DISKUSSIONSPAPIERE

Raffael Beier

Shifting Urban Policies in North Africa after the "Arab Spring"

Urgent Reaction or Real Changes?

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List of Abbreviations

AFD	Agence Française de Développement
ARRU	Agence de Réhabilitation et de Rénovation Urbaine, Tunisia
EU	European Union
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GOPP	General Organisation of Physical Planning, Egypt
HLM	Habitation à Loyer Modéré
HLNR	Housing and Land Rights Network, Egypt
INDH	Initiative Nationale du Développement Humain, Morocco
ISDF	Informal Settlements Development Fund, Egypt
MHPV	Ministère de l'Habitat et de la Politique de la Ville, Morocco
MURIS	Ministry of Urban Renewal and Informal Settlements, Egypt
PAGUDEL	Programme d'Appui à la Gouvernance Urbaine et Développement Economique Local, Tunisia
PAPV	Programme d'Appui à la Politique de la Ville, Tunisia
PJD	Parti de la Justice et du Développement, Morocco
PNRQP	Programme National de Réhabilitation des Quartiers Populaires, Tunisia
PRIQH	Programme de Réhabilitation et d'Intégration des Quartiers d'Habitation, Tunisia
SHP	Social Housing Project, Egypt
VNG	Association of Netherlands Municipalities
VSB	Villes sans Bidonvilles, Morocco

1 Introduction

There might be two impressions that are stuck in people's minds since the Arab uprisings that started in the late months of 2010: First, pictures of masses of protesting citizens occupying Tahrir Square in Cairo, Pearl Roundabout in Manama and Avenue Habib Bourguiba in Tunis. Second, the image of a poor street vendor from one of the most deprived urban neighbourhoods in Tunisia's neglected hinterland burning himself after being humiliated by a municipal employee. Both pictures show the significance of the spatial dimension: the city as "the environment that creates the structural conditions for dissent to emerge and be expressed."[1] Accordingly, the city in the "Arab Spring" might not only be perceived as "the site of the struggle, but also [...] the focus of the struggle."[2]

Social injustice, corruption, an authoritarian rule of law and the growing contrasts between rich and poor have become particularly evident in the Arab countries' largest metropolitan areas. Mirroring the contrast between global aspirations and local challenges, these "cities of extremes"[3] have seen the emergence of gated communities and urban flagship projects in the direct neighbourhood of precarious informal settlements. Far too often, the region's urban planning is not demand-led, but rather driven by a centrally controlled real-estate market that feeds a hardly transparent, rentier-based economic model. Consequently, top-down planning has often prioritised ambitious large-scale projects instead of decentralised and differentiated planning solutions.[4]

The increasing need for state authorities to participate in international competition has put cities at the centre of countries' marketing strategies orientated towards external stakeholders such as tourists and investors. However, from the governments' perspective, the Arab uprisings have endangered the marketability of cities. Accordingly, it can be expected that governments adapt their spatial policies to cope with the challenges the Arab uprisings have disclosed. Their perception of the role of public space and spatial disparities in the rise of recent Arab social and political movements has remarkably influenced post-2011 urban development. This needs to be analysed.

Therefore, this paper is designed as a comparative analysis that focuses on the local space-related expressions and perceptions of the diverse movements in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia that are commonly referred to as the "Arab Spring". The research questions are the following:

- In which way did planning authorities respond to the role of the city during the rise of the "Arab Spring"?
- What are the motivations behind the changes and continuations of urban policy?

The comparative study not only discloses the extent and range of urban policy shifts after the Arab uprisings, but also analyses them in the context of different urban conditions and political circumstances. Thereby, it corresponds to the call of Allegra et al. for more

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[1] Allegra et al. (2013, p. 1676).
[2] Stadnicki et al. (2014, p. 8).
[3] Bayat and Biekart (2009, p. 815).
[4] Cf. Barthel and Vignal (2014, p. 53); Elsheshtawy (2004, pp. 6ff); Fawaz (2013, pp. 23ff); Gillot and Moisseron (2012, p. 13).

comparative studies that deal with the local content of social movements.[5] The study is based on qualitative, problem-centred interviews and own field observations during February and March 2015 in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco.[6]

The study focuses on Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia because of their very different expressions of the Arab uprisings that have led to differing political situations. The Tunisian revolution has relatively quickly and peacefully resulted in ousting dictator Ben Ali and has further succeeded in realising a new political system – including a new constitution and democratic elections. However, questions remain about the resilience and sustainability of the young democracy.[7] Egypt firstly experienced a relatively violent revolution against the authoritarian regime of Hosni Mubarak. Then, new mass demonstrations as well as a final coup d'état of the military against the democratically elected government headed by Mohamed Mursi resulted in a new system very similar to the former contested regime of Mubarak. The new regime has replaced the instability that occurred with both waves of protests with another repressive new stability guaranteed by a strong military and a new constitution.[8] In contrast, Morocco has been far less affected by the Arab uprisings. The so-called February 20 Movement organised several mass demonstrations in almost all large Moroccan cities calling for more political rights, freedom of expression and a stronger separation of economic and political power within the framework of the existing monarchy.[9] The monarchy responded with pro-active appeasement measures such as an increase of food subsidies, constitutional reform and new elections that resulted in a new government headed by the moderate Islamist Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD).[10]

The first section of this paper deals with theories of current urban development policy in North Africa. It argues that the concept of "worlding cities' and the right to the city are useful theoretical concepts. However, it is not sufficient to see them as isolated concepts. Rather they are interlinked by an urbanism of urgency that primarily shapes urban development at the peripheries. In the second part, the study shows diverse perceptions of the role of the city. These perceptions facilitate an understanding of urban policy changes that have occurred in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia since 2011. Whereas the strategy to use urban development as a part of national marketing and investment strategies seems to be unchanged, urban peripheries have been at the core of urban development policies after 2011.

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[5]   Cf. Allegra et al. (2013, p. 1683).
[6]   In order to refer to the content of the interviews and in order to keep the anonymity of the interviewees I use the initials of the interview partners, the date as well as the place of the interview.
[7]   Cf. Piser and Dhaouadi (2014).
[8]   Cf. Achrainer (2014).
[9]   Cf. Darif (2014, pp. 110f); Maghraoui and Zerhouni (2013, p. 680).
[10] Cf. Maddy-Weitzman (2012, p. 90); Ruf (2013, pp. 198f).

2 Urban Policy between Global Ambitions and Local Challenges

2.1 Worlding Cities

Since the late 1980s, with the emergence of the global "attention economy"[11], the notion of global cities as hubs of international capital flows[12] and the recognition of cities as competitive engines of growth[13], the economic and strategic importance of cities has considerably increased. To raise attention and to attract investors and tourists, city planners have responded with the festivalisation of cities, the construction of urban megaprojects and the hosting of international events.[14] Of course, the North African countries considered in this study do not mark an exception. However, instead of just copying the above quoted theories and concepts, this study builds on the concept of worlding cities to avoid a bias towards the global North. Roy and Ong published their book on worlding cities with the particular aim to focus on city development in the global South against the hegemony of theoretical approaches developed in relation to evolutions in the North.[15]

Worlding cities are different from global cities. Whereas the global city status applies to cities in the centre of global capital flows only, worlding cities exist ubiquitously. Instead of focusing on the quantifiable position in a world economy, the concept looks at worldviews, individual perceptions and pictures of the world. In this sense, worlding refers to a self-positioning of being in the world; it corresponds to a phenomenological understanding of globalisation that acknowledges its "irreducible perspectival heterogeneity".[16] Accordingly, worlding practices are not restricted to specific places and take place everywhere people aspire to influence their own emergent status of being in the world. These are unstable and dynamic practices of competition, governmental experiments and financial speculation that contain globally circulating ideas, visions and capital.[17] This is often characterised by the breathtaking speed of building new megaprojects, new towns and "the tallest" towers, as well as by hysteria of unreasonable hyper-developments, spectacle and speculation.[18]

The notion of emergence and aspiration is central to the understanding of worlding cities in the global South. For Ong, worlding practices are "urban aspirations" rationalised by the growing economic significance of cities as well as a form of emergence from the colonial past: "Major cities in the developing world have become centres of enormous political invest-ment, economic growth, and cultural vitality, and thus have become sites for instantiating their countries' claims to global significance."[19] Cities develop into globally marketed brands visualising the nations' emerging status of being in the world.[20] This translates into an urban modelling that reproduces or aspires to existing forms of southern *and* northern urbanism. It

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[11]   Franck (1998).

[12]   Cf. Sassen (1994).

[13]   Cf. Clarke Annez and Buckley (2009).

[14]   Cf. Häußermann and Siebel (1993); Turok (2004).

[15]   Cf. Roy and Ong (2011).

[16]   Radhakrishnan (2005, p. 184).

[17]   Cf. Roy (2014).

[18]   Cf. Roy (2011); related to the Gulf, cf. Schmid (2009) and Bromber et al. (2014).

[19]   Ong (2011, p. 2).

[20]   In the case of Arab cities, cf. Bromber et al. (2014); Elsheshtawy (2004); Haines (2011).

also implies "inter-referencing", a continuous comparison and competition with presumptive world-class cities. What is perceived to be a world-class urban value or a desirable urban amenity (e.g. shopping malls, five-star hotels and golf clubs) is reproduced or pushed to extremes. By means of public-private partnerships or regional solidarities, urban blueprints and global architectural styles circulate across cities.[21] In the Arab world this modelling and inter-referencing of world-class is often called "Gulfanisation"[22] or "Dubaisation".[23]

2.2   Building and Planning at the Urban Peripheries

Worlding practices – understood as "worlding from above" and the urban aspirations of governments and city planners – are the predominant driving forces of urban development in North Africa. However as diverse authors argue, this might clash with the aspirations of ordinary citizens who claim their "right to the city" as a way of shaping an active urban life from below.[24] The right to the city has its roots in the French movements of the 1960s and the work of the French Marxist philosopher Lefèbvre. In his radical manifesto *Le droit à la ville*[25], he argues that industrialisation leads to the end of the traditional city and inevitably results in the full urbanisation of society. Through the production of the city and its inherent segregation, the working class is pushed from the centre to the periphery. Therefore, there is a need for a right to the city, understood as a right to urban life that implies several other rights including the right to housing, the right to work and the right to education. Instead of regarding the city as a form of industrial production, the right to the city takes the city as an oeuvre, a place of centrality and social interaction, available to everybody and developing according to people's needs. Lefèbvre does not consider the right to the city as limited to a modification of capitalism (e.g. through more participation in urban planning), but as part of a complete socialist revolution of society.[26]

In today's discourse the right to the city is often referred to Marcuse who describes it as "the demand [...] of those who are excluded [and] the cry [...] of those who are alienated; the demand is for the material necessities of life, the aspiration is for a broader right to what is necessary beyond the material to lead a satisfying life."[27] In other words, the push for a right to the city is led by the demand of the economically deprived and oppressed, as well as by the aspiration of the discontented to question the existing socio-political system. Thus, the right to the city does not only mean the fight against gentrification, displacement or eviction, but is also about enabling a free and self-determined urban life of empowered people, as well as a reclamation of public spaces.[28] This is why authors such as Fawaz see informal settlements as "the embodiment of the right to the city, neighbourhoods where dwellers are producing their living quarters in ways that challenge the dominant [...] modes of spatial production."[29]

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[21]   For the last paragraph, cf. Ong (2011).

[22]   Cf. Adham (2014).

[23]   Cf. Huchzermeyer (2011, pp. 33f).

[24]   In the case of Arab cities, see e.g. Bromber et al. (2014, pp. 6f), Elsheshtawy (2004, p. 8), Fawaz (2013); for a more general understanding consider e.g. Durand-Lasserve (2006); Huchzermeyer (2011).

[25]   For the following paragraph, cf. Lefèbvre (2009, pp. 131ff).

[26]   See also Lopes de Souza (2010).

[27]   Marcuse (2009, p. 190).

[28]   Cf. Fahmi (2009); Lopes de Souza and Lipietz (2011).

[29]   Fawaz (2013, p. 32).

People drive the development of the Arab world's urban peripheries by their livelihood strategies, realising settlements that resemble the compact oriental city with social interaction and community-based decision making at its core[30] (see figure 1).

Figure 1: A market around Morocco's oldest informal settlement, Carrières Centrales, in Casablanca

Source: Author's picture, March 2015.

Formal urban planning has hardly addressed North African urban peripheries such as informal settlements, popular neighbourhoods and declining public housing estates.[31] The exception is if they become centres of social discontent and unrest. In his analysis of the urban development of Casablanca during the past century, the Moroccan sociologist Rachik demonstrated how social pressure on the government has been the main driver of urban development in the urban peripheries. For example, riots and protest movements, but also epidemics or disasters increase pressure on the state, which then reacts by what Rachik calls *l'urbanisme de l'urgence* (the urbanism of urgency).[32] After the independence movement in the 1950s and bread riots in the 1980s, the Moroccan authorities directed attention to the neglected urban peripheries and provided, or at least announced, new social housing, created new institutions of urban planning and set up new programmes to deal with informal settlements. In periods of non-event and low social pressure on the government, formal urban planning has turned a blind eye to development at urban peripheries. Rachik argues if people at the urban margins aim at influencing urban policy to reach improvement of their living conditions, they need to put pressure on the state by means of social unrest. Due to the absence of electoral pressure, social pressure remains an important element to remind authorities of the existing difficulties at urban margins.

Of course, his analysis is restricted to urban development in Casablanca. However, the case of Casablanca shows striking similarities with other cities in North African countries considered

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[30]   Cf. United Nations Human Settlements Programme (2012, p. 99).

[31]   Following the understanding of Rachik (2002), the term urban peripheries should not be understood in a spatial but rather in a socio-economic way, referring to social exclusion that can, but does not have to be the result of spatial segregation.

[32]   Rachik (2002).

in this study: In Tunisia, the bloody general strike in 1978 marked an end of the laissez-faire approach towards informal settlements, characterised by the establishment of the public Agence de Réhabilitation et de Rénovation urbaine (ARRU) and the first six rehabilitation projects in Tunisia's informal settlements. Then, the next considerable increase in activity at the urban peripheries was intended to thwart the growing influence of Islamist forces in informal settlements after they had got considerable gains in the 1989 general elections. As a response the first Programme National de Réhabilitation des Quartiers Populaires (PNRQP) started operation and the number of rehabilitation projects, but also of demolitions, increased remarkably.[33] In Egypt, the state's ignorance towards so-called ashwa'iyyat (spontaneous settlements) stopped in 1992 when Islamist movements in one of the largest ashwa'iyyat in the Cairo agglomeration challenged the state by declaring the "Islamic Republic of Imbaba". This prompted the announcement of the National Program of Urban Upgrading calling for a massive informal settlement improvement through the provision of basic infrastructure, the widening of streets and demolitions. Although the state has not implemented the whole programme and especially the demolitions, this marked an important turning point in urban policy at Egyptian urban peripheries.[34]

2.3   The Theoretical Model of Dualistic Urban Planning

Worlding ambitions, the right to the city as well as the urbanism of urgency are heavily interrelated. Evictions and displacements in the name of worlding aspirations and for the purpose of urban megaprojects and tourist developments sharply increased during the past decade (see figure 2).[35] Moreover, planning authorities have started describing urban peripheries as backward quarters that do not fit within the progressive worlding image of the country and even jeopardise the country's economic ambitions.[36] What might be one of the consequences of this confrontational urbanism is rising social unrest. As a result, these interdependencies provoke a dualistic vicious cycle of protest action and short-termed, urgent reactions (figure 3): Briefly, social unrest endangers the promoted positive image of a city that is of relevance in global inter-urban competition and for national worlding ambitions.[37] Therefore, it provokes urgent counteraction of the ruling authorities towards areas perceived to be sources of social unrest – most likely the urban peripheries. But in turn, common interventions such as resettlement and the introduction of repressive control mechanisms risk provoking new unrest as they hinder people's realisation of a right to the city.

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[33]   Cf. Chabbi (2009, pp. 139f, 2011, pp. 207f), Schiffler (1992, p. 91).

[34]   Cf. Dorman (2009, pp. 426ff); Khalifa (2013); Sims (2012, p. 68).

[35]   For general work on this subjects, cf. Durand-Lasserve (2006); Plessis (2005); for North African examples, Barthel (2008b); Berry-Chikhaoui (2010); Fahmi (2009); Khalil (2014); Mouloudi (2010).

[36]   King Mohammed VI, 2001, quoted in Ministère de l'Habitat, de l'Urbanisme et de la Politique de la Ville (2013, p. 49): "L'habitat insalubre continue de s'accroître [...]. Cette évolution risque [...] d'entraver les efforts de développement déployés [...], afin que nos villes [...] puissent drainer les investissements productifs, notamment dans le domaine touristique auquel nous attachons un intérêt particulier alors que la beauté architecturale et urbanistique constitue un des facteurs qui rehaussent l'attractivité de ce secteur en matière d'investissement."

[37]   Cf. Mayer (2014, p. 29).

Figure 2: The confrontation between two modes of urban development: The Nile City Towers in Cairo behind informal developments

Source: Author's picture, February 2015.

The working of the model illustrated in figure 3 is likely to create some sort of vicious cycle. I distinguish two perspectives, the perspective of the planners and the perspective of the people. Both groups act in a rational way according to their specific aspirations, respectively the world-class city and the right to the city. The dynamic of the model builds on the simple logic of action and reaction: The action of the one implicitly creates a threat to the aspiration of the other group and provokes some form of reaction, which again might be a risk to the aspirations of the former. In this regard, two assumptions have to be considered: The first assumption is a strong top-down hierarchy in urban politics with the nation-state as its most powerful player.[38] This is the basis for urban interventions reasoned by national worlding interests as described above. The second assumption of the model is an authoritarian state system without electoral pressures. Therefore, people's only way of influencing urban policy is through putting social pressure on the government, for example by means of social unrest.

Consequently, the primary goal of urban policy in North Africa is the creation of the economically prosperous world-class city that results in the need for international place branding and competition. As long as people's struggle for the right to the city does not negatively impact this goal, urban integration can be neglected. However, if the failure of urban integration results in the emergence of informal settlements and, further, in the spread of social unrest or even extremism, city planners are forced to intervene where they perceive potential threats to the worlding strategies. Urban peripheries are most likely to be at the

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[38] For the case of Maghreb cities, cf. Zaki (2011, p. 16ff).

centre of these interventions due to their common stigmatisation as breeding grounds for unrest, criminal behaviour and extremism.[39]

Then, according to Rachik's explanations of the urbanism of urgency, governments react with urgent strategies ranging from appeasement on the one hand and repression on the other. Typically these measures include the increase (or the announcement of the increase) in the production of social housing, evictions and demolitions, the displacement of informal settlements, the reinforcement of patronage systems, or the limitation of access to public space.[40] The prior motivation for such interventions is not to improve disadvantaged living conditions as a consequence of failed urban inclusion, but rather to eliminate the mere symptoms of urban failure that present a risk to the aspiration of the world-class city image. Instead of finding long-term integrative solutions, these measures are rather short-term and risk a reduction of complex causes of unrest to specific topics such as the question of housing. Problems are shifted away from city centres to the urban outskirts, where social housing not only lacks inclusion.[41] Sharpened segregation also risks a further aggravation of marginalised people's living conditions.[42]

Instead of providing alternatives to protest, social unrest or extremism, these measures pose new challenges for the realisation of the right to the city. According to Stokes' concept of slums of hope and despair[43], these measures are likely to transform slums of hope, where people try to realise their right to the city, into slums of despair. In these declining settlements people give up their dream of becoming fully integrated into the urban life and are likely to rebel. And the cycle would start again (figure 3).

Figure 3: A theory of dualistic urban development policy in North Africa

Source: Author's own design.

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[39]   Cf. Dorman (2009, p. 427); Zemni and Bogaert (2011, p. 409).

[40]   For the reinforcement of patronage systems refer to e.g. Miller and Nicholls (2013, p. 463).

[41]   Cf. Beier and Vilmondes Alves (2015); Shawkat (2014c).

[42]   Cf. Toutain (2013).

[43]   Stokes (1962).

According to these theoretical considerations, we can assume that the "Arab Spring" has, firstly, reinforced short-term political activities directed towards informal settlements and other marginalised areas. Secondly, one can assume continued efforts to market a re-established stability through the promotion of new world-class developments in cities like Cairo, Tunis or Casablanca. In this case, the "Arab Spring" would be comparable to a new step of an urbanism of urgency. I assume this in the case of Egypt and, in a different form, in the case of Morocco. However, in the case of Tunisia, the "Arab Spring", due to its remarkable political reconfigurations, may have resulted in efforts to overcome the vicious cycle of short-term reactive urban policy by initiating a way forward towards long-term strategies of sustainable and inclusive urban development. To answer these questions, the paper looks first at the (new) governments' perception of the role of the city in the "Arab Spring", considering this role an important factor of post-spring urban policy. Second, I will look at recent developments of the two identified principal urban policy fields, urban peripheries and urban worlding ambitions.

3   The Role of the City in the Arab Uprisings

The role of the city for social movements has been controversially discussed in academia[44], reaching from the notion of revolutionary "rebel cities"[45] to cities being incubators of contentious relations.[46] Concerning the "Arab Spring", this discussion has provoked very different views on the city's role ranging from the public notion of a placeless Facebook revolution to scholars seeing the "Arab Spring" as part of the struggle for a right to the city and as a re-appropriation of public space.[47] Certainly, new media and virtual spaces have played a significant role in the spread and organisation of the movements; nevertheless, the importance of mass demonstrations in real public space has remained decisive.[48]

The images of people squatting in Tahrir Square and protesting on Avenue Habib Bourguiba have developed a powerful dynamic that caught not only local observers. Scholars have highlighted this symbolic dimension and, linked to that, the centrality of public spaces as a significant aspect of rising media awareness.[49] In parallel, people have re-politicised public space through collective action and have transformed mere transport nodes into social places of interaction between almost all social classes.[50] This leads inevitably to the question of the role of marginalised communities: "maybe, the merge that happened on Tahrir Square and all over Egypt, the merge between all the social classes [...] shed light on the informal settlements. And it shed the light from these settlements the other way round."[51] And further, concerning Tunisia, Ayeb is sure: "when we look at the chronology of events, and especially

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[44]   Cf. Mayer (2014).
[45]   Harvey (2013).
[46]   Cf. Nicholls (2008).
[47]   Cf. Lopes de Souza and Lipietz (2011).
[48]   Cf. Al Sayyad and Guvenc (2015).
[49]   Cf. Al Sayyad and Guvenc (2015).
[50]   Cf. Lopes de Souza and Lipietz (2011).
[51]   M.A.S. (Cairo, 08.02.2015).

some key moments in the revolution, it is tempting to assume that it was a revolution [...] of the margin against the centre."[52]

Focussing on the role of marginalised communities, one needs to refer to the trigger of the Arab uprisings, the self-immolation of a street vendor in Sidi Bouzid, a small town in the impoverished hinterland of Tunisia. His drastic action of protest was immediately followed by solidarity protests of marginalised local communities of non-regulated settlements.[53] It marked a climax of a series of protests in the relatively underdeveloped non-coastal areas in the west and south of the country.[54] Therefore, it is not astonishing that several observers consider inter-regional disparities as one of the main drivers of the nationwide movement in Tunisia:

> Le problème, c'est les disparités. [...] La révolution a été déclenchée dans le centre-ouest. [...] C'est la région où la pauvreté était et est encore la plus importante – notamment la pauvreté urbaine. Donc, ce n'est pas par hasard que les choses ont commencé là-bas.[55]

Whereas interregional disparities have been the main causes for the revolutionary moment in Tunisia, Egypt's uprisings have been remarkably characterised by the participation of people suffering under an increasing intra-urban segregation. Without ignoring the fact that scholars have widely argued that the middle class has played a crucial role in the Egyptian uprisings, the more or less successful first revolts would not have been possible without the decisive support of thousands of ashwa'iyyat dwellers joining the mass demonstrations.[56] One participant in the demonstrations reports:

> On January 25, we were stuck on the bridge, blocked by the police. But suddenly a huge group of people from Imbaba appeared and they simply passed the police barrier. Thanks to the people of Imbaba we reached Tahrir Square that day.[57]

Comparable to the Tunisian case, the participation of marginalised communities was provoked by long-standing state oppression and humiliation. An urban activist testifies:

> People of the informal areas were definitely a main part of the protesting people. Not because of the informality they are living in. But because of the terrible experiences they had with the security institutions. They are considered criminals by the state and they are treated as criminals. The revolution was an opportunity to take revenge.[58]

Contrary to the movements in Egypt and Tunisia, the February 20 Movement in Morocco was rather unable to merge with people from popular neighbourhoods. This is one reason among others that explains why it did not reach the same dimension as the movements in Tunisia and

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[52]   Ayeb (2011, p. 470).

[53]   Cf. Ben Jelloul (2014).

[54]   Cf. Aleya-Sghaier (2014); Ayeb (2011); Ben Jelloul (2014); Chouikha and Gobe (2011).

[55]   H.G. (Tunis, 19.02.2015).

[56]   Cf. Abourahme (2013, p. 726); Saunders (2011, pp. 326f); and according to O.K. (Cairo, 10.02.2015).

[57]   T.S. (Cairo, 10.02.2015).

[58]   A.Bo. (Cairo, 09.02.2015).

Egypt.[59] However, one should not neglect the role of people in popular quarters as a specifically targeted group by the state as well as by the movement itself. Both tried to influence the inhabitants to foster or respectively prevent their participation in the demonstrations. The state not only used loyal associations to influence people, but also spread rumours denunciating the February 20 Movement:

> Il y a des associations qui sont pro-autorité. Ça c'est le premier porteur de cette rumeur [que les jeunes du 20 février sont contre le roi]. Deuxièmement il y a des personnes qui sont prêtres payés pour faire ce genre de trucs [de propager des rumeurs]. […] Le [mouvement du] 20 février, il a fait des sit-ins et des marches dans tous les quartiers populaires pour mobiliser les gens. Mais les gens étaient là pour regarder, mais ils n'ont pas manifesté. Tout simplement parce que l'information était déjà partie.[60]

Figure 4: New informal constructions (red bricks) close to the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Tunis

Source: Author's picture, February 2015.

Beside the active and crucial participation of informal settlement dwellers in the revolutionary movements, informal settlements also gained public awareness because of their horizontal and vertical expansion during the uprisings (see figure 4). Many people in all three countries used the lack of state control and the high social pressure on the state to build new informal constructions. In the case of Tunisia, an urban policy consultant testifies: "Il y a eu une explosion en 2011 des constructions anarchiques et il y a eu des […] quartiers entiers qui sont apparus."[61] After the revolution in Tunisia, the municipal police, responsible for the control of building codes, was dissolved and integrated into the national police. The national police has had other priorities than fighting informal auto-constructions. As a result, this led to a drastic increase in informal buildings and informal extension to existing houses – not only in poor

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[59] Another important reason was the ability of the monarchy to quickly adapt to the new challenges and to response proactively with slight democratic reforms, a new constitution, the announcement of new elections and several other appeasement measures (cf. Darif (2014); Maddy-Weitzman (2012)).

[60] A.Ba. (Casablanca, 26.03.2015).

[61] A.B.S. (Tunis, 17.02.2015). Cf. also Sims (2012, pp. 279ff); Toutain (2013, p. 104).

neighbourhoods. In Egypt, new informal constructions were also a widespread phenomenon between 2011 and 2013.[62] In Morocco, the phenomenon has been far less important than in Tunisia or Egypt. However, some attempts to build new non-regulated settlements have been reported from the southern region around Agadir.[63]

4 Urban Policy at the North African Urban Peripheries since 2011

A striking phenomenon of post-2011 urban policy in North Africa is the strengthened focus on poor informal settlements, popular quarters and other little-integrated communities. This reaffirmed consciousness of the urban peripheries seems explicable with the theoretical implications of the dualistic urban development policy (cf. Chapter 2) as well as with the specific significance of marginalised communities during the uprisings in all three considered countries (cf. Chapter 3). However, the way governmental urban planners focus on the urban peripheries differs and ranges from institutional changes to laissez-faire approaches, promises of social housing, settlement upgrading as well as evictions.

4.1 Egypt

In Egypt, efforts to develop informal settlements have proven to be ineffective during the pre-revolutionary years. In 2008, after a rockslide catastrophe in the informal settlement of Manshiyat Nasr, the immediately created Informal Settlement Development Fund (ISDF) pushed for a resettlement of people from so-called unsafe areas to the desert hinterland of Cairo. However, – if the displacement has been realised at all – the crucial socio-economic integration remains lacking.[64]

With the uprisings, informal settlements have returned into public awareness (cf. Chapter 3). Several private initiatives came up such as Ma'an (Together) of the Egyptian actor Mohamed Sobhy, which has started collecting money to construct a new town in the desert hinterland of Cairo for around 3,000 families leaving from unsafe areas.[65] This approach did not differ from what was realised by the ISDF.[66] In parallel, the new governmental strategy towards informal settlements has been oscillating between caution and control, appeasement and repression – very similar to Rachik's urbanism of urgency. At least in its first year the new government of Al-Sisi has found itself confronted with a dilemma: On the one hand, they had to get back the control of informal settlements, as they perceive them as a security risk due to their active role in the revolution and, in some cases, their propinquity to the Muslim brotherhood.[67] On the other hand, Al-Sisi could not afford to raise protests again but rather needed to get people on his side to stabilise his power and legitimacy.[68] Therefore, the government hesitated in using forced evictions to a visible extent, because the fear that the population of informal

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[62] Cf. Sims (2012, pp. 279ff).

[63] Cf. Toutain (2013, p. 104); and according to K.A. (Berlin, 15.11.2014).

[64] M.A.S. (Cairo, 08.02.2015).

[65] Cf. Sims (2013, pp. 81f); A.Bo (Cairo, 09.02.2015), O.K. (Cairo, 10.02.2015) and A.Z. (Cairo, 10.02.2015); http://ma3an.com.eg/en/ (05.01.2016).

[66] According to O.K. (Cairo, 10.02.2015).

[67] According to A.Bo. (Cairo, 10.02.2015) and A.Z. (Cairo, 10.02.2015).

[68] Cf. Al Dailami (2014, p. 164).

settlements would start protesting again was higher compared to the pre-revolutionary period.[69] Instead, strategies concentrated on more inclusive, showcase projects as well as on the provision of social housing. Part of this cautious appeasement approach was certainly the inauguration of a complete new Ministry of Urban Renewal and Informal Settlements (MURIS) headed by the highly respected Laila Iskander in June 2014. The MURIS promoted a new, more community-based and participative approach of informal settlement upgrading – together with several academics and private initiatives. Laila Iskander herself affirmed several times her rejection of forced evictions and that time Al-Sisi also confirmed his preference for innovative participatory approaches.[70]

> In Maspero Triangle, it was expected of the army to bulldoze a lot of houses. But there are a lot of cautions about these impacts because people can still be angry. There is a certain fear of protests. Now, with the new MURIS they are trying to cooperate with initiatives like Madd [...]. I think the new president wants to get people on his side. So, he is supporting the approach of the MURIS. [...] I think the forced eviction is still but they are not willing to use it because it is a threat at this moment.[71]

Other housing policies have also contributed to the appeasement strategy. First, the new constitution contains the right to adequate housing for the first time.[72] Second, shortly after the first revolution in 2011, the new regime announced a new Social Housing Project (SHP) calling for the construction of one million housing units. In 2014, under Al-Sisi, negotiations regarding its realisation started with the Dubai-listed company Arabtec and were finalised in spring 2015. Though, only 11% of the total number of units planned to be implemented during fiscal years 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 have been completed, and only 57 families have benefitted from a new flat.[73] Observers – in line with the theoretical model of this paper – consider these housing programmes as ineffective, non-demand orientated and unsustainable. They point to the high number of vacant and unfinished housing units that are either kept empty for speculative purposes or because nobody wants to move in.[74] Furthermore, social housing rather serves electoral, clientelistic and strategic purposes.

> When Al-Sisi was running for presidency, each and everyone said: 'Guys, we will be having 1 million housing units! We have [solved] the problem of housing'. By the way, we have not. We really have other problems. We do have problems of the way that the Ministry of Housing is building their own houses. We are speaking about the quality of housing.[75]

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[69] However, this does not mean that forced evictions have stopped completely. The database of the Housing and Land Rights Network (HLNR) lists some incidences (cf. http://hic-mena.org/violationsearch.php, 06.01.2016).

[70] According to M.A.S. (Cairo, 08.02.2015) and A.Z. (Cairo, 10.02.2015).

[71] A.Bo. (Cairo, 10.02.2015). Madd, established in 2011, is a platform of urban professionals that initiated the Maspero Parallel Participatory Project. For the Maspero Triangle, see figure 5.

[72] Cf. Boumediene (2014).

[73] Cf. Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (2014, p. 51).

[74] Cf. Shawkat (2014a, 2014b), and according to M.A.S. (Cairo, 08.02.2015).

[75] A.Z. (Cairo, 10.02.2015).

Figure 5: Maspero Triangle (on the left), one of the oldest informal settlements in Cairo, threatened by eviction due to its prime location

Source: Author's picture, February 2015.

Besides the appeasement, Al-Sisi's coming into power has led to more restrictive measures. One needs to mention the demolition of recently built, but not yet occupied informal apartment houses in the neighbourhood of Maadi in April 2014 and the demolition of almost 1,000 housing units in 'Izbat an-Nakhl in February 2014.[76] Then, after the establishment of the MURIS, no documented forced evictions took place in Cairo until the second half of 2015 when state authorities demolished the homes of approximately 300 families in Gizeh.[77] Since then, the strategy of the government has drifted more and more away from appeasement towards stricter control and repressive measures. The power of Al-Sisi seems to have stabilised and the fear of terrorism has created an atmosphere of widespread tolerance among the population towards more state and security control.[78]

> Before the Egyptian Uprising in 25 January 2011, we as housing rights activists have reached understanding on a number of principles related to the right to adequate housing with the former regime. Now, there is a derogation of such principles however, the right to adequate housing was adopted in the Egyptian Constitution for the first time in 2013![79]

Moreover, as a consequence of a cabinet reshuffle the MURIS was merged with the Ministry of Housing headed by Mostafa Madbuly while pushing Laila Iskander out of her position. Madbuly has been hardly known for inclusive approaches. In particular, he was the founding

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[76] Cf. Schechla (2014).
[77] See again the HLNR database (http://hic-mena.org/violationsearch.php, 06.01.2016).
[78] Cf. Tibe (2015).
[79] Tibe (2015).

father of the Cairo2050 vision, an ambitious project that aimed at restructuring the capital and which was blamed for its ignorance towards informal settlements (see chapter 5).

4.2 Tunisia

Whereas the Egyptian government has focused on informal settlements, the primary concern of Tunisian urban policy is about reducing disparities between cities. In this sense, urban policy is particularly concerned with communities in the underdeveloped centre regions of Tunisia without ignoring the urban peripheries of more developed coastal cities.

> Si on revient déjà à la cause de la révolution, c'était les disparités régionales [...]. C'est pour cela qu'il faut repenser la question du développement territorial pour assurer plus d'équilibre entre les régions en matière de développement.[80]

Tunisian strategies to guarantee more territorial equality are based on reforms concerning political and administrative decentralisation. Decentralisation builds on the new constitution, promulgated in January 2014 that guarantees all local entities financial autonomy and proper financial resources. Practically, this should be realised considering at least four different aspects, namely more local financial resources and transparency, increased local decision-making authority, enhanced community participation and local capacity building.

The increase of the local entities' budget is a starting point. So far, central authorities have distributed less than four percent of the national budget to local authorities – in a hardly transparent way.[81] A first step was the implementation of a new inter-communal financial redistribution fund that aims at improving the financial resources of smaller and poorer municipalities.[82] Moreover, the non-governmental Al Bawsala organisation has started an initiative called "Marsad baladia" (Municipality Observatory) to supervise the disposal of municipal budgets and to prevent corruption. It is based on one of the first post-revolutionary laws ensuring the access to administrative information for every citizen.[83]

> We decided to provide information that can give an objective basis to judge municipalities' services. [W]e request financial resources, human resources, and other resources like equipment, real estate, etc. And then, how do they translate these resources into projects. We requested a list about all the development projects that they have. And then, to better understand the decision making process, we requested the meeting minutes of the decision-making sessions of these municipal councils. And the idea behind that is that the citizen has to understand the decision making process in order to be able to intervene.[84]

The quotation also demonstrates the increase of local electoral pressure, the second aspect. Rachik's urbanism of urgency assumes the non-existence of an electoral pressure, which allows the authorities to ignore the urban peripheries as long as their population does not

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[80] S.H. (Tunis, 16.02.2015).
[81] Turki (2014, p. 87).
[82] The Fonds de Coopération entre les Collectivités Locales was established in December 2012 (décret n° 2797 du 08.07.2013).
[83] Décret-loi n° 2011-41 du 26.05.2011.
[84] C.B. (Tunis, 15.02.2015).

revolt.[85] Hence, an increase in electoral pressure reduces the likelihood of neglecting the urban peripheries. In Tunisia, observers highlight the importance of local electoral pressure as a way to improve political efforts and to decrease mistrust between governed and governing people.

> Cette démocratie de proximité est la clé de tout. Lorsqu'on dit 'personnalisé', c'est adapté au contexte local. Et cette remontée d'information va devoir se faire avec les citoyens, avec les conseils municipaux élus par ces citoyens-là. Ces prises de décision vont devoir les représenter. Sinon, il y aura une sanction après la nouvelle élection.[86]

The new constitution allows for making municipalities accountable for their actions through the direct election of municipal councils. Pre-revolutionary municipal councils were replaced by so-called special delegations that managed municipalities until the municipal elections. However these elections have yet to be realised, although they were scheduled for 2015.

The third approach for ensuring a better interregional balance through decentralisation is citizen participation. It does not only translate decentralisation into action on the ground, but local governments try to regain trust and to re-convince people of the usefulness of municipalities and of politics in general.[87] Hence, the neglect of citizen participation and the lack of mutual respect contributed to the general feeling of dissatisfaction that consequently led to the protests in 2011.[88] Several local authorities have begun undertaking participatory projects at different levels. For example, some municipalities have empowered their citizens to take part in the municipal budget planning or have reserved a specific part of the budget for citizens to decide on its use.[89] Furthermore, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), with its programme CoMun, has been particularly engaged in promoting the participation of youth and female citizens. Still other municipalities have started improving their proximity with citizens through the use of information technologies in accordance to the smart city concept.

> Une municipalité modèle, c'est la municipalité de Sayada. […] Cette une municipalité ouverte. Ils ont fait une plateforme internet où tous les citoyens peuvent accéder à tous les projets, les procédures, etc. […] Ce n'est pas seulement l'information, c'est aussi la participation.[90]

However, the long search for a new widely accepted location of waste disposals has also highlighted the limits of citizen participation. Prior to that, citizen protests against open waste disposals of the Ben Ali era had forced the municipality to immediately close them – without having alternatives. Nobody was willing to accept a location close to one's own property.[91]

Strengthening local governance capacities in less developed municipalities is the fourth aspect and can also be regarded as another pre-condition for enhanced citizen participation. Some

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[85] Rachik (2002, p. 190).

[86] A.B.S. (Tunis, 17.02.2015).

[87] According to C.B. (Tunis, 15.02.2015), S.H. (Tunis, 16.02.2015) and H.G. (Tunis, 19.02.2015).

[88] A.B.S. (Tunis, 17.02.2015).

[89] According to I.S. (Tunis, 16.02.2015) and H.G. (19.02.2015).

[90] N.D. (Tunis, 18.02.2015).

[91] I.S. (Tunis, 16.02.2015).

poorer municipalities face difficulties in managing their new responsibilities due to a lack in financial and human capital.[92] At the moment, international organisations play an important role for capacity building for local authorities and in promoting good governance. An example is the Programme d'Appui à la Gouvernance Urbaine et Développement Econo-mique Local (PAGUDEL). This programme, initiated by the international cooperation agency of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG International), has begun increasing local authorities' capacity for the planning and managing of urban development.[93]

Beyond decentralisation, the continuation of urban upgrading in informal settlements remains important. In 2012, the fourth edition of the PNRQP, mainly financed by the French development agency AFD, was replaced by the Programme d'Appui à la Politique de la Ville (PAPV).[94] The programme comprises of an € 218 million investment in the requalification of popular, mostly informal settlements. PAPV is financed by the Tunisian government (40%), donations of the European Union (EU) and the AFD (28%) and loans from the European Investment Bank (32%). According to several experts, the programme has kept its so-called catch-up design, concentrating on infrastructure provision. Only the focus has slightly shifted towards the impoverished regions to diminish interregional disparities.[95]

In general, the Tunisian case shows less short-term and urgent urban action but rather is slowly installing the fundaments of a decentralised and inclusive urban policy. Evidence of this is the reluctance to sanction new informal constructions – which is also the result of the police's priority shift towards fighting the threats of a still fragile state system.[96] Other evidence is the current expert-based drafting process of a new, more inclusive and comprehensive housing strategy that should replace the above mentioned catch-up programmes in informal settlements.[97] However, current urban policy also needs to face immediate problems like the increase in housing prices, in particular in Tunis. This increase was primarily caused by the influx of a high number of wealthy Libyan refugees due to the crisis in their country. Especially students and lower middle class people now face difficulties to find adequate accommodation.[98] Moreover, the high youth unemployment, little economic growth and Islamic fundamentalism are challenges that could foil comprehensive urban strategies, reviving less sustainable but more repressive and urgent urban policy interventions.

4.3 Morocco

Morocco's urban policy has been far less affected by the Arab uprisings since 2011. Major changes had occurred in the first half of the 2000s with the establishment of wide-ranging new urban programmes such as the Villes sans Bidonvilles (VSB) programme as well as the

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[92] According to C.B. (Tunis, 15.02.2015), A.B.S (Tunis, 17.02.2015) and H.G. (Tunis, 19.02.2015).

[93] According to H.G. (Tunis, 19.02.2015).

[94] The AFD uses the name Programme d'Appui à la Politique de la Ville (PAPV). The Tunisian partner agency, l'Agence de Réhabilitation et de Rénovation Urbaine (ARRU), calls it Programme de Réha-bilitation et d'Intégration des Quartiers d'Habitation (PRIQH). Information can be found on the website of the ARRU (http://www.arru.nat.tn/index.php?id=459, 06.01.2016).

[95] According to S.H. (16.02.2015) and A.B.S. (Tunis, 17.02.2015).

[96] According to S.H. (16.02.2015), A.B.S. (Tunis, 17.02.2015) and H.G. (Tunis, 19.02.2015).

[97] According to A.B.S. (17.02.2015) and Ministère de l'équipement, de l'habitat et de l'aménagement du territoire (2014).

[98] According to N.D. and G.M. (Tunis, 18.02.2015) as well as A.A. (Tunis, 16.02.2015).

Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Humain (INDH).[99] However, the February 20 Movement and the uprisings in other Arab countries have impacted existing modes of urban policy. Similar to the other case studies, these readjustments primarily focussed on popular quarters and marginalised communities. This is best expressed by the renaming of the old ministry of housing into Ministère de l'Habitat et de la Politique de la Ville (MHPV).

> C'est un nom qui a une histoire et une connotation en France. Politique de la ville, c'est une politique destinée aux quartiers défavorisés, les banlieues, les HLM […]. Au ministère de l'habitat, le ministre était clair: Pour lui, la politique de la ville, c'est les quartiers défavorisés. Parce que les villes, c'est une urgence. Alors ca, c'est une première rupture qui a été consacrée après le printemps Arabe.[100]

Minor readjustments also affected the VSB programme that aims at eradicating all bidonvilles (shantytowns) in Morocco by means of resettlement and demolitions (see figure 6). As the programme was initiated after suicide attacks of bidonvilles dwellers in the city centre of Casablanca in 2003, it can be considered as a typical expression of the urbanism of urgency.[101] The implementation of the programme has for a long time lagged behind – especially in Casablanca. Since 2011, the speed of implementation has re-increased.[102]

> This is what I felt was expressed in my conversation with people that live in the slums, with people who are aware of the dynamics of what is going on in this process of being moved and I think they will definitely say that the government is trying to do more after 2011.[103]

Figure 6: The demolition of informal developments in Hay Mohammadi, Casablanca, in June 2015

Source: Private, June 2015.

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[99] Cf. Philifert (2014).

[100] T.H. (Rabat, 24.03.2015).

[101] Cf. Bogaert (2011) and according to T.H. (Rabat, 24.03.2015).

[102] Cf. Toutain (2013, pp. 104f).

[103] N.E. (Casablanca, 22.03.2015).

Beside security-related reasons, this is also explained by political incidents in 2011. Thanks to a well-balanced speech by King Mohammed VI, the new constitution guaranteeing the right to adequate housing and the victory of the PJD,[104] people in popular quarters felt more positive about new housing: "When those people started giving these promises and advocating these initiatives, people believed it more. [...] There is a more positive opinion than before."[105] The PJD, which has a remarkable voter base in popular quarters, tried to prove their commitment by an accelerated production of new housing in the framework of the VSB programme.[106]

Moreover, the INDH programme, which mainly operates in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, further expanded in 2012. The INDH is essentially based on the engagement of associations offering sporting, social, cultural and educational activities in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. They can apply for funds at the Ministry of the Interior, which manages the programme, and are quite popular amongst people living in popular quarters. However, academic observers view the INDH also as a way to depoliticise and co-opt civil society through the promotion of associations.[107]

The cooptation of associations to prevent resistance dates back to the 1980s. Then governing bodies, in their capacity of an enabling state, began inciting people to build up associations in order to assist the public authorities in its activities. However, the creation of associations had security-related motivations as well. The events during the spring of 2011 have demonstrated the way this patronage system works.

> Par exemple à Salé, le caïd[108] de l'arrondissement, il a invité des présidents des associations et quelques notables des quartiers populaires et il leur a dit: 'On vous prépare des banderoles qui […] soutiennent la monarchie, qui sont contre le mouvement du 20 Février. Allez-y, mobilisez-vous […] !' Ça s'est passé pendant le printemps marocain.[109]

From a governmental point of view, this strategy was successful (cf. chapter 3). Even existing protest groups against the demolition of houses for the construction of the Royal Avenue in Casablanca (see figure 7) or against the eviction of people in informal settlements in the VSB programme (see figure 6) have denied any cooperation with the February 20 Movement. It seems that the anti-royalist stigmatisation of the movement was crucial in order to prevent further engagement by people from popular quarters.

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[104] Cf. Ruf (2013).

[105] N.E. (Casablanca, 22.03.2015).

[106] According to N.E. (Casablanca, 22.03.2015).

[107] According to T.H. (Rabat, 24.03.2015) and M.E.M. (Rabat, 25.03.2015).

[108] The caïd represents the central authority on the lowest local level, the urban administrative quarter.

[109] M.E.M. (Rabat, 25.03.2015).

Figure 7: A royalist house owner protests against his eviction caused by the construction of the Royal Avenue in the medina of Casablanca

Source: Author's picture, March 2015.

5   Urban Worlding Ambitions since 2011

With the turn of the last century, urban megaprojects have become a crucial and widespread element of urban policy in North Africa. Most often they are realised by public-private developers and with support of external stakeholders such as the Gulf countries.[110] Examples are the Lake Tunis projects, the waterfront projects Casablanca Marina and Bouregreg valley between Rabat and Salé as well as the Cairo2050 vision. According to the conceptual model, we have to expect unchanged planning aspirations to world-class urban megaprojects. The Arab uprisings have negatively impacted the attractiveness of the affected countries for foreign investment and tourism.[111] From the new governments' perspective, this means strong socio-economic pressure to promote new stability and a favourable investment climate. In line with the worlding cities concept, this might be the fertile ground of other urban megaprojects as a way to market the countries' regained progress and stability.

The most remarkable example of urban worlding ambitions in North Africa prior to 2011 was Cairo2050. Through this outstanding and dimensionless assemblage of megaprojects, trans-forming the city of Cairo into a world-class city full of touristic sites and futuristic sky-scrapers, the ambitious planners aimed at showing the international significance and power of Egypt.[112] However, Cairo2050 was not only criticised for being rather a hyperreal copy of Dubai, but also for its incommensurate and exclusive character – in particular concerning the

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[110]   Cf. Adham (2014); Barthel (2008a, 2014); Elsheshtawy (2004).

[111]   Cf. Hopfinger (2014).

[112]   Cf. Adham (2014); General Organization of Physical Planning (2009); Sims (2012, pp. 88f); Tarbush (2012).

informal settlements that were simply "over-planned".[113] With the Arab uprisings, Cairo2050 disappeared and was declared an urban fantasy rather than a realistic plan. Ongoing critique, appeasement strategies as well as the fear of planners to be assimilated with a project closely tied to the Mubarak regime were the key reasons for its suspension.[114] However, the ideas behind did not disappear. In 2012, speculation emerged about a revisited strategy called Egypt2052 that would have eliminated all problematic aspects of Cairo2050.[115] With the appointment of Mustafa Madbuly as the new Minister of Housing in 2013, experts were convinced that Cairo2050 was back.[116] Madbuly had headed the General Organization of Physical Planning (GOPP), which had announced Cairo2050 in 2009. But there remains a lot of uncertainty and speculation about how Cairo2050 will look like in the future. New plans and projects have not been published, yet.

> It is different while it is the same. It is a different name, only a different name. But the mindset that created Egypt2052 is the same mindset that created Cairo2050. So, they are almost the same in their outcomes.[117]

Suspending large urban projects is not a solution for the Egyptian government for two reasons: First, there is the urgent need for the government to attract increased investment for economic reasons.[118] Secondly, worlding practices are essential to the Egyptian government, who perceives itself as a major regional power. However, it seems the way the government pursues Cairo2050 has changed. As the first version of Cairo2050 would have caused massive forced evictions, it became negatively associated with a non-people-centred top-down approach to urban policy – a potential source of unrest and protest. Consequently, the presentation of an overall strategy has been avoided and replaced by a number of sub-projects. This also shows a list of new urban projects that were launched in Egypt in the years 2011 and 2012.[119]

> What Cairo2050 turned to be now, I think, they were smart to understand what exactly the problem was. As for the problem, it was presenting the whole project as one project. [...] So, what did they do? Everyone was saying: 'No, there is no Cairo2050 anymore. There is Maspero project, there is Imbaba project.' Actually, all these areas that were part of Cairo2050 are now presented as separated projects.[120]

In March 2015, a new megaproject was born when Madbuly presented plans to build a completely new capital in the east of Cairo. The removed capital should function as the new administrative centre, housing all ministries, the parliament as well as a new international airport. The outstanding project size, its official comparison with other world-class cities and the very short implementation period are typical characteristics of worlding city projects.[121]

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[113] Cf. Sims (2012, pp. 278f); Tarbush (2012).
[114] Cf. Deknatel (2012); Tadamun (2014) and according to A.Z. (Cairo, 10.02.2015).
[115] Cf. Deknatel (2012); Tadamun (2014).
[116] According to O.K. and A.Z. (Cairo, 10.02.2015).
[117] M.A.S. (Cairo, 08.02.2015).
[118] Cf. Al Dailami (2014, p. 168).
[119] Cf. Barthel and Vignal (2014, p. 66).
[120] A.Z. (Cairo, 10.02.2015).
[121] Cf. Noueihed and Georgy (2015).

Also, the official website of the developer group picks up several global urban blueprints and frames that emphasise its international ambitions and will underlie the design of the new capital.[122]

Beyond the Gulf, Morocco is certainly among the Arab countries with the highest number of urban megaprojects, which aim to "express prestige and modernity."[123] The development of the Royal Avenue and CasaMarina in Casablanca (figure 8), the Bouregreg Valley waterfront project and the TangerMed megaport in northern Morocco are prime examples of this strategic urban policy. Most of the megaprojects stand in line with the monarch's general aim to develop Morocco into one of the 20 most frequented tourist destinations of the world by 2020.[124] King Mohammed VI has often highlighted the role of cities for the development of the tourism sector: "[D]ans le domaine touristique […] la beauté architecturale et urbanistique constitue un des facteurs qui rehaussent l'attractivité de ce secteur en matière d'investisse-ment."[125] The Arab uprisings have not considerably impaired the realisation of megaprojects. In contrast, it is likely that the turmoil and uncertainty in other Arab tourism and investment destinations have positively affected Morocco's ambitious urban plans:

> Le fait qu'il y avait un climat instable dans les pays qui étaient les concurrents du Maroc – je parle de l'attraction touristique – [...] là, le Maroc il en a bien profité. [...] Pour inciter les investisseurs le Maroc a fait pas mal d'incitations, pas mal de choses, et puis par rapport aux touristes aussi.[126]

Since 2011, new urban projects have been launched, often partly or completely financed with money from the Gulf. Examples are the Health Care City and a golf residential project both located in Marrakech and developed by the Emirati group Tasweek.[127] Furthermore, in May 2014, King Mohamed VI launched a series of projects called "Rabat Ville Lumière, Capitale Marocaine de la Culture" that aims at developing the capital into a globally recognised metropolis. Thereby, the Moroccan case illustrates the close interrelation between urban worlding practices and individuals' realisation of the right to the city at the urban peripheries. For example, the construction of the Royal Avenue in Casablanca has continued, disregarding protests against eviction and displacement of affected people (see figure 7). And also in a more indirect way, the preference for resettlement practices instead of in-situ upgrading has continued to be justified by worlding ambitions.

> La corniche va être fait où il y a des immeubles touristiques et tout ça. Il y a d'autres choix que de reloger des gens à l'intérieur de la ville […] Rabat c'est la capitale. Donc à mon opinion, la vision d'une ville de lumière c'est une vision globale parce que l'on doit avoir une capitale à la hauteur. Mais il y a des contraintes, il y a des problèmes, même à Rabat il y a des bidonvilles.[128]

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[122] Cf. http://thecapitalcairo.com/ (08.01.2015).

[123] Cf. Barthel and Planel (2010, p. 178).

[124] Ministère du Tourisme (n. y.).

[125] King Mohammed VI in 2001, quoted in Ministère de l'Habitat, de l'Urbanisme et de la Politique de la Ville (2013, p. 49).

[126] T.H. (Rabat, 24.03.2015).

[127] Cf. Barthel and Vignal (2014, p. 66).

[128] A.A. (Rabat, 20.03.2015).

Figure 8: The construction of the CasaMarina waterfront project in Casablanca

Source: Author's picture, March 2015.

In Tunisia, public-private partnerships to develop urban worlding projects date back to the 1980s when state authorities concluded an agreement with a Saudi Arabian investment group concerning the waterfront development of the northern shore of Lake Tunis. This practice of urbanism culminated in the launch of several new urban megaprojects like "Tunis Sports City" and the "Mediterranean Gate" during the mid-2000s. These projects lacked considerable social and spatial integration, as Emirati developers merely copied and pasted Dubai models.[129] With the political change in 2011 it became obvious that these projects, instead of following a public interest, had been heavily affected by corruption and misappropriation of the Ben Ali family and closest circles. Prime locations around Lake Tunis were sold to Gulf investors for ridiculously low prices.[130] Consequently, public authorities questioned the legitimacy of urban mega-projects and the realisation of Bukhatir's Tunis Sport City and Sama Dubai's Mediterranean Gate has remained blocked. Furthermore, the economic crisis contributed to the retrieval of Gulf investors.

Nevertheless, inspired by Keynesian economics and Franck's attention economy, the Tunisian government still considers megaprojects as a chance to boost both national demand and touristic attractiveness. Due to the difficult economic situation, characterised by high unemployment and shrinking tourist numbers, a complete turn-away from urban megaprojects is not an option. Instead, Barthel and Vignal indicate some change in the mode of operation: For example, Saudi developers left the megaproject Taparura in Sfax that is now financed and supported within the framework of the European "Union for the Mediterranean". Also, it has become more open towards the inclusion of civil society.[131] However, it is doubtful whether these are more general changes in the planning of urban megaprojects or whether it remains an exception. Recently, official statements indicated that Sama Dubai and Bukhatir are back in Tunisia, willing to continue with their aforementioned "copy and paste" projects in the

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[129]   Cf. Barthel (2008a, 2014).
[130]   Cf. Barthel and Vignal (2014).
[131]   Barthel and Vignal (2014: 62); Union for the Mediterranean (2015).

course of 2016. Moreover, in September 2014, a consortium of more than 50 international investors launched the megaproject "Tunisia Economic City" in Enfidha, a small town located next to Hammamet International Airport near Sousse. They not only promise thousands of new jobs and an increase in tourism. According to the developers, the new city should also manifest Tunisia's global economic ambitions and its geostrategic significance – typical worlding strategies. The new developments and the variety of new investors underline the impression of an increased international interest in supporting and shaping the recent development of Tunisia after the end of political turmoil.

6 Conclusion

Urban policy in North Africa is characterised by its dualistic nature. In this sense, the primary goal of national urban policy is the realisation of worlding ambitions. Worlding means that cities in North Africa are emerging into the era of globalisation. They develop into globally branded and sold products out of modern glass and steel, compete with other presumed world-class cities and aim at attracting international investors as well as tourists. Very much linked to that is a feeling of national pride and the wish to manifest supranational power. A challenge to this kind of urbanism is any event or condition that endangers the positive and sellable image of the city. Uprisings, riots or any other kind of social unrest are such challenges from the perspective of the government. The desire to reinstall the condition before the uprisings leads to an urbanism of urgency that was first documented by Rachik in the case of Casablanca. However, this kind of urban policy is only directed towards the symptoms of social problems, but not its basic causes. In the Arab world, social pressure on the government has initiated interventions at the urban peripheries such as the demolition or upgrading of informal settlements, the announcement of social housing programmes or more control of popular quarters. Out of these conceptual thoughts and empirical experiences, the paper has assessed whether the recent turmoil in North Africa has provoked similar short-termed and reactive interventions again or initiated new sustainable strategies to overcome failures of past urban development.

Against this background, the paper has explored two different dimensions that have influenced post-2011 urban policies. Firstly, it considered the political dimension, meaning the political impacts of the uprisings and revolutions: the reinstallation of authoritarian structures in Egypt, the political reforms in Morocco and the fundamental democratic transition in Tunisia. Secondly, it examined the urban dimension, the planners' perspective on the role of the city as a trigger or catalyser of the Arab uprisings. The characteristics of and the extent to which both dimensions have contributed to the shaping of post-2011 urban policies differ from country to country. Whereas the general framework of the political dimension might be relatively easy to assess, only a close look at the local context of the protest movements, including past urban development, makes it possible to capture the specific urban dimension.

In Egypt, intra-urban disparities have played a major catalysing role during the revolts. The multifaceted frustrations and humiliations people of informal settlements had experienced under the Mubarak regime motivated them to decisively take part in the protests. This urban dimension combined with the current political situation, the new authoritarian military

government, has led to an urgent political attention to marginalised neighbourhoods, stigmatised as a potential source of further social unrest. Expressions of this attention are the announcement of new social housing, further demolitions of ashwa'iyyat as well as the short period of the MURIS. Meanwhile, urban worlding ambitions seem to have even accelerated thanks to the announcement of building a new administrative capital and the continuation of the Cairo2050 megaproject. Therefore, it is likely that practices of a dualistic urbanism will continue, manifested in breathtaking world-class ambitions and secured by an urbanism of urgency of a strong state.

In Morocco, the February 20 Movement did not fundamentally change the political system in the "Moroccan spring". However, in 2011, the semi-authoritarian monarchy held new elections that, for the first time in history, brought the Islamist PJD to power. In addition, the new constitution, shifting power slightly from the monarch to the parliament, entered into force. By these minor adjustments, the monarchy has proven its capacity to adapt and prevent further unrest. Also due to that, urban issues played a subordinate role in the course of the February 20 Movement. Since the turn of the millennium, Morocco has experienced similar but not as extremely dualistic urban policies as Egypt. This general frame of urban policy has not changed with the Arab uprisings. Current practices of an urbanism of urgency such as the VSB programme have been strengthened and all major cities have developed urban megaprojects. The government succeeded by means of patronage to prevent the merge of the February 20 Movement with parallel protests against eviction.

The 2011 revolution in Tunisia was notably caused by inter-urban disparities. They gave rise to a general feeling of alienation among citizens in the marginalised regions of Tunisia, where the "Arab Spring" originated. Civil society groups, urban researchers as well as the post-2011 governments themselves have considered the reduction of inter-urban disparities as the principal goal of current urban policy. Unlike Egypt and Morocco, Tunisia has left the paths of pre-2011 urban policy by conceptualising new decentralised and inclusive local governance schemes as the basis of future urban policy. Obviously, the political context, such as the establishment of more democratic structures and the creation of more electoral pressure on the local level, has fundamentally contributed to these developments. However, the establishment of more inclusive and sustainable urban policies is only at its beginning. The economic crisis and shrinkages in the tourism sector have also led to a new push for urban megaprojects such as Tunisia Economic City. The pressure on the housing market, lingering low development opportunities in the central regions and in particular the lack of opportunities for youth in many disadvantaged neighbourhoods remain a challenge to long-term strategies.

In general, the analysis of changes in North African urban policies after the Arab uprisings is only in the beginning. Perhaps with the exception of Morocco, one has to deal with a lot of uncertainties about the future direction of urban development. More research is needed which elaborates in more detail on specific sub-fields of urban policy such as social housing, the development of informal settlements and urban megaprojects. However, this study has also shown that the "Arab Spring" has been a considerable driver of current urban policies in North Africa. Future research has to keep in mind the importance of the national political context as well as local specificities of the "Arab Spring" and, linked to it, its country-specific urban dimensions.

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