

# **The Semantics and Pragmatics of Demonstratives in English and Arabic**

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## Abstract

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This research investigates the semantics and pragmatics of demonstratives in two languages, English and Arabic, within the framework of relevance theory. The study applies the fundamental distinction between ‘conceptual’ and ‘procedural’ semantics in an attempt to account for the various instantiations of such referring expressions in the two languages. I argue that demonstratives play a crucial role in aligning the discourse models of the speaker and hearer by encoding procedural semantics instructing the hearer to maintain or create a joint level of attention to the intended referent as opposed to other referential candidates. Following Diessel (2006), I take it that this notion of joint attention subsumes all the cognitive and functional roles played by demonstratives in discourse. I also argue that demonstratives encode a (pro)concept of distance which falls under the scope of the attention-directing procedure, thus creating the internal contrast between the intended referent and other candidate referents. Within this proposal, I discuss how demonstratives can contribute to both the explicit and the implicit levels of meaning by virtue of the interaction between their encoded semantics and the context in a relevance-driven framework. Compared to other referring expressions or no referring expression at all, the role of a demonstrative achieves relevance on the implicit level. It can either highlight a certain aspect of the referent, or encourage the creation of weak implicatures, or signal a certain cognitive/emotional attitude towards the referent. The study is supported by an analysis of corpus data from both languages in order to supplement theoretical proposals with attested evidence.

I further extend my analysis to include two areas. First, I discuss cases of self-repair in spoken English discourse which involves the definite article and demonstratives. By linking the notion of self-repair to that of optimal relevance, I shed some light on the semantic and pragmatic differences between these two referring expressions. Second, I extend my analysis to include other forms of demonstratives in Arabic and explore their semantic and pragmatic behaviour in discourse. I propose a procedural account for the three forms attentional *haa*, *kadhaalik* and *haakadhaa*, arguing that their contribution goes well beyond that of mere demonstrative reference to that of being discourse markers encoding procedural constraints on interpretation. I also investigate some alternative syntactic structures where demonstratives occur, arguing that the stylistic effect of emphasis which they give rise to can be explained in terms of relevant cognitive effects.

## Acknowledgements

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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

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A final word, I submit this thesis at a time when history is being written in Egypt, at a time when the best linguists in the world cannot explain the meaning of the phrase ‘power of the people’ without referring to the 25<sup>th</sup> of January revolution in Egypt. Now more than ever I can truly say: I am Egyptian, and I am proud.

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## Arabic Transcription Notations

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ء	'
ا	a
ب	b
ت	t
ث	th
ج	j
ح	ḥ
خ	ḫ
د	d
ذ	dh
ر	r
ز	z
س	s
ش	š
ص	ṣ
ض	ḍ
ط	ṭ
ظ	<u>dh</u>
ع	ʕ
غ	ġ
ف	f
ق	q
ك	k
ل	l
م	m
ن	n
هـ	h
و	w
ي	y

### Short vowels

ا  
و  
ي

a  
u  
i

### Long vowels

ا  
و  
ي

aa  
uu  
ii

**Gemination:** repetition of the consonant.



## List of Abbreviations

---

Dem	demonstrative
DemP	demonstrative phrase
Fem	feminine
GH	Givenness Hierarchy
ICE-GB	International Corpus of English-British Component
ICECUP	ICE Corpus Utility Program
Mas	masculine
MSA	Modern Standard Arabic
NEMLAR	Network for Euro-Mediterranean Language Resources
NP	noun phrase
Part	particle
Pers	person
Plur	plural
Pres	present
Pro	pronoun
Sing	singular

## Chapter 1: Introduction

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### 1.1 Aims of the research

This thesis investigates the semantic and pragmatic features of demonstratives in two languages: English and Modern Standard Arabic (MSA)<sup>1</sup>. The research carried out here has two main aims. First, to propose a semantic analysis for demonstratives in these two languages; and second, to show how this analysis interacts with pragmatic principles to account for a wide range of uses of demonstratives as illustrated by attested examples from corpora chosen for this purpose. The theoretical framework used in this study is relevance theory, as the distinction it makes between conceptual and procedural meaning is crucial to the proposed analysis.

There is a vast amount of literature on the various types and usages of demonstratives in various languages (e.g. Himmelmann (1996), Cornish (1999), Diessel (1999), Botley & McEnery (2001a), Enfield (2003), Strauss (2002)). A simple definition which English can share with other languages is that a demonstrative is a word used to refer to some other entity which is associated with a notion of relative distance (proximal/distal), whether in the linguistic or non-linguistic context. Grammatically, it can be used as a determiner as in (1) or as a pronoun as in (2); and semantically it can be deictic (i.e. referring to an entity in the physical environment) as in (3) or anaphoric (i.e. referring back to an entity previously mentioned in discourse) as in (4). Also, demonstratives can have different types of discourse referents<sup>2</sup>, nominal (i.e. realised by a Noun Phrase (NP)) and non-nominal (i.e. realised by a whole clause), as in (5) and (6) respectively. In terms of type of reference, examples (4) and (5) also illustrate the difference between using a demonstrative to be directly co-referential (i.e. sharing a common head noun with the discourse referent), and using it to be indirectly co-referential (i.e. not sharing a common head noun with the discourse referent). The contrived examples below follow the traditional descriptive labels just mentioned, and they are all English examples at this point purely for explanatory purposes.

---

<sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise stated, the terms Arabic and MSA in this thesis are used to refer to Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), as opposed to Classical Arabic or any regional variety.

<sup>2</sup> The terms 'referent', 'antecedent', and 'discourse referent' of a referring expression have been used and defined in several ways in the literature. See for example Ariel (1990), Cornish (1999), Diessel (1999). I use the terms 'referent' and 'discourse referent' interchangeably to refer to either referents in the physical surrounding or in the text.

- (1) **This idea** is not feasible.  
[demonstrative determiner]
- (2) The country is in recession. **That** has been expected for months.  
[demonstrative pronoun]
- (3) Is **this** my book?  
[deictic]
- (4) A pregnant woman has to undergo several checks. **These checks** are called antenatal.  
[anaphoric, directly co-referential]
- (5) The sea is calm today. But **this body of water** can be dangerous.  
[anaphoric, nominal referent, indirectly co-referential]
- (6) The sea is calm today. But **this** can change in a minute.  
[anaphoric, non-nominal referent]

The reference of each demonstrative in these examples is contextually motivated by the speaker and contextually inferred by the hearer. The demonstratives in (2) and (5), for example, could be intended to refer to completely different entities. Moreover, the demonstratives in (1) and (3) illustrate the manipulation of the notion of distance between the physical and the metaphorical. A further complication arises if we compare them with (7) and (8) which may well refer to the same entities but using different referring forms:

- (7) **The idea** is not feasible.
- (8) Is **that** my book?

In terms of pragmatic function, these examples also show how demonstratives play a role in the organization of information flow in discourse. In (4) and (5), for example, the demonstratives reactivate the previously mentioned referents with or without adding new descriptive information, while the demonstrative in (6) directs attention to the whole proposition that ‘the sea is calm tonight’. But demonstratives can also introduce new referents in discourse as in (9) and (10):

- (9) **This sea** is calm today. [beginning of a novel]
- (10) Do you remember **those checks** you had in **that hospital** a couple of years ago?

These examples raise questions about how the interpretation process of demonstratives is triggered, what guides the interpretive path to the intended referent, and how do demonstratives contribute to what the speaker is explicitly saying and what s/he is implicitly saying. Above all, the main question would be whether a semantic analysis could be proposed which would interact with a pragmatic theory to make the right predictions about the interpretation of demonstratives in discourse. I summarise the questions that are addressed specifically in this study as follows:

- What is linguistically encoded by English and Arabic demonstratives?
- How do these linguistically encoded meanings interact with pragmatic principles to give rise to the different interpretations?
- How do English and Arabic demonstratives contribute to both the explicit and the implicit contents of the utterance?

I summarise my proposal as follows. I argue that the semantics encoded by demonstratives in English and Arabic has two components: one procedural, related to the notion of attention, and one (pro-)conceptual related to the notion of distance. Unlike previous cognitive approaches, the notion of attention is not regarded as a state but as a procedure which is manipulated to create or maintain a shared level of attention between participants to particular referents as the discourse unfolds. The encoding of distance, I argue, lies within the scope of the procedural semantics and is responsible for creating the internal contrast between proximity and distance. The interaction between the semantics of demonstratives and the relevance-based pragmatic considerations results in the various interpretations noted in the literature. This can be illustrated as follows:




Figure 1: Proposed semantic analysis for English/Arabic demonstratives

I use corpus data in both English and Arabic to supplement personal intuitions with corpus-based evidence<sup>3</sup>. This is particularly significant for this study since the larger part of the available literature on demonstratives in both languages is based on contrived examples of language use. This is especially true for the Arabic demonstratives, where corpus-based studies are rare. Corpus examples are used to provide evidence for how the proposed analysis works.

After discussing my general proposal, I further test my arguments by addressing two specific issues related to English and Arabic demonstratives separately. The first test involves self-repair in English. The English corpus (the spoken part) provides the facility to look into cases of self-repair involving demonstratives, i.e. cases where a speaker utters one referring form then utters another referring form in correction. I specifically discuss cases where a demonstrative is repaired to a definite article or vice versa, as well as cases where one form of demonstrative is repaired to the other form in the pair. The analysis of these cases of self-repair brings together insights from conversation analysis theories and relevance theory. I aim to show that the proposed semantic analyses for demonstratives successfully account for these cases because it differs from the semantics of the definite article in two main respects: (a) its attention-directing procedure, and (b) its encoding of distance. The metaphorical extensions of distance in terms of cognitive/emotional attitude are especially important in these cases as they are accounted for in terms of processing effort offset by cognitive effects.

The second test is the analysis of the morphological, semantic and pragmatic aspects of some specific forms of demonstratives in MSA. My proposed semantic analysis for Arabic demonstratives concerns the standard demonstrative forms: (proximal) *haadhaa*, *haadhihi*, *haa'ulaa'*, and (distal) *dhaalika*, *tilka*, *'ulaa'ik*<sup>4</sup>. However, there are other demonstrative forms which have unique uses in Arabic, namely *haa* (which is morphologically part of the proximal forms but can act as an independent demonstrative), *kadhaalik* (which is originally formed by attaching *ka* 'for similarity' to the distal demonstrative *dhalik*) and *haakadhaa* (which consists of *haa* + *ka* + *dhaa*). I propose that, within a relevance-theoretic framework, a procedural account of these forms sheds better light on their interpretation in discourse. I argue that the demonstrative *haa* reflects an attitudinal description of the speaker, while the

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<sup>3</sup> For references on corpus linguistics (uses and resources) see Kennedy (1998), Leech (1992), McEnery & Wilson (2001), and Meyer (2002) inter alia. See also Fillmore (1992) on a comparison between corpus linguistics and arm-chair linguistics.

<sup>4</sup> See section 2.3 for further details on demonstratives in Arabic. The forms mentioned here exclude the dual forms since they are less frequently used.

forms *kadhaalik* and *haakadhaa* can be ambiguous between a demonstrative and a discourse marker. I also use relevance theory to explain how the use of Arabic demonstratives in some specific syntactic structures has rhetorical effects.

## **1.2 Theoretical background**

What is known in the literature as ‘singular terms’ (e.g. Frege 1892/1980; Strawson 1950) include proper names, pronouns, demonstratives and definite descriptions. They have been defined in various ways, but they are most commonly known as terms that are inherently ‘about’ the objects to which they refer. In order to understand what such terms mean, the hearer will have to inferentially work out, taking context into consideration, what is being referred to. Demonstratives are one kind of referring terms whose interpretation depends on context and inference. Any theoretical proposal which attempts an account of the interpretation of demonstratives should allow a clear role for both inference and context, together with an encoded semantics. The assignment of reference will help the hearer to arrive at the proposition expressed, and in some cases to go beyond that to infer some implicit meanings.

Reference assignment is part and parcel of the more general process of utterance interpretation. One theoretical framework that attempts to account for this general process is relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson 1995, Sperber 1995, Wilson & Sperber 2002). Human communication is a mental and physical process that makes use of different resources in order to be successful. At the same time, the ease and speed at which humans communicate suggests that there is an underlying cognitive drive which governs this process. Relevance theory is a theory of communication that is based on a cognitive generalisation about how the human mind works. It argues that considerations of relevance are the guidelines for communication because our minds seek relevance in all information processing. Speakers try to be optimally relevant to their hearers by choosing the words, structures, intonation, etc. that would fulfil this goal, while hearers start the interpretation process with the underlying understanding that the utterance is relevant enough to be worth processing. In this picture, inference plays a big role on both the explicit and implicit sides of communication. Gricean pragmatics (Grice 1981; 1989) had shown before relevance theory that verbal communication cannot be a mere matter of encoding and decoding (as is the view of the so-called ‘code model’ of language), but that it needs inference. In response to this, relevance theory

developed a complete inferential model of language with an attempt to provide clearer insights to the old debate about the division of labour between semantic and pragmatics.

Relevance theory has also enriched the literature on linguistic semantics by postulating a basic distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning to correspond to the intuitive difference in describing the meaning of a word like *cat* and a word like *so* (Blakemore 1987; 2002; 2007). To put it simply, information about mental representations is considered conceptual, while information about operations applicable to them is considered procedural. This generally-accepted distinction can be illustrated by example (5), repeated below, where the meanings encoded by *sea* and *but*, for example, are different in nature:

(5) The sea is calm today. But this body of water can be dangerous.

A word like *sea* encodes information representing the concept SEA in the mind of the hearer, which in turn activates different kinds of information related to this concept (e.g. contextual information related to scientific facts or personal experiences of the sea, or lexical information related to phonetic and orthographic traditions, etc.). A word like *but*, on the other hand, encodes information on how to process the two parts of the utterance, i.e. that the second part is in contrast to what is stated in the first.

Demonstratives are seen as an interesting example of the conceptual/procedural meaning split. It is argued that the main function of procedural semantics is that it defines the way some aspect of pragmatic inference should proceed. In other words, it constrains the inferential activity associated with processing a certain word or phrase. This is particularly relevant to the study of demonstratives since inference plays a major role in the process of reference assignment. The concept of distance, on the other hand, shared by English and Arabic demonstratives, is an intrinsic semantic feature that justifies the very existence of these definite descriptions as opposed to the definite article or third person pronouns. I propose that studying the semantics and pragmatics of demonstratives from a relevance theoretic perspective allows us to draw a more generalised and unified picture about the way such linguistic items are interpreted in language.

### **1.3 Data**

This study focuses on demonstratives found in two corpora, both representing the written mode of their respective languages<sup>5</sup>, English and Arabic. The two corpora are comparable in terms of size (i.e. number of words) as well as in some of their text categories. Since the purpose of this study is to investigate the choice, behaviour and interpretation of demonstratives in their original languages, I have not used a parallel corpus of English and Arabic<sup>6</sup>. In this section, I briefly introduce the two chosen corpora and the software used in analysing them. One crucial tool used in this study is a concordancer. Leech and Fligelstone (1992: 18) define a concordancer as “a list of all the examples of the target item (the linguistic phenomenon being searched for), normally accompanied by enough context to enable a human being to study the item's occurrence in detail”. Different concordancer softwares have been used in order to identify demonstrative forms and the contexts in which they occur in both languages. Concordancer softwares differ in terms of the range of tasks they can perform, the languages they can deal with (which depends on which encoding they support, e.g. English and most European languages are written in a different encoding than languages like Arabic and Chinese), the speed with which they can perform these tasks relative to the size of the corpus, and the level of user-friendliness of their interface.

### **1.3.1 The English Corpus (ICE-GB)**

The British Component of the International Corpus of English (ICE-GB) is part of an international project that started in the late 1980s with the aim of compiling corpora that represent the national varieties of English that exist around the world. As Nelson et al (2002) point out, ICE-GB is the first national component of ICE to be released. It is composed of one million words of speech and writing that have been fully tagged and parsed, i.e. each word has been supplemented with information (tags) about its part of speech (verb, noun, adverb, etc.) and syntactic function (subject, object, etc.). The ICE tagset consists of 20 main word classes, while the parsing scheme has over 90 function and category labels. The time range of the texts in the ICE-GB covers the period from 1990 to 1993.

The ICE-GB is accompanied with the ICE Corpus Utility Program (ICECUP), a text analysis program that fully exploits the extensive grammatical annotation that ICE-GB contains. The program can perform all the tasks normally associated with text analysis

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<sup>5</sup> Except for the data used in Chapter 5 which is taken from the spoken part of the English corpus.

<sup>6</sup> A study of demonstrative phrases in English texts and their translated Arabic equivalents would certainly add an interesting angle to the analysis of the effect of the writer's/translator's perspective in the choice of a demonstrative. But this remains outside the scope of this research.



programs. For example, it can do simple string searches as well as generate KWIC (key word in context) concordances. Thanks to the comprehensive markup that complements the ICE-GB, specific searches can be carried out by manipulating a number of search variables, such as text category, speaker's age/gender/education, regional scope, etc.

In this study, the grammatical tags and features of the ICECUP have greatly facilitated the search process, especially with reference to the ability to search for a word plus a specified grammatical tag. For example, in a basic search for the distal demonstrative *that* in the ICE-GB, I define the grammatical features needed: pron (pronoun) and dem (demonstrative), and the ICECUP uses this information as a template to match similar structures in the corpus. The result is a fairly accurate count of all the proximal demonstratives in the corpus, excluding *that* as a relative pronoun, as the following screen shot figure shows:




Figure 2: Screen shot of *that* concordance in the ICE-GB using the ICECUP

As shown in Figure (2), the most convenient way to show search results is to concordance them, i.e. to align each instance of *that* in the centre of the screen with the preceding and following co-text on either side. The codes on the left of the screen shot are the textcodes of the source reference for each citation or text unit. Textcodes beginning with *S* refer to spoken texts, while those beginning with *W* refer to written texts. Each text unit, which corresponds to a grammatical sentence or a coherent utterance, occupies a separate line. The frequency of the proximal demonstrative is shown at the bottom of the screen. There are 6,690 instances of *that*, while the other number (6,397) is the number of the different text units in which *that* appears (the number is lower because it occurs more than once in some text units). The extra

information related to grammatical features appears in blue next to the word which has been searched for. Context is crucial for the analysis of the demonstratives. The ICECUP by default displays only the text unit in which the searched word occurs. However, by clicking on the Browse text button in the sub menu (View) on top of the screen, the entire text from which a certain text unit comes will appear in a new window, thus allowing a more comprehensive view. The entire text can be scrolled using the scroll bars and the user would be able to read the immediately preceding and following context.

The written section of the ICE-GB, which I have mainly worked with here, is divided into two major parts: printed and non-printed. I have only used the printed section in order to correspond to the Arabic corpus which depends on printed sources only. I have also excluded some text categories which do not have a corresponding category in the Arabic corpus (e.g. technology, natural sciences, hobbies, etc.). Hence, the corpus chosen for this study has the following size and categories:

<b>Text Category</b>	<b>No. of words</b>
Academic writing / humanities	21,714
Reportage / press news reports	41,556
Instructional writing (regulatory)	21,140
Persuasive writing / press editorials	20,725
Creative writing / short stories and novels	42,645
<b>Total</b>	<b>147,780</b>

Table 1: The English corpus chosen for this study from the ICE-GB

### **1.3.2 The Arabic Corpus (NEMLAR)**

Working with Arabic corpora presents more practical issues than working with English corpora. Once one decides to work with a corpus of Arabic, a number of questions arise: What kind of Arabic? Is there a corpus available? What are the tools you are going to use for analysis? The Arabic language has many regional varieties, and ultimately what determines the choice of a particular variety is the research purpose. Since this study aims at

investigating the choice and behaviour of demonstratives in written discourse from a cognitive-pragmatic point of view, I have opted for a corpus of Modern Standard Arabic (MSA). MSA is the modernized form of Classical Arabic (the language of the Qur'an). It is the most commonly accepted variant of Arabic for native Arabic speakers as it is used in formal speaking situations, such as sermons, lectures, news broadcasts, and speeches, and in all formal writing such as official correspondence, literature and newspapers. Therefore, choosing a corpus of MSA defines the set of demonstrative forms to be searched and analysed, without the need to consider regional differences in such forms.

Generally, there are fewer Arabic corpora available for linguistic research than English. Work in Arabic corpus linguistics is still in its early stages, compared to other languages, both due to limited financial resources in Arabic-speaking countries, as well as to the linguistic challenges the Arabic language itself poses to the process of natural language processing (e.g. different script than European languages, different direction of writing, the use of diacritics, etc.). Therefore, researchers in this field still face the challenges of finding resources that are easy to use, freely-available, and able to deal successfully with the special features of the Arabic language.

The corpus I have chosen for this study is the NEMLAR (Network for Euro-Mediterranean Language Resources) Arabic Written Corpus. It is a 500,000 word corpus of written Arabic discourse that is categorised into different text domains. The texts included have a time span that ranges from the late 1990s to 2005. The texts in this corpus come in different versions: raw text, text with diacritics (fully vowelized text) and text with part-of-speech tags (POS tags). However, due to the limitations of the tools available for handling Arabic corpora, I have only been able to use the raw text version of the corpus. The fully vowelized text adds little to the study, since the demonstrative forms under investigation are not semantically affected by diacritics.

The NEMLAR corpus does not include a corpus-management tool, so I had to resort to a separate program to use in the analysis. I have used for this purpose a software called LOLO<sup>7</sup>, a tool for extracting statistical information and lexical resources from Arabic corpora. LOLO (pronounced *lu'lu'*, literally *pearl* in Arabic) is a system that can manage a corpus and extract lexical resources (semi)automatically from it, including word frequencies, concordances, collocations, and term banks.

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<sup>7</sup> I am grateful to Yousif Almas, researcher at University of Surrey and the creator of LOLO, for the technical help he offered me during my research.

Since each text unit (e.g. each article, each short story) in the corpus is saved in a separate file, using LOLO, I have merged all the files in each text category to search the demonstrative forms used in this category collectively. By default, to open a corpus file in LOLO will automatically generate a complete frequency list of all the words in the file. A further search for a particular keyword will present the results in a concordance form, and the system additionally identifies collocates for this keyword and selects significant collocates on the basis of specific statistical criteria. The screen shot figure below illustrates the concordance of the 86 occurrences of the singular feminine proximal demonstrative *haadhihi* in the text category 'Literature Essays'. On the left of the screen, a full frequency list of all the words in this sub-corpus is presented, in descending order, where 3 demonstrative forms (proximal sing. fem. *haadhihi*, distal sing. mas. *dhaalika*, proximal sing. mas. *haadhaa*) hold the 14<sup>th</sup>, 15<sup>th</sup>, and 16<sup>th</sup> ranks respectively. The concordance list of the chosen demonstrative is shown with a standard amount of preceding and following co-text. Unfortunately, during the analysis, I had to often resort to the original files to view more context surrounding the use of a particular demonstrative in a particular utterance since LOLO, unlike the ICECUP, does not provide the feature of viewing the full context.




Figure 3: Screen shot of *hadhihi* concordance in NEMLAR using LOLO

I have excluded a number of text categories from the original NEMLAR corpus for two main reasons. The first is because they were unsuitable for the research question of this study (e.g. dictionary entries explanation, phrases of common words). The second is because they did not represent a purely written discourse (eg. interviews, broadcast news)<sup>8</sup>. I have also chosen certain text categories in order to roughly correspond to the English corpus. Therefore, the Arabic corpus chosen for this study has the following size and categories:

<sup>8</sup> For reasons of technical difficulties, I have also excluded the text category Islamic Topics since their text files only existed in the format with diacritization which are not readable by the concordance software.



<b>Text Category</b>	<b>No. of words</b>
Literature Essays	21,357
Political Debate	30,000
Political News	48,000
Legal	19,939
Arabic literature (short stories/novels)	8,643
<b>Total</b>	<b>127,939</b>

Table 2: The Arabic corpus chosen for this study from NEMLAR

The scope of the Arabic corpus is extended in Chapter 6, which looks into specific forms and structures of demonstratives, in order to provide more examples for analysis. The text categories that have been added to the data used in Chapter 6 are: General News, Business News, Scientific Press, and Sports Press.

While the focus of this study is not pure quantitative analysis in terms of frequency and/or statistical information, some reference to this kind of information will be mentioned for the sake of illustration. A final note to be taken into consideration is related to the search facility and frequency information for the Arabic data. The orthographic conventions of MSA do not separate the conjunction *waa* و (*and*) from the following word/token. This means that any concordance software will find it difficult to distinguish between the character و when it appears at the beginning of a word as the first letter or when it appears at the beginning of a word as a conjunction. For example, the tokens “ولادة” (*birth*) and “وهذا” (*and this*) will each be considered a single token although the latter is actually two words. Therefore, in order to arrive at accurate frequency results, I had to manually search for demonstrative forms on their own as well as orthographically attached to the conjunction و. Frequency information about occurrences of demonstrative forms in Arabic in this study includes both orthographic types.

#### **1.4 Structure of the thesis**

The dissertation consists of seven chapters. In chapter 1, I have introduced the aims of the study and outlined the main issues and the suggested semantic analysis for demonstratives

in English and Arabic. The rest of the thesis discusses the suggested analysis in more detail and explores its implications for the data.

Chapter 2 outlines previous studies on the interpretation of demonstratives. First, it summarises the earlier accounts of demonstratives in both English and Arabic from a lexical-semantic point of view. Second, it narrows down the discussion to cognitive-pragmatic accounts of demonstratives, focusing in particular on: Gundel et al's (1993) Givenness Hierarchy, Cornish's cognitive discourse model (2001), and Diessel's (1999; 2006) typological approach. I highlight the main differences between these accounts and a relevance-based account in terms of how the path to the intended referent is constrained and of how the notion of attention is employed as a procedure rather than a state.

Chapter 3 presents the main tenets of relevance theory and its cognitive view of human communication. It explains relevance-theoretic terminology used in the analysis developed here, and outlines the view of reference in verbal communication within the general approach to utterance interpretation. This chapter also presents the distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning developed within relevance theory. I discuss the implication of this distinction on the division between explicit and implicit communication, as well as on the notion of truth conditional meaning.

Chapter 4 presents a relevance-theoretic view of the semantics and pragmatics of demonstratives in English and Arabic. I argue that the notions of distance and attention are encoded by demonstratives within a procedural instruction to guide the hearer to arrive at the intended referent. I also explain, via corpus examples, the contribution of demonstratives to both the explicit and implicit levels of communication in both languages by appealing to the internal contrast of proximity/distance. Since the concept of distance falls under the scope of the attention-directing procedural semantics, attention is not only directed to the proximal/distal intended referent, but also to the other potential referential candidates on the distance scale.

Chapter 5 presents a further test to the proposed analysis for English demonstratives by focusing on cases of self-repair which involves the definite article and the demonstratives in the spoken part of the corpus. These cases reveal semantic differences between the two referring expressions, and the pragmatic effects which result from using a demonstrative as opposed to a definite article. I start from the assumption that self-repair is motivated by the speaker thinking about the 'way' s/he wants to convey his/her message, and argue that this is related to the notion of optimal relevance. I propose that a definite article is repaired to a demonstrative when: (a) the cognitive instruction encoded in the definite article is not (seems



not) enough to individuate the intended referent, or (b) the cognitive instruction encoded in the definite article is enough to individuate the intended referent but the extra spatial and procedural information is needed for other cognitive effects. I also argue that a demonstrative is repaired to a definite article when (a) the cognitive instruction encoded in the demonstrative is not needed to individuate the intended referent, or (b) the cognitive instruction encoded in the demonstrative with the extra spatial and procedural information is not warranted by other cognitive effects. I use corpus examples to show how emotional and/or stylistic factors play a role in motivations for repair.

Chapter 6 presents a further test to the proposed analysis for Arabic demonstratives by focusing on certain forms/structures of Arabic demonstratives. I present a procedural account of the demonstrative forms *haa*, *kadhaalik* and *haakadhaa*, highlighting issues in their interpretation. I propose that *kadhaalik* and *haakadhaa* should be treated as discourse markers since corpus examples support the view that a process of grammaticalisation is involved in transforming the discourse functions of these items. The final section discusses the use of demonstratives in alternative syntactic structures (i.e. noun+dem, proper noun+dem, dem+3<sup>rd</sup> person pro+noun) and argue that a relevance-theoretic framework accounts for the interpretation of emphasis associated with these structures.

Finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary of the results achieved in this study and makes some suggestions for future work.

## Chapter 2: Previous studies

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### 2.1 Reference

This study approaches the interpretation of demonstratives in English and Arabic from the point of view that demonstratives encode basic semantics which interacts with context within a general pragmatic framework. Previous accounts of demonstratives followed various approaches. This chapter presents an overview of previous studies on demonstratives as referring expressions. In this section, I discuss the relationship between reference and language. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 explore the uses and functions of demonstratives in English and Arabic. In section 2.4, I present a brief review of three cognitive-pragmatic approaches to the study of demonstratives: Gundel et al's Givenness Hierarchy (1993), Cornish's (2001) cognitive discourse model, and Diessel's (1999; 2006) typological approach and notion of joint attention.

The study of demonstratives as one kind of referring expressions has been a topic for discussion in a variety of disciplines. The issue of reference in language, which Carlson (2004: 74) calls "the phenomenon of aboutness", has been one of the most intriguing areas of research in both philosophy and linguistics. While linguists have considered demonstratives to be "one of the great puzzles of linguistic science" (Enfield 2003: 82), philosophers have been occupied with the issue of how we use demonstratives in language to represent reality. From the philosophical point of view, the category of demonstratives is considered a set whose members share three characteristics: context sensitivity, lack of descriptive content and cognitive-situational immediacy (Yourgrau 1990). Thus, words like *I*, *now*, *this*, *here* are all particular referential devices which stand in contrast to other descriptive phrases. Besides the semantic and pragmatic challenges the category of referential expressions poses, it has also raised issues at the very centre of the traditional concerns of philosophy.

Discussions about representation of the self and representation of the actual world often feature in the work of philosophers, such as Frege (1892a; 1892b), Russell (1940; 1950) and Peirce (1940), who considered reference to be at the intersection point of these two realms. Frege's work (1892a/1980) on demonstrative reference focuses on the phenomenon of indexicality and discusses the idea that demonstratives represent the shortest distance between thought and object. In addition, his famous distinction between the sense and the

reference of a word (1892b/1980) emerged from his argument that reference cannot be treated as identical with meaning. Russell (1940), on the other hand, championed the view that demonstratives are the basic form of contact between mind and world. Peirce (1940: 108), used the terms ‘index’ and ‘indexical expression’ in a rather general sense; for anything which “focuses the attention” or “startles us” is an index. The main function of demonstratives, according to him, is to “call upon the hearer to use his powers of observation, and so establish a real connection between his mind and the object” (Peirce, 1940: 110).

The interest of such philosophers in the phenomenon of reference was part of a general focus on the logical aspect of language which dominated the first half of the twentieth century. The second wave of language philosophers, including Austin (1955/62), Strawson (1950; 1971), and Grice (1967; 1989), shifted their interest from the logical implications of expressing a certain proposition to the semantic and pragmatic processes involved in deriving both word meaning and speaker meaning. The notions of explicit and implicit meanings, inference and context were discussed more often. Later on, the advent of cognitive pragmatics, especially the relevance-theoretic approach, laid a cognitive basis for an inferential view of communication<sup>9</sup>. This chain of development in our understanding of how language works is reflected in the study of reference. From the logical to the lexical-semantic, to the pragmatic, to the cognitive, referring expressions are still one of the most challenging issues of language study.

The notion of reference might be considered the most direct linguistic reflection of the relationship between language and the world. Similarly, the phenomenon of deixis could be considered the most direct linguistic reflection of the relationship between language and context. Woodworth (1991: 285) suggests that “since the interpretation of deictics is based on perceptual, cultural, and contextual information, they are at the heart of the interface between language and reality”. Linguistic approaches to the study of demonstratives have focused on the idea of demonstratives as referring expressions, essentially by virtue of being deictic expressions. Deixis, a term which is derived from the Greek word *δείξις* meaning pointing, is simply the use of certain linguistic expressions to locate entities in spatio-temporal, social and discursal context. Briefly, “deixis is the domain *par excellence* where language and reality meet” (Weissenborn and Klein 1982: 3). Similarly, Levinson (1983: 54) states that “deixis concerns the ways in which languages encode or gramaticalize features of the context of

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<sup>9</sup> For a brief overview of the development of pragmatics see Carston’s Introduction (2002: 1-14); and for a more detailed discussion of the development of pragmatics within the philosophy of language see Recanati (1994, 1998).

utterance”. This definition of deixis highlights the context-dependent aspect that plays a crucial role in the interpretation of such expressions. Context dependency is a feature that is shared by all referring expressions, including demonstratives. In semantic terms, this is characterised by describing such expressions as having a “variable reference” (Larson and Segal 1995: 199). According to them, “the presence of variable-reference terms shows that we cannot assign values to expressions simpliciter; rather we must assign them *with respect to a context of use or a context of utterance.*” (emphasis in the original)<sup>10</sup>. The notion of context-dependent expressions is so pervasive in natural languages, since no language lacks some form of context-dependent items such as personal pronouns or demonstratives.

Traditionally, linguists have tended to establish categories of deictics according to their function and the contextual parameter they define with little attention to their own semantic contribution. According to Fillmore (1997: 61), “deixis is the name given to those formal properties of utterances which are determined by, and which are interpreted by knowing, certain aspects of the communication act in which the utterances in question can play a role”. He identifies five kinds of deixis: person deixis, place deixis, time deixis, discourse deixis and social deixis. It should be noted, however, that these categories have been identified mostly in relation to Indo-European languages and to English in particular. In Arabic grammar (Ibn Al-Hajib 1980; Al-Nadry 1989; Al-ğalayinii 1993; Hassan 1994), similar categories exist and the role of context is identified as essential. Hassan (1995: 338) notes in his chapter on demonstratives that Arabic grammarians call demonstratives “ambiguous”<sup>11</sup> because they can refer to anything but do not have an independent meaning in themselves. According to him, this ambiguity is resolved only if a demonstrative is accompanied by a physical pointing gesture, or by referring to the context. Marmaridou (2000: 74), echoes this by saying that “deixis involves the identification of an entity or its spatiotemporal location by direct reference to context, participant roles and through gestural or symbolic ostension.”

Traditional approaches to the study of deictic expressions were more concerned with setting up categories for their functions than with explaining their semantic and pragmatic features that affect the utterances in which they occur. However, more recent approaches have focused more closely on the cognitive processing of deictic expressions in discourse. A number of scholars have noted that deictic expressions, in actual usage, are not always used to identify elements in the immediate speech situation, and the study of deictics started to use

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<sup>10</sup> See also Nunberg (1993).

<sup>11</sup> Semantically, this is the wrong word to use, but it shows that the traditional approach to such deictic expressions paid little attention to their semantic characteristics.

such notions as mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985), cognitive models (Lakoff 1987) and accessibility (Ariel 1990). The latter, for example, claims that it is the overall cognitive accessibility of referents rather than their physical salience that determines how they are referred to. Similarly, Gundel et al. (1993) based their proposal on referring expressions on the notion of the cognitive status of the referent.

The move to the cognitive-pragmatic approach is typically reflected in the study of demonstratives<sup>12</sup>. Enfield (2003), for example, studied the use of demonstratives in Lao and concluded that they do not encode the traditional meaning of distance; instead they rely on pragmatic inference for associations of being proximal or distal. He also argues that factors such as physical barriers, attentional focus, and the addressee's presumed access to information are what affect the choice by Lao speakers of one demonstrative rather than the other. In his corpus-based study, Oh (2001) challenges traditional claims regarding the deictic function of the demonstratives, and argues that the most critical factor in determining the speaker's choice of a demonstrative is focus in the sense of calling the addressee's attention to something for a particular purpose. Cornish (2001) highlights the primacy of the cognitive-interactive dimension in the interpretation of demonstratives.

The following sections introduce the basic uses and functions of demonstratives in English and Arabic. Then I return to the cognitive approaches to the study of demonstratives, highlighting their advantages and disadvantages, and how they bear on the proposal presented in this study.

## **2.2 Demonstratives in English**

As previously mentioned, demonstratives have been primarily studied as deictic expressions, i.e. expressions that evoke the speech-act situation. However, the notion of the speech-act situation is not exclusive to demonstratives. Its scope can also be expanded to include other referring expressions such as the definite and indefinite articles. Croft & Cruse (2004: 11), for example, say that "the meanings of *the* and *a* evoke the speech act situation because they make reference to the mental states of speaker and hearer". Therefore, the basic view is that deixis links referring expressions to the "spatio-temporal co-ordinates of the act

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<sup>12</sup> For a recent discussion of referring expressions from a relevance-theoretic point of view see Powell (2010).

of utterance” as Lyons (1977: 637) puts it. Deixis, in this sense, includes spatial deixis (*this, that, here, there*), temporal deixis (tenses, *now, tomorrow*) and person deixis (personal pronouns, person inflections)<sup>13</sup>. Lyons (1977, 1991) also suggests that the definite article and third-person pronouns should be considered as having a deictic function because (a) they are historically derived from the two proximal/distal deictic sets which in early English were marked for gender and could be used either pronominally or adjectivally, and (b) they invite the addressee to look into the context and identify the referent just like demonstratives. Another category of deixis is known as discourse deixis (Webber 1991; Levinson 2004), where reference is made by accessing a whole part of discourse or a discourse segment. Levinson (2004: 119) also mentions a category of social deixis, which “involves the marking of social relations in linguistic expressions”, including expressions such as titles and forms of address. An essential feature of all categories of deixis seems to be their egocentricity; i.e. deixis is organised relative to specific parameters of the communicative event that places the speaker as the centre of deixis. This study is concerned with the spatial demonstratives in English (*this, that, these, those*) which characterise their referents within the realm of distance as either proximal or distal.

The demonstrative system in English is considered a simple one, compared to Arabic and other languages. Kemmerer (1999: 47) points out that all languages have spatial demonstratives but that “there is a variation in the number of distinctions that languages make with respect to the degree of remoteness of entities from the deictic center”. He adds that some languages have far more complex demonstrative systems because they make more fine-tuned spatial distinctions with respect to the domains of geography (north coast/south coast, upriver/downriver), movement (toward the speaker/away from the speaker) or elevation (up/down). However, the demonstrative system in English is not only defined by its semantic distinctions. Halliday and Hasan (1976: 60) depict three systematic distinctions in English demonstratives: (a) semantic, i.e. between proximal and distal; (b) grammatical, i.e. between singular and plural; and (c) syntactic, i.e. between modifier (demonstrative determiner) and head (demonstrative pronoun).

Literature on the uses and functions of demonstratives has provided generous descriptive analyses for demonstratives in English. The most common classifications are those of Halliday and Hasan (1976), Himmelmann (1996), Lakoff (1974), Fillmore (1982),

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<sup>13</sup> Halliday and Hasan (1976: 37) follow a different, and broader, categorisation for referring expressions in English. According to them, there are 3 types of reference: personal (including personal and possessive pronouns); demonstrative (including demonstratives, locatives and the definite article); and comparative (including some comparative adjectives, quantifiers and adjuncts e.g. *same, else, more, so, such*, etc).

Levinson (1983), among others. Disregarding the different theoretical approaches and terminologies, these classifications share the basic distinction between exophoric (or situational) and non-exophoric (non-situational). That is, using a demonstrative to point to an entity in the physical environment as opposed to using a demonstrative to refer to anything else (in the preceding or following discourse). Himmelmann (1996: 205) acknowledges that the standard view in many reference grammars of English is that the basic and straightforward function of demonstratives is to point to visible entities in the physical surroundings of the interlocutors, then a derived function is to refer anaphorically to a previously introduced referent in discourse. However, in his corpus-based study of demonstratives in narrative discourse from 5 unrelated languages, he states that his aim is to focus on “the universal aspect” of the study of demonstratives; i.e. the uses of demonstratives which can be assumed to be universally attested in natural languages. He distinguishes four major categories of use: situational, discourse deictic, tracking (anaphoric) and recognitional. The examples below illustrate the four uses respectively:

(1) Is *this* my book? (accompanied by a pointing gesture)

[situational]

(2) The country is in recession. *That* has been expected for months.

[discourse deictic]

(3) A pregnant woman has to undergo several checks. *These checks* are called antenatal.

[tracking]

(4) Do you still have *that radio* that your uncle gave you last year?

[recognitional]

While the referent in (1) is available in the physical context, the referents in (2)-(4) are not and the demonstrative is used in these utterances to call upon the mental representation of the referent in the mind of the hearer. However, the way the referent in (4) is assigned is different than that in (2) and (3) due to the lack of any textual representation of the referent in previous discourse. Therefore, any theoretical account of the interpretation of demonstratives will have to be both precise enough and broad enough to accommodate all types of cognitive activities involved in the processing of discourse referents.

Referring via demonstratives is also more complicated on another level. Compared to other referring expressions, especially the definite article and personal pronouns, there are two distinctive features of demonstratives: (a) the involvement of a deictic centre (the

speaker), and (b) the resulting effect of assuming a certain attitude to the referent regardless of physical proximity or distance. The use of the distal demonstrative in (2), for example, may be said to convey a detached attitude to the referent (i.e. the fact that the country is in recession) that does not obtain with other referring expressions. Compare (2 a-c) below:

- (2) a. The country is in recession. **That** has been expected for months.
- b. The country is in recession. **This** has been expected for months.
- c. The country is in recession. **It** has been expected for months.

Similarly, the use of the definite article in (4) instead of the demonstrative would lead to the same referent but without the sense of cognitive remoteness the speaker conveys by using a demonstrative. Compare (4a) and (4b):

- (4) a. Do you still have **that radio** that your uncle gave you last year?
- b. Do you still have **the radio** that your uncle gave you last year?

Lakoff (1974) also discussed some uses of demonstratives under the label ‘emotional deixis’ which she considered problematic cases. Examples (5)-(8) below illustrate some of them:

- (5) He kissed her with **this unbelievable passion**. (1974: 347)
- (6) ‘Don’t lie to me,’ said Dick. **This** was a man who had twice been convicted of perjury. (1974: 348)
- (7) **That left front tire** is pretty worn. (1974: 351)
- (8) **That Henry Kissinger** sure knows his way around Hollywood. (1974: 352)

She explains the emotional aspect in terms of *this* reflecting more vividness and *that* reflecting solidarity. The descriptive approach to demonstratives would add little to explain the differences between (2a)-(2c) and (4a)-(4b) or to explain how (5)-(8) are interpreted. Lakoff herself considers these cases are “curious semantically” (1974: 251). These examples show that demonstratives are not only used to refer to physical, textual, or mental entities, but that they are also used to convey certain pragmatic attitudes in discourse. As I discuss in Chapter 4, the first step to explain how demonstratives are interpreted, both in their basic role to refer to a particular entity or in their extended role to convey particular attitudes, lies in



specifying their semantic content. Crucial in their semantics, as far as English and Arabic demonstratives are concerned, is the notion of distance and how it is employed in the interpretation process, physically and metaphorically. Halliday and Hasan (1976: 58), for example, who focus more on endophoric reference because it is textually cohesive, state that proximal demonstratives in English imply proximity to the speaker, while distal demonstratives imply distance from the speaker, which may or may not be proximal to the hearer. But they further explain that the meaning of *that* or *those* is “near you, or not near either of us, but at any rate not near me” (1976: 59). The intricacy of this interpretation of distance, especially in endophoric uses typical of written discourse, needs to be accounted for on both the semantic and pragmatic levels. I argue that this can be accounted for by adopting a unified semantics for demonstratives within a relevance-based pragmatic theory. I return to these examples later in my discussion of other cognitive accounts of demonstratives.

### 2.3 Demonstratives in Arabic

The structure of the vast majority of Arabic words depends on a system of sets of morphological consonantal templates onto which semantically abstract root meaning is imposed. The resulting combinations thereby acquire lexical value. Therefore, from the basic three-letter template in (9) which means ‘to write’, we can derive other related lexical items by manipulating long and short vowels:

(9) *kataba* كَتَبَ → *kaatib* (writer), *kitaab* (book), *maktab* (office/desk), *maktabah* (library)

However, as is the case in many languages, some of the basic functional elements of the Arabic language are expressed through closed sets of entities outside the main derivational system. Such entities essentially include personal pronouns, interrogatives, and deictics.

The earliest discussions of Arabic demonstratives are in classical grammar books. The treatments of Arabic demonstratives in those books have, at best, listed a number of uses and functions for those expressions accompanied by typical examples from classical poetry or the Qur'an. Few details are given on the semantics or pragmatics of demonstratives. The semantics and pragmatics of Arabic demonstratives is a largely under-explored area of study.

Nevertheless, modern reference grammar books, including those intended for non-native speakers, try to highlight some of the pragmatic functions of demonstratives, sometimes in light of comparisons with English.

Literally, demonstratives in Arabic are called '*asma:’ al-’isha:rah* (i.e. names of pointing/indication). Hassan (1995: 238) defines their main function as “كل مشار إليه له اسم إشارة” (“every referent has a demonstrative that suits it and every demonstrative refers exclusively to one specific referent”<sup>14</sup>). Demonstrative forms in MSA are standardised, although there are various forms in different regional varieties of Arabic (see section 6.1.1 for more details). Unlike English, demonstratives in Arabic, both proximal and distal, are marked for number, gender and case (in the case of the dual only), creating sets of demonstrative forms, as the table below shows. Demonstrative forms in MSA are historically preceded by those in Classical Arabic. Classical Arabic has a range of simple and complex forms of demonstratives, but the forms that have survived in MSA are both fewer in number and more defined. This agrees with Frei’s (1944) theory about the relation between the size and content of demonstrative systems and the cultural complexity of a language. According to him, “languages tend to reduce the size of their deictic systems rather than to expand them as they increase in cultural complexity” (quoted in Woodworth 1991: 275). The following table illustrates demonstrative forms in MSA:

		Proximal		Distal	
		mas.	fem.	mas.	fem.
Singular		haadhaa هذا	haadhihi هذه	dhaalika ذلك	tilka تلك
Dual	Nominative	haadhaan هذان	haataan هاتان	dhaanak ذانك	taanak تانك
	Genitive/accusative	haadhain هذين	haatain هاتين	dhiinak ذينك	tinak تينك
Plural		haa’ ulaa’ هؤلاء		’ ulaa’ ika أولئك	

Table 3: Demonstrative forms in MSA

<sup>14</sup> Unless otherwise stated, all translations of Arabic quotations are mine.

From the historical point of view, one common feature between English and Arabic demonstratives has to do with the etymology of the grammatical class of definite determiners. Himmelmann (1996: 206) expresses the dominant view within English grammar that “definite articles as well as 3<sup>rd</sup> person pronouns historically derive (are grammaticized) from demonstratives”. In Arabic too there are links between the three referring forms. As the table above shows, demonstratives in MSA are morphologically made up of the simple demonstrative *dhaa*<sup>15</sup>, which is complemented with other morphemes to form the compound proximal and distal forms. The distal demonstrative forms, excluding the dual, typically include *laam* ‘*al-bu’d* (the /*la*/ morpheme for distance) and *kaaf* ‘*al-ḥitaab* (the /*ka*/ morpheme for addressing) as in the forms *dhaalika* and *tilka* (Al-Nadry 1989: 162). The proximal demonstrative forms are prefixed with the morpheme /*ha*/, which is described as attentional *haa*<sup>16</sup>, as in the forms *haadhaa* and *haadhihi*. Buckeley (2004: 259) states that *haa* also occurs independently as a demonstrative adverb, in which case it acts as a time deictic that is used as a means for emphasis. With this function, *haa* typically introduces a verbal sentence and it emphasises the time when something occurs. Therefore, tracing their roots in Classical Arabic, *dhaa*, *haa* and *laa* are considered among the demonstrative bases in Arabic (cf. Fleisch 1970, Wright 1859). The *laa* morpheme for distance links demonstratives to the definite article. The definite article in Arabic is the prefix article ‘*al-*’ which is called in Arabic ‘*adaat* ‘*al-taʿriif* (“instrument of definition”). According to Wright (1859: 269), it “is composed of the demonstrative letter ʔ [*laam*] and the prosthetic ʔ which is prefixed only to lighten the pronunciation”. The same demonstrative letter *laa* is the one that appears in the distal demonstrative forms *dhaalika* and *tilka*. Therefore, Wright establishes the link between the two by saying that “though it has become determinative, it was originally demonstrative”. Similarly, the *haa* morpheme for attention links demonstratives to independent third person pronouns in Arabic which include *huwa* هو (mas), *hiya* هي (fem) and *hum* هم (plural).

Another similarity between Arabic and English demonstratives is that demonstrative forms in both languages can be used both adnominally and pronominally without morphological changes. Most Arabic grammar books classify demonstratives into two main categories (e.g. Hassan 1995; Babty 1992). The first takes into consideration the referent in

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<sup>15</sup> This deictic (including its feminine and dual forms) can be used on its own as a demonstrative. This clearly appears when a personal pronoun is used to separate attentional *haa* from the demonstrative as in: *haa huwa dhaa* and *ha hiya dhi*. In this case, the personal pronoun and the demonstrative agree in gender (Al-Nadry 1989, Hassan 1995, Buckeley 2004) I discuss this kind of structure in more detail in section 6.2.1.

<sup>16</sup> I discuss the semantics and pragmatics of attentional *haa* in detail in section 6.2.1.

terms of number (singular, dual, plural) and gender (masculine, feminine, and inanimate). The second category takes into consideration the referent in terms of distance, i.e. proximal, medial<sup>17</sup> or distal. Hassan (1995: 322) comments that the estimation of distance is left for the speaker to decide according to the norm and his relationship with the addressee. These two categories are not mutually exclusive, but it is a tradition to follow such a classification to clarify the correct usage of each demonstrative form. Hassan (1995: 236) explains that,

عند اختيار اسم من أسماء الإشارة لا بد أن نعرف أولاً حالة المشار إليه من ناحية: (إفراده، أو تثنيته، أو جمعه) و (تذكيره، أو تأنيثه) (عقله، وعدم عقله) ثم نعرف ثانياً حالته من ناحية: (قربه، أو توسطه، أو بعده) [“Upon choosing a demonstrative we must know first the state of the referent in terms of being singular, dual or plural, masculine or feminine, animate or inanimate, then we know secondly its state in terms of being near, medial or far”]

As an attributive determiner, the demonstrative normally precedes its noun, which is made grammatically definite by prefixing the definite article as in (10). As a pronoun, the deictic demonstrative in (11) would typically be associated with a pointing gesture. The demonstratives in (12) and (13) are anaphoric (referring to a preceding nominal entity) and discourse deictic (referring to a preceding non-nominal entity) respectively. But, unlike English, an Arabic demonstrative may also follow the head noun in case the noun is otherwise defined, i.e. when the head noun is defined by a genitive noun in an *'idaafah* (genitive) construction<sup>18</sup> as in (14), or when the head noun is naturally defined by being a proper noun as in (15). The demonstrative may also follow the head noun for emphasis as in (16).

(10) **هذا الكتاب جيد.** [demonstrative determiner]  
 hadhaa 'al-kitaab jayyid  
 this(mas) the-book good  
**This book** is good.

(11) **هذا كتاب جيد** [demonstrative pronoun]  
 hadhaa kitaab jayyid  
 this(mas) book good

<sup>17</sup> The demonstrative *dhaaka*, for example, is used to refer to medial distance. But this form is rarely used in MSA, therefore, it has been excluded from this study.

<sup>18</sup> An *'idaafah* construction is commonly referred to in English as a “genitive phrase”. It is a structure that relates one noun to another, giving a meaning that typically corresponds to English ‘of’ phrases (e.g. *The Queen of England* ملكة إنجلترا) or to the possessive suffix -‘s (e.g. *the boy’s book* كتاب الولد). In this construction, the first noun is made definite by being ‘added’ to the other noun, while the second noun has to be prefixed by the definite prefix *'al* (unless it is a proper noun).

**This** is a good book.

(12)	ظهر كتاب جديد في الأسواق. <b>هذا</b> الكتاب يناقش الكساد العالمي				[anaphoric]		
	dhahar	kitaab	jadiid	fii	'al-'aswaaq	hadhaa	'al-
	appear-it(past)	book	new	in	the-markets	this(mas)	the-
	kitaab	yunaaqiš	'al-kasaad	'al-3aalamii			
	book	discuss-it(pres)	the-recession	the-global			

A new book appeared on the market. **This book** discusses global recession.

(13)	الكتاب يناقش الكساد العالمي <b>وهذا</b> يعني أنه ممل				[discourse deictic]
	'al-kitaab	yunaaqiš	'al-kasaad	'al-3aalamii	wa
	book	discuss-it(pres)	the-recession	the-global	and
	hadhaa	ya3nii	'annahu	mumill	
	this(mas)	mean-it(pres)	that-it	boring	

The book discusses global recession and **this** means it is boring.

(14)	هل قرأت كتاب الاقتصاد <b>هذا</b> ؟				[noun + demonstrative]
	hal	qara't	kitaab	al-'iqtišaad	hadhaa?
	did	read-you(past)	book	the-economics	this(mas)
	Did you read <b>this</b> economics book?				

(15)	الغريب أن أحمد <b>هذا</b> لا يحب القراءة.				[proper noun + demonstrative]
	'al-ġariib	'anna	Ahmad	hadhaa	laa yuhibbu
	the-strange	that	Ahmad	this(mas)	not like-he(pres)
	'al-qiraa'ah				
	the-reading				

The strange thing is that **this Ahmad** does not like reading.

(16)	الأيام <b>هذه</b> صعبة.		[noun + demonstrative for emphasis]
	'al-'ayyaam	hadhihi	sa3bah
	The-days	this(fem)	difficult
	<b>These days</b> are difficult.		

These examples show similar descriptive categories for demonstratives to the ones in English. For example, Mejdell (2006: 178) notes that, in addition to the basic deictic and

anaphoric uses, Arabic demonstratives are also used to refer to the idea (question, proposition or event) which has been posed in preceding context, i.e. they are said to be discourse deictic as in (13) (cf. Webber 1991). Similarly, in English, where the term 'emotional deixis' has been used (cf. Lakoff 1974; Lyons 1977; Cornish 2001); the same thing has been noted for Arabic. Cantarino (1974-75) comments on the use of the demonstratives saying that they seem to be "frequently used with psychological approach rather than merely with a local meaning [...] *hādā* is used for things that are considered more important or more closely related to the person speaking, while *dālika* and *dāka* express a more remote attitude" (II: 30). This also depends on the notion of distance, and its metaphorical extension in cognitive terms. However, any theoretical account that attempts to account for the interpretation of demonstratives in such examples will have to explain not only how the process of reference assignment unfolds, but also how the use of demonstratives is semantically and pragmatically different from other referring forms. It needs to explain, for example, the difference between the (a) and (b) versions in the examples below:

- (12) a. ظهر كتاب جديد في الأسواق. **هذا** الكتاب يناقش الكساد العالمي.  
A new book appeared on the market. **This book** discusses global recession.
- (12) b. ظهر كتاب جديد في الأسواق. **الكتاب** يناقش الكساد العالمي.  
A new book appeared on the market. **The book** discusses global recession.
- (13) a. الكتاب يناقش الكساد العالمي **وهذا** يعني أنه ممل.  
The book discusses global recession and **this** means it is boring.
- (13) b. الكتاب يناقش الكساد العالمي **وتلك** يعني أنه ممل.  
The book discusses global recession and **that** means it is boring.
- (15) a. الغريب أن **أحمد هذا** لا يحب القراءة.  
The strange thing is that **this Ahmad** does not like reading.
- (15) b. الغريب أن **أحمد** لا يحب القراءة.  
The strange thing is that **Ahmad** does not like reading.

The interpretation of demonstratives in both English and Arabic does not only rest on the notion of distance. Demonstratives as referring expressions are essentially used to refer to a specific entity. Beyond the mere descriptive accounts, the cognitive approaches have looked into the nature of the referring act, and notions such as accessibility, focus and attention were seen as intrinsic to the semantic makeup of demonstratives in many languages. In the next sections, I discuss several of those approaches.

## 2.4 Cognitive approaches

In this section I discuss several cognitive-based accounts of the interpretation of demonstratives. First, Gundel et al's Givenness Hierarchy (1993; 2001; etc) rests on the notion of the cognitive status of the referent as a condition for using a referring expression. Cornish (2001) is also concerned with the cognitive constraints signalled by demonstratives, but he gives primacy to the cognitive-interactive dimension. Finally, Diessel's (1999, 2006) account relies on both typological and evolutionary evidence to define the main contribution of a demonstrative in an utterance which he describes in terms of joint attention. The brief overview presented here aims only to highlight the basics of those accounts and compare them to my own proposal for the analysis of English and Arabic demonstratives. With the exception of Cornish, who only deals with English demonstratives, the other accounts claim to be applicable to many languages.

In the study of referring expressions, the basic assumption is that speakers and hearers make continuous assessments about each other's state of knowledge vis a vis referents in discourse. In the process of communication, Huang (2000: 166) explains, "the speaker, in deciding on a particular referring form, has to ensure that it is the one that can serve for the hearer to identify the intended referent". Various theoretical approaches attempt to explain just how speakers do that by appealing to semantic, pragmatic, or cognitive factors. The starting point for any theoretical framework is:

In order to communicate successfully and enable the hearer to re-identify the object he is referring to, the speaker must express a concept – a linguistic mode of presentation – which (i) fits the object he wants to talk about, and (ii) corresponds to some information the hearer has in his dossier for that object. (Recanati 1993: 185)

The information a speaker has available about an object can come from different sources. The literature is full of terms that have attempted to describe how information is introduced (verbally and non-verbally), processed and stored in the mind to be used in the process of interpretation. While Recanati used the term 'dossier', Chafe (1976) talked about 'information packaging'; Prince (1981) distinguishes 'Given-New' information; Heim (1982) uses 'file-card'; Sanford and Garrod (1981) regard the domain of reference as a 'scenario'; Lambrecht (1994) sees that 'information structure' is a component of grammar that is

constructed in accordance with the mental states of interlocutors; and Ariel (1990) considers that referring expressions encode information about the ‘accessibility’ level of their referents.

It is intuitive to perceive a relationship between the notion of reference and human cognition. Gundel and Hedberg (2008: 4) explain why this is the case:

[Reference] comprises the ability to think of and represent objects (both real and imagined/fictional), to indicate to others which of these objects we are talking about, and to determine what others are talking about when they use a (pro)nominal expression.

A lot of cognitive work is involved in the processes of producing and understanding reference. The study of the interpretation of referring expressions from a cognitive-psychological perspective has been largely concerned with the idea of ‘attention’, i.e. the level of attention a referent has, with respect to both the hearer and the discourse. This notion of attention has also been associated with other cognitive notions such as accessibility, salience, givenness, consciousness, and focus. The common feature between them is gradability, i.e. the idea that attention is a matter of degree. A number of studies have attempted to outline associations between hierarchies of attention/accessibility/focus and the lexical forms which signal them. Setting up such hierarchies limits the amount of information that must be considered in identifying the intended referent; i.e. setting constraints on the processing procedure. The question remains how much of these constraints is linguistically encoded by the referring form? By answering this question we can understand why speakers choose a particular referring form to indicate to others what they are referring to, how hearers process this form, and how several referring forms can ‘fit’ the object we are talking about in different ways.

#### **2.4.1 The Givenness Hierarchy**

One of the comprehensive accounts proposed to deal with referring expressions is that of Gundel et al (1993; 1996; 2003 inter alia). Throughout their work, the authors try to answer two questions: (1) what do speakers know that enables them to choose an appropriate form to refer to a particular object; and (2) what do hearers know that enables them to correctly identify the intended referent of a particular form. Their main proposal is that the



interpretation of referring expressions in language<sup>19</sup> is directly linked to a set of implicationally related cognitive statuses, arranged along a Givenness Hierarchy (GH), which represent the conventional meanings signalled by those forms. A cognitive status, according to them, represents "information about location in memory and attention state" (1993: 274), and so has the function of restricting the set of possible referents. Moreover, the cognitive statuses are "necessary for explaining the relation between referring forms and conditions for their appropriate use and interpretation" (1993: 275). The cognitive statuses on this hierarchy are implicationally related so that the most restrictive 'in focus' entails all the lower statuses.




Figure 4: The Givenness Hierarchy according to Gundel et al. (1993)

The different referring expressions on this scale have these cognitive statuses as part of their conventional meanings. And because these cognitive statuses set conditions or restrictions on use, it follows that using a particular form guides the hearer in restricting possible referents. For example, the indefinite article restricts the set of possible referents to those which can only be identified as type, while the use of indefinite *this*, typical in colloquial English, signals that the speaker intends to refer to a particular entity, which the hearer has to retrieve or construct a new representation for. The cognitive status 'uniquely identifiable', which is encoded by the definite article, requires of the hearer to associate a unique representation of

<sup>19</sup> In Gundel et al. (1993), the authors report results from applying the Givenness Hierarchy on data from 5 languages: English, Japanese, Mandarin, Russian and Spanish. To the best of my knowledge, the only study that has applied the Givenness Hierarchy to Arabic demonstratives is the work of Amel Khalfaoui on Tunisian Arabic (2006, 2009). In these studies, the author finds correlations between Tunisian demonstratives and the cognitive statuses *familiar* and *activated*, and investigates some factors that affect the distribution and interpretation of these demonstrative forms such as avoiding ambiguity and previous familiarity with the referent.

the referent, based on either an already existing mental representation or a new one being constructed.

The cognitive statuses assigned for the (definite) demonstratives are ‘familiar’ and ‘activated’. The former signals that the addressee is able to uniquely identify the intended referent because s/he already has a representation of it in (short or long-term) memory; while the latter signals that the referent is represented in current short-term memory. In later studies, Gundel tries to reconcile her model of cognitive statuses with the idea that such referring expressions may be said to encode something other than concepts<sup>20</sup>. Although Gundel et al. argued that "these statuses are the conventional meanings signalled by determiners and pronouns" (1993: 274), Gundel (2003) suggests that these cognitive statuses "can be thought of procedurally as processing instructions". The instructions she proposes for demonstratives are along the lines of ‘associate a representation from working/short-term/long-term memory’.

There are some general issues which can be raised about the GH. First, it is noted that no explanation is given for the implication of assigning different cognitive statuses to the demonstrative *that*, where the difference appears to reside in the presence/absence of the descriptive content encoded by the head noun. This is difficult to reconcile with the fact that it is the referring form alone that is understood to signal/encode the relevant cognitive status. Compare, for example, (17a) and (17b) as uttered by a man to his wife trying out dresses:

(17) a. *That dress* I like.

(17) b. *That* I like.

Surely, the cognitive status of the referent *dress*, which is physically salient in the context of utterance, cannot change from being just Familiar to being Activated due to the presence of the descriptive content encoded in *dress*. Amfo & Fretheim (2005b)<sup>21</sup> note this and argue against the multiple cognitive statuses for the demonstrative *that*. They perceive it as a consequence of the absence of content words rather than an inherent semantic difference. They argue that "the procedural meaning of the distal demonstrative is the same regardless of whether the form functions as pronoun or determiner" (2005b: 50). But what is the procedural meaning encoded by the distal demonstrative? If the procedural meaning is perceived in

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<sup>20</sup> See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the conceptual-procedural distinction within relevance theory.

<sup>21</sup> See also Amfo & Fretheim (2005a) for a critical assessment of the implicatures claimed to be generated by the Givenness Hierarchy.

terms of processing instructions as to where to go in memory to search for the intended referent, as Gundel (2003) argues, then this is another issue.

The processing instructions proposed for demonstratives, which mainly depend on specifying the location of the intended referent in memory, place a huge cognitive load on the speaker and his/her assumptions about the addressee's mental representations. Note that procedural or computational processes are difficult to spell out by nature<sup>22</sup>. Note also that the actual structure of the human memory and the mapping of mental representations onto its different types is a matter of discussion rather than a matter of fact. The distinction between short-term memory and working memory is one example which is not made clearer by an example such as (17). Therefore, it could also be argued that the boundaries between the cognitive statuses will always be fuzzy. The attempt to set up a one-to-one relationship between discrete grammatical forms of referring expressions and non-discrete cognitive levels of attention is useful on the descriptive level, but it does not go far enough. Gundel et al.'s dependence on Gricean implicatures to explain some interpretations also lacks explanatory power since no clear indication is given as to when it is justified for a hearer to draw an implicature and when it is not.

Apart from these general issues, a question remains: are the cognitive statuses sufficient and necessary to account for the interpretation of demonstratives (and referring expressions in general)? Scott (2008; 2010) discussed the GH in detail and argued why the answer to this question should be negative. In brief, accessibility or givenness accounts<sup>23</sup> are not necessary in the presence of a procedural semantics which interacts with relevance-based pragmatics to guarantee both the arrival at the intended referent and the overall intended interpretation. Similarly, these accounts are not sufficient because in some cases they cannot explain the differences between using different referring forms where the difference lies on the implicit side in the form of different inferences and cognitive effects. To illustrate, compare (2a) and (2b), repeated below, and (3a) and (3b):

(2) a. The country is in recession. *That* has been expected for months.

b. The country is in recession. *This* has been expected for months.

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<sup>22</sup> I discuss procedural meaning in detail in section 3.2.

<sup>23</sup> The same argument can be extended to Ariel's (1988; 1990; 2001) proposal of an Accessibility Theory for referring expressions. She too argues that her theory "offers a procedural analysis of referring expressions, as marking variable degrees of mental accessibility" (2001: 29). But, a relevance-based procedural account can account for the process of reference assignment not by "eliminating wrong choices of competitors" as Ariel claims (1990: 85), but by maintaining the idea that procedures place processing constraints which, because they are optimally relevant, lead to the intended referent. For reasons of space, I do not discuss Ariel's theory in detail here. For further discussion see Scott (2008; 2010) and Reboul (1997).

- (3) a. A pregnant woman has to undergo several checks. *These checks* are called antenatal.  
b. A pregnant woman has to undergo several checks. *The checks* are called antenatal.

The referents in (2a) and (2b), i.e. the fact that the country is in recession, have the same cognitive status Activated. The determiners in (3a) and (3b) are different in that one requires the referent to be at least Activated, while the other requires the referent to be at least Uniquely Identifiable. The cognitive statuses are said to constrain the search for referents so that the intended one is the only remaining one. But, depending on cognitive statuses alone does not guarantee that *the checks* in (3b) is to be interpreted co-referentially with *checks*. Neither does it explain the differences in interpretation between the proximal and distal forms in (2a) and (2b) which refer to the same referent with the same cognitive status. A pragmatic theory is needed. Such a pragmatic theory should guarantee that (a) the intended referent is picked out without any unnecessary mental effort on part of the hearer; and (b) that the overall interpretation is meaningful. Gundel (1996; 2003) and Gundel & Mulkern (1997) acknowledge the need for relevance theory as a pragmatic framework. But Scott (2008; 2010) has argued that cognitive statuses are dispensable in the presence of a procedural semantics which works within a relevance-based framework. By invoking considerations of optimal relevance<sup>24</sup> “then the motivation for the additional theoretical machinery introduced by the alternative accounts is removed, and a simpler and more comprehensive analysis emerges” (Scott 2008: 276).

Therefore, I follow Scott (2008; 2010) in that a relevance-based account of demonstratives differs from the GH and other accessibility-based accounts in two main respects. First, a relevance-based account depends on procedural semantics which interacts with context to direct the hearer to the intended referent and the intended overall interpretation. Such procedural semantics is not analysable in terms of accessibility levels or cognitive statuses of the intended referent. Second, a relevance-based account explains how the choice of a demonstrative can contribute to the proposition expressed as well as to the implicit content of the utterance (i.e. in the form of extra cognitive effects). One main difference between my proposal and that of the GH lies in the characterisation of the procedural semantics encoded by demonstratives. For the GH, demonstratives encode degrees of attentional states. I propose to dispense with the notion of attention as a state in favour of

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<sup>24</sup> I discuss the notion of optimal relevance, and other relevance-theoretic terminology, in Chapter 3.

employing it as a procedure, which interacts with other conceptual and contextual information within a relevance-based framework to give rise to the various interpretations. My proposal follows Scott (2010) in that it is based on a minimal procedural semantics that depends on the traditional spatial distinction. For Scott (2010: 158), “this procedural information relates to the proximity/distance of the intended N to a deictic centre, as compared to competing instances of Ns”. In Chapter 4, I show how the notion of attention encoded as a procedure justifies the internal contrast between proximal/distal and competing referential candidates. I also argue that such a semantic characterisation sets demonstratives apart from other referring expressions and explains their pragmatic effects. My proposal also allows for a unified treatment for demonstratives in English and Arabic in a way that accounts for the range of uses of demonstratives in both languages.

#### **2.4.2 Demonstratives and interaction**

The traditional distinction between proximal and distal demonstratives in terms of spatial distance does not mean the exclusion of other dimensions for distance: temporal, social, emotional, cognitive, etc. The idea behind these distinctions is to contrast the representation of the intended referents on some level. Cornish (1999) discusses anaphora and deixis, from a cognitive-psychological perspective, as two complementary discourse procedures which facilitate the linking of representations in the speaker's and addressee's discourse models. In other words, they are "discourse model management procedures" (1999: 5) whose function is to make communication between speaker and addressee successful by aligning their discourse models and the referents mentioned therein. Drawing on his own extensive work on a variety of corpora of different genres in French and English, Cornish is keen on investigating the role of indexical expressions in discourse as a mental model that continuously unfolds and undergoes several cognitive changes. For him, "indexical expressions, whether used deictically or anaphorically, constitute specific tacit instructions to operate upon the mental discourse model which the addressee is constructing in collaboration with the speaker." (1999: 5). This characterisation moves away from simply describing functions of indexical expressions to trying to explain the cognitive process behind producing and interpreting an indexical expression in context.

Following Ehlich (1982), Cornish characterises the difference between deixis and anaphora<sup>25</sup> in terms of the cognitive notion of attention. Although both procedures “operate at the level of memory organization” (Cornish 2007a), one serves to draw the addressee’s attention to a new object of reference, while the other signals to the addressee that s/he should continue the existing focus of attention. In fact, he considers anaphora and deixis not to be mutually exclusive indexical categories. For him, they can be viewed on a continuum of different degrees of anaphoricity and deicticity which are realised in language via various indexical expressions. He (2007b: 149) also identifies an anadeictic span where there is an overlap between what might be called pure deixis and pure anaphora. Demonstratives, proximal and distal, are recognised at the centre of this span. The important point here is that the notion of attention is seen as corresponding to a procedure performed by deictic and anaphoric demonstratives.

Cornish (2001) goes beyond the traditional categorisations of demonstratives in spatial terms and focuses on their interactional role in the construction of discourse. He sets out to re-examine the standard view of deixis as essentially involving relative objective distance from the speaker's 'zero-point' within the deictic framework. He starts from the assumption that the choice of one rather than another of the members of a closed set of indexical expressions is a discourse creative act that manifests different types of sociodiscoursal relationships between speaker and addressee. However, he argues that the precise discourse values that are realised by demonstratives are basically cognitive. In other words, for him, the principles underlying the choice of a particular demonstrative "are not derived objectively, as it were, from their situational use in terms of degrees of proximity of a referent or demonstratum to the speaker or hearer"; they are rather "social and cognitive" principles (2001: 297).

According to Cornish, there are four major discourse functions realised by English demonstratives. The first is ‘situational reference’, where the demonstrative is used to refer directly to entities located in or derivable from the situation of utterance. ‘Recognitional reference’ involves the retrieval of a culturally or personally shared experience or situation which speaker and addressee are assumed to have stored in their long-term memories. The effect of using a demonstrative in this case is to signal a sort of 'complicity' between the interlocutors. ‘Discourse deictic reference’, as Cornish argues, provides the basis for the existence of anaphora, as it consists in a 'cognitive pointing' towards the result of processing a

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<sup>25</sup> While anaphora is realized via linguistic means only, deixis can also be realized via non-linguistic means such as a gesture or prosodic means such as a high pitch accent.

part of the surrounding discourse. Finally, ‘modal deictic reference’ is the focus of Cornish's study, as he follows Lyons (1977: 677) in considering this use the point at which deixis merges with modality. That is, the modal use of a demonstrative lies in the fact that the speaker wishes or does not wish to associate him/herself with or identify with the referent. Accordingly, the use of *this* or *that* tacitly instructs the addressee to place the referent within or outside his/her discourse-cognitive sphere. Cornish regards the modal use of a demonstrative as basic, since it is a common thread that runs through all the uses of demonstratives. He uses examples (18) and (19) to illustrate this type:

(18) I'm not going to the Eisteddfod this year. Work doesn't allow *that*. (2001: 303)

(19) ‘Do we want machines which are more intelligent than humans, or should we call a halt to it?’ he asked. ‘We are still a long way from *that decision* but I think we should be realistically talking about it...’ (2001: 303)

According to him, such examples provide evidence for an attitude of modal distancing on the speaker's part towards the referent. In (18) this is reflected in a denial on the speaker's part of the actuality of the event referred to, and in (19) in the assertion of the long time span.

Therefore, for Cornish, the basic use of the English demonstratives corresponds to an emphatic or modal use, which typically involves the expression of the speaker's attitude towards the referent, as well as of a particular discourse stance with respect to the addressee. This view certainly provides very useful insights regarding the use of demonstratives in English (and Arabic as well). However, while Cornish's aim is to argue for a basic use for demonstratives from which other uses derive, my aim is to show how they are interpreted in discourse. Cornish does not discuss in detail the implications of his view on the encoded semantics of demonstratives, but I argue that his view sheds some light on how demonstratives can contribute to both the explicit and implicit levels of communication. In (19), for example, the three referring expressions *it*, *that decision* and *it* refer to the same referent, but only use of the demonstrative gives rise to the extra interpretation of cognitive attitude which goes beyond merely identifying the intended referent. Also, the difference in interpreting the demonstrative in (2a)-(2b) and even (13a)-(13b), repeated below, can be explained in modal terms:

(2) a. The country is in recession. *That* has been expected for months.

b. The country is in recession. *This* has been expected for months.

- (13) a. الكتاب يناقش الكساد العالمي **وهذا** يعني أنه ممل  
The book discusses global recession and **this** means it is boring.
- (13) b. الكتاب يناقش الكساد العالمي **وذلك** يعني أنه ممل  
The book discusses global recession and **that** means it is boring.

According to Cornish, the proximal demonstratives would be seen as tacitly instructing the addressee to place the referent within his/her discourse-cognitive sphere, while the distal ones would be seen as tacitly instructing the addressee to place the referent outside his/her discourse-cognitive sphere. How is this interpretation triggered? And what triggers it? Cornish says that “my feeling is that this interpretive effect is a type of inference which may be drawn from the use of *that* in context, rather than it being a basic motivating principle determining its use” (2001: 305). As I discuss in Chapter 4, my view is that this inference is triggered by the semantics of the demonstratives and that considerations of relevance govern it. In other words, since reference assignment is not affected by the change of demonstrative form, then the difference can only be explained on the implicit level. In the interpretation process, the speaker considers the intended contextual assumptions (implicated premises and conclusions) which would justify the use of a proximal or distal form according to the context.

### 2.3.3 Demonstratives and joint attention

Diessel’s work (1999; 2006) represents another attempt at breaking away from the descriptive tradition towards a better understanding of how demonstratives contribute to discourse by taking seriously the notion of attention as an encoded procedure. Diessel (1999) discusses the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic features of demonstratives, through a large-scale typological study which included samples from 85 languages, He suggests that there are three criteria which define this category of deictic expressions: (a) they encode a meaning of spatial distance; (b) they serve syntactic functions; and (c) they serve pragmatic functions through the ability to manipulate the level of attention in discourse. Whether these are universal features or not is an issue to debate. He himself admits in his study that demonstratives in some languages are distance-neutral<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> See also Enfield (2003) and Kemmerer (1999).



According to Diessel, demonstratives are deictic expressions serving specific syntactic functions, and they are semantically characterised by having (at least) two forms which are deictically contrastive: proximal and distal. He describes the pragmatic functions of demonstratives as follows (my emphasis):

They are primarily used to *focus the hearer's attention* on objects or locations in the speech situation (often in combination with a pointing gesture), but they may also function to *organize the information flow* in the ongoing discourse. More specifically, demonstratives are often used to *keep track of prior discourse participants* and to *activate specific shared knowledge*. The most basic function of demonstratives is, however, to *orient the hearer outside of discourse on the surrounding situation*. (1999: 2)

The pragmatic functions mentioned in this quotation necessarily draw on the cognitive notion of attention and how it is related to the linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts by means of focusing, organizing, activating or orienting the hearer's cognitive capacities. What he considers to be the "basic function" of demonstratives, i.e. to orient the hearer to an entity in the surrounding situation, favours the deictic use instead of the anaphoric one. Apart from the discussion about which use is basic and which is derived, the importance of this work is that it attempts to find a common underlying pragmatic function for demonstratives in various languages. Therefore, studying the pragmatic properties of demonstratives amounts to a study of the contributions they make to the meaning and interpretation of the utterances in which they occur. The common cognitive theme seems to be that demonstratives orient the hearer's attention to discourse referents in the physical/textual/cognitive environment of the hearer in a way that affects the information flow in discourse.

Diessel (2006) draws on recent work in developmental and comparative psychology to shed more light on the communicative importance of demonstratives by employing the notion of joint attention. He considers demonstratives a special closed class of words which share a number of properties, most important of which are: (a) they are universal; (b) they are among the earliest words children learn; and (c) they are closely related to a particular gesture. Therefore, he argues that the main communicative function of demonstratives is not aimed at expressing distance. Rather, they direct attention and create joint attention in human communication. In his own words, Diessel states that "demonstratives constitute a unique class of linguistic expressions serving one of the most fundamental functions in language: in their basic use, they serve to coordinate the interlocutors' joint focus of attention" (2006: 445). Furthermore, he asserts that, by virtue of their communicative function to establish joint

attention, demonstratives play an important role in the internal organization of discourse as well as the diachronic evolution of grammar.

Joint attention can be thought of as a complex cognitive phenomenon, through which the communicative partners focus their attention on the same referent. From a developmental point of view, studies have shown that the ability to engage in joint attentional behaviours<sup>27</sup> emerges gradually during the first year of age. This can manifest itself in two ways: eye gaze and pointing. As Diessel mentions, eye gaze can be noticed in infants as early as six months old; while deictic pointing comes later towards the end of the first year, as it is used to give spatial orientation as well as to coordinate the attentional focus of the communicative partners. With the start of language acquisition, children acquire a new communicative device to manipulate joint attention, i.e. demonstratives. According to Diessel, there is no other linguistic means that is as closely tied to this function as demonstratives. They are not only used to indicate the location of a referent relative to the deictic centre<sup>28</sup>, but they also serve to coordinate the interlocutors' joint focus of attention. Motivated by such crucial communicative functions, Diessel argues that one of the few kinds of non-content words that children produce during the one-word stage are demonstratives. According to Diessel, the communicative importance of demonstratives is not only reflected in their early acquisition but also in their cross-linguistic distribution.

I discuss the notion of attention in more detail in section 4.1.3, but I take it that Diessel provides convincing evidence that we can take this notion of attention to subsume all the functions that demonstratives perform in discourse. Attention and demonstratives have been previously associated with each other in the literature. In purely cognitive terms, Croft & Cruse (2004: 46) explain that “attention comes in degrees and is usually modelled in terms of degree of activation of conceptual structures in a neural network model of the mind”. Therefore, it is the function of demonstratives to continuously adjust this level of activation or attention to discourse referents as it unfolds. Recall that the cognitive status Gundel et al. (1993) assign for demonstratives is Activated, which for them means that the referent is in short-term/working memory. Huang (2000: 160) further explains this as “activation of a referent in one’s current short-term memory at moment<sub>n</sub> is a result of focusing one’s attention on that referent at a previous moment<sub>n-1</sub>”. Grosz and Sidner (1986) characterise an entity as

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<sup>27</sup> This is referred to in the literature as triadic interactions, as opposed to dyadic interactions where the child focuses his/her attention on one particular object ignoring everything in the surrounding situation.

<sup>28</sup> The deictic centre is a conceptual unit that is grounded by the speaker's location in the speech situation at the time of the utterance (cf. Fillmore 1982).

activated if it is in global focus, i.e. the entire set of entities which are in some sense part of the attentional states of the participants of discourse.

The role of demonstratives, as Diessel explains, is to align the level of joint attention to referents between the participants. The notion of joint attention corresponds to the view of using demonstratives in discourse as a two-way referring act. A speaker chooses a referring form which suits his/her intended referent as well as his/her expectation of the hearer's cognitive capacity. The hearer, on the other hand, processes the referring form in a quest to arrive at the intended referent, assuming that the speaker intends to be relevant. This two-way relationship is made possible by virtue of the combination of procedural encoded semantics and relevance-based pragmatic principles. What unifies the different uses of demonstratives in the English examples (1)-(8) and in the Arabic examples (10-16) above, is the cognitive function of manipulating the hearer's level of attention to a specific referent so that it aligns with the speaker's own level of attention. This could be achieved by accessing a previously mentioned referent as in (3), or a cognitively remote shared referent as in (4), or by creating a new referent not previously mentioned in discourse as in (5) repeated below:

- (3) A pregnant woman has to undergo several checks. *These checks* are called antenatal.
- (4) Do you still have *that radio* that your uncle gave you last year?
- (5) He kissed her with *this unbelievable passion*. (Lakoff 1974: 347)

The combination of attention-directing procedures with conceptual spatial information interacts with context to give rise to the various interpretations of demonstrations. In (3), with the help of the conceptual information in the head noun, reference is resolved co-referentially with the previously mentioned *checks* as the discourse referent both speaker and hearer are currently sharing a similar degree of attention to. In (4) and (5), the hearer has to create a new representation for the intended referent based on the encoded semantics which instructs the hearer to create a joint level of attention to the intended proximal/distal referent as opposed to other referential candidates. The semantics encoded by demonstratives would also explain the differences between (4a)-(4b) and (5a)-(5b) which have to do with the speaker's attitude to the referent:

- (4) a. Do you still have *that radio* that your uncle gave you last year?
- (4) b. Do you still have *the radio* that your uncle gave you last year?
- (5) a. He kissed her with *this unbelievable passion*. (Lakoff 1974: 347)

(5) b. He kissed her with *an unbelievable passion*. (Lakoff 1974: 347)

It is intuitive that (4a) conveys an interpretation of cognitive remoteness and shared private information in a way that (4b) does not. Similarly, (5a) conveys a sense of personal attitude and a call for identification with this attitude in a way that (5b) does not. The difference does not affect reference resolution, but can be explained on an implicit level. This starts from the assumption triggered by the semantics that there are other potential referential candidates, i.e. other radios that may be given by other people, or other types of passion the speaker may be referring to. Driven by considerations of relevance, the hearer is justified in pursuing extra contextual assumptions in return for the extra processing effort of the proximal/distal information.

The interpretation of the various uses of demonstratives using an attention-directing semantics with a relevance-based pragmatics does not need accessibility or givenness statuses. Diessel (2006) also asserts that the notion of attention constitutes a common cognitive thread underpinning the different functions of demonstratives, whether text-internal (referring to entities in the linguistic context) or otherwise. According to him, anaphoric and discourse deictic demonstratives “involve the same psychological mechanisms as demonstratives that speakers use with text-external reference. In both uses, demonstratives focus the interlocutors’ attention on a particular referent” (2006: 476). Therefore, joint attention is not only crucial for coordinating the participants’ attentional focus in a speech situation, but it is also crucial in manipulating the internal organisation of discourse by maintaining shared attention on certain linguistic elements in the surrounding context. Other emotional or social effects triggered by demonstratives are also accounted for on the basis of the attention-directing semantics and the internal contrast within. By assuming this role for the notion of joint/shared attention in the semantics of English and Arabic demonstratives, we can propose a unified account which accounts for how they are interpreted within a relevance-based pragmatic framework.

## 2.4 Summary

I outlined in this chapter some traditional and cognitive approaches to demonstratives in English and Arabic. I attempted to highlight that there is too much attention paid to rigid

descriptive classifications of types/conditions of use. Although, on the theoretical level, the different forms of referring expressions can be distinguished from one another by use constraints (for example, in terms of accessibility levels or cognitive statuses), such constraints do not have enough explanatory power to explain the subtle pragmatic differences between them. But we have learned from the discussion of the cognitive accounts of demonstratives that there are two crucial issues which need to be addressed in any theoretical account. The first is that demonstratives can contribute to both the explicit and implicit levels of communication; i.e. in arriving at the proposition expressed and in going beyond that to further inferences regarding cognitive and/or emotional attitudes towards the referent. This is what Cornish (2001) tried to show by highlighting the importance of interactional factors in the use of demonstratives. The other issue is that there is evidence for a unified view for demonstratives in one language if we take seriously the view that the notion of attention as a procedure is at the heart of the semantics encoded by demonstratives. Diessel (2006) argued for this view using evidence from developmental psychology and typological studies. However, it is the integration of semantic, pragmatic, cognitive and interactional factors within a general theory of communication that provides a solid ground for the interpretation of demonstratives. I argue that relevance theory provides us with the necessary theoretical tools to explain how this is done. In the next chapter, I introduce relevance theory.

## **Chapter 3: Relevance theory**

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### **3.1 Relevance theory**

In the previous chapter, I pointed out that the notion of hierarchies of accessibility is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain the interpretation of demonstratives in discourse. I also pointed out that both Cornish (2001) and Diessel (2006) provide crucial insights into understanding how demonstratives are interpreted by speakers and hearers. But what is missing is the integration of those insights into a theoretical framework that would account for the choice and interpretation of demonstratives in various contexts, and most importantly, that would allow us to tell a more coherent story about the semantics of demonstratives in English and Arabic. In this chapter, I argue that a relevance-theoretic approach, which depends on the conceptual/procedural distinction, provide us with the necessary tools to explain the semantics and pragmatics of English and Arabic demonstratives.

In section 3.1, I briefly introduce the main tenets of relevance theory as a cognitive theory of communication, including its approach to the role of inference and how it contributes to the interpretation of both the explicit and the implicit sides of communication. I also introduce the relevance-theoretic approach to reference in general as part of the overall utterance comprehension. In section 3.2, I discuss the relevance-theoretic distinction between concepts and procedures, and the implications of this in relation to the explicit and implicit contents of communicated meaning. I also explain how the conceptual-procedural distinction affects the view of truth conditional/non-truth conditional meaning.

#### **3.1.1 Relevance theory and communication**

Relevance theory is a cognitively-based theory of communication, which aims to explain how the audience arrives at the communicator's intended meaning. It maintains that human communication is based on the tendency of human cognition to seek relevance. In communicative terms, it maintains that acts of ostensive communication, e.g. utterances, are optimally relevant, i.e. they are worth processing from the hearer's point of view and they are

the most suitable for the speaker's communicative preferences and abilities. Relevance itself is defined in terms of two notions: cognitive effect (i.e. the positive effect that results from processing an utterance) and processing effort (i.e. the cognitive effort exerted in processing an utterance).

Relevance theory is not the first theory to use the notion of relevance to explain human communication. But it offers a specific definition of 'relevance' and it is the first to take a notion of relevance as the cognitive basis of the human ability to communicate. Before relevance theory, others considered the notion of relevance, most notably Strawson (1971) and Grice (1989). Strawson suggested that a 'principle of relevance' validates the intuition that people do not direct isolated and unconnected pieces of information at each other. On the other hand, besides the maxims of Quantity, Quality and Manner, Grice stipulated a maxim of Relation which simply stated "be relevant". But he acknowledged that he had not proposed an exact definition of the term. Although Grice left this maxim undeveloped, his work established the idea that inferential pragmatic processing plays an important role in interpretation. Sperber and Wilson (1995), the co-founders of relevance theory, build on Grice's inferential theory and develop a more comprehensive approach to communication. For them, considerations of relevance govern the whole process of linguistic (and non-linguistic) processing. In this sense, relevance theory does not just reduce Grice's four maxims to one. It rather provides a more cognitive grounding for the notion of relevance by asserting that it is a matter of cognitive drive instead of an acquired maxim. This is reflected in the Cognitive Principle of Relevance (1995: 260):

(1) Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance.

This principle is not a maxim or a convention, but "a generalisation about ostensive communication" (1995:159) which rests on the assumption that communication is a form of goal-directed behaviour. The human cognitive system tends towards processing the most relevant inputs at any given time. Sperber (1996) deems this a 'naturalistic' approach to human communication as he maintains that "from birth onwards, humans expect relevance from the sounds of speech (an expectation often disappointed, but hardly ever given up)" (1996: 114). Moreover, Wilson and Sperber also use evolutionary evidence to support their claim for a general criterion of relevance. For example, they state that "in biological evolution, there has been constant pressure on the human cognitive system to organise itself

so as to select inputs on the basis of their expected relevance” (2002: 232). But how are those inputs judged to be relevant?

If we consider that the human mind is faced with possibly hundreds of communicative (and non-communicative) stimuli (linguistic and otherwise) every minute, it would be surprising to find out that there are no guidelines or benchmarks for processing them. In such a picture, one can assume a problem of severe overload to be a constant threat. As far as verbal communication is concerned, this becomes particularly important since successful communication essentially depends on a balanced or rational reciprocal system of mental processing. According to the relevance-theoretic view, the basic feature of the communicative know-how is that there is a single property – relevance – which makes information worth processing for a human being. In other words, relevance is a property of the inputs to our cognitive processes which renders them ‘useful’ as an approximation of the mental cost exerted in processing them and the benefit gained from that processing. Relevance theory, thus, relies on the underlying cognitive assumption which considers that humans as rational information processors have “the ability to allocate one’s cognitive resources efficiently” (Sperber et al. 1995: 44). It is this efficiency which motivates the definition of relevance in terms of ‘effort’ and ‘effect’. To put it simply, the smaller the effort, and the greater the effect, the greater the relevance. This weighing of processing effort and cognitive effect<sup>29</sup>, which is akin to a cost-benefit analysis in financial terms, is key to the nature of utterance interpretation. Both speaker and hearer seek the maximisation of relevance through this calculation of effort and effect in a linguistic discourse. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 260) capture this idea in the Communicative Principle of Relevance:

(2) Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance.

The mutual expectation of optimal relevance manifests itself as a discourse unfolds in two ways. On the one hand, a speaker produces an utterance with the intention to attract the hearer’s attention. Since the hearer’s cognitive processes would only pay attention to utterances that are relevant, this means that the speaker wants the hearer to assume that the utterance is indeed relevant to him. That is to say, there is a minimum level of relevance that

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<sup>29</sup> In the first edition of Sperber’s and Wilson’s book *Relevance: Communication and Cognition* (1986) as well as early papers, the term “contextual effect” was used. In the (1995) edition, this has changed to the term “cognitive effect”, which is seen as a contextual effect within a cognitive system.



the hearer is encouraged to expect: the utterance produced is relevant enough to be worth the effort exerted for its processing. On the other hand, there seems to be an upper bound on the level of relevance to be expected. In actual discourse, the speaker would be limited by his/her own abilities, i.e. the ability to convey appropriate information, the ability to present this information in the most linguistically efficient way, etc. The speaker also has some preferences to take into consideration, i.e. the goals intended from this communication, the rules of social/cultural etiquette to be followed, etc. Therefore, an utterance is deemed relevant inasmuch as it is compatible with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The combination of these two features is what defines "optimal relevance", and Sperber and Wilson explain that an utterance is optimally relevant to the hearer iff (1995: 270):

- (3) a. It is relevant enough to be worth the hearer's processing effort;
- b. It is the most relevant one compatible with the speaker's abilities and preferences.

As such, Carston (2002: 9) notes that the two factors that reflect the need for a notion of 'optimal relevance' are (a) the time pressure inherent in on-line mental processing; and (b) the speaker's responsibility for the quality of the stimulus s/he produces. The interaction between these two factors means that inference should play a bigger role in utterance interpretation than previously envisaged.

### **3.1.2 Inference and understanding**

Inference is probably the most powerful mechanism in language use. Relevance theory assumes an inferential view of language comprehension, which stands in sharp contrast to the more classical code model that dominated the pre-Gricean era in linguistic semantics. Briefly, the code model considers utterances to be signals which encode the messages that speakers intend to convey; whereas the inferential model maintains that a great deal of inferential processing is needed in order to interpret utterances. It follows that each model draws a different picture of how utterance interpretation proceeds. As Wilson and Sperber explain<sup>30</sup>,

On the classical view, comprehension is achieved by decoding signals to obtain the associated messages. On the inferential view, utterances are not signals but

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<sup>30</sup> See also Wilson (1998: 4) where she argues for an "updated code model" where inference plays a much bigger role.

pieces of evidence about the speaker's meaning, and comprehension is achieved by inferring this meaning from the evidence provided. (2000: 229)

Inference may be defined as the mental activity whereby the human mind can obtain information that is not literally present in the utterance. The acknowledgement of the role played by inference in utterance comprehension is largely motivated by the need to fill the gap between what a speaker 'says' and what a speaker 'means'. A classic example of the difference between 'what is said' and 'what is meant' is when A asks B if he wants to go to the cinema and B replies "I am tired". If linguistic interpretation only depended on decoding the semantics of each individual word in the utterance, then it would be impossible to explain how A understands this reply to mean that B is not coming to the cinema. Human communication does not depend on decoding alone, and linguistic pragmatics has shown that we need inference to arrive at what is said.

Therefore, the relevance theoretic view maintains that the intended interpretation of an utterance is not just decoded but inferred by means of an inferential process. This marriage between semantically encoded information and pragmatically inferred information is at the heart of relevance theory. Sperber and Wilson state that:

Verbal communication is a complex form of communication. Linguistic coding and decoding is involved, but the linguistic meaning of an uttered sentence falls short of encoding what the speaker means: it merely helps the audience infer what she means. (1995: 27)

In other words, natural language sentences do not fully encode the meanings they are used to express; they only give a schematic indication of the speaker's meaning. Instead, the hearer uses inference in recovering what is communicated, and in making these inferences the hearer necessarily makes use of contextual information in order to arrive at the intended interpretation guided by expectations of relevance. Some particular phenomena in verbal communication provide evidence that inference, and not decoding, plays the decisive role in filling the gap between sentence meaning and speaker meaning. Slips of the tongue such as (4), ungrammatical utterances such as (5), and incomplete utterances such as (6) are among the most notable:

(4) Can I have the text one? (meaning, 'the next one')

(5) Long time, no see.

(6) If you don't give me this, I'll... (with the right body language, it conceals a threat)

We understand these utterances despite their incompleteness or ungrammaticality because we infer meanings that we do take to be intentionally communicated to us. Inference, in interaction with context and within the general view of the speaker's intention to communicate, is needed in order to arrive at a meaningful interpretation of these utterances. Humans do this all time, not just with these particular cases but with normal utterances too. An inferential theory of communication such as relevance theory explains how inference is pervasive and essential in our communication.

Relevance theorists (e.g. Wilson & Sperber 1993; Carston 2002) generally agree that the semantic representation of an utterance is a logical form, or a 'blueprint', which needs to be fleshed out by virtue of pragmatic processes to become a fully fledged communicated proposition. To spell it out in detail, utterance comprehension is a two-phase process. The phonetic form of an utterance typically undergoes a phase of linguistic decoding to yield a logical form (or a set of logical forms in case of ambiguity). The second phase involves enrichment via pragmatic inference (including but not restricted to reference assignment and disambiguation) in order to yield the full propositional form known as the proposition expressed or 'explicature'. The following example illustrates this process in simple terms:

- (7) "She is not coming" → decoding → [x is not coming to y at time t] (logical form)
- (8) [x is not coming to y at time t] → pragmatic enrichment → Anna is not coming to the party tonight (proposition expressed)

While this example illustrates how inference is important even in the most mundane of contexts to arrive at the explicit meaning, the role of inference in utterance interpretation can be cleverly exploited to contribute to the communication of implicit meaning(s) too. According to Sperber and Wilson,

languages do not encode the kind of information that humans are interested in communicating. Linguistically encoded semantic representations are abstract mental structures which must be inferentially enriched before they can be taken to represent anything of interest" (1995: 174).

This applies equally to carefully selected mottos in advertisements that are designed to create stylistic effects in the audience as well as everyday utterances like "I am tired" to implicate

that the speaker does not want to do a certain activity. Consider for example (9) and (10) from English and Arabic advertisements:

(9) So hot. So cool.

(10) الحياة إختيار.

'al-**h**ayaah            'i**h**tiyaar

The-life              choice

Life is a choice.

In (9), taken from an advertisement about a brand of water filters, the hearer will have to go beyond the decoded meaning of the words which only say that this device can produce hot and cold water, to the inferred meaning that this is a new product on the market which is so desirable to have. The inferences the hearer makes draws on contextual assumptions about how the words *hot* and *cool* are used to mean good to have. Similarly, in (10) taken from an advertisement about a new private property development project, the simple decoded meaning of the utterance only conveys a general statement that life is made of choices. But the ad itself assumes that the audience will go beyond that to infer all sorts of assumptions about good choices, bad choices, how choices affect one's life, how deciding where to live is one of the biggest choices of life, and ultimately that deciding to buy into this property project is a good choice to make. The ability of language to work in this way is a reflection of the ability of the human mind to work in a certain way. An inferential theory of communication is essential to explain both. Such a theory needs to consider meaning as "something actively produced by interpretation (rather than merely read off from an inherent meaning of signs) and yet not something unbounded or ineffable" as Durant (2010: 97) states. The relevance-based cognitive model satisfies this by taking effort and effect into consideration.

The relevance-based inferential view of language is not only intuitively and cognitively plausible, but also it has serious implications. The distinctions between what is said and what is meant, and between what is explicit and what is implicit are captured in a better light when the role of inference is taken seriously. For example, for Grice, 'what is said' seems equivalent to the truth conditional proposition expressed by an utterance<sup>31</sup>, while 'what is implicated' arises pragmatically from the proposition expressed. So, he mainly discussed the

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<sup>31</sup> See for example Recanati (1991), Bach (1999), and Wharton (2002) for critical assessments of Grice's theory.

part played by inference in constructing conversational implicatures<sup>32</sup> (to use Grice's terminology), while he considered that the proposition expressed by an utterance is recovered by decoding alone. However, one of the main contributions of relevance theory is the demonstration that inferential processing is not only a factor in the derivation of the implicit content of an utterance, but also of the explicit content. Enrichment, loosening and broadening are all inferential-based activities related to the explicit side of communication. They have been associated in relevance theory with the interpretation of such poetic uses of language as loose talk, metaphors, similes, hyperboles, etc<sup>33</sup>.

### 3.1.3 Explicating and implicating

We have seen that relevance theory maintains that the fully-fledged propositional form is obtained by inferential enrichment of the linguistically encoded logical form. This is what Carston has termed "The Underdeterminacy Thesis"<sup>34</sup> (2002: 19), whereby linguistically encoded meaning not only underdetermines 'what is meant' by a speaker in a certain context, but also 'what is said'. The following examples illustrate different kinds of underdetermined meaning:

- (11) It's the same [as what?]
- (12) She is leaving [from where?]
- (13) That is difficult [relative to what?] (Carston 2002: 22)

The examples show that even the processes of disambiguation and reference assignment do not guarantee full propositionality. Utterances which are not ambiguous and whose referents have been assigned can still be semantically underdetermined and in need of further pragmatic enrichment to arrive at the proposition expressed. In the above examples, the encoded meanings of those fully sentential utterances do not seem to determine a complete propositional representation that could be assigned a truth value, i.e. an 'explicature'. The

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<sup>32</sup> Grice distinguishes between a conventional and a conversational implicature, where the former is semantically decoded, whereas the latter is not decoded but inferred. It can be said that the relevance theoretic work on discourse connectives, such as *and*, *but*, *moreover*, amounts to a reanalysis in procedural terms of Grice's notion of conventional implicature.

<sup>33</sup> See, for example, Carston (1996; 2002); MacKenzie (2002); Pilkington (2000), Rubio-Fernandez (2007), Vega-Moreno (2005), Wilson and Carston (2006) *inter alia*.

<sup>34</sup> See Recanati (2002) for an alternative view of semantic underdetermination which he sees to make a case in favour of "anti-inferentialism" rather than an inferential view of interpretation.

missing constituents, explained in brackets, have to be supplied pragmatically before we can say that these utterances are fully propositional. Further inferential processing is then required to yield the implicit content of what the speaker is communicating or what is known as ‘implicatures’.

Relevance theory has also shown that inferences play a role in deriving what have been termed ‘higher-level explicatures’ which are propositions embedded in attitudinal descriptions. They are part of the speaker's explicit meaning, but they make no contribution to truth conditions of the utterance. The following example, taken from Wilson and Sperber (1993: 14), illustrates the derivation of these different kinds of communicated meanings.

(14) a. *Peter*: Can you help?

b. *Mary* (sadly): I can't.

(15) a. Mary can't help Peter to find a job.

b. Mary says she can't help Peter to find a job.

c. Mary believes she can't help Peter to find a job.

d. Mary regrets that she can't help Peter to find a job.

Mary's reply in (14b) yields the basic explicature in (15a) which is constructed by enriching the linguistically encoded logical form of Mary's utterance. Therefore, (15a) is considered the proposition expressed by this utterance. (15b) to (15d) are its higher-level explicatures, which the hearer arrives at by embedding the proposition expressed under speech act descriptions or propositional attitude descriptions represented by the linguistic items *says*, *believes* and *regrets*. The importance of higher-level explicatures, as Blakemore (1992: 61) explains, lies in that “the main relevance of the utterance may be understood to lie more in the speaker’s attitude towards the proposition expressed than in the proposition itself”. By uttering (14b), for example, in a way that makes Mary’s attitude of regret explicit to the hearer (intonation, body language), Peter may respond to it by saying something like “I know”, i.e. I know that you feel regretful. In this sense, the relevance of the utterance lies not only in stating that Mary cannot help Peter, but in that Mary regrets not being able to do so.

The decoding-inference dichotomy, which characterises the two phases of utterance interpretation, also bears on the idea of the existence of two kinds of meaning: representational and computational, i.e. information about the mental representations to be

manipulated, and information about how to manipulate them. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 89) maintain that:

Representation and computation are two formally distinct and complementary processes, neither of which can exist without the other, and both of which are necessary for comprehension to take place.

Relevance theorists have proposed the terms ‘conceptual’ and ‘procedural’ for these distinct notions; i.e. for lexical meaning which maps onto representation and computation as mental processes. The distinction between conceptual and procedural encodings has been explored and developed most notably by Diane Blakemore (1987, 2002, 2007), whose early work motivated a large amount of research, both into the nature of procedural meaning itself and into the type of expressions which may be said to encode procedures. The idea behind this distinction is that inferential comprehension involves the construction and manipulation of conceptual representations, which are the building blocks of propositions on any representational level. However, some linguistic items seem not to contribute concepts at all to such propositions. Hence, linguistic items might be expected to encode two basic types of information: concepts or conceptual representations on the one hand, and procedures for manipulating them on the other. A simple example to illustrate this is to consider that a word like *cat* encodes a concept CAT while a word like *but* in *My cat is friendly but shy* encodes a procedure for processing the whole utterance so as to include what might be thought of as an element of contrast between its two parts. This is discussed in detail in the following section.

Within this relevance-based cognitive inferential model, considerations of processing effort and cognitive effect are at the heart of the communicative process. Therefore, it is important also to highlight the kinds of cognitive effects proposed by relevance theory. The relevance-theoretic view on the notion of cognitive effect starts from the belief that the human mind is an efficient device. Efficiency, whether related to a human or to an artificial skill, necessarily involves some sort of selection- for example, selection of tasks to perform at a certain time, or selection of a certain amount of information to attend to at a time. So, for the human mind to operate efficiently, it must assign its memory and processing resources selectively. The main criterion for this selection is the quality of some piece of information to improve the individual’s overall representation of the world. Thus, the mind should attend to information which enables it to achieve this general goal of the human cognitive system. According to relevance theory, the kind of information which is likely to contribute to this goal is of three possible types: information which provides confirmation

of existing assumptions, information which corrects mistaken beliefs, and information which expands and builds on existing knowledge. Since efficiency is a matter of striking the best possible balance between costs and benefits, cost is thought of in terms of the mental effort required to construct mental representations of the communicated propositions (which includes the subtasks of decoding acoustic or visual signals, drawing inferences, retrieving stored information from memory, etc); while the benefits are the positive cognitive effects. The positive cognitive effects are in the form of enrichment, revision, addition, removal or re-organisation of existing beliefs and assumptions, which ultimately improve the human being's knowledge of the world. In this sense, a positive cognitive effect is defined in terms of it contributing positively to the fulfillment of cognitive goals.

The following example illustrates the way linguistic utterances can give rise to the three types of cognitive effects mentioned above. Suppose someone said to me (16):

(16) Billy goes to the gym every week.

This utterance may lead to the strengthening of the assumption I already entertained about Billy that he is a person who likes to keep fit. In another context, the same utterance may actually come as a surprise for me because I thought (held the assumption) that Billy is someone who dislikes physical exercise. In this case, this utterance will contradict and eliminate my existing assumption about Billy. Finally, this utterance can result in a third type of cognitive effect by means of the derivation of a contextual implication. A contextual implication is constructed by combining the utterance with a contextual assumption so that the contextual implication follows from both the utterance and the contextual assumption but not from either on its own. In this case, combine (16) with the contextual assumption in (17) to yield the contextual implication in (18):

(17) People who go to the gym regularly watch their diet.

(18) Billy watches his diet.

To sum up, positive cognitive effects are produced as a result of the interaction of newly-presented information with a context of existing assumptions in one of three ways: by strengthening an existing assumption, by contradicting and eliminating an existing assumption, or by combining with an existing assumption to yield a contextual implication.



### 3.1.4 Relevance and reference

Within the relevance-theoretic view of communication and the role of inference in interpretation, reference resolution plays an important role in arriving at propositions. As discussed in the previous section, reference assignment is one of three subtasks involved in the recovery of the proposition expressed, which also includes disambiguation and enrichment. The general claim, as Wilson (1992) explains, is that the process of reference assignment involves the construction/retrieval of an appropriate mental representation which identifies the intended referent. Since this representation is part of the representation of the proposition expressed by the utterance as a whole, then it falls under the same presumption of optimal relevance. It is assumed that a speaker aiming at optimal relevance does not put his/her hearer to unjustifiable effort in achieving the intended effects, therefore it is justified to assume that the hearer will automatically adopt the least-effort strategy in utterance interpretation generally and in reference assignment specifically. Hence, two important assumptions follow:

- (a) The intended referent will be the one that requires the least processing effort in return for the most cognitive effect(s).
- (b) The intended referent will be worth processing for the hearer and will be the one most compatible with the abilities and preferences of the speaker.

The least-effort strategy could be thought of as an alternative to accessibility or cognitive status scales for reference assignment. That is, the expectation of optimal relevance in both the production and interpretation of a referring expression negates the need for a semantic encoding of an accessibility level or a cognitive status to narrow down the search space for the intended referent. This is taken care of by a procedural semantics which, together with pragmatic considerations, will lead to the intended referent. Wilson and Matsui (1998: 2) further explain that the notions of accessibility and acceptability are incorporated into the process of retrieving the intended referent as follows:

- a. Candidate interpretations differ in their accessibility to the hearer, and are therefore evaluated in a certain order.

- b. They are evaluated in terms of some criterion of pragmatic acceptability that the resulting overall interpretation is supposed to meet.
- c. The first interpretation that satisfies the pragmatic criterion is the one the hearer should choose.

Unlike other cognitive accounts which depend on the notions of accessibility or salience, a relevance-theoretic approach does not consider accessibility the only factor in reference assignment, nor does it depend on a one-to-one relationship between referring expressions and semantically encoded levels of accessibility. Rather, within relevance theory, the notion of accessibility is defined in pragmatic terms: what is accessible is judged against its pragmatic acceptability. A pragmatically acceptable interpretation is the first one consistent with the principle of relevance. In (19)-(21), for example, the referring expressions *he*, *this* and *it* refer to *Obama* (not *the Egyptian president*), the fact that the company is laying off employees (not *the company*) and *the pan* (not *the table*) respectively.

(19) Obama met with the Egyptian president and *he* used the aid card to push for reform.

(20) The company is laying off employees and *this* is terrible.

(21) The hot pan is on the table. Don't touch *it*.

The assigned referents incorporated into the proposition expressed of these utterances do not only yield preferred interpretations, but they are interpretations which are the most accessible in consistence with the principle of relevance. Processed in context, i.e. with access to the relevant contextual assumptions about world politics, employment and the pain hot pans can inflict, the hearers are able to assign the referents correctly without exerting gratuitous cognitive effort with the reward of arriving at a relevant interpretation. Therefore, Blakemore (2002: 74) concludes that “the first accessible interpretation which would rationally have been expected to yield adequate contextual effects for no unjustifiable effort is the only interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance”.

This ties in with the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure, as set out in Wilson and Sperber (2002: 259):

- (22) a. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.
- b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.

This processing heuristic results from the definition of optimal relevance as it applies in the interpretation of all utterances. Since reference resolution is part of overall utterance interpretation, it follows the same heuristic. A hearer processing the referring expressions in (19)-(21) is justified in pursuing a least-effort strategy. In (19), for example, the hearer is expected to test candidate referents in order of accessibility and stop when his/her expectations of relevance are satisfied. The first accessible candidate referent would be Obama and not the Egyptian president since it is judged against its pragmatic acceptability which is verified by the contextual assumptions in (23):

- (23) a. Obama is the president of the United States.
- b. The United States gives aid to Egypt.

The combination of the accessibility of candidate referents/contextual assumptions and acceptability of overall interpretation (in addition to the procedural encoded semantics in the referring expressions) is the mechanism behind the narrowing down of the search space for the intended referent. Therefore, Wilson and Sperber (2002: 259) explain that “it is also reasonable for the hearer to stop at the first interpretation that satisfies his expectations of relevance, because there should never be more than one”. It follows from the definition of optimal relevance that, the first interpretation which satisfies the hearer’s expectation of relevance is the one the speaker intended to convey.

Within this relevance-theoretic view of reference, it seems plausible to argue for a unified account for a particular set of referring expressions that does not necessarily depend on cognitive statuses or accessibility scales. As mentioned before, Scott (2008) has pointed out that one main difference between relevance theory and accessibility theories is that the former, instead of just narrowing down the set of potential referents, it does so to make the only one remaining is the intended referent. In this picture, the encoded semantics in the referring expressions themselves are seen as primarily procedural, i.e. a referring expression encodes a procedure whose aim is to constrain the search space for the intended referent. For instance, a proximal locative such as *here* constrains the set of potential referents to those in a

proximal location to the speaker, while a third person pronoun such as *she* instructs the hearer to constrain the search space for the intended referent to those entities which are female and singular. In actual processing, a procedural instruction performs the function of making the intended referent the most accessible one because it is the first one compatible with the principle of relevance.

Powell (1998; 2002; 2010) assumes a cognitive account to indexicals, and referring expressions in general, that is rooted in relevance theory. For him, the fundamental function of such expressions is to “pick out particular individual entities so that we can talk about them” (2010: 3). He starts from the assumption that relevance theory, unlike truth-conditional theories, allows us to fully appreciate the role the mind plays in mediating between language and the world. Referring expressions are used by a speaker to convey to his/her audience that a particular entity in the world should be picked out, the role of the mind here can be seen as a combination of intention (on part of the speaker) and inference (on part of the hearer). But most importantly, the role of the mind is reflected in the kind of meaning encoded by referring expressions. Powell (1998: 15) maintains that “there may well be good reasons to suppose that indexicals encode something like procedures”. His analysis of demonstratives in English rests on two main assumptions. First, that demonstratives, as well as other singular expressions, are individual concept communicators, where an individual concept is defined as “[a] dossier containing information all of which is taken by the holder of the concept to be satisfied by the same individual” (2010: 14). Second, that the semantic encoding of demonstratives integrates the notions of distance and non-uniqueness<sup>35</sup>. Powell (1998:18), for example, suggests the procedural semantics of *this* to be “find the speaker and then find an object near the speaker”. He also compares demonstratives and the definite article in terms of encoding (non-)uniqueness. For him, “the F encodes [...] the property of being a unique F” (2010: 196) while ‘that F’ does not. In other words, “a complex demonstrative ‘that F’ exploits the property of being a non-unique F to guide the hearer to an individual concept” (Powell 2002: 230).

Scott (2010) highlights two important aspects of Powell’s approach. First, his suggested procedural semantics for English demonstratives emphasises the relational quality of the notion of distance. That is, the intended referent is proximal or distal relative to a point of reference, which is not fixed but varies with context. Second, his stress that a demonstrative ‘that F’ encodes non-uniqueness ties in with the idea that the semantics of demonstratives

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<sup>35</sup> The notion of (non)uniqueness has been often associated with definite descriptions. For more details on the technical definition of this notion see Kadmon (1990) and Roberts (2002; 2003).

involve reference to other potential candidate referents, i.e that “the referent is therefore picked out as one instance of an F in contrast to all the other instances of Fs” (Scott 2010: 137). I discuss this in detail in the next chapter, as I argue for a procedural semantics for demonstratives which integrates the notions of attention, distance and the internal contrast which arises to involve other potential referential candidates on the distance scale. Scott (2010: 120) herself develops a procedural account of referring expressions as “encod[ing] procedural constraints on explicit content”. She follows Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Hedley (2007) in their view that expressions such as pronouns encode a combination of conceptual and procedural information. But she also stresses that the procedural semantics of referring expressions are not only used to guide the hearer to the intended referent on the explicit level of communication. Rather they “can also affect the inferences drawn during the implicit phase of communication” (2010: 130).

My proposal largely agrees with Scott (2010) in that it suggests a procedural semantics for demonstratives but in both English and Arabic. Both accounts move away from the traditional analysis of demonstratives in purely spatial terms as they acknowledge that the proximal/distal contrast can be identified on a number of dimensions (spatial, emotional, discursal, etc.). Both accounts are based on a relevance theoretic pragmatics which interacts with procedural semantics to systematically account for the contribution of demonstratives in the utterances in which they occur. Both accounts explain how demonstratives can contribute equally to the implicit and explicit sides of communication. Both accounts, however, differ in the details of the semantics encoded by demonstratives. In the next chapter, I argue that demonstratives encode an attention-directing procedure which sets them apart from other referring expressions. They also encode the (pro)concept of distance which falls under the scope of the procedural semantics, hence creating the internal contrast between what is proximal (or distal) and other potential referential candidates.

Finally, the relevance-theoretic approach to reference is not only different from other cognitive-based accounts; it is also at odds with earlier approaches to reference, most notably coherence-based approaches. Wilson and Matsui (1998) explain that, compared to coherence-based approaches (cf. Hobbs 1979) to reference, relevance theory allows for greater flexibility in the relations between utterances in discourse. Therefore, instead of having to recognise a fixed set of coherence relations, such as Explanation or Result, the criterion of relevance makes the need for such a set superfluous. The intended interpretation will be reached because it is the most relevant one, not because the coherence relation is identified. According to them, even the sole identification of a coherence relation does not guarantee a

correct interpretation. An interpretation of the definite expression in (24), for example, as expressing a coherence relation of Explanation to link the two utterances falls short of identifying the intended overall interpretation.

(24) I ran from the classroom to the playground. *The children* were making too much noise.

In this case, knowing the intended coherence relation does not solve the issue of reference resolution. Instead, a relevance-theoretic approach would be more appropriate since the criterion of relevance does not only apply to the candidate referents but also to the contextual assumptions a hearer will need to access in order to interpret the definite expression (bridging assumptions in this case as the definite description does not co-refer directly with an antecedent in preceding discourse<sup>36</sup>).

With these insights about the position of reference assignment within relevance theory, I take it that there are two essential elements in any theoretical proposal for the interpretation of referring expressions: (a) the semantic contribution of the referring expression itself, and (b) the general pragmatic considerations operating in the processing of this referring expression in context. In this part of the chapter, I have started with the second point. In the next part, I discuss how relevance theory explains encoded semantics in terms of concepts and procedures<sup>37</sup>.

### 3.2 Concepts and procedures

One of the most important contributions of relevance theory is its distinction between conceptual and procedural meanings. The conceptual-procedural distinction, like the theory itself, is motivated by some general assumptions underlying cognitive science that have to do with how the human mind works in interpreting language. The main assumption is that conceptual encodings contribute to the construction of conceptual representations; while procedural encodings constrain the inferential computations performed over these conceptual representations. The idea that there are expressions whose function is not to encode a concept but to indicate how to process the sentence or phrase in which they occur is not a relevance

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<sup>36</sup> For more details about bridging see Clark (1975) and Matsui (2000) for a relevance-theoretic perspective.

<sup>37</sup> For an alternative account of reference which rests on relevance theory but works within the realm of the theory of mental representations, see Reboul (1998).

theory invention. It has been expressed previously in some way in pragmatic theories. For example, in speech-act theory, such expressions are treated as illocutionary-force indicators; and in the Gricean framework, they are treated as carrying conventional implicatures<sup>38</sup>. But, within relevance theory, the idea was developed that there are expressions which may be said to encode procedural constraints on the inferential phase of comprehension.

This was put forward by Diane Blakemore (1987) where the idea of procedural meaning was a very specific one. Within her study of discourse connectives and non-truth conditional meaning, Blakemore saw procedural meaning in terms of “constraints on the results of pragmatic inferences involved in the recovery of implicit content” (1987: 122). Her analysis of expressions which contribute to interpretation by constraining the way in which their host utterances are processed depended on the view that certain linguistic expressions act as semantic constraints on relevance. In other words, she maintained that there are linguistically specified devices whose contribution to the interpretation of the utterances that contain them should be analysed in terms of constraints on the relevance of the propositions in which they occur. In this way, she was able to account for the semantic and pragmatic contribution of such expressions as *so*, *after all* and *but* which presented a problem for traditional truth conditional theories because they do not feature in the truth conditions of the utterances in which they occur. The analysis of this class of expressions which encode such constraints lies in the realm of what Blakemore calls 'semantic competence', despite the fact that it relies on pragmatic information. However, it should be noted that the term “procedural” itself did not feature at all in Blakemore’s (1987) early work, instead the term “constraints” was used.

The relevance-theoretic distinction between concepts and procedures can be seen as similar to a reformulation of Kaplan's (1989) distinction between the 'content' and 'character' of lexical items. Kaplan's introduction of this distinction was intended to address the inability of Frege's semantics to deal with context-sensitivity in language, especially with reference to indexicals and demonstratives. In the case of pronominals, for example, Kaplan suggested that the content is the individual, while the character is the rule for identifying the content of such an expression in any given context. To illustrate this, I use the famous example of someone, say David Kaplan, uttering:

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<sup>38</sup> Interestingly, in his discussion of what he terms ‘discourse deixis’, Levinson (1983) includes such expressions as *but*, *therefore*, *well*, *so*, *after all* in this category because they do not function referentially. He recognized that they are ‘different’ which can be seen as alluding to being ‘procedural’.

(25) I do not exist.

In this example, the content of “I” is the individual David Kaplan; the character of ‘I’ is a rule for identifying its content in a specific context. This rule, Kaplan explains,

tell[s] us for any possible occurrence of the indexical what the referent would be, but they do not constitute the content of such an occurrence. Indexicals are directly referential. The rules tell us what it is that is referred to. Thus, they determine the content (the propositional constituent) for a particular occurrence of an indexical. But they are not a part of the content (they constitute no part of the propositional constituent). (1989: 523)

Therefore, for Kaplan, the character defines a function that is associated by convention with a certain expression. This formulation is very close to the conceptual/procedural distinction within relevance theory as they both differentiate between what a word can refer to (i.e. a referent) and what a word can encode as a procedural guide to finding that referent. However, Hedley (2007: 50-52) points out one crucial difference between Kaplan's formulation and that of relevance theory. According to him, Kaplan does not differentiate between content and character in terms of types of meaning, i.e. they are both seen as descriptive meanings in Kaplan's theory (i.e. they only label). One consequence of this might be that extra explanation is required in order to account for the fact that the character of an expression does not appear on the truth conditional level. Whereas, in relevance theory, conceptual and procedural meanings are clearly distinguished with one being representational and the other computational.

As Wilson and Sperber (1993) point out, the idea that some words encode concepts and others encode procedures need not be seen as parallel to either words contributing to explicatures/implicatures or words contributing/not contributing to truth conditional meaning. This has been a rich area of research within relevance theory since Blakemore's early work. In the next two sections, I elaborate on this.

### **3.2.1 The conceptual-procedural distinction and the explicit-implicit distinction**

Research in relevance theory has emphasized the role of pragmatic input in arriving at the explicatures communicated by an utterance, given the underdeterminacy of linguistically



encoded meaning. On the implicit level of meaning, however, the standard view was that expressions such as *but*, *moreover* and *therefore* make their contribution through Gricean conventional implicatures. The introduction of the conceptual/procedural distinction has led to a rethink of how encoded meaning, analysed in procedural terms, plays a role on the level of what is implicitly conveyed. The difficulty in paraphrasing such words as *but* justified the procedural treatment since procedural encoding is seen as placing constraints on the types of representations to be constructed in interpreting an utterance, rather than yielding representations directly. But further research has raised questions about procedural meaning seen as contributing only to what is implicitly communicated. Blakemore (2002: 4) admits that her earlier formulation of procedural encoding “must be broadened to include constraints on all aspects of inferential processing”. This means that the explicit/implicit distinction interacts with the conceptual/procedural distinction in ways that have not been envisaged in the early research. Thus, Blakemore (2007) states that the emergence of the term ‘procedural’ is, in fact, associated with the recognition that the phenomenon of procedural encoding is not exhausted by expressions which constrain implicit content.

According to Wilson & Sperber (1993), linguistic constructions can encode two basic types of information: concepts/conceptual representations or procedures for manipulating them. Conceptual mental representations from any source have two main features: (a) they have logical properties, therefore can enter into entailment or contradiction relations, as well as acting as input to logical inference rules; and (b) they have truth-conditional properties, therefore it can be used to describe a state of affairs. Procedural information, on the other hand, does not contribute directly to the truth conditions of utterances, but it has the function of constraining the inferential phase of processing by guiding the inferential device to the right path. It seems that the distinction originally depended on the general idea that the normal way for words to contribute to the explicit (truth conditional) content of utterances is by encoding concepts. However, some expressions in language have been found to contribute to either the explicit, truth-conditional content of an utterance or the implicit, non-truth conditional content without encoding concepts. Examples of such expressions are discourse particles (*so*, *therefore*, *hence*) and interjections (*oh*, *ah*, *eh*)<sup>39</sup>. A procedural analysis of such expressions explains how they contribute to relevance by guiding the hearer towards the intended cognitive effects, and hence reducing the overall effort required.

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<sup>39</sup> For an account of interjections within relevance theory see Wharton (2001; 2003).

Aligning the conceptual/procedural distinction with the explicit/implicit distinction, then, does not seem to provide an accurate picture. Wilson & Sperber (1993), therefore, distinguish between four logically possible types of meaning as follows:




Figure 5: Four types of meaning according to Wilson & Sperber (1993)

According to this figure, some of the relationships between what is linguistically encoded and the level of interpretation it contributes to are fairly straightforward, while others are not. For example, most of what have been referred to as 'content' words (e.g. nouns, verbs, etc.) are considered conceptual and truth conditional since the concepts they encode are constituents of the proposition expressed by the utterance in which they occur. Sentence adverbials such as *seriously* and *frankly*, on the other hand, are considered conceptual but non-truth conditional since the concepts they encode only contribute to the higher-level explicatures of the utterance<sup>40</sup> (Wilson and Sperber 1993; Ifantidou 1993). In (26) and (27), for example, the

<sup>40</sup> Other linguistic forms which have been claimed to constrain the process of inferring higher-level explicatures include the indicative, imperative, or subjunctive mood, rising or falling intonation, inverted word order, and

role of the sentence adverbials is seen as contributing conceptual content which is interpreted by being embedded in descriptions of speaker's attitude.

(26) Seriously, I am not going to the party.

(27) Frankly, he should not have said this.

As for linguistic items which encode procedural meaning, relevance theoretic studies have initially concentrated on those which are non-truth conditional, such as discourse connectives (e.g. *but*, *so*), which contribute to constraining the derivation of implicatures. In (28) and (29), the proposition expressed is the same, i.e. both are true iff the referent of *she* is Egyptian and friendly. But the use of *but* and *so* encourage the derivation of different inferences on the implicit level. In (28), the inference is that she is friendly contradicts and eliminates an already existing assumption held by the hearer from processing that she is Egyptian. In (29), the inference is that she is friendly is a consequence of her being Egyptian.

(28) She is Egyptian but she is friendly.

(29) She is Egyptian so she is friendly.

Arguably less frequent, there are some expressions which carry procedurally encoded information and constrain the derivation of higher-level explicatures. Intonation, for example, has been analysed in those terms (Escandell-Vidal 1998; Fretheim 2002; Clark 2007; Clark & Wharton 2009), and Blass (1990; 2000) has analysed the hearsay particle *re* in Sissala in the same way. In Chapter 6, I also argue for an analysis of the demonstrative particle in Arabic 'attentional *haa*' as encoding a procedural constraint on higher-level explicatures.

Finally, Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Hedley (2007) argued that words like pronouns and some discourse markers are procedural but truth conditional as well, as they constrain the construction of the proposition expressed. Scott (2008:21) argues that determiners work in the same way, i.e. they encode procedures which interact with the conceptual meaning of noun phrases to constrain the search for the intended referent. She compares (30a) and (30b) in terms of the amount of processing effort exerted in return for the cognitive effects gained:

(30) a. John went into town for his lunch. He was late back to the office.

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some particles and markers such as *please* and *let's*. (see Clark 1991, 1993, 2007; Clark & Wharton 2009; Escandell-Vidal 1998; Fretheim 1998; 2002).

b. John went into town for his lunch. The rascal was late back to the office.

Both the pronoun and the definite NP refer to the same entity, i.e. John, by encoding procedural instructions for the hearer to constrain the search space for the intended referent. But the cognitive difference between the two utterances lies in the extra processing effort the hearer has to exert in the case of the NP. In relevance theoretic terms, Scott explains that assuming that the utterance is relevant enough to be worth processing, the conceptual information in the NP encourages the hearer to construct contextual assumptions and arrive at a contextual implication of the sort that justifies using the extra conceptual information in (30b).

To sum up, the view of relevance theory is that pragmatic inference plays a crucial role on both sides of the explicit/implicit distinction. There are some linguistic elements which seem to involve a special kind of encoding while bearing on the truth-conditions of the utterances in which they occur. Carston (2002), for example, follows Blakemore in considering this kind of encoding as procedural, and further stresses that "the essential function of procedural encodings is to constrain processes of pragmatic inference" (2002: 162). Carston (2002: 379) also stresses the important distinction between procedural constraints that work on the explicit content of an utterance and those which work on the implicit content. Therefore, according to her, there are two main subtypes of procedural semantics: (a) constraints on the pragmatic inferences involved in deriving the explicit content of the utterance, such as the case with pronouns and tense; and (b) constraints on the pragmatic inferences involved in deriving implicatures (intended contextual assumptions / contextual implications), such as the case with discourse connectives.

### **3.2.2 The conceptual-procedural distinction and truth conditions**

Blakemore's discussion of conceptual and procedural meanings does not only have serious implications for the old debate about the division of labour between semantics and pragmatics; but it also sparked new research into the cross cutting relations between the conceptual/procedural on the one hand and the truth conditional/non-truth conditional on the other. As mentioned above, Wilson and Sperber (1993), Blakemore (2002, 2007), and others

have shown that these two sets of distinctions are not strictly parallel. Wilson and Sperber (1993: 2) suggest that:

It is tempting to assume that these two approaches are equivalent, and classify the data in identical ways. This would be so, for example, if any construction which contributed to the truth conditions of an utterance did so by encoding concepts, while all non-truth-conditional constructions encoded procedural information. We want to argue that this assumption is false.

As mentioned earlier, there are expressions which seem to encode procedures but which in fact contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance; while other expressions encode concepts but do not contribute to truth conditions. Hussein (2008) also confirms that expressions such as personal pronouns and sentence adverbials show that the parallelism does not hold. He also argues that the conceptual/procedural distinction itself is not mutually exclusive. He mentions expressions such as the definite article *the* and the conditional marker *if* as examples of items encoding both conceptual and procedural meaning.

In her discussion of terms like pronouns and demonstratives, Carston labels those expressions ‘linguistic indexicals’<sup>41</sup> which are “communicative vehicles par excellence; they encode a procedure, or rule of use” (2002: 81). In other words, they encode procedural information which reduces the search space for the pragmatic process of reference assignment. More specifically, Carston suggests that we may analyse linguistic items along the lines of a taxonomy of the different semantic and pragmatic roles they can play on the following three levels: (1) encoded information (conceptual or procedural), (2) communicative function (explicit or implicit), and (3) truth conditions. To illustrate this kind of taxonomy, the following example represents the different types of semantic/pragmatic distinctions (following Carston's example 2002: 164):

(31) She is rich but, sadly, miserable.

- a) *she*: procedural, explicit, truth-conditional (constrains the derivation of the proposition expressed).
- b) *rich*: conceptual, explicit, truth conditional (contributes to the derivation of the proposition expressed).

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<sup>41</sup> Carston uses the term ‘linguistic indexicals’ in contrast to ‘mental indexicals’ which she defines as “possible cognitive correlates of particular uses of a linguistic indexical on particular occasions” (2002: 81). Context-sensitivity is what they have in common; i.e. their semantic value is contextually determined.

- c) *but*: procedural, implicit, non-truth-conditional (constrains the derivation of the implicatures)
- d) *sadly*: conceptual, explicit, non-truth-conditional (contributes to the derivation of the higher-level explicature)
- e) *miserable*: conceptual, explicit, truth conditional (contributes to the derivation of the proposition expressed).

Note that, although *she* and *but* are both procedural in terms of encoded information, the way they achieve their communicative function is radically different. This is not only due to the fact that one operates on the explicit level while the other operates on the implicit one; the difference also lies in the nature of their encoded procedural semantics and how it manipulates the conceptual representations expressed by the rest of the utterance. Moreover, just as there seems to be different kinds of procedures, there are also different kinds of concepts. The concept RICH<sup>42</sup> in (31), for example, is intuitively different from the concepts RICH\*<sup>43</sup> and RICH\*\* in (32) and (33) respectively.

(32) This soup is very rich.

(33) He is always rich in ideas.

In all cases, the hearer is able to process the conceptual information in a way that is appropriate to the intended context of use. In the next section, I elaborate on the different kinds of concepts as seen by relevance theorists. This bears on the semantics proposed here for demonstratives with regards to distance as the conceptual component.

### 3.2.3 Types of concepts

Just as it is intuitively convenient and important to discriminate between words encoding concepts and words encoding procedures, it is equally important to recognize that there are different kinds of concepts and of procedures. This recognition has implications for our understanding of how we use and interpret language, as well as for linguistic structure itself. Fodor (1975, 1978), who dubbed concepts as “words of mentalese”, developed ‘the

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<sup>42</sup> Small caps are used to represent concepts as distinct from linguistic expressions.

<sup>43</sup> The asterisk distinguishes between the linguistically encoded concept RICH and the various (ad hoc) communicated concepts.

language of thought hypothesis', which is independent from any particular natural language, and which mainly consists of concepts. Sperber and Wilson define a concept as "an enduring elementary mental structure [stored in long term memory], which is capable of playing different discriminatory or inferential roles on different occasions in an individual's mental life." (1998: 186). Accordingly, we can think of a concept in successful communication as the main element of the thought the speaker wants to communicate and of the thought the hearer actually retrieves. Since speakers communicate such concepts via words, does this mean that for every concept there is a word that encodes it and for every word there is an encoded concept?

Sperber and Wilson (1998) have argued that the mapping between words and concepts is not a straightforward one-to-one affair. This mapping could be one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-one or a combination of these, in addition to the existence of non-lexicalised concepts. For example, synonyms in any language give evidence that there are several words which map onto the same concept; while words like *uncle*, *aunt*, *sibling* in English are non-lexicalised concepts in other languages. More interestingly, the concept RICH in examples (31)-(33) above is an instance of one word mapping onto different senses of a concept. And if we recall the argument that linguistic utterances most commonly do not fully encode what they express, as Carston (2002) discusses under the label of the 'underdeterminacy thesis', then the idea that "the kind and degree of correspondence between concepts and words is a genuine and interesting empirical issue" (Sperber and Wilson 1998: 184) seems important.

In the examples above then, what is the relation between the different senses of the concept RICH? Carston (2002: Chapter 5) discusses this issue in terms of encoded concepts versus communicated concepts. That is, in everyday communication, utterances more often convey a more specific concept than the one actually encoded by a linguistic item. In (31), for example, the concept triggers the scenario of wealth, in (32) the concept triggers the scenario of food ingredients, and in (33) the concept triggers the scenario of a large supply. Therefore, in each of these utterances an 'ad-hoc concept' of RICH is actually communicated, which is a context-specific variant of the lexically encoded concept that is constructed on the fly<sup>44</sup>. Therefore, Carston (2002: 322) concludes that,

speakers can use a lexically encoded concept to communicate a distinct non-lexicalized (atomic) concept, which resembles the encoded one in that it shares elements of its logical and encyclopaedic entries, and that the hearers

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<sup>44</sup> See also Dokic (2006), who defines ad hoc concepts as "mental representations whose instantiation is sensitive to the context of the relevant cognitive task" (2006: 310)

can pragmatically infer the intended concept on the basis of the encoded one.

An ad hoc concept, therefore, is primarily constructed pragmatically during the process of utterance interpretation. That is, an ad hoc concept is created as an “occasion-specific sense”, according to Wilson and Carston (2007: 230), of a concept in a certain context. Therefore, the creation of an ad hoc concept depends mainly on the interaction of encoded concepts with contextual information, all under the guidance of the expectations of relevance<sup>45</sup>. This view strengthens the relevance theoretic suggestion that words are only pointers to meanings or concepts which have to be inferentially worked out.

The suggestion that natural language words are schematic in nature has been taken even further with Sperber’s and Wilson’s (1998: 195) utilisation of the term ‘pro-concept’ and their suggestion that “all words behave as if they encoded pro-concepts: that is: whether or not a word encodes a full concept, the concept it is used to convey in a given utterance has to be contextually worked out”. The examples Sperber and Wilson use include words like *my*, *have*, *near*, *long*. Although these kinds of words belong to different categories, they all share the same feature: they have some conceptual content and “their semantic contribution must be contextually specified for the associated utterance to have a truth-value” (1998: 196). These kinds of words also have in common an indexical element of some sort that needs to be resolved inferentially, much like a process of reference resolution. This can be illustrated in the following manner:

(34) *my* → who?

(35) *have* → what?

(36) *near* → on what scale?

I return to the notion of pro concept and how it bears on the semantics of demonstratives in the next chapter. But I draw the attention here to the correspondence between such expressions in (34)-(36) and the proximal and distal demonstratives. Consider for example the utterances below (accompanied by a pointing gesture):

(37) a. Is *this* my book? (where the book is on the table in front of the speaker)

(38) a. Is *that* my book? (where the book is held by the hearer standing at the door)

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<sup>45</sup> See also Barsalou (1983, 1987, 1991) and Barsalou & Medin (1986) on the nature and structure of concepts in cognitive theory.



The difference between the two demonstrative forms can be easily characterised in terms of the concept of distance. This amounts to uttering:

(37) b. Is [the proximal entity] my book?

(38) b. Is [the distal entity] my book?

In order to arrive at the full propositions of the utterances, the concepts of proximity and distance need to be contextually enriched in the same way the concept of belonging encoded by the word *my* does. Questions such as ‘proximal/distal to who?’, ‘proximal/distal on what dimension?’ and ‘belongs to who?’ must be answered first. Even if the book in question is in the same spatial spot in the two cases, then the contextual dimension will change from that of physical distance to that of modal-interaction (as argued by Cornish 2001). Hence, words like *this* and *my* seem to encode concepts of a different kind than that encoded by a word like *book*; i.e. concepts that have an indexical element which needs to be worked out. It is reasonable to argue, then, that demonstratives encode distance as a pro concept. Together with attentional-directing procedural instructions, the semantic contribution of demonstratives can be understood in a better light. I discuss this in detail in the next chapter.

### 3.3 Summary

Relevance theory is a theory of communication that is grounded in cognitive and evolutionary evidence. As Pietarinen (2005) suggests, postulating the criterion of relevance as the drive behind human communication has its roots in the idea of “cognitive economy”, i.e. the idea that the goal of communication is to maximise the relevance of stimuli available to the human mind while minimising the amount of mental effort exerted in processing them. In this chapter, I attempted to highlight the view of semantics and pragmatics from a relevance theoretic perspective<sup>46</sup>. Within this view, I discussed how relevance theory characterises the role of inference in communication, which is both driven and governed by the principle of relevance. The productive and spontaneous nature of our inferential devices

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<sup>46</sup> For the latest developments in relevance theory, see Clark (forthcoming).

have been shown to be cognitively sound and indeed necessary. Inference, in the relevance-theoretic view plays a role on both the explicit and implicit levels, following the argument that words are just pointers to communicated meanings. Relevance theory explains how communicators fill this gap by assuming a distinction between conceptual and procedural encodings. In this chapter, I also discussed the implications of the conceptual-procedural distinction on other semantic distinctions, and how the differentiation between different kinds of concepts can shed a better light on the semantic contribution of different lexical items. This theoretical grounding is essential for developing my proposal for the semantics and pragmatics of demonstratives in English and Arabic which depends on a weak semantics and a powerful pragmatics working together in a relevance-driven communication. My proposal starts from the assumption that demonstratives encode a combination of conceptual and procedural information which interact with context in order to arrive at a fully propositional utterance. I present my proposal in detail in the next chapter.

## Chapter 4. The semantics and pragmatics of demonstratives

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### 4.1 The semantics of demonstratives

As discussed in the previous chapters, demonstratives as referring expressions can be interpreted either deictically or anaphorically. In this chapter, I argue for a unified account for each of the demonstratives, in English and Arabic, based on a common semantic encoding and a relevance-driven pragmatic theory of communication. I argue that demonstratives encode a procedural instruction for the hearer to create or maintain a shared level of attention to a particular entity as opposed to other referential candidates. This procedural instruction, together with encoded information about proximity or distance of the intended referent, serves to fulfill the various interpretations demonstratives are used to communicate. The implications of this proposal are twofold. First, it presents a unified account for demonstratives even in view of the primacy of the deictic mode. If we accept the opinion that demonstratives are basically ‘pointing words’ and that anaphoric uses evolved from this basic use, then it is plausible to think of a common semantic core underlying their different uses. Second, this semantic characterisation accounts for the way demonstratives contribute to the explicit as well as the implicit side of communication. This is explained in terms of the interaction between the attention-directing semantics and the notion of distance which is encoded as a pro-concept. Distance, in this sense, is seen as a continuum which achieves relevance by falling within the scope of the procedure.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 4.1, I propose a semantic analysis of a range of demonstratives making use of the notions of distance and attention, with reference to both English and Arabic. The demonstrative forms discussed in English are the proximal *this/these* and the distal *that/those*. The demonstrative forms discussed in Arabic are the proximal *haadhaal/haadhihi/ha’ulaa’* and the distal *dhaalikal/tilkal’ulaa’ika*. I argue that demonstratives encode a procedure whose function is to establish or maintain a joint level of attention for referents in discourse. In section 4.2, I discuss the contribution of demonstratives to both the explicit and implicit sides of communication, illustrating with corpus examples. Various text-external and text-internal examples are discussed. I then consider first-mention use of demonstratives, i.e. demonstratives used to refer to an entity that has not been mentioned before in discourse.

### 4.1.1 What do demonstratives encode?

In the previous chapter, we saw that the view that linguistic items can encode different types of meaning has led to a big surge in research into the nature of these meanings, the relationship between them and which linguistic item encodes which type of meaning. The main content words in language, i.e. nouns, verbs and adjectives, are seen as the typical conceptual encoders; while the more functional items in language, such as pronouns, connectives, and deictic expressions are perceived as suitable candidates for a procedural treatment. In this chapter, I take a closer look at what demonstratives encode, arguing that by applying the conceptual-procedural distinction, we can adopt a unified account for the semantics and pragmatics of demonstratives, with evidence from English and Arabic.

Despite the fact that all languages have some form of demonstratives, it is not easy to define universal features for demonstratives across languages. Even a seemingly basic assumption such as spatial demonstratives encode information about distance is not to be considered a universal feature<sup>47</sup>. However, since the discussion here is concerned with demonstratives in English and Arabic, it is reasonable to argue that there are three assumptions about demonstratives as referring expressions in those two languages that are largely agreed upon: (a) that demonstratives are used to refer to an entity; (b) that demonstratives convey aspects of the spatial orientation between speaker, addressee, and reference objects; and (c) that context can make the use of demonstratives richer than one would expect on the basis of the simple proximal-distal distinction. The interaction of these three assumptions results in the wide range of interpretations of demonstratives in spoken and written discourse. Therefore, any theoretical account that proposes an analysis of demonstratives needs to account for three aspects: (a) the semantics encoded by demonstratives; (b) the communicative role of demonstratives; and (c) the general theory which controls the interaction of (a) and (b) with context in discourse.

In the huge body of literature on (English) demonstratives, their communicative role seems to have been explored from every angle (e.g. Lakoff 1974; Halliday and Hasan 1976; Lyons 1977; Fillmore 1982; McCarthy 1994; Himmelmann 1996). As for spatial meaning, proximity and distance are generally thought of as the semantic notions encoded by forms in two-way demonstrative systems. The more cognitive approaches to demonstratives have

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<sup>47</sup> See Diessel (1999), Enfield (2003), Kemmerer (1999) for examples.

explored their communicative role from the cognitive point of view. Ariel (1990) and Gundel et al (1993), for example, associate this role with a corresponding accessibility level of the referent; while Diessel (1999; 2006) closely tied it to the notion of joint attention. Attempts within relevance theory, e.g. Scott (2010), provide a semantic analysis within a pragmatic theory which together explain the interpretation of a range of demonstratives in a range of contexts. My argument starts from the assumption that such a theory is needed if we ever want to draw a coherent picture of the workings of these linguistic items which every language seems to have. I see relevance theory as particularly suited for this task for two main reasons. First, it provides us with the theoretic tools to describe what is encoded by demonstratives, by maintaining a distinction between what is conceptual and what is procedural. Second, a relevance-theoretic framework anchors the interpretation of demonstratives in a relevance-driven communicative act where the speaker aims at being relevant and the hearer expects that. Since demonstratives are highly contextual items which depend on the context to derive various interpretations, there should be some parameters for exploiting context in this way which is not too rigid to expect the semantics to account for all interpretations nor too loose to lead to inferential chaos. In this sense, the relevant contextual assumptions will be considered in the interpretation process, bearing in mind considerations of relevance.

In brief, my main assumptions for a relevance-theoretic proposal for the interpretation of demonstratives in English and Arabic are as follows:

- (a) Demonstratives encode a procedure which directs the hearer to create/maintain a joint level of attention to the intended referent
- (b) Demonstratives encode a (pro)concept of distance which falls under the scope of the procedural semantics.
- (c) The interaction of (a) and (b) with context is relevance-driven.

One caveat needs to be mentioned though. The formulation of procedural meaning is, by its nature, notoriously difficult to spell out. As mentioned in the previous chapter, procedures are essentially computations, and computations, by definition, cannot be pinned down in conceptual terms. Wilson and Sperber confirm that by saying that “we have direct access neither to grammatical computations nor to the inferential computations used in comprehension” (1993: 16). Hedley (2007: 35), in his work on the procedural meaning of

pronouns, explains how this bears on his proposals:

While maintaining a somewhat meta-linguistic format, I will make proposals reasonably explicit, though with the proviso that nothing crucial rests on the precise formulations put forward, either in terms of 'mentalese' generally, or in terms of instructions for inferential computations. The important element will be the content of my proposals for such procedural formulations, and how that content interacts with general principles of relevance theory, and the comprehension procedure that is a central tenet of it.

Bearing this in mind, my proposed semantics for demonstratives in English and Arabic are repeated here as follows:

- English/Arabic proximal demonstratives → create/maintain a joint level of attention to the intended proximal referent as opposed to other non-proximal candidate referents.
- English/Arabic distal demonstratives → create/maintain a joint level of attention to the intended distal referent as opposed to other non-distal candidate referents.

#### 4.1.2 Demonstratives and distance

Imagine two friends playing scrabble on a Friday night. Player A holds the square displaying the letter S in a desperate attempt to get any extra points by adding it to any word on the board. Player B wants to help so he can utter any of the following, accompanying his utterance with a pointing gesture:

- (1) You can add it to *this* word or *that* word.
- (2) You can add it to *this* word or *this* word.
- (3) You can add it to *that* word or *that* word.

These utterances reveal two points. First, that demonstratives code spatial information about the referent; and second that the conceptualisation of space is contextually relative. That is why a speaker can use proximal and distal forms freely as in (1)-(3) to refer to the same

entities but from different spatial perspectives. The spatial root of demonstratives is clearly one of the examples of how language conceptualises such notions as distance, space and time. Reboul (1997: 11), for example, argues that the information encoded by demonstratives "has to do with the relative distance between the speaker and the object designated", and that "it has a spatial content which closely parallels that between 'here' and 'there'". What is common about such deictic expressions is what Bühler (1982: 13) called the 'deictic centre' or 'origo' which is the stable axis in a context-free dimension. The role of context, as the utterances above show, is key in understanding the demonstratives.

Demonstratives are usually associated with deixis in physical space, i.e. referring indexically to entities in the physical context surrounding the interlocutors. This is termed in the literature the exophoric uses (cf. Halliday and Hasan 1976, Himmelman 1996, Lakoff 1974). Maes and de Rooij (2007), however, explain that the spatial meaning of demonstratives should be seen more like a spectrum of a range of extensions of the basic spatial configuration. This spatial configuration ranges from the simple spatial propositions expressed by items like *in* and *on*, to the "more complex metaphorical conceptualizations like *marriage is a journey* or *a career is an ascending pathway*" (2007: 83). This is also reflected in using demonstratives not to refer exophorically to entities in the physical context, but to refer endophorically to entities in the discourse. The various interpretations of the anaphoric and discourse deictic uses of demonstratives are associated with different degrees of what Maes and de Rooij (2007: 84) term "mental nearness". If we go back to our friends who are playing scrabble, player A loses the game then utters either (4) or (5):

(4) I always lose in Scrabble. I hate *this*.

(5) I always lose in Scrabble. I hate *that*.

Again, both utterances are acceptable. The speaker can equally use the proximal or the distal demonstrative to refer to the proposition that [he always loses in Scrabble]<sup>48</sup>. Whether it is physical distance or mental distance, some aspect of distance seems to be encoded in the demonstratives. But is the function of a demonstrative only to express distance? If the answer is yes, then how can we explain utterances (1)-(3) where the same entity was referred to by spatially different demonstratives? If the answer is no, then what else is semantically encoded by demonstratives such as *this* and *that*?

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<sup>48</sup> Although, it can be argued that using *that* in (5) refers to the fact that I always lose in Scrabble, while using *this* in (4) refers to the feeling that results from me always losing in Scrabble.

Maes and de Rooij (2007: 84) provide a starting point for answering this question. They claim that:

It is reasonable to assume that the interpretation of demonstratives in any context ultimately relies on the fundamental spatial configuration of human communication, and it is equally reasonable to assume that no demonstrative ever expresses space or distance directly, i.e. without the mediation of a speaker who conceptualizes space on the basis of his or her perspective, attention and intentions.

On this view, the very *raison d'être* for the existence of two sets of linguistic items in a two-way demonstrative system in a language such as English is to provide contrastive axes to the spatial configuration of space that they encode. Otherwise, either the definite article or the third person pronoun would have been sufficient. But utterances (1)-(3) show that even physical distance is indeed relative since the choice of a proximal or distal form in all three examples does not affect the reference resolution process itself. To explain the differences in interpretations, one will have to resort to such notions as attention, perspective, or intention. Similarly, moving from the basic deictic use to the discourse use (which Lakoff (1974: 346) claims is “derived from it by a process of metaphorization, or abstraction”), as illustrated in (4) and (5), also leaves us wondering about the effect the coding of distance has on the interpretation process. Taking for granted that demonstratives semantically encode proximity/distance, the key to understanding how this affects our interpretation of demonstratives is to consider that this encoding of distance has important system-internal implications. In other words, it is intuitively plausible to assume that when you describe something as near, you are cognitively allowed to compare that with something else that is far; i.e. the existence of a proximal referent may be said to imply the existence of other non-proximal referents. This line of reasoning will help us to do two things: (a) elaborate how the notions of attention, perspective or intention can explain the way demonstratives exploit, if they do, the encoding of distance in interpretation; and (b) lead to the consolidation of this view in the very semantics of demonstratives.

I discuss the notion of attention in detail in the next section, so I mention here briefly how the notions of intention and perspective bear on this discussion. As Scott (2009: 161-163) points out, the role intentions play in reference has been discussed by Kaplan (1989). He highlights the importance of speaker intention even in the physical act of demonstration saying that the demonstration should be regarded “a mere externalization of this inner intention” which itself determines the referent” (Kaplan 1989: 582 quoted in Scott 2009:



162). Scott, in turn, argues that this fits well with the fact that speakers' intentions assume a big role in reference resolution within a relevance theoretic framework. According to her, "all referential uses of 'this' and 'that' are dependent on the speaker's intentions whether or not they are accompanied by extra, externalised clues" (2009: 162). Therefore, the speaker's choice of whether to use a proximal or a distal form is driven by his/her intention to refer to an entity and label it as either proximal or distal. She quotes Bach (1992: 145) explaining this procedure as "you decide to refer to something and try to select an expression whose utterance will enable your audience, under the circumstances, to identify that object" (quoted in Scott 2009: 163). The audience interpreting (1)-(3) will be able to identify the objects in question, but how does the speaker's choice of demonstrative affect their overall interpretation of the utterances which only differ in their coding of distance? This brings us to the notion of perspective, i.e. identification of intention leads to a possible role for perspective.

Perspective is relevant in reference resolution inasmuch as the speaker as a deictic centre is. It is possible for the referent of a proximal demonstrative to be more distant with respect to the deictic centre than the referent of a distal demonstrative. Consider example (6), within the context of the Scrabble game, where player A is pointing to a word at the far end of the board from himself saying<sup>49</sup>:

(6) A: You can add it to *this* word.

B: You mean *that* word?

A: Yes. *That* word<sup>50</sup>.

The changes in the proximal and distal forms are not associated with a change in physical distance but with a change in perspective. Choosing to use a proximal form to refer to an entity physically far from the speaker is seen as an attempt to relate to the point of view of the hearer rather than to follow any metric conventions. The choice could also be seen as

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<sup>49</sup> The acceptability of this example largely depends on the physical gesturing that accompanies the demonstratives. I use this example to show that, in the right circumstances, demonstratives can be manipulated in that way. In interpretation, the internal contrast in the demonstrative helps to point out other possible referents the speaker might have had in mind. This is not to say, however, that proximal/distal demonstratives are interchangeable in all contexts. Compare, for example, (6) accompanied by a gesture where speaker A actually touches the word with his/her finger, to a case where s/he doesn't.

<sup>50</sup> Compare this example with a similar one in Scott (2010: 155), where she takes it that each speaker assesses the proximity/distance of the entity relative to herself, i.e. from her own perspective:

Natasha: Pass me that book.

Marya: This book?

Natasha: Yes, that book.

intentionally designed to help the hearer arrive at the intended referent. Once the hearer seems to have done that, the speaker shifts back to the ‘default’ perspective, i.e. the one that corresponds to distance. Such uses of demonstratives have been recognised in the literature and labelled ‘emotional’ uses (Lakoff 1974), ‘empathetic’ uses (Lyons 1977: 677) or ‘modal’ uses (Cornish 2001). Cornish (2001: 298), for example, suggests that,

the choice of one rather than another of the members of a closed system of indexical expressions is a discourse-creative act, manifesting different types of sociodiscoursal relationships between speaker and addressee, as well as the viewpoint from which the referent is envisaged.

This seems particularly relevant for examples such as (4) and (5) where physical distance is not at issue. If we apply Cornish’s view of modal reference, the distal demonstrative in (5) has a “distancing value” (2001: 304) as the speaker does not wish to associate him/herself with the referent. Indeed, this distancing effect is corroborated with the negative attitude signalled by the verb *hate*. But what about the proximal demonstrative in (4)? According to Cornish, this would be used when the speaker wishes to identify with the referent “placing it within his/her discourse cognitive sphere” (2001: 305). In the case of (4) and (5), then, reference resolution itself is not affected but the choice of demonstrative may be said to have an effect on a more pragmatic level. To paraphrase it, the speaker uses *this* to reflect a personal attitude towards the referent, whereas s/he uses *that* to comment on the referent from the outside.

The notion of perspective is not restricted to demonstratives. An extension of this notion can be seen in studies of stylistics and narrative analysis of what is termed ‘focalisation’ (cf. Black 2006; Herman & Vervaeck 2001 for example). According to Herman and Vervaeck (2001: 70-80), there are two kinds of focalisation: external and internal. External focalisation is equivalent to external point of view, where the information conveyed is limited to what the speaker says or does with no indication of his/her personal thoughts or feelings. Internal focalisation, on the other hand, expresses an internal point of view, where the information is conveyed in terms of the speaker’s conceptual and/or perceptual perspective. But while the characterisation of focalisation in narrative analysis is determined by several factors (grammatical, semantic, pragmatic, etc.), the characterisation of perspective in demonstratives is determined originally in their coding of distance. I would further argue that the characterisation of perspective in relation to demonstratives is determined in their coding of distance in view of the existence of two contrastive spatial

forms. Kemmerer (1999: 52) explains this in the following terms: “the proximal demonstrative ‘this’ means simply ‘closer to the deictic center than ‘that’” and, conversely, the distal demonstrative ‘that’ means simply ‘further from the deictic center than ‘this’”. If we take this to be semantically encoded by demonstratives, then we are one step closer to a unified account of their uses whether in expressing physical or metaphorical distance.

To summarise, I have argued in this section that the notion of distance is semantically encoded by demonstratives in English<sup>51</sup>. I have also argued that proximity and distance, as contextual notions, have a contrastive relationship that features in the semantics of the demonstratives and which can be manipulated according to the speakers’ intentions and perspectives. The discussion so far has focussed on demonstratives in English; however I take it that all claims within can be applied to demonstratives in Arabic (and possibly many other languages). Due to the lack of literature discussing the notion of distance in Arabic demonstratives from the semantic point of view, I add a brief comment. Classical Arabic originally had a three-way system of near, medial, and far demonstratives. The medial demonstratives are grammatically marked by adding *kaaf ’al ḥitaab* (kaaf for addressing) to the basic demonstrative *dhaa* (for masculine) and *tii* (for feminine). Therefore, the medial demonstrative forms are *dhaak* (mas. sing.), *tiik/taak* (fem. sing.), and *’ulaa’ik* (plur.)<sup>52</sup> (Babty 1992, Hassan 1995). According to Babty (1992: 100), the general view is that the judgement about the distance of the referent in terms of nearness or farness or midway distance is “متروك لرأي المتكلم” (“left for the speaker’s opinion”). Similarly, Hassan (1995: 322) comments that the estimation of distance is left for the speaker to decide according to the norm and his relationship with the addressee. This again points to the roles of intention and perspective. Interestingly, however, MSA has developed a preference for a more trimmed two-way system, where the medial demonstratives have been used less and less frequently. There are two exceptions, though. First, the plural form *’ulaa’ik* has taken its place as the distal demonstrative instead of *’ulaa’*. Second, the singular masculine form *dhaak* has retained its position in idiomatic contrastive expressions<sup>53</sup> such as (7), compared to the feminine equivalent which still uses the proximal/distal forms:

<sup>51</sup> There are of course languages whose demonstratives do not encode distance at all, such as German and the Turkish demonstrative *şu* (see Diessel 1999 for more examples).

<sup>52</sup> There are also dual medial forms, which, like their proximal and distal counterparts, are rarely used.

<sup>53</sup> In the entire Arabic corpus, there are 9 instances of *dhaak*, half of which occur in contrastive expressions. However, while (7) may well be interpreted deictically as referring to objects in the physical environment or anaphorically to refer to previously mentioned entities, this contrastive construction is popular in non-deictic uses where they have a vague reference. Such generic uses of demonstrative constructions also exist in English (e.g. *he talked about this and that*) and other languages such as Chinese. Wu (2004: 126), who compares

(7) لا أريد هذا ولا ذلك

laa	'uriid	hadhaa	wa	laa	dhaak
not	want-I	hadhaa	and	not	dhaak

I don't want **this** nor **that**.

The reasons why medial distance ceased to be an important distinction in MSA is beyond the scope of this discussion<sup>54</sup>. However, it remains relevant that distance is semantically encoded in Arabic demonstratives. As in English, speakers' opinions play a bigger role in actual use than considerations of physical or textual distance. Such opinions can affect the interpretation of demonstratives because they manipulate the contrastive relationship between the proximal and the distal.

Returning again to the question: Is the function of demonstratives in languages such as English and Arabic only to code distance? I mention two similar answers which my own proposal builds on. Maes and de Rooij (2007: 83) state that "the ultimate communicative function of demonstratives is not aimed at expressing distance". Enfield (2003: 86) further explains that "the basic function of demonstratives is not to specify WHERE something is, but rather to specify WHICH ONE you are talking about" (emphasis in the original). This is for him what demonstratives do to solve the "co-ordination problem" that is created in the act of reference between a speaker, a hearer and an object. This brings us to the notion of attention and how it is translated into a procedure that is semantically encoded by demonstratives with scope over the concept of distance.

#### 4.1.3 Demonstratives and attention

The association between the cognitive notion of attention and demonstratives as a system in language is hardly a new idea. In philosophy of language, Russell (1940: 111), for example, analysed demonstratives in terms of the notion "object of attention". C. S. Peirce, in his famous characterisation of linguistic items as signs, maintained that a demonstrative is an 'Index', whose main function is "that of forcing the attention upon its object" (quoted in Fitzjerald 1966: 58). In the linguistic tradition, demonstratives are used to direct an

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demonstratives in these two languages, describes such cases as being "used generically for things in general allowed by the particular discourse context in which they are used". In these cases, the author argues, the demonstratives lose their definiteness as well as their egocentric demonstrativeness.

<sup>54</sup> A similar situation is seen with the locatives *huna*, *hunaak* and *hunaalik* (here, medial-there, there), where the distal form *hunaalik* is rarely used in MSA, and instead the medial form assumed the position of the distal.

addressee's attention to a particular "region of the environment", as Lyons calls it (1977: 655), in order to arrive at the intended referent. Similarly, since demonstratives are primarily thought of as deictic expressions, Ehlich (1982: 325) defines deixis as "a linguistic means for achieving focusing of the hearer's attention towards a specific item which is part of the respective deictic space".

The notion of attention has also been associated with demonstratives in other languages. Dutch demonstratives, for example, have been analysed in terms of their "attention-directing aspect" (Kirsner and Van Heuven 1988: 237). Leonard (1995: 273) analyses demonstratives in Swahili in terms of "a speaker's relative concentration of attention on a referent". Küntay and Özyürek (2006) argue that the Turkish demonstrative system, which has a three-way distinction of distance, obligatorily reflects the addressee's attention, or lack of it, on the intended referent. Their study of how children use demonstratives as attention-directing devices has led them to the conclusion that "designing referential forms in consideration of recipient's attentional status during conversation is a pragmatic feat that takes more than six years to develop" (2006: 303). For Spanish, which also has a three-way demonstrative system, Hernández (2009) characterises demonstratives as 'lexical focus markers' by virtue of "focusing the hearer's attentional state on specific discourse referents".

Cognitive approaches to the study of referring expressions have also resorted to cognitive notions such as attention, accessibility and focus. Accessibility has been exploited in Ariel's (1990) Accessibility Theory and Gundel et al.'s. (1993) Givenness Hierarchy. Strauss (1993), on the other hand, characterised the differences between *this/that/it* in terms of focus. For Ariel, accessibility is a psychological notion which is encoded by a referring expression. Accordingly, *this* and *that* are mid accessibility markers. For Gundel et al., accessibility is a reflection of the cognitive status encoded by a referring expression, where a cognitive status is defined as the assumed attention status of the intended referent in the mind of the addressee. The English demonstrative pronouns, for example, encode an Activated status, i.e. the intended referent is represented in the current short-term memory of the addressee. Strauss, on the other hand, develops a 'schema of focus' for the three referring expressions *this*, *that* and *it*. The notion of focus is translated as the degree of attention which the speaker instructs the addressee to pay to the intended referent. Accordingly, *this* signals the highest degree of focus required, while *that* only signals a medium degree.

However, there is one important difference in the way the notions of accessibility, on the one hand, and focus, on the other, are linked to demonstratives. Accessibility and

cognitive attentional states for Ariel (1990) and Gundel et al. (1993) are attributed to referents BEFORE they are referenced using a demonstrative; whereas the degree of focus of attention for Strauss (1993) is attributed to referents AFTER they are referenced using a demonstrative. Therefore, in example (4), repeated below, Gundel et al would argue that the demonstrative pronoun signals that the intended referent (i.e. the proposition [I always lose in Scrabble]) has an Activated cognitive status and that is why the speaker chooses to use this form to refer to it. But, according to Strauss, by using the proximal demonstrative pronoun, the speaker is telling the hearer to attribute a high degree of focus to the intended referent just mentioned.

(4) I always lose in Scrabble. I hate *this*.

The distinction<sup>55</sup>, in my view, could be useful in the kinds of theories which promote the association between demonstratives and notions such as attention (focus or accessibility) as a state. Approaches which look into the cognitive state of the referent before it is referred to, as Gundel et al. (1993) do, would be better suited for predicting the necessary conditions for using a certain referring expression; whereas an approach which looks into the cognitive state of the referent after it has been referred to would be better suited for capturing the role referring expressions play in the information structure of discourse. In other words, whether it is claimed that the proposition [I always lose in Scrabble] is currently in the hearer's short term memory or it will assume a high degree of focus in the hearer's mind, these two claims answer different questions about the use of a demonstrative as a referring expression.

In my view, I propose to regard the notion of attention not only as a state, but as a process, or more adequately, an attention-directing procedure. Again, this is not a new idea. Recall Ehlich's (1982: 325) definition of deixis above as "a linguistic means for achieving focusing of the hearer's attention towards a specific item which is part of the respective deictic space". Demonstratives are primarily 'pointing words' and pointing in itself is an activity rather than a state. Enfield's (2003) description of the function of demonstratives as solving a 'co-ordination problem' is the first step to explain how attention as a procedure is linked to demonstratives as a class. To elaborate on this, I first comment on the notion of attention as a psychological concept, then I discuss how this is related to demonstratives as a universal feature following Diessel (2006).

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<sup>55</sup> Hernández (2009) has also pointed to this distinction in her corpus-based study of Spanish demonstratives.

Attention is considered a core cognitive process in theories of psychology. As a result, there is a huge body of literature on attention from the psychological/cognitive point of view (Deutsch & Deutsch 1963; Anderson 2004; Wright & Ward 2008 *inter alia*). For the purpose of this discussion, I only highlight two main points that we can benefit from. First, the idea that whether a given stimulus is attended to or not depends on two criteria: (a) its inherent saliency, and (b) the cognitive state of the observer. To illustrate this, imagine that you are at the airport picking up a friend's friend, and all you know about her is that she will be wearing a red coat. While you are screening passengers coming out of the gate, your attention may be captured by inherently salient entities such as a passenger with a really big suitcase or a passenger crying. But your attention will also be influenced by your knowledge so that you will direct your attention to any female wearing a red coat even though it is not inherently salient. If we apply this to our discussion, demonstratives have been described as referring to more or less salient entities, whether in the physical environment or in discourse. However, unlike the simple mechanism of visual attention which only involves an object and an observer, the act of referring involves three parties: a speaker, an audience and an object. Therefore, as the examples above show, especially (6), the act of referring is influenced both by the element of distance and the speaker's cognitive attitude to this distance in relation to the addressee.

The second point is related to the very definition of attention as a cognitive process. It is intuitively plausible to argue that if you direct your attention to some entity, this implies the existence of other entities that you need not pay attention to. The definition of attention from the psychological point of view supports this intuition. William James, the 19<sup>th</sup> century psychologist, defines attention as follows:

Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession of the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalisation, concentration of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others. (1890/1983: 403)

The implication which attention carries is that there are other entities you withdraw your attention from, and this sits well with the way demonstratives are understood in discourse. Whether a demonstrative is deictic in the sense of referring to an object in the physical environment (probably accompanied by a pointing gesture in a spoken discourse), or anaphoric in the sense of referring to a previously mentioned entity in a written discourse, the

fact that demonstratives encode distance (via a two-way distinction or more) brings about the implication that there are other potential intended referents. The function of a demonstrative, then, becomes to signal a procedure to direct one's attention to the intended referent as opposed to the other potential referents. This is one of the main differences between demonstratives and other referring expressions such as the definite article or third person pronouns. When player B wants to help player A find a place for his "s" and utters (8):

(8) You can add it to *this* word.

The demonstrative does not only provide a spatial orientation for the intended referent, i.e. that it is proximal to the speaker, it is also signalling that it is proximal compared to other entities in the surrounding context. The hearer would normally use this information to help him/her individuate the intended referent, but sometimes that is not all. With a sneaky intonation and facial expression, the speaker might utter (8) to direct the hearer's attention on a particular word so that s/he would ignore other potential words which might give him/her a bigger score. In the first case, the demonstrative is said to contribute to the explicit side of communication; in the second, the contribution of the demonstrative goes beyond that to the implicit side too.

The characterisation of attention as an integral part of the 'meaning' of demonstratives has been defended by Diessel (2006), who uses evidence from linguistic typology, historical linguistics and language acquisition to argue for the idea that demonstratives constitute a unique class in language. For this purpose, he further refines the notion of attention to that of 'joint attention' to capture the role played by demonstratives in human communication. The common cognitive thread underlying joint attention as a phenomenon and demonstratives as a class is the fact that both involve a complex tripartite relationship between "the actor, the addressee, and an object of reference" (2006: 465), in Diessel's terms. According to him, joint attention requires that those engaged in communication recognise that they are attending to the same thing. This can be achieved by eye gaze, gestures, or the use of language. Eye gaze and gestures are two types of joint attentional behaviour which, Diessel argues, mark the development of triadic interactions from dyadic ones around the first year of age. Typically, a dyadic interaction only involves two parties (person-person or person-object), whereas a triadic interaction adds a third party (person-person-object). Crucial to the discussion of demonstratives is how Diessel analyses the function of deictic pointing, i.e. the basic form of joint attentional gesturing. According to him (466), deictic pointing serves two functions: (a)



to provide spatial orientation for an object, and (b) to establish or manipulate a joint focus of attention. Therefore, he dismisses the idea that the function of demonstratives is only to indicate the location of the referent. For him, this view overlooks the communicative function of demonstratives.

Diessel (1999; 2006) champions the view that the exophoric use of demonstratives is the equivalent of deictic pointing and that all other endophoric uses are “extensions of the exophoric use: they appear later in language acquisition and provide the starting point for the historical development of demonstratives into grammatical markers” (2006: 470). It is the communicative function which they serve that unites them and makes it plausible to think of a common semantic core underlying these uses. Diessel (1999: 2) further lists in detail the range of functions he sees demonstratives are able to serve in discourse (my italics):

They are primarily used to *focus the hearer's attention* on objects or locations in the speech situation (often in combination with a pointing gesture), but they may also function to *organize the information flow* in the ongoing discourse. More specifically, demonstratives are often used to *keep track of prior discourse participants* and to *activate specific shared knowledge*. The most basic function of demonstratives is, however, to *orient the hearer outside of discourse on the surrounding situation*.

Note that the functions of focussing, activating or orienting are all mental processes or activities rather than states. Diessel’s notion of joint attention provides the main ingredient towards a unified account of the range of functions demonstratives are able to perform. It is specifically adequate for two reasons. First, it enables us to relate the behaviour of demonstratives to the cognitive notion of attention as a process rather than a state. Second, it not only enables us to account for the basic exophoric use, but also to account for the two fundamental referring acts demonstratives can perform in endophoric uses: to refer anaphorically or cataphorically to referents in discourse, and to refer to new referents in discourse. In other words, the process of directing attention need not be restricted to other notions such as familiarity or previous mention. You can equally direct your hearer’s attention to an entity you have just mentioned or to an entity you will mention soon. This is how demonstratives manipulate the level of joint attention to referents in discourse.

In his typological study of demonstratives in 85 language samples, Diessel (1999) also argues that in many languages demonstratives are uninflected particles. He further adds that “genuine demonstratives are particles, which developed only later into pronouns,

determiners and other syntactic categories in diachronic change” (2006: 474). This leads us to demonstratives in Arabic and where they fall in the discussion about attention. Arabic grammarians traditionally classify words in Arabic in three categories: (a) nouns, (b) verbs, and (c) particles. Hassan (1994: 87) explains that what decides the scope of each category depends on how one defines it. That is, some rely on considerations of form (i.e. grammatical features) and others rely on considerations of meaning (i.e. semantic features). An approach which depends on semantic features, for example, according to Hassan (1994: 87), maintains that “الاسم ما دل على مسمى، والفعل ما دل على حدث وزمن والحرف ما ليس كذلك” (“a noun is what signifies an entity, a verb is what signifies an action and a time, and a particle is what is neither”). Note how particles are only defined negatively instead of describing their own semantic contribution. Following this view, demonstratives would belong to the category of nouns. However, considerations of grammatical features (e.g. inflection) would render them special kinds of nouns. If grammatical features were given supremacy over the semantic ones, then demonstratives might be considered particles instead. Particles have been described as “ما دل على معنى في غيره” (“what signifies meaning in another entity”) according to Al-ġalayinii (1993: 12), which is probably more suitable for their semantics. Therefore, Hassan argues for a new classification of words in Arabic which takes into consideration features related to both form and meaning. According to him, following this view would solve many borderline cases, including adjectives or *ṣifaat*, adverbs or *dhuruuf*, and pronouns or *damaa’ir*<sup>56</sup>.

However, pronouns, including demonstrative pronouns are traditionally regarded within the category of nouns or *asmaa’*. Indeed demonstratives in Arabic are called *’asmaa’ ’al-’ishaarah* (literally, names of pointing). This term alone gives us two indications: (a) an indication of meaning in terms of signifying an entity, and (b) an indication of attention in terms of a pointing process whose function is to direct attention. The close relationship between the notion of attention and demonstratives in Arabic is emphasised in two ways. First, according to Hassan (1994: 110), the category of pronouns, which includes demonstrative, person and relative pronouns, share a semantic core that has to do with the meaning of presence/absence. For example, first and second person pronouns signify presence, while third person pronouns signify absence; demonstrative pronouns signify degrees of presence, while relative pronouns signify absence. Presence/absence as semantic core meanings (together with other core meanings such as negation, condition, and question)

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<sup>56</sup> Accordingly, Hassan (1994: 90) suggests 7 categories of linguistic items in Arabic as follows: nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, pronouns, particles and items in affective language.

are generally conveyed by particles. But, according to Hassan (1994: 111), demonstrative pronouns share some grammatical, formal, semantic and diachronic features which justifies grouping them into a separate category rather than considering them members of the nouns or particles categories. Semantically speaking, the essential condition for being referring expressions is that they lack reference in themselves although they are used “للدلالة على معين” (“to refer to a specific entity”) with the help of “قرائن السياق” (“evidence from context”) (Hassan 1994: 110). Therefore, demonstratives, for Hassan, have a ‘functional’ meaning of referring to a present/absent entity. The link between the act of demonstration and the notion of presence/absence intuitively implies an awareness, even manipulation, of the level of attention awarded to the intended referents according to their level of physical or cognitive presence.

Second, the morphological makeup itself of demonstratives in MSA emphasises the notion of attention. Demonstrative pronouns for Hassan (1994) do not include only the proximal and distal forms, but also the locatives *hunaa* and *hunaak* (*here* and *there*). This conforms with typological evidence which Diessel (2006: 483) explains is contradictory to the traditional view that demonstratives only include *this* and *that* while *here* and *there* are considered locational adverbs. In Diessel’s words, these forms “share important semantic features and often contain the same deictic roots”. What these forms in Arabic have in common is the first morpheme *haa* which is known in the Arabic grammar tradition as *haa* ‘*al-tanbiih* or attentional *haa*<sup>57</sup>. As mentioned in chapter 2, demonstrative forms in MSA are essentially compound forms, made up of the root demonstrative *dhaa* and attentional *haa* and which undergoes different consonant and vowel changes to result in different forms according to gender, number or case. Fleisch (1970), however, considers that both *dhaa* and *haa* are among the ‘demonstrative bases’ in Arabic. Although it is outside the scope of this study to present a detailed account of how and when the process of grammaticalisation of the root demonstrative *dhaa* into the form *haadhhaa* in MSA occurred, evidence from typological studies suggests that this is not an unusual case. Diessel (2006: 474) explains that,

Since demonstratives are very frequent they are often phonetically and pragmatically reduced. In order to strengthen such a reduced demonstrative it may be combined with other linguistic expressions. Very often, the reinforcing element is another demonstrative (cf. French *celui-ci* vs. *celui-la*); but occasionally a weakened demonstrative is strengthened by a

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<sup>57</sup> See also Chapter 6 (section 6.2.1.1) for a more detailed discussion about attentional *haa*.

content word such as Latin *ecce* ‘behold’, which reinforced the weakened demonstrative *ille* in Vulgar Latin.

What these examples have in common with demonstrative forms in MSA is that the reinforcing element is closely related to the notion of attention.

Therefore, Hassan (1995: 231) argues that attentional *haa* got its name from the fact that it fulfils two functions: (a) “تنبية الغافل إلى ما بعدها” (“to alert the inattentive hearer to what follows it”), or (b) “إشعار غير الغافل إلى أهمية ما بعدها، وجلال شأنه ليتفرغ له” (“to make the attentive hearer feel the importance of what follows it so that he will pay attention to it”). In this sense, the analysis of demonstratives in MSA as encoding both distance and the notion of joint attention naturally follows from their morphological roots. It is also worth mentioning that Cantarino (1975) has made an interesting claim about the origin of Arabic demonstratives. He states that “all Arabic forms of the demonstrative pronouns were originally elements of interjectional character, which, after the fading of this effect, have become particles of demonstrative determination” (1975: 30). As far as I know, this claim is yet to be substantiated with diachronic evidence<sup>58</sup>, given that Diessel claims that “roots [of demonstratives] are generally so old that they cannot be traced back to other types of expressions” (2006: 475). However, even if Cantarino’s argument is true, the interjectional nature he claims was the origin of demonstratives in Arabic conforms to their analysis as encoders of the notion of attention in terms of the cognitive awareness of mental states between speaker and hearer.

To sum up, I have argued in this section that demonstratives in English and Arabic can be said to be linked to the notion of attention. More specifically, I have argued that attention in this case should be seen more like a process, not a state, which reflects a joint effort on part of a speaker and a hearer. Unlike the notion of distance, which is not encoded by demonstratives in some languages, the notion of attention can be regarded as a universal feature. Although this notion has long been linked to the ‘function’ of the demonstratives, it remains unclear how and whether this notion features at all in their semantic representations. Diessel (2006) argues that defining demonstratives purely in semantic terms, i.e. suggesting that they encode distance, will have to be language-specific. However, if we define demonstratives in terms of their ‘communicative function’, i.e. their ability to manipulate joint attention to referents, then the definition becomes universal. Similarly, Hassan (1994: 113) puts Arabic demonstratives in a category of their own (that of pronouns) based on the

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<sup>58</sup> But see Wilkins (1992; 1995) on the semantics of interjections as deictics in a number of languages including English.

fact that they have a “دلالة وظيفية” (“functional meaning”). I argue that it is more plausible to think of this ‘communicative function’ as semantically encoded. I use relevance theory to show how we can use this semantic analysis of demonstratives in English and Arabic to account for their various interpretations.

#### 4.1.4 Distance, attention and relevance

The question, again, is what is semantically encoded by demonstratives? Enfield (2003: 86), who argues for a basic abstract ‘indicating’ function for demonstratives, acknowledges that “it is useful for drawing attention”, but dismisses the idea on the grounds that “attention-direction is not a semantically specified function”. However, if we think of attention-direction as a procedure that can be semantically encoded, it makes the task of drawing a consistent picture for the semantics of demonstratives easier. In his discussion of the English demonstrative *this*, Russell (1940:111) states that “There is obviously a general concept involved, namely, ‘object of attention’, but something more than this general concept is required in order to secure the temporary uniqueness of ‘this’”. Indeed, as far as attention is concerned, something more than a ‘concept’ is needed, i.e. a procedure. Therefore, I repeat below my proposal for the semantics of the demonstratives in English and Arabic:

- (a) Demonstratives encode a procedure which directs the hearer to create/maintain a joint level of attention to the intended referent (as opposed to other referential candidates)
- (b) Demonstratives encode a (pro)concept of distance.
- (c) The interaction of (a) and (b) with context is relevance-driven.

My proposal rests on the following assumptions: (a) I follow the relevance-theoretic view that words can encode either concepts or procedures; and (b) that linguistic items can encode a combination of both. From the previous discussion, we have seen that distance is encoded by demonstratives as a conceptualisation of space, physical and mental. In cognitive terms, proximity/distance is not difficult to conceptualise or to describe as a concept. Unlike procedures, concepts can be brought to consciousness and this is reflected in the fact that they can be paraphrased/translated/substituted in a straightforward way. However, there are two interrelated observations about the notion of distance which affect their semantic representation as encoded concepts. First, proximity/distance can be said to be indexical concepts, i.e. they need some inferential work to be complete. For example, if something is

said to be proximal/near, one needs to work out some issues like on what scale?/to whom?/compared to what? etc. In this sense, the concept NEAR is different in nature to concepts such as TREE or DOG. Second, this results in the fact that the concept of distance is heavily reliant on context to be a full concept. In relevance-theoretic terms, this corresponds to what Sperber & Wilson (1998) have termed a ‘pro-concept’. In their view, pro-concepts need to be “contextually worked out”. They mention other examples such as *my*, *have*, *near*, *long*. Although these kinds of words belong to different categories, they all share the same feature: they have some conceptual content and “their semantic contribution must be contextually specified for the associated utterance to have a truth-value” (1998: 185). However, not all concepts that need to be contextually worked out are indexical concepts. A pronoun, for example, such as *he* or *she* may be said to encode the concept MALE or FEMALE but it is the encoded procedure which guides the hearer to the context to find the intended referent. In other words, there is nothing indexical about the concept MALE itself as it is the case with the concepts of distance or length encoded by words such as *this* or *long*.

However, Wilson (2009) has suggested that “all words behave as if they encoded pro-concepts” (Sperber & Wilson 1998: 185) and that this view has several advantages<sup>59</sup>. One advantage is that this approach explains the difference between encoded concepts and communicated concepts which are considered part of speaker’s meaning. Consequently, another advantage is that this approach explains how lexical items merely provide pieces of evidence about speaker’s meaning even when they encode full concepts. However, Wilson (2009) further suggests applying this approach to scalar terms such as *tall* and *short*. These terms encode indexical concepts by nature which raise questions like: on what scale?/compared to what? etc. To answer these questions, again like the case of distance, more inferential work needs to be done. Therefore, Wilson (2009) suggests that *tall* and *short* may be analysed as encoding the same conceptual information, which can be formulated as ‘located on the height scale’, but different procedural orientations. Accordingly, *tall* would be interpreted as relevant as one moves up the height scale, while *short* would be interpreted as

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<sup>59</sup> On this view, it might be said that pro-concepts in fact look procedure-like. This argument has its roots in the work of the French pragmatist Ducrot (e.g. 1972; 1973) who argued that all linguistic expressions are procedural. In an email discussion on the relevance theory mailing list (December 2007), Dan Sperber developed this idea further by arguing that “when a conceptual content is encoded so is *ipso facto* the instruction to inferentially construct an ad hoc conceptual content taking the original encoded conceptual content as a starting point for the inferential process”. Therefore, the argument that all words seem to encode pro-concepts is another variation of saying that all words seem to encode procedures. Taking this into consideration, there is still a difference between a concept such as BOOK and a concept such as NEAR in terms of the type of procedures they also encode. In the former, it seems that the encoded procedure is the general one which just tells the hearer to use this conceptual content in context; but in the latter there is a more specific procedure which instructs the hearer to inferentially enrich the concept by answering questions such as ‘near what?’, ‘on what scale?’, etc.

relevant as one moves down the height scale. Therefore, I argue that there is good reason to attempt extending this view to the analysis of demonstratives in English and Arabic.

We have seen in previous examples that the use of demonstratives to encode distance is contextual, and highly relative. Even in characterising physical distance, demonstratives seem to be primarily fulfilling an interactive function. This can be seen to reflect “the ways in which speakers and addressees co-operate in order to manage the cognitive and social constraints on their joint creation of discourse” (Cheshire 1996: 369). On the other hand, several corpus-based studies have looked into the use of proximal and distal demonstratives where the distinction in spatial terms seems rather neutral. Cheshire (1996: 372), for example, states that “the proximal/distal dimension is rarely relevant” since it becomes neutralised. Hence, we can argue that demonstratives encode distance as a pro-concept, i.e. an incomplete concept which needs to be inferentially worked out. The conceptual information encoded by proximal and distal demonstratives (and even medial demonstratives in Arabic) may be formulated as ‘located on the distance scale’, where interpretation of proximity/distance is determined by moving nearer or farther from the deictic centre on the scale.

However, the communicative function of demonstratives is not achieved by encoding this conceptual information alone. A procedural instruction which employs the notion of attention is needed. To be clear, we need to specify what this cognitive procedure is, and what scope it operates on. The idea of specifying the scope of procedural encodings was discussed by Nicolle (1997). Working within the relevance-theoretic framework, Nicolle suggests that the process of utterance interpretation proceeds in three phases<sup>60</sup>: (a) phase one processes the phonetic input to yield a logical form; (b) phase two processes the logical form to yield a propositional form; and (c) phase three processes the propositional form to yield cognitive effects. Within this model of utterance interpretation, procedural information can have scope over either the sub-propositional conceptual representations at phase two or over the propositional conceptual representations at phase three. An example of the first type would be pronouns, as Nicolle suggests that a pronoun procedurally constrains the interpretation of the conceptual representation encoded by the same pronoun; i.e. a pronoun encodes both conceptual and procedural information. Therefore, for example, the pronoun *she* is said to encode the following:

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<sup>60</sup> Note that there is no suggestion here that these three phases occur in a chronological order.

SHE	
Conceptual information: Entity – 3 <sup>rd</sup> person, feminine, singular	Procedural information: Scope – minimal, highly accessible instance

Table 4: The lexical semantics of the pronoun *she* (from Nicolle 1997: 49)

An example of the second type of scope would be discourse connectives, which encode procedural information with scope over the propositional form, or non-indicative word order in English, which encodes procedural information with scope over the propositional attitude. Nicolle (1997: 54) specifically characterises procedural meaning in terms of two main features: (a) information about the manipulation of any conceptual representation(s) within its scope; and (b) the precise extent of that scope, including the nature of the conceptual representation about which information is provided.

Following Wilson (2009), I assume that demonstratives should be seen as triggering a cognitive procedure that is already available to the human mind. Attention-direction is a core cognitive procedure that may be triggered in and via several ways. More specifically, demonstratives trigger a cognitive procedure directing the hearer to create or maintain a shared level of attention to the intended referent. This cognitive procedure has scope over the concept of distance encoded by the demonstrative, therefore it gives rise to the contrastive aspect represented by the implication of other referential candidates. In other words, since the cognitive procedure of attention-directing has scope over the concept of proximity/distance on a distance scale, the implication of the existence of other entities on this scale falls out naturally. I use examples (8), repeated below, and (9) to illustrate:

(8) a. You can add it to *this* word.

b. *this* → create a shared level of attention to the intended referent [the proximal word] as opposed to any other word on the board.

(9) ظهر كتاب جديد في الأسواق. *هذه* الكتاب يناقش الكساد العالمي

<u>dh</u> ahar	kitaab	jadiid	fii	'al-'aswaaq	hadhaa	'al-
appear-it(past)	book	new	in	the-markets	this(mas)	the-

kitaab	yunaaqiṣ	'al-kasaad	'al-3aalamii
book	discuss-it(pres)	the-recession	the-global



- a. A new book appeared on the market. **This book** discusses global recession.
- b. *this* → maintain a shared level of attention to the intended referent [the proximal book] as opposed to any other book on the market.

Finally, it should be mentioned that demonstratives in English and Arabic encode other grammatical information such as those related to number and gender. English demonstratives encode information about number, whereas Arabic demonstratives encode information about number, gender and case (in the dual forms). The notions of number and gender have been treated as conceptual in a number of studies on pronouns (e.g. Nicolle 1997; Hedley 2007). As the above table shows, Nicolle (1997) considers person, number and gender to be conceptual information encoded by the pronoun *she*. In an earlier study (Zaki 2009), I also rendered such notions as encoded concepts. However, it has to be noted that, following on from the discussion above about the concept of distance, number and gender seem to work in a different way. There is nothing grammatical about the concept of distance, and the conceptualisation of distance, whether physical or mental, ultimately hinges on the ability of the human mind to access this concept with all its intricate assumptions. However, the case of number and gender is different. Number in English, for example, is primarily a grammatical notion, i.e. it does not necessarily coincide with number in real life. One clear evidence of this is the existence of words which are grammatically plural but semantically singular (e.g. spectacles, trousers, measles, etc), in addition to collective nouns which are sometimes singular and other times plural (e.g. news, committee, etc.). Similarly, gender is not a straightforward case in English, with the famous examples of referring to a ship as *she* or an unborn baby as *it*<sup>61</sup>. The same applies to gender in Arabic, which is even more grammatical.

In Arabic, all nouns, verbs, and adjectives have to carry gender because there is no neuter gender. Consequently, pronouns (demonstrative, relative, person, possessive) carry gender too. Therefore, it is not always the case that grammatical gender coincides with semantic gender. In fact, Hassan (1995: 587), following the traditional view that the masculine is the default in Arabic, discusses femininity in a separate chapter. He distinguishes 7 categories of feminine nouns in Arabic: (1) real feminine, (2) unreal feminine, (3) lexical feminine only, (4) abstract feminine only, (5) lexical and abstract feminine, (6) interpretive feminine, and (7) grammatical feminine. He maintains that the first two categories are the basic ones, which correspond to natural gender, while all the others derive

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<sup>61</sup> See Scott (2010: 197-205) for a further discussion of this point.

from them. The most common grammatical marker of femininity is the letter *taa' marbuutah* ة at the end of a noun. Yet some nouns have it but are semantically masculine (e.g. proper names *Hamzah* حمزة, *Usamah* أسامة), while others do not have this letter but are semantically feminine (e.g. proper names *Soad* سعاد, *Zainab* زينب). Moreover, two semantically similar nouns without the feminine grammatical marker receive different gender treatments, which becomes apparent with the use of a demonstrative and an adjective:

(10) *هَذَا* البيت كبير

hadhaa	'al-bait	kabiir
this-mas	the-house	big
This house is big.		

(11) *هَذِهِ* الدار كبيرة

hadhihi	'al-daar	kabiirah
this-fem	the-house	big
This house is big.		

Therefore, it is difficult to perceive of gender in demonstratives, in the above examples for instance, as an encoded concept which needs to be accessed in the same way as the concept of distance either in production or comprehension of the utterance. In other words, in interpreting both (10) and (11), the hearer takes it that the demonstrative instructs him/her to direct their attention to the entity described as proximal as opposed to other referential candidates on the distance scale. The feature of being masculine or feminine need not feature at all in the semantics. Even if it plays a role in reference resolution, in case for example there are two referents, one masculine and one feminine, the gender feature seems to operate on the grammatical level rather than the semantic one, i.e. it is part of the grammatical knowledge about the language rather than being part of the knowledge associated with the concept MALE or FEMALE. This issue needs to be discussed in further detail to be able to account for such grammatical notions within a relevance-theoretic framework. For now, I will maintain that distance is encoded as a concept by demonstratives in English and Arabic, while number and gender are not.

So far, I have outlined my proposal for the semantics of demonstratives in English and Arabic. In the next section, I show how this semantics integrates with the relevance-theoretic framework in the interpretation process. With the use of corpus examples, I also show how this proposal accounts for the role demonstratives play in retrieving the explicit content of

utterances, which has always been regarded their main function, as well as the role they play in retrieving some implicit meanings.

## **4.2 The interpretation of demonstratives**

### **4.2.1 Demonstratives and explicit content**

As it was discussed in chapter 3, relevance theory maintains that human communication depends on the criterion of relevance. A speaker chooses his/her words to be the most relevant ones to communicate his/her message. The hearer, in turn, expects utterances to be worth processing by being optimally relevant. The interpretation process of an utterance follows the general relevance theoretic procedure as follows:

- The relevance theoretic comprehension procedure
  - (a) Follow a path of least effort in deriving cognitive effects. Test interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, enrichments, etc.) in order of accessibility.
  - (b) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.

The processes of disambiguation, reference resolution and enrichments are pragmatic processes which contribute to the explicit side of communication. An explicit proposition, or an explicature, is a development of the logical form of the utterance. Consequently, reference resolution is a development of the logical form of the utterance. Therefore, it can be said that the primary function of referring expressions, such as personal pronouns and demonstratives, is to provide a constituent for the proposition expressed by guiding the hearer to identify the intended referent. If we think of the process of reference assignment as a mental search activity on the part of the hearer for the intended referent, then two important conditions follow. First, that this search activity should be constrained by some parameters; and second that there should be some general guideline to help mark the end of the search activity. This is the essence of the interpretation of referring expressions within a relevance theoretic framework. In the case of demonstratives, the parameters are provided by the conceptual and procedural semantics contained in the demonstrative. The benchmark for this mental activity

is pragmatic, i.e. the satisfaction of the expectation of relevance, at which point no further inferential activity is needed. The semantics and pragmatics work together to explain the interpretation process.

#### 4.2.1.1 Text-external uses

I start with an example of the exophoric, or text-external, use of demonstratives, i.e. referring to an entity in the physical environment. Going back to our context of the Scrabble game, consider example (6) repeated below, where player A is trying to help player B find a place for his “s”.

(6) A: You can add it to *this* word.

B: You mean *that* word?

A: Yes. *That* word.

This example is a prototypical case of what Enfield (2003: 86) has termed a ‘coordination problem’ where the demonstrative is used to provide the solution. In this context, the board game with all the words formed on it are at the heart of the joint cognitive environment shared by speaker and hearer. But, in each occurrence of the demonstrative, the speaker has focussed his/her attention on a specific element of this joint cognitive environment and s/he intends to convey this to the hearer via a demonstrative (accompanied with a pointing gesture or an eye gaze). A demonstrative tells the hearer to direct his/her attention to the same entity as the speaker and thus maintain a joint level of attention to the intended referent as opposed to other potential referents. The encoded semantics in the demonstrative also gives the hearer a clue to which referent is intended in terms of physical distance/perspective. This highlights the difference between a demonstrative and a definite article. If the speaker had started by uttering (12), reference resolution would have failed because the encoded semantics in the definite article does not provide enough information for the hearer to be able to arrive at the intended referent. Utterance (12) would raise the question “which one?” which a demonstrative naturally answers by virtue of both the encoded procedural and conceptual information.

(12) \*You can add it to *the* word.

Therefore, from the speaker's point of view, the choice of demonstrative (and utterance as a whole) is the most suitable as it is the optimally relevant one to communicate the intended meaning. In computing the utterance, the hearer assumes from the beginning that the utterance is optimally relevant for him/her to process. The clues that the speaker provided, through the pointing gesture and the semantics of the demonstrative, makes it easier for the hearer to access the intended referent as the first accessible candidate following a path of least effort. By arriving at the intended referent, the expectation of relevance should be satisfied and therefore no more inferential activity is needed. In (6), the hearer does not seem to be confident s/he has retrieved the right referent, so s/he uses a demonstrative again, with a different spatial orientation, to check s/he is maintaining a shared level of attention to the same referent with the interlocutor.

There are other deictic (or 'situational' according to Cornish 2001) uses of demonstratives which do not require a pointing gesture to facilitate their interpretation. In these cases, the concept of distance, although not interpreted in the spatial sense, is still valid in the temporal sense. That is, the proximal and distal demonstratives in (13) and (14) are interpreted as 'nearer' to the temporal deictic centre, i.e. the current point in time, and farther from the deictic centre respectively:

(13) هذه كانت ليلة لا تنسى

hadhihi	kaanat	lailah	laa	tunsa
this-fem	be-past	evening	not	forgotten

This was an unforgettable evening.

(14) تلك كانت ليلة لا تنسى

tilka	kaanat	lailah	laa	tunsa
that-fem	be-past	evening	not	forgotten

That was an unforgettable evening.

The main issue in the interpretation process is how the hearer is supposed to follow a path of least effort to retrieve the intended referent, i.e. evening, from among possibly a large number of potential candidates. The key is that the semantics encoded by the demonstrative interacts with the context in a way that makes it clear to the hearer which one is the intended referent so that it is the most accessible one s/he will go to without exerting any more effort than need be. The proximal demonstrative in (13) tells the hearer to direct his/her attention to an entity that is near the deictic centre on the temporal distance scale, compared to other potential referents which would be farther away from the deictic centre. Proximity in the temporal

sense logically leads to thinking of the current point in time, so there need not be specific assumptions about the potential other candidate referents. The interpretation of (14), on the other hand, needs to be processed in a context where the internal contrast actually helps in making the intended referent more accessible to the hearer. If, for example, our friends who were playing Scrabble met again a week later and they were talking about that night they had fun playing, uttering (14) would make a contextual assumption involving that night available for the hearer and, thus, more accessible. The hearer then would follow a path of least effort in resolving reference and the inferential process would then stop as it achieves relevance by arriving at the explicit content of the utterance.

Since the corpus chosen for this study consists of written discourse in both languages, examples of the exophoric (and deictic) use of demonstratives could only be found in the category of fiction where characters engage in conversation. In the temporal sense, demonstratives are used with the usual nouns which indicate certain points in time (e.g. *morning, evening, afternoon, time, moment*). Examples (15) and (16) illustrate this use.

(15) I 'm afraid I 'm still thinking of some-thing I was dealing with *this afternoon*. (W2F-011 022)

(16) لكن سؤالها في هذه المرة وضعني أمام مفاجأة (Fiction)

laakin	su'aaluhaa	fii	hadhihi	'al-marrah	wada3anii
but	question-her	in	this(fem)	the-time	put(past)-me
'amaam	mufaaja'ah				
infront of	surprise				

But her question this time has surprised me.

In both cases, the semantics encoded in the proximal demonstrative makes it accessible to the hearer to follow a path of least effort to arrive at the intended referent because it stands out as the most relevant by being proximal to the current temporal situation. It is no surprise, then, that demonstratives in both English and Arabic use the proximal form more to direct attention to current points in time. When distal demonstratives are used, the context supplies contextual assumptions to exploit the internal contrast between distal and other potential candidate referents in a way that makes the intended referent more accessible. In example (17) the speaker is describing the events of a particular day to his hearer, and in (18) the speaker is remembering the day she spent with her lover.

(17) Dinner *that evening* was an excellent steak followed by a soufflé so light that it melted on the tongue. (W2F-013 157)

(18) تلك اللحظاتُ أجلُّ من أن أدوّنَ عنها خواطري فحسبُ (Fiction)

tilka	'al-laḥadḥaat	'ajall	min	'an	'udawwin
that-fem	the-moments	important(super)	than	to	write-I(pres)

ʒanhaa	ḥawaatirii	faḥasb
About-it	memoirs-my	only

Those moments were more important than to only write my memoirs about them.

In the preceding discourse for (17) and (18), the intended referents have been mentioned in some other form. But the speakers use the demonstratives to direct their audience's attention again to the said evening and moments which occurred at a certain distal point in time. The hearers would exert least effort in accessing the intended referents which stand out as the most accessible compared to other evenings or moments.

Demonstratives used to refer exophorically to entities in the physical environment typically use pointing gestures as an explicit (non-linguistic) clue provided by the speaker to his audience to make the intended referent more accessible. The proximal demonstrative in (19) and the distal ones in (20) also provide spatial orientation for the hearer so that the search space for the intended referent would be narrowed down to the one the speaker wants the hearer to direct his/her attention to.

(19) أعطني هذه الكاميرا. ومدّ يده لاختطافها (Fiction)

'aʒtini	hadhihi	'al-kaamiraa	wa	madda	yaduhu
give(imp)-me	this-mas	the-camera	and	extend-he(past)	hand-his

li'ihṭiṭaafiha
to-snatch-it

Give me this camera, and he extended his hand to snatch it.

(20) A: 'Isn't *that* a castle on top of the cliff?'

B: 'Where?' I asked, but now she was pointing down at the courtyard.

A: Look at *that fountain*, all gushing with water! (W2F-013 013-015)

Note that in (19) and (20) the speakers could have used the definite article, but the use of demonstratives results in a slightly different interpretation process. Compare to (21) and (22):

(21) أُعْطِنِي *الكاميرا*. ومدَّ يَدَهُ لاختطافها

Give me **the camera**, and he extended his hand to snatch it.

(22) Look at **the fountain**, all gushing with water!

Due to the attention-directing semantics of the demonstratives, and given the expectation of relevance, the hearer's processing of (19) and (20) can be said to be explicitly communicating:

(19) a. أُعْطِنِي *هذه الكاميرا*. ومدَّ يَدَهُ لاختطافها

b. Give me the intended proximal camera as opposed to any other camera in the surrounding context.

(20) a. Look at **that fountain**, all gushing with water!

b. Look at the intended distal fountain as opposed to any other fountain in the surrounding context.

The processing of the extra spatial information in the demonstratives (compared to the definite article) which creates the internal contrast in the semantics is deemed relevant by both speaker and hearer in these contexts. In (19), it adds an extra layer of emphasis on this particular camera, which in turn emphasises the speaker's seriousness in wanting to have it. In (20), the emphasis on this particular fountain might be deemed necessary for the speaker who is directing the hearer's attention to different entities in the surrounding context.

#### 4.2.1.2 Text-internal uses

Apart from the exophoric uses, demonstratives have been noted to play two typical roles in referring endophorically in written discourse. These are anaphoric uses and discourse deictic uses. Diessel (2006) differentiates between the two categories in terms of 'text-internal reference' and 'text-external reference'. According to him, "demonstratives which



are used with text-internal reference indicate a link between the linguistic unit in which they are embedded (e.g. NP, PP, S) and the linguistic element to which they refer (e.g. discourse participant, proposition)” (2006: 475). Examples (23) and (24) illustrate the anaphoric case:

(23) His stories portray a violence which sometimes seems at odds with euphemistic propaganda: a lieutenant murders surrendering Germans; a staff officer shoots a Tommy to prevent panic. Yet *this violence*, too, is within a popular moralistic tradition. (W2A-009 089-092)

(24) The power that enables this union Coleridge categorized as the imagination, which has its basis in an act of will. In its primary form *this power* neither begins with sense-presented material nor produces an object for the senses. (W2A-003 058-059)

The demonstrative phrases in these two examples directly co-refer to their discourse referents which have been previously introduced via an indefinite NP in (23) and a definite NP in (24). The role of the demonstrative in both cases is to direct attention to the previously mentioned discourse referent through the procedural instructions to maintain a joint level of attention to a particular proximal referent as opposed to other referential candidates. The conceptual information from the head noun helps in narrowing down the search space to the previously mentioned noun, but what makes this particular entity, i.e. *violence* and *power* respectively, more accessible to the hearer is the internal contrast between what is proximal and what could be other referential candidates (e.g. other types of violence or power). It is this particular procedural semantics that would make the use of the definite article in these examples different in terms of the inferences the hearer is encouraged to draw. Compare, for example, (23) with (25) and (24) with (26):

(25) His stories portray a violence which sometimes seems at odds with euphemistic propaganda: a lieutenant murders surrendering Germans; a staff officer shoots a Tommy to prevent panic. Yet *the violence*, too, is within a popular moralistic tradition.

(26) The power that enables this union Coleridge categorized as the imagination, which has its basis in an act of will. In its primary form *the power* neither begins with sense-presented material nor produces an object for the senses.

In both cases, the reference of *this violence/the violence* and *this power/the power* will be resolved on the same entity; i.e. the previously mentioned *violence/power*. These are the most accessible referents that a hearer following a path of least effort would test first (as opposed to a newly introduced type of violence/power). However, the procedural semantics encoded

by the demonstratives dictate a slightly different interpretation process. The internal contrast in the semantics of demonstratives seems to add an extra layer of activation to the already mentioned intended referent. In (23) for example, it is not only activated as *a violence* but as *a violence which sometimes seems at odds with euphemistic propaganda* as opposed to other types of violence. Similarly, in (24), it is activated as *the power that enables this union* as opposed to other types of power. A hearer interpreting the demonstrative phrases *this violence* and *this power*, then, would consider (27) and (28) as contextual assumptions that are immediately accessible in the interpretation process:

(27) There is a type of violence which sometimes seems at odds with euphemistic propaganda

(28) There is a type of power that enables this union.

The use of the demonstratives then results in a strengthening of these contextual assumptions. In relevance-theoretic terms, this counts as a positive cognitive effect which is not attainable in the case of (25) and (26). Therefore, without resorting to explanations of accessibility or cognitive status, we are able to explain speakers' choices of referring expression solely in terms of the semantics of demonstratives in interaction with a relevance-driven pragmatics.

The other type of 'text-internal' reference is that of discourse deixis. According to Lyons (1977), discourse deixis is the basis for the existence of anaphora. Cornish (2001: 301) defines it as "a cognitive pointing towards the result of processing a predication (or a part of predication) in surrounding discourse". Examples (29) and (30) illustrate this use in English, and (31) and (32) in Arabic:

(29) BS management pleads irreversible unprofitability, but plays hard-to-get on the figures, and an economic think-tank claims horrific consequential job losses that assume the whole community will curl up its toes and collect dole forever. It is as pointless as it is predictable, for not one of the actors in *this drama* is prepared to change his script. (W2C-007 010-011)

(30) BR recognises that a clean environment not only is welcoming to travellers, but discourages crime. *That* is why new stations and new trains are light and airy, to help passengers feel less threatened. (W2D-009 142-143)

(31) إذا كان أبو مازن قد فاز في الانتخابات بدون منافس فهذا لا يعني أن فوزه قد أرضى الجماهير الفلسطينية (Political Debate)

'idhaa                      kaan                      Abu Mazen                      qad      faaz                      fii

if	be(past)	Abu Mazen	has	win(past)	in
'al-'intihaabaat	biduun	munaafis	fa-hadhaa	laa	ya3nii
the-elections	without	competitor	then-this	not	mean(pres)
'an	fawzuhu	qad	'arḏaa	'al-jamaahiir	'al-falastiiniyyah
that	success-his	has	satisfy(past)	the-people	the-Palestinian

If Abu Mazen has won the elections with no competition then **this** does not mean that his success has satisfied the Palestinian people.

(32) (Literature Essays) ولم يكن ممكنا إظهار التفاؤل، وإن عمد إليه عدد من الأدباء؛ **وذلك** لأنه سيبدو غير منطقي

wa	lam	yakun	mumkinan	'idhhaar	'al-tafaa'ul	wa
and	not	be(past)	possible	showing	the-optimism	and
'in	3amada	'ilaihi	3adad	min	'al-	
'particle'	resort-he(past)	to-it	number	of	the-	
'udabaa'	wa	dhalik	li'annahu	sayabduu	ḡair	mantiqii
authors	and	that	because-it	will-seem-he	not	logical

It was not possible to show optimism, albeit a number of authors did, and **that** is because it will seem illogical.

As the examples show, both proximal and distal determiners and pronouns can be used in discourse deixis. These uses illustrate the important role demonstratives play in the internal organization of discourse as referents, nominal and non-nominal, constantly experience varying levels of attention. According to Diessel (2006: 476), both types of uses “involve the same psychological mechanisms” which is basically directing the hearer’s attention to a particular entity. In this sense, “joint attention is thus not only important to coordinate the interlocutor’s attentional focus in the speech situation, it also plays an important role in the internal organization of discourse”.

Whether the speaker chooses to use extra conceptual information in a noun or not, by uttering an utterance with a demonstrative, the speaker intends for the hearer to identify a certain referent so that both speaker and hearer would maintain a joint level of attention to it. In the case of discourse deixis, the expectation of relevance leads the hearer to identify the intended referent as a whole proposition, such as [a clean environment is welcoming to travellers and discourages crime] in (30), or [Abu Mazen has won in the elections with no

competition] in (31), rather than individual referents<sup>62</sup>. By expectation of relevance here I mean that we need not rely on any independent discourse principles to identify referents in discourse deixis if we take seriously the view that discourse structure itself is a consequence of processing a text for relevance. Webber (1991: 22) also mentions that “which discourse segment provides the referent for [demonstrative pronoun] depends on what is compatible with the meaning of the rest of the sentence”. In relevance theoretic terms, this can be translated into accessibility and acceptability of interpretations mentioned earlier.

In the processing of these cases the demonstrative directs the hearer to align his/her level of attention to the intended referent in order to be compatible with the speaker’s current focus of attention. Cornish (2007b) calls this process ‘contextual pointing’. The speaker may use other conceptual clues, such as the noun *drama* in (29), but the use of bare demonstratives is more common in referring to such non-nominal referents. Again, using a definite article in (29) would not be unacceptable, but it would lead to a different interpretation process in terms of the contextual assumptions the hearer would be encouraged to consider. In (30), on the other hand, the definite article can not be used but the bare demonstrative can be substituted with the third person pronoun *it*. In both cases, reference will be resolved on the proposition expressed by the preceding clause. But the substitution would result in slightly different inferences in the interpretation process. The third person pronoun lacks the internal contrast between proximal/distal and other potential candidate referents that is encoded by the demonstrative pronoun. Using *that* in (30) amounts to communicating something like: it is only the fact that [a clean environment is welcoming to travellers and discourages crime] which is the reason why new stations and new trains are being light and airy as opposed to any other fact.

Similarly, in the Arabic examples, the demonstratives in (31) and (32) are primarily used to contribute to the explicit content by resolving the reference on the fact expressed in the preceding clause. The procedural semantics encoded by the demonstratives instructs the hearer to create a new level of joint attention on the intended referent as opposed to any other candidate referents (including individual entities in the preceding discourse). A hearer following a path of least effort in pursuit of a relevant overall interpretation will take it that

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<sup>62</sup> Webber (1991) discusses how sequences of clauses in a text can yield referents for demonstrative pronouns. She suggests that only “[discourse] segments whose contribution to the discourse model is currently in focus” (1990: 2) can be referred to. For more details on what is a discourse segment see Grosz & Sidner (1986) and Fox (1987) *inter alia*. From the cognitive point of view, the identification of a whole proposition (or fact, or event) as a referent expressed by part of the text depends, according to Webber (1988: 113), on “attribute[ing] distinct mental reality to units of text often called discourse segments, a reality that is distinct from that of the entities described therein”. For further discussion of abstract entities such as facts, propositions and events see Asher (1993).

the intended referents are the facts that [Abu Mazen has won in the elections with no competition] and [to show optimism] respectively. The fact that the demonstratives in (31) and (32) can be substituted by the other form in the spatially-contrastive pair without changing reference resolution can only be seen as contributing to the implicit content of the utterance.

The attention-directing semantics of demonstratives and their role in manipulating the internal information flow in discourse also allows us not to depend too much on textual distance between the demonstrative and its discourse referent. Referential distance has been discussed as an influencing factor in the accessibility of the intended referent within the framework of Accessibility Theory. Ariel (2001: 33) explains that:

The distance between a previous mention of the same referent and the current mention is an obvious measure of an accessibility distinction. The larger the distance separating different mentions of the same mental entity, the lower the degree of accessibility with which the mental representation is entertained.

Therefore, since in Ariel's scale a proximal demonstrative + NP signals a higher accessibility than a distal demonstrative + NP, we would expect it also to have a smaller textual distance from its referent. However, corpus examples show that the crucial function played by demonstratives in manipulating the level of joint attention between speaker and hearer depends primarily on the interaction of its procedural semantics with context rather than on the interaction of a proximal/distal demonstrative with textual distance<sup>63</sup>. In (33)<sup>64</sup>, for example, referential distance is very long but the speaker uses a proximal demonstrative with a directly co-referring noun. In (34), on the other hand, referential distance is short but the speaker chooses a distal demonstrative to co-refer to the same head noun.

(33) **ان الغضب في أدب المقاومة مريرا**، ومحاملا بانكسار الفدائيين، بعد أن توالى الهزائم في واقع وشعور الفلسطينيين، كان أدب المقاومة ساخطا على الأنظمة والحكام، وحالة السبات العربية، بل ومارس نقد الذات في كثير من الأحيان، ولم يحمل للمنتظرين تحت سماء الوطن الصبور غير فراغ الأكف وكثيرا من حسرة واعتذار. حتى بدا كمرآة عكست المراحل التي مرت بها المقاومة الفلسطينية من التفاؤل المطلق في البداية، إلى التراجع المحمل بوزر القرارات السياسية غير الحكيمة، وهذا ما لمسناه جليا في الحروب حيث لمع في سماء الشعر طفل (الأر بي جيه)، الذي سرعيا ما حمل عذاب الجلاء، ومرارة الذبح في صبرا وشاتيلا؛ ليترك في الأدب غصة خلفت وراءها قصائد وقصصا حملت خيوط تساؤل يانس، وأبعدت مع الوقت القارئ العربي عن أدب المقاومة الفلسطينية، وبدا أدبا محزنا، محبطا، متشبثا بالقلق والنقمة على العدو وعملائه في الداخل والخارج.

<sup>63</sup> See also Botley and McEnery (2001b) for a reassessment of the notion of anaphoric distance according to Ariel (1990).

<sup>64</sup> I only translate example (33), the part in square brackets, due to its length.

ولم يكن ممكنا إظهار التفاؤل، وإن عمد إليه عدد من الأدباء؛ وذلك لأنه سيبدو غير منطقي وستتم إدانته من قبل القراء، فلا يوجد في الواقع العربي المعاش ما يبرره، فحتى صيف ١٩٨٧ م لم يكن في الواقع الفلسطيني ما يوحى بفقدان حالة الصبر، وفي هذا الوقت تأجج الشعور بالقهر، وتخلى الشعب الفلسطيني في الداخل عن إستراتيجيته انتظار النجدة من الخارج لتحرير الأرض وعودة المهجرين إلى بيوتهم التي ما زالت تحن لأنفاسهم إن الانتفاضة الفلسطينية ثورة في الفكر الشعبي والواقع اليومي، فمشعلوها قوة سياسية واعية، وتشمل مجموع السكان. إنها إرادة جماعية نظمتها، فخلقت حالة من التضامن بين الأفراد، صهرتهم في بوتقة واحدة، وأوجدت لهم نظاما جديدا للحياة تحت ظروف مقاومة طويلة المدى، وهي ثورة معدية استطاعت أن تمتد بتأثيرها إلى المجتمعات العربية؛ لتحرك ذاكرتها وتعيد لأدبائها روحهم العتيقة، ولسيوفها ذلك المضاء ! فإن كان السجين في أدب المقاومة يتخيل شمس الوطن فهو في أدب الانتفاضة يحفر بأظافره جدران الزنزانة ليراها [الانتفاضة أعطت لأدب المقاومة مصداقيته، وأعدت إليه قراءه، فهو لم يعد يكتفي بالتعبير عن هذا الغضب، (Literature Essays) ! وإنما صار يزرعه في سطور الأدب توفيقا للتحريرون،

Anger in the literature of resistance is bitter... [17 lines later] The Intifada gave back to the literature of resistance its credibility, and returned its readers, for it does not suffice anymore with just expressing *this anger* but it implants it within the literature in a yearning for freedom.

وهي قابلة للتجاوز حسب درجة الوعي التي يتمتع بها المبدع .. **نلك الوعي** الذي لا يتيح للمتلقي فرصة الوقوف (34) (Literature Essays) والسؤال

wa hiya	qaabilah	lil-tajaawuz	ḥasab	darajat	'al-wa3y
and she	liable	to-surpassing	according	level	the-awareness
'allatii	yatamatta3	bihaa	'al-mubdi3	dhalik	'al-wa3y
which	enjoy-he(pres)	with-it	the-creator	that(mas)	the-awareness
'alladhii	laa	yutiiḥ	lil-mutalaqqii	furṣat	'al-wuquuf
which	not	allow-he(pres)	to-the-receiver	opportunity	the-stop
wa	'al-su'aal				
and	the-questioning				

It is liable to be surpassed according to the creator's level of awareness.. **That awareness** which does not allow the receiver the opportunity to stop and ask..

Example (33) introduces the referent for the first time (i.e. anger in the literature of resistance) and then the discourse goes on to describe the development of this kind of literature and its ongoing relationship with the Palestinian Intifada. The last sentence refers back to "this anger" after such a long textual span, using the demonstrative, where a lot of other discourse referents have been introduced and the hearer's attention must have been focused elsewhere. In (34), the textual span between the discourse referent "the awareness" and the distal demonstrative is very short. However, what these two uses have in common is the semantics of the demonstratives which suffices to signal that the hearer should direct (or

re-direct) his/her attention to the intended referent which is located as proximal/distal on the distance scale as opposed to other referential candidates. Together with the conceptual information in the head noun which facilitates retrieving the intended referent by making it the most accessible to the hearer, the demonstratives fulfill their role in contributing to the explicit content of the utterance. The interpretation process for these demonstratives might go as follows:

- (33) a. “this” directs the hearer to maintain a joint level of attention to the intended proximal referent as opposed to other non-proximal candidate referents.  
b. the conceptual information in “anger” restricts possible referents to those entities which qualify as “anger”.  
c. follow a path of least effort in accessing possible referents and stop when expectations of relevance are met.  
d. the first accessible referent is the previously mentioned “anger”.  
e. the intended referent is: the previously mentioned proximal entity “anger” as opposed to any other type of anger.
- (34) a. “that” directs the hearer to maintain a joint level of attention to the intended distal referent as opposed to other non-distal candidate referents.  
b. the conceptual information in “awareness” restricts possible referents to those entities which qualify as “awareness”.  
c. follow a path of least effort in accessing possible referents and stop when expectations of relevance are met.  
d. the first accessible referent is the previously mentioned “awareness”.  
e. the intended referent is: the previously mentioned distal entity “awareness” as opposed to any other type of awareness.

At this point in the interpretation, the issue of referential distance as an influencing factor in the accessibility of the intended referent does not seem particularly relevant. This is also complicated by the fact that if we replace the proximal and distal demonstratives in (33) and (34) respectively with the other forms in the spatially-contrastive pair as in (35) and (36), the differences between them cannot be explained in terms of accessibility of the intended referent.

(35) ان الغضب في أدب المقاومة مريرا.. الانتفاضة أعطت لأدب المقاومة مصداقيته، وأعدت إليه قراءه، فهو لم يعد يكتفي بالتعبير عن ذلك الغضب  
Anger in the literature of resistance is bitter.. The Intifada gave back to the literature of resistance its credibility, and returned its readers, for it does not suffice anymore with just expressing **that anger**..

(36) وهي قابلة للتجاوز حسب درجة الوعي التي يتمتع بها المبدع .. هذا الوعي الذي لا يتيح للمتلقي فرصة الوقوف والسؤال  
It is liable to be surpassed according to the creator's level of awareness.. **This awareness** which does not allow the receiver the opportunity to stop and ask.

In Ariel's (1990) Accessibility Theory, for example, the only difference between the two demonstratives in (33)-(35) and (34)-(36) lies in the accessibility of the intended referent. However, if we follow the procedural semantics proposed here, it seems more intuitive that the two demonstratives encode different information<sup>65</sup>. Therefore, we can explain the difference between the two versions of each example without the need for accessibility markings. In the interpretation process, the differences can be accounted for in terms of the inferences the hearer is encouraged to draw beyond reference resolution. That is, in terms of the speaker's attitude to the referents in question. In (33), for example, the speaker refers to the proximal entity *anger* as opposed to other non-proximal entities to emphasise his/her identification with it (as the surrounding discourse highlights the speaker's passion towards the discussed topic). In (34), on the other hand, the speaker does not necessarily relate to the intended referent, as the use of the negative sentence afterwards also shows. Therefore, the use of a distal demonstrative can be said to signal that the speaker is distancing him/herself from the referent. In 4.2.2, I further discuss the role played by demonstratives in implicitly communicating and how can this be accounted for in a relevance-theoretic framework.

#### 4.2.1.3 Other text-internal uses

There are other text-internal uses for demonstratives in English and Arabic that are noted in the corpus data. One is what Lyons (1977: 667-668) has termed "pure textual deixis" as opposed to "impure textual deixis". In the former, the demonstrative refers to a segment of text *qua* text, while in the latter the demonstrative refers to an aspect of the interpretation of a segment of the text (a proposition, fact or event) rather than the segment itself. This second type is what has been discussed in the previous section as discourse deixis. However, I mention here a few examples for pure textual deixis to show that the semantics proposed in

<sup>65</sup> See also Reboul's (1997) discussion of this point.



this study applies to these cases too. Pure textual reference can be easily seen in spoken discourse in corpus examples such as (37) from a direct conversation and (38) from a radio talk:

(37) A: I only buy my ----- from there.

B: Me too me too

C: Sorry. Did you catch *that word*? (S1a-017 323-326)

(38) There are no classes because some people move from one class to the other.

~~I'll repeat that~~, I'll repeat *that* because you're just university students and ~~you're not~~ haven't got the brain power of a man like Mr Redwood.

There are no classes, because some people move from one class to another. (S2b-036 052-053)

The demonstrative determiner in (37) and the pronoun in (38) refer to previously mentioned linguistic entities in themselves as opposed to aspects of their interpretation. In processing these demonstratives, the hearer starts from the encoded procedural semantics which instructs him/her to direct their attention to a specific entity the speaker is sharing a similar level of attention to. Given the contextual assumptions available to the hearer, following a path of least effort would lead to the intended referent as the first one to satisfy expectations of relevance. In (37), the hearer processes the utterance against the contextual assumption that one word was not audible in the conversation; and in (38) the preceding verb *repeat* gives rise to the assumption of lexical repetition. Therefore, reference is resolved in a way that amounts to communicating (39) and (40) respectively:

(39) Did you catch [the distal word that is inaudible] as opposed to other non-distal words?

(40) I'll repeat [the distal sentence] as opposed to other non-distal sentences.

Note that in both cases the speaker chooses to use the distal demonstrative. In a relevance-theoretic framework, speakers' choices are driven by considerations of relevance. Therefore, the choice of demonstrative in the two utterances is relevant in as much as it communicates further inferences regarding the speaker's cognitive or emotional attitude towards the intended referents. In (37), the speaker is cognitively distant from the referent that is inaudible to him/her; while in (38) the speaker is emotionally distant from the referent as the rest of the discourse reveals.

In written discourse, however, it is more difficult to determine textual deixis without questioning the anaphoric status of the referring expression. Ribera (2007), who studied textual deixis in narrative discourse in English and Catalan, argues that this kind of textual reference combines both deixis and anaphora, and that demonstratives in this case perform a referential cohesive function. Again, the interpretation of what can be called textual deixis in written discourse follows from the proposed semantics for the demonstratives in accordance with the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure. Examples (41) and (42) illustrate this:

(41) There is an inscription around the circumference which reads, ‘Thou Lord in the beginning hast created the earth and the heavens are the work of thine hands’. Within *this quotation* are engraved astrological zodiacal symbols, clockwise from Pisces uppermost. (W2A-040 110-114)

(42) [An excerpt from a literary work]  
In discussing *this passage* I have sought to identify only those underlying narrative frameworks which appear to have affected Lord Denning's decision as to the proper rule to apply. (W2A-007 074)

The conceptual information contained in the head noun together with the attention-directing procedure encoded by the demonstrative make the intended referent the most accessible one in discourse. These examples can be seen as verbal pointing to a linguistic referent, where the head noun and the conceptual information it encodes, act as the pointing gesture in the situational uses. The speakers use the head nouns *quotation* and *passage* to provide more evidence of their intention to refer to these particular linguistic referents as text. In this sense, they are new referents in discourse as they have new mental representations of being the textual act itself rather than aspects of processing this textual act.

Another text-internal use that is worth mentioning here comes from the Arabic data. A certain textual use of the proximal masculine demonstrative pronoun *haadhaa* followed by the conjunction *wa* (*and*) has been noted in the literature as having a more cohesive role than the basic referential one normally associated with demonstratives. Holes (2004: 189), for example, notes that this type of use occurs typically paragraph-initially, where the demonstrative is deliberately used as a form of “vague reference”. In this case, it fulfils the role of connecting two parts of a discourse by “referring back to the whole of what has just been reported and signalling that something more, but different, is about to be said about the same topic” (2004: 189). However, whereas Holes maintains that this type of use is typical of

spoken MSA, particularly in news bulletins, my corpus examples come from the Legal text category of the written corpus:

(43) *هنا وقد نص القانون على امكانية التصالح مع المخالفين فيما ذكر من مخالفات بشأن الابلاغ والقيود اذا سدد المخالف جنيه* (Legal)

hadhaa	wa qad	naṣṣa	'al-qaanuun	ʒalaa
this(mas)	and partc.	state-it(past)	the-law	on
'imkaaniyat	'al-taṣaaluh	maʒ	'al-muḥaalifiin	fiimaa
possibility	the-reconciling with		the-contraveners	in-what
dhukkir	min	muḥaalafaat	biṣa'n	'al-'iblaaḡ
was-mentioned	of	contraventions	regarding	the-notification
wa	'al-qaid	'idhaa	saddad	'al-
and	the-registration	if	pay-he(past)	the-
muḥaalif	5 junaih			
contravener	5 pounds			

**This**, and the law has stated the possibility of reconciling with the contraveners in the contraventions that have been mentioned about notification and registration if the contravener paid 5 pounds.

(44) *هنا وقد اوجب القانون على المواطن اذا طرأ تغيير على بيانات البطاقة ان يخطر مكتب السجل المدني بهذا التغيير* (Legal)

hadhaa	wa	qad	'awjab	'al-qaanuun	ʒalaa	'al-
this(mas)	and	part.	obligate(past)	the-law	on	the-
muwaaṭin	'idhaa	ṭara'a	taḡyiir	ʒalaa	bayaanaat	'al-
citizen	if	occur(past)	change	on	information	the-
biṭaaqah	'an	yuḥṭir	maktab	'al-sijill	'al-madanii	
ID card	that	notify(pres)	office	the-registry	the-civic	
bihadhaa		'al-taḡyiir				
with-this(mas)		the-change				

**This**, and the law obligates the citizen if there have been any changes in the information of the ID card to notify the civic registry office of these changes.

According to Holes, the demonstrative pronoun here has a dual cohesive role which enables it to mark a shift in the information focus and at the same time signal that what follows it is

topically connected to what precedes it. From the cognitive point of view, the shift in the information focus can be seen as a manipulation of the degree of attention to discourse referents in the mind of the reader. This follows from the attention-directing procedure encoded by the demonstrative itself in these examples, which act here as a rather extreme case of discourse deixis. In terms of reference resolution, the demonstratives refer anaphorically to the preceding parts of discourse, which are linguistically expressed by several clauses. The semantics of the demonstratives direct the hearer to create a new point of joint attention to the discourse referent, i.e. the whole preceding discourse, as opposed to any other potential candidate referents such as individual discourse referents within that preceding discourse. Due to the occurrence of this type of structure *haadhaa wa* paragraph initially, considerations of relevance would guide the hearer to the first and only accessible referent, i.e. the whole preceding chunk of discourse. The intended general reference of this kind of demonstrative use does not contradict its semantics. It amounts to communicating to the reader something along the lines of:

(45) Maintaining a shared level of attention to the preceding proximal chunk of discourse as opposed to any other non-proximal referential candidates, I add that..

However, it is noted that the demonstrative in these utterances is dispensable. Therefore, the extra effort exerted in processing it should be offset by an extra effect. Such an effect could be seen as primarily related to cohesion in discourse as Holes remarks. That is, the referential function of the demonstrative leads to a cohesive one whereby reference to the whole chunk of preceding discourse amounts to an assertion (extra activation) of it in a way that links two parts of discourse cohesively together. The particular tendency for only using the proximal form in this type of use warrants the implication of continuing topicality that Holes refers to, and at the same time eliminates the use of the distal form<sup>66</sup>. This pragmatic effect is inferred from the internal contrast in the semantics of the demonstrative.

To sum up, I have shown in this section that applying a relevance-based analysis of demonstratives as encoders of procedural meaning can account for the various uses of these linguistic items in English and Arabic. The proposed semantics consists of a procedure to maintain/create a joint level of attention (between speaker and hearer) to the intended referent on the distance scale, whether interpreted spatially, textually, cognitively, or emotionally. The

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<sup>66</sup> It can also be said that the tendency to follow the demonstrative expression *haadhaa wa* with the emphatic particle *qad* warrants its referential and discourse functions.

fact that this procedural semantics has scope over the concept of distance gives rise to the internal contrast which is reflected in the semantics as suggesting the existence of other referential candidates. There are two main advantages for this proposed semantics. First, it allows for a unified account of demonstratives in both English and Arabic based on a minimal semantics and powerful pragmatics without the need for extra accessibility markings or scales. Second, it not only allows us to explain how demonstratives contribute to the explicit side of communication, i.e. to retrieve the intended referent, but also to explain how they can contribute to the implicit side. I discuss this further in the next section.

#### **4.2.2 Demonstratives and implicit content**

The primary function of the procedural meaning postulated for the demonstratives is to act as a constraint on the construction of the explicatures of the utterances in which they occur. In other words, the procedural semantics serves to make the intended referent the most accessible one to the hearer and so facilitate the assignment of reference in the most cost-efficient way. However, I have also shown that, in some examples, comparing the use of a demonstrative to a definite article or a third person pronoun results in subtle differences in implicit inferences. I would like to focus in this section on how demonstratives can contribute to the implicatures of their host utterances by virtue of the interaction between their encoded meaning and the context.

Recall that the semantics proposed in this study is based on the idea that demonstratives in English and Arabic (and many other languages) encode information related to both attention as a procedure and distance as a concept. In relation to the concept of distance, recall also that I have suggested, following Wilson (2009), that demonstratives could be seen to encode the unified conceptual information ‘located on the distance scale’, where interpretation of proximity/distance is determined by moving nearer or farther from the deictic centre on the scale. Because this concept falls under the scope of the attention-directing procedure, an internal contrast arises in the form of the existence of other potential candidates on the distance scale. In the case where demonstratives refer exophorically to entities in the physical surroundings, the spatial contrast may well be needed in order to point the hearer correctly to the intended referent. However, even in these cases, we have seen that the conceptualisation of distance can be subjective, as illustrated by examples (1)-(3) and (6)

in the beginning of this chapter. This subjectivity suggests that the choice between a proximal and a distal form can be, in some cases, trivial.

The triviality of the proximal/distal distinction in demonstratives is even greater in written discourse, where physical distance is not at stake. Recall examples (4) and (5), repeated below, where the choice of demonstrative does not affect the proposition expressed.

(4) I always lose in Scrabble. I hate *this*.

(5) I always lose in Scrabble. I hate *that*.

The difference between the two utterances can only be explained by invoking the idea of an internal contrast, which is formulated in the semantics as ‘as opposed to other referential candidates’. The implication of this has led the literature on demonstratives to make several links between demonstratives and ‘emotional uses’ (e.g. Fillmore 1982; Lakoff 1974) or ‘modal uses’ (e.g. Cornish 2001). This feature has also been used to assert the deictic property in demonstratives, which many consider the basic function from which anaphora has derived. Lyons (1977: 638), for example, uses the term ‘egocentricity’, by which “the speaker, by virtue of being the speaker, casts himself in the role of ego and relates everything to his viewpoint.” According to him, egocentricity is temporal as well as spatial, and it transfers from one participant to the other as the discourse proceeds.

The crucial point here, if this internal contrast actually features in the semantics of the demonstratives, as I propose, is whether this means that the hearer will always make the extra inferences of contrast in the interpretation. The answer lies within the relevance-theoretic view of communication. Speakers and hearers are driven by the criterion of consistency with the presumption of optimal relevance. This means that speakers choose the most relevant words to communicate their intended messages, and hearers expect the utterances to be relevant in that way. This is spelled out in the relevance-theoretic notion of ‘optimal relevance’. Wilson and Sperber (2004: 612) define it as follows:

(46) An utterance is optimally relevant if and only if:

- (a) It is relevant enough to be worth the audience’s processing effort.
- (b) It is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s abilities and preferences.

And since relevance is a matter of effort and effect, this means that extra inferences are only warranted if they result in extra cognitive effects. In the case of demonstratives, then, the speaker chooses a demonstrative, as opposed to any other determiner, because it is the most relevant one in relation to his/her preferences in the communicated message. The hearer, on the other hand, upon interpreting a demonstrative, takes it that it is relevant enough to be worth his/her processing effort. Therefore, any extra inference of contrast resulting in an implicated assumption or an emphatic effect or an assumption about speaker's attitude, must yield an extra cognitive effect to be reasonably assumed the most relevant choice for the speaker. Compare for example, (4), repeated below, with (47):

(4) I always lose in Scrabble. I hate *this*.

(47) I always lose in Scrabble. I hate *the feeling that results from it*.

Both definite descriptions arguably refer to the same thing. However, a speaker might consider (4) to be the most cost-efficient way of referring to the intended referent since the extra effort exerted in processing the extra linguistic material in (47) is not warranted by any rewards (unless the speaker feels for some reason that his/her hearer would not be able to assign reference correctly so s/he spells it out).

Generally, in the interpretation process, the semantics of demonstratives, including the internal contrast between what is proximal and what is distal, is used to make the intended referent more accessible to the hearer and hence guide the hearer along the inferential path to retrieve the intended referent. This is how demonstratives contribute to the explicit content of the utterances in which they occur. But in the cases where the assignment of reference seems to have been possible using any determiner (or no determiner at all) other than a demonstrative, or another form of demonstrative, then there is more to be said about the contribution of a demonstrative. This is when the hearer's processing device is entitled to make further inferences and, according to the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure, stop when their expectations of relevance are satisfied. This is how demonstratives contribute to the implicit content of the utterances in which they occur. Scott (2009: 174) rightly points out that the role of demonstratives in contributing to the implicit side of communication "has been largely overlooked in previous accounts". I further argue that corpus data from written discourse in English and Arabic provides evidence that this role is even greater than expected.

We have already seen in previous examples that comparing demonstrative forms with each other or demonstratives with other definite determiners results in subtle differences which could only be explained on the implicit level. Consider, for example, (48) and (49) where the use of proximal/distal demonstratives is manipulated for certain implicit effects:

(48) One curious result of this is that what is repressed appears to be no more than a sage, sweet, nuptial love, rather than erotic desire; and, as such, it seems hardly worth repressing. If *this repression* lies behind Hanold's obsessions and hallucinations, the modern reader, armed with the later Freud, would want to know what lay behind *that repression*. (W2A 002 072)

(49) لا الشخصية بمفردها ولا الحدث بمفرده يمكن أن يعطي المعنى للقصة ، فكلاهما بحاجة إلى تلك الوعاء الذي يحتضنها وهذا الوعاء هو البيئة (Literature Essays)

laa	'al-šahṣiyyah	bimofradihaa	wa	laa	'al-ḥadath
not	the-character	with-alone-it	and	not	the-event
bimofradihi	yumkin	'an	yuṣṣii	'al-maṣnaa	lil-qisṣah
with-alone-it	possible	to	give	the-meaning	to-the-story
fakilaahumaa	biḥaajah	'ilaa	dhalik	'al-wiṣaa'	'alladhi
for-both-them	with-need	to	that(mas)	the-vessel	which
yaḥṭadīnuha	wa	hadhaa	'al-wiṣaa'	huwa	
embrace-it	and	this(mas)	the-vessel	he	
'al-bii'ah					
the-environment					

Neither the character alone nor the event alone can give meaning to the story, they both need *that vessel* which encompass it, and *this vessel* is the environment- time and place.

In both examples, the first instance is a case of indirect anaphora while the second instance refers directly to the same entity. However, the choice between the proximal and distal forms highlights the interaction of the semantics with the speaker's strategy. In (48), the DemP *this repression* refers to the process of restraining some feelings that are described in the preceding utterance. The process of reference resolution would be helped in this case with the existence of close semantic links between the head noun *repression* and the words *repressed* and *repressing*. Therefore, the choice of the proximal demonstrative could be justified on the basis of the prior use of such semantic cognates, where the speaker wants to draw the attention of his hearer to the consolidation of this process of repression which s/he goes on to



say more about. In (49), on the other hand, the DemP is a first mention to the referent الوعاء (“the vessel”) which was not mentioned before in prior discourse, hence the use of the extra defining information in the relative clause الذي يحتملها (“which encompasses it”). In this case, the choice of the distal demonstrative on part of the speaker is justified as s/he does not expect the hearer to be able to assign a co-referent for this DemP from previous discourse and the distal demonstrative signals cognitive remoteness in this sense.

The subsequent reference to the same entities in both examples uses the semantically opposite demonstrative. So, in (48), although the DemP *that repression* refers directly to the previously mentioned entity, the choice of the distal demonstrative is significant because it highlights the existence of other potential ‘readings’ of the repression concerned. This is probably encouraged by processing the previous co-text where references to *modern reader* and *later Freud* could be inferentially linked to assumptions about a ‘non-modern reader’ and an ‘earlier Freud’. On the other hand, هذا الوعاء in (49) uses the proximal demonstrative the second time because the speaker wants the hearer to maintain a joint level of attention to the entity just mentioned as opposed to any other ‘types’ of vessels. The use of the demonstrative in itself brings about an effect of emphasis to the entity, which also results from the internal contrast in the semantics, as opposed to just saying “ذلك الوعاء الذي يحتملها وهو البيئة” (“that vessel which encompasses it and it is the environment”). Therefore, in each case, the demonstrative is used the first time mainly to contribute to the proposition expressed; while the other form of the demonstrative is used the second time to add further implicit inferences to the interpretation. The extra inferences are driven by considerations of relevance and are warranted by extra cognitive effects. The interpretation process of these demonstratives can be illustrated as follows:

(48) *this repression* → maintain a joint level of attention to the proximal entity [process of repressing a sage, sweet, nuptial love] as opposed to other non-proximal candidate referents.

*that repression* → maintain a joint level of attention to the same ‘distal’ entity as opposed to other non-distal candidate referents.

*contextual assumption* → the modern reader/later Freud suggest a specific point of view

*conclusion* → the speaker refers to a specific type/reading of “repression” as opposed to other possible types/readings.

(49) *that vessel* → create a joint level of attention to the new distal entity [vessel] as opposed to other non-distal candidate referents.

*this vessel* → maintain a joint level of attention to the same ‘proximal’ entity as opposed to other non-proximal entities.

*contextual assumption* → there might be other types of vessels

*conclusion* → the speaker refers to a specific type of “vessel” which encompasses the story as opposed to any other type.

Moreover, it is also noted that if we interchange the proximal forms with distal ones and vice versa in these examples, reference resolution will not be affected and what will remain is the implicit inferences of contrast. This shows that the choice between a proximal and a distal demonstrative is sometimes in itself irrelevant, while the choice of a demonstrative determiner *per se* is the relevant factor due to its encoded semantics.

In the Arabic data, specifically, the irrelevance of choosing a proximal or distal form is clear in the use of idiomatic expressions involving a demonstrative. These include expressions such as *ومع هذا/ذلك* (and despite this/that), *وعلى هذا/ذلك* (according to this/that), *وغير ذلك/هذا* (more than this/that), *بالإضافة إلى هذا/ذلك* (in addition to this/that), *ولهذا/ولذلك* (and other than that/this), *ولهذا/ولذلك* (for this/that), etc<sup>67</sup>. All of these expressions involve a demonstrative pronoun, and they can occur with both proximal and distal forms. In such cases, reference assignment would not change if the proximal or distal form is used. The differences can only be explained by invoking the idea of internal contrast and how it bears on inferences regarding speakers’ attitudes. Examples, (50)-(52) illustrate this:

(50) (Literature Essays) *ومع ذلك (هذا) فإن شروط القصة القصيرة لم تعد ملزمة*

wa	ma3	dhalik	(hadhaa)	fa’inna	šuruuṭ	’al-qiṣṣah
and	with	that(mas)	(this)	so-part.	conditions	the-story
’al-qaṣīrah	lam	ta3ud	mulzimah			
the-short	not	anymore	obligatory			

And despite that (this), the conditions for the short story are no longer obligatory.

<sup>67</sup> These expressions are similar to what Halliday and Hasan (1976: 75-76) discuss as “discourse adjuncts” where expressions such as in *that being so, after that, under these circumstances*, etc are treated as conjunctives. While I agree with them that in these cases “there is overlap between conjunction and reference”, I think it is still important to identify the semantic contribution of the demonstrative itself, which determines reference, as well as having pragmatic effects relating to point of view and overall cohesion of discourse.

وهو ما شجع بدوره على انتشار كافة أنواع التقاليع في الوجه، بما في ذلك "ألوان شديدة الإغراء" من طلاء الشفاه (51) (General News) "المبلل" وغير ذلك (هنا) من أنواع التقاليع

wa	huwa	maa	šajja3	bi-dawrihi	3alaa
and	he	what	encouraged	with-turn-it	on
'intišaar	kaafat	'anwaa3	'al-taqaali3	fii	'al-wajh
spreading	all	kinds	the-fads	in	the-face
bimaa	fii	dhaalik	'alwaan	šadiidat	'al-'iḡraa'
with-what	in	that(mas)	colours	very	the-seduction
min	ṭalaa'	'al-šifaah	'al-muballal	wa	ḡayr
from	varnish	the-lips	the-wet	and	other
dhalik	(hadhaa)	min	'anwaa3	'al-taqaalii3	
that(mas)	(this)	from	kinds	the-fads	

And it encouraged in turn all sorts of fads in face makeup to spread, including very seductive shades of lip gloss and other (than that/this) kinds of fads.

(52) بل الأكثر من ذلك (هنا)، أن أحمد شوقي، لم يتردد في هجاء القائد الوطني أحمد عرابي (Literature Essays)

bal	'al-'akthar	min	dhalik	(hadhaa)	'an
but	the-more	from	that(mas)	this(mas)	that
Ahmad	Shawky	lam	yataraddad	fii	hijaa'
Ahmad	Shawky	not	hesitate-he(pres)	in	criticising
'al-qaa'id	'al-waṭanii	Ahmad	Orabi		
the-leader	the-nationalist	Ahmad	Orabi		

More than that (this), Ahmad Shawky did not hesitate to criticise the nationalist leader Ahmad Oraby.

As these examples show, it is more common to use the distal demonstrative in such idiomatic expressions. This could be the result of combining the encoded internal contrast with other contextual factors. In (50), for example, there is the effect of contrast in *despite that* where the speaker wants to distance him/herself from the previous argument. In (52), there is the effect of addition in *more than that* where the speaker wants to convey that s/he will add something new taking the previous discourse into consideration.

Another important factor that has been noted in the literature (e.g. Gundel et al 1993; Simon-Alt & Vieira 2002), is that demonstrative pronouns tend to be used with non-nominal

discourse referents more than demonstrative determiners<sup>68</sup>. However if we apply this to the expressions لهذا/لذلك (for this/that) with the demonstrative pronoun, we still see a notable difference in frequency. This particular expression in the whole Arabic corpus occurs 73 times with the distal demonstrative, while it occurs only 14 times with the proximal. In (53) and (54), the substitution of one form with the other does not affect the interpretation of the utterance as the expression is used to link the two parts of the utterance in a cause-result relationship:

(53) ويعتقد عدد من الخبراء الهولنديين المتخصصين في شؤون الجالية المسلمة، أن المساجد تعتبر التجمعات الكبرى (General News) بالنسبة للمسلمين، ولهذا فإن بمقدورها المساهمة بشكل إيجابي في مشاريع الحكومة

wa ya3taqid 3adad min 'al-ḥubaraa' 'al-holandiiyiin  
and think-he(pres) number of the-experts the-Dutch

'al-mutaḥaṣṣiṣiin fii šu'uun 'al-jaaliyah 'al-muslimah  
the-specialised in affairs the-minority the-muslim

'anna 'al-masaajid tu3tabar 'al-tajammu3aat 'al-kubraa  
that the-mosques considered the-gatherings the-great

bilnisbah lil-muslimiin wa li-hadhaa fa'inna  
with regard to to-the-muslims and for-this so-that

bimaqduurihaa 'al-musaahamah bi-šakl 'iijaabii  
are-able to the-contribution with-form positive

fii mašaari3 'al-ḥukuumah  
in projects the-government

And several Dutch experts in the affairs of the Muslim minority think that mosques are considered the place for major gatherings for Muslims, and **for this** (therefore) they can positively contribute to the Government's plans.

(54) ذلك الإنتاج الفني صادر من دول مسلمة **ولذلك** من المقترض أن يلقى ترحيبا من المشاهدين المسلمين (General News)

dhalik 'al-'intaaj 'al-faniyy šaadir min duwal  
that(mas) the-production the-artistic is produced from countries

muslimah wa lidhalik min 'al-muftaraḍ  
muslim and for-that(mas) from the-supposed

<sup>68</sup> See also Zaki (2007) where I examined the relationship between demonstrative determiners/pronouns and their antecedents in terms of syntactic and semantic features (e.g. nominal vs non-nominal, co-referring vs non-co-referring, etc.) in a corpus of English and Arabic texts.

'an	yalqaa	tarḥiibaan	min	'al-muṣaahidiin
that	receive-he(pres)	welcoming	from	the-viewers
'al-muslimiin				
the-muslim				

That artistic production comes from Muslim countries and **for that** (therefore) it is supposed to be welcomed from Muslim viewers.

The demonstrative pronouns attached to the preposition meaning *for* in these two examples act as a connector between two parts of the utterance that amounts to using *therefore* in English. The discourse deictic function performed by the demonstratives, i.e. referring to proposition, fact or event linguistically represented as a non-nominal discourse referent, follows from applying the attention-directing procedural semantics in interaction with the context to arrive at an optimally relevant interpretation. However, it is the choice of the proximal or distal form which leads to what Fillmore (1982: 38) has termed the phenomenon of “taking a point of view”. Inferences about point of view are only possible in such cases due to the internal contrast featuring in the semantics of demonstratives. These inferences are warranted because they do not add anything to the process of reference resolution itself but to the implicit content of the utterance. The idea of ‘focalisation’ in narrative analysis (Herman and Vervaeck 2001: 70-80) could be relevant here. The internal focalisation represented by the proximal demonstrative in (53) could be said to relate to the point of view of the Dutch experts; while the external focalisation in (54) exempts the speaker from any commitment to the argument (which is also supplemented by the grammatically passive, impersonal style of the following utterance).

The role demonstratives play in encouraging further implicated inferences could also be seen in cases where the demonstrative phrase introduces a new referent in discourse which has not been mentioned before. This type of use is typical of the definite article<sup>69</sup>; however the choice of a demonstrative not only adds the procedural instruction to create a new joint level of attention to the intended referent as opposed to other potential candidates, but also gives rise to further inferences regarding the speaker’s attitude. Consider examples (55) and (56), both from fictional discourse:

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<sup>69</sup> Fraurud (1990), for example, analysed 745 definite article phrases in a corpus of Swedish written texts and found that 61% of them were new to discourse, i.e. ‘first mention’. She also extends her arguments to English. See also Gundel et al. (1993).

(55) What use is despair for me now? She thought. It's too late for despair. And now she's experienced *this* burying of her being, she felt curiously relieved. (W2F-020 093)

(56) تأملتُ صورتي في المرأة، والنومُ ما زالَ يتعلّقُ بأهدابي.. هذا الإحساسُ اللذيذُ في أعماقي تسرّبَ لسطحِ المرأةِ وصيغَ كلَّ شيءٍ بلونِ الزهورِ (Fiction)

ta'ammalt contemplate-I(past)	ṣuuratii picture-my	fi in	'al-mir'aah the-mirror	wa and	'al-nawm the-sleep
maa zaal part. still	yataḥallaq hang(pres)	bi-'ahdaabii with-frills-my	hadhaa this(mas)	'al-'iḥsaas the-feeling	
'al-ladhiidh the-nice	fii 'aḥmaaqii in soul-my	tasarrab leak-it(past)	li-saḥḥ to-surface	'al-mir'aah the-mirror	
wa ṣabaḡ and dye-it(past)	kul every	ṣai' thing	bi-lawn with-colour	'al-zuhuur the-flowers	

I contemplated my picture in the mirror and I was still feeling sleepy.. *this* nice feeling deep down in me leaked to the surface of the mirror and coloured everything with the colour of flowers.

Both examples are strikingly similar in that they both refer to certain kinds of feelings, and the demonstratives are used to create a new entity in discourse. This new entity could have been introduced by the definite article, or even by the distal demonstrative. Given the fictional nature of the texts, the speaker chooses the proximal demonstrative in order to convey a certain subjective attitude to the referent<sup>70</sup>. In (55), the first sentence is told in the first person but then the third person narrator point of view takes over. The proximal demonstrative, by virtue of the internal contrast and the inferences it invites regarding the types of feelings going through the character's mind, seems to ground the referent within the character's point of view in an attempt to connect it to the reader's own point of view. Similarly, in (56), speaking in the character's voice, the proximal demonstrative is used not only to create a new referent in discourse, but also to anchor it fully within the character's point of view, as opposed to any other feelings that might be experienced by the character.

Finally, the use of demonstratives in the following examples could only be justified on the implicit level because they are dispensable in discourse. In other words, the omission of the distal demonstratives in (57) by just saying *especially Lottie*, and (58) by just saying *Al Akkad the genius*, would not render the utterances ungrammatical or unacceptable. Therefore,

<sup>70</sup> See Leech & Short (2007) for an introduction to linguistic style in fiction.

the extra effort exerted in processing them must be justified by extra cognitive effects. This, I argue, takes the form of the derivation of a range of weak implicatures.

(57) She ran off with one of the soldiers sent here when they were expecting trouble in the mines. I 'm talking about way back, when Lottie and her brother were hardly more than babes. There never was no trouble, except what Jane brought on herself. She'd let the fathers of Lottie and Jacob get away with what they did ... but she wasn't going to let this one out of her sight until he'd done the right thing by her. I suppose two bastard children by someone else would hardly strengthen her claim on him, would it? Especially *that* Lottie. (W2F-007 119)

(58) العقاد ذلك العبقرى (Literature Essays)

Al Akkad        dhalik        'al-ʒabqarii

Al Akkad        that(mas)        the-genius

Al Akkad, **that** genius.

Resolving the reference in these examples is straightforward. In (57), *Lottie* has been previously mentioned so the demonstrative instructs the hearer to maintain a joint level of attention to this entity as opposed to other referential candidates. In (58), since this is the title of an article, there are no other previously mentioned referents so that the intended referent is the most and the only accessible one. But according to the principle of optimal relevance, the use of an extra linguistic item must be offset by extra cognitive effects. The interpretation process for the utterance in (57) might proceed as follows:

- a. The utterance “especially that Lottie” is optimally relevant.
- b. Reference is resolved on the previously mentioned “Lottie”
- c. The extra effort used in processing the demonstrative must be offset by extra effects.
- d. Contextual assumption: being distal conveys distancing oneself from something.
- e. Contextual assumption: if you distance yourself from someone, you are not favourable of him/her.
- f. Weak implicature: the speaker does not like Lottie.
- g. Weak implicature: the speaker has criticisms about Lottie’s character
- h. Weak implicature: the speaker thinks Lottie is a problem for her mother.
- i. Weak implicature: the speaker holds Lottie responsible for her mother’s troubles.
- j. Etc.

Similarly, the interpretation of (58) might proceed as follows:

- a. The utterance “Al Akkad that genius” is optimally relevant.
- b. Reference is resolved on the previously mentioned “Al Akkad”
- c. The extra effort used in processing the demonstrative must be offset by extra effects.
- d. Contextual assumption: being distal conveys assuming an external point of view.
- e. Weak implicature: the speaker is identifying with the hearer’s viewpoint instead of his own.
- f. Weak implicature: the speaker is drawing attention to a particular aspect of Al Akkad’s character.
- g. Weak implicature: the speaker intends to convey that this aspect of Al Akkad’s character “being a genius” is not well known.
- h. Etc.

In this process, step (c) in each case is not actually represented by the hearer. However, once reference resolution is done the hearer’s expectations of relevance will not be quiet satisfied as the use of the demonstratives encourages further inferences to justify the use of the demonstratives. Besides showing that demonstratives contribute to the implicit content of utterances as well as the explicit one, these examples also illustrate how the notion of distance can be interpreted on many levels: physical and mental, spatial and temporal, emotional and cognitive. This shows that distance is not an inherent feature in the intended referents but it is a dynamic concept which gets its dynamicity essentially by being an indexical concept that needs to be interpreted relative to a context. What unites all the different aspects of this concept of distance is that theyfall under the scope of an attention-directing procedure which is primarily designed to help the hearer to arrive at the intended referent, and can also encourage the hearer to make further inferences. In the next section, I discuss the use of demonstratives to refer to an entity which has not been mentioned before.

#### **4.2.3 First-mention demonstratives**

Examples (55) and (56) in the previous section represent what I call first-mention demonstratives, an infrequent but important use. That is, the demonstrative is used to refer to



an entity that has not been mentioned before in discourse. I argue in this section that first-mention demonstratives are mainly used for their emotional effect which contributes to the implicit level of meaning. The idea of using demonstratives (and other referring expressions<sup>71</sup>) to refer in this way has been discussed in the literature under various labels. These include, 'bridging', 'associative anaphora', 'non-phoric' demonstratives, 'labelling', 'discourse deixis' and 'inferrables' (Clark & Haviland 1977; Hawkins 1978; Halliday & Hasan 1976; Erkü & Gundel 1987; Prince 1981; Francis 1994; Löbner 1998; Kleiber 1999; Matsui 2000 *inter alia*). In their study of French demonstratives, Apotheloz and Reichler-Beguelin (1999: 364) use the term 'indirect anaphora' and they define this use as:

- (a) The demonstrative refers to an object which has not been explicitly mentioned in the prior context, i.e. it is new in discourse.
- (b) The demonstrative refers to an object which can be identified on the basis of information provided by this prior context, i.e. information given in earlier discourse (or information made available through contextual assumptions), without being co-referential with any expression.

According to them, the interpretation of this kind of reference should take into account the various strategic interests of the speakers in their choice of a referring expression.

Crucial in the interpretation of demonstratives is the context, i.e. the interpretation of the referent relies on the hearer's ability to access the relevant contextual assumptions. In other words, "the hearer must be able to access, not only an appropriate referent, but also a context in which the speaker might reasonably have expected her utterance, on that assignment of reference, to be optimally relevant" (Wilson 1992: 169). Therefore, contextual assumptions play a major role, and the speaker utilises information in the DemP, both procedural and conceptual, to facilitate the hearer's access to the relevant contextual assumptions with the least effort. Elaborating on this, Wilson & Sperber (2004: 615) identify the three subtasks involved in the overall interpretation of utterances as follows:

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<sup>71</sup> Most of the work involves the definite article (e.g. Clark & Haviland 1977; Hawkins 1978), but some work has been carried out on possessive NPs in cases of associative reference (e.g. Kleiber 2003; Willemse 2007). As for demonstratives, Apotheloz and Reichler-Beguelin (1999: 363) assert that "numerous linguists consider that associative anaphora can only be introduced by definite NPs and claim that demonstrative NPs cannot take on the role of associative anaphora". But see Botley (2006) and Botley and McEnery (2001a) for using English demonstratives in indirect anaphora. See also Maclaren (1982) on the role of demonstratives in introducing new referents in discourse, and Sidorov & Gelbukh (1999).

- (a) Constructing a hypothesis about explicit content (EXPLICATURES) via decoding, disambiguation, reference resolution and other pragmatic processes.
- (b) Constructing a hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions (IMPLICATED PREMISES).
- (c) Constructing a hypothesis about the intended contextual implications (IMPLICATED CONCLUSIONS).

In the case of co-referring demonstratives, the hearer would only need to perform the first step to arrive at the intended referent. But in other cases, such as first-mention, the contribution of the demonstrative goes beyond explicit communication and the hearer would need to proceed to the second and third inferential steps to arrive at the intended referent. In (55) and (56) above, the role of the demonstratives is to create a new focus of joint attention to an entity that has not been mentioned before in discourse. Using the definite article instead would not have resulted in the ‘simulation-of-reality effect’ as Apotheloz and Reichler-Beguelin (1999) call it. This effect arises on the implicit level from following the subtasks of processing the utterance, and starting from the assumption that using the demonstrative (the proximal one in both cases) with its extra procedural and conceptual encoding should be rewarded by extra cognitive effects.

Other examples from the corpus include (59) and (60). They are both from the category of fiction, which, not surprisingly, is more likely to make use of implicit meanings and stylistic effects<sup>72</sup>.

(59) He could hardly blame her, he thought.

He decided he must return to the house.

He began running, feeling light and purposeful, scarcely seeming to touch the pavement with his feet, his heart strong and amazingly compliant with *this sudden awakening*. (W2F-008 094-096)

(60) She worked hard but she also drew strength from the peace of mind - a delicious kind of tiredness - at each day 's end , resulting from *that same concentration* on the manual and mechanical, from *this respite* in dealing with the buffetings of real life, from *this amicable truce* in the sexual war. (W2F-010 134)

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<sup>72</sup> The effect of text category on the type of referring expressions used is an interesting area of study. Referring expressions, seen as forms of cohesion in discourse (following Halliday and Hasan 1976), can be manipulated in certain types of texts for stylistic purposes. Jeffries & McIntyre (2010: 85) suggest that “the variability in the extent of cohesion of a text is quite significant in literary terms. Thus, although some cohesion is necessary for a reader to make sense of the text, some genres and text-types are more likely than others to minimise – or maximise – the concentration of cohesive ties.”

Note that (60) includes three types of referring expressions, all used to introduce new entities in discourse (with varying degrees and extents of newness from the new and unique to the new and general). Unlike the indefinite and the definite articles, the concept of distance encoded in the demonstratives is used to manipulate how the speaker conceives of his/her attitude towards the referent or how the speaker wants the hearer to approach the referent. The emotional aspect in relation to the referent and the speaker's attitude towards it is not needed in the process of retrieving the referent *per se*; rather it achieves relevance on the implicit level. This could be arrived at through a series of implicated premises and conclusions the hearer entertains in the interpretation process. Comparing (60) to (61), for example, will not change the reference resolution process itself, but only the demonstratives in (60) achieve reference with attitude:

(61) She worked hard but she also drew strength from *the peace of mind* - a delicious kind of tiredness - at each day 's end , resulting from *the same concentration* on the manual and mechanical, from *the respite* in dealing with the buffetings of real life, from *the amicable truce* in the sexual war.

The distal demonstrative is also used to introduce new referents in discourse in what is known in the literature as 'recognitional *that*', where "the intended referent is to be identified via specific, shared knowledge" (Himmelman 1996: 230). Leonetti (2000: 4) also claims that, "the only way to get first mention demonstrative DPs is to present an entity as if it were familiar for the addressee, strategically appealing to shared experience, even if the referent is not known". (62) and (63) illustrate this use in the English data:

(62) Enough about me for the moment,  
What about you?  
How's life in cultured Paris?  
How's it going with wine (Foster's), women and work (paid holiday).  
No doubt you'll be able to afford *that yacht* soon. (W1B-001 123-127)

(63) Algy is lying on my bed making *that noise* you don't like. (W1B-008 057)

Whereas the proximal demonstratives in (59) and (60) achieve relevance by virtue of the demonstrative phrase itself providing the context for further inferences, the distal demonstratives in (62) and (63) seem to direct the inferential path to specific shared knowledge between the interlocutors.

In the data from Arabic fiction, a similar pattern has been found. The proximal demonstratives in (64) are used for first mention with the implicit effect of influencing the emotional attitude to the referents.

(64) قرأتُ الخطابَ مرَّاتٍ ومرَّاتٍ، ولمْ أفضْ من الأمرِ العَجَبِ! كَرِيمِ شَاكِرٍ يُخْفِي فِي أَعْمَاقِهِ كُلَّ هَذَا الرَّحْمِ؟! .. كُلَّ هَذِهِ الرُّومَانِيَّةِ؟! .. كُلَّ هَذِهِ الْمَشَاعِرِ؟  
الرُّومَانِيَّةِ؟ .. كُلَّ هَذِهِ الْمَشَاعِرِ؟

qara't	'al-ḥiṭaab	marraat	wa	marraat	wa	lam
read-I(past)	the-letter	times	and	times	and	not
'aqd	min	'al-'amr	'al-ʔajab	Kareem	Shaker	
end	from	the-matter	the-amazement	Kareem	Shaker	
yuhfi	fii	'aʔmaaqih	kul	hadhaa	'al-zaḥam	
hide-he(pres)	in	soul-his	all	this(mas)	the-passion	
kul	hadhihi	'al-ruumaansiyyah		kul	hadhihi	
all	this(fem)	the-romance		all	this(fem)	
'al-maʔaaʔir						
the-feelings						

I read the letter many times, and my amazement hasn't stopped. Kareem Shaker hides all **this passion**? All **this romance**? All **these feelings**?

The use of the demonstratives in (64) is important since they single out a certain aspect of *passion*, *romance* and *feelings* that the speaker attributes to Kareem's letter and s/he wants the reader to direct attention to it too. The use of the proximal demonstrative sets the referents close to the speaker on the distance scale as opposed to any other general senses of these notions, thus creating a sense of identification with it, i.e. with the speaker's point of view.

However, in the Arabic data, the use of a demonstrative to refer to shared knowledge is not exclusive to the distal form as it is the case in English. In (65) and (66), both the distal and proximal forms are used for this purpose:

(65) وترك لنا الحكيم الكثير من الآثار الأدبية المتنوعة في أساليب كتاباتها، كما ترك لنا **نلك الرصيد الهائل من المسرحيات** التي تنوعت بين ذهنية واجتماعية وأخرى

wa	tarak	lana	Al-Hakim	'al-kathiir	min
and	leave-he(past)	for-us	Al-Hakim	the-lot	from

'al-'aathaar the-works	'al-'adabiyah the-literary	'al-mutanawwihah the-varied	fii in	'asaaliib styles
kitaabaatiha writing-its	kama as well	tarak lanaa leave-he(past) for-us	dhalik that(mas)	'al-raṣiid the-amount
'al-haa'il the-great	min from	'al-masrahiiyyaat the-plays	'al-latii which	tanawwihah varied
bayna between	dhihniyyah cognitive	wa and	'ijtimaa'iyah wa social and	'uḥraa other

And Al-Hakim left us a lot of literary works that are varied in their writing styles, and he also left us **that huge amount of plays** which varied between cognitive, social and other.

هؤلاء الشعراء مرتاحا إليهم ملتتمسا عندهم **هذا الجمال الفني** الذي يعوزنا في حياتنا اليومية (66)

ha'ulaa' these	'al-ṣuḥaraa' the-poets	murtaahān comfortable	'ilayhim to-them
multamisan seeking-I	ḥindahum in-them	hadhaa this(mas)	'al-jamaal the-beauty
'al-faniyy the-artistic	'alladhii which	yaḥuzanaa lack-we	fii in
ḥayaatinaa life-our	'al-yawmiyyah the-daily		

..these poets, feeling comfortable with them, seeking in them **this artistic beauty** which we lack in our daily life.

In the vast majority of cases, Arabic demonstratives used in the recognitional type are followed by extra descriptive information starting with a relative pronoun. This complies with Himmelmann's (1996: 230) opinion that "there is a tendency to incorporate additional anchoring or descriptive information into a recognitional mention to make the intended referent more accessible". The encoded semantics of the demonstratives directs the hearer to focus his/her attention on this new referent as opposed to other potential referential candidates which might be located on the distance scale. While the extra conceptual information helps to guide the inferential path in its task of creating a new referent in

discourse by providing a source for contextual assumptions, the internal contrast between the proximal and the distal manipulates the cognitive/emotional attitude to the intended referent.

### **4.3 Summary**

Levinson (1983: 55) said that “the grammatical category of deixis will probably be found to straddle the semantics/pragmatics border”. This chapter attempted to show how demonstratives contribute to the semantic and pragmatic levels of meaning. They do so either by only supplying evidence for the assignment of reference, and hence by arriving at the proposition expressed, or by going further and encouraging the hearer to make further inferences on the implicit level to fulfil his/her expectations of relevance. The key factor in this process is a minimal semantics encoded by the demonstrative itself, which interacts with a powerful pragmatic mechanism. I have argued that demonstratives in English and Arabic encode a combination of attention-directing procedure and a pro-concept of distance which falls under its scope. The procedure instructs the hearer to create or maintain a shared level of attention to a particular entity as opposed to other referential candidates. This procedural instruction, together with encoded information about proximity or distance of the intended referent, serves to fulfill the various interpretations demonstratives are used to communicate.

## **Chapter 5. Demonstratives and Self-Repair in English**

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### **5.1 Demonstratives and self-repair**

In this chapter, I discuss cases of self-repair in the spoken part of the English corpus in an attempt to further test my proposal for the semantics and pragmatics of demonstratives. Self-repair is simply defined as the process of a speaker correcting him/herself by changing one word(s) to another. The examples I discuss here involve speakers using a demonstrative then changing it to a definite article or vice versa, or using one form of demonstrative then changing it to the other spatially contrastive form. The analysis presented here therefore sheds some light on the semantic and pragmatic differences between the definite article and the demonstratives. The notion of repair in conversation analysis has been taken to give evidence for the close connections between grammar, pragmatics and interaction. Within the framework of relevance theory, I discuss how we can explain speakers' decisions to repair in terms of semantics and pragmatics, which ultimately bear on speakers' motivations and the kinds of inferences they make in production. Maximising relevance is as important for the speaker as it is for the hearer, and this is reflected in his/her choice of words. As far as referring expressions are concerned, the discussion in this chapter could be another step towards developing a fuller account of the inferences involved in production which others started (Owtram 2010; Clark & Owtram in press).

In the next section, I discuss the assumptions I am making about how the semantic analyses of the English definite article differ from the semantic analysis of demonstratives I have proposed here. In section 5.1.2, I invoke some insights from the literature on self-repair and discuss how we can explain it in relevance-theoretic terms. In the next 3 sections, I discuss examples of self-repair from the corpus starting with cases where the definite article is repaired into a demonstrative, then by cases where a demonstrative is repaired into the definite article, and finally cases where one demonstrative form is repaired into the other demonstrative form in the pair. The analyses proposed here allow a fairly straightforward account of cases of self-repair, and this constitutes some insight into the pragmatic processes involved in production.

### 5.1.1 The definite article and demonstratives

Any discussion about referring expressions in English naturally tends to compare these expressions to each other to allow for a better understanding of each one. The definite article and demonstratives have been compared in semantic, pragmatic and even historical terms<sup>73</sup>. Lyons (1977: 650), for example, points out that the definite article and third-person pronouns are historically derived from the two proximal/distal deictic sets which in early English were marked for gender and could be used either pronominally or adjectivally. Levinson (2006: 111) adds that “there certainly is close kinship between definite determiners and demonstratives, as shown by the frequent grammaticalisation of the former from the latter”<sup>74</sup>. However, he rejects the idea that the definite article is just a demonstrative unmarked for distance (cf. Lyons 1977; Anderson and Keenan 1985). One reason for that, according to him, is that many demonstrative systems in languages around the world have unmarked members; e.g. the distal *that* in English (Lyons 1977) and the proximal *haadhaa* in Arabic (Mejdell 2006).

From the semantic point of view, the difference between the definite article and the demonstratives as definite expressions has been explained in terms of uniqueness, identifiability, salience, etc. For many semanticists, the difference between definite descriptions (the N) from demonstratives (this/that N) lies in the way that reference is determined. Larson and Segal (1995: 341), for instance, compare the two examples below:

- (1) I'd better be getting back to *the office*.
- (2) I'd better be getting back to *that office*.

For them, with no accompanying gesture of demonstration, example (2) raises the question “which office” in a way that the other example does not. Therefore, they maintain that while the definite article seems to automatically pick out the most salient object in the context of utterance as its referent, demonstratives require a demonstrative gesture, or the referent has to be perceptually salient for the hearer. In their own words (1995: 342), “use of *that* and *this*

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<sup>73</sup> Also, a lot of work comparing the demonstratives and the definite article has been done on French. See Kleiber (1990; 1991), Corblin (1995), Apothéloz and Reichler-Béguelin (1999), and De Mulder (1997), *inter alia*.

<sup>74</sup> See also Laury (1997) who argues for the development of the definite article from the demonstrative determiner in Finnish as a case of grammaticalisation. The author argues that Finnish speakers use demonstratives to focus attention on important referents and to express and negotiate access to them in the interactive context of ongoing talk, and not primarily to talk about how near or far referents are.



implies that the referent is a perceptually salient satisfier of the nominal, while use of demonstrative *the* implies that the referent is the contextually most salient satisfier of the nominal". However, this characterisation cannot be applied to all cases. If (1) and (2) were uttered, for example, between two colleagues who are having lunch at a cafe near their place of work, the distinction in terms of perceptual salience falls short of accounting for the different interpretations. In the absence of any perceptually salient referent, the definite description in both cases is resolved on the office they work in. However, only (2), with the right intonation and access to contextual assumptions, can also convey an interpretation such as (3):

(3) That office I work in which I hate because of what happened yesterday.

This interpretation could be accounted for if we follow the semantic analysis proposed for the demonstratives here. The type of interpretation in (3) contributes to the implicit content of the utterance which makes use of shared contextual assumptions. The semantics encoded by the demonstrative in interaction with relevance considerations triggers the search for extra inferences in the interpretation compared to using the definite article.

Corpus-based studies have also been interested in investigating differences in the distribution and use of demonstratives and definite articles across languages. Gundel et al (2003) and Ariel (1988), for example, noted that demonstratives are less frequent compared to the definite article and personal pronouns in a wide range of languages. The higher frequency of *the* in English, particularly, compared to *this/that* suggests it needs less processing effort. Hence, the comparison between (1) and (2)<sup>75</sup> starts from the assumption that (2) needs more processing effort which has to be justified in terms of extra inferences to achieve relevance. In terms of use, Botley and McEnery (2001a) argue that English demonstratives have an accessibility status which is intermediate between that of the definite article and pronouns. Their work is largely based on the ideas put forward by Ariel (1990) and Gundel et al. (1993) who assign certain accessibility features for each referring expression within a continuum. For Ariel (1988, 1990), this is a continuum of accessibility, while for Gundel et al. (1993) it is one of cognitive status. Ariel's accessibility theory considers that demonstratives are mid accessibility markers which refer to entities either present in the physical environment or previously mentioned in the text. For Gundel et al., the

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<sup>75</sup> Given that both definite descriptions refer to the same thing.

definite article requires a cognitive status that is uniquely identifiable, i.e. the hearer can associate a unique mental representation of the referent, which is a lower status than that required by the demonstratives.

In terms of the encoded semantics, the definite article is generally seen to encode a more general linguistic meaning than demonstratives. A notable exception is Hawkins (1978), whose characterisation of the difference between the two suggests a more complex semantic analysis for the definite article. According to him, a speaker uses a demonstrative to instruct the hearer to match the linguistic referent with an object which is identifiable via physical perception or by being previously mentioned in discourse. But using a definite article includes a more detailed list of characterisations whereby the speaker indicates to the hearer to locate the referent in an 'immediate situation of utterance', or a 'larger situation of utterance', or an associative anaphoric reading, etc. Examples of these types are illustrated by (4)-(6) respectively:

(4) Harry, mind *the table*! (Hawkins 1978: 113)

(5) Halifax will never rise to the twentieth century. *The local councillors* are permanently asleep. (1978: 120)

(6) The man drove past our house in a car. *The exhaust fumes* were terrible. (1978: 123)

It could be argued that those characterisations do not necessarily mean a more complex semantics for the definite article. Rather, a minimalist semantics along the lines of "find a unique referent" could be maintained, while the interaction between the encoded semantics and the context results in more inferential work to arrive at the intended interpretations. What is missing from Hawkins' account is an overall pragmatic theory that would explain the inferential processing of such utterances. However, one important semantic difference between the definite article and the demonstratives for Hawkins is that reference with the former must be unique, while reference with the latter "must be unambiguous for the hearer, but not necessarily unique" (1978: 156). For him, this is the reason why there is a proximal/distal distinction in the demonstratives and not in the definite article.

There have also been previous attempts to account for the differences between the definite article and the demonstratives in relevance theoretic terms. Two main contributions are mentioned here. Leonetti (2000) starts from the basic assumption that both the definite article and demonstratives encode procedural instructions which guide the inferential processing involved in arriving at explicatures. The main difference between them is that

demonstratives encode a more restrictive procedure which links them to some sort of a deictic centre, while the definite article lacks this deictic feature. However, he further argues that one of the reasons for choosing a demonstrative rather than a definite article has to do with non-identifying information in the NP. Therefore, according to him, in some cases “a demonstrative is chosen when the descriptive content would not ensure the adequate selection of the discourse antecedent if preceded by the article” (2000: 4). He uses the following example in Spanish:

- (7) El ganador del premio es Angel Martinez, de Salamanca. {??El / Este} empleado de banca de cuarenta anos...  
“The winner of the prize is Angel Martinez of Salamanca. {*The / This*} *forty year old bank employee...*”

By non-identifying information here, Leonetti means that because the head noun carries discourse-new descriptive content, a demonstrative would be more ‘natural’ to use than a definite article<sup>76</sup>. This can be explained in terms of the semantics proposed here. If the definite article instructs the hearer to find a uniquely identifiable referent, and since there is only one candidate referent in the previous discourse (i.e. *Angel Martinez*), then reference resolution would be achieved and the new descriptive content in the head noun would be added to the representation of the referent. However, a demonstrative instructs the hearer to maintain a shared level of attention to the intended referent as opposed to other candidate referents. In this case, the new descriptive content would be used to do two things: (a) to convey that the relevant aspect of Angel Martinez that is being referred to is that he is a forty year old bank employee; and (b) to emphasise that it is this particular referent, i.e. Angel Martinez the forty year old bank employee as opposed to other Angel Martinezes or other forty year old bank employees, that is the intended one.

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<sup>76</sup> Gundel et al. (1988: 220) call this type of use “informative *this*” (which apparently only occurs with the proximal demonstrative) and suggest it is typical in non-interactive genres. The main function of the demonstrative in this case is to “informatively redescribe a referent”. Compare (7) with the example below:

- (i) Nearly lost in the polemic was Judge Kennedy himself. That was ironic, because in many ways **this former small-city lawyer** with the stable marriage and three attractive children and the fine reputation appears to personify just those values that made the image of Ronald Reagan so attractive after the convulsions of the 1960's and 1970's.

What both examples have in common is that the whole demonstrative (or definite) phrase can be substituted with an unstressed pronoun since the referent is already highly accessible to the hearer. However, a demonstrative is preferably used for the special reason of introducing new information in the noun phrase.

Still, it can be argued that, in some cases, a noun phrase preceded by a definite article may not be enough to pick out the intended referent. Consider examples (1) and (2) above as uttered between two work colleagues at lunch outside who were just discussing how the people working in their office are nicer than those in the head office. (1) and (2) could be referring to two different things in relation to the context, and the speaker might prefer to use the demonstrative to make it clear which office s/he is referring to because the internal contrast encoded by the demonstrative makes the intended referent the most accessible one. Leonetti further proposes that the distinction between demonstratives and the definite article can be reduced to a distinction between two types of definite determiners: (a) deictic definites (demonstratives) and (b) and non-deictic definites (articles). He considers this basic distinction together with the principle of relevance sufficient to account for the interpretation of those referring expressions without the need for accessibility markings. In fact, one point in common between the definite article and demonstratives is that both can be analysed in terms of conceptual-procedural components of meaning<sup>77</sup>. According to Hussein (2008: 74), for example, “the definite article is a conceptuo-procedural linguistic expression. It is neither fully procedural nor fully conceptual. It encodes a procedural meaning which leads to conceptual representation i.e. ‘definiteness’”.

Klinge (2006) attempts to characterise the difference between the definite article and the demonstratives by appealing to their etymological origins. He starts from the assumption that the three forms *the*, *this* and *that* share a pan-Germanic *th-* morpheme which is a demonstrative root from Old English that sets them in paradigmatic contrast with each other. This morpheme semantically encodes an ostensive instruction shared by all three forms, which triggers context-bound cognitive procedures. For Klinge, the difference between the definite article and the demonstratives lies in the distinction between ostension and deixis. Ostension is the basic cognitive notion underlying these referring expressions, while deixis is a compound notion that consists of ostension + indication of location relative to the speaker as the deictic centre. According to this view, the notions of uniqueness or familiarity that are often associated with the semantics of the definite article are considered a result of, not the origin of, the notion of ostension. The extra layer of deictic information encoded by the demonstratives helps in restricting the search for the intended referents in a way that reduces processing effort.

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<sup>77</sup> See Hedley (2007) for a similar argument for pronouns.

The accounts of Leonetti (2000) and Klinge (2006) share a basic underlying feature in the semantic difference between the definite article and demonstratives. They both encode an ostensive cognitive instruction to retrieve a unique intended referent, but the demonstrative also encodes more restrictive information regarding the location of this intended referent relative to the speaker as the deictic centre (whether spatially or metaphorically). Maes and Noordman (1995) take this idea further as they propose that the use of demonstratives implies that some context-based inferences are triggered in the interpretation while the use of definite descriptions does not carry this implication. Their account is based on a distinction between two cognitive functions of referring expressions: identification and predication. According to them (1995: 273), “identification is the process of establishing the referent, whereas predication is the process of attributing information to the referent”. Therefore, the definite article is seen primarily as a tool for identificational functions, while demonstratives serve both identificational and predicating functions. They do that via contextual inferences that are activated and accessed during the interpretation process. Such contextual inferences lead to modifying the representation of the referent by attributing information to it. In (8), for example, the extra information has to do with class membership of the referent (i.e. membership of the set of US presidents); whereas in (9), the information has to do with contextualising of the referent:

(8) Bush has decided to raise taxes after all. It is the first time {*the / this*} president has dared to do so. (Maes & Noordman 1995: 262)

(9) Yesterday, the first information about the PanAm Boeing disaster was released. {*The / this / that*} information does not yet give a complete picture of it. (ibid: 265)

According to them, the definite article in (8) only serves to identify the referent as Bush, but the demonstrative serves to classify the referent as a member of the class of presidents of the US and thus allows for a predicative reading by virtue of activating extra inferences. Similarly, the definite article in (9) does not allow for more than an identificational interpretation of the referent, while the use of the demonstrative contextualises the referent as the first information about the PanAm Boeing disaster.

Maes’ and Noordman’s account is intuitively plausible; however, some aspect of it is vague. It is not clear what exactly triggers the activation of the extra contextual inferences. In their account, the border line between the semantics and pragmatics seems to be blurred. If we adopt the view that it is the encoded semantics of demonstratives, as proposed here, which

triggers this activation, then a more systematic picture can be drawn. In (9), for example, the effect of contextualising the referent arises from the semantics of the demonstrative which assumes other referential candidates (i.e. this type of information as opposed to other types). Even in (8), class membership information also arises because using *this* tells the hearer to maintain a joint level of attention to the referent *Bush* as opposed to other potential referential candidates. The set of other referential candidates is restricted to those of US presidents as a result of contextual knowledge. Also, with extra inferences, considerations of effort and effect should be attended to. If we consider that these extra inferences are derived within a relevance-based framework then the picture becomes clearer. The interaction between the semantics of demonstratives and the context warrants the derivation of certain inferences which are relevant inasmuch as they lead to an optimally relevant interpretation of the referring expression and of the utterance as a whole. The outline of Maes' and Noordman's proposal is not in contrast with the proposal suggested here. The predicating role of demonstratives can be argued to follow from the proposed procedural semantics.

To sum up, I propose to characterise the difference between the definite article and demonstratives in English in relevance-theoretic terms. In so doing, we should be able to account for cases when a definite article is repaired to a demonstrative and vice versa. I start from the assumption that the definite article encodes procedural instructions to find a unique referent (i.e. to associate a unique representation for the referent)<sup>78</sup>. Given my proposal for the semantic analysis of demonstratives, it follows that the main difference between the two is that demonstratives encode the concept of distance which falls under the scope of attention-directing procedure to create an internal contrast. The definite article lacks this extra spatial and procedural information. Within a relevance-based proposal, I argue that motivations for repair between these forms could be illustrated as follows:

- ❖ A definite article is repaired to a demonstrative when:
  - a. The cognitive instruction encoded in the definite article is not enough to individuate the intended referent.

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<sup>78</sup> Hussein's (2008) proposal that the definite article encodes a procedure which leads to a conceptual representation of definiteness (or uniqueness) is in line with my own proposal for demonstratives, where the conceptual component falls under the scope of the procedural instruction. For reasons of space, I am unable to further discuss the semantics of the definite article here, but I take it that, compared to demonstratives, the definite article lacks two things: the attention-directing procedures (which implies the existence of other referential candidates) and the conceptualisation of distance.

- b. The cognitive instruction encoded in the definite article is enough to individuate the intended referent but the extra spatial and procedural information is needed for other cognitive effects.

In the reverse case, on the other hand, it can be argued that:

- ❖ A demonstrative is repaired to a definite article when:
  - a. The cognitive instruction encoded in the demonstrative is not needed to individuate the intended referent.
  - b. The cognitive instruction encoded in the demonstrative with the extra spatial and procedural information is not warranted by other cognitive effects.

Before looking at corpus examples, I discuss briefly the status of repair in conversation analysis and its relation to relevance.

### **5.1.2 Self-repair and relevance**

Previous literature on the differences between the definite article and demonstratives from a linguistic point of view is a necessary backdrop for this section. But some insights from the psycholinguistic theories on self-repair are also useful for this discussion. Repair has been at the centre of Conversation Analysis theory (Schegloff, Sacks and Jefferson 1977; Schegloff 1979; Reilly 1987; Good 1990 inter alia) where it is defined as a feature of spoken discourse in which a speaker changes one component of his/her (or the other's) utterance retrospectively. The equivalent of this phenomenon in written discourse would be re-drafting or crossing out one word and writing another. Repair can operate at any level: phoneme, morpheme, word, phrase, or sentence. Repair has been discussed in the literature under two categories: self-repair, where the speaker corrects his/her own utterance; and other-repair, where correction comes from the other interlocutor. Levinson (1983: 340) also highlights another distinction, that between self-initiated self-repair, as in (10), and other-initiated self-repair, as in (11):

(10) I've visited Lake Pretoria, I mean Lake Victoria, in Africa.

(11) A: I've visited Lake Pretoria in Africa.

B: Lake what?

A: I've visited Lake Victoria in Africa.

Theorists working within the theory of Conversation Analysis have been primarily interested in identifying mechanisms in repair, including motivating factors, verbal and non-verbal cues, types of errors and types of repair, repair position, etc. However, Levinson (1983: 341) further argues that the notion of repair can be even broader as he states that “the range of phenomena collected here under the concept of repair is wide, including word recovery problems, self-editing where no discernible error occurred, corrections proper (i.e. error-replacements) and much else besides”. Cross-linguistic studies of repair as well as the relationship between repair and other linguistic disciplines such as syntax and semantics have also been discussed in the literature.

The relationship between self-repair and syntax is particularly relevant for the discussion here in two respects. First, it is argued that repair and syntax are interdependent in the sense that the position of repair closely follows the syntactic structure of the language used. Fox et al (1996: 186), for example, who compare techniques of repair in English and Japanese, argue that the syntactic constituents of English strongly influence the repairs made by speakers:

When English speakers recycle part of an utterance, they do not back up a random number of words, as one might in replaying a tape, or even back to a randomly selected syntactic constituent boundary; in all cases of recycling in our data, speakers returned either to a beginning of a word within the phrasal constituent under construction when repair was initiated or to the beginning of the clause, but not to a word in a prior phrasal constituent or clause.

The cases of self-repair in corpus examples involving the demonstratives reflect this, since repairs have been made either at the level of the prepositional phrase containing the DemP, or at the level of the demonstrative pronoun/determiner itself. Secondly, the relationship between repair and syntax is relevant to future work that would build on the discussion in this section. Corpus examples of self-repair in Arabic were not available for this study since the corpus used only includes written data. There is a small but growing body of transcribed conversational data in Arabic, although work on spoken Arabic is limited compared to English largely due to the complications of the existence of many regional varieties of Arabic. Still, it would be interesting to compare the techniques of self-repair in English and Arabic. Although these techniques may be best described as language-specific, cross-



linguistic studies of repair (e.g. Fox et al 1996, 2010; Rieger 2003; Wouk 2007 inter alia) highlight similarities and differences which can ultimately be discussed against the background of different syntactic workings of different languages. If we follow Fox et al's (1996: 187) view of repair that it "represents a collection of strategies for responding to certain interactional pressures" then the different cultural backgrounds of English and Arabic will certainly influence how people react to interactional pressures<sup>79</sup>. The fact that there are also syntactic, phonetic and morphological variations between the two languages, e.g. the use of pronouns, the existence of pairs of accentuated/deaccentuated sounds in Arabic, gender agreement, etc., will also have its effect.

The issue at the centre of this discussion, however, is what motivates self-repair? In his insightful report on self-repair, Levelt (1983) develops a theory of monitoring and repair based on a corpus study of 959 cases of spontaneous repairs. According to him, monitoring is necessary for the detection of trouble in speech, while the production of the repair itself comes as a result of the speaker monitoring his/her 'inner speech' i.e. the phonetic strings just uttered. Interestingly, many of Levelt's characterisations of the underpinnings of self-repair vis-a-vis speakers and hearers correspond to the relevance-theoretic view of utterance production and comprehension as formulated in the relevance-theoretic notion of optimal relevance. The most relevant point to mention here is Levelt's explanation of what speakers monitor in their speech in relation to errors. He detects three main motivations for self-repair as a result of monitoring, which he formulates in the form of questions asked by the speaker as follows:

- (a) Do I want to say this now?
- (b) Do I want to say it this way?
- (c) Am I making an error?

One way of understanding the motivations behind these questions is to look at them from the view of optimal relevance. Questions (a) and (b) appeal to the speaker's preferences in producing an optimally relevant utterance, while question (c) appeals to the speaker's abilities in producing an optimally relevant utterance. In answer to question (a) a speaker is driven to replace his message by a different one because "while speaking, the speaker may realize that another arrangement of messages would be easier or more effective" (Levelt

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<sup>79</sup> For a general discussion of culturally-based linguistic styles of Arabic speakers in persuasive discourse see Johnstone (1989; 1987).

1983: 51). In answer to question (b), the speaker “become[s] aware that the way he expresses the intended information (idea, concept, proposition) needs qualification in view of the context of expression” (1983: 52). This triggers what Levelt calls ‘appropriateness repairs’. For him, there are three sources for judging the appropriateness of utterances: potential ambiguity, level of terminology, and coherence with previous discourse. All such subjective considerations of producing a certain utterance fall under the speaker’s personal preferences which shape both the form and content of his message. Therefore, the act of monitoring that Levelt describes can be seen as motivated by the desire to be optimally relevant. In this process, it might even be argued that the speaker tries to model the inferences likely to be made by the hearer in interpreting the utterance. The result of this appears in the cases of self repair. As for speakers’ abilities, this is reflected in question (c), when a speaker will be prompted to repair various lexical, syntactic or phonetic errors which result either from perceptual causes or are simply the wrong output.

With this background in mind, and for the sake of the argument in this section, I will assume that the corpus examples discussed below are not related to question (c) which has to do with production errors. In other words, I will assume that cases of self-repair from the definite article to a demonstrative or vice versa are not cases of lexical errors. Instead, in discussing these examples, I start from the assumption that the speaker has made the repair in response to the question: do I want to say my message this way?

### **5.1.3 The → this/that**

I start with examples where a speaker uses a definite article and then changes it to a demonstrative. According to Fox et al (1996: 205), articles and determiners are a popular place for repairs because they “provide material to be recycled before the speaker must produce a noun”. In these cases, repair is initiated after a noun phrase has been started. In recycling, the speaker may only repeat the part of the noun phrase that has been produced so far, i.e. the definite determiner. In other cases, the speaker also initiates repair after starting a noun phrase but the speaker repeats the whole clause rather than just the part of the noun phrase produced so far. In other words, “the domain of recycling can either be the local constituent under construction at the time repair is initiated (e.g. noun phrase) or it can be the clause” (1996: 206). In the examples below, the domain of repair is the local DemP itself:

- (12) A: We've seen no recovery  
 A: It's been no better in June and no worse than it was in May <,>  
 A: And retailers' expectations point to some modest recovery in July but you have to bear ~~that~~ <,> in mind that their expectations have not fully been met ~~since~~ since March  
 A: So they're fairly cautious about the future  
 B: Well if that's true Jackie about consumers that is bad news for the Government's hopes of an upturn because ~~the government~~ *this government* has been pinning <,> nearly all its hopes of getting out of the recession on consumer spending on the consumers dragging us out  
 (S1b-021 109-113 Broadcast discussions)

- (13) From its formation in seventeen ninety-one the Ordnance Survey had its drawing offices in the Tower of London <,>  
 And uh that's a contemporary sketch of the Tower <,>  
 Uh our drawing offices were <,> in this building here <,>  
 Uh but unfortunately <,> in eighteen forty-one uh a great fire so damaged ~~the~~ *those offices* that the department had to find another home <,>  
 (S2b-045 105-108 Non-broadcast speeches, Royal Society of Arts, London)

In these two examples, the same head nouns in the DemP, i.e. discourse referents (underlined), have been previously mentioned in the discourse and within a short textual span. Therefore, whether the speaker has chosen to use a definite NP or a DemP, reference resolution would not be an issue in the absence of any competing referential candidates or even a long textual span between referring expression and discourse referent. However, the speaker chooses to change the definite article to the more restrictive demonstrative. Since the cognitive instruction encoded in the definite article is enough to individuate the intended referent (*government, offices*), the hearer, who expects the utterance to be optimally relevant, would be encouraged to think that the extra deictic and procedural information is needed for other cognitive effects. The extra cognitive effect would be derived from the interaction between the semantics of the demonstrative and the context.

The semantics of the demonstrative encodes two kinds of extra information compared to the definite article. First, it encodes information about the proximity/distance of the referent; and second, it encodes procedural instructions to maintain a joint level of attention to the referent as opposed to other referential candidates. In (12), this results in an interpretation where the use of the demonstrative not only tells the hearer to identify the referent '*government*' (for which the definite article would have been enough), but it directs the hearer's attention to certain aspects of the referent '*the government*'. These aspects can be inferentially accessible from the context or from general knowledge. These can include inferences about 'the government that is currently in office/ that made certain economic

decisions/ that announced certain economic news etc.’. In (13), the context of the utterance might be said to make accessible for the audience the assumption that the said building includes many offices. Therefore, while the speaker used the modifier ‘drawing’ in the first two mentions of the discourse referent *drawing offices*, in the third mention the use of the unmodified definite NP might not be enough to individuate the intended referent. So the speaker uses the demonstrative *which*, by virtue of its encoded semantics, guides the audience to locate the intended referent as proximal and to direct their attention to the fact that the speaker is referring to those particular offices as opposed to any other offices in the building.

Similarly, in (14) below, where the domain of the repair is the prepositional phrase, the use of the demonstrative rather than the definite article has the same effect. The use of the definite article would have been acceptable as it uniquely picks the previously mentioned *tax* as the intended referent. However, the speaker chooses to change this to the demonstrative since the encoded semantics of the demonstrative adds the extra attention to the different aspects of ‘*the poll tax*’, to the different kinds of taxes, to the different attitudes towards this tax, etc which arise from the implication of contrast. This last assumption is particularly interesting if we note the two DemPs in this excerpt. Speaker A, who is clearly in favour of this tax, uses the distal demonstrative to refer it; while speaker B, who is apparently against it, uses the proximal demonstrative. In both cases, the demonstrative is used to fulfil the contrastive effect due to the encoded procedure, i.e. by instructing the hearer to maintain a shared level of attention to the intended referent *poll tax* as opposed to any other type of tax. But it is the notion of proximity/distance itself that is manipulated by speakers to signal, by virtue of interacting with the context, appeal to one’s own or the other’s point of view.

- (14) A: Uhm I must confess that I 'm unrepentant about the poll tax  
A: I think there were many virtues of that tax  
A: and I 'm glad to see some elements at least remain in  
A: At least we are including eighty per cent of the people  
A: And that was a great virtue I think in trying to get everybody to pay something and I 'm glad to see that we've retained that element  
B: But are there incipient problems Mr Bradbury ~~in the~~ **in this tax** because already Conservative MPs are starting to grumble about it aren't they and saying it's affecting the middle-class middle house owner uh and damaging the political chances for the party in that way  
(S1b-034 006-011 Broadcast discussions, Panorama, BBC 1)

In this sense, by using *that* speaker A is appealing to the other's point of view, and in using *this* speaker B is emphasising his/her own point of view. In both cases, the referent *tax* is characterised as located on the metaphorical distance scale, and it achieves relevance either by being proximal or distal from the deictic centre. Speakers' modelling of the hearers' likely inferences about proximity or distance may be said to influence the choice of demonstrative form.

#### 5.1.4 This/that → the

In asking him/herself "do I want to say my message in this way?" the speaker is effectively questioning whether this way is the most relevant one. As argued before, relevance is considered from the hearer's point of view as the degree to which it is worth processing. Whereas, from the speaker's point of view, relevance is considered both as the degree to which it is compatible with the speaker's abilities or preferences and as the degree to which it is worth processing for the hearer. Therefore, in cases of self-repair where the speaker changes a demonstrative to a definite article, it could be for one of two reasons. Either the speaker deems that the cognitive instruction encoded in the demonstrative is not needed to individuate the intended referent; therefore s/he uses the definite article instead to be the most relevant form worth the hearer's processing effort. In the other case, the speaker deems that the cognitive instruction encoded in the demonstrative with the extra procedural information is not warranted by other cognitive effects; therefore s/he uses the definite article instead to be the most relevant one in view of his/her communicative preferences.

In the following examples, the speaker chooses to repair his utterance by changing a DemP into a definite NP and uses the filler *uh* just before uttering the noun. Fox et al (1996: 206) explain that in these cases "the demonstrative pronoun serves as a place holder while the speaker looks for some lexically specified noun". The use of delay markers such as *uh*, *um*, *well* can also be used for the same purpose. Examples (15)-(17) illustrate this:

- (15) The TV news actually gave a better impression of the speech than <,> those who were there received of it  
I thought it was an extremely boring speech  
I also thought it was it was pretty low in content  
We'd been given **this uh the advance billing** that it was going to set out Major's vision for the for the next decade  
There was going to be a clean break with Thatcherism  
And it just wasn't there

(S1b-039 026-031 Broadcast discussions, Andrew Neil on Sunday, LBC)

(16) A: Uhm <,> Denis can we have your report which I trust won't be too deeply technical

B: No after two long reports we've got a very short one <,,> <laughter>

B: First we've got **this uh the format** <,> of the accounts which goes to me <,,>

(S1b-078 007-009 Business transactions, London)

(17) On the second of October <,> eighty-six <,> she was readmitted to the Pembury hospital <,> or rather admitted to the Pembury hospital <,> for repair of the <,> hernia <,>

That took place on the next day <,> and she was discharged home <,> on the fifth of October

The hernia was due <,> to uh <,> vomiting <,,> as a result of the treatment that she was given for her injury <,,> and straining while defecating <,> because she had become constipated again ~~due to this~~ <,> **due to the uh treatment** <,,>

(S2a-062 036-038 Legal presentations, Queen's Bench, London)

In (15) and (16), the definite descriptions create a new referent in discourse rather than referring to a previously mentioned one. However, it is interesting to note that in both cases the repaired demonstrative is the proximal *this*, which when used to introduce new referents has been labelled in the literature 'indefinite *this*', 'presentational *this*' or 'new *this*' (Gundel et al 1993; Maclaran 1982; Wald 1983). Example (18) illustrates a typical instance of indefinite *this*:

(18) I met **this man** the other day on the street, and he turned out to be my school mate.

Two important features of indefinite *this* have to do with their referential and emotional functions. Indefinite *this* is used to refer to a specific entity from the speaker's point of view, although it is unknown to the hearer. But the speaker uses the demonstrative instead of the indefinite article in order to communicate the intention to refer to a specific entity. Gundel et al (1993) characterise this feature in their Givenness Hierarchy by assigning a Referential cognitive status to indefinite *this*, which means that the speaker intends to refer to a particular object and expects the hearer to construct a new representation of this object by the time the sentence is processed. Although there might be other languages which have a different form for this type of use, there is no reason why indefinite *this* in English (and possibly Arabic) cannot be accounted for under the unified procedural approach proposed here. Therefore, instead of assigning a separate cognitive status for indefinite *this*, it can be argued that it encodes the same attention-directing procedural semantics which directs the hearer to create a new focus of joint attention in discourse. This would also explain the observation that

referents of indefinite *this* are likely to be referred to again in the following discourse, typically by a third person pronoun as in (18). The proximal demonstrative in (18) instructs the hearer to create a new focus of joint attention on the referent *man* as opposed to any other referential candidates. The internal contrast may highlight the newness of the referent as opposed to other ‘older’ ones, or it may highlight its metaphorical closeness to the speaker as opposed to other distant ones. Gernsbacher (1989: 536) suggests that referents introduced by indefinite *this* are more accessible than those introduced by the indefinite article because it “operate[s] cataphorically to improve referential access”. This could also be seen as the result of the creation of a joint level of attention on the referent shared by speaker and hearer, which warrants subsequent reference with highly focused expressions such as pronouns<sup>80</sup>.

The other emotional feature of indefinite *this* is what makes it typical in colloquial or informal styles of spoken discourse. It has been claimed by Lakoff (1974) to create a sense of ‘vividness’ in discourse. This can also be explained in terms of the semantics proposed here. The internal contrast which results from the attention-directing procedure having scope over the concept of distance encourages the hearer to process the referent of *this* as proximal or cognitively close as opposed to other non-cognitively close potential referents. Scott (2009: 178-179) also argues for this procedural account of the emotional effects of indefinite *this* as discussed by Lakoff, which do not obtain if the indefinite article is used. Within the relevance-theoretic view of effort and effect, Scott (2009: 178) explains that by using the proximal demonstrative “the hearer is therefore entitled to expect more or different effects to arise”<sup>81</sup>. In (19) and (20), for example, only the demonstrative encourages the hearer to derive extra inferences about the speaker’s emotional attitude to the referent which the speaker intended to convey by using a demonstrative.

(19) I don’t know where ***this feeling of anger*** which overwhelms me comes from.

(20) I don’t know where ***the feeling of anger*** which overwhelms me comes from.

Going back to examples (15) and (16), it seems that the emotional effect of indefinite *this* plays a role here. Using *this* in those examples would be perfectly acceptable, but

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<sup>80</sup> This also explains why Gernsbacher (1989) argues that entities introduced by the indefinite article are more likely to be subsequently referred to by the definite article rather than third person pronouns.

<sup>81</sup> Although Scott (2009: 179) states that “there is no comparable use of *that*”, I argue that the way recognitional *that* works is similar to indefinite *this* in that both are used to introduce a new referent in discourse, and both manipulate the proximity/distance internal contrast in return for special effects that have to do with either the speaker’s attitude to the referent or how s/he wants the addressee to approach the referent. See also section 4.2.3 on first-mention demonstratives.

stylistic motivations could be behind the self-repair. In other words, it seems that the speakers in those cases do not wish to use the proximal demonstrative *this* precisely because it will be interpreted as a case of indefinite *this* as explained above. This means that, while the speakers clearly intend to refer to a specific entity which they want the hearers to direct their attention to, they do not wish to communicate the ‘emotional’ aspect of the interpretation which is more suited for a casual type of discourse. Being examples from a broadcast talk and a business transaction respectively, the self-repairs in (15) and (16) are the result of stylistic awareness. Therefore, since the speakers do not wish to communicate the extra cognitive effects resulting from using a demonstrative, the use of a demonstrative in itself becomes unnecessary because the cognitive instruction encoded in the demonstrative is not needed to individuate the intended referent. It could even be said to be misleading since it would lead to unintended effects. A definite article is used instead in its typical function of introducing a new referent in discourse.

The case with (17) is different because the demonstrative phrase is used anaphorically to refer to the explicitly mentioned discourse referent *the treatment*. Since this is a case of direct co-reference, i.e. the definite description and its discourse referent share the same head noun, then using a demonstrative in this case is not needed to individuate the intended referent. The definite article would be enough. Therefore, if we follow my argument, using a demonstrative in this case would be warranted only if it is used to create extra effects. Such extra effects may have to do with the speaker’s attitude to the referent or highlighting other potential kinds of treatment, which all result from using a proximal demonstrative with its encoded internal contrast. In (17), it also seems that the type of discourse plays a role in the choice of a definite determiner. This example is taken from a legal presentation, where such extra effects would be implausible, or sometimes even confusing<sup>82</sup>. Therefore, the self-repair in this example can be seen as a by-product of the effect of text type on referential choice, which is justified by appealing to the semantics of the demonstratives as proposed here.

A final example is (21) below where the determiner phrase is intended to refer indirectly to (part of) the discourse referent (underlined). In this type of indirect reference, what has been called a ‘bridging implicature’ (Matsui 2000) is needed in order to assign reference correctly. According to Matsui (2000: 16), the role of this bridging implicature is to “introduce an intended referent which has not itself been explicitly mentioned”. The bridging

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<sup>82</sup> For details on the linguistic features of the genre of legal discourse see Bhatia (1993), Bhatia, Langton & Lung (2004) and Matilla (2006).



implicature needed in the interpretation of (21) could be formulated as the assumption in (22):

- (21) Having said that we knew this was the pièce de résistance he comes to the Lady Chapel  
now  
You see what <,> uhm Alan of uhm Walsingham did  
Something happened in there  
And when we went in he said everything about it all the light in the world all the sense of  
you know <,> uh reality of that time how they were saved by  
There 'd been some subsidence or some terrible storm that 'd uhm uh demolished part of  
**this the tower**  
(S1a-094 271-276 Private telephone call, London)

(22) The Lady Chapel building has a tower.

As discussed by Matsui (2000), this type of indirect reference is typical of the definite article, but there is disagreement in the literature on the suitability of using demonstratives in the same way. Example (17) is an utterance from a telephone call where the speaker is re-living the story of her visit to this building. It seems that the speaker first used the proximal demonstrative *this* as if to refer deictically to the tower she visited since s/he seems absorbed in re-living the experience as the use of the time adverb *now* also shows. The speaker may also have used the proximal demonstrative to convey a sense of cognitive closeness to the referent. However, the self-repair here seems to be motivated by an awareness that the intended referent is actually new in discourse and that the cognitive instruction encoded in the proximal demonstrative may not be suitable to individuate the intended referent. In other words, the speaker may have used the definite article because s/he thinks it is the most relevant to refer to a new entity in discourse which requires of the hearer to supply an extra assumption.

### 5.1.5 Distal or proximal?

I come now to the corpus examples where one demonstrative form is repaired to the other in the proximal/distal pair. If we follow the semantics proposed in this study for demonstratives then it can suggest that in principle using either the proximal or distal form may be irrelevant as long as they both trigger the implicit contrast with the other in their procedural semantics. However, we have seen from the previous discussion that the choice between a proximal or a distal form is driven by considerations of relevance. In written

discourse particularly, speakers manipulate the proximal/distal features in various ways to create special effects. Notions of point of view, perspective, empathy, etc have all been invoked to explain how demonstratives are used to lead to certain interpretations. These notions are invoked to explain the result of using a demonstrative in an utterance where either form would do without a change in reference.

I have argued that the conceptual information encoded by proximal and distal demonstratives may be formulated as 'located on the distance scale', where interpretation of proximity/distance is determined by moving nearer or farther from the deictic centre on the scale. This is the main point of difference between a demonstrative and a definite article: there is a consciousness behind a demonstrative where proximity/distance is interpreted relative to a deictic centre in a way that does not obtain with a definite article. However, Cheshire (1996: 372), for example, states that "the proximal/distal dimension is rarely relevant" since it becomes neutralised in usage. Similarly, Thavenius (1983: 169) describes the process by which a speaker chooses a demonstrative forms as follows, "his next step is to make a choice between *this* and *that*, and then the aspects of proximity and remoteness will often be involved, although they are not relevant in all cases". Yet, I argue that the cases of self-repair discussed here could be considered evidence for when the distal/proximal choice is relevant. The speakers in these examples do not change their choice from one demonstrative form to the other because it changes the reference or meaning, but because it changes the perspective, the point of view, the attitude.

Since the cases of self-repair discussed here are all in spoken discourse, the notion of the speaker as the deictic centre is paramount. In the examples below, self-repair is motivated by the speaker questioning if this is the best way to convey his/her message. In relevance-theoretic terms, the best way should be the optimally relevant one. As mentioned before, an optimally relevant interpretation is the first one the hearer will find which satisfies his/her expectations of relevance. Being aware of that, the speaker formulates his/her utterance in a way which achieves relevance for the hearer in return for the least effort. In (23)-(25), the common underlying theme is a strong argumentative/persuasive style which suggests that the speaker's preferences could be a determining factor in referential choice.

(23) A: It's a sign language though

B: Uhm

B: It's another form of communication

A: Uh so if we're to include sign language as evidence for genetic basis for language what's the genetic basis

A: It's not going to be just speech any more is it or  
 B: No it could be just re-routing because instead of hearing sounds they're not able to hear sounds so what's the point of speaking  
 B: You know they obviously use their eyes so they're going to use their fingers for a start  
 A: But ~~if the~~ if the genetic uh con contribution was specifically for spoken language then it would just sort of have nothing to do  
 A: It wouldn't predict that they would sort of start using signs <,>  
 A: So ~~if that~~ **if this evidence** more suggests that there's an innate drive to communicate by making some sort of s sign which symbolizes the internal uh message and that well I don't know perhaps speech has some priority in the absence of it <,> people start using any other sign that they can make <,,>  
 (S1b-003 152-161 Classroom lessons, UCL, London)

(24) and the third level of organisations are organisations ~~as~~ as I will explain in my strong sense of a definition of organisational learning develop their context uhm <,> make their own world uh <,> better for them to live in and to contribute to  
 And it's organisational learning ~~in that~~ **in this form** which I think is of interest  
 (S2a-049 078-079 Unscripted speeches, The Royal Society of Arts, London)

(25) A: and why do they then want us to get into a political union which would in fact effectively have prevented us from doing what we call our duty  
 B: But you see what German diplomats that one talks to tell you is that they haven't actually been pressed very hard by the Ministry of Defence ~~for~~ for funds  
 B: They haven't been pressed very hard by the Foreign Office either ~~and~~ and **that this is an issue** which has been whipped up for internal domestic uhm considerations  
 (S2b-013 081-084 Broadcast talks)

Whether it is a classroom debate, a persuasive speech or an argumentative broadcast talk, what unites the speakers in these utterances of different contexts is that they all have points to make which they have a particular attitude towards. The type of attitude is also common, as it is reflected in the fact that all such cases of self-repair from one demonstrative form to the other in the corpus are from the distal *that* to the proximal *this*<sup>83</sup>. It seems that the speakers consider the proximal demonstrative form to be more relevant because it suits more their personal attitudinal preferences which they intend to communicate to the hearers. That is, use of the distal demonstrative would not have changed the reference or the explicit content of the utterance. But the difference is explained on the implicit level. The interpretation of attitude itself is triggered by the internal contrast that is encoded in the demonstrative which sets the intended referent apart from any potential referential candidates. The self-repair is seen as an extra processing load compensated by an extra effect of conveying a personal

<sup>83</sup> The small size of the spoken part of the corpus does not allow me to look into cases where self-repair is from the distal to the proximal demonstrative. However, the lack of any such cases of self-repair could be significant in itself. An investigation of a bigger corpus might allow for a generalisation about speakers' tendencies in self-repair as far as attitude to a particular referent is concerned.

attitude towards the referent which results from using the proximal demonstrative instead of the distal one.

#### **4.4 Summary**

I discussed in this chapter how the relevance-theoretic account of demonstratives presented in this study can explain speakers' strategies in self-repair. While my semantic analysis mainly focussed on explaining how hearers interpret demonstratives within a relevance-based comprehension process, the discussion here turned the attention to speakers and how they choose their referring expressions within a relevance-based production process. I tried to shed some light on two aspects: (a) the speakers' awareness of the semantic differences between demonstratives and the definite article, and (b) the speakers' awareness of the likely inferences hearers are expected to entertain as a result of processing a referring expression. I argued that the semantics of the demonstrative encodes two kinds of extra information compared to the definite article. First, it encodes information about the proximity/distance of the referent; and second, it encodes procedural instructions to create/maintain a joint level of attention to the referent as opposed to other referential candidates. The combination of those two elements provides tools for explaining why a speaker repairs a definite determiner, starting from the assumption that a speaker is aware of the 'way' s/he wants to convey his/her message. Therefore, I argued that a definite article is changed to a demonstrative when: (a) the cognitive instruction encoded in the definite article is not enough to individuate the intended referent, or (b) the cognitive instruction encoded in the definite article is enough to individuate the intended referent but the extra spatial and procedural information is needed for other cognitive effects. I also argued that a demonstrative is changed to a definite article when (a) the cognitive instruction encoded in the demonstrative is not needed to individuate the intended referent, or (b) the cognitive instruction encoded in the demonstrative with the extra spatial and procedural information is not warranted by other cognitive effects. Corpus examples have shown that the implicit inferences encouraged by the use of a demonstrative are often a key motivation for the repair, and that the emotional and/or stylistic factors also play a role in motivating a speaker to change his/her referential choice.

## Chapter 6. Extending the analysis: Other forms of demonstratives in Modern Standard Arabic

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### 6.1 The morphology and semantics of demonstratives in MSA

Following from the relevance-theoretic view of demonstratives presented in this research, I extend the discussion in this chapter to other forms/structures of demonstratives in MSA which were not considered in previous chapters. In order to understand the semantics of such demonstratives and to account for how they behave pragmatically, I argue that a closer look at their morphological makeup can shed more light on this area. I discuss in detail three of demonstrative forms in MSA: attentional *haa*, *kadhaalik* and *haakadhaa*, arguing that a procedural analysis of these forms helps to explain their semantic and pragmatic behaviour in discourse. First, I argue for a procedural analysis of attentional *haa*, as in (1) below, which captures the notion of attention in the form of a constraint on the derivation of a higher-level explicature. Second, I argue that a distinction should be made between the use of *kadhaalik* as a demonstrative, consisting of *dhalik*, prefixed with the *kaaf* for simile (*kaaf 'al tašbiih*), and as a discourse marker, as illustrated in (2) and (3) respectively. I further argue that the semantic contribution of both *kaaf 'al tašbiih* and *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker can be systematically accounted for in procedural terms. Third, I argue that a distinction should be made between the different uses of the demonstrative form *haakadhaa*, which can function deictically, anaphorically or as a discourse marker, as illustrated in (4)-(6) respectively. I also explain how it functions as a discourse marker by encoding procedural constraints on relevance.

(1) <sup>84</sup>ها أنا ذا حر ومزال الوطن أسيرا<sup>84</sup>

haa 'anaa dhaa ḥurr wa maa zaal 'al-waṭan 'asiiraa  
haa 1<sup>st</sup> pers-pro dem(mas) free and part. remain the-country captive  
Here I am free and my country remains captive.

(2) أذاكر في المساء وكذلك يفعل أحمد (2)

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<sup>84</sup> This utterance was circulated in the Arabic media as the first comment said by Muntazar Al-Zeidy, the Iraqi journalist who threw his shoes at the American president George W. Bush at a press conference in Baghdad in early 2009, after he was released from prison.

'udhakhir f il-masaa' wa kadhalik yaf3al Ahmad  
 study-I(pres) in-the-evening and kadhalik do-he(pres) Ahmad

I study in the evening and Ahmad does the same.

(3) قال المدير أن غدا عطلة وأعلن كذلك عن زيادة في المرتبات

qaal 'al-mudiir 'an ġadan 3uṭlah wa 'a3lan  
 say-he(past) the-manager part. tomorrow holiday and announce-he(past)

kadhalik 3an ziyaadah fil- murattabaat  
 kadhalik about increase in the-wages

The manager said that tomorrow is a holiday and he also announced an increase in wages.

(4) لا تتجاهلني هكذا

laa tatajaahalnii hakadhaa  
 not ignore-you-me hakadhaa  
 Don't ignore me like this.

(5) "كلنا سنموت" .. هكذا قال الرجل

kullunaa sanamuut hakadhaa qaal 'al-rajul  
 all-us will-die hakadhaa say-he(past) the-man  
 "We are all going to die", the man said this.

(6) لم تسفر المباحثات عن جديد وهكذا تبقى مشكلة الشرق الأوسط بدون حل

lam tusfir 'al-mubaahathaat 'an jadiid wa hakadhaa  
 not result(pres) the-negotiation-s in new and hakadhaa

tabqaa muškilat 'al-šarq 'al-'awsat biduun ḥal  
 remain-she(pres) problem the-East the-Middle without solution

The negotiations did not result in anything new, and so the Middle East problem remains unresolved.

This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1.1 presents a brief overview of MSA as a variety, as well as demonstrative forms across several varieties of Arabic to provide a backdrop for the discussion of demonstratives in MSA. In section 6.1.2, I discuss previous research that has attempted a procedural analysis of linguistic forms in Arabic. I also argue

that a procedural analysis of demonstratives in MSA benefits from clues in classical and modern work on Arabic grammar. Section 6.2 focuses on three demonstrative forms in MSA: attentional *haa*, *kadhaalik*, and *haakadhaa* respectively. In each case, I show, using corpus examples, how a procedural analysis can account for each one. In section 6.3, I comment on the use of Arabic demonstratives in some alternative syntactic structures and show how a relevance-theoretic view can explain the interpretation of emphasis that is associated with these structures.

Since this chapter discusses specific forms of demonstratives, I have expanded the search for examples to include all text categories in the NEMLAR corpus chosen for this study, which includes 9 text categories. These text categories are: Arabic Literature, Business, General News, Legal, Literature Essays, Political Debate, Scientific Press, Sports Press, and Political News. While the focus of this chapter is not essentially quantitative, references to frequencies of occurrence are mentioned as an indication of use.

### 6.1.1 Demonstrative forms in MSA and varieties of Arabic

The Arabic language is characterized by a deeply complex history which has been affected by various linguistic, political, religious, sociological and cultural factors. The evolution of the variety of Arabic that is now known as MSA is a perfect example of the fusion of both external and internal influences on language. According to Holes, this process of evolution is best described as “a gradual but palpable narrowing of the gap between spoken Arabic and the *‘arabi:ya* [Arabic] in its contemporary form” (2004: 46). In other words, MSA is considered the variety of the language that is more standard than the local colloquial varieties but less elevated than the Arabic of the Qur’an or classical poetry<sup>85</sup>. On this view, Arabic seems to be a complex multiglossic language, with three main varieties: Classical Arabic, Colloquial Arabic(s), and Modern Standard Arabic<sup>86</sup>. If the Arabic language

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<sup>85</sup> Versteegh (1997) adds that the emergence of MSA in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was greatly influenced by the adaptation of the Arabic vocabulary to the modern period, as well as by the wave of reform in Arabic grammar. According to him, after the power of both French and Turkish started to fade with the demise of their political roles, Arabic assumed the status of the main medium of political ideas, which in turn affected its social status.

<sup>86</sup> Even more levels of Arabic have been recognised too. Al Said Badawi (1990), in his study of the Arabic language in Egypt and its relationship to culture, identifies 5 different levels or *‘mustawayaat’* of the language: *fusha* of the *turaath* (classical cannon), contemporary *fusha*, the colloquial of the cultured, the colloquial of the enlightened, and the colloquial of the illiterate.

could be seen as a continuum of different social levels, MSA would be somewhere in the middle.

As mentioned in chapter 2, the structure of most Arabic words depends on sets of morphological consonantal templates which take on a root meaning from which other derivations emerge. From the basic three-letter template in (7) which means ‘to write’, we can derive other related lexical items by manipulating long and short vowels:

(7) *kataba* كَتَبَ → *kaatib* (writer), *kitaab* (book), *maktab* (office/desk), *maktabah* (library)

However, as is the case in many languages, some of the basic functional elements of Arabic are expressed through closed sets of entities outside the main derivational system. Such entities include personal pronouns, deictics, and interrogatives. From a typological point of view, demonstratives in any language constitute a closed set of linguistic items which share certain morphological, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic features (cf. Diessel 1999). Demonstratives also constitute one variety of deictic expressions which form various closed micro-systems of opposition in any language, including spatial deixis (*here, there*), temporal deixis (*now, then*), in addition to the proximal-distal dichotomy.

Recall that demonstratives in Arabic get their name ‘*asmaa’ al-išaarah*’ (“names of pointing”) from the closest translation of the term ‘deixis’, which literally means ‘indication’. Demonstrative forms in MSA are all compound forms of the main demonstrative *dhaa*, while according to Cantarino (1975, p. 30), the plural forms “are actually different compounds and have no distinction in gender or case”. Holes (2004: 185), lists the full set of the demonstratives in MSA in the table below:

			<b>Proximal</b>	<b>Distal</b>
<b>Singular</b>	<b>Mas.</b>		haadhaa	dhaalika
	<b>Fem.</b>		haadhihi	tilka
<b>Plural</b>	<b>Common</b>		haa’ulaa’i	’ulaa’ika
<b>Dual<sup>87</sup></b>	<b>Mas.</b>	<b>Nom.</b>	haadhaani	dhaanika

<sup>87</sup> There is a receding use of the dual forms of demonstratives in MSA, or even of the dual forms in general (nouns, pronouns, adjectives) compared to Classical Arabic. This issue needs further investigation which is outside the scope of this study; however several stylistic and pragmatic factors may be said to play a role in weakening the dual in MSA. The situation across the regional dialects is even more radical as, according to Blanc (1970: 43), “the dialectal dual is not a grammatical concord category. Only nouns are marked as dual”. Therefore, in colloquial varieties of Arabic the dual forms of the demonstratives do not exist.



		<b>Acc./Gen.</b>	haadhayni	dhaynika
	<b>Fem.</b>	<b>Nom.</b>	haataani	taanika
		<b>Acc./Gen</b>	haatayni	taynika

Table 5: Demonstratives in MSA according to Holes (2004)

Different regional varieties of Arabic have their own demonstrative forms, but Holes maintains that most of them share the same basic morphological composition: (presentative particle) + deictic element + (distance marker), where the brackets indicate an optional part of the demonstrative form. As can be seen from the tables above and below, the prefix /haa/ corresponds to the presentative particle, while the suffix /ka/ corresponds to the distance marker. Several linguists, including Holes, studied and compared the different demonstrative forms across the Arabic-speaking countries. In the tables below, I summarise demonstrative forms in 7 different varieties of Arabic: Moroccan, Egyptian, Syrian and Kuwaiti as discussed in Brustad (2000: 114); Bahraini as discussed in Holes (2004: 185); San3aani (Yemeni) as discussed in Watson (1993: 44); and Tunisian as discussed in Khalfaoui (2009):

<b>Proximal Demonstrative Forms</b>			
	<b>Masculine</b>	<b>Feminine</b>	<b>Plural</b>
<b>Moroccan</b>	haada	haadi	haadu
<b>Egyptian</b> <sup>88</sup>	da	di	dool
<b>Syrian</b>	haad(a) <sup>89</sup>	haay(ye)	hadool(e)
<b>Kuwaiti</b>	haadha	haadhi	hadheela
<b>Bahraini</b>	haada	haadi	haadela
<b>San'aani</b>	haadha, dhayyaa	haadhii / tayyih	haadhawlaa / dhawlayya
<b>Tunisian</b>	ha / hadha	ha / hadhi	hadhum

Table 6: Proximal demonstrative forms in Arabic dialects

<sup>88</sup> Zaki (1972) lists a more comprehensive list of all the demonstrative forms used in Egyptian Arabic.

<sup>89</sup> The parenthesis indicates an optional part of the demonstrative pronoun.

<b>Distal Demonstrative Forms</b>			
	<b>Masculine</b>	<b>Feminine</b>	<b>Plural</b>
<b>Moroccan</b>	(haa)daak	(haa)diik	(haa)duuk
<b>Egyptian</b>	daak / dukha	diik / dikha	dukhum
<b>Syrian</b>	hadaak	hadiik	hadoliik
<b>Kuwaiti</b>	(ha)dhaak	(ha)dhiiĉ	(ha)dheela
<b>Bahraini</b>	haadaak	haadiik	haadelaak
<b>San'aani</b>	hadhaak / dhayyaak	hadhiik / tayyik	haadhawlaak / dhawlayyak
<b>Tunisian</b>	hak / hadhaka	hak / hadhika	hadhukum

Table 7: Distal demonstrative forms in Arabic dialects

According to these tables, it seems that Holes's basic morphological composition holds: all the proximal forms follow a pattern of [presentative particle + deictic element]; while the distal forms follow a pattern of [deictic element + distance marker]. There are two notable exceptions to these patterns. The first is that all the proximal forms in Egyptian Arabic lack the presentative particle *haa* as it only uses the morphologically and phonologically reduced forms *da*, *di*, and *dool*. The second is that the plural distal form in Kuwaiti Arabic lacks the /ka/ morpheme which indicates distance. However, it is important to note that the San'aani dialect has retained two forms of demonstratives for each one of the categories: distance, gender and number. One form has the initial particle *haa*, while the other form lacks it. Watson (1993: 43) suggests that the demonstrative forms which do not have the initial *haa* "appear to be based on a diminutive morphological pattern which has since lost its diminutive meaning". The particular situation in San'aani Arabic, which has two forms for each type of demonstrative, is a good example of how the colloquial varieties are flexible enough to develop both towards and away from the standard variety at the same time.

However, Holes's morphological formula for Arabic demonstratives should not be taken to suggest that the presentative particle *haa* is equivalent to a proximal marker that stands in opposition to the distal marker /ka/. One obvious reason for this is that the particle *haa* also forms part of the majority of the distal forms in the regional vernaculars mentioned above (even though this is not the case in the distal demonstrative forms in MSA). Therefore, we should differentiate between the prefix /ha/ and the suffix /ka/ on semantic as well as

grammatical grounds. In Arabic grammar, the prefix /ha/ is known as attentional *haa*, which is a particle that seems to have semantic value in itself. In Classical Arabic, as well as MSA (as in (1) above) and some regional varieties, attentional *haa* functions as a demonstrative particle in its independent form. For example, *haa* on its own (and *hak* in the distal form) is actually used as a demonstrative determiner in Tunisian Arabic. The suffix /ka/, on the other hand, is a grammatical marker which is known in Arabic grammar as *kaaf 'al ħiṭaab* (*kaaf* for addressing). Unlike the prefix /ha/, this is a bound morpheme that is used with demonstratives, as well as verbs and nouns, to denote the point of view of the (distant) other. Therefore, it is the presence or absence of the distal marker which seems to define the proximal/distal dichotomy in Arabic demonstrative forms. As for the presentative particle /ha/, I discuss its semantic contribution in more detail in section 6.2.1.

## **6.1.2 Arabic and procedural meaning**

### **6.1.2.1 Previous studies**

As previously mentioned, Blakemore (1987; 2002) initially developed the distinction between conceptual and procedural meanings, and since then many linguistic expressions in different languages have been analysed in these terms. However, little research has been done on applying the distinction to varieties of Arabic. Two studies suggested procedural analyses of discourse markers in MSA, Hussein and Bukhari (2008) and Hussein (2009). Hussein and Bukhari (2008) investigate the discourse marker *fa* (translated as *so, then*) in standard Arabic. They propose a procedural account of discourse markers in MSA and give a ‘full procedural analysis’ of *fa* in its different contexts. They suggest that this discourse marker encodes several kinds of procedural information, including constraining the interpretation of the two propositions in the utterance to the premise/conclusion meaning, encoding short time span between two actions or events expressed in the utterance and encoding a procedure of explication or even unexpectedness. Hussein (2009), on the other hand, compares the discourse marker *but* in English and standard Arabic. He claims that *but* in English is not ambiguous and that it encodes a general procedure whose implementation generates four different constraints on the interpretation of utterances in which *but* occurs. These different implementations are mirrored in MSA (but in different lexical expressions) so that the

interpretations of ‘denial’, ‘contrast’, ‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’ correspond to the Arabic disjunctions *lakinna*, *bainama*, *bal* and *lakin*.

Another relevant work is Khalfaoui’s (2009) which deals with Tunisian Arabic. In this study, Khalfaoui attempts a cognitive approach to the analysis of demonstratives in one vernacular variety of Arabic, Tunisian, using the theoretical tools of both relevance theory and the Givenness Hierarchy<sup>90</sup>. She discusses the factors that restrict the choice of demonstrative forms which have the same cognitive status (for example the proximal demonstrative *haadhaa* as a determiner and as a pronoun). She also argues that relevance theory provides a cognitive explanation for why speakers choose a demonstrative determiner over a pronoun in such cases. According to her (2009: 113), speakers “do not choose the demonstrative pronoun *haadhaa* when they cannot expect their audience to unambiguously identify the intended referent”. Following from the cognitive principle that hearers are attracted to relevant inputs which justify the processing effort exerted in interpreting them, speakers tend to choose the form that is relevant enough to direct the hearers to the intended referent. In such cases when there is more than one candidate referent, the demonstrative determiner is preferred because “the conceptual content of the noun makes it possible for the addressee to access only one possible referent and derive worthwhile conclusions that matter to him/her” (2009: 114).

Despite the scarceness of research on MSA from a procedural perspective, there are some interesting clues in classical and modern literature, which point towards a cognitive/procedural approach to such linguistic items as demonstratives. One clue comes from the classification of words in Arabic. Arabic grammarians traditionally classify words in Arabic into three categories: (a) nouns, (b) verbs, and (c) particles. Hassan (1994: 87) explains that what decides the scope of each category depends on how one defines it. That is, some rely on considerations of form (i.e. grammatical features) and others rely on considerations of meaning (i.e. semantic features). An approach which depends on semantic features, for example, according to Hassan (1994: 87), maintains that “الاسم ما دل على مسمى، “والفعل ما دل على حدث وزمن والحرف ما ليس كذلك” (“a noun is what signifies an entity, a verb is what signifies an action and a time, and a particle is what is neither”). A typical example is the seminal work by the Arabic phonetician and semanticist Ibn Jinni, whose book *Al-ḥaṣaa’iṣ* (1913)<sup>91</sup> is a study of the general system of language. Ibn Jinni follows the three-way

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<sup>90</sup> See chapter 2 for a discussion of Gundel et al’s (1993) Givenness Hierarchy.

<sup>91</sup> This book was originally written in the 10<sup>th</sup> century AD.

classification on the basis that nouns (*'asmaa'*) include all linguistic items which can be governed by a preposition (including proper nouns); while verbs (*'af3aal*) includes all linguistic items which express activity (present or past) or command. Ibn Jinni, as well as other grammarians of his time, collectively label the third category *'al-ḥuruuf* (literally it means *letters*, but it is also the technical grammatical term for particles in Arabic grammar). This category, which typically includes discourse markers such as *fa* (*so*), *thumma* (*and then*) and *laakin* (*but*), is distinct in that it gathers linguistic items which do not have meanings in themselves. Rather they acquire their meanings from the contexts in which they occur. Similarly, Al-ḡalayinii (1993: 12)<sup>92</sup>, who mentions prepositions, conjunctions and interrogative particles as examples of *'al- ḥuruuf*, characterises the semantic contribution of those items as: “ما دل على معنى في غيره” (“what signifies meaning in another entity”).

Therefore, traditional Arabic grammarians have noted that not all linguistic items have the same kind of semantics. Arguably, what appears to Ibn Jinni and Al-ḡalayinii to be empty semantic slots in the analysis of some linguistic items might be better thought of in procedural terms. These items are different from the linguistic expressions in the first two categories because they do not encode concepts. Rather they may be said to encode some procedural instructions whose function is to guide the interpretation of the conceptual information encoded by other items in the utterances in which they occur. The interpretation process in such cases relies heavily on context to arrive at the ‘full’ meaning. Therefore, although Ibn Jinni’s and Al- ḡalayinii’s characterisations of the semantic nature of particles massively underestimates them, at least their recognition of the semantic distinction between the different linguistic categories is on the right track.

However, this traditional classification presents a problem for demonstratives. Following the traditional view, demonstratives would belong to the category of nouns since they are ‘names of pointing’. However, considerations of grammatical features (e.g. inflection) would suggest that they constitute a special kind of nouns. If semantic features were given supremacy over the grammatical ones, then demonstratives may be considered particles instead, whose members have been described as “ما دل على معنى في غيره” (“what signifies meaning in another entity”) according to Al-ḡalayinii (1993: 12), as it is more suitable for their semantics. To solve this dilemma Hassan (1994: 87) argues for a new classification of words in Arabic which takes into consideration features related to both form and meaning. According to him, following this view would solve many borderline cases,

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<sup>92</sup> This book was originally written in the 12<sup>th</sup> century AD.

including adjectives (*ṣifaat*), adverbs (*dhuruuf*), and pronouns (*ḍamaa'ir*). The category of pronouns includes demonstrative, person and relative pronouns (1994: 110). In separating 'asmaa' 'al-'iṣaarah (names of pointing) from the rest of the 'asmaa' (nouns), Hassan is conforming to Bühler's view that "deictic words and naming words are two different word classes that must be clearly separated" (1990: 101). Describing the former as being primarily procedural and the latter as primarily conceptual would be one way of spelling out the difference between them.

Another clue which might suggest procedural meanings for Arabic demonstratives comes from Cantarino's (1975) work. He makes an important claim about earlier uses of Arabic demonstratives in general. According to him, "all Arabic forms of the demonstrative pronouns were originally elements of interjectional character, which, after the fading of this effect, have become particles of demonstrative determination" (1975: 30). An interjection is generally defined as an expression which is used to convey some kind of emotion or attitude in discourse. Crystal (1995: 207) explains that "an interjection is a word or sound thrown into a sentence to express some feeling of the mind". Examples of interjections in English include *wow*, *aha*, *ouch*, *oops*, *brrr* etc<sup>93</sup>. Wharton (2003: 177) suggests that, by definition, "an interjection expresses a mental or emotional attitude or state", but what is less clear is the nature of the semantic content of these expressions. Following a relevance-theoretic approach, Wharton (2003) argues that interjections encode procedural meanings which contribute to the derivation of higher-level explicatures (propositions embedded in descriptions of attitude or speech-acts). Therefore, the idea that demonstratives have developed from interjections points towards a common underlying semantic theme. Both types of expressions are so context-dependent that the role of pragmatic or inferential factors is key to their interpretation. Furthermore, the communicative content of these expressions does not seem to be of a conceptual nature in the sense other linguistic items encode. Rather they encode procedural information which indicates how the interpretation should proceed in order to arrive at a propositional attitude of some sort or to arrive at the intended referent. Taking into consideration the idea of the speaker as the deictic centre, it is not surprising that

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<sup>93</sup> Examples of interjections in Arabic would include *offf* (to express annoyance or boredom), *'allaah* (to express amazement or fondness), *'ayy* (to express pain), *'eḥem* (to express permission or presence), etc. As far as I know, there hasn't been a linguistic study of interjections in Arabic, although it would be an interesting area of research since both MSA and the regional dialects are rich with such expressions. However, Hassan (1994: 113) presents an interesting analysis of a more general category that he calls *'al-ḥawaalif*, which includes all items used as 'affective language'.

demonstratives have been seen as expressing a range of emotional effects similar to the way interjections convey emotional attitudes. However, instead of viewing these uses as ‘special’ cases of demonstratives, this historical piece of information might be a clue that what is needed is a unified account of demonstratives which would explain how they are interpreted in discourse in various contexts.

### 6.1.2.2 Traditional and modern approaches

The discussion of demonstratives in classical grammar books can be significantly different from that in the modern literature, where a more cognitive perspective could be seen. I mention here two examples for the sake of comparison. The first example is that from one of the classical landmarks in the history of Arabic dictionaries, *Lisaan al 3arab* (1997), which was originally compiled by the notable lexicographer Ibn Manzuur in the 13<sup>th</sup> century. In his entry for the demonstrative *haadhaa* (attentional *haa* + demonstrative *dhaa*), Ibn Manzuur simply states that (Vol 2: 445):

ها تنبيه تفتتح العرب الكلام به بلا معنى سوى الافتتاح.. فان خاطبت جئت بالكاف فقلت ذاك وذلك فاللام زائدة والكاف للخطاب وفيها دليل على أن ما يوماً إليه بعيد  
 (“*haa* attention the Arabs open their speech with, with no meaning apart from inauguration.. if you address you attach the *kaaf* and say *dhaak* and *dhalik*, for the *laam* is additional and the *kaaf* is for addressing and in it there is evidence that the referent is far.”)

Note that Ibn Manzuur states that the name of this particle is ‘*haa* attention’ but there is no mention thereafter of how this cognitive notion of attention is employed by *haa* in the language. For him, this particle ‘has no meaning’ except being used for opening speech. The only semantic value that he points out is for the particle *kaaf* which is labelled in the grammar *kaaf ’al hitaab* (*kaaf* for addressing) which indicates that the referent is assumed to be far from the speaker.

The modern approach has a different take on this discussion. Recall that, according to the relevance-theoretic view of interpretation, expectations of relevance play a major role. A speaker chooses a particular word or utterance based on his expectations of the hearer’s cognitive status; and a hearer expects this word or utterance to be relevant enough to justify the processing effort s/he is going to spend in interpretation. It is interesting to note that expectations of relevance can be seen reflected in the morphological makeup of

demonstratives in Arabic. From the above, we have seen that the root demonstrative in MSA is *dhaa* which is then affixed with different morphemes for different semantic and grammatical purposes. For the proximal, the prefix /ha/ is attached to form the demonstratives *haadhaa* and *haadhihi*, while for the distal, either the *laam* or the *kaaf* or both are suffixed to form the demonstratives *dhaak* (for medial distance) or *dhalik*. Makhzumi (1986: 51) characterises the use of these affixes in his discussion of demonstratives as follows:

وقد تلحق هذه الكلمات من أولها: (ها) زيادة في تنبيه المخاطب إلى المشار إليه، فيقال: هذا. هذه، هذى. هاته. هاتى. هاتا. هذان. هاتان. هؤلاء. وقد تلحقها كاف الخطاب وحدها أو مع اللام، للتحقق من تنبيه المخاطب للمشار إليه، فيقال: ذاك، وذلك، وتيك، وتلك. وذلك حين يكون المخاطب غافلا، أو بعيدا، أو حين يظن المتكلم المخاطب كذلك.

("these words may be prefixed by *haa* as an addition to direct the attention of the addressee to the referent, so it is said: *haadhaa*, *haadhihi*, *hadhiy*, *hatih*, *hatiy*, *hataa*, *haadhaan*, *hataan*, *ha'ulaa*'. And they might be suffixed with *kaaf* for addressing alone or with the *laam* to verify that the addressee is paying attention to the referent, so it is said: *dhaaka*, *dhaalika*, *tiik*, *tilka*. And that is when the addressee is unaware or far away, or when the speaker thinks this is the addressee's state.")

It is apparent from this excerpt that there is a more cognitive approach to the analysis of the demonstratives. On the one hand, the cognitive contribution of the particle *haa* is set out as an additional element of drawing the hearer's attention to the referent (which implies that the role of the root demonstrative is in fact to draw the hearer's attention to the referent). On the other hand, the use of the distal suffixes *kaaf* and *laam* is justified on both the physical level (when the addressee is far away) and the cognitive level (when the addressee is not paying attention). Makhzumi adds one more cognitive element that agrees with the relevance-theoretic model of communication, the claim that a speaker will use a distal form when s/he 'thinks' that the addressee is not paying attention. Expectations about the hearer's cognitive or attentional status play an important role in the speaker's choice of a demonstrative form.

It is worth noting that the idea of the speaker as the deictic centre in relation to the hearer and the referent is less clear in Arabic than it is in English. Sometimes (e.g. Ibn Manzuur 1997) what is distal is the referent itself, while in other cases (e.g. Makhzumi 1986) what is distal is the hearer. Al Zamakhshary (quoted in Fleisch, 1970: 44) establishes a tripartite system of *maraatib* or levels for the demonstratives, based on the speaker as the deictic centre. The three levels include: (a) *'al qurbaa* (the nearest); (b) *'al wustaa* (the mid-distanced); and (c) *'al bu3daa* (the farthest). Fleisch himself rejects this triple division in



favour of a two-level interpretation: near, centered on the speaker which is represented by the proximal demonstratives; and far, centered on 'al *ġaa'*ib (the absent, the hearer) which is represented by the distal demonstratives. Fleisch's two-way distinction of distance could be an attempt on his part to subsume both senses of distance: the physical and the cognitive. That is, the near which is centered on the speaker can be both physically or emotionally near the speaker; while the far can either be the referent itself which is absent from the speaker's physical or cognitive environment, or the hearer.

## 6.2 Case studies

### 6.2.1 Attentional *haa*: procedure and attention

*haadhaa* is the proximal singular masculine demonstrative in MSA. As mentioned above, other morphological and phonological variants of this form exist in the regional dialects. In most cases, the basic morphological makeup of this demonstrative form could be seen as follows:




Figure 6: The morphology of *haadhaa*

According to Hassan (1995: 228) the root demonstratives in relation to number and gender are *dhaa* (mas. sing.) *dhii*, *dhih*, *tii*, *taah*, *tih* (fem. sing.), *dhaan*, *dhiin* (mas. dual), *taan*, *tiin* (fem. dual), '*ulaa*' (plur.). As mentioned before, these root demonstratives can be used on their own in Classical Arabic, however the forms which survived in MSA are those ones where some affixes have become a fixed part of the demonstrative. I focus in this

section on the first part of the morphological makeup of the proximal demonstrative *haadhaa* in MSA, namely attentional *haa*. Al-Nadry asserts that:

ها التنبيهية ليست من جملة اسم الإشارة وإنما هي حرف جئ به لتنبيه المخاطب على المشار إليه، "بدليل سقوطه جوازا في قولك ذا وذاك، وجوبا في قولك ذلك"

("Attentional *haa* is not part of the demonstrative, but it is a letter that is used to draw the addressee's attention to the referent. To prove this, *haa* may be optionally dropped in *dhaa*, and should be obligatorily dropped in *dhaalika*")

Attentional *haa* does not only form part of the demonstratives, as Watson (2002: 211) points out that "it is most frequently attested as the initial consonant of the set of pronouns, including personal pronouns<sup>94</sup>, demonstratives, locatives<sup>95</sup> and presentational particles". This particle has been given its name in the literature based on its original uses in the language in an independent form. Nevertheless, little has been said about the semantic contribution of this particle in the utterances where it occurs, about how the cognitive notion of attention is reflected in its semantic encoding, about the truth conditions of an utterance containing attentional *haa* or about the extent of the speaker's commitment to these utterances.

The constructed examples (8)-(10) illustrate the uses of attentional *haa* in different syntactic structures:

(8) ها أنا ذا جاهز للخروج.

haa	'anaa	dhaa	jaahiz	lil-ḥuruuj
ha	1 <sup>st</sup> -pers-pro	prox-mas-dem	ready	to-go

Here<sup>96</sup> I am ready to go.

(9) ها هو الحل المنتظر.

haa	huwa	'al-ḥall	'al-muntadhar
ha	2 <sup>nd</sup> -pers-masc-pro	the-solution	the-expected

Here is the expected solution.

(10) ها قد جاء عمر.

haa	qad	jaa'	Omar
ha	emphatic-part.	come-he(past)	Omar

Here Omar has come.

<sup>94</sup> As in *huwa* (3<sup>rd</sup> person masculine), *hiya* (3<sup>rd</sup> person, feminine), *hum* (3<sup>rd</sup> person, plural).

<sup>95</sup> As in *hunaa* (here), and *hunaak* (there). Besides morphological similarity, demonstratives (entity-referring expressions) and locatives (place-referring expressions) also share some semantic features in a number of languages. See, for example, Wu (2004) for an analysis of these types in English and Chinese.

<sup>96</sup> I use the English word "here" as the closest translation of the particle *haa*.

Note in these examples the linguistic constituents which attentional *haa* combines with. In (8), attentional *haa* combines with a personal pronoun and a demonstrative (the personal pronoun divides the singular masculine demonstrative *haadhaa*); in (9), attentional *haa* combines with a third person pronoun; and in (10) it combines with the emphatic particle *qad*. What these linguistic constituents have in common is that they all do not seem to encode conceptual meaning like nouns and verbs do. Moreover, in all these utterances the removal of attentional *haa* would not affect the truth conditions of the utterances. Therefore, how can we explain that (10a) and (10b) have exactly the same truth conditions as they both communicate the proposition in (10c):

- (10) a. ها قد جاء عمر [ha part. come-he Omar]  
 b. جاء عمر [come-he Omar]  
 c. x come at time t past.

I argue that we can explain this if we apply the conceptual-procedural distinction to the semantics of attentional *haa* in a way that accounts for the cognitive notion of attention associated with its interpretation in the different contexts. Specifically, I argue that attentional *haa* encodes a procedural constraint on the derivation of higher-level explicatures. Before explaining this in detail using corpus examples, I discuss the status of attentional *haa* in Arabic grammar.

### 6.2.1.1 Approaches to attentional *haa*

In the literature, there are two main approaches to the contribution of *haa*. The first approach regards *haa* as a particle that has no meaning in itself. The second approach regards *haa* as a particle that has some level of deictic force and is used to direct the addressee's attention. The first approach is represented by scholars such as Ibn Jinni and Ibn Manzuur. For them, as discussed before, such particles have no real semantic contribution. But the majority of scholars acknowledge that *haa* as a particle does have some meaning related to the cognitive notion of attention, hence its label in the literature as 'attentional *haa*' or *haa 'al*

*tanbiih*. In typical tradition of his time<sup>97</sup>, Ibn Al-Hajib's (1980: 401)<sup>98</sup> exposition of particles of attention has taken the form of 3 short and concise lines of verse. He says,

وَنبِهُوا بِهَا أَمَا تُمُّ أَلَا  
عَلَى الْكَلَامِ بَعْدَهَا لِيَحْصِلَا  
وَنبِهُوا أَيْضًا بِهَا الْإِشَارَةَ  
وَالْمُضْمِرَاتِ نَحْوَ هَذِي سَارِهِ  
وَنَحْوِ هَاتَيْتُمْ وَنَحْوِ هَاتِنَا  
هَا هُوَ ذَا قَقَيْسٍ عَلَيْهِ مُعَلَّنَا

According to him, there are three particles of attention: *haa*, *'ammaa*, and *'alaa* which are used in the beginning of speech to draw the hearer's attention to what is said. In the third line of the verse, he mentions three examples uses of attentional *haa*: attached to the plural 2<sup>nd</sup> person pronoun, attached to the singular 1<sup>st</sup> person pronoun, and separated from a singular masculine demonstrative by an independent 3<sup>rd</sup> person pronoun. These examples are: *ha'antum* ([here] you+plural [are]), *ha'anaa* ([here] I [am]) and *haa huwa dhaa* ([here] he this). It is used here, he explains, to add attention to what is referred to in the pronouns. He also mentions the feminine singular demonstrative *hadhi*, where attentional *haa* has become a morphological part of the demonstrative, and calls it *mudmarah*, i.e. cliticised.

Therefore, just as the root demonstratives can be used on their own, attentional *haa* is also used on its own in various contexts. In this sense *haa* has its own deictic value, i.e. is not semantically empty. Also recall from Tables (8) and (9) above that *haa* and *hak* (with the *kaaf* for addressing to denote distance) are actually used as separate demonstratives in the Tunisian Arabic dialect. In the same manner, De Jong (2000: 172) recognises, in his study of the Bedouin dialects of northern Sinai, a form with *haa* + article *'al* (*hal*) that is used as a demonstrative. However, he adds that this demonstrative form has a lesser deictic value than the other demonstratives because they are “a deicticized article, specifying some object(s), person(s), or abstraction(s) not physically present or demonstrable at the moment of the utterance, but which /who is/are present in the mind of the speaker, not in the mind of the hearer”. This encoded deictic value has also been likened to similar particles in Latin and in French. Wright (1859: 268), for example, says that this particle has a demonstrative force

<sup>97</sup> It was a well-known tradition in the 10<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> centuries for Arabic grammarians to write their explanations in the form of poetry. Other famous examples include *Alfeiyat* Ibn Malik, which explains the rules of the whole Arabic grammar in one thousand lines of verse (*alfeiyah* literally translates as ‘thousand’).

<sup>98</sup> This book was originally written in the 13<sup>th</sup> century AD.

similar to the Latin *ce* in *hicce* (translated as ‘behold’<sup>99</sup>) and it is called in Arabic grammar *ḥarf ‘al tanbih* which he translates as “the particle that excites attention”. Holes (2004: 185), on the other hand, claims that *haa* is a presentative morpheme in Arabic whose original function resembles that of the French *voici* and *voilà* (translated as ‘here is/are, this/these is/are’<sup>100</sup>).

One of the broad studies that has looked into the ontogenesis of the monosyllabic grammatical particles in Arabic is that of Al Zannad (2005) in which he argues that most of the grammatical units in Arabic can be reduced to monosyllabic elements which share morphological, syntactic and semantic features. His account of the mono-consonantal *h* هـ is worth mentioning. Al Zannad suggests that the main function of this monosyllabic particle is attention, as most Arab grammarians maintain, whether it is attention in absolute (used independently) or drawing the addressee’s attention to a specific referent (prefixed to another linguistic item). For him, *haa* is a demonstrative syllable, which is shared by most Semitic languages, that has the basic meaning of *‘al ‘išaarah* (indication) to something absent, either physically absent or absent from the focus of attention. Therefore, he draws a continuum (2005: 531) of the uses of *haa* in conjunction with various other linguistic items which encode a range of meanings starting from the physically present object (referring to it by *haa*, or the demonstratives such as *haadhaa*, or the locatives such as *hunaa* or third person pronouns such as *huwa*), to the existentially present (referring to it by expressions such as *hayya* or *halla*<sup>101</sup>). Even the interrogative particle *hal* (is/does..?) lies somewhere in the middle of this continuum since asking about the unknown justifies the use of *haa* because “إذ “يقتضي طلب الإخبار تنبيهها للسامع أولاً” (“asking for information requires drawing the hearer’s attention first”). According to Al-Zannad, in semantic cognitive terms, the unknown is usually ambiguous or absent or divergent from the present in some way, and the use of *haa* is valid since “الهاء أصل في الدلالة على هذا الإبهام والمغايرة والغيباء” (“the *haa* is the root in signalling ambiguity, divergence and absence”) (2005:528).

It is worth noting that several scholars identified different kinds of demonstrative particles in Arabic, other than the obvious demonstrative forms. As mentioned above, Wright (1859: 268-269) considered *haa* a demonstrative particle. He also considered the *laam* (لـ), which appears in the definite marker *‘al* (الـ), the distal demonstratives *dhalik*, *tilka* (ذلك، تلك)

<sup>99</sup> According to the Etymological Dictionary of the Latin Language (Valpy 2005: 132).

<sup>100</sup> According to Merriam Webster’s French-English Dictionary (363).

<sup>101</sup> *hayya* roughly translates as *let’s*, while *halla* can be translated as *here, now*.

and the relative pronouns 'alladhy, 'allaty (الذي، التي), to be a demonstrative syllable. On the other hand, Fleisch, (1970) compiled a more comprehensive list of deictic elements in Arabic, which he called 'demonstrative bases'. According to him, these are morphemes which are mono-consonantal for the most part with a deictic signification. They include: the *dha* which appears in demonstratives like *haadhaa*; the *dhu* [of a person] to express possession; the *t* which appears in the feminine demonstratives *ta*, *ti*; the *l* which appears in distal demonstratives like *dhaalika*; the 'ul which appears in the plural demonstrative 'ula'ika; and the *haa* which appears in the proximal demonstrative pronouns. According to him, these represent the constitutive elements of deictic words in Arabic which fall outside the general system of language.

One question here is: if attentional *haa* is characterised both as a deictic form and an element of cognitive attention, which one should be considered the basic meaning and the other derived?<sup>102</sup> My claim is that the discussion of attentional *haa* in the classical literature tends to clearly identify the different 'meanings' expressed by *haa* without stating which one is more basic than the other. Al Farahidi, for example, in his seminal book *Kitaab Al-3ain* (1982: 102)<sup>103</sup> states that *haa* has four meanings:

- a. *haa* meaning take
- b. *haa*, or *hak*, to indicate giving something.
- c. *haa* for attention as in *haadhaa*, and *haadhaak*.
- d. *haa* meaning presentation of speech

Meanings (a) and (b) indicate physical demonstration (normally accompanied by a gesture). Meanings (c) and (d) add the cognitive angle, although meaning (d) does not seem to have much semantic value. However, historical developments in the use of this particle since Al-Farahidi compiled the first dictionary in the history of Arabic, clearly affected the way it is perceived in the literature as we have seen, for example, in the classical work of Ibn Manzur and Ibn Al-Hajib, and the modern work of Wright and Makhzumi (1986). In other words, it seems that in the development from classical Arabic to modern Arabic, the demonstrative deictic value of attentional *haa* gradually weakened in favour of the more cognitive meaning

<sup>102</sup> Recall that in English, scholars like Lyons (1977) and Himmelmann (1966) consider the deictic use of demonstratives to be the basic one, and that other metaphoric implementations of distance derive from it.

<sup>103</sup> This book, which is the first Arabic dictionary, was originally written in the 8<sup>th</sup> century AD. See also Al Farahidi (1995).

of drawing attention. In fact, the notion of attention could be considered the core semantic encoding in all of the four meanings Al-Farahidi mentions. Even the meaning “take” can be reduced to the underlying cognitive notion of attention and the subsequent semantic association of a mental procedure designed to direct the focus of attention to a certain entity. This is probably what Al-Zannad (2005:528) tried to capture by saying that “الهاء أصل في الدلالة” “على هذا الإبهام والمغايرة والغياب” (“the *haa* is the root in signalling ambiguity, divergence and absence”). Thus his continuum of linguistic items containing *haa* is warranted, since what they have in common is this reference to an absent which in turn requires the hearer to draw his/her attention to it.

So, this argument, if true, provides a logical explanation for the fact that in MSA, attentional *haa* has kept its presentative and attentional uses, while some of the regional vernaculars have kept its demonstrative uses<sup>104</sup> (cf. De Jong 2000; Khalifaoui 2009). This matches with the fact that MSA is primarily a written variety, while the regional vernaculars are primarily spoken varieties. In the next section, I discuss how we can account for the semantic contribution of attentional *haa* in MSA.

### 6.2.1.2 The relevance of attentional *haa*

In MSA, attentional *haa* is mainly used, as in examples (8)-(10) repeated below, to draw the hearer’s attention to what follows it.

(8) ها أنا ذا جاهز للخروج.

haa	'anaa	dhaa	jaahiz	lil-ḥuruuj
ha	1 <sup>st</sup> -pers-pro	prox-mas-dem	ready	to-go
Here I am ready to go.				

(9) ها هو الحل المنتظر.

haa	huwa	'al-ḥall	'al-muntadhar
ha	2 <sup>nd</sup> -pers-masc-pro	the-solution	the-expected
Here is the expected solution.			

(10) ها قد جاء عمر.

haa	qad	jaa'	'umar
ha	emphatic-part.	come-masc(past)	Omar

<sup>104</sup> According to Fillmore (1997: 64), deictic particles are capable of fulfilling gestural, symbolic and anaphoric functions. In MSA, attentional *ha* seems not to have a gestural-only feature, while in some local vernaculars using *haa* in the sense of take or give, as Al Farahidi notes, is still dominant.

Here Omar has come.

But the semantic contribution of attentional *haa* has not been discussed in the literature beyond this description. I propose a semantic analysis for attentional *haa* which works within a relevance theoretic framework. I start by applying the conceptual-procedural distinction, and argue that attentional *haa* encodes a procedural constraint that has to do with the speaker's attitude towards the proposition expressed. Following De Jong (2000) in his observation about the use of *haa*, my claim is that attentional *haa* is used in MSA mainly in cases where the proposition *p* is deemed to be important to the speaker but since it is only present in the mind of the speaker and not the hearer, the speaker wants to draw the hearer's attention to it. This description of attitude does not affect the truth conditions of the utterance, nevertheless it is linguistically communicated through the use of attentional *haa*. This can be formulated as follows:

❖ If *p* is the proposition expressed by an utterance:

*haa* → speaker believes that hearer should pay attention to *p*

In this capacity, the deictic value of *haa* is weakened in favour of a discourse function that is manipulated by the speaker to create certain emotive effects. In other words, attentional *haa* can be considered an illocutionary particle which achieves relevance by encouraging the hearer to create a higher-level explicature embedding *p* in an attitude of belief about the attentional state of the hearer. If we apply this to the examples above, it amounts to saying that each one of them communicates an explicature (i.e. the proposition expressed), as well as a higher-level explicature as follows:

(8) ها أنا ذا جاهز للخروج

Explicature: [I am ready to go]<sub>p</sub>.

Higher-level explicature: speaker believes that the hearer should pay attention to [I am ready to go]<sub>p</sub>

(9) ها هو الحل المنتظر

Explicature: [the expected solution exists]<sub>p</sub>

Higher level explicature: speaker believes that the hearer should pay attention to [the expected solution exists]<sub>p</sub>

(10) ها قد جاء عمر



Explicature: [Omar came]<sub>p</sub>

Higher-level explicature: speaker believes that the hearer should pay attention to [Omar came]<sub>p</sub>

As noted by Wilson and Sperber (1993), higher-level explicatures are descriptions of speech acts or descriptions of propositional attitudes that are made manifest by using certain linguistic items such as sentence adverbials (e.g. *seriously*, *frankly*, etc). These adverbials are conceptual in nature but do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance. However, they also mentioned that procedural items can contribute to the higher-level explicatures of an utterance by encoding inferential constraints. They mention examples such as the question particle *ti* in some French dialects which has the same function as word order inversion, and the dissociative particle *eh?* in English<sup>105</sup>. Along the same lines, I argue that attentional *haa* in Arabic encodes a procedure for constructing an explicature on a higher level that is relevant in its own right. In this sense, attentional *haa* is seen as a pragmatic marker. This conforms with the widely accepted claim that “pragmatic markers are often applied precisely to trigger attitudinal or illocutionary higher-level representations” (Andersen 2001: 62).

There are a couple of arguments in favour of a procedural analysis of attentional *haa* rather than a conceptual one. First, two of the main signs of procedurality, according to Wilson and Sperber (1993), are difficulty to explain and difficulty to translate. Native speakers of Arabic would need to think for a while before trying to explain what *haa* means in the above examples. This conforms with the view that “discourse particles are notoriously hard to pin down in conceptual terms” (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 104). Similarly, *haa* can be translated differently in different contexts. Second, according to Wilson and Sperber (1993: 106), higher-level explicatures can be true or false in their own right although they do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterances where they occur. Therefore, unlike the case with conceptual sentence adverbials such as *seriously* and *frankly*, higher level explicatures which are derived from the use of attentional *haa* cannot be open to charges of untruthfulness in the same way. Compare (11) and (12) below:

(11) Mary: Frankly, this steak is less than perfect.

Peter: That’s not true. You’re not being frank. (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 106)

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<sup>105</sup> See also Blass (1990; 2000) for a similar analysis of procedural items contributing to higher-level explicatures. And see Escandell-Vidal (1998), Fretheim (2002), Clark (2007), Clark & Wharton (2009) for accounts of intonation as encoding procedural constraints on higher-level explicatures. See also early work on non-declaratives (Wilson & Sperber 1988; Clark 1991).

(12) Ahmad: *Haa* Omar has come.

Mona: \*That's not true. You don't believe I should pay attention to the fact that Omar has come.

If attentional *haa* encoded a conceptual representation rather than a procedure, then the exchange in (12) would have been acceptable.

If we look at corpus examples, we can appreciate the semantic contribution of the particle *haa*. *Haa* in its independent form is associated more with formal texts and/or the more classical Arabic texts, so it is unsurprising that the search in the entire corpus of written Arabic resulted in 8 instances only. Some of these represent the [ha + 3<sup>rd</sup> person pronoun] structure, while the others represent the [ha + 3<sup>rd</sup> person pronoun + root demonstrative] structure. The examples below illustrate the first kind:

(13) وهو طيف ضوئي غير مرئي يقع بين الموجات القصيرة، والموجات تحت الحمراء، يمكن تركيزه بسهولة ولا يحدث (scientific press) *تلقًا بالجسم، لكنه عصي على التوليد، وها نحن بصدد كسر ذلك العصيان*

wa	huwa	ṭayf	ḍaw'y	gayr	mar'iy
and	2 <sup>nd</sup> -pers pro	spectrum	photic	not	visible

yaqa3	bayna	'al-mawjaat	'al-qaṣiirah	wal-mawjaat	taḥt
occur-it	between	the-waves	the-short	and-the-waves	ultra

'al-ḥamra'	yumkin	tarkiizuh	bisuhuulah	wa	laa
the-red	can-it(pres)	concentrate-it	with-ease	and	not

yuhḍith	talafan	bil-jism	lakinnahu	3aṣiyy	3alaa
happen-it	harm	in-the-body	but-it	difficult	on

'al-tawliid	wa	haa	naḥnu	biṣadad	kasr
the-generation	and	haa	we	about to	break

dhalik	'al-3iṣyaan
that	the-difficulty

And it is an invisible photic spectrum which occurs between short waves and ultra red waves, it can be easily concentrated and it doesn't harm the body. But it is difficult to generate, so here we are about to overcome this difficulty.

(14) *وها هي جوليانا سجرينا دافعت عن العرب وكتبت بصدق عن حقوقهم وعدالة قضايابهم ورفضت منطق الحرب (political debate) والاحتلال، ها هي مهددة بدورها أن تواجه نفس المصير*

wa	haa	hiya	Juliana Sigrina	daafa3at	
and	haa	3 <sup>rd</sup> pers pro	Juliana Sigrina	defend-she(past)	
3an	'al-'arab	wa	katabat	biṣidq	3an
about	the-Arabs	and	write-she(past)	with-honesty	about
ḥuquuqihim		wa	3adaalat	qadaayaahum	wa
rights-their		and	justice	causes-their	and
rafaḍat		mantiq	'al-ḥarb	wal-'iḥtilaal	
refuse-she(past)		logic	the-war	and-the-occupation	
haa	hiya	muhaddadah	bidawrihaa	'an	tuwaajih
haa	3 <sup>rd</sup> pers pro	threatened	in-turn	to	face-she
nafs	'al-maṣiir				
same	the-fate				

And here she is Juliana Segrina who defended the Arabs and honestly wrote about their rights and the justice of their cause and refused the logic of war and occupation. Here she is in turn threatened to face the same fate.

- (15) فالإدارة الأمريكية تسعى وراء تحقيق النموذج الديمقراطي الأمريكي في جميع بلدان الشرق الأوسط، وها هي (political debate) الخطوة الفلسطينية تمثل طوبة في هذا الصرح "الديمقراطي" الذي تسعى الإدارة الأمريكية في بنائه،

fal-'idaarah	'al-'amrikiyah	tas3aa	waraa'	taḥqiq	
so-the-adminstration	the-American	pursue-she	behind	achieve	
'al-namuudhaj	'al-dimuqraatiy	'al-'amrikiy	fii	jamii3	
the-model	the-democratic	the-amrican	in	all	
uldaan	'al-šarq	'al-awsat	wa	haa	hiya
countries	the-East	the-Middle	and	haa	3 <sup>rd</sup> pers pro
'al-ḥutwah	'al-filastiiniyah	tumaththel	tuubah	fii	
the-step	the-Palestinian	represent-she	stone	in	
hadhaa	'al-ṣarh	'al-dimuqraatiy	'alladhii	tas3aa	
this(mas)	the-edifice	the-democratic	which	pursue-she	
'al-'idaarah	'al-'amrikiyah		fii	binaa'ih	
the-administration	the-American		in	building-it	

The American administration pursues the implementation of the American democratic model in the whole of the Middle East, and here is the Palestinian step represents a brick in this democratic edifice that the American administration seeks to build.

In these examples the use of attentional *haa* is both syntactically and semantically optional with no effect on the proposition expressed. The third person pronoun on its own would be sufficient to express meaningful utterances<sup>106</sup>. A similar argument has been proposed by Recanati (1987: 50), who explains about sentence adverbials that:

Deleting the adverb would not change the proposition expressed by the sentence ... because the modification introduced by the adverb is external to the proposition and concerns the speaker's emotional attitude to the latter. This attitude is neither 'stated' nor 'described', but only 'indicated'.

The speaker's emotional attitude to the proposition expressed in these examples is linked to his/her subjective commitment to the importance of p in discourse and the fact that s/he wants to present p as important to the hearer too. Therefore, the particle *haa* is used to draw the hearer's attention to this particular part in discourse.

Similarly, the same argument can be made about the next set of examples, which illustrate the second type of structure [ha + 3<sup>rd</sup> person pronoun + root demonstrative]:

(16) **وها هو ذا الآن أخذ يتصدر أولويات الإستراتيجية الأمريكية بامتياز ، وبوضوح تام** (political debate)

wa	haa	huwa	dhaa	'al'aan	'ahadha	yataṣaddar
and	haa	3 <sup>rd</sup> pers pro	dem	now	take-he	tops-he
		'awlawiyaat	'al'istraatijyah	'al'amrikiyah		bi'imtiyaaz
		priorities	the-strategy	the-American		with-merit
wa		biwuḍuuh		taam		
and		with-clarity		absolute		

And here it is now first on the list of the priorities of the American strategy with merit and absolute clarity.

(17) **عزيتي سماح: لا أتحرج أن أقول حبيبتى - وهأنذا أقولها - ولكن لم أشأ أن أبدأ خطابي بما يُثيرُ غضبك** (fiction)

ʒazizatii	Samaah	laa	'ataḥarraj	'an	'aquul	ḥabatii
dear-my	Samah	not	embarrass-I	to	say-I	love-my
wa	haa	'ana	dhaa	'aquuluha		wa
and	haa	I	dem	say-I-it		and

<sup>106</sup> Although in (15) the 3<sup>rd</sup> person pronoun alone would not form a grammatically coherent utterance but it can do without it.

laakin	lam	'aš'a'	'an	'abda'
but	not	want-I	to	start-I
<b>hiṭaabii</b>	bimaa	yuthiir	<b>ḡadabik</b>	
letter-my	with-what	aggravate-he	anger-your	

My dear Samah, I am not embarrassed to say my love, there I said it, but I didn't want to start my letter with something that will upset you.

Removing the whole structure except for the personal pronoun, whose reference needs to be resolved in order to arrive at the proposition expressed, would not affect the truth conditions of the utterance. In (16) for example, speaking about America's hostile attitude towards Iran's nuclear aspirations, compare (a) and (b), which communicate the same proposition expressed (with resolving indexical expressions) in (c):

- (16) a. **وها هو ذا الآن أخذ يتصدر أولويات الإستراتيجية الأمريكية بامتياز، وبوضوح تام.**  
 b. **و هو الآن أخذ يتصدر أولويات الإستراتيجية الأمريكية بامتياز، وبوضوح تام.**  
 c.  $p \rightarrow$  [it] is [now] first on the list of the priorities of the American strategy with merit and absolute clarity.

But only (a) with attentional *haa* also expresses the higher-level explicature of the speaker's attitude towards the hearer's attentional state of *p*. In all these examples, too, it is noticed that there is a common affective factor in discourse. For example, in (13), the speaker is about to reveal an important scientific discovery, and in (17) the speaker is marking an important development in his relationship with his beloved by calling her "my love". Recall also example (1), repeated below, where the use of attentional *haa* is significant to the context of the utterance which is considered a political statement.

(1) **ها أنا ذا حر ومازال الوطن أسيرا (1)**

haa	'anaa	dhaa	<b>ḥurr</b>	wa	maa	zaal	'al-waṭan	'asiiraa
haa	1 <sup>st</sup> prs-pro	dem-mas	free	and	part.	remain	the-country	captive

Here I am free and my country remains captive.

Therefore, the use of attentional *haa* which creates the higher-level explicature is often described as creating an effect of emphasis. This stylistic effect can now be better understood as the result of the higher-level explicature communicating the importance of the proposition expressed.

Moreover, it should be noted that attentional *haa* can also occur in other types of structures. One is the [ha + emphatic particle *qad* + past tense verb] structure, and the lesser used [ha + sentence] structure. Since the corpus contained no examples of this sort, I mention here two ‘external’ examples albeit attested ones for illustration from Arabic poetry (poet’s name is mentioned between brackets):

(18) (موسى مصطفى) ها قد رحلتى وفي فؤادي من عيونك ألف ذكرى

haa qad rah<sup>h</sup>alty wa fii fu’aady min 3uyuunik ’alf dhikraa  
Here you had gone and in my heart are a thousand memories from your eyes.

(19) ها .. حبيبي .. مو على بعضك أحسك (كريم العراقي) ها .. حبيبي .. لخطري لا تأذي نفسك

haa habiby muu 3alaa ba3<sup>d</sup>ak ’ah<sup>h</sup>issak  
haa habiby lih<sup>h</sup>atry laa ti’dhii nafsak

Ha my love, I don’t feel you are yourself  
Ha my love, please don’t hurt yourself

In (18), as in (10) before, the combination of attentional *haa* and the emphatic particle *qad*<sup>107</sup> is not surprising since both are used as discourse particles with pragmatic effects in discourse. Similarly, deleting *haa* in (18) and (19) would not affect the proposition expressed but will only result in the loss of the higher-level explicature and, consequently, the stylistic effect of emphasis. All these examples show that attentional *haa* should be considered an illustration of a procedural item that is employed by a speaker to communicate descriptions of propositional attitude by setting constraints on the construction of higher-level explicatures. The main factor in this propositional attitude is the notion of attention which is common in all the instances of this illocutionary particle in Arabic.

To sum up, previous studies of the particle *haa* correctly identify the core meaning of attention that it communicates. Al Nadry (1989:162) in his discussion of Arabic demonstratives states that “attentional *haa* is not part of the demonstrative, but it is a [letter] that is used to draw the addressee’s attention to the referent”. Hassan (1995: 231) further suggests that *haa* got its name in the literature because it fulfils either one of two functions: (a) to draw the attention of the inattentive addressee to what follows it; or (b) to make the

<sup>107</sup> See Sarig (1995) for an account of *qad* as a discourse marker. In relevance-theoretic terms, this particle could also be analysed as encoding procedural meaning.

attentive addressee feel the importance of what is going to be said so that he will focus on it disregarding anything else. I argue that the characterisation of these two functions is better captured in the relevance-theoretic terms of procedural constraints on higher-level explicatures as discussed above. The procedural analysis proposed here is consistent with considerations of relevance. In choosing to use attentional *haa* the speaker is being faithful to his/her own preferences and objectives in communicating the importance of what is being said. The hearer, on the other hand, will interpret attentional *haa* as being optimally relevant and thus the purpose of the communicative act will be successfully fulfilled.

### 6.2.2 *kadhaalik*: demonstrative or discourse marker?<sup>108</sup>

*Dhalik* is the distal singular masculine demonstrative in MSA. It can occur in discourse attached to a number of prefixes, mostly prepositions. For example, we can find *li-dhalik* (*for that*), *bi-dhalik* (*with that*), *fa<sup>109</sup>-dhalik* (*so that*), and *ka-dhalik*. If we have a closer look at the latter form, we can see that is morphologically composed of:




Figure 7: The morphology of *kadhaalik*

In this section, I focus on the semantic and pragmatic contribution of this form, i.e. the distal singular masculine demonstrative *dhalik* as it is prefixed with what is known in Arabic grammar as *kaaf 'al tašbiih* (*kaaf* for simile), roughly translated as *like*. My arguments start

<sup>108</sup> A version of this section has been published in Zaki (2011).

<sup>109</sup> The *fa* is not a preposition in grammatical terms, it is actually a conjunction or حرف عطف.

from the assumption that we should distinguish between two uses of this particular form as illustrated in (2) and (3), repeated below:

(2) أذاكر في المساء وكذلك يفعل أحمد

'udhakhir	fil-masaa'	wa	kadhalik	yaf3al	Ahmad
study-I(pres)	in-the-evening	and	kadhalik	do-he(pres)	Ahmad

I study in the evening and Ahmad does the same.

(3) قال المدير أن غدا عطلة وأعلن كذلك عن زيادة في المرتبات

qaal	'al-mudiir	'an	ġadan	3uṭlah	wa	'a3lan
say-he (past)	the-manager	that	tomorrow	holiday	and	announce-he(past)
kadhalik	3an	ziyaadah	fil-murattabaat			
kadhalik	about	increase	in-the-wages			

The manager said that tomorrow is a holiday and he also announced an increase in wages.

Because the *kaaf* for simile has received little attention from the semantic point of view, *kadhaalik* is always analysed as a demonstrative prefixed with the *kaaf* which is used to link two parts of an utterance in a relationship of similarity. Moreover, there is no distinction in Arabic grammar books between utterances like (2) and (3) although they intuitively differ in how *kadhaalik* is used. For example, we need to be able to explain why *kadhaalik* in (2) cannot be omitted from the utterance without disrupting the meaning, while in (3) it can be omitted. We also need to explain why (3) without *kadhaalik* has the same truth conditions as with *kadhaalik* included in the utterance. I argue that we can answer these questions by applying a procedural analysis to this form which distinguishes between its use as a demonstrative, as in (2), and as a discourse marker, as in (3).

### 6.2.2.1 A distinction

The demonstrative form *kadhaalik* is analysed in the literature simply as a demonstrative which is prefixed with *kaaf 'al tašbiih* (*kaaf* for simile). This is a prefix that can be attached to any demonstrative, as in (20), or to other linguistic forms such as nouns, as in (21), and it is popular in metaphorical interpretations as in (22):



(20) أريد سيارة كهذه

'uriid	sayyaarah	ka-haadhihi
want-I(pres)	car	ka-this(fem)
I want a car like this.		

(21) المقال يناقش قضايا هامة كتدهور التعليم والخدمات الصحية

'al-maqaal	yunaaqiš	qaḍaayaa	haammah	ka-tadahwur
the-article	discuss-he(pres)	issues	important	ka-deterioration
'al-ta3liim	wal-ḥadamaat	'al-ṣiḥiyah		
the-education	and-the-services	the-healthy		

The article discusses important issues like the deterioration of education and health services.

(22) الفريق يبدو كالأسد الجريح

'al-fariiq	yabdu	kal'asad	'al-jariiḥ
the-team	seem-he(pres)	ka-the-lion	the-wounded
The team seems like a wounded lion.			

In these examples the *kaaf* for simile, as its name implies, signals a relationship of parallelism between each of the two propositions in the utterances. But this cannot be adequately explained in semantic terms if we follow the traditional approach in Arabic grammar which considers that all particles have empty semantic slots. I argue instead for a procedural analysis of *kaaf 'al tašbiih* whereby it constrains the interpretation by setting up a relationship between two propositions p and q so that they are understood to be similar premises for the same conclusion. In some cases the hearer will be driven to derive the simple conclusion that q is a type of p, but in other cases, depending on context, the hearer will derive other implicated conclusions.

Moreover, examination of corpus data reveals that the distribution of *kadhaalik* is considerably higher than other demonstrative forms prefixed with *kaaf 'al tašbiih*. My claim is that this distribution pattern can be explained if we consider that *kadhaalik* is not only a demonstrative as in (2), but that it developed another discourse function, that of a discourse marker.

(2) أذكر في المساء وكذلك يفعل أحمد

'udhakir	fil-masaa'	wa	kadhalik	yaf3al	Ahmad
Study-I(pres)	in-the-evening	and	kadhalik	do-he(pres)	Ahmad

I study in the evening and Ahmad does the same.

While, *kadhaalik* in (2) should be analysed as the distal demonstrative *dhalik* prefixed with *kaaf 'al tašbiih*, there are other uses when *kadhaalik* should be analysed as one semantic unit that acts as a connective in discourse. In this use, *kadhaalik* performs its connective function in the same way *also* does in English. As Blakemore (1987: 97-104) has shown in her analysis of *also*, it encodes a constraint on the interpretation of two propositions p and q in the utterance so that the conjunction of p and q can be combined with other contextual assumptions to yield contextual implications. Therefore, in (3), repeated below, *kadhaalik* conjoins the two propositions (3a) and (3b) which can combine with the contextual assumption (3c) to yield the conclusion in (3d):

(3) قال المدير أن غدا عطلة وأعلن كذلك عن زيادة في المرتبات

The manager said that tomorrow is a holiday and he also ANNOUNCED an increase in wages.

- a. The manager said tomorrow is a holiday
- b. The manager announced an increase in wages
- c. The economic situation is booming.
- d. The company is making a lot of profit.

Another aspect not addressed in Arabic grammar is the behaviour of *kadhaalik* as a focus particle, i.e. the interaction between *kadhaalik* and contrastive stress and its effect on the access of contextual assumptions in the interpretation process. I follow Blakemore's analysis of *also* in arguing that *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker interacts with focus in the sentence in a similar manner. For example, changing the stress (underlined) of (3'), compared to (3), reflects that what is relevant to know in (3) is the background assumption that the manager said something, while in (3') what is relevant to know is the background assumption that something (positive) has been announced.

(3') قال المدير أن غدا عطلة وأعلن كذلك عن زيادة في المرتبات

The manager said that tomorrow is a holiday and he also announced an INCREASE IN WAGES.

To sum up, my arguments concerning the use of *kadhaalik* rest on the distinction between two uses in discourse as follows:

- (a) *kaaf 'al tašbiih* + distal demonstrative *dhalik*, where reference assignment is necessary to arrive at the proposition expressed.
- (b) *kadhaalik* as a single semantic unit, where reference assignment is not necessary to arrive at the proposition expressed.

In the next two sections, I discuss in detail the semantic contribution of *kadhaalik* in both cases.

### 6.2.2.2 *kadhaalik* as a demonstrative

In this use, *kadhaalik* is simply a demonstrative prefixed with *kaaf* for simile. This prefix is a bound morpheme which can be prefixed to nouns, pronouns, particles, adjectives, as well as demonstratives. According to Ibn Al-Hajib (1980: 380), the *kaaf* is simply a preposition with the meaning of simile or *tašbiih*:

والكاف للتشبيه (ثم) زائدة      واسم لحرف الجر وهي القاعدة

(and the *kaaf* is for simile and it is an addition      and a preposition and this is the rule)

But note that the *kaaf* in Arabic grammar is capable of expressing a variety of meanings, not just simile. According to Babty (1992: 812-815), there are different terminological terms for the *kaaf* depending on what sort of meaning it conveys in the utterances. For example, *kaaf 'al ta3liil* (*kaaf* for reason) gives the reason for something as in the Qur'anic verse “*wa 'udhkuruuh kamaa hadaakum*” (and remember him[Allah] as [because] he guided you). *Kaaf 'al tawkiid* (*kaaf* for emphasis) achieves an effect of emphasis as in the Qur'anic verse “*laysa kamithlihi šay*” (there is nothing like him[Allah]). And then there is *kaaf 'al tašbiih* (*kaaf* for simile) which achieves the meaning of ‘similar to’. However, we should not confuse these categories with other grammatical classifications of the *kaaf* in Arabic grammar. From the grammatical point of view, the other types of *kaaf* that Babty mentions would be nominal *kaaf*, *kaaf 'al jarr* (prepositional *kaaf*) and *kaaf 'al ħitaab* (*kaaf* for addressing). In this sense,

the *kaaf* that is suffixed to the distal demonstrative *dhalik* is the grammatical *kaaf* for addressing<sup>110</sup>, while the *kaaf* that is prefixed to the distal demonstrative *kadhaalik* is the semantic *kaaf* for simile (which is grammatically the prepositional *kaaf*).

It is also interesting to note that this particle exists in many Semitic languages with more or less the same range of grammatical and semantic functions. According to Moscati (1969: 121), Akkadian, Syriac, Ethiopian and Hebrew share some form of the *ka* particle, either simple or compound, to express the relationship of simile. However, Arabic grammarians, since Sibawih<sup>111</sup>, differentiated between using the particle as a pronoun (e.g. *kitaabak*, i.e. book-your), as a particle for addressing (e.g. *dhaak*, i.e. mid-distance *that*), and as a preposition to mean simile (e.g. *kadhaalik*).

However, another look at the examples above reveals that the meaning signalled by *kaaf 'al tašbiih* in (20) and (21) is slightly different from that signalled in (22). In fact, what is called *'al tašbiih* in Arabic grammar actually refers to two distinct notions: exemplification, which is referred to as *'al tamthiil*, and similarity or *'al tašbiih*. This corresponds to using the word *like* in English to mean that something is an example of something else as in (23), and to mean that something is similar to something else as in (24):

(23) I hate green vegetables like spinach and peas.

(24) His mind is like a computer.

The common role that *like* performs in these utterances is that it makes explicit that two parts of the utterance are to be linked in some way. If we think of the proposition to be [p like q], then (23) seems to communicate that q is an example/type of p, whereas (24) seems to communicate that p is like q in respect to x. The key in the interpretation of both examples lies in the contextual assumptions that a hearer will retrieve to process them. This interpretive route is what relevance theorists have shown to occur in the processing of utterances containing discourse markers such as *but*, *so*, *after all*, *moreover*, etc. However, lexical items such as *like* and *kaaf 'al tašbiih* are syntactically classified as prepositions, so there is an

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<sup>110</sup> From the semantic point of view, this *kaaf* for addressing originally indicates a medial distance as in the medial demonstrative *dhaak*. But in the distal demonstrative *dhaalik*, since the *laam* for distance or *laam 'al bo3d* is also present, it refers to the farthest distance. According to Babty (1992: 101), the same gradience in distance which corresponds to the attached particles can also be seen in the locative pronouns *huna*, *hunaak* and *hunaalik* which can be roughly translated as here (near), over here (medium distance) and there (farther distance).

<sup>111</sup> Sibawih is an Arabic grammarian who lived in the 8<sup>th</sup> century AD and is called the 'Sheikh of Grammarians'. His most famous book is *Al Kitaab*, one of the first to clearly lay out the principles of Arabic grammar.

issue of the scope of the grammatical class of discourse markers. Fraser (1999: 946), working mainly on English, argues that discourse markers “are expressions drawn from the syntactic classes of conjunctions, adverbials or prepositional phrases”. This is not say that all conjunctions or prepositional phrases are discourse markers, but what seems to underlie these expressions as a pragmatic class is the common function that they impose a relationship between two segments of an utterance. However, as relevance-theoretic research has shown, discourse markers should also be considered as a semantic class where procedural encoding plays the role of signalling the inferential route to be followed in order to arrive at the intended interpretation of such a relationship.

Therefore, I argue that the *kaaf* for simile is a discourse marker which encodes a procedural constraint on how a hearer should interpret the two parts of the utterance which the *kaaf* connects. In this way, the *kaaf* is a conjunction that expresses a specific cohesive relation in discourse. Halliday and Hasan (1976: 247) recognise such devices which express some sort of ‘comparative relation’. In such a relation, there is semantic similarity “in which the source of cohesion is the comparison of what is being said with what has gone before”. While they mention expressions like *similarly*, *likewise*, *in the same way* to be exponents of comparative relations, I argue that expressions such as *like* and the *kaaf* are also exponents of comparative relations of the sort exemplified in (23) and (24). The processing procedure in both examples is the same, but it is the contextual assumptions against which interpretation takes place, guided by the criterion of relevance, that decides how more or fewer inferences are made. In relevance-theoretic terms, the *kaaf* and *like* signal that the hearer is to interpret the conjunction of p and q in a relationship of similarity to be premises for one conclusion. In the case of exemplification or *tamthiil*, the conclusion serves to strengthen the existing contextual assumption used in the interpretation in relation to the new proposition expressed. The interpretation of (23), for example, might go as follows:

- (23) a. I hate green vegetables  
b. I hate spinach and peas.  
c. Interpret p and q as similar premises for one conclusion  
d. Contextual assumption: spinach and peas are a type of vegetables  
e. Conclusion: spinach and peas are a type of vegetables that I hate<sup>112</sup>.

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<sup>112</sup> This is not to say that (23) only achieves relevance by arriving at the conclusion in (23e). Compare, for example, (23) interpreted as a reply to (i) and to (ii):

(i) Do you like green vegetables?

Similarly, the interpretations of (20) and (21), repeated below, go along the same lines. In (20), the contextual assumption is supplied from the physical environment as the hearer resolves the reference assignment of the demonstrative. Whereas, in (21), the contextual assumption is supplied from world knowledge. The implicated conclusions arrived at are given below:

(20) أريد سيارة كهذه

I want a car like this.

Conclusion: this car is an example of the type of car that I want.

(21) المقال يناقش قضايا هامة كتدهور التعليم والخدمات الصحية

The article discusses important issues like the deterioration of education and health services.

Conclusion: the deterioration of education and health services is a type of the important issues this article discusses.

The corpus examples in (25) and (26) also show how the *kaaf* is used to link the two parts of the utterance in a relationship of similarity. This leads to the derivation of an implicated conclusion that reflects exemplification or *tamthiil*. In (25), the hearer derives the conclusion that “the fires of Indonesian forests” is a type/example of eco challenges; while in (26) the hearer derives the conclusion that the “factories of nuclear weapons” are a type/example of nuclear reactors.

(25) ومن بين هذه القضايا: التحدي البيئي -الذي مع أنه ينطلق من بعض الدول كحرائق غابات إندونيسيا- فإنه يؤثر على الدول الأخرى (political debate)

wa	min	bayna	hadhihi	'al-qaḍaayaa	'al-taḥaddy
and	from	among	this(fem)	the-causes	the-challenge
'al-bii'iy		'alladhy	ma3	'annahu	yanṭaliq
the-environmental		which	with	part.-it	stem-he(pres)
min	ba3ḍ	'al-duwal	kaḥaraa'iq	ḡaabaat	'induniisiya

(ii) Would you like some peas?

In the first, it seems that the utterance achieves relevance from the main assertion that the speaker hates the category of green vegetables, while in the second the main assertion which achieves relevance is the one on which spinach and peas are an example of the category of green vegetables that the speaker hates.

from	some	the-countries	ka-fires	forests	Indonesia
fa'innahu	yu'athther	3alaa	'al-duwal	'al-'uḥraa	
so-part-it	affect-he(pres)	on	the-countries	the-other	

And among these issues: the ecological challenge, which, despite the fact that it stems from some countries like the fires of the Indonesian forests, it affects other countries.

(26) وتستخدم المفاعلات النووية أيضا كمصانع لإنتاج الأسلحة في البلدان التي تمتلك برامج حرب نووية

wa	tustahdam	'al-mufaa3ilaat	'al-nawawiyyah	'aiḍan
and	is-used	the-reactors	the-nuclear	also
kamasaani3	li-'intaaj	'al-'asliḥah	fil-buldaan	'allatii
ka-factories	to-produce	the-weapons	in-the-countries	which
tamtalik	baraamij	ḥarb	nawawiyyah	
own-she(pres)	programmes	war	nuclear	

And nuclear reactors are also used as factories to produce nuclear weapons in the countries which have nuclear war programmes.

In the analysis of the semantic contribution of the *kaaf* or *like* in these examples, we do not seem to be able to explain the procedure encoded by *like* or *kaaf* without using the notion of similarity or *tamthiil*. This might be an indication that this is a concept encoded in those expressions alongside the procedural information. The feasibility of one linguistic item encoding both types of meaning has been discussed in the literature in relation to discourse markers (e.g. Fraser 2006; Moeschler 2002) and pronouns (e.g. Hedley 2007). Fraser (2006), in particular, argues that discourse markers such as *thus* and *moreover* should be analysed as encoding conceptual elements in addition to the procedural ones. One piece of evidence for his argument is that, contrary to procedural-only views, these expressions do allow for denial of truthfulness. Example (27) applies this to an utterance with *thus* (as discussed in Fraser 2006):

- (27) a. The water won't boil. Thus, we can't make tea.  
 b. That's not true. It isn't necessary for the water to boil to make tea.

The same can be applied to examples with *like* and *kaaf* in (23) and (21) respectively:

(23) I hate green vegetables like spinach and peas.

That's not true. Spinach and vegetables are not examples of green vegetables.

المقال يناقش قضايا هامة كتدهور التعليم والخدمات الصحية (21)

The article discusses important issues like the deterioration of education and health services.

That's not true. The deterioration of education and health services is not an example of important issues.

When we come to the metaphorical examples in (22) and (24), repeated below, the same procedural process applies, except that expectations of relevance encourage the hearer to derive more inferences in order to warrant the relevance of the interpretation. Therefore, in (22), where the relationship is one of *tašbiih* (similarity) rather than *tamthiil* (exemplification), it is not enough to arrive at the implicated conclusion that *the wounded lion* is a type similar to *the team*, nor is it enough in (24) to conclude that a *computer* and a *mind* are of a similar type. These conclusions are not relevant enough to warrant the processing effort exerted in interpreting the utterances because the speakers also want to implicitly communicate in what sense the two parts of their utterances are similar<sup>113</sup>. The contextual assumptions retrieved in the interpretation of these utterances highlight the poetic effect of the simile and encourage the hearer to derive further implicated conclusions, or in some cases, a whole range of weak implicatures<sup>114</sup>.

الفريق يبدو كالأسد الجريح (22)

The team seems like a wounded lion.

- a.  $p \rightarrow$  the team seems like something
- b.  $q \rightarrow$  the wounded lion
- c. Interpret p and q as similar premises for the same conclusion
- d. Contextual assumption: a lion is a very strong and vicious animal
- e. Contextual assumption: a wounded lion is likely to be weak and vulnerable
- f. Contextual assumption: if a lion is wounded, it is likely to be defeated in a fight.

<sup>113</sup> This is similar to the exchange below, where B's explicit proposition does not achieve relevance until A processes the implicit meaning of [No I don't want to go]:

A: Do you want to go to the cinema?

B: I'm tired.

The relevance of B's utterance lies in its implicature rather than in its explicit content.

<sup>114</sup> See also work from the relevance-theoretic perspective on the interpretation of figurative language using the notion of 'ad-hoc concepts' (O'Donoghue 2009; Carston 2002; Wilson and Carston 2006 inter alia).



g. Implicated conclusion: the team will be defeated in the match.

(24) His mind is like a computer.

- a.  $p \rightarrow$  his mind is like something
- b.  $q \rightarrow$  a computer
- c. Interpret  $p$  and  $q$  as similar premises for the same conclusion
- d. Contextual assumption: a computer is very precise, accurate, fast, etc.
- e. Contextual assumption: computer memory never forgets
- f. Implicated conclusion: he is very precise, accurate, fast, etc.
- g. Implicated conclusion: he never forgets.

The corpus examples (28) and (29) illustrate this kind of poetic effect created by *kaaf* 'al-tašbih. In (28), world knowledge warrants a kind of interpretation where the relevance of the utterance is only achieved by making further inferences based on a comparison between people and locusts. Similarly, in (29) the image of the boat as a feather blown away by the wind is signalled in the mind of the hearer by using the *kaaf* and this encourages him/her to derive a range of weak implicatures about the status of the boat and the implications for its inhabitants. Note that in (29), the *kaaf* is not attached directly to the head noun (*riiṣah*, *feather*) but to the assertive particle 'anna.

(28) والجميع يسمعون الأحاديث الروتينية نفسها عن قسوة الغرباء الذين توافدوا كالجراد إلى الأرض المقدسة

wa	'al-jamii3	yasma3uun	'al-'aḥaadiith	'al-ruutiiniyyah
and	the-every	hear-they(pres)	the-talk	the-routine
nafsaha	3an	qaswat	'al-ḡurabaa'	'al-ladhiin
same-it	about	cruelty	the-strangers	who
tawaafadu		kal-jaraad	'ilaa	'al-'arḍ
come-they(past)		ka-the-locusts	to	the-land
'al-muqaddasah				
the-holy				

And everyone listens to the same routine talk about the cruelty of the strangers who landed like locusts on the holy land.

(29) القارب يكاد يغرق، لقد كانت الأمواج العاتية تتلاعب بالقارب كأنه ريشة في مهب الريح

'al-qaarib	yakaad	yaḡraq	la-qad	kaanat
the-boat	almost	drown-he(pres)	part.	be-she(past)
'al-'amwaaj	'al-3aatyah	tatalaa3ab	bil-qaarib	ka-'annahu
the-waves	the-strong	playing-she	with-the-boat	ka-part-it
riiṣah	fii	mahabb	'al-riiḥ	
feather	in	blowing	the-wind	

The boat is almost drowned, the strong waves were playing with the boat as if it was a feather in the wind.

So far, I have characterised the semantic contribution of the *kaaf* for simile as a combination of procedural and conceptual elements which work together to constrain the interpretation of two segments in an utterance<sup>115</sup>. This is intended to minimise processing effort by guiding the hearer to interpret the utterance in such a way that it achieves relevance. When the *kaaf* is prefixed to a demonstrative, reference resolution in this case is essential to identify the proposition q which is linked to proposition p as similar premises for one conclusion. Therefore, in (30), the referent of *haadhaa* is interpreted as a type of “commercial project” with all the implicated conclusions the hearer can infer from this similarity; whereas in (31), the referent of *tilka* is interpreted as an example of “phonic and ultra phonic bangs”.

(30) فالكل يعرف مدى دلالة هذه الكلمات لدى المسلمين جميعا، ومن ثم فإن الزج بها في مشروع استهلاكي كهذا ينال من قيمتها وقداستها (General News)

falkul	ya3rif	madaa	dilalat	hadhihi	'al-kalimaat
so-every	know-he(pres)	extent	significance	this(fem)	the-words
ladaa	'al-muslimiin	jamiia3an	wa	min	thamma
to	the-muslims	all	and	from	therefore
fa'inna	'al-zaj	biha	fii	mašruu3	'istihlaakiy
so-part.	the-intrusion	with-it	in	project	commercial
kahadhaa	yanaal	min	qimatuhaa	wa	qadaasatuha
ka-this	belittle	from	value-its	and	holiness-its

<sup>115</sup> I would further argue that if we take this procedural analysis of the *kaaf* seriously, it can also be used to account for the other ‘meanings’ it is able to convey in discourse, such as *kaaf 'al ta3liil* (*kaaf* for reason) and *kaaf 'al tawkiid* (*kaaf* for emphasis), by highlighting the role of contextual assumptions interacting with the procedural encoding.

Everyone knows how significant these words are for all Muslims, therefore exploiting them in a commercial project like this belittles their value and their holiness.

ولكن هناك عند السطح دوامات حمل لنقل الحرارة العالية أسفل السطح لأعلى السطح، هذه الدوامات ينتج عنها فرقة (31) (Scientific Press) صوتية وفوق صوتية كذلك التي نسمعها عند تجاوز الطائرات الحربية لحاجز الصوت

wa	lakin	hunaak	3inda	'al-saḥ	dawwamaat
and	but	there	at	the-surface	whirls
ḥaml	linaql	'al-ḥararah	'al-3aalayah	'asfal	'al-saḥ
carry	to-transfer	the-temperature	the-high	under	the-surface
li'a3laa	'al-saḥ	hadhihi	'al-dawwamaat	yantuj	3anhaa
to-the-top	the-surface	this(fem)	the-whirls	result	from-it
farqa3ah	ṣawtiyah	wa	fawq	ṣawtiyah	katilka
bang	phonic	and	ultra	phonic	ka-that(fem)
'allatii	nasma3uhaa	3inda	tajaawuz	'al-ṭaa'iraat	'al-ḥarbiyah
Which	hear-us(pres)	when	exceeding	the-aircrafts	the-military
liḥaajiz	'al-ṣawt				
to-limit	the-sound				

But at the surface there are whirls to carry the high temperature underneath the surface to the top of the surface. These whirls result in a phonic and ultra phonic bang like that we hear when military aircrafts exceed the sound limit.

As far as *kadhaalik* is concerned, if we go back to example (2), repeated below, we find that q is the referent of the demonstrative *dhalik* which needs to be resolved in order to arrive at the implicated conclusion of the sort: q is a type/example of p. In other words, *kadhaalik* in (2) communicates that what Ahmad does is a type of what the speaker does, i.e. study in the evening.

(2) أذاكر في المساء وكذلك يفعل أحمد

'udhakir	fil-masaa'	wa	kadhalik	yaf3al	Ahmad
study-I(pres)	in-the-evening	and	kadhalik	do-he(pres)	Ahmad

I study in the evening and Ahmad does the same.

Similarly, in the corpus examples such as (32a) and (33a), the *kaaf* links the two segments of the utterance in a relationship of similarity as illustrated in (32b) and (33b) respectively.

(32a) ومن جانبنا فإننا نرى أن وجود الديانة في البطاقة الشخصية تحمل في حقيقتها شبهة التمييز بين المواطنين فهي (Legal) والحال كذلك غير دستورية ومخالفة لنص المادة ٤١ من الدستور.

wa	min	jaanibinaa	fa-'innanaa	naraa	'anna
and	from	side-our	so-part	see-us(pres)	part.
wujuud	'al-diyaanah	fii	'al-biṭaaqah	'al-ṣaḥṣiyyah	
existence	the-religion	in	the-ID card	the-personal	
taḥmil	fii	ḥaqiqatihaa	ṣubhat	'al-tamyiiz	bayna
carry	in	reality-ita	suspicion	the-discrimination	between
'al-muwaatiniin	fahiya	wal-ḥaal	kadhaliik	ḡayr	
the-citizens	so-she	and-the-state	ka-that(mas)	not	
dustuuriyah	wa	muḥaalifah	linaṣ	'al-maadah	
constitutional	and	contradictory	to-statement	the-article	
waḥid	wa	'arba3iin	min	'al-dustuur	
one	and	forty	from	the-constitution	

From our view, we see that the presence of religion in the personal ID carries in reality the suspicion of discriminating between citizens, therefore as the situation stays like that it is unconstitutional and runs against the article number 41 of the constitution.

(33a) فالزري الفاحش موضة، وهو دعاية عن إمكانيات الفتاة التي توصلها للزواج! ثم إن كل الفتيات يلبسن كذلك، ولن يعيبه أحد على ابنتي (Fiction)

fal-ziyy	'al-faahṣiṣ	muuḍah	wa	huwa	da3aayah
the-dress	the-indecent	fashionable	and	he	propaganda
3an	'imkaaniyyaat	'al-fataah	'allatii	tu'ahiluhaa l	il-zawaaj
about	qualifications	the-girl	which	qualify-her	to-marriage
thumma	'inna	kul	'al-fatayaat	yalbisna	kadhaliik
then	part.	all	the-girls	wear-them	ka-that(mas)
wa	lan	yu3iibuhu	'aḥad	3alaa	'ibnatii
and	not	criticise	one	on	daughter-my

Indecent clothes are fashionable, as it advertises the girl's qualifications which make her suitable for marriage! And all girls dress like that, so no one will criticise my daughter.

(32b) The situation is a type of the situation where there is a suspicion of discrimination.

(33b) All girls dress in a way that is a type of indecent clothes.

The interpretation of *kadhaalik* here depends on both the procedural route signalled by the *kaaf*, in addition to resolving the reference of the demonstrative *dhalik*. To recap, the proposed procedural semantics for the *kaaf* is as follows:

❖ If p and q are two propositions in discourse then:

p *kaaf* 'al *tašbiih* q → interpret p and q as similar premises for one conclusion

In most cases, the conclusion would just be that q is similar to p so that q is an example/type of p. In other cases, more implicated conclusions are intended to be communicated, especially in metaphorical meanings. Since reference resolution here is essential to arrive at the proposition expressed, it is argued that the demonstrative contributes to the proposition expressed, hence to its truth conditions.

Similarly, we can argue that the contribution of the *kaaf* should be seen as affecting the truth conditions of the utterance, since it is analysed as encoding a combination of procedural and conceptual components. That amounts to saying that the utterances in (32) and (33), for example, are true or false depending on whether the relationship of similarity holds between its two segments or not. This can be formulated as follows:

(32c) [The situation is unconstitutional] is true iff the situation is a type of the situation where there is a suspicion of discrimination.

(33c) [All girls dress in this way] is true iff all girls dress in a way that is a type of indecent clothes.

However, note that not all discourse markers contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance in which they occur. In the next section, I discuss the non-truth-conditional cases of *kadhaalik*.

### 6.2.2.3 *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker

If we focus on the *kaaf* for simile in conjunction with demonstratives as used in the corpus, an interesting fact will emerge. Although theoretically, *kaaf 'al tašbiih* could be attached to any demonstrative, it is immediately obvious that there is something special about the masculine singular distal demonstrative *dhaalik*. Because the number of instances of the *kaaf* for simile attached to this particular demonstrative massively outweighs the number of instances of this particle attached to any other demonstrative. The table below illustrates this:

Token	No. of instances in the entire corpus
kadhalik	218
kahadhaa, kahadhihi, katilka, kaha'ulaa', ka'ula'ik <sup>116</sup>	7

Table 8: Number of instances of *kadhaalik* in the corpus

The big difference in distribution in actual use is a clue that the interpretation of *kadhaalik* ought to be expanded from the realm of demonstratives to the realm of discourse markers. As far as I know, *kadhaalik* has not been explicitly analysed as a discourse marker in Arabic. However, in one of the few books dedicated to connectors in MSA, Al-Warraki and Hassanein (1994) devote a whole chapter to expressions including *kadhaalik* which are used as connectors in discourse. The idea that there is a process by which “linguistic elements change into constituents of grammar, or by which grammatical items become more grammatical in time” (Wischer, 2006: 129) is known in the literature as the process of grammaticalisation. Prototypical cases that have been studied as examples of grammaticalisation include the development of auxiliaries from lexical verbs and prepositions from nouns<sup>117</sup>. One subtype of grammaticalisation, according to Wischer, is what is known as ‘pragmaticalisation’, i.e. the development of discourse markers or modal particles. I argue that, based on evidence from corpus examples, *kadhaalik* has developed a discourse marker status, whereby its two morphological parts have grammaticalised into a single semantic unit. In this section I discuss the semantic contribution of *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker.

<sup>116</sup> I have excluded the *kaaf* with the dual forms since these are already very rarely used in the corpus on their own. I have also excluded the possibility of the *kaaf* prefixed to the basic demonstrative *dhaa* since, as mentioned before, uses of this demonstrative on its own are more associated with classical texts. In MSA, the use of *kadhaa* has been reduced to the meaning of “such” as in “I bought *kadhaa wa kadhaa*” (such and such) where the referent is deliberately left vague.

<sup>117</sup> See also Nicolle (1998) for a relevance-theoretic perspective on grammaticalisation.

Relevance theoretic research has been interested in discourse markers in relation to other theoretical issues such as the conceptual-procedural distinction and truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning<sup>118</sup>. According to Blakemore (2002), the main difference between previous approaches to discourse markers and the relevance-theoretic approach is that the latter considers that discourse markers contribute directly to the relevance of linguistic communication rather than considering them as merely marking connections in discourse. The difference is not just terminological, but it is rooted in the relevance-theoretic view of communication and how human cognitive processes work.

For the purpose of the argument here, I base my view of *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker on these main assumptions:

- Some discourse markers encode procedural information.
- Some discourse markers do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance.
- Some discourse markers have developed from other linguistic items in a process of pragmaticalisation.

Taking into consideration the lack of any previous account of *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker in Arabic from a relevance-theoretic point of view, I argue that in some cases *kadhaalik* functions as a discourse marker, not as a demonstrative + a preposition (*kaaf 'al tašbiih*), and that in those cases it encodes a procedural meaning and does not affect the truth conditions of the utterance in which it occurs.

First, I explain the rationale behind the distinction between the two uses of *kadhaalik*. In order to distinguish between the two uses of *kadhaalik* in discourse, I propose three tests based on the most common features characteristic of discourse markers identified in the literature. Curcó (2004: 180) summarises those features as connectivity, being syntactically optional and being semantically optional. Accordingly, my three tests are:

- substitution of *kadhaalik* with another discourse marker
- removal of *kadhaalik* as a sign of being syntactically optional
- removal of *kadhaalik* as a sign of being semantically optional

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<sup>118</sup> See Blakemore (2002) and references within for a detailed account of the semantics and pragmatics of discourse markers from a relevance-theoretic perspective. For alternative accounts see Schiffrin (1987); Fraser (1990), Redeker (1991); Aijmer (2002), inter alia.

Despite the fact that discourse markers have been studied within a large number of frameworks, languages and corpora, there is still a lack of consensus regarding the classification of what a discourse marker is, as well as uncertainty regarding what is the definite set of discourse markers in any one language (cf. Fraser 1999). Arabic is no exception, as it is difficult to specify all discourse markers in MSA. In their computational corpus-based study of discourse markers in three languages (Arabic, English and Spanish), Samy and Gonzalez-Ledesma (2008: 3300) suggest four theoretical challenges which face any study of discourse markers: (a) difficulty in defining a discourse marker; (b) ambiguity in the grammatical categorisation of discourse markers (i.e. a discourse marker can be an adjective, adverb or a whole phrase); (c) syntactic ambiguity (i.e. does the discourse marker operate on sentence level or phrase level?); (d) discursive ambiguity (i.e. one discourse marker can have several discursive functions in discourse). Although, they do not include *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker in Arabic, they identify a number of discursive functions<sup>119</sup> for the sake of pragmatic annotation. According to them, the discourse markers *'aydan* and *wa* (translated as *also/too, and*) in Arabic represent the discursive function ‘co-argumentation’. I propose that *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker also exhibits the same discursive function in discourse. Therefore, my first test to differentiate between the two uses of *kadhaalik* is to substitute *kadhaalik* with *'aydan*. Let us apply this to my original examples (2) and (3), repeated below:

(2) أذاكر في المساء وكذلك يفعل أحمد

'udhakir	fil-masaa'	wa	kadhalik	yaf3al	Ahmad
study-I(pres)	in-the-evening	and	kadhalik	do-he(pres)	Ahmad

I study in the evening and Ahmad does the same.

(3) قال المدير أن غدا عطلة وأعلن كذلك عن زيادة في المرتبات

qaal	'al-mudiir	'an	ḡadan	3uṭlah	wa	'a3lan
say-he (past)	the-manager	that	tomorrow	holiday	and	announce-he(past)
kadhalik	3an	ziyaadah	fil-murattabaat			
kadhalik	about	increase	in-the-wages			

<sup>119</sup> They define 16 different discursive functions which represent reasoning strategies or ‘‘the verbalisation of certain mental operations’’. Among those are topicalisation, generalisation, co-argumentation, contra-argumentation, cause, condition, purpose, reformulation, etc. (Samy and Gonzalez-Ledesma 2008: 3301).



The manager said that tomorrow is a holiday and he also announced an increase in wages.

If we substitute *kadhaalik* with 'ayḍan in (2) the result will be unacceptable (as indicated by the asterisk), whereas (3) accepts the substitution with only a slight difference in meaning.

(2) a. \*أذاكر في المساء و أيضا يفعل أحمد \*

(3) a. قال المدير أن غدا عطلة وأعلن أيضا عن زيادة في المرتبات

Similarly, compare the corpus examples below, where (32) and (33) represent *kadhaalik* as a demonstrative, and (34) and (35) represent *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker.

(32) ومن جانبنا فإننا نرى أن وجود الديانة في البطاقة الشخصية تحمل في حقيقتها شبهة التمييز بين المواطنين فهي (Legal) والحال كذلك غير دستورية ومخالفة لنص المادة ٤١ من الدستور.

wa	min	jaanibinaa	fa-'innanaa	naraa	'anna
and	from	side-our	so-part	see-us(pres)	part.
wujuud	'al-diyaanah	fii	'al-biṭaaqah	'al-ṣaḥṣiyyah	
existence	the-religion	in	the-ID card	the-personal	
taḥmil	fii	ḥaqiqatihaa	ṣubhat	'al-tamyiiz	bayna
carry	in	reality-ita	suspicion	the-discrimination	between
'al-muwaatiniin	fahiya	wal-ḥaal	kadhalik	ḡayr	
the-citizens	so-she	and-the-state	ka-that(mas)	not	
dustuuriyah	wa	muḥaalifah	linaṣ	'al-maadah	
constitutional	and	contradictory	to-statement	the-article	
waḥid	wa	'arba3iin	min	'al-dustuur	
one	and	forty	from	the-constitution	

From our view, we see that the presence of religion in the personal ID carries in fact the suspicion of discriminating between citizens, therefore as the case stays like that it is unconstitutional and runs against the article number 41 of the constitution.

(33) فالزّي الفاحش موضّة، وهو دعاية عن إمكانيات الفتاة التي تؤهلها للزواج! ثم إن كل الفتيات يلبسن كذلك، ولن يعيبه (Fiction) أحد على ابنتي

fal-ziyy	'al-faahṣiṣ	muuḍah	wa	huwa	da3aayah
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the-dress	the-indecent	fashionable	and	he	propaganda
3an about	'imkaaniyyaat qualifications	'al-fataah the-girl	'allatii which	tu'ahiluhaa l qualify-her	il-zawaaj to-marriage
thumma then	'inna part.	kul all	'al-fatayaat the-girls	yalbisna wear-them	kadhalik ka-that(mas)
wa and	lan not	yu3iibuhu criticise	'ahad one	3alaa on	'ibnatii daughter-my

Indecent clothes are fashionable, as it advertises the girl's qualifications which make her suitable for marriage! And all girls dress like that, so no one will criticise my daughter.

واغتيال الحريري في انفجار ضخم استهدف موكبه بعد ظهر الإثنين ١٤-٢-٢٠٠٥ قرب فندق سان جورج بضاحية (Political Debate) بيروت الغربية . وأسفر الهجوم كذلك عن مقتل تسعة أشخاص

wa and	'uḡtiil assassinated	Al Hariry Al Hariry	fii in	'infijaar explosion	ḍaḥm huge	'istahdaf targeting
mawkibahu procession-his	ba3da after		ḍuḥr noon	'al-'ithnayn the-Monday	14-2-2005 14-2-2005	qurba near
funduq hotel	saan saint	juurj George	biḍaaḥiyat in-neighbourhood	bairuut Beirut	'al- ḡarbiyah the-west	
wa and	asfar result	'al-hujuum the-attack	kadhalik kadhalik	3an of	maqtal death	
tis3at nine	'aṣḥaaṣ people					

And Al-Hariry was assassinated in a huge explosion that targeted his procession on Monday 15-2-2005 afternoon near San George Hotel in western Beirut. The attack also resulted in the death of 9 other people.

(Business News) التنسيق بين القطاع الهندسي والإدارة العليا، وكذلك بينه وبين قطاع التسويق والمبيعات (35)

'al-tansiiq the-coordination	bayna between	'al-qiṭaa3 the-sector	'al-handasiy the-engineering	wal- and
'idaarah the-management	'al-3ulyaa the-high	wa kadhalik and kadhalik	baynahu between-him	wa and
bayna between	qiṭaa3 sector	'al-taswiiq the-marketing	wal-mabii3aat and-the-sales	

Coordination between the engineering sector and high management, as well as between it and the marketing and sales sector.

Applying the same test, the substitution of *kadhaalik* with another discourse marker results in meaning disruption in (32) and (33), while in (34) and (35), the substitution works:

(32) a. ومن جانبنا فإننا نرى أن وجود الديانة في البطاقة الشخصية تحمل في حقيقتها شبهة التمييز بين المواطنين فهي  
والحال **كذلك** غير دستورية ومخالفة لنص المادة ٤١ من الدستور.

(32) b. \* ومن جانبنا فإننا نرى أن وجود الديانة في البطاقة الشخصية تحمل في حقيقتها شبهة التمييز بين المواطنين فهي  
والحال **أيضا** غير دستورية ومخالفة لنص المادة ٤١ من الدستور.

(33) a. فالزي الفاحش موضحة، وهو دعاية عن إمكانيات الفتاة التي تؤهلها للزواج! ثم إن كل الفتيات يلبسن **كذلك**،

(33) b. \* فالزي الفاحش موضحة، وهو دعاية عن إمكانيات الفتاة التي تؤهلها للزواج! ثم إن كل الفتيات يلبسن **أيضا**،

(34) a. واغتيل الحريري في انفجار ضخم ... وأسفر الهجوم **كذلك** عن مقتل تسعة أشخاص

(34) b. واغتيل الحريري في انفجار ضخم ... وأسفر الهجوم **أيضا** عن مقتل تسعة أشخاص

(35) a. التنسيق بين القطاع الهندسي والإدارة العليا، **وكذلك** بينه وبين قطاع التسويق والمبيعات

(35) b. التنسيق بين القطاع الهندسي والإدارة العليا، **وأيضا** بينه وبين قطاع التسويق والمبيعات

In the examples where the substitution does not work, the problem lies in the loss of the deictic element in *kadhaalik* which is needed to arrive at the proposition expressed. In these cases then, *kadhaalik* does not function as a discourse marker but is a straightforward use of the distal demonstrative *dhalik* with the *kaaf* for simile.

If a discourse marker is to be considered syntactically optional, then its removal from a sentence would not affect the grammaticality of that sentence where it occurs. This is the second test I apply to my corpus examples. Again, in the first two examples which I argue represent the use of *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker, the deletion of this item does not result in any syntactic issues. But the same does not apply in the other two examples, which I take to represent the use of *kadhaalik* as a demonstrative.

(32) a. ومن جانبنا فإننا نرى أن وجود الديانة في البطاقة الشخصية تحمل في حقيقتها شبهة التمييز بين المواطنين فهي  
والحال **كذلك** غير دستورية ومخالفة لنص المادة ٤١ من الدستور.

ومن جانبنا فإننا نرى أن وجود الديانة في البطاقة الشخصية تحمل في حقيقتها شبهة التمييز بين المواطنين فهي \* c. (32) والحال غير دستورية ومخالفة لنص المادة ٤١ من الدستور.

فالزي الفاحش موضئة، وهو دعاية عن إمكانيات الفتاة التي تؤهلها للزواج! ثم إن كل الفتيات يلبسن كذلك، a. (33)

فالزي الفاحش موضئة، وهو دعاية عن إمكانيات الفتاة التي تؤهلها للزواج! ثم إن كل الفتيات يلبسن ، \* c. (33)

واغتيل الحريري في انفجار ضخم ... وأسفر الهجوم كذلك عن مقتل تسعة أشخاص a. (34)

واغتيل الحريري في انفجار ضخم ... وأسفر الهجوم عن مقتل تسعة أشخاص c. (34)

التنسيق بين القطاع الهندسي والإدارة العليا، وكذلك بينه وبين قطاع التسويق والمبيعات a. (35)

التنسيق بين القطاع الهندسي والإدارة العليا، وبينه وبين قطاع التسويق والمبيعات c. (35)

The same syntactic incompleteness exhibited in examples (32b) and (33b) is mirrored by a semantic incompleteness as a result of the deletion of *kadhaalik*. However, the removal of *kadhaalik* in (34c) and (35c) does not affect the truth-conditions of the utterance, hence it is semantically optional as in the third test, and it is a sign that it functions as a discourse marker here. (34a) and (34c), for example, both communicate the proposition (34d) below:

(34) c. Al Hariry was assassinated in a huge explosion and the attack resulted in the death of 9 people.

The question, then, is what is the meaning encoded by *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker? Blakemore's original definition of discourse connectives<sup>120</sup> is that they are "expressions that constrain the interpretation of the utterances that contain them by virtue of the inferential connections that they express" (1987: 105). Within the framework of relevance theory, the existence of such expressions is understandable as they mainly function to minimise processing effort. Within coherence theories, this has been explained in terms of discourse markers essentially making coherence relations in discourse explicit. One point of intersection between the two theoretical approaches is the evidence from corpus-based psycholinguistic experimentation which shows that discourse markers have a direct effect on

<sup>120</sup> These expressions have been called several things in the literature, including discourse 'markers', 'connectives', 'particles', 'operators', etc. In some cases it is only a terminological difference, while in others there are more serious issues behind the classification. For further discussion see Schourup (1999) and Blakemore (2002).

the hearers' attentional processes (Redeker 1991<sup>121</sup>; 2006). Whatever the theoretical framework, Redeker's definition below could be taken as the starting point:

A discourse operator is a word or phrase – for instance, a conjunction, adverbial, comment clause, interjection- that is uttered with the primary function of bringing to the listener's attention a particular kind of linkage of the upcoming utterance with the immediate discourse context. (Redeker 1991: 1168)

Characterising the semantic and pragmatic behaviour of discourse markers within a relevance-theoretic account leads to a better understanding of how they work in discourse. They constrain the interpretation of the utterances in which they occur by virtue of their encoded semantics, which can be procedural or conceptual or both<sup>122</sup>, in a way that reduces processing efforts and guide the hearer to arrive at the optimally relevant interpretation.

I have argued so far that in its non-truth-conditional uses *kadhaalik* functions as a discourse marker which encodes procedural constraints on the interpretation of the utterance in which it occurs. I have also argued that *kadhaalik* seems to signal a procedure of mental reasoning that expresses a relation of co-argumentation. In relevance-theoretic terms, Blakemore (1987) tried to capture this notion of co-argumentation in her procedural analysis of *also* in English. According to her, *also* and *moreover* are expressions used in English to “introduce additional evidence” (1987: 97). They do so by indicating that the two propositions they connect in an utterance are to be considered premises for one conclusion. Therefore, in (36a) and (37a), for example (quoted in Blakemore 1987: 97), *also* signals that the proposition it introduces is a premise, which is to be combined with the proposition in the preceding segment as a second premise, and that this licenses the derivation of the conclusions in (36b) and (37b) respectively:

(36) a. Susan has bought a tracksuit. Also she had salad for lunch.  
b. Susan intends to lose weight.

(37) a. Tom's here. Also he's brought his guitar.  
b. We can have some music.

Note that in those examples, contextual assumptions play a major role in arriving at the intended interpretation. And it is the role of *also* to constrain which contextual assumptions

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<sup>121</sup> In this study, Redeker digitally removed all discourse particles from the audio-recording of a 2-hour television talk. Then in the experiments, it was shown that the removal of discourse particles resulted in a delay in hearers' comprehension.

<sup>122</sup> See Moeschler (2002) and Fraser (2006) for arguments for the inclusion of both conceptual and procedural elements in the semantic encoding of some discourse markers.

are relevant to access in order to reach this intended interpretation. Therefore, *also* actually constrains the choice of context so that the proposition in the first segment is interpreted as evidence for a specific conclusion, then the second proposition is also interpreted as evidence for the same conclusion. This can be seen as the contribution of *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker in (2), repeated below, where it constrains the inferential route to proceed as follows:

(2) قال المدير أن غدا عطلة وأعلن كذلك عن زيادة في المرتبات

The manager said that tomorrow is a holiday and he also announced an increase in wages.

- a. The manager said tomorrow is a holiday
- b. The manager announced an increase in wages
- c. The economic situation is booming.
- d. The company is making a lot of profit.

Note that it is the conjunction of p and q in the utterance that warrants the derivation of the same conclusion. This is the gist of the notion of co-argumentation. In other words, the interpretation of p alone could go in different ways, positive or negative, depending on the contextual assumption accessed in the process. (38), for example, where the first segment is the same as that in (2), would be interpreted in a negative way, resulting in the conclusion that the company is going bankrupt.

(38) قال المدير أن غدا عطلة وأعلن كذلك عن رفق عدد من الموظفين

The manager said that tomorrow is a holiday and he also announced the firing of a number of employees.

Therefore, it is the use of *kadhaalik* which constrains the contextual assumptions to be accessed in the processing of p so that the conjunction of p and q would be premises in the same negative argument, leading to the same conclusion. This would explain the oddity of (39), for example, where the two segments of the utterance do not co-argue:

(39) أعلن المدير عن زيادة في المرتبات وكذلك عن رفق عدد من الموظفين \*

The manager announced an increase in wages and also the firing of a number of employees

Similarly, the interpretations of (34) and (35) would proceed along these lines, arriving at conclusions that might not have been arrived at on the basis of the first propositions alone. In (34), for example, the hearer will process the utterance with other contextual assumptions and

will arrive at some implicated conclusion about the political repercussions of the incident or its effect on the internal political scene in Lebanon.

Note also in the previous examples, as in (40) below, that *kadhaalik* is either immediately preceded by the conjunction *wa* (*and*) or *wa* comes before the main verb in the clause.

(40) واضح أن المظاهرات غير المبررة لا برامج لها. إنها تقوم لمجرد خلق حالة شغب طارئة للمستثمر المحلي وممانعة له في التوسع في استثماراته، وكذلك طارئة للمستثمر الأجنبي القادم إلينا

waaḍiḥ	'anna	'al-mudḥaaharaat	ġair	'al-mubarrarah	
clear	that	the-demonstrations	not	the-justified	
laa	baraamij	laha	'innaha	taquum	limujarrad
no	programmes	for-she	it-she	occur	for-just
ḥalq	ḥaalat	šagab	ṭaaridah	lil-mustathmir	
creating	state	riot	repelling	to-the-investor	
'al-maḥalliyy	wa	maaniṣah	lahu fii	'al-tawassu3 fii	
the-local	and	hindering	to-him in	the-expansion in	
'istithmaaraatuh wa		kadhalik	ṭaaridah	lil-mustathmir	
investments-his	and	kadhalik	repelling	to-the-investor	
'al-'ajnabiy	'al-qaadim	'ilaynaa			
the-foreign	the-coming	to-us			

It is clear that unjustified demonstrations have no agenda. They only happen to create a state of riot which drives out local investors and hinders the expansion of their investments, and also drive out foreign investors coming to us.

In fact, 122 occurrences of *kadhaalik* (55%) in the Arabic corpus are immediately preceded by the conjunction *wa*, while more than half of the remaining occurrences are preceded by the same conjunction but not immediately (usually before the main verb in the clause) or by the conjunction *kamaa* (*and also*). This shows that *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker has an additional function even in the presence of other connectives in the sense Blakemore (1987: 97) expressed as “introduce[ing] additional evidence”. This could be explained in terms of *kadhaalik* not only encoding that p and q are premises for the same conclusion, but also that the p is strengthened and q is a similar premise added to it to arrive at the same conclusion. In (2) above, the two propositions [the manager said that tomorrow is a holiday]<sub>p</sub> and [the manager announced an increase in wages]<sub>q</sub> are not just presented as true (which would have

been the case with just the conjunction *and*). The use of *kadhaalik* seems to strengthen the existence of p and to mark the addition of a similar proposition q, both are then to be used as premises for the same conclusion. This would also explain the acceptability of (38) and the unacceptability of (39) where the two propositions are not similar in the sense that both can point to the same conclusion.

Similarly, in (40) the two propositions are similar in that both can be used to arrive at the implicated conclusions (40a) and (40b) below. These conclusions are derived from the conjunction of p and q in the utterance and would not have been derived from the simple use of the conjunction *wa*:

- (40) a. No foreign investors will come to the country in question.  
b. The economic situation in this country will suffer.

As mentioned before, in this example, the removal of *kadhaalik* would not result in any syntactic or semantic disruption to the utterance, but the use of a discourse marker like *kadhaalik* would not have resulted in the derivation of the conclusions above if the utterance just used the simple connective *wa (and)*. In other words, the use of the conjunction *wa* would only serve to assert that each of the segments in the utterance is true, without signalling the need for extra inference. This characterisation resonates with the distinction Halliday and Hasan (1976: 244-250) make between the different types of additive cohesive relations performed by various linguistic items in discourse. In a nutshell, they distinguish between simple and complex additive relations, and the many semantic shades within such as ‘additive’, ‘negative’, ‘alternative’, ‘appositive’, etc. According to them, the additive relation expressed by *and* is a simple cohesive relation of addition, while “there are specifically EMPHATIC forms of the ‘and’ relation occurring only in an internal sense, that of ‘there is yet another point to be taken in conjunction with the previous one’” (1976: 246). This, I argue, confirms the co-argumentation reasoning which *kadhaalik* encodes. Blakemore (1987: 99) similarly says that “*also* makes explicit a relation which cannot be defined in terms of the truth-functional meaning of *and*”. The use of a discourse marker like *kadhaalik* is important in manipulating the mental processing of the utterances where it occurs, which would be different if these utterances were only linked together with the connective *wa (and)*<sup>123</sup>. In the

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<sup>123</sup> The connective *wa* itself can perform various pragmatic functions in Arabic discourse, but it is outside the scope of this study to discuss this further. For more details see Al-Farahidi (1995) and Yagi, S. M. and Ali, M. Y. (2008) and references within.



light of the principle of optimal relevance, the use of discourse markers such as *kadhaalik* is justified and warranted by cognitive effects. To recap, the proposed procedural semantics for *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker is as follows:

❖ If p and q are two propositions in discourse then:

p *kadhaalik* q → confirm the existence of p and add a similar proposition q so that p and q are premises for the same conclusion

Finally, Blakemore (1987: 97) identifies another aspect of the behaviour of *also* in discourse which, while relevant to the case of *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker has not been addressed in literature on Arabic. She maintains that *also*, unlike *moreover*, has the ability to interact with focus in an utterance so that the conclusions derived will depend on which contextual assumptions are taken as background against which the relevance of the utterance is determined. To illustrate, consider Blakemore's examples in (41) and (42):

(41) Susan also BOUGHT a chicken.

(42) SUSAN also bought a chicken.

The effect of *also* on the interpretation of (41) is a result of the interaction with the contrastive stress (capitalised) in the utterance. Blakemore argues that the processing of an utterance such as (41) requires that the hearer takes for granted the assumption (41a) which would only be relevant in the context of an utterance such as (41b). On the other hand, (42) requires taking for granted the assumption (42a) which would only be relevant in the context of an utterance such as (42b):

(41) a. Susan did something else with a chicken.

b. Susan stole a chicken.

(42) a. Someone else bought a chicken.

b. Tom bought a chicken.

The change in focus, represented by contrastive stress, manipulates the contextual assumptions which are derived as grammatically specified entailments from the given proposition (cf. Wilson and Sperber 1979). The same effect can be seen in the use of

*kadhaalik* as a discourse marker. Consider for example (3) and (3') repeated below, with the relevant assumptions the change in focus affects:

- (3) a. قال المدير أن غدا عطلة وأعلن كذلك عن زيادة في المرتبات  
The manager said that tomorrow is a holiday and also ANNOUNCED an increase in wages.  
b. The manager said something else.
- (3') a. قال المدير أن غدا عطلة وأعلن كذلك عن زيادة في المرتبات  
The manager said that tomorrow is a holiday and also announced AN INCREASE IN WAGES.  
b. Something else (positive) has been announced.

The assumptions that the manager announced something, someone announced an increase in wages, the manager did something are all grammatically specified entailments of the proposition. The interaction between *kadhaalik* and the contrastive stress (underlined) in the utterance is responsible for making certain assumptions more relevant than others in the interpretation process. Therefore, in (3) what is relevant to know is the background assumption that the manager said something else, while in (3') what is relevant to know is the background assumption that something else (positive) has been announced. This would also be mirrored in the contrastive stress pattern of the previous proposition [the manager said that tomorrow is a holiday].

*Also* in the literature (cf. Krifka 1999; Iten 2005; König 1991; inter alia) is identified as a focus/additive particle along with other expressions such as *too*, *even*, etc. Krifka (1999), for example, mentions that “additive particles are so-called because they express that the predication holds for at least one alternative of the expression in focus”. Iten (2005), on the other hand, stresses that such particles do not contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterances containing them. In his detailed study of focus particles, König (1991: 63) argues that they can perform one of three functions: (a) to be used as conjunctive adverbs; (b) to be used as coordinating conjunctions; and (c) to be used as quantifiers. *Also* falls into the first category of these uses, and I would claim that *kadhaalik* does as well. König further suggests that,

The essential point about the use of focus particles as conjunctive adverbs is the argumentative quality of the relevant sentences. This aspect of the meaning and use of focus particles can best be captured on the basis of Anscombe and Ducrot's (1983) ideas about the argumentative value of operators and connectives

and on the basis of Blakemore's (1987) theory that certain adverbs and connectives should be analysed as instructions to process the containing sentence in a certain context. What additive focus particles do [...] is to introduce another argument, in addition to that given in the preceding context, for the same conclusion. Or, to use Anscombe and Ducrot's terminology, the alternative proposition brought into the discussion by the conjunctive use of focus particles has the same argumentative orientation as the proposition expressed by the sentence containing the particle.

It is the interaction between the particle and focus in an utterance which determines the argumentative orientation of the proposition containing *also/kadhaalik*. This naturally follows from the relevance-theoretic view that an optimally relevant utterance must be worth the hearer's processing effort. Therefore, manipulating the relevance of the assumption to be accessed in the interpretation process is designed to make the hearer arrive at the relevant interpretation with the least processing effort<sup>124</sup>.

### 6.2.3 *haakadhaa*: deictic, anaphoric and discourse functions

This demonstrative form is rarely discussed in any detail in any book on Arabic grammar. In fact, when it is mentioned at all, it is only for the sake of documenting that this form exists in use with a simple note on how it is formed. This quotation from Al-ġalayinii (1993: 128) is a typical example:

ويجوز أن يُفصلَ بين (ها) التَّنْبِيهِيَّةِ واسم الإشارة بضمير المُشار إليه، مثل: "ها أنا ذا، وها أنتِ ذِي، وها أنتِما ذان، وها نحنُ تان، وها نحنُ أولاءٌ". وهو أولى وأفصحُ، وهو الكثيرُ الواردُ في بليغ الكلام، قال تعالى: {ها أنتمُ أولاءُ تحبُّونهم ولا يُحبُّونكم}. والفصلُ بغيره قليلٌ، مثل: "ها إنَّ الوقتَ قد حان" والفصلُ بكافِ التَّشْبِيهِ فِي نحو هكذا كثيرٌ شائعٌ.

"It is permissible to separate between attentional *haa* and the demonstrative with a pronoun, such as ..... . And separation using any other thing is rare, such as "*haa* it is time", and separation using *kaaf 'al tašbiih* as in *haakadhaa* is common".

Therefore, as mentioned before, in terms of morphological makeup, the proximal demonstratives (singular or plural, masculine or feminine) can be divided up into two

<sup>124</sup> Interestingly, König (1991) also notes that some focus particles have the ability to perform two functions: the conjunctive one, in the sense of *also/too* and the coordinating one in the sense of *and*; while others stick to one. I argue that this might be the main semantic difference between the two focus particles in Arabic: *kadhaalik* and *'aydan* (which I used as a substitute in the examples above). While *kadhaalik* can perform the two functions of conjunction and coordination in discourse, *'aydan* is only capable of being a coordinating particle. Due to space limitations, I leave the detailed discussion of this point for another occasion.

independent parts (attentional *haa* + root demonstrative) separated by a pronoun that refers to the same referent of the demonstrative (hence the grammatical agreement in gender and number). But another way of effecting this division is to use *kaaf 'al tašbih*. The following figure illustrates the morphological makeup of the ensuing form:




Figure 8: The morphology of *haakadhaa*

However, there is very little discussion about if and when this particular form has any discourse functions apart from being used as a demonstrative. This might be due to the fact that this form is one of the less used forms in Arabic. Even in the corpus chosen for this study, the number of occurrences of *haakadhaa* is very small compared to the other forms. The table below shows the breakdown of the number of occurrences of *haakadhaa* in the different text categories.

Text category	No. of instances of <i>haakadhaa</i>
Fiction	5
Literature essays	9
Political debate	3
General news	6
Scientific press	13
Sports press	2

Business news	1
Legal discourse	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>

Table 9: Number of instances of *haakadhaa* in the corpus

However, a closer look at the corpus examples, few as they are, reveals that *haakadhaa* is more than just a variant of the proximal singular masculine demonstrative.

### 6.2.3.1 A distinction

Looking at examples (4)-(6), repeated below, it seems that the contribution *haakadhaa* makes to the proposition in each of these utterances is different:

(4) لا تنظر إلي هكذا

laa	tandhur	'illay	hakadhaa
not	look-you(pres)	to-me	hakadhaa

Don't look at me like this.

(5) "كاننا سنموت" .. هكذا قال الرجل

kullunaa	sanamuut	hakadhaa	qaal	'al-rajul
all-us	will-die	hakadhaa	say-he(past)	the-man

"We are all going to die", the man said this.

(6) لم تسفر المباحثات عن جديد وهكذا تبقى مشكلة الشرق الأوسط بدون حل

lam	tusfir	'al-mubaah	hathaat	3an	jadiid	wa	hakadhaa
not	result(pres)	the-negotiations		in	new	and	hakadhaa

tabqaa	muškilat	'al-šarq	'al-'awṣat	biduun	ḥall
remain(pres)	problem	the-East	the-Middle	without	solution

The negotiations did not result in anything new, and so the Middle East problem remains unresolved.

In (4), *haakadhaa* seems to refer to an entity in the physical environment; in (5) it seems to refer back to the part of discourse preceding it; while in (6) *haakadhaa* does not seem to

'refer' to anything specific; rather it signals some kind of connection between the two parts of discourse which precede and follow it. Consequently, I argue that we should differentiate between three distinct uses of *haakadhaa*: it can perform deictic, anaphoric and discourse functions. Similar to the use of *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker, I argue that *haakadhaa*, as a result of a certain process of pragmaticalisation, has developed an ability to perform as a discourse operator as well as a demonstrative. Furthermore, I argue that in its anaphoric use, *haakadhaa* is mostly designed to be used as a tool for text deixis. I summarise my claims as follows:

- (a) *haakadhaa* can be used as a deictic referring expression, where reference assignment is necessary to arrive at the proposition expressed.
- (b) *haakadhaa* can be used as an anaphoric referring expression, where reference assignment is necessary to arrive at the proposition expressed.
- (c) *haakadhaa* can be used as a discourse marker, where reference assignment is not necessary to arrive at the proposition expressed.

By saying that discourse markers, such as *kadhaalik* and *haakadhaa*, do not require a process of reference assignment to occur in order to reach the proposition expressed I intend to differentiate between their uses as referring expressions and as discourse markers. However, it has been claimed that such discourse markers also have an indexical nature. This indexical nature does not refer to a specific entity as in deictic or anaphoric uses; rather it is related to the role discourse markers play in the overall coherence of discourse. Schiffrin (1987: 322), for example, states that "we need another dimension of analysis if we are to go further in understanding the contribution of discourse markers to coherence. I suggest that this dimension is deixis, and that all markers have indexical functions". Similarly, in one of the few studies of discourse markers in Arabic, Sarig (1995: 8) discusses the expressions *wa qad*, *la-qad* and *fa-qad* (where *qad* is an emphatic particle) and argues that "these words are in fact discourse markers, whose deictic function is to point out the text's rhetorical structure". Recall that within the framework of relevance theory, utterance interpretation is seen as a process of decoding and inference as human utterances massively underdetermine the propositions they express. In this process, referring expressions, such as pronouns or demonstratives, require a referent to be reached in order to arrive at the proposition expressed or the explicature of the utterance by following an inferential path that is often constrained by

both procedural and conceptual indicators. This proposition expressed then acquires truth conditions. However, some discourse markers contribute to the meaning of the utterance without affecting its truth conditions. They do so by acting as a “bridge” between referential units and the context (cf. Van Baar 1996). In relevance theoretic terms, if discourse markers ‘point’ to anything, they point to contextual assumptions and cognitive effects which are used in or result from the interpretation process, rather than to specific referents.

In the case of the discourse markers discussed here, i.e. *kadhaalik* and *haakadhaa*, this is reflected in saying that they behave as a single semantic unit where we cannot consider the root demonstrative on its own (*dhalik* and *haadhaa* respectively) as a referring expression which needs to be resolved in order to arrive at the proposition expressed. This is what Fernandez (1994: 21)<sup>125</sup> labelled as the difference between ‘explicit anchorage’ of the utterance in the context as encoded by demonstratives for example, and ‘implicit anchorage’ as encoded by discourse particles. In this sense, the ‘text’s rhetorical structure’ which Sarig (1995) mentions, may well be considered as an example of implicit anchorage rather than an explicit one. Aijmer (2002: 16) points out that “our knowledge about the indexical properties of discourse particles is uneven and incomplete”. I can only stress here that, as far as this study is concerned, although discourse particles are not considered constitutive elements of the syntactic/semantic structure of utterances in which they occur, they perform important functions in the cognitive processing of discourse. They do so by being indexical, but not referring, expressions which do not require a direct process of reference assignment.

### 6.2.3.2 *haakadhaa* in deictic and anaphoric uses

Let us turn to the different uses of *haakadhaa*. In this section, I start by discussing example (4), repeated below:

- (4) لا تتجاهلني هكذا  
 laa tatajaahalnii hakadhaa  
 not ignore-you-me hakadhaa  
 Don’t ignore me like this.

In a context where the hearer is clearly expressing an apathetic attitude towards the speaker either through gestures and body language or through the lack of any, the speaker in (4) uses *haakadhaa* to deictically refer to the physical demonstrations of the hearer’s attitude.

<sup>125</sup> Cited in Aijmer (2002: 15).

Similarly, the corpus examples (43) and (44) illustrate the same type of use, where *haakadhaa* is used deictically:

(43) (Fiction) ونظرتُ لأجدَ نظرةً في عينيها مكاره، فابتسمتُ وسألتُها: - لماذا تنظرينَ إليَّ هكذا؟ لقد اهتمَّ بي أخيراً (43)

wa	nadhartu	li'ajid	nadhrah	fii	3ainaiha	makkaarah
and	look-I(past)	to-find-I	a-look	in	eyes-her	sly
fa'ibtasamtu	wa	sa'altuha	limaadhaa	tandhuriin		
so-smile-I(past)	and	ask-I-her	why	look-you		
'ilay	hakadhaa	laqad	'ihtamma	bii		'ahiiiran
to-me	hakadhaa	part.	attend-he	to-me		finally

And I looked at her to find a sly look in her eyes, so I smiled and asked her: Why do you look at me like this? He finally paid attention to me.

(44) (Fiction) ماذا فعلَ بي هذا الفتى؟.. كيف أكونُ أمامَه هكذا بلا حول ولا قوَّة؟ (44)

maadhaa	fa3al	bii	hadhaa	'al-fataa?	kayfa
what	do-he(past)	to-me	this(mas)	the-boy	how
'akuun	'amaamahu	hakadhaa	bilaa	hawl	walaa
be-I(pres)	in-front-of-him	hakadha	without	state	nor
quwwah?					
strength					

What did this guy do to me? How can I be helpless like this in front of him?

In these examples, *haakadhaa* is used deictically, probably assuming an accompanying hand gesture, since it refers to an aspect of the physical environment. All deictic examples in the corpus are from fiction since *haakadhaa* will only be used in this way in spoken discourse. It is worth noting that in the translations, the expression “like this” is preferable due to the presence of *kaaf 'al tašbiih* (*kaaf* for similarity) in the demonstrative form. In its basic meaning, *kaaf 'al tašbiih* can be taken to signal to the hearer to interpret the referent as a physical example of what the speaker is referring to.

Turning to the second use of *haakadhaa* as a referring expression, it seems to be anaphoric in that it refers to a previously mentioned part of discourse. In (5), for example, *haakadhaa* anaphorically refers to what the man said in the quotation:

(5) "كلنا سنموت" .. هكذا قال الرجل (5)

kullunaa	sanamuut	hakadhaa	qaal	'al-rajul
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all-us will-die hakadhaa say-he(past) the-man  
 “We are all going to die”, the man said this.

Similarly, in the corpus examples (45) - (47), *haakadhaa* is associated with verbs of saying to fulfil its anaphoric function:

(45) (Literature Essays) وبدأ الناس يتحدثون عن حرب قادمة وعن اقتراب موعد هذه الحرب، هكذا كان الجد يقول

wa	bada'	'al-naas	yataḥadathuun	ʕan	ḥarb
and	start-he(pres)	the-people	talk-them(pres)	about	war
qaadimah wa		ʕan	'iqтираab	mawʕid	hadhihi
coming and		about	imminence	date	this(fem)
'al-ḥarb	hakadhaa	kaan	'al-jadd	yaquul	
the-war	hakadhaa	be-he(past)	the-grand dad	say-he(pres)	

And people started talking about an upcoming war and about the imminence of this war.. That is what the grandfather was saying.

(46) "حدث ما توقعناه" .. هكذا قال قائد الشرطة البلجيكية عقب حدوث شغب من جماهير الكرة المتابعة لمباراة "السويد وبلجيكا (Sports Press)

ḥadatha	maa	tawaqqaʕnaah	hakadhaa	qaal
happen-he(past)	what	expect-us(past)	hakadhaa	say-he(past)
qaa'id	'al-ṣurtah	'al-biljiikiyyah	ʕaqib	ḥuduuth
chief	the-police	the-Belgium	after	happening
ṣaḡab	min	jamaahiir	'al-kurah	'al-mutaabi'ah
fight	from	fans	the-ball	the-watching
limubaaraat	'al-suwiiid	wa	biljiika	
to-match	Sweden	and	Belgium	

“What we expected happened”.. This is what the Belgian police chief said after fights took place on the hands of the fans watching Sweden and Belgium match.

(47) "ما شاع عن شروق الشمس على الأرض من مغربها أسوة بما يحدث لباقي كواكب المجموعة الشمسية تأسيسا على (Scientific Press) ظاهرة الحركة العكسية غير صحيح من الناحية العلمية جملة وتفصيلا"، هكذا بين الدكتور مجدي

maa	ṣaaʕ	ʕan	ṣuruuq	'al-ṣams	ʕalaa
what	spread	about	rising	the-sun	on
'al-'arḍ	min	maḡribiha	'uswah	bima	yaḥduth
the-earth	from	west-its	similar	to-what	happen-he(pres)

libaaqii to-rest	kawaakib planets	'al-majmuu3ah the-system	'al-šamsiyyah the-solar	ta'siisan based	
3alaa On	dhaahirat phenomenon	'al-ḥarakah the-movement	'al-3aksiyyah ḡair the-opposite not	sahiiḥ correct	
min from	'al-naaḥiyah the-side	'al-3ilmiyyah the-scientific	jumlatan generally	wa and	tafsiilan detailed
hakadhaa hakadhaa		bayyan elaborate-he(past)	'al-duktuur the-doctor	majdii Magdi	

“What was spread about the sun rising on earth from the west similar to what is happening to other planets in the solar system based on the phenomenon of opposite movement is completely incorrect from the scientific point of view” This is what Dr. Magdi explained.

In these examples, three main features are in common: (a) *haakadhaa* as a referring expression is anaphoric; (b) in the translations, a demonstrative has to be used; and (c) the removal of *haakadhaa* will result in the ungrammaticality of the utterance and semantic incompleteness. Note also that what *haakadhaa* refers to in these examples are the segments of the text by virtue of being illocutionary acts of uttering in themselves. Hence, these segments of the text are all direct quotations. This particular use of the demonstratives is referred to in the literature as ‘pure textual deixis’. Lyons (1977: 667) has made a distinction between pure and impure text deixis. According to him, pure text deixis is the one which refers to a particular segment *qua* text, while impure text deixis refers to an aspect of the interpretation of that segment of text. The latter type has been re-labelled in the literature as “discourse deixis” (Webber 1991). My claim is that, as the examples above show, *haakadhaa* is mainly used anaphorically to refer to a particular previously mentioned segment of text as a text in itself.

The semantic role of *kaaf 'al tašbiih* in this form is less clear, as it is difficult to perceive a relationship of simile between two propositions p and q unless we think of q as an example of an utterance the speaker could have said. However, it seems that the morphological complexity of this particular demonstrative form is warranted by the change in word order. So, if we think of alternative syntactic structures for these examples, two options would emerge:

(45) a. وبدأ الناس يتحدثون عن حرب قادمة وعن اقتراب موعد هذه الحرب، هذا ما كان الجد يقوله.

(45) b. وبدأ الناس يتحدثون عن حرب قادمة وعن اقتراب موعد هذه الحرب، كان الجد يقول ذلك.

(46) a. "حدث ما توقعناه" .. هذا ما قاله قائد الشرطة البلجيكية.

(46) b. "حدث ما توقعناه" .. قال قائد الشرطة البلجيكية ذلك.

(47) a. هذا ما بيّنه الدكتور مجدي

(47) b. بيّن الدكتور مجدي ذلك.

In the first option, if a simple proximal demonstrative is used, it has to be supplemented by the particle *maa* (non-interrogative *what*) in addition to a pronoun suffixed to the verb to refer to the same referent of the demonstrative. Alternatively, if the sentence is to start with the verb in a normal VSO (Verb Subject Object) order, a distal demonstrative is more likely to be used which may convey remoteness in the speaker's attitude. Therefore, in order to avoid syntactic complexity or unwanted affective results, the speaker opts for using *haakadhaa* in a fronted syntactic position which seems to hit two birds with one stone: it trades in syntactic complexity for the less problematic morphological complexity, and it achieves a stylistic goal. From a relevance-theoretic point of view, this could be seen as a case where considerations of processing effort are being attended to, in addition to the speaker being faithful to his/her stylistic preferences in a way that makes it worthwhile for the hearer to process the utterance and arrive at the proposition expressed.

### 6.2.3.3 *haakadhaa* in discourse marker uses

Finally, I come to the third use of *haakadhaa*, that in which it transforms from being a referring expression where the referent of the root demonstrative *dhaa* has to be resolved in order to arrive at the proposition expressed, to being a discourse marker. In relevance-theoretic research, some discourse markers are seen as encoding procedural constraints on inferences, as Andersen (2001: 60) suggests that there is a "strong connection between markerhood and procedural encoding". As a discourse marker, I argue that *haakadhaa* exhibits a similar function to the discourse marker *so* in English. *So* has been extensively analysed by Blakemore (1987; 1988; 2002) as an example of semantic constraints on relevance. The general assumption underlying Blakemore's analysis is that discourse

connectives, such as *but*, *so* and *after all* guide the interpretation process by specifying particular properties of context and/or cognitive effects. Therefore, in her view, *so* signals to the hearer a specific inferential path to follow in order to interpret an example such as (48) below, which contrasts with the inferential path signalled to the hearer by *after all* in (49) below (2002: 95):

(48) a. Ben can open Tom's safe.      b. So he knows the combination.

(49) a. Ben can open Tom's safe.      b. After all, he knows the combination.

By virtue of its encoded semantics, *so* results in an interpretation where segment (b) is considered a conclusion (a contextual implication) inferentially derived by taking segment (a) as a premise together with a contextual assumption such as (50) below. *After all*, on the other hand, results in an interpretation where segment (b) is considered a premise which leads to the deduction of the proposition expressed by segment (a).

(50) If you can open a safe, you know the combination of the safe.

I take it that the inferential route signalled by *so* is the same one signalled by *haakadhaa* as a discourse marker. Incidentally, *haakadhaa* in this use is most likely to be translated in terms of other discourse markers. According to Hans Wehr, for example, *haakadhaa* translates as “so; thus; this way; in this manner” (1030). Without making any explicit claims about the type of encoding these expressions carry, it can be argued that they exhibit a common ‘logical’ relationship of the sort  $p \rightarrow q$  (premise  $\rightarrow$  conclusion). Therefore, the proposed procedural constraint encoded by *haakadhaa* can be formulated as follows:

❖ If p and q are two propositions in discourse then:

p *haakadhaa* q  $\rightarrow$  interpret p as a premise and q as an implication/conclusion

If we apply this to my original example (6), repeated below, it seems that without *haakadhaa* the hearer is not encouraged to infer that the proposition expressed [the negotiations did not result in anything new]<sub>p</sub> is a premise that would cause the proposition [the Middle East problem remains unresolved]<sub>q</sub> to be derived as an implication.

لم تسفر المباحثات عن جديد وهكذا تبقى مشكلة الشرق الأوسط بدون حل (6)

lam	tusfir	'al-mubaa	hathaat	ʒan	jadiid	wa	hakadhaa
not	result(pres)	the-negotiations		in	new	and	hakadhaa
tabqaa	muškilat	'al-šarq	'al-'awsat	biduun	ḥal		
remain(pres)	problem	the-East	the-Middle	without	solution		

The negotiations did not result in anything new, and so the Middle East problem remains unresolved.

However, it is noted that the omission of *haakadhaa* does not affect the truth conditions of the utterance as (6) is true if and only if the two propositions p and q are true.

If we look at corpus examples, we will find that *haakadhaa* as a discourse marker occurs in nearly 54 % of the cases (21 instances) while the other cases are deictic or anaphoric. In the discourse marker cases, *haakadhaa* is used for this type of constraint on inferences for the two types of relations identified by Blakemore (1988): causal effect and logical conclusion. According to her, the notion of 'consequence' which underlies the interpretation of propositions (p and q) linked by such expressions as *so* or *therefore* can be understood in one of two ways:

(51) q is caused by p

(52) q follows logically from p

In the corpus data, both types of consequence relation have been found. Logical conclusion is less frequent and restricted to scientific facts in scientific texts as the examples below illustrate:

وللشمس مجال مغناطيسي تبلغ شدته ٦ جاوس وتتغير أقطابه كل أحد عشر عامًا، فالقطب الموجب يصبح سالبًا (53) والسالب يصبح موجبًا.. وهكذا يعود الموجب ليبقى موجبًا مرة ثانية والسالب يعود ليبقى سالبًا مرة ثانية كل ٢٢ عامًا (scientific press)

wa	lil-šams	majaal	maġnaaṭiisiyy	tabluġ	šiddatuh
and	to-the-sun	field	magnetic	reach-she(pres)	strength-it
sittah	jaws	wa	tataġayyar	'aqṭaabuh	kul
six	gauss	and	change-she(pres)	poles	every
'aḥad	ʒašar	ʒaaman	fal-qutb	'al-muujab	yusbiḥ
1	10	year	so-the-pole	the-postive	become-he

saaliban negative	wal-saalib and-the-neg	yusbiḥ become-he	muujaban positive	wa and	hakadhaa hakadhaa
ya3uud return-he	'al-muujab the-positive	liyabqaa to-become	muujaban positive	marrah time	thaaniyah second
wal-saalib and-the-neg	ya3uud return	liyabqaa to-become	saaliban negative	marrah time	thaaniyah second
kul every	'ithnayn 2	wa and	3iṣriin 20	3aaman years	

And the sun has a magnetic field that is measured at 6 gauss and its poles change every 11 years, for the positive pole becomes negative and the negative pole becomes positive. So/therefore the positive becomes positive again and the negative becomes negative again every 22 years.

(54) ولكن لا يمكن توقع رجوع هذه الطاقات الهائلة إلى الشمس وإلى النجوم الأخرى بحركة تلقائية، وهذا فكل شيء (scientific press) يسير في اتجاه واحد نحو البلى والتحلل

wa and	laakin but	laa not	yumkin possible	tawaqu3 expecting	rujuu3 return
hadhihi this(fem)	'al-ṭaaqaat the-energies	'al-haa'ilah the-huge	'ilaa to	'al-šams the-sun	wa and
'ilaa to	'al-nujuum the-stars	'al-'uḥraa the-other	biḥarakah with-movement	tilqaa'iyyah automatic	wa and
hakadhaa hakadhaa	fakul every	šay' thing	yasiir move-he(pres)	fii in	'ittijaah direction
waaḥid one	naḥw towards	'al-balaa the-erosion	wa and	'al-tahallul the-degeneration	

But it cannot be expected that these huge amounts of energy will go back to the sun and the other stars automatically. So/therefore, everything is proceeding in one way to erosion and degeneration.

In these examples it can be said that the proposition expressed p directly (logically) implies the proposition expressed q as highlighted by the use of *haakadhaa*. In the interpretation process, *haakadhaa* helps in reducing the processing effort exerted by guiding the inferences the hearer is bound to make to those related to a logical consequence relation between p and q as formulated above. The contextual assumptions inferred in the interpretation process of

these utterances will be of a logical nature related to mathematical or scientific facts. Thus, the contribution of *haakadhaa* as a discourse marker in these utterances is purely procedural.

According to Blakemore (2003), hearers' intuitions about the various kinds of coherence relations in discourse stem from the cognitive drive to search for relevance in the interpretation of utterances. As for the speaker's role, it is in his/her interest to use the lexical expressions which help the hearer to arrive at the optimally relevant interpretation. In the examples below, the speaker uses *haakadhaa* as a discourse marker to activate those coherence relations in the form of a specific inferential path which identifies the proposition expressed as a causal implication resulting from the preceding proposition. The corpus examples below illustrate this second type of causal relationship signalled by *haakadhaa*:

وكذلك فإننا ننتوي إطالة دورة حياة المنتج عن طريق ابتكار استخدامات جديدة له، مثل استغلال تقنية التعرف على الصوت في تعليم نطق اللغات وهكذا قد قامت الشركة بإعداد بحثين تسويقيين عن اتجاهات المستهلكين.

(Business)

wa	kadhalik	fa'innana	nantawii	'iṭaalat	dawrat
and	kadhalik	so-part-we	intend-we	prolonging	cycle
<b>h</b> ayaat	'al-muntaj	<b>3</b> an	tariiq	'ibtikaar	'istiḥdaamaat
life	the-product	through	road	creating	uses
jadiidah	lahu	mithl	'istiḡlaal	tiqniyyat	'al-ta3arruf
new	to-it	such as	exploiting	facility	the-recognition
3alaa	'al-ṣawt	fii	ta3liim	nuṭq	'al-luḡaat
on	the-sound	in	teaching	pronunciation	the-languages
wa	hakadhaa	qad	qaamat	'al-ṣarīkah	bi'i3daad
and	hakadhaa	part.	embark-she	the-company	with-preparation
<b>ba</b> ḥthain	taswiiqiyyain	<b>3</b> an	'itijaahaat	'al-mustahlii	'al-mustahlii
two researches	marketing	about	trends	the-consumers	

And also we intend to prolong the product's life cycle by creating new uses for it, such as exploiting the voice recognition facility in teaching pronunciation of languages, and so/therefore the company has prepared two market researches about the trends of the customers.

وعلى الرغم من هذا فلم يتوقف العمل في المعهد حتى خلال الحرب، وإن انطلق من جديد بحبوية أكبر بعد توقف (56) الحرب في ١٩٩٥، وهكذا فقد أصدر المعهد في ١٩٩٥ الكتاب المهم "الأدب النثري للبوسة والهرسك في اللغات الشرقية" (General News).

wa	3alaa	'al-raḡm	min	hadhaa	falam
and	on	the-contrary	from	this(mas)	so-not

yatawaqqaf stop-he(pres)	'al-3amal the-work	fii in	'al-ma3had the-institute	ḥattaa even	ḥilaal during
'al-ḥarb the-war	wa 'in and part.	'inṭalaq start-he(past)	min from	jadiid new	
biḥayawiyah with-vitality	'akbar greater	ba3d after	tawwaqf stopping	'al-ḥarb the-war	fii 1995 in 1995
wa and	hakadhaa hakadhaa	faqad so-part.	'aṣdar produce-he	'al-ma3had the-institute	fii 1995 in 1995
'al-kitaab the-book	'al-muhim the-important	'al-'adab the-literature	'al-nathriy the-prose	lilbosnah of-Bosnia	
wa and	'al-harsak Herzegovina	fii in	'al-luḡaat the-languages	'al-ṣarqiyyah. the-Eastern	

In spite of this, work did not stop at the institute even during the war, rather it started again with more vitality after the war stopped in 1995, and so/therefore the institute has published in 1995 the important book “Prose Literature of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Eastern Languages”.

ثم إن معنى حقوق الإنسان يختلف من بلد إلى بلد، فمع أن البعض منفتح ومقر بإعلان ومبادئ حقوق الإنسان العالمية- (57) أو قل الغربية!- فإن آخرين يرفضونها باعتبارها دخيلة على القيم الآسيوية و معايير الحقوق الشرقية! وهذا ففي (Political Debate) الأسبوع الماضي كانت المفجأة بالنسبة إلى بعض وزراء ومسؤولي الدول أن...

thumma then	'inna part.	ma3naa meaning	ḥuquuq rights	'al-'insaan the-man	yaḥtalif differ-he
min from	balad country	'ilaa to	balad country	fama3 so-with	'anna part.
'al-ba3d the-some	munfatih open	wa and	muqqir acknowledge	bi'i3laan with-declaration	wa and
mabaadi' principles	ḥuquuq rights	'al-'insaan the-man	'al-3aalamiyyah the-universal	'aw or	qul say
'al-ḡarbiyyah The-western	fa'inna so-part.	'aaḥariin othera	yarfuduunaha reject-them-it	bi'i3tibaariha as being	
daḥiilah intruder	3alaa on	'al-qiyam the-values	'al-'asyawiyah the-Asian	wa ma3aayir and criteria	



'al-ḥuquuq the-rights	'al-šarqiyyah the-Eastern	wa and	hakadhaa hakadhaa	fafii so-in
'al-'usbuu3 the-week	'al-maadīi the-past	kaanat be-she(past)	'al-mufaaaja'ah the-surprise	bilnisbah according
'ilaa to	ba3d some	wuzaraa' ministers	wa mas'uulii and responsible	'al-duwal 'an the-countries that

The meaning of human rights differs from one country to the other. Some are open-minded and acknowledge the declaration and principles of universal, or say Western, human rights; while others reject it considering it an intrusion to Asian values and the Eastern criteria of rights. So, it was a surprise for some ministers that...

Even the uses of *sol/haakadhaa* which might be thought of as introducing a summary rather than expressing a causal or a logical relationship can also be accounted for within this proposal. In the example below<sup>126</sup>, taking all the propositions expressed prior to *haakadhaa* as premises, which describe the different roles the famous poet Shawky assumed during his career, and combining them with contextual assumptions about the various positions one can perform and how certain actions reflect personal and ideological attitudes, then one can arrive at the contextual implication that Shawky literally and ideologically moved from one position to the other.

في سنة (١٨٩٢)، توفي الخديوي توفيق، وتولى الحكم ابنه الخديوي عباس حلمي، فبقي شوقي على علاقة وثيقة مع (58) الخديوي الجديد، ينظم له قصائد المدح في مناسبات مختلفة. وبقي شوقي، ينسج على هذا المنوال، مدة طويلة من عمر الزمن، متجاهلا ما يحدث خارج أسوار قصر الخديوي. بل الأكثر من ذلك، أن أحمد شوقي، لم يتردد في هجاء القائد الوطني أحمد عرابي بعد عودته من المنفى، كما أنه تردد في البداية، في رثاء صديقه القائد الوطني مصطفى كامل. وأغرب من ذلك كله، أنه لم يتردد في مدح السلطان عبد الحميد، في إحدى قصائده. ولم يتبدل أحمد شوقي، أو بالأحرى ينزل من برجه العاجي، إلا بعد ما خلع الإنجليز الخديوي عباس حلمي، الذي كان يعالج في اسطنبول، وأعلنت أن مصر محمية بريطانية، وعينت مكانه السلطان حسين كامل، وبعدهما فشل شوقي في التقرب من الحاكم الجديد، حيث نفقته بريطانيا في سنة (١٩١٥)، وذهب إلى برشلونة في أسبانيا في سنة (١٩٢٠)، سمحت له السلطات الإنجليزية بالعودة إلى مصر، وحاول من جديد التقرب من الحاكم ولكنه فشل، مما أدى إلى انحيازه الكامل نحو الشعب المصري من جهة، ونحو الشعب العربي من جهة ثانية، فأخذ ينظم القصائد الوطنية والثورية. إلى جانب قصائده الغزلية. (وهكذا بين ليلة وضحاها انتقل شوقي من موقع إلى آخر، فأصبح شاعر الشعب، بعدما كان شاعر السلالة الخديوية).

And so, in a blink of an eye Shawky moved from one position to the other and so he became the poet of the people after he was the poet of the Khidivis.

<sup>126</sup> I translate the last part of the example only (between brackets) due to its length.

One final example for *haakadhaa* I want to mention here is where it is not simply used to signal the interpretation of q as a contextual implication expressed explicitly in discourse, but to question a contextual implication that is implicit in discourse. The following dialogue in a short story takes place between a couple who are fighting in a satirical way (I give the translation only):

- (59) A: إنني أهدرك.. فأنا يا سيد إياد غيرورة من الدرجة الأولى، ومثلي الأعلى في ذلك من يقطعن أزواجهنَّ ويُعبئنهم في الأكياس البلاستيكية!  
 B: تحسس عنقه: الحمد لله.. لسنا متزوجين بعد.  
 A: - أتظنُّ هذا يمثلُ فارقاً؟  
 B: - هرش رأسه: يا لها من تدبيسة!  
 A: - هكذا؟.. ماشي!.. تذكرُ كلماتك جيِّداً يا إياد، فسيجيءُ يومٌ تدفعُ فيه ثمنها غالياً.

- A: I am warning you Mr. Iyad, I am a very jealous person and my role model in this regard are those women who cut their husbands apart and bag them in plastic bags!  
 B: (feels his neck) Thank God we are not married yet.  
 A: Do you think this makes a difference?  
 B: (scratches his head) What a blow<sup>127</sup>.  
 A: **Is that so?** Ok.. remember your words Iyad, for the time will come when you pay the price for them.

In this example, it is interesting to observe the use of *haakadhaa* as a discourse marker in an interrogative sense. In the interpretation process, the hearer A has actually derived a contextual implication as in (61), taking the proposition “what a blow” as a premise, and a contextual assumption like in (60) in consideration:

- (60) If you consider something a blow, you regret it.  
 (61) Speaker B regrets his relationship with speaker A.

A does not want to explicitly articulate the contextual implication that she has derived, but she uses *haakadhaa* to point to it and question it. It is also noted that the use of *haakadhaa* is not obligatory in this utterance. In fact, it can be said that the particle *maašii* (OK) performs the same discourse function of signalling the derivation of a conclusion based on what has been said already. But the omission of both items does not affect the grammaticality or the meaning of the utterance. It is the use of *haakadhaa* and *maašii* that makes it explicit for the

<sup>127</sup> It is difficult to find an exact equivalent for the ‘colloquial’ Arabic word *tadbiisah*. It means that it is something you have done/been done to you and you cannot back out of it.

hearer that the speaker has actually derived the contextual implication, hence the relevance of the speaker's use of *haakadhaa*. This kind of example is similar to the example in (62) which Blakemore (1992: 139) mentions:

(62) A: Your clothes smell of perfume.

B: So (what)?

In this example, B is effectively asking what conclusion is s/he expected to draw from A's utterance so that it is relevant. Therefore, whether the implication is explicitly uttered or not in discourse, a proposition that is introduced by *haakadhaa* or *so* is interpreted as a conclusion by virtue of the procedural constraint encoded by these items.

### 5.3 A note on demonstratives and the interpretation of emphasis

I have argued in previous chapters that the semantic contribution of demonstratives as referring expressions in English and Arabic can be unified within a relevance-theoretic account of the demonstrative as encoders of a combination of conceptual and procedural information. The role of the procedural information is to constrain the inferential path of processing with the help of some conceptual clues in order to arrive at the intended referent. In this section, I discuss some uses of demonstratives in Arabic occurring in alternative syntactic structures other than the normal [demonstrative + noun] structure. These particular structures are mostly treated in the literature peripherally and collectively under the umbrella of the effect of emphasis. I argue that the interpretation of emphasis in these cases can be systematically accounted for if we take seriously the claim that referring expressions should be analysed in procedural terms.

In this section, I discuss the use of demonstratives in three alternative syntactic structures, as illustrated in (63)-(65) below. The common stylistic factor underlying these structures is that they signal an interpretation of emphasis of the referent.

(63) كانت الفكرة هذه جديدة للغاية

kaanat	'al-fikrah	hadhihi	jadiidah	lil-ġaayah
be-she(past)	the-idea	hadhihi	new-fem	very
This idea was very new.				

(64) أحمد هذا عبقري في الهندسة

Ahmad	hadhaa	ʕabqariy	fi	'al-handasah
Ahmad	hadhaa	genius	in	the-engineering

This Ahmad is a genius in engineering.

(65) السرطان مرض قاتل وهذا هو سر خطورته

'al-saraṭaan	maraḍ	qaatil	wa	hadhaa	huwa
the-cancer	disease	lethal	and	hadhaa	3 <sup>rd</sup> perspro
sirr	ḥuṭūuratuh				
secret	danger-it				

Cancer is a fatal disease and this is why it is serious.

These examples essentially make use of either an alternative word order of the demonstrative phrase, putting the demonstrative after the head noun, or an alternative structure (using the 3<sup>rd</sup> person pronoun). The manipulation of word order or lexical/structural choice for stylistic or rhetorical reasons has been discussed in Arabic literature under the term *ʕilm 'al-maʕaanii* (literally translated as ‘the science of meanings’). Abdul-Raof (2006:34) states that Sibawih, as early as the second Hijri century<sup>128</sup>, discussed in his *Al-Kitaab* some linguistic features which have rhetorical impact on the communicated proposition. According to him, “this is the first recorded reference to word order change that is semantically oriented, has pragmatic functions, and is a rhetorical feature of Arabic discourse” (2006: 34). In these particular cases, I argue that a relevance-theoretic view of the interpretation of demonstratives in Arabic helps us to account for the pragmatic functions they perform in discourse.

### 5.3.1 Noun + demonstrative

My argument in this section rests on the assumption that the pragmatic interpretation of (63), repeated below as (63a), is different from that of (66a) although both have the same truth conditions:

(63) a. كانت الفكرة هذه جديدة للغاية

kaanat	'al fikrah	hadhihi	jadiidah	liḡayah
was-fem	the-idea	hadhihi	new	very

<sup>128</sup> The Hijri is the Islamic calendar, the second Hijri century is equivalent to the 8<sup>th</sup> century AD.

This idea was very new.

(66) a. كانت هذه الفكرة جديدة للغاية

kaanat	hadhihi	'al fikrah	jadiidah	liġayah
was-fem	hadhihi	the-idea	new	very
This idea was very new.				

In Arabic grammar, it is necessary for a demonstrative phrase to have a definite head noun. Nouns in Arabic can be made definite in a number of ways, most commonly by adding the definite prefix *'al*, or alternatively by being suffixed with a personal pronoun, by being the first item in an *'iḍāafah* construction<sup>129</sup>, or by being a proper noun. That is why, when the noun in a demonstrative phrase is already definite by other means than prefixing the definite article *'al*, it is grammatically required that the demonstrative follows it instead. However, since the head noun in the DemP in (63) is already definite with the prefix *'al*, there is no grammatical necessity to change the order of the DemP, hence the perfect acceptability of (66). But such changes in word order occur in discourse, and the pragmatic effect that is normally associated with them is that of emphasis. I argue that a relevance-theoretic approach can answer two main questions about the use of such structures: how is the pragmatic effect of emphasis caused by the semantic content of the utterance, and why do speakers opt for using such structures in the first place?

According to relevance theory, every utterance carries a guarantee of optimal relevance. To be optimally relevant, the utterance has to be worth the hearer's processing effort, and it has to be the one that most suits the speaker's abilities and preferences. Since there is nothing grammatically prescribed as far as the structure in (63) is concerned, then it has to be the speaker's personal preferences which drive him to change the word order to communicate certain effects. By its nature, the Arabic language can be flexible in terms of word order, and Arabic rhetoricians have long studied these aspects of word order with regards to the relationship between the speaker and his/her audience. Al-Jurjaani (1972, 1905), for example, built his theory on the idea that 'deviation from the norm' is influenced by certain pragmatic factors. Abdul-Raof (2006: 100) further explains that:

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<sup>129</sup> Recall that an *iḍāafah* construction is commonly referred to in English as a "genitive phrase". It is a structure that relates one noun to another, giving a meaning that typically corresponds to English 'of' phrases (e.g. *The Queen of England* ملكة إنجلترا) or to the possessive suffix -'s (e.g. *the boy's book* كتاب الولد). In this construction, the first noun is made definite by being 'added' to the other noun, while the second noun has to be prefixed by the definite prefix *'al* (unless it is a proper noun).

word order is related to the deliberate and skillful manipulation of language by the text producer. It is concerned with the grammatical changes through the juxtaposition of sentence constituents in order to achieve different communicative functions, sublime style, and rhetorical effect.

Therefore, he clearly establishes a link between variations in word order and the speaker's personal agenda. The speaker could be aiming for achieving a certain pragmatic function, fulfilling a rhetorical need or simply aiming for a sublime style. In other words, an utterance communicates more than just a string of thoughts, as relevance theory has shown in its exposition of the role of inference in arriving at explicatures, implicatures and higher-level explicatures. Abdul-Raof (2006: 100) adds that "according to the rhetorical discipline of word order, a speech act does not only convey thoughts but also reveals the text producer's attitude that can be understood via the inferential ability of the text receiver". This is, of course, not only true of word order as a linguistic feature nor of Arabic as a language. Various linguistic features in English, from mood to intonation, can be said to have an effect on the speaker's communicated attitude towards what s/he is communicating.

According to this, the structure in (63) could be seen as a deviation from the norm expressed in (66) for a rhetorical reason. If we construe a context for these examples, we can see how the interpretation process would differ in both cases:

(63) b. و فجأة قرر أحمد أن يهاجر. كانت الفكرة هذه جديدة للغاية.

And suddenly Ahmad decided to immigrate. [The idea this] was very new.

(66) b. و فجأة قرر أحمد أن يهاجر. كانت هذه الفكرة جديدة للغاية.

And suddenly Ahmad decided to immigrate. [This idea] was very new.

In (66b) the demonstrative signals to the hearer to look for the intended proximal referent, helped by the conceptual information in the head noun (which is definite for grammatical reasons), as well as to maintain a joint level of attention to this referent in discourse which is expressed by a non-nominal segment. In (63b), on the other hand, the definite article itself in the head noun encourages the hearer to identify a unique referent while the demonstrative is used to refer again to the head noun. Since the procedural semantics of the definite noun instructs the hearer to retrieve a referent, and the procedural semantics of the demonstrative also instructs the hearer to retrieve a referent (which is the definite noun), then an effect of emphasis emerges. Rather than seeing the demonstrative as merely redundant, the double procedural instruction becomes emphatic (to the referent 'the idea to immigrate'). This is

where the other condition of optimal relevance becomes relevant. The use of the demonstrative does not only reflect the speaker's rhetorical preference, but it is worth the processing effort exerted by the hearer because of this rhetorical effect.

Looking into our corpus, however, all the examples of this kind of structure are the result of the grammatical necessity of putting the demonstrative in apposition to the noun because the noun is made definite by being attached to other pronouns or by being in an *idaafah* construction. Examples (67)-(69) illustrate this:

- (67) a. أَعْتَرَفْتُ أَنْ خُطَابَهُ يُدْعِدُّ شَيْئًا فِي أَعْمَاقِي.. سَعَادَةٌ خَفِيَّةٌ لَا أُدْرِي مَصْدَرَهَا تَبًّا.. هَذِهِ خِيَانَةٌ لِإِيَادٍ وَلِمَاذَا تَكُونُ؟..  
إِنَّهَا مَشَاعِرٌ فُطْرِيَّةٌ.. إِنَّ كَلِمَاتِهِ هَذِهِ تَدَاعَبُ فِي أَنْوَتِي إِحْسَاسَ التَّمَلُّكِ وَالسِّيَطْرَةِ

I admit that his letter touches something in my soul.. a hidden pleasure which I don't know its source. Damn, this is cheating on Iyad and why should it be? These are innate feelings.. [his words this] relate to my feminine feelings of possession and control.

- (68) a. A: كَلَامَ النَّاسِ يَا إِيَادَ.. لَا أُسْتَطِيعُ أَنْ أُخْرَجَ مَعَكَ كُلَّ يَوْمٍ بِمَفْرَدِنَا  
B: - بَرَجَاءَ: لِيَتَّكِبَ بِالْمَرَّةِ تَتْرَكِينَنَا مِنْ كَلَامِ النَّاسِ هَذَا.. - حَتَّى لَوْ كَانَ هَؤُلَاءِ النَّاسُ أَهْلِي.. أُمِّي وَأَبِي -

A: People's talk Iyad.. I can't go out alone with you every day

B: (pleading) I wish you could forget about [people's talk this].. even if these people were my family, my mother and father.

- (69) a. A: مَتَأَسَّفُ يَا تَاجَ رُوحِي.. يَا بَلَسَمَ جِرُوحِي.. يَا جَفْنِي الْقَرِيحَ  
B: - مَتَضَاحِكَةً: مَا مَعْنَى جَفْنِي الْقَرِيحِ هَذِهِ؟  
A: ..مَعْنَاهَا أَنِّي لَا أَنَْامُ اللَّيْلَ مِنْ فَرَطِ تَفْكِيرِي فِيكَ، حَتَّى تَقْرَحَ جَفْنِي وَتُورَمَ مِنْ شِدَّةِ السَّهْرِ

A: I am sorry, the crown of my soul, the cure of my wounds, my puffy eyelid..

B: (laughing) What is the meaning of [puffy eyelid this]<sup>130</sup>?

A: It means that I stay up all night thinking about you till my eyelids become puffy and swollen.

This structure has always been associated in the literature with emphatic effects (Buckeley 2004; Holes 2004, Brustad 2000; Ryding 2005 inter alia). In Buckeley's words (2004: 265) "the demonstrative may occasionally be in apposition to the definite noun, thus following it. This is to achieve an emphatic effect". However, it is not enough to explain what grammatical rules are required to achieve a certain word order. We need to be able to explain why this particular word order achieves certain pragmatic effects. Two features in these

<sup>130</sup> The speaker actually uses classic vocabulary in this expression for the stylistic effect of sounding 'learned' and 'cultured', hence the hearer's question actually asks about the meaning of the words not what he means by them.

examples are noticed. Firstly, with the exception of (67), these inverted DemPs are directly co-referring, i.e. the head noun has been explicitly mentioned in previous discourse. In (67), on the other hand, the DemP is indirectly co-referring as the head noun “كلماته” (*his words*) is indirectly related to “خطابه” (*his letter*). Secondly, within this inverted type of structure, the use of the demonstrative is optional as its omission will not render the utterances ungrammatical or incomprehensible. But instead of sufficing with the definite NP, represented by the head noun, the speaker uses the demonstrative as well. The use of the demonstrative and the processing effort involved in processing it must be offset by some contextual effect. Once again, the semantics of demonstratives plays a key role in creating a pragmatic effect.

In the interpretation process, since the utterance is perfectly understandable until the demonstrative appears, the processing of the demonstrative results in resolving its reference on the referent of the definite head noun just uttered and therefore an effect of emphasis emerges. In other words, by using the demonstrative, the speaker is drawing more attention to the head noun and emphasising it. It can also be argued that the use of a demonstrative in these structures warrants further inferencing on the part of the hearer by virtue of the procedural semantics of the demonstrative itself. Recall that, according to the account presented here, a demonstrative procedurally instructs the hearer to direct his/her attention to the intended referent as opposed to any other referential candidates. This encoded semantics, in interaction with other linguistic and stylistic features in discourse, encourages the hearer to make further inferences in search for relevance. That is, the demonstrative in these structures not only emphasises the definite noun but also all the contextual implications that may arise by interpreting this definite noun against other potential candidates. Therefore, the hearer may be said to infer the following contextual implications from (68a) and (69a):

(68) b. This type of “كلام الناس” (people’s talk) that A is referring to is useless/damaging to our relationship (as opposed to other kinds of people’s talk).

(69) b. This type of expression “جفني الفريح” (puffy eyelids) is so archaic and funny (as opposed to other more modern expressions).

In relevance-theoretic terms, this means an increase in the cognitive effects resulting from the use of the demonstrative and the implicit sense of contrast it communicates. Hence, the



relevance of such ‘special’ structures is translated into a weighing of effort and effect in interaction with encoded semantics.

In (67a), the case is slightly different because the head noun “كلماته” (*his words*) is indirectly co-referential and needs a bridging inference to be linked to its antecedent “خطابه” (*his letter*). Still, the emphatic effect that results from the procedural semantics of the demonstrative can be seen if we compare (67a) to (67b) where the DemP is reverted to its original word order, and to (67c) where the demonstratives is dropped altogether:

(67) b. *إنَّ هذه الكلمات تداعبُ في أنوثتي إحساسَ التملكِ والسيطرة.*

These words relate to my feminine feelings of possession and control.

(67) c. *إنَّ كلماته تداعبُ في أنوثتي إحساسَ التملكِ والسيطرة.*

His words relate to my feminine feelings of possession and control.

Both of these two utterances are perfectly acceptable. However, neither of the alternatives gives rise to an interpretation of emphasis because the interaction between the semantics of the demonstrative and the head noun largely depends on the word order in the DemP structure. The inverted structure alone works in the same way as if the speaker is repeating the head noun. Therefore, the pragmatic effect that results is similar to that caused by repetition. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 220) briefly discussed the pragmatic effects of repetition<sup>131</sup> as one type of poetic effects in language. According to them, in these cases “the task of the hearer faced with these utterances is to reconcile the fact that a certain expression has been repeated with the assumption that optimal relevance has been aimed at”. The reconciliation is achieved by considering the extra cognitive effects that results from the extra processing effort incurred by repetition. Therefore, in an utterance such as (70), quoted by Sperber and Wilson (1995: 219), the key in the interpretation is that “the speaker attaches a higher confirmation value to the assumption expressed than the hearer would otherwise have thought” (1995: 220).

(70) I shall never, never smoke again.

In the same way that “never, never” in (70) is similar in import to “definitely never”, as Sperber and Wilson argue, it can be said that “كلماته هذه” (*his words this*) in (67) is similar in

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<sup>131</sup> See also Ido (2002) for a discussion of the interpretation of repetition from a relevance-theoretic perspective.

import to “his very words” where the emphasis effect is apparent. Moreover, due to the interaction of the semantics of the demonstrative with the context, the inverted structure may also encourage the hearer to further infer an implicit meaning of contrast which would render “كلماته هذه” (his words this) as similar in import to “his very words as opposed to any other words”. Within this interpretation, it is reasonable to assume that the proximal demonstrative itself is taken to reflect a close emotional stance on the part of the speaker.

### 5.3.2 Proper noun + demonstrative

As seen in the previous section, such inverted DemP structures are motivated by the speaker’s degree of commitment to (part of) the utterance. A similar way of reflecting this occurs with proper nouns in Arabic. This construction is similar to the previous one, except in that it uses a proper noun. It is also a grammatical necessity in this case that the demonstrative, if used, should be in apposition to the proper noun. Otherwise, the much-less used classic construction “*haadhaa* + definite article prefix + proper noun” can be an alternative. Examples (71) and (72) compare the two cases:

(71) أحمد هذا عبقرى فى الهندسة

Ahmad	hadhaa	ʕabqariyy	fi	ʿal-handasah
Ahmad	this(mas)	genius	in	the-engineering
Ahmad is a genius in engineering.				

(72) هذا الأحمـد عبقرى فى الهندسة

hadhaa	ʿal-Ahmad	ʕabqariyy	fi	ʿal-handasah
this(mas)	the-Ahmad	genius	in	the-engineering
This Ahmad is a genius in engineering.				

What is interesting about this construction is that it is the proximal form which is most likely used, not the distal one, although this construction can be used to pragmatically communicate either emotional distance or closeness. This particular use of the proximal demonstrative is not unique to Arabic. A similar structure in English exists which also uses the proximal demonstrative with a proper noun. Ariel (1990: 204) discusses these cases as one of the ‘special’ uses of demonstratives which pose theoretical challenges for any framework, including her Accessibility theory. She also mentions that Hebrew “has the option of

prefacing proper names with a definite article” (1990: 205) but this results in a negative effect as it renders the proper name a common name. She further argues that, when a definite article is used in pre-modern English, the same effect is derived and quotes Jespersen (1949: 563) saying that “*the* may be used facetiously before men’s names, placing them in the category of pet names”. However, as seen in (71), using the definite marker with proper names in Arabic is not always associated with a negative effect. On the contrary, it can be motivated by a highlighted sense of respect<sup>132</sup>.

According to Ariel (1990), the use of a demonstrative as a high accessibility marker in such cases as (73) is another way of cancelling the familiarity associated with proper names, creating a negative connotation.

(73) This Henry Kissinger really is something.

She explains this negative effect within her theory by claiming that the demonstrative preceding a proper name is responsible for “cancelling the familiarity assumption associated with names”. Because this is unjustified, i.e. the referent is in fact familiar, then the use of the demonstrative as a raised accessibility marker creates the derogatory effect. Familiarity with the referent of the proper noun is the motivation for this kind of use, as Lakoff (1974) also maintains, in her discussion of what she terms ‘emotional uses’ of the demonstratives.

However, note that (73) can be used to communicate a negative effect as well as a positive one. For example, if preceded by (74) the hearer is likely to take (73) to communicate a sense of admiration, whereas preceded by (75) is likely to lead the hearer to interpret it as looking down on Kissinger:

(74) Kissinger’s role in ending the Vietnam war is impressive.

(75) Kissinger’s role in the bombing of Cambodia is shameful.

These two contrasting effects can be accommodated in a relevance-theoretic framework without the need to invoke accessibility hierarchies. The key, I argue, lies in two main aspects: the meaning encoded by the demonstrative itself, and the contextual assumptions and

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<sup>132</sup> We can find many examples of proper names from the pre-Islamic and Islamic eras prefixed with a definite article as in الشيماء (*Al-šaymaa’* – fem), الحسن (*Al-ḥassan* - male), الحارث (*Al-ḥareth* - male). These are used in the modern times without the definite article. However, Arabic surnames still retain the tradition of having the definite article. In English, the definite article can be used for stylistic purposes with proper nouns with stress (e.g. *This is THE Robbie Williams*), or without it (e.g. *The Ohio State University*).

inferences a hearer is encouraged to draw in the interpretation process. The important drive in this process is that relevance is a matter of cost and effect. Note that the use of the demonstrative in either (71) or (73) is not necessary, hence reference resolution is not an issue in these cases and the utterance can do away with any definite determiner. Therefore, it is the search for relevance that drives the hearer to make further inferences in order to reach cognitive effects. The procedural semantics of the demonstrative interacts with the contextual assumptions to create two effects: (a) to confirm the head noun itself and thus result in an interpretation of emphasis, and (b) to highlight the head noun (or aspects of it) as opposed to other referential candidates. This amounts to interpreting (71) as communicating the speaker's emphasis on a certain aspect of Ahmad's character (e.g. his scientific side), or interpreting (73) as communicating the speaker's emphasis on a certain aspect of Kissinger's character (e.g. his negotiating skills). However, while in these two examples the proximal demonstrative is used to convey the speaker's emotional closeness towards the referent, other examples reveal a different use for the proximal demonstrative.

Looking at corpus examples employing this kind of structure, it is no surprise that all of them come from fiction texts. However, all the examples use the proximal demonstrative for a negative effect. Consider examples (76a) and (77a) below:

(76) a. كريم هذا أغرب شخص في ثلثتنا

Kariim	hadhaa	'ağrab	šahs	fii	šillatuna
Karim	this(mas)	strangest	person	in	group-our
This Kareem is the strangest person in our group.					

(77) a. سأطاردك حتى في كوابيسك.. وإيادك هذا لن يحصل عليك أبداً..

sa'uṭaariduki	ḥatta	fii	kawaabiisik	wa	Iyaaduki
will-I-haunt-you	even	in	nightmares-your	and	Iyad-your
hadhaa	lan	yaḥsul	ʒalaiki	'abadan	
this(mas)	not	have-he	you	never	

I will haunt you even in your nightmares, and your Iyad will never have you.

In the context of (76a), the speaker has just read a love letter from Karim to her which took her by surprise. Therefore, the use of the demonstrative, apart from emphasising the noun itself and thus creating an effect of emphasis, may be said to highlight the speaker's attitude towards a certain aspect of Karim's personality, i.e. the mysterious aspect, which makes him

unpredictable to others. Similarly, in (77a), Karim utters this threat to his lover, who is in love with another man, Iyad. Therefore, by virtue of the semantics of the demonstrative and the internal contrast it creates, (77) may be said to encourage the derivation of more inferences related to the speaker's attitude towards the sleazy and sly aspect of Iyad's personality which Karim thinks is manipulating his lover. However, a question arises in these examples: why does the speaker choose to use the proximal demonstrative which would normally express a sense of positive closeness rather than negative distance? The answer most likely would lie in the grammaticality and acceptability of using the proximal demonstrative in these inverted structures. In fact, the use of the distal demonstrative instead as in (76b) and (77b) is both grammatically unacceptable and stylistically awkward:

(76) b. \* كَرِيمٌ ذَلِكَ أَغْرَبُ شَخْصٍ فِي ثَلَاثِنَا

Karim **that** is the strangest person in our group

(77) b. \* سَأَطَارُكَ حَتَّى فِي كَوَابِسِيكَ.. وَإِيَاكَ ذَلِكَ لَنْ يَحْصَلَ عَلَيْكَ أَبَدًا..

I will haunt you even in your nightmares, and Iyad **that** will never have you.

However, the distal demonstrative may be used to express emotional distance in the much-less used alternative structure in MSA as illustrated in (76c) and (77c), which reverts the order of the DemP and prefixes the definite article to the proper noun:

(76) c. ذَلِكَ الْكَرِيمِ أَغْرَبُ شَخْصٍ فِي ثَلَاثِنَا

**That** Karim is the strangest person in our group.

(77) c. سَأَطَارُكَ حَتَّى فِي كَوَابِسِيكَ.. وَ ذَلِكَ الْإِيَادُ لَنْ يَحْصَلَ عَلَيْكَ أَبَدًا..

I will haunt you even in your nightmares, and **that** Iyad will never have you.

This might be explained in terms of the markedness of the proximal and distal demonstratives in Arabic. Killean (1980: 177), for example, maintains that “in the Arabic use of deixis, the proximate demonstratives cover a much larger semantic field than do the distal demonstratives”. In these broad semantic fields, the proximal demonstratives seem to have the ability to interact with contextual assumptions to create various pragmatic effects. In examples which express a negative attitude, the choice of a proximal or distal form might not be as relevant in itself as the fact that a demonstrative has been used. The demonstrative

communicates to the hearer to maintain a joint level of attention to the intended (aspect of the) referent as opposed to other candidate (aspects of the) referents. Hence, certain pragmatic effects might arise from the interaction between this encoded semantics and the context.

The same line of argumentation can be applied to example (78) below, where the use of the demonstrative indicates the speaker's dissatisfaction with a certain aspect of Karim's personality.

(78) لقد شطختُ في تأمّلاتي.. كلُّ هذا بسبب خطاب كريم باشا. والله إنَّ كريم هذا لمشكلة

laqad	šataḥt	fii	ta'ammulaatii	kul	hadhaa	bisabab
part.	stray-I(past)	in	contemplations-my	all	this(mas)	with-cause

ḥiṭaab	Kariim	baašaa	wallahi	'inna	Kariim	hadhaa
letter	Karim	Pasha	by God	part.	Karim	this(mas)

la-muškilah  
part.-problem

I went far in my contemplations. All this because of Mr. Karim's letter. By God, this Karim is indeed a problem.

The interpretation of emphasis that is usually associated with this type of DemP structure is also heightened by the fact that the whole clause structure is the highest level of assertive structure that can be expressed in Arabic. The other variations of this structure would be as follows (from the least assertive to the most assertive):

(79) كريم مشكلة

Karim (is) a problem.

(80) إن كريم لمشكلة

Karim (is indeed) a problem.

(81) إن كريم هذا لمشكلة

This Karim (is indeed) a problem.

(82) والله إن كريم هذا لمشكلة

By God, this Karim (is indeed) a problem.

Abdul-Rauf (2006: 101) explains that “different word orders express variegated propositional attitudes and carry an illocutionary force, i.e. they lead to different inferable interpretations on the part of the addressee/audience”. It is interesting to note that the gradual change in the structures in (79)-(82) occurs by adding extra linguistic items which can all be argued to have a procedural nature. These include the affirmation tools *لِ* ('inna) and *لِ* (la-) in (80), the proximal demonstrative *haadhaa* in (81) and the term-of-oath *والله* (by God) in (82). If we follow the view that different stylistic patterns can give rise to distinct pragmatic effects, then the speaker’s choice of words becomes important in reflecting his/her assessment of the state of the hearer as well as of the context surrounding them. According to Abdul-Rauf (2006:101), for example, the pragmatic difference between the utterance in (79) and that in (80) is that the former is a reporting statement about the state of Karim, while the latter is a response to a denial about the fact that Karim is indeed considered a problem. Similarly, the difference between (80) and (81) is that the use of the demonstrative in (81) brings about the aspect of contrast which makes the hearer think about one side of Karim’s personality (that is related to the letter he wrote and the content of that letter).

So far, I have argued that the pragmatic effect that results from using the demonstrative with a proper noun can be accounted for by invoking the interaction of the semantics encoded by the demonstrative with contextual assumptions. However, the effect of contrast that is brought about by the semantics of demonstratives is not only related to their use with proper nouns. This can also be seen in other stylistic uses of demonstratives in Arabic. Al-Hashemy (1999: 112), in his study of Arabic rhetoric, states that proximal and distal demonstratives can be used to communicate the same pragmatic effect depending on context. He uses examples from Quranic verses<sup>133</sup>. For example, the proximal demonstrative in (83) and the distal demonstrative in (84) both communicate the important status of the head noun; while the proximal demonstrative in (85) and the distal demonstrative in (86) both communicate the despicable status of the head noun.

(83) "إن هذا القرآن يهدي للتي هي أقوم"

“Verily **this Qur'an** doth guide to that which is most right” (Al-Israa’: 9)

(84) "ذلك الكتاب لا ريب فيه"

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<sup>133</sup> Translation of Qur’anic verses follows the translation of Yusuf Ali (1990). The title of the chapter and verse number is given between brackets.

“**This is the Book**; in it is guidance sure, without doubt” (Al-Baqarah: 2)

(85) "هل هذا إلا بشر مثلكم؟"

"Is **this (one)** more than a man like yourselves?" (Al-Anbiya': 3)

(86) "فذلك الذي يدع اليتيم"

"Then **such [that] is the (man)** who repulses the orphan (with harshness)" (Al-Maa3uun: 3)

The interpretation of these examples would be clearer if we adopt a unified semantics for demonstratives which interacts with other contextual assumptions within a relevance-driven framework. In other words, the speaker's choice of a proximal demonstrative in (83) and a distal one in (84) to refer to the same entity (the Book, i.e. the Qur'an) can only be relevant in light of its semantics which brings about the element of contrast with other potential referential candidates in these contexts, and hence results in the pragmatic effect.

Similarly, the use of the demonstratives in (85) and (86) has a derogatory effect, which is reflected in the use of referring expressions such as *one* and *such* in the English translations, that is the result of the interaction of the semantics of demonstratives with the contextual assumptions available from the context. If we substitute the demonstratives in these examples with the 3<sup>rd</sup> person pronoun *huwa*, the utterances will be perfectly grammatical and meaningful, however the pragmatic effect will be lost because the element of contrast which arises from the semantics of the demonstratives does not exist. In the corpus example in (87), which I only translate to give a glimpse of the context, the use of the demonstrative to refer to a proper name with a derogatory effect goes to the extreme of even omitting the proper name itself and just using the demonstrative.

(87) وأقولها لك بصراحة: أنا لستُ نادمةً على أيِّ شيءٍ أفعلهُ.. أنا أحبُّ إياد، وأحبُّ أن أنعمَ بحضنِهِ الدافئِ وقبلايِهِ المُمْتعةِ.. أرايتَ مدى بجاحتي؟.. اشعُرْ يا هَذَا إنْ ودعني في حالي.. ألا تملكُ كرامةً على الإطلاق؟

And I say it frankly to you: I do not regret anything I do, I love Iyad and I enjoy his warm hugs and pleasant kisses. Do you see how bold I am? Get this you [*haadhaa*] and leave me alone. Don't you have any dignity at all?

The speaker has just mentioned the name of her hearer, but she deliberately chooses to use the proximal demonstrative alone in addressing her hearer this time. The Arabic structure [*yaa + haadhaa*] is not an expected one as it only uses the letter for addressing *yaa* without



adding any conceptual content other than that the referent of *haadhaa* is proximal. The speaker's intentional reluctance of providing his hearer with conceptual content, even an offensive one, could be said to create the derogatory pragmatic effect.

### 5.3.3 Demonstrative + 3<sup>rd</sup> person pronoun + noun

In the study of rhetoric in Arabic or poetic effects in English, the common underlying theme is that every speaker or writer has a unique style. Analysing the style of the producer can tell us a lot. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 217) maintain that,

From the style of a communication, it is possible to infer such things as what the speaker takes to be the hearer's cognitive capacities and level of attention, how much help or guidance she is prepared to give him in processing her utterance, the degree of complicity between them, their emotional closeness or distance.

The structure discussed in this section uses a demonstrative plus a third person pronoun before the head noun as illustrated in (65), repeated below. The pragmatic effect behind the stylistic use of this construction reflects how the speaker perceives his/her audience's cognitive capacity and how s/he wants to manipulate it.

(65) السرطان مرض قاتل وهذا هو سر خطورته

'al-saraṭaan	marad	qaatil	wa	hadhaa	huwa
the-cancer	disease	lethal	and	hadhaa	3 <sup>rd</sup> pers pro
sirr	ḥuṭūuratuh				
secret	danger-it				

Cancer is a fatal disease and this is why it is serious.

In this example, the demonstrative pronoun *haadhaa* refers to the proposition expressed by the previous segment of discourse (i.e. the proposition that cancer is a lethal disease). The use of the third person pronoun is optional as its omission will not affect the grammaticality of the utterance. However, its use results in a pragmatic effect of emphasis since the third person pronoun refers to the demonstrative which in turn refers to the proposition expressed by the previous part of discourse.

This type of structure is the most frequently occurring in the corpus as far as these alternative emphatic constructions are concerned. It occurs 31 times in the whole corpus, in

different text categories. The point I briefly discuss here has to do with the motivation behind using this construction. In other words, is it a grammatical necessity or a pragmatic effect that speakers are after? As corpus examples show, it is a combination of both. According to Buckeley (2004: 267), a pronoun of separation<sup>134</sup> is required in such constructions in order to “distinguish between a sentence and demonstrative phrase” when the subject is a demonstrative phrase and the predicate is a noun defined with the definite article. However, he also adds that “it is often used when a separation is unnecessary. This serves to emphasise the demonstrative subject”. Similarly, Hassan (1995: 244) explains that when used unnecessarily, a pronoun of separation “يكون الغرض منه مجرد تقوية الاسم السابق وتأكيد معناه بالحصص” (“is used for the purpose of merely strengthening the previous noun and emphasising its meaning with exclusivity”). But there is no explanation in Arabic grammar of how this effect of emphasis is generated. If we follow the relevance-theoretic approach to demonstratives which sees them as encoders of procedural meaning, this effect of emphasis can be accounted for in a systematic way.

In Arabic rhetoric, using the third person pronoun in this kind of structure is considered a way of bounding the meaning communicated by the proposition and making it more particular. Al-Hashemy (1999: 149) lists three uses of the third person pronoun as follows: (a) to express particularity (*'al-tahṣiṣ*) as in (88); (b) to express the confirmation of particularity in the presence of other items used for the same reason as in (89); and (c) to distinguish between a predicate and an adjective as in (90).

(88) "ألم يعلموا أن الله هو يقبل التوبة عن عباده" (88)

“Know they not that Allah doth accept repentance from His votaries” (Al-Tawbah: 104)

(89) "إن الله هو التواب الرحيم" (89)

“for Allah is Oft-Returning, Most Merciful.” (Al-Tawbah: 118)

(90) العالم هو العامل بعلمه (90)

The scholar is he who lives by his knowledge.

<sup>134</sup> Hassan (1995: 244) explains that it is called *ḍamiir 'al-faṣl* (pronoun of separation) because it “يفصل في الأمر” (“separates [between two cases in] the matter when in doubt”).

Only in (90) is the use of the third person pronoun grammatically necessary to render the utterance meaningful, otherwise it will be semantically incomplete. However, since the separation is unnecessary in (88) and (89), it creates a pragmatic effect of emphasizing the head noun *Allah* in both utterances. The procedural meaning encoded by the pronoun which instructs the hearer to identify the intended referent that has just been mentioned is superfluous. But since both speaker and hearer are positively seeking relevance in their communication, the use of the pronoun and the effort exerted in its processing triggers the search for extra cognitive effects. The use of the pronoun, thus, can be seen to confirm the existing referent, *Allah*, which has the same pragmatic import as communicating that it is Allah and no other.

Looking at corpus examples, we can see that there are cases where the use of a third person pronoun of separation does seem to be a grammatical necessity:

(91) *هذه هو اللقاء الذي يحمل رقم ٨٥ في تاريخ لقاءات الفريقين* (Sports Press)

hadhaa	huwa	'al-liqaa'	'al-ladhii	ya <b>h</b> mil	raqam
hadhaa	3 <sup>rd</sup> -pers pro	the-meeting	which	carries	number

<b>h</b> amsah	wa	thamaaniin	fii	taari <b>h</b>	liqaa'aat	'al-fariiqain
five	and	eighty	in	history	meetings	the-two-teams

**This is** the 85<sup>th</sup> time in the history of matches between these two teams.

(92) *أنا لا أبالغ.. هذه هي الحقيقة* (Literature essays)

'anaa	laa	'ubaali <b>g</b>	hadhihi	hiya	'al- <b>h</b> aqiiqah
I	not	exaggerate-I	hadhihi	3 <sup>rd</sup> -pers-pro	the-truth

I am not exaggerating, **this is** the truth.

(93) *وهذا هو الجدول الزمني المتوقع لمراحل إنتاج الجهاز* (Business)

wa	hadhaa	huwa	'al-jadwal	'al-zamanii	'al-mutawaqqa <b>3</b>
and	hadhaa	3 <sup>rd</sup> -pers-pro	the-table	the-time	the-expected

li-maraa <b>h</b> il	'intaaj	'al-jihaaz
for-stages	production	the-device

And **this is** the expected timetable for the production stages of the device.

In these examples, the third person pronoun *huwa* is used to distinguish between what is a complete sentence and what is a demonstrative phrase that still needs to be completed to be meaningful. On the other hand, the addition of the pronoun of separation in the examples below does not seem to fulfil a grammatical role, but is syntactically and semantically optional:

(94) *هنا هو واقع قطاع كبير من المدارس غير الحكومية* (general news)

hadhaa	huwa	waaqi3	qiṭaa3	kabeer	min
hadhaa	3 <sup>rd</sup> -pers-pro	state	sector	big	from
'al-madaaris	ḡair	'al-ḥukuumiyah			
the-school-s	not	the-governmental			

**This is** the situation of a large sector of non-governmental schools.

(95) *فبالرغم مما سمعه عن البحر؛ كانت هذه هي المرة الأولى التي يراه فيها بشكل طبيعي* (literature essays)

fa-bilraḡm	mimmaa	sami3ahu	3an	'al-baḥr	kaanat
so-despite	what	hear-he(past)	about	the-sea	be-fem(past)
hadhihi	hiya	'al-marrah	'al-'uulaa	'allatii	
hadhihi	3 <sup>rd</sup> -pers-pro	the-time	the-first	that	
yaraah	fihaa	biṣakl	ṭabi3ii		
see-he-it(pres)	in-it	with-shape	normal		

Despite what he heard about the sea, **this was** the first time that he sees it in a natural way.

(96) *هذه هي رسالة الشعر إنه سيف تدفع به الخطوب، وترفع به رايات العزة والكرامة* (literature essays)

hadhihi	hiya	risaalat	'al-ṣi3r	'innahu	saif
hadhihi	3 <sup>rd</sup> pers pro	message	the-poetry	part-it	sword
tudfa3	bihi	'al-ḥuṭuub	wa turfa3	bihi	raayaat
push	with-it	the-adversities	and raise	with it	flags
'al-3izzah	wal-karaamah				
the-pride	and-the-dignity				

**This is** the function of poetry. It is a sword in the face of adversities and with it flags of pride and dignity are raised.

(97) *هذا هو ما نقصده بمصطلح "الحضاري"؛ أي منها متحضرا للإسلام* (political news)

hadhaa	huwa	maa	naqṣiduh	bi-muṣṭalah
hadhaa	3 <sup>rd</sup> pers pro	what	mean-us	with-expression
'al-ḥadaarii	'ayy	manhajan	mutaḥadīran	lil-'islaam
the-civilised	i.e.	approach	civilised	to-the-Islam

**This is** what we mean with the expression “the civilised”, i.e. a civilised approach to Islam.

Whether the demonstrative is anaphoric as in (94), referring back to the proposition expressed by the previous discourse, or deictic as in (95), referring to an entity in the surrounding physical context, or cataphoric as in (96) and (97), referring forward to what will be uttered after the demonstrative, the use of a third person pronoun in these examples is optional. In his discussion of the various rhetorical means in Arabic, Abdul-Raof (2006: 93) suggests that the effective communicator “needs to be able to appreciate the context of situation that decides the stylistic patterns required”. In these utterances, the speaker makes an intentional use of the third person pronoun in order to create a special pragmatic effect for his/her hearer. Again, it is the weighing of effort and effect that makes it possible to account for the creation of these effects in discourse. The procedural semantics encoded by the pronoun leads to the effect of confirming the existing referent (the referent of the demonstrative) and thus is relevant for the hearer because it adds a cognitive effect, and it is relevant for the speaker because it reflects his communicative preferences. In terms of Arabic rhetoric, Al-Hashemy (1999: 141) eloquently describes the function of such rhetorical structures in language as:

اعلم إن معرفة خواص التراكيب وأسرار الأساليب وما فيها من دقيق الوضع وباهر الصنع ولطائف المزايا يسترعي لبيك إلى أن التقييد بأحد الأنواع الآتية يكون لزيادة الفائدة وتقويتها عند السامع لما هو معروف من أن الحكم كلما ازدادت قيوده ازداد إيضاحا وتخصيصا وحينئذ تكون فائدته أتم وأكمل.

“Note that knowing the details of the structures and the secrets of style, including all the accurate and elegant uses, attracts your attention to the fact that making a proposition ‘bound’ in one of these ways is for the purpose of making it more useful and forceful to the hearer. For it is known that when a proposition is more ‘bound’ it becomes clearer and more ‘particular’ and so its usefulness is more complete”.

It appears that Arabic rhetoricians are well aware of what the use of such rhetorical structures reflects about the relationship between speaker and hearer. But explaining these rhetorical

effects in relevance-theoretic terms sets them in a better cognitive light. This not only explains why speakers choose to use these structures, but also how the hearers are encouraged by them to arrive at certain pragmatic effects.

#### 6.4 Summary

I have presented in this chapter a procedural analysis of some demonstrative forms in MSA. First, I argued that the encoded procedural semantics of attentional *haa* captures the notion of attention in the form of a constraint on the derivation of higher-level explicatures. Second, I argued that a distinction should be made between the use of *kadhaalik* as a demonstrative, consisting of *dhalik*, prefixed with the *kaaf* for simile (*kaaf 'al tašbiih*), and as a discourse marker. I further argued that the semantic contribution of both *kaaf 'al tašbiih* and *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker can be systematically accounted for in procedural terms, which sets constraints on the interpretation of the two parts of the utterances they link. Third, I argued that a distinction should be made between the different uses of the demonstrative form *haakadhaa*, which can function deictically, anaphorically or as a discourse marker. As a discourse marker, I argued that it encodes a procedural constraint which tells the hearer to interpret the preceding proposition as a premise and the following proposition as a conclusion. Finally, I discussed using Arabic demonstratives in some alternative syntactic structures which have been labelled in the literature as having rhetorical effects of emphasis. I argued that by taking the procedural semantics of the demonstratives seriously, we can systematically account for this interpretation of emphasis within a relevance-based pragmatic theory.

## Chapter 7. Conclusion

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### 7.1 Summary

Demonstratives are pervasive linguistic items which rank high in frequency counts and cover a wide range of uses in a large number of world languages. Therefore, interest in demonstratives came from different disciplines, including philosophy, linguistics, language acquisition and cognitive science. However, Himmelmann (1996: 205) has claimed that “little is known regarding the similarities and differences in the use of demonstratives exhibited by various unrelated languages”. This study aspires to address this by providing a better understanding of the behaviour of demonstratives in the two unrelated languages: English and Arabic.

Lyons (1995: 294) defines reference as “a relation that holds between speakers (more generally, locutionary agents) and what they are talking about on a particular occasion”. Demonstratives are particularly interesting as referring expressions since they allow speakers a prime position in this relationship where spatial, temporal, cognitive or emotional factors can affect their referential choice. The main aim of this study has been to propose a semantic and pragmatic analysis of demonstratives in English and Arabic within the framework of relevance theory. I argued that the cognitive notion of attention can be seen as subsuming all the discourse functions of demonstratives in both languages. On the semantic level, I argued that demonstratives are better analysed as encoders of both conceptual meaning of distance and attention-directing procedural information, as both guide the hearer in the interpretive path. Within this view, I tried to show how demonstratives can contribute to both the explicit and implicit sides of communication by arriving at the intended referent to complete the proposition expressed, and by going beyond reference resolution to the derivation of extra inferences in return for extra effects. I have used corpus data from English and Arabic written texts to support my theoretical proposals, so that analytical work and theoretical hypothesising can be seen as complementary tools for achieving a better understanding of how demonstratives work in the two languages.

I also tried to further test my proposals for the semantics and pragmatics of English and Arabic demonstratives by extending the analysis to two further areas. First, I discussed the cases of self-repair in English spoken discourse, where a speaker uses one lexical item then repairs it to another. The cases discussed involved either using a demonstrative form then

repairing it to a definite article, or vice versa, or using one demonstrative form then repairing it to the other spatially-contrastive one. The discussion tried to shed some light on the semantic and pragmatic differences between demonstratives and the definite article in English. Second, I extended my analysis of the main demonstrative forms in Arabic to other demonstrative forms that are less discussed in the literature. I specifically argued for a procedural analysis of the forms attentional *haa*, *kadhaalik* and *haakadhaa*, which differentiates between their role as referring expressions and as discourse markers. I also discussed some alternative syntactic structures where Arabic demonstratives are used to create a stylistic effect of emphasis. I argued that such effects can be explained within a relevance-driven account. I summarise below the main findings in the three chapters that constitute the bulk of my research.

In chapter 4, I argued that demonstratives play a crucial role in aligning the discourse models of the speaker and hearer and that this should be reflected in their encoded semantics. This semantics has been proposed to be essentially procedural in nature consisting in processing instructions for the hearer to maintain/create a joint level of attention to the same referent the speaker is attending to. Following Diessel (2006), I take it that this notion of joint attention subsumes all the cognitive and functional roles played by demonstratives in discourse, whether spoken or written. I also argued that demonstratives also encode a conceptual component to help the hearer individuate the intended referent. The conceptual component is related to the concept of distance, i.e. specifying that a referent is proximal or distal on a distance scale. I argued that this concept of distance falls under the scope of the attention-directing procedural semantics. Due to the nature of drawing attention to an entity which implies withdrawing attention from other entities, the semantics of demonstratives naturally creates an internal contrast between the intended referent and other candidate referents. Therefore, my proposal for the semantics of demonstratives in English and Arabic can be summarised as follows:

- ❖ English/Arabic proximal demonstratives —————> create/maintain a joint level of attention to the intended proximal referent as opposed to other non-proximal candidate referents.
- ❖ English/Arabic distal demonstratives —————> create/maintain a joint level of attention to the intended distal referent as opposed to other non-distal candidate referents.



Through corpus examples, I tried to show that demonstratives can contribute to both the explicit and the implicit levels of meaning by virtue of the interaction of their encoded semantics with the context. When a demonstrative (compared to other referring expressions or to no referring expression at all) is not necessarily needed for assigning the reference, then its role becomes relevant on the implicit level. It can either highlight a certain aspect of the referent, or encourage the creation of weak implicatures, or signal a certain cognitive/emotional attitude towards the referent.

In chapter 5, I extended the analysis to investigate self-repair in the spoken part of the English corpus. I started from the assumption that a self-repair is motivated by the speaker thinking about the 'way' s/he wants to convey his/her message and how this relates to the notion of optimal relevance. I argued that self-repair between definite determiners reflects semantic differences between the definite article and demonstratives in English. I proposed that a definite article is changed to a demonstrative when: (a) the cognitive instruction encoded in the definite article is not enough to individuate the intended referent, or (b) the cognitive instruction encoded in the definite article is enough to individuate the intended referent but the extra spatial and procedural information is needed for other cognitive effects. I also argued that a demonstrative is changed to a definite article when (a) the cognitive instruction encoded in the demonstrative is not needed to individuate the intended referent, or (b) the cognitive instruction encoded in the demonstrative with the extra spatial and procedural information is not warranted by other cognitive effects. The analysis of corpus examples has also shown that emotional and/or stylistic factors play a role in motivations for repair. The discussion in this chapter tried to shed some light on the kind of inferences involved in production, especially the way a speaker tries to model the inferences likely to be made by his/her hearer which can motivate a self-repair.

In chapter 6, I extended the analysis to include other forms/structures of demonstratives in Arabic. I proposed procedural analyses for the forms attentional *haa*, *kadhaalik* and *haakadhaa*, which systematically account for their semantic and pragmatic behaviour in discourse. The main argument underlying the discussion in this chapter is that these forms have developed other functions beyond the mere reference to an entity. First, it was proposed that attentional *haa* encodes a procedural constraint on the creation of higher-level explicatures, describing the speaker's attitude towards the proposition expressed. Second, *kadhaalik* was proposed to have two different uses: one as a demonstrative attached to *kaaf 'al tašbiih* (*kaaf* for simile), and another as a single unit discourse marker. Within this

proposal, *kaaf 'al tašbiih* is seen as encoding a procedural constraint linking two segments of utterance together, while *kadhaalik* as a discourse marker achieves relevance via the cognitive effect of confirming the existence of the preceding proposition p and signalling the addition of another similar proposition q. Third, it was shown that the lesser used form *haakadhaa* is capable of performing deictic, anaphoric and discourse functions in discourse. As a discourse marker, it was suggested that the discourse function of *haakadhaa* in Arabic is parallel to that of *so* in English. Following Blakemore's (1988) procedural analysis of *so*, I proposed that *haakadhaa* achieves relevance by appealing to the cognitive effect of signalling the derivation of implicated conclusions. Therefore, the discussion in this chapter is consistent with the claim that pragmatic markers contribute to the interpretation of utterances in different ways (Andersen 2001: 63). While some are primarily analysed as devices for signalling intra-textual relations, others are related to expressing speaker attitude. I summarise below the main suggestions presented in this chapter for the semantic encodings of these forms in MSA:

- ❖ If p is the proposition expressed by an utterance:  
Attentional *haa* → speaker believes that hearer should pay attention to p
  
- ❖ If p and q are two propositions in discourse then:  
p *kaaf 'al tašbiih* q → interpret p and q as similar premises for one conclusion (e.g. q is an example/type of p)
  
- ❖ If p and q are two propositions in discourse then:  
p *kadhaalik* q → confirm the existence of p and add a similar proposition q so that p and q are premises for the same conclusion
  
- ❖ If p and q are two propositions in discourse then:  
p *haakadhaa* q → interpret p as a premise and q as an implication/conclusion

I also discussed the use of demonstratives in alternative syntactic structures, i.e. noun+demonstrative, proper noun+demonstrative and demonstrative+3<sup>rd</sup> person pronoun+noun. These structures, when not necessitated by grammatical rules, share a common rhetorical effect of emphasis that has not been discussed in detail before. I argued

that the semantics of the demonstratives in combination with considerations of relevance can explain the cognitive effect of emphasis.

## 7.2 Future research

Research in the field of reference and referring expressions can be approached from philosophical, linguistic, psycholinguistic, experimental, and even computational perspectives. Old questions are constantly being revisited just as new questions are constantly being asked. Fresh theoretical perspectives and intriguing corpus data will always keep this area of research alive and thriving. This study aims to be a small contribution to this ever-growing field. Yet, as always, due to the restrictions of time and effort one can possibly dedicate to such an academic endeavour, a few limitations will remain to drive future research.

One of the limitations of this study has to do with the size of the corpus used. Although it might be appropriate for the length and depth of this research, the need for a bigger corpus has struck me in more than one occasion. The first one is related to the discussion of self-repair in chapter 5, where I looked into cases involving definite referring expression. Due to the size of the corpus, the examples were limited in number and a bigger corpus would provide more examples for exploring more patterns of use. For example, when looking into self repair from one demonstrative form to the other, the corpus only provided examples of *that* being repaired to *this*. A bigger corpus would help in assessing how significant is the lack of any cases of *this* being repaired to *that* and the implications of this on speakers' strategies.

The discussion of self-repair is in fact an important step in the wider discussion of the kind of inferences speakers/writers make in production. Clark & Owtram (in press) suggest that the inferences made by writers about the inferences their readers are likely to make while reading are just as important as the inferences made by readers about the intentions of the writers. As far as self-repair is concerned, it can be seen as motivated by speakers making inferences about the inferences their audience are likely to make. While spoken discourse is more spontaneous and less planned than written discourse, speakers will be aware of the different inferences their choice of words can give rise to. In the example below, B's responses will lead to different inferences about politeness/rudeness:

- (1) A: Are you comfortable in this chair?  
(2a) B: I'm afraid not.  
(2b) B: No.  
(2c) B: Not really.  
(2d) B: This is the worst chair ever.

Similarly, the choice of a referring expression can affect the inferences a hearer is likely to make when processing the utterance. Compare (3)-(6):

- (3) I don't know why I have *a* sense of fear towards the trip.  
(4) I don't know why I have *the* sense of fear towards the trip.  
(5) I don't know why I have *this* sense of fear towards the trip.  
(6) I don't know why I have *that* sense of fear towards the trip.

Explaining the differences in interpretation between these utterances depends on the semantic contribution of the referring expressions and how it interacts with context to communicate implicit inferences of familiarity, detachment or vividness. A speaker uttering (3) then changing it to (5) or using the definite article as in (4) then repairing it to the demonstrative as in (6) would be motivated by considerations of relevance as to which inferences s/he intends to communicate to his/her hearer. Self-repair in referring expressions is an interesting case of inference awareness since they play an important role in manipulating the cognitive status of referents between speaker and hearer in discourse. A fuller account of the inferences involved in the use of referring expressions based on relevance-driven pragmatic principles would be useful in developing our understanding of the continuous interaction between speakers and hearers as they align their discourse models<sup>135</sup>.

Another area of future work which would benefit from a bigger corpus is the analysis of the specific demonstrative forms in chapter 6. My choice of attentional *haa*, *kadhaalik* and *haakadhaa* is based on the fact that they are not generally discussed in detail in the literature. Although, the limitations in corpus size affected the number of examples investigated, some patterns of use have emerged to the extent that two distinct uses of *kadhaalik* and *haakadhaa* have been identified. However, one would like to include the diachronic perspective to this discussion in order to further explore the roots of the grammaticalisation process that seems

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<sup>135</sup> In future work, I would also like to extend the analysis of self-repair involving demonstratives to Arabic spoken discourse, as well as to editing in written discourse in both languages.

to be behind the discourse functions of forms such as *kadhaalik* and *haakadhaa*. A similar study is that of Esseesy (2010), in which he studies the diachronic development of prepositions and subordinators into new functions in syntax, semantics and discourse. He even discusses one particular form, *li-dhalik* (preposition+distal demonstrative, meaning “therefore”), as a causal subordinator which has developed discourse functions. Using both historical and modern corpus data would allow for a fuller account of what Esseesy calls “motivating strategies for semantic extensions through grammaticalisation” (2010: 52) with respect to forms such as *kadhaalik* and *haakadhaa*<sup>136</sup>.

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<sup>136</sup> A more ambitious goal for future research would be to go beyond those particular demonstrative forms to a deeper and broader investigation of the class of discourse markers in Arabic from the perspective of relevance theory. It would also be interesting to investigate how the class of discourse markers bears on the classical classification of types of words in Arabic of Ibn Jinni (1913) and Al-ġalayinii (1993) compared to a more modern classification such as that of Hassan (1964).

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