STUDIES ON OTTOMAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

V

Edited by
SİNAN KUNERALP

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KEMAL RE'İS AND OTTOMAN GUNPOWDER DIPLOMACY

Kemal Re'is is best remembered in the contemporary European sources as the scourge of the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas at the turn of the 16th century. An analysis of his career from the Ottoman-Venetian peace of 1502 until his death in 1510, however, indicates that Kemal functioned primarily as provider of security for the Aegean commodities trade and as a type of envoy extraordinary to the Mamluk court. On two occasions, in 1507 and 1510, Kemal Re'is commanded fleets which transported military aid to the Mamluks in Egypt. This aid, in the form of men, ordinance, supplies, and gunpowder was destined for use against the Portuguese in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. This particular brand of gunpowder diplomacy not only protected Ottoman commercial interests in Syria and Egypt against Portuguese attack but also provided a basis for later Ottoman expansion into Africa. Ironically, in this case it was the transport function rather than the attack function of the Ottoman navy which served to promote Ottoman imperialism. In the long run Ottoman use of naval commanders and artillery aid to the Mamluks proved as effective a strategy of conquest as Ottoman gunboats in the harbor at Alexandria.

The history of commercial relations along the Indian Ocean/Red Sea/Mediterranean route is tied to the history of naval alliances. The Mamluk Qalā'ūn (1280-1290/678-689) received twenty ships in aid as part of a defensive alliance with the prince of Ceylon. This alliance also guaranteed safe passage for Mamluk merchant ships to the Far East. In the same century the Ilkhān Arghūn with Genoese ship-wrights attempted to cut off the Egyptian trade in the Indian Ocean by launching two galleys to blockade Aden.[1] In the fifteenth/ninth century

[1] S. M. Imamuddin, "Maritime Trade under the Mamluks of Egypt (644-923/1250-1517)", *Hamdard Islamicus* 3, no. 4 (Winter 1980) pp. 69-72. Aziz S. Atiya, *The Crusades in the Later Middle Ages*, London 1983, pp. 249-250, notes that Arghūn communicated with the Pope concerning an expedition against the Mamluks.

the Ming emperor tried to attain direct control over the Indian Ocean trade by sailing Chinese junks as far as the Red Sea. Barsbāy, (1425/828) meanwhile had taken over the customs of Jidda from the Sharif of Mecca and developed the port to the detriment of Aden. Under Barsbāy the revenues of Jidda came to 200,000 dinars annually with over 100 ships anchoring there every year. In 1504/909-910 the Portuguese Lopo-Soares was threatened with an Indian-Mamluk naval alliance in response to his pressure against Malabar.[2]

The overwhelming power of the Portuguese in the struggle for the Indian Ocean commerce and its rich customs revenues led to an alliance of the Mamluk Qānsūh al-Ghūrī (ruled 1501-1516/906-922) with Gujarati rulers. It also prompted the Mamluks to seek aid from their enemies, the Ottomans. The stimulus for this alliance was not only the Portuguese challenge to Qānsūh's political hegemony. It was also the threat that the customs revenues and Mamluk transit monopoly would be lost. For the Ottomans the stimulus was somewhat different.

The purpose of the Ottoman naval buildup in the reigns of Bayezid II and Selim I was to actualize Ottoman imperial ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean, and to protect Ottoman shipping. But the accrual of naval power combined with the Ottoman richness in building materials and ordinance allowed the Ottomans to increase their influence by means other than direct conquest. This took the form of naval aid in men, guns and materials to the Mamluks for use against the Portuguese.

Mamluk plans for naval operations in the Indian Ocean began in earnest in 1505/910-911 when Qānsūh al-Ghūrī prepared a fleet of 4 galions and 4 *fustas* in the Red Sea to be launched against the Portuguese. This offensive action was taken only after defensive measures had failed. Qānsūh had received envoys from Calicut with formal requests for aid and merchants with complaints about the Portuguese. The ruler of Calicut sought Mamluk support after attacking Cochin for collaborating with the Portuguese.[3] A Muslim merchant protested to Qānsūh that the Portuguese were wreaking havoc with Muslim shipping in the Indian Ocean and seizing all the spices. He alone had lost 30,000 ducats. The Sultan promised assistance.[4] In 1503/908-909 the Portuguese had seized a Muslim spice ship off India and the merchants had paid 25,000 ducats to secure their escape. Qānsūh sent some monks of the Holy Sepulchre to carry a message to the Pope and to the Catholic kings. If the Portuguese voyages were not stopped, he threatened to destroy Christ's tomb and other shrines. The Portuguese argued to

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[2]Geneviève Bouchon, "Le Premier Voyage de Lopo Soares en Inde 1504-1505", *Mare Luso Indicum* 3 (1976), pp. 66-68.

[3]Bouchon, "Lopo Soares," pp. 72-73, 84.

[4]Marino Sanuto, *I Diarii*, 36 vols., Venice, 1880-1887, v. 6 pp. 246,-249.

the Pope that this was an empty threat. It was pointed out that Qānsūh made a considerable revenue from the tourist pilgrim trade to the Holy Land, and that he would not jeopardize this revenue by destroying the Christian shrines. The Portuguese were right. The Mamluks, instead, fought the decrease in spice trade revenues by increasing the customs duties on the European merchants.[5]

In February of 1504/*Sha'bān* 909 the Venetian *muda* (state financed galley convoy) returned from Alexandria, having experienced severe difficulties over the availability of spices and the Mamluk administration of the loading period. The cargoes had been limited, the spices not at Alexandria when the galleys arrived, and the Venetians reluctant to accept Mamluk exactions.[6] This stirred Qānsūh to more aggresive action. It also intensified his attempts to enforce higher customs levies on the Venetian *muda* the following year. In February of 1505/*Ramadān* 910 the Beirut galleys had arrived in Venice laden with spices. However, in April/*Shawwāl* 911 the *muda* in Alexandria left port under fire from the Mamluks after failing to secure permission to sail. The permission had been contingent on Venetian-Mamluk accord over loads and prices. Under pressure from the Indian and Venetian merchants alike and faced with a loss in customs revenues Qānsūh al-Gūhīr began to equip a fleet at Suez.

According to Alvise Spandugino, writing to Venice from Egypt in March of 1506/912, Qansuh had 4 galions of 500 *botte* each, 2 barks of 200 *botte*, 9 light galleys, 3 *fustas* of 18 banks each and one brigantine.[7] He said the fleet was staffed with "Maghribis, Turks, and others," and well armed with artillery.[8] This report indicates that a joint action on the part of the Mamluks and the Indian

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[5]Ibn Iys, *Bada'i al-Zuhūr fi waqa'i al-Duhūr*, 5 vols., edited by Mohamad Mostafa, Cairo, 1960 v. 4; pp. 192-193. Girolamo Priuli, "Girolampo Priuli e i Suoi Diarri, " edited by R. Fulin. *Archivio Veneto* 22, pt. 1 (1881) pp. 175, 178 ; Frederic C. Lane, *Venice, A Maritime Republic*, Baltimore. 1973 p. 290

[6]Sanuto, 5: 825-827.

[7]Lane, *Venice and History*, Baltimore 1966, pp. 352-358. The *botte* was based on a cargo capacity measured in terms of wine casks. This was a measure of space, or volume, as well as of weight. Lane estimates the Venetian *botte* for the 15th/9th century at 640 kg., occupying about 900 liters (.9 cubic meters).

[8]Fulin, p. 192. Louis de Mas-Latrie, *Traités de paix et de commerce et documents divers concernant les relations des chrétiens avec les Arabes de l'Afrique septentrionale au Moyen Âge*, 2 vols (Paris, 1866; reprint, 1964, 2 p. 257. Duarte Barbosa, *A Description of the Coast of East Africa and the Malabar in the Beginning of the 16th Century*, Hakluyt Series 1, no 35, London, 1866, pp. 22-23, writing in 1515-1516/921-922, said the Mamluk fleet defeated by the Portuguese at Diu was manned by "Moors, Turks, and Maghribis". Ronald Bishop Smith, *The First Age of the Portuguese Embassies, Navigations, and Peregrinations to the Ancient Kingdoms of Cambay and Bengal (1500-1521)*, Bethesda, 1969, pp. 11-20. De Almeida, the Portuguese Viceroy, attempted to force Malik Ayās, the governor of Diu, to surrender Turkish survivors of the defeat of the fleet, but Malik Ayās refused.

ruler of Calicut was already formally planned by 1505/910-911. Calicut was well fortified, and had been armed with the aid of two Italian artillery masters.[9]

1505/910-911 and 1510/916 were years of intense pressure on the Mamluk state. This pressure is reflected in reprisals taken against the Venetian merchant community in the Mamluk territoires and in the Mamluk requests for naval and military aid. Egypt's trading partners in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean demanded that Portuguese aggression be met with aggression, a demand with which the Mamluks were ill-equipped to comply. Early in 1510/end 915-beginning 916, envoys from Calicut, Cambay, and Malacas came to intercede with Qānsūh al-Ghūrī. If aid was not forthcoming they threatened to collaborate with the Portuguese.[10] In 1510/916 Qānsūh was faced with equipping another fleet after the first one, launched in 1507/913, was destroyed at Diu. In both years Rhodian attacks on Muslim shipping were used to justify reprisals against European merchants in Egypt and Syria. In both years the Venetian *muda* for the following year was severely disrupted (the Alexandria galleys cancelled in 1506/912 and delayed for months in 1511/917). In both years Qānsūh appealed to the Ottomans for aid.[11]

By 1507/913 there is evidence of Ottoman ships carrying shipbuilding materials to Alexandria with some regularity. Sanuto reports that the *sancak beg* of Vise and the Sultan himself were shipping materials for sale to Alexandria. The *sancak beg*, referred to as the boon companion of Bayezid, had 3 ships of his own (*galion grosso, galion minor, nave*). He shipped timber, iron and wax. Bembo, the Venetian *bailo*, claimed that Bayezid, upon hearing that copper was in demand in Alexandria, sent 8,000 *miera* of Kastamonu mined copper to sell. Bembo said the Sultan had never done such a thing before but that now he had become a merchant.[12]

This Ottoman response to Mamluk initiatives, however, went far beyond the profit motive. Arms and supply shipments secured for the Ottomans a certain leverage at the Mamluk court. The provision of personnel for the Red Sea fleet gave Bayezid a military force on Mamluk territory. Short term Mamluk dependence on Ottoman arms gave Bayezid a measure of security against the possibility of a Safavid-Mamluk alliance.

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[9]Eugenio Alberi, *Le Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato Durante il Secolo Decimoesto*, Florence 1863 appendice: pp. 8-9.

[10]Sanuto, 11: pp 65, 75-76, 105, 479. It was after the envoys from India arrived that Qansuh dispatched the ambassador to Selim to ask for artillery.

[11]Fulin, "Girolamo," pp. 184,196.

[12]Sanuto, 7: pp. 12-13, 128, 152. On weights see Halil Inalcik, "Introduction to Ottoman Metrology," *Turcica* 15 (1983), pp. 311-326. *Miera* may be some bastardization of *miglio* (thousandweight).

Kemal Reis' delivery of a major arms shipment in September 1507/*Jumāda* I 913 came against a background of six months of diplomatic maneuvering and of the first major Safavid initiative into Ottoman territory. In early spring of that year an Ottoman ambassador arrived in Cairo at about the same time that Qānsūh was notified of Portuguese incursions into the Red Sea. If Jidda fell Mecca would be in danger and the inability to protect Mecca would signal the end of Mamluk hegemony in the Muslim world. This threat required fortifying Jidda and mobilizing the Mamluk fleet. Hence the Mamluk appeal for aid was directed against the Portuguese not the Safavids.[13] The Ottoman ambassador was warmly received. Bayezid could not be certain, after all, that Qānsūh would not negotiate with Isma'īl.[14] By making the Sultan dependent upon him for defense against the Portuguese, he helped insure against a Mamluk-Safavid alliance. Isma'īl could not provide Qānsūh with copper and gun founders. While Bayezid's envoy was still in Cairo, the Safavids invaded eastern Anatolia and decimated the Zū'l Ḳadr army of 'Alā ad-Dawla, nominally a Mamluk vassal. This attack, which provoked no real Mamluk military response, demonstrated that Ottoman precautions were warranted and pointed up the relative weakness of the Mamluks. Before Isma'īl's troops had withdrawn across the Euphrates, Bayezid's insurance policy arrived at Alexandria in the form of Kemal Re'is and a shipload of artillery.[15]

Renaissance diplomatic manuals describe the perfect ambassador as wealthy, well-born, handsome, eloquent, well versed in literature, law, languages and morally virtuous.[16] In Cairo in 1507/913 it seems that a reputation for seamanship was an even more desirable quality. Judging from Ibn Iyās' description of Kemal's naval exploits against the Europeans, there was more than a passing interest in Kemal's abilities at the court in Cairo where a formal

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[13]Ibn Iyās, 4: p. 109; said that a fleet of 20 Portuguese ships entered the Red Sea and attacked Muslim shipping. Sanuto, 7, pp. 234-235. Moresini, in Damascus, reported to Venice that Bāyezid sent artillery in response to Qānsūh's request because Bayezid feared the Safavids, and wanted an alliance. Moresini thought that the artillery was destined for use against Şāh Isma'īl, but he was mistaken. See also Sydney Nettleton Fisher, *The Foreign Relations of Turkey 1481-1512*, Urbana 1948, p. 95. The conquest of Mecca was a focal point of Portuguese imperial rhetoric and played a role in later Portuguese negotiations with Isma'īl. See Barbosa, p. 40; Ronald Bishop Smith, *The First Age of the Portuguese Embassies, Navigations and Peregrinations in Persia (1507-1524)* Bethesda, 1970, pp. 8-53; Alfonso D'Albuquerque, *The Commentaries of the Great Alfonso D'Albuquerque*, trans. by Walter de Graybirch, New York 1928; reprint, New York 1970, pp. 111-118; Joao de Barros, *Da Asia* 2, pt. 10, Lisbon: Livraria Sam Carlos, 1973: pp. 423-428. Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, *Ottomans et Safavides au Temps de Şah Isma'īl*, Leiden 1986 pp. 154-163 suggests that after Çaldıran Isma'īl was less inclined to Portuguese proposals against the Mamluks because he now had to view the Mamluk state as a possible ally against the Ottomans.

[14]Ibn Iyās, v. p. 4, p. 107; Sanuto, 7, pp. 128, 152, 164, 534-535.

[15]Ibn Iyās, v.4, p. 119.

[16]Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, Baltimore 1955, pp. 181-191.

reception was held in his honor.[17] Audiences with the Mamluk Sultan were not reserved for mere merchants and ship captains. Kemal Re'is brought 50 pieces of artillery and a crew of workmen for the Red Sea arsenal as well as a fleet load of copper to found more cannon. The Ottoman Sultan was well served by his naval commander's reputation. Kemal, as envoy, brought not only munitions but a tacit message of intimidation.

The Mamluk fleet sailed from Suez sometime in late summer or early fall of 1507/913 under Husaīn al-Kurdī, accompanied by another Ottoman commander, Selman Re'is. The details of the expedition and Selman's role in it are somewhat unclear.[18] According to Ibn Iyās, Husaīn had been engaged earlier in the year in fortifying Jidda against the Portuguese. The Mamluk fleet apparently numbered about 10 vessels and, in conjunction with a Gujarati fleet, met with initial success against the Portuguese off Chaul in January 1508/*Ramaḍān* 913. The victory was transitory, however, and in 1509/915 the combined Mamluk-Indian fleet was defeated by the Portuguese off Diu.

Even before news of the loss of this fleet reached Egypt, construction of more ships was underway. In spring of 1508/913-914 Qānsūh armed 11 galions at Damieta to procure timber and supplies for a new fleet at Suez. This unaccustomed activity on the part of the Mamluk Sultan, combined with uncertainty about Kemal Re'is activities, caused the Venetian regiment to refuse ships license to sail from Cyprus in June and July 1508/*Ṣafar-Rabī' I* 914. The Mamluks were not in the habit of keeping an active fleet in the Mediterranean. Particularly in view of the strained relations between Venice, the Mamluks and Rhodes at this time Venice could not be certain that the fleet at Diamata would be used only for transport. A spy ship was sent to reconnoiter at Damiata. Venice speculated that the Mamluk fleet might be used against Cyprus or Rhodes.[19] Another two Venetian galleys were sent to monitor Kemal Re'is. They reported that he was protecting shipping through the straits from Rhodian

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[17] Ibn Iyās, v. 4, p. 119; Sanuto, v. 7, p. 164. Kemal apparently served in some diplomatic capacity on a voyage to Tunis although the details of the mission in 1505-1506/911 are unclear. See Pīrī Re'is, *Kitāb-i Bahriye*, Istanbul, 1935, pp. 636, 645, 654-655, 671; Hans-Albrecht von Burski, *Kemāl Re'is, Ein Beitrage zur Geschichte der türkischen Flotte*, Bonn, 1928, pp. 64-66.

[18] For the varying accounts in the chronicles see Barros, v. 2, pt. 10, pp. 174-206, 282-310; Barbosa, pp. 22-33; Yakub Mughul, "Portekizli'lerle Kızıldenizde Mücadele ve Hicaz'da Osmanlı Hakimiyetinin Yerleşmesi Hakkında bir vesika, "*Türk Tarih Kurumu Belgeler* 2, no. 3-4 (1965) pp. 37-48; R. B. Sargeant, *The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast*, Oxford, 1963, pp. 41-44; E. Dennison Ross, "The Portuguese in India and Arabia," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1921), pp. 547-551; Ibn Iyās, v. 4: p. 124.

[19] Sanuto, v.7, pp. 67, 612-613, 630, 649; Ibn Iyās, v. 4, pp. 129, said the fleet was to be used against European corsairs. Venice used this type of intelligence to help secure her commercial shipping. Famagosta and Candia were her principal bases both for the transfer of information and for the regulation of shipping. The *Proveditor* of the Armada and *Luogotenente* of Famagosta had discretionary powers over ship sailings, both private and state-owned, from Venetian ports.

corsairs and posed no danger to Cyprus. Like the Mamluks, the Europeans were wary of Kemal's fleet as an instrument of aggression. When news of the disaster at Diu reached the Mediterranean, Qānsūh appealed to Bayezid for aid to launch a second fleet.[20]

In 1509/915 Qānsūh mobilized materials and troops for equipping the new fleet at Suez. It was to consist of 30 light galleys and 20 galions according to Venetian reports from Cairo in December.[21] This was a sizeable increase over the 1507/913 armada. Lumber was transported to Suez along with shipwrights (*marangoni*) and caulkers (*calafadi*) A captain was appointed with 1500 men: Europeans and black slaves, 500 gunners (*arzieri*) and the rest Maghribis and Turks. The fleet was being prepared with Ottoman assistance. One Nicolo Agrini of Napoli di Romania, who was captured on a Neapolitan galley, was serving as *armerajo* (armorer in charge of cannon). Qānsūh, it was reported, had moved to correct the errors of the last fleet, consolidate his alliances with Indian rulers, and punish the captain of the 1507-1508/913-914 expedition.[22] Although this report claimed that the fleet would be ready in July of 1510/*Rabī'II* 916, it was not launched until 1515/921. This was in part due to the difficulties the Mamluk Sultan had in governing his troops and forcing them to serve on the Suez campaign.[23] Arguably, given the insubordination of the Mamluks, the Red Sea fleets could not have been launched at all without the use of Ottoman personnel.

In his seminal work on gunpowder and firearms in the Mamluk kingdom David Ayalon discusses the formation of a special unit of arquebusiers by Qānsūh al-Ghūrī in 1510/916 and its use (or intended use) primarily as a Red Sea/Indian Ocean naval unit.[24] The unit composed primarily of Turcomans, Persians and other non-Mamluks was considered an inferior unit and called *al-tabāqah al-khāmisa* (fifth rank/corps). Mamluks were included in the unit only when the Sultan launched his big naval expedition against the Portuguese in June 1515/*Jumada* I 921. Ayalon points out that when Qāsūh prepared a naval expedition against the Portuguese in 1505/911 (before the formation of this

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[20]Ibn Iyās, v. 4, pp. 160, 182-185, 196. 'Alān Bāy was sent to the Porte in fall of 1509/915 and returned in August 1510/*Jamāda I* 916. Later Yūnus al-Dawla was sent to Istanbul to purchase lumber and artillery. He returned to Cairo in November 1510/*Sha'bān* 916.

[21]Sanuto, v.10, pp. 110-111.

[22]Duarte Barbosa, *The Book of Duarte Barbosa*, trans. Mansel Longworth Dames, 1918, pp. 44-49. Barbosa relates that the Mamluk captain collected money from the sultan and merchants of Gujarat and returned to Jidda with the funds to build a defense fortress against the Portuguese.

[23]Sanuto, v.10, p. 110, on the Suez preparations in 1510/916. Ibn Iyās, v. 4, pp. 201, 309-310, 317, 319-323, 331, 355, 362-367, 457-460, 466-467, 471-472, on the preparations of this fleet from 1510-1515/916-921. In 1513/919, for example, the Mamlūks ordered to Suez refused to report for departure, demanding a bonus payment first and threatening revolt.

[24]David Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom*, London, 1956, pp. 71-82. See Halil İnalcık, "The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-arms in the Middle East," in *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, London, 1975, pp. 202-203.

special unit) the fighting force was composed of a similar hodgepodge of "inferior" soldiers. Under pressure from the Mamluks the unit was formally dissolved in March of 1514/*Muḥarram* 920 although, in reality, it continued to exist as the arquebusier force was needed to fight the Portuguese.

The Mamluk Sultan evidently felt that any new expedition against the Portuguese would have to be substantially larger and better equipped than the last fleet. While construction work continued at Suez, Qānsūh sent ships to obtain more lumber at Ayas. One convoy of lumber had returned from Ayas in fall or winter of 1509-1510/915 and been transported to Suez. Another trip to Ayas was planned for spring of 1510/early 916. There were 9 galions ready in Alexandria in April/*Muḥarram* 916.[25] The Grand Master of Rhodes, utilizing intelligence on the Mamluk ship movements, seized the lumber convoy at Ayas on August 20, 1510/15 *Jumāda* I 916. The Rhodian fleet of 17 or 18 ships consisted of two large *naves* or galleys, 5 barks, 2 galions, 3 galleys, 5 *fustas*. After a battle the Mamluk commander was killed and the crews who could flee escaped to the shore leaving the ships to the Rhodians.[26]

In Venice this news cheered the merchants who hoped that Qānsūh would respond by retaliating against the French merchants in Egypt and Syria. The French merchants had been competing with Venice for the spice trade and for Mamluk concessions. However, the Signoria was also disappointed that this setback to Mamluk fleet construction might delay action against the Portuguese. As it turned out, the Venetian merchants suffered reprisals along with the other "Franks" for the Rhodian depredations.[27] Qānsūh attempted to offset his shortage of cash to pay the Mamluks through seizure of European merchandise and inflated customs dues without discouraging the commerce altogether. In any case the destruction of the lumber convoy at Ayas left the Mamluks even more dependent on the Ottomans. Without a Mediterranean fleet the Ottomans had to supply the transport ships as well as the arms and lumber.

There is some confusion in the sources over whether there were one or two Mediterranean Mamluk fleets in the summer of 1510/916. Priuli confuses the ships returning with aid from Istanbul that fall with the lumber convoy sent to

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[25]Sanuto, v. 10, pp. 636, 432, 799; v.11, pp. 76, 105, 227-228. Other reports say 14 galions and barks, a Messinan ship of 500 *botte* purchased by the sultan, a Genoese galley seized the previous year and an 800 *botte* galey which was a gift of Korkud ibn Bayezid then resident in Cairo. This indicates the various means by which a fleet could be assembled.

[26]Sanuto, v. 11, pp. 394, 639; Fulin, "Girolamo," pp. 213-214 ; Giacomo Bosio, *Dell' Istoria della Sacra Religione et Illustrissimo Militia de San Giovanni Gierosolimitano*, Rome, 1594, pp. 493-494. Ibn Iyās, v. 4, pp. 191-192, says 18 Mamluk ships were lost.

[27]Sanuto, v. 10, pp 885. There was a close association between Rhodes and France. In spring of 1510/916 when Rhodian galleys captured four Turkish *fustas*, the ships were sent to France. At the same time there were at least two French ships in the harbor at Alexandria.

Ayas and seized by the Rhodians in August/*Jamāda* I.[28] The lumber convoy sailed around June of 1510/*Rabī'I* 916 for Ayas. The other fleet, bringing aid from the Ottomans, was dispersed by a storm in October of 1510/*Rajab* 916. This fleet was the second major Ottoman aid shipment sent to Alexandria under the command of Kemal Re'is.

The fleet which sailed from Istanbul was the direct result of a special envoy sent to Bayezid by Qānsūh. Although a Mamluk envoy, Amir 'Alān, was resident in Istanbul in the winter of 1509-1510/915, another was sent for the express purpose of obtaining naval equipment. This ambassador had over 40,000 ducats. In June of 1510/*Rabī'I* 916 he arrived at Edirne with 60 mounted attendants to request artillery and lumber for the armada against the Portuguese.[29] The ambassador was rewarded with an Ottoman pledge of lumber, iron, artillery, sails, masts, all sorts of equipment, and a fleet to provide transport and escort to Alexandria. Bayezid refused payment for the aid so the ambassador spent the money he brought in Istanbul on additional equipment for the armada. Bayezid again sent Kemal Re'is to command the fleet escorting the Mamluk ambassador back to Alexandria. The Sultan ordered all ships (including Venetian ships) bound for Alexandria detained so that the fleet would sail in as great a force as possible.[30] When it sailed the aid fleet comprised 25-35 ships including 8 galleys. Shortly after departing Istanbul the fleet was dispersed in a storm, several ships lost, and Kemal Re'is drowned. Thus ended the career of one of the Ottomans' most renowned naval commanders. This loss, however, did not signal an end to the Ottoman military aid or to the Mamluk use of Ottoman captains. The rest of the ships regrouped and reached Alexandria. By December of 1510/*Ramaḍān* 916 the artillery and lumber from these vessels had already been shipped to Cairo.[31]

Zeno, the Venetian consul in Damascus, reported in November of 1510/*Sha'bān* 916 that 28 Turkish ships had arrived in Alexandria with Ahmed Re'is and Yūnus al-Dawla. He added that Bayezid had given a great quantity of artillery and equipment in return for the great honor paid to his son at the Mamluk court and also because he wished to pursue the assault on the

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[28]Fulin, "Girolamo," pp.212-218; Sanuto, v.11, pp. 279-480.

[29]Sanuto, v. 10, pp. 21-22, 637, 801 v. 11 , pp. 55, 76. Some reports say two envoys. Estimates of his purse range from 30,000 to over 50.000 ducats. The Mamluk envoy had an audience with Bayezid on June 29, 1510/22 *Rabī'I* 916.

[30]Fulin, "Girolamo," p. 218; Sanuto, v.7, pp. 164, 294, 589, 621, 661, 736. In July of 1510/*Rabi'II* 916 this armada still had not sailed. A letter of October 16th/13 *Rajab* 916 from Istanbul mentions that it had. It must have left only shortly before that date because reports from Famagosta on October 17th/14 *Rajab* do not include news of it being dispersed in the storm.

[31]Sanuto, v. 11; pp. 826, 829. The report from Cairo says that 18 ships arrived with lumber, iron and artillery. Ibn Iyās, v. 4, p. 201.

Portuguese.[32] The number of ships in this fleet is probably indicative not only of the extent of Ottoman aid to the Mamluks but also of the need for a large fleet to insure against the depredations of corsairs. Zeno was naive about the Sultan's enthusiasm for Korkud's 1509-1510/915-916 trip to Cairo. Bāyezīd, of course, had reason to suspect Ḳorkūd's motives for enjoying the hospitality of the Mamluk Sultan since his sons were already jockeying for position in the succession struggle.[33] Just as naval aid helped secure Bayezid against a Safavid-Mamluk alliance, it helped secure the ailing Ottoman Sultan against Mamluk backing of an attempt by Korkud to seize the throne. Expectations of Bayezid's imminent death resulted in premature word of his demise reaching Cairo early in 1509/end 914. Qānsūh went so far as to prepare a memorial service before the news was found to be in error. Though Bayezid still had three years to live, the extended visit of the Mamluk envoy in 1509-1510/915-916 may have represented time devoted to enhancing the Mamluk position at the Ottoman court in anticipation of the Sultan's death. So too, when Korkud fled to Cairo in June 1509/*Ṣafar* 915 Qānsūh had an opportunity to cultivate the friendship of Bayezid's possible heir. Qānsūh would not openly support Korkud while awaiting artillery shipments from Bayezid. His presence in Cairo, however, may have stimulated Ottoman generosity in the aid shipment sent in 1510/916. Ottoman gunpowder diplomacy thus functioned against both internal and external threats to the Ottoman expansion.

Meanwhile, the response of the Mamluk sultan to the Rhodians' attacks is chronicled in Priuli's and Sanuto's diaries, culminating in the seizure of Venetian merchandise and in Venice delaying the *muda* for 1511/917.[34] The situation was further exacerbated by the Grand Master's seizure of Maghribi merchants sailing on French ships for Tunis. Venice detained her own galleys, enroute to Alexandria, at Candia and Famagosta for fear of seizure by Qānsūh or his officers. In the two years before Domenico Trevisan's mission normalized Mamluk-Venetian relations, Qānsūh continued to receive naval aid from the Ottomans. Firearms along with military and naval supplies were provided.

The shipment initially commanded by Kemal Re'is reached Cairo on January 1511/*Shawāl* 916 including iron, wood, oars, arrows, 300 *makahil* (firearms), 40 *qantars* of gunpowder, copper etc.[35] Reports from Alexandria in

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[32]Francesca Luchetta, "L'Affare Zen in Levante nel Primo Cinquencento," *Studie Veneziani* 10 (1959), pp. 145-146, 206.

[33]Sa'd al-Dīn, *Tāc al-Tavārikh*, 2 vols., Istanbul, 1279/1862, v. 2, pp. 131-132, 168-171. See Çağatay Uluçay, "Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Padişah Oldu?," *Tarih Dergisi* 9 (1953), pp. 54-90; 10 (1954), pp 118-142; 11 (1955), pp. 185-200. On the false news of Bayezıt's death and Korkud's sojourn in Cairo see Ibn Iyās, v.4 pp. 152-156, 159, 167, 184, 186-187; Sanuto, v. 9, pp. 546-547; Uluçay, v. 9, pp. 58-60.

[34]Fulin, "Girolamo," pp. 220-226.

[35]Ayalon, p. 78.

April of 1512/*Ṣafar* 918 indicate that Qānsūh sent Ḥamīd Maghribī to Istanbul with 10 or 11 ships loaded with 160 *sporta* of pepper and other spices. These ships were ordered to return with lumber, iron and bronze for the Suez fleet.[36] The new sultan, Selim I responded generously, loading the requested materials on a sizeable fleet for the journey to Alexandria. Demonstrating his confidence to both the Mamluks and the Safavids he included cannons of iron and of bronze. This indicates the depth of Ottoman firepower at a time when Selim was preparing for a major land campaign in Azerbaican. Meanwhile ships and gunpowder were being produced at Suez.

In the spring of 1513/919 Alphonso d'Albuquerque had launched an attack on Aden. Although the siege on the fortress was unsuccessful, the Portuguese managed to burn a large number of merchant ships in the harbor.[37] This attack reaffirmed the immediacy of the Portuguese threat to the Red Sea and to Mecca. In August/*Jumāda* II 919 Qānsūh sent yet another envoy, Aq Bāy Ṭawīl, to the Porte, presumably to seek more aid. In April of 1514/*Muḥarram* 920 Qānsūh arrived in Suez to review the troops there and the progress of the fleet construction. There the admiral Selman Re'is was in charge of the fleet preparation with a force of 2,000 Ottomans. The fleet consisted of about 20 ships, armed with cannons of bronze and iron. The cost to the sultan of building and arming these ships amounted to over 400,000 dinars.[38]

The *tabāqa al-khāmisa* unit was used to guard the Suez shipyards and in May 1515/*Rabī' II* 921, 600 or more of them were appointed to take part in the joint Mamluk-Ottoman naval expedition which was later sunk by the Portuguese. This expedition left Cairo in August 1515/*Rajab* 921, commanded by the Ottoman Selman Re'is.[39] So, in 1514-1515/920-921, even while engaged in the campaigns against Isma'īl Safavi and 'Alā al-Dawla, Selim thought it worthwhile to have an Ottoman force at Suez.[40] The Ottoman contingent

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[36]Sanuto, v. 14, p. 500. The ships left Alexandria on April 22/5 Ṣafar 918. Either 8 *naves* and 3 galions or 6 *naves* and 4 galleys. Considering the timing, either Qānsūh was confident of Selim's accesion and wished to confirm relations quickly, or he expected the mission to be received by Bayezid. Ibn Iyās, v. 4, pp. 285, 324.

[37]Barbosa, v. 1, pp. 57-58; Sargeant, p. 47 citing the *Tarīkh-i Shanbāl*, an Arabic chronicle, says 40 ships were burned.

[38]Ibn Iyās, v.4, pp. 365-366. Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams, *Firearms and Fortifications*, Chicago, 1986 p. 30, estimates the costs of building, rigging and arming a galley in the mid-16th/10th century at 6-7,000 *scudi* (taking into account a crew of 150 oarsmen and 150 soldiers, sailors, and officers). He estimates the costs of salaries and provisions for each such galley at another 6-7,000 *scudi* per year.

[39]Ibn Iyās, v. 4, pp. 458-459, 465-466. Ibn Iyās had no sooner related the sending of Mamluks from Cairo to staff the fleet being launched at Suez, than he recounted the news that Selim's army was marching against Isma'īl and the Zu'l Ḳadr. In August 1515/*Rajab* 921 he reported that the governors of Damascus and Aleppo were blaming Qānsūh for not having fortified the frontiers properly against the Ottomans.

[40]Ibn Iyās, v. 4, pp. 365-366, 372-373.

outnumbered the Mamluks. The Mamluks resisted participating in the Suez expeditions which involved fighting at sea, fighting on foot, absence for more than one campaign season, and fairly remote chances of a safe return. The concentration of arquebusiers on the Portuguese front and of artillery on the Suez fleet reduced the Mamluk firepower which could be used to resist Selim's invasion of Syria and Egypt. Much of the remaining artillery was concentrated on port defense at Jidda and Alexandria.

Thus, the shipping of artillery and military supplies by the Ottomans to Egypt in the years before the conquest of Cairo is not as incongruous as it might seem. The shipments served the military and diplomatic objectives of the Porte against the Portuguese and against Isma'il Safavi. Earlier they helped insure that Qānsūh did not actively support the claims of Korkūd against his father Bayezid. The Ottoman sultans, Bayezid and Selim, capitalized on the adverse conditions brought on by the Portuguese navigations. Once the Portuguese threat to Mecca and to commerce focused Ottoman attention politically and economically on the Red Sea, they used arms to expand the Ottoman sphere of influence in Africa. After Çaldıran Selim was able to pursue Ottoman interests in Africa more aggressively, but the way had been paved by the Ottoman intervention in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean under Bayezid. The presence of Selman Re'is and an Ottoman force in Suez in 1514-1515/920-921 was a calculated intervention. Selman and his troops were an Ottoman advance force, diplomatically in the Indian Ocean if the fleet succeeded against the Portuguese, and militarily in the Red Sea region whether the fleet sailed or not. An Arabic chronicler called the arrival at Kamran of the fleet under Selman the "beginning of the coming of the Turks to the Yemen."[41] He might have added: to Egypt and to Abyssinia as well.

The extent of the Ottoman naval investment in the Red Sea is indicated by reports on the fleet after the conquest of Cairo in 1517/923. The Ottoman aid to the Mamluks had paved the way not only for the conquest of the Mamluk territories but also for the control of the Yemen. From there the Ottomans expected to extend their political and commercial hegemony to the Indian Ocean. One such report was from Selman Re'is, who was based at Jidda where he successfully warded off a Portuguese foray into the Red Sea in 1517/923.[42] This

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[41] Sargeant, pp. 48-49.

[42] Sargeant, pp. 50-51. A letter preserved in the Topkapı archives (E.6455) from Selman Re'is to the Grand Vezir İbrahim Paşa dated June 1525/*Sha'bān* 931 described the armaments (ships, cannon etc.) at Jidda and proposes a naval expedition against the Portuguese utilizing the 18 ships then at Jidda (6 *bastarda*, 8 *kadirga*, 3 *kalyata*, 1 *kayik*). He said that the Portuguese were very vulnerable to attack and argued that the financial rewards would be substantial. Selman said the Portuguese got 100,000 florins a year from Hormuz alone on the 10% customs on the 50-60 ships which arrived there annually. He described the prosperity and revenues of Yemen and Aden including the production in Yemen of red dye (*kızıl boya*) which was a source of great revenue. Michel Lesure, "Un Document ottoman de 1525 sur l'Inde portugaise et les pays de la Mer Rouge," *Mare Luso-Indicum* 3 (1976, pp.

was a decisive engagement because of the timing, just after the Ottoman conquest when governmental authority was still contested. The Ottomans had not yet consolidated their power in the Hijaz and Yemen, and the Portuguese could have followed up a victory with an attack on Mecca. Selman proposed that the Ottoman fleet at Jidda could secure great financial gain if it were used to take control of Aden and Hormuz from the Portuguese. He did not, however, get to pursue his designs on Hormuz. Instead he was later commissioned to command a fleet supporting the installation of Khaīr al-Dīn Ḥamza at Zabid and the reassertion of Ottoman rule in the Yemen. By 1547/954 the Ottomans had 44 galleys at Suez and also 14 oared vessels which had been sent from Suez to Mocha, according to a Portuguese report.[43]

Naval aid to the Mamluks in the early 16th/10th century has been used along with the stepped up exchange of envoys between the two powers as evidence that Ottoman-Mamluk relations were friendly during this period.[44] In the broader context of events in the Middle East at this time, Ottoman naval/military aid to the Mamluks was a calculated move to expand the Ottoman sphere of influence in the Mamluk territories paving the way for their eventual conquest. The Ottomans were the only Muslim power with the naval and artillery capabilities required to combat the Portuguese. The Mamluks needed those capabilities to preserve their own legitimacy. The Ottoman-Mamluk enmity was preserved intact while economic expediency forced Qānsūh to accept aid in the form of money, manpower, and materials to be used agains the Portuguese. In effect, this was a form of submission, a humiliation of the Mamluk military status which the Ottoman sultan heightened by insisting that he not be reimbursed for the assistance.[45] Certainly no one was more aware than Qānsūh of his vulnerability to an Ottoman takeover. Mamluk embassies to Istanbul served as much to assess Ottoman military and naval capabilities as to urge common action against the Portuguese. Qānsūh's defensive measures

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137-160, *oyle olsa sabikan amele gelince degin oniki kere yüzbinden ziyade sikke-i Guri altun harç olunub ve Ömürler dahi sarf olunmuşdur.*

[43]Salih Özbaran, "The Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf 1534-1581," *Journal of Asian History* 6, 1972, pp. 56, 73-2. This same report states that if the Ottomans wish they can build as many ships as they want because they can obtain lumber from the great forests of Birecik seven days distant, a large town with a great traffic from Persia. Özbaran cites the *mühimme defters* on the Ottoman *tershane* at Basra saying the lumber came through Birecik from Maraş. This report reflects the actual situation, the Portuguese being unaware of the real origin of the timber. On timber see also Colin Imber, "The Navy of Suleiman the Magnificent," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980), pp. 220-221, 228-230. For a detailed account of an Ottoman-Portuguese naval engagement in the Gulf see: Sīdī 'Alī Re'īs, *Mirāt al-Memālik*, İstanbul, 1313/1895, pp. 18-22.

[44]Bacqué-Grammont, p. 215; Celia Kirslake, "The Correspondence between Selim I and Qānsūh al-Gawrī," *Priloziza Orientalnu Fililogiju* 30 (1980), pp. 230-231.

[45]Halil İnalcık's review of David Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom*, in *Belleten* 21 (1957), pp. 503-506. See also: Ibn Iyās, v. 4, p. 109; Mughul, p. 37-41; Salih Özbaran, "Osmanlı Imparatorluğu ve Hindistan Yolu," *Tarih Dergisi* 31 (1977), pp. 77-84.

indicate that he had little doubt regarding Selim's intentions.[46] The Porte's superiority in artillery and sea power was emphasized by the sultan's largesse. The importation of Ottoman personnel and financing was coupled with an increase in Ottoman influence. The next step was to admit that the Ottoman sultan was the logical successor to the role of protection of the Holy Cities and defender of the trade routes against the infidel. As Selman Re'is suggested, there was no reason to suppose that the Ottoman navy could not extend the power of the Porte to the Indian Ocean just as it had to the Red Sea.

[46]By 1514/920 Qānsūh could not even be sure that Selim's campaign against Iran was not to be directed against Syria. Ibn Iyās v. 4, pp. 398, 402-404, 413-414, 432, 447-448.



EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION 1503-1516

Ship Concentrations

(Varied according to season/naval activities)

ZAKIA ZAHRA
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L'ARRIVÉE DES OTTOMANS EN ALGÉRIE

L'Algérie face à l'expansion espagnole :

La décadence puis la chute de l'État almohade donna lieu à l'établissement de trois petits Etats[1] qui rivalisaient entre eux, chacun voulant étendre ses frontières au dépend de l'autre. Cette rivalité causa la dégradation des domaines politique et militaire et favorisa la pénétration européenne sur le sol nord-africain.

Les principaux états européens qui se disputaient l'acquisition des côtes nord-africaines étaient l'Espagne et le Portugal, les deux grands empires commerciaux de l'époque. Il résulta de cette rivalité l'occupation des villes suivantes : Tetouan 1400, Ceuta 1415, Kasr Esseghir 1465, Casablanca (Anfa) 1468/69, Asila et Tanger 1471, M'lila 1497, Agadir 1500, Mers El Kebir et Safi 1507, Oran 1509, Bedjaïa, Alger et Tripoli 1510, Djerba 1511, Doukkala, Azemmour et Mazagan 1513.

Cette lutte se poursuivit jusqu'à ce que le Pape y mette un terme par le traité de Tordesillas en 1494, qui départagea les zones d'influence entre les deux rivaux par le Penon de Velez ; l'Espagne prit tout ce qui se situe à l'Est et le Portugal ce qui se situe à l'Ouest. Ce traité permit à l'Espagne d'étendre son expansion dans sa zone d'influence sans aucune concurrence et pour enraciner sa présence, elle construisit des forts dont le Penon d'Alger. Cet établissement espagnol sur les côtes nord-africaines marque le début d'un nouvel épisode dans la lutte entre l'Orient musulman et l'Occident chrétien.[2]

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[1] Ziyanides ou Abdelwadides (1236-1550), Mérinides (milieu du XIII[e] siècle - 1420), Hafsides (1229-1574).

[2] Pour plus de précisions sur cette lutte voir : Hess Andrew, *Iftirak al'alamain al Islami waal-massihi fi al Maghreb wa al Andalus*, traduit par Ahmet Abdurrahman Mustafa, Koweit, 1986 ;

Le déclenchement de cette lutte à l'époque moderne fût la conquête de Constantinople en 1453. Le Pape appella à une nouvelle croisade contre l'Islam qui menaçait le monde chrétien[3]. Plusieurs princes et nobles européens approuvèrent cet appel, mais Isabelle (1474-1504), qui mettra fin au dernier royaume musulman d'Espagne en 1492, fut la plus exaltée par cette idée car après avoir expulsé les musulmans de Grenade, elle les poursuivit jusqu'aux côtes nord-africaines ; et le testament qu'elle a laissé et dans lequel elle somme ses successeurs de ne pas arrêter la conquête africaine, ni la lutte contre les infidèles[4], nous démontre son désir ardent de s'emparer des côtes nord-africaines.

Étant une partie de la zone convoitée, l'Algérie suscita particulièrement l'intérêt de l'Espagne, car certaines de ses villes faisaient obstacle aux ambitions expansionnistes de cette dernière ; c'est ainsi que Djidjel, Bedjaïa[5] et Alger furent des lieux idéaux pour l'établissement des morisques fuyant la tyrannie espagnole et des bases de départ vers les côtes espagnoles à tel point que Ferdinand V (1479-1516) fut contraint à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour se protéger de leurs raids, en faisant évacuer la côte sud de Gibraltar à Almeria[6] ; d'autre part l'Algérie constituait une base stratégique de grande importance et sa prise permettrait à l'Espagne d'étendre son influence à l'Est, à l'Ouest et au Sud.

Et effectivement, elle mit son plan à exécution en 1505 lorsque Ferdinand V envoya une expédition sous le commandement de Don Diego Fernandez Cordova contre Mers el Kebir — un des meilleurs mouillages d'Afrique du Nord et la première ville algérienne victime d'une attaque espagnole — et qui comptait 10.000 hommes, 7 galères et 140 navires de différentes sortes[7]. Elle lui permit de s'emparer de Mers El Kébir et de la transformer en base militaire. Cette victoire l'encouragea à tenter de prendre d'autres villes ; et après 4 ans, en 1509 Oran vécut la même tragédie. L'expedition commandée, cette fois-ci, par le Cardinal Ximénès de Cisnéros en collaboration avec Pedro Navarro[8] et comptant 33

Braudel F. "les Espagnols et l'Afrique du Nord de 1492 à 1577", in *Revue Africaine*, 1928, pp. 184-235 et 351-428.

[3]Ata Allah Al Djamal Chawki, *Al Maghrib Al 'Arabi Al Kabir fi Al 'Asr Al Hadith (Libya, Tunis, Al Djazair, Al Maghrib)*, Al Kahira, 1977, p 47.

[4]De Grammont H.D., *Histoire d'Alger sous la domination turque (1515-1830)*, Paris, 1887, p. 5 ; Hess, *op. cit*, p. 65.

[5]Hamdan Ben Othman Khodja, *Al Mir'at*, traduit et annoté par Mohamed Larbi Zubeiri, Al Djazair, 1982, p. 108.

[6]Abdullah Inan *Mohammed, Nihayat Al Andalus wa tarikh Al'Arab Al Muntasirin*, T. II, Al Kahira, 1958, pp. 368-369.

[7]De Grammont, *op. cit.*, p. 5 ; El Mili Moubarek, *Tarikh Al Djazair fi Al Kadim wa Al Hadith*, T. III, Al Djazair, p. 22.

[8]De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 13; Julien C. A., *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord. Tunisie-Algérie-Maroc. De la Conquête Arabe à 1830*, T. II, Paris, 1952, p. 252; Wolf. J. B, *The Barbary Coast, Algiers under the Turks. 1500 to 1830*, New York-London, p. 5 ; Marçais G. "Oran", in *Encyclopédie de l'Islam*, ancienne édition (EI) T. III, p. 1061.

vaisseaux, 51 navires[9] et 24.000 hommes[10], se termina par la destruction totale de la ville, le massacre de 4000 Algériens[11], la capture de 8000 personnes et leur envoi en Espagne[12]. Au butin évalué à plus de 24 millions[13] s'ajoutait le pillage de manuscrits rares, d'armes de grande valeur et du lustre de la mosquée, tous transportés en Espagne par Ximénès[14]. Nous tenons à remarquer ici que chaque expédition était suivie par la destruction des édifices religieux et la conversion des mosquées en églises.[15]

Après avoir acquis des bases à l'Ouest de l'Algérie, elle se dirigea vers l'Est, et c'est Bedjaia qui fut, en 1510[16], attaquée par une flotte de 15 vaisseaux et 1400 hommes commandée par Pedro Navarro[17]. La prise de ces 3 villes occasionna la chute de la plupart des villes côtières algériennes entre les mains des Espagnols[18] qui réussirent à s'emparer de presque tout le littoral nord africain de M'lila à Tripoli dès 1515.

L'apparition des Ottomans en Algérie :

Face à l'invasion et l'établissement des Espagnols sur leurs côtes, les Algériens tentèrent à maintes reprises de secouer ce joug en utilisant tous les moyens dont ils disposaient[19]. Et c'est dans ce cadre que se situe l'appel des habitants de Bodjaia aux frères Barberousses qui étaient à la Goulette.

Les frères Barberousse étaient passés en Méditerranée occidentale au début du XVI[e] siècle; l'un d'eux Arudj (1512-1518), après sa fuite de Rhodes où il était en captivité, contacta Korkud (1470-1513), frère de Selim I (1512-1520) qui lui

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[9]De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 13 ; el Mili, *op. cit*, p 26.

[10]De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 13.

[11]De Grammont, *op. cit*, p.13; Julien, *op. cit*, p. 252; Al Madani Tawfik, *Harb Attalat Maat Sana Bayna Al Djazair wa Ispanya 1492-1792*, Al Djazair, 1984, 3[e] éd, p. 112 ; Marçais "Oran", EI, T. III, p. 1061.

[12]Julien, *op. cit*, p. 252; Al Madani, *op. cit*, p. 112; Marçais, Oran *EI* p. 1061 T. III

[13]La plupart des historiens ne précisent pas la nature de la monnaie avec laquelle on évalua le butin, alors que Al Madani l'évalue à 48 millions de dinars algériens ; voir Al Madani, *op. cit*, p. 112.

[14]De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 13 ; Al Madani, *op. cit*, p. 112.

[15] De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 13 ; Julien, *op. cit*, p. 252 ; Al Madani, *op. cit*, p. 112 ; El Mili, *op. cit*, p. 26.

[16]Julien, *op. cit*, p 252; Marçais," Bidjaya "in *EI* nouvelle edition (*EI2*), T. I, p. 1241 ; De Grammont cite 1509, *op. cit*, p. 15.

[17]De Grammont, *op. cit*, pp. 14-15.

[18]Alger, Mostaganem, Cherchell, Dellys... Les forces espagnoles se sont établies à Mers El kébir, Oran et Bedjaïa et y ont construit des forts, le reste des villes payaient tribut ; voir Wolf, *op. cit*, p 5.

[19]Les Algériens obligèrent les Espagnols à ne pas dépasser les murailles de leurs présidios ; voir Mantran R., *L'Empire Ottoman du XVI[e] au XVIII[e] siècle*, London, 1984, p. 4.

fournit le matériel nécessaire à la course[20] mais après la détérioration des relations entre Selim et Korkud, il s'enfuit à Alexandrie[21] dont le souverain memluk Meliki l'Ashraf Abu Nasr Jansu Al Gûri lui octroya l'autorisation d'y résider[22]. Et de là il se dirigea vers Djerba où il fut rejoint par son frère Khayreddine (1519-1546) qui dût quitter Mitylène lors de l'avènement de Selim au trône[23], et la parution de la loi qui interdit la navigation en mer Égée sans l'autorisation du sultan[24] visant à empêcher son frère Korkud de s'enfuir[25] et à mettre la main sur ses partisans; et comme Khayreddine etait frère de Arudj et ce dernier partisan de Korkud, il se sauva par crainte de Sélim.

Les deux frères firent de Djerba et la Goulette leurs bases d'attache[26] et vu leur grande activité ils devinrent célèbres en Méditerranée occidentale, ce qui poussa les habitants de Bedjaïa à demander en 1512 leur soutien contre les Espagnols[27]. Ils répondirent positivement et rejoignirent Bedjaïa avec 4 bateaux[28] ; lorsqu'ils y arrivèrent, un contingent de 3 à 4000 Algériens rallia leur force[29]. A la suite d'une bataille navale qui leur permit de couler un bateau espagnol et de mettre la main sur un autre, ils commencèrent le siège de la forteresse[30], et c'est pendant le siège que Arudj fut blessé au bras gauche alors qu'il inspectait l'état des murailles. Ils furent donc contraints de lever le siège et retourner à Tunis[31].

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[20] Rang S. et Denis F., *Fondation de la Régence d'Alger. Histoire des Barberousses, chronique arabe du XVI^e siècle*, T.I, Paris, 1887, pp. 14-16 ; Katib Çelebi, *Tuhfatül Kibar fi esfaril bihar*, Istanbul, 1728, p. 12.

[21] Çelebi, *op. cit*, p. 12 ; Rang, *op. cit*, p. 20.

[22] Rang, *op. cit*, p. 20.

[23] Selim I est le plus jeune fils de Bayezid II ; il fut appuyé par les janissaires qui écartèrent son père et le placèrent sur le trône le 25 avril 1512.

[24] Rang, *op. cit*, p. 22-23 ; Gallotta. A, "Khayr -al-din Pasha" in *EI2*, T. IV, p. 1187.

[25] Pour plus de précisions sur l'avènement de Sélim I et sa rivalité avec ses frères voir : Hammer. J. D. *op. cit.*, pp. 104-123 et 146-154; Farid bey Mohamed, *Tarikh Addawla Al Aliya Al Othmaniya*, Beyrut, 1977, p. 72 ; Uzunçarşılı. İ.H., "II inci Bayezidin oğullarından sultan Korkut" *Belleten*, CXXX S19, Temmuz, 1966, pp. 539-601 ; Uluçay. G, "Yavuz Sultan Selim nasıl Padişah oldu? *Tarih Dergisi*, C VI, Sayı 9, mart 1954, pp. 53-90 et C VII, sayı 10, eylül 1954, pp. 117-142 et C VIII, sayı 11-12, eylül 1955, pp. 185-200.

[26] Elles ont été cédées par le souverain Hafside Abu Abdullah Mohamed Ibn ul Hassan en échange du 1/5 du butin ; voir Çelebi, *op. cit*, p 26 ; Le Tourneau R, "Arudj" in *EI2*, T. I, p. 698 ; Gallotta, "Khayr aldin Paşha" in *EI2*, T. IV, p : 1187.

[27] Al Madani, *op. cit*, p. 162 ; El Mili, *op. cit*, p. 35.

[28] Çelebi, *op. cit*, p. 12 (verso) ; Al Madani, cite 5 bateaux, *op. cit*, p. 163.

[29] Haedo. F. D., *Histoire des Rois d'Alger*, traduit de l'espagnol par De Grammont, Alger, 1881, p. 11 ; De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 19.

[30] Rang, *op. cit*, p. 36 ; ils prirent deux bateaux selon Çelebi, *op. cit*, p. 12 (verso).

[31] Rang, *op. cit*, p. 36 ; Çelebi, *op. cit*, p. 12 (verso) ; Haedo, *op. cit*, p. 11 ; Al Madani, *op. cit*, p. 164 ; El Mili, *op. cit*, p. 36.

La défaite de Bedjaïa attira l'attention des deux frères sur la nécessité de trouver une base plus proche du futur champ de bataille ; ils ont probablement remarqué l'importance de la forteresse de Djidjel[32] qui n'était qu'à quelques kilomètres de Bedjaïa lors de leur retrait à la suite de leur défaite. L'occasion se présenta à eux — selon certaines sources — lorsque les habitants de Djidjel les appelèrent à leur ville[33], alors que d'autres sources nous rapportent que les deux frères ont écrit aux notables de la ville leur demandant de se préparer à les aider lorsqu'ils attaqueront la forteresse[34]. Dans les deux cas la population de Djidjel a largement contribué à chasser les Gênois de leur ville en 1514.

L'écho de la libération de Djidjel, incita la population à se joindre aux frères Barberousse, à tel point que leur nombre s'éleva à 20.000 soldats[35] et ce dans l'intention de libérer les autres villes côtières. De Djidjel qui fut prise comme base, ils se dirigèrent en 1514 vers Bedjaïa pour en faire le deuxième siège, mais cette initiative se solda par un échec car d'une part ils manquèrent de poudre et le souverain de Tunis qui commençait à craindre leur puissance refusa de leur en fournir[36], d'autre part un grand renfort arrivant d'Espagne[37] ils furent donc obligés de se retirer, et entraînant avec eux des prisonniers, ils regagnèrent Djidjel où demeura Arudj. Quant à Khayreddine il alla à Tunis avec 3 bateaux[38] et s'occupa à renforcer sa flotte jusqu'à ce qu'elle atteignit 28 bateaux[39].

Alors que Arudj était à Djidjel, la population d'Alger, profitant de l'occasion de la mort de Ferdinand V, s'engagea dans une nouvelle phase de lutte contre les Espagnols installés au fort du Penon qu'ils avaient construit sur l'îlot se trouvant en face de la ville d'Alger. Et puisque les Algérois connaissaient Arudj et Khayreddine à travers leurs exploits à Djidjil et Bedjaïa ainsi que leur rôle dans le transfert des Morisques en Afrique du Nord[40], ils leur adressèrent une lettre[41] demandant leur soutien car Arudj possédait des navires et des canons[42]. Quant à eux ils étaient assiégés par les Espagnols qui les empêchaient de sortir en mer car ils risqueraient de contourner leurs lignes.

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[32] Djijelli fut prise par les Gênois en 1260. En 1513, juste après l'échec du 1er siège de Bedjaïa, elle fut de nouveau reprise par André Doria ; voir Al Madani, *op. cit*, p. 166 ; Yver G., "Djijelli" in *EI2*, T. II, p. 550.

[33] Al Madani, *op. cit*, p. 166.

[34] Rang, *op. cit*, p. 50 ; El Mili, *op. cit*, p. 36.

[35] Rang, *op. cit*, p. 50 ; El Mili, *op. cit*, p. 36.

[36] Rang, *op. cit*, pp. 52-53 ; Çelebi, *op. cit*, p. 13.

[37] Haedo, *op. cit*, p. 14 ; Rang, *op. cit*, p. 53 ; Çelebi, *op. cit*, p. 13.

[38] Rang, *op. cit*, p. 54 ; Çelebi, *op. cit*, p. 13.

[39] Rang, *op. cit*, pp. 55-56 ; Çelebi, *op. cit*, p. 13.

[40] Julien, *op. cit*, p. 252 ; Esin, *op. cit*, p. 593.

[41] La lettre a été envoyée par Sélim Ettoumi selon Julien, *op. cit*, p. 255 ; Al Madani, *op. cit*, p. 173 ; De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 22.

[42] Le Tourneau, "Arudj", in *EI2*, T. 1, p. 699.

Nous situons l'arrivée de la lettre et par conséquent la venue de Khayreddine à Alger entre les mois de janvier et septembre 1516 pour deux causes : la première étant la mort du roi d'Espagne Ferdinand le Catholique le 22 janvier 1516 qui incita les Algérois à tenter de chasser les Espagnols de leur ville, la deuxième étant l'expédition de Diego de Vera le 30 septembre 1516[43], qui était une réaction violente et directe contre l'installation de Arudj à Alger qui eût pour résultat la coordination des efforts en vue de libérer la ville. La présence espagnole était donc menacée.

Arudj réserva un grand accueil aux messagers des Algérois et accepta leur requête sans hésitation. Il ressembla ses hommes et envoya 16 navires en emportant la moitié vers Alger, lui même avec 800 combattants auxquels sont venus s'ajouter 5000 soldats algériens s'y dirigea par voie de terre[44] ; il fut suivi par deux renforts envoyés par Khayreddine le premier de Djidjel, le second de Tunis commandé par son frère Ishak[45]. Au lieu de s'arrêter à Alger, Arudj alla à Cherchell pour écarter Kara Hassan, un de ses anciens partisans qui voulait établir un government autonome dans cette ville, puis alla à Alger où il fut très bien accueilli par la population[46]. Dès son arrivée Arudj commença le bombardement du Penon mais ses efforts furent vains en raison de la faiblesse de son artillerie[47].

L'échec de Arudj dans cette première tentative de libérer le Penon, ajouté à l'indiscipline de ses hommes poussa les Algériens à changer d'avis à son égard ; une vive opposition dirigée par Sélim Ettoumi ne tarda pas à naître, mais Arudj réussit à le tuer[48] et devint ainsi gouverneur de la ville[49]. L'opposition ne fut pas étouffée pour autant, et le fils de Sélim Ettoumi, Yahya demanda l'aide des Espagnols pour venger son père[50].

L'Espagne saisissant l'occasion envoya le 30 septembre 1516 une armada de 35 vaisseaux et plus de 3000 hommes commandée par Diégo de Vera mais l'expédition échoua[51], en raison du rôle qu'a joué la population d'Alger[52]. Cette

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[43]De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 23.

[44]Haedo, *op. cit*, p. 17; De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 22.

[45]Çelebi, *op. cit*, pp. 13-13 (verso); rang, *op. cit*, p. 60 et 64.

[46]Haedo, *op. cit*, p. 19; De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 22; Al Madani, *op. cit*, p. 174; El Mili, *op. cit*, p. 44.

[47]De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 22; El Mili, *op. cit*, p. 45 ; Maedo, *op. cit*, p. 20.

[48]Haedo, *op. cit*, p. 20-21 ; De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 22 ; Julien, *op. cit*, p. 255 ; El Mili, *op. cit*, p. 45 ; Le Tourneau, "Arudj", *EI2*, p. 699.

[49]Haedo, *op. cit*, p. 21 ; De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 22 ; Julien, *op. cit*, p. 255 ; El Mili, *op. cit*, p. 45.

[50]Heado, *op. cit*, pp. 21-22 ; De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 33 ; Al Madani, *op. cit*, p. 176 ; Le Tourneau, "Arudj", *EI2*, p 699.

[51]De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 23.

[52]Çelebi, *op. cit*, p. 13 (verso).

dernière malgré son differend avec Arudj s'allia à lui de nouveau pour repousser l'ennemi commun : les Espagnols.

Pendant ce temps le souverain de Ténès Abu Abdullah (1504-1517) se dirigeait vers Alger pour l'attaquer. Khayreddine qui était arrivé précédemment à d'Alger[53] sortit à sa rencontre[54] et réussit à le vaincre. A son retour à Alger, les deux frères se partagèrent l'Algérie, Khayreddine prit l'Est et Arudj l'Ouest[55]. Entre temps le souverain de Ténès était revenu à sa ville, et dès que Arudj l'apprît, il laissa Khayreddine à Alger et alla à Ténès pour l'écarter. Et c'est là bas qu'il reçut une lettre de la population de Tlemcen l'invitant à venir la soutenir contre son souverain qui s'était allié aux Espagnols ; il alla donc à Tlemcen où la population l'accueilla très bien[56], s'installa au Machwar[57] alors que le souverain de la ville Abu Hammu III (1517 - 1527) s'enfuit à Fes puis retourna à Oran où il demanda l'appui des Espagnols[58]. Sa demande fut satisfaite, il prit donc la route de Kalaat ûl Kilaa (Kalaat Beni Rached) — où se trouvait Ishak, envoyé par Khayreddine pour porter secours à Arudj — soutenu par une grande armée espagnole commandée par Don Martin d'Argote. Après avoir assiégé la forteresse durant 6 mois, il tua Ishak en janvier 1518[59]. Une fois la forteresse des Beni Rached prise, Abu Hammu III alla à Tlemcen où il assiégea Arudj 7 mois et le tua[60]. Puis encouragé par ces deux victoires, il poursuivit son chemin vers Alger pour s'en emparer ; en même temps une expédition espagnole envoyée par Charles Quint et commandée par Don Hugo de Moncade s'approchait d'Alger (juillet 1519) ; elle comptait 40 navires et environ 5000 hommes mais elle fut repoussée[61]. Néanmoins, conscients du danger que représentaient ces expéditions, les Algériens et Khayreddine trouvèrent la solution dans la possibilité de lier l'Algérie au Khalifat ottoman étant donné que le sultan ottoman etait devenu Khalife des musulmans après la conquête de l'Égypte (1517) et le transfert des clés des lieux saints à Istanbul. La gravité de la situation, ainsi que leur désir de se lier à l'État ottoman, nous sont demontrés dans la lettre qu'ils firent parvenir à Selim par le biais d'une délégation présidée par un des *ulemas* d'Alger Abul

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[53] El Mili, *op. cit*, p. 46.

[54] Ce sont les habitants de Ténès qui ont demandé l'aide des Barberousses contre leur souverain qui s'était allié aux Espagnols ; voir Çelebi, *op. cit*, p. 14 ; et c'est Khayreddine qui est sorti contre le souverain de Ténès selon Haedo, *op. cit*, p. 26.

[55] Çelebi, *op. cit*, p. 14 ; Rang, *op. cit*, pp. 92-94.

[56] Al Madani, *op. cit*, p. 186

[57] Al Machwar palais portifié édifié au XIII[e] siècle par le premier souverain Abdelwadide.

[58] Rang, *op. cit*, pp. 96-98 ; Çelebi, *op. cit*, p. 14 ; De Grammont, *op. cit*, pp. 24-25 ; Haedo, *op. cit*, pp. 29-30.

[59] Çelebi, *op. cit*, p. 14 ; Rang, *op. cit*, p. 100-102 ; Haedo, *op. cit*, p 30-31; De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 26.

[60] Çelebi, *op. cit*, p. 14 (verso) ; *op. cit*, p. 103 ; Haedo, *op. cit*, pp. 32-34 ; De Grammont, *op. cit*, p. 26-27.

[61] De Grammont, *op. cit*, pp. 31-32.

Abbas Ahmed Ben Ali Ben Ahmed (26 octobre-3 novembre 1519)[62]. Selim accepta la proposition des Algériens, envoya des présents à Alger et nomma Khaireddime beylerbey.

A partir des événements que nous venons de relater nous déduisons les conclusions suivantes :

1- L'Algérie a dû faire face depuis le début des guerres de *reconquista* espagnoles à une vague d'expéditions visant à la détruire comme État musulman et la coloniser. Les rois qui se sont succédés sur le trône d'Espagne ont tous œuvrer dans ce sens, mais la situation devint particulièrement menaçante avec l'avénement de Charles V au trône impérial en 1519, car dès son accession au trône il envoya une expédition contre Alger. Ces menaces ne tardèrent pas à se confirmer par la suite lorsqu'il commanda lui même ces expéditions en 1535 contre Tunis et en 1541 contre Alger. Les Algériens ont pris conscience très tôt du déséquilibre produit en Méditerranée occidentale et de la situation qui en résulta et décidèrent de se lier à l'État ottoman qui était à l'époque (XVI^{e} siècle) un empire puissant pouvant faire face à l'empire espagnol. Cette prise de conscience nous est démontrée dans la lettre qu'ils ont envoyé au khalife Selim I en 1519.

2- L'Algérie n'a pas été conquise par les Ottomans, comme le prétendent la plupart des historiens, car une simple comparaison entre l'arrivée des Ottomans en Algérie et leur entrée dans d'autres pays nous montre que la présence ottomane en Algérie ne résulta pas d'une expédition militaire, donc conquête, mais elle vient à la suite d'appels lancés par les habitants de différentes villes d'Algérie à Arudj et Khayreddine pour les soutenir contre la menace espagnole. Les appels se sont poursuivis comme suit : Bedjaïa 1512, Djidgel 1514, Alger 1516, Ténès et Tlemcen 1517.

3- Ces appels ont été adressés à Arudj et Khayreddine étant donné qu'ils étaient musulmans ; les Algériens sont allés jusqu'à s'allier à eux contre leurs propres souverains car ceux-ci avaient conclu des pactes avec les Espagnols, donc ils furent considérés comme étrangers n'ayant aucun droit à gouverner un pays musulman.

4- Selon la plupart des historiens, l'Algérie a été défendue et sauvée de l'emprise espagnole par Arudj, Kheireddine et leur armée. Ceci n'aurait pu arriver sans la forte participation des Algériens ce qui a permis de conjuguer les efforts contre l'ennemi commun : les Espagnols. Nous

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[62]Temimi A., "Lettre de la population algéroise au Sultan Sélim I en 1519", in *Revue de l'Histoire Maghrebine*, n° 6, juillet 1976, pp. 95-101.

pouvons comparer ici, à titre d'exemple seulement, l'effectif des Algériens qui se sont joint à Arudj lors de sa venue à Alger à celui de ses troupes : le nombre des Algériens s'élevait à 5000 soldats alors que les troupes de Arudj ne dépassaient pas 1600 soldats[63] .

5- Le lien de l'Algérie à l'Empire ottoman n'émana pas d'une initiative personnelle prise par Khayreddine comme le prétendent certains historiens, mais ce fut une décision prise par les Algériens, qui à la suite de réunions et de larges consultations[64], envoyèrent une délégation présidée par un lettré algérien nommé Abul Abbas Ahmed Ben Ali Ben Ahmed et porteuse d'une lettre au Khalif Selim I.

6- La présence ottomane en Algérie n'a pas été considérée d'un point de vue racial mais elle a été prise dans une optique plus large, c'est celle de la solidarité islamique car le monde du XVI^{e} siècle n'était pas celui des nationalités, il était divisé en deux parties distinctes : Islam et Chrétienté. Et lorsque les Algéirens ont décidé de lier leur destin à celui de l'État ottoman, ils ne pensèrent pas à se lier à un État turc mais à un État musulman, qui représentait le Khalifat musulman. Le lien spirituel était donc au dessus de toutes les considérations car bien que les Algériens connaissaient les Ottomans à la fin du 15^{e}/début du 16^{e} siècle[65] ils ne pensèrent jamais à se lier à leur État, et ce n'est que lorsque le sultan ottoman devint Khalif qu'ils le décidèrent.

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[63] De Grammont, *op. cit*, p 22.

[64] Dans la lettre envoyée les Algériens proposent à Sélim I leur lien à l'Empire Ottoman et disent que Bougie, l'Est et l'Ouest sont d'accord, alors que nous savions jusqu'à présent que la décision avait été prise par les Algérois (habitants d'Alger) ; ceci sousentend que la proposition a été discutée dans différentes villes d'Algérie et la décision fut uniforme.

[65] Parmi eux Piri Reis qui longea les côtes algériennes et nous laissa une description très importante voir son livre *Kıtabı Bahriye*. Istanbul, 1935 ; Mantran R., "La description des côtes de l'Algérie dans le *Kitabı Bahriye* de Piri Reis", in *Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 1973 pp. 159-168 ; Esin E., "La description des côtes algériennes par Piri Reis" in *Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations*, 1986, pp. 46-60 ; Afetinan A., *Life and works of Piri Reis : the oldest map of America*, Ankara, 1975.

Abderrahman EL-MOUDDEN

THE *SHARIF* AND THE *PADISHAH*: SOME REMARKS ON MOROCCAN-OTTOMAN RELATIONS IN THE 16TH CENTURY*

The text of a mid-eighteenth century *defter* from the *Cevdet Tasnifi* at the *Başbakanlık* Archives in Istanbul runs as follows: *Maġrip Padişahın Devlet Aliye'ye hediye ile vürud eden elçisine tevābi'ātiyle i'ṭā ve iḥsan buyurulan ta'yīnāt defteridir* (This is the register of the allowances which are ordered to be given and granted to the ambassador of the Sultan of Morocco and his companions who have come to the Sublime State with gifts [sent by the Moroccan Sultan]) (*Cevdet Tasnifi, Hariciye*, 4052, 5 M 1176/27 July 1762).

One notices two distortions in the official Ottoman nomenclature in addressing Moroccan rulers in this long sentence: the ruler is qualified as *Padişah* (sultan) and the country is called Morocco, whereas the regular and recurrent usage, since the 16th century, was *Fas Hakimi*, ruler of the principality of Fez.[1]

These distortions were certainly not an error of some scribe in the Ottoman central bureaucracy.[2] They showed the ground covered in Moroccan-Ottoman relations since the 16th century: *i.e.*, the mutual recognition as two independent powers within the same abode of Islam. This stage was reached only through a three-century long process. It is not my intention to follow up here this process. Rather, I will focus on its early stages in the 16th century, after making some preliminary remarks on controversies connected with the Ottoman presence in Morocco.

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[1] In Turkey, still today, Morocco is named Fas: cf. *Fas Büyük Elçisi* in Ankara.

[2] The bureaucracy was very careful on the choice of terms in the correspondence: whether a letter, for instance, was classified as a *hüküm* (order) or a *name-i hümayun* (sultanic letter) depended on the importance of its contents.

Controversies

The nature of the Ottoman presence in Morocco has been a controversial question with extreme positions held by both Turks and Moroccans. One example alone can show such exaggerations. The 4th of August is celebrated annually in Morocco and to much a lesser degree in Turkey as well, as the date of a victory of a resistant Islam against an invading Christianity. That is, the Portuguese army was routed in Northern Morocco (4 August 1578), in what was soon to be famous as "the Battle of the Three Kings".[3] A question which receives diametrically opposed answers concerns who won this victory. For Moroccan writers, of course, Moroccans were the heroes of the battle. If there was there some janissaries, they must have been a little group of mercenaries at the service of the Moroccan sultan, the Sa'adi 'Abd al-Malik (Razzuq 1986: I, 57-8).

Unsurprisingly, in Turkey, even in 1988, history for the public at large presents this victory as a *zafer* (triumph) of only the janissaries. Accordingly, Moroccans were there just to help the big brother fight the enemy.[4]

The same extremes prevail concerning the broad question of the Ottoman presence in Morocco. While Moroccan popular historiography and even some scholarly works would deny any Ottoman influence in Morocco, in Turkey, some historians even find it quite natural to extend the map of Ottoman lands to the Atlantic Ocean.[5]

Given the fact the two historical traditions ignore each other, is there any room for a balanced approach to Moroccan-Ottoman relations? Some recent studies allow us to answer affirmatively.[6] Their main new feature is that they rely on data from both Moroccan and Turkish sources. However, much work remains to be done in investigating Moroccan-Ottoman relations. The aim of these remarks is to contribute in the same spirit.

Emergence of Two Powers in North Africa

In 1510, the Spaniard Pedro Navarro conquered the city of Bougie, to the east of Algiers. In 1514, Baba Oruç, a "condottieri" (Larouil) of Ottoman origin,

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[3]In fact, this battle has more than one name. Significantly, parallel names are given to it in Morocco and Turkey. To the Moroccan Al-Kasar and Wād al-Makhāzin the Turkish *vis-à-vis* are Wadissebil or Wadiseyl.

[4]See for instance the article "B*ir Ağustos Zaferi*" by Yılmaz Öztuna, *Tercüman*, 4 Ağustos 1988, p. 6.

[5]So is the map at the Topkapı Museum entrance.

[6]A. Hess and D. Yahya among others. See the bibliography below.

supported by local population, took a foothold in Djidjelli, some ten miles to the east of Bougie. That was the beginning of a century-long struggle between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans for domination over North Africa. This struggle was to end by a solid establishment of Ottoman power in Algeria, Libya and Tunisia (Ch.-A. Julien 1966: II, 252-4).

In 1505, the Portuguese established a fortress at Agadir in the south west of today's Morocco. In 1511, not far from Agadir, the population of the Sus region chose Muhammad b. 'Abd ar-Rahman, reputedly from sharifian origin and supported by the main brotherhood movement in the area, the *zawiya* Jazuliya, as chief of the holy war, *(jihād)* and entrusted him with the responsibility of conducting it against the Portuguese in Agadir. Another century-long struggle was beginning here as well. This struggle, even though more reduced in scale than the first one, was to end by the establishment of a power parallel to the Ottoman one in North Africa, that of the Sharifian dynasties in Morocco (A. Laroui 1977: 239, 247).

In both cases, new contenders were supported or chosen by the local population to lead the struggle both against Iberian aggression and the weak resistance of local Muslim princes. The same historical context gave birth to two powers which opposed each other during part of the 16th century.

In the Ottoman center, was there any formal project for the conquest of Morocco? If ever such a projet existed, its records at the Turkish Archives either have disappeared or are not yet open to research. Many signs, however, show that the attempts were numerous, whether locally decided in Algiers, or centrally ordered from Istanbul. Were these efforts intended to establish an Ottoman province in Morocco as was the case in Egypt and Algeria or were they meant to promote a dependent but largely autonomous power? This issue can only be addressed after a brief review of the major Ottoman attempts in Morocco.

Ottoman Attempts to Take Control of Morocco

One of the major differences between the emergence of Ottoman power in Algiers and Tunisia and the first Ottoman attempts in Morocco is that in this latter case the Ottomans made a bad choice: they bet on the loser. Their first strong involvement in Morocco was to support the last Waṭṭasid dynasty. He had tried his fortune, unsuccessfully, in Spain and Portugal, to recover his throne. The Paşa of Algiers, Salih Reis, thought it a good policy to support him. In fact, he must have been aware of the fact that the population of Fez did not nourish any great love for the Sa'di ruler. The anonymous writer describes the euphoria with which this population welcomed the returning Waṭṭasid in 1554

(Anon.: 18).[7] Soon, however, they sought to get rid of the presence of the janissaries. When Salih Reis left Fez, Muḥammad al-Shaykh reoccupied the city, and Bu Hassun, the Ottoman ally met his tragic end. (Anon.: 21; Yahya 1981: 15; Hess 1978: 54-6).

Thus this first attempt yielded nothing. The second important one occurred twenty years later and was, this time channeled through the Sa'di legitimacy.

Al-Shaykh was killed in obscure circumstances. According to the earliest and most reliable Moroccan accounts, he was assassinated by a group of Ottoman envoys who had gained his confidence and were serving as his personal guards (Anon.: 27-8, İlter 1935-7: I, 169; Uzunçarşılı 1983: 45-6).[8]

In no less obscure circumstances, his sons had a misunderstanding about the succession, and three of them had to flee to Ottoman territories to escape the threats of their reigning brother 'Abd Allāh al-Ghālib (r. 1557-74). In a very skillful balancing act this sultan succeeded in maintaining an equidistant position between Habsburgs and Ottomans and applied a policy of "rule without struggle" (Yahya 1981: 28). His brothers became slowly part of the local Ottoman clientage and eventually even members of the provincial administration in Western Algeria (MD 25: 3113, 342, 27 S 982/10 Feb. 1575).

The Padişah Selim II (r. 1566-74) tried several times to settle peacefully the issue between the brothers according to the broad view of Islamic tradition: Muslims should not fight each other. In reality, this was a good tactic for an implicit strategy: the goal was to weaken the Sa'di power and the suggestion was to divide Morocco between the competing brothers. Al-Ghālib, again true to his policy, sent gifts and declined the suggestion (MD 7: 2484, 907-8, 22 Ca 976/ 14 Dec. 1568).

His death in 1574 raised anew the question of succession. Among the fleeing brothers, the eldest 'Abd al-Mūmin had been assassinated, most likely under al-Ghālib's instigation. The two survivors 'Abd al-Mālik and Ahmad had acquired a rich international political and military training. They would not allow their neophyte nephew to rule the country. The designs of 'Abd al-Mālik coincided with the designs of the Sublime Porte, right after the conquest of Tunis. The Ottoman attempt of 1576 channeled through the Sa'di legitimacy, was ordered by the Padişah Murat III (r. 1574-95) who decided to support 'Abd al-Mālik's projects of conquerring Morocco against Mūḥammad al-Mutawakkil (r. 1574-6) (Hess 1978: 95-6).

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[7]The anonymous chronicle is one of the earliest sources for this period.

[8]Turkish studies either reproduce Moroccan and French material about this episode (İlter), or prefer simply to skip it (Uzunçarşılı).

Here one can skip the details of the Ottoman expedition that accompanied 'Abd al-Mālik and established him as an Ottoman dependent Sa'di ruler in Fez. This expedition has already received close attention in various works (Cour 1904: 141-3; İlter 1935-7: I, 194 ff; Yahya 1981: 66ff; Hess 1978: 95ff). In many respects, this second Ottoman attempt was a repetition of the first one twenty years before. The Ottomans seemed to have come to stay. The anonymous chronicler recorded how 'Abd al-Mālik acted quickly in order to repay the expenses of the operation to Ramazan Pasha of Algiers and have the expeditionary troups leave Fez (Anon. 1934: 52-3).

More relevant to our purpose are the perceptions and expectations of both the Ottoman sultan and the Moroccan prince after the conquest of Fez. One can glean them through the correspondence exchanged between the two rulers in the *Mühimme* (MD 30).

For the short reign of 'Abd al-Mālik (1576-8) more documents pertinent to Morocco were recorded in the *Mühimme* than for the whole 17th century. This feverish epistolary activity is evidence of what is often imputed to 'Abd al-Mālik, that he was a ruler open to the new means of modern administration (Yahya 1981: 72-3, 88, n. 50).

The contents of these letters highlight the instructions given to the governors of Algiers and administrators of other Ottoman provinces that they should not interfere with the affairs of the Sa'di ruler. Although 'Abd al-Mālik recognized the "suzerainty" of the Ottoman sultan by saying the Friday *khutba* (sermon) in the name of Murat III, he managed carefully not to be affiliated with the second center of Algiers.[9]

The attitude of the Ottoman center can be grasped through three important letters sent to al-Mālik after his taking over in Morocco (MD 30: 489, 491, 492).

The first observation is that two of these letters were written in Arabic. This appears rather surprising in the case of a client who was most probably fluent in Turkish. The Ottoman sultan addressing other governors would consistently use Turkish, unless as in Algeria or Tunisia for instance, the letter is sent "to the people" of such city or region. On the other hand, the Sultan would address some rulers of particular status in Arabic: such was the case of the emir of Mecca and the king of Bornou (MD 30:494).

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[9]Algiers was the local center for the whole North Africa before 1587 and even beyond this date which corresponds to the establishment of three distinct provinces in Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli.

The second observation is that there is something intriguing about these letters. The cataloguer affirms that the second and the third letters are respectively simply the brief and the full Arabic versions of the first Turkish letter. Sure of his assumption, he goes on to date the three of them to 11 *Rebiyülahir* 985 (29 June 1577). The fact that they were written down almost in succession (see the numbering) may suggest that they came to the hand of the scribe in the same package. This would mean that they were conceived and written in very close periods if not at the same time.

However, a quick look at the contents of these letters show that they correspond to two distinct moments of feeling at the center toward the newly conquered land, though no concrete proof can be put forward to substantiate the idea they were actually drafted out in separate moments.

The first letter (489) is a lengthy text in Turkish informing 'Abd al-Mālik that the news of the successes of the Ottoman expedition had reached Istanbul and urging him to work in close cooperation with the new paşa of Algiers, Hasan Paşa. The second (491) skips the news of the expedition and stresses the necessary cooperation between 'Abd al-Mālik and Hasan Paşa. This must be a summary of the previous letter as recognized by the cataloguer. In effect, the Turkish text mentions at the end that a parallel text in Arabic was dispatched to 'Abd al-Mālik. The main interest of the Arabic text is that it qualified 'Abd-Mālik clearly as *wālī Wilāyat Fas*, the governor of the province of Fas.

The third one (492) insists again on the cooperation but this time in a very different tone. The role of the *Padişah* as Caliph is emphasized but 'Abd al-Mālik is addressed as *Hakim wilāyat Fas*, the ruler of the province of Fas. This seems to be an intermediary stage to the expression that was to become the authorized one: *Fas hakimi*, the ruler [of the principality] of Fas. Furthermore, this same letter concludes: *ḥattā yakūn al-mamlakatayn ka rūḥayn fī jasad wa sā'idayn fī'aḍud*, "[the mutual help is expected to be as strong] as the two states [countries or kingdoms which] will be like two souls in one body or two forearms for the same upperarm".

The body metaphors stress the unity of the *umma*, which is altogether a religious, cultural and social correlate of the political or institutional notion of the caliphate. The figure two, given twice, stresses, rather, the distinction between two political powers within the *umma*.

The extreme importance of this third letter lies in the fact that it shows how the Ottomans at the peak of their influence in Morocco perceived the horizon of a widely autonomous power in this region, though expected to be always a good ally.

How can one account for such a special status? Was it it due to the skills of 'Abd al-Mālik who from the outset tried as aforementioned to autonomize his power in particular toward his neighbours in Algiers (MD 30: 467)? Was it due to some special treatment on the part of the Ottoman center as it could be inferred from the status of the Hijaz where other Sharifs were also granted relative autonomy at least until early 19th century? Or was it due to the peripheral and remote position of Morocco in regard to the heartland of the Ottoman empire, in which case Morocco would have been treated by the Ottoman establishment in the same frame as Bornou or India? Or, finally, was it due to an early "national" feeling of Moroccan identity which opposed and caused the failure of Ottoman attempts to establish a durable influence to the west of Oujda? All these elements may have intervened and overlapped and yet, without further investigation, no definite answer is safe.

At any rate, the death of 'Abd al-Mālik on the evening of the battle of Wād al-Makhāzin (1578) and the prestige gained by Morocco due to the outcome of this battle freed the hands of 'Abd al-Mālik's brother and successor Aḥmad (r.1578-1603) who started a real policy of international competition with both Ottoman and European powers in the north west of Africa.

By 1587, when Algiers and Tunis were officially declared separate Ottoman provinces, the Sa'di regime was well established in Morocco, and for almost a decade, no serious Ottoman attempt to conquer it had occurred. The title of *hākim* applied to the Moroccan sultan, though somewhat belittling, was a common usage to qualify independent Muslim rulers (Orhonlu 1969: 119).

When in the 18th century the court scribes at Istanbul granted more than one previous *hākim* the honorific title of *padişah*, this vocable had lost much of its political weight. New struggles were clouding the horizon and new political settings and titles arose to face them.

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THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN NORTH AFRICA: A QUESTION OF DEGREE — TRIPOLI IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

In 1681, France was at peace with the Ottoman Empire. Tripoli, nominally part of the Empire, was not. For many years its corsair captains had directed a long campaign against French merchant ships. In August that year, therefore, a French fleet was sent to deal with them. Commanded by Abraham Du Quesne, it eventually came upon several Tripoli ships in the port at Chios in the Greek islands. When the Ottoman governor of the port refused to hand over the corsairs, Du Quesne destroyed several of them, and bombarded the town at the same time.

As a result the Porte intervened. The Admiral of the Tripoli ships was obliged to sign a treaty with the French in which he agreed to end corsairing attacks on French shipping. By the end of the year there was a French consul in Tripoli and agreements had been made for the return of French captives to France. Yet by the end of the following year, the treaty had been set aside by the local authorities in Tripoli and the corsairing war continued.

The incident at Chios and its aftermath reveal the ambiguity of the relationship between Tripoli and its nominal overlord in Istanbul. Clearly, the Porte had some influence over affairs in its North African province: it could after all insist upon a treaty. But Tripoli made the treaty, and Tripoli broke it. Some influence, then, but how much ?

Ambiguous relationships are interesting to study, and clearly the issues are wider than a single treaty. Before looking at the relationsihp, in 1681, between the poorest province in North Africa and the Sublime Porte in Istanbul there is another question to be answered first. How did it get like that, and why?

NORTH AFRICA AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Like the other North African provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Tripoli conducted its own diplomatic policies and made its own treaties, in a way which the Ottoman governors of, say Damascus did not. These provinces — Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers — had three orientations in their external relations: towards Europe, towards each other, and southwards across the Sahara, That these orientations were dictated by geography is shown by the fact that they were shared by Morocco, which never was a part of the Ottoman empire. Where they differed from Morocco was in a fourth aspect, their relations with the Sublime Porte in Istanbul: obviously, since they recognised the supremacy of the Sultan-Caliph in Istanbul and Morocco did not.

Tripoli shared other characteristics with Tunis, Algiers and, to some extent, with Egypt. Like them it was politically autonomous of central control. Like Algiers and Tunis it depended upon corsairing for some of its state revenues. Unlike Egypt or Tunis, it was a province poor in resources and with little industry.

Tripoli had been part of the Ottoman Empire since 1551, when the Knights of St. John were ousted. By then Algiers had already joined the Empire and Tunis would follow in 1574. But North Africa was only one of the battlefields in which the Ottomans were involved: they had to cope with the enmity of Venice in the Mediterranean, with the Holy Roman Empire in the north and the Persian Empire in the east and later with Russia: all of which was expensive. The North African provinces were quite remote from the capital, and very soon local political systems began to emerge — or perhaps partly to reassert themselves. The Ottomans were energetically resisted by the Arab tribes, led by their own shaykhs, and their own religious leaders. And they were disunited amongst themselves: the Pasha, the official Ottoman representative in each province soon clashed with those who had real power, the Janissaries.

By the seventeenth century, the Janissaries of Tunis controlled the *divan*, and were able to choose the real ruler of the city, the Bey. In 1631, Murad Bey persuaded the Sultan to appoint him Pasha, and then seized overall power in Tunis, laying the basis of a dynastic rule which lasted until 1705, although it was frequently contested. After the death of Murad II Bey in 1675 a civil war began in which the support of the Sultan in Istanbul failed to prevent one of the participants from being expelled from the city. On the other hand the support of the governor of Algiers was of little use to another participant.

By the beginning of the seventeenth century the Pasha of Algiers had also been reduced to a purely formal role, but the dominance of the Janissaries was

contested by the captains of the corsairing ships, the *raises*. The struggle between the *raises* and the Janissaries continued until, in 1671, the Janissaries effectively won and installed one of their own number to be ruler of the city, with the title of Dey. Even then, the *raises* kept considerable autonomy, with their own assembly, the *taifa*, while the interior of the country was placed under three beys, who had considerable local power. The regime was hardly stable and many Deys only ruled for a very short period.

Despite the political instability, the Porte was not able to wrench back direct control. There were more immediate problems and threats: military rebellions and factionalism at home, and then when Köprülü Mehmed Pasha restored order at the centre, a renewed campaign against the Hapsburgs culminating in the siege of Vienne in 1683. On the other hand, the rulers of the North African provinces paid formal allegiance to the Sultan, and sent him money and ships when he needed them for his fleet. Their violent squabbles posed no real threat to the survival of the Empire and it was actually advantageous to allow them to go their own way to pursue those squabbles on their own[1].

TRIPOLI IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Tripoli was the least significant of the North African provinces. Egypt's settled population along the Nile and its great capital of Cairo put it into a very different category from the other three provinces, of course. But Tripoli was the poor relation of the other three too. Although, like Algiers, Tripoli depended on corsairing for revenue it had a much smaller fleet: in 1676 Tripoli had twelve ships, and thirteen in 1679; Algiers had no less than fifty in 1676[2]. By the beginning of the seventeenth century Algiers had extended its operations into the Atlantic. It was not until 1680 that the first Tripoli ship dared to make its way through the Straits of Gibraltar[3]. Population figures, unreliable though they are, tell the same story. In 1675, the English Consul in Algiers reckoned its population at 32,000 families and another 31,000 individuals. The population of Tunis at this time was somewhere between 80,000 and 100,000. But Tripoli was

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[1]The preceding paragraphs are based on: M.A. Cook, *History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730*, Cambridge, 1983, 104-176; Taoufik Bachrouch, *Formation sociale barbaresque et pouvoir à Tunis au XVII^e siècle*, Tunis, 1977; Magali Morsy, *North Africa 1800-1900, A Survey from the Nile to the Atlantic*, London, 1984, 42-47; Jamil Abun Nasr, *A History of the Maghreb*, Cambridge, 1971, 174-179, 194-195.

[2]Bodleian Library, Rawlinson A 185, 276 "The Detention of the Tripoly Ships of War in the said port the 22 day of Aprill 1676"; ibid, 277; C.R. Pennell, *Piracy and Diplomacy in Seventeenth Century North Africa, The Journal of Thomas Baker, English Consul in Tripoli 1677-1685*, London and Madison, 1989, 106.

[3]Ellen G. Freidmann, *Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age*, Madison, 1983; Pennell *Piracy*, 124-25.

much smaller: a French estimate in 1685 reckoned its population at around 39,650 people[4]. It was hard to feed. Unlike Tunis, Tripoli was not surrounded by an extensive agricultural region. There were some irrigated gardens outside the wall, but in 1669, Osman Pasha, the ruler of the city wrote to King Charles II that he lived in a "sterill country". Foreigners were more scathing still: Thomas Baker the English consul in the 1680s described it as a "place Scituate in a Barren blind comfortless corner of Barbary"[5]. Trade was consequently small-scale. Although several attempts were made in the course of the seventeenth century to expand Tripoli's power to the south, across the Sahara, they did not meet with any permanent success. With merchant shipping frequently interrupted by her own corsairing activities, or those of other places such as Algiers[6], corsairing as a form of economic enterprise was an attractive option.

The importance of corsairing and the poverty of the rest of the local economy help to explain why Tripoli's rulers tried to cut a dash on the seventeenth century Mediterranean scene. If they did not, it would become what a twentieth-century Italian called "a crate of sand", so useless did he consider his country's war for Libya to be[7]. So, Tripoli's rulers had to be especially vigorous and grasp every advantage they could in their relations with Europe, with the other North African provinces, and with sub-Saharan Africa and the Porte. As a province of the Ottoman Empire, among such jewels in the imperial crown as Syria and the provinces of southern Europe, Tripoli did not amount to much, but some benefits could still be had from a relationship in which neither side lost very much and both gained a little. That, in fact, was the solution that the rulers of Tripoli and the Porte adopted.

TRIPOLI AND THE PORTE

A historiographical aside

Tracing the way in which that solution was reached is not easy. The history of Tripoli in the seventeenth century presents its own problems for a modern writer. Bulking large among them is the fact that, at the moment, we have remarkably little to go on. When Tripoli's own archives, along with the Ottoman archives in Istanbul, have been examined in detail, there will be masses more material with which to write detailed studies of the city and its surrounding

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[4]Pennell, *Piracy*, 36.
[5]*Ibid.*, 36.
[6]*Ibid.*, 40-42.
[7]C.f. John Wright, "Libya, Italy's promised land" in E.G.H. Joffe and K.S. McLachlan (eds.) *Social and Economic Development of Libya*, Wisbech, 1982 67-80; reference here to page 73.

area. For the moment, however, what there is consists of three main sources: those of European consular representatives, Arab chronicle sources, and the personal journals of European visitors, consuls, travellers and slaves (the visits were not always voluntary).

All of these sources have their limitations. The principal Arabic chronicle source is that of Muhammad ibn Ghambun[8], a state servant of Ahmet Karamanli Pasha who seized power in Tripoli in 1711 and converted the city into a family fief — at least until his family started killing each other in 1830 and the Ottomans imposed direct control five years later. Ibn Ghalbun is not one of the most celebrated North African historians. It is not that he is inaccurate so much as misleading: by running events together he leads one to suspect a sequence of cause and effect which is far from reality. Even so he provides details which appear nowhere else.

European chronicle accounts and consular reports are useful only up to a point. They are discontinuous, scrappy, biased (definitely biased) but like the material in ibn Glalbun, they do give indications of general themes. Among the most important accounts of this type are the records of the visit to Tripoli by Augustus Holstein during his voyage to the Mediterranean in 1675/76, which includes a long chronological account of events in Tripoli in the mid-seventeenth century, which appear to be accurate as far as it goes — at the least where it can be checked against other material, it corresponds[9]. Another source is the chronicle history of Tripoli written by a man who was a French captive there for long periods[10]. A third source is the journal of Thomas Baker English Consul in Tripoli between 1679 and 1685 and a man immensely experienced in North African affairs[11]. This article will try to use these documents to show what those general themes might be. This may even encourage more detailed research in the Tripoli and Ottoman archives which would contradict or confirm what the Europeans saw, or thought that they saw, and what ibn Ghalbun was able to record (or considered worth recording) at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

These caveats aside, the information on the seventeenth century is more complete than that on the century before — moreover it is during the seventeenth

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[8]'Abdallah Muhammad bin Khallil ibn Ghalbun, *Tarikh Tarabulus al-Gharb*, ed Tahir Ahmad al-Zawi, Cairo, 1949.

[9]Augustus Holstein, 'A journal kept after my return the 6th of february out of Holland from the year 1675 until 1676' British Library, Sloane MSS 2755. Hostein's journal is written with the use of numerous abbreviations and spelling which differs widely from that in use in English today. Where I have quoted from his manuscript, I have had to modernise and expand the abbreviations in order to make it intelligible,

[10]"Histoire Chronologique" in Philip M. Argenti (ed.) *Diplomatic Archive of Chios 1577-1841*, Cambridge 1954, volume 1.

[11]The text of his journal is in Pennell, *Piracy and Diplomacy*, 74-194.

century that Tripoli emerged, once again, as a city state. This was almost a natural role for it, certainly one the city had lived through before[12], but it was during the rule of Osman Pasha in the middle of the century that the role was really reasserted.

The career of Osman Pasha

Although the Turkish connection remained in place, by the beginning of the seventeenth century the Pashas had very little power. Ibn Ghalbun, writing something more than a century later found that his sources could not agree who "governed the city in the name of the Sultan in the time of Suleiman Dey" (1603-1614, or thereabouts)[13]. Augustus Holstein, a very well informed visitor in the 1670s, gave a list of the Pashas and Deys of Tripoli down to his own time. Of Ahmet and Suleyman (mid 1610s-mid 1620s) he writes that "Ahmet & Suleiman had but the names of Pasha because Sefer Dey did govern all." Of Hasan and "Cassin" (Cassim?) Pasha (mid-late 1620s) he goes on "Cherif Dey did all, the Pashas being little esteemed"[14].

Although the title of Pasha conferred no power on its own, it was still a useful addition for a Dey who held power already. Osman Pasha, who dominated Tripoli in the middle of the seventeenth century, used the title as one brick in the wall that shored up his power.

Osman ruled Tripoli for 23 years (1649-1672). When his predecessor died, Osman, then a troop commander[15], was able to persuade the troops of the Castle to recognise him during the night, and have letters sent to the governors of other places before the news was announced to the city in the morning. The city awoke to a *fait accompli*. He then distributed money to all the soldiers and abolished certain unpopular taxes which had been imposed under his predecessors. He had now won over both the soldiers and the population at large. That took up his first day in power. On the following day Osman regularised his position with Istanbul. According to ibn Ghalbun:

> Then he wrote to Sultan Mehmed IV asking him [to be named] governor. The Sultan wrote back to him as he had been asked and conferred upon him the governorship of Tripoli and its region and command over the fleet and the raiding at sea ... and every two years the Sultan renewed his command as an honour, and whenever a

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[12]Brett, Michael, "The City State in North Africa: The case of Tripoli" *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 34 (1986), nos 137-138, 69-94.

[13]Ibn Ghalbun, 103.

[14]Holstein, 25 rev.

[15]Ibn Ghalbun, 106-108 (?).

> messenger came to him from the Sultan he treated him in the best way possible[16].

The initial exchange of letters was accompanied by gifts as well: to the Sultan, but also to the *valide sultan* and other officials[17]. The mutual exchange of gifts nicely sums up the relationship. The Sultan's approval cost Osman more than it cost the Sultan, but he gained thereby: once the Sultan had confirmed him for the first time, he felt able to move onto the next stage of securing his rule. His previously amicable relationships with the people of Tripoli changed.

Osman became more and more autocratic. He imposed a monopoly on the sea-borne trade and in certain commodities sold to the Fezzan[18]; taxes were increased[19]. His main support was based on members of his extended family, some of whom were also married off strategically: into the family of the Bey of Tunis, for example[20].

The resulting series of revolts were put down with great severity. Appeals to the Porte fared no better. Holstein describes what happened when such an appeal was made in 1661:

> Some dissatisfied, as Cherif Chaban, go to Constantinople [to] complain against Osman Pasha. Mustafa Pasha is ordered to be pasha in Tripoli, but this cometh to nothing by the care of Mehmed Aga, Osman Pasha's friend, the Bostancı Pasha, the Janissary Aga: So the presents or gift after 3 days are accepted of[21].

Osman's friends at court were, it seems, kept sweet by gifts of money. But he gave another service to the Porte — providing ships for the fleet. Ships were sent in 1654 from Tripoli and Tunis to fight against the Venetians, and that year they were successful, defeating the Venetians near the Dardanelles[22].

In 1656, however, the Venetians soundly beat the Ottoman fleet off Tenedos and attempted to put a blockade on the Dardanelles. The Porte therefore sent out a call to its North African provinces to provide them with ships to try to break the Venetians' grip[23]. The demand was accompanied by large sums of

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[16] *Ibid.*, 110.

[17] L. Charles Féraud, *Annales Tripolitaines*, Tunis & Paris, 1927, 107-108.

[18] Ibn Ghalbun, 110,

[19] *Ibid.*, 118-119.

[20] *Ibid.*, 120; Holstein, 24 rev, 25 obv.

[21] Holstein, 25 obv "Bostancı" is my reading of Holstein's "Bustangi".

[22] Féraud, 198.

[23] Philip M. Argenti (ed.), *Diplomatic Archive of Chios 1577-1841*, Cambridge, 1954, vol. 1, 62-63, letter of de la Croix to Phélypeaux, Comte de Pontchartrain, n. d.

money to entice the corsairs to come along. In the event, according to two Algerian captains who were captured and interrogated afterwards, fourteen ships left their home port (although they had been asked for 20), passed by Tunis to find that four ships had already gone from there and seven from Tripoli. This, he said, was the first time in three years that the Algerian boats had joined the Imperial fleet, although Tripoli and Tunis had sent contingents every year[24].

The Tripoli squadron was back in action against the Venetians in 1665. On one of their normal corsairing cruises they surprised a Venetan ship, off the Sapienza islands, and destroyed it, at great damage to themselves, taking a number of prisoners. Back in Tripoli there were already a number of other Venetian prisoners, and these provided material for a show of pan-Ottoman solidarity of another sort. The Venetians had taken several ships full of Janissaries who were on their way from Cairo to Crete, and they refused to ransom them. The Janissaries who remained in Cairo were furious about this, blamed the Pasha there, and threatened to revolt. The upshot was that he wrote to Osman in Tripoli, who then negotiated the release of some important Venetian prisoners against the release by the Venetians of an Aga and 10 janissaries. The Pasha in Cairo was saved, and to show his gratitude, sent a present of two ostriches, a bear, some monkeys and some other African curiosities to Osman, as well as a ransom of 15,000 *écus*. He then went back home to Istanbul, having finished his tour of duty, and praised "the signal services which Osman rendered the Empire with his ships"[25]. Osman had done well out of his service to the empire: increased his credit with the Porte, added a substantial sum to his treasury, and laid the basis of a small ménagerie. All services had their reward.

In 1669 according to Holstein, "Osman sends 6 men of War under Osman Aga with Baly Chous, to serve the Grand Seignior against George Maria, knight." But that was profitable as well:

> This year the Tripolines destroyed 12 Christian ships, made 372 slaves, and got an half million of gold of prize goods.[26]

Tripoli ships were also responsible for putting out of commission one of the famous de Téméricourt brothers, Frankish corsairs who had caused immense damage to the Sultan's shipping in the eastern Mediterranean. Bonneville de Téméricourt's ship was driven ashore 70 miles east of Tripoli in 1669[27].

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[24] *Ibid.* 1, 85, letter of Mocenigo to Doge of Venice, Chios 5 May 1657 and 92-97 interrogatories of Hussein and Aidin, Turkish prisoners captured during naval battle, Chios 5 May 1657.

[25] *Ibid.* 1, 126-130, folios 58 *verso* to 60 *verso* of "Histoire chronologique du royaume de Tripoly de Barbarie" m.s. in Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

[26] Holstein, 25 obv.

[27] *Ibid.*, 25 rev.

All these services were performed at no cost to the Porte, and since with his powerful navy, it would have been hard to remove Osman, Istanbul left him alone. Admittedly, in 1663, people in Tripoli became a little nervous of the way in which the Porte's demands for ships were impinging on local autonomy. A ship from Istanbul carrying a new Pasha to Tunis passed through Tripoli, and on the same ship there was a high official — according to Samuel Tooker the current English consul, he was an officer of the Sultan's bedchamber. He announced that his task was to collect tribute from Tripoli and elsewhere, but it was generally believed that this was too inferior a role for such a high official and a general fear spread that he would also have the heads of several people both in Tripoli and in Tunis[28]. It all came to nothing, though. According to the French slave-chronicler, Osman would brush off the possibility that the Sultan might punish him for his independence by saying "The Sultan rules in Constantinople, and I rule in Tripoli."[29] In the end, it was local politics that led to his downfall. Neither his brutality to his enemies nor the acquiescence of Istanbul could protect him when he lost the support of the seamen on whom the economy largely depended. In 1672 they revolted over the way in which he was dividing the prize money, and Osman apparently committed suicide rather than allow his enemies to remove him from power[30]. The primacy of local politics had been asserted once more.

Having demonstrated their strength, the naval leadership found that no-one among its number was strong enough to exercise power alone. An attempt by the naval commanders to put another Osman on the throne failed. He was a Greek and the Janissaries were determined that they were not going to be ruled by another Greek[31] or, for that matter another *rais*. After a day in power he was removed and replaced — by a Janissary commander, Bali Çavuş. The Janissaries, having been excluded from power for so long, were determined to make changes in the political system.

> The militia could not endure that the offices of state, the customs, and the life of the particulars were in the will of one, as it had been in time of Mehmed and Osman Pashas, but that there ought to be taken a regulation after the model of the Algerians and Tunisians, where the

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[28] PRO, SP 71-22 (i), 17, Tooker to Sir Henry Bennett, Tripoly, 31 March 1663.

[29] Quoted in Féraud, 129.

[30] Ibn Ghalbun, 127; PRO, SP 71 22 (i)/68 obv-72 rev, "A Narrative of the revolutions in Tripoli in November and December 1672" denies the story about poison and says that Osman died of grief at seeing all his hopes dashed in the battle for control of Tripoli.

[31] Ibn Ghalbun, 128.

militia elects a Dey. So they did establish the Divan in its authority, expecting further orders from the Sultan, and a Pasha[32].

Bali, as his name suggests, was a former messenger who had undertaken several missions between Tripoli and the Porte[33]. So he had a good appreciation of the need to stay on the right side of the authorities in Istanbul. The other military leaders in Tripoli also viewed the Porte as a useful ally in the struggle for power. At least if there was a Pasha, appointed from outside, no one man could wield absolute authority. The Porte was being brought back into the political game in Tripoli, not out of any real strenght of its own, but because it provided a source of legitimation. Accordingly, shortly afterwards an embassy went off to Istanbul, consisting of representatives of the most importants groups in the city: the religious leadership sent the Mufti, the Dey sent his personal representative, the Janissaries sent 9 of their number and "a renowned citizen" accompanied by five men of mixed ancestry (Kulughlis) was, presumably, the representative of the city. They took an impressive collection of presents, not only to the Sultan, but to the Vizer, his Kahiya, the Kaimakam of Istanbul, the Defterdar and the Captain Pasha. The total value was estimated by one account at $100,000[34]. De Téméricourt was taken along too as a further sweetener for the Sultan who was evidently not too pleased by the events in Tripoli. He was brought round by the persuasive powers of the Vizier, and by the execution of de Téméricourt. Mollified by all this he agreed to appoint Khallil, an Albanian who had previously been Pasha of Tripoli in Syria and was the Vizier's "domestic"[35].

When Khallil Pasha arrived it was to a welcome rich in ceremony:

> The Dey had his colours flying at the Castle, the Pasha another on board, which was taken down by the Dey's order by a Çavuş. The Palace of Regip Bey is fitted to lodge the Pasha, who is received by the Dey upon the Mole, he kissing the Pasha's hands, and the Salamlik being said aloud. 12 Oda başıs march 2 and 2 after the Bölük başıs, then the chatels of the Pasha, further the Agas and Minsul Agas, then the Pasha on horseback, and the Dey at his left on foot, followed by the Mufti, Qadi and Rais, and others of the town, then the drums, and trumpets of the Pasha on horseback, and 4 men on foot with 4 red standards, wrapped up about the staff because he was not lodged in the

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[32]Holstein, 27 obv; PRO SP 71 22(i)/68 obv-72 rev, "A Narrative of the revolutions in Tripoli in November and December 1672" also mentions the expectation of orders from the Porte.

[33]Féraud, 132.

[34]The dollar sign ($) as it is used here refers to the Spanish dollar, which was in common use in seventeenth century North Africa.

[35]Holstein, 27 obv-rev; PRO SP 71 22(i)/68 obv-72 rev, "A Narrative of the revolutions in Tripoli in November and December 1672".

> Castle, intimating the office the Pasha hath possessed. The Dey, the Aga of the Divan were presented with caftans from the Sultan.

But it was empty ceremonial :

> It is agreed on that the Dey shall pay the Pasha every month 500 dollars besides the tents and necessary victuals for his family, which is daily to be furnished, and that he shall have 11 in the 100 of all prizes, but the Pasha have nothing to do with the state's business.[36]

Khallil's function was to occupy a luxurious chair, and so prevent anyone else from occupying it but he would, as it were, reign not rule. He was unimportant enough for ibn Ghalbun to refrain from mentionning his existence until he dealt with the rule of Aq Muhammad al-Haddad al-Anaduli (1678-79), that is five years after Khallil arrived:

> Khallil remained in the city for a long time, but he had no freedom of action because the commanders of the soldiers put an interdiction on the governor who had been sent by the Sultan.[37]

That did not, of course prevent him from trying to turn himself into an effective Pasha. With the death of Osman, the Porte — as its actions would show — hoped for a more active control over Tripoli. But unless Khallil could first win power locally on his own account, that hope could not be realised. It was one of these attempts that led ibn Ghalbun to mention him — but it was by no means the first.

Khallil Pasha and the political process in Tripoli

As Pasha, Khallil owed his position to the Ottoman Porte, but his role was determined by questions of local politics. He had been appointed because people from Tripoli had gone to the Porte to ask for a Pasha, as part of the political struggle in Tripoli. He remained a pawn in that political game.

The "principal in the embassy" that went to the Porte to ask for the Pasha's appointement was, according to Holstein, one Yusuf Aga. Having got his wish, Yusuf went on to use his man of straw in his political machinations. A few months after Khallil's arrival, Yusuf made his move:

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[36] *Ibid.*, 28 obv. "Oda başıs" and "Bölük başıs" are my readings of what Hosltein writes: viz. "Odabashas" and Bouloac Bashis".

[37] Ibn Ghalbun, 134.

> The Pasha, instigated by Yusuf Aga, demands of the Dey that the officers who had managed the customs and other affairs of state under Osman Pasha might give an account of their administration in his presence, the Sultan having sent him to succeed the other. The Dey answered, that the long services of these in Osman's time did exempt them of all ill thoughts, and that he had not kept them if he had not been sure of their fidelity.[38]

And that was very definitely that. Holstein goes on: "The 25 of June is Yusuf Aga strangled.[39]"

The possibility of using the support of the Pasha had not escaped other contenders for power. Shortly afterwards, four janissary commanders and sixteen soldiers were taken prisoner while trying to escape, "their treason against the Dey in erecting the Basha being discovered." To guard against further problems of this kind Bali Dey bought the loyalty of the Pasha's *kahiya* to be his spy in Khallil's house.[40]

There soon followed a more dangerous incident, as the Pasha became a rallying point not only for dissidents within the city but, more threateningly, for people in the hinterland. When the Qaid in the castle at Gharyan, up-country from Tripoli in a mountainous district to the south west, demanded tribute from the local people, they rebelled, and elected their own local Dey. They told the authorities in Tripoli that they would only end the rebellion on certain terms: that the castle at Gharyan be demolished, the garrison disbanded, the tribute abolished and that

> They will only acknowledge Khallil Pasha as legitimate lieutenant of the Sultan and not the Dey nor his officers, being his rebels.[41]

It dit not help Khallil greatly, this support from the mountains: the Dey obliged him to contribute soldiers to crush the rebels[42].

It should not be imagined, however, that the Porte simply stood on the sidelines during this initial period of the new regime. Istanbul did want to regain some control, and it did not rely only on the local forces of disorder to achieve it. In September 1673 an officer of the Porte arrived to demand that the estate of Osman (and his predecessors) should be handed over to the Porte[43]. This was in

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[38] Holstein, 28 obv.
[39] *Ibid.*, 28 obv.
[40] Holsteien, 28 rev.
[41] *Ibid.*, 28 rev.
[42] *Ibid.*, 28 rev.
[43] *Ibid.*, 28 rev.

line with a general policy of the Porte that the property of vizirs and pashas who had been dismissed or who had died should be turned over to the central treasury. The policy had originally been applied only to former Christian slaves of the Sultan, but by the second half of the seventeenth century was being applied to Muslim-born servants anyway — presumably as a way of preventing high officials from perpetuating themselves, although it failed in that intention[44]. Osman was born a Christian, of course, but that was hardly the point of this particular exercise: what was at stake was the ability of the Porte to control whoever ruled in Tripoli.

Bali tried to make a trade off with the Porte. He sent a representative to the Sultan to ask for the post of Pasha. He took with him 50,000 Sultanins to cover Osman's property[45]. The offer, quite clearly, was a formal acknowledgement of the Porte's authority in exchange for recognition as supreme power in Tripoli: the Osman solution, in fact. The Porte took the money and refused the offer, losing nothing in the process. Even if it could not remove Bali, it still had a man on the spot, who might be useful eventually.

For his part, Bali covered himself by making his peace with Khallil at the beginning of 1674. The throne which Osman had erected at the entrance to the inner gate of the castle was removed and so were some golden-coloured balls from the dome of the roof. With these gestures the two were reconciled for a while. It was a wise move: in April the Sultan sent a message that he wanted the heads of the Dey and two other principal officers in Tripoli. Although the Pasha had been the one who incited the Sultan to demand this, he now backed away. When the message from Istanbul arrived:

> they consent not to the reading of it, to promise one another to live in friendship. The Pasha is not willing to concern himself with the registers and the expenses of the State, that so he might pay the militia, like the Pasha at Tunis. The 30 of April the Aga returneth to Constantinople.[46]

After that, Khallil Pasha made no trouble for the various Deys for some years. He was brought out to meet Sir John Narbrough in 1676, and was one of the signatories on the peace treaty which the English admiral imposed on Tripoli by burning several ships in the harbour[47].

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[44]Rifa'at Ali Abou-el-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics*, Istanbul, Nederlands Historisch-Archaelogisch Institut, 1984, 12-13.
[45]Holstein, 29 obv.
[46]*Ibid.*, 29 obv.
[47]*Ibid.*, 31 obv.

It was not until Aq Muhammad al-Haddad, a man generally recognised to be quite horrible[48], violent far beyond the limits of seventeenth-century Tripoli, that Khallil emerged once again as a surrogate political figure.

According to ibn Ghalbun, it was a group of the military commanders who organised a rebellion against Aq Muhammad. They included the Dey's Kahiya, the Admiral of the Tripoli fleet, the treasurer and the son of an important local religious scholar who had a following among the ordinary people. Their aim, apparently, was to replace Aq Muhammad with Khallil, but Aq Muhammad was able to stop them. Vengeance came quickly: eight Kulughlis were executed by dismemberment[49].

Khallil tried again in 1684, when the Kahiya once again tried to organise a coup against Dey Hajj 'Abdallah al-Izmirli. The Kahiya's aim was to turn the Dey out of the Castle and install the Pasha in real power. The plot was once again discovered, and this time the Pasha was exiled to his palace outside the walls, under house arrest[50].

The interesting question is why none of the deys whom Khallil plotted against did not simply kill him. There are two explanations. Firstly, it would have left the position of Pasha open and available for anyone who could snatch it, combine it with the deylicate and repeat Osman Pasha's success: that was the standard against which all such attempts would be measured. The second reason is that it would have meant an open breach with the Porte — and the connection was far too useful.

The basis of the relationship between Tripoli and Istanbul, which had existed in Osman's time, had not changed. The rulers of Tripoli may have been unwilling to allow any power to the Pasha, but they continued to provide the sort of services the Porte valued, in ships and tribute. In 1675, for instance, the Tripoli fleet arrived at Rhodes, and the pasha there made them escort the convoy from Alexandria as far as the Dardanelles, through waters which were full of all sorts of pirates[51]. The Porte was very worried about losing this vital service and when Sir John Narbrough blockaded Tripoli in 1675 to force the Divan to sign a peace with England, the Porte tried to get Tripoli to sign it. A messenger was sent, who arrived at Tunis, but never arrived in Tripoli.[52] Rycaut, the English consul in Izmir, explained that

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[48]Pennell, *Piracy*, 104, 109; ibn Ghalbun, 135.
[49]Ibn Ghalbun, 135-136; Pennell, *Piracy*, 104.
[50]Pennell, *Piracy*, 177-78.
[51]PRO, SP 71 22 (i) /91 obv, Nathaniel Bradley to Joseph Williamson, Tripoli (8 July 1675).
[52]PRO SP 71 22 (i), 111-114 Narbrought to (not stated), before Tripoly, (August 5 1675).

> herein the Ottoman Court seemes the more concerned, in regard that Sir John Narbrough's lying before Tripoli prevents those people of giving Convoys to the Alexandria fleet bound for Const:ple & hinders them from coming into the Archepelago to disturb the Maltese & Ligornese Corsars wch greatly infest those seas: on wch consideration the G : Sigr hath strictly comanded the Tripoleens to purchase their peace wth a just restitution, but whether they be able or willing to doe it, time will decide.[53]

Even though this attempt came to nothing — it was Narbrough, burning part of the Tripoli fleet in port, who brought the divan to negotiate — the incident demonstrates how, when Tripoli's actions affected the security of the Empire, the Porte was willing to act. That is what lay behind the events of 1681.

THE FRENCH, TRIPOLI AND THE PORTE

Khallil had attempted to win power by backing one of the factions in the everlasting struggle in Tripoli. That struggle was all the more violent because the states were so high — usually the loser's heads — and the product was so low: the ruler of Tripoli was a big fish in a small pond.

Tripoli's economy in the mid-seventeenth century was, as we have seen, very insecure, and it depended to a considerable extent on corsairing. It must be stressed that although corsairing in Tripoli may have been carried out under the colours of holy war, it was primarily an economic operation.

That assertion can be justified in several ways. The first is the intentions of the corsair captains. The career of Shaban Rais was typical. He was a captain from Mallorca, another corsairing city, who arrived in Tripoli in 1682 to ransom a fellow-islander. When he discovered that the price of the ransom was too high, he simply converted to Islam. He soon became one of Tripoli's most successful corsair captains and married the daughter of the bey of Derna, a powerful political figure in Tripoli at the time. His services as a captain did not, however, protect him from the political squabbling. His ship was sold from under him, probably at the instigation of the Admiral, with whom he had quarrelled.[54]

The second justification is based upon the fact that not all Christian ships were raided. After the English under Narbrough burned part of the Tripoli fleet in port in 1676, the English were left well enough alone. So, generally, were the

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[53]PRO SP 71/122 (ii), 16-17, letter Paul Rycaut to (not stated), Smyrna 26 July 1678.
[54]Pennell, *Piracy*, 143-44; 168-69; 174.

Dutch after 1682. But French, Italian and other ships were attacked, or at least some of them were. Even while many French ships were being taken, a few favoured French vessels continued to trade normally with Tripoli. This happened elsewhere in North Africa: at Salé in Morocco in 1687 French ships equipped with safe conducts continued to trade, despite war with France[55]. One might expect that a holy war was undertaken, if not against all Christians, at least against all the ships of a particular Christian nation.

The third, and most convincing evidence for an economic basis to corsairing comes from the war with France itself: French prizes were the most valuable of all and when they were denied to the raises their takings declined.

In 1679, 4 French ships were taken prize, with a total value of $148,700. The following year, there were 8 (out of 20) and total earnings went up to $426,000. In 1681 3 out of 8 prizes were French; total earnings dropped to 129,000. In 1682, when there was a peace with France for most of the year, only 1 French ship was captured, out of 9 and takings dropped again — to $98,000. But the following year, with the peace broken, 7 French ships were taken, out of a total of 14 and earning shot up again to $234,000. So French ships made valuable prizes: their average value was $28,712 a ship, compared with an average of $16,667 for a Dutch ship (the next statistically significant group) and $6,875 for a Venetian ship; Venetian ships ranked second in the table of nationalities taken between 1679 and 1685[56].

Those figures are compelling enough, but the political events provide further evidence. In August 1680, after numerous complaints from the merchants of Marseilles that their ships were being taken in large numbers by Tripoli corsairs, Louis XIV sent a fleet to negotiate a peace. It was commanded by Admiral Abraham Du Quesne. When he arrived, his request for peace was turned down by the Dey in these terms:

> All Our Ships and souldiers are now in the Levant, in whose absence I cannot adventure to come to any conclusion, not att their returne either if they shall happen to be averse thereto...[57]

This may have been an excuse, but it was an accurate reflection of reality as well. As far as political affairs went, the interests of the corsair fleet came

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[55] *Ibid.*, 40-41.

[56] Pennell, *Piracy*, 45-50. These themes are discussed in more detail in C. R. Pennell, "Tripoli, in the late seventeenth century: the economics of corsairing in a 'Sterill Country'", *Libyan Studies* (London), 16 (1985), 101-112.

[57] Pennell, *Piracy*, 122; the account is confirmed by the *Histoire Chronologique*, Argenti, 339.

first, and the Dey could not oppose its wishes. So Du Quesne sailed off in pursuit of the fleet.

In the naval action that followed, Du Quesne stressed to the governors of Ottoman islands and towns in the Greek Archipelago that the French had no quarrel with the Empire. Indeed, the French King and the Sultan were at peace. He was merely pursuing ships commanded by *rebels* against the Sultan, and in fact, it was implied, they were helping the Sultan. Not surprisingly the Porte did not quite see it in the same way, and the Kapudan Pasha of the Ottoman fleet informed Du Quesne that he would not allow him to attack the Tripoli ships while they were in Ottoman ports. Du Quesne, however, continued to say that he was acting against rebels even when preparing to attack them in Chios port. The consequence of the attack on Chios, in July 1681, and the bombardement of its fortifications was that the Ottomans sent messages to Algiers and Tunis to send help. In fact, the Ottomans were unable to force the French to back down, and the Kapudan Pasha obliged the Tripoli commanders to agree to a treaty in October 1681.[58]

When the fleet got back to Tripoli, however, the treaty was not greeted with any enthusiasm at all. At the end of December the Admiral was banished, and all his property was confiscated, on the grounds that he should never have been in Chios in the first place: he had been told to go to Alexandria to keep out of the way of the French fleet. Another captain was banished to Tunis, and the Rear-Admiral relieved of his command "As a Person through much want of courage utterly un-qualified for that charge"[59].

The Divan did not, however dare to break the treaty. Indeed it was so nervous that it gave diplomatic precedence to the French Agent. The English Consul in Tripoli, Thomas Baker, protested at this:

> Their Answer was, that what was transacted at the Port of Scio was both againt their Reason and inclination, But being Vassals of y^e^ Gran Signor were bound to yield obedience to all his Comands[60].

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[58]This account is based primarily upon the material in Argenti, 158-353, and particularly 158-60, Guilleragues to Louis XIV, Pera 18 January 1680; 165-167, Du Quesne to Guilleragues, 18 July 1681; Finch to Jenkins, Constantinople, 25 July 1681; 171-178, Du Quesne to Guilleragues, Islands of Derlac, 31 July-2 August 1681; 180-183, Guilleragues to Louis XIV, Pera, 8 August 1681; 221, Raye to Jenkins, Smyrna 17 October 1681; 237-239 Guilleragues to Colbert, Pera, 20 December 1681; 252-255 Donado to Doge of Venice, undated end of 1681/beginning of 1682; 228-249, *Histoire chronologique*. The whole incident is not mentioned at all by ibn Ghalbun.

[59]Pennell, *Piracy*, 135-6; quotation from 136.

[60]*Ibid.*, 138-139.

Since the Divan at Tripoli had never shown any great obedience to all of the commands of the Sultan, this was a convenient excuse to cover their dismay at what had happened at Scio. The Sultan provided a useful cloak for their embarrassment.

When the English fleet commanded by Admiral Herbert turned up in November 1681, the Divan's tune changed. Herbert was given an enthusiastic welcome, and both sides bathed in mutual compliments for a week[61]. Baker was most relieved by this, because it marked the turning of the tide: with England back in favour war, when it came, would be directed against France. War, he believed, was inevitable.

The logic of the situation was quite simple: Tripoli could not afford a treaty with France and England at the same time. If the French treaty had stayed in place, then the economy would require war with another power. Until Herbert's visit changed things, Baker had feared that this would mean war with England. He wrote in his journal:

> Nothing under heaven being a more extravagant mistake than to Phansie That a considerable Squadron of ships 3000 Levents', 1500 Spahees', and all other Publique Charges can bee manitayned here, Whilst a poore barren Country, an empty Treasury, and a good Peace continued wth His Majestie (i.e. of England) and the French King, destroys the very fondations of its existence.[62]

He wrote that on 18 November 1682. On 9 December a French ship taken off Malta was sent in by a Tripoli corsair. Baker reckoned that the ship was taken without official approval, but after the corsair that had taken her returned, at the end of December, the policy was changed. Baker's account of the arguments are worth reproducing in full:

> 29'h December This Morning a full Divan was held in the Castle where diverse of these Captaines with other Person of esteeme, earnestly proposed to the Dey a War with the French, Alleadging that the Tyme in which they promised to bee here to consummate y^e^ Peace and Redeeme their remayning Captains was elapsed almost a yeare since and that they had not been owned by the French King as his Allies by soe much as one Letter from him which plainly shewed soe great slight, as nothing could bee greater; Adding further, that as long as a Peace were manitayned wth France t'would be tyme and money spent to noe purpose to Arme out these ships, Whilst all the Italians would enjoy the same Security to their navigation by abusing these

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[61] *Ibid*, 147-152.
[62] *Ibid*., 152.

> Turks with French Colours ; French Passes and French Sham-captains only to father such forraigne Imbarcations; Besides, that Notwithstanding the Ottoman Emperour and several of the Barbary Governments had continued in Amitie with the French Nation yet soe great was their Thirst and Ambition of becoming yet more Powerfull at Sea, That to increase the number of their slaves and Gallies they had Lately Armed out of Tholone and sent into the Levant Six ships of War with Portuguize Comissions to enslave as many of y^e^ Gran Sig^r^s Vassals as should fall into their hands. These Arguments influenced the Generality of that Assembly, the Admiral with a few more being the only Dissenters, which occasioned the Dey to assure him, That if there were any fearefull apprehensions in them, of evil contingencies which might arise by War, then was y^e^ tyme to declare himself fully, Because, there were several present that would be very thankfull for y^e^ honor of wearing his Flagg; Whereupon the forementioned French ship and Goods were made good Prize, the Christians, Slaves, the French Minister confined to his house, and War with France Declared.[63]

In passing, it is worth noting that Baker makes no mention of any call to wage holy war as a reason for attacking the French — and it is hard to imagine that he would have left it out, had the issue been raised. Even when the Ottoman Empire is referred to, the need for war with France is justified not in terms of imperial solidarity, but of the general untrustworthiness of the French. The important issues, it seems, were Tripoli's own relationship with France and economic necessity. Once the peace with the French had been ended, the Tripoli corsairs did their best to make up for lost time: in the first four months of 1683 they sent in six French ships, one of them worth $120,000: the richest ship that had ever been made prize in Tripoli.[64]

The Ottoman Empire may have been embarrassed by the behaviour of its supposed vassal, but could do very little about it. Conversely, the authorities in Tripoli were unwilling to break off relations: they simply ignored orders that were inconvenient.

On the other hand, when participation in imperial activities was likely to bring rewards, then they participated gladly. So, in August 1684, the Porte sent messengers to Tunis and Tripoli on an Algerian ship, demanding 100 Christian mariners to man new ships recently commissioned in Istanbul. The messenger was sent back in October without any Christian sailors, but with promises of some in the following spring[65]. The promises do not seem to have been realised — after all nothing was to be gained by sending off captives.

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[63] *Ibid.*, 153-154.
[64] *Ibid.*, 155-157.
[65] *Ibid.*, 172, 177.

In the following spring came another request for help against the Venetians — from Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers, and at the end of March Tripoli sent a fleet of seven ships[66]. Very soon the squadron was doing well by doing good for the Empire, and sending back ships it captured on the way: a Dutch vessel, which caused an embarrassing diplomatic incident, since Tripoli had just signed a treaty with the Dutch, and a French ship taken in the Archipelago.[67]

CONCLUSION: TRIPOLI AND THE PORTE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Bearing in mind the limited nature of the sources, a number of themes emerge very clearly.

The first concerns Tripoli. Tripoli was a 'natural' city state. It had been one before the Ottoman conquest, and it was a role that was forced upon it by its physical conditions. The agricultural land around it was too poor to provide much of an economic base, so Tripoli had to rely upon external sources of finance. Its hinterland was too large, too open and too sparsely populated with people who were, many of them, at the very least semi-nomadic for firm centralised government to be extended very far inland. So the city dominated the point where trade routes from the south linked in to the larger economy of the Mediterranean. Yet Tripoli's economy was a flea-bite in the Mediterranean trade. It therefore found itself obliged to live off the Mediterranean economy by raiding it rather than participating in it through trade — even though there was a bit of trade.

The second theme concerns the Ottoman Empire. The Empire was large, and the North African provinces were not central supports either of its economic power, or of the power of the centre. They were military outposts, useful to provide men and ships and bases against the Empire's main enemies, perhaps even strategically essential at times. But detailed control of their day-to-day affairs was neither easy, nor necessary.

The third theme is the way in which the first two relate to each other. It was not a simple relationship. At its bottom was the assumption that neither side wanted to break the link. The affirmation of the Sultan-Caliph gave political legitimacy to the ruler of Tripoli. If he could not become Pasha himself — which was what every Dey after Osman seems to have wanted — then the Pasha appointed by the Porte could be used as a surrogate: he would be allowed to sit in his palace, well supplied with money, but without political influence. The Porte

[66] *Ibid.*, 188-89.
[67] *Ibid.*, 190-191.

could tolerate this system — even though occasionally it tried, in rather a half hearted fashion to regain more control. It could tolerate it because it provided benefits: ships at times and money, for neither of which had any effort to be exerted. Tripoli was no danger to the stability of the empire, so it was a situation which could be lived with.

But, if the underlying assumption was that neither side wanted to break the link, the tension was always there. On the Porte's side there was a tendency to seek greater control, if only to benefit the clients of important men surrounding the sultan: Khallil Pasha was the Vizier's man. In Tripoli itself, the link with the Sultan meant that it could be manipulated by those who were opposed to the governor of the moment. Moreover, the link was only used when it was favourable. When economic and political necessity demanded it, the instructions of the Porte were ignored.

There is much more to be done to flesh out the bones of this story, and closer examination of the Ottoman archives in particular may force a reappraisal of the relationship: this is very much a provisional account. It is worth doing, though, because how an outlying province saw the Porte, and how the Porte saw its outlying provinces, throw light on the network of political, cultural and religious loyalties which may have held the empire together or may have pulled it apart.

B. G. MARTIN

GHŪMA BIN KHALĪFA, a Libyan rebel, 1795-1858[1]

Nineteenth-century Libya was the scene of many political changes and disturbances, many of them prolonged and widespread. One of the most far-reaching in its effects was the takeover in May 1835 of the old Qaramanli régime in Tripoli by the Ottoman Turks, inaugurating the so-called "Second Ottoman Period."[2] The appearance of an Ottoman fleet and the landing of Turkish troops

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[1]I would like to dedicate this article to 'Ali Mustafa al-Misurati, who first fostered my interest in Ghūma and his rising.

[2]For an exhaustive treatment of the career of Ghūma bin Khalīfa, other Arab resisters, and the activities of the Turkish occupiers themselves in the second Ottoman period in Libya, materials from the Libyan Archives at Tripoli are indispensable. As it seems difficult to go there, I have relied on three main sources and some secondary ones for this short article.

'Ali Mustafa al-Misurati's book on *Ghūma, Fāris al-sahrā', safha min ta'rīkh Lībyā, 1795-1856,* Tripoli, 1960 ("Ghuma, horseman of the desert; a page from Libyan history, 1795-1856") is very useful and contains a lot of information about the Maḥāmīd tribe, their homeland in the Nafusa Range, with poetry by Ghūma, many indispensable details about him, and some letters of his to Turkish officials. Misurati claims that he has more letters to, from, or about Ghūma, which he plans to publish. If he has published them, I am not aware where they have appeared.

A second source of great utility is the unpublished "Minor Field thesis" of Allen Streicker submitted to Northwestern University at Evanston, Illinois, in 1973. It is entitled "Government and Revolt in Tripoli Regency, 1795-1855." It is 111 pages long and includes a good treatment of Ghūma and other matters, based on European documents and sources. It also includes reports from the U. S. consuls in Tripoli over this time, taken from the National Archives in Washington, which give very valuable information and unique historical insights. I have used it extensively.

An article for *Majallat al-Buhūth al-Ta'rikhīya* ("Historical Research Review"), volume VII, 1985, pp. 167-191, published at Tripoli by Al-Fātiḥ University, is of great importance. By Muḥammad Amḥammad al-Ṭuwayr or Ṭuwayyir, it is entitled "Al-Intifādāt al-Waṭanīya didd al-Hukūmat al-'Uthmānīya fī 'ahd al-Wālī Muḥammad Amīn Bāshā (1842-1847) fi Tarabulus al-Gharb," ("Nationalist risings against the Ottoman Government in the time of the Wali Muhammad Amin Pasha at Tripoli (1842-1847"). From this article, it appears that Tuwayyir wrote an M.A. thesis at al-Fatih University in 1981, called "Thawrat al-Shaykh Ghūma al-Mahmudi fi Iyalat Tarabulus al-Gharb, 1835-1858" ("The revolt of Shaykh Ghūma al-Mahmudi in Tripoli Province, 1835-1858"); also that there is a thesis by 'Umar bin Isma'il, 'Al-Tatawwur al-siyasi wa'l-ijtima'i fi Libya, 1835-1882" ("Social and political development in Libya, 1835-1882"), a Ph.D. thesis for 'Ayn Shams University, Egypt, 1972, including material on Ghūma.

was indeed the start of a 25-year period of repression and internal warfare on a scale not seen in Libya since the rise of the Qaramanlis in the early eighteenth century. Yet, this Ottoman move was designed to forestall the French, to keep them out of Tripoli and away from Libya. Good grounds existed for these Turkish fears, as the French had taken over Algiers and parts of Algeria only five years before. They had much influence in Tunis, and over the Beys there. And the idea of a takeover seemed to recur frequently to French politicians—including the Emperor Napoleon III—until it was finally abandoned in 1855, during the Crimean War (see p. 69 below).

Despite the coming of a Turkish *vali* and the refurbishing of an Ottoman administrative bureaucracy for Libya, something not seen there for more than 100 years, the Ottoman government was still very weak. The reign of Mahmud II was well launched into the turmoil of the *Tanzimat* era, and the suppression of the Janissaries was only nine years in the past. Hence the conquest of Libya, if it was a sign of increasing vitality, was barely within the feeble military capabilities of the impoverished Turks. Not only were their land forces weak, but their navy, or most of it, had gone up in flames at the Battle of Navarino in 1828. All the same, Mahmud II consented to the reoccupation of Tripoli and its neighborhood so as to deny the use of it to any European power, to protect Egypt on its western flank, and to raise flagging Ottoman prestige against the troublesome Mehmed Ali Pasha and his son İbrahim, who were then threatening parts of Palestine and Syria. The Porte realized that Mehmed Ali would not always be in power and that it might eventually recover Egypt.

Such troubles as these go far in explaining Turkish preoccupations with Libya, and the revival of an Ottoman administration and civil service within the country. In the short run, the newly arrived Turkish bureaucrats wanted to recreate a network of taxable districts easily accessible from Tripoli or the Libyan coast, where Turkish troops could be sent easily and quickly, and to expand this network with its forts and little citadels southward into the interior. For Libya, Ottoman military units were still relatively powerful and able to crush any local opposition. It was hoped that its well-equipped soldiers would also overawe and frighten villagers and townspeople or cultivators into paying their annual taxes promptly—to say nothing of any special levies which these same civil servants might need to raise. And, far from the "reorganizations" and reforms which were then going on in Istanbul and parts of Anatolia, the Libyan province could still function with time-worn local policies, where the bureaucrats and the Ottoman troops employed methods of brutal effectiveness, proven techniques for raising money destined for the central treasury. In other words, reforms need not be

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Unfortunately, I have no access to either Tuwayyir's or Isma'il's thesis, both of which undoubtedly contain much useful information.
Other sources are footnoted as needed.

applied here just yet, although they were in the air and going to become visible in the near future. Thus, the bureaucrats could still count on raking in cash from the urban or rural populations in Libya, a portion of which they might still add to their own personal accounts, and which they could take home once their tours of duty were complete, or convert into other forms of portable wealth. These views about the policies to use in Libya were shared by most of the resident Turks from the time of Mustafa Necib Pasha (1835) until the days of al-Hajj Ahmed İzzet Pasha (1848-1852), who proved an exception. Only later, under Ali Riza Pasha (mid-1860s) and finally under Ahmed Rasim Pasha (1881-1899), perhaps the most enlightened and efficient of all,[3] would these old techniques of provincial rule disappear.

Meanwhile, there were many obstacles to the realization of the plans of the Ottoman bureaucrats. As a hangover from the confused last days of the Qaramanli régime, there existed certain independent-minded anti-Turkish elements who disliked the creeping occupation of the intruders, not only at Tripoli, but in towns and villages away from the capital, at various ports and small cities, and in the countryside. Typical of these were 'Adil al-Barqāwī in Jabal Akhdar (1841-42)[4] and the chief of the Awlād Sulaymān, 'Abd al-Jalīl Sayf al-Naṣr, a resister against the Qaramanlis who now opposed the Ottomans.[5] Another person of local prominence who exhibited signs of being opposed to the Turks was 'Uthman Agha or 'Uthman al-Adgham of Misurata[6], while just south of Tripoli in the Jabal Tarhūna, a local chief called Shaykh Ahmad al-Murayyiḍ was showing similar signs.[7] The only chief of any standing who appeared to welcome the Ottomans, and indeed came to Tripoli in person to make his submission to them, was a chief of Ghariyan, in the Jabal Nafusa range southwest of Tripoli called Ghūma bin Khalīfa al-Maḥmūdī, head of the numerous and powerful Maḥāmīd tribe. It is worth noting that Ghūma was on friendly terms with 'Abd al-Jalīl Sayf al-Naṣr and had in fact been his ally against the Qaramanlis on several occasions. Later, Ghūma revived this relationship, which continued until 'Abd al-Jalīl's death at the battle of Wadi Zamzam (1842).

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[3]See my "Ahmad Rasim Pasha and the suppression of the Fazzan Slave Trade," in *Africa*, XXXVIII, 4, Rome 1983, pp. 545-579.

[4]Tuwayyir, "Intifāḍāt," p. 168.

[5]For the life of 'Abd al-Jalīl Sayf al-Naṣr, see E. Subtil, "Histoire d''Abd el-Gelil, Sultan du Fezzan," in *Revue de l'Orient*, 1844. Tuwayyir also (*Intifāḍāt*, p. 180) states that he is "now doing (1985) a state doctorate thesis" at the University of Tunis entitled "The Rising of 'Abd al-Jalil Sayf al-Naṣr against the Ottoman Turks in Libya, 1830-1842" under the direction of Professor Tamimi.

[6]'Uthman al-Adgham was a prominent person in the Qaramanli period, then decided to oppose the Turks. See Streicker, *Government and Revolt*, p. 72, also Rodolfo Micacchi, *Tarabulus al-Gharb taht hukm usrat al-Qaramanli*, translated by Taha Fawzi, Cairo 1961, Chapter IX and Document 33, pp. 84-85.

[7]Streicker, *Government*, pp. 72, 83.

Doubtless Ghūma's friendship and alliance with 'Abd al-Jalīl made him suspect to the Turks, for on his arrival in Tripoli in May of 1835, Mustafa Necib Pasha threw him directly into the nearest prison, Tripoli Castle, where he was confined for nearly five months. This was in spite of the fact that Ghūma had been accompanied to Tripoli by a delegation of the shaykhs of the Mahāmīd tribe. Like Ghūma, they had come to the Vali quite submissively, wanting to make clear that they had rebelled against the Qaramanlis because of their widespread corruption and tyranny, and that they were hoping for peace and tranquillity.[8] Ghūma's companions were allowed to leave by the Pasha, but Ghūma was released by Mehmet Ra'if Pasha, Mustafa Necib's successor, only after Necib had been deposed as Vali by Sultan Mahmud II for illegally minting Ottoman coins; he had been in office for only four months.[9]

It is not surprising that from this time on, Ghūma began to conceive a hatred of Turks which became permanently and ineradicably rooted in his mind. He was to make almost continual trouble for the occupiers until he was killed by the Ottomans in 1858, save for a 13-year period when he was exiled and imprisoned at Trabzon in Turkey, from 1842 to 1855.

Ghūma bin Khalīfa was born about 1210/1795, in the Maḥāmīd tribal district in the Jabal Nafusa. According to 'Ali Mustafa al-Misurati, his birthplace was near the Wadi al-Atal west of the Bi'r al-Ghanam, one of the wells used by the tribe.[10] Ghūma's father was the leading chief of the Maḥāmīd at the time, Khalīfa ibn 'Awn. Shaykh Khalīfa had been an associate and friend of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli and had occasionally helped him by his great influence, and because he was a tribal shaykh "whose word was heard" (*masmū' al-kalama*).[11] The Maḥāmīd had been circulating in this part of Libya for a long time, as they were descended from the Banu Sulaym who had nomadized in this vicinity since the end of the eleventh century; some of them had stayed near Tripoli.[12] Other elements of the Sulaym had moved about in the deserts south of Tripoli, toward the Fazzan. Even in the twelfth century, the traveler al-Tijani had run across the Maḥāmīd and some of their close relatives, the Jawārī, on the coast west of Tripoli, near Qābis (now in Tunisia).[13]

During the seventeenth century, one of the Maḥāmīd sub-clans (the Banu Nuwayr) had participated in a rising (1080/1669), presumably against the

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[8]Streicker, *Government*, p. 72, Tahir Ahmad al-Zāwī, *Wulat Tarabulus min bidayat al-Fath al-Arabi ila nihayat al-'Ahd al-Turki*, Beirut 1970, p. 238.

[9]Zāwī, *Wulat*, p. 239.

[10]'Ali Mustafa al-Misurati, *Ghūma, faris al-Sahra*, Tripoli 1960, p. 57.

[11]Misurati, *Ghūma*, pp. 57-58.

[12]Tahir Ahmad al-Zāwī, *Ta'rikh al-Fath al-'Arabi fi Libya*, Cairo 1963, p. 260.

[13]'Abdallah al-Tijani, *Rihlat al-Tijani*, Tunis 1958, p. 113.

Ottomans.[14] They had later been involved in the wars against Ahmad Qaramanli, supporting the last Ottoman governor, Muhammad Khalil Amis (or Maḥmūd Abū Umays) in 1711.[15] More recently, the Maḥāmīd (who had by 1810 evolved into two sections, the Awlād Sa'īd bin Sūla and the Awlād Marmūrī) had acquired better tribal unity under Shaykh Abu'l-Qasim bin Khalīfa (Ghūma's brother) which had later been converted into a lasting peace between the two factions very soon after Ghūma inherited the leadership of the Marmūrī faction (plural: Marāmīr).[16] In the Jabal Nafusa itself, the particular places occupied semi-permanently by the Maḥāmīd and the Marmūrī clan lay between Ṣarmān and the Wadi al-Atal, at the center of which was their fort, Qasr ibn Nīrān in the vicinity of Yafran or Yefren.[17] It is also worth noting that while Ghūma is often referred to as Ibn 'Awn or Ghūma ibn 'Awn, 'Awn was actually his paternal grandfather, not his father.[18]

Jabal Nafusa, for a long time before the days of Ghūma, had been a center of rebellion—from the standpoint of the Turks and from the peculiar standpoint of Tripoli and some other coastal towns. This certainly had to do with the divergent economic interests, to say nothing of the radically different cultures, represented by the urban population of Tripoli vs the nomadic Arabs (and some Berbers) of the desert and the mountains. Political control, also, always radiated from Tripoli, as in the first and second Ottoman periods; invariably it aimed at taxing the nomads and mountaineers, very often including a special tax on the olive production of the Jabal Nafusa, Ghariyan, etc.[19] Tarhuna District was frequently taxed in the same way. In other words, the townspeople of Tripoli looked down on the countrymen and despised their poverty and different lifestyle, whereas the nomads and mountaineers saw Tripoli (and probably Binghazi and Darna, also) as unwanted centers of Ottoman political control to which taxation had to be forcibly paid, with nothing being given in return. Thus the tradition of revolt and opposition (and also migration) from the mountains continued from the 'Abbasid period, when Ibādī Berbers resisted the Arabs, right through the early Ottoman period, when a rebel and *mahdi*, Yahya bin Yahya al Suwaydi (1589-90) fought the Pasha's soldiers from the capital.[20] About the time of the Qaramanli succession (from 1711 to c. 1713), it was the turn of Jabal Tarhuna to rebel against the Qaramanlis, and in 1715 the pattern was repeated in the Jabal Nafusa, when 'Ali bin 'Abdullah al-Sanhaji al-Fasi (Abū Qīla) proclaimed there

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[14]Misurati, *Ghūma*, p. 55.
[15]Misurati, *Ghūma*, p. 55.
[16]Misurati, *Ghūma*, p. 55-56.
[17]Misurati, *Ghūma*, p. 57.
[18]See Jamil Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*, Cambridge 1987, p. 314.
[19]Streicker, *Government*, p. 76.
[20]Unpublished paper by Soraya Faroghi, "Der Aufstand des Yahya ibn Yahya, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des osmanischen Tripolis," 1975.

that he was the *mahdi*. This insurrection was shortly crushed by Ahmad Qaramanli. These disturbances continued into the late eighteenth century, when a certain "Suffanassa" (Sayf al-Naṣr) fought the Qaramanli ruler. Nor is this an exhaustive list of risings, insurrections, and turmoil directed against interference from Tripoli and the coast.[21]

Further, these episodic risings (including Ghūma's), and also certain activities of his father, Khalifa ibn 'Awn, can be fitted into this same traditional pattern. Khalifa ibn 'Awn, for example, favored Yusuf Qaramanli in the late 1790s against his brother Ahmad, and the Libyan historian al-Na'ib says in his *Manhal al-'Adhb* that Yusuf

> decided to take appropriate means to get the reins of power into his hands . . . At that time Shaykh Khalifa ibn 'Awn al-Mahmudi, *shaykh* of the Banu Nuwayr tribe, was highly influential. Yusuf wrote to him. He answered, agreeing to help Yusuf. Indeed, he was disposed to back him, because of the fortunate aspects of the opportunity . . . [to besiege Tripoli] . . .[22]

Khalifa in fact had made an alliance with Yusuf Qaramanli, perhaps in this way hoping to neutralize the future ruler and keep him distant from Jabal Nafusa. But his plan failed to keep the new Qaramanli pasha away entirely. Regular revolts at Jabal Ghariyan took place in 1803, 1807, and 1810. At Jabal Tarhuna there was a revolt in 1810, one in Nalut in 1816, then sporadic trouble broke out in Jabal Nafusa from 1815 to 1821. Yusuf Pasha had to send a large force against a rising of "Shaykh Halifa" in 1818, which the Shaykh was forced to settle in the same year by a payment of "120,000 Spanish dollars, 1000 black slaves," adding the expenses of sending soldiers and suppressing the rising, "and some cattle, horses, and sheep." This was how Yusuf Pasha repaid his former ally who had aided him to power.[23]

Therefore, it was not surprising that Ghūma, who had attempted clearly to reach some accommodation with Mustafa Necib Pasha in 1835 by going to Tripoli and offering presents in person, hoped to sound out the new Ottoman governor, to see what he wanted and what his policies were likely to be. Ghūma (somewhat naively) was rudely awakened by his short stay in prison and quickly realized that he was faced with a much more powerful and determined adversary in the Ottoman Turks than the Qaramanlis had ever been during his father's time. If the Turks had declared war on him, he would now do the same thing to them. From this time until his death in 1858, Ghūma seems rarely to have hesitated in

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[21] Streicker, *Government*, pp. 29-30.

[22] Ahmad Hasan al-Na'ib, *Al-Manhal al-'adhb fi ta'rikh Tarabulus al-Gharb*, Istanbul 1317/1899, p. 303.

[23] Streicker, *Government*, p. 50.

resisting the Turks, and to have conceived this role as his perpetual mission in life.

It is clear that the Turks faced a major military problem in subduing Libya, starting from Tripoli. Basically, the matter was an issue of spreading out from the capital, taking in the regions close at hand, then moving south and east toward the coastal towns near the Egyptian frontier and simultaneously toward the south, in the direction of the Fazzan. Some minor campaigns also brought the Turks toward the Tunisian frontier and in the direction of Ghadamis. At each step of this process, new citadels and small forts (*qaṣrs*) were erected and provided with garrisons and officers, who doubled as civil administrators. This long-term Turkish plan was carried out only slowly, although it was mostly complete by 1860. Nor was the Ottoman advance carried out wholly by troops who were ethnic Turks; one of the first moves in Tripoli and its vicinity after the takeover of 1835 was to put into force a system of conscription for Arabs and Berbers. Conscription was paralleled by compulsory study of the Turkish language, so at the end of the Libyan campaigns of "pacification" in the late 1850s and later, many conscripts of Arab origin could be found among Ottoman military units, some speaking at least an elementary kind of Turkish. Muslim Montenegrins, Albanians, and Kurds also appeared in the ranks of the various Turkish contingents.

For the Arab resisters opposing the Ottomans, the problem was quite different. They knew the country very well; they were superb horsemen and camelmen. Thus they were ready to carry out prolonged guerrilla warfare. Most of the time, they could be relied upon even if the Turks could sometimes exploit Arab factionalism or personal dislikes effectively, as in Ghūma's case when his nephew Bīrī and some followers went over to the Turkish side. Thus the tribes of the Jabal Nafusa District did very well at night attacks, ambushes in narrow *wadi* beds, and in operations in hilly country with few good roads. Perhaps the biggest problem of the Arab resistance was obtaining supplies. As the Turks closed off access to the Mediterranean coast, Jarba, and Malta, a market for weapons, it became harder to get rifles, cannon, lead for bullets, powder (was some made locally in the Jabal Nafusa?), and other munitions, to say nothing of foodstuffs. Toward the end of Ghūma's efforts, considerable amounts of supplies were coming into Jabal Nafusa and other regions controlled by the insurrectionists from Tunisia. It is hard to ascertain just what proportion of these supplies were of French origin, brought within the range of Ghūma's forces by the French, and paid for by them from French government funds. Like many guerrilla forces, Ghūma and his men relied quite heavily on weapons captured from the enemy.

Streicker states that the Turks used "sophisticated," yet "blunt" techniques when it came to "subduing a refractory populace."

> . . . If the tribes got out of hand and war broke out among them, they were charged with heavier taxes, once subdued and chastised. At the same time, it was often the [Ottoman] government's policy to play one *saff* (clan or faction) off against another. Not infrequently, when an area was conquered, all of its most important shaikhs were simply beheaded, leaving the people without a political focus. As an alternative, a troublesome shaikh would be removed and his main opponent installed . . .[24]

Many of these techniques were employed by the Turks, as they slowly emerged from their original confines around Tripoli after 1835. To discuss these operations in a little more detail, it is useful to proceed by looking at the activities of each successive pasha. Mustafa Necib, the first governor, only stayed at Tripoli for four months in 1835 and had merely landed his troops and their supplies when he was caught minting coins without the sultan's permission, and recalled to Istanbul. His successor, Mehmed Raif, a former governor of Gallipoli, did slightly more (1835-36), since he suppressed the Arab tribes living in the vicinity of Tripoli itself, then moved to take Zanzur and Zawiya. Tajūrā', an important commercial town near Tripoli, was taken and its population made to pay an indemnity of impressive size. Then Mehmet Raif took control of the long coast, stretching from Tripoli along the Sirte, and eastward as far as Binghazi and Darna.[25]

In the summer of 1836, Tahir Pasha (actually a Turkish admiral) went after 'Uthman Agha of Misurata, a major town east of Tripoli on the coast. 'Uthman was considered by the Ottomans as a troublemaker and perpetual rebel. They were pleased when Tahir Pasha defeated him and forced him to flee to Jabal Tarhuna. However, Tahir Pasha failed to take and hold either the Tarhuna District or Ghariyan at the eastern end of the Jabal Nafusa.[26] Here, Ghūma was able to muster sizable tribal forces during 1836-37 and to defeat Tahir Pasha, advancing on Zawiya and Zuwara, seizing much booty and war material from the Turks, then retiring into the Jabal Nafusa. Since he had failed, Tahir Pasha was recalled and replaced by a new governor, Çeşmeli Hasan Pasha, in the late spring of 1837.

It is remarkable that after taking so much loot from the Turks, Ghūma soon sent most of it back to them. Al-Zawi comments that

> . . . Shaykh Ghūma's return of this war material had as its reason, the fact that his fight against the Turks was to seek the reform of a corrupt

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[24] Streicker, *Government*, pp. 78-79.
[25] Zāwī, *Wulat*, pp. 240-241.
[26] Zāwī, *Wulat*, pp. 240-241.

government, the enforcement of justice and the establishment of order and security . . . [27]

One might also add that Ghūma was a person who was aware of the power and standing of the Sultan as the first personality in Islam, that he did not really want to fight against him, as a good Muslim, knowing that greedy European powers were not far away. Ghūma surely was one who believed that Abdulmecid was "a good king with bad courtiers"—which would account for the bad treatment he had received from Mustafa Necib Pasha. Yet as time went on, Ghūma would have reason to alter his opinions.

The new pasha seemed at first to want to stop hostilities against the local Arabs and come to some accommodation with them. Streicker suggests that this was due less to a real wish for peace on the Ottoman side than lack of men and equipment.[28] Also, a raging plague and various deep-seated economic troubles compounded the difficulties of the Ottomans. However much one might admire the courage that demanded an ongoing revolt against the Turks, both 'Abd al-Jalīl Sayf al-Naṣr and Ghūma had blocked several trade routes, that from Tripoli to the south, via Ghadamis, or directly to the Fazzan, and also routes passing through the Jabal Nafusa to different destinations, because of intermittent hostilities.[29]

However, Çeşmeli Hasan Pasha proposed to recognize both 'Abd al-Jalīl and Ghūma as rulers of their own territories, against an annual tribute. Both insurrectionists had accepted this proposal when Hasan Pasha suddenly required that the tribute should be a retroactive one for several years; at this, the arrangement broke down and hostilities resumed.[30]

A similar arrangement was attempted in 1838 again, under Çeşmeli Hasan's successor, called Ali Askar or Ali Ashqar Pasha. Ali Ashqar abandoned the idea of retroactive tribute from Ghūma and 'Abd al-Jalīl, and contented himself with a request for simple annual payments, in Ghūma's case, of about 8000 *qurūsh*. At the end of 1839, this plan also foundered over a poor harvest, and war continued between Turkish conquerors and Arab resisters. By the start of the 1840s, the Turks were able to apply effective pressure against the Arab resistance by pinching off their supplies, both over the normal routes via Jarba, the Libyan coast, and also through Tunisia. For an interval, Ghūma, his fellow-tribesmen, and allies suffered considerably. It is also true that the war began to heat up, and the earlier chivalrous move by Ghūma of returning the adversaries' war materials was now unthinkable. It had become a guerrilla war *à outrance*.

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[27] Zāwī, *Wulat*, p. 242.

[28] Streicker, *Government*, pp. 80-81.

[29] André Martel, *Les confins saharo-tripolitains de la Tunisie (1881-1911)*, I, Paris 1965, p. 123.

[30] Zāwī, *Wulat*, p. 243.

Whether either side took many prisoners is uncertain, and the number of atrocities increased markedly. For instance, when in 1841, a number of Ghūma's helpers were captured by the Turks (to the number of about 70), they were taken to Tripoli and killed the day after capture, in some cases suffering the horrible death of the *khāzūq or* stake of impalement.[31]

The situation of Ghūma's ally, 'Abd al-Jalīl Sayf al-Naṣr, was also serious at the start of the 1840s. 'Abd al-Jalīl wanted the Ottoman Sultan to recognize him as ruler of the Fazzan, and had arranged a meeting about this with the British consul, who was trying to get diplomatic support in Istanbul for this maneuver. In return, 'Abd al-Jalīl was prepared to halt the slave trade. As he was returning from the Sirte region where the meeting had taken place, along with 'Uthman al-Adgham, his son, and Shaykh Aḥmad al-Murayyiḍ in May 1842, his movements were betrayed to the Turks—supposedly by some of his friends. At the subsequent Battle of the Wadi Zamzam, 'Abd al-Jalīl was caught without warning by the 'Amil of Misurāta, Hasan Bey bin 'Abdallah al-Bel'azi, one of Ali Ashqar's subordinates, and beheaded.[32] This was a serious blow not only to the Awlād Sulayman tribe of which 'Abd al-Jalīl was the head, but to Arab resistance generally. It was also a serious blow to Ghūma, who was now virtually alone in resisting the Turks.

Yet, so far, he had resisted successfully, most recently at the fight on the Wadi al-Hayra, which allowed him to get control of the Zawiya District, of Zuwara and the 'Ajīlāt. After this defeat and others, Ali Ashqar Pasha decided to use tricks if confrontation would not help him. So he sent his spies and agents to study the rising and those who were participating in it, and then to sow dissension between Ghūma and his allies. Finally he sent his troops to Zawiya to recover it; in a pulverizing battle, the Arab forces took many casualties, and finally retreated to the mountains. According to Zawi, the house roofs and upper stories in certain quarters of the town still showed the marks of cannonballs, as late as 1950.[33]

Despite all that he had done for the Ottoman cause, the cruel Ali Ashqar Pasha was recalled to Turkey in 1842. This was presumably caused by his avarice and his venal techniques of enriching himself at the expense of local Libyans, particularly in the Tarhuna area. Tuwayyir gives a long list of illegal seizures (*ightiṣabāt*) made by this man in the vicinity of Zawiya and Tarhuna alone. It included every sort of livestock, black slaves, funds in cash, and other portable goods of value to the enormous total of 232,000 *qurūsh*. Such unlawful seizures and confiscations by corrupt Turkish officials were obviously one of the

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[31]Zāwī, *Wulat*, pp. 244-246; Streicker, *Government*, pp. 82,83.
[32]Tuwayyir, *Intifāḍāt*, p. 168.
[33]Zāwī, *Wulat*, p. 245.

major mechanisms keeping Ghūma's revolt and other armed conflicts going—to say nothing of the obnoxious annual taxes heaped on Arab cultivators and farmers. For many people, the only answer was migration, often into Tunisia.[34]

Ashqar Ali was soon replaced by Mehmed Emin Pasha, who offered Ghūma a pardon if he would come to Tripoli and make his submission, an offer guaranteed by the British consul. As he was much depressed by the death of ʿAbd al-Jalīl, Ghūma showed once again (as in 1835) a touching trust in the good faith of the Ottoman Turks.

According to Zawi, Ghūma soon showed up in Tripoli asking for a pardon, which was arranged for him by the harbormaster, Mustafa Qurchi or Gurji. He was treated with deference and was made a temporary (?) member of the Tripoli administrative council (*majlis al-idāra*), the members of which had guaranteed his safety. Unfortunately, differences of opinion began to arise between Ghūma and a Turkish general, the notorious Ahmed Pasha (known as "Jazzār" Ahmed Pasha, or "Ahmad the Butcher" to local Libyans after his exploit of the following year [1843], when he invited 60 shaykhs of the Jabal area to a conference under a flag of truce, then massacred all of them). It seems that he used his influence at the Porte to have Ghūma seized, along with his cousin Mīlūd and some others, and sent in exile to Turkey, first to Istanbul, then to Trabzon on the Black Sea. Here Ghūma remained for 13 years, until 1855.[35]

Apparently, it was no help to Ghūma to have written a letter to the new pasha, Mehmet Emin, telling him of his wish to submit, of his reverence for the Sultan, and a number of other points, indicating that he and his people were tired of resistance and would happily submit to the Ottomans. In this letter, there is no mention of Ghūma's wish to see a return of the Qaramanlis to Tripoli, in the

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[34]Tuwayyir, *Intifāḍāt*, pp. 169-170.

[35]Zāwī, *Wulat*, pp. 247-248. In contrast to the claims of Tahir Ahmad al-Zāwī, *Wulat*, pp. 247-248, the course of events from September to December 1842 may have been quite different. According to Tuwayyir, *Intifāḍāt*, pp. 171-176, Mehmet Emin Pasha carried out some elaborate maneuvers to ensnare Ghūma, Shaykh ʿAbd al-Hadi bin Ahmad al-Murayyid of Tarhuna, and others. This involved the promise of various reforms for Tripoli and its region by the Ottomans primarily through the formation of provincial administrative council (*majlis al-idāra*). This included the Maliki and Hanafi *muftis* of Tripoli, important personages, and local dignitaries. Mehmet Emin's plan involved enlarging the council with Arab chiefs and shaykhs, Ghūma and others among them. This was merely a mechanism for co-opting and using such Arab leaders, and neutralizing them in the eyes of their own people. Once they had become suspect to their adherents in this fashion, they would be retained by the Turks to advise them on intelligence matters. The entering wedge here was a written commitment (*taʿahhud*) signed between the shaykh and the Ottoman pasha. Ghūma signed such a pledge because he realized (after ʿAbd al-Jalīl's death) the futility of winning a definitive victory over the Turks. But, according to Tuwayyir, the council and its doings were merely a smokescreen, so that the suspicions of Ghūma and his friends could be lulled. Mehmed Emin Pasha, claims Tuwayyir, saw his opportunity, having Ghūma and his friends within the city of Tripoli, and took it, shipping them off to Turkey under escort at the end of December 1842. Based on documents from the Tripoli Archives, this version may well be reliable.

person of Hasan Bey Qaramanli, doubtless a forlorn possibility.[36] That Ghūma was made to cool his heels in Tripoli from September until December of 1842 does indicate that the Turks probably had a difficult decision in determining what next to do with him.

Once Ghūma's exile to Turkey was known to the Mahāmīd, there was a violent reaction against what the Arabs of the Jabal saw as Turkish duplicity. A Turkish *mudir* (Hasan Agha), on his way to Ghadamis, passing via the mountains, was murdered, which led to the massacre by Ahmed Pasha mentioned above.[37] Ahmed Pasha also erected a new citadel near Yafran, from where he could control most of the Nafusa range. The Turkish occupier also demanded back taxes and an indemnity. At this, it is claimed that 80,000 people fled into Tunisia.[38]

Little is known of the conditions of Ghūma's stay at Trabzon, whether he was in a local prison, or merely kept under conditions of "house arrest." However, Trabzon was the scene of one of the most puzzling episodes in Ghūma's career; his escape from there to Libya in 1855 during the Crimean War. Both the timing of his escape and its circumstances evoke amazement, then curiosity. An escaping prisoner needs a passport, money, new clothing, perhaps a temporary new identity. If Ghūma was "sprung" from a high-security prison—as seems wholly possible—jailers and guards might have been bribed or paid off, looking the other way as Ghūma left the prison. André Martel, author of an exhaustive study of Franco-Ottoman relations and conflicts along the frontier between Tunisia and Tripolitania, suggests that Ghūma was perhaps aided by "some European agent."[39] A professional French intelligence agent named Antoine d'Espina suggested in a report (April 1855) quoted by Martel that Ghūma might have been helped to escape for good reasons, ". . . pour susciter à notre allié le plus d'embarras possible loin du théatre actuel de la guerre, afin d'empêcher la concentration de forces . . . "[40]

Looking objectively at the matter of Ghūma's escape, one might employ a *cui bono* argument. Here the likely beneficiaries would be the Russians, and the persons most likely to have helped Ghūma, the Tsarist Russian intelligence services. Yet, the consensus among historians seems to be that at the time of the Crimean War, the Russian clandestine services were more than somewhat

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[36]For the text of this letter, see Mehmet Behīj al-Dīn, *Ta'rikh-i-Ghalbūn*, Istanbul 1868, pp. 139-140. Rossi, *Storia di Tripoli e della Tripolitania*, Rome 1968, p. 305, note 29, gives an Italian translation of the Turkish text, itself a translation from Arabic.

[37]Ṭuwayyir, *Intifaḍat*, p. 177.

[38]Streicker, Government, p. 84.

[39]Martel, *Confins*, p. 118.

[40]Martel, *Confins*, p. 118, note 2.

amateurish and disorganized. Thus, the agents who aided Ghūma to escape were presumably French [over this point al-Misurati disagrees, suggesting that the Turks could be and were bribed by Libyan Arabs with plenty of cash (or to use his term, with *rishwa)*]. Here again, André Martel's suggestions are useful, for the French secret service of the 1850s was an efficient and well-informed one.[41] This is true not only of Tripoli itself, where there were many agents (such as the famous Léon Roches) but also in southern and southeastern Tunisia along the frontier with Ottoman Libya. Hence, as Martel states.

> . . . In 1855, everything had been got ready for a *coup de main* at Tripoli, together with the principal [local] chiefs. But the Emperor [Napoleon III] thinking that while he was fighting alongside Turkey, it was not the time to take away one of its provinces, gave the order to abandon the project . . .[42]

Hence the projected French plan for an invasion of Libya could well have been the reason for Ghūma's release. But by the time he actually reached the Jabal Nafusa, the French project had been aborted. It would be useful to know more details of the dates and times of these maneuvers, likewise how Napoleon III was planning to include Libya in some "North African Arab Empire" presided over by France. Algeria had already been acquired for this, and Tunisia and Libya would ultimately fall into their allotted places. Some further light on these points is shed by a document of January 1855, in which the Consul of the Two Sicilies reported from Tripoli that the French Consul there said (the French having the best of relations with Ghūma) that his government wanted to persuade the Sultan to

> . . . restore at Tripoli a regency with a hereditary pasha drawn from the old family of the Qaramanlis, which would pay an annual tribute to the Porte, and which would be, like the Bey of Tunis, under partial French protection . . . [43]

During the absence of Ghūma in his Trabzon confinement (1842-55) the Jabal was fairly quiet. In part, this was the silence of the missing population, since a large segment of the mountain's inhabitants had fled into Tunisia after the Ahmad Jażzar Pasha massacres of 1843. Occasionally, however, Arab resisters and guerrillias would attack some Turkish *qaṣr* or Ottoman official traveling through to destinations beyond the Jabal Nafusa. But, as a surrogate leader in Ghūma's absence, Mawlūd (or Mīlūd) bin Sa'id b. Shaqrūn al-Maḥmūdī was far less effective. The tempo of resistance accordingly slackened.

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[41]Martel, *Confins*, pp. 113-118 on French spies and agents.
[42]Martel, *Confins*, p. 119, note 1.
[43]Rossi, *Storia*, p. 309.

Mawlūd had been let go by the Turks from Trabzon in 1844, after two years detention, promising his captors to keep the Jabal in order for them. Yet once he had got away from the Turks, Mawlūd made it clear to his friends that he would continue with the uprising, and try to lead it as best he could. Coming home via the island of Jarba, he aired his views often enough that the Turks got wind of them. According to Streicker, the Ottomans threatened an invasion of Tunisia if Mawlud were not extradited to Tripoli. But together, the Bey of Tunis and the French warned the Turks off.[44] And once back in the Jabal Nafusa, Mawlūd found the Ottomans in occupation of large parts of the district. Jazzar Ahmad Pasha (still in command in 1847) was able to drive Mawlūd and his men off, at which he returned to Jarba. Also, Mawlūd's family had been captured by the Turks and were still being held as hostages. Thus, Mawlūd was effectively neutralized. All the same, episodic skirmishes and small combats took place in the Jabal in 1847 and 1848. It appears that these "low-intensity" conflicts were triggered by forced Turkish conscription of Arab recruits. At every opportunity, these soldiers deserted to the resisters, taking their arms with them and turning against the Ottomans, sometimes inflicting heavy losses on them. Even so, the Turks found a certain support even among members of the Maḥāmīd tribe: one of these was the prominent Qāsim al-Maḥmūdī, a distant relative of both Ghūma and Mawlūd. These clashes diminished in violence during the time of al-Hajj Ahmed İzzet Pasha (1848-52). Ahmed İzzet proved to be a very superior governor, as he tried to encourage trade and cut obligatory taxation, and generally to improve the situation of the Arabs, both urban and rural.[45]

Ghūma's return to Libya in the early months of 1855 coincided with the final year in office of a new but less amiable pasha, Mustafa Nuri (1852-55), distinguished by his old-fashioned methods (much like those of twenty years before), his corruption, his speculations in grain, and overall, a return to pre-*Tanzimat* administrative procedures, most of which were the direct opposite of the enlightened techniques practiced by Ahmed İzzet Pasha.[46]

The era of Mustafa Nuri Pasha also coincided with increasing tension between France, Britain, and Turkey on one side, and Russia on the other. Streicker points out that simultaneously with the Pasha's levying heavier taxation, and partial famines of artificial origin, and manipulation of the grain crop, that the Libyan population was much excited over the coming hostilities in which Turkey would be involved.[47] Many Libyan tribesmen got themselves ready for combat, for they had heard that large numbers of Turkish troops had been withdrawn from Libya to fight the Russians. Large amounts of arms and

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[44] Streicker, p. 85.
[45] Zāwī, *Wulat*, pp. 250-256.
[46] Streicker, *Government*, pp. 87-88.
[47] Streicker, *Government*, pp. 88-89.

ammunition were coming into the country at this time, also. And before re-entering the Jabal, Ghūma wrote to Mustafa Nuri Pasha asking him—despite all his bad experiences with the Turks—for a position in the bureaucracy in Tripoli, so that he could safeguard the interests of the mountaineers. On the Pasha's refusal, he continued back to the Nafusa District, apparently accompanied on his journey by numbers of both Tunisian and Libyan nomads and mountain men, and being hailed as a hero and liberator from Turkish tyranny.

Once close to Yafran, Ghūma proclaimed that his revolution had begun; he now stated openly that his objective was to expel the Turks from the capital and replace them with Hasan Bey bin 'Ali Qaramanli, the son of the last ruler of the earlier dynasty. Whatever their troubles with the Qaramanlis had been, the inhabitants of the Jabal Nafusa, Arabs and Berbers, and the population of many adjoining areas welcomed this plan.[48] The first operation by the resistance forces was an attack on the Turkish citadel at Yafran in June 1855. Yafran was occupied by an Ottoman garrison commanded by Qāsim al-Maḥmūdī, Ghūma's relation and bitter enemy. Ghūma convinced the Arab troops in the *qaṣr* not to fire on his men, but just to load their muskets with powder, and the upshot of the fight was a Turkish rout. When the Turks at Tripoli received word of this, they sent half of their available troops against Yafran, Ghūma's standing being much enhanced by his victory. As this force of 1500 men and their artillery toiled up toward the captured fort, they were ambushed by Ghūma's men, who killed 1400 of them and took all their supplies and weapons. The remaining hundred were about to be massacred by Ghūma's followers, when he stopped them and sent the prisoners back on mules with sufficient supplies to reach Tripoli. Qāsim al-Maḥmūdī, who had overseen the beheading of certain members of Ghūma's own family, was also returned to Tripoli.[49]

This was perhaps the high point of Ghūma's rising. The insurrection now (summer 1855) was in control of most of Tripoli Province— at least the rural regions—although Tripoli and Binghazi and Darna still backed the Ottomans. The depleted Turkish military forces in Tripoli were presently reinforced with 1800 regular soldiers from Anatolia. Ghūma had meanwhile announced himself as the chief of state of a "mountain government" centered on Jabal Nafusa, presumably to continue until the re-appearance of one of the Qaramanlis in Libya.[50] That he did not move at this instant against Tripoli seems to have been Ghūma's great error, and it was probably connected with a long drought. Only with the autumn rains (starting in October) could Ghūma hope to make a successful assault on the capital. But the other side could use this opportunity as well; thus, Ghūma moved with a small force against Ghariyan (September 1855)

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[48]Streicker, *Government*, pp. 89-90.
[49]Streicker, *Government*, pp. 91-92.
[50]Streicker, *Government*, pp. 91-92.

and then against Tripoli, hoping no doubt to draw the Turks out of the city toward the hills and mountains to the southwest, and defeat them closer to Yafran, as he had done previously.[51]

Meanwhile, Istanbul had decided to replace Mustafa Nuri Pasha, not a conspicuous success, with Osman Muhtar Pasha, and many of the old Pasha's rapacious henchmen were removed at the same time, Mustafa Nuri being appointed *vali* of Selanik —according to the U.S. Consul M. J. Gaines in a report to Secretary of State W. J. Marcy.[52]

After Osman Muhtar Pasha's arrival, it was clear that the Porte was determined to finish with Ghūma. Osman Pasha's first move, and a useful one from his standpoint, was to issue a general amnesty for all rebels—except Ghūma. This act had its effect; because of shortages of food and ammunition, because of a serious drought and the death of much livestock, the mountaineers had mostly had enough. Ghūma's troop strength from the summer of 1855 to January of the following year dropped from about 14,000 to 4,000. Osman Pasha presently led an assault (January 1856) on the citadel at Yafran, with about 12,000 men, both Arab conscripts and Turkish regular troops. Ghūma and his followers, half demoralized, were routed. Ghūma (now about 61) fled to the western end of the mountains, where he was momentarily safe, then went to Tunisia. Meanwhile, Osman Pasha tried to take advantage of Ghūma's defeats and age to inviegle him to live in Tripoli with a Turkish government pension, or to live under the same conditions in some remote Ottoman province. But Ghūma always refused.[53]

Nevertheless, there is good evidence that the French—or at least the French consul at Tripoli, Léon Roches—was still maintaining his ties to the rebels. Could the aborted imperial project of 1855 still have been alive, or was it simply the doings of the French consul, a sort of personal policy in Libya which Roches had in hand? In any case, the American Consul, Gaines, recorded that on the capture of Yafran, letters from the French Consulate to Ghūma were discovered in the captured citadel by Osman Pasha. Ottoman agents also intercepted a "spyglass" being dispatched to Ghūma by the French.[54]

In the spring of 1856, the tireless Ghūma had again gathered new followers in Tunisia to promote a new rising in the Jabal. But he was already on the slippery slope of defeat; for the Crimean War had ended in April 1856, there still existed food shortages in the Jabal and throughout Tripolitania, famines and

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[51]Streicker, *Government*, p. 93.
[52]Streicker, *Government*, p. 94.
[53]Rossi, *Storia*, pp. 310-312; Streicker, *Government*, pp. 95-96.
[54]Streicker, *Government*, p. 95.

various epidemics were rampant. The Ottomans would soon have all the troops they wanted for Tripoli, too, having concluded peace with Russia. Further, Osman Muhtar Pasha, failing to get Ghūma to give up his revolt, sent agents to trick him into submission or to capture him: several of these efforts failed, and Ghūma eluded the Pasha.

Ghūma had further trouble in 1857 when he went back into Tunisia, both to recruit followers and evade the Turks. Tunisian tribes who had supported him, and apparently the Bey of Tunis himself—who had aided him in past time—refused to help further. There are also reports that Ghūma went briefly into eastern Algeria, perhaps because Consul Roches wanted him to settle there and to be quiet for an interval, or more likely, because he was planning a further rising in Tripolitania. In any case, Ghūma returned to the Jabal in the spring of 1858.

As soon as Ghūma's latest move became known to Osman Muhtar Pasha, he sent a column of troops to Yafran after Ghūma. These included *bāshī būzuqs* (irregular infantry) from Prevesa in Albania. The site of Ghūma's camp was betrayed to them by an ex-follower of Ghūma's. The Albanians caught him, some of his family, and many of his partisans. Ghūma's death came when he heard his daughter cry out for help; he came toward her, was then wounded and fell from his horse, and an Albanian cut his head off.[55] It was sent to Tripoli, to Osman Pasha. This event (at the end of March 1858) seems to have taken place either in the Jabal itself, or more likely, south of there, on the road to Ghadamis, where Ghūma was fleeing with the last handful of his supporters, and evidently, members of his own family.

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[55]Streicker, *Government*, p. 99.

Engin Deniz AKARLI

THE DEFENCE OF THE LIBYAN PROVINCES (1882-1908)*

When the Italians attacked Libya in 1911, they expected a walk-over. Contrary to all previous calculations and expectations, however, Libya did not prove to be an easy prey. The Ottoman troops there were few in number and poorly equipped, but the local population assembled under the Ottoman standards. Soon a formidable front of resistance took shape that bogged the invaders down on a narrow strip along the coast. Even after the signing of the Ouchy Treaty and the withdrawal of the Ottomans, local resistance continued, making the Italians pay a high price for their dreams of a colonial empire.[1]

No resistance movement of that caliber against such an overwhelmingly superior enemy can be organized in such a short time. Obviously, there must have been a historical backgound to it. It is mainly this issue to which I will address myself in the present article. I will also try to cover the relevant developments in Ottoman foreign policy.[2]

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* This paper was originally prepared for, and delivered, at the conference on "Libyan Resistance and Turkish officers" that was organized by the Libyan Studies Center in Tripoli on November 21-23, 1981.

[1] See, e.g., Joachim Remak, *The Origins of World War I, 1871-1914*, New York, etc., 1967, pp. 51-53; Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi*, 3 vols., Istanbul-Ankara, 1940-53, vol. II/1, pp. 99-288; E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*, Oxford, 1949, pp. 104-133; W. C. Askew, *Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya, 1911-1912*, Durham, N.C., 1942.

[2] My research is essentially based on notes taken from the related documents preserved in the Yıldız Palace Archives of Sultan Abdülhamid II. These archives are now part of the Turkish Prime Ministry Archives in Istanbul and are referred to as the *Yıldız Tasnifi*. They contain numerous documents which are invaluable for an understanding of the long reign of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909). At the time of the writing of this article, only a portion of this collection of documents, the section referred to as the *Yıldız Esas Evrakı* (henceforth, YEE), was available to researchers, but it was possible to see the summary cards of the documents from the other sections as well. The other sections are referred to as the *Sadaret Resmi Maruzatı*, *Mütenevvi' Maruzat*, and *Hususi Maruzat*, henceforth abbreviated as YT-RM, YT-MM, and YT-HM, respectively. (For the Yıldız Collection see S. Shaw, "The Yıldız Palace

When the French occupied Tunis in 1881, the Italians, eager to join the European race for building colonial empires, turned their eyes to Tripoli for consolation.[3] The Ottomans were determined to protect Tripoli against not only the Italians but also the French. Early in 1882, reports from Tripoli expressed concern over the southward advance of the French troops in Tunis along the Tripolitanian border, chasing the Bedouin tribes who resisted occupation. As the Tunisian tribes freely transgressed the boundaries (which were uncertain anyway), the Ottoman authorities in the area felt worried lest the French follow suit and occupy the hinterlands of Tripoli. They asked for an additional supply of rifles and ammunition from Istanbul, and also made arrangements to offer asylum to the Tunisian tribes provided that they remained peaceful and ceased all hostilities. Precautions were also taken to preserve peace and order in Tripoli so that no excuse was created for any foreign intervention. Meanwhile, all major capitals in Europe were alerted to developments in the area.[4]

At that point, the British, who saw France as a reliable ally against the increasing power of Bismarck's Germany, were not opposed to giving the French liberty of action in Tunis in exchange for a free hand in consolidating their recently acquired position in Cyprus.[5] Yet, the rapid development of events in Egypt, which culminated in its outright invasion by Great Britain in July 1882, broke the Anglo-French *entente* and set off a relentless rivalry between them over the partitioning of Africa.[6]

The crisis in Egypt worked to the advantage of the Italians. In September 1882, the Ottoman ambassador to Paris informed the sultan that the French were opening negotiations with the Italians with a view to working out differences.

Archives," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, III (1971), pp. 211-237, and A. Çetin, "Yıldız Arşivi'ne Dair," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi*, no. 32 (March 1979), pp. 563-586). It should be clear that the present article barely penetrates the very rich information available on Libyan history in Ottoman documents. In addition to the documents of the Yıldız Collection, there are many other documents related to Libya in other collections of the Prime Ministry Archives, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry Archives (which are recently annexed to the Prime Ministry Archives), and the Hamra Palace Archives in Tripoli. (For the last mentioned source see Muhammad Tâhir 'Uraybî, *Wathâiq al-Sarây al-Hamrâ bi-madîna Trâblus*, Tripoli, 1977.)

[3]A. J. P. Taylor, "International Relations," *The New Cambridge Modern History* (henceforth, NCMH), XI, 553-554.

[4]YT. HM: No. 280 26 Ca 1299 (15 III 1882); no. 14-25/341, 28 C 1299 (17 V 1882); 9 B 1299 (27 V 1882); 16 B 1299 (3 VI 1882). YT. MM: No. 218, 16 R 1299 (7 III 1882); nos. 281-282, 15 Ca 1299 (4 IV 1882); no. 24-351, 27 C 1299 (16 V 1882); nos. 12, 13, 115, 136, and 137, Za 1298 (XI 1881); no. 152, 10 Ra 1299 (30 I 1882); no. 45/1842, 5 Ş 1299 (22 VI 1882). (The dates in parentheses here and hereafter represent the Gregorian equivalents of the *hijri* dates mentioned before them). Also see Abdurrahman Çaycı, *La Question Tunisienne et la politique Ottomane 1881-1913. Erzurum 1963*, pp. 70-76.

[5]R. Robinson and J. Gallagher with A. Denny, *Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism*, Garden City, N.Y., 1968, p. 94.

[6]*Ibid.*, 94 ff. Also see R. Oliver and A. Atmore, *Africa since 1800*, Cambridge, 1967, 103 ff.

France was willing to approve Italian ambitions in Tripoli in return for an acknowledgement of her rule in Tunis.[7] Britain would be even more willing to support the Italians. Having lost their influence in the Ottoman court[8], and having been bogged down with numerous diplomatic problems resulting from their action in Egypt, the British would much rather have a pliable Italy than a hostile France as a neighbour in Egypt.

In view of these developments, the Ottoman government felt obliged to strengthen its position in Libya.[9] Italy began to be viewed as the major threat to Ottoman rule in the area. In 1884, the Council of Ministers submitted an extensive report to the sultan on the precautions that should be taken to avert effectively any belligerent action of Italy.[10] Although a history of Libya during Abdulhamid II's reign is yet to be written[11], a number of documents indicate that a sincere effort was made to implement the suggestions of the Council in 1884. Upon the sultan's order and working under the direction of German staff-officer von der Goltz, the High Commission of Military Inspection prepared plans in 1885 for the military defense of Benghazi and Tripoli against a possible invasion.[12] Towards the end of the same year the sultan was briefed about the preparations against Italian activities.[13]

Efforts were also made to neutralize Italy's flirtation with France and Britain. Taking advantage of the differences between major powers, the Ottomans managed to improve their international bargaining strength by observing a flexible and non-committal foreign policy. They sided with France in disputes over the issue of Egypt, but were still careful not to alienate Britain altogether. The diplomatic isolation of the British helped the Ottomans. Close relations were established with Russia while remaining on generally amicable terms with Austria-Hungary. Germany was approached without arousing French suspicions. Germany's influence on Italy within the Triple Alliance also helped

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[7]YT.HM, 22 L 1299 (6 IX 1882).

[8]See E. D. Akarlı, "The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)", unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1976, pp. 30-36.

[9]YT. HM: no. 251, 26 S 1301 (28 XII 1883).

[10]YT. RM: no 2593, 12 Ş 1302 (27 V 1884). For the Islamic overtones of Ottoman foreign policy at this time, see E. D. Akarlı, "Abdülhamid II's Islamic Policy in the Arab Provinces, " *Turkish-Arab Relations*, Ankara: Hacettepe University, 1979, pp. 44-60.

[11]In this respect, a work done after the completion of the present article is most likely to have closed an important gap in our knowledge: see Michel Le Gall's "Pashas, Bedouins and Notables: Ottoman Administration in Tripoli and Benghazi, 1881-1902," unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1986.

[12]YT.HM: 13 Ş 1302 (28 V 1885).

[13]YT.HM: 19 Z 1302 (29 IX 1885).

the Ottomans.[14] Italy, on the other hand, moved into an anti-French position. The French broke off negotiations in 1887 and instituted a tariff war whose adverse effects were felt in Italy for almost ten years.[15]

The Ottomans seem to have utilized this relief of pressure over Libya to reinforce their position, if we judge by the reports presented to the Sultan in 1888, which assured him that Libya was no longer an easy prey for Italy.[16] Still, Abdülhamid was not satisfied with these assurances and demanded a joint report from the Ministries of War, Naval Affairs and Military Provisions on how the forces, fortifications and lines of communication in Libya could be further improved.[17] Also, the local commanders were encouraged to communicate their needs directly to the Palace.[18]

The deliberate purpose of the Ottoman military preparations was to render Libya self-sufficient enough to hold its own against an attack until help was sent.[19] Towards the realization of this objective, effective ways of cooperation with the local population had to be worked out. Although the Ministry of War insisted on the establishment of a regular military organization in Libya[20], the financial problems of the Ottoman government imposed a limit on the number of regular troops that could be stationed there. In fact, one of the complaints of the commanders in the area was that the salaries of the troops were left in arrears, sometimes as long as six months.[21] Besides, the predominantly tribal structure of the population hampered local recruitment, although no efforts were spared to encourage the Libyans to enlist.[22]

Under these circumstances, Abdülhamid chose to rely on and work in close cooperation with the local tribal sheikhs. They were assigned military-administrative ranks and duties. Militia regiments were formed along tribal

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[14] Akarlı, "Problems", 40-65. For the French support to the Ottomans against Italy, see *Said Paşa'nın Hatıratı*, 2 vols., Dersaadet, 1328, vol. II, pp. 302 and 307-308.

[15] G. A. Craig, *Europe since 1815*, 2nd. ed., New York, etc., 1966, p. 346, and J. P. T. Bury, "Diplomatic History, 1900-1912, " NCMH, XII, 121.

[16] YT.HM: 29 Za and 10 Z 1305 (7 and 18 VIII 1888).

[17] YT.MM: no. 773/2713, 22 Ş 1306 (23 IV 1889).

[18] YT.MM: no. 1996, 27 R 1308 (10 XII 1890).

[19] YT. MM : no. 1546/2717, 8 C 1308 (19 I 1891), and no. 1635/4396, 24 N 1308 (4 IV 1891).

[20] YT.MM: no. 1677/5191, 17 Za 1308 (24 VI 1891). Also see YT.HM: no. 377, 23 S 1320 (1 VI 1902).

[21] YT.HM: no. 1135, 8 C 1310 (28 XII 1892).

[22] YT.HM : no. 2252, 18 L 1310 (5 V 1893) ; nos. 780, 785, 829, and 892, 1-22 B 1319 (X-XI 1901). Also see the next note, and cf. YT.HM : no. 352, 26 Ra 1319 (13 VII 1901) for the beginnings of a census.

lines.[23] There was always a risk involved in training, equipping and relying on tribes for military purposes, because they might become unruly and disturb peace and order.[24] In Libya, the Ottomans tried to minimize that risk by establishing a close and mutually beneficial cooperation with the leaders of the Sanusi order which was influential among the tribes. Abdülhamid personally saw to it that good relations were maintained with the Sanusi order.[25] Indeed, the few serious conflicts that did occur between the tribes and local authorities in Libya were peacefully settled through the intermediacy of the Sanusi leaders.[26] As it was ultimately the mobilization and resistance of the Sanusi tribes that turned the invasion into such a costly venture for the Italians, Abdülhamid's policy can be considered to have borne fruit. Had it not been for the earlier efforts to organize the Libyan people for war, the Young Turk officers would have needed a miracle to achieve the same success in 1911.[27]

It was again during Abdülhamid's reign that a deliberate effort was made to cultivate a feeling of solidarity, a common social bond between the Ottoman Turks and Libyan Arabs, mainly through the establishment of a public school system in Libya. In 1876, there were only three junior high schools in Tripoli which offered a somewhat modernized education. By 1905-6, there were 32 modernized elementary schools, eleven in Benghazi and twenty-one in Tripoli, six junior high schools, evenly distributed between the two provinces, one boarding high school in Tripoli, and one crafts school again in Tripoli. These figures may not appear impressive, but the improvement in time is

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[23] YT.MM: no. 1681/4377, 23 Za 1308 (30 VI 1891); no. 4491, 30 Za 1308 (7 VII 1891); no. 1677/5191, 17 Za 1308 (24 VI 1891); no. 5308, 24 Za 1308 (1 VII 1891); no. 2164, 2 R 1315 (31 VIII 1897), and YEE: 14/1379/126/10.

[24] See, e.g., the case of Eastern Anatolia, Stephen Duguid, "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia," *Middle Eastern Studies*, IX/2 (May 1973), pp. 139-155. Also see YT-MM, no. 1677/5191, 17 Za 1398 (24 VII 1891) about the concerns of military experts over the armament of the tribes affiliated to the Kuloğlus. On certain problems encountered by the Ottomans in helping the tribes who inhabited the borderlands between Libya and Tunis, see Çaycı, 93-97.

[25] See documents preserved in files no. YEE: 14/451/126/9; YEE: 29/64/51/78, and YEE: 30/2241/55/78. Also see YT.HM: no. 356, 21 C 1303 (1 VIII 1907), and Evans-Pritchard, pp. 90-100. At first Abdülhamid II had thought reliance on his old acquaintance Shaikh Muhammad Zâfir would be sufficient in winning the support of the various Libyan tribes. Shaikh Zâfir, who belonged to the Shadhiliyya order, had become acquainted with Abdülhamid during a visit to Istanbul in 1875-76. After his rise to the sultanate, Abdülhamid established a *zaviye* for Zâfir nearby the Yıldız Palace. Zâfir's *zâviye* became the address of many North African visitors to Istanbul. (See Butrus Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abdulhuda al-Sayyadî," *Middle Eastern Studies*, XV/2 [May 1979], p. 139). Nevertheless, the rivalry between the Sanusiyya and Shadhiliyya orders obliged the sultan to cultivate good relations also with Shaikh Sanusi. [There should be detailed information on Abdülhamid's relations with the Libyan shaikhs and notables in Le Gall's dissertation mentioned in note 11 above.]

[26] Evans-Pritchard, 99-100.

[27] For the Young-Turks' efforts I rely on Evans-Pritchard, 109-117, and Ş. S. Aydemir, *Tek Adam*, 3 vols., Istanbul 1965, I , pp. 174-180. (Also see Aydemir's *Enver Paşa*.)

unmistakable. Besides, figures do not reflect the guidance and support provided to the local population for the improvement of the traditional schools, nor the educational opportunities made available to the Libyans in Istanbul and other Ottoman cities.[28]

There were also efforts to improve other public services and the quality of administration in Libya. Actually, the sultan saw to the preparation of a number of reports on what ought to be done to reform (*islâh*) the provinces of Tripoli and Benghazi.[29] Although, once more, the financial troubles of the Ottoman government set limits to what actually could be done, not all the Ottoman plans for the improvement of the Libyan provinces remained on paper. A hospital was built in Tripoli[30], a telecommunication network which connected the major towns of Libya to one another and to Istanbul was developed,[31] and the construction of a harbor in Tripoli was initiated.[32] Further research promises to reveal additional accomplishments.[33]

Military considerations, however, or rather the expansionist ambitions of the Italians, continued to be central to Abdülhamid's thoughts about Libya. A number of developments at the turn of the century made the sultan anxious over the future of Tripoli and, therefore, Benghazi. Reports from the Ottoman ambassadors in Europe pointed to the improved relations between France and Italy on the one hand, and France and Great Britain on the other. Hitherto, the Ottomans had taken advantage of the differences between France and Britain over the issue of Egypt in securing the former's diplomatic support against Italian ambitions in North Africa. Now, while France and Britain had begun to smooth out their differences, flirtation between Italian and French diplomats was clear evidence of a secret agreement between them.[34]

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[28]See Bayram Kodaman, *Abdülhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi,* İstanbul, 1980, pp. 128-203, and *idem,* "Tanzimattan II. Meşrutiyete kadar Sanayi Mektepleri," *Social and Economic History of Turkey, 1071-1920,* ed. by Okyar and İnalcık, Ankara, 1980, pp. 287-295. For the crafts school in Tripoli, also see YT.MM: no. 1025/8162, 18 L 1316 (1 III 1899), and YT.RM: no. 3125, 23 Za 1323 (29 I 1906), and no. 1039, 22 Ra 1326 (24 IV 1908). For the emphasis put on education to help generate an Arab-Turkish solidarity, see E. D. Akarlı, "Abdulhamid II's Attempt to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman System, " in D. Kushner (ed.), *Palestine in the late Ottoman Period,* Leiden and Jerusalem, 1986, pp. 74-89.

[29]YEE: 14/251/126/8; YEE: 14/331/126/8; YEE: 14/364/126/9; YEE: 18/94-95/94/44. Also see the documents mentioned in note 54.

[30]YT.MM: nos. 7803, and 8468, 16 Za and 20 Z 1312 (11 V and 14 VI 1895).

[31]Evans-Pritchard, pp. 99-100.

[32]YEE: 35/2314/44/109; YT.MM: no. 840-1027, 15 Ra 1316 (3 VIII 1898); YT.RM: 1029-5155, 1 B 1316 (15 XI 1898).

[33]The reader is likely to find a fuller assessment of the developments in public services in Libya during Abdülhamid II's reign in Le Gall's dissertation mentioned above.

[34]See the report of the Ottoman ambassador to Rome in Said Pasha's memoirs, II, pp. 301-303; *cf.* pp. 304-305. For the Anglo-French agreement on Libya's hinterland, see YT.RM: no. 1448-3848, 13 Ca 1317 (20 IX 1899). *Cf.* Çaycı, pp. 97-103 and 117-119. For the general

In January 1902, Abdülhamid and a number of his advisors believed that the Italians might attack Tripoli at anytime. The Sultan considered signing a regional defensive alliance with France, but Grand Vizier Said Paşa held the view that such an alliance would contradict the existing international treaties (namely, Treaty of Paris of 1856, Treaty of Berlin of 1878, and the convention of the Hague. France as well as Italy were parties to these treaties and signing a dual agreement with one against the other for the protection of a part of the Ottoman state would mean an acceptance of the nullity of the treaties. Nevertheless, Abdülhamid, with the encouragement of the Ottoman ambassador to Paris, insisted that Said opened negotiations with the French ambassador to Istanbul. There were long-pending issues between the French and Ottoman governments in North Africa ensuing from the Ottoman refusal to recognize absolute French sovereignty in Tunis and Algeria, and concerning the demarcation of the Tripolitanian hinterland. Abdülhamid hoped to win French support in exchange for a favorable settlement of these issues. Much to the surprise of Said Paşa, the French ambassador agreed to negotiate, but the end result of the negotiations did little to strengthen the Ottoman position in Libya against Italian ambitions. According to Said Paşha, this outcome was natural because the commitments of the French in the new network of alliances was stronger and the Ottoman position more vulnerable than what the sultan presumed.[35]

Said Paşa did not regret the ineffectualness of the talks with the French,[36] for he was reluctant to risk the more general interests of the state because of Libya. In view of the role he played in 1911 (when Italy actually attacked Libya), first as an advisor to the government then as the Grand Vizier,[37] it may be instructive to look more closely at his views in 1902. Abdülhamid had also urged the Council of Ministers to discuss and determine the measures that should be taken to defend Libya against a probable Italian attack. Said took a pessimistic attitude akin to cynicism:

> I got the decree read in the Council. [Then I began to contemplate.] At time of war, the troops must be sent to Tripoli under the protection of the navy. Yet, the obvious state of our navy, or the state to which it has been reduced, makes it unnecessary to describe our inability to send a fleet into the Tripolitanian waters. Given the absence or the incapacity of the

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state of European diplomacy around this time see also Askew's *Italy's Acquisition of Libya;* and Bury in NCMH, XII, pp. 117ff and 121, among other works.

[35]Said Pasha, II, 300-311. For border disputes with the French administration in Tunis also see YEE: 35/260/95/103; YEE: 35/157/157/103; YT.HM: no. 1181, 15 C 1310 (14 I 1893); no. 2998, 25 Z 1310 (9 VII 1893); YT.RM: no. 1448-3848, 13 Ca 1317 (20 IX 1899); no. 3448-9304, 14 Z 1317 (16 IV 1900); YT.RM: no. 891-3149, 14 R 1320 (22 VII 1902); and no. 1042-3726, 5 Ca 1320 (11 VIII 1902). Also see Çaycı, 109-110, 115 and 122-125.

[36]Said, II, 302-303.

[37]İ. M. K. İnal, *Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrıazamlar,* İstanbul, 1940-53, pp. 1082-1087 ; H. Z. Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve Ötesi,* İstanbul, 1965, pp. 276-290.

transport ships in the Maritime Arsenal, we cannot even send troops there between now and the breaking out of the war. Consequently, as defending Tripoli in any appropriate way is unfeasible, it then becomes inevitable to try to retain it through other [diplomatic] means, instead of military measures. Recourse to those means is possible, but the present [diplomatic] situation is unpromising. Therefore, whether it will be possible to keep Tripolitania among the Ottoman provinces or not is contingent upon the future vicissitudes of the international balance of power.

As for the discussions that took place in the Council upon the aforementioned decree of the sultan, although the facts stated above are known to all, it suited nobody to express them openly and to say that if we are obliged to fight we cannot seriously defend Tripoli against Italy or any other power. So it was decided to reinforce the troops [and also to send new rifles and ammunition there].[38]

Later in that year, the diplomatic situation worsened. Reports from the Ottoman ambassadors in Europe continued to warn the Palace against Italian intentions. The measures to reinforce the troops in Libya were accelerated.[39]

The Ottomans were understandably alarmed, for it was just around this time that the Triple Alliance was once more renewed, but now Italy managed to extort a clear recognition of her interests in Tripoli. Hitherto, Abdülhamid had counted on Germany to curb the anti-Ottoman ambitions of her two partners in the Alliance. In view of the Franco-Italian rapprochement, however, Germany, too, was eager to please Italy. So Italy now had secured the support of all the major powers except Russia.[40]

Quite clearly, unlike the situation in the 1880s and the 1890s, the Ottomans found diplomatic maneuvering increasingly difficult. Britain had consolidated her position in Egypt with which her eastern Mediterranean policy underwent a radical transformation. The Straits lost their earlier importance to Britain. Instead, she based the defenses of her interests in the Near East on her position in Egypt, Cyprus, Aden and the Persian Gulf. These were the crucial places in Britain's new strategy; and she could now make concessions on the issue of the Straits. Britain had already settled accounts with France. Her new strategy put her in a position to ease relations with Russia as well. Russia and

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[38] Said, II, 309.

[39] YT.MM: no. 76/8486, 8 Za 1319 (16 II 1902); no. 9507, 15 Z 1319 (25 III 1902); no. 9892, 23 Z 1319 (2 IV 1902). YT.HM: no. 178, 24 M 1320 (3 V 1902); nos. 436 and 503, 3 - 13 Ra 1320 (10-20 VI 1902). YT. RM: no. 178-611, 21 M 1320 (1 V 1902). Cf. Çaycı, 126-127.

[40] In addition to the sources mentioned in the previous note, see Askew, *Italy's Acquisition of Libya;* Bury in NCMH, XII, p. 121; Bayur, I, pp. 58 and 159; and M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923*, London, etc., 1966, p. 287.

France had already allied themselves to one another in view of their common suspicions of Germany's ever growing military and industrial strength. They now looked forward to winning Britain to their side. Britain was eager to come out of her isolation for she too was suspicious of Germany.[41]

Abdülhamid, the chief architect of Ottoman foreign policy, was worried over the development of events. The Ottomans' good relations with Russia and France were becoming meaningless trump cards against Britain, and the British concern over the Straits an ineffective weapon against Russia. Abdülhamid sounded Britain out about a reconciliation. The British were not interested. Even if they overlooked the sultan's generally anti-British policy over the past years, a *rapprochement* with the Ottoman state promised no conceivable advantage to them, while on the other hand, it was certain to gravely endanger the delicately preserved peace in Europe at a time when Britain was not yet ready for a war.

Britain hastened to strengthen her international position. She signed the *Entente Cordiale* with France in 1904 and the conventions of 1907 with Russia. Germany was alarmed. She regarded the alliances between her western and eastern neighbours as a menace to her security. She speeded up her military and naval build-up, which was already the chief source of anxiety for her neighbours. At the same time, Germany clung more tightly to Austria-Hungary, her only reliable ally among the major powers, as Italy was dancing between the two power groups. The rigidity of the response of the sides in security matters stiffened the respective position of the power groups in a way detrimental to the Ottomans.[42] Thus the Ottoman position *vis-à-vis* all the powers was weakened, The harder the sultan tried to break the impasse, the more concessions he was obliged to make to every one of them. Yet, each concession brought the state closer to the brink of being partitioned among the powers. It was mainly in an effort to halt this development that the Young Turks launched a succesful coup that nullified the sultan's powers in 1908, and dethroned him in 1909.[43]

At the beginning, the Ottoman cabinets backed by the Young Turks were in general inclined to end German influence at Istanbul and to seek British support instead. The response they got from the British, however, did not exceed occasional expressions of sympathy and encouragement.[44] A letter by Foreign

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[41]Dwight E. Lee, *Europe's Crucial Years, 1902-1914*, Hanover, 1974, pp. 1-18, 49-80, and 143-173; Anderson, pp. 261-262; Robinson and Gallagher, pp. 254-289; and Bury, NCMH, XII, pp. 112-139.

[42]Akarlı, "Problems", 66-67, and documents stated on pp. 236-237 n. 95-97; Lee, pp. 19-173, and 433-442; Bury, NCMH, XII, pp. 112-139; and Remak, pp. 30-46.

[43]Akarlı, "Problems", pp. 66-69. *Cf.* note 46 below.

[44]Feroz Ahmad, "Great Britain's Relations with the Young Turks, " *Middle Eastern Studies*, II/2 (July 1966), pp. 302-329.

Secretary Sir Edward Grey on July 31, 1908 provided an insight into the British attitude:

> If Turkey really establishes a Constitution and keeps it on its feet, and becomes strong herself, the consequences will reach further than any of us can yet foresee. The effects in Egypt will be tremendous, and will make itself felt in India. Hitherto, whenever we have had Mahometan subjects, we have been able to tell them that the subjets in the countries ruled by the head of their religion were under a despotism which was not a benevolent one; while our Mahometan subjects were under a despotism which was benevolent ... but if Turkey now establishes a Parliament and improves her government, the demand for a constitution in Egypt will gain great force, and our power of resisting the demand will be very much diminished. If, when there is a Turkish Constitution in good working order and things are going well in Turkey, we are engaged in suppressing by force and shooting a rising in Egypt of people who demand a Constitution too the position will be very awkward...[45]

Nevertheless, the British continued to enjoy the sympathies of a strong clientèle well-placed within the Ottoman governmental system. In response, the Germans created their own clientèle mainly among the staff officers. The struggle between these groups, enhanced by the differences of opinion among the Ottomans over the solutions to the economic and internal political problems of the country, led to a situation which clearly indicated that the end of the Ottoman state was not very far.[46] Such was the disarray in which the Ottomans found themselves when the Italian war broke out.

Italy took full advantage of the situation. As already mentioned, she was a member of the Triple Alliance, and yet had signed advantageous dual agreements with the members of the Triple Entente, except Russia. In October 1909, she secured Russia's support as well, and cleared the coast to realize her designs on Tripoli at an opportune moment.[47]

The war with Italy manifested to the Ottomans the degree of their diplomatic isolation and the vital risks it involved. Their appeal to Germany's arbitration fell on deaf ears.[48] Their overtures to the British to obtain an even if unequal agreement, not so much to save Libya as to secure British support against future

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[45] Grey to Lowther, Private, London, 31 July 1908, The Papers, F. O. 800/78, quoted in F. Ahmad's article mentioned in the previous note, p. 303.

[46] E. D. Akarlı, "Friction and Discord within the Ottoman Government, 1876-1909," *Boğaziçi University Journal-Humanities*, VII (1979), pp. 19-22; F. Ahmed, *The Young Turks*, Oxford, 1969; Bayur, II, pp. 230-288.

[47] Remak, 51-52; and Bayur, II, p. 310.

[48] İnal, p. 1084.

worries, likewise bore no fruit.[49] The Balkan Wars were the last warning to the Ottomans to find a solution to their problems. In a desperate search for security from attack, on the verge of an impending world crisis, the Young Turks took the reins of government directly into their hands, and turned to Germany for support. That support at best promised to turn the Ottoman state into a 'German Egypt'. The Young Turks were well aware of the unbalanced nature of their relations with Germany, but all they could do was to hope to work out the differences through the war. Instead, the Ottoman state met its final collapse.[50]

In retrospect, it seems quite obvious that the Ottomans could not retain Libya. In fact, as already indicated, not a few statesmen, the likes of Said Pasha, had already lost their hopes as early as 1902, the beginning of the end of Ottoman rule in Libya. Yet, the failure of the efforts to adapt Ottoman foreign policy to the vicissitudes of international diplomacy does not seem to have adversely affected Abdülhamid's decision to prepare for an all-out war in Libya.

Italy's moves were closely observed,[51] while military preparations, including the recruitment and training of the local population, were accelerated.[52] Also protracted efforts were made to settle the regional disputes with the French and British in order to improve the relations between Libya and her neighbors.[53] The efforts to increase the effectiveness of all branches of the local administration continued,[54] and a greater importance than ever was attributed to cooperating with the Sanusi leaders.[55] Once more, the principal objective of all these efforts was to make Libya self-sufficient, so that it could hold its own against an outside attack. That, Libya succeeded in doing, despite the evacuation of most of the regular troops shortly before the War.

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[49]These overtures were initiated by Said Pasha. See Bayur, II, pp. 83 and 175-183, and compare with Necmeddin Molla's recollections provided in İnal, pp. 1083-1086 and1776-1777.

[50]Feroz Ahmad, *Middle Eastern Studies*, II/2, 302-329, and his criticism of U. Trumpener's *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 1914-1918, Princeton, N.J., 1968 in *Middle Eastern Studies*, VI/2 (Jan. 1970), pp. 100-105. Also see E. Adamof (ed.), *Sovyet Devlet Arşivi Gizli Belgelerinde Anadolu'nun Taksimi Planı*, ed. and tr. by H. Mutluçağ, İstanbul, 1972, pp. 53-89.

[51]See, e.g., YT.HM: no. 3633, 8 Za 1321 (26 I 1904); YT.MM: no. 1517, 10 S 1322 (26 IV 1904) ; YT.RM: no. 2178/1, 4 B 1325 (13 IX 1917).

[52] YT. MM: no. 4627, 13 Ca 1323 (16 VII 1905) ; YT.MM: no. 5030, 28 Ca 1323 (31 VII 1905); YT.RM: no. 3097/6, 21 Za 1323 (17 I 1906); YT.RM: no. 1939, 9 C 1326 (9 VII 1908). Also see note 54 below. *Cf.* Çaycı, pp. 166-178.

[53]YT.RM: no. 3339, 17 Z 1323 (12 II 1906); no. 877, 13 Ra 1324 (7 V 1906); YT.HM: no. 84, 17 M 1325 (2 III 1907).

[54]YT.HM: no. 963, 13 Ca 1323 (16 VII 1905); no. 2407, 23 Za 1323 (19 I 1906); YT.MM: 5030, 28 Ca 1323 (31 VII 1905); YT.RM: no. 3417, 24 Z 1323 (19 II 1906).

[55]YEE: 29/64/51/78; YEE: 14/451/126/9; YT.RM: no. 3417, 24 Z 1323 (19 II 1906); YT.HM: no. 356, 21 C 1303 (1 VIII 1907). Also see the documents mentioned in note 25 above.

F. A. K. YASAMEE

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, THE SUDAN AND THE RED SEA COAST 1883-1889 *

The Sudan was a far-away country of which the Ottoman Empire's rulers knew little. It had entered the Empire late and by indirect means, having been conquered early in the nineteenth century as a private initiative by the Governor of Egypt Mehmed Ali Paşa. By the 1840s Mehmed Ali Paşa had established Egypt and its dependencies as a self-governing province of the Empire under the hereditary control of his own family: the Sudan thus remained a region in which the Ottoman Sultanate enjoyed formal sovereignty but no real power[1]. In contrast, the neighbouring ports on the African shore of the Red Sea had formed part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, being administered not from Egypt, but originally as a separate province and latterly as dependencies of the *vilayets* of Hijaz and Yemen. However, in 1865 the ports of Suakin and Massowa had been formally ceded to Egypt, and direct Ottoman rule had finally ended in 1874, when the port of Zeyla was transferred to Egypt for administrative purposes. Here too, the sultanate would henceforth enjoy sovereignty but no direct power. After 1874 the Egyptian Khedive İsmail extended his own power and Ottoman sovereignty eastwards along the Somali coast from Zeyla to the Horn of Africa, and beyond to Ras Hafun. Even so, Egyptian control of the littoral was insecure: France and Italy had set up trading stations on the Red Sea coast at Obok and Assab respectively, Britain was established close by at Aden, and there was a

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*I wish to express my gratitude to the Director of the Başbakanlık Arşivi, Istanbul, to the Keeper of the Public Record Office, London, and to the present Lord Salisbury for permission to quote from records in their keeping.

Abbreviations:

BBArş: Başbakanlık Arşivi, Istanbul; *YEE:* Yıldız Esas Evrakı; *MVM*: Meclis-i vükela mazbataları; *FO:* Foreign Office Records, Public Record Office, London; *GFO*: German Foreign Office.

[1]Holt, P. M., *The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898* (London, 1958), pp. 1-5; Shibeika, Mekki, *British Policy in the Sudan 1882-1902*, (London, 1952), p. 1ff.

permanent threat of Abyssinian invasion from the interior. In 1877 İsmail attempted to shore up his position by concluding a convention with Britain: this recognised Ottoman sovereignty over the whole coast to Ras Hafun. For reasons which remain obscure, however, the Ottoman government failed to ratify the Convention, and since the Khedive was not empowered to conclude international agreements on his own account, the legal status of the Convention was left in doubt[2].

Thus neither in the Sudan nor on the adjacent coasts was the Ottoman Empire a territorial state in the full sense: that is to say, a state enjoying direct and unqualified authority over a defined territory and its population. The Ottoman Sultan's authority depended upon that of the Khedive, and relations between the two were regulated by a series of Ottoman *firman*s to which the diplomatic practice of the age gave the force of international as well as domestic law. The *firman*s defined the Khedive's territorial jurisdiction and autonomous privileges, and forbade him to alienate any portion of his rights and territory to foreign Powers. They limited the size of his army, but permitted him to request the Sultan's military assistance against domestic revolt; however, they did not empower the Sultan to intervene on his own initiative. At bottom the *firman*s were designed to protect the Sultan and the Khedive against each other; they offered the Sultan little insurance against the possibility of a challenge to the Khedive's authority from a source other than himself[3]. Four such challenges had to be faced by Sultan Abdülhamid II in the 1880s: the first was the Egyptian army mutiny of 1881-2 led by Ahmed Urabi against the Khedive; the second was the consequent British occupation of Egypt in 1882; the third was the Mahdist revolt which overthrew Egyptian rule in the Sudan in 1883-4 ; and the fourth, deriving from the Mahdist revolt, was the occupation of the African shores of the Red Sea by Britain, Italy and France in 1884-5. Abdülhamid's attitude towards the third and fourth of these challenges was essentially determined by his experience of the first and second, and before analysing his Sudanese and Red Sea policies it is worth summarising the main features of his response to the Egyptian crisis of 1881-2.

These were three. The first was fear of revolution. Abdulhamid suspected that Urabi's anti-European protestations were a sham, and that his movement was in reality a British-inspired ploy to establish an "Arab government" which would challenge Ottoman possession of the Islamic Caliphate and Ottoman supremacy in the Fertile Crescent and Arabia. The sources of this suspicion have been well

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[2]Orhunlu, Cengiz, *Habeş Eyaleti*, (İstanbul, 1974), ch. vii, passim.; Ramm, Agatha, "Great Britain and the Planting of Italian Power in the Red Sea, 1868-1885", *English Historical Review*, lix (May 1944).

[3]Deringil, Selim, "The Ottoman Response to the Egyptian Crisis", (1881-1882) *Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations* 1986, vol 1, pp. 31-38.

explored by other authors and will not be rehearsed here[4]. For present purposes it suffices to note first, that the suspicion was wildly inaccurate, but second, that it reflected the Sultan's more justified belief that his hold over his Arab provinces was fragile. In these regions the Ottoman Empire was theoretically a territorial state upheld by a centralised bureaucracy and a standing army; in practice it depended upon the support of local men of influence who might easily be tempted to shift their allegiance to rival sources of patronage: to European Powers like Britain and France, and also to neighbouring Moslem governments, of which the most powerful prior to 1882 had been the Khedivate of Egypt. The Hijaz was a particularly sensitive area: the site of the Holy Cities whose guardianship underpinned the Ottoman Caliphate, but also a province in which Ottoman power was qualified by the traditional and recognised authority of the indigenous Emirs of Mecca[5].

The second feature had been a firm refusal to contemplate Ottoman military intervention against Urabi, despite requests from the Khedive Tevfik and the European Powers, and even at the price of provoking a British occupation of Egypt. The refusal stemmed only in part from concern that a military commitment might prove unlimited; much more compelling was Abdülhamid's fear that intervention would play directly into the hands of the British and their Urabist stooges, by offering them an opportunity to subvert the Ottoman troops sent against them[6]. The third feature, which developed in response to the British invasion and occupation of September 1882, was an uncompromising legalism which denied all legitimacy to the British occupation and insisted upon an absolute respect for the Sultan's sovereign rights and the letter of the *Firmans*. This was understandable. Rights were all that the Sultan had ever possessed in Egypt, and in practical terms, he had no other weapon to use against the British occupation: he could not influence developments within Egypt, and he was unable to persuade the other European Powers to take effective diplomatic action. His insistence upon his rights did bring British assurances of respect for the legal *status quo*, and promises that the occupation would be temporary: the latter acquired a more concrete form in August 1883, when Gladstone's government announced its intention of carrying out a preliminary withdrawal of British forces from Cairo to Alexandria[7].

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[4]Deringil, Selim, *op. cit.*

[5]Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı, *Mekke-i Mükerreme Emirleri*, (Ankara, 1972), especially p. 125ff.

[6]Deringil, Selim *op. cit.*

[7]Robinson, Ronald and Gallagher, John, *Africa and the Victorians. The Official Mind of Imperialism*, (London, 1961), p. 130; *BBArs, YEE*, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Encümen-i hususi mazbatası, 5 Muharrem 301/25 Teşrin-i evvel 99.

II

Fear of revolution, non-intervention and legalism were also the decisive features of Abdülhamid's response to the revolt of the Sudanese Mahdi. The revolt had begun obscurely in 1881, when one Muhammed Ahmed proclaimed himself to be a Mahdi sent to deliver Islam from the corruptions of Egyptian and Ottoman rule. The religious character of his movement was pronounced, but it also drew strength from the material grievances of the Sudanese, and particularly from resentment at Egyptian efforts to suppress the lucrative African slave trade in which the Sudan served as middleman for the markets of Arabia[8]. The revolt gradually gathered strength in the remote west of the Sudan; however, it was not until the Mahdi's ally Osman Digna carried the revolt into the eastern Sudan in the summer of 1883 that Abdülhamid began to express serious concern and a renewed fear of revolution. He drew an immediate parallel with the Urabist movement: the "False Mahdi" was a "Second Urabi"; his followers were former Urabists who had escaped to the Sudan in 1882, and like Urabi and his supporters they were "vermin". The two movements shared the same goals and the same foreign patron: the Mahdists' objective was the establishment of an "Arab government", and their revolt was a British-inspired ploy to challenge Ottoman control of Arabia and Ottoman possession of the Caliphate:

> The manifestation of this False Mahdi means another form of the manifestation and movement of Urabi... If insufficent importance is given now to this affair... it is most strongly probable that from such carelessness there will emerge within the near future a disastrous result such as the formation in opposition to ourselves of an Arab government... Since those who provoked this affair must be those who contrived the Urabi episode, it seems advisable to lift the masks from the inventors' faces, and to establish and publish their identity[9].

This comparison between an officers' revolt and a religious movement may seem odd, but then Abdülhamid was far less interested in the Mahdi's ideology than in his opportunities. Mahdism was a hostile force on a map: what worried the Sultan most was the presence of revolt in the eastern Sudan, from where it might easily spread across the Red Sea into Arabia. The Red Sea was a conduit, not a barrier: its African and Arabian shores were bound by numerous trading links; Osman Digna himself was a slave trader who originated from Jeddah, and enjoyed numerous connections in the Hijaz[10]. Consequently the

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[8]HOLT, *op. cit.*, chs. i-ii, *passim.*

[9]*BBArş, Mısır İrade,* No. 1113, 23 Muharrem 301/12 Teşrin-i Sani 99. *Cf., Documents Diplomatiques Français,* v, no. 203 Noailles to Challemel-Lacour, 6 October; *GFO,* Aegypten 3, Radowitz to Bismarck No. 149, 18 September.

[10]*BBArş, YEE,* K 36/2475/Z150/XI, Tezkere-i aliye-i hususiye, 10 Rebiülahir 305/13 Kanun-i evvel 303.

Ottoman government's first concern was to prevent the insurrection from spreading into neighbouring regions, and above all into Arabia. Early in the autumn of 1883 it decided to strengthen the garrison in the Hijaz and to send warships to the Red Sea; the press was instructed to refer to the Mahdi as a "rebel" (*şaki*), and as a further precaution against subversion, it was proposed that the "aged and untrustworthy" Şerif Abd lmuttalib, whom the Sultan had deposed as Emir of Mecca in 1882, should be exiled from the Hijaz to İzmir[11].

The question of Ottoman intervention arose when the Khedive lost control of the Sudan at the end of the year. In November 1883 the Mahdi annihilated an Egyptian expeditionary force which had been sent against him. The Khedive had neither troops nor funds to support a fresh campaign, and the British government refused to intervene: it cancelled its plan for a preliminary withdrawal from Cairo to Alexandria, but at the same time it instructed the Khedive to cut his losses and abandon the entire Sudan, together with his territories along the Red Sea and Somali coasts[12]. The Khedive turned to his Ottoman suzerain: he suggested that the Sudan might yet be held if Egypt could assemble a fresh army, and he asked Abd lhamid to assist by permitting a recruitment of volunteers among the populations of the Ottoman Empire proper. The fact that this was not a request for direct Ottoman intervention made no difference to Abd lhamid's response: he dismissed the proposal with precisely the same argument which he had employed against the despatch of regular Ottoman forces to Egypt in 1882:

> If permission is given for the troops which Egypt wishes to recruit, this will plainly mean that they become a Turkish army in the service of the English. To outward appearances they will be despatched against [the Mahdi]; but in truth, as part of the intrigues adopted by the English, they will be united with the vermin gathered around [the Mahdi], and we shall have caused all of them to be used against ourselves. It is manifest what degree of difficulties the Empire's position will suffer from a second Urabi problem[13].

This did not deter the Sultan's own Ministers from proposing military intervention. They did not share Abd lhamid's suspicion that Britain was secretly colluding with the Mahdi, but they were alarmed by Britain's decisions to cancel her preliminary withdrawal and to abandon the Sudan. They pointed to rumours that Britain might offer to place the Sudan under direct Ottoman control, and they proposed that the Sultan should offer to send troops to the Sudan: this was the

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[11] *BBArş, YEE,* K36/2475/Z150/XI, Komisyon mazbatas , 13 Zilkade 300/3 Eyl1 99; *Mısır İrade,* No. 115, 27 Muharrem 301/16 Teşrin-i sani 99.

[12] Shibeika, *op. cit.*, ch. iv, *passim* Robinson and Gallagher, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-140.

[13] *BBArş, Mısır İrade,* Nos. 1116 and 1117, 3 Safer 301/22 Teşrin-i sani 99; *YEE,* K36/2475/Z150/XI, Enc men-i hususi mazbatas , 4 Safer 301/23 Teşrin-i sani 99.

only way to preserve the integrity of the Empire's dominions, and offered the best hope of holding Britain to her pledge to evacuate Egypt[14]. Abdülhamid would have none of it. He repeated his view that the "second Urabi's" rebellion was a British-inspired sham, and he argued that the Sudanese problem could not be resolved separately from the Egyptian question as a whole; he declined to consider Ottoman intervention without a prior agreement for a British evacuation of Egypt. He also raised a legal point: Britain's decision to separate the Sudan from Egypt was a clear violation of the *Firmans* which guaranteed the integrity of the Khedive's territories, and an imposition of direct Ottoman rule might be held to confirm this violation[15]. His Ministers backed down: they admitted that the Khedive had made no request for the Empire's intervention, and they conceded that the safer course would be to invite Britain to enter into an exchange of views on the possibility of resolving the Egyptian question as a whole.[16]

For diplomatic purposes at least, the Sultan proposed to ignore the Sudanese issue. This left the initiative in Britain's hands, and she quickly warned that she was not ready for a general discussion of the Egyptian question. Nor did she allude to the possibility of Ottoman intervention: Britain professed herself anxious to secure the Sultan's sovereign blessing for whatever arrangements she might choose to make in the Sudan, but for the time being her preferred alternative to Egyptian control was some form of local self-government to be worked out in conjunction with indigenous Sudanese leaders[17]. The policy of abandonment stood: at the beginning of January Britain despatched General Gordon to the Sudanese capital Khartoum as Governor-General, with orders to supervise the Egyptian withdrawal, and at the beginning of February a small force under General Graham was despatched to the Red Sea port of Suakin to serve as a temporary check upon Osman Digna[18]. Abdülhamid expressed dissatisfaction: he had hoped that this offer of talks might induce Britain to halt the abandonment of the Sudan, and he took particular exception to a proclamation in which Gordon announced Egypt's withdrawal to the Sudanese population[19]. He was also worried by the arrival of British forces at Suakin: this seemed to contradict the policy of abandonment and might conceivably threaten Arabia. On March he went so far as to suggest that Graham's real purpose might be the rescue of Midhat Paşa and his confederates from their Arabian prison at

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[14] *BBArş, YEE,* K36/2475/Z150/XI, Encümen-i hususi mazbatası, 8 Rebiülevvel 301/26 Kanun-ı evvel 99; Encümen-i hususi mazbatası, 9 Rebiülevvel 301/27 Kanun-ı evvel 99.

[15] *BBArş, Mısır İrade,* No. 1127, 1 Kanun-ı sani 99; *YEE,* K9/2636/Z72/4, Muhtira-ı Humayun; Said Paşa, *Said Paşa'nın Hatıratı,* i, (İstanbul, 1328), pp. 495-503).

[16] *BBArş, YEE,* K36/2475/Z150/XI, Encümen-i hususi mazbatası, 20 Rebiülevvel 301/7 kanun,ı sani 99.

[17] Shibeika, *op. cit.,* p. 155ff.

[18] *ibid.,* chs. v-vi, *passim.*

[19] FO 78/3622, Dufferin to Granville no. 73, February 29; *BBArş, YEE,* K36/2475/Z150/XI, Encümen-i hususi mazbatası, an Cemaziyülevvel 301/16 Subat 99.

Taif[20]. Midhat's murder barely two months later is an interesting coincidence; by then, however, Graham's expedition had been withdrawn, and Britian's presence at Suakin had been reduced to a small garrison[21].

The most the British were prepared to offer was an Ottoman occupation of the Khedive's Red Sea territories. The Red Sea was vital to Britain's own Imperial communications, and the presence of the French station at Obok made her reluctant to experiment with native solutions. On 29 February the Foreign Secretary Granville hinted to the Ottoman Ambassador Musurus that an Ottoman occupation was desirable[22] . The Sultan's Ministers were favourable at first, and suggested that an occupation would give the Empire a material standing in the Egyptian question[23]. The Sultan's Arab adviser Seyyid Fazıl was equally favourable: he argued that an Ottoman occupation would protect the Moslem population of the coasts against Abyssinian incursions, and serve as a barrier against European penetration of Arabia[24]. Abdülhamid was reluctant to be diverted from the pursuit of a comprehensive Egyptian settlement, however, and before long his Ministers themselves began to express reservations: an occupation of the Red sea ports might be held to violate the legal *status quo* defined by the *Firmans*, and there was a risk that the Empire might be drawn into the conflict in the Sudanese interior[25]. A further complication arose in July, when Britain refused to recognise the Ottoman claim to sovereignty as far as Ras Hafun: she offered to support an Ottoman occupation of the Red Sea coast between Bab el-Mandeb and the port of Zeyla, but warned that she would make alternative arrangements along the Somali coast east of Zeyla, and that she would occupy the port of Berbera herself. The Porte referred to the Convention of 1877, but Granville refused to recognise it. The Sultan's Ministers were divided: a minority were ready to accept the British offer, but the remainder preferred to postpone a decision until the Khedive had been consulted on the legal status of the Somali coast[26].

Britain was in no mood to wait. At the beginning of August Granville announced the imminent withdrawal of the Egyptian administration from the Harar region, and requested that the Sultan take immediate steps to secure the

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[20] *BBArş, Mısır İrade,* No. 1155, 8 Cemaziyülevvel 301/23 Şubat 99.

[21] Shibeika, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

[22] FO 78/3620, Granville to Dufferin no. 61, Feb 29.

[23] *BBArş, YEE,* K36/2475/Z150/XI, Encümen-i hususi mazbatası, 7 Cemaziyülevvel 301/22 Şubat 99.

[24] *BBArş, YEE,* K14/88-26/Z88/12.

[25] *BBArş, YEE,* Meclis-i vükela mazbatası, 22 Receb 301/6 Mayıs 300.

[26] *BBArş, YEE,* K36/2475/Z150/XI, Meclis-i vükela mazbatası, 11 Şevval 301/22 Temmuz 300; K39/84-9/Z84/125, Zabt, n.d.; Musurus to Asım, tel. no. 263, 18 Temmuz 84; no. 268, 20 Temmuz; no. 273, 24 Temmuz; FO 78/3621, Granville to Dufferin, no. 65, 17 July.

ports of Zeyla and Tajoura; he warned that failure to act would oblige Britain to occupy Zeyla herself. The Porte attempted to side-step the issue by proposing a settlement of the Egyptian question as a whole; Granville refused, but when the Sultan's Ministers conferred on 7 September they were unable to produce a unanimous recommendation in favour of occupying the two ports. Abdülhamid took no decision: the practical upshot was that by the end of September British forces had occupied both Berbera and Zeyla[27]. Granville indicated that the offer of Zeyla remained open, but Abdülhamid continued to avoid the issue and his Ministers remained divided. In the meantime the Porte busied itself with fruitless attempts to challenge Britain's refusal to recognise Ottoman sovereignty along the Somali coast[28].

III

By the autumn of 1884 there were signs that Britain herself might lose control of events. Her hopes of a rapid withdrawal from the Sudan suffered an embarrassing setback when the Mahdi succeeded in besieging Gordon at Khartoum; Gladstone's Cabinet was constrained to send a relief expedition from Cairo under General Wolseley. Wolseley's expedition placed the Sudanese issue on ice: no further decisions would be taken until Khartoum had been relieved.[29] In the meantime, however, a power vacuum was developing in the Red Sea. At the beginning of November the Khedive announced his withdrawal from a lengthy stretch of the coast between Zeyla and the port of Massowa, and declared that authority in these regions had consequently devolved upon the Sultan[30]. Less than three weeks later the Porte learned that France had occupied Tajoura; when challenged, France stated that she had never recognised Ottoman sovereignty on the coast. This did at least unite the Sultan's Ministers: they proposed that the *vilayet* of Yemen be instructed to take over Zeyla and the coast as far as Massowa without delay, and warned that failure to do so would lead to further incursions by foreign powers[31]. Their warning was without effect. Abdülhamid continued to place priority upon an overall Egyptian settlement, and even rumours of further French annexations and a possible Italian intervention failed to shake his resolve. At the beginning of 1885 he despatched his Justice

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[27] *BBArş, YEE*, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Draft tel. to Musurus, n.d.; Musurus to Asım, tel.no. 304, 28 Ağustos 84; Meclis-i vükela mazbatası, 16 Zilkade 301/26 Ağustos 300.

[28] *BBArş, YEE*, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Meclis-i vükela mazbatası, 7 Safer 302/14 Teşrin-i evvel 301; K39/2130/Z129/118, Asım to Musurus, tel. n.d.; Asım to Said, 5 and 29 Muharrem 302 Musurus to Asım no. 360, 8 Teşrin-i evvel 84; no. 408, 27 Teşrin-i sani 84.

[29] Shibeika, *op. cit.*, ch. viii, *passim*.

[30] *BBArş, YEE*, K39/2130/Z129/118, Meclis-i vükela mazbatası, 7 Safer 302/14 Teşrin-i sani 300.

[31] *BBArş, YEE*, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Meclis-i vükela mazbatası, 7 Safer 302/14 Teşrin-i sani 300.

Minister Hasan Fehmi Paşa to London to explore the possibility of an agreement for British withdrawal from Egypt. Hasan Fehmi's instructions nowhere mentioned the Sudan or the Red Sea coast by name; instead, they obliquely noted that the *Firmans* forbade the Khedive to surrender any portion of his territory or privileges on any pretext whatsoever[32].

Worse was to follow. At the beginning of February 1885 Italy occupied Massowa, even before the Khedive had withdrawn his administration from the port. This aggression was not unanticipated. The Ottoman government had known since the beginning of the year that Italy was preparing a Red Sea expedition, and by the time the expedition sailed in mid-January it was clear that the objective was Massowa. It was also clear that Italy enjoyed Britain's tacit support: Granville denied the existence of any agreement, but did not hide his belief that an Italian occupation was preferable to a French one. The Sultan's Ministers pressed for an immediate agreement with Britain on the future of the Red Sea coast; they also proposed that an official and troops be sent to take charge at Massowa. Abdülhamid avoided a decision: he commanded discussion and re-discussion, and hesitated until it was too late. On 1 February the Porte learned that Italy had taken Beylul, a port near to her existing station at Asab, and nine days later the Khedive confirmed that Italian forces had also occupied Massowa[33].

The occupation coincided with the news that Khartoum had fallen to the Mahdi. This came as a double blow. It aroused renewed fears for the security of Arabia: the Khedive warned that he was powerless to prevent the expansion of Mahdism to the Red Sea coast. Abdülhamid commanded immediate measures to strengthen the defences of the Hijaz and Yemen, and the despatch of additional warships to the Red Sea[34]. It also cast fresh doubt upon Britain's intentions. The prospect of an early British withdrawal from Egypt receded still further, and there was a disturbing suggestion that Britain might invite Italian troops into the Sudan. In the event Britain turned to the Sultan: on 7 February she asked him to send troops to Suakin. The request was backed by a threat: Granville warned that there could be no doubt that feelings hostile to the Ottoman Caliphate existed among the tribes of the Sudan and of Arabia, and that if Abdülhamid failed to assist, Britain might conclude "political alliances with Arab tribes on terms which might not always be favourable to His Majesty" — a suggestion which

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[32] *BBArs, Mısır İrade*, No. 1191, 20 Rebiülevvel 302/26 Kanun-ı evvel 301.

[33] Yasamee, F. A. K., "The Ottoman Empire and the European Great Powers 1884-1887" (unpublished PhD thesis, London 1984), pp. 89-90.

[34] *BBArş, MVM*, No. 30, 25 Rebiülahır 302/30 Kanun-ı sani 300; *Mısır İrade*, No. 1197, 8 Cemaziyülevvel 302/ 11 Şubat 300.

the Porte took to imply a possible accommodation between Britain and the Mahdi[35].

Yet even in these circumstances Abdülhamid refused to intervene. He continued to insist upon an overall Egyptian settlement with Britain, and privately dismissed the offer of Suakin as "unacceptable". Some of his Ministers also expressed reservations: the Serasker Gazi Osman Paşa warned that "if the objective is to send troops to Suakin this will entail joint operations with British forces against the Islamic population and is therefore impermissible"[36]. Abdülhamid conceded that Britain's own intentions in the Sudan should be probed: he was especially puzzled by a report that she was planning to build a railway from Suakin to the Sudanese interior. Hasan Fehmi was instructed to ask whether Britain would abandon her military operations, and whether she proposed to withdraw her own garrison from Suakin[37]. Granville replied that Britain stood by her original decision to abandon the Sudan, but added somewhat ambiguously that neither Wolseley's expedition nor the Suakin garrison would be withdrawn immediately[38]. Hasan Fehmi suggested that Britain was merely hoping for a prestige victory which would enable her to extricate herself from the Sudan with honour, but Abdülhamid was more sceptical: he predicted that Britain would use her Sudanese operations as a pretext for prolonging her occupation of Egypt[39].

Hasan Fehmi made a vain bid to revive the idea of an Ottoman takeover of the Sudan. On 4 March he unofficially suggested to Granville that an Ottoman Commissioner and troops might be sent to take charge of the Sudan once Britain's military operations had ceased; Granville expressed cautious interest, and Hasan Fehmi urged the Porte to pursue the matter[40]. The Porte was in no hurry to be drawn: on 25 March the Council of Ministers agreed that the proposal was "worthy of examination and consideration in detail", but advised the Sultan to say nothing to Britain for the moment. Evidently the Ministers' purpose was to shelve the issue: there is no sign that any further "examination and consideration" took place. In late April Britain announced that she was withdrawing Wolseley's expedition, and would undertake no further operations in the Sudan; the Ottoman government made no response, and does not appear to have discussed one[41].

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[35] Yasamee, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-92; *BBArş, MVM*, No.55, 17 Cemaziyülevvel 302/ 20 Şubat 300.
[36] *BBArş, MVM*, No. 30, 25 Rebiulahir 302/30 Kanun-i sani 300; *Mısır İrade*, No. 1197, 8 Cemaziyülevvel 302/ 11 Şubat 300.
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] *BBArş, YEE*, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Fehmi to Asım, tel. no. 44, 4 Mart 300.
[39] *BBArş, YEE*, K36/139-20/Z139/XVIII, Fehmi to Osman Bey, 8 Mart 300; Osman Bey to Fehmi, 8 Mart 300.
[40] Yasamee, *op.cit.*, pp. 97-101.
[41] Shibeika, *op. cit.*, pp. 304-308.

Nor was there any prospect of inducing the Sultan to intervene in the Red Sea. The Porte had protested vigorously against the Italian occupation of Massowa, and both Italy and Britain had conceded that the port was legally Ottoman territory; Italy added that she would withdraw when Britain left Egypt[42]. The effect was to confirm Abdülhamid's view that a settlement of the Egyptian question must take priority, but in practice Hasan Fehmi failed to make any significant headway in London and at the end of April he was recalled[43]. In the meantime Italy made yet a further landing at Arafali, and thereby extended her control to the entire coast between Asab and Massowa[44]. The British themselves were still inclined to treat the Red Sea as a separate issue, and in late March they made a fresh proposal for an Ottoman occupation of Suakin and Zeyla. Misunderstandings delayed consideration of this proposal until May, and in the event the Sultan's Ministers divided: a majority favoured acceptance of the British proposal, seeing in it a source of material leverage and a guarantee against further incursions by Italy and France, but a minority preferred to postpone the issue in the hope that Britain might yet be brought to a comprehensive Egyptian settlement. The minority eventually carried the day, evidently with Abdülhamid's support, and it was decided to leave the British proposal unanswered[45].

IV

The Sultan would not compromise his principles of non-intervention and strict adherence to the *Firmans*; given this, the only hope of progress lay in an alteration of Britain's attitude, or else in a change of circumstances in Africa. June 1885 saw two encouraging development. The first was the death of the Mahdi; the second was a change of government in Britain. Lord Salisbury took office at the head of a minority Conservative administration, and promptly made Abdülhamid an offer of general cooperation in Egypt. Salisbury was eager to enlist the Sultan's moral authority in support of the British occupation; he was also anxious that the Ottoman Empire should make a contribution to Egypt's defence, and to his end proposed that the Sultan should garrison Suakin and Egypt's frontier with the Sudan[46]. Abdülhamid objected that "it would damage his prestige if his troops were seen in proximity to those who have taken so many Mussulman lives in the Sudan", and suggested that "moral persuasion will

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[42]*BBArş, YEE,* K36/2475/Z150/XI, Meclis-i vükela mazbatası, 17 Cemaziyülahir 302/20 Şubat 300; 23 Cemaziyülahir 302/26 Şubat 300; tel. from Rome Embassy, 8 Mart 85.

[43]Yasamee, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-117 *passim.*

[44]*BBArş, MVM* No. 147, 7 Receb 302/10 Nisan 301.

[45]Yasamee *op. cit.*, pp. 101, 113-114, 119.

[46]Hornik, M. P., "The Special Mission of Sir Henry Drummond Wolff to Constantinople, 1885-1887", *English Historical Review,* lv (October 1940), pp. 598-604.

do more to settle this question than military intervention"[47]. This suggestion of negotiations with the Mahdists was a new departure, and was presumably inspired by a hope that the Mahdi's demise would moderate Sudanese attitudes. Salisbury agreed that it was worth pursuing, and at the end of October it was decided to send a British and an Ottoman High Commissioner to Egypt to consult with the Khedive on future reforms and to open negotiations with the Sudanese. The two Commissioners chosen were Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa and Sir Henry Drummond Wolff; they commenced their mission in January 1886[48].

The change in the Sultan's attitude was more apparent than real. Abdülhamid had by no means rid himself of the suspicion that the British were secretly backing the Mahdists; for this reason he insisted that the Ottoman Commissioner and the Khedive should be responsible for all contacts with the Sudanese[49]. Nor did Abdülhamid accord a high priority to negotiations with the Mahdists. He stood by his opinion that a settlement of the Egyptian question must come first, and argued that the best guarantee of a restoration of order was a full British evacuation. Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa faithfully reflected these views: when Drummond Wolff suggested that they commence their joint mission with an examination of the Sudanese issue he replied that they would do better to concentrate upon the reconstitution of the Egyptian army[50]. In the summer of 1886 the two High Commissioners despatched an Egyptian officer to the Sudanese frontier to establish contact with the Mahdists[51]. This produced no worthwhile results, but in the event 1886 proved to be a quiet year for the Sudan: the Mahdi's successor, the Khalifa, was preoccupied with internal matters, and made no moves to attack Suakin or Egypt. In November Abdülhamid expressed concern at reports that the Mahdists were equipping themselves with modern weapons and issuing their own currency; even so, his concern derived chiefly from fears that Britain might revive her demand for Ottoman military intervention[52]. These fears proved to be misplaced. Like Abdülhamid, Salisbury was determined that the Sudanese issue should not obstruct an Egyptian settlement; by the end of the year he was confident that the Sudanese frontier would remain quiet, and in January 1887 he sent Drummond Wolff to Istanbul with an offer to negotiate a comprehensive Egyptian settlement which would provide for a British evacuation[53]. Salisbury's terms included a proposal that the Ottoman Empire should take control of Suakin, but this was dropped without

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[47] *Salisbury Papers*, A41, Drummond Wolff to Salisbury, Private and Secret, 1 September 1885; Private, Secret and Confidential, 1 September 1885.

[48] Hornik, *op. cit.*, p. 606-607; Uçarol, Rifat, *Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa. Bir Osmanlı Paşası ve Dönemi*, (İstanbul, 1976), pp. 170-183.

[49] Yasamee, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

[50] *ibid.*, pp. 184-186.

[51] Uçarol, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-190.

[52] *BBArş, YEE*, K36/2475/Z150/XI, İrade-i seniye, 22 Safer 304/8 Teşrin-i sani 302.

[53] Yasamee, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-268 *passim*.

argument as soon as Abdülhamid showed himself disinclined to accept it[54]. On 22 May 1887 Britain and the Ottoman Empire signed a convention which established that Britain would evacuate Egypt at the end of three years; the Convention nowhere mentioned the Sudan or the Red Sea coast, and contented itself with confirming all existing *Firmans*[55].

V

The Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 22 May 1887 quickly proved to be a diplomatic disaster. Russia and France took vigorous exception to certain of its terms, and fearing European complications, the Sultan refused to ratify it. Britain broke off negotiations on 15 July 1887, and the Convention lapsed[56]. This was a turning-point in the Egyptian question. Britain lost interest in cooperation with Abdülhamid; she also lost interest in evacuating Egypt. Abdülhamid continued to live in hope: after 1887 he made repeated efforts to reopen negotiations with Britain, insisting as ever upon a comprehensive Egyptian settlement[57]. That said, he did manifest a new willingness to treat the Red Sea as a separate issue, and to abandon his opposition to direct Ottoman intervention on the coast. Part of the explanation for this change lay in a reviving fear of Mahdist aggression and a consequent threat to Arabia. December 1887 saw rumours that Osman Digna was preparing to attack Suakin; these provoked the Sultan to a fresh statement of his fears of revolution:

> The sole and single cause of the Sudanese revolution is the seditious political notion of establishing an independent Arab government in opposition to the Empire, the Caliphate and the Sultanate, and of transferring the Islamic Caliphate there. Both the rebels and those who encourage them — secretly or openly, by word or by deed — have taken this notion as their goal, and they have many servants and supporters in Egypt, in Istanbul and in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. The secret political hopes and plans of England are in entire accord with this[58].

Four months later the Sultan drew attention to an alleged Mahdist proclamation predicting the conquest of Egypt and the Hijaz, and calling upon the Bedouin of the Hijaz for assistance; he again warned that the Mahdists must be receiving support from foreign powers who wished to set up an Arab

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[54] *BBArş, YEE,* K36/2475/Z150/XI, İrade-i seniye, 6 Şaban 304/18 Nisan 303.

[55] FO 78/4059, Drummond Wolff to Salisbury No. 92, May 24 1887, with inclosures.

[56] Yasamee, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-287.

[57] Robinson and Gallagher, *op. cit.*, ch. viii, *passim.*

[58] *BBArş, YEE,* K36/2475/Z150/XI, Tezkere-i aliye-i hususiye, 10 Rebiülahir 305/13 Kanun-ı evvel 303.

government and Caliphate, and he expressed regret that the idea of an Arab Caliphate had supporters in Istanbul[59]. The Sultan's Ministers took all this with a pinch of salt; they assured him that the Hijaz was well-defended, and that there was no reason to believe that the Mahdists were receiving foreign support[60]. Nonetheless, it can scarcely be a coincidence that the Sultan's alarms coincided with renewed Ottoman interest in the possibility of occupying Zeyla. The Khedive was sounded in December 1887, and in April 1888 the Ottoman government made a direct approach to the British government. The Khedive proved amenable enough, but Salisbury's response was sceptical: he warned that Britain must stay at Zeyla as long as Italy and France retained their footholds on the Red Sea coast, and he did not hide his suspicion that the Sultan might transfer Zeyla to France. Abdülhamid let the matter drop[61].

A second factor pushing the Sultan to reconsider his views on direct intervention was fear of further incursions by Italy. In February 1887 Italy had secured a quasi-alliance with Britain through the so-called Mediterranean Agreement; since then she had pursued a policy of self-assertiveness throughout the Near East, and in the process provoked a host of minor quarrels with the Ottoman Empire[62]. In July 1887 there had been rumours that Britain might hand over Suakin to Italy; these proved false, but by the following April reports of substantial Italian troop movements at Massowa were causing fresh alarm[63]. In the event Italy's blow proved to be a moral one: in July 1888 she unilaterally abrogated the regime of the Capitulations at Massowa, and confirmed that she would no longer recognise Ottoman sovereignty over the port[64]. The immediate effect was to awaken Abdülhamid's concern for Suakin: he suggested that this might be Italy's next target. His Ministers doubted that Britain would agree to transfer the port to Italy, but reports of fresh Sudanese attacks led Abdülhamid to broach the possibility of an Ottoman takeover: he reminded his Ministers that in 1885 Britain had offered to place Suakin under Ottoman control. In November the Khedive suggested that Britain might be planning to abandon the port; the Sultan's Ministers foresaw that other European Powers might intervene, and suggested that the Khedive should be instructed to retain Suakin. Abdülhamid objected that the Khedive was quite capable of handing Suakin over to Italy: he

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[59] *ibid.*, Tezkere-i aliye-i resmiye, 27 Receb 305/27 Mart 304.

[60] *ibid.*, Encümen-i hususi mazbatası, 12 Rebiülahır 305/15 Kanun-ı evvel 303; Meclis-i has-i vükela mazbatası, 28 Recebm 305/28 Mart 304.

[61] *ibid.*, *Mısır İrade*, No. 1314, 11 Rebiülahir 305/14 Kanun-ı evvel 303; No. 1386, incl. Rustem to Said no. 125, 5 Mayıs 88.

[62] Lowe, C. J., *Salisbury and the Mediterranean 1886-1896*, (London, 1965), pp. 68-69.

[63] *BBArş*, *Mısır İrade*, No. 1303, 16 Zilkade 304/25 Temmuz 303; No. 1327, Selh-i Receb 305/30 Martk 304.

[64] *ibid.*, No. 1337, 27 Zilkade 305/24 Temmuz 304, with inclosures; *YEE*, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Mazbata-ı husuiye, 24/ Zilkade 305/21 Temmuz 304; mazbata-ı hususiye, 29 Zilkade 305/26 Temmuz 304.

proposed that the Empire take over Suakin at once, and retain it on the Khedive's behalf until such time as Britain evacuated Egypt[65]. The Ministers agreed that an Ottoman occupation might offer a chance to reach a peaceful settlement with the Sudanese: a military commission was appointed to examine the practicalities of a takeover, and an approach was made to the Khedive[66]. Interestingly enough, these decisions coincided with rumours that some of the Sultan's Palace *şeyhs* had been in correspondence with the Mahdists, and that an emissary from Osman Digna had been received in Istanbul.[67]

The proposal came to nothing: the Khedive declined to support it, and Britain warned that she had no intention of leaving Suakin[68]. The Sultan made a further vain bid for Zeyla in 1890, and as late as 1896 he made a fresh proposal for an Ottoman occupation of Suakin[69]. He was too late: the British were losing interest in withdrawal from the Red Sea coast, just as they had already lost interest in withdrawal from Egypt. As early as 1888 Britain and France had agreed on the demarcation of their respective "Somalilands", and similar negotiations between France and Italy commenced in 1890. Ottoman sovereignty was no longer recognised on any part of the coast from Massowa to the south[70]. Ottoman prospects in the Sudanese issue were no better. In 1889 Britain easily repulsed the last Mahdist offensive against Egypt, and by 1896 the threat of French incursions from the west was forcing her to reconsider her original policy of abandonment. The Sudan was reconquered in stages between 1896 and 1899, and the Mahdist regime overthrown; but the old formula of Khedival rule and Ottoman sovereignty was not restored. Instead, the Sudan became an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium[71].

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[65] *ibid.*, *Mısır rade*, No. 1345, 19 Muharrem 306/14 Eylûl 304; *YEE*, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Meclis-i mahsus- v kela mazbatas , 3 Zilhicce 305/30 Temmuz 304; 10 Rebi levvel 306/3 Teşrin-i sani 304; Tezkere-i hususiye-i aliye, 15 Safer 306/9 Teşrin-i evvel 304; 15 Rebi levvel 306/6 Teşrin-i sani 304.

[66] *ibid.*, Meclis-i mahsus- v kela mazbatas , 17 Rebi levvel 306/9 Teşrin-i sani 304; İrade-i seniye, 18 Rebi llevel 306/ 10 Teşrin-i sani 304.

[67] FO 78/4201, White to Salisbury, no. 37, 29 January 1889$ no. 47, 1 February 1889.

[68] *BBArş*, *YEE*, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Meclis-i mahsus- v kela mazbatas , 11 Cemaz , 11 Cemaziy levvel 306/1 Kanun- sani 304; 14 Cemaziy levvel 306/4 Kanun-i sani 304; İrade-i seniye, 17 Cemaziy levvel 306/7 Kanun- sani 304.

[69] *ibid.*, *Mısır İrade*, No. 1386, 14 Cemaziy lah r 307/23 Kanun- sani 305; SHIBEIKA, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

[70] RAMM, *op. cit.*, p. 232; Guillen, Pierre, *L'Expansion 1881-1898*, (Paris, 1984), p. 338, pp. 451-459.

[71] Shibeika, *op. cit.*, chs. xi-xv.

VI

The problem of the Sudan and the Red Sea coast derived from the same root cause which had produced the Egyptian crisis of 1881-2; namely, the collapse of the Khedive's domestic authority. The Ottoman Empire was left facing challenges to its sovereignty in regions where it enjoyed no direct power; it also faced the prospect that the Khedive's territories would be lost either to European Powers or else to a new and revolutionary Moslem Power. The obvious solution was military intervention. Abdülhamid refused to apply it, and not because he had much hope of success with diplomatic alternatives: their practical outcome was a series of European occupations. This tells us a great deal about the limitations of Ottoman power. Empires fight limited wars. That is how they are assembled and sustained, and during the course of its lengthy history the Ottoman Empire was no exception to this rule. It is a striking feature of Abdülhamid's regime that he showed great reluctance to fight such wars in any quarter. He justified this in the Balkans with the argument that a limited war could easily become general; in Moslem Africa he argued that war would lead to revolution. This was the deeper significance of his refusal to intervene in Egypt, the Sudan or the Red Sea coast: a confession that his Empire dare not defend its regional interests by force of arms, and that judged by this criterion, it could no longer sustain the role of an imperial state.

İdris BOSTAN

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE CONGO : THE CRISIS OF 1893-95

In the last quarter of the 19th century the European powers focused their attention on the least explored continent — Africa. Exploratory expeditions on the part of England, France, Germany, and Italy were aimed at carving out additional territories for these powers. In this period, equatorial Africa became a particularly attractive bone of contention. Special efforts were also made to discover the sources of the Nile and Congo rivers. The Congo Basin was to become the subject of the 1884-85 Berlin Africa Conference, called together by Prince Bismarck to work out an equitable means of 'sharing the spoils'. As a power with African interests the Ottoman Empire was represented at this conference, and took part in the deliberations which ended up deciding that all powers would have free access to the Congo and Niger rivers, and free trade would not be hindered along these waterways.[1] But the conference did not serve as a final agreement, and the powers continued to divide the continent through bilateral treaties, and particularly intense competition developed between Britain, Belgium and France.[2]

The Belgian attempt at the occupation of Equatoria

Exploratory expeditions were usually the harbingers of definite occupation and colonisation by the metropolitan power. The activities of Belgium in the Congo Free State, her interest in the territories north of Lake Albert and in the southern Sudan tended to worry other powers with interests in the area, who tried to contain the Belgian initiative. Particularly the exploratory missions supported

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[1] The text of the Berlin Treaty on Africa is to be found in French and Turkish at the *Başbakanlık Arşivi* (BA) *Yıldız Esas Evrakı* (YEE) Kısım 25, Evrak 52/5, Zarf 52, Karton 73. The text in Turkish only is in, BA/ *Name-i Hümayun*, Nr. 14, p. 113-125.

[2] For a historical *résumé* of the partitioning of Africa by the European states, see : E. A. Boateng, *A Political Geography of Africa*, Cambridge 1980, pp. 54-79. The issue of the partition of Africa was also taken in hand by the second secretary of the Ottoman High Commission in Egypt, Mehmed Muhsin Bey. He argued that the Europeans were devising fictitious maps showing purely arbitrary borders, and that one should be wary about using them. See : Mehmed Muhsin, *Afrika Delili*, (Cairo 1312), pp. 31-32.

by King Leopold II in the Congo Basin, soon began to yield results. A Belgian expeditionary force was attempting to reach the Upper Nile valley and unite this territory with the Congo Free State. Thus the crisis of 1894 was born.

An editorial in the *Correspondance Politique* published in Vienna and dated 27 August 1893, questioned whether Belgium had any rights in Equatoria since the region had been previously occupied by the Khedivate. The story in the paper, emanating from sources in Alexandria, stated that the khedive of Egypt had rightful claims on the area based on his having established control through the expeditions of Emin Paşa, an official in Egyptian service. The paper further stated in no uncertain terms that Equatoria had been a province of Egypt, (*Hatt-ı İstiva Eyaleti*) which had been administered by Egyptian officials in the name of the Ottoman sultan. The representative of the Ottoman state at the Berlin Conference, Said Paşa, had stated at the sitting of 31 January 1885, that the Ottoman state had well established and time-honoured rights in the area. Thus, the publication concluded, Belgium had no right whatsoever to annex these lands to the Congo Free State, which had been proclaimed neutral by international agreement. The article ended by stating that the Khedivate could not remain indifferent to such a transgression, and that this would re-activate the Egyptian Question.[3]

The Egyptian province of Equatoria had been established between 1870 and 1876 by Samuel Baker Paşa and Gordon Paşa, both then in Egyptian service. The completion of Egyptian administration and the establishment of the province as part of Egyptian Sudan (*Sudan-ı Mısri*), had been achieved during the governorship of Emin Paşa (1878-1884). Although the actual 'administration' of the Egyptian officials in Equatoria did not extend very far beyond fortified outposts such as Lado and Gondokoro, and the total number of troops Gordon and Emin had at their disposal was no more than 1500, it was internationally acknowledged that this territory was the hinterland of Egypt.[4]

The news of the annexation of Equatoria into the Congo Free State aroused great consternation in Istanbul. When the *Correspondance Politique* article reached the Porte, Grand Vezir Cevad Paşa demanded immediate

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[3]BA/ *Mümtaze-i Mısır*. 5/A, 135, enclosure 8.

[4]On Gordon's activities in the Sudan and his struggle against the Mehdists see: A. B. Theobald *The Mahdiyya, A History of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1881-1899*, (London 1951) pp. 67-139; P. M. Holt *The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898* (Oxford 1958) pp. 79-97. For detailed information on the constitution of the province of Equatoria by Emin Paşa see: Ian R. Smith *The Emin Paşa Relief Expedition 1886-1890*, (Oxford 1972). For the history of the province of Equatoria through local sources, see: Şevki el-Cemal, *Tarihu Sudanu Vadi'n-Nil*, (Cairo 1969) vol. II, pp. 231-294.

information from the Ottoman representatives in Brussels and London.[5] The Ottoman ambassador in London, Rüstem Paşa, promptly saw Lord Roseberry the foreign secretary and asked him if he had any information regarding the matter. Roseberry answered that Britain was indeed deeply concerned over the Belgian move, and feared the Belgian mission might transgress into British-held territory. They had therefore officially protested to Brussels. Roseberry added that they had no exact information as to the whereabouts of the Belgian mission, but they were suspected to be somewhere around Wadelai (*Vadi-i Ulya*). Roseberry stated that he had asked King Leopold for information but the latter had replied that he knew nothing about the matter. Rüstem Paşa reported that the Belgian king's attitude, 'had caused much incredulity' in London. Roseberry continued to say that the Egyptian khedivate was considering protesting to the Powers. The Ottoman ambassador promptly replied, 'The khedive does not have the right to initiate any official move in matters of foreign policy. If any official protest is to be undertaken, the khedive can only do this through the intervention of his legal sovereign, the Ottoman sultan's government at the Sublime Porte.' The ambassador concluded that as the British Foreign Secretary had remained silent upon this statement, Britain was prepared to endorse an Ottoman protest in Brussels.[6]

The next piece of information regarding the article in *Correspondance Politique* came from the Ottoman minister in Brussels. The minister stated on 19 November 1893 that the paper's correspondent in Alexandria had reported the Belgian military unit commanded by Commander Van Kerckhoven had reached Equatoria but that the commander had died. Nothing was known as to what had happened to his troops, who were reported to have dispersed. The envoy went on to say that Britain was seeking definite information on the issue, and had officially protested to Brussels. The king of Belgium had replied that he did not recognize any of Britain's rights or claims in the area. The Congolese government, in the meantime, was attempting to steal a march on the British, and achieve its aim of uniting Congolese possessions with the Nile. As to Britain, which had no legitimate claims to the area once London had settled the matter of Uganda, it wanted to occupy the area and deny other powers access to the Nile. Could Belgium resist British pressure in this situation? If Egypt was to have any real power in the area where it had a clear legal right, the khedivate must, at least, secure control of Khartoum. The British however were sure to prevent this. The envoy's advice was that 'The Ottoman state must clearly define the rights of the Egyptian khedivate in the area, and must make the powers

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[5]BA/ *Bab-ı Ali Evrak Odası* (BEO) *Mısır Hidiviyeti'nin Tezakir Defteri* 1036/68-8 p. 69. Memorandum from the Grand Vezier to Foreign Ministry 25 Rebiülevvel 1311 (6 October 1893).

[6]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 6. Ottoman Embassy, London to Foreign Ministry. (27 October 1893).

accept them. Thus it will have preempted the aims and desires of the Congo Free State and Belgium'.[7]

Meanwhile the Sublime Porte ordered its legal advisors to study the consequences of Belgian penetration into the Upper Nile Valley. The Porte's advisors examined the situation from the standpoint of international law and reported on 20 January 1894 that the protection of the province of Equatoria was the responsibility of the Egyptian khedivate, which had to act through the Sublime Porte. Although the territory in question had, as of late, been in rebellion against Egypt, these lands were still legally part of Egypt, which in turn was a vassal of the Ottoman empire. Therefore, any aggression against Egyptian holdings was to be considered aggresion against the empire. The Ottoman High Commissioner in Egypt, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, should be asked for information regarding the matter.[8]

The events in the southern Sudan coincided with Ottoman attempts to procure the evacuation of the British from Egypt, invaded by British forces in 1882.[9] Since 1885, the now largely symbolic Ottoman presence in Egypt was represented by Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa. This eminent statesman was to closely monitor the encroachments of the powers on Ottoman rights in the area.[10]

The Porte now turned to its 'man on the spot' and in a letter dated 22 February 1894, forwarded the views of the legal advisors, asking the high commissioner to comment on them. Also, since the Congo Free State seemed to be encroaching on Egyptian territory, the Paşa was requested to provide information as to to the real extent of Egyptian claims in the area.[11] The

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[7]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 7. Ottoman Embassy, Brussels to Foreign Ministry. (19 November 1893). It is known that the Belgian force commanded by Van Kerckhoven had reached a point called Lehmin near the west of Wadelai in August 1892. See: G. N. Sanderson, 'Contributions from African Sources to the History of European Competition in the Upper Valley of the Nile.' *Journal of African History* III/1 1962 p. 81. On Van Kerckhoven's accidental death see P. M. Holt *The Mehdist State in the Sudan* p. 199 note 2.

[8]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 9. Copy of Sublime Porte Legal Advisors' Report, 23 Receb 1311 (20 January 1894).

[9]BA/ *Yıldız Tasnifi, Sadaret Resmi Maruzat*, 68/3 Draft presented to sultan regarding proposals for British evacuation of Egypt. 6 Cemaziyelevvel 1311 (15 November 1893). Since the British invasion of Egypt in September 1882, the official British line had always been that the invasion and occupation was to be 'temporary'. The Ottoman archives are full of unavailing attempts made by the Ottomans to hold the British to their word.

[10]For more detailed information on Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa see: Rifat Uçarol, *Bir Osmanlı Paşası ve Dönemi: Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa*. (Istanbul 1976) ; Selim Deringil, 'Ghazi Ahmed Mukhtar Pasha and the British Occupation of Egypt' *Al-Abhath*, XXXIV (Beirut 1986) pp. 13-19. There are numerous reports, telegrams, and letters from Ahmed Muhtar Paşa in the Ottoman archives dealing with the consequences of the European partition of Africa for Ottoman interests.

[11]BA/ BEO, *Mısır Hidiviyeti'nin Muharrerat Defteri*, 1032/68-4 p. 12.

Ottoman high commissioner answered on 6 March that if Ottoman interests were to be preserved in the region

> It is imperative that we know precisely which areas in the Sudan were under the control of the Egyptian government before the outbreak of the Mehdist movement. The Ottoman state must officially demand a map from the Egyptians demarcating the area they controlled. If this map is procured it can serve as incontrovertible evidence in the present dispute and in any question involving the Sudan in the future.[12]

Acting on the Commissioner's suggestion, the Porte wrote to the Egyptian khedivate asking for a map illustrating the border of the Egyptian Sudan and the province of Equatoria.[13] In addition, Sultan Abdülhamid II issued an imperial order (*irade-i seniyye*) to the Grand Vezir, ordering him to write to the khedive, enjoining that ruler to protect the territory in question.[14]

While on the one hand striving to gather information from its high commissioner and the khedive, on the other, the Porte sought to discover the extent of British involvement in the issue. In furtherence of this aim Rüstem Paşa had asked for another meeting with Lord Roseberry on 2 March. The ambassador made enquiries regarding any recent information the British might have received over the Congolese annexation of the Upper Nile. He asked in particular what response had been received from Brussels after the British government had lodged its official protest there. Yet the foreign secretary's answers divulged little new information beyond the statement that the Belgian force was believed to be in Lado and Wadelai. The British official would have no objection whatever if the Porte decided to file an official protest in Brussels.[15] On 21 March the Porte wrote to Ahmed Muhtar Paşa stating that the Sudan was in no sense some sort of no-man's-land. The Egyptian conquests of Dharfur, Khartoum etc. had been undertaken by Khedive Ismail (1863-1879), in the name and upon the orders of the late Sultan Abdülaziz. In addition to this the Egyptians had levied taxes on the area and conscripted its population into the army, thus effectively enforcing Egyptian, and by proxy, Ottoman rule. The sultan informed his commissioner that the khedive had been instructed to defend the area against encroachments by the Congo Free State.[16] On the same day a

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[12]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 11.

[13]BA/ *Ibid*, enclosure 14.

[14]*Ibid*.

[15]BA/ *Mısır İradeleri*, 1585, enclosure 2. Ottoman Embassy, London to Foreign Ministry. (2 March 1894).

[16]BA/ BEO, *Mısır Hidiviyeti'nin Muharrerat Defteri*, 1032/68-4, p. 15. For the conquests of Khedive Ismail in the area see: Mekki Shibeika, 'The Expansionist Movement of Khedive Ismail to the Lakes' *Sudan in Africa* ed, Yusuf Fadl Hasan, (Khartoum 1971) pp. 142-155; for the administration of the Sudan at the time of Khedive Ismail see: P. M. Holt-M. W. Daly, *A History of the Sudan* (London 1988) p. 74-82.

letter was sent to the khedive asking him to furnish the Porte with a map of the area, clearly indicating Egyptian possessions.[17]

Only Muhtar Paşa replied on 3 April confirming that in recent years Egypt had established control in Equatoria. He emphasised yet again that it was imperative that the khedive send a detailed map to Istanbul.[18] Acting on this the Porte wrote yet again to Cairo asking the Egyptian government to furnish specific information regarding the precise location of the Congolese mission, so that the Porte would be able to issue an official protest.[19] Once again, no reply was received from the khedive.

In view of these developments, on 10 April the Sultan issued a decree ordering the Grand Vezir to have the Foreign Ministry register an official protest in Brussels, and further ordering him to prevent the annexation of Equatoria by the Congo. The Sultan also ordered that contact should be established with the French ambassador at the Porte, as France was the power most likely to support the Ottomans in this issue.[20] Muhtar Paşa replied on 24 April that it was impossible for the Egyptian government to supply exact information on what was happening in Equatoria. All lines of communication between Cairo and its Sudanese provinces had been severed, and any news of the area had to be obtained through European sources. The Paşa also stated that he was enclosing a map. In this communication the Commissioner stressed that the European powers, having acquired the sources of the Nile, could build dams which would control the annual overflow of the river. This would mean the ruin of Lower Egypt. The Ottoman representative gave his detailed assessment of the plans for partitioning east-central Africa among Britain, Belgium, Italy and Germany. He stated that Wadelai was the critical factor in the grand British design of uniting their southern African possessions with Egypt.[21]

The British Occupation of Wadelai

Almost as though to prove Ahmed Muhtar right, reports soon started to come in that the British had occupied Wadelai. On 9 May the Ottoman ambassador made enquiries at the Foreign Office. He was told that a British

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[17]BA/ BEO, *Mısır Hidiviyeti'nin Muharrerat Defteri*, 1032/68-4, pp. 15-16.

[18]BE/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135 enclosures 21-23.

[19]BA/ BEO, *Mısır Hidiviyeti'nin Muharrerat Defterleri*, 1032/68-4, p. 17. The matter was also referred to Muhtar Paşa see *ibid.* p. 18.

[20]BA/ Mısır *İradeleri*, 1585 ; The instructions to issue a protest in Brussels is in BA, BEO, *Mısır Hidiviyeti'nin Tezakir Defteri*, 1036/68-8, p. 82, 6 Şevval 1311 (12 April 1894).

[21]BA/ BEO *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 25. Ahmet Muhtar Paşa to Grand Vezir 18 Şevval 1311 (24 April 1894). In this communication the Paşa gives intricate details on the geographical and political conditions of the area. The map has not been located.

military detachment, commanded by a Major Owen, had indeed flown the British flag in Wadelai. The explanation for this was that the Sudanese troops left behind by Emin Paşa had revolted soon after his departure and turned to brigandage, raiding into British territory in Uganda. The British officer in Uganda however, had taken them in hand and in fact had used them to repulse an attack on Uganda from the tribes in Wadelai. The British officer had then used these same Sudanese troops to cross Lake Albert and occupy Wadelai. Lord Roseberry was confident that the sovereign rights of the khedive over the area would be preserved. What had prompted Britain to act in this fashion was the fear that a third party would take control of Wadelai. In fact it had been agreed at the Berlin Africa Conference of 1885 that if Belgium were ever to pull out of the Congo, the area would go to France. The British foreign secretary told Rüstem Paşa that if France were ever to acquire control of the Congo, she would be in a position to easily occupy Equatoria and Wadelai.[22] As the British moved on Wadelai, the Congolese unit commanded by Major Béart, had been marching towards Lado. It seems that the British in Uganda had invaded Wadelai to pre-empt any Congolese invasion of that territory. Muhtar Paşa reported that the Congolese unit marching on Lado had been intercepted and defeated by the Sudanese under British command.[23]

The Anglo-Belgian Agreement of 12 May 1894

The treaty signed in Brussels on 12 May aimed at sorting out the respective British and Belgian spheres of interest in the southern Sudan. The first article of the treaty, in which King Leopold II was acting for the Congo Free State, regulated the demarcation of the frontiers between British and Belgian possessions. The second article determined that Britain would lease a portion of the territory west of Lake Albert to Belgium. This territory would extend from a point on the west coast of Lake Albert to Fashoda in the north. The third article determined that in return, Belgium would lease to Britain, the strip of territory stretching from the harbour on the north shore of Lake Tanganyika to the southermost point of Lake Albert. The fourth article stipulated that neither power would put forward any political claims in the areas it was leasing. The fifth article stated that the Congo Free State would allow the construction of a telegraph line linking British south Africa with British occupied Egypt. The sixth article guaranteed that the contracting parties would recognize the mutually

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[22]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 29; the letter from the Ottoman Embassy, London was presented to the Grand Vezir by the Foreign Ministry on 21 Zilkade 1311 (26 May 1894) see BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 28; For the activities of Major Owen in the area see, Omar Tosun, *Tarihu Müdiriyyeti Hatti'l istivai'l-Mısriyye-i* Alexandria 1356/1937, vol II pp. 326-331.

[23]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 26, pertaining to letter from Muhtar Paşa to Porte 11 Zilkade 1311 (16 May 1894); On the clashes in Wadelai see, O. Tosun *op. cit.*, vol. III pp. 329-330.

equal rights of their subjects in these territories.[24] On the day of signature the British sent a diplomatic note to Brussels requesting that it recognize the rights of the Khedive and the Ottoman Sultan in the Upper Nile. The Belgian foreign ministry complied with the request on the same day. Orders were immediately issued to British military authorities in the field to waste no time in occupying areas leased to Belgium with British local forces as the Belgians had no troups in area.[25]

Reactions to the Anglo-Belgian Treaty

The Ottoman embassy in London was to closely monitor debates in Parliament concerning the treaty. Rüstem Paşa reported on 1 June 1894 that the governement had been roundly criticisized for its handling of the issue. The Ambassador reported on 31 May that Sir Charles Dilke M.P., had confronted Sir Edward Grey with the following questions. One: When had Belgium first proposed that Britain lease the strip of territory from Lake Tanganyika to Lake Albert. Two: Was it true that the Khedivate had reaffirmed its rights in the province of Equatoria by its note of 1 August 1892? Three: Had the German and French governments protested the treaty concluded with Belgium? Sir Edward Grey had replied that he was unable to respond immediately to the first two questions. He did however admit that France had protested the treaty, but no word had yet been received from Germany. Sir Charles Dilke then asked if Germany had officially protested in Brussels. Grey replied that he could make no comment regarding communications between foreign countries.[26] The ambassador reported that the debates had continued well onto the next day. On that occasion Grey had reiterated that the British government had promised to protect the rights of the Khedivate in Equatoria.[27]

On 9 June Rüstem Paşa again wrote to Istanbul that Sir E. Ashmead Bartlett had asked whether France had categorically rejected the Anglo-Belgian Treaty. Grey replied that this was true but that he would make no comment on it. The attack was then taken up by Dilke who asked if the Ottoman empire and Germany had officially protested the treaty. Grey replied that no official protest

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[24]BA/ YEE, Kısım 5, Evrak 2115, Zarf 83, Karton 2, enclosure 5/2; The text of the treaty was sent to the Porte from the Ottoman Embassy and it was translated by the Translation Office.

[25]*Ibid.* The Ottoman geography books of the period included Fashoda within the frontiers of the Egyptian Khedivate. Similarly the region of the Bahr-ül Gazal was included in the borders of the Egyptian Sudan. For more details on this see, Ömer Subhi B. Edhem, *Afrika-yı Osmani-i Mısır Hidiviyeti*, İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütübhanesi (IÜK), Türkçe Yazmalar (TY), No. 4123.

[26]BA/ YEE, 5/2115/83/2 enclosure 4. Ottoman Embassy, London to Foreign Ministry 1 June 1894.

[27]*Ibid,* enclosure 2. Ottoman Embassy, London to Foreign Ministry, 2 June 1894.

had been lodged by Germany, but that Berlin had asked for a guarantee for its commercial entreprises in the area. No protest had been received from Istanbul.[28]

On 14 June Dilke again brought up the matter of the Congolese agreement. Grey replied that since he had answered the last questions on the issue in Parliament, Germany had protested the third article in the treaty. Also, after the occupation of Wadelai by British forces, the Ottoman ambassador had told him that such an occupation would never be recognized by the Porte.[29]

As Berlin had taken exception to Article 3 of the treaty, Britain now accepted to change the delimitation of the frontier in accordance with German demands.[30] Yet this concession failed to satisfy Berlin which had lodged an official protest in London on 12 June 1894.[31] Germany was ultimately to achieve her aim, and the Ottoman embassy in London reported on 1 September that Britain and Belgium had decided to cancel the article offensive to Germany.[32] The Anglo-Belgian treaty was also rejected by France and this was made known in the Congo via the French Ambassador in Brussels.[33] The treaty was also discussed in the French Chamber where the Foreign Minister stated that they refused to recognize it. France protested the agreement and stressed that it was important to guarantee the integrity of Ottoman territory in the area.[34]

The Reaction of the Ottoman government to the Anglo-Belgian Treaty

The Anglo-Belgian Treaty was to lead to considerable debate among the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin on Africa. The Ottoman ambassador in Berlin reported that some ambassadors were asking him for the views of the Ottoman government on this issue, as the Ottoman empire was both a signatory of the Berlin Treaty, and a power whose African possessions bordered the area covered

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[28]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 42. Ottoman Embassy, London to Foreign Ministry 9 June 1894.

[29]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 43; *ibid*, enclosure 41; communications dated 9 and 15 June from the Ottoman Embassy, London were presented to the Porte by Foreign Minister Said Paşa on 21 Zilkade 1311 (25 June 1894).

[30]BA/ *Mısır İradeleri*, 1592, enclosure 11. Telegram from Foreign Office to British Ambassador, Istanbul, 6 June 1894.

[31]BA/ *Mısır İradeleri*, 1592, enclosures 8-9. Note from British Embassy Istanbul to Porte. 13 June 1894.

[32]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 53. Letter from chargé d'affaires of Ottoman Embassy London, 1 September 1894; presented to Porte by Foreign Minister together with letter of presentation dated 9 Rebiülevvel 1312 (10 September 1894).

[33]BA/ *Mısır İradeleri*, 1592, enclosure 3. Ottoman Ambassador Brussels to Foreign Minister, 29 May 1894.

[34]BA/ YEE, 5/2115/83/2 enclosure 4. Foreign Minister to Porte, 5 Zilhicce 1311 (9 June 1894)

by the Anglo-Belgian accord.[35] The developments regarding the issue were closely monitored by Istanbul, and the Ottoman archives show that no development was too insignificant for the Ottoman diplomats, who reported on the most intricate details. The text of the Anglo-Belgian Treaty was forwarded by the British Embassy to the Sublime Porte on 24 May 1894. Rüstem Paşa's assessment was that the treaty was a step in the direction of British unification of their holdings in southern Africa with their newly constituted province of Uganda. The other major gain for the British, the ambassador argued, was to interpose the Congo Free State between French possessions and the Upper Nile.[36]

The next piece of information regarding the Anglo-Belgian Treaty came from the Ottoman minister in Brussels.[37] In a letter dated 28 May the Ottoman envoy put forward the following views : 'Before the treaty the British had been suspicious of Belgian designs on the Nile, and had vehemently opposed any claim the latter may have made regarding the Nile Valley.'[38] The Ottoman representative's interpretation was that the Belgians had then moved towards the French who had not been particularly forthcoming. Thus, King Leopold had found himself obliged to come to some sort of understanding with London. Yet, the treaty act as concluded between the two powers had no legal validity whatsoever as neither Belgium nor Britain had any clear title to the land in question; 'Britain has never occupied any part of the Bahr-ül-Gazal and the Congolese government by openly admitting that it was to lease these lands, is admitting that it does not have any legal title to them.'[39]

On 12 May 1894 the Porte ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Commission of Legal Advisors (*Hariciye Nezareti İstişare Odası*) to give a detailed assessment of the Anglo-Belgian Treaty. On 2 June 1894 the legal advisors to the Porte reported in the following terms:

> The treaties concluded between Britain and Italy on 5 May 1894 and Britain and Belgium on 12 May of the same year indicate that Britain is coming to an agreement over the partition of Africa with

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[35] BA/ *Mısır İradeleri*, 1592, enclosure 12. Ottoman Embassy Berlin to Foreign Ministry. 5 June 1894.

[36] BA/ YEE, 5/2115/83/2 enclosure 5/1, Ottoman Embassy London to Foreign Ministry 24 May 1894, encloses newspaper clippings from British press quoting from French papers on French opposition to the treaty; Foreign Minister Said Paşa had translated and summarized the treaty which he duly presented to the Grand Vezir on 4 June 1894, see *ibid*, enclosure 5; the oficial announcement of the British protectorate in Uganda occured on 18 June 1894: see Şevki Ataullah el-Cemel, *Tarihu Sudanu Vadi'n-Nil* Cairo 1980 vol III, p. 108.

[37] BA/ *Mısır Iradeleri*, 1592, enclosure 3.

[38] *Ibid*. The Ottoman minister in Brussels to Foreign Ministry. The minister mentioned that he had advised Istanbul of these developments on 19 January 1893.

[39] *Ibid*, Ottoman Legation Brussels to Foreign Ministry, 29 May 1894.

other powers. The areas in question are lands over which the Ottoman empire has clear rights... The reason why the British and Belgian governments recognized these rights is purely to pacify the Sublime Porte and France ... The "leasing or "allowing the occupation" of lands belonging to another power can in no sense be considered legal. Have the British procured the right to act as the legal agents of the khedivate? Has the khedive consulted with the Sublime Porte over the issue? These points are not known. Most of the lands covered in the treaty were occupied in the name of the khedivate by Gordon Paşa and Emin Paşa, but the Egyptian administration there later weakened. The Porte must obtain precise information from Muhtar Paşa. On this basis it can then decide whether to lodge a firm protest in London and Brussels, asking for the return of these lands, or make do with a simple declaration of non-recognition.[40]

Meanwhile the Ottoman legation in Madrid reported on 9 June 1894 that the *Standard* newspaper published in London, had claimed that the Porte was about to officially protest in London over the Anglo-Belgian treaty. The paper had interpreted the possibility of an Ottoman protest as a very serious matter because the territory to be leased to Belgium incorporated a large Muslim population. Thus any diplomatic intervention on the part of the Porte would carry additional weight.[41] The Grand Vezir's office also wrote to the Foreign Ministry on 6 June that the Anglo-Belgian Treaty made it technically possible for a Cape-to-Cairo railway to be built.[42]

On 6 June the Porte asked for another assessment of the situation which was presented by the Commission of Legal Advisors and signed by the Porte's legal advisor Gabriel.[43] This report stressed again that the areas which were the object of controversy belonged to the Khedivate, as far as Lake Albert. Also, the Ottoman state had put forward its view through its representative at the Berlin Conference of 1885. The Ottoman delegate had stood up for Ottoman rights in the Nile Valley. Also, it had been determined at the same conference that no power was to undertake the occupation of any territory in Africa which had been previously claimed. Yet, the White Nile had a connection with Egypt, and it was known that Egypt had pre-existing claims in the area. The Anglo-Belgian arrangement was therefore null and void. The Porte's legal advisors declared that

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[40]BA/ YEE, 5/2115/83/2 enclosure 5/3.

[41]BA/ *Mısır İradeleri*, 1592, enclosure 6, telegram from the Ottoman Chargé d'Affaires Madrid, to Foreign Ministry 9 June 1894; The telegram was presented to the Porte by Foreign Minister Said Paşa on 6 Zilhicce 1311 (10 June 1894) see *ibid*, enclosure 5.

[42]BA/ BEO, *Mısır Hidiviyeti'nin Tezakir Defteri*, 1036/68-8, p. 99. Memorandum presented by Porte to Foreign Ministry 2 Zilhicce 1311 (6 June 1894). For a discussion of the Cape-to-Alexandria railway project together with an assessment of the various completed railways in Africa inclusive of map see, *Afrika-yı Cenubi Cumhuriyetleri ve Afrika'da Şimalden Cenuba Mümted Şimendifer Layihası*, IÜK, TY, 9480-9482.

[43]BA/ BEO, *Mısır Hidiviyeti'nin Tezakir Defteri*, 1036/68-8, p, 99.

Istanbul should make its views clearly known to all parties, as silence might be construed as a sign that the Ottomans had acknowledged that they relinquished any claims in the area. The Ottoman state should send expeditions of exploration into the area and stake its claim before it was too late.[44]

Thus the Ottomans refused to recognize the *fait-accompli* of the occupation of Wadelai, and the Anglo-Belgian Treaty. On 3 June the Sultan Abdülhamid II ordered that it be made known in London that he would never recognize the British occupation of Wadelai as legitimate.[45] Accordingly, on 14 June, Rüstem Paşa saw Lord Kimberley, and relayed the Sultan's views, Lord Kimberley replied that the British military unit had retaliated to aggression on the part of the chief of Omoro against Uganda. The British detachment had repulsed the assailants and pursuit had taken place into Wadelai. But Britain was not contemplating occupying the area, and orders had been given to lower the British flag and evacuate the troops.[46]

The reports coming in from the various ambassadors of the Porte in the European capitals indicate that all of them were closely following developments in central Africa where Britain's movements were regarded with suspicion. The Ottoman embassy in Berlin reported that the *Berliner Tageblatt* of 4 June 1894 had given extensive coverage to the British occupation of Wadelai. The paper had stated that Wadelai was just a first step in British plans to occupy the entire area. To prevent this, Egypt must re-occupy the Sudan, which the British had forced them to abandon. The reason the British had acted in this way was to create a vacuum in the area which they could then fill.[47]

On 30 June the Porte sent Muhtar Paşa another letter requesting information on the most recent situation in the Sudan.[48] The answer from the Paşa which was received on 2 July gave details of the capture of Khartoum by

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[44]BA/ YEE, 5/2115/83/2, enclosure 3, memorandum from Foreign Minister to Grand Vezir, and report of Sublime Porte Legal Advisor both dated 5 Zilhicce 1311 (9 June 1894).

[45]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 32, 29 Zilkade 1311 (3 June 1894); Abdülhamid's orders were duly communicated by the Grand Vezir to the Foreign Minister on the same day, see *ibid*, enclosure 27.

[46]BA/ *Mısır İradeleri*, 1608, enclosure 1-3, Ottoman Embassy London to Foreign Ministry, 14 June 1894.

[47]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 46-47, Ottoman Embassy Berlin to Foreign Ministry, encloses newspaper clipping. The paper expressed the view that Egypt should at least re-assert its control over eastern Sudan; it claimed that the Khedivate had the necessary troops with which to recover Khartoum, thus re-establishing stability in the area. In addition, the paper stated, until the Mehdist troubles the region had been quite prosperous but was now in ruin. The British had allowed this to happen as part of their exploitative policy in Egypt. This clipping was translated by the Foreign Ministry and presented to the Grand Vezir on 17 Zilhicce 1311 (21 June 1894).

[48]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır* 5/A, enclosure 45. Porte to Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa 26 Zilhicce 1311 (30 June 1894).

the Mehdist forces, and how the British had forced Egypt to withdraw from the Sudan. Şerif Paşa, then Egyptian prime minister, had stated that he had no authority to cede any territory without asking Istanbul. When the British had insisted he had resigned and had been replaced by Nubar Paşa, who had begun to evacuate the area of Egyptian officials and troops. According to the Ottoman high commissioner, Britain had acted in this way because she was coveting the Sudan's bountiful economic resources and was wary of the Ottoman state which controlled vast lands in Africa.[49]

Despite repeated assurances that they would evacuate Wadelai, the British stayed on, thus making the Ottoman government very uneasy. This was linked with the broader issue of the British evacuation of Egypt, which had been a running sore in Anglo-Ottoman relations since the British invasion of Egypt in September 1882. An imperial decree (*İrade-i Seniyye*) dated 9 July 1894 voiced Abdülhamid's frustration over the matter. It stated that the British had no right to fly their flag over Wadelai. They had declared that they recognized Ottoman sovereignty in Egypt but they were still flying their flag there which the khedive had been unable to prevent. They had therefore failed to honour their promise about continued recognition of Ottoman suzerainty.[50] The Porte's decision to protest the Anglo-Belgian treaty was referred to the sultan by the Grand Vezir Cevad Paşa on 10 June.[51] The next day Cevad Paşa applied for an audience to have the sultan's answer.[52] The imperial decree which was issued on 12 June was a clear statement of the Ottoman 'official line' on recent developments:

> The Congo Free State was initially not recognized by the Sublime Sultanate because the area contains many Muslim peoples, and it is not proper that they should live under Christian rule. This is both politically and religiously objectionable. In addition to this the areas of Nubia, Kordofan, and the Sudan were conquered by the Khedive Ismail Paşa, authorized to do so by the *fermans* he held from the late Sultan Abdülaziz (may Heaven be his eternal resting place). In fact it is well known that foreign travellers in the area could only proceed in safety in the shadow of the Ottoman imperial standard. For these reasons the Ottoman Empire's rights to sovereignty in the area are undisputable. Therefore it is completely improper for Britain to enter into international agreements regarding areas over which it has no rights whatsoever. If the Ottoman State ignores these developments, the same

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[49] *Ibid*, enclosure 48, Ahmed Muhtar Paşa to Porte 29 Zilhicce 1311 (2 July 1894).

[50] BA/ *Mısır İradeleri*, 1608. Grand Vezir Cevad Paşa wrote to the Foreign Minister on 7 Muharrem 1312 (11 July 1894) informing him of the Sultan's views. See BA/ BEO, *Ayniyat Defterleri*, 1634, p. 47.

[51] BA/ YEE, 2115/83/2 enclosure 1. The Sultan ordered that Cevad Paşa present his assessment of the Congo crisis together with all the documentation pertaining to the issue, see: BA/ *İrade-Hususi*, 57, 13 Zilhicce 1311 (17 June 1894).

[52] BA/ *Mısır İradeleri*, 1595.

pattern will be repeated in Egypt proper where the Britishers' designs are known to all.

The Sultan's order also repeated that the Ottoman state should act in consultation with other powers who disapproved of the treaty, and the Ottoman ambassador should lodge an immediate protest in London. The Council of Ministers was also ordered to report its views on the most recent developments.[53] On 13 June the Palace repeated its instructions to issue a protest in London and asked why the Porte was delaying. The French ambassador had made representations against any delay as this would have grievous consequences for the future of Egypt.[54] On the same day the Ottoman Council of Ministers declared that as Germany and France had protested the Anglo-Belgian treaty, it was impossible for the Porte to recognize it.[55] When the Porte asked for a statement of the intentions of the Belgian government, the latter replied that since the Porte had recognized the Anglo-German Treaty of 1890 dealing with the area, the Ottoman state, by implication, recognized the rights of Britain in the region. In reply, the Ottoman minister in Brussels stated that the Anglo-German Treaty had not been recognized by the Ottoman empire, or by any other power. When the sultan was advised of these developments he demanded information regarding the Anglo-German Treaty, and commanded that he be informed as to what had been done about it at the time.[56]

It soon became apparent that the Ottoman protest of the Anglo-Belgian Treaty did not create much of a reaction in London. Also the Italian newspaper *Tribuna*, covered the issue and added that the time had come for Italy to claim what was rightfully hers in Ottoman Tripolitania.[57] On 1 July the sultan commanded that he be informed as to why the Ottoman protest had evoked such

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[53]BA/ *Ibid*, İrade dated 8 Zilhicce 1311 (12 June 1894). Most of the Muslims in the Congo were Arabs. For detailed information on the Congo Arabs see: Sidney Langford Hinde, *The Fall of the Congo Arabs*, London 1897. Also according to Mehmed Mihri Bey, most of the Muslims in the eastern and northern Congo were Arabs originally from Zanzibar, see: *Sudan Seyahatnamesi*, Istanbul 1328, s. 330. See also Mehmed Muhsin, *Africa Delili*, Cairo 1312 p. 116.

[54]BA/ *Mısır İradeleri*, 1595, 9 Zilhicce 1311 (13 June 1894). In the telegram from the Ottoman Embassy in London to the Foreign Ministry dated 9 June 1894, there is still no mention of any official Ottoman protest of the treaty, see: BA/ *Mısır Iradeleri*, 1592, enclosure 4.

[55]BA/ *Meclis-i Vükela Mazbatası*, 378, 9 Zilhicce 1311 (13 June 1894).

[56]BA/ *İrade- Hususi*, 21 Zilhicce 1311, 100. The British Ambassador to the Porte informed the Foreign Ministry that a treaty had been concluded between Britain and Germany in 1890, see: BA/ *Yıldız Tasnifi, Sadaret Resmi Maruzatı* 70/34 enclosure 6. The next day, the Grand Vezir Cevad Paşa sent a memorandum to the Foreign Ministry asking for information regarding the Anglo-German Treaty, see: BA/ BEO, *Ayniyat Defterleri*, 1634.

[57]BA/ BOE, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 55. The Italian newspaper *Tribuna* declared that the Ottoman Empire would not be able to prevent Italian occupation of Tripoli.

little response in London.[58] It seems that because France and Germany had already protested the Anglo-Belgian Treaty, and had succeeded in securing the cancellation of some of its articles the treaty was no longer of any importance. The fact was that the Ottomans had protested against a document which was something of a non-starter. London simply saw no point in raising diplomatic tension over a non-event. Yet the Sultan continued to follow developments closely. On 22 July the Grand Vezir transmitted information he had received from London and Brussels regarding declarations made by these two governments that the Anglo-Belgian Treaty contained nothing damaging to Ottoman interests or rights. The Sultan ordered on the next day that the matter be discussed in the Council of Ministers.[59]

The aftermath of the Anglo-Belgian Treaty

The Anglo-Belgian Treaty of 12 May 1894 was thus stillborn. But the activities of the colonial powers continued. On 14 August a treaty was concluded between France and the Congo Free State. This determined that Lado and Wadelai in Equatoria would be left to the Congo. On 6 September Abdülhamid ordered that the issue be closely monitored. The Ottoman Council of Ministers decided on 17 September, that as with the Anglo-Belgian Treaty, this document too was null and void as far as the Ottomans were concerned.[60] The next critical development came with the annexation of the Congo Free State by Belgium.[61] The Porte sounded out the participants of the Berlin Africa Conference to determine their attitude. The Ottoman ambassadors in the various European capitals reported that Austria, Germany Britain and Italy had made no objection to the move. Russia was indifferent and it was commonly recognized that France would receive most favoured nation status in the area. The Council of Ministers decided that the Porte should await the definite response of the powers.[62] On 25 February 1895 Abdülhamid ordered that an official *démarche* be instigated to determine the attitude of France.[63]

The two main actors in the European rush for spheres of interest in Africa were Britain and France. The Ottoman state's claims of sovereignty in the southern Sudan were supported by France who felt that this was a way to keep Britain out of the area. Juste like his colleague in London, the Ottoman

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[58]BA/ *İrade-Hususi*, 27 Zilhicce 1311, p. 122.

[59]BA/ *İrade Hususi* 19 Muharrem 1312, p. 81, BA/ *İrade-Hususi*, 28 Muharrem 1312 p. 132.

[60]For a summary of the Anglo-Belgian Treaty of 12 May 1894 see; P.M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan*, p. 206-207, and Şevki Ataullah el-Cemel, *Tarihu Sudan* III, pp. 108-109; BA/ *Mısır İradeleri*, 1623; BA/ *Yıldız Tasnifi Sadaret Resmi Maruzat*, 72/11.

[61]BA/ *İrade-Hususi*, 20 Receb 1312, p. 70.

[62]BA/ *Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları*, 83 18 Şaban 1312 Cabinet Minutes.

[63]BA/ *İrade-Hususi*, 29 Şaban 1312 p. 116.

ambassador in Paris was faithfully monitoring the debate in the French Senate over the African issue. On 7 April 1895 he reported that two days previously the French foreign minister had been severely criticised by deputies who demanded to know whether British claims in central Africa had any legitimate basis. The deputies had pointed out that the Ottoman government's rights to sovereignty over Egypt had been recognized by all the European powers in the treaties of Paris (1856), London (1871), and Berlin (1878). Thus it was difficult, they said, to understand the basis for British claims on the area. The French minister for foreign affairs had replied in the following terms:

> The territory from the Lakes District of the Upper Nile to Wadi Halfa spans some 2000 kilometres. It is presently under the control of the Mehdist forces and no European power has any say in the area. The Egyptians, after having occupied the area for a long time, have now retired northwards, and the Emin Paşa Mission has been forced to withdraw. Today Equatoria and the southern Sudan are in the Egyptian sphere of interest and under Ottoman sovereignty. France has never recognized any British claims in the area.[64]

On 28 August the Ottoman high commissioner in Egypt sent news of developments in the area based on news reports from Reuters news agency. Reuters was quoting the commander of the Belgian forces in the area who declared that a Congolese unit of 1000 men equipped with Krupp guns and Maxim riffles had reached Lado. Another had reached Kavall near the southern shores of Lake Albert. It was reported that the Congolese forces had been engaged in battle by the Mahdists around Lado. The Ottoman official underlined however, that because all communication by sea and land between Egypt and the area in question had been severed, all news emanated from European sources.[65] Acting on this information, the Grand Vezir asked the Foreign Minister to investigate the truth of the Congolese aggression.[66] According to the telegrams received from the Ottoman legation in Brussels, on 5 and 15 October 1895, this news was without foundation. British newspapers who had not liked the recent visit of King Leopold to Paris, had invented the story which had been subsequently shown to be false.[67] Previously, on 2 September, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa had been asked to send a map showing the final positions on the African chess board,

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[64]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 79, Letter from Ottoman Embassy Paris dated 7 April 1895. Presented to the Sultan by Foreign Minister Said Paşa on 5 May 1895, see: *ibid.*

[65]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135 enclosure 83, Ahmed Muhtar Paşa's letter dated 7 Rebiülevvel 1313 (28 August 1895); BA/ BEO *ibid.* 13/79. For the clashes between the Congolese and Mehdist forces see: Holt, *op. cit.* pp. 197-203.

[66]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 89.

[67]BA/ *Meclis-i Vükela Mazbatası*, 85 ; BA/ BEO *Mısır Hidiviyeti'nin Tezakir Defteri*, 1036/68-8 p. 144.

indicating which power had final control in Equatoria.[68] On 21 September Muhtar Paşa complied with this request and sent a map which was studied in the Council of Ministers and passed on to the Ministry of War.[69]

Conclusion

The study of this topic clearly indicates that in the period under review the Ottoman state had no real power in the area which could have enabled it to intervene. For this reason it had to set policy in accordance with the views of those European powers which were prepared to support it. The situation also meant that the sultan had to make do with the verbal protection of this legal status in the area. This meant a meticulous attention to detail and a systematic attempt to prevent the establishment of any precedent which might be harmful to its interests in the future. Even developments in as remote an area as Equatoria could have a bearing on matters closer to home. Thus all attention possible was devoted to gathering, processing, and verifying information. Another aspect of the Ottoman 'legal presence' in Equatoria was the factor of a large Muslim population. Istanbul argued that these people should not be abandoned to Christian rule. Thus Abdülhamid II played the card of the Islamic Caliphate which technically made him the spiritual head of all Sunni Muslims. These were the main tenets of a hopeless rearguard action which could not stand up against the virulance of European imperialism.[70]

Translated from Turkish by Selim Deringil.

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[68]BA/ BEO *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 82. Letter from Porte to Ottoman high commissioner, Egypt 12 Rebiülevvel 1313 (2 September 1895).

[69]BA/ BEO, *Mümtaze-i Mısır*, 5/A 135, enclosure 89, memorandum of Foreign Ministry dated 19 Cemaziyülevvel 1313 (7 November 1895).

[70]For the main characteristics of Hamidian foreign policy see: Selim Deringil, 'Some Comments on the Concept of Legitimacy in the Foreign Policy of Abdülhamid II', *Studies On Ottoman Diplomatic History*, I, Istanbul 1987 pp. 97-102.

Selim DERİNGİL

LES OTTOMANS ET LE PARTAGE DE L'AFRIQUE 1880-1900

L'histoire du partage de l'Afrique a été étudiée en grande partie du point de vue d'abord des pays et des systèmes imperialistes, et ensuite du point de vue des pays et des peuples colonisés. Mais dans le domaine de l'étude de la présence ottomane en Afrique il y a une lacune presque complète. C'est sans doute parce que les Ottomans, aux yeux des Européens, n'appartenaient ni à un groupe ni à l'autre ; ils n'étaient pas un peuple colonisé au sens vrai du terme, mais d'autre part ils n'étaient pas les meneurs d'une machine impérialiste à l'échelle européenne. Aux yeux de leurs ex-sujets la période ottomane demeurait marquée comme une période de déclin et de dégénérescence. Pour les Turcs mêmes, avec quelques exceptions notables comme Abdürrahman Çaycı, et Cengiz Orhonlu, l'Afrique ottomane ne reçut qu'une attention dérisoire et les chercheurs concentrent leurs efforts sur les Balkans, l'Anatolie, ou la péninsule arabe.

La place dont nous disposons ne nous permet pas de présenter *in extenso* la politique de l'État ottoman à l'égard du partage de l'Afrique. Ce travail consiste donc en un essai qui tentera de décrire les grands axes de la pensée ottomane en ce domaine.

Premièrement : Les hommes d'États ottomans étaient concients du fait que les forces militaires à leur disposition étaient très limitées. Cela imposait une attitude très 'légaliste' dans la conduite des relations avec les Grandes Puissances.

Deuxièmement : Les arguments avancés par les Ottomans reposaient toujours sur deux principes de base ; les droits émanant du 'passé' (ou les anciens titres), et le concept de 'précédent'.

Dans tout contact avec les Grandes Puissance les hommes d'État ottomans s'efforçaient de prévenir l'établissement de précédents qui pouvaient fournir à leurs adversaires l'occasion de s'ingérer dans les affaires intérieurs de l'État.

Inversement, ils cherchaient toujours des précédents qui leur offriraient l'occasion d'avancer l'argument de 'droits historiques' ou de 'titres anciens'. Tout cela exigeait une adresse considérable dans le domaine du Droit International. A ce sujet les conseillers juridiques de la Sublime Porte se montraient extrêmement habiles, et la Porte soulignait à chaque occasion qu'elle était membre du Concert Européen.

Cet article se propose de présenter quelques cas qui résument l'application de la politique ottomane, d'après des documents récemment ouvert aux chercheurs dans les archives ottomanes d'Istanbul. La question sera traité en trois parties ; la Tripolitaine, l'Afrique-Centrale, et les côtes ouest de la Mer Rouge (ou autrement dit, l'*Afrika-i Osmanî*).

La Tripolitaine ottomane et les relations turco-françaises

Après l'occupation par la France de l'Algérie en 1830, et surtout après son invasion de la Tunisie en 1881, suivi par l'occupation de l'Égypte par l'Angleterre en 1882, les Ottomans ont sérieusement repris en main leur politique concernant cette province lointaine. Leurs efforts visaient au rétablissement du pouvoir ottoman dans ce dernier territoire du Magreb.

Afin de réformer l'administration dans ce pays jusqu'alors négligé, l'État a entrepris des investissements considérables, malgré ses faibles ressources financières et humaines. En concurrence avec la France, qui cherchait à détourner les routes de commerce trans-sahariennes vers la Tunisie et l'Algérie, Tripoli cherchait à rétablir ses relations avec les trois centres de commerce sahariens : Marzuq, Ghudamis et Bornu.[1]

Déjà, en 1875, le pouvoir ottoman se trouvait rétabli à Ghat, où répondant à l'appel des négociants du lieu, ce carrefour stratégique des caravanes se trouvait établi comme *kaza* ottoman. En plus, en 1877 le gouvernement interdisait tout voyage par les européens au delà de Tripoli, sauf pour ceux qui étaient officiellement porteurs de laisser-passers ottomans. Parmi les trois centres du commerce transsaharien, Marzuq se trouvait en déclin mais Ghudamis prospérait grâce à son rôle d'intermédiaire indispensable sur les routes vers le Tchad, surtout pour le pèlerinage africain vers la Mecque. Mais entre ces trois lieux Bornu était de loin le plus important pour Istanbul. Les liens entre Bornu et l'empire ottoman étaient très ténus depuis qu'au seizième siècle, les Ottomans avaient

[1]Michel L. Gall, *Pashas, Bedouins and Notables: Ottomans Administration in Tripoli and Benghazi 1881-1902*, Princeton University, Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation 1986, pp. 117-124.

encadré les troupes du Sultan de Bornu.[2] Comme les deux autres centres, Bornu était un lieu important pour le commerce d'esclaves, qui fut interdit par l'État ottoman en 1847. Les liens entre Bornu et Istanbul, quoique symboliques, étaient d'une longévité surprenante ; en 1890 les voyageurs dans la region rapportaient que le pavillon ottoman battait toujours sur les remparts du palais du Sultan de Bornu.[3] En effet en 1886 le Sultan de Bornu venait d'affirmer ses liens avec Tripoli dans une lettre remise au Paşa de cette ville et adressée au Sultan Abdülhamid II.

En somme, les relations entre l'État ottoman et les centres commerciaux du Sahara dépendaient du passage libre des marchandises du bassin tchadien vers les ports de Tripoli et de Benghazi. C'est précisement sur ce plan que s'établit la concurrence franco-ottomane dans le Sahara. Quand le colonialisme français commença sa pénétration dans cette region il profita de l'experience ottomane. C'était d'abord par simple détournement du commerce que la France comptait établir son influence. Ce ne fut que vers les années 1880 que des projets plus ambitieux seraient mis en chantier.

Mais ni les Français ni les Ottomans n'ont pu imposer leurs volontés dans cette région gouvernée en fait par ses propres lois. En 1881 la mission du Colonel Flatters échouait spectaculairement, et les grands projets de liaison de l'Algérie française aux territoires français d'Afrique Centrale par le chemin de fer furent abandonnés. En février 1881, le Colonel Flatters et ses tirailleurs étaient massacrés par les Touaregs dans le plateau du Hoggar. Cinq ans plus tard la garnison ottomane de Ghat partageait le même sort et les Touaregs massacraient les troupes ottomanes, le 14 octobre 1886. Vers la fin des années 1880 les relations turco-françaises dans le Sahara étaient dans l'impasse et Istanbul avait fini par accepter que l'établissement définitif du pouvoir ottoman dans le désert n'était pas conforme aux réalités locales. En France la mauvaise publicité occasionnée par la catastrophe du Colonel Flatters avait ajourné *sine die* tout projet global concernant le Sahara. L'impasse turco-française ne sera rompue qu'après la délimitation des sphères d'influence respectives de l'Angleterre et de la France après la crise de Fashoda en 1898.[4]

L'émergence du danger italien dans la Tripolitaine

Dans la littérature contemporaine sur les prétensions italiennes dans la Tripolitaine on n'admet l'existence de desseins sérieux de la part de l'Italie

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[2]Cengiz Orhonlu, 'Osmanlı-Bornu Münasebetine aid Belgeler' *Istanbul Üniversitesi Tarih Dergisi* No. 23 (mars 1969) ; pp. 111-130.
[3]Le Gall, *op. cit*, p. 169.
[4]*Ibid*, pp. 131-135 ; 159-163.

qu'après le début du 20e siècle. Mais des documents inédits jusqu'à présent et récemment mis à la dispositions des chercheurs nous montrent que les soupçons ottomans vis-à-vis des Italiens datent de 1884 au moins.

Un memorandum provenant du *vilayet* de Tripoli et portant la date du 15 août 1884 notait que les adhérents à l'ordre religieux (*tarikat*) des Senoussis étaient toujours en train d'user de leurs influences en faveur de la Sublime Porte. En matière d'éducation ils exerçaient une influence civilisatrice sur les nomades, en leur conseillant d'obéir au Caliphe et de ne pas s'entretuer. Certaines influences néfastes provenant des étrangers cherchaient à semer la discorde entre le *tarikat* et le pouvoir ottoman en calomniant les *dervi*ş, et en les accusant d'intriguer contre les Ottomans. Le *Vali* soulignait que l'ordre demeurait loyal à l'État. La Sublime Porte répondait le 15 septembre 1884. Le Sultan avait décrété l'envoi de 1000 *kuru*ş aux chefs du *tarikat*. La raison en était que ces chefs de *tekke*s avaient refusé les offres d'honneurs et des cadeaux émanant des Italiens. Le Ministre de l'Intérieur affirmait que leur attitude était d'autant plus louable que le cadeau porté jusqu'au Jaghbub, le centre du *tarikat* en plein désert, consistait en un service à thé en porcelaine comprenant un grand nombre de pièces et valant plus de mille livres turques ![5]

Le danger italien continua à préoccuper les hommes d'État ottomans. Un compte-rendu du Conseil des Ministres daté du 28 avril 1885 constatait que d'après les informations reçues du chargé d'affaires ottoman à Rome, les derniers préparatifs militaires italiens pourraient concerner une mobilisation pour l'invasion de la Tripolitaine. L'avis des ministres était que les actes de ce genre étaient en contravention directe avec les accords internationaux et le droit international. L'État ottoman devrait avertir les autres puissances. Mais les simples protestations ne valaient pas grand chose et pouvait même provoquer un fait accompli de la part de l'Italie. Donc, le gouvernement devrait entreprendre les mesures sérieuses pour la défence de la Tripolitaine contre une aggression italienne eventuelle. Sinon on risquait le fait accompli qui pourrait déchaîner "l'effet domino" en encourageant d'autres puissances à s'emparer des possessions ottomanes en Afrique.[6]

Un explorateur ottoman en Afrique Centrale.

Avec l'intensification de la concurrence des puissances pour les terres africaines dans la dernière décennie du siècle, les Ottomans entreprirent une

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[5] *Başbakanlık Arşivi* (BA) *Yıldız Arşivi, Resmi Maruzat* (Y.A. Res.) 25/14. *Vilayet* de Benghazi au ministre des Affaires intérieures, 2 Ağustos 1300 (13 août 1884); *İrade* du 23 *Zilkade* 1301 (15 septembre 1884).

[6] Y.A Res. 29/39 Compte-rendu du Conseil des Ministres 12 *Şaban* 1302, (28 mai 1885).

politique de propagande pan-islamiste en Afrique. Mais cette propagande devait se garder de tout éclat afin de ne pas provoquer de représailles de la part des Grandes Puissances.

A la mi-avril 1894, un aide de camp du Sultan Abdülhamid II, İbrahim Derviş Paşa, attirait l'attention du Sultan sur les activités de certains 'ingénieurs' anglais qui faisaient des travaux cartographiques en Afrique Centrale. Derviş Paşa conseillait au Sultan d'envoyer des agents secrets ottomans aux mêmes territoires, et lui recommandait un certain Muhammad Başala, négociant à Tripoli, comme la personne la plus qualifiée pour entreprendre cette tâche. Başala, très probablement un ancien marchand d'esclaves, se trouvait à Istanbul et offrait ses services. Comme preuve de sa familiarité avec l'Afrique Centrale, Başala avait rédigé un rapport détaillé d'un voyage qu'il avait entrepris entre 1878 et 1882 comme explorateur et propagandiste de l'État.[7]

Başala commençait son récit en déclarant que les pays où il avait voyagé contenaient des millions de musulmans, qui vénéraient le Caliphe ottoman et pouvaient donc être rassemblés sous son drapeau (le rapport abondait en déclarations optimistes visant sans doute à faire plaisir au Sultan). La première escale de Başala était l'oasis de Kawar, où il aurait eu de longs entretiens avec les notables de ce pays, tous les adhérents du *tarikat* Senoussi, et leur aurait 'expliqué longuement et sincèrement la générosité et la bienveillance de son Auguste Maitre le Caliphe...' Başala décrit aussi en détail le commerce du sel entre le Kawar et le Soudan. De là il traverse le désert jusqu'au grand carrefour du Sahara, Bornu. Başala précise que Bornu était l'endroit le plus important qu'il avait visité pendant ses voyages :

> Parce que Bornu était l'endroit le plus important que j'ai visité pendant mes pérégrinations, j'ai remis le cadeau le plus important que je portais à son souverain... Le Saint Étendard du Caliphat (*Sancak-ı Şerif*)... Celui-ci prit ce cadeau avec le plus profond respect et ordonna qu'on le hisse sur sa résidence tous les jours saints, et tous les vendredis...[8]

Rappelons ici que les voyageurs européens avaient rapportés que le pavillon ottoman flottait toujours sur Bornu en 1890.[9] Pendant les quatres années que Başala aurait vécu à Bornu, il serait entré en correspondance avec les souverains de Sokoto et de Kano (en Nigeria actuellement) en leur décrivant, 'la largesse et le pouvoir du Sultan'. Dans le cour de son voyage de retour Başala croise une tribu de Touaregs du Hoggar :

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[7]BA, *Yıldız Esas Evrakı* (Y.E.E) 39/2128/129/118, Aide de Camp du Sultan au Secrétariat Imperial, 7 *Şevval* 1311 (14 avril 1894).
[8]*Ibid.*
[9]Le Gall, *op. cit.*

> Je les ai trouvé très dévoués à notre Maitre et ils m'ont fièrement racontés qu'ils tenaient toujours un ferman Impérial de la part du Sultan Selim. Ils m'ont raconté d'une manière très bizarre que quelques temps auparavant ils avaient croisés des voyageurs français envoyés par leur gouvernement, mais qui ne portaient pas de ferman de passage du Caliphat, Donc, ils les ont tous tués et ont saisi leurs biens et leurs animaux...[10]

Les Touaregs auraient demandé à Başala de porter 'la bonne nouvelle' au Sultan. Étant donné que Başala a fait cette rencontre en 1882, et qu'il s'agissait des Touaregs du Hoggar et d'une mission française officielle, il est possible qu'il soit tombé sur les mêmes Touaregs qui avaient massacré la mission du Colonel Flatters en février 1881.[11]

Quoique peint en couleurs plutôt vives, le rapport de Başala demeure un document intéressant car il nous montre que l'État ottoman faisait un effort de garder le contact avec les musulmans de l'Afrique Centrale pendant la période la plus virulente de l'impérialisme. Bien que Başala ait très probablement exagéré pour faire plaisir il donne des informations sur des territoires très peu connus même par les explorateurs européens à cette date.

Les Ottomans et la Conférence de Berlin sur l'Afrique (15 novembre 1884-26 février 1885)

Il est assez courant de voir, dans la littératureé sur des questions africaines des déclarations proclamant que l'élite ottomane ne s'intéressaient pas aux affaires africaines. Ces affirmations sont dénuées de tout fondement, et sont les produits d'un état d'esprit qui s'arroge le droit d'adopter sans critique le discours euro-centriste de "l'homme malade". L'allégation souvent faite selon laquelle les Ottomans se désintéressaient de la délimitation des bassins du Niger et du Congo est également erronée. Le délégué du Sultan à la Conférence de Berlin, Mehmed Said Paşa, fait figure de parti actif et bien informé dans les déliberations.

Quand les invitations à la Conférence furent envoyées, l'Empire ne figurait pas parmi les états invités. Les Ottomans qui virent que même des puissances de deuxième rang comme les États-Unis et la Suède, qui n'avaient pas de possessions africaines, étaient invitées, interprétèrent cela comme le comble des insultes. Le 10 novembre 1884, la Sublime Porte demanda l'avis à ses conseillers juridiques sur les questions suivantes : *primo* la Sublime Porte, figure-t-elle comme invitée dans toutes les conférences convoquées depuis la

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[10] BA, Y.E.E 39/2128/129/118.
[11] Le Gall *op. cit.*

conclusion du Traité de Paris en 1856 ? *secundo* : Étant admis comme membre dans le Concert Européen, est-ce que la Sublime Porte ne dispose pas du droit d'être invitée à toutes les réunions de ces puissances ? Et lié à cette question : si l'État ottoman ne proteste pas de son exclusion auprès du gouvernement allemand est-ce que cela pourrait engendrer l'affaiblissement de ses droits acquis par le Traité de Paris ? En réponse, les conseillers juridiques ont constaté que l'État ottoman était invité à toutes les grandes conférences depuis 1856. Mais des conférences de plus petite envergure, concernant plutôt des questions locales, s'étaient réunis sans la participation d'Istanbul. Les deux exemples avancés par les conseillers furent la conférence sur le Luxembourg réunie à Londres en 1867, et la Conférence de Madrid réunie pour régler l'affaire du Maroc en 1880. En conclusion, les conseillers étaient d'avis que la Sublime Porte devrait insister sur sa participation car il était fort probable que les actes de la Conférence de Berlin s'étendraient sur les questions touchant aux territoires ottomans en Afrique. Si l'Empire se tenait a l'écart il se trouverait en difficulté dans le futur car la conférence devrait régler des questions de principe en matière d'invasion et d'occupation. Étant donné aussi le grand nombre de pays participants, l'État ottoman pourrait se trouver isolé dans le futur.[12]

Un compte-rendu du Conseil des Ministres datant du 13 novembre 1884, expliquait que la participation ottomane à la conférence était indispensable, malgré le fait que l'ordre du jour ne concernait que des territoires où l'état n'avait pas d'intérêts directs. Un délégué devrait se trouver présent dans le cas où les délégués des autres puissances excéderaient les limites de la conférence et entameraient des discussions sur les territoires faisant partie de la sphère d'intérêt de la Porte.[13]

Le 2 décembre 1884 le Sultan Abdülhamid II ordonna qu'un délégué ottoman soit présent à la Conférence de Berlin avec les instructions suivantes : 'défendre tous les droits de l'Empire dans le Continent Africain...'[14] Les rapports envoyés par Said Paşa de Berlin nous montre un diplomate professionel, suivant attentivement le déroulement de la conférence, et n'hésitant pas à intervenir quand les intérêts de la Sublime Porte semblaient être en cause. Les 4 et 9 décembre Said Paşa envoya deux télégrammes contenant des informations sur la délimitation du bassin du Congo. Le délégué du Sultan rapporta même les moindres détails sur les tracés minutieux des frontières 'théoriques' de cette région que les Européens divisaient sans même l'avoir vue. Said Paşa rapporta aussi les

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[12] Y. A Res, 26/9 Aide-mémoire des conseillers juridiques de la Porte. 28 *Teşrin-i Evvel* 1884 (10 novembre 1884).

[13] Y.A Res, 26/14 Compte rendu du conseil des Ministres, 23 *Muharrem* 1302, (13 novembre 1884).

[14] Y. A Res, 26/27 Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à la Sublime Porte, 12 Sefer 1302, (2 décembre 1884).

discussions d'un éventuel chemin de fer dans le Congo.[15] Le délégué d'Istanbul précisait également que la question sur laquelle tous les délégués étaient d'accord était l'adoption du principe du commerce libre dans le bassin du Congo et les territoires jusqu'à l'Océan Indien. Si l'État ottoman s'opposait à cette tendance générale il se trouverait isolé. Le 13 décembre Said Paşa faisait un nouveau rapport sur l'insistance des puissances sur la question du libre commerce. Il soulignait qu'une résistance inutile sur ce point pourrait obliger Istanbul à céder sur d'autres points plus importants comme l'exclusion des sources du Nil du bassin congolais. L'Ambassadeur affirmait que de s'obstiner sur ce principe ne servirait à rien, et que en tout cas les régions affectées contenaient une faible population musulmane.

La perspective islamique d'ailleurs, fut un des critères les plus importants du point de vue ottoman. Quand le délégué italien proposa de formuler un protocole général mettant toutes les missions chrétiennes sous la protection de la Conférence, Said Paşa s'y opposa vigoureusement. Dans ses efforts sur l'affaire des missionnaires il fut soutenu par le Prince Bismarck, qui fait savoir qu'il opposerait également à la proposition italienne, et que l'affaire ne reviendrait pas à l'ordre du jour.[16] Ce soutien du participant le plus influent fut interprété à Istanbul comme un vrai 'coup diplomatique'. Mais les membres du Conseil n'étaient pas du même avis que Said Paşa sur la question du libre commerce. Un compte-rendu, après avoir évalué les télégrammes de Said Paşa, concluait que la Sublime Porte devrait garder sa réserve sur ce point.[17] En somme, la Porte estimait qu'elle avait affirmé sa présence en Afrique par sa participation à la conférence.

Les Ottomans et la Doctrine de Hinterland.

Un des problèmes principaux débattus par la Confèrence de Berlin fut le Principe de l'Hinterland. Développé par Bismarck afin de prévenir les affrontements entre les puissances, d'après ce principe tout pays s'établissant dans quelque région africaine que ce soit, devait en informer les autres puissances. En 1888 ce principe fut élargi par l'Institut de Droit International de Lausanne, et devint le principe de base de l'occupation de l'Afrique.[18] En 1890 la Sublime Porte adoptait le Principe de l'Hinterland (*Hinterland Kaidesi*) comme fondement juridique dans son différent avec la France sur le hinterland de la Tripolitaine. Le

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[15] *Ibid.* Aide mémoire des Affaires Étrangères à la Sublime Porte, 14 *Sefer* 1302 (4 décembre 1884); télégramme de Said Paşa au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 1 *Kanun-u Evvel* 1884 (9 décembre 1884).
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] Le Gall, *op. cit.* p. 166.

30 octobre 1890 le ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Porte envoya une note diplomatique au Quai d'Orsay. Il soulignait que les droits de l'Empire en Afrique, 'd'après les anciens titres et le Principe de l'Hinterland', devraient s'étendre jusqu'à la plupart des territoires du Tchad et le Nigeria du Nord.[19]

Le gouvernement ottoman appuyait ses arguments sur les droits souverains du Sultan dans ces régions proclamés à la Conférence de Berlin cinq ans auparavant par le délégué ottoman et sur le fait qu'aucun des plénipotentaires n'y avaient soulevé d'objection. L'interprétation du gouvernement ottoman du Principe de l'Hinterland dans les régions contestées fut basé sur les liens commerciaux qui existaient entre les territoires ottomans du Fezzan et de Marzuq qui servaient de base à toutes les caravanes parcourant le bassin tchadien. En plus, la population des région contestées était presque entièrement musulmane. Donc, les régions de Kanem, Waday et Bornu étaient le hinterland naturel du pouvoir ottoman.[20]

Évidemment, la position ottomane fut rejetée par le gouvernement français qui répondit que les régions en question étaient des terres 'non-appropriés' et donc ouvertes à la colonisation.[21] La Doctrine de l'Hinterland continua d'occuper les esprits des hommes d'État turcs. Le Commissaire ottoman en Égypte, (*Mısır Fevkalade Komiseri*) après l'occupation anglaise de ce pays, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, était un des défenseurs des droits ottomans en Afrique. Les archives d'Istanbul contiennent les nombreux rapports qu'il rédigea conseillant le Sultan de s'opposer aux Anglais qui rongeaient petit à petit les intérêts ottomans en Égypte. Un de ses rapports daté du 24 avril 1894, expliquait longuement l'extension du pouvoir européen vers les sources du Nil. Le Paşa conseillait le gouvernement d'intervenir dans le Soudan en se servant du Principe de l'Hinterland pour empêcher le partage du Haut Nil entre le Congo Belge et l'Angleterre. L'État ottoman devait défendre ses intérêts en Afrique Centrale contre les gouvernements congolais, anglais et allemand. Car, si les Européens arriveraient à séparer le Soudan de l'Égypte, les Ottomans se trouverait coupés du Soudan et seraient dépendants des informations européennes concernant l'intérieur de l'Afrique. La Sublime Porte devrait fournir les cartes géographiques prouvant d'anciens titres sur le Soudan de la part de l'Égypte, qui à son tour, était toujours symboliquement tributaire de l'Empire. Le rapport de Muhtar Paşa est d'autant plus intéressant qu'il prévoit le barrage d'Aswan. Le Paşa soulignait que l'éventuelle construction d'un barrage près des sources du Nil aurait un effet

[19] *Ibid*, p. 168.
[20] *Ibid*, p. 169.
[21] *Ibid*, p. 171.

singulier sur l'écologie entière de la région. Une puissance possédant ce barrage pourrait priver l'Égypte de sa seule source de vie, les alluvions du Nil.[22]

L'Empire Ottoman et l'affaire de la Somalie

Après l'invasion de la Tunisie et l'occupation de l'Égypte, le partage africain se trouvait accéléré. Les côtes de l'ouest de la Mer Rouge demeuraient, dans les années 1880, un des derniers morceaux du 'gateau africain'. Cette région, indiqué comme *'Afrika-i Osmani'* (l'Afrique Ottomane) sur les atlas turcs, devenait une arène de la confrontation diplomatique et coloniale entre le pouvoir ottoman et les puissances européennes. La région intéressait les Ottomans car elle se trouvait aux approches du Hejaz, la base symbolique de la légitimité du Sultan comme Caliphe du monde musulman.

Les documents inédits des archives d'Istanbul nous révèlent que les 'hommes du Sultan' se sont efforcés de garder intact leurs droits dans la Somalie mais qu'ils ont dû céder, comme ailleurs, devant des forces supérieures. En 1882 Istanbul proposait que la Somalie soit administré directement par la Sublime Porte. Dans un entretien avec l'ambassadeur britannique à Istanbul, Lord Dufferin, le 24 avril 1882 le ministre des Affaires étrangères trouvait ce dernier fermement opposé à toute proposition de ce genre. En un style typique de la diplomatie anglaise, Dufferin indiqua que ce ne serait pas l'Angleterre qui s'opposerait à une telle mesure mais d'autres puissances européennes. L'Ambassadeur indiqua que l'envoi éventuel de forces militaires ottomanes 'provoquerait l'exitation' parmi les puissances. Mais, si la Somalie était temporairement rattachée à l'Égypte qui l'administrerait au nom du Sultan, Londres n'aurait pas d'objection, en plus, 'cela serait un appui pour l'effort constant de l'Angleterre de protéger les droits du Sultan dans la région...'[23]

Il faut noter que cette conversation eut lieu cinq mois avant l'occupation anglaise de l'Égypte en septembre 1882. Le diplomate anglais avait clairement énoncé que l'Angleterre reconnaissait les droits souverains du Sultan sur la Somalie. Mais trois ans plus tard, la même puissance trouvera les moyens de s'emparer du même territoire en rejetant systématiquement les mêmes droits qu'il avait reconnu trois ans auparavant. Le 26 janvier 1885, le Conseil des Ministres ottoman notait que le port de Berbera sur la côte somalienne venait d'etre envahi par l'Angleterre. Les ministres avaient notés que cela constituait une violation

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[22]BA, *Mümtaze-i Mısır* 5A 135 enclosure 25. Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa à Sublime Porte. (24 avril 1894).

[23]BA. Y. A. Res. 15/36 Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à la Sublime Porte. Numero 65. 4 *Cemaziyelahir* 1299 (24 avril 1882); Y. A. Res. 27/29 Compte-rendu du Conseil des Ministres. 8 *Rebiyülahir* 1302 (26 janvier 1885).

flagrante des droits de souveraineté que l'Angleterre avait publiquement reconnus à plusieurs reprises. Le même compte-rendu résumait aussi les transgressions des autres puissances dans la région. L'Italie qui avait envoyé des colonisateurs à Assab dans la Corne de l'Afrique, douze ans auparavant, s'était maintenant décidée à occuper le port d'Assab et ses environs. L'ambassadeur de la Sublime Porte venait de télégraphier de Rome que mille soldats avaient été embarqués sur deux navires de guerre destinés à Assab. Les Ministres notaient que l'Italie, qui avait envahi Massawa sur la Mer Rouge en 1884, cherchait maintenant à relier ses diverses têtes de ponts. Le même document remarquait qu'une 'Société Bancaire de Marseilles' (*Marsilya Hey'et-i Sarrafiyesi*) avait entrepris l'achat de la région de Sheikh Said dans le Golfe d'Aden. L'Ambassade ottomane à Paris venait de rapporter qu'une corvette française portant des ingénieurs avait pris la mer en vue de réaliser des études sur la viabilité du projet. Les ministres avisait que l'État ottoman devrait avertir toutes les puissances de ses anciens titres dans la région, mais aussi des mesures militaires devraient être mises sur pied pour défendre les intérêts de la Porte.[24]

Dans tous ces trois cas d'agression la Sublime Porte cherchait à mettre en valeur ses 'droits émanant du passé'. Mais comme toujours, elle vit que l'argumentation juridique ne valait rien sans la force militaire pour la mettre en pratique.

Le 25 octobre 1884 deux aide-mémoires échangés entre le ministre des Affaires étrangères Asım Paşa et le Grand Vezir Said Paşa reflètent les mêmes préoccupations juridiques. Asım Paşa notait que le ministre des Affaires étrangères britannique, Lord Granville, avait fait savoir à l'ambassadeur ottoman à Londres, Musurus Paşa, que le gouvernement britannique ne reconnaissait pas les droits ottomans en Somalie, car l'État ottoman avait refusé d'approuver le traité de 1877 entre l'Égypte et l'Angleterre concernant la Somalie. Said Paşa répondait que les vues de Lord Granville étaient absolument irréconciliables avec les droits clairs et nets du gouvernement ottoman. Si ce pays ne reconnaissait pas les droits de l'Empire dans ces territoires pourquoi avait-il demandé la sanction de la Sublime Porte au traité de 1877 ? Le Grand Vezir recommandait l'occupation de la côte de Zeyla à Massawa par les troupes du *Vilayet* du Yemen et, en même temps, la recherche d'une solution de droit avec l'Angleterre. Said Paşa ajoutait que l'affaire était d'autant plus délicate que la conférence de Berlin était en cours.[25]

Au sujet de la volte-face anglaise la Sublime Porte envoya des instructions très fermes à son ambassadeur à Londres. Musurus Paşa devait faire savoir à Granville que les droits de souveraineté ottoman ne dépendaient pas d'un traité

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[24] *Ibid.*

[25] Y. A Res. 27/29 Aide-Mémoires échangés entre Asım Paşa et Said Paşa 5 *Muharrem* 1302 (25 octobre 1884).

quelconque entre l'Angleterre et l'Égypte. Ces droits étaient beaucoup plus anciens, et se basaient sur le fait qu'en Somalie le sultan ottoman était vénéré au titre de Caliphe par tous les musulmans depuis des siècles. En plus les Anglais avaient récemment encouragé la Porte à envoyer une force militaire dans cette région, donc reconnaissant eux-mêmes ces droits. La Sublime Porte soulignait que ses droits souverains n'étaient pas prescriptibles, et souhaitait que l'Angleterre revienne à sa politique antérieure.[26]

Le 8 janvier 1886 un télégramme provenant de l'Égypte, et rédigé par le Khédive Tevfik Paşa, relatait l'histoire de l'occupation de Ra's Hafun sur la côte somalienne. Le Khédive répondait aux questions du gouvernement ottoman sur la continuité du pouvoir égyptien en Somalie. Le pavillon ottoman fut érigé à Ra's Hafun pour la première fois en 1867 et pour la deuxième fois en 1875. Mais le Khédive avouait que l'Égypte ne disposait pas des moyens militaires ou financiers pour tenir Ra's Hafun, et que les troupes égyptiennes avaient dû être retirées.[27]

Conclusion

Dans la litterature courante sur l'histoire diplomatique de l'Empire ottoman au 19e siècle l'attitude la plus fréquente est la suivante : 'Une histoire de la Turquie sans les Turcs'. Mais les Ottomans n'étaient pas de simples observateurs indifférent à leurs sort, comme les dépeint l'historiographie de type orientaliste. Ils jouaient un rôle actif dans les jeux politiques du Moyen-Orient et du Maghreb. Car, il ne faut jamais oublier que l'Empire ottoman, aussi affaibli et corrompu qu'il soit, n'a jamais été colonisé au sens propre du terme. Jusqu'à la fin de l'Empire en 1918, les hommes d'État turcs sont responsbales de leurs actes, de leurs décisions, et de leurs erreurs, car, quoique influencés par les Puissances, en fin de compte ils sont restés maîtres chez eux.

Cependant, même dans les recherches entreprises récemment, nous observons la même attitude assez simpliste. On avance souvent, par exemple, que le Sultan Abdülhamid II poursuivait deux buts contradictoires : il voulait se faire accepter comme membre dans le Concert Européen, mais à la fois, il cherchait à faire le pan-Islamisme. La position du Sultan n'était point contradictoire, ni même exceptionelle. Le Tsar avec le pan-Slavisme et le Kaiser avec son pan-Germanisme faisaient exactement la même chose. La dose de

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[26] *Ibid*, épreuve des instructions envoyés à Musurus Paşa du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. (sans date).

[27] *Ibid*, Khédive Tevfik Paşa au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 20 *Rebiyülevvel* 1302 (8 janvier 1885).

romantisme n'était pas plus prononcée dans le cas ottoman que dans celui des autres puissances.

En plus, les hommes d'État ottoman ne se faisaient point d'illusions sur les limites de leurs pouvoir. Après l'invasion de Tunis en 1881, Arifi Paşa, ministre des Affaires étrangères, constata que l'Empire ottoman avait des droits clairs et nets en Tunisie mais, 'Les droits n'existe que si on les utilise...' (*Hak isti'mal ile payidar olur*).[28]

Dans ce canevas de la politique ottomane en Afrique nous pouvons constater que ce qui manquait aux serviteurs du Sultan n'était pas la sophistication ou bien les arguments juridiques, mais la puissance matérielle. Étant donné cette réalité il est trop facile de juger inutiles, voire puériles leurs efforts d'établir les 'anciens titres' et leurs 'droits souverains dans le Congo'. Mais vus dans leurs propre contexte les arguments de la Porte nous révèlent un État complètement dépassé sur le plan matériel mais gardant toujours son habileté politique. Les Ottomans dans leur politique africaine avaient affaire à une vraie 'tâche de Sisyphe', leurs arguments juridiques étant remis en cause à chaque crise.

[28]BA. Y.E.E 11/1128/126/9 Aide-mémoire d'Arifi Paşa 27 *Cemaziyelahir* 1298. (28 mai 1881).

Michel LE GALL

A NEW OTTOMAN OUTLOOK ON AFRICA: NOTE ON TURN OF THE CENTURY LITERATURE

Even the casual reader of African history in the late nineteenth century will find references to the Ottoman government. Most of these references record in passing the attendance of an Ottoman minister at a conference or a word of protest from Istanbul, or else they mention the sultan as the nominal suzerain of Egypt, Tunisia, the Sudan or parts of Ethiopia and the Red Sea coast. Apart from alleged Ottoman-Sanusi cooperation in the Chad Basin[1] and asides on pan-Islamism, however the vast literature on the "Scramble for Africa" fails to recognize the existence of any Ottoman reaction to the rapid European colonization of continental Africa beyond the Mediterranean coastal areas of Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt, the first two of which had fallen under French, and the third under British, rule.[2]

This note proposes to review the emerging attitudes of, and information available to, the Ottoman government of Africa in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and first decade of the twentieth century as reflected in the internal bureaucratic documents and manuscripts dealing with the twin provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, or as they were known to the Ottomans, Trablus Garb and Bingazi.

From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, the Ottoman government had enjoyed a comparative advantage over the European states *vis-à-vis* Africa: for one thing, it represented a power whose religion — Islam — was that of much of North and West Africa; for another, it commanded outposts along the

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[1]For a review of Ottoman-Sanusi relations, see my "Ottoman Government and the Sanusiyya: a Reappraisal," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 21 (1989): pp. 91-106.

[2]A first look at this subject was provided by Ettore Rossi in his article, "Per la storia della penetrazione turca nell 'interno della Libia a per la questione dei suoi confini," *Oriento Moderno* 9 (1929): pp. 154-67. A modern Turkish account by Abdurrahman Çaycı, *Büyük Sahrada Türk-Fransız Rekabeti, 1858-1911*, (Erzurum 1970) provides a thorough survey.

Mediterranean coastline from which it might have extended its rule inland. But the Ottoman government did not do so. Almost four centuries of direct or nominal Ottoman suzerainty over the coast from Algiers to Alexandria have left little trace in the literature of any developed or sustained Ottoman political interest in the African heartland.[3]

Before the "Scramble"

Ottoman attitudes towards Africa on the eve of the European "Scramble for Africa" were shaped by two elements, a political strategy and an economic interest. Both had their origins in a legacy of some three hundred and fifthy years.[4]

In the sixteenth century the Ottoman government sought to secure the western Mediterranean as their *mare nostrum* by maintaining a string of naval bases in North Africa. Ottoman "naval imperialism"[5] envisaged these North African dependencies not only as naval bases, but also as providers of ships and sometimes sailors to patrol the western Mediterranean and harass enemy shipping, notably that of the Habsburg empire and Venice. With the Ottoman abortive siege of Malta (1565) and their defeat at Lepanto (1571), the western Mediterranean, however, succumbed to the power of the Habsburgs and their allies. By the mid-seventeenth century, the Ottoman Imperial Council had little occasion to call upon its North African vassals for reinforcements, and imperial rule in these outposts quickly sank to a nominal status. Local janissary families vied for control and two of them forged dynasties that enjoyed virtual independence for over a century: the Qaramanlis of Tripolitania (r. 1711-1835) and the Husaynids of Tunisia (r. 1705-1957).[6] Oblivious to their Ottoman *raison d'être*, these tributary rulers continued the *jihad* against Europe as corsairs and mercenaries for economic gain. Their operations were not challenged until, at the Congress of Aix-La-Chapelle (1819), the navies of Europe and the United States joined to suppress piracy in the Mediterranean.[7]

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[3]There were periodic forays into the interior, or contacts with local rulers. But none of these reflected a coherent overal policy. For an attempt to subdue the Fezzan in 1577-78 and submit it to the rule of the Awlad Muhammad, see Rossi, "confini," p. 154. For relations with Bornu in the late sixteenth century, see Cengiz Orhonlu, "Osmanlı-Bornu münasebetine ait belgeler," *Tarih Dergisi* 8 (1969): pp. 11-130; B. G. Martin, "Mai Idris of Bornu and the Ottoman Turks," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3 (1972): pp. 470-90.

[4]There are a number of general works on Ottoman policy in North Africa. See Andrew Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier* (Chicago, 1978); Samih İlter, *Şimali Afrika'da Türkler*, 2 vols (Istanbul, 1934).

[5]Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, pp. 80-81.

[6]For a brief overview of the history of both dynasties, see R. Mantran, "Husaynids" and "Karamanlis", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* 2nd ed.

[7]Çaycı, *Büyük Sahra'da*, p. 9.

The French conquest of Algeria in 1830 prompted a reassessment of Ottoman ties with North Africa. In the wake of French support for Muhammad Ali, the *de facto* independent ruler of Ottoman Egypt (r. 1805-1841), the Sublime Porte could not allow French aggression on the southern shores of the Mediterranean to go unanswered. The Ottoman reconquest of Tripolitania in 1835 was a reply, albeit a feeble one, to the French seizure of Algeria. But while the rationale behind the Ottoman move harkened back to the sixteenth century, the navy needed to revive a North African base was lacking. Instead of ships, the Porte stationed in Tripolitania a tiny garrison of less than 1,000 men and signed with neighboring Tunisia treaties which reaffirmed her historical links with the Sublime Porte.[8]

Ottoman economic interest in the heartland of Africa before the mid-nineteenth century was linked to the trans-Saharan trade through Tripoli, which furnished Istanbul with slaves and other luxury items such as gold dust and ivory. This trade between the kingdoms of the Chad Basin and the northern coastal towns had ancient roots and had been carried on for centuries by local Arab merchants.[9] And while few Istanbul merchants invested in the caravan trade, they purchased slaves in Tripoli through their agents. For the coffers of the Ottoman state and those of its North African tributary states, the revenues brought by the trade derived from market and port taxes.

Except for interruptions due to raids in the interior, the caravan trade continued unhindered until the 1840s, when British abolitionists launched an attack on the African slave trade to the Ottoman Empire. Their efforts elicited little sympathy or cooperation from the Sublime Porte at first, but through negotiation they effected the virtual suppression of the trade by 1890.[10] In the early stages of the suppressionist efforts, Ottoman statesmen never suspected that the larger political fate of Africa would soon be at stake.

Whereas the Ottomans and the Qaramanlis had never exploited the trade for the political domination of the Sahara and Chad Basin, French officials in Algeria were quick to embark on just such a scheme. Beginning in the 1850s,

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[8]For an overview of Ottoman civil and military strength in Tripolitania at the outset of the French invasion of Tunisia, see Başbakanlık Arşivi (BA)/Yıldız Esas Evrakı (YEE)/14/388/126/9, report of Governor Nazif Paşa, 1 Haziran 1297/13 June 1881. For the texts of treaties with Tunisia, *ibid.*, YEE/35/260/95/103, envelope 1. For an overview of the status of Tunisia in the Ottoman Empire, Robert Mantran, "L'Evolution des relations entre la Tunisie et l'Empire Ottoman du XVI[e] au XIX[e] siècle," *Cahiers de Tunisie* 26-27 (1959): pp. 313-333.

[9]On the ancient origins of the Trans-Saharan trade, see B. G. Martin, "Kanem, Bornu and the Fezzan: Notes on the Political History of a Trade Route," *Journal of African History* 10 (1969): pp. 15-27.

[10]For the suppression of the slave trade, see Ehud R. Toledano, *The Ottoman Slave Trade and Its Suppression, 1840-1890* (Princeton 1982).

the French resident general in Algeria launched a plan to subdue the Sahara by first syphoning the bulk of trans-Saharan trade away from Tripoli, its preferred terminus, to Algiers.[11] Complaints lodged at the Porte by merchants in the southwest emporia towns of Ghat and Ghudamis evoked little sympathy at a time that France was an Ottoman ally in the Crimean War. In 1862, French officials signed the Treaty of Ghudamis with a chief of the Azger Tuareg, the nomads responsible for escorting the trans-Saharan caravans. In response to requests by merchants and the governor of Tripolitania, the Porte reduced export taxes to a level well below the one in Algiers thereby sustaining the flow of the caravan trade to Tripoli.[12]

In 1875, the Porte finally agreed to the establishment of an Ottoman garrison in the emporium town of Ghat and appointed a Tuareg chief as Ottoman *kaymakam* (district official).[13] Unwittingly, the Ottomans had gained a political edge in the Sahara. This, however, was not due to any merit of Ottoman policy but rather to the indiscretion of French policy and explorers in the Sahara. Still, more pressing for both Ottoman officials and the advocates of French colonialism was the new protectorate over Tunisia.

Pan-Islamism and New Currents in the Bureaucratic Correspondence

In May 1881, the French conquered Tunisia and in September 1882, the British occupied Egypt, two provinces over which the Ottoman sultan claimed suzerainty, albeit a purely theoretical one. These developments gradually elicited a marked change in the attitudes of the Ottoman government towards Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the African interior. By comparison with Tunisia and Egypt, it should be remembered that Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were barren, poorly administered, and underpopulated provinces. Their capitals were dusty towns, not cities. The Kuloğlu irregulars, the descendants of janissaries and native women who were the mainstay of the local defense forces, were undisciplined, ill-equipped to defend the provinces, and unwilling to fulfill their

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[11]For a French perspective on the conquest of the Sahara, see Augustin Bernard and Nicolas Lacroix, *La pénétration saharienne, 1830-1906* (Algiers 1906). For the Western African campaigns and their connection with the Sahara see A.S. Kanya-Forstner, *The Conquest of the Western Sudan, A Study in French Military Imperialism* (Cambridge, 1969).

[12]For the Ottoman perspective on these events of the 1850s and 1860s, see my "The End of the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade: A View from Tripoli, 1857-1902," paper presented to the Workshop on the Long Distance Trade in the Slaves Across the Sahara and the Black Sea in the 19th Century, Bellagio, Italy, 10-16 December, 1988. See also, André Martel, "La politique saharienne et ottomane, 1835-1918," in *Le Sahara, rapports et contacts humains, 7ème colloque d'histoire organisé par la Faculté des Lettres d'Aix-en Provence* (Aix-en-Provence, 1967), pp. 91-144.

[13]For the order to establish an Ottoman garrison at Ghat, see BA/İrade/Dahiliye/49188.

functions as tax collectors, regardless of the tax exemptions that they enjoyed.[14] A good part of the credit for fostering government interest in these provinces must go to Ahmed Rasim Paşa, Ottoman governor of Tripolitania from 1881 to 1896. An advocate of Midhat Paşa's constitution of 1876 and a relative and ally of the liberal reformer, he was banished to the governorship of Tripolitania by Sultan Abdülhamid II.[15] There, rather than accepting his banishment as a retirement, he carried out his responsibilities with great determination. During his unprecedented fifteen year tenure, he restructured the finances of the province, radically expanded its defenses, and introduced extensive administrative and educational reforms.[16] In the eyes of more avowedly anti-European officials in Tripolitania, Ahmed Rasim acquiesced too easily to French demands over the Tripolitania-Tunisia border and Ottoman outposts in the Sahara, two of which he dismantled.[17] These quarrels aside, he commanded the respect of a sultan who did not look kindly on his governor's political opinions.

Concurrent with the reforms instituted by Ahmed Rasim was the appearance in Istanbul of a number of works that sought to bestow some importance and value on Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the last two provinces that remained to the Porte on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. At the same time, the bureaucratic correspondence between Istanbul and its North African provinces reflected the pan-Islamic schemes of Abdülhamid II, which called for the recognition of the sultan's spiritual command over all Muslims by virtue of his also being Caliph, the rightful successor of the Prophet Muhammad.

As a government policy, the aim of pan-Islamism was to harness the sympathy and support of those Muslims who either lived under European control — be it in North Africa, India or Southeast Asia — or were at risk of falling under the yoke of the unbelievers.[18] The policy stirred up a good deal of uneasiness in European chancelleries. Many observers were quick to associate it with anti-European conspiracies whereas in fact there was little or no evidence to

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[14]BA/YEE/14/388/126/9, Nazif Paşa's report, 1 Haziran 1297/13 June 1881.

[15]For Ahmed Rasim's political biography, see Mehmed Süreyya Paşa, *Sicill-i Osmani*, 4 vols. (Istanbul 1308-15) 4: pp. 856-57.

[16]For an overview of these reforms, see the *salname* of the province of Tripoli for the year 1312 A.H.: *Salname-i vilayet-i Trablus Garb, 1312 A.H* (Tripoli 1312 A.H./1894-5), pp. 168-187.

[17]See the remarks of Mahmud Naci, *Tarikh Tarabulus al-Gharb*, translated by Muhammad al-Usta (Beirut, 1970), pp. 188-89. (The Turkish text was not available to me.)

[18]For a description of the Pan-Islamic circle in Istanbul and its "cosmopolitan milieu", see Martin Seth Kramer, "The Congress in Modern Islam: On the Origins of an Innovation," Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1982, 1-24 An abbreviated version of this chapter appears in *idem, Islam Assembled: the Advent of the Muslim Congresses* (New York, 1986), pp. 1-9.

support such an allegation.[19] Pan-Islamism fostered numerous political contacts and burgeoned the payrolls of the sultan's palace; but it produced few tangible foreign policy successes. It did enjoy another existence, however, as a literary motif in the bureaucratic correspondence and in that between the Palace and its Muslim sympathizers. Here, the paternal — not to say patronizing — attitudes that the rhetoric of Pan-Islamism sometimes engendered resembled the discourse of the "white man's burden"; only the scale of self-delusion was greater, chiefly because the Ottoman government did not wield the political might of its European foes.[20]

In dispatches between the provinces and Istanbul, the governors of Tripolitania or Cyrenaica might boast of the vast number of Sultan Abdülhamid's loyal subjects in the Sahara, or mention a *hutbe* (sermon delivered at Friday prayer) spoken in the sultan's name in some little-known oasis of the Sahara. Such references echoed the aspirations of the sultan's Pan-Islamic circle in Yıldız Palace. They also endowed the twin provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica with a political significance which might enhance the career of a governor who was languishing on the frontier of the empire. Governor Musa Kazım paşa (r. 1885-1888), for example, draws upon this Pan-Islamic motif in a memorandum on reform.

> The political importance [of the province of Benghazi] is obvious. For a long time, it has been under the sway and power of the Exalted Refuge of the Caliphate. And it is on an Islamic continent of nearly ninety million (*sic*) souls who, night and day, are preoccupied with the triumph of his Exalted Highness. There can be renewed and refurbished bonds between Africa and the seat of the Sublime Caliphate built upon existing ties.[21]

The anonymous faithful in Africa cropped up in many guises, but the Tuareg were a favorite. In one case, Ahmed Rasim estimated the number of loyal Tuareg "overcome by consideration and affection (*meyl ve muhabet*, an often repeated phrase) for his Illustrious Highness, Protector of the Exalted state" at

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[19]This was particularly true of the stories fostered by French observers about the Sanusi brotherhood and the Ottoman government, an issue that I have touched on elsewhere. See my "Ottoman Government and the Sanusiyya."

[20]See for example the remarks of the sultan's chief secretary in a letter to Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi where he refers to "the people of the Sudan" as "ignorant and dim-witted" and as coveting "amulets and such things that glitter." The letter of 2 Rebiülahir 1313/22 September 1895 is quoted in part in Fuad Shukri, *al-Sanusiyya, din wa dawla* (Cairo, 1948), 87. A readable facsimile of the letter appears on p. 419.

[21]BA/YEE/2254/126/11, a report on the defense of Benghazi by Musa Kazim Paşa, governor of Cyrenaica, 20 Cemaziyelahır 1302/14 April 1885.

five million.[22] A special sultanic envoy to the chief of the Sanusiyya put the Tuareg population at two million.[23]

Such statistical and rhetorical flourishes were not always greeted in the Palace with the skepticism that they merited. Collected in the Yıldız Palace archives are a number of testimonials to what Abdülhamid II and some of his advisors construed as the loyalty of African rulers to the Ottoman state. One is a letter dated 1886 from the new sultan of Bornu to Ahmed Rasim Paşa in which he avows his loyalty to the governor (ruler?) of Tripolitania (*mushir Tarabulus*) and asks the governor to accept the gift of a black eunuch.[24] A note in another file, confirms that the Ottoman flag was again flying above Ghat after an attack by the "loyal Tuareg" on the Ottoman garrison in the fall of 1886 and that a telegram announcing the good news had been sent to the Imperial Palace.[25]

Literary Works on Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Africa

In addition to the daily government dispatches concerning Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, these twin provinces were also dealt with in longer and more specialized writings that appeared in Istanbul between the 1880s and the beginning of World War I. As a category of writings, these works can best be described as handbooks or almanacs, although they are far more detailed than the official government *salnames* or yearbooks. They all offered appraisals of Tripolitania's and Cyrenaica's importance for the African continent and shared the predominant theme of their being "the gateway to Africa." Many of these writings drew upon the itineraries and information from European explorers who had embarked upon their African journeys from Tripoli — notably Lyons, Barth, and Nachtigal.

One example of this genre is a short book of 1889/90 entitled "Tripoli and Benghazi: Center for the Great Sahara and Sudan."[26] Dedicated to the sultan by its author Ömer Subhi, a major detached to the Chief of Staff, the book tries

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[22]BA/İrade/Dahiliye/75700, Ahmed Rasim Paşa to the minister of interior, 29 Ramazan 1302/11 July 1885.

[23]Sadık el-Mueyyed Bey, *Afrika Sahra-i kebirinde seyahat* (Istanbul, 1314 AH), p. 87. For further discussion of this work, see below.

[24]BA/YEE/30/332/51/78, Ahmed Rasim to the sultan's chief secretary, 5 Şaban 1303/9 May 1886; enclosure, letter from Shaykh Hamish of Bornu. For earlier nineteenth century exchanges between the rulers of Bornu and the Ottoman governors of Tripoli, see B. G. Martin, "Five Letters from the Tripoli Archives," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 2 (1962), pp. 350-379.

[25]BA/YEE/30/2366/55/78, Ahmed Rasim to Mansur Paşa, 19 Cemaziyelahir 1304/24 March 1887.

[26]Ömer Subhi, *Trablus Garb ve Bingazi ile Sahra-i kebir ve Sudan merkezi* (Istanbul, 1307 AH).

to explain not only the military and political significance of the twin provinces, but also their geographic and physical features. The text is overloaded with French phrases which are intended to bestow an air of authority and relevance on the analysis. Throughout, the work labors to sustain the argument that the Sahara, the Sudan, and Africa are an Eldorado of natural resources and commercial opportunities open to the Ottoman government by dint of its rule over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, Europe's threshold to Africa or as the author puts it "the Asia Minor of Africa."[27] In the process, Ömer Subhi provides a detailed account of the towns and villages of each *sancak,* the different caravans routes followed by the merchants engaged in trans-Saharan trade, and the goods that they carried. Of particular interest is the final section of the book entitled "Sudan".[28] Here, the author reviews the geography, natural resources, and regimes of the Saharan states of Bornu, Baguirmi, Sokoto, Zinder, Waday, and Bilma. In the end, however, Ömer Subhi presents little more than a gazetteer of the towns and administrative divisions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and the Sahara that lay beyond.

More detailed in its contents is an unpublished work of 1884 entitled "Concerning Tripoli, Benghazi, and the Fezzan: Parts of Ottoman Africa."[29] Written by a captain in the office of the Chief of Staff and presented to the sultan, the manuscript deals not only with the geography and population of these regions, but also with what the author understands as their agricultural potential — an idea he derives from North Africa's fame as a granary in Roman times.

For each town, *kaymakamlık,* and *sancak,* Yüzbaşı Ali offers precise population statistics which were compiled in the course of the reorganization of Tripolitania's tax system in 1884.[30] In addition, he details the distribution of the 12,000 Ottoman regulars throughout the province, noting what equipment they have and what battalions have cavalry units attached to them.[31] The chief merit of this work lies in its careful review of the agricultural produce (*hasılat-i arziye*) of the two provinces. In particular, he draws attention to the growing importance of esparto grass (*half otu*) for the economy of Tripolitania, an export that in time was to furnish the provincial treasury with customs revenues of over a million *kuruş* by 1890.[32] He also details the wheat and barley production, the yield of the latter being sufficient to provide exports to England for malting.[33]

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[27] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 77-88.

[29] Yüzbaşı Ali, "Afrika-i Osmaniden Trablus Garb ve Bingazi ve Fizan kıtalarına dair". MS Istanbul University, TY 5002.

[30] *Ibid.*, 34-36.

[31] *Ibid.*, 46-48.

[32] *Ibid.*, 53; YEE/14/207/126/7, Ahmed Rasim's report on Tripoli, 7 Şevval 1308/16 May 1891.

[33] Yüzbaşı Ali, "Trablus Garb," p. 54.

Fruitful comparisons are to be made between Yüzbaşı Ali's work and Mahmud Naci's book of 1912, "The History of Tripolitania."[34] The latter is a valuable storehouse of information on Tripolitania and its African hinterland on the eve of the Italian invasion. What endows the work with special value is the author's native knowledge of the area: Mahmud Naci, a one time representative of Tripolitania to the Ottoman parliament in Istanbul was the descendant of an Albanian family of janissaries that had settled in the provinces generations earlier.

The book begins with a thorough review of the population of Tripolitania based on the first detailed census of that province made in 1911. Naci's figures are not only more reliable than those of Yüzbaşı Ali. They also show very clearly that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the population of the province was increasingly sedentary and that it was also settling especially in the coastal towns, where it became engaged in menial tasks associated with preparing and shipping exports like esparto grass, skins and sponges.[35]

Mahmud Naci's discussion of Tripolitania's agriculture and natural resources contains materials similar to those found in Yüzbaşı Ali, but also provides some useful and little-known facts about Tripolitania's trade. For example, it shows that Great Britain (excluding Egypt) dominated Tripolitania's import trade; that the value of the goods Great Britain furnished to that province in the late nineteenth century was more than double that of any other European power including Italy and France;[36] and that it absorbed three times as much of Tripolitania's exports that did France, Italy, or the Ottoman Empire.[37]

The next section of the book deals with the history of Tripolitania. Here, Mahmud Naci provides the most thorough review available in Turkish of that province's history from Roman to Ottoman times.[38] He precedes his review of the successive conquests of the Romans, Byzantines, Arabs and Ottomans, with a detailed ethnographic history of the province beginning in Punic times. His discussion touches on the ancient Lydians, the Berbers, the Hawara, and of course the various waves of Arab settlers that followed the conquest of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in the seventh century.[39] He also includes notices on the settlement of the Jews in Cyrenaica after the destruction of the Temple in 70 AD, and on the African slaves who mixed with the local Arab population.[40]

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[34]For full bibliographic information, see note 17.
[35]Mahmud Naci, *Tarikh*, pp. 14-18.
[36]*Ibid.*, p. 57.
[37]*Ibid.*, p. 60.
[38]*Ibid.*, pp. 121-184.
[39]*Ibid.*, pp. 112-117.
[40]*Ibid.*, p.118.

The fourth and final section of the book deals with the question of Tripolitania's borders and hinterland. Here, the author reviews the principles of nineteenth century international law which served to determine the hinterland of a particular colony and the rights that a colonial power enjoyed over this hinterland region. His principal task is to prove that the Anglo-French accords of the 1890s violated Ottoman rights to the vast hinterland of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, which stretched (in present-day terms) from Sudan to Nigeria and from southern Libya to the Central African Republic. To buttress his claim to Ottoman rights over the territory, Mahmud Naci reviews the history of key hinterland oases such as Tamasinin, Barkat, and Janet, which were seized by French military forces in the first decade of the twentieth century.[41] He focuses particularly on the role of these oases in the trans-Saharan trade between Tripolitania and the African heartland, and on the interdependence between the welfare of the Tripolitanian merchants and the local Tuareg tribesmen that escorted the caravans.[42] Implicitly, he condemns the policies of the Hamidian regime as timid in the face of French imperialism and lauds what he believes to have been the more aggressive but equally unsuccessful policies of the Young Turks.

Another turn of the century category of literature that touched on Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was very much in the old Islamic tradition of travel literature (*rihlet*) although it, too, found its conterpart in Europe in the works of Nachtigal and Barth. Foremost among these is Sadık el-Mueyyed Azamzade's "A Voyage in the Great Sahara", published in 1896/7.[43] The author, an aide-de-camp of Sultan Abdülhamid II, chronicles his second journey to Kufra, the headquarters of the Sanusi brotherhood in southern Cyrenaica, in 1895. While the book contains virtually nothing about the political exchanges between Sadık el-Mueyyid and Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi, it provides a detailed account of life along the desolate caravan trail from Benghazi to Kufra. Written in the form of a diary, the work describes the tribes, animals, vegetation, food, and climate of the region that the author and his caravan crossed. Here and there, incidental details about the history of Sanusiyya can be gleaned. In particular, one gains a sense of the immense influence that this brotherhood exercised over the daily lives of the Cyrenaican bedouins. The book also includes half a dozen photographs taken by the author who was himself an accomplished amateur photographer. Photographs of these regions of the Sahara were rare in the nineteenth century, as most European travel books were illustrated by engravings, rather than photographs.

The real interest of the work lies in its final section. There, the author interrupts the format of the earlier parts of the book and launches into a review of

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[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 191-192.
[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 193-203.
[43] For full bibliographic information, see note 23.

the different tribes and parties which he portrays as the natural allies of the Porte against the European imperialists. He provides a brief account of the Tuareg and the Tibu[44] and then follows it with a region by region description. He lays special emphasis on the oasis of Bilma because of its salt flats and the role that it played in intra-Saharan trade.[45] Furthermore, he considers Waday as a potential ally and an important economic power in the Sahara after the collapse in 1890 of Bornu, a state that had intermittent exchanges with the Porte form the sixteenth to the nineteenth century.[46]

Quite unlike the handbooks discussed above, the underlying tone of this work is clearly pan-Islamic. Although the book never clearly states what policy to pursue, it is clear that Sadik el-Mueyyid is intent upon supporting and nourishing the rhetoric and political ambitions of his patron Sultan Abdülhamid in Africa.

Advocacy politics is also the underlying purpose of another travel work by Abdülkadir Cami Bey, the representative of Fezzan to the Ottoman parliament. His book, entitled "From Tripoli to the Great Sahara", recounts a voyage that he made to the town of Ghat in 1906 in the company of the explorer Hanns Vischer.[47] Again, it provides descriptions of the caravan trails and oases of he Tripolitanian hinterland. And while the material included in the book is more accurate than that provided by Sadik el-Mueyyed, in particular in terms of the population of these hinterland regions, the intent of the book is equally political: to win support and funding in the Ottoman parliament for further military maneuvers in the Sahara against French forces that had temporarily occupied Janet and Bilma in 1905. As a former *kaymakam* of Ghat, Abdülkadir was trying to draw a more positive picture of Ottoman strength and influence in the Sahara than circumstances warranted. Where this work differs from that of Sadik el-Mueyyed is in the terms in which it views Ottoman interests in the Sahara. For the aide-de-camp of the sultan, the issue is the recognition of the sultan as caliph among a distant Muslim population. For Cami Bey, what was at stake was the very territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the dangers implicit in yielding to European imperialism.

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[44] Sadık el-Mueyyed, *Seyahat*, pp. 79-81.
[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 101-103.
[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 104-109.
[47] Abdülkadir Cami Bey, *Trablus Garbden Sahra-i kebire doğru*, (Istanbul, 1326 AH).

In conclusion, it should be noted that it is difficult to draw any clear link between the concerns and aspirations reflected in the writings surveyed above and actual Ottoman policies in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The tasks expected of the governors of these twin provinces and their subordinates were more mundane: tax reform and military reorganization. Nevertheless, one can safely surmise that these writings not only reflected a new Ottoman interest in Africa, but also sparked such interest in the upper ranks of the Ottoman government. One indication for this likelihood is their presence in the personal library of the sultan.

Salih ÖZBARAN

THE OTTOMANS IN AFRICA: A TRIBUTE TO CENGİZ ORHONLU

Cengiz Orhonlu, who passed away in 1976, at the early age of 49 was professor of history at the History Department of Istanbul University.[1] The way he became involved in research into Ottoman Africa is best told in his own words in the foreword of *Habeş Eyaleti*:

> 'The beginnings of this study go back to when I was visiting McGill University in Montreal in 1959-60. I had been unable to provide a satisfactory answer to an Ethiopian Ph. D student regarding the Ottoman presence in Ethiopia. After this I started to read the travelogues in the Redpath Library together with other related literature on the subject and to gather notes. After my return to Turkey I started to collect archival materials pertinent to the topic. This task, which I had thought I would be able to complete very quickly soon proved to be extremely slow, given the dearth of archival material. This lead me to decide that I would not limit myself as to time and would complete the study only after I had collected enough material.

Indeed Orhonlu sought his material with tremendous energy and concentration only publishing two articles until 1974 when his major work appeared. While combing the Ottoman archival sources he knew well, he also attempted to import the relevant literature from abroad. (In 1965-69, while preparing my doctoral dissertation at the University of London I was party to the difficulties he experienced in this sphere, and tried to provide what assistance I could.)

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[1] For two articles that correctly reflect aspects of Orhonlu's historical scholarship see : Nejat Göyünç, 'Cengiz Orhonlu: Hayatı, Eserleri, Şahsiyeti,' *Türk Kültürü Araştırmaları* XV/1-2 (Ankara 1976) pp. 7-38; Mahmut Şakiroğlu, 'Prof. Dr. Cengiz Orhonlu, 1927-1976' *Belleten* XL/160 (Ankara, 1976) pp 669-686.

Some Comments on Orhonlu the Historian

After Orhonlu's death in 1976 one of his colleagues payed homage to him in the following words:[2]

> Orhonlu was renowned for not allowing himself to be constricted by a narrow approach to historical material. He knew how to move flexibly from century to century and from topic to topic. While researching into the various subjects he was interested in he always stressed the multiplicity of influences operating in a historical process. He was always able to interpret the mass of material he found in the Başbakanlık Archives in Istanbul, which he treated as his second home. Apart from the works he published as books from the press of Istanbul University, he also wrote numerous articles.[3]

> Those who knew him very well-like myself-would picture him as follows : 'Orhonlu had the most uncanny knack of producing a coherent text from his typewriter from the most disparate of sources. Often the paper he removed from the typewriter would be filled with new additions as soon as it was taken from the carriage. He was always in the utmost hurry to get the most recent findings to the public, to the extent of not allowing substantial revisions of his work. For him, History was a science, the science of unearthing the past. He was not too interested in the literary side of history.[4]

Nejat Göyünç, his close friend and colleague, did not hesitate to add that Orhonlu was relentless in his search for evidence and had the rare capacity of inspiring research.[5]

The making of 'Ottoman Africa'

Cengiz Orhonlu's first sally into African history took the form of an article which he later incorporated into *Habeş Eyaleti*.[6] In many ways this work constituted an introduction for his later examination of the Ottoman presence in the Red Sea along the spice route to India, and the Ottoman-Portugese struggle for the control of this lucrative trade. In Orhonlu's own words :

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[2]C. Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Şehircilik ve Ulaşım*, (ed. Salih Özbaran) Izmir 1984, p. III. Other works by Orhonlu are : *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretleri İskan Teşebbüsü* (Istanbul 1963); *Osmanlı İmparatorlu'nda Derbend Teşkilatı* (Istanbul 1967); *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na aid Belgeler: Telhisler*, (Istanbul 1970)

[3]*Ibid.*

[4]*Ibid.*

[5]Göyünç, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-26.

[6]C. Orhonlu, 'XVI. Asrın ilk yarısında Kızıldeniz Sahillerinde Osmanlılar' *Tarih Dergisi* XII/16 (Istanbul 1962) pp. 1-24.

'(After 1517) the Ottoman state decided to take part in the eastern trade with India and points further east which it assessed to be very lucrative. One way of reviving this trade which had been somewhat stagnant during the recent wars was to revitalize the trade in gold and spices. The first thing that needed to be done here was to establish the security of the routes between the Mediterranean and India by securing the control and hegemony of the Red Sea. It has also been argued that the Ottoman push eastward was also to some extent to circumvent Safavid influence in the same area. Ottoman contact with the east, Turkestan, India etc. was thus to be established via the sea route. The greatest rivals of the Ottomans were the Portugese who claimed a monoply on the eastern trade at this time.'[7]

For his first article Orhonlu had relied mainly on Fernand Braudel. His subsequent work became more original as he increasingly incorporated Ottoman materials. These take shape in his account of Ottoman attempts to establish control over the coastal towns of east Africa and Ethiopia.[8] Here, Orhonlu gave particular emphasis to the Ottomans' desire to reach the sources of the gold coming into the Mediterranean basin. The expeditionary force led by Salih Paşa in 1552, when 15 camel loads of gold dust was acquired, is given as proof of this aim.[9]

'No doubt the matter of the gold trade was not the only incentive pushing the Ottomans into Ethiopia. Another factor was the monopoly of the eastern trade. The Ottomans had hoped to break the Portugese hold on the Indian Ocean by sending fleets commanded by Seyid Ali Reis and Pirî Reis, but had not succeeded due to their lack of ocean going ships. To compensate for this the Ottomans chose Ethiopia as their objective. This was not accidental. As this was a land with a shoreline on both the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, any power controlling it could hope to realize serious inroads into the trade with India which had to follow this coast, and ultimately control trade. This was the aim behind the campaigns of 1554-1555.'[10]

These two articles dealing with the Ottoman attempt to establish their hegemony over Ethiopia were later to be incorparated in *Habeş Eyaleti*, published in 1974 two years before his death. This was to be Orhonlu's most comprehensive work covering the province of Ethiopia from its inception to when it became an empty claim in the 19th century, and ending with Ottoman-Ethiopian relations after effective Ottoman withdrawal from the area. There is

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[7]C. Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Güney Siyaseti: Habeş Eyaleti,* (henceforth referred to as *Habeş Eyaleti)* Istanbul 1974.

[8]C. Orhonlu, 'Osmanlıların Habeşistan Siyaseti, 1554-1560' *Tarih Dergisi* XV/20 1965 pp. 39-54.

[9]C. Orhonlu, 'Osmanlıların Habeşistan Siyaseti', p. 40.

[10]*Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

little doubt that with *Habeş Eyaleti* Orhonlu ranks as the Turkish historian who has taken the Ottoman-African connection in hand in the most comprehensive manner. His diligent efforts in the *Başbakanlık, Topkapı,* and the *Hariciye* archives are a testimony to painstaking scholarship. His ability to pull together the plurality of documents, registers, and other archival sources have enabled him to shed light—to a certain extent— on the Ottoman presence in Ethiopia. The French historian Michel Lesure, who reviewed *Habeş Eyaleti* had this to say: 'No doubt of all the lands reached by the Ottoman expansion those of north-east Africa are the least known. M. Orhonlu's book is a useful contribution which sheds fresh light on the issue.'[11]

As I pointed out above, Lesure has also drawn attention to the fact that there is a serious dearth of sources for the first half of the sixteenth century regarding the Ottoman attempts to establish control of the spice routes, their policy in the Indian Ocean, and towards Ethiopia. Orhonlu's statement that the Ottoman archives comprise many unused documents pertinent to the spice trade, is more applicable for the second half of the century.[12] This means that we are in need of new sources for the study of Ottoman policy in the south. No doubt Orhonlu went some way towards this aim by combining the works of historians like Lane and Braudel with the report of the Ottoman sailor, Selman Reis. Yet, it is possible to complement his work with other sources. An exemple of such a source are the letters exchanged between the king of Portugal. D. João III, and Süleyman II in 951/1544. These letters were exchanged by the intermediary of the Portugese ambassadors Duarte Catanho and Diego de Mesquita, and are preserved in the *Torre do Tombo* archives in Lisbon.[13] Although Orhonlu was not able to use these sources, they constitute a vital counterpart to the materials he found in the Ottoman sources. For instance in regard to the reasons given by Orhonlu for the Ottoman incursions into Ethiopia, we find additional information in the correspondance between the Archbishop of Ethiopia, Dom Andre de Oviedo, and the Pope. In a letter to the supreme pontif dated 15 June 1567, Oviedo stated that the Ottomans were after slaves for their galleys, provisions, iron etc. (*Porque se os Turcos vieram primeira e se fizerem senhores de Ethiopia... serão de grande periuizo a India ... porque ha nesta terra muitas cousas que lhe servem muito pera provimento de suas gales, como são escravos, vitualhas, ferro etc.).*[14] In keeping with this information, Orhonlu has established that the Governorate of Ethiopia, *Habeş Beylerbeyiği,* was officially

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[11]M. Lesure, 'Les Ottomans et l'Éthiopie' *Mare Luso-Indicum* III, (Paris 1976) p. 199.

[12]C. Orhonlu, *Habeş Eyaleti* p. 9.

[13]Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (Lisboa) *Corpo Cronologico,* Parte 1, Maço 72, Documento 16 ; Maço 3, Documento 4 ; In the same archives, *Documentos Orientais,* Maço 1, Documentos 23, 24.

[14]P. Emmanuelis d'Almeida, *Historiae Aethiopiae,* (Romae 1907) capitulo XVII.

established on 5 July 1555, and Özdemir Paşa was charged with the conquest of the area.[15]

The Province of Ethiopia (Habeş Eyaleti)

It is known that as early as 1542 the Ottomans in Yemen were giving support in the form of firearms and troops to Ahmed el-Mucahid whom they recognized as the ruler of Ethiopia. El-Mucahid was involved in a struggle with his Christian rival, Galavdeves (Cladius) who was supported by the Portugese. Although the Ottomans instigated a campaign from Egypt in 1555 with the aim of conquering the Sultanate of Funj, Orhonlu claims that the more effective thrust which was aiming to reach as far as Mozambique, was to be from the Red Sea.[16] Indeed, the Ottoman forces advancing from Egypt combined with the forces based in the Arabian side of the Red Sea coast which was already under Ottoman control. In the campaign of 1557-1559 Özdemir Paşa took Massawa, Arkiko, Tigre, Deberva (Debaroa), penetrating well into Ethiopia. Even though the death of Özdemir Paşa caused the Ottoman advance to falter, and some of the territory taken was subsequently lost, the key positions along the route linking the Red Sea with Ethiopia were to remain under Ottoman control. The Ottoman - held strategic points were supported by Sefer Reis from the sea. This led to the development of a situation very unfavourable to the Portugese. As put by D'Almeida ; 'The reason for all this is Özdemir Paşa (*Baxa Zamur*) who is now in Massawa (*Maçua*) with many Turks.'[17] When P. Andre de Oivedo and his followers arrived before Massawa in four *fusta*s on 17 March 1557, they found a determined Özdemir Paşa (*Baxa do Turco*) already there preparing to take the port.[18] Orhonlu estimates that the Ottomans landed a disciplined force of some 1400-1500 troops in Ethiopia. Despite their technical superiority, the Ottoman troops had difficulties with the harsh climate and terrain. (In fact the troops were given additional pay in recognition of the hardship of their mission and the long distances involved.)[19] Orhonlu points out that the subsequent Ottoman expansion into the area, commanded by Özdemir Paşa's son, Osman Paşa, does not receive much attention in the Turkish sources. This episode does however receive mention in Diogo do Couto's *Da Asia* and Pero Pais' *Historia*, After 1567, in the successive rules of the *Beylerbey*s Hüseyin Paşa, Ahmed Paşa son of İskender Paşa, Rıdvan Paşa, and Süleyman Paşa, the province went through a period of stability, Orhonlu correctly points out that the uprising of Imam Mutahhar in the Yemen in 1569-1570, meant that the Ottoman effort in Ethiopia

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[15] C. Orhonlu, *Habeş Eyaleti* p. 37. *Rüûs Defter* No. 213 15 *Şaban* 962 (5 July 1555).
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] D'Almeida, *op. cit.*, Livro IV, capitulo XIII.
[18] P. Pais, *Historia da Ethiopia* II (Porto 1945) p. 276.
[19] C. Orhonlu, *Habeş Eyaleti*, p. 40.

had to be slowed down as some of the forces stationed there had to be used to reinforce Ottoman forces in the Yemen. Like the other *Beylerbeyliks* of North Africa, Yemen, Basra and Lahsa, in Ethiopia too, effective, long term Ottoman control could not be established beyond the points held by Ottoman garrisons. In this respect the characteristics of Ottoman administration in these areas are very similar. The battle of Addi Qarro (Debra Qarro) was lost in 1578 (or 1579) during the administration of Ahmed Paşa. In the time of Hızır Paşa the victory of Arkiko was won against the combined forces of the king of Ethiopia and his Arab allies. In the 1582-89 (?) period relations with the Ethiopian ruler were relatively good but this was followed by a renewal of hostilities. This see-saw of battles and truces between the Ottomans who controlled key points along the coast and the Ethiopian ruler who controlled the interior continued until the end of the 16th century.

According to Orhonlu, the 17th century is not particularly rich in Ottoman documentary sources on Ethiopia. Generally writing from western sources, he portrays this century as a relatively quiet one compared to the previous century. Orhonlu puts the generally good relations maintained with the Ethiopian king down to the continued control by the Ottomans of the coast, and their success in levying customs duties on caravans going into the interior.[20]

Orhonlu's major Ottoman sources for the province are weighted towards the 16th century and are mostly from the *Rüûs Defterleri* and the *Mühimme Defterleri*. The province was also to some extent a case study of the difficulties the Ottomans experienced in provisioning and controlling their more distant possessions. The communications were stretched along the route Istanbul, Alexandria, Suakin, Massawa and were bound to be somewhat tenuous. In Orhonlu's words :

> 'Because of the vastness of the lands and the weakness of the forces which were to maintain communications and control, this meant that the area had to be constantly reinforced. The semi-continuous state of war with the Ethiopian monarchy made this all the more necessary. The fact that the province did not have sufficient resources of its own meant that the pay of the troops had to be sent from another province—usually Egypt. Yet, this often meant the troops were not payed on time, which constituted an important weakness of the administration. These unfortunate circumstances meant that often they were not very enthusiastic in the performance of their duty.'[21]

Most of Orhonlu's Ottoman material comes from the 16th and to a certain extent the 17th centuries. The author of the *Habeş Eyaleti* has stressed that he

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[20] *Ibid.*, p. 83.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

was not able to find precise data regarding the administrative and financial structure of the province. He states that he does not think an inventory (*tahrir*) was ever undertaken for the province, at any rate he found no such account. Despite these handicaps he has, through his use of the *Rüûs* and the *Mühimme Defterleri*, been fairly successful in bringing to light the structure of this distant province of the Ottoman empire. The province, like many other provinces in Africa and Arabia was, as of 1555, to have the status of *salyaneli eyalet*— *salyaneli* province status meant that the province's taxes were collected directly for the centre and were transferred to the central treasury after the local expenses were deducted. The administrative centre was the *sancak* of Suakin, with Akik, Bor (Bur), Matrer (?). Hindiye, Sarace, and Ibrim (which was transferred from Egypt) making up the other *sancaks*. According to Orhonlu : 'The greatest source of income for the province was the customs duty levied on shipping calling at the ports of Massawa, Suakin, and Beylül.' Spices were the most lucrative source of duty, 'All ships laden with spices payed duty at every port of call'.[22] The combined customs duty collected by all the ports mentioned above came to 15.000 *filori* in 1581, and it was collected through tax farming, (*iltizam*). Pearl fishing was another source of income which brought considerable revenue.[23]

The slave trade was another important source of money. Most of Orhonlu's work on the slave trade is based on research done by foreign scholars and accounts of European travellers rather than Ottoman documents. No doubt, the lack of sources due to the failure of the Ottoman to fully control Ethiopia, meant that Orhonlu was unable to paint a more complete picture of what was, after all, a typical Ottoman *salyane* province. For instance he has no information on agricultural taxation or on *ihtisab*, — *ihtisabiye* being taxes collected by merchants and craftsmen on behalf of the market supervisor (*muhtesib*).

We learn from Orhonlu also that most of the Ottoman troops serving in Ethiopia were transfered from other nearby provinces, usually Egypt and Yemen. Two such groups were the *Mısır Kulu* and the *Garip Yiğitler* from Egypt. Also from Yemen came *şeggalin*, gunpowder, cannon and firearms. Another item which had to be imported was draught animals; horses and mules had to be brought in from the other provinces of the empire. The most important element in the maintenance of the province were the war galleys that the Ottomans used to provision and defend this area until well into the 17th century.[24]

In the 18th century Ethiopia had become something of a backwater for the Ottomans. As put by Orhonlu :

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[22] *Ibid.*, p. 98.
[23] *Ibid*, p. 100.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 116-128.

'The holder of the sancak of Jeddah was also usually made Beylerbey of Ethiopia. This meant that they became absentee officials who managed their affairs in Ethiopia through a representative (*mütesellim*). This was largely because the revenues of the province were very inadequate and did not cover its expenses... This development was partly due to the fact that the Ottoman centre was occupied elsewhere and therefore left the local administrators of Ethiopia to their own devices. However the reason (for the decline of Ottoman power in the area) was the increasing influence and power of the colonial empires.'[25]

Ottoman Relations with Bornu.

Another major contribution of Cengiz Orhonlu to the study of Ottoman Africa is his article dealing with Ottoman relations with Bornu and the documents he published relating to that issue.[26] Orhonlu brought out in this article that the Ottoman penetration south from the North African coast occured under the command of the Beylerbey of Algiers, Salih Paşa. The southernmost points reached by Ottoman forces were Ouargla and Toggourt. In this article Orhonlu also published documents showing the contacts the Ottomans established with the lands of the African interior. It must however be indicated that in this study Orhonlu made use of the previous research of G. B. Martin on Ottoman-Bornuan relations. His major contribution in this field has been to provide information for Turkish readers who knew very little about this aspect of Ottoman history and to complement the already existant research with Ottoman documentation. The reasons for the Ottoman-Bornuan *rapprochement*, which lived through its golden age in the reign of Idris Alawma (1570-1602) are given as twofold. First, the desire on the part of the Ottomans to make use of the prestige and influence that the Sultanate of Bornu had attained along the critical central African trade routes, second the desire on the part of the Bornuan ruler to make use of Ottoman power to secure acces to the *hac*. Orhonlu's account, based on the *Divan-ı Hümayun Mühimme Defterleri*, of the Bornuan delegation which arrived in Istanbul in 1574 is as follows :

'The chief envoy was a certain Elhac Yusuf. The delegation desired the following from the Ottoman state: to secure the safety in transit of the Bornuan caravans to and from the hac, to provide the same safety and security for those travelling for the purposes of trade...'[27]

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[25] Ibid., p. 129.

[26] C. Orhonlu, 'Osmanlı-Bornu Münasebetlerine Aid Belgeler.' Istanbul Üniversitesi *Tarih Dergisi* 23, 1969 pp 111-130.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 121.

Orhonlu indicates that İdris, unsatisfied with the Ottoman directed his attention towards Morocco after 1582, even though good relations were maintained with the Ottoman empire.

Conclusion

Orhonlu's *Habeş Eyaleti* and his other studies occured just at the time when Turkish and other (especially Arab) historians were beginning to adopt new perspectives towards Ottoman rule in the Arabian lands and Africa. Since the 1970s the subject of Ottoman Africa has received fresh attention particularly through the efforts of the Tunisian historian Abdeljelil Temimi. This type of effort has led to the deployment of funds for research of the Ottoman centuries in Africa. However Orhonlu's pioneering work made much of this subsequent interest possible, and gave it a basis from which to develop. In Orhonlu's posthumously published, *Afrika ile ilgili Türkçe Yayınlar ve Kayıtlar* (Turkish Records and Publications dealing with Africa), we note that there have been numerous publications concerning the subject.[28] Unfortunately however, we also see that the standard of scholarship in many of these publications is very low. (I would like to take pains to point out at this point that the well documented work of Samih Ilter, and the contributions of Abdürrahman Çaycı, Ercümend Kuran and Orhan Koloğlu are a cut above the rest and are not to be forgotten.)

Orhonlu began work on a portion of African history of direct interest to the Ottomans when previous work which he could have used did not exist, and there was little or no incentive to undertake work of this kind. Taking in hand Ottoman documentation he has managed to produce a corpus of exemplary work. One could say that the major contribution to African history from Turkish historiography was made by Cengiz Orhonlu. His death at an early age meant that much of what he began has remained unfinished and we have been deprived of many of the insights he was to impart. Our hope is that his works will be translated into other languages and his research will provide inspiration for subsequent generations of African historians.[29]

Translated from Turkish by Selim Deringil.

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[28] C. Orhonlu, 'Afrika ile İlgili Türkçe Yayın ve Kayıtlar' *İstanbul Üniversitesi Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*. 7-8 (Istanbul 1977) pp. 145-156.

[29] For the brief English summary of a paper delivered by Cengiz Orhonlu at a conference in Rome on the importance of the Ottoman archives for Ethiopian history see : C. Orhonlu, 'Turkish Archival Sources on Ethiopia' *IV Congreso Internazionale di Studi Etiopici*, (Roma 1974) pp. 455-462.

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

STUDIES ON OTTOMAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY