

Cyprus: In Search of Peace

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BY KEITH KYLE



CYPRUS: IN SEARCH OF PEACE

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MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INTERNATIONAL

MRG works to secure rights and justice for ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities. It is dedicated to the cause of cooperation and understanding between communities.

Founded in the 1960s, MRG is a small international non-governmental organization that informs and warns governments, the international community, non-governmental organizations and the wider public about the situation of minorities around the world. This work is based on the publication of well-researched Reports, Books and Papers; direct advocacy on behalf of minority rights in international meetings; the development of a global network of like-minded organizations and minority communities to collaborate on these issues; and **the challenging of prejudice and promotion of public understanding** through information and education projects.

MRG believes that the best hope for a peaceful world lies in **identifying and monitoring conflict** between communities, **advocating preventive measures** to avoid the escalation of conflict and **encouraging positive action** to build trust between majority and minority communities.

MRG has consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council and has a worldwide network of partners. Its international headquarters are in London. Legally it is registered both as a charity and as a limited company under English law with an international governing Council.

THE PROCESS

As part of its methodology, MRG conducts regional research, identifies issues and commissions Reports based on its findings. Each author is carefully chosen and all scripts are read by eight independent experts who are knowledgeable about the subject matter. These experts are drawn from the minorities about whom the Reports are written, and from academics, journalists, researchers and other human rights agencies. Authors are asked to incorporate comments made by these parties. In this way, MRG aims to publish accurate, authoritative, well-balanced Reports.



One side of the buffer zone in Cyprus. The sign forbids entry to the other side.

CAROLINE PENN / IMPACT

Cyprus: In Search of Peace

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Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UN General Assembly; Resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992).

Article 1

1. States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories, and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity.
2. States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends.

Article 2

1. Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities (hereinafter referred to as persons belonging to minorities) have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination.
2. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life.
3. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live, in a manner not incompatible with national legislation.
4. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and maintain their own associations.
5. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and maintain, without any discrimination, free and peaceful contacts with other members of their group, with persons belonging to other minorities, as well as contacts across frontiers with citizens of other States to whom they are related by national or ethnic, religious or linguistic ties.

Article 3

1. Persons belonging to minorities may exercise their rights including those as set forth in this Declaration individually as well as in community with other members of their group, without any discrimination.
2. No disadvantage shall result for any person belonging to a minority as the consequence of the exercise or non-exercise of the rights as set forth in this Declaration.

Article 4

1. States shall take measures where required to ensure that persons belonging to minorities may exercise fully and effectively all their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the law.
2. States shall take measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs, except where specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to international standards.

3. States should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, persons belonging to minorities have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue.
4. States should, where appropriate, take measures in the field of education, in order to encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture of the minorities existing within their territory. Persons belonging to minorities should have adequate opportunities to gain knowledge of the society as a whole.
5. States should consider appropriate measures so that persons belonging to minorities may participate fully in the economic progress and development in their country.

Article 5

1. National policies and programmes shall be planned and implemented with due regard for the legitimate interests of persons belonging to minorities.
2. Programmes of cooperation and assistance among States should be planned and implemented with due regard for the legitimate interests of persons belonging to minorities.

Article 6

States should cooperate on questions relating to persons belonging to minorities, *inter alia* exchanging of information and experiences, in order to promote mutual understanding and confidence.

Article 7

States should cooperate in order to promote respect for the rights as set forth in the present Declaration.

Article 8

1. Nothing in this Declaration shall prevent the fulfilment of international obligations of States in relation to persons belonging to minorities. In particular, States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations and commitments they have assumed under international treaties and agreements to which they are parties.
2. The exercise of the rights as set forth in the present Declaration shall not prejudice the enjoyment by all persons of universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms.
3. Measures taken by States in order to ensure the effective enjoyment of the rights as set forth in the present Declaration shall not *prima facie* be considered contrary to the principle of equality contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
4. Nothing in the present Declaration may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.

Article 9

The specialized agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system shall contribute to the full realization of the rights and principles as set forth in the present Declaration, within their respective fields of competence.

Preface

The problem of Cyprus – divided both politically and, since 1974, geographically between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities – has been a violent and seemingly intractable conflict. Half-forgotten by the international community for long periods, the island's need for constructive solutions is now returning to some prominence on the international agenda – not least because of the Cyprus Government's application for membership of the European Union (EU).

The conflict in Cyprus has a number of features in common with troubled relations between majorities and minorities in other states, although in this case the community which could be termed the main numerical minority – the Turkish Cypriots – rejects the term 'minority' as an inadequate description of its status. Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot populations differ in their language and religion, and both communities identify with other national populations – in Greece and Turkey – which have been closely involved in the island's affairs. Currently, the Greek Cypriots' and Turkish Cypriots' physical separation prevents the kind of day-to-day contact which could gradually lead to enhanced intercommunal trust and understanding.

In addition to the polarization of the two main communities in Cyprus, MRG is concerned that the cultural survival of the island's three smaller minorities – Maronites, Armenians and Latins – risks being overlooked. The Report therefore includes an account of the situation of these smaller communities and considers the provision that should be made to protect their minority rights.

Cyprus appears to be at a turning point in its recent history. All told, 1998 could be a critical year, with presidential elections south of the ceasefire line and accession negotiations between Cyprus and the European Commission scheduled to begin. More worryingly, Russian missiles are due to arrive in the south and Turkey has belligerently stated that the missiles will not be allowed to be delivered. These crucial issues present many difficulties but also a possible opportunity whereby all parties could benefit through constructive negotiations.

In publishing this Report MRG seeks to support international efforts by the United Nations (UN) and EU towards a peaceful, sustainable resolution of the Cyprus problem. The text provides an independent and balanced analysis of the conflict, its origins, and negotiations to date. Besides helping inform key international governmental organizations and governments wishing to resolve the conflict, the Report is intended to provide information about this unusually complex situation to journalists and thus to contribute towards well-informed, accurate and constructive media discussion. MRG also hopes that the Report will be of interest to Greek and Turkish Cypriots, both in Cyprus and beyond, so that an understanding of the problem can be shared. The Report concludes with policy recommendations based upon MRG's

wide experience of, and involvement with, situations of intercommunity conflict.

The author of this Report, Keith Kyle, is an acknowledged scholar on Cyprus and a frequent visitor to both sectors of the divided island. His text outlines the background to the current conflict, which emerged almost as soon as Cyprus achieved independence in 1960, and chronicles the long, painstaking and so far inconclusive efforts to facilitate a solution. While many such initiatives in the past have failed, it is widely held that most if not all the necessary components of a lasting and equitable solution can be found in proposals previously made, most notably in the 'Set of Ideas' for a new federal arrangement put forward by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992.

Relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots have frequently been marked by a bitter intensity, but there have also been instances of flexibility, goodwill and a willingness to compromise at both political and community levels. Such more hopeful indicators can lay the groundwork for a progressive programme of confidence-building measures. It is MRG's belief that, with enough political will, a future settlement that safeguards the main concerns of both sides, and which makes special provision for Cyprus's smaller minorities, can be built.

Alan Phillips
Director
November 1997

Glossary

AKEL	Progressive Party of the Working People
CLP	Communal Liberation Party
DIKO	Democratic Party
DISY	Democratic Rally
<i>enosis</i>	union with Greece
EOKA	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
Hellenism	the pursuit of principles associated with classical Greek civilization
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NUP	National Unity Party
OECD	Organization for European Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RTP	Republican Turkish Party
<i>taksim</i>	partition
TMT	Turkish Defence Organization
‘TRNC’	‘Turkish Republic of North Cyprus’
UN	United Nations
UNFICYP	United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus



Introduction

Cyprus is an island of 3,572 square miles in the eastern Mediterranean. It is 141 miles in length and at its widest point 59 miles in breadth. It is a mountainous island – the long and elegant Kyrenia range that overshadows the inland capital of Nicosia runs just below the northern coastline; in the centre and west is the Troodos massif, including one of those heights which the Greeks named Olympus. Between these two is a plain, 12–15 miles wide, which is very fertile provided the rains arrive. Scenery and climate alike seem to justify the classical reputation of Cyprus as the birthplace of Aphrodite, which explains the heavy dependence of the modern economy on the tourist industry. The northern shore faces Turkey, which at the nearest point is only 43 miles distant; Syria is 64 miles to the east, while the Greek mainland is 500 miles away, though the Greek islands of Crete and Rhodes are closer. The great majority of the population is and has been for more than 3,000 years Greek by language and culture.

Of an estimated population of 573,566 at independence in 1960, 442,138 (77.1 per cent) were Greek Cypriots, whereas 104,350 (18.2 per cent) were Turkish Cypriots. The remainder, apart from 17,713 Britons, were Maronites, Armenians and Latins who were obliged to opt to be treated as Greek or Turkish; all chose to be ‘Greek’.¹ The Turkish Cypriots were scattered over the whole island; they did not form a numerical majority in any district. Are we confronted here with a problem of minority rights? This touches the heart of the controversy: for it is the Turkish Cypriot population’s contention that it is not a minority but a separate and equal community; therefore, it believes that the concept of minority rights not only offers no solution, but is the notion against which it has always struggled.

When Cyprus achieved independence there was no Cypriot nation, nor much sign of one emerging, despite the common experience of British colonial rule. Greek and Turkish Cypriots had just emerged from a ‘liberation struggle’ in which they were on opposite sides. There were no universities in Cyprus, no private business partnerships between Greeks and Turks, and little intermarriage. The one institution that was shared – the trade unions – had been almost torn apart by the pressures of the anti-colonial struggle.


Background

It is generally considered, as the result of excavations, that the Mycenaean Greek colonization of Cyprus took place towards the end of the second millennium BC, when Greek civilization and culture were introduced. During most of its recorded history Cyprus has been the object rather than the initiator of historic events. The


Ottoman Turks captured the island from the Venetians in 1570–1 and ruled it for 300 years, during which time some Turks settled there and some Greek-speakers converted to Islam. In 1878 at the time of the Congress of Berlin, Turkey gave the island over to British administration while retaining nominal sovereignty, which Turkey renounced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

The years of British rule did nothing to encourage the emergence of a Cypriot nation, largely because of the underlying ambition of the Greek Cypriots expressed mainly through the Autocephalous Orthodox Church to achieve *enosis* – union with Greece. There was no recent parliamentary experience; the Legislative Council had not met since 1931, when a crisis that originally arose over taxes led to Government House being burnt down, two bishops being deported and when, two years later, the Archbishop died, no successor being elected. For Turkish Cypriots the 1931 crisis guaranteed their alignment with the colonial power even though their own political expression was as stifled as that of the Greeks.

There were Turkish quarters in all of the main towns, and of the villages in 1960, 114 or about 18 per cent were mixed (though this was only a third of the number 70 years before). Even in the mixed villages, however, it was possible to tell the Greek and Turkish quarters apart. There were 392 purely Greek and 123 purely Turkish villages, examples could be found in each of the island’s administrative districts and these were often right alongside villages of the other’s community.²



Cyprus de facto at the beginning of 1998



Cyprus – 'UN Non-Map, 1992': Territorial adjustment suggested in the Boutros-Ghali 'Set of Ideas'.

Cyprus divided: Before and after independence

The opposition to British colonial rule and to all British proposals for self-government under British sovereignty was led by two men: Michael Mouskos, who in October 1950 was elected Archbishop of Nova Justiniana and All Cyprus taking the name of Makarios ('Blessed') III, and Colonel George Grivas, a Greek Cypriot who had headed an extreme right-wing guerrilla group during the Axis occupation of Greece. On 1 April 1955, following a parliamentary statement that Britain would 'never' give up sovereignty over Cyprus, Grivas launched a campaign of sabotage with a series of simultaneous explosions across the island. His underground army was called EOKA (the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters). The revolt had begun.

The British tried to suppress the revolt, executing many Greek Cypriots caught with arms and exiling Makarios to the Seychelles. At the same time, Britain sought to settle the dispute politically by negotiation with Greece and Turkey, and by offering constitutional settlements that would protect the Turkish as well as the Greek Cypriot communities. The Greek Cypriots did not take the British Government's warnings seriously about the likely reaction of the Turkish Cypriots to any change of sovereignty, and felt – and still feel – that Turkey became involved only when prompted by the British. Nor, for a while, did the Turkish Cypriots take seriously the possibility of Britain yielding its sovereignty.

In 1956 to stem Greek demands for self-determination (which was code for *enosis*), Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, said that if the time ever came when it would be possible to grant self-determination, it would have to be granted to both communities. This statement is regarded as one of the most important title deeds of the Turkish Cypriot case. Logically this would have involved partition (*taksim* in Turkish) but there was no territorial basis for this without a massive exchange of populations. By 1957–8 when British departure seemed more likely, the Turkish Cypriots took the precaution of creating a paramilitary force under the name of the Turkish Defence Organization (TMT). Its presence was made evident in Nicosia in the first half of 1958. In retaliation Grivas ordered raids on police stations with Turkish police as the chief targets and waived all restrictions on killing Turks. Many Turkish villages were burned. In August an intercommunal ceasefire was proclaimed and held.

In London, the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan decided that he could accept Greek offers to have sovereign bases rather than sovereignty over the island. In the summer of 1958 Makarios indicated for the first time that he would accept independence for Cyprus rather than union with Greece. Responding to these developments Greece and Turkey entered into direct talks which produced the

Zürich Agreement followed immediately by the Lancaster House settlement between them and Britain, both in February 1959. Although Makarios and the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Dr Fazıl Küçük, made declarations accepting the Zürich terms in principle, and delegations from both Cypriot communities were present in London, this was in essence a solution imposed from outside Cyprus by the three interested powers; it was accepted by the leaders but not ratified by any popular referendum.

The 1960 independence Constitution

Cyperus gained her sovereign independence by virtue of a Constitution and three Treaties – the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Establishment – all of which came into operation on 16 August 1960. They are interrelated so that, for example, the 48 'Basic Articles' of the Constitution are incorporated into the Treaty of Guarantee, while the two Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance are in turn said in Article 181 of the Constitution to 'have constitutional force'. The Treaty of Establishment makes it clear that the boundaries of the Republic of Cyprus do not coincide with those of the island; Britain retains absolute sovereignty over two enclaves, totalling 99 square miles, which contain the military bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. Britain is also given certain military rights (including an electronic surveillance facility) on the territory of the Republic.

The Constitution is drawn up explicitly in terms of the two communities – and has been referred to subsequently by the Turkish Cypriots as a functional federation, though that expression does not actually appear. The official languages are Greek and Turkish, the Greek and Turkish flags may be flown without any restriction, and the Greek and Turkish national holidays must be celebrated. The country is defined as:

*'An independent and sovereign Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President being Turkish elected by the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus respectively.'*³

There are 10 ministers, seven chosen by the President and three by the Vice-President, of whom one must receive one of three major portfolios (in practice a Turkish Cypriot was appointed to defence). Decisions in the Council of Ministers are to be taken by absolute majority, except that either the President or the Vice-President has an absolute

veto over decisions relating to defence, foreign affairs or internal security, and a delaying one on other matters.

The legislative system

The legislative system is unicameral. The House of Representatives has 50 members, 35 Greek and 15 Turkish. According to Article 78(2):

'Any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the representatives elected by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively taking part in the vote.'

This provision also applies to any change in the electoral law and the adoption of any law relating to the municipalities. This last question had baffled the constitution-makers. In five towns, separate Greek and Turkish municipalities had emerged as a result of the 1958 communal confrontations and had been recognized by the British. They would now be officially established – thereby becoming the only organ of the Constitution based on the idea of territorial separation – but for a duration of four years during which the President and the Vice-President were supposed to decide whether they were to continue.

Legislation on other subjects is to take place by simple majority, but again the President and the Vice-President have an absolute veto on defence, foreign affairs or internal security, and a delaying one on other matters – as in the Council of Ministers.

Outside the House of Representatives there are two elected Communal Chambers, one Greek, the other Turkish, which are given separate functions not entrusted to the House. These include culture, education, personal status, religious matters and sport. For these purposes they are entitled to impose taxes, set up courts and conduct their own relations with the Greek and Turkish Governments over help with funds or with personnel.

The judicial system

The judicial system is headed by both the Supreme Constitutional Court and by the High Court of Justice, each consisting of Greek and Turkish Cypriot judges, each with a neutral president (who shall not be Cypriot, Greek, Turkish or British). The High Court's jurisdiction mainly concerns appeals but can also deal with 'offences against the Constitution and the constitutional order'. The Supreme Constitutional Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the allocation of functions and powers between the various institutions. Either the President or Vice-President may appeal to this Court if they feel that a law, including, specifically, the tax laws, would have the effect of discriminating against one of the communities. Moreover, human rights are strongly protected. A series of guarantees against discrimination and in support of fundamental rights and liberties (Articles 6–35) are closely based on the appropriate European Conventions.

Other issues

Finally, the Constitution recognizes the bicomunal nature of Cyprus in its arrangements for administration.

All public services shall employ a 70:30 ratio of Greek and Turkish Cypriots at all grades (compared with the ratio of 80:20 that might have been expected if based on population). The Public Service Commission is to consist of 10 members, seven of them Greek, but a number of decisions are made dependent on the approval of at least two of the Turkish members.

There is to be a Cypriot Army, 2,000-strong, of whom 1,200 should be Greeks and 800 Turks, together with security forces, comprising police and gendarmerie, also totalling 2,000, but this time with 1,400 Greeks to 600 Turks; forces stationed in parts of the Republic inhabited almost totally by one community shall have police drawn entirely from that community.

A first reaction to this document must be that for a nation of 574,000 this is a very elaborate and rigid Constitution. It runs to 199 Articles and of these the 48 'basic' ones are to remain unalterable in perpetuity. The remainder can in practice only be altered by mutual agreement of the two communities. Constructed with the help of a Swiss constitutional adviser, the Constitution is of the consociational variety which gives the preservation of the communal balance a higher priority than majority rule. Moreover the Constitution was screwed into the international system by the accompanying Treaties.

Under the Treaty of Guarantee with Britain, Greece and Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus undertakes to uphold its own independence and Constitution, not to participate in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever and to prohibit any domestic action likely to promote union with another state (*enosis*) or partition (*taksim*). In return Britain, Greece and Turkey recognize and guarantee not only the independence, integrity and security of Cyprus, but also 'the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution'. In the event of a breach of the provisions of the Treaty, the three guarantors 'will consult together' about 'measures necessary to ensure observance'. Then follows the most critical wording of the Treaty, currently cited to support the Turkish position. If, says Article 4, concerted action should not be possible:

'Each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by this present Treaty.'

The Treaty of Alliance, which is between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, establishes a tripartite headquarters on the island, with military contingents of 950 Greeks and 650 Turks to provide for the defence of the new Republic and to train the new Cypriot Army. The various Treaties were signed on behalf of Cyprus by the Greek President and the Turkish Vice-President, this in Turkish eyes sanctifies the equal status of the two communities as 'co-founder partners' in the new state.

The crisis of 1963:

Violence erupts

Archbishop Makarios was elected the first President of Cyprus by the Greek Cypriot voters in December 1959 and Dr Fazil Küçük the first Vice-President by the Turkish Cypriots. Makarios had critics on the right from supporters of Grivas (who left the island for a hero's welcome in Athens) and on the left because in its estimation the settlement had placed Cyprus under the aegis of NATO. Makarios moved swiftly to consolidate his position – by appointing EOKA people to key posts, most notably Polycarpos Yorgadjis as Minister of the Interior, and by launching a vigorous foreign policy of friendship with the non-aligned powers. This served to disarm the potential opposition of the communist AKEL (the Progressive Party of the Working People) which was content with five unopposed members in the first House. But the process of satisfying the political needs of the Greek Cypriot community led to a series of conflicts with the Turkish Cypriots in which the two communities' views on the Constitution were made plain. The Greek Cypriots believed that the constitutional privileges accorded to the Turkish community were preposterous; the Turkish Cypriots that these were the bare minimum, to be exercised to the last item.

The background disputes

The disputes concerned the following issues:

The 70:30 ratio in public services

The Turkish Cypriots required that a 70:30 ratio should be attained within five months of independence as had been stipulated in a pre-independence agreement between the President-elect and the Vice-President-elect. The Greek Cypriots in the Public Service Commission argued that they could not fill 30 per cent of the jobs overnight from 18 per cent of the population, stating that many were in any case poorly qualified, and that standards and qualifications could not be lowered. At the end of 1963 there were 2,000 appeals outstanding in the Supreme Constitutional Court about public appointments.

Taxes

Since a majority vote of the Turkish deputies in the House was needed to pass tax legislation, the Turkish Cypriots sought to use this as leverage on other issues. Whereas the Greek Cypriots wanted a permanent tax law, the Turkish

Cypriots wanted it renewed annually, which would have enabled them to use their bargaining power in each session. Since there was deadlock, personal income tax was abandoned by the House and the Greek Cypriots enacted it instead through the Greek Communal Chamber.

The Cypriot Army

The Minister of Defence, who was a Turkish Cypriot, proposed an army of five battalions, each of three companies. At the battalion level they should be mixed, but at the company level the units should be from one community or the other, thus permitting Turkish Cypriots to be protected by Turkish Cypriot units. However, a majority in the Cabinet decided that the units should be mixed at every level instead. On this issue the Vice-President used his power of final veto. The President therefore decided not to have an army at all.

Separate municipalities

Existing colonial laws had to be extended eight times while Greeks and Turkish Cypriots failed to agree whether fresh legislation should establish separate municipalities as the latter demanded. In December 1962 the Greek Cypriot majority rejected a further continuation of the status quo. The Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber then purported to confirm the position of the Turkish municipalities, while the Council of Ministers fell back on a pre-1959 colonial law to replace all the existing elected municipalities by appointed development boards. Both these actions were found unconstitutional by the vote of the neutral president in the Supreme Constitutional Court.

The status of the Vice-President

Dr Küçük, the Vice-President, complained that since he had an absolute veto over foreign policy he should be told what that policy was about. He said that Spyros Kyprianou, the Foreign Minister, was not showing him the papers. Küçük objected strongly to Makarios adopting a policy of non-alignment and going to the Belgrade Non-Aligned Summit without his agreement.

The new Republic's first three years could hardly be described as an unqualified success. The necessary restraint on both sides if such a delicate mechanism of checks and balances is to work or, alternatively, is to be short-circuited, was absent. Already by the end of 1961 the Turkish-language press was calling for the interven-

tion of Turkey, Greece and Britain and the resignation of Makarios over the income tax issue.

Other concerns

The question of whether President Makarios ever meant the 1960 Constitution to work or whether from the outset his acceptance of it was a manoeuvre first to obtain independence and then to clear the ground for *enosis* is still highly controversial. As an Archbishop he was predisposed to see the whole island as Hellenic; as President he celebrated the various anniversaries of heroic deaths during the war against the British (a civic memory which included the Greek and excluded the Turkish Cypriots) with many references to his own fidelity to the cause for which they had died, specifically the cause of *enosis*. However, there are many Greek Cypriots who believe that Makarios did support the Constitution until he concluded that, unless amended, it was unworkable.

Turkish Cypriots call attention to a confidential document called the 'Akritas Plan', which was later published in the Greek Cypriot press. This document – which is now known to have had two authors, one of them Yorgadjis, the Minister of the Interior – lays down a plan in which 'negative elements' in the Constitution should continually be stressed in public, accompanied by lavish use of such internationally acceptable concepts as 'self-determination' and 'minority rights' to describe the case for amending it. In this way, Cyprus would win control over its own institutions and thus effectively nullify the Treaty of Guarantee since the Constitution it was to guarantee would by then be no more. If the Turkish Cypriots showed a willingness to fight they were to be struck down hard before any outside intervention arrived. Whether this was an action plan or a contingency plan has been much argued.

The Turkish Cypriots had made some preparation for a breakdown, since they were determined that independence should not mean, as the Turkish Cypriot negotiator Rauf Denktaş put it, 'a change of colonial masters for the worse'. In October 1959, after the Zürich and London agreements but before independence, the Turkish motorboat *Deniz*, gun-running to Cyprus, was intercepted by the British. But some of the Turkish Cypriot political leaders counted on the Constitution settling down. They were encouraged in this by the first Turkish Ambassador to Nicosia, Emin Dirvana, who was an admirer of Greek culture, and tended to discount the warnings of Denktaş, now president of the Turkish Communal Chamber, who claimed through intelligence sources to know better. However a core element of the paramilitary TMT remained and there was some evidence of clandestine arming, recruiting and training within the Turkish Cypriot community in the expectation of a clash.⁴ Meanwhile, Yorgadjis used the constitutional breakdown over tax collection as an excuse to get Makarios's authority for building up a 'secret army' of ex-EOKA forces. There were also other gangs of armed irregulars on the Greek side, products of the culture of violence dating from the EOKA struggle.

The 13 amendments

On 30 November 1963, President Makarios wrote to Vice-President Küçük proposing 13 amendments to the Constitution which, he said, would 'remove obstacles to the smooth functioning and development of the state'. He did so with the knowledge and encouragement of the British High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Clarke, who reported to the Commonwealth Relations Office that they were 'to my mind a reasonable basis for discussion', provided that they were recognized to be Makarios's first bid. When the British Ambassador in Athens caught sight of them he told the Foreign Office, 'I cannot for the life of me see that they can be considered reasonable.'⁵

Taken together, these amendments would have resolved all outstanding issues in the Greek Cypriots' favour. The President and Vice-President would lose the right of veto; the necessity for separate majorities of Greek and Turkish members for the passage of certain laws, including taxes, would go, so would separate municipalities; the ratio in the army, police and public services would be the same as the population ratio; the separate Greek Communal Chamber would be abolished (though the Turks could keep theirs); and the administration of justice would be unified so that a Greek could not demand to be tried by a Greek judge and a Turk by a Turkish judge. These proposals would certainly have streamlined the administration but from the Turkish Cypriot point of view they removed almost all the props to their claim to be 'co-founders' of the Republic and demoted them to the status of a minority. In the view of the Greek Cypriot constitutional lawyer, Polyvios Polyviou, the course followed by Makarios was:

*'A grievous error [... which ...] could not but have appeared to the Turkish Cypriots as a dangerous development that might change the internal balance of power and be taken internationally as a sign that the bicomunal nature of the State was giving way to unitary and majority principles.'*⁶

Makarios's proposed amendments were immediately rejected, not initially by the Vice-President, though he did so at length later, but by the Government of Turkey.

Violence erupts

The atmosphere after the presentation of the 13 proposals was very tense, with the Turkish Cypriots interpreting the move as a preparation for *enosis*. On 21 December 1963 a street brawl in a Turkish quarter in Nicosia between a Turkish Cypriot crowd and Yorgadjis's plain-clothes special constables was followed immediately by a major Greek Cypriot attack by the various paramilitary forces against the Turks in Nicosia and in Larnaca. Although the TMT and Turkey's military contingent organized the defence of the Turkish Cypriot community, and there were acts of retaliation directed at the Greek Cypriots, there is no doubt that the main victims of the numerous incidents that took place during the next few months were Turks. Some 700 Turkish Cypriot hostages,

men, women and children, were seized in the northern suburbs of Nicosia. The mixed suburb of Omorphita suffered the most from an independent gang of Greek Cypriot irregulars led by Nicos Sampson who made a full assault on the Turkish Cypriot population. During the first half of 1964, fighting continued to flare up between neighbouring villages; 191 Turkish Cypriots and 133 Greeks were known to have been killed while it was claimed 209 Turks and 41 Greeks were missing and could also be presumed dead. There was much looting and destruction of Turkish villages. Some 20,000 refugees fled, many taking refuge in Kyrenia and Nicosia. Food and medical supplies had to be shipped in from Turkey. Twenty-four wholly Turkish villages and Turkish houses in 72 mixed villages were abandoned. Most of the moves seem to have been spontaneous, but in some cases the people were ordered to leave and, once villagers had moved, the Turkish paramilitaries, now much expanded in numbers and known simply as 'the Fighters', ensured they did not return to government-controlled areas. The necessary territorial basis for partition was being established.

Further developments

In Nicosia the guarantors – Greece, Turkey and Britain – began to move over the Christmas week. The 650-strong Turkish military contingent positioned itself along the Nicosia–Kyrenia road. Turkish jets from the mainland buzzed Nicosia. The Turkish fleet set sail for Cyprus. Makarios, alarmed that a Turkish Army might indeed land, agreed that the British should intervene from their Sovereign Bases. This produced a ceasefire in Nicosia, an exchange of hostages, and the establishment of the 'Green Line', marking a neutral zone between the Greek and Turkish quarters in the capital which is still in place. The Turkish Cypriots expelled from their side of that line the entire Armenian community of Nicosia on the ground that it had aligned itself with the Greek position.

What the guarantors did not do was to carry out the one purpose for which they existed – the restoration of the 1960 Constitution. The establishment of the Green Line brought peace to Nicosia – though not yet to other places – but it did not bring the fractured Government together. The Greek and Turkish Cypriot ministers remained on opposite sides of the line. It is absolutely basic to the Turkish Cypriot case that there has been from this time on no legal government in Cyprus – solely provisional bodies on both sides pending the establishment of a new legal order, the old one having been overthrown by force. According to the Greek Cypriot thesis there continued to be a legitimate and democratically elected Government representing the great majority of the people which had, as many ex-colonial countries were doing, asserted its right to gain control of its institutions – and had done so at a time when the Vice-President and the Turkish Cypriot ministers, looking for any excuse to bring about partition, had wilfully continued to absent themselves.

At a conference in London of the three guarantor states and the two Cypriot communities, Makarios demanded the termination of the 1960 agreements as unworkable and their replacement by 'unfettered independence' – a unitary government with freedom to amend

the Constitution. He offered the Turkish Cypriots minority rights, which they rejected out of hand. The Turks and Turkish Cypriots said that the December fighting proved that the two communities should be physically separated. Consequently they demanded a fully federal state of Cyprus with a border between Turkish and Greek provinces known as the 'Attila Line', which is not unlike the present Green Line; or, failing that, 'double *enosis*', which would bring a frontier across Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. Either solution would imply a population transfer. The London conference broke down with no chance of agreement.

Keeping the peace

While the ceasefire held in Nicosia, the British were unable to prevent the Greek Cypriots from attacking the Turkish Cypriots at Limassol, causing widespread casualties and damage. Turkey announced for the second time that its fleet was sailing for Cyprus. Britain insisted on the peace-keeping burden being shared. Aiming above all at preventing a clash between two NATO partners – but wanting to keep the dispute within the NATO family – the United States of America (USA) tried to organize a NATO intervention but Makarios would not consider it. The UN had to be brought in. By Security Council Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964, the UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and a UN mediator were established. Makarios interpreted the UN Resolution as recognizing the 'unfettered independence' which he sought and appointed Greek Cypriot ministers to take over the Turkish portfolios.

The UNFICYP was originally over 6,000-strong; it is now (1997) down to about 1,500. Troops and police have been supplied at various times by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. The force has achieved a good deal but as Dr Richard Patrick, who served in the UNFICYP, put it:

*'It could not kill Cypriots to prevent them from killing each other. The force's main deterrent was its presence. Its observers ensured that the communities' version of events could now be verified and internal support for their causes could be lost or gained by these observers' reports.'*⁷

By the use of persuasion they were able to prevent many killings. However, they could not be everywhere and they could not stop a determined attack. In the first few months the UN had the greatest difficulty in getting a hold on events because there were repeated outbreaks of fighting in different parts of the island.

Since there was no Cypriot Army, Makarios now formed a National Guard, introducing conscription and ignoring the veto of Vice-President Küçük. Supplies of arms came in from Czechoslovakia, and a Greek general and officer corps from Greece took command. In April, Makarios paid a long visit to Athens during which George Papandreou, the Prime Minister of Greece, committed himself to the campaign for Cyprus's self-determination. He declared publicly that the UN

Resolution made the 1960 agreements invalid. According to Andreas Papandreou, who was then a minister in his father's government:

*'A clandestine operation then began on a huge scale of nightly shipments of arms and troops, of "volunteers" who arrived in Cyprus in civilian clothes and then joined their "Cypriot" units. The process was not completed until the middle of summer. No less than 20,000 officers and men, fully equipped, were shipped to Cyprus.'*⁸

In June 1964 there was another alarm. It was learnt that a decision had been made in Ankara to establish a Turkish bridgehead in Cyprus and bring about the complete separation of the two communities. The USA intervened swiftly and effectively. President Lyndon Johnson sent what Under-Secretary George Ball described as 'the most brutal diplomatic note I have ever seen'⁹ to İsmet İnönü, the Turkish Prime Minister, which had the effect of immediately stopping the expedition.

Despairing of the anarchy prevailing on the island because of the large number of weapons in the hands of undisciplined gangs, the Greek Government sent Grivas back to Cyprus. He went there to command the mainland Greek troops but it was not long before he also took over the National Guard. Grivas very rapidly restored discipline but, noting the Turkish Cypriots' ability to bring in Turkish arms and troops to Kokkina, in August he launched a major attack on the town. Planes from Turkey then attacked Greek Cypriot positions with bombs, rockets and napalm. Makarios appealed to the Greek Government and to the Soviet Union for help. 'We did not [send planes]', Andreas Papandreou later wrote, 'not because we did not wish to but because it was technically impossible'.¹⁰ Grivas had to abandon the attempt to eliminate the Turkish position at Kokkina and a UN ceasefire was accepted by Cyprus and Turkey. A period of comparative calm followed. The clash at Kokkina had drawn sharp attention to the realities of Cyprus's geographical situation – vulnerable to Turkish strikes, but beyond the range of Greek planes.



The crisis of 1967: Makarios changes direction

In 1964–5 two major attempts to settle Cyprus by outside mediation – the Acheson plan and UN mediation – failed:

The Acheson plan

The USA sent its former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to Geneva to try for a political deal between Greece and Turkey. This would have given Cyprus the choice of independence or *enosis*, in exchange for which Turkey would get a sovereign base on the Karpas peninsula (north-eastern Cyprus), and Greece would cede a small Greek island, Kastellorizon, to Turkey, which is very close to the latter's coast. The Turkish Cypriots would have two or three cantons in which they would have 'local self-administration' and a resident international commissioner to see fair play. The plan was initially accepted in principle by both Greece and Turkey, but finally rejected by George Papandreu as 'partition masquerading in the rhetoric of *enosis*' because of Makarios's total opposition. The Turks then rejected a revised version.

The UN mediator's report (26 March 1965)

The UN mediator was Galo Plaza, the former President of Ecuador. His report, however able in its analysis of the problem, was instantly rejected by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots as being grossly partisan in its prescription. It considered the 1960 solution as 'a constitutional oddity' which could not be maintained against the will of the majority. Plaza thought that Cyprus should voluntarily undertake not to give up its independence, and that this should be backed by a popular referendum. The island should also be demilitarized. The Turkish case for federation was rejected because this would involve 'a compulsory movement of the people concerned contrary to all the enlightened principles of the present time'.¹¹ He recommended a unitary constitutional system that embodied generous provision for minority rights and a resident UN commissioner.

The reaction of the Turks was that they would have no further dealings with Plaza; no sooner had he spoken than the idea of UN mediation was dead. Later UN contributions towards peace in Cyprus have had to be couched in

the much more tentative and circuitous language of the Secretary-General's 'good offices' and the exchange of 'non-papers'.¹²

Background issues

Half or more of the Turkish Cypriot community was now compressed into disconnected enclaves on the island. These fragments were loosely organized into groups of villages and sub-regions where full-time 'Fighter' units were stationed, and where Turkish Army officers were posted; and into seven regions, mostly based on the Turkish quarters in the towns, where civil government was controlled by district officers and the 'Fighters' were commanded by Turkish army colonels. In Turkish Nicosia the top civilian authority was the General Committee, headed by Küçük, which subsequently became the Provisional Government. Military command was exercised by a Turkish General, Kemal Coskün.

The Cyprus Government imposed an economic blockade against the enclaves, which was at first total but which was soon modified under UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent pressures to let in quotas of food. Later, the passage of specific 'strategic materials' was prohibited; this was a large and growing list which severely affected economic activity. There was some passage and commerce between Greek and Turkish areas but this was subject to much delay, tedious searches and – sometimes – instances of kidnapping and hostage-taking. This was, perhaps, inevitable when the two communities were on a permanent war footing; however, even then this atmosphere did not prevail everywhere. The UN was continually engaged in negotiations to secure Turkish Cypriot 'freedom of movement' without needless molestation, and to mediate complicated local arrangements about police patrols.

On 21 April 1967 democracy was overthrown in Greece, bringing to power a group of colonels, some of whom had experience of serving in Cyprus. They declared that the Cyprus dispute had gone on long enough and should be wound up. On 2 July they issued a statement calling for the resignation of those leaders in Cyprus who 'on the eve of decisive developments', set 'groundless conditions and subversive prerequisites'. In September they arranged a meeting with Turkey's leaders at Evros on the mainland Greco-Turkish border with the idea of settling the Cyprus problem with a dramatic flourish. The meeting was badly prepared and on the Greek side naively conducted on the assumption that the Turks would be willing

to accept *enosis* in return for relatively minor concessions. The failure was embarrassingly complete.

Relations with Makarios, who did not fancy a union with a military dictatorship or its Cyprus intrigues, became increasingly strained. Makarios began cutting the budget of the National Guard and building up his own paramilitary force, the Tactical Reserve, and became more amenable to UN suggestions for easing tension. Roadblocks, for example, were removed from outside the Turkish quarters of Paphos and Limassol, and Turkish Cypriots were allowed to buy 'strategic materials'.

The 1967 clash

On 15 November 1967, arising out of a long drawn out but minor dispute about police patrols, Grivas – deciding that he had to assert Government authority in an area where the Turkish Cypriot Fighters were very active – attacked them at Kophinou.¹³ Fighting was heavy. Turkey instantly sent an ultimatum to the junta in Athens, demanding that Grivas be recalled immediately, that all Greek troops in excess of those permitted by the Treaty of Alliance be withdrawn, that Greek Cypriots be disarmed and that all economic restrictions on the Turkish Cypriot community be removed. The Turkish Air Force made sorties over Greek Thrace and troops were again concentrated on the Greco-Turkish border. The junta withdrew Grivas at once and after an intense period of US shuttle diplomacy by Johnson's envoy Cyrus Vance, an agreement between Greece and Turkey was reached. Besides the withdrawal of excess Greek and Turkish troops within 45 days, the National Guard was to be dissolved and the size and powers of the UN force were to be increased. These terms were partially implemented. Some 12,000 Greek troops were shipped back to Greece, and, in March 1968, the last economic restrictions were withdrawn from the Turkish enclaves – a gesture which was not reciprocated by the Turkish Cypriots who continued to maintain their roadblocks in order to bar Greek Cypriots from their enclaves. But in a decision which he lived to regret, Makarios did not dissolve the National Guard with its officers from Greece and its intense anti-communist indoctrination, and he prevented any increase in the UN force.

A change of direction

The events of 1967 had a profound effect on Makarios's political direction. 'A solution by necessity', he said publicly on 12 January 1968, 'must be sought within the limits of what is feasible, which does not always coincide with the limits of what is desirable.' He then called a presidential election to endorse his position, whereupon the bishops of the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus ruled that if he was to give up *enosis* he should not continue as President. He ran nevertheless, receiving 95.4 per cent of the vote, with an intransigent pro-*enosis* candidate getting 3.7 per cent.



The crisis of 1974:

The Turkish assault and occupation

Three developments followed from Makarios's acceptance of the impracticality of *enosis* after the crisis of 1967:

- UN-sponsored intercommunal talks between the Greek Cypriot President of the House of Representatives Glafkos Clerides and the Turkish Cypriot Rauf Denktaş went on from 1968–74.
- A new internal opposition against Makarios by supporters of Grivas and *enosis*.
- The deterioration and collapse of relations between Makarios and the Greek junta.

Intercommunal talks

The intercommunal negotiations made, in one sense, rather striking progress despite repeated setbacks between 1968 and 1974. Denktaş, who had always adopted a more confrontational style than Küçük, now returned from exile in Turkey and, finding the Turkish Cypriot community demoralized and in some danger of disintegration, decided to change his approach. He now said that he was willing to go a very long way towards accepting the 13 amendments and eliminating the deadlocks in the system, provided he was given new provisions on local government. But these did not turn out to be easy. The Turkish Cypriots wanted Greek and Turkish villages, municipalities and groups of villages to be run by their own councils with 'independent powers, duties and jurisdiction' subject only to limited regulation by the corresponding Greek or Turkish members of the House of Representatives, meeting separately. Therefore the Turkish enclave system would be institutionalized. Mixed villages would be run by whichever population group was largest.

This was the one period in which the Greek Cypriots could have escaped from the Turkish Cypriot vocabulary of federal equality for the two communities (except at a very local level). But the opportunity was missed. The negotiations lacked consistent political support. Clerides was very committed to an agreement; but it did not help that throughout these prolonged talks – which were held in secret – he was persistently undermined by local critics and not always supported by his own Government which, in turn, was being undermined by Athens. Furthermore, Denktaş gave Greek Cypriots the impression that he was

often held in check by Ankara. Many Greek Cypriots feared that the Turks were trying to reintroduce at the level of local government the same federal or cantonal ideas they had abandoned in the centre. Moreover, until 1972 the intercommunal talks lacked the presence of an independent participator with the ingenuity to suggest methods of overcoming obstacles. After the talks had temporarily broken down, the UN representative Osorio Tafall carried out this task with distinction. But by then it was too late; the domestic system was too unstable.

Makarios's oppositions

The deteriorating relations between President Makarios and the junta in Athens, coupled with the development of a terrorist opposition to Makarios on Cyprus were shaping events. Moreover, as Richard Holbrooke, the senior US diplomat now charged with helping to broker a Cyprus settlement, said in Nicosia on 11 November 1997:

'American history in this area is not entirely clean. There are some things that previous American administrations did ... particularly between the mid-1960s and 1977 which I think were shameful'.¹⁴

He was referring specifically to the USA's support for the Greek colonels, who were able to derive from this the impression that it was with US approval that they could move against Makarios, who was labelled in Washington 'the Castro of the Mediterranean'. To break Makarios the junta backed a group in Cyprus calling itself the National Front which accused him of betraying Hellenism. There was a campaign of sabotage and terrorism, and in March 1970 Makarios's helicopter was shot down; he narrowly escaped. Yorgadjis, the former Minister of the Interior, who was said by Makarios to be implicated, was murdered a week later in mysterious circumstances. Grivas returned clandestinely to Cyprus in the autumn of 1971 and began a rerun of his role in the 1950s, setting up a movement called EOKA B in support of *enosis* and as a threat to Makarios.

In February 1972, the Greek Government told Makarios to dismiss his long-time Foreign Minister, Kyprianou, and other open opponents of the junta and create a 'government of national unity' composed of all segments of 'nationalist Cypriot Hellenism' (that is, excluding AKEL and others lacking enthusiasm for *enosis*). Makarios was told to remember that 'the National Centre is always Athens'. A fortnight later the bishops of the Church of Cyprus, purportedly in Holy Synod,

ordered Makarios to resign as President on the grounds of the incompatibility of ecclesiastical authority and state power. Makarios replaced Kyprianou but held mass rallies to prove his popularity, refused to form the type of government demanded, and sponsored a new newspaper which attacked the junta and supported the Greek King. Clerides told Makarios that he was fighting on three fronts – the Greek junta, EOKA B and the Turkish community. He advised him to compromise with the Turks. But that advice was not taken.

Turkey was in any case becoming impatient. Early in 1974, after an election, Bülent Ecevit came to power believing that what Cyprus needed was a federation. He complained bitterly to the UN Secretary-General that the intercommunal talks had been allowed to continue without any clarity on political philosophy. He thought it quite wrong to say, as the UN had persistently done, that the devices under discussion could be fitted into a 'unitary state'.

The plot against Makarios thickened. On 13 April the three bishops declared the Archbishop deposed. Makarios soon rallied by bringing together a Synod of Eastern Orthodox Churches which vindicated his position and unfrocked the rebel bishops. Politically, Makarios enjoyed an unopposed re-election. But he remained disinclined to take strong measures against Grivas and EOKA B despite incidents of terrorism; Makarios did not wish to be seen to use methods reminiscent of the British during the freedom struggle, Grivas was a royalist like Makarios and was also opposed to 'partition disguised as *enosis*', so might still be useful. However, Grivas died of a heart attack in January 1974 and control of EOKA B was rapidly taken over by agents of the junta.

In the autumn of 1973 there had been a further military coup in Athens in which the original Greek junta was replaced by another headed by the Chief of Military Police, Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, though the actual head of state was General Phaedon Gizikis. Makarios wrote to President Gizikis on 2 July 1974 in a letter which he made public complaining bluntly that 'cadets of the Greek military regime support and direct the activities of the EOKA B terrorist organization'. More than once, Makarios said he had felt and in some cases he had almost touched a hand invisibly extending from Athens which was seeking to liquidate him. He had found it 'absolutely inadmissible' that Greek officers had enrolled 57 candidates – who had been rejected by his Council of Ministers – for reserve commission in the National Guard. Makarios asked for the 650 Greek officers staffing the National Guard to be withdrawn and ended proudly that he was:

'Not an appointed prefect or locum tenens of the Greek Government in Cyprus but an elected leader of a large section of Hellenism and as such I demand an appropriate conduct by the National Centre towards me'.

The Greek Government's immediate reply was to order the go-ahead to the conspiracy that had been long maturing against Makarios. On 15 July 1974 the National Guard, led by its Greek officers, overthrew the Cyprus Government, demolished part of the presidential palace and announced Makarios was dead. This, however, was not so. He had escaped to Paphos from where he was rescued

by the British and taken to their Sovereign Base at Akrotiri. As far as world opinion was concerned the last straw was the man whom the conspirators installed in Makarios's place: Sampson, the EOKA fighter and, in 1963, leader of gratuitously violent assaults on Turkish Cypriots.¹⁵

Greece, Turkey and Britain

If Turkey ever wanted to establish herself on Cyprus, citing Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, she would never have such a favourable opportunity again. First Ecevit, the Turkish Prime Minister, who was personally well regarded by Western leaders, flew to London to invite Britain's cooperation as co-guarantor. The British Government was faced with a difficult choice. If it did not act it would seem to be giving the go-ahead to the Turks. But there were effectively only 3,000 troops available on the Sovereign Bases and the ability of this small force to overwhelm the Greek military and restore Makarios seemed dubious; lacking even more was the political will to take this gamble. Still, many Britons were left feeling that with Britain's reputation and treaty obligations at stake, something more enterprising should have been attempted. This was subsequently to be the vigorously expressed view of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on Cyprus.¹⁶

Turkey attacks

On 18 July Ecevit sent Athens an ultimatum calling for the resignation of Sampson, the withdrawal of the Greek officers of the Cypriot National Guard and firm pledges of Cyprus's independence. The junta were foolishly confident that the USA would, as before, stop the Turks from using force and sent an equivocal answer. What Ecevit called the 'Peace Operation' then went forward. Under cover of aerial bombardment and with the use of napalm, Turkish troops made an assault landing near Kyrenia at dawn on 20 July and met with fierce resistance. When they occupied Greek Cypriot villages the way they were reputed to have treated the civilians spread terror along the path of their future advance. The European Commission on Human Rights, which was denied the opportunity by Turkey of investigating Cyprus's subsequent charges fully (on the ground that the Government of Cyprus, not being a 'legal' government, could not bring charges) found 'very strong indications' that the Turks had committed a number of mass murders of civilians.¹⁷ There was also plentiful evidence of how thoroughly they looted property. By the time the UN was able to obtain a ceasefire on 22 July the Turkish Army had only secured a narrow corridor between Kyrenia and Nicosia, which it widened during the next few days in violation of the terms, but which it was impatient to expand further on military as well as political grounds. The cost of achieving this had been to expose the Turkish enclaves in Cyprus to instant occupation, or in the case of Famagusta to siege, by National Guard and EOKA B troops, who regarded the enclaves as Trojan horses, and in some cases took brutal revenge on Turkish Cypriot families.¹⁸

In Athens, Ioannides wanted to attack Turkey on all fronts but others in the junta, many of whom outranked him, declared this impossible. The junta collapsed and handed over power to civilians under Constantine Karamanlis. In Nicosia, Sampson had given up the usurped presidency in favour of Makarios's constitutional deputy, Clerides.

James Callaghan, the British Foreign Secretary, summoned a conference of the three guarantor powers to Geneva. There they issued a declaration that the Turkish occupation zone should not be extended, that the Turkish enclaves should immediately be evacuated by the Greek Cypriots, and that a further conference should be held at Geneva with the two Cypriot communities present to restore peace and re-establish constitutional government.

came under Turkish occupation reaching as far south as the Louroujina salient. This Turkish action created the basic political circumstances of present-day Cyprus.



The second attack

By the time that the second Geneva conference met in August, international sympathy – which had been with the Turks in their first attack – was swinging back towards Greece now that it had restored democracy. At the conference there was a curious reversal of roles: Clerides, taking Turkey's claim to have acted under the Treaty of Guarantee at its face value, asked for the full restoration of the 1960 Constitution. But the Turks and Turkish Cypriots were no longer speaking that language. Denktaş and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Professor Turan Günes, took the view that the new crisis disproved the assumption made after 1967 that *enosis* was dead. The Turkish Cypriots had been made to feel unwanted in Cyprus, so, it was said, it was now essential to have a geographical federation of two autonomous zones, of which the Turkish zone would occupy the northern 34 per cent of the island. Horrified at what Callaghan is said to have described as the creation of two separate states, within a Cyprus turned into a refugee camp, Clerides called the Greek Cypriots the true minority who needed protection. Although they were a majority on the island they were a small and defenceless minority in the strategically relevant area, given Turkey's geographical proximity and military might. Told by Callaghan that he must suggest something, Clerides filed a plan for a bicomunal constitution based on the work of the intercommunal talks about autonomous Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot administration of groups of villages.

On 13 August the Turks demanded that either their main plan or a new version produced by Günes, under which the Turkish federal zone would be divided between six cantons in different parts of the island but would still add up to 34 per cent, must be accepted in principle that very night. Under extreme pressure to yield the principle of federation to save Cyprus from a further invasion, Clerides asked for 36–48 hours to consult with Athens, with Greek Cypriot community leaders and also with Archbishop Makarios who was in London. To Callaghan's extreme indignation the Turkish Foreign Minister denied Clerides that opportunity on the grounds that Makarios and others would use it to play for more time. An hour and a half after the conference broke up the new Turkish attack began. It rapidly occupied even more than had been asked for at Geneva. Now 36.5 per cent of the land

The consequences of 1974: The north-south divide

The human costs

The effect on the Greek Cypriot population of this Turkish action was traumatic. Out of a total community of 574,000 some 180,000 were refugees. Callaghan's nightmare of the island as a gigantic refugee camp had come true. Fed by rumours of the Turks' actions in July, most Greek Cypriots in the north fled their homes at word of the Turks' approach. The Turks would have had a real problem in dealing with a large Greek Cypriot population if in the mass it had stayed. Nothing more was heard about the precisely limited objective of 're-establishing the state of affairs' of the 1960 Constitution originally attributed to the Turkish 'Peace Operation'.

It has been estimated that 3,000 Greek Cypriots and 500 Turkish Cypriots were killed in a month.¹⁹ The Greek Cypriots afterwards collected records of 1,619 missing people, half of them unarmed civilians; it was claimed that there was evidence, some of it photographic, that they had been in Turkish hands and in certain cases had been taken to the Turkish mainland. Since 1984 an autonomous Committee of Missing Persons including a UN representative has been meeting spasmodically. There are currently 1,493 Greek Cypriot cases and 500 Turkish Cypriot cases before it, but so far it has failed to resolve a single one. Turkish Cypriots say that some of the missing were in all probability killed in Greek-on-Greek violence at the time of the coup against Makarios, and Denktas has now conceded that the Turkish Army gave some over to local Turkish Cypriot partisans, who shot them. There is little prospect of any of them being alive, but it remains deeply unsatisfactory that nothing has been resolved. The Turkish Cypriots naturally call attention to their own unaccounted losses, reaching back to 1963, which they put at 800. They refer especially to the fate in 1974 of the mixed village of Tokhni, where they say that all the Turkish men were shot, as well as to three other villages where civilians were murdered and are now specially commemorated.²⁰ In 1997 there was an agreement between the two communities to make a new attempt to resolve this emotive issue of the missing on both sides.

After the fighting ended in 1974 when the Turks halted their advance, Clerides and Denktas began meeting again. By the following year they had agreed that those

Turkish Cypriots who had been attempting (with great difficulty) to leave for the north, would be allowed to do so. In return the 10,000 or so Greek Cypriots who had stayed in the north could either stay and enjoy full minority rights or leave if they genuinely wanted to. The Turkish Cypriots subsequently termed this an 'Exchange of Populations Agreement' – a phrase no doubt intended to echo the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, when a major population transfer between Greece and Turkey was supposed to have ended the feud between them. But no such language was in the 1975 agreement. In the event, nearly all the Greek Cypriots in the north left in the next few years, complaining of harassment; they were prevented from returning by the Turkish Army along its ceasefire line. By 1996 there were only 486 Greek Cypriots in the north living in two villages in the Karpas and 187 Maronites in the Kormakiti region. Of the Turkish Cypriots living in the south, 343 were known to the UN.²¹

Cyprus's north-south divide

Apart from these small exceptions the island has been transformed into two mono-ethnic zones, with an impassable (to most Cypriots) barrier between them running across the island and cutting through the walled city of Nicosia. The ceasefire line is supervised by the UN, who maintain and police a buffer zone, generally two to four and a half miles wide but narrowing down to a very short distance indeed in parts of Nicosia. The two front lines run for 112 miles across the island with 22 permanently staffed observation posts. Under the Cyprus Government's rules, foreign visitors (and journalists) can cross the buffer zone from south to north provided that they return to the south overnight. Visitors on the Turkish side may not cross the other way because, according to the same rules, they will have entered the country illegally, (though pre-1974 foreign residents can).

The vast majority of the refugees from the north were villagers with close-knit kinship ties and attachments to the land and their orange and lemon groves. Those who could boarded with relatives and friends in the south. The rest had to be accommodated in light shacks made of plywood and gypsum, and desperately cold and draughty in winter. Although these ex-villagers are now, after years of

emergency housing, living in housing estates, many of them still talk and think about returning to their former homes in the north.

The economic consequences

The territory which the Turkish Army had seized for the Turkish Cypriots contained most of the country's cargo-handling capacity in the port of Famagusta; 65 per cent of existing tourist accommodation and 87 per cent of the hotel beds under construction; half the agricultural exports, including 75 per cent of the citrus fruits, and nearly half of its industrial production. There were also cultural losses, including the looting from churches and monasteries of items like the remarkable Kanakaria Mosaics, which were eventually recovered by the Orthodox Church of Cyprus after legal action in the USA.

Faced with the task of providing relief for this vast mass of refugees and the need to build up fresh assets to replace those that were gone, Government planners went in for labour-intensive projects and maximum incentives with few planning restrictions. The Cyprus tourist industry had been the money spinner of the Republic's first decade. What had been done before could be done again. Although it had been assumed that the north had most of the tourist attractions, necessity forced the Greek Cypriots to look to the potential assets of the rest of the island. There was an uncontrolled building boom – Limassol was sacrificed to the spirit and even Paphos imperilled – but a mood of planning and conservation now prevails.

Tourism in the south, which has proved such a tremendous success, especially among British holidaymakers, may now have levelled off; arrivals were down by 7.5 per cent in 1996 on the previous year. In May 1997 President Clerides warned of the threat to the industry caused by 'irresponsible acts', which must be taken to include provocative demonstration on the Green Line such as the one that led to violence in August 1996. Mass tourism may in any case have reached a plateau and the (Greek) Cypriot authorities now aim to attract higher income tourists. The other high fliers of the Cyprus economy have been in the realm of financial services, which have greatly expanded in recent years. Offshore banking has become a major item, although there is some nervousness about how this will be treated if Cyprus is accepted as an EU member.

(Greek) Cyprus's rapid economic recovery could not have come about without the initiative and hard work of the people (many do two or even three jobs a day). Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriots complain bitterly that the ever-increasing gap between the levels of prosperity in the north and the south is because the world treats the Government on the south side of the Green Line as the Government of the whole island. As such it receives and allocates foreign aid grants and loans; furthermore, it represents Cyprus at all international bodies, so that Ercan (Greek name: Tymbou) – which the Turkish Cypriots have converted from a small landing-field into a full-sized airport – is unused except by Turkish planes; Turkish Cypriot passports are unrecognized and Turkish Cypriot postage stamps are declared 'illegal and of no validity'. The same argument is used to stop the purchase of citrus and vegetable exports from the north, and every effort is made to

discourage ships from going to Famagusta. The Greek Cypriots defend their embargo by saying that it is the only way that is open to them to reply to the theft of their assets and the illegal occupation of more than a third of their country by the Turkish Army.

A visitor to the north of Cyprus cannot avoid noticing a change from the dynamic pace of life in the south. Since 1977, growth has proceeded on average at half the pace of the south and the difference in prosperity between the two parts of the island are now (1997) very pronounced. The size of the northern economy has been calculated at only 7 per cent of the combined GNP of the two economies. A Turkish Cypriot earns on average only 25 per cent of a Greek Cypriot's wages. For so small a community, a very high proportion of the labour force in the north (21 per cent) is engaged in the public sector, largely to provide middle-class professional occupations and to reduce emigration. Turkey still provides heavy subsidies, despite the lower standard of living on the mainland, and has frequently but ineffectively sought to divert the use of its assistance into more productive channels. Some 24 per cent of Turkish Cypriots still work on the land.

Unsurprisingly the two sides have different explanations for this relative lack of development: the Turkish Cypriots blame it almost exclusively on the economic blockade organized by the south, and Greek Cypriots (as well as some Turkish and Turkish Cypriot critics) speak of bad management, lack of investment and corruption. Especially since going over to the Turkish lira, Turkey's high level of inflation has also been imported – this has run to three figures and is currently (1997) assessed by the OECD at 75 per cent.²²

Multi-party politics in Cyprus

Politics in the south

Fully competitive party politics in the south began in the parliamentary election of 1976 following the final break between Clerides and Makarios. Clerides and his new party, the Democratic Rally (DISY), were firmly pro-Western and anti-communist. He argued that an agreement with the Turkish Cypriots was the only practical way of getting the refugees back to their homes and that such an agreement had been possible in the past and could be again. Most of Makarios's associates joined together in the Democratic Party (DIKO) headed by the former Foreign Minister Kyprianou. Kyprianou believed that the Cyprus problem should be internationalized, that the main emphasis should be placed not on talking to Denktas but on building up the moral and legal case against Turkish aggression and occupation on all international fronts. The struggle, DIKO said, might be a long one but piling on the economic and diplomatic pressure was the way to get results. Clerides's technique, DIKO felt, had offered too many concessions for no real return. There should be no leaning towards the West; non-aligned or Eastern help were all welcome.

In 1976 Greek Cyprus still operated the first-past-the-post system in multi-member constituencies. Three par-

ties – the communist AKEL, Cyprus's oldest political party which could be certain of gaining around a third of the votes; Kyprianou's DIKO; and EDEK, a small middle-class socialist party with hawkish views led by Dr Vassos Lyssarides – linked arms to completely wipe out DISY. In 1981, the same protagonists confronted each other under different ground rules; the system had been changed to one of reinforced proportional representation. By now Makarios was dead and Kyprianou, as Speaker, had become his successor. This time AKEL and Clerides's DISY fought each other to a stand-off, each gaining 12 seats. Kyprianou's DIKO came third, with eight seats, and Lyssarides's EDEK fourth, with three.

This appeared to place the hawkish Kyprianou in a weak position for the approaching presidential election of 1983 since AKEL and DISY, though ideological opposites, had dovish views about negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots. However, despite AKEL declaring that it had lost confidence in the President's handling of the Cypriot problem, ideology prevailed and Kyprianou was re-elected with the essential aid of communist votes.

Politics in the north

By the time that the Turkish Cypriots had decided to hold elections in their enclaves – on 5 July 1970 to coincide with the parliamentary elections in the south – Denktaş had established himself as the community's natural leader. At that stage he was opposed to party politics; and it was not until December of the same year that the marxist opposition formed the Republican Turkish Party (RTP). Parties were not encouraged until after the proclamation in 1975 of the so-called 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus', which was declared to be not an independent state but one of the component parts of a future federal Republic of Cyprus. Its Constitution, unlike that of 1960, provided for both a President and a parliamentary system with a Prime Minister.

Denktaş was first elected 'President' in 1976 with 76.6 per cent of the vote. The conservative National Unity Party which drew together Denktaş's companions in the leadership of the struggle, dominated the first 40-member 'Assembly'. The principal opposition parties were both left-wing – the Communal Liberation Party (CLP) led first by Alpay Durduran and subsequently by Mustafa Akinçi, and Ösker Özgür's RTP.

The next election campaign was fought in 1981 at a particularly worrying period economically. The opposition parties argued that Denktaş could not blame everything on the 'Greek-Cypriot economic embargo'; they said north Cyprus would have done better had scarce foreign exchange not been used to benefit just a few local capitalists. Both the left-wing parties also advocated greater flexibility in negotiating with the Greek Cypriots. Denktaş just managed to retain an overall majority, being re-elected 'President' again by a vote of 51.7 per cent. But there was a hung parliament and great difficulty in forming a stable administration.

Further fall-out (1974–86): Negotiations come and go

International consequences

Greeks and Greek Cypriots drew some international lessons from their traumatic experience in 1974. The first was to blame the USA, on whom they had relied to save them if the Turks ever turned threats into reality. There were anti-US riots in Nicosia on 19 August 1974 in which the new US Ambassador was killed. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was accused of having first supported the junta in power and then having ‘tilted’ in favour of the Turks during the actual clash by refraining from addressing them in the harsh manner adopted by Lyndon Johnson in 1967. Kissinger certainly failed to give Britain the backing which, after the Suez experience, she felt she needed if she was going to make a stand against the Turks. The Greeks also argued that Turkey would never have had the strength and capacity to invade had it not been for the large supply of US weapons that were intended for deterrence against the Soviet Union.

Internationally the Cyprus issue has continued to be dealt with at several levels. At UN debates and Non-Aligned Summit meetings, Greece and the Cyprus Government could now count on receiving either unanimity or overwhelming majorities in favour of resolutions calling on ‘foreign armed forces’ and ‘foreign military personnel’ to leave and all refugees to be allowed to return to their homes in safety. At the NATO level the issue becomes further complicated by multiple disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial limits in the Aegean, and overflight rights flowing from the Greek doctrine of a ‘political continuum’ between mainland Greece and its islands. Because of events in Cyprus, Greece began stationing troops on the Eastern Aegean islands that were labelled as demilitarized by the Treaty of Lausanne, though the Greeks contend that these provisions were rendered obsolete by later treaties. These are now confronted by the powerful Fourth Aegean Army which the Turks have massed on the mainland opposite, heavily equipped and trained in amphibious warfare.²³

The Makarios–Denktaş guidelines

Archbishop Makarios returned to Cyprus on 7 December 1974 and immediately resumed the presidency, declaring that Clerides had ‘demonstrated an over-enthusiasm for making concessions’, although he now

agreed that there should be a federal solution. After several ineffective rounds of negotiations under UN auspices, Makarios and Denktaş met twice at the UN headquarters in Nicosia in February 1977 and agreed on four guidelines for future negotiations that taken together represented a marked departure from previous Greek Cypriot positions. Makarios confirmed his acceptance of the idea of a federal Republic, which should be bicomunal, independent and non-aligned. Second, he agreed that the proportions of territory ‘under the administration of each community’ should be determined ‘in the light of economic viability or productivity and land-ownership’, rather than, inferentially, according to a strict population ratio. The third point dealt with one of the main embarrassments that the Turks had about an agreement. They are a small and economically weak community. If a federation were to guarantee the full range of human rights mentioned in the Universal Declaration and the European Convention there is a distinct danger of Greek Cypriots, making use of freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the right to own property, coming en masse into the Turkish area dominating it commercially and even numerically. Makarios now agreed that in discussing the ‘three freedoms’ they should bear in mind ‘the fundamental tasks of a bicomunal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community’. The final point spoke of the powers and functions of the central federal government, being such as to safeguard the unity of the country.

It may be asked why, if so much had been granted by the Greek Cypriots in 1977, there is still no agreed Constitution. One possible reason is that a few months after the agreement Makarios died of heart failure; many of his leading associates including Kyprianou – his successor – had been against the new policy. A second possible explanation, much favoured by many Greek Cypriots, is that from the start Denktaş did not want a settlement. He was, it is said, gradually getting his tiny realm into some shape, though still heavily subsidized by Turkey, and did not want to be overwhelmed by Greek Cypriots.

Whatever the merits of that, a third reason is undoubtedly the point that federation is not an easy form of government anyway and particularly not on a small island with half a million people, only two federal units, disputed boundaries and disproportionate numbers. The slow motion negotiations that have followed since the 1977 agreement have had the parties prompted and prodded into fresh encounters after considerable intervals, mainly by the UN but sometimes by other powers. The Greek Cypriots, wanting a strong central government, accuse the

Turkish Cypriots of producing a constitutional draft appropriate only for a confederation; the Turkish Cypriots, wanting a weak central government, reproach the first with seeking a unitary state and calling it a federation.

The Kyprianou–Denktaş agreement

In his ‘evaluation’ made in 1981 of the intercommunal talks, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim reflected wearily:

‘The two sides’ estimates of natural resources, land ownership, infrastructure, percentage of land under each side’s control, number of displaced persons, differ; consequently there is no easy basis for an objective suggestion.’

In May 1979 Kyprianou and Denktaş, brought together by Waldheim, reached a 10-point agreement. Talks were to be resumed on all territorial and constitutional questions on the basis of the Makarios–Denktaş guidelines and of the ‘relevant UN resolutions on Cyprus’. But, it was said, in order to build confidence, precedence would be given to reaching prior agreement on the resettlement under UN auspices of Varosha, the fashionable tourist area of Famagusta where rows of modern hotels had been mouldering unoccupied since the Turkish occupation. This would be implemented without awaiting the outcome of discussion on other aspects. Point six of the agreement said that the two sides were to ‘abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks’ and that they should take practical measures to promote confidence, goodwill and the return to normal conditions.

Since Varosha was to have ‘priority’, the Greek Cypriots naturally expected that it would be taken first. But the Turkish Cypriots held that the provisions of the agreement had to be taken together and that it was quite inconsistent with point six that the Greek Cypriots should persist with their economic blockade. The Greek Cypriots also complained that what they were being offered in Varosha was no more than a narrow enclave on the coast which would permit only a very limited number of refugees to return, because the access road was to be controlled by Turkish Cypriot police; these refugees would then be subjected to a Turkish administrative veto. In effect, the Greek Cypriots said that they would be managing the resort for the economic benefit of the Turkish Cypriot zone.

‘Independence’ in the north

In 1983 the new UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, who as a former UN Special Representative in Cyprus felt himself especially equipped to solve that problem, attempted to narrow down the points of difference by means of a series of options which he termed ‘indicators’. The intercommunal talks had been suspended since May 1983 because Kyprianou, soured by the experience of the Varosha negotiation and very much encouraged by the Government of Athens (headed since 1981 by

Andreas Papandreou), decided to rally world opinion through a new Resolution endorsing Greek Cypriot points in the UN General Assembly. This supplied the Turks and Turkish Cypriots with the occasion for bringing the already languishing contacts between the parties to a halt until Denktaş suggested a summit meeting with Kyprianou to ‘clarify the intentions’ of both sides. Kyprianou was in no great hurry; he accepted for the following March (1984). Then on 15 November 1983, Denktaş clarified his own intentions by proclaiming the independence of the ‘Turkish Republic of North Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’).²⁴

Britain was quick to act as a guarantor power in bringing the move before the UN Security Council which, on 18 November by 13 votes to one (Pakistan against, with Jordan abstaining), said that the declaration was ‘legally invalid’ and should be withdrawn, and that no state should recognize the new entity. To date, apart from Turkey, no other state has. The Council did not, however, meet Greek and Greek Cypriot demands for sanctions against Turkey.

Kyprianou, anxious to head off any moves by the north to consolidate the new ‘state’, presented a ‘Framework for a Comprehensive Settlement’ to the UN Secretary-General in January 1984, stipulating that there could be no direct negotiations until the ‘declaration of independence’ had been withdrawn. It was published in May and many of its provisions still feature in the Greek Cypriot case. They provide that before any federal Government should be set up both Turkish troops and Turkish settlers from the mainland must be withdrawn from the island; that the local forces on both sides (the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot Security Force) should then be abolished, leaving security in the hands of a specially constituted international force paid for by Cyprus; that the international guarantors of the new settlement should no longer be the interested parties (including Turkey); and that no one should have the right of unilateral intervention. The Republic should be a federal state, with specified powers attributed to the centre. The presidential system was to be retained, with a Turkish Vice-President and a ratio of seven to three among ministers. Kyprianou said that the Greek Cypriots preferred a unicameral parliament but that they were prepared to consider a bicameral alternative with the upper house on a 50:50 basis, provided ‘deadlock-resolving mechanisms’ (unspecified) could be installed.

On territorial adjustment, the Greek Cypriots, who had hitherto been willing to allow the Turks 23 per cent of the island for their region (as opposed to 36.5 per cent presently occupied) declared themselves willing to concede 25 per cent ‘provided that areas such as Famagusta [Varosha] and Morphou, which used to be thickly populated by Greek Cypriots ... would be under Greek Cypriot administration’. The question of Morphou is a major obstacle to agreement. Its return has always been insisted on by the Greek Cypriots and always rejected by the Turkish Cypriots. They do this on two grounds: that it would be unfair to uproot the present Turkish residents of Morphou who, having come from the south, have already had to move three or sometimes more times; and that, possessing the north’s principal source of water, the town and surrounding district are economically vital to the Turkish region’s citrus industry.

Setback in New York, 1984

In August 1984 de Cuellar reworked his ‘indicators’ into a series of ‘working points’, around which he held separate talks with representatives of the two sides at Vienna and subsequently with Kyprianou and Denktas in three rounds of ‘proximity talks’, between September and December in New York. On 29 November, in the middle of the third round, Denktas suddenly announced, with a great flourish, that he fully accepted the latest refinement of the Secretary-General’s draft. This meant that he would accept the reduction of the Turkish region to ‘29 per cent plus’, would abandon a previous demand for a rotating presidency and would press ahead with confidence-building measures. Kyprianou, who was rather taken aback by this development, obtained a 10-day recess to enable him to consult politicians in Nicosia and Athens. When he returned he handed in a list of reservations. Nevertheless, in a mood of some optimism, de Cuellar deemed the moment ripe for a face-to-face meeting of the two leaders (the first in six years) at a New York summit in January 1985.

Before going to New York Kyprianou, who had owed his election to the presidency to his endorsement by the communist AKEL, publicly repudiated this alliance and formed a new government that consisted exclusively of members of his own DIKO party.²⁵ Although Kyprianou consulted the other party leaders before he left, he decided not to include them in his delegation.

Despite both sides having expressed a qualified optimism, with Denktas at the opening ceremony declaring, ‘This is the handshake of the century,’ the experience was an extremely unhappy one. Part of the trouble was due to the uncertain status of the UN documentation, including one paper which had two different headings, ‘agenda’ and ‘preliminary draft for a joint high-level agreement’. Kyprianou chose to treat it as the first, Denktas as the second. This document covered most of the issues in dispute: the legislature would be bicameral; disputes over the distribution of functions between the two levels of government would be decided by a tripartite body, with one non-Cypriot voting member; there would be a special development fund to bring the economy of the Turkish region up to the standard of its Greek neighbour and a moratorium on ‘actions tending to prejudice the process outlined ... both on the international scene and internally’ – something which the Turkish Cypriots would interpret as meaning the immediate lifting of the economic blockade. Confidence-building measures would proceed and working groups would decide on details of territorial adjustments and the application of the three freedoms. A transitional Government of the federal Republic was to be set up.

Denktas proposed that this draft be signed before the working groups were set up, claiming that this was his understanding of the UN’s intention. Kyprianou who had come expecting to negotiate, responded in his most lugubrious style and in a manner which struck his domestic critics, not to mention the wider international audience, as having been needlessly clumsy. Not content with pointing out the tentative and incomplete nature of the document, he chose to read out the full text of his

Government’s requirements, laying particular stress on the prior settling of the issue of the ‘three freedoms’, the timetable for the withdrawal of the Turkish troops and the exact location of the areas that would be returned to the Greek Cypriots. Denktas responded, ‘I have made enough concessions. If everything has to be renegotiated then I have to withdraw my concessions and start from square one.’

The Turkish Cypriots then proceeded to the adoption of their own ‘Constitution’ and its ratification in a referendum. Kyprianou was immediately accused both by AKEL and by AKEL’s ideological opposite, Clerides’s DISY, of being opposed to a federal Republic, even though that had been conceded by Makarios in 1977. These were the two largest parties who between them commanded a majority in the House of Representatives. Cyprus was convulsed with bitter exchanges, Kyprianou accusing his critics of taking positions identical to those of Denktas. On 23 February 1985 a motion of censure was carried against the President in the House of Representatives and he was asked either to resign or agree to be bound in future by a majority vote of the party leaders. Kyprianou’s refusal, on the ground that Cyprus had a presidential and not a parliamentary system, was upheld by the Constitutional Court.²⁶ However, he was sufficiently shaken by criticism to accept in April 1985 a new text produced by de Cuellar; while it consolidated three previous documents, it did not differ greatly from what had been on the table in New York, except for two substantial omissions.²⁷ But this draft was now rejected by the Turkish Cypriots, Denktas complaining that de Cuellar had only consulted the Greek Cypriots in preparing it.

De Cuellar tries again

On 29 March 1986, de Cuellar tried again to bump start the negotiations. But this time it was the turn of the Greek Cypriots to reproach him for refashioning his ‘Draft Framework Agreement’ so as to accommodate solely the Turkish Cypriot requirements. Kyprianou, strongly backed by Greece, now took the position that, since experience showed that his government’s quarrel was really with Turkey rather than with the Turkish Cypriots, international issues should take priority over intercommunal ones. No progress would be possible with the latter until an international conference involving the permanent members of the Security Council and the guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey and Britain) settled questions like the withdrawal of Turkish ‘occupation troops’, the nature of future international guarantees and the application of the ‘three freedoms’. The Cyprus Government also declared itself very critical of the UN’s way of working, stating:

When messages are carried by UN officers they often get the wrong signals, so that misunderstandings arise. Alternatively, views of what they think the parties might have agreed are paternalistically substituted. Such officials (particularly junior ones) are not there to mediate.’

With the Cold War still in place, the idea of an international conference, which the Soviet Union was quick to pick up, was most unappealing to the West.

Since the Greek Cypriots were unresponsive to de Cuellar's latest effort, Denktas, true to his style of seeking whenever possible to co-opt the Secretary-General to his side, announced on 21 April his 'positive reply' to the latest UN proposals, making it clear, at the same time, that there could be no withdrawal of occupation troops until after the transitional federal Government had been set up. This established the pattern for two years of sterile exchange: Denktas repeating his acceptance of the 1986 'Draft Framework Agreement' and Kyprianou repeating the need for an international conference. It also served to underline the inherent paradoxes of the UN's position. The UN Security Council has all along been operating on the Cyprus question on two levels: **substantive**, in the form of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, which, acknowledging the (Greek) Cypriot Government as the only legitimate authority, make demands that are broadly in accord with the Greek and Greek Cypriot positions – such as the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, the safe return of all refugees to their homes and respect for the fundamental freedoms of every Cypriot; and **procedural**, in which the Secretary-General, being asked to use his 'good offices' to promote negotiations between two politically equal communities in Cyprus, is presumably required to show even-handedness regarding the recognized Government and its opponent. To say the least, this calls for exceptional dexterity on the Secretary-General's part.



Keeping the peace: The 'Set of Ideas'

The demographic issue

Between 1986 and 1992 there was little progress, though some clarification of the issues was achieved. Denktaş was becoming more formalistic in advancing propositions he had previously expressed: that since 1963–4 there had been no legal Government of Cyprus and very little was to be expected so long as Kyprianou and his successors (Presidents Vassiliou and Clerides) made use of their 'false title'. There were significant changes in vocabulary, with Denktaş talking in terms of 'self-determination' and 'peoples' instead of 'communities'.²⁸ This prompted de Cuellar to question whether Denktaş's use of terminology any longer entitled him to go on taking part in 'intercommunal talks' as the UN had intended them.

The Greek Cypriots in turn put increasing emphasis on the demographic issue, which arose from the substantial numbers of Turkish immigrants from the mainland who had been accorded 'naturalization' by the unrecognized authorities. Much of the evidence for this came from debates between the political parties in the north, with the left-wing opposition parties and press (the CLP, RTP and the newspaper *Yenidüzen*) being highly critical of the extent to which the distinctive Turkish Cypriot character of the population in the north was being diluted.²⁹

For many years it was difficult to get reliable demographic information from the north, though the Council of Europe made an attempt in 1992 through a Spanish expert Alfons Cucó. He reported that the northern population had risen between 1974 and 1990 from 115,728 to 171,500,³⁰ a growth rate which could only be accounted for by considerable immigration from mainland Turkey, especially in view of the sizeable numbers of Turkish Cypriots known to have left the island, though some of these have returned. A census taken in 1996 by the northern authorities shows the population reaching 198,215. This has led to the assertion, strongly denied by the Turkish Cypriot authorities, that mainland Turks have either reached or have even exceeded half the population of the north.³¹ The removal of this substantial element of the north's current population as well as of Turkish forces has been a consistent Greek Cypriot demand, though there is some willingness to make allowances for people born in north Cyprus and for mixed marriages.³² According to the Cyprus Government most of these mainlanders have been there for over 20 years; as for the rest, there is, they say, a considerable flow back and forth between north Cyprus and Turkey but applicants for 'naturalization' are not eligible until after five years' residence.

UN peace-keeping

De Cuellar made a further attempt to kickstart negotiations with a 'Set of Ideas' in July 1989 but came to the end of his second term of office without achieving any progress. Among the international community feelings of frustration and impatience were becoming more marked as the UNFICYP's mandate kept being renewed at six-monthly intervals without any evidence of moves towards a settlement. In December 1985 the eight countries which had been participating in the peace-keeping force complained about the 'continued massive shortfall' in the voluntary contributions that were supposed to support it. In 1987 Sweden withdrew her contingent, Canada followed in 1993. Other contributors, including Britain, reduced their provision. From a strength of 2,328 (including 36 civilian police), the force declined to 1,206 in 1994 and only rose to 1,513 in 1996 because Argentina stepped in to supply a contingent. However since 1993 the financial basis has changed. Since it is the Greek side that is really anxious that the UN should stay, the Cyprus Government now bears a third of the cost and Greece provides an annual contribution of US \$6.5 million, with the rest of the expenses met out of general UN funds.

Every year until 1996 the Secretary-General was able to report that both sides had generally respected the ceasefire and the military status quo. Even so the UN force has had to intervene on average about three times a day over minor incidents (encroachments into the buffer zone, the firing of weapons, insults, obscene gestures and stone-throwing) to prevent them from escalating. There was one agreement in 1989 by which opposing forces withdrew a little in Nicosia but it has proved impossible to extend this. Nor has the Security Council had any more luck with repeated calls to prohibit the firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone.

On considering de Cuellar's final report in December 1991 the Security Council insisted that 'the mere maintenance of the status quo does not constitute a solution'. Henceforth, the 'unacceptability' of the status quo became a familiar refrain of all subsequent UN resolutions. The demolition of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War on the one hand, and the growth of local conflicts in the world making claims on the UN's resources on the other, led to mounting criticism of the way the Cyprus conflict seemed frozen in time.

The almost total separation of the two communities prevailing since the mass population movements in the mid-1970s had meant that there were no clashes, thus keeping Cyprus out of the world's headlines for long peri-

ods. This was used by some pro-Turkish commentators as an argument for saying:

*The problem has been solved ... since the Turkish intervention not one Greek Cypriot has been killed and not one Turkish Cypriot has been killed; there is peace on the island.*⁷³³

This began to change in 1987 when, for the first time, an organized group of several hundred Greek Cypriot women broke through the buffer zone to the west of Nicosia and penetrated into Turkish territory before they were ejected with nobody being seriously hurt. On 19 July 1989, on the fifteenth anniversary of the Turkish military intervention, a column of Greek Cypriot women, led by the Greek Orthodox Bishop of Kitium, again attempted to march into the Turkish zone, claiming that they were only returning to their own homes. There were 111 arrests by the Turkish Cypriots, mainly of women but including two priests and three foreign journalists; nearly all of them were fined and sentenced to between two and 10 days' imprisonment. Such episodes were considered by the Greek Cypriots as a warning that they were in no way resigned to writing off the partition of the island as a *fait accompli*. From then on they took place every year, working up to a tragic climax in August 1996.

Vassiliou, Boutros-Ghali and the 'Set of Ideas'

In the presidential election of 21 February 1988 Kyprianou's candidature was eliminated in the first round and the winner was an independent businessperson, George Vassiliou, who was running with AKEL support. Rather excessive hopes were expressed at the time that a man without a political record would be able to inject fresh ideas into the pool. In his campaign, Vassiliou undertook to hold talks with Denktas and to revive the meetings, which his predecessor had dropped, of the National Council, made up of the leaders of all parties in the House of Representatives. Any settlement would be put to a referendum and he would resign if he failed to secure a 'significant' majority. 'Outline Proposals for the Establishment of a Federal Republic' were agreed by all Greek Cypriot parties in January 1989; in several respects these represented an advance, in for example admitting the possibility of cross-voting in elections for President and Vice-President instead of having purely ethnically-based franchises. On the other hand the document gave parties out of power a chance to attack any President attempting to negotiate flexibly.

After Vassiliou proclaimed his desire not to be tied too much by protocol, Vassiliou and Denktas held several rounds of direct talks; they led nowhere. Denktas insisted that each of the two units of a future federation should have its own sovereign status, a condition which has always been unacceptable to Greek Cypriots as opening the way for legitimizing a future Turkish Cypriot secession. He also insisted that the continued presence of Turkish troops was the only acceptable guarantee. Vassiliou contended that, if he were to carry a referendum

convincingly, he must deliver the departure of the Turkish forces and the return of a substantial proportion of Greek Cypriot refugees to their old homes under Greek Cypriot rule. Hence the crucial question was not what percentage of land would be released by the Turkish Cypriots but what particular land. If it was land that had formerly been heavily populated by Greeks, that, it was thought, would ensure that enough of the political pressure would be taken away to enable a settlement to be endorsed. Some refugees would still be left who would either have to live under Turkish Cypriot rule or accept compensation. But it was thought, rightly or wrongly, that most of them would opt for the latter.

Denktas meanwhile was coming under domestic attack from his own 'Prime Minister', Dervis Eroglu, for being prepared to give up any territory at all. At a meeting in Famagusta on 23 February 1992 Eroglu went so far as to say, 'The Turkish Cypriot side will neither make any territorial concessions nor will it allow a single Greek Cypriot to live among Turkish Cypriots.'⁷³⁴ Despite the falling-out between Denktas and Eroglu, which led to Denktas at one time bringing in the left-wing RTP as a coalition partner, Eroglu is at the time of writing (1997) once again 'Prime Minister of the TRNC'.

From the outset, the new UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, showed impatience with the slow pace of Cyprus negotiations and resolved to play a more forceful role than his predecessor. In his first report to the Security Council on Cyprus he proposed to undertake one more 'determined effort' and, if that failed, to invite the Council to examine alternative courses of action. In the hope of putting the two sides under more pressure he called attention in April 1992 to the dwindling of UNFICYP's strength. 'It is unlikely', he said, 'that the UN will be able for much longer to maintain a peace-keeping presence in Cyprus of the present scale.'

Exhaustive negotiations went on in New York in the second half of 1992. Boutros-Ghali put forward his own comprehensive 'Set of Ideas' about a possible settlement under eight headings, which was then endorsed by Security Council Resolution 774 of 26 August 1992. The Council expressed the 'firm expectation' that agreement could be arrived at by the end of 1992 and that the transition to a federal union should be completed during 1993. It added, in a final show of resolve, that if that did not happen the Secretary-General should identify the reasons for the failure and should recommend alternative courses of action.

Provisions of the 'Set of Ideas'

Thus, though a 'Set of Ideas' is in UN-speak a 'non-paper' suggesting a tentative status, the subsequent endorsements by the Security Council would appear to lend it a more authoritative standing. Moreover, in order to force the pace, it was accompanied for the first time by a 'non-map'. Cyprus is defined, in a phrase that comes from the de Cuellar era, as the 'common home of the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community', whose relationship is specifically stated to be 'not one of majority and minority but one of two communities in the federal Republic of Cyprus'. The 'Set of Ideas' goes on to

say that 'political equality does not mean equal numerical participation in all branches and administration of the federal Government', but it does mean 'the effective participation of both communities in all organs and decisions'. The Constitution is to be approved by separate referendums in the two communities and can only be amended by the agreement of both. In a passage meeting the approval of Denktaş but dismaying to Greek Cypriots, a similar pair of referendums would be required on any decision to accede to the European Community/Union. The Greek Cypriots' most essential requirement would be met by the statement that the federal Republic is to have one sovereignty which is indivisible, one international personality and one citizenship.

The federal functions are listed with residual powers vested in the two politically equal federated states. Each federated state, it is stipulated, 'will be administered by one community' and will decide on its own governmental arrangements. Interestingly enough in view of Cyprus's past history it is stipulated that the federal Republic will be secular and that 'religious functionaries will be prohibited from holding elected or appointed political office in the federal Government or in the federated states'. The legislature is bicameral, the upper house having a 50:50 ratio and the lower house a 70:30 one. In case of differences between the Houses, a conference committee will attempt to reach a consensus. But in addition to this (in a provision thoroughly disliked by nearly all Greek Cypriots, who regard it as characteristic of a confederal rather than a federal state), it is provided that for a bill relating to the budget, citizenship, defence, foreign policy, immigration, security and taxation, either community in the House of Representatives can insist on a separate majority of each of the two communities being required. This contrasts with the much more constrained offer in the 'Outline Proposals' of the Greek Cypriot parties that 'no significant measure affecting particularly the Turkish Cypriot community can be passed without Turkish Cypriot parliamentary support'. At the same time the Boutros-Ghali 'Set of Ideas' attempts to avoid the financial breakdown that occurred in the first years of independence with the provision that, if the federal budget is not adopted, the most recent budget plus inflation shall remain in effect.

The Secretary-General acknowledges that there is still no agreement on the method of selecting the President of a Cyprus federation, with the Greek Cypriots wanting election 'by popular universal suffrage' and the Turkish Cypriots wanting the office to rotate between the communities.³⁵ The President and the Foreign Minister are not to come from the same community, which would result, if the Greek version of the presidency is adopted, in the Foreign Minister always being Turkish. As before, ministers are to be in a seven to three ethnically-based ratio and to take decisions by majority vote. But decisions on specified matters require the agreement of both President and Vice-President. They also both have a veto over some legislation and a suspensory veto over the remainder.

There is to be only one Supreme Court (as opposed in effect to two in 1960) with an equal number of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges and a rotating presidency. The 'three freedoms' are to find a place in the Constitution, but the freedoms of settlement and of right

to property are not to be implemented from the outset. They are to wait until the resettlement process is over and even then are to be regulated 'in a manner to be agreed upon'. As for security and guarantees, complete demilitarization as advocated by the Greek Cypriots is mentioned only as 'an objective'. In the meantime there are provisions for the staged withdrawal of all non-Cypriot forces, except for contingents of equal size³⁶ from Greece and Turkey stationed in the appropriate regions, alongside equivalent federal units of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. All this is to be monitored by the UN.

The 'non-map' shows the suggested territorial adjustments, revealing that Morphou is to be returned to the Greek Cypriots, as is Varosha and a swathe of villages. Greek and Turkish Cypriots whose homes are on the 'wrong side' of the line are to have the choice of return or compensation. Those who return can only do so only after the existing residents have been relocated and rehoused. As soon as both communities have endorsed the settlement by referendum, all forms of economic blockade and travel restrictions directed at the Turkish Cypriots will be lifted.

Reactions to the 'Set of Ideas'

It is to this 'Set of Ideas' to which politicians and commentators refer when they say that the ingredients of a settlement are all present except for the necessary political will. An immediate reaction is that in some respects it bears a fairly close resemblance to the 1960 Constitution which was much abused at the time as impossibly complicated for so small an island. The main changes arise from there now being a territorial, rather than only a functional, basis for federation. There are also some points of detail which indicate that something has been learnt by experience.

In 1992-3 the 'Set of Ideas' resulted in acute controversy between Greek Cypriots while, for all that the Turkish Cypriots claimed to be in 'basic agreement with 91 out of the 100 paragraphs', their points of dissent were major ones vociferously expressed. Vassiliou, though unhappy about some aspects, was willing to use the 'Set of Ideas' as a 'basis for negotiation'. He considered that it represented the best deal to be got out of the UN and, more importantly for him, that it carried the full backing of the USA. Tactically, he considered that, should it fail, Denktaş must be seen to be to blame. This was shown to have effect when Security Council Resolution 789 on 24 November 1992 for the first time named the Turkish Cypriots as the party responsible for lack of progress. Noting the failure of talks that had taken place during the previous month, it declared that this was 'because certain positions adopted by the Turkish Cypriot side were fundamentally at variance with the Set of Ideas'.

Notwithstanding this tactical achievement, Vassiliou was sharply attacked by the leaders of parties other than AKEL for having, in effect, given away too much. Specifically this included Clerides of the right-wing DISY, who had previously been AKEL's ally on this issue. Their argument was that the UN's ideas failed to meet all the requirements of the 1989 'Outline Proposals'. It was unfortunate that this controversy occurred during the

run-up to the presidential election of February 1993. According to the *Cyprus Weekly*³⁷ the contest was principally conducted over whether the UN's ideas should be accepted or rejected.

This controversy somewhat obscured the fact that the main critical voice was that of Denktaş, who wanted it stated that, borrowing a Swiss formula, 'The federated states are sovereign in so far as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal Constitution.' Further, federal rules and procedures must be implemented by the federated states themselves (as in a confederation) or by federal officers belonging to the community in which they serve; the presidency should rotate between the communities and each community should occupy half the seats on the Council of Ministers with decisions being reached by consensus, not by voting. Freedom of settlement and the right to property, while being recognized in principle, should be liable to exceptions so numerous and comprehensive that very few cases, if any, would not be covered by them. That said, even if something had been left out, there were 'additional specific and general exceptions'.

Denktaş protested most loudly at the Secretary-General's non-map, particularly one which would deprive the Turkish Cypriots of Morphou (which they have renamed Güzelyurt). Nearly 40,000 new refugees would, he said, be created and he dismissed as 'social housing' Vassiliou's offer to create alternative homes for Turkish Cypriots who would be displaced. The Turkish Cypriot 'Assembly' passed a resolution requiring prior recognition of the 'TRNC' before there could be any thought of negotiating a federation.



Recent events (post 1993): Peace falters

Revisiting the confidence-building measures

The very narrow defeat of Vassiliou by Clerides in the February 1993 presidential election brought to power a veteran of the Cyprus problem. In the past Clerides had been critical of Makarios's intransigence and had joined with AKEL in criticizing Kyprianou's negative stance in 1985, but now, after several defeats, he had finally become President with Kyprianou's help. He made it plain that his priorities were to emphasize Hellenic ties with all political forces in Greece and to press ahead with Cyprus's application for EU membership, as a means of hastening the solution of the Cyprus problem – thereby adding to the pressures on Turkey to force the Turkish Cypriots to settle.

Besides casting blame on the Turkish Cypriots, Security Council Resolution 789 of 24 November 1992 had marked the UN's return to the notion of a series of confidence-building measures to improve the climate for a settlement. In July 1993 the UN put forward 14 proposals. These included 'a significant reduction' in the size of the Turkish occupation force, matched by cuts in defence spending by the Cyprus Government, which had grown considerably under Vassiliou; cooperation on water problems and bicomunal meetings of professional groups, trade unions and political parties (which have periodically taken place since then, though they are liable to sudden cancellations and postponements, usually on the part of the Turkish Cypriot authorities).³⁵

But the two most important questions concerned: the proposed reopening of the Nicosia International Airport, which is in the buffer zone, to be administered by the UN, and to be accessible to both sides; and the resettlement (mainly by Greek Cypriots) of the uninhabited and fenced-off area of Varosha. Elaborate plans were drawn up by UN experts, aimed at balancing the advantages principally to the Turkish Cypriots of the Nicosia Airport against the advantages mainly to Greek Cypriots of the revival of Varosha. When it came to making such a deal, the difficulty, as always, lay in the sensitivity of the Greek Cypriots to anything which might be held to constitute a recognition of the north Cyprus 'state' and the sensitivity of the Turkish Cypriots to anything which might seem to recognize the right of the Greek Cypriot authorities to call themselves the Government of Cyprus. Once more the confidence-building measures were bogged down because of a lack of confidence. Denktas repeatedly required the UN to make 'clarifications' in his favour until

Clerides broke off the talks on the grounds that the UN had modified its ideas as a result of unilateral talks with the Turkish Cypriots. He also suspected that, having pocketed the advantages of a confidence-building measures agreement, Denktas would lose all interest in an overall settlement. Clerides asked Boutros-Ghali to concentrate on getting a 'comprehensive settlement'.

The horse-traders

Between 18 and 31 October 1993, Clerides and Denktas met in five rounds of informal talks arranged by Gustave Feissel, the resident UN representative, in which they tried to 'horse-trade' between their respective positions. Clerides offered to accept the Turkish Cypriot formula about limited sovereignty based on the Swiss model ('the federated states are sovereign in so far as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal Constitution') in return for Turkish Cypriot support for Cyprus's application to join the EU. Denktas replied that 'this condition unfortunately entails legal, political and economic difficulties and complications'. Clerides tried trading off his acceptance of Denktas's idea of a rotating presidency against Denktas's acceptance of complete demilitarization. He also twice proposed trading a good territorial adjustment from the Greek point of view against strict limits on the number of Greek Cypriots allowed to return to properties inside the Turkish region as opposed to accepting compensation for them.

Clerides, who was very conscious that his and Denktas's good faith were being assessed against each other at that very time by the European Commission, reported bleakly to Boutros-Ghali that the talks had established two things: that the positions of Denktas were the positions of Turkey and that neither Denktas nor Turkey possessed the political will to solve the Cyprus problem. Feissel should be warned not to prepare further meetings which were bound to fail. In his own letter to the Secretary-General, Denktas put his emphasis on the confidence-building measures, of which he now appeared as a strong advocate, and accused Clerides of riding off at tangent on the obsession of an EU application.

Membership of the EU

Cyperus's application for membership of the EU was made by Vassiliou in 1990. The European Commission presented its *avis* (opinion) on the applica-

tion on 30 June 1993. It found that, as a European state practising democracy, with educational levels comparable to those in most industrialized countries and enjoying a figure for GDP per head which exceeded that of several existing Union members (including Greece), Cyprus was, 'in the southern part of the island at least', in all essential respects eligible. The one serious obstacle was the Turkish military occupation of the island's northern third, linked to that sector's much lower standard of living.³⁹ On this the Commission decided to defer its view until January 1995 when it would base its judgment on 'the positions adopted by either party' in the intervening intercommunal talks. To help it with this assessment it sent an observer, Serge Abou, to Cyprus to make periodic reports.

Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots protested vigorously against the whole procedure. Consistent with their case that there was no legitimate Government of Cyprus in existence, they contended that the Greek Cypriots had no right to act on behalf of the whole island on this issue. The 1960 Constitution, after all, provided that the Turkish Vice-President had a veto over any law or decisions concerning foreign affairs other than participation in international organizations which included both Greece and Turkey (Article 50). Article 181 had given constitutional force to the prohibition in the Treaty of Guarantee of 'any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, ... union of Cyprus with any other state'.⁴⁰ 'We want to enter the Community,' said Denktaş, 'but after Turkey and only as a united Cyprus when the economies of the two sides reach the same level.' The Turkish Cypriot jurist Necati Münir Ertekin wrote:

*'EU rules would ... mean that the Turkish Cypriots would lose [through the European Court] any protection they might negotiate against being swamped in Northern Cyprus by Greek Cypriots. Most critically of all, they lose the protection of Turkey, since Turkey could hardly intervene in a EU member state.'*⁴¹

At the European Councils in June 1994 and December 1994 it was resolved that the next EU enlargement would include Cyprus and Malta. UN observer Abou's reports spoke of the lack of tangible return from the UN's efforts at promoting reunification, but were generally favourable to the Greek Cypriot side, picking out for particular praise Clerides's latest 'notably courageous' overtures. 'All the cards ... are now on the negotiating table. If the political will is found, all the ingredients of a ... settlement ... are to hand.' The European Commission recommended a two-track approach – an undertaking that the EU would start negotiations for Cyprus's membership six months after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), while at the same time pursuing a policy of friendly gestures towards Turkey which might enlist her cooperation.

It makes matters worse in Turkish eyes that Greece is already a member of the EU while Turkey is not. Turkey's application has been ruled to be 'premature'; quite apart from the economic difficulties, there were found to be serious human rights obstacles. This was a gall to Turkey which considers itself, and is considered especially by the USA, as a vital strategic asset to the West. If the road to Turkish Cypriot acceptance of the EU was to pass through

Ankara it was unfortunate that Turkey was to be in a mood of smouldering resentment at the EU's verdict.⁴²

Acknowledging the awkwardness of this situation the EU had negotiated a Customs Union between the EU and Turkey but this was blocked by a Greek veto. In March 1995 Greece lifted the veto in return for Cyprus receiving a definite timetable for the start of her accession negotiations: six months after the end of the Union's IGC, which points to the early months of 1998, during the EU's British presidency.⁴³ Meanwhile a 'structured dialogue' was to take place to ensure that at least 40 per cent of Cyprus's legislation and institutions were in line with EU requirements ahead of the starting date.

In view of Abou's reports of the sharply deteriorating state of the Turkish Cypriot economy, much reliance was placed on expounding the great potential benefits of EU membership to the Turkish sector. European Commission documents were inclined to assume that a sufficient understanding of these economic factors would outweigh security and cultural fears. But this is not generally proving to be the case, though it would be true to say that trade unionists and some Turkish Cypriot businesspeople take a more favourable view of early EU membership than the political and commercial establishment. Turkish Cypriots (but not 'ministers' and 'civil servants' as such) have attended seminars about the EU and have even gone on briefing trips to Brussels but the disinclination remains strong to entering the EU without Turkey.⁴⁴

There is real bitterness about the pronouncement of the European Court of Justice on 5 July 1994,⁴⁵ effectively excluding Turkish Cypriot exports from EU markets by disallowing movement certificates not issued by the Government of Cyprus. This was seen as reinforcing the Turkish Cypriots' argument that, if a federal Cyprus were in the EU, they could find themselves vulnerable to European Court rulings rendering invalid safeguards aimed at preserving the Turkish and Muslim character of the north. Immediately after the 1994 verdict, the 'TRNC Assembly' deleted from the 'Constitution' the commitment to a future federation and declared itself in favour of closer integration with Turkey. On 28 December 1995 Turkey and the 'TRNC' signed a joint declaration saying that accession negotiations should be taken up with the EU only after a final settlement safeguarding Turkish Cypriot sovereignty had been completed and that federal Cyprus and Turkey should only join the EU simultaneously. This was followed by another joint statement on 20 July 1997 providing for step-by-step matching of structural cooperation and harmonization of Cyprus and the EU by similar action between the 'TRNC' and Turkey. On 6 August 1997, an Association Council was set up to:

*'Determine the measures to be taken with the aim of achieving partial integration ... in the economic and financial fields and in matters of security, defence and foreign affairs on the basis of association.'*⁴⁶

The 'defence dogma'

The diplomatic sphere was not the only one in which Clerides's panhellenist initiatives manifested them-

selves. They have also done so in the matter of defence. Greek Cypriots are perpetually aware of the 30,000–35,000 Turkish troops stationed in the north, their weaponry including 300 recently upgraded main battle tanks and 200 armoured personnel carriers, and their numbers being further reinforced by 4,500 members of the Turkish Cypriot Security Force. If it came to a fight these might be expected to overwhelm the 10,000-strong Cyprus National Guard under the command of a Greek general, reinforced by reservists and the 950 members of the Greek national contingent. But this has not stopped first Vassiliou and subsequently Clerides updating their equipment in order to raise the cost to the Turks of any resort to force. In November 1993 Clerides signed with the Greek Government what has become known as the ‘defence dogma’, which in effect mingles the defence planning of the two countries. In future the Greek Air Force is to use bases to be built near Paphos. For the last two years the Greek Navy and Air Force have taken part in exercises with the National Guard, and a new Cyprus defence budget provides for \$2.5 billion expenditure before the year 2000. It was largely to protect the new bases that the Greek Cypriots placed an order with the Russians for S-300 (or Sam-10) surface-to-air missiles, to be located in the foothills of the Troodos mountains.⁴⁷

In January 1997 when these purchases became known Turkish ministers reacted with brutal directness. The missiles would not be allowed to be delivered. Taken literally this is a threat of an act of war. The Russians say that by supplying these weapons they are merely equalizing the strategic balance. But an act of equalization would affect the status quo, which, given the proximity of Cyprus to the Turkish mainland, has throughout been one of Turkish strategic dominance. When Britain and the USA protested both against the Cyprus Government’s arms order and the language of the Turkish reaction, Clerides responded that the missiles would not be delivered until the middle of 1998. It was clear that in the minds of Greek Cypriots the prospect of what could happen if this delivery were to take place was meant to work on the international community as an additional spur to early settlement. What it might do, on the other hand, is to suggest to one or several of the EU’s member states, every one of whom has to approve a new member, that a divided Cyprus would be a dangerous asset.

Clerides meanwhile reaffirmed the Greek Cypriot proposal for the complete demilitarization of the island and the stationing there of a permanent multinational force, paid for by Cyprus, which should guarantee security all round. He added that this force could include a Turkish element provided it was subject to the international commander. Denktaş, while agreeing that the Turkish armed presence would be substantially reduced after a settlement, continues to insist that only a Turkish force under independent Turkish command would give Turkish Cypriots a feeling of security.

The motor-cyclists

Another reminder that the Cyprus situation should not be regarded as static was the motor-cycle rally of 11

August 1996. The demonstration was well signalled in advance: an international contingent rode in from Berlin, to symbolize the end of divisions in that city, announcing that it was going to end divisions in Cyprus by riding through the lines to Kyrenia; the Orthodox Church of Cyprus contributed generously to the expenses of the occasion; and on the day lavish coverage was provided by the television channels. The Turkish Cypriots also took steps in advance, bringing over from Turkey members of the Grey Wolves, a paramilitary organization no stranger to violence, and planned to administer a lesson.

Although urged many times to take earlier action, President Clerides waited until the actual day of the demonstration before prevailing on the leaders to call off their attempt to force their way through the Turkish zone. In an atmosphere of high excitement some motor-cyclists rode up and down the ceasefire line, penetrating the buffer zone at several points, lighting fires and approaching the Turkish positions. The worst of several clashes occurred at Dherinia; the Turks, on seeing several hundred Greek Cypriot demonstrators pouring into the buffer zone, shouting insults and throwing stones – without restraint from the Greek Cypriot police who were present – released a wave of about a 1,000 counter-demonstrators including the Grey Wolves who had been bussed across a restricted military area; these beat up the intruders savagely and relentlessly with batons and iron bars, killing one of them. Three days later, on the occasion of the dead man’s funeral there was a further demonstration in the Dherinia buffer zone when a Greek Cypriot civilian, a cousin of the dead man, climbed a Turkish flagpole on the edge of the Turkish lines to pull down the Turkish flag. He was immediately shot dead, whereas he could quite easily have been arrested. The incidents, which were seen in detail on world television, made a deep impression, hugely damaging to the cause of reconciliation. Altogether 19 UN soldiers were injured when trying to bring the disorderly crowd under control. The incident showed the limitations of UN peace-keeping when it receives absolutely no cooperation from the local police. The scholar Dan Lindley comments:

When UNFICYP has to confront demonstrations, it can only concentrate about 250 of its 1150 peacekeepers in one place and these peacekeepers are unarmed. One or two peacekeepers can calm a slingshotting incident, but 250 peacekeepers can do little against hundreds of motorcyclists.⁴⁸

In a sense both sides had made their point: the Greek Cypriots that Cyprus is not a dead issue but one that is liable to flare up at any minute; the Turkish Cypriots that whoever crosses the line without authority dies. Well ahead of the August 1997 anniversary Clerides made clear that a repetition would not be allowed. He cited the 7 per cent fall in tourism over the preceding year. This was not the only possible penalty: in a number of EU capitals which had not been in close touch with Cyprus affairs it was suddenly realized that Cyprus membership might mean real trouble.

The minority communities

Since the Turks, the second largest community in Cyprus, have always rejected for themselves the category of a minority, the question of minority rights in the island, narrowly defined, concerns only the smaller recognized communities. There are three such communities: the Maronites, the Armenians and the Latins. There are also small communities of Greeks in the north and Turks in the south. When the 1960 Constitution was being drawn up, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were agreed that, for civic purposes, the minorities would have to decide whether they should be classified as 'Greeks' or 'Turks'. Faced with this choice they lined up with the Christian Greeks rather than the Muslim Turks. Since 1960, each of the three minorities has been able to elect a non-voting member of the House of Representatives, who, however, does have a vote in the appropriate committee when matters affecting that community are being decided.

The Maronites

According to the 1960 census, there were 2,752 Maronites at independence. The Maronites themselves claim that they now number c. 5,000 and are the largest of the minorities.⁴⁹ Before 1974, 90 per cent lived in four villages in the north. They were farmers and livestock owners, and some were substantial landowners. The Maronite Church in Cyprus has limited autonomy, subject to the Patriarch in the Lebanon and to the Vatican. The present Archbishop is Lebanese, though his successor appointed by the Pope will probably not be, and the priests study in the Lebanon. Mass is conducted in Arabic, Aramaic and Greek; the Arabic that is spoken at home among the older people bears a resemblance to that spoken in the Lebanon.

After 1974 about 2,000 Maronites were 'enclaved' (that is, they chose to remain in their villages in the Turkish-occupied area). This number has been reduced by psychological pressures to 170, whose average age is 68. There is now only one primary level schoolchild, who is given private tuition by a retired schoolteacher. Older schoolchildren who go to Greek schools across the ceasefire line are normally allowed to visit their parents but not thereafter, unless they give up their education to settle in the north. Therefore it is virtually impossible to bequeath property to the next generation. Permission of enclaved Maronites to visit south of the ceasefire line is periodically interrupted in retaliation for border demonstrations against the Turks. The UN visits the villages once a fort-

night with supplies of food and medicine, but the Turkish Cypriots will not permit a permanent UN presence.

The greatest danger for the Maronites, most of whom are not enclaved but are now scattered across the south, is seen by their leaders to be that of assimilation. Their main grievance is that they have been acknowledged as a religious group but not as a minority. They have had government assistance in building a church in Nicosia and some (though, they claim, not enough) help over another one in Larnaca, but their request for a Maronite primary school was rejected on the ground that 'your language is Greek'. In 1995 for the first time President Clerides told them that they were a 'community' and would be recognized as such in any new Constitution of Cyprus. He also said that he was prepared to finance the school.

The Armenians

The Armenians are recognized as an ethnic group with its own language and with schools in every town. The community at one time after the First World War numbered 20,000 but most were in transit after their appalling wartime experiences and moved on. In the 1970s there was a recruitment drive for Armenians to migrate to Soviet Armenia which had a certain initial success. Some of those who went soon regretted it but had great difficulty in leaving. Sixty families have now returned to Cyprus and have been given back their Cypriot nationality.

At the time of independence the Cypriot Armenians, who then numbered 3,378, were mainly living in the Turkish part of Nicosia near the ceasefire line and possessed a sixteenth-century monastery with 700 acres nearby. At the close of 1963, when the Constitution collapsed, they found themselves forced to move over to the south. The Government gave them land on which to build their churches and schools. Their internationally celebrated secondary school in Nicosia, the Melkonian Institute, is one in which they take much pride. They tend to be good businesspeople but, finding the prospects limited in Cyprus, often seek opportunities abroad. There is considerable intermarriage with Greek Cypriots.

The Latins

This is the smallest of the communities, claiming 2,000 members, of whom 450 are registered voters. They are Roman Catholics of different national origins including some Latin Americans, who have settled in Cyprus

during the past century. Less than a handful of families can claim any connection with the Catholic rulers of Cyprus in the distant past. Social and cultural life for Latins revolves around their churches. They have been given a new sense of purpose by the need to provide for the substantial number of Filipino servants who are employed on the island.

One subject that has agitated the community has been a new law on civil divorce, providing, in the case of each religious group, for a Family Court consisting of two judges and one member of the relevant community. In the light of the Catholic Church's teaching on divorce this provided problems of conscience for the elected Latin representative invited to submit a list of names from which the community member should be chosen. An amendment now provides that, if the representative declines to act, the appointment can be made by the president of the Family Court.

Greeks in the north

There are 486 Greek Cypriots still living on the Karpas peninsula, mainly in the villages of Ayias Trias and Rizokarpaso⁵⁰ who sometimes receive visits from the UN, but the organization makes repeated complaints about restrictions on its freedom of movement. The intention has clearly been to squeeze the community out. Its members, like the Maronites, are not permitted to bequeath property to a relative, even next of kin, unless he or she already lives in the north. The Turkish Cypriot authorities have refused permission for a Greek secondary school; students who go south forfeit the right to live in the north once, if they are boys, they have reached the age of 16, if girls, 18. Greek Cypriots do not have private telephones and have to make their phone calls from police stations. They can only travel to the demarcation line with police escort and cannot receive visits from close relatives who do not live in the north.

As a result of vigorous UN representations in 1995 some improvements in the daily life of the Greek Cypriots regarding movement within the north, the principle of private telephones and occasional visits to their religious centres, were noted by the Secretary-General in his 1996 report. But Boutros-Ghali declared that their situation 'continues to fall far short of the normal life they were promised' in the 1975 agreement. Some further improvements were promised to Clerides by Denktas in 1997.

Turks in the south

There are 343 Turks who live in the south.⁵¹ The UN made a special enquiry about their welfare in 1995. They found that they 'were not subjected to a restrictive regime', having the same legal rights as other citizens but that they were 'often the victims of capricious discrimination or police harassment and thus did not at present enjoy a fully normal life'. In response the (Greek) Cypriot authorities promised to take steps to establish a Turkish primary day school in Limassol and a liaison office for

Turkish Cypriots' problems, both to be in the suitable setting of 'a sizeable old Turkish Cypriot house'. As for police harassment, there had been cases of such behaviour in Limassol towards Greek Cypriots and these were being dealt with severely. The same would be true of any proven mistreatment of Turkish Cypriots.

An investigation by the Greek daily *Alithia* in 1996 found that the small Turkish community in Limassol was divided between two groups who never spoke to each other – the first named after a shoemaker who acted as spokesperson with the Greek Cypriot authorities and claimed that Turkish Cypriots could get financial help and had no reason to complain; the second called 'the fraternity of the unemployed' whom the shoemaker dismissed as 'lazy' and 'troublemakers' who did not try to get work. A Greek Cypriot lawyer who was interviewed for the same article confirmed some of the allegations of police harassment. He said the police started out with the assumption that some of the Turks living in the south must be spies for Denktas and placed them under surveillance accordingly.⁵²

The shootings of August 1996 had a devastating effect on Turkish Cypriots in the south. They felt thoroughly intimidated and the 400 or so labourers who were accustomed to coming over the line from the north on a daily basis ceased to do so.

Concluding questions

The year 1998 could be critical in the history of the Cyprus problem. In February there will be a presidential election south of the cease-fire line. During the British presidency of the EU in the first half of the year the accession negotiations between the European Commission and Cyprus are due to begin, with no indication of Turkish Cypriot willingness to participate. On the contrary the Turkish Cypriot leaders have not only made halting them a precondition of further intercommunal talks but have signed agreements with the Turkish Government for a partial integration of north Cyprus with Turkey in response. In the middle of 1998 the S-300 missiles are due for delivery from Russia to (Greek) Cyprus and, if this happens, a very real possibility exists that Turkey will attempt to carry out its threat to intercept this delivery, possibly at the Dardanelles. It is obvious that a crisis involving both the UN and the EU in confrontation with Turkey could result.

The USA, as the sole remaining superpower, is expected to play a major role in the coming stages of the Cyprus drama. The appointment of Richard Holbrooke, negotiator of the Dayton Agreement over Bosnia, to conduct US policy over Cyprus is an indicator of the importance the White House now attaches to the subject. But while US pressure on Turkey has sometimes had some effect, exaggerated expectations in this regard would not be wise. British interest was reflected in the earlier appointment of Sir David Hannay, who has had a great deal of experience both with the EU and the UN. Other EU members are taking steps to be regularly briefed. How will they all respond to coming developments and what effect will their responses have on the length of the accession procedure?

In principle, both communities would rather Cyprus became reunited as a federal state before it enters the EU, but the Turkish Cypriots want much more. They want the present EU application to be withdrawn pending agreement on their kind of federation, and then only renewed by a federal Government when the EU is ready to receive Turkey as a member at the same time. The Turkish Cypriot opposition parties on the left (the CLP and RTP) differ to the extent that they would probably agree to a united Cyprus becoming a member in advance of Turkey. The Greek Cypriots on the other hand, having applied for EU membership as 'the Government of Cyprus', expect to accede whether or not a federal solution is reached beforehand. It is not that they are indifferent to reunion. Quite the contrary: their main motive for the application to the EU was the belief that membership negotiations would set up pressures that would make reunion more likely to happen. But having started out on this track and having got the EU's agreement to press ahead with the access negotiations regardless of any Turkish objections, they are determined to push ahead in any event. This policy gains support right across Greek Cypriot society, including the communist AKEL and the

trade unions, despite the fact that some farmers and small and medium businesses are likely to suffer adverse consequences. Everywhere in the south, the political gains are said to outweigh any losses. The small minorities identify with the Greek Cypriot community in this. The Maronites hope that when a new Constitution is drawn up for a federal Cyprus they will gain recognition as an ethnic minority as well as a religious group.

Cyprus will present the EU with special problems whether there is agreement on reunion before accession or not. If there is such an agreement, it would almost certainly include major safeguards to prevent the north being overwhelmed by Greek Cypriots. Since these safeguards would be at odds with European law embodying the 'three freedoms', they would require substantial derogation from the application of that law. Certain precedents have been cited from earlier enlargements – the Åland Islands, ruled by Finland, were allowed to continue to take measures to preserve their exclusively Swedish character; the Danes are permitted to impose some limits on foreign (i.e. mainly German) possession of houses on their territory. How far would the EU be prepared to go along these lines to accommodate a Cyprus settlement?

If, which seems more likely, there is no prior agreement, Cyprus's chances of EU membership would depend, when its negotiations with the European Commission are over, on each one of the 15 member states agreeing to admit a still divided island, with a large Turkish Army stationed in part of it. How is European law going to prevail over a Republic which controls only two-thirds of its territory and seeks to blockade the remainder? On the other hand, should an applicant country that meets the criteria for EU membership be rejected on account of a non-member's armed veto? These are broader questions to which the situation described in this Report is liable to give rise.

Recommendations

Cypriot citizenship and confidence-building

- 1 The scale and frequency of bicomunal meetings between businesspeople, political parties, sports people, trade unionists, etc. should be greatly increased, and follow-up projects, such as a joint chamber of commerce and other joint ventures, should be actively promoted.
- 2 Efforts should be made to create a sense of Cypriot citizenship, without prejudice to existing cultural loyalties. Now that there are universities in both the north and the south, interchange between them should be facilitated.
- 3 To make the above possible a framework is urgently required to avoid confidence-building activities failing because of fears of prejudicing the case of either side on constitutional issues.

National peace-building

- 4 All groups in Cyprus need to be involved in the discussions on the peace process in order to achieve a peaceful and viable settlement. If federation is the commonly agreed solution, far more needs to be done on both sides of the Green Line to discuss its potentialities, its varieties and its obligations.
- 5 The idea of cross-voting for presidential and vice-presidential elections is worth exploring; so that candidates should be encouraged to pay attention to the needs and wishes of both communities.
- 6 A new Constitution in Cyprus would need to address the position of, and guarantee rights to, the Maronite, Armenian and Latin minorities in Cyprus. These groups need to be consulted on the new constitutional provisions. In addition, the new Constitution should comply with international minority rights standards, such as the UN Declaration on Minorities, OSCE standards relating to minorities and the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which Cyprus has ratified and which comes into force in February 1998.

International efforts

- 7 The security issue is paramount for both sides because their historical experiences give them reason for concern. The international community should be ready to supply a multinational force (including police) as part of a settle-

ment. If the Sovereign Base Areas could contribute to such an arrangement Britain should be prepared to make them available. In the meantime a substantial degree of supervised disarmament on both sides of the Green Line is highly desirable. Furthermore, Greece and Turkey should refrain from any military manoeuvres which could jeopardize a future peace settlement.

- 8 The EU should carry out intensive work on the scale and nature of the safeguards for the Turkish/Muslim character of the north which it would be prepared to accommodate in a future treaty of accession.



- 1 Department of Statistics and Research, Republic of Cyprus.
- 2 For further information, see Attalides, M., *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*, Edinburgh, Q Press, 1979, p. 5.
- 3 Article 1, the Constitution of Cyprus.
- 4 Patrick, R.A., *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict 1963–71*, Ontario, University of Waterloo, 1976, pp. 37–8.
- 5 PRO FO 371/168975 Clark to CRO (Inward Tel. No. 926), 28 November 1963. FO 371/168978 Sir Ralph Murray (Athens) to Derek Dodson (FO). Kyle, K., 'The British and Cyprus in 1963', in *Friends of Cyprus Report*, no. 37, spring 1994, pp. 10–12.
- 6 Polyviou, P., *Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation*, pp. 32–4.
- 7 Patrick, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
- 8 Papandreou, A., *Democracy at Gunpoint*, André Deutsch, 1970, p. 100.
- 9 Ball, G., *The Past Has Another Pattern*, Norton, 1982, p. 350.
- 10 Papandreou, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
- 11 Higgins, R., *United Nations Peacekeeping, Documents and Commentary*, vol. 4, Europe, 1946–79, Royal Institute of International Affairs/Oxford University Press, p. 325.
- 12 The term 'good offices' is deliberately opaque. It has been defined by the UN as 'a very flexible term as it may mean very little or very much' (*Handbook on the Peaceful Resolution of Disputes*). It refers to the role which the Secretary-General can play in the prevention or resolution of conflicts. It is the very lack of precise definition that enables the Secretary-General and the parties, who may not recognize each other's legitimacy, to explore options without prejudice. It is often contrasted with the role of Mediator, which is more formal and usually implies, as in the case of Galo Plaza, the drawing up of findings and the presentation of a Report. A 'non-paper' is a diplomatic term for a written submission that does not have the status of a formal document: it is a tentative formulation, as is a 'non-map'. Franck, T.A. and Nolte, G., 'The good offices function of the UN Secretary-General', in A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury (eds), *United Nations, Divided World*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 143–82.
- 13 Patrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 133 *et seq.*
- 14 Ambassador Richard Holbrooke at a Press Briefing in Nicosia, 11 November 1997.
- 15 'Any chance that the coup had of success disappeared when Sampson was made President.' Theodoracopulos, T., *The Greek Uprising*, Stacey International, 1976, p. 48. Makarios, speaking to the UN Security Council, called Sampson 'a well-known gunman' (19 July 1974). He was also judged by many to be emotionally unstable.
- 16 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Third Report Session 1986–7, *Cyprus*, 7 May 1987.
- 17 Council of Europe, *Report of the European Commission of Human Rights. Cyprus Against Turkey*, nos 6780/74 and 6950/75, 1976, see pp. 110–19 (and also see the dissenting opinion of the Turkish member, pp. 186–92).
- 18 *The Times*, 23 July 1974; *New York Times*, 29 July 1974.
- 19 Attalides, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
- 20 The three other Turkish Cypriot villages at which massacres are alleged were Aloa, Maratha and Sandalaris. See Oberling, P., *The Road to Bellapais*, Boulder, Social Science Monographs, 1982, pp. 184–6.
- 21 *Report of Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, S/1996/1016, 10 December 1996, p. 5.
- 22 *Bulletin of the TRNC Central Bank, 1995*; as Apostolides, C., 'The economy of the Turkish occupied part of Cyprus and the economic disparities between the occupied area and the Government-controlled part of Cyprus' in *Friends of Cyprus Report*, no. 39, autumn 1996. Apostolides calculates the GNP per head of the north at 1,484 Cypriot pounds compared to 5,624 in the south. The exchange rate of the Turkish lira (the currency of the north) was 5,703 to the Cyprus pound in 1990 and 152,385 in 1996. Theophanous, *The Political Economy of a Federal Cyprus*, Nicosia, Intercollege Press, 1996, p. 17.
- 23 Wilson, A., *The Aegean Dispute*, IISS, 1979.
- 24 The institutions of the self-proclaimed but internationally unrecognized entity in the north are referred to in this Report in inverted commas. This is done as a factual reminder of the status which they occupy in the eyes of the international community and is not intended as an editorial comment one way or the other.
- 25 President Kyprianou terminated the cooperation agreement with AKEL on 22 December 1984 and reshuffled his Cabinet on 8 January 1985. But as far back as 27 August 1984 the communist daily *Haraghi* had been criticizing him for not really believing in the federal formula of 1977.
- 26 It is also worth noting that in the subsequent parliamentary election Kyprianou's party won four extra seats.
- 27 The two points omitted in the new draft were that a bill would need at least 30 per cent of Turkish Cypriot support in the upper house to go through and that residual powers would be reserved to the provinces.
- 28 Dodd, C.H., *The Cyprus Issue. A Current Perspective*, Eothen Press, second edition, p. 9.
- 29 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. 6589, Rapporteur, Alfons Cucó, *Report on the Demographic Structure of the Cypriot Communities*, 1992. Alpen Durduran, leader of the New Cyprus Party, furnished Cucó with an estimate of 55,000 Turks naturalized, Mustafa Akinçi, leader of the Communal Liberation Party estimated 40,000–45,000 and the UN representative thought the same. According to the Republican Turkish Party some 30,000 Turkish Cypriots left north Cyprus in 1985–90. (Cucó, pp. 28–35). In 1987 the Cyprus Government supplied the British Parliament with an estimate of 60,000 settlers (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Cyprus*, HMSO, 1987, p. 63). Later figures cited have been as high as 80,000 or even 90,000. The Turkish Cypriot journalist who led the campaign against the settlers, Kutlu Adali of *Yenidizen* was murdered on 6 July 1996, a crime which has never been cleared up.
- 30 Cucó, *ibid.*
- 31 The latest official Greek Cypriot estimate of the number of Turkish Cypriots presently on the island is

- 90,600 (as against a Greek Cypriot population of 735,900). Press and Information Office, *The Almanac of Cyprus 1996*, Nicosia.
- 32 Interview with President Clerides, November 1996.
- 33 Lord Willis, Vice-Chair of the Friends of Turkish Cyprus, in House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Third Report Session 1986–7, *Cyprus*, 1987, p. 47.
- 34 ‘Eroğlu: No territorial concessions’, in *Kıbrıs, North Cyprus Monthly*, February 1992, p. 1.
- 35 The Boutros-Ghali text says simply that the President would be elected ‘by universal suffrage’ (as opposed to election by the Greek electorate only). However, the National Council proposal in 1989 would in addition provide that in the election of the (Turkish) Vice-President the Greek voters would have a share equal to that which the Turkish voters had exercised in the presidential election. A more general application of this cross-voting idea, seen as an incentive to candidates with appeal to the other community, has been advocated by the *Friends of Cyprus*, see Carras, C., ‘The interest of Cypriots and the game of nations’, in *Report 32*, *Friends of Cyprus*, autumn, 1991, and ‘A guide to cross-voting’, in *Report 38*, *Friends of Cyprus*, autumn 1995, p. 15.
- 36 The size of the Greek and Turkish contingents is not stipulated in the available texts of the ‘Set of Ideas’. But it is probable that 5,000 was the number Boutros-Ghali had in mind.
- 37 *The Cyprus Weekly*, 6–11 February 1993, p. 16.
- 38 Speaking of the improved position prevailing in 1997, Dan Lindley of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Defense and Arms Control Program says in his working paper, *UNFICYP and a Cyprus Solution: A Strategic Assessment* (May 1997), ‘Of all the bicomunal activities proposed, about 75% take place. The Turkish side is responsible for blocking 99% of the 25% that do not take place’ (p. 35, note 47).
- 39 The Commission’s *avis* estimates that the GDP per head in the north is three to four times smaller than in the south (*Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic for Membership*, COM(9) 313 final, Brussels, 30 June 1993, p. 8).
- 40 This interpretation of the Treaty provision is not shared by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which holds that it was never intended to cover a body like the EU. A legal opinion to the contrary has been supplied to the Turkish Cypriots by the distinguished international lawyer Professor M.H. Mendelson. He maintains, moreover, that Britain is bound by the Treaty of Guarantee to veto admittance of a divided Cyprus into the EU.
- 41 Ertekün, N.M., ‘The Greek Cypriot eagerness and agitation for EU membership – Why?’, in *Kıbrıs, North Cyprus Monthly*, 31 January 1995.
- 42 It did not help that the European Commission had also found that Greece’s request for admission was premature. This was overridden on political grounds by the Council of Ministers. There was no such overriding in the case of Turkey.
- 43 Greece subsequently imposed another veto on a financial protocol which flowed from the Customs Union agreement on the ground that the Turkish Government had not agreed to refer the dispute about the Imia/Kadak islet to the World Court. The European Parliament, objecting to Turkey’s civil rights record, also stopped EuroMed funds for Turkey except for projects in promotion of democracy. Both these events stoked Turkey’s sense of grievance against the EU.
- 44 There were some exceptions to this, particularly among the trade unions and opposition figures including Mustafa Akinçi, leader of the Communal Liberation Party, who sees the merit of a Federal Cyprus with full Turkish Cypriot participation inside the EU advancing future Turkish membership. But Ösker Özgür, the former leader of the Republican Turkish Party, gave it as his opinion at a conference in London in November 1996 that Turkey would need to be admitted first.
- 45 Case 432/92 *European Court Reports*, 3087, 1994, *R. v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S.P. Anastassiou (Pissouri) Ltd*. The decision was made on a request from the English High Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on points of European law. The Court’s findings preclude member states from accepting goods originating in Cyprus (in this case citrus fruit and potatoes) under certificates other than those issued by the competent authorities of the Republic of Cyprus.
- 46 *Kıbrıs, Northern Cyprus Monthly*, 1–31 August 1997, p. 5.
- 47 A further reason for the purchase of the missiles was the war scare caused by the sudden escalation in January 1996 of the dispute between Greece and Turkey over the uninhabited Aegean islet of Imia/Kadak. In case war happened, it was feared that Turkey would take over all of Cyprus.
- 48 Lindley, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
- 49 Interview with Antonis Hadjirousos, Maronite non-voting member of the House of Representatives.
- 50 UN Security Council, *Report of Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Cyprus/1996/1016*, p. 5.
- 51 *Ibid.*
- 52 Andreou, A., ‘The Turkish quarter of Limassol’, in *Alithia*, 30 December 1996.

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