

# **Resonating in Transition**

The 'Musical' Momentum in the  
Discursive Emergence of Actuality

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# **Resonating in Transition**

The 'Musical' Momentum in the  
Discursive Emergence of Actuality

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*In memoriam Henry E. Allison (1937-2023)*

## Abstract

The aim is to investigate in detail the general anthropologic circumstance that communicative instances can be interventions that change societal actuality. In the course it is established that the inter-relationality of meaning is a substantial precondition of discursivity because the appearance of an object arises from the meaning, we apply to it and thus is a product of human discursive agency. This suggests that the world as it appears to us emerges from a discursive process that is open not only to the persuasive communication of certain meanings but also to negotiating the applicability of meanings.

Because perception is a highly individual process it is important to understand the preconditions and social processes for a holistic intersubjective world to appear before exploring the 'musical' momentum in the discursive emergence of actuality. Without certain a priori entrenched in the human condition and without culture as an ever-transitional spacio-temporal a priori consisting of recursively applied meanings living in a generally coherent world would not be possible.

The exploration of the musical nature of the performative dimension of communication yields the realization that the performance as a means to increase the discursive effect of communication derives the associated behavior from the prelingual social capacity of attunement. The roots of discursive resonance lie in human musicality.

Finally, a model of performative potentiality factors is compiled that is exemplified by the analysis of the performative potentiality of the Udo Lindenberg song "Sonderzug nach Pankow" in the transformation process leading to German reunification.

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# Prelude

The romantic notion that humanity is essential to creation, revitalized by the German idealist's conception of humanity as lifted out of nature and time, a pattern prespecified by the numinous plea to subdue and dominate the world in the book of Genesis, has misled humanity into the inextricable situation of 2022 and needs to be fundamentally revised. The necessity to remove humanity from the throne of creation was expressed already in the 1950s by lyricists like the roman-catholic agnostic and pro-democratic critic of German society, Hans Magnus Enzensberger<sup>1</sup> (November 1929 – November 2022).

As embodied minds we will always be constrained to entropy and reliant on nature and its resources: we are, like everything else, only temporal beings. Still, there is a spark of applicability in Schelling's stance that our indeterminateness distinguishes us.<sup>2</sup> While we cannot be quite sure that our will is as free as we like to think, we are indeed indeterminate in the sense that we are the most adaptable beings, independent from existential dedication to any natural niche. Though this does not lift us out of the ontic, it does create an alienating distance towards it, which we should intend to use for contemplation instead of trying to bridge it by appropriation.

Naturally gifted with awareness, the mandate of our indeterminateness is to experience the world discursively, that is establishing and applying meaning individually and socially where there are merely numb chains of causation – but in anticipation of its mere temporary, provisional applicability, without any sound claim to absoluteness. This fate of being forced to permanently generate temporal actuality by our discursive faculty, is how humanity is captive to its degree of ontic independence; our growing awareness that this our actuality we generate feeds back onto the ontic, unites us, more than anything else, as equal subjects to our common responsibility towards the greater good of life as such beyond us and the here and now.

Fifty years after the dystopic Hollywood science fiction movie “Soylent Green” (Richard Fleischer, 1973) prophesized that untamed carbonized

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<sup>1</sup> See for example Enzensberger's poem: *Ehre sei der Sellerie* (Glory to the celery)

<sup>2</sup> F. W. J. Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom*. Trans. Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt. (Albany: State University of New York Press., 2006). P. 51

human industry would cause global heating and will by today (2022) have led us into a future of not only environmental but also moral and emotional desertification we have to acknowledge that, measured by actual developments since 1972, the motion picture was accurate, possibly not only in its environmental message. Though it appeared to be designed as a contribution to the societal discourse, it was not able to transcend entertainment<sup>3</sup>. Soon almost forgotten, its lead actor, Charlton Heston, turning away from his formerly liberal, anti-racist positions, eventually becoming vice president of the National Rifle Association of the USA (NRA), “Soyland Green” seems to have contributed little to nothing towards achieving a shift in thinking and acting towards decarbonizing economy to prevent the carbon dioxide induced rise of global mean temperature from occurring.

A decade later, in 1983, the pioneer of popular German-speaking rock music, Udo Lindenberg, published his song “Sonderzug nach Pankow” in which he demands rather cheekily – but by far transcending audacity for sheer entertainment – to be allowed to come and play live to his fans in the GDR. For me as a West German twelve-year-old, people-rocker Lindenberg’s congenially balanced expression of humorous and somewhat pally disrespect towards the Chairman of the State Council, Erich Honecker, as the representative of the whole nomenclature of the GDR to the swinging melody of “Chattanooga Choo Choo” (Harry Warren, 1941) substantially formed my view of the politicians of the GDR. When I was studying communication and media as well as political science in the former East German City of Leipzig, venue of the decisive Monday demonstration of 9 October 1989, I remembered that song and started to reflect on the possibility whether it might have contributed to a change in the appearance of the GDR authorities, also on the eastern side of the inner-German border, and might need to be assumed to have resonated especially in the reckless but nonviolent civil resistance of the Monday demonstrations of fall 1989 that manifested the peaceful revolution in East Germany<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> The problem of transcending the entertainment nature of certain media is broadly discussed in: Neil Postman, *Amusing ourselves to death: public discourse in the age of show business* (New York, NY u.a.: Penguin Books, 1986).

<sup>4</sup> Ministerium für Statssicherheit der DDR MFS, “Rechtliche Einschätzung des Liedtextes: Entschuldigen Sie, ist das der Sonderzug nach Pankow von Udo Lindenberg Blatt 148,” in [www.stasi-mediathek.de](http://www.stasi-mediathek.de). Das Bundesarchiv (<https://www.stasi-mediathek.de/medien/rechtliche-einschaetzung-zum-liedtext-sonderzug-nach-pankow-von-udo-lindenberg/blatt/148/>: Bundes Republik Deutschland, 1983).



A similar thought occurred to me with respect to the “Graceland” album that Paul Simon had produced together with South African musicians and its context of Apartheid. As a fifteen-year-old I moved to South Africa in October 1986 and witnessed the »culture of violence« the Apartheid system had spawned, and it was the music of the “Graceland” album that had just appeared with its enthusing cultural crossover character that built a bridge over the troubled waters of my distressing experience of Apartheid-actuality towards the amazingly positive feeling of life many black South Africans fostered despite the violent injustices of the racist system. Might it also have contributed to the – more unlikely than likely – result of developments that the fight against Apartheid and its savage defense did not lead into an outright civil war but to an orderly transformation to democracy as the integrative rule of the majority?

That such performative potentiality, especially of popular music, indeed is an issue in nation-building has been proven again by the decision of the Ukrainian Parliament to ban Russian musicians. In the legislative comment to this law, it was stated that the musical products of the aggressor state (Russia) might inspire separatist tendencies among the Ukrainian people. Russian music might reduce the barrier to adopting a Russian identity and might in this way weaken Ukrainian statehood. Only artists that openly condemn the invasion are excluded from this regulation.<sup>5</sup>

Might this imply that music has a higher potentiality than movies to have an effect on society? While a survey that compares the performative potentiality of music and movies may be worthwhile, this study does not make this differentiation between media of communicative instances. The subtitle “The ‘Musical’ Momentum in the Discursive Emergence of Societal Actuality” is not so much about the medium the chosen example of a communicative instance happens to be in, nor about a music sociological reflection, but it is about the nature of discursivity as a performance that relies on

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The Bundesarchiv comments this legal assessment of the song by the Stasi: Honecker, receiving plenty of irony in the lyrics, had the song banned. Whoever played the “special train” in public risked being arrested. In a legal analysis, Hauptabteilung IX, the investigative body of the Stasi, examined possible criminal offenses that the song lyrics fulfilled. In the paper, options are listed on which legal basis and with what consequences one could take action against musicians or discotheque operators who would play the “Special Train to Pankow”.

<sup>5</sup> Deutschlandfunk Kultur Website, [<https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/ukrainisches-parlament-ver-bietet-russische-musik-in-der-oeffentlichkeit-104.html>] (last viewed 25.10.2023)]

resonance effects by utilizing the quasi-material quality of music to bridge the ontic gap between a sender and the intended receiver of meaning communicated, as will be discussed in chapter 3.

Being aware the above stated hypotheses about the societal effect of the “Sonderzug” song and the “Graceland” album are based on purely subjective experience and might possibly even arise from some kind of wishful thinking, I started to ask the more fundamental question of how it would even be possible for a single communicative instance to have an effect on the conduct of life in a society? Looking into this question, I realized that in order to answer it I first needed to find out how this experienced world that a society establishes and is part of at the same time comes about at all. As a result of this endeavor, this world is here conceptualized as actuality that emerges from discursivity which shares the idea of intersubjectivity well-established by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann with Hartmut Rosa, but in a more specific, less numinous way.

Before carrying on, it needs to be pointed out: Though this study’s title shares the term »resonance« with the title chosen by Rosa, it is completely independent from his delineations and not to be understood as a comment to his approach as its very beginnings date back to 2002. This completely coincidental involvement with Rosa materialized in a conversation over a beer after a lecture he delivered in Leipzig back in what must have been 2014. I took advantage of the opportunity to tell him about my then already more than a decade old dissertation project of assaying the potential of songs to have an effect on social change and mentioned my not yet fully developed concept of the significance of resonance to which he responded by telling me about his next major project of a sociology of resonance, jesting that he obviously needed to speed things up. Well, he obviously did: while it took him just two more years to publish his comprehensive concept of how the world should resonate within us, it took me almost another decade to finalize my proposition investigating how what we say or do sometimes resonates in the world in a way that makes it change in a certain way.

In exploring the interrelation of communication and the world we live in, the here presented study utilizes Kant’s transcendental idealism as the philosophic basis and takes biological findings into consideration, producing a model of discursive actuality that bears significance for an anthropological foundation of communication and media science. This includes:

- a differentiated understanding of the fundamental difference in the way pluralistic and autocratic societies relate to the world

- the development of a triangular epistemological model that poses the fundamental operationalization of the hypothesis of the complexly inter-relational nature of meaning as it poses the base unit in the discursive process and will be central for the account of the emergence of actuality
- a concept of transcendental actuality in an understanding of how societal actuality emerges
- a concept of discursive resonance in its relation to communicative performativity
- the differentiation of six factors in the acquisition of discursive resonance
- a tool for assessing the performative potentiality of a communicative instance by analyzing how it loads the factors of discursive resonance.

Finally, this analysis tool will be exemplified by applying it to Udo Lindenberg's song "Sonderzug nach Pankow" (from now on: the "Sonderzug" song). Did it potentially transcend entertainment and have a societal impact? Did it possibly resonate in the discursive emergence of the developments leading to the peaceful revolution in the former GDR and, eventually, the re-unification of Germany? Regarding these questions, the analysis tool here suggested intends to deliver only potentialities and approximations that can be used for making qualified hypotheses about the impact a communicative instance may have had and may possibly be interpreted as pieces of circumstantial evidence but not as proof or falsification. Acknowledging the self-organizational nature and hyper-complexity of societal emergence it appears categorically doubtful that it is possible to objectively reproduce the effects of specific communicative items in this process as it is impossible to prove the effect of a butterfly's flap in the occurrence of a tornado. Assessing to what degree a communicative instance may have resonated discursively and so impacted the emergence of actuality by analyzing its potentiality of doing so is an inclusive approach as it anticipates that it is always multiple factors that induce a social development and that these factors usually have a large share of pre- or subconscious vectors.

An advantage of this analysis tool is that it can be applied with varying intensiveness. One can start by using it for a qualified initial assessment of a communicative instance that goes beyond intuitive impression. Further-

more, it is not imperative to be in spacio-temporal proximity to the communicative instance in question or the situation that it supposedly impacted in order to generate a qualified hypothesis. This makes it suitable for the study of historic cases as well as for assessing the effectuality of communicative instances in other parts of the world that would take a lot of effort to access.

All this makes this tool particularly applicative for the use in an academic environment for exercising a general understanding of how public communication can have an effect on society as well as of the discursive dimension of human agency in general – especially if realized as a team assignment with the task of discussing the plausibility of all findings in the group and to document these discussions as part of the academic task.

The critical reader may ask: why should a pop song dating from the good old days of vinyl and the uncontested primacy of broadcasting – original and popular as it may have been – have any exemplary relevance in today’s age of streaming and social media? Hasn’t Jürgen Habermas already proclaimed a *nouvelle media* époque by declaring “a new structural change of the public”?<sup>6</sup> The answer must be: it can be assumed that commonly known and as such socially resonating instances of public communication arise since humans have gained the ability of creating mediate publics by aggregating individual attention for »meaning« beyond the immediate spatial and temporal vicinity. Any culture depends on that resource of the human condition. Thus, it can also be assumed: the basic factors of the potentiality of an instance of communication to resonate in such a way that there is a sustained influence on society are the same whatever the original medium of that communicative instance was. Thus, this dissertation does not understand itself as a media scientific study but as a communication scientific one.

The “Sonderzug” song has been chosen as a first example to be analyzed – and not any other, possibly more activist or even more popular communicative instance – because it appeared in the very unique societal actuality of a politically divided people and it is of tractable but significant associative complexity. The fact that it is not an activist song is considered an advantage because relating to it is not a matter of political orientation, instead it is intriguing by its good-humored lyrics that go well with the popular swinging tune of Chattanooga Choo-Choo. Of course, it was mainly the lyrics

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<sup>6</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *Ein neuer Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit und die deliberative Politik*, Originalausgabe, erste Auflage ed. (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2022).

disrespectful towards the GDR's head of state Erich Honecker that got the song banned in the GDR, but these lyrics unfolded their meaning so effectively only in the synthesis with that catchy classic tune from the 'class enemy' USA. The fear that this song might sustainably undermine the authority of the state's nomenclature might not have been completely unsubstantiated.

I would like to thank Kathrin with all my heart for her patience and all her support not only in the three years of the extra-occupational implementation of this thesis, but all the way from the very first beginnings in 2002. I would also like to thank Prof. Arnulf Kutsch for encouraging me already in these beginnings to focus on and explore resonance as a phenomenon in public communication, and I am extremely grateful to Prof. Rudolf Rübsamen for consulting me with respect to the (neuro)biological aspects delineated in this study. Furthermore, I would like to extend my deeply felt gratitude to David Smith and Emma Frey for their dedicated proof reading.

# 1 Read First

## 1.1 Introduction: discursive actuality?

At about 20:30h on Saturday 12 October 2019 a Porsche-driver died when he crashed at high velocity into a cubical rock with the mass of about 3,5t on the German Autobahn A81 not far from Stuttgart. An instant before, that rock had still been resting 22m higher on a not very steep forested slope that was not officially pronounced an area of falling rocks and as such not regularly inspected. It is assumed that the pressure exerted by roots of a tree in the surroundings had lifted the large stone beyond a tipping point so that it started to roll right down to the fast lane. In the misty darkness of autumn, the Porsche pilot had no chance to dodge that massive cube.<sup>7</sup> A lethal freak of nature.

This tragedy of coincidences illustrates a number of things. First of all, it exhibits a merciless intrusion of hard ontic reality into human life. The rock was a true fact with intrinsic consequences for any object highly charged with kinetic energy where not even the most radical constructivism can seriously separate the experience from the ontic cause.

Secondly, it is a striking example of emergence. A complex row of factors came together, synthesizing this situation to occur. The rock had to have a certain shape and had to lie at a certain angle so that the marginal lifting by the root growing right there beneath it pushed it over its tipping point, and on its specific route straight down the woody slope where there were no trees in its way to stop it. Then there was a flat ground, the highway at the bottom of this slope, so that it came to a halt, and it was a German highway without speed limit, which was in this very moment used by a reckless driver stampeding the horsepower of his sports car to a stretched gallop.

Thirdly, the accident illustrates the discursivity of human existence in a drastically densified way. The world we experience emerges from the constant weaving of empiric (outer) and ideal (inner) factors. We live in a world of

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<sup>7</sup> Hy Quan Quach, "Unfallursache: Wurzeldruck brachte Dreieinhalb-Tonnen-Felsen ins Rollen," *Südwestpresse Die Neckarquelle* (Villingen-Schwenningen, Germany), 14.10.2019 2019, [https://www.nq-online.de/lokales/unfallursache-wurzeldruck-brachte-dreieinhalb-tonnen-felsen-ins-rollen\\_50\\_111786819-16-.html](https://www.nq-online.de/lokales/unfallursache-wurzeldruck-brachte-dreieinhalb-tonnen-felsen-ins-rollen_50_111786819-16-.html). [https://www.nq-online.de/lokales/unfallursache-wurzeldruck-brachte-dreieinhalb-tonnen-felsen-ins-rollen\\_50\\_111786819-16-.html](https://www.nq-online.de/lokales/unfallursache-wurzeldruck-brachte-dreieinhalb-tonnen-felsen-ins-rollen_50_111786819-16-.html) Last visited 04.04.2023

meaning as the conceived or experienced relation of forceful consequence between empiric objects. Our existence depends on the applicability of our assessment of the relation of implication between objects. The cubical rock got its tragic meaning of being a lethal barrier for fast traveling vehicles and their occupants from the consequence that it could be expected to have by its mass, its shape, and from where it came to rest in relation to a speeding tin can. It can be supposed the driver realized the inevitably lethal force of the upcoming impact in the instance, having only little time to sorrowfully regret not seriously anticipating the possibility of a hazard lying in the dark and not duly adapting speed to the relation between the reach of the beam of his front lights and the time needed to slow down the car sufficiently.

While matter as such has no intrinsic instance that cares about changing its outer appearance or its composition, it is here postulated that autopoiesis (see 2.2.2) constitutes that instance in living organisms. Whether black holes collide and merge or the earth falls victim to anthropogenic catastrophe, ontic reality is indifferent. And even if there was a metaphysical instance that did care, its existence would be beyond our limits of experience and cognition, as Kant points out in his rejection of metaphysics, implying that any metaphysical assumption is either instructed by personal faith or purely speculative imagination.

In our materiality we are constituted by ontic reality, and we essentially are part of it, but any meaning we experience is constituted by discursivity: the application of our inherent epistemological conditions, issuing from the existential impulse to maintain life, to objects of our environment. The continuous process of judging necessitated by autopoiesis as the self-maintenance of life – which encompasses consciously making provisions for sustaining the conditions for life in case of crises as well as for coming generations – is here viewed as the origin of discursivity and meaning. The world as discursively perceived through the filter of meaning is what is here conceived of as actuality.

To differentiate »actuality« from »reality« is a suggestion of the Austrian philosopher and communication scientist Ernst von Glasersfeld<sup>8</sup> that was originally aimed at the German language where »Wirklichkeit« is a much more commonly used term than »actuality« in the English language. To transfer

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<sup>8</sup> Ernst von Glasersfeld, "Konstruktivismus statt Erkenntnistheorie," in *Konstruktivismus statt Erkenntnistheorie*, ed. Willibald Dörfler (Klagenfurt: 1998). P. 40

this differentiation into the English language seems appropriate and potentially fruitful, however, since as analogue to »Wirklichkeit« the term »actuality« expresses the constitutive dimension of human agency in how people experience, observe, and evaluate their environment. »Actuality« is an emergent spacio-temporal state of the environment generated by conditions given by nature as well as by conditions formed in social interaction in a process of subjective individual apperception that may be described in subjectively differing, sometimes complementary, sometimes contradictory, ways. »Reality« expresses a far more ontological concept in that it literally identifies a state of the environment before an observing person enters the scene. Applying the term »reality« to label a certain description of the state of the human environment as such, proposes an objectivity of perception, a stability of the described state, and the common validity of this description that cannot be claimed because the human environment is ever emergent in its changing natural conditions, in social interaction, and individual perception. Therefore, it seems appropriate to discriminate actuality from reality as Kant discriminated between appearances and things in themselves. Though actuality is the only world available to us as we have no immediate cognition of reality in-itself, existence is not a dream or a video game because we are indeed living in an ontic world that we need to adapt to.

Accordingly, the constitutive differentiation of this study is that between reality and actuality. As this differentiation is not common to everyday language, one may feel that discriminating between these seemingly synonymous terms is philosophical hair splitting. Therefore, the reader is kindly asked to start the reception of this study by reconstructing this introductory archaeology of associative thought depicting the substantive benefits of this differentiation in its accord with the »discursivity thesis« elucidated by Henry E. Allison in derivation from Kant's transcendental idealism. (The philosophic delineation is delivered in chapter 2.2) Whereby it must be noted that the terms »discursivity« and »discursive« are used throughout this study in their epistemological dimension only, never in the ordinary way that especially the term »discursive« is sometimes used in English to pejoratively describe a distraught, roaming kind of speech or text that is lacking coherence and aim.

At the beginning of their introduction to their benchmark opus in the sociology of knowledge "The Social Construction of Reality", Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman rather offhandedly assess the significance of the term reality in its relation to knowledge:



*The basic contentions of the argument of this book are implicit in its title and sub-title, namely, that reality is socially constructed, and that the sociology of knowledge must analyze the process in which this occurs. The key terms in these contentions are 'reality' and 'knowledge', terms that are not only current in everyday speech, but that have behind them a long history of philosophical inquiry. We need not enter here into a discussion of the semantic intricacies of either the everyday or the philosophical usage of these terms. It will be enough, for our purposes, to define 'reality' as a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as having a being independent of our own volition (we cannot 'wish them away'), and to define 'knowledge' as the certainty that phenomena are real and that they possess specific characteristics. It is in this (admittedly simplistic) sense that the terms have relevance both to the man in the street and to the philosopher. The man in the street inhabits a world that is 'real' to him, albeit in different degrees, and he 'knows', with different degrees of confidence, that this world possesses such and such characteristics. The philosopher, of course, will raise questions about the ultimate status of both this 'real' and this 'knowledge'. What is real? How is one to know?<sup>9</sup>*

It is this indiscriminate use of the term »reality« that leaves thought with the unsatisfactory situation of the complete disappearance of the »real« as declared by the French media-sociologist Jean Baudrillard – which turns him into a philosopher of post-modernity. As there is nothing left that signs can refer to but signs again, almost anything can be claimed because a distinction between reality and simulation cannot be maintained. Validity is always provisional. Now that „the real is substituted by signs of the real“<sup>10</sup> „all interpretations are true.“<sup>11</sup> Baudrillard declared that, in consequence thereof, society was entering an age of simulation.

In accord with Baudrillard it can be recorded that the presumed loss of a common reality was induced by the elimination of the binding principle of God in modern pluralist societies. As the Aristotelian concept of the unmoved mover the monotheistic God used to personify the universal instance of reference that imparted ambiguous human existence the essence of unambiguous true reality by affording the metaphysical mass that inferred gravitational cohesion to the experience of the world. Without the normative

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<sup>9</sup> Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The social construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge*, Anchor Books ed., Anchor books, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967). P. 1

<sup>10</sup> Jean Baudrillard, Lothar Kurzawa, and Volker Schaefer, *Agonie des Realen*, ed. Lothar Kurzawa and Volker Schaefer, Merve-Titel, (Berlin: Merve-Verl., 1978). P. 9

<sup>11</sup> Baudrillard, Kurzawa, and Schaefer, *Agonie des Realen*. P. 31

power of religion, things, to many people, seem to become incoherent and arbitrary.

Important agents in this development were all kinds of relativist or even constructivist conceptions. The intellectually most momentous influence seems to have come from poststructuralism. Starting in the 1960s, poststructuralism introduced its anti-essentialist program to sociology. Scholars like Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and later Judith Butler forwarded the demise of metaphysical essentialism which was initially induced by Immanuel Kant's »Critique of Pure Reason«. Kant's concept of enlightenment as man's emergence from self-incurred immaturity can be seen as the ongoing effort of de-essentializing thought. An effort substantial to poststructuralism as well.

But Kant was not the first to effectively sideline metaphysical essentialism, and the poststructuralists were not the first to effectively spell it out for society. Scepticists like Xenophanes intellectually leveled the ground for the polis democracies, and the communication sociologists of the sophistic school had a strong educational impact in support of democracy. But while democracy, being ahead of its time, remained a momentary and local phenomenon, Plato's essentialist conception of the otherworldliness of true reality proliferated throughout the world for more than 2000 years, keeping peoples immature while intellectually legitimizing authoritarian systems of religious and ideologic nature to this day.

In this way, Kant's theoretical contribution to dissolving the socially binding power of the religious narratives that explain and legitimize a certain order of things – placing faith strictly in the realm of personal convictions – was substantial to the sustained prevalence of rationality and equality. But the struggle goes on. For a few decades in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, modern ideologies took a quasi-religious position, proclaiming final validity. And now that the globalized postmodern pluralistic liberal view of the world (largely inspired by subjectivist poststructuralist thought) is becoming the dominant mindset in the culture of the west, we witness an intensifying resistance by the preservers of the essentiality principle with their traditional values, who want to keep society straight by defending the old order. This is not only true for any religious fundamentalism, or the remains of nationalistic and racist ideologies, but to some extent also for a large share in western pluralistic societies that prefer to hold on to the orientation provided in a reality constituted by metaphysical essentialism when it assumes to have the choice only

between this and the potentially incomprehensibly corrupted, disorienting actuality that might even be a complete simulation created by the powerful.

Baudrillard's contention about the disappearance of reality gives voice to a general discomfort that is grounded in a traditional misconception ultimately borne by the indiscriminate use of the term reality. While »Reality« in its philosophical use indeed needs to be freed from its essentialist implications, it is at the same time necessary to save it from trivialization. »Reality« is a term that has the conceptual capacity of referring to the world in both its physical and its social dimension as it proceeds intrinsically, without or beyond one's perception. But any structures and laws that are deduced from this proceeding of reality cannot be conceived of as true in the sense of »essentially applicable« – truth categorically is not an ontological property – but only as »actual«. »Actuality« on the other hand, is not to be understood as a subjectivist but as a critical concept that anticipates the provisional nature of knowledge. It is a hybrid concept because it refers to the societal »Lebenswelt« (see 2.2.3) established by common circumstance, as well as to the indivisible unity of the human sphere as such.

Conceiving of the world we live in as »actuality« recognizes it as a product of human discursivity. Does this make the world less, 'real'? We still cannot 'wish things away', as Berger and Luckman accurately observed, but the concept of actuality openly anticipates that the meaning of things can potentially be transformed by changing the general attitude towards them. This is not to be conceived of as a doctrine of radical constructivism or post-structuralism, or any other school of thought that confesses to or is accused of radical subjectivism, but as a faculty of the human condition to adapt and promote change. The objective validity of perceptions is established by comparing them with the perceptions of others as well as criticizing them with the use of reason. This epistemological structure of discursive checks and balances is the core conclusion drawn here from Kant's transcendental idealism (see 2.2.3), which, by and large, also conforms with the famous findings of Berger and Luckman on societal objectivation processes.

The nature of the human condition, which is our existential constitution, does not allow us to perceive reality in itself, but only representations thereof. To be constrained to discursive actuality is the ontic reality of the human condition. Everything else is an illusion. As truth is not an ontological quality, conceiving of our Lebenswelt as actuality is not a loss of reality, but facilitates gaining a critical-realistic assessment of the contribution our cognitions and our knowledge have in what we experience as our Lebenswelt

environment. This makes life more adequately complex – which may be a challenge for many people – but in addition, it also averts societies falling for the truly abysmal simulations: the authoritarian assertion of an ontological truth and the societally normative assumption of an according true reality – be it innervated by religion, ideology, opportunism, or pure cynicism. Therefore, even in the contrary, the world is even realer because in actuality the forces actuating the consequences that personal life is subjected to can be stripped of their assumed essentiality so that we can duly adapt to change or promote it.

Realism acknowledges that we live in a materially real world that we experience. A critical realist approach anticipates that our observing and our knowing in this world is, though principally intuited by materiality, always discursively mediated and as such subject to prior knowledge and processes of inter-subjectivity. As it is impossible to erase the contribution of discursivity from the equation, the world can only appear to us. A diligently critical realism will therefore integrate the second order nature of actuality by observing the momentary structures of the discursive process, as they are instructed by the intention of re-constructively representing in our minds what is going on around us in order to be able to perform apt judgements, decisions, and actions. The substantial contribution of discursivity needs to be made apparent for a clearer comprehension.

Once more, this does not imply that actuality is a product of human collective or individual construction. Actuality as a performance of discursively interrelated meanings orchestrated by a temporary order of principles is more adequately understood as a product of constantly emergent self-organization, of coinciding, of pieces falling into place as illustrated by the drastic example of the rolling stone accident. In its contingency, actuality is not a subjectivist concept of concealed arbitrariness, but a critical realist scenario of principles competing in the fabrication of meaning, where factuality needs to prove its objective validity by its plausibility and persuasiveness as well as the coherence and necessity of its consequences.

## 1.2 Scientific Positioning: discursive resonance as a category of communication and media science

The German media-philosophers, Christiane Voss und Lorenz Engell, argue that ethnologic and culture-historical anthropologies with their substantial and diverse inventory are facing scientific anthropologies without getting into direct contact with them and assert the impossibility of translating scientific methods (e.g. biologic) into methods of the arts such as social and historical sciences as a matter of principle.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore they assess that media philosophy has turned away from scholastic philosophy and has become a self-contained field by synthesizing philosophic and media scientific terminology, vocabulary and horizons of theorization for the analysis of self-chosen phenomena. They claim that the specifically media-philosophic intervention into the interdisciplinary field of anthropologic research distinguishes itself by focusing on the irreducible man-media-entanglement and the mostly rather plastic relationality of human ways of existence, pursuing the question *how* specific environmental conditions make the observable ways of human existence come about instead of asking *what* man in abstracto might be.<sup>13</sup> Together with Katerina Krtilova Voss and Engell substantiate their approach of analyzing the *Conditio Humana* in the age of media by establishing the concept of »media-anthropologic scenes« that considers the plurality of human ways of existence under the aspect of their constitution in terms of one might call mediality, materiality, and situationality. In this scenario »scenes« are conceptualized as configurations of objects, bodies, and gestures as well as operations and statements that pose a structured sequence of events and actions in a dramaturgic lapse of time.<sup>14</sup>

As this unique approach aims at contemplating the plurality of life expressions that come about under certain dispositives exerted by media-anthropologic scenes, it incorporates the specific contribution of media as an anthropologic constant in times of constantly intensifying media-usage. This is

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<sup>12</sup> Christiane Voss and Lorenz Engell, *Mediale Anthropologie: ... geht aus einer Tagung an der Bauhaus-Universität im Jahre 2012 hervor*, ed. Christiane Voss and Lorenz Engell, Schriften des Internationalen Kollegs für Kulturtechnikforschung und Medienphilosophie, (Paderborn: Fink, 2015). P. 7

<sup>13</sup> Voss and Engell, *Mediale Anthropologie: ... geht aus einer Tagung an der Bauhaus-Universität im Jahre 2012 hervor*. P. 8-9

<sup>14</sup> Christiane Voss, Kateřina Krtilová, and Lorenz Engell, *Medienanthropologische Szenen: die conditio humana im Zeitalter der Medien*, ed. Christiane Voss, Kateřina Krtilová, and Lorenz Engell (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, 2019). P. 1

a substantial contribution not only to anthropology but also to communication and media science, which, while it deals with essentials of human affairs, tends to appear somewhat detached from deeper anthropological reflections.

The here developed six-factor model contrived for analyzing the potentiality of communicative instances to resonate discursively as sketched in chapter 4 is connectable to that approach as it might also be conceived of as a tool to reconstruct specific media-anthropologic scenes. However, it must be noted that the approach pitched by the present study goes beneath the analytical level Engell, Voss et al are targeting. Of course, in modern highly mediatized societies, discursive resonance cannot be thought of without the structural contribution of the institutionalized media that is here tunneled for gaining an undistorted perception of communication as such. The unit of investigation chosen here is the »communicative instance« as a certain entity of meaning-performance.

In the endeavor of understanding *how* communication as a dynamic environmental factor, be it public or private, can have an effect not only on what people personally think and do but also on how they collectively experience the world the present study goes beyond the horizon of media studies audaciously leaving the well-established approaches of media reception research and media effects research aside and not only digs into epistemological philosophy and cultural sociology, but pointedly contacts evolutionary anthropology, especially with regard to the latter's lingo-musicological, biological, and neuroscientific findings and perspectives. The elements within the human condition facilitating the emergence of how the world appears to us that this knowledge-archaeological excavation unbars are here subsumed in a category described by the chiffre »'musical' momentum« because this term metaphorically embodies the aesthetic relationality and performative experientiality of the process descried.

It must be conceded, however, that the Foucauldian metaphor of an archaeology of thought does not quite fit here because following the humanist motive of consulting the sources (*ad fontes*) the enterprise starts deep down in the protosteloid mud of ancient Greece and then moves upwards, making a substantial find in Kant's philosophy of transcendental idealism – the theory of discursivity as it has been carved out by the recently deceased Henry E. Allison (1937-2023) – before drawing on the today's most effectual layer of poststructuralism to understand the discursive process in which, of course, communication and media play a substantial role.

While the noun »discourse« and the adjective »discursive« have been most seminally established in sociological thought by poststructuralist thinkers like Michel Foucault<sup>15</sup>, Jacques Derrida<sup>16</sup>, and Judith Butler<sup>17</sup>, the actual functioning of the discursive process does not seem sufficiently reflected even though this is essential for the assessment of the outcome. The same applies for »resonance« as a sociological category in the way it has been elaborated by Hartmut Rosa. The present thesis aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the discursive process and its resonance phenomena as well as at making this specific insight into the *Conditio Humana* appropriate for a more substantial anthropological grounding of communication and media science.

Especially important in the context of discursive resonance is the musico-lingual complex within the human condition as investigated by neuro-scientists like Michael Koelsch or Tecumseh Fitch. Since the linguistic turn sociology appreciates language as substantial for our relating to the world – and this is applicable because words are indeed the vehicles of thought: Thinking is listening to what we are saying. In the *Theaetetus*, Plato describes this discursivity of thought in the following way:

*I mean the conversation which the soul holds with herself in considering of anything. I speak of what I scarcely understand; but the soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking – asking questions of herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she has arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a sudden impulse, and has at last agreed, and does not doubt, this is called her opinion. I say, then, that to form an opinion is to speak, and opinion is a word spoken, – I mean, to oneself and in silence, not aloud or to another: What think you?*

This passage is very revealing with regard to the implications of Plato's empiric-idealist concept: Thinking appears detached from the ever-changing environment and accordingly is, categorically, a silent and autonomous process. While we might imagine that the »sudden impulse« he is referring to could also be induced by the environment, there is no indication that he would 'jump' to that conclusion. In the contrary, in the discussion prior to

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<sup>15</sup> Michel Foucault, *The order of things: an archaeology of the human sciences*, ed. Michel Foucault, 1st American ed. ed., World of man, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971).

<sup>16</sup> Jacques Derrida et al., *Limited Inc.*, ed. Werner Rappl et al., Dt. Erstaug. ed., Passagen-Philosophie, (Wien: Passagen-Verl., 2001).

<sup>17</sup> Judith Butler, *Bodies that matter: on the discursive limits of "sex"* (New York, NY u.a.: Routledge, 1993).

this passage in the Theaetetus, the concept of »knowledge as perception« has been dismissed. Regarding our relating to the world this is nontrivial. Thus, this thesis goes to some lengths explicating the substantial difference between Plato's empiric idealism and Kant's transcendental idealism and the concept of »discursivity as an intertwining of empiric impressions and ideal concepts« derived from it. This interface functionality of discursivity opens our individual process of understanding not only to the ontic environment but also to the social environment as Kant has implied. This means: How we conceive something and what we think, say, or do accordingly can always have an impact on how others conceive that very object. This impact is here understood as »specific discursive resonance« if the meaning communicated is adopted by another person, while »general discursive resonance« refers to an unspecific impact like reporting or reflecting it in further communication. Such resonance effects originate from an intrinsically human musicality that is coupled with the lingual apparatus. As the »'musical' momentum« in human interaction, »discursive resonance« substantially fits into communication and media science as a concept for hitherto unsatisfactorily conceptualized phenomena.

This concept of discursive resonance also touches the question of social construction that media supposedly play a significant role in<sup>18</sup>. Starting with Berger and Luckman<sup>19</sup> in the 1960s, social sciences in general seem to have experienced the proliferation of a constructivist paradigm. Everything and everyone has become subject to the social construction of reality. Constructivism in its variant of System Theory as introduced in the 1970s by, among others, Umberto R. Maturana and Francisco Varela<sup>20</sup>, and subsequently developed into a full-blown sociological theory by Niklas Luhmann in the eighties, divides all aspects of life into interdependent processes of communication, through all levels of organization right up to societies and nations.<sup>21</sup> These second order cybernetics<sup>22</sup> are also the subject of radical

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<sup>18</sup> Niklas Luhmann, *Die Realität der Massenmedien*, 2., erw. Aufl. ed. (Opladen: Westdt. Verl., 1996).

<sup>19</sup> Berger and Luckmann, *The social construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge*.

<sup>20</sup> F.G. Varela, H.R. Maturana, and R. Uribe, "Autopoiesis: The organization of living systems, its characterization and a model," 5, no. 4 (1974),

<sup>21</sup> Niklas Luhmann, *Social systems*, ed. Niklas Luhmann, Writing science, (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1995). ; Niklas Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme: Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie*, 1. Aufl. ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984).

<sup>22</sup> Heinz Von Foerster, *Observing systems*, The systems inquiry series, (Seaside, Calif.: Intersystems Publ., 1981).



constructivism as it was taught by Heinz von Foerster and Ernst von Glasersfeld, who drew on Jean Piaget's theories about the development of the mind in children, and became popular especially within the German-speaking scientific community in the 1990s. Social constructionism, then, as an approach in social psychology that similarly investigates how societal reality is generated by lingual means, was introduced by Kenneth J. Gergen in the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century<sup>23</sup>.

These approaches have in common that they see our *Lebenswelt* as a product of the human mind only, borne from its need of *making* sense of the world. The aspect of self-organization that is also inherent to most of these approaches and could be the tie to an ontic realness is strongly hampered by the dominant word stem »construct« that signifies a high degree of disposability to intention and plan. But reality cannot be conceived of as a house we design and build to live in; illustrating it by varying a platonic metaphor, it is more like a cave that emerges in the beam radiated by our minds while we move deeper into the unknown. What we discover is completely contingent. We must relate to a world that is familiar and strange to us at the same time. Also, what biologists refer to as »niche construction of a species« does not imply any intentionality or plan but describes the inherent effect of a species' conduct on its ontic environment that can be quite undesired – like global warming for example.

Though the conception of discursivity and discursive resonance sketched here is clearly delimited from constructivist conceptions, it is semantically related to Butler's notion of construction as the emergence of materialization:

*Crucially, then, construction is neither a single act nor a causal process initiated by a subject and culminating in a set of fixed effects. Construction not only takes place in time, but is itself a temporal process which operates through the reiteration of norms; sex is both produced and destabilized in the course of this reiteration.*<sup>24</sup>

In her view construction is equivalent to Austin's concept of illocutionary performativity and results from reiterations within discourse as Derrida has

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<sup>23</sup> Kenneth J. Gergen, *An invitation to social construction*, Reprint. ed. (London u.a.: Sage, 2002).

<sup>24</sup> Butler, *Bodies that matter: on the discursive limits of "sex"*. P. 10

established for that rather specific case of speech acts where an uttering actually does what it says.

The present thesis abstracts the concept of performativity and delineates how it can be transferred into a more general understanding of communication effects. In the approach taken here it is the structure of discourse that emerges from discursive recursivity as explicated in subchapter 2.3.3. Exciting such discursive recursivity is here conceived of as discursive resonance. While approaches using the »construct« word stem will always be questioned, what part of a phenomenon is constructed and what is a given, as Butler concedes happens in the matter of sex<sup>25</sup>, is nugatory in the concept sketched here. Each and every thing ever only appears to us, though this appearing is not arbitrary as it is a necessity that it relates to reality somehow, but neither is it essential as explicated in subchapter 2.2.3.

The construction paradigm has become so prevalent that abstaining from it can already be seen as a deliberate act of delimiting from it. With his monography "Resonance", Hartmut Rosa sketches a sociology of people's relationship to the world that takes an 'existentialist' approach that has one fundamental essentialist implication. While also assuming that language frames how we relate to our environment, he asserts "that physical and symbolic or meaning-laden relationships to the world cannot be cleanly separated from each other. [. . .] our experience of and attitude towards the world is always shaped by the amalgamation of body and meaning."<sup>26</sup> In other words, Rosa proposes that humans do have an ontic relationship to the world that is real beyond construction. This relationship is established by resonance effects that we experience mediated by our senses. He exemplifies:

*As every reader knows from personal experience, the perception of a specific smell – say, warm summer rain on tar, a certain aroma of grass and flowers, a gymnasium – can instantly establish an intense form of relating to the world, becoming a medium of biographical memories.<sup>27</sup>*

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<sup>25</sup> Butler, *Bodies that matter: on the discursive limits of "sex"*. P. 11

<sup>26</sup> Hartmut; Wagner Rosa, James C. , *Resonance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019). P. 89

<sup>27</sup> Rosa, *Resonance*.

Rosa's pessimistic diagnosis of modernity as a story of increasing alienation, in line with other generations of the Frankfurt school<sup>28</sup>, which he has posed in his prior work about social acceleration<sup>29</sup>, made him look for an alternative, something that stands in opposition to the alienation generated by the modern imperative to gain as much of the world as possible which he sums up as follows:

*The prevailing modern notion that quality of life is necessarily improved by an increase in options and resources is misleading. On the contrary, there are good reasons to assume that the internally dynamic, autotelic, escalatory logic of modernity places ever increasing burdens on how human beings relate to the world – or even is itself in fact the expression and product of a problematic relationship to the world.<sup>30</sup>*

He postulates that alienation results in decreasing resonance experiences and hence identifies the solution to the alienating force of appropriation in revitalizing »resonance« that he characterizes as being connected and open to other people and things – a principle he recognizes as being adumbrated by scholars like Erich Fromm, Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, and Rahel Jaeggi.<sup>31</sup>

Before looking at how the present thesis relates to this concept, it is necessary to explicate succinctly in the way in which this basic critique is shared here. While Rosa's abstinence from constructivist conceptions may be based on an underlying sympathy for essentialist and historicist notions that his somewhat romanticist realism may rest on<sup>32</sup>, it is here proposed to look at the basic concept of constructivism from his alienation-critical point of view. The very term »construction« involves a human agency that goes far beyond an appropriation of resources, it suggests an appropriation of the foundations of the world that evokes an equally fundamental alienation from this world by calling into question its ontic basis along with the very notion of living in one common world – ultimately compromising any real relationship to this world. But the same reproach applies to essentialism as it alienates by

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<sup>28</sup> Frédéric Vandenberghe, *Tuning into Harmut Rosa's systematic romanticism*, 10 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40711-023-00189-2>.

<sup>29</sup> Harmut Rosa and Jonathan Trejo-Mathys, *Social Acceleration A New Theory of Modernity* (Columbia University Press, 2013).

<sup>30</sup> Rosa, *Resonance*. P. 26

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* P. 27

<sup>32</sup> Vandenberghe, *Tuning into Harmut Rosa's systematic romanticism*.

distorting our view of the world with its judgmental normativity. Both constructivism and essentialism want to dissolve the problem of living in a world of contingent objects, the one by discounting its realness, the other by obliterating its contingency. Therefore, it is also worthy of criticism that Rosa tries to overcome the alienating effects of the imperative to subdue and dominate the world in all respects by framing an essential experiential layer of existential, quasi-religious reassurance<sup>33</sup>: I can feel it, therefore it is real. He endeavors to substitute one concept of purpose-oriented world relation with another equally normative, though more idealistic, concept.

Though it was following its own agenda all along it turns out that this thesis proposes a functional conception of resonance that is relatable to both Butler and Rosa. Prospecting from a different angle what Butler refers to as reiteration and performativity as well as examining the very ‘musical’ substance in the human condition of what Rosa refers to as resonance, it follows a critical realist line of thought declining a constructivist notion, at least in relation to the world as the experienced whole and abstains from any normativity towards resonance. It is asserted that the environment we live in is one of intrinsic facts, whether they are ontic or social, which human cognition arranges in the continuous self-organizational process of discursivity, itself part of the ontic human condition, into actuality. As an inherent part of discursivity, resonance is the ultimately uncontrollable ‘musical’ momentum within the emergence of the world we live in. Establishing the factors that influence the potentiality of a communicative instance to acquire specific discursive resonance was the contribution to communication and media science this thesis initially aimed at.

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<sup>33</sup> To some extent Rosa’s notion of resonance is in line with postmodern mysticism as it is most vividly illustrated in “Star Wars”.

### 1.3 Working Hypothesis: the discursive emergence of societal actuality is affectable by performative intervention

In his treatise »The birth of tragedy out of the spirit of music« Friedrich Nietzsche makes a rather lyrical, though none the less philosophically substantive and conclusive suggestion, as to why we need to understand our »Lebenswelt« despite its existential realness as appearance, and, vice versa, why how the world appears to us needs to be acknowledged not as a pre-given ontological but as a continuously generical empirical reality:

*For the more clearly I perceive in nature those all-powerful art impulses, and in them a fervent longing for appearance, for redemption through appearance, the more I feel myself driven to the metaphysical assumption that the Verily-Existent and Primordial Unity, as the Eternally Suffering and Self-Contradictory, requires the rapturous vision, the joyful appearance, for its continuous salvation: which appearance we, who are completely in it and composed of it, must regard as the Verily Non-existent,—i.e., as a perpetual unfolding in time, space and causality,—in other words, as empiric reality.<sup>34</sup>*

Nietzsche here refers to Immanuel Kant's concept of »transcendental idealism« in which the vanguard of modern thought argues that we only have access to the appearance of the things of our environment, not to the things as such (in themselves). As will be delineated in the chapter 2.2, transcendental idealism is apt for predicating why we live in an environment that is ever changing, without doubting its real ontic existence beyond our experience, or invoking a concept of ontic reality as the keeper of the metaphysically true static identity of the things in themselves that is categorically accessible, though only to the right-minded wise person in a kind of revelational process. What Nietzsche is here conceptualizing as »continuously becoming empirical reality that evolves from »non-existence« is in the context of the present study viewed as »emergent actuality of applied meanings«. The term »reality« is exchanged for »actuality« for the reason of making a clear distinction between, on the one hand, our world of the incircumventable appearances of the things in themselves, and on the other hand, ontic reality to which we categorically have no immediate perceptual access.

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<sup>34</sup> Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy; or, Hellenism and Pessimism* (2016). P. 38

On the basis of Kant's epistemological assumptions Nietzsche construes an extremely significant point ascribing the driving force behind the continuous generating of appearances ultimately to aesthetics, indicating that empirical reality emerges from human perception as a culturally embossed intersubjective actuality. In his dialectically structured delineations Nietzsche identifies two fundamental antithetical aesthetic principles that react with another, synthetically, in a way that a new kind of public art emerges, and he recognizes this event in the birth of tragedy from the spirit of music in classical Greece. The pictorial principle is personified by the god of dream-visions and sooth-saying, Apollo, while the harmonic principle is epitomized by the God of ecstatic dissolution in music and dance, Dionysos. From the synthesis of the individualizing quality of painting, sculpturing, and storytelling on the one hand and the collectivizing quality of singing, symphonic music, and dancing on the other, the performative quality of tragedy evolves as the epitome of the performing arts.

Nietzsche's assumption gives a valid clue to a holistic understanding of performance that is necessary as the term semantically has a triple identity. The first meaning of the term refers to the execution of tasks in the »realm of labor«. The second meaning of the word refers to the artistic modus of acting-out. A performance is a momentary event of public acting in »the realm of the stage« that, strictly speaking, emerges and perishes in the same instance. Thirdly, performance signifies the achieving to effect a substantial difference. The substance of interest here is the »performative performance«, a public act that affects a situation by inducing consequences, as if the presence of a rock resting on the fast lane was constituted just by postulating it. A performance becomes potentially performative when it goes beyond entertaining to imparting subjective meaning assumptions to the societal public by generating resonance in its audience through physical expression with the force of an intersubjectively synchronized and compacted presence.

Nietzsche was sure that "every art has a layer of rhetoric"<sup>35</sup> by intentionally or subconsciously expressing subjective assertions. The Attic tragedy always aimed at transcending entertainment. Making assertions with a social relevance was part of the performance concept. The meanings conveyed by the story were supported by the physical expressions of the actors including speaking, reciting, music, singing and choreography— creating a holistic

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<sup>35</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke*, 2., durchges. Aufl. ed., vol. 7, dtv, (München: Dt. Taschenbuch-Verl., 1988). P. 32 (14)

experience for the audience where rational and affective strands were woven into a three-dimensional fabric that embraced each spectator as a member of the polis' public and participant in its societal discourses. Thus, the meanings conveyed in the drama were not just understood or not understood, but they were experienced like if in real life or even more intensely.<sup>36</sup> In this way, meanings conveyed in a play may have been found applicable for life and society where they were then recursively applied so that the view of a certain matter in a polis was changed. An example might be recognized in Aristophanes' comedy "The Clouds" that ridiculed Socrates in a way that made his authority in Athens suffer significantly.

This conception of the societal performativity of performance results from the change of the conceptual metaphor that frames how we conceive of culture and Lebenswelt as such. Erika Fischer-Lichte argues that, starting with Nietzsche, the conceptual metaphor »culture as text« is eventually transformed towards »culture as performance«.<sup>37</sup> She invokes the Russian director, dramatist and theatre practitioner Nikolai Evreinov (1879-1953) who in an essay from 1908 coined the term »theatricality« that refers to the universally applicable precept of the creative transformation of the perceived world. He defined theatricality as the human pre-aesthetic instinct that poses the culture generating and evolving principle that is the condition fundamental not only to art but also religion, law, customs, and politics. Fischer-Lichte points out that Evreinov introduced theatricality as an anthropologic category that refers to the human faculty to creatively transform the perceived world and can thus be seen as a pioneer in the conception of human performativity in the sense John L. Austin (1911-1960) introduced the term to philosophy as constituting actuality through speech acts.

The present study takes a step backwards for gaining a bigger picture that also includes the epistemological condition of human conception and action. In this step away from the object of interest while still facing it, it becomes apparent that there is a process of applying the mind's concepts to its sensations of its ontic and social environment that is essential not only for theatricality but for any human agency. And it turns out that the concepts of »performing« and of »performativity« need to be neatly differentiated from each

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<sup>36</sup> See 3.2.4

<sup>37</sup> E. Fischer-Lichte, "Grenzgänge und Tauschhandel. Auf dem Weg zu einer performativen Kultur.," in *Performanz: zwischen Sprachphilosophie und Kulturwissenschaften*, ed. Uwe Wirth (Frankfurt am main: Suhrkamp, 2007). P. 294 f

other. While both are inherent to discursivity as this epistemological condition of the mind, the faculty of performance, arises from the human intention to craft its *Lebenswelt* by achieving performativity and performativity itself is an effect that emerges from the intersubjectivity of discursivity. This study, then, does not adopt the concept of culture or even actuality as performance as its unconditional paradigm, but it does draw on it the view that the performance of communicative action can have a lasting, sometimes disruptive effect on actuality. Performance gains performativity when it resonates in societal discourse and can in this way have an impact on the emergence of the ever-transitional actuality. This study's telos thus is to explore the factors that equip a performed communicative instance with the potentiality to have an effect on actuality in its perpetual emergence from discursivity.



## 1.4 Objective and Proceeding: Not »whether«, but »how« potentially?

The objective of this study is not to prove the working hypothesis that societal actuality is affectable by performative intervention, but to explore and delineate the fundamental epistemological conditions and mechanisms as well as the factors that might provide communicative instances like the “Sonderzug” song with such discursive potentiality.

This approach has been chosen because it is assumed to be a generally shared experience that some communicative instances attain discursive resonance in a way that their impact then turns them into a social intervention, while how such an effect might come about is usually not adequately contemplated. The endeavor of establishing valid factors that together define the potentiality to have such an effect sets the path of analyzing the underlying epistemological and communication-theoretical interrelations for reaching the destination of applying the established factors in an exemplary case study to the “Sonderzug” song in order to assess its performative potential with which it might have had an effect on the discursive emergence of actuality in the late GDR. It is not the aim to investigate whether any potentiality of performativity was actualized, whether the performance of Udo Lindenberg really effected a difference with regard to the societal situation of the GDR for the categorical reason that the ascription of societal influence is an ascription of power. As such it is a highly political procedure that is subjected to the conscious and subconscious forces of interest, benevolence, envy, and pride respectively and can easily have colonialist implications if the communicative instance in question comes from the outside.

In the course of sketching the path of this thesis, it turned out that discursivity is the key epistemological concept for an understanding what our Lebenswelt is and how it continually emerges as actuality. Thus, this study has, to a large part, become a disquisition about the nature and the functioning of discursivity as an integral part of the human condition and as the basic epistemic process underlying all human cognition, knowledge, and performativity. The other categories central to this study like »meaning«, »reasoning«, »actuality«, »emergence«, »performativity«, and »discursive resonance« are all ultimately deduced from the concept of discursivity. Even music is here reduced to its discursive origin and functionality.

The study opens with an archaeological excavation in the vast fields of Greek philosophy which endeavors to uncover the origins of the two basic

epistemic concepts of societies, the one represented by Plato, the other by the contentious sophists. The aim is to identify and explicate the two fundamentally conflicting approaches for dealing with the inescapable epistemic skepticism that has infused thought ever since presocratic philosophers like Xenophanes formulated it. These two approaches especially differ in their assessment and handling of »change«.

When the discussion of the difference between the concepts of essential truth on the one hand and factualness on the other meets Aristotle, the path of this study takes a new turn and leads to the development of the epistemic triangle of discursive relationality as the epistemological model substantial to all further considerations of the present dissertation.

If each one of us is endowed with a discursive mind, does this not entail that we each live in a closed subjective universe? How is it possible that actuality is one and a multitude at the same time? Such questions are pursued by looking into Immanuel Kant's »transcendental idealism« with the result of approximating a universal world of appearance and the discursive structures from which it continuously emerges. However, to investigate how a »societal actuality« emerges and what it is constituted by, we need to revisit Aristotle to gain an understanding of »emergence« before making a huge leap to Michel Foucault and post structuralism, from where we come to a conception of »culture as an operating system« before we arrive at the realization of the significance of »recursivity« for the self-organizational nature of societal emergence.

Before we can reach the point where this realization can be transposed into the concept of »discursive resonance«, we need to take the long way of analyzing communication and its performativity to comprehend the necessity of purposely performing expressions that arises from the ultimate independence of understanding. For clarification, the concept of discursive resonance is then applied to communicative instances from contemporary history that are conceived of as performative interventions because they are assumed to have had an impact on societal actuality.

Subchapter 3.2 explicates the discursive nature of music as a performance art. This was undertaken not simply because the communicative instance here used as an exemplary case study is a song, but because music, in its performative nature, has made a substantial evolutionary contribution to discursivity that needs to be examined to gain a holistic understanding. The first step of this examination is to identify what is transcendental about music: in what way is music significant for everyone? This process leads to

the scrutiny of the discursive properties of music by relating it to its sister in discursivity: language. For depicting music's capacity to convey meaning, subchapter 3.2.3 elaborates relevant neuroscientific findings systemized by Stefan Koelsch before outlining a concept that draws on these findings in order to establish how music may acquire discursive potentiality even on a societal scale.

At this point it is the task of drawing on what has been learned in the previous inquiries to establish factors of discursive resonance that allow for an analysis of the degree of performative potentiality of communicative instances. Before the analysis of these factors can be applied to the example of the "Sonderzug", it is necessary to break them down for operationalization.

## 2 The Discursive Emergence of Societal Actuality

### 2.1 The Nature of Meaning: metaphysical essentialism vs. relational discursivity

#### 2.1.1 The origins of the two conflicting basic epistemic concepts of societies

»The Times They Are a-Changin'« was the title of Bob Dylan's third album, published in 1964, which became a milestone and turning point in the history of popular music. On the one hand, the album instituted Dylan's role as mouthpiece of the youth movement that supported the civil rights campaign in the US as he demands and/or prophesies change in societal actuality to come, while protesting against the prevalent racism, for example by criticizing the unjust indulgence towards the murderer of an Afro-American waitress with the song "Death of Hattie Carroll". On the other hand, this album made his music so popular that Dylan consequently plugged his guitar to an amp at the Newport Folk Festival in 1965 to reach out to a new and larger audience, thereby concluding the integration of folk and rock. In effect, "The Times They Are a-Changin'" authentically demanded the transformation of societal actuality, predicted its inevitability, and incidentally catalyzed the emergence of new pop-musical era.<sup>38</sup>

When Dylan, the first musician to receive the Nobel prize for literature, rhymes: "Come gather 'round people / Wherever you roam / And admit that the waters / Around you have grown / And accept it that soon / You'll be drenched to the bone..." one might easily associate a famous saying of the first philosopher known to reflect on the phenomenon of »change«, Heraclitus. Looking at the dynamic change of societal actuality in Greece that was brought about by the rise of democracy around the year 500 BCE, Heraclitus came to the pictorial conclusion that a person cannot step into the same river twice because new water is constantly flowing past as »everything is in flow« (panta rhei), and therefore nothing is constant but change. This dictum stands like a monument in its paramount significance. As Popper points

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<sup>38</sup> "The Times They Are A-Changin' (Bob Dylan)," Songlexikon. Encyclopedia of Songs, 2014, accessed 02.01.2020, <http://www.songlexikon.de/songs/timestheyaredylan>.

out, Heraclitus can be acknowledged as “the philosopher who discovered the idea of change”<sup>39</sup>. Heraclitus inadvertently stopped seeing the world as the sum total of everything that is – the randomly scattered rubbish heap that he felt was left of the old static cosmos – but visualized it as a dynamic entity emerging from all the interacting processes going on within the banks of the river of existence.<sup>40</sup> This new view of the world has evolved a strong and autonomous intellectual effectuality that is fundamental for the common sense that modernity applies to life, and, therefore, also fundamental to the model of the »discursive emergence of societal actuality« as it will be delineated here.

But Heraclitus’ farsighted statement itself also makes no exception from the process-nature of existence as it also evolved from a dynamic intellectual process of its times. Its precursory intellectually epochal culminating point, the deeper intellectual archaeological layer, may be located as represented by a scripture fragment from 6<sup>th</sup> century BCE by pre-Socratic philosopher Xenophanes whom Popper appreciated as a progenitor of his concept of critical rationalism<sup>41</sup>:

*And as for certain truth, no man has seen it, nor will there ever be a man who knows about the gods and about all the things I mention. For if he succeeds to the full in saying what is completely true, he himself is nevertheless unaware of it; and opinion (seeming) is fixed by fate upon all things.*<sup>42</sup>

Science has shown that this plea for a rational epistemological skepticism is appropriate even on the basic level of sensory impressions. In the introductory first chapter of their textbook “Sensation and Perception” the authors state:

*There seems to be no sudden break between perceiving or sensing an object and guessing the identity of an object. In some respects, we can say that all perception of objects requires some guessing. Sensual stimulation provides the data for our hypotheses about the nature of the external world, and it is*

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<sup>39</sup> Karl R. Popper, *The open society and its enemies*, 3. impr. ed., vol. 1 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949). P. 9

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. P. 8

<sup>41</sup> Karl R. Popper, *In search of a better world: lectures and essays from thirty years*, 1. publ. ed. (London u.a.: Routledge, 1992). P. 192, and Karl Raimund Popper, Sir, *The world of parmenides: essays on the presocratic enlightenment*, Routledge Classics, (London: Routledge, 2016). P. 46

<sup>42</sup> Friedrich Solmsen and Kathleen Freeman, "Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers," 59, no. 2 (1950), Xenophanes fragment 34

*these hypotheses that form our perception of the world. No matter how convincing a percept may be, it still may be wrong.*<sup>43</sup>

But the skepticism expressed by Xenophanes concerning the general possibility of grasping truth, and, hence, being in possession of it, goes far beyond sensation and marks a climacteric break in intellectual history. In its density Xenophanes' verdict on truth visualizes how rational epistemological skepticism relativizes the prevailing concept of truth and leaves us with seeming and opinion. The relativism thus induced by rational epistemological skepticism has become the intellectual condition that made it possible to deconstruct the confinements of the ancient statical cosmos, where everything had its absolute and unambiguous position in a metaphysical coordinate system. The old Greek tribal society with its taboos and fixed social roles disintegrated because a question mark could now potentially be put behind any authoritarian claim that, for legitimization, refers to the gods, ancestry, or traditions. Complementarily, laws that regulate coexistence in a society no longer qualified as naturally nor metaphysically given, but could now be considered manmade and therefore contingent, and open to modification.<sup>44</sup> The only way of gaining reliable orientation and sustainable governing in such a relativized world that is feasible to a society enlightened by such skepticism and relativism is public reasoning of opinions in common and open discussion.

The growing spirit of rational epistemological skepticism as exemplarily expressed by Xenophanes can therefore be seen as the intellectual presupposition to Kleisthenes' epoch-making rationalistic political reforms in the Athenian Politeia dating from 508/507 BCE, thus establishing the first democracy in history.<sup>45</sup> Carrying on the work of his predecessor as law giver, Solon, Kleisthenes initiated replacing the ionic tribe system, which relied on mythically under pinned loyalties and clan relations, by a system of ten new tribes which were to be composed as decided by the people after intense exchange of opinion in public discussion.<sup>46</sup> In this way, ancient closed

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<sup>43</sup> Stanley Coren, Lawrence M. Ward, and James T. Enns, *Sensation and perception*, 6. ed., intern. ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004). P.5

<sup>44</sup> Popper, *The open society and its enemies*, 1. P. 62

<sup>45</sup> It must be noted that Kleisthenes' predecessor Solon was, of course, the first statesman who introduced democratic laws in Athens, but these reforms, as brilliant and farsighted as they were, had not really been that effectual because the tribal and aristocratic structure of the society had remained too strong. Kleisthenes was able to change this structure and to re-introduce democracy sustainably.

<sup>46</sup> A. Andrewes, "Kleisthenes' Reform Bill," *The Classical Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (1977), P. 242.

structures were opened up and society was reintegrated according to common reason. The organization of the society as a whole as well as structures of formal individual social coherence (leaving immediate family untouched) were now based on, at least as a matter of principle, democratic decision. This transformation was only possible because the bindingness of hitherto unquestioned truths had been corroded by the acid of epistemological skepticism. A process catalyzed by the Athenian ambition for modernization, progress, and prosperity. Interestingly enough, the kingdom of Sparta, with its closed tribal structure and cruelly feudal identity as the Greek hegemon, tried to intervene by supporting Kleisthenes' reactionary opponent Isagoras in the struggle for power.<sup>47</sup>

Witnessing how the democratic revolution proliferated, eventually also reaching his hometown Ephesos after Kleisthenes' successful democratic reforms in Athens as the fruit of epistemological skepticism had been made, we may imagine Heraclitus utter his famous saying. That a person cannot step into the same river twice because new water is constantly flowing past is commonly interpreted as an affirmative assertion about the processual nature of existence, but for Heraclitus it was an assertion born from conflict and personal suffering.

It is necessary to see Heraclitus' apt diagnosis of the nature of existence in the light of his reactionary attitude towards it that surfaces in his drastic anti-democratic and pro-aristocratic statements as well as his glorification of war and of war-heroism.<sup>48</sup> Popper clarifies the context of Heraclitus' hostility towards democratic change:

*In order to understand the effect of this revolution, we must remember the stability and rigidity of social life in a tribal aristocracy. Social life is determined by social and religious taboos; everybody has his assigned place within the whole of the social structure; everyone feels that his place is the proper, the 'natural' place, assigned to him by the forces which rule the world; everyone 'knows his place'.<sup>49</sup>*

With the democratic revolution, the Hellenic societies, formerly based on closed exclusivity, became more open and integrative, and, especially for

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<sup>47</sup> Andrewes, "Kleisthenes' Reform Bill." P. 241 A circumstance that may remind of Wladimir Putin's policy in Europe and the USA

<sup>48</sup> Popper, *The open society and its enemies*, 1. P. 9

<sup>49</sup> Popper, *The open society and its enemies*, 1. P. 9

members of the aristocracy like Heraclitus himself, all former certainties were washed away. Heraclitus actually answers to his own assessment of constant flux with his reactionary conviction that tension and fight is the creative principle of all the change that constitutes this flow. He denies change to have any integrative or progressive mandate. To him the true sense of change is to generate heroism by fighting it.

In his magnum opus “The Open Society and its Enemies”, Popper identified historicist thinking, the doctrine that there are essential laws of development in history, and that it is requisite to strive to discover and apply these, as the principle most antagonistic to the open society. Ironically, historicism was a reaction to the wave of change that had been instigated by epistemological skepticism. Popper pointed out that he comprehends Heraclitus not only as the discoverer of the idea of change, but also as the actual father of historicism.<sup>50</sup> The definitions, doctrines and political program of his famous interpreter, Plato, however, eclipse Heraclitus’ views in their systematics and essentialist dogmatism. Plato can justly be accused of having arrayed the most operative and far-reaching objections against a pluralistic, integrative, and permeable society in intellectual history. He shared the experience of acatalepsy – the impossibility of recognizing the true nature of things – with Xenophanes, and the painful experience of vicissitude, the state of constant flux, with Heraclitus. But as Heraclitus before him and, to some extent, Aristotle after him, he could not be content with these findings. Understanding truth as a property of the ontic, of that which is, Plato assumed that the world we perceive, where everything is merely appearance and opinion, must be a kind of projection from a metaphysical sphere of pure ideas and imperishable forms. Rejecting the state of constant flux, that Heraclitus in a pessimistic moment of succumbing to circumstance had farsightedly described the world to be, Plato, in a revisionist notion, fled into imagining his new, distant, and exclusive cosmos of static ideas – not accessible by the deceivable senses, but only by intellectual intuition in a process quite similar to a religious revelation.<sup>51</sup>

As the perfect and good forms or ideas are the metaphysical sources of the projections onto matter that form our world of sensible things, Plato considered them to be the starting point of all changes in this actual world of flux

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> vgl. Hans Albert, *Traktat über kritische Vernunft*, 4., verb. Aufl. ed., Die Einheit der Gesellschaftswissenschaften, (Tübingen: Mohr, 1980). P. 18



we live in; and they stay being their ideal – how they were originally meant to be – forever. The more things change, the more they get corrupted and decay as they are estranged from their true identity. Popper's central critique of Plato as an agent of historicism and an enemy of the open society tightens its sociological grip around this contempt for change:

*Plato teaches that change is evil and that rest is divine.*<sup>52</sup>

Plato developed this paradigm, Popper illustrated, because he, just like Heraclitus, experienced change as an ongoing crisis. Plato grew up and was politically socialized in a time of civil insecurity and political instability. When he was born the war between Athens and Sparta was raging, and it was becoming increasingly fierce. When he was a young man the tyranny of the 30 was ruling Athens. When democracy was re-established, his beloved teacher, Socrates was sentenced to death by the new government. Popper quotes Plato:

*Seeing that everything swayed and shifted aimlessly, I felt giddy and desperate.*<sup>53</sup>

From this experience he derived a law of historical development, according to which all social change is degeneration, corruption, and decay. Furthermore, in Plato's view this law does not only apply to human history, but it is part of a cosmic law that holds true for all things.<sup>54</sup> In this way the assumed historical law of social decay may have been exalted within his thinking in such a way that it became Plato's determinant doctrine.

The fact remains that this doctrine made him draw conclusions which give his political philosophy a totalitarian programming because he believed that social change can be and must be arrested by the authority of the ideal state. Hence a state needs a wise and powerful leader, able to reverse all change so that the condition of the state improves by developing back towards the numinous ideal of a state, where everything has its static meaning set by law. Logical inference leads to the conclusion that in this concept there is no difference between natural law and normative law, because there is only »good

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<sup>52</sup> Popper, *The open society and its enemies*, 1. P. 37

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. P. 16

<sup>54</sup> That change, especially in respect to cosmology, is not a process of decay but, indeed, of substantial emergence can be seen by observing the process of nucleosynthesis – the development of more complex matter from hydrogen and helium through nuclear fusion. Our colorful world is made of dust from generations of stars.

law« which is naturally given. It can be derived from the metaphysical ideal. A modification of the good law is not desirable. Accordingly, common discussion and people's voting is not desirable either; nor is it necessary because the true idea, the metaphysical essence, the perfect and eternal form of the state as such with its good laws, will only reveal itself to someone thoroughly educated who has developed the ability of intellectual intuition<sup>55</sup>: a man of true wisdom and spiritual nobility, a Philosopher King. When the author of the gospel of St. John has Jesus say he had come to witness truth, he is referring to exactly this platonic concept of metaphysical truth, implying that he is the one and only true king of the world because he is directly connected to the source of existence. What he says and does cannot but witness true essence.

It is a feasible assumption that monotheistic revelational religions and the quasi-religious authoritarian ideologies, such as communism/socialism, nationalism/fascism and racialism/apartheid are two sides of one coin, as they all rely on the concept of the metaphysical truth behind all things that can be known by the virtue of the enlightened as envisaged and elaborated by Plato. In respect to the societal actuality of a nation state, this royal vocation burdens with the responsibility and, of course, endues with the full authority of doing what is necessary to lead a state effectually in the light of its idea so that the ideal state will eventually be actualized. This principle of the actual realization of metaphysical truth implies everything that can historically be associated with authoritarian religious systems and nation states. The most cruelly persecuted victim of this principle is freedom of thought and speech as it always encompasses a system of surveillance as well as a propagandistic structure of public communication, where only messages compliant with the truth as intuited by the Philosopher King and his representatives may be emitted while divergent thoughts, facts, and opinions will be suppressed.<sup>56</sup>

»The end justifies the means« is the motto of radicalized believers and ideologists of all ages ever since Plato. Though, paradoxically, this idiom is usually not associated with 'divine' Plato but rather with the 'profane' sophists. Plato despised these experts in public discourse. He accused the sophists of betraying the concept of truth with their ambition of making the weaker cause the stronger cause by the persuasive (mis)use of rhetoric. George

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<sup>55</sup> Popper, *The open society and its enemies*, 1. P. 29

<sup>56</sup> Wilfried Stroh, *Die Macht der Rede: eine kleine Geschichte der Rhetorik im alten Griechenland und Rom* (Berlin: Ullstein, 2009). P. 163

Alexander Kennedy points out that sophistic and rhetoric were indeed (structurally) change and progress oriented, while truth seeking philosophy had the tendency of erecting dogmata.<sup>57</sup> Particularly the discursive ambition of turning the weaker cause into the stronger one catalyzed civilizational development:

*To make the weaker argument the stronger can certainly be open to moral objections, but historically the discovery in the fifth century of the possibilities of logical argument, and thus the willingness to ask new questions, proved fundamental to scientific progress and social and political change. That the earth is round and circles the sun had long seemed absurd to most people, and to argue that blacks should be equal to whites had long seemed to many the weaker cause.<sup>58</sup>*

And indeed, the sophists drew very different conclusions from Xenophanes' skepticism and Heraclitus' process paradigm than Plato. They did not so much believe in truth but in majorities. The Sophists looked at reality as an actual but dynamic situation which is made up of entities of meaning that are, to a large extent, subject to opinion. Therefore, they accepted that situations could be redefined by forming opinion.

*The term »sophistic« denotes an educational movement in the fifth and fourth century BCE. It aimed at enabling people to become socially and politically effective, free from intellectual taboos and the restrictions of binding traditions implied by the religious-mythical view of the world the aristocracy invoked for legitimizing its still alive claim for authority and leadership. The sophists were intellectuals committed to discourse and driven by a pedagogical and enlightening spirit. They pursued an education that intended to substitute myth with logos, and tradition with faculty of reason.<sup>59</sup>*

The most important representatives and philosophic master minds were Protagoras (490-411 BCE), and Sicily-born Gorgias from Leontinoi (485-396 BCE), who is considered to have been the first teacher of eloquence.<sup>60</sup> It is in question, though, in how far the sophists can be marked out as a consistent school of thought or whether a dialectic form of intellectuality was termed

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<sup>57</sup> George Alexander Kennedy, *A new history of classical rhetoric*, Princeton paperbacks, (Princeton, NJ u.a.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994)., P. 9

<sup>58</sup>Kennedy, *A new history of classical rhetoric*. P. 7

<sup>59</sup> Manfred Fuhrmann, *Die antike Rhetorik: eine Einführung*, 6., überarbeitete Auflage ed. (Mannheim: Artemis & Winkler, 2011)., P. 17

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

sophistic. At first the terms »Sophist« and »Philosopher« were used almost synonymously, some contemporary authors, for example, also considered Socrates to be a sophist.<sup>61</sup> However, though the Sophists may not have formally outlined a model of society, their teaching points to a notion of societal structure that answers to epistemological skepticism as well as the new view of »the world in process« as summed up by Heraclitus. The impossibility of recognizing the unambiguously true meaning of things in a world in process necessitates maximizing the degree of perception of the »complex actuality«<sup>62</sup> by hearing different perspectives on a subject in order to draw rational conclusions by discursively integrating new facts, findings, and opinions, i.e. change, adequately. While in Plato's utopian state the philosopher king makes all decisions according to the higher truth of the ideal, it is imperative for a democratic society to improve its decision making by deploying a public epistemic-hermeneutical agency. Under the condition of the freedom of speech and information which allows for interpretational competition, rhetoric as a technique of public performative communication can provide this important epistemic-hermeneutic function. As teachers of rhetoric, the sophists were active protagonists of reason and argument; of structures and institutions for debate with open results; of the possibility of changing discourses and thereby changing the majorities' interpretations of the objects or situations concerned. In that way the sophists were, intentionally or not, agents of a discourse-based society open to the struggle of opinions and open to change as a process of adapting to constant and general flux in the sense of an »emergent now«. These protagonists of a pluralistic and integrative societal actuality did not convict change of being a corrupting process leading away from a metaphysical ideal but valued it as society's chance of attaining evolutionary development and facilitating progress. In rendering their educational services, the sophists and their teaching of rhetoric, on a level of state-theory, were functional for improving the societal perception of actuality by improving the quality of discussion, improving societal integration, and proliferating political participation. That Popper highly valued »the great thinkers who called themselves Sophists«<sup>63</sup>, is quite easily

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<sup>61</sup> Christian Glasmeyer, *Platons 'Sophistes': Zur Überwindung der Sophistik* (Universitätsverlag Winter, 2003), p. 20

<sup>62</sup> The term »complex actuality« is analogue to the German sociological term »komplexe Wirklichkeit« and refers to the world perceived, distinct from »reality« referring to the world before perception.

<sup>63</sup> Popper, *The open society and its enemies*, 1. P. 58

understood. What he conceptualized of as »open society« was already a most desirable societal condition for the sophists some 2500 years ago.

Through the disdainful writings of Plato and some other ancient philosophers, including Aristotle, however, the term »Sophistes« was turned into a pejorative vocational title for teachers of eloquence, who imparted their knowledge in schools of rhetoric to students for profit. Plato's main allegation, however, was that they gave primacy to the appearance instead of the essence. He demanded that the word should not have any constructive power.<sup>64</sup> Especially Protagoras' postulation of the objective of turning the weaker cause into the stronger one<sup>65</sup> was fundamentally criticized by arguing with platonic categories of truth. In Plato's view, the only legitimate speaker was the philosopher struggling for truth by pursuing the idea behind a thing; and sophistic rhetoric was nothing more than a questionable instrument for manipulating audiences into persuasion by strategically making seductive use of people's affective susceptibility.<sup>66</sup> Being an unapologetic rationalist, Plato was more than skeptical about affects and considered their discursive involvement inappropriate as he classified affects as desires that man has in common with the animal and that need to be domesticated by the reign of reason because they are wild, violent, polymorphic, and in constant transition.<sup>67</sup> Accordingly he termed the affect »pathos«, that what is to be endured, and placed it on the tier of the delusional senses.

The sophists, on the other hand, held the opinion that the affects had a perceptual as well as an orienting significance beyond just complementing rational reason. For them, pathos was a completely legitimate discursive dimension of rhetorical acting with an important epistemic and hermeneutical function.<sup>68</sup> In his praise and apology of the mythical figure Helen, whom ancient Greek historians accused of initiating the Trojan War, the ancient

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<sup>64</sup> Plato and Harold North Fowler, *Theaetetus: Sophist*, ed. Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library ;, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). Theaitetos, 177e; see also Plato and Fowler, *Theaetetus: Sophist*. Sophistes, 218c

<sup>65</sup> Glasmeyer, *Platons 'Sophistes': Zur Überwindung der Sophistik*. P. 18

<sup>66</sup> Kennedy, *A new history of classical rhetoric*. P. 3

This ancient judgement still resonates in the negative connotations of »hair splitting«, »deceitfulness« and »shallowness« many associate with sophistic and rhetoric to this day.

<sup>67</sup> Kurt Emig, "Die Vernunft des Begehrens," in *Affekte: philosophische Beiträge zur Theorie der Emotionen : Reiner Wiehl gewidmet*, ed. Stefan Hübsch (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1999). P. 12

<sup>68</sup> Øivind Andersen and Brigitte Mannsperger, *Im Garten der Rhetorik: die Kunst der Rede in der Antike*, ed. Brigitte Mannsperger, Øivind Andersen, and Øivind Andersen (Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchges., 2001). P. 47

communication theorist, Gorgias from Leontinoi, makes a significant remark:

*I both deem and define all poetry speech with meter. Fearful shuddering and tearful pity and grievous longing come upon its hearers, and at the actions and physical sufferings of others in good fortunes and in evil fortunes, through the agency of words, the soul wont to experience a suffering of its own.*<sup>69</sup>

This suggests an assumption of speech as a public agent of affects like, for example, empathy, which Aristotle defines as a pain excited by the sight of dreadful evil of which one can assume it might come upon oneself or someone close.<sup>70</sup> Any communication in its original sense of making things common needs to incorporate such empathy because conveying facts and reasons alone will not express all the implications. It takes the shared affect to be an intersubjective bio-physical space to synchronize experience in the encounters of people.<sup>71</sup> As for Aristotle there is no affectless state of mind, the affects are an integral part of the intersubjectifying process. A speaker always needs to draw upon the natural disposition to adapt an affect that is inherent to any communication situation by charging a rational argument with the appropriate emotion as a persuasive means because, as Aristotle defines it:

*The emotions are all those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgements, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain; such are anger, pity, fear, and all similar emotions and their contraries.*<sup>72</sup>

The potential of abusing the persuasive means of rhetoric is, of course, embedded in its power as an affectively effectual public medium and it is within the performative constitution of rhetoric to be exploited by a demagogue who wants to stoke people's emotions. In the political structure of the ancient Greek democratic societies, presented facts, findings and interpretations had to be criticized in the live public arena by competing political protagonists. Since the ability of the listeners to verify these facts and interpretations is structurally extremely limited, the individual rhetoric ability of a speaker to persuade an audience can be decisive. Fearing a gifted rhetor's

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<sup>69</sup> Gorgias: Encomium of Helen §9

<sup>70</sup> Aristotle and John Henry Freese, *Art of rhetoric*, ed. John Henry Freese, Loeb Classical Library ;, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). Rh. 2.8.2

<sup>71</sup> Andreas Hetzel, *Die Wirksamkeit der Rede: zur Aktualität klassischer Rhetorik für die moderne Sprachphilosophie*, Sozialphilosophische Studien, (Bielefeld: Transcript-Verl., 2011). P. 437

<sup>72</sup> Aristotle and Freese, *Art of rhetoric*. Rh. 2.1.8

demagogic ambition of moving beyond the limits of factualness and democratic customs with the intention of usurping power as a tyrant was, therefore, quite reasonable. But Plato's criticism of the sophists and rhetoric is hypocritical as he tried to instrumentalize the icon of such a demagogic usurper, Dionysios I of Syrakus and his son and successor Dionysios II, with whom he got acquainted when he visited Sicily in order to try and convince the tyrants of leading Syrakus in accordance with the ideas of his philosophy.<sup>73</sup> He pursued the utilization of populism, which he otherwise scorned, in the service of ideology.

Like Plato, and also Aristotle, many, especially but not only notabilities, in the societies of the polis democracies regarded populism as a constant potential threat. In this atmosphere of fascination and enthusiasm for rhetorical grandeur, on the one hand, and distrust, envy, and suspicion on the other, it is quite comprehensible that politicians were directly held accountable for their advice to the ekklesia and could actually be punished if the democratic decisions they had induced had negative consequences. However, such political decisions potentially have long term, sometimes irreversible, consequences that occur as a result of the dysfunction of rhetoric's epistemic-hermeneutical agency issuing from incomplete or inapplicable information and interpretation. This may happen due to lacking information and insight on all sides, or due to the intentionally misleading rhetoric of a demagogue pursuing a tyrant's agenda by the use of lies and exaggeration for the public incitement of hatred with the aim of mobilizing the masses by arousing a powerful sentiment of need of action. By whipping it in, such a demagogue, driven by either personal ambition or, as Plato intended, ideology, or any alloy of the two, can clothe lies in the gown of „alternative facts“ so persuasively that these lies discursively become highly effectual for the societal actuality. The model of an ideological nation-state, as Plato had devised it, will always need to exercise an authoritarian and propagandistic communication structure where the higher truth is normative for the selection and presentation of information to be disseminated because the path towards what a dogmatic ideology conceives of as an ideal society takes a lot of persuading, including the manipulative distortion of factualities. As history has vividly shown, all doctrines that once were regarded as metaphysical truths have turned out to be temporary constructions. In the historicist approach of

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<sup>73</sup> Plato went three times to Syrakus with the intention of converting the current tyrant into a philosopher king who ruled his realm according to his, Plato's, philosophy. The whole context is delineated in Plato's seventh letter.

Platonism, the factualness of such a frail truth guides perception, while the problems encountered in actuality are regarded as transitional, mostly arising from irresolute implementation of ideological directives. A contest of opinions in the public arena, of course including the objective of turning the weaker cause into the stronger one, is deemed neither functional nor desirable and therefore needs to be deterred for its corrosive quality.

Being torn between progressive thought and sympathy towards metaphysical essentialism and monarchy, while despising lies and tyranny, Aristotle defined rhetoric by emphasizing a property that is the source of what is here assumed of as the epistemic-hermeneutical meta-functionality of rhetoric that facilitates a holistic perception of actuality to a society necessary for adaption by change:

*Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever. This is the function of no other of the arts, each of which is able to instruct and persuade in its own special subject; thus, medicine deals with health and sickness, geometry with the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic with number, and similarly with all the other arts and sciences. But Rhetoric, so to say, appears to be able to discover the means of persuasion in reference to any given subject. That is why we say that as an art its rules are not applied to any particular definite class of things.<sup>74</sup>*

Aristotle sketches rhetoric as the art of finding out and communicating all aspects of a matter that support the point one wants to make. This is an assumption that becomes meaningful for a democratic society like the Athenians' because in a political or judicial rhetorical situation a number of speakers talk publicly about one subject, irradiating it from different angles. This implies that Aristotle indeed viewed rhetoric as a discursive agency providing the holistic description and interpretation of a subject to an audience. This pluralism distinguishes democratic societies from societies governed by essentialistic revelationalism.

### **2.1.2** The epistemic triangle of discursive relationality

Unfortunately, though, Aristotle's progressive concept of rhetoric is somewhat contradicted by his rather shallow definition of truth as factualness

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<sup>74</sup> Aristotle and Freese, *Art of rhetoric*. Rhetoric. Book 1, Chapter 2. 1355b 26-35,



that answers too mono-dimensionally to the »man measure doctrine« of Protagoras:

*To say that what is is not, or that what is not is, is false; but to say that what is is, and what is not is not, is true; and therefore, also he who says that a thing is or is not will say either what is true or what is false.<sup>75</sup>*

The question that arises under the ontic condition of acatalepsy, as defined by Xenophanes: what can be the common ground for judging what is factual and what is fictional? Is someone, who is sincerely stating her or his perception, telling the truth though the perception does not fully or not at all correspond to the object in itself? The dilemma remains because defining truth as conforming with facts is just an empty tautology as long as the objective verification of what is fact is not accounted for. But that doesn't make witnessing of any kind an arbitrary instance. We can record that someone who is deliberately stating something that does not conform to her/his perception or knowledge but who claims so is lying, no matter whether out of self-interest, in the desire to please, or in the name of an ideology that is derived from what its disciples hold as metaphysical truth.<sup>76</sup> In all relativity, by the defined value of the concept »fact« there cannot be such a thing as an alternative fact.

A substantial fulcrum of the discussion about truth and factualness in the context of the system-controversy between democracy, tyranny, and ideology is the mentioned »homo mensura« or man-measure doctrine that the measure for the truth of anything whatever it is, is how it appears to the human mind by the sophist Protagoras that Plato confuted in his writing,

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<sup>75</sup> Aristotle and W. D. Ross, *Metaphysics*, Metaphysics, (Raleigh, N.C.: Generic NL Freebook Publisher, 2000), Book. Metaphysics. Book 4. 1011b

<sup>76</sup>Anstelle von einer Anerkennung von wahrheitsverbürgenden Rationalitätsstandards werde ich kurzum von Wahrheitsorientierung sprechen. Wie fängt eine Wahrheitsorientierung an? Was hält uns dazu an, die Unterscheidung zwischen wirklichen und vermeintlichen Gründen, zwischen Wahrheit und Schein wichtig zu nehmen? Im Lichte der theoretischen Möglichkeit von Selbsttäuschung zeigt sich, dass die wahrheitsgarantierende Rationalität nicht von vornherein gegeben ist, sondern sich je in Entstehung befindet. Sie ist keine Invarianz, sondern ein zeitlich Gewordenes. Diese Emergenz wahrheitsverbürgender Standards und die Vermeidung von Selbsttäuschung verlaufen synchron und sind zwei Seiten derselben Medaille. Eine Wahrheitsorientierung überhaupt fängt an, indem Selbsttäuschungen abgetragen werden und eine Öffnung für Gründe an ihre Stelle tritt. Tilo Wesche, *Wahrheit und Werturteil: Eine Theorie der praktischen Rationalität*, 1 (Online-Ausg.) ed., Philosophische Untersuchungen - Band 27, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012). P. 9

and that Aristotle already disapprovingly refers to in the introductory lines to his above cited definition of truth<sup>77</sup>:

*Of all things the measure is man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not.*<sup>78</sup>

That this is commonly understood as an expression of a radically subjective relativism in a »true for me – true for you« sense is due to Plato's most influential tendentious doctrinal tradition towards sophisticism in general and Protagorean thought in particular. As there is no original textual testimony from Protagoras himself, Plato's account of the homo-mensura-statement in the "Theaetetus" dialogue has become the dominant reference to it. As an instance of performative communication itself, this dialogue on the nature of knowledge includes the recital of the phrase, its critical discussion as a subjectivist notion, its reduction to absurdity by Socrates (respectively Plato in the name of Socrates) and the imaginative apology by Protagoras. Plato's specific criticism of Protagoras' doctrine, and of the Sophists in general is trenchantly expressed in the following passage from the Theaetetus dialogue:

*If what each man believes to be true through sensation is true for him – and no man can judge of another's experience better than the man himself, and no man is in a better position to consider whether another's opinion is true or false than the man himself, but each man is to have his own opinions for himself alone, and all of them are to be right and true – then how, my friend, was Protagoras so wise that he should consider himself worthy to teach others and for huge fees? And how are we so ignorant that we should go to school to him, if each of us is the measure of his own wisdom? (161B)*

Through Plato and Aristotle, who shared the fundamental objection, Protagoras' Philosophy was delegitimized and the radical subjectivist interpretation of the homo mensura doctrine became semantically dominant in intellectual history.<sup>79</sup> But, it is important to note that »ἀνθρώπων« can mean

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<sup>77</sup> Aristot. Met. 4.1011b: „But perhaps it is for this reason that those who argue not from a sense of difficulty but for argument's sake are compelled to say that the appearance is not true in itself, but true to the percipient; and, as we have said before, are compelled also to make everything relative and dependent upon opinion and sensation, so that nothing has happened or will happen unless someone has first formed an opinion about it; otherwise clearly all things would not be relative to opinion.“

<sup>78</sup> Plato and Fowler, *Theaetetus: Sophist*. Theaetetus 151e or DK 80B1

<sup>79</sup> Richard McKirahan, "Protagoras of Abdera: The Man, His Measure ed. by Johannes M. van Ophuijsen, Marlein van Raalte, and Peter Stork," 108, no. 2 (2015), P. 311

both the individual person as well as mankind as such.<sup>80</sup> This double-layer-meaning of the word »human« opens the way to a pars pro toto understanding where the individual person is a generically representative part of humanity as such, as well as to a generalized, and at the same time gradual understanding of the homo mensura statement, as Versenyi argues by invoking a passage from Plato's dialogue »Protagoras«:

*'Are those things good which are profitable to men?' Socrates asks (Prot., 333 D), and in his answer Protagoras uses not only man qua species as the measure of goodness and utility (which are obviously not mere sense perceptions), but extends relativity all the way down the line. What is good for men is relative to (its usefulness for) men, what for horses, cattle, dogs, trees, etc., to horses, cattle, and so on. What is good for men may be bad for animals, and vice versa, what may be good for the roots of a tree may be bad for its shoots, what benefits the inward parts of man may harm the outside of the body .... Thus we see a diversity of "things" (fairness, justice, goodness, utility, nourishment, and their opposites) relative to an equal variety of "measures," which may be more inclusive (state, species of animals) or less inclusive (parts of man and things) than the individual.<sup>81</sup>*

The elaboration in the name of Protagoras dealt with here reveals that, in Protagoras' thinking, cognition and knowledge are »object relational« in the sense of »meaning to« in relation to varying measures. This more complex, multi-dimensional approach to the relativism expressed by the homo-mensura-statement appears to be a less denouncing, more rational and, as such, a more appropriate interpretation.<sup>82</sup>

In the cited passage from Theatetus, Plato himself implies that subjective opinion is the (of course dismissible) alternative concept to metaphysical truth, alluding to Xenophanes' statement of epistemological skepticism mentioned above. And indeed, the way Xenophanes contrasts »opinion« or »seeming« to »truth« is a more instructive clue to the epistemological implications of Protagoras' assertion than Plato's disparaging delineations. Opinion can easily be defined as a personal hypothesis of a certain quality of an object. Because its quality is determined by the consequences, in the broadest sense of the word, this object's predicates can, at higher resolution, be

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<sup>80</sup> Peter Osorio, "Protagoras' Homo-Mensura Doctrine and Literary Interpretation in Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi," 71, no. 6 (2018), P 1047, Footnote 16

<sup>81</sup> Laszlo Versenyi, "Protagoras' Man-Measure Fragment," 83, no. 2 (1962), P. 180

<sup>82</sup> Versenyi, "Protagoras' Man-Measure Fragment." P. 178

viewed as a subjective assessment of the consequences to be expected of this object. These assumed consequences are, self-speaking, always consequences in relation to something or someone. But this something or someone is not the thinking subject, this is where the *homo mensura* statement is often misinterpreted, possibly because it is ambiguously formulated.

In the invoked passage Aristotle argues:

*If to the thinking subject "man" and the object of thought are the same, "man" will be not the thinking subject but the object of thought; and if each thing is to be regarded as relative to the thinking subject, the thinking subject will be relative to an infinity of specifically different things.*<sup>83</sup>

While Aristotle is heading in the right direction in the first part, he goes astray in the second – and captures epistemology, contrary to much of his other thought, in the cul-de-sac of empiric idealism. Each thing must not be regarded as relative to the thinking subject, but to the object of thought the thinking subject relates it to: what may be good for the roots, may be bad for the shoots. Not the thinking subject will be relative to an infinity of specifically different things, but one object of thought (subject-object) to another object of thought (object-object). The thinking subject stands by and actively observes by making assumptions about the consequences and implications the subject-object has for the object-object. This is also true in the specific case where one of these objects of thought is the thinking subject itself, as Aristotle acknowledges in the first part.<sup>84</sup> In a cosmos of acatalepsy, even what we consider as knowledge needs to be reconsidered as basically being assumptions. This involves the affected something or someone categorically needing to be differentiated from the cognizing subject at all times as all hypotheses about consequences and implications always rely on assumptions about the effecting subject-object and the affected object-object. One and the same subject-object potentially has different consequences for different object-objects of the same kind as these consequences are constituted not only by the properties of the subject-object but also by the properties of the individual object-object. Therefore, as Aristotle noted, even if the observer and either the effecting or the affected object are identical, and secure knowledge about one's own predicates should theoretically be

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<sup>83</sup> Aristotle and Ross, *Metaphysics*. *Metaphysics* 1011b

<sup>84</sup> Some scholars interpret Aristotle's delineations on the art of healing in exactly this way, that no being has power over its so-being because an ability can only accidentally be applied in reference to the self. Emig, "Die Vernunft des Begehrens." P. 14 (footnote 10)

presumed, the cognizing subject hypothesizing about its own consequences and implications for an object-object or the consequences and implications of a subject-object for itself, still only does so in reliance on assumptions about itself – implying that a cognizing, hypothesizing subject always, even in respect to itself, needs to be understood as an observer that must be differentiated from its object nature.<sup>85</sup> This means that in any instance, even if the thinking subject reflects on itself as a physical and mental entity, in respect to any other object it is always an observer that reflects on a subject-object in relation to an object-object.

The structure of the discursive relation between observing-subject, subject-object and object-object is here conceived of as the »epistemic triangle of discursive relationality«, in which any relation between objects is, as a matter of principle, completely independent of what a subject cognizes – this is applicable not only to objects of the ontic environment but ultimately also to those of the social environment. Searle suggests viewing the factuality of an object as its real efficacy due to its intrinsic features<sup>86</sup>, features that will unfold their consequence inexorably. As anticipated in the model of the epistemic triangle of discursive relationality, the reciprocal implications of two objects are substantially independent from the cognition of an observing subject and will inexorably unfold the respective intrinsic consequences in relation to another object's intrinsic features.

The presumption of the inherent determinacy of object-interrelation represents the dimension of reality that the cognizing subject encounters as hard facts if the appearances generated in the three dimensionally discursive process of perception diverge too much from reality. While the ontically or socially inherent relation between a subject-object and a certain object-object is temporarily untouched, the set of the consequences the observing-subject assumes of a subject-object to be the sum of what it hypothesizes that it evokes, causes, and implies in relation to that certain object-object will be processed by the observing-subject by applying as its »meaning« to this subject-object in relation to that particular object-object. The application of this meaning generates the appearance of the subject-object that represents it in

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<sup>85</sup> In Niklas Luhmann's terms we need to record that cognitive systems can belong to their own environment.

<sup>86</sup> John R. Searle, *The construction of social reality* (New York u.a.: Free Press, 1995). P. 8

the mind of the observing-subject, which involves that an essential part of an appearance is always (object-) inter-relational. Lorenc put it this way:

*People "thrown into the world" – to put it in Heideggerian terms – experience objects, other people and even their own selves as phenomena imbued with meaning, and the world – as an environment that is permeated by the discursive and the linguistic. The discursive understood in such way means a set of conditions that enable not only understanding, interactions and communication between subjects, but our very encounters with the objects of this world on the whole.*<sup>87</sup>

However, for the power of judgement as valid hypothesizing about the consequences and implications that two objects have for each other we need not only to have knowledge about the respective properties, but we must also creatively apply educated guesswork and deliberation. In the second edition of his monograph "Kant's transcendental idealism. An Interpretation and Defense", Henry E. Allison extends the concept of discursivity into the process of perception itself when he emphasizes the significance of what he calls »discursivity thesis« as inherent to Kant's transcendental idealism – the view that human cognition is discursive in that it requires both mental concepts and sensory intuition.<sup>88</sup> What something is assumed or hypothesized to evoke, cause, and implicate is determined by schemas of interdependent pre-set and dynamic variables within the state of mind of an observer, like its knowledge, its pre-understandings, or its affect dispositions and always includes a certain degree of situational guessing. The discursive concept of meaning investigated here is not to be confused with the semiotic concept of meaning as the determinate relatedness of a sign to a referent.

A scientifically recognized approach of psychological research, this epistemological model can be related to is »attribution theory«, initiated by Fritz Heider in 1958. Attribution theory is the scientific study of naïve theories and commonsense explanations about the causality of appearances, especially but not only in the socio-psychological realm.<sup>89</sup> It is concerned with examining the conjectures people make about why a circumstance had a

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<sup>87</sup> Iwona Lorenc, "Discursiveness of art as a philosophical problem," *Art Inquiry* Vol 23 (2021): Art in the world of discourses (2021), P. 30

<sup>88</sup> Henry E. Allison and Immanuel Kant, *Kant's transcendental idealism*, ed. Immanuel Kant, Revised and enlarged edition ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). P. xiv

<sup>89</sup> Compare Friedrich Försterling, *Attribution: an introduction to theories, research, and applications*, 1. publ. ed., Social psychology - a modular course, (Hove u.a.: Psychology Press, 2001). P. xi

specific impact on someone or something and not another. Using the case of assessing a certain trait of a person Heider delineates:

*It is notable that in everyday life our judgement of personality traits generally depends on gauging the “objective” qualities of what the person experienced; it is made on the basis of the attribution of certain properties to the object.<sup>90</sup>*

In researching what causal attributions people make and how this affects their understanding and feeling, attribution theory presupposes the triangular nature of discursive cognition. This becomes specifically visible in one of the original experiments concerning the »chasing vs. following« problem described by Heider where an observer, the test person, watched a film in which two triangles, T and t, were moving in a way that the appearance of either T chasing t or T following t could occur to a test person. The aim was to find out what spacio-temporal conditions of the movement lead to the respective appearances. Being a completely artificial situation, the results were often indefinite until the test persons were granted further information, for example that T is much stronger than t, which then frames their cognition.<sup>91</sup> This leaves us with the three elements of the epistemic triangle of discursive relationality: the cognizing subject »test person« with his or her knowledge and pre-understandings, the object-object »t«, and the subject-object »T«.

Friedrich Försterling outlines the central assumptions of attribution theory that the desire to gain an applicable understanding of the world turns people into naïve scientists who make rational conjectures about the nature of relations between objects:

*Attribution theorists assume that individuals attempt to develop a realistic understanding of the causes of events and that the methods used by “the man on the street” to come to causal conclusions have remarkable similarities with the methods used in science. The naïve person is expected to form hypotheses about the causes of events, to deduce predictions from these hypotheses, and to use his or her observations to test the articulated hypotheses. In the case that relevant information is missing, the individual is assumed to search for this information. Furthermore, it is assumed that information that contradicts her hypotheses will lead her to revise her ‘faulty’ assumptions.<sup>92</sup>*

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<sup>90</sup> Fritz Heider, *The psychology of interpersonal relations* (Hillsdale, N.J. u.a.: Erlbaum, 1982). P. 169

<sup>91</sup> Heider, *The psychology of interpersonal relations*. P. 44 ff

<sup>92</sup> Försterling, *Attribution: an introduction to theories, research, and applications*. P. 10

But how do appearances then relate to ontic reality? Dependent as we are on our perception and knowledge for maintaining a real life in a real world, both cannot be completely arbitrary but must somehow relate to the ontic, real, material, and social world. Especially when hypotheses about the intrinsic properties of objects and their relations are highly inappropriate or incomplete, the observing-subject concerned will sooner or later be witness to unexpected consequences caused by a fact – conscious of it or not. Exemplifying this very clearly is the case of the first woman to receive a Nobel Prize, Marie Curie (1867-1934) who pioneered exploring the phenomena of nuclear fission and invented the term »radio activity«, eventually dying from its then still unknown effects on her body. Appearance needs to approximate reality by a process of learning within the cognizing subject. The continuous confrontation of perception with intrinsic reality does not, by the normalizing power it exerts, allow for as deep a subjective divide between people’s perception as orthodox phenomenology and radical constructivism might presume. The appearances generated are fundamentally similar among cognizing subjects. In terms of motivation to apply the schemas of perception to cognize the environment, self-interest is the most general condition – as in the case of a farmer who needs to know what is good for the roots and what for the shoots in order to grow crops successfully.

History shows that the fundamental gap between the ever-assuming relational human perception and the determining materiality of existence cannot be securely closed, even science can ultimately only assume to produce applicable knowledge. Though the impact of a fact is materially determined in ontic reality, its meaning within the world of appearance is indetermined and subject to interpretation and opinion which depend on ever incomplete knowledge. This is what Xenophanes refers to: we cannot know whether we state truth in the sense of correspondence with ontic reality. In the light of the epistemic triangle of discursive relationality, the concept of truth therefore needs to be downgraded to honesty, the correspondence between actual perception and statement under the condition of criticizing perception diligently, which of course includes the use of the current means of science.

In Plato’s cosmos of ontic ideas, a true meaning of objects does exist because each thing has a metaphysically determined relation to any other thing that can be intuited by the philosophically educated rationalist’s intellectual contemplation. In a state that has overcome the rocky path of transition and has arrived at the ideal status, this philosopher king would be privileged with the power to lead his nation state according to the wisdom revealed to him, without the necessity of explanation or even societal discourse. Plato



actually sketched this, his ultimate ideal of a silent, contemplative philosophy in his description of Socrates' death which he is supposed to have died in silent grandeur, placing truth above life. The punch line is, as Hetzel points out, the legend of Socrates' death is structured by a refined and elaborate rhetoric of speech and rhetorical renunciation that reveals platonic philosophy to be the endeavor of persuasion towards sense.<sup>93</sup> To arrive at this end, Plato and many of his enthusiasts were prepared to use rhetoric extensively in the form of propaganda. Since then, any state that has invoked metaphysical truth has sooner or later turned into a despotic tyranny that ultimately resorted to propagandistic structures of communication for persuading of what it considered essential sense, ultimately limiting discursivity to its ideologic confines. Ideologic regimes thus become captives of their own echo chambers that they create by recursively applying only those meanings they have generated themselves. In consequence such societies collapse due to a lack of earnest world-perception that could have portrayed and processed the necessities of actuality, thus making necessary adaption possible. Dionysos, turning Plato down, prevented political Platonism from failing already at this early stage.

The discursive approach to meaning delineated above does not represent any sort of linguistic concept of meaning, it is about the appearance of objects as these are shaped in the mind by the nature and significance of their implications, not about the names of objects. Though, of course, in the practice of the discursive process the integral relation between the signified and its, however arbitrarily assigned, signifier cannot be resolved, as discussed for example by Gottlob Frege or Ludwig Wittgenstein. This thesis is interested in how the discursive process changes actuality by adapting the meaning of objects in their interrelations and thus their appearances that are processed as concepts of the mind and not so much in the operational relation between a term and its conceptual content. Meaning, as it is conceptualized here, is more closely related to significance than sense. Sometimes the way an object is significant for another object is conceived of as its sense. Meaning, though, being the concept fundamental to both of these interpretations, can be declared to be an object's sense but it is always an object's implications for another object.

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<sup>93</sup> Andreas Hetzel and Gerald Posselt, *Handbuch Rhetorik und Philosophie*, ed. Andreas Hetzel and Gerald Posselt, Handbücher Rhetorik, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017). P. 2

Communication in the original sense of the Latin verb »communicare« means »making something a common« and refers to imparting the content of perception so that others can share it without having the perception themselves. The presumability of sincerity in the representational correspondence between cognition and statement is the content-related condition for legitimate participation in public affairs. To intentionally disregard the exigency of this correspondence, it does not necessarily take an ideologic notion, a populist motivation that is often subliminally guided by self-interest and sometimes ideologically camouflaged, will suffice. In this demagog configuration speech becomes fictional and it becomes impossible for the audience to compare validly and weigh the different accounts given by different speakers because it would mean comparing the merely desirable with the unsparing, which will, of course, lead to a distortion in opinion formation, and would potentially result in detrimental decision making. Because human societies, even under the condition of acatalepsy, still existentially depend on the approximation of correlation between perception and reality, a societal system is most sustainably functional where actuality is portrayed as holistically as possible and a rhetor has the responsibility not only for his or her statements to correspond with his or her perception, but also for his or her perceptions themselves. The dependence on perceiving the environment as applicably as possible involves the fundamental necessity of exchanging and criticizing perceptions in an open and integrative public discursive process.

## 2.2 The Discursivity of Actuality: approximating a transcendental world of appearance

### 2.2.1 The discursivity of meaning

A public discursive process is only possible if we can validly assume to be referring to similar »phainomena«, to appearances of objects that are substantially identical. But because perception as the generating of appearances in the dynamics of the epistemic triangle of discursive relationality is, of course, a performance of the individual in its subjectivity, the question is how exactly it is possible that we can live in a generally common, intersubjective, though in its particulars individually varying appearance of the world?

Some thinkers set in even earlier and doubted the sheer existence of a world to be perceived. Epistemological concepts that are committed to platonic philosophy, considered the possibility that our conception of objects of our environment, of our reality so to say, is nothing but a gigantic construction of the soul. In this potentially solipsistic view, especially characteristic among thinkers in the dawn of enlightenment, like Berkeley, Descartes, Leibniz, and others<sup>94</sup>, reality is a projection of sensorial data onto the soul as the central instance of the individual. We cannot know what it actually is that evokes the sensorial data we perceive – whether reality materially exists at all, and not merely as a projection of godly thought onto our minds coming from the center of existence, the world as a holographic movie so to say.

The pioneer of the logical reasoning of this »empirical idealism« was the French rationalist philosopher and mathematician René Descartes (1596-1650). Fundamentally skeptical about human perception, he floats the possibility: „the outer world may only be a dream.“<sup>95</sup> In his famous formula »cogito, ergo sum« he retreats to the one and only certainty, to subjectivity: if he can be skeptical, it must still be him who is skeptical. But according to logic and theory of cognition, he argues it is not possible to conclude from one's own existence the existence of other subjects (solipsism). It is only because God in his perfection cannot be a »Genius malignus«, a fraudster, that we can rely on our perception. With Descartes, »empirical idealism« potentially becomes »ontologically subjective idealism«. With the empiricist

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<sup>94</sup> Allison and Kant, *Kant's transcendental idealism*. P 27

<sup>95</sup> René Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," (1641), Princ. philos. I, 4. Medit. I

George Berkley (1685-1753), bishop of Cloyne, spiritually reinsured epistemology takes another step away from the realm of materialism. Berkley denied the existence of an external reality altogether, assuming that we only experience mental images which are not only created but also caused by the mind itself. He transcends the subjectivity of our access to reality by complementing it with a creator / creation relation when he coins the phrase: „Esse est percipi“, „Being means to be perceived“. Only in perception things and people are existent. Allison explicates:

*The theocentric model, with its ideal of an eternalistic, God's-eye view of things, is the common heritage of the Platonic tradition, but it is particularly evident in the great rationalists of the seventeenth century. One thinks in this connection of Malebranche, who claimed that we „see all things in God,“ and (. . .) of Spinoza, who maintained that the goal of human cognition is to view things sub specie aeternitatis (Allison's emphasis). (. . .)*

*Moreover, in spite of their essentially psychological orientation, it is clear from their views on conceptual representation that the empiricists were also committed to this model. Although most apparent in Berkeley, who was something of a Platonist, it is equally true of Locke and Hume.<sup>96</sup>*

In a world by and large still committed to monotheistic dogmata, the tension between skepticism towards faculty of perception, on the one hand, and the desire for cognition of unequivocal truth on the other, was resolved by using God as the metaphysical reference: truth cannot be represented in the mind by sensory cognition or reasoning only; truth can be perceived if sensation and thought occur in the cathartic light of the creator. Leibniz, for example envisions finding „the pattern of the ideas and truths which are engraved in our souls“<sup>97</sup> in the realm of divine understanding.<sup>98</sup> In his significance as a cornerstone of modernity, Kant endeavors to find answers to almost exactly the same desiderates as Leibniz within the human condition, but without God as a filler.

In all due skepticism towards the faculty of cognition, the most influential philosopher of modern times did not see the necessity of questioning material existence as the fundamental source of the stimuli that compose our perception for explaining how we as a multitude of individuals can live in a

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<sup>96</sup> Allison and Kant, *Kant's transcendental idealism*. P 29

<sup>97</sup> R. M. Mattern et al., "New Essays on Human Understanding," 93, no. 2 (1984),

<sup>98</sup> Allison and Kant, *Kant's transcendental idealism*. P.29

common, though varying appearance of the world. Kant confutes empirical idealism as well as any kind of solipsism, which he viewed as a scandal to philosophy. He derives his alternative epistemological model of empirical realism from his philosophical concept of »transcendental idealism«, which is not only very close to Protagoras' thought but also to what Xenophanes stated in the famous fragment cited above some 22 centuries earlier: Kant, Protagoras, and Xenophanes assume the world to exist materially as such also in absence of an observing mind, and at the same time dismiss simplistic realism because they doubt the possibility of gaining absolute and unequivocal knowledge about the environment through cognition.

Kant's first step in his approach to overcoming the contradiction between the fact of existing in one common real world and the variability and indeterminacy of perception is to distinguish between »things in themselves« and their »appearances« to the mind. This differentiation establishes the basic possibility that our perception of one and the same object can vary considerably, bypassing the fundamental doubt concerning the materiality of the world that arises from the experienced inconsistency of perception. This inconsistency of perception is not experienced because the world is not real, it is induced by the inability of the human mind to cognize fully, and ontically objectively as if it were watching reality in itself because it cannot but actively select, organize, and interpret the incoming sensorial data, inevitably applying its inert as well as its acquired principles to its apperceptions as they are the conditions of the possibility to perceive and cognize.<sup>99</sup> In this discursive process the mind creates »phainomena«<sup>100</sup>, appearances that represent what it cognizes as external entities. While cognition is stimulated by the ontic reality, only the phainomena are accessible to us as the objects of perception that are processed by the mind. Kant summarizes:

*“By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves*

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<sup>99</sup> Nikolaus Knoepffler, *Der Begriff "transzendental" bei Immanuel Kant, 2., vollst. überarb. Aufl. ed., Akzente Sonderband Philosophie, (München: Utz, Wiss., 1997). P.*

<sup>100</sup> The phainomenon spelling is used because it is closer to the original Greek spelling, with the aim to make a distinction between its specific meaning as used by Kant and the more trivial meaning of common language that refers to the phenomenon as an intense occurrence of a somewhat indistinguishable origin or cause.

<sup>101</sup> Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason. Immanuel Kant, Paul Guyer, Allen W. Wood," 91, no. 2 (2000), Critique of Pure Reason A 369

In deliberate conceptual delimitation from empirical idealism and solipsism as such Kant delineates further:

*Yet the reservation must also be well noted, that even if we cannot cognize these same objects as things in themselves, we at least must be able to think them as things in themselves. For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is an appearance without anything that appears.<sup>102</sup>*

The difficulty in explaining the difference between »things in themselves« and their »appearances« on a practical level can be considered a logical challenge of transcendental idealism as maintaining this differentiation in the process of reflection becomes an increasingly challenging cognitive task, especially when moving from a social to an ontological level because it feels dissonant to everyday experience.

The approach of the present elaboration to this problem, which is instrumental for its analytical intention, introduces the instance of »meaning«, making the essential differentiation of transcendental idealism somewhat more concrete and reproducible. Things in themselves are the things as they are in their wholeness, without the heteronomy exercised by an observing mind's assumptions about its »meaning to«. <sup>103</sup> The appearances, on the other hand, result from the inevitable discursive application of meaning by our senses and mind onto our sensations stimulated by the things in themselves in the cognition process.

Key to this understanding of the difference between »things in themselves« and »appearances«, between »ontic reality« and »actual knowledge« is the shift of the location of meaning as a consequence of Kant's »Copernican Revolution« derived from transcendental idealism. While »meaning« was usually comprehended by transcendental realism as well as common sense realism to be a property of the objects, meaning, under the magnifying glass of transcendental idealism, turns out to be a discursive performance of the observing-subject – a performance that is discursive in that it correlates concepts (meanings) and sensible intuition. <sup>104</sup> To be more precise: according to Kant's discursive approach to cognition, the process of the cognition of objects as such can be understood as an application of observer-immanent pre-given

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid. B XXVI f

<sup>103</sup> Allison and Kant, *Kant's transcendental idealism*. Allison P. 119

<sup>104</sup> On the »discursivity thesis« in the interpretation of transcendental idealism please turn to Allison and Kant, *Kant's transcendental idealism*. P. 3

meaning patterns, the a priori categories, onto sensory impressions of exogenic objects, resulting in the apperception of appearances that serve as representations of the things in themselves.

The epistemological structure constitutional to the discursiveness of this process of generating appearances by assigning meaning is what is here conceived of as the epistemic triangle of discursive relationality, where an appearance of an object is generated within an observing-subject's mind by this observing-subject's assumptions of the consequences a subject-object has in relation to an object-object. In this triangle the states of being subject and object will usually oscillate in varying degrees between two objects because of their reciprocal relation. The assumed properties of the object-object define the assumption of the consequence of the subject-object for the object-object just as much as the assumed properties of the subject-object itself. By this relational reciprocity, a change in the assumption of the properties of one object changes the appearances of both objects. Thus, the appearance of an object is always interrelated with other objects, making the differentiation between subject and object seem a purely theoretical though none the less important one for analysis and judgement. Subject-object and object-object can even be identical, for example in transcendental aesthetics (sensation), as will be delineated below, and under certain circumstances all corners of this triangle can seem to fall into one spot if the analytical resolution is not increased, for example when an observing individual reflects on the consequences of its own features for itself.

The very point of transcendental idealism is that it accounts for the possibility of objectively valid knowledge despite the fact that perception is always an act of the individual that has no direct access to intrinsic reality in itself.<sup>105</sup> In his main work "Critique of pure reason", Kant engages in an in-depth analysis of the principles, especially the a priori concepts that he theorizes the human mind applies, quite in the sense of the patterns desired by Leibniz as cited above, to synthesize the phenomena as processable information from the data as stimulated by the environment. A priori concepts, including the categories, can be seen as the »epistemic conditions«<sup>106</sup> of the human

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<sup>105</sup> „Der Ausdruck ‚transzendental‘ bezeichnet genau genommen nicht die Methode der Kritischen Philosophie, sondern den Charakter der sie leitenden Fragestellung; in der Transzendentalphilosophie wird nach Bedingungen gefragt, unter denen sich die objektive Gültigkeit von Begriffen und Sätzen a priori als möglich begreifen lässt.“ Wolfgang. Röd, *Geschichte der Philosophie Bd. 9/1: Erster Teil: Kritische Philosophie von Kant bis Schopenhauer*, 1st ed. ed. (München: C.H. Beck, 2013). P. 33

<sup>106</sup> Allison and Kant, *Kant's transcendental idealism*. xv

mind that enable it to make sense of the data it perceives with its senses, or rather as inborn meaning patterns that the mind applies or projects onto that data in order to gain connectable and processable knowledge. Kant implies that because the a priori concepts are part of the human condition, so to say, – as they are concepts engraved to the human mind as such instead of being individually acquired – cognition in its discursivity is transcendental in the sense of being generally similar in all human observing subjects.

Kant differentiates two levels of cognition. As the base for the whole intellectual process Kant identifies »sensory impression« as it delivers what he calls »the intuitions« in response to the stimuli that are received by the sense organs from ontic reality. These intuitions or sensations are generated by the mind's projection of the modes of space and time in a process Kant calls »transcendental aesthetic«<sup>107</sup>. Without transcendental aesthetic, experience would not be possible, because space and time are a necessary given, and thus a priori, to any cognition and even imagination.<sup>108</sup> And human minds do so in similar ways, making it a transcendental process. But it must be noted that Kant comprehended space and time as they are available to us also only as categories of the mind and not as properties of ontic reality in itself.

Indeed, modern cognition science has found structures in mammal brains that actually operate using a very similar process. In 2014 the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine was conferred on three cognition scientists who observed two different but related patterns of brain activity that in their combination constitute a positioning system for the representation of Gestalt, spacial relation and time course, and as was recently shown, social relations, and even of memory. John O'Keefe identified the »place cells«, and May-Britt Moser and Edvard I. Moser discovered the complementing »grid cells«.<sup>109</sup>

While Kant hypothesized on spacio-temporality being categories of the mind only on the grounds of certain preliminary logical considerations that were

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<sup>107</sup> Aesthetic is here used in its original sense of sensory perception.

<sup>108</sup> Kant's delineations of Transcendental Aesthetic are the subject of the chapter of the same name of *The Critique of Pure Reason*

<sup>109</sup> Neil Burgess, "The 2014 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine: a spatial model for cognitive neuroscience," *Neuron* 84, no. 6 (2014),



of fundamental significance to him<sup>110</sup>, it is, on the grounds of these neuroscientific findings on the spatial model for cognition, even more validly possible for us today to adopt Kant's most challenging premises for the understanding of the cognition process without sharing his paradigm that the ontic world must be space- and timeless. As cognition is a performance of the mind it needs to have its own means of representing space and time, detached from any ontic reality of space and time, but valid in representing spacial and chronologic relations intersubjectively.

Constituting the fundamental functioning of sensory impression as the core of transcendental aesthetic, the projection of the modes of space and time can be understood as an attribution of basic determinations of relations. In a cognized object these relations have consequence in creating its Gestalt or form factor, its appearance to visual and tactile senses. But this meaning is auto-related only – in constituting an object's form factor, each spatiotemporal property of an object is subject-object and object-object at the same time because it is in a mutual relation to all the other properties simultaneously.

When it comes to the generation of the holistic phenomenon of an object as its representation to the mind, in Kant's epistemological system the level of understanding is arrived at, where the raw material of sensory impression is brought into the order of apperception.<sup>111</sup> In its discursivity, this process of understanding is accurately illustrated by applying the epistemic triangle of discursive relationality: The shining sun (subject-object) and a warm stone (object-object) are just sensations, but that the sun heats the stone is a synthetic understanding a person (observing-subject) arrives at firstly by the »cognition of an objective temporal order«, namely: the sun shines and then the stone heats up, and secondly by a judgement about the relation of these occurrences, namely: the sun is the cause of the effect that the stone gets hot, which is a projection of the mind's a priori category of cause and effect, derived from the assumption of the properties of both objects and their interaction. In the same way as in the process of sensory impression, the patterns of space and time are necessarily projected onto the incoming data, the a priori categories of understanding are necessarily projected onto

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<sup>110</sup> Karl R. Popper, Laura J. Bennett, and Melitta Mew, *In search of a better world: lectures and essays from thirty years*, ed. Laura J. Bennett, Melitta Mew, and Karl R. Popper, 1. publ. ed. (London: Routledge, 1992). P.126

<sup>111</sup> Allison and Kant, *Kant's transcendental idealism*. P. 309

observations in the process of understanding, thereby applying meaning to intuitions, and turning the data into information. Brushed against the grain, this also implies that any cognition necessarily is recognition: we cannot create a percept of any circumstance that we cannot apply one of the categories to, our immediate understanding is limited to the a priori categories which, keeping in mind that we also can only recognize because we can only cognize what is really there, as Kant pointed out categorically.

Kant identified twelve a priori categories that can be considered as properties of the mind and, therefore, as formal laws of cognition, classified in quantity, quality, relation, and modality. The class of quantity contains the categories of unity, plurality, and totality. The class of quality contains the categories of reality, negation, and limitation. The class of relation contains the categories of substance and accident, cause and effect, and community (how things interact). And the class of modality contains the categories possibility, existence, and necessity.<sup>112</sup> Whether each of the items in this inventory list is applicable is not determinant – they certainly are all scrutable – decisive is the assertion that humans share a common epistemological structure.

But is this inventory conclusive with regard to the holistic nature of human cognition? Apperception being not only rational but also having an affective dimension, it appears necessary to look for affect-items that are similarly transcendental for complementing the inventory. And indeed, we make a substantial find in the opus of Charles Darwin, who compiled a list of affects which he considered universally pre-given. In “The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals”, published in 1872, Darwin explores the evolutionary history of emotions that could be traced across cultures and species. In this context he identifies six basic innate emotions by concluding from the identification of differentiable instinctual facial expressions and body movements that he called »the language of the emotions«: anger and fear, surprise and disgust, joy and sadness.<sup>113</sup> Darwin’s seminal assumption of primary affects can be understood as a concept of transcendental emotions which suggests that we automatically apply similar emotional meanings to similar situations. This not only makes empathy a commonplace part of perception but

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<sup>112</sup> Kant delineates the a priori concepts in the chapter Deductions of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding in his Critique of Pure Reason

<sup>113</sup> Darwin’s assumption has been elaborated by Paul Ekman whose distinction of 7 basic emotions set the standard for today’s research.

also implies the constant coalescing of emotion and thought. While cognition contributes the dimension of quantity, the affects contribute the dimension of quality. Circularly interacting in all mental activities, affects and rationality are not opponents, but reciprocally complementing partners. In cognition, thoughts are directed by feelings and feelings by thoughts all the time.<sup>114</sup> Thought and affect are forming an indivisible discursive unity that constitutes the power of judgement.

### 2.2.2 The nature of meaning

Perception, as a discursive production of appearances by the ineluctable application of relational meaning onto the things perceived with the senses, though a performance of the individual, is not arbitrary, even if it involves a degree of subjective guessing, but transcendental. All requirements of the discursivity of cognition are usually commonly given: the environment, the senses, and the basic meaning-concepts the mind applies in the cognition process: time and space, quantity, quality, relation and modality<sup>115</sup> as well as the primary affects. Therefore, in the spirit of Kant's transcendental idealism, it can be recorded that it is in principle possible to judge objectively to a certain degree on the grounds of the human epistemological condition in the sense of »true for us humans«, but under the condition of ontological uncertainty because we can neither cognize nor know the very nature of the things as they are in themselves. For Kant this »human objectivity« was the paradigm for his ethics of the »Categorical Imperative« and his concept of freedom that have not only become constitutive for the age of enlightenment but can be seen as the prevalent basis for scientific knowledge and universal human rights as well as – possibly in the future, even more than witnessed in the first quarter of the 21st century – an integrative fundament of an open, diverse, and pluralist earth-society.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> Compare: Luc Ciompi, *Die emotionalen Grundlagen des Denkens: Entwurf einer fraktalen Affektlogik*, Sammlung Vandenhoeck, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997).

<sup>115</sup> Allison and Kant, *Kant's transcendental idealism*. P. 136

<sup>116</sup> In his writing „Zum ewigen Frieden“ (1795) Kant delineates a refined concept of cosmopolitanism in which he demands a League of Nations (Völkerbund), a „federalism of free states“ that has the task of announcing and maintaining eternal peace on earth.

Only after the detrimental experiences with ideological political systems that subscribed to quasi-religious essential truths in the 20th century, Kant's »Copernican revolution« of theorizing that knowledge emerges within the mind in involvement with the environment, not as a projection by either god or metaphysical ideas, nor an imprint by the ontic world as such, finally seems to have led to the emancipation from both theism and Platonic doctrine in their authoritarian revelationalism as well as to the enlightening of naive common sense realism and has become fundamental for western pluralistic modernity. In the context of this chapter's search for the meaning of meaning it can be recorded that in a pre-critical view of the world things have an intrinsic meaning, while the critically enlightened view of the world anticipates that it is the observer who attributes meaning to the things.<sup>117</sup>

Especially the great advances of cognition-science have shown from a biological point of view that the observer-centered epistemology is appropriate. But even though Kant hypothesized farsightedly on the sensory conditions of human cognition, he could not yet really reflect on its biological dimension constituted by the interlinked functioning of the organic senses and the neurological processes that go prior to conscious cognition. On the one hand they enable us to experience material reality, the sense of vision, for example, by converting certain frequencies of electromagnetic radiation into the colors we perceive. On the other hand, they are a selective filter, for due to limited processing resources they cannot illustrate the whole of material reality and need to concentrate on the most useful spectrums. An organism's senses are instruments that serve making sense of its environment in reference to its specific needs in its specific ecological niche.<sup>118</sup> Human eyes can process only a certain bandwidth of electromagnetic radiation, but this

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„... Kant's ethical and political philosophy had enjoyed considerable resonance in the wider world during the post-war decades, as is evident in the drafting of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and the *European Convention on Human Rights*, and of the West German and other constitutions . . .“

Onora O'Neill, *Acting on principle :: an essay on Kantian ethics*, Second edition. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

<sup>117</sup> „The upshot is that according to the strongest version of transcendental idealism, all the objects of human experience are nothing but what we represent them to be, when we represent sensory objects according to the a priori normative principles of our understanding and our reason: so our cognition does not conform to the objects we cognize, rather those objects necessarily conform to our innate a priori normatively-governed faculties of cognition (Bxvi, A92/B125–126).“

[<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-judgment/#JudTraldeTru> (Last visited 31 March 2021)]

<sup>118</sup> Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, *The tree of knowledge: the biological roots of human understanding*, ed. Humberto R. Maturana, Rev. ed., 8. [print.] ed. (Boston u.a.: Shambhala, 1992).

enables us to differentiate the colors we need for gaining the information vital for our self-preservation. With 50 to 15.000 Hertz<sup>119</sup>, the audible bandwidth of sonic wave frequencies of humans correlates to the range that is predominant in our environment and enables us to understand each other's voices in their complete possibilities of expression – from high-pitched alarmed shrieking to the calming low-pitch humming of a parent (about 12.000 to 80 Hertz). This specialization of the senses entails a limitation of perception that functions as a pre-selective filter in that it limits the data the brain needs to filter for meaningful information in a hyper complex environment. As such the instrumental specialization of perception is part of the adaption of a species to its ecological niche. Birds of passage, for example, have developed a highly sensitive quantum-organ for the magnetic field of the earth.<sup>120</sup>

The Chilean cognition scientists, Humberto E. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela emphasize the biological dimension as the ontic condition of cognition, and describe cognition as a radically individual process with the somewhat solipsistic implication that knowledge about the world is always and only constructed within a particular organism in the solitude of a black box. This is exactly what Plato criticized in his radical subjective interpretation of the homo mensura doctrine:

*All cognitive experience involves the knower in a personal way, rooted in his biological structure. There, his experience of certainty is an individual phenomenon blind to the cognitive acts of others, in a solitude which is transcended only in a world created with those others.*<sup>121</sup> ~

This »experience of certainty« is essential for the progression of any living individual because it constitutes the necessary basis for decision-making. Maintaining the processes that living entities must operate continually in order not to disintegrate requires making decisions that in their consequence must contribute to sustaining these processes. To achieve this an individual must be informed about her or his own needs as well as about the possible

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<sup>119</sup> Gerhard Roth, "Die Konstruktivität des Gehirns: Der Kenntnisstand der Hirnforschung," in *Die Wirklichkeit des Konstruktivismus: zur Auseinandersetzung um ein neues Paradigma ; [Kongreß im Oktober 1992 in Heidelberg]*, ed. Hans Rudi Fischer (Heidelberg: Carl-Auer-Systeme, Verl. und Verl.-Buchh., 1998). P. 49

<sup>120</sup> Noboru Ikeya and Jonathan R. Woodward, "Cellular autofluorescence is magnetic field sensitive," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 118, no. 3 (2021),

<sup>121</sup> Maturana and Varela, *The tree of knowledge: the biological roots of human understanding*. P. 18

resources to meet them, and to assess the consequences of these resources in reference to the relation between the degree of usefulness, on the one hand, and associated tribulations and risks on the other, before selecting. It must create knowledge by deducing, processing, and aggregating meaning by mastering a complex cognitive process.

As in the endeavor of staying alive, the response-time to a perception may involve an existential significance, we must assume that cognitive complexity was reduced in the course of evolution by directly linking many kinds of perception to situation-specific goal-directed physical reactions such as survival-relevant behavioral patterns like flight or fight, feeding, socializing, sexual reproduction, experience of loss, etc. that we experience as emotions in the way Darwin had suggested. This means, specific feelings like fear, rage, or joy are triggered by situation-specific perceptions while cognition is, in turn, controlled by the prevailing affect. The operator-effects of affects on cognitive functions have the power not only to change the focus of attention but also to modulate the prioritization of perception and memorization.<sup>122</sup> In this view, affects have a dual appearance. They eventuate in immediate, involuntary physical reactions as well as in mental states that we call feelings that will determine the quality we ascribe to an object as well as our correlative choices and behavior. These assumptions are supported by neuro-scientific findings that suggest a direct connection between the amygdala as a constitutive part of the limbic system, the center for assessing the affectively relevant content of perception and the memory network consisting of hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, and the temporal poles. This can be conceived of as a strong indication that this memory network is also involved in processing affects. Koelsch delineates:

*Within this network, the hippocampus is presumably involved in memory formation and generation of emotions, the hippocampal gyrus in storing emotional memories and recognition of emotion, and the temporal poles probably in the retrieval of emotional memory.*<sup>123</sup>

Thus, affects have a discursive significance per se because the meaning of an appearance always has an emotional dimension, even if we do not reflect on

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<sup>122</sup> Compare: Ciompi, *Die emotionalen Grundlagen des Denkens: Entwurf einer fraktalen Affektlogik*.

<sup>123</sup> Stefan Koelsch, *Brain and music*, 1. ed. ed. (Chichester, West Sussex u.a.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013). P. 232

it consciously.<sup>124</sup> And it can be recorded: holistic discursive cognition is an essential function within the ongoing process of self-generation in living entities for which Maturana and Varela created the term »autopoiesis« to describe this determinant quality of living entities. The term was originally coined for characterizing the recursive organization of cells and meta-cellular biological organisms where the product of the cooperation of the system's components is exactly that organization that generates these components<sup>125</sup>, but it was soon adopted for describing the emergent self-organization of social entities as well<sup>126</sup>, as is accounted for in the following definition:

An entity is an autopoietic system if it is constituted by an integrated and closed network of recursive operations that #1 synthesizes the components necessary for reproducing itself, #2 defines its periphery, #3 controls its interchange processes, and #4 facilitates the navigation in as well as #5 the adaption to its environment.<sup>127</sup>

In order to maintain itself, an autopoietic system is intrinsically self-referential, which means that each and every operation is performed in reference to the cause of self-generating in a complex cooperation with the other operations of the system in relation to an even more complex environment. This self-referentiality must result from an intrinsic impulse to retain the process of self-generation. For achieving this, higher organisms need not only to continually observe themselves as well as their environment, but they need a central instance of control, a process of meta-operations we conceive of as the cognizing mind, which itself is also generated by the processes

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<sup>124</sup> which to some degree seems to contradict the central notion of intentionality in Husserl's phenomenological approach. While both kinds of affect-appearances transcend intentional cognition, they sometimes ought to be drawn to awareness for conscious cognitive use. When we react with the common symptoms of stress, for example, this evidently goes back to the existential fear associated with facing a predator, in which an immediate reaction of either fight or flight were mandatory. Though, in modern life, facing a pride of lions or a wolf pack has become a rare event for the majority of people, cardio-vascular disease as well as physical and mental symptoms of chronic anxiety and exhaustion depression have become very common illnesses that can be ascribed to enduring constant stress, though often on a non-conscious level. Becoming aware of these signals and considering them in one's discursive processes will be operative for the quality of future behavior and choices in respect to health.

<sup>125</sup> Maturana and Varela, *The tree of knowledge: the biological roots of human understanding*. P. 56

<sup>126</sup> Niklas Luhman even introduced the term as a central aspect of his theory of social systems. In how far »autopoiesis« can be deployed in sociology is thoroughly discussed in Hugo and Arnold Cadenas, Marcelo, "The Autopoiesis of Social Systems and its Criticisms," *Constructivist Foundations* 10, no. 2 (2015),

<sup>127</sup> This definition mounts on the definition by Paul Bourguine and John Stewart, "Autopoiesis and Cognition," 10, no. 3 (2004),

maintained in an autopoietic system. The essential function of cognition is to facilitate these meta-operations that pilot environment-related operations through transforming data by understanding and judgement into information as the reference for decisions that regulate operations<sup>128</sup>. This, of course, is very much in accord with transcendental idealism that regards the purpose of discursive cognition in generating understanding as the basis for judgement and assumes universal a priori categories that can, just as the primary affects, much more appropriately be conceptualized as conditions arising from human physicality than as part of a metaphysical entity like a soul that gets added to the body as, for example, Descartes assumed in accord with the traditional respective religious paradigm. Furthermore, the integration of autopoiesis as a teleologic driving force into Kant's system is appropriate as expedience is a consistent postulate of his philosophy and nature-intention (Naturabsicht) is a fundamental assumption of his ontological reasoning.<sup>129</sup>

Maturana's and Varela's proposition that an individual cannot be aware of the cognitive acts of other individuals at all, on the other hand, needs to be disputed in the light of Kant's findings on the transcendently discursive nature of cognition. Guided by the universal a priori categories complemented by the basic affect categories, we can assume that similar autopoietic systems are guided by similar meta-operations that in similar environments will lead to similar behavior. Even though, as Kant first analyzed and Niklas Luhmann coined, „we cannot know about reality in itself because we don't have the means to distinguish between the conditions of the existence of real objects and the conditions of their perception as we don't have an epistemically independent access to reality“<sup>130</sup> we can to a certain degree anticipate

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<sup>128</sup> A significant example of this cybernetic phenomenon on the cellular level is the control of messenger RNA's translation activity for the synthesis of the specific protein for which it carries the genetic information by cytoplasmatic proteins. Depending on the status within a cell cytoplasmatic proteins can bind to a certain mRNA and thereby either initiate, stabilize or deter its translation process, and so control the production of that specific protein, and thereby control its activity.

<https://www.spektrum.de/lexikon/biologie/messenger-rna/42380> last visited 14.01.2021

<sup>129</sup> Ulrich Johannes Schneider, *Philosophische Archäologie und Archäologie der Philosophie: Kant und Foucault* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2004), <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-149218>. P. 86

<sup>130</sup> Luhmann, *Die Realität der Massenmedien*. P. 17 „Konstruktivistische Theorien behaupten, dass kognitive Systeme nicht in der Lage sind, zwischen den Bedingungen der Existenz von Realobjekten und den Bedingungen ihrer Erkenntnis zu unterscheiden, weil sie keinen erkenntnisunabhängigen Zugang zu solchen Realobjekten haben.“ This doctrine of constructivism can be seen as a result of Kant's influence on modern epistemology.



the cognition, the judgements, the decisions and the resulting behavior of other individuals of our common species because of the »epistemic circumstance of discursive similarity«. And not only of our own species:

*Humans often focus on how different we are from other animals. Certainly, there are some important differences, but more and more we are learning that we differ by degree rather than kind. We see these similarities most clearly when we look at human populations that live a more traditional, foraging lifestyle. Barsbai et al. compared more than 300 such foraging human populations with mammal and bird species living in the same environment across a wide array of environmental conditions (see the Perspective by Hill and Boyd). They found that all three groups converged with regard to foraging, social, and reproductive behaviors. Thus, adaptation to environmental selection shapes similar responses across a wide diversity of life-forms.<sup>131</sup>*

If an epistemic circumstance of discursive similarity is to a certain extent transcendental for a variety of species, this must apply to humanity all the more because the barriers for the initial exchange of meaning by communication would otherwise be insurmountable; it would simply be too complex to identify and/or create common objects<sup>132</sup> that can be taken reference to in discourse without the sound assumption that in a common environment people will arrive at similar perceptions and judgements because the fundamental conditions of cognition are shared – not only the functioning of the senses but also the mental processing of the data perceived.<sup>133</sup> This is a decisive precondition for establishing societies, not merely its result, because it is the precondition for the reproducibility of experience and judgement which is essential for weaving that one common world which the constructivists Maturana and Varela refer to in the quotation above and which is the adaptation to life that is characteristic for humanity.

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<sup>131</sup> Science 14 Jan 2021: Vol. 371, Issue 6526, pp. 292-295

„The similarities are not only present for behaviors directly relating to the environment, such as finding food, where we might expect a clear correlation, but also for reproductive and social behaviors, which might seem less dependent on the local environment.“ said author Dr. Toman Barsbai, from the University of Bristol and the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

Toman Barsbai, Dieter Lukas, and Andreas Ponderfer, "Foraging humans, mammals and birds who live in the same place behave similarly," *Science X* 2021, no. 19 April (2021), last visited 19.04.2021

<sup>132</sup> Luhmann, *Die Realität der Massenmedien*. P. 178

<sup>133</sup> George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge to western thought* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999). P. 5: "What universal aspects of reason there are arise from the commonalities of our bodies and brains and the environments we inhabit."

The philosopher Ernst von Glasersfeld, who founded the school of Radical Constructivism together with the physicist Heinz von Förster assisted by Maturana and Varela, criticizes Kant for remaining in the traditional concept of knowledge that cognition is always evoked by the perception of something and that the ontic world is the stimulus for the synthesis of phenomena.<sup>134</sup> Radical Constructivism dismisses any kind of causal relation or correspondence between the ontic world and human knowledge. For terminological reasons, von Glasersfeld suggests using “the term actuality for everything that is created by human action and human knowledge, and the term reality for that reality which is ontological in the sense of the philosophers in that it is supposed to exist before an observer even came into it.”<sup>135</sup>

Thus, this concept of actuality, as well as Kant’s Phenomena, which are representations but not icons of the things in themselves, indeed are very similar approaches. This impression even intensifies if the theory of the a priori categories as given concepts of »ascribable meaning« in the sense of a hypothesis of relational consequence, as suggested in this study, is related to the existential-necessity approach to cognition as implied by the autopoiesis theory. The integration of these approaches into one process involves cognition to be a continuous performance of the individual mind, which also correlates to some extent with the notion of radical constructivism that actuality is the result of the permanent cognitive construction by an individual. Kant sums up the core of his Copernican Revolution in the sentence:

*Our intellect does not draw its laws from nature but imposes its laws upon nature.*<sup>136</sup>

At face value this seems not only very similar but almost congruent to Jean Piaget’s even more process-oriented teaching that the intellect organizes the world by organizing itself<sup>137</sup>, which has been adopted as a central paradigm

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<sup>134</sup> Ernst von Glasersfeld, "Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit und des Begriffs der Objektivität," in *Einführung in den Konstruktivismus*, ed. Heinz Von Foerster (München: Piper, 2014). P. 11

<sup>135</sup> von Glasersfeld, "Konstruktivismus statt Erkenntnistheorie." P. 42 „... Wirklichkeit für alles das zu verwenden, was durch menschliches Wirken als menschliches Wissen hervorgebracht worden ist, und Realität für jene Realität, die ontologisch ist im Sinne der Philosophen, die als solche existieren soll, bevor ein Erlebender überhaupt in sie hineingekommen ist.“

<sup>136</sup> K.R. Popper and L.J. Bennett, *In Search of a Better World: Lectures and Essays from Thirty Years* (Routledge, 1996). P. 131

<sup>137</sup> Ernst von Glasersfeld, *Radikaler Konstruktivismus: Ideen, Ergebnisse, Probleme*, ed. Ernst von Glasersfeld, 1. Aufl. ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996). P. 311

of the radical constructivist conception that all knowledge is constructed, without exception.

The decisive difference is not only that Kant's transcendental idealism, as criticized by von Glasersfeld, presupposes a relation of causality between ontic reality and perception, but also that it assumes a priori categories of cognition that are part of the ontic human condition in their own way, which turn cognition ultimately into recognition of ontic stimuli by signifying a degree of pre-given knowledge that allows us to relate to the ontic world according to that common ontic human condition, while Radical Constructivism subscribes to a radically subjective empirical idealism, viewing the human mind as a *tabula rasa*, or an empty bucket which fills with experiences, and completely constructs its knowledge by creating categories for its experiences while these experiences themselves are products of the mind.<sup>138</sup> This ultra-subjective evolutionary notion is instrumental for radical constructivism as it understands this process of knowledge construction as a process of establishing and maintaining viability.

With the concept of »viability«<sup>139</sup> von Glasersfeld intends to describe the relationship between actuality, the subjective individual appearance of the world, and reality as a state of fitness in the Darwinian sense. As long as the appearance of the world an individual has developed is functional in navigating her safely through the unknowable ontic reality, it is viable. Whenever an individual encounters an obstruction, she will have to adapt her inner map. Therefore, knowledge was not about »what«, but about »how«.<sup>140</sup> In this, radical constructivism seems to put into intellectual practice the subjectivist relativism the Sophists were accused of, especially with regard to the *homo mensura* doctrine and their weaker-stronger-case reflections, with all the epistemological inadequacies and intellectual as well as ethical shallows that are going to be encountered when the »why« is neglected or insufficiently reflected. With his concept of viability, von Glasersfeld implies the same empirical idealism, verging on solipsism, that Maturana and Varela manifested by putting forward the black box model of perception in the quotation above. But without the presupposition that it is the one ontic reality

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<sup>138</sup> von Glasersfeld, "Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit und des Begriffs der Objektivität." P. 35 Kant reflects exactly on this process and its inter-human similarity as a part of the ontic reality of human kind

<sup>139</sup> von Glasersfeld, "Konstruktivismus statt Erkenntnistheorie." P.30

<sup>140</sup> Heinz von Foerster, *Einführung in den Konstruktivismus*, ed. Heinz Von Foerster, 14. Aufl. ed., Serie Piper, (München u.a.: Piper, 2014). P. 13

that we all derive our perception from, that cognition is our interface to that reality, our endeavor of generating viability would necessarily fail due to complete disorientation – except, of course, if one would solipsistically deny the existence of ontic reality at all and assume that all existence was only a construction of the mind (“the absurd proposition that there is an appearance without anything that appears”). In that case the concept of viability would become nugatory as there would be nothing to adapt to. But taking von Glasersfeld’s differentiation between reality and actuality we can assume that radical constructivism does indeed accept the existence of ontic reality. And in an ontic reality we need an ontically given similarity of perception, otherwise it would be complex beyond conceivability to generate that intersubjective actuality of shared objects Varela and Maturana refer to and the appearance of the world would never be more than the experienced world of a single individual.<sup>141</sup> This results in the same solipsism as the denial of an empiric reality because it would have the categorical consequence that everybody was living in his/her own world alone.

The concept of viability is entailed by the assumption of a profound division between reality and actuality that Radical Constructivism proclaims due to its blindness model of perception. Von Glasersfeld, for example, uses the metaphor of the blind wanderer drawing a map of the obstacles he encounters on his way through a forest to describe the human relation to reality, which implies that we can, if at all, only have a rudimentary imagination of the ontic world.<sup>142</sup> But this metaphor only highlights the radical constructivist tendency to reduce sensory perception to the perceptions of a single sense, vision, even though it needs to be understood as a holistic process where a percept that transcends the sum of the perceptions of the single senses emerges in the cognitive interoperation of all senses. Certainly, this holistic percept still only represents ontic reality phenomenally, but it allows us to determine our own as well as, for example, through empathy, other people’s position in this representation of the ontic world and even recognizes us as all as being equally subjected to the forces in our common natural environment that are acting independently from our cognition. We can anticipate, for example, that a blind wanderer resting unawares under a heavy dry branch of an oak tree in a storm is not only exposed to a potentially fatal risk because entropy and gravity are universal in their consequences, but

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<sup>141</sup> von Foerster, *Einführung in den Konstruktivismus*. P. 33

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.* P. 20

also that he might have sat down because he is exhausted, lost, and scared. Ontic reality reenters human actuality unexpectedly every now and then as hard intrinsic facts because the real relation between objects lies beyond what we can observe like the branch coming down, but we are in disposition of the conditions for socializing our apperception so that we are able to help each other out in creating a more holistically applicable representation of the environment.

We cannot conceive ontic reality in itself because our apperception is ever pre-structured and incomplete at the same time and may differ, by degree, not by kind, according to our individual cognitive abilities, ambitions, and socio-cultural context, not because our cognition is completely independent from the ontic world. That memories and even perceptions can be artificially induced and that the brain constantly completes perceptions with data that is not empirical does not mean that perception is not induced by ontic reality as such at all. It just means that cognition is both a biological and social process with interfaces on both sides. The senses, including their neurological network, can be innervated to produce a false percept and a childhood memory, for example, can be suggested by a highly credible person telling a plausible and adaptable story.<sup>143</sup> Cognition may also seem to be independent of reality because it is a process where the consistency of meaning and the coherence of perception have primacy over accuracy.<sup>144</sup> The details are not as important as the big picture. If accuracy had the primacy, we would constantly be slowed down by the experience of cognitive dissonance because all the minor inconsistencies between our knowledge and momentary perception would need to be consciously sorted out.<sup>145</sup>

Still, the differentiation between reality and actuality is very fertile, as long as it is not understood as the strict dualism Radical Constructivism turns it into. »Reality« conceptualizes that humans as organisms and human societies as their meta organisms are a part of an ontic world in which the laws of nature, as we conceive them, are existentially superordinated to any and all of human endeavor. Humanity is not only subjected to ontic reality, but, as

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<sup>143</sup> Elizabeth F. Loftus, "Creating false memories," *Scientific American* Vol. 277, No. 3, SEPTEMBER 1997 (1997),

<sup>144</sup> Roth P. 59

<sup>145</sup> When it is necessary to gain objective empirical data, we need to make use of instruments for measuring.

humanity is real itself, ontic reality is also subjected to human agency.<sup>146</sup> That the rise of average temperatures and the accelerating disappearance of species that are being empirically observed, need to be assigned to human industry in order to take steps to stop these existential processes is ventilated in the »climate change« and »anthropocene« discourses which have generated a term like: »anthropogenic threats«<sup>147</sup>.

These discourses can be taken as significant examples of the discursive generation of what is here conceived of as actuality. While reality, as the dimension of ontic existence, does not associate any meaning to the rise of temperature on earth or the extinction of species, actuality, defined by Kant as the appearance of existence at a determinate time<sup>148</sup>, integrates the assessment of the consequences of these observations in reference to the existential measure of human autopoiesis. Very similar to the basic though much more trivial example of the sun heating the stone, the scientific example here is also a matter of cause and effect. Based on knowledge, it was initially forecast that a certain development was going to have certain consequences and, thus, become a cause of a certain effect. On the grounds of the physical properties of CO<sub>2</sub>, the Swedish scientist and Nobel laureate, Svante Arrhenius (1859-1929), predicted that the increasing human emissions of this molecule would boost the natural greenhouse effect of the atmosphere.<sup>149</sup> That a continuous increase in mean-temperature can be observed as correlating with an increase of CO<sub>2</sub> molecules in the atmosphere that can be associated to human emissions as its cause, is today considered as evidence for the anthropogenicity of global warming. The relational consequences for the object-object »mean temperature« constitute the meaning of the subject-object »human CO<sub>2</sub> emissions« they are assigned to. This discursive dimension becomes clearer if one contemplates that Arrhenius was already swaying in his assessment of the consequences for humanity. In 1896 he warned that by its excessive burning of coal humanity might cause global heating beyond

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<sup>146</sup> This correlation is what Karl Popper describes in his 3 Worlds approach. Compare: K.R.P. Mark Amadeus Notturmo, K.R. Popper, and M.A. Notturmo, *Knowledge and the Body-mind Problem: In Defence of Interaction* (Routledge, 1994).

<sup>147</sup> Jedediah F. Brodie, Sara Williams, and Brittany Garner, "The decline of mammal functional and evolutionary diversity worldwide," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 118, no. 3 (2021),

<sup>148</sup> Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason. Immanuel Kant, Paul Guyer, Allen W. Wood." CPR A145/B184: Kant identifies a schema for each category as its mediator for the identification of objects to be subsumed under its category. The schema of actuality is existence at a determinate time.

<sup>149</sup> Elisabeth Crawford, *Arrhenius: from ionic theory to the greenhouse effect*, 1. publ. ed., Uppsala studies in history of science, (Canton, Ma.: Science History Publ., 1996).

conceivability, while in 1906 he commented very optimistically about his prediction, expecting the increasing CO<sub>2</sub> quantum to improve climatic conditions for agriculture and, thus, for feeding the quickly growing world population.<sup>150</sup>

And indeed, looking at it rationally, the existential significance of autopoiesis always necessitates the contemplating and discussing of different imaginable consequences before making a judgement because every judgement will itself have, possibly existential, consequences for that purpose and accordingly needs to be well assayed. The problem today is that even under the autopoietic imperative to approximate correspondence between knowledge and fact, scientific evidence is not generally accepted as unequivocally applicable but is reflected on in the light of other subjective considerations, possibly driven by short term motives or ideological, respective religious considerations.

### 2.2.3 The intersubjective processing of meaning

In Kant's system this extension of discursivity into the domain of intentional consciousness is conceived of as »reason«. He classifies reasoning as the highest level of the discursive process:

*All our cognition starts from the senses, goes from there to the understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is nothing higher in us to work on the matter of intuition and bring it under the highest unity of thinking.*<sup>151</sup>

While understanding is the first-order faculty of processing the data intuited into appearances by subsuming it under the rules of the categories, reasoning is a second-order faculty as it interconnects the dispersed and fragmentary cognitive products of understanding by first generating principles and then projecting these onto the objects for unifying them into a holistic appearance of appearances in their interrelatedness.<sup>152</sup>

Fundamentally, the acquired principles have the same key function in the reasoning process as the a priori categories have in the process of understanding: assigning meaning in order to make sense of the environment. This

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<sup>150</sup> Crawford, *Arrhenius: from ionic theory to the greenhouse effect*.

<sup>151</sup> Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason. Immanuel Kant, Paul Guyer, Allen W. Wood." CPR A298/B355

<sup>152</sup> Allison and Kant, *Kant's transcendental idealism*. P. 310

makes it difficult to discriminate in practice where understanding ends and reasoning starts. Discursivity facilitates the continuity of the perception process within an individual as well as between the intra-individual frame and the inter-individual frame. This is important to note because reasoning, other than understanding, does not assign meaning by applying universally given categories, but by applying dialectically emergent principles that are ultimately generated by hypothesizing which is partly directed by cognitive reasoning and partly by affective reasoning, making it a fundamentally highly subjective process. Hence, Kant postulates for good reason that reasoning, which has been understood as purely dialectic since pre-socratic philosophy, needs to be measured by empirical experience and understanding for producing further-processable outcomes. However, because empirical experience (transcendental aesthetics) and understanding also involve subjective hypothesizing, apperception, vice versa, also needs to be put to the scrutiny of reasoning, so that different experiences and understandings can be compared and synchronized for generating intersubjective appearances.<sup>153</sup>

This suggests an integrated view of discursivity as a process of combining understanding and reason into a system of checks and balances. The phenomena generated by understanding can be objectively false impressions like optical illusions, as intentionally used, for example, in the architecture of the Athenian Parthenon<sup>154</sup>, or as intuited by a mirage, or subjectively false impressions like those produced by schizophrenia. In these cases, reasoning can help to criticize and objectify sensations, for example by contextualizing them. Understanding, on the other hand, as the perception of the empirically existing object, can help to correct unapplicable conceptions generated by reason. The ineluctable affects intrinsic to any perception will automatically be included into this scheme of critique. Bitter medicine, for example, will be much better consumable if its healing effect is sufficiently impressed on the patient. And rationality can produce objectively unapplicable understandings if empathy is not discursively included. Compassion is an often rationally devaluated, but, especially in the long run, just as often extremely consequential measure of judgement. On the other hand, affects like fear and also joy can prove to be un-substantive when exposed to the scrutiny of rationality.

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<sup>153</sup> Gareth Stedman Jones, "Dialectical Reasoning," in *Marxian Economics*, ed. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1990). P. 121

<sup>154</sup> Coren, Ward, and Enns, *Sensation and perception*. P. 5



For Kant, principles have the function of unifying understanding, but in this unifying functionality they also have the potential of forming the processes of cognition and judgement because they can pilot the process by predetermining what is to be perceived and what to be ignored. Generated by the integrative discursivity of reason where different opinions, doctrines, and affective attitudes have an influence, which can sometimes turn out to be completely chimerical, principles need to be regarded as fully subjective and speculative rules for classifying understanding and judgement. Because principles indeed are, to different degrees, products of human construction and have the function of piloting, structuring, and framing perception, they have to prove their validity beyond »feeling right« for envisaging an understanding of objects and situations by allowing the logically inference of relational meaning that is consistent with empirical experience and can plausibly only be maintained as long as they provide valid relational meaning that contributes to generating coherent, integrated, and integrative phenomena. Transcendental idealism therefore postulates that empirical experience and understanding must be used for correcting principles of reason, which of course is difficult, if not impossible, if reason derives its principles from metaphysically essentialist doctrines. In this case it can often be observed that incongruous empirical findings are either negated or are modified to make them accord. In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant proposes a concerted application of reason and experience:

*Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must approach nature with its principles in one hand, according to which the agreement among appearances can count as laws, and, in the other hand, the experiment thought out in accord with these principles – in order to be instructed by nature not like a pupil, who has recited to him whatever the teacher wants to say, but like an appointed judge who compels witnesses to answer the questions he puts to them.<sup>155</sup>*

Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertakings and cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any censorship of higher principles without damaging the very substance of its functionality by restricting its complexity and drawing upon itself a disadvantageous suspicion. For there is nothing so important, nothing so holy, that it may be exempted from this examining review and inspection, which knows no respect of person, history, or tradition. On this freedom rests the rationality of reason, which has no dictatorial authority, but whose claim is never anything more than the

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<sup>155</sup> Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason. Immanuel Kant, Paul Guyer, Allen W. Wood." Bxiii

agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express its reservations, indeed even its veto, without holding back as long as this veto is built and expressed along the lines of tolerance, honesty and due diligence.<sup>156</sup>

In Kant's larger endeavor of exploring a rational approach to objective knowledge, he generally considers metaphysics to lie beyond the human faculty of experience. »God«, »the immortal Soul«, and »the Cosmos« may be considered »transcendental ideas« but not as principles of reason in the strict sense since they have no empirical point of reference. This implies that, even though reason's principles often are derived from higher principles<sup>157</sup>, they can only be related virtually to the transcendental ideas because the meaning they generate cannot be empirically proven, and must therefore be considered, as Kant puts it rather pejoratively, »transcendental seeming«, which applies to any reification of the transcendental idea of God in a specific canon of religious beliefs and commandments.

For the practical considerations of this study in reference to actuality, between these transcendental ideas and the concepts of understanding there is a lot of space for paradigms, in the commonplace sense of the term, as meta-principles that constructively interpret the world in the light of their dialectic premises.<sup>158</sup> Depending on the paradigms, different meanings of one and the same object can be coherent for further reasoning.<sup>159</sup> This entails that different principles can possibly be considered objective in accordance to different, mutually preclusive paradigmatic approaches<sup>160</sup>, as is the case in the realm of »relativity theory« and in the realm of »quantum theory«. But as meta-principles, paradigms themselves, of course, must also be subject to the discursive process of reason and can only be considered applicable as long as they generate principles and meaning coherently applicable to the objects in their environmental context.<sup>161</sup> However, this does not prevent reason

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid. A738f / B766f

<sup>157</sup> Allison and Kant, *Kant's transcendental idealism*. P. 311/312

<sup>158</sup> For further insights on the function of paradigms please refer to Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical investigations*, 2. ed. ed., A Blackwell paperback, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978). §50

<sup>159</sup> In psychology, for example, seven paradigmatic approaches can be differentiated: behavioristic, cognitive, biologicistic, psycho-dynamic, humanistic, evolutionary, socio-cultural.

<sup>160</sup> Principles of any paradigmatic origin can be very resistant even when they prove to yield inadequate meanings that lack even paradigmatic coherence because traditionalism is a common human aberration.

<sup>161</sup> Especially ideologies and religions have the tendency to reverse this relation by making the environment adoptable to its paradigms and oftentimes override reason with dogmata.

from producing a dialectic noise of yet insufficiently criticized relational appearances.

In their function of producing coherent meaning, paradigms, as all principles, have the constructive ability of putting a focus on certain aspects, making them more sharply visible, while de-complexifying actuality by blinding out information implausible in reference to themselves, or that which is beyond their epistemic scope. Furthermore, principles generate virtual artifacts that they need for self-stabilization, thus contributing to the dialectic noise referred to above.

Is it then appropriate to deem paradigmatically construed »views of the world« (Weltanschauungen) a person's actuality? As will be delineated in the next subchapter, culture poses a paradigmatic filter that has a decisive influence on how people relate to the world, how they perceive, organize, and treat their environment and how they expect to be treated by the environment. Thus, a view of the world that is dominant in a society will always have a strong effect on actuality because our paradigms configure how we experience the world and how we shape it. Because there are many more forces acting on us than a cultural view of the world could possibly represent, it also poses a potentially fatal limitation to the perception of the environment. A person or society dogmatically confined to its view of the world will ultimately fail because intrinsic consequences of unexpected, divergent situations and developments will require realizations that go beyond its paradigmatic horizon. A view of the world is only two dimensional, like a static picture, and therefore inadequate for representing the world as a place to live in. Even if a person assumes that the environment always conforms to his view of the world, it is still inadequate to term this subjective construct the person's actuality: ideology is a more appropriate term here. Such personal ideologies are, of course, very common and it is important that they are also subject to criticism because they also make for epistemological distortions as has been pointed out by the protagonists of Critical Theory in attachment to Karl Marx' theory of ideology critique.

Actuality is the indefinite appearance of the world we live in, as derived from Kant's transcendental idealism, that must be envisaged as a cosmos that is inside and outside of us at the same time. Correspondingly, this cosmos allows for movement in all directions, both physically by locomotion as well as ideally by the means of reasoning, while relational meanings of objects may change by changing the ideal or the physical vantage point. This assumes that actuality is not isolated from ontic reality and that an object can

exert the force intrinsic to its factuality even if an observing subject is ignorant of it or has a diverging subjective assessment of it. As social integration is the adaption to the environment that is characteristic of humanity, this is not only true for the natural dimension of life but also in the social dimension, where, for example, normative laws and conventions apply objectively in that they bring consequences universally so that ignorance does not protect against punishment.<sup>162</sup> Failing to assign the statutory meaning to a red traffic light may lead to accident, injury, and/or punishment, but late at night at a junction in a rural area people may apply different principles, possibly anticipating such behavior of situationally disregarding road traffic regulations.

It needs to be recorded that actuality is real in two respects: Firstly, actuality represents the world as a whole as the context and the environment that conditions individual existence, even if only a small part of the world can be experienced, and it does this from a subjective perspective only. Secondly, actuality includes factualities. Even though in actuality nothing is ever quite unambiguously perceived and assessed, material objects really fill a certain space, laws and conventions really exert a normalizing force (or it has certain implications if they do not), and events really are interactions that take a certain timespan, all bringing about substantial consequences that ultimately create a difference to the status quo ante.

From an autopoiesis point of view it would be desirable to reduce insecurity towards zero by generating a complete representation of the world by anticipating all of the imaginable relationalities between all objects, which is as impossible as perceiving reality in itself. While a maximally extensive apprehension is desirable, it is dysfunctional for limited minds and senses to consider relational consequences that lie beyond a sensible degree of probability. Effectively, only those meanings can be considered by a perceiving subject that seem most applicable by personal reasoning and most applied because they are intersubjectively circulating. Together these considerable (in the literal sense) consequences of an object form its »aggregate of meanings« that ultimately poses the object's dynamically indeterminate appearance in the mind of a perceiving subject.<sup>163</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> Ignorantia legis non excusat.

<sup>163</sup> „Imagine (. . .) a Coca-Cola can on a table; if you walk around the table while watching the can, stop every now and then and describe the can as you see it. The description will each time be partly similar

Because these aggregates of meanings represent an object's hypothesized consequences for a multitude of other objects, they generate the cosmos of actuality by the dynamics of their interrelations as an intersubjective horizon of possibility. Of this multitude of discursively available relational appearances, one or the other might possibly prove to be a more objectively applicable assessment than the one momentarily opined, or might, even though completely subjective, endanger one's own autopoiesis if not anticipated, like a truck driver not stopping at a red traffic light.

In the same way as human autopoiesis makes the comparison and critique of perceptions, as well as the exchange of views on inferred meanings and the discussion of the superordinated principles, a necessity, reasoning transcends the barriers of the individual self towards the social sphere. Endeavoring a sociological application of this concept, reason, as the faculty and the function of drawing mediate inferences<sup>164</sup>, needs to be understood as a dialectically discursive process of sense generation in which the results of reasoning, the principles, and the meanings inferred by their projection, are continuously reintroduced into the process.

That Kant himself already had a broader understanding of reason, which went far beyond the confines of scholarly philosophy, can, for example, be deduced from his essay about enlightening where he states:

*This enlightenment requires nothing but freedom--and the most innocent of all that may be called "freedom": freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters.*<sup>165</sup>

In societies where public reasoning is institutionalized, a much larger perception base as well as a much larger variety of interpretative principles is generated. Under such circumstances, subjective principles sometimes compete and sometimes complement each other while proving the pure objectivity of a principle is an unattainable objective that needs to be surrogated by applicability, which can be measured only by the practical and ethical sustainability of the meaning they produce. Viability is not sufficient because

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and partly different. Yet it is the same can, and no single description of it is comprehensive, since every single description is biased by the particular position from which we described it."

Jan Blommaert, *Discourse: A Critical Introduction*, Online-Ausg. ed., Key topics in sociolinguistics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). P.17

<sup>164</sup> Allison and Kant, *Kant's transcendental idealism*. P. 311

<sup>165</sup> Immanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment," (29 May 2021 1784).

[www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html](http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html)

principles also need to answer the »why« for producing meaning, that, when it is applied to an object, allows reason to infer coherent meaning for related objects in an ongoing sequence, as, for example, in chains of causation. Intersubjective acceptance is a better indicator, but still not completely adequate. To prove the applicability of a principle, the meaning generated needs to resist a threefold scrutiny of the social reasoning process: a conclusive hypothesis of its »why«, and the scientific exploration of its validity in relation to the empirical environment as well as, ultimately, proving its intersubjective acceptability in the contest with opposing approaches in the dialectics of the societal arena. As a result of going through such troubles, such a society will have a more adequate representation of its environment than autocratic societies with no or only restricted performance of public reasoning.

The paradigm of anthropogenicity as applicable to rising global temperature and mass extinction, as discussed in the example above, is, as with any principle, a product of such socially discursive reasoning. For asserting its general acceptance and application, it is not enough to generate evidence, for example, that the bleaching and dissolution of coral reefs<sup>166</sup> are a mediated consequence of the increasing accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and to what extent this increasing accumulation is man-made. It is also necessary to illustrate and argue it in a way that it also becomes accessible for those who deny it on principle. The principle of the strong dominance of natural factors in climatic change, in turn, not only needs to show scrutable explanations for the well-established correlation between the rise of human CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and the rise of global mean temperature, but also in how far it is reasonable to risk future dire consequences by completely discounting the anthropogenicity principle and the evidence it currently produces. Because there will always be minorities that contest well established findings on the authority of their diverging principles even in scientific discourses, evidence is never completely unambiguously accepted. This applies even more to the discursive process of public reasoning where the connection between knowledge and evidence is rather delicate and ultimately remains a matter of believing which, again, is subject to principles. However, despite all possible differences in the assessment of objects and their relation due to diverging principles, the combination of the autopoietic need for applicable knowledge and the epistemic circumstance of discursive similarity

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<sup>166</sup> Chelsea Harvey, "Corals are dissolving away," in *Scientific American* (23 February 2018, 08. Mai 2021). <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/corals-are-dissolving-away1/>.

facilitates the conditions that the most sensible conceptions will more probably prevail in the inter-individual (public) discursive process. Only where principles are derived from an essentialist construction like political ideology or religion, may they evolve the dynamics to suspend and overrule sensibility.

In summary, discursivity can be envisaged as the continuous process of empirically observing objects, establishing an object's meaning in relation to another object, before acquiring its appearance by attributing that meaning to that object. Thus, discursivity is a mediating process of a teleologic quality situated in the human condition, driven by the purpose of autopoiesis. On the level of transcendental aesthetics, the performance of discursivity is synthesizing the percepts of the objects perceived by applying the core epistemological concepts of space and time to the data intuited from the outer world. On the level of understanding, these percepts are turned into phenomena by discursively relating the percept of one object to other objects according to the a priori categories and by involuntary application of the fundamental affects. In its continuity, discursivity then facilitates the seamless adoption of these same phenomena into the third level, the level of conscious reasoning where they can be criticized and altered. On this level of reasoning, discursivity is complemented by dialectic and extends into the social sphere where it synthesizes the principles which generate the aggregates of the meanings that can more or less coherently be assigned to the objects which compose actuality as a holistic representation of inter-subjectively processed relational phenomena. Lacking perception of the things in themselves, these intersubjective phenomena serve as common objects for the discourses that recursively generate the principles that structure the process of reason.

Is this a construction process? Principles are constructions and they do act as constructive operators that have an influence on the discursive process. When principles are essentialized in instances such as religions and ideologies they do exert a constructive power that may successfully suppress the criticizing force of discursivity for a while in the process of the emergence of actuality, but they categorically cannot override the discursive process sustainably. Sooner or later such constructions fail on complexity and fall victim to the self-organizational sway of discursivity, no matter how hard they try to contain it.

Even though discursivity is a universal process, actuality ultimately needs to be assumed as individually experienced reality. Each and everybody has his

or her own subjective vantage point within the space of actuality. Because of the circumstance of discursive similarity, these vantage points differ only by degree, not by kind, and discursivity can act as the transgressive element that seamlessly integrates individual perception and understanding with the inter-personal dimension of social reasoning. Furthermore, this discursivity-approach also anticipates that actuality as such is emergent because reasoning keeps the aggregates of meanings in constant transition in the sense of Heraklit's *panta rhei*. We live in a transcendental, hyper-complexly meaningful and empirically tangible intersubjective appearance of the world at a determinate time that emerges from a continuous discursive process.



## 2.3 Societal Actuality as an Emergent: the epistemic functionality of culture

### 2.3.1 The concept of emergence

According to Plato's historicist approach of transcendental realism where the good development of a society is achieved only by observing the real truths of the ideas, destiny is predetermined, and future developments are ipso facto predictable as they follow cosmically given rules. Or, to put it the other way round: the rules of Plato's hidden static and closed cosmos are projected onto the texture of society and materialize as the un pitying transcendental laws that human history essentially obeys. Society and history only seem to be open processes as sketched by Heraclitus' concept of »panta rhei«, whereas in 'truth' they were as invariable and closed as his metaphysical static cosmos of ideas itself.

Actuality, as derived from transcendental idealism, is the hypercomplex and equivocal spacial appearance of the world at a determinate time which can be considered an ever changing cosmos of transitional phenomena, being emergent in two ways: In a broad sense of self-organization, as its interrelations are too complex to be planned and purposely constructed because actuality is assembled as existence at the determinate moment of now by quasi mystic (complex beyond conceivability) circumstance within the mist of possibilities that obscures the future which actuality appears from. And in a holism-sense as it is more than the sum of the aggregates of meanings (objects) it comprises.

Emergentist thinking refers to the interdisciplinary line of thought which states that that novelty arises within the world because certain entities of one level can react as elements with another, together forming a new entity on a new level – as the result of such a reaction transcends the sum of its elements. The most striking example of such a reactive process in its unpredictability is water. Two hydrogen and one oxygen atoms form the molecules of a new material with characteristics that are absolutely independent of, and irreducible to, its elements: looking at the elements on their own there is no way of predicting the result of their reaction. And the occurrence of water, after the element oxygen had emerged in the process of nuclear fusion within stars and was proliferated into space through supernovae, has changed the world fundamentally in an evolutionary way.

The thinker first known to connote the relationship between an entity and its parts as potentially one of qualitative transcendence was Aristotle. The famous proverb that »the whole is more than the sum of its parts« can be seen as a paraphrase or conclusive abstract of two paragraphs in his *Metaphysics* Part VII and VIII:

*Now since that which is composed of something in such a way that the whole is a unity; not as an aggregate is a unity, but as a syllable is — the syllable is not the letters, nor is BA the same as B and A; nor is flesh fire and earth; because after dissolution the compounds, e.g. flesh or the syllable, no longer exist; but the letters exist, and so do fire and earth. Therefore, the syllable is some particular thing; not merely the letters, vowel and consonant, but something else besides.<sup>167</sup>*

*In all things which have a plurality of parts, and which are not a total aggregate but a whole of some sort distinct from the parts, there is some cause;<sup>168</sup>*

The term »emergence« is derived from the Latin verb »emergere«, where it can still be used transitively: bring forth, bring to light; as well as intransitively: to rise, to arise, to appear, to crop up, to become visible – to emerge. In the 1560s this process-indicating word-stem was adopted from French into the English language.<sup>169</sup> In the 19<sup>th</sup> century »emergence«, in its intransitive dimension only, became part of technical language in different fields to express the appearance of new properties or merits. In jurisdiction, for example, the term »emergens novum« describes the appearance of a new fact that changes the discerned nature or quality of a case or situation. Around 1870, German biology adopted the term in plant morphology to connote Gestalt changes. And, from 1870 onwards, English-speaking philosophy termed the qualitative properties of the human mind that could not be deduced from the micro-structure of the brain as »emergent«. This applies, for example for the above-mentioned interaction of »grid cells« and »place cells« as two different but related patterns of brain activity that, in their combination, constitute a neural positioning system for the representation of Gestalt, spacial relation and time course, as well as social relations, and memory.

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<sup>167</sup> Aristotle, G. Cyril Armstrong, and Hugh Tredennick, *Metaphysics*, ed. G. Cyril Armstrong and Hugh Tredennick, Loeb Classical Library, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). *Metaphysics* 7-1041b

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.* 8-1045a

<sup>169</sup> <https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=emerge> (last visited 11.11.2019)

The 20<sup>th</sup> century evolutionary concept of »emergentism« that formed out of these intellectual developments comprises the term's significance-dimensions »sudden«, »unexpected«, and »new« in their permanent coincidence.<sup>170</sup> A pre-determination aspect may be latently present in the fixed reactive potentiality of elements, but as the new entities formed by these reactions have new qualities and new reactive potentials (to become elements of an entity of the next level) that cannot be reduced to the qualities or reactive potentials of its elements, there is no necessary continuity from one evolutionary level to the next. Instead, the development is principally disruptive and often paired with a saltatory increase of complexity: Water has become an element of organisms, organisms form food chains, symbiotic relationships, families, and clans or even societies.

### 2.3.2 The poststructuralist approach to societal change

This layer-structure also applies to a certain extent to actuality as the appearance of appearances in their interrelatedness as arranged by the principles of reason that also generate the elements here conceived of as composing actuality, the aggregates of meanings that reshape the appearances of the objects of the environment as generated by understanding. While understanding as a transcendently discursive process reproduces determinate objects, reasoning as a socially integrative process of a dialectically discursive nature generates arrangements of an indeterminate and ever provisional quality. As the social process of societal accommodation that reasoning is here conceived of on the basis of the implications of Kant's account of reasoning, as invoked in the preceding chapter, reasoning needs to be abstracted from reason in the sense of »objectively rational thinking« because it generates not solely rational but also irrational principles; not solely empirically applicable meanings but also mere illusions; not solely appropriate appearances but also purely speculative assertions that need to be ventilated, criticized, judged and subsumed by further reasoning.<sup>171</sup> Actuality is

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<sup>170</sup> Tatjana Petzer, "Emergenz und Zukunft," *Forum Interdisziplinäre Begriffsgeschichte* 6, no. 1 (2018), P. 49

<sup>171</sup> Under the circumstance of big data and its scientific processing by analytic algorithms the conceptions about objects of one temporal layer being effects of certain causes situated in a precessing temporal layer are increasingly used not only for reconstructing causation but also for predicting future events, while under an emergentist stance any conceptions about future effects need to be assumed of as inherently speculative assumptions, even if they may be scientifically grounded.

dynamically shaped by the thus emerging momentary semantic contents of the aggregates of meanings in their interrelation. In so far, the concept of actuality, as it is interpreted here to be generated by the general social process of reason, is quite congruent to the post-structuralist conception of the »order of things« developed by the neo-Kantian historicist and philosopher, Michelle Foucault:

*The fact that at a determinate time some things can be seen and other things not, refers to the temporality of the structure of rationality, so that it is senseless to speak of the rationality and to put a claim to the reason, but the question must always be, what rationality and what reason we are talking about.<sup>172</sup>*

What can be taken to be intellectually presumed in this quotation, though not explicitly mentioned, is the virtual equation of the Kantian concept of principle-guided reason with the structure of rationality as mediated by language. Beginning at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> century and accelerated in the 1950s the skepticism towards language as a »transparent medium« was growing. Instead, especially in the social sciences, language was increasingly conceived of as »the incircumventable condition of thought«. This »linguistic turn« comprised the new paradigm of utilizing language as the fundamental explanatory model for analyzing the social world.<sup>173</sup>

A major implication of this new paradigm was turning attention from the speaking subject to the structure of language, conceiving of the structure of language not only as generally and theoretically incircumventable, but even as precedent to any individual practice of meaning attribution and sense fabrication. This is the premise signifying the structuralist line of thought that conceives of meaning as an effect of linguistic structure.<sup>174</sup> In consequence, the essence of linguistic structure – the essential structure behind the appearing structure, so to say – became the telos of structuralism. It was convinced that the definite structure of structure could be scientifically

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<sup>172</sup> »Die Tatsache, daß in einer bestimmten Zeit einiges gesehen werden kann und anderes nicht, verweist auf die Form der Rationalität einer Zeit, so daß es keinen Sinn hat, von der Rationalität zu sprechen und die Vernunft einzuklagen, sondern die Frage immer sein muß, von welcher Rationalität und welcher Vernunft die Rede ist«

Michel Foucault and Joseph Pearson, *Diskurs und Wahrheit: die Problematisierung der Parrhesia*; 6 Vorlesungen, gehalten im Herbst 1983 an der Universität von Berkeley/Kalifornien, ed. Joseph Pearson, Merve, (Berlin: Merve-Verl., 1996). P. 12f

<sup>173</sup> Stefan Münker and Alexander Roesler, *Poststrukturalismus*, 2., aktualisierte und erw. Aufl. ed., Sammlung Metzler, (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2012). P. 28

<sup>174</sup> Ibid. P. 29

discovered. It is this decisive detail, which stirred objections, prompted many thinkers to move on and helped establish post-structuralism. “Structuralist desires for extra cultural understandings are themselves cultural understandings. [. . .] While the structuralists looked through the glasses of their comprehension of the structures onto the world, the critical view of the post-structuralists was focused on the glasses themselves.”<sup>175</sup> Putting it in Kantian terms: Structuralism succumbed to the temptation of transcendental realism in supposing to be able to deduce the real and as such essential structure of the world because it was supposed to have engraved itself in to the structure of human language and thought. Post-structuralism, in its attachment to Kant, turns this relation around and views structure as such as the generative inner organizational condition of the human mind that is necessarily applied onto the world in the process of perception. But structure, like reason, is indeterminate and current; it is historic in its contingency. The order of things emerges from an open and uncentralized game of references and differences<sup>176</sup> that is here conceived of as reasoning which itself is a discursive process that bears emergent meanings. The discursively generated arrangement of dominant meanings in a society at a determinate time that configures this society’s members’ interpretation of the world is what Foucault calls »episteme«.<sup>177</sup>

In his theorizing on the functioning of what Kant conceived of as principles of reason, Foucault considers this determinate though contingent configuration of cognition to be a »positive unconscious of knowledge« that is socially precedent to knowledge and reasoning of the individual.<sup>178</sup> With the obvious intention of connecting to Kantian terminology he characterizes the functioning of this collective presupposition as that of a »historical a priori«.<sup>179</sup> While the concept of episteme is quite similar to the concept of paradigms as used above, it complies even less with a consciously preformed and static setup of propositions but suggests more of a subconsciously self-

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<sup>175</sup> Ibid. P. 31

<sup>176</sup> Ibid. P. 32

<sup>177</sup> Hannelore Bublitz, *Diskurs, Einsichten. Themen der Soziologie*, (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2003). P. 45

<sup>178</sup> Michel Foucault and Ulrich Köppen, *Die Ordnung der Dinge: eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften*, ed. Ulrich Köppen, Michel Foucault, and Michel Foucault, 9. Aufl. ed., Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990). P. 11

<sup>179</sup> Michel Foucault, *Archäologie des Wissens*, ed. Michel Foucault, 6. Aufl. ed., Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994). P. 184

organizational and emergently dynamic character of the principles that currently dominate in the configuration of the aggregates of meanings to an extent that deviant principles generating too deviant meanings and their underlying perceptions of interrelation are effectively excluded from serious consideration. Applying the conception of actuality as it is here derived from Kant's transcendental idealism, this suggests that the principles that reasoning is subject to must be seen as structuring semantic elements which it pre-generates by itself by the application of currently determinate superordinated meta-principles that govern the discursive process by their recursive application.

In Foucault's »post-structuralist« endeavor to lay bare the current knowledge structures that configure individual cognition at a definite time-period in an »archaeology of knowledge« it is this emergent self-organizational reasoning in reference to a certain meaning horizon or frame of contextually related objects<sup>180</sup> which constitutes the matter and the entity of a discourse. What can be predicated about such a »complex of meanings« emerges from the structure that is molding this process and is constitutive for the perception of objects in their interrelation.<sup>181</sup>

Thus, a discourse at the same time articulates, defines, and tabulates the constitutive elements of the semantic content of each concerned object's aggregate of meanings as well as their interrelatedness in a »complex of meanings«. Therefore, the structure and its obvious as well as its hidden governing principles can, in reverse, be deduced from the analysis of a discourse. Because of the immensity of the categorically inter-relational nature of meaning, to achieve this it is necessary to also analyze different discourses in their relation to each other.

The intention of discourse analysis is not about deciphering a hidden objective sense by interpretation, or speculating on what was supposed to be meant, but to reconstruct why a specific statement emerged and not another, as well as analyzing truth-performances inside discourses. Statements are not to be conceived of as »documents« that verify something, but as muted »monuments« that form up by a structuring rule that can be traced down.<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> Zoltán Kövecses and Bálint Koller, *Language, mind, and culture: a practical introduction*, ed. Bálint Koller (New York u.a.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006). P. 81

<sup>181</sup> Peter Sich, *Foucault: eine Einführung*, Reclams Universal-Bibliothek, (Ditzingen: Reclam, 2018). P. 31

<sup>182</sup> Ibid.

The instance Foucault calls the historic a priori defines what qualifies and what disqualifies to be stated about an object by conditioning the realness, in the sense of givenness, appropriateness and connectability, of statements not their validity.<sup>183</sup> By determining what can be considered as real, the collectively subconscious episteme provides the empirically reconstructable discursive order of perception and knowledge. Being precedent to all individual experience, in the terms derived from transcendental idealism, this episteme constitutes the currently applicable set of principles for weaving the aggregates of meanings of the objects of the environment into a multi-layered texture of interdependencies which creates actuality as the appearance of the world at a determinate time in a determinate place.

Even though societal change often occurs in a way that is experienced as disruptive, the forming of actuality is not an arbitrary process, but happens in a genealogical attachment to the past.<sup>184</sup> By the complexity of the interrelatedness that is applicable to the underlying texture of principles, actuality is necessarily more than the sum of all appearances. In being generated by a holistic weaving process of reactions between those principles of reason, the unpredictability of the new principles synthesized by these reactions that occur in this weaving process makes actuality irreducible to any singular determining factors of the past and, as such, completely contingent. This emergence of actuality is not only disruptive in respect to bringing forth principles and phenomena that are perceived as new and modern, making the old ones look outdated, but also in respect to the broadness of its applicability. Due to the revolutionary character of the process of switching to new paradigms, as Kuhn has shown in science, similar transformations in various areas of actuality often occur almost simultaneously.<sup>185</sup> This poses two questions: What is the texture that is generated by the delineated weaving process that constitutes actuality and, secondly, what is the scope of this texture?

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<sup>183</sup> Foucault, *Archäologie des Wissens*. P184

<sup>184</sup> Foucault, *The order of things: an archaeology of the human sciences*. P. 12.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid. and Thomas S. Kuhn, *The structure of scientific revolutions*, 3. ed., 5. impr. ed. (Chicago u.a.: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2004).

### 2.3.3 The interrelation of culture, actuality, and change

In the same way as languages often signify cultural entities, the scope of an episteme as a certain discursive order constitutes a homogeneous social sphere in time and space that is usually conceived of as a culture. As getting to know a culture requires learning its language as its »set of signs«, becoming part of a culture requires learning and adopting its discursive structure as this is requisite for active participation and, furthermore, for achieving integration. Thus, culture functions like the operating system of a digital device. It constitutes a social system by constituting what belongs to the system, and by determining what inputs can be processed as well as how these inputs will be processed. Beyond these rational aspects, a culture constitutes a certain »structure of feeling«<sup>186</sup> that defines how we relate to the world emotionally from within that culture and how we experience the processes going on within that culture, what affects we associate with them – almost in the way the user interface of an operating system does, which is no mere surface function either, but functions in a relation of complex reciprocal determinations with the processes beneath. Like an operating system, culture determines how things work by referring to itself, how they interrelate, and how one conceives of the world from within that social environment. This implies a phenomenology of culture as the »epistemic operating system« of self-referent social systems that often feature the attributes of autopoiesis, like family, clan, and gang, as well as institutional forms of organization like political party, church, corporation, and nation state. All certainties are socially conditioned by the culture of the group we belong to.<sup>187</sup> Culture facilitates that we apply at least very similar meanings to societally significant objects and share a way of discursively defining these meanings.

In their thorough analysis of the dimensions of national and organizational cultures, Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov have also described culture as a software of the mind:

*The sources of one's mental programs lie within the social environments in which one grew up and collected one's life experiences. The programming*

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<sup>186</sup> Raymond Williams, *Marxism and literature*, Marxist introductions, (Oxford u.a.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977). P. 133

<sup>187</sup> Jean-Noël Kapferer, *Gerüchte: das älteste Massenmedium der Welt*, ed. Jean-Noël Kapferer, 1. Aufl. ed., Aufbau-Taschenbücher, (Berlin: Aufbau-Taschenbuch-Verl., 1997). P. 322



*starts within the family; it continues within the neighborhood, at school, in youth groups, at the workplace, and in the living community.*<sup>188</sup>

Key to the understanding of culture as an epistemic operating system in the context of the present inquiry is the processual relation of »dispositive« and »subjectification«. A dispositive, as coined by Foucault and interpreted by Giorgio Agamben, can be described as a social structure which superimposes itself onto the individual and thus forms human behavior with a strong normalizing power.<sup>189</sup> The episteme, which is here viewed as the structure a priori to a culture, is defined by Foucault „as a strategic dispositive that allows to filter those assertions out of all possible statements, about which one can say: this is true or false“<sup>190</sup>. In „The Order of Things“, Foucault elaborates how culture acts as a kind of bio-dispositive, quite in the sense of the »epistemic operating system« suggested here, which subjectivizes the individual by superimposing and providing the structure for being governed, being controlled and having duties, as well as having rights and being self-consciously attached to one's unique identity at the same time<sup>191</sup>:

*The fundamental codes of a culture – those governing its language, its schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices – establish for every man, from the very first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home.*<sup>192</sup>

A conceptual mechanism in the human mind that frames in a culturally specific way what we think, say, and do – to some degree comparable to an algorithm in a software – is »metaphor«. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson even suggest that the nature of the human conceptual system is mainly metaphorical and that discourses are structured by metaphors.<sup>193</sup> While

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<sup>188</sup> Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov, *Cultures and organizations: software of the mind; intercultural cooperation and its importance for survival*, Rev. and expanded 3. ed. ed. (New York, NY u.a.: McGraw-Hill, 2010). P. 5

<sup>189</sup> Giorgio Agamben and Andreas Hiepko, *Was ist ein Dispositiv?*, ed. Andreas Hiepko, 1. Auflage ed., TransPositionen, (Zürich: Diaphanes, 2008).

<sup>190</sup> Michel Foucault, *Dispositive der Macht: über Sexualität, Wissen und Wahrheit*, Merve-Titel, (Berlin: Merve Verl., 1978). P.124

<sup>191</sup> Das „Wort Subjekt [hat] (...) einen zweifachen Sinn: vermittelt Kontrolle und Abhängigkeit jemandem unterworfen sein und durch Bewusstsein und Selbsterkenntnis seiner eigenen Identität verhaftet sein.“ (Foucault, *Archäologie des Wissens.*, P. 246f)

<sup>192</sup> Foucault, *The order of things: an archaeology of the human sciences*. P. 19

<sup>193</sup> George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors we live by*, 9. [print.] ed. (Chicago u.a.: Univ. of Chicago Pr., 1992). P. 4 and 5

metaphorical thinking is generic to culture as such, the metaphors themselves vary from one culture to another. Lakoff and Johnson exemplify their notion using the culturally conceptual metaphor »argument is war« and prompt imagining a culture that applies the conceptual metaphor »argument is dance«. While the 'argument is war' metaphor implies that arguments are about attacking and defending and that there is always a winner and a loser, 'argument is dance' involves viewing the participants as partners who aim to perform their propositions in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way – somewhat like the Brazilian martial arts dance Capoeira. (The discursive significance of metaphor will be further discussed in chapter 3.2.4)

Subjectification can then be described as the process in which the individual person is ascribed an identity with a certain place and role in actuality which she experiences along certain concepts that she shares in inter-subjectivity with others by the degree she shares cultural paradigms with these others. This assumes that subjectification as an integrative normalization is the divisional force of culture as a dispositive that will intrinsically eventuate in cultural clusters which evolve identity-borders by determining about association and dissociation, familiarity and alienness. For Berger and Luckman it is these cultural entities they focus on in their treatise about "The Social Construction of Reality" as they conceive of these cultural entities as the multiple realities our world consists of.<sup>194</sup> In the terminology of this present disquisition, the differentiation between the general concept of actuality as the unified spatiotemporal appearance of appearances and the separate culturally configured actualities that people experience as the reality they live in with their own specific exigencies, is more applicably implemented by labeling these entities as »systemic actualities«, each operated by a discrete »system of meanings« that integrate them into definite human interaction contexts.

The still most significant dimension of systemic actuality is the nation state as that class of social autopoeitic meta-systems that currently structures the civil world. As the dominant geo-political and domestic organizational principle, the nation state has the function of providing a definite »institutional context of individual existence« and the belonging to it, as well as endowing formal identity to its people. In the current world-order, each and every living individual is expected to be a citizen of such a formally marked out entity that is recognized as such by the other nation states. Being exempted from

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<sup>194</sup> Berger and Luckmann, *The social construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. P. 21

this principle is experienced and viewed as fateful. In order to make those provisions, a nation state, by its self-referentiality as an autopoietic system, will defend its integrity against diverging forces from outside and inside. Avoiding disintegration from the inside is usually achieved by integrating the people living within its borders into a nationally applicable structure of power-relations that is formed by its specific operating culture, either by force or by maintaining a necessary degree of cohesion through the provision of participation. In this way, the dispositive »nation state« is supposed to shape the experienced actuality as the »Lebenswelt« of the people living within its borders even more than any other cultural systems like family, clan, tribe, religion or class, because by applying its law according to its constitutional culture, it configures a society of subjects that own certain roles, duties, and rights which make up their civil identities.

In its history as a principle of organizing the world, the »nation state« has always had a problematic affective dimension. Overheated sentiments of patriotism were decisive for the general enthusiasm in many European countries for going to war with each other in 1914 and chauvinist nationalism was determinant in the genesis of World War Two. Still, being constitutive for the integrational functionality of a nation state, personal identification and constitutional loyalty seem indispensable cohesive factors defined by and defining its culture. The integrity of a nation state is challenged if it cannot institute a cultural meta-identity that engagingly integrates all subcultures. Provinces, for example, that feature their distinct cultural heritage including a language, usually have a strong cultural identity of their own, often feel alien, and sometimes strive for independence. Such constellations may, for example, have developed due to the heritage of colonialism as in the case of South Sudan or due to European nation-state formation in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as in the case of the Basques, Galicians, and Catalonians in Spain.

Sometimes nations experience profound fragmentation along cultural fault lines that result from a growingly antagonistic discourse between differing paradigmatic attitudes, like in the USA where pro-actively progressive citizens on the one side and citizens with ideologically sclerotized attitudes on the other constantly feel reciprocally offended. In other cases, like Apartheid South Africa, and to a certain degree also in the systemic complex of Israel and the Palestinians, the difference between cultural identities is strategically emphasized, often from both sides, for the purpose of maintaining ethnic fragmentation by keeping mutual resentment intense. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century process of establishing a German nation state, cultural super-national agents like the Roman Catholic church were looked at with suspicion. In the

emerging struggles of the »Kulturkampf« Chancellor Bismarck stirred a sentiment of mistrust against Roman Catholics. Doubting their undivided loyalty to the state, he invoked the concept of »ultramontanism« to condemn the cultural identity-attachment to Rome.<sup>195</sup>

Today it is a task of social integration that the religious and ethnical subcultures of immigrants do not completely detach, but get incorporated into the societies of nation states, and a task of international political integration that nation states render parts of their sovereignty to meta-national institutions like the European Union or even the United Nations Organization, together generating a cultural identity beyond the nation state that is based on constitutional treaties as well as on personal encounters.

Quite congruent to Foucault's view of culture as a kind of bio-dispositive, Jürgen Habermas' concept of *Lebenswelt* refers to a system of social norms that can be understood as collective expectations of behavior including a complex of culturally inherited background convictions.<sup>196</sup> As such, any culture is subject to discursive forces and therefore emergent. This is, and in this Foucault and Habermas implicitly agree, also true for a nation state culture – institutionalized, bureaucratic, and static as that may sometimes appear.

The German Professor of English language and literature, Wolfgang Iser (1926-2007), cofounder of the research group Poetry & Hermeneutics, delineated the emergence of culture as such as a recursive process of human adaption to environmental conditions, arriving at a conclusion that ultimately matches the key post-structuralist concept of subjectification:

*Humans are provoked not only initially but permanently to make inputs into their entropic environment, and these return as altered feedback loops, indicating success or failure which in turn feed into a revised input. According to Norbert Wiener's basic formula, recursive looping adjusts future conduct to past performance. Effective behavior must be informed by a kind of feedback process, telling it whether it has met requirements or fallen short of them. Thus, a learning process gets under way, from which culture as the artificially built human habitat emerges, not as something added on to the human being, but as*

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<sup>195</sup> Ronald J. Ross, *The failure of Bismarck's Kulturkampf: Catholicism and state power in imperial Germany, 1871 - 1887* (Washington, DC: The Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1998).

<sup>196</sup> Detlef Horster, *Jürgen Habermas: eine Einführung*, Einführung Philosophie, (Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchges., 2010).

*an ingredient of human self-production. (. . .) Therefore, we might say recursion continues to be the operating mode that structures the process of world-making in the course of which humans are shaped by what they have made and remain what they always have been: »cultural artifacts«<sup>197</sup>*

Ultimately, Iser's starting point in this paragraph's line of reflection on the emergence of culture is the same as Protagoras' in his man-measure statement and marks it as being essentially led by an anthropologic telos: What is the human being? He concludes that humans are products of the culture that they themselves bring about, which forms the artificial habitat Iser refers to, presumably having Habermas' *Lebenswelt* concept<sup>198</sup> in the back of his mind, which is here referred to as actuality. Culture, societal actuality and general actuality are, thus, structurally coupled by a reciprocal process in which culture forms societal actuality which is part of general actuality which feeds back on culture, which again shapes societal actuality. Iser's line of thought supports the notion that what is real in actuality are the forces, be they exerted by culture as the governing system of meanings (episteme) or by empirical facts, resulting in exigencies that each and every individual has to act upon, discursively guided by its culture. These actions are communicative because they inevitably produce feedback that is reintroduced into that system of meanings, that they were guided by in the first place, signaling either failure or success of its application. Meanings that are applied with a coherent outcome will acquire discursive recursivity so that it will be reinforced and the principle it was deduced from will become more powerful. Meanings that have failed to produce a coherent outcome will, most probably together with their principles, be altered until a meaning is appropriately applied to its object and subsequently recursively exerted. Due to the epistemic triangle of discursive relationality an outcome may appear to be incoherent if the concept of an object related to the meaning in question has changed. It follows that cultures and their societies acquire adaption and change through the recursive application of difference in the form of altered or completely novel meanings and principles.

Though this is a simplified scheme, it becomes clear that discursive recursivity plays a key role in the emergence of culture and societal actuality and

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<sup>197</sup> Andreas Mahler, "Wolfgang Iser, Emergenz. Nachgelassene und verstreut publizierte Essays," 33, no. 2 (2015), P. 253 – 254

<sup>198</sup> A concise summary of Habermas' *Lebenswelt* concept: Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, 4., durchges. Aufl. ed., vol. 2 (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1987). Vol.2 P. 192

needs to be conceptualized as a product of human behavior and a structure building element in the episteme at the same time. Others can be influenced or affected directly by what we say or do, which may be good or bad enough, but statements and actions potentially transcend the immediate situation because their reintroduction into the current system of meanings may have an effect on the governing culture and thus on societal actuality in a way that cannot be anticipated with certainty.

From here on it is presupposed that recursivity is conceived of as a structurally progressive process. While recursivity of the first order is the recurrent application of one meaning or principle to different objects, recursivity of the second order is the recurrent application of a meaning or principle to its own entailments which has a fractal effect.<sup>199</sup> With regard to nation-building Aristotle summarizes the fractal effect of what is here conceived as discursive recursivity of the second order in the Nicomachean ethics as follows:

*In a word, then, states come about from activities that are similar to them.*

*That is why the activities must exhibit a certain quality, since the states follow along in accord with the differences between these. So, it makes no small difference whether people are habituated in one way or in another way straight from childhood; on the contrary, it makes a huge one – or rather, all the difference.<sup>200</sup>*

This statement also indicates a conservative tendency in the discursive process of a society. Citizens usually do not jump to experiment with alternative principles or to adopt novel meanings. As Lazarsfeld has established this conservative tendency is also prevalent in individual media reception:

*... the more strongly partisan the person, the more likely he is to insulate himself from contrary points of view.<sup>201</sup>*

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<sup>199</sup> Possibly one could go on calling the application of meaning or principles to entailments of entailments recursivity of the  $n^{\text{th}}$  order, but this is of no concern here. Decisive is the application of the principle of differentiating into first and second order as introduced by Heinz von Förster in cybernetics and already applied to the process of perception in the previous chapter.

<sup>200</sup> Aristoteles and C. D. C. Reeve, *Nicomachean ethics*, ed. C. D. C. Reeve and Aristoteles (Indianapolis, Ind. u.a.: Hackett, 2014). 1104a 20-25

<sup>201</sup> Paul Felix Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet-Erskine, *The People's choice: how the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign*, Third edition, Columbia Paperback Edition ed. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1968). P. 89

This assumption of the selective use of media to reinforce prevailing attitudes is substantiated by findings in cognitive neuroscience. Jonas T. Kaplan et al's study "Neural correlates of maintaining one's political beliefs in the face of counterevidence" for example, has shown that the strong tendency in people to discount or even blot out information contradicting their principles and paradigms results from affective processes in the brain:

*We used neuroimaging to investigate the neural systems involved in maintaining belief in the face of counterevidence, presenting 40 liberals with arguments that contradicted their strongly held political and non-political views. Challenges to political beliefs produced increased activity in the default mode network – a set of interconnected structures associated with self-representation and disengagement from the external world. Trials with greater belief resistance showed increased response in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and decreased activity in the orbitofrontal cortex. We also found that participants who changed their minds more showed less bold signal in the insula and the amygdala when evaluating counterevidence. These results highlight the role of emotion in belief-change resistance and offer insight into the neural systems involved in belief maintenance, motivated reasoning, and related phenomena.*<sup>202</sup>

The central finding was that the likeliness of test subjects to change their attitude after reading counterevidence decreased relative to the increase in intensity of the activation of the amygdala during the experiment. As part of the phylogenetically ancient limbic system, the amygdala is the anxiety-center of the brain that constantly assesses the emotional grade or quality of a situation and is always involved when we experience something as emotional. The more significant the conviction countered by the presented information was to the test subject, the more emotionally intensely this person reacted to that threat and the less likely she or he was to change her or his convictions. The researchers concluded that it does not make much of a difference to the brain whether a threat is physical or to the identity.<sup>203</sup>

This identity-conservational predisposition seems to be the constant within the human condition responsible that meanings conforming with our attitudes have a much better chance to resonate discursively than contradictory

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<sup>202</sup> Jonas T. Kaplan, Sarah I. Gimbel, and Sam Harris, "Neural correlates of maintaining one's political beliefs in the face of counterevidence," *Scientific Reports* 6, no. 1 (2016/12/23 2016), P. 1

<sup>203</sup> Kaplan, Gimbel, and Harris, "Neural correlates of maintaining one's political beliefs in the face of counterevidence." P. 5

meanings – to a degree that this effect distorts or even corrupts our interpretation of data. It is arguable, though, that convictions, assumptions, and opinions are not only a substantial part of a person's identity in that they represent its coordinate system of values necessary for individualization but also in that a person shares its convictions, assumptions, and opinions with the people it identifies with. Stressing the importance of socialization for the emergence of a »self« in a person George Herbert Mead argues:

*He is what he is in so far as he is a member of his community, and the raw materials out of which this particular individual is born would not be a self but for his relationship to others in the community of which he is part.*<sup>204</sup>

Mead thus implies that belonging to a certain socio-cultural group is an important part of identity. Changing one's convictions, assumptions, and opinions could lead to estrangement and ultimately exclusion from that group putting one's identity through loss of belonging in question. In this understanding a conformity bias could be assumed to result from the fact that, for the sake of identity stability, we do not easily risk our belonging.

As some statements or actions dissonant with a person's pre-attunement still unfold accordant resonance in the discursive process within that person, there must be a discursive mechanism that provides for adopting new convictions, assumptions, and opinions in which the social factor plays an important role. A clue to such a discursive mechanism can be concluded from the »spiral of silence« theorem of the German Public Opinion theorist Elisabeth Noelle Neumann (1916-2010). In her theory about the phenomenon that a silent opinion-majority in a society may have the erroneous impression to be in minority if a large enough opinion-minority is speaking out loud and aggressively, she assumed a quasi-statistic perception-sense (organ) to be part of the human condition.<sup>205</sup> This functioning of quasi-statistical perception can also be assumed for the mechanism of personal discourse assessment that can be conceptualized as an inwardly cascading process:

- Perception level: statements, judgements, and actions will be assessed in their degree of relevance that is foremost established by the

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<sup>204</sup> George Herbert Mead et al., *Mind, self, and society: the definitive edition*, ed. Charles W. Morris, Daniel R. Huebner, and Hans Joas, Annotated edition ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015). P. 200

<sup>205</sup> Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, *The Spiral of Silence. Public Opinion – Our Social Skin* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984).



relevance of the issuer or the relaying person, respectively the relaying circle of people, in relation to the meaning conveyed.

- Awareness level: if regarded as relevant enough, the meaning conveyed will be assessed in its relation to the governing epistemic culture. It will either be interpreted as fostering the structure of the current episteme or as an application of a divergent meaning that would contribute to altering the current structure of discourse, requiring adoption and adaption. One's initial emotions towards the meaning conveyed depends on one's preferences.

- Behavior level: Finally, the meaning conveyed will then be classed on a range between structurally exemplary (potentially trending), and non-exemplary (random and arbitrary) for validating its intersubjective re-applicability by assessing its prominence in discourse. According to Noelle-Neumann, the fear of exclusion informs the personal decision about adopting an opinion and is instructive for one's behavior.

In the terminology of Berger and Luckman, this cascade of discourse assessment, though it is only a model of thought, is here assumed to contribute substantially in the process that generates "the objectivations of subjective processes (and meanings) by which the intersubjective commonsense world is constructed"<sup>206</sup>. In the terms of the present conceptualization: this cascade catalyzes the accentuating of those meanings of the diverse aggregates of meanings that are commonly considered to be objectively applicable knowledge instructing people's behavior. Beyond Berger and Luckman, it can be noted in accord with Aristotle that a society constitutes itself not just by permanently producing knowledge, but, more precisely, by re-applying the knowledge that emerged from the re-application of prior knowledge and the failures this produced. In relation to this realization, it is important to note that in the discursivity of actuality there is no difference in the intrinsicality of consequences between social and ontic facts because:

*"If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."*<sup>207</sup>

The sociologists Dorothy Swaine Thomas (1899–1977) und William Isaac Thomas (1863–1947) condensed the connection between what meanings

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<sup>206</sup> Berger and Luckmann, *The social construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. P. 20

<sup>207</sup> William Isaac Thomas, "The Methodology of Behavior Study" in *The Child in America: Behavior Problems and Programs*. (New York: Knopf, Alfred A., 1928). P. 572

people hold as applicable and what they do in consequence in this simple sentence known as the »Thomas-Theorem«. While this theorem gets to the heart of the recursive nature of the discursive emergence of actuality, it also closes the circle back to the Protagorean man-measure statement, which, in the light of Xenophanes' skepticism and Kant's transcendental idealism, logically complements it as if it had been uttered in the same breath. Because we cannot know reality in itself, our environment related actions, as individuals and societies, depend on how we assess a situation, which leads to new situations, assessments, and actions. What we do and say, how we judge today affects the emergence of the epistemic structure that forms how we experience and form our world tomorrow. In this way, everyone has an influence on the emergence of actuality and we can be certain that it will indeed have an impact to be the change one wants to see in the world.<sup>208</sup> And in discursivity, human agency goes far beyond the empirically obvious. What we do and say, how we judge, has the potentiality of the flap of a butterfly. Because that flap can under the appropriate circumstances, by the self-organizational faculty of chaos, cause a tornado, it is the recursive potentiality in discursivity that may amplify the effect of an individual's action on the emergence of the epistemic structure to a degree so that it functions as a disruptive performative intervention regarding how we experience our world tomorrow.

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<sup>208</sup> Paraphrasing a frequently quoted statement usually attributed to Mahatma Gandhi

## 3 The Performative Dimension in the Discursive Process

### 3.1 Discursive Resonance by Communication: assaying performativity

#### 3.1.1 The two autonomous elements of communication

As emphasized throughout, actuality as our intersubjectively experienced Lebenswelt is not a bubble. As humanity we are affected by and have an effect on the world on an ontic level. Human agency recursively affects not only what humans experience, but extends to the living conditions of, as in the case of climate change, all the other forms of life on our shared planet. From a biological point of view, the way humanity shapes its environment in a recursive process can be regarded as what biologists call »niche construction«, „whereby organisms' effects on their environments (e.g., beavers building dams, or worms aerating the soil) feed back upon the biological selection experienced by future generations.“<sup>209</sup> Thus scientists like the cognition biologist W. Tecumseh Fitch suggest that not only human condition has an effect on human culture but that human culture in its capacity to provide a social structure for adapting to the environment again feeds back on the human condition on its genetic base. He emphasizes this connection especially for the evolution of language:<sup>210</sup>

*Probably because of a long disciplinary distinction between the 'social' and the 'natural' sciences, and a long resistance among anthropologists and psychologists to any sort of biological determinism, it has taken a surprising amount of time for these simple facts to be recognized. But facts they are, and there is now a healthy body of theory concerning gene-culture interaction and co-evolution (Richerson and Boyd 2005) and abundant empirical data exploring specific examples of how and why this happens (Durham 1991; Laland et al. 2010). The keyword here is "co-evolution," and this literature emphasizes that neither genes nor culture are the primary causal forces in this ongoing evolutionary dance; rather they are causally intertwined.*

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<sup>209</sup> W. Tecumseh Fitch, "Genes, Language, Cognition, and Culture: Towards Productive Inquiry," 83, no. 2 (2011), P. 324

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

*Although this literature does not, to my taste, adequately emphasize the prime role of language in cultural evolution, scientists interested in language evolution have provided insightful investigations of gene-culture coevolutionary dynamics in the domain of language evolution.<sup>211</sup>*

While the coevolution of genetics and culture with regard to language is beyond the scope of this chapter's investigations into the human agency in the process of the discursive emergence of actuality, a basic understanding of the nature of the human faculty of communication as fundamentally constituted by the interrelation of its embodied configuration and its culturality is instrumental for the advancement of the desired realizations. Due to general autopoiesis, as succinctly delineated in subchapter 2.2.2, cognition occurs in an individual as an ultimately self-referential but not semantically closed system and focuses an individual's relation to its environment overridingly on the perception of resources to satisfy its needs as well as on challenges it must adapt to. Specifically human autopoiesis, as of any social animal, furthermore, involves integration of the individual into a social body by mutual perception. As a result, any human individual is ontically switched to continuous observing in order to process the incoming data for meaning, including the decoding of signals from conspecifics, but also actively imparts meaning for expressing needs and cooperating in the social body. This means, intentionally imparting meaning always depends on the intrinsic cognition-impulse to receive signals and analyze data for recognizable meaning as the constitutive resource for the transfer of meaning between individuals, usually referred to as communication.

Though the epistemological Copernican revolution Kant derived from his concept of transcendental idealism with its assumption of a priori structures of knowledge fundamentally assumes that cognition is always a self-referential process of recognition in that only meanings can be applied to sense impressions that are available to an individual we are not semantically closed but categorically open to the transfer of information if we can attach it to prior knowledge. But because recognition always resorts to predictive guessing in applying meaning to any sensation, including communication, and thus produces an unverifiable entropic noise of seeming, to be understood depends not only on the formally correct coding and decoding of signals but also on the ultimately indeterminable circumstance that the meaning expressed resonates as intended in the discursive process of the receiver in

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<sup>211</sup> Fitch, "Genes, Language, Cognition, and Culture: Towards Productive Inquiry." P. 324

that it suitably touches applicable prior knowledge in the mind of the observing subject like striking a certain chord on a guitar.

Upon closer observation, this basic concept of discursive resonance also implies that because we are always trying to identify meaning, any perception can potentially strike a chord that bears new information in a person if it touches prior knowledge in a certain configuration. On the one hand, this is an indispensable source of creativity, on the other it makes attaining accord between what is meant and what is understood an often unanticipatedly contingent process. While it doesn't take a mirage or a schizophrenic episode for the senses to fail to represent received empirical data to the mind applicably – and an individual can suffer complete shipwreck with his or her recognition in general – this applies even more when it comes to the hermeneutics of verbal and non-verbal expression. Interpreting behavior means navigating those islands of behavior which actually express specific meaning at all, before subduing the storms of behavioral ambiguity. Understanding speech, then, has the precondition of access to the language used and calls for a detailed map of the situational currents of agendas for distinguishing text and subtext.

Pointing it out again, Maturana and Varela have not only established the existential necessity of autopoietic systems to observe their environment and receive data, but also that observing and understanding of sensations is a process within the mind of an individual in its ontic separateness from the environment. Hence, expressing meaning on the one hand, and recognizing meaning on the other must be regarded as two separate processes, one performed by the sender, the other performed by the observer of communication.<sup>212</sup> It is only the results of such communication that is here conceived of as discursive resonance.

By being used as the term for imparting as well as partaking, both respectively singularly, the Latin term »communicare«, portrays this fragmentation between its two distinct elements that need to be constellated in the process in order for communication to succeed. Only where an observing individual recognizes the meaning a sending individual actually has emitted, communication has occurred in the strict sense of the telos intrinsic to the Latin term,

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<sup>212</sup> Maturana and Varela even went so far as to assert that cognitive systems are semantically closed and could not interact directly with another. The environment only perturbs the cognitive system and the cognitive system can only perturbate its environment, information can thus not be transferred. This is dismissed here because the epistemic circumstance of discursive similarity is assumed.

that something – correlative to the present elaboration’s specific approach: an instance of meaning as the discursively concluded hypothesis of relational implication – has become an intersubjectively shared common. Accordingly, the significant resource generated by successful communication is the ability of referring to an »intersubjectivated phenomenon« as a common object in further exchange.<sup>213</sup> It is these common objects, generated by communication, that discursive reasoning utilizes, first for implementing its precondition of reducing the entropy produced by recognition to a tractable degree, and second as objects of reference in the process of further social reasoning itself.

This constellating of expression and comprehension has two preconditions. It is fundamentally possible because the epistemic circumstance of discursive similarity applies: the basic conditions of perception and understanding are the same in all human individuals, as Kant has pointed out in transcendental idealism, and communication partners do usually live in a more or less common environment. Furthermore, it necessitates an exchange medium that imparts access to a common set of signs as, most significantly, established by language as humanity’s specific vehicle for discursively overcoming the ontic gap between individuals through expression that purposefully anticipates the physical and cognitive conditions of comprehension, the current knowledge, as well as the interests of the target subjects, together forming their discursive condition.

That we cannot not communicate<sup>214</sup>, as Paul Watzlawick (1921-2007) has so famously and applicably pointed out, is therefore less attributable to a permanence of the flow of intentional, unintentional, or even unconscious information we might emit, than to the autopoietical presetting to observing that makes us constantly strive for additional information. It can thus be assumed that the information one reckons to receive from another individual usually lies far beyond this individual’s intentionality, not making intentional communication any easier. In fact, subconsciously or otherwise unknowingly emitted information, as well as information only imagined or misunderstood by an observing assumption-making subject, can be discrepant to an extent that the intended message is completely corrupted in its meaning to the recipient. The Canadian sociologist Erving Goffman (1922-1982), who

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<sup>213</sup> Luhmann, *Die Realität der Massenmedien*.

<sup>214</sup> Paul Watzlawick, Janet Beavin Bavelas, and Don D. Jackson, *Menschliche Kommunikation: Formen, Störungen, Paradoxien*, ed. Paul Watzlawick, 10., unveränd. Aufl. ed. (Bern: Huber, 2000).

delineated the performative nature of human acting in everyday life, differentiated between »the expression one gives« and »the expression one gives off« as the two sides of the ever continuous presentation of self.<sup>215</sup> He pointed out that the self-presenting individual has the intention to manage the impression she or he makes, while the observing others will always aim to know more than the self-presenting individual is consciously offering. Dependent on cooperative behavior for staying alive as they may be, humans are also in competition with one another.

Discursivity being a self-organizational continuum from the tier of intra-individuality through the interpersonal tier right up to the discourses within a society and inter-societally, understanding induced by communication results, as indicated by Tomasello, from the structural cooperation between the discursive system of the sender, who wants to be understood, and the discursive system of the receiver who wants to understand<sup>216</sup>. The receiving subject does not arbitrarily produce or construct meaning but is ontically set to re-produce or re-construct the meaning a sending subject is emitting with the aim of representing it in his or her mind applicably because this meaning may carry significant information or may impart the sender's intentions which may be harmful, cooperative, or otherwise of significance. As pointed out above, this striving for information within the observer has a strong autonomy within the communication process and can even initiate communication completely detached from any intentional emitting. The most drastic case of this is secret surveillance, but it is also a common phenomenon in situations of day to day life when the meaning performed by an emitting subject is inaccessible to the target subject because it does not share either the signs and concepts used, or substantial prerequisite information (knowledge), or the interest for an applicably reasoned understanding, and thus performs understanding detached from the sender's intention, weaving its own meaning according to its personal discursive conditions. It is this source of misunderstanding, which not only requires the sender to anticipate the specific discursive conditions of its audience to perform its expression accordingly, but also the receiver to proactively criticize its understanding, for example by initiating a feedback process.

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<sup>215</sup> Erving Goffman, *The presentation of self in everyday life*, 1. Anchor Books ed. ed., Anchor books, (New York u.a.: Doubleday, 1959). P. 2

<sup>216</sup> Michael Tomasello et al., "Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition," 28, no. 5 (2005),

### 3.1.2 The ontic gap and the performative nature of communication

Independent from any speech-act-theoretical concept of »performativity«, the continuous challenge to bridge the ontic gap between the conveying and the observing communicator turns communication into a »performance« in at least three different semantic nuances on two tiers. In its general use, the term »performance« has a dual signification, firstly it refers to the process of executing an action and secondly to the achievement of an intended effect. The specific sense of performance as the physical enacting of an expression like in a stage performance is a peculiar amalgamation of the two general significations as it refers to the process of enacting as a transient materialization of an expression, almost like painting with water vapor onto the blue canvas of the sky – a concept offered by the English but not by the German language.

Though this matter of »theatricality«<sup>217</sup>, where performance ultimately manifests an experience-space of its own, is the destination of the following delineations and will subtly run through these like a consistent thread, approaching »performance«, »performative« in its dual signification as an adjective and as a noun, and »performativity« in its dual signification from the angle of the discursivity thesis needs to start on the general tier. In this regard, the discursively operative performances are expressing on the emitter's side and comprehending on the observer's side with the aim of attaining accord between what is meant and what is understood. The stronger a sender's intention to make its message understood by its audience, the more effort it will allocate to enacting its expression. The stronger an observer's intention is to receive and understand the information a sender is emitting, the more effort it will allocate to performing comprehension while it is usually difficult to distinguish what share of an occurred attainment of accord of a meaning can be attributed to the performance of expressing and what to the performance of comprehending.

Because cognition takes place in the black box of an individual's mind, an instance of discursive resonance stays not only opaque to any empiric assessment but also without consequences until its result reenters actuality and thus eventually the field of intersubjective discursivity – either in way of report or of reapplication. Therefore, the only aspect of discursive resonance that is of interest here and will later be operationalized as discursive

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<sup>217</sup> See subchapter 1.3



resonance is when a result of communication reenters the social sphere, though it is sometimes difficult to determine, to what extent the discursive resonance that has occurred was specific in the sense that it correlated with the message of the sender.

Enlightened by the realization that communication is established by two distinct and equally significant discursively performative systems, we temporarily take on the usual, less complex perspective when reflecting on communication and view it as an intentional act initiated by a meaning-conveying subject. From this point of view the success of communication needs to be measured in terms of the intention of the conveying communicator and to be viewed as its performance, turning the grade of discursive resonance into the degree of performativity. By her or his performance of communication, a communicator wants to establish not only a maximum of correspondence between message and percept but also the way the communicated meaning reenters the social sphere. If such a communicator only intends to inform, communication can be defined as successful when a message is recognized in the performance of comprehension of a receiving subject in a way that the expressed meaning is represented in the mind of the target subject applicably and thus has become a shared instance in the respective object's aggregate of meanings: performativity of information has occurred. But for humans it is also part of personal subjectivity to have intentions that requisition conforming behavior and as such involve either the necessary imperative power or persuasion. If the target-subject adopts a certain meaning issued by a sender as applicable, performativity of persuasion has occurred.

Increasing the chance to achieve the intended performativity in a communication process involves performing the message in a way considered adequate for generating the requisite quality of resonance in the discursive system of an observer. In persuasion, for example, the message becomes charged with suggestive potentiality beyond just presenting a meaning, so that it is more likely to perform not only understanding but also the adoption of the suggested meaning as the applicable instance in the aggregate of meanings of the matter in question by the targeted individuals, and their carrying out the corresponding behavior accordingly. Thus, the intended performativity materializes in the intensity of the performance of expression, that is, due to the dual sense of performance indicated above, usually also called performativity.

In the light of these considerations about the desire to perform discursive resonance between subjects that are ultimately locked in self-referential

discursive processing of individually perceived actuality, it needs to be stressed that any expressive performance aims at a certain performativity. But how behavior and utterances are perceived is never completely controllable, especially due to the delineated affective dimension where we, beyond the interpretation of the content itself, constantly apply a variation of the epistemic triangle of discursive relationality for perceiving affective motives by relating what is said to how it is said, and what is done to how it is done. With regard to the relationality of content and tone of an uttering Kant delineates:

*Every expression of language has, in context, a tone that is appropriate to its sense [Sinne]; that this tone more or less designates [bezeichnet] an affect [Affect] of the speaker and conversely also produces one in the hearer, which then in turn arouses in the latter the idea [Idee] that is expressed in the language by means of such a tone.<sup>218</sup>*

He is thus implying that the affect dimension of a performance frames the way it is received and understood. In accord with Kant, also Austin points out that performatives generally require a sincere expression of affective commitment in the utterance to unfold its end unambiguously.<sup>219</sup>

This assumption about the substantial significance of the affective dimension of communication to acquire specific discursive resonance is also vindicated by the findings of Kaplan et al mentioned above. The affect dimension of communication is highly significant for achieving specific communicative performing because the brain uses affects for identifying quality and significance of inputs and will vice versa also use the affects that an input is charged with for processing it – always, not only if paradigms constitutive for a person's identity are involved that it derives its attitudes from. How something is said or done informs an observing subject about what was actually meant. Thus, discrepancies between expression and content are not just contra productive but usually convey a sub-message of their own.<sup>220</sup> That it always needs to be anticipated that a different understanding of what

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<sup>218</sup> Immanuel Kant, Paul Guyer, and Eric Matthews, *Critique of the Power of Judgement* (Cambridge University Press, 2002). KU §53, 5:328, pp. 205–206.

<sup>219</sup> John Langshaw Austin, *How to do things with words*, ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa, 2nd ed. ed., The William James lectures, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975). P. 9 and P. 15 following

<sup>220</sup> Jens Seiffert, Günter Bentele, and Lars Mende, "An explorative study on discrepancies in communication and action of German companies," *Journal of Communication Management* 15, no. 4 (2011),

was intended, possibly an ultimately more applicable, more honest one, occurs, is the most instructive implication of Paul Watzlawick's best known communication axiom that we cannot not communicate<sup>221</sup>. This cannot be overestimated because the meaning deduced from any utterance or behavioral act can potentially take on an autonomous effect by recursively reentering the discursive process.

Looking at the performance of discursive resonance under the aspects of the constant involvement of the amygdala, not only in direct interaction with the environment but also in situations of mediated perception, indicates a substantial experiential dimension within human communication. This assumption is supported by the Mirror Neuron Hypothesis that observing a bodily movement of another individual activates the same brain activity as performing these activities by oneself. This hypothesis is based on the observation made Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, and Rizzolatti in 1992 that the respective neurons in the F5 region of the brain of macaque monkeys are activated not only when they perform gestural arm or communicative mouth movements, but also when they observe these behaviors. Liebal points out:

*Interestingly, the F5 region of macaques and Broca's area in humans are homologous structures. As Broca's area is not only involved in language production, but also in the execution of arm movements, these findings seem to support theories of a gestural origin of human language and that the neurobiological foundations were already present in the last common ancestor of humans and monkeys.*<sup>222</sup>

It is no wonder then that searching for the evolutive origins of language, in evolutionary anthropology gesture has moved to the center of scientific focus, or, as Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) put it:

*What we call meaning must be connected with the primitive language of gestures.*<sup>223</sup>

While gestures usually are an integral part of the human verbal linguistic expression system, that fulfill an illustrating function in complementing

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<sup>221</sup> Watzlawick, Bavelas, and Jackson, *Menschliche Kommunikation: Formen, Störungen, Paradoxien*. P. 51

<sup>222</sup> Katja Liebal and Linda Oña, "Mind the gap – moving beyond the dichotomy between intentional gestures and emotional facial and vocal signals of nonhuman primates," 19, no. 1-2 (2018), P. 129

<sup>223</sup> Quote from: Wittgenstein, L. *The Big Typescript*, as found in: Michael Tomasello, *Origins of human communication*, 1. MIT paperback ed. ed., The Jean Nicod lectures, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010). P. 1

speech, they can indeed acquire a language-like signaling functionality in human communication wherever they are needed to take on the full burden of expression by themselves.<sup>224</sup> This applies especially to formally convention-alized sign languages, but also in nuances also in many informal situations as the evolutionary anthropologist Michael Tomasello points out in his comprehensive survey of scientific findings on the “Origins of Human Communication” specifically with regard to pointing and pantomiming:

*Human beings, of course, find such gestures as pointing and pantomiming totally natural and transparent: just look where I am pointing and you will see what I mean. Indeed, even prelinguistic infants use and understand the pointing gesture, and in many social situations in which vocal language is not possible or practical – for example, across a crowded room or in a noisy factory – humans naturally communicate by pointing and pantomiming. Tourists manage to survive and interact effectively in many situations in foreign cultures, in which no one shares their language, precisely by relying on naturally meaningful forms of gestural communication.*<sup>225</sup>

It is Tomasello’s central assessment that the natural and spontaneous human gestures of pointing and pantomiming represent that form of direct intentional expression that first established the specifically human social-cognitive and social-motivational infrastructure of cooperative communication which served as the psychological platform for the diverse systems of conventional verbal languages to build on.<sup>226</sup> Pointing to objects and pantomimic describing refined the ability of sharing intention and attention as well as the skill of culturally passing on commonly understood conventions of communication, which can rudimentarily be found in other primates as well, to a degree which enabled human kind to develop highly differentiated languages.<sup>227</sup>

Especially pantomiming – one only needs think of American First Nations’ narrating dance to get a more vivid picture – but also pointing, as any gesturing, is of course, expressive physical performing in a theatrical sense that still imparts communication some of the resonating experientiality which Tomasello can be interpreted to be assuming that human communication

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<sup>224</sup> S Goldin-Meadow, "The Two Faces of Gesture: Language and Thought" in *Gestural communication in nonhuman and human primates*, ed. Katja Liebal (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2007). P. 219 – 234

<sup>225</sup> Tomasello 2010 P. 2

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.* P. 12

emerged from and consequently, at least fundamentally, still functions by for increasing the chance of an expressing communicator to bridge the ontic gap toward the observing communicator, even under the circumstance of a hyper complex society. Because experientiality is thus fundamental for the performance of discursive resonance, it suggests itself, then, to fathom the substance of that resonating experientiality in its very realm: music.

## 3.2 The Musicality of Performativity: resonating experiences

### 3.2.1 Transcendental aspects of musicking

It is reported that on 2 October, a week before the decisive demonstration of Monday 9 October 1989 in the city of, among others, Bach, Mendelssohn-Bartholdi and Wagner, people started singing "The Internationale", the hymn of socialism, with the intention of holding its claim of attaining human rights against the ruling nomenclature while shuffling in a dense crowd on a six lane ring-street around Leipzig's city center.<sup>228</sup> While this occasion of mass musicking was an exception in the peaceful revolution, the resistance against Apartheid in South Africa had always had a musical dimension. Marching in protest, mourning for people killed in the struggle, or in triumph, like on 11 February 1990 when Nelson Mandela was released from prison, people burst into chanting, singing, and a specific form of rhythmic-run and stampeding-dance marching. In its physicality, singing and rhythmic movement is not only an evident statement of presence and involvement, but can also be an unmistakable expression of meaning. Sounds, gestures, and language fuse into a performance that makes an immediate impression on its audience and its performers alike. Everyone gets entangled by the experience in one way or another. One may experience being submerged in sound while immersed in the crowd or being knit together with the co-performers.

But what is it that this intense experientiality of music arises from? Apparently anticipating this very question, Descartes made some very instructive hypotheses in the third chapter of his reflections on the nature of music, »Compendium Musicae«, his first book written at the age of 22 but only published after his death. He suggested that sounds are cognized as music because of rhythmic parcellation:

*But, this division is noted by a percussion, or stroke, as they call it; which is ordained to assist our Imagination, that so we may the more easily perceive all the members of the Tune, and be delighted with the proportion, which ought to be in them. Now, this proportion is most frequently kept in the members of the Tune in order to the helping of our Imagination', for that while we yet heare the*

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<sup>228</sup> Holger Dambeck, "Sitzblockade wie im Westen Meine erste Montagsdemo " Online News Magazine, no. 12.08.2022 (2014),

*last of the time, we may remember what was in the first, and what was in the rest of the Tune. . . . And thus doth our Imagination proceed even to the end ; where at length it conceives the whole Tune, as one intire thing composed of equall members. [sic!]<sup>229</sup>*

This emphasis on the role of »imagination« indicates that Descartes looked at the recognition of tunes as a discursive process where a cognizing mind applies certain concepts to sensorial stimuli. But he also suggested that sounds have the faculty of evoking immediate motoric and emotional effects. He largely ascribed this faculty to the property of sound to generate physical resonance:

*[. . . ]: so as from the beginning of each stroke, the sound is emitted more distinctly. Which all Singers naturally observe, and those who play on instruments; principally in Tunes, at whole numbers we are wont to dance and leap : for, this Rule is there kept, that we may distinguish every stroke of the Musick, with a single motion of our bodies ; to the doing of which we are also naturally impelled by Musick. For certain it is, that a sound doth concusse, or shake all circumjacent bodies, as is exemplified in Thunder, and the ringing of Bells ; the reason whereof is to be referred to the disquisition of Physiology. But, insomuch as the Hoti is confest by all men , and that the sound is emitted more strongly, and distinctly in the beginning of a measure, as we have formerly hinted : we may well affirm, that that sound doth more smartly and violently concusse or agitate our Spirits, by which we are excited to motion ; as also by consequence, that Beasts may dance to number, or keep time with their Feet, if they be taught and accustomed thereto ; because to this, nothing more is required, then only a mere natural Impetus, or pleasant violence.*

*Now, concerning those various affections, or Passions, which Musick, by its various Measures can excite in us; we say, in the Generall, that a slow measure doth excite in us gentle, and sluggish motions, such as a kind of Languor, Sadness, Fear, Pride, and other heavy, and dull Passions : and more nimble and swift measure doth proportionately, excite more nimble and sprightly Passions, such as Joy, Anger, Courage, etc. [sic!]<sup>230</sup>*

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<sup>229</sup> René Descartes and William Brouncker Brouncker, *Renatus Des-Cartes excellent compendium of musick: with necessary and judicious animadversions thereupon. By a person of honour*, ed. William Brouncker Viscount Brouncker, Thomason Tracts, (London: Thomas Harper, 1653). P. 5

<sup>230</sup> Descartes and Brouncker, *Renatus Des-Cartes excellent compendium of musick: with necessary and judicious animadversions thereupon. By a person of honour*. P. 5-6

Thus, according to Descartes, music has a double nature of resonating in discursivity as a tune and in immediacy on a pre-cognitive level through volume and beat. Putting Descartes' delineations to the scrutiny of modern science, it turns out that he was not entirely wrong. In his investigations into the neuro cognition of music Koelsch delineates that music alone indeed has semantical and syntactical dimensions that the human brain draws respectively consistent information from, which can be transformed into conscious meaning by what Descartes called »imagination«. <sup>231</sup> And Descartes was on the right track with his mechanistic theory that sound has the basic potential of having an immediate effect on motion and emotion, even though this is, at least in humans, a much more complex process than he could have had conceptualized. Descartes' presumptions do by some degree of abstraction apply for some frog species as well as some insects, for example fireflies, that do show entrainment in synchronizing the conduct of their respective display behavior as this is, as Fitch supposes, "underpinned by hard-wired neural circuitry that evolved to support that specific domain" <sup>232</sup>.

In higher organisms like birds and mammals, the ability to entrain bodily movements to musical beat has been scientifically established only since 2009. A first milestone on this path was the appearance of Snowball, the sulfur-crested cockatoo (*Cacatua galerita leonora*) whose dance videos had become extremely popular on YouTube. While many scientists were skeptical about the veracity of the material, the cognitive psychologist Aniruddh D. Patel and his team investigated the bird's synchronization abilities experimentally and it turned out that Snowball adapted its movements perfectly to any speeding up or slowing down of the music by the scientists, manifesting that a parrot is capable of PPE (Pulse Perception and Entrainment). <sup>233</sup> There is also some weak evidence for this ability in chimpanzees and elephants. The only other mammal with a sound performance, though, was a California sea lion bobbing its head up and down to music.

Patel developed the hypothesis that entrainment is a by-product of the ability of vocal learning. And indeed, the higher species having the PPE capability also seem to share a certain neural circuitry, a direct neural link

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<sup>231</sup> Koelsch, *Brain and music*. P. 176-177

<sup>232</sup> W. Tecumseh Fitch, "The biology and evolution of musical rhythm: an update," in *Structures in the Mind: Essays on Language, Music and Cognition in Honor of Ray Jackendoff*, ed. Ida Toivonen et al. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015). P. 299

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.* P 301-302



between the auditory perception areas and the motor areas of the brain that provide the infrastructure not only for the faculty of entrainment but also for vocal learning.<sup>234</sup> Accordingly, contrary to Descartes' optimistic assumption, the large majority of animals (beasts) can neither by themselves dance nor be taught to dance in relation to musical beat, just as they cannot be taught to sing a certain melody, or talk.

That perception of rhythm is an a priori of the human condition has also only been scientifically established in 2009. István Winkler et al have produced results that strongly support the view that beat perception is innate rather than learned. They have shown by EEG measurements that newborn infants anticipate the downbeat as the commencement of rhythmic cycles. Leaving out the downbeat triggers brain activity that is associated with the disappointing of sensory expectations.<sup>235</sup>

Regarding the affective effects of tempo that Descartes suggests these findings also indicate a specific relation between the tempo of music and the feelings aroused in the mind. This relation was investigated already in 1937 by Kate Hevner with US-American students as test-persons. The results of her experiments showed that allegro (152) aroused feelings of excitement and of happiness while medium fast paced music (102, andante) aroused feelings of gracefulness, medium slow music (80, still andante) sadness, slow music feelings of dignity, even slower music made dreamy (72, adagio), and very slow music (63, largetto) aroused feelings of serenity.<sup>236</sup> The universal validity of these findings, of course, is subject to a strong bias due to the cultural homogeneity of the complete approach.

A more universal perspective on the immediate affective dimension of music, specifically singing, was intended by Anna M. Unyk et al in 1992. The team assessed that although singing as such is universal, there is little evidence of musical universals in the practice of singing as, for example, the structure of the songs varies strongly from culture to culture. Typifying cultural identity,

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<sup>234</sup> Henkjan Honing, *The origins of musicality*, ed. Henkjan Honing (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2018). P. 159

A circumstance that indicates a significant relation between dance and speech as well as between music and speech that is going to be looked into further below.

<sup>235</sup> István Winkler et al., "Newborn infants detect the beat in music," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 106, no. 7 (2009),

<sup>236</sup> Kate Hevner, "The Affective Value of Pitch and Tempo in Music," *The American Journal of Psychology* 49, no. 4 (1937), P. 624-625

singing can even be seen as a significant carrier of enculturation. Infants, on the other hand, would have been only limitedly exposed to the music of their culture and would thus be less likely to perceive musical structures in a way specific to their culture as is the case for infants younger than six months in the domain of speech perception where they exhibit behavior that is comparatively free of cultural coinage. Apparently presupposing that this was not only due to having little exposure to culture but also to the state of the perceptual and expressional abilities of infants, their thesis was that adults would anticipate that infants were better served with music structured more universally and less culturally tinted. Accordingly, they assumed that lullabies might share common features across cultures as they have a rather uniform function and audience, in the same way that infant-directed speech has similar features in many tonal and non-tonal languages. These features include the use of a higher pitch, wider pitch range, and simple though very modulated intonations as well as a slower rate, shorter sentences, prolonged pauses, and more repetition. All in all, these features have a performance character and confer a musical quality to such infant-directed speech as also Barkow remarks:

*The communicative force of [parental] vocalizations derive not from their arbitrary meanings in a linguistic code, but more from their immediate musical power to arouse and alert, to calm, and to delight.*<sup>237</sup>

In the study, 30 lullabies from various cultures and geographic regions were played in pairs with matching adult songs from the same culture to 20 university students. It turned out that the test persons were (more than by chance) able to distinguish the lullabies by deciding which song was more repetitive and simpler in its structure. This result supports the assumption of a close relation between infant-directed speech (IDS) in its universality on the one hand and lullabies on the other. This is a conclusion that is shared by the authors of a much broader and more thorough but otherwise quite similar study published in 2022. Courtney B. Hilton et al. "collected 1,615 recordings of infant- and adult-directed singing and speech produced by 410 people living in 21 urban, rural, and small-scale societies and analyzed their acoustic forms."<sup>238</sup> They "found cross-culturally robust regularities in the

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<sup>237</sup> Anna M. Unyk et al., "Lullabies and Simplicity: A Cross-Cultural Perspective," *Psychology of Music* 20, no. 1 (1992), P. 15

<sup>238</sup> Courtney B. et al Hilton, "Acoustic regularities in infant-directed speech and song across cultures," *Nature* (2022), P. 1

acoustics of infant-directed vocalizations, such that infant-directed speech and song were reliably classified from acoustic features found across the 21 societies studied. The acoustic profiles of infant-directedness differed across language and music, but in a consistent fashion worldwide."<sup>239</sup> Pursuing a secondary analysis, they "studied whether listeners are sensitive to these acoustic features, playing the recordings to 51,065 people recruited online, from many countries, who guessed whether each vocalization was infant-directed. Their intuitions were largely accurate, predictable in part by acoustic features of the recordings, and robust to the effects of linguistic relatedness between vocalizer and listener."<sup>240</sup>

In the context of the present investigations into the discursive origin as well as the discursive value of music and in relation to Descartes' suppositions about the immediate effect of music on affect-states of the mind, the significant implication of these studies' realizations is that a certain intentionally performed configuration of sounds with musical characteristics is universally applied to communicate on a pre-lingual, purely emotional level in a truly universal setting – as infancy is a decisive stage in in each and everybody's life. This assumption is supported by findings that acoustic properties that encode emotional expression in affective prosody are highly similar to those encoding these expressions in music.<sup>241</sup> Koelsch asserts that such prosody and music have in common the ability to evoke feeling sensations (*Empfindungen*) that are a priori. This seems appropriate as these feeling sensations can already be evoked in infants by how something is expressed, while they cannot understand the meaning of what they are told yet. In accordance with Hilton et al, it may be suggested that IDS derives its form with its specific acoustic attributes that distinguish it from adult-directed vocalizations consistently across cultures from its function of supporting parent-infant communication by facilitating the capture and maintenance of infant attention<sup>242</sup> and modulating infant affect<sup>243</sup> by arousing certain feeling sensations.

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<sup>239</sup> Ibid.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid.

<sup>241</sup> Koelsch, *Brain and music*. P. 160

The Mafa people for example recognized musical encodings manufactured by western scientists according to the prosodical expressions of emotions clearly above chance level, indicating a universality of these encodings.

<sup>242</sup> Unyk et al., "Lullabies and Simplicity: A Cross-Cultural Perspective." P. 16

<sup>243</sup> Hilton, "Acoustic regularities in infant-directed speech and song across cultures." P. 1

Daniel Stern has introduced an integrative function-concept that involves a holistic performance-approach to such IDS. In »affect attunement« the parent's expressive mirroring of the infant's behavior is conceived of as the intersubjective sharing of affects while supporting and guiding the infant in learning what it feels in its states of affect. Attunement is recasting the observed behavior and shifts the focus to its motivational core, the affective quality behind the behavior. For illustrative reasons, two of the examples invoked by Stern will be quoted:

*A nine-month-old girl becomes very excited about a toy and reaches for it, she lets out an exuberant 'aaaah!' and looks at her mother. Her mother looks back, scrunches up her shoulders, and performs a terrific shimmy with her upper body, like a go-go dancer. The shimmy lasts only about as long as her daughter's 'aaaah' but is equally excited, joyful, and intense.*

*A nine-month-old boy bangs his hand on a soft toy, at first in some anger but gradually with pleasure, exuberance, and humor. He sets up a steady rhythm. Mother enters into his rhythm and says 'kaaaa-bam, kaaaa-bam,' the 'bam' falling on the stroke and the 'kaaaa' riding with the preparatory upswing and the suspenseful holding of his arm aloft before it falls.<sup>244</sup>*

In these examples it becomes clear that affect attunement is achieved in communicative instances between parent and child that fulfill the requirements for achieving directed discursive resonance as defined in the previous subchapter: an authentic protagonist that meets the spirit of the situation with what he or she is saying and with how he or she is behaving – even though the what and the how is almost indistinguishable in instances of affect attunement. In so far, affect attunement as a specific instance of IDS can be seen as a universal form of performative intervention in which a parent turns the infant's immediate or first order experience into a reflected or second order experience. Through the mirroring expression by its parent, the infant becomes aware of its affect and starts to discover how it can process and express it appropriately as an emotion.<sup>245</sup> It would be a substantiated assumption that the mirroring function of certain neurons is instrumental in establishing that resonance between mother and child.

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<sup>244</sup> Daniel N. Stern, *The interpersonal world of the infant: a view from psychoanalysis and developmental psychology* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1985). P. 140

<sup>245</sup> Compare: Robin G. Collingwood, *The principles of art*, Repr. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960). P. 109-110

As will be delineated below in more detail this can be conceived as a metaphoric process where the musical attributes of IDS are deployed to make the *what* understandable by an exaggerated expression, a performance of the *how*. And it can be assumed that this affect-metaphorical capacity is maintained in human affairs by its transfer upon music and that music thus is a, to some degree universal, affect-metaphorical human faculty that has some resemblance to language because syntactical and sometimes even semantic concepts are not only applied to verbal and gestural expressions but also to other sonic expressions, especially music. Delineating his approach of »musicking« Christopher Small emphasizes:

*The fundamental nature and meaning of music lie not in objects, not in musical works at all, but in action, in what people do. It is only by understanding what people do as they take part in a musical act that we can hope to understand its nature and the function it fulfills in human life.*<sup>246</sup>

Not only lullabies but also IDS in general, and specifically affect attunement, are ultimately genuine and primal forms of such musicking, particularly because the audience of such performances is in these cases an indwelling counterpart whose resonant behavior is necessary for completing the function of the communicative action. Furthermore, as a transcendental phenomenon, IDS supports the assumption that music and language issue from a common functional and hence also neuro-evolutional origin<sup>247</sup>.

### 3.2.2 The common discursive origin of music and language

From an evolutionary perspective many scientists have wondered about music's adaptive function, possibly most of all Darwin himself:

*As neither the enjoyment nor the capacity of producing musical notes are faculties of the least direct use to man in reference to his ordinary habits of life, they must be ranked amongst the most mysterious with which he is endowed.*<sup>248</sup>

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<sup>246</sup> Christopher Small, *Musicking: the meanings of performing and listening*, Music Culture, (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1998).

<sup>247</sup> For a brief overview of the discussion about the relation between language and music in the brain please see Fitch, "The biology and evolution of musical rhythm: an update." P. 296

<sup>248</sup> Charles Darwin, *The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex: in two volumes* (London: Murray, 1871). P. 333

Fitch expresses his doubt that, as was sometimes argued, music played a consistent role in sexual selection as a significant factor of sexual attractiveness and invokes the approach of Robin Dunbar who proposed that vocal exchanges had the function of strengthening intra group relations through »vocal grooming«. <sup>249</sup> An answer to the question of how far such vocal grooming abilities might have posed an initial selection advantage may be indicated by looking at IDS as a significant element in caring for offspring suitably, which is a crucial task for most vertebrate species' sustainable success in reproduction. It is completely appropriate to conceive of adapting expression to the needs of an infant as a central performance in human parenting rather than, as an embarrassed adolescent bystander might, seen as just a somewhat bizarre behavior of adults intrigued by what Conrad Lorenz phrased »baby schema«, craving for the infant's attention and resonance. And after approximating an understanding of the universality of IDS as a primal form of musicking, it here seems appropriate to take a closer look into how far findings on the musical nature of IDS can also be utilized for acquiring an understanding of the development from the mere grooming function to the discursive quality of music.

The one field of the application of infant-directed expression that can, by its function, be directly generalized for human coexistence as such is affect attunement, quite consistent with Dunbar's proposition, but as an expressive performance of grooming that includes vocalizations as well as facial mimic, gesturing and pantomiming. It is a very general experience anyone will recognize, that placid and sustained cohabitating and collaborating in immediate communities such as families and teams regularly requires instances of (re)bonding and accord (re)establishment. Though without referring to Stern's concept of »affect attunement« Jonathan H. Turner argues in the same direction and applies the term »attunement« pertinently, arguing that humans needed to adopt such behavior because by their phylogenetic configuration they were of rather limited sociality with stronger natural bonding only between mothers and their direct offspring. Not having had the genetically installed urge to live in larger communities but having been forced to as an adaption to life in the east African savanna, necessary because of environmental changes, it took hominids an extra effort of emotional fine-tuning with respect to mood, texture, tone, and substance to overdub the primordial

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<sup>249</sup> W. Tecumseh Fitch, "The biology and evolution of music: A comparative perspective," 100, no. 1 (2006), P. 31

ego-track for acquiring harmony and flexibility in the bonds such generated.<sup>250</sup> Contrarily one might of course argue, hominids were able to practice attunement only *because* they were extremely social animals. Either way, it can, in accordance with Dunbar, be assumed that the increase in group size which seems to have resulted from life in the open savanna required refining the ability to bond even among adults.<sup>251</sup> But it must be pointed out that Stern did not limit affect attunement to bonding. He suggested that affect attunement also has a discursive dimension as it includes inducing a shared assessment of an experienced situation or jointly perceived object, for example by agreeing what to fear and what to enjoy, which includes actually imparting affects. Affect attunement may also include the dimension of establishing what Tomasello calls »shared intentionality« as a collective state of mind necessary for directed communication and joint action.<sup>252</sup> All in all, by its function of rendering affective consonance, it is here suggested to view affect attunement as the social side of the evolution-theoretical category of »emotional control« that usually describes the intra-individual operation of controlling the otherwise involuntary, reflexive display of affects either in vocalizations or, as observed by Darwin, in facial expressions.<sup>253</sup>

Discussing scenarios of the relation between emotional control in hominids and the evolution of language, Liebal invokes two approaches. The one approach suggests that emotional control was a precondition for the development of language, while the other assumes, vice versa, that language was a precondition for emotional control.<sup>254</sup> Presuming language development was that co-evolutional process suggested by Fitch as invoked in subchapter 3.1, intertwining genetic and cultural advances, it would be appropriate to apply the above findings from infant development research with its cultural implications to evolutionary anthropology in its genetic dimension. In this evolutionary line of thought, an improvement of articulation abilities in hominid species could be explained by conceiving of superior articulation as a substantial advantage in social conduct and thus an advantage in reproduction.

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<sup>250</sup> Jonathan H. Turner, "The Evolution of Emotions in Humans: A Darwinian?Durkheimian Analysis," 26, no. 1 (1996), P. 17

<sup>251</sup> Robin Dunbar, *Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2020).

<sup>252</sup> Tomasello et al., "Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition."

<sup>253</sup> Turner, "The Evolution of Emotions in Humans: A Darwinian?Durkheimian Analysis." P. 13

<sup>254</sup> Liebal and Oña, "Mind the gap – moving beyond the dichotomy between intentional gestures and emotional facial and vocal signals of nonhuman primates." P. 122

And it can hence be validly imagined that the relation between language development and emotional control was distinguished by a completely reciprocal process facilitated by affect-attunement.

Instances of affect attunement between primate group members can be seen as events of performing expressive articulation that still indiscriminately integrate musical, gestural, and verbal traits, but, furthermore, also provide opportunity as well as necessity for their differentiated development with entrainment as the biological path from uncontrollable affect display to intentional gestural and verbal communication. An example of a primal kind of situation of such integrated affect attunement might still to be noticeable in »pant-hooting«<sup>255</sup> and, as implied by Dunbar, also in physical »grooming« instances among chimpanzees, which are not just a practice of mutual body care but must also be viewed as situations with gestural implications. Challenged by the growing complexity of social formations, affect attunement evolved to produce more differentiated, refined, and eventually intentionally directable ways of expressing, so that rudiments of language emerged gradually from affect-driven melodic vocalizations and, in the long run, turned out to be suitable for other coordinative purposes as well.

Attaching to Tomasello's hypothesis of the significance of cooperativeness attained by gesturing as the prerequisite social-motivational infrastructure of the mind for the development of language delineated in subchapter 3.1.1, it can be argued that the mechanism of affect attunement has the functionality and the properties necessary to facilitate this emotional basis, and that the concept of affect attunement assumes that emotional states are attuned by a holistic expressive performing, which does indeed deploy gesturing and pantomiming but also includes sound and rhythm as even more primal elements. This substantial significance of gesture, sound, and rhythmic articulation might explain how the genesis of a syntactic concept essential for gesturing and speaking as well as musicking came about to be neurologically located in one and the same area of the brain, the »Broca's area«. While the significance of the Broca's area for the syntax of pantomiming and hand movements has already been established for some time, Richard Kunert et al established the same function for music to be located in the same place only in 2015. Delineating on their findings concerning the significance of the Broca's area for syntax in language and music:

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<sup>255</sup> Tomasello, *Origins of human communication*. P. 19



*We show that the processing demands of musical syntax (harmony) and language syntax interact in Broca's area in the left inferior frontal gyrus (without leading to music and language main effects). A language main effect in Broca's area only emerged in the complex music harmony condition, suggesting that (with our stimuli and tasks) a language effect only becomes visible under conditions of increased demands on shared neural resources.<sup>256</sup>*

This supports the conception that music and language originate from one identical proto lingual melodic and rhythmic vocal articulation faculty that was deeply involved with pointing and pantomiming and indicates an innate duo-modality of human intentional communication, with vision and audition as the two complementary elements of an indivisible cognitive compound. Below this cognitive compound entrainment is the basic and primal mechanism of coordinating not only sound and motion but also purposefully co-performing affects through vocalizations and body gestures. Making a possibly not so bald proposition: Without attunement empowered by entrainment as its elementary neurological qualification there would be neither music and nor language.<sup>257</sup> And, on the other hand, without the evolutive differentiation of two distinct subsystems of expression within what Koelsch calls the »music-language continuum«<sup>258</sup> homo sapiens could not have developed that highly sophisticated discursive ability constituted by the inseparable ensemble of emotion and reason, the Dionysian and the Apollonian as Nietzsche implied (see 1.2), in cognitive processing that distinguishes its species possibly more than anything else. By our thus acquired neurological wiring, even what we conceive of as the most rational thought and judgement involves affective readings and reactions<sup>259</sup> that co-determine our assessments of interrelations which generate the meaning of objects and thus induce how they appear to us.

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<sup>256</sup> Richard Kunert et al., "Music and Language Syntax Interact in Broca's Area: An fMRI Study," *PLOS ONE* 10, no. 11 (2015), P. 1

<sup>257</sup> For a similar though much more elaborate argumentation please also refer to Ian Cross, "The evolutionary nature of musical meaning," 13, no. 2\_suppl (2009), a

<sup>258</sup> Koelsch, *Brain and music*. P. 244

<sup>259</sup> Turner, "The Evolution of Emotions in Humans: A Darwinian?Durkheimian Analysis." P. 14

### 3.2.3 Dimensions of meaning in music according to Koelsch

At its core, music is a purely relational and at the same time emergent phenomenon. In rhythm each beat receives its meaning from its temporal distance to the preceding beat and the subsequent beat. In melodies each tone receives its meaning from its relation to its preceding and to its subsequent tone.<sup>260</sup> All beats and tones together form an instance that is more than their sum, and variations in beats and tones form a different music from what was before. It is necessary to keep this in mind when reflecting on music's capacity to convey meaning because it marks both the discursive strength and weakness of music in comparison to language. While language, in its unique propositional capacity, is a semiotic system of defined signal-concept relations, music cannot be as exact, but is, on the other hand, much more variable and adaptable in its expressions.

In music, syntactic processing has the function of recognizing and structuring auditory elements that together, constellated in memory, represent an entity with a certain form. It is this form that carries significance for a listener who is familiar with the syntactic regularities.<sup>261</sup> As delineated, such regularities are in part transcendental and in part culturally diverse. The same applies to musical semantics. Koelsch names seven dimensions of musical meaning which he differentiates into three classes. Extra-musical meaning is subdivided into the iconic, indexical, and symbolic dimension. Intra-musical meaning has no further subdivisions. The musicogenic class of musical meaning includes the physical, emotional, and the personal dimension.<sup>262</sup> But, noting that the semantic concept of meaning as such is about the relation between signals and concepts, it is not completely appropriate to conceive of the intra-musical and the musicogenic class as semantic. The aspects of musical meaning dealt with in these classes are more appropriately understood as discursively produced. However, before the discursive functionality of musical meaning can be investigated in full, it is necessary to briefly look into what Koelsch views as semantic musical meaning.

The extra-musical class of musical meaning is designative and as such semantic in that it refers to objects or concepts that lie beyond music. The iconic value of music arises from the utilization of musical signals like

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<sup>260</sup> Koelsch, *Brain and music*. P. 100-101

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.* P. 138

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.* P. 157

sounds, patterns, or forms that resemble the auditory characteristics of empiric objects like the dog's barking in the »Spring« of Antonio Vivaldi's »Four Seasons« or sounds that picture weather conditions like the brooding heat in the »Summer« of the same composition.

Indexical qualities emerge from music when it portrays a person's state of mind by imitating an expression that can be associated with a certain psychological condition like joy, sadness, fatigue, relaxation, or an enterprising spirit. A comparison of the acoustical signals used in the description of some basal affects like anger, fear, happiness, sadness, and tenderness in music and in prosody has shown that the acoustic coding of the respective affects are highly similar in both modes.<sup>263</sup> This again supports the notion of the common evolutionary root of language and music and gives another indication of the universal accessibility of basal musical expressions. In a study presenting the Mafa people living in North Cameroon with »Western« style tonal music expressing joy, sadness, and fearfulness, the native African participants recognized the affects expressed by those musical stimuli significantly above chance level. But comparing their recognition rate with »Westerners« it turns out that the understanding of the indexical quality of musical signs is also considerably influenced by culturally embossed experience and knowledge.<sup>264</sup> To a certain extent this also applies for the iconic dimension of musical meaning. The access to the iconic meaning of music is facilitated and limited at the same time by the experience and knowledge of the pictured phenomenon, be it the brooding heat of an Italian summer or a dog's barking.

The symbolic dimension of musical meaning on the other hand is completely dependent on cultural or individual knowledge or experience. Though auditive symbols like commercial jingles and national anthems are usually intended to have not only a recognition function but also an affective function by evoking certain feelings and emotional associations, they derive their meaning completely from semiotic definitions that need to be learned or from association by personal experience.

While these extra-musical meaning dimensions are semantic by their designative character, intra-musical meaning emerges within the perception

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<sup>263</sup> Patrik N. Juslin and Petri Laukka, "Communication of emotions in vocal expression and music performance: Different channels, same code?," 129, no. 5 (2003),

<sup>264</sup> Thomas Fritz et al., "Universal Recognition of Three Basic Emotions in Music," 19, no. 7 (2009),

process itself by an application of the epistemic triangle of discursive relationality (2.1.2), as an observer (automatically) assesses how one musical element structurally relates to another musical element. Within entities of tonal music, a harmonic context is established that has a specific structure with a certain stability and a certain extent. A harmonic structure made up of chords that belong to the harmonic core, for example, has a greater stability than structures built up otherwise which will most probably be perceived as livelier and more diverse in their expression, and harmonic structures can be limited to a single key or bestride a row of keys, which may result in greater harmonic complexity.<sup>265</sup> In so far, intra-musical meaning is closely related to syntactic processing of music.

The functionality of intra-musical meaning as an intrinsic element of music cognition is best illustrated by the phenomenon of compositional disruption within harmonic structure that results in a breach of expectancies in a listener. Such a breach is usually followed by a post-breach structure that induces a resolution of the conflict between structural expectancy in the listener and structural formation devised by the composer or the improvising performer. Koelsch emphasizes the need to differentiate between post-breach structure and resolution because these structural contrivances resonate in a listener by evoking different affects: during the post-breach structure tension builds up in anticipation of how the disruption is going to be resolved, and relaxation sets in when the 'situation' is finally resolved. Thus, the 'management' of expectancies is a substantial discursive means of the composer to frame the listening experience.

Music performs its resonance-effects in a listener by its ever-different rhythmic and harmonic formation. This is the intra-musical experience with its self-referent meaning dimensions. The meaning a listener attributes to these effects in relation to the human condition as well his or her ever-individual character, knowledge, and experience of life, is what Koelsch conceives of as musicogenic meaning. The differentiation made by Koelsch between a physical, a personal, and an emotional dimension of musicogenic meaning is helpful for a rough categorization of these phenomena: In the physical dimension Koelsch subsumes the phenomena that have here been conceived of as entrainment and attunement and he also points to their social implications as delineated above. In the personal dimension he subsumes feeling sensations that are evoked by an individual, often biographically attained,

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<sup>265</sup> Koelsch, *Brain and music*. P. 175

attachment to a certain piece of music or preference for a certain composer. In the emotional dimension Koelsch subsumes the phenomena evoked by prosody and the above delineated a priori character of certain prosodic features, especially found in IDS. But by its primordial nature the affective dimension of musical meaning transcends everything else. This has been corroborated by neuro-scientific experiments conducted by Steinbeis and Koelsch<sup>266</sup> who have investigated how far musical stimuli can prime the processing of a subsequently presented word. It turned out that the brains of participants in the experiments were processing words that were matching the affective valence of the musical stimulus significantly faster than mismatching ones that measurably drew more neural resources. The authors evaluate the outcome as evidence that emotion is a specific route to meaning in music. Subsequently these results indicate once more that music is indeed the language of emotions as the human mind always evaluates it for affective meaning and that musical expressions of emotions can activate associated meaningful concepts.

### **3.2.4** Generating discursive resonance by performing metaphorical experiences

While verbal language, by principle, can only express what has been a thought before and needs to be processed as thought by the recipient as well, music can express and evoke affects directly – and as affects are determinant in cognition by establishing the quality of an object, we need to assume that music, just by itself, has a much larger discursive potential than we usually anticipate. Even viewing music as a non-verbal language of emotions seems appropriate in so far as it can express and evoke affective meaning not just by being processed syntactically and semantically in the mind but even more by being experienced on a metaphorical level.

Ultimately, the affective nature of musical meaning infuses all musicking – musicking as the holistic concept of the participation in musical communication – beyond the categorization made in the previous subchapter and places it in a discursive meta position: Music is by its own means discursive in its capacity of priming and framing our perception and understanding of

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<sup>266</sup> Nikolaus Steinbeis and Stefan Koelsch, "Affective Priming Effects of Musical Sounds on the Processing of Word Meaning," 23, no. 3 (2011), P. 165

our natural, cultural, and social environment, our actuality. It makes a difference listening to the thunderstorm sequence in Vivaldi's »The Four Seasons« summer which appreciates rain, thunder, and lightning as a forceful redemption from brooding heat, or Beethoven's 6<sup>th</sup> Symphony (Pastoral) in the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> movement which makes its point by stressing the contrast between the menacing formation of high rising dark clouds, the intensifying wind and rain mounting in fearsome thunder and lightning on the one hand and the gladdening moment when the sun comes out again, pacifying the scenery with its warmth and light, birds singing and insects swarming the meadows again on the other.

More frequently though, especially in modern popular music, music in its Dionysian way does not have to speak by itself alone but joins in an artistic unification with its Apollonian sister in discursivity, verbal language, in a process where language becomes part of the music and music augments the referential system of language. Beethoven's endeavor not just to set Schiller's »Ode an die Freude« into music but to express its spirit exemplifies how music and language can *pari passu* be synthesized into a new entity. The 9<sup>th</sup> symphony is an opus of secular spirituality that combines text and music – what is said with how it is said – in a way that a holistic metaphorical experience emerges in the listener that transcends both the verbal proposition as well as the aesthetic message of the music. It is here suggested that it is this capacity of performing such humanly significant metaphorical impressions that distinguishes discursively momentous music in general and such popular music in specific.

Metaphors are usually understood as lingual means that are often used – especially but not only in the political context – to intensify and direct the experientiality of speech because thinking and speaking of one thing in terms of another<sup>267</sup> is inherent to the human condition as, among others, Lakoff and Johnson have established.<sup>268</sup> Through the cognitive and affective implications of their imagery, metaphors usually not only frame the conceptual understanding of a matter but also increase the experiential intensity and

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<sup>267</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors we live by*. P. 5.

<sup>268</sup> For further delineations on the functioning of metaphors in politics please see George Lakoff, *The political mind: a cognitive scientist's guide to your brain and its politics; [with a new preface]* (New York, NY u.a.: Penguin Books, 2009).

thus the persuasive performativity of a message.<sup>269</sup> With respect to the »argument is war« example already mentioned in chapter 2.3, this means we conceive of arguments in terms of war and hence experience them as zero-sum games even though a verbal conversation and a physical fight are not the same thing and arguments potentially also have cooperative aspects like the common interest in finding a solution to a problem. In this way metaphors are much more than lyrical or otherwise pictorial language. Talking about one thing in terms of another is expressing our concept of understanding it. Such concepts, though, are not just rationally effective but even more so emotionally. Arguments are not just understood as war, they are experienced as such because the concept »argument« is located in the same emotional world as the concept »war«. It would even seem appropriate to locate the tipping point when a conversation starts to be conceived of as an argument at that moment when the dialogue starts to feel conflictive, when the passion for the object of discussion derails into affects of competition and power. But it starts to feel that way, because we are culturally configured to apply the concept »war« to an argument, not because an argument in essence is a war.

The first condition for the metaphorical capacity of music lies in its inherent ability to refer to or even epitomize experiences of different spheres like nature, society, religion, love, friendship, childhood, or other emotional worlds and impress them on a listener by its own means. The second condition is provided by music's ability to prime representations of meaningful concepts. The third condition is the human tendency to attune to music so that it can emotionally frame our experience. These conditions enable the music of a song not only to affectively tone our concept of its lingual propositions but to embody it by its musical means so that the expressive entity emerging from the synthesis of music and lyrics can create an intense though completely ideal experience in the listener.

The ultimate capacity of song to be a metaphorical experience is carrying the listener into a state of mind where one can temporarily experience a world governed by alternative principles. When such a musically metaphorical experience relates to a personally or societally challenging situation it can give an experiential taste of a particular idea or vision for interpreting

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<sup>269</sup> Kateryna Pilyarchuk, Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, and Alexander Onysko, "Conceptual Metaphors in Donald Trump's Political Speeches: Framing his Topics and (Self-)Constructing his Persona" (2018). Please also refer to subchapter 3.2.4

that real world situation. This implies that song can form experiential representations of conceptual metaphors. Thus, a song can add another spin to an aggregate of meanings of an object and can develop discursive resonance that may potentially lead to altering or intensifying how we conceive of a situation and its challenges. Sometimes the metaphorical dimension of song just gives us an orientation or provides an emotional pattern for dealing with the situation, in both cases music embodies its meaning in a way that transcends its aesthetic or entertaining value.

Because music can attune people to one another it has the potential to influence the experience of a real-world situation not alone on the level of the individual but also inter-subjectively. It is the capacity to attune people that makes music as such an important medium of cultural accommodation on any level of society. As one song might have acquired a specific significance in the life of a couple because they experienced its relationship in the light of this song's metaphorical impression together, another choral piece might become the anthem of a confederation of states because it gives a metaphorically impression of their common desire for a culture of peace, friendship, and cooperation after times of national chauvinism and horrific wars – as is in the case in the European Union choosing a passage from Beethoven's 9<sup>th</sup> symphony that features the key message of Schiller's "Ode an die Freude".

In its performance of metaphoric experientiality, song has the potential to be a change agent in systemic actualities by its capability of affecting the systems of meanings of families, societies or any other kind of social system through its embodied statement. Though the field of popular music has become extremely diverse and fragmented, it still is a medium with an enormous reach that still has the potential to make an impact on the emergence of societal actuality when it starts to attune people collectively. Through its omnipresence and its attuning performativity, pop-music can resonate in people's experience of life in whatever cultural niches they dwell.



### 3.3 Performing Discursive Resonance: acts of communicative instances

Communicative instances are entities of lingual, gestural, musical, or behavioral actions that are recognized to express meaning and are thus discursively performative. The dual signification of performance in general language poses the particularity that the adjective »performative« and the noun »performativity« can be understood to express the quality of deliberate enacting of expression, sometimes unsatisfactorily referred to as »performed communication«, as well as its effecting a certain circumstance. Thus, speaking of performative communication or the performativity of communication can accountably mean both the characterization as being charged with increased expressive intensity and the consequentiality of a communication that Austin contemplated so seminally in his speech act theory. But, as in the initial thesis of this chapter about the ontic gap to be bridged by communication has suggested and the account of parent-child attunement by the intensive use of gesturing and child directed melodic speech in subchapter 3.2.2 has vividly illustrated, both concepts are closely related because the effect of communication often results from its enactment. One can usually assume that a communicator increases the intensity of enacting his or her expression in a communicative instance, especially with regard to the affect dimension, when aiming at effecting specific discursive resonance: the comprehension, the processing, and, ultimately, the recursive application of the expressed meaning by the target subject.

An example of an intentionally initiated communication-performance that generated such a performative effect that substantially disrupted the actuality of German society by gaining an autonomous momentum of discursive resonance is the press conference of Günther Schabowski, member of the SED Politbüro, on 9 November 1989 where he announced the freedom of travel to the citizens of the GDR live on TV. Asked when this was going to be effective, he became weary, searched his papers, and, finding no information, answered somewhat insecurely but firmly enough, that the freedom of travel was legal with immediate effect, kicking off an instantaneous surge that ultimately could not be contained but irresistibly overcame the border-post barriers towards the west.

In its time lapse emergence, anarchic dynamics, and societal scope, this case is very well suited for applying the discourse assessment cascade for a concise illustration of the preconditions as well as the process of societal discursive resonance and its intersubjectifying functioning:

On the perception level the statement of Schabowski was assessed in its degree of relevance by the observers. The setting of the statement was the singular event of an official live press conference of the government of the GDR that was charged with international attention and high expectations after months of demonstrations for change and legions of people that had fled the GDR via Hungary. Whatever statement was going to be issued would clearly be highly relevant and therefore instructive for the anticipation of future developments and individual positioning.

On the awareness level Schabowski's statement was assessed in its relation to the governing epistemic culture. In this regard, the press conference took a leaden development that was typical for the government of the GDR and it could have been expected that the Politbüro would have attempted to calm the situation by consoling its citizens with promises, until the whole situation culminated in the disruptive instance of a complementing piece of information that was given after a direct request. The societal actuality of the late GDR was characterized by a profound experience of unfreedom and discontentment<sup>270</sup>: this was clearly an application of a meaning that was heavily diverging from the discourse-line of the government and fostering the discourse-line of the demonstrators, and as such, promoted change that would require adoption and adaption. For the epistemic culture of the GDR, which always included the active differentiation between text and subtext<sup>271</sup>, the unintentionally produced integratedness of the statement not only indicated a general acceptance of open borders but also of integrated, outright communication one might call clear and honest. Assessing the nature of the relation of a relevant statement or action to the current epistemic culture is crucial for a personal positioning in the discourse. In order to be able to respond by what one says or does it is important to be alert.

On the behavior level the alerted citizens of the GDR needed to assess whether the change-promoting meaning this relevant Politbüro-statement conveyed was generally adopted and actively re-applied, ignored or even revoked. Many may have initially come to the border posts to find out what was going on, and whether others were coming as well, while others may have massed behind a border post to see how the border police were reacting before some started chanting, while most waited with decreasing patience. The point is that the discursive resonance that occurred in the behavior of

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<sup>270</sup> See Focus Group interviews in the appendix.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

the masses resulted in an unambiguous recursive amplification of the trend towards crossing the borders and travelling freely.

This brief case study exemplifies how the extent to which a meaning that a communicative instance expresses is adopted and recursively applied can be understood as its discursive performativity, and though this largely depends on the performer and his or her performance, it also depends on the intensity of the incentive or self-interest on the observer's side to adopt it. In its interactivity this process resembles the general concept of attunement as self-organizational inter-subjectivation that may seemingly be initiated by a single conveying communicator but is maintained and advanced collectively.

When surveying the societal depth and width of discursive performativity, it is thus not a presumable enacting communicator and her or his intention, ability, and success to persuade others that is guiding reflections but, quite in the tradition of the field, the perceived performative configuration of communicative instances: What factors influence that an observing subject not only comprehends but also processes and ultimately even recursively applies the meaning expressed? As the recursive application of meaning has here been established to be the social mechanism that societal actuality emerges from, the significance of this question is considerable, which possibly is the reason for the vast discursive processing the matter of performativity has experienced.

In 1955 Austin summed up his speech act theory in which he differentiated the locutionary act as the literal meaning of a proposition, the illocutionary act as a deed performed in the proposition, and the perlocutionary act as the outcome generated by the proposition as dimensions in an utterance. This can be explicated by applying it to two momentous communicative instances in German Cold War history: When John F. Kennedy exclaimed at his visit in 1963 "Ich bin ein Berliner" the locutionary act was to say that he is a citizen of the city of Berlin, the illocutionary act was his honest commitment to a free and open society by dedicating himself to this then newly divided city, the perlocutionary act, the actual result, was soothing the pain imposed by the building of the wall and the anxieties elicited by this measure as well as generating a sober west-enthusiasm that carried through till November 1989 and far beyond.<sup>272</sup> When the Chancellor of the FRG, Willy Brandt fell

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<sup>272</sup> Andreas W. Daum, *Kennedy in Berlin: Politik, Kultur und Emotionen im Kalten Krieg* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003). (English version: *Kennedy in Berlin*. Translated by Dona Geyer. Cambridge University Press 2008)

to his knees at the cenotaph in memory of the Jewish Ghetto in Warsaw in 1970 the locutionary act was somewhat painfully dropping on both knees simultaneously, the illocutionary act was a sincere public display of penance for the German genocide against Jews, the perlocutionary act was generating a self-concept of Germany as an ethically renewed member of the world community.<sup>273</sup>

Though an in-depth historical analysis of these cases would exceed the scope of the present delineations, it is here (intrepidly) postulated that both examples can be considered »discursive interventions« because each catalyzed societal developments by sustainably resonating in the discursive emergence of actuality in a way specific to the meaning they conveyed and thus had a distinct impact on the governing epistemic culture of their time. This was possible because the observers experienced that Kennedy and Brandt did not just play their role but were true protagonists in that their performance embodied the meaning they conveyed. A precondition substantial to this effect is, as emphasized by Austin's theory, the affective authenticity of the performance.

His delineations on performatives in "How To Do Things With Words", which can be seen as the origin of speech act theory as well as of wider philosophical reflection on performativity, also describe instances where the illocutionary speech acts are institutional performatives because most situations where an utterance creates an immediate factual difference in actuality by its declarative force are culturally or even legally institutionalized, as Austin indirectly acknowledges in brackets:

*In these examples it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it.*<sup>274</sup>

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Daum delineates the genesis of Kennedy's »Ich bin ein Berliner« as a deliberate derivation from Cicero's »Civis Romanus Sum« by Kennedy himself (III,3.) and elaborates on its political as well as societal significance.

<sup>273</sup> "When Willy Brandt fell to his knees," International Auschwitz Committee IAC, 2020, accessed 06.08.2022.

"With this gesture, Willy Brandt has remained deep in the hearts of the Holocaust survivors and many people in Poland. And he gave post-war democracy in Germany a legitimacy of humanity and credibility which lives on to this day." (Christoph Heubner, executive Vice President of the International Auschwitz Committee)

<sup>274</sup> Austin, *How to do things with words*. P. 6

In situations like – invoking two of his examples – christening a ship at its launch by calling out the respective formula followed by the name, or a religious minister or a registrar declaring a couple as married who have mutually expressed the respective intention, „the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action“<sup>275</sup>. To produce this kind of specific discursive resonance, these »performatives« fall back on pre-intersubjectivated meaning as a cultural a priori – that is: knowledge about specific social-factual consequences for the involved subjects and/or objects that are, by convention, intrinsic to the formula if it is spoken in its defining context. The words alone cannot actualize a speech act, that would be possible only in a magical world. In actuality, the words spoken are just one component of a socially significant ritual that, in this social significance, relies on institutional validity<sup>276</sup> that is not constituted by a singular act but comes about by the reiteration of norms<sup>277</sup>, as Butler points out:

*The illocutionary speech act performs its deed at the moment of the utterance, and yet to the extent that the moment is ritualized, it is never merely a single moment. The moment in ritual is a condensed historicity: it exceeds itself in past and future directions, an effect of prior and future invocations that constitute and escape the instance of utterance.*<sup>278</sup>

A wedding ceremony is a valid example of such a frequently reiterated public ritual that even has an almost transcendental quality to it because it is found in many cultures in one way or another. But to achieve its institutional performativity with its social implications, a wedding ceremony not only reiterates preset meanings, it also requires the applicable execution of the rite to be actualized: a certain spatiotemporal situation that establishes the performative's specific context, like in front of an altar, in a registrar's office, or another defined space at an agreed time; a specifically authorized protagonist<sup>279</sup> who establishes the performative's validity, like a religious minister or a registrar; certain pre-defined gestural movements and/or formulaic utterings that establish the correctness and applicability of the performative's content, like asking bride and groom whether they want to marry the other

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<sup>275</sup> Ibid. P. 7

<sup>276</sup> Jörg Volbers, *Performative Kultur: Eine Einführung*, SpringerLink Bücher, (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2014). P. 34

<sup>277</sup> Butler, *Bodies that matter: on the discursive limits of "sex"*. P. 12

<sup>278</sup> Judith Butler, *Excitable speech: a politics of the performative* (New York, NY u.a.: Routledge, 1997). P. 3

<sup>279</sup> Austin, *How to do things with words*. first lecture P. 8

and exchanging rings; a specific sequential order and affective manner that establishes the performative's appropriateness, like sequencing question and answer and a solemn but affectionate seriousness; a witnessing and resonating audience that establishes the performative's significance, at least consisting of two appointed witnesses to the marriage that testify the act so that its meaning must be recursively applied by the couple and neither can say he or she was just joking or being polite.

By generalizing from the wedding ceremony, the following institutional performativity establishing elements can hence be assumed<sup>280</sup>:

1. The context-element
2. The protagonist-element
3. The content-element
4. The enacting-element
5. The audience-element

A wedding promise without these elements may exert a declarative force for the couple involved that constitutes a lasting relationship but for society it would merely be a promise without legal effects. But what if, on the other hand, a communicative instance of cultural relevance that has no specific ritual or institutional background were complemented by these elements? Would this not automatically increase the potentiality of the meaning expressed by such a communicative instance to resonate on a higher level than without? What if the president of the United States, leader of the western coalition, had been indisposed because of his chronically aching back, for example, and vice president Lindon B. Johnson had delivered the speech stating he was a citizen of Berlin, or if Kennedy had not uttered it in front of a huge audience and broadcasted on TV but instead to Willy Brandt, then mayor of the city, personally at state banquet, or if he had got it wrong and said: "Ich will ein Berliner", or if he had not appeared as sincere and determined but wavering. It is improbable that in any of these cases the illocutionary act of commitment would have acquired the same level of efficacy – of societal performativity.

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<sup>280</sup> The system of differentiation and itemization acquired here diverges from Austin's as delineated in the second lecture P. 14 following (Ibid.)

Endeavors to establish an object as common in discourse, to influence the general assessment of a situation, or to establish certain formalities by means of institutionalized declarative speech acts are common phenomena in human affairs. In attachment to, but not in complete accord with, Austin, the term »performatives« is here used for instances of performative communication that have succeeded in performing empirically observable specific discursive resonance in that the meaning which it has perceivably expressed has not only been understood but has been recursively applied as adopted meaning. Only those sporadic actions or statements, though, that distinguish themselves by resonating with a seminal, sometimes disruptive effect in a precariously charged societal situation can be considered discursive interventions.

To what *extent* discursive resonance reproduces the *intended* meaning is an important question because this is not only a matter of the subjective assessment of the emitting initiator of this communication but also a matter of the hermeneutics of the observers. However, correlating with the grade of the circumstance of discursive similarity, one can usually expect that in most intra-cultural situations the hermeneutics of common sense apply and the message that was understood accords agreeably with what was meant – if not instantaneously then after clarifying feedback loops.

In the rationale of the epistemic triangle of discursive relationality, the significance of the subject-object »performed instance of meaning« is dependent on the attributes of the object-object »situation« in a way that the relation can easily switch, which means the situation becomes the subject-object that selects a matching instance of performed meaning to be resonant by its attributes, even if this instance of meaning was performed in a different context, completely unintentionally, or in a blunder. This can be seen in the example of Schabowski's press conference which, despite its uncertain, confounded manner, exerted the institutionalizing performativity of a speech-act because the people seized the »Kairos«, the opportunity of the moment. Substantially determinant for the performance of discursive resonance is the degree of matching between the requirements of the situation and the cognitive as well as the affective potentiality of the instance of performed meaning. Decisive, though, is not the intention but the concordant proceeding of discursive resonance itself.

## **4 Analyzing Performative Potentiality: establishing and analyzing the factors of discursive resonance**

### **4.1 The Key-factors of Discursive Resonance: thinking Aristotle's Rhetoric ahead**

The first hurdle an issued meaning must take to become part of the public discursive process at all, is for it to be assessed as adequately significant. It is therefore necessary to keep in mind the assumption of the discourse assessment cascade as outlined in subchapter 2.3.3 when it comes to identifying factors of discursive resonance. This states that the significance of an issued meaning is estimated by a conceiving subject in relation to the relevance of the issuer, in relation to its urgency, and in relation to its acceptance. But, as the previous chapter has indicated, that what empowers an instance of performed communication with the performativity to act as a discursive intervention is the emphatic ensemble of personal integrity, rational content, and affective expression in relation to the dynamics of a certain situation. When generalizing this finding in respect to any performance of discursive resonance, two dimensions need to be distinguished because performance is an act of the issuer while discursive resonance is an effect that is located in the minds of the perceiving subjects. On the one hand, there is the dimension of the single factors as such as they can be reconstructed in the analysis of a performance of communicative instance and, on the other, there is the dimension of their interrelation as an observing subject will perceive them holistically. Concerning the dimension of interrelation of the single factors in its decisiveness for performativity it is necessary to regard such a holistically effecting circumstance as emergent, where the whole transcends the sum of its elements. The observed or experienced effect cannot be reduced to simple causalities and the exact interoperation of the elements remains cryptic.

Applying this assumption of emergence to the dimension of the elements in combination with conceiving of the emerging effect as resonance suggests regarding these elements as dual natured: as factors that can be regarded as distinct from each other and as frequencies that are experienced only in their ensemble. Hence, to acquire performative discursive resonance beyond an institutionalized setting, each factor must not only contribute its part on its



own for achieving formal completeness, but these factors must interoperate effectively as frequencies in ensemble in the mind of a perceiving subject. Because this is ultimately impossible to reckon, it is only feasible to assess the potentiality of performativity and, to some degree, its directedness by analyzing the factors, not the actual effect.

Therefore, it is appropriate to resolve the integrated status of personal integrity, affective expression, and rational content. When looking at them as single factors, it becomes apparent that they are not only congruent with three of the items contained in the list of elements that establish formal performativity as set out also in subchapter 3.3, but also with the three central means of persuasion as distinguished in Aristotle's »Rhetoric«: Ethos, Pathos and Logos:

*Now the means of persuasion furnished by a speech are of three kinds. The first depends on the character of the speaker, the second on putting the listener into a certain frame of mind, the third on the speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove.*<sup>281</sup>

Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as the faculty of considering what may be persuasive in reference to a subject<sup>282</sup> indicates, as delineated in subchapter 2.1, that rhetoric can fulfill an epistemic-hermeneutical function for society. In Aristotle's understanding, this function is generated in the triangular dynamics between speaker, audience, and subject. In this rationality, ethos, as suggested in the above citation, is located in the speaker, pathos in the audience, and logos in the argumentation in reference to the subject while all three are considered technical means of persuasion that need to be orchestrated by the speaker.<sup>283</sup> By differentiating substantially between issuing and understanding, the present exploration has a slightly different angle. While Aristotle authored a, albeit very analytical, directive for rhetorically deploying ethos, logos, and pathos for achieving persuasion, it is the aim of the present study to analyze the single factors as they occurred in an instance of public communication that evolved societal relevance, possibly even as a discursive intervention, a performative of the fourth degree, in retrospect. So, the aim is not to give issuers of communication directives for achieving maximum discursive resonance but to analyze the potentiality an instance of

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<sup>281</sup> Aristotle and Freese, *Art of rhetoric*. P. 17

<sup>282</sup> Ibid. P. 15

<sup>283</sup> Antoine C. Braet, "Ethos, pathos and logos in Aristotle's Rhetoric: A re-examination," *Argumentation* 6, no. 3 (1992/08/01 1992), P. 310

public communication may have borne in the discursive process of a society, which, of course, requires a certain degree of reception from the audience. Whether the potentiality that emerged and its observed direction was intended or not is irrelevant.

The question that arises is: what needs to be incorporated in an inventory of performance-factors for a relevant, if not conclusive, analysis of performative potentiality? The factors would need to transcend cultural idiosyncracies, be a priori to some degree. Ethos, Logos, and Pathos have proven to be applicable in different epistemes over a long period of time. And as rhetoric was a prototype of communication that created audiences by aggregating individual attention at a societal level and can as such even be seen as progenitor of today's public media, it can reasonably be assumed that in the course of the establishment of a global public Ethos, Logos, and Pathos have become an intrinsic part of the discourse-structure in most parts of the world even if they possibly had no or a different relevance in some cultures. Nietzsche, by claiming that any art had a layer of rhetoric<sup>284</sup> implicitly extends the applicability of the three means even to any artistic confection.

As the three factors established in subchapter 3.3 personal integrity, rational content, and affective expression correspond to the protagonist-element, the content-element, and the enacting-element in the list of elements that establish formal performativity as well as to the proven Aristotelian measures of rhetoric, it is consistent that Ethos, Logos, and Pathos also correspond to the protagonist-element, the content-element, and the enacting-element. While accepting Ethos, Logos, and Pathos as factors of discursive resonance, it is, therefore, compelling to have another look at that list to derive further factors that may need to become items of the inventory of performative potentiality factors:

1. The context-element
2. The protagonist-element
3. The content-element
4. The enacting-element
5. The audience-element

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<sup>284</sup> Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke*, 7. Bd. 7, 32 (14)

The context-element refers to the formal momentary situation a performative communicative instance takes place in. It is the precarious charge of such a specific societal context at a specific time that condenses it into a contoured situation that, as a dispositive, frames the actuality of its subjects. Such a situation is dynamically emergent and changes with time. The performance of a meaning may coincide with a certain situational circumstance in a way so that the situational circumstance becomes an amplifying, a neutral or a weakening factor for performing discursive resonance. In Greek mythology this factor of the right point in time is personified by the god »Kairos« whose name is here reproduced as the term for this performative potentiality factor. What is more important, Kairos is also an Aristotelean category that he elucidates, not in the Rhetoric, but in the Nicomachean Ethics.

The audience-element refers not only to the number of people that witness the performance of a meaning but also to the role these people play in the power relations and the influence they hence have. As this plays an important role on the behavior-level in the discourse assessment cascade it is necessary to factor in the audience-element to the present approach of establishing factors of performative potentiality.

Pressing what was initially one of Austin's examples for performatives to its limits, in a marriage ceremony it is important to note again that the size of the wedding party is not decisive for the formal performativity, only the presence of the necessary witnesses in their function of representing the public. However, the number of guests can make a difference in the informal dimension of a wedding, for example in so far as their weight of number potentially increases the significance of the event because, in relation to crowds, size is signaling relevance. It can be hypothesized that the appearance of the societal significance of Bob Geldof's »Live Aid« Concert in 1985 was inflated far beyond its political scope by the 1,5 billion people it attracted to witness the event on TV, who hence became bearers of a commonly shared experience. But because people anticipate that TV-coverage created public noticeability, also the idea of the size of the world-wide TV-audience will have contributed substantially to its perceived relevance. Even in the age of social media, reach still has this twin-circumstance which is best reflected in amplitude because actual perception and perceived perceivability together create an impression of volume. This hypothesis is based on the assumption of a quasi-statistic organ made by Noelle-Neuman in her Spiral of Silence theory. For the sake of consistency, the factor of amplitude is here also called by its Greek term: Platos. (Incidentally, Platos is also the name of Plato in ancient Greek.)

In their reinterpretation of the elements establishing formal performativity each of these five factors is necessary for analyzing performative potentiality, but is this fivefold inventory sufficient, or are there other factors that need to be included? There are two fields of theory and research that are closely related and need to be consulted as they also deal with factors of discursive resonance: the psychological field of persuasion and the media-scientific field of news values.

In his survey of theory and research in the field of persuasion, Daniel J. O'Keefe differentiates three kinds of factors of persuasion: source factors, message factors, and receiver and context factors.<sup>285</sup> It is not only the trinomial structure that strikingly resembles Aristotle's three means of persuasion through rhetoric, but also the details. The source factors obviously cover the considerations towards the issuer or communicator. Attributes like credibility, likability, and similarity to the audience are critical for a communicator's ability to achieve the discursive resonance of adopting the conveyed attitude.<sup>286</sup> The message factors include the structure of the message, the particular content included in the message, and sequential-request strategies for effecting compliance.<sup>287</sup> The receiver and context factors comprise natural or enduring receiver characteristics like gender and personality traits, induced receiver factors, and contextual factors.<sup>288</sup>

On closer inspection it becomes apparent that the structure of factors presented in O'Keefe's summarizing reproduction of theory and research in the field of persuasion is not completely concurrent with Aristotle's, and furthermore that the deviations from »the Rhetoric« support the fivefold compilation acquired here. While all the source factors, credibility, likability, and similarity with the audience, are obviously exactly what Ethos encompasses, only the message factors of structure and content unambiguously belong to logos. Sequential-request strategies can better be positioned in Pathos because they have the aim of inducing a certain frame of mind which is vividly illustrated by their pictorial names, for example: »foot in the door« and »door in the face«. In the third category the induced receiver factors do, by Aristotle's definition, belong to Pathos whereas enduring receiver characteristics

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<sup>285</sup> Daniel J. O'Keefe, *Persuasion: theory & research*, 2. ed., [repr.] ed., Current communication, (Thousand Oaks u.a.: Sage Publ., 2003).

<sup>286</sup> O'Keefe, *Persuasion: theory & research*. P. 181

<sup>287</sup> Ibid. P. 215

<sup>288</sup> Ibid. P. 241

and contextual factor both belong to the environment of the communication and need to be regarded as attributes that define the situation and hence need to be positioned in the – here complemented – category of Kairos. The audience is not a factor of its own.

With respect to the field of news values it must be mentioned that the inventors of the concept, Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge, introduced »Amplitude« as one of the qualifiers that increase the likeliness of an item to be featured in print or broadcast. Paul Brighton and Dennis Foy render Galtung and Ruge's definition in their update to the state of theory and research in the field as: "Threshold expands beyond the normal, and the unexpected become news."<sup>289</sup> This does, in part, comply with the concept of Platos as it is featured here, but, as delineated above, the direction of the latter is more generally the impression of volume which, among others, also includes the aspect of Galtung and Ruge's qualifier »continuum«: "Once an event has become news it gathers its own momentum."<sup>290</sup>

To classify the different news values in the here proposed system of factors for discursive resonance with the intention of assaying whether there are hints to other factors that would need to be included, it will henceforth be referred to the news value inventory as compiled by Tony Harcup and Deirdre O'Neill<sup>291</sup>:

**Exclusivity:** *Stories generated by, or available first to, the news organisation as a result of interviews, letters, investigations, surveys, polls, and so on.*

Exclusivity results from the favor of the hour which clearly marks it as part of Kairos.

**Bad news:** *Stories with particularly negative overtones such as death, injury, defeat and loss (of a job, for example).*

Bad news draws on affects like anxiety, sympathy or even Schadenfreude (malicious joy) which qualifies it for Pathos.

**Conflict:** *Stories concerning conflict such as controversies, arguments, splits, strikes, fights, insurrections and warfare.*

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<sup>289</sup> Paul Brighton and Dennis Foy, *News values*, 1. publ. ed. (London u.a.: SAGE Publ., 2007). P. 7

<sup>290</sup> Ibid.

<sup>291</sup> Tony Harcup and Deirdre O'Neill, "What is News? : News values revisited (again)," 18, no. 12 (2017), P. 28 ff

As conflicts refer to certain acute situations, this news value can unambiguously be attributed to Kairos.

**Surprise:** *Stories that have an element of surprise, contrast and/or the unusual about them.*

While surprise arises from situational circumstance, surprise also describes a certain affect, therefore it can be attributed to Kairos as well as to Pathos.

**Audio-visuals:** *Stories that have arresting photographs, video, audio and/or which can be illustrated with infographics.*

As »enduring receiver characteristics« might suggest an audience factor, the significance of audio-visual material for the publishing process might suggest a media factor, especially with regard to Marshal McLuhan's fundamental proposition that the medium was the message. Unlike in the case of »enduring receiver characteristics« the mediality of a meaning cannot be straightforwardly attributed to one of the five factors, but it is here argued that mediality assists perceptibility, which is an aspect of Platos. Platos as reach or volume can fundamentally be acquired by any meaning in the course of what the above-mentioned qualifier of continuity describes. In the course of things, any meaning may get pervasive media processing that includes audio-visual coverage. Thus, the choice of media is not regarded as a factor of its own but is subsumed in Platos.

**Shareability:** *Stories that are thought likely to generate sharing and comments via Facebook, Twitter and other forms of social media.*

Shareability can hardly stand as a news value of its own but would need to be differentiated into attributes like cuteness, funniness, kitchness or just snideness, or the other listed news values, and is here neglected.

**Entertainment:** *Soft stories concerning sex, showbusiness, sport, lighter human interest, animals, or offering opportunities for humorous treatment, witty headlines or lists.*

The entertainability of a content is usually drawn from its affective potentiality and can be attributed to Pathos.

**Drama:** *Stories concerning an unfolding drama such as escapes, accidents, searches, sieges, rescues, battles or court cases.*

Drama as it is described here also draws on affects and can be positioned in Pathos.

**Follow-up:** *Stories about subjects already in the news."*

Follow up fits with the above mentioned concept of continuity and can thus be attributed to Platos.

**The power elite:** *Stories concerning powerful individuals, organisations, institutions or corporations.*

Any elitist aspects can be attributed to Ethos.

**Relevance:** *Stories about groups or nations perceived to be influential with, or culturally or historically familiar to, the audience.*

Relevance is quite congruent with the concept of elite and can also be attributed to Ethos.

**Magnitude:** *Stories perceived as sufficiently significant to the large numbers of people involved or in potential impact, or involving a degree of extreme behaviour or extreme occurrence.*

Magnitude can by definition be attributed to Platos.

**Celebrity:** *Stories concerning people who are already famous.*

Like elite and relevance, celebrity is an attribute of Ethos.

**Good news:** *Stories with particularly positive overtones such as recoveries, breakthroughs, cures, wins and celebrations.*

Like bad news, good news draws on affects and can thus be attributed to Pathos.

**News organisation's agenda:** *Stories that set or fit the news organisation's own agenda, whether ideological, commercial or as part of a specific campaign.*

Where agenda is a criterion, highly rational processes are at work, which qualifies it for Logos.

Overview of the subsumption of factors of persuasion and news values into the key-factors of discursive resonance

	<b>Kairos</b>	<b>Ethos</b>	<b>Pathos</b>	<b>Logos</b>	<b>Platos</b>
<b>Source factors</b>		Credibility Likability Similarity to audience			
<b>Message factors</b>			Sequential request strategies	Structure  Particular content	
<b>Receiver and Context factors</b>	Enduring receiver characteristics  Contextual factors		Induced receiver factors		
<b>News values</b>	Exclusivity Conflict Surprise	Power elite Relevance Celebrity	Bad news Entertainment Drama Good news Surprise	News-organization's agenda	Follow-up Relevance Magnitude Mediality

It is, therefore, no surprise that this leaves us with five primary factors of performative potentiality that are almost congruent with the elements that establish formal performativity, differing not so much in substance but decisively by the momentousness of their extended depth as will be delineated in the following subchapters. But, as has been delineated in subchapter 3.1.3, the integratedness of the five primary factors also plays a vital role for the performative potentiality of a communicative instance and needs to be considered as a sixth factor, though not in the same way as the five primary factors, it instead poses a meta-level. To analyze the performative potentiality of a communicative instance to resonate discursively, each of the five primary factors first has to be prospected by itself before relating them to each other to see what the impression of the whole picture effectively looks like. Therefore, this meta-level factor will here be called »symphonos«, which is supposed to indicate that its analytical inspection conceptionally includes the final synoptic assessment of a communicative instance's performative potentiality.



## 4.2 Procedure and Method: a discursive approach of assessment

The aim of this analysis is to assess the potentiality of a communicative instance to have performed discursive resonance in a certain cultural environment at a certain time. Correlating with the ultimately Kantian concept of discursivity, which is the epistemological approach fundamentally instructive to this thesis as a whole, this analysis focusses on the actual appearance of the respective communicative instance, not on what might have been intended by its author. Objects of the environment stimulate perception, but how they are perceived depends on the cognitive capability, the knowledge, and the situational mindset of the observing subjects. This process of discursivity ideally includes checks and balances beyond individual intentionality that make for generating critically evaluated phenomena which generally correspond at least inasmuch to an object's reality as necessary for operationalizing that object for current use or adaptation. As the present analysis requires generating observations of its own as well as observations of observations, it needs to be ensured by the research design that these observations also undergo a process of critique.

After establishing the five factors of discursive resonance, it is now necessary to establish their theoretical content. These derivations and descriptions yield the respective knowledge interest to be explored in the analysis of the historic example. For clarity's sake, each factor-analysis will be applied to the example, subsequent to each factor's theoretical delineation. The first step in each factor-analysis will be to operationalize the knowledge interest by breaking it down into a small number of particular research issues. How this analysis is then conducted is on principle up to the user's knowledge-objective. To simply get a first idea of a communicative instance's performative potential, one might go through the factors by means of one's own recollection and reckoning. If a more sophisticated conclusion is desired, this can be attained by profiling available literature and data which has usually already undergone a process of critique. When this is carried out in a group, including discussion, the advantages of social discursivity, the greater degree of perception and the inherent process of critique will lead to even more refined results. If it is desirable and feasible to get a more experience-based result, one needs to go for a more empiric study design, which might include biographical interviews, questionnaire-based surveys, or focus groups. In the two former methods, a desirable level of critique can be attained by comparing the single results to each other or by leveling them. The latter

procedure, the focus group, is the empiric method of choice in this study and will be discussed in more detail.

The approach chosen here for assessing the performative potentiality of the “Sonderzug” song in the pre-revolutionary situation in the GDR of 1983 that eventually evolved into the developments leading to the fall of the iron curtain and ultimately to German re-unification is to carry out an experience-oriented survey in the form of two focus groups. This approach is appropriate because the context of the investigation lies in a country where the subject of the investigation was banned, which means that there are only a few sources concerning the reception of the “Sonderzug” song in the GDR. The other reason is of a methodical nature. Discursivity, as it is conceptualized here, is only limitedly positivistic in that it is about continuously making more or less well-informed assumptions that always need to be criticized. Accordingly, it is the aim of this study to analyze the potentiality of a communicative instance’s performativity and not to prove its impact. But, furthermore, it is appropriate to choose a scientific approach that correlates with this aim. Carried out forty years after the focused situation, the focus group discussion depends on the memory of the participants, but memories are always subject to biographical shadowing. An assessment of past experiences can thus only produce approximations, too, but in a valid way.

The focus group is a tool of qualitative research that was first implemented by Robert Merton and his team of the Bureau of Applied Social Research to study the effects of mass communications in general and the persuasiveness of wartime propaganda in specific.<sup>292</sup> They summarized its function as follows:

*The focused interview is designed to determine the responses of persons exposed to a situation previously analyzed by the investigator. Its chief functions are to discover: (1) the significant aspects of the total situation to which response has occurred; (2) discrepancies between anticipated and actual effects; (3) responses of deviant subgroups in the population; and (4) the processes involved in experimentally induced effects.*<sup>293</sup>

The very point where the concept of the research tool focus group connects to the approach of the present study is the supposition of a unitary situation. The aim here, though, is not to prospect the response itself that occurred to

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<sup>292</sup> Robert K. Merton and Patricia L. Kendall, "The Focused Interview," 51, no. 6 (1946),

<sup>293</sup> Merton and Kendall, "The Focused Interview." 541

a certain situation, be it a certain societal circumstance in general or a specific certain communicative instance, but to deploy the participants' expertise in order to reconstruct how the larger public may have experienced the societal circumstance of the time in question and to analyze how certain features of the communicative instance in question may have appeared to the people in that situation in relation to that situation. This also implies that the participants are not required to evaluate the impact of the communicative instance, but only to describe their experience of it broken down into the aspects of the factors identified.

The focus group approach as such inherently takes account of the discursive nature of perception as it is implicitly based on individuals discussing their perception of one object (communicative instance) in relation to another object (societal circumstance). One of its major discursive attributes for sociological research is that it promotes self-disclosure among participants.<sup>294</sup> This is induced by the synergetic dynamics that usually emerge in the atmosphere of trust and individual significance that builds in a balanced group that is neither too heterogeneous nor too homogeneous in its composition and is authentically esteemed by the researcher as a collective of experts. Under these conditions, the participants are challenged and encouraged to put forward their own point of view, which can help them generate a clearer recollection of their experience because chains of associative thought in combination with the natural urge to contribute may unearth forgotten or unconsidered details. Thus, creating a more complete and discursively criticized picture is obviously a unique effect that amounts to the specific validity of the results generated by focus groups that is sought here.

Krueger et al propose considering a focus group approach if, for example, the researcher wants to assay the range of opinions, perceptions, ideas, or feelings people have about something.<sup>295</sup> The information desired here, though, is not how people thought or felt about the "Sonderzug" song as such or whether, or to what degree, they thought it had an impact in the GDR society, but how they evaluate the five factors and their interrelation with regard to the song. The focus group is the appropriate approach for this

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<sup>294</sup> Richard A. and Krueger and Mary Anne Casey, *Focus groups : a practical guide for applied research / Richard A. Krueger, University of Minnesota, Professor Emeritus, Mary Anne Casey, Consultant, 5th edition ed.* (SAGE, 2015), Book. P. 4

<sup>295</sup> Krueger and Casey, *Focus groups : a practical guide for applied research / Richard A. Krueger, University of Minnesota, Professor Emeritus, Mary Anne Casey, Consultant.* P. 21

rather analytical task because a focus group can provide the required expertise by aggregating a substantial amount of relevant experience and abstractive capacity.

This involves a well-informed choice of participants. They needed to be experts for the experience of life of young people in the GDR while they also needed to represent the GDR society in its breadth at least to a certain extent. This was achieved by inviting people from different spheres of the current civil society who were between 18 and 40 years old in 1983. The focus group included 'G', an artist (painter), who was part of a dissident group that was attached to Nikolai church pastor Christian Führer and included Wolfgang Tiefensee, the future social-democrat mayor of the city of Leipzig; 'Ul', a music teacher who considered himself well adapted and in consent with the ideals of socialism but had, because of his roman-catholic faith, conscientious objections against military service and had been intimidated because he had accordingly, initially somewhat naively, chosen to opt for serving as a construction soldier; 'R', an engineer who had joined the state-party (SED) with the intention of contributing to reforms from within the apparatus; 'A', a foundry-type composer who was ignorant of non-GDR actuality because where she was living she was not able to receive broadcasting from the west; 'St'n, an unpolitical but freedom-loving carpenter who was a somewhat hedonistic Rock Music fan with connections to a music record smuggler; 'Ur', an academic who worked at the museum for the history of the city of Leipzig who was married to a 'capitalist' (private entrepreneur) and had to find effective work-arounds for her family and herself. For conceptional reasons, the two disk jockeys, 'F' and 'M', who were arrested and prosecuted for playing the "Sonderzug" song at a, then very popular, disco in the city of Guben in 1983 formed a second focus group, although, according to the theory of the focus group approach, their number was not adequate. They were interviewed separately from the main focus group because their specific experience with the issue in question might latently have turned the other participants into observers, hindering their active participation. With the intention of keeping the discussions as informal and spontaneous as possible the questions asked were intuitively modulated and were not quite analogous in both groups.

To deploy the assembled expertise and generate the desired information, the established research issues of each factor need to be operationalized by transferring them into a small, sufficiently analytical but practical and thus not too particular, array of questions that anticipate and account for the experiential nature of the resource. This process will stand at the beginning of

each factor's analysis in its application to the chosen example of the "Sonderzug" song. These questions structure the focus group process as a guideline, but they will also finally recursively be put to the whole text that emerges from the transcriptions of the recordings of the discussions because answers to some questions may be given implicitly while giving a response to another question.

Statements that are not contradicted are rated as acceptable to the majority of the group. Statements that appear in both groups or are echoed or otherwise supported by group members receive increased consideration. The same applies to conclusive lines of thought that emerge in discussion. A statement that is contradicted by others will only remain unconsidered if the stating person effectively retracts it. Please note: In the analysis sections all intext references refer to the focus group discussions documented in the appendix.

### 4.3 “Sonderzug nach Pankow”: resonating in transition?

Contrary to what one might assume at first glance, the song “Sonderzug nach Pankow” was an instance of intercultural communication. The Federal Republic of Germany where its performer, Udo Lindenberg, was living and publishing, and the German Democratic Republic where the song developed a distinct effectuality, were governed by completely different »systems of meanings«<sup>296</sup> and were divided by a hermetic border. And in retrospect, the growing together of these distinct actualities which had evolved over time has turned out to be a much more viscid and difficult process than could possibly have been anticipated in the shared enthusiasm of 9 November 1989. All the more, the “Sonderzug” song, published in January 1983, is a suitable case as an example for the analysis of performative potentiality of communicative instances because it encompasses sufficient historical significance and societal complexity for illustrating it in principle.

To understand Lindenberg’s approach in the “Sonderzug” song, one should know that he was inspired by a German forerunner, the “Kötzschenbroda-Express” from 1947 performed by Bully Buhlan that also used the popular swinging melody of the “Chattanooga Choo Choo” composed by Billy Warren and popularized by Glen Miller.<sup>297</sup> In his song, Bully Buhlan satirically describes a train ride in the Soviet occupied zone from Berlin to Kötzschenbroda, the train station then closest to the largely destroyed city of Dresden, with all its troubles and inconveniences. Lindenberg thus draws on the satiric tradition of the Chattanooga Choo Choo melody which was already laid out in the original song but gives it a political frame by addressing the GDR head of state, Erich Honecker, personally in a pally, disrespectful manner with parodistic elements:

*Excuse me, is this the Special Train to Pankow?*

*I need to have a short trip to East-Berlin.*

*I've got to get something straight with your chief-indian.*

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<sup>296</sup> See subchapter 2.3.3

<sup>297</sup> Matthias Tischer, “Sonderzug nach Pankow (Udo Lindenberg),” in *Songlexikon. Encyclopedia of Songs*. (02/2012, <http://www.songlexikon.de/songs/sonderzug>: Zentrums für Populäre Kultur und Musik der Universität Freiburg, 23.07.2023 2012).

*I am a yodeltalent and want to play there with a band.*

*[Chorus]:*

*I brought a bottle of Cognac, which tastes very yummy.*

*I'm going to sip it with Erich Honecker at all ease*

*Saying: "Hey, Hony, I'll sing for little money*

*In your "Palace of the Republic", if you give me a chance.*

*All the popmusic-monkeys are welcome to sing there,*

*perform with their crappy bullshit-lyrics,*

*But only little Udo, only little Udo is forbidden to do that,*

*And we don't comprehend it."*

*I know that I have a whole lot of fans and rooters*

*In the G-, GDR, increasing by the hour.*

*Oooh, Erich, hey, is it true you're such a squar minded troll?*

*Why don't you allow me to sing in the "Worker's and Peasant's State"?*

*Is this the Special Train to Pankow?*

*Is this the Special Train to Pankow?*

*Excuse me, the Special Train to Pankow?*

*[Chorus]*

*Hony, I used to think you're probably quite easy.*

*I know, deep inside of you, you must be a rocker, too.*

*You probably, when nobody can see you,*

*Put your leather jacket on. You lock yourself up in the loo*

*And hearken to western radio stations!*

*Hello, Erich, can you hear me? – Hello-helloye-hello!*

*Hello, Hony, can you hear me? – Hello-helloye-hello!*

*Hony, can you her me? – Yo-de-lo-de-le-doe!*

*Hello, Erich, can you hear me? – Yo-de-lo-de-le-doe!*<sup>298</sup>

The song that became a hit in the FRG was immediately banned in the GDR together with his other song dealing with inner German relations, “Das Mädchen aus Ostberlin” (the Girl from East Berlin), and the “Chattanooga Choo Choo” itself<sup>299</sup>, probably because the melody had instantly become a hymnic icon referring to the meaning carried by the “Special Train to Pankow” lyrics. The assessment of the ministry for state security (Stasi) in 1983 concluded: “The songs of his repertoire ‘Girl from East Berlin’ and ‘Special Train to Pankow’ pose a severe defamation of the socialist state and social order of the GDR and its leading representatives.”<sup>300</sup> In a legal analysis, Hauptabteilung IX, the investigative body of the Stasi, examined possible criminal offenses that the song lyrics had committed. In the paper, options are listed regarding which legal basis and with what consequences one could take action against musicians or discotheque operators who would play the “Sonderzug” song. Indeed, at least two disk jockeys from the city of Guben were arrested and sentenced to five months imprisonment.<sup>301</sup>

The story behind the song originated from around 1975 when Lindenberg started requesting permission to perform in the GDR from the ministry of culture. His repeated efforts were denied time and again. Gravely frustrated, Lindenberg wrote the lyrics fitting the melody of the legendary swing standard as a personal letter of complaint to Erich Honecker that “popmusic-monkeys” with their insignificant lyrics were allowed to come and play live while he was constantly turned down. In an article about the song from 17 April 1983 the German news magazine DER SPIEGEL argued that he was referring to the West-German Kings of shallow-schmaltz »schlager music«, Rex Gildo and Costa Cordalis.<sup>302</sup> In an unofficial meeting with GDR officials in 1978 Lindenberg was offered the encouraging explanation that the time had not yet come. The obviously rather puzzled SED functionaries, in spite of their voluminous Stasi dossier about Lindenberg, did not really know what to make of him. An article in the FDJ-Mgazine “Neues Leben” from 1977 stated that he was the perfect anti-type to the sleek West-German beau

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<sup>298</sup> <https://lyricstranslate.com> Last visited 26 June 2023, all rights reserved Udo Lindenberg 1983

<sup>299</sup> N.N., “Hallo, Erich,” *DER SPIEGEL* 16/1983 (1983),

<sup>300</sup> Michael gnd Rauhut, *Schalmei und Lederjacke : Udo Lindenberg, BAP, UndergroundRock und Politik in den achtziger Jahren / Michael Rauhut*, Orig.-Ausg. ed. (Schwarzkopf & Schwarzkopf, 1996), Book. P. 99

<sup>301</sup> Tischer, “Sonderzug nach Pankow (Udo Lindenberg).”

<sup>302</sup> N.N., “Hallo, Erich.”



entertainers and his activity in the West-German peace-movement was valued but at the same time he was reproached for not connecting with what the GDR viewed as »organized progressive forces« like the DKP, the German Communist Party.<sup>303</sup> Lindenberg's further activities were positively observed by the official GDR-press organs like "Junge Welt", the newspaper of the youth organization FDJ (Free German Youth) where he was featured in 1979 with statements about his disinclination towards the "politcontrollt" as he called the members of the West-German government in his signature »Lindenberg slang«, or the SED (Socialist Unity Party) newspaper "Neues Deutschland" which appreciated his contribution to organizing a peace-festival in Bochum in the same year.<sup>304</sup> Even though Lindenberg had become one of the more eminent faces of the West-German peace-movement that mobilized demonstrators by the hundreds of thousands against the NATO double-track decision, he was still denied the invitation.

The well-known German TV-Journalist and talk-show host, Reinhold Beckmann, who witnessed Lindenberg's one and only concert in the GDR (before the wall came down) on 25 October 1983 as a junior camera assistant of a West-German TV-crew, assumed in retrospective that the functionaries feared his casual, impudently snotty manner that was in no way socialist-statesmanlike but dangerously popular with young people.<sup>305</sup> And as Lindenberg himself opined, the GDR-leadership might be afraid his performances could possibly lead to emotionalization and uncontrollable turmoil.<sup>306</sup> As it turned out, neither the assumption nor the fear itself were unsubstantiated. That Lindenberg was eventually invited to perform for 15 minutes in the palace of the republic in Berlin to 4000 handpicked members of the FDJ in a concert that concluded an otherwise almost unnoticed peace-campaign of the GDR government and also featured Harry Belafonte, was most probably due to strategic consideration. Lüthi argues that the GDR regime had hoped to prevent the implementation of the NATO double-track decision by letting Lindenberg perform.<sup>307</sup> But this does not seem

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<sup>303</sup> N.N., "Hallo, Erich."

<sup>304</sup> Ibid.

<sup>305</sup> Reinhold Beckmann, "Udo Lindenberg in der DDR," *DER SPIEGEL*, 13.01.2011, 2011, <https://www.spiegel.de/geschichte/udo-lindenberg-in-der-ddr-a-949286.html>.

<sup>306</sup> N.N., "Hallo, Erich."

<sup>307</sup> Lorenz M. Lüthi, "How Udo Wanted to Save the World in 'Erich's Lamp Shop': Lindenberg's Concert in Honecker's East Berlin, the NATO Double-Track Decision and Communist Economic Woes," *Contemporary European History* 24, no. 1 (02// 2015),

appropriate as it would have been a severe overestimation of the performative potentiality of such a concert, which does not resemble the highly rational approach to policy making in GDR headquarters. The line of thought proposed by *DER SPIEGEL* in an article published in the edition following the concert is more convincing: In the heightened tension between NATO and the Warsaw-Treaty over nuclear armament Lindenberg's appearance as part of a state peace campaign might gain the sympathy of those peace-activists in the GDR who did not associate with the government, which posed the large majority. In addition to this desired image transfer, it was intended to utilize his intensity as a performer for indirectly but clearly conveying the severe reservation prevalent among GDR citizens concerning the posture of the USSR in the nuclear armament negotiations to the leadership of the USSR by letting him speak out freely.<sup>308</sup>

If this indeed was what Honecker desired, Lindenberg delivered. When he addressed the audience, he argued against nuclear weapons in west and east, against Pershing and SS20, as well as against stationing new missiles in the GDR.<sup>309</sup> The whole concert was recorded by GDR-TV and broadcasted three times, including Lindenberg's statement. What was not recorded – and the West-German crew was physically hampered to do so – was the growing crowd of Lindenberg fans right outside the palace of the republic who had bypassed erected barriers, chanting and singing Lindenberg verses, Lindenberg escaping his shadows, getting outside and being raised to the shoulders by that crowd, and the police struggling with those “emotionalized” citizens resulting in uproarious scenes with new police reinforcements constantly streaming in and 44 arrests being made.<sup>310</sup> All this was extremely unusual in the GDR, possibly even unprecedented in this intensity at such a delicate place since 1953. These incidents may have decisively discouraged the GDR leadership to allow Lindenberg to carry on with his plans for an open-air tour through the GDR which had been promised to him as part of the deal that he played with his band at that FDJ concert.<sup>311</sup>

History has placed the “Sonderzug” song in the context of that notorious FDJ concert and it is feasible to argue that Lindenberg's opportunity to perform in the GDR emerged at least in part as a consequence of the

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<sup>308</sup> N.N., “Ey, ich hab Udo gesehen,” *DER SPIEGEL* 44/1983 (1983), Ey, ich hab' Udo gesehen

<sup>309</sup> Ibid.

<sup>310</sup> Beckmann, “Udo Lindenberg in der DDR.”

<sup>311</sup> N.N., “Aber easy,” *DER SPIEGEL* 20/1984 (1984),

“Sonderzug” song’s performativity. Beckmann even goes so far as to suggest the possibility that he might have been witnessing a first crack in the wall on that 25 October 1983<sup>312</sup> when Lindeberg’s fans behaved in a way that might be accurately viewed as a recursive application of the meaning imparted by the “Sonderzug” song, and thus created an anarchic incident that signified the persistent compromise of authority the regime was fearing when it put it on the index.

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<sup>312</sup> Beckmann, "Udo Lindenberg in der DDR."

## 4.4 Kairos

### 4.4.1 The situation factor

Kairos, the Greek God of the opportune moment, was frequently portrayed with a pair of scales balancing on a razor blade, which is commonly viewed as the origin of the phrase »on a knife-edge«. Furthermore, the back of his head is shaven, while he has a dense lock of hair on his face. Kairos can only be seized while faced, once passed there is nothing to retrieve him by. That is why an opportunity needs to be seized by the tuft.

Illustrated in this way, Kairos represents the concept of presence as that sharp reef in the river of time at which future turns into past, which resonates with Kant's definition of actuality as existence at a certain point in time, subscribed to here. As such, actuality is, as delineated, configured by the specific momentary interoperation of certain subjectificating forces. Because the forces as well as their interactions are, due to various agents, themselves subject to incessant change, actuality is ever emergent and can develop situations of increased intensity that may become turning points in this emergence. It is these situations that as kairological occasions set the stage for instances of societally interventive communication.

In the structure provided by the epistemic triangle of discursive relationality, a Kairos can be viewed from the perspective of each of the three elements:

- A cognizing subject can, as an agent, intentionally or unintentionally align a subject-object and an object-object. An ancient literary narrative that can serve as an example – if the necessary acting agent is included in the story – can be found in Homer's *Iliad* where Kairos denotes that point in time at which an arrow delivers a fateful strike to a target. "Whether it is the top of a head (*Iliad* VIII, ll. 83–86) or between the shoulder blade and neck (*Iliad* VIII, ll. 326–30), kairos is an encounter that yields a mortal wound, a successful striking of a target in a deadly spot."<sup>313</sup> But the contrary can of course also constitute Kairos. When an acting agent fails to achieve what was aimed for and thereby creates a new situation, this can be just as kairologic in its consequence.
- A subject-object can, by appearing on the scene, kairologically define a point in time that is experienced as a caesura in history. One may think of

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<sup>313</sup> Melissa Shew, "The Kairos of Philosophy," *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 27, no. 1 (2013), P. 47

the asteroid that caused the extinction of the dinosaurs. In cultural memory, these appearances often fit into a context of divinity, like in the cases of religious founders like Siddhartha Gautama, Jesus of Nazareth, and Abū l-Qāsim Muhammad. In recent centuries, civic and scientific accomplishments have taken over this age-constituting Kairos-capacity. The beginning of the modern times, for example, is signified by a rationalism-based journey of Christopher Columbus who set out for India on a route to the west that led him to a continent previously not part of the collective knowledge of central European societies.

- An object-object, though, can constitute a Kairos most accountably. Whether it is the hosts of almost synchronously hatched turtles heading for the sea that attract seabirds or an anarchic situation of social chaos that turns otherwise innocent people into looters, it is often the occasion that actualizes behavior. The momentary configuration of circumstances can generate a conditional intensification of actuality that constitutes a specific, sensitive situation. Taken holistically, such kairologic situations can generally be conceived of as object-objects that redefine the meaning of other objects, including structurally turning some into involuntary subject-objects, like the massive rock resting on a highway lane that has a speeding sportscar crash into it. Hence, situations are kairologic when they force acts and utterances to relate to them because anything one does or says is ipso facto discursively charged with a meaning that arises from the utterance's or action's relation to the prevailing conditions.

From all three perspectives, a performative intervention, then, as the communicative instance that changes or contributes substantially to changing a situation, is signified by introducing or substantially supporting an alternative principle that, by generating variant meanings, catalyzes a turn in the situation. In the »Nicomachean Ethics«, Aristotle points out that *what* we do or say, the logos, must not only be applicable to the matter at hand in general but it must also be to the point of the momentary particulars because the given circumstances establish the Kairos that one needs to meet.<sup>314</sup> In his example of a ship in a storm, the sailor is required to apply an alternative principle. While under the ultimate perspective of autopoiesis, cargo is usually a precious asset, however on a vessel in dire straits it becomes dangerous ballast that may need to be tossed overboard.

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<sup>314</sup> Aristoteles and Reeve, *Nicomachean ethics*. 1110a

It is obvious, then, that the circumstantial conditions configuring an issue constitute one decisive element of the situational particulars a communicative instance must answer to in order to perform discursive resonance. The other element of the situational particulars a communicative instance must meet is constituted by the receivers that form its audience. Both elements are structurally coupled in discursivity as it is the people that define the situation as real as well as the issue in its circumstances that establishes its public of stakeholders.

Phenomenologists cannot but ask themselves how it can be possible to talk about a common situation when all perception of a situation is individually subjective.<sup>315</sup> In the present discursivity approach, a similar conception of a situation in different individuals can be presumed because the circumstance of discursive similarity, delineated in subchapter 2.2.2, is assumed to apply. Furthermore, this approach assumes that a situation needs to be viewed as a dispositive that exerts certain subjectifying forces on everybody who is exposed to these, even if a person is unaware of it, denies it, or has found a comfortable way of adapting. It is the act of becoming aware of these subjectifying forces exerted by a situation's configuration of circumstances that occasions a situation's discourse with its distinct complex of meanings. Those who share in this discourse together constitute a situation's public. In the more abstract concept of situation as a dispositive proposed here, sharing in a situation does not necessitate to be affected by it in the same way as other participants. Culprit and victim, for example, share in one situation even though their individual exposures to the subjectifying forces exerted by that common situation-dispositive have different consequences. The specifics of individual affectedness are here conceived of as the position of a person within a situation. This situational positioning of a person constitutes his or her enduring receiver characteristics of role.<sup>316</sup> The precept of discursive similarity indicates that people in similar roles within a situation will apply similar principles and will hence choose to attribute similar meanings. Though the similarly enduring receiver characteristic of similar affectedness does constitute a common interest and thus a core for the crystallization of an inclusive sub-public, the consistency of the situational assessment may be

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<sup>315</sup> Bernhard Haupt, *Situation - Situationsdefinition - soziale Situation: zum Wandel des Verständnisses einer sozialwissenschaftlichen Kategorie und ihrer erziehungswissenschaftlichen Bedeutung*, Europäische Hochschulschriften / 11, (Frankfurt am Main u.a.: Lang, 1984). P. 69

<sup>316</sup> Hans Peter Buba, *Situation: Konzepte und Typologien zur sozialen Situation und ihre Integration in den Bezugsrahmen von Rolle und Person* (Duncker & Humblot GmbH, 1980). P. 20

diffused if some of the similarly-affected stakeholders apply divergent paradigms. And very often the contrary is also true: people not affected by a situation at all or at least not in the same way as certain others will, either by spontaneous empathy or because of their paradigms, fraternize with a certain sub-public.

The term »sub-public« is here preferred over the terms »partial public«, which plays a prominent role in – not only but especially German – Public Relations research, and »target public«, which is a concept of marketing, because it attaches to the concept of subcultures and expresses a degree of informality, civil participation, and autonomy. While sub-publics can categorically be initialized or even instrumentalized by external agents, they usually emerge among people having a similar understanding of the position they are placed in by the forces prevailing within a certain situation. But things can also be structured completely the other way round: sub-publics that form around a certain identity-inherent paradigm, usually highly charged with affect dispositions, start to constitute a situation, as for example in cases of ideologic, religious or ethnic demarcation. Applicable to all variants, the term sub-publics indicates a state of increased spontaneity and self-organization without formal discrimination between the function of issuing and receiving of communication. This implies that sub-publics are precarious in that they have the potentiality of detaching from the general public.

The effective audience of a communicative instance, though, is usually larger than the sum of the situation's immediate sub-publics as it is not only established by the aggregation of individual attention of the people that became aware of it for the specific relevance it has for the situation they are participating in but also of the people that attach to that communicative instance because of their interest in the situation or because they have become aware of it by its intrinsic qualities, which may again result in an awareness of the particular situation and participation in its discourse in this part of the effective audience.

A communicative instance can perform discursive resonance in the discourse of a situation that it was not targeting at because the potentiality of that instance actualizes the recursive application of the meaning it carries by one of the situation's sub-publics. A relevant example of such a case is the Catalan freedom hymn "L'Estaca", an anti-fascist song that had been directed against the Franco regime in Spain and was adopted by the Belarus opposition in 2020 in an adapted version. As also Austin emphasized, it is the

context that issues the meaning, and this involves a situation's immediate sub-publics ultimately choose the communicative instances relevant and applicable. As the ban of L'Estaca in Spain for its protest-message at its time indicates, communicative instances adopted by one sub-public will usually acquire at least a signaling relevance for all sub-publics of a situation.

The Kairos factor is established by the definiteness of the situation and how a communicative instance relates to the development of that definition. The degree of definition can be rated by assessing to what extent a situation has generated identifiable sub-publics. In a latent situation, an issue, by affecting people, starts generating a diffuse complex of meanings without distinct border lines. If the members of at least one group of stakeholders start to act as a situational sub-public by establishing a discourse focusing on the situation's issues, the situation becomes established. If conflicting sub-publics of almost equal publicity in that discourse have appeared, or if a societal sub-public gets into open conflict with an elite, the state of the situation is transformed towards a pointed condition. If a specific situation has permeated a society as a whole by turning all its members into stakeholders, the generalized stage is arrived at. If the generalized situation results in fragmenting this society by the division into almost equally perceived conflicting sub-publics, or even if it is just an elite, usually in the form of the government, against a vast majority of its people, this situation is in a pointed generalized state, which involves the potentiality of escalating towards civil war.

But the definition of a situation alone is not a sufficient condition for a communicative instance to resonate in a way that it has an interventive impact. In its stage of definition, a situation needs to have reached a certain intensification. The societal power relations that have generated the status quo need to be destabilized by the forces acting within the situation in a way that a communicative instance has a certain leverage for evolving its impact. A communicative instance will not be able to initiate or catalyze change that has not evolved a certain degree of latency. As in the example mentioned in the introduction, the roots would never have been able to lift the rock to the degree that it started to roll down the slope, had it not been lying tilted in a way that it took only a minute impulse to cause that pivotal change. Thus, a situation can be understood as an actuality-bubble of increased density and reactivity that is always interacting with societal actuality, sometimes encompassing it completely.

For analyzing the performative potentiality of a communicative instance, one needs to assess in how far it is relating relevantly and congruously to a



situation as established by the other factors, Ethos, Logos, Pathos, and Platos. It therefore is part of the task in the Kairos factor not only to identify the situation's sub-publics and subsequently its state of definition but also to identify the issue and the prevailing power relations and paradigms that create the situation, as well as the circumstantial conditions and the subsequent latency of change that expresses itself in the needs, expectations, and attitudes within the various sub-publics.

#### 4.4.2 What was the situation in the GDR in 1983?

It is the understanding presupposed here that a specific spatiotemporal configuration of circumstances defines a societal situation by exerting different subjectifying forces on the various stakeholders. The social intensity of that situation, on the other hand, is established by the sub-publics that crystallize around issues that arise from that situation, especially issues that are determinate for the experience of life. Therefore, it is the intention to design a progressively specific array of questions that approaches to establish indications towards the situation in the GDR, the power relations effective within it, and its intensity in 1983 that starts with exploring the current issues of the time.

##### *A) What topics influenced the attitude to life in 1983?*

'M' remembers that the missile discussion was very current and that he was very worried and even had bad dreams about a nuclear war (P. 1, M1).

'F' cannot name any specific topics (P. 1, F1).

'G' remembers that the decline of the GDR had become apparent, that the general feeling was one of depression, and that most people wanted to change something. (P. 25, G2). He states that one had to be careful what one said and to whom. He also points to the "Eine Mark für Espenhain" petition campaign which was launched by church environmental groups in 1987<sup>317</sup> (P. 32, G4).

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<sup>317</sup> Walter Christian Steinbach, "Eine Mark für Espenhain": vom Christlichen Umweltseminar Röttha zum Leipziger Neuseenland (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2018).

'Ul' was heavily intimidated by representatives of the political system because he had decided not to serve in the armed forces but only as a construction soldier, for religious reasons. He had started to work as a violin teacher, which was what he desired most, when he was drafted by the army in 1983, and was now fearing that he would be forbidden to carry out this vocation. These encounters with the state radically changed his previously positive view of the GDR radically (P. 26, Ul2).

'R' regretted that the Soviet Union did not accept the NATO offer not to station Pershing missiles in West Germany if it did not station SS-20 missiles in East Germany. He viewed this as a heavy-handed step backwards. Indirectly he also refers to the environmental issues caused by coal mining (P. 27, R2).

'A', out of reach of western media, felt content with the GDR. She was regularly approached to join the party (SED) which she always rejected with the stereotypical reason that she did not feel mature enough yet (P. 28, A2).

'St' was very keen to experience as much freedom as possible. He did everything he could to be able to listen to as much music from the West as possible and he hitch hiked through Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary (P. 28, St2).

'Ur' and her family were suffering from being insulted as capitalists because her husband was a private entrepreneur. They always felt the need to be watchful of what they said and to whom. Her son was harassed and intimidated because he refused to become an informal collaborator of the Stasi. Furthermore, he was not allowed to study because he did not commit himself to three years of military service. She thinks that the unification of Germany was something her children discussed with others. All in all, the most important issue for 'Ur' was the lack of freedom, as such, that everyone seemed to be suffering from (P. 29, Ur2).

*B) What attitudes were there towards the state and the political leadership?*

'F' states that the dictatorial dimension of the system was not an issue for him because he did not take the regime seriously at all. He considered the political elite a laughingstock (P. 2, F5). They even played the "Sonderzug" at a disco twice, though that song was completely off limits, not as a gesture of opposition to the state but because it was opportune in terms of entertainment (P. 14, F35). Also, their sentence in a summary trial to five months

imprisonment for disrespecting representatives of the state did not really scare them in the end because they were released after about two weeks (P. 21, F61) because of procedural errors (P. 15, F38).

Together 'F' and 'M' sketch a development of the relation between the leadership of the GDR and its young citizens. The World Festival of Youth and Students 1973 in Berlin was an event which marked a very liberal development, promising more freedom and a cultural opening up (P. 1, F4). This more liberal feeling of life lasted until Wolf Biermann was expatriated in November 1976, which also marked a major cut because it was followed by the exit of many popular actors and musicians (P. 3, M5, M6). In the following years, people experienced more ideological pressure that subsided again to some degree by the beginning of the 80s, but people were disappointed (P. 2, F5) and most withdrew into their private sphere (P. 4, M7).

'F' also refers to assertive applicants for emigration (P. 2, F5). This must here include those who planned a secret defection.

'G' represents the alternative milieu of people who eventually became active dissidents.

'U' represents those who were victimized by the system for conscience-based issues.

'R' represents people who tried to change things in active cooperation with the system.

'A' represents that mildly political share of the population that had positively arranged itself with the system.

'St' and 'Ur', very much like 'F' and 'M', represent those who were politically and culturally inclined but wanted to go about their private lives while exploiting or even trying to broaden the corridor of freedom available, accepting a certain risk of getting into trouble with the system but not opposing it openly (or only mildly).

### *C) Have group memberships been derived from these attitudes?*

'M' was not aware of any distinct groups within the GDR society in 1983. The "swords into plowshares" movement that yielded a crystallization of distinct oppositional groups became significant only later (P. 4, M8). When Gorbachev introduced Glasnost and Perestroika and the GDR did not

follow suit this lead to a fracture within the society and the environmental and peace movement became more pro-active (P. 5, M11).

'F' notes that there have always been intellectual circles (P. 4, F8).

'G' recounts how he, as someone who was acquainted with musicians like the Renft group, moved into a house where a group of church people were living as squatters who carried out oppositional actions and how they trusted and integrated him (P. 31, G4).

'Ul' did not experience any distinct groups within the GDR society. Everyone was more or less swimming with the stream. But once he got into trouble, he did meet people that were different, for example Wolfgang Tiefensee, who belonged to his roman-catholic congregation and was also one of 'G's' oppositional housemates (P. 33, Ul3). 'Ul' notes that it was only very few people that were openly non-conformist.

'R' knew people in the SED Party that motivated him to join in 1986 so that they could form a reformist cluster (P35, R3).

'Ur' experienced the private entrepreneurs as a group of its own. People who were working hard but were always kept down by the system (P29, Ur2).

In conclusion it can be noted that the experience of the societal situation in the GDR of 1983 was signified by the intense experience of a lack of freedom, intensified by increasing material shortages that again decreased the freedom of choice, and the impression that change was inevitable. Much more than the increasing material shortages, though, it was the shortage of civil liberty that was weighing down the citizens of the GDR. Lack of freedom was most painfully experienced by the large majority with regard to the freedom of speech. People could never speak their mind freely but always had to be very careful what they said and in whose presence. Accordingly, the citizens had no right and no means to contribute to and less still to demand or initiate the transformation of the system they were longing for.

The doctrine stating that the party (SED) was always right (P. 41, Ur5) victimized not only people who were in open conflict with the system like applicants for emigration, but also people like 'F' and 'M' or 'Ul' who were well adapted but came into conflict with the system one way or another, for example, by trespassing the narrow boundaries of freedom or having conscientious objections to military service. Subsequently, society as a whole was affected because everybody had to bite his or her tongue not to say

anything that might get oneself into trouble. As a result, not only satirists adopted the practice of conveying meaning between the lines, but also popular music. (P. 40 G9) Feeling constrained by a scoffed-at elite and choosing one's words very carefully had become an inherent part of GDR culture.

The restrictive politics of the GDR leadership also made cultural goods from the West, like music records for example, scarce, and accordingly precious, with the effect that the West appeared golden and promising while the GDR appeared suspicious and ridiculous. (P. 9, F19) Though they experienced a grave chasm between claim and reality of the GDR leadership's competence, the participants did not remember having experienced open antagonism between nomenclature and common citizens or between certain groups within the GDR society in 1983. All in all, the GDR was an extremely normalized society, where education was ideologically informed from early childhood on (P. 19, F56), with the grave downside of civil bondage which was not only experienced by those who were consciously affected by the constrictive and musty spirit of the GDR and its nomenclature. Things started to get more pointed in the second half of the 1980s when Glasnost and Perestroika were *not* implemented in the GDR and church groups started to thematize environmental issues publicly.

Concerning the potentiality of this situation as the Kairos-factor, it is significant that the situation was not yet highly charged, but that social charge was building up considerably, heading for a tipping point. Discontent was increasing rapidly, and the aging nomenclature was being progressively dismissed as lame and obsolete. (P. 35, R3) The prevailing power relations were eroding and societal change was looming as the shortcomings of the system became apparent while the citizens felt helpless and depressed or frustrated because there was no lever for them to bring forward the necessary transformation.

## 4.5 Ethos

### 4.5.1 The credibility factor

The Greek term »Ethos« focuses on a person's character as the basic sentiment piloting her or his deeds and is usually conceived of as credibility. The concept of »Ethos« as sketched by Aristotle in his major contribution to communication theory, "On Rhetoric", does not encompass preconceived ideas about the speaker within the audience. Dealing with the technique of public communication, this concept only includes those aspects of credibility that a speaker can express while delivering a speech.<sup>318</sup> The attributes Aristotle requires a speaker to display convincingly are good sense, virtue, and goodwill (phronesis, arete, and eunoia).<sup>319</sup> These attributes are, to a large extent, congruous to the attributes that the psychology of persuasion still defines as supportive, as elaborated in subchapter 3.2.1, although there has been a shift in accentuation. The idea behind »similarity to audience« is, ultimately, adoptability which is also part of the concept of »good sense«. This more specific concept of »credibility« is largely congruent with »virtue«, as is the case with »likability« and »goodwill«. In chapter 9 of the first book of "On Rhetoric", Aristotle defines an inventory of »virtue«: justice, courage, self-control, magnificence, liberality, gentleness, prudence, and wisdom. One may argue that what is conceived of as virtuous traits of character are a culturally variable and will differ according to the expectations and needs of a situation's sub-publics.

In an ideal case, an issuer of communication will be able to display practical competence, a virtuous character, and sincere benevolence. If a speaker displayed a virtuous character and sincere benevolence but could not be conceived of as relevantly competent, possibly because of appearing unacquainted with the situation and the topic to be discussed or because of using inappropriate language, the audience would have problems taking this speaker and his cause seriously. If the speaker appeared cowardly or had a suspicious air about him the audience would doubt whether this person's motives, aims and intentions had the necessary quality, while a discredit in benevolence might make the audience skeptical as to whether a speaker is

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<sup>318</sup> Braet, "Ethos, pathos and logos in Aristotle's Rhetoric: A re-examination." P. 311

<sup>319</sup> Aristoteles and George Alexander Kennedy, *On rhetoric: a theory of civic discourse*, ed. George Alexander Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 2.1.5 and 1.8.6.

driven more by self-interest than wanting the best for the community. Aristotle concludes that if speakers display none of the three qualities the audience would not expect to get good advice at all. If, on the other hand, all three are convincingly displayed, there would be no reason to doubt that their suggestions were trustworthy. This framing effect of the Ethos seems to come in degrees, as Aristotle implies by suggesting that it was especially strong in affairs governed by wavering opinions, lacking exact criteria.<sup>320</sup>

This would mean it could usually be expected that the importance of the performance of self within the performance of issuing communication decreases by the degree to which tangible criteria were available. But this view presupposes that the definitions of these criteria are commonly accepted, which is rarely the case, not only in public matters but even in science. What weakens this thesis even more is that people are not particularly good at discriminating between a lie and honest testimony. Psychological research has shown that, with a 54% detection rate, the results are almost on the level of pure guessing.<sup>321</sup> The perceived credibility of the person who does or says something is therefore always an important beacon for the audience and preconceived ideas about the speaker that can be assumed to be predominant in an audience do accordingly play an important role, too. In acknowledgment of Goffman one might say, Ethos is not only about the situational or momentary performance of self, but also about the holistic image of a person as it has emerged over time.

Looking at what has been outlined here on performativity, while integrating the applicable attributes of news value (power elite, relevance, and celebrity), at its base Ethos is about the acceptability of the issuer as a protagonist ›P‹ of his or her performance of a communicative instance in a certain situation and has two dimensions. The authority dimension is about the »who« and is concerned with the appropriate relevance of a ›P‹ as defined for example by the office it holds, its expertise, its fields of public activity, or its sheer prominence: Is ›P‹ qualified by its structural power, its knowledge and skill, or its general recognition to make a relevant contribution? This accords with requirements on the perception-level in the discourse assessment cascade, where it is assumed that the relevance of a meaning is mainly measured

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<sup>320</sup> Aristoteles and Kennedy, *On rhetoric: a theory of civic discourse*. *Rhet.* 1.2, 1356a 6–8

<sup>321</sup> David C. Raskin, Charles R. Honts, and John C. Kircher, *Credibility Assessment: Scientific Research and Applications*, ed. David C. Raskin, Charles R. Honts, and John C. Kircher (San Diego: Academic Press Inc, 2014). P. 5

in relation to the relevance of the utterer. The motivational dimension is about the »why« and is concerned with the sincerity of ›P‹: why is ›P‹ saying or doing something at all and why is ›P‹ saying or doing what she is saying or doing? The question how ›P‹ is saying or doing what she is saying or doing is significant for both dimensions because it relates to capability as well as involvement.

To assess the Ethos factor's contribution to the performative potentiality of a communicative instance, it is first necessary to establish those relevant ›P's that contributed in a publicly salient way to a communicative instance and the ›P‹ conceived of as the initiator or dominant ›P‹. Very often a communicative instance is identified only with a single ›P‹ or a collective conceived of as a single ›P‹, but sometimes the process of historic memory generation is very selective, emphasizing the role of one salient or the dominant ›P‹ while other ›P's relevant at the time of the communicative instance's impacting are blotted out. One must also bear in mind that, especially since information warfare has gained significance in politics and societal controversy, the perception of a communicative instance to be expected can be distorted or even completely inverted in some sub-publics by the assumption of a concealed agenda or otherwise questionable motives and conduct, or even a wirepuller in the background, which, at least for these sub-publics, delegitimizes the involved ›P's and turns the communicative instance as a whole into an opaque, plot-like matter. Because accusations are, as propositions sui generis, difficult to immediately assess by society, this can of course also be used as a strategic means to discredit a certain ›P‹ and to contain the effect of its communicative acting.

In a second step each ›P‹ to be included in the analysis is profiled:

- Where does ›P‹ come from? Cultural, ethnical, and socio-economic background.
- Age and personal situation of ›P‹ at the time right before the appearance of the communicative instance? To what degree was ›P‹ a publicly prominent person? Privateer, rising star, established person of public interest or of fading glory, elder states(wo)man?
- If ›P‹ was a public person before, what was he or she prominent for, where was he or she politically subsumed, whom did he or she accordingly appeal to?
- Did ›P‹ hold a public office or exercise other socially distinguishing activities?



These issues are important for distinguishing whether the »P« is acceptable and relevant for the public as a whole, only for certain sub-publics, or for nobody really.

#### **4.5.2 Who was Udo Lindenberg to the citizens of the GDR?**

In the case of the “Sonderzug” song it is quite unambiguous that Udo Lindenberg is the sole protagonist. Because the data this survey is based on is collected by focus group discussions only, the knowledge interest has been adjusted accordingly. It cannot be expected that participants have ever reflected on Udo Lindenberg in such detail. Therefore, the questions are on a more general, experiential level. The aim is to establish how Lindenberg appeared to the citizens of the GDR.

##### *A) When did you first hear about Udo Lindenberg?*

‘M’ first heard of Udo Lindenberg in the mid 1970s, ‘F’ in 1972. ‘A’ was 14 years old when she first heard of Udo Lindenberg, which was around 1978.

##### *B) Why was Udo Lindenberg popular in the GDR?*

‘F’ thinks that Lindenberg’s use of the German language, which was very unusual for a West-German artist, was as decisive for his popularity as his particular style of using it, which was experienced as “cool” (P. 7, F15).

‘M’ assumes Lindenberg’s way of playing on words to have been determinant. (P. 7, M16) He had a very specific ‘handwriting’, a characteristic sound (P. 9, M19).

‘G’ also emphasizes Lindenberg’s use of the German language, which may have been pioneering for West-Germany while the use of the German language in Rock Music was customary in East-Germany. Furthermore, he is also in agreement with ‘M’ and ‘F’ in his assessment of the significance of Lindenberg’s characteristic use of the German language that he experienced as very authentic (P. 40, G9).

##### *C) How credible did people think he was?*

‘M’ found Lindenberg very credible because the image he fostered matched with his signature use of the German language (P. 9, M19, M20).

'Ur' emphasizes that she and her family (we) always believed Lindenberg's every word (P. 39, Ur4).

'Ul' expresses his amazement about how credible Lindenberg appeared even to him who usually assumed that West-German artists were performing for profit only. He hypothesizes that this may have been the case because Lindenberg was assumed to have an affinity for socialism. "There was some kind of oscillation" that resonated with him (P. 41, Ul7). In his time as a construction soldier in Prora, from 1986 to 1988, where he was domiciled together with his comrades in a certain building with a view of the Baltic Sea, another Lindenberg song became their hymn that gave them strength and hope while looking out to the sea: "Hinterm' Horizont geht's weiter" (Beyond the horizon there is a future). Now that 'Ul' thought about it, he realized that he really bought everything Lindenberg had sung because he was an honest type with an authentic fluffiness that he regarded as "cool" (P. 41, Ul8).

#### *D) How substantial was Lindenberg's social relevance in the GDR?*

Back then 'M' did not consciously think that Lindenberg had any social relevance in the GDR, but in retrospect, considering Lindenberg's performing in the palace of the republic and the crowd waiting and cheering outside, he assumes that he must have been relevant somehow (P. 10, M21). He also brings up the possibility that some of his songs were a statement about the situation of East Germans, he mentions the song "Girl from East-Berlin".

'F' believes that Lindenberg would have filled a stadium anywhere in the GDR, had he had the possibility to play. (P. 10, F21) Attaching to 'M's statement about songs with East-German signification, he attributes a political implication to Lindenberg that had been discounted in that focus group discussion up to this point (P. 10, F22).

Ulrike and her family considered Lindenberg to be a sly dog but also a very political person. She acknowledged that both traits came together at the concert in East-Berlin when he found a very subtle way of saying that there must never again start a war from German soil, dismissing both Pershing and SS-20 missiles. They thought that he was admirable because he was part of the peace movement and also addressed issues of dropping out of society. Furthermore, she respected him for insisting on coming and playing to his many fans in the GDR (P. 37, Ur4). In her view he was an untimely all-German star (P. 39, Ur4).

*E) What thoughts, feelings, hopes, expectations are linked to Lindenberg as a person and to his music?*

'G' attached to what he experienced as Lindenberg's striving for an all-German cause. He believed in the power of music, writings, and pictures to be agents of change, or that they could at least give strength and hope. He subsumed Lindenberg in this category (P. 39, G8, P. 40, G9).

'Ul' experienced Lindenberg's music as encouraging on more than one occasion (P. 41, Ul8 and P. 44, Ul10). Furthermore, he points out that Lindenberg was able to reach different milieus because he was not too intellectual but spoke the language of the people (P. 56, Ul29, Ul30).

'R' points out that Lindenberg not only used the language of the people but that he used a slang that appealed to many (P. 56, R29, R30).

'Ur' recounts that she and her family were strongly attached to Lindenberg because he was in the peace movement and addressed social issues (P. 37, Ur4).

In sum: To many people, not only his devout fans, in the GDR of 1983, Udo Lindenberg appeared like a close 'buddy' who spoke one's language – in every respect. He sang in German, using a specific artistic slang that he fostered as his trademark and that appealed to people because it was "cool", light, and also funny as he was always playing on words. This made him appear unpretentious, very accessible, and fun to be with. The fact that he was involved in the West-German peace-movement and dealt with the social down sides of capitalism as well as with specifically East-German themes in some of his songs, refined his appearance in the GDR even more and created an image that resembled the ideal or even archetype of a caring, understanding, and encouraging brother. This impression was boosted by his co-performing and his balanced statement at the peace-concert in the »Palast der Republik« on 25 October 1983. Lindenberg transcended the role of an entertainer and had, as a moderately political artist, become a sympathetic authority, raising his voice not for revolt but for integration and balance in a deeper sense. Especially with his "Sonderzug" song, many GDR citizens seem to have felt that Lindenberg gave voice to their suppressed thoughts and feelings, publicly substituting them in their oppressed right to speak out and accepted him as a highly credible protagonist who was motivated by a genuine interest in human affairs in general and East German affairs in specific, not just by profit.

## 4.6 Pathos

### 4.6.1 The tonality factor

In Pathos, speech and music meet, since it includes a concept of affective resonating in which the speaker, by creating a feeling within himself and expressing it in his speech, triggers a similar affective vibration in his listeners as described by the concept of affect attunement (See 3.2.1). Hetzel emphasizes and delineates the close relation between speech and music. He summarizes Cicero's description of communication through affects and his use of musical metaphors as follows: 'The 'ears' of the people become 'flutes' for the speaker, picking up the 'breath' of his speech (Cic, Brut. 192); the minds of the auditorium are compared to the 'strings of the lyre' (Cic. Brut., 199) which the orator is striking."<sup>322</sup> In Cicero's view, rhythm is able to communicate directly with the soul.<sup>323</sup> And Plato, who rejected Gorgias and his conception of rhetoric as a means of manipulation, agrees with this same Gorgias in an enigmatic way and, in certain respects, even surpasses it with regard to the musical quality of public speech. Plato grants rhythm a kind of resonating power that is able to open the soul, while Gorgias emphasizes the effectiveness of rhythmic speech formation in his theory of rhetoric.<sup>324</sup> But while Gorgias regards poetry as a whole as discourse and thus as an object of rhetoric, Plato subsumes rhetoric and poetry in his »politeia«, which has hitherto been substantially criticized here, under music as the actual leading cultural medium for creating publicity.<sup>325</sup> Ultimately, for him, it is the resonance rules of music that govern the aggregation and guidance of attention. For the thinkers of ancient Greece, the communication components of a language condensed into speech that move in the dimension of »pathos« have their function in that they, perhaps resembling a dance or the relationship between conductor and orchestra via a resonance of the affects, create a reciprocal identification between the communicator, as the leader, and the recipients, as the led.<sup>326</sup>

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<sup>322</sup> Hetzel, *Die Wirksamkeit der Rede: zur Aktualität klassischer Rhetorik für die moderne Sprachphilosophie*. P. 436

<sup>323</sup> *Ibid.* P. 440

<sup>324</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>325</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>326</sup> Hetzel, *Die Wirksamkeit der Rede: zur Aktualität klassischer Rhetorik für die moderne Sprachphilosophie*. P.436

Fundamental to this attention arousing, attention bonding, and attention conducting capacity an issuer can deploy by intentionally performing emotional coloring, is the fundamental capacity of tonality to inform the receiver how to interpret the content of a communicative instance, especially in moments when the issuer's control over his or her performance slips. Discrepancies between the expression one gives and the expression one gives off are not always noted and not always found relevant, but they do have the potential to weaken the propositional power of a communicative instance, sometimes to absurdity. A solid accord between what is expressed and how it is expressed, on the other hand, can, as delineated in subchapter 3.1.3, substantially increase the potential of a communicative instance's intended meaning to resonate discursively. Of course, there are also cases where an issuer intentionally produces a discrepancy or a tonal exaggeration, for example to counteract the verbal message satirically or to ironize it in many different shades, depending on the intention.<sup>327</sup> The expression thus generated can also be received in line with the author's intention, but in its ambiguity it will be much more dependent on the audience's knowledge and mood as well as much more difficult to reproduce, while it may strengthen the cohesion of those privy to the encrypted meaning.

Tonality, thus, is discursively significant in two ways that heavily interact with each other. Being a carrier of meaning by itself, tonality in the common case of lingual communication is important as a frame for the meaning expressed by the content of the words. In this way, tonality is decisive for the discursive orientation of a communicative instance within societal discourse as it has a strong influence on how a communicative instance as an emergent whole is interpreted, this is even true in central bank communication as Chen Gu et al have shown<sup>328</sup>. But still it is specifically substantial in situations that are not so much about ontic or institutional facts but about otherwise emotionally charged social interaction. Thanking somebody, for example, very much like apologizing, takes a rather complex use of subtle corporal and vocal signals.<sup>329</sup> The performative power of a statement of gratitude depends on how it is expressed because in this purely social situation

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<sup>327</sup> Alice Lagaay, *Metaphysics of performance: performance, performativity and the relation between theatre and philosophy*, Berliner Arbeiten zur Erziehungs- und Kulturwissenschaft, (Berlin: Logos-Verl., 2001). P. 92

<sup>328</sup> Chen Gu et al., *It Is Not Just What You Say, but How You Say It: Why Tonality Matters in Central Bank Communication* (S.l.: SSRN, 2022).

<sup>329</sup> Volbers, *Performative Kultur: Eine Einführung*. P. 36

lingual content is closely linked to the appearance of the concomitant behavior. In the western culture a »thank you« without eye contact and possibly a brief nod is usually perceived as weakened in sincerity while an exaggerated gesturing and coloring of the voice may also appear inappropriate or even as sarcastic. At the same time, tonality strongly influences the fundamental potential of a communicative instance to generate discursive resonance at all in most situations.

As the tonality of a communicative instance is composed of the diction and the presentation, if language is involved, for analyzing the tonality of such a lingual communicative instance it is necessary to look at the choice of words as well as at the presentational frame like mimic, gesturing, color of voice, the rhythm and the melody of speech or, if applicable, the music altogether to assess (a) to what degree the communicative instance is emotionally charged and (b) what emotional attitude the specific situation is approached and connoted with, what feelings are aroused?

#### **4.6.2** To what extent did the “Sonderzug” song excite affects?

The communicative instance in question here is a song that was published on vinyl records and played on radio in contrast to communicative instances that are singular life-performances like John F. Kennedy’s “Ich bin ein Berliner” or Willy Brand’s falling to his knees. Due to this infinite identical reproducibility that has become an inherent part of the nature of today’s music consumption, the character of the tonality factor is slightly different. Affective reactions that were initially experienced may wear down due to an inflation-effect, the song someone once liked may become boring, distorting its overall appraisal, or, on the other hand, someone may associate a memory of a certain emotional situation with that song which also poses an individual distortion of the affects originally aroused by the song itself. Such effects need to be recognized in the analysis; they cannot be avoided by the design of the questions.

##### *A) What kind of feelings were generated by the song at the time?*

‘M’s initial reaction is imagining that people might have been anxious when he and ‘F’ dared to play the “Sonderzug” song even twice that night, which made them go to jail (P. 16, M43). Some moments later he can imagine that people had a feeling of freedom while the song was playing. “Only for that

moment” (P. 18, M48). But he still believes that one or the other looked over his or her shoulder out of reflex to see who was watching because there could always be informal collaborators of the Stasi around (P. 18, M50).

‘F’ points out that almost everyone jumped up when the tune started and danced (P. 16, F42). He implies that people felt joviality when they heard the song when he states that he believes the figurative language made them imagine Erich Honecker in a leather jacket with a cognac and so on, almost like in a caricature (P. 17, F49). Later on, he states that the guests were cheerful and sang along and that they enjoyed the provocation that was expressed by the song (P. 23, F68). ‘F’ thinks that there might indeed have been a feeling of freedom while the song was playing, as ‘M’ had suggested, but he supposes that this had not been sustainable (P. 18, M52).

‘Ur’ remembers how the song created an “incredible atmosphere” in the hospital’s large men’s dormitory where her husband was lying when it was published in January 1983 because it was playing all the time. Everyone was enthused about it (P. 37, Ur3).

‘Ul’ experienced the song as conveying ease and coolness. Furthermore, he thinks that it was able to loosen anxiety of authority (P. 54, Ul27).

### *B) How strong were these feelings?*

‘F’ would not quite call the reaction to the song euphoric but “going in that direction” (P. 16, F43).

‘Ur’ describes the feeling the song created as enthusiasm which, of course, implies an accurate rating of its intensity (P. 37, Ur3).

### *C) What about the song created those feelings?*

‘F’ found the music very danceable. A Jazz standard that was arranged to be more rocking, the ideal now-we-all-dance song (P. 16, F41). He also supposes that the imagery of the catchy lyrics came alive in people’s minds (P. 17, F49).

‘Ul’ points out that to him as a musician the main message was not so much in the lyrics but in the music, specifically its airiness. To use such a catchy, popular, and light tune for making fun of a dictator is very “cool”. “One carries that around in the mind with oneself.” The music was beautiful and eased everyday life (P. 44, Ul9).

'G' assumes it helped that the tune was already known and popular (P. 44, G13).

'M's initial reaction of imagining that people may have felt anxious when they played the "Sonderzug" song at that disco in Guben may be ascribed to the effect delineated above that a person associates a certain emotional situation with a song, namely the anxiety-inducing situation of being indicted and sentenced to imprisonment, which conforms with what Koelsch refers to as symbolic musical meaning. Though this is an individual distortion, it is still enlightening because it sheds even more light on the experience of unfreedom that was, as explored in subchapter 4.4.2, characteristic for the situation in the GDR of 1983. The fact that he assumes people were actually thinking and feeling in the dichotomy of unfreedom/freedom becomes apparent when he states that he could imagine that people experienced a feeling of freedom while they were dancing to the "Sonderzug" song.

This impression squares with 'F's recount that everyone jumped up and danced to the song, also enjoying its provocative momentum, 'Ur's recollection of the incredible atmosphere that emerged while collectively listening to the song, as well as 'Ul's experience that the song conveyed ease and coolness and his reckoning that it helped loosen authority-anxiety. The intensity of the affects ascribed to the song is fittingly described by the term »enthusiasm« introduced by 'Ur'.

Though 'F' had the same experience as 'M', his memory is more directed to their professional success with playing the song. With the analytical view of an experienced disc jockey, which he was at the time, he ascribes the affective effect of the song to the caricaturist imagery of the lyrics, which was, to a large degree, acquired through the tonality created by the Lindenberg-slang<sup>330</sup> with its sometimes provocative diction, as well as to its dance-appeal. The professional musician 'Ul' emphasizes the musical quality of the song with its beautiful and well-known melody that radiates airiness and ease.

The specific nature of the affects aroused with their social orientation and attuning effect in combination with their specific intensity is the factor that confers its maximal potentiality to the song to resonate performatively.

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<sup>330</sup> Tischer, "Sonderzug nach Pankow (Udo Lindenberg)."



## 4.7 Logos

### 4.7.1 The argument factor

In the language of ancient Greece, »Logos« is an extremely versatile term. In his opus about rhetoric Aristotle refers to Logos as the true or probable argument. In the context of this study, Logos represents the somewhat more general concept of the argumentative dimension of a communicative instance. This argumentative dimension is, for example, important in the discourse assessment cascade when it comes to estimating an expressed meaning's challenge to the status quo on the awareness-level.

As communicative instances do not necessarily consist of speech but can be all sorts of communicative actions like falling to one's knees in front of a memorial or giving a Hippy kind of leather jacket to a head of state as a present<sup>331</sup>, we need to take the whole instance into consideration first, so as to be able to identify those parts of the content that propose or can be understood to propose situationally relevant meaning – meaning still understood as a certain assumption of the relation between two objects, like: what Germans under Nazi rule (subject-object) did to Jewish people (object-object) was a breach of civilization and as genocide a crime against humanity that needs honest and deep repentance; or: the urge for more freedom in the GDR (object-object) cannot be constrained sustainably by an authoritarian nomenclature (subject-object) that, accordingly, must either loosen up or be disregarded. Such propositions can either be outright or encrypted in symbolic acts, metaphors, allusions, or otherwise artistic expressions. Aristotle makes yet a different distinction with regard to propositions. He differentiates between induction by the use of examples and deduction by the use of syllogisms that he calls »enthymemes« which indicate a greater lyrical freedom than usually granted to logical syllogisms in dialectic.<sup>332</sup>

Regarding the analysis of the performative potentiality of a communicative instance, the first objective in the context of the Logos factor is to identify all the arguments that belong to the referent and, in a subsequent second step, what significant meanings may be proposed tangibly. The third step needs to be taken when the five primary factors are related to each other in the domain of Symphonos. Here, the identified meanings need to be

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<sup>331</sup> as alluded to in the "Sonderzug" song and carried out by Lindenberg in the aftermath

<sup>332</sup> Aristotle and Freese, *Art of rhetoric*.

surveyed according to their degree of situationally-immediate or associatively-mediated relevance and their consistency among each other and in relation to the other factors for assessing the communicative instance's propositional potency.

As pointed out, in order to identify significant meanings proposed by the communicative instance, the first task is to engage in scanning it for significant argumentative formations like examples, syllogisms, symbols, allegories, metaphors, plain statements, and sometimes symbolic actions before these can be analyzed for the meanings they carry. The significance of an argumentative formation is constituted by its specific discursive gravity. An argumentative formation is significant if it noticeably stands out because it is either marked by being a climacteric densification that is orbited by supportive minor argumentative formations, by its relative extent, by its evocative expressiveness, by its associative prominence, or by standing in direct coequal relation with other argumentative formations.

Even disruptively interventive executive action in societally seminal occasions will, by the rationality of the sub-publics, generate a specific gravity that marks it out – as the example of Schabowski's "now, immediately" vividly illustrates. The significance of the answer is marked by a climacteric densification because the journalist's question, the pause, the stammer, and the confusion subsequent to the answer constitute minor argumentative formations that orbited it.

It needs to be anticipated that relevance is defined by the sub-publics in the context of their situation, not by the intention of the issuer. The question, therefore, is not what the issuer wanted to express, but what meaning the situative sub-publics may have recognized as relevant in the content of the communicative instance. Examining this question conclusively is, again, part of the domain »Symphonos« (3.3.7). What can be conceptualized here, though, is whether the argumentative formations are clear and unequivocal, and if there are any contradictions or whether all extracted meanings pointing in a similar direction? Are certain meanings repeatedly expressed? Are there synergetic effects between meanings?

#### **4.7.2 What messages were assigned to the "Sonderzug" song?**

Again, it is necessary to adapt the analytical intention to the memory-reliance and experience-orientation of the method of the survey. This means

that questions cannot be as specific and need to address the individual memory of experiences.

*A) Which formulations were particularly appealing?*

'F' and 'M' instantly remember the bottle of Cognac that tastes yummy and that Honecker puts a leather jacket on, locks himself in the loo and listens to west-radio. 'F' assumes these to be the catchiest bits.

'M' carries on with the verse: "All the popmusic-monkeys are welcome to sing there, perform with their crappy bullshit-lyrics, But only little Udo, Only little Udo is forbidden to do that, And we don't comprehend it."

'Ur' quotes freely: "Honey, you also go to the loo for listening to west-radio and put your leather jacket on" (P. 41/42, Ur6).

*B) What was the main message of the song at the time?*

'F' thinks that the term »message« is a little bit of an exaggeration. He assumed it to be a nice gag about Honey (Erich Honecker). To him it seemed like an embrace, though in an ironic manner (P. 13, F32).

'M' points out that publicly calling Honecker "Honey" was a novelty and a provocation (P. 13, M33). He supposes that reading out his full title on the GDR TV news must have taken about twenty seconds (P. 14, M34).

'F' adds that calling Honecker Honey was considered demeaning, (P. 13, F33) especially considering the personality cult practiced in the GDR (P. 14, F34). He supposes that people had internalized the lyrics and imagined them literally, and he comes up with the association of caricature (P. 17, F49).

'Ur' also associated the lyrics of the "Sonderzug" song with caricature. Another feature of the lyrics she remembers is that Erich Honecker, the head of the GDR government, was addressed in the informal or familiar form (German: Du. The erstwhile »thou«). Lindenberg puts himself on the same level with him to establish a fictional personal relationship (P. 41/42, Ur6).

'R' did not view the song "super politically". It was the looseness, ease, and jocundity of the song, how Lindenberg put things so sententiously and that alternative way of saying it, that conveyed a message to him (P. 44, R10). Inspired by what 'Ul' suggests after his prior statement, he identifies the

essence of this message as that “crazy-likeness” that was not allowed for citizens of the GDR (P. 45, R11). Later he repeats that what caught him was the looseness or lightness and that it was something completely different, not so preachy (P. 55, R28).

#### *D) What did people think Lindenberg intended to express?*

‘F’ suggests that Lindenberg just wanted to knock at Honecker’s door but assumes that the song did have a provocative effect (P. 17, F44).

‘M’ thinks that Lindenberg only intended to loosen up the communication while he did not really intend to be provocative (P. 15, M40). Later in the discussion ‘M’ acknowledges that there indeed was a provocative gesture to it (P. 20, M55).

‘St’ emphasizes that he was impressed by the humorous and extraordinary approach of embracing Honecker from behind (P. 43, St8).

In conclusion, it is, first of all, noteworthy that the argumentative formation »leather jacket«, »loo«, »west-radio« was spontaneously recounted in both groups independently. This implies that this is what GDR citizens could most easily attach to: Erich Honecker as a person like any other. As becomes very clear in both discussions: listening to west-radio more or less secretly was not just absolutely common, it was also characteristic for life in the GDR as for example ‘St’ points out (P. 50, St11). To imagine Honecker listening to west radio turned him into a common contemporary.

In this line of thought it is significant that the notion of »embrace« as well as the notion of caricature also appear in both discussions independently. Looking at all the statements of the focus group participants supports the impression that the song’s main message was bifurcated for GDR citizens. One ‘meaning-hemisphere’ of the message contains the attempt of approaching Honecker somewhat sympathetically from human to human. Establishing a personal relationship here requires liberating him from his artificial elevation. The lyrics thus address Honecker in the familiar form and by his nickname and depict him as a human being one can embrace. The other ‘meaning-hemisphere’ is the provocative caricature this attempt produces through the harsh contrast between its vivid imagery and the image of Honecker predominant in the GDR. ‘F’ and ‘M’ went to jail for disparaging Erich Honecker when they played the “Sonderzug” song at a party, twice.

It is important to note, though, that the answers given to question D strongly indicate that people did not assume Lindenberg intended to demean Honecker, but that he accepted it as a possible result of his approach – and that most GDR citizens hilariously welcomed this result.

It seems that it was specifically this well-balanced combination of good intent and provocative effect that made the message of the “Sonderzug” song highly adoptable and maximized its discursive potentiality.

## 4.8 Platos

### 4.8.1 The publicity factor

In the English language, the concepts of »publics« and »audiences« are closely related, sometimes the terms are even used synonymously, very much as in the case of actuality and reality. Studying the anthology “Audiences and publics”<sup>333</sup> edited by Sonia Livingstone, one gets the impression that English-speaking literature seems to struggle to allocate distinct features to these two terms. In the German language on the other hand, the term corresponding to »audience«, »Publikum« is also closely related to the concept of public but in a slightly different way. Etymologically, public and audience both originate from the Latin language. While public indicates to the more abstract concept of the matters of the state that are of general interest and accessible for everyone, audience indicates the situation of concentrated listening (audire) to speakers which is generalized for situations of visual or mixed communication. In this way, the German term »Öffentlichkeit« (public or public sphere) originally had exactly the same meaning as Publikum while the audience, which translates into German as Publikum, denominates the more concrete concept of receivers of communication. Thus, it is compelling that the term Publikum appears to be progressively replaced by specific terms for denoting the visitors, readers, listeners, viewers, and users of public media, though they are not seen as much as sociological unities as the term »audience« implies in the English language. In German literature, the term »Öffentlichkeit« with its implication of civil involvement in societal discourse has been widely discussed and frequently referred to ever since Habermas contemplated on “the structural change of the public sphere” in 1962<sup>334</sup>.

The present inquiry makes a point of differentiating between audiences and publics. An audience is viewed as an entity of individuals that intentionally and actively receive a certain communicative instance.<sup>335</sup> In this concept,

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<sup>333</sup> Sonia M. Livingstone, *Audiences and publics: when cultural engagement matters for the public sphere*, ed. Sonia M. Livingstone, 1. publ. ed., Changing media, changing Europe, (Bristol u.a.: Intellect, 2005).

<sup>334</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, 3. Aufl. ed., Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993).

<sup>335</sup> This implies that individuals who do not voluntarily receive a communicative instance do not belong to its audience but only to its public, which is important not only regarding the more than theoretical possibility of forcing people to witness certain events or listen to propaganda.

belonging to an audience is a deliberate act. The public, then, is the sphere of societal discourse in which the issuer of a communicative instance can endeavor to aggregate attention or try to avoid attention. Those individuals who do take notice of the respective communicative instance in one way or the other, so that further communication can hook up to it, form this communicative instance's public – as particles of dust can become the nuclei of the droplets within a cloud. The public generated by a communicative instance is thus categorically larger than its immediate audience because a public is a much broader unit than an audience and includes individuals whose attention has been aggregated indirectly, accidentally, or by force. Sub-publics, as discussed in 3.3.2, on the other hand, are sometimes more, sometimes less encapsulated public spheres within a societal public sphere or across borders which sustain their own discourses.

Publicity, then, is here viewed as the noticeability of a communicative instance and the meaning it carries within a public sphere, usually generated by media transmission. In the rationale of the present deliberations, publicity represents a form of performativity of apprehension that can be conceived of as »general discursive resonance«: a performance of a communicative instance succeeds in being reproduced and becomes part of an object's aggregate of meaning by that further processing in the public sphere. This implies that publicity as general discursive resonance is a substantial qualification for achieving »specific discursive resonance« as performativity of accord: performing that a specific meaning is recursively applied. This is the case not only because publicity is necessary for the proliferation of the knowledge about a communicative instance but also because assessing the degree of publicity a certain meaning receives is of substantial importance for estimating the grade of its acceptance.

In her public opinion theory of the »spiral of silence«, Noelle-Neumann assumes that the person in the street interprets the intensity of what he perceives as the relative amplitude of an opinion in the public sphere not only in terms of prominence but even more in terms of approval by the use of its quasi-statistical sense (*organ*), as she called it. Out of fear of exclusion, people tend to stay silent if their personal opinion does not comply with what they assume to be the opinion of the majority and they even tend to switch to agreeing with it, at least in public. Noelle-Neuman concludes that people

thus turn their impression of amplitude into an assessment of the relations of power, not only within in the public sphere but within society as such.<sup>336</sup>

Again, language is very telling in this respect, as volume connotes both a concept of the space an object fills and the amplitude of a sound. What is loud must be big, what is big must be powerful. And it is essential to note that publicity understood as social amplitude is also subject to the physical principle of amplitude summation. The difference is that, in physical reality, only sounds occurring simultaneously add up while in the case of publicity it must be assumed that all perceived expressions and applications of a certain meaning over a certain period of time add up in the memory of the individuals that together form the public. This means it is not always the huge event that is effectively perceived as the loudest: instead, it is sometimes the many smaller incidents that add up decisively.

The knowledge interest of the inspection of the publicity factor is, thus, to assess the social amplitude not only of the communicative instance in question but also of the meaning in its specific orientation because that is an indication of the degree of its recursive application. The amplitude of a communicative instance's general publicity is a significant parameter because it is a valid indicator of the general discursive resonance of the meaning this communicative instance suggests, which again needs to be regarded as the base for its potential to specifically resonate discursively (perform accord).

#### **4.8.2** How noticeable and prevalent was the “Sonderzug” song in the GDR?

In western democracies, data of media reach is meticulously collected as it is imperative for the media industry. Ascertaining the reach of the “Sonderzug” song in the GDR in 1983 would not be completely impossible either, even though nobody was worrying about such details because they could not be monetized. The public of the GDR was officially one established by the state media, while it actually was divided into those without west-reception and those quasi-secretly informed by the West-German media. Knowing how many people were able to receive west-radio, for example, one could at least make a well-informed estimation of how well-known Lindenberg's song was in the GDR, but the qualitative approach chosen

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<sup>336</sup> Noelle-Neumann, *The Spiral of Silence. Public Opinion – Our Social Skin*.



here is not concerned with quantities, it is drawing on experiences informed by the quasi-statistical sense-organ assumed by Noelle-Neumann.

*A) How well-known was the “Sonderzug” in the GDR?*

‘M’ supposes that the “Sonderzug” song was one of the best known songs in the GDR, at least for a while (P. 20, M55).

‘G’ states: “Everybody knew it.” (P. 49, G23) Even his father, born in 1921, could recite the lyrics (P. 49, G24).

‘Ur’ agrees that everyone knew the song. She had immediately recorded the song from the radio (P. 37, Ur3). She and her family also knew the lyrics by heart (P. 49, Ur19).

‘A’ emphasizes that she did not consume west-media and did not know about the song. It turns out there were two reasons for her abstinence: she was living in Dresden and her mother was a teacher (P. 28, A2).

*B) How frequently was the song listened to?*

‘F’ suggests that this depended on whether somebody was able to receive west-radio or not. In Guben and Berlin for example, where he was living, he heard the song playing on the radio every day because he was able to and did listen to radio stations from the west. People from the Dresden region would have had to come to the disco in Guben to get acquainted with the “Sonderzug” song, he annotated somewhat jocularly (P. 20, F58).

*C) Until when did the song still play a role?*

‘M’ supposes that the “Sonderzug” song had the conventional career of a hype. But he cautions that this is only guesswork, he has never asked anybody (P. 21, M58).

‘F’ eventually suggests that the “Sonderzug” song has gone beyond the usual career of a hit and has become a standard-song (P. 21, F61).

‘M’ then agrees with ‘F’ and states that he believes the song plays a certain role in the inner German relations (P. 21, M59).

‘R’ remembers that Lindenberg had to play the song twice at his concert in Suhl in 1990 because the audience celebrated it so intensely (P. 52, R21).

'Ul' states that the song was always there, even when times got harder. He tries to remember another song that was so present but cannot think of one, even if the song did not always play the role it played in 1983 (P. 52, Ul20).

*D) Did one talk about the "special train"?*

'G' states that people talked about it (P. 53, G30).

'Ur' says she was always talking with others about Lindenberg (P. 53, Ur29).

'St' was discussing it with others when it came on. (P. 53, St12) "Everybody was laughing about it" (P. 54, St14).

The participants agree that in 1983 everyone in the GDR was acquainted with the "Sonderzug" song, even 'A' does not contradict this, but notes that she had no knowledge of the song in 1983 as she was not listening to west-radio because she lived in Dresden and her mother, being a teacher, could not afford to get into conflict with the system. Thus, it is plausible that the large majority of at least the younger half of GDR citizens appreciated the song and felt – by their quasi-statistical sense-organ – that virtually everybody knew the song. Furthermore, the song had become a hit in the GDR not only due to the efforts of the relating senders – it was very frequently played on radio stations from West-Germany – but also due to the situationally conditioned interests of the observing subjects (see subchapter 3.1.3) – people also actively recorded the music these stations broadcasted, if they liked it, on tape recorders, and 'Ur' emphasized that she had immediately recorded the "Sonderzug" song.

Contrary to 'M's initial supposition that the song had the conventional career, implying that its popularity must eventually have had a steep decline, it turned out to be consensus that it remained popular and became a standard-song with an all-German significance.

Even though the "Sonderzug" song was officially banned from public performance it did generate an unprecedented "hidden" sub-public in the GDR that went beyond the consumption of the song for entertainment only, as people were actively discussing the song, which is another strong indication that it had the potential to resonate in a performative way.

## 4.9 Symphonos

### 4.9.1 Assessing the potentiality of the factors in their interrelation

The ultimate performance of a communicative instance would be to effect a state of mind in which the audience not only understands but experiences its message. This is possible if the performance succeeds in holistically representing the meaning it expresses in a way that generates a parallel ideal space in which one gets an experiential impression of the actuality governed by the principles that induce that meaning. This occurs with the highest probability if the communicative instance is highly integrated, if the factors relate to each other consistently.

Ultimately, this is because meaning emerges from our relentless assessing of the relation between two objects as described in the delineation of the discursive perception triangle in subchapter 2.1.2. For example, one will always relate the message to the issuing protagonist and its role. A role-related discount of the message can occur if he or she states something which complies very much with her or his role: "In her/his position she/he has to say that even if it was not her/his real opinion". Or a role-related potentiation can occur if the content of what is stated deviates to an accountable degree from what one might have expected: "If even he/she in his/her position is saying that than it must be true or even still understating things". In situations of a pointed generalized state which features a division between two almost equally strong sub publics, it will almost certainly occur that communicative instances issued by a protagonist of one group are completely discounted by the members of the other and vice versa. And the question of how a protagonist of a communicative instance is stating or doing what he or she is stating or doing that is part of the pathos factor intensely relates to the ethos factor because it informs about capability, involvement, and possibly even intention.

Ehninger and Brockriede surmise that, in practice, most arguments derive their power of persuasion from a synergetic fusion of ethos, pathos and logos<sup>337</sup> and even Aristotle assumes that certain properties must relate to other properties, *genos* and *telos* for example<sup>338</sup>. The same applies, of course,

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<sup>337</sup> Douglas Ehninger, *Decision by Debate*, 2nd ED. ed. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co, 1978). P. 89-91

<sup>338</sup> Euthymios Papadimitriou, *Ethische und psychologische Grundlagen der aristotelischen Rhetorik*, Europäische Hochschulschriften / 20, (Frankfurt am Main u.a.: Lang, 1979). P. 85 and 86

to the extended spectrum of factors as it is suggested here. Suggestive potency is maximized when all factors match up suitably: when the argumentative content meets the situation; when the protagonist deploys a tonality that he or she can credibly apply to the message; when the experienced publicity of the communicative instance is appropriate for the situation and the protagonist, and so forth. Inconsistencies between message and tonality, or even rather minor appearing discrepancies<sup>339</sup> between the image of a protagonist and its positioning in the situation in question can either prevent the meaning carried by a communicative instance from gaining considerable discursive resonance because of implausibility or might even invert the polarity of the effected discursive resonance in relation to what was intended because of distrust or even ill-mindedness for example. Conditional, though, for the occurrence of a discursive intervention, which is a communicative instance with the highest performative potentiality, is the applicability and conclusiveness of the meaning it carries in reference to a situation.

Thus, symphonos, as the harmony of the five primary factors in a communicative instance is a meta-level factor for the performativity of accord of this communicative instance. At the same time, though, it is exactly this meta-functionality of the Symphonos concept that also makes it the natural context for the final assessment of the performative potentiality of a communicative instance that arises from the five primary factors in their interaction as an ensemble. As there can neither be a nostrum nor a scale delivered here for the task of assessing the performative potentiality of a communicative instance, which clearly is a desiderate for further inquiry, each user of this analysis-approach will ultimately need to compile her or his own set of criteria depending on the nature of the communicative instance in question.

#### **4.9.2** What was the performative potentiality of the “Sonderzug” song?

Symphonos is not so much a factor of its own as a theoretical representation of the tier where the holistic impression of the five primary factors emerges from their interrelation. It turned out that it is difficult to be surveyed by questioning focus group participants directly because these questions tend to feel like unnecessary repetitions of what has already been discussed (P.

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<sup>339</sup> Seiffert, Bentele, and Mende, "An explorative study on discrepancies in communication and action of German companies."

23, F68). One has to note: the discursive process of appearance production is mostly happening unconsciously and thus stays unobserved by the observing subject, which seems to be resulting in cognitive resistance to access. That is why a different approach was tried in the second focus group discussion. The Symphonos questions were left aside or integrated into the other factor-questions, but the moderator left more room for free discussion by the participants with the aim of generating even more interaction and thus more information to draw on in finding indications to make an assessment of the grade of coherence of the communicative instance in question. This was successful to the moderate degree that some statements included important information relevant here. The direct answers from the first focus group do give complementing information about how people experienced the coherence of the five primary factors in the “Sonderzug” song, but they do not substitute the interpretation of the material produced when discussing the other questions for assessing the appearance of the song as a whole in any way because the analysis of the factors’ interrelation cannot be separated from the properties established for each of the factors individually.

*A) How did the song relate to the general experience of life in the GDR?*

‘F’ assumes that people thought it was smart (P. 19, F53). But he denies that it was such a tristesse in the GDR that there was such a significant contrast between the song and the experience of Life in the GDR (P. 19, F55).

‘Ul’ describes the mood in the GDR as gloomy. Everything was grey, dirty and musty while the song was happy, making fun of a person one did not like. That made everyday life lighter (P. 44, U110).

‘A’ states that the contrast between the experience of life in the GDR and the song was like black and white (P. 55, A15). But it needs to be taken into account that she only became aware of the song just before the end of the GDR (P: 28, A2).

*B) Was its popularity appropriate?*

‘F’ and ‘M’ agree that the song’s popularity was appropriate (P. 22, M62, F64).

*C) To what extent did Lindenberg's tonality, the melody, and the message fit together?*

'F' supposes: 110% (P. 22, F65). He refers to the given catchiness of the song (P. 23, F67).

'M' would not make any discounts: 100%. He cannot imagine the song with any other melody, for example (P. 23, M63).

'Ul' points out that it was specifically this combination of music and lyrics that created the song's infectious lightness and was experienced as "cool".

*D) Who else can one think of who could have expressed the message of the song?*

Neither 'M' nor 'F' can imagine any other person singing that song (P. 23, M64, F66).

*E) Was this song captivating in any way?*

'M' thinks the song did have a captivating effect. He reasons that this effect had a very complex background like the antagonism between east and west in general and the relation between GDR and FRG in specific. "There are many things coming together, which only rarely happens in a song" (P. 23, M66).

'F' refers to the good mood the song created and that most people sang along when they played it that night. It was a very danceable song spiced up with a little provocation. "Yes, and all that together made it a mega-hit" (P. 23, F68).

'Ur''s recount of the situation in the men's dormitory of the hospital her husband was in strongly indicates the captivating effect of the song (P. 37, Ur3).

'Ul' emphasized that the song was so catchy that one carried it around in one's mind (P. 44, Ul19).

Regarding the integration of Ethos, Pathos, and Logos, it is striking how pronouncedly these three core factors appear to square in the "Sonderzug" song. All three participants with a specific expertise in music, the two former DJs 'M' and 'F' as well as the music teacher 'Ul', attest the song's complete coherence. Considering that the song was very conspicuous as it had an

eminent social and political dimension that combined sympathy and satire in an extremely daring way, completely experimental in the inter-German relations, this is as remarkable as it was vital for the song's development. Based on the focus group discussions the following can be assumed: Lindenberg's use of his signature slang and caricature imagery in the lyrics was effectively borne by his image as an authentically original and politically involved artist while this was framed in a distinguishing way by one of the most acclaimed tunes of the swing era that he resorted to as the "Sonderzug" song's melody. As all three factors were assessed as attaining a maximum of performative potentiality it is appropriate to consider that the song, by itself, has also gained maximal performative potentiality.

An interpretation deduced from the focus group discussion that highlights the significance of this inner consistency of the song is that the notion of »embrace« established in the Logos factor with its implications for the Pathos factor matches perfectly with the »brother« or »buddy« image established in the Ethos factor. In terms of the discursivity theory set out here, both meanings can be assumed to issue from the same paradigmatic principle, possibly best described as »human equality«.

To gain a full picture of the song's potentiality, though, it is necessary to take the two primary factors into account that categorically lie beyond the control of the artist:

The publicity the song acquired was experienced as appropriate, which means it was neither overrated nor underrated. Had it been experienced as overrated, one might need to presume that people started to doubt the significance of the song, reducing the sustainability of any effect it might have had. Had it been experienced as underrated this could mean that its significance was not fully recognized at the time, which could be an indication of retarded performative potentiality. Since the immediate, as well as the long-term, recognition, the song obtained seem to have been unprecedented in the GDR it is appropriate to assume full potentiality in this respect too.

By definition, it was the aim of this survey to assess the potentiality of the "Sonderzug" song to resonate performatively in the discursive processes of the pre-transformative situation in the GDR in 1983. Most decisive for this assessment is, of course, to what degree the communicative instance in question was significant and applicable in relation to that situation.

As delineated in subchapter 4.4.2 the situation in the GDR in 1983 was signified by the experience of bondage. According to the participants of the

focus groups it was specifically the absence of the liberty of speech and opinion, ultimately the 'unfreedom' of thought that was most depressing about life in the noticeably declining GDR at the time the "Sonderzug" song was first broadcast on west-radio stations. The background of this bondage was the ideological doctrine that the party is always right. The decisive representative of the SED was the senescent General Secretary of its Central Committee and Chairman of the State Council, Erich Honecker. Lindenberg addresses this linchpin of the increasingly distressing situation, an endeavor that resulted in a caricature that people enjoyed obviously because it expressed what people felt and thought but did not have the freedom to say. Dialectically speaking, it appears as the antithesis to the dispositive exerted by the GDR nomenclature, but composed in a conciliatory, categorically non-violent way that people could easily adopt in a situation that was not yet pointed but still rather calm. The absence of active sub-publics signified the still undisturbed uniformity of the successfully normalized socialist society, but it also averted the song from being 'hijacked' by one or the other sub-public if it had acquired any relevance at all. Had the situation been more intense, the song might have appeared as a comical trivialization of a monstrous dictator. Had it been published in the era of transition from Ulbricht to Honecker which was marked by a more open posture of the GDR nomenclature, as 'F' and 'M' recount, the song would most probably not have had that substantial resonance either. In 1983, on the other hand, things came to a head with the reciprocal stationing of nuclear missiles while the financial and material shortages became more and more apparent, kindling fear and discontent at the same time. Thus, 1983 does seem to have been the Kairos of the song's effectuality, the appropriate time to make a difference.

This fully developed performative potentiality becomes apparent in statements given by 'Ur', 'M', and 'Ul' that illustrate the metaphoric experience the song conveyed. While 'Ur' recounts how the song had created an incredible atmosphere (P. 37, Ur3), 'M' puts forth the impression, the people dancing to the "Sonderzug" song had an experience of freedom while they were dancing (P. 18, M48). 'Ul's notion, then, is still more complex. He experienced how the song conveyed ease, how it had an easing effect on the experience of everyday life and suggests that the song may even have had the effect of loosening anxiety of authority (P. 54, Ul27). In this way the song helped actualize the latent spirit of contradiction.



## 5 Conclusion and Perspectives

### 5.1 Conclusion

To assume that we can influence what a person feels, thinks, or does by who we are, what we say, and how we express it is an anthropological constant. In this study it has furthermore been manifested to be generally applicable that some speeches, symbolic actions, songs, or stammered utterings can have an effect on many people's attitudes and behavior at the same time, in certain cases in a way that this effect seems to change the world. The endeavor of this thesis was first to establish how the human *Lebenswelt* must be composed, so that such communicative instances could possibly have an influence on the actuality of whole societies at all before analyzing how these communicative instances might unfold their effect, subsequently identifying factors that determine the potentiality of a communicative instance to have such an effect, and finally applying the analysis of these factors in the example of Lindenberg's song "Sonderzug nach Pankow".

In an archeology of knowledge approach, ancient Greek essentialism and relationism were prospected with regard to their concept of change as such, eventually resulting in an epistemological model of the relational nature of meaning that turned out to be a key to an applicative understanding of knowledge and actuality. This key, by fitting into Kant's somewhat subtle differentiation between a thing in itself and its appearance, brings to light the concept of discursivity which is dormant in his complex delineations of transcendental idealism that bears the notion of an emergence of actuality. The discursivity of human knowledge can be conceived of as the continuous weaving together of sensory impressions and inner concepts into appearances. In this de-essentialized cosmos, meanings are not properties of the objects, but products of discursive comprehension and we only have access to the appearances as our perceptions of objects as they are determined by the meanings, we apply to them.

That we can live in a common world and can share objective knowledge though this is an ultimately intra-individual process is possible because we are all equipped with the same basic conditions of perception and understanding and because discursivity bridges the gap between the intra-personal and the inter-personal frame. This world needs to be conceived of as an emergent actuality because, in the discursive process, even the meanings recursively applied are in constant transition.

Evidently, even a potentially infinite inter-personal discursive process has spacio-temporal boundaries, though, categorically, each one is accessible to everyone because the individual discursive processes are all based on the same fundamental epistemological categories that establish the human sphere. A society, then, is a cultural entity constituted by a common system of recursively applied meanings that is generated in a shared discursive process. Change in societal actuality occurs because adjustment performances produce meanings that differ from former ones that are eventually recursively applied. It occurs that a distinct communicative instance suggests a divergent meaning in relation to a certain object. Such a communicative instance is performative if the meaning it expresses receives discursive resonance in that it is adopted and recursively applied. Because communication is a bifurcated process established by the two ontically separated but structurally coupled operations of issuing messages on the one hand, and understanding messages on the other, changing the meaning recursively applied to an object is not just a matter of pure reason. The exploration of the musical nature of the performative dimension of communication yields the realization that the performance as a means to increase the discursive effect of communication derives the associated behavior from the prelingual social capacity of attunement. The roots of discursive resonance lie in human musicality.

Thus, it is compelling that the five primary factors which have been identified to determine the potentiality of a communicative instance to perform such discursive resonance gain crucial momentum by their harmonic confluence. The analysis of these factors in relation to the “Sonderzug” song was not supposed to prove that it resonated, or in what way it resonated, but has successfully attained its goal of establishing the song’s measure of potentiality to have resonated discursively in the societal situation of the GDR in 1983.

When ‘F’ once met Lindenberg and told him what happened to him and ‘M’, Lindenberg’s sole comment was: “Well, it wasn’t for nothing” (P: 22, F63). He neither explained what exactly was for nothing nor what that ‘it’ was for then. Assuming he was referring to the “Sonderzug” phenomenon as a whole, the question remains as to what effect it actually might have had – a substantial question that automatically comes up in the context of assessing the performative potentiality of a communicative instance in the discursive process of a certain situation. ‘F’ and ‘M’ both assume that the Lindenberg song “Sonderzug nach Pankow”, including the interactions attached to it, has had a preparing effect as predecessor of a thaw period that was signified, for example, by the multi-billion-credit line provided by Franz Josef Strauß,

then minister-president of Bavaria, for example, that started later in 1983 (P. 22, F62, M60).

Considering its extreme potentiality to have performed resonance in the discursive processes of the GDR in 1983, it seems appropriate to assume that the song in its political and social context was not only a symbolical instance of sorts, but more of an excellent overture to the subsequent period of transformation, paraphrasing the core theme and introducing to the spirit of the episode to come: Freedom of civil participation and the spirit of non-violence. Again, both can be subsumed under the paradigmatic principle of human equality. The fact that the very paradigm that was also applied at the Monday demonstrations when the participants chanted “we are the people” or sang “The Internationale” to assert its human rights claim, as mentioned in subchapter 3.2.1, suggests that the “Sonderzug” song might have invigorated this movement of self-empowerment, possibly even giving a certain spark to a sentiment that was building up – providing a taste of freedom in civil equality, of rebellion without violence as a metaphoric experience. As ‘Ul’ suggests, the “Sonderzug” song may have contributed to deconstructing the dictatorial notion of authority through the disarming caricaturist imagery in combination with the song’s airy tonality that together conveyed the meaning: “Honecker, you are just another human being.” By reaching and subsequently integrating many of the younger citizens into this meaning, the “Sonderzug” song appears to have contributed to increasing the definition of the situation in the GDR.

The individual process of judgement of whether a person adapts and recursively applies that meaning, eventually resulting in actual behavior, is here conceived of as the personal discourse assessment cascade. According to this process-model, the meaning mentioned had to go through three levels of progressive internalization.

- On the perception level people assessed the relevance of Udo Lindenberg in relation to the relativization of the head of state and government. Here, everything stated in the context of the Ethos factor is applicable.

- On the awareness level people related this attitude towards Erich Honecker and the whole nomenclature to their current actuality for assessing whether adapting it would require them to change something and whether that change was to their liking or not. In this context everything stated in the Logos factor is significant.

- On the behavior level, people need more information in order to decide whether they adopt it in their attitude and their behavior. For many people, it is instructive in this respect, how many of their peers seem to be adopting it because the common person fears being socially excluded. Regarding the impression of acceptability by the majority, the information gathered in the Platos factor is relevant.

Based on the findings made in the focus group discussions, it is feasible to conclude that a large number of the GDR citizens eagerly adopted the notion that Honecker and all of the ruling class had no legitimation to conceive of themselves as essentially elevated as to deprive them of the right of participation or at least felt encouraged in their existing homothetic attitude. Still, these conclusions are only indicative, as likely and well-reasoned as they may be, because the discursive process is hyper complex and never unambiguous. Actuality emerges as a resonance of a multitude of discursive vectors. Communicative instances can eventuate substantial discursive resonance if the recursive application of the meaning they express proliferates because the factors devised here play together appropriately as the flap of a butterfly's wings can theoretically cause a tornado if the atmospheric circumstances are thus configured.

## 5.2 Perspectives

However, while a butterfly could never consciously try to cause a tornado as it has no concept of a tornado, people do use their concept of public and public opinion to try and influence social developments performatively. The pioneer of Public Relations, Edward L. Bernays did not start the fire, but viewing his profession as both an art and a science he understood how to fan and direct the discursive flame by generating a breeze of publicity that his clients were positive would become a wind of change. Born as the son of Sigmund Freud's sister he was closely related to the grandest representative of psycho analysis, not only in the flesh but also in the spirit. "The father of spin"<sup>340</sup> drew on his uncle's knowledge about the subconscious to orchestrate performative interventions to the purpose of his clients. His infamous "torches of freedom" campaign, commissioned by American Tobacco, was a performative communicative instance that aimed at encouraging women to start smoking by calling on their desire to be modern and experience autonomy by being a little rebellious, linking cigarettes to the floating ideas of women's freedom and self-efficacy. Stigmatizing the stigmatization of women with a habit then considered inappropriate for women may indeed have been an advancement of liberalism and diversity, still it was ethically questionable because it had been a commercially motivated *couverte* operation and it meant manipulating people into an extremely unhealthy habit or even addiction, which, of course, is a recursive application of meaning sui generis.

Because Bernays was assuming "The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society"<sup>341</sup>, he might well be considered a modern sophist who took on himself the task of making the weaker case the stronger one. While some sophists might have agreed with him that manipulation is a legitimate means of social engineering, Aristotle, we may imagine, would have limited his agreement to the notion that the interest-guided performance of communication has an important function in democracy. From Aristotle's "Rhetorik" we can deduce the idea that purposively performed communication is important in open, pluralistic societies because representing the

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<sup>340</sup> Larry Tye and Edward L. Bernays, *The father of spin: Edward L. Bernays & the birth of public relations*, 1., Owl Books ed. ed., An Owl book, (New York: Holt, 2002).

<sup>341</sup> Edward L. Bernays and Mark Crispin Miller, *Propaganda*, ed. Mark Crispin Miller (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Ig Publications, 2005). P. 29

different interests and attitudes present in a society serves a necessary epistemic-hermeneutic agency of orientation and navigation in the mists of discursivity. The process of public reasoning, which plays an essential role in the discursivity model of societal emergence delineated here, depends on the performance of displaying the various existing interpretations of an object and the principles guiding these interpretations. This pluralist process can only be facilitated by democracy while it is, itself, facilitating democracy. But the guise of populist manipulative communication can also endanger democracy, with well-financed tyranny lurking around the corner of each crisis. Surely, money cannot buy love, but it can organize support and noticeability – and the noticeability of support is, according to Noelle-Neumann’s spiral of silence theorem, a powerful discursive agent of its own.

It must be clear: a democracy can die – not only by decapitation in a coup d’état, but also the slow death of constitutional degradation. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have sketched a three-step process of authoritarian subversion that some established democracies are currently undergoing. According to them, tyranny starts with the election of a person who has an authoritarian program as head of the executive before this government then starts to abuse and expand its constitutional competences and finally suppresses opposition.<sup>342</sup>

From a discursivity theory point of view, the journey towards tyranny starts even earlier. The initial defect occurs when the antagonism between the main forces within a society’s discursive process becomes so extreme that they cannot be integrated anymore, and the process of public reasoning starts to drift apart uncontrollably. The resulting cultural division will be self-reinforcing because the autonomous systems of meanings that have emerged will develop processual as well as semantic closure and will thus strive to stabilize themselves in their self-referentiality instead of subordinating under a uniting concept or paradigm. Such substantial divisions in the discursive process of a society impress tyrants the voltage energizing their endeavor.

But, as the transformative process in the GDR proves, the opposite is true as well. And even though the transformation performed in the GDR

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<sup>342</sup> Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, *How democracies die* (UK: Viking an imprint of Penguin Books, 2018).

ultimately resulted from the discursive self-empowerment of its citizens only<sup>343</sup>, one can assume the “Sonderzug” song facilitated effectual assistance as an integrative performative intervention. If dictatorships can be overcome by unbinding and integrating the public discursive process this must also be true for reversing the degradation process of a democracy by reintegrating society and its discursive process. This would necessitate overcoming the barrier posed by the selective usage of media and its amplifying effect on opinions, as established by Lazarsfeld, by instances of performative communication that resonate in way that an integrative intervention is effected.

In their seminal opus “Why nations fail” Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson emphasize the importance of integrative political and economic institutions for the sustained functionality of a nation state. In the approach delineated in this study the emergence and maintenance of political and economic institutions as dispositives within a society is assumed to result from its culture as its operating system. Institutions don’t appear out of thin air and can’t exist independent from a society’s culture. Culture as a system of dispositives substantially includes implicit and manifest institutions, be they integrative or exploitative. Acemoglu and Robinson do admit that institutions have a cultural dimension but maintain their differentiation between culture and institutions.<sup>344</sup> In the light of the findings of this study it might be a worthwhile endeavor to investigate in how far communicative instances can become discursive institutions? To some extent, the “Sonderzug” song might be considered such a discursive institution, an integrative one on top of that. On the other hand, the six factor model here established for analyzing the potentiality of a communicative instance to resonate discursively can of course also be turned around and be used for trying to design communicative instances with the intention of creating such integrative discursive institutions.

In any case, this case study highlights the important role the arts, especially the performing arts, can play as a moral compass and agent of development in society. Being an artist neither obligates to nor dispenses from a political stance, but the exposure coming with it endues not only the potentiality of

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<sup>343</sup> Dettlef Pollack, *Das unzufriedene Volk: Protest und Ressentiment in Ostdeutschland von der friedlichen Revolution bis heute*, Sonderausgabe für die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung ed., Schriftenreihe / Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, (Bonn; Bielefeld: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung : transcript, 2020).

<sup>344</sup> Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty*, 1. edition ed. (New York, NY: Crown Publishing, 2012). P. 57

influence but, more importantly, a distinct responsibility for the discursive integrity and coherence of a society that each artist should be aware of, particularly in times of multiple crises.

Desiderata regarding the applicability of the suggested tool for the analysis of the performative potentiality of a communicative instance are a) evaluating the validity of the five primary factors and the meta factor, possibly by framing a reversal test, and b) inspecting to what extent these factors also apply to communicative instances that have gained increased relevance through the internet like TV-series or digitally such as social media postings in their potentiality to resonate in attitudes and actions.

Regarding the discursivity thesis, it is desirable to further elaborate its significance as a philosophical concept for communication- and media science in the sociological dimension. There is evidence that the discursivity thesis may well turn out to be applicable as a fundamental epistemic constant and a natural middle way between subjectivist concepts like radical constructivism, purely positivist stances, and more or less essentialist concepts. The discursivity thesis has great potential to explain how a culture, as the operating system of a society, interacts with its own artifacts like movies, music, or the arts by the interchange of meanings. Particularly important in this context appears to be the task of reflecting on artificial intelligence as well as algorithms in social media and search engines in terms of the discursivity thesis and the recursive application of meaning. What will it mean for society if it starts to depend on machines that imitate human discursivity while recursively applying prior results of its own discursive process so that the principles of reasoning originally coded into the system will be reapplied continuously, producing a fractal momentum which might result in the paradox that such technologies effectively keep us from adapting duly to a changing environment? Especially with regard to democratic elections the role of AI in the discursive process may become crucial considering its power to imitate discursive resonance by sheer computing power to manipulate voters.



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# Appendix

## Focus Group 1

'F' and 'M'

W: Meine erste Frage wäre, von welchen Themen war das Lebensgefühl 1983 geprägt?

F1: Das kann ich nicht sagen.

M1: Ich kann mich noch gut erinnern an die Raketendiskussion. SS20, Pershing. Das hat damals eine große Rolle gespielt.

F2: Ach das war damals, ja?

M2: Ja, das war Anfang der 80er. Und ich habe sogar davon geträumt. Gruselige Träume hatte ich gehabt. Atomkrieg und sowas. Das fällt mir als erstes ein, ja.

F3: Ich lese gerade „Jenseits der Mauer“, hatte ja schon mal zählt, die Biographie der DDR neu geschrieben von der Heuer, da hat die auch drauf abgestellt, ja dass das Anfang der achtziger Jahre war genau

M3: das Zweite war bei mir, dass mein Studium zu Ende war und ich geguckt habe was kann ich machen halt nach dem Studium. Das war die Zeit.

W: Die Hauptsache waren aber diese SS 20 Geschichten?

M4: Und das war ja ziemlich heftig damals, die Wahrnehmung. Da gab es ja in diese Konzertsreihen auch: "Rock für den Frieden" in der DDR, wo ja auch Lindenberg aufgetreten ist im Palast der Publik. Und da wir ja sehr musikkaffin waren, hat das natürlich auch eine Rolle gespielt in der Wahrnehmung.

W: Welche Haltungen gegenüber dem Staat und der politischen Führung gab es denn eigentlich? Also was, also was für verschiedene Haltungen gab es, also können Sie das beschreiben?

F4: Also wie gesagt, in Ihrer Vorrede bin ich schon darauf gekommen, dass das eigentlich, ich spreche jetzt mal für mich, ich denke mal bei Michael ist es ähnlich, dass der Staat für uns eigentlich so eine diktatorische Rolle im Vordergrund stehend gar nicht gespielt hat, weil das hat uns eigentlich gar nicht so tangiert. Also wie gesagt, man hat schon, also wir waren jetzt nicht die ständig an irgendwelchen Stammtischen, hatten wir sowieso nicht, oder irgendwelche politischen Witze gerissen haben, so nicht, aber das war eigentlich für uns, also eigentlich ignorierend, sag ich mal so. Die waren einfach nicht akzeptiert, so sage ich mal, das ist ganz einfach. Wie gesagt, weil ich auch gerade diese Biografie der DDR jetzt gerade lese, also ein Höhepunkt der Anerkennung, gerade von den jugendlichen Schichten, hatte die DDR-Führung, glaube ich, am meisten zum Weltfestspiel in Berlin, '73. Das war mal so ein ganz liberaler Aussetzer kann man sagen von der Staatsführung, wo dann doch die Jugend der Welt, natürlich teilweise kommunistisch, zusammenkam, aber die DDR hat sich da auch geöffnet von der kulturellen Seite her, also gerade Musik war in Berlin, war natürlich die, heute würde man sagen die Hölle los sozusagen, also war schon ein ganz breit gefächertes Programm von natürlich auch besonders unseren DDR-Rockbands, denen haben wir eigentlich immer schon zugesprochen gerade von den Texten her, das war so wahrscheinlich auch mittlerweile bekannt, dass jedoch zwischen den Texten eben vieles versteckt haben, was man so offiziell nicht sagen konnte wahrscheinlich auch dann, wenn man es gesagt hätte verboten wäre. Das war so eine Hochstimmung und das war dann gerade der Übergang zwischen Ulbricht und Honecker. Also, da haben die sich dann wirklich mal ganz stark Mühe gegeben wahrscheinlich, um den entsprechenden Spiegel in der Medienlandschaft zu bekommen auf der Welt, dass man auch als sozialistischer Staat eben sich so darstellen kann und eigentlich haben wir so alle unterschwellig wahrscheinlich gedacht: das wird jetzt so weitergehen, noch mehr ein Schritt dieser Freiheit in allen Beziehungen geben wird.

W: Und wie war es dann, dass es die nicht gab, diese Freiheit

F5: Das war natürlich doch eine Enttäuschung, aber das wurde jetzt nicht so stark irgendwie in unseren ich sag mal Partys, wo man ja viel über Politik diskutiert hat das war jetzt nicht so, dass man jetzt so auf den Punkt das gesagt hat: ja wir sind jetzt enttäuscht von Erich Honecker und seinem Politbüro, sondern das, eigentlich war das in unseren Kreisen, in denen wir so verkehrt hatten, war es eigentlich alles so ein Nenner. Das war eigentlich gar kein Thema, weil man eigentlich wusste, dass es relativ aussichtslos ist, darüber zu sprechen vielleicht schon nicht, aber irgendwelche Proteste in



der Art waren eigentlich, wenn man jetzt nicht wirklich ein hartgesottener Antragsteller auf Ausreise gewesen wäre, war es eigentlich nicht so das Thema bei uns, mehr unterschwellig. Also wie gesagt, deshalb ist es wahrscheinlich bei uns gekommen, weil wir diesen Titel gespielt haben, uns diese Gefahr, also sie wissen ja der Paragraph heißt: die Herabwürdigung von öffentlichen Personen aus dem Staatsapparat - oder so ähnlich, war uns gar nicht so bewusst, weil wir das gar nicht, die haben wir ja eigentlich gar nicht so, also als die Repräsentanten jetzt so, sag ich jetzt mal im Nachhinein vielleicht, nicht so akzeptiert. Also, für uns waren die einfach so eine, ja teilweise eine Lachnummer oder so könnte man so schlimm sagen.

M5: Das ist eine Art von Humor gewesen von Lindenberg, den die Offiziellen in der DDR nicht verstanden haben. Die haben das sozusagen als Angriff auf ihre Autorität verstanden und die Leute und unter anderem auch wir waren da, wohl noch ein paar andere, waren sozusagen die Transporteure dieser Texte. Naja und um das mal zu ergänzen was Frank sagt, es geht ja dann weiter mit 76, 77 mit der Biermann Ausbürgerung, da gab es in diesen Cut. Bis dahin lief: die Leute haben sich immer gefreut auf den nächsten Parteitag von der SED. Da gabs dann entweder mehr Kindergeld oder mehr Ehekredit, irgendwas gab es immer. Die Leute waren immer ganz gespannt was gibt es dieses Mal.

F6: Und die Lockerung zwischen beiden deutschen Staaten.

M6: 72, ja Helsinki und da war so eine Phase zwischen Weltfestspielen und Biermann-Ausbürgerung, die war relativ, ich sag mal jetzt für DDR-Verhältnisse, entspannt. Und dann kam diese Biermanngeschichte und damit verbunden halt die Ausreise von vielen bekannten Schauspielern, Musikern, die so in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung halt eine große Rolle gespielt haben in der DDR. Und das war so ein Bruch halt, den hat man auch schon gespürt. Da gab es ein bisschen mehr agitatorischen Druck von oben, würde ich mal sagen. Den gab es ja sowieso immer, aber das war ein bisschen intensiver halt.

F7: Ich kann mich da auch gerade anschließen, weil mich gerade die Erinnerung wieder trifft. Ich war da schon beim Studium und da hat man richtig gemerkt, wie diktatorisch das eben durchgesetzt wurde. Da wurden eben der, ich weiß gar nicht, wie das war, FDJ-Rat, da mussten die irgendwie so ein Kommuniqué verfassen und das sollten wir unterschreiben und so. Also haben auch viele nicht unterschrieben, ich zum Beispiel auch nicht, weiß ich noch. Da wurde man natürlich schon so in diese, also in die Ecke gestellt, dass man nicht pro DDR ist, so in der Richtung. Aber das war so, ja das war

so ein bisschen ideologisch geprägt, aber das hat sich dann auch wieder verflacht. Also, ich sag mal so 80er Jahre, ich vergleich's mal so mit der Musik, da hat nichts richtig Spannendes so stattgefunden, sag ich mal so. Jedenfalls wie gesagt, ich war auch mehr so privat eigentlich so, junge Familie. Also, mein Kind war gerade zwei Jahre alt und irgendwie Wohnungssuche hat man nicht, konnte man das damals ja nicht nennen, aber trotzdem neu eingerichtet und so weiter. Also ja, eben so das persönliche familiäre Glück aufgebaut nicht, so kann man das vielleicht sagen,

M7: Wir haben uns wohl so auf das Private glaube ich auch zurückgezogen. Man wusste, was man wann an welcher Stelle sagen musste, das war halt so in der DDR und ansonsten haben wir unser Leben gelebt halt. Wir waren auch nicht Dissidenten oder so. Wir waren eben in der DDR aufgewachsen und haben auch da unsere Freiräume halt auch ausgenutzt

W: Gab es irgendwelche gesellschaftlichen Gruppen, in die sich die DDR aufgeteilt hat?

M8: Nicht, dass ich wüsste. Das kam erst später mit dem „Schwerter zu Pflugscharen“ und so, diese Geschichten, daraus ist sowas entstanden.

F8: Intellektuelle Kreise, die gab es natürlich immer schon und die waren relativ klein, nicht, so um Heym rum und so. Das war aber nicht so, das hat man so in den Westnachrichten als für uns progressive Meldung so aufgenommen. Aber das war jetzt nicht irgendwo, dass man sich da zusammengefunden hat, um darüber zu diskutieren. Also ich sag mal so, wir waren so aus den 70er Jahren, waren wir so progressive Jugendliche, aber nicht im Sinne von der FDJ progressiv, sondern, naja doch progressiv hat damit Sozialismus eigentlich nichts zu tun. Wir waren doch sehr aufgeschlossene, an Kultur und Politik interessierte Leute, sag ich mal so.

W: Und hat sich das bis 89 verschärft? Gab es dann eine wachsende Kluft zwischen Nomenklatur und den normalen Menschen, oder haben sich diese Konfliktlinien verschärft bis 89?

M9: Das gab es in der Umwelt- und Friedensbewegung, die in der DDR auch schon entstanden ist, auch noch gefördert durch Gorbatschow, die Perestroika genau, und da ist man davon ausgegangen, dass das in der DDR auch eine Perestroika geben könnte, in dem Sinne. Aber das gab's nicht.

F9: Das war was eigentlich bei uns diskutiert wurde bei uns, so, dass man sich das eigentlich das so gewünscht hätte.

M10: Und ich finde, dass sich erst mit Gorbatschow dieser gesellschaftliche Bruch und diese Gruppenbildung intensiviert hat.

F10: Naja, vielleicht war das so '87.

M11: Nee, '85. Ab '85 war das mit Gorbatschow, das meine ich. Und da war das schon zu spüren. Das ist dann auch öffentlich geworden. Das ist dann auch in den bundesdeutschen Nachrichten aufgetaucht, Schwerter zu Pflugscharen, wenn halt wieder mal irgendeine Kirche durchsucht wurde oder irgendeine Versammlung aufgelöst wurde. Da gab es dann auch hier im Prenzlauer Berg vor allen Dingen auch Zusammenkünfte von oftmals von Intellektuellen auch, die eine gewisse Aura schon mitbrachten. Also von Leuten, da waren eben Partys, da waren 40, 50 oder noch mehr Leute und da haben auch politische Themen eine Rolle gespielt, glaube ich. Aber das war erst ab Mitte der 80er Jahre, dass das sich so intensiviert hat. Und die kann ich gar nicht sagen, dass es sich zugespitzt hat zu 89. Ich glaube nicht. Also, ich denke mal, die ostdeutsche Nomenklatur, die hatten ziemlich zu rudern gehabt, wie sie das in den Griff kriegen, ohne jetzt zu überziehen. Die wollten ja auch nicht hier so plötzlich als Polizeistaat oder so. Ich meine, war natürlich eine Diktatur, aber Diktatur kann man ja so und so wahrnehmen. Also eine Diktatur von Putin nimmt man anders wahr als eine Diktatur in Kuba zum Beispiel. Also gibt es schon vielleicht auch Unterschiede in der Wahrnehmung. Die DDR wollte ja nicht so ein mega Polizeistaat sein, obwohl sie es das dann natürlich war. Es ging ja nur um die öffentliche Wahrnehmung, auch im Westen.

F11: Aber wie gesagt, ich kann mich noch erinnern, ein entfernter Freund, war auch ziemlich schnell nach Berlin gegangen, da gab es immer schon auch diese Verhaftung zum 7. Oktober da gab es schon mal so eine Protestbewegung, so 87, 88. Da wurden die mal alle, das weiß ich noch, weggesperrt hier und verhört. Ich weiß nicht was für Schilder hatten und so weiter. Und der hat das auch gemacht der kam ja auch, der kam dann auch nach Guben, Provinz und hat mit einer neun Millimeter Kamera am ersten Mai bei so einem Umzug gefilmt. Da war auch die Stasi schon total ganz wild, und das müssen wohl in Berlin wahrscheinlich noch viele andere gemacht haben. Da gab es natürlich schon so eine politische Szene, die das ein bisschen provoziert hat. Aber wie dann natürlich der Staat jetzt darauf so reagiert hat kann ich auch nicht sagen. Also, wie gesagt, es gab mal ein paar Auswüchse wie ich gerade sagte in Berlin aber letztendlich hat sich das dahin gewabert, so dieses ganze Verhalten. Es ging dann erst richtig los dann

wo die naja die die Ungarn-Touristen dann sich nach dem Westen aufgemacht haben.

W: Wann haben sie ungefähr das erste Mal von Udo Lindenberg gehört?

M12: Mitte der 70er.

F12: 72 oder so.

M13: Ach, klar. Schon die ersten Platten waren ja bekannt.

F13: Also die wurden dann schon bei uns gespielt. Wir hatten auch so ein paar Gitarrenspieler, das wurde auch schon mal so zelebriert. Aber das waren ja alles keinen politischen Texte, Andrea Doria, okay, das ist jetzt weitläufig, aber sowas in der Richtung. Aber Sonderzug nach Pankow, also für uns als Diskjockeys war das, ich sag jetzt mal ohne jetzt darüber gesprochen zu haben, auch damals nicht, das war einfach so eine eingängige Melodie, so von diesem Jazz Standard her, irgendwie Glenn Miller. Das hat einfach so verschiedene Generationsgeschmäcker zusammengebracht, und naja der Text war natürlich auch so ein bisschen, aus meiner Sicht jedenfalls, war der lustig gewesen. Aber natürlich schon mit dem kleinen Hintergedanken, dass da unsere Partei-Bonzen, sage ich jetzt mal so, Anstoß finden könnten aber wie gesagt wir haben die Gefahr jetzt nicht so epochal auf uns zukommen sehen und was Herr Michael ja schon erwähnte, das ist eine so eine Diktatur, die Ideologie schwebt zwar groß im Raum, aber umso weiter sie kommen und in die unteren Schichten, will sich ja natürlich jeder kleine Parteisekretär profilieren und der meldet das gerne in die nächste Ebene. Und da gibt es natürlich klare Fälle und es gibt so Fälle, wo man sagen kann, wenn einer ein bisschen Intellekt hat, dann kann man darüber lachen, auch wenn ich ein strammer Genosse gewesen wäre. Aber das hat sich eben dann so hochgeschaukelt und irgendwo ist dann ein Ventil, wo es dann wahrscheinlich, ob Honecker so in der Lage war, das so richtig zu relativieren. Aber eigentlich ist es entstanden, weil Udo ja immer schon kommen wollte, und Honecker hatte ihn nicht gelassen. Daraufhin packe ich ein Fläschchen Cognac ein. Das war ja eigentlich so eine kleine Anmache, nu lass mich doch endlich Mal rein. Da hätte man auch stolz sein können drauf, aber auf so einen Rockmusiker ist man nicht stolz, wenn der so eine Avance macht.

W: Wieso war denn Udo Lindenberg überhaupt zu populär in der DDR?

M14: Der war zunächst mal nicht populärer als andere, würde ich sagen.

F14: Naja doch.

M15: Das ist so langsam gestiegen, aber warum kann ich jetzt auch gar nicht sagen.

F15: Ich denke mal doch, er war so einer von den wenigen, also gerade von den westdeutschen Künstlern, die die deutsche Sprache benutzt haben und natürlich aus einem eigenen Stil, der irgendwie auch cool war, geprägt hat.

M16: Durch sein Wortspiel, seine Wortkunst, würde ich mal sagen.

F16: Und das hat man, ohne dass man das jetzt schon theoretisch irgendwie durchleuchtet hat, damals, jedenfalls wir so als Jugendlichen, aber das hat man schon irgendwie so als cool, sag ich mal doch, so aufgenommen und das fand man einfach gut. Also, wir fanden natürlich auch unsere DDR-Rockbands, die Entsprechenden natürlich, auch gut. Da gab es jetzt noch nicht so: das ist jetzt ein Westkünstler, oder so. Das war einfach so.

W: Aber er hat nichts Bestimmtes verkörpert für Sie?

F17: Nein. Also für mich.

M17: Ja, dazu muss man sich vielleicht auch nochmal sich angucken, wie das überhaupt war mit der Westmusik im Osten. Es gab natürlich auch diverse Veröffentlichungen, also sogenannte Lizenzproduktionen von der Plattenfirma Amiga, wo große Künstler wie Tina Turner, Queen, ach es gab eine ganze Menge. Es gab mehr, als ich dachte. Ich habe mir das letzte Mal angeguckt. Sowas gab es, aber das meiste hat sich doch abgespielt, dass man Platten sich besorgt hat aus dem Westen. Da gab es verschiedene Möglichkeiten. Meine Oma hat mir mal Platten geschickt, im Paket. Das war in den 70ern noch möglich. Aus dem Westen. Oder andere haben es mitgebracht, Verwandte, die kommen durften, die wurden natürlich verbreitet, die wurden dann auf Tonband überspielt oder auf Kassettenrekorder und das hat sich dann so verbreitet halt und das zweite Medium war das Radio. Wir haben damals jeden Samstag, da haben wir unsere festen Termine gehabt, am Radio gesessen. Man hat in Guben auch noch einen ganz guten UKW-Empfang gehabt und dann halt die Titel mitgeschnitten. Und die waren ja auch so gemacht, dass man mitschneiden konnte. Also wurde nicht reingesprochen, und wenn es wirklich mal einer gemacht hat, dann hat er sich entschuldigt. Da haben wahrscheinlich welche angerufen oder geschrieben, dass es doof war, dass der da drauf gequatscht hat. Da haben sie es halt nochmal gespielt. Also die waren dazu gemacht, um mitgeschnitten zu werden, die Titel. Das haben wir natürlich jeden Samstag gemacht, ein paar Stunden und waren dann wieder fit für die nächsten Diskotheken

F18: Oder wir sind viel nach Prag oder Budapest gefahren und da gab es natürlich immer schon eine größere Lockerung und diese platten die die Amiga verlegt gab es unterm Ladentisch. Da muss man schon so Beziehungen haben.

M18: Und sie wussten, wenn am Plattenladen eine Schlange stand, haben sie gewusst gab es wieder eine Lizenzproduktion.

F19: Also eigentlich wie bei vielen Sachen hat die DDR durch ihre Verknappung eigentlich sich selber diesen ganzen Argwohn oder dieses Lächeln auf sich gezogen. Unbedarfte haben gesagt dann muss es doch im Westen wirklich irgendwas Goldenes geben, was wir unbedingt brauchen, was uns der Staat natürlich verweigert.

W: Wie glaubwürdig fanden sie denn Udo Lindenberg damals?

M19: Also, ich behauptete mal, dass das wir, speziell als DJs oder auch andere Musikinteressierte mehr über die internationale Musikszene wussten als zum Beispiel Westdeutsche. Also weil einfach der Drang nach den Neuen, die Neugier ja viel größer war. Das lag nicht auf der Straße, sondern wir mussten uns drum bemühen. Und dadurch hat man sich viel intensiver auch damit beschäftigt. Und insofern war Lindenberg einer von anderen, aber mit einer ganz besonderen Handschrift, mit einem bestimmten Sound, was ihn ausgemacht hat als Rocker.

F20: Mit deutschen Texten.

M20: Das gehört dazu. Insofern fand ich ihn als glaubwürdig, weil das war eben auch ein Image, das er gepflegt hat, sicherlich. Und es gab ja auch andere. Rolling Stones zum Beispiel, um mal so eine einfache Band zu nennen, die haben ja auch ihren Habitus, durch ihre Auftritte, durch Bühnenshows, sich einen bestimmten Ruf erworben. Das hat der Lindenberg auf seine Weise eben auch gemacht. Aber was ich nicht unter der Kategorie glaubwürdig oder nicht glaubwürdig einordnen würde.

W: Hatte er denn irgendeine Form von gesellschaftlicher Relevanz in der DDR?

M21: Für mich nicht, aber wenn ich die Berichte sehe, damals von seinem Auftritt im Palast der Republik, wo ja der ganze Parkplatz voll mit Leuten war, muss er es doch gehabt haben. Also vermute ich mal, dass er doch...

F21: Naja, nach heutigen Maßstäben hätte der in jeder Bezirksstadt das größte Stadion gefüllt. Erstmal schon, weil es ein Westkünstler war. Also hätte auch Peter Maffay sein können, da wären auch alle hingeströmt.

M22: Vielleicht spielten auch bestimmte Songs eine Rolle, zum Beispiel „Mädchen aus Ostberlin“ und so, kann sein, dass das auch eine Rolle gespielt hat.

F22: Er hat doch schon ein bisschen mehr politisch gewirkt. Das haben wir jetzt schon auch ein bisschen außer Acht gelassen, ja doch. Das gibt immer Leute, denen ist das eigentlich vollkommen scheiß egal, der Inhalt, sondern es geht darum: kommt was Besonderes oder es kommt aus dem Westen, wie bei uns, das muss ich einfach haben oder ich muss es anhören. Ob man da 100% hinter steht, ist bei vielen nicht so 100% klar. Das ist nämlich meine, also es gehen auch viele zum Stones Konzert heute noch, die einfach nur sagen, dass es eben mit 60 oder mit 70 auch cool wäre, wenn ich da reingehe. Obwohl sie eigentlich längst auf Helene Fischer stehen.

W: Gab es dann trotzdem irgendwelche Gedanken, Gefühle, Hoffnungen, Erwartungen, die sich mit der Person von Udo Lindenberg verknüpft haben, wenn sie jetzt mal so frei herum assoziieren.

F23: Ich habe gerade mal an das Mädchen aus Ostberlin gedacht, oh Gott, das muss ja wirklich eine blöde Situation sein, dass er dann abends um, weiß ich, 23.59 Uhr die Grenze passiert haben muss. Aber das war jetzt so, auf einen Liedtext bezogen schon das Emotionalste für mich jetzt, was ich so gedacht hätte, haben könnte aber nicht haben.

W: Aber wieso haben sie ihn denn zum Beispiel gespielt bei ihren Auftritten?

M23: Weil es sehr gut geeignet war, gespielt zu werden auf einer Diskothek. Und natürlich mit diesem Kribbeln, das damit verbunden war. Gehen wir jetzt zu weit, überziehen wir jetzt damit. Hat das für uns vielleicht Konsequenzen. Aber das hat in dem Moment auch nicht die Rolle gespielt. Wir haben es einfach gemacht. Weil wir als DJs natürlich auch ein gewisses Standing hatten in der Location, wo wir gespielt haben.

F24: Ja, das Besondere ist, naja, hat aber nicht damit irgendwie was beeinflusst, dass ich sowas gespielt habe. Universum, muss man sich vorstellen, war oben so ein normales Tanzcafé, Bar, also ein Betrieb für gestandene Leute der sozialistischen städtischen Gemeinschaft sozusagen und unten im Keller waren so die Hottentotten, so hätte Walter Ulbricht wahrscheinlich

noch gesagt, die da Beatmusik gespielt haben. Also kam natürlich auch eine gewisse Vermischung zustande, weil die älteren Leutchen, ich nenne es mal anders, von oben, die mussten unten auf Toilette gehen und unten war natürlich immer die Tür offen von unserer Diskothek, also von dem Club dort würde man heute sagen. Da haben die sich natürlich hingestellt und wollten mal gucken wie die Hottentotten da mit ihren langen Haaren abhotten und was da für Mädels sind wahrscheinlich auch. Und wir wissen es ja eigentlich, das hat ja einer von denen da gemeldet, ne?

M24: Ja, da war oben eine Lehrerveranstaltung an demselben Abend und wie Frank gerade gesagt hat die gucken auch mal unten rein in der Diskothek und da muss einer dabei gewesen sein von den Lehrern, der sich profilieren wollte, der der Meinung war er müsste jetzt irgendwie melden.

F25: Einhalt gebieten.

M25: So geht es nicht. Wir hatten da unten schon ziemlich große Freiheiten. Also wenn das von Interesse ist, weiß ich nicht. Also kennen Sie ja vielleicht, dass es eigentlich vorgeschrieben war, dass man 60 Prozent Ostmusik spielen musste und maximal 40 Prozent Westmusik. Westmusik aber nur die von denen veröffentlichten Lizenzplatten oder von den Mitschneidesendungen im DDR-Rundfunk. Alles andere war also theoretisch verboten. Und wir haben in der Regel 99,8 Prozent - es gab ein paar DDR-Bands, die wir auch gespielt haben. Und so haben wir statt 40 zu 60 99 zu 1 gespielt und das konnten wir machen. Und wir hatten natürlich auch so ein Notfallprogramm, aber das hat eher mit der AWACS zu tun gehabt. Das hat weniger mit dem 60 zu 40 zu tun gehabt, sondern mit dem AWACS. Also AWACS war wie die GEMA. Die sind manchmal einfach so aufgetaucht und haben kontrolliert. Hat man schon mal ein Auge auf einen gehabt, ob mal jemand da war, der verdächtig war. Und in dem Zusammenhang kann man im weiteren Sinne auch Lindenberg sehen. Der war ein der Teil 99 Prozent und mit diesem Song, der einfach dafür gemacht war, gut gefunden zu werden. Zumal auch in dem Zusammenhang, wo wir gespielt haben, also in dem Club.

F26: Ne, es war, ich sag mal, aus heutiger laxer Sicht, das war schon eine kleine Provokation. Das war schon... Spielen wir mal, ne?

M26: Wir haben sogar zweimal gespielt, weil das total eingeschlagen ist.

F27: Die Leute haben natürlich das Funkeln in den Augen gekriegt, und ein bisschen freut man sich auch, wenn die Resonanz da ist.



M27: Aber um noch mal auf die Frage zurückzukommen, welche Relevanz Lindenberg hatte oder welche Erwartung wir an ihnen hatten und so, das kann ich ehrlich nicht sagen, dass ich da irgendwie Erwartung hatte.

W: Aber, dass er kommt, zum Beispiel, war doch so eine Erwartung, dass er kommt und live spielt.

M28: Klar, da gab es ja auch harte Verhandlungen, der war ja kurz davor, aber die haben im letzten Moment noch wieder abgesagt die Tournee. Also irgendwie dachten die, das können sie nicht beherrschen.

F28: Ich habe durch Zufall auch einen Schwager, der kommt aus dem Westen und war zu der Zeit auch so ein Konzertveranstalter, Musikmanager, der Christof, und der kannte Udo und der kannte, wie es so ist, in der Künstlerszene wieder Leute und Udo hat den angerufen und gesagt, du hast doch viele Ostbands in Westberlin spielen lassen und umgekehrt teilweise. Was muss ich machen? Ich will nach Ostberlin spielen und so. Und ja, der hatte dann letztendlich den Kontakt hergestellt. Da war dann das Konzert im Palast der Republik.

M29: Naja, der war eben auch live dabei und da gab es auch eine Reportage über diesen Abend und da tritt Christoph auch auf. Der war auch vor Ort gewesen. Und der sagte, dass die alle die Hose voll hatten, die Stasi-Leute eben.

F29: Und da war natürlich auch viel, die ersten Reihen, das kennen wir auch Manfred Krug Konzerten. Und das waren eben alles geladene FDJ-Funktionäre.

M30: Ja, da kann man ja auch eine Geschichte erzählen über Manfred Krug Konzerte in Friedrichshain. Da war das ganze Theater, glaube ich, voll mit Stasi-Leuten. Und die haben nicht applaudiert.

W: Können Sie sich noch an irgendwelche Formulierungen aus dem Lied erinnern, aus dem „Sonderzug nach Pankow“?

F30: Na ja, mit dem Fläschchen Cognac, das schmeckt ganz lecker und dann ziehst du dir eine Lederjacke an.

M31: Schließt dich ein auf dem Klo und du hörst West-West Radio.

F31: Ja, er ist da besser vom Gedächtnis her, aber das sind so die eingängigen Zeilen, sag ich mal so.

M32: Ich bin ein Jodeltalent und will da spielen mit ner Band. All die ganzen Schlageraffen dürfen da singen, dürfen ihren ganzen, weiß ich nicht, Schrott

zum Vortrage bringen. Nur der kleine Ud0, der darf das nicht und das verstehen wir nicht.

W: Und was war für Sie damals die Hauptbotschaft des Liedes? Gab es da irgendeine Botschaft, die Sie daraus gehört haben?

F32: `Ne Botschaft, das ist natürlich ein bisschen übertrieben. Ach ja, also, das war einfach ein netter Gag auf Honny. Also, wie so eine Umarmung kam mir das eigentlich mehr vor. Doch, ziemlich ironisch natürlich, aber...

M33: Ja, das war schon einfach auch eine Provokation. Auch von Lindenberg wahrscheinlich. Und dass Honecker öffentlich "Honey" genannt wurde. Das war natürlich auch neu. Das war ja der Genosse Erich Honecker und nicht "Honey".

F33: Das war ja schon als solches eine Herabglimpfung.

M34: Wenn du die aktuelle Kamera geguckt hast, das hat wahrscheinlich 20 Sekunden gedauert, den vollständigen Titel zu verlesen.

F34: Es war es schon ein richtiger Personenkult, zwar nicht jetzt so wie in Nord-Korea. Naja also wie sagt für uns war das, denke ich, eine kleine Provokation aber lange nicht mit diesen Ausmaßen gedacht. Wir fanden einfach lustig. Wir hatten halt auch mal drei Wodka-Cola getrunken, da ist man dann ein bisschen leichter in seinen Entscheidungen und da haben wir das Ding einfach raufgehauen und ohne jetzt zu denken, dass wir die Welt damit verbessern.

M35: Vielleicht wollten wir auch die ersten sein, kann ja auch sein, das weiß ich nicht mehr. Weil, das hat ja dann die Runde gemacht, ganz klar. Das andere DJs wahrscheinlich auch aufgenommen und gespielt irgendwo.

W: Aber sie haben es nicht aus Opposition zum Staat gemacht, das war einfach nur unterhaltungstechnisch opportun sozusagen.

F35: Genau.

M36: Ich fand es cool, irgendwie.

F36: Aber das es ist nicht politisch konform ist in der DDR das wussten wir schon aber natürlich nicht mit dieser Überbewertung, dass wir zu fünf Monaten Knast verurteilt wurden, im Schnellverfahren. Also man hat ja doch immer noch so halbwegs an den Rechtsstaat geglaubt, aber mit dem Schnellverfahren war das ein bisschen sehr merkwürdig.

M37: Wobei man dem Gubener Staatsanwalt einen besonderen Ehrgeiz nachgesagt hat, sich zu profilieren beim Schutz des Sozialismus.

F37: Stimmt, Schulze hieß der glaub ich.

M38: Nee, Pietsch. Das war ein harter Hund. Und der wollte sich ganz besonders hervortreten. Besonders vorbildlich sein und hat natürlich mehrere Verfahrensfehler gemacht, was sich im Nachhinein herausgestellt hat. Hat auch Runden gemacht im ostdeutschen Anwaltsverein, oder wie es jetzt auch wieder hieß. Und der ist so weit wir im Nachhinein erfahren haben, auch hinter den Kulissen aktiv gewesen, so dass sie das wieder kassieren mussten.

F38: Naja, unsere Frauen haben sich in Anwälte genommen. Also wir durften ja in der Verhandlung im Schnellverfahren keinen Anwalt haben. Das war glaube ich auch den damaligen Regeln konform wahrscheinlich gewesen. Aber eben, unsere Frauen haben sich den Anwalt genommen und da wurde das dann nochmal aufgerollt. Da waren wir aber schon im, naja, auf dem Wege zum richtigen Knast. Aber die haben uns dann in Frankfurt Oder, oder erst eine Woche in Cottbus und dann noch da irgendwie so rum aufenthalten lassen. Und da kamen auch schon die Stasi noch mal ins Gefängnis und die haben das natürlich alles noch mal aufgerollt und haben gesagt, dass unsere Frauen einen Kassationsantrag gestellt haben.

M39: Aber da gab es wohl ziemlich viel Aufstand bei den Anwälten über das Urteil.

W: Was glauben Sie denn, was wollte Lindenberg eigentlich zum Ausdruck bringen mit seinem Song?

F39: Naja der hat einfach noch mal angeklopft bei Erich.

M40: Ich denke mal der wollte die Kommunikation ein bisschen auflockern. Ich glaube nicht dass er die Provokation wollte. Er wollte das so auf seine coole, lockere Art eben bringen. Aber da hat er nicht damit gerechnet, dass die Funktionäre relativ wenig Spaß verstehen, dass das einfach nicht Ihre Sprache ist. Vielleicht gab es irgendwo welche die, aber da hat sich doch niemand aus Versteck gewagt.

F40: Ich sagte ja, umso höher die Ebene: da waren zwar noch vielleicht Leute, die noch einigermaßen klar denken konnten, aber da das schon so zu gefiltert war von unten nach oben und jeder muss einen Rechenschaftsbericht abgeben, da konnte man das wahrscheinlich auch gar nicht mehr so verschweigen.

M41: Kannten sie den Film Sushi in Suhl? Da ist das was Frank gesagt hat total nachvollziehbar dargestellt. Das ist eine Komödie von jemanden der in Suhl ein japanisches Restaurant eröffnet hat zu DDR-Zeiten und da ist genau das. Da wird von unten nach oben gemeldet, jeder wollte immer besser als der andere und wenn der Oberste das ganz anders gesehen hat, da gab es Anschiss nach unten und der Anschiss hat sich dann potenziert nach unten. Also so war die Kette im Osten. Mit diesem oder jenem Ausgang. Das war unterschiedlich, aber im Falle von Sushi in Suhl war das für den Betreiber positiv. Die sind natürlich nachher auch alle da aufgetaucht: Bezirkssekretär und so weiter. Weil sie es toll finden mussten, weil Erich hatte auch nichts dagegen.

W: Wurde der Melodie irgendwelche Bedeutungen beigegeben?

F41: Ja, die war gut tanzbar, klar. Das war ja so ein Jazz-Standard. Chattanooga Choo Choo. Und das hat er noch ein bisschen angerockt. Ja. Das war halt der Ideale jetzt-tanzen-wir-alle Song.

M42: Es gibt ja sonne und solche Covers, aber das war irgendeiner... Ja, das hat er gut gemacht, muss ich sagen.

W: Was glauben Sie, welches Gefühl hatten der Song bei Ihrem Publikum damals ausgelöst?

M43: Naja, der eine oder andere hat vielleicht die Schultern eingezogen, kann ich mir vorstellen. Also viele, eine ein oder andere, die haben es schon gesagt.

F42: Wie Michael schon sagte, die meisten sind alle aufgesprungen, haben getanzt.

M44: Ja, aber vielleicht haben sie auch gedacht, die trauen sich ja was, kann ja auch sein.

W: Also war das Euphorie, was war das?

F43: Euphorie ist aus meiner Sicht ein bisschen überbewertet, aber so in die Richtung gehend.

W: Also vor allem, dass man tanzen konnte oder hat der Text nochmal eine Rolle gespielt? Was war das? War es das Konglomerat aus beiden?

F44: Ich denke, die meisten kannten den Song ja schon aus dem Radio, also kannten sie auch den Text, weil der war ja gut verständlich, war ja auch in Deutsch noch außerdem. Und naja, manche merken es ja sowieso nichts, aber ich denke mal 80 Prozent haben schon den Songtext auch verstanden.

Also von dem Publikum, was wir da hatten. Und die wussten schon, dass es eben doch eine kleine Provokation war.

W: War das eine Art Gute-Laune-Song oder wie muss man sich das vorstellen?

F45: Also sie müssen heute mal, gut heute nicht mehr, aber so vor zehn Jahren noch, da gab es immer so irgendwelche, ich sag mal bunten Sendungen dazu. Also für ein ganz anderes Publikum. Denn spielen sie den immer irgendwie so als Orchesterfassung, oder so spielen sie den teilweise noch. So ist meine Wahrnehmung. Also ist der gesellschaftlich glaube ich in der Lindenberg Fassung noch mehr publik als das Original.

M45: Wir haben ja den Song später noch gespielt, also jetzt, nicht zu DDR-Zeiten, sondern bei unseren Comeback Auftritten, so 2015/16. Und da hat sich das auch ein bisschen so erhalten. Wahrscheinlich, das war ja bekannt, was damals mit uns passiert ist.

F46: Wobei das natürlich für uns so eine spezielle Sache war und jeder von denen wir jetzt auch unser Comeback veranstaltet haben, die kannten uns ja von früheren Zeiten her und so weiter, war das eigentlich so mehr so ein i-Tüpfelchen, aha, jetzt spielen sie nochmal ganz locker.

M46: Ganz entspannend, ohne Konsequenzen.

F47: Also eigentlich heute so, also ist jetzt nicht mehr so das Ding, wo wir jetzt sagen, der müsste auf unserer Playlist stehen.

M47: Ja, es ist aber in gewisser Weise auch ein Evergreen. Ist ja nun schon fast 40 Jahre her. 40 Jahre. Ja, 40 Jahre. Genau.

F48: Jetzt spürt man da so einen Zugang.

W: Aber damit haben wir im Grunde schon die Frage beantwortet, was an dem Song Gefühle ausgelöst hat. Können Sie das nochmal irgendwo identifizieren, was an dem Song vielleicht bei Menschen Gefühle ausgelöst haben mag?

F49: Ich denke, viele haben sich den Text dann auch verinnerlicht, haben sich so vorgestellt, einfach wörtlich genommen. Lederjacke anziehen, Cognac, Erich und das haben sich so vorgestellt. Wahrscheinlich gab es da irgendwelche Karikaturen davon mit, oder im Fahrstuhl oder so was. Also ich denke mal, da haben sich viele so Bilder vorgestellt, ohne eine politische Veränderung da irgendwie mit in Einklang zu bringen.

M48: Ich kann mir vorstellen, in dem Moment, wo der lief der Song, also nur für den Zeitraum, so eine Art Freiheitsgefühl auch gewesen ist. Das war immer nur für den Moment halt.

F50: Dass du den spielen konntest?

M49: Nein, in der Wahrnehmung von den Leuten... Wir konnten ja im Grunde machen, was wir wollten. Wir hatten ja bis auf die Aufwartung von AWak-Leuten keine Vorgaben von dem Clubbetreiber. Wir konnten machen, was wir wollten. Er hat einen guten Umsatz gemacht, wenn wir da Termine hatten. Er hat immer den besten Umsatz gemacht, um es genau zu sagen. Das war sowas von voll. Aber in dem Moment, wo das so lief, da muss man sich wirklich mal überlegen, was da an den Leuten vorgegangen ist. Ich kann mir vorstellen, weil wir sowieso immer alles gespielt haben, was die Leute hören wollten, was wir gut fanden. Dass es da so ein Moment war, dass man sagt, oh cool, irgendwie nicht so, das man würde sagen.

F51: Ja cool, aber cool, aber nicht viel weiter würde ich sagen.

M50: Naja, und vielleicht muss die Leute es schon gedacht haben in dem Moment. Das war Besonderes halt. Da war sowieso vieles Besonderes was wir hatten, aber das war halt doch was ganz Besonderes. Ja, aber es ist getanzt worden, also. Vielleicht hat sich auch der ein oder andere umgesehen. So ein Reflex halt, gucken ob da jemand zu guckt, aber die die Leute die IMs oder so, die hat man ja nicht an der Nasenspitze erkannt, die waren da mittendrin.

W: Um noch die Frage anzuschließen: in welchem Verhältnis stand dieses Gefühl zum allgemeinen Lebensgefühl der DDR?

F52: Das kann ja wirklich, wie Michael auch schon gesagt hat, vielleicht so eine kleine Sequenz mal gewesen sein, dabei, aber das hat weder eine Nachhaltigkeit, glaube ich.

W: Nö, aber in dem Augenblick, es geht nur um den Augenblick sozusagen.

F53: Das hat man so schick gefunden.

M51: Das ist möglich, die Leute haben gesagt, guck mal, das ist möglich.

F54: Das ist ja cool, die spielen das ja auch so. Und wir können tanzen.

M52: Aber wahrscheinlich mit den Gedanken, naja, das könnte Konsequenzen haben, denke ich mal schon, dass das auch bei den Leuten auch noch eine Rolle gespielt hat, dass man das nicht einfach so durchlaufen lässt. Aber wir hatten ja das Pech mit der Lehrerveranstaltung da. Gut, vielleicht wäre

es auch ein anderer gewesen, wenn die nicht da gewesen wären. Aber das Lebensgefühl in der DDR, was das beeinflusst hat.

W: Nein, das meine ich nicht. Sondern ob es im Kontrast zueinander stand. Wie der Kontrast war, in dem es zueinander stand. Das Gefühl, das von dem Song ausgegangen ist und das Lebensgefühl in der DDR.

F55: So trist war es dann doch nicht gewesen.

M53: Als ich das erste Mal in den Westen fahren durfte, weil ich hatte eine Oma im Westen und ich durfte zum 85. Geburtstag fahren, bin ich dort gefragt worden, ob es Kinos gibt in der DDR. Was soll ich sagen? Ich war ein bisschen schockiert über die Fragen. Ja, was du meinst, das war nicht ganz so trist in der DDR. Also die Freiräume waren schon vorhanden. Man hat auch gewusst was man sagen kann was man nicht sagen sollte. Es gab Leute, die waren mutiger, die konnten nicht an sich halten die mussten unbedingt provozieren und so.

F56: Wenn Du jemand warst, der es wirklich jetzt drauf ankommen lassen wollte dann hatte man einfach so eine schleichende Indoktrinierung. Man hat einfach vom Kindergarten wahrscheinlich gelernt, dass es irgendwie Regeln gibt. Also Regeln gibt es ja generell immer, guter Anstand oder sonst was, aber das ist eben doch und dann später natürlich noch bei den jungen Pionieren, das wurde man ja in der ersten Klasse, das ist auf was der Staat Wert legt. Also ich war in Staatskunde immer sehr gut gewesen, obwohl ich nicht die..., aber man wusste immer, was man da schreiben sollte. Also da hatte sich keiner hingesetzt und gesagt, ich möchte mehr Demokratie im Sozialismus weil er gewusst hat.

M54: Ich würde sagen, du wärst auch sofort abgekanzelt worden. Etwa mit der Frage, sind Sie gegen den Frieden? Das war das erste Durchschlag-Argument. Das Zweite war, überprüfen Sie Ihren Klassenschlagpunkt. Und davon ausgehend ist spinnt sich alles andere drumherum

F57: Wenn es Du in deiner Beurteilung hattest: Frank muss seinen Klassenstandpunkt überprüfen dann war das eigentlich schon keine Weiterempfehlung zum Studium oder sowas. Das hat sich einfach so eingeschliffen und ich kenne auch so Geburtstagsfeiern von meiner Familie, da haben die dann mal so politische Witze gemacht. Da wurde eben das Fenster zugemacht, so kann ich mich erinnern. Aber bei unseren Veranstaltungen war die Musik so laut.

W: Aber wie bekannt war denn der Song in der DDR überhaupt?

M55: Also ja, ich denke mal, dass es für eine kurze Zeit wahrscheinlich einer der bekanntesten Songs war. Vermute ich mal. Schon dieser provokante Gestus, der dahintersteht, würde ich sagen.

W: Wie häufig hat man den Song in der DDR ungefähr gehört? Also nicht jetzt zahlenmäßig, sondern wie hoch war die gefühlte Frequenz?

F58: Hängt wahrscheinlich davon ab, ob du jetzt Westradio empfangen konntest in deiner Region oder nicht. Bei uns hast du den praktisch in jeden Tag gehört. Wir haben ja immer SFB oder Rias gehört. Da war natürlich jeden Tag schon. Jetzt haben die die Hände gerieben, die Musikredakteure, kann ich mir so vorstellen, in West-Berlin. Aber wenn du jetzt mal im Elbsandsteingebirge gewohnt hast, dann musst du nach Guben kommen, um den in der Diskothek zu hören.

W: Aber die Leute haben es immer auch mitgeschnitten und dann auch alleine gehört?

M; Gehe ich mal stark von aus.

F59: Es wurde viel mitgeschnitten. In den 80er Jahren fingen glaube ich die Kassetten an.

M56: Ach Quatsch, Mensch. Henry hat schon Anfang der 70er einen Kassettenrekorder gehabt. Ich habe 70 Jugendweihe gehabt und habe überlegt, ob ich mir von meinem Jugendweihe Geld einen Kassettenrekorder kaufe oder ein Kofferradio. Ich habe mich dann für ein Kofferradio entschieden.

F60: Haben viele mitgeschnitten, weil eben diese, wie Micha schon sagte, die Westmusik teilweise eben verboten war. Später haben sie dann DD-64 zugelassen.

M57: Ach, das gibt es seit 60er Jahren. Das bezieht sich auf das Deutschland-Treffen 64. Da gab es noch mal so ein Jugend-Treffen 64 zwischen ostdeutschen und westdeutschen Jugendlichen. Seitdem gibt es wahrscheinlich diese Sendungen.

W: Bis wann hat der Song ungefähr eine Rolle gespielt? Was würden Sie sagen, wann hat das wieder abgeebbt, diese Relevanz?

M58: Das kann ich jetzt gar nicht sagen. Ich vermute mal, dass es, es ist nur eine Vermutung jetzt, dass es so gewesen ist wie mit vielen Sachen, die so plötzlich so einen Hype haben, dass es auch wieder relativ schnell abebbt. Das ist meine Vermutung, ich kann es auch nicht sagen. Ich habe auch niemanden gefragt danach.



F61: Ich würde dem Zustimmung oder beipflichten. Also ich erinnere mich noch, wo wir nach 14 Tagen ausm Knast rauskamen. Manche wollten dir den Gefallen tun und haben den Song gespielt, also im privaten Umfeld. Das fand ich jetzt auch nicht so spannend. Also für mich war das dann doch erstmal ein bisschen persönlich gebrandmarkt. Das hat sich dann später einfach wieder geändert. Wie so ein Hit eben ist. Ein Jahr hat er da der vielleicht schon auf dem Buckel gehabt.

Da kommen ja wieder andere Sachen, die wichtiger geworden sind. Aber man kann schon sagen, dass es so ein Standard-Song ist.

M59: Ja, der spielt in den deutschen Beziehungen eine gewisse Rolle, denke ich mal, wie kaum andere Songs. Ich denke, bislang so. Gerade auch in der Beziehung zwischen Lindenberg und den ostdeutschen Kulturverantwortlichen. Da gab es die Konzert- und Gastspielführung, die ja verantwortlich war für die Konzerte hier. Und natürlich auch direkt zum zu Honnecker und dem Politbüro. Da gab ich auch später noch so einen Austausch von einer Schalmei und mit einer Gitarre und einer Lederjacke. Das hat dann wahrscheinlich Honecker mitgemacht, um da zu zeigen, dass er doch eigentlich liberaler oder so, aber ich denke mal das waren rein politische Gesten, die nicht groß Bedeutung hatten, außer die Wahrnehmung da ein bisschen zu glätten oder so. Aber zu der Tournee ist es auch nicht gekommen. Insofern war das auch nicht besonders hilfreich scheinbar, der Austausch von Geschenken. Aber ich denke schon, mir fällt jetzt sonst nur ein "I've been looking for freedom" oder von den Scorpions "Wind of Change". So Songs, die man in Zusammenhänge bringt und das ist bei dem Lindenberg-Song eigentlich auch so.

F62: Als Vorbereiter vielleicht.

M60: Ja, dass er vielleicht auch schon ein bisschen so ein Vorgänger von so einem Tauwetter war. Es gab ja dann auch diesen Milliarden-Kredit von Strauß und so. Es gab ja dort eine gewisse Annäherung auch in den 80er Jahren.

F63: Also ich hatte ihn ja mal dann auch persönlich getroffen, da hab ich ihm kurz die Story erzählt und er dann: hat doch auch was gebracht. Also das war eigentlich alles, was er mir dazu gesagt hat.

W: Also fanden Sie Lindenberg in seiner Haltung glaubwürdig, die er in dem Song zum Ausdruck gebracht hat? Oder war das opportunistisch irgendwie?

M61: Ach, das war Udo. Der hat doch gewusst, dass er viele Anhänger hatte in der DDR und das auch bestimmt gern aufgetreten wäre.

W: Also finden Sie, dass der Song seiner Popularität gerecht geworden ist? Also war seine Beliebtheit gerechtfertigt?

M62 & F64: Ja.

W: Und zu welchem Grad würden Sie sagen, hat Lindenberg's Tonfall, die Melodie und die Botschaften zusammengepasst?

F65: Naja, also... 110%ig.

M63: Ja, würde ich keine Abstriche machen, also 100%. Den Text von Sonderzug auf „Hänschen klein“ gesungen oder auf irgendeine andere Melodie kann ich mir nicht vorstellen.

W: Hätten sich denn jemand anders vorstellen können, der das Lied singt?

F66 & M64: Nee.

F67: Das ist schon so eingehend, wie man sagt.

M65: Naja, das kommt doch auch bei dem Original vor mit so einem Zug, mit so einem Eisenbahngeräusch. Ja, der musste das nehmen. Also, der konnte gar nicht anders nehmen.

W: Also würden Sie sagen, dass der Song eine fesselnde Wirkung hatte irgendwie auf die Menschen? Oder würden Sie das dem Song absprechen?

M66: Doch, das hat er schon gehabt. Das ist aber eine komplexe Geschichte. Das ist nicht nur ein Musik-Hit, den es fast jede Woche gibt oder jeden Monat. Es gibt große Hits, Sommerhits, Winterhits, weiß ich was. Bei dem Song ist es halt komplexer. Da spielen die aus Ost-West Verhältnisse eine Rolle. Die Beziehung zwischen Honecker und Lindenberg spielt eine Rolle. Da kommt so viel zusammen, wie eigentlich selten bei einem Song. Und natürlich die besondere Situation zwischen Ostdeutschland und Westdeutschland das gibt es ja auch nicht mehr so oft außer in Nord- und Süd-Korea

W: Und für die Menschen selber, also für ihre Hörer für ihre Gäste bei den Diskos also was kann das für die gewesen sein, was kommt dafür die dazu vom persönlichen Lebensgefühl her wo hat sie das im persönlichen Lebensgefühl getroffen.

M67: Ich denke die meisten hatten den Eindruck, dass es zu der Location passt, der nannte sich Live Club.

F68: Die gute Laune, die meisten haben ja mitgesungen Ja, so ähnliche Fragen haben wir ja schon mal ähnlich beantwortet, denke ich mal. Das war gut tanzbar. Eine kleine Provokation hat man von allen Seiten auch gespürt. Ja, und das alles zusammen war natürlich dann der Mega-Hit.

M68: Vielleicht der eine oder andere war verwundert oder vielleicht sogar auch dankbar, dass das öffentlich gespielt wurde. Kann auch sein. Weil, das klingt doch anders in so einem Club, mit einer gewissen Lautstärke, als zu Hause, wo man nicht so laut aufdrehen darf, und man sich Kopfhörer aufsetzen muss oder so.

## Focus Group 2

'G', 'Ul', 'R', 'A', 'St', 'Ur'

W: Wir wollen jetzt noch ganz kurz eine Vorstellungsrunde machen.

G1: Ja, mein Name ist 'G' und ich bin Maler und Grafiker. Wir haben da viel mit dem Pfarrer Führer und der... Naja, es war so eine verrückte Zeit. Wahnsinn. Viel unternommen, ja.

Ul1: 'Ul', ich bin Geigenlehrer. Zu dem Zeitpunkt war ich in Nordhausen. Ich war auch bei den Bausoldaten zum Beispiel, 86 bis 88 und bin echter Leipziger hier geboren. Und dann auch drei Jahre in Nordhausen gewesen an der Musikschule und seitdem auch wieder in Leipzig.

R1: Mein Name ist 'R', ich komme nicht direkt aus Leipzig, ich bin in Gröbern geboren, aber das ist im Südraum und musste dann umsiedeln nach Leipzig, wo dann meine Heimat verschwunden ist. Also ich habe da viel mit diesen verschwundenen Dörfern und so weiter zu tun. Ich unterstütze da auch den Verein, der in Wachau die Kirche unterhält. Also aber doch ein ziemlicher Leipziger, doch schon heimische Scholle.

A1: Mein Name ist 'A' und ich bin auch kein richtiger Leipziger, aber seit 1974 sind wir hergezogen. Da fühle ich mich jetzt sehr als Leipzigerin. Und zu den Zeiten, wo du uns gerne befragen möchtest, 1983, war ich mit der Lehre fertig und bin Schriftsetzer gewesen, im Bleisatz. Das war auch etwas Historisches, hat mich auch sehr ausgefüllt. Und mit der Wende war das verschwunden und jetzt bin ich Krankenschwester.

St1: Mein Name ist 'St'. Ich wohne jetzt schon immer in Holzhausen, habe dort ein Eigenheim von meinen Großeltern geerbt. 83 war ich Zimmermann. Hatte damals gerade die Messe mit gemacht. Ich bin jetzt Haustechniker im Labor.

Ur1: 'Ur', ich bin nach Leipzig zum Studium gekommen, an der damaligen Karl-Marx-Universität, heute wieder Universität Leipzig. Der Liebe wegen hier in der Gegend geblieben, habe in der Zeit, um die es uns geht, im Stadtgeschichtlichen Museum als wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin gearbeitet.

G2: Also ich war '83 zur Armee gekommen, das war eine gruselige Zeit. Ja, so. Ich hatte aber das Glück, ich bin in Leipzig gelandet und war im Alfred Frank, das war auch ein Maler gewesen. Und da ist so eine, ja, in Berlin war das Erich Weinert Ensemble, das waren die, die drei Jahre gedient haben,

und in Leipzig waren die, die anderthalb Jahre gedient haben, das Alfred-Frank-Ensemble. Also ich hatte da mit ganz vielen Musikern zu tun, von Kreuzianern, Thomaner, Jazzer, also die ganze Musikszene war dort, die nur anderthalb Jahre gedient haben und da wurden natürlich auch schon ganz schön viele politische Diskussionen geführt. Also das war schon, ja, man merkte auch immer mehr, dass es so bergab geht mit der DDR. Es gab immer wieder die 80er Jahre, also ich habe zwei Brüder, die Malermeister sind, es gab keine Farben, also überall klemmt es. Es war schon so eine bedrückende Situation und wir wollten auch immer was verändern. Also ich war zum Beispiel jemand, der... Meine Brüder sind ausgereist, ich wollte aber hierbleiben. Ich wollte eigentlich eine bessere DDR. Da hat man überlegt, was kann man machen, um die DDR besser zu machen und, und, und. Und so ein Lied wie von Udo, das hat einem ja auch irgendwie Kraft gegeben. Ich kenne noch die Zeit, da war Udo bei uns total verboten. Also 1979 durfte der nirgends gespielt werden. Da gab es in Zweenfurth eine Diskothek, da ist man mit dem Zug hingefahren und dort wurde Udo gespielt. Und der ganze Saal sang kräftig diese Lieder mit. Die mussten dann irgendwann zumachen, weil spricht sich ja rum, aber da ist die Szene von Leipzig und die spielen dort Udo, was ja verboten war an der Diskothek zu dem Zeitpunkt. Also, so ein Lied hat einem schon ganz schön Kraft gegeben. Wie Musik oder auch Malerei einen auch in solchen Situationen ganz schön Kraft geben kann.

Ul2: Ja, ich hatte 1982 ja mein Studium an der Musikhochschule, abgeschlossen als Geiger und hatte eigentlich nur die klassische Musik im Kopf und im Ohr und war auch relativ angepasst. Aber ich hatte 1983 die Einberufungsmusterung zur Armee und habe dort gesagt, dass ich zum Bausoldaten gehen will. Und ab dem Zeitpunkt hat sich mein Bild total verändert. Das war dann, da habe ich die hässliche Fratze der DDR plötzlich kennengelernt, mit "Das geht doch nicht" und "Das kannst du doch nicht machen". Der hat mich da angebrüllt und solche Sachen. Und das war für mich eine ganz schwierige Zeit. Da kam für mich eigentlich ziemlich vieles ins Rutschen. So, weil ich plötzlich Angst bekam. Kann ich meinen Beruf noch machen? Und so weiter, wurde gedroht, dass ich nicht mehr arbeiten darf als Lehrer, weil es da so Gummiparagraphen gab. Und mir hat natürlich die Musik auch Kraft gegeben, aber es war damals komischerweise ein anderes Lied. Und zwar war das von Reinhard May "Wir sind nur alle arme Würstchen" oder so. Ich weiß gar nicht mehr genau, wie das geht. Und das habe ich immer im Kopf gesungen, weil ich immer diese Typen dann erlebt habe, wie die mir mit mir gesprochen hatten. Und ich hatte ziemlich Angst und so

und war eingeschüchtert und habe das immer in meinem Kopf gesungen. Das ist also ein anderes Lied, aber was auch in dieser Zeit mir viel Kraft gegeben hat. Und natürlich war ich sehr religiös, und in der Kirche aktiv. Der Bischof hat sich für mich eingesetzt, hat das an den Kardinal gegeben und der hat dann damals mit dem alten Gysi das besprochen, in meinem Fall. Der war damals für Kirchfragen zuständig. Ja, das war damals meine Situation, eine ziemlich angstbesetzte Situation, an der Musikschule in Nordhausen meine erste Stelle und ich durfte keine Fehler machen, ich wollte unbedingt Geigenlehrer werden, aber ich war auch fest entschlossen, Bausoldat zu werden.

G3: Chapeau. Ich habe den Mut nicht gehabt, weil ich wusste, was es bedeutet, Bausoldat zu sein. Kein Ausgang oder wenig Ausgang und wie die dort arbeiten mussten. Ich habe gesagt, ich bin hier in Leipzig, ich tue das runter, die anderthalb Jahre. Aber ich ziehe wirklich einen Hut vor denen, die das gemacht haben, den Schritt. Ich war nicht so mutig, in dem Fall.

R2: Studium war schon vorbei, also meine Armeezeit also ähnlich unbedingt drei Jahre machen muss man ein bisschen ausholen aber 1970 haben die mich eingezogen und als Abiturient habe ich immer gesagt: nein ich möchte das nicht. Und dann haben sie mich an die Grenze geschickt, dort war ich dann anderthalb Jahre an der Grenze. Es war eine gute Zeit, fand ich, weil man einfach mal so ganz andere Leute kennenlernte und 1970 kann ich mich erinnern, da hat sich Willy Brandt in Erfurt mit Stoph getroffen. Und da hatte ich eine ganz, ganz tiefe Hoffnung, dass sich mal was ändert. Dass mir was vorwärtsgeht. Da ist aber nichts passiert. Und er, dann ist er mal 79, der NATO-Doppelbeschluss, und 83 dann auch noch die Stationierung der Perschings. Und da habe ich gedacht, das wird sich so verhärten. Ich habe da wirklich nicht mehr dran geglaubt. Also das war meine Empfindung so. Weil ich dachte, das ist ja eher ein Rückschritt, als dass das mal eine Einigung... Es ging ja da drum, die NATO hatte gesagt, also müsst ihr euch mal überlegen, die SS-20 aus der DDR raus und die Pershings nicht mehr in Westdeutschland. Und das ging nicht, ne? Die haben die einfach hingestellt und... Ja, und da hab ich gedacht, okay, das geht nicht vorwärts. Also es war mein Eindruck so. Und dann kam Udo mit dem Lied und da war mir klar, also der tritt nie auf bei uns. Weil da gibt es ja auch ein paar Sachen, so der Oberindianer und... Was war noch so? Der Schrat. Ja, Honny, du alter Schrat. Da war mir klar, also das waren schon ganz schöne Tiefschläge. Er durfte ja aber 1983 dann doch her. Der Egon Krenz hatte ihn eingeladen. Das war für mich wieder so eine Sache, das wurde auch übertragen im Fernsehen. Aber das waren ja alle nur die FDJler. 84 wollte er kommen und eine

Tournee machen, das wurde dann abgesagt. Vier Lieder durften er singen. Aber das war nicht dabei. Er hat ja auch gegen die Pershings einige Sachen ganz klargestellt.

A2: Was waren die Themen damals? In der Hinsicht gar nichts. Ich komme aus einem Elternhaus: meine Mutti war Lehrerin, die durfte in keinem Fall irgendwelche politischen Sachen sich erlauben. Ich bin bis 25 zu Hause gewesen und da war ich noch 83 mittendrin, da war ich 21. Also, ich bin unpolitisch. Und mich hat auch jedes Jahr jemand angequatscht, ob ich in die Partei eintreten will. Und da hatte ich immer meinen Standartsatz: ich fühle mich noch so unreif. Das haben sie immer hingenommen. Da war ich sehr zufrieden. An mehr erinnere ich mich nicht. Und auch das Lied von Udo Lindberg mit dem Sonderzug habe ich auch erst gegen Ende der DDR wahrgenommen oder überhaupt je gehört. Weil, ich hatte ja zu Hause kein Westfernsehen und auch kein Radio. Ich war also ein bisschen auf DDR-Linie. Ich war ein proletarischer Mensch.

St2: Ja, die ganze Musik, wo du rankommst, war mir so langweilig. Und da hatte ich einen Kumpel kennen gelernt. Und der ist an die ganze Westmusik mit rangekommen. Und ich habe mich damals mit meinem Onkel Antennen zusammengesetzt, dass ich ein Rias empfangen kann. Und da hatte ich dann abends, Sonntagabend um zehn immer Rhythm and Blues. Und dann und habe meine Antennen genau ausgerichtet. Und er hatte immer Kontakt zu irgendwelchen heimischen Gruppen, die haben Platten aus dem Westen rüber geschmuggelt. Da kamen 100 DDR-Mark oder 150 DDR-Mark für so eine Schallplatte. Und da durch bin ich an alle Musiker rangekommen. Und wo Lindenberg das Lied rausgebracht hatte, das war auch früh im Radio. Und da hab ich mich riesig gefreut, wie der den Nagel auf den Kopf getroffen hat. Da bin ich grinsend auf Arbeit gefahren und meine Kollegen, die haben das auch schon alle gehört. Da war ich komplett verblüfft. Ansonsten: Ich hatte meinen Hausbau, da hatte ich zu tun. Und im Urlaub, da bin ich durch Rumänien getrampt und Bulgarien und Ungarn. Da hab ich mir die Länder so angeguckt, um die Leute mal live kennenzulernen. Ich hatte da auch mal eine Gruppe, die mit mir auch rumgetrampt sind. Also ich war da nicht alleine. Und ich fand das auch toll, dass ich zum richtigen Zeitpunkt solche Leute getroffen habe.

Ur2: Wir hatten ziemliche Probleme. Mein Mann war selbstständig, und wir galten wo wir zu Hause waren, als Kapitalisten. Und die Kinder wurden als Kapitalistenkinder beschimpft. Und in der Schule war es auch ziemlich problematisch. Lindenberg-Fans war die ganze Familie, einschließlich

meines Bruders. Wir kannten alle Texte, wir kannten alle Melodien. Und wir haben natürlich immer, wenn irgendwas Neues kam, das alles reflektiert. Und in der Familie haben wir uns darüber amüsiert und fanden das toll. Aber wie gesagt, rein was das Fragen in der damaligen Zeit betraf, man muss ja sehr vorsichtig sein, mit wem man überhaupt über bestimmte Dinge gesprochen hat. Und gerade in unseren Kreisen, die Selbstständigen, bildeten wir eigentlich auch so eine Gruppe, die natürlich auch immer ganz andere Vorstellungen von der Welt hatten. Das waren alles Leute, die hart gearbeitet haben, aber vom Staat ja eigentlich doch immer klein gehalten wurden. Und ich kann mich noch erinnern, dass besonders mein Sohn viele Probleme hatte. Der sollte damals als IM angeworben werden. Und damals hat er als Jugendlicher, die Jugendlichen sind ja nach Prag gefahren, die sind nach Budapest gefahren, was ja unsere Kinder auch gemacht haben, um sich dort auch mit Westdeutschen zu treffen und einfach irgendwie natürlich das vorwegzunehmen, die späteren Einheiten. Für die war ja immer der Einheitsgedanke auch da für die Jugendlichen. Jedenfalls sind auch bis nach Bulgarien getrampt und so. Und da spielte natürlich Musik auch immer eine große Rolle. Aber damals, als mein Sohn angeworben werden sollte und er nein gesagt hat, hat man ihm gedroht von der Staatssicherheit: man würde ihn das spüren lassen, man würde ihn erst mit über 20 zur Armee holen und er ist dann auch so gekommen, er war schon 23, 24 damals und er hatte wirklich das ausbaden müssen, dass er nein gesagt hatte. Und ich habe damals an den Kommandanten geschrieben, weil ich mir wahnsinnige Sorgen um meinen Sohn gemacht habe, weil ich gefürchtet habe, der wird sich das Leben nehmen. Die haben ihn dermaßen schikaniert. Und damals hatte ich aber das große Glück, dass es ein verständnisvoller Vorgesetzter war, der mir zurückgeschrieben hat, machen Sie sich keine Sorgen. Ich kümmere mich darum. Das geht nicht, dass man mit ihrem Sohn so umspringt. Er hatte sich auch an der Humboldt-Universität beworben. Natürlich war auch keine Chance. Er hätte sich nicht drei Jahre verpflichtet konnte sich einen Studienplatz abschminken. Das war auch der Fall. Wie gesagt, hat er dann später mal nach der Wende versucht, an der Uni noch mal Fuß zu fassen. Aber dann als selbstständiger Karriere gemacht. Zum Glück bis heute hat das alles funktioniert. Aber zur DDR-Zeiten null Chance. Mit den langen Haaren, die ja damals auch in der DDR obligat waren, was ja alles aus dem Westen rüber schwappte, war natürlich keine Chance, irgendwo eine Arbeit zu finden. Also wir haben da schon sehr viel durchmachen müssen, weil wir immer natürlich das entgelten mussten, dass eine andere Meinung herrschte. Und auch im Museum wusste man ganz genau, mit wem kann man offen sprechen und wo hält man sich eher zurück.



Also es war eine Situation der Unfreiheit, unter der man irgendwie doch relativ stark gelitten hat. Das war für mich eigentlich auch einer der wichtigen Faktoren damals, als es zur Einheit Deutschlands kam, dass man gesagt hat, die Unfreiheit, nicht unbedingt so sehr die Reisefreiheit, aber die Unfreiheit war doch irgendwie für mich das gravierende Moment. Wir haben natürlich uns mit vielen Freunden getroffen und haben diskutiert in Runden, damals auch als die Biermann-Affäre war, wie man ausgebürgert wurde. Wir haben das alles reflektiert, auch die Situation der Schriftsteller in der DDR, weil ich da immer sehr interessiert schon war an dem Thema. Das hat mich natürlich immer schon beschäftigt. Ich hätte damals auch keine Zeile geschrieben, ich würde mich jetzt nicht besser machen als ich bin. Natürlich bin ich kritisch gewesen zu DDR-Zeiten, habe mich auch im Museum unbeliebt gemacht, besonders bei einem Parteisekretär. Aber ich bin immer davon ausgegangen, dass ich doch in diesem Staat natürlich gelebt habe, sozialisiert worden bin, und mich nicht besser machen will, als ich bin. Ich meine, ich habe natürlich versucht, auf meiner Ebene bestimmte Dinge anzusprechen, aber ich denke mir, es gab nicht so eine Oppositionshaltung, dass man eben die eigene Familie gefährdet hätte. Und Lindenberg, wie gesagt, war für uns irgendwie, das war so die ganze Sprache, die ganze Art des Umgangs, auch irgendwie die Staatsführung quasi so in gewisser Weise auch zu verunglimpfen, aber damals durch die Hintertür wieder reinzukommen und zu sagen, "Honey, du bist doch eigentlich ein ganz guter Typ, nehmen wir es nicht übel, ich bin eben so, wie ich bin." Nicht umsonst wurde er damals ja als mittelmäßiger Sänger bezeichnet. Oder die Stasi-Akten, die hat man ja auch mal gelesen, die Lindenberg zugesprochen worden sind und wir dann auch schließlich lesen konnten. Das war schon für ihn eine ganz merkwürdige Situation. Er war ja sich bewusst, dass er in der DDR sehr beliebt war und wollte natürlich auch unbedingt hier auftreten. Also wir fanden ihn toll und finden es eigentlich auch noch immer interessant, dass er ja heute immer noch einen Status hat und als Künstler immer noch up to date ist.

W: Können Sie sich daran erinnern, ob es bestimmte Haltungen gegenüber dem Staat gab, die Menschen in Gruppen aufgeteilt haben? Also wissen Sie, was ich meine? Dass es so Haltungen in der Gesellschaft gab, die Sie von anderen Leuten unterschieden haben, also sehr stark? Dass man wirklich von so einer Gruppenbildung in der DDR sprechen konnte? Oder war das eigentlich eher unmerklich im Alltag, dass es eigentlich eine große Masse von Menschen gewesen ist?

G4: Das gab es schon, so eine Gruppenbildung. Zum Beispiel, ich bin jetzt in keiner Kirche und ich habe dann aber so mitgekriegt, dass es in diesen Kirchengruppen da eine ganz schön intensive Bewegung gibt. Man hat ja auch die Nachrichten geguckt und die Studenten in den 80ern, die waren, fand ich, sehr unpolitisch. Die hatten einfach Angst gehabt, also viele, nicht alle jetzt, ihren Studienplatz zu verlieren. Denn die ersten Montagsdemos, die gingen ja auch nicht von Studenten aus. Und die HGB, die Maler, die haben geschwiegen und, und, und. Und ich war immer jemand, ich war natürlich mit vielen Musikern zusammen, also auch die Renfleute, der Cäsar und so. Man musste ja auch aufpassen, wem man was erzählt. Es gab Leute, da hat man Vertrauen gehabt. Hinterher kam auch raus, dass der Cäsar bei der Stasi war. Das hat man damals auch nicht gewusst, aber der hat nun keinen verraten. Da gab es ja solche, die Leute wirklich jeden Tag alles aufgeschrieben haben. Und dann gab es welche, die sind eingetreten, weil die teilweise erpresst worden sind oder oder. Und haben aber nichts berichtet. Und dann hatte ich das Glück, ich bin in ein Haus gezogen. Und das war, sag ich mal, kirchlich besetzt. Und die hatten auch, warum auch immer, absolutes Vertrauen gleich zu mir. Und da merkte ich, so zufällig bin ich jetzt in eine Gruppe reingeraten, hier passiert was. Da gab es die Aktion "Eine Mark für Espenhein" und da wurden Plakate gemacht und Demos. Und da fingen dann die Montagsdemos an. Der Pfarrer Führer verkehrte dort und wir waren dann auch so die letzten Wähler, wir haben die Wahllokale besetzt. Da war ich froh eigentlich, dass ich dann in so eine Gruppe reingeraten bin, die natürlich auch erstmal Vertrauen hatten. Dann dachte ich mir, wenn jetzt einer von uns verhaftet wird, wen verdächtigen die? Da habe ich mich schon geärgert, dass die mich so ins Vertrauen gezogen hatten, weil ich bin in das Haus neu eingezogen. Ich war plötzlich in dieser Gruppe neu drin und jetzt dachte ich, jetzt wird einer verhaftet. Aber da denken die dann nicht, der hier, der schon 20 Jahre bei uns mit in der Kirche ist, von klein auf, nein, das ist der, den hat die Stasi da hinziehen lassen und der soll dort... Da habe ich immer gedacht, hoffentlich wird keiner verhaftet. Weil das so alles, mit dem bin ich heute noch allen befreundet, so ein ganz toller Kreis war. Und da wird natürlich Themen diskutiert, man wusste auch, Telefon wird abgehört und das waren immer so Sachen. Oder dann hat man sich angeguckt, oder auch in Gaststätten war das so, wenn man dann ein Fremder plötzlich kam. Und da macht der einen politischen Witz oder gab eine Runde aus, da hat man sich so angeguckt oder unerm Tisch so mit dem Fuß. Sofort ein anderes Thema, weil es war wirklich so. Das wussten die ja auch und damit haben die auch Angst gemacht. Das war ja so eine typische Stasi-Geschichte. Wir sind dort, wo wir von der Demo kamen, Eine Mark für

Espenhain, da standen die offiziell da mit ihren Fotoapparaten und haben uns nicht heimlich fotografiert, sondern bewusst fotografiert, um zu zeigen, wie wir wissen, wer ihr seid. Man hat ja untereinander nie so richtig gewusst, ist da jetzt oder es passierte irgendwas. "Scheiße, hat der mich jetzt..." Und wenn man dann seine eigenen Stasi-Akten mal liest, dann sagt man "Oh, an den hab ich jetzt nicht gedacht." Es konnte aber nur anhand der Geschichte, konnte das ja nur der und der sein, wo ich sage "Ey, boah." Aber das war auch so, denen ihre Masche gezielt auch Angst zu verbreiten. Da war vielleicht auch gar keiner an dem Tag in der Gaststätte am Tisch. Der wollte wirklich bloß, der kam neu, da war in der Gegend, der wollte Bier trinken und wollte einfach mal einen Witz erzählen und hatten eine Runde Bier als Dankeschön und alle dachten, "kein Wort mehr, der ist garantiert von der Stasi." Das war auch so, eben die Masche, solche Geschichten zu machen, Angst zu verbreiten.

Ul3: Also Gruppenbildung in dem Sinn habe ich nicht erlebt. Also eigentlich muss ich sagen, alle sind mehr oder weniger mitgeschwommen. Jeder hatte die Schere im Kopf, wusste, wann er was zu sagen hat und wann er nichts zu sagen hat. Man war irgendwie oppositionell im Großen und Ganzen eingestellt, hat gemeckert und fand es irgendwie doof. Aber so richtig dagegen habe ich eigentlich nicht erlebt. Und das war wirklich schon erstaunlich. Erst bei dem Zeitpunkt, wo ich gesagt habe, ich will zu den Bausoldaten und ich wahnsinnige Druck bekommen habe, habe ich dann Leute kennengelernt, die anders waren. Aber das waren sehr wenige, muss ich sagen. Zum Beispiel in meiner Gemeinde hier, in der Propstei-Gemeinde, der Wolfgang Tiefensee, der war damals schon bei den Bausoldaten gewesen.

G5: Der gehörte er ja auch zu unserer Gruppe damals.

Ul4: Aber das waren wirklich wenige Menschen. Und ich muss sagen, bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt bin ich auch mitgeschwommen. Ich habe zwar auch genörgelt, ich habe Westfernsehen geguckt und Westmusik gehört und alles. Aber in dem Sinne, da wo man jetzt, ich war auch relativ naiv, zum Beispiel dieser Passus mit den Bausoldaten, den gab es halt, das wusste ich. Und da dachte ich, na ok, da beruf ich mich auf den, ich mach das jetzt einfach mal. Aber dann zu merken, was das für Konsequenzen hatte, das war mir in dem Moment nicht klar. Und das habe ich danach dann erst kennengelernt im eigenen Erfahren. Aber ich hatte nicht so wahnsinnig viele... Die haben dann immer gesagt, ey Uli, komm sei vorsichtig, zieh das notfalls zurück und mach keinen Stress. Also, ja, so hab ich das wahrgenommen.

G6: Ja, mit den Bausoldaten, da ich ja nicht in der Kirche war, man konnte ja, wenn man in der Kirche war, sagen, mein Glaube verbietet mir das. Ich jetzt als Atheist hätte das nicht sagen können. Das war auch so, die Kirchensachen, ich war nun in keiner Kirchengemeinde drin gewesen. Ich als Außenstehender, das war immer so, wo ich auch manchmal dachte, oh, die gewinnen.

Ul5: Also ich war nicht direkt gegen den Staat, muss ich sagen. Ich fand das eigentlich ganz okay. Ich fand die Ideen des Staates auch ganz okay. Ich fand Kapitalismus eigentlich scheiße mit Profitmaximierung und alles. Ja, ich fand das eigentlich, die Idee fand ich schon ganz gut. Und hatte auch immer gehofft, dass ich das vielleicht mal so, dass ich mal ein bisschen lockerer werde oder so. Aber ich war jetzt nicht direkt gegen den Staat. Aber ich war eben sehr gläubig und bin dadurch total angeeckt. Und habe gemerkt, wenn man irgendeine Grenze überschreitet, dann wird es nicht mehr lustig. Dann sind die wirklich ganz böse.

G7: Unter dem Motto "Willst du nicht mein Bruder sein, . . . ?"

Ul6: Das war ganz komisch. Ich war sogar in der 7. Klasse noch FDJ-Sekretär. Das ist jetzt für mich nicht mehr nachvollziehbar. Aber ich bin immer ganz gut mitgeschwommen. Und ich muss auch sagen, wenn Leute von früher reden, die verklären das ja manchmal so. Ich kann mir das vorstellen, die haben sich in dem Mief halt eingerichtet. Und es gab sehr wenige wahrscheinlich, kleine Gruppen wahrscheinlich.

R3: Wie gesagt, mein Studium habe ich 1976 dann schon abgeschlossen und war dann in Leipzig in der Gruppe junger Ingenieure. Und ein Teil von diesen jungen Ingenieuren, die waren auch in der Partei. Wir haben uns aber außerhalb von Betrieb und Partei und Gewerkschaften immer mal getroffen. Also ich sag mal wirklich Biertisch. Wir haben uns wirklich prächtig verstanden. Und wir haben irgendwie den Glauben gehabt, es muss sich was ändern. Und wenn sich nichts ändert von oben, dann machen wir das von unten. Und ich bin dann '86 in die Partei eingetreten, weil wir, ich sag mal, drei gute Freunde da hatten. Der eine war sogar so APO-Sekretär. Wir wollten von unten, den sogenannten dritten Weg. Das war so unsere Idee. Die Grundidee, wie du es auch schon gesagt hast, ist ja nicht verkehrt, aber es muss sich was ändern. Also dieses Statische und dieses hammermäßig Alte, was uns dann so vorsteht, das müssen wir aufbrechen. Das war unsere Idee und das haben wir auch verfolgt. Wir haben auch im CEG, das war damals mein Arbeitgeber, auch ganz schön Stimmung gemacht. In der Parteiversammlung, da sind wir aufgetreten und sagten, nee, das machen wir

nicht. Wir sehen das ganz, ganz anders. Also man hat echt auch mal einen Widerspruch gezeigt. Das war also mein Ansatz, es muss sich was ändern. Ich bin auch kirchlich erzogen, aber das war damals nicht so meine Plattform, sondern die jungen Ingenieure, wir waren alle gut gebildet, waren teilweise auch promoviert und da gab es so eine geistige Ebene, wo man gesagt hat, wir müssen doch mal aus der Enge raus. Dieses immer so im Kopf, das Enge, das hat mich auch unheimlich gestört. Nicht mal das Reisen oder wenig Geld haben als Ingenieur, das war gar nicht mal so das Thema. Aber diese Bevormundung, dieses so eng machen, das hat mir gar nicht gefallen. Du bist ausgerissen, bist in der weiten Welt marschiert, die damals offenstand. Aber es war ja trotzdem eng.

St3: Ich hab ja nichts vermisst. Weil es keine Bananen gibt, da sage ich jetzt nicht, jetzt geht es mir aber schlecht. Du hattest Dein Essen, das wurde natürlich später immer schlimmer. Da konntest du nur noch so viel kaufen, dass du davon dein Leben fristen konntest: Leberwurst und Bier und Brot. Aber das habe ich alles nicht vermisst. Ich hatte auch einige Freunde, aber da war auch nirgendwo was mit Stasi. Hier mit Aufbruch und wir müssen was ändern. Das war ja auch ein bisschen das Problem der Bildung. Man muss ja erstmal an Wissen rankommen, um zu denken, ich kanns verändern. Gemerkt habe ich es erstmal doch richtig, wo ich bei der Armee war.

R4: Aber wart ihr nicht auch irgendwo eine Gemeinschaft irgendwo in der Firma oder Betrieb?

St4: Nein, in der Firma nicht. Das war eine ganz kleine Tischlerei.

R5: Unter den Bauleuten, da gab es ja bestimmt auch ein paar APO-Leute.

St5: Ja, aber die sind nie aufgetreten. Die haben zwar mal was mit FDJ versucht oder so, aber den Versuch haben die dann schnell wieder aufgegeben.

R6: Das war bei uns doch ziemlich massiv. Es waren immer nur alte Leute und das hat uns ziemlich gestört. Dann hat einer den Mut, muss ich sagen, ein Abteilungsleiter. Und der hat uns ja mitgezogen und hat gesagt, okay, das versuchen wir halt. Ja, dann kam aber 1989 der Wende, da waren andere schneller.

St6: Was mir immer leidgetan hat, ich war ja nur hier mit dem Bau sehr verwandt, weil mich das immer fasziniert hat, wenn man durch Leipzig gefahren ist die alten Häuser, wie die hier verfallen sind. Und da habe ich mir auch noch gesagt, wenn wir das Erbe unserer Väter nicht bewahren können,

dann ist es eng. Du hast die Zustände der Gesellschaft an den Häusern immer gesehen.

W: Wir müssen im Thema noch mal weitergehen, weil wir ein bisschen mit der Zeit aufpassen müssen. Wann hast du das erste Mal von Udo Lindenberg gehört?

A3: Da war ich 14 Jahre alt. Es geht aber nicht um dieses Lied. Alle anderen Lieder habe ich von ihm gekannt. Alle anderen. Von einer Freundin von mir, der Cousin hatte alle möglichen Kassetten. Mit dem haben wir uns dann ständig getroffen. Ja, aber wie gesagt, bei dir ging es ja um das Thema 83 und dieses Lied mit Sonderzug, den kannte ich dann erst zur Wende. Die Zeit war ja dann vorbei, dass man sich mit diesen Udo Lindenberg Dealern getroffen hat. W: Aber Sie kannten das Lied schon 1983?

Ur3: Ja. Mein Mann war damals im Krankenhaus und wir haben ihn besucht. Es war ein ziemlich großer Männerschlafsaal und alle kannten das und es wurde ständig rauf und runter gespielt. Wir haben es natürlich sofort aufgenommen und es war eine unwahrscheinliche Atmosphäre, weil jeder sich dafür begeistert hat.

W: Und wie glaubwürdig fanden sie das Lied?

Ur4: Also Udo haben wir immer jedes Wort geglaubt. Natürlich war Udo immer ein Schnitzohr, aber andererseits war das auch ein sehr politischer Mensch. Also wenn man sich jetzt im Nachhinein diesen Film anschaut, der ja gedreht wurde von diesem Konzert, und im Umfeld des Konzertes. Und dass er dort natürlich auch sehr raffinierter Weise gesagt hat, es soll kein Krieg von deutschem Boden ausgehen, wo ja sogar die FDJler dann alle geklatscht haben. Und er natürlich auch sowohl die Pershings als auch die SS20 genannt hat. Was natürlich wirklich sehr überlegt und toll war, dass er in dem Moment auch die richtige Sprache gefunden hat. Also ich fand Udo Lindenberg eigentlich immer großartig, weil er Themen angesprochen hat. Er hat ja sowohl die Verlierer der Gesellschaft als auch die Außenseiter immer thematisiert. Und dann kommt er eben plötzlich, er will unbedingt in die DDR, weil er hier eine große Fangemeinde hat. Das war einfach klar. Er hat sicher viele Informationen bekommen, die auch immer durchgedrungen sind. Ich fand das toll, dass er immer darauf bestanden hat, in der DDR aufzutreten. Dass er das immer wieder thematisiert hat und immer wieder versucht hat, in dem er ja dann später auch diesen Brief, den er ja nicht selber geschrieben hat, aber der ja Honecker erreicht, wo angeblich dann Krenz die Aufgabe von Honecker kriegt, das mal zu prüfen. Also ich finde,

das war schon alles toll eingefädelt. Und dass es immer die richtigen Leute gab, die ihn dabei auch unterstützt haben. Also sowohl die Musikmanager im Westen als auch im Osten. Also der hatte immer eine Fangemeinde gehabt. Ich meine, wenn man sich überlegt, in dem Film, der ja dann gezeigt wurde, nach dem Konzert, wie die Leute dann auch in Berlin, leider waren wir ja dann nicht dabei, nach ihm gerufen haben. Im Konzerthaus, im Konzertsaal selber, saßen ja die FDJ-Leute, die alle vorher instruiert worden sind, wie sie da zu erscheinen haben und den welcher Aufmachung und nicht unbedingt seine Fans, die mussten ja draußen bleiben. Und das war ja toll, dass die Leute tatsächlich nach ihm verlangt haben und dass er sich dann tatsächlich auf seinen Fans zeigt. Und ich finde es auch raffinierter, dass natürlich ausgeschlachtet wurde. Belafonte war ja auch zu diesem Konzert geladen. Und dass das so raffinierter Weise doch irgendwie zusammengebracht wurde. Belafonte sollte sich aber nicht irgendwie als zweites Rad am Wagen fühlen. Eigentlich war er ja der wichtigste Mann mit seiner Friedensbewegtheit. Und Lindenberg, der sich aber auch, muss man jetzt mal sagen, in Anführungsstrichen "Friedensapostel" oder "Friedensbewegt" gezeigt hat, Was ja durchaus auch ernst zu nehmen ist. Aber das wurde natürlich in der DDR wiederum honoriert, dass man gesagt hat, jetzt können wir den doch eigentlich mal zu dem Konzert einladen. Es geht ja um den Weltfrieden. Und da wollte natürlich niemand abseitsstehen. Und das war ja dann auch wieder sehr raffiniert eingefädelt, denke ich mal. In gewisser Weise hat man ihn natürlich auch wiederum missbraucht, muss man sagen, als Star, um zu zeigen, wir sind weltoffen, wir wollen so einen Künstler, der ja eigentlich uns widerstrebt, aber wir wollen den doch hier haben, um zu zeigen, dass wir weltoffen sind und mit ihm gut auskommen können und so. Und das aushalten, dass er eben so beliebt ist. Um das wieder zu brechen, indem man eben Leute rekrutiert, die im Grunde genommen ja gar keine Fans waren, vielleicht im Stillen des Herzens dieser oder jener, aber eigentlich waren ja die richtigen Fans draußen, die unbedingt ihren Udo sehen wollten. Was man ja auch wieder verstehen kann. Er war unglaublich beliebt. Wenn man so den Udo Lindenberg von damals so vor Augen hat. Damals hat er ja noch sein lockeres Haupthaar gehabt, immer schon seine lässige Sprache, seine ganze Art des Auftritts. Er hat sich ja damals auch so immer mokiert, er soll eine Gummihose angehabt haben. Also Gummi, die haben wohl nicht richtig geguckt, es war ja eine Lederhose, die ich anhatte. So was habe ich ja vielleicht nicht nötig. Also er war schon ein Star im Westen und im Osten auch. Und das war natürlich eine tolle Geschichte, denn man hatte ja quasi schon vorweggenommen einen gesamtdeutschen Star hier im Osten gehabt.

W: Welche Gedanken, Gefühle, Hoffnungen, Erwartungen haben Sie mit der Person und der Musik von Udo Lindenberg verbunden?

G8: Naja, weil ich schon immer auch ein Mensch war, der auch an die Kraft der Musik geglaubt hat. Es gab ja auch ein „Mädchen aus Ostberlin“ schon vorher und er hat ja schon ganz viel da in die Richtung, und immer wieder, was sie eben auch gerade sagten, in Radiointerviews, im Fernsehen gesagt, er kämpft dafür und dass es auch mal hier eine gemeinsame Sache gibt. Naja, wie gesagt, diese Kraft der Musik, der Bilder, der Schrift, da glaubt man dran, dass das auch was verändern kann. Mittlerweile bin ich zwar nicht mal ganz der Überzeugung, dass Musik oder Bilder was verändern können, aber die können Kraft geben, Menschen, Hoffnung geben. Und das ist aber auch ganz wichtig. Also die Hoffnung, dass es eben . . . Ich bin zum Beispiel jemand der nicht so sich in Worte fassen kann, was der Schriftsteller kann, Hermann Hesse oder keine Ahnung, also ich kann das nicht. Da bin ich froh, dass es Menschen gibt, die das können. Aber das ist die eine Seite, aber die andere Seite, ich möchte manchmal gerne was schreiben und das liegt mir nicht. Und da bin ich froh, dass es Menschen gibt, die meine Sprache sprechen, sag mal wie auch der Konstantin Wecker oder so. Das ist jetzt, genau so würde ich es ausdrücken, wenn ich die Worte gefunden hätte. Da ist man froh und dann kriege ich immer gleich Gänsehaut. Ja, das ist wirklich, dass es Menschen gibt, die das eben können und einem den Mut geben, dass eine Kraft in den Menschen ist, dass sich was verändert. Auch gerade in der heutigen Situation. Wir haben zwar, uns geht es immer noch sehr gut, aber es sind überall Ängste da und wir wissen alle nicht, was noch passiert und kommt, und trotzdem gibt es da Leute, die einem Mut machen.

W: Würden Sie Udo Lindenberg da einordnen?

G9: Ja, natürlich. Gerade in dieser Zeit, das war einer der ersten. Drüben war ja das Deutschsprachige gar nicht so in der Rockmusik. Bei uns war das anders, weil das brauchte und es sind tolle Sachen entstanden, weil ja vieles versteckt worden ist in den Liedern. Ich staune ja immer wieder, dass zwischen Liebe und Zorn von Renft durchgegangen ist, wenn man sich den Text heute noch mal anguckt: „Wer im Hintern zu schwer, im Kopfe zu bequem ist und hängt dann noch unsere Fahne raus, sagt, ist das Betrug?“ Also das sind so Texte, wo man sagt, und im Westen, da war Udo ja der erste, heute sagt man zwar, der war der erste, der hat deutschsprachige Rockmusik gemacht, das stimmt nicht, weil die gab es ja bei uns schon, aber vom Westen her war er der erste, so und der hatte eben ganz verrückte Themen, Andrea Doria, da haben wir auf dem Tisch getanzt, sag ich mal, nach



solchen Liedern. Also das war schon, ja, im Westen auch viel bewegt, wo der aus einer ganz anderen Richtung kam. Der war ja Schlagzeuger gewesen bei Doldinger. Und wenn man heute diesen Tatort Vorspann hört, das ist Udo, der da am Schlagzeug sitzt. Das wissen die wenigsten, dass er ein guter Drummer war. Und dass der dann in diese Richtung gegangen ist und die deutsche Sprache da auch im Westen, Und dann auch für uns, diese Lockerheit, diese Sprache, die bei uns in der Rockmusik anders war. Ich rede jetzt nicht von Schlagern, das war wieder was anderes. Aber bei uns musste alles versteckt werden. Und Udo hatte schon seine nuscheligen Art, die Mütze hoch und runter. Wie gesagt, ich durfte ihn ja mal selber kennenlernen. Udo ist, wie er ist. Die Nina Hagen, die da war, die hat für mich... tut mir leid. Also die hat nur geschauspielert und immer mit ihrer... Die hat eine Tasche gehabt und mit ihrer rosa Kuh gesprochen. Ich sage, ja, ist gut, langsam.

Ul7: Aber es ist schon komisch, dass er so glaubwürdig wirkt. Das war bei mir auch so. Man nimmt ihm das ab. Normalerweise... Künstlern im Westen habe ich das nicht abgenommen, weil ich dachte, das geht viel um Profit und so. Aber dem Lindenberg hat man das irgendwie abgenommen. Vielleicht, weil er auch ein bisschen so sozialismusaffin war. In irgendeiner Schwingung war der schon. Das ging mir auch so bei Konstantin Wecker später noch viel stärker. Wenn ich an Willi denke, wo man dann wirklich auch...

G10: Was er ja immer aktualisiert.

Ul8: Wir sind ja bei Udo. Da muss ich noch eine Geschichte erzählen. Ich hatte es ja von Reinhard Mey mal erzählt. Solche Leute können einem Kraft geben. Ich habe ihm das auch geglaubt. Wir hatten ja einen Bausoldaten, ich war im Prora. Und wir haben dort immer in diesem Bau gelebt und haben aufs Meer geguckt. Und damals war der Lindenberg Hit, ich war 86 bis 88 dort, ich habe es ja schon gesagt, "Hinterm Horizont geht's weiter". Und das war für uns so, das kann ich auch nicht beschreiben, das war so unser Hymne dort. Die war immer präsent und da haben wir immer auf das Meer geguckt und haben gesagt, Leute, irgendwann wir kommen ja raus und so und das hat einem Kraft gegeben und wirklich, jetzt wo ich darüber nachdenke, ja ich habe ihm das auch abgenommen. Alles, was er gesungen hat, das war irgendwie ein ehrlicher Typ, so. Ja und diese fluffige Art und so, das war cool, das war gut.

Ur5: Und wenn man sich überlegt, im Grunde genommen war es ja so, die Partei und Staatsführung stand ja immer über allem, nicht umsonst hieß es: die Partei hat immer Recht.

R7: Immer. Immer.

Ur6: Und dadurch durften dann die Herrschaften in keinem politischen Witz auftauchen. Ich meine, wenn jetzt unter der Hand Witze erzählt wurden, aber es gab die Karikaturistenszene, hat ja dann erst nach der Wende auch in Leipzig angefangen, diese Themen aufs Papier zu bringen. Im Grunde genommen gab es keine Karikatur zu der Partei- und Staatsführung. Und hier wurde plötzlich der Staatsratsvorsitzende, der ja quasi über uns allen stand, so quasi, na ja, auf "Du und Du" angesprochen. "Ja, Honni, du hast doch, du gehst auch aufs Klo und hörst Westradio und die Lederjacke ziehst du doch eigentlich auch an." Also dadurch macht sich Herr Lindenberg mit ihm gemein, stellt sich mit ihm auf eine Stufe und will auch eine persönliche Beziehung herstellen. Ich finde, das ist eine ganz interessante Geschichte, weil man sich mit diesem Thema von Staats wegen sehr beschäftigt hat. Man muss sich überlegen, eigentlich geht das nicht. Das ist ja ein Sakrileg, den Honecker hier zu verunglimpfen und den hier quasi aufs Klo mit Westradio und so. Was ja in der DDR, für uns war das Gang und Gäbe. Ich war ein paar Mal im Internat. Wir haben ständig Westradio gehört. Da lag unsere Internatsleiterin immer an der Tür und dann, wenn die die aufgerissen hat, haben wir natürlich so getan, dass sind wir die Unschuldslämmer vom Dienst. Das war einfach so üblich, denn man hat sich ja immer das Neueste reingezogen. Aber in der Geschichte hier, was Lindenberg hier fertiggebracht hat, dieses Thema auch am Kochen zu halten. Und das wurde ja dann fortgesetzt. Es gibt ja dann wirklich eine Begegnung zwischen den beiden. Als Honecker ins Saarland fährt, wo es sich ja betont volkstümlich gibt. Bei Lafontaine und so, auch ein alter Sozialist, haben sie wahrscheinlich dann ihre gemeinsame Meinung ausgetauscht.

R8: Und auch Gitarre. Der Erich hat auch eine Gitarre gekriegt. Gitarren statt Knarren.

Ur7: Genau. Und dann hat Honecker ja vorher schon ihm die Schalmee geschickt.

R9: Ja, der war selber mal Spieler.

Ur8: Genau, der war selber mal Spieler. Und hat eben ihm dann eine Schalmee. Also gibt es quasi wie auf gleichberechneter Basis einen Austausch von Musikinstrument des jeweiligen Partners. Wenn man sich das überlegt. Die Geschichte wird dann relativ unverkrampft. Aber das kann natürlich auch Politik gewesen sein, wenn man wollte sich einfach den Anschein geben, dass man doch relativ jovial ist von Seiten der DDR, dass man damit gut

kann. Das war ja wieder auf die Jugend gemünzt, die wahrscheinlich dadurch auch irgendwie das Signal bekommen sollte, "Guck doch mal, wir können auch."

G11: Naja, die konnten ja auch den Udo nicht, nichts anhaben. Wenn das jetzt ein DDR-Künstler gewesen wäre, wäre es was anderes gewesen.

Ur9: Aber er durfte dann ja nicht auf die Tour gehen.

G12: Ja, aber das war einfach von Anfang an klar. Ja, aber mir war klar, dass das nie stattfinden wird. Den kannst du nicht einfach spielen lassen und der hätte dann noch seine Meinung gesagt. Und dann wären dort 10 oder 100.000... Das hätte der Staatsapparat nicht unter Kontrolle kriegen können. Also das war mir klar, dass das nicht stattfindet. Und da war ich auch nicht überrascht, als die dann ausgefallen ist. Aber das war eben so von unserem Apparat: was wollten die machen? Wenn man jetzt mal sich in die Situation versetzt. Das war ein Angriff auf Honecker, wie sie schon sagten, den haben sie auf eine Ebene gebracht und die konnten den aber ja nichts anhaben und jetzt total dagegen irgendwie, ja was blieb denn, das war ja lustig gemacht, das war ja auch so, also blieb denen ja, da haben die wahrscheinlich sehr lange überlegt, was können wir jetzt tun, damit wir so ein bisschen aus dem Schneider kommen, wir schenken dem die Schalmel, da wird der Honecker nicht selber draufgekommen sein.

St7: Das war witzig. Also ich habe mich noch mal den Hut vor denen gezogen. Er konnte auch mal über seinen Schatten springen. Nicht einfach so dumm sein und blöde Sau sagen, so ungefähr, sondern ein gleiches Mal mit gleichem zu beantworten.

W: Was war denn für Sie so die Hauptbotschaft des Liedes?

St8: Oh... Naja, ich fand's erst einmal sehr humorvoll, dass er auch mal so darüber nachgedacht und erstaunlich, wie er ihn so von hinten umgriffen hat. Da dachten wir, wie werden sie denn jetzt reagieren? Jetzt wird es spannend. Und die Hälfte hat man ja dann mitgekriegt. Ich habe den Rest erst später mitgekriegt.

W: Was war für Sie die Hauptbotschaft?

Ul9: Die Hauptbotschaft war eigentlich gar nicht so der Text, sondern eben auch die Komposition, die ja nicht von ihm ist, also auch die Melodie, wo man sich so . . . (singt die Melodie). Also schon diese Leichtigkeit der Musik, ja. Ich habe natürlich als Musiker vordergründig immer Musik gehört und jetzt nicht vordergründig Texte. Und ich muss sagen, schon diese Musik,

die so populär und so eine Leichtigkeit hat, und dann macht man sich über so einen Diktator lustig, das ist irgendwie einfach was Cooles, ne, das ist total cool. Und das schleppt man natürlich im Kopf auch mit rum. (Singt die Melodie von Chattanooga Chu Chu) Das ist natürlich sehr schön, das macht den Alltag auch irgendwie entschwert.

G13: Ja und man kannte ja die Melodie, ne? Ja, ja, ja. War ja schon da. War es einfacher noch diese Botschaft rüberzubringen über die Melodie und dann noch dieser tolle Text dazu.

U10: Ja, ja. Und das ist eben in so einer, wenn so viel schwer in dem Land ist und das wurde ja dann '89 ganz schlimm. Ich kann mich noch entsinnen an den Sommer, der war so grauenvoll, so beschwert, die Leute verschwanden alle und es gab keinen Aufbruch und so. Und das war '83 noch nicht so, aber es war eben auch immer so eine düstere Stimmung. Die Gebäude schon, wenn man das gesehen hat, alles so grau, dreckig und miesig, irgendwie man hatte sich so eingerichtet. Und dann aber so was Fröhliches und dann noch über einen, den man auch blöd fand, noch so ein lustiger Text. Das war einfach, das hat den Alltag aufgehellt.

G14: '83 war auch noch dieses Sportfest in Leipzig, fällt mir gerade ein. Da haben die da noch versucht, hier so dieses, das war ja immer alle paar Jahre, dann waren mal jahrelang ruhe, da hatten sie wahrscheinlich kein Geld gehabt und dann machten die ja '83 wieder diese große Sportschau hier in Leipzig. Und da war ich gerade bei der Armee.

R10: Mein Eindruck war gar nicht so politisch, muss ich sagen. Aber diese absolute Leichtigkeit, wie der das so prägnant, vier Worte, also eine Strophe oder maximal fünf, und da war eine Botschaft drin. Da konnte man etwas damit anfangen. Ich habe das gar nicht mal so superpolitisch gesehen, aber diese Lockerheit und Leichtigkeit und Flapsigkeit. Wie man es eben auch sagen kann, das hat mich so fasziniert, wo ich sage, Mensch, man, der hat sich so eine Waffel gemacht, das hat mich so fasziniert, wo ich sagen muss: Mensch, der hat sich so eine Waffel gemacht, das so zu verpacken. Das hat man bei Renft nicht gleich so rausgehört. Das war wesentlich verschlossener.

U11: Darf ich da mal einhaken? Man stelle sich das Lied jetzt mit einer anderen Musik vor, mit einer viel ernsteren Musik, das hätte eine ganz andere Wirkung. Und wäre vielleicht auch viel schwieriger. Aber gerade diese Kombination mit dieser Leichtigkeit, das macht es cool.

R11: Genau, dieses crazy-hafte, das durften wir noch nicht sein. Mal die Sau rauslassen, das ging ja alle wirklich maximal in der Badewanne und so.

Ur10: Die Sau sollte schon rausgelassen werden. Zu den Brigadefeiern sollte die sozialistische Sau sollte rausgelassen werden.

R12: Ja, aber da gab es auch noch die Abteilungsleiter, der da noch aufgepasst hat, wenn wir über die Stränge geschlagen haben.

Ur11: Vielleicht noch eine andere Überlegung. Ich kann mich erinnern, wir haben damals die Butlers kennengelernt. Mein Mann war ja Kfz-Schlosser von Beruf und hat denen das Auto repariert. Und wir sind damals denen immer hinterhergefahren, wenn die aufgetreten sind. Die kamen ja als quasi Beatles. Damals fing das in Holzhausen an. Ich kann mich noch erinnern, ich war gerade Studentin, da kam mein Mann in meine Studentenbude und sagte Uschi, wir müssen nach Holzhausen, da stehen die Beatles. Und da habe ich gesagt, was? Gott oh Gott, jedenfalls wir kommen dort hin, der Saal kochte und da waren es die Butlers. Und wie die Beatles in der gleichen Manier die Frisuren und die Songs und so. Und damals war ja die Situation noch eine ganz andere. Es hat nicht lange gedauert, die wurden verboten. Und dann kam ja Renft. Und Renft war ja im Grunde genommen auch nicht lange. Wir kennen ja vielleicht noch die Best-Demo und so, was sich damals ereignete. Wir haben das ja auch dann im Stadtgeschichtlichen Museum wesentlich später nach der Wende in einer Ausstellung thematisiert, wie das damals zugegangen ist. Also dass eben solche Bestrebungen niedergeschmettert wurden. Und die wurden ja wegen Steuerhinterziehung angeklagt. Und jetzt war aber die Situation doch schon relativ entspannter, muss man sagen. Gut, Lindenberg stammte zwar aus dem anderen Teil Deutschlands, aber trotzdem konnte man eben dann mit solchen Titeln anders umgehen. Ich meine, ich kann mich noch erinnern, ich habe damals im Verlag für die Frau als Kulturredakteur gearbeitet, war meine erste Stelle nach dem Studium, und ich hatte mit Renft guten Kontakt, weil eigentlich vorgesehen war, dass ich in der Redaktion der Saison, wo ich gearbeitet habe, in der Saison den Artikel über Renft schreibe. Ich habe mich schon mit denen getroffen, ich habe Fotos bekommen und dann wurde ja nichts draus, weil wie gesagt dieses Verbot anstand und dann war ja alles vergessen. Und damals bin ich noch zu Fips Fleischer und habe mit ihm gesprochen und habe gesagt, was mache ich denn jetzt? Da meint er: der kommende Stern, das sind die Pudys. Die sind angepasst und denen passiert das nicht. Und da habe ich gesagt, danke. Also über die habe ich nicht geschrien. Aber wie gesagt, die Situation war dann doch eine andere von 1983.

G15: Das waren ja 10 Jahre dazwischen. Das darf man alles nicht vergessen.

Ur12: Nein, aber ich will damit nur sagen, was man auch erlebt hat. Und dann war es doch wieder eine andere Situation.

A4: Darf ich fragen, welches Jahr das war mit den Butlers in Holzhausen?

Ur13: Das war 1964.

A5: Okay.

W: Hatte es irgendeine Bedeutung, dass der Song in der DDR verboten gewesen ist?

G16: Na ja, wie alles Verbotene. Es ist ja so, dass es dann intensiver gespielt wird. Es gab ja Kassettenrekorder, jeder hatte das auf seiner Bandmaschine. Es lief ja, auch wenn man das Westradio gehört hat. Also wie gesagt, die meisten wissen das vielleicht gar nicht. Man konnte sich das denken, dass die das nicht bei DT64 spielen, oder wie die Sender hießen.

St9: Wir wir sind drangekommen an die Musik. Und das war entscheidend. Und vielleicht, gerade weil es verboten war, war es noch besser. Noch interessanter.

Ul12: Also, im Dresdner Raum vielleicht nicht. Ich weiß nicht, aber wir haben hier... Also, ich habe es gar nicht gewusst, das war wohl logisch. Aber man hat ja auch, ich weiß gar nicht, ich habe die DDR-Musik gar nicht so wahrgenommen. Man hat eben Deutschlandfunk gehört.

A6: Ich nicht.

Ul13: Also, ja, naja, also bei uns hier.

Ur14: Soldaten-Sender AFN. Radio Luxemburg wurde gehört.

G17: Pop nach 8. War auch ein toller Sender. Mit Thomas Gottschalk. Das hat er damals noch ganz locker gestaltet, Pop nach 8. Das kam immer eben nach 8 eine Stunde.

R13: Und Busch & Jäger und der Sechser.

Ur15: Musikladen.

G18: Ja, Musikladen war natürlich Spaß.

R14: Das wusste der Produzent.

G19: Vorher der Beat Club. Da war ich in einem Alter, als das anfing. Da wollte ich Professor Flimmrich gucken. Meine Schwester wollte den Beat Club gucken. Das war immer so ein Konflikt. Mein Vater wusste jetzt auch nicht, was gucken wir. Wir hatten ja nur einen Fernseher damals. Was gucken wir? Kleiner Professor Flimmrich?

St10: In Dresden war das ja schon schwierig, an so eine Information heranzukommen. Die haben ja dann im Ostseurlaub eine Woche, 14 Tage ununterbrochen durchgesehen, und sind wieder heimgefahren. Und in Thüringen habe ich es gesehen, ich hatte mich ja ein bisschen mit Antennen befasst, die haben ja ihr Dorf zusammengefasst und irgendwo in alten Telegrafmasten organisiert und dann irgendwie ihre Antennenanlagen. Die waren ja richtig teuer. Ihre Antennen waren dazu da, dass die and die Informationen von drüben rankamen.

Ur16: Die waren nach dem Ochsenkopf ausgerichtet.

G20: Ja. Wir hatten ja wenig ZDF, aber in Thüringen, die konnten ZDF gucken. Hier in Leipzig war mehr die ARD. Viele hatten ja ihre Antennen, ich komme aus dem Waldstraßenviertel, unter dem Dach, da wohnten viele Genossen. Über mir wohnt ja der Stadionkommissar. Der hatte aus dem Zentralstadion die Fahnen mitgenommen wahrscheinlich. Der hatte so riesen DDR und rote Fahnen. Bei uns war es dunkel zum 1. Mai. Mein Vater hat sich schon mal aufgeregt: irgendwann verbrenne ich die. Dann mache ich das Feuerzeug an. Mein Vater war auch Maler: ich sehe nichts. Die DDR-Fahne hing hier runter. Aber auch der Stadionkommissar, Genosse ohne Ende, hat, das hat man dann immer gehört, hatte auch hier alles Westfernsehen. Hat er seine Frau gerufen, die hatten aber ihre Antenne unter dem Dach. Mein Vater hatte sie auf dem Dach gehabt. Es gab ja Zeiten, die haben meine Brüder erlebt, da wurden die Antennen abgeknipst. Da wurde die FDJ losgeschickt, da haben die die Antennen abgeknipst. Im Osten geht die Sonne auf, im Westen geht sie unter, dann runter mit den Westantennen. Irgendwie gab es da so einen FDJ-Spruch. Das war schon verrückt.

Ur17: Aber man muss schon dazu sagen, dass es da tatsächlich vor Gericht als Hausfriedensbruch gewertet wurde. Also die FDJ-Leute, die das ja auch im Auftrag mancher...

G21: Ja, die haben es dann ganz schnell sein lassen. Das war so eine richtige Aktion.

Ur18: Die durften das eigentlich nicht. Es war Hausfriedensbruch. Es wurde vor Gericht als Hausfriedensbruch behandelt. Es war nicht gestattet. Da war im Überschwang der Gefühle, zu viel.

Ul14: Aber in den 80ern war das kein Thema mehr.

G22: Nee, dann nicht mehr.

W: Wie bekannt war denn der Song "Sonderzug nach Pankow" in der DDR?

G23: Jeder kannte den.

Ur19: Den kannte jeder. Wir kannten den ganzen Text. Ich kenne ihn heute noch.

G24: Aber selbst meine Eltern. Mein Vater war Jahrgang 1921 und der kannte den Text auch. Der hat diesen Staat sowieso gehasst. Der ist als junger Mensch noch eingezogen worden im Zweiten Weltkrieg und der hat das so gehasst, diese Uniform, dieser Stechschritt, sagte immer: ah, die kopieren den Adolf. Also ich bin da ein bisschen anders groß geworden. Also bei uns gab es auch kein DDR-Fernsehen, das hat mich manchmal auch geärgert. Ja, aber mein Vater hat diesen Staat richtig gehasst, so dieses ganze System. Und da musste ich manchmal, wenn ich einen DDR-Film gucken wollte, da habe ich gesagt, wir schreiben morgen einen Aufsatz über den Film. Da hat er dann eingesehen und da haben wir dann den Film geguckt.

Ur20: Da sie das gerade sagen mit dem Westfernsehen. Mein Sohn bekam in der Schule eine neue Lehrerin, die hat uns alle die Eltern zum Elternabend aufgefordert, wir sollten ein Pamphlet unterschreiben, dass wir nicht den Westen sehen und dass die Kinder nicht in Westen sehen. Und die haben alle unterschrieben. Und da bin ich aufgestanden und habe gesagt, ich kenne euch doch, ich meine auf dem Dorf kennt man sich alle. Und ich habe gesagt, ihr Heuchler, ihr guckt doch alle den Westen, was soll das? Wir sollten lieber uns dafür stark machen, dass unsere Kinder nicht zu viel fernsehen. Aber wie gesagt, die haben alle unterschrieben. Ich war der Einzige, die nicht unterschrieben hat. Ich habe hinterher natürlich das Gruseln bekommen und habe gedacht, hoffentlich muss das jetzt meinem Sohn nicht ausbaden. War aber nicht der Fall. Sie war doch relativ konzilient und hat das nicht gemacht.

Ul15: Aber wann war das? Das muss doch Anfang der 70er gewesen sein.



Ur21: Naja, das spielt ja jetzt keine Rolle. Aber es war tatsächlich der Fall. Die Lehrerin im Überschwang der Gefühle wollte sich eben darstellen, der Direktor war mit anwesend. Für den Elternabend, sie wollte sich ein Zeichen setzen. Deswegen hat sie damals in einer diese Unterschriftenaktion ins Leben gerufen.

G25: Zu mir kam die, unsere Klassenleiterin, nach Hause zu meinen Eltern und die hat gesagt, es kann ja nicht sein, dass der Gerd in der siebten Klasse die Haare länger hat, wie die in der zehnten. Das sollte ich mir die Haare abschneiden. Das ist ja extra zu meinen Eltern gekommen. Oder meine Schwester hatte ein Abzeichen gehabt, das war Anfang der 70er oder 69, da stand nur "no" drauf. Das haben die der abgefetzt. Da stand nur "no" drauf, mehr war nicht. Oder mit einer Jeanshose oder einem Westbeutel, das ging gar nicht.

R15: Das war ein Unterschied zu den 70er Jahren, fand ich. Die 80er Jahre waren schon unheimlich locker.

G26: Da hat sich schon vieles geändert.

R16: Da war schon vieles anders und sehr bedrückend. Und viele waren, ich sag mal, auch schon ganz schön frech und selbstbewusst.

G27: Da kam dann auch die Punk-Szene in den 80er.

W: Also die Autorität ist schon erodiert.

R17: Ja, ja, genau. Da fing das schon an, alles...

Ur22: Aber man musste ja auch was in Polen passiert, man hat das ja ganz aufmerksam registriert.

Ur23: Gorbatschow.

R18: Das hat auch Hoffnung gegeben.

Ur24: Die Zeitung habe ich damals alle gesammelt.

G. Sputnik, der ist dann verboten worden. Aber dann kam China und Krenz, hat das ja befürwortet, die Aktion in China. Und da hat man wieder Angst gehabt. Da dachte man, oh, wenn die das jetzt genauso machen hier, das wussten wir alles nicht.

St11: Ich habe mir gerade das Denken reingekriegt, weil wir ja jetzt immer mehr Westfernsehen gucken konnten. Und wie gesagt, du musst ja erstmal mal etwas wissen, um etwas anderes denken zu können oder eine Frage zu stellen. Und die konnten nicht verhindern, dass die Leute Westfernsehen

gucken konnten. Und dadurch haben die alle eine andere Denke reingekriegt. Das konnten sie nicht mehr kontrolliert. Die Punkmusik hat sich ja nicht in der DDR erfunden. Die kam ja aus England rüber. Irgendwie muss sie ja hier angekommen sein. Als Beispiel.

Ul16: Also Westfernsehen hat ihr eher geguckt.

A7: Nein. Ich nicht.

Ul17: Entschuldigung.

A8: Ich gehörte ja zu den vielen. Wir hatten einen Fernseher, aber da gab es kein Westfernsehen. Und ich hatte dann eine Wohnung mit 25 bekommen, da hatte ich auch keinen Fernseher.

Ul18: Gut, aber dazu muss man sagen in meiner Schulklasse hatten eigentlich alle. Also da gab es vielleicht zwei oder drei. Auch in der EOS selbst, wo ich war, die haben auch „die rauchenden Colts“, das hat jeder geguckt und so. Welche Ranch, konnten alle mitreden.

R19: Ich wollte ja noch einmal anmerken, dass es so viele persönliche Kontakte gab. Die Reiserleichterung, das dürfen wir nicht vergessen. Die neue Ostpolitik der Bundesregierung, hat auch einiges gebracht. Ich habe Onkel gesehen, die waren bei mir sonst immer auf dem Foto, und die sagen, wir sind ein bisschen SPD-lastig, und da gab es viele interessante Diskussionen auch. Das hat natürlich auch das Bild geändert oder geformt. Und auch selbstbewusster.

Ul19: Und auch wir hier als Messestadt, das darf man nicht vergessen. Weil man das immer noch mit Dresden so sieht, die sich als Residenz immer so fühlen. Leipzig war immer eine weltoffene Stadt.

G28: Bürgertum schon immer. Das ist aber heute noch so. Ich habe viele Freunde in Dresden, ich mag die so, aber das ist ein anderes Völkchen. Leipzig war immer Bürgerstadt, Bürgertum und offen, weltoffen. Wir hatten zweimal den Westen hier eine Woche. Da hat man in der eigenen Stammkneipe keinen Platz mehr gekriegt. Da wurden plötzlich weiße Tischdecken hingelegt und Reserviert-Schilder, weil ja die Westgäste auch bisschen Trinkgeld da gelassen haben.

Ur25: Reserviert für Gäste mit freikonvertierbarer Währung.

W: Bis wann hat ein Ressort ungefähr eine Rolle gespielt? Du sagst, bis 1989?

A9: Da habe ich ihn erst kennengelernt, ich kannte vorher die ganzen anderen Texte, aber den Titel nicht.

W: Wie kam es dazu, dass du ihn kennengelernt hast? Was war das für ein Zusammenhang?

A10: Im Radio. Dann habe ich ja ein Radio gehabt. Ich hatte schon ein Radio, aber eben. War für mich nicht wichtig, Westfernsehen oder so.

R20: Naja, er ist ja auf den Fernseher gekommen.

A11: Nicht für mich. Es geht um 83.

W: jetzt geht es um die Spanne, so 83 bis 89. Was hat der Song für eine Karriere, für eine Wahrnehmungskarriere?

R21: Ein Jahr später, nach der Öffnung, ist der schon in Suhl aufgetreten, da hat er das Lied zweimal gesungen. Weil der Saal getobt hat, die Thüringer Halle, oder wo er aufgetreten ist.

G29: Wann ist der denn in Leipzig aufgetreten?

Ur26: 90 war Leipzig.

R22: Aber das war eben die zweite Station. Ich wollte noch hin . . .

A12: Messerhalle 7

R23: Das hab ich gedacht, nee das war in der 2, in der Messehalle 2 ist der aufgetreten und ich stand vor der 7, ich dachte, kein Schwein, hier geht nichts los. Die Sieben war die typische Messerhalle, genau, aber das stimmte nicht.

Ul20: Also, um darauf zu antworten, ich denke der war immer da, immer präsent. Ich überlege gerade, ob es einen ähnlichen Song gab, der immer so unterschwellig da war, oder auch kritischer war, ein Ende der 80er. Aber mir fällt im Moment nichts ein, muss ich sagen. Mir fällt nichts ein, aber nicht ein Ende der 80er irgendwie, das ist ein anderes Thema. Die Zeiten wurden ja noch schwerer. Es war auch sehr ernst. Der war unterschwellig immer da, hat vielleicht nicht immer die Rolle gespielt wie in '83.

R24: Aber das war auch künstlerisch der Song, wo er alles reingepackt hat. Wo alles passte. Für mich auch wirklich alles gepasst. Zu Andrea Doria hat man rumgeblödel, da hat man gesoffen und was weiß ich nicht. Das war nur Jux, sag ich jetzt mal.

Ul21: Aber auch selbst von anderen Künstlern fällt mir jetzt nicht. Also von anderen Westkünstlern, was hier eine Rolle gespielt haben könnte, Ende der 80er.

Ur27: Aber wir hatten ja einen wunderbaren Sänger, Holger Biege beispielsweise, mit seinen tollen Songs.

Ul22: Ja, aber mir fällt kein Song auf Anhieb ein.

Ur28: Ich habe den immer präsent, weil er wirklich ein toller Sänger war.

Ul23: Ja, ich meine, ist ja jeder anders. Ich war immer Rockerin, ich werde bis an mein Lebensende immer Rockerin bleiben, weil ich das so toll finde. Aber wie gesagt, auch die Beatles und so. Also ich meine, das sind alles Songs, die Klassiker sind und die mich immer wieder erinnern.

Ul24: Nee, es geht ja um diese Relevanz, auch was er beschreibt.

W: Aber wie ist denn das? Hat man sich denn über den Song auch unterhalten? War das ein Gesprächsthema oder war das...

A13: Kann ich mich nicht erinnern.

G30: Oh ja. Ja, schon, wie er es verpackt hat.

Ur29: Ich habe mich ständig über Lindenberg unterhalten.

R25: Ich habe immer den letzten, wo die Durchsage auf Russisch kam, da habe ich versucht das zu übersetzen: Was hat er gesagt? Was war jetzt?

St12: Als der rauskam, haben wir uns darüber unterhalten. Aber dann war das ja nicht mehr neu. Der Lindenberg war ja für mich jetzt nicht so selten.

A14: Dann hat jeder sein Privates gehabt.

St13: Wir konnten das absolut voll verstehen. Es wurde immer gelacht.

R26: Es war nicht so, dass man gesagt hat, das ist jetzt die Initialzündung und jetzt müssen wir revoluzzern. So hat er es ja auch nicht gemeint. Er hat es ein bisschen locker gesehen. Er hat gesagt, Mensch komm.

Ul25: Es gab keinen Song wie die Marseillies oder so.

W: Nein, das ist auch nicht der Punkt. Aber es mochte im Grunde jeder das Lied. Oder gab es bestimmte Gruppen, die das offen abgelehnt haben und andere Gruppen, die es besonders gemocht haben oder so?

St14: Ach, wir haben alle drüber gelacht.

R27: Dann gab es schon die ältere Generation, die fand das schon ein bisschen anrühlich so, also Staatsrat als Oberindianer zu bezeichnen.

Ul26: Ja, die ältere Generation.

G31: Meine Eltern nicht.

W: Sie hatten ja schon vorhin schon ein bisschen angesprochen, was das für ein Gefühl ausgelöst hat bei Ihnen. Vielleicht können wir da mal eine kurze Runde drüber machen. Was für ein Gefühl hat dieses Lied bei Ihnen ausgelöst? Gab es da irgendwie sowas, was Sie damit jetzt heute noch verbinden? Sie sagten so leicht und locker.

G32: Ja, na eben, dass der so unseren Staatsratsvorsitzenden, der so von allen einfach so auf die Schippe geschickt genommen hat, so was auch, gucke, hier, toll. Also das hat eben, ja.

Ul27: Ich glaube, das ist bei allen Leuten, vor denen man in einer gewissen Weise Angst hat, wenn die so runtergebrochen werden, oft du bist auch nichts anderes und so. Ich kann mich entsinnen, zum Beispiel an eine andere Geschichte von der Hochschule, da war auch so ein ganz strenger Professor und wir mussten da einen Notenständer holen aus dem Saal und der probte sein Quartett und seinen Kollegen aus dem Orchester und sagte, das kannst du dir selber nicht spielen, was ihr spielt. Und diese Sache, dass einer, vor dem wir Angst hatten, dass der so einfach mal so auf die Schulter geklopft wird, das wirkt immer total befreiend. Und gerade auch dieser Druck und dieser Mief und diese Angst und wenn dann einer so locker herangenommen wird, das ist einfach ein wunderbares Gefühl.

W: Wie stark war denn dieses Gefühl? Sie sagen jetzt, dass es relativ kontrastierend war gegenüber dem allgemeinen Lebensgefühl der DDR. Und wie intensiv war denn dieses Gefühl, dieses Kontrastes sozusagen gegenüber dem, was man sonst in der DDR erlebt hat? Könnte man das in Worte fassen?

A15: Schwarz-Weiß.

Ur30: Aber ich denke jetzt eher an eine andere Geschichte: das klägliche Ende dieses Mannes. Krank, muss sich verstecken am Ende. Und vorher wurde eben, wie gesagt, dieses Lied... Dieses Lied, was so eine gewisse Heiterkeit auch ausstrahlt und sich über die Verhältnisse hinwegsetzt. Und dann auf einmal endet dieser Mann, der ja wirklich als Tyrann in die Geschichte eingegangen ist und der alle Fäden in der Hand hatt, um Menschen, quasi über seine Helfer zunichte zu machen, der dann plötzlich als

ausgleichendes Element selber so ein elendes Ende nimmt. Wenn ich das jetzt ins Verhältnis setze, muss ich denken, kriegt das Lied natürlich für mich wieder einen ganz anderen Stellenwert.

W: Nämlich?

Ur31: Naja, weil ich mir denke, die Geschichte hat das ihre dazu getan, um eine Karriere zu beenden, die ein Volk geknechtet hat. Und noch seine Frau dazu, als Volksbildungsministerin, die am Grunde genommen ganze Schü-lergenerationen auf dem Gewissen hat.

G33: Ja, mit ihrer Politik.

Ul28: Aber es war auch, finde ich, jetzt nur ein Song. Man darf jetzt, denke ich, auch nicht das zu überbewerten. Es gab einfach so viele Alltagsorgen und Alltagsprobleme.

R28: Also mich hat wirklich auch diese Lockerheit und dieses, das war was ganz anderes und war einfach nicht so belehrend. Es gab viele, die haben Balladen vorgetragen auf den Frieden und man sollte doch die Pershings verstecken. Das hat er ganz anders gemacht. Und dann die Gitarre, Gitarren statt Knarren. Drei Worte, ja? So was sitzt doch. Und das behältst du ja auch ganz anders im Hirn, als nun eine ewig lange Epiloge über etwas. Sondern das war markant, kurz und das fand ich so befreiend. Erfrischend auch.

Ul29: Genau, was Lindenberg eben schafft, ist wirklich eben auch verschiedene Milieus zusammen zu kriegen. Wenn man jetzt zum Beispiel an Wundermann denkt, der ja auch sehr kritisch war, aber das war schon sehr lyrisch, sehr intellektuell und so. Und da war eigentlich... Lindenberg ein anderer Typ. - Der hat eben das geschafft. -

R29: Die Sprache des Volkes hat er mehr gemacht.

Ul30: Ja, genau, die Sprache des Volkes.

R30: Das Schnoddrige.

Ul31: Ja, genau.

Ur32: Genau, das ist das Markenzeichen.

G34: Manche haben ja auch die versteckten Botschaften nicht erkannt, die die sogenannten Liedermacher teilweise drin hatten oder unsere Rockmusiker. Das war bei Lindenberg eben ein bisschen anders alles.

Ul32: Ganz genau. Wir waren ja zwar ein bisschen geschult, immer dazwischen zu hören und so, aber natürlich kann das nicht jeder. Natürlich strengt das auch an.

G35: Ja, manchmal hat man auch was reininterpretiert, was die Band, wenn man sich hinterher mal unterhalten hat oder die man kennengelernt hat, so gar nicht gemeint haben. Man hat ja auf alles geachtet. Stimmt das so oder so, oder ein Bild oder Sachen reininterpretiert. Jetzt hat das sich bestimmt hier... Ich weiß, bei der Armee musste ich ein Bild malen. Also wie gesagt, Alfred Frank war ein Maler gewesen, Widerstandskämpfer in der Kaserne, wo ich war und war ja auch in der Leipziger Hochschule und da hatte er seinen 100. Geburtstag. Und ja, da habe ich ein Bild gemalt und musste, Montag früh sollte das hängen, weil der General kam, draußen am KTL. Und ich habe den gemalt im Stand mit einer Friedenstaube. Ich habe mir wirklich nichts dabei gedacht. Das war einfach für mich ein Symbol. So. Ich musste Montagfrüh sofort zum General. Aber mit einem Ton. Und da war der Politnik da, da haben die mich zur Katze gemacht. "Wollen Sie mich in den Knast bringen?" Ich wusste nicht, was die von mir wollen. Ich dachte, die haben mir das Bild jetzt beschmiert. Ich wusste nicht, was die wollen. "Sie können doch nicht, Alfred Frank, den Kommunisten eine Friedenstaube in die Hand malen." Ich sag: Moment mal. Das ist schon ein ewiges Symbol des Friedens hier. Ja, der westlichen Friedensbewegung. Das war ein Kämpfer mit einer Waffe in der Hand. So, wollten dann eine Waffe in der Hand. Das war noch 1983. Wir diskutierten noch, da sah ich schon mein Bild. Schleppten welche an, die hatten das abgemacht. Ja, wirklich. Ich musste das sofort übermalen. Da musste ich in mein Zimmer da rein. Was machst Du jetzt. Waffe in der Hand ist ja totaler Unsinn. Ich war da unter Druck gesetzt worden. Wir haben gesagt, ich gehe nach Schwedt. Das war hier so unser DDR-Knast bei der Armee. Da hat man vieles gehört. So da habe ich den, der hat ja seine Handbewegung mit dieser Taube gehabt und da habe ich den dann so einen Lappen, so einen Mallappen drin gemalt und habe den so einen Malpinsel reingesetzt. Jetzt kamen alle an zu mir, klopfen, das haben sie dann dran gemacht. Und alle sagten, oh Gert, du hast es wieder einen gucken lassen. Jetzt wusste ich wieder nicht, was meine Soldaten von mir wollten. "Ne Mensch, du hast da doch Häkelzeug hinter..." Von Weitem sah das aus, als wenn ich da Stickzeug hätte. War aber auch nicht meine Absicht

Ul33: Aber man hat immer gegiert nach kritischen Sachen. Deswegen ist man ins Kabarett gerannt und hat gehofft, dass da so Sachen... Und dann

hat man viel gelacht. Heute ist das ja alles sehr vordergründig geworden. Schon verrückt.

G36: Aber heute will das auch keiner mehr hören. So politisches Kabarett ist so selten geworden. Die haben es ja auch schwer jetzt, unsere Kabarettisten. Damals hatten die Pfeffermühle und Akademiker alles viel einfacher. Die konnten ja viel mehr verpacken und die Leute haben ja auch wirklich . . ., heute wenn man hingehet, da ist fast immer alles leer. Es geht gar keiner mehr ans Kabarett.

Ul34: Das Verpacken funktioniert ja heute auch gar nicht mehr richtig.

G37: Ja, man darf ja alles sagen. Da ist es schon wieder schwieriger.

W: Ganz, ganz herzlichen Dank.

Ul35: Gerne. War sehr interessant, so macht man einen Ausflug in die Vergangenheit.



## Zusammenfassung auf Deutsch

In der vorliegenden Dissertation geht es im Innersten um die Diskursivität von Wirklichkeit. Der Frage, wie Instanzen performativer Kommunikation auf die Emergenz gesellschaftlicher Wirklichkeit einwirken könnten, kann man sich nicht nähern, ohne zuvor zu klären, was menschliche Wirklichkeit überhaupt ist und wie sie entsteht. Der Schlüssel, der hier angewendet wird, um beides zu beschreiben ist das von Kant angeführte und seinem transzendentalen Idealismus zugrunde gelegte epistemologische Prinzip der Diskursivität, so wie es von Allison zuletzt ins Zentrum seiner Kant-Interpretation gestellt wurde.

Angesichts der Renaissance autokratischer Regierungsformen einerseits und der kulturellen Spaltung westlicher Gesellschaften andererseits sowie der mit beidem einhergehenden Verbreitung der Performance von Bullshit-Kommunikation ist es das Anliegen dieser Ausführungen, ein Verständnis von Wirklichkeit zu vermitteln, das sowohl den metaphysischen Essentialismus als auch den radikalen Subjektivismus hinter sich lässt und statt dessen von einem kritischen Realismus geprägt ist. Wenn wir Aufklärung wegen der großen gesellschaftlichen Macht von Religion und Ideologie bisher vor allem als die Deessenzialisierung des Denkens verstehen mussten, so muss die Kritik dessen, was wir als real erleben heute auch die Auseinandersetzung mit dem genauso fragwürdigen Eindruck der Künstlichkeit der Realität umfassen sowie dem damit zusammenhängenden, für die psychische Gesundheit außerordentlich problematischen Gefühl der Auflösung der Realen.

Hat bisher Gott oder zuletzt auch Ideologie dem Erleben jenes Maß an Kohärenz und Sinn verliehen, das vor einem befürchteten Versinken in Beliebigkeit bewahrt hat, so bedarf es in einer deessenzialisierten Welt wesentlich komplexerer Strategien. Davon fühlen sich viele Menschen überfordert. Während jene Hälfte der Gesellschaft sich nach den alten Richtigkeiten mit deren traditioneller gesellschaftlicher Stratifizierung sehnt, hat sich in der anderen ein inzwischen poststrukturalistisch geprägtes, egalitär-pluralistisches Weltbild durchgesetzt, in dem zum Beispiel Identität nicht als gegeben betrachtet wird, sondern als etwas, das zunächst gefunden, dann aber auch erarbeitet und gepflegt werden muss, ohne jedoch je als beliebig betrachtet zu werden.

Eine entscheidende Folgerung, die hier aus dem zugrunde gelegten kritischen Realismus gezogen wird, ist es, die erlebte Welt nicht als Realität, sondern als Wirklichkeit zu betrachten und auch zu bezeichnen. Damit soll

nicht nur angezeigt werden, dass die pure Realität eine ontische Größe ist, die dem wahrnehmenden Beobachter letztlich unzugänglich bleibt, sondern auch, dass die Wirklichkeit jene Sphäre ist, in der der Mensch seiner eigenen Mitwirkung nicht entkommen kann, weil die menschliche Wahrnehmung zwingend eine eigene Wirksamkeit entfaltet. Diese schon durch die eigenen Wahrnehmungsbedingungen hervorgebrachte Wirklichkeit ist das Betätigungsfeld des Menschen. Die Arbeitshypothese dieser Arbeit ist es, dass die Performativität ihrer Kommunikation eine elementare Kraft ist, mit der Menschen Wirklichkeit gestalten. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, zu eruieren, auf welchen epistemologischen Konstanten diese Performativität beruhen könnte und zu konzeptionalisieren, wie sie ihre gesellschaftliche Wirksamkeit entfaltet, bevor ein Ansatz zur Analyse der performativen Potentialität einer kommunikativen Instanz entwickelt und auf ein Beispiel angewendet wird.

Wissenschaftliche Bezugspunkte sind konstruktivistische Theorien, von denen sich diese Arbeit abgrenzt, sowie die von Hartmut Rosa 2016 unter dem Titel „Resonanz“ vorgelegte Soziologie der Weltbeziehung, die einen wesentlich ideelleren Umgang mit Resonanz an den Tag legt.

Die Ausführungen beginnen mit einer geistesarchäologischen Betrachtung von Bruchstücken griechischer Philosophy, mit der Absicht die epistemischen Grundlagen der beiden ca. 400 v.u.Z. vorfindlichen Gesellschaftskonzepte zu untersuchen, um die Differenz herauszuarbeiten, wenn Diskursivität als epistemologische Konstante gesellschaftlich integriert wird und wenn nicht. Ausgangspunkt ist dabei der Unterschied im Umgang mit dem damals allgemein anerkannten Paradigma des epistemischen Skeptizismus, wie er von vorsokratischen Philosophen wie Xenophanes ins Feld geführt wurde. Während die sich allmählich durchsetzende Staatsform der demokratisch verfassten Stadtstaaten die Notwendigkeit eines öffentlichen Diskurses anerkannte, weil es in einer vieldeutigen Wirklichkeit darauf ankommt, ein möglichst umfassendes Bild eines Sachverhalts zu erzeugen, war das von Popper als Historismus bezeichnete Gedankengebäude hinter Platons Gesellschaftskonzept des Philosophenkönigtums dafür verantwortlich, dass hier keine öffentliche Erörterung vorgesehen war, sondern lediglich gelenkte Kommunikation. Platon betrachtete Wandel als schädlich und wollte in der von ihm entworfenen Gesellschaft einen Regenten installieren, der per rationaler Intuition die Geschicke seines Staates lenkt, mit dem Ziel

diesen in den seinem metaphysischen Ideal entsprechenden Ausgangszustand zurückzuführen. Der Suche nach absoluter Wahrheit verpflichtet, verabscheute Platon die Demokratie und ihre vielleicht wichtigsten Agenten, die Sophisten, denen er vorwarf, den Schein höher zu achten als die Wahrheit und einen radikalen Subjektivismus zu vertreten.

Doch der Homo-Mensura-Satz, auf den sich Platon dabei bezogen und den er durch seine Deutung mit nachhaltiger Wirksamkeit diskreditiert hat kann auch so interpretiert werden, dass der Mensch als solcher das Maß dessen ist, was für ihn gut ist und was nicht. Das Weiterdenken der aristotelischen Darstellung eines subjektiven Relativismus im Lichte dieses einleuchtenden Interpretationsansatzes führt sodann zur Entwicklung des epistemischen Dreiecks der diskursiven Relationalität. Dem epistemischen Dreieck der diskursiven Relationalität liegt das Konzept zugrunde, dass ein wahrnehmendes Selbst fortwährend Annahmen macht über die Wirkung, die ein Subjekt-Objekt auf ein Objekt-Objekt hat, wobei die Rollen je nach Wahrnehmungsperspektive ständig oszillieren können. Diese Einschätzung der Implikationen dieser Wirkungsbeziehung wird als die »Bedeutung« weiterverarbeitet, die einem Objekt zugewiesen wird. Aus der Zuweisung dieser Bedeutungen entsteht die Welt der Erscheinungen, die wir als Wirklichkeit betrachten.

Wenn es bei der Erscheinung der Dinge darauf ankommt, wie der einzelne Mensch ihnen aufgrund seiner individuellen Einschätzung Bedeutung zuweist, ergibt sich die Frage, wie Menschen als individuell wahrnehmende Subjekte überhaupt in einer gemeinsamen Wirklichkeit leben können. Descartes und Berkley zum Beispiel haben sogar die materielle Existenz der Welt an sich mit einem Fragezeichen versehen und in den Raum gestellt, dass alles nur ein Traum sein könnte. Diesen aus einem empirischen Idealismus erwachsenden Solipsismus hat Kant als einen Skandal der Philosophie betrachtet und ihm den kritischen Realismus, der aus seinem transzendentalen Idealismus hervorgeht, entgegengestellt.

Kant unterscheidet zunächst zwischen den Dingen an sich und ihren Erscheinungen und umgeht damit den Zweifel an der Wirklichkeit der Welt in dem er Inkonsistenzen in der Welterfahrung mit der Unvollkommenheit bzw. der Bedingtheit der menschlichen Wahrnehmung begründet. Der hier

vorgeschlagene Schlüssel zum Verständnis der Differenz zwischen den Dingen an sich und den Erscheinungen ist der Begriff der »Bedeutung«. Erscheinungen entstehen, in dem wir den von uns wahrgenommenen Objekten Bedeutung zuweisen. Dieser Vorgang ist unumgänglich, da einerseits der Zweck menschlicher Wahrnehmung das zur Aufrechterhaltung der Existenz notwendige Fällen von Urteilen ist und andererseits die Wahrnehmungsmöglichkeiten in ihrer grundsätzlichen Begrenztheit auf diesen Zweck hin optimiert sind. Während der transzendente Realismus genauso wie der naive Realismus davon ausgeht, dass Bedeutung eine Eigenschaft der Dinge ist, kehrt Kant die Verhältnisse in seinem transzendentalen Idealismus um und verortet die Bedeutung als ein Ergebnis der Diskursivität der Wahrnehmung.

In einem zweiten Schritt überwindet Kant die daraus sich ergebende Folgerung eines Inseldaseins des Individuums in undurchdringlicher Subjektivität durch die Manifestation allgemein menschlicher (transzendentaler) Wahrnehmungsbedingungen, den apriorischen Kategorien. Es sind diese allen Menschen gemeinsamen Kategorien, die sie anwenden, um in der Diskursivität ihrer Wahrnehmung externen Sinnesreizen Bedeutung zuzuordnen, die eine grundsätzliche Einheitlichkeit und damit Objektivierbarkeit menschlicher Wahrnehmung gewährleisten. In ähnlichen Situationen und Umgebungen werden Menschen zu grundsätzlich vergleichbaren und damit nachvollziehbaren Entscheidungen gelangen, das ist was hier als die epistemische Bedingung diskursiver Ähnlichkeit betrachtet wird. Da denken und fühlen eine unteilbare Einheit bilden muss bei ganzheitlicher Betrachtung in die Bedingung diskursiver Ähnlichkeit neben der kognitiven Ebene auch die von Kant allgemein vernachlässigte affektive Ebene der Wahrnehmung einbezogen werden. Deshalb werden hier dem Inventar der von Kant aufgezählten zwölf apriorischen Kategorien die sechs von Darwin identifizierten Primäraffekte hinzugefügt. Und es ist wichtig festzuhalten, dass Affekte diskursiv bedeutsam sind, weil aufgrund der essenziellen autopoietischen Funktion der Wahrnehmung an sich jede einzelne Wahrnehmung auch eine emotionale Bewertung erfährt.

Aufgrund der epistemischen Bedingung diskursiver Ähnlichkeit wird auch der Subjektivismus radikal-konstruktivistischer Prägung zurückgewiesen. Allerdings wird von Glaserfelds Unterscheidung zwischen Realität als die ontische Welt, wie sie existiert bevor ein Beobachter sie betritt und

Wirklichkeit als die Welt, die durch menschliches Handeln als Wissen hervorgebracht wird, grundsätzlich übernommen. Wirklichkeit wird hier als der Begriff für jene Welt der Erscheinungen verwendet, die aus der Diskursivität menschlicher Wahrnehmung und menschlichen Wissens hervorgeht, die aber eben nicht abgeschirmt ist gegen den Einbruch als hart erlebter Fakten, wenn Objekte ihre intrinsische Wirkung entfalten, diese Wirkung aber nicht antizipiert worden war.

Diese von jedem einzeln wahrgenommene aber doch allen gemeinsame Wirklichkeit entsteht aus einem diskursiven Prozess zweiter Ordnung, den Kant Vernunft nennt. In der Vernunft wird alles Wahrnehmen und Verstehen unter Prinzipien zusammengefasst und vereinheitlicht. Dieser diskursive Prozess ist nun nicht mehr durch gegebene bzw. angeborene Kategorien strukturiert, sondern durch emergente Prinzipien, die durch die Dialektik des Geistes hervorgebracht werden und Bedeutung erzeugen, in dem sie, wie die apriorischen Kategorien im Bereich des Verstehens, auf die Objekte der Wirklichkeit angewendet werden. Ein Vorgang, der sich uneingeschränkt zwischen dem intra-individuellen Rahmen und dem inter-individuellen Rahmen hin und her bewegt, der also nahtlos übergeht zwischen der Person und der Gesellschaft. Die Diskursivität der Erkenntnis besteht also in der Kombination aus verstehender Wahrnehmung einerseits und Vernunft andererseits. Gemeinsam bilden sie ein System der Checks and Balances, der gegenseitigen Kritik und Korrektur. Die Vernunft kann Wahrnehmung kontextualisieren und so falsche Eindrücke korrigieren, während die exakte Wahrnehmung des empirisch Vorfindlichen, also etwa das genaue Hinsehen oder Hinhören, fehlgeleitete Annahmen korrigieren kann.

Da im Bereich des »Vernünftens«, wie Kant es auch gelegentlich nennt, Prinzipien erkenntnisleitend sind, kommt es vor, dass im Lichte verschiedener Meta-Prinzipien, die hier als Paradigmen bezeichnet werden, unterschiedliche Bedeutungen eines Objektes als kohärent erscheinen können in der weiteren diskursiven Verarbeitung. Daraus folgt, dass je nach paradigmatischem Ansatz verschiedene Bedeutungen als objektiv gültig betrachtet werden. Aber auch die Paradigmen sind selbstverständlich dem Prozess der Diskursivität und damit der Veränderung unterworfen und können nur so lange als gültig betrachtet werden, wie die Prinzipien und Bedeutungen, die sie hervorbringen kohärent anwendbar sind auf die Objekte ihrer Umwelt.

Im Hinblick auf die autopoietische Bedeutsamkeit der Wahrnehmung und des Wissens wäre es erstrebenswert, wenn man die sich aus der Begrenztheit der Erkenntnis ergebende Unsicherheit gegen null tendieren lassen könnte, in dem man alle vorstellbaren Relationalitäten zwischen allen Objekten, also alle möglichen Bedeutungen antizipiert. Doch das ist ebenso unmöglich wie die Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit an sich. Effektiv ist es nur sinnvoll möglich, jene Bedeutungen zu antizipieren, die entweder durch die eigene Vernunft kritisiert und als zutreffend befunden wurden oder solche, die intersubjektiv zirkulieren, also zwischenmenschlich oder öffentlich erörtert werden. Zusammen bilden diese zu erwägenden Bedeutungen eines Objektes dessen Bedeutungsaggregat, das die Erscheinung dieses Objektes im Bewusstsein eines wahrnehmenden Subjekts prägt. In ihrer Relationalität untereinander bilden diese Bedeutungsaggregate gemeinsam den einen Kosmos der Wirklichkeit, in dem diese Wirklichkeit durch unterschiedliche kulturelle Konfiguration viele unterschiedliche Gesichter hat.

Die Betrachtung, wie gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit beginnt mit einer Erörterung, dass Wirklichkeit generell in zweifacher Weise emergent ist. Zum einen in einem allgemeinen Sinne der Selbstorganisation, da die Interrelationen aus denen sie sich selbst unter quasi-mystischen Bedingungen im Nebel der Möglichkeiten als Existenz im hier und jetzt zusammensetzt zu komplex sind, um als konstruiert betrachtet werden zu können. Zum anderen in einem holistischen Sinne, da Wirklichkeit mehr ist als die Summe der Objekte, aus denen sie besteht.

Es lässt sich festhalten: Wirklichkeit wird geformt durch den semantischen Inhalt der Bedeutungsaggregate der Objekte, aus denen sie sich zusammensetzt, welcher bestimmt wird durch die vorherrschenden Prinzipien. Dieses Verständnis ist sehr nah am von Michelle Foucault entwickelten Konzept der Ordnung der Dinge, die es erlaubt bestimmte Dinge zu erkennen und andere nicht. Das diskursiv generierte Arrangement dominanter Bedeutungen in einer Gesellschaft zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt, welches konfiguriert wie ihre Mitglieder die Welt sehen, bezeichnet Foucault als Episteme, das er in Anlehnung an kantische Terminologie als ein geschichtliches Apriori betrachtet, weil es dem Erkennen und dem Wissen der Menschen vorausgesetzt ist. Diese Betrachtungsweise legt nahe, die kantischen

Prinzipien der Vernunft als strukturierende semantische Elemente zu betrachten, die die Vernunft selbst durch die Anwendung übergeordneter Meta-Prinzipien hervorbringt, welche den diskursiven Prozess momentan durch diese Rekursivität regieren. Rekursivität ist dabei ein voranschreitender Prozess, der in erster Ordnung eine wiederholte Anwendung von Prinzipien und den aus ihnen generierten Bedeutungen auf Objekte der Wirklichkeit umfasst, in zweiter Ordnung eine Wiederanwendung der aus dem betreffenden Metaprinzip abgeleiteten Prinzipien und Bedeutungen auf die eigenen Ableitungen, was einen fraktalen Effekt zur Folge haben kann. Konkret ereignet sich Rekursivität in der diskursiven Selbststrukturierung des Vernunftprozesses in kontextuelle Bedeutungskomplexe, welche den Gegenstand und die Einheit eines Diskurses definieren. Die Intention der Diskursanalyse ist es, zu rekonstruieren, warum eine bestimmte Aussage getroffen wurde und nicht eine andere, um dem Epistem als geschichtlichem Apriori auf die Spur zu kommen, oder anders ausgedrückt: um die regierenden Paradigmen in ihrer Verflochtenheit zu identifizieren. Aufgrund der Komplexität dieser Interrelationen ist Wirklichkeit als die Erscheinung der Erscheinungen mehr als die Summe aller Erscheinungen und dadurch nicht reduzierbar auf einzelne bestimmende Faktoren der Vergangenheit, sondern zunächst einmal ganz und gar kontingent.

Der Geltungsbereich eines Epistems konstituiert eine homogene soziale Sphäre, die gewöhnlich als eine kulturelle Entität wahrgenommen wird. Das bedeutet im Umkehrschluss: um an einer kulturellen Entität zu partizipieren, ist es notwendig, nicht nur deren Sprache zu erlernen, sondern auch die der Kultur zugrundeliegende diskursive Struktur anzunehmen. Als Ausdruck und Träger eines Epistems zugleich funktioniert Kultur wie das Betriebssystem eines digitalen Gerätes. Wie ein Betriebssystem eine kohärente digitale Umgebung herstellt, konstituiert eine Kultur ein kohärentes soziales System in dem sie durch ihre diskursive Struktur definiert, was zum System gehört und was nicht, welche Inputs bearbeitet werden und wie diese Inputs bearbeitet werden. Dazu gehört es, dass Kultur auch die Gefühle ihrer Angehörigen strukturiert, wie sie sich emotional auf die Welt beziehen und wie sie die Prozesse innerhalb der Kultur empfinden, welche Affekte sie mit ihnen assoziieren. Eine Kultur bestimmt selbstreferentiell, wie die Dinge funktionieren, wie sie sich aufeinander beziehen. Es liegt also nahe, eine Kultur als ein epistemisches Betriebssystem selbstreferentieller sozialer System zu betrachten, die die Merkmale der Autopoiesis aufweisen, wie etwa die Familie oder der Staat. Alle Gewissheiten sind sozial konditioniert durch

die Kultur der Gruppe, zu der man gehört. Berger und Luckmann betrachten diese kulturellen Entitäten als die multiplen Realitäten aus denen unsere Welt besteht. In der Terminologie der vorliegenden Ausführungen ist eher von systemischen Wirklichkeiten zu sprechen, die entstehen, in dem soziale Umwelten von Bedeutungssystemen zu abgegrenzten menschlichen Interaktionskontexten vereinigt werden. Der lebensweltlich signifikanteste Interaktionskontext ist immer noch der Nationalstaat, weil er durch die Anwendung seiner Gesetze im Rahmen seiner konstitutionellen Kultur eine Gesellschaft von Subjekten mit bestimmten Rollen, Pflichten und Rechten konfiguriert, welche deren Identität als Bürger manifestieren.

Foucaults Auffassung von Kultur als existentiell subjektivierendem Bio-Dispositiv ähnelnd, betrachtet Habermas Lebenswelt als ein System sozialer Normen, die von kollektiven Verhaltenserwartungen und ererbten Hintergrundüberzeugungen geprägt sind. Auch Iser betont, dass es die Kultur ist, durch die der Mensch seine Umwelt, seine Wirklichkeit gestaltet. Kultur, gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit und die Wirklichkeit im Generellen, so könnte man in Anwendung systemtheoretischer Terminologie sagen, sind strukturell gekoppelt. Kultur prägt die gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit und die Wirklichkeit im Generellen hat Rückwirkungen auf die Kultur, die wiederum die gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit prägt. In dieser strukturellen Koppelung ist Kultur, insbesondere in ihrer hier hervorgehobenen epistemischen Funktion, gemeinsam mit der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit der Diskursivität unterworfen und damit emergent. Angetrieben wird diese diskursive Emergenz von der diskursiven Rekursivität: der rekursiven Anwendung von Bedeutungen und den ihnen zugrundeliegenden Prinzipien, die zu einem für die weitere Verarbeitung kohärenten Ergebnis geführt haben. Bedeutungen, die bei ihrer Anwendung keine kohärenten Ergebnisse erzeugen, werden abgeändert bis kohärente Ergebnisse erzielt werden. Sodann wird diese neue Bedeutung rekursiv angewendet. Anpassung und Wandel geschehen also durch die rekursive Anwendung von Differenz. Allerdings werden nur solche Bedeutungen zur Anwendung in Betracht gezogen, die einen gewissen Grad an Signifikanz aufweisen, der in einem kaskadierenden Prozess ermittelt wird.

Eine Gesellschaft konstituiert sich also nicht nur durch die andauernde Produktion von Wissen, sondern durch die rekursive Anwendung von Wissen, welches hervorgegangen ist durch eben solche Wiederanwendung von



Wissen und der dabei entstandenen Fehler. In Beziehung zu dieser Erkenntnis ist es wichtig zu beachten, dass es in der Diskursivität der Wirklichkeit keinen Unterschied gibt in der Substantialität von sozialen und ontischen Tatsachen, weil die Konsequenzen die gleiche Wirksamkeit ausüben, wenn Menschen Situationen als real definieren. So hängen unsere Handlungen davon ab, wie wir eine Situation bewerten, und sie führen zu neuen Situationen, Bewertungen und Handlungen. So kann das, was wir heute tun und sagen potenziell Wirksamkeit in der Emergenz der Wirklichkeit von morgen erlangen.

Die performative Dimension der diskursiven Emergenz gesellschaftlicher Wirklichkeit ergibt sich daraus, dass Menschen ein Interesse daran haben, Wirklichkeit zu gestalten. Einerseits kann das, was Menschen tun und sagen in der Absicht erfolgen oder geäußert werden, Einfluss darauf zu nehmen, was Menschen tun und denken, was sich darauf auswirken kann, wie die gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit von morgen aussieht. Daraus ergibt sich die Neigung zur Performance, zur bewussten Inszenierung dessen, was man tut oder sagt. Andererseits gibt es Situationen, in denen Menschen nach neuen Deutungen und Bedeutungen suchen, so dass bestimmten in Handlungen oder Äußerungen enthaltenen Bedeutungen Signifikanz im Hinblick auf eine Lösung beigemessen wird. Daraus ergibt sich eine Neigung, Performativität, also Wirksamkeit, zuzulassen. Das Erkenntnisinteresse im Hinblick auf Performativität liegt darin, wie kommunikative Instanzen diskursive Resonanz erlangen.

Zunächst ist es wichtig, die beiden autonomen Elemente der Kommunikation voneinander zu differenzieren: das Senden und das Empfangen von Signalen. Während das Senden von Signalen auf die soziale Verfasstheit des Menschen zurückzuführen ist, ist das Empfangen von Signalen eine Bedingung der Autopoiesis. Wie jedes lebende Wesen muss der Mensch dafür sorgen, sich die notwendigen Ressourcen zugänglich zu machen. Dazu muss er ganz grundsätzlich seine Bedürfnisse wahrnehmen und die Quellen für ihre Befriedigung ermitteln. Darüber hinaus aber, hat es sich für das eigene Überleben als notwendig erwiesen, die Intentionen der Mitmenschen zu verstehen, auch (oder vielleicht besonders) dann, wenn die dies womöglich vermeiden möchten. Menschen können nicht so sehr deswegen nicht nicht kommunizieren, weil sie ständig unbewusst Signale aussenden und so potentiell Informationen preisgeben, sondern weil die Mitmenschen auf

ständigen Empfang geschaltet sind und ihre Umwelt auf Signale absuchen, denen sie, vielleicht existenziell bedeutsame, Informationen entnehmen können. Kommunikation im engeren Sinne geschieht nur da, wo ein wahrnehmendes Individuum die Bedeutung versteht, die das sendende Individuum gemeint hat. Nur so können gemeinsame Objekte entstehen, auf die sich weitere Kommunikation beziehen kann.

Dieser ontische Graben zwischen sendenden und empfangenden kognitiven Systemen macht es erforderlich, dass ein Verfasser von Bedeutungen diese so zum Ausdruck bringen muss, dass die gemeinten Empfänger sich angesprochen fühlen, den Ausführungen folgen und den Inhalt verstehen. Während man gewöhnlich davon ausgeht, dass dies vor allem durch Sprache erreicht wird, so muss man konstatieren, dass in der Kommunikation eine sozial-affektive Vorsprachlichkeit gibt, die eine Struktur der Kooperation zwischen beiden Seiten herstellt und zu deren Mitteln u.a. das gestische und das körperliche (pantomimische) Zeigen gehören. Diese Dimension der sozial-affektiven Vorsprachlichkeit wird umso stärker in die Performance von Bedeutung mit einbezogen, je mehr dem Verfasser daran liegt, diskursive Resonanz zu erzielen, also die Performativität, dass das Gegenüber genau den von ihm gemeinten Bedeutungsinhalt in seinem Verstehen re-produziert und ihn sich vielleicht sogar aneignet. Die grundsätzliche Bedeutsamkeit der Performance kann deshalb nicht überbewertet werden, weil die Autonomie des Verstehens dazu führen kann, dass die Bedeutungen, die Aussagen oder Handlungen entnommen werden, sich verselbständigen können, in dem sie rekursiv in den Prozess der Diskursivität wieder eingeführt werden, obwohl sie so nie gemeint gewesen sind, was, zumindest theoretisch, nie im Interesse des Senders ist und nur in bestimmten Fällen im Interesse der Empfänger.

In Anlehnung an Austin, aber nicht in Übereinstimmung mit ihm, werden als Performative jene Instanzen performierter Kommunikation betrachtet, die erfolgreich darin waren, diskursive Resonanz auf der Ebene der Überzeugung erzielt zu haben. Die Performativität der Sprechakte bei Austin bezieht sich implizit eher auf institutionalisierte Situationen, in denen ein Sprechakt tatsächlich eine Handlung darstellt, die empirisch nachvollziehbare lebensweltliche Folgen hat. Dennoch lassen sich aus seinem Modell fünf Elemente ableiten, die öffentliche Performativität begründen: Das Kontextelement, das Protagonistenelement, das Inhaltselement, das Ausführungselement, das Publikumselement. Jedes dieser Elemente hat jeweils für

sich selbst eine gewisse direkte Wirkung. Jedes Element interagiert aber auch mit jedem anderen Element. Im Hinblick auf die Kohärenz der affektiven und der kognitiven Ebene ist allerdings anzunehmen, dass es besonders bedeutsam ist, dass bei einer Kommunikationsinstanz das Ausführungselement und das Inhaltselement in weitreichendem Gleichklang miteinander stehen: wie etwas gesagt oder getan wird muss übereinstimmen mit dem, was gesagt oder getan wird. Letztlich entscheidend für die Herstellung diskursiver Resonanz ist der Grad der Übereinstimmung zwischen den Anforderungen der zugrundeliegenden Situation sowie der kognitiven und der affektiven Potentialität der performierten Bedeutungsinstanz, was hier als die diskursive Integriertheit einer Kommunikationsinstanz betrachtet wird.

Wie eng Performativität und Diskursivität miteinander zusammenhängen, wird deutlich, wenn man die Musik unter diesen Vorzeichen beleuchtet. Dazu ist es zunächst einmal notwendig, sie auf ihre allgemeine Gültigkeit hin zu untersuchen, also ob und inwiefern sie im Leben aller Menschen eine ähnliche grundlegende Funktion hat. Die Ausgangshypothese ist, dass Musik zu mindestens eine intensive Erlebnishaftigkeit beinhaltet, die allen Menschen zugänglich ist. Deshalb stellt sich zunächst die Frage, woraus diese Erlebnishaftigkeit entspringen mag. Darüber hat auch Descartes nachgedacht. In seinem Frühwerk „Compendium Musicae“ hat er bei der Wahrnehmung von Musik zum einen der menschlichen Imagination eine zentrale Rolle beim Verstehen von Melodie zugewiesen und der Musik damit eine diskursive Dimension attestiert, zum anderen hat er eine Unmittelbarkeit des Rhythmusempfindens postuliert und dem Tempo der Musik eine direkte Wirksamkeit zugeschrieben. Und tatsächlich hat die Neurokognitionsforschung bestätigt, dass Musik syntaktische und semantische Eigenschaften hat, also Bedeutung transportieren kann, und dass Entrainment, also die Fähigkeit Bewegungen am Impuls eines Rhythmus auszurichten, zwar nicht vielen Organismen zu eigen ist, aber in jedem Fall dem Menschen als solchem. Auch für das Zutreffen der Tempohypothese gibt es Hinweise. Bei der Untersuchung, ob Wiegenlieder über die Kulturen hinweg gemeinsame Merkmale aufweisen, ist nicht nur deutlich geworden, dass es diese Merkmale gibt, sondern dass Wiegenlieder diese Merkmale mit säuglingsorientierter Sprache teilen, in der Bedeutung weniger sprachlich kodiert wird als durch die musikalische Performiertheit. Der Einsatz von Sprachmelodie hat also über die Kulturen hinweg die Funktion, die Gefühle des Kindes zu modulieren, in dem gezielt bestimmte Empfindungen hervorgerufen werden.

Ein wissenschaftliches Konzept, bei dem dies eine wichtige Rolle spielt, ist das Modell der Gefühlseinstimmung (Affect Attunement) von Stern. In einer Instanz von Affect Attunement sind das Was und das Wie eine kaum zu unterscheidende Einheit und kann als eine performative Intervention betrachtet werden, bei der ein authentischer Protagonist den Geist einer Situation und damit deren Erfordernisse genau trifft mit dem, was er oder sie aussagt und mit dem, wie sie oder er dies tut. Dies kann als ein metaphorischer Prozess betrachtet werden, bei dem Bedeutung von einem Erlebniszustand in einen anderen übertragen wird. Insofern ist das Konzept des Affect Attunement auch abstrahierbar von der spezifischen Situation der vorschulischen Kommunikation mit einem Kind auf generell menschliche Interaktionssituationen, in denen es notwendig ist, dass erwachsene Individuen sich emotional aufeinander einstimmen, etwa, um vor einer Jagd ein erhöhtes Maß an Kooperationsfähigkeit aufzubauen. Darüber hinaus hat Affect Attunement aber auch auf eine ganz einschlägige Art und Weise eine diskursive Funktion, in dem es eine gemeinsame Einschätzung einer Situation hervorbringen, also Bedeutung vermitteln kann. Insgesamt könnte man die Funktionalität des Affect Attunement als das betrachten, was Tomasello als Shared Intentionality, als gemeinsame Beabsichtigung, betrachtet, weil es den Beteiligten die Steuerung ihrer Empfindungen durch ein ganzheitliches Performieren ermöglicht, welches neben gestischem und pantomimischem Darstellen eben auch die noch primäreren Elemente der Musik beinhaltet. Dies wäre ohne das evolutionär erworbene Entrainment als grundlegende neurokognitive Fähigkeit nicht möglich. Neurowissenschaftlich verorten kann man dieses Zusammenspiel im Broca-Areal, was dafürspricht, dass Sprache und Musik beide aus einer gemeinsamen protosprachlichen, melodisch-rhythmischen Ausdrucksfähigkeit in enger Verbindung mit gestischer und pantomimischer Darstellung hervorgegangen sind.

Während die propositionale Kapazität des semiotischen Systems Sprache aus ihrer klaren Definition von Zeichen-Begriff-Beziehungen hervorgeht, kann Musik sich in ihrer emergenten Relationalität zwar nicht so exakt ausdrücken, ist aber wesentlich variabler und anpassungsfähiger. Kölsch hat die semantische Dimension der Musik systematisiert und dabei sieben Formen musikalischer Bedeutung identifiziert, die er in drei Klassen unterteilt hat. Wobei eigewendet wird, dass der Begriff semantisch eben eine definierte Zeichen-Begriff-Beziehung beinhaltet und deshalb nur

außermusikalische Bedeutungsformen von Musik als semantisch im engeren Sinne betrachtet werden kann, während innermusikalische und musikogenerische Bedeutungen eher als in sich diskursiv betrachtet werden müssen, da ihr Verständnis eher aus einer emergenten Zuordnung entspringt, die meist eine affektive Konnotation aufweist. Während also Sprache nur ausdrücken kann, was vorher ein Gedanke gewesen ist und vom Rezipienten auch als Gedanke weiterverarbeitet werden muss, kann Musik direkt Gefühle evozieren. Da Gefühle die Qualität einer Bedeutung beinhalten ist es gerechtfertigt davon auszugehen, dass Musik ein wesentlich größeres diskursives Potential hat, als man gemeinhin annehmen würde. Man kann sogar so weit gehen, Musik als eine Sprache der Affekte zu betrachten, die auf einer metaphorischen Ebene erlebt werden kann, weil sie die diskursive Kapazität hat unsere Wahrnehmung und unser Verstehen unserer Wirklichkeit in einen eigenen Gefühlsrahmen zu setzen, der auch von den vorfindlichen Bedingungen abweichen kann. Gemeinsam mit der textlichen Ebene eines Popsongs beispielsweise, können so ganzheitliche metaphorische Erlebnisse in einem Hörer hervorgerufen werden, die das diskursive Potential haben rein ideell eine andere Wirklichkeit vorzustellen, in der andere Prinzipien herrschen und andere Bedeutungen angewandt werden.

#### 4.1

Wenn es darum geht, die performative Potenzialität einer Kommunikationsinstanz zu analysieren, gilt es zu bedenken, dass eine darin geäußerte Bedeutung letzten Endes noch die Hürde nehmen muss, Teil des gesellschaftlich-diskursiven Prozesses zu werden, wie es von der Diskursbeurteilungskaskade abgebildet wird. Darüber hinaus gilt jedoch die Annahme, dass es zunächst einmal vor allem das Zusammenspiel von persönlicher Integrität, affektivem Ausdruck und rationalem Inhalt in Beziehung zur Dynamik einer gegebenen Situation ist, welche eine performierte Kommunikationsinstanz mit der Potentialität gesellschaftlicher Performativität ausstattet. In diesem Zusammenspiel gilt es einerseits, die Potentialität einer Kommunikationsinstanz in den einzelnen Faktoren zu analysieren, bevor man deren Zusammenspiel beleuchtet. Zuallererst aber, ist es die Aufgabe, die Faktoren im Einzelnen zu identifizieren und zu operationalisieren.

Wenn man das Zusammenspiel persönlicher Integrität, affektiven Ausdrucks und rationalen Inhalts in Beziehung zur Dynamik einer gegebenen

Situation auflöst erhält man vier Faktoren, die übereinstimmen mit vier der fünf Elemente, die die institutionelle Performativität einer kommunikativen Instanz herstellen: Protagonistenelement, Ausführungselement, Inhaltselement, Kontextelement. Darüber hinaus stimmen die ersten drei dieser Faktoren auch mit den drei Mitteln der Überzeugung überein, die Aristoteles in seiner Rhetoriklehre festgehalten und ausgeführt hat: Ethos, Pathos und Logos. Diese drei Faktoren können schon aufgrund ihrer geschichtlichen Bewährtheit als zutreffend betrachtet werden. Darüber hinaus, können aber auch die beiden übrigen Elemente in dieses Faktoreninventar aufgenommen werden. Der situative Kontext stiftet überhaupt erst den Bezugsrahmen einer kommunizierten Bedeutung und wird hier unter dem Begriff Kairos einbezogen. Das Publikumselement, welches im Sinne des Ausmaßes der erreichten Öffentlichkeit mit dem Kriterium der Handlungsebene der Diskursbeurteilungskaskade übereinstimmt, wird hier unter dem Begriff Platos, dem griechischen Wort für Amplitude in das Inventar aufgenommen.

Um zu eruieren, ob dieses Inventar aus fünf Faktoren ausreicht, oder ob weitere einbezogen werden müssen, werden zwei Felder der Theorie und Forschung konsultiert: Das psychologische Forschungsfeld der Persuasion und das medienwissenschaftliche Feld der Nachrichtenwerttheorie. Dabei zeigt sich, dass das Feld der Persuasionsforschung sowieso stark der aristotelischen Dreigliedrigkeit folgt und dass auch alle Posten der Nachrichtenwerttheorie den fünf Faktoren zugeordnet werden können. Daraus wird abgeleitet, dass keine weiteren Faktoren notwendig sind, um die performative Potentialität einer Kommunikationsinstanz abzubilden bzw. zu analysieren. Allein die Ebene des Zusammenspiels der fünf Faktoren ist noch nicht abgebildet. Diese Meta-Ebene, auf der eigentlich die Bewertung der Analyse durchgeführt wird, ist zugleich aber auch ein eigener Faktor, da der Grad der Stimmigkeit eine wichtige Bedeutung für die Potentialität einer Kommunikationsinstanz hat, diskursive Resonanz zu erlangen. Deshalb erhält dieser Meta-Faktor, der zugleich die Meta-Ebene der Beurteilung der Potentialität der Kommunikationsinstanz als ganzer darstellt, hier die Bezeichnung Symphonos.

## 4.2

Nach dem die Faktoren identifiziert sind, werden sie nun inhaltlich gefüllt und auf das Beispiel des Songs „Sonderzug nach Pankow“ angewandt. Der

Übersichtlichkeit und Verständlichkeit halber werden diese Schritte für jeden Faktor direkt in dieser Reihenfolge durchgeführt. Mit der Intention, dem dieser Arbeit zugrunde liegenden Konzept der Diskursivität auch bei der empirischen Untersuchung des Beispiels gerecht zu werden wurde hier die Fokusgruppe als Mittel gewählt, um die performative Potentialität zu untersuchen. Der Ansatz der Fokusgruppe ermöglicht durch den darin angelegten diskursiven Austausch unter den Teilnehmenden, dass die erinnernde Wahrnehmung effektiv erweitert und gleichzeitig kritisiert wird. Darüber hinaus greift auch hier das Prinzip der Potentialität, weil auch die erinnernde Wahrnehmung in sich nur eine Annäherung an die erinnerte Wirklichkeit darstellen kann.

### 4.3

In seinem gesellschaftspolitischen Kontext war der „Sonderzug“ eine Instanz interkultureller Kommunikation, da auf den beiden Seiten der innerdeutschen Grenze gänzlich unterschiedliche Bedeutungssysteme herrschten. Die damit verbundene spezifische Signifikanz und Komplexität machen den Song umso geeigneter als Beispiel für die Analyse der Potentialität einer Kommunikationsinstanz.

### 4.4

Kairos lässt sich konzeptualisieren als eine Situation verdichteter Wirklichkeit mit erhöhter Reaktivität, die als ein abgrenzbarer Bedeutungskomplex einen spezifischen Diskurs stiftet und als ein Dispositiv durch ihre subjektivierende Kraft allen ihren Stakeholdern eine Rolle zuweist. Die dabei entstehenden Unteröffentlichkeiten sind insofern prekär, als dass sie das Potenzial bergen, sich zu radikalieren und sich dabei von der allgemeinen Öffentlichkeit loszulösen. Die Definiertheit einer Situation lässt sich daran ermesen, inwieweit sie identifizierbare Unteröffentlichkeiten hervorgebracht hat und wie diese sich zueinander verhalten. Der Kairosfaktor lässt sich dann operationalisieren, in dem die Definiertheit einer Situation bestimmt und die Kommunikationsinstanz zu den Entwicklungen in dieser Situation in Beziehung gesetzt wird.

Die Analyse der Fokusgruppendifkussionen hat ergeben, dass die Situation in der DDR 1983 gekennzeichnet war von einem intensiven Erleben von Unfreiheit und dem Eindruck, dass Veränderung unvermeidbar ist. Am

schmerzhaftesten wurde die fehlende Redefreiheit erlebt, da man immer aufpassen musste, was man in wessen Beisein sagte und es keinerlei Ansatz gab, die erhoffte Transformation zu befördern. So war die Situation 1983 zwar noch nicht konflikthaft aufgeladen, doch die Unzufriedenheit nahm rapide zu angesichts der sich durch die Unfreiheit ergebenden Hilflosigkeit gegenüber den immer offener zutage tretenden Unzulänglichkeiten.

#### 4.5

Ethos wird meist etwas verkürzt als die Glaubwürdigkeit eines Redners betrachtet, tatsächlich geht es um die allgemeine Akzeptabilität eines Kommunikators als Protagonist bzw. Protagonistin einer spezifischen Kommunikationsinstanz. Die Akzeptanz durch das Publikum hängt dabei von der Autorität und der Intention ab, also der Frage nach dem wer und der Frage nach dem warum.

In den Fokusgruppendifkussionen ist deutlich geworden, dass Lindenberg für viele Menschen in der DDR weit mehr war als ein Rockstar, er war zu einer Art Bruder oder bester Kumpel geworden, der einen verstand und für einen eintrat. Durch sein Engagement für die Friedensbewegung und seine wohl austarierte politische Haltung wurde er als sympathische Autorität und ein höchst glaubwürdiger Protagonist wahrgenommen, der angetrieben war durch sein authentisches Interesse an den Angelegenheiten des Menschen im Allgemeinen und der Menschen in Ostdeutschland im Besonderen und nicht allein durch Profitstreben.

#### 4.6

Pathos als der Tonalitätsfaktor umfasst die affektive Dimension des Ausdrucks einer Kommunikationsinstanz. Hier schwingen auch die musikalischen Elemente sprachlicher Kommunikation mit. In diskursiver Hinsicht ist die Tonalität in zweifacher Weise relevant. Zum einen ist sie selbst Träger von Bedeutung, zum anderen als deutender Rahmen für die sprachlich ausgedrückte Bedeutung. Anhand der Tonalität kann beurteilt werden, zu welchem Grad eine Kommunikationsinstanz emotional aufgeladen ist und mit welcher emotionalen Haltung einer Situation begegnet wird.

Dass dem Song zugeschrieben wird, ein Gefühl von Freiheit vermittelt zu haben zeigt einmal mehr, dass Unfreiheit die definierende Kategorie der Situation in der DDR von 1983 gewesen ist, die auch die Gefühlsebene bestimmt hat. Die Menschen, genossen an diesem Song das provokative



Momentum und die enthusiastische Atmosphäre der angstlösenden Leichtigkeit.

#### 4.7

Im Zusammenhang dieser Arbeit bezeichnet Logos die argumentative Dimension einer Kommunikationsinstanz. Hier geht es also um die von einer Kommunikationsinstanz ausgedrückten situativ signifikanten Bedeutungen, wie sie sich aus ihren Inhalten zusammensetzen. Deshalb ist es wesentlicher Bestandteil der analytischen Arbeit in diesem Argumentationsfaktor, die Kommunikationsinstanz auf argumentative Formationen hin zu untersuchen und diese auf ihre situative Relevanz hin zu überprüfen. Werden für die situativen Unteröffentlichkeiten bedeutungsvolle Aussagen getroffen?

Die Botschaft des Songs, die sich den Menschen der DDR als besonders bedeutsam darstellte war, dass auch Erich Honecker auch nur ein Mensch wie jeder andere sei. Diese Hauptbotschaft setzte sich aus zwei Bestandteilen zusammen. Die eine Bedeutungshemisphäre der Botschaft besteht aus dem Versuch, Honecker auf einer menschlichen Ebene zu begegnen, was voraussetzt ihn von seiner künstlich erhobenen Position herunterzuholen. In der Umsetzung dieses Ansinnens liegt die andere Bedeutungshemisphäre der provokativen Karikatur. Die Menschen würdigten die implizite Intention Honecker zu umarmen, freuten sich aber besonders an dem Vorgang der Herabsetzung, der damit einherging.

#### 4.8

Platos bezeichnet im Griechischen die Amplitude und wird hier verwendet, um den Publizitätsfaktor zu beschreiben. Publizität wird als Wahrnehmbarkeit einer Kommunikationsinstanz operationalisiert. Wie sich bei der physikalischen Lautstärke die Amplituden verschiedener Geräusche addieren kann man auch hier annehmen, dass das Prinzip der Amplitudensummation zutrifft. Während jedoch bei der physikalischen Lautstärke sich nur gleichzeitige Geräusche addieren, sind es bei der Publizität die über einen bestimmten Zeitraum wahrgenommenen Erscheinungen einer Kommunikationsinstanz, zu denen selbstverständlich auch Berichterstattung über diese gehört, die zusammen als die Amplitude deren gesellschaftlicher Präsenz empfunden wird. Ziel ist es also, die soziale Amplitude einer Kommunikationsinstanz abzuschätzen.

Die TeilnehmerInnen der Fokusgruppen stimmen darin überein, dass 1983 jeder in der DDR den „Sonderzug nach Pankow“ gekannt habe. Darüber hinaus stellte es sich als Konsens heraus, dass der Song lange Zeit beliebt geblieben ist und mit der Zeit zu einer Art Standardlied mit ganzdeutscher Bedeutsamkeit geworden ist. Auch wenn der Song also verboten gewesen ist, hat er doch in bisher noch nicht dagewesener Weise eine mehr oder weniger geheime Suböffentlichkeit hergestellt, in der er auch diskutiert wurde.

#### 4.9

Die Beurteilung der performativen Potentialität einer Kommunikationsinstanz geschieht letztlich in der Gesamtschau der Faktoren, wie sie als einzelne mit diskursiver Signifikanz aufgeladen sind und wie konsistent sie sich zueinander verhalten. Insofern ist Symphonos zugleich die Ebene der Beurteilung als auch ein Metaebenenfaktor, der jedoch nicht zu den Primärfaktoren zu zählen ist.

Im Hinblick auf die drei Kernfaktoren Ethos, Pathos und Logos ist es bemerkenswert, wie kohärent sie zusammenpassen. Eine Interpretation, die aus den Fokusgruppendifkussionen abgeleitet wurde, verdeutlicht die Bedeutsamkeit dieser inneren Kohärenz: Der Vorstellung einer Umarmung, wie sie im Logos Faktor festgestellt wurde passt mit ihren Implikationen für den Pathos Faktor perfekt zum Image des Bruders oder Kumpels wie es im Ethos Faktor festgestellt wurde. Beide Bedeutungen können zurückgeführt werden auf das ihnen gemeinsame Prinzip der Gleichheit der Menschen.

Bezüglich der Bewertung der Potentialität des Songs, diskursive Resonanz zu erhalten ist es darüber hinaus von großer Bedeutung, dass die beispiellose Publizität, die er erhalten hat als absolut angemessen betrachtet wurde und dass die Botschaft des Songs sich in vollem Maße zutreffend auf die erlebte Unfreiheit als dem Kern der Situation der Bürgerinnen und Bürger der DDR bezieht. Daraus ergibt sich die Einschätzung, dass der „Sonderzug nach Pankow“ das volle Potential zur Erreichung diskursiver Resonanz entfaltet und darüber hinaus eine metaphorische Erfahrung zu vermitteln vermag.

Als Schlussfolgerung lässt sich festhalten, dass unsere Lebenswelt eine Wirklichkeit ist, die in ihrer Diskursivität fortlaufend emergiert. Wandel kommt dadurch zustande, dass zur Anpassung an veränderte Bedingungen Bedeutungen rekursiv zugewiesen werden, die sich von vorhergehenden Zuweisungen unterscheiden. Diese Differenz der zugewiesenen Bedeutung

kann auch durch Kommunikationsinstanzen hervorgerufen werden, wenn sie diskursive Resonanz erfahren. Das Potential, in dieser Weise performativ zu sein ergibt sich aus den erläuterten fünf Faktoren sowie ihrem Zusammenspiel. Für den Lindenberg Song „Sonderzug nach Pankow“ konnte dargestellt werden, dass dieses Potential in vollem Maße gegeben war.

So nachvollziehbar und wohlbegründet deshalb auch sein mag, dass der Song auch diesem seinem Potenzial entsprechende Wirkung entfaltet hat, so bleibt diese Annahme doch hypothetisch, da der diskursive Prozess hyperkomplex ist und die darin wirkenden Kausalitäten niemals eindeutig nachvollziehbar sind. Trotzdem versuchen Menschen immer wieder, den diskursiven Prozess durch kommunikative Maßnahmen zu beeinflussen. Dies ist zum Beispiel ein Ziel von Public Relations, so wie sie Edward L. Bernays entwickelt und angewendet hat. Er betrachtete die Beeinflussung der Öffentlichen Meinung als ein wichtiges Element in demokratischen Gesellschaften. Tatsächlich profitieren demokratische Gesellschaften davon, wenn verschiedene Akteure mit unterschiedlichen Interessen und Meinungen, ihre Sicht der Dinge performieren, denn nur so kommt sie zu einem umfassenden Bild der Wirklichkeit, welches sie benötigt, um sich fortlaufend den Gegebenheiten anzupassen.

Doch wenn Haltungen innerhalb einer Gesellschaft sich zu sehr polarisieren oder eine Haltung das Monopol für sich beansprucht, können Demokratien auch zugrunde gehen. Wenn die Differenz zwischen den diskursiven Kräften zu groß und irgendwann unüberwindbar werden, spaltet sich die Wirklichkeit in zwei sich semantisch voneinander abgrenzende Bedeutungssysteme, was oft zur Folge hat, dass von einer Seite nach einer mächtigen Führungsfigur verlangt wird. Aber auch im Hinblick auf die künstliche Intelligenz und ihre die menschliche Diskursivität imitierende Funktionsweise gilt es Vorsicht walten zu lassen, da in ihrer wachsenden Effizienz auch ein großes fraktales Potenzial liegt.