Researching livelihoods and services affected by conflict

Afghanistan: Developing a method for village characterisation

Methods paper: Internal document

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Research for a Better Afghanistan

AREU

About us

Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) aims to generate a stronger evidence base on how people make a living, educate their children, deal with illness and access other basic services in conflict-affected situations (CAS). Providing better access to basic services, social protection and support to livelihoods, matters for the human welfare of people affected by conflict, the achievement of development targets such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and international efforts at peace- and state-building.

At the centre of SLRC's research are three core themes, developed over the course of an intensive one-year inception phase:

- State legitimacy: experiences, perceptions and expectations of the state and local governance in conflict-affected situations
- State capacity: building effective states that deliver services and social protection in conflict-affected situations
- Livelihood trajectories and economic activity under conflict

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) is the lead organisation. SLRC partners include the Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) in Sri Lanka, Feinstein International Center (FIC, Tufts University), the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Pakistan, Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction of Wageningen University (WUR) in the Netherlands, the Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Contents

1 Introduction

This report describes the methods that are to be used to identify key village variables that might help account for 'village behaviour' and explain how these link to potential or actual public good delivery outcomes in Afghanistan. It is argued that this understanding will allow a preliminary characterisation of village preconditions before programmatic interventions engage with villages. This may allow a clustering of villages that are similar and different with respect to the potential generation of public goods. Such differences need to be systematically addressed both in programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

The rationale for this study is presented in section 1.1 and the empirical and theoretical background is discussed in section 1.2. The report draws from an earlier draft method and design which has been field tested in ten villages and the findings from this field test are discussed in section 1.3. Section 1.4, drawing on these findings, develops the methods to be applied at the second stage of the research. This stage, which will start in October 2013 and run until December 2014, will collect primary and secondary data from over 100 villages in two contrasting provincial locations. This data will be analysed using statistical techniques to identify key variables that might underpin village behaviour and public good delivery outcomes. These variables will be used by interested NGOs in a third phase of the study and applied when clustering villages that are similar and different in terms of behaviour, as well as exploring how this might affect programmatic design and implementation.

1.1   Study rationale

A focus on the village as a unit of analysis needs justification. In Afghanistan's institutional landscape four key institutions can be identified: the state, the market, the community and the household. The term 'community' is commonly used within Afghanistanas an equivalent to a 'village' but the village is not the only socio-spatial structure that exists between the household, the state and market. There are various intermediate structures such as ethnicity, tribe, *qawm* and *mantiqua* which can, depending on circumstances, join people across space and impose norms and expectations of behaviour. Villages can therefore be embedded in other informal institutions and which may not necessarily be the most significant institution at the local level.

The village, like the market, has a physical identity and exists as a place. However it also, like markets, contains bundles of institutions that establish rules of behaviour and norms of practice. Thus the village can be talked of as an institution in the sense that one can talk of village norms or social order, while recognising its other identity as a physical place.

The rationale for this study draws from empirical Afghanistan evidence[1] which found significant differences between villages with respect to their capacity to generate public goods. Key public goods that can be generated by villages are seen to be a capacity to support dispute resolution, ensure security and provide basic welfare for the village inhabitants. This approach of focusing on the existing village level and non-state forms of governance are rooted in an investigation of the conditions for collective action and accountability[2]. This is in contrast to the focus on individual rights and accountability that have accompanied efforts to 'democratise' village level governance in Afghanistan. Empirical observation from Afghanistan and comparative evidence from China[3] suggests that there can be important synergies between village level collective capacities to generate public goods and external interventions to supplement these.

It is also important to note that customary structures with deep historical roots are not easily displaced by the introduction of new formal structures by external actors. In India, which has had a long history of

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[1]Adam Pain and Paula Kantor, (2011). Understanding context: How villages differ and why. Kabul, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

[2]See comparative evidence from Somalia in D.K. Leonard with M.S. Samantar (2011) What does the Somali Experience Teach us about the Social Contract and the State?*Development and Change*42 (2) : 559-584

[3]Lily Tsai, (2007), Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China. American Political Science Review, 101 (2) 355-372

a developmental state, customary organisations continue to exercise a major role and have not withered away despite the presence of formal local governing councils since the 1950s[4]. The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) has been in existence for a relatively short time and while it has channelled an unprecedented level of funding into villages for public good provision, with its planned completion in 2015 yet likely decline in funding, it remains far from clear what will happen once the incentives that have fuelled the formation and functioning of CDCs is removed, a view echoed in the King's[5] recent comparative evaluation of community driven development programmes in conflict conditions.

Various studies[6] have argued, drawing on evidence from randomised experimental evaluations, that the elected CDC councils under the NSP improve governance. Even accepting the robustness of the method, and there is critical literature that questions randomised approaches[7], questions can be asked about who defines 'improved governance', and even if it is 'improved', what this might mean if governance at district and provincial level, as well as at a national level, are characterised by patrimonial practices and rent seeking behaviour. Further, this does not necessarily mean that village level governance is bad and may well be 'good enough' to fit the circumstances.

In summary, an interest in the role of customary structures and the source of authority in villages is justified for several reasons: firstly they are likely to remain durable whatever the future of the NSP programme; secondly, there is a need to understand the circumstances in which such structures might provide an obstacle to the introduction of new forms of governance arrangements; and finally, there is a need to recognise where and why they might provide an opportunity to be built on.

It is argued that the source of differences in village behaviour is driven largely by the behaviour of village elite and the incentives that they have to support village level public good provision. Where villages are relatively egalitarian, collective governance based on reputation, trust and moral authority and a focus on collective consensus can maximise village level public good provision. Where such conditions do not exist public good provision can be minimal and external interventions can be captured by the elite. This logic and the theory underlying this, supported by comparative evidence,is briefly discussed in section 1.2.

1.2   Empirical and theoretical background

Since 2001 there has been a major effort by development actors – government, donors and NGOs – to bring the village into developmental and political processes. There have been several views or assumptions underlying these efforts. On the one hand, there has been the position that villages either lack institutional structures, governance systems and accountability, or if they exist, they have been captured by the elite or the politically powerful to serve their own ends.

Thus, programmes such as the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) have sought to introduce new democratic structures into the village based on assumptions of the primacy of individual rights. The NSP has also been seen as central to building linkages between the village and government, supported by funding to increase public goods delivery at the village level. It has been assumed that the NSP, through the establishment of the Community Development Committees (CDCs), would build the accountable governance capacity at the village level and in so doing displace any pre-existing governance structures.

On the other hand, there have been a large number of empirical studies that have drawn attention to the durability of village level organisations, their complexity and their changing nature over time. Such organisations have been seen to include the shura (village council), the mullah (religious leader) and malik (village representative),although the names and functions of these customary organisations vary considerably between regions and villages. There is also considerable evidence that these customary

[4]Gabrielle Kruks-Wisner, (2011). Seeking the Local State: Gender, Caste, and the Pursuit of Public Services in Post-Tsunami India. World Development, 39 (7) :1143-1154

[5]King,E. 2013. A Critical Review of Community-Driven Development Programmes in Conflict-Affected Countries. International Rescue Committee and UK Aid

[6]See for example Andrew Beath, FotiniChristia and Ruben Enikolopov (2013) 'Do Elected Councils Improve Governance: Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan'. Policy Research Working Paper 6510. Washington, The World Bank.

[7] See Angus. S. Deaton (2009) 'Instruments of Development: Randomisation in the Tropics, And the Search for the Elusive Keys to Economic Development' Cambridge, MA, USA: National Bureau of Economic Research)

organisations play an important role in the provision of public goods within the village, particularly in relation to dispute resolution and basic welfare provision. The 2005 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) for example[8] provides evidence of how significant village councils (Shura) are seen to be in dispute resolution. Despite the international focus on formal justice system and its presumed dysfunction, the evidence shows[9] that informal justice systems play an important, if variable but synergistic, role in relation to dispute resolution

It is common for NGO field workers, both in the NSP programmes and other activities to talk of villages that have been easy to engage with or are receptive, in contrast to those villages which are more difficult to work with and where powerful people are more concerned with their interests than those of the village. Accordingly, it is possible to talk of villages behaving in different ways – those with more of a developmental perspective and keen to build public good provision and those where elite act to limit access to such public goods and capture them for their own interests.

It is argued[10] that village customary organisations in Afghanistan can often exhibit four key features that are supportive of the provision of public goods: the separation of powers among the key community structures, the existence of checks and balances between these structures, the presence of economic veto players who have sufficient influence to ensure that there is no abuse of power and the ability of these organisations to raise local revenues under conditions of budget constraints.

Differences between villages, it has been suggested[11] lies in the role of the veto players and their relative numbers. Where land inequalities are low, not only are the elite likely to be economically insecure, they are also likely to be more numerous. They are therefore likely to have a shared interest in promoting and supporting social solidarity and ensuring the provision of public goods. However, where the number of elite is relatively small and where they are economically secure, often as a result of large landholdings, the incentives to promote social solidarity and widen access to public goods provision is likely to be more limited. The elite are therefore likely to act more in their own interests rather than in the interests of the village population.

1.3   The design of the research and results from the field test

The study has been broken down into the three stages. The first stage was the development of a draft protocol for the collection of relevant data drawing on existing and comparative literature. This was reviewed with NGO partners, both national and international, who were selected on the basis of their interest and long standing presence in the districts or provinces of interest. This was then field tested in 10 contrasting villages (five in Takhar and five in Badakhshan). The lessons from that field test are discussed here and will lead to a refinement of the design, which will be discussed in section 1.4 of this paper.

The method itself is based on an exercise in exploring the relationship between variables (such as ethnic composition, distribution in land holdings etc.) which might explain foundational or causal factors in village behaviour and the outcomes of that village behaviour, as reflected in the level and scale of village public goods that are provided. The analysis is of course complicated by the fact that the intervention of the NSP programme may have changed or influenced some of the causal factors, as well as the level of public good provision. In particular, there may be effects of the subdivision of villages (or amalgamation of one or more villages) into CDCs. However observational and other sources of evidence indicate that village level behaviour is still largely explained by the behaviour of customary village organisations. Despite three decades of conflict and upheaval, out migration, refugee movement and resettlement, in many villages, although in not all, village organisations continue to play a strong role.

[8] Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and Central Statistics Office. 2007. The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2005. Kabul, MRRD and CSO.

[9] Coburn, N 2011.The Politics of Dispute Resolution and Continued Instability in Afghanistan.Special Report. Washington, United States Institute of Peace

[10] Drawing on Jennifer Brick (2008).The Political Economy of Customary Organisations in Rural Afghanistan. Working Paper; University of Wisconsin, Madison

[11] Pain and Kantor, 2011:37

Data will be collected from a large number of villages (at least 50 villages per location) and then analysed using statistical tools to identify variables, or groups of variables, which might cause inter-village variation in behavioural patterns and suggest how villages can be clustered according to similarity and dissimilarity. This will involve both factor analysis, which will seek to identify a relatively small number of factors that can be used to represent relationships among bundles of many inter-related variables. This reduced number of factors can then be used in cluster analysis. This is an exploratory tool to organise the collected data into meaningful groups or clusters (of villages), based on combinations of independent variables. This is done to maximise the similarity of cases within each cluster (grouping similar villages) whilst maximising the dissimilarity between different groups (or clusters of dissimilar villages).

The draft field test protocol was divided into five basic sections for the collection of village level information:

- Assessment of the position of the village in relation to the outer world: this addressed what could be seen as the foundational or given characteristics of the village taking into account historical events and external connections
- Information on the village economy and its resource structure: this was designed to capture a description of resource richness and land distribution assessing the degree of land inequality
- Information on customary village institutions and their performance: this aims to provide an assessment of the customary institutions and their membership and identification of the influential people in the village
- Information on institutions introduced to the village by external actors since 2001: this aimed to find out who the key people in the introduced organisations are and the extent to which membership of this overlaps, or not, with the people who are seen to be influential in the village
- Evidence on public good provision: this aims to assess public goods provision and the degree to which it has been driven by customary organisations and externally influenced action

Based on a preliminary analysis of the data, comments from the field teams and debriefing of lessons learnt the protocol has been reviewed and revised and is attached as Annex 1 to this report. The revisions are discussed below.

However, a number of observations can also be made from a review of the evidence from the ten village case studies:

- The introduction of the NSP CDC appears to have changed the visible landscape of village organisations, with the role titles for positions in the CDC being used to describe what key people do in the village
- However, a listing of the influential people in the village, and observations from the field team suggests strongly that the influential people before CDCs have a strong presence in the new CDCs; the question arises as to whether, and to what extent, the performance of the CDC is subject to the performance of customary structures and traditionally influential people or not; where such structures work well it is possible that this may have an influence on the performance of the CDC
- There is considerable variation between villages with respect to the level of public goods that they provide informally and some villages provide a surprising amount; the evidence is consistent with the view that the level of this provision is linked to both the role and power of the elite in the village. This depends on the degree of social homogeneity, determined both by ethnic diversity and levels of equality in land ownership
- A number of the small test villages had either been combined with another village for the purposes of CDC formation or with large villages divided into two or more CDCs; the effects of this on customary structures and the role of influential people was not clear, but in at least one case there was evidence that one influential person, although located in one CDC, continued to have a major influence over the decision making of a second CDC

- The mantequa remains for many, but not all, villages a significant unit of identity with critical roles in collective resource management, dispute resolution and selection of representatives;

As a result of the lessons learnt the protocol has been revised in format and order and some of the questions developed in more detail:

- Section 1 (Position of the village in relation to the outer world) has been revised to group all the information on village size and identity and to clarify that the discussion on the mantiqua should refer to pre NSP and after NSP; the section on village networks / connections has been developed to reflect the richness of the information that was collected; questions on the CDC has been moved to section 5;
- Section 2 on village economy and structure has had some minor adjustments made;
- Section 3 on village customary organisations has had a new section added to investigate the customary structures before NSP was introduced and the role that they played and to investigate what effects NSP introduction might have had on these; the listing of influential people and their roles has been revised;
- Section 4 now focuses on Public Good Provision by Village Customary Organisation and also includes a question how past food distribution in the village was handled;
- Section 5 then moves to investigate the introduced organisations and seeks to collect more information on how the village sees the effects of, where this has happened of being divided into several CDCs or the village joined by a CDC to another village. Questions of key office holders for each CDC in the village are asked and views on how the role of the CDC is compared with customary structures asked;
- Finally, Section 6 looks at the provision of public goods in the village in collaboration with government support and NGOs.
- A new section 7 has been added to ensure that the field teams review their findings on the completion of each village and provide an initial assessment of the village in relation to the importance of customary organisations.

1.4   Implementation of the method

This revised protocol will be implemented over the coming year (October 2013 to September 2014) leading to a results paper being published by December 2014. The protocol will be applied in two provinces contrasted by geography (a largely mountainous one, and one that is more flat with more extensively irrigated land) but including villages within each province that are located between the plains and mountains. At least fifty villages per province will be sampled, with contrasting villages (based on landscape position and distance from district centres) selected. It is assumed that all villages will have been part of the NSP programme.

The protocol will be important to seek different informants for each section. Not only will this minimize informant fatigue but it will also allow for the cross-checking of information from different informants or groups of informants. This will mean that for each village several of the protocol forms will need to be used for each informant or group of informants.

The following table indicates the different informants that can be drawn on for each section.

Section	Informants
1. Position of the village in relation to the outer world	Group 1 Village Elders
2. Village Economy and Structure	Group 2 Village households NGO staff
3. Village Customary Organisations	Group 1 Village Elders Group 2/3 Village Households (men) Group 1 Village Households (women)
4. Public Good Provision by Village Customary Organisations	Group 1 Village elders Group 2/3 Village households Group 1 Village Households (women)
5. Introduced Organisations	CDC Membership NGO staff Group 1 Village Households (women)
6. Externally Supported action by government / NGOs	CDC Membership NGO staff Group 1 (Village Households (women)
7. Village Debriefing	Interview Team

The attached protocol at present is written in narrative form. Prior to the field work a coded version will be developed in order to ensure consistency in its application and to enable statistical analysis.

At the end of the village assessment there will be a village debriefing. The collected information from the different informants will need to be reviewed and compiled into one complete village assessment that will reconcile possible different views or opinions. The data in this complete village assessment form will then be entered into a prepared Excel data sheet. The information from the village debriefing done by the team will be written up in individual village word files.

The data in the excel data sheets will need to be proof checked against the original form.

Annexes

Village context analysis protocol

Village Name	
District	
Province	
Informant Name(s) / Group & Position	
Interviewers	
Note Taker	
Date of interview	

Annex 1: Position of village in relation to the outer world

Altitude of village (*metres above sea level*)	
Village Name and Identity	
When was the village settled?	
Name of village (*as defined by village*)	
Number of Mosques in the village	
Number of households in the village	
Are there any IDPs settled within the village? If so how many households, where did they come from and when did they settle?	
Social identity - Identity of the main ethnic group in the village and number of households - Number of households of main ethnic group - Other ethnic groups in the villages and number of households	
Ethnic Identity of surrounding villages	
Mantiqua	
Mantiqua (discuss how this worked/ was used before NSP was introduced)	
- name of mantiqua to which village belongs	
- number of villages in mantiqua and its coverage	
- role / significance of mantiqua (e.g. collective resource management, dispute resolution, elections, other)	
Since the introduction of the NSP programme have there been any changes in the role and function of the mantequa. If so what has changed and what effects has this had?	
Village Landscape position (*irrigated plain/ rainfed plain/ mainvalley floor/ main valley edge / side valley floor/ side valley edge/ hillside or hilltop*)	

Irrigation:	
- Does the village share an irrigation source with other villages? - What is the irrigation source? – spring / qarez / seasonal stream or river / permanent stream or river canal/ irrigation canal - Is this water supply reliable? - If so is the village upstream, mid stream or downstream from these other villages?	
Distance to district centre in terms of travel time (hours) by specified means (car, horse, foot) of transport)	
Road Access (number of months a year that it is normally connected)	
History: what have been the key historical connections of the village to the outside world (through trade, migration, refugee experience etc)	

Village networks / connections: who are the key people that the village connects to at various levels (e.g. district, province and beyond e.g. Kabul), what is the role of these key people, who in the village has or can use the connections, what is the basis/ origin for that connection and what are those connections used for:

- district level (Yes or No)	
- if yes at district level what is the connection and who has it	
- provincial level (Yes or No)	
- if yes at provincial level what is the connection and who has it	
- national level (Yes or No)	
- if yes at national level what is the connection and who has it	
- has the district or mantequa to which the village belongs have one representative or more in the Provincial Council (Yes/No)	
If yes to the Provincial Council who are they and what is is made of this connection and by whom	
- has the district or mantequa to which the village belong have one representative or more in the National Parliament (Yes/No)	
If yes to the National Parliament who are they and what is is made of this connection and by whom	
Are there other powerful actors in the mantequa / district e.g. commanders who are infuential (yes/no)	
If yes who are they and what role do they play?	

Annex 2: Village Economy & Structure

Total area (jerib) of agricultural land in village	
- area of rainfed land (jeribs)	
- area of irrigated land (jeribs)	
- area of orchard land with irrigation (jeribs)	

Check : Total area = rainfed + irrigated + orchard

Land distribution*(% of large, middle, small and landless households & households that sharecrop; large etc. will be relative to villages but landholding ranges will be needed)*

Landholder types	Irrigated land holding range (jeribs)	Rainfed land holding range (jeribs)	Livestock holdings range	Estimated no hhhlds in each category
Large				
Medium				
Small				
Landless				
Check value for irrigated / rainfed land consistent with above figures			Total	

Check: total number of households equals the number of households given in Section I

	Months food security good year	First source of cash income by size	Second source cash of income	Third source of cash income	No hholds with migrant labour
Large					
Medium					
Small					
Landless					

Note: If landless give agriculture as source of income check if they are sharecroppers and what proportion of the landless are sharecroppers. Also check if they actually sell produce or simply grow it.

Note: Agriculture is not specific enough as an answer as source of income: find out which crops or livestock are sold.

Are there any *hamsaya* households in the village (landless from other villages working on a landlords land and living in his housing) (yes/no) If yes how many of them, where did they come from and how long have they been in the village?

Annex 3: Customary Village Organisations	
Before NSP was introduced please describe the customary organisation (arbob/ malik, whitebeards, mosque/ mullah etc) that existed in the village, what role they played and how the people who were active in them were selected? Note: Space is given for upto 5 customary organisations but there may be less. If there are more insert additional rows.	
Customary Institution 1 Name:	
What effect[12] if any has NSP had on the role that customary organisation 1 plays and the selection of people to fulfill these roles?	
Customary Institution 2 Name:	
What effect if any has NSP had on the role that customary organisation 2 plays and the selection of people to fulfill these roles?	
Customary Institution 3 Name:	
What effect if any has NSP had on the role that customary organisation 3 plays and the selection of people to fulfill these roles?	
Customary Institution 4 Name:	
What effect if any has NSP had on the role that customary organisation 4 plays and the selection of people to fulfill these roles?	
Customary Institution 5 Name:	
What effect if any has NSP had on the role that customary organisation 5 plays and the selection of people to fulfill these roles?	
What positions if any did women hold in any of the above customary organisations? Were women members of other customary organisations not mentioned above?	

[12]In asking this question we are interested if the formation of CDC has meant that the customary organisation does not exist anymore and its role has been absorbed into the CDC or if the CDC has made no difference – it is still there and still functions as before – or if the leadership of the customary organisations has simply moved into the CDC and continues to play the same customary role as well as the new role of CDC chairman etc.

Customary Structures / Influential people in the village: (fill in table below)

- list the most influential people (upto ten if they identity ten) in the village in order of influence (most influential first)<u>before the NSP was introduced</u>
- what is the influence that they have / what do they do / what is their role?
- what is the basis/ source of their influence in the village/ why are they influential?
- do they have a traditional/ customary position in the village and if so what is it?
- are they now a member of the CDC, if so in what position?
- which landholding group do they come from
- do they have influence/ connections outside the village and if so what is it and with whom?

(Assessment to be done separately with at least two different village groups)

Name Influential Person 1	
What is the role they played in the village?	
How did they come to have this role –why were they selected?	
Are they a member of customary structure & if so which one?	
Are they now a Member of the current or a past CDC	
Land holding group	
Do they have Outside village influence	
Name Influential Person 2	
What is the role they played in the village?	
How did they come to have this role –why were they selected?	
Are they a member of customary structure & if so which one ?	
Are they now a Member of the current or a past CDC	
Land holding group	
Do they have Outside village influence	
Name Influential Person 3	
What is the role they played in the village?	
How did they come to have this role –why were they selected?	
Are they a member of customary structure & if so which one ?	
Are they now a Member of the current or a past CDC	
Land holding group	
Do they have Outside village influence	
Name Influential Person 4	
What is the role they played in the village?	

How did they come to have this role –why were they selected?	
Are they a member of customary structure & if so which one?	
Are they now a Member of the current or a past CDC	
Land holding group	
Do they have Outside village influence	
Name Influential Person 5	
What is the role they played in the village?	
How did they come to have this role –why were they selected?	
Are they a member of customary structure & if so which one?	
Are they now a Member of the current or a past CDC	
Land holding group	
Do they have Outside village influence	
Name Influential Person 6	
What is the role they played in the village?	
How did they come to have this role –why were they selected?	
Are they a member of customary structure & if so which one?	
Are they now a Member of the current or a past CDC	
Land holding group	
Do they have Outside village influence	
Mirab:	
- Does the village have a mirab or share a mirab with other villages? - If yes who is the current mirab and does he come from this village? - If not which village does he come from and why was he selected? - How long has the mirab been in position? - Who was responsible for his selection?	

Annex 4: Public Good Provision by Village Customary Organisations

Village based actions: <u>note this relates to actions initiated by the village, not by NGOs although NGOs might have been asked to assist.</u>	
Dispute/ conflict resolution (*what sort of conflicts, resolved by whom*)	
- When there are conflicts in the village who are the key people in the village engaged to seek conflict resolution; - Does the nature of the conflict determine who will be engaged to seek resolution (e.g. differences between internal household conflicts, conflicts between a few households, conflicts between many households - how are those conflicts addressed and resolved (give examples) - Are there examples of conflicts that have not been solved within the village? (Yes/No) - If yes what are these conflicts and how have they been addressed	
Informal Welfare/ social protection(*grain banks, food provision*) Please pay particular attention to the role of the Mosques, whether or not they raise money etc	
If a household runs faces major difficulties through illness, economic hardship or food insecurity how does the village respond? - Leave it to the household to find help - Leave it to other individual households to help out - Take village level action (give examples) - If village level who organises this?	
Collective Action (*public good provision, common pool resources etc*)	
Have there in the last 10 years been any major natural disasters (drought, floods, landslides): if yes: - what were these disasters and when? - How many households were affected - What actions if any did the village take to help the affected households?	
What joint activities / actionscan be remembered thatvillage households worked together with<u>in the village</u>? - what was the activity / action? - who organised it? - what was the benefit of the activity / action - who benefited from the activity/ action	
What joint activities / actionscan be remembered that village households worked together with<u>households from other villages</u>over the last 10 years? - what was the activity / action? - who organised it? - what was the benefit of the activity / action - who benefited from the activity/ action	
<u>If before the NSP was established</u>, food aid was delivered to the village who decided how the food should be distributed and how was that distribution done?	

Annex 5: Introduced Organisations	
(a) Village NSP CDC	
Which NGOs have worked in the village, what have they done and when and which NGO was responsible for the NSP programme	
Year village joined NSP programme	
How many elections have been held for the CDC since it first started?	
Has the NGO clustered this village/ CDC with other village CDCs; if so how many other village/CDCs has it clustered it with, do these include the villages that were in the mantiqua and if not what were the changes	
Number of CDCs in the village - CDC shared with one other or more villages; if so give number of villages that are a member - One CDC in the village - If more than 1, number of CDCs in the village - If more than 1 CDC how do the fit with the number of mosques in the village?	
If the CDC is **shared** with another village, what effects has this had on village customary structures and the role of influential people? Do they still fufill their traditional role? How are the roles shared between the new CDC and the old customary structures in the different villages and influential people? How were candidates selected from the villages sharing the CDC and did this create any problems? How were these solved? How were the key positions in the CDC (head, deputy, treasurer and clerk) shared between the villages? How were projects under NSP identified and what negotiations took place in choosing these?	
If the village has been **divided** into two or more CDCs what is the basis on which the village was divided? What effects has this had on village customary structures and the roles and activities of influential people? With several CDCs how does this affect decision making and action at the level of the old village (before the CDCs). After the creation of several CDCs in the village, which CDC/ head of CDC was more influential and why? What was the process of project selection under NSP? Was this done independently by each CDC or jointly and if jointly which CDC / who had the most influence?	
Since the establishment of the CDCs how has this changed the presence of women in decision making structures in the village?	
If after the NSP was established, food aid was delivered to the village who decided how the food should be distributed and how was that distribution done? How did this differ in any way from before the NSP was established? (Pay particular attention to the effects where a CDC joined two or more villages or where a village was divided into several CDCs)	
What other activities / actions and role has the CDC undertaken since it was established?	

Who are the current members of the NSP and what are their roles?			Fill in the box below	
Name	Position	Member of previous CDC (Yes/ No)	Which landholding group	Tick if on list of influential people

Individuals who were members of earlier CDCs but were not relected				
Name	Position	Which landholding group	Tick if on list of influential people	Any specific reason why they were not reflected?

What activities / actions and role has the CDC undertaken since it was established?	
How would you describe the differences and similarities between the past role of customary structures and the CDC?	
Has the NGO made an assessment of the CDC performance? - If so what is that assessment based on? - What is the assessment?	
Have there been other associations / organisations introduced into the village by outside agencies? (Yes/No)	
- if yes please list them and complete a separate form for each	

(b) Introduced Organisation – Complete a form for each organisation	
Introduced Organisation 1: e.g. WUA / Agricoops	
- Date organisation introduced / established	
- Name of NGO that introduced the new organisation	
- Purpose / role of new organisation	
- How was membership of the organisation selected	
- How many of the households are members of the organisation?	
- Who are the current members of the leadership of the organisation and what are their roles?	

Name	Position	Member of NSP CDC (Yes/ No)	Which landholding group	Tick if on list of influential people

Has the NGO made an assessment of the organisation performance? - If so what is that assessment based on? - What is the assessment?	

Annex 6: Externally supported action by government / NGOs etc	
Schools (when started for boys, girls, what percent attending)	
- What year did boys in the village first go to primary school and where was this school? - What year was the first primary school for boys started in the village? - Who initiated / was responsible for the idea of having the school? - If the school was established before 1978, did it continue to function between 1978 – 2001? - What proportion of primary age boys in the village go to primary school? - What year did boys in the village first go to secondary school and where was this school? - Does this village have a secondary school and if it does when was it built? - What proportion of secondary age boys in the village now go to secondary school?	
- What year did girls in the village first go to primary school and where was this school? - What year was the first school for girls started in the village? - Who initiated / was responsible for the idea of having the school? - If the school was established before 1978, did it continue to function between 1978 - 2001 - What proportion of primary age girls in the village go to primary school? - When did girls in the village first go to secondary school and where was this school? - Does this village have a secondary school for girls and if it does when was it built? - What proportion of secondary age girls in the village now go to secondary school?	
Health Facilities	
- Does the village have any health facilities? - If so when were these established? - Who initiated / was responsible for the idea of having the health facility?	
Other Public Goods (e.g. drinking water supply, electricity, roads, irrigation canals, etc	
- Does the village have ………………………? - If so when were these established? - Who initiated / was responsible for the idea of having the …………………?	

Debriefing points for the assessment team: this must be done on the completion of the village assessment	
First review the information from the different informants and complete an overall village assessment form to ensure there are no gaps in information. Where there are differences in views from different informants either seek to reconcile these or recognise and include the range of views. Then discuss the following issues focusing both on your conclusions as well as thinking through the evidnece / observations that have led you to these conclusions.	
In your view who are the key actors in village decision making now?	
What evidence can you provide to support this view?	
What do you see as the relative role of village customary structures and the CDC in decision making and action in the village?	
What evidence can you provide to support this view?	
How would you compare the level of public good provision in this village with other villages?	
What in your view explains any differences?	
What evidence do you have to support this view?	
Any other comments / observations with supporting evidence	