

Peter Graf (Hg.)

Der Islam im Westen
– der Westen im Islam

V&R unipress



Leihgabe an die Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft

Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek

Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.ddb.de> abrufbar.

1. Aufl. 2004
© 2004 Göttingen, V&R unipress GmbH
mit Universitätsverlag Osnabrück
Einbandgestaltung: Tevfik Göktepe

Alle Rechte vorbehalten
Printed in Germany

ISBN 3-89971-150-5

Inhalt

KARDINAL DR. FRANZ KÖNIG

Grußwort zur Eröffnung der Konferenz am 28.10.2002
»Der Islam im Westen, der Westen im Islam«..... 13

CHRISTIAN WULFF

Grußwort des Niedersächsischen Ministerpräsidenten zur Eröffnung des
Projekts »Islamischer Religionsunterricht in deutscher Sprache –
wissenschaftliche Weiterbildung von LehrerInnen«..... 15

PETER GRAF

Vorwort.....17

PETER GRAF

Der Islam im Westen, der Westen im Islam 21

Teil 1: Bildungspolitische Kontextbedingungen..... 33

RAINER KÜNZEL

Der Islam im Westen, der Westen im Islam – Neue Aufgaben in der
Lehrerbildung..... 35

DALIL BOUBAKEUR

Islam in Europa – die französische Erfahrung 39

HASSAN HANAFI

Islam and the West – Clash or Dialogue? 47

ABDULLAH HANNA

Das bürgerliche Europa und der arabische Orient..... 57

ALBRECHT FUESS	
Islam's Compatibility with Secularism	69
GHASSAN FINIANOS	
Der Islam, der Laizismus und die Demokratie	77
Teil 2: Religions-, friedens- und dialogpädagogischer Kontext.....	93
KERIM YAVUZ	
Probleme der religiösen Erziehung in der multikulturellen Familie und Gesellschaft	95
NASUHI ÜNAL KARAARSLAN	
Die religiöse Wahlfreiheit und ihre Ausübung im Islam	105
CEMAL TOSUN	
Islamischer Religionsunterricht in interkultureller und interreligiöser Perspektive	113
WINFRIED VERBURG	
Religionsunterricht in der religiös pluralen Gesellschaft – Konsequenzen für die Ausbildung der Religionslehrkräfte.....	133
DIETER WACKERBARTH	
Stellungnahme der Evangelischen Kirche zum islamischen Religionsunterricht an deutschen Schulen	139
MUALLA SELÇUK	
Some General Consideration on Interreligious Education in Turkey in the Context of Peace Education.....	143
PETER STÖGER	
Interreligiöser Dialog in Zeiten der Globalisierung und des Fundamentalismus.....	149

Teil 3: Migrations- und geschlechtsspezifische Aspekte 163

GABRIELE ERPENBECK

Die Situation muslimischer Frauen in Niedersachsen..... 165

EBRU AKTAN KEREM

Change of role concepts in modern times 169

CAVIDAN IMREN-ÇÖLTÜ

Die Reflexion des kulturellen und religiösen Erbes in der deutschsprachigen Literatur türkischer Autorinnen und Autoren 183

Teil 4: Entwicklungsperspektive einer Religionspädagogik für Muslime..... 199

DALIL BOUBAKEUR

Der interreligiöse Dialog als Faktor des sozialen Zusammenhalts in Europa und Instrument des Friedens im Mittelmeerraum 201

ELSAYED ELSHAHED

Religiös-ethische Erziehung als Interkulturelle Erziehung – Eine pädagogische Herausforderung für den Islam 211

PETER ANTES

Islamischer Religionsunterricht in modernen Gesellschaften 227

JOSEF LANGE

»Muslime im Dialog« als Eröffnungskonferenz des Bund-Länder-Projekts »Islamischer Religionsunterricht in deutscher Sprache. Wissenschaftliche Weiterbildung von LehrerInnen« an der Universität Osnabrück 237

PETER GRAF

Religiös-ethische Erziehung von muslimischen Schülern 241

Autorenverzeichnis 265

Albrecht Fuess

Islam's Compatibility with Secularism

1.0 Introduction

In response to the ›German Central Council of Muslims‹ ›Islamic Charta« that reaffirms Islam's compatibility with the rules and regulation of the German state, an anonymous *group of Muslims* launched an appeal to *all Muslims and truth seeking humans*. It states:

»We, as Muslims in Germany, feel forced to reply to the »Islamic Charta« because it claims to be Islamic, whereas each declaration in the name of Islam should derive from Islamic sources, i.e. koran and sunna, and this »charta« does not comply to this in its central teachings. (...) Because in Islam only God (Allah) has the highest authority over humans and has to be obeyed. (...) Muslims are not part of this (German) society nor any other society, they form their own distinct community, i.e. the Islamic umma, therefore we also completely reject the argument that Muslims as a minority have to integrate into the society. (...) Minority integration is not part of Islamic terminology. (...) The Central council of Muslims in Germany does use these terms in order to avoid sanctions by the state, but this is not the language of the Muslims. They prefer to speak a clear language even in times of sanctions and torture and they do not confound truth with lie, even when uttered by a pure heart.«¹

This anonymous *group of Muslims* represents only a marginal view in the German Muslim community, but nevertheless its demands reach a broad section of the German Muslim community through several means of communication like publications, mosque sermons and the Internet.

They disseminate simple messages and refer to »undisputed« Islamic creeds like the uniqueness of God and the five pillars (*ark n*) of Islam. By invoking common tropes they raise the suspicion of their co-believers only at

1 *Group of Muslims: »Stellungnahme zur »Islamischen Charta« des Zentralrats der Muslime in Deutschland vom 20.02.2002 und Appell an alle Muslime und wahrheitssuchenden Menschen«, circulated via Internet, 10.06.02: www.al-imaan.de/Artikel/Aktuell/Aktuell-Dateien/Stellungnahme_zur_islamischen_Charta.htm.*

second sight. Moreover, if we consider the fact that many Muslims in the West are at unease with certain customs and moral standards of their host country, we might understand that some are susceptible to the recruitment attempts of the Islamists.

This trend is amplified by the fact that many Muslim immigrants to Europe come from rural areas. Their encounter of an urban society is much more of a shock than for Muslims arriving from the middle class in their home countries. Middle class Muslims adapt much faster to new surroundings and public urban structures in the host countries, because they know them already well from their countries of origin.

In dealing with the topic »Islam in the West« one has to consider the deep religiosity of the Muslim community in Muslim countries and in the Muslim Diaspora in Europe. Whereas only 13% of white British say that religion is important to them, over 90 % of British Muslims with South Asian origins insist on the eminent role of faith in their life.² Therefore, we find a huge difference regarding the importance of religion. Not surprisingly Islam accompanies the devote Muslim throughout his daily routine also in Europe and it is certainly not that easy to keep religion in the private sphere as it is for most »part-time« Christians. Therefore some Muslim immigrants will find it hard to deal with everyday secularism, known in the west.

After all, secularism is a concept that originated in the West. People coming from totally different societies will need time to adjust, especially if they feel that their host country reacts hostile to their way of life and to their religious culture, qualifying it as backwards. Anyhow, both sides have to deal with reality as we are not likely to see large-scale conversions of Christian and Atheist Europeans to Islam nor Muslims renouncing their religion.

2.0 Islam and Secularism

We know already that Islamist groups are opposed to Western secular governments, but what about their attitude towards their Islamic home countries? Most followers of Islamic fundamentalist movements do not obey governments in Islamic states either, claiming that they are un-Islamic and already infected by the secular Western virus, by having introduced Western oriented penal codes, etc. For fundamental Islam this is already a trace of secularism.

2 MOODOD, Tariq: Muslime im säkularen britischen Multikulturalismus, in: Muslime im säkularen Rechtsstaat, hrsg. von Thomas Hartmann und Margret Kranich, Frankfurt 2001, S. 81.

Islamists reject the division of *dīn wa-dawla* (religion and the state) in the Islamic world and according to them every believer should only follow the true principles of Islam that the Islamists define.

Although the Islamists try to bomb the Islamic society back into what they believe was the Islamic Golden Age, i.e. the Arabian Peninsula at the time of the prophet in the seventh century, it has to be said that the concept of the unity of *dīn wa-dawla* is a very modern one. Obviously no textual evidence of this term has come to us prior to the 18th century.³ Before that time the expression *dīn wa-dunyā* (religion and world, whereby world is meaning here the duties of everyday life) was used to describe religious and public affairs. For some religious scholars like the important Damascene author of Mamluk times Ibn Taymīya (d. 1328) *dīn* and *dunyā* were intertwined. Accordingly, the »exercise of a public office is one of the most important duties of religion.«⁴ His vigorous views about the inseparability of official and religious duties of the Mamluk sultans were contested and therefore he was arrested by the Mamluk Sultan al-Nāsir Muhammad and died in prison in 1328⁵. We can remark that in this case the sword had more power than the pen, as it had been the case for most of the time of Islamic, especially Sunnite history.

The ideal of political and religious power in one hand had already ended with the era of the *rāshidūn*-caliphs⁶ and the murder of the fourth successor of the Prophet Muhammad, the caliph 'Alī, hero of the emerging Shiī movement, in the year 661.⁷ The years and Islamic dynasties to come then witnessed the dualism of political rulers and religious scholars, '*ulamā*', who sometimes complained about their rulers but were mainly content they were Muslims. Moreover, the case of Ibn Taymīya had shown what happened if the criticism started to annoy the ruler. Therefore there was already a de facto division between *dīn wa-dawla* as it would be called centuries later in Medieval times, although Islam was the main identity factor for these empires

3 KERMANI, Navid: Islam in Europa – neue Konstellationen, alte Wahrnehmungen, in: Muslime im säkularen Rechtsstaat, S. 14.

4 GARDET, L.: Dīn, in: The Encyclopaedia of Islam (EI²), vol. 3, Leiden 1991, S. 295-296.

5 HOLT, Peter Malcolm: The Age of the Crusades, The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517, London 1986, 152-153.

6 The *rāshidūn*-caliphs, i.e. the right guarded caliphs, is the name given to the four immediate successors of the Prophet Muhammad.

7 NOTH, Albrecht: Früher Islam, in: Geschichte der arabischen Welt, hrsg. von Ulrich Haarmann, München 1987, S. 76-79.

and dynasties. Modern scholars often argue that the term *dīn wa-dawla* (religion and state) surfaced as a reaction of Muslims against Western modernity when they were faced with European colonialism, secularism, atheism and other Europeanisms.⁸

In response to this secular threats orthodox Muslim scholars emphasized the claim to one single Muslim community, the *umma*, and within this *umma* there should be no difference between *dīn wa-dawla* in a Western sense. This view became even more popular as the concepts of nationalism, socialism and communism all blatantly failed in the Islamic context and the Islamist slogan *al-Islām huwa al-hall* (Islam is the solution) became number one graffiti in many suburbs of Islamic countries. This was in some kind also a reaction to the perception of technical and – even more frightening – total military inferiority. Very Orthodox Muslims like the Indian Scholar Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi (1999), a man close to the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, tried to encounter the technical superiority of the West with moral superiority and Nadwi states therefore that the world would be morally a much better place if Muslims would renew their religion by going back to the days of the prophets and stick faithful to it. He outlines many of his preaching in his widely circulated book: *Mādhā khasira al-‘ālam bi-inhitāt al-Muslimīn* (What did the world loose by the downfall of the Muslims?). Its English title »Islam and the World« sounds from the outside more restrained, but the book contains the same criticism.⁹ Other contemporary writers see in Western dominated globalisation the sabotage of the »Islamic Personality« a weakening of the true Muslims by the introduction of materialist culture.¹⁰

In recent years these orthodox views have more and more radicalised and in some countries especially of the Arab world one can notice an increasing Islamisation of the public sphere. Obviously the rulers tried to influence public opinion despite allegations of nepotism and corruption by presenting

8 KRÄMER, Gudrun: Gottes Staat als Republik, Reflexionen zeitgenössischer Muslime zu Islam, Menschenrechten und Demokratie, Baden-Baden 1999, 43; Schulze, Reinhard: Die Politisierung des Islam im 19. Jahrhundert, in: *Welt des Islam* 22 (1982), 1-4, S. 103-116.

9 NADWI, Abul Hasan Ali: *Mādhā khasira al-‘ālam bi-inhitāt al-Muslimīn*, Kairo 1994 (First printed in 1951); Nadwi, Abul Hasan Ali: *Islam and the World*, Lucknow 1982.

10 LEVINE, Mark: Muslim Responses to Globalisation, in: ISIM (International Institute for the Study of Islam in the MODERN WORLD), NEWSLETTER 10 (2002), S. 1.

themselves as most pious Muslims. This fosters an atmosphere where it is not recommended to anyone to describe himself publicly as an atheist or secularist. In Egypt the writer Farag Fawda was murdered by Islamists in 1992 after doing so.¹¹ Also Nobel prize winner Naguib Mahfouz has been severely wounded in 1994 with a knife because some of his novels are allegedly un-Islamic in the eyes of Islamic fundamentalists.

Very strange remained also the cases of Egyptian professor Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd¹² and the female medical doctor Nawal el-Saadawi¹³, a womens' right activist. In both cases the spouses were accused that they were married with persons who had beliefs contrary to Islam, and therefore they were encouraged to divorce against their personal preference. The wife of Abu Zayd was divorced, whereas the husband of Nawal al-Saadawi remained married.

What were the crimes of these persons? Abu Zayd, a linguist professor at Cairo University, argued for a more flexible approach to Koran interpretation and el-Saadawi had called in an Interview with an Arabic weekly the pilgrimage to Mecca a vestige of paganism, because people would turn around a cube of stones and she also said that in the Koran there was no obligation for women to wear the veil. These are legitimate inner-Muslim criticisms, but in times when Muslims all over the world have the feeling to be accused by the West just for being Muslims, it creates an atmosphere inside Muslim countries where any critic on the practices of Orthodox Islam is countered with the accusation that he is already corrupted by the West and an agitator against Muslim interests.

Most recently Saad al-Din Ibrahim, the well-known Egyptian human rights activist and director of the Ibn Khaldun Centre in Cairo, was sentenced to prison for alleged betrayal of Egyptian interests and espionage. His engagement for human rights was not always welcomed by the Egyptian government, especially his report on the torture of citizens in the Al-Kush village in August 1998.

One of the accusation points was that he had taken money for his centre from a foreign power. In fact, Saad al-Din Ibrahim was funded by the European Union. Although he was finally acquitted by Egypt's highest appeals court after almost three years of court trials in March 2003, his health has

11 KRÄMER, Gudrun: Gottes Staat als Republik, S. 152.

12 KERMANI, Navid: Die Affäre Abu Zayd, in: Orient, 35(1994/1), S. 24-26.

13 See: www.nawalsaadawi.net/news.htm.

been severely damaged by the time he served in jail.¹⁴The Saad al-Din Ibrahim case is exemplary for the crack within Muslim societies. When hundred Arab intellectuals demanded in an open letter in the Arab journal *al-Quds al-Arabi* from the Egyptian government the liberation of Ibrahim, the newspaper *al-Usbū'* (the week) criticised them in an article entitled: »Go back into your holes! May God have mercy on you« sharply and asked why they did not attack Israel and the USA instead and help the Palestinian cause.¹⁵

Although some Islamic governments are already acting according to the demands of Muslim orthodoxy in order to avoid a possible Islamist coup d'état, the Islamists are still criticizing these governments for their lack of unity of *dīn wa-dawla*, in their respective countries.

Anyhow, the majority of the Muslims would not like to replace the oligarchic ruling systems of today with a totalitarian system of the Islamists, but these Muslims are definitely looking for a change of the current situation. Many of them want to leave the countries altogether. Many Muslims see a brighter future for them and their families abroad and they are heading for the West despite alleged moral corruption. A very striking example even for an Islamist was told by a French journalist who was held hostage by the Hizb Allah in Beirut. As he was about to be liberated one of his guards asked him if he could help him to obtain a visa for the U.S.A.

2.1 *Islam and Secularism in the West*

The immigrants are usually pleased to be in Europe initially. They encounter better work opportunities and personal freedom, but soon they will find themselves in a completely new life situation compared to their initial background. Their children experience a different life compared with their own upbringing. Anyhow, most of them succeed to adjust without losing their original identity. They definitely became European Muslims and only a very small minority of them believe to live in a *dār al-harb*, region of war, com-

14 Human Rights Watch: The State of Egypt vs. Free Expression: The Ibn Khaldun Trial, see: www.hrw.org/reports/2002/egypt; »Politically Motivated Verdict Overturned in Egypt«, (New York, December 3, 2002), see: www.ifex.org/alerts/view.html?id=11644; www.democracy-egypt.org

15 *al-Quds al-Arabi*: 30. September 2002, *al-Usbū'*, 7. October 2002; see also: The Middle East Media Research Institute: www.memri.de/uebersetzungen_analysen/laender/aegypten/egypt_kommunique_16_10_02.html.

pared to the *dār al-Islām*, region of Islam, just because they live in the Muslim Diaspora.¹⁶

Nevertheless, one point which will be very astonishing to them is the extent of society's disregard for religion, especially atheism might be a strange concept to them.

Despite some odd experiences, young European Muslims are increasingly mingling with their host societies and taking an active part through sporting clubs, political parties and other mutual social activities within the native community. Therefore integration takes place, but examples of successful integration are less interesting to the media compared to unsuccessful integration or Muslims actively opposing the German system. A decreasing percentage of young people going to the mosque is not equal to a higher level of integration and every Muslim playing football instead of praying is not always a good sign, as one might deduce from some public sayings of German officials.

After all, everyone should follow his faith as long as his religious practice does not violate the laws of the state. Western society has opted, after long centuries of struggle, for the system of secularism. Muslims will have to comply with it, even the anonymous Muslim group stated at the beginning of this article.

3.0 Conclusion

What are the outlooks for the relations of Islam and secularism in the future? Apparently, Muslims living in Europe will be subjected to secularism and will have the same rights to exercise their religion as other religious communities. Islam should become part of European pluralism.

On the other hand no one can predict when and if there will be increasing secularism in the Islamic world. The population of Islamic countries will have to find its own way to cope with the challenges of the future. Copying Western ideas has already failed during this century. Therefore Islamic societies will have to search their own solutions. Islam will play an important role in this process as an identifying factor for the majority of the population.

The West might help actively in this development or stay out, if it can not live up to its own standards, especially in human rights questions.

16 RAMADAN, Tariq: Die europäischen Muslime – Wandlungen und Herausforderungen, in: Muslime im säkularen Rechtsstaat, S. 93.

A dialogue between all groups of Western and Islamic societies should help in this respect. Both sides have to learn more about each other and to understand that neither of the two is monolithic.

In this respect Navid Kermani, a German Scholar of Islamic Studies, argues for Islam's malleability and implicitly underscores its potential compatibility with a secular state system: »Islam is capable of legitimising socialism as well as monarchy. It has arguments for the separation for state and religion as well as for its unity. The same holds true for despotism and revolution. And even if it is vital for the Western observer to be able to give a well-founded judgement about Islam, there will be as many Muslims in any of these cases of judgments who will differ from them and certainly not comply with them.«¹⁷

17 KERMANI, Navid: Islam in Europa – neue Konstellationen, alte Wahrnehmungen, in: Muslime im säkularen Rechtsstaat, S. 14.