

US DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS ON TURKEY
I

**TURKISH STUDENTS' MOVEMENTS
AND THE TURKISH LEFT
IN THE 1950's – 1960's**

**Presented and annotated
by
RIFAT N. BALI**

2007

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**THE ISIS PRESS
ISTANBUL**



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AMERICAN STUDENTS' MOVEMENTS
AND THE TURKISH LEFT
IN THE 1950's - 1960's

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Presented and annotated by

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Rifat N. Bali

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Born in 1948 in İstanbul. Graduate of Sorbonne University Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. Author of numerous articles, editor of several books. His areas of studies are: History of the Jews of Turkey in the Republican period, lobbying activities of the Turkish, Jewish, Israeli and Armenian non governmental organizations, Turkish media. He published the following books:

Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri – Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni 1923-1945, İletişim Yayınları, 1999; *Musa'nın Evlatları Cumhuriyet'in Yurttaşları*, İletişim Yayınları, 2001; *Les Relations Entre Turcs et Juifs dans la Turquie Moderne*, İsis Yayıncılık, 2001; *Tarz-ı Hayattan Life Style'a – Yeni İnsanlar, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar*, İletişim Yayınları, 2002; *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri – Aliya: Bir Toplu Göçün Öyküsü 1946-1949*, İletişim Yayınları, 2003; *Anadolu'dan Yeni Dünya'ya, Amerika'ya Göç Eden İlk Türklerin Yaşam Öyküleri*, İletişim Yayınları, 2004 (This book was awarded the Yunus Nadi 2005 prize in the category of Social Sciences Research); *Türkiye'de Yayınlanmış Yahudilikle İlgili Kitap, Tez ve Makaleler Bibliyografyası (1923-2003)*, Turkuaz Yayıncılık, 2004; *Avram Benaroya: Un Journaliste Juif Oublié Suivi de Ses Mémoires*, Les Editions Isis, İstanbul, 2004; *Devlet'in Yahudileri ve 'Öteki' Yahudi*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004; *Ümit Kıvanç'a Cevap Birikim Dergisinin Yayınlamadığı Makalenin Öyküsü*, İstanbul, 2005; *The "Varlık Vergisi" Affair A Study on Its Legacy Selected Documents*, (The Isis Press, İstanbul, 2005), *Maziyi Eşelerken*, (Dünya Kitapları, İstanbul, 2006).



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- AID : Agency for International Developments
AMCONGEN : American Consulate General
CNU : Committee of National Union
ERF : Economic Research Foundation
DP : Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party)
ESSB : Economic and Social Studies Board (Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Heyeti)
GNA : Grand National Assembly
GOT : Government of Turkey
GP : Güven Partisi
GÜÇ : Genç Üniversiteliler Çemberi
İÜTB : İstanbul Üniversitesi Talebe Birliği. (İstanbul University Students Union)
JP : Justice Party (Adalet Partisi)
MDO : Milli Devrim Ordusu (National Reform Army)
MTTB : Milli Türk Talebe Birliği. (National Turkish Students Union)
NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NP : Nation Party (Millet Partisi)
RPNP : Republican Peasant Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi)
RPP : Republican's People Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
SOFA : Status of Forces Agreement
TLP : Turkish Labour Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi)
TMGT : Türkiye Milli Gençlik Teşkilatı (Turkish National Youth Organization)
TMTF : Türkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu. (Turkish National Students' Association)
TUSLOG : The US Logistics Group
US : United States
USA : United States of America
USIS : United States Investigations Services
USSR : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

My career as a researcher began in the second half of the 1990s. During my years of research in Turkish and foreign archives and libraries I came to understand that, for many subjects dealing with modern Turkey, a complete and credible piece of research could not be done by relying solely on Turkish sources. A multiplicity of voices and viewpoints—in particular, non-Turkish ones — were essential to constructing a more balanced and authentic narrative. I was greatly aided in my endeavors by the panoply of foreign archival sources available, in particular the abundant and often very rich diplomatic archives of the U.S. State Department, housed in the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland. The various consular and ambassadorial reports, dispatches and other communiqués of past American representatives in Turkey are of enormous value to anyone interested in the social, political and cultural history of the Turkish Republic. My own perusals of the holdings gradually convinced me that many of these documents would be of great service to other scholars and researchers if published, and it was with this thought in mind that I have begun the project at hand.

The work you now hold in your hands will be the first in a series of books presenting selected documents from the aforementioned National Archives and Records Administration. It is my hope that the present volume will represent a contribution—however modest—to the history of Turkey's leftist movement.

Rifat N. Bali

INTRODUCTION

My career as a researcher began in the second half of the 1950s. During my years of research in Turkish and foreign archives and libraries I came to understand that for many subjects dealing with modern Turkey a complete and credible piece of research could not be done by relying solely on Turkish sources. A multiplicity of voices and viewpoints—in particular, non-Turkish ones—were essential to constructing a more balanced and objective narrative. I was greatly aided in my endeavor by the priority of foreign archival sources available in particular the abundant and often very rich diplomatic archives of the U.S. State Department, housed in the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland. The various consular and ambassadorial records, dispatches and other communications of past American representatives in Turkey and its various states in various historical periods of the country's evolution provided me with a wealth of first-hand information. It would be of great service to other scholars and researchers if gathered and made available with the thought in mind that I have begun the project at hand.

The work you now hold in your hands will be the fruit of a number of books presenting selected documents from the aforementioned National Archives and Records Administration. It is my hope that the present volume will represent a contribution—however modest—to the history of Turkey's liberal movement.

John W. Hall

I

DOCUMENTS CONCERNING TURKISH UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

To: Department of State
From: Amcongen, Istanbul

August 14, 1950
Subject: Student Organizations in Turkey

A survey of the history of student organizations in Turkey shows that student associations and unions properly incorporated under law did not exist before 1918. The first associations thus established in the more liberal period following immediately the war years were the student associations of the Faculties of Medicine, Letters and Sciences of the University of Istanbul and of the School of Engineering. Shortly after their formation these organizations joined into a body known as the National Turkish Students Union (Millî Türk Talebe Birliği).

The life of these associations was punctured with all sorts of intermissions. Thus for instance during the period of authoritarian regime of farreaching domestic reforms following the termination in 1923 of the national struggle for liberation, the student organizations in question went practically out of existence. In 1933 an effort was made to re-establish the National Turkish Students Union, but five years later this body was altogether suppressed by the authorities as a result of embarrassing student demonstrations for the annexation of the Hatay.

The year 1940 witnessed a revival of organized student activities. In that year, still existing isolated student groupings came together and set up the Students Union of the University of Istanbul (İstanbul Üniversitesi Talebe Birliği), but neither the union in question nor its component associations possessed much autonomy since their activities were strictly controlled, in fact, guided by chosen members of the University faculty.

Organized student activity in Turkey on a truly autonomous basis developed after the initiation of a more liberal political regime in 1945 and the consequent adoption of new legislation in 1946 whereby the right of associating ceased to be dependent on governmental sanction. Indeed, most of

the student associations, unions and federative bodies in existence today are incorporated under the new law.

Since the right of forming associations is denied to minors and since in Turkey the legal age of maturity is 18, existing student organizations comprise only students of superior educational establishments generally of university standing. Associations of students of lycées do not exist at present.

As things stand today the student bodies in existence can be grouped into three categories: associations (Cemiyet or Dernek), unions (Birlik) and federations (Federasyon). The functions and the organization of these bodies follow a more or less uniform pattern.

Associations embrace the students of one educational establishment or those of its different departments if the institution is composed of several well defined sections. For instance the students of the Istanbul Superior School of Maritime Trade are organized in one association; whereas the student body of the Istanbul University is grouped into eight distinct associations corresponding to the various faculties and schools composing the University.

Every association is headed by a president and an executive committee (consisting from 5-7 members) elected by the general body of members which meets annually. The same body also elects a disciplinary board and a sufficient number of auditors.

Associations carry the name of the institution or the department to which their member students belong. Their main objectives are: to protect and represent the collective interests of their members as regards the administration of the school or the faculty; to facilitate academic activities of their members by securing or publishing for distribution textbooks, class notes, compendia, etc.; to extend financial support to needy students; to operate canteens; to organize sport and social events; to keep alive the traditions of the institution and to promote fraternity and patriotism.

The revenues of the associations consist of membership fees, of donations and of the proceeds derived from the sale of textbooks and from the sport and social events organized. The annual income thus realized by a student association varies according to its importance between T.L. 5.000.- and T.L. 40.000.-, the wealthiest one being the Students Association of the Medical Faculty of the Istanbul University.

Unions are formed among various student associations affiliated with the same institution or the student associations of various establishments of superior learning within one and the same province. They are run by an executive committee composed of an equal number of representatives chosen by each association forming a member of the union. The said committee is headed by a president chosen annually in rotation from among the

representatives of each member association. A disciplinary board and a board of auditors constitute additional agencies of student unions.

The nature of the unions is somewhat symbolic. Though they are charged with the protection of the interests of the student body as a whole, and though some of them do operate joint reading rooms, libraries and canteens, their main task is to maintain contact and coordination among the member associations, and thus to contribute to the attainment of joint objectives. In this connection unions play an important role in laying down policies for the purpose of keeping alive nationalist sentiments, furthering patriotic thought and ensuring loyalty to the principles of the Kemalist revolution.

The income of the unions consists of yearly and, whenever necessary, supplementary contributions payable by the member associations, donations and proceeds from the operation of canteens and libraries and from social events and sport contests organized.

Though student associations and unions have been in existence on and off since 1918, their organization into a federative body is a recent development. As a matter of fact the first step in this direction was taken only in 1948 when the student unions of the Istanbul University and the Istanbul Technical University decided to set up a federative body known as the "National Federation of the Student Unions of the Turkish Universities". Subsequent requests for adherence resulted in 1950 in the change of this name to the broader appellation "National Federation of Students of Turkey".

In fact, the said organization constitutes today the only federative student body in existence in Turkey. The seat of the Federation is in Ankara. According to its statutes which were adopted in a students convention which met in Ankara in November 1949, the principal objectives of the Federation broadly are: to unite the students of Turkish superior scholastic institutions under one organization and thus to consolidate national and academic solidarity, to establish contact with youth of other countries, to contribute to the development of genuine student and youth organizations and to work towards the materialization of the joint objectives of the unions and associations composing the Federation. To achieve the foregoing the Federation is qualified to engage in the following activities:

- a) develop sense of responsibility among the studying youth;
- b) combat currents opposed to the principles of the Turkish Revolution;
- c) disseminate information on the working methods and activities of youth organizations;
- d) protect and defend academic autonomy;

- e) establish contacts with identical world youth organizations;
- f) adhere to international student and youth organizations;
- g) represent the Turkish student body within the country as well as abroad;
- h) organize travel as well as arrange sport contests and intellectual contacts and exchanges with the youth of other countries;
- i) establish contact with official as well as independent international cultural organizations;
- j) effect surveys with a view to seeking means for the setting up of student homes and centers;
- k) work towards the raising of the standard of living of the Turkish student;
- l) contribute to the formation of a central Turkish Youth Committee;
- m) protect the collective rights and interests of the students of superior schools and universities;
- n) encourage and organize the youth with a view to securing its active participation in the general recovery of the country.

The statutes of the Federation make it clear that it is a non political organization and that it maintains no affiliation with any political party.

The members of the Federation are the student unions of superior schools and universities. However, student associations in provinces where a student union does not exist are individually authorized to join the Federation as member. The associations and unions which up to the present have joined the Federation constitute, with minor exceptions, practically the entirety of the student organization in this country to date. They are as follows:

I- The Student Union of the Ankara University

(Ankara Üniversitesi Talebe Birliği) is composed of the following associations:

- a) Student Association of the Faculty of Medicine
(Tıp Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)
- b) Student Association of the Faculty of Science
(Fen Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)
- c) Student Association of the Faculty of Languages, History and Geography
(Dil-Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)
- d) Student Association of the Faculty of Law
(Hukuk Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)
- e) Student Association of the Agricultural Faculty
(Ziraat Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)

- f) Student Association of the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine
(Veteriner Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)
- g) Student Association of the Faculty of Theology
(İlâhiyat Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)

II- The Student Union of the Ankara Superior Schools
(Ankara Yüksek Tahsil Talebe Birliği)
consisting of the following associations:

- a) Student Association of the School for Technical Training
(Teknik Öğretim Okulu Talebe Cemiyeti)
- b) Student Association of the School of Political Sciences
(Siyasal Bilgiler Okulu Talebe Cemiyeti)
- c) Student Association of School of Superior Experts for
Agricultural Machines and Tools.
(Tarım Alet ve Makineleri Yüksek Uzmanlık Mektebi)

III – The Student Union of the Istanbul Technical University (İstanbul
Teknik Üniversitesi Talebe Birliği) composed of

- a) Student Association of the Faculty of Civil Engineering (İnşaat
Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)
- b) Student Association of the Faculty
of Architecture (Mimarlık Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)
- c) Student Association of the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering
(Makine Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)
- d) Student Association of the Faculty of Electrical Engineering
(Elektrik Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti).

IV – The Student Union of the Istanbul University
(İstanbul Üniversitesi Talebe Birliği)
comprising the following associations:

- a) Student Association of the Faculty of Medicine
(Tıp Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)
- b) Student Association of the Faculty of Sciences
(Fen Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)
- c) Student Association of the Faculty of Letters
(Edebiyat Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)
- d) Student Association of the Faculty of Law
(Hukuk Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)

- e) Student Association of the Faculty of Economics
(İktisat Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)
- f) Student Association of the Faculty of Forestry
(Orman Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti)
- g) Student Association of the School of Dentistry
(Diş Tababeti Okulu Talebe Cemiyeti)
- h) Student Association of the School of Pharmacy
(Eczacı Okulu Talebe Cemiyeti)

V – The Student Union of the Istanbul Superior Schools
(İstanbul Yüksek Okullar Talebe Birliği) consisting of the
Following Associations:

- a) Student Association of the Superior School of Commerce and
Economics
(Yüksek Ticaret ve Ekonomi Okulu Talebe Cemiyeti)
- b) Student Association of the Technical School
(Teknik Okulu Talebe Cemiyeti)
- c) Student Association of the Department of Architecture of the
Academy of Fine Arts
(Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi Yüksek Mimar Bölümü Talebe
Cemiyeti)
- d) Student Association of the Department of Painting, Sculpture and
Decorative Arts of the Academy of Fine Arts
(Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi Resim, Heykel ve Süsleme Bölümü
Talebe Cemiyeti)
- e) Student Association of the Superior School for Maritime Trade
(Yüksek Deniz Ticaret Okulu Talebe Cemiyeti)

VI – Student Association of the Izmir Superior School of Economics
(İzmir Yüksek Ekonomi Talebe Cemiyeti)

VII – Student Association of the Zonguldak Technical School
(Zonguldak Teknik Okul Talebe Cemiyeti)

As for the organization of the Federation it consists of the following
bodies:

The General Convention – This is the highest organ of the Federation.
It is composed of the delegates dispatched by every member union and 4
delegates designated by each member association in provinces where a union
does not exist.

The Convention normally meets every year during the second half of March. It may also be convoked in extraordinary session by the Administrative Board or upon demand by two member unions. The functions of the Convention are: to review the annual activities and the accounts of the Administrative Board; to elect the President of the Federation, the Vice President, the Administrative Board and the Board of Comptrollers; to modify the statutes; to determine the orientation of the activities of the Federation; to admit or expel members; and to carry out the duties of a superior disciplinary board.

The President and Vice-President of the Federation – These officers have full powers to represent the Federation. The President is elected by 3/5 majority from among two candidates designated by every member union. The Vice-President is chosen from among the candidates of unions operating in provinces other than the one to which the President's union belongs.

The President and the Vice-President of the Federation head the Administrative Board.

The Administrative Board – This body consists of natural and elected members. The natural members of the Board are the presidents of the member unions and associations. The elected members are chosen by the General Convention on the basis of two from every union and one from every member association.

The Administrative Board which meets every three months at the invitation of the President of the Federation carries out the following duties: lay down the program of work of the Executive Committee; decide the three monthly budgets of the said body; review its activities and accounts; elect a provisional President in care the said position should be vacated; appoint delegates to the meetings of international student or youth organizations of which the Federation is a member; convoke the General Convention; and set up specialized committees for the purpose of materializing the objectives of the Federation.

The Central Executive Committee – This committee consists of the President of the Federation and four members designated by him subject to the approval of the Administrative Board which is qualified to dismiss it at any time. The Executive Committee is required to meet at least once weekly. It is in charge of the actual conduct of the affairs of the Federation. The committees of specialists set up by the Administrative Board work under its jurisdiction. One of the members of the Executive Committee carries out the functions of Secretary General of the Federation.

Provision is also made in the Statutes of the Federation for the setting up of local executive committees wherever required. At present such a committee exists in Istanbul alone. It is composed of the presidents of the local unions and is presided over by the Vice-President of the Federation. Moreover, the Federation has local bureaus in Zonguldak and in Izmir.

The Board of Comptrollers – This body is elected by the General Convention which consists of one member from every member union and association. It meets at the invitation of the Executive Committee at least twice yearly with a view to auditing the accounts of the Federation.

Committees of Specialists – These committees set up by the Administrative Board according to arising needs, are required to assist the said Board and the Executive Committee in their work for the attainment of the objectives of the Federation. The committees formed so far are the following:

- a) Committee on Tourism
- b) Committee on Sports
- c) Committee on Fine Arts and Folklore
- d) Committee for the Protection of Student Rights
- e) Committee for the Intellectual and Physical Recovery of Anatolia.
- f) Committee for Preparation for a National Youth Committee.

Moreover a temporary committee has been established to organize the 1950 Council Meeting of the World Assembly of Youth (WAY) which is to meet in Istanbul this month.

The Federation is a founding member of this international organization and has a representative sitting on its central executive committee.

As for the revenues of the Federation, they consist of a) admission fees of T.L. 500.- collected from joining unions and T.L. 125.- from adhering associations, b) monthly membership dues of T.L. 125.- for member unions and T.L. 40.- for member associations, c) all sorts of donations, and d) revenues derived from activities engaged in by the Federation.

The number of student formations not comprised under the general organization of the Federation described above is extremely small today. The most important of the non federated associations are those forming the National Turkish Students Union (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği) abolished in 1938 and reorganized in 1946. This Union is composed of five student societies (Dernek) formed by students of the Faculties of Medicine, Law, Sciences and Letters of the University of Istanbul and of the Superior School

of Commerce and Economics. It has its seat in Istanbul and looks upon the Federation as a rival organization. Endeavors to bring the said union under the organization of the Federation have so far failed.

Though the Union in question claims to be the continuation of the first students union set up in 1918 and though its revival in 1946 was sponsored by the People's Party, it has not been able to compete with the newly established Federation the rapid expansion of which has definitely pushed it into the background. The fact that the associations composing the National Turkish Students Union are not strictly student organizations since membership to these formations continues after termination of student status, and, moreover, the Union's well known affiliations with the People's Party have adversely influenced the standing of this formerly popular establishment.

Still the Union under reference continues to be quite active and practically always manages to take the lead in manifesting the response and sensitivity of the student body in national issues. In fact, the meetings protesting efforts for the annexation of the island Cyprus to Greece and the relatively recent demonstrations staged in connection with the funeral of Marshal Fevzi Çakmak repudiating governmental indifference to the event, were largely the work of the Union in question.

As a matter of fact, the accent of interest of the Union tends to rest more on the stimulation of nationalist sentiment among the student body than on coping with its more immediate problems. The form of nationalism advocated by the Union is in certain respects said to exceed accepted limits and to fringe on racialism. In fact, several of its adherents have been known to favor irredentist and Pan Turanianist trends. Though not openly coming out as a supporter of such rather outmoded preachings the Union very definitely has the reputation of being a rightist organization. In that capacity it is a strong opponent of cosmopolitan and, in particular, communist thought.

Another non federated student organization worthy of note is the Society of Youth of the Istanbul Superior Schools (Istanbul Yüksek Tahsil Gençlik Derneği) which came into being last year. This association which operates under the slogan "Free Education, True Freedom, Lasting Peace" comprises a sprinkling of students from various institutions of superior learning in Istanbul. It is known to follow a policy diametrically opposed to that of the strongly nationalist National Turkish Student Union. In fact, its orientation is definitely leftist. Moreover, it also opposes the activities of the National Federation of Students which it qualifies as a retrograde organization. Of the international student associations, it appears to support the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) which last September held a Congress in Budapest, as well as the International Union of Students (IUS).

The activities of this society has so far been limited. It has of late, however, managed to conduct a vigorous campaign in the matter of securing the liberation of the convicted leftist poet Nazım Hikmet.

All the student organizations mentioned are, as is the case with the Federation, essentially non political in character. As a matter of fact their Statutes definitely specify that they pursue no political objectives. This stipulation must, however, be interpreted in a rather narrow sense, that is to say these associations do not maintain official affiliations with any specific political grouping within the country. Otherwise on political issues of a broader character such as nationalism, human freedoms, democratic rights and even more defined questions such as for example the fate of Cyprus, the pardon of poet Nazım Hikmet, etc., the associations and unions in question do not hesitate to take a quite outspoken stand. In fact, occasionally the authorities encourage these organizations to reflect popular reaction on matters in which the Government could not express its frank opinion without embarrassment. This applies mostly to matters involving the foreign interests of the country. Such reaction is generally manifested by way of proclamations, public meetings and demonstrations. Moreover most of the more prominent associations and unions issue monthly journals or bulletins.

Thus the organ of the National Student Federation is entitled "Bulletin of the National Federation of Students of Turkey" (*Türkiye Millî Talebe Federasyonu Bülteni*). The mouthpiece of the National Turkish Students Union bears the name "National Unity" (Millî Birlik). Finally the leftist Society of Youth of the Istanbul Superior Schools issues a journal called "The Free Youth" (*Hür Gençlik*). (See enclosures 1, 2 and 3 respectively.)

A reliable assessment of the size of the membership of most of the student organizations under reference has proved impossible. Practically all the associations affiliated with the National Federation regard all students in the institution in which established as "natural members" qualified to benefit from the facilities and privileges offered. Some registration is effected for the collection of dues, but this is rather done in a haphazard manner so that records on hand hardly constitute a basis for reliable estimates.

As for the National Turkish Students Union, it boasts a registered membership of around 6.000. This figure too is not of a nature to furnish an accurate idea of the true size of the membership of the Union which automatically continues to retain on its books the names of members who long ago have ceased to be students.

With the Society of Youth of the Istanbul Superior Schools, the situation is somewhat different. Since it is a newly established organization without subsidiaries the number of its members is known and was last reported to be 78.

The public instruction authorities and the administrations of the educational establishments are extending steadily growing recognition to the associations set up by their students. Of the organization referred to above the associations affiliated with the National Federation appear to be those favored at present, a situation which in certain institutions gives rise to complaints on the part of other existing associations.

Such recognition manifests itself in periodic consultations and in the delegation to the associations of authority such as the distribution of State aid to needy students, the issuing of passes for travel at reduced rates; appointment of representation for certain occasions, etc. Such collaboration and delegation of powers obviously serves to consolidate the prestige of these associations with the student body in general.

It will be noticed that the organized bodies under reference comprise only students of superior schools and universities. Endeavors, sponsored by the National Student Federation, are now under way for the organization of the entire youth on a national basis. The structure visualized in this connection is one topped by a National Youth Committee uniting under its aegis student associations, youth sport organizations as well as youth movements sponsored by labor unions and political parties.

Charles W. Lewis, Jr.
American Consul General

Enclosures:

- 1 / Türkiye Millî Talebe Federasyonu Bülteni.
- 2 / Millî Birlik.
- 3 / Hür Gençlik.

RG 59 Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files file 882.06/882.4614.

To: Department of State
From: Amconggen, Istanbul Central Foreign Policy Files

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* *

Confidential

November 7, 1963

Subject: Istanbul Students in Turkish Politics

Summary

After the revolution of May 27, 1960, particularly after the April 28 student demonstrations in Istanbul which preceded, the importance of student groups in the Turkish political structure increased greatly. Students counted themselves along with the army, press and intellectuals as one of the four "standing forces" (zinde kuvvetler) pledged to guarantee reform and progress.

Over half of the students of higher education in Turkey study in Istanbul; the city is the center of major national student organizations, all of which support "the principles of May 27". Opposed to these groups is a conservative "nationalist" student group, a small but vocal minority. Important are ideological factors, which have provided the mainspring of action. Ideological splits have recently provided an opportunity for leftwing groups to exploit students and have led to increasing fragmentation of student forces.

Istanbul Student Body and Politics

Of 72,000 members of the state sponsored Turkish National Students' Federation (TMTF) over 40,000 study in Istanbul. These figures include students of universities, technical schools, and all other post-lycée educational establishments. All but a small percentage of enrollment is affiliated with the TMTF. About 32,000 students attend Istanbul University, 2,700 attend Istanbul Technical University and the remainder are scattered among "high" schools such as Robert College, the High Commercial and Maritime Academies, etc. The center of political activity is Istanbul University, particularly the Faculties of Economics, Law and Literature, which make up 60 percent of the student body. The Technical University and the "high" academies are more stable, have a higher class attendance and percentage of graduates, and have few professors engaged in political life.

The reasons for Istanbul University's involvement in politics are both historical and institutional. The school, protected since 1946 by a law granting independence (muhtariyet) from government control, has long been a center of reformist thinkers and has looked with suspicion on the Anatolian interior as a hotbed of conservative Islamic influences. Members of the faculty have prominently been engaged in politics, as have student leaders, to the extent that a university position, either as professor or student leader, has become a suitable channel for a political career (our A-193). National politics intervene in the deliberations of the Academic Senate; the affiliations of active professors are known to their colleagues. University politics have become part

of the continuum of national politics to such an extent that chairs are sometimes handed out on political considerations. It is not uncommon to hear a professor say of an esteemed colleague "He is in a very bad political position. No one is supporting him just now despite the man's academic reputation."

A second impetus to politics is the failure of the university to maintain discipline and to insist that students devote full time to the task of education. A course failed need only be made up within five years. A student may stay in school for years without finishing. The number of students graduating is sometimes less than one-fifth of those entering (see table). Of any given class the number graduating within five years averages between 20-25 percent per year. This contrasts strikingly with the record of the Technical University (chiefly an engineering school) where the proportion of those graduating commonly exceeds 75 percent of an entering class.

TABLE I- Annual Admissions and Graduations from Istanbul Universities
(1957-1963)

Istanbul University	a. Entrants	b. Graduates	b as % of a
1957-58	5005	759	14
1958-59	5101	953	19
1959-60	5306	1511	28
1960-61	6925	1411	21
1961-62	6168	1148	18
1962-63	6703	750 (est.)	11 (est.)
<u>Technical University</u>			
1957-58	584	274	57
1958-59	610	397	66
1959-60	610	464	76
1960-61	531	537	10
1961-62	532	392	74
1962-63	549	400 (est)	73 (est)

Source: University secretariats in Istanbul, 1963.

Enrollment and graduation has also been influenced by politics. Admissions to Istanbul University doubled between 1957 and 1960 because of the Democratic Party regime's sensitivity to student pressures and its desire to avoid trouble from disgruntled failures. The entrance examination system came into effect in 1951 because of limited facilities to cope with growing demand. Examination failure has often been taken personally by disappointed entrants.

As a consequence student discontent has been most acute in October and November when entrance examinations are given for the beginning academic year. The number of failures has increased. There have been minor student demonstrations at exam time in Istanbul almost every year since 1959.

Demonstrations have sometimes resulted in increased admissions; they have also encouraged university officials to expedite graduation, but the slow production rate has resulted in growing roles of inactive students. It has been proposed that exemption from military service extend only until 26 years of age (instead of the present 29) in order to encourage students to finish up. A large number of students however are anxious to hang on to their student status, which gives them discounts on everything from theater tickets to bus rides as well as a safe if temporary social status permitting them to dabble in politics with relative immunity. Some have made a career of student or "youth" work; heads of organizations are frequently well into their thirties. The charter of the National Youth Organization, for example, provides that one-third of the membership may be over 35 years of age.

The failure to weed out the indolent has created an academic proletariat. At the same time faculty leadership has been provocative. Prior to the May 27 Revolution a number of professors, prominently including Law Professors Hüseyin Nail KUBALI, Political Scientist Tarık Zafer TUNAYA and Doçent İsmet GİRİTLİ played active, and often well meaning, roles in stirring up students against the Menderes regime. The April 28 (1960) student riots were partly the result of these efforts. The ease with which the May 27 Revolution was carried out encouraged both students and faculty to think of their political power in exaggerated terms.

The faculty situation has been complicated by the return of the "147" university professors, temporarily retired by the National Unity Committee. Of the total about 70 were professors from Istanbul University. Although all but a few have long since returned to their posts, a wound remains because those who took the chairs of the absent "147" have insisted on keeping their privileges. The faculty is sharply divided on internal issues, and many of the "revolutionaries", such as Kubalı, Giritli and Tunaya, have found themselves excluded from larger faculty groups.

New figures, such as Economics Doçent İdris KÜÇÜKÖMER, have begun to provide political inspiration to students. The newcomers, along with some of the earlier leaders, have been variously identified with leftwing and even with plotting groups. They have attempted to take over leadership of the students as part of the "standing forces" united with the intellectuals, press and military. This activity has however been tacitly condemned by the larger body of the faculty who have withdrawn increasingly from national politics and to

some extent from contact with students as well. The limited faculty influence remaining is flavored with adventurism. But this course has been increasingly opposed by the GOT since May 21, 1963; Küçükömer for example has been called in for questioning at least twice since that time.

Political Action

Student political action on national problems in Istanbul has been of three kinds: demonstrations, memorials and provision of fora for political figures. In all three cases the chief vehicle for action has been the national student organizations, which have some government support. Recently smaller ad hoc organizations (see below) have been created to act on issues of the day; their influence has been temporary however. It remains to be seen whether such groups will be tolerated by security authorities. With a few exceptions party groups play a minor role in student action, their functions being more the long range on of channeling student votes and leadership into larger party organizations.

Since May 27, 1960, student demonstrations have become a political tradition whenever remnants of the old DP regime threaten to turn the clock back. The route of larger marches from the Old City to Taksim is nearly fixed, as are the amenities of paying homage to the military (without whose cooperation no sizable demonstration could take place) and to the symbols of the Atatürk Revolution, e.g., the Taksim memorial. Smaller demonstrations may occur without a fixed pattern as events require; these seem to be valuable chiefly as a vehicle for publicity.

Of less importance have been student memorials to leaders on national problems, such as the flag drenched in Turkish blood given to Cyprus Vice-President KÜÇÜK in January 1963 and recent student participation in efforts to have incumbent Mayor UĞUR run as an independent to succeed himself in local elections. Student organizations also play host to national leaders who require a forum suitably decorated with the symbols of the Atatürk Revolution. Particularly active in this way has been the National Students' Union (MTTB) in aiding ex members of the National Unity Committee to give their views, for example providing the setting for Natural Senator ATAKLI's prophecy of a "legal revolution" on the anniversary of the April 28 demonstrations last spring (our A-179). In most cases student activity gives the impression of enthusiasm without spontaneity. Government, or at least military, support is usually in the background.

Organizations

a. The Turkish National Youth Organization (Türkiye Milli Gençlik Teşkilatı), known popularly as the "TMGT"). This is a roof organization for five groups concerned with the gamut of youth problems, most prominently including the Students' federation described below, as well as the national women's organization, and the "Reform Hearths", a nationwide society teaching "Atatürkist ideals". The TMGT has some financial support from the GOT and operates with limited independence. The nationwide organization is controlled from central headquarters in Beyoğlu. The largest factor in the TMGT is the student Federation, which nominated and elected present President Cevdet HACALOĞLU. Politically the TMGT seems to be closer to the civilian government than to the military; its role is largely limited to advice to student organizations and representation.

b. The Turkish National Student Federation (Türkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu or "TMTF"). A national organization of 72,000 students in higher education including in membership the vast majority of student bodies in all universities in the country. Of the total about 40,000 are in Istanbul. The TMTF is the major student organization and has government sponsorship. Headquarters is located in Cağaloğlu near the University.

Key element in the TMTF is the Istanbul University Students' Union (İÜTB) with an estimated 21,000 members. In the pyramid of youth organizations the İÜTB with its large bloc of votes is the dominant factor in electing officers to higher organizations and provides the key to success for student leaders who plan to use university activities as the foundation of a political career. The İÜTB furthermore is the tactical organization for political activities cooperating (and sometimes competing) with the semi independent Student's Union discussed below.

c. The National Turkish Students Union (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği, or "MTTB"). The MTTB is semi independent, highly active in politics and the oldest student organization. Its 19,000 members are all in Istanbul and are all automatically members of the TMTF (and therefore included in the figures given above) but are not members of the İÜTB. The MTTB is presently led by Yüksel ÇENGEL, an effective leader who seems to have brought the organization close to the Republican Peoples' Party. The MTTB is strongly nationalist and has in the past flirted also with the "14" retired CNU members and the Natural Senators. Through an allied organization, the Kemalist Society (Kemalistler Derneği), it has tried to maintain liaison with the army. For some time after May 27, 1960 the MTTB behaved independently of the

RPP, with which it worked closely during the late Menderes period, but this rift seems to have been repaired in recent months.

The MTTB is outspokenly a political organization and is relatively free of government control. For several years the GOT has tried to merge the MTTB and TMTF. Recently articles of merger were agreed upon and enabling legislation has been proposed to the Grand National Assembly. The MTTB remains hesitant however lest after merger another independent student group takes its place. It apparently fears that merger would mean a greater degree of control than its constituents want.

d. Political party organizations. All political parties have youth organizations in Istanbul. Prior to May 27, 1960 the RPP Youth Organization was a major political factor, but since that time it has become increasingly less effective, especially since the RPP has been able to influence major student organizations through its power in the government. This development is not welcomed by many RPP officials here who fear that by exploiting control over student organizations the formal structure of the party has been weakened, as well as weakening the RPP's appeal to youth on doctrinal grounds as the party of Atatürk.

Second in number to the RPP and probably more important ideologically is the Youth Organization of the Turkish Labor Party which boasts over 1,000 members, and claims to be gaining. The Labor Party has traded on increasing student interest in socialist ideas and has been much quicker than the RPP in taking the lead in controversial political activity.

While other parties have formal youth and student organizations there effect among students has not been noticeable. Despite rumors to the contrary, the Justice Party, which claims a majority of Istanbul's votes, has yet to show strength among students and has been forced to cede leadership among conservative students to extremists, only a few of whom are formally members of the party.

e. Activists.

1) Nationalist Societies (Milliyetçiler Dernekleri). These are conservative idea clubs with a strong turanist and religious influence. They are not limited to students, but also exist in small towns where no higher education is offered. Members may be any age but the accent is on youth. Since May 27, 1960 they have been used in Istanbul by conservative politicians as a means of approaching a sympathetic element of the Istanbul University student body. Accurate information on membership and organization is not available. An outgrowth of the Turkish Hearths (Türk

Ocakları) founded in 1908 as a means of propagating Turkish nationalism, the Nationalist Societies are now controlled by turanist elements variously connected with the Justice Party, daily *Yeni İstanbul* and Col. (ret) TÜRKEŞ. Their last major appearance in student political activity was a counter demonstration in March 1963 (Our A-156) against the MTTB and TMTF, who were demanding the return to prison of former President BAYAR.

2) Some students, finding the structure of the major organizations confining, have formed a number of smaller activist organizations, both open and secret. Best known of these is probably the student wing of the Milli Devrim Ordusu (National Reform Army), a secret organization devoted to active protection of the ideals of the May 27 Revolution and to maintenance of "revolutionism" in Turkish political life. It is not specifically an Istanbul organization. The MDO has not been overtly active since spring of 1963, and its functions may have been taken over by later groups.

During the disturbances of last March a group called "GÜÇ" or Chamber of University Youth appeared briefly as key group of pro-revolutionary activists. "GÜÇ" has not been heard of recently and may not reappear in the fall term.¹ Both MDO and GÜÇ are suspected by martial law authorities of cooperation with military plotting groups.

3) There are reportedly also avowed communist groups. These may be divided into subgroups according to divisions in the world communist movement. Little is known about communist groups, much information coming from doubtful, "anti-communist" sources who wish to gain support for themselves by emphasizing the communist danger. But the large number of university sources who have spoken of communist activities and the undoubted student affinity for leftwing ideas indicate that these groups do exist. They are however probably very small in number. Faculty sources state that foreign influence comes from Western Europe rather than the Communist Bloc. The strong intellectual tradition of French influence at Istanbul University suggests that interest in communism in the first instance has come through Paris, where a small number of exiled Turkish communists are in residence. At present communist activity among students is probably devoted to infiltrating existing organizations, to recruitment of leadership and to exploitation of student interest in leftwing ideas. There is no convincing evidence of direct contact with Soviet agencies in Turkey.

4) Kurdish influence in student politics runs through all groups from the communists to the major organizations. Kurdish activism in Turkey has at times centered on the University where there are a number of prominent

¹ Prof. Toktamış Ateş, his brother and a few of his friends were among the founders of GÜÇ. Please see Toktamış Ateş, "İyimserliğin Zemini (II)", *Cumhuriyet*, 6 January 2005 [ed.].

professors of Kurdish origin, a.g., Economics Professors Şükrü BABAN and Memduh YAŞA, and where loyalties among Kurdish students provide a strong voting bloc in student organizations. Until recently the MTTB was controlled by Kurdish students, who still retain considerable influence.

Objectives of Kurdish students, according to Professor YAŞA, are to stir up student activity as much as possible so that in the course of political change concessions will have to be made to the Kurdish element. Yaşa, no Kurdish nationalist himself, says that activists divide into three groups, nationalists, who want an independent state, communist nationalists, who are convinced that the Kurdish future is linked with socialism and the USSR, and lastly Turkish Kurds who simply want better breaks for Kurds in the country. Communist Kurds reportedly have financial help from counterparts in Europe. A number of so-called Kurdish communists recently arrested in Istanbul were University students (Our A-18). According to Yaşa, Kurdish unity tends to transcend ideological ties so that Kurds of differing persuasions can work together on specific problems. Determined activism and cohesiveness of the Kurdish element, which may not be more than a 3,000 students, gives it considerable importance in student affairs.

Ideological Influences

In terms of political action ideology probably plays a greater role in student affairs than organizational or political affiliation. The mainspring of student action in recent years has been reaction to attacks on the symbols of progress and revolutionism which the students cherish, e.g., Menderes' attack on the independence of the University, amnesty of DP leaders and the release and threatened resurrection of former President Bayar. While student actions have usually been protests, their concerns are often positive. Underlying motives of student political behavior stem from a few principles taught Turkish youth at all levels of the national education system. Among these are nationalism, respect for human rights, respect for the armed forces, secularism and social democracy. Among minority elements, such as the Nationalist Societies, these ideas are subject to heresies such as turanism and thinly concealed fascism. In the large student body of Istanbul University there are sizable groups who question some of these ideas. The course of ideological disputes is not clearly marked and takes unexpected turns. Particularly significant has been the growing concern with social and economic questions (Our A-76, December 7, 1962) as expressed in the recently accepted addition to the principles of Atatürkism, "social justice". Below is a discussion of some major idea elements.



a. Social Justice. This term is variously defined as "moderate etatism", fabian socialism, and outright communism. Social justice is a slogan successfully introduced by the May 27 Revolution. Of the so-called "principles of May 27" of which student leaders repeatedly speak it is the only new concept even vaguely distinguishable and generally accepted. It is less an idea than a symbol. It is expressive of students' broad belief in social and economic progress along egalitarian lines and their antipathy to the symbol of the rich capitalist. It expresses students' growing awareness of economic issues and conversely their current disinterest in political and institution problems. Prior to May 27, 1960 students could be worked up over denial of freedom of speech; since that time there have been very few protests against censorship, martial law and other restrictive government acts.

While few disagree with the wide notion of social justice, some students (and others) see it as an open door to socialism and even communism. Controversy lies here. There is considerable difference of opinion on how far social justice must go. A large percentage of students are from bourgeois families and are not opposed to the present structure of Turkish government, i.e., mixed economy, parliamentary democracy, planned development. Intellectual leadership, however, appears to be in the hands of relative radicals who are chiefly concerned with the plight of peasants and the urban poor. While radicals are small in number, they are active and have in the past been able to influence and even control mass student action when the student body has been worked up over less controversial issues.

b. Nationalism. Like all children of Atatürk, Istanbul students couch political activity in nationalist terms. But beneath nationalism lies controversial ideas over which there is considerable disagreement.

The large body of students, particularly the leadership of organizations influenced by Kurds, reject turanism, although in several major organizations and among faculty leaders there are influential turanists. Turanism is repelled by the cosmopolitan tradition of the University. But there are limits, such as when the question of foreign intervention arises. It is fair to say that the mass of students are not without sympathy for Turks living under foreign rule, but this matter does not come within the scope of their political consciousness. Turanism is usually discussed as a matter concerning race relations within today's Turkey.

A more testy subject is militarism and relations with the Turkish Army. Every student leader knows that political action depends ultimately on military support or at least neutrality. Secondly every male student knows that he will soon serve in the army, probably as a reserve officer. The army is

much on his mind. But student leaders, especially those planning a political career, are increasingly aware that military influence in politics can be confining. Until this year the idea was in vogue that student leaders could rise rapidly in politics as part of a civilian cadre of a military government. Students flirted with plotting groups. But the recent failure of Col. (ret.) AYDEMİR has led to second thoughts. Revolution no longer looks so easy. More intelligent students have come to realize that military leadership has not provided answers for political problems. As the head of the TMGT says, "We were sympathetic to Aydemir once, but we said that he was not Atatürk. Had he been so, we would have been obliged to follow him." Leaders also realize that their role in a military government might be severely circumscribed. The close relations between students and the army which developed after April 28, 1960 have cooled somewhat.

c. Secularism. A fundamental of the Turkish education system is total secularism and an implied disparagement of Islam and the problems of the spirit. This idea is accepted by the broad mass of university students, who wish to live as much as possible like the international European free of the fetters of earlier traditions. Secularism separates the students from the broad mass of lower classes in Istanbul, who tend to regard the university as atheistic. Consequently student demonstrations, while they may appear to express wide popular support on a given issue, often are a sign of precisely the opposite. Student demonstrations are often quietly resented by the bulk of Istanbul citizenry. Up to now little popular opposition to student activity has appeared. But if students continue to intervene in national questions during the post May 27 era some form of resistance may eventually appear. Grounds for this resistance may well be the vulnerability of students as "godless".

Conclusion

1. In recent years, roughly from 1950 to present, students in Istanbul have played an important role in Turkish politics because of their effectiveness as a pressure group. Success of student political activities is conditioned on a benign environment in which government forces are at least neutralized and on a connection with some other element which holds power in its own right. Since the events of April 28, 1960 students have been closely aligned in spirit with the officers of the Turkish army. Their function has been to call attention to issues on which the army has felt strongly but has not wished to intervene directly in politics. In recent times there is evidence that the civilian

government has attempted to reverse the mechanism by exploiting students as a means of consolidating military support on given issues.

2. The central civilian government has means at its disposal of controlling mass student action. The government has control over the major student organizations through finances and its ability to create and abolish new organizations. In extremes it may also call on the army and the forces of public safety. A more subtle means of control is manipulation of the terms of scholarship, a tactic which the government now threatens to employ.

Istanbul University has for years been allowed to exist in a kind of political anarchy, justified in the name of Academic freedom and deriving from the University's juridical independence. While this independence is not susceptible to frontal attack the government can insist upon changes in the requirements for graduation and matriculation and can always threaten recalcitrant students with suspension of their exemption from military service. Through budget control a powerful government has the upper hand, and this fact is well known to faculty members.

Recent disturbances in Istanbul have taken place with implied government support. But since the abortive May 21st coup d'état that the government is increasingly less tolerant of public disturbances. Possibly an important factor in this trend is the opposition of conservative elements of the Coalition to student advocacy of socialism.

Under current conditions of martial law it seems unlikely that further mass student demonstrations will appear this year unless given a major challenge by DP remnant elements. Even then the public mood would be less tolerant than it has been in the past, and it is likely that the next mayor, if he is in sympathy with the opposition, would wish to take counteraction.

3. If demonstrations are squelched and the government ceases to support other outlets for political activity, it seems likely that there may be a trend toward increasing the scope of covert student groups. Some of these have already been formed in cooperation with military plotters. Others are reportedly established to propogate leftist ideologies. As noted above student political thought is not without significant controversies. These differences can easily promote fragmentation of groupings. Since the major student organizations are committed chiefly to the simple ideas of orthodox Atatürkism fostered by the Ministry of Education, more challenging ideas may well find fertile ground in small secret organizations. The history of plotting groups and the memory of the 1908 period provide precedents to build on.

But at the same time secret doctrinal groups are less likely to appeal to student bodies as a whole. Controversy is more likely to flare up within the University itself making it difficult for students to present a united front in

national affairs. By and large the student body is not composed of fire breathing rebels but rather of Turkish students brought up to fight for the "ideas of Atatürk". When controversy moves into newer areas there is likely to be less unity and less opportunity for action.

For the Consul General
John E. Merriam
American Consul

RG 59 Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1963, POL 13 2/1/63 Box 4073.

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To: Department of State
From: Amcongen, Istanbul

Confidential

November 19, 1964
Subject: Istanbul University: Culture or Anarchy

Summary:

The Consulate General has commented in the past (see Ref... Airgram especially) on the fact that ever since the revolution of May 27, 1960, Turkish students have counted themselves, together with the army, press, and intellectuals, as one of the four "standing forces" (zinde kuvvetler) pledged to guarantee Atatürkist reforms and progress. Since May 27, 1960, the RPP has elected to permit its Youth Organization to decline in importance and total membership, preferring to influence the major student organizations through its power in the government. The RPP hoped that by discarding political labels it could achieve a broader influence and consequent support from among students. This it has undoubtedly achieved. Such organizations as the Turkish National Student Federation (Türkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu, or "TMTF") and the National Turkish Students Union (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği, or "MTTB"), frequently issue statements supporting the GOT position on key issues, or protesting actions considered inimical to Turkish interests. Recent events have revealed that in return for this support, the student leaders are expecting an increasing number of concessions from the government.

Immediately prior to the scheduled November 1 opening of Istanbul University, the students (or more accurately, student leaders) became involved

in a dispute with the University Rector. The dispute resulted in the Rector's cancelling the traditional opening day ceremonies, and the issuance of some accrimonious press statements by the student leaders. This recent series of incidents is not, however, an isolated happening but forms part of a larger running feud between faculty and students which has been brewing for some time.

The airgram which follows describes the recent events and their background, and attempts to assess the important consequences which could result for Turkey's future political and social life.

Student Power and Restlessness:

As has been pointed out previously (see Ref.. Airgram), the nature of the May 1960 revolution against the Menderes regime has tended to encourage both the faculty and students at İstanbul University to exaggerate their political importance. The April (1960) student riots which did in fact contribute greatly to the downfall of Menderes were largely inspired by such professors as Hüseyin Nail KUBALI, Tarık Zafer TUNAYA, and İsmet GİRİTLİ. There thus exists at the University a lingering "revolutionary" atmosphere, which has been intensified because a number of the older professors have elected to withdraw from active political life and have interested themselves either in academic reforms, or conversely, in their own private interests.. This has tended to leave the field open to more politically adventuresome professors such as Economist İdris KÜÇÜKÖMER, who has been listed repeatedly as the guiding force behind student demonstrations.

In addition to the general atmosphere of political ferment, the University operates under severe disadvantages.. Classes are crowded, textbooks expensive, and supervision of students is often minimal. In addition, the status of "student" confers certain material advantages (reduced entertainment admissions, transportation reductions) that young people are anxious to enjoy. There is also security and the prestige in knowing that as a student one has a "place" and a voice within Turkish society. As a result students in their middle 30's are not uncommon. Critics of the İstanbul University students often insist, with considerable justice, that many remain at the University to postpone the acceptance of responsibility and to avoid military service.

Two Burning Issues: Fees and Attendance:

Given the above situation, it is natural that Istanbul University students should be jealous of their prerogatives, and be willing to use their not inconsiderable power to protest any attempts to thin their ranks or make entering into or continuing at the University more difficult. Thus for example, at the beginning of every academic year supplementary lists of students accepted are issued by the university authorities largely as a result of student pressure, and are accompanied by a reassuring statement by a University spokesman that "No student will be left out in the cold". It has been the growing conviction of many professors and administrators at Istanbul University that the institution's long standing ills can only be cured by cutting down on the total number of students, and by insisting on higher levels of performance... There would seem to be strong statistical support for such a view. A review of the figures and percentages of entrants and graduates of Istanbul University between 1957 and 1963 reveals that the percentage of the latter against the former has never been more than 28%, and for the most recent academic year is estimated to be as low as 11%. The students in turn contend that reforms must come first, otherwise deserving individuals will be deprived of an education. It is in this manner that the debate continues..

Again this summer the subject of fees was brought up. On October 1 the Senate of Istanbul University announced that it would not increase student tuitions. This decision was based upon a letter from the Ministry of Education dated September 9, stating that the government would cover any deficit incurred by the University during the academic year. The University announcement was immediately followed by a press statement by Zeki TELCİ, President of the Istanbul University Students Union (İÜTB) and Yüksel ÇENGEL, President of the National Turkish Students Union (MTTB) to the effect that the students respected the authorities for having admitted their mistakes, and for having made efforts to correct them. At the close of the joint message the two leaders expressed the hope that in the following year "a continuing solution might be found to this problem"; an obvious indication that they expect the government to continue to absorb the financial losses of the university.

Shortly thereafter, on October 18, the National Education Commission of the RPP issued its report at the RPP National Convention (Kurultay) in Ankara. The report could be summarized as follows:

In middle level education the principle was accepted 10 years ago that students having failed one examination could pass on to the next higher grade. This year the Ministry of Education changed this arrangement, and wished to

return to a system requiring the passing of all subjects. This decision was made suddenly and the people are not prepared for it. If adopted, the Ministry's proposal would have serious repercussions on the social, economic, and cultural life of Turkey. Without thoroughgoing reforms, without redressing the real grievances of the students, without reducing class sizes to normal, such a change could only be harmful.

Minister of Education ÖKTEM replied at the convention that it was only through leaving the failing students outside the University that the problems enumerated in the report could be solved. The Minister added significantly, "Let us not go back to the former (i.e., Menderes') regime's policy of concessions."

A subsequent vote of the Convention delegates saw the defeat of the Education Commission's report by a vote of 331 to 228. Though the position taken by Öktem was thus supported, voices were heard calling for his resignation. Oil was finally poured on the troubled waters by Prime Minister İnönü who pointed out quite cogently that the matter was before the courts (a number of parents had brought suit in the Danıştay, or Court hearing cases between private individuals and the government, against the new Ministry of Education edicts) where it should be settled, and not at a political convention. It is significant to note that the RPP Convention busied itself almost exclusively with the above problem to the virtual exclusion of all others. On October 23, 1964 the Danıştay did in fact support the Ministry's decision.

It should be noted that the discussions at the RPP Convention were confined to "middle" education; that is the lycee or high schools. Nevertheless, both students and educators realized clearly that any decision concerning passing criteria in this area would be seized upon as a precedent for future action in the universities.

Thus on the two major issues which form the core of any discussion of educational reform fees and conditions for passing the score was tied at one victory each for the students and academicians. The next round began with the opening of the Fall semester.

A Chronology:

On October 26, 1964, Osman Zeki TELCİ, the President of the Istanbul University Students Union (İÜTB), called upon the Dean of the Faculty of Pharmacy, Turan BAYTOP to act as an intermediary in an alleged dispute between the Dean and the Faculty's Student Committee. According to the students, Telci was merely attempting to be a peacemaker, but according to the Dean of the Faculty of Pharmacy, he presented himself as a rude and

bellicose intruder. In the course of the very brief interview which followed, the Dean showed Telci the door telling him not to interfere where it was none of his business. Immediately thereafter, Telci issued a press statement attacking the Faculty of Pharmacy and making unflattering comparisons between it and a private school of pharmacy in Istanbul. The Dean felt himself insulted and complained about Telci to Istanbul University Rector Cemal SARÇ. The Rector immediately opened an investigation into the case.

Shortly before November 1, the traditional day of the festive opening of Istanbul University, the İÜTB sent Telci's name to the Rector as its choice for a speaker at the opening day ceremonies. The Rector, pointing out that Telci was still being investigated, asked for a second choice. The students refused to offer another name, and insisted they would boycott the opening. Under the circumstances the Rector felt he had no other alternative but to cancel the ceremonies. On November 2 the students held an informal meeting at the Marmara Restaurant opposite the main gate of Istanbul University at which time they gave a press conference and attacked the University, its administration and faculty in the most severe terms. (See Enclosure 1 for a complete list of student grievances.)

On the following day, another meeting was held by the students in the same restaurant, after which a black ribbon was stretched across the University's main entrance gate bearing the words "Old fashioned ideas". The students symbolically broke the ribbon and placed a black wreath before the Atatürk monument within the University grounds. As a final note of protest, the assembled students gathered before the Rector's office building and observed fifteen minutes of silence. The following day all Istanbul newspapers bore headlines quoting student leaders as saying the University was worse than a slave camp, together with accompanying stories detailing the students' grievances. During the following days, Professor Sarç told journalists he did not understand why the students had failed to complain to him earlier and later promised a full investigation into the student allegations. On November 6, the President of the Turkish National Student Federation, Ahmet KETENCİ, the President of the Istanbul University Students Union, Osman Zeki TELCİ, accompanied by members of the University Committee (i.e., faculty members), visited Sarç. After the visit, the student leaders issued a statement that they had reached an agreement with the Rector about the necessity for reorganization of the University. The University Committee then issued its own communique asking that press, government, and student representatives be included in the committee which would examine the students' accusations. RPP Konya Deputy Rüştü ÖZAL proposed in the GNA that same day that the assembly examine the Istanbul University incidents and that an investigative

committee be formed by the assembly. On November 11, the Istanbul Public Prosecutor summoned Çengel and Telci to his office to give proof of their various allegations. The student leaders refused to reply stating they could not do so without previous consultation with their respective groups.

The Consulate General has been informed that Farih KÜÇÜKKURTOĞLU, a member of the Istanbul Police Department (First Section, Political), forwarded a complete report on the student's activities to the Istanbul Public Prosecutor at the latter's request shortly after November 11, as a result of which the student leaders were warned to moderate their activities and were told that no further action by the Public Prosecutor would be undertaken.

Küçükkurtoğlu's report allegedly was most unfavorable to the students' case and pointed out that their attacks against the University professors had been motivated almost completely by their desire to thwart attempt to raise University fees or thin their ranks by raising academic standards.

Comment:

The following are among the more important comments which might be made concerning the recent tension at Istanbul University.

1. An issue of *Kim* magazine of November 5 pointed out, in an article heavily biased in favor of the students, "Students and teachers fought shoulder to shoulder prior to May 27 for the independence (muhtariyet) of the University." This is undeniably true, as are undoubtedly many of the student allegations against the faculty. It is doubtful, however, that abuses of position are as widespread as the student statement might indicate. Of even greater importance is the question who is going to control the University. In all fairness to the students, it would appear that they are unwilling to accept the fact that although partners with the faculty in the revolution, they cannot expect to enjoy the same status in an academic environment.

2. One cannot ignore the influence of outside forces in the current University tension. The most cursory review of the events of the past few months reveals that the student groups here in Istanbul have been used as political tools on a variety of issues domestic and foreign. The reporting officer has had occasion to speak with Ziya NEBİOĞLU, Youth Editor of the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*. Nebioğlu stated that he conceived of his job as making Turkish students feel a sense of solidarity with the rest of Turkey's "progressive community", by giving them a voice in the press. Nebioğlu

takes a very dogmatic stand on most current issues, and one cannot avoid the conclusion that his relationship with the students is a two-way one; that is, he both reports on student activities, and advises the students. It may be difficult for the GOT to avoid landing in an impasse in its relations with university officials and students, if it continues, in effect, to play one off against the other, and countenance the "organizing" activities of such individuals as Nebioğlu and Küçükömer (see above).

3. Until the present, the Istanbul middle class, particularly the intellectuals, has tended to support the aspirations of students, as the custodians of the Atatürk tradition. As a consequence of the condescending and threatening statements made by the student leaders, the students have lost a good deal of support. One even hears from otherwise pro RPP quarters that such disrespect would never have occurred during the Menderes regime.

4. If the recent University dispute tends to split the "standing forces" which have traditionally backed the reformist aspirations of the RPP, the extreme right and left will tend to profit the most. There are already signs that this is the case. On November 3, the Provincial Youth Organization of the Justice Party issued a statement attacking the University administrators, noting that many professors were using their position at the University to mix into politics, instead of doing research. It has long been a sore spot with the JP that the University community is pro-RPP, and this recent unrest has provided them with an excellent opportunity to break the homogeneity. The text of a panel discussion attended by most of the key student leaders in Istanbul was published in the November 6 issue of the socialist magazine *Yön*. Among the comments made by the student leaders were criticisms of a Turkish policy which permits American bases on Turkish soil and which insures the nation's economic "bondage" through the medium of American aid. The comments were couched in terms similar to those used in a recent foreign policy statement (see Congen's A-54 of October 22) of TLP President Mehmet Ali AYBAR. Thus the GOT may be forced to grant greater and greater concessions to the students to prevent their coming increasingly under TLP domination (see also Istanbul's Political Weekly of November 11 to 18, for additional evidence of TLP student cooperation).

For the Consul General

John R. Countryman

Vice Consul

Encl.

Enclosure - List of Student Grievances:

1. There is a faculty member still present in the University who promised a coed that she would pass his course, then seduced her, as a result of which she committed suicide.

2. The (intellectual) autonomy of the University has been used as a screen for personal ambition and has come to mean nothing more than economic autonomy for the faculty.

3. There are faculty members who register the children of their relatives and friends in the faculties of their choice without examinations.

4. The Dean of one of the faculties of the University knowingly violated article 132 of the Constitution (article insisting upon the impartiality of courts). Another faculty Dean committed a rare offense by withholding evidence and documents concerning the guilt of this colleague. It is interesting to note that the same professors who prepared our Constitution reveal not the slightest reaction against those who violate it. However, despite the fate after May 27 of those who committed similar offenses, professors still commit the same offenses.. These actions are like those of the Mafia gang.

5. If we consider the fact that faculty members should work 1650 hours a year and instead work between 500 and 85 hours, we can understand how they exploit the community and how they bring their monthly income up to 20,000 liras.

6. When studying the tax paid in return for income earned in places of private employment, the yearly income of the faculty members who make the most money should be 40,000 liras per year, whereas the monthly income of these persons is actually 40,000 liras.

7. The professors who also have jobs outside the University constitute 70-75 percent of the whole University faculty staff.

8. Thirty to thirty-five percent of the faculty members work in banks, in Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and administrative boards.

9. The same faculty members who secure a passing level of 93 percent for their students in private schools, secure only a 6-9 percent level in the University.

10. There is in this University a faculty member who made his employees prepare the work he presented at an international scientific congress.

11. There is in this University a faculty member who, while giving the credentials of Assistant Professor to members of the younger generation, makes them promise not to open offices in connection with their professions as long as he himself is alive.

RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, Political and Defense POL 13 TUR 1/1/64, Box 2755.

II

DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE TURKISH LEFT

To: Department of State
From: Amcongen, Istanbul

Confidential

May 7, 1964
Subject: Leftward drift in Istanbul

Summary and Introduction

Recently the Istanbul left has gained new strength, it has moreover publicly adopted the "socialist" label. Political leaders of both RPP and JP now concede that the left has become a significant force. Apparent causes of this are concern over alleged failure of Turkey's policy on Cyprus, increasing vigor of the labor movement and the prospects of a non intellectual conservative (i.e. Justice Party) accession to power.

Associated with this has been continued activity of the Turkish Labor Party, an organization spawned from the same group of urban progressives who normally support the RPP but which takes a strong Marxist line. Prospects of the RPP going into opposition lead some sources to speculate on eventual cooperation between the two groups in some areas.

Causes of the Leftist Surge

1. Impetus has been given to the leftist vogue among urban intellectuals by statements of Prime Minister İNÖNÜ appearing in pro RPP publications critical of the Western Alliance and its role in the current Cyprus crisis. Leftist intellectuals have long argued that any change in Turkish internal politics is dependent on a change in foreign policy. İnönü's statement quoted in a *Milliyet* headline April 16 that, "The Western Alliance May Collapse", has led leftist journalists such as *Cumhuriyet's* İlhan SELÇUK to jump to the conclusion that the government now envisages a neutralist foreign policy, i.e. a policy not tied to capitalism.

Popular discouragement over the Cyprus affair has led some who are not ordinarily pro left or pro socialist to see hope for more effective foreign policy in a neutral non capitalist posture. While in the last few days criticism

of the US has somewhat abated, there is now markedly less enthusiasm for the Western alliance among members of the influential Istanbul middle class.

2. Since the passage of the new labor law permitting collective bargaining and the resultant growth of trade unions and union activity in the Istanbul industrial area, there have been a growing awareness of the industrial working class as a political force. Although major newspapers have played down most labor disputes, even ignoring some strikes, large sections of the community are aware of labor's demand for a growing share of national income.

As reported earlier, a significant minority element among Turkish unions is linked with the Marxist dominated Turkish Labor Party. Among these are the rubber, metal and chemical unions. Pro TLP labor leaders have been outspokenly anti-American and have threatened to use anti American propaganda as a weapon against US owned plants here.

The Istanbul organization of the Turkish Labor Party dominated by Marxist Mehmet Ali AYBAR includes few moderates but many old line socialists and fellow travelers. The organization here differs substantially from the TLP's Ankara group (ref Ankara's A-838) which seems to have moderate leadership. Aybar's insistence on maintaining his headquarters in Istanbul is undoubtedly linked with his desire to keep the party on a hard left course and to be near the center of industrial activity.

For Istanbul, collective bargaining is a new experience which most Turkish observers are unable to evaluate accurately. There seems to be a tendency to overrate the political power of the TLP. This over estimation may be the TLP's greatest asset. There is abroad consensus that future political movements must give considerable attention to the labor problem. Existence of a strong socialist oriented anti American labor party here has colored the situation. A surprising number of moderate middle class Istanbulians now believe that winning labor support may mean being anti capitalist and anti Western.

3. Strongly contributing to the leftward drift is the articulate element of the RPP who believe that the party's future inevitably lies in its taking a stronger reformist, if not socialist, course. In Istanbul this element is usually identified with former Deputy Prime Minister Turhan FEYZİOĞLU, Labor Minister Bülent ECEVİT and others of the young RPP "summit" group. The "summit" group appears to have substantial support from the Istanbul RPP and pro government newspapers such as *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet*.

The RPP's policies toward extreme leftists in the TLP are contradictory. On the one hand as the party in power the RPP is fighting hard to support business unionism as represented by Türk İş (The Turkish Labor

Confederation) against TLP domination of the working class. The issue here is whether labor will be represented by a "class party" or by an apolitical union on the US model with influence in political parties of a broader scope.

On the other hand the RPP at times cooperates with the TLP in student activities and in propaganda campaigns, particularly in recent demonstrations over Cyprus. A monograph prepared for the RPP by a local RPP youth leader several years ago openly refers to "class parties" and the manner in which they should be used as satellites by the RPP. The monograph urged that class parties be used to awaken the public to reform issues which the RPP would ultimately espouse after the initial shock had been taken by the "class party", i.e. the TLP.

There is moreover a natural affinity between the two parties deriving from the fact that both are built on the same social base. TLP leaders, like RPP leaders, refer to themselves as "intellectuals". Some young TLP members openly admit that they chose the smaller TLP as a vehicle for their careers because the RPP offered less opportunity for young men. RPP leaders have in the past been concerned about defections to the TLP, although recently there have been reports of a trend in the opposite direction strongly suggesting that RPP's attempts to woo the left are bearing fruit.

4. A final factor is the common belief that the next general election will be won by the non intellectual, conservative Justice Party, which has yet to find substantial support among the Istanbul educated middle class (our A175). Both RPP and JP leaders in Istanbul have commented on the reaction toward the left which is likely to follow a JP accession. Both regard the Turkish Army as the key to the situation arguing that the capitalistic policies of the JP would again create a class of rich businessmen as the DP had done. Such a group, they argue, by showing off its wealth would quickly create feelings of jealousy and hostility among salaried military officers and civil servants. These groups have normally been pro RPP, or rather staunchly Atatürkist and progressive. They played an important role in bringing about the downfall of the DP regime.

One RPP leader has commented that he was frankly surprised by the military revolutionists' call for "social justice" after May 27, 1960. He added that any future military venture in government would probably be socialist "with a vengeance" despite military attachments for NATO.

These views are shared by Istanbul JP Deputy Muhittin GÜVEN, probably the most important local JP leader, who feels that unless the party moves quickly to establish a center position it may well be confronted with another military threat. Güven feels that the army's affection for the West would be subordinate to its own requirements for domestic prestige, i.e. the

need of individual officers to maintain their position on the socio-economic scale. He adds moreover that any slur on Turkish national honor accruing from the Cyprus affair would subordinate feelings for NATO even further.

Countervailing Factors

1. The leftist drift in Turkey is most noticeable in the large cities, and may be chiefly a local phenomenon. Most opposition movements in recent history have drawn heavily on urban thinking; this has been particularly true of reform movements. Perhaps the RPP's greatest political asset is its traditional dominance of reform issues and strong hold on educated urban classes. The RPP has been and is likely to remain a moderate party. Among the middle class it is not likely to lose out to the TLP at least for the present; the TLP has been clearly branded "extremist" and thus beyond the pale for much of the middle class.
2. As one astute American observer has remarked, "There are two factors keeping Turkey away from socialism. These are money and Russia, and the two are not related".

Leftist ideas have always had to come from Western Europe rather than the Soviet Union because of local antipathy to "Russia". The Istanbul leadership of the TLP has been branded "marxist", a term closely associated with "Russia" in the public mind. This fact is also an important source of the RPP's relative advantage.

More intelligent observers say that the flexible or neutralist policy now advocated by the left would be disastrous because Turkey for the past several hundred years has grown accustomed to having its foreign policy controlled from abroad (except for the regimes of Atatürk and early İnönü). İnönü, they claim, is now reaching the end of his career with no strong personality about to appear to replace him. Turkey without strong leadership and severed from the Western Alliance might be hard pressed to refuse Soviet blandishments. In the past few days local sources who hailed earlier proposals of neutralism have had second thoughts.

One reason for second thoughts is Turkey's continuing need for financial assistance in large volume. Most local observers realize that this can be had only from the United States, if Turkey wants to have maximum freedom of action. Even leftists have commented on the difficulties of substituting other sources of aid. The fear of losing US aid can be a decisive factor in money conscious Istanbul.

Comment

The leftist trend which has been apparent in Istanbul roughly since the revolution of May 1960 brought with it a new tolerance for criticism of Turkey's economic and political systems. The trend has moved by fits and starts but has increased in strength. The Istanbul left has grown from a group of idealistic intellectuals, tough union leaders, fellow travelers and undoubtedly some disciplined Communists to a larger ideological movement enjoying a considerable vogue among educated classes. While undoubtedly members of the clandestine Turkish Communist Party have played a role in this development, it is worth noting that with the exception of a few TLP members the Turkish left as a movement has had little sympathy for the Soviet Union. Possibly on order from abroad Turkey's few known communists have not been identified with the movement.

Nevertheless a great deal of fuzzy thinking appears in leftist discussions. A number of writers show remarkable predilection for anti-American and pro-Soviet commentary. One or two writers have in private expressed admiration for Chinese Communism, leaving the impression that, if the example of the Soviet Union is banned by tradition in Turkey, there are other sources to be used. The degree of communist influence in the left is in any case still a question mark, suffice to say that there must be disciplined Communists encouraging it.

But perhaps the greatest single pressure on leftist thinkers here is the belief fostered by years of exaggerated anti-Communism, of police pressure on newspapers and of political conformism that socialist ideas must be repressed as long as Turkey remains tied to the capitalist West. The genuine feeling for the late President John F. Kennedy among the Istanbul leftists resulted chiefly from their belief that the New Frontier was not bound to a rigid capitalism and that socialism within the Western Alliance was possible. The express goal of many "socialists" in Istanbul is the creation of something akin to the British Labor Party, the chosen example of socialism identified with the West. Istanbul intellectuals are passionately "Western", if nothing else.¹

A basic question is whether the left in Istanbul expresses a deeply felt need for political change or whether it is simply the reaction to Turkey's total acceptance of Western capitalistic standards. In a country with a mixed economy it can be argued that the political institutions should represent economic realities. If half of national industry is government owned and if the government plays a dominant role in society, it is not surprising that a

¹ It is worth noting in this regard that Paris has long been a major refuge of Turkish Communists.

similar political expression be demanded. This is in effect the argument of the more intelligent Istanbul leftists like *Milliyet's* Çetin ALTAN.

The educated element is aware that Turkish withdrawal from the Western Alliance could be disastrous. They criticize much of modern Turkish capitalism and the present political system, but they are not interested in drastic change. Of interest is that after İnönü made his famous statement that the "Western Alliance may Collapse" many leftists felt he was "playing a game", they argued that the leftward move should not be suddenly announced but should have a suitable development. They are confident that they will have their voice in Turkish politics but are wary of the strings attached.

For the Consul General
John E. Merriam
American Consul

RG59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1946-1966. Political and Defense POL 2 TUR General Reports and Statistics, Box 2751.

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From: Department of State
To: Amcongen, Istanbul

Confidential

August 6, 1964

Subject: Problems of the Turkish Left as seen from Istanbul

Enclosed is an essay on the Turkish "Left" submitted as a contribution to current discussions of strategy in this area. It is an attempt to generalize on Istanbul experience and to extend it to a discussion of the political impact of the Turkish left in the nation as a whole. Views expressed are those of the reporting officer; many of them are shared by Istanbul political observers and politicians.

Summary

The essay makes three points: First is that the left is divided between a pro-communist element and a native outgrowth of etatism of the 1930's; the pro-communist element is today represented by the Turkish Labor Party (particularly its Istanbul wing) and the native (or etatist) element by an amorphous group of intellectuals with strong leanings toward the RPP. Second is that, after a JP accession, the RPP as an opposition party would feel the need of a broader popular appeal and would adopt a socialist line under the influence of the non communist etatist left. Third is that, while the RPP as a leftist organization might wax increasingly critical of the United States and the Western Alliance, it would be held in check by restraining forces in the middle class who advocate gradualism and a pro Western posture.

In sum it is argued that Turkey has since the time of Atatürk and the etatist writings of the 1930's developed a loose reformist philosophy of her own which may be a guarantee against communist penetration. This is not to say that Turkey is immune to communist subversion or "socialist neutralism" but that Turkey, exposed to the pains of national development longer than many other nations, has developed anti bodies which may protect the body politic in the absense of complications (such as the Cyprus crisis).

For strategy toward the left the study advocates that the nativist, etatist elements in the left be recognized as friendly and that the TLP be opposed, that Türk-Iş confederation's espousal of "business unionism" be encouraged as a means of pre-empting politics from labor affairs as much as possible and that, should the RPP become an opposition party, present contracts be maintained and encouraged lest unnecessary antagonisms develop.

For the Consul General

John E. Merriam
American Consul

Encl.

Problems of the Turkish Left

The Turkish left is still disorganized, although many see it as the breeding ground of the leaders and ideas of the future. While some of its problems are common to leftist movements in other countries, several are typically Turkish, affecting not just the left but all political groups in Turkey. Among these problems are militarism, relations between intellectuals and the people, and the critical need of building nationwide political machinery.

The immediate political question is how the left will be represented in Turkish politics, whether it will be confined to the doctrinaire marxist Turkish

Labor Party (TLP) or whether in a major post İNÖNÜ re-orientation the Republican People's Party will take it over.

Definition: Internal Divisions:

Part of the problem of defining the left is identifying its internal divisions. These are not always clear, but there are at least two which go back into Turkish political history and have consistently prevented cohesive political organization.

a) Kadro vs. the Communists

Historically most important is the division first apparent in the early 1930's in the differences between the etatist philosophy espoused by the magazine *Kadro* and the first program of the clandestine Turkish Communist Party.

As Şevket Süreyya AYDEMİR¹ has stated, the aim of the Kadro group was less the resolution of class conflicts than the rapid development of the country by expeditious means. To this phrase might well be added "and consistent with Turkish political tradition". The Kadro group was primarily concerned with creation of an elite of intellectuals to provide technical and political leadership. The Kadro group's ideas were widely regarded as a blend of the ideas of Moscow, Rome (Mussolini) and Constantinople (the Ottoman Empire). With the passage of time intellectuals have emphasized the marxist content but without casting off the influence of the other traditions.

Turkish communists started out full-blown as children of the Soviet Revolution with full emphasis on the class struggle, armies of workers and peasants, etc. It was not long before they learned the need of adapting to Turkish conditions. The second program of the "Communist" party in 1946 (then known as the "Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Socialist Party") de-emphasized contacts with Moscow, emphasized limited relations with the West and conveniently forgot about the army of workers and peasants. (See Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 359 pf for a discussion of communist platforms).

The history of the small communist movement shows how marxist and Soviet ideas have been forced to adapt to local demands. Intellectuals would not accept ideas from the North but would gladly take the same ones from the West. Etatists and communists both have been forced to seek the same sources of inspiration (usually French; Sartre, Gide, etc.) with the result

¹ An original member of the Kadro group who has become an avowed Marxist.

that on the left intellectual distinctions have been blurred. But fundamental differences between the Kadro and communist groups persist. The heirs of the former are essentially elitist, even militarist, in the Turkish tradition. The communists reject these tendencies and continue to hue as close to Moscow's line as local conditions will permit.

The present day leaders of the "communist" group can be shown as Mehmet Ali AYBAR, Behice BORAN and a handful of other leaders of the Turkish Labor Party. Recent drafts of the TLP platform carry the same insistence on class differences, the same euphemisms for breaking away from the Western camp, and the same affinity for workers and peasants expressed in the platform of the early thirties.

The heirs of the Kadro tradition are, fittingly, writers and journalists. They have been prominent recently in publishing the weekly *Yön*, and in organizing the Socialist Cultural Association. The group is a mixed bag, but most, like *Yön's* Doğan AVCIOĞLU, *Cumhuriyet's* Nadir NADİ, and columnists like İlhan SELÇUK and Çetin ALTAN, see the socialist revolution in Turkey as an imposition of reform on the Turkish people by an intellectual elite. While there are often second thoughts about the role of the military, especially after disenchantment with the CNU regime of 1960-61, the perennial idea returns that "reformist" officers in the Army will be the enforcers of the new order.

b) Authoritarian vs Populist

The left is divided like other Turkish political movements by the "top-down or bottom-up" controversy, i.e. whether direction ought to come from an elite at the top or from the mass of voices at the bottom.

The differences between the populist and authoritarian attitudes are rooted as much in social as ideological differences. To date the left is strongly represented in three elements of Turkish society, intellectuals, students and labor union leaders. The attitudes of intellectuals and students both tend to be authoritarian; the leftist student in any case does not hesitate to count himself with the "intellectuals". Leftist labor union leaders and those of rank and file who follow them think almost entirely in terms of a mass political force, exerted by a labor party with broad popular support.

It is in the urban proletariat that the left has made its first major bid on the popular level.¹ Characteristically the sole voice is that of the TLP heard

¹ A second popular appeal by the left is to moslem minorities, particularly the Kurds. Here again the impetus is from the TLP. Note that cultural autonomy for the moslem minorities was a plank in the 1931 Communist Party platform. (Karpas, op. cit.).

through its control of several major trade unions (Metal Workers, Rubber-Plastic Workers, Press Technicians, etc). Socialist intellectuals like Çetin Altan remain far too middle class to work effectively at this level. The Istanbul papers which employ leftwing writers appeal primarily to the middle class and probably fall behind the circulation of conservative and apolitical "independents" in working class districts. While the socialist intellectual repeatedly calls for sympathy for the working man, he seems to be incapable of speaking with him.

Timing- The Next Opposition

The political cycle in Turkey seems to favor a leftist experiment. Politicians widely accept the argument that the next elections will be won by the Justice Party and that the RPP will become the "principal opposition party" (ana muhalefet partisi). Many in the RPP are discouraged with the vagaries of democracy; others feel that it is time for the RPP to go down to the popular level and fight the JP on its own ground. Both groups tend to feel that the "American system" of private enterprise and multi-party democracy has failed and that a moderate socialist party is needed which can help Turkey to benefit from a broader political outlook.

In the next few years the RPP is likely to suffer the loss of İsmet İnönü, a loss calling for total reconstitution of party leadership. At this point the young provincial leaders who have kept control of the grass root's party organization and who have long fought for a populist trend in RPP strategy may well take over the party machinery, in alliance with the party's small but articulate leftist element. The grass root's leaders have long seen in such phrases as "Social Justice" a password to popular support. Many feel that only the dynamism of the left, i.e. advocacy of social reform, will put the mass of peasant voters in the RPP column.

The RPP as a leftist opposition would be loud, tough and often irrational. The progressive press, the youth organizations and young "revolutionary" officers may again use the propaganda of threats and pathos which finally unnerved the Menderes regime.

Kadro etatist intellectuals would be almost certain to line up with the RPP, as they did prior to 1960 and as many have continued to do so since. The small leftwing element already present in the RPP today is itself an outgrowth of the etatist movement.

As a leftist opposition the RPP is likely to emphasize planned development, social justice, expropriation of properties of rich landlords, merchants and industrialists and may possibly attack the "vestiges of

imperialism". In this work the heirs of Kadro and other RPP leftist "intellectuals" would operate the party propaganda machinery while the politicians organize votes at the grass roots. This alignment between intellectual and practical politician would be natural for a party without the responsibility of power; politicians gain inspiration, and intellectuals a following.

RPP opposition is likely to be more noisy and emotional the more it feels threatened by the TLP. The TLP's extreme stands might well gain support in some regions and force the RPP to move further left to counter extremist competition. (our A-187). On the other hand, the TLP without national organization and faced with a resolutely anti-communist Justice Party will have a hard fight for survival. The inter play between the TLP and RPP in the growth of the left should be one of the most critical aspects of Turkish politics in coming years. In the long run however the RPP has every chance of winning out, providing it meets the challenge.

Problems of Approach

In dealing with the Turkish left it would be well to be guided by the principal of alienating only those who, by consistent refusal to accept the US position in Turkey or the US alliance, show themselves as hostile. So far only a part of the intellectual element of the TLP has taken this position. While it may well be so, no significant evidence has yet appeared indicating that there are communists or crypto communists among the heirs of Kadro or the RPP leftist group. There are a number of quiescent "communists" convicted in the 1950's who have not identified themselves with the TLP (and probably would not be accepted by the TLP for tactical reasons).

a) The TLP. Strengths and Weaknesses

The TLP has wisely avoided rigid elitism and authoritarianism. It has based its strategy on a popular approach, the creation of a mass movement. It understands traditional popular distrust of Turkish rulers and the extent to which at least outwardly ballot box democracy has been accepted. The TLP however lacks a nationwide political machine and local sources of money to support it. Without proper organization it can never be a serious contender at the polls. It must face the established two party mentality which concentrates on two well established organizations, both on their own behalf willing to go far to keep another rival from appearing against them. The history of RPP-DP street fights in the early days of the Demokrat Partisi and of the JP attacks on

the first TLP attempts to establish offices in the Istanbul squatter areas are illustrative. But the greatest weakness of the TLP is that its leader Aybar and many of its supporters are "branded" (damgalı) in the Turkish mind as "communists". While the latter term has ceased to have the opprobrium of earlier times, it is still a symbol of loathing in large areas of the country and may remain so for some time.

b) The Heirs of Kadro, the RPP Leftists

By contrast the heirs of Kadro and the RPP leftists are intellectuals strong in tradition and organization but dependent on others for popular support. The leftist group within the RPP is subjected to important balancing forces. The party comes almost entirely from a conservative, educated middle class, which has profited by the reforms of Atatürk but has a vested interest in not changing the social structure too rapidly. Also, the party holds considerable sympathy in and is to some extent dependent upon reformist elements in the Army. In making policy on foreign affairs, for example, it is likely that a leftist RPP would advocate greater diplomatic "independence" but add "within NATO".

In opposition RPP leftists would probably be vociferous but not terribly dangerous. The balancing factors of the middle class, the Army and the party politicians themselves will tend to keep the party in a moderate position. The RPP leftists would at times be irresponsible and would probably attack the SOFA agreement,¹ American business and even the Western Alliance. But power would undoubtedly have a conservatizing effect, and much of the sound and fury of an RPP opposition probably could be regarded as "tactical".

Some Suggested American Tactics

A) With Intellectuals

Even extreme Turkish leftists have been amenable to friendly approaches from American officials. Some of this is Turkish hospitality, but

¹ SOFA stands for Status of Forces Agreement. Status – of – forces agreements are not basing or access agreements. Rather, they define the legal status of U.S. personnel and property in the territory of another nation. The purpose of such an agreement is to set forth rights and responsibilities between the United States and the host government on such matters as criminal and civil jurisdiction, the wearing of the uniform, the carrying of arms, tax and custom relief, entry and exit of personnel and property, and resolving damage claims. The SOFA is usually an integral part of the overall military bases agreement that allows U.S. military forces to operate within the host country. (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/sofa.htm>) [ed.].

much of it is desire to communicate with the West and with the USA. Some shrill intellectuals like Çetin ALTAN relish provoking arguments with unwary Americans but, when they see that these tactics fail, usually adopt a normal, friendly attitude. Some have commented favorably on Americans' ability to be tolerant even of hostile ideas. Openness is admired; sensitivities are exploited. In dealing with leftist intellectuals it is necessary to turn a deaf ear to nonsense and to try to guide conversation into areas where the Westerner has an intellectual advantage. The relative shallowness of the intellectual can be exposed very quickly, and this can be exploited, since most are genuinely curious about American culture. But shallowness must not be taken as stupidity. While the Turkish leftist may be ingenuous in some respects, he is usually genuinely interested in his subject. "Bull", bravodo, patronage will repel him as quickly as tolerance, curiosity and knowledge will attract.

In dealing with leftist intellectuals as a group, some of the same tactics used at the personal level may be applied. The US must not allow itself to be provoked by an irresponsible opposition. Such reactions would only convince the egocentric leftwing press of its own importance (many in Istanbul are journalists first and leftists afterwards). The prescription is to seek friendship wherever possible among major opposition party leftists, to ignore provocations and avoid giving by act or omission succour to extremists. The favor of the United States, even of individual officers, is still a political asset to be exploited. Favors ought to be dispensed with a clear idea of who are men of good will, and these must not be judged by their isolated statements but by the consistency of their position.

B) With Labor Unions

The US is in effect already engaged in a struggle with the Turkish Labor Party over the future of Turkish unionism. US efforts in support of Türk İş have been taken by the TLP as a direct maneuver to exclude labor from politics. The TLP has reacted accordingly.

US efforts in support of Türk İş seem to have born fruit. Labor leaders show a dislike of foreign "isms" involved in TLP doctrines, an interest in maximizing the total of national profits and their share in them, and seem to prefer working with Americans to other foreigners. At this stage of development the goal of most union leaders is to develop a strong and well financed organization; there is as much interest in maximizing finances as power. For these reasons "business unionism" is likely to succeed. It would be well to continue to maintain support for Türk İş and other confederations taking this line and to treat labor as totally apolitical. While, of course, the

US must bear in mind the political importance of the labor movement, and the political views of labor leaders, it might do well to take the TLP at its word and simply pre-empt this area from political opportunists.

In this connection it would be necessary for American officials to remain on good terms with the genuine labor leaders who have rank and file support, whether they be associated with the TLP or not. The degree of ideological penetration among labor leaders is still small. Although there are a few doctrinaire leftists active in the labor movement, the force of their teachings does not yet appear to play a decisive role. Even outwardly hostile labor leaders such as pro-TLP leader Rıza KUAS and Kemal TÜRKLER are still approachable.

C) With Political Parties

Emphasis should be laid on the two party system, which gives a certain measure of stability and predictability to the Turkish political system. If it is a sound assumption that the JP will take power in the near future, it is an equally sound assumption that the RPP will be the major opposition party. While the RPP in opposition may well take a vociferous anti American line on some issues, there should remain much common ground between the party and American officials. Contacts with the RPP must be maintained and developed, particularly among the younger element who may well take over the party and who must not be allowed to think of the US as their enemy.

The leftist content of Kadro etatist ideas is not much stronger than the common forms of European evolutionary socialism. The Kadro etatist group comes from the middle class and remains emotionally and intellectually tied to the West and to Turkey's military alliances. The goal of political parties in Turkey, as elsewhere, is to seek and retain power. Given the customary irrationalism of Turkish politics, the party in opposition may say many things to gain power which it would not say when in possession of it. For the US it is important to watch the RPP leftists carefully and see how they are committed to their own propaganda and where they are infiltrated by the "communist" element.

Conclusion

The argument above rests on a chain of postulates. The first is that the heirs of Kadro brought up in the Western tradition of the Atatürk revolution are enough committed to the present state of Turkish society and enough hostile to Soviet influence that they will not turn away from Turkey's present

alliances. The second is that, while proof is lacking, Turkish Labor Party is the successor to (and possibly a front for) the Turkish Communist Party. The third and fourth are that the Justice Party will come to power and that the RPP will be forced leftward in order to mount an effective opposition.

The key assumption is that a leftwing RPP will not be hostile to US interests because:

1) the RPP would continue to be staffed by representatives of an essentially conservative educated middle class, 2) the RPP would keep its unspoken alliance with the Turkish Army, and 3) that the Army would remain pro American.

The pivotal position of the Army and its friendship nurtured by continued contact with the US military establishment is still the best guarantee of the US position in Turkey. Years of aid and public affairs efforts have yet to secure for the US an effective reservoir of public support which can be tapped in times of stress. Perhaps the gravest lesson of the Cyprus crisis is that in "national issues" the Turkish public in the heat of controversy may forget (or be made to forget) where its long term interests lie. For this reason US policy in Turkey must be based on alliance with power groups within the country until the effects of development programs are more clearly visible in the body politic. This argument begs the question whether the Army, as some allege, is not already penetrated by anti-American, leftist ideas. If so, there is little evidence. It is a comforting thought that leftist ideas are only likely to be transmitted to the Army from the RPP, that thanks to Atatürk the channels of communications between the two have been well cut.

RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66, Political and Defense File POL 12 Political Parties TUR 1/1/64, Box 2754.

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To: Department of State
From: American Embassy Ankara

Confidential

December 29, 1964
Subject: The socialist Movement in Samsun

SUMMARY: While on a visit to Samsun in mid December the reporting officer found that during the past two years Turkey's budding socialist movement has spread to Samsun, with the Turkish Labor Party as its primary vehicle. Thus far the movement is mainly composed of intellectuals, particularly school teachers and professional people but there is evidence it is trying to extend its roots downward by penetrating the TEKEL Cigarette Factory. The party seems to have a semi clandestine tone. For example, the man described as being the TLP's most important member in Samsun works quietly behind the scenes, and is not an officer in the organization. There is also evidence that the party is attempting to construct a cellular structure. The following report is, in a limited way, a case study of how the TLP operates in a provincial center.

The reporting officer visited Samsun from December 16 through 18. This was his fourth visit over a period of four years, and, as a result, he both has excellent contacts in the area and some perspective from which to view developments. On this trip the development which struck him most dramatically was the growth of the socialist movement in Samsun, something which has occurred within the past two years. The sources of much of the information below concerning this movement is James BORLAND, an employee of the American Tobacco Company, who has lived in Samsun for ten years, is fluent in Turkish, whose wife is Turkish, and who is an objective, but sympathetic observer of the Turkish scene. In addition the reporting officer had an opportunity to discuss the socialist movement with other residents of Samsun and met briefly with some leaders of the movement itself.

The Embassy is, of course, familiar with the socialist movements in Ankara and Istanbul which are centered around major universities. We have had reports indicating that the TLP is active in Izmir, Gaziantep, Diyarbakir, and, to a lesser degree, in Adana. This is our first report, however, of the TLP in Samsun and is a far from complete case study of how the party actually operates in a provincial center.

In retrospect it should be no surprise to find an active socialist movement in Samsun. It is a growing seaport city of some 110,000 and is by far the largest city on the Black Sea. The reasons for its growth are obvious from a glance at a map. Samsun is situated between two fertile river deltas and is on a natural line of access to the interior. A large variety of crops are grown in the area, the most important, of course, being tobacco. In the city itself there are located a number of small manufacturing enterprises, several large tobacco manipulating plants and a large TEKEL (monopoly) cigarette factory. Samsun has always had a tradition of political consciousness and its inhabitants, who consider themselves quite progressive, are proud of the fact that in 1919, when ATATÜRK left Istanbul on his famous trip, it was to Samsun that he came and found immediate support. The leading families of

the city are mostly immigrants from Greece and the Balkans who came in the 1920s to replace Greeks who were expelled. Smaller groups of immigrants are the Cherkess from the Caucasus, Laz from the eastern end of the Black Sea, and the inevitable Anatolian peasants who have been drawn by the area's prosperity. In the June 1964 senatorial elections the Justice Party enjoyed an almost 2 to 1 numerical margin over the Republican Peoples Party.

Samsun boasts a group of self-conscious intellectuals. These people are primarily professional men, the most important groups being doctors, lawyers, government employees and school teachers. It is among these intellectuals that the socialist movement finds most of its adherents. An atmosphere has developed not unlike the one we have witnessed in Ankara and Istanbul in which in many instances to be an intellectual almost means one must be a socialist. The unwillingness of most Turks to be unconventional once a pattern has been set is clearly evident among these people. They feel themselves to be advanced thinkers and in truth a small number of them obviously do possess considerable intellectual attainment but in fact the majority of the group is quite conformist and dogmatic in its adherence to the latest fad. There is constant discussion among the members of the group concerning Turkey's economic and social problems but their solutions are familiar: rule from above with a strong authoritarian hand.

The vehicle of the socialist movement in Samsun is the Turkish Labor Party. (In the course of his visit the reporting officer did not hear the Socialist Cultural Association mentioned.) The TLP is formally organized with a Provincial President, Sulhi KUTUCU, a Board and a Secretary General. It appears, however, that the Party's unofficial organization is more important than its formal organization. In the center of Samsun there is a drugstore owned and operated by Mustafa Oğuz KÖYETÜRK. Köyetürk is a man of about 40 who was educated at the School of Pharmacy in Istanbul. He is quiet, unassuming, a lover of classical music and apparently an excellent behind-the-scenes manipulator. His drugstore is the center every evening in which the town's intellectuals gather to discuss socialism. Köyetürk himself seldom takes the lead in these discussions, preferring to draw others out by asking questions if the discussion lags. He started two newspapers in the past which failed. Despite his seemingly modest means he has managed to secure funds for the party whenever it has been in desperate straits. Twice a year he makes trips, unaccompanied by his wife, to Istanbul and Ankara of two to three weeks duration. The purpose of these trips is to attend concerts and the theatre. The reporting officer was assured by several contacts, the most reliable one being James Borland, that Köyetürk is the most important member of the

TLP in Samsun despite the fact that he is neither an officer nor a member of the Board in the formal party organization.

Mr. Borland, who is an excellent student of Turkish literature, has been drawn into discussions with members of the group which meets in Köyetürk's drugstore because they seem to enjoy matching wits with a well informed foreigner. He has found them extremely well read in Turkish literature (especially Köyetürk who neither speaks nor reads a foreign language) but quite dogmatic in their approaches to Turkish problems. Their discussions tend to run to the clichés of the late 19th century Marxist movement with a large overlay of today's conventional anti imperialist wisdom. One interesting thread of disagreement, however, which does seem to run through the group's discussions is the question of whether socialism in Turkey must take a revolutionary form or whether it can develop in a democratic framework. Mr. Borland's estimate is that about 1/3 of the group supports democratic socialism while about 2/3, including Köyetürk, believes in revolutionary socialism. Another subject discussed on occasion is the possible benefit to Turkey of a neutralist foreign policy.

In the course of his visit, the reporting officer visited the drugstore twice and met Köyetürk although he did not observe any of the discussions described above. In the course of one visit he noticed a large amount of TLP literature, including copies of the Ankara monthly, *Sosyal Adalet*, for sale. In order to open a discussion he remarked to Köyetürk that he knew the editor of *Sosyal Adalet* and wondered how widely the magazine was read in Samsun. Köyetürk responded that "all the intellectuals" in Samsun were supporters of the TLP and were reading *Sosyal Adalet*. He added that the TLP was now well organized in 33 provinces and that although he himself was a great opportunity for a leftist party to make a place for itself in the political spectrum. He seemed friendly but slightly embarrassed in the presence of an American diplomat.

There is evidence that the TLP is engaged in setting up a cellular, clandestine or semi clandestine organization. Mr. Borland feels that they have made the most progress among school teachers and remarks made in his presence lead him to believe there are a number of cells among school teachers in the Samsun area which remain at least semi clandestine in their contacts with each other. He also believes that the TLP is attempting to penetrate the large Tekel Cigarette Factory. On at least three occasions when he has entered the drugstore a small group of TLP members were "working on" the foreman of the Tekel labor force and one or two of his friends. The first time that this occurred the TLP members changed the subject when Mr. Borland entered but

the foreman, apparently being an outsider, did not get the word and went on talking, revealing that in effect an attempt to recruit him was in progress.

During the August anti-American demonstrations in Turkey some things occurred in Samsun which may or may not be related to the situation described above. A demonstration was organized in Samsun by the school teachers organization and one of the labor unions. In the course of this open air meeting, a large crowd was harangued on the sins of the Americans. Several people present thought the speeches had a definite "Marxist" tinge. The same observers also thought there were agitators among the crowd attempting to work it up. At one point two German tourists who had just disembarked from a ship and who looked like Americans approached the crowd with cameras. (All Americans from the nearby radar site had been confined to the base.) A small group of men on the fringe of the crowd attacked the Germans, knocking them down. A policeman who was standing nearby interfered in a mild way and while he argued with the attackers, a German speaking tobacco company employee assisted the Germans to their feet, got them into a taxi and advised them to leave town. The reporting officer had an opportunity to discuss the events with several people who were present. They were uncertain as to what the purpose of inciting the crowd was, several of them feeling that it was probably a test to see what the possibilities for mass action were.

For the Ambassador:

Philip Clock

Counselor of Embassy

RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files
1964-66. Political and Defense, POL 12 TUR 10/20/64, Box 2754.

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To: Department of State
From: Amcongen-Istanbul

Confidential

January 21, 1965
Subject: The Istanbul Left

Summary:

During an interview January 11, 1965 İlhan SELÇUK, noted "socialist" writer for the influential Istanbul daily, *Cumhuriyet*, presented the reporting officer a list of current areas in which the Istanbul left is most anxious to effect a change. Selçuk, like the other socialists in Istanbul, is beginning to see "the struggle" increasingly in economic terms and is most dogmatic in insisting that "foreign exploitation" in Turkey cease and be replaced by a thoroughgoing system of state socialism. During the conversation he was frank and seemingly sincere in his praise of the United States from where he has recently returned as a Leader Grantee, but felt that American Institutions were in no way applicable to a Turkish context. Particularly disturbing in this conversation was the fact that while Selçuk and the reporting officer were speaking alone the former's attitude was warm and there was a significant exchange of ideas; toward the end of the conversation, however, Cem İPEKÇİ, nephew of well known Istanbul newspaper and motion picture magnate Abdi İPEKÇİ, joined the conversation and from that time forward Selçuk was alternately restrained or self consciously bellicose, thus leading one to the possible conclusion that he is under considerable outside pressure to take a "hard line", after writing a series of articles favorable to the U.S. during his recent visit.

The United States and Socialism

Selçuk began with unstinting praise of the United States, particularly the degree of discipline, fairness and administrative competence which dominate her public and private life. He said he was particularly gratified to see the degree to which social justice and socialism had become accepted tenets of the American system. He was deeply impressed with the strength of the American labor movement and such federally backed projects as the Tennessee Valley Authority.

Selçuk also found Americans both intelligent and friendly. At this point, however, he lamented that Americans abroad, particularly those in government, simply refused to disassociate themselves from local forces of reaction and failed to understand how necessary socialism was for an "emerging country." He pointed out that such examples of "bowing to American business interests" as the Ereğli Steel Mill and the general tendency of American business in Turkey "to exploit," were certain to damage relations between the two countries.

Freedom of Thought

Selçuk next touched upon three causes which the Istanbul left is currently supporting: the rehabilitation of deceased Turkish poet and communist Nazım HİKMET; protest against current bans on the works of

French revolutionary writer François Emile BABEUF¹; and criticism of harassment of the left by the Turkish police and security services.

When I pointed out to Selçuk that perhaps for any country it was at times useful to make a distinction between a gifted artist and a naive or malicious political figure, Selçuk replied that in the case of Hikmet no such distinction was appropriate as the latter had been persecuted in Turkey and had been forced to flee to Russia in fear of his life. Selçuk closed this segment of our conversation by noting that there were communist and socialist parties in Western Europe and the United States; therefore what justification could there be for not having them in Turkey.

The Istanbul Left Looks Outward

Though Selçuk had revealed his usual propensity toward dogmatism up to this point, the conversation had been friendly and a dialogue had been maintained. At this point, however, without so much as a by-your-leave, Cem İpekçi, nephew of Abdi İpekçi, Director of publication of *Milliyet*, entered the room and injected himself into the conversation. Selçuk became deferential to İpekçi and tended to be less flexible in debate. İpekçi attacked the Johnson administration for returning to the reactionary policies of the pre-Kennedy days and in this was supported by Selçuk, İpekçi noted that the late President Kennedy had refused to recognize military governments which had overthrown constitutional regimes, but that President Johnson had quickly recognized the revolutionary junta in Brazil merely because its predecessor had been left leaning. İpekçi added that the French press, always more objective than the American, had been highly critical of Johnson's policy toward Brazil. İpekçi and Selçuk then noted that America in failing to adopt, as had the Russians, the concept of a planned economy would soon find itself left behind in the economic field. İpekçi was particularly scornful of "romantic notions of private initiative" and insisted that today progress is the result of large groups of state experts concentrating on the solution of economic and social problems.

¹ The "Babeuf affair" started when Vedat Günyol and Sabahattin Eyüpoğlu translated into Turkish a book of the French politician Babeuf. The book was ordered to be banned on 13th October 1964 on the pretext that it was communist propaganda. This ban was protested by the famous author Melih Cevdet Anday who published a declaration on behalf of Türk Edebiyatçılar Birliği (Turkish Writers Association). When Yaşar Kemal, Melih Cevdet Anday, Demir Özlü, Sabri Altunel, Şükran Kurdakul, Orhan Arsal, Edip Cansever, Memet Fuat, Hüsamettin Bozok and Arif Damar all members of Turkish Writers Association in a sign of protest deposited a wreath at the Atatürk monument in Taksim they were put under custody and the Court decided to prosecute them. The trial started on 23rd December 1964 and lasted until 23rd June 1966. The court decided that there was no case of communist propaganda. (Source: *Cumhuriyetin 75. Yılı*. Vol. 2, 1954-1978, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul, 1998, p. 534) [Ed.].

Comment:

Selçuk's attitude and comments are significant from two standpoints. Though he appeared to be sincerely impressed with the United States as a result of his recent visit it was disheartening to note the degree to which he has given way to the pressures of the socialist environment in which he circulates in Istanbul. Cem İpekçi is certainly a leader among those who are currently blunting the wholesome effects wrought by Selçuk's visit to the U.S. This in turn tends to confirm the Consulate General's suspicion that the İpekçi family's francophile opinions may conceal deeper hostilities to the U.S. position in Turkey.

The conversation with Selçuk also revealed that one of the more pernicious aspects of current Istanbul "socialism" is its propensity to spread out in all directions, encompassing a vast area of ideology, most of it anti American, in the place of any serious debate over economic organization.

For the Consul General

John R. Countryman
American Vice Consul

RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1946-1966. Political and Defense POL 1 TUR 1/1/65, Box 2751.

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To: Department of State
From: Amcongen-Istanbul

Confidential

February 4, 1965
Subject: The Istanbul Left at the beginning of 1965.

Summary:

This report is an attempt to bring up to date the Consulate General's previous reports on the activities of the Istanbul left, with particular reference to

recent changes in its composition, tactics, strengths and weaknesses, and a concluding word about its possible future. Recent events, which the left has utilized to the fullest, have helped consolidate its strength about a solid core of supporters. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Istanbul's left is its potential for increasing its appeal to a wider segment of the local populace while becoming more extremist. This twin development is supported by a number of factors, ranging from the Istanbul "intellectual's" inherent distaste for the "right" to the inability of the local RPP to retain its sole and traditional position as the party of reform in Turkey.

Traditional Factors Favorable to the Left in Istanbul

It is repeatedly the experience of foreigners in Istanbul that the vast majority of the city's upper and middle class residents consider themselves, by their own not very grudging admission, as "intellectuals". Almost anyone who is a lycee graduate considers himself as part of this "elite." This appellation carries with it considerable ideological baggage, some of it valuable, some of it wrapped in fuzziness. When one considers Istanbul's Ottoman past, and contrasts it with present day realities, particularly in regard to an elitest mentality, the old maxim, "The more things change the more they remain the same" comes inevitably to mind. Most Turkish intellectuals will solemnly intone the judgment that the Ottoman Empire represented the rule of a cosmopolite Constantinople elite over the various subject provinces and nations, among them the poor and unfortunate Turkish peasants of Anatolia. All of this supposedly changed with the advent of the Atatürk reforms. Yet there remains in Istanbul a stubborn refusal to surrender the prerogatives of the Ottoman past, or to recognize the Anatolian peasantry's right to decide upon its own destiny. All of these factors tend to increase the attractiveness of an authoritarian socialist system in the minds of many Istanbul intellectuals.

Though contemporary Turks in Istanbul will agree that Ziya Gökalp's book *The Essentials of Turkism (Türkçülüğün Esasları)* first published in 1923 is somewhat out of date (though one of Turkey's largest and most respected publishers, Varlık, has recently brought out a reprint of the volume) many of Gökalp's concepts have taken root in the minds of local intellectuals. These same principles have enabled the Istanbul intellectual to pay lip service to "reform" while maintaining his essentially elitest Ottoman prejudices. Gökalp distinguishes between "culture" (Hars) and "civilization" (Medeniyet). In order to be truly contemporary says Gökalp, Turkey must be Western oriented in her civilization, and wholly so, yet turn toward the Turkish villager, with his traditional speech patterns, folkways, handicrafts, etc. as a source of "culture." Thus the Istanbul left can count on a strong reaction in its

favor whenever it sounds the warning that the Anatolian peasantry is being exploited by "reactionaries," formerly religious, but now increasingly commercial (i.e., capitalist). Solutions are always sought in terms of the state, and any suggestion of greater local democracy, which would allow popular sentiment in the villages to filter upward to Ankara, is generally rejected as leaving the door open to "exploitation."

It became traditional in the Ottoman Empire to leave the management of commercial, and indeed many governmental affairs, in the hands of minority groups. The Turk was the tiller of the soil and wielder of the sword. Recent years have seen a revision of part of this formula: the Turk is increasingly interested in government service, but "business" retains much of its former stigma even though there are numerous Turks in the latter profession. It should not be doubted that the recent deportation of Istanbul Greek citizen minority, almost all of whom were engaged in commercial activities, was both cause and effect for the judgment of most Istanbul intellectuals that only "undesirables" engage in trade. Visiting American professors at Istanbul University invariably comment that their students prefer a secure job in one of the Ministries to a career in business. This is an atmosphere in which both jealousy and suspicion of any commercial transaction can fester. As in the case of increased local initiative being equated with "religious exploitation" so too, any suggestion that the business community be permitted to operate with less governmental interferences often branded as an invitation to "theft," "tax evasion" and "speculative profits."

At this point note should be taken of three extrinsic forces which have given considerable aid and comfort to the left in its "recruitment" of middle class Istanbul intellectuals: extreme right wing religious nationalism; a business community which can be by turns, irresponsible, divided, or simply unwise in its tactics; and the decline of the RPP in Istanbul.

The Extreme Right Wing

It cannot be doubted that almost the entire thrust and effect of the extreme right wing in Istanbul serves to confirm the worst fears of the pro Atatürk, middle class "elite" described previously, and almost forces them to take a "leftist" posture, if only out of defense.

The extreme right wing in Istanbul loosely groups itself about a number of personalities, publications and organizations. Gökhan EVLİYAOĞLU, former editor of *Yeni İstanbul* and now editor of the weekly *Düşünen Adam*, has always taken a leading role in extreme right wing

activities. He has been active within the JP, and his distaste for the local moderates who support Süleyman DEMİREL is well known. The current top management of *Yeni İstanbul*, the İstanbul daily with a circulation of about 10,000 which has long been the bellwether of the extreme right, is controlled by Editor in Chief Refik ÖZDEK, Editorialist Nezdi BURUN, and General Director Kemal MORAN. One of the chief financial backers of the newspaper is Kemal UZAN. The reporting officer recently spoke to all of the above named members of the *Yeni İstanbul* group and found them to reflect accurately the low quality of their publication. Though committed to anti communism and free enterprise, the low journalistic standards and combination of religious and nationalist extremism, more than offset the newspaper's positive contributions. The same atmosphere pervades other publications (most of them weeklies) which complete the spectrum of the extreme right: *Büyük Doğu*, *Hür Adam*, *Hüryol*, *Yeni İstiklâl*, *Tohum* and *Yaprak*.

A few examples of the kind of articles which these latter publications run side by side indicates the considerable harm they can do to the cause of political moderation, and the glee they must afford the extreme left. In the January 6, 1965 issue of *Yeni İstiklâl*, page 1 carried a banner headline, "Great Danger; For Turkey the Greatest Danger is Soviet Russian Imperialism Coming From the North." This was followed by an accurate, if inarticulate, detailing of past Soviet perfidy, particularly toward Turkey. At the bottom of the page appeared a rather clever cartoon picturing a Trojan Horse labeled "Russian Friendship" from which was descending a horde of little men, who could be seen disappearing down the streets of İstanbul pictured in the background. On the same page, however, was a long poem entitled, "Weeping Ayasophia" calling for the restoration of the building as a mosque, and hinting at the harm attempts at Westernization had done to "Holy Islam". In the December 16 issue of the same *Yeni İstiklâl* the feature article discussed the comments of an English journalist on the Mevlana (Dervish) celebration at Konya. The English journalist is purported to have described the celebration as "the safety valve of a secular republic." In reply, the editors of *Yeni İstiklâl* remind the secularists that they were deceiving themselves about the depth of the peoples' religious commitment, and at the same time spoke of secularism as being a "league of leftists and Masons." Playing on the traditional mistrust of the Anatolian for his more cosmopolitan İstanbul compatriot, the same issue, in an article by Cevat Rifat ATILHAN, speaks of a conspiracy, going back to the Ottoman period, of those in the service of "world Jewry" and places much of Turkey's contemporary ills at the doorstep of Zionism and Israel.

Behind these publications and such personalities as Evliyaoğlu, and the recently returned Professor Ali Fuat BAŞGİL (whom *Yeni İstanbul* sources say will shortly resume an active writing career) stand such organizations as the Association of Preacher Training School Graduates (İmam Hatip Mezunları Cemiyeti) and the members of Istanbul's Preacher Training and High Islamic Schools (İmam Hatip Okulu and Yüksek İslamiyet Enstitüsü). Members of the two latter schools can be counted upon as demonstrators, and have proven themselves in street fighting following the release from Kayseri Prison of former DP President Celal Bayar and in a recent attack on a Turkish Labor Party meeting.

Perhaps the most unfortunate result of right wing activities is that a polarity is set up in the minds of many Istanbul "intellectuals" wherein religious reaction, private enterprise, and anti communism become opposed to secular progress, socialism and, increasingly, anti Americanism. Another indication of the manner in which these triads can become solidified in peoples' minds can be seen in a recent issue of Evliyaoğlu's *Düşünen Adam*, in which an article lauding free enterprise and foreign investment written by the well known industrialist Vehbi KOÇ, appeared sandwiched in among clumsy attacks on the left and extreme national and religious propaganda. Koç's unwise selection of such a forum for his economic ideas brings one to the second extrinsic source of the left's strength in Istanbul.

The Istanbul Business Community

The local business community is simply lacking in political acumen and generally refuses to assume any cultural leadership. Company unions are often preferred to relations with the moderate Türk İş syndicate, thus paving the way for more extreme demands by the Turkish Labor Party. Both the Consulate General and USIS have received reports that local business leaders have recently united to threaten both *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet* with the withdrawal of advertising if anti private sector editorializing does not cease. Such heavy handed tactics lay the business community wide open to charges of "exploitation." Though there is no evidence that any American businessmen are involved in this, the danger exists nonetheless that Americans will be accused of instigation and participation.

Weakness of the Local RPP Organization

The Consulate General has commented previously on the weak structure and lack of vitality of the Istanbul RPP organization. Local RPP leaders such as Ali SOHTORİK, Auf ÖDÜL, Şahin GÜROL and Ali SEDEN

are lack luster figures. Sohtorik has drawn considerable criticism from both within and without his own party, for having allegedly reached his present position by virtue of being İnönü's nephew by marriage. Further, there are numerous indications that the RPP in Istanbul is ceding the political initiative to the Turkish Labor Party. Though it is still possible to draw a line between the editorial policy of such newspapers as *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet* and the more extreme tone of TLP publications such as *Yön*, the gap is closing rapidly.

Last August's anti American demonstrations on the part of Istanbul University student groups could almost serve as a watershed; prior to that time it seemed that the RPP had things well in control locally, and that both the press (through such writers as *Cumhuriyet's* Ecvet GÜRESİN) and the student leaders were essentially pro RPP. Since the advent of the Cyprus crisis, however, and the deliberate surfacing of anti-American sentiment, both the student groups and the press seem to have swung increasingly into line with the Turkish Labor Party. Deprived of the strong and reliable backing of the press and student groups, the disquietude of local RPP leaders such as Sohtorik and Seden (see Sohtorik Memcon of 12/19/64 and Seden Memcon of 12/3/64) is readily understandable.

Istanbul's Left: An Attempted Definition

Because of the traditional and contemporary factors outlined above, and because, particularly during the last few months, the left has been trying its wings, any accurate definition of this segment of Istanbul opinion is difficult. Yet some attempt at definition is necessary, because in contacts with the representatives of the left and its thinking, the American observer has to steer his way between the twin dangers of a smart, obtuse severity, and a genial, lax almost universal acceptance.

The left is first of all the Turkish Labor Party and its three major press organ *Yön*, *Eylem* and *Sosyal Adalet*. Istanbul's A-15 of August 6, 1964 discussed the Istanbul left in terms of the struggle between the "Kadro Group" (those who grouped themselves around the Turkish magazine *Kadro* in the 1930's, and who espoused a philosophy of etatism in which were blended the then existing ideas of Moscow, Rome (Mussolini), and Constantinople (the Ottoman Empire)) and the "Communists" (descendants of the 1946 "Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Socialist Party"). This distinction between the Kadro and the Communists points up the difference between the reform wing of the present RPP and the more extremist ideas of the TLP. One of the most disturbing aspects of the current political scene in Istanbul, however, is the

degree to which both the ideas and personalities of the two groups are tending to move closer together. Furthermore most Istanbul publishers either exercise minimal control over editorial policy or are themselves somewhat "left". Such well known socialist intellectuals as *Milliyet* editorialist Çetin ALTAN, *Cumhuriyet's* İlhan SELÇUK, and Robert College Public Relations Director and *Yön* contributor İbrahim ÇAMLI, though they may disavow party connection and insist that they are merely pointing out areas for needed reform, continually employ the same rhetoric and espouse the same causes as the TLP. Indeed, a turning point may have been reached in the history of Istanbul's leftist community in December 1964 when columnist Altan practically issued his valedictory to the RPP. In an editorial of December 2, he stated:

"We think that the RPP cannot expect, after all this (Altan had listed various RPP offenses ranging from lack of action on land reform to its countenancing of embezzlement), to have won the support of Turkish public opinion. The confidence which seemed to be felt at the beginning toward the RPP by intellectuals, artists, writers, is being lost more every day. Youth no longer feels much sympathy toward this party which won a lot thanks to youth."

And again on December 11 he wrote: "The only road which could save the RPP would be to show courage at least equal to that of the Labor Party in England."

The sad fact emerges that, with the exception of editorials by *Cumhuriyet's* Kayhan SAĞLAMER and *Milliyet's* ABDİ İPEKÇİ there is little writing in the Istanbul press that is clearly distinguishable as RPP rather than TLP inspired. Indeed the last two mentioned journals are continually surfacing issues and making judgments on them that are favorable to the TLP line.

Program and Tactics of the Istanbul Left

In the wake of the Cyprus crisis, *Cumhuriyet*, during the month of October 1964, carried a series of interviews with leading Turkish political figures, in which each figure gave an answer to the question, "What should Turkey's foreign policy be." In his reply, TLP President Mehmet Ali AYBAR (Enclosure I of Istanbul's A-54), made three major points: Turkey has become a dependency of the United States; this relationship has forced Turkey to grant excessive political and economic concessions; foreign (i.e. U.S.) aid is an ultimate curse, whose temporary absence can be offset if Turkey is willing to make the necessary "internal changes". These latter "changes" would

presumably involve the switch to a completely socialist form of government. Since this October statement and through *Eylem*, *Sosyal Adalet* and *Yön*, the three main lines set forth by Aybar have been taken up and expanded throughout the leftist community. On November 15, 1964, in a speech delivered at the Istanbul Provincial Congress of the Turkish Labor Party, Aybar concluded his plea for the re-establishment of friendly relations with the Soviet Union with the words: "Especially if those friendship tie (between Turkey and Soviet Russia) regain the nature they had during the War of Independence, they could help Turkey greatly to attain her independence and realize her social development." With this highly pro Soviet ingredient having been added to the ideological brew, the left has proceeded to attack along the following lines:

1. The U.S. is the aggressor in Viet-Nam, the Congo and Cuba. *Eylem* of October contained this rather brutal analysis at the conclusion of an article on American Imperialism and the Yellow Press: "Cuba had attained its independence and freedom. It had achieved them, but it had fallen into the hands of the American trusts. American Imperialism had conquered another stronghold, by using the yellow press, by provoking the American nation, by forcing the American Government into war.... At the cost of lives, at the cost of happiness."

2. Foreign aid and investment are detrimental to Turkey's development and independence. A reference in the January issue of *Sosyal Adalet* to the Common Market brands it as a creation of international monopoly capitalists, who, working through the developed six are seeking to exploit the lesser developed countries they accept as "associates". Attacks on foreign investment have grown particularly sharp in recent months with particular attention to the Ereğli Steel Mill.

3. Essential human freedoms are lacking in Turkey, and this is largely due to the past pernicious influence of the U.S. *Sosyal Adalet* and *Yön* have led recent efforts to rehabilitate deceased Turkish Communist poet Nazım HİKMET, who fled to Russia in 1951 and died in Poland in 1963. The January issue of *Sosyal Adalet* gave considerable play to a translation of Jean Paul SARTRE's statement honoring Hikmet delivered at a December 15 ceremony at Paris Pleyel Concert Salon. Left wing "intellectuals" such as Çetin Altan and İlhan Selçuk have commented in conversations with the reporting officer that Hikmet was persecuted due to the reactionary influence which the U.S. wields over Turkish thinking. It should be emphasized that such "martyr cases" as that of Hikmet gain considerable attention and consequent sympathy particularly among younger writers, artists and students.

Parallel with the efforts directed at Hikmet's rehabilitation is a current attack on Laws no. 141-142 (subversion), Altan, in an editorial of January 17, neatly combined an attack on the Turkish National Security Service with one against American "interference" in Turkey by concluding: "The time has come to revise the secret agreements signed with foreigners during the former era, which we hear amount to fifty-six, and especially to give the National Security organization back to our national security in its true meaning." (Allusions to Turkey's being a police state are frequent.)

4. American achievements are largely overblown and other countries can serve as more suitable models for Turkey's economic and intellectual development. The article from *Eylem* quoted above linking the "yellow press" with U.S. imperialism in Cuba is a particularly subtle use of propaganda designed to simultaneously discredit American foreign policy objectives and to shut off the possibility of U.S. rebuttal by discrediting the reliability of the American press. In a recent conversation with İlhan Selçuk and Cem İPEKÇİ, the reporting officer was subjected to severe criticism of the American press, particularly with reference to its "biased" reporting of the recent military coup in Brazil. Ipekci noted that the French press, "always more reliable than the American", had severely criticized the United States support of an armed rebellion against a constitutional regime, but that "the facts had been suppressed in the U.S. press.

In addition to attacks on the free enterprise as "exploitation," much leftist conversation centers about the necessity for central state planning. To support this end the Istanbul left tends to suppress articles describing the successes of capitalism. It can also count on the well known fiscal irresponsibility and hodge podge planning methods of the Menderes regime to precondition readers' minds.

5. Aside from political and economic pressures which the United States asserts on Turkey from without, the presence of American military and AID advisers within Turkey is an affront to Turkish sovereignty and ultimately injurious to economic development.¹ In this last regard the recent Tunatos strike at the TUSLOG² Üsküdar warehouse represents a particularly artful

¹ On September 4, 1961, the Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act, which reorganized the U.S. foreign assistance programs including separating military and non military aid. The Act mandated the creation of an agency to administer economic assistance programs, and on November 3, 1961, President John F. Kennedy established the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

USAID became the first U.S. foreign assistance organization whose primary emphasis was on long-range economic and social development assistance efforts. Freed from political and military functions that plagued its predecessor organizations, USAID was able to offer direct support to the developing nations of the world. http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html [ed.].

² TUSLOG stands for Headquarters The United States Logistics Group Sixteenth Air Force. [ed.].

combination of TLP action coupled with biased press reporting. As Enclosure No. 1 indicates, one of the latest TLP policy objectives is to achieve the removal of American military installations from Turkey and such incidents as the Tunatos strike are well calculated to help achieve this end.

Left Activity in the Arts

Most Istanbul observers would agree that the vast majority of Istanbul's writers, poets, musicians and actors support the TLP, at least emotionally if not with their membership dues. The Turkish Men of Letters Association (Türk Edebiyatçılar Derneği) has been an action group to secure the repeal of Laws No. 141-142 and its first incursion into this area was the "BABEU" affair described in ConGen's week of November 4, 1964. The leading members of this Association, Şükran KURDAKUL, Melih Cevdet ANDAY, Arif DAMAR, Demir ÖZLÜ, Mehmet FUAT, Orhan ARSAL, Edip CANSEVER, and Vedat GÜNYOL frequently appear in leftist publications and are all firmly committed to the almost total exclusion of the belle lettristic features which characterize most contemporary Western literature.

Perhaps the best private acting company in Istanbul and the one which arranged for the presentation last year of Bertold Brecht's *The Good Woman of Seczuan* is the Kent Players under the direction of Yıldız Kenter who has frequently associated herself with leftists and leftist causes.

During last year's Belgrade folklore festival, first prize was awarded to Tülay GERMAN, a pupil of the well known Saz (stringed instrument) player and Turkish folklore vocalist Ruhi SU, who was arrested in the 50's for communist activities but subsequently released. Su and German are currently the featured act at a new Istanbul night club, the As Klübü, which draws large numbers of Istanbul's younger and middle aged intellectuals.

The Consulate General has received an unconfirmed indication from the Editor in Chief of the Istanbul publishing house *Varlık*, that the Soviets and their East European partners have succeeded in penetrating the literary life of Turkey. The editor, Yaşar Nabi NAYIR, told the reporting officer that as Turkish authors retain the translation rights to their works published in Turkish, the Soviets and East Europeans approach any writer who betrays a bias toward "social realism" with an offer to deposit a sum of money in his name in a Russian or East European bank in exchange for publishing rights. Of course the funds cannot be transferred to Turkey or elsewhere abroad, but the Turkish writer is told the money is available for travel or "an extended visit" in the East European nation.

The Future of the Turkish Left

From current observations of the Istanbul scene it would seem inevitable that the Istanbul left will grow in power and importance, if for no other reason than that there is no adequate break, either legal or political, upon its expansion. Perhaps the only legitimate questions which can be asked at this point are, first, "What kind of a left will emerge in, say, the next five years?" and, from the vantage point of Istanbul, "What kind of political spectrum will surround it?"

There are in Istanbul indications that the old RPP-JP polarity which has been a fixed point around which recent political events in Turkey have revolved, may be breaking down, and might be replaced within the next few years by a fuller spectrum of parties reminiscent of post war Italy or France. The new alignment might include essentially four major parties: the Turkish Labor Party clearly discernible as a Communist or at least as a radical socialist party; a Social Democratic successor to the RPP; a new JP corresponding very roughly to one of Europe's Conservative or Christian (Islamic?) Democratic parties; and a Nationalist Party, religiously conservative and crypto fascist. The only other alternative to this party proliferation generally recognized here is some sort of authoritarian rule, in all probability military and socialist. There is a tendency in certain circles of the left to prefer this latter alternative, for a variety of motives ranging from pure self interest to a failure of democratic will in the face of what is interpreted as excessive bickering in Turkish political life. It is surely in the interests of the West to see extreme elements in Turkish politics isolated, and to encourage the growth of a strong and Western oriented "center", based ultimately on the more moderate elements of the present RPP and JP. If the advantages of this strong, if bifurcated, center are admitted, such a development must, at least here in Istanbul, depend upon: (1) strengthening the moderately socialist elements within the RPP, and preventing their making common cause with the more radical TLP; and (2) the JP escaping the domination of its more right wing elements.

Thus it may be concluded that moderate elements within the RPP should not be allowed to indulge in any sentimentality over the plight of the Turkish peasant which might obscure the clear intent of such totalitarian statements as that by Rıza KUAS, General Secretary of the Turkish Labor Party (Enclosure No. 1 to Ankara's A-534): "Our workers, real supporters of Atatürk, revolutionary youth, and poor peasants, are openly backed by the TLP with the intention of bringing these elements to power."

For the Consul General

John R. Countryman
American Vice Consul
By W.D. Hubbard
Encl.

RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-1968. Political and Defense POL 12 Political Parties TUR 1/1/65, Box 2754.

Enclosure

From the Book *Program of the Turkish Labor Party*
Extract from Chapter XII. Foreign Policy
And National Defense

The real aim of our War of Independence was the establishment of an independent Turkey. We fought against imperialism and capitalism. We followed an independent foreign policy during Atatürk's time; we were in favor of freedom, the National Pact and peace, and we were against imperialism and colonialism. We had formed a well trained independent national army, well equipped through the sacrifices of the nation, in order to defend our independence, Republic and Fatherland. The principal aim of Atatürk's foreign policy was to establish and develop friendly relations with neighboring countries. The Turkish Russian friendship agreement; the Balkan Pact with the participation of Greece, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria; and the Sadabad Pact were documents indicating the main lines of our foreign policy.

We did not trust foreign capital or foreign aid and credits. We knew the necessity of being watchful and careful toward foreign capital.

During Atatürk's time, Turkey was definitely against imperialism and colonialism.

However, after the victory, the land owners, who are left-overs from medieval feudalism, and the local capitalism which relies on roots abroad and on the world of international finance could not be eliminated.

In the closing days of World War II, while the single party regime was shaken through various political, economic and social difficulties, the land owners and local capital circles had gained sufficient strength to speak with loud voices and they got hold of the main arteries of our national life. The fact

that the world had divided into two antagonistic military blocs, and the proposal made by America to give aid and credits to Turkey, prompted the government of that time, which was looking for credits anyway and was under the influence of capitalist circles, to accept this proposal and to make out of Turkey a small ally of the capitalist bloc.

Since 1947-48, Turkey has become a state which exists thanks to foreign aid and credits. The aid and credits, coming each time under heavier conditions, rendered Turkey more and more dependent. The local capitalist circles with roots abroad and the land owners, obtaining profitable business possibilities thanks to this aid and credit, increased their fortunes, influence and domination greatly.

Turkey is now in the middle of a vicious circle: because of the foreign aid and credits which she cannot renounce, Turkey is becoming more and more dependent, and because she is becoming more dependent, Turkey is running after new credits and aid under the influence of capitalist circles mediating for foreigners.

Turkish governments have abandoned completely the foreign policy of Atatürk's time and follow a dependent foreign policy lacking personality.

The Turkish Labor Party establishes and applies its foreign and national defense policies by keeping in mind these examples and situations. The Labor Party follows a foreign policy becoming the Turkey of the War of Independence, which is jealously independent, which is against imperialism and colonialism, which is peaceful and attached to the principles of the United Nations.

THE TURKISH LABOR PARTY:

- Sets forth the condition of full equality in international relations.
- Considers independence and equality as fundamental rights for all nations and people.
- Supports with all its might through peaceful means the national liberation movements of nations.
- Is definitely against imperialism and colonialism.
- It is for peace, and believes that war is justified only as means of self defense.
- It will not spare any effort in the elimination of military blocs and bases in foreign countries which threaten peace and create the danger of a nuclear war.

- It is against discrimination between nations in world trade, monopolies exerted on raw material sources and is against the pursuit of a price policy against nations possessing raw materials.

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To: Department of State
From: Amcongen-Istanbul

Confidential

July 15, 1965

Subject: Anti-left activity in the Istanbul business community

Summary

There is an increasing awareness in Istanbul of the recent growth in the strength of the left and this awareness has caused a reaction against the left which is most significant in the heretofore politically aloof business community. This reaction of the private sector is expressed through three organizations, two of them older with a long term approach and one new, the Information Bureau of the Union of Chambers, which has as its minimum goals the improving of the public image of the business community and the curtailing of the attack from the left. The business community remains divided but may have found its most effective tool in this new organization.

As reported in the referenced airgram, a significant anti leftist movement is in the incipient stages of development in Turkey, an important part of which is centered in Istanbul. While several Istanbul newspapers of far rightist (*Yeni İstanbul*), religious conservative (*Tercüman*) and JP (*Son Havadis* and *Haber*) tendencies have long played up the communist danger, the present anti leftism involves a considerably broader cross section of Istanbul society and is basically a reaction to the very real inroads made recently by socialist and far left ideas.

In view of the pre-eminent economic position of Istanbul certainly the most relatively significant developments and those reported herein have been in the business community. Traditionally the business community has been reluctant to get involved in politics and the present degree of business activity in the anti leftist movement is at least partially explained by the fact that it

cuts across party lines. Until recently, and even now to some extent, Turkish businessmen have been unable to see a threat to their own interests in leftist attacks on "foreign oil cartels" and foreign companies in Turkey in general. The awareness that the leftist target is not so narrowly circumscribed but in fact is private enterprise in general has come slowly and incompletely and the lack of coordination among the various groups is in part attributable to this fact.

The reaction of private enterprise in Istanbul to leftist pressures has expressed itself in various ways. In the first place, it has addressed itself to the long term problem through two institutions and has only just begun to react to the recent increase in leftist propaganda by the creation of a third instrument. What divides these groups is indicative of the basic split in the business community, a split which exists between the Chamber of Industry and the Chamber of Commerce, and also one which is occasioned by a clash in personalities.

To cope with the long term problem there have been founded the Economic and Social Studies Board (ESSB) and the Economic Research Foundation (ERF). The ESSB was founded in 1961 following conferences held at Istanbul University in 1959 under the sponsorship of both that University and Columbia University. (The ESSB has had backing from both the Ford Foundation and AID). The ESSB comprises four businessmen and three professors. Its President is Nejat Eczacıbaşı, well known Turkish pharmaceutical and ceramics manufacturer, and its Vice President is Professor Sulhi Dönmezer, a specialist in criminal law. The other members are Orhan Mersinli of Philips, Behçet Osmanağaoğlu of Koç Burroughs (and present President of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce), Yohan Erbe of Unilever (a Dutchman), Professor Vakur Versan (lawyer to Mobil Oil and former President of Turkish American University Association), and Professor Memduh Yaşa (economic adviser to *Yeni Gazete*). The ESSB's Secretary General is Mrs. Sadun Kâtipoğlu, a former employee of USIS in Istanbul. The ESSB has held three summer conferences, at Yeşilköy and Kilyos, in 1962-64. The subjects were "Capital Formation in a Developing Economy," "Local Aspects of Economic Development," and "Agricultural Development". This year the conference, which is held each year in August, will have as its subject "Planning and Growth in a Mixed Economy." The ESSB also holds seminars in its own quarters during the rest of the year. The ESSB insists that all possible sides to a discussion be aired and that, while conclusions may be reached and printed for its research projects, no conclusions are reached in the seminars and conferences. In this fashion, it hopes to avoid the stigma of being a totally partisan organization and hence to develop a reputation for

fairness and respectability. To date, it has not yet been attacked in the press as a partisan organization. The ESSB's objectives are obviously long term.

The ERF is quite different. Founded in 1963, its principal members are Kâzım Taşkent (President), Ahmet Dallı (Chairman of the Akbank and a member of JP's National Administrative Board), Tevfik Ercan (owner of the Çınar Hotel), Hayri Baran (Turkey's biggest private shipowner), and Behçet Osmanağaoğlu. Fuat Süren, although not a member of the Board, is active in ERF (Süren owns Trans Türk and is one of Turkey's leading importers). ERF's Secretary General is the well known Professor Nuri Eren. ERF is supposed to be a straight propaganda organization although it has adopted the same system as ESSB conferences, research and seminars. Unlike the ESSB, the ERF does not use the "open forum" technique. It does not invite all shades of opinion on questions at issue. Furthermore, it has no university professors among its members. So far, it has held only one relatively important seminar on the subject of exports this year.

Late last year Vehbi Koç, Turkey's leading businessman and industrialist, started a campaign to merge ESSB and ERF. The principle of the "open forum" was the rock on which this merger foundered. The ERF board was split 50-50, with Dallı, Ercan, Osmanağaoğlu, and Baran leading the fight for the merger. This group finally lost out to another group headed by Cihat İren, Taşkent's representative. Taşkent, Turkey's leading private banker, then became President of ERF. Dallı has not attacked Taşkent at this time because the JP will need Taşkent's money for the election campaign. (Taşkent was a big DP backer.) Meanwhile, Mr. Koç has thrown his backing to ESSB. While Taşkent has assured Nuri Eren of his continued support, the latter's contract (TL 10,000 per month plus representation) expires in January and the likelihood is that Mr. Eren will be looking for another job.

With this internecine warfare continuing between business leaders, it became quite evident to some of them that perhaps some other instrumentality should be created. Some of these businessmen had already tried to put *Akşam* out of business by withholding advertising but they were singularly unsuccessful in this undertaking. Having learned this lesson they came to the conclusion that they should at least mount an "information attack." This led to the creation of the Information Bureau of the Union of Chambers. (It is located in Istanbul and is just moving into its offices on Tepebaşı.) The idea is to provide copy for newspapers on the understanding that, if the press gives private enterprise's point of view ("equal time" at least) then nothing will happen to the advertising. It is backed by both Chambers and particularly by Ahmet Dallı and Fazıl Zobu (a Koç lieutenant who runs the Türkay Match Company and present President of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry). What

this Information Bureau can accomplish is difficult to say because its staff has not yet been blooded. Furthermore, it will be hampered by the basic split between the views of the merchants, as represented by the Chamber of Commerce, and those of the industrialists, as represented by the Chamber of Industry. In essence, therefore, the private sector does not appear to have been able to set its home in order and to achieve common aims and purposes. However, it may be that the Information Center can achieve something to improve the image of the private sector or at least contain the attack from the left.

For the Consul General

Wharton D. Hubbard
Consul

RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files
1964-66 POL 23 TUR 1/1/64, Box 2758.

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To: Department of State
From: Amconsul, Izmir

Confidential

August 13, 1965

Subject: The Basis of Some Anti-Americanism in Turkey

INTRODUCTION:

For several years the posts in Turkey have been concerned with the growth of anti-Americanism, and the various analyses have usually attributed the problem to either the growing influence of the left or the "American presence." These two factors are undoubtedly major causes, yet there are probably other elements, psychological and cultural in nature, which are more difficult to diagnose and to treat. Such elements are connected with the fact that all phases of Turkish life and culture are in transition, that Americans are

serving as the most influential advisors, that the ultimate goals are best illustrated by American models, and that any hesitation or failure encountered in attaining the goals must somehow be attributable to American influence. An expert may examine random cases and find that the breakdown originated in some sin of omission or commission on the Turkish side, but it is only human that an individual or a nation finds it difficult to accept his own inadequacy and yearns for an outside culprit.

Many sensitive Turks have long recognized that a modern nation may not be an unmixed blessing, and even in 1900 one of them viewed the path to westernization with hesitancy:

Stealthily the West was creeping in, trying to lure the East with her wonders... She dangled before our dazzled eyes the witchery of her science and the miracles of her inventions. We caught a glimpse of her brilliance and timidly listened to the song of the siren. Like country folk at a banquet, we felt humble and awkward in our ways. But vaguely we sensed the coldness of her glitter and the price of her wooing.

Such statements do not necessarily come from a conservative, religious reactionary, but are simply the doubts of anyone who wishes to preserve the best elements in his culture against attacks from gaudy gadgets of a foreign world. And even after being sincerely committed to a decision which will bring a greater good, many can and do look back with regret on elements which had to be sacrificed. Often we speak of a cure being worse than the disease, mention patients who abandon some needed treatment, and sympathize with the more persevering soul who grows discouraged, curses the doctor, and regrets the absence of some undiscovered miracle drug. Certainly the path to industrialization is as arduous as anything devised by the medical profession, and we Americans who play the role of experienced specialist must expect a degree of antagonism from the suffering patient who is following our prescribed directions.

The examples of Turkish problems which are used in the following discussion can easily become absurd if carried too far. However, they are intended only to illustrate how an unfavorable climate is created which might become fertile soil for more serious activities. When weariness, frustration, and uncertainty beset him, the Turk can become like a cranky child who is not pleased or distracted by any offering, and his criticism of U.S. policies regarding Cyprus, petroleum, AID, foreign investment, etc. reflects this unrealistic tone and rarely responds to presentation of rational facts. This does not mean that he is basically ungrateful, incompetent, or less devoted to his announced programs, but suggests that at times his reactions should not be taken at their face value.

BUSINESS: Waste vs. Saving

In every history of modern Turkey it is pointed out that one of the most significant changes which has occurred is that the Turk has replaced the Armenian and the Greek in the business community. To an American this transition may not seem particularly extraordinary, but the change contains one of the most crucial elements in the Turkish character. In the old Ottoman society, the positions of respect were located in either the military or the bureaucracy, and value was placed upon activities connected with conquest or command. These are essentially the same values which the Turkomen tribes brought with them from the Steppes and were re enforced by Bedouin values in Islam. In such societies the symbol of affluence and prestige is in wasting freely and spending generously what is now often referred to as conspicuous consumption and extensive hospitality is held in the highest repute.

Today, however, the situation has changed drastically, and the tribal mores have been replaced by capitalist ones. Thus the ambitious young man who wishes to achieve success in the modern world must save and invest, must watch every kuruş in a business transaction, and must be attuned to the demands of customers for whom he may have little respect. For this merchant chained to his shop selling fertilizer and insecticides, these modern methods may be his means, but the end remains the traditional goal of becoming wealthy enough to waste freely and spend generously. Resolving this paradox is no easy matter for the most able personalities, and lesser men can easily become discouraged in making the attempt. Furthermore, the economic system of a modern, industrialized nation is highly complex, requiring that minute bits and pieces be all assembled at the proper moment and in the proper order if the ever demanding, unappreciative, soulless machines are to function properly. For the modern Turk who heard stories of conquest and command at his grandfather's knee, the business world can appear niggardly and distasteful, lacking in opportunities for both heroism and nobility.

In looking for some answer to the predicament, a uniquely Turkish system is sought which would combine the productivity of industrialization with the satisfactions of the traditional professions. Etatism was thought to be a proper compromise, but its failures have become increasingly obvious. As the search continues, the businessman grows more desperate for a resolution to the demands of capitalist competition and tribal generosity. The American experts push him toward complete acceptance of that world which was formerly thought fit only for lowly Greeks and Armenians, and it should not be surprising that he remains hesitant about pursuing such a divergent course.

POLITICS: Intellectuals vs. Technicians

Concepts of industrialization were brought to Turkey by an educated and professional elite who recognized that their own country had fallen to a point where it could not protect itself against either a military or an economic invasion. To a large extent these men were intellectuals, men of theory adept at visualizing a new order, but with little appreciation for the technical skills required in a mechanical age. As initiators of the revolution however, they believed it was their right to maintain their position of leadership as directors of the future government, even though industrialization in underdeveloped countries frequently hinges on the acquisition of investment capital and the ability to organize vast enterprises. The intellectual does not possess the capital himself, rarely has the type of mind suitable for handling details of industry, and is therefore in danger of losing control to industrialist and technicians. But one alternative is to establish some sort of socialist regime or guided democracy which uses government capital to finance the industrialization and keeps the intellectual in power by controlling the government.

In Turkey one of the unanalyzed but pressing topics of domestic debate revolves around who are the rightful heirs and guardians of the Atatürk reforms. The military certainly considers that they should have a major share as do the professors and students. The most potent adversaries, however, are the industrialists and the technicians who scoff at the inability of the soldiers and the theorists to satisfactorily administer a modern state. In this debate, America, as the champion of free enterprise and a broad based electorate, plays an important if silent role and is as much a danger to the intellectuals as the native industrialist who more directly threatens the established power structure. The shape of the battle has already become apparent with the recent attacks on the selfishness of the profit motive as opposed to the altruism of one who works solely for the development of his country. The debate will certainly become more heated during the election period and will not be really settled by the defeat or victory of any particular party.

FAMILY LIFE: Security vs. Loneliness

The old Turkish family was closely knit, usually lived in the same area, if not the same house, and drew security and companionship from brothers, aunts, and cousins. In contrast, the newly married couple of today often finds itself assigned to a strange city away from the familial hearth. It has been normal for centuries that the husband may have to leave his home on

military or other business, but only recently has it become the accepted practice for the family to go along. Aside from the usual burdens connected with transfers, this places a great psychological strain upon the wife who has never had the experience of being required to find new friends in a new city. Turkish social life still remains largely closed, and unless the wife has relatives or schoolmates in the new location, she may well face a lonely existence. As an overwhelming majority of marriages continue to be arranged by the parents, it often occurs that the isolated couple finds they have little in common at a time when the extended family is not around to offer solace and security.

Into this pot of frustrations comes the American movie, filled with Hollywood glamour and dedicated to the get married and live happily ever after theme. Certainly evenings spent before the screen can be pleasurable and amusing, but at the same time it illustrates the contrast between the American model and the Turkish reality. In trying to resolve the difficulties, the security and companionship of the traditional family grouped together can look attractive despite all the mother in law stories, and brings doubt on the American way of life now being pursued.

STYLELESSNES: Individuality vs. conformity

One of the perils of modernization is what is often referred to as "Stylelessness", the substitution of the unique by the common. Usually the problem is discussed in terms of the originality of handicrafts versus the monotony of the mass produced, machine made products but in Turkey it is the distinctiveness of the culture rather than the artistic crafts for which preservation is sought. Although not quite sure about what qualities make a Turk distinctive, every schoolboy is convinced that he is made from better stuff and intended for greater achievements than, for example, his squabbling, noisy, irresponsible Arabic and Greek neighbors. However, just as industrialization demands standardized materials for its undifferentiating machines, a modern society encourages the production of a personality who wears accepted clothes, speaks an accepted language, and is versed in certain techniques. In addition, modern methods are rational and scientific, discovered by foreigners, based on the metric system and the speed of light, and do not recognize any inherent superiority in family blood or race. It is a world of profit and Rotary Clubs which believes that money is money, that no potential customer should be offended, and that the egalitarian extrovert wins more potentially rewarding contacts than the withdrawn, principled superman.

Many a Turk wonders if the benefits accruing to this universal man are worth the sacrifice of his special identity. So far, such oriental nations as Japan and Formosa which have been most successful in their modernizing programs have not been able to maintain their cultural autonomy, and few believe the Turk could reverse the trend. Furthermore, fully accepting the values of the West would mean that the game must be played according to those rules with little opportunity for the late comer to fully master the techniques required for meeting the competition. Hope of success therefore tends to encourage a policy of semi isolation in which there is more opportunity for controlling the situation.

SOCIAL ACTIVITIES: Dreams vs. Reality

The Turkish ability to sit silently and do nothing has long been famous and is still thought worthy of comment by many visitors and authors of touristic material (one writer even described the Turk as sitting "beatifically"). This trait was perhaps developed during long years in the harem or nights around the campfire, but the radio and the automobile have helped many in the new generation to realize that such quietude is neither necessary nor desirable. Unfortunately the facilities for coping with this new restlessness have not been developed, and the impatient soul has few outlets for his excess energy. The problem is particularly crucial for the young who have the most leisure and the least opportunity for using it constructively. Student life as envisioned by Sigmund Romberg has absolutely no close parallel: rooms with less than four occupants are rare, dating is practically unheard of, social clubs are undeveloped, athletic facilities are scarce, etc. The result of such problems was illustrated in a recent study by an Ankara professor which showed that 86 percent of the students went to the movies more than once a week and that having such an impressionable group constantly exposed to idealized scenes of life creates dream substitutes and unrealistic aspirations. When the dream world is then compared with the real world, the contrast is so unfavorable that it can not help bringing questions of who and what are responsible, and the role played by the U.S. in Turkey is such as to make us the obvious scapegoat in many of the bull sessions.

CONCLUSION: The White Man's Burden

All the examples which have been used and there are thousands of others illustrate the complex effects which American activities may

unwittingly have on Turkish life. In physics we know that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction, and it would appear there is a corollary in the psychological sphere. Commentators on the Middle East have long been fond of saying that the more things change, the more they remain the same. Perhaps by this it is meant that the further a nation goes toward modernity, the closer it must hold many of the traditional elements. Part of the reaction against the U.S. is thus a reaction against the prime force which is pushing it away from the known, the beloved, the secure.

In the past the British spoke frequently and jokingly about "the white man's burden." Today the expression has lost much of its original meaning in the destruction of colonialism, but perhaps the burden has merely taken another form, one that requires that the advisor (rather than the colonialist) persist in the face of antagonism and all the virulent devices of yellow journalism. The significant decision then lies in determining which criticism can be successfully rebutted and which is a psychosomatic disease incapable of treatment by anything more than time, tranquilizers, and a sympathetic ear.

If the analysis is accepted that part of the present anti Americanism is caused by a combination of internal frustrations and the role of the American advisor, it would suggest that the U.S. has done little to create it and has relatively little chance of controlling it. It is, then, a normal type of hostility which must be expected when friends become too familiar and can probably be alleviated only by sympathetic understanding. Trying to counteract this particular virus by extensive activities and repeated explanations may only prolong its duration and turn it into a more respectable opposition.

This plea for moderation does not mean to suggest, however, that significant problems do not exist. Certainly the difficulties which arise from the activities of the left and the American presence must be met with firm and decisive responses in order to prevent their developing into aberrations. Xenophobia has not completely died and any overt or covert attempt to resurrect it as a part of the agonies of industrialization must be prevented. The difficulty for us in this transitional period is to avoid using the sledge hammer for driving the tack.

Maxwell K. Berry
American Consul

RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files
1964-66. POL TUR-US 6/10/65, Box 2758.

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To: Department of State
From: Amcongen-Istanbul

Confidential

August 26, 1965
Subject: Some comments on the Istanbul left.

Summary and Conclusions

The Istanbul left has recently become "institutionalized" to a greater degree than was previously evident, coalescing primarily around the TLP and to some extent around the left wing of the RPP. The reason for this is the October elections which require hard work if socialist sentiments are to be translated into election success. Istanbul students, at first glance a monolithic leftist force, are in fact divided. Much of what appears to be leftist sentiment is at root nationalist, raising the possibility that the RPNP under Türkeş may be a force among students equally as strong as the presently active TLP. The only positive aspect in this situation is that they are divided, as the hegemony of either group would not be in the U.S.'s long term interests. The new and as yet undefined İnönü statement that the RPP is to the left of center may stop the drift of some intellectuals from the RPP to the TLP, but is unlikely to win new mass support for the RPP here unless it is accompanied by a grass roots approach heretofore largely lacking.

Istanbul's A-102 of February 4, 1965 reported on the Istanbul "left" as of January 1965. The purpose of this airgram is to comment on some significant aspects of the Istanbul left at the time when Turkey approaches national elections in October.

The definition of left as used herein will not be precisely defined. (The RPP at this time is in the midst of a major disagreement over the meaning of İnönü's statement that the RPP is to the "left of center".) However, for purposes here, left means at least the advocacy of government's playing the major role in economic development, and generally a viewpoint which is doctrinaire, to some degree authoritarian and not necessarily democratic.

A discernable change in the Istanbul left is its having become more "institutionalized" than at any time in the recent past and its tending to coalesce around organizations, principally the Turkish Labor Party, which repeat a fairly limited number of particular if not always precisely defined themes. These themes, played with variations are about what might be expected: exploitation of Turkey's wealth by foreign capitalists, especially the foreign petroleum cartels; interference by foreign, particularly the U.S., governments in the internal affairs of Turkey in order to facilitate the further

exploitation of Turkey by foreign companies; Turkey's being a satellite of the U.S. and other imperialist nations; impossibility of Turkey's developing under capitalism or with U.S. assistance which is designed to keep Turkey in a subservient position and which only saddles Turkey with huge debts; Turkey's being "sold out" by Turkish businessmen who cooperate with the foreigners. On the "positive" side: the virtues of socialism, national self sufficiency, and an "independent" foreign policy.

The major reason for this coalescing is precisely the reason of elections and the participation of the TLP as a full fledged political party in them. For the TLP to make a decent showing in the elections it must mobilize all the resources available to it. Getting votes in an election is entirely another matter from getting a newspaperman, professor or student leader to parrot the party position on a particular issue. The TLP wants and has been quite successful in getting volunteer workers who will go out and canvas for votes. As the party looks for workers, many persons who have been grouped in the heretofore amorphous left find that they must make a choice now if they are to share in what will in all probability be the first small victory of the left. Of course, most will show their preference only by casting their ballots for the TLP in October, but others will join what local JP and RPP politicians have termed a dedicated and hard working group of political workers who function in a highly professional manner.

For those attracted to socialism or the concept of strong state control of economic affairs but who find the TLP too extreme for their liking, the RPP, or a significant wing of it, has now taken positions on many issues which, while not basically different from those of the TLP, have the benefit of coming from respected public figures in an established and respected party. However, in the case of youth this can be as much a disadvantage as an advantage, since the appeal of the left to youth is to a very great degree emotional.

Press

Sentiments of a generally leftist nature find expression in a number of Istanbul dailies, most particularly *Akşam* and *Cumhuriyet*, neither of which goes so far as to give outright support to the TLP although *Akşam's* Çetin Altan and *Cumhuriyet's* İlhan Selçuk are both avowed socialists and repeat the TLP line in their columns.

Çetin Altan remains the lion of the left, idolized especially by those leftist students and other "intellectuals" least deserving of the name. It is impossible to say that Altan's influence has declined, first because it was

never measurable, and second because the issues with which he constantly deals imperialism, capitalism, anti-Americanism, socialism, etc. are more popular than ever. However, the writings of others more intelligent and more coherent if not always more dedicated to the truth than he on the same subjects are now common in the left leaning press. As the issues are widely and freely discussed by students, professors and politicians, including moderate leftists, it becomes more and more difficult for him to preserve the image he has worked so hard at creating of the brave fighter for justice standing alone against the combined onslaught of the capitalists, imperialists and "sold men."

Altan has been and remains influential in attracting people, especially youth, to the leftist cause. But it is the very naïve of which there is unfortunately a plethora who see him as providing all the answers. Altan remains popular with many because they enjoy his slashing vitriolic attacks, but the more sophisticated realize that others are better qualified to expound the theory and practice of a leftist rise to power. And also many admirers begin to find his constant repetition of the same stale ideas just plain tiring.

Altan himself has become somewhat "institutionalized" if not in fact at least in the minds of the public. There are persistent rumors that he will run for Parliament as an independent on the TLP ticket. Whether or not these rumors turn out to be true, Altan is tied in the minds of many with the TLP.

Much the same thing can be said for İlhan Selçuk. It is perhaps unjust, but Selçuk who is probably Altan's intellectual superior and certainly far more sincere is generally regarded as Altan's "little brother", a situation enhanced by Selçuk's picking up and elaborating on Altan's themes in his own column a couple of days after they appear in Altan's.

The anti-left press is another story. Suffice it here to say that leftist charges are now being countered and the response is receiving a degree of press coverage in moderate, not professionally anti communist, papers often equal to the original charge. Additionally, some newspapers now shy away from printing the more irresponsible leftist charges if not from conviction, then from financial considerations. The effect has not been to diminish the amount of leftist material circulating but rather to restrict it somewhat to a number of publications, some daily, some weekly, with the reputation of being "socialist" or "leftist".

Youth

In speaking of youth and politics, one thinks immediately of the students of Istanbul University and Istanbul Technical University and the

organizations which purport to represent them. As a professor at Istanbul University active in student affairs recently told the reporting officer: "The potential of the students for influencing affairs is tremendous. Thank God they're divided". As mentioned, irresponsible and extremist writers such as Çetin Altan have their most fanatical following among university students. Leftist slogans and fuzzy concepts abound. Anti-U.S. sentiment runs high. However, genuine doctrinaire Marxists don't predominate. Most of the leftist slogans are at root nationalist slogans. Beginning with the present Cyprus problem the leftist press has consistently exploited the nationalist issues starting with U.S. "desertion" of Turkey. From this point anything American became suspect and the idea of Turkey exploited by foreign capitalists quickly took root in a xenophobic youth fed from the earliest years on nationalism and eager to find a scapegoat for Turkey's inability to surmount her problems inside or outside of the country. It should be noted that even in the speeches and writings of those farthest to the left, Turkish businessmen are seldom attacked because they are capitalist exploiters but because they are "sold men", the lackies of the foreign exploiters. Their sin therefore is not exploiting the poor, but the much more heinous offense of betraying the sacred Turkish nation. This distinction is made here not to minimize the considerable strength of the "socialists" but to partially explain why the apparently solidly leftist student body is not a monolithic force. Only one of the major student organizations, the Turkish National Student Federation (TMTF) is presently under the leadership of a person, Ahmet Ketenci, who might legitimately be asked on the basis of his statements and actions if he is a communist. The TMTF is Turkey's largest student organization but Ketenci, although he has used the organization name to endorse various leftist and "anti-imperialist" causes is by no means secure in the presidency. His term of office expires in the early Fall and though he has stated his intention of running for another term, he will probably not be re elected short of engaging in some highly questionable maneuvering.

The other two largest organizations, the Turkish National Student Union (MTTB) and the Istanbul University Students Union (İÜTB) are in the hands of "nationalists". Although neither leader is in any sense pro U.S., they cannot be termed communist and in fact probably derive some financial support from the JP.

The TLP is organized at Istanbul University. The number of actual members is not known but is not believed to be great. On the other hand the number of students willing to support the TLP on a "nationalist" issue is considerable.

A professor at Istanbul University has termed the takeover of the RPNP by Türkeş as significant in terms of winning students away from the TLP and the far left. According to his analysis a large number of students who are basically anti communist, but strongly nationalist and searching for an emotional cause will be attracted to Türkeş because he is both nationalist and "socialist" without however being in any way communist tainted, but on the contrary anti-communist.

Working Class

Leftist ideas do not originate among the working classes, nor and this is more difficult to judge do the more extreme views get a mass following amongst the poorer classes. A Justice Party source has said that the greatest asset of the Justice Party in combatting the spread of the influence of the TLP among workers and gece kondu dwellers is the person of TLP leader Mehmet Ali Aybar. Aybar is widely known as an extremist, if not an actual communist, and the Justice Party is therefore able to portray the TLP as communist. While the socialist doctrine of the TLP might find and there are indications that it does find a degree of sympathy amongst workers, the dislike of communism keeps the TLP from getting much active support at this time. The same JP source said that if the TLP had at its head, say a moderate professor of high stature and was able to portray itself as a responsible labor party along the British line, then it would be a real threat to the JP and to the RPP and NP in the fight for workers' votes. It is at this point that one encounters what is perhaps the greatest unknown of the forthcoming elections in Istanbul. To what extent will workers and gece kondu dwellers, while publicly eschewing the TLP, lend their votes to that party in the privacy of the voting booth? It is in any event clear that this is the last major election in which the votes of the gece kondu dwellers will be secured by promises of water, electricity, sewerage and a job for cousin Ali newly arrived from Erzurum. The JP thinks they can hold the line in this election, the RPP itself being bled of intellectuals and some party administrators think the JP will lose heavily to the TLP. Some of the older JP officials tend to dismiss the threat, saying that the gece kondu dwellers are firmly tied to the old values and with a greater affinity for their home villages than for the city. The younger party men realize that this is an illusion, and that they may squeak by this time, but that a doctrine, not just the cry of "communist", will have to be found if the workers are not to be won over to the doctrinaire and authoritarian socialist views of the TLP or another party of the far left.

RPP and the Left

The recent, and as yet undefined, İnönü statement that it is to the "left of center" is (aside from internal party politics) obviously an attempt to prevent the defection of intellectuals to the TLP and to win new adherents amongst those committed to leftist ideas or longing for an easy solution to Turkey's problems. This move may serve to prevent intellectuals already established here as members of the "elite" from deserting the RPP for the uncharted waters of a future with the TLP. However, it is doubtful if this new line will have the necessary emotional appeal to attract those who are convinced that the answers to Turkey's many problems are to be found in a "socialist" solution. The RPP may change its mask, but it is known and will continue to be known as a party influenced if not controlled by those with vested interests. Therefore the RPP cannot be counted on by the impatient to take the exhilarating step of moving decisively in a new leftward direction.

As for gaining new mass support with a more leftist doctrine, it is likely to remain an illusion in Istanbul until the RPP adopts the sort of grass roots approach which will enable the party to establish real rapport with the voters.

For the Consul General

Nicholas M. Murphy
American Vice Consul

RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-66, Political and Defense, File POL 12 TUR 7/1/65, Box 2754.

III

DOCUMENTS CONCERNING DOĞAN AVCIOĞLU AND THE *YÖN* JOURNAL

To: Department of State
From: American Embassy, Ankara

December 29, 1961
Subject: Publication New Weekly *Yön*

On December 20 new weekly newspaper (24 pages, tabloid size) *Yön* (Direction) appeared.

Masthead names only Doğan AVCIOĞLU (formerly with *Akis* and RPP Research Bureau) as both owner and editor. Editorial offices are in Ankara but paper printed on *Vatan* presses in Istanbul.

First issue gives commanding prominence to two-page declaration on Turkey's economic development which runs as follows:

1. Atatürk reforms, democracy, education and social justice can only be achieved through rapid economic development. To extent we approach western level of production we can achieve westernization the goal of Atatürk reforms.

2. Essential that teachers, writers, politicians, trade unionists, entrepreneurs and managers – those who are in position to be able to give direction to Turk society reach agreement on basic outlines particular development philosophy.

3. As starting points our philosophy we consider it essential to mobilize all resources, to plan economic life as whole, to bring social justice to masses and to award them democracy. This can be done by understanding of new statism. Economic system that takes its impetus frm private enterprise, permits development at too slow a pace, increases injustice in income distribution, emphasizes profit rather than national benefit. Even in West, which had suitable conditions and colonies, development was slow, wasteful and burdensome and not based on popularly elected govts. Western socialists agree.

4. We understand the new statism as being conscious intervention of the State when clearly required to reach aforesaid aims. Recommended industrial, commercial and agricultural cooperatives, state guidance of

investments, elimination profiteering, educational mobilization, revival Village Institutes, strengthened unions, land reform.

Paper names over 100 signers this declaration and asks others to write in. In printed names younger members faculties, particularly Ankara Political Science Faculty, journalists and writers predominate, but trade unionists, natural senators, few deputies, civil servants also named. For example Alev COŞKUN (Constituent Assembly member), Oktay EKŞİ (journalist), Bahir ERSOY (trade unionist), Vehbi ERSU (natural Senator), Turan GÜNEŞ (defeated RPP candidate), Suphi KARAMAN (natural Senator), Nusret KARASU (former Minister of Health), Coşkun KIRCA (RPP Istanbul Deputy), Mehmet Ali KIŞLALI (journalist), Şükrü KOÇ (RPP Aydın Deputy), Sami KÜÇÜK (natural Senator), Mahmut MAKAL (author), Naim TİRALİ (RPP Giresun Deputy), Seyfettin TURHAN (journalist), Turgut YEĞENAGA (former RPP Deputy).

Other articles include editorial titled "Let's Tighten Our Belts But First, Social Justice", one describing 14 as misinformed but well intentioned socialists, another accusing Mehmet Baydur (Turkish Ambassador Germany) of misusing his authority while Minister of Commerce, also mildly scornful comment on US policy toward Red China, comment that West fails understand underdeveloped countries' need for aid views matter only as political necessity tries get away with least possible.

Comment:

General tone of paper consonant with attitudes younger RPP members and junior university staffs. Declaration and editorial both emphasize social justice to a noticeably greater extent than democracy. Concept has two aspects, helping the unfortunate, restraining the exploiters.

Sponsorship of *Yön* not yet clear to Embassy. Obviously its economic views more palatable to some RPP elements than to any JP elements. But such signers of Declaration as Embassy officers have talked to deny paper has any party connection. (These signers remarkably ignorant paper's antecedents and claim know no more than that Doğan Avcıoğlu is publisher and editor.) First issues ads, which could give some indication financing, are from banks, *Vatan* paper's printer, Koç, and two almost full page ones from companies owned by M. Osman TATARLI – Istanbul importer and manufacturer.

Editors of *Yön* clearly see Turkey's major problem as that of economic development and presumably signers of Declaration concur. In text of Declaration itself editors invite discussion on its suggestions. So staff and signers do not necessarily view each item there in as undebatable. However,

they probably unite in desiring an emphasis on statism, though here too there may well be differences in degree.

Paper's economic thinking definitely socialist oriented, and tinged with egalitarianism. Attitude toward West one of admiration in the abstract but touched with chauvinism in particular instances.

Placing overwhelming emphasis on the undeniably severe economic problems and stressing the state's role in their solution not likely leave much room for encouraging development political democracy. In fact tone is non democratic in its emphasis on classes who can lead public. Foreign affairs given little place in this thinking which, coupled with normal nationalism evident in intellectual circles, probably tends towards down-playing importance Türk international commitments.

Yön also striking as an apparently voluntary attempt by individual Turks to evolve a national policy, thus contrasting strongly with usual tendency admit problem vital but leave solution to others, usually government.

RG59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal Files 1960-63, Box 3094, file 982-61/12-161.

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January 23, 1962

Subject: Two Memoranda of Conversation Which Throw Further Light on the Policies of *Yön*, the New Turkish Paper.

Enclosed is an excerpt of a memorandum of a conversation on January 7 between Turan GÜNEŞ and Second Secretary Tanguy and a memorandum of a conversation on January 6 between Mümtaz SOYSAL and the reporting officer. Both conversations dealt at least in part with the policies and objectives of *Yön*.

In general the two conversations are consistent with each other, but a few divergences should be noted. For example, Soysal might well not consider Güneş to be quite so much a part of the management of *Yön* as Güneş himself apparently does. Soysal was categorical in his statement that he, AVCIOĞLU and EYÜPOĞLU controlled the paper.

Similarly, although it is very much a question of nuance, Soysal seemed of a more doctrinaire inclination than did Güneş.

Although the paper's writers generally have an RPP background, it seemed clear that Soysal at any rate now puts most of his hopes in a new party. This view has also been stated by Avcioğlu in articles in which he condemns all existing parties as incapable of representing the peasants and workers.

For the Ambassador,

Robert G. Barnes
Counselor of Embassy

Memorandum of Conversation

Participants: Turan GÜNEŞ and C.R. Tanguy – January 7, 1962

..... Güneş indicated that he continued to be pleased with the public's acceptance of *Yön*, with which he is associated. He said that they had run off an additional ten thousand copies of the first issue since the initial printing of 40.000 copies proved to be inadequate. Anticipating a drop in sales because of a loss of novelty appeal they had printed only 25.000 copies of the second edition, but once again this proved inadequate. Therefore, they were printing 30.000 copies of the third issue. Güneş said that if they could maintain a sales level at between 25 and 30.000 copies this would be quite gratifying. He noted in this connection that the weekly news magazine *Akis* sold only about 10.000 copies. Güneş said that the purpose of *Yön* was to popularize the idea of pragmatic socialism as a doctrine and had no use for the Marxist/Leninist brand of socialism. They did believe, however, that in Turkey's present economic situation strong government leadership was necessary in order to modernize and expand the economy. In this connection he noted once again that top priority should be given to improving the condition of the peasants; relatively speaking, Turkish workers in the towns and cities were not so badly off.

The ensemble of Güneş' remarks to me suggested to me that *Yön* is strongly influenced and perhaps controlled by those RPP members who are particularly interested in economic questions and who have carried their thinking a little further than have most of their colleagues on the possibilities of an updated, expanded etatism. With regard to the content of *Yön*, Güneş,

who also writes for *Hür Vatan*, said that he was generally satisfied, although he and some of his friends felt that a few of the articles expressed a radical or extremist point of view not in keeping with the paper's non-doctrinal approach to economic and social questions.

Memorandum of Conversation Participants; Muntaz Soysal and T.N. Metelaf-January 6, 1962.

At the Ambassador's reception on January 6 I met and had a long conversation with Mümtaz SOYSAL.

Soysal, who is on the staff of the Faculty of Political Science, is a man in his early 30's, very neatly dressed and an engaging conversationalist. He is impressively alert and intelligent. He speaks excellent English, as far as I could tell under the circumstances, without accent. (I believe Soysal was educated at Galatasaray and the London School of Economics. I am told that he speaks good French and Italian, as well as English, and that he is now studying German. He spent several months at Princeton in the summer of 1960)

Speaking of *Yön*, Soysal said that he, AVCIOĞLU and Cemal Reşit EYÜPOĞLU (lawyer, defeated RPP candidate for senator from Trabzon and former member of the Constituent Assembly) constitute the management of the paper. As Soysal and Eyüpoğlu both have jobs that are in some respects government employment, only Avcioğlu appears on the paper's masthead. Actually, the three of them are joint owners of the paper. All the funds necessary to start the paper came from Eyüpoğlu, and the other two are paying him back from the revenues they earn from the paper's sale.

They had planned to publish *Yön* some time last fall, Soysal said, but they delayed its publication until mid December to assure that it would hit the market at the time when the reading public was no longer preoccupied with elections and the maneuvers leading to the establishment of the coalition government. The group had hopes for sales of 15 to 20,000 copies a week, but to date, their fondest hopes had been exceeded as sales were running at 35,000. In connection with question of sales, I had asked him why the third issue of the paper published a two page review of what sounds like an attempt to capitalize rather sensationally on the Kinsey report, a novel entitled "The Chapman Report". Soysal said only "We want to sell". This is perhaps the reason for this review. The only other one I could conceive of was a desire to show Americans in a bad light.

Soysal and his two partners apparently view *Yön* as the first step in the establishment of a new political party. He mentioned the Social Security Party (Sosyal Güvenlik Partisi) as a possible name. He said that one of the most difficult problems in establishing this party was that they wished it to be one that appealed to both labor and peasants, and that, therefore, it could not be identified with any maneuver designed merely to assure higher wages or higher prices for agricultural products. The labor movement would have to be convinced that it could only benefit itself in the long run by avoiding stress on wage increases at present. Hence, the party's aims were to be economic development and social justice, the latter being considered to comprehend those social measures which would benefit labor and/or the peasantry without seeming to give one group undue advantage over the other.

We did not have much time to talk about statist bias of *Yön*, but when I mentioned that it seemed to me that perhaps the Turkish peasant or the Turkish workers tends to expect too much from the State and to take too little action to help himself, Soysal said "We are trying to take advantage of this tendency. The peasant has an expression 'baba devlet' (father state) and since that attitude is there, we want to use it."

Soysal mentioned incidently that Avcioglu has now left the RPP Research Bureau and is working full time for *Yön*.

RG59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal Files 1960-63, Box 3094, file 982-61/1-262.

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To: Department of State
From: American Embassy, Ankara

Confidential

October 6, 1966
Subject: Lack of Cohesion in the Turkish "Left"

SUMMARY

Aside from those elements of the Republican Peoples Party (RPP) which can legitimately be considered among the "organized left" in Turkey, the Turkish Labor Party (TLP) and, for lack of a better name, "the Doğan Avcioğlu group" represent a large part of the remainder. Avcioğlu, through his own vehicle, *Yön* magazine, recently issued a challenge to the TLP (and to a lesser extent, the RPP) to engage in an open discussion of "the role of socialism in Turkey". In apparent violation of party discipline, many TLP members have responded to Avcioğlu's call and have written articles which have appeared in *Yön* expressing opinions ranging from absurd comments to thoughtful articles. At the same time, Avcioğlu's supporters have written generally more articulate articles presenting the views of the non TLP left. The debate is probably of interest to *Yön*'s readers and may even have boosted *Yön*'s circulation. (This possible motivation on the part of Avcioğlu has not escaped the notice of a number of observers.) The debate has also brought completely into the open the basic differences and jealousies which divide the intellectual left.

Over the past few months, Doğan Avcioğlu, editor and principal contributor to the far left weekly, *Yön*, has instigated a somewhat heated debate over the role of the political left in Turkey. In *Yön* of June 17, Avcioğlu wrote an article expressing some of his own views on "the role of socialism in Turkey", indicating how his views differed from the apparent position of the TLP and inviting rebuttal from members of that party and from the interested public in general. Avcioğlu is reported to have said later that he intended to "invite a debate which would defend socialist goals and the use of socialist methods in Turkey". He reportedly added that he is "not sure whether socialism belongs in the hands of the TLP or some other political party" and expressed the hope that the discussion would provide insights into that specific matter.

The TLP's initial and official response to Avcioğlu's suggestion was to ignore it. His challenge to the TLP's leadership was ascribed to "sour grapes" stemming from the fact that he had failed to jump on the bandwagon earlier and therefore could now only enter the TLP as an "ordinary member". One TLP adherent remarked to an Embassy officer that Avcioğlu is regarded by the party as an "opportunistic socialist" who, by nature, finds it difficult to subordinate himself to anyone. Avcioğlu's past proclivity for criticizing specific areas of the TLP's effort was noted, as was the mutual dislike existing between AYBAR and ALTAN on the one hand, and Avcioğlu on the other. TLP observers, together with many of more reliable credentials, did not hesitate to note that Avcioğlu's call for a debate may be a circulation gimmick.

But some TLP members did not get the word. Within two weeks, *Yön* had begun printing rebuttal from a number of party adherents. In the following

weeks there have been a number of signed articles submitted by TLPers ranging from ordinary members, through provincial officers, university docents, and one not very well known national committee member. The rebuttal has ranged from indignant and semi literate to the ethereal, both in content and prose. While the debate thus far has resulted in the discussion of a number of random ideas ranging from the evils of capitalism to definition of the proletariat in Turkey, two recurring themes can be noted. The first, which appears in a highly esoteric fashion, revolves around differences in interpretations of the writings of Marx and Lenin as updated by certain modern Soviet and eastern European writers. The second theme, which appears quite frequently, seeks to determine whether the TLP is truly a labor party and therefore qualified to speak on the behalf of Turkey's workers.

In the interim, Avcıoğlu has continued to expound his further views on the economics and politics of socialism, and his effort has been augmented by a long article on the origins of the socialist movement in Turkey and the schisms therein. This latter article, which pointed out that *Yön* is not a TLP organ, was authored by the recently beaten (Embassy's A-147) İlhami Soysal, also from *Yön*'s stable of writers. The rebuttal is continuing to pour in from TLP adherents, and RPP Deputy Coşkun Kırca has even found it necessary to answer an Avcıoğlu article on the RPP's economic posture (Embassy's A-168). Kırca, however, used the daily newspapers *Milliyet* and *Ulus* as his platforms, rather than responding through the pages of *Yön*.

Possibly the most interesting aspect of the forum to date, has been the exchange between Avcıoğlu and Fethi Naci. Naci is a former TLP member (possibly expelled) and a regular contributor to *Yön*. With this background, Naci had been considered by many as one of the non TLP or non affiliated leftists, and therefore, possibly sympathetic to the views of the "Avcıoğlu group". Naci, however, took Avcıoğlu to task at considerable length over the latter's "misinterpretations" of Marxist theory. In an earlier article Avcıoğlu had discoursed on applied Marxism Leninism and the role of the middle class. Naci in his rebuttal wrote that Avcıoğlu is inconsistent in his writings and only presents such theories as will support his given argument. Avcıoğlu found it necessary to rebut the rebuttal in the same issue.

In its September 23 issue, *Yön* severely criticized the TLP's forthcoming national convention which only 53 members are scheduled to attend. In its attack, *Yön* decries the "lack of democracy" within the TLP and insinuates that the TLP has yet a way to progress before it can convincingly be called a going organization. And so it continues.

Comment

Avcioğlu and *Yön* have, in the past, consistently adhered to the policy of support for the TLP in the most general sense and when it suited, but have assiduously avoided giving the impression that *Yön* is a TLP organ. In following this policy, *Yön* and the TLP have naturally united in criticizing the Government and the actions of the United States. *Yön* has also made its pages available to RPP and CNU spokesmen who wish to say something which corresponds with its general policy lines, and it has been the most popular forum for many "unaffiliated" leftist writers from the fields of education, economics, etc. While the current debate emphasizes the differences which exist between the various leftist elements, it is safe to assume that these elements are still united in their pro socialist, anti JP Government, and anti U.S. / NATO views.

Doğan Avcioğlu himself, reportedly has expressed the view that a "Nasserist type socialist regime" is best suited to Turkey's current situation and needs. Avcioğlu feels it is foolish to expect that the current legal government, or any government which is likely to be elected within the foreseeable future will address itself to the real needs of the people while holding the conviction that the only government which can fulfill the economic, social, and political needs of the Turkish people is a socialist government. Therefore, it is a socialist's duty to work for the establishment of a socialist regime, and such a regime can only be established through a coup or revolution. A popular revolution is out of the question, since the masses have yet to be educated. The only solution is a military coup, followed by the establishment of a "Nasserist type" government, and Avcioğlu is said to be committed to, and possibly working actively toward this end. This point of view, reportedly shared by Avcioğlu and his associates, is one of the points of contention between the unaffiliated "group" and the TLP. The TLP is believed to be split itself between those committed to the ideology of evolutionary socialism and a more impetuous group demanding the installation of a socialist regime by any means. TLP President General Mehmet Ali Aybar, despite his apparent militancy at times, reportedly is committed to evolutionary socialism. He allegedly has told confidants that if voted out of office, he would be perfectly willing to step down. However, some months ago he did not expect to be voted out of office. To the contrary, he was expressing the optimistic view that the TLP would be voted into power within the next 15 to 20 years. The dissenters, or the revolutionaries, within the TLP probably are closer to the position held by Avcioğlu.

It is not possible to determine, at this juncture, which faction might be winning within the TLP. Since Aybar remains in his party post, and since there is no indication that he has changed his position, we assume that the party remains in the hands of evolutionists. There have been indications from the TLP youth organization that such remains the official party position. Avcioglu's call to debate may be connected with the known split within the TLP, or as his detractors would have one believe, with circulation or personal ambitions. In any event, Avcioglu's call, and the subsequent response by TLP members and others, has brought to public attention the long standing lack of cohesion within the left.

Hart

RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-1966, Political and Defense, POL 12 TUR 1/1/66, Box 2754.


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To: Department of State
From: American Embassy, Ankara

July 12, 1967
Subject: demise of *Yön*

During the first week of July the far left weekly *Yön* announced that it was ceasing publication as a weekly and would subsequently appear as a daily. As yet, there has been no sign of its reappearance in any form and most political observers now conclude that it has passed from the political scene. Even such frequent contributors as İlhan Selçuk eulogized *Yön* as a creature of the past which pioneered in introducing new concepts and in discrediting outworn taboos. Pro-RPP *Kim* stated that *Yön* occupied an exceptional place in Turkey's political history as the vanguard of certain concepts which set the direction towards better social and economic conditions. Pro-JP *Yarın*, on a less charitable note, stated that *Yön*'s closing down was caused by lack of readership and because there was a split in the leftist movement. JP and GP sources state that what has been known as the *Yön* group will probably try to infiltrate the left of center RPP through such avenues as *Kim* so that it can eventually mold the RPP into what this group considers a truly socialist



party. Such statements may be largely aimed at discrediting the RPP and its left of center leaders and yet, in the light of the support which *Yön* has given to Secretary General Bülent Ecevit in the past, such a move is possible. Certainly the *Yön* group may be expected to continue to express their political views and to carry on their activities in some form. This group played a decisive role in achieving what has often been termed as the acceptability of the left in Turkey. The reporting officer, recalling the first issue of *Yön* in December 1961, highlights below a few aspects of *Yön's* controversial and eventful five and a half year life.

Yön's first issue appeared on December 20, 1961 and is most remembered for its Manifesto signed by 150 leading left-wing intellectuals (whose number eventually reached over 1.000) and included most of the country's well known leftist writers, novelists, politicians, and professors, as well as two life senators and persons such as Coşkun Kırca of the newly formed Güven Party. The Manifesto did not use the word socialism but neostatism. It called for an authoritative development plan, stating that because private enterprise was motivated by profitmaking it could not achieve a steady development. Viewed by today's standards of leftist parlance, the Manifesto was not very left wing but for the Turkey of 1961 it was a bold step. The nucleus of what became known as the *Yön* group were RPP Deputy Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu (Istanbul), Political Science Professor Mümtaz Soysal, and well known leftist writer (at that time Research Director of Türk-İş), Doğan Avcıoğlu.

At the time of *Yön's* appearance the TLP existed in name only and the words leftism and socialism were generally equated with communism and Moscow stooge. In the first issue Avcıoğlu was courageous enough to say, "In the second half of the 20th century the only way to develop is with socialism." By boldly printing such statements, *Yön* made a revolution in Turkish politics. It was often closed down by the various İnönü coalition governments. The JP never took any legal action against it.

After the October 1965 elections, *Yön* began to differ from time to time with the TLP. In the summer of 1966 Doğan Avcıoğlu launched a campaign against this party's administration which developed into a split on the leftist front and probably was a critical cause of the downfall of *Yön*. A-203 traces the history of the lack of cohesion in the Turkish left which for convenience may be divided into (1) elements of the RPP, (2) the TLP, (3) and for lack of a better name, the Doğan Avcıoğlu Group. In the summer of 1966, Avcıoğlu issued a challenge to the TLP, and to a lesser extent to the RPP, to engage in an open discussion of the role of socialism in Turkey. In apparent violation of party discipline, many TLP members responded to

Avcıoğlu's call and wrote articles which appeared in *Yön* during the summer and autumn of 1966 expressing opinions which ranged from absurd comments to thoughtful articles. Avcıoğlu's supporters generally wrote the more articulate articles presenting the views of the non-TLP left. The debate brought completely into the open the basic differences which divided the intellectual left. As the debate on the socialist strategy came to an end in the October 14 issue of *Yön* (A-239), Avcıoğlu pointed out in an attempt to show some unity, that "socialism is good and capitalism is bad." However, he explained that the TLP was promoting socialism in an antiquated fashion, that it had been remiss in not mobilizing and utilizing nationalist forces in the struggle and had not been able to define or come to terms with the class structure in Turkey, an imperative for the coming revolution. The JP was generally pictured as the stooge of the capitalist powers, particularly the USA. In characterizing the *Yön* - TLP controversy, JP Deputy Aydın Yalçın told the reporting official in December 1966 that the *Yön* group favored the Chinese type of communism (which Yalçın termed one favoring more immediate revolution and was hardline), whereas the TLP favored the Soviet variety of communism which Yalçın viewed as more gradual and included coexistence.

On January 3, 1967, a new weekly *ANT* made its debut on the Turkish political scene and has come to be regarded as the spokesman of the TLP replacing the former TLP organ *Sosyal Adalet*. Much of the former *Yön* readership is reported to have shifted to *Ant*. Soon after the appearance of *Ant*, the RPP weekly *Kim* (published by Orhan Birgit, a member of the RPP Administrative Board) which had been sliding more to the left since the RPP Convention of October 1966, began to feature articles as pro-left as many which were being published in *Yön*. It is, therefore, not too surprising that many persons now speculate that various former *Yön* contributors such as Avcıoğlu, İlhami Soysal and İlhan Selçuk might be given positions on *Kim*.

The first issue of *Yön* in December 1961 ran 20,000 copies which were sold the first day and its second issue came out in 50,000 copies. For five years, *Yön* was a popular mascot for students who carried it on buses and seemed to make a point of reading it in public or quoting it in conversations. Its popularity began to drop sharply in 1967 and its most recent circulation was estimated at below 15,000. Even so, its sudden closure seemed unduly abrupt and many political observers caution that the whole story of this closure is not yet known. *Yön*'s demise can hardly be mourned by Americans who were the favorite targets of distorted reporting. By giving the left in Turkey a voice and a vehicle, however, *Yön* in a somewhat perverted way made a contribution toward a more open society in Turkey.

RG59 General Records of the Department of State – General Foreign Policy Files
1967-69, Box 394. PP9 TUR XP POL 12 TUR

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To: Department of State
From: American Embassy, Ankara

4 November, 1969
Subject: Appearance of first issue of *Devrim*

The initial issue of Doğan Avcioğlu's new weekly journal *Devrim* appeared on October 21. Utilizing an eight-page newspaper format, the first issue reportedly had a press run of 50,000 although we doubt that anywhere near that number was sold at TL 1.50 per copy. The actual printing was done on the Ankara presses of *Hürriyet*.

The cast of characters is a familiar one. Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu is listed as the owner and Avcioğlu as the publisher. Uluç Gürkan, a former president of the Political Science Faculty Students Union, is listed as the managing editor. Columns by İlhami Soysal, İlhan Selçuk and Çetin Altan appeared in the first issue and apparently will be a regular feature. There was a poem by Fazıl Hüsnü Dağlarca (who recently refused an award from the University of Pittsburgh), and short articles by Muammer Aksoy and Altan Öymen of *Cumhuriyet*. Several less familiar names appeared as well, but our records place them in the category of Turkish Labor Party functionaries and/or "reformed" communists. Turhan Selçuk provided some unsigned but very distinctive cartoon work.

The general tone of the first issue was that of anti-American, anti-"imperialism", pro-"completely independent Turkey" diatribe. Like its predecessor *Yön*, however, the quality of the writing and production is good and the format and layout is attractive. The principal article, occupying the entire back page and authored by Avcioğlu, was billed as "Devrim's Declaration." This article intends to tell the reader exactly what is wrong with Turkey and vaguely states what might be done in the nature of "changing the order" and bringing about a more satisfactory system. The general ideas were originally presented in Avcioğlu's recent book, *Turkey's Order*. The remainder of the issue contained for the most part a re-hashing of old familiar

themes presented in a lively fashion. Most of these themes are familiar from the pages of *Akşam*, *Cumhuriyet* and even *Yön*.

A translation of *Devrim's* Declaration is enclosed for your information.

DEVIRIM – No. 1, October 21, 1969

DEVIRIM'S DECLARATION

An Obscure Course:

Post-election Turkey is again the same Turkey and nothing has changed. Whereas, Turkey is a country which definitely has to change.

We were optimistic in the first years of the Republic despite all difficulties. We believed that before long we would establish a fully independent Turkey and become a nation which had attained contemporary civilization.

The Republic is now approaching its "fiftieth" year. Turkey presents a dark picture:

The secular Turkish State, created out of nothing by Kemalism, is disintegrating due to religious, tribal and sectarian feuds; it is sinking and gradually melting away. Separationist trends are getting stronger. The dauntless politician offers for sale the most sacred values for the sake of votes and irresponsibly incites religious order, tribal and sectarian feuds which destroy the nation.

International oil companies and archaic States at the service of imperialism have mobilized the evil forces with the aim of drawing Atatürk's Turkey again into the net of the supporters of the canonical law who smell of oil, dollars and pounds sterling. The politician who tries to curry favor with evil forces or at least considers it clever to avoid their anger in his anxiety for votes, is directly or indirectly becoming an accomplice of those who want to revive Abdülhamit and Vahdettin's religious order. Thus seeds of bloody fraternal feuds are being sown.

Even political parties with the most progressive outlook seek help from sheiks, aghas, tribal chiefs and middle men who sell sacks full of votes in the political market and take advantage from feudalism and its remnants, sectarian differences and ethnic characteristics. National will, in the hands of national will salesmen, is paving the road to oppression of the people, disintegration and enslavement of the nation.

Economic impasse:

Our era is an era of rapid development. Today it is possible for an under-developed country to make a break-through and attain the level of contemporary civilization within 20 to 25 years. Countries which until yesterday were only provinces of the Turkish State achieved their development in 18-20 years. Small Bulgaria's per capita export is over ten times that of Turkey. While the Republic, approaching its fiftieth year, still relies on the assembly installations of Western firms for manufacture of tractors, Bulgaria, which we underrate, is building tractor factories in India. Third World countries are in a race to attain economic independence and rapid development by building "factories to build factories". Turkey is constantly being left behind in this race.

After close to fifty years of effort since the founding of the Republic, it has only been possible to set up "assembly" and "packing" industries with machinery, raw material, spare parts and technical know how coming from abroad. Such an industry is channeled in general to meet the luxury consumer needs of high income groups and operates with excessive monopolistic profits. This situation has done nothing to secure our economic independence; in fact, it has increased our dependence upon the outside. Our total export revenue is TL 4.5 billion, while import needs of the manufacturing industry alone is far above TL 6 billion. Efforts are being made to close this large deficit by constant begging for loans

Agriculture, still in feudal or semi-feudal state, is far from being modern. Close to 80 percent of operations are dwarf agricultural operations which work under primitive conditions. Usury, a medieval practice, exists with all its intensity. The peasant works not for himself but for the usurer, middleman and agha. Land and forest wealth is being mercilessly destroyed. Erosion is eating up our land. Irrigated lands are becoming barren. It was proclaimed that Turkey would become one of the major wheat exporting countries in the world whereas since 1958 Turkey has been constantly importing wheat from abroad. Turkey, an "agricultural country" is compelled to spend its limited foreign exchange for importation of agricultural commodities in order not to go hungry.

Social Impasse:

In an economy based on backward agriculture and sham industry, social problems, far from being on the road to solution, are on the contrary getting

more difficult. People unable to get their food from the land are flowing into the cities, but it is not possible to secure work and housing for them. Mushroom houses, which numbered 240 thousand in 1960 increased to 465 thousand in 1967, are continuing to increase rapidly. According to official estimates, in 15 years Turkey's population will reach 55 million and half of this population will live in cities. At the present rate big cities will be submerged in mushroom houses and luxurious rich areas will remain as small islands in their midst.

Unemployment in cities is above half a million today. Tomorrow, when close to 30 million people begin to live in cities, industry will have to provide work for at least 4-5 million of them. It is an illusion to think that sickly industry in an unhealthy state of development will be able to provide work for 4-5 million people in 15 years. At this rate millions of unemployed are expected to fill the cities in the near future. On this subject, the authorities concerned, in the hope of sending large numbers of workers abroad, do not have a single serious measure beyond getting into the Common Market. Such authorities are unmindful of the fact that it will make Turkey a common colony and divert Turkey from becoming industrialized and developed.

Impasse in Education and Health:

We are far from having solved the problem of ignorance. According to the second Five-Year Development Plan the number of illiterates in the country will increase in the coming years. The illiterate population will increase from 11.5 million in 1967 to 14 million in 1972 and to 18 million in 1977. Despite this impasse in education, Atatürkist teachers are being oppressed. Greater importance is given to imam-preacher schools than to technical and agricultural schools but poor peasant children have no other means of getting education except for attending these imam-preacher schools. Eyes are closed to the opening of numerous Koran courses with and without permission and even the activities of theological schools (Medrese) in the east. We remain as spectators to the development of private schools of higher learning in an unprecedented and scandalous manner.

Health affairs are in as wretched a state as education. Only a very small section of the population is able to benefit from health facilities. Socialization of medicine has not yielded the expected result. Many doctors prefer to work in foreign countries, or at least in big cities rather than in Anatolia. Brain drain to Europe and America continues. The most valuable scientists needed to raise Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization are going abroad instead of

becoming a stimulating force in national development. The pharmaceutical industry, which has made public health the subject of dishonest trade, is continuing to be a scandal and the citizen is exploited in his sick bed.

Chasm between Rich and Poor:

Injustice in the distribution of revenue is already very great. A small group, made up of aghas, middlemen, usurers, assembly industrialists and comprodors, gets close to one third of the national revenue. The chasm between the poor masses and the luxury and waste of a happy minority is rapidly developing. According to research conducted by the State Planning Organization on distribution of revenue, going at the present rate "in the next ten year period distribution of revenue in Turkey will take a more inequitable form than today". According to the calculations of the State Planning Organization, it has not been possible to tax the fortunate minority in proportion to their revenue and thus remedy the loss of over ten millions in taxes.

Desire for "National Army":

Because of the imbalance in investments and in imports and exports, Turkey for many long years has lived beyond her means. She has been able to maintain this situation by continuing in debt under increasingly heavy terms. Turkish foreign policy is conducted on the principle of finding loans continually. One of the conditions of American aid as clearly specified in "Food for Peace Law" is "to support US foreign policy". For this reason, heavy debts and the constant need for loans considerably limits Turkey's possibilities of pursuing an independent foreign policy despite changing world conditions.

Dependence on foreign economic and military aid entails sacrifice in national defense strategy to the extent that the interests of the donor country do not reconcile with the national interests of the recipient.

Military aid, in the hands of the donor, is always an instrument for interventionist pressure. Cyprus events have bitterly shown the disadvantages of being dependent upon foreign sources for supplies.

Knowing full well that extreme dependence on foreign sources from the economic and military points of view is not in harmony with our national interests, we were nevertheless forced to accept in December 1967 the new NATO strategy which left the security of outer-flank states exposed. In our

anxiety to assure our national security we have undertaken big and perhaps unnecessary risks to protect the interest of the West and the USA. On the other hand, the new strategy makes Turkey's defense by NATO and the USA against a threat from the north even more doubtful than before. NATO and the USA will defend Turkey only to the limited extent which their own interests require. Although this fact is clearly known by civilian military authorities in all its nakedness, excessive dependence upon foreign aid makes it impossible to put into effect a foreign policy and defense strategy which recognizes priority to national interests within the framework of alliances. They feign not to see that Turkey, a shelter for atomic bases involved in conflicts beyond Turkey's will, is being dragged into risks which are not in our national interest.

Under these conditions independence remains only in form and is not in harmony with Atatürk's principle of "full independence" to say the least. Under these circumstances, the desire for a "fully independent Turkey" which comes at the head of the demands of Youth, is a reaction in conformity with Atatürkist tradition. The Republic has been diverted from its Kemalist course both in its internal and foreign policies. Desire for a national army has sprung up as the sole means of salvation from the danger of Turkey losing its historic existence.

Why weren't we able develop?

The main task of reformists (revolutionaries) is to get out of the present shameful situation in the shortest possible time and to realize as soon as possible Kemalism's goal of an independent and developed Turkey.

If Turkey is among under-developed countries today, the basic reason for this is bad distribution and utilization of economic resources. At the cost of the poverty of the masses, close to 1/3 of Turkey's national revenue is in the hands of a small group of 300 thousand people (from a population of over 34 million) comprised of land aghas, big middlemen and usurers, "assembly" industrialists and comprodors etc. If this small group had used an important part of its share from national revenue in productive investments, drawbacks from bad distribution of resources would have been remedied to a certain extent. But the situation is that this small group whom the press has labeled as "fortunate minority" set aside only a very small portion of the resources in their hands for investments. Although it receives over 30 percent of the national revenue, it invests only in the ratio of 5-6 percent of the national revenue. A large part of these investments are directed towards construction of

luxury residences and the likes. The share going towards real industrialization is extremely small. The fortunate minority spends a big part of its revenue at home and abroad. Foreign exchange smuggled out of the country in various ways is used to purchase villas in Europe and to immitate the lives of western millionaries. The fortunate minority who refuse to invest in the country, invest in Europe.

In the country an extensive luxury service sector also is taking shape to accommodate the expenditures of this small group. Luxury hotels, luxury restaurants, gambling places in the guise of clubs, society cocktail bars, fashion houses, night clubs, society clinics, society private schools etc. are being fed with resources in the hands of the fortunate minority. Villas and apartments worth millions, motor-boats, luxury automobiles, lots of servants, and parties are other forms of wasteful consumption of the fortunate minority. An important wing of our dependent and weak industry has developed as luxury consumer industry for the spendings of this group. In this way our poor country, in the hands of the fortunate minority, is spending the funds which should go to heavy industry, electronic industry and chemical industry for luxurious villas, night clubs, expensive automobiles, etc.

How we can develop:

Turkey's rapid development and the solution of her increasingly grave social problems is possible by channelling the resources which are now being wasted to the good of society. If an important amount of the over 30 percent of national revenue in the hands of the fortunate minority were to be channelled to investments in the hands of society, our rate of development could increase to over 10 and even to 15 percent. A ten percent rate of development means a 6.5 fold increase of national revenue in 20 years; 15 percent means 16 fold and realization of development in a reasonably short period.

Only if resources which are wasted today in a manner contrary to national interests are placed at the disposal of the society (its real owner), will it be possible to use them in the most productive manner for the prosperity of the people. Investments could be directed towards basic industry within the discipline of a real plan instead of to luxury housing and assembly industry.

Today one cannot speak of industrialization of a country which can't make the machinery it is using. Without heading towards basic industry a country cannot come to possess modern technology and escape form dependence upon outside help. Basic industry is the requirement of economic and technological independence as much as development. On the other hand,

the provisions of the Constitution on the right of citizens to work, to rest, to have social security and education and health, could be brought to life in an atmosphere of rapid development by channelling resources from luxury services to the needs of the people.

Utilization of resources (which are currently being wasted) for rapid development and social justice should cover all the fields which constitute the fortunate minority's sources of revenue. Nationalization of banks, insurance, foreign trade and assembly industry and a fundamental land reform directed towards the formation of big cooperative farms should be brought about. It is essential above everything else to increase investment resources and to use them in the most productive manner from the good of the society within the framework of a compulsory plan. Thus, by securing rational distribution and use of resources in the economic plan, a change of order will have been realized in the areas of development, social justice and full independence.

Kemalist reform has been left unfinished:

A change of order would be a reform in the direction of Kemalism. On the subject of attaining the level of contemporary civilization, it is a fact that after the War of independence there were possibilities of independent development. Atatürk saw that attainment of contemporary civilization would be realized by a change of order through reform and liquidation of medieval institutions in the country and not by becoming the satellite of the West as in the years of Ottoman reforms. Abolition of the sultanate and caliphate and establishment of sovereignty of secular thought based on logic and science in all institutions were superstructural reforms which were undertaken on the road to foundation of a new order. Atatürk did not stop with superstructural reforms, but in order to establish the foundation of change of order he turned to State industrialization and land reform. However, all efforts to bring about the realization of land reform until 1945 were not successful because of the resistance put up by land aghas and their allies. Initial steps taken for the establishment of etatism degenerated after 1945. Thus Kemalist reforms remained unfinished. The duty of Kemalists today is to put a stop to the anti-Kemalist trend; to maintain Kemalist reforms and give them root through infrastructural reforms; to attain the level of contemporary civilization in the shortest possible time; and to achieve the goal of a fully independent Turkey for which Atatürk devoted his entire life.

Coalition of conservative forces:

Today also, any potential change of order is confronted with the powerful resistance of those benefiting from the order in force. While the bourgeoisie in the west liquidated feudal relations by means of land reform brought about with the support of the peasant masses, in Turkey the bourgeoisie is arm in arm with the most reactionary classes such as the land aghas. While the bourgeoisie in the west is strengthening national economic independence, the bourgeoisie in Turkey is acting as the broker for foreign capital. He sees his future not in independence but in foreign capital of advanced capitalist countries.

Thus, was born a conservative forces coalition comprised of aghas, usurers, middlemen, assembly industrialists and compradors which has obstructed Turkey from attaining full independence and full measure of contemporary civilization this so that they can maintain the existing order. This coalition is supported by outside forces and efforts are made to strengthen it in order to keep Turkey in a dependent status for political, economic and military reasons within the system of the capitalist world.

Ballot box democracy:

The adoption of multi-party life and full franchise, instead of weakening the conservative forces coalition and wiping out remnants of feudalism by granting a voice to the large masses, has worked the opposite way during the past 23 years by securing the power of the alliance of conservatives. It was always the conservative forces coalition which came out of the ballot box instead of the masses who earn their living by the sweat of their brow. National will became the will of the fortunate minority. Kemalism was liquidated by means of the ballot box. Religious reaction, subdued by Kemalism but not uprooted because infrastructural reforms had not been realized, found means of developing and spreading within western political system. Religious reactionary forces are mobilized to make the masses forget their real interests and to fortify the rule of the conservative forces. Both the oil companies and imperialism as well as the conservative forces coalition consider conservative religious forces as their natural ally. Thus democracy, which means the rule of the people, has turned into the rule of reactionary forces and imperialism in Turkey.

The western political system, not only in Turkey, but in all under-developed countries with similar social structures, has yielded the same result.

Western political institutions have strengthened the ruling powers backed by conservative forces. The great masses are fully under the economic and ideological control of landlords, usurers and middlemen. But, at the same time, these medieval institutions, even at the cost of excessive exploitation, provide a certain degree of social security to the large masses. A peasant who has business in the city or is in need of money goes to the agha and the usurer. This security machinery binds the votes of the masses to the agha, usurer and middleman. Religious reactionary forces complement the economic sovereignty of the conservative coalition over the masses in the ideological plan. It is for these reasons that elections in Turkey have brought and will continue to bring conservative forces coalitions to power. The 1969 election is the latest example of this.

The impasse of political parties:

Even political parties which came forward with programs for change in the existing order were constantly compelled to give concessions to the conservative forces coalition in order to be able to achieve what little success they could. These parties try to benefit from ethnical characteristics and sectarian differences and in the elections put at the top of their lists the names of candidates from agha, middleman and usurer families in the hope that they will bring votes. Thus, even the political parties which appear to be in favor of change in the present order contribute to the degeneration even in those years when in opposition. If we take into account that the conservative forces coalition has powerful allies both in and outside the country, those parties with claims of a desire to change the present order will be rendered ineffective and compelled to compromise with the conservative coalition should they manage to come to power.

In the initial years of the Republic, Turkey for the first time attempted to apply a western-style political system. That experiment in multi-party life entrusted to the hands of such leaders of the War of Independence as Karabekir, Cebesoy and Orbay, soon brought the young Republic to one of two roads: Either Western political institutions were to be rejected and the ideal of founding a modern Turkey through reforms was to be abandoned, or the caliphate and sovereignty of foreign capital to be accepted again. Liberal Party experiments conducted by Atatürk through his colleagues in whom he had confidence did not yield different results. The third experiment after 1945 developed in the same way along anti-Kemalist lines and as time passes it is becoming more difficult to turn back.

Historic Duty of Kemalists:

Atatürk, who would not abandon the ideal of attaining contemporary civilization in the shortest possible time through reforms conducted in independence for the easily attainable veneer of democratic institutions, adopted single party democracy which gave more importance to substance than to form. The single party set out to liquidate feudal institutions, strengthen independence and mobilize education. From this point of view, Atatürk's single party regime was more democratic than the present so called liberal multi-party regime which has returned the feudal remnants to the foreground and brought back foreign hegemony. However, the single party envisaged by Atatürk as an instrument to achieve the necessary change of order directed towards attaining contemporary civilization was not able to become a real reformist party because our Liberation War depended on the nobility for special historic reasons. The party under the domination of the nobility and conservative bureaucrats, was not able to realize fundamental land reform which would liquidate feudalism and all its remnants. Whenever land reform was taken up a new party was born out of the issue and the old party in turn disowned the land reform it had started thus totally losing its reformist character.

Today, only a reformist party which finds it essential to depend on the organized masses who earn their living with the sweat of their brows, will be able to take the unfinished Kemalist reform to its goal. Such a party could establish a fully independent, civilized and truly democratic Turkey by destroying the economic, political and ideological hegemony of the conservative forces coalition on the masses.

There are also reformists in our country who believe fundamental changes are possible with strong popular support even if reformist cadre's ties with the people are broken off. However, all examples show that unless the driving force of the people is mobilized and directed towards forming a real peoples' administration, such experiments are bound to remain unfinished and sooner or later fall into the hands of the conservative coalition and its powerful foreign allies.

"For the people with the people" and not "for the people despite the people" is the slogan of reformists. The reformist of today will say "halt" to the present anti-Kemalist trend. His task is to establish a civilized, independent and democratic Turkey working hand in hand with the people. He who avoids this task does not deserve the legacy of the National Liberation

War and the distinction of reformist. It is the historic duty of our generation to turn over to the future generation a Turkey worthy of the ideals of the National Liberation War.

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