CHATHAM HOUSE

Al-Qaeda Five Years On:
The Threat and the Challenges

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SUMMARY

• Five years on, the challenge to al-Qaeda is coming from within as traditional Islam attacks the use of terror as un-Islamic and popular support wanes as terrorist attacks target Muslims.

• Nonetheless, there has been an increased radicalization of the Muslim street but this seems to be finding expression in Islamist groups who are keen to use democratic channels.

• Al-Qaeda's main success has been to highlight the link between the West's policies in the Middle East and terrorism.

• Despite its religious rhetoric, al-Qaeda's strength lies in its political message which resonates with many but whose tactics have attracted only the fringe.

• The West faces a terrorist challenge that comes from within its borders and which impinges on community relations and civil liberties.

Introduction

Since the attack on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001, both those who sanctioned and organized the atrocity, and those who initiated the War on Terror have succeeded in fomenting a long-drawn-out battle that has opened up many fronts. Each party has fed off the other's 'successes' and 'failures' which have been used to bolster their own policies or reprisals. The US and its allies have, in stressing the threat from al-Qaeda, unintentionally helped enhance al-Qaeda's stature as a global political player, despite an overall weakening of the organization through tough security and other measures. From al-Qaeda's standpoint, the very survival of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, despite repeated and concentrated efforts to locate and capture them, coupled with their frequent media statements as well as the continuing acts of terrorism carried out by seemingly small autonomous cells in themselves amount to success rather than failure, particularly given the standing and power of their adversaries.[1] Al-Qaeda also feels vindicated by US policy in the Middle East, whether it be the war in Iraq or US support for Israel's campaign in Lebanon.

Nevertheless, al-Qaeda is facing a very serious challenge to its legitimacy and potential popularity which is being undermined, somewhat unexpectedly, from within the Muslim world itself. In pursuing its political agenda, al-Qaeda had couched its rhetoric in religious terms, yet the traditional Muslim religious establishment has responded by condemning its tactics as un-Islamic. In the meantime, rather than attracting more support among Muslim populations, al-Qaeda has seen support increasing for moderate non-violent Islamist groups (best exemplified by the electoral victories achieved by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt). Worse still for al-Qaeda, the post-9/11 terrorist activities it inspired in Madrid and London failed to resonate with the Muslim street.

These newer attacks have created an additional security problem with the emergence of a small minority in Western communities who find the al-Qaeda cause appealing. The problem has therefore been transformed from one of terrorism finding its way to Europe's shores into terrorist activity that is partly home-grown (and so far this seems to be mainly a European problem,[2] although whether the US has avoided it because of a structural difference in assimilating immigrants or whether it is only a matter of time before it too faces the same issue remains to be seen). This is bound to increasingly affect not only domestic issues related to immigration, ethnicity and integration but eventually foreign policy decisions because of the linkage repeatedly being made by activists and non-activists between terrorism and regional concerns. It is here perhaps that al-Qaeda has set in motion the most significant potential challenge for policy-makers.[3]

The war on terror: the balance sheet

Al-Qaeda as an organization has been weakened since it carried out the 9/11 atrocities and consequently came under attack in Afghanistan and became subject to harsh security measures worldwide. The US can argue that although legally dubious (and possibly harmful from a propaganda point of view), both the internment of captured personnel in Guantánamo and rendition, coupled with other security measures, have helped undermine the development of al-Qaeda's core structure and may even have weakened the effective work of many of its cells.[4] These security measures have included a multi-pronged globally coordinated attempt to deprive al-Qaeda of communication, finance and recruitment. Almost all concerned countries, from the US to the EU and even to Saudi Arabia, now have Financial Task Forces charged with tracking wire payments, vetting charitable donations and monitoring monetary traffic to ensure that al-Qaeda's financial flow is severely disrupted. Likewise, al-Qaeda's communication network is being monitored and undermined. This is happening in the virtual sphere through monitoring and tracking of internet traffic and physically through enhanced border controls, with, for example, a broad agreement on biometric identification papers and shared visa and flight data. In terms of pursuit, there is greater cooperation regionally and globally, as evidenced by the European arrest warrant and the various bilateral agreements with the US for speedier extradition (although this latter is being used by the US for non-terrorist- related crimes, such as dealing with the 'NatWest Three'[5]).

Such intense monitoring has raised various concerns about civil liberties, especially in the US, where a written constitution makes it harder for the government to apply such rigorous monitoring to its own citizens. This is evidenced by the recent Federal Court ruling that the presidential order for warrant-less telephone monitoring of international calls for data mining violates the First and Fourth Amendments and should be stopped, although the case is ongoing.[6] The US federal authorities also argue that part of the reason for the success of the British government in foiling the alleged Heathrow plot in August 2006 was the new UK law allowing police to hold terror suspects without charge for 28 days, whereas the constitution forces them to hold a citizen for no longer than 48 hours without charge.[7]

Nonetheless, terrorist activity continues to

mushroom in support of the ideology and tactics of an organization under attack in its home base on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border and whose leadership is on the run. The hampering and foiling of terrorist plots reflects a large measure of success on the part of security services from Europe to Pakistan, but the fact remains that terrorist attacks have continued over the past five years,[8] from Bali to Cairo and from Madrid to London, while the prospect of new attacks indicates a large degree of failure in eliminating the threat. The question then becomes why the threat has not been eliminated, given the sophistication of the Wetern security measures and the suppression of Islamist groups that espouse terror tactics, especially in Algeria and Egypt, and attempts to do so in Saudi Arabia. The answer lies largely in the nature of the opposition which defies, and is resistant to, traditional security measures.

As has been frequently noted, the absence of a formal single organizational structure has contributed to making the fight against this brand of terrorism more elusive and difficult. In addition, the global nature of the supporting network and its use of the internet as a means of communication have all helped increase the difficulties faced in eliminating the threat.[9] Equally critical, but not as tangible as the technical and logistical difficulties in facing al-Qaeda proper, is the continuing emergence of new terrorist cells and the radicalization of individuals, whether through recruitment or independently, especially in immigrant communities in the West. Much has been said about the attractiveness of al-Qaeda's world-view and its terror tactics to a small minority of radicalized individuals who seem to form into terror cells that attach themselves to the mother organization. This process, which is almost a reverse of the normal recruiting methods of 'standard' terrorist groups, makes it difficult for the security services to monitor all possible suspects. Yet there is an acknowledgment that possible converts are being sought out in mosques, university campuses and prisons, which presupposes some structure or link.[10] There is uncertainty about whether terrorist acts such as the London bombs in July 2005 were conceived locally with only technical aid supplied from abroad, or planned once al-Qaeda, or an affiliate, knew of the existence of a group of individuals willing to form a cell. If the latter, how far in advance does al-Qaeda plan its attacks? Was the alleged August plot long in preparation with al-Qaeda deciding on the timing as and when circumstances dictated and in response to specific events? The apparent sophistication of the August plot might argue for a premeditated plan, which in turn raises questions about a continuing effort by al-Qaeda to develop its use of terror through other weapons and methods.

However, despite these very valid concerns over the possibility of ever more sophisticated methods of terrorism, the fact remains that acts of terror can be carried out by a few dedicated individuals with limited resources, and limited contact with the mother organization.[11] A few committed local fanatics with a basic knowledge of chemistry can wreak enormous carnage if they chose mass transport vehicles, whether trains, buses or aeroplanes, as the scene of their attacks. Moreover, the 'institutionalization' of suicide bombing as a terrorist weapon since 9/11 has increased the public's vulnerability.

The very survival of al-Qaeda, in whatever form, breeds support from radical elements and insecurity on the part of the international community. It has pushed the US into even more direct engagement in the Middle East and therefore increased the resentment of Muslims towards the US,[12] thereby creating a vicious circle.

Al-Qaeda's ace: the regional connection

Political turmoil in the Middle East such as in Palestine, Iraq or Lebanon, as well as the survival of Arab regimes, embolden those who want to resort to violence as a means of reprisal and fuel the appeal and actions of al-Qaeda. When al-Qaeda attacked the Twin Towers, the background against which it did so was the previous Iraq war and the US presence in Saudi Arabia. Worryingly for future developments, given the recent events in the Middle East, bin Laden cited the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 1982 as a key moment in the transformation of his perception and motivation.[13]

One of the most significant developments since 9/11 is the way in which Iraq, rather than developing into a model of a 'new' Middle East, has degenerated into a battleground for extremism and sectarian violence. One of the reasons cited by the Western allies for the attack on Iraq was the possibility of a terrorist threat, with the war presented as a continuation of the Afghan campaign – part of a single extended effort to eradicate the threat from al-Qaeda. However, one of the effects of the Iraq conflict was that al-Qaeda supporters were provided with a base from which they could engage with their enemies after they had been denied the Afghan arena with the fall of the Taliban regime. And while al-Qaeda supporters are only one player among many in Iraq, nevertheless their involvement in the conflict kept al-Qaeda's name on the agenda in what is seen by many in the region and the wider Muslim world as 'resistance' to US occupation, although Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's extreme tactics and videotaped beheadings alienated many who had previously sympathized with al-Qaeda.[14]

While Muslim anger was galvanized around Iraq it hardly ever lost sight of the Palestinian cause which could always be conjured up by any radical movement, whether religious or secular, to rally support. If there is one area of general consensus among Muslim majorities over the West's double standards and the justification for the resort to suicide bombings, it would be in the case of Palestine. While the US and UK governments continued to deny a linkage between regional crisis and terrorism, not only al-Qaeda but also Muslims who condemn al-Qaeda continued to stress the connection. Even Muslim governments acknowledge it exists, particularly with regard to Palestine, and more recently the EU has acknowledged an implicit link between the two.[15]

Al-Qaeda and those who support it see themselves as translating into action long-standing sentiments of anger and despair at injustices committed against the Muslim world. In addition the perception of the West's complicity in perpetuating these injustices (support for Israel, the war in Iraq and support for autocratic Arab regimes) remains widespread. Furthermore, al-Qaeda tends to extend the parameters of Muslim concern from the Middle East theatre to a much wider Muslim arena (although there is of course a historical precedent as well as a religious basis to the idea of a Muslim *umma*). This is reflected in al-Qaeda's accusing the Pakistani government of complicity with the West, its sponsoring of activists in Indonesia and the implication of a revival of Muslim claims to Iberia when Zawahiri talks of Muslim Spain.[16] This global Islamic agenda goes a long way in firing the imagination of Muslims who are attracted to the idea of a renaissance of Muslim power. In a sense, the larger-than-life image and the grandiose message of al-Qaeda are central to its appeal and the recruitment of supporters. While al-Qaeda has clearly failed to galvanize majority support, despite attempting to represent and fight for a broad 'Islamic cause', it has succeeded in disturbing the status quo. It has shown Arab governments in particular that it can undermine their relationship with their main sponsor, the US, and engage it in the region in ways al-Qaeda itself can capitalize on.

The battle for hearts and minds

Al-Qaeda's Achilles' heel: the theological backlash

Nonetheless, it is now clear that al-Qaeda has failed to transform itself into a widespread movement. It remains a terrorist organization which echoes the concerns of Muslim majorities but has achieved diminishing support for its tactics despite the emergence of supporting cells over several years in states as divergent as Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Britain. Interestingly, from its inception it failed to attract the mainstream of the radical Islamist movements in Arab countries.[17]

The initial idea behind al-Qaeda was, as its name implies, the establishment of 'a base' which would bring together the different Islamist groups, coordinate and fund their activities while allowing them autonomy. The significance of this quest remains strong today insofar as there is still a search among activist Muslims for a body that can represent what are seen as shared grievances which need to be addressed on a transnational level. Additionally, the floating majority, who are alienated from their non-responsive governments, and who share many of the concerns held by the Islamists, remain leaderless and receptive to anyone who is ready at a certain point to represent their grievances and frustrations. This was the case with support shown for bin Laden, even for Saddam Hussein during the invasion of Iraq and, more recently, for Hassan Nasrallah in the midst of the Lebanon conflict, as it was true of Nasser in the 1960s.

The question remains whether al-Qaeda can ever regain the sympathy it seems to have generated in the Muslim street in the days following 9/11 and somehow build on that to create a more solid long-term popular appeal. It does not seem capable of doing so, not so much because of extensive security measures against it, but primarily owing to three important factors.

First, attacks on Muslim civilians in Saudi Arabia and Jordan have resulted in a serious setback in terms of support in both these countries because of local civilian casualties. Moreover, for the vast majority al-Qaeda is also seen as tainted by its perpetuation of sectarian violence in Iraq. Especially in the wake of Hizbullah's essentially Shi'i resistance to the Israeli attack on Lebanon, this will be viewed as increasingly unacceptable to many across the Muslim world despite Sunni concerns over increasing Shi'i influence.[18]

Secondly, there has been a heightened radicalization of the middle ground in the Muslim world. A growing number have embraced Islamist politics but will not sanction al-Qaeda's tactics and will pursue democratic avenues when they are made available. This radicalization may itself be a worrying development for the West but it is also weakening al-Qaeda, whose legitimacy and ambition rest on approval from the Muslim masses – and these are essentially saying opposition can occur within an alternative framework that may be Islamist and uncompromising but should be non-violent.

Thirdly, there has been a growing discomfort and opposition religiously and morally to terrorism among

Muslims. Al-Qaeda has driven a wedge between Muslim communities not about the importance of regional and international politics and the role of the US, but about the justification of violence in the name of Islam. This is perhaps one of the most significant ongoing developments and one which will determine the nature of the Islamists' struggle against their governments and the West in the future.

The traditional religious establishment (long seen as the enemy by al-Qaeda) has, by repeatedly arguing the theological case for its long-held beliefs, substantially shifted opinion against the resort to violence on religious grounds. This has been particularly evident in Egypt, Saudi and Yemen and has created a backlash which has in turn helped emphasize the polarization within Muslim communities over who has the right to interpret Islam.

Although governments have encouraged the *ulema* to promote a non-violent interpretation of Islam as a method for countering radicalization, nevertheless, this current needs to be seen as a genuine attempt by Muslim scholars and Muslim communities to protect Islam from what is believed to be an assault on its teachings and principles, irrespective of the position of governments. Those very same protagonists in the fight against al-Qaeda can be strong opponents of Western policies and of governments in the Muslim world. Their weakness lies in their inability to provide a sufficiently activist framework of action for those Muslims who are frustrated at the present situation. In Muslim societies and communities where for the majority religious belief dominates in shaping their world-view, the theological battle ultimately poses a very serious challenge to al-Qaeda and its supporters.[19]

The democratic channel versus radicalization

The other major development that has occurred to differing degrees in much of the Arab Middle East is that the barrier of fear against authoritarian governments has to some extent been broken. Moreover, the level of liberalization, while limited, has provided a freer environment for the press, professional syndicates and political parties to voice opposition. Elections have often been marred by malpractice and have maintained existing rulers in power; nevertheless, they have involved a greater degree of freedom than previously and have consequently raised the public's expectations for change.

In this new climate where there is increased criticism of governments, and despite heightened anti-US sentiment, al-Qaeda's appeal has been undermined by the more vociferous opposition. It is not so much the secular forces but the Islamist ones that have

greater legitimacy in pulling the carpet from underneath those who promote al-Qaeda's arguments. The majority in Muslim states seem to more openly express a similar anger to that of al-Qaeda towards their governments and the West but have not adopted its tactics. They appear willing to channel their opposition through political parties and the democratic process when it is available, but they continue to be frustrated in their endeavours to pursue the democratic path by the slow pace of change in the region and ongoing repressive measures.

Thus, against the uncertain progress of democratization in the Middle East, and the frequently frustrated ambitions of Islamist parties that condemn the use of violence, al-Qaeda continues to offer a radical alternative, even if only to a minority. Moreover, there is no reason why the present situation and anger of Muslims will not generate new levels of radicalism and terror. The champions of this may be a neo-al-Qaeda or a separate organization or cells. The response of a new generation of activists may prove more brutal in their actions than the old al-Qaeda, especially if there is a renewed motivation and access to the use of chemical and biological weapons.[20]

Al-Qaeda has failed in reversing the perceived aggression on Muslim lands and has arguably contributed to the military involvement of the US and its allies in the region. Its image of 'resistance' is likely to be gradually replaced by others more in touch with the shifting middle ground that is still radical enough to appeal to heightened nationalist and religious sentiments but is unwilling to condone terrorism. Al-Qaeda's lethal legacy will be that even if the democratic alternative becomes entrenched among the majority, there remains the possibility of a tiny minority who could perpetrate terror in the name of the same cause.

Europe's home-grown enemy

Part of the fallout of 9/11 is that al-Qaeda's message has found some, albeit very limited, support in Western societies. The reasons for this, and the implications, are in some ways the most worrying development in terms of security for Western governments and societies. The terrorist threat has developed into one that comes from within. Al-Qaeda captured the imagination not only of angry youth in the Muslim world but of some in Muslim communities in the West, where it has in consequence become a deep concern that democracies appear to give rise to the same terrorist responses as the undemocratic systems of the Middle East.

Those Muslims in the West who are connected with al-Qaeda are clearly a small minority. Arguing that they have not been integrated and are alienated from the countries where they are citizens may be valid but fails to take into account the extent to which they are also attracted to 'a cause', and in this they are not unique either as a group or historically. The link with causes beyond one's own boundaries, and criticism of government policies, have in the past drawn support for various radical organizations but it is clearly the extent of commitment and the ruthless lengths to which these recruits are willing to go that make them appear unique.

It is as if post-9/11 the notion of a clash of civilizations has become a self-fulfilling prophecy, partly as a result of al-Qaeda's own desire for confrontation with the West, because it is through confrontation that it believes it can achieve change; and the West's perception is that it is defending democracy, a view voiced particularly by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair. For all the attempts not to point the finger at Islam as a religion, a polarization has nonetheless taken place, increasingly using 'us' and 'them' terminology. This has contributed to attracting a cult-like and anarchist response to al-Qaeda by a marginalized element that is disillusioned with the state within Western societies.[21]

Attempts at undermining radical interpretations of Islam are part of a long-term process. On one level the theological counter-attack from Muslim *ulema* has had positive results. The review of the Saudi educational curriculum and the clampdown on the madrassas in Pakistan were policies instigated as a means of countering the continuing radicalization of youth and of suppressing recruiting centres.[22] On another level, while this was happening, the expression of radical politics and terrorism continued to manifest itself, no less so than in relation to the situation in Iraq. There was a continued desire to respond to external military involvement in the Middle East through the resort to violence.

Of course ideology and religion matter; they shape world-views and responses to politics, and they have been either largely underestimated or misunderstood by analysts and policy-makers. However, this does not mean that radical responses would not have been sought out anyway outside the realm of Islam. If we were to assume, for example, that in the Middle East secular attitudes prevailed over religious ones and that in place of radical Islamist opposition groups a secular-oriented opposition came to dominate, we are still likely to have seen the emergence of terrorist groups to counter prevalent feelings of injustice and powerlessness.

A large part of the challenge for the West, therefore, is how to deal with the reference to religion and religious values in the context of political activism and radicalism. Is it the main motivator of extremist politics?

Despite religious references, since 9/11 the defining elements for al-Qaeda have primarily been political: specifically, a hostile stance towards the US and its policies in the Muslim world, as well as opposition to Muslim governments. Some analysts have emphasized Wahhabism and Salafism as theological traditions that lend themselves to extremism. However, while radicalization finds justification in religious interpretations, violence in itself is not set in any one tradition or religious sect. While the re-education of Europe's Muslim youth in the tenets of traditional Islam might convey the message that the use of terror is unacceptable, thus countering sympathy for al-Qaeda, the problem for European governments remains that a segment within the Muslim community is both politicized and angry at the conduct of foreign policy.

Conclusion

Al-Qaeda's terrorism has forced the issue of the need to examine Western policies towards the Muslim world. It has communicated to the West that there are consequences to its policies. In the process it has laid the blame for all the ills of the Muslim world on the West, in a way which mirrors the post-colonial blame of Western powers by the secular socialist Arab regimes.

Al-Qaeda has used its understanding of democracy to employ terror as leverage. Zawahiri is on record as saying that since in democratic countries the people elect their governments, they become responsible for the action of these governments and so effectively lose the protection afforded by civilian status. This is echoed in the various speeches bin Laden made to Western audiences including the offer of a truce after the Madrid bombings and in his messages to Europe and the US.[23] In essence, the message to the citizens of Western democracies is that it is their governments and not al-Qaeda which should bear the responsibility for the infliction of terror on their societies. While the indications are that, with the possible exception of Spain, such a message found no broad resonance among Western populations, it can be argued that Western governments and their societies are becoming increasingly aware of the need to address more than security issues, and of the fact that regional crises help foment terror.

Of the three main grievances held by the majority of Muslims against Western policy in the region, US

involvement in Afghanistan (even within a NATO context) and in Iraq is likely to prove temporary, despite the present inability of the Iraqi government to gain control.

The two other issues may prove more intractable. First, Muslim populations feel that their undemocratic regimes are supported by the West. Despite talk by the current US administration of democratization and EU talk of better governance, moves towards political reform remain hesitant and slow. This is partly because regimes, in a rearguard action to defend their authority, point to the growing power of the Islamist trend as a way of cautioning their Western sponsors against moving too quickly in this process. Yet it is precisely the rise of a viable moderate Islamist opposition with the prospect of winning power that can undermine the appeal of the radical Islamists, including al-Qaeda, to the masses.

Secondly, the Arab–Israeli conflict continues to be a festering wound. Symbolically, the minimum required to win over the moderate faction within the Muslim world would be a swift establishment of a viable Palestinian state with some sovereignty over at least parts of East Jerusalem (although no one now asks for the implementation of UN Resolution 242). The problem is that it is hard to see how this can be achieved. The EU might push harder for a solution that is uncomfortable for Israel, but is difficult to see how a US administration would fail to listen to Israeli concerns about security. These concerns affect all aspects of the solution: speed of implementation, 'viability' of the proposed state, return of the

Palestinian refugees; while given the symbolic significance of Jerusalem for Israel, it is equally hard to see how it can abandon control over that city, or even a small part of it.

Another problem is that since al-Qaeda has evolved into a multi-cell structure, only nominally controlled by bin Laden and Zawahiri, it becomes more difficult to see how there could be a consensus among radical Islamists over what may constitute sufficient changes in policy on the part of Western governments, even were one to assume some change.

Although al-Qaeda is about the globalization of terror for the promotion of a political agenda linked to specific regional issues, mainly in the Middle East, one of the more unexpected consequences of its actions has been the tensions that surfaced in Europe's own immigrant communities around unresolved questions of integration and identity. Previous European terrorist organizations have either been about issues of independence or autonomy (such as the IRA or ETA); or about challenging societal values (such as the Red Brigade or Baader Meinhof). Al-Qaeda has primarily posed a challenge on the political level about national causes and only on a secondary level in representing alternative values and an alternative world-view. However, like all terrorism it is an assault on innocent life, and as such operates outside the accepted parameters of conflict resolution. While sympathy for al-Qaeda has diminished fairly rapidly in the Middle East, nonetheless Muslim populations still have grievances that need to be resolved and not ignored.

Endnotes

[1] In its April 2006 report on terrorism, the State Department described al-Qaeda leaders as 'scattered and on the run' and the threat as coming from 'small autonomous cells and individuals'.

[2] There was one case of an al-Qaeda sleeper cell (young Americans of Yemeni background) captured in New York state in the US.

[3] It is notable that the EU's Counter-Terrorism Strategy, published on 1 December 2005, makes specific reference to dealing with two of the main grievances of Islamist groups, namely the encouragement of greater democracy in the Middle East – 'better governance' – and a solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict – 'conflict resolution'.

[4] USAF Counterproliferation Centre, Global War on Terror Bibliography. *http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cps-terr.htm#agro*

[5] The arrest of these three former bankers and their extradition to the US in 2006 were related to the collapse of Enron in 2001.

[6] ACLU vs FSA ruling on 17 August 2006, although both parties agreed to stay the matter until a hearing on 7 September.

[7] Interview with Michael Chertoff, the US Homeland Security Secretary, in the *Financial Times,* 17 August 2006.

[8] See the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Country Reports for a detailed yearly summary of terrorist activity. *http://www.mipt.org*.

[9] See Gabriel Weimann. *WWW.Terror.Net – How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet.* Special Report 116 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2004). Available online at *http://www.usip.org*.

[10] EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

[11] Fawaz Girgis, in his book *The Far Enemy:Why Jihad went Global* (Cambridge University Press, 2005) p. 32, quotes Zawahiri's advice on 'jihad' from Ayman al-Zawahiri, *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner* [in Arabic] (London: Ashraq al-Awsat, 12 December 2001): 'Tracking down the Americans and the Jews is not impossible. Killing them with a single bullet, a stab, or a device made up of explosives or killing them with an iron rod is not impossible. Burning down their property with Molotov cocktails is not difficult. With the available means, small groups could prove to be a frightening horror for the Americans and Jews …'.

[12] 'Terrorism and US Policy', *http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/index1.html.*

[13] In a videotaped message addressed to the American people and broadcast on 29 October 2004, bin Laden states: 'The events that made a direct impression on me were during and after 1982, when America allowed the Israelis to invade Lebanon with the help of its third fleet. They started bombing killing and wounding many, while others fled in terror. I still remember those distressing scenes: blood, torn limbs, women and children massacred. … As I looked at those destroyed towers in Lebanon, it occurred to me to punish the oppressor in kind by destroying towers in America, so that it would have a taste of its own medicine and would be prevented from killing our women and children.' Quoted in Bruce Lawrence (ed.), *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden* (London/New York: Verso, 2005), p. 239.

[14] For the links between Zarqawi and al-Qaeda see Jean-Charles Brisard, *Zarqawi: The New Face of al-Qaeda* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), pp. 145–55.

[15] EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

[16] International Crisis Group 'Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous', Report No. 63 (Jakarta and Brussels: ICG, 26 August 2004).

[17] For an assessment of the internal struggle within the Jihadist Movement, see Fawaz Girgis, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went Global* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 151–85.

[18] See Vali Nasr, 'When the Shiites Rise', *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2006), pp. 58–75.

[19] Maha Azzam, 'The Centrality of Ideology in Counter-Terrorism Strategies in the Middle East' in James J.F. Forest (ed.), *Countering Terrorism in the 21st Century* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, forthcoming 2007).

[20] 'Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Terrorism/Warfare: A Bibliography' (Naval Post-Graduate School),
 http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/bibs/chemnuctech.htm.

[21] For a discussion on how religious cults engage their recruits see Marc Galanter and James J.F. Forest, 'Cults, Charismatic Groups and Social Systems: Understanding the Transformation of Terrorist Recruits', in James J.F. Forest (ed). *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes* (Westport, CT/London: Praeger Security International 2006, pp. 51–71.

[22] 'Strengthening Education in the Muslim World,' USAID Issue Paper No. 2 (June 2003).

[23] Article by Craig Whitlock, 'From bin Laden, Different Style, Same Message', *Washington Post,* 25 November 2004. Also see Karen J. Greenberg (ed.), *Al-Qaeda Now* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 238 for bin Laden's 'Speech to Europe', April 2004, and p. 242 for his 'Speech to the American People', October 2004.

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