

Egyptian Nuclear Leadership— Time to Realign?

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Summary

- The 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference is Egypt's next best chance to advance its disarmament agenda, as it will chair both the New Agenda Coalition and the Non-Aligned Movement.
- Egypt's principled position successfully bound states to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. However, its high-risk negotiating strategy could diminish Egypt's regional influence if it is perceived as preventing reasonable progress toward regional nuclear disarmament and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- The United States and Egypt would both gain by acting on President Obama's call to approach challenges through partnership. Egypt should accept and encourage incremental successes, instead of viewing progress through a zero-sum lens. The United States should reconsider Egypt's six proposed steps toward the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East.

A New Moment

Standing before a crowd of 3,000 in Cairo on June 4, President Obama challenged the people of the United States and Middle East to acknowledge and transcend the traumas of history and begin a new era of constructive engagement.¹ In choosing Egypt as a venue for reinvigorating U.S. relations with the Arab world, the administration recognized the important strategic role Egypt can and must play for rhetoric to translate into results.

Egypt's role in preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East is especially urgent. As Iran advances its nuclear capability, Egypt increasingly faces the prospect of being politically sandwiched between two nuclear-armed states. This potential could generate domestic pressures to seek a nuclear deterrent as a means to ensure security and maintain regional influence. However, the best way for Egypt to leverage the security threat posed by Iran is by continuing to be a model of restraint in the Middle East. By pressing for security and disarmament within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),² Egypt may be able to solidify Arab perspectives on arms control and strengthen its regional leadership.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference is Egypt's next best chance to advance its disarmament agenda. Specifically, Egypt could initiate movement toward implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, which calls for progress in the peace process, a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) and weapon of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East.³ Egypt will be the chair of both the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Both coalitions have shown an ability to influence the debate—both as deal makers and deal breakers. Yet both coalitions have been weakened in recent years as a result of Egypt's intransigence. The NAM's diverse membership makes crafting strong consensus agreements difficult in any case, especially given India and Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons outside the NPT and within the NAM. Egypt's more extreme views (such as the insistence that Israel disarm and accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state before peaceful relations are established with all of its neighbors) further diminishes the NAM's collective bargaining position within the NPT review process because its views are dismissed as impractical. The NAC has been undermined by Egypt's refusal to commit to ratify of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, one of the 13 Steps crafted by the NAC and accepted as a final document at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.⁴ If Egyptian leadership does not provide renewed vigor to these coalitions in 2010, their internal divisions could deepen, leading to an erosion of Egypt's stature.

The Power of Deadlock

In 1995, Egypt led fourteen Arab states to resist the indefinite extension of the NPT.⁵ Their united stand forced the three depository states—the United States, United Kingdom, and Russian Federation—to compromise by sponsoring a Resolution on the Middle East to gain Arab support for extension.⁶ Since the Resolution was passed without a vote as part of the extension decision, it is perceived as being inextricably linked to the extension.

Egypt's principled and intractable negotiating position successfully bound states to the Resolution on the Middle East in an era of stalemated politics. When the nuclear-weapon states tried to distance themselves from the Resolution before the 2000 Review Conference, Egypt forced an impasse in

all three preparatory committee meetings.⁷ Eventually, Egypt succeeded in having progress toward the 1995 Middle East Resolution considered in a subsidiary body at the 2000 Review Conference, as well as having the UN Secretariat compile documentation on implementation. In addition, Egypt won a reaffirmation of the Resolution on the Middle East in the 2000 final document, thus recommitting the depositories to their 1995 commitments and linking the Resolution to the extension once more.

The United States moved more aggressively in the 2005 Review Conference to diminish the importance of previous conference decisions.⁸ Egypt firmly objected, and as a result, one month of negotiations led only to agreement on a bare-bones précis of the conference. While there was no consensus document reaffirming commitment to the 1995 Resolution, Egypt successfully resisted the adoption of a document that backpedaled on earlier commitments.

It is not clear that Egypt's high-risk negotiating strategy will continue to pay off. The Obama administration adheres to a different political philosophy than its predecessor. The White House now promotes multilateralism and supports the adherence to, and the strengthening of, international treaties and regimes. At the 2009 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting, the United States asserted full support for "the objectives of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference" and pledged to "work with all states, within and outside the region, to implement the Resolution's objectives."⁹ Moreover, President Obama has committed his administration to a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Egypt has long viewed its role as protector and promoter of Arab interests, however, the saliency of pan-Arabism may be declining relative to the promotion of individual state interests. Continued Egyptian recalcitrance, in the face of an accommodating United States, could backfire if Egypt is perceived as preventing reasonable progress toward regional nuclear disarmament and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. There are already signs Arab states are increasingly unwilling to sacrifice nuclear cooperation to pursue a principled position. The United Arab Emirates, for example, has broken Arab ranks by foregoing enrichment rights in return for a civilian nuclear agreement with the United States, and there are indications that Algeria might be willing to do the same.¹⁰

A Weakened Regime

Within the framework of the NPT, Egypt has led the Middle East. Since its ratification of the treaty in 1981, Egypt has promoted compliance with NPT principles. Moreover, Egypt was instrumental in gaining universal acceptance of the NPT among Arab states. However, Egypt has acknowledged, in response to concerns raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that it "failed, inter alia, to declare 67 kg of imported UF₄, 3 kg of uranium metal, 9.5 kg of imported thorium compounds, unirradiated fuel rods containing 10 percent enriched U-235,... and the undeclared irradiation of uranium and thorium targets that had been dissolved in three laboratories."¹¹

While Egypt has cooperated with the IAEA to clarify these issues, the source of uranium particles found in Egypt remains unspecified, leaving open questions regarding the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities or facilities in Egypt. Diplomatically, the tension between Egypt's dogged pursuit of universality, and the United States' perceived shielding of allies outside the treaty, has weakened the NPT by deadlocking the review process that is otherwise needed to strengthen the regime.

The counterproductive nature of this stalemate was recognized by former Egyptian ambassador to the United States, Nabil Fahmy, when he asserted that "the problem with the NPT is while it was meant to be an active, even proactive, agreement, it has become a static agreement. Any agreement that remains static and reflective of the environment of 40 years ago will be under stress."¹²

More recently, at the final Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2010 Review Conference, Egyptian delegates voiced resentment that the NPT "has not led to Israel's accession to the treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state, nor to the placement of its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards or to the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East."¹³ The evident failure of the Review Conferences to address these outstanding issues triggered the delegation to "question the utility of the extension of a treaty that has, until now, not provided [Egypt] with security."¹⁴

Recalculating the Odds

In the fourteen years since the indefinite extension of the NPT, little progress has been made toward the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East. Nevertheless, asserting that the NPT has failed to provide Egypt added security is an overstatement.

For one, the NPT has prevented further nuclear escalation in the Middle East. Iran, because of non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, has been levied with legally-binding UN Security Council resolutions calling for a suspension of fuel-cycle related activities. The hope is that these measures will help motivate Iran to build international confidence that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. Egypt and other states fear that Iran will develop nuclear weapons or, at least, use its fissile material production capabilities as a latent deterrent to undermine the security of other states. The framework of the NPT inhibits Iranian nuclear ambitions by increasing the costs of getting caught and prevents further nuclear competition in the region. The NPT provides means, via IAEA safeguards and other transparency requirements, to give other states warning of unwelcome developments and enable strategic planning and diplomacy to prevent destabilizing nuclear shocks in the region. Whatever the limitations of the NPT's effects in the Middle East, Egypt and other states would be more insecure without it.¹⁵ Indeed, the key measures for a lasting solution to nuclear weapons-related

issues in the region are included in the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East agreed to at the 1995 NPT Review Conference.

Second, the NPT has provided a powerful context for Egypt to press for negative security assurances against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons. Egypt's interest in negative security assurances coincides with the broader global need to strengthen the security benefits that are the foundation of the nonproliferation regime. The NPT provides a platform for Egypt to press for negative security assurances. By facilitating coalition building among the other states party, the NPT adds weight to Egypt's concerns. Similarly, the NPT allows Egypt to insist on Israel's disarmament from a principled position because the NPT provides the legal basis for pursuing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In addition, the regime's near universal acceptance firmly establishes Israel as an outlier to institutionalized global norms. The power of agreed-to rules and norms should not be ignored.

Therefore, it is in Egypt's interest to utilize its 2010 leadership role to strengthen the NPT by shoring up support for progressive steps toward a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone. Deadlock and compliance issues should be a source of concern, rather than an excuse. Continuing to question the treaty's utility will only undermine the NPT's mandate and consensus agreements like the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

There are critics, however, who argue that Egypt's principled position is a convenient cover. Egypt's inflexibility allows for minimal advancement toward implementation of the 1995 Resolution, which could be in Egypt's interest for two reasons. First, without progress toward implementation of the 1995 Resolution, Egypt is able to assert (however unconvincingly) that its security has not been augmented under the NPT. This could endow Egypt with a convenient hedge if it feels the need to counter a nuclear-armed state in the region by withdrawing from the NPT and developing a weapons capability. In such an instance, Egypt may fear that a nuclear-armed neighbor will be accorded undue regional influence because of its latent destructive capabilities.

Second, Egypt's leadership identity may be increasingly dependent on the nuclear agenda for legitimacy and authority. Egypt's leadership derives in part from pan-Arabism, which is based on opposition to Israel. If progress toward Israel's disarmament is achieved, and regional relations improve with Israel, the ties that bind Arab foreign policy may fray. Egypt's leadership platform and strategic objectives could be marginalized by Arab states pursuing individual state interests over regional Arab objectives. Similarly, if Israel were integrated into the Middle East, it would overtake Egypt in a qualitative comparison of economic and military strength. Besides the inherent strategic rivalry that would ensue, Israel's material strengths might enable it to ignore, or at the very least, discount Egyptian concerns.¹⁶

Egypt's security is best served under the NPT. If Egypt is concerned about the potential of a regional state developing nuclear weapons and asserting undue

influence, it should work to strengthen the NPT, not undermine its authority. Doing so could increase the ability of the IAEA to detect noncompliance, enhance the efficacy of the international response, strengthen the global norm against pursuing nuclear weapons, marginalize those actors who pursue their development, and further pressure all nuclear-armed states to disarm. If Egypt is worried that progress will perversely weaken its regional influence, it should consider instead how a continued impasse will affect its authority. Already, the desire for a united Arab position appears to be giving way to the pursuit of individual state interest. If Egypt is perceived as blocking the legitimate interests of regional states, its leadership position could be undermined by those same states. The best way to prevent the erosion of Egyptian leadership is for Egypt to become an indispensable force for progress. If Egypt's intractability is not a self-interested strategy aimed at maintaining the status quo, as Egyptian officials argue, a change is necessary to convince critics that Egypt is committed to constructive progress under the NPT.

Next Steps

The United States and Egypt would both gain by acting on President Obama's call to approach challenges through partnership. Egypt is right to insist on universalization of the NPT and advancement toward a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. If Egypt wants tangible progress toward implementation of the Middle East Resolution, it should assess objectively what is achievable in the short, medium, and long term and accept and encourage incremental successes, instead of viewing progress through a zero-sum, all-or-nothing lens. This means acknowledging that Israel's accession to the NPT and placement of facilities under safeguards is tied inextricably to the peace process, per the text of the 1995 Resolution.

The United States should encourage constructive Egyptian engagement by reconsidering Egypt's six proposed steps toward implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East. This does not mean that the United States should forego continued pressure on Egypt to strengthen nonproliferation rules. However, by engaging Egypt's proposal, the Obama administration secures soft power gains and shares the onus for progress with regional actors.

In summary, Egypt called for:

- Reaffirmation of the 1995 Resolution, accompanied by a commitment to the principles and implementation of the Resolution (including a call for Israel to accede to the treaty as soon as possible as a non-nuclear-weapon state, place its facilities under IAEA safeguards, and for non-nuclear-weapon states in the Middle East to reconfirm their pledge not to acquire or allow nuclear weapons on their respective territories).

- Reiteration that nuclear trade with Israel requires Israel's accession to the treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state and placement of its facilities under IAEA safeguards as a precondition.
- Organization of a 2011 international conference on the potential for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
- Submission of national reports on the implementation of the Resolution, including information on Israel's nuclear program.
- Formation of a standing committee to prepare for the 2011 international conference and assess progress toward implementation of the 1995 Resolution.
- Creation of a subsidiary body to NPT Main Committee II mandated with a follow-up mechanism for implementation of the 1995 Resolution.¹⁷

It is unlikely that the United States will disclose national reports on the nature and scope of the Israel's program or verbally agree to insist on Israel's adherence to the NPT as a precondition for supply—steps two and four. It is not clear on what basis, and with what accuracy, the United States or other states could describe Israel's nuclear status in the absence of inspections or Israel voluntarily sharing that information. Moreover, Israel's long-standing policy not to advertise or seek domestic and international prestige from its nuclear status has reduced proliferation pressures in the region, which could become more intense if Israel were declared to possess nuclear weapons. The ways in which North Korea and Iran have exploited the NSG-India nuclear deal's acknowledgement of India's nuclear-armed status illustrate this problem. Similarly, without the prior establishment of durable peaceful relationships with all states in its region, and greater security against violent actors supported by regional states, Israel is no more likely than NAM-members India or Pakistan to sign the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state.¹⁸

However, the United States can and should reaffirm its commitment to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East—step one. If the United States more energetically embraced the 1995 Resolution's call for progress in the regional peace process, including a halt to any expansion of settlements, and more clearly tied the peace process to the core security objectives of the nonproliferation regime, Egypt would be in a stronger position to press for the other regional states to reaffirm their commitment “without exception, not to acquire, develop or allow the existence of nuclear weapons on their territories”—the second part of Egypt's proposed step one.¹⁹

The United States should also accept Egypt's suggestion for a 2011 international conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East—step three. Such a conference could discuss regional negotiations, targets, mechanisms, verification procedures, and time frames. Important early elements of such discussions could be to clarify reciprocal steps states could take to build confidence in each others' security and to explore procedures for verifying implementation of a zone free of nuclear

weapons. For such a conference to succeed, Egypt needs to realign its view of multilateral dialogues.

Regional security forums have the potential of introducing new dynamics to Middle Eastern relations. During the Arms Control and Regional Security working group (ACRS), which ran from 1992 to 1995, introduction of a win-win cooperative approach was later analyzed as having undermined Egypt's attempt to form a unified Arab position. This resulted in Egypt increasingly narrowing emphasis on the nuclear issue to rally Arab support for its position. The end result was entrenchment and hardening of Egypt's position and eventual cessation of ACRS.²⁰ The potential of Arab politics to frustrate regional security efforts should not be underestimated; however, it may be possible for Egypt to leverage these types of cooperative security dialogues. If Egypt prevented escalating tensions in its bilateral relationship with Israel, it could act instead as a mediator between Israel and the other Arab states. Undoubtedly, such a position would bolster Egypt's influence. During ACRS, Egypt was skeptical of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) as strategies to postpone the nuclear agenda, promote premature normalization with Israel (defined as normalization before resolution of territorial disputes), and encourage acceptance of Israel's security concerns as unique.²¹ Egypt could utilize CSBMs to keep the nuclear issue on the agenda, and indeed, deal with it first. Potential CSBMs could begin as declaratory measures, and perhaps progress to measures such as a production halt of fissionable material.

Discussions at a conference could (re)open communication between Israel and the other states in the region. Of course, it is uncertain if all the regional states would participate. Several do not recognize Israel's existence and have been unwilling to meet directly and openly with Israel. Requiring all relevant states to participate in such a conference is a reasonable and necessary beginning, not an outcome. The United States, in particular, will be instrumental to creating a conference framework that can attract regional participation. However, if states required for negotiating and implementing an eventual zone free of nuclear weapons in the region are unwilling to join Israel in diplomacy to this end, they betray their own lack of seriousness regarding this challenge, or at least the relative lack of priority they place on the nuclear issue compared to other issues.

Egyptian involvement in persuading regional states to be in attendance is crucial and would ameliorate concerns of Egypt's waning influence as well as initiate the next best opportunity for achieving regional disarmament goals. Less obvious is the validation conference attendance would provide to Egypt's foreign policy.²² Egypt is one of only two Middle Eastern states to recognize and have formal diplomatic relations with Israel. Egypt's peace agreement is not only a tribute to Egypt's policy of conflict management, but it is also an effort to decrease the focus on Israel in Egypt's strategic thinking and posture. This will only be possible if other states follow a similar approach. If they did, Egypt might gain relief from critical pressure from states that otherwise reject taking similar steps.

It is impossible to imagine that states would be able to establish the circumstances necessary for their nuclear disarmament if they did not recognize and build mutual confidence among each other first. The United States and Russia (and the USSR before) recognized each other long before they began nuclear disarmament. India and Pakistan recognize each other, but not have begun negotiations on nuclear reductions. Since the mandate of Egypt's proposed conference is to discuss steps toward the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, state recognition and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations could be discussed as an essential step toward creating a NWFZ in the Middle East. In the broader context of steps toward implementation of the 1995 Resolution, recognition could be a CSBM and an outcome, rather than a precondition. Indeed, it is possible to argue that establishing and strengthening such informal relations further grants Israel implicit recognition, which is crucial to forging formal diplomatic ties and overcoming regional obstruction. In order for the conference to achieve such critical agreements, however, all relevant states must be in attendance.

If the United States chooses to support the conference proposal, it should also agree to a standing committee to follow-up on the implementation of the Middle East Resolution intersessionally—step five. This standing committee would also conduct consultations in preparation for the 2011 conference. The United States and other major powers should explore the possibility of creating a subsidiary body of Main Committee II with a mandate to follow-up on the Resolution—step six. They could alternatively propose to explore the issue of Middle East security within the context of a global forum considering global nuclear disarmament. Such a forum could be held within the Conference on Disarmament.²³

Washington and other NPT states should recognize that states inside and outside the nonproliferation regime pose a threat to regional security. While Israel's security concerns vis-à-vis Iran and neighboring states are legitimate, Washington should give credence to Egypt's worries over the impediments Israel's nuclear status poses to preventing proliferation. Likewise, Egypt should not underestimate the Resolution's link to the peace process or the necessity of incremental progress. For fourteen years, Egypt has fought to keep the Resolution on the Middle East linked to the NPT core principles and objectives. The time is ripe to progress beyond merely treading water.

Notes

¹ For full text of the speech, please see http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09.

² For background, see Sammy Salama and Khalid Hilal, “Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Presses Government for Nuclear Weapons,” *WMD Insights* (November 2006), http://www.wmdinsights.com/I10/I10_ME3_EgyptianMuslim.htm (accessed May 23, 2009); and Roe Nahmais, “Mubarak Hints: We’ll Develop Nukes,” *YNet New*, January 5, 2007, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3348600,00.html> (accessed June 15, 2009). Please note that there are experts who argue that Egypt’s domestic push for nuclear capabilities is a shield to deflect attention from more pressing domestic issues such as poverty and unemployment.

³ For full text of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, see http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/Resolution_MiddleEast.pdf.

⁴ For full text of the 13 Steps, see <http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/monj05b.htm>.

⁵ There are experts who argue that Egypt intended to reject indefinite extension of the NPT if Israel did not agree to sign the treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Their argument contends that Egypt failed to unify Arab states against indefinite extension, thus forcing Egypt to qualify its position by pursuing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. In this view, Egypt was unsuccessful in unifying the Arab states. Egyptian officials have responded to these claims by asserting that Egypt had never intended to withdraw from the NPT and other Arab states’ unwillingness to express Egypt’s hard line merely reflected their lack of understanding.

⁶ For full text of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, see http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/Resolution_MiddleEast.pdf.

⁷ For a more detailed discussion of the maneuvering in the Preparatory Committee Meetings leading to the 2000 NPT Review conference, see Rebecca Johnson, “The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Challenging Times,” *Acronym Report* 13: 3 (February 2000), <http://www.acronym.org.uk/acrorep/a13pt3.htm>.

⁸ For a more detailed discussion of the maneuvering in the 2005 NPT Review Conference, please read Rebecca Johnson, “Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed,” *Disarmament Diplomacy* 80 (Autumn 2005), <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd80/80npt.htm>.

⁹ Rose Gottemoeller, “Statement by Rose Gottemoeller, assistant secretary of state for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation” (Third Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2010 Review Conference, New York, NY, May 8, 2009), http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom09/statements/8MayME_US.pdf (accessed May 27, 2009).

¹⁰ Nour Malas, “U.A.E. Passes Nuclear-Energy Law,” *Wall Street Journal*, October 5, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125473014380463945.html?mod=googlenews_wsj (accessed October 6, 2009) and “Algeria, Emirates Plan Nonproliferation-Friendly Nuclear Programs; Egypt Keeps Fuel Cycle Options Open, Rejects Expanded IAEA Monitoring,” *WMD Insights* (June 2008), http://www.wmdinsights.com/I25/I25_ME1_AlgeriaEmirates.htm (accessed August 6, 2009).

¹¹ Pierre Goldschmidt, “The IAEA on Reports on Egypt: Reluctantly?” Proliferation Analysis posted June 2, 2009, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23200&prog=zgp&proj=znpp> (accessed June 22, 2009). For a complete listing and explanation of Egypt’s safeguard violations, please see International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt*, report GOV/2005/2, February 14, 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2005/egypt_iaea_gov-2005-9_14feb2005.pdf.

¹² Peter Crail and Miles A. Pomper, “The Middle East and Nonproliferation: An Interview with Nabil Fahmy, Egypt’s Ambassador to the United States,” *Arms Control Today* 38 (September 2008): 8–11, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_09/Fahmy (accessed May 21, 2009).

¹³ Maged Abdel Fatah Abdel Aziz, “Statement by the Permanent Representative of The Arab Republic of Egypt” (Third Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2010 Review Conference, New York, NY, May 4, 2009), <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT2010Prepcom/PrepCom2009/statements/2009/04May2009/04May2009AMSspeaker-9-Egypt.pdf> (accessed May 27, 2009).

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Emily B. Landau, *Arms Control in the Middle East: Cooperative Security Dialogue and Regional Constraints* (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2006): 60–159.

¹⁷ For the full text of the Egyptian proposal, see Maged Abdel Fatah Abdel Aziz, “Statement of Egypt, Specific Issue: Regional Issues Including Resolution on the Middle East,” Third Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2010 Review Conference, New York, NY, May 2009, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom09/statements/8MayME_Egypt.pdf (accessed May 27, 2009); and The Arab Republic of Egypt, “Implementation of the 1995 Resolution and 2000 Outcome on the Middle East: The Final Outcome of the Last Session of the Preparatory Committee,” working paper, May 4, 2009, <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom09/papers/WP20.pdf>, (accessed May 27, 2009).

¹⁸ George Perkovich, personal interview, June 22, 2009.

¹⁹ Maged Abdel Fatah Abdel Aziz, “Statement of Egypt, Specific Issue: Regional Issues Including Resolution on the Middle East,” Third Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2010 Review Conference, New York, NY, May 2009, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom09/statements/8MayME_Egypt.pdf (accessed May 27, 2009).

²⁰ Landau, 60–89.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Hassan Abou Taleb, “Bilateral and Regional issues in U.S.-Egyptian Relations,” Voices from the Middle East web commentary posted June 2009, <http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23278&prog=zgp&proj=zme> (accessed June 17, 2009).

²³ George Perkovich, personal interview, June 22, 2009.

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