The Radical Rights' Grip on Environmental Politics in Western Europe

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Examining Changing Party Competition Patterns in the wake of Rising Populist Radical Right Parties and their Effects on Environmental Policy-making

Dissertation

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Publications

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Article 1:
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	Article 1 (ch. 7)	Article 2 (ch. 8)	Article 3 (ch. 9)	Article 4 (ch. 10)
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Theory	LB	LB	LB	MB LB
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Note: LB = Lars E. Berker, MB = Michael Böcher, JP = Jan Pollex

Contents

Tables

Figures

Abbreviations

General		*Political Parties*	
ACF	Advocacy Coalition Framework	AfD	Alternative für Deutschland/Alternative for Germany
AT	Austria	BZÖ	Bündnis Zukunft Österreich/Alliance for the Future of Austria
BW	Baden-Württemberg	C	Centerpartiet/Centre Party
BY	Bayern	CD	Centrum Democraten/Centre Democrats
CPT	causal process tracing	CDA	Christen-Democratisch Appèl/Christian Democratic Appeal
CHES	Chapel Hill Expert Survey	CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union/Christian Democratic Union
CICA	Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation	CSU	Christlich Soziale Union/Christian Social Union
COV	Covariational Analysis	CU	Orthodox Protestant Christen Unie/Christian Union
ETS	European Emission Trading System	D66	Democraten 66/Democrats ’66
EU	European Union	FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands/Free Democratic Party Germany
FfF	Fridays For Future Movement	FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs/Freedom Party of Austria
GAL	Green/alternative/libertarian	FvD	Forum voor Democratie/Forum for Democracy
GER	Germany	FW	Freie Wähler/Free Voters
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation	GL	Groen Links/Green Left
INUS	Insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result	JA21	Juiste Antwoord 2021/Correct Answer 2021
MARPOR	Manifesto Research on Political Representation	KD	Kristdemokraterna/Christian Democrats
MV	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	L	Liberalerna/Liberals
MEP	Modern Environmental Policy	LPF	Lijst Pim Fortuyn/Pim Fortuyn List
MSSD	Most Similar Systems Design	M	Moderate Samlingspartiet/Moderate Party
PIDA	Political Process-Inherent Dynamics Approach	MP	Miljöpartiet de Gröna/Green Party
PRRPs	Populist Radical Right Parties	NEOS	Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum/New Austria and Liberal Forum
PRRP	Populist Radical Right Party	NPD	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands/National Democratic Party Germany
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis	ÖVP	Österreichische Volkspartei/Die neue Volkspartei/Austrian People‘s Party/New Austrian People‘s Party

KLM	Royal Dutch Airlines	PDS	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus/Party of Democratic Socialism
SN	Sachsen	*PvdA*	Partij van de Arbeid/Labour Party
ST	Sachsen-Anhalt	PVV	Partij voor de Vrijheid/Party for Freedom
SH	Schleswig-Holstein	REP	Die Republikaner/The Republicans
SE	Sweden	S	Sveriges Socialdemokratiska arbetarparti/Swedish Social Democratic Party
SEK	Swedish Krona	SD	Sverigedemokraterna/Sweden Democrats
TAN	Traditional/authoritarian/nationalist	SGP	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij/Reformed Political Party
TEP	Traditional Environmental Policy	SP	Socialistische Partij/Socialist Party
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	SPÖ	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich/Social Democratic Party Austria
-	-	V	Vänsterpartiet/Left Part
-	-	VVD	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie/People's Party for Freedom and Democracy

1 Introduction

Environmental policy first emerged as a new field of policy in the 1970s, and has become one of the central issues on political agendas worldwide. At the same time, capacities and efforts for environmental policy-making have developed considerably on both the national and international level (Böcher 2023). However, despite some notable achievements, the overall progress in the handling of many environmental issues has waxed and waned over the years. Tardy developments around the super-issue of climate change indicate rather negative trends (IPCC 2023), but also accounts of achievements in several ecological sustainable development goals point in a similar direction (Biermann et al. 2022, Sachs et al. 2022). Considering that environmental policy activities vary between nations, administrative levels and periods of time (e.g., Duit 2016, Jahn 2016), from a policy analysis perspective this instinctively evokes questions on favourable and unfavourable domestic conditions of environmental policy-making (Jahn and Klagges 2023).

In Europe, one of the most influential changes in domestic politics has been the unprecedented rise of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) that has intensified over the last 20 years. PRRPs have unsettled European democracies disputing the legitimacy of contemporary democratic systems from a nationalist and populist perspective (Albertazzi and Mueller 2013, Mudde 2013, Huber and Schimpf 2017), and they have obtained an increasing influence on the way policy issues are framed and tackled in the political system. While this has been examined in-depth for the influence on their core issue of migration policy (e.g., Meguid 2005, Bale et al. 2010, Akkerman 2012, Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn 2016, Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020), their impacts on environmental policy-making have received attention in political science research only more recently (e.g., Lockwood 2018). In fact, the *Radical Rights' Grip on Environmental Politics* has developed into a highly relevant field of research since the outset of this dissertation in Spring 2019 (Sommer et al. 2021).

Contributing to this research field, this dissertation deals with two central research questions:

- Which positions do populist radical right parties take in the field of environmental policy?
- How do populist radical right parties affect environmental policy-making?

While the first question is straightforward, the second question includes two dimensions: first, it concerns the direction of potential effects, i.e., whether PRRPs take a positive or a negative effect on environmental policy, if they take an effect at all. Second, it pertains to the causal mechanisms of these potential effects. Considering these research questions, the overall research design of this dissertation is clearly X-oriented focusing party positions and their implications on environmental policy (e.g., Ganghof 2019).

To prepare the investigation of these two research questions, this dissertation starts with a nuanced conceptualisation of environmental policy (ch. 2) and the introduction of some basic perspectives on the study of political parties which provide important elements for the ensuing theoretical and empirical considerations (ch. 3). The theoretical groundwork is based on the traditional partisan theory (e.g.,

Schmidt 1996), the cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), and literature on party competition (e.g., Laver 1989, Strøm 1990). The latter two are necessary supplements to partisan theory in the context of this dissertation, since the effects of PRRPs on policy-making often take shape only indirectly (e.g., Schain 2006). Therefore, they can be expected to materialise predominantly through their effects on party competition environments indicated by party system change. To approach these party system dynamics, the cleavage theory represents the pertinent theoretical perspective (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2023). The theoretical fundament is elaborated in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 5 also presents the leading hypothesis of this dissertation and, furthermore, includes a review of the state of scientific literature on the nexus of PRRPs and environmental policy as it has developed within the overall period of investigations between 2001 and 2023. Methodologically, the articles of this research project all apply a case study approach focusing on parties, party competition dynamics, and partisan effects on environmental policy in a selection of four Western European countries, i.e., Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The case selection, the methods of analysis and of data collection are outlined in chapter 6. The following four chapters (ch. 7, 8, 9 & 10) represent the research articles included in this cumulative dissertation. The articles use a variety of proxies for environmental policy looking at party reactions to the *Fridays For Future*-movement (FfF), environmental budget proposals and policies, and the specific policy of aviation taxes respectively. Following these specific research approaches, the research articles address the two research questions to a varying degree. To give the reader a first orientation in this regard, Table 1 assigns the four research articles to the two research questions and, for the sake of better illustration, also to the five hypotheses that will be derived properly later in the theory part. Chapter 11 synthesises the results of the empirical analyses, highlights its research contributions and implications for future research, and points to the limitations of this work. The dissertation ends with a brief outlook.

To end this introduction, it is worth underlining that this dissertation has been written in a highly buoyant field regarding the dynamics in the empirical world as well as the development of related research. The empirical chapters have been published or are still to be published in high-quality, peer reviewed journals and contributed to the on-going expansion of literature. Thus, they reflect this dynamism and the development of knowledge – which not least concerns my own knowledge. As knowledge production characterises the essence of political science and science in general, I am confident that the visibility of this progress in the empirical chapters may give the readers a welcoming hand to delve into the positions and effect of the populist radical right in the field of environmental policy.

Research Question / Hypothesis	**Article**			
	Party Reactions to FfF in Germany (Ch. 7)	Party Reactions to FfF in Europe (Ch. 8	Environmental Policy-making in Sweden (Ch. 9)	Aviation Policy Instrument Choice (Ch. 10)
Which positions do populist radical right parties take in the field of environmental policy?				
H1. Populist Radical Right Parties take negative positions on sustainability policy issues like climate change.	X	X	X	X
H2. Populist Radical Right Parties take positive positions on traditional environmental policy issues like nature conservation.			X	
How do populist radical right parties affect environmental policy-making?				
H3a. Strong Populist Radical Right Parties affect sustainability policies negatively if they are considered as viable coalition partners. This effect unfolds directly through participation in government.			X	
H3b. Strong Populist Radical Right Parties affect sustainability policies negatively if they are considered as viable coalition partners. This effect unfolds indirectly through adaptations of positions of established parties in order to facilitate future coalitions (*Pull Effect*).	X	X	X	
H4. Strong Populist Radical Right Parties affect sustainability policies positively if they are excluded as viable coalition partners (*Push Effect)*.	X			
H5. Strong Populist Radical Right Parties affect traditional environmental policies positively.			X	

Table 1: Initial overview of the main content areas of the four articles included in this cumulative dissertation in relation to research questions and hypotheses; Author's own illustration

2 Environmental Policy: A Brief Introduction and Differentiation

Party positions and national policies in the field of environmental policy represent the overarching outcomes of interest in this dissertation. While the individual research articles address diverse specific elements of this broad field, it is appropriate to begin with a more general but nuanced introduction to some basic characteristics of environmental policy as a political issue. At its core this chapter establishes a distinction between two diverging understandings of environmental policy that will serve as an important conceptual fundament for the theoretical and empirical considerations following.

Environmental policy has emerged as a political issue in Western Europe since the 1970s when a new environmental awareness had been proliferating in European societies in the light of intruding environmental challenges. For a basic definition, Knoepfel (2007 [2002]) states:

> „The term 'environmental policy' includes all government measures aimed at: 1) assessing the state of environmental pollution; 2) evaluating this pollution in relation to the threat it poses to either human welfare (anthropocentric) or ecosystems (ecocentric); and 3) controlling polluting activities by means of regulations, economic incentives and/or training, moral persuasion, information campaigns and collaborative contractual arrangements with selected target groups." (p. 9)

Thus, environmental policy comprises both the monitoring of environmental problems and their political handling through concrete policy-making. In today's politics environmental policy has established as an independent and salient field of policy, as can be seen, for instance, from its broad institutionalisation in the form of environmental ministries and administrations and the increasing number of actors specifically engaged in environmental policy (Böcher 2023). Beyond the institutionalisation and the involved actors, policy fields are commonly understood to be characterised by two further main features, i.e., by the specific problems addressed and the related policy measures (e.g., Loer, Reiter and Töller 2015). Both features have undergone a substantial development since the 1970s so that two distinct perspectives on environmental policy have become distinguishable: a *traditional environmental policy* (TEP) perspective and a *modern environmental policy* (MEP) perspective which can also be referred to as *sustainability policy* (Carter 2018, ch. 7 & 8). Despite reflecting a historical development from the former to the latter, both perspectives prevail to this today and shape contemporary conflicts across and within actors and institutions (Hupke 2020, ch. 3 & 33, Carter 2018, ch. 7). As the research of this dissertation applies an actor-centred perspective, it is particularly important to disentangle these two viewpoints in order to prepare for a differentiated analysis of positions in the field of environmental policy.

Environmental policy analysis literature usually identifies six dimensions characteristic to the problem structure of environmental issues: *commons*, *persistency, spatiality, temporality, uncertainty* and *integration* (Böcher and Töller 2012, ch. 3, Carter 2018, ch. 7). In addition, a seventh dimension can be considered that shapes the problem perception of relevant actors, i.e., *environmental justice* (Pollex and Berker 2022). In the following paragraph, for an expedient differentiation, each of these seven dimensions is briefly examined for the two perspectives on environmental policy.

Firstly, the environment as a whole and its subparts, like oceans, the atmosphere, or lakes are characterised as *commons* meaning that they belong to everyone equally (Böcher and Töller 2012, ch. 3, Carter 2018, ch. 7). They are both non-excludable and non-rival (ibid.). As a result of this, people hold a shared responsibility for these commons. This often leads to free-rider problems whereby people are loath to live up to this responsibility knowing that other people might benefit from their efforts and could take action just as well (Hardin 1968). This understanding of environmental problems applies to

both the traditional and modern environmental policy perspective. Secondly, environmental problems are understood to be *persistent*. The persistency of environmental problems represents a complex concept with several components. Böcher and Töller summarise that persistent problems involve "a high and diffuse number of polluters and that no simple technological solutions are available" (2012, p. 95, author's own translation). Thus, connecting to the idea of the environment as a common, persistency points to the often futile effort to pin down the actors responsible for a specific environmental pollution. As a corollary, there is rarely *the one* solution to tackle an environmental problem. Instead, several polluters need to be addressed in multiple ways at the same time. While persistency clearly qualifies the problem perception from a MEP perspective, it is less evident for the traditional view. In the latter, sources of pollution or threat can be predominantly identified straightforwardly and solved with single, often technical end-of-pipe, policies (Carter 2018, ch. 7, Knoepfel 2007 [2002]). For instance, SO_2-immissions on forests have been traced back to polluting industries and could be tackled through the installation of filters. Likewise, endangered species are to be protected by the provision of conservation areas. This approach, however, is feasible only when environmental problems are understood to be only local or regional[1] and short-term. Such environmental problems, "on the one hand, could be witnessed by human sense and, on the other hand, could be well managed by regulatory instruments" (Böcher 2023, p. 16). In contrast, the MEP perspective reflects the fact that most of the environmental problems today, such as the climate or the biodiversity crisis, are genuinely global and intergenerational and, therefore, also call for global and long-term solutions. Consequently, the two perspectives differ significantly in their views on the *spatiality* and *temporality* of environmental problems (Böcher and Töller 2012, ch. 3, Carter 2018, ch. 7, Knoepfel 2007 [2002]). The fifth dimension of environmental problems concerns their *uncertainty*. Uncertainty exists in various ways ranging from uncertain scientific evidence on how the problems might develop in the future in terms of seriousness and causality to the uncertainty of actual policy effects and the unclear problem-solving potential of future technology (Böcher and Töller 2012, ch. 3, Nair and Howlett 2017). These uncertainties are taken into account in the MEP perspective, whereas they are far less considered in the traditional view. Traditional environmental policy-making is regularly reactive to already existing environmental problems, while modern environmental policy-making relies on scientific projections of future developments and the principle of prevention (Vig and Kraft 1990, Fiorino 2001, Jordan and Lenschow 2008). Also, in their reflection on the *environmental justice* dimension the two approaches diverge significantly. Based on the inherent concept of sustainable development representatives of a MEP integrate social and development policy aspects into their perception of environmental policy (Brundtland et al. 1987). They stress that the causes and effects of environmental problems vary crucially across societal groups within nations, usually disadvantaging ethnic minorities and the poor, but also across richer and poorer nations

[1] Here the term regional refers to environmental regions that may also cross national borders.

on a global scale (Holifield, Chakraborty and Walker 2017, Elvers 2011, Koch and Fritz 2014). This nexus between welfare, development, and environmental policy is not reflected in the TEP perspective. Finally, the two perspectives on environmental policy differ in their view on the necessity of *integration*. In relation to persistency, which emphasises the variety of actors responsible for an environmental problem, the integration-dimension transfers this insight to the level of policy fields. From a MEP perspective, environmentally damaging activities are spread across various fields of policy. This cross-sectional nature of environmental problems calls for an integrative environmental policy-making, i.e., an Environmental Policy Integration (e.g., Jordan and Lenschow 2010). While this integration is inherent to the modern view on environmental policy as "first-order operational principle to implements and institutionalize the idea of sustainable development" (Lenschow 2002, p. 6, Jordan and Lenschow 2008), in the traditional perspective with its concentrated focus on 'purely environmental' problems it is far less recognised.

Concluding from this discussion of the seven problem dimensions, environmental problems tend to be considered as *simple* or *complex problems* from a TEP perspective in ways that the problems are something tangible and there is varying but limited debate on the related solutions[2]. By contrast, the MEP perspective conceives of environmental problems as *wicked* (or even *super-wicked*) problems (Levin et al. 2012), for which already the problem diagnosis is contested and the solutions are overly complex due to two characteristics: on the one hand, the broad range of actors involved in both problem-causing and problem-solving on different levels of governance and, on the other hand, the wide temporal and spatial horizons that need to be considered (e.g., Böcher 2023). Furthermore, it has become evident that the diverging perceptions of environmental problems yield different designs of environmental policy. While the TEP paradigm entails mostly reactive policies and can be characterised as narrow in terms of scope, time and space, the MEP perspective pursues an inclusive, global, long-term and preventive approach to environmental policy-making.

It is crucial to reiterate that the traditional environmental policy perspective is not only a historical artefact, but it persists even in today's politics (Carter 2018, ch. 7). Thus, the differentiation, which is summarised in Table 2, provides us with an important theoretical basis to understand the positions and actions of contemporary political actors such as political parties. In addition to that, note that the two approaches represent ideal type perspectives on environmental policy and may serve as yardsticks *how actors perceive* environmental problems and their solutions, not necessarily as clear-cut categories to define them objectively as traditional or modern. In this vein, some environmental policies might be equally well framed from both perspectives or an integrative point of view. For instance, the introduction of forest reserves can be understood as a classic nature protection measure but also as a climate mitigation tool due to the functioning of forests as carbon sinks.

[2] For the classification of problems see e.g., Roberts (2000).

Characteristics	Environmental Policy	
	Traditional Environmental Policy	**Modern Environmental Policy (*also* Sustainability Policy)**
Problem Structure		
Commons	✓	✓
Persistency	✗	✓
Spatiality	Local, regional, partly international	Global
Temporality	(rather) short-term	Long-term
Uncertainty	✗	✓
Env. Justice	✗	✓
Integration	✗	✓
Policy Design		
Orientation	Reactive / Immission-focused	Preventive / Emission-focused

Table 2: Traditional and Modern Environmental Policy Perspective: Problem Structure and Policy Design in Comparison. Author's own illustration

3 Political Parties and their Persistent Importance

As outlined, in my dissertation, I investigate political parties' effects on environmental policy-making reflecting on insights from classic partisan research and policy analysis. At the outset of this endeavour, I deem it necessary to introduce some basic concepts of political parties and to explicate the persistently important role of political parties in the policy process. In the first subchapter, four major perspectives on political parties are presented which shed light on the multifarious nature of parties, provide us with a basic definition of a party, and clarify the focus of my own research. Thus, the first subchapter also lays the party theoretical groundwork for further theoretical elaborations in the remainder of this dissertation. The other two subchapters outline the persistent importance of political parties for policy-making in general (ch. 3.2) and environmental policy-making in particular (ch. 3.3).

3.1 Political Parties: A Basic Conceptualisation

In its long history partisan researchers have approached the phenomenon of political parties from a variety of perspectives and produced multiple typologies in order to capture the diversity of political parties. Based on previous overviews (Gunther and Diamond 2003, Lucardie 2018, Wolinetz 2002,

Wiesendahl 2022), in summary, four main perspectives on political parties can be discerned in the literature which partly intertwine but each emphasise distinct facets of political parties:

- a functional perspective
- an ideological or programmatic perspective
- an organisational perspective, and
- a rational or strategic perspective

The *functional perspective* refers to the basic functions political parties are to fulfil in and for a democracy. In this literature strand, parties are attributed a central role in modern democracies (Keman 2006) that materialises in sets of concrete functions. Although the specific number of functions varies from author to author, the catalogue can be condensed to the six following functions (e.g., Strøm and Müller 1999, Diamond and Gunther 2001, Jun 2013): Parties are responsive to the electorate and, thus, *reflect, aggregate and articulate interests* taken up from society (1). They function to *socialise* people as democratic citizens *and mobilise* them for participation, in particular, during election campaigns (2). Following on these two functions, they also benchmark public debates by *prominently promoting policy alternatives* (3) and are to *translate policy demands into the political-administrative system*, since, after all, political parties are mainly responsible for making policies when they succeed in forming government (4). Not least, parties *recruit and socialise future political elites* (5). Ultimately, by fulfilling this set of functions political parties are essential for the legitimisation of a democracy as a whole as they *represent the linkage between society and the politico-administrative system* (6) (Lawson 1980). The degree to which these normative functions are fulfilled in reality varies across time and space and it is a continuous object of empirical research (e.g., Keman 2014). While a comprehensive empirical examination is not object of this dissertation, two important insights can be obtained from this catalogue: first, several of these functions already explicate parties as central entities of the policy-making process (especially 3 & 4), which I will elaborate in the following subchapter (see ch. 3.2). Second, from the fifth function of recruiting elites, we may derive a minimum definition of political parties that leaves space to all parties that potentially can take an effect in the policy process. In this respect, I refrain from definitions ridden with any further prerequisites[3] and follow Sartori (2005 [1976]) who, pertinently, conceives a political party as "any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office" (p. 57).

The second major perspective on political parties in party research is the *ideological or programmatic perspective*. This perspective is probably the most intuitive approach to political parties as for most people (and voters) it is the party's ideology that represents its defining feature. Likewise, as distinctly normative organisation, for the party itself ideology lies at the heart of its organisation providing the glue that holds party members together and, usually, makes them join the party in the first

[3] E.g., participation in government, representation in parliament or specific level of electoral support.

place (Wiesendahl 2022, ch. 7.9). The ideology functions as ideational superstructure of a party which is specified in policy positions and articulated in party programmes. It reflects the origin and historical development of a party and, although it is subject to changes and adaptations in the course of time, it is usually characterised by a high degree of tenacity. The literature addresses party ideology regularly with reference to the *cleavage theory* (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and the concept of *party families* (e.g., Mair and Mudde 1998). The cleavage theory relates the origin of parties back to societal lines of conflicts and, thus, links it to the sociological basis of individual political parties. As it represents a central starting point for my own research, it is introduced in depth further below (see ch. 4.1.1).

One of the most pertinent models of party families has been provided by von Beyme (1985) who, similar to the cleavage theory, however less condensed, understands political parties to have emerged in opposition to specific political opponents and/or a socio-political developments (see von Beyme 2000). For instance, early liberal parties formed as opposition to feudalism and absolute monarchies, while Christian parties have fought against secularisation and the division of church and state. In more modern times, green parties emerged opposing a continuously materialist and patriarchal society that pursues perpetual economic growth at the expense of the environment. While most of the conflicts identified by von Beyme (2000) are widely accepted in the literature, more recent research has refined and partly revised our perspective on the political conflicts he suggested to account for the emergence of the latest newcomer party families, i.e., what he called the right-wing populist and ecological parties. This is explained further below in the context of the so-called neo-cleavage theory. Importantly, as described, party families often serve as a short-cut for the ideological positioning of parties in empirical research. Harnessing that, I will come back to the concept in my elaborations on partisan effects (see ch. 5).

The third perspective concerns the *internal organisation of parties*. Although elements of inner party organisation had been one of the first aspects addressed by partisan research (e.g., Michels 1989 [1911], Gauja 2023), in modern partisan research, parties were long considered to be monolithic actors and their complex internal organisation and dynamics have been ignored (Wolinetz 2002). Nowadays, the relation of the three faces or parties, i.e., party on the ground (= party members), party in central office (= professional party administration) and party in public office (= parliamentary representatives), and the distribution of power between them has become a central starting point for party typologies (Kirchheimer 1965, Panebianco 1988, Katz and Mair 1995, Wolinetz 2002) and their empirical investigation (e.g., Scarrow, Webb and Poguntke 2017). Acknowledging this perspective as essential for a realistic and thorough look at political parties, however, the research included in this dissertation focuses on *inter*-party competition as central factor, and, therefore, had to leave out any further investigation of internal party organisation, e.g., the positions and power of party leaders or activists within a specific party. Although this is in line with the mainstream of party competition literature, considering the potential effects of internal party organisation on policy positions and party strategies (Strøm 1990, Hennl and Franzmann 2017), this is a limitation that had to be made in order to avoid overcomplexity and to sharpen the theoretical focus.

The fourth major perspective on political parties stands in the rational choice tradition of political science and addresses the *rationales and strategies of political parties*. It conceives of political parties as rational actors driven by their own interests and objectives. This perspective relates closely to the causal mechanisms underlying effects of political parties and inter-party competition which I will elaborate on in the theory part (see ch. 5). At this point, therefore, only some fundamentals are to be introduced. Basically, the literature discerns three ideal type objectives of political parties: office-seeking, vote-seeking and policy-seeking (e.g., Strøm 1990). The *office-seeking* objective regards parties first and foremost as power-seeking organisations. As Schattschneider (1942) famously put it in his definition of a political party: "A political party is first of all an organized attempt to get power. Power is here defined as control of the government" (p. 35). Depending on the institutional context, in most party democracies in Western Europe parties usually cannot seek office alone but depend on other parties as coalition partners (Bergman, Back and Hellström 2021). Apart from the pure power-argument, office-seeking approaches often also include the party representative's desire for 'spoils' that regularly come with the attainment of governmental offices, i.e., by the access to party patronage[4] (Wolinetz 2002). Another strand of party literature shifts an electoral motivation to the fore of party objectives and understands parties as mainly *vote-seeking*. This notion of political parties centrally goes back to Downs' (1957) seminal contribution on electoral competition. According to his spatial model of party competition, political parties are predominantly *vote maximisers* and assuming party competition to take place on a single left-right dimension parties will converge on a median position as this position promises the best chances to gain a maximum of votes (ibid., Strøm 1990). Thus, a classic Downsian party addresses policies only at a more superficial level in order to maintain the flexibility necessary to react to rapid changes in public opinion (Wolinetz 2002, Magyar, Wagner and Zur 2023). The *policy-seeking* objective, finally, connects directly to the aforementioned ideological perspective on political parties. Like office-seeking, this party goal is mainly derived from coalition studies where it complemented the early 'policy-blind' theories that explained the formation of governments only by numerical parameters, like the number of parties and seats (Strøm 1990, Buzogány and Kropp 2013). From the policy-seeking perspective, it is the main goal of parties to bring their ideological concerns on the political agenda and implement policies based on their programmatic positions (Strøm 1990, Wolinetz 2002).

The three objectives of party behaviour are, obviously, closely intertwined and, in practice, every party pursues each of these objectives to a certain degree. In order to disentangle the relationship between these goals further, Budge and Laver (1986) suggest to differentiate between *intrinsical* and *instrumental* values of party objectives. Thus, parties pursue the goals as an end in itself (intrinsical) or as means to

[4] A narrow conception of party patronage excluding various forms of clientelism, like personal rewards and gifts, is "the ability of political parties to appoint individuals to (non-elective) positions in the public and semi-public sector, including posts in core civil service, foreign embassies, state-owned companies, quangos or regulatory agencies" (Kopecký et al. 2016, p. 418).

the attainment of another goal (instrumental). Following Wiesendahl (2022, ch. 2.2.1), only policy-seeking would have an intrinsical value *per se*, while votes and offices can be understood as instruments to realise policies. While this is obviously not wrong and corresponds to the ideal type of democratic decision-making, it neglects certain feedback dynamics in this process. In fact, it seems reasonable that vote-seeking does not imply any intrinsical value as parties hardly fight for votes for "the pure thrill of winning", but rather to gain power or realise policy programmes (Strøm and Müller 1999, p. 11, Strøm 1990). The intrinsical and instrumental facets of office-seeking have been already outlined, i.e., power and party patronage and means to implement policy (Budge and Laver 1986). In the context of this dissertation, the interrelations of policy-seeking with the other two objectives are most interesting. The intrinsical value of policies for parties is evident, however, it is equally evident that policies can be *instrumental* and affect the vote-seeking and office-seeking rationales of parties regarding electoral strategies or coalition considerations. As I will work out in detail in the theory part (see ch. 5.2) parties might strategically emphasise or de-emphasise certain issues in order to increase their support among voters and/or to improve the prospects of certain coalitions (e.g., Abou-Chadi 2016, Green-Pedersen 2019, Budge and Laver 1986).

3.2 The Persistent Importance of Political Parties in National Policy-Making Processes

In this part, I address the question why it is worth scrutinising the effects of political parties from a policy analysis perspective. Political parties have faced severe criticism concerning their effectiveness (e.g., van der Heijden 2002, or, famously, Crouch 2004). Against these swan songs, in the following I will present – without claim of completeness – an overview of the potential effectiveness of political parties, which in several of its dimensions is also proved by the articles included in this dissertation.

In the traditional view of partisan theory, parties deploy effects only while holding office and this, certainly, is a decisive mechanism (e.g., Schmidt 1996) (see ch. 5.1). But, in the light of theories of the policy process as well as basic ideas of partisan research, this must be understood only as *one* of multiple causal mechanisms.

In principle, parties can be understood to operate in four different arenas in which they may have an impact on the policy-making process at different stages: electoral arena, parliamentary arena, implementation arena and an internal party arena (Larsson and Bäck 2008). In the first two arenas, actions reflect the classical vertical representation process of parliamentary democracies, in which parties as intermediary agencies take up interests from society and transfer them to the parliamentary arena (including both parliament and government) (Keman 2006). In addition, the third arena refers to the interaction between parties and public administration, and the fourth arena to negotiations and struggles inside the parties. As explained before, I exclude this fourth arena in the presented research for reasons of parsimony (see ch. 3.1). It does not address partisan effects on policy-making directly but rather preceding processes of opinion formation. Considering the remaining arenas and matching them with ideal type phases of the policy process (Jann and Wegrich 2007) shows that it is too limited to

focus only on governmental actions if we want to get a complete picture of partisan impact on public policy-making (Figure 1).



Figure 1: Political Party Arenas in the Policy-Cycle Author's own illustration based on Jann and Wegrich (2007) and Larsson and Bäck (2008)

In the following, I briefly go through the first three arenas and, based on policy analysis literature, clarify *how* political parties may unfold effects on public policy. In a slightly different order, I start at the formal core of policy-making processes and first look at the *parliamentary arena* before I elaborate on the *electoral* and, finally, the *implementation arena.*

Parliamentary Arena

In the original view of partisan theory, as formulated in pioneering works by Hibbs (1977) and Tufte (1980), parties do matter when they hold office and produce different policy outputs based on different party ideologies or on different constituencies' interests (Schmidt 1996) (see ch. 5.1). This basic mechanism (*governmental party → policy formulation*) still dominates the notion of partisan influence today in policy analysis – and of course, parties in government have a considerable power to influence public policy making. However, governmental parties are not alone in the parliamentary arena and the focus on formal decision-making power at the stage of policy formulation does not map the whole truth. Famously, Hicks and Swank (1992) pointed to a potential "contagion effect" passing policies from opposition parties on to governmental parties, which ultimately materialise these policies in governmental policy. More recent research on party competition corroborates this idea and substantiates the capability of opposition parties to affect policy-making (e.g. Green-Pedersen 2019, Zohlnhöfer 2017). Here, two mechanisms appear to be most important: first, parties might directly influence the political agenda when they get involved in pushing an issue's salience (*political party → party system*

agenda[5]) (Green-Pedersen 2019, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). Second, by doing so they indirectly force their competitor parties to deal with this issue and ultimately might affect not only the party system agenda but also the respective parties' positions (*political party → political party position*) (e.g. Bale et al. 2010, Spoon, Hobolt and De Vries 2014)). As these forms of partisan effects through traditional partisan theory and party competition are at the core of my dissertation, I elaborate on them in more detail in the theory part (see ch. 5).

Electoral Arena

While the parliamentary arena focuses on political parties only, the electoral arena indicates that parties unfold effects in problem definition and agenda-setting also on the society as a whole. As mentioned above, in representative democracies it is a commonly accepted function of parties to provide certain guidance for the formation of interests and to offer interpretative patterns on policies (e.g. Jun 2013) (see ch. 3.1.1). In consequence, they exert influence on the public sentiment which, in turn, is an important yardstick for the other political parties as well as political actors overall (*political party → public sentiment*) (see ch. 5.1 & ch. 4.1). However, as already reflected in the traditional partisan theory, the process between parties and society is highly interactive so that parties take up stimuli from society. Thus, they also represent important gate-keepers for organised interests like business lobby groups, associations, non-governmental organisations or social movements (Rucht 1996, Allern and Bale 2012, Tarrow 2011). Research has shown that different parties grant interest groups access to a varying degree, and usually filter issues taken to them by adjusting these issues to their own existing programmes *(political party → effect of interest organisations)* (Piccio 2019, Poguntke 2006, Hubo and Göhrs 2021). Overall, although usually neglecting the effective force of political parties due to their American focus, theories of policy-change, on a more abstract level, suggest that parties can matter as actors of policy subsystems (Weible and Sabatier 2018). Following the *Advocacy Coalition Framework*, in these subsystems[6] parties operate as part of so-called advocacy coalitions and struggle for influence and ultimately for implementing policy measures. In doing so, they could target not only the policy positions of other actors in the subsystem (Weible, Sabatier and McQueen 2009) but also larger discourses (Hajer 2002) (*political party → distribution of power in policy subsystems*).

Implementation Arena

Regarding the implementation arena, political parties can have effects on the policy-making process at the stages of policy implementation and evaluation. For implementation, parties in government often represent the leading principle and regarding common practices of patronage they often also determine

[5] Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010) introduce the term of a party-system agenda in order to better approach the agenda-setting effects yielding from party competition. "The party-system agenda emerges from the continuous political debate among political parties", however, at the same time, it represents a structural constraint to individual parties' issue emphases as they need to react to it (p. 260f).

[6] Following the *Advocacy Coalition Framework,* subsystems are defined by a specific policy topic, a territorial scope and actors that are directly or indirectly involved (Weible, Sabatier and McQueen 2009).

the leading staff structures of agencies (Kopecký et al. 2016, Hustedt and Salomonsen 2014) (*political party → staff structure of public administration*)[7]. Finally, at the ideal type end stage of the policy-cycle, parties certainly play a role in terms of systematic evaluation procedures as parliamentary opposition scrutinising governmental actions but also as governmental parties since these are responsible for stipulating more systematic evaluations in the first place (e.g., Schoenefeld et al. 2019). As a decision in favour of policy evaluation falls in line with conventional policy formulation or party competition, this does not add another causal mechanism to the overview.

Arena	Causal Mechanism
Parliamentary	governmental party → policy formulation *(traditional partisan theory)*
	political party → (party system) agenda in terms of salience
	political party → political party position
Electoral	political party → public sentiment / public agenda
	political party → effect of interest organisations
	political party → distribution of power in policy subsystems in terms of positions and discourses
Implementation	political party → staff structure of public administration

Table 3: Forms of Partisan Effects

In conclusion, it is evident that *parties do matter* and are capable of influencing public policy-making in a variety of ways going well beyond the view of traditional partisan theory (Table 3). Focusing on the causal mechanisms of the parliamentary and partly also the electoral arena, the research of this dissertation will prove this point for the field of environmental policy.

3.3 The Persistent Importance of Political Parties for Environmental Policy-Making

The preceding explanations demonstrated the manifold effectiveness of political parties in the general policy-making process. In times of an extensive globalisation, a necessary follow-up question is if national policy-making is still relevant for policy-making in a specific field of policy because, in case it

[7] One may add that parties in government can determine which public agencies exist in the first place. However, since this is an overarching structural decision taken before the implementation, it rather falls in the category of policy formulation.

is not, the potentially expansive influence of political parties miss the mark (Schmidt 1996). This often-raised criticism on partisan effects applies particularly to the field of environmental policy which, due to its often international or even global problem structure (see ch. 2), was said to be predominated by (global) governance regimes questioning the steering capacity of national governments (Mol 2007, Lederer, Wallbott and Bauer 2018). In contrast, in research on the environmental state it is argued that "while the state constitutes only one modality of political power, it is an especially significant one because of its historical claims to exclusive rule over territory and peoples—as expressed in the principle of state sovereignty" (Eckersley 2004, p. 6, see also Duit 2014b). Concerning the international but also national governance regimes, Duit (2014a) concludes that "many of these governance arrangements would not be able to persist and function without the state taking the role of initiator, financier, and coordinator. Governance arrangements depend on the state for carrying out key functions such as initiation of networks and collaborations; funding of larger projects, research, and policies; collective decision making, rule making, and lawmaking; and the sanctioning of transgressions" (p. 339). The refocussing on the nation state in environmental and climate policy-making has also been highlighted, for instance, by the Paris Agreement, which has been negotiated by nation-states and, ultimately, set high responsibilities on these nation-states and their national actions in order to achieve the agreed climate policy goals (Görg et al. 2017, Tobin 2017, Zell-Ziegler et al. 2021). In the European Union (EU) environmental policy has been driven substantially by supranational institutions like the European Commission (Steinebach and Knill 2017), or the European Parliament (Burns 2020). Thus, it might be a particularly contentious case as regards the continuous effect of national politics. However, research has shown that member states, even in this unprecedentedly integrated policy environment, continue to influence environmental policy-making (Lenschow 2021). This holds especially true for several *pioneer* or *leader states* which in various ways succeeded in controlling the policy-making process on the European level in their own interest (Liefferink and Wurzel 2017). In conclusion, national governments have always kept playing a pivotal role in environmental policy-making, and, thus, also the parties that compose them in party democracies. Therefore, national party politics persist to be crucial for environmental policy-making.

4 Changing Party Systems and related Party Competition in Western Europe

In my doctoral thesis, I investigate the role of changing party competition as main factor for party positions and related policy output in the field of environmental and climate policy. For each political system, the overarching configuration of party competition itself is laid out by party systems which becomes immediately visible by looking at Sartori's pertinent definition of a party system: "the *system of interactions* resulting from inter-party competition. That is, the system in question bears on the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function (in the mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts, competitively or otherwise, to the other parties" (Sartori 2005 [1976], 39; italics

in the original). As a foundation of my research, in this chapter, I will, therefore, lay out the significant changes that party systems in Western Europe underwent in the last decades. Notwithstanding different approaches (e.g., Ware 1996, Mair 1997, Niedermayer 2013, Wiesendahl 2022), in the literature party systems are usually characterised by two dimensions introduced by Sartori[8]: the format, which first and foremost entails the sheer number of parties as well as the related fragmentation of a party system (Sartori 2005 [1976], ch. 9, Wolinetz 2006)[9]; and the mechanics, which focuses on ideological or positional distances between the parties, i.e., the polarisation of a party system (Sartori 2005 [1976], ch. 9). Regarding the format the changes of party systems are laid out in the first subchapter by looking at the fragmentation of party systems. While this dimension of party systems can be captured quite straightforward, displaying the changes in the mechanics-dimension requires several steps: After a short introduction to this dimension (4.2), following Niedermayer (2009, 2013) the currently dominant lines of conflicts in modern West European party systems are identified based on the cleavage theory (4.3). By outlining my specific approach to the theory, this subchapter also entails an important clarification of the focus of this dissertation. In a next step the positions of political parties and the polarisation of party systems on the identified main cleavages are illustrated for the four countries of focus of this dissertation (4.4). In addition, this subchapter also showcases the implications of this changing party system environment for party competition. These illustrations also serve as brief introductions to the party systems of the four countries of focus informing the subsequent empirical analyses. Finally, the developments depicted are put into the context of the field of environmental policy questioning previous handling of 'the' environmental cleavage (4.5).

[8] This accounts, in particular, for established democracies, for which "Sartori's typology, while subjected to many criticisms and refinements […], still constitutes the most important point of departure when examining party system change" (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2023, 36).

[9] Wiesendahl (2022), in addition, includes asymmetry and volatility as quantitative system characteristics that complement the canon (ch. 8.3). Volatility is not a party-system characteristic as such but describes the relation to the voters. Furthermore, volatility normally only provides the value of voter change in total and does not refer to gains and losses of specific parties which could indicate changing power relations among the parties (ibid.).

4.1 The Format of Party Systems: Growing Numbers

For the *format of party systems*, measurements of fragmentation have proved to be the most appropriate way of analysis. They include the number and the relative size of parties in a party system and can be measured on an electoral (→ votes of all parties participating in an election) or parliamentary level (→ seats of all parties in parliament). The most valid and, nowadays, most applied measure of fragmentation is the *effective number of parties* which goes back to Laakso and Taagepera (1979)[10] (Mair 2006b). In research on partisan systems, it is common practice to look at this effective number of parties on both the electoral level and the parliamentary level in order to get a comprehensive picture of party system patterns (e.g., Siaroff 2019, ch. 2). For this first dimension of party systems, it is sufficient to conclude that the fragmentation of party systems has increased considerably in all Western European states since the 1970s on both levels of party competition[11] (e.g., Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2022). Figure 2 and



Figure 2: Electoral Fragmentation in selected countries (1945-2022). Author's own illustration; Data: Casal Bértoa (2022) complemented by my own calculation for the Swedish election in 2022

[10] $N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}(\%\ of\ votes\ or\ seats)_i^2}$

[11] Data retrieved from the *Who Governs in Europe and Beyond*-database (https://whogoverns.eu/about/, 13/07/2023) (Casal Bértoa 2022) complemented by my own calculation for the Swedish election in 2022.



Figure 3: Parliamentary Fragmentation in selected countries (1945-2022). Author's own illustration; Data: Casal Bértoa (2022) complemented by my own calculation for the Swedish election in 2022

Figure 3 confirm this trend for the four countries of focus of this dissertation. Due to electoral thresholds the electoral fragmentation is usually slightly higher than the parliamentary fragmentation. The consequent differences are least notable in the Netherlands (effective threshold[12]: 0.67% of the votes) while for Germany they have been remarkably high in some years[13]. For instance, in the German election 2013 the electoral fragmentation was 1.3 higher than the parliamentary since with the FDP and the AfD two parties obtained vote shares just below the threshold of 5%. The small decrease of parliamentary fragmentation in the most recent elections in Germany and Sweden points to slight shifts of seats from smaller parties towards increasing middle-sized parties.

In light of the increasing fragmentation, it is clear that new parties emerged in European party systems in the last decades and that these new parties made no cameo appearances but managed to persist as new competitors and thereby changed party system dynamics. Importantly, among these new competitors the party families of PRRPs and Green Parties are the most successful in terms of number,

[12] In the Netherlands, no legal threshold exists but an effective threshold depending on the number of seats in parliament (Siaroff 2019, p. 391).
[13] In both Austria and Sweden an electoral threshold of 4 % is in place.

electoral success, governmental participation and durability[14] (Mudde 2013, De Vries and Hobolt 2020, Emanuele and Sikk 2021). Recalling the pivotal research questions of my dissertation the impacts of the first-mentioned challenger parties are at the fore of my research.

The fragmentation of party systems already provides some indications to "what sort of government coalitions is possible and the competitiveness of election" (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2023, 33, Wolinetz 2006). However, following previous research, ideologies and political positions need to be taken into account in order to really understand the core of party competition and its implications (Sartori 2005 [1976], ch. 5, Mair 2006b, Dalton 2008, Bardi and Mair 2008). This brings us back to the second dimension of party systems characteristics, i.e., the *mechanics***,** or qualitative properties, *of a party system*.

4.2 The Mechanics of Party Systems and the Cleavage Theory: A Brief Introduction and a Clarification of the Research Focus

As usual in modern party system research, Sartori (2005 [1976], ch. 5) paved the way here for future research as he was among the first who introduced *ideology* as a criterion for the analysis of party systems. More specifically, he suggested examining the *ideological distance* or *ideological proximity* of parties on a left-right-scale (Sartori 2005 [1976], ch. 6). Based on how parties array on this scale, we could measure the degree of *polarisation* in a party system which indicates the direction of competition. In this vein, Sartori discerned centripetal and centrifugal tendencies as central patterns of party competition describing the convergence (*centripetal*) or the divergence of parties on the left-right scale (*centrifugal*) with extreme parties on the fringes of the party system (Sartori 2005 [1976], ch. 5). Another important characteristic of party competition is the *segmentation* (Sartori 2005 [1976], ch. 6). While segmentation can be observed also on the electoral level, i.e., concerning the volatility of voter behaviour (see footnote 9), for my research, the segmentation on the parliamentary level is more decisive. Here, it refers to the cooperation potential between parties in a party system. If the segmentation is very low, almost all parties are eligible to cooperate, while high values of segmentation indicate clear cooperation patterns between rigid sets of parties or individual parties (see also Mair 1996).

While Sartori's ideas have been criticised as being devoid of sufficient conceptual precisions, they have introduced essential concepts for the study of party systems that are still valid today and they have pointed to the core of party competition, i.e., ideology and its role in the competition for government (Mair 1996, 2006b, Wolinetz 2006, Wiesendahl 2022, 8.3). Specifically, the *mechanics* help us to answer several questions that are essential for the research of my dissertation: first, which are the salient societal conflicts of a party system; second, how are these conflicts taken up by political parties in terms of their positioning and overall polarisation on these lines of conflicts; and, ultimately, third, how do

[14] This refers only to new party families as also radical left parties have experienced some revival recently (e.g., De Vries and Hobolt 2020).

these party system features impact party competition *for* government but also party cooperation *in* government and in the policy-making process in general (Wolinetz 2006, Mair 2006b, Bergman, Back and Hellström 2021)? The third question concerns the theoretical core of my dissertation and, accordingly, I will return to it in the theory part (see ch. 5). The answers to the first two questions lay the foundation for this theoretical reasoning as well as its later empirical applications. I will address them in the next subchapters. As introduced above, for this purpose, I will follow Niedermayer (2009, 2013), who in accordance with the aforementioned suggests a three-step procedure in order to reflect the role of ideology in party competition in specific party systems: first, we must discover which lines of conflicts are prevalent in modern West European party systems; second, we need to scrutinise how the political parties of a party system array on these lines of conflict; and third, we must seek to understand to which extent the whole of the party system relates to these lines of conflict. As the key premise of my research is that party systems and their inherent party competition patterns in Western Europe are about to change, I include temporal accounts to reflect this dynamic.

The most influential theory used for reflecting on the prevalent lines of conflicts and for understanding the reshaping of party systems is the *cleavage theory*. First developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), it addresses not only the supply side of politics, i.e., parties, but also the demand side, i.e., societal patterns. Explaining the striking stability of party systems before and after the Second World War – or in their words the "freezing" of party systems at this time (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, p. 50) – they identified lasting lines of conflict in Western European societies that produced stabile bounds between parties and their core constituencies which they called *cleavages*. Although Lipset and Rokkan (1967) did not explicate the concept of a cleavage in detail, nowadays political scientists, by and large, agree on cleavages as being defined by three components: first, a *socio-structural reality* meaning that cleavages originate in conflicts between large social groups with similar living environments; second, a *collective identity* which the specific social groups develop based on their shared experiences and from which they derive specific ideologies, values and interests; and third, an *organisational expression* of these ideologies and interests in the form of political parties that institutionalises the societal conflicts and conveys those to the political system (Mair 2006a, Bartolini and Mair 1990, Bornschier 2009). Ford and Jennings (2020), rightly, point to the fact that "[a]ll cleavage politics is therefore, at least in part, identity politics, since stable cleavages depend on groups with stable and shared identities that are organized into politics by parties" (p. 297).

Although researchers agree on the three components of a cleavage, the exact conceptualisation of these components has been at issue for a long time. In particular, there has been a lot of discussion on the dealignment and realignments of voters and parties pertaining to the question if collective values must be embedded in socio-structural realities for a cleavage to manifest (Mair 2006a). *Dealignment* refers to significant changes in the structure of modern societies which made societal bounds between voters and parties more volatile, e.g., de-industrialisation, secularisation, and individualisation (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2023, Lane and Ersson 1999, Dalton 2000, Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg 2000, Ferreira da

Silva, Garzia and De Angelis 2019). Given the traditional idea of cleavages this dealignment would make the theory obsolete. However, while the existence of these processes cannot be questioned, the idea of *overall* volatile electorates which only focus on short-term issues and which gear their votes towards the popularity of individual candidates at the expense of political parties and their long-term ideologies is questioned indeed. *Realignment* equally sees weakening ties between voters and parties, however, this only concerns a *specific group of* parties, i.e., the more established parties. Instead of observing a dealignment in absolute terms, the hypothesis here is that voters do not remain entirely unbound after detaching from a party but rather reattach to other (newcomer) parties. This realignment might be a middle- or long-term process and can entail a transformation period of higher volatility. It takes place "when new conflicts lead to novel alliances among social groups. In multi-party systems, the transitions from one configuration to another usually entail the emergence of new parties that do not fit into old conflict-patterns. In two-party systems, on the other hand, the same parties may have a continuous existence while radically changing electorates and programmatic positions" (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2023, p. 31, see also Marks et al. 2021). Bornschier (2009) emphasises that in the empirical application of the cleavage theory the overall assessment of all three cleavage-components has hardly been done due to concerns of overcomplexity and, in addition to the organisational expression, he makes the case for focusing on collective values as central elements of cleavages rather than class structures (see also Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995, Mair 2006a, Kriesi 2010). This concurs with the broad concept of cleavages which shall be applied in this dissertation. Accordingly, a cleavage consists of conflicting values on a societal level and an organisational expression of this conflict in the intermediary system which can but need not be represented by political parties (e.g., Enyedi 2005).

Beyond this conceptual definition, another cleavage theoretical question is even more important in order to clarify my research focus. As stated above, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) brilliantly integrated societal and party conflicts in their theoretical approach and, evidently, the relationship between parties and society is interdependent. On the one hand, there is always a bottom-up element of decision-making in party democracies which reflects the responsiveness of political parties to the electorate and the functions of interest aggregation and articulation (e.g., Keman 2006). However, likewise, parties present policy alternatives to the voters and, thus, considerably shape societal discussions (Mair 2006a) (see ch. 3.1.1). The centrality of parties in this process is already underlined by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) famously stating that "cleavages do not translate themselves into party oppositions as a matter of course" (p. 26) but that they hinge upon the strategic behaviour of the parties. Sartori emphasised this point when he states that "it is not the objective class (class conditions) that creates the party, but the party that creates the "subjective" class (class consciousness)" (1990 [1969], 169). More recent research takes up and buttresses these actor-centred claims of the old masters of partisan research. For instance, Enyedi (2005) makes the case for this top-down perspective on cleavages as these "would not exist without elites conceptualizing the conflict situation" (p. 699). He illustrates this with a case study on the early FIDESZ-party in Hungary which succeeded in integrating a number of diverse conflicts and binding

various previously divided voters of the right camp to a new encompassing party ideology on the cultural conflict line. Holmberg (2011) emphasises that "[r]epresentative democracy has a leadership component. Legislators are not only supposed to behave as delegates reacting to shifts in public opinion. They are also expected to act as trustees shaping public opinion" (p. 75). In an empirical time-series study of policy positions of voters and parliamentary representatives in Sweden between 1968 and 2006, he corroborates this "dynamic representation from above" (Holmberg 2011). In the investigated cases of policies, most policy opinion changes (47%) followed an elite-driven pattern with voters moving towards positions where elites have already been. The opposite was only prevalent in 19% of the cases (ibid.). Similarly, Rovny and Edwards (2012) show that political parties strategically politicise and depoliticise different dimensions of the political space depending on their status as niche or mainstream party. Furthermore, Moral and Best (2023) find that "citizen polarization responds to party polarization, rather than the other way around" (p. 230). This is supported by Vachudova (2021) who concludes a top-down effect by populist parties on voter's attitudes towards other parties' elites framing those as "corrupt […] and culturally harmful" (p. 477) (see also Stroschein 2019). The latter effect increases for governing populist parties due to the extended communication resources at their disposal (Vachudova 2021). As a corollary, I follow this literature that sees party (elite) competition as pivotal for the societal competition and focus on the political party side of party politics. In the end, the cleavage theory integrates the two research traditions of electoral studies and political party research (Niedermayer 2009). Basing my research clearly in the latter strand, it is essential to see on which lines of conflicts *parties* compete with each other. This is in line with other major research on cleavages which have concentrated on the supply-side of cleavages, i.e., political parties (Kriesi et al. 2006, Kriesi 2010, Hooghe and Marks 2018, Hutter and Kriesi 2019, see Dennison and Hunger 2023). To be consistent, according to the original cleavage theory this should indicate parallel developments on the societal level, however, an in-depth consideration of this sociological or electoral studies approach is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Importantly, there are recent studies which indeed confirm voters to reflect a two-dimensional space with the socio-cultural dimension gaining increasing importance in recent years (Oesch 2012, Marks et al. 2021, Bornschier et al. 2021, Dassonneville, Hooghe and Marks 2023).

4.3 Dominant Conflicts of Party competition and the Restructuring of West European Party Systems

Having introduced the cleavage theory and clarified my own research focus within this theory, I return to the mapping of the mechanics of party systems in Western Europe and their recent changes. Following the introduced three-step procedure by Niedermayer (2013), this subchapter outlines the currently prevalent conflict structures of West European party systems.

Originally, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identified four main cleavages shaping West European party systems: *workers vs. employers and owners*, *land vs. industry* or *primary vs. secondary economy*, *state vs. church* and *centre vs. periphery*. They conceived these four cleavages originating in the two

major historical processes of industrial revolution and evolution of nation-states. While they saw the former two cleavages evolving from the industrial revolution, the latter two emerged from the evolution of nation-states which produced conflicts between centralised and secular states and established ethnical, cultural, linguistic, or religious groups and organisations (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Basically, the four cleavages were present in all Western European societies, however, their individual impact varied considerably due to "[d]ifferences in the timing and character" of the two revolutions, their interaction, and the behaviour of political actors like movements, organisations, and parties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 34f). The one conflict that shaped all West European party systems similarly was the conflict between workers and employers since "all countries of Western Europe developed lower-class mass parties at some point or other before World War I [although] [t]hese were rarely unified into one single working-class party" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 35). This traditional class cleavage, centrally, revolves around issues of economic redistribution and governmental regulation. It is still prevalent in party systems across Europe (Rovny and Edwards 2012), although today, it is, often, more broadly conceptualised as economic dimension of party competition (Dassonneville, Hooghe and Marks 2023). Originating in the seminal contribution by Downs (1957), it is predominantly this economic dimension that continues to define our understanding of the political space. On this unidimensional continuum 'left' is commonly associated with more state interventions and the pursuit of equality while 'right' is connected to the emphasis of free markets opposed to state regulation and the acceptance of hierarchies within a society (Bobbio 1996, Jahn 2011). However, researchers widely agree that modern European party systems are shaped not by only one but by at least two dominant lines of conflicts, thus, yielding the necessity to consider a multi-dimensional arena of party competition (e.g., Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990, Dalton 2009, Bornschier 2010, Rovny and Edwards 2012, Niedermayer 2013, Marks et al. 2021, Dassonneville, Hooghe and Marks 2023).

While for specific party systems additional dimensions, like regional or ethnic conflicts, continue to be important[15], it is the cultural dimension of party competition that is considered as an essential complement of the economic dimension as it has taken increasing effect on party systems all over Europe since the 1970s (e.g., Flanagan and Lee 2003). Like other cleavages, the new cultural divide developed from fundamental shifts in society. A continuous economic and technological development, an intensifying de-industrialisation, a singular educational expansion as well as the spread of mass communications overall engendered substantial changes in values (and skills) of citizens in Western societies in the post-war period (Inglehart 1977, ch. 1). This "silent revolution" let younger cohorts especially demand for the recognition of 'new' political issues, such as identity, gender equality, minority rights, the environment, on a systemic level. Likewise, it brought about calls for active political participation and a renewal of democratic institutions (ibid.). Following the actor-centred cleavage perspective applied in my dissertation, it is crucial how these societal shifts have materialised in party

[15] This applies, for instance, to countries like Belgium or Spain (e.g., Knutsen 2010).

systems. Inglehart (1977) already indicated that the "emergence of these new issues presents the existing political parties with a dilemma […] [and that since] 'new politics' often clash with strongly held traditional values and norms […] [it] has resulted in pressures toward the formation of new political parties" (p. 13). From a distinctive party research perspective, the sociological findings on a cultural divide have been harnessed to explain the rise of, above all, green parties, but also parties of the 'new right', i.e., early PRRPs (Müller-Rommel 2019 [1989], Kitschelt 1992).

Building on these early insights, the cultural cleavage has been elaborated and its importance for modern party competition was empirically confirmed by various researchers who form the core of a research strand that can be called "neo-cleavage theory" (Marks et al. 2021, Hooghe and Marks 2018, Kriesi et al. 2006, Kriesi 2010, Hutter and Kriesi 2019, Merkel 2017). Neo-cleavage researchers share the observations of societal macro-trends, like secularisation, individualisation, de-industrialisation and an expansion of education, brought forward by Inglehart (1977), and punctuate globalisation as an additional system-level driving force of value change. Thus, the emergence and intensification of the cultural cleavage can be traced back to two major processes in Europe that reveal an intriguing analogy to the two revolutions identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) although in a reversed direction: de-industrialisation (↔ industrial revolution) and globalisation (↔ nation-building). De-industrialisation has played some part in the evolution of the cleavage as it involved a tertiarisation of society with accompanying processes of educational expansion and occupational upgrading (Inglehart 1977, Oesch 2012). This shift to a service society has ameliorated the prospects of some parts of society, i.e., the formally more educated, whereas it has deteriorated situations for others (Spier 2010, Oesch 2012). Empirical research has shown that the cultural cleavage materialises on socio-structural characteristics like education, occupation, rural-urban location, and gender on the demand side (Marks et al. 2021). However, as Oesch (2012) noted: "Although rooted in the employment structure, this divide between winners and losers of post-industrialization is not primarily about the economy and the just distribution of resources, but about culture and the definition of identity" (p. 34, see also Kriesi et al. 2006). From a theoretical-philosophical point of view, Fukuyama terms this need for acknowledgment of a person's own value, dignity and identity *thymos*, and stresses that, although it is correlating with socio-economic aspects, this culturally-loaded thymos is the overall dominant driving force for human action (2018). As such, it provides an essential part of the explanations for the intensifying cultural divide in the last decades (Fukuyama 2018).

While the mentioned socio-economic processes contribute undeniably to the unsettling of identities and life situations, the second macro-development brought up above, appears to entail even bigger implications. Globalisation involves three intertwining dimensions: economic, political and cultural (Held et al. 1999, ch. 1). Globalisation in the *economic dimension*, evidently, also connects to the described de-industrialisation in an economic dimension as, for instance, many traditional industries were relocated from Europe to other parts of the world and many jobs in the service-sector are highly internationalised, therefore, benefitting higher educated occupants who are equipped to move in

international working environments (Hooghe and Marks 2018, Held et al. 1999, ch. 3). However, two other developments, relating to the other two dimensions of globalisation, had large implications here in Western Europe, i.e., European integration and increasing international migration. The deepening and geographical expansion of the European Union in the wake of the treaties of Maastricht (1993) and Lisbon (2009) represented an institutional benchmark of political (and economic) globalisation (Hooghe and Marks 2018). Yet, the subsequent the transfer of significant regulatory competencies from national governments to the supranational EU-level (e.g., Zürn 2003) has also raised issues about the transparency and democratic legitimacy of decisions that are often made past elected national parliaments and governments (Kocka and Merkel 2015). This political globalisation contributed to EU-scepticism among citizens and specific political parties which exploit the EU as a symbol of the rule of a distanced and selfish political elite counteracting the interests of ordinary people (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002, Huber 2020). Moreover, the EU has always been understood as a project of a common European culture pointing to the cultural dimension of globalisation. As such, the EU potentially triggers "a fear of cultural, ethnic and linguistic loss or dilution" (Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz 2012, p. 115). Paradoxically, a common European identity, might be perceived as both a threat to national identities itself and a platform of demarcation against 'non-European' immigrants, then, threatening an exclusively framed idea of European identity (ibid., Loch 2017). Not least, the so-called 'refugee crisis' in 2015 led to a critical politicisation of immigration that entailed "a significant shift to new types of discourses on immigration […] drawing on traditional *and new* forms of discriminatory rhetoric or outright racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia" (Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2018, p. 3; italics in the original). The increasing influx of 'non-European' labour and refugees made European societies less homogenous and more multicultural. As part of the multi-faceted shifts following globalisation, this contributed to fears and resistance among certain groups which hold on to ideas of a homogeneous nation-state with related norms and traditions (Norris and Inglehart 2019, ch. 13, esp. pp. 446ff). As Hooghe and Marks (2018) note "[n]ationalism has long been the refuge of those who are insecure, who sense they are losing status, and who seek standing by identifying with the group (p. 114). Indeed, empirical evidence cumulated that connects the emergence of the new cultural cleavage in the last two decades closely to the policy fields of European integration and immigration (Hooghe and Marks 2018, Hutter and Kriesi 2019, Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002).

In summary, we may conclude that globalisation processes have left a significant imprint on (Western) European societies. While they reinforced previously existent de-industrialisation, they challenged the political sovereignty of nation-states and related national identities bringing issues like European integration and immigration to forefront of the political agenda. Concurrently, the political conflict around these issues has equally intensified suggesting the consolidation of a new cultural cleavage. The two most pertinent approaches of neo-cleavage theory prove clear reflection of these socio-cultural developments on the level of party systems.

As the probably most widespread notion of the new transnational cultural cleavage, researchers affiliated with the University of North Carolina and the associated Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002, Bakker et al. 2020a) have introduced the divide ranging from *Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL)* values at the one end to *Traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN)* at the other end (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). GAL actors embrace issues of new politics like ecology, gender equality, multi-culturalism and participatory democracy. TAN advocates support traditional family values and the idea of a powerful, hierarchically organised nation state, while they strongly oppose the idea of an open society (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). In accordance with the original cleavage theory, political parties have played a main role for the institutionalisation of the cleavage. Mainstream parties, which have emerged from and settled on the old cleavage structures, were at best reluctant to reflect the rising societal contention around the new issues as they were hardly compatible with their own programmatic foundations and entailed serious risks to cause internal fissures. This hold especially true for centre-right parties which were torn between "neoliberal support for transnationalism and nationalist defense of sovereignty" (Hooghe and Marks 2018, p. 121, Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). In a silent and uncoordinated sort of a non-aggression pact, they rather tried to de-emphasise these issues and in their official positions consistently embraced transnationalism in the form of open borders and international exchange. In contrast, "TAN and GAL parties take more extreme positions on Europe and immigration than mainstream political parties; they tie these issues into a tightly coherent worldview; they consider them as intrinsic to their programs; and, correspondingly, they give these issues great salience" (Hooghe and Marks 2018, p. 123). Thus, it were not only PRRPs but in response also some radical left and especially green parties that pushed the new divide on the political agenda depending on national variations of already existent cleavage structures, which, importantly do not vanish completely but remain as ground layers for party competition only with diminished shaping power (Hooghe and Marks 2018). However, while green parties most fully embrace transnationalism, PRRPs must also be considered to champion the opposition against transnationalism (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2018).

The second pertinent notion of the new cultural cleavage has developed around researchers of the Universities of Zurich and Munich (Kriesi et al. 2012). These researchers share the observations of the described profound societal changes in Western European countries. Going back to the overall process of globalisation in an economic, cultural and political dimension, these changes generate new groups of 'winners' and 'losers' who centrally support or reject the opening of national borders (Kriesi et al. 2006). In line with this emphasis, Kriesi et al. (2006) term this arising divide a *conflict between integration and demarcation* (p. 922, see also Kriesi et al. 2012). Investigating the political implications of this new divide empirically in six European countries, Kriesi et al. (2006), importantly, found that it does not represent an additional conflict but rather a transformation of the older cultural dimension. In contrast to the 1970s, it showed a weakened link to left-libertarian issues, like gender, inclusive democratic participation or the environment, and had been loaded with new issues, above all immigration and

European integration. Even more than Hooghe and Marks (2018), Kriesi et al. (2006) attribute the crucial role for this development to PRRPs, "who have been able to formulate a highly attractive ideological package for the 'losers' of economic transformations and cultural diversity" (p. 929) by putting the cultural implications of globalisation and the defence of a national identity at the core of their political programme (ibid.). In a more recent study on the effects of the Euro-crisis and the so-called refugee crisis on the evolution of the cultural cleavage in 15 European countries between 2000 and 2017, Hutter and Kriesi (2019) confirmed their earlier findings for Western Europe and, furthermore, corroborated two arguments made similarly by the GAL-TAN-researchers. First, traditional cleavage structures are not completely replaced by the new divide but rather overlaid. While the new value-based cleavage gains in salience and increasingly structures party competition, its specific appearance and politicisation depend on existent cleavage structures varying between national political systems or on a superordinate level between cultural regions. Second, for North Western European countries the authors identify patterns of a tripartite party competition with "a unified political left on the upper left and the political right split between a more centrist and a nationalist-conservative camp" of which the latter radicalised in their opposition against immigration and cultural liberalism in the wake of the two crises (Hutter and Kriesi 2019, 1010).

The emergence of a new cultural cleavage in Western Europe has been confirmed by several other researchers reaching conclusions very similar to the ones explained above, however using different denominations. Among others they refer to it *libertarian-universalistic versus traditionalist-communitarian* (Bornschier 2010), *nativist protectionism versus globalisation* (Loch 2017) or *cosmopolitan versus communitarian* (Teney, Lacewell and De Wilde 2014, Merkel 2017)[16].

In line with the theoretical focus of this dissertation, neo-cleavage researchers emphasise the importance of party behaviour and party competition for the final breakthrough of this cultural divide. Only the specific response and non-response of political parties to the described societal and political transitions let the cleavage fully evolve. As established mainstream parties showed, by and large, consensus on the transnational issues, and, thus, were hardly interested in addressing these issues, they left room for new

[16] Another very often-cited contribution in this regard has been made by Norris and Inglehart (2019) who discern three cleavages, currently, prevalent in European party systems and the United States: a traditional left-right cleavage on economic interests, an authoritarian–libertarian cleavage on cultural values and a populist–pluralist cleavage on the "legitimate source of governance" (p. 65).At the end of their rich and in many parts inspiring empirical analysis they conclude that the cultural dimension has gained in importance through the increasing mobilisation of authoritarian-populist values that evolved as a counter-reaction to the proliferation of liberal values in the wake of the Silent Revolution, i.e. a "Cultural Backlash". These values had been exploited by political parties (and other actors) of the populist radical right. I did not reflect further on this contribution for two reasons: first, it focuses on the supply side of the cultural cleavage rather then on the demand side and, therefore, lies outside the focus of my dissertation; and second, because Norris and Inglehart (2019), in the end, reduce the cultural counter-reaction to a *generational* cleavage arguing that authoritarian values are represented first and foremost by older cohorts while libertarian values are embraced throughout younger generations. This final conclusion, however, is a fallacy based on their own empirical data (Schäfer 2022) and also contradicts robust findings in the literature which sees authoritarian values spread across societies as a whole and least not only across older generations (e.g., Foa and Mounk 2016). It does not invalidate this rich contribution as such but clearly questions its specific notion of the cultural cleavage.

challenger parties which were eager to push these issues to the top of the political agenda to secure a place in the party system and, thus are main responsible for the transformation of party systems and related party competition (Hooghe and Marks 2018, Kriesi et al. 2006, Hooghe and Marks 2004, De Vries and Hobolt 2020, Dassonneville, Hooghe and Marks 2023). In the last three decades, in Western Europe, these new challenger parties were not only but first and foremost PRRPs, which, compared to early research, in the neo-cleavage literature have replaced green parties as major research objects in the context of the cultural divide. It is noteworthy, that the emergence of the cultural divide has taken off clearly only from the middle of the 2000s and since then accelerated[17]. This trend is reflected by the rapidly growing influence of PRRPs in West European party systems.

Digression: Overview of the electoral performance of PRRPs in Western Europe

Figure 4 provides an overview of the electoral performance of PRRPs in Western Europe, and we can see that PRRPs have gained increasing traction among voters. The dark grey dashed trend line displays a clear positive development in the 15 countries included in the sample over the last 30 years. Considering the four countries of focus of my dissertation equally positive trends are discernible. In Austria, the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ) has been the overall strongest of the PRRPs here and even entered governmental coalitions two times. It has lost electoral approval only two times in the mid of the 2000s after internal quarrels and in the elections 2019 a scandal around the party speaker (e.g., Wineroither 2021). However, it has contrived to recover quite rapidly after these incidents indicating a very broad and consistent voter base. Its counterpart in Germany, the *Alternative für Deutschland* (Alternative for Germany, AfD), represents one of the youngest members of the PRRP family in Europe. Founded in 2013 as Eurosceptic right-wing liberal party, it has turned into a clear PRRP by now (e.g., Arzheimer and Berning 2019). While it entered parliament already in its second participation in elections in 2017 with 12.6% of the votes, it has lost slightly in 2021 ending at 10.3%. Its most recent trends, yet, also indicate a continuously positive trend. In the highly fragmented party system of the Netherlands, more than one PRRP have been successful at the polls. To reflect the overall strength of PRRPs in the country, the vote percentages in Figure 4 sum their voices if applicable. After a cameo appearance of the *Centrum Democraten* (Centre Democrats, CD) in 1994, the *List Pim Fortuyn* really paved the way for PRRPs in the beginning of the 2000s. When the party dissolved again quickly after the assassination of its party leader, the newly founded *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (Party for Freedom, PVV), under its well-known party leader Geert Wilders, has become and remained the most successful and influential PRRP in the Netherlands still gaining close to 11% in the national elections of 2021 (e.g., Crum 2023). Since the election of 2017 two additional parties have joined the PRRP family group in the Netherlands: the *Forum voor Democratie* (Forum for Democracy, FvD) (election results: 1.78%, 2017 and 5.02%, 2021) and the *Juiste Antwoord 2021* (Correct Answer 2021, JA21)

[17] For instance, based on data of 2006, Rovny and Edwards (2012) still found a predominance of the classic economic dimension of party competition in European party systems.

(2.37% ,2021) (ibid.). Finally, in Sweden, the *Sverigedemokraterna* (Sweden Democrats, SD) is the only PRRP. Since it first entered the national parliament in 2010 with 5.7% of the votes, it has continuously expanded its vote share and became the second largest party in the election of 2021 with 20.54% of the total votes. Currently, it serves as a support party of a right-wing government coalition while assuring itself high influence on the government through a detailed support-agreement and party representatives in the government administration (e.g., Hagevi 2022) (see ch. 9).



Figure 4: Vote Percentage of Populist Radical Right Parties in 15 European Countries. Author's own illustration; Data: MARPOR (Lehmann et al. 2022)

4.4 Party Positions and Polarisation in changing Party System Environments

It has become clear that West European party systems are characterised by at least two central lines of conflict: a socio-economic cleavage and an increasingly important socio-cultural cleavage. In this subchapter, for each of my four countries, I will depict where the political parties are located on these lines of conflict for each system and, then, I will shortly reflect the overall party system on them in order to understand how the party system as a whole relates to the cleavages. In light of the policy context of my dissertation, additionally, I look at the parties' positions and the overall polarisation on environmental issues. Furthermore, I supplement the three-step procedure with an introductory analysis of the coalition options in the party systems. As Mair (2006b) has argued, "the core of any party system qua system is constituted by the structure of competition for control of the executive. […] [I]t then follows that a party system changes when there is a change in the structure of competition" (p. 65). What is more, the understanding of these coalition options is crucial for the understanding of the extended

partisan theory based on coalition considerations that I pursue in my dissertation (ch. 5.2). All in all, the following explanations not least serve as brief introductions to the respective party systems of the four countries of focus[18].

For these explanations, I rely on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES)-dataset (Bakker et al. 2020a) whose quality for cross-national comparative studies on both socio-economic and socio-cultural conflict dimensions has been confirmed (Bakker, Jolly and Polk 2022) and which includes information on all conflicts of interest here. Regarding the positions, I present figures juxtaposing the positions of political parties in the respective national party systems in 2010 and 2019. Thus, it is possible to grasp the long-term development of positions within the last decade. The decision for the specific years results from the availability of data as the environmental item was not included in the expert survey before 2010 and the most recent survey has been conducted 2019. The positions on the x- and y-axes reflect the individual party's position on the socio-economic[19] (x) and the socio-cultural[20] (y) scale, while the environmental position is presented by a circle or a triangle discerning qualitatively different positions in favour of environmental protection (triangle) as opposed to in favour of economic growth (circle)[21]. Furthermore, the vote share at the most recent election before the time of survey is displayed in the figures by the size of the symbols. According to Dalton (2008) "[p]arty system polarization reflects the degree of ideological differentiation among political parties in a system" (p. 900). The two usual measures of party system polarisation are standard deviation or range (Schmitt and Franzmann 2020), of which the weighted standard deviation has become the most pertinent (Hanretty 2022). For my calculation of party system polarisation, I use the weighted standard deviation formula proposed by Dalton (2008)[22] that has been applied for the investigation of ideological polarisation based on CHES-data successfully elsewhere (e.g., Borbáth, Hutter and Leininger 2023). This is important, because for reasons of consistency, I rely on the already described CHES-data on the three lines of conflict also for my calculation of party system polarisation. Due to data availability, the party system polarisation on the

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[18] It is important to note that I only include parties represented in the respective national parliaments as these represent the most crucial actors for party competition.

[19] "LRECON = position of the party in YEAR in terms of its ideological stance on economic issues. Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending, and the welfare state. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right want a reduced role for government." 0 = Extreme Left…5 = Centre…10 = Extreme Right (Bakker et al. 2020a, codebook)

[20] "GALTAN = position of the party in 2019 in terms of their views on social and cultural values. "Libertarian" or "postmaterialist" parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, abortion rights, divorce, and same-sex marriage. "Traditional" or "authoritarian" parties reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition, and stability, believing that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues." 0 = Libertarian/Postmaterialist…5 = Centre…10 = Traditional/Authoritarian (Bakker et al. 2020a, codebook)

[21] "ENVIRONMENT = position towards environmental sustainability." 0 = Strongly supports environmental protection even at the cost of economic growth…10 = Strongly supports economic growth even at the cost of environmental protection. (Bakker et al. 2020a, codebook)

[22] $Dalton's\ Index = \sqrt{\sum_i^N s_i * (\frac{v_i - \bar{v}}{5})^2}$; v = *party's CHES-value of a party on the respective line of conflict*; $\overline{v} = standardised\ party\ system\ mean\ of\ the\ respective\ CHES - value$; s = seat share of party

socio-cultural and the socio-economic is depicted almost for the full period of investigation (2000-2019), whereas the polarisation on environmental protection covers only the development in the last decade (2010-2019). Higher values indicate a higher degree of party system polarisation on the respective line of conflict. Considering, the development of coalition options in this changing political environment, I calculated the arithmetically possible minimal winning coalitions based on the seat-share and evaluated their desirability for each party system in line with the polarisation depictions at the end of the 2000s and the election before the 2019[23]. In addition, I present the coalition considerations of the most recent elections held in the countries[24].

[23] The minimal winning coalitions have been computed using the R package CoopGame (Staudacher and Anwander 2019).
[24] Further explanations of the coding procedure and the coalition consideration tables can be found in the Appendix (Appendix 1).

4.4.1. Austria

While in the past Austria had been a classical two-and-a-half-party system, it has turned into a predominantly moderately multi-party system since the 1990s (Siaroff 2019, p. 174ff). The two main parties had been the social democratic *Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich* (SPÖ, Social Democratic Party Austria) and the Christian-conservative *Österreichische Volkspartei/Die neue Volkspartei* (ÖVP, Austrian People's Party/New Austrian People's Party). The party system has long been completed by the initially smaller nationalist *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ, Freedom Party of Austria). From the 1980s on, this party has transformed into a PRRP under a new party leader, Jörg Haider, and since then has gained increasing influence. In my period of investigation from 2000 until 2022, the party system is characterised by a relative, though alternating, balance between ÖVP, SPÖ and FPÖ. The multi-party system is completed by the Austrian Green Party, *Die Grünen-Die Grüne Alternative* (GRÜNEN, The Greens-The Green Alternative), which has constantly received around 10% of the votes in the elections since 2000, and the liberal *Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum* (NEOS, New Austria and Liberal Forum), which has achieved a vote share of between 5% and 8%. Furthermore, the CHES-data of 2010 includes the *Bündnis Zukunft Österreich* (BZÖ, Alliance for the Future of Austria) which had been a temporary spin-off party from the FPÖ. Concerning the positioning of the parties on the relevant lines of conflict (Figure 5 & Figure 6) there are hardly any changes observable between 2010 and 2019. We see that on the socio-economic scale SPÖ and the Green Party take clear left positions in favour of state interventions, while the ÖVP traditionally advocates the concept of a lean state. This concept is even more favoured by the NEOS. The FPÖ moved from a centrist position in 2010 to a more right-wing position in 2019. On the socio-cultural scale, as suggested by the neo-cleavage theory, indeed, the Green Party and the PRRP FPÖ (or BZÖ in 2010) take the positions at the opposing extreme poles. On this scale, SPÖ and ÖVP advocate slightly more moderate positions although they can be assigned clearly to a more GAL-, i.e., SPÖ, and a more TAN-side, i.e., ÖVP. This pattern appears quite stable over the period of investigation. The NEOS also takes a distinct GAL-position on this scale. At first sight, the environmental issue seems to integrate clearly into the socio-economic left-right divide. However, looking more precisely into the data, the qualitative cut-off point at a CHES-value of 5 might reflect the picture not entirely adequately as the NEOS obtained a value of 5.4 and, thus, reveal a much shorter distance towards, e.g., the SPÖ (4.9), than, to the ÖVP (7.1). In fact, the NEOS must be understood as a socio-liberal representative of the liberal party family that includes stronger environmental positions in its party programmes (Pollex and Berker 2022). Concluding, the ideological positionings show a party system which is divided into two opposing camps diverging, first and foremost, in their positions on the socio-cultural dimension. The competition on environmental issues tends to be integrated into this socio-cultural scale. In accordance with that, the overall party system polarisation on the socio-cultural scale is higher than the polarisation on the socio-economic scale throughout the period of investigation, whereas the polarisation on environmental issues has a rising tendency towards the 2020s (Figure 7). While high socio-cultural polarisation in Austria can be related

to the long-term political agency of the established FPÖ (Rossell Hayes and Dudek 2020), the latter can be explained by the increasing vote share of the Green Party and, especially, the FPÖ which according to the data take diametrically extreme positions on environmental matters.

Due to the early establishment of the as coalition partner not overly popular FPÖ and the already entrenched significance of the socio-cultural cleavage, the coalition considerations of Austrian parties, traditionally, have been rather pragmatic. However, in the run-up to the election of 2008 they had returned to a *cordon sanitaire*-strategy regarding the two PRRPs leaving the coalition between SPÖ and ÖVP as the only feasible option (Müller 2009) (Appendix 1A). In the course of the decade, the FPÖ has shifted programmatically towards the ÖVP on the socio-economic scale, and the ÖVP adopted many positions of the FPÖ on the socio-cultural scale, especially in the field of migration policy (Plescia, Kritzinger and Oberluggauer 2020, Eberl, Huber and Plescia 2020). Therefore, a coalition between the two parties had indeed become plausible and also more desirable for the ÖVP which was proven by the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition after the election in 2017 (Appendix 1A). It was only due to the well-known *Ibiza*-scandal, and other ensuing issues overshadowing the two parties' election campaigns during the snap election of 2019, that this coalition could not be continued (Eberl, Huber and Plescia 2020). Considering the programmatic positions, only a coalition of the two traditional main parties ÖVP and SPÖ had seemed as another viable option which, however, was excluded by both parties straight after the election (ibid.). It is a clear symbol of the Austrian pragmatism that the ÖVP, then formed an "unlikely partnership" with the Green Party which, even in hindsight, does not seem as a reasonable option concerning their ideological positions on either of the conflict lines (Eberl, Huber and Plescia 2020, p. 1360) (Figure 6).

In conclusion, the Austrian party system has been characterised by a persistently strong socio-cultural polarisation, and difficult coalition formations throughout the whole period of investigation. It changed only considering the treatment of the PRRP by the centre-right ÖVP. The two parties have clearly converged programmatically and in the short term might even form desirable coalitions if further scandals are avoided. The increasing environmental polarisation has not yet turned into a hurdle for coalition formation due to a pronounced pragmatism of the ÖVP.



Figure 6: Positions of Austrian Parliamentary Parties in 2010. Own illustration; Data: CHES (Bakker et al. 2020). The size of the symbols displays the vote share of the respective party



Figure 5: Positions of Austrian Parliamentary Parties in 2019 . Own illustration; Data: CHES (Bakker et al. 2020). The size of the symbols displays the vote share of the respective party



Figure 7: Development of party system polarisation on three lines of conflict in Austria (2000-2020). Own illustration; Data: CHES (Bakker et al. 2020); Data for environmental polarisation was only available from 2010 to 2019

4.4.2 Germany

Like the Austrian, the German party system, post-World War II, has represented a two-and-a-half-party system for a long time with the only difference that it was the liberal *Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands* (FDP, Free Democratic Party Germany) instead of a PRRP representing the third, minor party in the system (Siaroff 2019, pp. 270-279, von Alemann, Erbentraut and Walther 2018). For several decades, the FDP had played the role of the kingmaker for governmental coalitions oscillating between the two major *Volksparteien* with the in internationally comparative terms peculiar party alliance of *Christlich Demokratische Union* (CDU, Christian Democratic Union) and *Christlich Soziale Union* (CSU, Christian Social Union) on the one side and the social democratic *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland* (SPD, Social Democratic Party Germany) on the other side (ibid.). From the 1980s on, the party system evolved into a moderately multi-party system although the predominance of the CDU/CSU and SPD persisted up until the election in 2009. First, the Green Party *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* (GRÜNEN, Alliance 90/The Greens), entered the parliamentary stage in the 1980s. In the 1990s followed the socialist *Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus* (PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism), which gained more overall significance as *Die Linke* (LINKE, The Left) in the mid-2000s. As the latest newcomer, the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD, Alternative for Germany) emerged in the party system (ibid.). While it has started as an Eurosceptic right-wing liberal party in 2013, it has now turned into a clear PRRP and, thus, ended the German exceptionalism regarding the (non-)presence of an over a longer period successful far-right party in the party system (e.g., Arzheimer and Berning 2019)[25]. Altogether, today's party system comprises six relevant parties – seven if we count CDU/CSU as two – of which four parties have reached around or more than 20% in the polls of recent years so that it is difficult to pin down a stable predominant party in this dynamic environment. However, the CDU/CSU still comes closest to this ideal.

The German parties had organised predominantly on the socio-economic scale with Die Linke on the left end and the FDP on the market-liberal right end of the spectrum. On the socio-cultural conflict line, the parties, by and large, used to converge on a rather centrist position with the Green Party deviating somewhat towards the GAL-end and the CSU representing the still moderate most TAN party in the party system. This was still the situation in 2010 (Figure 8). At this time, only the Greens and the Left clearly took an environmentally friendly position so that the environmental conflict was integrated in the left-right conflict with the SPD being more hesitant on this matter.

While the polarisation on the socio-economic scale has remained quite stable in the course of the decade, the party positions in 2019 reveal a clear increase of polarisation on the socio-cultural scale (Figure 10).

[25] To be sure, there had been other examples of far-right parties that had performed well at elections in Germany, like the *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (NPD, National Democratic Party Germany) in the 1960s or *Die Republikaner* (REP, The Republicans) around the beginning of the 1990s. However, these parties did not succeed in taking root in the electorate and disappeared shortly after their initial successes (e.g., Decker and Hartleb 2007).

Most significantly, this is explained by the emergence and the increasing electoral success of the AfD which, in line with the literature on PRRPs, has adopted a very extreme TAN-position, but also by the movements of the three electorally comparatively stable left-wing parties, SPD, the Greens, and the Left which all shifted more towards the GAL-end and take a pro-environmental position. Thus, it is not surprising that also the polarisation on the environmental conflict line has increased in the last decade. As also the FDP is categorised as a GAL-party by the CHES-experts, the party competition on the environment, however, seems to be still a left-right matter.

In contrast to Austria, the coalition options have changed clearly in the period of investigation. In the 2000s SPD and Grüne had formed an ideologically desirable government on the socio-economic left which was replaced by a grand coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD between 2005 and 2009, which was rather pragmatic but given the rather centrist positions of both parties ideologically not unfitting. In 2009 this grand coalition was still a viable option, but as also an ideologically matching cooperation between CDU/CSU and FDP was possible, the latter was the obvious choice (Appendix 1B). Such a desired coalition was off the table in the more recent coalition negotiations. The "historic" election of 2017 evidenced the increasing significance of the socio-cultural conflict and the election results presented challenges for the established parties and their preferred coalition considerations (Faas and Klingelhöfer 2019, p. 922). Excluding any cooperation with Die Linke or AfD, in 2017 only two of the minimal winning coalitions had been feasible, although none had been desirable (Appendix 1B) (Jakobs and Jun 2018). After long and ultimately unsuccessful negotiations between CDU/CSU, FDP and Green Party again a grand coalition was formed. Towards the end of the period of investigation (Appendix 1B), considering the ideological positioning, the overall party competition pattern seems to portend a reinforcing GAL-TAN dynamic with regard to the continuously stable vote share of the AfD and the latest coalition of SPD, the Greens and the FDP (Faas and Klingelhöfer 2022). The latter, in fact, must be understood as another result of pragmatic coalition building in light of increasingly complex coalition formation conditions and the *cordon sanitaire*-strategy towards the PRRP AfD (Debus 2022).

In summary, in the German party system polarisation has intensified in all three depicted dimensions, of which the socio-cultural and the environmental dimension have shown the sharpest increase indicating their increasingly important role for party competition. The coalition formation has become more complicated. Whereas desirable coalition options were still available in the 2000s, the coalitions from 2017 on represent more pragmatic and programmatically challenging collaboration for the governmental parties. In the short- and middle-term, also in Germany, party competition will revolve around the question how the established parties will deal with the PRRP AfD and if they perform more than pragmatic programmatic shifts to facilitate other coalitions.



Figure 8: Positions of German Parliamentary Parties in 2010. Own illustration; Data: CHES (Bakker et al. 2020). The size of the symbols displays the vote share of the respective party



Figure 9: Positions of German Parliamentary Parties in 2019. Own illustration; Data: CHES (Bakker et al. 2020). The size of the symbols displays the vote share of the respective party



Figure 10: Development of party system polarisation on three lines of conflict in Germany (2000-2020). Own illustration; Data: CHES (Bakker et al. 2020). Data for environmental polarisation was only available from 2010 to 2019

4.4.3 Netherlands

Due to its proportional election system without election thresholds, the Dutch party system has always been characterised by a high number of political parties yielding a highly multi-party system. However, this system, for a long time, has included three main parties which represented a stabilising core of the system, i.e., the Christian democratic *Christen-Democratisch Appèl* (CDA, Christian Democratic Appeal), the social democratic *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA, Labour Party), and the liberal *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (VVD, People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) (Siaroff 2019, pp. 360-369, Louwerse and Timmermans 2021). In the beginning of the 2000s, above all, the CDA was at the centre of party competition dynamics while in the 2010s this role was predominantly taken by the VVD which has been the leading party in every governmental coalition in this decade (ibid., Pellikaan, de Lange and van der Meer 2018). The Dutch party system is completed by several smaller parties, of which only the more successful ones with at least 10 seats in parliament at some point in the period of investigation shall be mentioned here: the social-liberal *Democraten 66* (D66, Democrats '66), the classic green *Groen Links* (GL, Green Left), the socialist *Socialistische Partij* (SP, Socialist Party) as well as the PRRPs *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (LPF, Pim Fortuyn List), which dissolved in 2008, and the still active *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV, Party for Freedom).

The majority of parties have taken rather centrist positions on the socio-economic scale in 2010 but also 2019 (Figure 11 & Figure 12). The quite high polarisation on this line of conflict is explained by the relatively high vote-shares of SP and, especially, VVD, which mark the fringes of the socio-economic cleavage (Figure 13). On the socio-cultural scale the electorally successful GL and D66 take the most distinct GAL-positions, whereas in the Netherlands the opposite positions are not occupied by the PRRPs but by the smaller strongly religious parties, i.e., the Calvinist-fundamental *Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij* (SGP, Reformed Political Party) and the Orthodox Protestant *Christen Unie* (CU, Christian Union) which advocate strong anti-feminist, abortion-critical and partly homophobic policies based on the Bible. The environmental issue, does not align clearly with one of the two superior cleavages. It is striking that apart from the niche party *50Plus* all socio-economically left parties present environmentally-friendly positions. However, if we neglect the two smaller parties CU and *DENK*, and take into account the more influential D66, the environmental issue integrated even stronger into the socio-cultural cleavage. In terms of polarisation, it is evident that the polarisation on the socio-economic scale has kept a high level throughout the period of investigation, while, at the same time, the polarisation values on the socio-cultural scale and the environment have increased and reached a similar level of intensity. The increasing importance of the socio-cultural line of conflict has been buttressed by other research on the Dutch party system (De Vries 2018, van Holsteyn 2018).

Turning to the appraisal of desirability among coalitions, it becomes clear that the large majority of the arithmetically possible coalitions have not been desirable in ideological terms. This has a lot to do with the centrifugal tendencies of the party systems with relatively strong parties on the socio-economic left (SP) and the socio-cultural TAN (PVV) fringes. In 2010, the centre-right VVD and CDA still had ventured a minority government with support of the PRRP PVV that unsuccessfully disbanded only two years later (Van Holsteyn 2011). Since then, almost all parties have rejected any coalition with the PVV. A similar *cordon sanitaire* strategy has been applied by the majority of parties to the far-left SP, although there has been some lose cooperation with the green GL and the social democratic PvdA in the mid of the 2000s (Voerman 2023). As especially the PVV performed persistently well in elections, the coalition formation in the Netherlands has become a tedious task significantly reflected by the record-breaking periods of cabinet formation after the elections 2017 (211 days) and 2021 (299 days) (van Holsteyn 2018, van Holsteyn and Irwin 2022). As a consequence, the other parties have been driven into coalitions which they did not favour ideologically. In fact, none of the necessary three- or four-party coalitions in the covered period has been completely desirable from this perspective, but has been met with caution or even initial rejection by at least one of the involved parties. While the VVD and the CDA could not come to terms with the green GL on migration and integration issues, the socio-liberal D66 was not keen on any cooperation with the religious-conservative CU (van Holsteyn 2018, van Holsteyn and Irwin 2022). The latter decided to enter such a governmental coalition only after long and controversial negotiations (ibid.). Therefore, these coalitions represent coalition options that were possible but not desirable (Appendix 1C).

In conclusion, in the Netherlands coalition formation has been a daunting task throughout the period of investigation due to the high fragmentation of the party system and the strength of more extreme parties. The PRRP PVV has been strong in the party system already in the beginning of the 2010s and kept a considerable level of support up until now. Only the treatment of this party alternated in the course of the decade: while it has been considered as coalition partner in 2010, it was excluded from coalitions until most recently. In the run-up to the election 2023, there have been again some centre-right parties, like the VVD, that haven taken a cooperation with PVV into consideration



Figure 11: Positions of Dutch Parliamentary Parties in 2010 . Own illustration; Data: CHES (Bakker et al. 2020). The size of the symbols displays the vote share of the respective party



Figure 12: Positions of Dutch Parliamentary Parties in 2019. Own illustration; Data: CHES (Bakker et al. 2020). The size of the symbols displays the vote share of the respective party



Figure 13: Development of party system polarisation on three lines of conflict in the Netherlands (2000-2020). Own illustration; Data: CHES (Bakker et al. 2020). Data for environmental polarisation was only available from 2010 to 2019

4.4.4 Sweden

In the 2000s the Swedish party system represented a highly multi-party system with at first seven and, from 2010 on, eight relevant parties vying for seats in the national parliament, the *Riksdag*. Building on a comparatively homogeneous population and a strong historical commitment to neutrality in foreign policy, welfare and other socio-economic issues had been the sole issues of political contention for a long time (Siaroff 2019, pp. 450-458). This brought about a clear left-right divide in the party system. On the left, there are the former communist *Vänsterpartiet* (V, Left Part), the social democratic *Sveriges Socialdemokratiska arbetarparti* (S, Swedish Social Democratic Party) and the green *Miljöpartiet de Gröna* (MP, Green Party). On the right side of the political spectrum, four parties are situated, i.e., the originally agrarian and now socio-liberal *Centerpartiet* (C, Centre Party), the liberal *Liberalerna* (L, Liberals), the Christian democratic *Kristdemokraterna* (KD, Christian Democrats) and the classic conservative *Moderate Samlingspartiet* (M, Moderate Party). These parties had formed two opposing blocs in the party system within which the social democratic S predominated the left and M led the right bloc as largest party respectively. While S had traditionally been the predominant actor in the Swedish party system overall, consistently taking the lead with at least more than 30% of the votes, M has gained influence especially in the elections of 2006 and 2010 when they headed a highly formalised alliance of the centre-right parties. These years also have been described as the "zenith of 'bloc politics'" in Sweden (Aylott and Bolin 2015, p. 731). The clear-cut bloc constellation phased out, when the populist radical right *Sverigedemokraterna* (SD, Sweden Democrats) entered the *Riskdag* in 2010 and since then managed to reach and consolidate a high vote-share. With the SD a new socio-cultural dimension has been introduced in Swedish politics (Siaroff 2019, pp. 450-458).

This shift is clearly discernible if we compare the positioning of Swedish parties in 2010 and 2019 (Figure 14 & Figure 15). Whereas in 2010 the party system largely spreads along the traditional left-right dimension with the two largest parties of S and M each situated on one side of the scale, in 2019 the party system increasingly stretched out along the socio-cultural dimension taking an overall 'thinner' shape. In particular, C, but also V, L and MP moved towards the GAL-end of the socio-cultural dimension, while the TAN-end was strengthened by an increasingly successful SD and a smaller shift of M. The biggest party, S, has positioned itself slightly more towards the centre on the both dimensions. Regarding the environment, pro-environmental stances concentrated on the socio-economic left side of the party system in 2010 with the socio-liberal C as an outlier in the right-wing bloc. In 2019, environmental issues seem to have been integrated into the socio-cultural dimension except for the smaller liberal party, L. In line with these positional shifts of parties, the polarisation on the environmental and even more on the socio-cultural dimension have increased considerably, and outpaced the degree of polarisation on the socio-economic dimension which has been on the wane throughout the period of investigation but remains at a moderately high level (Figure 16).

As an immediate effect of the entry of the SD into the parliament, the bloc-logic of Swedish party competition was severely challenged as neither of the two camps had been able to form a majority coalition and any cooperation with the populist radical right newcomer party was rejected (Appendix 1D).

In the beginning, this effect was moderated by the institutional peculiarity of *negative parliamentarism* which provides party coalitions with the possibility to be parliamentary accepted if there is no parliamentary majority *against* the government (Bergman 1993). This institutional rule has set the basis for minority governments as a standard option for Swedish government formation (ibid.). However, in the past, minority governments, mostly in the form of social democratic one-party governments, relied on more or less formal agreements with parties of the same ideological camp. In contrast, the renewal of the right-wing government required collaborations with parties across bloc-borders as for instance reached with the green MP on migration policy (Aylott and Bolin 2015). In the following years, the situation complicated further since SD was able to increase its vote share. Sticking to their *cordon sanitaire*-strategy, the other parties facilitated a red-green minority cabinet in 2014 on the basis of a broad agreement that, however, was backed by the right-wing party bloc rather reluctantly (Aylott and Bolin 2015). After the election in 2018 another agreement for such a minority government was reached but apart from the left V, it was only supported by the two liberal parties, C and L which were compensated by an agreement on several liberal policies (Aylott and Bolin 2019, Eriksson 2019) (Appendix 1D). The other two traditional right-wing parties, M and KD, were no longer willing to participate and started to explore potential collaborations with SD, thus terminating the previous *cordon sanitaire* (Aylott and Bolin 2023). Ultimately, after the national election in 2022, M, KD, and after considerable internal struggle also L agreed on the formation of a minority government based on a strong support agreement with SD. Considering the hesitant behaviour by L, and the severe tensions between the left V and the socio-liberal C in socio-economic terms, both minimal winning coalition cooperations in 2022 were not ultimately desirable for all involved parties (Aylott and Bolin 2023) (Appendix 1D). Eventually, the cooperation of the centre-right M, KD, L and the PRRP SD marks the preliminary end of a significant change in Swedish party competition within in the 2010s: the long-entrenched socio-economic logic of bloc competition has been replaced by an increasingly socio-cultural one (Aylott 2022, Hagevi 2022, Aylott and Bolin 2023).



Figure 14: Positions of Swedish Parliamentary Parties in 2010. Own illustration; Data: CHES (Bakker et al. 2020). The size of the symbols displays the vote share of the respective party



Figure 15: Positions of Swedish Parliamentary Parties in 2019. Own illustration; Data: CHES (Bakker et al. 2020). The size of the symbols displays the vote share of the respective party



Figure 16: Development of party system polarisation on three lines of conflict in Sweden (2000-2020) . Own illustration; Data: CHES (Bakker et al. 2020); Data for environmental polarisation was only available from 2010 to 2019

4.4.5 Summary: West European Party Systems are in Flux

Party system research suggests that the party systems of Western Europe are characterised by two cleavages: a long-entrenched socio-economic cleavage and an increasingly important socio-cultural cleavage (ch. 4.3). Thus, West European party systems are in flux.

This has been confirmed for the party systems of the four countries of focus in this dissertation considering the positioning of parties on these two lines of conflict, the related polarisations, and the resultant coalition options (ch. 4.4). In the brief introductions to these party systems, it has become visible that established parties have sharpened their positions along the socio-cultural cleavage and that especially new (or older) challenger parties of the populist radical right, which take most distinct position on this cleavage, represent an increasingly strong point of reference in the party competition. In line with that, the polarisation on socio-cultural issues has increased in all party systems and outpaced the polarisation on socio-economic matters, yet, without rendering them irrelevant. This development is already more advanced in Austria and the Netherlands. In Sweden, it has materialised at an unprecedented speed more recently in the 2010s, while in Germany, it appears to be equally progressing only with some delay. The different state of this restructuring is clearly connected with electoral demise of historically dominant parties and the concurrent establishment of the respective PRRP in these party systems in terms of vote share and its acceptance among other parties as potential coalition partners. The rise of PRRPs has significantly challenged old truths of party competition patterns and forces the established parties to realign their coalition considerations. In all party systems, the question whether to open up or not to open up to collaborations with the PRRPs has become a key dividing line between (and within) parties. As this question has not been resolved consistently in either of the party systems, so far, coalition formations have become highly complicated. In Austria and the Netherlands, it has been some centre-right parties that opted for a rather pragmatic handling of coalitions with the PRRPs, although their willingness to cooperate has alternated in the course of time. In Germany, parties still follow a consistent cordon sanitaire and experiment with pragmatic coalitions excluding the PRRP. The most distinct change in party systems dynamics can be observed in Sweden, where the entry of the PRRP into the parliament contributed to the dissolution of the traditional left-right blocs and led to the on-going formation of two new blocs along the socio-cultural dimension.

Concerning the area of environmental policy, the implications of these substantial changes of party systems and related party competition have not yet been completely clarified. However, the development outlined in the four countries of focus, at least indicate a growing integration of the environmental conflict into the socio-cultural cleavage. The following final subsection of this chapter puts this matter into the context of the general research on cleavages, and thereby setting the stage of the specific research goal of this dissertation.

4.5 First Conclusions: Neo-Cleavage Theory and the Environment

In summary, research deems political parties essential for the emergence of the new cultural cleavage. While mainstream parties had been reluctant to take clear positions on the new issues, challenger parties, above all PRRPs, exploited this situation and pushed cultural issues more and more to the top of the political agenda. So far, research has linked the 'new' cleavage primarily to the two issues of European integration and immigration and provided cumulative evidence for its increasing influence on party competition in party systems across Europe (Hooghe and Marks 2018, Hutter and Kriesi 2019, Vachudova 2021). In line with the early ideas of 'new politics' (e.g., Müller-Rommel 2019 [1989]) (see ch. 4.1.2), however, further issues should be considered to obtain a full understanding of this new line of conflict and its implications. Green-Pedersen and Little (2023) state that "four issues are typically seen as the core of new politics or the new cultural divide" (p. 7) which are: European integration, immigration, personal rights (e.g., gender equality, abortion, or minority rights) and the environment (Green-Pedersen and Little 2023). More recently, the gender-issue has been addressed as another major element of this new cleavage configuration (e.g., Sass and Kuhnle 2022). The environment has, so far, received somewhat a special treatment by cleavage researchers.

In the first wave of literature on the cultural cleavage the environment had been one of the central issues. Yet, although it was often mentioned in the context of the issues of new politics (Müller-Rommel 2019 [1989]), it was often treated as a separate cleavage highlighting a conflict between environmental protection and an unlimited growth-oriented economy, or in short, ecology versus economy (Töller 2022). Thus, the environmental conflict was somewhat pulled out of the bigger context of the new value-based cleavage, and, in such specific form, was usually applied to explain the emergence of green parties (von Beyme 1985, Töller 2022). As the Greens evidently also emphasised the environment as their main policy issue and ideological core (van Haute 2016a), it seemed to have been separated somewhat from the nexus of other new politics issues and researchers have been connecting environmental issues only marginally to an overall socio-cultural divide. Yet, early research on the new cultural divide indeed addressed this nexus bringing about ambiguous results. Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) indicate that a party's position on the environment correlates strongly with its position on the traditional left-right scale, however, even slightly stronger with its position on the GAL-TAN scale. Thus, they point to an overlap of the new cultural cleavage and this policy issue, which is unsurprisingly strongest among reformist green parties but also explains positioning of mainstream parties. However, it is important to note that they looked specifically at environmental policy making on the EU level as an issue of European integration (see also Marks et al. 2006). Looking at the environmental issue in general terms, in their comparative study on six European countries based on content analyses of newspapers, Kriesi et al. (2006) found that, between 1976 and 2004, the environment has been largely integrated into the economic left-right divide with the exception of Germany where it has turned into a consensus issue. Afterwards, discussions concentrated on the question if the environmental conflict between

environmental protection and economic growth is absorbed by the traditional left-right cleavage or if it represents a cleavage on its own cross-cutting the socio-economic dimension (Dalton 2009, Farstad 2018). Dalton (2009) concludes that the environmental conflict is not incorporated fully into the left-right divide. While right parties quite consistently prioritise economic growth over environmental protection, it is the parties on the left which diverge considerably on this matter splitting into clearly pro-environmental green parties and other more ambiguous leftist parties (ibid.). These findings are particularly interesting as they represent a mirror image of the party patterns identified by the neo-cleavage theory on issues of European integration and migration issues. Here, the parties of the left camp show quite coherent positions, while on the right side of the spectrum a divergence of centre-right and far-right parties has been evident (Hutter and Kriesi 2019) (see ch. 4.3). These contrasting results might indicate support for claims that the environmental conflict, although it equally cross-cuts the left-right divide, is no part of the increasingly important socio-cultural cleavage, but, in fact, a cleavage on its own (Bornschier 2010, Töller 2022).

As a consequence, the environment is hardly taken up in more recent accounts of the new cultural cleavage and, if at all, it appears only as a form of standard reference to climate change as part of the cosmopolitan value complex (e.g., Merkel 2017). Tellingly, Jörgens, Knill and Steinebach (2023), in their conclusion of a recent handbook on environmental policy analysis, state that the environmental conflict cannot be explained by classic left-right patterns and bring in the new cultural cleavage as promising alternative approach, but neither elaborate on this claim nor refer to any literature distinctively substantiating it. After all, the neglect of environmental policy in the newer cleavage literature is not surprising since this research, in its majority, has concentrated on populist radical right parties as manifestations of the new cleavage and these parties had not stood out with any significant accounts of environmental issues. That this has changed is proven by most recent literature that will be introduced in the following chapter (see ch. 5.1) and that includes the research articles of my dissertation.

Given the increasing attention populist radical right parties devote to environmental issues and especially climate change more recently, it seems reasonable to scrutinise the described connections of environmental policy and the new cultural cleavage anew (e.g., Jahn 2021). Crucial questions are whether populist radical right parties adopt environmental positions in line with their extreme positions on the cultural divide, thus, consolidating the association between the new cleavage and environmental policy; and, if they do, in what way could they change the party competition on environmental policy?

5 Theory: Partisan Effects in the Field of Environmental Policy – going beyond the Traditional Partisan Theory and turning to Party Competition

This chapter lays out the central theoretical foundation of this dissertation. The first subchapter (5.1) introduces the traditional partisan theory and elaborates the state of the literature on political parties' positions and effects in the field of environmental policy. A particular focus is placed on the

environmental policy positions and effects of PRRPs. Building on that, the second subchapter (5.2) presents an extended version of partisan theory, which is based on office-seeking motivations of political parties in party competition and represents a specific approach to understanding the effects of PRRPs in detail.

5.1 Traditional Partisan Theory: Political Parties' Positions and the Effects of Governmental Parties

5.1.1 Traditional Partisan Theory: A closer look

Partisan theory is the central theoretical approach addressing the effects of political parties in policy analysis, and one of the most influential theoretical approaches in policy analysis in general (Schmidt 1996, Töller 2022). In its basic version, it reflects the tenets of cleavage theory and the party government model (Töller 2022). This version of partisan theory is, as outlined above (ch. 3.2), straightforward: Building on different core constituencies, different parties produce different policy outputs when they are in government (e.g., Schmidt 1996, Wenzelburger 2015) (Figure 17).

Figure 17: Basic version of the traditional partisan theory. Author's own illustration

If one takes a closer look, it becomes apparent that already this traditional partisan theory is to be understood as a two-step process on two different levels of analysis (Figure 18). In the first step, political parties diverge in their *positions* in a specific field of policy. Going back to the objectives of political parties (see ch. 3.1.4), researchers explain this development of different policy positions with two main causal mechanisms taking place predominantly *within parties* (Wenzelburger 2015, Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer 2020, Töller 2022). On the one hand, as theorised in the traditional partisan theory, parties evolve their positions by taking cues from voters, thus, being primarily vote-seeking. On the other hand, parties may be less driven by voting motives but derive their positions from their own party ideologies and, thus, they are policy-seeking. In this policy-seeking derivation, internal party actors play a pivotal role. Either party elites adopted the party ideology fully during their socialisation in a respective party or they rely on the party programmes that reflect the party's ideology (Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer 2020). For the latter, the internal party organisation plays a pivotal role as parties dominated by party members are more likely to adopt programmes consistent with the party ideology, while elite-dominated parties may tend to design programmes with the focus on winning elections (Wenzelburger 2015). At this point, the theoretical elaborations are still somewhat erratic as explanations of the policy-seeking mechanism, evidently, shift into the vote-seeking derivation. This calls for a subsequent theoretical

refinement in future research[26], however, it is less important for this dissertation since internal party processes are excluded from the analysis. In the end, it is most likely that a mixture of both mechanisms explains the development of party positions and that it hinges upon scope conditions which of the two prevails in a particular situation, e.g., an election lying ahead (ibid., Töller 2022). The second step of the classic partisan theory proceeds on the level of the policy process: *political parties translate their policy positions into actual policies* when they have gained governmental office. This step, equally, depends on a number of scope conditions that might dilute or even hinder the effect of governmental parties (Schmidt 1996). Most importantly, party governments need to be continuously capable of making a difference in the context of other national veto-players, international influences, or socio-economic constraints (ibid.). For the field of environmental policy, this has been substantiated above (see ch. 3.2 & 3.3).

In conclusion two aspects of this introduction to partisan theory are central for the following line of argument of my dissertation. First, partisan theory is not only about policy outputs but also about policy positions of parties; and second, a party position develops from different causal mechanisms relating back to the three objectives of political parties. I expand on these conclusions in the next sub-chapter in which I introduce an extended version of partisan effects for policy analysis.

Before that, I am going to present the state of the art on partisan theory in the field of environmental policy and, in particular, provide a detailed account on the positions and effects of populist radical right parties on this policy as this lies at the core of my investigations.



Figure 18: Disentangled Basic version of the traditional partisan theory. Author's own illustration

[26] E.g., it is particularly interesting, how the formulation of party programmes proceeds within parties, which kind of impact specific party elites and party members have on this process, and how these processes vary among different parties and party families (Merz and Regel 2013, Korte et al. 2018).

5.1.2 Partisan Effects in Environmental Policy: The State of the Art

Partisan effects have first been investigated in the field of economic policy by Hibbs (1977) and Tufte (1980) who both confirmed a diverging impact of left or right governments on macro-economic policy outcomes, like unemployment or inflation rates, in the United States. In terms of actual policy output left parties are considered to prefer more state intervention and larger public budgets than right parties which advocate lean state structures (Tufte 1980, Allan and Scruggs 2004). Nowadays, partisan effects have been examined for various fields of policy, however, yielding rather mixed results when it comes to the actual effect of parties (e.g., Potrafke 2017). For my dissertation, the field of environmental policy is most relevant. This subchapter, therefore, provides an overview of the state of the art on partisan effects in environmental policy in general and looking at populist radical right parties in particular.

When environmental issues first emerged in the political arena in the 1970s and 1980s, they have been understood to be cross-cutting the traditional socio-economic line of conflict and, therefore, hardly could be explained by the left-right scale (Müller-Rommel 1985, Rovny 2015). Mostly regulative environmental policies were challenging for both pure left and right ideologies. On the one hand, although left parties traditionally were more inclined to state interventions, they perceived too strict environmental measures as threat to industry jobs going against the interest of their core constituencies (Müller-Rommel 2019 [1989], Neumayer 2003). On the other hand, whereas right parties often concurred with the preservative character of nature conservation (also for religious reasons), at the same time, they were at odds with any larger state intervention for economic reasons, i.e., the belief in free markets (Pilbeam 2003, Jahn 2022) (see also ch. 4.3).

If we look at empirical studies, however, the traditional left-right-divide appears to have materialised over time also in environmental policy. Several researchers find parties of the left to take more pro-environmental positions (Carter 2013, Facchini, Gaeta and Michallet 2017, Farstad 2018) and to pursue more environmentally-friendly policies than parties of the right. The latter holds true not only for traditional environmental policies like air, water and soil protection (Jahn 1998, Neumayer 2003) or more comprehensive environmental performance indices (Wen et al. 2016, Jahn 2016), but also specifically for the field of climate policy. For instance, left party governments tend to promote renewable energies more than right party governments (Aklin and Urpelainen 2013), they represent a sufficient condition for an ambitious climate mitigation policy (Tobin 2017) and they produce more and stricter energy-related climate policies like taxes and regulations (Schulze 2021).

In contrast, other researchers point to a mainstreaming of environmental concerns. Testing partisan effects on CO_2-emission reduction in 19 OECD countries between 1992 and 2008, for instance, Garmann (2014) confirms the 'parties matter' hypothesis – although he finds centre governments to perform even better than left ones – but states that partisan effects seemed to trail off towards the 2000s. He concludes a policy convergence on environmental issues after a period of familiarisation. Similarly, based on an own expert survey and a citizen survey by the *International Social Survey Program* for the year 2013, Rohrschneider and Miles (2015) show that environmental policy preferences established in

Western European party systems *across* all political parties and voters and persisted even in the context of an economic crisis. Although they indicate an overall higher environmental reputation of left and especially green parties among voters, they, thus, corroborate a mainstreaming of environmental policy among parties. In accordance with that, we can find, multiple empirical cases of conservative parties which engage actively with environmental policies (Båtstrand 2015, Hess and Renner 2019). This is supplemented by an ideological argument according to which conservatism and environmentalism are "natural bedfellows" (Scruton 2006, p. 8). Classic conservatist principles like the overall pursuit of maintenance and the idea of an intergenerational trusteeship between the present, past and future generations that includes the inheritance of a social and ecological order, seem perfectly compatible with specific goals of environmental policy and sustainability (Scruton 2006, Riedel 2021).

We may conclude that, although the left-right divide found considerable empirical support as guideline for partisan effects in environmental policy, the overall picture is more complicated and ambiguities concerning environmental policy positions remain in both traditional ideological camps. Following Töller (2022), we can trace this uncertainty back to two major "problems" of partisan theory research in the field of environmental policy[27]. The "dependent variable problem" refers to conceptualisation and operationalisation of environmental policy. First, the studies diverge in their focus, i.e., which specific sector of environmental policy they investigate. Second, they operationalise environmental policy differently: while some researchers concentrate on environmental performance of political administrations by looking at a variety of environmental indicators (→ outcome[28]), others investigate actual policies, like environmental taxes or regulations (→ output). From a policy analysis perspective, the former is especially problematic as the causal mechanisms between pertinent explaining factors of the discipline and environmental indicators are more than uncertain (Töller 2022). According to Töller (2022) the "core problem of partisan theory application to environmental policy" is the "'cleavage'-problem" (author's own translation). Regarding the variety of issues that subsume under environmental policy (see ch. 2), it is a point at issue whether we can theorise *only one* environmental cleavage at all. In addition, it is crucial how parties respond to this cleavage and if specific patterns are discernible that can be used for the formulation of expectation on party behaviour. As explained above, it is, indeed, an ongoing debate if parties' environmental positions are structured by the traditional socio-economic left-right divide, by the new socio-cultural cleavage, or if the environment represents a cleavage on its own

[27] For the sake of completeness, Töller (2022) names two problems of partisan theory research on environmental policy in addition to the ones I mention here: while the "empirical problem" describes the outlined ambiguity of findings itself, the "problem of singular causality" refers to the fact that party effects most often develop and vary depending on the specific contexts (Töller 2022, author's own translations).

[28] The picture gets even more complicated as the outcome of environmental policy is sometimes even further differentiated between *outcomes* and *impacts.* Following this more fine-grained approach the concept of outcome described here reflects rather the impacts, while the outcome in this reading refers to effects on actors like citizens, administration, trade unions or enterprises (e.g., Steinebach 2023). To illustrate the dependent variable problem, however, it suffices to refer to the much more common dualism between output, i.e., legislation, and outcome, i.e., environmental performance (e.g., Tosun 2015).

(see ch. 4.3). Speaking to this debate, this dissertation takes the second option as a basic assumption and investigates whether the environmental conflict is increasingly embedded in the new cultural divide – and if it does, what that means for the current and future party competition in this policy field. As a first acid test, one should expect the party families of green parties and PRRPs, that oppose on the new cultural line, take equally opposing positions on the environmental issue. The following paragraphs will summarise what partisan theory research so far recorded regarding these two party families and the environment. In line with the focus of my dissertation and considering the novelty value the main emphasis will lie on the PRRPs.

Originated in the environmental movements of the 1970s and 1980s, green parties' position on the environment is most distinctively positive and environmental concerns have always been at the very heart of their ideology (Müller-Rommel 1993, Dryzek et al. 2003, van Haute 2016a, Poguntke 2017). Therefore, it is not surprising that green parties have widely obtained the issue-ownership on environmental matters in comparison to other parties (Spoon, Hobolt and De Vries 2014, van Haute 2016a). Regarding partisan effects of green parties on environmental policy, in contrast to the ambiguities of the left-right divide, research has produced clear results concerning the direct effects which are consistently positive (Knill, Debus and Heichel 2010, Jensen and Spoon 2011, Evrard 2012, Böcher and Töller 2016, Hubo and Göhrs 2021).

More ambiguous are findings on the party competition effects of green parties or indirect effects, i.e., if they lead to a 'greening' of other parties. While most studies found that a strong green party in parliament has a positive impact (Poguntke 1993, Neumayer 2003, Bernauer and Koubi 2009, Zohlnhöfer and Engler 2014, Spoon, Hobolt and De Vries 2014, De Vries and Hobolt 2020, ch. 5), others indicate no significant effects (Jensen and Spoon 2011) or even concluded a negative effect. Regarding the latter, for instance, Abou-Chadi (2016) argues that mainstream parties, which face strong green parties, strategically opted to de-emphasise environmental issues as any more attention to these issues would benefit only the issue-owning green parties. These ambiguities are likely to evolve from different research approaches allowing different level of detail when analysing indirect partisan effect. Overall, the studies indicate that these indirect effects of green parties depend on specific party competition situations. This can be illustrated by a case study by Green-Pedersen (2019, ch. 9). From his comparative case study of seven Western European countries between the 1980s and the mid-2010s, he concludes that especially Social Democratic parties have had clear incentives to address the environment due to coalition considerations. This applies to situations in which Social Democratic parties try to win green parties as coalition partner or when they "are trying to draw environmentally friendly Social Liberal/Centre parties away from the right-wing bloc […][thus using the] environment […] [as] an attractive wedge issue" (Green-Pedersen 2019, p. 131f, similarly see Kayser and Rehmert 2021). If coalition considerations, however, are not at stake, he resonates with Abou-Chadi (2016) and sees a negative impact of increasing Green party strength on environmental issue salience in the party system (Green-Pedersen 2019, ch. 9).

5.1.3 Populist Radical Right Parties and the Environment: Positions and Effects

The family of populist radical right parties represents the opposite extreme pole of the new cultural cleavage (Hooghe and Marks 2018) (see ch. 4.3.2). Since first representatives of this party family emerged in the 1980s (Betz 1994, Loch 2017), it has become the arguably "most studied party family in political science" (Mudde 2017, p. 1).

Digression: The Populist Radical Right Party Family

As a consequence, it is no surprise that the specific characterisation of the party family, just as the concept of populism (e.g., Loch 2017), is scientifically contested and researchers propose varying conceptualisations with diverging emphasis on single elements (Priester 2016, Odmalm and Rydgren 2019). Since it is not focus of this dissertation to contribute to these conceptual discussions, it appears sufficient to contrast only two examples here. Decker and Lewandowsky (2012) conceptualise populism as fundamental element of the party family, which they accordingly call *right-wing populists* (author's own translation). This populism might occur in three forms which reflect ideological varieties within the right-wing populist party family. A *cultural form* that creates an ingroup of putatively legitimate people based on nation, culture or religion; an *economic form* which includes neo-liberal elements or welfare-protectionist elements; and a *political or institutional form* that refers to an anti-establishment orientation (Decker and Lewandowsky 2012). According to the authors the advantage of such conceptualisation emphasising populism as basic characteristic is that it may include parties with nationally diverging political programmes but typical right-wing populist forms of populist appeals, organisation, and electorates. In contrast, Mudde (2017) presents a narrower conceptualisation. He sees the party family as a distinct subtype of radical right parties and gives their radical right ideology precedence over their populist element which he, in turn, includes in the ideology. Three distinct features characterise the populist radical right ideology, and, thus, also the party family: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. *Nativism* concurs with the cultural form of populism by Decker and Lewandowsky (2012). "As a combination of nationalism and xenophobia [it] is an ideology that holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native (or 'alien') elements, whether persons or ideas, are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state" (Mudde 2017, p. 4). It relates clearly to the idea of ethno-pluralism. *Authoritarianism* includes beliefs, also typical to conservatism, embracing strict hierarchies in a society, traditional patriarchal gender roles, and strict law and order policies. Finally, *populism*, understood as a *thin ideology*[29] that connects to right radicalism in the context of PRRPs, refers to the creation of two separated groups antagonising the 'ordinary people' and the 'corrupt elite' with the PRRPs themselves representing the former group (Mudde 2004). Importantly, in distinction to right extreme parties, the

[29] A thin ideology reflects specific ideological traits of an actor, however, unlike fundamental ideologies it is does not provide a comprehensive world view to derive guiding positions to the whole of political issues. Therefore, thin ideologies, like populism or feminism, need to adapt to so-called *host ideologies*, such as liberalism, socialism, conservatism, or right radicalism (Mudde 2004, Loch 2017).

PRRPs are democratic in the sense of accepting the sovereignty of the people and majority decisions (e.g., Loch 2017). Furthermore, they are not right in a socio-economic meaning so that the party family may include diverging positions on welfare issues (Mudde 2017, see also Mudde 2007). In my dissertation, I follow Mudde's widely established conceptualisation, as it does not rely chiefly on the 'thin ideology' of populism but puts to the fore the distinct ideological and programmatic core of the party family, and, thus, provides a more clear-cut concept of PRRPs (Loch 2017).

Aside its conceptualisation the broad reception of PRRPs in the research literature focused predominantly on their diverse impacts in the field of immigration policy, e.g., in terms of mainstream party positions (Minkenberg 2001, Meguid 2005, van Spanje 2010, Bale et al. 2010, Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn 2016, Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020), policy output (Akkerman 2012, Röth, Afonso and Spies 2018), the public discourse (Schain 2006, Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn 2016), or on liberal democracy as such (Albertazzi and Mueller 2013, Mudde 2013, Huber and Schimpf 2017). Given the typical core of their ideology described above, this dominant research focus is not further surprising. When I started the work on my dissertation in spring 2019, accounts on the nexus of PRRPs and the environment had hardly existed. In a conference paper, Gemenis, Katsanidou and Vasilopoulou (2012) had been among the first[30] who addressed this research niche, and based on a comparative analysis of party manifestos of 13 parties in 12 European countries diagnosed the majority of the (extreme) radical right parties with an outright rejective position on environmental issues, thus, breaking the party consensus on this valence issue. In a comparative case study of two far-right parties in UK and Denmark Forchtner and Kølvraa (2015) addressed in particular the communication of radical right parties showing that these parties have no difficulties to link the support of environmental protection and the rejection of climate change to their original ideologies. For instance, global climate change policy efforts are pictured as threat to *national sovereignty* and as driven by a global neo-religious elite counteracting the *national people* (ibid.). Lockwood (2018) picked up the threads and theorised linkages of specifically the *populist* radical right parties and the issue of climate change. He discerned a *structuralist approach* and an ideological *approach*. The structuralist approach suggests that core constituencies of PRRPs, i.e., blue-collar workers, depend on economic sectors most threatened by the transformation induced by climate mitigation measures, while the ideological approach explains the engagement of PRRPs with the high compatibility of the issue with their typical anti-elitist and nationalist ideology construing climate change as a conspiracy of cosmopolitan politicians and scientists (ibid.). In the wake of rising PRRPs and an increasing salience of environmental issues (above all climate change) in the public discourse, from 2019 on, literature on PRRPs and the environment has flourished addressing both the

[30] To be sure, valuable research on far-right parties and the environment existed before (e.g., Jahn and Wehling 1991, Geden 1996). In their majority, they focused more on established extreme right parties and less on the rising PRRPs relevant for my study. For reasons of parsimony, I, therefore, concentrate on the already extensive state of the art reflected in the burgeoning international literature on PRRPs and the environment.

parties' positions and their political impacts. The following paragraphs will summarise the state of the literature for both dimensions separately.

Positions of Populist Radical Right Parties on Environmental Policy

Hess and Renner (2019) built on Gemenis, Katsanidou and Vasilopoulou (2012) and looked at PRRPs' positions on climate and energy transition policies by analysing party programmes between 2007 and 2017. In order to determine these positions as specific characteristics of PRRPs, they contrasted them with positions of major conservative parties in the respective countries, thus, confirming the standalone positions of PRRPs against climate change measures although these have been more moderate among Mediterranean representatives of the party family (Hess and Renner 2019). Schaller and Carius (2019) were the first to investigate this matter in a broader empirical research design in terms of cases and data sources, including not only party programmes, but also various oral or written statements by leading party representatives and the voting behaviour of the parties on selected environmental issues in the European Parliament. Comparing the 21 then electorally strongest PRRPs in Europe they made two central conclusions. First, they revealed the party family's positions on climate change to be heterogenous. Seven parties were *denialist/sceptics* of climate change[31], 11 parties were *disengaged/cautious* about the topic and a marginal group of three parties were *affirmative*, thus acknowledging climate science and the threat of climate change. Second, they could conclude from the voting patterns in the European Parliament that all PRRPs were supportive of locally-oriented environmental protection measures (like biodiversity protection in Europe or the reduction of single-use plastic) whereas the majority rejected any measures to tackle the global issue of climate change (Schaller and Carius 2019). In 2020, a first edited book completely dealing with "The Far Right and the Environment" has been published containing case studies on 11 European countries and the USA which focus, first and foremost, the parties' communication but, thus, also their related positions (Forchtner 2020a). As most of the analysed parties fall in the category of PRRPs, it is a central contribution to the state of the reflected here. The bottom-line of the compilation is that there is a heterogeneity among PRRPs' commitment to environmental protection while they all oppose climate change and climate change mitigation measures, thus, for the latter, showing a more coherent picture in the in-depth case studies than suggested by Schaller and Carius (2019). If the commitment to environmental protection exists, it is strongly embedded in the respective party's nationalist DNA, specifically in the belief in an "organic connection between land and people" which the authors refer to as "organicism" or "organic ethnonationalism" (Forchtner 2020b, p. 311). Among the countries of focus of my dissertation[32] this organicism is most pronounced in the Austrian FPÖ which has put environmental matters to the fore of

[31] This group includes the most relevant PRRPs in the four countries of focus of my dissertation, i.e., the AfD, FPÖ, PVV and SD.

[32] Note that there was no case study on the Netherlands included in the compilation.

its programme since its inception in the 1950s but also more recently it even exceeds the Austrian Green party concerning pro-environmental parliamentary activities (Voss 2020). In a far lower intensity, but with a similar ideological grounding, this organicism is also observable in the communication of SD in Sweden (Hultman, Björk and Viinikka 2020) and on a few occasions also for the AfD in Germany (Forchtner and Özvatan 2020). In a less distinct nationalist way, the AfD, however, is in evidence to harness concerns about environmental protections, like landscape or bird protection, to mobilise against the expansion of wind energy, i.e., climate protection measures (Otteni and Weisskircher 2022a, b). Independent of the specific extent of nationalist environmentalism, all parties are at least sceptical about an anthropogenic climate change and reject climate change policies linking them to their anti-libertarian, anti-globalist, and anti-elitist worldviews (Forchtner 2020b). This is most evident for the AfD in Germany (Forchtner and Özvatan 2020, see also Otteni and Weisskircher 2022b) but also the Swedish SD has turned into a climate sceptical political party outright opposing related climate mitigation measures (Hultman, Björk and Viinikka 2020). The picture is a bit more ambiguous for the FPÖ. In contrast to the findings by Schaller and Carius (2019) for EU parliamentary activities, the FPÖ clearly embraces climate mitigation policies on the national level targeting, for instance, the extension of renewable energies, the phase-out of fossil fuels or the reduction of industrial agriculture (Voss 2020). Nevertheless, leading members of the party, including the then chairman Heinz-Christian Strache, openly questioned human-made climate change on several occasions (Forchtner 2019a). Applying a more differentiated conceptual perspective, especially the question of how PRRPs address the topic of climate change, has received further scientific attention. In their comparative case study of the three major PRRPs in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, Vihma, Reischl and Nonbo Andersen (2021) discern three ideal types of climate change opposition: "climate science denialism, climate policy nationalism, and climate policy conservativism" (p. 222) which respectively concern the science behind anthropogenic climate change, nationalist objections or the actual policy response especially their economic costs. They conclude that an “outright science denialism appears to have been less focused” in the communication of the three parties analysed (p. 232). However, the three parties differed in the extent they express climate nationalism by referring to the putatively very limited impact of climate actions in their respective country on global emissions and “frequently rally against ‘climate alarmists’” (p. 232). While, the Sweden Democrats and The Finns Party embraced these lines of argumentation, the Danish People’s Party has accomplished a turn from a climate-sceptic party towards a “moderate climate policy conservative position” (p. 233). Nevertheless, all three parties share populist attitudes on the topic framing climate mitigation policies as urban elite measures that stand in contrast to the interests of the ‘common people’. Interestingly, they also show that all three parties clearly responded to the increasing salience of environmental and climate policy from 2018 on by addressing the matter in specific policy programmes and intensifying their communication around it, and, in particular, emphasising environmental protection (Vihma et al. 2021). Another aspect that is especially relevant for my research is “a novel type of climate nationalism” of the Sweden Democrats handling climate change. Despite

being critical of international cooperation, in general, their major approach to tackle climate change is raising aids for climate measures not in Sweden but in the Global South where it would be more efficient (Vihma et al. 2021).

In a similar vein, Forchtner and Lubarda (2023) examine the communication of 24 far-right parties, i.e., PRRPs (18) and right-extreme parties (6), in the field of environmental and climate policy in the European Parliament between 2004 and 2019 based on a differentiated analysis of climate scepticism. Slightly more elaborated than Vihma, Reischl and Nonbo Andersen (2021), they discern evidence scepticism, process scepticism regarding both scientific knowledge-making processes and decision-making processes, as well as response scepticism which concerns the concrete policy measures implemented to tackle climate change. Especially interested in the differences between PRRPs and the extreme right, the authors conclude that "only a minority of analysed texts outright deny anthropogenic climate change and that, instead of evidence-sceptic arguments, the investigated actors largely voice scepticism towards existing scientific/decision-making processes and, especially, policy responses" (p. 45). Thus, "far-right parties cannot be discarded as simply denying anthropogenic climate change. Indeed, some of them might even champion climate protection, suggesting far-right responses to the crisis (p. 63)." Furthermore, they found "indicative empirical support" (p. 60) that extreme-right parties tend to support climate and environmental protection measures more than PRRPs. As corollary of this review of the state of the art on PRRPs and the environment, it is crucial to a apply differentiated perspective on environmental policy (see ch. 2) when we look at the ideological and programmatic positions of PRRPs in this policy field. Thus, we can derive three conclusions from the literature: first, PRRPs very often support traditional environmental policy in the form of environmental protection (see also Debus and Tosun 2021); second, PRRPs are in their absolute majority against sustainability policies, such as climate change mitigation measures (see also Fraune and Knodt 2018); and third, despite these clear tendencies we also face a certain heterogeneity in the party family when it comes to their positioning on sustainability and traditional environmental policy. This stresses the necessity of case-sensitive approaches in order to analyse these parties' positions and their related effects.

What becomes clear from the review of PRRPs environmental and climate positions is that *the way* these parties speak to the environment and climate reveals recurring patterns that I will shortly elaborate in the following. For this purpose, in his analysis of environmental and climate positions of eight PRRPs in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Kevický (2023) identifies three components essentially establishing the link between PRRPs and the environment: nationalism, globalism and populism. As Kevický's approach refers to environmental policy overall and not only to climate change, like other frameworks (e.g., Marquardt, Oliveira and Lederer 2022), it provides a good starting point to understand this nexus in general.

Following Forchtner and Kølvraa (2015) *nationalism* is usually linked to the environment in three dimensions: in an *aesthetic dimension* nationalist actors express a romantic view on the environment which emphasises the beauty of an original and untouched nature that provides a harbour of recreation

for the people living in it. This is closely intertwined with the *symbolic dimension* which connects nature to the national territory and national cultural identity. This concurs with the concept of 'organicism' described above (Forchtner 2020b) and connects to the notorious rhetoric formula of 'blood and soil' as used by the National Socialists in the Third Reich (Forchtner and Özvatan 2020, Radkau 2008, pp. 220-239 & 260-265). Nature is seen here as an emblem of the sovereign nation itself, the 'homeland', and, thus, needs to be protected from 'external' influences such as foreign powers, corrupt elites, or non-indigenous groups (Kevický 2023). Ultimately, there is a *materialist dimension* of the nationalism-environment-nexus. This dimension refers to nature as a source of resources that can be exploited and which should serve first and foremost the own nation. "Economic nationalists often promote ideas of self-sufficiency, especially [regarding] food and energy" (Kevický 2023, p. 34, Forchtner and Kølvraa 2015).

The component of *globalism* refers to the implications of globalisation in a socio-economic and a cultural dimension (Kevický 2023). The socio-economic dimension relates, firstly, to the "losers of modernization"-hypothesis (Betz 1994) which as described above is one of the central explanations for the electoral success of PRRPs in general (Kriesi et al. 2006, Spier 2010) (see ch. 4.3.2). To recall, the argument goes that due to the economic and political constraints of a globalised economy, national governments have an increasingly limited leeway to pursue independent socio-economic policies in order not to risk international competitiveness of the national economy. Therefore, mainstream political parties, by and large, converged on policies of de-regulation and welfare state entrenchments. This opened room for newcomer parties, like the PRRPs, to take distinct positions in these fields of policies, especially, addressing voters that feel threatened by the socio-economic globalisation. As shown, Lockwood (2018) links this argument of PRRPs as new worker's parties (e.g., Rydgren 2013) to the economic transformation induced by climate mitigation measures which putatively threatens, in particular, voters of PRRPs and their interests. In turn, PRRPs take opposition against these measures for vote-seeking reasons. However, Lockwood dismisses this structuralist explanatory power as PRRPs oppose climate mitigation also in states with expansive welfare-states which are supposed to alleviate potential negative consequences and, also in states where the key industries, and, thus related jobs, are, in fact, not significantly endangered by climate mitigation policy (2018). Given that environmental protection measures are equally often regarded as a threat to national industries, this structural argument is also inconsistent with the rather positive positions of PRRPs on traditional environmental policy. As a corollary, and in line with my explanations of the new cultural cleavage (see ch. 4.3.2), the cultural dimension might be also more decisive to establish the globalist link between PRRPs and the environment. As shown, researchers see a consolidating cleavage, driving and driven by PRRPs' electoral successes, between globalist-oriented and more national-oriented values in Western European societies. While this globalist component hardly applies to a traditional notion of environmental

protection[33], climate mitigation policy is an inherently global issue that is frequently connected with supranational organisations like the EU or the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002, Huber 2020). As such, it can be easily linked to the anti-globalist agenda of PRRPs. This coincides with Lockwood's (2018) ideological argument for establishing a link between PRRPs and climate change which "combines authoritarian and nationalistic values with anti-elitism, producing hostility to climate change as a cosmopolitan elite agenda, along with a suspicion of both the complexity of climate science and policy and of the role of climate scientists and environmentalists" (p. 713). Following this explanation, the globalist component intertwines considerably with the third component of populism.

Populism in its basic form is often used to describe a certain style of politics characterised by simplifications and provoking polemic exaggerations (e.g., Jagers and Walgrave 2007). Understood as an ideological component it refers to the idea of a society that is split in two homogenous and antagonistic groups, i.e., 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite' (Loch 2017, Huber 2020). As shown in the literature review above, in the field of environmental policy, most often PRRPs seek to contrast often nation-based 'the pure people' with a construed global elite of politicians, scientists and environmentalists (see also Buzogány and Mohamad-Klotzbach 2022, Böhmelt 2021, Jacob, Schaller and Carius 2020). In this way, it shows some overlaps with the component of nationalism (Kulin, Johansson Sevä and Dunlap 2021), but it is also used to oppose certain groups within nation-states, which advocate "the mainstream consensus on 'political correctness' regarding climate change" spearheaded by green parties and environmental activists (Buzogány and Mohamad-Klotzbach 2022, p. 327). The overly complex, often abstract, and often transnational problem structure of environmental problems makes the issue highly eligible for these populist appeals (Böhmelt 2021). In the context of climate change, Marquardt, Oliveira and Lederer (2022) summarise this element of populism concisely as the "anti-elitist and anti-cosmopolitan component" (p. 779), to which they add another component, i.e., "the contestation of established knowledge" (ibid.). Indeed, the populist argument is closely linked to another recent development called *post-truth politics* which challenge the general acceptance of established norms and institutions, such as scientific knowledge production and evidence and instead praise value of personal experiences (Fraune and Knodt 2018, Marquardt, Oliveira and Lederer 2022)[34]. An example of the conflation of populism and post-truth is the debasement of the broad scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change as part of an elitist left-green political agenda, which is commonly raised in populist radical right networks (e.g., ibid.).

[33] Although classic matters of environmental protection are often international, they lack a distinctive globality (see ch. 2).

[34] In a case study of the German PRRP AfD, Böcher et al. (2022), however, showed that the relationship of populist right radicalism and science is somewhat more ambiguous. While the AfD indeed questions the established standards of scientific knowledge production regarding the evidence on global climate change, they nevertheless rely on expertise that somewhat mimicries these standards, thus, acknowledging their argumentative value.

In summary, although each of these three components sheds light on the link between PRRPs and environmental issues individually, they seem to intertwine strongly to varying degree. In particular, globalism seems like a component that can be analytically isolated but which materialises in practice within the other two components. Therefore, the ideological link is established, first and foremost, based on nationalism and populism which concurs with two of the three ideological pillars of the general PRRP concept in my research introduced above (Mudde 2017). While the different traits of nationalism help us to explain, above all, the positive position of the PRRPs on traditional environmental policy, the ideological pillar of populism, partly loaded with nationalist ideas, crucially substantiates the widespread scepticism on climate change and the related rejection of climate mitigation policies among these parties.

Effects of Populist Radical Right Parties on Environmental Policy

Moving from positions to actions, it is important to reflect on the question to which extent PRRPs have been able to transform the outlined policy positions into actual effects on environmental policy. In view of the infancy of the research on PRRPs and the environment, research on this matter is still scarce and, except for a few accounts on traditional environmental policy effects (Voss 2020, Tosun and Debus 2020, Schaller and Carius 2019), it focuses predominantly climate change related aspects.

Ćetković and Hagemann (2020) examined the influence of PRRPs on energy and climate policy in a comparative case study of six West European countries between 2008 and 2018. Their analysis shows that the government involvement of a PRRP, led to minor negative effects only in some cases, when the PRRP was in charge of relevant ministries and the overall public opinion on climate and energy was low. In the majority of the cases, the PRRP influence was limited due to their status as junior partner in the government coalition and a strong commitment of other governmental parties to international climate agreements. Interestingly, the authors also identified a possible positive indirect impact of an increasingly strong PRRP as it can force mainstream parties into coalitions with minor environmentalist parties that otherwise would not have been plausible (Ćetković and Hagemann 2020). In contrast, Jahn (2021) finds, in his quantitative study on governmental environmental performances in 28 EU member states from 1990 to 2018, that the participation of a PRRP in government has a clearly negative impact on the level of greenhouse gas emissions. Lockwood and Lockwood (2022) confirm this negative effect of governing PRRPs for the policy output of climate policies in an analysis of 31 OECD countries between 2007 and 2018, although in accordance with Ćetković and Hagemann (2020) this effect is far less pronounced in countries with proportional election systems and higher likelihood of coalition governments where PRRPs usually only play a minor role in governments. Importantly, the authors stress that "[i]f the fortunes of [PRRPs] continue to rise, it is possible that the mitigating effect of proportional representative electoral systems on the relationship with climate policy will weaken or disappear" (Lockwood and Lockwood 2022, p. 20). Interestingly, Böhmelt (2021) argues in his study on effects of populism on CO_2-emissions per capita in 66 countries between 1994 and 2016 that it is the

degree of populism which is responsible for a government's weak environmental performance irrespective of its left-right ideology. Especially, given that PRRPs are the most successful populist party family in Europe, this does not speak against their negative effects and it substantiates my conclusion from above regarding the populist component of PRRP ideology to be central for climate policy positions. Furthermore, Böhmelt's (2021) finding is most likely a consequence of the broad global case sample of the study that includes several left-wing populist governments, e.g., in South America, that have been as cautious as their right-wing counter-parts on climate policy although not questioning climate change as such (Ryan 2017). For Europe, other research shows that it is above all right-wing populism, i.e., PRRPs which take rejective positions and actions in climate policy, while European left-wing populists tend to address the issue positively (Huber et al. 2021). Surdea-Hernea (2023) tests the effects of PRRPs' electoral gains on national climate policy outcome, i.e., annual greenhouse gas emissions, in EU member states between 1990 and 2018 in a sophisticated statistical model. Not only does he corroborate the negative effect of PRRPs on climate policy outcome, but also, he investigates different causal mechanisms of this effect. For this purpose, he discerns a *configurative* effect that reflects PRRPs' participation in formal policy-making in both parliament and government, and a *contagion* effect of PRRPs that leads to a lower climate policy performance through affected mainstream parties positions. For the former, he finds ample evidence and stresses that already an increasing parliamentary strength of PRRPs exerts a negative influence on national greenhouse gas emissions, while this influence is further increased when the PRRPs are part of the government. This interactive reinforcing can be explained by the more direct influence of incumbent PRRPs but also by the generally increased amount of political leverage available to governmental parties, like an increased presence in the media. The contagion effect, which the author traces back to parties' vote-seeking motivations, is not statistically relevant, thus, dismissing an accommodation of PRRP positions on climate policy through other parties. However, the author rightly reflects that this weak manifestation might be produced by the period of investigation which ends before the recent intensification of political struggle on climate change and the PRRPs' adoption of this issue (Surdea-Hernea 2023). In the end, literature, so far, has confirmed a negative impact of PRRPs on climate change policy, mostly in the form of direct effects through governmental participation, while Ćetković and Hagemann (2020), and, in particular, Surdea-Hernea (2023), importantly point to indirect effects through party competition, which are at the fore also of my dissertation. I will elaborate on the theoretical fundaments for this form of effects in the next subchapter.

5.1.4 Summary: Partisan Effects in Environmental Policy

As a summary, Table 4 presents an overview of partisan positions and effects differentiated for the fields of traditional environmental policy and sustainability policy. The information is mainly derived from the literature review above. Only for the positions of liberal parties I rely on further literature (Pollex and Berker 2022, van Haute and Close 2019). In general, the heterogeneous liberal party family has

received scant attention from an environmental policy perspective, and to the best of my knowledge, there are no studies systematically investigating the impact of liberal parties on environmental issues. The same holds true for the effect of PRRPs on the traditional environmental policy.

Party family	**Traditional Environmental Policy**		**Modern Environmental Policy (*also* Sustainability Policy)**	
	Positive Position	**Positive Effect**	**Positive Position**	**Positive Effect**
Left/Socialist Parties	✓ **BUT**	✓ **BUT**	✓ **BUT**	✓ **BUT**
Social Democratic Parties	✓ **BUT**	✓ **BUT**	✓ **BUT**	✓ **BUT**
Green Parties	✓	✓	✓	✓
Liberal Parties	✓ ✗	?	✓ ✗	?
Christian Democratic Parties	✗ **BUT**	✗ **BUT**	✗ **BUT**	✗ **BUT**
Conservative Parties	✗	✗	✗	✗
Populist Radical Right Parties	✓	?	✗	✗

Table 4: Party Family Positions and Effects in the two subfields of environmental policy; author's own compilation. The green ticks indicate confirmation while the red crosses indicate rejection. The 'But' in bold display minor ambiguities within party families which otherwise show clear tendencies, while a concurrence of ticks and crosses mark major ambiguities within the party family. The question mark point to missing research specifically addressing this matter; Note that agrarian, communist, and fascist parties are not considered here as they do not play a central role in modern Western European party systems. Regional parties are also excluded as they are not relevant in the countries of focus of my dissertation.

5.2 Extended Partisan Theory: Political Parties' Positions and the Effects of Party Competition

The traditional partisan theory has been introduced as a two-step process taking place on a political party level and a level of the policy-making process. At the interface of these two steps, the positions of political parties are situated. These can be seen as product of the first step and, at the same time, as the fundament for the second step, i.e., the governmental decision-making (see ch. 5.1). For the formation of party positions the classic partisan theory literature has recognised, first and foremost, the interests of core constituencies or an independent party ideology pursued by the party elites as crucial factors (Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer 2020) (see ch. 5.1). It is evident that, in modern reality, these factors are no longer as straightforward as the traditional partisan theory might suggest – or they never have been. On the one hand, the electorate has become more fluid and the patterns of voters' party affiliation are about to change in an uncertain direction, yet with the certain effects that the old class-based constituencies are no longer the solid bedrock of party positions they had been in the past and that socio-cultural issues have gained traction in the last decades (see ch. 4). On the other hand, party positions are

not only long-term shaped by the socialisation of responsible party elites within the party (Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer 2020), but also by short-term fluctuations of public sentiments in combination with punctuating events external to the political system, like natural disasters, economic crises, or war (Zohlnhöfer and Engler 2014, 2023, Burstein 2003, Crawley, Coffé and Chapman 2022). In addition, other interest organisations of the intermediary system, such as lobby groups or social movements, can influence the party positions (Burstein and Linton 2002, Kanol 2015).

In my dissertation, I put to the fore another factor that plays a pivotal role for the positioning of political parties, i.e., *the positions of other parties in the context of overall party competition patterns in a party system*. This integration of party system features into the study of partisan effects has been deemed wanting by other researchers. For instance, Häusermann, Picot and Geering (2013) emphasise that for an adequate application of partisan theory in policy analysis "we need to study the context in which the party operates. Electoral institutions condition the way parties come to power, policy institutions influence their policy preferences, *cleavages structure the political terrain and coalition-formation, and the spatial configuration of party competition constrains or shapes policy choices in the light of electoral trade-offs*" (p. 232, highlighting in italics by the author).

Importantly, this perspective adds two aspects to the conventional study of partisan effects: first, it emphasises the fact that not only governmental parties take an effect on the ultimate policy decisions but that also opposition parties in (or even outside) the parliament often unfold an effect on governmental parties' positions and, thus, by the same token, on governmental policies. While this indirect effect of political parties is nothing new *per se* (e.g., Zohlnhöfer 2019) and I have already referred to several studies investigating such an effect also in environmental policy-making (see ch. 5.1), it has been less clearly connected to the classic partisan theory and the newer research on party systems in combination with the specific traits of PRRPs. Second, the actual causal mechanism of such an indirect partisan effect has been, first and foremost, linked to vote-seeking but to a much lesser extent to office-seeking motivations of political parties up until recently. Hence, it is a premise of my research, that in order to fully understand partisan effects, it is important to reflect the specific party competition environment political parties operate in. In the following, I elaborate this *office-seeking motivated indirect partisan effect* as an extended version of partisan theory on a theoretical basis and relate it back to the explanations on changing party systems from the previous chapter (see ch. 4).

As already introduced above (see ch. 3.2), Hicks and Swank (1992) brought in opposition parties in the analysis of partisan effects referring to a "contagion effect" of these parties on governmental parties. Research on party competition has confirmed this idea and substantiates the capability of opposition parties to affect other parties' positions (e.g., Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009, Bale et al. 2010, Spoon, Hobolt and De Vries 2014) and, ultimately, also governmental policy-making (e.g. Green-Pedersen 2019, Zohlnhöfer 2017). But, how does this indirect effect of opposition parties through party competition unfold in detail?

In chapter 3.2, I introduced four arenas in which parties usually operate. For the understanding of party competition, Laver (1989) puts to the fore two of these arenas as two highly interactive levels of party competition, i.e., the parliamentary arena and the electoral arena, and emphasises that the electoral gains of a party (transformed through specific electoral laws) in the electoral arena determine its legislative weights in the parliamentary arena. As a start, this simply reflects the regular bottom-up representation process in modern parliamentary democracies and the obvious fact that parties with more votes usually get more seats[35] and, thus, have more power to influence the ultimate policy-making. In our context, it is more important that according to Laver (1989) the ultimate bargaining weight of political parties for (governmental) coalition-building and policy-making, is determined by these legislative weights *in combination with* the policy positions of the respective parties. In light of the typical dualism of centripetal or centrifugal party competition, Laver (1989) refers, here, to positional shifts between more centrist and more periphery positions and states that, e.g., shifts towards more periphery positions are likely to bring electoral gains at the expense of coalition options which are more multifarious at the centre of the party system. In that way, parties might shift positions in order to gain votes and/or office and, thus, build up a new party system environment which, in turn, shapes their behaviour in the future. Policy-seeking, here, must be understood as instrumental for vote- and office-seeking (ch. 3.1). Laver (1989), further, argues that the regular trade-offs in terms of vote- and office-seeking make parties rather cautious when it comes to boosting new issues on the political agenda or taking more extreme positions. This, however, does not concern new challenger parties which, in the first place, are less interested in gaining office and, thus, may unleash bigger changes in party systems. Laver (1989) concludes:

> "Party systems can change endogenously as a result of the process of party competition and not only as a result of exogenous changes in outside influences on the system [like changing voter demands]. Endogenously generated party system change can affect a number of important system parameters, including the number and identity of parties in the system, their weights, their policy positions and the salience of policy dimensions" (p. 322).

In the end, a party will try "to bring about party system change on terms that will be particularly favourable to it" (ibid., p. 323). Therefore, for instance, green parties propel environmental issues, conservative parties often concentrate on the economy, social democrats are likely to embrace welfare policy or PRRPs migration policy. It is important to reiterate the two-fold interaction of parties and the respective party system here: On the one hand, individual parties are interested in and capable of pushing forward changes of the party system in terms of salience of specific policy issues and, in more extreme cases, also concerning the predominating cleavages as a whole. This is line with my theoretical perspective on cleavages explained in ch. 4.2, which assigns political parties a vital role in the emergence

[35] It is important to note that this putative corollary applies in such straightforward way only to political systems with proportional election systems, as present in the four countries of focus of my dissertation, but it is often invalidated in disproportional majoritarian election systems as so-called manufactured majorities in, e.g., the UK, have shown in the past (e.g., Lijphart 2012, pp. 153-157).

and shaping of cleavages, and also with the party system agenda idea (see ch. 3.2), which is highlighted in the agenda-setting literature and understands parties as active agents in this famous *conflict of conflicts* (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 2014, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015, Seeberg 2023). On the other hand, these changes in the overall foundation of party competition also shape all parties in the party system (ibid.).

If we take a closer look on how parties react to other parties in party competition, different strategies have been identified in the literature. In her influential study on the electoral performance of green parties and populist radical right parties in 17 Western European countries, Meguid (2005) identified three main strategies by established parties that affect the electoral success of these parties: an *accommodative* strategy according to which parties take over the positions of their rival parties, an *adversarial* strategy according to which parties take a diverging position from the rival party on a specific political issue, and a *dismissive* strategy with which parties intentionally avoid to take any position on an issue advocated by a rival party. Importantly, these strategies entail implications for both the positioning of parties in an ideological or programmatic space on a single policy issue or a more complex cleavage (like the ones presented in ch. 4.2) and the salience, or attention, parties dedicate to a specific issue. While the differentiation between issue *salience* and issue *position* has represented a point of debate among partisan researchers for a long time (e.g., Budge 2001)[36], nowadays, researchers have turned broadly to a complementary or integrative conception of these two expressions of party positions (see Magyar, Wagner and Zur 2023, also Wagner 2012). Wagner (2012), convincingly, argues that "positional decisions precede salience choice in party strategies" as parties are highly unlikely to decide on driving an issue on the political agenda before forming a positioning on this issue. Furthermore, positions represent the core of the party's ideological identity which is important to its activists and voters who will most probably not support a party simply because it speaks a lot about a problem but rather because of the positions it expresses in these speeches (ibid.). However, when a party opts not to address an issue at all or with a very low salience, this reflects also a position. Therefore, although focusing more on policy positions, in my dissertation, overall, I apply an integrative approach of party positions that includes the salience a party assigns to an issue.

For the salience of an issue in a party system, according to Meguid (2005), both the accommodative and the adversarial strategy are likely to boost the salience of an issue, whereas the dismissive approach makes a lowering or stagnation of attention more likely. Very similar to Meguid (2005), Bale et al. (2010) discerned the three approaches of *adopt, hold* and *defuse* in their study of the strategic response of social democratic parties to populist radical right parties in four European countries between 1980

[36] In fact, it still characterises the diverging conceptual fundaments of data collection for the two major comparative data sets on party positions. While the CHES-project (Bakker et al. 2020a), I mostly used in my research, country experts assign each party a specific position on issue-related or ideological scales following the concept of spatial party competition, the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) is based on the concept of saliency and measures the relative attention parties pay to specific issues in their election manifestoes as proxy of their positions (Lehmann et al. 2022).

and 2010. While the shown party strategies focused on a unidimensional party competition, Rovny (2015) presents a list of four central party strategies relevant in competitive situations when established parties get challenged by other parties on new issues which are hard to grasp from the established parties' habitual perspective, as present in the case of environmental and climate policy (see ch. 4.3). So, how do parties deal with such a second increasingly relevant issue dimension? According to Rovny (2015), the first option for mainstream parties is to take, again, a dismissive strategy by *ignoring* the new issue in order to keep the party competition unidimensional. Second, they can opt for "*subsuming* it by way of framing it in the views and rhetoric of the dominant dimension" (p. 913, italics in the original). This would mean that the issue is integrated into the already existent cleavage, and the party competition could be continued largely unidimensionally. The third option is *taking a position* on the newly-raised issue. Corresponding to Meguid (2005), this could involve an accommodative (convergent) or an adversarial (divergent) position, and in either way, would consolidate a two-dimensional party competition as the new issue is accepted as such. As a fourth strategy, Rovny (2015) suggests the *blurring* of the new issue by "presenting vague or inconsistent positions on it" (p. 913). This seems like a rather undecided and short-sighted version of striking the balance between ignoring and taking a position. The party accepts the new issue as a new object of competition and, thus, contributes to its establishment in the medium term, however, it refrains from immediately forming a proper position on it.

A still open question is why parties (re)adjust their positions to their competitor's positions in the first place. Firstly, a change of party positions might, of course, result from internal reorganisations, for example, when new party elites introduce new policy convictions to a party, or from considerations that an adjusted position might increase the likeliness of achieving a desired policy outcome. In this way, a change in positions roots in a policy-seeking motivation of the political party. From a party competition perspective, as noted above, the adaptation of policy positions can be understood as an instrument to pursue the goals of vote- and/or office-seeking. Downs (1957) suggested parties to be predominantly *vote-seeking* and hypothesised them to gear their positions towards the positions other parties are likely to take. Thus, they, ultimately, converge on rather centrist positions, around the median voter's position, in order to attract as many voters as possible. This famous assumption, however, is based on very specific scope conditions like a unidimensional party competition (e.g., Stokes 1963). In contrast, parties, and especially, newcomer parties, may have strategic vote-seeking incentives to take more extreme positions using this as way to distinguish themselves from other parties and to create unique selling points by emphasising these specific issues (Wagner 2012). According to Wagner (2012) "this is the case when parties are relatively small, when issue positions are ideologically distinctive and when other parties neglect [and/or broadly converge on] the topic" (p. 82). As a corollary, it is clear that vote-seeking motivations of individual parties are pivotal for the positioning of political parties and point to a central causal mechanism of party competition. Based on this mechanism, for the field of environmental policy, I already showcased that the strength of green parties influences the positioning

of established parties on this matter (Spoon, Hobolt and De Vries 2014, cf. Abou-Chadi 2016), while such a vote-seeking effect, so far, could not been confirmed for the PRRPs (Surdea-Hernea 2023) (see ch. 5.1.3). Instead, the causal mechanisms substantiating the confirmed effect of PRRPs on environmental policy (e.g., Jahn 2021) (see ch. 5.1.3) are an object of current research. What has been shown is that the rise of the socio-cultural cleavage has been pushed significantly by new populist radical right challenger parties which are likely to have acted out of a vote-seeking motive in the first place addressing voter segments no longer reached by the established parties (Hooghe and Marks 2018) (see ch. 4). As a consequence, a new party system reality has emerged – and is still consolidating – in which PRRPs play a pivotal role. Resulting from this, the intriguing question is, how PRRPs take effect on other parties in this new party landscape. Here, the vote-seeking mechanism alone reflects only one side of the party competition argument since in multi-party systems parties are not only competitors on votes but also potential partners for future government coalitions. This aspect puts to the fore an office-seeking mechanism which is often overlooked in research on partisan effects and, which is investigated in my dissertation to contribute to the understanding of PRRPs' effects in the field of environmental policy[37].

That coalition considerations play an important role for the positioning of parties also in the field of environmental policy has been emphasised by Green-Pedersen (2019, ch. 9). As reflected above (see ch. 5.1.2), social democratic parties have used strong environmental positions as tool to win green parties as coalition partner or as a wedge issue to win over environmentally friendly liberal parties actually entrenched in a right-wing bloc (Green-Pedersen 2019, ch. 9). Similarly, Kayser and Rehmert (2021) argue that the leverage of green parties on governmental policy making depends on not only on polls – as purely vote-seeking motivations would suggest – but predominantly on the (prospective) dependency of other parties to form a government with the green party. They conclude "even when environmental parties are out of government, governing parties may court them as future coalition partners when their coalition-inclusion probability is high by removing policy obstacles such as incompatible environmental positions" and that this has a direct impact on governmental policy-making (Kayser and Rehmert 2021, p. 240). In more general terms, we also know from coalition research that changing party systems dynamics, potentially, exert an influence on all three stages of coalition governments, i.e., the formation, the governance, and the termination (Bergman, Back and Hellström 2021). In this regard, Bergman, Back and Hellström (2021) emphasise the relevance of all the factors highlighted above, when they refer to the "rise of right-wing populist parties, rise of new policy dimension, increased polarization [and] increased fragmentation" as most important aspects of changing party systems (p. 31, *listed in a figure in the original*). From a policy analysis perspective, it is most important that these changing party systems dynamics influence the policy-making of coalitions, which,

[37] Note that the prioritisation of office-seeking depends considerably on the electoral situation of a party. For most established parties, office-seeking might be overall important as it paves their way to power and equips the party with necessary positions to transfer their interests into policies. However, when a party stands at the brink of non-representation, vote-seeking motivations are likely to take precedence.

in turn, is based on the government formation process (ibid.). In fact, as shown in ch. 4.2, the coalition options have considerably changed in recent decades, mostly due to the increasing success of PRRPs. At the same time environmental issues have established on the political agenda in most Western European countries and PRRPs broke the latent consensus of accepting the climate issue as a serious challenge for modern societies (see ch. 5.1.2). In this situation, just as Green-Pedersen (2019, ch. 9) illustrated for Social Democratic parties and pro-environmental positions, PRRPs can use especially the globalist climate issue as wedge issue to drive, in particular, traditionally centre-right parties away from other parties.

Thus, the environmental positioning of established parties, and, consequently, also environmental policy-making can be understood to hinge considerably upon the reaction of other parties to this challenge of PRRPs. This office-seeking motivated indirect partisan effect through PRRPs might evolve in two directions which shall be called the *pull effect* and the *push effect*. The *pull effect* sets in when parties decide to open up for coalitions with the PRRP so that they are pulled over to the PRRP's side. Recalling the party strategies delineated above, this effect may materialise in three ways in such a situation. First, a party might try to ignore the environmental issue consistently in order to dodge any complications for coalition formations with the PRRP due to diverging positions on this matter. However, this strategy is less likely to succeed considering the high salience of environmental issues on the overall political agenda. Therefore, it is more likely that parties choose the second option and take only cautious or blurry positions on environmental issues in order to keep all coalitions options open. Both strategies entail a de-emphasising of environmental matters and, thus, are likely to have a negative effect on the overall environmental policy-making. A third option for parties that consider coalitions with the PRRP is to accommodate their own positions towards the position of the PRRP. This would entail a higher polarisation on environmental issues in the party systems and, most likely, imply even more negative implications for environmental policy-making when these parties enter government.

The remaining party strategies would lead to the *push effect* meaning that established parties have no other coalition option but to turn to green or other more environmentally friendly parties in order to form viable coalitions. Empirically, this indirect effect of PRRPs has been observed for climate policy-making by Ćetković and Hagemann (2020) yet without specifying the underlying causal mechanism in detail. Concerning the strategy of subsuming, a party would try to address environmental questions from a socio-economic perspective. Applying this strategy would mean to try to counter-act the attempt of PRRPs to incorporate environmental concerns into a cultural issue and could lead to a depolarisation on these matters with potentially positive effects for a factual environmental policy-making. However, this last strategy could also be perceived as an adversarial position that renders coalitions with PRRPs more difficult. Hence, this and the pure adversarial strategy are likely to be applied when a party excludes any coalitions with the PRRP.

In principle, the described effects might concern both traditionally left and right parties, however, several research shows that parties react mostly to contender which are ideologically adjacent (e.g.,

Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009, Bayerlein 2021). Indeed, it is difficult – although not impossible – to imagine a centre-left party to consider a coalition with a PRRP in Western European party systems. In conclusion, it has become clear that the office-seeking effects of PRRPs on environmental policy-making rest significantly on the fundamental strategic reactions of established parties to PRRPs, either engaging with these new challengers or ostracising them, e.g., by means of a *cordon sanitaire* (e.g., Heinze 2018). The following table summarises the causal mechanisms of the office-seeking motivated indirect partisan effect through PRRPs in environmental policy making as detailed out above (Table 5).

Party opens up for coalition with a PRRP		**Party excludes coalition with a PRRP**	
→ ***Pull Effect***		→ ***Push Effect***	
Party Strategy	**Potential Effect on Sustainability Policy Making**	**Party Strategy**	**Potential Effect on Sustainability Policy Making**
Ignore	De-emphasising, negative	***Subsume***	De-emphasising, positive
Blur	De-emphasising, negative	***Adversarial***	Emphasising, positive
Accommodative	Emphasising, negative	-	-

Table 5: Causal Mechanisms of the Office-seeking Motivated Indirect Partisan Effects of Populist Radical Right Parties in the Field of Environmental Policy



Figure 19: Extended Version of Partisan Theory Integrating Office-seeking Motivated Indirect Partisan Effects of Populist Radical Right Parties. Author's Own illustration; The traditional version of the partisan theory is coloured red, while the extensions are in green colour

The extended version of partisan theory adds another level to the investigation of partisan effects. To be sure, the inclusion of the party system dynamics rises the theory's complexity and brings about a reduction of parsimony. However, this is deemed as a necessary trade-off to understand the effect of political parties in general – and for the cases at hand of PRRPs in particular – as comprehensive as

possible. Thus, the party system dimension not only does represent an important scope condition in order to explain potential inconsistencies of traditional partisan effects, but also it sheds light on another dimension of partisan effect, i.e., the partisan effect through office-seeking motivated party competition. It is important to note that these effects of party competition patterns on the party system level encompass both effects on a party's position due to coalition *considerations* before the coalition formation and effects on the *actual coalition formation*. As such they, consistently, run parallel to the coalition governance and, therefore, protrude into the Policy Process Level. Figure 19 shows how these effects integrate into the traditional version of the partisan theory.

5.3 Derived Main Hypotheses

From the in-depth theoretical explanations in the previous two subchapters five main hypotheses can be derived for this dissertation. The first two hypotheses speak to the first research question on positions of PRRPs in the field of environmental policy. Applying the distinction between sustainability policy and traditional environmental policy (see ch. 2), the literature suggests two clear-cut positions:

H1. Populist Radical Right Parties take negative positions on sustainability policy issues like climate change.

H2. Populist Radical Right Parties take positive positions on traditional environmental policy issues like nature conservation.

To answer the second research question on the effects of PRRPs on environmental policies, three further hypotheses can be formulated following the traditional partisan theory and my own extensions based on the literature on coalition formation and party competition. Hypothesis three on the negative effect of PRRP on sustainability policies includes two causal mechanisms and, therefore is subdivided into 3a and 3b. H3a relies on the traditional partisan theory, while H3b reflects one direction of the indirect effects of strong PRRPs given a party competition constellation in which other parties open up for a cooperation with the PRRPs. H4 hypothesises a positive effect of PRRPs on sustainability policy through party competition when such cooperation is dismissed by the other parties. Due to presumably positive positions of PRRPs on traditional environmental policy, the effect of strong PRRPs in this subfield of environmental policy can be expected to be positive irrespective of its causal mechanism.

H3. Strong Populist Radical Right Parties affect sustainability policies negatively if they are considered as viable coalition partners. This effect unfolds:

a. Directly through participation in government

b. Indirectly through adaptations of positions of established parties in order to facilitate future coalitions (Pull Effect).

H4. Strong Populist Radical Right Parties affect sustainability policies positively if they are excluded as viable coalition partners (Push Effect).

H5. Strong Populist Radical Right Parties affect traditional environmental policies positively.

6 Methods

This section provides an overview of the methodological approaches underlying the four research articles of my dissertation. First, the research design of *comparative case studies* will be introduced which has been applied in all four articles. Considering three main dimensions of this research design, its specific utilisation in each of the four empirical articles will be made transparent. After that, the methods of analysis and data collection are presented in a brief and summarising manner. The specifics regarding these methods are addressed in the respective article (ch. 7-10).

6.1 Comparative Case Studies

All research in this dissertation is situated in the political science subdiscipline of *comparative politics*. In contrast to early definitions of this discipline, which were based on its primary objects of research, i.e. the (comparative) study of political systems, nowadays comparative politics is understood to be characterised first and foremost by the specific method of research, i.e., the comparative method (e.g., Sartori 1991, Jahn 2007).

In this method-centred discipline, comparative case studies and single-case studies have long been conceived as an inferior research approach in comparison to experimental research and large-n quantitative studies (Lijphart 1971, Ruffa 2020). This criticism originated, predominantly, in the widespread conception of 'good research' to be capable of producing clear (single) causality statements generalisable to a population of cases as large as possible. Following this nomothetical claim as an absolute benchmark, (comparative) case studies have been expected to emulate the ideals of macro-quantitative studies (Lijphart 1971, 1975, King, Keohane and Verba 1994, Brady and Collier 2010) and to adopt basic logics of covariational (or correlational) thinking. In this light, it is no surprise, that covariational versions of the comparative case studies have become the most frequently used approaches of this research design and sometimes even equated with *the* comparative method (Lijphart 1975, Sartori 1991, Peters 2013, ch. 2). As reflected in the *Most Similar Systems Design* (MSSD) (Lijphart 1975, Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009) or *Co-Variational Analysis* (COV) (Blatter and Haverland 2012, ch. 2), the ultimate goal of comparative case studies is to control for potentially explanatory variables through case selection in small-n contexts in order to detect the specific effect of an *individual* independent variable on the dependent variable. This dominant claim is concisely summarised in the often quoted litany of comparative politics research by Peters (1998): "Maximize experimental variance, minimize error variance and control extraneous variance" (p. 30) (see e.g., Pickel 2016).

In the past two decades, comparative case study methods have been developed and refined considerably and a more pluralist perspective has been established that qualifies the delineated narrow application of the method. An extensive reflection on the various blossoms of (comparative) case-study approaches is beyond the scope of this dissertation. This has been done elsewhere (e.g., George and Bennett 2005, Rohlfing 2012, ch. 3, Jahn 2013, ch. 11-12, Gerring 2017, ch. 3, Ryan 2018). Instead, I discuss the three

main dimensions of case study research characteristics that are relevant to specifying my own case study approach: *casing and case selection*, *explanatory focus and understanding of causality*, and, *type of observation, coverage, and generalisability* (Siewert and Wagemann 2020, p. 151-155). Beforehand, I must refer to a first fundamental distinction that is to be made between case-centred and theory-centred case studies (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 1). *Case-centred case studies* are regularly idiographic, in-depth and often descriptive explanations of a single case. While they might be guided by a theory, they do not aim for the advancement of theory and they hardly generalise their insights to other cases. In contrast, *theory-centred case studies* contribute to the advancement of theories in three different forms: *exploring* (or generating) new hypotheses, *testing* (or evaluating) existent hypotheses, or *refining* existent hypotheses (ibid.)[38]. In the research of my dissertation, I conduct theory-centred case studies with varying focuses on the three purposes.

6.1.1 Casing and Case Selection

The first vital characteristics of theory-led comparative cases studies are diligent *casing*, i.e. case definitions, and *case selection* (Siewert and Wagemann 2020). Both casing and case selection need to be substantiated in interaction with the theory and the specific research questions. Considering this explicit need for context, it is reasonable to refer to the methodology sections of the respective articles for in-depth explanations of the two elements (see ch. 7-10). At this point, I will only introduce general considerations of casing and case selection and provide an overview of the four research articles on these procedures (see Table 6, Table 7, Table 8 and Table 9).

A case is commonly defined as "a bounded empirical phenomenon that is an instance of a population of similar empirical phenomena" (Rohlfing 2012, p. 24). C*asing* details these two attributes in the context of a specific research project: The first attribute can refer to a number of possible boundaries in different dimensions. According to Rohlfing (2012) every case essentially has "a *temporal* and a *substantive* bound" (p. 24, italics in the original). The *temporal bound* is reflected in the period of investigation chosen by the researcher on theoretical considerations. In my dissertation, I set the basic temporal bound on the period between 2000 and 2023 as this is the period in which changes in Western European party systems had been most explicit through the increasing breakthrough of populist radical right parties (see ch. 4). Furthermore, two of the comparative case studies reflect a development over time (ch. 9 & 10), while the other two case studies on party responses to FfF summarise data collected at different points of time into static positions for each party (ch. 7 & 8). The *substantive bound* concerns a content-related definition (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 2.1) which is usually reflected in the dependent variable/outcome of the studies and which entails a clarification of the *unit of analysis*. All research of my dissertation deals with the broad field of environmental policy and its politics. In three of my analyses, I focus on political parties' positions on environmental policy which are represented by two different concepts, i.e., a party's

[38] Gerring (2017, ch. 3.1) makes a tantamount distinction between *descriptive* (→ case-oriented) and *causal* (→ theory-oriented) case studies (similarly Jahn 2013, ch. 11).

response to FfF and a party's design of environmental policy budgets. In addition, environmental policy budgets, represent not only the party's position but also its policy output when the party is in government (see ch. 7-9). The chapter on aviation taxes from the other chapters in regard to the substantive bound. Here, evolutions of a specific policy instrument in the field of aviation policy represent the substantive cases (ch. 10). Beyond these essential bounds, the definition of a case requires at least one other bound (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 2.1). Often, this is a spatial bound (e.g., Gerring 2017, ch. 2.1). For the case studies at hand, this is reflected in the respective political systems chosen. Additional boundaries, such as the presence of a strong FfF movement or the classification of the selected countries as 'environmental pioneers' are elaborated in the respective articles. The second attribute of the definition of a case pertains to the question 'what is the case a case of?'. It is essential to reflect which group of cases can be perceived to be sufficiently similar to the case investigated in terms of the causal relationship identified (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 2.1, Gerring 2017, ch. 2.2). This population is defined by the same definitory dimensions as the case, but its boundaries are much larger on at least one of these dimensions. For instance, while in chapter 8 the party reactions on FfF are investigated in three specific environmental pioneer states in Western Europe, the population are all political parties in all environmental pioneer states in Western Europe.

The definition of the population also marks the scope conditions of possible empirical generalisations and, as such, it is an important point of departure for the *case selection*. As case study researchers are rarely blessed with the opportunity to investigate all cases in a population, there is a need to select purposefully from this population, so that the results derived from the selected cases can inform about the population itself. Consequently, the researcher should at least have a general overview of the potential population for case selection. Which selections are purposeful[39] is further guided by the research goal of a specific investigation (Gerring 2017, ch. 3.2). As introduced above, one may discern exploration, testing and refining as main goals of theory-centred (comparative) case studies. In this dissertation both exploratory (ch. 10) as well as theory-testing case studies (ch. 7-9) have been employed. An exploratory case study is interested in discovering explanations for an outcome and in ruling out other factors that do not account for this outcome. In an exploratory comparative case study, therefore, it is favourable to find cases with a maximal variance in the outcome of interest (Y) and a minimal variance in relevant background conditions (Z) (Gerring 2017, pp. 79-83). This set-up provides us with the opportunity to contrast the (non-)presence of factors in the two cases, and, thus, to rule out certain factors as main explanatory factors (or sufficient conditions) of the outcome (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 3.2). If, for instance, two cases with a left-green government (Z) are contrasted that brought about a

[39] Of course, in practice, usually, other less strategically motivated criteria take influence on case selections in case studies as well, e.g., language proficiencies or previous knowledge on and acquaintance with the case. While this common feature of case selection in case studies is often called – somewhat pejoratively – *convenience case selection* (see e.g., Ruffa 2020), Gerring (2017) refers to it as "logistics" (p. 44) underlining its practical asset for case studies when it complements the purposeful/strategic case selection.

diametrical policy output in terms of nature (non-)protection (Y), the specific composition of government can be excluded as an individual explanatory factor. Although the party government might still unfold explanatory power *in combination with* other factors, this type of case selection lays the groundwork for the purposeful examination of the effects of the investigated factors. This case selection approach is applied in the research on aviation taxes (ch. 10).

The other three studies of my dissertation pursue a theory-testing (also called theory estimating) goal. For this purpose, the two investigations of party reactions to FfF (ch. 7 & 8) are based on a cross-case *Most Similar Systems Design* (MSSD) which relies on the idea of a theoretically guided maximisation of the variance in one explanatory factor (or more, if applicable) (X) and minimisation of the variance in potentially confounding factors (Z) (Gerring 2017, pp. 95-98). As no information on the party reactions, i.e., the outcome (Y), had been available beforehand and we had been interested in the potential effect of varying party competition patterns through the party shares of PRRPs and Green parties (X_1), this case selection method was the optimal choice. Despite our focus on the party competition patterns, the theory applied suggested three other potential explanatory factors ($X_{2\text{-}4}$) for which we could ensure sufficient variance among the cases (see ch. 7 & 8). At the same time, the MSSD provided some control for several background conditions (Z) (e.g., electoral systems). In addition, the selection ensured that all parties operate in environmental pioneer states which raised the probability of our outcome (Y) to be present in all selected cases. The third theory-testing study (ch. 9) is a typical case study on a within-case level that puts a causal relationship between a cause and an outcome, which has been discovered in theory and/or previous research, under scrutiny. Thus, a case (or more cases) is (are) selected in which both the cause (X) and the outcome (Y) are clearly present (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 3.2, Gerring 2017, ch. 5.3). In the specific study of party government policy-making in Sweden, this was given through the existence of an increasingly strong PRRP which, eventually, has become a governmental support party (X), and through a decreasing environmental policy output (Y). Both was indicated beforehand in the literature, so that it been a suitable case to trace down possible the causal mechanism between X and Y here, i.e., a pull effect of PRRPs on centre-right parties (see ch. 9; see 5.2). As the case and its proposed causal mechanism are put under scrutiny in such a case study, the approach can easily merge into a theory-refining case study, or, in Gerring's typology (2017, ch. 3.1), a *Diagnostic Pathway Case Study*.

Article (Chapter)	Casing					Case Selection (Rohlfing (2012) / Gerring (2017))	Relation to the overall Research Question of my Dissertation
	Unit of Analysis	Time	Space	Dependent VAR / Outcome	Population		
Party Reactions to FfF in Germany (Ch. 7)	Political Party	08/2018-12/2019	Germany: national and subnational level	Party Response to FfF (Party's Position on Env. Policy)	All parties in Western European party systems of environmental pioneer states in which FfF has been likely to be a relevant topic.	Theory-Testing Case Study of Typical Cases, including cases facing and not facing a high PRRP-vote share / Estimating Causal Most Similar Systems Design	Parties as main research object. Investigation of party competition patterns as one of the main explanatory factors.
Party Reactions to FfF in Europe (Ch. 8)	Political Party	08/2018-06/2020	Austria, Germany, Sweden	Party Response to FfF (Party's Position on Env. Policy)	All parties in Western European party systems of environmental pioneer states in which FfF has been likely to be a relevant topic.	Theory-Testing Case Study of Typical Cases, including cases facing and not facing a high PRRP-vote share / Estimating Causal Most Similar Systems Design	Parties as main research object. Investigation of party competition patterns as one of the main explanatory factors.
Environmental Policy-making in Sweden (Ch. 9)	Party Government / Political Party	2001-2023 *(processual perspective)*	Sweden	Party's Design of Environmental Budgets (Party's Position on Env. Policy)	All party governments with direct or indirect government participation of a populist radical party in government.	Theory-Testing Within-Case Typical Case Study in which a strong PRRP and a weaker environmental policy output are present / Diagnostic Causal Pathway Study	Party governments as main research object. Investigation of party competition patterns as main explanatory factor including its causal mechanism.
Aviation Policy Instrument Choice (Ch. 10)	Policy Evolutions	2008-2021 *(processual perspective)*	Germany, Netherlands	Policy Evolution of Aviation Taxes	All policy evolutions of aviation taxes in those EU countries in which the introduction of an aviation tax at least has been debated. (Another scope condition applied here is the presence of a major aviation hub in the country.)	Exploratory Case Study of Typical Cases in a Variance-on-Y Design / Exploratory Causal Most Similar Systems Design	Policy Evolutions in a subfield of environmental policy as main research object. Investigation of partisan and party competition effects as explanatory factors and their interplay with other potential explanations.

Table 6: Overview of Casing, Case Selection and Relation to the overall dissertation project of the respective studies. The column 'case selection' is based on two typologies of case selection methods in order to substantiate the scientific pertinence of the chose approach

6.1.2 Explanatory Focus and Understanding of Causality

Regarding the *explanatory focus* – or the *causal perspective* (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 2.3) – the case study literature discerns two main approaches: while an *effect-of-causes* or *X-centred* approach concentrates on the effect of a single factor (X) on an outcome (Y), a *causes-of-effect* or *Y-centred* approach aims to explain an outcome (Y) as comprehensive as possible (Ganghof 2005, 2019, Goertz and Mahoney 2012, ch. 3, Rohlfing 2012, ch. 2.3)[40]. The conventional applications of MSSD or COV described above are straightforward examples of an effect-of-causes approach. The starting point of my research is X-centred in that it focuses on the effects of changing party competition constellations through rising populist radical right parties on environmental policy. However, in chapters 8 and 10 the perspective shifts to a Y-centred approach as several other explanatory factors are taken into account from the start. Thus, this dissertation can be best described as a combination of both approaches that scrutinises the X-centred thinking on the superordinate level by the means of X- or Y-centred analyses of individual cases on the level of each (comparative) case study (for such combined research designs see e.g. Ganghof 2019, ch. 6).

Another characteristic distinguishing (comparative) case studies concerns the *understanding of causality* which includes two central components: First, studies differ in their perspectives on causality in terms of their level of analysis as they are mainly interested either in the *cross-case* investigation of *cause(s)-effect-relationships* as such or they deal with the *within-case* inquiry of *causal mechanisms*, i.e., how the relationship between cause(s) and effect take shape in detail (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 1.4 & pp. 28-30, Siewert and Wagemann 2020). While these different perspectives are often related to the explanatory focus in ways that X-centred approaches focus on cause-effect-relationships and Y-centred studies on causal mechanisms. While this holds true for X-centred approaches, the general distinction is somewhat a misleading. To be sure, Y-centred studies are generally characterised by more in-depth and often also time-related explanations. Therefore, they are particularly suitable for the exploration of causal mechanisms, as most often achieved by the method of *Causal Process Tracing* (Blatter and Haverland 2012, ch. 3, Rohlfing 2012, ch. 6). However, at the same time, they might be designed to discover the causes of an effect as comprehensive as possible without explicitly considering causal mechanisms (Ganghof 2019, ch. 5). Second, the understanding of causality refers to the *type of effect* a cause has on an outcome (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 1.5). Here, the two fundamentally different perspectives of correlational (or covariational) thinking and set-theoretical thinking stand opposite each other. According to Rohlfing (2012) "[t]his dimension constitutes a cleavage within the social sciences […] [which] cuts across the more established differentiation between large-n and small-n research" (p. 15) as it is not about the

[40] A third comparative case study approach that is additionally discussed in the literature is the *congruence analysis* (Blatter and Haverland 2012, ch. 4) or *contrastive research design* ("kontrastives Forschungsdesign") (Ganghof 2019, ch. 4, author's own translation) which contrasts (often two) competing or complementary theories.

number of cases nor a cross-case or within-case focus but precisely about the ontological conception of causality.

This conception is ontological considering that the perspectives differ in their very basic conceptualisation of the world. In the wide-spread correlational view, causal relationships are investigated between variables which are treated as properties of empirical cases (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 2.4). For instance, if we were interested in the causal relationship between the strength of PRRPs and the complexity of coalition formation in various party system systems, following a correlational approach, one would estimate the association, for instance, by looking at the correlation of the PRRP vote share and the number of feasible coalition options characterising party systems. In a set-theoretical perspective, causal relationships are considered between sets and cases are assigned to sets only after defining them in relation to theory and case knowledge (ibid.). In the mentioned example, a researcher would develop a clear idea of the sets 'Strong PRRP' (e.g., at what vote share can one speak of a 'strong' PRRP), and 'Complex Coalition Formation Situation' (e.g., at what number of parties is the situation 'complex') before s/he assigns cases to these sets. Thus, set theory always implies clear differences *in kind* and not only *in degree*. While this strategy might also be applied in correlational case studies, it is a prerequisite for set-theoretical thinking (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 2.4). More importantly, "set-relational causation is based on *invariant* cause-effect relationships" (Rohlfing 2012, p. 51, italics in the original) meaning that set-theoretical researchers are interested only in the cases assigned to sets relevant for the specific claim of causality, e.g., only in party systems with a high vote share of PRRP. In contrast, correlational studies would also include party systems with a low PRRP vote share. Ultimately, the causal relationships between sets are "interpreted in terms of sufficiency and necessity, as well as forms of causes that can be derived from them" (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 3)[41]. In addition to the described basic ontological claim, the literature commonly refers to three further fundamental aspects of causality that distinguishes the set-theoretical perspective from the correlational: *asymmetric causality*, *conjunctural causality*, and *equifinality* (Siewert and Wagemann 2020).

First, in the correlational view, causal relationships are usually symmetric. A positive correlation implies that an increase (decrease) in the independent variable aligns with an increase (decrease) in the dependent variable. A negative correlation suggests that a decreasing independent variable coincides with an increasing dependent variable and, *vice versa* (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 2.4, Goertz and Mahoney 2012, ch. 5). Contrary to that, *asymmetric causality* suggests that the explanations of a positive outcome do not automatically tell us anything about the explanations of the negative outcome or, as Goertz and Mahoney (2012) put it, "[t]he causes of a failure outcome are not necessarily equivalent to the absence or negation of the causes of the success outcome" (p. 68). Coming back to the example above, a set-theoretical approach would not consider any possible effects of a low PRRP vote-share or make any

[41] These set-theoretical forms of causes are explained in detail further below (see ch. 8).

statements on the potential factors for a high number of coalition options – at least not within the same analysis.

Second, set-theory puts to the fore the investigation of configurations of causal factors which in combination explain an outcome. This is based on the conviction that, at least in social sciences, we almost always face a complex reality in which outcomes are explained by combinations of factors, i.e., *conjunctural causality*. It is a common illustration that set-theoretical researchers are interested in finding causal packages or recipes of factors in order to explain an outcome (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, ch. 4). Correlational studies, share the perception of a complex reality, but, in their majority, they aim to investigate the significance of an individual independent variable for a specific outcome (ibid.). To be sure, statistical models, too, consider multiple variables, however, their main emphasis is to chase down the individual effect for each of these variables, while they summarise their effect, usually, in an additive, not configurational, manner (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 2.4). Although the application of interaction terms reflects causal configurations to a certain extent, these do not equal the set-theoretical understanding of conjunctural causality as they are related back to average effects across cases and do not take into account case-sensitive causal combinations (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, ch. 4).

This need for a case-sensitive perspective on causal configurations is clearly connected to the third crucial aspect of causality, i.e., *equifinality*. Straightforwardly, equifinality means that there are several possible causal combinations and pathways to one outcome. In correlation thinking, if multiple factors are included, they form one singular explanation for all cases in a causal model. From a set-theoretical perspective, it is crucial to look at specific combinations and interactions of these factors, of which each might present a particular explanatory path on its own (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, ch. 4, Siewert and Wagemann 2020).

In this dissertation, the empirical chapters mainly apply the set-theoretical perspective but also are open to correlational causes if deemed appropriate. The set-theoretical perspective is clearly reflected in the application of the QCA (ch. 8) and the explorative analysis of causal mechanisms (ch. 9). The analysis on party reactions to FfF (ch. 7) is consistently conducted in the correlational version of a MSSD. The research on aviation taxes (ch. 10), reflects a special feature of exploratory case studies in this regard as these kind of case studies do not know *ex ante* whether the causal effect to be discovered are correlational or set-relational (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 3.1).

6.1.3 Type of Observation, Coverage, and Generalisability

Coming to the final main dimension used to characterise the research design of a comparative case study, Siewert and Wagemann (2020), first, refer to the *type of observations*. In this regard, literature conventionally discerns *data-set observations* (Brady 2010), which are concise and numerical, and *causal process observations*, which are usually presented in encompassing narratives and combine evidence from various sources. Building on that, Gerring (2017, ch. 8) discerns *matrix* and *non-matrix* type of data which is analysed in either a *formal* or *informal* way. The former directly connects to the

type of observations, whereas the latter explicates whether the data is presented with a clear framework of causal inference. In two of my analyses (ch. 7 & 10), the data is presented in a non-matrix format of narratives and presented rather *informally* without explicating the understanding of causality – although it exists implicitly (see above). The study on the causal mechanism between PRRPs and environmental policy output (ch. 9) is primarily based on matrix-data from an original data set on budget proposals by Swedish parties. Despite being presented in narratives, this data is analysed in a formal way based on set-theoretical thinking. Finally, the formally designed QCA on party reaction to FfF is clearly based on matrix-data and presented formally (ch. 8).

In the context of case studies, *coverage* pertains to the number of *selected* cases – not the whole population – that are investigated in the case studies (Siewert and Wagemann 2020). Usually, case study researchers are eager to achieve a full coverage here, and, indeed, this has been done throughout the research pieces of my dissertation. In the second study on party reactions to FfF (ch. 8), even though we faced a few deviant cases left unexplained by the QCA, these could receive initial explanations by the means of case-knowledge based narratives.

The last essential characteristic to be discussed in this introductory overview of the comparative case study research design is the matter of *generalisability*. Generalisations are always a difficult point in case studies and can be seen as "the hardest challenge for case study research" (Gerring 2017, p. 239). This is mainly due to the fact that the comparative case study method "lacks tools, such as significance testing, for determining the likelihood that the generated results are due to chance or to systematic cause–effect relationships" (Rohlfing 2012, p. 200). Furthermore, it is genuinely difficult because theory-oriented case study researchers are wanderers between worlds: on the one hand, they are interested in generalising their insights to a larger population – nomothetical claim –, while, on the other hand, they want to provide internally valid and encompassing explanations of their selected cases – idiographic claim (Gerring 2017, ch. 10.2, Ruffa 2020, Jahn 2007). Acknowledging these difficulties, however, case study researchers are able to generalise their findings beyond the cases investigated as long as they utilised a clear casing and case selection. As shown above these define a population, to which the case belongs, and, explicate the relation of the case(s) to the population. In the case selections conducted in this dissertation, the investigated cases are theoretically or empirically derived *typical cases,* meaning that they are "similar to a specific group of similar cases in the population" (Rohlfing 2012, 201) which is defined by the set scope conditions. "The relevant criterion is *causal homogeneity*, which signifies that a cause–effect relationship is, on average, expected to hold true for the cases within the population" (Rohlfing 2012, p. 24).

A more challenging task represents the generalisation beyond this specific population. For this purpose, Gerring (2017) suggests to adopt a transparent distinction between a "manifest scope", which includes the population of the case study, and a "potential scope" of an inference, which goes beyond this specific group in a more speculative manner (p. 235). In order to put these speculations on a plausible fundament, it is recommended to include cases that result from the relaxation of one of the scope conditions. For

instance, the results from the two-case study on aviation taxes (ch. 10) could be informative to other cases in which an aviation tax has been discussed or even introduced but which lack a major aviation hub in their respective national territory. To *assess* these hypothetical generalisations, case studies depend on future research. If this is done by follow-up case studies, Rohlfing (2012, ch. 9) calls this a *layered generalisation*, however, clearly, other types of investigations, e.g., statistical inquiries are equally possible depending on the data available (Gerring 2017, ch. 10.4). This approach resonates with Yin (2014, ch. 2) who is overall critical about any empirical generalisability of case study insights and holds the view that case studies, instead, are to achieve a conceptual generalisability by producing statements that can be investigated in new case studies.

Article (Chapter)	Explanatory Focus	Understanding of Causality		Type of Observations	Coverage	Generalisability
		Level of Analysis	Type of Causality			
Party Reactions to FfF in Germany (Ch. 7)	Effect-of-causes / X-centred	Cross-Case	Correlational (*implicitly*)	Non-matrix data / narratives	Full Coverage	*Given for the case study population*
Party Reactions to FfF in Europe (Ch. 8)	Causes-of-effect / Y-centred	Cross-Case	Set-Theoretical	Matrix data / QCA	Full Coverage	*Given for the case study population*
Environmental Policy-making in Sweden (Ch. 9)	Causal Mechanism between X and Y	Within-Case	Set-Theoretical	Matrix data / narratives	Full Coverage	*Given for the case study population*
Aviation Policy Instrument Choice (Ch. 10)	Causes-of-effect / Y-centred	Cross-Case + Within-Cases	Open (*at the end, implicitly set-theoretical*)	Non-matrix data / narratives	Full Coverage	*Given for the case study population*

Table 7: Overview of the explanatory focus, the understanding of causality, the type of observations, coverage and generalisabilityof the studies included in the dissertation.

6.2 Methods of Analysis

As we can see from the explanations above, the method of (comparative) case studies has undergone a considerable development and differentiation process over the last two decades. Particularly, assiduous efforts have been made to refine case selection approaches in order to deal stringently with the matter of generalisability. Yet, research has engaged less in the matter of analyses so that "relatively little is known about what to do when one has actually selected his/her case(s)" (Ruffa 2020, p. 1142). In this vein, it important to understand that a diligent case selection as such, already serves as an essential part of the final analysis since it involves, for instance, the elimination of certain factors as individual independent variables or sufficient conditions. In fact, in case studies almost always the selection and analysis of a case (or more cases) are intertwined and "[c]ase study methods entail much more of a circular back-and-forth between case selection and case analysis than is usually recognized" (Ruffa 2020, p. 1143, Gerring 2017, ch. 7). Nevertheless, three major techniques of case study analysis can be discerned (Ruffa 2020). Among these, the one that has been most standardised is the *causal process tracing* for which a set of tests has been developed as means to understand and estimate the explanatory power of causal effects and especially causal mechanisms (e.g., Beach and Pedersen 2013, Rohlfing 2012, ch. 6). In my research, there are some parts of analysis taking cue from process tracing, yet, not harnessing the full potential of the elaborated method (ch. 9 & 10). I follow (Ruffa 2020) who calls for the possibility of a pragmatic application of tracing processes in order to understand the cases at hand and the causal mechanisms at play. Thus, I see the applied forms of process tracing integrated in the second method of case study analysis, i.e., *structured focus comparison*. "Such comparison is structured because the same questions are asked across the cases, and it is focused because only the questions relevant to understanding the plausibility of the theory are asked, therefore focusing only on certain aspects" (Ruffa 2020, p. 1144). The research on aviation taxes applied this type of comparison guided by the heuristic of *Political Process-Inherent Dynamics Approach* (PIDA) (Böcher and Töller 2007) and integrated a process tracing perspective investigating the focused aspects in policy evolution processes that had been developing over several years (ch. 10). In contrast, the first structured focus comparison juxtaposes political parties' reaction to FfF in a theory-led manner without considering any temporal development (ch. 7). The third method listed by Ruffa (2020) is called the *method of congruence*[42] which represents rather a matter of fact in theory-centred case studies (or sound empirical research in general) as it simply describes the stringent matching of theoretical assumptions and empirical insights. As such, it is part of all analysis techniques applied in in this dissertation and not further considered explicitly due to its inherent redundancy.

Finally, in the international comparison of party reactions to FfF, the analysis is conducted by means of a *Qualitative Comparative Analysis* (QCA) (ch. 8). Surprisingly, in light of its increasing popularity and suitability for the analysis of comparative case studies, this method was not included in the list by Ruffa (2020). A central reason for this might be that a QCA cannot be effectively applied to the investigation of a very small number of cases, which is often seen to be typical for case studies. Instead, it unfolds it considerable analytical potential in medium-N research designs. Due to its distinct case-sensitivity and foundational perception of configurational causality, it, too, can be understood as a typical cross-case case study method of analysis (Siewert and Wagemann 2020, Rihoux 2003). As a research approach the QCA is deeply rooted in set-theoretical thinking and the related understanding of causality

[42] It should not be confused with the elaborated *Congruence Analysis* presented in the previous footnote.

reflecting comprehensively, asymmetric and configurational causality as well as equifinality (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp. 8-13). The application of QCA as an analysis technique is explained in-depth in the specific method section in chapter 8.

An overview of the methods of analysis applied in the research of this dissertation is provided in the following table (Table 8).

Paper (Chapter)	Method of Analysis
Party Reactions to FfF in Germany (Ch. 7)	Structured focused comparison
Party Reactions to FfF in Europe (Ch. 8)	Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
Environmental Policy-making in Sweden (Ch. 9)	(Causal) Process Tracing
Aviation Policy Instrument Choice (Ch. 10)	Structured focused comparison (incl. process tracing)

Table 8: Overview of the methods of analysisapplied in the studies included in this dissertation.

6.3 Methods of Data Collection

For case study methods, three main techniques of data collection are usually discerned: interviews, observation, and document analysis (McNabb 2015, ch. 17). The specific data collection method applied may vary between different variables considered in the specific study and, in fact, operationalisations of some factors were based on secondary data or scientific literature analysis. These are detailed out in the respective chapters. Here, I focus on the *original* data collected in the research of my dissertation. Throughout all four analyses this data collection centrally relies on the analysis of documents which have been coded manually by the means of content analysis. The analyses encompass a variety of document types, including parliamentary documents, election programmes, coalition agreements, media reports, and budget proposals. A peculiarity of the documents analysis of the budget proposals in chapter 9 is that the originally retrieved data is of quantitative nature presented in the form of figures, whereas the other data exists in a qualitative text format. After retrieving the relevant data, a crucial step of case studies is to organise, code and categorise this data by the means of relevant theoretical concepts (McNabb 2015, ch. 17). This step can be seen as the first part of the analysis but also as the last part of the data collection. In the two studies on party reactions to FfF (ch. 7 & 8), data on the outcome is prepared for further analysis through a coding procedure, ultimately resulting in a quantitative index of (non-)support of the movement. The budget figures in chapter 9 are organised by inductively derived subsectors of environmental policy and they provide information on both the positions of each party (factor) but also combined positions of party coalitions (outcome). The quantitative nature of data did not change through this procedure which is preparatory for the final analysis. In the study on aviation taxes in Germany and the Netherlands (ch. 10) the qualitative data derived from the documents is transferred into two thick narratives on the policy evolutions structured by the PIDA-heuristic. In contrast to the other three studies, here, the organisation of data is already an inherent part of the presented cross-case analysis as it is integrated in the contrastive case depictions. In practice, however, the organisation of data has been conducted case by case before being put into the context of the other case. The data collection and preparation procedures are detailed out in the methodology sections of the respective chapters. The following table provides an overview of the general data collection methods applied (Table 9).

Article (Chapter)	Data collection method	Data Sources	Data Sources Research Bases	Data type (before preparation)	Data type (after preparation)	Data availability
Party Reactions to FfF in Germany (Ch. 7)	Document Analysis	Twitter posts, Press releases and parliamentary documents (parliamentary minutes, enquiries, motions)	Parliamentary data bases + Party websites + Official social media accounts of parties and party leaders	Qualitative	Quantitative	Available for all cases
Party Reactions to FfF in Europe (Ch. 8)	Document Analysis	Press releases, Twitter and Facebook posts and, parliamentary documents (parliamentary minutes, enquiries, motions)	Parliamentary data bases + Party websites + Official social media accounts of parties and party leaders	Qualitative	Quantitative	Available for all cases
Environmental Policy-making in Sweden (Ch. 9)	Document Analysis	Budget Proposals	National parliamentary data base	Quantitative	Quantitative	Available for all cases
Aviation Policy Instrument Choice (Ch. 10)	Document Analysis	Parliamentary documents (parliamentary minutes and legislative texts and proposals), election programmes, coalition agreements, media reports	National parliamentary data bases + Dow Jones Factiva and Nexis Uni	Qualitative	Qualitative	Available for all cases

Table 9: Overview of the methods of data collectionapplied in the studies included in this dissertation

7 *Article 1:* Friend or Foe?—Comparing Party Reactions to Fridays for Future in A party System Polarised between Afd and Green Party (with Jan Pollex)

Berker, Lars E., and Jan Pollex. 2021. "Friend or Foe?—Comparing Party Reactions to Fridays for Future in A party System Polarised between Afd and Green Party." Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 15 (2): 165-83. doi: 10.1007/s12286-021-00476-7.

7.1 Introduction

Since 2018, *Fridays for Future* (FfF) has risen as a new environmental movement pushing politicians to take action against climate change. So far, research has mainly looked from a sociological perspective at this movement and provided insights into the socio-structural composition of the protesters and into their personal motives for participation (Wahlström et al. 2019, De Moor et al. 2020)[43]. Its reception in the political sphere, in particular by political parties as its main actors, however, has hardly been subject of systematic examination yet although research showed this relationship to be essential for understanding the effects of social movements (Rucht 1996, Keman 2006, Tarrow 2011). While Sommer et al. (2019) only gave a short and cursory overview on political reactions to FfF, Raisch and Zohlnhöfer (2020) presented first results for German federal parties based on the analysis of Twitter accounts. This paper intends to expand on this research by capturing party reactions comprehensively based on a variety of sources, including both social media and parliamentary debates, and exploring possible explanations for variation in party reactions in a comparative manner. We perceive Germany as a suitable site of investigation for two reasons: it represents one of the most important areas for FfF in Europe regarding their absolute numbers (Wahlström et al. 2019, De Moor et al. 2020); and its federal structure offers a promising opportunity to harness the virtues of comparison. We proceed in two steps. First, we take stock of how different par- ties meet the FfF-movement and classify their reactions on two dimensions which indicate the basic position of the party towards the movement and the attention a party concedes to it: *degree of approval* and *frequency of reference*. Importantly, we conceive FfF not as a contender of parties in the intermediary system but as an object of party competition[44]. Second, in order to provide a comprehensive view on party reactions to the new movement, we shift attention to possible explanations for the variance of reactions. For this purpose, we draw upon existing research (e.g., Hutter and Vliegenthart 2018) identifying factors responsible for how parties react to social movements. In particular, we focus on the ideological affiliation of parties and aspects of party competition. For the

[43] For Germany see, e.g. Rucht (2019a, 2019b); Sommer et al. (2019).
[44] While this neglects the active role FfF plays in a dynamic political discussion it helps us to investigate party stances towards the movement.

latter, we attribute a special role to the German *Green Party* and the populist radical right party (PRRP)[45] *Alternative für Deutschland* (*Alternative for Germany*, AfD) and aim to explore their impact on party reactions overall. While an effect of green parties in the field of environmental policy is already an established subject of political science research, the latter only recently receives some more attention. Thus, understanding both parties as central factors in our analysis, in the wake of rising PRRP influence, we intend, in particular, to move the AfD to the limelight and examine its possible impact.
In sum, this paper addresses two key research questions:

1. *How do individual political parties in Germany react to the Fridays for Future movement regarding the degree of approval as well as the frequency of reference?*
2. *Which factors may account for the variance in reactions of the parties particularly focussing on party competition?*

To respond to these questions we, first, outline theoretical considerations on party behaviour and social movements and extract potential causal factors for different party reactions. Next, we introduce our research design and methods and, on this basis, give an account of our descriptive and comparative analyses. The final section discusses our key findings and contributions.

7.2 Theoretical considerations

Research has been interested in environmental movements since the beginning of environmental politics in the 1970s and analysed both their emergence and impact. For instance, Müller-Rommel (1993) showed an influence on the development of Green parties and more recently, Jahn (2017) confirmed an effect on governmental positions and even environmental outcomes. Importantly, Rucht (1996) points to the necessity to investigate the responsiveness of political parties to (environmental) movements in order to understand their impact in the political sphere (also Piccio 2019).

To address this latter point, we first have to clarify the relation of political parties and social movements in general. According to the literature, social movements might either merge with or into a political party and thus transfer their demands to the parliamentary sphere, or deliberately stay outside the parliamentary policy-making process and seek to take effect first and foremost through agenda-setting (Hutter, Kriesi and Lorenzini 2019b). The latter is the very strategy that FfF has declared to pursue, so far (see FfF 2020, Haunss et al. 2019, Neuber and Gharrity Gardner 2020). This non-partisan attitude, however, does not mean that FfF operates without any link to political parties. In fact, parties represent their main target group since—in accordance with partisan theory—these are ultimately responsible to translate its demands into political action (Keman 2006). Hence, like movements in general, FfF seeks support among political parties to render their agenda-setting efforts effective not only within civil society but also inside parliament (Dryzek et al. 2003, Hutter, Kriesi and Lorenzini 2019b). Conversely,

[45] Based on Mudde's (2017) established conceptualisation we, henceforth, refer to respective parties as populist radical right parties (PRRP). Though disagreeing on the specific term, in the face of last years' programmatic shifts, today, political scientists agree on classifying the AfD as PRRP (e.g., Arzheimer and Berning 2019).

assuming parties to behave rationally, different reactions to FfF might emerge due to varying strategic considerations by parties in terms of vote- and office-seeking (Downs 1957, Strøm 1990, Poguntke 2006).

Party reactions to protests or movements, in general, have rarely been a specific subject to research (e.g., Tarrow 2011, as exception Piccio 2019). Only recently, Hutter and Vliegenthart (2018) investigated the responsivity of individual political parties to *issues* brought forward by street protests in four Western European countries[46]. Although we focus on reactions to the *movement* itself, FfF is strongly intertwined with its demands, so that we may utilise the set of factors suggested by Hutter and Vliegenthart (2018) to approach our second research question and ex- plain the variety of party responses. Thus, we first focus on *ideological affiliation* on the traditional left-right-scale and expect left parties to take rather positive positions towards FfF while right parties tend to be more opposing. Generally speaking, this is also in accordance with the literature on party positions on environmental policy although the exact positioning of (in particular centre-left and centre-right) parties remains a question at issue (Carter 2013, Töller 2017). In contrast, the extreme poles, usually, are more clear-cut. Turning to the German case, they are represented by the Green Party (positive) and the populist radical right AfD (negative) (Neuber and Gharrity Gardner 2020). The Green Party integrates two further aspects considered by Hutter and Vliegenthart (2018), as it can be seen to be most *radical* on climate matters and in any case, to hold the *issue ownership* on this policy (Spoon, Hobolt and De Vries 2014). Although issue ownership is attributed to a party through the electorate, literature confirms that parties themselves take actively part in maintaining and pushing this reputation (e.g., Budge 2015). Furthermore, the Greens originated in the environmental movement and traditionally are affiliated with other actors advocating for environmental policy (Dryzek et al. 2003, Bukow 2016), so that, all in all, they can be expected to support FfF most positively and vigorously.

However, literature states quite unanimously that individual parties might deviate from the reactions typical to their ideological affiliation depending on whether they are part of the government coalition or part of the opposition (Vliegenthart, Walgrave and Meppelink 2011, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, van der Brug and Berkhout 2015). Even though the direction of effect is less unambiguous, we take possible effects of *government-opposition status* into account and in accordance with Hutter and Vliegenthart (2018) conjecture opposition parties to react more frequently on FfF since they offer an opportunity to criticise the government (also Gilljam, Persson and Karlsson 2012). When it comes to the 'contagion effect' of parties we diverge from Hutter's and Vliegenthart's idea that parties show reaction to the movement after it was picked up by "some parties" (2018). For pragmatic reasons we neglect this dimension of time but refine the focus on party competition by using the concepts of *electoral threat* and *opportunity*, put forward by Spoon, Hobolt and De Vries (2014). While the authors provide a number of factors, for our comparison we concentrate on the potential electoral threat of the contender

[46] They focus ideological affinity, radicalism, issue ownership, opposition status and contagion effect (Hutter and Vliegenthart 2018).

parties and its ideological proximity to the respective responding parties. Thus, we seek to provide an explanation for variance while at the same time keeping the analysis manageable. Since we are looking at reactions to an environmental movement the Green Party seems to be the obvious candidate for the role of the main contender. However, as described above, in the wake of recent political trends PRRP, such as the AfD, appear to have become increasingly influential regarding the issue competition in Western European party systems (e.g., Meguid 2005, Bale et al. 2010, Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020)[47]. In terms of environmental policy, they clearly have marked a change of party competition as they broke the political consensus on this former *valence issue* and (in their majority) take a firmly negative stance (Gemenis, Katsanidou and Vasilopoulou 2012, Schaller and Carius 2019, Lockwood 2018). Consequently, from a theoretical perspective we would assume both the Green Party and the AfD to pressure mainstream parties (meaning above all CDU/CSU and SPD) in the field of environmental policy. To sum up, we derive the following assumptions as heuristic landmarks guiding our investigation (Table 10).

Factor		**Assumed effect on individual parties' reaction on FfF in degree and frequency of approval**
Ideological affiliation		We assume centre-left and left parties to react more positively and more frequently to FfF than centre-right and right parties.
Issue ownership		We assume the Greens to react most positively and most frequently to FfF.
Government-opposition status		We expect opposition parties to react more frequently to FfF while the reaction depends on ideological affinity.
Party Competition	**strong Green Party**	We assume mainstream parties (SPD, CDU/CSU) to react more positively and more frequently when challenged by strong Greens.
	strong AfD	We assume mainstream parties (SPD, CDU/CSU) to react more negatively and less frequently when challenged by a strong AfD.

Table 10: Assumptions

7.3 Research design and methods

Our research is guided by two questions. To answer the first one, we start with parties on the federal level and analyse their reactions to FfF. We deem this step important for three reasons: first, since FfF has addressed all levels of politics, neglecting the highest administrative level would seem to miss the mark of comprehensively investigating party reactions to FfF in Germany. Second, we are thus able to cross-validate our findings from the *Länder*-level on an enriched data basis. In addition, we use the positioning of federal parties as a yardstick to evaluate varying responses to FfF on the subnational level. Overall, research points to the dynamics between levels which we reflect in our two-step approach (Bräuninger et al. 2020).

[47] Although other scholars stress that any further impact of populist radical right parties still needs to be empirically proven (e.g., Mudde 2013).

For our second research question, we turn to the *Länder*-level as this enables us to leave a simple single-case study behind and *explore* potential causes of variance between German political parties[48] more precisely in a structured comparative analysis (Beinborn et al. 2018). Thereby comparing parties from German *Länder* ensures extensive similarities that let us hold several potentially influencing factors quite constant (Sack and Töller 2018) — of which literature on party competition deems the electoral system and political salience of FfF most important (Spoon, Hobolt and De Vries 2014). Thus, following a classic *most similar systems design* (e.g., Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009), we are equally interested in maximising the variance on our four factors derived in the previous section (e.g., Peters 2013): party ideology, issue ownership, government-opposition status and especially, the specific constellation of party competition.

Since variance of party ideology is almost guaranteed in German multi-party systems and environmental issue ownership is almost exclusively aligned with the Green Party, we focus on increasing the variance of the other two factors choosing parties from *Länder* which differ distinctively in terms of their governmental compositions and their party competition constellations (Bräuninger et al. 2020)[49]. As delineated above, for the latter we expect the Green Party and the AfD to be most decisive and therefore look at their respective strength. Hence, our case selection comprises an intermediate *n* with 37 parties in six German *Länder*[50] selected on two criteria (Table 11).

State (*governmental parties*)	**AfD share**	**Green Party share**
Baden-Württemberg – BW (*Green Party, CDU*)	15,1%	30,3%
Bayern – BY (*CSU, FW)*	10,2%	17,6%
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern – MV (*SPD, CDU)*	20,8%	4,8%
Sachsen – SN (*CDU, SPD)*	9,7%	5,7%
Sachsen-Anhalt – ST (*CDU, SPD, Green Party*)	24,3%	5,2%
Schleswig-Holstein – SH (*CDU, Green Party, FDP*)	5,9%	12,9%

Table 11: Case selection criteria

With the six complementary cases on the federal level, these parties stand for the population of the relevant parties in the German federal system.

To analyse these parties' reactions to FfF we discover two dimensions: the *degree of approval* as well as the *frequency of reference*. Captivating the degree of approval, we adapt existing research that focuses general party reactions to (new) contenders (Meguid 2005), e.g. accommodation, dismissal, aversion, and strategies of dealing with contenders (Bale et al. 2010). Following the literature, we differentiate between five forms of reaction which allow us to identify qualitative differences within general rejection

[48] CDU, CSU: Christian democratic; FDP: liberal; FW: conservative; Green Party: green-left; SPD: social democratic; Left Party: socialist-Left; AfD: populist radical right (for details see Decker and Neu 2018).

[49] Note that despite being a system feature, competition constellations deploy an immediate effect on individual parties by shaping their strategic behaviour in terms of office- and vote-seeking.

[50] The selection of three governments with participation of the Green Party is not biased in Germany, since the it participates in 10 of 16 regional governments.

or approval: strong and weak rejection, caution, strong and weak affirmation (Table 12). In a first inductive step, we applied the categories to the material (*see* below) and developed a coding scheme which we re-assessed and re- fined before coding all data[51]. Overall, the coding scheme proved applicable and left only a small amount of ambiguous coding segments[52] which were crosschecked in the research team for intercoder-reliability. Differentiating between weak and strong responses enables us to indicate qualitative differences, e.g. between a critical and defamatory stance. To assess overall party positions, we estimated average position based on all coded data.

Position towards FfF	**Coding scheme[53]**
Strong rejection (-2)	Clear critique of the movement, e.g. reproach of hysteria or denial of climate change and FfF demands Example: *description of FfF as "left wing extremist" or "indoctrinated mad youth"* (AfD, ST, Twitter)
Weak rejection (-1)	Restrained critique towards FfF, e.g. questioning the demands of the movement or pointing to compulsory schooling Example: *"We need Mondays for economy […] instead of Fridays for future."* (FDP Federal, Twitter)
Caution (0)	Acknowledging FfF without positioning, e.g. references to meetings with movement representatives
Weak affirmation (1)	Positive reference to the movement, e.g. appreciating its existence Example: *„[…] I acknowledge respectfully, that they[, the young,] protest on streets and express concern about their future."* (CDU, MV, Parliamentary speech).
Strong affirmation (2)	Positive reference and support of the movement, e.g. calls for participation in FfF demonstration Example: "Thank you Fridays for Future […] We will fight for a better climate policy." (Greens, Federal, Twitter)

Table 12: Party reactions and related coding scheme

Measuring the frequency of reference is based on the notion of topic salience (Wagner and Meyer 2014). While we do not compare references to FfF with references to other topics, we follow previous research stressing the advantages of an integrative conception of salience-related and ideological features of party reaction (Meguid 2005, Guinaudeau and Persico 2014). Hence, we understand a more frequent dealing with the topic to signal parties' interest and importance assigned to the issue.

Since the FfF movement is a rather recent phenomenon we rely on a variety of data sources to raise the number of observations to a sufficient level and get a picture as complete as possible. Therefore, we

[51] Coding done with *MAXQDA*.
[52] As segments we conceived whole statements (i.e. a tweet or a parliamentary speech) and coded them accordingly.
[53] Examples are translated from German and show representative parts of the whole segments.

assess party positions based on press releases, Twitter posts and documents of the parliamentary process on both administrative levels. While research on party preferences usually relies on manifestos (Eder, Jenny and Müller 2017) we cannot use this data since there was no general election after 2017 in Germany and state elections in just a few *Länder*. Research shows parties' press releases to represent their position and signal their issue priorities (Harris, Fury and Lock 2005). Furthermore, Twitter has become a major outlet for party communication (Jungherr 2016, Conway, Kenski and Wang 2015) and parliamentary documents, such as parliamentary protocols, are commonly used to assess party positions on certain issues (e.g., Maatsch 2014). Thus, we collected press releases of parties, Twitter posts and analysed parliamentary debate protocols, enquiries and motions. To be included, the respective sources had to refer explicitly to FfF or Greta Thunberg. While for parliamentary sources we coded statements irrespective of the politician's status in the party, for the other we focused on party leaders and party's central offices. Additionally, we considered media coverage (researched via LexisNexis) to enrich the data base. Overall, 612 observations[54] are included in our analysis covering a time period between 08/2018 (when Greta Thunberg first demonstrated in Stockholm) and 12/2019.

7.4 Party reactions to Fridays for Future

In our first descriptive step, we focus on parties on the federal level to analyse their reactions to FfF and provide a comprehensive picture of German parties' general responses. Following our research design, we differentiate between strong and weak rejection, caution, weak and strong affirmation. Overall, parties on average refer to the movement 40 times, with the AfD and Greens marking the most active parties (Figure 20).

[54] Observations were derived from overall 542 sources: 97 parliamentary protocols, 97 parliamentary inquiries and motions, 93 press releases, 10 media coverages, 245 Twitter posts.



Figure 20: Reactions to FfF by federal parties regarding positions and frequency

Here, the analysis of party positions towards the FfF movement shows three results. First, there is clear difference in party reactions to FfF along a left-right divide with centre-left parties being more supportive than conservative and liberal ones and the AfD taking a dismissive stance towards FfF. Second, conservative and liberal parties in Germany are more cautious with regard to their reaction and less explicit in their position. Third, our analysis shows a distinct polarisation between the centre-left parties and the AfD. The Green Party vigorously refers to the movement and positions itself as its principal supporter. The AfD is not only the most hostile party, it also most frequently refers to FfF. This reaction can clearly be characterised as a strong rejection of the movement and its claims. In several instances party representatives dismiss and defame the movement, question its goals and overall dispute climate change. Thus, not only the clear rejection of FfF but also the explicit reaction to the movement differentiates the party from conservative parties in Germany.

Moving to the subnational level (Figure 21), values of approval cover the whole scale from –2 to 2, while the frequency of references to FfF ranges from zero, e.g. FDP in SN[55], to a maximum of 28 references, e.g. Greens in BY, and discloses an average of about nine references.

[55] For state abbreviations see Table 11.



Figure 21: Reactions to FfF by Länder parties regarding positions and frequency

Overall, the analysis of the sub-national level confirms a pattern detected at the national level. Parties of the left have addressed FfF across the board positively with no party showing a value below two. Hence, they support the movement without exception. However, looking at frequency, there is variance observable with parties mentioning the movement between 2 and 28 times. Two aspects are worth mentioning: for the Left Party, we see a quite clear divide between less active Western and more vigorous Eastern associations of which the latter even outperform the corresponding Green Parties. For the Green Party, it appears to be the contrary as the regional associations of BW and BY are dominant in claiming affiliation with FfF while in the Eastern *Länder* their ambitions are expressed less clearly or even must be seen to be limited as in SN. In SH, on the other hand, the co-ruling Green Party and the oppositional SPD show a similarly welcoming behaviour.

In the conservative camp, all regional associations of the centre-right parties CDU, CSU, FDP and FW reluctantly address the movement and show a below-average number of references. This cautiousness is also reflected in their degree of approval as the centre-right parties notably concentrate in the middle with only two deviations to more positive positions (+1, CDU, FDP in SH) and one deviant case to the negative side (–1 CDU in ST). Additionally, three regional associations of the FPD did not yield any observations (MV, SN, ST) neither in parliament nor in press releases or on Twitter. While the parliamentary inactivity is no surprise due to their extra-parliamentary status in the concerned states, the overall reserve stands out since there are examples of parties not represented in parliament which show reactions on other channels, e.g. Green Party in MV or Left Party in BW.

All regional associations of the AfD considered in our analysis take up a clearly negative position, with blatantly hostile reactions in four cases and a slightly less rejective reaction in BW (–1.5) and SH (–1). In terms of frequency, all six regional associations are eager to bring up references to FfF noticeably often. In fact, the AfD in ST is the party in our selection that made second most references and is only excelled by the Bavarian Green Party.

Concluding, parties' reactions are most similar *within* party organisations across the different regional settings, however, they still reveal variance in particular regarding the frequency of responses. Both the different degrees of activity among regional Green Parties and Left Parties as well as two aspects concerning the centre-right, namely their rather positive orientation in SH and the deviating case of the CDU in ST, are interesting in this regard and we will come back to them in the next section. While a too fine-grained examination of the variance among the regional parties could be premature concerning our rather low number of observations avail- able for each state, general patterns are clearly discernible and in sum, they resonate with our findings from the federal level. Considering the degree of approval and the frequency of references, the AfD and the centre-left parties react most vigorously to FfF taking up two totally opposing positions. This reflects a strong polarisation on the movement while the centre-right parties remain somewhere in between.

7.5 A closer look at different party reactions

In this section we reflect upon our assumptions and discuss different party reactions in detail. While Social Democrats, Left and Green Party take the most positive stance towards FfF, CDU/CSU, FDP and FW are rather cautious and the AfD dismisses the movement. The frequency of reference, by and large, completes this picture and confirms the cautious attitude of the centre-right parties towards FfF as well as the positive responses of centre-left and left parties. Thus, *ideological affiliation* can help explain party reactions to FfF. However, we find differences between the parties that remain unexplained by the left-right scale (see above).

Therefore, we turn to other explanatory factors. First, we consider the *government or opposition status* of a party and assume opposition parties to react more frequently to FfF with the kind of reaction depending on ideological affiliations. On the federal level, opposition status indeed aligns with parties' vigorousness in responding to FfF. However, looking at the subnational cases, the explanatory power of party status is limited. Due to our case selection and research focus we cannot draw conclusions for Christian Democratic parties (always a member of government in our cases) or the Left and AfD (both always in opposition). The Greens and SPD show variance in party status but this does not align with party reactions to FfF. For instance, the Greens in BW are among the most active parties in our sample despite their status as leading governmental party and more frequently refer to FfF than the oppositional SPD. And in MV, the governing SPD is more frequently referring to FfF than the oppositional Left party and the Greens, which are not in parliament. Overall, a party's status does not explain reactions to FfF in our cases. Looking at Greens and SPD, we find strongly affirmative and highly frequent references from the parties both while in government (Green Party BW; SPD MV) and in opposition (Green Party BY; SPD SH)[56].

To arrive at a more complete picture, we turn to *issue ownership*. We assume issue ownership as a given condition—in our case, the German Greens are clearly owning environmental and climate issues and should thus be the party most supportive of the movement (*see* Sect. 2). Generally, the results of our analysis underline the role of issue ownership. All regional branches of the Green Party are clearly affirmative of FfF and refer to it above average (except for the Green Party in SN). Yet, also some other regional parties of the centre-left camp refer to FfF clearly above average, e.g. SPD in MV or SH or the Left Party in ST and SN.

Thus, while ideological affiliation and issue ownership can explain general pat- terns, some cases need a closer inspection. Therefore, we turn to aspects of *party competition*. We assumed the strength of the Greens and the AfD to impact mainstream parties' reactions (*see* Table 10). While the Green Party is commonly understood as contender on climate issues (van Haute 2016b), we argue that with its described consensus-breaking course, the AfD equally must be seen as clear con- tender which potentially exerts influence on other parties' climate policy positions. In accordance with the literature,

[56] However, we did not focus party status in our case selection, e.g. the AfD is in opposition in all states. Thus, this insight should be investigated further.

we would expect contagiousness to increase with gains[57] and the AfD more or less stagnated, in ST the AfD has performed successfully in several elections and holds its historical results from 2016 at around 25% and the Green Party only plays a minor role although in the period of investigation it doubled its support in polls up to around 11% (Holtmann and Völkl 2016). At the same time, in both states the CDU suffered serious losses in the EU election and also in other election polls. As a consequence, the Christian Democrats face serious electoral threats in both *Länder* with the only difference that these threats come from absolutely different directions regarding the environmental question, and thereby FfF. This line of argumentation, furthermore, is supported by a closer glance at the present coalitions. In SH the so-called *Jamaica*-coalition of CDU, Green Party and FDP is said to operate well and pragmatically on a basis of mutual trust and respect (Knelangen 2018). In clear contrast, the CDU-SPD-Greens coalition in ST, by default appears to work on the brink of break-up and periodically discloses diverging positions on central issues as well as a serious lack of mutual trust (Spiegel 2020). Given these dynamics of competition, in comparison the CDU in ST is more likely to direct its attention towards the AfD both in terms of *vote-* and *office-seeking*. Thus, considering these two cases and our brief analysis, we want to stress the potential of state-specific party competition as an explanation for varying responses to FfF.

7.6 Discussion & Conclusion

In this article we shed some light on party reactions to the Fridays for Future movement. Our first question addressed the overall reaction of parties regarding the degree of approval (i.e. affirmation or rejection) as well as the frequency of references. Initially, we looked at the federal level to approach the general positions of German parties and developed a yardstick for capturing varieties. However, our main emphasis was on the comparative analysis of reactions on the subnational level, where we in particular focused the impact of the AfD and the Greens on mainstream parties (CDU/CSU, SPD). Altogether, the analysis shows a clear difference between centre-left, centre-right and populist radical right parties. While the first group is strongly affirmative and clearly a friend of FfF, the AfD acts its part as a foe. In contrast, the centre-right parties are cautious and, mainly, keep a low profile in this polarisation. By using a fine-grained analytical approach, we were able to not only differentiate between approval or dismissal but to also uncover nuanced differences (cf. Raisch and Zohlnhöfer 2020). For instance, there is clear qualitative difference between critical reactions to FfF (e.g. from the CDU) and degrading responses by the AfD[58]. In our investigation, the described general trend has to be put into perspective regarding the *Länder-level.* There are some differences among parties' regional organisations, i.e. the Greens are not in all cases the most frequent supporters of FfF. This underscores the point that, at least concerning FfF, they represent no lonely extreme pole on the left. On the other side

[57] Due to the lack of available election polls for the subnational level, we included results of the European election as a benchmark. From 12.9%, 2017 to 26% in the beginning of 2020 in election polls and in the European election the Green Party even outperformed the CDU and became strongest with 29.1% (*Sources*: wahlrecht.de; https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/europawahlen/2019/ergebnisse/bund-99/land-1. html, accessed April 14 2020).

[58] Raisch and Zohlnhöfer (2020) arrive at a slightly different picture regarding the AfD. All in all, this indicates the need for further research into party responses to FfF.

of the party landscape, it became clear that centre-right parties are consistently cautious apart from two deviant cases: In SH the CDU is more supportive, while the CDU in ST is rejecting FfF. To provide some explanations for these varieties, we followed existing research (e.g., Hutter and Vliegenthart 2018) and took party status, party ideology, as well as issue ownership and party competition into account.

Thus, answering our second question, we come back to our assumptions. While party status could not explain varieties in the six *Länder*, overall, party ideology is the main explanation for responses to FfF, and competition can shed light on some deviating cases. For instance, the SPD refers more frequently to FfF in states where the Greens are in less competitive positions (e.g. low number of members, smallest faction or not even in parliament). Thus, Social Democrats fill the void and are more active in supporting FfF. Nevertheless, our analysis indicates the Green Party to be the prime supporter of the movement. When it comes to the centre-right parties, regionally specific party competition constellations shaped by the Green Party resp. the AfD provide explanations for the divergent party positions in ST and SH.

Furthermore, our analysis underscores that the AfD understands climate change as a crucial issue which it addresses by combining an openly rejective attitude with a high frequency of references (Kemmerzell and Selk 2020). The latter attests a willingness to bring and keep the topic on the political agenda and, indeed, the AfD has declared the climate issue as their third main topic after Euro and migration policy (Welt 2019). Unlike other parties of the right, the AfD underlined its status as a political pariah and broke the minimal consensus on climate policy by questioning its very (scientific) legitimation. Thus, the party chose a strategy of 'offence is the best defence' and picked out FfF and their main activists as most prominent examples of a distinct pro-climate advocacy to prove their oppositional attitude. As Wagner (2012) has shown, a vote-maximising perspective can explain why parties emphasise issues. In our cases, the AfD seems to stress its extreme position to underline its anti-establishment position and to differentiate itself from other parties in an environment of increasing party competition around climate issues—which was fuelled from the FfF protests.

In sum, our analysis clarified a number of factors and their explanatory power for different reactions to FfF. Yet, some external variance regularly remains and we cannot rule out other (additional) explaining factors, e.g. traditional idiosyncrasies of regional party associations (Bräuninger et al. 2020), a bias caused by overrepresenting individual politicians' statements or increased cross-party awareness caused by a different climate change exposition as it is plausible in SH due to its specific geographical situation at the coast (Böcher and Töller 2016). Thus, further state- level factors should be considered in future research. With regard to general party positions and issue ownership we adopted positions from the federal level. How- ever, as Bräuninger et al. (2020) show, subnational party systems and party positions differ between states as well as over time. Future research might dive deeper into (environmental) policy positions on the state level. Furthermore, we conceptualised FfF as an issue parties react to. This helped to show general reaction and party stances. Yet, how and whether political parties in Germany adopt the movement's demands and interact with FfF must be dealt with in further research. Overall, while Fridays for Future has undoubtedly pushed environmental and cli- mate policy discussion, systematic findings

regarding party reactions to FfF have been scarce. By investigating these reactions in Germany and more specifically in six states we developed two core insights. First, our analysis presents first reliable data on the reactions of political parties to FfF at the German federal and state level. It shows a clear difference based on parties' general ideological positions. This corroborates the existence of a partisan effect for this specific issue in Germany and, thus, let us contribute to clarify which side Social Democratic (clear affirmation) as well as Christian Democratic parties (cautiousness) are on in the field of environmental policy. Second, the fierce reactions of the AfD indicate an intense polarisation on climate policy between the centre-left and the radical right with the centre-right par- ties somehow in between. This raises questions whether future environmental resp. climate policy will be characterised by a bipolar (Thomeczek, Jankowski and Krouwel 2019) or rather tripolar party competition. As the AfD takes a contender position in climate policy challenging the overall consensus of parties in Germany, this underlines the uneasy relation between environmentalism and right-wing populism.

8 *Article 2*: Explaining Differences in Party Reactions to the Fridays for Future-Movement – a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of Parties in Three European Countries (with Jan Pollex)

Berker, Lars E., and Jan Pollex. 2023. "Explaining Differences in Party Reactions to the Fridays for Future-Movement – a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Qca) of Parties in Three European Countries." Environmental Politics 32(5): 755-92. doi: 10.1080/09644016.2022.2127536.

8.1 Introduction

The Fridays for Future (FfF) movement has undoubtedly left its mark on society and politics in Europe and beyond. For instance, in September 2019, millions of protesters joining the movement around the world demanded climate protection measures from their governments.[59] Even amid the Covid pandemic, FfF has manifested its role and continued to be a major representative of societal concerns on climate policy.

While there is a growing body of research examining the movement from various perspectives (e.g., Wahlström et al. 2019, De Moor et al. 2020), in- depth analyses of FfF's reception by political parties are still scant. This is a major analytical shortage since the issue of party-movement relations is at the core of (environmental) movement research. Both movements and parties play 'complementary roles for democratic representation' (Hutter, Kriesi and Lorenzini 2019a). Analysing party responses to FfF is crucial for three reasons.

First, while FfF stands in the tradition of previous environmental movements, it is, nevertheless, characterised by unique features, e.g. protesters' young age and its state-centred focus (De Moor et al. 2021). In contemporary party democracies, the latter points to political parties as the main addressees of the movement as these fulfil an essential function in transporting societal interests into the political sphere (Keman 2006). They can legitimise (or delegitimise) a movement and its demands (e.g., Kitschelt 1986).

Second, FfF has adopted a rather moderate role within recent climate activism considering its protest forms compared to other movements, e.g. Extinction Rebellion (Berglund and Schmidt 2020, Buzogány and Scherhaufer 2022). Despite some indications of internal quarrels on the claims of the movement (Marquardt 2020), recent literature overall indicates its modest positions: focusing on core issues of environmental politics debate, like intergenerational and global environmental justice, FfF emphasises the need to follow scientific evidence and to respect international agreements (De Wever Van der Heyden, Neubauer and van der Heyden 2020, Marquardt 2020, Svensson and Wahlström

[59] Guardian. 2019. Climate crisis: 6 million people join latest wave of global protests. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/sep/27/climate-crisis-6-million-people-join-latest-wave-of-worldwide-protests. Access Date: 15/04/2022.

2021, Buzogány and Scherhaufer 2022). Thus, we deem it justified to understand FfF essentially as a symbol of a resolute but not radical, i.e. system changing, climate policy.[60] This holds especially true in our period of investigation when FfF was still in the establishment phase and protesters rallied behind the idea to bring the climate topic to the top of the debate without specifying concrete approaches to address the issue (De Wever Van der Heyden, Neubauer and van der Heyden 2020). Hence, and factoring in a conceptualisation of environmental policy as a valence issue, we might assume a broad coalition of parties to react positively to the movement. However, first studies investigating party reactions showed (centre-)left parties to be more affirmative of FfF than right-wing parties (Raisch and Zohlnhöfer 2020, Berker and Pollex 2021). Yet, we still lack international comparative insights into party responses to the movement. Building on our previous study (Berker and Pollex 2021), we seek to contribute to filling this gap by investigating factors potentially influencing party reactions.

This aspect is linked to a third issue informing our analysis. Against the backdrop of rising right-wing populism which often entails a denial of climate change (Lockwood 2018), party reactions to FfF could not only be impacted by general ideology but also by parties' opportunistic considerations, e.g. regarding populists as potential coalitions partners to gain power. Put differently, our research relates to two existential challenges for democracies, i.e. populism and climate change (Buzogány and Mohamad-Klotzbach 2021).

Overall, party reactions to FfF are one indicator of the movement's potential impact in the political sphere. Internationally present, the movement, thus, poses a unique opportunity to contribute to the burgeoning but still incomplete understanding of party behaviour in the area of environ- mental and climate policy (Abou-Chadi, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2020). Providing a first internationally comparative analysis of party reactions to FfF by looking at 19 political parties in three European countries (Austria, Germany and Sweden), in a broader sense, we ask whether FfF's moderate stance allowed the movement to generate support from a broad coalition of parties which, in turn, is needed to realise the movement's demands (Rucht 2004).

Specifically, our research question is two-fold: do general patterns of party responses emerge that signal a broad support by parties across ideological boundaries? Or is party behaviour, as existing research points out, shaped by party competition (Hutter and Vliegenthart 2018)? While issue ownership and governmental status might play a part here, in our qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), we are particularly interested in the potential effect of inter-party competition on the socio-cultural conflict dimension often understood to stretch from green parties to populist radical right parties (PRRP) at its extreme poles (Kriesi 2010). While the role of green parties in this party competition on environmental policy is well- addressed by research (e.g., Carter 2013, Spoon, Hobolt and De Vries 2014), the behaviour and impact of PRRP has received attention in the literature only recently (Lockwood 2018, Schaller and Carius 2019, Forchtner 2020a).

[60] FfF addresses topics related to core climate policy and to the broader area of environmental policy. We mostly use the term environmental policy and incorporate climate policy in it.

In our article we, first, briefly discuss theoretical approaches to investigate party reactions to a movement and, second, describe our research design and methods. After that, we present our results and discuss them against our theoretical expectations.

8.2 Theoretical considerations – Analysing party reactions

Existing research on social and environmental movements emphasises their relevance for political parties, their positions and even their foundation, e.g. the establishment of green parties in the 1980s (Müller-Rommel 1993, Jahn 2017). By voicing concerns, demonstrating, or – as in the case of FfF – skipping school to gain attention, movements try to impact politics and seek influence on political elites (Offe 1985). Thus, inquiring party responses to (environmental) movements is at the heart of environmental politics research (Rucht 2004). This applies specifically to party reactions to FfF which explicitly stated to challenge political actors on climate matters as its main objective. To analyse how parties react to the movement, we draw upon Hutter and Vliegenthart (2018) and their approach to investigate party responses to protest events focussing on four variables which we adapt for our research questions.

First, considering *party ideology*, we already indicated that FfF differs considerably from previous environmental movements, e.g. in the 1980s (Rootes 2004), as it appears rather moderate in its protest forms and its demands. Together with the general mainstreaming of environmental policy (Carter 2013) we could expect an overall support of the movement by political parties, eventually excluding PRRP. On the other hand, research points out that left parties are regularly associated with environmentally friendly positions (e.g., Kitschelt 1993, Neumayer 2003, Jahn 2016, Berker and Pollex 2021). Additionally, left parties generally emphasise their roots within previous movements rather than right parties. While social democratic parties developed with labour movements, green parties emerged from environmental movements (e.g., Dryzek et al. 2003). This leaves us with two competing assumptions on the reception of FfF that we seek to answer in the analysis (Table 13).

Second, following research on *issue-ownership* (Guinaudeau and Persico 2014, Budge 2015), we see a qualitative difference between parties continuously and utterly dedicated to environmental issues and those taking 'only' a positive stance. Thus, especially, parties affiliated with an environmental issue-ownership should react positively to the movement.

Third, research shows *government parties* to take moderate positions while *opposition parties* tend to emphasise more extreme stances to gain attention and votes (Bawn and Somer-Topcu 2012). Adapting these insights to our research, we assume opposition parties to be more active in emphasising their support of the movement as a way to clarify their position. In contrast, government parties are more careful in wholeheartedly supporting it (Hutter and Vliegenthart 2018).

Finally, we assume party competition to affect party reactions. Here, we focus especially on green and PRRP and their impact on competition as extreme poles of the environment-related conflict dimension (Marks et al. 2021).

Conditions	Assumed effect on individual parties' reaction on FfF in degree of approval
Party Ideology	1. We assume no effect of party ideology, i.e., all parties to react rather positively to FfF.
LERI	2. We assume an effect of party ideology, i.e., left parties to react more positively to FfF than right parties.
Environmental issue-ownership **ENVIO**	We assume parties holding environmental issue-ownership to react most positively to FfF.
Government-opposition status **GOVOPP**	We expect opposition parties to react more positively to FfF.
Party competition **PC_OS**	We assume parties aligned to either PRRP or green parties in their coalition considerations to take a cautious or supportive stance, respectively, towards FfF.

Table 13: Theoretical assumptions

The argument goes that political parties' positions on FfF not only rely on their own ideological positions but that these positions might be adjusted to positions of competitors if parties prioritise the pursuit of rational choice goals, i.e. vote-seeking and office-seeking (Strøm 1990, Poguntke 2006).

In today's advanced industrial democracies, the already high complexity of party competition has further increased due to more and more fluid electorates, the growing importance of socio-cultural issues like immigration and environment and the related rising number of parties (Kriesi 2010, Rovny and Whitefield 2019, Marks et al. 2021). The latter applies especially to countries with proportional election systems as present in the three countries focused here. In this overall dynamic environment, party competition is increasingly shaped by the dichotomy of right-wing populists and their green, alternative, and liberal counterparts (Marks et al. 2021). Mobilising anti-establishment voting, PRRP often challenge not only conservative parties but also centre and centre-left ones (e.g., Meguid 2005, Bale et al. 2010). By the same token, green parties get into challenger positions when they increase electoral support. This said, in terms of vote-seeking successful PRRP and green parties may represent an electoral threat for almost all other parties. However, in multi-party systems, party competitors do not only represent challengers but also potential coalition partners, so that coalition considerations affect party behaviour not less than equally (Green-Pedersen 2019). As both rationales of vote- and office-seeking, without doubt, play an important part in defining party behaviour beyond policy- seeking (Budge and Laver 1986, Strøm 1990), for reasons of parsimony, it is often necessary to concentrate on one of the mechanisms (Strøm and Müller 1999). We follow Kayser and Rehmert (2021), who investigate the effect of office-seeking party competition on environmental policy and conclude that 'even when environmental parties are out of government, governing parties may court them as future coalition partners when their coalition-inclusion probability is high by removing policy obstacles such as incompatible environmental positions' (p. 240). An easy strategy for parties to court an environmental

party in this way and without binding themselves to all too concrete policy proposals is to support FfF as an emblem of climate policy in line with the Paris agreement. On the other hand, parties that rather depend on PRRP for future government coalitions are likely to refrain from clear statements on FfF as PRRP habitually oppose FfF and related policy demands (Lockwood 2018, Schaller and Carius 2019, Berker and Pollex 2021). Furthermore, in contrast to the pure vote-seeking argument, coalition considerations are no party system property, but can be identified for each party specifically regarding its relationship to main contenders. Thus, we concentrate on office-seeking as a core dimension of party competition and, therefore, assume parties rather aligned to PRRP for future coalitions to react with reserve to FfF, whereas parties somewhat dependent on green parties to follow their lead in supporting FfF. This assumption refers to configurational causality and equifinality inherent to set-theoretical thinking. For instance, not only parties of the left but also centre-right parties might take a positive stance on FfF if they depend on green parties for coalitions. This, of course, hinges upon specific national configurations of party competition (e.g. bloc politics) which we reflect in our operationalisation of party competition for each party individually in the period of investigation (see below and Appendix 2C).

8.3 Research design and Methods

8.3.1 Case selection

In this article, we concentrate on 19 political parties,[61,62] in three European countries. Although political parties represent the cases in our investigation, the case selection was based on country level features, which essentially relate to the party level. As a fundamental prerequisite, we had to ensure that the FfF movement is a topic of national party competition at all. However, since FfF is not yet covered by any common database due to its recency (e.g. PolDem) and no exact and comparable numbers of protesters are available, which could have been used as a clear indicator of salience, we needed to conceptualise the strength of FfF based on different indications.

We selected Austria, Germany and Sweden as these belong to the group of 'established environmental states' meaning nations with a traditionally strong stance on environmental matters (Liefferink et al. 2009, Duit 2016) that is confirmed by high public sentiments on the importance of climate change as political issue in 2019 (European Commission 2019). Hence, we can expect FfF to achieve a similar weight. The strength of FfF in all these countries had to be vindicated by entering the field. In all three countries, FfF has a national organisation, and in each country, we saw some major protest events (Wahlström et al. 2019). Furthermore, drawing upon Bandau and Bothner (2020), we considered google trends in our assessment, showing continued interest in FfF by Google users in the three countries. Individually, these aspects are rather clues than evidence. Nevertheless, taking them altogether, we are confident to assume the movement to be equally relevant in the three countries.

[61] See Appendix 2A for a detailed list of the parties. Note that throughout the article we use the nationally common abbreviations.
[62] Due to missing data in two conditions we had to remove the Austrian JETZT party (formerly 'Liste Pilz') from our data set.

Besides, the selected countries share further potentially relevant characteristics and, e.g. as parliamentary and established democracies attribute a major role to political parties and secure similar handling of public protests[63] (e.g., Lijphart 2012). Despite these institutionalist commonalities, parties in these countries vary considerably concerning our four factors derived from theory. Their multi-party systems all involve a diverging number of left and right parties securing *party ideology* variation and revealing different party system patterns, among others indicated by the number of effective parties (Siaroff 2019). The latter entails different party dynamics and combined with the varying strength and establishment of PRRP or Green parties ensure different *party competition* constellations. Also, for the remaining two factors some variance is visible: while *issue-ownership* is attributed to at least three parties of the sample, namely the green parties, *governmental status* spreads out on six parties of different ideologies. In summary, our sample of parties provides us with sufficient experimental variance pertaining to our four factors.

8.3.2 Data collection

The data collection approach for our outcome builds on our previous research on political parties' reactions on FfF on the (sub)national level in Germany (Berker and Pollex 2021). Here, we extended the scope and successfully applied the approach in an international sample, thus, producing a novel dataset. Our analysis covers the period from August 2018 (when Greta Thunberg first demonstrated in Stockholm) until June 2020and relies on parliamentary debates, press releases and social media posts (on twitter and facebook), of which the latter represent increasingly important communication channels for parties (Jungherr 2016). Combining different sources allows us to arrive at a comprehensive picture of party responses to this recent movement. To be included, the respective sources had to refer explicitly to 'FfF', 'Greta Thunberg', 'school strike for the climate' or 'climate strike' or in case of tweets addressing the movement. While for parliamentary sources we coded statements irrespective of the politician's status in the party, for the other we focused on party leaders and party's central offices. Altogether, we made 469 observations in the three countries (AT: 98, GER: 280, SE: 91) which distributed across the sources with a focus on twitter (*in total* 247) and the parliamentary debates (123) (facebook: 68, press releases: 31)[64] (Appendix 2B).

To estimate parties' expressions and statements on FfF, we rely on existing research on party reactions to challenger parties and social movements (Meguid 2005, Bale et al. 2010, Schwartz 2010). Overall, it shows parties to either embrace, ignore or dismiss new actors, e.g. movements. Movements can provide 'new sources of support' for parties and their positions and thus, motivate them to form alliances (Schwartz 2010, p. 590, Martin, de Lange and van der Brug 2022). Likewise, parties might be motivated to ignore movements because of diverging preferences. Hence, we developed five categories to map party

[63] Even if they may show some variance in terms of inclusiveness (Dryzek et al. 2003).

[64] Some parties rarely refer to FfF. Therefore, we weighed the outcome with different reference values, like the size of the national parliament and the size of the respective party. This had no impact on the assignments of any party to the outcome set except for the German FDP which we discuss in detail. Overall, we deem the comparability sufficient and opted to focus on the unweighed data in our analysis for reasons of parsimony.

reactions: *strong, weak rejection, caution* and *strong, weak affirmation*. These categories help us differentiate general responses to FfF and qualitative differences. For instance, strong affirmation shows in clear support of the movement, e.g. calls for participation in FfF demonstrations ('*Thank you Fridays for Future [. . .] We will fight for a better climate policy*', Green Party DE, Twitter). On the other side of the spectrum, strong rejection reflects explicit critique of the movement, e.g. reproach of hysteria or denial of climate change and FfF's demands (*'Greta Thunberg's fundamentalist children's crusade*', Sweden Democrats, Facebook) (for coding scheme and further examples see Appendix 2B).

As segments we conceived whole statements (i.e. a tweet or a parliamentary speech) and coded them accordingly. Only a few coding segments had been ambiguous and these were crosschecked in the research team for intercoder-reliability. To assess overall party positions, we estimated average positions based on all coded data. The coding process was run with MAXQDA.

8.4 Analysing party reactions from a set-theoretical perspective: QCA

To test our assumptions and investigate why party reactions differ, we conduct a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Party behaviour is impacted by a variety of factors, e.g. strategic and ideological goals or environmental circumstances (Strøm 1990). As they conflate and interact in their effects, a QCA with its emphasis on conjunctural causality appears to be the most suitable analytical approach for our endeavour (Fagerholm 2016). Furthermore, the operationalisation of a factor like party competition needs to consider several peculiarities of party systems dynamics (Green-Pedersen 2019) and therefore, highly depends on a case-sensitive analysis. QCA enables us to combine this case-sensitivity with a high degree of formalisation, and, thus, to identify regularities comparably across a medium number of cases (Rihoux 2003, Ragin 2014). To prepare the QCA, we must conceive of our theoretically derived factors and the outcome as sets to/in which each case is attributed a membership. In classical crisp-set QCA membership is dichotomous, so that by defining a theoretically and empirically derived qualitative anchor point all cases are assigned full membership or non-membership in every relevant set (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). While we apply this crisp-set dichotomisation for issue-ownership and government-opposition status, for the other two and the outcome, we opted for the more fine-grained fuzzy-set QCA. Fuzzy-sets maintain the qualitative distinction between membership and non-membership, yet let us also establish differences in degree for partial memberships (Schneider and Wagemann 2012).

In the following, we will introduce our calibrations of the four conditions and the outcome (for details Appendix 2C). For operationalising the sets of *party ideology* and *environmental issue- ownership*, we relied on data of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al. 2020b) and calibrating parties' ideology remained close to the data structure choosing an anchor point of 5.0. The resulting distribution of left-right parties match intuitive expectations and could be cross-validated with case-knowledge. For environmental issue-ownership we set the anchor point at a CHES-value of 4.0. Although, regarding the data-distribution, a cut-off between 1.6 (V) and 3.9 (C) would have been plausible, in con- sideration of Swedish Centre-Party's history as issue-owner combined with its notable recent efforts to regain it

(Bolin 2019), we chose to attribute it full membership in the set.

In terms of the *government-opposition status*, most naturally, political parties are part of the government set when they hold office. Although the change of government within the period of investigation in Austria and the support of the Swedish minority government by two opposition parties create a less clear picture, we opted for a clear-cut crisp-set calibration of this condition. For Sweden's C and L, we adhered to the formal distinction and assigned them a non-membership (as opposition party). For the Austrian case we drew upon the proportional length of the respective periods of government within our period of investigation and assigned government status to the ÖVP and the FPÖ.

When investigating *party competition*, we focus the dimension of office-seeking, which includes dynamics of both rivalry and cooperation. More specifically, we are interested in each party's potential to form government coalitions. However, apprehending coalition considerations is a complex endeavour that 'requires knowledge of both the general and most frequent stable patterns of coalition-building in a country as well as knowledge of party positions on individual issues' (Green-Pedersen 2019). Based on the literature on national party competition patterns as well as more current case knowledge (Dolezal and Zeglovits 2014, Pierre 2015, Aylott and Bolin 2019, Jun and Niedermayer 2020, Plescia, Kritzinger and Oberluggauer 2020), we appraised the individual party's dependence on coalitions with the green party or the PRRP respectively and assigned set-membership values instantly in a fuzzy-set manner. A premise for this operationalisation and measurement is the fact that PRRP and green parties are at the opposite extreme poles of the relevant party competition. Therefore, the membership of green parties (1) and PRRP (0) is straight-forward, while for the other parties three examples illustrate our approach: we assigned a fuzzy-set-value of 0.67 to the German SPD as it needs the increasingly strong Green Party for any future ideologically coherent coalition, but it has options for coalitions without the Green Party (i.e. with the CDU/CSU). At the same time, a coalition with the AfD seems impossible. Things are different for KD and M in Sweden, which due to the break-up of the conservative electoral *Alliance for Sweden* lost coalition options and are turning to the PRRP SD since the beginning of 2019. Consequently, we gave both a value of 0.33. A more complicated case was the ÖVP, which in the period of investigation formed coalitions with both the PRRP FPÖ and the Green Party and thus would perfectly fit the point of indifference. Since this is not possible within set-theoretical thinking, we drew again upon governmental terms' proportional length. Therefore, we coded the ÖVP with 0.33, even though at the end of the period of investigation, it is less likely to enter a coalition with the FPÖ.

Turning to our outcome's calibration, the calibration procedure has been quite straightforward. Looking at the average values of approval from 2 to −2, we presume that all parties taking only cautious positions on FfF are more out than in the set of FfF-supporters and, therefore, set the anchor point at 0.1. Differences in degree are reflected by thresholds at −1/1 telling apart rather cautious and hostile positions among parties for non-membership and (overall) positive positions considering membership. In Figure 22 we plotted the calibrated distribution of cases on the calibrated left-right scale. As we can see, 11 parties support FfF (OUTC > 0.5), while eight parties take a non- supporting position (OUTC <



Figure 22: Partisan support of 'Fridays for Future' distributed on a left-right scale.

0.5).

Apart from the assignment of fuzzy-set-values in party competition which we explained carefully above (Appendix 2C), plausible robustness-tests have been run for all calibrations (Appendix 2F). Although partly, the alternative models entailed changing row assignments of singular cases, these tests did not indicate any larger effects on the final solution and thus buttressed the robustness of calibration (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, Ch. 11.2).

8.5 Results

In line with established procedures of QCA, the following section presents the results of our analysis respecting in particular conjunctural and asymmetric causality (e.g., Schneider and Wagemann 2012, Thomann 2020). Thus, we investigate (combinations of) first necessary and then sufficient conditions for the support and non-support of FfF respectively in separate steps. Finally, we elaborate on explanations of outlier cases that are not clarified by the analysis.

Regarding a supportive stance towards FfF, i.e. the positive outcome in our QCA[65], there is no single consistent individual necessary condition explaining this outcome (Appendix 2E). A left party ideology (leri) is part of a necessary disjunction including governmental status (GOVOPP) or a party competition strategy oriented towards green parties (PC_OS). Yet, being a left party is no necessary condition on its own as three right-wing parties are (highly) supportive of FfF (C, NEOS and L). It is noteworthy that all three parties are members of the liberal party family whereas all conservative and Christian democratic parties have been loath to show (any) sympathy for FfF. In this light, the necessity analysis for the negated outcome suggests that party ideology nevertheless plays a major part since there is no left party which is non-supportive of FfF. A right-wing party ideology (LERI), there- fore, is a necessary condition for disapproving of FfF.

Party ideology and party competition are also part of the first solution term in analysing sufficiency (Table 14). As INUS conditions[66] a left party ideology (leri) and a party competition oriented towards green parties (PC_OS) in combination imply that the respective party is supportive of FfF. This overall consistent configuration's explanatory power is consider- ably high as it covers eight out of 11 parties supportive of FfF.

Intermediate solution	**leri***PC_OS	+	**govopp*PC_OS → OUTC**
Single case coverage	GRUENE AT, GRUENE DE, V; MP; DIE LINKE, SPO; S, SPD		GRUENE AT, GRUENE DE, V; DIE LINKE, SPO; NEOS, *FDP*, L; C
Consistency	1.0		0.956
Raw coverage	0.649		0.596
Unique coverage	0.217		0.163

Table 14: Sufficient conditions for the positive outcome; Notes: Cases separated with a semicolon represent different truth table rows. Cases in italic are deviant cases consistency in kind. Items in bold display the parsimonious solution. Solution consistency: 0.967; Solution coverage: 0.812; Incl.-Cut: 0.8.[67]

Interestingly, all left-wing parties support FfF to a very similar extent with only minor differences between green, socialist and social democratic parties. According to the parsimonious solution, this even holds true irrespective of coalition considerations favouring the green party. This pronounced response to FfF resonates with our second

[65] QCA has been run with R gratefully using the QCA-packages provided by Dusa, A., 2019. QCA with R. A Comprehensive Resource. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Retrieved from: https://protestinstitut.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/20190625_Protest-for-a-future_GCS-Descriptive- Report_ipb.pdf.

[66] INUS stands for Insufficient but necessary, see, e.g., Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 79 f).

[67] Table representation inspired by Hinterleitner, Sager and Thomann (2016).

assumption and it suggests a distinct pro-environmental positioning of left parties on environmental and climate issues. A second solution path indicates that opposition parties (govopp) with an office-seeking strategy adjusted to green parties (PC_OS) react highly positively to FfF. This solution term adds an explanation for the cases of the right-wing liberal parties in all three countries. In summary, Figure 23 visualises parties' set memberships in at least one of the two solution terms (x-axis > 0.5) and in the set *FfF-supporters* (y-axis > 0.5). Thus, parties that share characteristics indicated in the solution terms and support FfF can be found in the top-right area of the diagram. However, the plotting shows clearly that we face one outlier case. The German FDP is included in the second solution but does not support FfF. We discuss this so-called deviant case consistency in kind (DCCK) below.



Figure 23: Intermediate solution for partisan support of 'Fridays for Future'

For the negated outcome, i.e. a dismissive stance towards FfF, we obtained only one solution path in the sufficiency analysis (Table 16): right-wing parties (LERI) oriented towards a PRRP in party competition (pc_os) and without an environmental issue-ownership (envio) are members of the set *Non-FfF-supporters*.

Intermediate solution	LERI*envio***pc_os**	**→ outc**
Single case coverage	AfD, KD, M, SD; FPO, OVP	
Consistency	0.820	
Raw coverage	0.898	
Unique coverage	-	

Table 15: Sufficient conditions for the negated outcome; *Notes: cases separated with a semicolon represent different truth table rows. Items in bold display the parsimonious solution. Solution consistency: 0.820; Solution coverage: 0.898; Incl.-Cut: 0.75*



Figure 24: Intermediate solution for partisan non-support of 'Fridays for Future'

As an INUS-condition in the intermediate solution, the non- membership in the party-competition set (pc_os) sticks out as an individual remaining sufficient condition in the parsimonious solution stressing its significance as an explanatory factor. The solution coverage is high, explaining six out of eight cases with a negated outcome. Empirically, however, the argument of party competition applies only for three of these cases since AfD, FPÖ, and SD logically do not compete with themselves.

Concerning the remaining three, we deem it justified to state that among centre-right parties with a cautious stance on environ- mental issues competitive pressure from the far-right can leave its mark. In our analysis two cases remain unclear: CDU/CSU and FDP (Figure 23 & Figure 24). The German Christian Democrats could not be considered in the analysis for methodological reasons (Appendix 2F, M6). Drawing upon our theory, a mixture of a business-friendly right-wing position and a governmental party strategy to avoid issues potentially entailing clear policy changes might explain the CDU/CSU's reservations about FfF (Debus and Müller 2013). The FDP is included in the analysis, as part of a contradictory row containing three liberal parties which we opted to include after due methodological consideration (Appendix 2F, M5). However, as a deviant case, it needs further explanation. Although, we had to reject any reasoning solely based on a fine-grained interpretation of parties' environmental positions (Appendix 2F, M5), for the liberal parties it might point to an important part of the explanation. In line with the CHES data, literature indicates that the FDP since the 1970s has headed substantially for an economic liberalism (Höhne and Jun 2020) whereas NEOS and L show distinct social liberal traits (Bolin 2019, Close 2019). Especially NEOS has opted to emphasise pro-environmental stances in the last elections – even more than, e.g. the SPÖ – and differs from the German FDP in several issues (Johann, Jenny and Kritzinger 2016, Plescia, Kritzinger and Oberluggauer 2020).[68]

8.6 Conclusion and discussion

Comparing party reactions to Fridays for Future in three countries, based on first international data, we observed clear differences between parties. Overall, we can identify three distinct reaction patterns to the movement. Left parties uniformly support FfF, PRRP fiercely oppose it and centre-right parties are divided – either supporting FfF or showing an at best cautious attitude by ignoring the movement. This observation clarifies our first assumption and underlines that FfF did not receive general support of parties despite its principally moderate positions and forms of protest. Instead, like previous movements, it is positively received in the centre-left camp but does not get support from most centre-right parties. Hence, while the movement's general strategy has secured support from the general public, it was inept to broaden political support beyond the usual allies. In sum, these findings corroborate ideas from purely case-study-based research identifying party ideology as necessary condition for high party responsiveness to environ- mental movements (Piccio 2019) but qualify findings from our previous study on Germany and its *Länder* where the left-right divide on reactions to FfF is clear-cut (Berker and Pollex 2021).

We investigated four conditions possibly accounting for this variance: party ideology, environmental issue-ownership, government-opposition status and party competition shaped by Green parties or PRRP.

[68] The same applies to Swedish C. However, also belonging to the ENVIO-set, C was no part of the contradictory row.

Somewhat surprisingly, environmental issue-ownership offered only scarce explanatory power. Although it represents a sufficient condition for FfF-support as all issue-owners support FfF strongly, in our sample it did not explain differences between the parties in their response to FfF.

A party's opposition-status also entailed a positive reaction to FfF, yet only in combination with a party competition attitude favouring the national green party. This elucidated the cases of three liberal parties. However, it is rather speculative that these parties would have behaved differently as governmental parties. Overall, government status does not explain reactions to FfF in our sample, although it might contribute to explanations as discussed for the CDU/CSU. Future research should deepen the analysis of this factor. Ultimately, although we formulated our assumptions by and large conservatively in the fashion of singular causality, the solutions in our QCA rightly emphasises conjunctural causality, pointing to both ideology *and* party competition in order to explain responses to FfF. In line with previous research this highlights the need to reflect both conditions when it comes to the analysis of party positioning (Abou-Chadi 2016). While, left parties, overall, support FfF and in our sample there were no traces of a turn to the PRRP, explaining the split of the centre-right parties, our analysis indicates party competition to be relevant. For ÖVP in Austria as well as KD and M in Sweden, we could find some indications of an impact of competition pressure from the far-right fringe. Especially for the latter, their future stances on climate protests and their programmatic development are utmost interesting after turning to SD for governmental options. Considered conversely, the same holds true for the other centre-right parties in Sweden (C and L) who veered to the centre-left parties as they rejected any cooperation with the PRRP. The current end of bloc-politics in Sweden (Aylott and Bolin 2019) might, by and large, reflect general trends of increasingly pluralist party systems in Europe engendering a more dynamic party competition in terms of office-seeking. Ultimately, the observed peculiarities of party com- petition on FfF may refer to overall party system dynamics on the issue of climate change and environmental policy. Thus, even if we cannot generalise our case-sensitive results methodologically, we would expect similar party response patterns to occur in other countries with multi-party systems and also for other issue related to environmental policy.

In order to understand the conditions under which parties stick to their ideology or rather follow party competition in environmental politics, how- ever, an even more fine-grained approach to party competition is needed. First, aspects like the electoral vulnerability of a party, its size and its prospects to enter government as well as the actual strength and the maturity of the challenger party must be taken into account as these clearly are factors determining coalition considerations in the national party competition (Spoon, Hobolt and De Vries 2014, Abou-Chadi, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2020).

Second, there is a need to disentangle the relationship between party competition and environmental positioning. Dealing with the deviant case of the FDP which showed no support of FfF while rather oriented to the Green Party in national party competition, we turned to the environmental positions of the parties in order to explain party responses. In the medium term, it will be crucial to investigate if parties change position in response to party competition (e.g. the FDP therefore becoming greener) or if

strategies in party competition change due to its positioning on ideology – or even on environmental issues like climate change (therefore, turn to the PRRP). Third, in our analysis we focused on the left-right dimension which is still the most common approach towards party ideology. Reflecting the multi-dimensionality shaping todays party systems (Rovny and Whitefield 2019), however, it would be reasonable to include the socio-cultural dimension (Kriesi 2010), which some scholars deem most important for the investigation of environmental and climate policies (Rovny 2015). Our conceptualisation of office-seeking party competition points already to the importance of this conflict dimension, yet, importantly, it is not the same: while one could locate parties on this line of conflict according to their ideology positions, we investigated if parties are pushed to either direction on this scale irrespective of their own ideological position on it.

All in all, our findings contradict previous research that based on the

conception of environmental policy as a valence issue concluded a de- emphasising strategy of *all* mainstream parties (Abou-Chadi 2016) and adds to the literature questioning the notion of environmental policy as such an issue (Farstad 2018, Carter and Little 2021). The social cultural dimension needs to be included in the investigation of party competition on the environment. Reflecting wider societal conflicts and their potential intensification, however, it is equally important to contemplate its meaning for the overall formation of alliances in the context of sustainably.

Finally, we want to address some caveats. For some parties, our analysis relies on a limited number of observations. In particular, the Liberals in Sweden only referred to FfF three times. However, we chose to include the party to arrive at a comprehensive picture of party responses to FfF. In this case, however, our results must be taken carefully and future research could investigate some party positions and, above all, their reluctance to react to FfF. Additionally, we treated FfF as an issue of party competition and, thus, addressed only one side of the party-movement-interaction. Research needs to advance on these insights by further investigating the interplay of movements and conventional politics. This holds true especially regarding, so far, less politicised conflicts between moderate growth-oriented and more radical growth-independent concepts of sustainability (Blühdorn and Deflorian 2019, Machin 2020). Given that FfF represents a resolute but not radical direction of climate policies the observed tripartition of party reactions might only give a temporary impression of future party competition constellations on this matter. As the struggle around the handling of climate change is likely to gain salience and intensify in the future, advancing knowledge on the impacts of movements, therefore, is a crucial task.

9 *Article 3*: Turn to the right, turn away from the green? – A nuanced analysis on how a populist radical right party affects environmental policy-making in Sweden

Berker, Lars E. *tbc*. "Turn to the right, turn away from the green? – A nuanced analysis on how a populist radical right party affects environmental policy-making in Sweden".
Currently under review.

9.1 Introduction

Across Europe populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have gained traction and become increasingly influential. Prominently, in the field of immigration policy, the literature confirms various impacts, e.g., on the positions of mainstream parties and the public discourse (e.g., Bale et al. 2010, Akkerman 2012, Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020). More recently, researchers started to address the nexus of PRRPs and environmental policy painting a split picture of the parties' positions in this field (Lockwood 2018, Forchtner 2020b, Buzogány and Mohamad-Klotzbach 2022). Notwithstanding a certain heterogeneity in the party family, in their majority, PRRPs take utterly critical positions on sustainability issues like the fight against climate change while they favour traditional environmental policies targeting the protection of domestic nature. Considering the actual effects of PRRPs on environmental policies, research, so far, has remained wanting on two central points. First, studies mainly addressed the area of sustainability policies, for which they evidence a negative impact of PRRPs on policies related to climate mitigation (e.g., Jahn 2021, Lockwood and Lockwood 2022). In contrast, PRRPs' effects on traditional environmental policies received only scant attention. Second, since most of the studies on effects were based on macro-quantitative approaches, the causal mechanisms underlying the confirmed negative impacts on sustainability policies have been left rather unclear.

In this article, both research gaps are addressed in a theory-testing *typical case study* of Swedish environmental policy-making in the wake of a rising PRRP influence (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 3). Sweden serves as typical case for growing PRRP influence as it experienced a rapid and drastic rise of the populist radical right *Sverigedemokraterna* (SD). While the party started as a parliamentary pariah when it first entered the Swedish parliament, *Riksdag*, in 2010 with 5.7% of the total votes, with 20.5% in 2022, it has become Sweden's second largest party and support party for a new right government under prime minister Ulf Kristersson (Hagevi 2022, Aylott and Bolin 2023) (Table 16). In addition, a negative impact of PRRPs on sustainability policy has been confirmed for Sweden (e.g., Jahn 2021), so that it represents a suitable case for a within-case analysis exploring potential causal mechanisms that underly the relationship between cause and outcome. Importantly, this case study goes beyond previous studies and applies a nuanced perspective on environmental policy utilising a novel dataset based on environmental budget proposals. Thus, it is not only possible to re-examine the previous results on sustainability policy by triangulation, but also to juxtapose partisan effects on sustainability policy and traditional environmental policy on one single uniform database.

Two research questions guide this case study: first, based on classic partisan theory, it enquires *how the populist radical right party SD affects Swedish environmental policy-making differentiated by the two subsectors of sustainability policy and traditional environmental policy*. Second, reflecting research on party competition, it explores, *how the potential effect of the populist radical right SD on environmental policy evolves in terms of causal mechanisms*.

For the analysis the method of causal process tracing is applied looking from a partisan effects perspective for necessary and sufficient conditions that determine the outcome, i.e., environmental policy.

Party	**1998**	**2002**	**2006**	**2010**	**2014**	**2018**	**2022**
Vänsterpartiet – Left Party (V)	12.0	8.4	5.9	5.6	5.7	8.0	6.8
Sveriges Socialdemokratiska arbetarparti – Swedish Social Democratic Party (S)	36.4	39.9	35.0	30.7	31.0	28.3	30.3
Miljöpartiet de Gröna – Green Party (MP)	4.4	4.7	5.2	7.3	6.9	4.4	5.1
Centerpartiet – Centre Party (C)	5.1	6.2	7.9	6.6	6.1	8.6	6.7
Liberalerna – Liberals (L)	4.7	13.4	7.5	7.1	5.4	5.5	4.6
Kristdemokraterna – Christian Democrats (KD)	11.8	9.2	6.6	5.6	4.6	6.3	5.3
Moderate Samlingspartiet – Moderate Party (M)	22.9	15.3	26.2	30.1	23.3	19.8	19.1
Sverigedemokraterna – Sweden Democrats (SD)	0.4	1.4	2.9	5.7	12.9	17.5	20.5
Government	Persson I (S)	Persson II (S)	Reinfeldt I (M, C, L, KD)	Reinfeldt II (M, C, L, KD)	Löfven I (S, MP)	Löfven II / Anderss on I (S, MP)/(S)	Kristersson I (M, KD, L + SD[1])

Table 16: Swedish election results 1998-2022(percentage of votes); [1]Other governments had support parties too, however, the support of SD has been highlighted here for two reasons: First, the degree of formalisation has never been as high as in this cooperation, and second, it concerns directly the main research focus of this contribution.

The article proceeds as follows: after deriving guiding assumptions from theoretical and empirical accounts on partisan effects on environmental policy, I introduce my case selection, the novel dataset, and my method of analysis. Based on this, developments of Swedish environmental policy in its distributional dimension and relevant parties' environmental policy positions between 2001 and 2023 are analysed. Subsequently, I elaborate on SD's effects on these developments. The article finishes with a conclusion that considers limitations and outlines potentials for future research.

9.2 Partisan Theory in Environmental Policy

The classic version of partisan theory is straightforward. Relying on different core constituencies, different parties produce different policy outputs when they are in government (e.g., Schmidt 1996).

Traditionally, left parties are considered to prefer more state intervention and larger public budgets than right parties which advocate lean state structures (e.g., Hibbs 1977). Nowadays, partisan effects have been examined for various fields of policy, however, producing rather mixed results concerning the effects of parties (e.g., Potrafke 2017). For my investigation the field of environmental policy is most relevant.

When environmental issues first emerged in the political arena in the 1970s and 1980s, they have been widely understood as (part of) a new socio-cultural cleavage cross-cutting the traditional socio-economic line of conflict and, therefore, hardly could be explained by the left-right-scale (e.g., Müller-Rommel 1985). For instance, in Sweden environmental concerns have originally been integrated by the centre-right *Centerpartiet* (C) and, only later, taken up by the centre-left green party *Miljöpartiet de gröna* (MP) (Christensen, Dahlberg and Martinsson 2015). In general, emerging environmental regulation was challenging for both pure left and right ideologies. Whereas left parties traditionally were prone to state interventions, they perceived too strict environmental measures as threat to industry jobs going against the interests of their core constituencies (e.g., Neumayer 2003). Right parties often concurred with the preservative character of nature conservation (also for religious reasons), yet, they were at odds with any larger state intervention for economic reasons (Pilbeam 2003, Jahn 2022). Over time, however, the left-right-divide seems to have materialised also in environmental policy. Multiple researchers find left parties to take more pro-environmental positions (Carter 2013, Facchini, Gaeta and Michallet 2017) and to pursue more environmentally-friendly policies than right parties (Neumayer 2003, Jahn 2016). Taking this left-right-assumption as a starting point, however, the overall picture is more complicated. Some researchers indicate a mainstreaming of environmental concerns after a certain period of familiarisation and, thus, a programmatic convergence of parties on environmental policy (e.g., Garmann 2014). Also, research empirically proved multiple conservative parties to engage actively with environmental policies (Båtstrand 2015, Hess and Renner 2019). This is complemented by a theoretical perspective according to which conservatism and environmentalism can even be understood as "natural bedfellows" (Scruton 2006, p. 8). Classic conservatist essentials like the overall pursuit of maintenance and the idea of an intergenerational trusteeship between the present, past and future generations that includes the inheritance of a social and ecological order, seem perfectly compatible with specific goals of environmental policy and sustainability (Scruton 2006, Riedel 2021).

Yet, in order to understand the impact of PRRPs on environmental policy neither the traditional left-right- nor the mainstreaming hypothesis seems sufficient. Following more recent research on conflict structures in European party systems, it is necessary to reflect an increasingly important scale between *Green-Alternative-Libertarian* (GAL) and *Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist* (TAN) positions. This scale represents a modern interpretation of the socio-cultural cleavage and includes positions on the environment and above all on the subfield of climate mitigation (Bornschier 2010, Green-Pedersen and Little 2023). Advocates of this "neo-cleavage theory" (Hooghe and Marks 2018) find green parties on the GAL-end of the spectrum which embrace environmental questions most wholeheartedly and also

affect policy-making in this direction. On the opposite TAN-end of the spectrum, PRRPs are situated. The literature on PRRPs and environmental policy draws a split picture of related PRRP's positions (Lockwood 2018, Schaller and Carius 2019, Forchtner 2019b). On the one hand, PRRPs, in their majority, reject any larger engagement in sustainability policy which they often perceive as ideological projects driven by globalist elites contradicting the interests of 'the common people' (Lockwood 2018, Buzogány and Mohamad-Klotzbach 2022, Böhmelt 2021). For instance, regarding climate mitigation policy, they, time and again, question the existence of human-made climate change (Schaller and Carius 2019, Lockwood 2018). On the other hand, they typically sympathise with traditional environmental policy like nature protection measures idealising a special link between 'the land' and 'the people' (Forchtner and Kølvraa 2015, Forchtner 2020b). Research on whether these positions of PRRPs materialise in actual effects on environmental policy is growing but still scant. Jahn (2021) in his quantitative study on environmental policy outcomes of 28 EU member states finds "substantive proof" that PRRPs in government lead to increasing greenhouse gas emissions (p. 991f). Lockwood and Lockwood (2022) corroborate this negative effect of PRRPs in government for the climate policy output in an analysis of 31 OECD countries between 2007 and 2018. The effect of PRRPs on traditional environmental policy has received far less attention, but two studies on the Austrian PRRP *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ, Freedom Party of Austria), indeed, indicate a positive effect on these type of environmental policies (Voss 2020, Tosun and Debus 2020).

This brief overview on PRRPs' positions and effects in environmental policy leads to two assumptions regarding the first research question on the impacts of PRRPs in environmental policy:

(1) *Governments that include or depend on PRRPs show a low engagement in sustainability policies.*

(2) *Governments that include or depend on PRRPs show a high engagement in traditional environmental policy, like nature conservation*.

The second research question guiding this case study concerns the causal mechanisms underlying these potential effects of PRRPs on environmental policy. Regarding this, the studies referred to above have pointed to *direct* partisan effects. In line with the traditional partisan theory, these effects are understood to be straightforward and PRRPs take effect when they come into power. While this effect is indeed straightforward for political systems that usually produce single-party governments, it is less clear for countries with proportional elections systems in whose typical coalition governments PRRPs often obtain the role as minor coalition partner. In such constellations, PRRPs are found to be less able to unfold any larger influence on policy-making as illustrated for climate policies by Lockwood and Lockwood (2022) or Ćetković and Hagemann (2020). Generally, research has rightly pointed out that party positions and related policy activity to a large extent hinge upon various scope conditions (e.g., Häusermann, Picot and Geering 2013). Aside the mentioned institutional setting of electoral systems, I focus another of these scope conditions, i.e., an indirect partisan effect through party competition (ibid.). This effect can enrich our understanding of the causal mechanisms underlying the influence of PRRPs

and is likely to unfold especially in multi-party systems. In these systems, parties are both competitors on votes and potential partners for future government coalitions bringing to the fore two central goals of parties which may motivate them to adapt their policy positions: vote- and office-seeking (Green-Pedersen 2019, ch. 9, Strøm 1990). Triggered by the electoral success of PRRPs, established parties could be inclined to put less emphasis on sustainability matters, like climate mitigation efforts, in order to appease and win back voters potentially drawn to the PRRP. This reflects the "contagion effect" prominently introduced by Hicks and Swank (1992). According to the literature on other policy fields, the risk of such a contagion through vote-seeking is present not only for centre-right but also centre-left parties (e.g., Bale et al. 2010). Yet, for PRRPs in environmental policy, such a contagion effect, so far, could not be vindicated (Surdea-Hernea 2023). Instead, it is informative to turn to a contagion effect based on office-seeking. From this perspective, it is coalition considerations that make parties adjust their programmatic positions to remove potential obstacles for future coalitions (Green-Pedersen and Little 2023, Kayser and Rehmert 2021). This contagion argument seems to apply, primarily, for the centre-right parties which are ideologically more likely to form coalition with a PRRP. Importantly, such an office-seeking-based indirect partisan effect of PRRPs would occur *before* the actual coalition formation, but *after* the decision of parties to open up for a cooperation with the PRRP. As a result, the other coalition partners would bring positions into the coalition that are already shaped by the PRRP. Generally, this would qualify the argument of an ineffective minor coalition partner. To capture this effect of PRRPs on coalitions it is crucial to scrutinise the development of party positions before the actual coalition formation. Combined with the outlined position of PRRPs on environmental policy, the third assumption, therefore, is that:

(3) *Political parties that depend on a PRRP for coalition formation move programmatically towards the PRRP and show a low engagement in sustainability policies and a high engagement in traditional environmental policy after turning to the PRRP.*

Finally, party positions, in general, depend on further scope conditions than indirect partisan effects through party competition. First, regarding the bottom-up decision-making process in party democracies, parties are usually responsive to public sentiments (Bardi, Bartolini and Trechsel 2014). Public support of environmental matters is, therefore, pivotal for parties' willingness to address those matters (Ćetković and Hagemann 2020) and to compete on them. Hence, a high public support for environmental matters forwards a high partisan engagement in this field of policy. This public environmental sentiment is commonly understood to be influenced by the state of the economy and environmental positions are often said to be articulated and pursued more clearly in economically sound times (Facchini, Gaeta and Michallet 2017, Jahn 2016). Second, another positive effect can be expected from national commitments to international environmental policy regimes like the Paris Agreement that sets a conducive action framework for party positions and puts the topic higher up on the public agenda (Ćetković and Hagemann 2020).

9.3 Dataset and Methods

9.3.1 Dataset

In environmental policy analysis, researchers generally face a severe dependent variable problem and usually must make hard decisions concerning which specific aspects of the wide field of environmental policy to choose and how to collect valid data on these selected aspects (Töller 2022). This concerns both the policy output (Knill, Schulze and Tosun 2012) as well as the positions of political actors such as parties (Pollex and Berker 2022). Regarding the former, many studies substitute the policy output with the policy outcome whose causal link to policy-making, however, is not immediately provided (e.g., Neumayer 2003, Jahn 2016). For the positions of political parties on the environment, researchers usually rely on manifesto codings based on one or two items that hardly reflect environmental policy's complexity or on expert assessments that capture environmental policy positions only as a whole and, moreover, are external ascriptions (Pollex and Berker 2022). This article suggests another approach and derives party positions and policy output from the hard figures of annual budget proposals that in Sweden are published not only by governmental but also opposition parties. To be sure, the budget proposals of opposition parties are not entirely independent of the governmental proposal, which they take as yardstick, but as will be seen, they show sufficiently strong divergences to deduce specific policy emphases. Overall, looking at this often-neglected distributional dimension of environmental policy (Duit 2016) enables us to investigate party positions more differentiated.

The dataset comprises information on the annual allocation of governmental spending as proposed by parties or party alliances between 2001 and 2023. This period was chosen since both the field of environmental policy due to the growing global attention on climate policy (e.g., Oberthür and Groen 2017), and the party competition due to new-forged alliances and the entry of a new influential competitor, i.e., SD (Aylott and Bolin 2019, Hagevi 2022), showed considerable dynamism and, therefore, provided a sufficient degree of variance concerning the important elements. Furthermore, the budget for 2024 marks the halftime result of the new right government, so that the government's effects can be appraised on a first solid basis.

Relevant data were retrieved in the official online database of the Swedish parliament (*Dokument och Lagar*) searching for budget proposals of the respective year. Data collection focused only the spending parts of budget proposals that were explicitly labelled as part of the field of environmental policy, i.e., sector 20 of the budget "General environmental and nature management" (*Utgiftsområde 20 Allmän miljö- och naturvård*). Thus, I had to leave out spending items from other areas that unfold potential effects in environmental policy. For instance, multiple items from the sector 21 "Energy" (*Energi*), like the funding of wind or solar power, clearly relating to the environmental sector, are not considered in the database.

The retrieved raw data, thus, comprise amounts of governmental spending for each of the specific items, the environmental budget and the overall proposed governmental budget in total. To

prepare the data for an effective analysis of the environmental spending over time and across parties as well as for a more fine-grained analysis of the priorities given in the individual budgets *within* environmental policy, I ran two steps of data refinement. For a better comparability of the overall priority given to the environment over time, firstly, I calculated the environmental sector's spending percentage share of the overall governmental spending. For cross-case comparison, I calculated the average of all parliamentary parties' absolute environmental spending for each year and measured the deviation of each budget proposal from that average (for an example, Appendix 3A). To get to a more nuanced picture of which subfields of environmental policies are prioritised in the respective budgets, secondly, I inductively assigned the individual items to environmental policy subsectors, added up their amounts for each subsector, and calculated each subsector's relative share of the total environmental budget. Seven subsectors could be discerned: *Environmental Administration*, *Monitoring*, *Research*, *Nature Conservation*, *Climate Mitigation*, *Climate Adaptation* and a marginal *Residual Category* which comprises items that are either too general in target or too outlying to fit in one of main subsectors (for specific assignments, Appendix 3F). As will be shown below, the two major subsectors in terms of absolute and relative spending have been climate mitigation and nature conservations which represent suitable proxies for the introduced areas of sustainability policy and traditional environmental policy.

9.3.2 Methods of analysis

As stated in the introduction, the present case study represents a typical case study on a within-case level (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 3.1). In its theory-testing form, such case study aims to investigate a complementary hypothesis that sheds light on a cross-case relationship. For this endeavour both the cause and the outcome of the relevant relationship need to be present (ibid.). Since in Sweden, the new right government is supported significantly by the PRRP SD, X is clearly present. Likewise, we can expect a negative sustainability policy on the basis of previous studies (Jahn 2021), so that Y is most likely given as well. However, as in the cited research the development of traditional environmental policy is not considered, the latter is to be confirmed by the novel data analysed here.

The actual causal analysis takes cues from *causal process tracing* (CPT) (Blatter and Haverland 2012, ch. 3, Rohlfing 2012, ch. 6) which follows set-theoretical considerations by looking for necessary and sufficient conditions in configurations of factors evolving over time (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). More recently, the method of CPT has experienced some rich methodological advancement which in its purist form, however, represents a highly technical and hardly applicable endeavour. This said, I follow a more pragmatic approach of process tracing which is "focused, structured and aims at providing a narrative explanation of a causal path that leads to a specific outcome" (Ruffa 2020, p. 1144, Flyvbjerg 2006). Here, the distinctive focus is set by partisan theory concentrating on the factors presented in the theory section. While the data for parties' environmental positions and Swedish environmental policy output is derived from the presented dataset, the information on the other factors are collected from

different sources (for a list, Appendix 3E). The analytical accounts are mainly based on descriptive statistics which are performed and illustrated with R.

9.4 Analysis – The Effects of the new Right government and its parties on environmental policy – Does the PRRP make the Difference?

In line with the guiding assumptions the analysis is done in two steps: First, the environmental policy output of the new right government is investigated in the context of previous governments' policy output and based on the differentiated perspective on environmental policy facilitated by the novel dataset on Swedish environmental budgets applied here. Thus, the findings of previous research on sustainability policy are to be confirmed and, furthermore, complemented by separate information on traditional environmental policy. Second, the office-seeking-motivated contagion effect is investigated as a possible causal mechanism between the influence of PRRPs and the specific environmental budgets of the government. For the latter, the individual budgets of the four governmental parties are used as reflections of their environmental positions. They are scrutinised in a temporal perspective in order to detect possible changes that can be linked to the crucial changes of coalition considerations when first M and KD, and later L, opened up to a cooperation with SD from 2018 on.

9.4.1 Swedish Environmental Policy Output

The environmental policy activities of the new right government have become criticised from the start in autumn 2022. A first point of contention has been the reorganisation of the Ministry of Climate and Environment. After being organised as an independent government department since its inception in 1987, under the new right government it has been shifted under the authority of the combined Ministry of Climate and Enterprise. While there is still a Minister for Climate and Environment, the ministry is now formally headed by the Minister for Energy, Business and Industry[69]. Another major criticism concerned the government's announcement to reduce the Swedish biofuel blending obligations (*reduktionsplikt*), which was finally implemented in November 2023 (Betänkande 2023/24:MJU5). The government expects palpable fuel price reductions of this measure in times of energy crisis whereas critics perceive it as a significant drawback to meet the country's climate goals. This has been accompanied by several environmentally relevant changes in the most recent budgets.

While on the revenue side, importantly, environmental taxes on fossil car fuels have been reduced temporarily (Prop. 2022/23:1, p. 75; Prop. 2023/24:1, p. 273f), on the spending side, we can observe similar changes proving a major policy change in Swedish environmental policy. Based on the novel dataset, we can analyse these changes in a nuanced way and put them into a historical context.

[69] Dagens Nyheter 2022, 18/10/2022, "Nya regeringen lägger ner miljödepartementet". *https://www.dn.se/sverige/inget-miljodepartement-i-regeringsforklaringen/*, 15/01/2024.



Figure 25: Development of environmental policy in Swedish governmental budgets in absolute amounts (2002-2024). Author's own illustration and data; Explanations: the approved budgets are represented by filled circles and connected by a solid line; projections are represented by circles with a plus and are connected by a dashed line. The approved budget for 2022 was the joint budget of M, KD and SD. In the graph it is contrasted with the governmental budget proposal of S and MP. Both are labelled. The graph also shows a budget between 2022 and 2023. Main budgets, called autumn budgets, can be amended through spring budgets. Usually, these amendments are not significant and, rarely, concern the environmental policy sector. The spring budget of 2022 by S, however, meant a significant increase of environmental spending and, therefore, it is added in the figure.

Looking at the development of Swedish environmental policy budgets over the last two decades (Figure 25), four phases may be discerned: a first *phase of tentative growth* from 2001 to 2006 (= budgets: 2002-2007), a second *phase of stagnation* from 2006 to 2014 which was succeeded by a *phase of rapid growth* from 2014 to 2022, and finally, a new *phase of decline* from 2022[70]. To be sure, the governmental term of the new right government is still ongoing, but the budgets for 2023 and 2024 represent a halftime result of the new government, and thus, provide a first solid data basis for reflecting the overall direction of its policy activities. As such, they already mark a significant deviation in the development of

[70] Note that the percentage development is nearly congruent with the development of absolute spending numbers (Appendix 3B).

environmental policy spending and indicate that Sweden has entered a new phase of environmental policy[71].

To provide a fine-grained picture, we can examine these developments of Swedish environmental policy spending differentiated by environmental policy subsectors (Figure 26). We can see that the subsectors of administration, monitoring and research all diminished in relative proportions, however, their funding in absolute terms has also risen slightly. They represent the solid bedrock of Swedish environmental policy spending. Climate adaption has played only a minor role. The biggest dynamics can be observed in the changing prioritisation of nature conservation and climate mitigation measures. While nature conservation measures represent a major sector throughout the period of investigation, climate mitigation was only a minor area until 2015. From then on, it has turned into the biggest spending area in 2022. Being evidently the main driving force for the expansion of environmental policy spending in the rapid growth-phase after 2014, its share has increased from around 7% in the environmental budget of 2015 up to 56% in the adjusted spring budget of 2022. In absolute amounts this meant an increase by more than 20 times (2015: 0.48 billion SEK; 2022: 10.1 billion SEK, adj. 2022: 14 billion SEK). Yet, also investments for nature conservation measures have almost doubled in that period from 3.72 to 6.75 million SEK. In stark contrast, the budgets for 2023 and 2024 have entailed deep cuts in both sectors. Taking the last social democratic budget for 2022 as reference, the spending on climate mitigation measures was reduced first by 2.9 billion SEK (= -20.9%)[72] for 2023 and then by additional 0.96 billion SEK for 2024 amounting together to a decrease of 27.8% within two years. The investments in nature conservation were lowered by around 1.99 billion SEK (= -29.5%) but then raised again by 0.68 billion SEK which in sum still indicates a decrease of 19.4% compared to 2022 (Figure 26).

[71] The budget projections for the following years (2025 and 2026) buttress this trend change of environmental policy spending.

[72] These numbers result from the exclusive focus on budget area 20 in the data. As two big items of climate mitigation, i.e., support of charging infrastructure and bio fuels, have been moved (back) to the budget area 21 *energy*. Without these two items included, the cuts would still amount to 1.87 billion SEK (= -14.5%).



Figure 26: Development of environmental policy in Swedish governmental budgets in absolute amounts differentiated by environmental policy subsectors (2002-2024). Author's own illustration and data; For explanations see Figure 25

In summary, considering the first two environmental budgets of its incumbency, the new right coalition has implemented drastic cutbacks resulting in reductions of absolute environmental spending by more than 22% from rounded 24.8 billion SEK (≈ 2.2 billion €) in the (adjusted) budget for 2022 to 19.3 billion SEK (≈ 1.7 billion €) in the budget for 2024. These figures answer the first research question and evidence a clear negative effect of the new right government on environmental policy. Therefore, the findings of previous studies on sustainability policy and the first assumption of this study are confirmed looking at its distributional dimension. At the same time, the results contradict the second assumption on traditional environmental policy as the considerable cuts concern not only climate mitigation measures but also the sector of nature conservation.

9.4.2 Exploring Partisan Effects of Sverigedemokraterna in Swedish Environmental Policy-making

At first sight, the identified phases of Swedish environmental policy match strikingly well with the left-right expectations from the traditional partisan theory. While the phases of growth (first tentative, then rapid) fall in legislative terms of left governments, the phase of stagnation and the start of decline

occurred in the terms of the right coalitions. Is a right-wing government, therefore, a sufficient condition for low environmental policy spending? Zooming in on the two right-wing governments in the period of investigation, we can see that in the first three years of the centre-right Reinfeldt-government, environmental policy had continued its cautious growth trajectory and that, first, the budget proposal of 2010 contained visible, still only minor, cut-backs in the policy area (-6.7% from 2010 to 2013). This is qualitatively different to the spending cuts implemented by the Kristersson-government. Thus, this observation questions the traditional partisan hypothesis and portends the effects of other factors. The biggest difference between the two governments must be seen in the substitution of SD for C which could be understood as first hint to a larger influence of SD in the field of environmental policy. However, the other three parties (M, KD and L) that have been part of both coalitions, also have shown slightly negative trends concerning their environmental position (Bakker et al. 2020a) and salience (Lehmann et al. 2022) since 2014 (Appendix 3D) – that means clearly before they moved to SD for office-seeking reasons.

Going beyond general positionings on environmental issues, the dataset applied here lets us trace back party positions in more detail and, thus, shed light on effects of party competition, i.e., which of the new government's positions are attributable to the centre-right parties and which to SD. Examining the distribution of environmental spending in right parties' budget proposals across environmental policy subsectors (Figure 27), we see that until 2022 these parties tended to support the rapid expansion from 2015 on and put a strong emphasis on climate mitigation measures – with the exception of SD. While M (48.4%), KD (49%) and L (42.3%) proposed to spend more than 40% of environmental spending on climate mitigation measures, SD dedicated only 15.6% to this sector. In contrast, it budgeted more than 53% of environmental spending for nature conservation. However, in absolute numbers even for the latter sector M and L planned larger amounts which indicates SD's overall low spending levels in environmental policy. These observations confirm general assumptions on PRRP's sustainability policy positions for SD (Hultman, Björk and Viinikka 2020), yet it qualifies the party's stance on traditional environmental policy to be less positive than expected. At the same time, it shows that the centre-right parties which got closer to SD did not adapt their environmental positions simultaneously.



Figure 27: Development of environmental policy in Swedish right parties' budgets in absolute amounts differentiated by environmental policy subsectors (2002-2024). Author's own illustration and data; Explanations: Since SD first entered national parliament in 2010, data is only available for budgets from 2011 on. For 2022, M, KD and SD presented first individual budgets and then a joint budget. The latter is represented by circles with a plus in the respective graphs.

The budget for 2022 marked a historical turn in the treatment of SD representing the first official cooperation between SD and other parties. M, KD and SD presented a joint budget and in a tight parliamentary situation succeeded in putting it through in parliament against the budget of the red-green minority government (Riksdagens protokoll 2021/22:33). For the environmental sector, this joint budget remained close to the red-green government as also M's position was quite similar. KD and especially SD had to make large concessions to M and agreed on a considerably higher spending amount on climate mitigation compared to their own budget proposals of that year. For nature conservation, the three parties came to terms on a level close to the original proposal by SD which meant an increase for KD and a slight decrease for M (Figure 27). At this point, like the Liberals, M showed considerably higher environmental ambitions than KD and SD and seemed to have 'domesticated' them in their first budget collaboration.

The divergent environmental positioning among Swedish right parties can be further illustrated, when we compare them with the other parliamentary parties examining deviations from the yearly averages (Figure 28). At the beginning of the period of investigation, all parties, including the left parties, proposed similar environmental budgets. Only M paid decreasing attention to the environment until they entered the centre-right *Alliance* in 2006. In the next two governments, the *Alliance*-parties together addressed the environmental sector below-average, which concurs with the phase of stagnation identified above. For the budget proposal 2011, the centre-right bloc considered the sector slightly below-average, while SD, as parliamentary newcomer, took an average position. Considering the distributional dimension of environmental policy, Swedish parties still converged environmentally significantly at this "zenith of 'bloc politics'" in 2010 (Aylott and Bolin 2015, p. 731). Thereafter, an intensifying divergence was observable among the right parties. Some former *Alliance*-parties (C, L, M) first showed some reservations towards environmental policy spending, but especially from 2018 on, they have embraced the topic increasingly more. In this year, there were not only elections in Sweden but also the country experienced severe forest fires, which might have shifted the public focus to environmental issues. L started at a low level, then levelled up joining the January Agreement[73] for the budget 2020 and expanded its environmental budget even after it left the agreement. Although it was not part of the January Agreement, M, equally, increased its environmental policy spending well above-average until 2022. Environmental EU-requirements to receive Covid-19-recovery funds might have played its part here. However, KD and, particularly, SD estimated considerably lower investments for environmental policy and ended up suggesting around 2.2 billion SEK (KD) and 7.8 billion SEK (SD) below the general average (Figure 28).

[73] In January 2019 S, MP, C and L agreed on a policy deal that secured the support of C and L for the red-green government in parliament. The agreement was necessary to ensure majorities without SD (Eriksson 2019, Aylott and Bolin 2019).



Figure 28: Development of environmental policy spending in Swedish parties' budget proposals: Deviation from yearly averages (2002-2024). Author's own illustration and data; Explanations: For budget 2022 M, KD and SD presented first individual budgets and then a joint budget. The latter is represented by a square with a plus and labelled accordingly

Considering these historical developments of positions, the third assumption on an office-seeking motivated contagion effect through SD prior to the coalition formation must be rejected. While the average spending of all parties has increased throughout the period of investigation (Appendix 3C), all three parties directly involved in the new right government had kept a comparatively low profile in environmental policy even without the influence of SD. This holds true for both subsectors of climate mitigation and nature conservation. In hindsight, the period between 2018 and 2022, in which M and L adopted rather environmentally-friendly positions, must be understood as an exception rather than a rule. For M, this is also indicated by the coalition negotiations in 2022: As second largest party of the new alliance and prime minister party, it could have been expected to put a larger weight on the environmental area in the negotiations if it had addressed environment issues for ideological reasons. In contrast, L represents the smallest party in the new party alliance and, although they provide the minister of climate and environment, their overall impact must be deemed rather limited. Therefore, the actual level of its climate and environmental ambitions is hard to appraise. KD's and SD's positions are clear and completely compatible with the budget decisions for 2023 and 2024. While KD stood for a stronger

environmental policy in the beginning of the 2000s, since then it took an increasingly rejective position. In its election programme of 2018, it dedicated, in fact, 0% to environmental matters (Lehmann et al. 2022). SD has put, proportionally, a main emphasis on nature conservation. However, overall, it has always advocated for very low spending levels in the environmental sector. In sum, the environmental budgets of the new right government are not explained through office-seeking accommodations towards SD but are rather explained by traditional partisan effects: in the Swedish case, a right party government is a necessary condition for low environmental policy spendings.

Nevertheless, a different party competition argument can be derived from the analysis. The massively increased vote share of SD led to changed coalition considerations among Swedish parties and the formation of two new blocs (Aylott 2022, Aylott and Bolin 2023). While some parties rule out any cooperation with SD (V, MP, S and C), other parties (M, KD and L) have turned to SD to gain governmental office (Hagevi 2022). Strikingly, the parties opposing SD include all parties that advocate more ambitious environmental policies in the Swedish party system. In this situation, Swedish centre-right parties do not depend on environmental ambitious parties (like C in the past), to gain office and obtain parliamentary majorities. This missing of a 'green voice' in a coalition can be understood as pivotal factor for low environmental policy spending and it has been facilitated by a strong SD. Therefore, for the Swedish case, a strong SD and a right-party government depending on the PRRP represent necessary conditions for a sufficient configuration, i.e., INUS-conditions[74]. Furthermore, in contrast to the vote- and office-seeking pressure from SD, the electoral pressure from more environmentalist opposition parties has been low: both C and MP lost votes in the election of 2022 (Table 16). Thus, in the end, centre-right parties are not forced to pursue a less ambitious environmental policy by the PRRP but they are allowed to do so[75,76].

This conclusion is corroborated if we consider pertinent scope conditions potentially influencing the position of centre-right parties and, thus, also the turn in Swedish environmental policy. First, regarding the intensifying political discourses on climate change on UN-level as well as EU-level (e.g., Oberthür and Groen 2017), there has been an institutional context establishing the need for environmental action. In fact, EU commission required countries to address climate mitigation measures to receive Covid-19-recovery-funding. The sharp increase of environmental spending for 2021 and 2022 might be partially explained by this eligibility conditions and it puts the size of cutbacks by the Kristersson-government into context. However, considering the budget proposals of the other parties and the continuous validity of the funding requirements, the partisan effect is still evident. A second

[74] *Insufficient* but *necessary* part of a condition which is itself *unnecessary* but *sufficient* for the result (e.g., Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu 2009).

[75] We can observe this 'missing of a green voice'-effect also for the centre-left S. In its independent budgets, they apply considerably less ambitious spending levels on environmental policy compared to the joint budgets with MP.

[76] A similar – presumably less intense – effect could also unfold in so-called grand coalitions which, however, is inconceivable in the traditional logic of bloc politics in Sweden and, thus, has been ruled out by S and M.

scope condition concerns the public demand for environmental matters which has been favourable for ambitious actions as it has increased more recently (SOM, Göteborgs universitet 2022). Third, stable economic conditions represent an important context factor for governmental environmental action. Even during the Covid-19-pandemic Sweden has increased its GDP per capita[77], so that this condition was positively present. Yet, in 2022 the Russian war against Ukraine has unsettled the markets and shifted the attention to other fields of policy. In fact, environmental and climate policy have not been prominently discussed in the election campaign of 2022 (Hagevi 2022). It seems likely that this context, and less the government ideology, plays a major part for the positions and decisions of the new right government. However, two arguments speak against this "emergency politics"-argument (e.g., Schmidt 2022). First, the situational and institutional context still keeps the environment on the political agenda as the EU continues to forge ahead with the topic pushing forward the European Green Deal as one of its major projects today (Claeys, Tagliapietra and Zachmann 2019). Second, since the cutbacks are consistently planned over the course of the next years for which the further development of the situational context is unpredictable, the projections of the budget must be understood as a clear positioning and, thus, make the case for an ideological rather than a situational rationale.

9.5 Conclusion

This contribution examined the effects and underlying causal mechanisms of the PRRP SD in Sweden putting it into the context of the development of Swedish environmental policy over the last 20 years from a party research perspective. Utilising a novel dataset on budget proposals of individual Swedish parties and party alliances, it looked at the often-neglected distributional dimension of environmental policy. On this basis, the analysis focused the positioning of centre-right party positions and related policy decisions in the wake of the rising influence of the populist radical right SD. In summary, it can be concluded that Swedish environmental policy spendings have increased from 2002 until 2022 in the parliamentary approved budgets. In these budgets, for a long time, *nature conservation* represented the major environmental subsector until it was overtaken by *climate mitigation* from 2015 on. The budget for 2023 was a turning point of Swedish environmental policy and has ushered in a phase of decline that has been confirmed by the ensuing budget for 2024.

Partisan effects have been confirmed as a major explaining factor for this policy change. In line with traditional partisan theory, the Swedish centre-right parties involved in the new government kept a rather low profile on environmental policy spending and the historical developments suggest that deviating moves upwards by the conservative M and the liberal L have rather been strategically motivated. The Christian Democratic KD and, especially, the PRRP SD, showed constantly low levels of environmental ambitions and proposed severe cutbacks of environmental policy spending in their individual budgets. This adds to the still scant literature on right parties' positions on environmental

[77] OECD (2022). https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gross-domestic-product-gdp.htm, 15/01/2024.

issues (Hess and Renner 2019) and qualifies claims that the Swedish representatives of these parties, generally, embrace environmental and, in particular, climate mitigation matters (Båtstrand 2015, Carter 2013). Instead, a right party government is a necessary condition for lower environmental policy spendings rejecting an environmental policy mainstreaming for the Swedish case.

Considering the influence of SD, the qualitative analysis suggests that the strong presence of SD as a support party is, in fact, a necessary complement that together with a right-party government makes a sufficient configuration for a less ambitious environmental policy since it provides mainstream right parties with the opportunity to form a governmental coalition without a 'green voice'. As stated above, it can be concluded that environmental policy plays no major part for these parties, ideologically, and in the new party competition constellation they also lack vote- or office-seeking strategic incentives to address the issue (Green-Pedersen and Little 2023). This speaks to the general literature on PRRP's influence on environmental policy and adds another causal mechanism that focuses coalition considerations. Thus, it presents evidence for a reversed version of the indirect effect posited by Ćetković and Hagemann (2020) in their comparative case study on PRRPs' impacts on low-carbon energy transitions. The authors found an indirect positive influence of PRRPs, if mainstream parties exclude PRRPs as coalition partners and, consequently, "reach out to new partners among social-liberal, green, or other smaller parties which have progressive energy and climate positions" (ibid., p. 2). A prerequisite of such an effect is a consistent *cordon sanitaire* by the majority of other parties. If this is not present, the 'missing of a green voice'-effect detected in this case study is likely to evolve. Instead of adapting their own policy position and keeping their strategical demarcation from the PRRP, the three centre-right parties rather kept their policy positions and adapted their office-seeking strategies by opening up to the PRRP. As similar reconfigurations of party competition patterns take place in countries across Europe (Jungar and Jupskås 2014, Bornschier 2010), and mainstream parties are forced to decide over cooperation or (non-)cooperation with electorally growing PRRPs, this finding is important for the research on other European party democracies.

For Sweden, despite the clear direction of environmental policy-making indicated by the mid-term review of two of the four budgets in a legislative term, the environmental policy of the right government is still developing and future research is needed to confirm these findings. It will be important to examine also other dimensions of environmental policy like regulative policies and other economic instruments like environmental taxes or so-called negative subsidies, that counteract effective nature conservation or climate mitigation (Skovgaard and van Asselt 2019), and look if they triangulate the findings presented here.

Overall, the analysis of budget proposals proved to be a highly informative and at the same time pragmatic approach to investigate the development of Swedish environmental policy over time. Future research on environmental policy could utilise this budget approach also for cross-national comparisons. This applies above all to other Scandinavian countries in which we find similar budget processes but also to countries in which only governmental parties submit budget proposals as it provides us with a

valuable possibility to examine partisan effects on actual policy outputs. Environmental policy represents a multi-dimensional and cross-sectional issue and examining its distributional dimension can serve as a promising complement for researchers to arrive at a picture as complete as possible. This contribution showed that the Swedish PRRP has been an important factor for an at least temporary decline in Swedish environmental policy. However, its impacts clearly depend on other parties behaviour bringing to the fore the *interactive* environmental policy effects of populist radical right *and* centre-right parties in the context of changing party competition constellations all over Europe.

10 *Article 4*: Aviation Policy Instrument Choice in Europe: High Flying and Crash Landing? Understanding Policy Evolutions in the Netherlands and Germany (with Michael Böcher)

Berker, Lars E., and Michael Böcher. 2022. "Aviation Policy Instrument Choice in Europe: High Flying and Crash Landing? Understanding Policy Evolutions in the Netherlands and Germany." Journal of Public Policy 42 (3): 593-613. doi: 10.1017/S0143814X22000034.

10.1 Introduction

In the Paris agreement, countries have committed themselves to decrease their carbon emissions drastically. Against this background, in transport policy aviation has become an emblematic bone of contention since it is proven to be the most polluting mode of transport (Rothengatter 2020). In sum, around 2.5 % of global carbon emissions are caused by global aviation transport, although different studies indicate a potentially higher greenhouse gas effect of up to 5 % or even beyond due to more influential non-CO_2-emissions, e.g., nitrogen oxides (Lee et al. 2009, Lee et al. 2021). At the same time, global aviation traffic is deemed essential for global interactions and trade, and it has continuously grown in the years until 2020. While the number of flights has decreased significantly in the COVID-19 pandemic, the sector is expected to return to its growth trajectory after the pandemic (Gössling and Humpe 2020). As this growth regularly entails a substantial increase of emissions, the regulation of aviation transport epitomises general characteristics of environmental policies representing the classic conflict between ecological and economic interests. For aviation transport, in principle, policymakers have a number of instruments at their disposal which aim at technological innovations of airplanes, the development and use of alternative low-carbon fuels or the reduction of the absolute number of flights (Larsson et al. 2019, Fichert, Forsyth and Niemeier 2020). In our study, we focus only on instruments targeting the latter goal, for which – if governments have taken action at all – the introduction of aviation taxes[78] is the policy that as our analysis shows is the only nationally available and, accordingly, the one that has been chosen most. While it is rather evident, why national governments, generally, have been reluctant to regulate the aviation sector regarding specific institutional settings like the *Chicago Convention* (Conrady, Fichert and Sterzenbach 2019; see below), the factors accounting for variations in national political handling of aviation transport have hardly been addressed by political scientists so far (Forsyth 2020). Thus, it is striking that some countries have successfully implemented regulations of aviation transport in form of an aviation tax while other countries have not. As "successful," we understand legislative implementation that has remained in place throughout our period of investigation

[78] Aviation taxes, also called ticket taxes, "levy a tax on each origin-destination passenger departing from an airport in the country where the tax is applied" (Faber and Huigen 2018, p. 8).

(policy output) irrespective of its actual problem-solving or side-effects (policy outcome). Within the harmonised *European Economic Area,* this situation represents an interesting puzzle, in particular as this variance of output is present even among environmental pioneer states (Liefferink et al. 2009, Duit 2016). This, ultimately, yields our research question *why did some European countries successfully adopt an aviation tax?*

For exploring our research question, we concentrate on the Netherlands and Germany which showed a substantially different handling of the aviation tax in a comparable period of time (from 2008 until 2021). Specifically, we focus on the processes of policy-making in these two countries since these provide us with consistent explanations for causal backgrounds of national instrument choice (Hall 2003, Blatter and Haverland 2014).

In our work, we follow research on instrument choice in environmental policy and apply the heuristics of the *Political Process-inherent Dynamics Approach* (PIDA) (Böcher and Töller 2015). As this approach integrates explanatory factors of policy analysis and has been used to study instrument choice and change (Böcher and Töller 2007, Böcher 2012), it suits our main research interest to explore possible explanations and their related causal configurations for the variance in the taxation of aviation transport among European countries. Methodologically, our research design applies a *causes-of-effect*-perspective and represents a case-oriented research approach (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, ch. 3, Rohlfing 2012, ch. 2).

As central findings, in our comparative case study, we identify temporally and nationally diverging conceptions of problem structures as well as different configurations of party competition as main explanatory factors for instrument choice and aviation policy evolution.

Our contribution proceeds as follows: in the next sections, we outline foundations of instrument choice research and present the PIDA. After that, we explain our general research approach including the selection of the illustrative case studies; before, we explore specific factors shaping instrument choice in aviation policy in a comparative case analysis. In the final section, we summarise the main conclusions and put these into perspective of current debates on environmental and economic rationales of policy-making.

10.2 Instrument choice in environmental policy

The choice of policy instruments has long been an important research question in policy research and especially in environmental policy (Salamon 2002, Böcher 2012, Howlett 2019, Capano and Howlett 2020, Capano, Pritoni and Vicentini 2020). Research on instrument choice, which developed as early as the 1980s, initially assumes that the state can use different instruments to achieve policy goals, including regulation, taxation or persuasion (Böcher 2012). Even in this early literature, it was argued that instruments are not chosen based on whether they best solve the policy problem, but that instrument choice often depends on political processes including institutional back- ground, power relations and conflicts between different interests (Woodside 1986). Especially in environmental policy, instrument

choice has been for long a major research topic: starting point was here the observation that the state mainly relied on command-and-control instead of more efficient market-based instruments suggested by environmental economists (Larrue 1995). Thus, in research on instrument choice, importantly, "choice" does not mean that the state always selects the "best" alternative between different available instruments, but rather that an instrument is often used for political reasons without really considering other instruments, or that alternative instruments are often only theoretically available. Instrument choice is an umbrella term for research that deals with questions of why an instrument was designed exactly the way it was, why it was chosen and not another or even what differences exist between similar instruments introduced in different countries or policy fields (Hahn 1989, Jordan, Wurzel and Zito 2013, Bähr 2010, Mann and Roberts 2018). At that early stage of instrument research, it became clear that instrument choice deals with considering "how policy makers select instruments in practice" (Bressers and Klok 1988, p. 22) and that "perceptions of the proper "tool to do the job" intervenes between context and choice" (Linder and Peters 1989, p. 35). The idea behind eco-taxes as a market-based environmental policy instrument is that ecologically undesirable actions (e.g. emissions) are priced by the intro- duction of a tax. An eco-tax, therefore, should help as a price signal to confront polluters with the ecological consequences of their economic action (Böcher 2010). However, research on the introduction of such market-based instruments showed early on that such instruments were rarely introduced in their "textbook" version (Hahn 1989). Regarding eco-taxes, key findings were as follows: (1) the tax rate, often, is too low to stimulate behavioural change, as the taxes were not imposed to provide incentives for more environmentally friendly behaviour, but to generate revenue for the state budget (Bressers and Huitema 1999, Hahn 2013). (2) When economic incentives are implemented, they encounter institutional paths of environmental policy that endure. Market-based instruments then exist parallelly to other regulations and complement but do not replace them. In practice, economic instruments compete with long-standing regulations and are often only added to the range of existing instruments (Hahn 1989, Bressers and Huitema 1999). More recent instrument research refers to this as "layering" or the incremental emergence of policy mixes (Jordan, Wurzel and Zito 2013, Wurzel, Zito and Jordan 2013). (3) Another important finding is that the rate of an introduced tax is often very low at the beginning and only slowly moves to the direction of economic incentives mainly to tame political resistance (Hahn 2013). Based on these findings, an open question is how to analyse and explain these observed deviations from textbook rationality regarding the introduction of new market-based instruments. In our article, we want to examine to what extent we can identify similar empirical phenomena in the case of aviation taxes and scrutinise concrete policy choices on the basis of PIDA.

10.3 Analytical framework political process-inherent dynamics approach (PIDA)

The PIDA has been developed to analyse environmental policy processes and explain their outputs, like policies or emerging instruments (Böcher 2012, Böcher and Töller 2012, 2015). PIDA was inspired by an early version of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework by Kiser and Ostrom

(Kiser and Ostrom 1982). Like the IAD, PIDA serves as an analytical framework integrating different factors as independent variables influencing policy processes and the emergence of policies. PIDA highlights, like IAD, the role of actors and institutions. However, PIDA does not examine the emergence of institutional rules as answers to collective action problems and derive recommendations from them, such as conditions that lead to successful governance of the commons (Ostrom 1990). The biggest difference, and the reason why we use PIDA, is that IAD has mostly been applied to decentralised common good problems (Clement 2010). Unlike IAD, PIDA explicitly takes into account different factors of the overarching policy processes that shape institutions and policy instruments "politically" and particularly emphasises the conflicts between, e.g., political interest groups and political parties that are central to explaining policies but do not play a particularly important role in IAD (Clement 2010, Tosun and Workman 2017). PIDA emphasises the interests of parties and political actors, the role of institutions as enabling or hindering factors, and above all highlights chance, dynamics and power-determined aspects that may even lead to "suboptimal" policies not solving problems. Since PIDA also integrates the actual availability of alternative measures as an explanatory factor and has already been successfully applied in instrument choice studies, this approach is particularly well suited for our study (see for a recent application of PIDA: Pelaez Jara 2020). Another alternative to PIDA could be policy design approaches (Eliadis, Hill and Howlett 2005, Peters 2018, Howlett 2019). Such approaches, however, in our view, assume too strongly as if policymakers, when confronted with a policy problem, could draw on a "toolbox" of instruments from which to choose the most appropriate one based on (nearly) complete information. Since we, first, do not take it for granted that politicians are necessarily interested in problem-solving and second, assume that lobbying interests and other politico-economic factors strongly influence the selection of aviation taxes and that the instrument does not correspond to ideal design, we do not apply policy design approaches here. For PIDA, policy-making is "characterized rather by developments that are the outcome of chance and inherent dynamics than (mainly) by formal-rational, public-good-orientated problem solving" (Böcher and Töller 2015, p. 16). Power and the interests of powerful groups often prevent "rational" policy design, which is particularly evident in environmental policy in view of the countless discussions about climate policy that is too weakly designed (Cullenward and Victor 2020). In a recent contribution, Howlett writes precisely that policy design research assumes a government that serves public interests and often overlooks the "dark side" of politics (Howlett 2021). Howlett therefore proposes a new research agenda that also looks much more closely at such power-driven aspects of policy (Howlett 2021). In this context, PIDA could inform policy design research in the future.

The main argument of PIDA is that policies are neither the result of rational problem-solving processes nor the result of pure interest aggregation (Böcher and Töller 2012, 2015). The central factor determining political processes are *actors* and their interests. Individual or collective actors' activities take place under certain institutional framework conditions, which can be formal or informal and action-constraining or action-enabling. These *institutions,* understood as formal or informal rules, affect the

possible implementation of policy alternatives by either extending or limiting the options available for policymakers' choices (Scharpf 2000). Important are institutional path dependencies, meaning that political decisions determine a long-term path that political actors cannot leave or easily change (Peters 2019). Another influencing factor is the *problem structure* that affects different aspects of the policy process. Is there a clear political problem with a clear solution or are there contested problems leading to political conflicts about how to solve them? Are there distributional conflicts between different societal groups resulting from different policy alternatives? Another factor is that of available *instrumental alternatives*. Can all theoretically conceivable instrument alternatives really be selected in a political decision-making situation, or do institutional path dependencies, political interests and power relations, or dominant social discourses, unfold a restricting effect? Actual possible instrument choice often diverges from theoretical options in policy. Furthermore, unexpected *situational aspects* representing external factors like scandals and catastrophes can change the course of a political debate and open new windows of opportunity (Böcher 2012, Böcher and Töller 2015). PIDA aims to explain policies in which the institutional framework plays a major role and conflicts and changes in actor behaviour occur in the political process because of their inherent dynamics and problem structures. So far, the approach has been used to analyse different cases in environmental policy (Vogelpohl et al. 2021b, Vogelpohl et al. 2021a) and more recently in housing policy (Slavici 2021) or governance of European genome editing (Ladu 2020).

PIDA helps to analyse and explain instrument choice in environmental policy (Böcher and Töller 2007, Böcher 2012). It is here argued that the choice of environ- mental policy instruments does not follow straightforward problem-solving, after which politicians select the instrument that seems best suited for the solution. Furthermore, policy instruments are neither the result of the power and interests of political actors alone, nor the result of comprehensive political learning processes. Rather, in the policy-making process, we identify elements of political rationality that act as restricting or enabling filters and thereby reduce the theoretically available range of policy instruments before governments adopt a specific instrument and not another or a special variation of an instrument (Figure 29).



Figure 29: PIDA as analytical framework for studying instrument choice (Böcher and Töller 2007, adapted from Böcher 2012)

According to PIDA, policy instrument choice is the result of the interaction of different factors which leads to two contradictory consequences: on the one hand, the range of available policy instruments increases (Böcher and Töller 2007, 2012). This is the case, e.g., when, due to societal discourses and the influence of scientific policy advice, alternative instruments are more strongly taken up and discussed in the political process. On the other hand, some factors like institutions, the problem structure or power and interests of political actors limit the degree of instrumental change. This is the case when distributional effects of a possible introduction of new instruments become known and groups that are negatively affected by the consequences of a new instrument, e.g., higher costs due to a new tax, engage in lobbying or when institutions such as constitutional law oppose the introduction of new instruments. Due to different political systems, these factors may differ between countries and may lead to variations in the policy output (Böcher and Töller 2007, 2012).

10.4 Methodology

For our study, all countries are relevant in which the introduction of a ticket tax for international aviation passenger transport has been on the agenda at some point of time irrespective of the ultimate status of the tax[79] (for an overview, see Faber and Huigen 2018). Exploring policy-making processes in an underresearched area of policy analysis, however, we rely on a case-sensitive research design and therefore could not include all cases in our study. Instead, we opted for a paired comparison which grants us a maximum of case intimacy and helps us to avoid looking only at national idiosyncrasies (Tarrow 2010). The Netherlands, here, is particularly interesting since it had introduced an aviation tax, which was abolished only one year later, and most recently reintroduced such a tax. Considering this variety, we deem it most suitable for our purposes to explore and illustrate explanations for specific aviation policy instrument choice. By including Germany as a second case, we examined a positive case selection as we looked for relevant cases that discussed the issue within a comparable period of time and share further scope conditions (especially EU membership and presence of a major aviation hub[80]) but differ most on the dependent variable. The development in the German case displays stability (positive case) whereas the Netherlands has long represented a case of failed implementation (negative but possible case) (Blatter and Haverland 2012, ch. 3) (Table 17). Furthermore, the two countries are interesting since they mutually are main point of references in public debates on the aviation taxes. In terms of research design, this case selection, ultimately, forms a *most similar cases with different outcomes design* (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009).

[79] In Europe, as of 2021 an aviation tax is in place in eight countries: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK (EU 2019).
[80] Based on data from the *Airports Council International Europe,* for us a major aviation hub is present in a country if one or more airports in the period of investigation are consistently among the top 10 in the list of traffic volume, i.e., airports with an average number of more than 39.000.000 passengers per year.

COUNTRY	MAJOR AVIATION HUBS (2008-2019) (IATA-CODES)	AVIATION TAX (YEAR OF ADOPTION)
FRANCE	CDG	*yes*, low (1999)
GERMANY	FRA, MUC	*yes,* moderate (2011)
ITALY	FCO	*yes,* low/moderate (1993)
NETHERLANDS	AMS	*yes*, moderate (2008) *no* (2010-2020) *yes*, low (2021)
SPAIN	MAD, BCN	*no*
UK	LHW, LGW	*yes,* high (1994)

Table 17: Presence of aviation taxes in EU countries with major aviation hubs as of July 2021

The data collection relied on the analysis of a comprehensive number of documents including election programmes, coalition agreements, parliamentary documents as well as media reports. Based on the terms commonly used for the tax in the two countries ("vliegbelasting" and "Luftverkehrsabgabe"), national parliamentary databases have been scrutinised in order to reproduce the policy-making processes around the ticket taxes in an inclusive manner. To identify the relevant media articles, two media databases have been used (Dow Jones Factiva and Nexis Uni). The research has been complemented by a literature review on aviation trans- port policy. For data analysis, we applied an "inductive process tracing" (Falleti and Mahoney 2015) as we sifted relevant information from the various documents, put this information in chronological order and first afterwards sorted it guided by the PIDA-dimensions. Gerring (2017, ch. 8.2) refers to this mode of analysis quite generally as "qualitative analysis," and it has been applied successfully elsewhere (see e.g., Müller and Thurner 2017). Thus, we produced "thick" chronological case descriptions (Blatter and Blume 2008) on the policy evolutions in both countries.

10.5 The Dutch *Vliegbelasting*: A policy round trip that ultimately looped the loop

The Netherlands is considered a busy bee regarding environmental policy-making (Liefferink et al. 2009, Duit 2016). Therefore, it is no surprise that they were among the first movers in Europe regulating the national aviation sector. Following the elections from 2006, the new government of the conservative *Christen-Democratisch Appèl* (CDA), the social democratic *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA) and the Christian- orthodox *ChristenUnie* (CU) agreed in their coalition contract on the introduction of an aviation tax (*Source*: NL01[81]). This *vliegbelasting* (*English:* aviation tax) was part of a governmental programme aimed at an environmental "greening" of the Dutch tax system based on the *polluter-pays*-principle (NL02, NL03, NL07). The Ministry of Finance stressed the need to create incentives for environmentally friendly behaviour among citizens and to internalise environmental costs into prices (NL07, NL17). From the beginning, the argumentation was related first and foremost to environmental reasons, and only secondly – and to a much smaller extent – to the fiscal argument of tax revenue (NL05, NL17). At the end of 2007, the tax was adopted in both chambers and supported by multiple parties with

[81] For the list of sources, *see* Appendix 4.

only[82] the liberal *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (VVD) and the populist radical right *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV) as opposers (*Source*: NL21, NL31). The tax was finally implemented by 1 July 2008 providing tax rates differentiated by two categories: € 11.25 for destinations that lie within the European Union or that are less than 2,500 km from the Dutch airport of departure; and € 45.00 for all other destinations (Vliegbelasting, Art. 36re, NL04). For the next years, the revenue of the tax was expected to amount € 350 million per year (estimated for 2009–2011) and € 179 million for the remaining half in 2008 (NL17). In socioeconomic terms, the government estimated that the growth of the aviation sector is only to be delayed but that no losses of existent jobs will occur[83] (NL17, NL22). Ecologically, the tax should lead to a decreasing number of passengers, less flight movements and less harmful emissions (NL17). From the beginning of the legislative process, the *vliegbelasting* was very contested.

In parliament, above all, the VVD and the PVV argued persistently against the tax seeing it as part of "de groene manie van dit cabinet" (*English*: "the green obsession of the cabinet," Mark Rutte, VVD, NL26). Implying its negative economic *and* environmental impacts, the parties stimulated parliamentary debates on and sub- mitted (unsuccessful) motions against the tax (NL05, NL06, NL19, NL23, NL24, NL25). One main argument was that the tax would not even have a positive environmental effect since higher ticket prices made Dutch passengers rather go to foreign airports (by car) instead of flying less (NL19, NL30).

Most naturally, the entire aviation industry but also the tourism sector opposed the tax and campaigned against it before and after its implementation applying the whole portfolio of lobbying such as begging letters, commission of scientific studies and protests of the employees of the aviation and tourist branch which was sup- ported by the big Dutch trade unions (NL25, NL33[84]). In February 2008, Ryanair and the airport Maastricht-Aachen took legal actions and brought the debate over the aviation tax to the court (Faber and Huigen 2018). The plaintiffs perceived the tax as unlawful state aid as the exceptions made for transfer and transit passengers favour certain airports and airlines and therefore suggested its incompatibility with European law. Additionally, the two parties, more generally, questioned the compatibility with the Chicago Convention (see below), but, in the end, the court decided in line with the governmental argumentation (Faber and Huigen 2018).

[82] Other parties (PvdD, SP) neither did vote for the annual budget plan but had voiced support for the plan of an aviation tax. In the first chamber, the PVV did not hold any seats at that time.

[83] Specified figures provided by *Significance* research institute and confirmed by the *Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis*) indicated that at Schiphol in 2011, there would be 8-10 % less passengers with the tax in place than without the tax. For regional airports, the prognosis indicated 11–13 % less passengers. Any bigger effect on the Dutch economy as a whole was estimated as improbable (NL18).

[84] Here a group of aviation sector representatives took the opportunity of being called for an expertise on the aviation tax to express its distinct disagreement with it.

Despite this overall headwind, the government had held its official line of argumentation and defended the tax referring to its environmental benefits and the lack of alternatives (NL06, NL07, NL30, NL23), even after first figures had showed a severe decrease of passengers at Schiphol (NL08, NL10, NL27). However, in February 2009, in the view of an intensifying global economic crisis, the Minister of Transport and Water management stated in the media that the aviation tax must be put under scrutiny to support the aviation sector (NL28). He specified his concerns and announced the government's decision to establish an inter-ministerial working group to investigate options to release pressure from the aviation sector and make Schiphol competitive again (NL28). The State Secretary of Finance, who had been responsible for introducing the tax, conceded such an examination of the tax, yet confirmed upon request clearly that the government had no intention to abolish the tax (NL28). In contrast, in March 2009, the government presented a stimulation package which among others measures led to the reset of the *vliegbelasting* to zero by 1 July 2009 and its abolishment later that year in the annual budget 2010 (NL12, NL29).

In 2017, the Dutch story of aviation taxes took another turn as the new cabinet under minister president Rutte revealed plans to reintroduce the *vliegbelasting* in its coalition agreement. This decision was unexpected as none of the four coalition parties had included the tax in their election manifestos – although some authors suggest an agenda-setting effect of the rising Green party, *GroenLinks*, which opted out of the coalition talks earlier that year (Buijtendijk and Eijgelaar 2020). In contrast, it is evident that it has been a state secretary from the liberal party *D66* who pressed ahead with the tax so that it has been introduced by 1 January 2021. During the legislative term, the tax has been adjusted several times[85] and at the end was set at a flat rate of € 7.45 per passenger per flight irrespective of other factors such as the flight distance and thus obtains a considerably lower level than the original tax from 2008 (NL16). From statements of the government, it becomes strikingly clear that this low tax level was motivated by political pragmatism in order to secure a parliamentary majority for the basic idea of greening taxation (NL15, NL30). Interestingly, even the experiences from the failed 2008 policy had been brought forward by government's representatives (NL15, NL30). Furthermore, parliamentary discussions reveal that the aviation tax was only the third-best policy choice for the government to realise its plans of regulating the civil aviation sector. First, they looked into possibilities of promoting technological innovations of air- planes, e.g., by taxing airplanes according to their efficiency and fuels, and especially they investigated solutions on the pan-European level, e.g., by repeatedly addressing the respective commissioners and holding a conference on the specific topic of aviation taxes (NL13, NL14, NL15, NL30). Only as these efforts failed, they opted for the reintroduction of the aviation tax.

[85] E.g., the originally targeted taxation of cargo transport was abandoned.

10.6 The German *Luftverkehrsteuer*: A policy that stayed the course

In 2010, the Ministry of Finance presented the *Luftverkehrsteuer* (English: aviation transport tax) in a draft, that represented a quite comprehensive policy package to tackle the ramifications of the global economic crisis (*Source:* DE01). As part of this package, the main goal of the aviation tax was budget consolidation (DE01). Environmental motives have – if at all – been secondary for the conservative-liberal government and have been voiced only occasionally in parliamentary debates (e.g. DE05).

Against the votes of the three opposition parties, the policy package was adopted by the first chamber, the *Bundestag*, in October 2010 (DE05). It is important to note that the major target of the opposition's criticism was not the aviation tax but rather other elements of the policy package. In contrast, the three German *Länder* Rhineland-Palatinate, Berlin and Brandenburg sought to stop the tax in the second chamber and brought forward a number of legal and economic objections, among others by referring to the recent negative experiences in the Netherlands (DE08). However, they could not win the majority for their motion so that the law was finally adopted in December 2010 (DE02). By 1 January 2011 an aviation tax has come into force which in many aspects resembled the Dutch predecessor as it is calculated for each passenger departing from a German airport (LuftVStG. §5, DE02) differentiated by three levels of distance and corresponding prices: € 8.00 for short-haul, € 25.00 for medium-haul and € 45.00 for long-haul flights (DE02). Since 2010, the tax rates have been adapted several times at slightly lower rates[86] and until April 2020 amounted around € 7.38, € 23.05 and € 41.49.

Although the aviation tax was not a particularly controversial issue in the *Bundestag*, it has been contested in the following years. While there have been most natural disagreements between environmental NGOs and aviation sector's businesses (i.e. *Lufthansa*, *Air Berlin, Ryanair, airport operators*) as well as their associations, an increasingly severe resistance has originated from federal state representations. In particular, Rhineland-Palatinate stands out in this regard as it has continuously promoted motions against the tax, initiated a resolution in cooperation with the aviation industry and in 2014 even went to the constitutional court against the law. The court, however, followed earlier jurisdiction (e.g. in the Netherlands, *see above*), dismissed the case and thereby confirmed the legal position around the tax (DE11) (Faber and Huigen 2018). However, the coalition of opponents in the *Bundesrat* had grown, so that following an initiative of Bayern, Hesse, Lower Saxony and Saxony, in November 2012, the chamber urged the government to abolish the tax immediately (DE10). The government, however, adhered to its position, and, especially, the attitude of the Ministry of Finance can be described as uncompromising since the annual tax revenue of around € 1 billion was an important element of its overall consolidation policy (Saalfeld and Zohlnhöfer 2015). Critical voices by other Ministers (of Economic Affairs or Transport) did not carry enough weight in comparison to the Minister of Finance's influential position (e.g., Murswieck 2015).

[86] First and foremost, these reductions are due to an agreement with the aviation sector that burdens of the aviation tax and the European emission trading system should not exceed € 1 billion in total.

The new coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats committed themselves to continue the consolidation course and, in this context, also has kept the aviation tax. Since the tax is hardly an issue in the following legislation and neither in the election 2017 (DE15-18), it persists with only some already indicated adaptations of its actual rates. First, in 2019, in light of an intensifying discussion on climate mitigation policies the aviation tax regained attention and, from April 2020 on, the federal government raised the rates considerably to € 12.90, € 32.67 and € 58.82 as part of its climate programme (DE03, DE04).

10.7 Analysis

Comparing the policy developments in the two countries (Table 18), two questions are interesting for our analysis of instrument choice from the PIDA perspective: why was the tax introduced in the first place and why did the tax, which was so similarly designed in both countries, persist in Germany while it was quickly abolished in the Netherlands and reintroduced on a considerably lower tax level more than 10 years later?

COUNTRY	2008-2009	2010-2011	2011-2017	2017-2020	2020-2021
NETHERLANDS	Introduction of the tax for environmental reasons	Abolishment of the tax for economic reasons	Persistence of decision – low saliency of the topic	Reintroduction of the tax for environmental reasons	Persistence of decision despite corona pandemic
GERMANY	----------	Introduction of the tax for economic reasons	Persistence of decision – low saliency of the topic	Raise of the tax for environmental reasons	Persistence of decision despite corona pandemic

Table 18: Evolutions of aviation taxes in the Netherlands and Germany 2008-2021

The explanatory factor *instrumental alternatives* refers to the question whether political actors have real and realisable policy alternatives at hand. It is closely inter- connected with the factor of *institutions* which regularly limits available national policy options. For the regulation of aviation transport, a number of alternative instruments[87] might be discussed in the political discourse but in the decision situation the scope for instrument change is limited due to its global and European *institutional* embedding and resulting path dependency.

One of the most important institutions for aviation policy is the Chicago *Convention on International Civil Aviation* (CICA). In 1944, this convention established rules for civil aviation that are binding under international law to facilitate the international exchange of people in peacetime and to boost air traffic. Thus, the convention acts as a strong institutional filter in the sense of path dependency, and by its contradictory motive, makes the introduction of political instruments aimed at restricting air traffic more

[87] For available national policy options, *see* Larsson et al. (2019).

difficult. Among other things, it stipulates that kerosene on board of landed aircrafts may not be taxed (CICA, Art. 24a). Following this provision, it also has become a standard clause in the important air service agreements (ASA) that aircrafts from the contracting countries are allowed to refuel tax-free (Conrady, Fichert and Sterzenbach 2019). Hence, comprehensive tax solutions for international aviation are practically ruled out. However, *within*-states taxes are allowed and regularly applied, e.g., in the United States, Norway or Japan. In the EU, since 2005 the Energy Taxation Directive (2003/96/EC) entitles EU-member states to implement taxes on kerosene within their territories but also in bilateral agreements (Art. 14b) while at the same time in its preamble it advises against doing so in light of international agreements (§ 23) (Conrady, Fichert and Sterzenbach 2019).

Concerning climate change mitigation measures specifically, it is striking that the pioneering Kyoto protocol conceded measures for the international aviation to the *International Civil Aviation Organisation* (ICAO) and not to national governments (Art. 2, paragraph 2 UNFCCC 1997)[88]. Nevertheless – or even in response to the ICAO's inertia (Birchfield 2015) – from 2012 on the EU has integrated the inner- European aviation transport in the European Emission Trading System (ETS) (2008/101/EC) (Efthymiou and Papatheodorou 2019) which institutionally limits member states' options to adopt national measures. The more recent efforts of the Dutch government to enforce further pan-European regulation are here illustrative. Thus, despite some easing tendencies in most recent times[89], institutionally, we may conclude a tenacious path dependency that is relevant for aviation policy in both countries and that in both cases made policymakers choose very similarly designed policies. Seen through the lens of PIDA, institutional factors limit the range of actually available policy options for policymakers.

Interestingly, the actually addressed *problem structures* differ clearly between the countries and over the course of the years, whereas the Dutch government at both occasions primarily has targeted a greening of the tax system and only secondarily refers to tax revenue (in the context of an even more ambitious overall goal to advance Dutch society, Wilp 2012), the German government explains the introduction of the aviation tax essentially with reference to its general goal of budget consolidation in the face of the economic crisis (Saalfeld and Zohlnhöfer 2015). If at all, environmental considerations have played only a minor role in the German case. This reversed hierarchy of goals is interesting as it prestructures governmental lines of reasoning in the view of similar external perturbations and sets different bench- marks for the public assessment of the policy, which in turn generate different feed-back loops for policymakers. Focusing more recent developments, it is striking that, nowadays, both

[88] This, ultimately, led to the implementation of the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) which is to be implemented stepwise and has started its voluntary two-year pilot period in 2021 (*see* https://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/CORSIA/Pages/default.aspx, accessed 31/01/22) (critically see Larsson et al. 2019).

[89] In light of its European Green Deal, the European Commission announced to revise the Energy Taxation Directive and "remove outdated exemptions, e.g. in aviation and maritime transport" (COM/ 2021/550 final, 10).

countries have adopted an environmental reasoning in order to justify the aviation tax or its raise. However, if we look at the considerably differing tax rates, path dependency has clearly played its role. Since the tax had been established in the German case on a medium level, it needed to be raised in order to unfold an emblematic effect, whereas in the Netherlands previous experiences let the government apply an only symbolic flat rate at a low level. Both stories highlight the primacy of economic interests in their own way and reveal highly conflicting arguments for the same tax. This not only corresponds to the fundamentals of PIDA which suggest that "already existent policy solutions seek their problems" (Töller and Böcher 2017, p. 548; authors' own translation) but it also confirms Hahn's ideas on eco-tax choices (2013), that taxes were not imposed to provide incentives for more environmentally friendly behaviour, but to generate revenue for the state budget and that economic motives engender institutional paths for environmental policy that endure (see above).

Regarding *situational aspects*, the global economic crisis, which climaxed from the end of 2008 until spring 2009, must be seen as the central event in the beginning of the period of investigation. In both the Netherlands and Germany, the overall GDP per capita growth had substantially decreased. If one looks only at the Dutch case, the simple argument could be that the tax was introduced in sound economic times and as these had changed, conflicting goals had to be reassessed and, ultimately, the tax had to be removed. However, the insights of the German case, where a very similar policy not only was adopted first in the very same eco- nomic crisis but also survived these times of crisis, make the picture more complicated and rather dismiss this argument. Equally, it would not explain why both governments stick to their decisions to reintroduce or raise the tax for environmental reasons in the midst of another tense economic situation caused by the COVID- 19 pandemic.

As one domestic *institutional* factor, we already identified previous policy decisions which begot path dependencies for instrument choice and their specific design, whereas international and supranational institutions are most similar for the two countries (EU and ICAO membership); it is worth looking at other national institutional differences and in particular at the actors involved in the process since PIDA indicates that it is important *how* external perturbations exert influence on and are filtered by endogenous factors, i.e., processed by domestic actors.

A major difference between the countries is its degree of federalism. Lijphart (2012) classifies Germany as a federal state whereas the Netherlands is semi-federal. In particular, it is relevant, that German Länder keep their public budgets partly independent from the federal level (e.g., von Beyme 2017) and, therefore, are interested in independent revenues and economic activities as potentially stimulated by regional airports. These idiosyncrasies are most evidently reflected in the constellation of actors participating in the policy process.

Actors and their interests are at the centre of PIDA and may represent the main explanatory variable. According to classical partisan theory, key actors in national policy-making processes are the incumbent political parties so that a change in the composition of government likewise results in a change in policies (Hibbs 1977, Schmidt 1996). Empirically, left parties have been affiliated with more state-

interventionist approaches of policy-making, whereas right parties generally avoid state interventions such as taxes (ibid.). In the Dutch case, the initial introduction of the aviation tax corresponds to these assumptions of classical partisan theory. Although the CDA was the strongest party in government and Jan Peter Balkenende stayed prime minister for the fourth time in a row, the formation of the Christian-social government meant a serious shift to the left, especially in terms of economic issues and in contrast to the former coalition between CDA and the liberal VVD (Wilp 2012). The three-party-coalition was by no means a planned coalition as, in particular, CDA and PvdA had contested each other fiercely in the election campaign and the personal relation between the party leaders Balkenende and Bos was difficult (Wilp 2012), but setting a sustainable course for the aviation transport sector was something all parties had agreed on before[90] (*Source*: NL37-40). Yet, the abolishment of such a tax through the same coalition contradicts classical partisan theory. Equally contradicting are the findings from the German case where a conservative-liberal coalition introduced an entirely new tax and thus produced a significant policy change (Rixen 2015) – and, furthermore, this tax is kept under the continuous governmental dominance of the Christian Democratic party up until 2021.

A basis for explaining this puzzle can certainly be found in the special economic situation as well as in the different targets of the taxes in the two countries. However, the actual effects of the tax, i.e., higher tax revenue and burden of the aviation industry, as well as the reaction of the affected sectors had been quite similar so that it is still unclear why the tax could persist in Germany under difficult economic conditions while it did not in the Netherlands under similar conditions.

Approaches that go beyond classical partisan theory and include opposition parties in their analysis can help to shed light on this question (Seeberg 2013, Zohlnhöfer and Engler 2014, Abou-Chadi, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2020). Interestingly, from the beginning the Dutch government was confronted with a quite strong opposition against the tax by the VVD and the PVV which helped to keep the topic up on the political agenda both inside and outside the parliament. In the German case, such a parliamentary opposition was missing completely since all three left opposition parties programmatically consented to the tax and could criticise only details from an environmental perspective (e.g. DE06, DE07). Only the Liberals openly opposed the aviation tax but were voted out the *Bundestag* in 2013. Therefore, a nucleus for a coalition against the tax never came into being.

This could not even be compensated by German state governments which expand the range of relevant actors in German federalism and, as described above, made serious efforts to fight the tax before and after its introduction[91]. Instead, German federalism had a reverse effect in this matter. In the German political system, the federal government and the *Länder* rely on quite independent budgets and since the German federation had sold most of its stakes in airlines and airports, it was, in contrast to some of

[90] While the PvdA made a rather broad state on this issue, the CDA pursued a European solution and the CU opted for the introduction of a national aviation tax (NL34-36).

[91] Interestingly, irrespective of their specific party ideologies.

the *Länder*, less dependent on the aviation industry's growth (FIS 2016). Taking first and foremost care of the federal budget, the Federal Minister of Finance, therefore, could neglect negative sector-specific developments resulting from the aviation tax. In the Netherlands, the situation was the exact opposite as the Dutch state has held considerable shares in Schiphol so that the government felt the negative effects of its own action in a direct and facing an economic crisis also intense manner[92].

Additionally, the durability of the aviation tax in Germany can be connected to the *Nixon-goes-to-China*-argument. The fact, that in particular the traditionally business-friendly Christian Democrats advocated the tax, has made it extraordinary difficult for lobby organisations to deploy any influence on the government. In the Dutch case, the ties between aviation industry and the government appeared considerably closer forming an "iron triangle" between Schiphol, the Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) and the ministry of infrastructure (Buijtendijk and Eijgelaar 2020). In any case, this held true for the policy round trip in 2008 and 2009.

However, in the beginning of the 2020s, three things have changed that provide explanation for the reintroduction of the tax: first, aviation interests seem to have lost their leverage on the ministry (Buijtendijk and Eijgelaar 2020); second, as in the German case, parties taking strong environmental positions have increasingly gained influence; and third, the *Nixon-goes-to-China*-argument could equally be applied to the cabinet led by the VVD and especially prime minister Rutte who took a strong stand against the original tax from 2008.

The effect of lobbyism, overall, remains a rather intangible subject for research. Since in both cases, representatives of the aviation and tourist sectors took action against the tax and the threat potential of the two national aviation sectors can be deemed similar, from a comparative perspective we are inclined to relate any possible impact back to party behaviour reflecting the dependence of interest organisations on governments' responsiveness (Woll 2007). However, any further independent influence can be neither rejected nor confirmed within the scope of this article.

[92] *See* https://www.schiphol.nl/en/schiphol-group/page/shareholder-information/, accessed 31/01/22.

PIDA DIMENSION	GERMANY		NETHERLANDS	
	2010-2011	2017-2021	2008-2009	2017-2021
INSTRUMENTAL ALTERNATIVES AND PROBLEM STRUCTURE				
INSTRUMENTAL ALTERNATIVES	Practically none		Practically none	
ADDRESSED PROBLEM STRUCTURES	Economy	Environm.	Environm.	Environm.
TRANSBOUNDARY PROBLEM STRUCTURES	Yes		Yes	
SITUATIONAL ASPECTS				
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS	Unstable, with regard to the economic crisis	At the end, unstable due to COVID19-crisis	Unstable, with regard to the economic crisis	At the end, unstable due to COVID19-crisis
INSTITUTIONS				
EU MEMBERSHIP	Yes		Yes	
ICAO MEMBERSHIP	Yes		Yes	
STATE ORGANISATION	Federal		Semi-Federal	
ACTORS				
GOVERNMENT	Centre-Right	Centre	Left-Centre-Right	Centre-Right
INFLUENTIAL OPPOSITION PARTIES	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS	Yes		No	
POWERFUL LOBBY ORGANISATIONS	Yes		Yes	
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT'S SHARES OF MAIN AIRPORTS	No		Yes	

Table 19: PIDA explanatory factors for variances in the evolution of aviation taxes in Germany and the Netherlands

10.8 Conclusion

Our comparative analysis shows that environmental policy instrument choice depends on several factors. The PIDA has proved useful in analysing the different policy outputs in the two states and reveals a configurational causality that can explain aviation policy instrument choice in two European countries (Table 19). Firstly, it is striking that the same policy was applied to address different problems and that actual options change over the course of time so that environmental ration- ales seemingly have become more influential. Secondly, however, these environ- mental rationales still have to be embedded in economic reasoning. The considerable raise of the German aviation tax in 2019 has only been possible as it continues the path of an economically motivated policy and the reintroduction of the *vliegbelasting* in the Netherlands has evidently been shaped by economically derived constraints. Thus, in line with

classic instrument choice literature (see above, e.g., Hahn 2013) the primacy of economy appears to be continuously valid. Thirdly, different configurations of party competition have played a pivotal role and underscore the importance of looking at partisan effects beyond governmental par- ties (e.g., Seeberg 2013). As well, *new* instruments like the aviation tax by no means replace other existing regulations – here the aviation taxes in both countries have been added to existing aviation policy like the European ETS.

Fundamentally, it is evident that instrument choice with the objective of regulating transport volume in the aviation sector is strongly shaped by institutional factors that constrain the number of instruments available. However, as environmental concerns have gained considerably in political importance, these institutions are getting in a state of flux. In the EU, a revision of the energy taxation directive and the ETS is on the agenda calling for future research to address the interactions of EU- and nation-state level in more depth and examine if a "regulatory cooperation" in aviation transport policy will take place (Holzinger and Knill 2004). Furthermore, the external validity of our investigation is clearly limited, although potentially a generalisation across other cases in which an aviation tax has been discussed is possible, so that an examination of the identified factors beyond the two cases at hand is most appealing. Thus, our study can be understood as a first part of a *layered generalisation* (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 9.3) which increases the generalisability step by step by transforming scope conditions to variables in order to add a new layer of cases to the study. A promising step would be to relax the scope condition of time or problem structure, i.e., presence of a major aviation hub, and apply the findings to further positive EU-cases in which an aviation tax has been introduced (*time*: France, Italy; *problem structure*: Austria, Sweden).

As our analysis shows, this future research can be fruitfully guided by the PIDA which has revealed the *political* aspects of instrument choice and elucidated that governments can by no means carry out rational policy design here. Thus, the factors described by PIDA can also be used to further develop policy design approaches as they especially integrated aspects of what Howlett recently called the often neglected "dark side" of policy-making (Howlett 2021). Regarding its limitations, just as other heuristics, PIDA leaves some vagueness about specific causal mechanisms of the individual factors but also their interactions. This has to be investigated deductively with support of specific theories (Slavici 2021) or inductively as in this study.

Finally, our comparative case study contributes to the broader research on sustain- able transitions in which despite positive recent developments a deeper understanding of the policy process and related constellations of power interests and institutions, is still needed (Normann 2015, Köhler et al. 2017). Aviation transport, in particular, can be understood as an increasingly symbolic area for this (Becken et al. 2021) pointing to questions of to which extent and for what reasons the state enforces environmentally oriented regulation. From our analysis, explanations do not indicate any further turnaround in the ongoing priority struggle between environmental and economic considerations, while the back and forth on aviation taxes actually shows that politics here is by no means always problem-

solving-oriented, but follows other rationalities. A factually rational choice of instruments is not to be expected.

11 Conclusion

This concluding chapter comprises three parts. It begins with a synthesis of the research articles included in this cumulative dissertation in which their main empirical results will be re-analysed against the background of the overall theoretical foundation on PRRPs' effects and positions in environmental policy (ch. 5). Building on this synthesis, in a second step, the central contributions and implications for future research are explained in terms of theory, methodology, empirical advancements. The chapter finishes with a reflection on limitations.

11.1 Synthesis

With the question of conducive and hindering conditions for the evolution of environmental policy as a starting point, this dissertation investigated the role of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in environmental policy. Thus, it combined two strands of political science research that had been interconnected only marginally before, i.e., the research on PRRPs and the environmental policy analysis. In fact, at the outset of this project in spring 2019, literature on this nexus of PRRPs and environmental policy hardly existed and represented a clear research gap (ch. 5.1). Over the last four years, research on this topic has been burgeoning and addressed first the positions and later the impacts of PRRPs in environmental policy. The empirical chapters included in this dissertation have contributed to this valuable development of research.

Overall, this dissertation is based on an X-centred research design and, in line with the general advancement of the research field, examined both the positions of PRRPs and their implications for actual policy-making in the area of environmental policy. For both research goals, it proved to be pivotal to take a nuanced perspective on the dependent variable. Therefore, two central subfields of environmental policy are distinguished that differ in their views on problem structure and related policy solutions (ch. 2): On the one hand, traditional environmental policy includes environmental problems and policies characterised by a rather narrow issue-related, geographical, and temporal scope. On the other hand, modern environmental policy (or sustainability policy) encompasses a broad range of environmental and even social issues, that are to be problematised and tackled based on a global and long-term perspective.

11.1.1 Positions

Applying this nuanced perspective, it has become the conventional wisdom that PRRPs take rejecting positions in the field of sustainability policy and more positive positions on traditional environmental policies. The developing state of the art on this matter has been substantiated by all empirical articles of this dissertation using different proxies for environmental policy respectively. Chapters 7 and 8 evidence

hostile positions of PRRPs in Germany, Austria and Sweden towards the climate movement of *Fridays for Future*, which has epitomised the public call for sustainability policies. In addition, chapter 10 has pointed out such a rejective position on the example of a specific sustainability policy in the Netherlands, i.e., the ecologically motivated introduction of an aviation tax. Utilising a novel data base on environmental budget proposals in Sweden, chapter 9 sheds light on the positions of the Swedish PRRP, *Sverigedemokraterna* (SD), in both subfields of environmental policy. Looking at this distributional dimension of environmental policy, the rejecting position of PRRPs on sustainability policies has been confirmed, whereas some need for clarification has been raised on the positive position on traditional environmental policy. To be sure, the SD clearly prioritises traditional environmental policy (like nature conservation) over sustainability policies (like climate mitigation), but it does not stand out with a distinct environmentally-friendly position in comparison to other parties. Despite rhetoric commitments, it does not advocate for ambitious investments in this subfield.

In summary, the hypotheses regarding the positions of PRRPs must be evaluated differently (*for hypotheses see* ch. 5.3). The first hypothesis can be confirmed: *Populist Radical Right Parties take negative positions on sustainability policy issues like climate change.* In contrast, the nuanced analysis of the Swedish PRRP raises doubts about the second hypothesis: *Populist Radical Right Parties take positive positions on traditional environmental policy issues like nature conservation*. Although PRRPs, in their majority, communicate positive positions on traditional environmental policy, it is less clear if they also advocate such positions in actual policy-making.

11.1.2 Direct and Indirect Effects

Building on these findings on PRRPs' environmental policy positions, the second research question of this dissertation was *how these parties affect environmental policy-making.* This question entails two dimensions: First, it asks for the *direction of effect*, i.e., whether PRRPs take a positive or a negative effect on environmental policy, if they take an effect at all. Second, it aims at the *causal mechanisms of these potential effects*. In chapter 3 various causal mechanisms of partisan effects have been discerned, of which two have been scrutinised primarily in this dissertation and were elaborated in the in the theory part: Following traditional partisan theory (ch. 5.1), a PRRP can be expected to take influence on environmental policy only when it enters government. In theory, this provides them with a direct effect on policy-making. Yet, considering that most governments in Western Europe are coalition governments in which, so far, PRRPs have only achieved the role of minor coalition partners, this direct effect was less likely to unfold in practice. Instead, indirect effects through party competition have been more plausible – but also more complex in their specific development. Generally, these indirect effects may build on a vote-seeking or office-seeking argument. Because investigating either of these two arguments is already an intricate endeavour and the latter has received only scant attention in the literature on partisan effects, so far, this dissertation opted to focus the office-seeking argument as underlying rationale for the causal mechanism. Presented as extended partisan theory (ch. 5.2), the causal chain of

this mechanism starts with the process of a changing party competition environment through the rise of PRRPs as new challenger parties. On the party system level, this rise of PRRPs is reflected in the increasing importance of the socio-cultural cleavage in Western European countries which as such is already driven by PRRPs (ch. 4.3). On the level of the policy process these institutional changes produce a significant alternation of both coalition options for and coalition considerations of political parties (ch. 4.4). As a consequence, political parties are expected to adapt their positions towards new coalition partners in order to remove potential programmatic obstacles for these coalitions. It is an ongoing debate among and within a large number of parties in Western European countries whether PRRPs represent viable partners for political cooperation. This holds particularly true for traditional centre-right parties which are usually situated closer to the PRRP in ideological terms. Depending on this decision, the effect of PRRPs on environment policy can take two directions: if centre-right parties open up for a coalition with the PRRP, they are expected to be drawn programmatically towards the PRRP, and, when they enter government, unfold a negative effect on sustainability policy and a positive effect on traditional environmental policy (→ *pull effect*). Conversely, if established parties exclude any cooperation with the PRRP, there is the possibility that they are pushed into considering cooperation with other new, more environmentally-friendly, partners such as left, socio-liberal, or green parties, and act accordingly (→ *push effect*). This two-directional office-seeking argument of party competition elaborated in this dissertation (ch. 5.2) adds a less considered causal mechanism to the explanation of PRRP effects in environmental policy and beyond.

This effect has been investigated empirically in the two chapters on party reactions to FfF (ch. 7 & 8) and the in-depth case study on Swedish environmental policy (ch. 9). Taking FfF as a proxy for sustainability policy, the two comparative case studies indicated an effect of party competition. In the *structured focused comparison* of parties in six selected German *Länder*, the main factor explaining differences in party responses to the movement was the parties' left-right ideology evidencing a strong support of left-wing parties, a cautious positioning of the centre-right, and, as said before, a rejective attitude of the PRRPs (ch. 7). Yet, two cases of the Christian Democratic CDU deviated from the cautious behaviour. While the CDU in Schleswig-Holstein revealed rather positive stances towards FfF, the CDU in Saxony-Anhalt showed indices of a more rejecting position. Interestingly, in both cases the CDU represented the largest party in a three-party coalition including the Green Party so that a push effect towards more environmentally-friendly positions could have been expected from the extended partisan theory. This, however, applied only to the CDU in Schleswig-Holstein. In Saxony-Anhalt such push effect failed to materialise. From the perspective of extended partisan theory, it is considerations on future coalitions that may account for this divergence. In Schleswig-Holstein the coalition of CDU, FDP and the Green Party worked well and the electorally successful Greens represented a most-likely coalition partner also for future coalitions, while the electorally marginalised AfD could be expected to play no role at all in the near term. In clear contrast, the CDU in Saxony-Anhalt led a highly dissonant coalition of CDU, SPD and Green Party, and faced an electorally increasingly strong AfD whereas the

Greens' vote-share was extremely small. In such a situation, a pull effect through the PRRP AfD appeared plausible and, indeed, some members of the CDU voiced willingness to at least explore cooperations with the AfD for the future. Yet, it is important to note, that also diverging vote-seeking strategies or different political convictions of the party elites might explain these deviations of the two regional Christian Democratic parties.

Similarly, in the international comparison of the party responses to FfF, the *qualitative comparative analysis* (QCA) of the 19 parties in three countries pointed to ideology and party competition as central explaining factors (ch. 8). Considering party ideology, it found a right-wing ideology to be a single necessary condition for negative reactions to the movement, but no sufficient condition since some right-wing parties had also been in favour of FfF. For the explanation of this split in the centre-right camp, the analysis points out party competition to be relevant. While most centre-right parties that depend on the respective national green party for coalition formation take positive positions towards FfF, all centre-right parties that opened up for a cooperation with the PRRP show overall negative reactions to the movement. The latter held true for the Austrian ÖVP and the two Swedish parties, M and KD. In line with the findings of chapter 7 and other literature (e.g., Abou-Chadi 2016), the study, thus, emphasises that the positioning of parties centrally forms on a combination of party ideology *and* party competition. However, this explanation is not encompassing as two cases of right-wing parties in the sample remained unexplained: the Christian Democratic CDU and the liberal FDP in Germany took cautious or rejecting positions on FfF despite their dependence on the green party in office-seeking party competition. This highlights the need for further explanations. As the study suggests, one approach can be to reflect the specific manifestations of right-wing ideology on environmental policy more fine-grained for each party. For instance, right-wing liberalism includes both social liberal and classical economic liberal parties that differ in their inherent support of environmental policy (e.g., Close 2019). Yet, also the party competition effect of PRRPs on other parties' environmental positions needs to be scrutinised as it was only indicated on a more abstract level and the clear causal mechanism has been left obscure.

This has been done in the in-depth case study of Swedish environmental policy-making which enabled a detailed analysis of the centre-right parties' environmental positions and potential adaptations in interaction with an increasingly influential PRRP (ch. 9). Thus, chapter 9 can be understood as a follow-up study scrutinising the indications found in the first two studies (ch. 7 & 8). As mentioned above, in this study, environmental policy and related party positions were measured by the means of a novel dataset looking at the environmental budget proposals. Due to the Swedish institutional peculiarity that these budget proposals are submitted not only by governmental but also by opposition parties, it was possible to derive both positions of individual parties and the national environmental policy output from this dataset. Regarding the effects of party competition through the Swedish PRRP, the intriguing question was whether the centre-right parties, indeed, shift their environmental positions *after* they opened up for a cooperation the PRRP. The *causal process tracing* analysis, however, disclosed that the parties, apart from some minor deviations upwards, have kept a low profile on sustainability policy and

traditional environmental policy already before their turn to the PRRP. Hence, the expected contagion effect was not visible. Looking at the environmental policy output of the new right government of M, KD and L, that is supported by a strong PRRP on a highly formalised basis, rather, the traditional partisan theory provides explanatory power. The analysis showed that the environmental budgets of the new right coalition expose significant cutbacks in both subsectors of environmental policy. Yet, as the new right coalition is a product of recent reconfigurations of Swedish party system driven by the success of the PRRP, this environmental policy output brings to the fore an alternative hypothesis on the causal mechanism underlying the indirect effect of PRRPs on environmental policy. In Sweden, the new party competition environment, which has been altered significantly by the increasing SD, has rendered possible the formation of a governmental coalition without a 'green voice'. In the previous Swedish left-right bloc logic, this was not possible since the socio-liberal and environmentally progressive Centre Party (C) had been a necessary part of any right-wing governmental coalition. Thus, although it does not affect the party positions, a strong PRRP allows centre-right parties to implement their less ambitious environmental policy programmes on the condition that centre-right parties are willing to ally with the party in the first place. The ultimate effect concurs with the traditional partisan theory, but the fundament of this partisan effect has been changed by the increasing influence of the PRRPs which brings about the opportunity for a predominantly TAN-coalition and, thus, makes a sidelining of environmentalism in party competition dynamics feasible.

Concluding, two of the three studies summarised so far indicate support for the pull effect through PRRPs on centre-right parties in the field of environmental policy (ch. 7 & 8) (*Hypothesis 3b*). Yet, there are two important caveats: First, these studies considered only the first stage of party positioning on sustainability policies and excluded the second stage of actual policy-making in the parliamentary arena. Second, they only focus on the rhetoric positioning of parties on the basis of more abstract cross-case comparisons. Applying a more detailed perspective, the study on Swedish environmental policy (ch. 9) rejected the pull effect as a causal mechanism, but confirmed the direct effect of traditional partisan theory, i.e., hypothesis 3a: *Strong Populist Radical Right Parties affect sustainability policies negatively if they are considered as viable coalition partners. This effect unfolds directly through participation in government.* At the same time, the in-depth case study rejects hypothesis 5 as the government strongly supported by the PRRPs takes negative effects also on traditional environmental policies. In addition, the case study suggests a different indirect effect of PRRPs that is to be investigated further in future research: *Strong populist radical right parties affect sustainability and traditional environmental policies negatively through the reconfiguration of available coalition options making the inclusion of 'green voices' in governmental coalitions dispensable*. Hypothesis 4 on the push effects of PRRPs receives only marginal support from the findings on the Schleswig-Holstein CDU in chapter 7. However, it is unclear whether the PRRP played a decisive role in the change of coalition options. Instead, it appears more likely that the rise of the Green Party was the vital driving force in this case.

Finally, the *structured focused comparison* on aviation taxes represents a Y-oriented comparative case study (ch. 10), and, as such, did not focus the partisan effects of PRRPs, in particular. Guided by the *Political Process-Inherent Dynamics Approach* (PIDA), it emphasises several factors influencing the implementation of aviation taxes. Aside the institutional setting and the problem structure, two factors related to partisan theory have been pivotal for explaining the diverging policy evolutions in the Netherlands and Germany. Thus, the study sheds some light on the effects of changing party system dynamics, in general, but also on the effects of PRRPs, in particular, in the field of sustainability policy. First, it underlines the meaning of the specific composition of governmental coalitions related to the policy to be implemented. In this vein, a *Nixon-goes-to-China*-effect applied in both cases as the successful introduction of an aviation tax was carried out by centre-right governments which were not expected to advocate for such a tax for ideological reasons. Second, the (non-)actions of opposition parties had been central. While in Germany the left-wing opposition parties were in favour of the tax, in the Netherlands the PRRP PVV was one of the central political forces mobilising against the ecologically motivated first attempt to implement the tax. In combination with the actions of the centre-right VVD and interested organisations of the aviation sector, it contributed to the creation of an overall hostile sentiment against the tax, which, ultimately, yielded its abolition. Similar effects, however, have not been visible at the end of the period of investigation, when the tax was reintroduced by a VVD-led government. The German PRRP, AfD, entered the public stage only after the introduction of the tax, and did not oppose its raise in 2019 as this was no central point on the political agenda. At this time, it had been a settled policy pointing to an effect of path dependencies. Overall, this study points to the need to consider party competition but also further scope conditions, such as institutions, problem structure and issue salience, to understand the direct and indirect effects of political parties on environmental policy-making. Table 20 presents an overview of the described findings in relation to the hypotheses.

Ultimately, this dissertation confirmed the rise of PRRPs to be a hindering factor for environmental policy-making. PRRPs stand out concerning their distinctly rejecting positions on sustainability policies which they put into action when gaining influence in governmental coalitions. Even in traditional environmental policy, the positive impacts expectable from their rhetorical commitments must be questioned. Although they might not influence other parties' environmental policy positions through a *pull effect*, they function as a mainspring of sidelining environmentalism in party competition and render non-environmental coalitions possible – and in light of their increasing electoral traction also probable.

Hypothesis	Addressed in	Appraisal
H1. Populist Radical Right Parties take negative positions on sustainability policy issues like climate change.	Ch. 7, 8, 9 and 10	Confirmed
H2. Populist Radical Right Parties take positive positions on traditional environmental policy issues like nature conservation.	Ch. 9	Not confirmed
H3a. Strong Populist Radical Right Parties affect sustainability policies negatively if they are considered as viable coalition partners. This effect unfolds directly through participation in government.	Ch. 9	Confirmed
H3b. Strong Populist Radical Right Parties affect sustainability policies negatively if they are considered as viable coalition partners. This effect unfolds indirectly through adaptations of positions of established parties in order to facilitate future coalitions (*Pull Effect*).	Ch. 7, 8 and 9	*Ambiguous*: rather not confirmed.
H4. Strong Populist Radical Right Parties affect sustainability policies positively if they are excluded as viable coalition partners (*Push Effect)*.	Ch. 7	Indicated*
H5. Strong Populist Radical Right Parties affect traditional environmental policies positively.	Ch. 9	Not confirmed
New Hypothesis		
Strong populist radical right parties affect sustainability and traditional environmental policies negatively through the reconfiguration of available coalition options making the inclusion of 'green voices' in governmental coalitions dispensable (*Missing of a green voice Effect*)	Ch. 9	Derived from the findings

*Table 20: Final appraisals of the hypotheses based on the empirical findings of this dissertation. *= minor indications of this hypothesis were found that, however, are not sufficient to categorise it as confirmed.*

11.2 Contributions and Research Implications

This subchapter highlights the central contributions and implications for future research regarding theory, methodology and empirical advancements. Note that as especially some of the empirical contributions have already been summarised in detail before in the synthesis, they will only be addressed briefly here.

11.2.1 Theory

This dissertation centrally contributes to the theoretical advancement of partisan theory as regards, in particular, the effects of PRRPs and partisan effects in environmental policy. In this respect, two major contributions directly linked to PRRPs will be outlined in the following: first, the proposal for an extended partisan theory to enhance the understanding of PRRPs' effects, and, second, the inductively derived hypothesis on an additional indirect effect of PRRPs in the field of environmental policy which in relation to the neo-cleavage theory may also inform research on partisan effects in environmental policy more generally.

In the search of PRRPs' effects on public policy, researchers face the challenge that direct effects through governmental action have been rather elusive since PRRPs, so far, have been formally less influential representing only minor coalition partners. Nevertheless, studies find correlations between certain policy outputs or outcomes and the electoral success of PRRPs (for environmental policy e.g., Jahn 2021). To trace down these parties' effects, therefore, it is necessary to go beyond the traditional partisan theory and apply a more inclusive and interactive understanding of partisan effects. Here, a two-step notion of partisan effects may serve as a groundwork since it emphasises the position formation as a first separate process preceding and determining the public policy effects of parties. Building on that, in contrast to the traditional view of partisan theory, the position formation of a party cannot be simply understood as a product of voters' preferences but other factors need to be taken into account. Among them, the positions and strategical actions of other parties in party competition play a pivotal role (e.g., Seeberg 2013, Häusermann, Picot and Geering 2013, Green-Pedersen 2019, Seeberg 2023), and, thus, one may speak of partisan effects on party positions that precede the traditional partisan effects on public policy. Without taking into account the specific interactions between parties in a party system as regards their positioning before their ultimate policy-making, researchers run danger to underestimate or even ignore the factual effectiveness of political parties. Instead, it is crucial to reflect the strategic position and behaviour of each party in a given party competition context in order to appraise their individual effects.

In this respect, PRRPs play a special role as, up until today, they are widely dismissed as a legitimate competitor or coalition partner but due to their often extreme positions and rhetoric not least pertaining to democracy, it is often a momentous decision for other parties how to deal with them. Taking this into account, this dissertation has derived two potential causal mechanisms from literature on party competition and coalition considerations (Zohlnhöfer 2017, Green-Pedersen 2019, Abou-Chadi and

Krause 2020, Ćetković and Hagemann 2020, Kayser and Rehmert 2021, Kayser, Orlowski and Rehmert 2022) and integrated them into a single consistent approach to explain PRRPs' effect, i.e., the *extended partisan theory* (ch. 5.2). As synthesised above, based on the decision of established parties to cooperate or not to cooperate with a PRRP, this may lead to a *pull-* or *push-effect* concerning the adaption of policy positions of the PRRP (ch. 11.1.2). Although the two effects could only be indicated but not confirmed in the empirical analyses of this dissertation, the extended partisan theory is deemed an important point of departure for future studies on PRRPs' influence as it provides a systematic approach to capture the indirect effects of these parties on public policy. An open question pertains to which rationales of parties underly the two mechanisms in a specific situation. In this dissertation I opted to look at office-seeking motivated effects, which are often less considered in the literature of party competition. However, as outlined in the introduction to the extended partisan theory (ch. 5.2), pull effects could evolve not only from parties' strategies to form coalitions but also from their interest in maximising votes – in the sense of classic contagion effects (Hicks and Swank 1992). Previous research has investigated factors influencing whether a party prioritises either of these two goals in a party's overall strategy, e.g., its size and its prospects to enter government as well as the actual strength and the maturity of the challenger party (Spoon et al. 2014, Abou-Chadi et al. 2020). In contrast, it is less clear how parties behave on specific issues if these issues can be expected to have contradictory effects on the two goals. In the medium term, it will be intriguing to investigate if parties change their positions in response to party competition rationales on vote- or office-seeking, or if their positions make them change their party competition strategies, e.g., by opening up to a PRRP. To disentangle the party rationales at work in future research, congruence case studies appear to be a valuable method (Blatter and Haverland 2012, ch. 4). As this case study approach focuses explicitly on contrasting the explanatory power of theories, it can serve as an appropriate tool for juxtaposing policy-, vote- and office-seeking effects on the positioning of parties in the field of environmental policy. Although not applying a congruence analysis and focusing on office-seeking motivations, the analysis of chapter 9 made a first step in this regard. It showed that the three Swedish centre-right parties followed the second strategy by sticking to their policy positions on environmental (and other socio-cultural) issues and opening for cooperation with the PRRP SD.

From these findings a new hypothesis on the indirect impacts of PRRPs on environmental policy-making was derived. This 'missing of a green voice'-hypothesis represents another contribution to the understanding of PRRPs' effects. As PRRPs centrally – although not solely – contributed to the recent changes of Western European party systems, they co-created party competition dynamics that allow to marginalise environmental concerns in the formation of governmental coalitions. In interaction with the strategic behaviour of centre-right parties (or other mainstream parties) delineated above, this leads to government coalitions most likely pursuing low-key environmental policies. Put into a bigger context, it will be intriguing to analyse if expanding PRRPs blaze the trail for a *de-mainstreaming* of environmentalism – particularly in the sense of modern environmental policy – in the party systems of

Western Europe. While these developments of party interactions continue to be in flux and clearly need to be investigated in further empirical research, they entail aspects enhancing the broader understanding of the environmental cleavage. This, in turn, has immediate implications for the general research on partisan effects in environmental policy and can understood as an additional major theoretical contribution of this dissertation. The research articles evidence that PRRPs have turned to environmental policy. This turn can be explained by ideological motives (ch. 5.1.3) or by strategical motives utilising a negative position, above all, on sustainability issues as unique selling point to gain votes and/or as a wedge issue to split established party blocs and make other environmentally less engaged parties available for future coalitions. Environmental policy appears to be ideally suited for the two strategical motives, given the broad convergence on this valence issue that had been developed among mainstream parties. Irrespective of the incentives for PRRPs, their growing vote-shares in combination with their distinctly rejecting positions on environmental issues, clearly, contributed to the increase in party system polarisation on the environment, as depicted for the four countries of focus in chapter 4. Certainly, also the electoral success of their socio-cultural counterparts, i.e., green parties, has played a role, but their electoral performance diverged more strongly between the countries and their positive stand on environmental policy is nothing new. It is the turn of PRRPs towards environmental issues that consolidated the connection between environmental and socio-cultural issues, more recently. From cleavage theory perspective, the findings of this dissertation cautiously indicate an incipient convergence of the environmental and the more general socio-cultural cleavage on the party system level, i.e., the third component of a fully-fledged cleavage (ch. 4.1). Interestingly, studies that address the first two societal components of a cleavage point to a similar direction (Kulin, Johansson Sevä and Dunlap 2021, Huber, Fesenfeld and Bernauer 2020, Herold et al. 2023, Marg and Zilles 2023).

At the end, these are only indications that environmental conflicts become more and more culturally loaded. It is a fact the European cleavage structures are in a flux, but it remains an open and crucial question to which extent the environmental cleavage is moving too, and indeed has been overlayed by the socio-cultural cleavage. From a neo-cleavage theory perspective, the newly derived hypothesis could be read as follows: TAN-governments are more clearly against environmental policy than traditional right governments. Yet, as the relationship between the socio-economic cleavage and the socio-cultural cleavage is also continuously changing, and furthermore depends on national peculiarities, the hypothesis could also be that TAN-right-governments are more clearly against environmental policy than GAL-left governments. Considering these uncertainties, what is clear from the depicted developments is that future research on environmental policy should take the socio-cultural cleavage much more into account. This speaks not least to the literature on partisan effects in the field environmental policy.

11.2.2 Methodology

Methodologically, the research articles of this dissertation utilised a variety of methods of data analysis and data collection, while they all applied a research design of (comparative) case studies. Thus, they clearly illustrate the assets of case-sensitive and in-depth case study analyses in the context of partisan theory. Whereas more abstract research designs can provide valuable insights into general directions of partisan effects, it is (comparative) case study designs that seem appropriate to capture both partisan positions and partisan effects adequately.

The most central methodological innovation of this dissertation has been the novel data approach to the investigations of environmental policy as applied in the study on environmental policy-making in Sweden (ch. 9). As outlined in chapter 5.1.2.1, in environmental policy, researchers usually face a dependent variable problem which accounts for a lack of comparability between studies (Töller 2022, Steinebach 2023). As the two main approaches, environmental policy is conceptualised either by the environmental performance of a country or a region, i.e., the levels of environmental indicators like emissions, pollution or resource depletion (e.g., Neumayer 2003, Bernauer and Koubi 2009, Jahn 2016, 2021), or by the policy output, i.e., single policies or the total number of environmental policies implemented (e.g., Knill, Debus and Heichel 2010, Lim and Duit 2018, Schulze 2021). Despite being clearly valuable, each approach has its shortcomings. On the one hand, while environmental performance measures can cover large parts of the broad field of environmental policy, the causal link between environmental policy-making and environmental indicators underlies considerable uncertainties (Töller 2022). On the other hand, studies on environmental policy output usually miss the bigger picture of the policy field by investigating only a few selected policies or they neglect the *policy intensity*, i.e., the policy stringency of policies in terms of regulatory levels and scope (Schaffrin, Sewerin and Seubert 2015, Howlett and Capano 2019), when they rely on indices counting policies. A remarkable exception that integrates both the number of policies and policy intensity has been presented by Knill, Schulze and Tosun (2012). However, concentrating on the regulation of air pollution, they, too, had to focus on a single sector of environmental policy. In contrast, looking at the hard figures of environmental budgets as data approach makes it possible to obtain pragmatically an integrated, but nuanced, view on the field of environmental policy in a time-series perspective. In Sweden and other Scandinavian countries, where also opposition parties yearly submit budget proposals, this even applies to both the policy output and party positions. This makes it a valuable and more dynamic source of party positions in these countries compared to the rather static party manifestoes. However, when it comes to the policy output, the benefits hold equally true for every other country, as budgets form the basis for government work everywhere. To be sure, the dataset utilised in chapter 9 also left out areas related to environmental policy, like investments on different energy technologies. However, as this had to be done for research pragmatic reasons being only one researcher who retrieves and sorts the relevant data, this flaw can be compensated with the means of only few additional human resources. Another caveat

is that approach does not take into account other important instruments of environmental policy, like regulative policies or other economic instruments, like environmental taxes (Böcher 2010) and so-called negative subsidies (Skovgaard and van Asselt 2019). Yet, the other economic instruments could be derived from the same data sources. In summary, investigating the distributional dimension of environmental policy complements the usual operationalisations of environmental policy and adds a valuable perspective to future environmental policy analysis. This holds, in particularly, true in times of larger socio-ecological transition projects, in which public investments are increasingly deemed a necessary component of environmental policy-making (e.g., Mastini, Kallis and Hickel 2021, Sachs et al. 2022).

11.2.3 Empirical Contributions

The research articles of this dissertation contributed to the state of the art in several research strands. Most clearly, they advanced the research on the nexus of PRRPs and environmental policy in two regards. First, the empirical analyses have enhanced knowledge of *PRRPs' positions in the field of environmental policy* which was still developing at the outset of this dissertation project. While they buttress the meanwhile widely held view that PRRPs take clearly negative positions on sustainability issues, they qualify the idea of PRRPs embracing consistently traditional environmental policies. As shown in the analysis of chapter 9, despite of rhetorical commitments, the Swedish PRRP was loath to advocate more investments in nature protection. This puts into context findings indicating positive positions of PRRPs on traditional environmental policy issues (Schaller and Carius 2019, Tosun and Debus 2020, Voss 2020). Therefore, future research should delve deeper into these positions, which, so far, have been addressed mainly on a theoretical basis (ch. 5.1.3), but less in empirical studies. Second, this dissertation contributed to the research on the *effects of PRRPs on environmental policy* as regards the direction of effects and potentially underlying causal mechanisms. Concerning the direction of effects, the analysis of environmental policy-making in Sweden (ch. 9) supports previous studies which equally found direct negative effects of PRRPs on sustainability policy when these parties participate in governmental decision-making (Jahn 2021, Böhmelt 2021, Lockwood and Lockwood 2022, Surdea-Hernea 2023). For traditional environmental policies, the study suggests a similarly negative effect. Contradicting the common ideas of PRRPs' positive stance towards traditional environmental policy mentioned above, future research should scrutinise the effects also in this environmental policy subsector. To date, investigation of PRRPs' effects in environmental policy has focused predominantly on climate policies sidelining their potential influence on traditional environmental policy. For both subfields of environmental policy, the *pull-effect* proposed in the extended partisan theory deserves closer attention in empirical research. Researchers should go beyond the positioning of political parties and investigate the salience attributed to environmental policies in party programmes and governmental action as well as the discourses applied to the issue. The intriguing questions is whether mainstream parties might adapt a low attention to environmental issues or emulate communication frames of PRRPs

(e.g., Küppers 2022), after deciding to cooperate with them. Both can entail significant implications for the overall practicability of environmental policy-making (Green-Pedersen 2019, ch. 9, Feindt and Oels 2005).

In addition, the research articles of this dissertation confirmed that scope conditions identified for the traditional partisan theory are equally relevant for the extended partisan theory (e.g., Häusermann, Picot and Geering 2013). In particular, studies indicated public sentiment to be relevant here (Burstein 2003, Zohlnhöfer and Engler 2023). A generally low public sentiment on environmental policy most likely reduces the need for parties to show reaction on related issues at all and, thus, makes it irrelevant as an obstacle for (future) coalition formations. However, recalling the premise of this dissertation that political parties do not simply respond to the public opinion but are able to influence it actively (e.g., Kulin, Johansson Sevä and Dunlap 2021) (*see* ch. 4.2), this relationship further complicates. In fact, it is conceivable that the public sentiment of environmental policy depends on strategic decisions of each party to push issues onto the agenda that make coalitions between other parties harder to realise or strengthen the link between itself and other parties (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, Green-Pedersen 2019). Considering PRRPs' turn to environmental policy, potential interactions between public salience of environmental issues and office-seeking motivated pull effects in the wake of electorally growing PRRPs should be further examined in future research.

Another noteworthy contribution is a valuable by-product of the original research focus and concerns a different party family. In the search of contagion, or more specifically *pull*-, effects of PRRPs, the research articles dealt considerably also with the environmental positions of centre-right parties. Thus, the empirical results of this dissertation (ch. 7, 8, 9 & 10) also inform the investigation of centre-right parties' environmental positions which have received surprisingly scant attention in the literature considering their importance as leading governmental parties in Europe (valuable exceptions: Båtstrand 2015, Hess and Renner 2019).

Aside the dissertation's main contributions to research on the nexus of PRRPs and environmental policy, it seems appropriate to mention three other notable contributions that in light of the different approaches towards environmental policy as dependent variable speak to different strands of literature respectively, especially: social movement research, transport policy analysis, and the specific field of Swedish environmental policy analysis.

First, the empirical analyses of chapter 7 and 8 were among the first to present robust data on party responses to *Fridays for Future*. As regards international comparison, to the best of my knowledge, chapter 8, in fact, has been *the* first to provide such data. This has been a crucial advancement of knowledge on this important actor of the new climate movement since political parties have been the main addressees of the movement's appeals in party democracies (De Moor et al. 2021). Following the literature of party-movement interaction, in fact, parties represent a central political opportunity structure for the effect of social movements which depends on the responsiveness of parties in order to realise their demands (Kitschelt 1986, Rucht 2004). This also reflects another potential causal

mechanism of partisan effects presented in chapter 3, which is an intervening effect on the impact of interest organisations, here the climate movement. FfF had intended to ensure a broad support for their claims among political parties across ideological camps, however, as the results show, it has failed to achieve this goal. While many centre-right parties revealed reactions from cautious to rejecting, PRRPs mobilised strongly against the movement by disputing their concerns, demonising the individual activists, or outright accusing the whole movement of being led by vested red-green interests. These results have been taken up by several other contributions on party-movement interactions (e.g., Buzogány and Scherhaufer 2023, Weisskircher, Hutter and Borbáth 2023, Heinze 2023). More recently, *Fridays For Future* has lost traction due to difficult conditions for climate protest mobilisation in the COVID-19-pandamic and, especially, the antisemitic statements published by its international section and not rectified by its founder and figurehead Greta Thunberg. Nevertheless, the analyses may inform further studies on future or other contemporary parts of the climate movement as a point of reference. As in the studies at hand *Fridays For Future* has been used only as a proxy for sustainability policy and only minor attention was paid to actual *inter*action between parties and movements, that are at least equally shaped by the movement's behaviour, this, in particular, is an aspect to expand on.

Second, chapter 10 has addressed the field of aviation transport from a policy analysis perspective. Research on aviation transport policy had been surprisingly neglected by political scientists, so far (Forsyth 2020). Therefore, this comparative case study represents a crucial step to filling this research gap by providing first findings on the *politics* of aviation transport policy. The PIDA-heuristic has proved valuable in guiding this research so that future research can build on the empirical and theoretical insights of this chapter. What is more, the analysis may inform the policy analysis by the means of PIDA more generally. As other studies applying this approach have indicated, the analytical richness of the PIDA can benefit from the complementation of other policy analysis approaches, e.g., partisan theory (Slavici 2021).

Third, chapter 9 adds to the research on Swedish environmental policy, in which Sweden is usually listed among the pioneers of environmental policy in comparative policy research (Scruggs 1999, Börzel 2002, Jänicke 2005, Duit 2016, Jahn 2016, ch. 6.2, cf. Hysing 2014). Taking a distinct party politics perspective, my research results question whether this relatively high performance builds upon a similar strong core of environmental concerns in domestic Swedish politics which would guarantee a lasting strong performance for the future. In this regard, future research needs to examine further developments in Swedish environmental policy and, if the negative trends are confirmed, scrutinise the role of PRRP in interaction with other factors.

11.3 Limitations

As a number of limitations originating in the theoretical and empirical focuses is already mentioned in the direct context of research contributions, the following paragraph only emphasises some of these and complements them with a few from a methodological perspective.

Theories are helpful tools to set the focus in empirical political science research which is necessary to handle the often vast array of potential influences characterising socio-political phenomena (e.g., Peters 2013, ch. 5). However, such a focus comes always at the expense of leaving blind spots that might be equally relevant for explanation (ibid.). This dissertation concentrated on the party system side of the cleavage theory in order to approach the effects of PRRPs on environmental policy-making (ch. 4). Thus, the important societal side of cleavages has been neglected. It has been made clear that the societal trends possibly mirroring the developments on the party system should be put under scrutiny in future research, e.g., by investigating if the growing importance of socio-cultural conflicts manifests also among citizens. Perhaps even more importantly in the context of this dissertation, possible interaction effects between society and parties require further examination. In this vein, it is crucial to reflect that public opinion is not only a factor influencing political parties, but at the same time it is at least equally shaped by political parties and the party competition among them.

Therefore, it can be extremely valuable to get more internal insights to party actions. This points to the methodological approaches chosen. In order to disentangle the strategies of political parties at work, interviews with politicians, party members or party staff may be enlightening – although it is questionable to which extent these 'show their cards' and provide reliable information especially considering the currency of the topic. Moreover, different approaches towards the positioning of parties could have been reflected more comprehensively. Although already a variety of operationalisations has been harnessed (e.g., own data from document analyses and budget proposals as well as the CHES-dataset), party positions could also have been derived from the highly pertinent MANIFESTO-Project (Lehmann et al. 2022) or voter surveys (e.g., Schmitt et al. 2022). It should be investigated if these data approaches triangulate the empirical findings of this dissertation. Furthermore, all empirical work in this dissertation has been done in case study research designs. As mentioned in the methodology chapter (ch. 6), generalisations are always a weak spot of this research design and the results can only be generalised by future studies. In this vein, the evaluations of the hypotheses need to be scrutinised, for instance, by further case studies following the strategy of a *layered generalisation* (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 9) or, if data availability allows, by quantitative studies that are able to generalise based on significance tests (Gerring 2017, ch. 10.4). This holds particularly true for the newly derived hypothesis on indirect causal effect of PRRPs on environmental policy. In terms of limited generalisability, also the focus on environmental pioneer countries in Western Europe applied in this dissertation must be reiterated. This case selection was considered appropriate to ensure a high significance of environmental policy in the national party competition. Otherwise, it might have been even harder to detect the already empirically elusive effects of PRRPs on the environment. However, since environmental policy has established almost worldwide as a separate policy field (e.g., Böcher 2023), it is desirable to explore PRRPs' effect and its causal mechanisms in this field of policy also beyond the selected political systems.

12 Outlook

As PRRPs have started emphasising environmental policy only recently and are still clarifying their environmental profiles, the research object is a constantly, and sometimes, quickly moving target. Representing a hot topic makes it extraordinarily interesting for research, but, at the same time, constantly puts the results at risk to be less relevant the next day or month due to significant changes in the field. The flourishing development of the related literature in recent years speaks for itself here. However, not only does this hold true for the nexus of PRRPs and the environment but similarly applies to other topics addressed in the empirical parts of the dissertation. While the *Fridays For Future* movement clearly has lost traction, innovations on aviation transport policy are currently under review on the EU-level. Equally, the coalition market is a fast-moving business. So far, the shift of coalition options resulted primarily in push effects bringing about coalitions without PRRPs. However, the continually growing vote share of PRRPs appear to make many parties question all too categorical cordon sanitaire strategies. While some Swedish centre-right parties already chose the opposite way, the cases of the ÖVP in Austria at the end of the 2010s or more recently the VVD in the Netherlands around the election in 2023 showcase a revival of more pragmatic approach towards the populist radical right challengers. In Germany, the party system is about to fragment increasingly along the socio-cultural cleavage leaving little room for prognoses other than that the old desirable coalitions are highly unlikely to be available in the near future. Here, the established centre-right parties are still eager to distance themselves from the PRRP. Overall, it seems reasonable to presume that similar to the overall establishment of PRRPs (Art 2007, De Jonge 2021, ch. 5), centre-right parties will play a pivotal role in whether the stances of PRRPs on environmental policy become socially acceptable and groundwork for future governmental policy-making, thus, facilitating, e.g., "climate obstruction" (Ekberg et al. 2022). As the final lines of this dissertation being written, the *Radical Rights' Grip on Environmental Politics* seems to emerge more and more regarding the cumulating interactions of centre-right parties and PRRPs on environmental issues[93].

In the end, this topicality only substantiates the relevance of the chosen research topic and the need for future research which can build on the insights of this dissertation and may take up some of the several proposals made above. Party systems are in flux, party competition changes, populist radical right parties are on the rise, and the environmental pressures are intensifying. In light of these overall dynamics, it is a challenging time for societies in Western Europe, but also an interesting time for environmental policy analysis.

[93] E.g., considering the EU Nature Restoration law: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/07/12/nature-restoration-law-survives-knife-edge-vote-in-the-european-parliament-amid-right-wing; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/PV-9-2023-07-12-RCV_FR.pdf; 10/12/2023; or regulation on wind energy expansion in forests in Thuringia, Germany: https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/thueringen/windraeder-wald-gesetz-fdp-strom-100.html; 10/12/2023.

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14 Appendix

Appendix 1 (Chapter 4.4)

The evaluation of desirability is based on the ideological positions of parties on the main lines of conflicts presented above and the parties' own pre-election commitments derived from scientific literature and my own case knowledge. This approach resonates with earlier research on coalition probabilities (Debus 2022). The desirability measure can obtain values between 0 and 2: a value of 0 indicates a coalition that is arithmetically possible, but ideologically inconceivable; a value of 1 classifies a minimal winning coalition option as viable but not ultimately desirable for the involved parties due to ideological distances or the bad reputation of one of the involved parties; while a value of 2 indicates a desirable coalition that is preferred by the involved parties on a programmatic basis. With one necessary exception in Sweden in 2010, minority coalitions with alternating support parties are basically excluded from these considerations since, usually, parties are interested in reliable majorities in their government term, and, thus, if even minority coalitions might formally come into being, they build on minimal winning coalitions in terms of their voting weight in practice.

A: Austria

SPÖ	ÖVP	FPÖ	BZÖ	Grüne	Desirability
1	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**
1	0	1	1	0	0
1	0	1	0	1	0
1	0	0	1	1	0
0	1	1	1	0	0
0	1	1	0	1	0
0	1	0	1	1	0

Minimal Winning Coalitions and their ideological desirability in Austria 2008, own calculations and illustration. The row marked in bold indicates the coalition ultimately constituted.

SPÖ	ÖVP	FPÖ	Grüne	NEOS	Desirability
1	1	0	0	0	1
0	1	1	0	0	1
0	**1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**
1	0	1	1	0	0

Minimal Winning Coalitions and their ideological desirability in Austria 2019, own calculations and illustration. The row marked in bold indicates the coalition ultimately constituted.

B: Germany

CDU/CSU	SPD	FDP	Die Linke	Grüne	Desirability
1	1	0	0	0	1
1	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**2**
1	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	1	1	0	0

Minimal Winning Coalitions and their ideological desirability in Germany 2009, own calculations and illustration. The row marked in bold indicates the coalition ultimately constituted.

CDU/CSU	SPD	FDP	Die Linke	Grüne	AfD	Desirability
1	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**
1	0	1	1	0	0	0
1	0	1	0	1	0	1
1	0	1	0	0	1	0
1	0	0	1	1	0	0
1	0	0	1	0	1	0
1	0	0	0	1	1	0
0	1	1	1	1	0	0
0	1	1	1	0	1	0
0	1	1	0	1	1	0
0	1	0	1	1	1	0

Minimal Winning Coalitions and their ideological desirability in Germany 2017, own calculations and illustration. The row marked in bold indicates the coalition ultimately constituted.

CDU/CSU	SPD	FDP	Die Linke	Grüne	AfD	SSW	Desirability
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
0	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**1**
0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0

Minimal Winning Coalitions and their ideological desirability in Germany 2021, own calculations and illustration. The row marked in bold indicates the coalition ultimately constituted.

C: Netherlands

Considering the high fragmentation of the Dutch party system, the calculation of minimal winning calculations alone presents a challenge. To meet that challenge, it is helpful to extend the idea of minimal winning coalitions to the concept of *minimal coalitions* (e.g., Geys, Heyndels and Vermeir 2006). Following this concept, the formation of coalitions regularly does not only rely on the minimal number of seats necessary for a parliamentary majority, i.e., minimal winning coalitions, but also on the minimisation of involved parties, i.e., minimal number coalitions in order to avoid overcomplexity in coalition formation and coalition governance. Hence, both tables represent only those minimal coalitions with less than five parties. In addition, for pragmatic reasons for the calculations on the election in 2021 only parties with more than three seats are included as otherwise the number of possible coalitions would have exceeded the tangible amount considerably. Furthermore, these parties are unlikely to be integrated in a minimal winning coalition as their seat share would not contribute to stable coalitions basing on a reliable majority. This taken into account, the results still display 21 arithmetically feasible coalition for 2010, 23 for 2017 and 14 for 2021.

SP	D66	CU	CDA	VVD	PvdA	PvdD	GL	SGP	PVV	Desirability
1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
0	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0
1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1
0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0
0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0

Minimal Winning Coalitions and their ideological desirability in the Netherlands 2010, own calculations and illustration. The calculation produced 40 possible minimal winning coalitions of which only the 21 with less than five parties are displayed here. The row marked in bold indicates the coalition ultimately constituted.

SP	D66	CU	CDA	VVD	Pvd A	Pvd D	GL	PVV	50+	Desirability
1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0

1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
0	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**
0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0

Minimal Winning Coalitions and their ideological desirability in the Netherlands 2017, own calculations and illustration. For pragmatic reasons parties with less then four seats had been excluded from the calculation (i.e., SGP and DENK). The final calculation produced 77 possible minimal winning coalitions of which only the 23 with less than five parties are displayed here. The row marked in bold indicates the coalition ultimately constituted.

SP	D66	CU	CDA	VVD	Pvd A	Pvd D	GL	FvD	PVV	Desirability
0	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**
0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0
1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0

Minimal Winning Coalitions and their ideological desirability in the Netherlands 2021, own calculations and illustration. For pragmatic reasons parties with less than four seats had been excluded from the calculation (i.e., SGP, DENK, VOLT, JA21, 50+, BBB and BIJ1). The final calculation produced 100 possible minimal winning coalitions of which only the 14 with less than five parties are displayed here. The row marked in bold indicates the coalition ultimately constituted.

D: Sweden

V	S	MP	C	L	KD	M	SD	Desirability
0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0

Minimal Winning Coalitions and their ideological desirability in Sweden 2010, own calculations and illustration. Note that the coalition ultimately constituted is not listed here as it represented a minority government which relied on alternating parliamentary majorities

V	S	MP	C	L	KD	M	SD	Desirability
1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
1	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**
1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0
1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0
0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0
1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0
1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0

Minimal Winning Coalitions and their ideological desirability in Sweden 2018, own calculations and illustration. The row marked in bold indicates the coalition ultimately constituted. Note that this coalition officially only included S and MP and furthermore is backed also by L, thus, representing a minority government with a parliamentary surplus support coalition.

V	S	MP	C	L	KD	M	SD	Desirability
0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0
1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0
0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0
0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0
0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0
0	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**
1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1
1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0

Minimal Winning Coalitions and their ideological desirability in Sweden 2022, own calculations and illustration. The row marked in bold indicates the coalition ultimately constituted. Note that this coalition officially represents a minority coalition only including M, KD and L. However, it is back by SD based on a highly formalised cooperation agreement

Appendix 2 (Chapter 8)

A: Sample and Raw Data

Raw Data

Party		Party name (– translation)	Party Ideology[1]	Env. Is.-Owner[2]	Gov.-Opp.	Party Comp.	Outcome
FPO	AT	*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs – Freedom Party of Austria*	9.1	8.4	1	0	-2
GRUENE AT	AT	*Die Grünen-Die Grüne Alternative – The Greens-The Green Alternative*	2.5	1.5	0	1	2
NEOS	AT	*Das neue Österreich und Liberales Forum – New Austria and Liberal Forum*	5.9	5.4	0	0.67	2
OVP	AT	*Österreichische Volkspartei/Die neue Volkspartei – Austrian People's Party/New Austrian People's Party*	6.9	7.1	1	0.33	*0*
SPO	AT	*Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich – Social Democratic Party Austria*	4	4.9	0	0.67	1
AfD	DE	*Alternative für Deutschland – Alternative for Germany*	9.2	8.4	0	0	-2
CDU/CSU[3]	DE	*Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich Soziale Union –Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union*	6.5	6.1	1	0.67	0
DIE LINKE	DE	*Die Linke – Left Party*	1.4	4.3	0	1	2
FDP	DE	*Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands – Free Democratic Party Germany*	6.4	7.5	0	0.67	-0.5
GRUENE DE	DE	*Bündnis 90/Die Grünen – Alliance 90/The Greens*	3.2	1.6	0	1	2
SPD	DE	*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland – Social Democratic Party Germany*	3.6	4.7	1	0.67	2
C	SE	*Centerpartiet – Centre Party*	6.8	3.9	0	0.67	2
KD	SE	*Kristdemokraterna – Christian Democrats*	7.8	6.1	0	0.33	*0*
L	SE	*Liberalerna – Liberals*	6.5	5.4	0	0.67	0.67
M	SE	*Moderate Samlingspartiet – Moderate Party*	7.7	6.5	0	0.33	*0*
MP	SE	*Miljöpartiet de Gröna – Green Party*	3.3	0.6	1	1	2

S	SE	*Sveriges Socialdemokratiska arbetarparti – Swedish Social Democratic Party*	3.9	4.8	1	0.67	1.75
SD	SE	*Sverigedemokraterna – Sweden Democrats*	8.5	7.9	0	0	-1.4
V	SE	*Vänsterpartiet – Left Party*	1.7	1.6	0	0.67	2

N = 19.
[1] CHES 2019: lrgen.
[2] CHES 2019: environment.
[3] For CDU/CSU we calculated averages of their respective CHES-values.

Notes on the outcome (OUTC):

- *v*alues for the degree of approval are calculated averages, i.e., for the Swedish Liberals (L) we coded three segments of which two obtained a value of 1 (weak affirmation) while one segment was coded 0 (Caution). Dividing the sum by the total number of observations yields a final approval value of 0.67 [= (1 +1 +0)/3].
- Degrees of approval highlighted in italics are derived from the overall lack of references.
- Note that the number of observations differs sometimes extremely for some of the cases raising question about comparability. During the research process, we addressed this issue two-fold. First, we see the number of a party's comments on FfF itself as a statement since less or even no comments signal a lack of interest. However, we are convinced that the positions expressed still outweigh the sheer number, e.g., if there were only few comments pointing to similar direction. This applied, in particular, to the AfD which revealed a surprisingly high frequency of throughout hostile comments and, thus, could by no means assigned a set-membership of FfF-support. Using the AfD as a reference case, after due consideration of weighing, the number of observations, ultimately, did not affect the overall set-assignment of parties. Second, we put the outcome into perspectives of nation size and party size using, e.g., the size of national parliament or the membership number of the respective party. Indeed, we observed some changes in raw values here, e.g., the Austrian Green Party achieved by far the highest values of approval, but set-theoretically speaking this does not suggest that they belong even more to the set of FfF-supporters than other parties. It does not produce a difference in kind. Finally, throughout these procedures the assignments of each party to the outcome set remained robust and aligned with the values here (with exception of the FDP which we discussed as an DCCK), so that we are confident that the comparability is sufficient.

Descriptive Statistics of Raw Conditions and Outcome

Variable	*Minimum*	*Maximum*	*Mean*	*Median*	*Standard deviation*	*Set skewness*[1]
Environmental Issue-ownership (CHES 2019: environment)	0.6	8.4	5.1	5.4	2.4	**26.32 %** *holding issue-ownerhsip*
Party Ideology (CHES 2019: lrgen)	1.4	9.2	5.5	6.4	2.5	**57.89 %** *(rather) right-wing parties*
Government-Opposition Status (own data)	*already cs-calibrated*	*already cs-calibrated*	*already cs-calibrated*	*already cs-calibrated*	*already cs-calibrated*	**31.58 %** *have governmental status*
Party Competition Office-Seeking (own data)	*already fs-calibrated*	*already cs-calibrated*	*already cs-calibrated*	*already cs-calibrated*	*already cs-calibrated*	**68.42 %** *(rather) depend on the Green Party for coalitions*
Outcome (own data)	-2.0	2.0	0.8	1.75	1.5	**57.89 %** *(rather) support FfF*

N = 19.
[1] Percent of cases with set membership > 0.5.

B: Coding and data sources

Coding scheme and examples

Position towards FfF	Coding scheme
Strong rejection (-2)	Explicit critique of the movement, e.g., reproach of hysteria or denial of climate change and FfF demands
	Example*: *"Greta Thunberg's fundamentalist children's crusade*"
	(Sweden Democrats, Facebook)
Weak rejection (-1)	Restrained critique towards FfF, e.g., questioning the demands of the movement or pointing to compulsory schooling
	Example: "*We need Mondays for the economy […] instead of Fridays for future"*
	(FDP, Twitter)
Caution (0)	Acknowledging FfF without positioning, e.g., references to meetings with movement representatives
Weak affirmation (1)	Positive reference to the movement, e.g., appreciating its existence
	Example: "*We pay respect to the Swede who raised [climate] issues to a global scale through her dedication, namely Greta Thunberg.*"
	(Liberals, Swedish parliament)
Strong affirmation (2)	Positive reference and support of the movement, e.g., calls for participation in FfF demonstration
	Example: "*Thank you Fridays for Future […] We will fight for a better climate policy*"
	(Green Party DE, Twitter)

**Examples are translated from German and Swedish by the authors.*

Distribution of observations across sources

Party	Country	Twitter	Facebook	Parliamentary debates	Press releases	Frequency	Country *in total*
FPÖ	Austria	0	7	2	0	9	
GRÜNE AT	Austria	34	31	0	1	66	
NEOS	Austria	7	3	2	0	12	
ÖVP	Austria	0	0	0	0	0	
SPÖ	Austria	5	1	3	2	11	AT = 98
AfD	Germany	37	10	12	7	66	
CDU/CSU	Germany	6	0	10	3	19	
DIE LINKE	Germany	40	1	16	2	59	
FDP	Germany	24	0	10	4	38	
GRÜNE GER	Germany	42	2	14	4	62	
SPD	Germany	22	0	10	4	36	GER = 280
C	Sweden	9	1	0	0	10	
KD	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	
L	Sweden	0	0	3	0	3	
M	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	
MP	Sweden	13	10	13	1	37	
S	Sweden	0	0	14	1	15	
SD	Sweden	0	1	4	0	5	
V	Sweden	8	1	10	2	21	SE = 91
All Parties		247	68	123	31	469	

C: Calibrations

OUTCOME "FfF-support" (OUTC)

FfF-support is conceived as a concept which is straightforwardly operationalised by the individual party's degree of approval as it has been recorded in the document analysis (for data collection details *see* Methodology part). These values are calibrated in a fuzzy-logic. We considered values of approval from 0 on downwards to indicate a party's attitude non-supportive towards FfF and therefore a non-membership in the set "FfF-support". Accordingly, the cross-over point of the set is at 0, while the fuzzy-thresholds are at -1 and 1 respectively. The fuzzy-thresholds are set at clear gaps in the empirical data (S: 1.75 to L: 0.67; FDP: -0.5 to SD: -1.4) representing differences in degree (*see* Appendix 1).

In an original version, we also included the frequency of references in the production of the outcome variables, however, this procedure did not yield any different results when weighed in a plausible manner taking the AfD as a reference case that must be assigned full non-membership despite its high frequency of references. Nonetheless, the number of references was relevant for the coding of three cases in our sample which did not refer to FfF at all on any of the communication channels taken into account in our data collection: the Austrian ÖVP and the Swedish KD and M. Considering their fundamental ignorance of FfF it is clear to assign these parties a non-membership, yet, the matter of degree is more difficult. In the end, we decided code these parties -1 expressing a clearly rejecting, however not openly hostile attitude towards FfF. Apart from this conceptually understandable decision, the overall robustness ranges (Hofstad 2019) for the calibration of the three thresholds has been extremely narrow since other decisions (e.g. assigning L or FDP more extreme values) would not have been plausible.

Own data ***Coding of degree of approval to FfF in the period of investigation (08/2018 – 06/2020).***	**Fuzzy-set calibration**
> 1 ***Centerpartiet, DIE LINKE, GRUENE AT, GRUENE DE, Miljöpartiet, NEOS, Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarparti, SPD, SPÖ, Vänsterpartiet***	1
≤ 1; > 0 ***Liberalerna***	0.67
≤ 0; ≥ -1 ***CDU/CSU, FDP, Kristdemokraterna, Moderata Samlingsparti, ÖVP***	0.33
< -1 ***AfD, FPÖ, Sverigedemokraterna***	0

Party Ideology on the Left-Right-Scale (LERI)

This condition represents a party's overall ideological stance on a left-right scale. In the original data values at zero indicate an extreme left ideology and values around five mark the centre, while values at 10 an extreme right ideology. For our calibration, parties with full-membership are right-leaning parties, whereas non-membership displays a left ideology. Considering the CHES-data for all models of the QCA the anchor point is set at 5.0 which for the identification of left-right positions is unchangeable as otherwise it would violate the underlying CHES-expert appraisal of the parties and their comparability. In our main model, we decided to set the fuzzy-anchors at 7.5 respectively 2.5.

CHES data ***LRGEN = position of the party in 2019 in terms of its overall ideological stance.***	**Fuzzy-set calibration**
≥ 7.5 ***AfD, FPÖ, Moderata Samlingsparti, Kristdemokraterna, Sverigedemokraterna***	1
> 5; < 7.5 ***CDU/CSU, Centerpartiet, FDP, Liberalerna, NEOS, ÖVP***	0.67
< 5; > 2.5 ***GRUENE DE, Miljöpartiet, Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarparti, SPD, SPÖ,***	0.33
≤ 2.5 ***DIE LINKE, GRUENE AT, Vänsterpartiet***	0

For robustness checks, an alternative model with a different calibration has been run, i.e. with a slightly broader political centre (thresholds: 8; 5; 2) which was in particular crucial for the assignment of the Swedish conservative M and Christian-democratic KD. However, since the qualitative anchor has not been changed, in accordance with the literature (Schneider, Wagemann 2012, 288f) this decision revealed only minor increasing effects on the solution coverage (covS) (CS-M1: 0.649; CS-M2: 0.676 | PS-M1: 0.676; PS-M2: 0.703) of the terms with LERI and did not alternate the solution as such.
Other models considering a narrower political centre would not yield any different fs-assignments in our sample compared to our original model (thresholds: 7; 5; 3) or are simply not plausible with regard to case knowledge (e.g., a model with thresholds at 6.5, 5 and 3.5 would assign parties clearly located closer to the centre of the political spectrum to the more extreme ends, i.e. Swedish C).

Environmental Issue-ownership (ENVIO)

This condition shows whether a party can be seen as an issue-owner in the field of environmental policy. We combined a) CHES-data on whether a party supports environmental protection even at the expense of economic growth (0 = strongly supports environmental protection; 10 = strongly support economic growth) and b) case knowledge on issue-ownership in the respective national party systems. Consequently, we set the point of indifference at four in the original data yielding that parties with a value of 1 are conceived as environmental issue-owners while 0 indicates the opposite.
A threshold set at 2.0 could be justified by only looking at the CHES-data. However, applying case-knowledge of the Swedish party system a threshold at 4.0 is reasonable as we face a situation in which C traditionally has hold an environmental issue-ownership, i.e., in energy policy, and more recently, is eager to obtain it. However, considering the German left party as next closest to this threshold, any further shift of the threshold would blur the issue-ownership concept as environmental policy has never been preserve of the DIE LINKE although the party's programme has recently shown ambitious policy ideas in this field.
Comparing the two models (M1-threshold: 4.0 | M3-threshold: 2.0) for a robustness test we see that solutions for the analysis of the positive outcome are in clear subset relation therefore proving our results to be robust. For the negated outcome the same rows are included in the procedure of logical minimisation which leaves the solution formula unchanged.

CHES data *ENVIRONMENT = position towards environmental sustainability.*	**Crisp-set calibration**
< 4 ***Centerpartiet, GRUENE AT, GRUENE DE, Miljöpartiet, Vänsterpartiet***	1
> 4 ***AfD, CDU/CSU, DIE LINKE, FDP, FPÖ, Kristdemokraterna, Liberalerna, Moderata Samlingsparti, NEOS, ÖVP, Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarparti, SPD, SPÖ, Sverigedemokraterna,***	0

Government-Opposition status (GOVOPP)

This condition reveals whether a party held office for the majority of days in the period of investigation. In principle, it is a conceptually clear-cut difference in kind so that we opted for a crisp-set calibration of this condition. However, considering our cases the change of government within the period of investigation in Austria as well as the support of Swedish minority government by two opposition parties create a less clear picture. While for the Swedish case the parties formally holding no governmental offices should be considered as opposition parties, for Austria, the proportional number of days in governmental office decided if a party is full member of the set (→ governmental party) or not (→ opposition party). Consequently, we assigned government status to the ÖVP (481 of 601 days in office) and the FPÖ (300/601)) and opposition status to the Green party (175/601).

For robustness tests, we run a model that includes both Austrian Green Party and FPÖ in the set of governmental parties (M4). In this model the Austrian Greens Party takes seat with the Swedish Greens leaving the solutions apart from minor changes in the coverage unique unchanged.

Own data. *Calculating the number of days in governmental office for each party (08/2018-06/2020).*	**Crisp-set calibration**
majority of days as governmental parties ***CDU/CSU, FPÖ, Miljöpartiet, Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarparti, SPD, ÖVP***	1
minority of days as governmental party or constant opposition party ***AfD, Centerpartiet, DIE LINKE, GRUENE AT, FDP, GRUENE DE, Kristdemokraterna, Liberalerna, Moderata Samlingsparti, NEOS, SPÖ, Sverigedemokraterna, Vänsterpartiet***	0

Party Competition based on office-seeking (PC_OS)

On the premise of understanding parties as, at least partly, office-seeking organisations, this condition considers whether a party is rather dependent on the national green or the populist radical right party in order to enter governmental office. A value of 1 indicates a total dependence on the respective green party while a 0.67 means coalitions option are rather oriented towards the green party (in particular in contrast to the PRRP) but other coalition options are available. Note that the appraisal did not take into account arithmetically possible coalition considerations but options based on ideology and parties' self-claimed options. Accordingly, parties with a value of 0.33 are more likely to form a government coalition with the PRRP than with the Green party but also have other coalition options. For more detailed explanations of our set assignments see the tables below. Note that the appraisals are, again, based on the majority of days in the period of investigation.

Own data *Appraisal of coalition considerations of each party regarding the respective national green Party and the PRRP in the period of investigation (08/2018 – 06/2020).*	**Fuzzy-set calibration**
1 ***DIE LINKE, GRUENE AT, GRUENE DE, Miljöpartiet,***	1
0.67 ***Centerpartiet, CDU/CSU, FDP, Liberalerna, NEOS, Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarparti, SPD, SPÖ, Vänsterpartiet***	0.67
0.33 ***Kristdemokraterna, Moderata Samlingsparti, ÖVP***	0.33
0 ***AfD, FPÖ, Sverigedemokraterna***	0

Explanation of coalition considerations (in the period of investigation)

Party			**Explanation of coalition considerations** (in the period of investigation)
FPO	AT	0	*Coalitions with the Green Party are excluded.*
GRUENE AT	AT	1	*Coalitions with the PRRP are excluded.*
NEOS	AT	0.67	The NEOS take an ideological position between Greens and OVP but are much closer to the Greens when it comes to non-economic policies such as environmental or immigration policy. Furthermore, their voter base is strongly rooted in an urban, intellectual milieu that has strong aversions towards the FPO.
OVP	AT	0.33	The OVP already formed a government coalition with the FPO in the past. Although it also formed a coalition with the Greens, this cooperation is characterised by fiercer differences. For instance, the coalition agreement explicitly states that the partners do not agree on all issues and leave some of them to open processes in the Parliament. The OVP takes similar positions as the FPO on issues like immigration policy.
SPO	AT	0.67	The SPO has not formally excluded coalitions with the FPO and, in the past, cooperated with the party on the subnational level. However, it is much more geared towards the Green party and has articulated its preference for centre-left coalitions.
AfD	DE	0	*Coalitions with the Green Party are excluded.*
CDU/CSU	DE	0.67	CDU/CSU have excluded any kind of coalitions with the AfD, have been in coalition negotiations with the FDP and the Green party, but ultimately opted for a coalition with the SPD. Therefore, forming government with the Green party is certainly an option (in contrast to the AfD), but they had other alternatives.
DIE LINKE	DE	1.0	As CDU/CSU exclude any coalitions with the left party in Germany, the only plausible option to enter government for DIE LINKE is a left-party coalition including the Green party. In reality, however, this option has been quite improbable as the Green Party but in particular the SPD have been reluctant to pursue such a coalition, due to policy disagreements (e.g., foreign policy) and the left party's putative lack of governability.
FDP	DE	0.67	After the federal election of 2017, the FDP conducted coalition negotiations with the CDU/CSU and the Green Party which it, finally, terminated due to policy disagreements. Coalitions with SPD and CDU/CSU are ideologically possible, while any coalition with the AfD is excluded.
GRUENE DE	DE	1	*Coalitions with the PRRP are excluded.*

SPD	DE	0.67	Ideologically, the SPD has most in common with the Green Party which makes it the probably favourite coalition partner, however the SPD has had other coalition options, i.e. with the CDU/CSU. At the same time the party excluded any coalition with the AfD.
C	SE	0.67	In the January-agreement between S, MP, C and L of January 2019 the four parties forged an alliance in order to handle the difficult majority ratios in the new elected parliament and to prevent any influence on power by SD. Thus, clearly opposing SD, C, however has a number of other coalition options in the Swedish multi-party system.
KD	SE	0.33	The January-agreement of 2019 entailed the break-up of the conservative *Alliance for Sweden* originally comprising M, KD, L and C. In wake of these events KD revoked its *cordon sanitaire*-strategy towards SD and started to speak with SD party leader, among others in order to explore options for a conservative government with the support of SD. In contrast, a coalition with the Green party is no feasible option for the party.
L	SE	0.67	In the January-agreement between S, MP, C and L of January 2019 the four parties forged an alliance in order to handle the difficult majority ratios in the new elected parliament and to prevent any influence on power by SD. Thus, clearly opposing SD, L, however has a number of other coalition options in the Swedish multi-party system.
M	SE	0.33	The January-agreement of 2019 entailed the break-up of the conservative *Alliance for Sweden* originally comprising M, KD, L and C. In wake of these events M revoked its *cordon sanitaire*-strategy towards SD and started to speak with SD party leader, among others in order to explore options for a conservative government with the support of SD. In contrast, a coalition with the Green party is no feasible option for the party.
MP	SE	1	*Coalitions with the PRRP are excluded.*
S	SE	0.67	The Swedish social democrats have formed coalition governments with the Green Party two times in a row in the wake of elections in 2014 and 2018. While clearly opposing SD, S – as strongest party in parliament – has a number of other coalition options. This holds particularly true if we take into account the Swedish tradition of minority governments.
SD	SE	0	*Coalitions with the Green Party are excluded.*
V	SE	0.67	The left party regularly is excluded from formal coalition formations in Sweden, yet, it has supported left-wing governments several times in history. Clearly opposing SD, coalitions with the Green party are ideologically conceivable, however there are other ideologically thinkable – although improbable – options to enter government, i.e. in a minority government with S.

Calibrated data set

	LERI	ENVIO	GOVOPP	PC_OS	OUTC
FPO	1	0	1	0	0
GRUENE AT	0	1	0	1	1
NEOS	0.67	0	0	0.67	1
OVP	0.67	0	1	0.33	0.33
SPO	0.33	0	0	0.67	1
AfD	1	0	0	0	0
CDU/CSU	0.67	0	1	0.67	0.33
DIE LINKE	0	0	0	1	1
FDP	0.67	0	0	0.67	0.33
GRUENE DE	0.33	1	0	1	1
SPD	0.33	0	1	0.67	1
C	0.67	1	0	0.67	1
KD	1	0	0	0.33	0.33
L	0.67	0	0	0.67	0.67
M	1	0	0	0.33	0.33
MP	0.33	1	1	1	1
S	0.33	0	1	0.67	1
SD	1	0	0	0	0
V	0	1	0	0.67	1

D: Truthtables from the analyses of sufficiency

Positive Outcome incl. logical remainders

	LERI	ENVIO	GOVOPP	PC_OS	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
6	0	1	0	1	1	3	1.000	1.000	GRUENE AT,GRUENE DE,V
2	0	0	0	1	1	2	1.000	1.000	SPO,DIE LINKE
4	0	0	1	1	1	2	1.000	1.000	SPD,S
8	0	1	1	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	MP
14	1	1	0	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	C
10	1	0	0	1	0	3	0.887	0.798	NEOS,FDP,L
12	1	0	1	1	0	1	0.795	0.660	CDU/CSU
11	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.496	0.330	FPO,OVP
9	1	0	0	0	0	4	0.425	0.198	AfD,KD,M,SD
1	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-	
3	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-	
5	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-	
7	0	1	1	0	?	0	-	-	
13	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-	
15	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-	
16	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-	

Plotting of the contradictory row 10



Positive Outcome excl. logical remainders, incl. deviant cases consistency in kind (DCCK) which are marked bold

	LERI	ENVIO	GOVOPP	PC_OS	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
6	0	1	0	1	1	3	1.000	1.000	GRUENE AT,GRUENE DE,V
2	0	0	0	1	1	2	1.000	1.000	SPO,DIE LINKE
4	0	0	1	1	1	2	1.000	1.000	SPD,S
8	0	1	1	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	MP
14	1	1	0	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	C
10	1	0	0	1	1	3	0.887	0.798	NEOS,**FDP**,L
12	1	0	1	1	0	1	0.795	0.660	**CDU/CSU**
11	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.496	0.330	**FPO,OVP**
9	1	0	0	0	0	4	0.425	0.198	**AfD,KD,M,SD**

Decision to include the contradictory row as it includes two more cases (see main text). Of course, only dealing with the DCCK in the analysis. Therefore, we chose a raw consistency threshold of 0.8.

Negated Outcome incl. logical remainders

	LERI	ENVIO	GOVOPP	PC_OS	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
9	1	0	0	0	1	4	0.858	0.802	AfD,KD,M,SD
11	1	0	1	0	1	2	0.752	0.670	FPO,OVP
12	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.602	0.340	CDU/CSU
10	1	0	0	1	0	3	0.553	0.202	NEOS,FDP,L
4	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.330	0.000	SPD,S
2	0	0	0	1	0	2	0.248	0.000	SPO,DIE LINKE
6	0	1	0	1	0	3	0.000	0.000	GRUENE AT,GRUENE DE,V
8	0	1	1	1	0	1	0.000	0.000	MP
14	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.000	0.000	C
1	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-	
3	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-	
5	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-	
7	0	1	1	0	?	0	-	-	
13	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-	
15	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-	
16	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-	

Negated Outcome excl. logical remainders, incl. deviant cases consistency in kind (DCCK) which are marked bold

	LERI	ENVIO	GOVOPP	PC_OS	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
9	1	0	0	0	1	4	0.858	0.802	AfD,KD,M,SD
11	1	0	1	0	1	2	0.752	0.670	FPO,OVP
12	1	0	1	1	0	1	0.602	0.340	CDU/CSU
10	1	0	0	1	0	3	0.553	0.202	**NEOS**,FDP,**L**
4	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.330	0.000	**SPD**,**S**
2	0	0	0	1	0	2	0.248	0.000	**SPO**,**DIE LINKE**
6	0	1	0	1	0	3	0.000	0.000	**GRUENE AT**,**GRUENE DE,V**
8	0	1	1	1	0	1	0.000	0.000	**MP**
14	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.000	0.000	**C**

Considering the gap in the consistency values between rows 11 and 12, we chose a raw consistency threshold of 0.75.

E: Analyses of necessity

Analysis of Necessity (OUTC)

```
                Cons.Nec Cov.Nec RoN
LERI       0.431   0.498 0.608
ENVIO      0.406   1.000 1.000
GOVOPP     0.297   0.610 0.847
PC_OS      0.839   0.938 0.921
~LERI      0.676   1.000 1.000
~ENVIO     0.594   0.523 0.428
~GOVOPP    0.703   0.666 0.580
~PC_OS     0.321   0.496 0.733


                                    inclN   RoN   covN
-------------------------------------------
1  leri+GOVOPP+PC_OS   0.920  0.651  0.809
2  ENVIO+GOVOPP+PC_OS  0.946  0.635  0.813
-------------------------------------------
```

Conditions that passed the consistency threshold of 0.9 are highlighted bold. A consistent necessary condition is appraised as trivial if coverage is below 0.6 and the RoN value is below 0.5. Thus, all consistent conditions here are also non-trivial.
Note that although an environmental issue-ownership (ENVIO) is part of such a necessary disjunction, individually, this is neither a necessary condition since there are many cases of parties supportive of FfF despite being not member of the ENVIO set.

Analysis of Necessity (~OUTC)

```
                Cons.Nec Cov.Nec RoN
LERI       1.000   0.626 0.676
ENVIO      0.000   0.000 0.737
GOVOPP     0.350   0.390 0.780
PC_OS      0.398   0.241 0.488
~LERI      0.198   0.158 0.604
~ENVIO     1.000   0.477 0.406
~GOVOPP    0.650   0.334 0.409
~PC_OS     0.898   0.752 0.848


                            inclN   RoN   covN
-------------------------------------
1  LERI          1.000  0.676  0.626
2  LERI*envio    1.000  0.784  0.715
3  GOVOPP+pc_os  0.949  0.607  0.560
-------------------------------------
```

Conditions that passed the consistency threshold of 0.9 are highlighted bold. A consistent necessary condition is appraised as trivial if coverage is below 0.6 and the RoN value is below 0.5. Thus, in our analysis only LERI is consistent and also non-trivial.

F: Robustness tests

While, as noted in Appendix 3, the calibration of the outcome has a considerably narrow robustness range, and the cali bration of party competition is discussed in detail, for the other three conditions, we run three alternative models of cali bration. Ceteris paribus these alternative calibrations did not bring forward any contradictory results. As illustration, w e present the intermediate solutions resulting from the different models below, highlighting deviations from the origina l model in bold.

Analysis of Sufficiency (OUTC)

Model 1 - OUTC (*original model*)

leri*PC_OS + govopp*PC_OS => OUTC

	inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1 leri*PC_OS	1.000	1.000	0.649	0.217	SPO,DIE LINKE; SPD,S; GRUENE AT, GRUENE DE,V; MP
2 govopp*PC_OS	0.956	0.947	0.596	0.163	SPO,DIE LINKE; GRUENE AT GRUENE DE,V; NEOS,FDP,L; C
M1	0.967	0.959	0.812		

Model 2 - OUTC ("Broad political centre")
changed calibration thresholds for LERI: 8; 5; 2

leri*PC_OS + govopp*PC_OS => OUTC

	inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1 leri*PC_OS	1.000	1.000	**0.676**	0.217	SPO,DIE LINKE; SPD,S; GRUENE AT,GRUENE DE, V; MP
2 govopp*PC_OS	0.956	0.947	0.596	0.136	SPO,DIE LINKE; GRUENE AT,GRUENE DE,V; NEOS,FDP,L; C
M1	0.967	0.959	0.812		

Model 3 - OUTC (*"Strict environmental issue-ownership"*)
changed calibration thresholds for ENVIO: 2

leri*PC_OS + govopp*PC_OS => OUTC

	inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1 leri*PC_OS	1.000	1.000	0.649	0.217	SPO,DIE LINKE; SPD,S; GRUENE AT,GRUENE DE, V; MP
2 govopp*PC_OS	0.956	0.947	0.596	0.136	SPO,DIE LINKE; GRUENE AT,GRUENE DE,V; NEOS,FDP,L; C
M1	0.967	0.959	0.812		

Cut-off point at 0.8. The solution term represented uniquely by C is now gone and the liberal party family is united in its set-membership. While the conservative solution is changed slightly as envio is added to the second solution term as an INUS condition, the presented intermediate solution does not

change at all. This underlines that the solutions of Model 1 and Model 3 are, if at all different, in a clear subset relation and can be considered robust (Schneider, Wagemann 2012, ch. 11.2.2).

Model 4 - OUTC (*"All-in government Austria"*)
For the Austrian case governmental status has not only been attributed to ÖVP and FPÖ but also to the Green Party. As we can see below, we obtain slightly different parameters of fit, however no substantial changes, so that robustness is confirmed.

		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1	leri*PC_OS	1.000	1.000	0.649	**0.298**	SPO,DIE LINKE; SPD,S; GRUENE DE,V; GRUENE AT,MP
2	govopp*PC_OS	**0.949**	**0.937**	**0.515**	**0.163**	SPO,DIE LINKE; GRUENE DE,V; NEOS,FDP,L; C
	M1	0.967	0.959	0.812		

Furthermore, we considered changing the consistency thresholds in the truthtables for both the positive and the negated outcome. For the positive outcome, however, a lowering of the threshold would be a futile exercise since we could only include rows containing deviant cases consistency in kind. In contrast, a stricter threshold would exclude the contradictory row 10.

Model 5 - OUTC (*"Excluding the liberals"*)
Raw consistency threshold: 0.9

leri*PC_OS + ENVIO*govopp*PC_OS => OUTC

		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1	leri*PC_OS	1.000	1.000	0.649	**0.433**	SPO,DIE LINKE; SPD,S; GRUENE AT,GRUENE DE,V, MP
2	**ENVIO***govopp*PC_OS	1.000	1.000	0.271	0.054	GRUENE AT,GRUENE DE,V; C
	M1	**1.000**	**1.000**	**0.704**		

In our paper we decided against an exclusion of the contradictory row (for the plot, see Appendix 4) after carefully considering the established strategies of dealing with such rows (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 120-123). We decided against a redefinition of the population for practical reasons (above all available data and a limited number of cases), while theoretical considerations let us stick to our four chosen conditions instead of adding another condition. An aspect we carefully examined has been to re-specify the conceptualisation and calibration of the condition "environmental issue-ownership" as we found indications of an added explanatory power if we reconceptualise it broader as "strong environmental position" and operationalise it as a fuzzy-set with three thresholds. However, in the CHES-values we faced a big group of parties lumping around the value of 5, showing that they are willing to consider the environment as a relevant dimension next to the economy – but only to a certain extent. This group encompasses at least cases from the SPD (4.7) to the CDU/CSU and KD (6.1) for which, based on case knowledge, we see a difference *in degree* but could not justify a difference *in kind*. Following the CHES-coding and setting the anchor point at 5.0, on the other hand, would not have dissolved our inconsistent row as all three cases would have obtained again full membership in the set. In the end, we opted to keep our conceptualisation of ENVIO and its calibration as we can substantiate these choices both theoretically and empirically and holding an issue-ownership or not represents an actual difference *in kind* (see above).
All in all, by including the inconsistent row into the logical minimisation procedure we secured a higher coverage of cases at the expense of a lower – but still remarkably high – consistency (0.956). If we chose

a cut-off point at 0.9, Swedish C would have been the only right-wing party showing a positive outcome and the respective solution term had emphasised ENVIO as a central INUS condition in the parsimonious solution. The other three liberal parties would have remained unexplained, although two cases (NEOS and L) contribute to the overall explanation and point to the combined weight of party competition and opposition status.

Analysis of Sufficiency (~OUTC)

Model 1 - ~OUTC (*original model*)

LERI*envio*pc_os => ~OUTC

		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases	
1	LERI*envio*pc_os	0.820	0.753	0.898	-	AfD,KD,M,SD; FPO,OVP	
M1		0.820	0.753	0.898			

Model 6 - ~OUTC ("Including CDU/CSU")
Raw consistency threshold: 0.6

LERI*envio*GOVOPP + LERI*envio*pc_os => ~OUTC

		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases	
1	**LERI*envio*GOVOPP**	**0.780**	**0.718**	**0.350**	**0.051**	**FPO,OVP; CDU/CSU**	
2	LERI*envio*pc_os	0.820	0.753	0.898	0.599	AfD,KD,M,SD; FPO,OVP	
M1		**0.828**	**0.768**	**0.949**			

The consistency of the row 12 (0.602), which includes the CDU/CSU, is distinctively below the well-established consistency benchmark of 0.8 (e.g., Greckhamer et al. 2018). Therefore, it is excluded from the logical minimisation procedure of the QCA. However, if include the row, the solution vindicates the robustness of our original model as it does not contradict the original solution and to great part even equals with that solution.

Model 7 - ~OUTC ("Without Austrian cases")
Raw consistency threshold: 0.8

LERI*envio*govopp*pc_os => outc

		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases	
1	LERI*envio***govopp***pc_os	**0.858**	**0.802**	**0.599**	-	AfD,KD,M,SD	
M1		**0.858**	**0.802**	**0.599**			

Considering the rather low and only just sufficient consistency value of the second row it could be plausible dismissing the two Austrian governmental parties. This would leave us with only one row entering the logical minimisation procedure and the INUS-condition govopp is added. As this solution term clearly is in a subset relation with our original solution it buttresses the robustness of the latter.

Appendix 3 (Chapter 9)

A: Overview of parties' and party alliances' environmental budget proposals 2022 differentiated by environmental subsectors

Sector | Party	*Left Party (V)*	*Social Dem. Party (S)*	*Green Party (MP)*	*Centre Party (C)*	*Liberals (L)*	*Christian Democrats (KD)*	*Moderate Party (M*	*Sweden Democrats (SD)*	*M, KD, SD*
Total Budget	1276523503[1]	1204219603	1204219603	1195373626	1197683203	1206885103	1186065903	1185646786	1203120332
Total Environmental Budget *(% of total budget)*	24211580 (1.9 %)	21851580 (1.81 %)	21851580 (1.81 %)	20878355 (1.75 %)	22170880 (1.85 %)	18471580 (1.53 %)	21926580 (1.85 %)	12813580 (1.08 %)	20951580 (1.74 %)
Deviation from the average Env. Budget *(average = 20639132.3)*	+3572447.7	+1212447.7	+1212447.7	+239222.7	+1531747.7	-2167552.3	+1287447.7	-7825552.3	+312447.7
Environmental administration *(% of total env. budget)*	1907952 (7.88 %)	1877952 (8.59 %)	1877952 (8.59 %)	1909862 (9.15 %)	1875452 (8.46 %)	1741952 (9.43 %)	1887952 (8.61 %)	1780952 (13.9 %)	1877952 (8.96 %)
Monitoring[2]	513714 (2.12 %)	513714 (2.35 %)	513714 (2.35 %)	505714 (2.42 %)	505714 (2.28 %)	475714 (2.58 %)	513714 (2.34 %)	513714 (4.01 %)	513714 (2.45 %)
Research[2]	1359896 (5.62 %)	1329896 (6.09 %)	1329896 (6.09 %)	1326761 (6.35 %)	1329696 (6.0 %)	1329896 (7.2 %)	1329896 (6.07 %)	1529896 (11.94 %)	1329896 (6.35 %)
Nature Conservation[2]	8751418 (36.15 %)	8751418 (40.05 %)	8751418 (40.05 %)	7407418 (35.48 %)	8751418 (39.47 %)	5725418 (31.00 %)	7246418 (33.05 %)	6846418 (53.43 %)	6746418 (32.20 %)
Climate Mitigation[2]	11538600 (47.66 %)	9038600 (41.36 %)	9038600 (41.36 %)	9388600 (44.97 %)	9368600 (42.26 %)	9058600 (49.04 %)	10608600 (48.38 %)	1992600 (15.5 %)	10143600 (48.41 %)
Climate Adaptation[2]	140000 (0.58 %)	140000 (0.64 %)	140000 (0.64 %)	140000 (0.67 %)	140000 (0.63 %)	140000 (0.76 %)	140000 (0.64 %)	140000 (1.09 %)	140000 (0.67 %)
Residual[2]	0 (0 %)	200000 (0.92 %)	200000 (0.92 %)	200000 (0.96 %)	200000 (0.90 %)	0 (0 %)	200000 (0.91 %)	10000 (0.08 %)	200000 (0.95 %)

[1]Absolute values are displayed in thousands Swedish Krona (SEK). [2]For the seven subsectors the values in parentheses represent percentages of total environmental budget. Note that as a then government coalition S and MP only submitted a joint budget proposal

B: Development of environmental policy percentage of total Swedish approved budgets 2002-2026



C: Development of environmental policy investments in Swedish parties' budget proposals. Yearly averages for budgets between 2002-2024



D: 1.4: Environmental positions and environmental salience of Swedish centre-right and right parties. Development over time and in comparison with average of EU-countries and Scandinavian countries

Due to missing data Norway is not included for calculation of averages of Scandinavian countries which include here Denmark, Finland and Sweden. *Sources*: Lehmann et al. 2022 (CMP) and Bakker et al. 2020 (CHES).




Average of EU Countries . . . . .
Average of Scandinavian Countries _ _ _ _
Salience of Environmental Protection (per501) of Right-wing Parties
30
20
10
0
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Year
Party
C
KD
L
M
SD

E: List of sources for the dataset

Condition(s)	Description	Source(s)	Link
Vote_perc	Percentage of votes won in the last national election	MRG/CMP/MARPOR + Valmyndigheten	https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/datasets https://www.val.se/valresultat/riksdag-region-och-kommun/2022/valresultat.html
Seat_Abs, Seat_perc	Percentage of parliamentary seats won in the last national election	MRG/CMP/MARPOR + Valmyndigheten	https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/datasets https://www.val.se/valresultat/riksdag-region-och-kommun/2022/valresultat.html
Part_Coop	Party Alliance	*Own research based on case knowledge*	-
PartFam	Party Family	*Own research based on CMP*	https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/datasets
Gov_Status	Governmental Status	*Own research based on case knowledge*	-
CHES_lrgen, CHES_Env	Left-right position, Environmental position in most recent CHES	CHES	https://www.chesdata.eu/
CMP_Env	Environmental salience in the party's election programme of the last national election.	MRG/CMP/MARPOR	https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/datasets
PubOpp_Env	Public sentiment on the environment in Sweden in the respective year.	SOM-Institut, University of Göteborg	https://snd.gu.se/sv/catalogue/collection/national-som Göteborgs universitet, SOM-institutet. 2022. "Den nationella SOM-undersökningens kumulativa dataset 1986-2020."
GDPCapita	Swedish GDP per capita in the respective year	World Bank and OECD	https://ourworldindata.org/economic-growth Note: *Figures are given in constant US-$. This*

			means it is adjusted for inflation to allow for comparison over time, but not for price differences between countries.
CO2_prod, CO2_cons	Swedish production based CO_2-emission in the respective year, Swedish consumption- based CO_2-emission in the respective year	Global Carbon Project	https://ourworldindata.org/consumption-based-co2
Party_Leader	Name of the party leader in the respective year	*Own research based on case knowledge.*	-
AbsBudTot, EP_abs, EP_avyear, EP_difavyear, EP_perc, Admin_abs, Admin_EP, Mon_abs, Mon_EP, Res_abs, Res_EP, NC_abs, NC_EP, CM_abs, CM_EP, CA_abs, CA_EP, Residual_abs, Residual_EP	Data on environmental policy spending proposed by the party individually or as part of a party alliance in budgets proposals in the respective year. The data displays environmental policy spending in general but also differentiated by subsectors.	*Own research based on official budget proposals by parties.*	https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/
CoG_P, CoG_PS, CoG_G, CoG_Gov, CoG_P_CH, CoG_PS_CH, CoG_G_CH, CoG_Gov_CH	Centre of gravity of relevant government coalitions and party alliances for environmental policy making $= \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{CMPenvironmentalposition} * \text{parliamentaryseatshare}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{parliamentaryseatshare}}$	*Own research. Calculation method adopted from Cusack 1997. Calculations based on data from MRG/CMP/MARPOR and CHES.*	https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/datasets https://www.chesdata.eu/

F: Items assignments to environmental subsectors in budget proposals for 2024-2002
Only available in digital form due to difficult graphic presentability in print. Please contact the author.

Appendix 4 (Chapter 10)

Country	Number	Description	Record number (if applicable)	Type of Source	Institution	Date
Governmental sources						
NL	1	Coalitieakkoord tussen de Tweede Kamerfracties van CDA, PvdA en ChristenUnie	-	Party document	Government	09/2007
NL	2	Miljoenennota 2008	KST-XXX-1	Parliamentary document	Government	09/2007
NL	3	Nieuwe energie voor het klimaat Werkprogramma „Schoon en zuining“	-	Policy Programme	Government	09/2007
NL	4	Wet Vliegbelasting (van 20 december 2007, houdende wijzigingen van enkele belastingwetten (Belastingplan 2008))	STB-11399	Legislative document	Government	12/2007
NL	5	Vragen en Antwoord (De Jager)	KVR-2698	Parliamentary document	Government	06/2008
NL	6	Vragen en Antwoord (Eurlings)	KVR-3457	Parliamentary document	Government	09/2008
NL	7	Miljoenennota 2009	KST-31700	Parliamentary document	Government	09/2008
NL	8	Wijziging van enkele belastingwetten en einige andere wetten (Belastingplan 2009)	KST-31704-8	Parliamentary document	Government	10/2008
NL	9	Vragen en Antwoord - Wijziging van enkele belastingwetten en einige andere wetten (Belastingplan 2009) (De Jager)	KST-31704-22	Parliamentary document	Government	11/2008
NL	10	Vragen en Antwoord	KST-31700XII-7	Parliamentary document	Government	11/2008
NL	11	Fiscaal stimuleringspakket en overige fiscale maatregelen - Nota	KST-31301-14	Parliamentary document	Government	05/2009
NL	12	Miljoenennota 2010	KST-32123-1	Parliamentary document	Government	09/2010

NL	13	Internationale conferentie vliegbelasting en CO2-beprijzing gaat van start	https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2019/06/20/internationale-conferentie-vliegbelasting-en-co2-beprijzing-gaat-van-start	Press Release	Government	06/2019
NL	14	Aviation Tax	https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2019/11/07/aviation-tax-press-release	Press Release	Government	11/2019
NL	15	Nota van Antwoord. Luchtvaartnota 2020-2050.	-	Government Report	Government	11/2020
NL	16	Wijziging wetsvoorstel vliegbelasting naar Raad van State	https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2020/11/13/wijziging-wetsvoorstel-vliegbelasting-naar-raad-van-state		Government	11/2020
NL	17	Vliegbelasting	https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/milieubelastingen/vliegbelasting	Website Information	Government	01/2021
Parliamentary Sources						
Second Chamber						
NL	17	Wijziging van enkele belastingwetten (Belastingplan 2008)	KST-31205-3	Parliamentary document	Tweede Kamer	09/2007
NL	18	Nota over de toestand van 's Rijks Financiën	KST-31200-39	Parliamentary document	Tweede Kamer	09/2007
NL	19	Algemene financiële beschouwingen	TK-7	Plenary debate	Tweede Kamer	10/2007
NL	20	Algemene financiële beschouwingen	TK-8	Plenary debate	Tweede Kamer	10/2007
NL	21	Stemmingen	-	Parliamentary vote	Tweede Kamer	11/2007
NL	22	Belastingplan	TK-26	Plenary debate	Tweede Kamer	11/2007
NL	23	Banenverlies Schiphol	TK-68	Plenary debate	Tweede Kamer	03/2008
NL	24	Stemmingen	TK-70	Plenary vote	Tweede Kamer	04/2008

NL	25	Vragenuur	TK-97	Plenary debate	Tweede Kamer	06/2008
NL	26	Algemene politieke beschouwingen	TK-2	Plenary debate	Tweede Kamer	09/2008
NL	27	Vragenuur (van der Hoeven-Cramer)	TK-28	Plenary debate	Tweede Kamer	11/2008
NL	28	Vragenuur (Eurlings-De Jager)	TK-52	Plenary debate	Tweede Kamer	02/2009
NL	29	Wijziging van de Invorderingswet 1990 en enkele andere wetten	KST-31301-11	Parliamentary document	Tweede Kamer	04/2009
NL	30	Wet Vliegbelasting	TK-62	Parliamentary debate	Tweede Kamer	03/2020
First Chamber						
NL	30	Belastingplan 2008	EK-14	Plenary debate	Eerste Kamer	12/2007
NL	31	Stemmingen	EK-15	Parliamentary vote	Eerste Kamer	12/2007
Other						
NL	32	Advies Raad van State en nader rapport	KST-31205-4	Parliamentary document	Council of the state	09/2007
NL	33	Reactie van "Min.v.Financien Klankbord Groep"		Expert report	Expert Group	04/2008
NL	34	CDA Verkiezingsprogramma 2006	*see* https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/	Party document	Political Party	11/2006
NL	35	CU Verkiezingsprogramma 2006	*see above*	Party document	Political Party	11/2006
NL	36	PvdA Verkiezingsprogramma 2006	*see above*	Party document	Political Party	11/2006
NL	37	CDA Verkiezingsprogramma 2017	*see above*	Party document	Political Party	03/2017

NL	38	CU Verkiezingsprogramma 2017	*see above*	Party document	Political Party	03/2017
NL	39	D66 Verkiezingsprogramma 2017	*see above*	Party document	Political Party	03/2017
NL	40	VVD Verkiezingsprogramma 2017	*see above*	Party document	Political Party	03/2017

Country	Number	Description	Record number (if applicable)	Type of Source	Institution	Date
Governmental sources						
DE	1	Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung unter Federführung des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen	BR-Drucksache: 532/10; BT-Drucksache: 17/3030	Parliamentary Document	Government	09/2010
DE	2	Luftverkehrsteuergesetz	Bgbl 2010, Nr. 63	Legislative Document	Government	12/2010
DE	3	Gesetz zur Änderung des Luftverkehrsteuergesetzes	BBGBL 2019, Teil I, Nr. 48, S. 2492	Legislative Document	Government	12/2019
DE	4	Verordnung zur Absenkung der Steuersätze im Jahr 2020	BBGBL 2020, Teil I, Nr. 17, S. 762	Legislative Document	Government	04/2020
Parliamentary Sources						
Bundestag						
DE	5	Zweite u. dritte Beratung d. Gesetzes: Tagesordnungspunkt 7	Plenarprotokoll 17/68	Plenary Debate	Bundestag	10/2010
DE	6	Entschließungsantrag von Bündnis/90-DieGrünen-Fraktion	BT-Drucksachen: 3440	Parliamentary Document	Bundestag	10/2010
DE	7	Entschließungsantrag von SPD-Fraktion	BT-Drucksachen: 3454	Parliamentary Document	Bundestag	10/2010
Bundesrat						
DE	8	Antrag der Länder Rheinland-Pfalz, Berlin, Brandenburg“ zur Beantragung der Streichung der Luftverkehrsabgabe durch den Bundesrat	BR-Drucksache: 532/3/10	Parliamentary document	Bundesrat	10/2010
DE	9	Beratung im Bundesrat zum Haushaltsbegleitgesetz unter Tagesordnungspunkt 5	BR-Plenarprotokoll 875	Plenary debate	Bundesrat	10/2010
DE	10	Antrag des Freistaates Bayerns zur Abschaffung der Steuer und Beschluss des Bundesrats	BR-Drucksache 688/12 (Beschluss)	Parliamentary document	Bundesrat	11/2012
Other						

DE	11	Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgericht zum LuftVStG	BVerffG-Aktenzeichen: 1 BvF3/11	Court decision	Constitutional Court	11/2014
DE	12	CDU Bundestagswahlprogramm 2013	*see* https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/	Party document	Political Party	09/2013
DE	13	SPD Bundestagswahlprogramm 2013	*see above*	Party document	Political Party	09/2013
DE	14	FDP Bundestagswahlprogramm 2013	*see above*	Party document	Political Party	09/2013
DE	15	CDU Bundestagswahlprogramm 2017	*see above*	Party document	Political Party	09/2017
DE	16	SPD Bundestagswahlprogramm 2017	*see above*	Party document	Political Party	09/2017
DE	17	FDP Bundestagswahlprogramm 2017	*see above*	Party document	Political Party	09/2017
DE	18	Bündnis/90-DieGrünen Bundestagswahlprogramm 2017	*see above*	Party document	Political Party	09/2017

Ehrenerklärung

Ich versichere hiermit, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit ohne unzulässige Hilfe Dritter und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe.

Verwendete fremde und eigene Quellen sind als solche kenntlich gemacht.

Ich habe nicht die Hilfe eines kommerziellen Promotionsberaters in Anspruch genommen. Ich habe insbesondere nicht wissentlich:

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Mit ist bekannt, dass Verstöße gegen das Urheberrecht Unterlassungs- und Schadensersatzansprüche des Urhebers sowie eine strafrechtliche Ahndung durch die Strafverfolgungsbehörden begründen können.

Die Arbeit wurde bisher weder im Inland noch im Ausland in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form als Dissertation eingereicht und ist als Ganzes auch noch nicht veröffentlicht.

Ich erkläre mich damit einverstanden, dass die Dissertation ggf. mit Mitteln der elektronischen Datenverarbeitung auf Plagiate überprüft werden kann.

Magdeburg, 15.02.2024

Lars E. Berker