-political or legal relations. Moreover the expression of ethnic arrogance, rancour or strife should not be allowed.
- Local subcultures (tongues, heritages, ways of life, etc....) are respected and may be freely expressed and promoted -without deviation towards the excitement of animosity between fellow country-men, or the hampering of free dialogue and interaction , between subcultures towards the development of a national human culture, and without derogation from the national education policies or from the status of the official language.
- In its foreign and domestic policy, the state shall show consideration for the import of its different cultures. It shall pay regard in its international relations to the sense of cultural attachment or geographical neighborhood of the different sub-nationalities or inhabitants of the Sudan. It shall, for example, allow for no discrimination between nationals of different origins in policies of information or

housing, and shall not show bias in foreign relations towards the development of pan-Arab rather than pan-African ties.

the region and the country

The Sudan is a united state:

- Independent by virtue of its own national sovereignty,
- Whose people are mobilized in one central political allegiance,
- But diverse as to its far-flung regions inhabited by heterogeneous populations wherein prevail different needs, circumstances and standards of life.
- The nature of the Sudan generally calls for an increased national effort to reinforce the unity of the land and to strengthen the central national allegiance.
- It requires also with respect to the governance of the country due consideration from regional remoteness and socio-political disparity.
- In consideration for the identity of the different regions and the special needs, conditions and cultures of their inhabitants, and for the difficulty of administering the Sudan from one centre, there shall be established separate regions governed autonomously in certain regards and integrated into the national government otherwise.
- For the same considerations the composition of the central government Leadership shall incorporate elements from all regions. Government shall be organized in collegial and composite forms to allow for this representation. Some regional balance shall also be observed as far as possible in public service enterprises and in the different institutions of national government and administration.
- In consideration for the unity of the land, the national constitutional system shall preserve the integrity of those national powers necessary for maintaining a united sovereign country and for promoting the development and insurgence of the nation or coping with the states of national emergency.

The general laws and policies shall also ensure the oneness of the national territory by regulating and facilitating contact, communication and intercourse as well as the free circulation of persons, goods and information across regions towards a closer interaction and a more perfect union of the entire nation.

A) The Sharing of Power:

- The regional self-government system established in the South by virtue of the Self-Government Agreement of the early seventies, and by constitutional amendment in the North since the early eighties, is based on the principle of assigning to regional authorities the right of the legislative initiative and executive autonomy with respect to certain matters, without restraining the central authority from legislating on the same matters with absolute authority that overrides regional laws.
- A federal system would transfer to the federated regions matters of an even wider scope, but, more importantly, attribute to regional measures immunity from interference by central authorities through participation or abrogation, except with regard to a matter specifically designated as concurrent.

- In view of the scope and degree of federal autonomy, federalism requires the setting up of adequate infrastructure - material and human, and presumes the provision of sufficient financial resources independently raised by or transferred to the regions. All this may not be possible except through a process or a period of preparation and gradual transition to be duly conceived.
- The detailed evaluation of the respective government powers and relationships in the Sudan may lead to preference for a mixed system - comprising federal and regional elements in any equation or with respect to different matters. Besides this system of decentralization, a measure of deconcentration may be introduced. This is an administrative policy that merely broadens the scope of delegation to regional departmental branches with full central political control.
- Some of the major powers normally reserved for the centre to be administrated with high centralization or with administrative deconcentration are: national defence and security, foreign relations, nationality immigration and aliens, trans-regional means of communication and transport, the judicial system and the general legal codes, the financial order and its institutions, external and inter-regional trade, the natural resources - fluvial subterraneous and atmospheric, the general education and economic plans,... etc.
- Some of the matters normally assigned to the regions to enjoy thereto the initiative or the monopoly of legislation, according to the regional or federal principle respectively, are: regional security and administration, local government, culture, social affairs, tourism, education, health and social services, agriculture and industry, regional commerce,... etc.
- Some of these matters or of any other residual powers may be concurrent, for joint action by the centre and the regions.
- Provision should be made for a sharing formula between the centre and the regions with respect to land, internal revenue resources, joint major economic projects, the organization of professions and trades, the institutions of higher education, ... etc.
- Provision should also be made for safeguards of the freedom of communications, traffic and the passage of information, persons and goods, for the immunity of lands, projects, institutions and functionaries belonging to one authority as against the interference of another authority.
- Provision should likewise be made for a defined emergency regime that permits the national authorities to transgress the normal limits and equations, of power sharing to the extent of the necessity (wars, calamities, constitutional collapse...).
- Provision should finally be made for the participation of the regions in all constitutional amendments that relate to their legal status.
- Consideration for regionalism can also be confirmed by special arrangements in the composition of central agencies response for the planning of national policies. The political traditions and the financial means of the Sudan may not make a bicameral legislature commendable as long as the national deputies are in fact representatives of regional constituencies. As to the leadership of the executive branch of government, the parliamentary system of government might be preferred, as it is based on

collegiate executive power and allows for any political convention or usage governing regional representation or balance.

- The balanced presence of regions may also be observed in any consultative councils or permanent committees under the auspices of the executive, or even in the civil service.

- The National Islamic Front stands for the adoption of a federal system in the constitutional regulation of decentralization in the Sudan, with equal regard to all regions, or with special arrangements for some, and through any process of gradual transition.

B) The Sharing of Wealth:

- In view of the wide discrepancy in the relative economic standard of the regions, and in order to ensure a fully integrated economic development, so that no region in the land would claim exclusive rights to natural resources within its borders, the national government would not be deprived of the means necessary for the upkeep of the common weal, no region would be left too far behind in the general progress of the country and no region would be left too far behind in the general progress of the country and no region would develop without positive contributions for the development of the country at large - through contributions to central state resources, the attraction of emigrant labour and the intensification of economic exchange in the national market:

- The state shall adopt a comprehensive plan for economic development with a view of promoting general prosperity and ensuring the balance of regional development through the encouragement, direction and dispensing of projects towards depressed sectors and areas.

- In the transfer of national funds in support of regions, the state shall take into consideration the relative size of the population and the feasibility of utilization as well as a positive preference for less developed regions to further their growth towards parity.

- Notice should be taken, in the composition of national economic and planning agencies for the balance representation of the different regions.

- The persons and the institutions of the private sector should be encouraged to intensify their economic initiatives in those regions that are disadvantaged. The same should be observed in the extension of administrative, funding or taxation concessions.

- The state shall endeavour to link all the regions of the country through roads and other means of communication and transport, so that the economic movement should freely and evenly roll on across the national territory.

- Every region where a national project is situated, may retain a reasonable share of the opportunities and returns provided thereby, without prejudice to the due share of the state as a whole in all national opportunities and resources.

Peace, transition and constitution

In the pursuit of peace and stability the substantive issues which have always been in dispute among Sudanese are better taken up first for dialogue and resolution. Only thereafter should procedures and measures necessary for implementing any national consensus be dealt with. The most important of the

latter is an agreed arrangement determining the destiny of the present political institutions, of the various national political forces as to participation in public life.

The national concord and the program for its implementation shall be decided upon in a general constitutional conference whose legal resolutions shall be ultimately put before the constituent authority for adoption in the permanent constitution or in appropriate legal measures. Political resolutions shall be the subject-matter of a national charter.

A national body, agreed upon by all parties concerned, shall be charged with preparation for the conference - undertaking studies, organizing the paper work and extending invitations to participants. A government agency shall handle the necessary technical and administrative work under the supervision of the above-mentioned body.

The various political forces shall conduct preliminary consultations and dealings designed to coordinate stands and points of view, and shall promote a favorable political climate to ensure the success of the conference.

Participation in the conference is open to all national political forces, whatever the respective weight and irrespective of recognition of, a participation in the present government or political set-up or otherwise and of operation inside or outside the Sudan. (The participation of Sudan People Liberation Movement is subject to an agreed cease-fire arrangement).

Observers from African countries as well as international regional organizations and the United Nations Organization may be invited to attend the conference.

The conference shall determine all the issues of substance concerning the ordering of public life in the Sudan, especially its justice as to differences of religious association and cultural identity or as to distribution of power or wealth, and shall consider any constitutional or political matter relating thereto. The conference shall also settle the issues of transition, including:

1. The completion of the Constituent Assembly as to full regional representation.
2. The form of government during the transition.
3. The administration of southern and northern regions pending the establishment of a final constitutional system.

The plight of those citizens who were displaced, or who incurred damage, deserted the public service or left the country because of the state of fighting and insecurity.

The resolutions of the conference shall be adopted by unanimity, while recommendations may be adopted my majority.

Appendix 4: The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and the War in Darfur

The Nuba Mountains Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) came into effect 72 hours after it was signed in Switzerland on the 19th January 2002. In the Agreement the warring parties, the SPLA and the Government of Sudan, agreed to an internationally monitored cease-fire among all their forces in the Nuba Mountains. This was set, at first, for a renewable period of six months but it had the broader objectives of promoting a just, peaceful and comprehensive settlement of the conflict. This peace agreement set in motion the last days of the North-South civil war in Sudan. It gave credibility to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process and was the first time that government, rebel and international officials had seriously negotiated for peace. On 9 January 2005 the promise of this agreement was fulfilled when a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed by President Omar al-Bashir of the government and John Garang of the SPLA.

But despite the jubilation, amongst Sudanese and international officials alike, after 22 years of war, and despite the peace treaty Sudanese society was more ethnically fragmented than at any other time in its history. In February 2003 *al Rai al Aam* newspaper in Khartoum quoted a government official as stating, what many in the country had suspected for around a year, that the surge in banditry in the Western province of Darfur was in fact a new regional rebellion. Two rebel factions, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), had emerged in reaction to the North-South peace process and established two different fronts, recruiting from the Fur and Zaghawa communities respectively. Their justification for war was that the CPA rewarded only those who had picked up arms and excluded all other parties and regions in the distribution of power, wealth and representation.

These movements recruited by arguing that over the 1990s the Muslim African minorities in the North had, in serving Khartoum, in reality been serving the interests of a minority Arab elite. In 2003 a group of Darfuri politicians turned the Islamic rhetoric of the regime on its head in a pamphlet asserting that race not religion had guided the war. One of its supporting arguments was a brief survey, entitled the ‘Black Book’ (*al-Kitaab al-Aswad*), of the ethnic origins of the martryrs in the PDF that pointed to a disproportionate casualty rate amongst volunteers of Western origin in comparison to Arabs from central Sudan. Throughout Sudan the ‘Black Book’ instigated a renewed interest in ethnicity and regionalism with riots breaking out in Eastern Sudan amongst the Beja and violent clashes between Southerners and Northerners in Khartoum. Whilst in 1996 the state appeared to be between “radical reconstruction and deconstruction” (Kok 1996), in 2004 analysts were warning that the continual deconstruction of agencies of social control was leading to possible state collapse in Sudan.

The Darfur rebellion caught the government by surprise and with the majority of its forces committed in the South. As in the Nuba Mountains the army was demoralised from decades of war and underfunded, but unlike the war against the SPLA the army was also heavily dependent on soldiers recruited from the same communities as the rebels. Reports began to come from Darfur of the defection of soldiers from the ranks of the army. Furthermore, the Justice and Equality Movement had prior links with the alienated Turabi faction of the NIF in Khartoum, with its head, Khalil Ibrahim, reputedly an ex-PDF coordinator. Checkpoints went up around Khartoum, two coup attempts were announced and all leaders of Turabi’s party were imprisoned.

In April 2003, the rebels attacked el Fasher airport, destroying half a dozen military aircraft and kidnapping an airforce general. The Southern rebels had managed nothing of the kind in twenty years. Obeying the commands of the same security apparatus that had commanded the *Jihad* against the Nuba the army was pulled back from Darfur and local Arab tribes were encouraged to defend themselves. Unwilling to rely on the PDF as more than auxillaries, military intelligence sought out new alliances and as before, mobile militia forces were recruited as the mainstay of the government’s counterinsurgency strategy. The government established a Border Intelligence Guard (*Istikhbarat al-Hudud*), directly controlled by Military Intelligence, that has been identified as the “core of the Janjaweed” as well as using the security apparatus to recruit tribal militias like Musa Hilal’s “The Light, The Fast and the Fearful” (*Al-Khafif, Al-Sariya, Al-Muriya*) (ICG 2005, 8). Members of these organisations were, however, allied to a little known Arab supremacist movement known as the ‘Arab Gathering’ (*Tajammu al-Arab*). Implanted on Darfuri soil by Libya in the 1980s this movement had recruited from Chadian nomadic exiles and smaller landless Arab nomads in Darfur. These groups

sought more than the reopening of nomadic routes closed by war. Controlled by a radical racist organisation this networked movement sought the proclamation of an Arab homeland in the region.

By Christmas 2004, estimates suggested over 300,000 people had died (Coeburg 2005), over half directly from violence and that around 2.5 million people required humanitarian assistance[340]. Yet despite extensive media coverage, political rhetoric and popular activism, in his report of the 7 March 2005, over two years after the conflict began, Kofi Annan, UN secretary general, announced that the "killing and raping and burning are still going on."[341].

By the date of writing, in early 2006, the Sudanese state's military weakness has not been rectified[342] and the delegation of violence no longer appears to be reversable. Although there is no central policy of genocide an amalgamation of opportunistic land-grabs, historic grievances and private motives has allowed a small number of ideological combatants to unravel Darfur's social order.

The structural conditions that have facilitated the Darfur crisis exist in periphery areas throughout Sudan: local administration has collapsed under the weight of broken promises and political infighting, distrust and disillusionment mean that support must be bought or 'coerced' rather than 'won' and resource conflicts have been aggravated by decades of drought and war. By initiating a policy of divide and rule in the 1990s it appears that this may be the regimes's only feasible governance strategy[343]. The government, as a result, is not only privatising warfighting, but the regulation of entire social groups.

[340]USAID Sudan: Darfur - Humanitarian Emergency Fact Sheet #25 (FY 2005).

[341]http://www.unsudanig.org/emergencies/darfur/press/data/SG-Statement-following-SC-Mtg-7Mar05.pdf

[342]According to information received by the Commission, the army is approximately 200,000 in strength, whilst its logistical capacity was designed for an army of 60,000 (UN 2005, 27).

[343] Another example is the largely Nuer South Sudan Defence Forces headed by Paulino Matiep and operational within the oil areas of Upper Nile. Whilst dismissed as a militia by many observers the SSDF has been granted formal recognition by the state and the freedom to regulate elements of the Nuer community within Sudan. Stories of the abduction of children for recruitment, independent court services and taxation in SSDF areas (Kalakla, Fiteihab in Omdurman, and Haj Yousef in Khartoum North) are rife.

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Interviews:

Sudan: (Between December 2002 and March 2003)

Named:

- Abbas Saeed Abdel-Gader, Assistant to Peace Advisory, Khartoum.
- Prof. Abdul-Rahim Ali Mohamed Ibrahim, Rector, Khartoum International Institute of Arabic Language/ ex-Member of Council of Forty., Khartoum.
- Ahmed Abdallah Adam, assistant to the Peace Advisor, Khartoum.
- Arthur Poole, ICRC Official, Khartoum.
- Maj-Gen. Fadlalla Burma Nasir, ex-Minister, Umma Party member, Khartoum.
- Gatluak Deng, ex-Governor of Upper Nile, ex Council of Southern Sudan, Khartoum.
- Mohammed Awad Mohammed Ali Kaballo, Ahlia University, Khartoum
- Dr. Mohamed El-Mukhtar Hassan Hussein, Director Information, Research and Studies Department, Peace Advisory of the Presidency, Khartoum
- Nhial Bol, editor, Khartoum Monitor, Khartoum
- Sadiq al-Turabi, Son of Hassan al-Turabi, Khartoum.

Anonymous:

- Businessman in competition with regime supported business, Khartoum.
- Doctor of Anthropology – specialist on Western Sudan, University of Khartoum, Khartoum,
- Doctor of Anthropology – specialist Southern Sudan, University of Khartoum, Khartoum,
- ex-Local Adminstrator Kadugli (1987-1995), Khartoum,
- ex-Police Officer purged by NIF, Khartoum.
- ex-PDF Student Trainee 1994, Khartoum
- ex-PDF Student Trainee (1992) and Combatant (1992, 1995), Khartoum
- ex-PDF Combatant, Khartoum
- Ex-PDF Conscript, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Joint Military Commission official, Kadugli,
- Misseriya Lecturer, Dilling University,
- Misseriya Local Administrator, Dillinge,
- Nuba Local Adminstrator, Dillinge,
- Peace Coordinator, International Relief Agency, Nuba Mountains
- Political Officer, International Embassy, Khartoum
- Program Support Manager, International Relief Agency, Nuba Mountains
- Professor of Political Science, University of Khartoum, Khartoum.
- Rizeiqat Omda, Khartoum,
- Nuba Omda 1, Kadugli,

- Nuba Omda 2, Kadugli,
- Representative, Martyrs Foundation, Khartoum,
- Sudan Armed Forces Conscript, Khartoum,
- UNDP advisor on Nuba Mountains Peace Process, Khartoum
- United Nations Mine Action Service official, Kadugli,

Lebanon: (Between September 2003 and December 2003)

- Antoine Najjamé, Lebanese Forces Ideologue, Beirut.
- Asaad Chaftari, Second in Command of the Security Services of the LF under Elie Hobeika, Beirut.Charles Chartouni, Lebanese Forces Command Council Member, Beirut.
- Farid al-Khazen, Professor of Political Science, American University of Beirut, Beirut.
- Fuad Abu Nader, Commander in Chief of the Lebanese Forces 1983-4, Beirut.
- Georges Freiha, Popular Committee Coodinator and Chief of Staff of Amine Gemayel's Presidency, Beirut.
- Habib Efraim, Representative of the Lebanese Syriac communitee, member of the Lebanese Forces, Beirut.
- Jean Aziz, ex-LF combatant and representative of the Qornet Shehwan Christian Political Bloc, Beirut.
- Michelle Awad, Professor of Sociology in Lebanese Forces Officer Academy, Beirut.
- Nader Succar, LF student Coordinator and Combatant, Beirut.
- Roget Dib, Lebanese Forces Deputy Commander under Samir Geagea, Beirut.
- Simon Hadad, Political Scientist, University of Notre Dame, Beirut.
- Tawfik Hindi, Political Advisor to Commander of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, Beirut.
- Ziad al-Masri, Political Scientist and resident of the Chouf Mountains, Beirut.