ANALECTA ISISIANA
XXX

Paul J. MAGNARELLA

ANATOLIA'S LOOM

•

STUDIES IN TURKISH CULTURE, SOCIETY, POLITICS AND LAW



THE ISIS PRESS
ISTANBUL

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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©1998 The Isis Press

Published by
The Isis Press
Şemsibey Sokak 10
81210 Beylerbeyi - Istanbul
Tel.: 0 (216) 321 38 51

ISBN: 975-428-113-0

First published 1998

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-11920154153-27776209X-19/fragment/page=0002

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Paul J. Magnarella is Professor of Anthropology and Legal Studies at the University of Florida. He earned the M.A. and Ph.D. in Cultural Anthropology and Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard University and the J.D. with Honors from the University of Florida College of Law. He also earned Certificates in Human Rights Law and Teaching from the International Institute of Human Rights, Strasbourg, France. At the University of Florida Magnarella teaches international, human rights and humanitarian law courses in the College of Law and courses on legal anthropology, political anthropology, theory, Middle East Societies and Islamic Civilization in the Department of Anthropology. He also served as Visiting Lecturer at Innsbruck University (Austria), at the University of Florence's Anthropology Institute (Italy), and in Soviet Georgia, by invitation of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Magnarella has been a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer in Turkey, a Fulbright-Hayes Scholar, a United States Department of State Scholar-Diplomat for Near Eastern Affairs, an Intern at the United Nations Centre for Human Rights, in Geneva, and the President of the Association of Third World Studies. In addition, he served as an Expert-on-Mission at the U.N. Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (The Hague, 1995), and currently serves as Special Counsel to the Association of Third World Studies. He is a member of the International Law sections of the Florida and American Bar Associations. Magnarella has conducted field research in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, and has published extensively in scholarly journals. He has authored three books: *Tradition and Change in a Turkish Town* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman/J. Wiley, 1974, rev. 1981), *The Peasant Venture* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman/ D.K. Hall, 1979), and *Human Materialism* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1993).

His special recognitions include the Distinguished Service Award granted by the Association for the Anthropological Study of Diplomacy, Politics, and Society (1982) and the Association of Third World Studies Presidential Award "In Recognition of His Outstanding Contribution to Scholarship Devoted to the Third World" (1993).

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I dedicate this book to
the people of Turkey,
who have kindly shared
their land and culture
with me.

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PREFACE

I am honored that such a fine publishing house has decided to reprint a collection of my articles in a single volume. I thank Sinan Küneralp and Isis Press for including my work in the highly regarded Analecta Isisania Series.

Because most of the articles are reprinted here in their original form, I ask the reader for a certain amount of forbearance. Some statements in these articles are now dated and are of historic rather than contemporary relevance. In addition, the introductions to several articles are similar, since they set the same historic background and context for their research topics.

My studies have been greatly aided by too many people to thank adequately here by name. I express my gratitude to the people of Turkey and to my professors and colleagues. I owe a special thanks to Howard A. Reed, an esteemed scholar of Ottoman and modern Turkey, for his most gracious Foreword to this volume. Finally, I thank some very special persons — Sharlene, Christine, Mark and Brad— for their most valued love and support.

Paul J. Magnarella

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FOREWORD

Anatolia's Loom offers a unique collection of studies spanning a fascinating broad and insightful spectrum of materials on modern Turkey. Its author, Paul J. Magnarella, is one of the very few scholars whose research and publications on contemporary Turkish culture, community, society, politics, human and economic development, international relations and law have opened new frontiers of understanding in each of these significant fields. No one else has combined such varied disciplines in analyzing Turkish society and polity. Even more notably, Magnarella has also developed a universal social science paradigm--Human Materialism--on the basis of his Turkish research. He has also engaged in research elsewhere in the Middle East, in Africa and in Europe. He has also lectured widely, authored or edited five books and published extensively in scholarly journals.

In this twentieth century, masses of traditional peasants along with townsfolk, who normally form the most stable core of the citizenry, have ventured to urban areas or abroad by the millions. These emigrations have had an incalculable impact on the rapid, uncontrolled explosion of city populations, with ripple effects throughout the globe. Related problems of various minorities, refugees, ethnic cleansing, regional and international conflicts, grave new ecological stresses exacerbated by nuclear proliferation, biological or chemical toxins, lack of education, housing, employment and even at times hope, place enormous new responsibilities on governments and the international agencies trying to serve burgeoning populations and improve the quality of life for all. Among the consequences of these vast migrations, agriculture has been neglected in favor of industry, water is in increasingly short supply and even more polluted, anomie and despair among younger and older citizens lead to growing competition for finite resources, denial of human rights, civil strife, arms races and wars.

The perceptive studies in this book analyze the roots of many of these ills on the basis of the Turkish experience. The author clarifies how Turkey, a bellwether less developed country that has progressed astonishingly since it won the first war of national liberation of the 20th century in 1922, has confronted and dealt constructively with many of these challenges. In so doing, the Turks have become exemplars for many newly independent peoples. Today, Turkey is

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universally respected for its responsible participation in international bodies devoted to peace and security. Its basic policy, adopted by its founding President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a brilliant general of the defunct Ottoman Empire turned civilian statesman, has been to seek "Peace at home and peace in the world."

Yet the costs of Turkey's rapid development continue to be high. For example, a decade ago Turkey was one of some eight nations with substantial agricultural surpluses to help feed a hungry world. However, agricultural production has declined, and Turkey is now importing increasing amounts of food for its more than 65 million people who can ill afford the additional costs involved. But Turkey's dynamic economy keeps growing, as it has for decades despite substantial inflation. For many years the Turkish economy grew at an average of around 5% per annum, faster than that of its fellow members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which includes Germany, Japan and the United States. In the early 1990s Turkey devoted a higher proportion of its national budget to education than to defense. Today, however, the military again devours the giant's share of national resources, while education, health and social welfare decline. Turkey is a microcosm of issues confronting the human family. As Professor Magnarella's studies indicate, it has much to teach policy makers and concerned citizens about better ways to approach persistent problems constructively.

Magnarella's achievement is remarkable from any viewpoint. It is all the more so in view of the fact that he began as a middle school social studies teacher in the United States, hoping eventually to study Renaissance art in Italy. Instead, he volunteered for the Peace Corps in 1963, spent two years as an English teacher in two small Turkish towns, married Sharlene — a fellow Peace Corps Volunteer — and returned to the U.S. to pursue graduate studies in political science. A chance reading of Mischa Titiev's *Introduction to Anthropology* persuaded him that anthropology offered better insights into cross-cultural empathy than did politics, so he went on to earn the Ph.D. in Anthropology at Harvard and began his outstanding teaching, research and public service career. He is one of several Peace Corps Volunteers whose service in Turkey resulted in careers devoted to Turkish studies. Magnarella was also awarded the J.D. with honors, and is currently a Professor of Anthropology and Legal Studies at the University of Florida.

In addition, Paul earned certificates in Human Rights Law and Teaching from the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. He has served as a Fulbright Scholar, a U.S. Department of State Scholar-Diplomat for Near Eastern Affairs, an intern at the United Nations Centre for Human Rights in Geneva, and President of the Association for Third World Studies. He has been guest lecturer at the University of Innsbruck in Austria, the University of

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Florence's Anthropology Institute, and at various universities in the former Georgian S.S.R. at the invitation of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Paul also served as an Expert-on-Mission at the U.N. Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at the Hague and currently serves as Special Counsel to the Association for Third World Studies as well as its Special Representative to the U.N. Economic and Social Council. He has also won a number of academic awards and recognitions.

Magnarella's pathbreaking research has been pioneering in several areas, one being his study of Turkish towns. In his first book—*Tradition and Change in a Turkish Town* (1974, rev. ed. 1981)—he produced fresh data on the demography of the late Ottoman Empire. He explained how Ottoman Muslim survivors, who were forced out of the Balkans and southern Russia (notably Circassia and Georgia) by ethnic cleansing and the wars of the 19th and early 20th century, found refuge in Anatolia, where they were resettled by a financially bankrupt Ottoman administration. Gradually, these refugees integrated harmoniously with local Turks despite over a decade of devastating wars from 1911 to 1923. Turkey emerged from the ordeal of World War I to become the only Central Power to successfully resist Allied occupation as envisioned in the imposed Sevres Treaty of 1920, which would have granted most of the Ottoman Turkish Anatolian heartland to France, Greece, Italy and Russia. Turkey's new leaders negotiated the 1923 Lausanne Treaty which recognized Turkish national sovereignty and essentially the present borders of the Turkish Republic. *Tradition and Change* is a penetrating analysis of life and social organization in the western Anatolian town of Susurluk which Magnarella deftly places within its regional, national and international contexts. Anthropologist John Gulick, an expert on the Middle East, characterized this work as "one of the best anthropological community studies in the Middle East that has so far been published" (*The Middle East: An Anthropological Perspective* 1983:237).

In his next book—*The Peasant Venture* (1979)—Magnarella produced the first study of the assimilation of Georgian refugees in Turkey. This work was also one of the first analyses assessing the impact of large scale labor emigration to Europe on the sending village community. Turkey has had some two million of its citizens living and working in West European countries, especially Germany.

In the mid-1970s, Magnarella also took the lead in collaborating with a talented Turkish scholar in their pioneering research on the development of Turkish social anthropology. Their article resulting from this study appears as the first contribution to this remarkable anthology. Alas, too few Americans engaged in various fields of Turkish studies carry out joint research with Turkish

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colleagues. Magnarella and Türkdoğan's article is an excellent example of fruitful and mutually beneficial collaboration.

Few social scientists of my acquaintance have the great sense of humanity, kinship with the people whom they study, and professional talents that Paul Magnarella's personality and writings reveal. I know of no other scholar specializing in Turkish themes who has developed a new, universal paradigm. This theoretic model, expounded in his book—*Human Materialism: A Model of Sociocultural Systems and a Strategy for Analysis* (1993)—is designed to bridge the gap between scientific and humanistic approaches to understanding human behavior, culture and society. He applies this paradigm to several studies in this collection.

It is a pleasure to invite readers to learn from and savor this landmark anthology of studies based on research of over a quarter of a century. As a life-long student of Turkey and her people, I have learned much from Paul Magnarella's original and thought-provoking analyses. They have enriched my understanding as an educator and historian. I want to underscore what Richard D. Robinson, Professor of International Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and outstanding field researcher in Turkey in the late 1940s and early 1950s, wrote about Magnarella's research. Robinson had visited the town of Susurluk in 1948, twenty-one years before Magnarella arrived there for his pioneering study. In his *Foreword* to Paul's excellent first book, Robinson wrote:

> Every page of Dr. Magnarella's study rings true. What is particularly appealing is his ability to intermingle anthropological models with meaningful statistics and anecdotal snapshots of life. His final anecdote, the story of Mustafa the tailor, in a way encapsulates the whole process of social change in the Turkish context, with its joy and sorrow, its opportunity and dilemma. One suspects that the story of Mustafa the tailor will be referred to by other analysts with the same frequency as Daniel Lerner's "Grocer and Chief of Balgat."[1]

All that I have read of Magnarella's writings since then also rings true to me with the same authentic quality and tone. He and his publishers are to be congratulated for this noteworthy anthology of exceptional merit which I commend to you. [1]

Howard A. Reed
Professor of History Emeritus
University of Connecticut
Honorary Member, Turkish Historical Society

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[1]Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*. New York: The Free Press, 1958.

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INTRODUCTION

Personal Reflections

The articles contained in this volume cover a span exceeding a quarter of a century, from 1967 to 1994. During that time my thinking about humans and social science progressively changed. Because a scholar's views of his subject are determined, in significant part, by his personal experiences, I have decided to include here some personal history and intellectual influences that have affected my writings about Turkish culture, society, politics, and law.

My involvement with Turkey goes back to 1963, when I accepted an invitation from the U.S. Peace Corps to join a training program for potential volunteers. In June of 1963, I along with about eighty other young college graduates reported to Georgetown University's Washington D.C. campus to begin training. For ten weeks we immersed ourselves in courses on Turkish language, history, and society, and tested our character with challenging canoe trips through the rapids of the upper Potomac River. Our Peace Corps group, known as Turkey II (1963-65), was designated to teach English as a foreign language in public middle and high schools located in Turkey's provincial capitals. Having taught English grammar for a year to American seventh graders, I felt qualified for the assignment. The organizers of the training program made a genuine effort to sensitize us and to foster respect for our future hosts. The following advice appeared in our Peace Corps Training Program Turkey II manual:

> Success in Peace Corps projects largely depends on the Volunteers' adherence to the basic principle of adaptation to the cultural system of the host country. The Volunteer must work with that system and live under the local law which governs the indigenous population. The Volunteer must learn to speak the language of the host country in a literal sense, as well as learn "to speak the language" in the figurative sense of having insight into and understanding of the values and behavior of the people. In all aspects of his daily life, in his hours of recreation as well as those of his professional or technical assistance, the Volunteer will find himself in situations which require great tact

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> and sympathetic imagination. To that end the Volunteer must be constantly alert to exercise kindness and consideration, to preserve the dignity of others, and to refuse to threaten anyone's social position or to usurp his authority. [p. 19]

In retrospect, the training succeeded as well as could be expected. Living in a foreign culture, like being married, is too deep a social, physical, and psychological experience to convey to others through readings and lectures. Probably the best one can do is counsel patience, tolerance, and respect.

Upon completion of our training at Georgetown, we traveled to Turkey. After a brief adjustment period in Ankara, the volunteers set out in small groups by mini-bus for their teaching sites. Another volunteer and I were driven to Burdur, a provincial capital of about 35,000 residents (1963) in southwestern Turkey on the edge of the Anatolian plateau. I survived in this city for a year, largely because of the help and sincere hospitality of practically everyone I stumbled into. Fellow teachers and students always seemed to be there to answer my questions or to help solve my problems. Their friendship made this strange town become home. Few could speak English, but they had the patience to help me understand.

During much of this first year I lived in the bachelor quarters of the high school pension along with four other Turkish teachers, who had come to Burdur from distant parts of Turkey. They taught me to speak Turkish, to play the mandolin, to wash properly in the Turkish bath (*hamam*), to enjoy Turkish food, to appreciate Turkish humor and political satire, as well as to empathize with my village students, whose families had sent them away to school at great expense and with even greater hope.

During the day I taught English to five classes of fifty to seventy students each. They sat there alertly, three to a bench in their blue jackets and dresses, eager to hear a native speaker create the magical sounds of English and amused to hear him stumble badly over Turkish. In the winter, each classroom was heated by one small wood stove attended by the students themselves. Light was provided by a single electric bulb that glowed so dimly the students were unable to see the writing on the blackboard in the late afternoon. I never ceased to marvel at their ability to learn with barely a complaint under these conditions.

My one college course in cultural anthropology proved very useful as I lived in Turkey, first in Burdur then in Antalya with my new wife, also a volunteer. From anthropology I gained an appreciation for cultural variation and an aversion to ethnocentrism. I found the different ways Turks carried out ordinary tasks intriguing. Although I rated cultural anthropology my favorite

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college course, actually becoming an anthropologist seemed a totally unrealistic aspiration. Careers in anthropology, I thought, were reserved for a select few who could reside abroad for extended periods and then leisurely write fascinating books without worrying about earning a living.

Consequently, joining the Peace Corps formed no part of a plan to become an anthropologist. On the contrary, I envisioned studying Renaissance art and history in Italy immediately after completing my Peace Corps tour. Besides, being an anthropologist required fluency in an unusual language. During Peace Corps training I had concluded that Turkish was beyond me. Because Turkish word order is the reverse of English, I doubted that I could ever think backwards fast enough to carry on a decent conversation even with the most patient of Turks. To my joy and amazement, however, I was doing just that after a year in country.

The circumstances prompting me to realize I could possibly function as an anthropologist remain vivid. During my second year in Turkey I revisited Yeşilköy, a romantically remote village on the edge of the Anatolian Plateau without electricity, plumbing or hard roads. The villagers had hosted me for three days about six months earlier when they were celebrating a wedding. During this visit, with my Turkish much improved and my mind and body accustomed to the rigors, smells and tastes of peasant life, I enjoyed long, deep conversations with the village men about their and my lives: our pasts, presents, and "God-willing" futures. For a moment during our talks, the former mono-lingual, mono-cultural, provincial me slipped apart from myself to observe the recast me from the far side of the room. Assessing in English its new counterpart comfortably immersed in the Turkish peasant milieu, it felt a proud exhilaration. We both realized a profound enrichment had occurred.

This Turkish experience provided me with the opportunity to learn how intellectually invigorating confronting the culturally different can be. New people, words, customs, ideas, material creations, etc. constituted the stimuli for mental analysis, aesthetic enjoyment, and humanistic appreciation. Reaching understandings of previously strange and mysterious cultural phenomena gave me a novel sense of satisfaction and personal growth.

This, my first stay in Turkey constituted an anthropological experience in several important ways: I had to learn the local language to effectively communicate with ordinary people; I lived on the native economy at a standard comparable to my Turkish counterparts; I became a long-term, participant observer in a true anthropological sense. By experiencing society from within as a community teacher, I had the opportunity to gain the kind of empathetic understanding many anthropologists hope for.

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Furthermore, the host country's own rich culture demanded special, anthropological attention. Turkey's twentieth century history of disintegrating Ottomanism, emergent Kemalist republicanism, and struggle towards political democracy, its contrasting peasant villages and expanding cities along with its culturally and geographically diverse regions intrigue even the casual observer. Consequently, at the conclusion of my Peace Corps assignment, I decided to pursue graduate education in the United States in order to better understand some of what I had seen and experienced.

Initially, I entered Indiana University's graduate program in political science, and one of my term papers dealing with Turkey's 1965 election became my first scholarly publication (Magnarella 1967). Although I liked political science, a spare-time reading of Mischa Titiev's *Introduction to Cultural Anthropology* convinced me anthropology offered better approaches to cross-cultural understanding. After one year at Indiana, I transferred to Harvard University where I subsequently completed the A.M. in Social Anthropology and the Ph.D. in Anthropology and Middle Eastern Studies.

Those first two years in Turkey contributed tremendously to my anthropological education at Harvard by providing empirical references for abstract theoretical frameworks. Emile Durkheim's mechanical versus organic solidarity and Robert Redfield's folk-urban continuum came to life as I applied them to Turkey. Term papers represented opportunities to try out different analytic approaches on Turkish data in order to solve sociocultural puzzles and to compare the efficacy of rival theoretical models. Two of these term papers resulted in scholarly publications (Magnarella 1969, 1970).

Alongside interesting anthropology courses with Cora DuBois, David Maybury-Lewis, Evon Vogt, John Pelzel, John Whiting, and Irven DeVore, I took stimulating courses in related disciplines: in sociology with Talcott Parsons and in social psychology with David McClellan. I also studied Ottoman history with Stanford Shaw and advanced Turkish literature with Zekiye Eglar, a Turkish woman who held a Ph.D. in anthropology from Columbia University. For two years Dr. Eglar and I read more than a dozen ethnographies of Turkish villages, a Turkish urban study, numerous articles in the *Turkish Journal of Sociology,* and *Kutagu Bilig*, a tenth century book of advice for Central Asian Turkish rulers (see Eglar and Magnarella 1971). This academic preparation along with the knowledge and friends gained during my two years in Turkey aided the subsequent fieldwork phase of my studies immeasurably.

For the Ph.D. dissertation, I decided to study the impact of modernizing processes on traditional Turkish culture and society within a small urban context. Anthropological studies of villages and within large cities had already been done, but the Turkish town was largely unexplored. Crucial for the success

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of this research was the selection of a modernizing town whose authorities would permit the study. A good Turkish friend from Peace Corps days deserves the credit and my eternal gratitude for both the town selection and a favorable local reception. This friend had attended my adult English classes back in Burdur days. An agricultural engineer, he had recently been assigned to a sugar beet refinery in Susurluk, a town of about 12,000 in 1969. Owing to the refinery, introduced in the late 1950s, the town and some of its surrounding villages were undergoing marked infrastructural changes, including new roads, cash cropping, urban growth, etc. Susurluk proved to be an excellent research site. My Turkish friend facilitated my entrance by introducing me to town officials, businessmen and some factory workers.

A novice anthropologist's first excursion into the field has been described variously as the initiation into the club; as an episode in psychological trauma; as a journey into self discovery; as a stumbling towards pan-human awareness; etc. Graduate students commonly criticize their professors for inadequately preparing them for this seemingly mystical adventure as well as for failing to divulge their own emotional grapplings with this liminal stage of professional maturation. For me, however, returning to Turkey was like going back home. Thanks to my Peace Corps experience, I already knew the country fairly well. My previous years in Turkey helped me to adjust quickly to living conditions, and my knowledge of Turkish enabled me to begin conversing with townspeople and collecting information immediately.

Among the most critical relationships that anthropologists forge in the field are those with their "key informants"--those god-sends with the patience and charity necessary to transform cultural illiterates into passably civilized humans. Our debts to these teachers-of-culture for their contributions to our intellects, social nature, scholarship and careers are usually beyond recompense. Those of us from industrially advanced, affluent countries return home to write up our research in the form of dissertations, articles, or books, and then reap the rewards of our scholarship. Meanwhile, the major source of our knowledge, our key informants, continue to live at their same levels, with little or no material gain from their investments of time, effort, and more in a foreigner's odd career. Not that they complain, however, for such people are the first to exclaim the spiritual benefits of their close friendship with that foreigner, who one day had descended upon their community like a lost soul, but later left like a departing offspring or sibling.

In my own initiation to the club one god-send in particular stands out. She was my "landlady," a plump, five foot two inch, peasant woman in her seventies with deep brown eyes and hennaed reddish-brown hair. She was an encyclopedia of local knowledge, who had outlived three husbands and her several children. For a year I lived with her and her fourth husband in their three

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room house on one of the town's main streets. We shared meals, entertained guests together, and passed many hours of enjoyable conversation either basking in the sun of their garden on mild days or huddled around their small wood stove on cold winter nights. Being illiterate, they entrusted me with the reading and writing of their correspondence. I shared household duties, like shopping and gardening. We became a family. I called her *annem*, my mother, and her husband *amca*, uncle; they called me *oğlum*, my son. They never learned my name!

My Turkish mother was a treasure-trove of folkloric wisdom, a fortune teller, a Quranic prayer reciter, a popular curer, and a matchmaker. Over the year, she enriched my life with information about her varied activities. Through her I learned about the etiquette of Turkish home life and got a glimpse of the hidden world of traditional women. She baked special biscuits for me whenever I went on a trip and ritualistically poured water on the steps to ensure that my journeys and returns would go smoothly. They always did. Before she died in 1977, she told me that we would reunite in the hereafter. "I made you my spiritual son," she explained. "If you don't attain paradise, Allah will let me bring you in."

Thanks to my Turkish mother and other god-sends, the research went extremely well, resulting in some life-long friendships, treasured memories, a dissertation, several published articles, and a well-received book (Magnarella 1974). The Susurluk research led me to other communities and to a unique study of emigrating peasants and their sending village (Magnarella 1979).

Theoretical Orientations

In 1979 I joined the faculty of the University of Florida as a professor of anthropology, teaching courses on anthropological theory, the Middle East, kinship, culture change, and political anthropology. Later, I also became a part-time law student with a concentration in international and human rights law. I completed the J.D. or doctorate of law degree in 1991. Two of the articles in Part 5 of this collection reflect my current interests in the interrelationships of law, politics, and society.

Prior to the 1990s, the theoretical underpinnings of most of my writings were largely eclectic. I had made no commitment to any particular theoretical model. More recently, however, I developed a theoretical paradigm I call human materialism and expounded in a book entitled *Human Materialism: A Model of Sociocultural Systems and a Strategy for Analysis* (Gainesville, Fl.: Univ. Press of Florida, 1993). Human materialism is a systematic paradigm designed to bridge the gap between scientific and humanistic approaches to

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understanding human behavior, culture, and society. It conceptualizes humans as rational, cost/benefit calculating, scheming, emotional, loving and hating, social creatures, who are indoctrinated to some degree in ideological, ritual, and symbolic systems that influence their thought, behavior, and perceptions of their natural and sociocultural environments. Even though human materialism eschews simplistic, reductionistic characterizations of human nature, it still manages to offer a framework or research strategy for investigating human sociocultural systems and generating hypotheses and theories that facilitate understanding, explanation, and prediction.

The human materialist paradigm constitutes both an abstract model of sociocultural systems and a research strategy. It combines in a unique and fruitful way a number of established theoretical perspectives. One of its major strengths and innovations is its blending of infrastructural causality with humanistic teleology. That is, it places human behavior within its effective environmental context and also focuses significantly on human thought, especially the plans, strategies, and agendas of societal leaders. The paradigm analytically divides sociocultural systems into three major interfacing components—infrastructural, social structural, and superstructural—and suggests, for the purpose of hypothesis formation, a sequence of causal relationships. Although the model assumes mutual causality within, between and among the three major components, it hypothesizes that the direction of the more powerful causal forces goes from infrastructure to social structure to superstructure.

The human materialist paradigm is designed to be dynamic, rather than simply mechanical. It is comprehensive enough to deal with sociocultural systems as small as families or hunting and gathering bands, or as large as modern states and interstate systems. It can address questions in any of the social sciences areas: kinship, society, politics, economics, religion, law, education, etc.

Most of the articles in this collection appear in their original form, with some relatively minor corrections. Although several of the pre-1993 articles contain traces of the human materialist paradigm, three articles have been extensively revised to reflect its explicit application. They are "A Humanistic Model of Changing Peasants" in Part III, "Civil Violence in Turkey: Its Infrastructural, Social and Cultural Foundations," in Part IV, and "Desecularization, State Corporatism, and Elite Behavior in Turkey," also in Part IV. I suspect that most of my future analytic studies will be heavily influenced by human materialism.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF TURKISH SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY

This report traces the development of social anthropology in Turkey from its intellectual foundations to about 1972-73. The report has a number of limitations which we would like to point out at the start.

1. It deals almost exclusively with "Turkish social anthropology"; that is, it mainly covers studies conducted in Turkey by Turkish social scientists who have examined social, economic, political, educational, and/or religious institutions and the sociocultural values, norms, and roles which structure the relations of participants in these institutions. In preparing the report, we have been particularly interested in the work of social scientists who have resided in their research sites for an extended period and have employed the characteristic anthropological research technique of participant observation. We have treated any studies conforming to the above topical and research criteria as "social anthropological" studies, even though their authors may describe themselves by other labels, such as sociologists or rural sociologists.

2. Our treatment of the subject is neither bibliographical nor fully biographical. We only highlight the important works and persons marking the various stages of development of social anthropology in Turkey. A thorough treatment of the topic would have required a book rather than a short report. Excellent bibliographies by Beeley (1969) and Tezcan (1969) are available, but unfortunately biographical accounts of many important Turkish social scientists do not exist. We hope that some of Turkey's many promising young scholars will soon undertake the task of providing them.

3. Except in rare cases, we have not included foreign research in our discussion. Readers wishing information on foreign social research in Turkey are referred to Kolars (1962) and Weiker (1969).

4. Our information is often uneven. For instance, we give much more information on some authors than on others. This can largely be attributed to differential response or lack of response by Turkish scholars to our requests for information.

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HISTORICAL AND INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND

Social science in Turkey developed largely in response to social, economic, and political problems in the late Ottoman and early Turkish Republican periods.[1] At the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, Ottoman intellectuals were debating the causes of their Empire's decline and possible remedies for it. They wondered why the deterioration of conditions in the Islamic East coincided with advances in the Christian West. While conservatives or "Pan-Islamists" preached an Islamic revitalization as the solution, "Westernists" advocated the adoption of successful European social, legal, educational, and governmental institutions.

The military represented an important channel for cultural transmission from West to East. As a consequence of Turkey's adverse contacts with modern Europe's military might, most Ottoman leaders agreed that the Empire's decline was at least partly attributable to their own armies' antiquated tactics and equipment. Hence, they established new schools in which Western military subjects, along with the modern mathematical and physical sciences, were taught. For example, in 1828 a new medical school with European instructors was opened in Istanbul to train doctors for the "new" Ottoman army. Physicians for the civilian population still studied the syllabus based on the writings of Galen and Avicenna (Lewis 1961: 82-83).

Diplomatic contacts with Europe represented another important channel of Western influence into the Empire. Mustafa Reşit Pasha (1800-58), considered by many the real architect of the 19th-century Ottoman reforms, was sent to Paris as Ambassador in 1834. He mastered French and exchanged ideas with such important French intellectuals as the Orientalist Silvestre de Sacy and the social philosopher August Comte. His communications with Comte concerning methods of improving Ottoman government and society may very well represent the first direct contact of an Ottoman leader with Western sociological thought. After Paris, Reşit was sent to London, where he was favorably impressed by the British political system. The reforms he largely initiated and designed, collectively known as the *Tanzimat*, "the reorganization," contained such principles as the following (Lewis 1961: 105):

> the security of life, honour, and property of the subject, the abolition of tax-farming and all the abuses associated with it, regular and orderly recruitment into the armed forces, fair and public trial of persons accused of crimes, and equality of persons of all religions in the application of these laws. It was this last that represented the most radical breach with

[1] The best English-language sources for these periods are Ahmad (1969), Berkes (1964), Davison (1963), Lewis (1961), Mardin (1962), and Ramsaur (1957).

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ancient Islamic tradition, and was therefore most shocking to Muslim principles and good taste.

Favorable European contact intensified during the Crimean War (1853-56), in which France, England, and Sardinia joined forces with the Ottomans against Russia. Large numbers of English, French, and Italian officials, merchants, journalists, soldiers, and travelers were present in Istanbul and other parts of the Empire disseminating European ideas and money. For many wealthy Ottoman families, a European education for their sons became the fashion; students went to Paris, Geneva, London, and other university centers to become exposed to Western culture and political thought.

During the period following the *Tanzimat*, a new Turkish literature developed, differing in form and content from classical Ottoman writings. This literary movement, which accelerated the spread of Western social and political thought in Turkey, was pioneered largely by three men: Ibrahim Şinasi (1828-71), Ziya Pasha (1825-80), and Namık Kemal (1840-88).

Ibrahim Şinasi, the son of an artillery officer, learned French as a boy from a French renegade in the Ottoman service. Later, thanks to Mustafa Reşit Pasha he joined a Turkish student mission in Paris, where he reportedly took part in the revolution of 1848 and became acquainted with the poet-statesman Lamartine, whose writings greatly influenced him. After five years abroad, he returned to Turkey and was appointed to the Ministry of Public Instruction. He resigned, however, in 1859 and began to publish his own journal, through which he hoped to assimilate Turkish intellectual life to that of the West (Lewis 1961: 133-34).

Ziya Pasha also studied French as a boy, and with the help of Mustafa Reşit Pasha he was appointed third secretary to the Sultan. Later he fell out of favor with the Ottoman rulers and fled to Europe, living successively in Paris, London, and Geneva. He translated Rousseau's *Emile* into Turkish and wrote vigorous criticisms of the Ottoman regime. In his book *The Dream*, written in London in 1869, he argued for the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire on the basis of French and English governmental principles (Emin 1934).

Namık Kemal, the youngest and most famous of these three innovators, was born to an aristocratic family and educated by private tutors. At seventeen he secured a position in the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte — Turkey's open window to the West. He came under the influence of Şinasi and collaborated with him on his journal. His critical essays on Ottoman affairs set the authorities against him, and he fled to Europe with Ziya in 1867. For the next three years he lived in London, Paris, and Vienna, where he translated a number of French works into Turkish while studying law and economics. He

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returned to Turkey to continue his political writings, only to be exiled by Sultan Abdulaziz. In a long series of plays, novels, essays, and poems, Kemal attempted to reconcile two basic ideas of the French revolution — freedom and fatherland — with Muslim traditions. He had been deeply impressed by the French and English parliamentary systems, and his political thought was heavily influenced by Rousseau and Montesquieu, whose *Esprit des Lois* he began publishing in translation in 1863 (Lewis 1961: 137-43).

Although these and other Western thinkers in the Ottoman Empire were persecuted and often exiled by the authorities, their writings and activities contributed to the creation of a group of intellectuals known as the Young Turks, who believed that the Ottoman Empire could be saved only by the adoption of Western political and social institutions. The Young Turks entered into a political struggle with the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid, their primary objective being the restoration of constitutional rule and of the Parliament which had been suspended and prorogued since 1878. (They achieved this goal in 1908.)

As the Westernists attempted to formulate a Europeanization process for the Empire, they came to realize the difficulty of superimposing Western institutions on an incompatible cultural base. Hence, they tried to systematize their thinking by studying the foundations of Western civilization and the evolution of Turkish culture (Berkes 1936: 241).

One of the Young Turks who tried to utilize Western social scientific ideas in his conceptualization of a reformed Ottoman Empire was Ahmet Riza (1859-1930). Son of an Austrian mother and an Anglophile Turkish father, Riza studied in France and learned French fluently. Initially he tried to reform the Empire by working within the system, first in the Ministry of Agriculture, then in the Ministry of Education. However, he resigned from government service in disgust and went to Paris in 1889, where he joined a colony of Young Turks. There he met Pierre Lafitte, a disciple of Comte, who instructed him in the positivist philosophy that was to dominate his thinking. Riza became a familiar figure in Parisian positivist circles as well as an occasional contributor to the *Revue Occidentale,* the French positivist journal. Comte's concepts of "order" and "progress" were the keystones of Riza's political writings, which he published in the Young Turk fortnightly journal *Meşveret* (Consultation). Although he did not produce any systematic sociological treatises, he was responsible for spreading Comte's philisophy to Turkey, where it subsequently influenced many Turkish sociologists (Berkes 1936: 241).

Prince Sabahaddin (1877-1948), son of Sultan Abdulhamid's sister, escaped to France with his father and younger brother in 1899 to avoid political persecution. While there he met Edmond Demolins, a disciple of Frédéric Le

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Play, and adopted the Le Play school of social thought, a rival of the Comte school being expounded by Riza. Sabahaddin founded a society of Young Turks in exile called *Ligue de décentralisation administrative et d'initiative privée* and published the paper *Terakki* (Progress) as its organ. He shared Le Play's great admiration for the English system of local self-government especially as expounded by Demolins in his 1897 work *A quoi tient la superiorité des anglo-saxons*.

Sabahaddin was probably the first Ottoman to offer a complete social diagnosis of the underlying causes of Ottoman deterioration. He saw the Sultan's tyranny as the product of a particular sociocultural system, which had to be changed to reform the Empire. Following Demolins, he argued that societies were based on either *formation communautaire* or *formation particulariste*. The first category is typified by Eastern societies, among them the Ottoman, in which there is a tendency for people to rely on the community, family, tribe, clan, or public powers. In societies of the second category, there is a tendency for individuals to rely on the self. England was seen as the best example of this type (Berkes 1964:310-12). Following the reasoning of Le Play, Sabahaddin (1965) argued that Western individualism, private ownership, and governmental decentralization were responsible for the success of modern European states, and he advocated Westernization of this kind for Turkey. Sabahaddin and his disciple Mehmet Şevki (1968) popularized the ideas of Le Play in Turkey.

The major theoretical and methodological contributions Le Play was to make to Turkish social anthropology were his emphasis on the family as the basic unit of society and the use of the case-study method and the analysis of family budgets. Le Play maintained that each family functions primarily to earn subsistence for its members through work. The family's geographical location strongly influences the nature of its work and the character of its subsistence. This "place-work-family" triad became the focus of a number of social anthropological studies in Turkey, among them the village studies of Salahaddin Demirkan (1941 *a, b*).

Probably the most important personality in the development of both sociology and social anthropology in Turkey is Ziya Gökalp (1875-1924). The son of a government employee, he grew up in the rather remote Southeast Anatolian city of Diyarbakir. He studied French in lycée and became familiar with the writings of Namik Kemal, Ziya Pasha, and others in the modernist movement. In 1908 he joined a group of Young Turks in Salonika and discussed ways of modernizing Turkey. He became familiar with the major schools of 19th-century European sociology and found Emile Durkheim's concepts, theories, and methods most applicable to the Turkish situation.

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Like Sabahaddin, Gökalp believed that political change in Turkey had to be accompanied by general sociocultural change to have any meaning. Hence, he employed Dukheimian sociology in a systematic investigation of Turkey's social and cultural problems. His prolific writings in Turkish journals addressed the question of how the Turks should integrate Western civilization with their Turkish and Islamic legacies. Among Gökalp's major contributions was his distinction between "civilization" and "culture." For him, "civilization" represented the shared creativity of many different peoples; it consisted primarily of mankind's intelletual and scientific achievements. By contrast, "culture" was comprised of one nation's unique sociocultural values, originality, subjective views, and expressions. To reform society. Gökalp contended, one must first understand and appreciate its unique culture and then adapt to it those aspects of international civilization that will induce harmonious change. His sociocultural philosophy offered a solution to the controversy reigning in Turkey between the Pan-Islamists and Westernists. Unlike the members of these two camps. Gökalp argued that Turkification, Islamization, and modernization could be harmoniously combined to achieve national development (Emin 1931; Gökalp 1959, 1968; Heyd 1950).

Gökalp has been called the intellectual father of the Turkish Revolution (Webster 1939:138). The first Turkish Chair of Sociology was established for him at Istanbul University in 1915. He founded a research institute of sociocultural studies and started a short-lived journal of sociology (*Içtimaiyat Mecmuası*) in 1917. Under his influence, many important works by Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, Fauconnet, and Mauss were translated into Turkish. Gökalp also encouraged the introduction of sociology into the normal schools. In 1924 this was achieved by copying the program the French Ministry of Education had prepared for the French normal schools. The first sociology textbook was a translation of the French textbook by Hess and Gleyze. In 1927 two of Gökalp's former students — Mehmet Izzet and Ali Kami — prepared Turkish textbooks, which were also based on French models. Hence, pre-World War II sociology in Turkey was dominated by the influence of Gökalp and Durkheim (Berkes 1936).

A common feature of all the various schools of social thought developed during the late Ottoman and early Republican periods was "their tendency to treat sociology as a kind of philosophy, even of religion, and as a source of quasi-revealed authority on moral social, political, and even religious problems" (Lewis 1961: 227).

The Young Turks dedicated themselves to the credo of Ottomanism — the establishment of a modernized Ottoman Empire with liberal institutions in which peoples of all races and religions could feel a common identity and enjoy common citizenship. However, the development of Arab nationalism and the Balkan Wars of the early 1900s, in which the Albanians and Slavs won their

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independence from the Ottoman Empire, combined to render Ottomanism impractical.

Towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, Pan-Turkism, a new political ideology proposing the union of all Turkic peoples in Asia in one nation-state, emerged and received impetus from various sources: the example of European nationalism; the development of Turcology — the study of Turkic language, history, and culture — in Turkey and Europe; and the immigration to Turkey of educated "Russian Turks" (Muslim Tatars and Turks from the Volga, Central Asia, the Crimea, and Azerbaijan), who were familiar with Russian Pan-Slavism.

One of the first organized expressions of this new ideology was the establishment of the Turkish Society (*Türk Derneği*) in Istanbul in 1908, with the objectives of studying "the ancient remains, history, languages, literatures, ethnography and ethnology, social conditions and present civilizations of the Turks, and the ancient and modern geography of the Turkish lands" (Lewis 1961:343). In 1912 Ziya Gökalp joined the editorial board of the society's organ, *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland), and became the chief theoretician of the Turkist movement. Many cultural and political articles on Turkism were published under his direction.

Associated with *Türk Yurdu* was a club called *Türk Ocağı* (Turkish Hearth), established in 1912 in Istanbul and expanded to other cities, with the stated aim of advancing the social, scientific, and economic levels of the Turks and striving for the betterment of the Turkish race and language (Lewis 1961:344). By 1930, there were 255 branches of this club in Turkey (Karpat 1963: 56).

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I and the subsequent establishment of the Turkish Republic under the dynamic leadership of Kemal Atatürk combined to eliminate Pan-Islamism, Ottomanism, and Pan-Turkism as viable ideologies. Atatürk wanted to transform Turkey into a modern Western nation-state. His foreign policy was based on the rejection of all expansionist dreams. Atatürk's task was to inculcate in the people the idea of the territorial state of Turkey, the fatherland of a nation called Turks, divorced of religious and dynastic loyalties.

> The theory propounded by Kemal and his disciples was, briefly, that the Turks were a white, Aryan people, originating in Central Asia the cradle of all human civilization. Owing to the progressive desiccation of this area, the Turks had migrated in waves to various parts of Asia and Africa, carrying the arts of civilization with them. Chinese, Indian, and Middle Eastern civilizations had all been founded in this way, the pioneers in the

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> last named being the Sumerians and Hittites, who were both Turkic peoples. Anatolia had thus been a Turkish land since antiquity. This mixture of truth, half-truth, and error was proclaimed as official doctrine, and teams of researchers set to work to "prove" its various propositions. [Lewis 1961:353]

> Anatolia was to become the cradle of the new Turkish nationalism. Archaeology, anthropology and history were to be extensively utilized to prove the continuity of Anatolian culture through the Turkish period, as well as its relation to the West, of which Turkey was striving to become a part. [Karpat 1963: 56]

Because Pan-Turkism — the ideological foundation of the *Türk Ocağı* — conflicted with his own national ideology, Atatürk had the club disbanded and replaced by new educational-cultural institutions called People's Houses (*Halk Evleri*), which were under the control of his own Republican People's Party. From 1932, the date of their establishment, until 1950, the date of their demise, the number of People's Houses expanded steadily to 478, distributed among cities, towns, and villages throughout Turkey. "Their purpose was to bridge the gap between the intelligentsia and people by teaching the first of these the national culture which lay among the Anatolian masses and, the second, the rudiments of civilization, and an indoctrination of the nationalist secular ideas of the Republic regime" (Karpat 1963:55).

In order to teach the intelligentsia the culture of the common folk, the People's Houses encouraged and financed the publication of numerous linguistic, ethnographic, and folkloric studies in many of the provincial capitals throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Although these works are of uneven quality, some of them are outstanding. Among the important ethnographic contributions are those of Hamit Zübeyr Koşay (1944), Abdülkadir İnan (1968), and Mehmet Halit Bayri (1939, 1947).

As part of this general nationalistic policy, the Institute of Turcology was established at the University of Istanbul in 1924. Its publication, *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, (Journal of Turcology) contained many historical, philological, and folkloric articles.

THE DEVELOPMENTAL PERIOD

Social anthropology in Turkey initially developed within this atmosphere of nationalistic purpose. The Anthropology Institute (*Antropoloji Enstitüsü*), also known as the Center for Anthropological Research in Turkey (*Türkiye Antropoloji Tetkikat Merkezi*), was established in 1925 in the Faculty of Medicine of Istanbul University. Most of its research dealt with physical

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anthropological topics, though it did publish some folkloric studies by George Dumezil (1928), who was Professor of the History of Religions at Istanbul from 1925 to 1931, and a socio-statistical study of suicide in Istanbul by Max Bonnafous (1928), who taught sociology at Istanbul University at about the same time. The first real social anthropological work to emanate from the Institute was Kemal Güngör's *Ethno-anthropological Study of the South Anatolian Yuruks* (1940-41).

Şevket Aziz Kansu (b. 1909) qualifies as the first professional Turkish anthropologist. In 1927, as an Assistant in the Faculty of Medicine of Istanbul University, he was sent to France to study at the École d'Anthropologie de Paris and under Georges Papillaut of the Laboratoire d'Anthropologie, École Pratique des Hautes Études. In 1929 Kansu successfully defended his thesis, "L'Étude morphologique des crânes néocaledoniens et des nègres africains," and received "le diplôme des sciens anthropologiques" (Kansu 1940: 37). He returned to Turkey in the same year to teach physical anthropology in Istanbul University's Medical Faculty and to edit the Anthropology Institute's *Revue Turque d'Anthropologie*. In 1933, President Atatürk invited Kansu to Ankara to direct an archaeological excavation. In 1935, Kansu was instrumental in having the Antropology Institute moved from Istanbul to the newly established Faculty of Language, Literature, and Geography in Ankara, where he began teaching physical anthropology, ethnology, and prehistory. Although he produced numerous textbooks, Kansu is best known for his research on prehistory and physical anthropology in Turkey. He became Chairman and Professor Ordinarius of the Department of Anthropology and Ethnology, and in 1946 he was named the first President (*Recteur*) of Ankara University (Kansu 1946, 1955).

The Institute's primary objective was to contribute to the development of the Kemalist thesis of history: to research the cultural origins, historical development, and physical characteristics of the Turkish people. For example, in 1937, by the order of Atatürk, anthropology professors, students, doctors, and health officials throughout Turkey participated in the cephalic measurement of 64,000 Turkish men and women, completing the task in only four months (Kansu 1940:20-23).

As part of his plan to Westernize Turkey, Atatürk reorganized Istanbul University in 1933 and established several faculties in Ankara during the 1930s. Lacking a large indigenous elite to fill all the faculty positions created, he capitalized on Turkey's long-standing relationship with Germany and readily accepted more than 100 German professors who had found Hitler's policies intolerable. Among those who went to Ankara in the 1930s were composer Paul Hindemith, who helped reorganize Turkish musical education; opera director Carl Ebert, who founded and directed Turkey's State Conservatory of Music and Performing Arts; Hittitologist Hans Güterbock (now at the University of

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Chicago); and Sinologist-sociologist Wolfram Eberhard (now at the University of California, Berkeley) (Fermi 1971:67-70, 352-53). Eberhard was invited to Ankara University in 1937 to teach Classical Chinese language and history because the Turks hoped to be able to reconstruct their earliest history from Chinese sources. During his 11 years there, he trained many Turkish scholars in Chinese as well as in folklore. One of his students, Bahaeddin Ögel, published an impressive work on the history of pre-Islamic Turkish culture (1962).

Turkish social anthropological research developed significantly from 1940 to 1960. The full-length village studies, based on fieldwork, produced during this period have strongly influenced both the course of social anthropology in Turkey and foreign understanding of Turkish rural life. In our estimation, five scholars especially stand out.

The first is Niyazi Berkes, who studied sociology at the universities of Istanbul and Ankara and in 1935 went to the University of Chicago on a research fellowship in sociology. He contributed a series of articles on American sociology (Berkes 1938-40) to the Turkish journal *Ülkü* (Ideal) and returned to Turkey in 1939 to become Assistant Professor (*Doçent*) of Sociology at Ankara University. In 1940 he began field research in a group of villages near Ankara, investigating such topics as population, economic life, work organization, material culture kinship, and scial organization (Berkes 1942). In 1952 he went to Canada's McGill University, where he rose to the rank of Professor in the Institute of Islamic Studies. His most noted publication is *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (1964).

The second scholar, Behice Boran, studied sociology at Columbia University and held the rank of Assistant Professor of Sociology in the Philosophy Branch of Ankara University's Faculty of Language, History, and Geography. In her major work (Boran 1945) she investigated the comparative interrelationships between social structure and ecology in a group of mountain and lowland villages near Manisa in western Turkey. In her opening chapter she discusses a series of structural concepts, such as "social institution," "integration," and "differentiation." She also stresses the importance of field methodology, which she criticizes Durkheimian sociology (then dominant in Turkey) for belittling. In succeeding chapters she organizes her research materials under the headings of demography, economics, social stratification, external relations, family, and urbanization. Boran become a political activist and left the University in 1946. Eventually she became chairman of the Turkish Labor Party, a Marxist organization which was banned by the military in 1972 but was reorganized with Boran as chairman in 1975.

The period's most thorough study was conducted by the sociologist Ibrahim Yasa in the village of Hasanoğlan, near Ankara. Yasa was born in 1917

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in Bergama; he received his B.A. (1933) and M.A. (1937) in sociology from the University of Missouri and his Ph. D. (1941) in sociology from Cornell University. In 1942 he was appointed Instructor of Sociology at the Village Institute near Hasanoğlan, and in 1944 he and his students began to study social, cultural, and economic life in that village, focusing attention on change over the preceding 30 years, during which "the propinquity of the railway saved the village from economic and social isolation and changed it from a closed to an open village" (Yasa 1957:iii). The pages of his detailed study (published in Turkish in 1955 and in English in 1957) reveal the intimate knowledge he acquired of village life during his several years' residence in the community. He divides his monograph into the following sections: research methods, village history and natural environment, travel and communications, demography, economics, kinship, education, administration, religion, and social change.

In the introduction to the English edition of this work, A. T. J. Matthews, who was then associated with the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East, wrote (pp. v-vi):

> From the time of Ziya Gökalp — the first prominent Turkish sociologist — until very recently, the discipline has tended to follow the French school. Consequently, its orientation has been dominantly philosophical rather than scientific; it has been more interested in questions concerning what should be the ideal Turkish society than in what Turkish society actually was. Unfortunately for the disipline, some of the Turkish scholars gave considerable attention to securing and interpreting data for the purpose of justifying their own personal ideologial beliefs, and as a result, they came into conflict with politial leaders. Thus, the particular orientation of the discipline and its consequences in action tended in the end to retard acceptance of sociological studies. It is important to note that this monograph is representative of the new scientific orientation which is emerging in Turkish sociology.

In 1949 Yasa became Assistant Professor of Sociology at Istanbul University, and in the summer of 1950 he conducted field research in the village of Sindel, in western Turkey. He was especially interested in the influence that urban contact had had on the community's social organization, economics, religious beliefs, and family structure (Yasa 1960). Both of these works, but especially the Hasanoğlan study, have become models for subsequent village research in Turkey. In 1959 Yasa moved to Ankara University, where he occupies the Chair of Sociology in the Faculty of Political Sciences.

The fourth scholar of this period, Nermin Erdentuğ, was born in Malta in 1919. She studied in Ankara University's Anthropology Institute, receiving her Licence in 1940 and completing her doctorate in 1942. She was successively promoted to the positions of Assistant (1940). Assistant Professor (1944), and

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Professor (1959) in the Institute. Her field studies in the villages of Hal (Erdentuğ 1956) and Sün (Erdentuğ 1959) represent the first book-length ethnographies of isolated rural communities in Turkey's underdeveloped eastern hinterland. In both studies she organizes her materials under the headings of economic life, social life, religious life, and life-cycle rituals. (A number of interesting shorter village studies were also published during this period, many of them appearing in *Sosyoloji Dergisi* [Sociology Journal], edited by Hilmi Ziya Ülken.)

The last of the five outstanding social scientists selected from this period is Mümtaz Turhan (1908-69). Turhan was born in the eastern Anatolian city of Erzurum, where his father was employed as a government official. He received his elementary-school education in Kayseri and his lycée education in Bursa and Ankara. Thereafter he studied at the universities of Berlin and Frankfurt, receiving a doctorate in psychology from the former in 1935. He was appointed Assistant of Experimental Psychology in Istanbul University's Faculty of Letters in 1937 and was promoted to Assistant Professor in 1939 (Gülensoy 1969:244). Shortly thereafter he traveled to England to study under Sir Frederic C. Bartlett, Professor of Experimental Psychology, and to earn a second doctorate from Cambridge University in 1944. He then resumed his position at Istanbul University and in 1952 was selected to head the Chair of Psychology there.

Through his teaching, research, and writing, Turhan has contributed importantly to the development of psychological anthropology in Turkey. Like Gökalp, whom he succeeded as intellectual leader of Turkey's social scientific community, Turhan was vitally concerned with Turkey's acculturation to the West. He wrote prolifically on village development and educational reform. In his first and most important social scientific work — *Kültür Değişmeleri: Sosyal Psikoloji bakımından bir Tetkik* (Culture Change: A Social Psychological Investigation) (1951) — he reviewed the various anthropological theories of culture offered by Rivers, Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, Wissler, Redfield, Linton, Lowie, Kroeber, and others. He then examined cultural and attitudinal change in five eastern Anatolian villages where he had personally conducted fieldwork. This was followed by a discussion of psychocultural change during the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire. Throughout his analysis, he drew heavily on the theories and concepts of Western social scientists, especially those of his mentor Bartlett (1923, 1946). Following Bartlett, Turhan analyzed culture in terms of "hard" and "soft" features (cf. Bartlett 1946), the former consisting of those elements which give each culture its uniqueness.

In a 1957 article entitled "Some Thoughts on Village Research Methods," Turhan stressed the importance of understanding the villagers'

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attitudes towards the outside and their general mental frame of reference. Throughout his writings he argued, as did Gökalp, that harmonious Westernization in Turkey requires an understanding of both cultures (Turkish and European) and a deep appreciation for the values and attitudes of the recipient peoples. As an expression of these views, he drew the following analogy (Turhan 1950: 67-68):

> An important condition for the success of an imposed change is that those who direct and control the change should be like a good translator. Just as a good translation needs somebody well versed in both languages involved, so it is incumbent upon those controlling and directing cultural change to be familiar with each of the two cultures and at least to be able to foresee and understand the implications of the social and psychological phenomena which will occur during the changes.

From the above it is apparent that professional social anthropological research in Turkey was initially conducted mainly by Turkish sociologists (e.g., Berkes, Boran, Yasa) who had received advanced training in the United States. By the 1950s, however, anthropology at Ankara University had achieved strong academic status. As the Turkish anthropologist Şenyürek (1953:79) wrote at that time:

> In Turkey, there is a well-organized and extensive Department of Anthropology in the University of Ankara. The Department of Anthropology and Ethnology is a part of the Faculty of Language, History and Geography, founded in 1936, which is one of the eight faculties of the University of Ankara, established in 1946. In the Department of Anthropology and Ethnology a total of forty-two courses are given in physical anthropology, prehistory (Haleolithic, Mesolithic and Neolithic periods), human paleontology, ethnography, ethnology, social anthropology, and the history of the various branches of anthropology and ethnology. The Department which gives both the Licence and Doctor of Literature degrees in anthropology and ethnology, has at present two professors, two docents (assistant professors) and three assistants in its cadre. Since 1940 this Department has given twenty-eight Licence degrees and five Doctor of Literature degrees in anthropology and ethnology. At present (1952), The Department has fourteen students enrolled of whom six are from other departments of the Faculty, mostly from the Department of Geography, taking a certificate in the Department of Anthropology and Ethnology. The Department of Anthropology and Ethnology has a well-equipped laboratory of physical Anthropology, an independent library and a museum with exhibits on prehistory, physical anthropology and ethnology.

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During this period a series of Turkish novels about village life contributed to the creation of a broad popular interest in peasant conditions that paralleled the development of the social sciences. Most of the novelists were progressive thinkers who regarded villagers as the ignored and exploited segment of Turkish society. Among them were Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu (1899-1974), whose *Yaban* (Stranger) is regarded as the first village novel of the Turkish Republican period; Sabahattin Ali (1907-48); Kemal Tahir (b. 1910); Orhan Kemal (1914-71); and Mahmut Makal (b. 1931), whose *Bizim Köy* (Our Village) created a literary and political explosion. (Rathbun 1972 and Stone 1973 offer excellent discussions in English of this literary development.)

The international legal and social scientific community also had a special interest in Turkey, because of its unique status as an Islamic country whose leaders had voluntarily embarked on a vigorous program of Westernization. For instance, during the 1950s an international group of lawyers and social scientists, including Turks — Timur, Findikoğlu, Velidedeoğlu, Belgesay, and Postacıoğlu — gathered to assess the reception of Swiss family law in Turkey (for a report on this conference, see *International Social Science Bulletin* 1957; for a more recent assessment, see Magnarella 1973).

Lewis has described Turkish scholarship during this developmental period as follows (1961:432):

> With encouragement and support from successive governments, Turkish universities and learned societies have sponsored a truly impressive output of research and publication, notably in history, archaeology, language and literature, the general aim of which is to recover and illuminate the Turkish past. Great progress has also been made in the social sciences. Not all the work is of equal value, and some, notably in the 1930's, was directed to political rather than scholarly ends. Turkish scholars have, however, shown a growing regard for the standards and an increasing familiarity with the methods of critical scholarship, and in so doing have acquired a significance that is more than purely local.

THE RECENT PERIOD

During the 1960s and early 1970s, both the amount of social scientific activity and the number of research directions increased greatly. Hence, our discussion must again limit itself to the highlights. Among the trends characterizing this period are (1) greater use of quantitative techniques of data collection (surveys, questionnaires, censuses) by both social anthropologists and sociologists; (2) greater application of social scientific studies to Turkey's social problems; (3) the beginning of the social scientific study of urban life; (4) the development of social anthropology and sociology in centers other than Ankara

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and Istanbul; (5) a renewed interest in the systematic study of Turkish folklore; and (6) increased activity on the part of government agencies specifically established to deal with rural and urban social problems.

One of the most noted scholars of this period is the sociologist-anthropologist Mübeccel Kiray. Born in İzmir in 1923, she completed her undergraduate and graduate studies at Ankara University, receiving her doctorate in sociology in 1944. Subsequently, she studied cultural anthropology at Northwestern University, receiving a Ph. D. in 1950. She returned to Turkey to teach at Middle East Technical University, Ankara, where she was promoted to the ranks of Assistant Professor in 1960 and Professor in 1965. She recently headed the Social Sciences Division at that university.

Kiray conducted one of the first important studies of this period on Ereğli, a Black Sea coastal town just west of Zonguldak (Kiray 1964; for an English-language discussion of this work, see Magnarella 1970). The study is important for two reasons. First, it focused on a small town which had been scheduled to become an industrial center. A systematic study of the town's preindustrial character could later be compared with the results of a postindustrial restudy. Second, it relied heavily on quantitative data collected by administering a lengthy interview schedule to a large, systematic sample of townsmen. Subjects dealt with include demography, socioeconomic life, standards of living, family structure, educational, recreation communication, religion, world view, and town-village ties. The study stimulated interest in urban social research and in the collection of quantitative data. Like Yasa's village studies, Kiray's was an important model for subsequent research.

In 1966 Ibrahim Yasa published his research on the social and economic life of families living in Ankara's *gecekondu* or shantytown district (Yasa 1966*a*). The research, which was sponsored by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, relied primarily on data gathered by a comprehensive interview schedule administered to a sample of 916 households. Other research in the city of Ankara is being conducted by members of Ankara University's Institute of Urban Affairs, e.g., Director Fehmi Yavuz (1962, 1966), Cevat Geray (1966), and Ruşen Keleş (1966, 1972).

A group of social scientists (nonanthropologists) at Istanbul University (such as C. O. Tütengil, F. Findikoğlu, M. Eröz, and A. Kurtkan) also turned their attention to the study of urbanization by joining forces with the Sakarya Research Center and investigating social, physical, and educational problems in the city of Adapazarı (published in *Sosyoloji Konferansları* 1966-67).

Another major urban research project has been conducted in İzmir by member of the Turkish Social Science Association: Şerif Mardin, Ruşen Keleş,

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Cevat Geray, Deniz Baykal, Ergün Özbudun (political science); Mübeccel Kiray, Oğuz Arı (sociology); Orhan Türkay (economics); Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı (psychology); Şefik Uysal (education); and Emre Kongar (social work). Interview schedules have been administered to several population samples, and each research member is analyzing data pertinent to problems of his discipline: kinship, politics, occupational choice, religious values, attitudes, etc. Arı (1972), Kiray (1972), and Kongar (1972) have already published their findings. Unfortunately, this important study, which is financed by a Ford Foundation grant, does not include the work of a social anthropologist. Although many of the data were gathered without the benefit of the researchers' long-term, intimate residence among the people being studied, the investigations and their findings will contribute significantly to the knowledge of urban life in Turkey's large cities.

The only ethnographic study of an urban community was conducted by the sociologist Fatma Mansur (1972) in Bodrum, a small town on the Aegean coast.

Several Turkish ministries, especially the Ministry of Reconstruction and Redevelopment (*Imar ve Iskan Bakanlığı*), have been making important contributions to urban research. (See the numerous references to the writings of Ayda and Turhan Yörükan in Tezcan 1969.)

The study of rural communities also progressed during this period. The political scientist Cevat Geray (1967) directed a community development study of Bünyan, a village near Kayseri. Yasa's (1969) restudy of Hasanoğlan, which had been elevated to municipal status in 1954, describes many social economic, and cultural changes. In the following years, two graduates of Ankara University, who had been trained by Yasa and other social scientists there, published interesting comparative village studies. The first one, by Özer Ozankaya (1971), an Assistant Professor of Sociology in Ankara University's Political Science Faculty, compares the political culture of two remote, underdeveloped villages in northeastern Anatolia with that of two exposed, developed villages in central Anatolia. The second, by Erdoğan Güçbilmez (1972), compares the socioeconomic changes of two villages in Ankara Province. Another of Yasa's students, Ismail Beşikçi, published the first modern social study of a nomadic Kurdish tribal group (1969). Mahmut Tezcan, a sociologist in Ankara University's Education Faculty, published a study of the blood feud (Tezcan 1972), and M. Kiray collaborated with geographer Jan Hinderink to produce a comparative geographic and socioeconomic study of four villages in south-central Turkey (Hinderink and Kiray 1970). Interesting village social surveys dealing primarily with family life have been directed by Rezan Şahinkaya (1966, 1970), an Assistant Professor of Home Economics in Ankara University's Agricultural Faculty.

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All of these village studies rely heavily on the use of questionnaires and interview schedules for the collection of data. All of them could have been significantly strengthened if the researchers had also employed the social anthropological techniques associated with long-term residence in the subject communities. An exception is the study of a Black Sea coastal village by Vedia Emiroğlu (1972), a former student of Erdentuğ. In addition to offering a detailed ethnography of village culture, she focuses on the problem of cultural change, especially the impact of new agricultural technology on traditional practices and attitudes. In her introductory chapter she discusses some of the ideas about cultural change expounded by Western anthropologists, such as Malinowski, Mead, Herskovits, Redfield, and Foster, as well as the theories of Ziya Gökalp and Mümtaz Turhan.

During this period, also, Nermin Erdentuğ published two of the very few cross-cultural studies. In one (Erdentuğ 1972*a*) she examines rural society in Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan; in the other (Erdentuğ 1972*b*) she notes similarities between Turkish and Japanese culture.

Although social sientific research continues to be dominated by scholars from universities in Ankara and Istanbul, social scientists in outlying areas have recently begun to make important contributions. The work of rural sociologist Orhan Türkdoğan of the comparatively new Atatürk University in Erzurum is a notable example. Born in Malatya in 1928, Türkdoğan later studied sociology and anthropology at Ankara University, graduating in 1955 from the Sociology Department. In 1959 he became an Assistant in the Faculty of Science and Letters of Atatürk University. During the ensuing years he conducted field research of a social anthropological nature in three Molokan (Russian Christian) villages in eastern Turkey. His 1962 doctoral dissertation (published in 1971) represents the first social scientific study of a non-Muslim people in modern Turkey. From 1962 to 1964 Türkdoğan studied anthropology in the United States, at the universities of Missouri and Nebraska. He then returned to Atatürk University, where he became Assistant Professor in 1967 and Professor in 1971. His numerous publications demonstrate the scope and depth of his problem-oriented, applied social scientific interests: community health and medical sociology (1972), community development (1969), comparative social structure (1965), rural sociology (1970*a*), and urban problems (1974). Türkdoğan is representative of a new group of Turkish social scientists who are teaching and researching in the more remote areas of Turkey and thereby contributing importantly to a broader understanding of the country's social, cultural, and economic problems.

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ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITIES

Since its establishment in 1935, the Anthropology Institute of Ankara University has offered the widest range of anthropology courses available in any Turkish university. Today the Institute is comprised of four chairs: Physical Anthropology, Ethnology, Paleoanthropology, and Prehistory. The teaching and research faculty associated with each chair are as follows:

Physical Anthropology: As of Spring 1975, the only active member of this chair was Dr. Assistant Armağan Saatçıoğlu. Former members Ord. Prof. Dr. Şevket Aziz Kansu (who headed the Chair) and Prof. Dr. Seniha Tunakan retired in 1973.

Ethnology: Prof. Dr. Nermin Erdentuğ heads this chair, which also includes two senior members — Prof. Dr. Orhan Acıpayamlı and Prof. Dr. Sedat Veyis Örnek — and two Assistants — Dr. Attila Erden and Dr. Zafer Ilbars.

Acıpayamlı, one of Turkey's leading folklorists, was born in 1922 in the Denizli village of Acıpayam. He studied anthropology at Ankara University's Anthropology Institute, graduating in 1945. He then worked as an Assistant in the Amasya Museum, located about 265 km northeast of Ankara. While there he became active in the collection and analysis of folkloric materials. During the ensuing years he reviewed the available literature on Turkish folklore (most of which consisted of interesting amateur studies published in the 1930s and 1940s by the People's Houses) and developed an interview schedule that he administered to villagers in a variety of Turkish provinces (Acıpayamlı 1961: 1-4). In 1954 he was appointed Assistant of Ethnology in Ankara University's Anthropology Institute, and the following year he spent three months in Paris studying folklore with Henri Rivière. Acıpayamlı was successively promoted to Assistant Professor in 1965 and Professor in 1970. Some of his major published works deal with Turkish birth customs (1961), the evil eye in Anatolia (1962), and the Turkish rain prayer (1963). He is thoroughly familiar with the English and French approaches to the study of folklore.

Sedat Veyis Örnek, the third senior member of the Chair of Ethnology, is also a folklorist. Born in Sivas Province in 1927, he was graduated by Ankara University's Theology Faculty in 1953. After receiving his doctorate from West Germany's Tübingen University in 1960, he joined Ankara University's Anthropology Institute as an Assistant of Ethnology. He was promoted to Assistant Professor in 1965 and to Professor in 1971. His primary research interests have centered around Turkish folkloric practices associated with various stages in the life cycle (Örnek 1966, 1971*a*). His *Ethnologic Dictionary* (1971*b*), which defines common anthropological terms in Turkish and identifies

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key personalities in anthropology, is an extremely useful reference source for both Turkish anthropology students and instructors.

Paleoanthropology: This chair, developed largely by the efforts of now deceased Ord. Prof. Dr. Muzaffer Şenyürük, is at present headed by Prof. Dr. Enver Bostanci. Other members include Assistants Berna Alpagut and Esin İlter. Senior member Doçent Dr. Refaket Çiner died in 1974.

Prehistory: This chair was headed and developed by Prof. Dr. Kiliç Kökten, who died in 1974. Present members include Dr. Güney Soylu and Dr. Assistant Işın Yalçınkaya.

In 1963 the Institute revived its journal, which had ceased publication in 1939. It appears annually under the new title of *Antropoloji.* Members from each chair are represented on its editorial board, and articles published to date have dealt with all four areas of anthropology.

Anthropological instruction was not fully revived at Istanbul University until 1959, when, thanks to the efforts of Prof. Mümtaz Turhan, a Chair of Social Anthropology and Ethnology was created in the Faculty of Letters. In the same year, C. W. M. Hart, an Australian by birth and an American by citizenship, who had served as the President of the Society for Applied Anthropology, became the first anthropologist to occupy this Chair. In the following year, the Chair was elevated to departmental status, thus authorizing it to enroll thesis students and to grant certificates of study. The Department graduated its first class in 1964.

Hart insisted that all his students learn anthropology through fieldwork. For many of them, this meant going out of the classroom into the shantytown districts of Istanbul and talking with residents about their lives and problems. Over the years, several groups of students systematically collected data with interview schedules in the shantytown district of Zeytinburnu. These data became the bases for their theses and for a monograph by Hart (1969). Other student thesis topics have been villages, factory workers and other occupational groups in Istanbul, and Turkish demography (Saran 1971). Hart returned to the United States in 1969, and is now teaching at Wichita State University; the social anthropological tradition he established is being capably carried on by his former assistant Dr. Nephan Saran. Her major publication is a statistical study of juvenile delinquency in Istanbul (Saran 1968). In 1971 the Department had one Assistant Professor (Dr. Saran), two Assistants, and 250 thesis students (Saran 1971:3). In the same year it issued the first volume of its annual journal — *Journal of the Department of Social Anthropology and Ethnology (Sosyal Antropoloji ve Ethnoloji Bölümü Dergisi).*

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Anthropology courses are offered at several other Turkish universities. Recently, anthropological instruction in Turkey has been aided immensely by the publication of Bozkurt Güvenç's Turkish-language general anthropology text (1972). Güvenç, who teaches anthropology at Hacettepe University in Ankara, has prepared a first-rate presentation of the historical development and major areas of anthropology. His use of Turkish data as well as cross-cultural examples to illustrate points makes the text especially appropriate for its Turkish audience.

ASSESSMENTS

The growing number of competent Turkish social scientists makes one optimistic about the future of social research in Turkey. The Turks have shown serious concern for the development of social science in their country. In 1970, leading Turkish social scientists devoted a conference to just that topic (*Türkiye'de sosyal araştırmaların gelişmesi* 1971). Conference participant Bozkurt Güvenç (1971) presented a set of criticisms of Turkish social anthropology that we believe still holds true today. He finds Turkish sociologists-anthropologists too limited in their selection of research topics and in their application of concepts. Among the topical areas that have not been researched he includes studies of child socialization, culture and personality, and regional markets. His list of unutilized or insufficiently applied concepts includes the Great Tradition — Little Tradition, alliance and descent, and role and status. (We would add the emic-etic dichotomy as well.) He also laments the problems arising from the absence of a generally agreed-upon social science vocabulary (a problem shared by many Third World countries in which scholars are attempting to develop a social science literature in the vernacular) and criticizes researchers for their lack of fully developed research methodologies.

With respect to this last criticism, we have noted that recently many Turkish sociologists/social-anthropologists have been relying almost exclusively on social survey methods in their research. Although questionnaires and interview schedules accumulate important data, we feel they do not produce the degree of empathy, understanding, and appreciation of a community's life and problems that is possible through successful participant observation and long-term residence in the subject community. In their attempt to be quantitative and statistically analytical, social scientists run the risk of separating themselves from the people they are trying to understand. By using questionnaires and interviewers exclusively, social scientists directing research projects fail even to see or talk with most of the people whose behavior and attitudes they will later try to explain. Greater personal involvement of a social anthropological nature could correct this tendency.

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In addition, Güvenç criticizes Turkish social scientists for not having developed or adhered to any particular theoretical school and for not having taken full advantage of the theoretical and conceptual developments in their field. Although French social theory historically influenced Turkish social scientific thought, this trend has not continued into the present. For instance, Claude Lévi-Strauss has had no impact on Turkish anthropology.

Güvenç also recommends that the various social science chairs, departments, and institutes in Turkish universities cease their squabbles and establish close cooperative ties.

The major general recommendation of the conference was that problems of social and economic development be given top priority for social scientific research and that the Turkish government support such research and utilize its findings in the decision-making process. As in any developing country, cooperation and coordination between government agencies and social scientists are necessary so that limited research funds can be applied to projects most beneficial to the nation.

ABSTRACT

The report traces the development of Turkish social anthropology from its intellectual foundations in the 19th-century Ottoman Empire to its near maturation in the early 1970s of the Turkish Republic. Rather than offering a bibliographical or a fully biographical account, the report focuses on important Turkish scientists and publications highlighting the various stages of social anthropological development. It begins by relating the various responses of Ottoman intellectuals to the declining status of their empire vis-à-vis Europe and illustrates how Western social scientific thought was diffused to Turkey at this time. Moving to the post-World War I period, the report discusses the impact of modern Turkish nationalism on the organization and nature of early anthropological research. Finally, it describes the current status of social anthropological research and anthropological instruction in Turkish universities.

RÉSUMÉ

Le rapport retrace le développement de l'anthropologie sociale turque depuis ses fondations intellectuelles durant l'Empire Ottoman du 19ème siècle jusqu'à sa presque maturité sous la République Turque du début des années 1970. Plutôt que d'offrir un compte-rendu bibliographique ou biographique complet, le rapport est centré sur les savants et publications turques, ce qui met en valeur les diverses étapes du développement de l'anthropologie sociale. Il commence par

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relater les diverses réactions des intellectuels ottomans devant le declin de leur empire en face de l'Europe, et illustre comment la pensée socio-scientifique occidentale a été diffusée en Turquie à cette epoque. Passant à la période d'après la première guerre mondiale, le rapport discute de l'impact du nationalisme turque moderne sur l'organisation et la nature de la recherche anthropologique. Finalement, il decrit le statut actuel de la recherche socio-anthropologique et de l'instruction anthropologique dans les universités turques.

RESUMEN

La crónica remonta el desarrolla de la antropología social en Turquía, desde su cimiento intelectual en el Imperio Ottomano del siglo diesinueve hasta su casi madurez a principios de los años 1970 de la República Turca. Mejor que ofrecer una relación bibliográfia o enteramente biográfica, la reseña enfoca importantes científicos y publicaciones turcas que destacan las varias etapas del desarrollo antropológico social. Empieza relatando las diversas respuestas de los intelectuales otomanos al estado de decadencia de su imperio frente a Europa y esclarece cómo el pensamiento científico social del Occidente se difundió en Turquía en ese tiempo. Cambiando al período de la post-guerra mundial primera, la reseña discute el impacto del nacionalismo turco moderna en la organización y naturaleza de las primeras investigaciones antropológicas. Finalmente describe la situación generalizade de la investigación y la instrucción antropológica en las universidades turcas.

РЕЗЮМЕ

В докладе олисывается развитие турецкой социальной антропологии от науала ее образования во времена оттоманской нмперии в девятнадцатом веке, до ее почти полного созревания в ранних 1970-х годах. Но вместо представления библиографического или полностью биографического отчета, в докладе внимание сосредоточиваетея на главных турецких ученых и изданиях, которые особенно осветили разные этапы в развитии социальной антропологии. Сначала в докладе рассказывается о разных предложений оттоманских мыслитедей вызванных упадком их империи по отношени ю с Европой, и обьсняется как в зто время научно-социальная мысль с запала проникала в Турцию. Переходя к периоду после первой мировой войны, в докладе обсуждается воздействие современного турецкого национализма на организацию и характер раннегоантропологического исследования. И наконец, в докладе описывается сегодняшкее положение социального

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антропологического иследования ипреподования антропологии в турецких университетах.

COMMENTS

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The subject of this study is fascinating — the development of anthropological studies in Turkey from the late 18th entury until today. For the early period, the authors rely mainly on Lewis's *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* and the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* To collect their data on contemporary anthropology in Turkey, they sent questionnaires to the various social scientists there. Thus their study does not give us any insight into how the various stages of the development of social anthropology were affected by the prevailing intellectual climate and the social and political conditions of the time. Had the authors cared to give us an account of the content of the various works of the Turkish thinkers, they might have shed some light on the social problems prevalent then. For instance, what was the content of Ibraham Şinasi's 1859 journal, or of the criticism of the government which led to Namık Kemal's flight from the country in 1867? What were the social causes of Ahmet Riza's "disgust" with the Ministry of Education? According to the authors, Gökalp "employed Durkheimian sociology in a systematic investigation of Turkey's social and cultural problems," but nowhere are we told how he used Durkheimian sociology or what cultural and social themes he treated in his writings. The data on contemporary Turkish social scientists do not go beyond the information one usually finds in a curriculum vitae. No account is given of the social conditions and the intellectual atmosphere which might have affected their studies. We are only told, for example, that Behice Boran of Ankara University "became a political activist and left the university in 1946. Eventually she became chairman of the Turkish Labor Party, a Marxist organization which was banned by the military in 1972 but was reorganized with Boran as chairman in 1975."

The authors conclude that the anthropological studies that have been accomplished in Turkey are deficient in the use of anthropological methods of fieldwork and participant observation and in certain areas of study, such as culture and personality, regional markets, etc. I would add that studies on politics, ritual, symbolism, and religion seem to be lacking in Turkey as well as in other Near Eastern countries. It is ironic, however, that the authors' methods, like those of the anthropologists they criticize, lack a sound anthropological approach. They enumerate the works of social scientists, their

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degrees, etc., as if these scholars were isolated from the rest of the Turkish society and not affected by their society and its current problems. Like the work on which they comment, their study is deficient in certain "areas," namely, reference to social and economic problems and to the particular social moods in which these social scientists live and work.

by WOLFRAM EBERHARD
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This is an article which certainly will help many colleagues who are unable to read Turkish and yet want to know what is being done in Turkey in their field.

As in many countries, anthropology and sociology in Turkey are influenced by political attitudes, and it is difficult to remain totally impartial. Nevertheless, I think the authors have presented us with a well-balanced study.

I miss some scholars who seem to me to have had an impact, though none of them can officially be called a "social anthropologist." The late Fuad Köprülü might be called the first to have studied folk narratives and epics from a sociological and literary viewpoint. His work was continued by Pertev Naili Boratav (now in Paris) with his social analysis of Turkish folk narratives and narrators (a German translation [Boratav 1975] of which has just been published) and by Boratav's pupil Ilhan Başgöz (now at the University of Indiana, Bloomington), who published the largest collection of Turkish riddles (Başgöz 1968) and has also studied Turkish rain prayers. A second line is represented by Nermin Abadan, whose study of Turkish workers in Germany (Abadan 1964) was one of the earliest studies of foreign workers in Europe.

The role of the *Halk Evleri* could perhaps have been underlined more strongly, although I agree with the authors that much of the published work consists of data and not analysis. Still, a man like Ali Riza Yalgın, with his work on the nomadic Yürük of southern Turkey (Yalgın 1950), might have been mentioned; he has informally influenced numerous others.

by NERMİN ERDENTUĞ
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This report is a successful attempt at meeting a long-neglected demand with its up-to-date biblio-biographical account of studies carried out by Turkish

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social scientists in Turkey. We are greatly indebted to the authors for their endeavour. Nevertheless, there are some points to be stressed with relation to my own work.

At the outset of my career, I spent about three years (1948-51) in British universities, and this experience was influential in my adherence to the British functionalist school despite my later academic studies in the United States. I was the first Turkish anthropologist to use fieldwork techniques (mainly participant observation) in Turkey. I established sociocultural anthropology (ethnology) as an independent chair at Ankara University in 1960. Since then, my colleagues and I have developed various ethnographic and folkloric studies. I have always given priority to sociocultural change in Turkish peasant studies in the M.A. and Ph.D. studies carried out under my supervision (see Erdentuğ 1969, Emiroğlu 1972, Ilbars 1974). I also initiated applied anthropological researches at the M.A. and Ph.D. levels at the Academy of Social Work, Ankara (1961), the Faculty of Education, Ankara University (1968), and the Faculty of Medicine (Department of Community Health), Diyarbakır (1970). These researches are closely related to community development from the standpoint of health and, especially, education (Erdentuğ 1972*c*, 1975). In fact, I was the initiator of a Ph.D. research project in community health development carried out among the Zazas and Kurdish societies of southern Turkey (Gençler 1974).

by BOZKURT GÜVENÇ
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I should perhaps address myself to antecedents or developmental questions, since my stand on current issues is amply described and fully credited by the authors.

That social science develops in response to social change, a phenomenon observed time and again elsewhere, is sustained by the Turkish experience; hence the relevance of the "historical" introduction provided by Magnarella and Türkdoğan. They lean, however, heavily on the political rather than on the sociocultural history of the land — yet to be undertaken.

The Young Turks, as well as some early Republicans, tried to reform the state without due regard to its socioeconomic infrastructure. In the less than 130 years stretching from the French to the Russian Revolution, Turks had their enlightenment, a series of reformations, and their renaissance as a new nation-state, but these, nearly always initiated at the top, seldom or only recently reached the agrarian backbone of the state. Lacking a suitable foundation, formal reforms were bound to fail. Thus Gökalp's Turkism, emphasizing integration

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and solidarity — with Durkheimian overtones or undercurrents — actually curbed the pace of development and came to be used as a sociological or "scientific" antithesis of culture change. Urban intellectuals exposed to this doctrine identified themselves with the West, looked down on the "backward" peasants, and became devoted advocates of rural development through education *alone*, without any understanding or appreciation of the socioeconomic and structural issues (e.g., industrialization) involved. Under the circumstances, the secular sociology of the new, secular state, dethroning Islam, became an ideological instrument of political stability. It was such an intellectual climate that led the literati to speculate about the *ideal* Turkish society rather than to investigate such basic questions as what Turkish society *really* is or how, *in fact*, it functions — as was correctly observed by Matthews (in Yasa 1957).

Turhan (1951), well aware of this predicament, originating from mere ignorance, became a champion of a "hands-off" policy, with a rationale remarkably reminiscent of Malinowski's counsel to the British administration of the colonies: in effect, "cultures do and will change, but don't force it on them!" Meanwhile, those fieldwork-oriented social scientists who agreed neither with Gökalp's foundations nor with Turhan's anachronistic liberalism lost their positions: M. Sherif, Berkes, Boran, and — let's recall — Boratav. The vacuum thus created was filled by novelists, poets, and romantic radicals from the Village Institute Movement ably described by Kirby (1960-1962). The literary and cultural gap between Levantine Istanbul and the Anatolian *taşra* (rocky-farmstead people) yawned wide, as is shown by Stone (1973).

Participant observation in the field is *not*, certainly, the only alternative to what our students call "Box Sociology" — survey questions followed by boxes. The Turkish social sciences, however, have rich and deep insights to gain from "*emic* descriptions of the cultural unconscious being remolded by the ongoing, unprecedented changes," i.e., social anthropology.

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I should like to call attention to some additional references: Helling and Helling (1956), Stirling (1965), and a number of articles of my own that have social anthropological aspects (Yasa 1959*a, b*, 1962*a, b, c*, 1963*a, b*, 1966*b*, 1968). My study of Hasanoğlan 25 years later (Yasa 1969*a*) will soon be available in English.

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REPLY

by PAUL J. MAGNARELLA
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Foremost, we wish to express our appreciation to those commentators who have contributed substantively to the subject of our article. Erdentuğ has clarified her position in Turkish anthropology, and Güvenç has provided us with a better understanding of the relationships between social science and social change in Turkey. We thank Eberhard, Erdentuğ, Güvenç, and Yasa for adding the names of scholars whom they rightly feel should have received more prominent mention, or at least inclusion.

With respect to social anthropological works by non-Turks, Stirling's (1965) study certainly holds a special place. We might also add a few other works by non-Turks which we believe constitute special contributions: the cultural-geographical studies of Morrison (1939), de Planhol (1958), and Kolars (1963), the study of village politics of Szyliowicz (1966), the tribal study of Bates (1973), and the town studies of Benedict (1974) and Magnarella (1974).

In sharp contrast to the other comments, we found most of Abu Zahra's criticisms invalid, unfactual, and nonproductive. For example, contrary to her claim, we relied very little on the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* for the early period; we explicitly listed in n. 1. the English-language sources we found most useful. Türkdoğan is more than familiar with the Turkish primary and seondary sources, as is demonstrated by his publication on Ziya Gökalp (Türkdoğan 1970*b*).

For our presentation on contemporary Turkish anthropology, we did not rely extensively on the results of a questionnaire, as Abu Zahra assumes. Türkdoğan has been a participant in the Turkish social science scene for the past quarter-century; he is personally acquainted with practically all of the contemporary scholars we discuss. We studied the available literature and presented a preliminary version of our ideas to a group of Turkish scholars attending the Seminar on Turkey's Social and Economic Problems held in Erzurum, Turkey, in October of 1973. We profited greatly from their comments, criticisms, and recommendations.

If our purpose had been to "shed some light on contemporary social problems" in Republican Turkey, we would have found an examination of current national and international economic, political, and demographic factors much more productive than Abu Zahra's recommended exposition of a 19th-century criticism of the Ottoman Sultan.

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Finally, Abu Zahra's claim that Turkey lacks studies of politics and religion is grossly uninformed. Politics is probably the single *most* studied Turkish social scientific subject. Tezcan's (1969) bibliography of Turkish sociology, which covers many but far from all of the Turkish-language books and articles published from 1928 to 1968, lists more than 1,000 works on Turkish politics. Under the heading of religious sociology, Tezcan has 200 references. Excellent studies in both these areas also exist in European languages, and many additional studies have appeared since 1968.

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ANTROPOLOGICAL FIELDWORK, KEY INFORMANTS, AND HUMAN BONDS

SUMMARY

Anthropologists have long realized how important key informants are to the success of their enterprise. Although antropologists have entered into special relationships with their key informants, they rarely reveal who these people are and what human bonds exist. This essay describes two persons who made my anthropology possible.

A novice anthropologist's first foreign excursion into the field has been described variously as *the* initiation into the club, an episode in psychological trauma, a journey into self-discovery, a stumbling toward pan-human awareness. Graduate students criticize their professors for inadequately preparing them for this mystical adventure as well as for failing to divulge their own emotional grappling with this liminal stage of professional maturation. Fortunately, over the past 10 to 15 years, our colleagues have helped corect this situation by writing frankly about their fieldwork experiences.[1]

Among the most critical relationships that anthropologists forge in the field are those with "key informants" — those god-sends having the patience and charity necessary to transform cultural illiterates into passably civilized humans. Our debts to these teachers-of-culture for their contributions to our intellects, social nature, scholarship, and careers are beyond recompense. Those of us from industrially advanced, affluent countries return home to write dissertations, articles, or books, and to reap the rewards of scholarship. Meanwhile, the major sources of our knowledge, our key informants, continue on, with little or no material gain from their investments of time, effort, and more in a foreigner's odd career. Not that they complain, however, for such people are the first to exclaim the spiritual benefits of their close, blood-like friendship with that

[1]For a convenient recent summary of this field work literature, see Lawless et al. (1983). Richardson (1975) offers a particularly poetic and self-revealing statement; for some of the best early reports, see Casagrande (1960).

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foreigner, who one day descended upon their community a lost soul, but left a departing offspring or sibling.

Informants come in a variety of types. In some cases, the key informant has a formal relationship with the anthropologist. The informant may be an assistant, interpreter, language teacher, cook, maid, or house-boy, who supplies information and other service for a monetary return. In other cases, the relationship is one of true friendship. The anthropologist and informant enjoy each other's company. The anthoropologist finds the informant so interesting that through her or his personality and knowledge he or she hopes to unlock the mysteries of the local culture. In some cases, friendship deepens into kinship. They become sisters, brothers, parents, or spouses. Their basic human bond enables each to overcome the barriers of culture and exchange on a pan-human plane.

In my own initiation, two god-sends in particular stand out. One accepted me as a son; the other as a brother. For the first, I met a maternal need, for the second I may have contributed to an evolving tragedy. Without them, my stumbling toward pan-human awareness would have been far different, certainly less rewarding.

I

A country of 300,600 square miles divided between Asia Minor and Europe, Turkey is slightly larger than Texas and Louisiana combined. Its 1985 population of 49.5 million resulted from a hefty average annual growth rate of more than 2 percent since World War II. About 98 percent of the people are Muslim and speak Turkish. After centuries of intermarriage with Mediterranean and Balkan peoples and the assimilation of such peoples into the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish state, the vast majority of today's Turks physically resemble southern Europeans. Turkish culture and society, influenced over the centuries by Central Asian, Persian, Arab, Greek, Armenian, Balkan, and west European peoples, are highly complex phenomena.

Turks differ in sociocultural class, rural-urban living experience, and educational level. Despite this variation, a Turco-Islamic value system, shared by most Turks, characterizes the idealized Turkish male as courageous, brave, and strong; moderate in all activities; respectful of the learned and the elderly; loyal to kin and friends; guided by a keen sense of honor and shame; concerned for his and others' dignity; patient and enduring in the face of hardship; and generous, hospitable, and friendly. Historically, the Turkish male was a *ghazi,* or champion of Islam, who defended the faith against foreign threats. Today's Turks

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now associate this traditional image with patriotism as well as Islam. To die in the service of the country is to die a martyr.

Turkey's population has grown faster than her economy. In recent years, unemployment rates have been around 20 percent, and the incomes of much of the population are at or below the subsistance level. Exposure to the West has infected Turks with rising expectations, and limited domestic opportunities have impelled many Turks to emigrate. More than two million Turkish workers and family members live in Western Europe and Saudi Arabia. Of those who remained at home some turn to political violence in desperate attempts to rectify economic and demographic forces beyond their control. Most Turks, however, rely on supportive family ties and religion to endure the hard times.

Although Turkey has been urbanizing rapidly, more than half of the working population is engaged in agriculture while only 15 percent work in industry. Today about 50 percent of Turkey's people live in some 35,000 villages, but that proportion was much higher in the past. Most hinterland villagers grow wheat, barley, and rye as well as the fruits and vegetables common to the northern Mediterranean region. Villagers along the seacoast combine fishing with agriculture, while those near the Mediterranean diversify their farming with citrus fruits. Villages are commonly marked by poverty, high rates of illiteracy, and families fragmented by emigration.

Turkey's cities are a rich blend of history, peoples, and lifestyles. Adorned with beautiful architectural treasures from the Byzantine, Ottoman, and modern eras, they are the home of Turkish literary, musical, scientific, industrial, and commercial elites: people who have benefited from the best educations at home and abroad and who read, write, and speak fluently at least one western language. These cities contrast the historic with the modern, the rich with the poor, the urbanite wtih the peasant. Powerful magnets, they draw in more people than they can accommodate. Consequently, shanty towns, populated by poor but aspiring arrivals from the country, ring their outskirts.

Small towns occupy a critical mediating position between Turkey's urban, secular elite and its more religious, rural folk. Most villagers do their buying and selling in weekly town markets. To further their educations beyond grade five, village children must attend town or city schools. Village headmen and councils must report to higher ranking town officials. Although town residents frequently have rural backgrounds, town governmental, educational, and commercial elites come from major cities. Prior to 1970 there were a few anthropological studies of Turkish villages, but practicaly nothing on Turkish towns. With the hope of filling this gap, I embarked on my fieldwork in 1969.

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II

In August of that year I arrived in Susurluk, the small Turkish town in northwestern Asia Minor that was to become my home for a year. Although fresh from three years of graduate work at Harvard, I had been to Turkey before as a Peace Corps Volunteer. Consequently, I knew something of the language and the people. I say something, for I spent the next year correcting my previous misimpressions.

Thanks to a Turkish friend from Peace Corps days, I was able to stay in a factory dormitory on the edge of town until I got established. While there, I explored the town and made new acquaintances, who, on my request, searched for a local family who might take me in or rent me a room. They warned that this would not be easy and some even said impossible; the townspeople were conservative and not likey to accept a foreign male into their homes. By the third week, no family had been found, so I rented an apartment in an two-family home near the center of town.

From there, I set about meeting new people: neighbors, merchants, craftsmen, and town officials. After about three more weeks, two men who worked at the factory told me they had found an elderly couple who might rent me a room in their home. The husband and wife lived alone and could use the money. Later I learned the couple had known about my wishes for some time but only consented to consider me after several people had implored them on my behalf. Meanwhile, they, neighbors, and friends had scrutinized my every move. Now, it appeared, I had passed the observation test and could be examined close up.

The next afternoon, my factory friends took me to the couple's small home. At a pleasant meeting in their backyard garden, we discussed rental matters over coffee. The husband and wife asked about my family, my background and plans. Intermittently they exchanged whispered messages between themselves and with my go-betweens. Finally, they said they would send word in a few days. Fortunately, they said yes, permitting me to share their home and part of their lives for the next ten months.

We became more than good friends. They opened their home and their hearts to me. We shared meals, entertained guests together, and passed many hours of enjoyable conversation either basking in the sun of their garden on mild days or huddled around their small wood stove on cold winter nights. Being illiterate, they entrusted me with the reading and writing of their correspondence. I shared household duties, like shopping and gardening. We became a family. I called her *annem,* my mother, and him *amca,* uncle; they called me *oğlum,* my son. Although I lived with them for a year, they never learned my name!

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My Turkish mother was in her seventies. Having been born in a poor village during the time of the Ottoman Empire, when Turkish Muslims used the lunar calendar and when, in any case, peasants often failed to register the births of their daughters, she could only estimate her age. She had already outlived three husbands and several children. She was a plump, five feet two inches tall with deep brown eyes and hennaed reddish-brown hair. At home, she usually went barefoot and wore a dark, spotted smock, but exposed her hair. When she went out, she always wore a headcloth, coat, and shoes — all black and heavy. Only her round face and expressive eyes peered from this blob of darkness. She spoke Turkish with the regional peasant accent, and eveyone knew her as Shukriye Abla — Big Sister Shukriye.[2] Eventually, I learned that she was a folkloric encyclopedia, a fortune teller, a Quranic prayer reciter, a popular curer, and a matchmaker. She hid these proficiencies from me. After I had discovered her about to embark on a journey into the occult did she reveal them, little by little.

One night, very late, about a month after I had moved in, I saw her wearing her usual black headkerchief and long black coat about to leave the house. When I asked what was up, she fidgetted with embarrasment and anxiously whispered that she was going to save a girl. "Go in the house and I'll tell you about it tomorrow," she promised, as the passed through the gate out on to the street.

The next day she explained, in tones reserved for the deepest secrets, that the neighbor's daughter was dying, and no doctor could help her. She and some other women concluded that a family enemy had persuaded a sorcerer in the village of Karapurjek to hex the girl. The sorcerer must have carved an image of the girl from a bar of soap, pronounced an incantation over it, and then dropped it into a well. As the soap dissolved, the girl wasted away. To counter the hex the women neighbors called Shukriye Abla to recite her prayers and perform rituals over the sick girl. Other elderly women participated to add moral strength.

This revelations was the opening of a treasure box. My Turkish mother explained hexes and cures to me. In the "language of the Quran," she recited some of her prayers, many of which she had memorized in her childhood. Although she did not know the meanings of individual words, she knew the purpose and proper situation for each prayer. I began reading to her from books written by Turkish professors, all males, on Turkish folk practices associated with life cycle crises: birth, circumcision, marriage, pregnancy, death. Initially, she was astounded that professors would write on such topics. As if the books gave greater legitimacy to her skills, she began to expound on the published descriptions. She amplified what was written, offered the local variation of the practice, and at times, rejected it outright as the fabrication of a city professor.

[2]For a photograph of this woman, see Magnarella (1981, 13).

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Before long, she realized, correctly, that she knew more than the writers, and had in fact become my professor.

She was also a matchmaker. One of her nephews, a successful merchant of about 35 who lived in a distant city, often wrote to her about a search for a "nice, soft carpet." The nephew was already married, but his wife had become sickly and no longer engaged in sex. To satisfy his need, while avoiding local sanctions, he hoped my mother would find him a girl willing to be set up as his mistress in a furnished Istanbul apartment. "His wife was always a cold bitch," she told me, "she should either divorce him or let him be a man."

One of the most exciting events of our household resulted from her enthusiasm for matchmaking. Ahmet, a town native of about 30 who was orphaned in youth and divorced in adulthood, wanted to remarry. What was normally an easy task became complicated by Ahmet's desire to marry a virgin and take her away to Izmir, a large, distant city where he held a lowpaying custodial job. Local families refuse to marry their virgin daughters to divorcees, especially poor ones. Despite this, young Oya, a virgin, they said, fell in love with Ahmet and wanted to be carried away. A year before, my mother had gone to Oya's parents to ask for her hand on Ahmet's behalf. But they refused. Now, Oya was eighteen and could legally marry on her own. In reality, she could marry Ahmet only if they skipped town. They passed messages through my mother. Oya was anxious to elope before her older brother got discharged from the army. With him and her father both watching her, she stood little chance of escape. Even if she did, her brother would quickly track her down.

The plan was set. Ahmet was to wait in Izmir, and Oya would slip out of her home, meet my mother, and together they would bus to the big city and to Oya's nuptial bliss. On the appointed day, Oya wore an extra pair of underwear, but otherwise dressed normally in her dress, coat, and headcloth so as not to arouse the neighbors' suspicions. The two women walked through the back streets, down to the main highway, where they waved down the bus. After an eight-hour-ride, they reached Izmir and taxied to Ahmet's apartment. Before the couple got too involved, my mother had Ahmet fetch an *imam* and two witnesses so that a religious marriage ceremony could be conducted. "I had obligations to Oya, to her parents, and to the Muslim community," she later told me. The sacred vows were exchanged that evening, and the next day my mother returned home.

Meanwhile, Oya's father suspected what had happened and immediately came to our house. Fortunately, neither her husband nor I knew what the old woman had been up to. From there Oya's father went to the police. Shortly after my tired mother returned home from the long, exhausting bus ride, the police arrived to take her to the station for questioning. Claiming that witnesses had

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seen her and the girl at the town bus station, they demanded to know where she had taken Oya. Recognizing a bluff, my mother played dumb. Then the police switched tactics. "You know", they told her, "how much or our beloved Prophet wants all Muslims to tell the truth."

Her conscience heavy, my mother told a half truth. Yes, she, at the girl's own request, had accompanied Oya to the Izmir bus depot. From there, Ahmet took them to his apartment. Where that was, she could not remember. Big cities make her dizzy. They got married, and that's all she knew. The police released her, but the next day they brought her back for further questioning. This time, saying it had just turned up, she gave them a slip of paper with Ahmet's work address. She didn't want to give it to them earlier, she told me, for fear that the police might break in on the couple during their first night alone. Eventually, the couple was legally (that is, civilly) married, and my mother felt she had earned *sevap,* Allah's reward for a pious deed.

III

While my Turkish mother revealed to me part of the hidden world of women, another person, of about my own age, introduced me to the more public world of men and politics. Shortly after I arrived in Susurluk, I met Mustafa, a slightly built, light complexioned bachelor of twenty-nine years, who worked as a journeyman tailor in the shop of a friend. Having been born and raised in Susurluk, he knew almost everyone. His deceased father had been active in politics and had held local office in the town's largest political party. Emulating his father, Mustafa became the president of that party's youth branch. He had friends and relatives everywhere: in businesses, crafts, services, and local government. He was so good natured and non-threatening that even leaders of the opposition parties liked him. On the surface, the town appeared to be his natural, harmonious setting. Dressed smartly in a suit that he, himself, tailored, he strolled to the shop at a leisurely morning hour, always careful to walk three blocks out of his way to pass the home of a special young lady. Once in the shop, he varied his work pace — now stitching intensely, now stopping to joke and sip tea with visitors. At noon, he strolled home by the usual circuitous route to lunch on a fine Turkish meal prepared by his grandmother or brought over by one of his many sisters, aunts, or cousins. Afternoons were again spent working and socializing. Evenings, he frequently crossed the street to his brother-in-law's restaurant to dine with a group of friends. Late evenings were usually spent either watching a movie, attending some civic or club meeting, or drinking and dancing farewell to a fellow bachelor about to be married.

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At first, to my mind, Mustafa, his family, and friends, had achieved that sense of community for which we in the West, especially anthropologists, have been questing. But, I was wrong. Mustafa was not content.

Over the past several years, townsmen had emigrated to Europe as workers. They returned, driving new cars, loaded down with European goods, and exclaiming their success to all who listened. Mustafa's own brother-in-law had gone to work at the Ford factory in Cologne, West Germany. After saving a tidy sum, he quit and rejoined his family in Susurluk. Now, he tells Mustafa, returning was his life's major mistake. After Germany, he found the town stagnant.

In the fall of 1969, a friend came home on vacation from his job in Switzerland. He raved about the high wages and excellent living conditions in that "most civilized of all countries," and claimed that his special connections could secure fine jobs for any townsmen willing to invest 2,000 Turkish Liras (about $200) in their cause. Before the friend returned to Switzerland, Mustafa handed him TL 1,000 — his entire savings, and waited for the promised letter of employment. It never came. Mustafa became despondent and a little embarrassed.

A few months later, *Milliyet* — a major Turkish newspaper — carried a series about a group of Turkish tailors who were employed in a Rochester, New York, clothing factory. Mustafa excitedly asked me to help him write a letter of application for work there. I could not help but compare gray, industrial Rochester with this idyllic town, nestled between green rolling hills and crowned with clear blue skies and sunshine for most of the year. Surely, even at ten times his present income, Mustafa would not achieve the sense of social fulfillment in Rochester that I so envied him. But no amount of cautious reasoning could dissuade him. Again, his friends offered encouragement; his brother-in-law even expressed envy. Months passed before the Rochester plant sent a card in acknowledgement of Mustafa application. Then, again, silence. Shortly before leaving Susurluk, I wrote one last letter to Rochester to ask about Mustafa's chances.

Those last weeks in town were memorable, but sad. Mustafa and I spent many evenings together, conversing and drinking rakı in the town park. He never tired of asking about the United States and imagining himself there, doing all the things he enjoyed at home, but on a grander scale! He would work hard, save money, and then buy a car, a TV, a modern house — "The complete set." He would marry an American and their children would grow up happily amidst abundance.

By September of 1970, I was back at Harvard, "analyzing my field data," when a letter from Mustafa arrived. Although Rochester had returned his application with a note saying there would be no work, he assured me that one

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way or another he would get to the United States and fulfill his dream. But he never came, and during my next visit to Turkey in 1972, I found him in Istanbul, working in a dingy shop and living in an antiquated apartment house. The town had become too confining, he said, so he moved to the big city, had a friend get him a job with an Istanbul tailor, and soon married a young lady who worked in the same shop. His wedding sank him in debt, and their two incomes were barely enough to get by on. But he must stay and try to build a future. His home town had become a place of the past, to which return evinced failure. In the book I eventually wrote, I described Mustafa as but "one of millions participating in a new 'Culture of Discontent,' created largely, but inadvertently by the world's more modern [read affluent capitalist] countries... engendered by a level of aspirations far exceeding the bonds of his local opportunities. Made to want what only a few privileged could afford, he rejected a past, even an evolving present, in impatient pursuit of a distant, probably unattainable future" (1974, 183).

IV

So, these were two of my god-sends; except for them I would not have accomplished what I did. I had a lengthy interview schedule that was administered to a large sample of people; I collected census and other "hard data." I took extensive notes from town newspapers. I read everything available about the town and district. But it was that special human acceptance extended by these two persons, in particular, that enabled me to understand the townspeople as a scientific humanist.

Mustafa, I visit and reminisce with whenever I visit Istanbul. My Turkish mother died in 1977. I miss her folk wisdom, the bisquits she baked specially for me whenever I went on a trip, her ritualistic pouring of water to ensure that my journeys and returns went smoothly, and they always did. I miss her. She told me before she died, as if she had not already done so much, "We'll reunite in the hereafter. I've made you my *ahret oğlu,* my spiritual son, so if you don't attain paradise, Allah will let me bring you in."

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CONCEPTUALIZING THE CIRCUM-MEDITERRANEAN FOR PURPOSES OF SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

Abstract

Although Circum-Mediterranean anthropologists have rejected the culture area trait approach, none has offered a comprehensive alternative. This paper presents a reconceptualization of the Circum-Mediterranean area utilizing a dynamic systems model. It discusses how this systems approach, combined with a theoretical paradigm, can facilitate social scientific research by viewing the region as an intensive interactional/ecological zone or as a substantive/theoretic generative field; or by focusing on the Circum-Mediterranean system interface and making inter-areal systems comparisons. [Circum-Mediterranean, culture area, anthropological theory]

Conceptual labels, like metaphors, require careful monitoring; they begin as devices to facilitate thought, but soon stultify it. So it has been with the culture area concept. As applied to the Mediterranean region, Llobera (1987:119) argues, the concept has been used in "a totally uncritical way." He calls for abandoning it unless employed with great critical caution, or using it only as a loose typological tool or teaching device (Ibid. 116). Llobera was referring primarily to the cultural area trait approach, which Davis (1977:12-13) also rejects: "a certain kind of agriculture, a certain respect for towns, a climate, a type of plough and a couple of syndromes . . ."

This paper offers a reconceptualization of the circum-Mediterranean region designed to promote more productive social scientific research. It also outlines several fruitful research directions, and, in the process, refers to a few well-known and less famous studies.

The circum-Mediterranean as a Cultural-Natural System

The traditional culture area label was attached to a territory characterized by an identifiable complex of cultural traits commonly associated with one or

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more modes of ecological adaptation applied to the territory's special set of environmental conditions (Ehrich and Henderson 1968). Within a designated culture area different but usually complementary ways of life (such as peasant agricultural and pastoralism) coexist as characteristic patterns. Anthropologists have employed the culture area concept both synchronically and diachronically to map trait-complex distributions at a particular period and for successive periods.[1] The mapping should not be an end in itself, however, but an initial step in the analysis of cultural change and continuity, boundary maintenance and change, areal expansion and contraction, which are all related to the processes of technological, demographic, and political change, social encounters and intellectual development. Although the recognizable cultures within a specified area should contrast with those of adjacent areas, boundaries may shift through time and may not be sharply delineated at any time. Transition zones with a blending of traits may make the passage from one culture area to another a matter of gradation.

During preindustrial periods, persistent culture areas were commonly bound by natural frontiers such as mountains, rivers, seas, oceans, deserts, marshes, etc. These frontiers limited external contacts and caused area inhabitants to look inward for trade, alliances, and other kinds of social intercourse. The resulting dynamic density of social interaction heightened the need for effective forms of economic, political, and sociocultural integration.

The traditional cultural area concept can be enhanced greatly by refashioning it within a more dynamic systems approach. By so doing, we can reconceptualize the circum-Mediterranean region as an open cultural-natural system consisting of the natural factors making up its geography and climate, the historic sociocultural factors (consisting of the peoples, cultures, political entities, etc. found in the region through time), the interface of these factors with those of the region's environment, and the diachronic/synchronic interrelations between and among these elements and their attributes.

Rather than speak of boundaries, systems theorists employ the concept of "interface." They pay more attention to system-environmental connections and interpenetrations than to separations. At any point in time, an open system is characterized by both initial state conditions and external influences. An open system engages in interchanges with its cultural-natural environment, and these interchanges are essential to the system's viability, continuity and change. Open systems may respond to environmental intrusions by elaborating their structures to more complex levels.

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[1] For an extensive list of circum-Mediterranean cultural traits and a bibliography containing much of the pertinent anthropological literature, see Gilmore (1982).

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A system's emergent properties are not found in its individual parts. The whole is more than the sum of its parts, and the part is more than a fraction of the whole. To be truly productive, the cultural-natural system concept must be used in conjunction with a theoretical paradigm. Although this writer prefers a "human materialist" approach (See, Magnarella 1993), no effort is made here to impose any particular theoretical paradigm. Research can be enhanced by combining any one of many available paradigms with the cultural-natural systems approach described here. Currently, the anthropology of the circum-Mediterranean area consists of an impressive number of localized, effectively uncorrelated studies largely unresponsive to any theoretical paradigm. The result has been a limited opportunity for effective comparative studies and only limited contribution to the process of theory construction and verification.

The systems conceptualization advocated here calls for a Janus-faced approach to social scientific studies, with one face empirically examining a particular set of entities and interrelationships to which theoretical constructs are applied and tested, while the other face views a wider vista, placing the empirical data within larger historic cultural-natural contexts and searching for points of articulation with higher level theoretical paradigms. This approach emphasizes the dual process of creating successively more general inductions and successively more specific deductions. It enriches localized analysis, while promoting intra- and inter-regional comparison as well as theory building, application, and testing.

The Circum-Mediterranean in Historic-Ecological Perspective

Prior to industrialization and more modern forms of travel and communication, the circum-Mediterranean littoral and adjacent hinterlands, with their combination of natural harbors, balmy weather, and agro-pastoral potentials, bounded by rugged mountains and snowy winters to the north, mountains and deserts to the east, the Great Sahara to the south, and the Atlantic Ocean to the West, constituted a natural setting for human occupation, settlement, and intense interaction. The Mediterranean Sea became an advantageous travelway for boats of small and moderate size. The convenience and low cost of ship transport as compared to overland travel by pack animals facilitated and intensified commerce and communication between ports around the Mediterranean coast.

Agricultural surpluses, technological advances and trade profits stimulated population growth, differentiation of economic function, social stratification, and more complex forms of political integration. Efforts to control and integrate various economically differentiated populations led to the development of

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numerous principalities, kingdoms and empires which competed for territorial domination, markets and resources. Most of these political entities promoted an official religion that served to legitimize rule and indoctrinate followers. Various societies, such as classical Greece, developed leisure classes that engaged in literary, scientific, philosophical and artistic creativity.

Much of circum-Mediterranean history has been characterized by shifting alliances and rivalries among political entities.[2] The ongoing competition placed a premium on improvements in technology, communication, and organization. Periods of comprehensive political and theological integration were achieved by the dominance of the Roman Empire and the subsequent spread of Christianity. Under the Romans, peculiar forms of law, architecture, sculpture, painting, and language spread throughout the Mediterranean region and its northern hinterlands. Latin became the lingua franca of the Roman Empire and of European scientists, theologians, and philosophers for centuries. Invading Goths, Vandals, and Huns further complicated the region's socio-political dynamics and split the Empire into its Eastern and Western wings. Eventually Byzantine Orthodox Christianity and Roman Catholicism demarcated the East-West division and enveloped the peoples of their northern hinterlands. Along with religious conversion went other Mediterranean-based cultural and political influences, chief among them being language (Latin and Greek), writing, the ordering of time, the principle of religiously authorized rule, and canon law.

The seventh century birth of Islam in Arabia, and its subsequent spread throughout North Africa, Spain and the Middle East presented Eastern and Western Christendom with new challenges. Muslim leaders stressed their monotheistic religion's continuity with Judaism and Christianity while simultaneously promoting its goal of universal dominance.

As the Arabs extended Islam's realm, they borrowed from older Greco-Roman traditions and adopted cultural elements from converted Persians, Berbers, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Turks and others. The Islamic concept of universal brotherhood, the universality of Arabic, and the annual pilgrimage to Mecca stimulated commerce, social intercourse, and creativity. The resulting Islamic culture was syncretic. It consolidated in its peculiar religious mold the cultural achievements of various circum-Mediterranean and hinterland peoples.

Christian contacts with Muslims in Spain and Sicily as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Crusades funnelled Arabic words, concepts, foods, products, and dress styles into Europe. But the Crusades and the subsequent Ottoman conquests of Constantinople and the Balkans, hardened an

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[2]For a detailed historical essay on Europe as a cultural area, see McNeill (1977).

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evolving Muslim-Christian adversarial mentality. Later Christian-Muslim relations were largely confrontational with industrial Europe dominating its Mediterranean neighbors. Throughout this period of European political and economic domination, however, the intermingling of cultural traditions continued. European technology and politico-legal ideas spread, through imposition or voluntary acquisition, throughout much of North Africa and the Middle East, while students and workers from these areas invaded Europe seeking modern Western educations and industrial jobs.

Research Directions

The circum-Mediterranean's natural beauty and historic richness account for the close attention artists, poets, historians, and social scientists have devoted to it over the centuries. The above historic sketch, however inadequate, reveals an array of potential topics and fruitful research directions that can be productively pursued through the application of the cultural-natural system concept in conjunction with a viable theoretical paradigm.

One direction can focus on the circum-Mediterranean area as an *intensive interactional/ecological zone*. Historically, this ecologically diverse area has been inhabited by peoples differing in terms of their languages, religions, modes of adaptation as well as social, economic, and political structures. The area's value to social science stems in significant part from the presence of diversity within the interactional field. For example, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) constructed his famous theory of cyclical history on the systemic interactions between desert and urban peoples.

More recently, Blok (1972) examined city-hinterland relations in Mediterranean Europe and explained the observed configurations in terms of organization of production, the process of state formation, the merging of noble classes with the urban mercantile bourgeoisie, and the threats from bandits and pirates. Lopez Casero (1988) conducted a comparative study of agricultural cities in Sicily and two regions of Spain (Andalusia and La Mancha). He concluded that the settlement of agricultural workers in cities can be attributed to water shortages, vulnerability to crime, exposure to disease and the reigning system of extensive cultivation. Some Yugoslavian urban sociologists have revived and expanded the theoretical framework and methodology of Serbian Jovan Cvijic (1966) to study the rise and fall of Balkan as well as Byzantine-Turkish cities (Vujovic 1988). Cvijic's approach focuses on population ecology, urban functions, migration and ethnic diversity.

The interactions of different ethnic populations have intrigued some scholars. For instance, Freund (1975) assessed the socio-political consequences

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that ethnic minority-majority interactions have had on their resident countries and "homelands." The study included Southern France, Spain, Gibraltar, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel. Two of the many other interactional foci have been patron-client links (e.g., Gellner and Waterbury 1977) and core-periphery relations (e.g., Schneider and Schneider 1976).

Other scholars have conducted intra-areal comparisons of interactive cultural phenomena. For example, Wolf (1969) compared aspects of social structure and symbolism in Latin Europe and the Islamic Near East. Gellner (1968) contrasted the character and structure of sects in Christian Europe with those of North African Islam. Magnarella and Türkdoğan (1973) analyzed and compared the Turkish-Islamic ritual kinship practice of *kirvelik* with the structurally parallel practices of *kumstvo* (Balkans) and *compadrazgo*.

Utilizing the cultural-natural system conceptual scheme outlined above, another research direction involves treating the circum-Mediterranean as a *substantive and theoretic generative field*. Substantively, the area's people have created, elaborated and spread religious, philosophical, scientific, political, jurisprudential, etc. ideas of global importance. Consequently, the area offers social scientists a historically rich cultural laboratory in which to investigate the generation and maturation of some of humanity's significant intellectual achievements: at least two of the world's universalistic religions (Christianity and Islam), ethno-nationalism,[3] various schools of philosophy and art, the state political form, etc.

Theoretically, circum-Mediterranean socio-cultural systems present rich research environments in which social scientists can generate hypotheses and theories, which they can further apply and test cross-culturally, thereby contributing both to a better understanding of the area and to the advancement of anthropology and other social scientific disciplines. The theoretical paradigms of Emile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto and Antonio Gramsci represent three well-known social scientific achievements with circum-Mediterranean roots. On a much more modest level, this writer has utilized circum-Mediterranean materials to develop a causal theory of civil violence (Magnarella 1982), a humanistic model of peasants in change (1979), and a "culture of discontent" concept to characterize the socioeconomic and psychological condition of marginal, third world peoples who view, with envy, Western standards of living and desperately desire to immigrate (1974).

The cultural-natural system conceptualization of the circum-Mediterranean may also be used as the basis for *inter-areal systems comparisons*. Various

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[3]For the outline of a proposal to investigate the European genesis and diffusion of political nationalism, see Llobera (1987:112-114).

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aspects of circum-Mediterranean politics, economics, religions, legal systems, etc. can be fruitfully compared with those of North America, Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Far East, etc. Those social scientists interested in working on even higher levels of abstraction could investigate the interrelationships of the circum-Mediterranean system with other areal systems in a world system model (see Wallerstein 1979).

The final research direction to be considered here concerns the *circum-Mediterranean system interface.* Often labeled core-periphery problems, some interface studies have focused on various dominant/subordinate relations. Historically, these have included relations between political centers, such as Rome, Constantinople, Damascus, Baghdad and their dominated or marginal territories. More recently, they have concerned relations between the industrial North and the agrarian South, the imperialist North and the colonial South, employer North and employee South, the products exporting North and the people exporting South, as well as between Arab petro-power and European industrial might.

However, interface problems go beyond these dominant/subordinate relationships. In terms of effective international integration, Europe is at the cutting edge; it has become an attractive model for other parts of the world. Currently, circum-Mediterranean countries belong to a number of economic, political and legal organizations that relate them intimately to countries of the hinterland and beyond. Only a few significant examples need be mentioned here. Turkey, Greece, Italy, France, and Portugal have membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization along with Great Britain, Norway, Denmark, the Benelux countries, Canada, and the United States. Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece are members of the European Economic Community. Turkey, an associate member, is applying for full membership; Cyprus and Malta are seriously considering to do the same. The Council of Europe's 21 member states include Malta, Cyprus, France, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. The Council works for cooperative achievements in the areas of education, family affairs, architectural heritage, cultural affairs, environmental protection, justice, human rights, labor, migration, youth, health, social security, mass media policy, local government, and regional planning.

Through its memberships, Turkey has become a key connection between the Christian North and the Muslim East and South. In addition to its NATO, EEC, CE ties, Turkey belongs to the Islamic Conference, a body of 42 Muslim countries, including the Arab states of the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean. The Islamic Conference is concerned with a broad range of political, economic, cultural and religious issues. Its policies as well as those of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries are significantly influenced by Saudi Arabia--a petro-powerful hinterland state. In addition, Saudi Arabia's influence on Western

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Europe through its oil export, investment and Islamic banking policies along with its European-based Islamic centers catering to Europe's Muslim citizens and immigrant workers is often profound.

While Turkey and the North Mediterranean countries interface with Northern Europe through NATO, the EEC, and the EC. The Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries interface with their Asian and African hinterland neighbors through the Islamic Conference. The nature and consequences of these interfaces on the local, regional, national and international levels constitute important questions for investigation.

Of particular interest to social scientists concerned with international respect for human dignity are the nature and consequences of the Council of Europe's Human Rights Convention and Social Charter. Together, the Convention and Charter guarantee citizens of the 21 member states basic civil, political, social and economic rights. Both the Convention and Charter have become domestic law of the member states. Furthermore, when individuals believe that violations of their rights have not been remedied by their own national courts, they may file a complaint with the European Commission of Human Rights, which may in turn refer the petition to the European Court of Human Rights. The Convention empowers the European Committee of Ministers to ensure enforcement of the Court's judgments. In recent years, the Court has decided between 30 to 40 cases annually, and state compliance with its judgments has generally been good (Buergenthal 1988:108).

Taken together, the missions and agendas of these international organizations have seriously impacted on the circum-Mediterranean cultural-natural system, affecting practically every life dimension. Memberships in the above mentioned and other international organizations have influenced circum-Mediterranean states in areas ranging from the transfer of ideas, peoples, goods, services, and technology to new jurisprudential conceptions of the person. For instance, Turkey, in its eagerness to be accepted as a full member of the EEC, has ratified the European Human Rights Convention and Social Charter, and has recognized the jurisdiction of the European Human Rights Commission and Court. More recently, Turkey has announced the wholesale revamping of its prison system to conform to Western European standards. Turkey's example may, in turn, influence the legal systems of some members of the Islamic Conference.

Conclusion

In summary, the approach outlined here, combining a cultural-natural systems concept with a theoretical paradigm, facilitates both macroscopic and microscopic social scientific research in a number of directions. By its

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interactive, comparative, generative, and interfacing foci, the approach advocates expansive theoretical and substantive thinking, rather than provincial, particularistic concern. The indigenous and contextual diversity of the circum-Mediterranean system confronts social scientists with a rich array of challenging research topics. Despite the wealth of previous scholarship, what remains to be studied is greater than what has been learned.

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THE TURKISH BRIDEWEALTH PRACTICE IN TRANSITION[1]

Urban modernization with all its inherent elements has been a catalyst to change throughout the Middle East. Since World War II especially, many urban innovations have diffused to rural areas causing traditional practices to be either modified, transformed or abandoned. In rural Turkey the giving of a bridewealth (*başlık* or *ağırlık*) by the family of the groom to the family of the bride prior to the wedding has been a generalized custom of long tradition. There is also evidence to show that this custom was still practiced in Turkish cities during the earlier part of this century.[2] However, more recent ethnography and observation reveal that this practice has been virtually discontinued in the cities and its frequency is decreasing in rural areas.[3]

While a number of anthropologists have provided information on the bridewealth practice, few have tried to analyze it. For instance, Nermin Erdentuğ explains the bridewealth as compensation to the bride's family for the loss of a worker.[4] Paul Stirling says that it is basically a form of conspicuous consumption used by the families of the marrying couple to impress each other and their neighbors.[5] While both these anthropologists made interesting observations, I believe that a more detailed examination of this social practice is necessary before conclusions can be reached.

Unfortunately, the paucity of satistical evidence renders such an analysis extremely difficult. Below I have drawn from the variety of empirical observations offered by a number of English and Turkish sources in an effort to

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[1]I wish to thank Dr. Zekiye Eglar, Dr. Şinasi Tekin, and Dr. Richard Robinson, for their critical comments and helpful suggestions; naturally, any short-comings are my responsibility. In addition to the sources cited within, I have also drawn on my own observations made during a two-year residence in Turkey (1963-65).

[2]Hamit Zübeyr Koşay, *Türkiye Türk Düğünleri üzerine Mukayeseli Malzeme* (Comparative Materials on Turkish Weddings) (Ankara, 1944), p. 116; Lucy Garnett, *Home Life in Turkey* (New York, 1909), pp. 238-39; Vahan Gardashian, *Actual Life in the Turkish Harem* (New York, 1911), p. 20.

[3]Ibrahim Yasa, *Hasanoğlan, Socio-economic Structure of a Turkish Village* (Ankara, 1957), p. 99; Nermin Erdentuğ, *A Study on the Social Structure of a Turkish Village* (Ankara, 1959), p. 27; see also Orhan Türkdoğan, *Erzurum ve Çevresinde Sosyal Araştırmalar* (Social Research in Erzurum and Its Environs) (Ankara, 1965), pp. 86-93.

[4]Erdentuğ, *A Study*, p. 31.

[5]Paul Stirling, *Turkish Village* (New York, 1965), p. 118.

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induce hypotheses to be tested by further investigation. Functional analysis has been employed from an historical perspective, and an effort has been made to demonstrate how variations in the size of the bridewealth are concomitant to variations of certain other related factors. My basic assumption is that the bridewealth practice and the kinship system of which it is a part exist to answer certain needs, or to fulfill certain functions. When these needs change, the social practices utilized to meet them will also change. When it becomes necessary to fulfill these needs by new means, more traditional social practices will tend to disappear.

According to the Village Law adopted in 1925, settlements with less than 2,000 inhabitants are classified as villages.[6] The number of such settlements increased from 34,787 in 1955 to 35,444 in 1960,[7] while in the same five years their average size grew from 490 persons to 534.[8] This growth partly reflects an annual population increase during the period of approximately 2.6 per cent for all of Turkey.[9] Migration to the cities has prevented an even larger increase in rural areas. Whereas rural inhabitants represented 71 per cent of Turkey's total population in 1955, they represented 68 per cent in 1960.[10] Government sources estimate that about 170,000 people are migrating from the villages to the cities annually.[11]

Generally, Turkish villages are semi-isolated communities located either on the perimeter or in the center of lands on which their residents raise crops or graze herds and flocks. The Anatolian village economy is based on mixed agriculture. Cereals, such as wheat, barley, and rye along with vegetables and fruits common to the northern Mediterranean coastal countries are cultivated. Yields depend mainly upon the amount of water available. The plateau is generally a dry region in comparison with the Turkish littoral. Most villagers also raise goats, sheep and some cattle. The production of plateau villages has traditionally been at about the subsistence level. Only since World War II have more modern agricultural methods been introduced to some of these settlements.[12]

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[6]Fehmi Yavuz, "Planning the Development of Villages and Cities," in *Social Aspects of Economic Development* (Istanbul, 1964), p. 37.

[7]Richard Robinson, *High-Level Manpower in Economic Development, The Turkish Case* (Cambridge, 1967), p. 29.

[8]R. Keleş, and O. Türkay, *Köylü Gözü ile Türk Köylerinde İktisadi ve Toplumsal Değişme* (Economic and Social Change in Turkish Villages as Seen by the Villager) (Ankara, 1962), p. 12.

[9]Robinson, *Ec. Development*, p. 21.

[10]Yavuz, in *Social Aspects*, p. 38.

[11]C. W. M. Hart, "Peasants Come to Town," in *Social Aspects of Economic Development* (Istanbul, 1964), p. 58.

[12]See K. H. Karpat, "Social Effects of Farm Mechanization in Turkish Villages," *Social Research*, XXVIII, I (1960), 83-103; Richard D. Robinson, "Tractors in the Village — A Study in Turkey," *Journal of Farm Economics*, XXXIV, 4 (1952), 451-62.

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Although the particulars of kinship are not standard from village to village, certain regularities appear in the ethnographies of those Anatolian Turkish villages whose histories go back before World War I. The kinship patterns of villages settled more recently, especially those occupied by immigrant Turks, often differ markedly from those of older villages.[13] The following pages will deal with the more 'indigenous' Turkish villages. An attempt will be made to sift through local and regional differences in order to abstract common social elements which will aid in the understanding of the kinship system and in the analysis of the bridewealth practice.

Turkish rural society is strongly patriarchal. It traces descent and passes most property through the patriline. Because agnatically related households tend to group together, many villages are roughly divided into districts along kinship lines. Monogamous marriage is by far the statistical norm. Although polygyny is illegal, most of the villages covered by the ethnography contained from one to three such marriages. Though many villagers tend to favor patrilateral kin for spouses, no single kinship category is generally preferred or prescribed.[14] Villagers marry patrilateral kin, matrilateral kin, and non-kin. Marriage alliances exist within villages and between villages. Qur'anic prohibitions are normally respected.[15] The ideal household is the patrilocal extended household, composed of the patriarch and his wife, unmarried sons and daughters, and married sons and their spouses and children.[16] After the death of the patriarch and his wife, the extended family divides into as many nuclear families as there are married sons to form them. Owing to economic and demographic factors, especially the increasing imbalance in the land: population ratio, and the improved capacity for physical mobility, the proportion of village households resembling the ideal is generally small.[17]

The selection of a spouse has traditionally been the prerogative of one's parents. Generally boys over eighteen years of age have some say in the choice of their mates, but girls commonly have none. Normally the boy's parents do the bride searching. They approach the parents of the prospective bride

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[13]For examples see Hilmi Ülken and Ayda Tanyeli, "Gönen Monografisi," *Sosyoloji Dergisi*, X-XI (1955-56), 115-54.

[14]Cf. Stirling, *Turkish Village*, pp. 189-92, 202-04; Erdentuğ, *A Study*, pp. 36-37; Yasa, *Socio-economic Structure*, pp. 115-17.

[15]The Qur'ān advises an unmarried male that he may not marry the following kin types: mother, mother's sister, father's wife, father's sister, sister, brother's daughter, sister's daughter. Therefore, he may marry any female in his own generation except his real sisters. In addition, a married male may not wed his wife's mother, daughter, son's wife, or two sisters together. The Qur'ān also limits the number of wives that any male may have at one time to four; S. 4: 3, 23; Maurice Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Muslim Institutions*, translated by J. P. MacGregor (London, 1961), p. 130.

[16]Nermin Abadan, *Social Change and Turkish Woman* (Ankara, 1963), pp. 24-25; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, p. 43.

[17]See Erdentuğ, *A Study*, pp. 9-12; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, pp. 98-119; Yasa, *Socio-economic Structure*, pp. 110-14.

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themselves or through an intermediary to ask for their consent. If the families are mutually acceptable, agreement on the size of the bridewealth, value of the trousseau and other financial particulars has to be reached.[18]

The value of the bridewealth is not standard, even within the same village.[19] Two factors in particular appear to determine its amount. One is the prestige of the families involved, that is, their position in the socio-economic strata of the community. Wealth, measured in terms of land and animals, is probably the most important criterion for determining this position.[20] The amount of bridewealth that a girl's family demands often varies directly with its prestige. Families of high rank are expected to give and receive a more valuable bridewealth than those of lower rank.[21]

A second factor is the presence or absence of previous kinship ties between the families of the marrying couple. Marriages between close patrilateral kin are normally accompanied by low bridewealths while marriages between non-kin are accompanied by high bridewealths.[22] The second factor overrides the first. For instance, if a marriage were to involve close patrilateral kin, the bridewealth may be low or non-existent, regardless of the prestige of the families.

The bridewealth can be broken down into several components. Part of it often consists of jewelry, such as gold bracelets, which is given to the bride for her personal possession. Another portion is used to offset the expenses incurred in accumulating the trousseau. In some cases, the various items comprising the trousseau are purchased after this part of the bridewealth is actually paid.[23] A third part is used by the bride's parents to cover the expenses of the wedding celebration. In addition, Yasa reports that in Hasanoğlan a special portion of the bridewealth is also designated for the bride's father.[24]

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[18]H. Uğurol Barlas, *Kayseri Düğünleri* (Kayseri Weddings) (Istanbul 1963), pp. 13-22; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, pp. 179-81; Yasa, *Socio-economic Structure*, pp. 95-97.

[19]The tendency at present is for the bridewealth to be paid in the form of money and gold. However, in the past animals and farm implements were also used. Koşay, *Türkiye*, pp. 45, 53, 116. Stirling reports that bridewealth values in his two research villages between 1949 and 1952 averaged about $ 170 with a high of $420. Stirling, *Turkish Village*, pp. 186-87. Turkey's annual per capita income for this period averaged about $ 177. Reader Bullard, *The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey* (New York, 1961), p. 513. Özsan reports that in 1964 bridewealth values in certain villages near Zonguldak ranged from about $ 40 to $ 1,000. Filiz Özsan, "Bazı Devrek Köy Toplumlarında Kadının Mevkii" (The Status of Women in some Devrek Village Communities), *Antropoloji*, I, 2 (1964), 13.

[20]Paul Stirling, "Social Ranking in a Turkish Village," *The British Journal of Sociology*, IV, 1 (1953), 31-44; Yasa, *Socio-economic Structure*, pp. 85-93.

[21]Erdentuğ, *A Study*, p. 32; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, p. 187.

[22]For examples see Stirling, *ibid.*

[23]Koşay, *Türkiye*, pp. 88, 92, 116; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, pp. 186-87.

[24]Yasa, *Socio-economic Structure*, p. 122.

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The size of the bridewealth determines the size of the trousseau and the elaborateness of the wedding celebration. A large bridewealth is accompanied by a large celebration to which relatives and friends from near and far are invited to feast and inspect the trousseau.[25] Marriages between poor families are accompanied by neither high bridewealths nor great celebrations. The same often holds true for marriages between close patrilateral kin.

It appears as though the bridal gifts, trousseau and wedding celebration utilize the totality of the bridewealth. Therefore the bridewealth received for a daughter cannot be used to help secure a wife for a son.

Some Consequences and Functions of the Bridewealth Practice

The ethnography points out at least two functions for the bridewealth:

1. Compensation for the trousseau.
2. The maintenance of prestige by impressing relatives and neighbors with an expensive trousseau and an elaborate wedding celebration.

In addition, one anthropologist claims that it is compensation to the bride's family for the loss of a member.[26]

This last explanation is definitely insufficient when applied generally. A bridewealth does not accompany every marriage in which the wife-giving family loses a member. This explanation also implies that families assign a monetary value to each of their daughters — an implication which most villagers would rightfully deny.[27] We must also note that in many cases the bridewealth is absorbed by the bridal gifts, trousseau and wedding celebration. Stirling writes that "The villagers themselves insisted time and again that every honourable father is out of pocket over his daughter's wedding, inspite of the bride price."[28]

I believe that the most significant functions and consequences of the bridewealth are as follows:[29]

1. The bridewealth and the subsequent related activities are means whereby the inauguration of new interfamily and interlineage alliances is manifested and old alliances are publicly reaffirmed. Except in cases of economic hardship, a

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[25]Barlas, *Kayseri*, pp. 31-33; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, pp. 178-85: Yasa, *Socio-economic Structure*, pp. 99-101.
[26]Erdentuğ, *A Study*, p. 31.
[27]Cf. Stirling, *Turkish Village*, pp. 185-86.
[28]*Ibid.*, p. 186.
[29]These are not necessarily ranked in their order of importance.

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substantial bridewealth payment and wedding celebration generally accompany a marriage between previously unrelated families. In rural Turkey, as in other parts of the world, marriage is a recognized way for families and lineages to ally. Distinct sets of rights, duties and obligations accompany the creation of these affinal ties.[30]

As Barlas and others have described in detail, the ceremonies preceding a marriage include a complex exchange of gifts.[31] The bridewealth and trousseau represent an exchange between the two families, each acting as a unit. In addition, other exchanges often take place in which the parents, siblings, patrilateral and even matrilateral kin of the marrying couple participate as individuals. As the French sociologist, Marcel Mauss, has argued so cogently, a complex system of exchange of this kind universally expresses the creation or reaffirmation of an alliance between distinct social units.[32]

One reason why a large bridewealth and wedding celebration need not accompany a marriage between close patrilateral kin is because no new alliance has been created. Previous agnatic relations are not altered. Rights, duties and obligations within the lineage do not change. Therefore, the marriage need cause little excitement and life goes on as normal. Stirling comments on a marriage which fits this category exactly:

> Between brothers, bride price is very much less, and a wedding between father's brother's children is always a small scale affair, with little or no publicity. During my stay, a girl was married to the house next door to her father's brother's son for only T.L. 200 and with so little fuss that I did not know of it till after it had happened.[33]

2. The bridewealth is a means by which the security and future living conditions of a bride are provided for. In addition to contributing to a large trousseau, a high bridewealth also helps to ensure the bride's good treatment in the home of her affines. If the bride finds conditions unbearable there, she can run home to her father, who has the power to effect a permanent separation. This action would cause her affines a significant economic loss as the full bridewealth is practically impossible to recover. The bride's jewelry, the father's portion and the wedding expense money are generally lost forever.[34]

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[30] See Stirling, *Turkish Village*, pp. 170-73.

[31] Barlas, *Kayseri*, pp. 16-41; H. Uğurol Barlas, *Maraş Düğün Adetleri* (Maras Wedding Customs) (Istanbul, n.d.), pp. 19-59; Süheyla Efe and Uğurol Barlas, *Kutahya Düğün Adetleri* (Kutahya Wedding Customs) (Istanbul, 1963), pp. 13-46; Erdentuğ, *A Study*, pp. 30-34; Yasa, *Socio-economic Structure*, pp. 99-104.

[32] Marcel Mauss, *The Gift* (New York, 1967). (First published in 1925.)

[33] Stirling, *Turkish Village*, p. 187.

[34] Cf. Erdentuğ, *A Study*, p. 32.

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This 'security' function is especially applicable when a marriage takes place between members of previously unrelated or unacquainted families. Both Özsan and Stirling note that high bridewealths are demanded of families who are not well known by the bride's kin.[35] In such cases, the girl's family is anxious about their daughter's future. They are especially concerned with the way she may be treated by her new affines. This is because the adjustment which a new bride must make in the home of strange affines is often very difficult. The first few years of marriage are considered the most trying years of a girl's entire life cycle. She is subordinate to everyone in her husband's household and is constantly carrying out their commands.[36] On the other hand, marriage between close patrilateral kin generally requires little adjustment on the part of the bride. After the wedding she takes up residence with people she has known all of her life.

3. The bridewealth also offers some security to the bride in the event that she is divorced or widowed. That component which the bride receives in the form of jewelry functions as alimony should she be divorced or as life insurance should her husband's death precede hers. A large proportion of rural marriages, divorces and inheritance cases have not been conducted by the civil authorities as required by law.[37] However, village custom provides for many of the same exigencies as do more modern civil codes.

Another Turkish custom which can provide security for a widow is the levirate. But a widow cannot always rely on one of her husband's male kin to take her as his wife. Demographic and economic factors may make such a marriage very unlikely. Oftentimes the only available male is much younger than the widow or is already married. In any case a family which has already given a valuable bridewealth for their deceased son's wife has a strong incentive for providing his widow with another husband. By doing so, the valuables which she still possesses from the bridewealth can be maintained within their social unit. The levirate does not involve a second bridewealth.

4. The bridewealth can function to preserve a community's social stratification. It acts as a check on social mobility by discouraging males of poor, humble families from marrying girls from families of high rank.

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[35]Özsan, *Antropoloji*, I, 2 (1964), 12; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, p. 187.

[36]See Erdentuğ, *A Study*, pp. 22-23; Joe E. Pierce, *Life in a Turkish Village* (New York, 1964), p. 83; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, p. 109.

[37]Of the 34 village divorce cases recorded by Stirling between 1949 and 1950 not one had been accomplished in the courts, as they legally should have been. Stirling, *ibid.*, pp. 214-15. Although abolished by law, many villages have been executing divorce according to Muslim tradition. H. Timur, "Civil Marriage in Turkey: Difficulties, Causes and Remedies," *International Social Science Bulletin*, IX, 1 (1957), 35.

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Initially a girl acquires status from her father. But after marriage she derives status from her husband and his kin. Both Muslim law and Turkish custom disapprove of marriage of women to men of lower socio-economic status.[38] Normally a high ranking family will offer its daughters in marriage to non-kin only by demanding bridewealths too high for less wealthy families to pay. Families which are able to meet the bridewealth requirement will usually be of economic status acceptable to the girl's kin. Naturally, other criteria in addition to the economic one will determine whether or not a marriage alliance will ultimately take place. It is important to note that marriages involving close patrilateral kin are usually between people of similar status. This may be an additional factor explaining the little emphasis on bridewealth in such cases.

The giving and receiving of high bridewealths are also traditional means whereby families demonstrate their social rank within the community. The poorer villagers are impressed by this extravagance, and they often date events in their lives in reference to the occasions of elaborate weddings.

However, there are ways of avoiding the bridewealth, either partially or fully, and of crossing social boundaries. One such method is referred to as *iç güveyliği*. It typically involves the marriage of a rich family's daughter to a poor family's son with the consent of both sides, but without a bridewealth. Residence is uxorilocal. The groom lives with his wife's family which endeavors to help him by financial and other means to acquire status equal to its own. In effect, the groom relinquishes his place in his own family and patriline and voluntarily accepts whatever position is granted to him by his wife's father. In this way the bride's social and economic position is protected.

Traditionally this practice has not been looked upon with favor by villagers. It violates their ideals of patrilocal residence and patriarchal authority. The groom in such cases is considered *kılıbık* (hen-pecked) and can be the object of mockery. In spite of this, the custom has practical advantages which many villagers recognize. Boran writes that this marital arrangement was becoming more acceptable in the village of Adiloba,[39] and Yasa reports that about 8 per cent of Hasanoğlan village households contained a marriage of this type in 1946.[40]

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[38]Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Institutions*, p. 130; Mübeccel B. Kiray, *Ereğli, Ağır Sanayiden Önce Bir Sahil Kasabası* (Eregli, A Small Coastal Town before Heavy Industry) (Ankara, 1964), p. 126; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, p. 208; Efe and Barlas, *Kutahya*, p. 11; Ibrahim Yasa, *Sindel Köyü* (Ankara, 1960), p. 55.

[39]Behice S. Boran, *Toplumsal Yapı Araştırmaları* (Studies of Social Structure) (Ankara, 1945), p. 180.

[40]Yasa, *Hasanoğlan*, p. 117.

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Kidnapping (*kız kaçırma*) and elopement (*kaçışma*) are two other means of avoiding the full bridewealth burden and of marrying out of one's class. This is especially true if the girl loses her virginity in the process. Deprived of this extremely important quality her own prestige is diminished, and she can only be married at a reduced bridewealth.

While the conditions leading to these events are extremely varied, they generally involve socio-economic factors.[41] For example, even though the boy's kin are poor, the girl's family may still insist on a large bridewealth to cover the expenses of a valuable trousseau and a large wedding celebration. Seeing that these demands are impossible to meet, the boy may try to elope with the girl or kidnap her if she is unwilling. Sometimes even after the engagement, elopements take place to avoid the great expense of a wedding. Both families may agree to the arrangement or the boy's side may secretly advise it.

These practices are regarded as deviant behavior and may result in serious conflict or even shooting wars between families or villages.[42] However, it is the custom for mediators to endeavor to reconcile the girl's side. If their intercessions are unsuccessful, relations between the families remain extremely hostile. If they are successful, a small wedding with a reduced bridewealth may follow. In any case, both sides suffer some loss of prestige for being parties to the unconventional affair.

Statistics for such kinds of marriages are rare. Both Erdentuğ and Stirling estimate that about 5 per cent of the marriages in their research villages resulted from these practices.[43]

5. The bridewealth also functions to ensure 'economically practical polygyny.' According to Islamic law, only those who are economically able may, under certain circumstances, take more than one wife.[44] Thus, the initial expense of the bridewealth represents a check on those males whose appetites for wives are greater than their economic capacities.

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[41]Ibrahim Yasa, *Türkiye'de Kız Kaçırma Gelenekleri ve Bununla İlgili Bazı İdari Meseleleri* (Kidnapping Traditions in Turkey and Some Associated Administrative Problems) (Ankara, 1962), offers a detailed discussion of the problems with actual cases. Stirling, *Turkish Village*, pp. 192-94 offers several examples in English.

[42]Nermin Erdentuğ, *Hal Köyünün Etnolojik Tetkiki* (An Ethnologic Examination of Hal Village) (Ankara, 1956) pp. 58-59; Özsan, *Antropoloji*, I, 2 (1964), 11; Yasa, *Türkiye'de Kız Kaçırma*, pp. 19-22.

[43]Erdentuğ, *Hal*, p. 58; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, p. 193.

[44]Maulana Muhammad Ali, *The Religion of Islam* (Lahore, 1950), pp. 637-43.

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The Urban Situation

At present the bridewealth practice is extremely rare in urban areas. This may be attributed to a combination of two factors. The first is Western influence. Since the end of World War I the upper urban classes have been continually adopting more Euro-American ways and advocating westernization for the whole of Turkey. For example, in 1925 the urban elitist controlled central government passed a marriage law which limited the groom's bridal gifts to two dresses and restricted feasting to one day. It also forbade the public exhibition of the trousseau and the employment of dancing girls. The proponents of the law claimed that high wedding expenses often prevented marriages and thus drove Turkish youth to elopement, illicit relationships, and other immoral activities.[45] While this law was rarely, if ever, enforced, it did represent a manifestation of the movement away from more traditional practices by more modern urban groups.[46]

The second factor involves functional necessities and functional alternatives. Some of the functions which the bridewealth provides in the villages are not needed in the cities, and others are fulfilled by different means.

In the urban centers lineage ties become undone, while family ties are somewhat loosened. Unlike village marriages, city marriages rarely create interlineage alliances. The youth demand more freedom in the selection of their spouses, and the elderly are informed of the civil code which invalidates marriages that lack the mutual consent of the couples involved.[47] As a result marriage has become more of a personal matter with families giving more consideration to the preferences of their children than formerly. This trend is indexed by the greater frequency of neolocal residences and nuclear families in urban areas.[48]

In the cities the future security of the bride can be protected by government-sanctioned means. In 1926 the Turkish Government adopted the Swiss Civil Code. At present Turkish courts apply this Western code to all cases involving marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc. During recent decades urban Turks have been developing a better understanding of this code and have been resorting to the courts more often to settle conflicts arising within their families. In

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[45] *Daily News,* Ankara, May 9, 1967, p. 1.

[46] This legislation was repealed on May 8, 1967. Opponents to the law claimed it unconstitutionally restricted personal freedom and was unenforceable because the practices it proscribed are deeply engrained in Turkish village society. *Ibid.*

[47] Yaşar Gürbüz, "Family Law," in *Introduction to Turkish Law,* edited by Tuğrul Ansay and Don Wallace (Ankara, 1966), p. 117.

[48] Abadan, *Social Change,* p. 24; Rachel Rustow, *Family Living and Child Rearing in Modern Turkey* (Princeton, 1962), ch. I, p. 13.

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contrast, a great many villagers have maintained an ignorance and suspicion of the courts' functions.[49]

Unlike the ethno-Islamic law reigning in traditional villages, Turkey's present civil code allows women legal rights equal to those of men. Women can sue for divorce and demand alimony, the payment of which is compelled by the courts. They can also protect their rights to private property and inheritance by resorting to the courts. This code also prohibits polygyny. However, the enforcement of this provision has been vigorous only in the cities.[50]

The concept of social stratification is also different in the cities where social and economic opportunities are more numerous. Education, industry, government, the services and technical trades all offer avenues for social mobility which the villages lack. In the city an intelligent and ambitious young man can move up the social ladder regardless of the social standing of his parents. When evaluating a future husband or son-in-law, individual ability and potential as well as present wealth and family status must be considered.

Therefore, the bridewealth is not needed in the cities to manifest an alliance between lineages, to help ensure the bride's security, to maintain a traditional social stratification, or to check 'economically unpractical polygyny.'

Transitions in the Villages

The reasons for the decreasing frequency of the bridewealth practice in rural areas can be attributed to the cities and their spreading influence. Today Turkish villages are not the isolated communities they were prior to World War I. The frequency of physical contact and mediated communication between urban and rural areas has greatly accelerated since 1950.[51] Presently more villagers are migrating to towns and cities than ever before, with the result that kinship ties are spreading over ever-widening spatial distances. This diffusion of kingroup members is causing a breakdown in lineage ties and a concomitant loosening of familial ties. Many villagers believe that city customs and practices are

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[49]L. F. Fındıkoğlu, "A Turkish Sociologist's View," *International Social Science Bulletin*, IX, 1 (1957), 13-20; Paul Stirling, "Land, Marriage and the Law in Turkish Villages," *International Social Science Bulletin*, IX, 1 (1957), 21-33; Timur, *Int. Social Science Bull.*, IX, 1 (1957), 34-36.

[50]See footnote 49.

[51]Until 1950 Turkey had been governed by the Republican Peoples Party. The 1950 national and local elections saw the Democrat Party sweep into office. It had campaigned very actively on the village level, and after its election continued to champion rural causes. As a result, larger amounts of government funds were spent on rural projects than ever before. See K. H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton, 1959), pp. 293-307; Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York, 1958), pp. 19-42.

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culturally superior to their own, and there has been an effort by an increasingly large number of them to imitate these urban ways of life.[52]

Modern advances in travel and communication have been accompanied by more effective governmental and judicial administration. Today the laws of the Turkish State affect a larger percentage of her citizens than ever before. A greater proportion of Turkey's rural citizens have enjoyed some formal education than at any time previous. Since 1950 villagers have learned more about their government and have been placing greater trust in governmental organs to help them solve some of their problems. As a result, there has been a greater application of civil law to rural marriage, divorce and inheritance cases.

Villages are still a very long way from duplicating urban social patterns, but the change is slowly in that direction. As the influence of the cities and especially as the application of Western legal codes intensify, the bridewealth practice, along with many other traditional customs, will become altered or lost to history.

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[52]Boran, *Toplumsal*, pp. 211 ff.; Lerner, *Traditional Society*, pp. 19-75; Stirling, *Turkish Village*, pp. 206-07; Yasa, *Hasanoğlan*, pp. 117, 179-94.

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DESCENT, AFFINITY, AND RITUAL RELATIONS IN EASTERN TURKEY

The available anthropological literature on ritual co-parenthood focuses mainly on the Christian world. This paper discusses and analyzes the structure and functions of *kivrelik*, a form of ritual co-parenthood established through the Islamic ritual of cirumcision and practiced in Eastern Turkey. It explains how *kivrelik* can function as either an intra-group or an inter-group integrative mechanism, or as a device to extend one's personal social network. It also discusses the complementary and supplemental uses of ritual kinship, descent, and affinity.

The amount of interesting ethnography and stimulating analysis of the Christian institution of co-parenthood (*compadrazgo*) as found in Latin America and Europe has reached impressive proportions. By contrast, parallel forms of ritual kinship in certain other parts of the world, especially the Middle East, have received little attention. A correction of this situation would certainly contribute to a better appreciation of ritual kinship as a human institution and would allow for more valid cross-cultural generalizations. It is our hope partially to fill this lacuna by dealing with *kivrelik*, a form of ritual co-parenthood practiced in a region of the Middle East and established through the Islamic ritual of circumcision. In preparing this study we have relied on published sources, ethnographic data kindly offered us through personal communications, and our own field research.[1]

Unlike co-parenthood in Christianity, the cluster of institutionalized behavior associated with *kivrelik* has no formal base in religious law. Neither *kivrelik* nor circumcision is mentioned in the *Quran*. However, it is known from pre-Islamic poetry that the custom of circumcision existed in early Arabia, and

[1]The authors wish to thank Dr. Hamit Zübeyr Koşay, the Dean of Turkish ethnologists, and Dr. Fahrettin M. Kırzıoğlu, a noted specialist on the cultural history of Eastern Turkey, for kindly supplying information of critical importance to this study. The authors are also grateful to Dr. William A. Haviland and Dr. Sidney W. Mintz for their constructive comments. Magnarella conducted field research in Turkey over a period of three years (1963-65, 1969-70) and one summer (1972). Of this time, two summers were spent in Eastern Turkey. Türkdoğan began his Turkish field research in 1955. Since then, with the exception of two years (1962-64), he has conducted fieldwork in Turkey, especially its eastern half, on a nearly continuous basis.

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Muslim theologians trace its practice to Abraham (Gibb and Kramers 1953: 254-255). The institution of *kivrelik* may very well antedate Islam also.

Kivrelik is found in a large region including Eastern Turkey, the Southern Caucasus, Northern Iraq, and Northwestern Iran (Kırzıoğlu 1953: 504-505). Published ethnographies and the authors' own research provide evidence for the general absence of this form of ritual kinship in the more indigenous communities of Western Turkey. Magnarella did discover that the institution has been preserved in the West by certain peoples, such as Kurds and Georgians, whose ancestors had migrated from the east since the late nineteenth century. At present the extent of this or similar practices in other Islamic areas cannot be stated accurately. Kırzıoğlu reports that a similar, if not identical, institution under the name of *qarib* is practiced by Arabic-speaking residents of the Mardin-Siirt region of Turkey (personal communication). Koşay notes that the same is true of Turks living in Kazan and Ufa, but instead of using the term *kivrelik*, they simply refer to the circumcision sponsor as *sünnet babası*, circumcision father (personal communication). Whether or not this practice there is due to the influences of Orthodox Christianity we do not know. For the purposes of this paper we will confine our attention primarily to Eastern Turkey.

Within Eastern Turkey members of the following ethnic groups, which are divided among Sunni and the various Alevi-Shiite sects of Islam, are all known to practice *kivrelik*: sedentary and nomadic Turkmen; Azeri and Karapapak Turks; and sedentary and nomadic speakers of Kurdish, Zaza, and Kurmani. It is important to note that the spatial distribution of these peoples is coterminous with the spatial distribution of *kivrelik*. There are two major divisions of nomadic Turkic people in Anatolia: the Turkmen, who settled the region east of Sivas; and the Yuruks, who for the most part settled west of Sivas (Sümer 1967). Although both Turkmen and Yuruks historically have shared a common religion, language, mode of ecological adaptation, and social, political, and economic organization, only the Turkmen practice *kivrelik*. This fact, together with linguistic evidence, points to the diffusion of this practice to the Turks after they migrated to Eastern Anatolia.

With respect to religion, *kivrelik* is practiced by both Sunni Muslims and members of various Alevi-Shiite sects. It is reported that among the Alevis (both Turkish and Kurdish) the institution is especially valued. According to their tradition the Prophet Muhammad placed great importance on this ritual relationship when his grandsons, Hasan and Husayn, were circumcised. For this reason they believe that the blood of the Imams (Hasan and Husayn) passes between the sponsored and sponsor during circumcision (Fırat 1961: 158).

The word *kivre* (the reciprocal term used by the main parties to the ritual relationship) and its variants — *kirva, kiriv, kevra, kurva, kirev* — are not of

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Turkish derivation (see Koşay 1932, Dersimi 1952:32). They appear in neither the Middle Turkic dictionary compiled in 1073 by Mahmud al-Kashgari (Atalay 1939-40) nor the more recent lexical works of Wilhelm Radloff (1960 [1893-1911]). However, the word may be indigenous to Kurdish and/or Farsi. In both languages the root *kirv* has the meaning of "penis." In Farsi, *kirv* has the additional meaning of "holding" (Muin 1342 A.H.).

The variation in the institution's linguistic form is more than matched by its structural and functional diversity. This is to be expected in the light of the area's richly diverse history which involved the influences of the various Hittite, Median, Persian, Hellenistic, Eastern Roman, Sasanid, Byzantine, Arab, and Turkic empires. A historical treatment is beyond the present study. We will confine ourselves to a description of the institution and some possible functional correlates. To accomplish this, it will first be necessary to outline the social organization with which the ritual statuses and roles of *kivrelik* articulate. Throughout the article we will deal with what we believe to be central tendencies and not with innumerable variations.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The kinship structure of the various peoples in Eastern Turkey has a strong agnatic bias (Beşikçi 1969; Dersimi 1952; Erdentuğ 1956, 1959; Fırat 1961; Sümer 1967; Tanyol 1964-66; Türkdoğan 1965). Society is male dominated, and much of a family's wealth passes through males. The agnatic core of the family, ideally the patrilocal extended family, is the basic social unit. Strong ties are also maintained with agnatic kinsmen outside the household. Most of the people in this area have had a history of tribal and lineage organization based on an ideology of agnation. In practice, however, this ideology has been qualified by bilateral, affinal, territorial, and other contractual ties.

With respect to marriage preferences, a great deal of variation exists. Some Turkish villagers, like those of Hal (Erdentuğ 1956), and some Kurdish nomads, such as the Alikan (Beşikçi 1969), verbally as well as behaviorally express a strong preference for agnatic kin, especially the patrilateral parallel cousin, while other Eastern Turkish villagers disfavor marriage with such kin (Erdentuğ 1959). This variation is not the result of regional or ethnic differences. Türkdoğan found a wide range of variation among a group of villages in the vicinity of Erzurum (1965). Results of an informal interview survey of sixty adult males conducted by Magnarella in the Eastern provinces of Ağrı, Van, Hakkari, Mardin, and Urfa during the summer of 1970 indicate that marriage with bilateral first cousins is generally allowed and practiced. A preference for bilateral cousin marriage was expressed by about one-fourth of the persons

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interviewed. In actual practice, most villages in the literature exhibit a high proportion of village endogamous marriage with fifty percent or more such unions being common. Only a small proportion of marriages is not arranged or strongly influenced by parents or elderly kin. About one marriage in ten is the result of elopement, and a lesser number results from kidnapping (Erdentuğ 1956, 1959; Tanyol 1964-66; Türkdoğan 1965).

On a more general social level, ethnic and religious preferences also exist. In the past, especially, the various ethnic groups are believed to have been highly endogamous. However, inter-ethnic marriages between people of the same religious affiliation have become more frequent with time. Religion continues to be a strong boundary maintenance factor. Even today marriage between members of different religious sects is uncommon and not condoned (cf. Erdentuğ 1959:22).

Thus, for the most part, marriage is utilized either to strengthen existing kin ties, to cement neighborhood or territorial ties, or to extend kinship outside one's village to people of like ethnicity. It is less commonly used to establish affinal ties with people of different ethnicity, and it is almost never employed to extend kinship to members of different religious sects.

Generally, social relations in Eastern Turkey, which is the most remote and underdeveloped section of the country, can best be described as particularistic in that people relate to others primarily in terms of familial, kinship, residence, ethnic, and religious citeria. Membership in society is defined in terms of belonging to some particularistic sub-group such as an extended family, lineage, village, tribe, religious sect, or ethnic division.

SOME ASPECTS OF *KIVRELIK*

Similar to *compadrazgo,* an institution associated with baptism (Mintz and Wolf 1950), *kivrelik* involves three central elements: (1) the rite of passage associated with the cirumcision of a male child (who is usually between the ages of seven and twelve); (2) the socio-spiritual ties established between the participants; and (3) the sponsorship. The *kivrelik* relationship has several basic characteristics. It is an intimate, particularistic relationship very much like kinship, but differing from it in that it is formed in a voluntary way. It is institutionalized by means of ritual and has its own reciprocal term of ritual kinship. The sponsor, who usually holds the child while the latter is being circumcised, is *kivre* to the child and his father, and vice versa. The term is often used reciprocally between members of the sponsor's and the sponsored's families. The relationship between the two families is one of trust, mutual assistance, close friendship, and respect. The rights, duties, and responsibilites between the

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sponsor and the child parallel those between a father and son. The sponsor shares responsibility for the boy's circumcision expenses, training, education, well-being, and marriage. In return the boy reciprocates with the loyalty, obedience, respect, and affection he gives his own father. People claim that it is more shameful to disobey or disrespect one's *kivre* than one's father.

The *kivre* relationship parallels coparenthood in another important respect — the incest taboo is extended to both families. While the sponsored boy may marry his father's brother's daughter, he may neither marry nor have sexual relations with the offspring of his sponsor.[2] As in the case of kinship, this prohibition does not apply to members of the succeeding generation. Because of the nature of this relationship, which includes the incest taboo, the homes of both families are open to each other and the avoidance of men who are *kivre* is not observed by women of either household.

KIVRELIK STRUCTURES

The published ethnography and our own research indicate that the *kivre* relationship takes on two basic structural forms. The first is that of an inter-group contract. Here the relationship is entered into by members of two groups, such as families or lineages, rather than by individuals, and all members of both groups have a joint or corporate interest in the rights, duties, and obligations of the relationship. In such cases the term *kivre* is used reciprocally between members of the two groups, and it makes little difference which mature male member of the sponsoring group actively participates in the circumcision ritual by holding the child. For instance, although the patriarch usually participates, he may send another male member if the necessity arises. In cases where a woman is the household head, she will send a male to represent her and her household at the actual ceremony. Folk tradition, rather than Islamic principles, prevents her from actively participating.

This structural form is probably best demonstrated in the Alevi Turkish village of Sün, located in the province of Elazığ (Erdentuğ 1959). Here it is common practice for the statuses of sponsor and sponsored to be inherited in the patriline, so that the members of one lineage are *kivre* to those of a second, who may be *kivre* to those of a third. It appears that the sponsorship relation may be either directly reciprocal between two lineages, or unilateral. In both cases, a bond of ritual kinship is established between otherwise unrelated lineages and is renewed each generation. This bond carries with it the extension of primary kinship rights and obligations as well as the incest prohibition.

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[2]This is structurally analogous to the relationship established between a wet nurse or "milk mother" (*süt annesi*) and a suckled child.

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Another characteristic of this form of *kivrelik*, although not unique to it, is the selection of the sponsoring group before or soon after the child is born. Therefore the parties to the *kivre* relationship often are known many years before the circumcision actually takes place.

The second basic structure is the dyadic contract. Here the relationship primarily involves a series of father-sponsor and sponsor-child ties. In many, if not most, cases an inter-group relationship also develops, but it is secondary and derives from an extension of these person centered, dyadic relationships. Commonly, a father chooses a sponsor, or vice versa, because of personal considerations based on friendship, economic, or political gain. While both families hold each other in mutual respect, the obligations of the relationship rest most centrally on the father and sponsor. Members of their respective families are under no obligation to renew the relationship in the succeeding generation; in practice, it is rarely renewed. In this type of relationship it is important that the selected sponsor participate in the circumcision personally. If this is impossible, he may send a respresentative. But this is clearly less desirable.

Such structures have been noted by Türkdoğan in the cities of Tokat, Kars, and Diyarbakir. They appear to be common in more urban areas where personal networks vie with kin group affiliation as efficacious and manipulative elements in the structuring of social life. However, they are found in village settings also.

KIVRELIK FUNCTIONS

The solidarity and instrumentality funtions of *kivrelik* have already been touched on. In addition, the institution acts as a mechanism of social control by imposing statuses and reciprocal modes of normative behavior onto the members of two kin groups.

With respect to social integration, *kivrelik* appears to be utilized in three distinctive ways. In some cases it is employed as a further mechanism of intra-group integration. An example of this is in the Sunni Turkish village of Hal, located in the province of Elazığ. Erdentuğ notes that a high proportion of marriages in this village are between agnatic kin, with a stated preference for the patrilateral parallel cousin (1956:59-60). Generally, marriage within the village appears to exceed marriage outside, and both the levirate and sororate are commonly practiced. *kivrelik* parallels marriage. The circumision sponsor, too, is usually a close kin, often the father's brother or the father's brother's son, although sometimes a close neighbor is selected (Erdentuğ 1956:95). Thus, in Hal village, primary and secondary marriages are generally used either to

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reinforce existing kin connections or to supplement extant neighborhood ties, and *kivrelik* represents a duplication of these efforts. When *kivre* ties are established among kin, kinship takes precedence and the incest taboo does not apply. The sponsor's daughter and the sponsored boy may marry.

The second, and probably the major, use of *kivrelik* is as a mechanism to complement marriage and promote inter-group integration. In such cases it is obligatory that the sponsor be unrelated to the child and that the incest taboo be extended. The participants may be of different socio-economic class, ethnicity, settlement, or religious affiliation.

During our fieldwork, informants emphasized that *kivrelik* is primarily an institution which reaffirms existing friendships or promotes new ones. They consistently denied that wealth, power, class, and prestige were important considerations. Sertel (1971:40) has rejected this claim and writes that *kivrelik* "contributes to the maintenance of the status-quo within the system by not allowing persons of different socio-economic status from establishing binding relations with each other" (*Ibid.*: 37). Sertel further writes that "members of different Muslim sects or members of different ethnic groups do not usually establish ritual ties with each other ... Kinship ties — ritual or otherwise — are never formed between members of different religious sects" (*Ibid.*: 42). Her data come mainly from a village in Eastern Turkey where *kivre* links tend to be horizontal — connecting members of the same socio-economic class, religion, and ethnic background. It will be shown that the generalizations based on this case are clearly invalid. Because friendship ties are of critical importance, and because close friends tend to be of the same socio-economic class, *kivre* links are horizontal. Nevertheless, *kivre* ties between people of different status, ethnicity, and religion are not uncommon.

Türkdoğan has observed that in some instances *kivrelik* is a distinctly inter-class phenomenon. In the province of Kars the religious leader (*Ahunt*) of a Shiite sect usually assigns rich, high status members of his sect as sponsors for the children of poor members. It is common for such wealthy men to be *kivre* to several different poor families at the same time. In this way the poor are helped materially and socially by the rich, and the rich gain in prestige and earn the intercession of the Prophet.

Members of low socio-economic classes are also known to sponsor members of high socio-economic classes. For example, in the province of Kars a wealthy and highly respected family has three sons and a different *kivre* for each. All three *kivres* are of much lower socio-economic status. One is a low level town employee, another is a truck driver, and the third is a poor farmer. When Türkdoğan questioned a member of this family about the selection of their *kivres* and their comparative status, he was told: "With us it is not wealth that is

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important, but friendship." Türkdoğan could find no evidence indicating that the basis of the relationship was other than deep friendship. Although the statuses of the participants were quite different, each held the other in deep mutual respect.

In his desire to find a neat explanatory model, the anthropologist might be tempted to depict those seeking *kivre* as coldly calculating such criteria as wealth, power, prestige, potential economic and political aid, etc. While this model does prove useful in some instances, it is clearly deficient in too many cases. Typical of these is one investigated by Türkdoğan in the city of Diyarbakır. There the owner of a small variety store found that twenty different men had requested to sponsor his young son's circumcision. Among the twenty a wide range of socio-economic statuses were represented. Several applicants were very successful businessmen, who, by virtue of their economic and political power, represented attractive sources of potential aid to the small store owner and his son. However, the father chose a comparatively humble carpenter, who had a workshop near his store. When asked why he made this selection, he replied: "Because my carpenter friend is an honorable, religious, and modest man." These qualities — honor, piety, and modesty — were what this father wanted most for his son. In return the carpenter received the great honor of sponsoring the child of, and establishing *kivre* relations with, his good friend. The store owner is a Turk; the carpenter a Kurd.

Despite the folk ideology that the *kivre* relationship should be based on mutual respect, friendship, and affection, the institution is liable to exploitation for economic or political gain. Patron-client relationships are evident, with the high status patron offering his client favors and prestige by affiliation and the client rendering counterprestations of loyalty and obedience. It appears that formerly, especially prior to the forties, the practice of establishing *kivre* ties with important government officials was fairly prominent. Through this relationship local families hoped to gain the political advantages of preferential treatment, and the government officials were able to establish a local base of support and cooperation (cf. Sertel 1971). However, not all government officials regarded this arrangement with favor. In 1935 the governor of Kars decreed that no government official in his province could establish *kivre* ties with local families (Kırzıoğlu, personal communication). In more recent decades the government rotation system has rendered this type of exploitation ineffectual. Most important government officials, except for locally elected mayors, are assigned to posts outside their home provinces by the central authorities in Ankara. They commonly remain in these posts for two or three years and are then reassigned to other parts of the country. As many families choose their *kivres* about the time of their sons' births, and as public opinion is strongly against such political arrangements, this type of *kivre* relationship is rarely entered into today.

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Friendship, mutual aid, and political and economic gain are only some of the counterprestations of *kivrelik*. Historically, *kivrelik* has been used in Eastern Turkey by lineages and tribes to cement alliances, mitigate emnity, and settle blood feuds (Dersimi 1952:32; Fırat 1961:158; Kırzıoğlu 1953:450-505). Marriage can and does achieve the same results, but in general practice marriage tends to be ethnically and religiously endogamous, while *kivrelik* is often non-restrictive. It has proven an effective mechanism for extending the network of trust to people of different lineages, tribes, ethnic backgrounds, and religious affiliations. It has helped incorporate new people into an existing system as when migrants enter a village or region. It has also provided the basis upon which pacific relationships between nomads and sedentary agriculturalists could be built.

In the provinces of Kars, Erzurum, Malatya, and Sivas, *kivre* ties between Turks and Kurds are very common. Some Turkish informants professed to prefer Kurds as sponsors, claiming that the latter manifest a greater appreciation for the relationship as demonstrated by their sometimes lavish circumcision gifts. In the Iğdır district of Kars Province it is quite common for Azeri Turks, who generally are Shiites, to establish *kivre* ties with Sunni Turks. There are also cases where *kivre* links have been established between Christians and Moslems. Data collected by Türkdoğan from 1959 to 1962 among the Russian Molokans of Kars Province (see Türkdoğan 1971) show that *kivre* ties between these Orthodox Christians and local Muslims, both Sunni and Shiite, were not uncommon. They acted as an effective means of integrating this small Christian community into its Muslim environment.[3]

In these last two examples, *kivrelik* operates in an environment comprising heterogenous and particularistic social groups to complement marriage as a mechanism for establishing alliances and providing a basis for mutual aid and trust. While marriage tends to be intra-ethnic and intra-religious, *kivrelik* crosscuts boundaries. The fact that *kivrelik* is legitimized and sanctioned by the most important of religious rituals enables it to compete with agnatic and affinal kinship relations, which are also legitimized by the most basic values of society.

In addition to being employed as a mechanism of intra-group and inter-group integration, *kivrelik* is also used as a means of extending one's personal social network. This functions within the structure of the dyadic contract described and is common in more urban areas where one's personal network of social relations rivals or surpasses the social importance of one's membership in discrete kin groups. The content of the relationship may be friendship as well as

[3]Ritual kinship ties between Muslims and Christians are also evident in the Balkans (Hammel 1968) and in the Caucasus (Benet 1971).

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economic or political aid. This function is probably best exemplified by the newly arrived migrants to the cities who are separated from their kin groups — their main sources or social, economic, political, and emotional support. In order to adjust to the city, they develop individual social networks to cope with the problems of finding a job, a place to live, and sources of social, political, and emotional support. *Kivrelik* is often employed as an instrument to develop such networks and contribute to the attainment of these goals.

AGNATION, AFFINITY, AND *KIVRELIK*

The variations in the structure and function of *kivrelik* and in its articulation with other elements of the social structure illustrate the adaptation of this cultural mechanism to the needs of various situations. In its inter-group integrative function, *kivrelik* resembles *kumstvo* as practiced in the Balkans (Hammel 1968). Here the sub-systems of descent, affinity, and *kivrelik* are often in complementary distribution resembling a mutually exclusive relationship among three structural allomorphs.

However, in its intra-group integrative function the articulation of *kivrelik*, descent, and affinity is quite different. In this instance, both marriage and *kivrelik* have a distinctly endogamous character — they are both used to reinforce existing agnatic ties. Their endogamous application is only restricted by the vary narrow range of primary kin types comprising the incestuous unit. With this single exception, descent, affinity and *kivrelik* take on the character of free variants, which are often mutually inclusive and redundant.

In either of the above two functions, both *kivrelik* and affinity represent major structural alternatives which can be manipulated to further organize and express a social condition whose character is in large part determined by a comparatively inflexible ideology of agnation.

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ASPECTS OF KINSHIP CHANGE IN A MODERNIZING TURKISH TOWN

ABSTRACT

This paper examines aspects of kinship change in a Turkish town which has recently undergone a series of dramatic changes including the input of a modern sugar refinery and increased social and economic integration with the more urban and advanced cities of Turkey. A more dynamic and relevant approach to the study of kinship change is proposed which deals with people's goals, the ways these goals change through time, and the ways individuals interact with their kin to attain these goals.

This study finds that within the context of a more modern socioeconomic structure basic kinship goals such as postmarital residence, ideal household composition, and spouse selection have changed and that "participant" kinship is becoming progressively confined to the nuclear family. These changes have had a positive consequence for the ethnic integration of the community.

Ideal Tools for the study of kinship and familial change would be the concepts, postulates, and operating rules of an accepted body of social theory. Unfortunately such a theory does not exist. "There is no adequate theory of social change, just as there is no fully developed general theory of society" (Etzioni and Etzioni 1964:75). In the specific area of the family, social theorizing has been badly neglected (Goode 1959, 1968).

At present probably the most prevalent hypothesis of familial and kinship change is that industrialization and urbanization undermine large kinship systems, reducing them to some version of the conjugal system found in Western countries.[1] This hypothesis is based on two interrelated assumptions:

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[1] In the course of this paper the following definitions will be adhered to: modernization is "the process of social change whereby less developed societies acquire characteristics common to more developed societies" (Lerner 1968:386). "It means essentially becoming a member of the common pool of world knowledge and useful techniques..." (Moore 1965:6). Economic growth or economic development refers to the increse in real income per capita. It also implies structural change in the economy in the direction of greater differentiation and more complex integration. Industrialization "entails the extensive use of inanimate sources of power in production of goods and services" (Moore 1968:263). This concept applies equally to manufacturing and

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the "theory of structural constraints" and the "fit" between the conjugal family and the modern industrial system. The first involves the idea that the modern industrial system imposes certain organizational and institutional demands and changes on the economy as well as on the entire social system. According to this theory, social systems are composed of functionally interdependent component parts, of which the family or kin system is one (Moore 1965: 11-12). As these components evolve in the direction of improved functional fit with the modern industrial sytem, their structures usually change. In the case of the kinship system, it is assumed that evolvement will eventuate in the conjugal system, as this provides optimum fit. The traditional extended family system with its standards of ascription, particularism, and diffuseness is theoretically ill-suited for the efficient functioning of a modern industrial system in which hiring and promotion are based on merit and one's relationship to his job is functionally specific. It is also maintained that the traditional extended family system inhibits the mobility necessary in a modern industrial system.

This theory conforms to the traditional structural-functional approaches in anthropology which give principal attention to the study of the formal structures of a society's institutions and the ways in which these institutions function as component parts of a single integrated system to contribute to the maintenance of societal equilibrium. The recurring complaint about this type of approach is that it lacks dynamism; that it is basically a static model of the social system and cannot deal with change in a satisfactory manner. It is also criticized because it fails to account for a spreading ideology favoring the conjugal system. In many cases, this ideology is independent of industrialization (Goode 1963).

I would like to make a suggestion (for which I do not claim originality) that would add useful dynamism to this approach and at the same time increase its relevance for the people being studied. I propose that kinship change be studied with primary reference or focus given to goal-directed activity involving kin. That is, that the structure of kin relationships be examined as a process of goal directed activity. According to this approach, a study of kinship change would involve a study of goals and how they change through time and a study of how individuals interact with their kin to attain these goals.

In this paper, this approach will be utilized in the study of kinship and the family in a modernizing Turkish town. Specifically the following will be examined: (1) the kinship goals of household formation and spouse selection, and (2) the household's internal relations with emphasis on decision making, an important goal-directed activity.

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nonmanufacturing activities. Examples of the latter are the mechanization of agriculture, transportation, and communication. Industrialization is a component of economic development which in turn is a subprocess of modernization. For an elaboration of the Western conjugal system as an ideal construct, see Goode (1963:7-10).

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In the presentation of the data, education will be treated as an independent variable. In general I have found that those Turkish townsmen in the higher educational strata are more involved in the modernizing aspects of Turkey. They usually occupy more technically oriented positions, earn more money, read more, travel more, know more about their country's affairs, and see modernization as more desirable. I am assuming that as greater proportions of the town's population attain higher levels of modern, secular education, their attitudes and behavior will increasingly resemble those of today's more educated citizens who represent indicators of the direction of change.

Susurluk: Past and Present

The setting of this study is Susurluk, a Turkish town located in the nothwestern corner of Asia Minor, which has experienced a dramatic series of changes is recent years. During the 1930's and 1940's it was a quiet peasant community of about 4,000 citizens and served as a brief halting place for travelers. Its economy was one of near subsistence with little participation in the national economy. The local economy was also characterized by a lack of industrialization and a low degree of differentiation in production and marketing. The town's secular educational facilities were limited to one primary school (grades 1-5) attended mainly by boys. Widespread illiteracy and a paucity of radios severely restricted the use of the national news media.

The ethnic composition of the town and district was very mixed. In addition to indigenous Turks, there were Balkan Turks, Circassians, Georgians, Gypies, and a small number of Albanians and Balkan Slavs whose Muslim parents or grandparents had found refuge in Turkey during the second half of the nineteenth century when those parts of the Ottoman Empire in which they lived were lost to either Russians or Balkan Christians. While these immigrant peoples had to adjust to their new environment, they tried to maintain the most valued elements of their cultures. As a result, the town and its surrounding villages portrayed an ethnic mosaic. A strong preference for marriage within ethnic groups operated to maintain certain basic cultural and social boundaries through time. However, adherence to a common religion — Sunni Islam — and common Turkish citizenship promoted interethnic relationships and solidarities.

As a result of a number of political and agricultural considerations Susurluk became the site of a modern government sugar beet refinery which began operation in 1955. This large plant created either full or part-time employment for approximately 1,000 males from the town and surrounding villages. In addition, it provided the area's peasants with a ready market for their first cash crop and offered them the necessary technical assistance and equipment to cultivate it.

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The construction and subsequent operation of the refinery stimulated the expansion of the town's crafts, services, banking, and other support activities. As a result of this expansion of its economic and occupational structure, the town changed from one where the overwhelming majority of its adult male population was primarily engaged in farming to one in which only a small proportion derive their livelihoods chiefly from such pursuits.

The availability of numerous wage jobs provided a strong incentive for many peasants to leave their villages to reside in town. By 1960, the town's population reached 11,450 including over 100 administrative and technical personnel who had recenly moved with their families to Susurluk to occupy high or intermediate level positions in the sugar refinery, banks, government, and schools. Most of these people had lived and studied in Turkey's larger and more modern cities, such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, and they brought to Susurluk an urban style of life and a more cosmopolitan air.

Concomitant with these changes were a number of advances in education, news media participation, and travel. Susurluk now has three primary schools, a middle school (grades 6-8), a Lycée (grades 9-11), and a girls' vocational school (postprimary). It is estimated that about 90% of the eligible town children and 75% of the eligible village children attend primary school. This represents a great improvement over past years. Expansion of educational facilities has meant increased literacy, and with it increased attention to newspapers, magazines, and books. Exposure to the outside has also been enhanced by a proliferation of radios and three new cinemas. In addition improved travel facilities now give the area's residents relatively easy access to the major cities in the Marmara-Aegean region.

Field Work

The field work for this study was conducted from August 1969 to August 1970. During this period I resided in Susurluk with an indigenous Turkish family and lived in intimate association with the townspeople. No interpreter was employed because I speak Turkish well as a result of two previous years' residence in Turkey and several years of formal classroom training in Turkish.

Data were collected through participant observation and informal interviews of both males and females, a content analysis of local and regional newspapers covering a ten-year period, and a study of written sources. In addition, two interview schedules were administered, the first to group of 307 middle school students (238 males and 68 females). It dealt with family, vocational, and educational topics. The second, cited in this paper, consisted of 100 questions on such topics as family life, education, migration, travel, economics, and occupation. It was administered to a quota sample of 55 single

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males and 127 married males. Three trained interviewers (local Turkish males) were instructed to select adult males from the various ethnic groups, occupational groups, educational groups, and residence quarters of the town.[2] While the sample was not randomly selected, it appears to be representative of the town's adult male population in terms of the factors listed above.[3] The conclusions reached in this paper are based on all of the above sources of information.

The Household and Family in Susurluk

The traditional Turkish and Caucasian kinship systems are similar in many important respects. According to the literature (for Turkey, see Berkes 1942; Boran 1945; Erdentuğ 1956, 1959a, 1959b, 1964; Kiray 1964; Pierce 1964; Stirling 1965; Şahinkaya 1966, 1970; Yasa 1957, 1960, 1969; for the Caucasus, see Geiger et al. 1956; Luzbetak 1951), postmarital residence is ideally patrilocal, and the traditionally ideal household is agnatically extended and patriarchal. It is composed of the patriarch and his wife, unmarried sons and daughters, and married sons, their wives and children. After the death of the patriarch and his wife, the extended family divides into as many nuclear families as there are married sons to form them.

This ideal involves a process of dynamic fission. To illustrate this process let us begin with an example of a household which has achieved the ideal. It is composed of a patriarch, his wife, and his two married sons and their families. We will call this T_1. At T_2 the patriarch and his wife die. Now, according to the ideal norm, the two sons establish two separate households, each composed of one nuclear family. Later, at T_3, with the marriage of the original patriarch's grandsons, these two nuclear households are converted into agnatically extended ones. Although the ultimate goal is the attainment of a patriarchal and agnatically extended household, a frequent intermediate step is the establishment of a nuclear one. Thus, given the demographic facts of real life and this ideal norm involving dynamic fission, we would expect to find a large number of nuclear households even in communities where the ideal household is

[2]Because of the relatively moderate size of the planned sample, I decided to confine it completely to males. This had two advantages: (1) it rendered data which were comparable to that already gathered on another Turkish town by the female Turkish sociologist, Kiray, (1964; also see Magnarella 1970), and (2) it avoided the complaints that might have been registered by male household heads who looked upon interviews with their women with strong disfavor. This lacuna in the survey data was partially remedied by informally interviewing women with whom I had gained confidence; e.g., members of the family with whom I resided, neighbors, and relatives of very close friends. During previous work in Turkey both my wife and I had very close friendships with female teachers and local families in the provincial capitals of Burdur and Antalya. These experiences plus the written ethnographies helped me to gain a great deal of information on the lives of women in Turkish society.

[3]On the practical necessity of using nonrandom samples in the social sciences, see Pelto (1970).

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an extended one. Thus, census data alone are usually insufficient evidence from which to induce norms for ideal household formation and postmarital residence rules.

The traditional household is typified by male dominance, deference to elders, and the subservience of women. Both Turks and Caucasians stress the patriline for purposes of tracing descent and passing on property. Although their common religion, Sunni Islam, permits polygyny, monogamy has been the statistical norm.

It should be stressed that this type of household is an ideal norm, not necessarily an empirical reality. In regard to Susurluk, it is significant that all informants over 35 years of age agreed that about 20 years ago this *was* the generally accepted ideal and goal of most married males of all ethnic groups in their community.

Of the 181 households in my 1970 sample, 71.3% were nuclear, and the average-size household for the total sample was 4.34. Twenty-two percent of the sample appeared to fit the ideal household type, or a variant of it. However, closer examination revealed that half of these 40 cases, were not the result of the ideal process. In these cases, it was not the son who brought his wife into the paternal home, but the parents (usually only a widowed mother) who joined their son's originally neolocal household as dependents. In several cases, parents had moved from the village to town to join their sons who were successfully employed there.

Most of the extended households which resulted from the ideal process were of two types. The first were households composed of kin who were jointly engaged in a family business — either agricultural, commercial, or craft. The second were households of poorer families in which a son had recently married and could not affort to live separately. It was the expressed intention of many of these sons to establish their own households when they were financially able.

All my informants claimed that extended households were more common in the past when Susurluk was a small, agrarian community. This claim is supported by national statistics. According to the 1965 census, the proportion of village households containing two families or more was 26.9%; for towns (district capitals) it was 14.5%; and for cities (provincial capitals) it was 9.8% (*Genel Nüfus Sayımı* 1965:673-75). The average-size household in the small agrarian village was also larger than in the district capitals (which are usually mixed agricultural, commercial, and administrative centers) and cities, being: 6.16 for villages; 5.22 for towns, and 4.69 for cities (*Genel Nüfus Sayımı:* 1965). On the basis of this national pattern, it seems likely the average household size and the prevalence of extended households in Susurluk decreased

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as the town envolved from a small agricultural community to an industrial, commercial, and administrative center.

Unfortunately, reliable statistics for the composition and size of households in the past are not available. However, even if they were, they would be of limited help when dealing with ideal goals. In addition to ideal norms, actual household size is influenced by numerous factors, including migration, occupation, economics, military service, government assignment, education, and longevity. It is possible that significant changes in a community's average household size for two different periods do not result from a change in the ideal household goal, but from these other factors.

On the level of norms, household types are most immediately determined by postmarital residence rules. For example, a patrilocal, postmarital decision rule leads to the creation of an agnatically extended household. An ideal household norm is accompanied by an ideal postmarital residence rule. In order to learn whether there has been any change in this ideal rule or goal, I asked respondents with whom they believed newlyweds should reside. Their answers, cross-tabulated by education, are contained in Table 1.

TABLE 1. POSTMARITAL RESIDENCE PREFERENCES BY EDUCATION

	Education					
Residence:	None	Primary	Middle	Lycée	University	Total
Patrilocal	75.0%	19.0%	12.1%	—	8.3%	16.9%
	6	19	4	—	1	30
Neolocal	25.0%	80.0%	87.9%	100.0%	91.7%	82.5%
	2	80	29	24	11	146
Either	—	1.0%	—	—	—	0.6%
	—	1	—	—	—	1
Totals	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	8	100	33	24	12	177

P= 0.001

For this table and for all tables in which education is a variable, the categories have been collapsed so that "primary" represents those who have either attended or completed primary school, and "middle" represents those who have either attended or completed middle school; and so on.

These answers and other data from my study strongly indicate that the ideal postmarital residence rule has changed for many townsmen. It also appears that the more educated a person is, the more likely he is to favor neolocal residence. Significantly, the 82% who said that newlyweds should live by themselves did not mean that they should reside in a separate home close to parents or other relatives. Many of them stressed that the couple should be away

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from their families — alone. As one person aptly put it: "It's the only way they will find peace."

These data, taken together with observations made by anthropologists and sociologists whose research in Turkey has already been cited, indicate a nationwide trend toward neolocality. The reasons for this trend are undoubtedly complex. In regard to Susurluk, it appears that a new, expanded economic structure, improved travel, and an awareness of job opportunities outside the community are making possible a change whose impetus was inherent in the traditional culture. A large number of townsmen explained that newlyweds should live alone if finances permit, since, in part, patrilocal residence existed for economic reasons. In agrarian Susurluk, families were commonly both the units of production and of consumption, and most young couples were financially dependent on their families. Now with increased job opportunities patrilocal residence is not necessary for many of them. Another important factor is the great value Turkish men place on masculine dominance and authority. By residing in his father's household, a young man remains in a subordinate position. All of his decisions can be influenced by older kin, especially parents. A married son becomes his own man, so to speak, by establishing his own home. Neolocal residence is also preferred by many young wives who want to avoid domination by their mothers-in-law (cf. Erdentuğ 1956; Rustow 1962).

This basic change in the structure of family relations may have important implications for the process of goal-directed activity involving kin. In a limited number of cases I observed that families living in nuclear households are less influenced by elderly kin than families living in extended households. This observation was tested by asking the married members of the sample whether or not (and if so, how often) they consulted with elderly kin when making important decisions. The comparison is between nuclear households and extended households of all types. Several elderly married members of the sample who had no kin older than themselves were omitted. Table 2 contains replies cross-tabulated by household type.

The results do indicate that heads of nuclear family households are less likely to consult with elderly kin when making important decisions than are married males living in extended households. This finding corroborates observational data on kinship relations, which show that kin outside the nuclear family, especially elderly kin whose status demands deferences and obedience, participate less in the day-to-day affairs, decisions, and other goal-directed activities of nuclear families than of extended ones. However, in many cases this is a difference of degree, not of kind. For many nuclear families in Susurluk, ties with older kin continue to be extremely important for a number of purposes ranging from emotional to economic support.

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TABLE 2. CONSULTATION WITH ELDERLY KIN BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE

	Household Type		
Consultation	Nuclear	Extended	Total
Always	16.0%	33.3%	21.7%
	13	13	26
Often-Sometimes	59.3%	51.3%	56.6%
	48	20	68
None	24.7%	15.4%	21.7
	20	6	26
Totals	100%	100%	100.0%
	81	39	120

P=0.084

The internal organization of local households is largely determined by the traditional division of labor, the age, the sex, and the kinship relations of their members. The household authority pattern has already been described as patriarchal and ideally women should be obedient, subservient, and secluded. There is a saying in Susurluk and throughout much of Turkey that "Women have long hair, but short minds." Thus their activities should be controlled and they should do nothing without the permission of their men. One local man told me that in the *Quran* Allah has said, "If you do not worship me, worship your husband." The informant concluded from this that a husband is second only to Allah and his wife must heed his every word.

The subordinate position of Turkish women has been documented extensively in the anthropological and sociological literature. For instance, commenting on conjugal relations in two Turkish villages. Stirling writes: "Men wield the authority. No woman was head of a household with a grown man in it, and where a husband chooses to be unreasonable and selfish, the only recourse of a woman is flight. Wives are occasionally beaten by their husbands; open references to such beatings always arouse much mirth. Men decide all matters concerning the farming routine, all major sales and purchases, the marriage of children, visits to the doctor, in fact, everything of importance" (1965:112). The Turkish sociologist, Yasa, reached the same conclusion: "Family misunderstandings in Hasanoğlan (his research village) are short-lived because the woman nearly always submits to the man's authority" (1957:119).

This condition is not confined to the village. The female Turkish sociologist, Kiray, depicts marital relations in the town of Ereğli as follows: "The woman is always subordinate to the man. She cannot act contrary to his word. Alone, she cannot make decisions. Nor can she oppose her husband's decisions" (1964:122, author's translation from the original Turkish).

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The female Turkish sociologist, Şahinkaya, offers some unique data that result from interviews with 200 urban and 200 village wives in the Hatay Province (1970). The responses given by these women support the observations made by other social scientists. For example, 43% of the urban women and 39% of the village women "confessed that their husbands may beat them whenever they get angry" Şahinkaya 1970:64). When asked how arguments usually end, only 8% of the urban wives and 5.3% of the village wives said that their husbands usually accept their ideas.

And finally, in a recent article on the status of women in Turkey, the female Turkish social scientist, Abadan, concludes that "the great bulk of Turkish women still conform to the old image of the tradition-bound, obedient, submissive, religious female" (1967:99).[4]

According to local informants, both male and female, the women of Susurluk formerly had little to do with family finances. Men controlled the money and were not accountable to their wives. However, since the establishment of the sugar refinery, this arrangement has been altered. For instance, prior to 1955 women in the market place were a rare sight. But the newly arrived wives of the refinery's managerial staff had been accustomed to public shopping in the cities where they had previously lived, and many continued to shop publicly in Susurluk. These women established an important precedent. Since many of the local men were working days at the refinery, and since young boys were attending school, shopping for daily household needs became a problem. Gradually, more and more families solved it by allowing their women to imitate their "urban sisters" and shop themselves. In this way, women began to handle a larger part of their families' finances and to represent their families more often in external affairs. While this has freed them somewhat from the confines of the home, it also has created problems. Many husbands demand a detailed accounting of daily or weekly expenditures. Because many of the middle-aged and more elderly wives possess only the rudiments of literacy, simple accounting is an extremely difficult and troublesome task, and ordinary discrepancies are common, occasionally leading to serious conflict.[5]

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[4]With particular references to village society, the female Turkish anthropologist, Erdentuğ, firmly agrees with Abadan (1967:20). For further descriptions of the woman's subordinate position in villages see Şahinkaya (1966) and in cities, see Yürtören (1965). No attempt has been made here to exhaustively list similar observations and conclusions by social scientists — both male and female, Turk and foreigner — who have actually conducted field work in Turkey. An examination of the social scientific literature produces no support for the notion that in general Turkish women traditionally have been very powerful figures in their families.

[5]According to the women interviewed by Şahinkaya, male domination of domestic affairs is also common in Hatay households. She reports that 23% of the 200 urban wives and only 3% of the village wives said that they managed their family budgets (1970:32, 64). Arguments over family spending also appear to be more frequent in urban homes, as 27% of the urban wives and 15% of the village wives claimed that money management is the most important cause of conflict in their marriages (1970).

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TABLE 3. CONSULTATION WITH WIFE BY EDUCATION OF HUSBAND

	Education				
Consultation	None	Primary	Middle	Lycée-University	Total
None	50.0%	13.8%	12.5%	6.7%	15.0%
	4	11	3	1	19
Sometimes-Often	50.0%	57.5%	58.3%	46.6%	55.9%
	4	46	14	7	71
Always	—	28.7%	29.2%	46.7%	29.1%
	—	23	7	7	37
Totals	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	8	80	24	15	127

P = 0.07

In order to obtain some general data on decision making, married members of the sample were asked if they consulted their wives when making important decisions concerning the whole family. On the basis of observations, it was generally hypothesized that men with higher educations would consult their wives more often than those with lower educations for two reasons: (1) the wives of those with higher educations were probably educated themselves and thus capable and desirous of contributing to an important family decision, and (2) educated males are probably less likely to demand passive subservience of their wives and more likely to be open to their opinions and ideas. Table 3 contains their responses cross-tabulated by education.

Respondents with higher educations consulted their wives more than did those with a lower education. It is interesting that only 15% of the sample claim never to consult their wives for important family decisions, while 29.1% claim to do so always. One wonders whether this represents a trend toward greater collaboration in the decision-making process. Considering the growing ideal of a neolocal, nuclear household and the spreading jural and social ideology of equality, in conjugal relations with the context of a modernizing economic and occupational structure, I believe one can logically assume that family decisions are progressively becoming joint ventures with wives playing more active public and private roles in the goal-directed activities of their families.

The father-son relationship in reference to decision making was also examined. A great deal of familial and societal stability and change rests on this relationship. For example, we have already seen that an alteration in this relationship is contributing to the dissolution of the patriarchal, extended household as an ideal norm; that is, a conformance by sons to the values of their

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fathers as conveyed through advice functions to maintain the traditional, sociocultural system. On the other hand, as sons, especially educated sons, begin to make progressively more of their important decisions on the basis of their modern education and seek the advice of their fathers less, this functions to promote change.

The 55 young bachelors in the sample were asked if they consulted their fathers (or in the absence of their fathers, other elderly kin) when making important decisions. It was hypothesized that those with higher educations would tend to consult their fathers less than those with lower educations. Due to the small sample size, educational categories have been collapsed.

The differences between the degrees to which these two educational groups claim to consult their fathers (or other elderly kin) it too slight to warrant acceptance of the hypothesis. Probably the most interesting points in Table 4 are that only three members of the sample (5.5%) claim not to consult their fathers for important decisions at all, while over half of the sample (58.2%) claims to do so always. These data indicate that in spite of remarkable changes in the community's social and economic structure, the father-son relationship is still a close one with sons frequently seeking their fathers' advice for important personal decisions.

TABLE 4. CONSULTATION WITH FATHER BY EDUCATION OF SON

	Education		
Consultation	Primary-Middle	Lycée-University	Total
None	6.0%	4.5%	5.5%
	2	1	3
Sometimes-	33.0%	41.0%	36.3%
	11	9	20
Always	61.0%	54.5%	58.2%
	20	12	32
Totals	100%	100%	100.0
	33	22	55

It appears that two of the most important familial goals are seeing that sons are established in life and that daughters marry well. Because sons will eventually head their own households and possibly aid elderly parents, it is essential that they be prepared for secure occupations. Practically all fathers in the sample want their sons to attain higher eduational and occupational statuses than their own. As a measure of fathers' concern, the sample was asked if they wanted to choose their sons' occupations for them (a strongly worded statement). The result was that a high proportion, about one half, of them answered yes. There were no significant differences between the various educational groups.

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The problem of assessing the degree of change here is a difficult one. One might assume that in the past traditional patriarchs were more common, and thus more than half the fathers would have strongly influenced their sons' vocational choices. However, such an assumption should be treated as a hypothesis to be tested, not as a baseline for comparison. Hoping to learn the degree to which fathers did exercise an influence in this area, the total sample was asked if their fathers had influenced their selection of an occupation, type of work, or education. Fifty respondents (28%) answered yes, while 129 (72%) said no. The positive responses were fewer than I had expected, and I questioned local informants further in an effort to learn why.

Many informants felt that fathers today are more actively concerned about their sons' vocational futures than their own fathers were about theirs. In the past, a narrow economic and occupational structure coupled with limited educational opportunities, created a situation in which few occupational choices existed. This limiting situation was more influential in determining one's occupation than was parental influence. Today by comparison a confusing maze of opportunity channels exists, and a father feels the necessity of guiding, even pushing, his son in the right direction.

It appears that the increasing complexity of the community's socioeconomic structure has contributed to greater complexity of familial decision making. Many more factors must be taken into consideration than was formerly the case. Often the amount of information necessary for a wise decision is beyond the capacity of any one family member. The challenge of complexity is being met by greater familial participation in the decision-making process.

The Selection of Spouses

In Susurluk, mate selection was traditionally a goal-directed activity in which a wide network of kin participated. The responsibilities for and the symbolic ritual of this important task were group-oriented rather than individual-oriented. Change in this area has involved a process of individuation — the emergence of the individul from the kin group. Comparison between the traditional and emerging procedures illustrates this process.

The traditional method of selecting spouses was functionally consistent with the ideal, patrilocal, extended household. Because a new bride joined the household of her husband's parents, her selection was important to the whole household, not just the marrying son. It is consistent under this system for the head of the household to have final authority in the acceptance or rejection of this new member.

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When a daughter marries, she leaves her natal household and joins that of her in-laws as a very subordinate member. The first few years of marriage may be the most trying period of a girl's life. It is her parents' responsibility to see that she is not given to a family that will make her life wretched.

In addition to these two important considerations is a third one involving the interfamilial alliance or acquisition of relatives which marriage entails. In a society where both honor and shame, which are paramount in importance, are shared by relatives, it is vital to choose in-laws who will not dishonor or shame one's offspring or one's household and lineage. Thus the primary responsibility and authority for the selection of a spouse rested with one's parents or household head. During the entire premarital process — the search, negotiations, interfamilial gift exchange, traditional engagement, and marriage ceremony — the individuals to be married played minor roles and in fact were often absent from the ritual involved.[6]

More recently the individual has enjoyed much more freedom in the selection of a spouse. This is especially true for males. Coeducational schools offer many youths opportunities to meet, become friends, and even fall in love. The concept of romantic love has from times past held a central place in Middle Eastern poetry. However, only recently has it become more generally associated with interpersonal relationships and marriage. Western films and novels are largely responsible for this. Westernization in the legal sphere is also critically important here. According to Turkey's new civil code, at 18 years of age both boys and girls can marry without parental consent, and all marriages require the expressed consent of the two persons involved. These alterations have stimulated and facilitated elopements as evidenced by their increased frequency in recent years.

In addition to these legal changes a more normative one is also taking place which involves a shift from an emphasis on ascriptive criteria to a stress on achievement criteria in the parents' evaluation of an offspring's potential spouse. In the past, according to informants, a person was usually evaluated in terms of his family because in a rural agrarian society with few avenues for social mobility, one's ability to rise above his parents was indeed limited. In a modernizing society, the opportunities for advancement — education, industry, new services, and technical trades — are much greater. Thus, when evaluating a future husband or son-in-law, individual ability, education, and potential as well as present wealth and family status must be considered.

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[6]It appears that many of the Hatay women interviewed had little influence on the choice of their spouses. Şahinkaya reports that 53% of the urban wives and 28% of the village wives said they were not acquainted with their husbands at all prior to their marriage. In addition, 9% of each group said that they knew them only slightly (1970:22-23).

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In an attempt to assess the comparative emphasis on ascriptive and achievement criteria for purposes of selecting a spouse, the married respondents to the questionnarie were asked what kind of son-in-law they wanted. In addition, bachelors, were asked to state the qualities which a potential groom should possess. Practically all respondents said familial and personal reputation and morality were important considerations. However, in addition to these very basic criteria, the following criteria were also given: approximately 80% of the respondents stressed achievement criteria, i.e., hard work, education, and official government position — and, significantly, five percent simply said that they wanted someone that their daughters loved while only one percent maintained that ethnicity was important.

TABLE 5. MOST DESIRABLE QUALITIES OF ACCEPTABLE SON-IN-LAW

Qualities	Number	Percent
Hardworking	49	40.5
Educated	41	33.9
A government official	7	5.8
Wealthy	2	1.7
Handsome	7	5.8
Someone my daughter loves	6	5.0
Like ethnicity	1	.8
Other	8	6.5
Totals	121	100.0

Some members of the sample who had no daughters did not answer this question.

To examine the other side of the coin, the married sample was asked what kind of daughter-in-law they wanted (n = 120). Again, almost all asserted the importance of personal and familial morality and reputation. The majority added that skill in the homemaking arts was essential. About 16% mentioned education as an important consideration; only two percent said that they preferred a girl of like ethnicity; and a large proportion, about 30%, simply said they wanted someone their sons wanted or loved.

At least two of these responses — education and son's choice—are clearly modern. The fact that public education, especially above the elementary level, has only recently become a practical, realizable goal for most townspeople enables us confidently to assume that this emphasis on the educational factor evidences a recent trend toward the greater use of achievement criteria in the evaluation of potential spouses. The "son's choice" response evinces the fact that marriage is more and more becoming primarily the undertaking of two individuals.

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While these attitudinal data offer support for the hypothesis that there has been a deemphasis on ascriptive criteria, a more valid testing of the hypothesis requires the examination of actual behavior. This kind of test was conducted by examining a large number of marriages in reference to ethnicity, an ascriptive element which traditionally has been important. The data were gathered through formal and informal interviews, genealogy collection, and consultation with key informants. The marriages have been divided into three generations by age of husband in 1970. The ethnic units used were those which the members of the community themselves employ. Because of their special status, Gypsies were not included.

TABLE 6. MIXED MARRIAGES BY AGE OF HUSBAND

Age of Husband	Marriage Not Mixed	Marriage Mixed	Totals
18-35	71 (54.0%)	61 (46.0%)	132 (100.0%)
36-50	203 (72.5%)	77 (27.5%)	280 (100.0%)
51+	120 (91.6%)	11 (8.4%)	131 (100.0%)
Totals	394 (72.6%)	149 (27.4%)	543 (100.0%)

P = less than .001

It is hypothesized that with increased modernization the proportion of mixed marriages will increase. Because the modernization of Susurluk began to accelerate about 15 years ago, prior to the collection of these data, there should be a great increase of mixed marriages involving males under 35 years of age (given that males normally marry between 20 and 22 years of age). The data are contained in Table 6.[7]

[7]For the purpose of this comparison, each person was assigned the same ethnicity as his father for two reasons: first, this is socioculturally valid as people in Susurluk identify primarily in terms of their fathers, and second, to do otherwise may have biased the test in favor of the hypothesis. For example, if a person has a Balkan Turk father and a Circassian mother, unless he married someone of the same ethnic background (which has low probability) his marriage would have been treated as a mixed one. This practice would have compounded "mixed" marriages over the three generations.

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The results strongly support the hypothesis. The proportion of mixed marriages has increased steadily over the generations to the point where today almost one of every two marriages is mixed. As a result of the town's economic expansion and the resulting large peasant migration to the town, today members of the various ethnic groups find themselves working and living side by side, sharing the same dreams for material improvement, and committed to the same means for their attainment. This situation has functioned to reduce the preexisting social barriers.

Conclusion

In the town of Susurluk, change has brought a more modern commercial and industrial structure, a greater integration with the modern urban centers of Turkey, and closer contacts with the West. This process of modernization has occurred concomitantly with certain changes in the structure and process of kinship. Today, as a consequence of a new economic structure, very few extended families continue to be both the units of production and consumption. This, along with ideological influences, has contributed to the dissolution of the extended family as an ideal goal and the nucleation of the household, with the further consequence that "participant" kinship is becoming more and more confined to the nuclear family. There appears to be an intensification of internal household relations, with the frequency of consultation between husbands and wives on important decisions increasing while the frequency of consultation with elderly kin outside the household is decreasing. There is also evidence that the father-son relationship has intensified in importance with reference to certain goal-directed activity.

Change has also involved the process of individuation — the emergence of the individual from the large kin group as evidenced by the increased exercise of individual initiative in the selection of a spouse and the greater emphasis on achievement criteria in the evaluation of potential spouses. This has further contributed to the progressive elimination of sociocultural barriers, which formerly separated the district's various ethnic groups, and has promoted closer integration of the community.

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CONJUGAL ROLE-RELATIONSHIPS IN A MODERNIZING TURKISH TOWN*

This paper examines conjugal role-relationships in a formerly agrarian Turkish town which has recently entered the age of modern industry. While these relationships were highly segregated in the past, they are presently becoming more joint in nature with wives participating more in important familial decisions, representing their families more in public places, and joining their husbands more in public activities. Available evidence supports the hypothesis that these changes are associated with the higher levels of technology and secular education in the community. On the basis of this case a cross-societal hypothesis of change in conjugal role-relationships is offered.

In her influential study entitled: *Family and Social Network*, Elizabeth Bott states that while it is constantly claimed that the family is the backbone of society, little is actually known about the relationship between family and society — the ways families interact with external persons and institutions (1957:1). In her own Greater London sample she did find that such interaction was strongly influenced by the conjugal role-relationships of the families being studied. While several American and English studies have followed up this pioneering work (Udry and Hall, 1965; Aldous and Strauss, 1966; Turner, 1967), there has been comparably little application of these ideas in non-Western contexts.

In this paper a description is offered of the conjugal role-relationships of traditional and more modern families in a modernizing Turkish town. It will be shown that a change in these relationships is in progress and that this change is affecting the entire community organization. It is hypothesized that this type of change is positively associated with modernization cross-societally.

*The field research for this study was carried out from August 1969 to August 1970 and was supported by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare and Harvard University. The author holds a Ph.D. in Anthropology and Middle East Studies from Harvard University. Grateful acknowledgement is given to Sharlene Magnarella and Drs. Carroll Pastner and Howard Nixon for their comments and suggestions.

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SUSURLUK: PAST AND PRESENT

The setting of this study is Susurluk, a Turkish town located in the northwestern corner of Asia Minor, which has experienced a dramatic series of changes in recent years. During the 1930's and 1940's it was a quiet peasant community of about 4,000 citizens. It served as a market corner and district seat for its surrounding villages. Its economy was one of near subsistence and was characterized by a lack of industrialization and a low degree of differentiation in production and marketing. The town's secular educational facilities were limited to one complete primary school (grades 1-5) attended mainly by boys. Widespread illiteracy and a paucity of radios greatly restricted the use of the national news media.

Because of a number of political and agricultural considerations, Susurluk became the site of a modern, government sugar beet refinery which began operation in 1955. This large plant created either full or part-time employment for approximately one thousand males from the town and its surrounding villages. In addition it provided the area's peasants with a ready market for their first cash crop and offered them the needed technical assistance and equipment to cultivate it.

The construction and subsequent operation of the refinery stimulated the expansion of the town's crafts, services, banking, and other support activities. As a result, the town changed from a condition where the overwhelming majority of its adult population was primarily engaged in farming to one in which only a small proportion derive their livelihoods chiefly from agricultural pursuits.

The availability of numerous wage jobs attracted many villagers to the town, and by 1960 Susurluk's population reached 11,450. Included in this figure were over one hundred administrative and technical personnel with their families who had recently moved to Susurluk to occupy high and intermediate level positions in the sugar refinery, banks, government, and schools. Most of these people had lived and studied in Turkey's larger and more modern cities, and they brought to Susurluk an urban style of life and a cosmopolitan air.

Concomitant with these changes were a number of advances in the fields of education, news media participation, and travel. By 1970 the town had three primary schools, one middle school (grades 6-8), a lycèe (grades 9-11), and a girls' vocational school (post primary). It was estimated that over 90% of the town children of both sexes eligible for primary school were actually in attendance. As a result of increased literacy and the greater number of radios, made possible by the community's new affluence, more attention was now being given to national newspaper and new broadcasts. Travel had also been facilitated

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by new roads, expanded bus and rail service, and the economic capacity of the community to use them.

FIELD WORK

The field work for this study was conducted from August 1969 to August 1970. During this period I resided in Susurluk with an indigenous Turkish family and lived in intimate association with the townspeople. No interpreter was employed. I embarked upon this research with a high proficiency in Turkish as a result of two previous years residence in Turkey and several years of formal classroom training in Turkish. Data were collected through participant observation and informal interviews of both males and females, a content analysis of local and regional newspapers covering a ten year period, and a study of written sources. A short questionnaire dealing with family, vocational and educational topics was administered to 306 middle school students (238 males and 68 females). In addition, a pre-tested 100-item interview schedule covering such topics as family life, education, migration, travel, economics, and occupation was administered to a quota sample of 55 single males (ages 18-35) and 127 married males (ages 18-68). Three trained interviewers (local Turkish males) were instructed to select adult males from the various ethnic, occupational, and educational groups, and residence quarters of the town. As the interviewing progressed, respondents were tallied with reference to the above variables so that the kinds of people being underrepresented could be determined and then sought out. Interviews were conducted privately with the anonymity of the respondent guaranteed. No more than one male from any one household was interviewed. The result was a quota sample which appears to be fairly representative of the town's adult male population in terms of the proportions of that population comprising the above groups and residence quarters.[1]

Confining the sample to males had two advantages: (1) it rendered data which were comparable with those already gathered on another Turkish town by the female Turkish sociologist, Kiray (1964) and (2) it avoided the complaints that might have been registered by male household heads who looked upon interviews with their women with strong disfavor. This lacuna in the survey data was partially remedied by informally interviewing women whose confidence I had gained, e.g., members of the family with whom I resided, neighbors, and relatives of very close friends. During previous work in Turkey both my wife and I had had very close friendships with female teachers and local families in the provincial capitals of Burdur and Antalya. These experiences plus the written

[1]For the practical necessity of using non-random samples in anthropology and the other social sciences see Pelto (1970: 293-96).

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ethnographies helped me gain a great deal of information on the lives of women in Turkish society.

The research was of an exploratory nature, and thus the conclusions are tentative, on the level of hypotheses requiring further validation. While conclusions are based on all of the above sources of information, the data reported in the tables are from the adult samples only.

FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD: SOME TRADITIONAL ASPECTS

The traditionally ideal Turkish household is agnatically extended, being composed of the patriarch and his wife, unmarried sons and daughters, and married sons, their wives and children.[2] It is typified by male dominance, deference to elders, and the subservience of women.[3] Turks stress the patriline for purpose of tracing descent and passing on property. While their religion — Islam — permits polygyny, monogamy has been the statistical norm.

Although supreme authority may rest with the father or eldest male, the actual internal organization of the household is female-centered. It is the women, who being largely confined to the home, manage and direct its internal affairs while the men spend most of their time away. The division of labor is clear-cut. Women have responsibility for the internal home, and men provide the income and represent the household in dealings with the external world. Even public shopping for the household has traditionally been the duty of men.

The areas covered by male and female roles are almost completely mutually exclusive. For example, rarely does a husband take on wifely tasks. Even when his wife falls ill, in the absence of a mature daughter, it is the wife's neighbors, friends, or relatives who take over her household duties of cooking, cleaning, sewing, etc. This sharp division of labor has contributed to a strong interdependence of the sexes. It is impossible for a man to live without a woman and still maintain his masculine integrity. Likewise, it has traditionally been difficult for women to maintain a household without men, as females in small

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[2]The literature on Turkish kinship includes: Berkes (1942), Boran (1945), Erdentuğ (1956, 1959a, 1959b), Kiray (1964), Pierce (1964), Stirling (1965), and Yasa (1957, 1960, 1969). For a more general discussion of kinship in Susurluk see Magnarella (1971).

[3]For example, the Turkish sociologist, Yasa, writes that "family misunderstandings in Hasanoğlan (his research village) are short-lived because the woman nearly always submits to the man's absolute authority" (1957: 119). In a recent article on the status of women in Turkey, the female Turkish social scientist, Abadan, writes that "the great bulk of Turkish women still conform to the old image of the tradition-bound, obedient, submissive, religious female" (1967:99). With particular reference to village society the female Turkish anthropologist, Erdentuğ (1964:20), firmly agrees with Abadan. For further descriptions of the woman's subordinate position in villages see Şahinkaya (1966: 4-5) and in cities, see Yürtören 1965: 17, 42).

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conservative communities have been culturally blocked from most public occupations.

This sharp distinction of sex roles and the division of labor has been symbolically represented in the architecture of traditional Turkish homes, which contain two sections: the *harem* (women's quarter) and the *selamlık* (male's quarter). In earlier times, segregation by sex was even more marked in urban areas than in rural ones.

"The only men allowed into the *harem* were the husband and a very few close relatives of the women who, by Islamic law, they could not marry. Thus Turkish women of the Ottoman era, especially in the cities, spent their lives in the complete seclusion of the *harem*. Their occupations consisted mainly of doing or supervising the housework, looking after the children or embroidering. Their social life was restricted to family gatherings" (Afetinan, 1962: 28).

FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD: SOME ASPECTS OF CHANGE

In this section two concepts borrowed from Bott (1957) are employed. The first is that of a "segregated conjugal role-relationship," which is defined as a relationship in which "husband and wife have a relatively large proportion of complementary and independent activities and a relatively small proportion of joint activities" (Bott 1957: 55). By contrast the second concept — "joint conjugal role-relationship" — is one in which husband and wife have a relatively small proportion of complementary and independent activities and a relatively high proportion of joint activities. Traditional Turkish conjugal role-relationships have already been described as highly segregated. The extent of this segregation will be discussed here with reference to change. During the discussion "local families" will be compared with those of the "official class." By "local families" is meant indigenous townspeople, and by families of the "official class" is meant families that came to Susurluk from cities and whose heads are employed in some official or managerial capacity either by the sugar refinery, banks, or government agencies. In Turkey these people are distinguished as a separate class — the *memur sınıfı*.

The external social relations of local Susurluk families most often take the form of individual member social networks rather than the form of an organized group. That is, the family as a unit rarely engages in social interaction with other social units. Instead, individual family members have their own social networks. For husbands and wives these social networks tend to be highly segregated, with each spouse interacting with a different set of people. These networks are usually close-knit, in that most people comprising the network

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know each other and interact with each other. Generally, such networks are important to the individual throughout his life.

In most of Turkey and especially in small towns such as Susurluk there has traditionally been a segregation of the sexes in most public and recreational activities and an absence of courtship. For these reasons heterosexual peer groups among young adults are rare. Instead, peer groups are unisexual and their memberships are tightly knit, being composed of relatives and close friends. Very often members think of themselves as being closer to one another than siblings.

Therefore, in a small town such as Susurluk both husband and wife enter marriage with their own separate close-knit social networks. Each spouse continues to look to members of his or her social network for companionship, emotional support, recreation, and even economic aid. Because these external relations offer so much, correspondingly less demand is made on one's spouse and a rather rigid segregation of conjugal roles is maintained.

The fact that most males, whether single or married, find satisfaction outside their families is clearly shown in the responses to the following question.

TABLE 1 — WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING GIVES YOU THE MOST SATISFACTION?

	Number	Per cent
My work	135	79.4%
My family	11	6.5%
Free time	2	1.2%
Religious activity ..	6	3.5%
Town events ..	4	2.4%
Following national events	5	2.9%
Following international events	7	4.1%
Totals ..	170	100.0%

For most of the respondents (79.4%) work is their most satisfying activity. This is no surprise. Most occupations in town are extremely social in that they allow for visiting, chatting, and even some friendly entertaining. Shopkeepers and tradesmen such as tailors, shirt makers, and shoemakers spend a large part of their day conversing and drinking tea with friends as they work. Many commercial and trade shops have taken on the character of the former Turkish *oda*. They have become daily gathering places were friends meet to discuss all matters of concern.

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Thus we should not interpret the results of this question in terms of the Weberian Protestant ethic. Satisfaction from work does not derive exclusively or even primarily from a drive to achieve. It derives from numerous socio-cultural factors, which include segregated conjugal role-relationships, the importance of individual social networks, and a culture which places a high value on sociality.

Of course social life continues after work hours also. Most Susurluk men are free at night and on Sunday. But a great part of this free or leisure time is spent outside of the home, in public places. The three most popular places are coffee-houses, cinemas, and the town park. The coffeehouse is an old tradition in Turkey, but for Susurluk the cinema and the park are relatively recent. Movies, especially outdoor summer ones, became popular only in the fifties, and the town park was built in 1960-61. It is beautifully landscaped with trees, shrubs, and flowers. Scattered among the greenery are small wooden tables and chairs where people can relax and be served tea or coffee. The casinos, restaurants, and clubs are popular for a restricted segment of the population. They are frequented by the town's official and upper commercial classes. Members of these classes dine and drink rakı together in small groups at their favorite restaurants and then repair to the City or Relaxation Clubs to play cards. This kind of entertainment is far too expensive for the average townsman, who must satisfy himself with drinking tea among friends in a coffeehouse or in the park and watching a weekly movie.

In the past husbands and wives customarily did not frequent places of public entertainment together. However, more recently some changes have taken place. In order to determine the extent of change the married members of the sample were asked to name those public places that they frequented with their wives.

TABLE 2

Do you take your wife to the following:	Yes		No	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Restaurant	2	1.6%	124	98.4%
Casino (park)	5	4.0%	121	96.0%
Cinema	87	69.05%	39	30.95%
Park	95	75.4%	31	24.6%
Beach	9	7.1%	117	92.9%

Although the town park has only been in existence since 1961, it has become the town's most popular strolling, relaxing, and gathering spot. In

addition to a play area for children and a small "zoo" containing some birds and rabbits, the park contains two tea gardens which double for casinos at night where food and drinks are served to the sound of the latest popular recordings. In part, the town park duplicated the restaurant and outdoor dining area already existing at the sugar refinery where families of the official class gather for their evening meal. These familial gatherings in a public place by an important reference group offer local families a model to emulate. As local restaurants and coffeehouses are completely taboo for local women,[4] the new park became an extremely important mechanism for change. From the beginning the government stressed that it was designed for family use and named it "Susurluk Family Park." Because of its newness it was not subject to the existing customs and taboos which segregate the sexes in other places. And leaders of the town, such as the present mayor, are endeavoring to establish familial norms governing park use by taking their own families there daily.

Although the beautiful Sea of Marmara is only 50 minutes to the north by cheap public transportation, only nine members of the sample said they took their wives to the beach. Even this is probably a change that can be attributed to the sugar refinery which maintains a large resort for its employees and their families on the Sea of Marmara at Erdek, about one hour from Susurluk. All employees are entitled to spend 15 days at the resort each summer in a rent-free cabin. While few of the local men are willing to let their wives actually swim or sunbathe, more and more of them are taking their families to Erdek for a summer holiday or vacation — a concept unknown before the arrival of the sugar refinery.

Out of the 181 respondents questioned, 46 said their families went somewhere on a summer vacation. Of these 27 said their families go to Erdek, and the remaining 19 visit friends or relatives in other towns or cities.

Even cinema attendance has been strongly influenced by official class families who go to the movies together almost weekly. The movie houses have special "family sections" where married couples or unescorted women may sit apart from the general male population.

Generally speaking the conjugal role-relationships of official class families are joined much more than those of local families. Most Susurluk people have traditionally assumed that male and female interests are different, and there was no expectation that leisure time should be spent together sharing common interests. By contrast, many of the wives of officials are educated and demand to participate in the social world with their husbands. These expectations

[4]The two members of the sample who said they took their wives to a restaurant meant the restaurant at the sugar refinery.

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were dramatically publicized in the local newspaper in 1965 when a group of such wives wrote what amounted to an open letter to the district head (who is in effect their husbands' superior) in which they complained that their husbands were spending too much time in their clubs playing poker, coming home late at night, and generally disturbing familial peace. They asked the district head to enforce the no gambling law and require the clubs to close earlier so that their husbands might rejoin their families. These are not the submissive women who make ideal wives in a small community like Susurluk but they are the kind of women who will influence change.

Formerly local women had little to do with their families' finances. Men controlled the money and were not answerable to their wives. However, since the coming of the sugar refinery this arrangement has been altered. For instance, prior to 1955 women in the market place were a rare sight. But the newly arrived wives of the official class had been accustomed to public shopping in the cities where they had previously lived, and they continued to shop publicly in Susurluk. These women established an important precedent. As many of the local men began working days at the factory, and as young boys were attending school, shopping for household needs became a problem. Gradually, more and more families chose to solve it by allowing their women to imitate their "urban sisters" and shop themselves. In this way women began to handle a larger part of their families' finances. In addition they more often represented their families in external affairs. While this freed them somewhat from the confines of the home, it also created problems. Many husbands demand a detailed accounting of daily or weekly expenditures. As many of the middle aged and more elderly wives possess only the rudiments of literacy, simple accounting is an extremely difficult and troublesome task. Ordinary discrepancies are common and occasionally lead to serious conflict.

In an attempt to learn something about the degree of female participation in the family decision-making process, married members of the sample were asked whether and to what extent they consulted their wives when making important decisions which concerned the whole family. It was hypothesized that husbands with higher educations consulted their wives more often than husbands with lower educations for two reasons. The first is that the wives of those with higher educations probably were educated themselves and thus capable and desirous of contributing to important family decisions. The second reason is that educated males are probably less likely to demand passive subservience of their wives and more likely to be open to their opinions and ideas. The following table contains their responses crosstabulated with education.

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TABLE 3 — CONSULTING WIVES FOR IMPORTANT FAMILY DECISIONS

Consultation	Education				
	None	Primary	Middle	Lycée-University	Total
None	50.0%	13.8%	12.5%	6.7%	15.0%
	4	11	3	1	19
Sometimes-Often ..	50.0%	57.5%	58.3%	46.6%	55.9%
	4	46	14	7	71
Always		28.8%	29.2%	46.6%	29.1%
		23	7	7	37
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Totals ..	8	80	24	15	127

p =.07

For this and other tables in which education is a variable, the categories have been collapsed so that "primary" represents those who have either attended or completed primary school; "middle" represents those who have either attended or completed middle school; and so on.

Respondents with higher educations did claim to consult their wives more than those with lower educations. The relationships in this table offer us a useful predictive model. Because there is a positive relationship between degree of husband-wife consultation and education, and because the level of education in the community is rising, we can logically assume that important family decisions are progressively becoming joint conjugal ventures.

Conjugal relationships in Susurluk are not only influenced by the behavior of official class families, but also by greater exposure to a modernizing national society and the Western world. While many of the local people are anxious to improve their standards of living through modern technology, they are critical of urban and Western influences on the family, heterosexual relationships, and social life in general. These influences violate the traditional concepts of honor and shame. While these concepts are common throughout the world, their substance is relative to the social systems which they function to preserve. In essence, honorable acts are ones which are in accord with reigning social norms and values; shameful acts violate such norms and values. In societies like Turkey where the conscience of honor is so highly developed, reaction to social change is often strong.

Critical points of honor rest on a man's relationship to his wife, daughters, or sisters. By maintaining their purity in traditional cultural terms, a man maintains his honor. When his women become tainted, his own honor turns to shame. In Turkey, as in some other Muslim countries, it is traditionally

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believed that preservation of female purity requires seclusion from other men. Even a minimum of exposure may lead to a state of defilement for a woman and dishonor for her man. Thus Westernization in the critical area of heterosexual relationships, especially conjugal ones, has been met with stubborn resistance. The following poem, which appeared in a local newspaper in 1969, cogently expresses the concern of many Susurluk people. While the poet makes specific reference to the "pagan" New Year's Eve celebration which has entered Turkey from the West, and Susurluk via the sugar refinery, his concern is, of course, more general.

New Year's Eve and My Woman

When I won't have you the object of gossip
How can I let you consort with strangers?

Veiled
Your beauty
— Your physical and your spiritual beauty —
Grows in my heart
My woman.

You should never be exposed to all, my woman
You should never be the bait of desire, my woman
You should never be without modesty, my woman

But here you stand exposed to all, my woman.

What can be the reason?
Has the evil eye looked upon my Ayshe-Fatma?
What person,
What thing
Has pushed you in this quagmire?

Enough, my woman
Enough of this empty drunkenness.

These fads from Europe —
What have they to do with us,
With our tradition?
With our religion?

Whatever comes out of Europe you grasp,
You take in the name of fashion
Placing it on your head as a crown.

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The hemline, sometimes tight
Sometimes narrow rose.
Mini is less than mini
The hemline is at your thigh.

The bee hive has fallen
Honey mixes with the mud.
Show sorrow, my woman
Mother of this generation.
You must not be a carnival clown.

Progressives say
The veil is reactionary
But I say
Primitives are more progressive
Than they.

Along with the spread of a more liberal view of women and a changing economic and occupational structure have come greater opportunities for female employment outside the home. For example, a new cannery in the neighboring district of Mustafakemalpasha employs many more women than men because the management finds them more dexterous and efficient workers. These women come from small conservative communities where this kind of employment goes against traditional social mores. However, material want, optimum working conditions, and good pay have proved sufficient to overcome the obstacles of honor and shame. For these same reasons about 12 Susurluk families have allowed their single daughters or wives to leave the country and work in Germany unescorted by either their fathers, brothers, or husbands.

Of course employment of women outside the home could seriously affect the conjugal role-relationship. A series of questions was asked both single and married members of the sample with the hope of assessing their attitudes toward such employment. Again it was hypothesized that education would be a determining factor with the more educated men holding more liberal attitudes on the outside employment of women.

All the questions referred to adult women. The first asked for opinions about outside work for single women. Three possible answers were offered.

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TABLE 4 — OPINIONS ON OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT OF SINGLE WOMEN

	Education					
They Should:	None	Primary	Middle	Lycée	University	Total
Not work..	87,5%	48.0%	50.0%	4.2%	38.5%	43.6%
	7	49	17	1	5	79
Work half-day (if necesary)		14.7%	23.5%	20.8%	7.7%	16.0%
		15	8	5	1	29
Work full-day (if necessary) ..	12.5%	37.3%	26.5%	75.0%	53.8%	40.3%
	1	38	9	18	7	73
Totals	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	8	102	34	24	13	181

p = .001.

Over one-half of the sample (56.3%) believed that single girls should work outside the home if necessary. Education appears to be an important factor as a higher proportion of respondents in the lycée and university categories exhibit more liberal views than respondents in other educational categories.

Single and married respondents were also asked their opinions on the outside employment of married women. Again the hypothesis was that respondents with higher educations would tend to say that married women should work outside the home if necessary.

TABLE 5 — OPINIONS ON OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT OF MARRIED WOMEN

	Education					
They Should:	None	Primary	Middle	Lycée	University	Total
Not work..	87,5%	67.6%	79.4%	41.7%	50.0%	66.1%
	7	69	27	10	6	119
Work half-day (if necesary)		21.6%	17.6%	33.3%	25.0%	21.7%
		22	6	8	3	39
Work full-day (if necessary) ..	12.5%	10.8%	2.9%	25.0%	25.0%	12.2%
	1	11	1	6	3	22
Totals	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	8	102	34	24	12	180

p = .059.

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The results again indicate support for the hypothesis as the lycée and university categories had the largest proportions of respondents claiming that married women should work outside the home if necessary. However, it is important to note that about two-thirds of the total sample (66.1%) held the opposite point of view. As a result of numerous conversations with local men it was learned that opposition to the outside employment of married women was commonly based on three fundamental fears.

The first fear was neglect of home and family. Many men believe that caring for a family and running a household are full-time jobs in themselves, which cannot be done properly if their wives are out working. In Turkish the word for family (*aile*) is also the word for wife. The two concepts are merged culturally as well as linguistically. For many men the argument was not that a woman's place is at home with her family, but that she is the family. And who could logically argue that the family should not be at home.

The second fear concerned the honor-shame opposition and involved the idea that outside employment enhanced the dangers of promiscuity as such work often entails contact with unrelated men.

The third basic fear involved a potential challenge to male authority or a threat to male identity. It was believed that with increased economic power, wives might assume a new air of authority in their conjugal relations.

The main motivating forces favoring the outside employment of women were economic necessity and the desire for a better standard of living.

It would be interesting to see what kinds of occupations Susurluk men believe that women can be successful in. Although the Turkish Republic was established as a secular state, Turkey is more than 98% Muslim, and for this reason it is appropriate to note that the Muslim *ulema* (theologians) of Al Azhar University in Egypt issued a *fatwa* (decree) on June 11, 1952, which "denied women the right to take jobs in public life 'because of their femininity which makes them likely to quit the path of reason and moderation,' but was prepared to see them exercising certain professions 'where strength of judgment and will are not required'" (Forget, 1962: 100). This is a strong conservative standard against which the attitudes of Susurluk men can be compared. Single and married members of the sample were read a list of occupations and asked which ones they believed women could successfully perform. The following table contains their replies.

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TABLE 6 — CAN WOMEN BE SUCCESSFUL IN THE FOLLOWING OCCUPATIONS? (n=182)

	Yes		No	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Doctor	180	98.9%	2	1.1%
Lawyer	168	92.3%	14	7.7%
Judge	163	89.6%	19	10.4%
Engineer	159	87.4%	23	12.6%
Pharmacist	181	99.45%	1	.55%
Teacher	180	98.9%	2	1.1%
Nurse	181	99.45%	1	.55%
Writer	174	95.6%	8	4.4%
Military Officer	68	37.4%	114	62.6%
Grocer (*bakkal*)	110	60.4%	72	39.6%
Butcher	38	20.9%	144	79.1%
Tailor	181	99.45%	1	.55%
Laborer	147	80.8%	35	19.2%

The proportion of positive replies may he higher than some people might have expected. These answers certainly make the men of Susurluk appear much more liberal than the 1952 *ulema* of Al Azhar University. However, it is probably no coincidence that one of the respondents who said that a woman could not be successful as a judge claimed that her sex would prevent her from being objective. "A handsome man could influence her. She's woman first." But most members of the sample agreed with the statement made by one of the young bachelors: "Today women and men are one (equal). Women can do any kind of work."

In the light of this common attitude, one immediately asks why only 20.9% of the sample said that women could be successful butchers. Local informants explained that a major part of the answer lies in the realm of traditional religion and the concepts of purity and pollution. A woman is considered ritually impure during her entire menstrual period. While in this state of impurity she should not pray (*namaz*), fast (*oruç tutmak*), or participate in any religious ritual. And if possible, she should not prepare food or cook for others. From this it naturally follows that women would not make ideal butchers. This thinking also may have been extended by some to the occupation of grocer, even though this occupation requires much less direct contact with food.

One of the main objections to women as military officials is that the occupation is basically inconsistent with the idealized female role, no matter how broadly defined it may be. Anything military is masculine or non-feminine.

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But in spite of this socio-cultural incongruity, slightly over one-third (37.4%) of the sample believed that women could successfully perform this role.

In order to bring the matter closer to home and to get a better idea about the future role of women in this community, both single and married members of the sample were asked to state their vocational preferences for their own daughters (real or imagined). Their replies, cross-tabulated with education, are contained in the following table.

TABLE 7 — VOCATIONAL PREFERENCES FOR DAUGHTERS

	Education				
Vocation	None	Primary	Middle	Lycée-University	Total
Professional[a]	12.5%	47.6%	64.7%	83.0%	56.1%
	1	49	22	29	101
Non-professional[b] ..	12.5%	8.8%	5.8%	8.5%	8.3%
	1	9	2	3	15
Housewife	75.0%	43.6%	29.5%	8.5%	35.6%
	6	45	10	3	64
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Totals ..	8	103	34	35	180

p =.001

[a]Professional occupations include: doctor, engineer, lawyer, pharmacist, and teacher.
[b]Non-professional occupations include: government clerk, dressmaker, and nurse.

It is evident again that education is a crucial factor. The proportion of men preferring the traditional vocation of housewife for their own daughters decreases markedly with ascending levels of education. More than one-half of the respondents with middle or higher educations hope that their daughters will attain professional status. Again, the relationships shown here can be treated as a model predictive of the future.

CONCLUSION

The traditional social system of Susurluk can be described in terms of a simple two level model. One level is comprised of a group of individual, female-centered households — each a distinct social unit. On the second level these individual units are firmly tied into the larger community by a series of male

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dominated social networks. Each household is an individual domain with its patriarch acting as king and minister of external affairs. The system is characterized by a sharp distinction between male and female roles, a marked division of labor by sex, and highly segregated conjugal role-relationships. This system functioned in a technologically simple agricultural and limited market economy.

However, with change in the community's economic and occupational structure, increased integration with a modernizing nation, and a greater exposure to the Western world alterations in this system were inevitable. Two dramatic alterations have been the emergence of women from the confines of the home and from behind the barrier of masculine protectionism and a change in the nature of conjugal role-relationships.

The female emergence is taking the form of greater participation in the external social and economic life of the community and is being aided by the behavioral models offered by the more urbanized official class families of the town. Local male attitudes concerning the employment of women outside the home and the kinds of occupations in which they can be successful are generally favorable to further change. The consequences of this emergence will significantly affect the core of the social system.

Conjugal role-relationships are progressively becoming more joint in nature with husbands and wives carrying out more activities together. It is believed that this change is the result of a more modern economic structure, a greater integration with the modern urban centers of Turkey, and an increasing level of secular education in the community's population. These inputs carry with them elements of Western values: for example, the more "rational" work culture of modern industry and the stress on equality of individuals and individual achievement in modern secular education.

It is further believed that the Susurluk experience is not unique, but rather is only one example of a universal process which can be stated in the form of a cross-societal hypothesis: In traditional societies initially characterized by a low level of technology, a low level of secular education, and segregated conjugal role-relationships, modern industry and higher levels of secular education will have the effect of altering conjugal role-relationships so that they become more joint in nature. It is hoped that anthropologists and sociologists will test this hypothesis in a number of different societies around the world. Because conjugal role-relationships are so central to the social organization of communities, a verified generalization of this kind would greatly aid in the development of a more general theory of social change.

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FOLK CUSTOMS IN THE TRADITIONAL TURKISH HOME: THEIR MEANING AND FUNCTION

This paper deals with the customary rituals and beliefs associated with traditional Turkish homes and enacted or held by Turkish women, especially, as they carry out the routine tasks of caring for their homes and families.[1] Rather than catalog and analyze the entire complex of home ritual and belief, which is impossible at this time, I offer a programmatic paper that explains my basic assumptions and outlines an approach for studying the topic. The examples of ritual and belief offered here are limited to the Northwestern region of Anatolia, especially to the Balıkesir province.

The approach presented here is fashioned after the types of symbolic analysis engaged in by Levi-Strauss, Victor Turner, and others (cf. Nancy Munn 1973). Similar to Turner (1972), I define ritual as a standardized sequence of activities, involving gestures, words, and objects, which is performed in culturally appropriate contexts and is designed to achieve some combination of psychological, social, cultural, spiritual, health, economic, etc. goals. The term «ritual context» involves ideas of appropriate place and time. In this paper, I will be concerned with those rituals and beliefs whose appropriate place is the traditional home and which occur in association with a variety of time dimensions.

Symbols are the smallest meaning units comprising a ritual. They consist of «sign vehicles» (objects, gestures, or words) that stand for some other thing or idea with which they have no intrinsic connection. The following example of a ritual-belief illustrates this point. Many traditional women in the Balıkesir region believe that when a neighbor borrows an onion, garlic, or something bitter (*acı*), the borrowed object should never be exchanged directly from hand to hand. The lender should place it down, and the borrower should then pick it up. If it is exchanged from hand to hand directly, relations between the two persons will become bitter or painful (*acı*). Here, the sign vehicle for bad relations between neighbors is the borrowed onion, garlic, etc. This belief and its

[1]Many people kindly helped in the preparation of this paper. Particularly, I would like to thank my Turkish mother, Dr. Zekiye Eglar, Zulal Balpinar, and Sencer Yeralan. I also thank the American Philosophical Society for its grant support.

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associated sign vehicle and symbolism transform a routine act of lending into a ritual.

Victor Turner has divided symbols into two major categories: dominant and instrumental. A dominant symbol occurs over and over again in many different contexts, but it possesses considerable autonomy regardless of the rituals in which it appears. It usually has the ability to condense many different meanings into its ritual message. Instrumental symbols, by contrast, are dependent for their signifcance on the context in which they occur. They acquire meaning in terms of the total system of symbols which comprise a given ritual.

I assume that traditional home ritual and beliefs accomplish four major functions:

1) Spiritual. They enable the ordinary housewife to appreciate the wonder of God and the universe.

2) Creational-Predictive. They provide the housewife with an opportunity to share in the shaping of her community and the universe.

3) Institutional. They involve the housewife in the validation and maintenance of the social and cultural order.

4) Practical. They provide the housewife with practical guides to manage ordinary routines as well as life crises.

In addition to accomplishing these four major functions, the ritual-belief systems of a particular people make specific thematic statements about their society and culture. One objective of ritual analysis is the interpretation of these statements.

With respect to the first three of the four major functions, that is the spiritual, creational-predictive, and institutional, the traditional Turkish home contains an object so sacred that we may refer to it as the 'home altar' and to the woman associated with it as the 'home priestess'. This sacred object or dominant symbol, so central to the home, is the domestic hearth (*ocak*). Much of what the famous cultural historian Fustel de Coulanges has written about the symbolic place of the sacred fire in ancient Greek and Roman homes applies equally well to the traditional Turkish domestic hearth.

> In the house of every Greek and Roman was an altar; on this altar there had always to be a small quantity of ashes, and a few lighted coals. It was a sacred obligation for the master of every house to keep the fire up night and day. Woe to the house where it was extinguished. Every evening they

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covered the coals with ashes to prevent them from being entirely consumed. In the morning the first care was to revive this fire with a few twigs. The fire ceased to glow upon the altar only when the entire family had perished; an extinguished hearth, an extinguished family, were synonymous expressions among the ancients. (Coulanges 1956; 25).

In Turkey, too, the family and lineage are symbolized by the domestic hearth. Some of the worse insults one can hurl at another deal with the extinction of the hearth, that is, with one's family and descendents. Examples from Balıkesir villages are:

«*Ocağın sönsün!*» — May your hearth be extinguished!

«*Ocağına Baykuşlar tünesin!*» — May owls (symbols of death) perch on your hearth!

«*Ocağına incir dikilsin!*» — May figs be planted in your hearth. (Balkır 1945b).

Because of the sacred hearth's identity with the family, its fire must be guarded carefully and treated piously. Fire from the hearth should not be given out to strangers or enemies, who might defile it and endanger the family. According to one belief, if it is given out on 40 successive days, the family line will end. Consequently, it should be given out very infrequently, only to trusted relatives and friends when absolutely necessary. According to another belief, it should never be given out after 11:00 *alaturka* time (Balkır 1935b:38).

The hearth, of course, provides many practical benefits to the family. It creates heat, produces fumigants (which relieve the house of insects), and cooks food. The last product — food — is also sacred. Its consumption not only ties the family even more closely together in holy bonds, but also establishes and strengthens spiritual links with people outside the home. Food is a symbolic extension of the hearth and family essence.

To drop in on a family while they are eating is regarded as a special act. To such an unexpected guest people say, «Your mother-in-law must like you!» The guest is invited to the table, and even if he has already eaten he should take at least one mouthful of food so as to demonstrate symbolically his socio-spiritual tie with the host family. Families also demonstrate their socio-spiritual bonds with the community by sharing food on holidays or whenever neighbors are in need or have suffered a loss. An interesting example of this sharing is the *aşure* tradition.

Aşure is a sweet dish, containing at least seven kinds of fruits and vegetables, prepared by the eldest woman of a household for the Tenth of

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Muharrem. After cooking it in its large container, the woman covers it with a tray and calls a person knowledgeable of the Quran to read or recite a prayer over it. Later, she divides the *aşure* up into smaller containers. (People believe the condensed water on the cover tray formed from the steam of the *aşure* has medicinal powers. If wiped on the eyes, it will prevent eye aches.) Younger members of the family then distribute the small containers of *aşure* to relatives, friends, and neighbors. (It must be distributed to at least seven different households.) Each recipient reciprocates by saying, «May Allah accept your good deed,» to the giver (*Allah kabul etsin*). The recipient then returns the emptied container after having rinsed it out with water only. (Water, too, is holy. It may be that washing the *aşure* container thoroughly with soap would symbolize a separation between giver and receiver.)

There is at least one additional element in this tradition. Not only does each family extend its essence to the community by sharing holy food (prepared by its women and fire) on a holy day, it also promotes good fortune. In the process of preparing the *aşure*, the woman drops a coin into the large container. Later that coin is randomly included in one of the small containers of *aşure* that are distributed. People believe that the family receiving the coin will enjoy prosperity as a result.

Hence, the *aşure* tradition combines universal Islam with local family and community tradition into a ritual complex which has spiritual, creational-predictive, institutional, and practical functions.

In some villages, a new bride's introduction to the domestic hearth of her husband and his kin occurs on the very first day she enters her in-laws' home. For example, in a village near Bursa, the new bride is taken by the senior women of the house to the kitchen, where she kneads wheat flour and water. After that she goes to the hearth and presses her right hand to the wall above it, leaving her hand print there (Magnarella 1979: 48).[2]

Thereafter, all of her interactions with the hearth take on a symbolic significance. For instance, it is believed that if she can restart the fire in the morning with one blow (*bir üfürüşte*), her day will go well. Or, if she is usually able to restart the fire quickly, her first child will be beautiful (Balkır 1935a:61, 62).

The hearth fire also emits interpretative messages. For example, some villagers believe that if the fire gives off a bluish glow, it means someone is speaking negatively about the household head (*ev sahibi*) (Balkır 1935a: 111). Or

[2]Although I first recorded this custom in a Georgian village, I have been told that it occurs in Turkish villages also.

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as an elderly woman told me, «When the fire crackles, we say someone is talking against me.»

Fire from the hearth also plays a role in many folk cures (see Balkır 1935b) and acts against the evil eye (*nazar*). For instance, it is believed that one should not give raw milk to another, or else the evil eye will strike the cow, causing its milk to stop. However, if it becomes necessary to give raw milk to someone outside the family, one can counter the evil eye by placing a small hot coal from the hearth into the milk (Balkır 1935a: 165).

Because the hearth is associated so closely with the family line, it should not be put out intentionally. To throw water on the fire is wrong, for it symbolizes the extinction of the family. People usually cover the hot coals with ashes and allow them to cool slowly. One elderly woman told me that some immigrant women (*Muhacirler*) in the Balıkesir area brought their hearth coals with them all the way from the Balkans. Questions of fact aside, the statement underlines the importance of hearth to family continuity.

The home also contains other special parts, such as the ceiling or rafters from which items are hung to cure ill residents or to protect the home from the evil eye; the walls in which nail clippings are wrapped and stored to protect their owners from sorcery and to be preserved until judgement day when they will be recollected; and the entrance, especially the threshold (*kapı eşiği*), which marks the dividing line between the safety of the home and the dangers of the spirit (*cin, şeytan*) world. One should not linger in the doorway, but should pass through it, saying *destur* (by your leave) and *bismillah*... (in the name of Allah...) so as to protect oneself from the evil spirits with which one may collide, especially at night.

Many of the housewife's home furnishings and utensils also have special ritual importance. One of the most significant is the broom, whose use always involves ritual. Along with being a useful house cleaning implement, it is an opponent of evil. People believe that dirt and filth, which the broom helps eliminate from the home, are the habitats of evil spirits. Consequently, as a woman sweeps her home, she simultaneously clears it of evil.

The broom's mystical nature goes even beyond this, for it possesses curative powers. As an example, it is believed that a person with a tendency to trip over (or tangle) his/her broom in the local mosque (Balkır 1935a: 94). Also, a woman will be relieved of a migraine headache (*yarım baş ağrısı*) if she sweeps half (*yarım*) the mosque and returns home without looking back.

The broom can also help protect new mothers from the devil and other evil spirits. For instance, during the first 40 days after childbirth, a mother

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(called *lohusa*) should be guarded by a relative or friend so as to prevent the devil from adversely affecting her. When the guardian finds it necessary to leave the new mother alone, he/she should place a Quran near the mother's head and either a broom or piece of iron by the door to continue the watch (Özer 1963 : 107).

Additional ritual - beliefs associated with the use of the broom include the following:

Because of the broom's power, it should not be used to hit children with. And if while sweeping the dining area, her broom should happen to touch some part of a person's body, the sweeper should spit-blow (*tükürmek*) on the broom, or else boils will appear on the spot the broom touched (Balkır 1935a: 3).

Angels spread their wings over food crumbs that have fallen on the floor. Hence people should not step on them. The angels get upset if the crumbs are not swept up immediately and carefully after the meal is finished (Balkır 1935a: 14; informants).

In many small village homes, residents sleep in the same room that they eat in. They take mattresses from a closet and roll them out on the floor. It is believed that the floor should be carefully swept first, for if any food crumbs remain they will frighten the sleepers in their dreams (Balkır 1935a: 137).

One should not sweep late at night, for at that time dark places are occupied by the devil and spirits. By sweeping one will cause them to collide or may collide with them. However, if a woman finds it necessary to sweep, she should first singe the ends of her broom (Balkır 1935a: 119). Of course, before beginning this or any other project, she should say «In the name of Allah...» (*Bismillah...*).

If a woman leaves a room only half (*yarım*) swept, she will get a migraine headache (*yarım baş ağrısı*). She should always finish. If she should leave the room sweepings behind the door, she will experience poverty (Balkır 1935a: 177, 178).

A woman should not sweep out her house immediately after a member of the family has left for a trip. Also, when someone in the community dies, neighbors should not sweep out their homes until the deceased has been carried away to the mosque (Balkır 1935a: 149).

Although the home represents the residence of people, and is therefore in the realm of culture, it also contains symbolic elements of nature, with which people must live in harmony. For instance, it was generally believed that every traditional home was inhabited by a snake, called *temel yılanı* (foundation

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snake). If the residents were good people, the snake would rarely permit itself to be seen and would cause no harm. If the residents were bad, the snake would appear frequently so as to scare the people away. If the residents chose not to move out, then either the house would be destroyed or the family line would die out. Consequently, after seeing the snake several times, home residents should review their living habits and make any necessary adjustments so that they may conform more closely to the moral standards of the community.

There are ritual-beliefs associated with other creatures of nature found in the home also. As an example, people believe they should not destroy a spider's web either on Fridays or at night. To do so is symbolic of destroying one's own home. Spider webs can be destroyed at dawn (Balkır 1935a: 93; informations).

The full repertoire of ritual-beliefs associated with the Turkish home would fill a large book. I offer the following additional examples to demonstrate some degree of their diversity. All come from the Balıkesir region and were supplied by Balkır (1935a) and my Susurluk informants.

1) If a woman does her laundry on 41 consecutive Thursdays, she will become rich. However, beginning the job before dawn is a necessary condition.

2) On Saturdays, the quilt should not be covered with a sheet, because that sheet will want death.

3) Those who shave on Wednesday, do laundry on Thursday, and trim their nails on Friday will be rich.

4) When a mattress is being raised from the floor, it should be folded head first, not foot first. Only death beds are folded foot first. To do so at other times, would symbolize the death of the bed's occupant.

5) A woman should finish any needle work she has already started before the Feast of Sacrifice (*Kurban Bayramı*) begins. If she cannot do so, she should break the thread and knot it. Otherwise, the legs of the sacrificial animal (*kurban*) will be tied, preventing it from crossing the bridge to heaven (*sırat köprüsü*).

6) No needle work should be done on a suit or dress while a person is wearing it. Otherwise, the wearer's intelligence will be tied up (she/he will become stupid).

7) If a woman leaves a piece of work unfinished and says, «I will complete it tomorrow,» it will not get done. She should say, «If Allah wills.» (*İnşallah* or *Allah kısmet ederse*).

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8) It is bad to play with a scissors or to leave it open. If either is done, it means one's enemy will talk against her.

9) A woman who has just made herself a new dress should throw the leftover cloth fragments into the street, not into the fire. If she throws them into the street, she will be blessed with more cloth; if she throws them into the fire, her new dress will likewise be destroyed by fire.

10) The street ditch becomes the stopping place of evil spiris at night. Hence, one should not throw water out into it, so as not to stir up the spirits.

11) One should always break egg shells before throwing them away. This is because the devil takes unbroken shells, fills them with puss an offers them as water to persons at the point of death. He tries to trick such persons (who are supposedly thirsty) into trading their faith for a drink.

12) A woman should not allow milk to boil over on her stove. If she does, the cow's nipples will burn and its milk will stop.

13) If large bubbles form on the top of one's coffee, it means an enemy's envious eyes are upon her/him. If many small bubbles form it means the coffee drinker will come into money. She/he should touch them with her finger and wipe it on her chin or forehead saying, «May it come to me».

14) One should not strike the table with a spoon, or else the debt of the household head (*ev sahibi*) will become great.

15) If while cutting bread, a slice falls into the food, it means a guest will come.

16) It is wrong to turn away a beggar who has come to one's home. If the beggar is given nothing, then she/he will appear to the uncharitable person in the form of a sand snake and trouble her/him.

17) However, a woman should not give a beggar bread from her table, or else the good fortune of her family will be lost.

The exact origins of these and the hundreds of other home rituals are hidden in the past. Their persistance into recent times is evidence of their psychological, cultural, and social value. I believe it is reasonable to assume, in a Durkheimian fashion, that the mundane chores of maintaining the home were so important to family and lineage survival that society, especially its women, assigned special spiritual-symbolic meanings to their work and thereby elevated it to a higher, more mystical and sacred plane.

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In this respect, the work worlds of traditional men and women are similar. Just as male members of the traditional crafts had their own patron saints, sacred work procedures, ceremonies, etc., so too did women. Just as male craftsmen marked special occasions of their work life (e.g., graduation from apprentice to journeyman) with special religious ritual (see Magnarella 1974: 64-69), so too did women engage in organized ceremony to mark their special occasions, especially marriages, births, and other culturally defined life crises. Like the young boy entering a trade, each young girl is initially an apprentice in both the skills and knowledge of family care and in the skills and knowledge of the constellation of ritual-beliefs associated with these home tasks.

Being a universal religion, Islam gives life a universal meaning. However, it does not deal specifically with all the details of work life. Consequently, ritual and special meaning in this area are created locally and then seek legitimation in Islam. Many of my illiterate informants claimed (incorrectly) that their special ritual-beliefs were prescribed by the Quran. More generally, many Muslims dedicate each task they undertake to Allah by saying, «*Bismillah...*» before they begin. In addition, prior to beginning an important home task traditional women commonly say, «*Benim elim değil, Ayşe Fatma eli*» (Not my hand, but the hand of Aysha [the Prophet's wife] and Fatima [the Prophet's daughter]). In these and many other ways every traditional home act takes on the quality of holy ritual; it acquires spiritual meaning and links the woman actor directly with her God. Almost nothing in the house remains secular. The traditional Turkish home becomes a temple, and the house-wife becomes its priestess.

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THE ASSIMILATION OF GEORGIANS IN TURKEY: A CASE STUDY[1]

INTRODUCTION

Although the details of the immigration of Georgian, Circassian, and other Caucasian people to Turkey in the second half of the nineteenth century comprise some of the most dramatic pages of late Ottoman history, precious little is known about the assimilation of these people in Turkey. Even their numbers can only be guessed. The official censuses of the Turkish Republic do not list people by their ethnic background but rather by the languages which they purportedly claim as their mother tongues. Commenting on the reliability of similar census data, Sabahattin Alpat (President of the Turkish State Institute of Statistics) has written that "pre-tests carried out before the censuses showed that the information given about residence and the period of residence, number of marriages, births, and marriage age were answered either incorrectly or incompletely."[2] He further states that it is difficult to find qualified personnel to conduct the census, especially in the villages where the bulk of the population lives.[3] When we add to these considerations the general tendency on the part of non-Turks to claim Turkish as their mother tongue for social reasons, we must conclude that official statistics by mother tongue are poor indicators of the actual number of the various non-Turkish peoples in Turkey.

The following table contains official statistics for the various census years of the number of people in Turkey claiming either Abkhaz, Circassian, or Georgian as their mother tongue. It also shows the number of people who claimed Turkish as their mother tongue, but either Abkhaz, Circassian or Georgian as their second language. There is high probability that the vast majority of these people are ethnically Caucasians.

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[1]The field work for this study was conducted in Turkey from August 1969 to August 1970. I wish to thank Dr. William Haviland for commenting on an earlier version of the paper.

[2]Sabahattin Alpat, "Critical Review of Demographic Data Obtained by Turkish Population Census", in *Turkish Demography*, ed. by F. C. Shorter and B. Güvenç (Ankara, Turkey: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1969), p. 61.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 48.

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Caucasian Mother Tongue

	1927	*1935*	*1945*	*1950*	*1955*	*1960*	*1965*
Abkhaz	—	10,099	8,602	17,000	14,000	4,000	4,563
Circassian	95,901	91,972	66,691	76,000	80,000	63,000	58,339
Georgian	—	57,325	40,076	73,000	52,000	33,000	34,330

Caucasian Second Language

	1935	*1945*	*1955*	*1960*	*1965*
Abkhaz	2,000	1,000	12,000	4,000	7,836
Circassian	15,000	10,000	72,000	56,000	55,030
Georgian	16,000	9,000	47,000	29,000	48,976

Sources: 1959, *Türkiye Istatistik Yıllığı* (Ankara, 1959), p. 81.
1960, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Istatistik Yıllığı* (Ankara, 1962), p. 79.
1965, *Genel Nüfus Sayımı* (Ankara, 1969), pp. 178-179.

Inter-census fluctuation in the number of people claiming a particular language as a mother tongue are, in part, reflections of the differential quality of the various censuses. The general decline from about 1950 on of those claiming a Caucasian language as their mother tongue is a partial indicator of degree of acculturation. Many of the descendants of the original Caucasian immigrants now speak Turkish much more fluently than the language of their forefathers.

The following pages offer a brief history and partial ethnography of a Turco-Georgian village located in the northwestern corner of Asia Minor twelve kilometers from the town of Susurluk. The degree of assimilation of these Georgians is also discussed.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In about 1877-78 a group of Georgian from the vicinity of Batum on the Black Sea emmigrated to Western Turkey rather than remain in their homeland and fall under Russian domination.[4] Their leader, Sadık Ağa, directed them to a place called Üç Çeşme (three springs) in the present province of Balıkesir. The hills surrounding this spot were occupied by Yürüks — Turks who lived a transhumant existence grazing their sheep, cattle, and goats on hilltops in summer and in valleys during winter. Shortly before the arrival of the Georgians, the Governor-General of the region — a famous Ottoman by the name of Ahmed Vefik Pasha — had ordered the Yürüks to cease their nomadic way of life and settle down in permanent villages. Like other Yürüks in the area, those near Üç

[4]This account is largely based on the oral history provided by the Georgians and Yürüks of this settlement.

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Çeşme originally chose to ignore this order, but they were soon hunted down by the military who punished them by destroying their tents.[5] Now convinced that they must settle, a group of these Yürüks invited the newly arrived Georgians to establish a village with them. The Georgians accepted the invitation, and the two peoples agreed on a hill site not far from Üç Çeşme.

This new settlement area was similar to the one which the Georgians had left, in that it was hilly and ill-suited for farming. However, by tradition the Georgians were not farmers but artisans, especially builders. They helped the Yürüks construct their homes, and in turn the Yürüks taught the Georgians animal husbandry. Both these peoples learned techniques of farming from a group of immigrant Turks from Bulgaria who had established their own village on a nearby plain.

Adjustment to this new environment required most Georgian families to engage in agriculture as their primary source of livelihood. Only a few household heads were able to support their families by working as contractors, building homes for people residing in other villages. Although this situation remained basically unchanged up to the early 1950s, very few Georgians became tied to the soil. The men maintained their traditional building skills, and most of them looked forward to the day when they could revert to their former way of life.

SETTLEMENT PATTERN

The village, now known as Mana, is composed of about 150 houses clustered on the eastern slope of Keltepe (bald hill). It overlooks a stretch of broken terrain on which villagers struggle to cultivate such crops as wheat, barley, rye, corn, and garden vegetables. The settlement is divided horizontally into an upper quarter occupied exclusively by Yürüks and a lower quarter occupied by Georgians. These two quarters are separated by a dirt road and are sharply distinguished by architectural differences. While the Yürük homes are small, closely spaced, one-story adobe structures, the Georgian dwellings are large, two-story structures located on large plots and constructed of red brick which the Georgians made in their own brick ovens. One Georgian home has the date of its construction — 1302 A.H./1884-1885 — inscribed over its entrance. These architectural differences also reflect the greater proclivity on the part of the Georgians to maintain large extended families over multiple generations.

Although both Yürüks and Georgians are Sunni Muslims, each quarter had its own mosque and *imam* prior to 1955, and as a result religious gatherings were ethnically separate. Prior to the 1950s it is estimated that there were about

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[5]Mustafa Salman, *Balıkesir Tarihi, Coğrafyası* (Balıkesir, Turkey: Türkdili Matbaası, n.d.), p. 65.

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ninety to one hundred Georgian and seventy to seventy-five Yürük households. Since then the number of Georgians has diminshed greatly, and as a consequence both people have decided to share the same mosque.

Located on the dividing road in the center of the village is a small general store owned and operated by a Georgian, but patronized by both Georgians and Yürüks. In addition to providing a focal point for interethnic commercial activity, it functions as an informal gathering place for men of the village. During the slack farming seasons one can always find a group of men either sitting in the store or in the neighboring tea house drinking tea and discussing village affairs or other matters of interest.

A similar focal point of the village is the two-room primary school (grades 1-5) also located near the village's center. In it both Georgian and Yürük children receive instruction in Turkish from a teacher appointed and salaried by the central government. The use of Georgian is prohibited in the classroom.

KINSHIP

The traditional Georgian and Yürük kinship systems are similar in a number of respects. For both, the traditionally ideal household is agnatically extended and patriarchal, being typified by male dominance, deference to elders, and the subservience of women. Georgians and Yürüks stress the patriline for purposes of descent and inheritance. Although their common religion — Sunni Islam — permits polygyny, its actual frequency is very low.

However, the marriage preferences and prohibitions of these two peoples are quite different. While Georgians prefer to marry Georgians, they strictly prohibit marriage between bilateral first cousins, and strongly disfavor marriage between bilateral kin more distantly related. As a consequence, many of the Georgians in Mana have married Georgians from other villages in the region.

By contrast Yürüks permit marriage with first cousins and in certain cases prefer it. Some Yürüks have told me that they prefer marriage with the father's brother's offspring because this union prevents the wealth of close kin from going to strangers. However, other Yürüks have said that while marriage with the first cousin is permitted, it is better to marry among strangers, even non-Yürüks. Today, both attitudes appear to be about equally pervasive.

The actual selection of spouses is generally accomplished in one of three ways: agreement between families, elopement, or kidnapping. While the ideal arrangement is the first, in which the patriarchs of two households indirectly negotiate the marriage of their offspring, both Yürüks and Georgians allow their

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teenagers sufficient freedom to make clandestine meetings between young lovers and elopements possible. Faced with the fait acompli, the families of the young couple usually accept the situation with varying degrees of reluctance.

Kidnapping for the purposes of marriage is a traditional Yürük custom which is not condoned by Georgians. Although Yürüks permit marriage between first cousins, they are not typified by endogamy. Historically these people have been known to kidnap their wives from other communities. During the early Ottoman period many Greek, Armenian, and Arab women were incorporated into the various Yürük tribes in this manner. This custom has had a similar result in the village of Mana. During the early years of the settlement, marriage between Yürüks and Georgians was non-existent and a socio-cultural boundary between these two people was maintained. However, in time the inevitable occurred — young Yürük males began to abduct Georgian girls from the fields or the village well. In some cases the girls' kin reacted violently and mediation was necessary to prevent the initiation of a blood feud. In other cases, however, both Georgians and Yürüks accepted the situation and recognized their new affinal ties. In time these marital unions had the effect of reducing the socio-cultural barrier between the two peoples, thereby facilitating future intermarriages. While Georgians still prefer that their children marry Georgians, they no longer abhor intermarriage with Yürüks or other Turks, and the frequency of intermarriages has increased.

POLITICS

On the local level the village is governed by a headman (*muhtar*) and a four-member council of elders (*ihtiyar heyeti*) who are all elected by the villagers from their own number. Over the years the council has generally been composed of equal numbers of Yürüks and Georgians and the office of headman has more or less rotated. Villagers claim that election to the headmanship is not the result of politics between two competing ethnic factions, but rather the outcome of a consensus between the two peoples over a particular man that they are confident will deal with them fairly and evenly. It was symbolic that in 1969-1970 the headman was a Yürük married to a Georgian.

The fact that on the national level both ethnic groups have been strong supporters of the same party has acted to facilitate cooperation locally. Their support for the Democratic Party from 1950 to 1960 and for the Justice Party thereafter was largely attributed to an incident which took place in their village during the single party rule of the Republicans under İsmet Inönü (Ismet Pasha).

In 1942 the Republican government ordered the villagers of Mana to build a schoolhouse on a hill about one-third mile to the east of the village across a deep gorge. The villagers protested because they thought the site was a poor

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choice. Access to the school would have been difficult and dangerous for the children, especially during the late winter and early spring when mud and swift currents fill the lower reaches of the gorge. They also complained that they could not devote the demanded time to the construction of the school without serious detriment to their own small farms. As one villager put it: "We had all we could do to take care of our families much less spend days working on the school and hauling materials in our wagons all the way from town — twelve kilometers with no road!" However, the government was deaf to their complaints and the district head (*kaymakam*) ordered gendarmes to the village to force the villagers to build the school. Under these conditions the school was completed with great resentment.

The proposed curriculum of the new school was to be very broad. In addition to the standard school subjects, certain vocational subjects such as carpentry, masonry, agriculture, and home economics were to be taught. However, only one teacher was sent to staff the school and he could not carry out the curriculum alone. The educational experiment ended in failure. The teacher was withdrawn and the school building crumbled. Today the villagers satirically refer to the pile of stones remaining as the "Ismet Pasha School".

A few years later the people voluntarily built their own school near the center of the village, which is still is use.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Events in the nearby town of Susurluk have had an important impact on Mana. In the early 1950s Susurluk was selected by the goverment as the site of a large sugar beet refinery, and construction on this facility began in 1954. Many Georgians found employment as the demand for local construction workers was great. Once the refinery began operations in 1955, it directly and indirectly created numerous wage-paying jobs which attracted thousands of peasants to town. As a result, the population of Susurluk quickly doubled to about 11,000 and the demand for housing was unprecedented.

The Georgian builders helped meet this demand by forming private construction companies which experienced great success. As they became established occupationally, they moved their families to town and took up permanent residence there. Today there are about thirty to thirty-five Georgian households in Susurluk. Most of them are located in New Quarter, a section of town built up since 1954. They have their own coffee house where elderly males meet and converse in their mother tongue.

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It is estimated that since 1954 about thirty other Georgian families left the village to settle in the large cities of Istanbul, Izmir, and Bursa. Today there are only about thirty Georgian households left in Mana. By contrast most Yürüks have remained in the village, being satisfied with their way of life and deriving a reasonable livelihood from animal husbandry. In 1965 the total population of the village was 610.

ASSIMILATION

The degree to which the Georgians of Mana have been absorbed into the culture and society of Turkey can be described as high. An assessment of this assimilation requires the consideration of several factors.

Probably the most important of these lies on the level of values and religious identification. Being pious Muslims, the immigrant Georgians share with the Turks the same moral code or constellation of socio-cultural values which is embodied in their common religion. They are both members of a Muslim brotherhood and accept the same Islamic criteria for the evaluation of life. This facilitates mutual understanding and interethnic cohesion. For example, after the Georgian emigration from Mana in the 1950s, the comparatively few remaining Georgian families found it impractical to maintain their own separate village mosque. Because no religious differences existed to prevent them from joining with the Yürüks in the use of one mosque, both ethnic groups now meet together in communal prayer. Similarly, the Georgians who moved to Susurluk were immediately accepted as members of the religious community, and they now pray alongside their Turkish neighbors in the quarter mosques.

A second factor, which should not be overlooked, is the racial one. Georgians are very European in appearance. Those of Mana tend to have light to medium complexions and medium to tall stature. Light brunette and blond hair and green and blue eyes are common. These physical features are very attractive to Turks, and they have played no little role in the intermarriage of the two peoples.

Intermarriage is a doubly important factor, as it not only provides evidence for assimilation, but also acts as a cause of further integration. All Georgians with whom I talked said that intermarriage between Georgians and Turks, especially in the town of Susurluk, is becoming progressively more frequent. From survey data collected in Susurluk, I learned that of seventeen marriages involving at least one Georgian, five were with Turks and two were with Circassians. In the remaining ten both partners were Georgians. Most of the mixed marriages had occurred since 1955, and there was no significant

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difference between the sexes of the Georgians who married outside their ethnic group.

The next factor to be considered is the socio-economic one: rather than being a burden on the community, the Georgians have proven themselves able and industrious workers. Their skills have been recognized by the Turks as important contributions to the construction of Mana and the development of Susurluk. Many of the Georgians in Susurluk have prospered from their labor. They approach the ideal image of the pious, hardworking Muslim whose industry benefits his community, his family, and himself. For this they are admired.

The assimilation of Georgian and other non-Turkic peoples in Turkey has also been influenced by the official position of the government, especially during the early years of the Republic when the establishment of a Turkish national homeland and spirit was of critical importance. According to the official histories all Muslim people living in Turkey are racially and ethnically Turks. Georgian and Circassian are said to be mere dialects of Turkish, and the speakers of these languages are pressured to learn true Turkish. Even today formal education or publication in these non-Turkic languages is prohibited and their use in public places is not condoned.[6]

This official ideology is inculcated in the public schools and appears to be generally accepted by the Georgians in Mana and Susurluk. For instance, one primary school teacher of Georgian extraction told me that Georgians are really Caspian Turks who speak a Turkish dialect which they should now replace with standard Turkish. As an educational leader in his community, his opinion carries great weight. Today practically none of the young and only a few of the middle-aged Georgians claim fluency in Georgian. When I asked for kinship terms or other Georgian words, they would usually refer me to their elders saying that today only the old really know the language.

Finally, we must note that the assimilation process has been facilitated by the openness and tolerance of the Turks, who have welcomed these Muslim immigrants to their homeland and accepted them. In Susurluk there is no evidence of Turkish discrimination against Georgians. Georgians are not barred from entry into social clubs or occupational groups. They participate in local politics, and at least one Georgian holds a high position in the local branch of one of the major political parties. The typical Georgian in this area is proud to be a Turkish citizen, and he is typically accepted as such without reservation.

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[6]Added note: Legislative reforms in 1991 partially removed the restrictions on the use of non-Turkic languages.

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Personal observation of Turco-Georgian relations in towns and cities in various parts of Turkey corroborate these conclusions on a wider scale. In Turkey's major cities Georgians are found holding important positions in industry, commerce, banking, education, goverment, and the professions. To my knowledge, there are few, if any, Georgian separatists in Turkey.

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TURKISH TOWNSMEN VIEW APOLLO

Traditionally, anthropologists have stressed the study of the life, culture and world view of esoteric peoples living in isolated parts of the world. However, in more recent years as a result of international trade, politics and war, advances in travel and communication, and the diffusion of modern technology and industry, such peoples have become a rarity, and many anthropologists have shifted their attention to the problems of modernization. They have become interested in the processes whereby members of traditional societies adjust to modern industry, urbanization, statehood and increased integration with the outside world. When studying such changes, anthropologists believe it important to learn how the people themselves perceive change in their environments and lives — how they evaluate modernization and assess its consequences.

More recently a new dimension — astronautics — has been added to the problem of modernization. The advances in space by the world's leading powers have a determining effect on the lives of all peoples by forcing their entrance into a new era. While today's critical scientific research may deal with the effects of a modern factory in a traditional community, tomorrow's will concern the human consequences of interplanetary exploration.

In my own recent research on tradition and change in a modernizing Turkish town, one of my objectives was to learn the reactions of Turkish townsmen to man's exploration of his first foreign planet — the moon. The site of the study — Susurluk — is located in the northwestern corner of Asia Minor. During the 1930s and 1940s it was a quiet peasant community of about 4,000 citizens. More recently is has been transformed into a busy market center with a modern beet sugar refinery, expanded trades and crafts, and a diverse Muslim population of 13,000. During the period of field work — August 1969 to August 1970 — I resided in Susurluk with an indigenous Turkish family and lived in intimate association with the townspeople. Data for this study were obtained from informal interviews with numerous townspeople and a formal interview schedule administered to a stratified sample of 152 townsmen. While the sample was not randomly selected, it is representative of the town's adult male population in terms of such factors as ethnicity, education, occupation, age and quarter of residence.

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The research was designed to answer four questions: what proportion of townsmen were aware that man had landed on the moon; how did they learn about it; what were their opinions of its usefulness, and what were the reasons for their opinions? While informal interviews on this topic took place at intervals throughout my residence in Susurluk, the formal interview schedule was administered in the spring of 1970, from one to two months after the "unsuccessful" mission of Apollo 13.

Let's See What They Will Say Now!

Ever since I can remember I have witnessed this. Whenever some scientist announces that he has set out to make a discovery, a certain group of people immediately raise an outcry: "Impossible! Whatever is necessary in this world, Allah has already created. Those presumptuous persons who try to discover what Allah has left hidden are irreligious. Nothing but misery will be their due. They cannot and will not succeed."

Most of those who speak this way either pretend to be knowledgeable of Islam or are under the influences of others who make such pretensions.

When man was trying to invent the automobile, they asked: "What will pull it? an ass?" Upon being told that it would be powered by its own engine, they stood in disbelief. They reacted in the same way to electricity, the radio, and the airplane. However, when these things became reality, they simply said: "Of course. Why not? It has all been written in the Quran in such and such a verse that these things would come to pass."

When it came to the subject of moon exploration, they said: "Man has done many things, but he will not go to the moon. The moon is fire; those who go will burn."

They reacted to the early set-backs in the Apollo program with ridicule. "Ha, ha, ha. So they're going to the moon, are they! Look at those infidels. May Allah cure them of their insanity."

But now moon exploration, too, has become a reality. Man has set foot on the moon. He has erected the flag of his earth country, collected stones and dust, and left behind instruments to aid in future research. What will they say now? Very simple. "It was written in the Quran."

This editorial, written in the tradition of Mahmut Makal, the famous Turkish reformer who portrayed his fellow villagers as ignorant reactionary Muslims, appeared in the local Susurluk newspaper in July of 1969, a few days after Neil Armstrong made man's first footprint in moon dust. Like Makal, the author is a primary school teacher, a self-styled modernist, and a secularist. In

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my conversations with him, I got the impression that his anti-religious bias was so strong that he could not conceive of modernization and Islam co-existing. He contended that his editorial accurately describes the reaction of most Susurluk townsmen to the Apollo program. The extent to which his claim is true can be determined from the findings of this study.

The people of Susurluk impressed me which their awareness of the US Apollo program in general and their knowledge of missions 11 and 12 in particular. Old and young, literate and illiterate spoke with excitement about the exploits of the astronauts. Only four members of the sample (one illiterate and three with less than a fifth grade education) either admitted not knowing that man had successfully landed on the moon or could not give the approximate date of any moon landings. For example, one claimed that he knew of the moon landings because he had read about them in the Quran.

The second impressive finding was that most townsmen had learned about the moon missions through the national news media and not orally from friends. Ninety-four per cent of the sample said their information came from either the radio or press, or both. Although the Turkish press and radio did give the Apollo missions a great deal of publicity, it still might have been expected that residents of a small Turkish community like Susurluk would rely more on conversational transference of such news, rather than applying directly to the national media.

When it came to an evaluation of moon exploration, I found that the vast majority of townsmen had firm opinions and reasons to support them. About 85 per cent of the sample (and about 90 per cent of the people with whom I talked informally) thought that moon exploration was a useful endeavor, while 12.5 per cent disagreed. Only 2.6 per cent, or four members, of the sample were not sure. There was no clear association between respondents' opinions and their levels of educations.

Some of the reasons given by those who believed that moon exploration was not useful were very original; others were quite pragmatic. For example, a poor illiterate gypsy said that the man in the moon was very far away, and we could expect no help from him. Another humble townsman, an illiterate Turk, said that it was all a waste of time because we had everything we needed on earth. A Circassian with an eighth grade education believed that the activities in space amounted to little more than ostentation on the part of two world powers. An ice cream peddler with a fifth grade education evaluated the program personally: I don't benefit from it." And a plurality of those who gave negative evaluations, including people with either high school or university educations, criticized the moon programs for their "insignificant" results.

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However valid their reasoning, these dissenters were in the minority. Most townsmen believed that lunar research was beneficial and their reasons showed equal variety. Only two people with whom I talked informally and four members of the sample conformed to the stereotype depicted by the secularist school teacher in his editorial. They held that the moon missions were useful because they verified what has already been written in the Quran. This reliance on the sacred book as a universal truth to explain what might otherwise be incomprehensible was clearly not common among many townsmen. The few who did think this way were usually pious, humble people from the lower educational ranks.

Some of the townspeople, like four members of the sample, regarded space exploration with a vision commonly associated with the most far-sighted of modern men. They saw the moon and planets as potential homes for man — the lands of future migrations. The majority of townspeople were somewhat less visionary, but still very optimistic. For instance, 62 per cent of the sample believed that moon exploration was useful because it would expand knowledge, and 19.3 per cent said it would render important material benefits to mankind. These people talked in terms of finding new sources of energy, cures for cancer, and remedies for other earthly problems.

In some ways the most moving replies were given by a sizeable proportion of the townsmen (12.4 per cent of the sample) whose faith in modern astronautics and the motives of the political leaders who direct it was so strong that they deemed further justification for moon exploration unnecessary. A typical answer in this category was given by a Turkish carpenter: "If it [moon exploration] were not beneficial to mankind. America would not be working so hard at it."

It becomes obvious from this study that a great majority of Susurluk townsmen have accepted, even approved of their forced entry into an era over which neither they nor their own political leaders exercise any control. Contrary to what the secularist teacher has described, most townsmen do not oppose the new space technology on religious grounds. In fact, the degree to which many of these Muslims firmly believe in the potential benefits of astronautics and in the altruism of the powers applying it, is almost embarrassing to an American visitor. Let us hope that their trust and confidence are not betrayed.

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SOME TRENDS AND CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNIZATION IN TURKEY

Peter Benedict. *Ula: An Anatolian Town.* Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974. xiv+280 pp. Figures, tables, maps, appendices, references and index. Gld. 64.

Peter Benedict, Erol Tümertekin, and Fatma Mansur, eds. *Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives.* Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974. xii+446 pp. Figures, tables, maps and references. Gld. 124.

Peter Benedict's *Ula,* the study of a Turkish town with a population of 4,616 in 1965, represents an important addition to the small, but growing number of Turkish town studies, which include the English language publications by Mansur (1972) and Magnarella (1974) and the Turkish language publication by Kiray (1964). (For an English language review of Kiray's study see Magnarella [1970].) Benedict's book deals less with the town as a social unit than as a regional market center. Based on "fieldwork conducted in 1967-68" (xii), the book focuses on the town's historical experiences with economic vicissitudes caused by regional and national forces.

Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives is an anthology with sixteen contributors: eleven Turkish social scientists, four Americans and one German. Their fields include anthropology, demography, community development, geography, law, political science, sociology, and urban planning. The volume contains some excellent studies and attests to the growing number of competent Turkish social scientists, many of whom hold advanced degrees from American and European universities. Eight articles deal with rural development, five discuss urbanization and urban problems, and one focuses on labor emigration, especially to Germany.

Although the editors declare that "no central theme for the entire volume has been attempted" (x), explicitly or implicitly practically all of its chapters treat issues of westernization-modernization. Taken together, the contents of both these books can be readily utilized to illustrate several aspects of modernization which are being experienced in Turkey as well as in many other less developed countries.

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The first aspect is the increased political, sociocultural, and economic integration of small communities into their regional and national settings. The second aspect is nicely expressed by Warren's (1972) "Great Change" model. On the community level, according to Warren, modernization entails change in the relative importance of horizontal relations (i.e., relations among individuals and groups within a community) and vertical relations (i.e., relations between community members and members of regional, national, and international organizations). As a community modernizes, vertical relations attain progressively greater increments of political, economic, and sociocultural power. Consequently, they subordinate horizontal relations, causing the community to become increasingly dependent on outside people and agencies.

To exemplify these points, let us begin with a few case studies from *Turkey*. In the chapter entitled "Shepherd Becomes Farmer," anthropologist Daniel Bates describes the soioeconomic conditons of a group of peasants in southcentral Turkey who had formerly followed a nomadic way of life, relatively free of distant economic forces. Now settled, they have necessarily become involved in a national market economy, with serious local repercussions. These peasants also find they must now conform more closely to the laws and regulations decreed by distant government agencies — forces beyond their reach and control.

In her study of four villages in the Adana region of southcentral Turkey, sociologist M. Kiray discusses how a transition from locally-oriented vegetable and grain farming to externally-oriented mechanized cotton cultivation has not only made the villagers dependent on national markets, but has widened local class distinctions between land owners, who have established important external connections, and workers, who have been transformed from sharecroppers to wage laborers.

Geographer John Kolars, who conducted his research in southwestern Turkey, explains how the villagers of Bahtili successfully developed a citrus industry with the indispensible technical and financial assistance of the Turkish government and United Nations agencies. Now integrated into the national economy, these formerly insulated villagers find themselves in direct competition with citrus growers in distant pars of Turkey. Kolars describes other ramifications of this change:

> The geographic range of village operations has steadily enlarged and the growth of the villagers' horizon of perception has paralleled this increase. In order to operate successfully in their expanding world the farmers have had to deal with increasingly remote and abstract phenomena. At the same time, they have devised new types of relationships with agents of change in the outside world. One result of this pattern is larger incomes which

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> are sometimes used to obtain university educations for favored children. This, in turn, may well mean that a new generation of village sons will perhaps be forced to choose between urban and rural futures (232).

In his study of Ula, Benedict found that improved travel and communication links with large cities have oriented many of the region's residents to the outside. Rather than shop in the small town of Ula, many villagers and townspeople now move easily to the large cities where selection is greater and prices are cheaper. Convenient access to the industrial products of these cities has caused the elimination of many town crafts. Consequently, Ula's importance as a regional market center has declined.

In each of these cases, closer regional and national integration has caused a change in the power balance between horizontal or intra-community relations and vertical or extracommunity relations, with the latter achieving greater economic and political strength.

A third aspect or consequence of modernization-westernization is most disturbing. Intensified exposure of villagers and townspeople to modernizing urban centers and to the industrial, consumption-oriented West often leads to rising expectations and the development of what I call a "Culture of Discontent." This culture is characterized by a people's manifest dissatisfaction with locally available income and consumption opportunities and their pressing desire to abandon their communities, even their countries, in pursuit of a "better life" (Magnarella 1974: 180).

In Turkey the "Culture of Discontent" has contributed to a flow of people from villages to cities and from cities abroad. In his chapter in *Turkey* entitled "Indices of Modernization," Ahmet Tugaç, a member of Turkey's State Planning Organization, discusses a 1968 national survey of peasant attitudes as compared with a similar survey conducted in 1962. Despite significant improvements in village life over the past quarter century, Tugaç reports that 84 percent of the peasants surveyed in 1968 wanted to migrate to cities. Even in the most developed villages, about 73 percent of the respondents expressed this wish. Apparently, with increased exposure to the outside, aspirational levels rise and satisfaction with rural life diminishes, even in those villages that have made significant economic progress. Peasant responses to an interview item which asked them to name their most significant criterion for selecting a job evidence a striking trend towards greater consumption orientation. The percentage saying "money" was the single most significant criterion increased markedly from 18 percent in 1962 to 41 percent in 1968. In a town survey I conducted in 1970, 66 percent of the sample chose "money" (Magnarella 1974: 68).

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Apparently, not only do villagers want different kinds of work, they want their work to translate into more consumption-oriented life styles. Benedict believes a similar situation exists in many small towns. In Ula he found that education contributes to feelings of dissatisfaction with local opportunities, and that many of the town's young and talented natives have left for large cities.

In their chapters on urbanization, F. Shorter, B. Tekçe, and T. Akçura note that Turkey is experiencing a redistribution of population from rural to urban locations within a context of rapid demographic growth. Unfortunately, industrialization has not paralleled urban migration. Cities can offer neither the jobs nor the services that most migrants need. Consequently, Akçura writes, Turkey is undergoing a process of "pseudo-urbanization." Nearly half of the population in major cities inhabits squatter zones of *gecekondus*, which may very well become permanent features of the urban landscape.

The quest for material fulfillment does not end here. In the 1960s Turkey's overburdened cities became the main launching areas for Turkish labor emigration to Europe. Political scientist N. Abadan-Unat writes about the motivations that drive these workers abroad:

> Contemporary migrant workers have one dominating, conscious wish: to make as much money as possible as quickly as possible. This strong desire is propagated and cultivated intensively by the mass media, which contribute to enlarging the circle of those with "rising expectations." Stereotypes, higher standards of living, and social welfare inspire most of the migrant workers.... The basic motivation thus remains the prospects of higher earnings, and money tends to become an end in itself. The migrant thinks that money will solve all his problems. He assumes that savings will enhance his status, and absolve him from the past without his being obliged to make a radical change in his personality or his habits (386).

Currently there are over one million Turks in Europe, and another million have officially registered their desire to join them. However, foreign work opportunities have provided Turkey with only temporary relief from internal pressures. When the recent Arab oil embargo sharply curtailed Europe's industrial production, Turks and other foreign workers suffered. Some lost their jobs; others received early retirement. Several European governments decided to discontinue importing foreign labor until the economic situation improves greatly. Turkey's immediate future is imperiled by an annual population growth rate of about 2.5 percent, growing unemployment at home, and an influx of Turkish workers from abroad, who may become an unemployed industrial minority at home.

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Both these books help provide social scientists and state planners with basic information needed to appreciate the dimensions of the socio-economic problems shared by Turkey and other less developed countries.

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TURKISH MIGRATION TO EUROPE: CASE STUDIES

R. E. Krane, ed. *Manpower Mobility across Cultural Boundaries: Social, Economic and Legal Aspects. The Case of Turkey and West Germany.* Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975. vi+222 pp. Maps, tables, and bibliography. Gld. 68.

Nermin Abadan-Unat and Contributors. *Turkish Workers in Europe, 1960-1975: A Socio-economic Reappraisal.* Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976. vi+425 pp. Maps, tables, appendix, index, and bibliography, Gld. 160.

Since the early 1960s, an asymmetrical relationship has characterized interactions between the highly industrialized "center" countries of Western Europe (especially West Germany) and the "periphery" countries of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean. Whereas the center countries are the loci of highly advanced technologies, expanding economies, and affluent living standards, the less industrialized periphery countries with their lower living standards constitute industrial markets and sources of raw materials as well as cheap export labor.

The center has developed a special value system which supports and promotes its Western, urban-industrial society. Within this system, concepts such as productivity, expansion, export surplus, along with conspicuous production, acquisition, display, and consumption constitute core values. The center's institutions not only thrive on these values, but radiate them, for the center has a built-in need to expand. The more far-reaching its domain, the more successful its promoters. In the past, most peoples of the periphery articulated with the center only occasionally and fragmentarily. However, as a result of technological advances in transportation and communication and international migration, articulation has become more regular and integrated.

According to official German statistics, as of January, 1973, the major labor exporting periphery countries had the following numbers of migrant workers employed in West Germany: Italy, 409,448; Greece, 268,408; Spain, 179,157; Portugal, 68,994; Yugoslavia, 465,611; and Turkey, 528,414 (*Turkish Workers*, 387). Large numbers of workers from these countries were also found in Austria, France, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Switzerland.

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The two volumes under review are both collections of mostly previously unpublished studies dealing with this multifaceted center-periphery relationship between Turkey and Western Europe (but particularly West Germany) from the disciplinary perspectives of anthropology, sociology, economics, geography, and law. Both books contain chapters by scholars from the United States, West Germany, and Turkey. In addition, *Turkish Workers* includes the work of Dutch and Swiss contributors as well.

Each book's chapters are organized so as to first describe and explain labor migration from Turkey to West Germany, and then to assess its consequences for both countries. Tufat Kolan in *Manpower* depicts the 1950-1970 period in Turkey as one of unprecedented social and economic change. The country experienced a population boom; the mechanization of agriculture displaced rural manpower; large investments in highway and transportation systems facilitated rapid, but premature urbanization. By 1960, Turkey was faced with high unemployment and a serious balance of payments deficit.

A sharply contrasting picture is sketched in *Turkish Workers* by Eberhard de Hann, who writes of the enormous expansion of the post-World War II West German economy. That country's declining birth rate, her top-heavy age pyramid, the expansion of her military forces, and the prolongation of education and vocational training of many of her citizens combined with economic expansion to create a great need for more workers than were available nationally to fill the many openings existing in industry that required some or little skill. Until the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, West Germany conveniently absorbed refugees from the East. Thereafter, however, she became increasingly dependent on other countries for workers. In the early 1960s, it certainly appeared as though West Germany and other center countries were rescuing peripheral countries, like Turkey, when the former agreed to import and employ the latter's excess labor.

Gottfried E. Völker, who contributed similar chapters to both books, writes that the foreign worker population of West Germany grew from about 300,000 in 1960 to almost 2 1/2 million by 1973, when they made up somewhat less than 20 percent of West Germany's total labor force. (The corresponding figure for Switzerland was slightly over 25 percent.) Most foreign workers were employed in iron and metal producing industries, followed by manufacturing and construction. Until 1969, Italy was West Germany's dominant labor supplier; from 1969 to 1972 it was Yugoslavia; thereafter, it became Turkey.

By 1974 West Germany was officially employing approximately 600,000 Turks, of whom about 75 percent were male and 25 percent female. When unofficial workers, wives, children, and other dependents are added on, the

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number of Turks in West Germany reaches about one million. In *Manpower*, R. E. Krane estimates that by the end of 1972, approximately one Turkish male in thirteen of the 20-39 years of age cohort had had working experience in Western Europe. Questions are immediately raised as to the various impacts of this large population movement.

A number of writers, such as Terry D. Monson, Duncan R. Miller, and Ihsan Çetin in *Manpower*, and James E. Akre, Günter Schiller, and Völker in *Turkish Workers* examine the economic impact of this international labor migration from micro and macro perspectives. On the level of the individual workers, the economic consequenes of labor emigration appear quite positive. Those who left Turkey earn from ten to seventy times more than they could have if they had remained, and the vast majority of returnees claim emigration was a beneficial experience. In fact, German surveys show that most foreign workers want to remain in the host country longer than the time periods stated in their contracts.

It also appears that many workers improve their work skills and/or attitudes while abroad. In 1967-68, Krane carried out an interesting study which involved interviews with the managers of forty-one industrial firms in Turkey that employed returnees. Twenty of the managers said there were noticeable differences in attitudes and work habits between workers who had experience abroad and those who had none. Seventeen affirmed that the differences were positive ones and used adjectives such as more productive, efficient, orderly, and responsible to describe them.

The managers of German firms also appear basically satisfied with labor migration. Despite the significant cost of hiring foreign workers (in terms of government and transportation fees, training and housing expenses, etc.), their numbers have increased substantially. Hence, it must be assumed that employing foreigners has been less costly than the alternatives of hiring Germans or investing in labor-saving capital equipment.

However, as we move above the level of the individual worker and the firm, the picture is much less clear. Several writers point out some of the positive aspects of migration for Turkey. Akre writes that temporary emigration "provides a degree of relief from high unemployment and under-employment, adds significantly to foreign exchange reserves, and permits a higher rate of capital investment and more favorable balance of payments than would otherwise be possible" (*Turkish Workers,* 189). Monson believes labor emigration represents an excellent opportunity for Turkey to develop a significant portion of its own industrial labor force more efficiently and less expensively than it could if it were training workers domestically. And on the basis of his examination of various macro-economic indicators (such as gross national and gross domestic

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product, capital formation, employment, labor productivity, and per capita income), Kolan concludes that "the favorable movements of the indicators imply that, at the very least, migration policy has not had adverse effects on Turkish economic development" (*Manpower*, 138).

A contrary opinion, however, appears to be in the majority. For example, Nermin Abadan-Unat in *Turkish Workers* complains that emigration is draining Turkey of skilled human resources. She cites a 1973 West German study that revealed that prior to their emigration, 46 percent of Turkish workers had been employed in factories, 32 percent had been active artisans, and only 21 percent were involved in agriculture. Akre writes that 46.3 percent of Turkish workers entering West Germany in 1971 (not an untypical year) were classified as skilled. Ruşen Keleş in *Turkish Workers* notes that most workers emigrate from Turkey's urban and developed regions, while other studies show that the average education of emigrants is higher than the average of their non-migrating cohort group. Miller and Çetin are convinced that "private entrepreneurs in Turkey are undoubtedly incurring higher costs and/or lower marginal productivity due to increased labor turnover and skilled labor losses" (*Manpower*, 137).

Miller and Çetin also warn that Turkey has become overly dependent on workers' remittances, which now constitute its largest single foreign exchange earner. In 1972, remittances were equal to 83.6 percent of all other exports combined. Kolan criticizes the Turkish government's policy of utilizing remittances primarily to pay for increasingly large import bills. He recommends instead that these foreign earnings be used to create future employment opportunities in Turkey for workers who must eventually return from Europe and seek work locally. Both Abadan-Unat and Akre caution that the Turks' living experience in Europe and the large volume of imports into Turkey are contributing to a disdain for domestic products and a preference for foreign goods that will worsen Turkey's already precarious balance of payments problem.

Otto Neuloh in *Turkish Workers* notes two other disturbing trends: 1) Despite the fact that high population growth rates have contributed to Turkey's urbanization and unemployment problems in the past, Turkey's population continues to grow unchecked at about 2.6 percent per year. 2) From 1962 to 1972, Turkey's unemployment almost doubled even though over one-half million Turks had emigrated to Europe during this same period. In addition, Keleş points out that emigration eventually contributes to Turkey's urbanization, because practically all who go abroad from cities and at least 50 percent of those who emigrate from villages settle in urban areas when they return. One consequence of this urban resettlement has been a skyrocketing inflation of real estate values. Many returnees regard urban real estate as the most attractive form of investment.

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From all that these researchers write, it appears that Turkey has been complacently growing more and more dependent on a relatively insecure means of economic vitality, when it should regard international migration as merely a temporary grace period during which it must vigorously address its own internal structural problems of rapid urbanization, population growth, inflation, unemployment, and balance of payments deficits. Unfortunately, it seems that the implementation of a rational plan of national development which does not rely heavily on remittances is not imminent.

With respect to West Germany, labor immigration has facilitated its economic expansion and has not yet hindered its favorable balance of payments situation. However, Vülker warns, the costs to the West German infrastructure (in terms of housing, schools, health and transportation facilities, and other social services) of importing large numbers of foreign workers and their dependents may now be excessive. In 1962, the infrastructural cost per foreign worker was estimated at 25,000 DM; by 1973, it had in creased to 32,500 DM (based on 1962 prices).

Schiller feels that many of the cost-benefit studies conducted to determine how the economies of Germany and Turkey have been affected by labor migration miss the basic point, because capitalist economies are not run at costs and benefits for populations. They are institutional arrangements to maximize production and consumption for the purpose of making profit. Hence, such studies fail to sufficiently address themselves to the social, cultural, and psychological consequences of migration.

Fortunately, a number of contributors to these two volumes have examined some of these consequences. For example, the Turkish social scientists Ayşe Kudat in *Manpower* and Mübeccel B. Kiray in *Turkish Workers* deal with the relationship between migration and family organization. Both note the existence of extensive family fragmentation after the migration of the father or both parents, and Kiray especially wonders about the negative consequences that absent parents and a series of foster homes will have on the personality development of Turkish children.

The geographers John R. Clark in *Manpower* and Ger Mik and Nia Verkoren-Hemelaar in *Turkish Workers* discuss the conditions of marked segregation under which Turkish workers live in Cologne, Germany, and the Netherlands, respectively. Public opinion surveys in West Germany show that a large majority of Germans do not regard Turks especially favorably, and most want the number of foreign workers in their country reduced. Vülker writes that the German prejudice against Turks seems to be greater than that against other "guest workers," because the Turks are socially and culturally the most different. Despite this lack of social acceptance, however, most Turks prefer the German

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way of life to their own, and most want to remain in West Germany. According to a recent Turkish State Planning Organization report, 78.2 percent of workers who had returned to Turkey from abroad expressed dissatisfaction with some aspect of their economic lives in Turkey and said they wanted to reemigrate.

Taken together, these studies provide convincing support for Vülker's recommendation that Germany discontinue importing foreign labor and begin exporting industrial capital instead. This alternative might solve many kinds of problems. West Germany's economy could continue to expand, but its infrastructure would be relieved of the burden created by guest workers and their dependents. On the other hand, workers from peripheral countries, like Turkey, could remain home with their families and still earn good wages. Family fragmentation, problems of psychological adjustment for adults and children, and the drain on needed skilled resources would be avoided.

The mass migration of people under consideration here may prove to be one of this century's most important media for the diffusion of western, industrial culture from the center to the periphery. The ultimate consequences of this asymmetrical relationship are yet to be seen. Much more study is needed, especially concerning the impact of emigration on small "sending" communities. The theoretical frameworks of most studies so far have been largely built on push-pull explanations. The understanding of migration would be further enhanced by the application of reference group theory as well as the behavioral modeling theory of Bandura (1969). Both of these help explain some of the processes whereby individuals choose among cultural alternatives in the labor migration experience.

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A HUMANISTIC MODEL OF PEASANTS IN CHANGE

Among the many epigraphs created to capture the critical dimensions of our transilient twentieth century, the "age of peasant migration" should certainly be included. Throughout much of history, peasants have been tied to the soil by ecological and political constraints. They tended to be people of cultural persistence, only marginally participating in either the great classical civilizations or the more modern industrial societies. In the twentieth century, however, the conditions that maintained this relationship changed dramatically. Rapid rural population growth combined with the spread of industrial urbanization, the expansion of industrial markets, and progressively enveloping travel and communication networks have both forced or permitted many peasants to uproot. Consequently, many rural dwellers succumbed to the power of ideas, values and models inappropriate to their traditional lifestyles, but inextricably linked to the mass production, consumption-oriented, industrial societies that bred and nurtured them. Millions of peasants joined the uprooted, leaving those small communities that constituted the distinctive folk cultures of the earth's many niches to join homogenizing mass societies. They have been emancipated from the soil, but captivated by a modern dream. As Lopreato (1967:xiii) succinctly put it, they "want to be peasants no more."

This chapter addresses the complicated topic of peasant mobility and change within the Human Materialist paradigm[1] by focusing on an actual case of peasant migration from a Muslim village in Turkey across state and cultural boundaries to Christian, industrial Europe. It explores the infrastructural, social structural and personal reasons for this movement and assesses the consequences for the human participants and their sending community.

A major objective of this chapter is the formulation and application of a combined etiologic-teleological "model of people in change" that is intended both to explain the psychosocial and cultural dimensions of emigrating people in this particular case and to constitute a modest contribution to theories of change involving peasants and other marginal peoples who become ensnared in the world's urban capitalist, industrial-service system.

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[1]For a full description of this paradigm, see Magnarella (1993).

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A Model of People in Change

While a materialist model of sociocultural systems can be applied to understand changes on the system level, it is insufficient for understanding change on the individual level. To achieve that objective, human materialism combines infrastructural, social structural and superstructural components with human teleology. The human teleological component of the human materialist research strategy draws heavily on humanistic psychology, humanistic anthropology, learning theory, reference group theory and modeling theory. The resulting construct, with its emphasis on a combination of contextual factors, self conception, and purposive behavior is, I believe, especially well suited to the analysis and explanation of sociocultural and psychological change on the individual level. The basic components of the human teleology model are presented below in the sequential fashion necessitated by the constraints of our written medium. Such a presentation, however, distorts the model, for in its actual application it takes on a more holistic and synchronous character. As I describe and interrelate the model's various components, I name a few scholars who have defined or employed one or more of the model's basic parts. I do so without assuming that the persons mentioned necessarily originated the ideas involved.

The Humanistic Component. The model's personality component is derived from the goal-oriented Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler (1956), which views each individual who strives to accomplish various self-selected goals within his/her phenomenal field. Adlerian personality theory is socioteleological; it conceives of people as being pulled in front by their ambitions, rather than being pushed from behind by hereditary and environment. The Adlerian person actively initiates actions to improve his/her status. The unitary dynamic principle is life as movement in the direction of growth and expansion, life as dynamic striving from a perceived minus position to a perceived plus position. This principle implies a high degree of internal, subjective causation. Because the individual participates in the cause, he/she becomes the important intervening variable.

Adler maintained that human existence requires each individual to face up to a basic set of life tasks or challenges: work-cooperation, society-friendship, and love-sex-marriage. That is, human existence necessitates reliance on others, cooperative and affective relations with others, and beneficial contributions to others. Although these life challenges are regarded as universal, human responses to them vary across as well as within societies. In many respects, these ideas parallel those of the anthropologist Charles Erasmus, who wrote: "In this changing world of cultural behavior I view man's [and woman's] motivational and cognitive attributes as the active agents of causality, ... Motivation is the stimulus to action, but cognition introduces a creative element without which

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action would not take symbolic and cultural form" (1961:11). Although ecological, technical and social factors affect the probability of appearance or extinction of a particular human behavior, all cultural behavior stems from human motivation and the employment of human cognition to achieve goals within the constraints of limiting conditions.

Erasmus posits three basic motivations: 1) the desire to survive; 2) the desire for sexual gratification; and 3) the desire for prestige, social status, or achievement (1961:13). In the study of sociocultural change, the third may be the most important and may be conveniently subsumed under Adler's work-society-love triad. Erasmus reasons that "Because of the long maturation period or social dependency during which the human child is subject to many tests of achievement, persons in all human societies become victims to some degree of invidious comparison and the concern for status" (1961:13) Hence, prestige motivation is universal and can be considered a stimulus to cultural development.

The individual in Erasmus' model of humanity is a rational being whose future actions are largely a function of his/her frequency interpretations, that is, his/her probability estimates (based on past observations and direct or vicarious experience) that such action will be rewarded, rather than punished. People will alter their behavior when new frequency interpretations make clear connections between the alternative and a more desirable consequence. At the most general level, the individual's motive is the attainment of greater prestige or, in Adlerian terms, movement toward a perceived plus position.

The Behavioral Component. Various behavioral models based on learning theories and developed in experimental psychology during the past half century postulate that most human behavior patterns are established and maintained by means of differential reinforcement. Members of a group or society generally reward only those behaviors they regard as desirable, and punish those they deem wrong. This differential reinforcement system usually increases the probability that individuals will repeat preferable behaviors under similar circumstances and reduces the frequency of those behaviors associated with punishment.

According to these models, much of cultural behavior is established and maintained or weakened by its reinforcing or negative consequences, called contingent stimuli. Among the major types of contingent stimuli are: primary stimuli, secondary stimuli, and generalized reinforcers. Primary stimuli are largely physiologically-based and include such things as food, water, and physical abuse, which are generally similar from one society to another. By contrast, secondary stimuli (e.g., verbal compliments, material goods, love) are learned, and their perceived values vary among different societies. Of greatest

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importance to the study of sociocultural change are generalized reinforcers, such as prestige and money, because they have high saturation levels (most people can never get too much) and they can be exchanged for a wide variety of primary and secondary reinforcers.

The behavioral component of the model neither eliminates nor negates considerations of intercultural variability or individual personality differences. An individual's motivations and learning history, including the internalized values and norms of his/her culture (including ideological indoctrination), all play a role in determining his/her state variables and his/her appraisal of any contingency. Additional considerations of importance include: infrastructural constraints and opportunities; the individual's ability to predict, evaluate, and combine all of the relevant consequences of his/her actions; and the individual's capacity to perform the behavior necessary to achieve the desired goal.

The Reference Group and Modeling Component. Many of an individual's values, norms, attitudes, and characteristic modes of behavior are shaped by his/her enculturational experience and primary group memberships. Yet, many people (especially those in societies undergoing change) orient themselves to values, norms, attitudes, and behavior patterns other than "their own" and aspire to statuses and identities which are not part of their membership groups. This phenomenon constitutes the concern of reference group theory.

Reference groups are "those groups to which the individual relates him/herself as a member or aspires to relate him/herself psychologically (Sherif and Sherif 1969:418). The term *reference person* is used when the source of an individual's attitudes and goals is another person, and *reference set* is appropriately used when an individual orients him/herself to a category of people, such as a social class, urbanites, or modern Europeans, who do not strictly constitute a group. Schmitt (1972) has subsumed these three terms under the single rubric of *reference other,* and refers to the process of identifying with or comparing oneself to others as the *reference other orientation.*

Multiple Reference Others, Sociocultural Change and Prediction. In a closed, egalitarian society with simple technology (such as a hunting and gathering band), people generally identify with others who are very similar to themselves. In these cases, the *reference other* concept is of limited use. However, in an open, complex society with a wide variety of statuses and opportunities for social mobility, an individual may have multiple reference others of differential importance (ego involvement) to her or him. The norms of some of these references may be mutually incompatible, and consequently they may cause the individual to be alienated from certain groups (usually his or her more primary and traditional ones) or to compartmentalize his or her attitudes and behaviors into appropriate sociocultural contexts. An example of the second

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case is a person from a peasant background who aspires to become an urbanite. In order to avoid negative sanctions, she or he acts like a peasant in his or her natal village and like an urbanite in the city. In this more differentiated situation, the *reference other* concept enhances predictability. By knowing the relative importance of a person's reference others with respect to his/her hierarchy of values and motivations, we improve our ability to predict the kinds of choices that he or she will make under various sets of conditions.

The Normative Function of Reference Others, Anticipatory Socialization, and Modeling. The reference other concept is based on an individual's capacity to relate to persons, groups, and social categories that may be absent from his or her environment and even remote in terms of geography and time. A person can imagine herself being identified with people she never met (Sherif and Sherif 1969:422-23). As a consequence, this person (say a peasant girl in a small isolated village, who chooses as her reference set modern, urban women about whom she formed impressions exclusively from magazines) may begin to shape behaviors, attitudes and goals that she deems characteristic of her reference set, but which may conflict with local ways. Merton (1957) termed this process of behavioral and attitudinal change "anticipatory socialization," and Bandura (1969) called it "modeling." According to Merton, the individual prepares herself for entrance into her reference set and hopes that by emulating the perceived characteristics of that set, others will identify her as a member. The transforming peasant in this example may begin to draw such opposing contrasts between the norms or standards of her own membership group and those of her reference set, that for her the first becomes a negative reference group and the second a positive reference set. The difference being motivated rejection of her own group's norms in favor of motivated assimilation of the other's (Merton 1957:300).

Highly corroborative of reference group theory and its associated concept, anticipatory socialization, is the modeling theory of learning and behavioral change described by Bandura and Walters (1963) and Bandura (1969). They point out that in all societies motivated individuals learn vicariously by observing the behavior patterns of real-life or symbolized models. People are also reinforced vicariously when they see that their models or "reference others" are rewarded for their characteristic behavioral modes. Hence, modeling and reference group theory can be used conjointly to indicate the sources or an individual's or a group's behavior standards and the agency of their reinforcement.

The application of this humanistic-behavioral model of humanity in change to an actual case below should further clarify its nature and usefulness.

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Peasant Migration to Europe from the Village of Hayriye

Fearing potential Russian persecution at the end of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, thousands of Muslim Georgians fled their homeland on the Black Sea's southeastern coast and hinterland and found refuge in Ottoman Anatolia. About 250 of these Georgian immigrants established the present village of Hayriye in the mountainous province of Bursa in Northwestern Anatolia.[2]

Hayriye is located in the foothills of the Uludağ Mountain range. Its terrain is splintered by ravines and gorges, and its northern edge has been increasingly lost to erosion. Its mountainous soils are less fertile than those of villages on the alluvial plain. Given soil conditions and available technology, the village's carrying capacity appears to have been just over 1,000 persons, its population size in 1950. Thereafter, progressive erosion took land from farms and even home sites, causing food production and population size to diminish slowly.

Villagers maintained a peasant economy with labor intensive plow technology in which grain agriculture predominated in terms of labor and production. The basic units of productions were households, comprised of either nuclear or extended families. Traditionally, the agricultural work cycle provided Hayriye with its tempo and rhythm. All villagers had to organize their lives and arrange their plans with primary deference to the basic movements of agriculture's symphony: plowing, sowing, hoeing, and harvesting. Only when the final movement has been concluded could families marry their grown children, circumcise their young sons, and engage in other major social events.

Until the 1950s, socioeconomic relations in Hayriye were structured primarily by patrilineal descent, marriage, and common village residence. Kin and neighbors cooperated informally to solve the economic exigencies of existence and to perform the requisite rituals of passage through the life-cycle. As the twentieth century moved into its second half various attempts were made to add formal structures to village life. Two external change agents were particularly important here. One was an architect from the provincial capital of Bursa, who had married a woman from the village; the other was an urban school teacher, who had been born and raised in the village. Both men wanted to help the villagers "develop," that is, improve their economic situations and enjoy a higher standard of living.

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[2]Field work for this study was conducted in the spring of 1970, the summers of 1972 and 1974, and the fall of 1984. For more information about this village, see Magnarella (1979).

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They saw an opportunity to accomplish this in 1964, when the Turkish government announced that it would grant priority for purposes of worker emigration to West Europe to mountain and forest villages that established development cooperatives which would: 1) submit names of villagers desiring to work abroad; 2) collect remittances from those who go abroad; and 3) apply the remittances to village development projects. The government gave priority to mountain villages because they tended to be poorer than plain villages, and many infringed on government forests.

Due to high levels of unemployment in Turkey, coupled with the need for inexpensive labor in the expanding economies of West Europe, Turkish workers had begun emigrating in the early 1960s. Turkey had concluded its first agreement to supply workers with West Germany in 1961. Thereafter, Turkey signed similar agreements with several other European countries. Reports from early emigrants about European pay scales, working conditions, and their own ability to save were so positive that a craze to emigrate soon developed in Turkey. West Germany was the dominant host country, absorbing about 90 percent of the approximately one million Turks who had emigrated by 1974. In that year, another million Turks hoping to emigrate were on the waiting list.

Since the early 1960s, an asymmetrical relationship has characterized interactions between the highly industrialized "center" countries of Western Europe (especially West Germany) and the "periphery" countries of the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean regions. Whereas the center countries are the loci of highly advanced technologies, expanding economies, and affluent living standards, the less industrialized periphery countries with rather lower living standards constitute industrial markets and sources of raw materials and cheap labor.

The center has developed a special value system which supports and promotes its Western urban-industrial-service system. Within this system, concepts such as productivity, expansion, acquisition, display, and consumption constitute core values. In the past, most people of the periphery articulated with the center only occasionally and fragmentarily. However, as a result of technological advances in transportation and communication and international migration, articulation has become more regular and integrated. Peoples of the periphery articulate not merely through the mediated message, but through the adoption of reference sets, groups, and persons as well as though a system of direct and vicarious reinforcement. The monetary rewards for adherence to center norms are generalized reinforcers whose satiation boundaries are practically limitless. The system's stimuli are human motivations for material abundance and the social prestige that such abundance symbolizes.

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The architect and the teacher thought sending workers to Europe would eliminate the poverty and near-subsistence lifestyle common in Hayriye by generating needed capital for both individual families and the village. They immediately set about preparing a cooperative charter and filling out the necessary forms. They also outlined the positive aspects of migration to the villagers. Initially, some were reluctant, others had heard of the success experienced by previous migrants and did not need much convincing. Within a short period of time, over 70 men, about half of all males in the 20 to 29 age group, formally expressed their wish to emigrate.

The government approved Hayriye's application for a Village Development Cooperative (VDC) and awarded it a sizable contingent for labor emigration. In November of 1965, 71 Hayriye men went via the VDC to West Germany where most got jobs in manufacturing industries. At first, many of the village's women cursed the architect and teacher for sending their men to the distant "land of the non-believer," but these curses quickly changed to prayers of thanks when money began pouring into their purses. In 1972, the government awarded Hayriye another contingent so that 29 more village men (ranging in age from 22 to 33) went to West Germany to join their friends and relatives in lucrative employment.

The infrastructural elements promoting labor emigration are clear. Hayriye's decreasing land area made it impossible for a population exceeding one thousand to support itself through plow agriculture. Improved travel means and communications had exposed the villagers to consumerism in the cities. Consequently, many villagers had succumbed to the revolution of rising material aspirations, which could be satisfied only by emigration to urban-industrial centers. Moving to the cities, however, required relocation capital and a job. Most villagers lacked the first and had no guarantee of the second. The government's VDC program and the help of two change agents gave many village men a way out.

While the above infrastructural and social structural factors help explain why some villagers had to leave Hayriye, they do not explain the value and norm choices that some men and women made subsequently. Understanding individual decisions is enhanced by applying the multidimensional model outlined above.

Migrant Ideology and Psycho-Social Change

Migrant ideology refers to the migrants' cognitive model of the nature and goals of their migration (Philpott 1970:11). Most Hayriye men initially regarded emigration to Europe as a temporary experience, after which they would return to their village. Their initial goals included finding good-paying jobs, satisfying

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work, and possibly learning new technical skills. Their familial goals consisted of accumulating enough capital to make life secure for their families in Hayriye. Once in Europe, however, these men were exposed to an efficacious set of references or models that corresponded to a different system of prestige and statuses. Consequently, many changed their goals.

For example, prior to their 1965 departure for West Germany, the first contingent of village workers was told that they could bring their wives with them. In fact, the architect and teacher encouraged them to do so, saying, among other things, that just as European women work and earn good money, so also could their wives. However, everyone of the 61 married men refused to do so. Their typical response was: "What business do our wives have there among infidels? Isn't it enough that we go away to work? Our wives will stay home where they belong." For them, preserving their women at home was a matter of honor. To do otherwise would have meant a loss of prestige and status according to their village's traditional system of sociocultural values.

But when they got to Germany, they saw that women there were not confined to their homes, that they had good-paying jobs, and that Turkish couples with jobs were able to accumulate saving almost twice as fast as a man could working alone. Many of the Hayriye men used the husbands of the employed women as models or reference sets, and the significant amount of extra money that their wives earned acted as vicarious reinforcement for their special behavior. This strongly influenced many Hayriye men to change their traditional position. Within a year, they began sending for their wives. By 1976, almost two-thirds of Hayriye's 93 emigrant workers belonging to the cooperative had their wives with them in West Germany, and most of these women were working.[3] By acting this way, these men would have lost prestige in terms of the traditional rules of a now outmoded village value system, but they gained prestige and status in terms of a new, evolving system, whose basic components were adopted from reference sets and models outside the village.

Members of their new reference sets (e.g., European industrial workers and highly successful Turkish emigrant workers) became especially efficacious models because the monetary reward they received for their employment behavior is a generalized reinforcer with an extremely high saturation level. Not only can money be exchanged for a wide variety of desirable goods and services, but its acquisition and expenditure contribute importantly to the achievement of prestige and status in Europe's and urban Turkey's industrial, sociocultural system.

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[3]In 1972, 82 percent of the Turkish guest workers in West Germany were married, and 46 percent of these had their wives with them. The vast majority of these married women--88 percent--were employed (Abadan-Unat 1976:10). Also in 1972, the average savings of Turkish workers in West Germany was DM 2,700 for bachelors as compared to DM 5,475 for married men accompanied by their wives (Abadan-Unat *et al.* 1976:395). DM 3.2225 = $1.00 (1972).

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Consequently, not only did new, lucrative employment roles become important to the former peasants, but by extension, the perceived lifestyles of those acting in these roles became important as well. Peasants learn what they can about these new lifestyles through a process of observation and vicarious reinforcement. When they see that their behavioral models are handsomely rewarded for their characteristic behaviors, the peasants themselves are rewarded, albeit vicariously, and are thus encouraged to adopt the perceived modes of their references' behavior.

Before going abroad, the villagers' impressions of Germans were limited but positive. When they first arrived in Germany, almost all Hayriye men took up residence in factory dormitories and spent most of their time with fellow villagers and other Turkish immigrants. In time, as they became more familiar with their surroundings and had their wives join them, many moved to more residential parts of their cities and became somewhat more integrated into the German sociocultural milieu. In subsequent years when they returned to Hayriye to spend their vacations, they emitted glowing reports of their German hosts. They described Germans as industrious, ingenious, honest, and "clean people, who knew neither lies or curses." Because of these outstanding qualities, the workers credited Germans with being more Muslim than some fellow Turks. The only criticism voiced by some workers had to do with the freedom and openness of German women. On the whole, however, they depicted Germans as extremely positive references sets and models for change.

Workers desiring to get pay increases, promotions, or special privileges (such as jobs for village relatives) tended to conform to the standards of their German superiors and acculturated Turkish predecessors. The first "successful" migrant workers used Germans as their reference sets; they adopted the German work ethic, learned some German, and rose to some supervisory capacity. They often acted as foremen, passing directives from their German superiors to their Turkish subordinates.

This system of modeling had implications for areas of life outside the factory as well. Migrant workers not only allowed their wives to work, but to adopt German dress patterns, material values, as well as recreational and consumption styles, such as drinking beer and eating pork, both of which are prohibited by Islam. In short, they developed a propensity for a Western, urban life style.

In Turkey, they invested in urban real estate, both to protect their capital from inflation and to provide future places of residence and business. When they visited the village on their annual or biannual vacations, they brought back the wonders (radios, T.V.s, cassette tape recorders, sewing machines) of Europe in their merchandise-laden cars. Whereas in the past Hayriye residents carefully

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avoided ostentatious display because they feared others' envy and the evil eye, now they tended towards conspicuous display--a mode of prestige achievement so common in the West.

European labor migration also affected the moral conception of village community. The range of moral fields in which villagers had manifested strong, moral commitments to others was quite narrow, usually being confined to members of households and relatives. Villagers cooperated with their kin and members of tight neighborhood groups for their mutual benefit. Because most residents were largely confined to their remote village and were embedded in its network of social relations, their reference others and models for behavior consisted primarily of local people. The rewards for appropriate behavior were locally dispensed in the form of social acceptance.

In order to avoid invidious sanction in the form of gossip, envy, and the evil eye, villagers commonly hid any surplus or special items they accumulated rather than display them. Those wealthy few, who owned large amounts of land and could accumulate sizable surpluses, were socially and religiously obligated to conspicuously share part of their wealth in the form of large contributions to the maintenance of the mosque and school, meat and grain to the poor on religious holidays, and other material aid to general village projects and to the needy. In return, the villagers granted these men special prestige, leadership status, and the title *aga*. But if a wealthy man did not distribute a sizable portion of his surplus, the villagers made him the object of their invidious sanction.

A few paternalistic *ağa*s acted as if they regarded the entire village as one of their strong moral fields, and by so doing they provided some cohesion to a settlement atomized by the many separate kin groups that formed a series of discrete moral fields. These *ağas* did not behave this way because they were necessarily benevolent or altruistic, although some may have been both. They acted paternalistically toward the village because of an historic, religiously sanctioned tradition reinforced by strong local pressures to share and by their own desire for special prestige. The recipients of an *aga*'s distribution did not regard the act as charity, for they considered it his moral obligation to share. They compensated him with prestige and believed they were instrumental in helping him earn grace (*sevap*) in the eyes of Allah. Because villagers place a high value on independence, a leader's ability to direct them depended principally on persuasion, with persuasive powers resting mainly on a reputation for sharing. Under these conditions, common villagers exercised some control over the distribution of an *aga*'s surplus.

Large-scale migration to Europe transformed this traditional situation. The European sociocultural system impacted directly on the village's infrastructure by providing monetary resources that resulted in changes

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throughout the social structure (e.g., village statuses) and superstructure (e.g., prestige symbols). The flow of remittances back into the village freed many families from dependence on the soil and obliterated traditional economic and prestige dependencies between rich and poor. Economic leveling undermined the traditional persuasive leadership roles of the village *ağas*. As invidious emulation replaced invidious sanction, and because the material goods necessary for emulation originated outside the village, the *ağas* could no longer earn prestige and leadership through conspicuous giving. Consequently, the village lost influential, indigenous leaders who regarded all of Hayriye as a strong, unified moral field. Without the *ağas* and the traditional socioeconomic structure, the elected village headman no longer carried the paternalistic and persuasive authority he once did. Because each kin group is concerned primarily with its own welfare, and because the only role traditionally able to overcome this discreteness has been eliminated and not replaced by a functional alternative, in this respect migration's prosperity has weakened the village as a community. Hayriye has become a place of past identification, rather than a home community. Migrants and their families refer to it often, but return to it seldom and briefly. Together, they constitute a kind of dispersed identity group with a village of their past as a common reference point.

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THE PEOPLE OF TURKEY'S EASTERN BLACK SEA COAST

Turkey's eastern Black Sea coastal region, stretching from Trabzon east to the Soviet border and south to the lofty Pontic peaks, contains a cultural diversity and historic richness that few outsiders realize. For over a millennium the area has been home to Laz, Greeks, Armenians and Georgians. During that period, the area also attracted foreign conquerors, like the Romans, Russians, and Turks. Only the last have remained.

Because the Laz have lived here since pre-Christian times, one of the region's historic designations has been Lazia. When Rome ruled the area from 14 - 117 A.D., it was known as Lesser Armenia. Subsequently, it fell under Eastern Roman and then Byzantine control, ruled from Constantinople. In 1205, a year after the Fourth Crusaders conquered Constantinople, Lazia became part of the separate Byzantine Kingdom of Trebizond (now spelled "Trabzon").This Kingdom lasted until it was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in 1461. Today, the region forms a small, but fascinating corner of modern Turkey.

The area's lush beauty contradicts the starkness of the lands to its south. The Pontic Mountains, with peaks achieving 10,000-14,00 feet within only 20-45 miles of the Black Sea, insulate the verdant coast from the arid Anatolian plateau. The mountains' seaward slopes host a virgin forest of beech, birch, maple, chestnut, oak, poplar, elm, willow and fir at their lower elevations. Up about 3,500 feet these deciduous trees mingle for a short interval with pine woods, which then climb in solitude to 6,300 feet. The forests provide habitats to deer, bears, wild pigs as well as to wolves, fox, martens and a wide variety of birds. Short rivers descending to the sea have carved out deep ravines that stimulate the creativity of the eastern Black Sea peoples. Responding to these environmental challenges, the inhabitants have constructed camel-back bridges over many of the rivers, and spaciously beautiful wooden chalets that adorn valley ridges and high mountain slopes, accessible only by steep, narrow winding paths that discourage all but local residents. The Laz and the Hemshin also build beautiful wooden *seranders*, small corn storage buildings raised on poles. The stone bridges and the homes with their out-buildings, both fashioned by hand from selected woods, are works of art.

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These peoples have also developed a form of steep slope agriculture, growing cabbage, beans, squash, lettuce, corn, onions, hazel nuts, pears, plums, and tea. Some of the gardens incline so sharply, cultivators reportedly have to secure themselves with rope to trees above or risk slipping into the deep ravines. Corn, a significant staple used for making the area's special bread, entered the region in the 17th century. Tea, today's most important cash crop, became popular only in the last thirty years. Tea cultivation is enhanced by the mist and clouds that snuggle into the ravines and mingle with the forests lending a mystical, Brigadoon quality to the entire scene. The region's building designs and agrarian technology contrast markedly with the square, adobe brick homes and the dry plateau agriculture of Anatolia. The eastern Black Sea peoples historically have had greater cultural affinity with the Byzantine West and Caucasian East than with the Anatolian South. An appreciation of the region's recent transformation is enhanced by an understanding of its inhabitants' cultural legacies.

The Byzantines

For roughly a thousand years between the 5th and 15th centuries, the Byzantine Empire preserved and propagated Orthodox Christianity as well as Greek culture and language throughout the Balkans, Asia Minor and other parts of the Middle East. During much of this period, Christian speakers of the Pontic Greek dialect constituted a major element in the eastern Black Sea population. Trabzon, the area's major city and commercial port, was a center of Byzantine Greek culture. Its ruling class and commercial traders spoke Greek. Among the many historic monuments attesting to this period of Byzantine influence are the 13th century church of Aya Sophia and the older Monastery of Sumela, which clings gracefully to the sheer rock face of a mountain south of Trabzon.

Even after the Ottoman Turks conquered the Byzantine Kingdom of Trebizond in the 15th century, Greek speakers continued to be significant. For centuries thereafter their numbers and culture dominated the coastal settlements to such an extent that many of the newly arrived Turks acquired Greek ways, some adopting Greek for public discourse. From the late 17th to the 19th centuries, however, the dual process of Islamic conversion and emigration diminished the Greek-Christian population.

Rather than completely abandoning Christianity for Islam, many of the "converts" syncretized the two religions. At least for a time, they kept their Christian names (along with new Islamic ones), honored their favorite saints, saved their revered bibles, and enacted Christian life-cycle rituals, while simultaneously functioning as sincere Muslims. These common folk accomplished what the Christian and Muslim clergy regarded as theologically impossible. In time however, clerical and governmental pressures forced these

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dual religious believers to end their syncretic ways. Some opted for emigration, others for more complete Islamization. Yet, as late as the 19th century, Greek writers tell of "Crypto-Christians" still living in the settlements of Rize, Of, and Stavra near Trabzon (Hasluck 1929).

James Brant visited Trabzon in 1835 when he was the British Consul to Erzurum. He estimated the city's inhabitants to consist of 3,500-4,000 Christian Greeks, 1,500-2,000 Christian Armenians, and 20,000-24,000 Muslims (Brant 1836). Prior to World War I, Greek-speaking Christians comprised an estimated 20% of Turkey's Black Sea coastal population. After that war, however, Turkey and Greece engaged in a major population exchange that sent 1.3 million Greek Christians to Greece in return for a half-million "Turks." Interestingly, both governments regarded religion as an essential criterion for determining whether one was a Turk or a Greek. Consequently, the Greek government deported thousands of Muslim Greeks to Turkey, and Turkey deported only Christian Greeks to Greece (Lewis 1961). In that exchange, practically all the Christian Greeks from Turkey's Black Sea coast went to Greece, where many resettled in the area of Salonika. To this day, other Greeks refer to them as Lazoi or Laz, a misnomer that Turks use generally for Black Sea coastal peoples (Meeker 1971).

A significant number of descendants of the original Greek Pontic population remains, however, in the districts of Of and Çaykara, about 50 miles east of Trabzon. They are a Muslim, Turkified people whose ancestors converted to Islam back in the 17th century. According to anthropologist Michael Meeker, some contemporary Of residents explain their ancestors' conversion to Islam with the following story. They say a Byzantine emperor had sent two Christian priests to Of to investigate the Islamic religion being brought into Anatolia by the Turks. Islam so impressed the priests, they chose to join the Muslims. Centuries later, their descendants returned to Of and successfully evangelized for Islam among the Greeks there (Bryer 1969).

In 1879, a Greek writer estimated that of the 10,000-12,000 families then living in Of district, 8,000-10,000 spoke Greek, but only 192 were Christian (Bryer 1969:208). During my 1986 visit to Of, residents told me that everyone there spoke Turkish; few knew Greek. They said Greek is still spoken in some of the hinterland villages to the south. The town of Of still exhibits some fine examples of Pontic Greek domiciliary architecture.

The Hemshin People

During the Byzantine and much of the Ottoman period, a large number of Christian Armenians lived in eastern Asia Minor between the Pontic Mountains to the north and the Taurus chain to the south. Owing to the wars and anarchy of

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the 19th and early 20th centuries, most of these Armenians fled or were driven east to the Caucasus region or south into Syria. An Islamisized, Turkified Armenian population known as the *Hemshinler* (sing., *Hemshin*) remained, however, on the northern slopes of the Pontic mountains in northeastern Turkey.

According to the Armenian historian Levond, these Armenians settled there during the time of Emperor Constantine IV (780-797). Clavijo, a Spaniard who traveled through the area in 1405, wrote that the Christian Armenians there had become dissatisfied with their ruler (probably the Byzantine Emperor at Trebizond) and voluntarily submitted to the Muslim lord of Ispir, a city just to the south of the Pontic range. Consequently, the Lord of Ispir sent them a Muslim governor accompanied by a Christian deputy. The French philologist, Georges Dumezil, in his study of the Armenian language of the Hemshin, claims some of these people converted to Islam in the 18th century (Meeker 1971). Eventually, all became Muslims.

Today, many of the residents of the upper valleys south of Pazar, Ardesen, and Hopa still call themselves and are referred to as Hemshin. In this area, two towns--Hemshin and Çamlı Hemshin--carry the people's historic name. In 1986, several Hemshin told me of their combined Armenian and Turkish ancestry, but they claimed only the Hemshin living south of Hopa still speak Armenian.

The Laz

The Laz originated in the Caucasus region and speak a language (also called Laz) related to Georgian. In pre-Christian times, either the Georgians or the Circassians forced many Laz to move southwest along the Black Sea coast. Most converted to Christianity in the 6th century. During the early Byzantine period, emperors Justin (518-527) and Justinian (527-565) regarded the Laz as *foederati* or clients and paid them handsomely to guard the empire's eastern border. They granted the Laz leaders Byzantine wives and titles, and educated some Laz princes at the court in Constantinople. Despite all this, the Byzantines never completely subjugated the fiercely independent Laz, nor did the Laz ever become fully assimilated to Byzantine culture. They became Christians, but of an independent kind who appointed their own priests. Even the Ottomans, who conquered the Laz territories in the 15th century, did not significantly curb the independence of traditional Laz leaders until the 19th century.

According to historian W.E.D. Allen, from classic times the Laz have been infamous as daring pirates and skilled boat builders. They have also been commercial shippers, traders, and fishermen. Over the centuries the Laz have utilized the fine woods of the Pontic forests to construct small boats especially

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suited to Black Sea coastal travel. Their seafaring abilities helped Mustafa Kemal (the founder of modern Turkey) win Turkey's post World War I struggle for independence. Employing their small boats, the Laz smuggled large quantities of arms and munitions from Batum to Samsun, from where they were transported inland to Kemal's forces.

Historically, the Laz have also farmed the lower valleys and narrow alluvial fans of the area's rivers. They combined gardening with transhumant pastoralism. The latter activity involves grazing small herds of sheep, goat and cattle on the lowlands in the winter and in the high Pontic pastures in the summer.

Today, as in the past, the Laz are the most numerous of the peoples living along Turkey's eastern Black Sea coast. They are most common in the districts east of Rize: Çayeli, Pazar, Ardeşen, Fındıklı, Arhavi, and Hopa. During much of the Ottoman period, this area was known as the Province of Lazistan. Today practically all Laz speak Turkish and many can also speak Laz. Although the Laz language has no written literature, certain Laz poets such as Rashid Hilmi and Pehlivanoğlu have been popular.

The Georgians

The Georgians number over 80,000 in Turkey and over two million in the Soviet Union. They boast an ancient political tradition. After the campaigns of Alexander the Great in the 4th century B.C., the Georgians established the Kingdom of Iberia in the area of present-day Batum. But by 65 A.D. Pompey's Roman legions forced the Georgians into dependent status. Roman culture and political influence dominated until the 3rd century A.D. when the Sassanids of Iran gained supremacy over Eastern Georgia, thereby exposing it to Persian culture and the Zoroastrian religion. Later in that same century, Christianity entered the Caucasus region. Neighboring Armenia embraced the religion first; Georgia's conversion soon followed. According to tradition, a captive woman from Cappadocia in Central Anatolia, later known at St. Nino, inspired the conversion in 337 A.D. during the reign of Constantine the Great. During the next six centuries, the Byzantine, Iranian, and Arab empires controlled different parts of Georgia. Georgian national independence began to rise in the 11th century, however, reaching its zenith in the next century under the reign of Queen Tamara (1184-1213). Her domain extended into present-day northeastern Turkey. Unfortunately, the Mongol invasions of the 13th and 14th centuries terminated what historians regard as Georgia's golden age.

During the next several centuries, the Sunni Muslim Ottoman Turks and various Shiite Muslim Iranian dynasties competed for dominance over the

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Transcaucasus region, the area between the Black and Caspian Seas south of the Kuban and Kuma Rivers. For much of this period, the Ottomans controlled the western portion of that region and propagated Sunni Islam among its Georgian and Circassian peoples. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the Adcharian Georgians, whose traditional homeland is now divided between Turkey's Artvin Province and the Georgian republic of the USSR, converted to Islam and began adopting Turkish ways. When Dmitri Kazbey, a Georgian Colonel in the Russian service, visited Adchara in the 19th century, he lamented that Turkish had begun displacing Georgian there as early as 1820.

The eastern Georgians, having remained Christian, allied with the Christian Russians against the Ottomans. As a result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, Russia gained control of Artvin and other parts of Eastern Turkey, causing many Muslim Georgians, who had remained loyal to the Ottomans, to flee to Western Turkey where many resettled in the Bursa area (Magnarella 1979). Shortly after World War I, Turkey regained much of this territory, including a part of Adchara containing dozens of Muslim Georgian villages.

The Turks

Although the Turks arrived last to the eastern Black Sea region under discussion, they soon became its dominant political and cultural force. The Turks originated in inner-Asia. The first written evidence of their language, which belongs to the Altaic family along with Mongolian, dates to the 8th century A.D. runic inscriptions found on steles along the Orkhon River near present-day Ulan Bator, Mongolia. During the ensuing centuries, the famed Turkish horsemen of the Asiatic steppe galloped west, where they found employment under Persian and Arab rulers and became Muslims. They eventually surpassed their employers, as the Seljuk and then the Ottoman dynasties gained military and political prominence.

Prior to the 12th century, Anatolia was predominantly populated by Greeks, Armenians, Laz, and, in the Southeast, Kurds, all ruled from Constantinople, the Byzantine capital. In 1071, a Seljuk prince, named Kılıçarslan, and his Turkish army defeated the Byzantine Emperor Diogenes at Manzikert in eastern Anatolia and thereby opened much of Anatolia to Turkish tribes seeking new homes and pastures. After the Seljuk defeat and social disruptions caused by the 13th and 14th century Mongolian invasions, the Ottomans reorganized the vitality and aggressiveness of the Anatolian Turkic tribes into a supreme military force that conquered Constantinople in 1453 and Trebizond in 1461, thereby extinguishing the Byzantine era.

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The Turks intermarried with the local population, welcomed their conversion to Islam, while tolerating, as Muslims should, the continuation of Christianity. Because the Byzantine Orthodox clergy had been so intolerant of Christian heterodoxy in Anatolia, many Anatolian Christians actually preferred the more permissive rule of the Turks. Although Islam was the dominant religion of the Ottoman Empire, the rights of Christians and Jews to continue the ritualistic and social practices of their religions was recognized and facilitated by the *millet* system. The Ottoman government permitted each millet (ethno-religious community) to elect its own leaders and regulate its own internal socio-religious affairs, such as marriage, divorce, education, church or synagogue maintenance, etc. By the end of the 19th century the Ottoman government had recognized fourteen such millets within the Empire.

Russian expansion and national independence movements in the Balkans during the 19th century combined with World War I to dissolve the multi-national Ottoman Empire. Out of the ruins, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk constructed the present state of Turkey. He immediately embarked on the ambitious project of remaking the country into a modern nation-state in the image of the leading European powers. Secularism and nationalism became two of his guiding principles. He abolished the Caliphate and Sultanate, disestablished Islam as the state religion, and replaced Islamic law with secular European codes. He also promoted the creation of a nationalistic Turkish ideology, which advocated Asia Minor as the ancient Turkish homeland and claimed that all the Muslims people living there--Laz, Georgians, Circassians, Kurds, and others--were really Turks speaking various Turkish dialects. To ensure their full integration as Turkish citizens, these peoples were encouraged to learn "standard Turkish," while instruction and publication in their mother tongues were prohibited. The eventual spread of public primary schools offering compulsory instruction in Turkish, civics, Turkish history, science, and math has largely accomplished Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's nationalistic goal.

Regional Traditions

Over the centuries the folkways of the eastern Black Sea people have blended together to create a special regional character, consisting of cultural elements shared and embellished by Greeks, Armenians, Laz, Georgians, and Turks. They range from the peculiar Black Sea pronunciation of Turkish to the dozens, possibly hundreds, of recipes for preparing *hamsi* (anchovy), the region's favorite fish. They include the popular *horon*, a lively Caucasian style of dance appropriate to the peoples' high spirits. The eastern Black Sea men are known for their dignified demeanor, and the women for their gracious beauty. The region's unique style of slope gardening, emphasizing corn, hazelnut trees, and

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more recently tea, forms another part of the cultural complex. But especially characteristic of the area has been the wanderlust of its men.

Historically the rugged topography had limited agriculture, and alternative land-based industries have been virtually absent. Hence many Black Sea men have had to search abroad for work. Owing to their legendary reputations for seaworthiness and bravery, they were eagerly recruited into the Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman armies and navies. They are still actively sought out by the Turkish navy and merchant marine. Black Sea men have also emigrated to major cities in the Ottoman Empire, Persia, Russia and Poland to work as cooks, bakers, restaurateurs, and pastry chefs. After earning their "fortunes," many have returned to their Black Sea villages to retire. Others have stayed in their newly found homes, establishing families and passing businesses on to their sons. Today every Turkish city and many European ones have at least one bakery, pastry shop or restaurant run by Black Sea men from Turkey.

During his 1932 travels in Turkey's eastern Black Sea region, the European geographer W.R. Rickmers was impressed by how many men there spoke Russian. "Before the war," he explained, "many Lazis earned their living and saved a fortune in Russia as artisans and, above all, as Turkish bakers....On the roads or in the mountain villages I always found someone of whom I could ask questions in Russian" (Rickmers 1934:472).

The Russian experience was not confined to the Laz. During my 1986 visit to Turkey's eastern Black Sea area I found Osman Bey, a 90 year old Hemshin, living in one of the region's historically beautiful wooden chalets, resting on a ridge back in the Pontic foothills. A small boy from the village led me up the steep, twisted path to Osman's home. His 74 year old wife invited me into her kitchen where she served Turkish coffee while Osman narrated the story of his overseas adventures.

In 1914 Osman and two of his brothers sailed together across the Black Sea to Yalta in the Crimea where they joined their uncle who ran a pastry shop there. After a short stay they decided to travel back to Turkey overland through the Balkans. After this sojourn, Osman headed east to Batum and then north to Moscow where for several years he worked as a baker. He estimated there were 3,000 men from Turkey's Black Sea region working in Moscow at the time. They were bakers, cooks, waiters, pastry chefs, and restaurant owners. Between eighty to one hundred Black Sea men formed their own Turkish bakers association. Osman married a Russian woman and looked forward to earning his fortune in Moscow. In 1929, however, Stalin eliminated the private sector and practically all the Black Sea men departed. Osman was forced to leave without his wife. He returned to his Black Sea village and for several years lived with his parents in his present home, a creation of his great grandfather well over a

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century earlier. He married a local woman, who according to custom moved into his paternal home and joined the household's women in their gardening and domestic chores. In 1932 Osman left home again. This time he went to Warsaw, Poland where he ran a pastry shop until 1940 when war conditions forced him to leave. He returned to Turkey and worked in an Istanbul bakery for the next 17 years. Throughout these long periods, he visited his family only briefly and infrequently. His wife, as expected of women in her circumstances, remained in the village, living in Osman's paternal home, gardening his paternal lands, and raising his children. Finally, in 1957, 40 years after his first venture abroad, Osman came home to stay.

People in this village say dozens of men from Osman's generation spent their youth and middle years working abroad. Many, like Osman, went to Yalta, Batum, Moscow, and Warsaw; others traveled southeast to Teheran, Iran. A fortunate few did earn fortunes and returned to the village to build their monumental mansions high above the valley. Osman's 67 year old paternal nephew said his generation stayed in Turkey. His sojourns took him to Trabzon and Istanbul. Now, he too has retired to the village, but his son carries on the tradition by working in Ankara's famous Flamingo Pastry Shop. Today, the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc are closed to Turkish workers. Instead, they go to Saudi Arabia, Western Europe (especially West Germany), and Turkey's metropolises.

Several consequences have flowed from this tradition of emigration, known locally as *gurbet* (Turkish for "exile" or "absence from home"). For one, many Black Sea men have become cosmopolitan without rejecting their Black Sea traditions. They combine a village social ethic and a staunch Islamic religiosity with an admirable entrepreneurial spirit. Consequently, they have become famous throughout Turkey as trustworthy, industrious, venturesome, and capable businessmen. In addition to their typical bakery pursuits, Black Sea men have become conspicuously successful outside their region in Turkey's transportation, shipping, commercial retailing, urban real estate, and finance sectors. Turkey's most famous capital broker, known as "Banker Kastelli," is a Black Sea Laz from Kastel village, who mastered Turkey's capital investment market without ever completing high school.

The traditional community and family systems in the eastern Black Sea region ingeniously preserved local values while readying boys for the world beyond the village. In the past, especially, women lived out their lives within village confines and functioned as the primary preservers of local culture. As children, they grew up in the close company of their mothers, who taught them all the domestic skills: cooking local specialty dishes, maintaining a harmonious and hospitable home, attending to the wishes of elders, and gardening. As young wives they moved into the villages, if not the homes, of their in-laws. They

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often raised their children while their husbands worked away from the village. They taught their children their mother tongues, a work ethic, and all the social virtues they acquired from their own mothers.

Unlike girls, boys grow up and eventually retire in the homes and villages of their fathers and fathers' fathers. As children, they learned vicariously about the outer world from the adventures of the village's well-traveled men. They eagerly listened to their grandfathers narrate stories of life, work, and struggle in other countries or in Turkey's major cities. They anxiously waited for the periodic visits of their own fathers or uncles then working in some distant place. These men brought back the latest news of life beyond. When a new generation left the village, their paths had already been smoothed by the knowledge and accomplishments of their predecessors. As young men, they ventured out into the world fortified by their mothers' social graces, their male elders' instructive narratives, and a wanderlust tradition.

Regional Change

The eastern Black Sea region has experienced accelerating change over the past twenty years. Formerly, the area's rugged terrain made east-west travel long and arduous at best. Back in 1835, the British Consul, James Brant, had to journey from Trabzon to Batum by boat because no coastal road existed. With the exception of Trabzon, he found no towns along the way. Surmene, Rize, Pazar, and Hopa were merely "spots" for weekly bazaars or markets. This situation continued with slight change until the late 1950s, when Rize began to evolve into Turkey's tea capital. Today, all the "spots" are growing towns, enjoying the area's new prosperity.

Determined to develop its nascent tea and forestry industries, the government eventually built a hard-surfaced coastal road and a number of serviceable dirt roads south into the Pontic forests. Agricultural extension agents fanned out over the region, teaching villagers the techniques of growing tea for market, while the government Tea Bank offered the further inducement of easy credits for initial tea plantings and cultivation. By the 1980s, practically every villager that could grow tea was doing so. Over the past decades the domestic and export market demand for Turkish tea has grown steadily. In 1966, the Turkish government tea monopoly operated 22 tea factories in the eastern Black Sea region. By 1986 the number had more than doubled. In addition, with the recent cessation of the government's monopoly, several private companies have also opened factories in the region. These factories not only buy all the tea villagers can produce, they also offer about 30,000 jobs to local men, enabling them to stay in the region and spend more time with their families.

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In the past, most village women gardened exclusively to produce food for home consumption. The small proportion of households with extensive landholdings also grew hazelnuts for market. Tea production has significantly altered that situation. Today, every household with as little as two acres of land can produce enough food and tea to meet most home consumption and expense needs. Women, the traditional family gardeners, have become income earners. They have achieved a new economic status.

As the region prospered, practically all the villages became electrified and many rural families bought television sets. Almost every village built a primary school and most got easy access to middle and high school over the new roads. By 1985, the area's literacy rate had climbed to 75%, and the number of rural middle and high school graduates, especially females, had risen dramatically.

During my 1986 visit I witnessed a consequence of these changes first hand. While I was climbing one of those fatiguing hillside paths, ubiquitous to Black Sea villages, two beautiful young women, carrying heavy loads on their backs, gracefully passed me in the opposite direction. They cheerfully greeted me as though they were on a Sunday stroll. Later that same day, I met them in their parents' home. From all outward appearances, they were traditional rural women, living with their parents, carrying out domestic chores in typical village dress. But, they were also high school graduates. They were part of a new generation of rural women, who, with their parents encouragement, took advantages of today's educational opportunities. Everyone was proud of their achievements, but somewhat perplexed as to what was next. Their educational success had created a dilemma: neither the village nor the regional towns were ready to accommodate large numbers of educated women. Aside from some teachers and, more recently, bank clerks, women did not work in the public domain. The new woman is educated, more extensively traveled, and increasingly aware of the world beyond her village. She still possesses all the graciousness of her mother, but whether she will be content to live her mother's lifestyle is still an open question.

While the region has enjoyed economic and educational gains, it has incurred cultural losses as well. An evolving standard Turkish culture and language have been displacing local tongues and folkways. For at least a generation, men have dropped the region's traditional dress in favor of the European clothes worn throughout Turkey. Women have been making this transformation at a much slower pace. Probably only 5 per cent of today's younger descendants of local Armenians or Greeks can speak their ancestors' mother tongues. For Laz and Georgians, the proportion is much higher--probably above 60 per cent. None of the present-day Laz or Georgian speakers can read those languages, however. Without access to formal instruction, books or newspapers in those languages, speakers cannot acquire the new words

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necessary to express modern concepts. Hence, the number of persons able to speak the region's historic languages continues to decline at an accelerating rate.

But the Black Sea people do not dwell on these cultural displacements. During my 1986 visit I met no one who lamented the on-going language loss. Apparently, the people generally think of themselves primarily as Turks, rather than as minorities cut off from fellow ethnics in other parts of the world. They regard their region's greater integration with the rest of Turkey as a positive development. I also noticed no discrimination against eastern Black Sea people by the majority Turkish population. To the contrary, the Black Sea people are admired for their patriotism, honesty, and coping spirit.

The eastern Black Sea region constitutes a unique piece of our world's cultural mosaic. Like many other special pieces, however, it is undergoing the sort of change typically produced by the homogenizing forces of state nationalism.

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THE HEMSHIN OF TURKEY: YAYLA, A PASTURE IN THE CLOUDS

Owing to its Ottoman past, when peoples from the Middle East, North Africa, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia became part of the sultan's empire, Turkey has enjoyed a rich cultural diversity. Currently, however, the forces of modernization are eliminating many distinctive cultural practices, producing a more uniform society. One region that has recently come under the pressure of change is Turkey's northeast corner.

The eastern Black Sea coastal district, extending from Trabzon to Hopa and south to the often misty Pontic mountain range, has historically been home to Greeks, Laz, Armenians and Georgians. It has also attracted conquering Romans, Russians, and Turks. In pre-Christian times the region was known as Lazia. From 14 A.D. to 117 A.D., the ruling Romans called it "Lesser Armenia." Later it became part of the Eastern Roman and then Byzantine Empire, and was governed from Constantinople. In 1205, a year after the Fourth Crusaders conquered Constantinople, Lazia was joined to the separate Byzantine Kingdom of Trebizond (now spelled "Trabzon"). This Kingdom lasted until the Ottoman Turks conquered it in 1461. Up until the 1950s, many of the region's residents still referred to the coastal towns by their old Laz and Greek names, rather than by their new Turkish ones. Hence, Çayeli was called Mapavri, Pazar was Atina, and Fındıklı was Viçe.

The area's verdant splendor contrasts sharply with the brown aridity of the Anatolian plateau further south. The Pontic Mountains, with peaks reaching 10,000-14,000 feet within only 20-45 miles of the Black Sea, insulate the green coast from the dry hinterland. The mountains' seaward slopes host a virgin forest of beech, birch, maple, chestnut, oak, poplar, elm, willow and fir at their lower elevations. Up about 3,500 feet these deciduous trees mingle for a short interval with pine woods, which then climb in solitude to 6,300 feet. The forests provide habitats to deer, bears, wild pigs as well as to wolves, fox, martens and a wide variety of birds. Short rivers descending to the sea have carved out deep ravines that historically made east-west travel by land nearly impossible. Responding to these environmental challenges, the inhabitants have constructed camel-back bridges over many of the rivers, and spaciously beautiful wooden chalets that

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adorn valley ridges and high mountain slopes, accessible only by steep, narrow winding paths that discourage all but local residents.

The Hemshin People

The people known locally as Hemshinler (sing., Hemshin) make up one component of the region's cultural mosaic. Their history goes back to the eras of Byzantine and Ottoman rule when a large number of Christian Armenians lived in eastern Asia Minor between the Pontic Mountains to the north and the Taurus chain to the south. Owing to the wars and anarchy of the 19th and early 20th centuries, most of these Armenians fled or were driven east to the Caucasus region or south into Syria. An Islamized, Turkified Armenian population, called Hemshinler, remained on the northern slopes of the Pontic mountains in northeastern Turkey.

According to the Armenian historian Levond, the ancestors of these Armenians settled there during the time of Emperor Constantine IV (780-797). Clavijo, a Spaniard who traveled through the area in 1405, wrote that the Christian Armenians there had become dissatisfied with their ruler (probably the Byzantine Emperor at Trebizond) and voluntarily submitted to the Muslim lord of Ispir, a city just to the south of the Pontic range. Consequently, the Lord of Ispir sent them a Muslim governor accompanied by a Christian deputy. Historian A. Bryer notes that an early sixteenth century register listed 457 Christian and 214 Muslim households in the Kaza (sub-province) of Hemshin. Bryer describes this as an exceptionally high Muslim proportion for this part of the Pontos, where the normal ratio of Christians to Muslims was about ten to one. The Russian census of 1926 listed 629 Hemshinler in a village just south of Hopa, near the present Soviet border. The French philologist, Georges Dumezil, in his study of the Armenian language of the Hemshinler, claims some of these people converted to Islam in the 18th century (Meeker 1971). Eventually, all became Muslims.

Today, several thousand Turkish-speaking residents of the upper valleys south of Pazar, Ardeşen, and Hopa still call themselves and are referred to as Hemshinler. In this area, two towns—Hemshin and Çamlı Hemshin—carry the people's historic name. In 1986, several Hemshin told me of their combined Armenian and Turkish ancestry, but they claimed only the Hemshin living south of Hopa still speak Armenian. None of these people was probably ever literate in Armenian. In physical appearance they resemble others in the area. Only the women distinguish themselves by wearing a unique head dress, consisting of two scarves, a dark *pushi* beneath a colorful *shar*.

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The Eastern Black Sea People

Over the centuries the folkways of the eastern Black Sea people have blended together to create a special regional character. This recognizable character consists of cultural elements shared and embellished by Greeks, Armenians, Laz, Georgians, and Turks. They range from the peculiar Black Sea pronunciation of Turkish to the dozens, possibly hundreds, of recipes for preparing *hamsi* (anchovy), the region's favorite fish. They include the popular *horon*, a lively Caucasian style of dance appropriate to the peoples' high spirits. The eastern Black Sea men are known for their dignified demeanor, and the women for their gracious beauty and industry. The region's unique style of slope gardening, emphasizing corn, hazelnut trees, and now tea, forms another part of the cultural complex. But especially characteristic of the area has been the wanderlust of its men and the hardworking, loyal nature of their women.

Historically the rugged topography limited agriculture, and alternative land-based industries were virtually absent. Hence many Black Sea men had to search abroad for work. Owing to their legendary reputations for seaworthiness and bravery, they were eagerly recruited into the Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman armies and navies. They are still actively sought out by the Turkish navy and merchant marine. Black Sea men have also emigrated to major cities in the Ottoman Empire, Persia, Russia and Poland to work as cooks, bakers, restaurateurs, and pastry chefs. After earning their "fortunes," many have returned to their Black Sea villages to retire. Others have stayed in their newly found homes, establishing families and passing businesses on to their sons. Today every Turkish city and many European ones have at least one bakery, pastry shop or restaurant run by Black Sea men from Turkey.

During his 1932 travels in Turkey's eastern Black Sea region, the European geographer W.R. Rickmers was impressed by how many men there spoke Russian. He wrote that, "Whoever knows Russian can travel without an interpreter. On the roads or in the mountain villages I always found some one of whom I could ask questions in Russian." He explained that, "Before the war, many Lazis earned their living and saved a fortune in Russia as artisans and, above all, as Turkish bakers."

The Hemshinler also shared the Russian experience. In fact several Hemshin bakers told me their ancestors essentially learned the baking trade in Russia, and brought it back to Turkey where they taught it to younger generations. People from the valley of Çamlı Hemshin say dozens of their grandfathers spent their youths and middle years working abroad in places like Yalta, Batum, Moscow, Warsaw and Teheran, Iran. A fortunate few earned fortunes and returned to their villages to build monumental mansions high above the valley. Today, the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc are closed to Turkish

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workers. Instead, they go to Saudi Arabia, Western Europe (especially West Germany), and Turkey's larger cities.

Several consequences have flowed from this tradition of emigration, known locally as *gurbet* (Turkish for "exile" or "absence from home"). For one, many Black Sea men have become cosmopolitan without rejecting their Black Sea traditions. They combine a village social ethic and a staunch Islamic religiosity with an admirable entrepreneurial spirit. Consequently, they have become famous throughout Turkey as trustworthy, industrious, venturesome, and capable businessmen. In addition to their typical bakery pursuits, Black Sea men have become conspicuously successful outside their region in Turkey's transportation, shipping, commercial retailing, urban real estate, and construction.

The traditional community and family systems in the eastern Black Sea region ingeniously preserved local values while readying boys for the world beyond the village. In the past, especially, women stayed home and functioned as the primary preservers of local culture. As children, they grew up in the close company of their mothers, who taught them all the domestic skills: cooking local specialty dishes, maintaining a harmonious and hospitable home, attending to the wishes of elders, gardening, and living in the high pastures. As young wives they moved into the villages, if not the homes, of their in-laws. They often raised their children while their husbands worked away from the village. They taught their children their mother tongues, a work ethic, and all the social virtues they acquired from their own mothers.

Unlike girls, boys grew up and eventually retired in the homes and villages of their fathers and fathers' fathers. As children, they learned vicariously about the outer world from the adventures of the village's well-traveled men. They eagerly listened to their grandfathers narrate stories of life, work, and struggle in other countries or in Turkey's major cities. They anxiously waited for the periodic visits of their own fathers or uncles then working in some distant place. These men brought back the latest news of life beyond. When a new generation left the village, their paths had already been smoothed by the knowledge and accomplishments of their predecessors. As young men, they ventured out into the world fortified by their mothers' social graces, their male elders' instructive narratives, and a wanderlust tradition.

Gardening and Transhumant Pastoralism

While the men worked away, their loyal women kept the home fires burning. With only limited help from males, they raised the children, kept up the home, farmed the land, and cared for the livestock. Historically, the Laz

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farmed the lower valleys and narrow alluvial fans of the area's rivers, while the Hemshinler farmed the upper valleys. These peoples developed a form of steep slope agriculture, growing cabbage, beans, squash, lettuce, corn, onions, hazel nuts, pears, plums, and, more recently, tea. Some of the gardens incline so sharply, cultivators reportedly have to secure themselves with rope to trees above or risk slipping into the deep ravines. Corn, a significant staple used for making the area's special bread, entered the region in the 17th century. Tea, today's most important cash crop, became popular only in the last thirty years. Tea cultivation is enhanced by the mist and clouds that snuggle into the ravines and mingle with the forests lending a mystical, Brigadoon quality to the entire scene. The region's building designs and agrarian technology differ markedly from the square, adobe brick homes and the dry plateau agriculture of Anatolia. The Laz and the Hemshinler also build distinctively beautiful wooden *seranders*, small corn storage buildings raised on poles.

The Hemshinler combined gardening with transhumant pastoralism, which involves grazing small herds of sheep, goat and cattle on the lowlands in the winter and in the high Pontic pastures in the summer. Every spring, each Hemshin family had to divide itself into two work teams composed predominantly of wives, mothers, and daughters. One team stayed home in the village preparing the ground and doing the spring planting. The other took the animals up to the mountain pastures (Turkish *yayla*, Hemshin Armenian *lere*).

In May, just before spring planting, some of the Hemshin women and their daughters with the help of young boys and a few men, traditionally drove their cattle, sheep and goats up the mountain along a steep winding path to the place called Ayder, laying on a northern slope of the Kaçkar range, about fourteen miles from their villages. They choose Ayder, in part, because of its natural hot and cold water springs. There, at an elevation of about 2,000 meters, their ancestors had constructed small, sturdy wooden houses with exteriors of oak and interiors of pine, both kinds of trees taken from the surrounding forest. They lived in these small wooden houses together and grazed their animals for about a month. Upon arrival, they planted corn, potatoes, pole beans, and cucumbers in little gardens next to their homes. Come August, these vegetables would constitute an important part of their food supply.

They also installed barrel-shaped hives high up in huge beech trees to facilitate the collection of honey from the bees who spend their summers extracting nectar from the wide variety of rhododendron adorning the mountainside. British mountaineer, Denis Hills, wrote that the honey from the Pontic slopes is notorious, known as "poison honey" or as the Turks say, "crazy honey" (*deli bal*), because of its intoxicating powers. Back in the fourth century B.C. the Greek warrior, Xenophon, reported that his soldiers got terribly drunk on Pontic honey, becoming totally incapacitated for about a day. The

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Hemshinler admit their honey can intoxicate the uninitiated, but explain that by boiling and storing it for a time, the honey is rendered harmless.

In June, when the snows on the higher slopes have melted, the family units again divided. Some members stayed in Ayder to tend the gardens, collect honey, and act as communication links between the permanent villages below and the other family members who drove the animals to higher pastures. Traditionally, the men made these migrations on horse or mule; the women, however, walked because the Hemshinler considered it shameful for them to mount an animal.

One of the higher yaylas, called Kavrun, sits well above timberline at an elevation of about 2,500 meters and lies at the end of a three and one-half mile trek from Ayder. Denis Hills, visited this yayla in 1962. He described it as "a wide triangle of well watered pastures sheltering below the south-western edge of the great Kaçkar massif. Here two hundred crude stone and wooden shanties close-packed along a stream serve as a temporary summer village..." The Hemshin pastoralists were surprised to see him, a foreigner, in their "most private haunts." They told Hilis that the last foreign visitor—an Austrian geologist—to visit their yayla had appeared in the 1930s.

As the weather warmed, Hemshin boys took the animals to even higher elevations for fresh grazing. But every night they brought them back down to the temporary summer village for protection against wolves and bears. In the pre-dawn morning, the women milked the cows and ewes before the boys again drove them to the upper pastures. During the day, the women and girls were busy in and around the settlement. They had to fetch water from the nearby stream and firewood from the forest below. Even today, a common sight is young women with heavy loads of wood on their backs trekking up the steep path to their yayla homes. The women also made cream, yogurt, and cheese, which they periodically sent to their family members living in Ayder and the permanent villages below. In return, they brought back, or their kin carried up, corn meal and vegetables. One of the yayla specialty dishes is a cheese cornbread, baked over a small wood stove.

Once the planting in the permanent villages below was finished, more family members, especially girls and women, ascended to the yayla to spend some time visiting relatives in the cool highlands. Their arrival was treated as a festive occasion, with singing, music, and dancing. They would stay until tea-cutting time required their labor in the village gardens below.

The yayla retains a fairyland quality about it, with its small wooden shelters clustered together above the clouds; the women and girls move about in their colorful dresses, some spinning yarn from sheep's wool on ancient hand

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spindles, others knitting the colorful socks for which the region is famous, all engaging in animated conversation. For the yayla dwellers, the Kaçkar mountains are full of spirits (*jinler* and *piriler*) who emerge at night, taking the form of animals or humans with their legs on backwards. The Hemshinler avoid these disguised spirits, who try to beguile them, by staying in their wooden shelters at night, huddled around the wood stove, sharing warmth and conviviality.

In late September or early October, when the weather turns cold and the grass stops growing, the Hemshinler would round up their animals, close up their shelters for another season, and descended to Ayder. There they would be greeted by their relatives and friends, and together they engaged in a colorful "Farewell to the Yayla" festival, with singing, horon dancing, and *tulum* (bagpipe) music. With the culmination of this event, both joyful and sad, the Hemshinler closed up their summer homes in Ayder and returned to their villages to spend the long, damp winter, reminiscing about their summer haven above the clouds.

The Changing Scene

Inevitably, such an idyllic world is transformed by development and prosperity. During my summer 1988 visit to Ayder, I learned that for some years it had been connected by daily bus service to the coastal city of Pazar. Life in Ayder appeared to be dominated by over a dozen modest hotels catering to native and foreign tourists who wanted to hike on the mountain trails, bathe in the hot springs, or simply enjoy the cool, clean mountain air. Some of the hotels are built of wood in the traditional style; others are built of cinder blocks. Many Hemshin families who formerly went to Ayder to participate in the pastoral transhumant complex, now go to operate hotels, restaurants, and small stores, catering to the several thousand tourists who visit each summer.

The formerly distance government has also become intimately involved in Ayder's transformation. The Ministry of Public Works, hoping to exploit the medicinal reputation of the hot springs to its maximum touristic potential, was constructing in the heart of Ayder a cement monstrosity with over one hundred private bath rooms. The Forestry Department has built dirt roads extending beyond Ayder into the forest to facilitate timber hauling. These roads now make it possible to travel by truck or jeep to the vicinity of some of the yaylas. Consequently, many of the pastoralists have discarded their horses and mules, figuring they were no longer necessary.

My 1988 visit to Kavrun yayla also revealed a much changed situation. This temporary settlement is now greatly diminished in size. Rather than the 200

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wooden shanties observed by Hills in 1962, there are only about sixty, and not all were inhabited. The rest have fallen into disrepair and disuse, or had burnt down and were never rebuilt. Their locations are still marked by bare stone foundations. Far fewer families now participate in the yayla migration.

Life in the yayla is now sustained by a limited number of elderly women who have been making the spring migration since childhood. Still willing to live under primitive conditions, without plumbing, phone or electricity, these women, wise in the circumstances and lore of the mountain, represent a passing generation, one not to be replicated. Their young female helpers--granddaughters and nieces--join them in the summer for several weeks at a time, as if visiting a mountain retreat on vacation. Unlike their grandmothers and great aunts, these girls are literate. They attend school the rest of the year, and many reside in urban areas. One of the young ladies I met in the yayla, living with her grandmother in a wooden shanty, spends the rest of the year in Ankara, Turkey's capital, studying at Middle East Technical University. She plans to become an engineer, not a village peasant.

The future of this yayla will be determined by government planners. The Ministry of Tourism has chosen Kavrun as the site of a future ski operation. Already in 1988, the ministry had extended the forestry road to Kavrun and was planning the location of ski lifts. Within a few years, this "private haunt" may become the winter playground of native and European skiers as well as a favorite summer spot for hikers and campers.

Yayla life is a passing phenomenon because the economies of the cities and villages below have changed. The eastern Black Sea region has undergone a major transformation in the past twenty years. Formerly, the area's rugged terrain made east-west travel long and arduous at best. Back in 1835, the British Consul, James Brant, had to journey from Trabzon to Batum by boat because no coastal road existed. With the exception of Trabzon, he found no towns along the way. Surmene, Rize, Pazar, and Hopa were merely "spots" for weekly bazaars or markets. He described A'tenah (i.e., Pazar, the closest city to Çamlı Hemshin) as "a very insignificant place." This situation continued with slight change until the late 1950s, when Rize began to evolve into Turkey's tea capital. Today, all the "spots" are growing towns, enjoying the area's new prosperity.

Determined to develop its nascent tea and forestry industries, the government eventually built a hard-surfaced coastal road and a number of serviceable dirt roads south into the Pontic forests. Agricultural extension agents fanned out over the region, teaching villagers the techniques of growing tea for market, while the government Tea Bank offered the further inducement of easy credits for initial tea plantings and cultivation. By the 1980s, practically every villager that could grow tea was doing so. Over the past decades the domestic

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and export market demand for Turkish tea has grown steadily. In 1966, the Turkish government tea monopoly operated 22 tea factories in the eastern Black Sea region. By 1986 the number had more than doubled. In addition, with the recent cessation of the government's monopoly, several private companies have also opened factories in the region.

In the past, most village women gardened exclusively to produce food for home consumption. The small proportion of households with extensive land holdings also grew hazelnuts for market. Tea production has significantly altered that situation. Today, every household with as little as two acres of land can produce enough food and tea to meet most home consumption and expense needs. Women, the traditional family gardeners, have become income earners, and consequently they have achieved higher economic status. With the enhanced profitability of tea production, most farm families devote more of their land to tea plants and less to other crops and animals. The care of tea plants, tea harvesting, hauling and sales require more family members to stay in the village all summer.

At the same time that village labor requirements are increasing, better educational opportunities and alternative job opportunities are becoming available in the nearby cities. Due to the recent prosperity of the region, largely from tea production and overseas workers' remittances, the coastal cities are absorbing new investments. In addition to the tea factories, construction projects and new industries offer residents attractive employment options. With improved roads, village children have easy access to schools beyond the elementary grades. The area's literacy rate has jumped to about 75 per cent, and with expanded rural electrification during the past decade, many village homes now contain television sets and convenience appliances. Currently, most families find the intensive labor demands of animal husbandry and transhumant pastoralism too time consuming and unprofitable. Today's youngsters, who want to spend future summers in the mountains, will probably do so as tour guides, rather than as shepherds.

The annual spring migration to the mountain, the summer stay in the high yayla, and the festive fall return to the low lands comprised an important part of the Hemshin annual round of life and folkloric cycle. Hemshinler, young and old, speak with youthful enthusiasm or ripe nostalgia about their days in the pastures above the clouds. These noble people realize, however, they are describing a time with few tomorrows.

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ST. NICHOLAS
IN CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM LANDS

Saint Nicholas, a fourth century figure born in Asia Minor, the land now occupied by Turkey, is one of Christendom's most popular saints. He is commemorated in both the Roman Catholic and eastern Orthodox Churches and associated with the celebration of Christmas. Whereas most patron saints are specialists, Nicholas is a generalist, being the protector of maidens, children, sailors, bankers, pawnbrokers, merchants, sailors, charitable fraternities and guilds and of cities as diverse as Fribourg and Moscow. The story of this widely venerated saint crosses continents and oceans, traveling from the place of his birth in Asia Minor, through Europe and Asia and to the New World. Interestingly, in contemporary Muslim Turkey, where Nicholas is affectionately known as *Noel Baba* or Father Noel, his legends and fame are not only preserved, but enhanced.

The story of this widely venerated and popular saint takes one across continents and oceans, from the place of his birth, throughout Europe and Asia, to the New World, and back again to the point of departure.

The historic and mythic Nicholas

Nicholas was born to rich and pious parents around 300 AD in Patara, on the southwestern Mediterranean coast of Asia Minor. He spent most of his life in the nearby community of Myra, located about eighty-five miles southwest of the present-day Turkish city of Antalya. Both Patara and Myra had been part of ancient Lycia, a district whose warriors took part in the Trojan War during the thirteenth century B.C. Myra had been an important ancient Lycian port city. Its name derives from myrrh, a sweet smelling resin obtained from shrubs which are abundant in the area. It may also have been a holy city during the ancient era, for its mountainside is honeycombed with rock tombs from that period. The Romans had conquered Myra in 42 BC., and it was still part of the Roman Empire when Nicholas was born.

Reportedly, Nicholas (his name meant "victory") was destined for greatness from the very beginning. There is a legend of how as a baby he stood

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up in a tub during his first bath. In his early years, Nicholas showed signs of piety, fasting even in infancy and learning all he could about the holy scripture. His parents died when he was still young. Instead of indulging in his rich inheritance, he gave much of it away to the needy. According to legend, when the bishop of Myra died, other bishops gathered in the local church, fasting and praying to god to help them choose a proper successor. One night the senior bishop had a vision in which a divine voice instructed him that the first person named Nicholas who entered the church the next morning should be made bishop. The next morning, the boy Nicholas entered the church and to his surprise was proclaimed the new bishop of Myra. This legendary event, which was one of the most celebrated episodes in the Medieval Christian calendar, presumably occurred during the reign of the Roman Emperor Diocletian (A.D. 285-305).

Nicholas' tenure as bishop began when Asia Minor was still in the process of being Christianized. In the region of Myra, Nicholas had to contend with the popular cult of the Greek goddess Artemis. One legend credits Bishop Nicholas with destroying Artemis' beautiful Lycian temple. Through time, the descendants of the early Christians enhanced Nicholas' legacy by attributing to him the powers of some pre-Christian gods. For example, some scholars believe that after Christianity supplanted the ancient Greek cults, Nicholas took the place of Poseidon and became legendary for his miraculous rescue of ships and seamen in distress.

The lore of St. Nicholas consists of certain precocious feats, a series of beneficent deeds, and about twenty miracles whereby he helped people in distress, either during his lifetime or through his intervention after death. One of the legends, still alive in Turkey and popular throughout Europe, concerns Nicholas and three destitute maidens. While still a young man and before becoming bishop, Nicholas learned of a poor nobleman with three daughters, who could not marry because their father lacked the resources necessary to provide them with dowries (a Greek custom). To qualify them for marriage and thereby save them from a life of prostitution, Nicholas secretly threw three bags of gold through their window on three successive nights. In paintings of the saint, Italian artists have transformed the three bags of gold into three golden balls, usually carried on a bible in Bishop Nicholas' left hand. Italy's most famous banking family, the Medici, used the saint's symbol of the three golden spheres on its coat of arms. Subsequently, other bankers and pawnbrokers appropriated the symbol, and Nicholas became the patron saint of bankers and pawnbrokers, as well as of maidens. Contemporary Turks tell this story to emphasize both charity and humility. They are especially impressed with Nicholas' intention to remain anonymous and not garner any credit for his good deeds.

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Another popular legend depicted in Christian art has Nicholas saving his community from starvation. Bishop Nicholas convinced captains of grain ships destined for Alexandria that even if they gave a large part of their corn cargo to Myra, they would still find enough on their ships to deliver to their final destination. The corn saved the people of Myra, and the ships were miraculously replenished at sea before they completed their journey.

A French legend, originally unknown in the Byzantine world of Asia Minor and Greece, credits Nicholas with miraculously reviving three students that an inn-keeper had killed and dismembered. Some European paintings depict this legend with St. Nicholas standing before three small, male nudes in a tub. This alleged miracle made St. Nicholas the patron saint of students.

Nicholas' fame and legend spread

Many of the legendary events in Nicholas' life were illustrated in religious icons that Christians used to adorn their churches and stimulate prayer. During the Byzantine iconoclastic period (726-843), however, some Christians went on a rampage, destroying all the icons and images of saints they could lay their hands on. Fortunately, some of the oldest and best icons of St. Nicholas and other saints survived this destructive mania in the remote monastery of St. Catherine at Mount Sinai in present-day Egypt. Safely located within Muslim Arab jurisdiction, away from the Christian iconoclasts, the monks of St. Catherine saved their monastery and icons. They even claimed that their monastery had been given special protective status by the Prophet Mohammed, himself.

According to chronicles, Nicholas made the pilgrimage to the Holy Land, participated in the Council of Nicaea in 325 as bishop, and died in Myra circa 353. The first local church of St. Nicholas was built around his tomb in the sixth century. In 1043, the Byzantine Emperor Constantine IX and Empress Zoe had it rebuilt. The name, Nicholas, which had been uncommon before the fourth century, became increasingly popular thereafter. Myra, now part of the Turkish town of Demre, became known throughout Christendom as the city of St. Nicholas.

During the reign of Justinian in the sixth century, the cult of St. Nicholas spread to other parts of the Roman Empire and a church was dedicated to him in Constantinople. By the ninth century, his cult was in full bloom throughout Byzantium, the successor to the Eastern Roman Empire. His legends and miracles were fully recorded in the sacred literature of the time. From the tenth century onward, people, villages, churches and monasteries were named after him. His fame radiated out from Constantinople. The Orthodox Christians of

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Syria, Palestine and Egypt, who like those of Constantinople spoke Greek, adopted the saint from Myra as one of their own. In the ninth century, the patriarch of Antioch was named Nicholas; in the tenth century a Nicholas was the Patriarch of Alexandria, Egypt, and in the eleventh century there was a St. Nicholas Church in Bethlehem. The Russians, who accepted Orthodox Christianity from the Byzantine Greeks, made Nicholas the patron saint of their country. When the Greeks won independence for their own state in the nineteenth century, they did the same. There most probably will be a vigorous revival of St. Nicholas in post-Soviet Russia.

Although there were references to St. Nicholas in the holy literature of France and Germany during the ninth century, reverence for the saint spread and deepened from the tenth century on after the marriage of the Byzantine princess Theophano in 972 to the German King Otto II. The flurry of church dedications in Europe after the wedding evince that St. Nicholas, so popular in Byzantium, had become a favorite in northern and western Europe as well.

Following the defeat of the Byzantine army by the Seljuk Turks in 1071 at Manzikert in eastern Anatolia, Christians in Europe feared that the relics of their saints in Asia Minor were endangered by the invading and settling Muslim Turks. Consequently, a group of merchants from southern Italy raided St. Nicholas' tomb in 1087 and smuggled some of his bones back to Bari, a town on the southern Adriatic coast of Italy, where in 1197 the now famous Church of San Nicola di Bari was built to enshrine them. The church became a famous pilgrimage site, first used by the crusaders on their way to and from the Holy Land. Bari's attachment to St. Nicholas preceded these events, however. Until 1071, when it was conquered by Robert Guiscard, the Norman, Bari had been part of the Byzantine Empire. From 1035 to 1062 the Archbishop of Bari was a Greek named Nicholas, who had had two St. Nicholas churches built at his own expense.

Soon after the transfer of St. Nicholas' remains, the number of Italian churches built or renamed in his honor multiplied. From 1087 to the end of the thirteenth century, seventy-four additional St. Nicholas churches appeared in southern Italy, about fifty-six in Rome and central Italy, and approximately fifty in Venice and northern Italy.

Saint to Santa Claus

From 1200 to 1600, over twelve hundred European churches were dedicated to St. Nicholas, and December 6 was adopted as the date of his birth. The legends of his life and miracles were preserved by writers in *The Lives of the Saints*. His feast day, December 6, was celebrated throughout Medieval

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Europe. On December 5, students in various communities chose one of their number to become the Boy Bishop, in commemoration of their patron saint. The chosen student performed his bishop's duties on December 28, Holy Innocents' Day, which commemorates the murder of innocent children by Herod of Ascalon. On Innocents' Day, the boys performed mass and the Boy Bishop delivered the sermon. The medieval intellect interwove St. Nicholas' legends to pattern this ritual celebration connecting students, St. Nicholas, the Boy Bishop and the Holy Innocents. Claiming that this ritual inversion too often resulted in youthful disrespect for church elders, the latter had the custom abolished in all of Europe by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In December of 1985, however, the St. Nicholas parish of Bournemouth, England revived this medieval tradition by naming a ten-year old Boy Bishop of the congregation.

The custom of an adult dressing as St. Nicholas and giving small presents and sweets to children on December 6th also began in the Middle Ages. Today, the practice continues in the Catholic parts of Germany, Switzerland, northern France, Belgium and Protestant Holland. In the more northern parts of Europe, the gift giver often dressed in furs. In Germany he was called Pelznickel (*pelz* meaning "fur," and *nickel* being a shortened form of Nicholas). The Pennsylvania Dutch still refer to him by this name. Somehow *Christkindel*, the German for Christ child, became Kriss Kringle, another name for Santa Claus in the United States. Because many Protestants were opposed to the Catholic cult of saints, they associated gift giving with Christ and Christmas Eve, rather than December 6th.

The fame of St. Nicholas traveled to the New World with Dutch settlers, who built their first church on Manhattan in 1642 and dedicated it to Sinter Klas. They continued to celebrate December 6th as the Saint's day; someone dressed as the Bishop, rode a white horse, and distributed gifts to children in the company of Black Peter, the bugaboo who punished naughty children. When the British took control of New Amsterdam, they merged the Dutch celebration with their customs associated with Father Christmas and the birth of Christ on December 25.

Santa Claus, as we know him today, sprang from a popular poem penned by Clement C. Moore in 1823. Moore's "Visit from Saint Nicholas" depicted the Saint as a chubby and plump, right jolly old elf with twinkling eyes, rosy cheeks, with a nose like a cherry and a beard as white as snow, with a sleigh full of toys and eight tiny reindeer. The most lasting visual images of Santa Claus were created by the great American illustrator, Thomas Nast, for the December issues of *Harper's Magazine* in 1863 and 1864. Moore's poem and Nast's illustrations captured the hearts of the American people, and Santa became a key element of American culture to be commercialized by stores and gift producers around the country. In his modern, American form, Santa was exported back to Europe and

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to other parts of the globe after World War II. Today, the jolly old elf, no different than the one sitting with children on his lap at New York's Macy's, is found in the center of Demre, Turkey, on December 6th, distributing sweets and gifts to the town's Muslim children.

A Christian-Islamic saint

How and why does this Christian saint still hold a prominent place in the hearts and minds of some Turks? The answer is found in the historical experience of cultural assimilation involving both Christians and Muslims.

Muslim Turks began settling around Myra in the thirteenth century. They took up residence beside the Christian Greeks already there. According to Islamic teaching, Christians are "people of the book," that is, followers of the bible and worshippers of the same god that Muslims revere. Therefore, Muslims should not hinder Christians in their religious practices. Although orthodox Islamic doctrine opposes the concept of saints, many Muslim Turks in Anatolia adopted existing Christian Greek customs and beliefs concerning the power and holiness of saintly tombs. Muslims, like their Christian neighbors, regularly visited the tombs of saints or holy persons and through ritual and prayer beseeched the holy spirits to ensure bountiful harvests, cure their ill, and protect their children.

During the Ottoman period, rural Muslims also shared in the lore of Christian saints, especially the most important local ones, like St. Nicholas. They learned some of the saintly legends and repeated them to their children in order to stress the virtues of generosity, honesty, and humility. Many Greeks became Muslim while remaining Christian and shared in the Islamic ritual and lore of their Turkish neighbors.

Some of the Islamic Sufi orders had a close affinity to Christianity in Anatolia and the Balkans during Ottoman times. Unlike strictly orthodox Muslims, the Sufis developed their own sacraments and cult of saints similar to those found in Christianity. In many locations Sufis shared holy places with Christians. In particular, the Bektashi order of Sufis equated their own saint, Sarı Saltık, with St. Nicholas. They merged the two figures into one, and both Bektashis and Christians visited and prayed at holy sites, such as tomb caves, devoted to this combined Islamic-Christian saint. In some cases Sufis took over abandoned St. Nicholas churches and converted them into their own *tekke*s or lodges. In the process they appropriated the saint into their own cosmology and equated him with the local founder of their order.

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This blending of cultural practices and beliefs continued for centuries, finally to be upset after World War I when the secular government of the new Turkish Republic banned all Sufi orders, and Greece and Turkey agreed to exchange their "Turkish" and Greek populations. As a consequence, most Christian Greeks living in rural Turkey were exported to Greece. However, the descendants of Anatolian Greeks who had converted to Islam remained, and the cult of Christian saints remained with them. In addition, many of the so-called Turks deported from the Aegean Islands to mainland Turkey were not Turks at all, but ethnically Greek Muslims, whose ancestors had converted to Islam during the period of Ottoman rule. These people arrived in Turkey speaking only Greek and still believing in the efficacy and virtue of Christian saints. They helped perpetuate the well-established Christian-Muslim traditions. Rural, unlettered Greeks and Turks had no doctrinal difficulties merging their folk versions of Orthodox Christianity and Islam. Such difficulties were the preserve of educated clerics.

More recently, the Turkish government has officially recognized the important connection between St. Nicholas and Turkey. In 1963, the Turkish Directorate of Historical Works and Museums, with the help of Professor Semavi Eyice, devised and implemented a plan to excavate St. Nicholas' original church, buried beneath centuries of mud deposits, and to renovate it. On December 6, 1983, the Turkish government sponsored the first international symposium on St. Nicholas at Demre. Church officials, religious scholars and art historians, archaeologists, and journalists attended. In 1992, the Tenth Symposium on St. Nicholas was held in the same place. It attracted clergy, scholars and the curious from around the world. For the first time, representatives of the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches took part in a joint celebration of the Mass in Demre's St. Nicholas Church. The annual symposium begins with a pilgrimage to the important sites in St. Nicholas' life, starting with his birthplace in Patara, and includes presentations of scholarly papers and discussions of the saint's life and legends. In 1993, one of the symposium's scholarly presentations was made by Fener Patriarch Dr. Gabriel Premetidis on the subject of mysticism and spiritual life in Anatolia before and after the time of St. Nicholas.

Nicholas now has two personae. In religious icons he is usually portrayed as the revered saint, wearing a bishop's robe and miter and holding a crosier or staff. As Santa Claus or Kriss Kringle he now has a red suit with white fur trim and is fully associated with December 25, the birthday of Christ. Today, both of these personae are celebrated in Demre, Turkey, the land of Nicholas' youth and adulthood. An international array of clerics and scholars come together every December 6 to exchange information and discuss this remarkable historic figure. At the same time, a rolly-polly Santa, in red suit with

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white trim and a fur cap, appears in Demre's town square surrounded by smiling children, who eagerly anticipate his distribution of gifts.

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CIVIL VIOLENCE IN TURKEY: ITS INFRASTRUCTURAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS

Introduction

Shortly after the September 12, 1980 military takeover in Turkey, General Kenan Evren, Turkey's Chief of the General Staff and President of the National Security Council, addressed his country saying, "In the course of the last two years, terrorism has caused 5,241 deaths and 14,152 wounded or disabled." He maintained that a "covered war" was being waged in Turkey" in utter disregard for any human consideration." For these and related reasons, "The Turkish Armed Forces have been obliged to take over the rule of the country in order to protect the unity of the nation and the country, to safeguard the fundamental rights of people...." (Evren 1980:4). Evren's depiction of Turkey's chaotic situation was not exaggerated. Acts of political violence between the radical right and left that affected everyone in-between accelerated during the late 1970s, reaching a crescendo in 1980.

Political terrorism was widespread in terms of Turkey's geography and the socioeconomic backgrounds of participants. In the absence of accurate official statistics, the Turkish publication *Briefing* surveyed available news sources to gauge the extent of civil violence during the months of February, March, and June, 1980. According to *Briefing,* there were 159 political murders in February spread over twenty-seven of Turkey's sixty-seven provinces. This was regarded as a comparatively calm month because universities were on vacation. However, "just under two-thirds of the victims were students or youths or young workers, and almost a third were officials or professional people, lawyers and policemen, being the two groups apparently most at risk" (*Briefing* 10 March 1980). In March, the figures rose to 182 murders in thirty-six provinces, and in June they reached 224 murders in forty provinces. *Briefing* added that the death toll only represented the tip of the iceberg. "Bombings, shootings, explosions are far more frequent than outright murder... [M]any of the terrorist movements, although rejected by the population as a whole, appear to be able to retain a substantial following among the young" (*ibid.*).

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With respect to the socioeconomic backgrounds of those involved in civil violence, little was definitely known. To my knowledge, the only data available to the public were collected by journalist Emin Colasan, who administered a brief questionnaire to 287 political militants (125 leftists and 162 rightists) being held in Ankara's Kapalı Prison in late 1978. The results of this admittedly unscientific sample were presented in *Milliyet* (April 18-21, 1979) and again in Ergil (1980). The data revealed only small differences between leftists and rightists with respect to age, income, place of birth, occupation, and education. A large majority of both groups was under twenty-five years of age; over a third were born in villages; and, about 30 per cent were born in provincial capitals. Over 60 per cent had spent the greater part of their lives in either Ankara, Istanbul or Izmir, and about half were *lise* (high school) and university students before entering prison. Although the inmates' families included a wide range of income levels, the sample contained a larger proportion of low income families than the population as a whole.

On the basis of these data, we cannot conclude that left-wing militants were uniquely different from right-wing militants with respect to age, residence, occupation, or income characteristics. Both were discontent, generally young people who were committed to violent action as an appropriate means of political change. The data showing that 72 per cent of the rightists and 64 per cent of the leftists were living with their families and an additional 3 per cent of each were living with relatives at the time of their imprisonment offer little support for the claim that "family breakdown" was a major cause of youth violence.

Back in the early 1970s, when I was studying tradition and change in Turkey, I wrote that Turkey was experiencing the genesis of a mass culture of material aspirations nurtured by the mass media and greater exposure to the lifestyle of the industrially advanced West. "A tide of aspirations, swelling beyond the consumption limits imposed by the local economy, has created, what I call, a 'Culture of Discontent,' characterized by manifest dissatisfaction with locally available income and consumption opportunities and a pressing desire to abandon Susurluk [town] and even Turkey in pursuit of a 'better life'. " (Magnarella 1974:180).

Turkey's recent situation was derived in part from this culture of discontent, which had been intensified under worsening infrastructural (especially economic and demographic) and political conditions. In this chapter, I offer a theory of civil violence and briefly outline some of the major economic, demographic, political, social structural, ideological and psychological factors contributing to civil violence in Turkey.

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Relative Deprivation

In a significant article entitled "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," political scientist Ted Robert Gurr maintained that the most systematically developed and empirically supported psychological theory explaining human aggression was frustration aggression theory. He also argued that "many of the variables and relationships identified in social psychological research on the frustration-aggression relationship appear to underlie the phenomenology of civil violence" (1972:36). Building on that theory, he proposed the framework of a general theory of the conditions that determine the likelihood and magnitude of civil violence. His basic premise is that:

> the necessary precondition for violent civil conflict is relative deprivation, defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between their *value expectations* and their environment's apparent value *capabilities*. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are justifiably entitled. The referents of value capabilities are to be found largely in the social and physical environment: they are the conditions that determine people's perceived chances of getting or keeping the values they legitimately expect to attain. (Gurr 1972: 37-38).

Gurr had previously written: "The primary causal sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors. Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence." (1970:12-13).

Many social scientists have accepted Gurr's basic assumption that relative deprivation makes civil violence probable. Samuel Huntington (1971) adds that the modernization process of transitional societies intensifies relative deprivation by widening the gap between increasing aspirations and relatively inadequate capabilities, owing to insufficient levels of employment, production, and government resources.

A Theory of Civil Violence and Terrorism

Below I offer the outline of a human materialist theory of civil violence and terrorism, that incorporates Gurr's ideas, along with major additions and modifications (especially infrastructural and ideological), that I believe apply to Turkey and other countries. I begin by altering Gurr's causal sequence as follows: The primary causal sequence in civil violence and terrorism is first the existence of infrastructural and perceptual (interpretative informational) conditions leading to the development of discontent; second, the inability of the society to correct the infrastructural deficiencies (e.g., basic resource shortages in the face of rapid

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population growth); third, the acceptance of ideologies condemning those conditions creating discontent and advocating violent action to alter the conditions; fourth, violent action. The more extensive and intense the first two conditions, the more probable will be widespread civil violence.

The infrastructural and social structural conditions ultimately leading to civil violence and/or terrorism include the existence of:

1) a population size exceeding available economic opportunities

2) marked differences in the distribution of wealth and "quality of life" goods and services among the population

3) an insecure economic situation for many or most citizens, consisting of such factors as marked growth in inflation, high unemployment and underemployment, and no concrete signs of improvement in the near or intermediate future

4) great demand for, but limited access to educational opportunities

5) an inefficient, incompetent, ineffectual, corrupt and/or despotic government either incapable of or unwilling to devote substantial talent and resources to the solution of the above problems.

The perceptual conditions include the perception on the part of a significantly large part of the population that:

1) it enjoys proportionally less of the country's economic and "quality of life" opportunities than others do

2) other countries, especially neighboring countries, are enjoying much more economic and "quality of life" success than their own

3) their government is either incapable of or unwilling to devote the requisite talent and resources to the solution of these problems

4) given the prevailing socioeconomic and political arrangement, there is little or no hope for improvement in the near or intermediate future unless radical changes are made

5) existing ideologies that condemn marked socioeconomic inequities and legitimize violent means for addressing the situation are valid.

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A general test of this theory would require the examination of a large number of cases to determine whether the specified infrastructural-perceptual conditions are highly associated with civil violence. Rather than provide such a test here, I offer a brief case study of the Turkish situation, which documents the association of the specified infrastructural-perceptual conditions and civil violence as well as their parallel intensification.

Infrastructural and Perceptual Conditions

Population. Turkey's population has grown rapidly since World War I. It was only 13.6 million in 1927, but reached 20.9 million in 1950, 27.8 million in 1960, 35.6 million in 1970, and 45.4 million in 1980. The yearly growth rate during the 1960s and 1970s averaged 2.5 per cent; in recent years about 1 million new people have been added to the country's population annually. Since the 1950s, Turkey's major urban populations have been increasing at about twice the national average, as many rural people abandon their villages in search of a better life in the cities. Unfortunately, Turkey has not been able to provide basic health, housing, fuel, and related needs to much of her existing citizenry, not to mention the million plus expected annually.

Relative deprivation was markedly visible in the *gecekondu* districts (shanty-towns) of most major cities. In the 1970s over half the people of greater Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir were *gecekondu* residents. Mango writes, "the all-pervading bureaucracy has not been able to enforce a minimum of town planning, and the majority of urban Turks live in Jerry-built concrete jungles, without parks or open spaces, with polluted air to breathe--often one large slum punctuated by oases of bearable living, which seems to those outside them, as havens of luxury. Rapid change... has produced a social as well as economic crisis. The sheer misery of living... has bred radicalism" (1979:30).

In an August, 1980 interview, Istanbul mayor Kotil claimed that between 250,000 and 350,000 new people were being added annually to Istanbul's population, then estimated at 5.5 million. The increases aggravated the city's already serious housing, employment and transportation problems. According to the mayor, terrorist organizations easily recruited gunmen from among the jobless in the *gecekondu* sections. One such district, Gültepe, had an unemployment rate of 25 per cent and had experienced about 100 murders by both right- and left-wing terrorists between 1977 and mid-1980 (Howe, August 26, 1980c). A *New York Times* (August 13, 1980) interview with Ankara's mayor, Ali Dincer, provided a similar story. The mayor estimated that 70 per cent of Ankara's 2.5 million inhabitants resided in *gecekondu* districts. He claimed that 50 to 60 of these districts were organized into "liberated zones" under the control of either left- or right-wing militants. These were areas in

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which government authority was ineffectual and access was limited to partisans. In February, 1980, the Istanbul newspaper *Hürriyet* claimed that thirty-one of Turkey's sixty-seven provinces contained such "liberated zones."

Income Distribution. Available statistics for 1973 demonstrate that Turkey's income was distributed very unevenly, with only 27.4 per cent of its households receiving 65 per cent of the national income, while the remaining 72.6 per cent of households get only 35 per cent. The 1973 situation, as illustrated in Table 1, most probably persisted to 1980.

Table 1. Income Distribution in Turkey (1973)

Income Groups	Households	Income
(in T.L.)	%	%
0- 5,000	12.2	01.5
5,000- 10,000	17.8	05.4
10,000- 15,000	20.0	10.1
15,000- 25,000	22.5	17.9
25,000- 50,000	18.1	25.4
50,000-100,000	06.8	18.6
100,000+	02.5	21.0

Source: *Turkey Almanac 1978* (Ankara: *The Daily News*, 1978) p. 178.

Unemployment, Foreign Work, and Labor Strikes. Turkey's employment situation steadily worsened during the second half of the 1970s. By early 1980, unemployment reached 20 per cent, with underemployment certainly higher. Turkey's demographic-economic structure contained dangerous internal disjunctions. Due to rapid population growth, each year the number of new persons entering the labor market was about twice the number of new employment opportunities, resulting in the addition of several hundred thousand new unemployed each year (*Milliyet*, November 23, 1979).

During the sixties and early seventies, labor migration to Western Europe appeared to provide a partial safety valve, as over a million Turks acquired jobs and more consumptive life styles in industrially advanced and economically successful countries. However, the demonstration effect (i.e., witnessing greater economic success in other countries) associated with these experiences abroad added even greater demand pressures on Turkey's economy and government. Returning workers and their families demanded more consumer goods and government services; they bid up the prices of what was available, and expressed dissatisfaction with local work and living conditions.

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Because of the 1973-74 oil crisis, many European countries experienced declining economic growth rates, and consequently ceased importing large numbers of foreign workers. West Germany, the largest and, in many respects, the most attractive European employer of Turks, had (officially) 514,000 Turkish workers there in 1978, as compared with 605,000 in 1973 (*Milliyet*, November 23, 1979). As a result, many Turks who were nurturing the hope of eventually migrating to Europe for work became discouraged, disappointed, and resentful of a lost opportunity.

During the two years prior to the military takeover, over 120,000 Turks reportedly had requested asylum in Europe, especially in West Germany (Munir, 1980). Ironically, most of these people were not political refugees at odds with the Turkish government, but moderates who feared the Turkish government's inability to ensure their physical and economic security. European officials claim that many were essentially seeking economic asylum.

While not having a job and income is certainly miserable, many Turkish workers with jobs showed that they were far from content with wages and working conditions. In the 1970s, Turkey's manufacturing industry was hit by frequent and often violent strikes. As Table 2 shows, strikes increased by 371 per cent over the 1974-77 period, and the corresponding number of man-work days lost jumped by 1,229 per cent.

The first half of 1980 was another period of intensified strike activity. The Istanbul-based newspaper *Cumhuriyet* (10 June 1980) reported that as of 6 June 1980, 47,662 workers in various industries were on strike affecting 203 places of business. Of these, 41,735 workers (affecting 175 work places) were engaged in strikes organized by DISK (Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions), a politicized left-wing confederation which advocated the nationalization of all foreign trade, private banking and insurance; a complete redistribution of land; and a planned economy to improve the workers' lot (Landau 1974: 93).

Inflation. According to the July, 1980 report of *Foreign Economic Trends*: "The decade of the seventies has been a period of rising inflation in Turkey. At about seven percent in 1970, the rate of increase in prices had accelerated to 15-20 percent by 1975-76. In 1978 inflation approached 60%, and last year [1979] the Ankara Consumer Price Index increased by 72%, that for Istanbul grew by 82%, [and] the [national] Wholesale Price Index went up by 81%." (p. 6).

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Table 2. Turkish Labor Strikes, 1974-77

Number	1974	1975	1976	1977	% Increase 1974-77
Strikes	45	90	105	167	371
Workers involved	21,046	25,389	32,899	59,889	284
Man-work days lost ('000)	470.1	1,102.7	1,768.2	5,778.2	1,229

Source: *Türkiye Istatistik Yıllığı 1979* [Turkish Statistics Yearbook, 1979], Ankara, p. 168.

Inflation estimates for 1979 and the first half of 1980 reached 100 per cent and beyond. Turkish citizens responded angrily. They bitterly protested government-imposed price increases on various goods and services in February, 1980. Leftist militants seized a half-dozen food trucks in Istanbul and distributed the contents to *gecekondu* residents. Ferryboat riders refused to pay the 100 per cent increase in tickets. In Ankara, militants plundered several supermarkets, and several hundred student sympathizers of the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Way burned an effigy of Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel while chanting slogans against the price increases. In Izmir, workers from a state-owned thread factory protested the government's economic policy by forcing some shops to close, blocking traffic, and cutting electricity, water, and transports to some sections of the city (Howe 1980a).

Coupled with this astronomical inflation at home was a marked decline in the value of the Turkish Lira (TL) on international money markets. From 1971 to December 1980, the Turkish Lira had been devalued a total of 650 per cent against the U. S. dollar. Whereas the dollar purchased TL 14 in 1971, it purchased TL 89.7 in December, 1980.

These devaluations and the reasons for them had at least two consequences of importance to the present analysis. For one, they meant that the cost of attractive import goods and many locally manufactured items, such as appliances, cars, even chemical fertilizers (all of which contain imported components), skyrocketed out of the reach of many disappointed consumers. The shortage of foreign exchange, which helped bring on the devaluations, meant that many basic necessities normally imported for Turkey's industry, such as petroleum, machinery, spare parts, and raw materials fell in short supply. Such import shortages, coupled with a local shortage of electric power, meant that

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Turkey's industry had to operate at between 40-60 per cent below its capacity. This condition impacted negatively on the continually worsening job market.

Education. According to Turkish scholar Sherif Mardin (1978) and others (e.g., Szyliowicz, 1972; Cohn, 1970), the public's demand for education over the past quarter century created such a burden on the state-supported school system that educational quality was downgraded. Overcrowded classrooms, poorly paid instructors (some of whom were unqualified), a stress on memorization rather than experimentation, extremely limited individual student attention, and the like became characteristic of education throughout much of the system. The consequences were especially acute at the potentially volatile *lise* and university levels. In Turkey the university diploma is the key (but not the guarantee) to the world of attractive jobs; for many it is the minimal requirement for advancement in life. Mardin wrote: "In 1977, 360,000 students competed in the entrance examination to universities for 60,000 places. This leaves 300,000 candidates suspended in mid-stream, with no means of reintegrating them into the employment structure except as disgruntled minor employees with salaries that constitute a pittance by any standards" (1978: 250). These people become recruitment targets for extremist groups.

Many of those who earned diplomas were also suspended and discontent. Back in 1970, University of Istanbul sociologist Muzaffer Sencer described a situation which persisted throughout the seventies and into the eighties:

> This problem, Turkey's education-economic crisis, may be summarized as a massive swelling of students in various branches of higher education, wholly disproportionate with the needs of the community, and consequently, as an incapacity on the part of the graduates to hold their own without falling into the situation of "unemployed people with a diploma." In other words, those who graduate from institutions of higher education are for a large part incapable of finding the status and the work they deserve and thus face a situation in which their diplomas prove to be worthless. (1970:12)

Many observations of student unrest in other parts of the world apply equally well to Turkey. For example, in his conclusions about student political activism in developing countries, Emmerson (1968:401) wrote: "In the university where underpaid, part-time professors lecture to anonymous crowds, where "education" means passing examinations and "learning" means cramming for them; where the student is unsupervised, unstimulated, and finally, unrewarded--under these conditions, student unrest is almost inevitable."

And although he is speaking specifically of Latin America, Clutterbuck could well have been referring to Turkey when he wrote:

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> Latin America remained the most active theatre for the urban guerrilla, largely because of the rapid expansion of the cities and of the educational system to cope with it. Many young people emerged from universities with an awareness of the inequalities in their societies, but saw no avenues open to them in the existing systems for rectifying them. In nations with a long tradition of violence and *machismo,* some of them joined urban guerrilla groups whose aims extended to exerting pressure for internal political change (1976:23)

Exposure. There are many indices of exposure, awareness and aspirational development. Some of them, like foreign work and formal education, have already been touched on. Here, I refer to education again. Over the decades, the Turkish government has made strenuous efforts to democratize education by making it available to more and more citizens. The growth in student numbers has been impressive. Looking at only the two ends of the educational continuum, primary school student enrollments jumped from less than a million in 1940-41 to about 5.6 million in 1977-78, while higher education enrollments rose from only 13,000 to a staggering 346,000.

The increases in the numbers of radios and televisions were equally meteoric. The number of registered radios grew from less than 100,000 prior to World War II to 4.3 million in 1977, while registered televisions skyrocketed from under 4,000 in 1971 to over 2.5 million in 1977. Finally, the number of Turks who traveled outside the country for purposes either of tourism, education, pilgrimage or work increased steadily from one-half million in 1970 to 1.24 million in 1976. The vast majority traveled to countries whose standard of living exceeded that of Turkey. Turkey's 1977 Gross National Product per capita of $1,110 compared unfavorably with the $4,810 average for Europe and the $2,950 average for the Middle East (*World Bank Atlas* 1979). Hence, in whatever direction Turks looked, whether to the industrially-advanced West or to the oil-rich Arab South, they witnessed greater economic success. Being a proud people, many Turks were quick to develop and accept conspiracy theories to explain these observed differences. Why else would they be in such a comparatively dismal condition?

The foregoing briefly documents the intensification of Turkey's deep infrastructural (economic and demographic) problems. The situation was worsened by the Turks' growing demand for goods and services and by their government's inability either to solve the infrastructural problems or to meet increasing citizen demands. These conditions, along with the demonstration effect, contributed to a severe state of relative deprivation on the part of many Turks. Even though they were discontent, the majority still hoped for peaceful remedies. A significantly large and diffuse minority, however, chose the road of civil violence.

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Ideologies

There was no shortage of persons and groups advocating political ideologies and methods (ranging from legal to violent) to rectify Turkey's social and economic problems. Prior to the 1980 coup, the most popular, legitimate political parties were the left-of-center Republican People's Party and the right-of-center Justice Party. In the seventies, neither was able to win a parliamentary majority, and the resulting coalitions were largely ineffectual. Neither party advocated violence.

During the 1960s and 1970s, a growing number of Turkish workers were opting for more activist and socialist solutions to their own conditions. In terms of membership, one of the two largest labor confederations was DISK, which split from the moderate, "above politics," Türk-İş confederation in 1967 in order to politicize workers and advocate socialism. As of June 6, 1980, 88 per cent of Turkey's total 47,662 striking workers were DISK members.

Prior to the 1980 military takeover there were reportedly over fifty extremist organizations operating in Turkey. The leftists were largely divided into pro-Moscow and pro-Maoist factions that fought among themselves as well as against the right and with whomever else got in the way. Some of them made appeals to minorities in Turkey such as the Kurds and Alevis, who are Shiite Muslims. The popular Turkish newspaper *Günaydin* (3 May 1977) described a number of these organizations "who are initiating incidents and writing their slogans everywhere from Fatih's cannon to Barbarossa's tomb to the walls of mosques." The following examples are taken from *Günaydin*.

Dev-Genç (Turkish Revolutionary Youth Federation) was originally organized in 1969 by Marxist students at Ankara University. Its goal was to educate the people in revolutionary action by conducting mass demonstrations. It maintained the following: the Soviet Union is not imperialist, just revisionist; local capitalists have joined hands with the imperialists to form an oligarchic dictatorship; the Kurdish people in the East are being oppressed; there is no need for Turkey to go through the process of national democratic evolution; the only way is revolution. The organization's wall slogans included: "War of liberation against imperialism and oligarchy"; "The only way is revolution"; "Stop national oppression in the East."

One of the groups to grow out of *Dev-Genç* was the THKP-C (Turkish People's Liberation Party Front), originally led from Istanbul by Mahir Çayan, who died in 1972. It claimed that socialist revolution in Turkey could be realized only through armed rebellion; that guerrilla-type combat in the cities was necessary to create revolutionary terror and destroy the bourgeoisie, just as it did in parts of Latin America. At least eight Marxist terrorist groups claimed the

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Çayan legacy, including the THKP-C Marxist Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit whose members were accused of thirty-five murders, including those of several American servicemen. Much of this group was captured by Turkish authorities in Istanbul in February, 1980. Other groups included *Dev Sol* (Revolutionary Left) and *Kurtulus* (Liberation), both with strong followings in Ankara's *gecekondu* areas.

One of the most important groups on the right was the young militant, anti-communist "gray wolves" supported by Alpaslan Türkeş's National Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*). They advocated armed combat to stop the spread of communism in Turkey, and combated leftists on university campuses and elsewhere. They called for the liberation of Turks living outside of Turkey under communist rule and for the consolidation of all Turkish people into one nation-state. They opposed birth control and envisioned a Turkey with a population of 100 million.

Other rightist groups supporting the same causes were TIT (Turkish Revenge Brigade) and ETKO (Captive Turks Liberation Army). Rightist organizations with a more religious bent included IKO (Islam Liberation Army) and TIB (Turkish Islamic Unit). According to *Briefing* (10 March 1980), the left outstripped the right by at least four to one both in terms of adherents and activities.

Hence, persons disillusioned with the regular political parties were able to choose from among a variety of extremist organizations offering either Marxist-Leninist, religious, or racial "solutions" to Turkey's problems.

Cultural Contributions

In addition to the above infrastructural and political contributions to civil violence, there may have been indigenous factors that formed part of the traditional Turkish sociocultural system. In the case of Turkey, many observers commented on the positive value for violence under certain conditions inherent in traditional Turkish culture. Ankara University political scientist Doğu Ergil (1980) offered an argument and analysis along these lines. He maintains there are two fundamental sources of violence in Turkish society: crimes of honor (*namus cinayeti*) and blood feud. Both have their roots in rural society where limited economic possibilities often place individuals and groups in a position of intense competition, and where official authorities are remote and alien. Consequently people have developed self-sufficient mechanisms to protect their families from enemies.

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Namus refers to the honor associated with female sexual purity. The *namus* of a family is dependent on the sexual purity of its women. A family cannot possess degrees of it; they are either *namuslu* (honorable) or not. *Şeref* is social honor which one can earn and add to by behaving in accordance with societal norms. A *şerefli* (honorable) person protects the *namus* of his family and reacts aggressively against those who either threaten or stain it. A person's and a family's prestige in society is largely dependent on *şeref* and *namus*.

Attacks on a family's sexual purity may be either physical or verbal. In such cases, family males have the responsibility to retaliate. The ideal male is brave, unbending, aggressive, and determined to win. In matters of honor, he is quick to take offense. Mardin (1978) maintains that Turkish families socialize their children to be warriors, with aggressive tendencies to be directed against any available outgroup. He endorses anthropologist Paul Stirling's depiction of the Turkish village as a "chip-on-the-shoulder" society. On the basis of her research, the social psychologist Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı (1970) concludes that a general dogmatic or intolerant behavior tendency, termed "core authoritarianism," is closely associated with early socialization in rural Turkish families. In Turkey's rural areas, gun ownership and use are common. Ergil (1980) argues that the gun has become symbolic of the male sexual organ: using it is equivalent to asserting one's masculinity.

A crime of honor is a violent act one commits usually in retaliation against another who has threatened or stained one's women. The attack will be against the persons believed responsible for the threat or stain and against the women involved, if it is believed they were compliant.

The following two examples of such honor crimes in Turkey were taken from Turkish newspapers and reported in the American press. One occurred in the southeastern Anatolian village of Gundikani. A 33 year old male and a 16 year old girl attempted to run off together, but were caught by the girl's family. Reportedly, "family assemblies were held and the girl and man were tried and condemned to death without the intervention of state authorities. The man's head, arms, and legs were cut off and his body was thrown into the Tigris River. The girl was shot in the outskirts of the village" (Howe 1980c). In another case, "a young worker from the southern city of Adana was said to have killed his three sisters when he learned they had committed what he believed to be indecent acts" (*ibid.*). In cases of stained *namus*, the resulting aggression can be directed both inside and outside the family.

Ergil argues that crimes of honor are essentially a rural tradition transported to the cities by rural migrants. He supports his argument with data on 273 crimes of honor which occurred between 1970 and 1975 in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir--Turkey's three major cities. Of these crimes, 89 per cent were

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committed by lower class persons, who had migrated to *gecekondu* areas from villages. With respect to crimes in general, national statistics appear to support an even broader thesis than that proposed by Ergil. For example, in 1971 the percentage of men with rural occupations such as farmer, logger, etc. who were convicted of and imprisoned for crimes was almost five times greater than the percentage of men with such occupations in the national population (*Türkiye Istatistik Yıllığı 1979* pp. 123, 152).

The tradition most frequently commented on in connection with Turkey's civil violence is the blood feud. Mardin wrote: "Student violence, by and large, is directed against other students. The pattern of attack, retaliation, revenge, and counter-offensive in which groups are involved is reminiscent of the blood feud in its regularity, symmetry and inevitability" (1978: 231). In a similar vein, *Briefing* carried this comment: "The spate of political murders in Turkey has to be seen partly in the context of a fairly long history of blood feuding and local violence between rival families, factions, and communities" (March 10, 1980, pp. 8-9).

A particular danger of the political blood feud is its self-perpetuating quality. Once initiated, it can continue for decades, as the revenge obligation is passed from brother to brother, father to son. Mario Modiano commented on the Turkish blood feud in connection with the instigation of inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian antagonism for political purposes:

> Political extremists sought to exploit these revolutionary frustrations [of conflicting ideologies and rising expectations] by triggering the mechanisms of social, religious, and ethnic rivalry latent in the clan system that is still part of the main fabric of Turkish society. The politicians may now be losing control of the warring minorities, as the chain of violence becomes self-sustaining through the deep-rooted tradition of the blood feud. And it is there that lie the potential seeds of a full civil war. (Modiano 1980).

On the social structural level, peer groups played an important role in the recruitment and activities of militant organizations. In small towns and villages, especially, unisexual peer groups (resembling age-sets) are common. They are tightly knit and provide members with a great deal of social and emotional support. Such peer group relations can last almost a lifetime if the group is not divided by geographical separation. Young people with rural backgrounds who find themselves in the city feel a need to belong to a supportive peer group, and many join groups which carry an extremist political ideology. Often times the personal attachments are more important than the particular political ideology involved.

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The case of V. C. Oduncu, a 17 year-old rural migrant to Ankara who was on trial for seven counts of murder in March of 1979, illustrates this point well. According to the report of his testimony and the prosecutor's remarks:

> In his testimony to the military prosecutor, released to the press, Oduncu said, "One day I was sitting in a coffee house in Salihli [a small southwestern town] with two friends. A group came in. They beat us up with clubs and chains. Later I discovered that my friends were Idealists [members of a right-wing organization] and that's why we were beaten. I became an Idealist too." The prosecutor's office said Oduncu was then charged with two assassinations of leftists and spent two years in jail. Released from prison, the prosecutor added, he joined his rightist friends again and acquired a gun. He was caught after allegedly robbing a jewelry shop and firing at a rival youth hostel. Last December, Oduncu escaped from prison with 12 others, the prosecutor said, adding that he allegedly was involved in five more assassinations until his recapture several weeks ago. Questioned about his political ideology, Oduncu was quoted as telling the prosecutor, "I am a rightist and I am opposed to leftists and communists. But I really don't know what rightist or leftist means." (*Gainesville Sun*, March 14, 1979)

Conclusion

The above human materialist analysis not only identifies the reasons for a country's civil unrest and political terrorism, but helps identify potential solutions. For Turkey, some of the major areas needing attention are obvious. Turkey must vigorously address its infrastructural problems. It must reduce the rate of population increase immediately and reach zero growth as soon as possible. Hopefully, Turkey has not already surpassed its optimum population size. Given its limited resource base, a Turkey of 100 million people as envisioned by the Gray Wolves, is an ill-advised goal.

Means should be developed to redistribute the nation's wealth more equitably. An effective land reform program coupled with greater government attention to the rural sectors would reduce urban migration and possibly even reduce the size of overcrowded cities. Rural life must be made more attractive. Elsewhere I have argued that Turkey's rejuvenation would be greatly facilitated by the development of a variety of postpeasantry socioeconomic styles in which labor-intensive agriculture is combined with light mechanization. Peasants have traditionally been associated with low levels of consumption and resource utilization. They can preserve and promote value systems and life-styles consonant with the coming age of increasing scarcity and conservation (Magnarella, 1979).

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Needed also is a progressive tax reform which does not discourage or unduly penalize those private entrepreneurs who produce goods efficiently and provide satisfying work for many. In this connection, State Economic Enterprises must be operated more efficiently so as to produce more by reducing waste. If this proves impossible, such enterprises should be privatized so as to provide incentives for more efficiently produced, quality products.

International trade is a necessary component of any state's viability. Turkish products, being generally inferior to those of Western Europe, do not compete well in the Economic Community. Turkey should continue to develop markets in the Muslim Arab countries and Iran. In addition, it should try to capitalize on its ethnic and religious affinities with the newly independent republics of Central Asia: Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzia and Kazakistan. Because these states have majority Turkic and Muslim populations and commercial industrial sectors less advanced than those of Turkey, Turkey can enjoy a major advantage over other countries in gaining access to these opening markets.

On the social structural level, Turkey should change its election law, so that only those parties that win at least 15 percent of the national vote may enter parliament. A 15 percent barrier with a remainder system would increase a major party's probability of winning an electoral majority and thereby make the necessity of multiparty coalition governments, which are inherently unstable, less likely. By disadvantaging small parties, such a law would also reduce party splintering and encourage more political compromise.

On the superstructural level, consumer aspirations must be curbed. People should be discouraged from expecting goods and services that the country is incapable of providing to a large proportion of the population. The educational curricula should emphasize the critical analysis of the consequences of materialism and excessive consumerism. Students should be encouraged to identify and design appropriate values and lifestyles upon which a secure, satisfying future can be built within the parameters of Turkey's limited resources.

Turkey, like many other developing countries, is facing a colossal challenge—one that is unprecedented in human history. The components and dynamics of today's ecological and political economic problems are so unique that the paths to success traveled by the world's "arrived countries" may no longer lead the way. New guides are needed. Those developing countries that discover new roads to economic achievement and political stability will become beacons to the world.

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TURKEY'S EXPERIENCE WITH POLITICAL DEMOCRACY

Of all the countries with a predominantly Muslim population, Turkey is probably the only one to seriously experiment with western-style, political democracy. For this reason, an examination of the Turkish case is critical to any discussion of democracy in the Third World.

POLITICAL DEMOCRACY DEFINED

By western-style political democracy, I mean any one of several types of political systems that share the following set of conditions:

1) The right of political choice through regular, open, and contested elections. A free selection process in which opposing groups have relatively equal access to the voters.

2) The existence and participation of genuinely opposing political groups, with restriction on the opposition determined by judicial or other open and objective processes.

3) Freedom of expression and dissent through public means, such as assembly, press, radio, television. Freedom of thought, religion, etc.

4) Universal suffrage. A political process open to the vast majority of mature citizens.

5) Legal equality. Citizens stand equal before the law without discrimination based on race, religion, class, sex, etc. The state has the responsibility to protect the security and rights of all citizens equally.[1]

Using this working definition, we can say that only about thirty of the world's approximately 160 states presently (1983) qualify as political democracies. These include the states of Western Europe and North America,

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[1] In preparing this list, I have been influenced by Buultjens (1978).

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Mexico, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India, and only a few other more debatable cases. Of the Middle East countries, only Turkey has qualified, and that was during only parts of the 1950's 1960s, 1970's (see below). Israel's systematic discrimination against its own Arab citizens disqualifies it (see Lustick 1980).

TURKEY'S POLITICAL HISTORY

Under the charismatic leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later Mustafa Kemal Atatürk), the Turkish Republic was constructed on the crumbled foundations of the multinational Ottoman Empire, which had suffered dissolution and partition after World War I. Mustafa Kemal — the most impressive military officer in the defeated Ottoman army — refused to surrender Turkey to the will of foreign powers. His inspiring personality and unswerving determination revitalized the defeated Turks into a military force that drove the Greek occupation forces from Anatolia and secured an independent Turkish homeland. Kemal then embarked on the ambitious project of remaking the country into a modern nation-state in the image of the leading European powers.

This challenge required the creation of a new identity and symbol of loyalty for the peoples of Turkey. Unlike many of the new Arican leaders who must educate their citizenry to transfer loyalties from particularistic social units, like tribes, to a very general one, like a state, in Turkey Atatürk had to achieve the opposite. Loyalty and identity had to be shifted from the general to the particular — from a wide multi-national Islamic Ottoman-Empire to a uni-national, secular Republic. This entailed the attainment of a new socio-cultural and political integration on the basis of secular values and norms which alienated many people and undermined their sacred symbols of collective identity. According to the program of Atatürk's Republican People's Party (RPP), "religion, being a matter of conscience, [was to be] separated from the affairs of this world and the state as well as from politics" (as quoted in Rustow 1957:86). Given the pervasiveness of Islam in Turkey, this goal was revolutionary, if not unrealistic.

Atatürk accused Islamic-Ottoman institutions and culture of responsibility for the fall of the Empire and the the miserable conditions of the Turks, and he decreed that the new Turkey would be based on the principles of nationalism, secularism, statism, populism, and reformism (see Karpat 1959). Among his numerous secular reforms were the abolition of the Caliphate and Sultanate, the disestablishment of Islam as the State religion, the closing of the religious schools and brotherhoods, the replacement of Islamic law with European codes, the abolition of the Faculty of Theology, the replacement of Arabic script with Latin letters, and the prohibition of the fez — the customary Muslim headgear.

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In addition, it was required that the Muslim call to prayer be made in Turkish, rather than the traditional Arabic, and Istanbul's Aya Sofya mosque — a symbol of Muslim victory over Christian Byzantium — was converted into a museum, while at the same time numerous mosques throughout the country were turned over either to the RPP for political uses or to the military for temporary barracks and supply depots. New mosque construction was strongly discouraged and in some places prohibited.

Kemal's principle of populism (Turkish, *halkçılık*) did not imply political or social democracy. Rather it meant national independence through citizen labor. It also had anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist overtones. In his 1921 speech on the Grand National Assembly, Kemal said,

> Populism is a social doctrine which aims to base its social order on work. [...] To protect this right and to keep our independence secure, all of us pursue a doctrine which justifies nationwide struggle against imperialism that wants to destroy us and against capitalism that wants to devour us. [As quoted in Ozbudun (1981:88)].

In later years, according to the Turkish political scientist Ergun Ozbudun, "populism came to mean... popular sovereignty and equality before the law, as well as a rejection of the class conflict" (*Ibid.*).

From 1923 until his death in 1938, Kemal Atatürk ruled Turkey through a single party system as a benevolent but firm dictator, who allowed no opposition to stand in the way of his reforms. Two experiments with multi-party politics "failed" when he quickly lost patience with opposition that he felt only impeded the country's rate of progress.

Although Atatürk could have been another sultan or a European-type king, he chose the title of President of the Turkish Republic. Yet, his political operating mode was not democratic. One of his biographers described him as follows:

> Mustafa Kemal was victor, dictator, undisputed master in his own particular world... He had no wish to be dictator. The dictatorship was to him a necessary evil, which would have to stay until the people were ready to govern themselves. At the same time, he was no friend of liberal democracy. A soldierly-disciplined, well-led national State was his creed. He saw in that the State form of the future. [Froembgen 1971:256].

Atatürk's successor, retired General Ismet Inönü, continued his political policies up to the end of World War II. At that point, Inönü moved Turkey more toward democracy. Many of the reasons for this shift have been succinctly summarized by the Turkish political scientist Kemal Karpat (1959:140-141):

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It appeared certain at the end of the war that Turkey's political and economic interests lay in the West, and that these could be best served by a closer rapprochement ot it. Thus, the destruction of the one-party regimes in Italy and Germany, the adherence of Turkey to the United Nations Declaration, and her closer rapprochement to the West considerably weakened the foundations of one-party rule at home. Moreover, the political atmosphere abroad, especially in the United States, made it apparent that without a democratization of her political system, Turkey would not be able to gain in the West the proper moral recognition she desired and needed. Furthermore, the strains of discontent at home, stemming from various political, social, and economic measures taken during the war, had become so serious that it was necessary to "open a safety-valve" to prevent a general upheaval. All of these helped to prepare the ground for liberalization.

Inönü announced in 1945 that he would permit another experiment in the formation of opposition parties. Dissident members of the RPP, who opposed the government's rigid stance on religion and the economy, immediately organized the Democrat Party (DP). This new party found support among businessmen disgruntled by strict wartime economic controls, consumers suffering from the high cost of living, Christians and Jews who had to pay a discriminatory tax (*varlık vergisi*) in 1942, elitist groups whose ambitions were not being promoted by the RPP, and millions of malcontent peasants who resented the RPP's neglect of agriculture and suppression of religious expression (Rustow 1957).

As expected, however, the rigged election of 1946 deprived these people of an opportunity to register their complaints. After over twenty years of strict compliance with RPP directives, the government officials and bureaucrats responsible for the election's supervision could not remain neutral: many acted as though their patriotic duty was to ensure an RPP victory. To correct this situation, parliament passed a new election law which required secret ballots, public accounting of votes, equal broadcast time for each party, and the supervision of elections by the judiciary.

The electoral system had been evolving progressively up to this time. During the early years of the republic, the voting franchise had been limited to males over eighteen years of age, and the national electoral system was indirect. Men voted for secondary electors who selected the actual deputies to the unicameral assembly. In 1934, women received the right to vote and to run for national office. Consequently, the Fifth Assembly, elected in 1935, had eighteen female deputies. In 1946, the electoral system became a partially direct one. In 1950 and thereafter, however, elections were based on fully direct suffrage. All votes became equal; ballots were cast secretly; and results were counted openly. Since that time, citizens twenty-one years of age or older have been eligible to

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vote, the exceptions being military personnel below the rank of officer, persons who have been convicted of or stand accused of serious crimes, and persons banned from the process by military governments. (For a fuller description of the systems of government and politics in Turkey prior to the 1980 coup, see Magnarella 1983.)

In 1950, the first open and honest election of the Turkish Republic gave the DP a resounding victory. Surprisingly for many, the Republicans honored the will of the people by stepping down. "Turkey thus became perhaps the only country in modern history in which an autocratic regime peacefully gave up the reins of government" (Tachau 1972:382).

The Democrats created an atmosphere of religious tolerance by allowing the Arabic call to prayer and including Islamic instruction in the regular primary school curriculum as a voluntary course. Religious expression, long forced to remain secret or dormant, asserted itself openly once again. Nevertheless, neither the DP nor the majority of Turks favored the reestablishment of a religious state; most people preferred a combination of secularism in government and religious freedom in society. The DP accepted Atatürk's secular principles and acted against religious extremism.

The political divisions manifested during Turkey's multi-party era grew out of the country's dichotomous socio-economic structure. Until 1950, the RPP existed as a fascist-like totalitarian party, which claimed to be the supreme instrument of society. It was an elitist organization whose leaders doubted that a party responsive to the people could solve the country's pressing economic and social-cultural problems. The RPP rested on a supportive alliance of urban elite, civil bureaucrats, military leaders, and large landowners, who through their affiliation with the party were able to reenforce their domination over the peasantry, who together with the urban poor comprised about 75% to 80% of the country's population.

The DP, having found support among the disinherited and the RPP's own disenchanted, took a number of social and economic measures during its period of rule (1950-60) which altered this dichotomy. It gave more attention and benefits to rural areas: roads, electric projects, farm credits, aid for building construction, new industry, and more educational and medical facilities. These contributed to the villagers' and townpeoples' new capacity for political awareness and involvement. In the cities, DP support for private industry and commerce facilitated the development of an urban elite that rivaled or surpassed the high bureaucratic and military echelons in terms of wealth and status. Accompanying these changes and compounding them were an economic boom and inflation that favored many DP supporters, but penalized people living on fixed salaries, such as civil bureaucrats and military officers (Ergil 1975).

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Turkish citizens who profited from the DP's socioeconomic measures and/or who valued the greater freedom of religious expression returned the party to power in 1954 and 1957. These events served to increase frustration and resentment among RPP supporters who were suffering from withdrawal of status. To compensate for their impotence at the election polls, the frustrated urban supporters of the RPP began expressing their anti-government sentiments in the press and through public demonstrations. However, the political tradition that the DP inherited from the RPP was intolerant of vigorous and vociferous opposition. Following the model of the previous regime, the DP became repressive: it silenced the opposition press and legislated against public anti-government demonstration. By legal definition, most adverse expression became criminal.

Significantly, unlike former Generals Atatürk and Inönü, the DP leaders — Prime Minister Menderes and President Bayar — had never been professional military men, and the peroid of DP rule is the only time in modern Turkish history when a general has not occupied at least one of the two highest governmental offices. This fact contributed further to the military's lack of confidence in the DP. In 1960, when the government increasingly relied on the army to quell the "illegal riots" of political protest by university students in Ankara and Istanbul, the military leadership decided that civilian politics had failed.

Headed by General Cemal Gürsel, the military carried out a bloodless coup on May 27, 1960, arresting Democrats holding national office and replacing most Democrats in municipal offices with either military officers or RPP members. During the ensuing period of martial law, the military permanently outlawed the DP and purged its own officer ranks of DP sympathizers. Former DP Prime Minister Menderes was accused of violating the constitution, and after litigation he was condemned to death and hanged along with his Foreign and Finance Ministers (see Weiker 1963).

One of the first acts of the ruling junta, known as the National Unity Committee (NUC), was to appoint a commission of liberal law professors to write a new constitution which would both act as a legal obstacle to future political abuses and institutionalize the military's involvement in politics. The resulting document created a bicameral parliament and made members of the NUC senators for life. It also created a National Security Council, that included the armed forces commanders, who would assist the cabinet in decisions concerning "national security and coordination." In addition, the constitution provided for a new independent court empowered to decide on the constitutionality of parliamentary legislation. It legalized the organization of free trade unions with the right to strike and bargain collectively. It called for certain social and land reforms, and provided autonomous status for radio, television and

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the universities. It guaranteed the freedoms of conscience, political belief, assembly, and press as well as the right to form political parties and cultural organizations. This was to be Turkey's most liberal and democratic constitution ever. It became law in 1961 after winning acceptance in a national referendum.

On April 11, 1961, the NUC lifted the ban on political parties, and most of the former Democrats reorganized themselves into the Justice Party (JP) and the New Turkey Party (NTP). In the October 15 general elections no party won a clear majority, but the former Democrats did surprisingly well, winning 46.6% of the vote (JP — 34.6% and NTP — 12%). The RPP, still headed by Ismet Inönü and favored by the NUC, won only 38.4%. Upset by the former Democrats' strong showing, certain military factions wanted to annul the election results, abolish the new parties, and continue praetorian rule. But General Cemal Gürsel, head of the NUC, and the "moderates" decided to turn the government back to civilians.

Prior to the elections, the NUC had made the parties agree to avoid criticism of the 1960 revolution and to elect General Gürsel President of Turkey as soon as a new civilian parliament was formed. After the elections, the NUC also forced the JP to enter into a coaliton government with the RPP leader, Inönü, as Prime Minister. Despite these safeguards, praetorian radicals remained dissatisfied, staging abortive coups in 1962 and 1963.

From 1962 to 1965, four different coalitions experienced little success in their attempts to work together and govern the country. In the 1965 election, the JP, under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel (a civilian, businessman, and engineer), won a clear majority of parliamentary seats and assumed power. The JP realized that in order to be permitted to govern, it had to convince the praetorians that it would protect and enhance the military's corporate interests. In his program speech to Parliament on November 3, 1965, JP head and Prime Minister, Demirel, lauded the military and promised that his government would "take the necessary measures so that the personnel of the Armed Forces... will be able to enjoy a standard of living suitable to the honour and pride of their vocation" (as quoted in Ahmad 1977: 176). Following that, Demirel's government increased the military's share of the national budget substantially, greatly enhancing officer salaries and perquisites (Ergil 1975).

Another development pertinent to the military's corporate interests and national politics was initiated in the 1960's with the establishment of the Army Mutual Assistance Association, known in Turkey as OYAK. Among other things, OYAK controls a huge investment fund accumulated through obligatory and voluntary contributions of military personnel and investment profits. Sizable investments have been made in the auto, truck, tractor and tire industries; petrochemical, cement, and food processing industries; retail and service

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industries. In this way, the Turkish military became partners with foreign and domestic firms, and shared with them the same economic concerns. Through OYAK investments, the economic security of thousands of active and retired armed forces personnel became dependent upon the profitability of large capitalistic enterprises. A "military capitalist sector" was created (Ahmad 1977:280-181; Ergil 1975). Consequently, the military's corporate interests expanded into the areas of labor law, trade unionism, monetary policy, corporate taxation, tariffs, investment banking, and related matters.

The late 1960s witnessed a deterioration of the Turkish economy (high rates of inflation, unemployment, labor-management strife, and small business bankruptcies). In response, many workers and university students began to support the radical programs of extreme right and left-wing political organizations, whose right to exist was guaranteed by the 1961 constittion. The RPP had moved to the left-of-center under the leadership of social democrat (and civilian) Bülent Ecevit in opposition to the pro-capitalist JP. Leftist views also became prominent in the media as well as in the lower ranks of the government bureaucracy and the military. Violent strikes and anti-government demonstrations; clashes between right- and left-wing students; occupations and boycotts of universities together with the economic decline created an intolerable situation for conservative military leaders.

Believing that Demirel's JP government was unable to cope effectively with the crisis, the praetorians forced it to reign[2] and replaced it with a series of "above party" civilian governments from 1971 to 1973. During this period, the military also purged itself of several hundred "left-leaning" officers and cadets. It declared martial law in most of the major cities and over a dozen provinces; prohibited strikes and lockouts; banned radical political publications; arrested thousands of leftist, religious activists, and intellectuals; and shut down radical political organizations, such as the religious National Salvation Party and the pro-Marxist Turkish Workers Party.

Arguing that the abuses of the rights granted by the liberal 1961 constitution had been the cause of the anarchy, the military exerted pressure on civilian parliamentarians to amend it. Consequently, freedom of the press was somewhat restricted, and the autonomy of radio, television, and the universities was curtailed. Certain categories of government employees were prohibited from joining unions. Authorities received the right to imprison persons for up to seven days before showing cause, and martial law powers were expanded. (For these and other amendments, see Dodd 1979:101-105).

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[2]This has been called the "coup by communique."

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In 1973, the military decided to step into the background again and allow the public to determine its government through general elections. Over the next seven years. Turkey was "ruled" by ineffectual coalitions often comprised of political parties with opposing views. Both the RPP and the JP had been reduced in strength by factional splits. Small parties profited from a new national remainder electoral system which permitted parties receiving insufficient votes on the provincial level to win parliamentary seats to pool their votes on the national level and gain seats from their national totals.

The weak coalition governments were faced with problems too immense to handle: high rates of inflation and unemployment; a growing balance of payments deficit; serious energy shortages; industry operating well below capacity; labor and student unrest; and excessive urbanization. These were aggravated by an economic decline in Western Europe that put a halt to the flow of Turkish workers abroad and reduced the remittances of those already there. In addition, the U.S. embargo an military aid to Turkey, because of the latter's 1974 military operation on Cyprus, caused serious reductions in the defense budget.

Once more, many workers, students and other dissident citizens joined political action groups of the right and the left which advocated violence as a remedy to politico-economic ills. Violent strikes, bloody clashes between rival groups, political terrorism, and crimes of all sorts spread throughout the country.[3]

On September 12, 1980, the military stepped onto this chaotic scene, to take control of the government. It declared martial law throughout the country, dissolved parliament, banned all political parties and political activities, and arrested thousands of suspected terrorists and criminals, along with political activists, intellectuals, and union leaders. The country had failed again to function as a democracy.

The new military junta, called the National Security Council (NSC), was to rule the country for the next 3 years and 3 months as the most repressive of Turkey's praetorian governments. It came down especially hard on members of leftist trade unions and suspected Kurdish separatists (Barchard 1984; van Bruinessen 1984).[4]

The NSC ruled by decree, which automatically became law. Among other acts, it permanently terminated all existing political parties and arrested several

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[3]For a discusison of this situation as well as the infrastructural, cultural, and psychological conditions that promoted it, see Magnarella (1982).

[4]For various critiques of the 1980 coup and its consequences, see *MERIP Reports* vol. 14, nos. 2-3, (1984).

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of their leaders. It also outlawed all but one moderate labor union confederation, and decreed that henceforth, unions could not engage in political activity. The junta forbade strikes during its period of rule, and legally limited strikes thereafter to 60 days duration. NSC laws denied public service employees the right to strike and empowered the government to halt any strike for reasons of public health or national security. They placed the universities, radio and television under direct government supervision and sharply curtailed the freedom of the press. Any criticism of the coup, the NSC, or its actions constituted a crime. This law, like the others enumerated above, has extended beyond the period of praetorian rule.

The NSC threw out the 1961 constitution, replacing it with a much less liberal document that created a unicameral parliament and a very strong office of president. According to the new constitution, the president's actions can go largely unchecked by other branches of government. For example, Article 105 states that "No appeal shall be made to any legal authority, including the Constitutional Court, against the decisions and orders signed by the President of the Republic on his own initiative." Article 125 states that "The acts of the President of the Republic in his own competence and the decisions of the Supreme Military Council are outside the scope of judicial review" (1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey). With the acceptance of this new constitution in the November 1982 referendum, General Kenan Evren — head of the NSC — automatically became President for the next seven years.

The NSC scheduled elections for November 1983, after it had a new political parties and election law written. The praetorians barred over 700 former politicians from politics for periods of five to ten years. It also prohibited the thousands of persons imprisoned during and after the coup from running for office. All new parties and candidates had to submit to NSC review before they could enter the election. The junta had empowered itself to veto, without giving reason, any applicant. Of the 17 parties applying, only three survived the veto process.

In November, multi-party elections were held without incident, and a new civilian government was voted into office. Interestingly, the party that President Evren supported came in last, while the one he targeted for criticism finished first. Turkey's citizens once more asserted their right to choose.

CONCLUSION

Owing to the Ottoman past, Turkey's citizenry historically has had only limited experience with self-government. During the era of the Turkish Republic, certain elites found the ideas of Western democracty appealing, but

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primarily in the abstract. Many of the same elites were convinced that Turkey's common people — poorly educated or illiterate, religiously conservative, etc. — could not be relied on to make the kinds of political choices Turkey needed to modernize (i.e., westernize) and join the ranks of European states. In practice, then, these elites favored a form of "custodial democracy." The military, claiming it acts in the name of the people and in accordance with Atatürk's tradition, has closely monitored civilian politics and has taken charge of the government when it deemed necessary.

During the first 61 years of the Turkish Republic — from its founding in October, 1923 up to October, 1983, Turkey has experienced only 26 years and four months of multi-party civilian rule (periods: May 1950 to May 1960; October 1961 to March 1971; October 1973 to September 1980). Of these multi-party periods, the decade of the 1961 liberal constitution best exemplified the five conditions of political democracy enumerated at the beginning of this essay. The two other terms of multi-party politics represent weaker approximations of them.

The remaining political periods — from 1923 to 1950, when the RPP of former Generals Atatürk and Inönü dominated the government, usually as the country's only legal party; from May 1960 to October 1961 and from September 1980 to November 1983, when the military ruled directly; and from March 1971 to October 1973, when the praetorians governed indirectly — do not qualify as occasions of democratic government. With the November 1983 elections (restrictive as they were), Turkey may have begun a transition back to some form of democracy. Time will tell.

Why has Turkey experienced such difficulty achieving and maintaining political democracy? Some observers say it is because such a govermental form is incompatible with traditional Turkish political culture which promotes authoritarian-patrimonial rule (e.g., Tamkoç 1983). Others believe a combination of sociocultural and infrastructural factors have inhibited democratic development (e.g., Magnarella 1982). Still others charge that Turkey's tradition of military interference and the military's established practice of using government directly to protect and promote its own interests threaten civil rule of any kind (e.g., Ergil 1975; Kemal 1984). Some less analytic commentators attribute Turkey's political problems almost solely to foreign subverison, either from the United States or the Soviet Bloc, depending on their own political biases.

There have been foreign pressures on Turkey favoring democracy. Following the 1980 coup, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Economic Community, and the Council of Europe — organizations in which Turkey holds membership — urged Turkey's praetorians to return to the barracks

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and permit the reestablishment of civilian rule as soon as possible. Within Turkey itself, there are strong democratic forces among some of the political elite, intellectuals, students and labor organizations. It appears that the realization of democracy will depend on the ability of these democratic forces to reach an accommodation with the military which must involve an agreement concerning basic infrastructural change.

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DESECULARIZATION, STATE CORPORATISM, AND ELITE BEHAVIOR IN TURKEY

Introduction

Anthropologists have long been concerned with political processes in social units labeled band, tribe, chiefdom, and state (Fried 1967; Llewellyn 1983). They have failed, however, to offer a paradigm comprehensive enough to deal with bands and tribes as well as with the complexities of modern political organizations. Human materialism, I believe, is capable of explaining and predicting the historical course of states and other political organizations. In the following case study of the modern Turkish state, I employ the human materialist paradigm to analyze the teleology of elite behavior operating under the pressures and constraints of domestic and international infrastructural and superstructural forces. I maintain that Turkey's early history did not take an inevitable course. Instead, it was in significant part the result of the goals, aspirations, and personalities of men like Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. These political leaders strived to achieve personal and national agendas within the limiting parameters imposed by the country's geopolitics and resources as well as its multiethnic and largely Muslim population.

Early Secularism

Turkey was an offspring of the multi-cultural but mainly Muslim Ottoman Empire, which suffered defeat and dissolution in World War I. Immediately after the war, much of present-day Turkey fell under the control of the victorious countries of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Greece. Leaders of the Turkish post-war independence movement utilized Islam and Muslim loyalties to rally the masses of Anatolia. Their proclaimed aim was to rescue 'Islamic lands' and 'Islamic populations' from Christian rule. In February 1921 a pan-Islamic conference met in Sivas, Turkey for the purpose of rallying Muslim opinion to the nationalist cause. One-fifth of the first Grand National Assembly consisted of Muslim clerics (B. Lewis 1961:396-398). Once Turkish independence was won, however, Mustafa Kemal (later to be known as Atatürk), the only successful Ottoman General in World War I, consolidated his military and political power and implemented his secularist policies. Prior to the war,

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Mustafa Kemal had visited Western Europe as a military officer and became deeply impressed with the industrial and governmental systems of the West. Later, he regarded the West's victory in World War I as clear evidence of its political, technological and cultural superiority. He blamed Islam for Turkey's and the Arab world's comparatively backward condition, and he resented the hold Islam had on the minds of ordinary Turks.

Islam, having no national boundaries, stood in dialectical opposition to Atatürk's goal of establishing a western-style, Turkish nation-state based on undivided citizen loyalty. In the 1920s Atatürk disestablished Islam as the state religion. He initially restricted religious education, then eliminated it from the public schools. He nationalized the Islamic foundations, eliminated the formal power of the *ulema* (Muslim theologians), and had European civil and penal codes adopted in place of the *sharia* (Islamic law). He also removed certain Islamic symbols from daily use: he outlawed the traditional Muslim headgear for men, replaced the Arabic script (the script of the Quran) with Latin letters, and substituted the European calendar and methods of reckoning years for the Islamic lunar calendar and Hejira-based dating system. Atatürk also closed down and banned the Muslim brotherhoods. His goal was to disestablish Islam--to terminate its powers in national affairs, whether political, cultural, or social. The Criminal Code of 1926 made the formation of political associations on the basis of religion or religious sentiment a crime (B. Lewis 1961: 400-406; Dodd 1969: 21-22).

In the 1930s, the regime's desire to break Islam's hold on the hearts and minds of the people became even clearer. The secularist government prohibited religious education and converted many mosques to secular uses. The requisite government permission for the construction of new mosques or the repair of existing ones was rarely given. The government had Aya Sophia, the Basilica of Constantinople that Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror had converted into a mosque as a symbol of Islam's victory over Byzantine Christianity, converted into a museum. The ruling elite also mandated that the traditional call to prayer be made in Turkish, not Arabic--the language of the Quran and the Prophet. In 1932 Atatürk founded the Turkish Language Society to, among other things, "purify" the Turkish language by eliminating from it Arabic and Persian words acquired during the Islamic period and replacing them with Turkic words or roots. Significantly, European words, although equally foreign, were allowed to remain; some new ones were even added (B. Lewis 1961:410,427; G. Lewis 1974:100-107).

Because Atatürk and his close associates controlled both the government and the military, they were able to impose secularism on an unwilling Muslim Turkish society from above, enshrining it in the 1937 constitution. Atatürkists promoted a rationalist, scientific-minded, anti-traditionalist, and anti-clericalist

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secularism. They regarded it as a necessary condition of modernization. This cultural goal was achieved among the urban elite, but not in the small towns and villages where people preserved their Islamic values, traditions and world-view. Devout Muslims attacked secularism, arguing that it undermined the cultural-ethical basis of social life. For them Islam was the spiritual necessity of Turkish society. They accused the secularists of misrepresenting Islam as an obstacle to scientific progress. They believed the elimination of Islam from education weakened family ties and lowered moral standards, particularly those of the youth. They also valued Islam as a counter to atheistic leftist movements and ideologies which, during World War II had gained ground in Turkey. They argued that official secularism could not effectively oppose leftist currents. Conversely, the secularists considered any concession to religion a regressive step. They maintained that Turkey and the entire Muslim world had failed to reform Islam sufficiently to make it receptive to modern (western) ideas (Karpat 1959: 274-278).

State Corporatism

State corporatism is a particular kind of political-economic organization located in the social structural component of the human materialist paradigm. In its pure form, state corporatism refers to an economic and socio-political system in which the ruling elite has organized the system's constituent interest units into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories. The ruling elite grants such units, (e.g., a trade union, a teachers' association, or a press association) a representational monopoly within their respective areas. In exchange, the units must acquiesce to the ruling elite's control over their selection of leaders, design of agendas, and articulation of demands and supports (Schmitter 1974).

Throughout the 1923-1946 period, Turkey was structured in terms of a state corporatist model, with a single political party—Atatürk's Republican Peoples Party (RPP)—at the helm. The RPP, the state bureaucracy, and the military were undifferentiated in terms of their leadership, goals and loyalties. The party and the bureaucracy centrally controlled the universities, radio administration, state economic enterprises, governmental administration, the domestic airline, railways, postal and telegraph services, public education, financial institutions, insurance, etc. In their promotion of an internal unitary structure, the Republicans, in their nationalist ideology, even denied the existence of non-Turkish languages and ethnicities among Muslim peoples within the country, such as Kurds, Laz, Georgians, Circassians. All were officially defined as Turks speaking non-standard variants of Turkish (G. Lewis 1974: 97-98).

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The government promoted economic restructuring largely through the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs), which were created through a policy of nationalization of certain existing enterprises and government initiative in starting new ones. The policy activated Atatürk's principle of statism whose purpose was originally to develop the national economy by freeing it from dependence on foreign capital and supplementing local capital. According to Karpat (1959:86-87):

> By 1945, statism had enveloped all the major fields of economy, either by way of new enterprises or by nationalization (mines, forests, transportation, etc.)... In agriculture there were thirty state farms; in forestry, one hundred twenty-one enterprises; in mining, eleven enterprises; in industry, twenty-two large factories such as steel, cement, leather, paper, textiles...; in monopolies such as tobacco and alcohol, forty-seven plants. Several organizations were established for the distribution of soil products and of gas and coal; several others dealt in utilities; still others controlled ice plants, slaughterhouses, beaches, restaurants, and stadiums.

The Turkish sociocultural system interfaced with more powerful environing systems (i.e., the United States and Western European states) that impacted on its infrastructure and elite decision-making. Owing to a variety of international and domestic demands and expectations, the RPP agreed to permit the formation of an opposition party in 1945. Again, Karpat explains:

> It appeared certain at the end of the war that Turkey's political and economic interests lay in the West, and that these could be best served by a closer rapprochement to it. Thus, the destruction of the one-party regimes in Italy and Germany, the adherence of Turkey to the United Nations Declaration, and her closer rapprochement to the West considerably weakened the foundations of one-party rule at home. Moreover, the political atmosphere abroad, especially in the United States, made it apparent that without a democratization of her political system, Turkey would not be able to gain in the West the proper moral recognition she desired and needed. Furthermore, the strains of discontent at home, stemming from various political, social and economic measures taken during the war, had become so serious that it was necessary to "open a safety-valve" to prevent a general upheaval. (1959:140-41).

Dissident members of the RPP, who opposed the government's secular and economic policies, organized the Democrat Party (DP). This new party quickly found support among the country's malcontents: businessmen disgruntled by strict wartime economic controls; consumers suffering from the high cost of living; Christians and Jews resentful of having been burdened with the discriminatory *varlık* tax in 1942; elites whose ambitions were not being promoted by RPP leaders; and grumbling peasants who resented the RPP's neglect of agriculture and suppression of religious expression (Rustow 1957).

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The state bureaucracy proved incapable of conducting a fair election in 1946. After over twenty years of close identification with the RPP, government officials and bureaucrats responsible for the election's supervision could not remain neutral; many behaved as though their patriotic duty was to ensure a RPP victory. Hence, the RPP won. The new parliament made good faith efforts, however, to provide for fair elections in the future. It passed a new election law which called for secret balloting, public accounting of votes, equal broadcast time over the state-controlled airways for all competing parties, and the supervision of the elections by the judiciary. In 1950, the DP scored a resounding victory in Turkey's first open and fair election. The Republicans honored the will of the people by stepping down.

Given the new election law that called for open, multi-party elections, catering to popular religious sentiment served the interest of the DP. Consequently, the Democrats showed more religious tolerance than the Republicans by allowing muezzins to once more make the call to prayer in Arabic and by including religious instruction in the primary school curriculum as an elective course. In addition to facilitating freer religious expression, the Democrats catered to those large sectors of the population that the elitist and corporatist Republicans had ignored. The DP used the state treasury to finance electrification projects, road construction, farm credits, schools, medical facilities, and factories in small town and rural areas. In cities, DP support for private industry and commerce promoted the emergence of an urban elite that rivaled or surpassed the high bureaucratic and military echelons in terms of wealth and status. Accompanying these changes were inflation and an economic boom that helped DP supporters, such as private entrepreneurs and farmers, but penalized people living on fixed salaries, such as civil bureaucrats and military officers.

Turkish citizens who profited from the DP's economic measures and/or who valued its greater tolerance for Islamic expression returned the Democrats to power in 1954 and 1957. To compensate for their impotence at the election booth, the frustrated Republicans and their supporters began expressing their anti-government feelings in public demonstrations and the press. But the DP had inherited from the RPP a political tradition of intolerance for vigorous and vociferous opposition. Following the example of their predecessors, the Democrats became repressive. They silenced the opposition press and legislated against public, anti-government demonstrations.

Significantly, the period of DP rule (1950-60) was the first time in Turkey's history when neither the president nor prime minister was a former general or admiral. Both President Kemal Atatürk and his prime minister, Ismet Inönü, had been high ranking generals. After Atatürk's death in 1938, Inönü became the RPP chairman—a post he held until 1972, a year before his death at

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89 years of age. Most of the high military officers identified with Atatürk's RPP and its leader Inönü. By contrast they distrusted the DP leaders—President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, neither of whom had had a significant military past or military loyalties. The generals felt their budget allotments under the Democrats were inadequate. Both the RPP and military leaders resented the fact that an opposition group that capitalized on the traditional religious sentiments of the populace was so firmly in control of the modernizing state corporatist structure they had created in the single-party era.

Headed by General Cemal Gürsel, the military carried out a bloodless coup on May 27, 1960. They justified their action by alleging DP violations of the constitution and Atatürk's principles. The military arrested Democrats holding national office, replaced most Democrats in municipal positions with either military officers or RPP members, purged their own officer ranks of some 5,000 DP sympathizers, and retired 147 university professors. Many of the discharged officers and professors had been appointed or promoted because of their DP loyalties (see Weiker 1963).

The ruling junta, known as the National Unity Committee (NUC), appointed a commission of liberal law professors to write a new constitution designed to legally obstruct future political abuses and reinstitutionalize the military's role in government. The resulting document created a bicameral parliament and made members of the ruling junta senators for life. It also created a National Security Council, comprised of the armed forces chiefs, to assist the cabinet in making decisions concerning national security and coordination. It authorized the establishment of a constitutional court with the power of judicial review of parliamentary legislation. The constitution legalized free trade unions and granted them the right to strike and bargain collectively. It called for certain social and land reforms, while providing autonomous status for the radio and television administrations as well as the universities. It guaranteed the freedoms of conscience, political belief, assembly, and press as well as the right to form political parties and cultural organizations. The constitution also confirmed the independence of the judiciary by creating a High Council of Judges authorized to appoint, promote and dismiss judges. "At the time, the 1961 Constitution was hailed as one of the most democratic constitutions in the world" (Tamkoç 1983:15).

Before turning the government back to civilians in 1961, the NUC made all political parties agree to avoid criticism of the 1960 revolution, to respect the new constitution, and to elect General Gürsel President of Turkey as soon as a new civilian parliament was formed. Hence, the military took political control of the country and used its powerful position to create legislation designed to protect and enhance its own position. It employed temporary military force to create self-serving legal force. However, the 1961 election results disappointed

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the generals. The Justice Party, which consisted mostly of former Democrats, won a plurality of the vote (46.6 per cent), while the pro-NUC Republicans, headed by former General Inönü, won only 38.4 per cent.[1] Consequently, the NUC ordered the JP to form a coalition government with the RPP and accept Inönü as Prime Minister.

The moderates within the NUC believed Turkey's future lay with the West. Turkey was a member of NATO, and her application for associate membership in the European Economic Community had been made in 1959. Owing to the pressures of Turkey's democratic allies and to the demands of her politicized citizens, the Generals were compelled to create some form of political democracy. But for the military and their RPP allies, a democratic, multi-party system had a serious drawback: the possibility of a popular opposition party winning a general election and taking control of the powerful state corporatist entity to use for its own and its supporters' benefit. The Democrats had done this in the 1950s.

To prevent such an event from reoccurring, the military constitutionally weakened the state corporatist structure by expanding labor rights, allowing rival unions and associations, granting some state institutions autonomy, and creating a constitutional court with the power of judicial review. Concomitantly, the military provided itself with key government positions—the presidency, lifelong senate seats, and membership on the NSC—to protect its own corporate interests and to guide the politicians whoever they might be.

A major development concerning the military's corporate interests and role in Turkey's economy was initiated in 1961 with the creation of the Army Mutual Assistance Foundation, known as OYAK. The Foundation soon ranked among the most important economic organizations in Turkey. Among other things, it controls a huge investment fund accumulated through obligatory and voluntary contributions of military personnel and investment profits. It has invested substantially in the auto, truck, tractor and tire industries; petrochemical, cement, and food processing industries; retail and service enterprises. Through OYAK, the Turkish military became partners with foreign and domestic investors, and shares their economic interests. Because of OYAK investments, the economic security of thousands of active and retired armed forces personnel became dependent on the profitability of large capitalistic enterprises. A "military capitalist sector" was created (Ahmad 1977:280-281; Ergil 1975:12-15). Consequently, military corporate interests expanded into the areas of labor law, trade unionism, trade and monetary policy, corporate taxation, tariffs, investment banking, and related matters.

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[1]For full elections results and a study of vote distribution by province and socioeconomic variables, see Paul J. Magnarella, "Regional Voting in Turkey," *The Muslim World* 57 (1967): 224-34, 277-87.

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From 1962 to 1965 four different coalitions experienced little success in working together to govern the country. The 1965 election gave the Justice Party, headed by Süleyman Demirel, a parliamentary majority. Only five years after the military ousted the Democrats, their successors were again the popular choice of the electorate. Predictably, Demirel had to convince the praetorians of his willingness to protect their interests before they would let him rule. Consequently, in his speech to parliament on November 3, 1965 he lauded the military and promised that his government would "take the necessary measures so that the personnel of the Armed Forces... will be able to enjoy a standard of living suitable to the honour and pride of their vocation" (quoted in Ahmad 1977:176). Subsequently, Demirel's JP government increased the military's share of the national budget substantially, greatly enhancing officer salaries and perquisites (Ergil 1975).

By the late 1960s Turkey's economy had deteriorated badly with high rates of inflation, unemployment, labor-management strife, and small business bankruptcies. These infrastructural strains caused many workers and university students to begin supporting the radical programs of extreme right- and left-wing political organizations, whose right to exist was guaranteed by the liberal 1961 constitution. The RPP was divided internally between the pro-military faction headed by chairman Inönü and the left-of-center faction headed by secretary general Bülent Ecevit, who strongly opposed military intervention. Leftist views became more popular in the media as well as in the lower ranks of the government bureaucracy and the military. Violent strikes and anti-government demonstrations; clashes between right- and left-wing students; occupations and boycotts of universities together with the economic decline that endangered OYAK investments created an intolerable situation for the praetorians.

Believing that Demirel's JP government was dealing ineffectively with the crisis, the praetorians forced its resignation and replaced it with a series of "above party" civilian governments from 1971 to 1973. During this period the military also purged itself of several hundred "left-leaning" officers and cadets. It declared martial law in most major cities and over a dozen provinces; prohibited strikes and lockouts; banned radical political publications; arrested thousands of leftists, religious activists, and intellectuals; and shut down radical political organizations, such as the pro-Islamic National Salvation Party and the pro-Marxist Turkish Workers Party (Dodd 1979:7-22).

Arguing that abuses of the privileges granted by the 1961 constitution had been the cause of the anarchy, the military exerted pressure on civilian parliamentarians to amend it. Consequently, freedom of the press was somewhat restricted, and the autonomy of radio, television, and the universities was curtailed. Certain categories of government employees were prohibited from joining unions, and authorities were empowered to detain persons for up to seven

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days before showing cause (Dodd 1979:101-105). In 1973 the military stepped into the background, and for the next seven years the country was "ruled" by ineffectual coalitions often comprised of parties with opposing views. The weak coalition governments faced problems too immense for them to handle: high rates of inflation and unemployment; a growing balance of payments deficit; serious energy shortages; industries operating well below capacity; labor and student unrest; and excessive population growth and urbanization. These were aggravated by an economic decline in Europe that halted the flow of Turkish workers abroad and reduced the remittances from those already there. In addition, the U.S. embargo on military aid to Turkey, because of the latter's military operation on Cyprus, caused serious reductions in the defense budget. These infrastructural problems predictably led to civil unrest.

Again, many workers, unemployed citizens, students and other dissidents joined political action groups of the right and left which advocated violent "remedies" to politico-economic problems. Even the police were divided. Violent strikes, bloody clashes between rival groups, political terrorism, and crimes of all sorts spread throughout the country. By September 12, 1980, the date of the military takeover, political violence had escalated to such an extent that participants and observers talked of civil war conditions.[2]

The coup transformed Turkey from a chaotic but democratic republic with a bicameral legislature and a multiparty political system into a country under the temporary rule of a five-man military junta--the National Security Council--headed by General Kenan Evren, Chief of the General Staff. During its three years of rule (September 1980 to November 1983) the military authorities arrested about 200,000 persons, of whom almost 40,000 were tried and convicted of crimes ranging from theft and murder to attempting to establish either a Marxist-Leninist or an Islamic state (Yeşilada 1987:38). The NSC declared martial law throughout the country. It took over the legislative functions of parliament, which it dissolved, and appointed a mixed civilian-military cabinet headed by retired Admiral Bülent Ulusu to handle the day-to-day business of government.

The ruling generals also set about instituting a new socio-economic and political structure based on a state corporatist model. Upon its takeover, the NSC dissolved all existing political parties, prohibited all political activity and labor strikes, disbanded the left- and right-wing trade unions, placed restrictions on the news media, and replaced over a thousand civilians in government posts with military officers. The NSC ordered the country's new structuring through a series of edicts, which had the force of law. According to these, various interest

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[2]For a discussion of this situation as well as the infrastructural, social structural, psychological and ideological conditions that promoted it, see this book's chapter entitled "Civil Violence in Turkey".

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groups, such as soldiers, civil servants, teachers, and *lise* (high school) students, were no longer permitted to form associations. The formation of professional associations by architects, doctors, lawyers, engineers, and artisans was permitted, but such organizations were prohibited from engaging in political activity or associating with political parties. The NSC also passed a series of laws which attached previously autonomous professional associations to government ministries. For example, the Turkish Bar Association was tied to the Ministry of Justice, the Medical and Pharmacists Association to the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the Artisans and Craftsmen Association to the Ministry of Trade, and the Engineers and Architects' Association to the Ministry of Public Works. Consequently, these associations fell subject to the hierarchical control mechanisms of the government (Pevsner 1984).

The NSC extended its plan of state corporatism to labor unions.[3] Prior to the 1980 coup, four labor confederations dominated the scene. Three of these actively favored political parties. The Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions (known as *DISK*) alternately supported the Marxist Turkish Labor Party and the left-of-center Republican Peoples' Party. By contrast, the Confederation of National Labor Unions (MISK) and the Confederation of Right Labor Unions (*Hak-Is*) supported the radical right-wing National Salvation Party and the pro-Islamic National Salvation Party respectively. After the 1980 coup, the ruling NSC permitted only the moderate Confederation of National Labor Unions (*Türk-Iş*) to continue. The new trade union regulations prohibited any union from engaging in political activity, political strikes, general strikes, solidarity strikes, and the occupation of workplaces (Dodd 1983:41-44). Hence, the new structure eliminated inter-confederation competition and even informal union-party affiliations.

The NSC also set about establishing control over the major institutions of ideological indoctrination. In the area of higher education, the NSC created the Higher Education Council with the aim of depoliticizing and centralizing control over formerly autonomous universities. The Council, known as YÖK, attempted to structure a uniform administration and curriculum for all universities. It has the power to hire, assign, and fire faculty and administrators; to regulate research; set curriculum; regulate university budgets; establish admissions policies; and set dress codes. The Head of State appoints the Council president and all university presidents. The Council's total membership consisted of eight members chosen by the Head of State, six persons selected by the

[3]The development of trade unionism in Turkey had been relatively recent. Kemal Atatürk had opposed the formation of all class-based organizations, believing they had a divisive effect on society. The Associations Act of 1938 prohibited the creation of trade unions and political parties, other than Atatürk's own Republican Peoples' Party (RPP). The situation did not change until after World War II when the RPP permitted the formation of other political parties in 1946 and labor unions in 1947. But, strikes, collective bargaining and lockouts were not legalized until 1963. As a consequence, union membership jumped from 283,000 in 1963 to about 4 million in the late 1970s.

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Council of Ministers from among high-ranking civil servants, one member from the General Staff chosen by its chief, two members from the Ministry of National Education, and eight faculty members, each with at least 25 years seniority, chosen by the university presidents. The Head of State must approve or veto any recommended appointee. The Higher Education Law (No. 2547, enacted 4 Nov. 1981) prohibited faculty and students from being affiliated with any political parties and their attached organization, or from becoming involved in any political activity on behalf of a party.[4]

The NSC also took autonomy away from the Turkish Language and History Societies. These scholarly organizations were reorganized and placed under the aegis of the constitutionally created Atatürk High Institute, which is under the control of the President, but attached to the Prime Ministry. Members of the Institute's governing board consist of the Military Chief of Staff along with the Ministers of Information, Education, and Culture. In addition to the language and history societies, the Institute contains the Atatürk Research Center, whose purpose is to study Atatürk's principles and reforms, and the Atatürk Culture Center, whose goal is to study Turkish culture from the perspective of Atatürk's principles (Ilhan 1986:50-57).

The NSC had these and other changes incorporated in a new constitution that was much more restrictive than its predecessor. The 1982 constitution greatly increased presidential powers on the model of de Gaulle's Fifth Republic. When he deems necessary, the president may call parliament into special session or dissolve it and call for new elections. He may initiate challenges to legislation in the Constitutional Court. In addition to appointing and dismissing ministers, he appoints the justices of the Constitutional Court, the Military Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Military Court as well as members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors. He also controls higher education by appointing members of the Higher Education Council and university presidents. In times of crisis, the president together with the cabinet is empowered to declare a state of emergency, martial law, or military preparedness and issue decrees carrying the force of law. Significantly, presidential decrees may not be challenged by the Constitutional Court. Metin Tamkoç (1983:19) has written that a close examination of the constitution's provisions reveals "a definite nostalgia—a return to the good old days of Atatürk, ..."

Owing to demands by Western countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Economic Community, and the Council of Europe—organizations in which Turkey itself held membership—and democratically-minded Turks for a return to multi-party civilian rule, the

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[4]Formally known as, *Yükseköğretim Kanunu ve Yükseköğretim Personel Kanunu* [Higher Education Law and Higher Education Personnel Law] Yükseköğretim Kurulu Yayınları Yayın No. 4 (Ankara: 1984).

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to extend their state corporatist model to civilian politics. Nevertheless, they strictly controlled the formation of political parties. The NSC had new political parties and election laws written, and then scheduled elections for November 1983. By decree the praetorians barred over 700 pre-coup politicians from politics for periods of five to ten years. They also prohibited the thousands of persons imprisoned during and after the coup from running for office. They required all new parties and candidates to submit to NSC review before entering the election. The junta had empowered itself to veto, without giving reason, any applicant. Of the 17 parties that applied, only three survived the veto process, although the generals wanted just two.

The NSC openly favored the pro-military Nationalist Democracy party headed by retired General Turgut Sunalp. It tolerated the slightly left of center Populist Party headed by Necdet Calp, an Under Secretary to Admiral Ulusu's coup government, but openly criticized the Motherland Party of economically liberal Turgut Özal. To the Generals' surprise, Özal's party won the election.

In order to protect the corporatist order after the eclipse of direct military rule, General Kenan Evren arranged for himself to automatically become President of the Republic with the endorsement of the new constitution by referendum, and other NSC members received executive positions as members of the Presidential Council in the National Assembly (Yeşilada 1987: 40-41). From their high positions, the generals could keep their guardian eyes on the newly elected premier.

Turgut Özal became the dominant politician of the eighties. Born in 1927, Özal earned a degree in electrical engineering from Istanbul University. He spent 1952 in the U.S. studying electrical power projects. In 1965, then-Premier Süleyman Demirel named Özal chief of the State Planning Office. When the military forced Demirel's government to resign in 1971, Özal took a job with the International Monetary Fund in Washington. Two years later, he returned to Turkey to manage a large private business conglomerate. In 1979 Demirel, again Prime Minister, renamed Özal as chief of the State Planning Office. Özal then designed an economic stabilization program based on liberal economic principles, that the IMF strongly endorsed. Because the program began producing positive results and because of the IMF's confidence in Özal, the generals brought him into the cabinet after the 1980 coup (Ludington 1984:3). For the same reasons, the generals were reluctant to veto Özal's entrance into the 1983 election, even though they did not want him to become Prime Minister.[5]

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[5]The praetorians distrusted Özal's independence. In 1982 Özal resigned from the militarily imposed government of retired Admiral Ulusu, because the NSC refused to allow him to appoint his own man as Finance Minister. Military leaders may also be wary of Özal's liberal economic policies which call for privatization of the State Economic Enterprises, a move that would attenuate the corporatist state structure.

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Fortunately for Özal, his free market, export oriented economic policies appeared to work. The inflation rate fell and the trade balance narrowed. His 1985 visit to the U.S. certainly helped his cause with the military. The American President received him warmly. According to a high U.S. administration official, "Özal represents Reagan's own ideals—a man who stands for free enterprise, free trade, freeing the economy from government interference, and letting people work" (Henze 1985:12). (Turkey's unemployment rate continued at a high level exceeding 20 per cent, and Özal's free market policies did not extend to labor. His government so restricted wage increases, that an average worker's earning power quickly fell below pre-1980 levels.) President Reagan told Premier Özal that "the United States remains committed to high levels of security assistance to Turkey to speed up the modernization of your armed forces and to support your economic reform program." Özal returned to Turkey with a promise of $785 million in military aid (Gwertzman 1985:3). The new Premier had brought home the goods!

The New Islamic Dimension

While restructuring the corporatist state, the 1980-83 military government deviated from the Atatürkist model in two important respects. First, for reasons already discussed, the praetorians had to allow civilians to form competing political parties. Second, the praetorian leaders changed their attitude towards Islam. Sometime in the late 1970s, certain military heads and civilian leaders agreed that Islam was not merely a potential danger that required state control, but a useful psycho-social resource that the state should harness, promote and utilize. Instead of opposing it, as did Atatürk, or merely controlling it, as had been the official practice, the praetorians actually endorsed a particular version of Islam they hoped would facilitate internal social control, psychologically protect the state, and economically enhance beneficial relations with oil rich neighbors. Prior to the mid-1970s and the boom in Arab oil revenues, Turkey's ruling elite had little reason to cater to conservative Muslim countries, like Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait. After the oil boom, they had many reasons to do so. The version of Islam they adopted is called the *Türk-Islam Sentezi* (Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, or TIS).

The Turkish press reported that the Atatürk High Council met on June 20, 1986 under the chairmanship of President Evren and adopted a position paper advocating the promotion of a Turkish national culture based on TIS. According to the Istanbul daily *Cumhuriyet* the position paper reasons that:

> Turkish culture and Islamic culture, the sources of our national culture,... reached a full synthesis at the time of the Anatolian Seljuks and especially the Ottomans. Despite this, neither one nor the other was overpowered and disappeared, but both grew to a mature synthesis through

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> the selection of courses which complemented and reinforced each other... Today's generations are confronted by a three-pronged cultural heritage based on the Turkish, Islamic and Western cultures. We are faced with selecting, with the appropriate priority and appropriate gravity and harmonizing within the whole of the Turkish national culture, the elements from each of these three prongs of this heritage which our modern-day people need,... (April 23, 1987:10).

Cumhuriyet reported that only a minority of those present opposed the adoption of TIS as the official version of Turkish culture, arguing that it would violate Atatürk's principle of secularism. The news report appears to have been confirmed in a press interview with the Intellectual Hearth President, Süleyman Yalçın, who acknowledged that he and his fellow IH members were "happy that the Atatürk High Council had adopted TIS" (Güvenç et al.:1987).

The history of TIS goes back at least to the 1960s when conservative intellectuals, many of them university professors, formed the "Intellectual Club" in Istanbul for the purpose of conducting an ideological struggle against the spread of leftist thought. They sponsored conferences and seminars. Prof. Ibrahim Kafesoğlu organized the Club's first and second Nationalist Congresses in 1967 and 1969. The congresses' purpose was to seek an ideological response to the various leftist and separatists movements in Turkey, which participants believed endangered Turkish unity. Among the congresses' conclusions was the assertion that Islam was an integral component of Turkish nationalism and therefore ought to be an integral part of a nationalist educational program. Shortly after the 1969 convention, the Intellectual Club disbanded, and in May 1970 the Intellectual Hearth was formed in its place with Prof. Ibrahim Kafesoğlu as its first general chairman (Landau 1974:202).

TIS was introduced publicly in its current form in 1973 in a publication entitled *The Intellectual Hearth's View*.[6] In 1983 it appeared in the position paper of the Special Select Committee on National Culture (State Planning Organization) which was appended to the Fifth Five Year Plan.[7]

TIS is both a theory of world history and of Turkish culture. It postulates that each nation has a core culture which remains the same over the ages. Its thesis is as follows: All human societies having a culture are defined as a nation (*millet*). The essence of a nation's culture is unchanging. Each nation has its unique natural history which advances towards its special destiny (like Hegel's *geist*) independent of other nations' histories. The major threats to Turkish

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[6]The full reference to this publication, which was written in Turkish, is: Aydınlar Ocağı, *Aydınlar Ocağı'nın Görüşü: Türkiye'nin Bugünkü Meseleleri*. (Istanbul, 1973).

[7]State Planning Organization Publication No. 1920/300, which is discussed by Güvenç *et. al* in "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis: The Intellectual Hearth's Ideological Gift to 12 September," *Cumhuriyet*, (April 19-23, 1987).

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national culture are communism and Western secularism. Both are tools of foreign imperialism and enemies of religion-based nationalism. A state which does not recognize the role of national religion in national culture and history will lose its national identity. Turkey's population is 98 per cent Muslim, and over the centuries Islam has become an integral part of the Turkish character.[8]

According to TIS , Turkey's political peace was destroyed after May 27, 1960 because state agencies were not coordinated according to a common national ideology. Autonomous institutions, such as the universities, academic associations, and the radio and television administration became states within states, or states against the state. The Ministry of National Education, the Turkish Radio and Television Administration, the Turkish Linguistic Association and the leftist press damaged the national culture by altering the Turkish language. Historic Turkish words (with religious connotations) were replaced by artificial inventions.

The Intellectual Hearth favors multi-party politics. But the participating parties must accept the national culture as the national will. Extremist parties on the right and the left must be prohibited. The Intellectual Hearth does not favor the establishment of an Islamic state. It prefers a circumscribed, paternalistic democracy, an army-government integration, with the military as the guardian of the national culture and will.

TIS, as it appears in the 1983 National Culture Report of the State Planning Organization, consists of five basic propositions:

1) The cause of the crisis in the 1970s was cultural collapse resulting from internal and external attacks by secularists and communists, tools of imperialism seeking to destroy the national culture.

2) National unity requires the general acceptance of a national culture.

3) The main sources of Turkish national culture are Islam and the "central values" Turks brought with them from Central Asia. The two are harmonious. Islam is the religion best suited to the Turkish character.

4) Turkey can progress by preserving its own unchanging cultural core and adopting only the technical advances of other societies. Foreign culture is both unnecessary and damaging to national progress.

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[8]According to Güvenç *et al., Ibid.*, many TIS proponents regard Ziya Gökalp as the first father of Turkish nationalism, and Atatürk as the second. For the philosophy of Ziya Gökalp, see Heyd (1950) and Berkes (1959).

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5) The power of the state must be employed to restore and preserve the national culture (Güvenç, et al. 1987).

In a interview by *Cumhuriyet* (April 21-22, 1987), Suleyman Yalçın, President of the Intellectual Hearth, said that Turkishness and Islam have become so inextricably linked over the centuries that when a Turk loses his religion, he loses his Turkish identity. He maintained that those Turks who do not believe in Islam, must still respect it because it is the religion of their nation.

When asked if the definition of the Turkish national will would change if a majority of living Turks defined it differently from the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, Yalçın replied that the word national includes present and past Turks—living and dead. Because the national will has developed over a 1,200 years of Turkish-Islamic history, he argued, a present-day majority cannot change it. (Yalçın was born in 1926 in Çanakkale, Turkey. He was graduated by the Istanbul University Medical Faculty in 1950, and became a Professor of Pathology on that faculty in 1968. He taught in the U.S. in 1964-66 and 1970-73.)

During the 1970s, the Intellectual Hearth influenced political parties on the right: the Justice Party, the National Salvation Party and the National Action Party. After the 1980 coup, the Intellectual Hearth became closely associated with the NSC. Consequently, it became influential in academic and cultural life, and "reached the point of defining official ideology" (Güvenç, et al. 1987). The military, faced with Marxist-Leninist organizations on the left and Islamic fundamentalist organizations on the right, and believing that Islam has influenced and will continue to influence the thought of most Turks, apparently decided that a TIS that utilized Islam to promote Turkish nationalism without advocating an Islamic state was the best available ideological alternative.[9] By endorsing and promoting TIS, they politicized a comparatively mild form of Islam as a component of their official Turco-Muslim ideology. This constitutes an example of how persons in positions of political and economic power attempt to control a sociocultural system's superstructure—its ideologies, rituals and symbols—to promote their own agendas.

Collaborating members of the Intellectual Hearth saw the military as the most efficient channel for implementing their ideology at the official level. Therefore, Intellectual Hearth welcomed the military takeover as a corrective to

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[9]According to Margulies and Yıldızoğlu (1988), the Turkish daily, *Milliyet*, listed nine activist religious organizations it claimed are growing in strength. Of them, the *Hizb al-Islam* (Party of Islam), the Islamic Jihad, and *Hizb al Tahrir* (Party of Freedom) were pro-Khomeini and may have received secret financial support from Iran. Others, such as *Nurcu*, the *Süleymanci* and the *Nakşibendi* are brotherhoods that have long been active in Turkey. All advocate the establishment of an Islamic state.

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the country's disintegration. Hearth members maintain that the civilian government and public educational institutions had failed in their purpose, which is to promote the nation's core (Turco-religious) culture. In an effort to legitimize their position, TIS proponents have redefined Atatürk's position on Islam. They claim Atatürk favored compulsory religious instruction, but did not implement it in his time for practical reasons. Atatürk's "desire" was finally realized, they say, after 1980, when the military government made religion instruction compulsory, first by decree, then by constitutional law (Cemal 1987:17-20). In part, Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution reads: "Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools."

The Turkish political scientist Gencay Saylan (1987:66) has asserted that the Intellectual Hearth resembles the Opus Dei--a Spanish Catholic Institution--in its goal of providing the intellectual and moral foundations of an authoritarian political system. The aim of its proponents is not to establish an Islamic state,[10] but to make individuals intellectually and spiritually immune to appeals from the left and the religious right, so as to protect the capitalist and "secular" (military-civilian) basis of society. According to the Turkish writers Akin and Karasapan:

> These attributes were precisely what the generals were looking for. The T-I synthesis, with its emphasis on authoritarian politics and social control through the use of cultural and religious motifs, was the perfect ideology for Turkish decision-makers expecting a protracted period of social and economic dislocation. A 1983 State Planning Organization document,... enunciated the importance of religion in 'safeguarding the state and national unity' in the current period of 'rapid industrialization and social change.' (1988a:18).

Akin and Karasapan claim that in the 1980s many high ranking officials and administrators in Turkey's important cultural, scholarly, and educational institutions were persons committed to TIS. These institutions included the Ministry of Education; the Higher Education Council, which controls the universities; the universities, themselves; the Atatürk High Institution of

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[10]Two of the groups advocating the establishment of an Islamic state are the *Nurcus* and *Süylemancis*. The first are the disciples Saidi Kürdi, sometimes called Saidi Nursi (after the village Nurs, where he was born in about 1875). His preaching stressed the need to follow a modern interpretation of the Quran and to establish an Islamic state in Turkey with the Sheriat as the law of the land. He claimed secularism and atheism opened the way for communism in Turkey. The second group was founded by Süleyman Seyfullah (1863-1946). Some leaders of this movement were educated at Al-Azhar in Cairo and at the Umayyad Medrese in Damascus. They opposed the intrusion of foreign, especially western ideas, practices, and customs in Turkey. The military considered each of these organizations a danger to the state. After the March 12, 1971 military intervention, the generals had some leaders of these groups arrested. They were tried and convicted of conspiring to destroy the present order and establish a religious state (Landau 1974:183-86).

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Culture, Language and History; and the State Radio and Television Administration.

Shortly after the NSC decided to make religious education a compulsory part of the public school curricula, Necati Öztürk, Director General for Religious Education, Ministry of National Education wrote an article in the major Turkish daily, *Milliyet*, explaining the goals of the religious instruction. His explanation, which is paraphrased and summarized below, conforms to the TIS view:

> Compulsory religious education will conform to Atatürk's principle of secularism by not mixing religion with the affairs of state. Such courses will meet the needs of family and community, as they are designed to fill the void in our children by imparting knowledge of morality and faith with a scientific bent. From a sociological point of view, the school is an extension of society; it reflects society's characteristics. A school devoid of the mores and values of its society cannot be considered an educational institution. It is thus impossible to ignore the fact of religion present in the mores and values of Turkish society.
>
> Religious instruction in our schools is grounded on three general aims: 1) The individual aim: religious sentiment has its place in the developmental stages of the child. 2) The historical and cultural aim: compulsory education for the new generation must promote a self-identification with our history, literature, art—in short, with our national culture—through scientific and emotional modes of appreciation. 3) The social aim: education must take into account the role religion plays in inter-personal and inter-group relations (adapted from Öztürk 1981).

He ended his article by offering the standard and compulsory basis of legitimation: "As the great Atatürk said, 'Every person needs a place to learn about his religion, beliefs, and faith. School is just that place'" (Öztürk 1981).

Islamic Instruction

In the 1930s, the secularist ruling elite prohibited religious instruction and shut down all Islamic theological schools. In 1949, on the eve of Turkey's first fair election, the RPP government, hoping to win favor with the voters, reintroduced religious education into the public schools by permitting two hours of instruction on Saturday afternoons in cases where parents specifically requested it. In 1950, with the Democrats in power, religious instruction became compulsory in grades four and five (unless parents specifically opted out) and optional for other grades (B. Lewis 1961:410-413). With the 1982 constitution of the NSC, religious instruction became compulsory in all public schools grades.

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Historically, the government's investment in Islamic preacher (*Imam Hatip*) schools also escalated. In 1950-51, the DP government opened seven such schools in seven provinces. Graduates received diplomas equivalent only to those granted by a primary school (*ilk okul*). In the 1960s, under the Justice Party (the successor to the DP), their diplomas were upgraded to the middle school level (*orta okul*), and in 1976 they were upgraded to the equivalent of conventional high school (*lise*) diplomas.

Islamic preacher schools grew rapidly under the National Front governments of the 1970s (comprised of the conservative Justice Party, the ultra-nationalist National Action Party, and the pro-Islamic National Salvation Party). By being academically upgraded to lises in 1976, their graduates received diplomas that qualified them for all departments of the universities, even the medical schools. That is, they ceased being institutions devoted exclusively to the training of clerics. Consequently, the Islamic preacher schools became more attractive to larger numbers of students, especially females who became indoctrinated with conservative religious values and dress customs. Once in the universities, many of these women insisted on dressing in a religious manner, contrary to the dress regulations of the Higher Education Council. This created the so-called *turban* (female Islamic head dress) controversy (*Hürriyet* 1987).

From 1979 to 1985, the number of Islamic preacher schools jumped from 588 to 716. In 1985, 30% of all high school students were attending these religious schools. The following year, the government was sponsoring 3,000 Quranic courses for 100,000 students, and there were Faculties of Islamic Theology in eight of Turkey's 27 public universities with about 10,000 students enrolled (Reed 1988:1-5). In addition, the government's Department of Religious Affairs in Ankara was printing and selling about 600,000 copies the Quran a year (Margulies and Yıldızoğlu 1988).

The 1980-83 military government's support for Islamic instruction was enthusiastically endorsed and continued by Prime Minister Turgut Özal and his ruling Motherland Party. According to Nicholas Ludington, a close observer of the Turkish scene, "Turgut Özal has moved beyond his predecessors in publicly calling for recognition of Turkey as a state with deep-rooted Islamic traditions and important interests in the Muslim world" (1984:1-3). Özal is a devout Muslim whose father had been a religious leader in the eastern Turkish city of Malatya. Reportedly, NSC head and later President Kenan Evren is also the son of a religious leader--a mosque imam (Park and Yavuz 1983:35).

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International Islamic Ties

Both the military and the Motherland governments of the 1980s utilized the Islamic connection with neighboring oil rich countries for economic, political and cultural purposes. The so-called Rabita Affair is one example of this connection. "Rabita" stands for *Rabit'at al-Alam al-Islam*, the Saudi-sponsored World Islamic League. Its purpose is to strengthen Islam throughout the world by funding religious education, publications, buildings, seminars, and the like. In 1981, the military government secretly agreed to let Rabita pay the salaries of some 200 government-employed imams working among Turkish guest workers in Belgium and West Germany. Subsequently, the Turkish government gave Rabita permission to fund numerous religious organizations and projects in Turkey. The League provided funds to build a small mosque on the grounds of the Turkish parliament. It also funded a major portion of Middle East Technical University's Arabic language program as well as the construction of a mosque and Islamic center on that university's Ankara campus. Reportedly, these last two projects were first proposed by Korküt Özal, the Prime Minister's older brother, and were submitted for President Evren's approval by Yusuf Özal, the Prime Minister's younger brother, who then headed the State Planning Organization. Importantly, Korkut Özal was a founding member of the Saudi-backed al-Baraka Turkish Finance Corporation and a member of the Nakşibendi religious order (Akin and Karasapan 1988b; Mumcu 1987). He had been a leader of the pre-1980 coup National Salvation Party, and as such had been convicted by a military court of violating the constitution by exploiting religion for political purposes. A military court retrial in 1985, however, acquitted him and other NSP leaders of that charge.

The Faisal Finance Corporation, founded by Salih Özcan, who is a member of Özal's MP and the only Turkish member of Rabita's founding congress, is another important Saudi-backed finance institution in Turkey. The Özal government exempted these two companies from ordinary bank regulations and placed them under the supervision of the Prime Ministry. By new legislation, the Özal government also exempted the Islamic Development Bank from all taxes, duties and fees.[11] The partners of these firms included religiously conservative Turks and similar corporations operating in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt and the Sudan. These corporations use part of their capital and profits to support Islamic publications and educational foundations (Mumcu 1987:173-181).

The most pronounced example of Turkey's desecularized foreign policy is its involvement with the Islamic Conference. After being penalized by a U.S.

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[11]For the texts of these laws in English, see *Al Baraka Turkish Finance House: Regulations and Communiques Related to Special Finances Houses* (Istanbul: Sahin Yüksel Ofset, 1987), 51-52.

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arms embargo and European criticism for its 1974 intervention on Cyprus, Turkey began pursuing a multi-dimensional foreign policy, opening doors to the Muslim world and Soviet bloc. Turkey's participation in the Islamic Conference Organization, a body of 42 Muslim states organized to promote economic, political, and cultural cooperation, began in 1976, when it ratified the Conference's charter and hosted the Conference's seventh foreign ministers meeting in Istanbul. Interestingly, after the 1980 takeover by the military, ostensibly to preserve Atatürk's principles (one being secularism), Turkey's level of participation in the Islamic Conference escalated. In 1981, during the rule of the NSC, Turkey for the first time sent its Prime Minister, Bülent Ulusu, to the Conference's Summit meeting in Taif, Saudi Arabia. Then in 1984, President Kenan Evren, former head of the NSC, represented Turkey at the Conference's Summit Meeting in Casablanca.

Two years earlier, General Evren expressed his views concerning Turkey's relationship to the Islamic world in a speech given at the Islamic Development Bank Governors meeting in Istanbul:

> Turkey is an inextricable part of the Islamic Community. Our country attaches utmost importance to the further strengthening of her historic and spiritual ties with the Arab and Islamic countries and to establishing fruitful cooperation with Islamic countries in every field. Turkey considers the Islamic Conference an ideal forum to consolidate the common moral values of Islamic countries which stem from our religion and to broaden cooperation among Islamic countries. In this regard, our relationship to the Islamic conference and to Arab and Islamic countries constitutes an indispensable and essential dimension of our foreign policy.
>
> Islamic solidarity can only be achieved through the employment of tangible activities embracing political, economic, cultural and social fields,...
>
> I would like to express my gratitude for the important financial contributions of the Islamic Development Bank to Turkey and to the positive attitude of the Islamic Bank in regard to the question of resource transfers. [as quoted in Çevik 1983:501-502]

The infrastructural reasons for this ideological speech were evident. In 1983, there were some 120 Turkish firms working on construction projects in the Middle East and North Africa worth about $10 billion. The Middle East and North Africa also represented a growing market for Turkish workers. In 1983, there were about 100,000 Turkish workers there, remitting about 90 per cent of their earnings to Turkey (Çevik 1983:502). Through the 1980s, the Muslim oil producing countries continued to be crucial for Turkish exports, oil imports, and overall balance of trade. In 1987, these countries accounted for 30 per cent of all Turkish exports. From 1982 to 1987, the Saudi-based Islamic Development

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Bank extended $478 million in long/medium term and $334 million in short term loans to Turkey at very favorable rates (Editor 1988:63).

By 1988 Turkey provided a permanent secretariat for the Conference's Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation, and it hosted the Research Center on Islamic History, Art and Culture in Istanbul; the Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Center for Islamic Countries in Ankara; and the International Commission for the Preservation of the Islamic Cultural Heritage in Istanbul (Yılmaz 1988:5-11).

Conclusion

When Atatürk implemented his version of secularism, the world's Muslim countries were economically weak and dominated by the West. Atatürk hoped to remodel Turkey infrastructurally, social structurally and superstructurally in accordance with his vision of a Westernized ideal. Hence, he promoted new industries, encouraged women's entrance into the professions, and instituted the principle of secularism. In more recent times, both the domestic and international scenes have changed. Turkey's serious economic and political problems in the 1970s provided the milieu for the emergence of competing political factions advocating radical ideologies. By themselves, Atatürk's ideological principles proved insufficient to solidify Turkish society under conditions of extreme economic and demographic stress. Internationally, some of the Muslim countries had achieved economic power and Western respect through their oil wealth. Hoping to achieve an advantage over more industrially advanced Western states in the competition for lucrative trade and construction contracts, Turkey's leaders began emphasizing their common Islamic heritage with their oil rich neighbors. Turkey's infrastructural problems drove its superstructural reorientation. Turkey's infrastructural weaknesses also exposed it to the influences of more economically powerful, external sociocultural systems (i.e., oil-rich Muslim states) that linked Islamic propagation with economic aid and trade.

A significant segment of Turkey's leadership looked to Islam as a partial solution to its political and economic problems. The conservative political parties had already found that by publicly displaying a reverential attitude towards Islam, they earned a loyal constituency and received support at the polls. Conservative intellectuals, long dissatisfied with Atatürk's secularism, attributed the root causes of the country's social disintegration to the absence of an Islamically-based moral consensus. The praetorians accepted this analysis and endorsed a Turkish-Islamic synthesis they hoped would strengthen Turkey both superstructurally by providing a moral consensus and infrastructurally by

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enhancing beneficial economic relations with the Muslim world. The praetorians believed both developments would strengthen the state corporate structure.

Given these developments, the Turkish state traded away its secular character. The government, the praetorian guards, and their intellectual allies legitimized and promoted a version of Islam designed to reinforce state authority and promote their special agendas.

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EAST MEETS WEST: THE RECEPTION OF WEST EUROPEAN LAW IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE MODERN TURKISH REPUBLIC*

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Ottoman Empire existed from the fourteenth to the early twentieth century. At its height in the sixteenth century, it embraced much of the Middle East along with parts of Southeast Europe and North Africa. Before the Ottoman Sultan proclaimed the 1839 Imperial Decree of Reform (the *Hatti-Sharif* of Gülhane), the Empire had a dual legal system comprised of the *Shari'a* or Islamic law and the *Kanun* or state law. Ottoman Muslims regarded the shari's as a divinely inspired corpus of political, social and moral regulations and principles, which could not be altered by humans.[1] Theoretically, the *Shari'a* was derived from four main sources: the *Quran,* the *Sunna* or Tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, the censensus of qualified jurists, and analogical deductions from these. In reality, pre-Islamic customary law and the administrative practices of the early Islamic states strongly influenced the character of the *Shari'a.*[2] Of the four Sunni schools of Islamic law, the Ottomans adhered to the Hanafi School.[3]

Although highly developed in the fields of personal behavior, the *Shari'a* dealt only generally with matters of public law, state organization and administration.[4] According to Islamic political theory, the legitimate ruler of a properly constituted state exists to serve Allah's purposes by administering the community of believers. Hence, the *Shari'a* doctrine of *siyasa* (government administration) allowed the ruler wide discretionary powers to safeguard the interests of the state. Provided he did not contradict the *Sharia'a,* the ruler could

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[1]Ebül'ulâ Mardin, *Development of the Shari'a Under the Ottoman Empire, in* Law in the Middle East 279 (Majid Mhadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny eds., 1955).

[2]James N. D. Anderson, Islamic Law in the Modern World 20 (1959).

[3]For a general treatment of Islamic law and the Hanafi School, *see* Asaf A.A. Fyzee, Outline of Muhammadan Law (1974); Abdur Rahim, The Principles of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (1981); and Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic law (1964).

[4]Mardin, *supra* note 1.

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issue a variety of directives to deal with a wide range of issues.[5] Therefore, the Ottoman Sultan had the right to invalidate any *kanun* they believed contradicted the *Shari'a*, legislate to maintain public order. He did so by issuing *kanuns*, or legal directives. Although the *ulama* (religious scholars) theoreticaly had the right to invalidate any *kanun* they believed centradicted the *Shari'a*, they rarely did so, probably because they were under the authority of the Sultan who could remove them from their positions. They also depended on the Sultan to execute their legal decisions. Consequently, the Sultan was relatively free to legislate changes in Ottoman institutions and practices to promote his policies.[6] In the Empire, the religious institution administered Islamic law, justice and education. Its head was the *Seyh-ul-Islam*, the Chief Mufti of Istanbul, who presided over a hierarchy of *muftis* (jurisconsults) and *qadis* (judges), and *Shari'a* courts with territorial jurisdictions.[7]

The Ottomans governed many of their non-Muslim subjects, such as Greek Christians, Armenian Christians, and Jews, through the *millet* system. *Millets* were organized and legally recognized religious communities whose religious leaders (e.g., bishops and rabbis) were given the privilege of administering the civil and spiritual affairs of their communities. This system permitted internal autonomy for the administration and maintenance of holy places, marriage, inheritance, and education. *Millet* courts resolved disputes between persons of like religions.[8] However, *Shari'a* courts applying Islamic law had jurisdiction over disputes involving at least one Muslim or two non-Muslims of different *Millets*. In such cases, non-Muslims were often at a disadvantage. For example, if a non-Muslim were convicted of murdering a Muslim, the law of retaliation was applied to him. But if a Muslim were convicted of murdering a non-Muslim, the penalty was the *diyya*, a fine and prison term.[9]

As part of their comprehensive treaties with the Ottoman Empire, European powers, such as France, Great Britain, and Russia, extracted certain extraterritorial rights which initially applied only to their own nationals. For instance, these rights, known as capitulations, gave the French Consul exclusive jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases arising among French citizens. Disputes arising between French and Ottoman subjects were to be resolved in Ottoman courts with a translator present. Eventually, France and other European

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[5]Noel J. Coulson, *The State and the Individual in Islamic Law, in* The Traditional Middle East 122, 125 (James Stewart-Robinson ed., 1966).

[6]Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Modern Turkey 14-15 (1964). *See* Halil Inalcik, the Ottoman Empire (1973), and Abdolonyne Ubicini, Letters on Turkey: an account of the Religious, Political, Social, and Commercial Condition of the Ottoman Empire (1856, Reprint edition by Arno 1973).

[7]Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey 439-40 (1961).

[8]*Id.*

[9]Choucri Cardahi, *Conflict of Law, in* Law in the Middle East 334, 337 (Majid Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny eds., 1955).

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powers extended their jurisdictional rights to various Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. However, the Europeans and the Ottoman Christians continued to complain bitterly about their inferior status in the *Shari'a* courts.[10] As the Ottoman Empire weakened, its leaders reluctantly conceded to external and internal demands for legal reform.

A. The *Tanzimat*

Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, Europe advanced financially, commercially, scientifically, and militarily, while the Ottoman Empire declined. Believing that borrowing from Europe was necessary to revitalize the Empire, some Ottoman leaders promoted innovations in military organization and technology as well as in science and commerce. Because Islamic law proved inadequate to deal with the new problems involving foreign exchange, corporations, and international business transactions, both Europeans and reform-minded Ottomans advocated legal innovations.[11]

The *Tanzimat* or "Great Reform" period was inaugurated in 1839, by Sultan Abd al-Majid's proclamation of the *Hatti-Sharif* of Gülhane. This official edict stipulated the basic equality of all Ottoman subjects regardless of their religion or ethnicity. Under the pressure of his European allies in the Crimean War, the Sultan issued a more detailed edict in 1856, known as the *Hatti-Humayun.* As a consequence, between 1839 and 1881, the Ottoman government adopted European maritime laws and the French codes of criminal and commercial law, along with the French codes of commercial and civil procedure.[12] These changes validated the testimony of Christians against Muslims in Ottoman courts. They also permitted the establishment of mixed civil and criminal courts, with non-Muslim and Muslim judges in equal numbers, applying European rules of evidence and procedure.[13] However, the principles of these European substantive and procedural legal codes often contradicted the *Shari'a.* For instance, the commercial code allowed interest on loans, a practice expressly forbidden by the *Quaran*; the criminal code displaced the Quranic system of penalties, such as the stoning of adulterers, the flogging of wine drinkers, and the mutilation of thieves; and, the procedural codes instituted mixed tribunals, with Christian, Jewish and Muslim judges deciding

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[10]Herbert j. Liebesny, *The Development of Western Judicial Privileges, in* Law in the Middle East 314-16 (Majid Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny eds., 1955).

[11]S. S. Onar, *The Majalla, in* Law in the Middle East 292, 293 (Majid Khadduri & Habert J. Liebesny eds., 1955).

[12]Muhammad R. Feroze, *Family Laws in the Turkish Republic,* 1 Islamic studies 131, 131-140 (1962).

[13]Lewis, *supra* note 7, at 112.

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cases according to European (mostly French) law.[14] Consequently, the jurisdictions and functions of the *Shari'a* courts were severely contracted, being confined mainly to family law (marriage, divorce, wills, inheritance, etc.),[15] while the *Millet* courts of the Empire's minorities continued to administer their own family law.

B. The 20th Century Kemalist Reforms

In his study of Islamic law, Esposito maintained that because kinship is at the core of Islam, family law has been the heart of the *Shari'a* and the major area of Islamic law remaining in force to govern the lives of more than 800 million Muslims from North Africa to Southeast Asia.[16] Notably, Turkey, a country with a 98% Muslim population, replaced Islamic family law with a European code after the Great War.

With the Ottoman Empire's demise in World War I, the heartland of the old Empire — Istanbul and Asia Minor — was reconstituted as the Republic of Turkey under the strong leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later called Mustafa Kemal Atatürk). Kemal, a former Ottoman general, wanted to fashion Turkey into a modern, Western-style, secular, nation-state with full sovereignty and a uniform legal system. To achieve this end, he had to convince the European powers to give up their capitulatory rights, and the non-Muslim minorities to relinquish their *Millet* legal privileges. He accomplished both in 1926, by replacing the *Shari'a* with the new Turkish Civil Code, an imitation of the Swiss Civil Code.[17] Atatürk had the Swiss Code adopted with few changes and in great haste so as to deny reactionaries time to devise strategies to oppose him.[18] Furthermore, he abolished the Caliphate and Sultanate, disestablished Islam as the state religion, replaced existing penal and commercial codes with more modern ones from Europe, and substituted Latin letters for the Arabic script.[19] While the Ottoman reforms were introduced unsystematically and without enthusiasm, being mainly intended to conciliate hostile foreign criticism, the

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[14] Leon Ostrorog, *The Angora Reform* 48-49 (1927).

[15] Berkes, *supra* note 6, at 179.

[16] John L. Esposito, *Women in Muslim Family Law* (1982).

[17] Apparently, the main reason why the Swiss Civil Code, in particular, was chosen was that the Turkish Minister of Justice, Mahmud Es'ad, had studied law in Lausanne, as had some other Young Turks of his generation. During his 1925 conversation with Count Leon Ostrorog (who described himself as the former Judicial Adviser to the Ottoman Government), the Minister of Justice is quoted as saying: "The Swiss Code is good Code; I am going to have it adopted, and I shall ask the Assembly to proceed to vote *en bloc*, as Napoleon had his Code voted. If it had to be discussed article by article, we should never get through." Ostrorog, *supra* note 14, at 88.

[18] I.E. Postacıoğlu, *The Technique of Reception of a Foreign Code of Law, 9 Int'l* Soc. Sci, Bull. 54 (1957).

[19] See Berkes, *supra* note 6, and Lewis, *supra* note 7.

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vigorous Kemalist reforms of the 1920s resulted in a systematic Europeanization of Turkey's legal system.[20]

II. THE FORMAL AND LIVING LAW

The balance of this article addresses the interrelationships between change in law governing familial relations from the late Ottoman to the early Republican eras and actual social practices. No attempt is made to fully explicate the substantive rules of family law under the *Shari'a* and the Turkish Civil Code. The *Shari'a* rules are covered in the works previously noted,[21] and the Turkish Civil Code is treated in the works by Ansay, Wallace, and Adal.[22] Here, certain formal rules of family law are examined in relation to their corresponding "living rules."

The empirical data bases for the two periods are uneven in quality. For the late Ottoman period, information on family life is quite limited, coming primarily from native and travelers' accounts and tax records. The first sources are highly subjective, while the second offer information on household sizes, not behavior.[23] For the Republican period, there are several good anthropological studies of villages and towns, as well as a small number of social surveys. For this paper, both anthropological accounts and the 1968 survey conducted by Hacettepe University's Institute of Population Studies are utilized.[24] This survey (which will be referred to in the text as the "Populations Survey") is probably the best of its kind available for public use.[25]

A. Age of Marriage

Islamic law does not specify any minimum age for marriage. Reportedly, the Prophet Muhammad married Aishah, his favorite wife, when she was only

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[20] C.J. Hamson, *The Reception of Foreign Law in Turkey: Introduction,* 9 Int'l Soc. Sei. Bull. 7, 10 (1957).

[21] *See* Fyzee; Rahim; and Schacht *supra* note 3.

[22] Introduction to Turkish law (Tuğrul Ansay & Don Wallace eds., 1966); Erhan Adal, Fundamentals of Turkish Private Law (1985).

[23] Alan Duben, *Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Ottoman-Turkish Family and Household Structure, in* Family in Turkish Society 105 (Türköz Eder ed., 1985); Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830-1914; Demographic and Social Characteristics (1985).

[24] Serim Timur, *Türkiye'de Aile Yapısı* [Family Structure in Turkey] (1972).

[25] This survey, conducted by the Hacettepe Institute of Population Studies, included the results of interviews with 3, 303 married women under 45 years of age and with 2,787 of their husbands. The survey covered 4,505 households in 256 cities, towns and villages across Turkey. The locations and distribution of the sites (150 villages with under 2,000 population, 49 towns with populations from 2,000 to 15,000, 25 towns with populations from 15,000 to 50,000, and all 32 cities with populations over 50,000) were scientifically selected to represent Turkey's major geographical zones and community types. *Id.* at 185-203.

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nine. But, because he waited five years before consummating the marriage, some Muslim jurists argue that the Prophet's *Sunna* (tradition) does not endorse prepubescent marriage.[26] In his examination of early 17th century records from the *Shari'a* court of Kayseri, a city in central Anatolia, Jennings discovered "a few cases where girls who had been 'wed' as children came to court when they came of age to indicate formal consent to (or repudiation of) the marriage..."[27] A ruling by a government commission during the late Ottoman period, that the minimum marital ages were ten for boys and nine for girls, indicates that prepubescent marriages may have occurred with some frequency just prior to the establishment of the Republic.[28]

The Turkish Civil Code raised the minimum ages for marriage. Originally, they were eighteen for men and seventeen for women. By 1938, however, the government realized that these were not in accord with village custom, so it lowered the minimums to seventeen for men and fifteen for women, with the courts being empowered to reduce them further to fifteen and fourteen in extraordinary cases.[29] Consequently, the new Civil Code legally prohibits "cradle" and child marriages. Fourteen percent of the women in the Population Survey[30] entered their first marriage between the ages of ten and fourteen, although the average marital age was seventeen.[31] On the basis of these data, Özgen concludes that at least 14% of all first marriages in recent decades involved underage women.[32] Such marriages occur clandestinely, without the legally required civil ceremony.[33]

B. Impediments to Marriage

Because the Turkish Civil Code (Art. 92) reduced rather than extended the popularly recognized legal impediments to marriage, its observance has created no problem. The Code prohibits unions between siblings, aunts and nephews, uncles and nieces, lineal relatives of different generations (grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren), or foster kin standing in any of these relationships.[34] By

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[26]Maulana Muhammad Ali, *The Religion of Islam* 601 (1983).

[27]Ronald Jennigs, *Women in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records — The Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri,* 18 J. of the Econ. & Soc. Hist. of the Orient 55, 77 (1975).

[28]Eralp Özgen, *Early Marriage, Brideprice and Abduction of Women, in* Family in Turkish Society 313, 314 (Türköz Erder ed., 1985).

[29]Vakur Versan, *The Kemalist Reform of Turkish Law and Its Impact, in* Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey 249 (Jacob M. Landau ed., 1984).

[30]*See generally, supra* note 3.

[31]Timur, *supra* note 24, at 95.

[32]Özgen, *supra* note 28, at 315.

[33]*See infra,* Religious Marriage Ceremonies at II B.I.E.

[34]Yaşar Gürbüz, *Family Law, in* Introduction to Turkish Law 115, 119 (Tuğrul Ansay & Don Wallace eds., 1966); Adal, *supra* note 22, at 77-78.

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contrast, Ottoman Islamic law also forbade marrying two sisters together or the wife of one's son. It also placed a "milk mother" or wet-nurse in the structural position of mother, thereby prohibiting marriage with her or her close relatives.[35] Furthermore, under Islamic Law a Muslim male could not marry a "pagan", although he could marry a Jew or Christian. A Muslim woman, however, was prohibited from marrying anyone but a Muslim.[36]

According to ethnographic accounts, Turks generally continue to observe the Islamic impediments as well as certain customary, non-Islamic prohibitions of their own.[37] For example, in a village this writer studied, the community practiced two forms of spiritual kinship that had consequences for potential marital ties. One form links a boy and the man who holds him during the former's circumcision ritual. The man becomes the boy's *kivre* (spiritual father), thereby placing all of his and the boy's close relatives in a non-marriageable kinship relationship. Similarly, two unrelated persons can ritualistically become spiritual siblings (*ahretler*), and thereby create the kinds of kinship ties between the members of their two families that prevent them from intermarrying.[38]

Both Islamic law and the Turkish Civil Code permit marriage between other relatives, including first cousins. The Population Survey showed that 29.2% of the women interviewed had married relatives. Such marriages ranged from 35.7% for women living in villages to 17.1% for women living in cities. The vast majority of these marriages were between first cousins (78.3%), with brothers' offspring marriages being the most common (29.2%).[39]

1. ABDUCTION

The abduction of women for the purpose of marriage is an old Turkish custom. Its prohibition appeared in a 16th century decree issued by Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent. The decree held that a man who abducts and forcibly marries a woman, shall be made to divorce her. The abductor shall also be beaten

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[35]Quran, Sura IV:22-24. The English version of the *Quran* utilized for this article is the Glorious Qur'an (Abdullah Y. Ali trans., 1938).

[36]Muhammad Abu Zahra, *Family Law, in* Law in the Middle East 132, 136 (Majid Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny eds. 1955).

[37]The village ethnographies include: Paul Stirling, Turkish Village (1965); Ibrahim Yasa, Hasanoğlu, Socio-economic Structure of a Turkish Village (1957); Nermin Erdentuğ, A Study on the Social Structure of a Turkish Village (1959); Yusuf Kurban, *Eskitaşlı Köyü Monoğrafisi* [Eskitaşlı Village Monograph], 10-11 Sosyoloji Dergisi [Sociology Journal] 44 (1955-56); and Paul J. Magnarella, the Peasant Venture (1979). Town studies include those by Mübeccel Kiray, Ereğli — Ağir Sanayiden Önce bir Sahil Kasabası [Ereğli — A Coastal Town before Heavy Industry] (1964); Peter Benedict, Ula: an Anatolian Town (2974); Fatma Mansur, Bodrum, a Town in the Aegean (1972); and Paul J. Magnarella, Tradition and Change in a Turkish Town (1974).

[38]Paul J. Magnarella, The Peasant Venture 33-35 (1979).

[39]Timur, *supra* note 24, at 78.

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and have his beard shaved off.[40] The present Turkish Criminal Code (Art. 429) provides that: "Whoever, through force, violence, threats or fraud and under lascivious feelings or with intent of marriage, abducts a woman who has reached her majority either legally or by judicial decree, or detains her in a place, shall be punished by imprisonment for three to ten years."[41]

Despite this law, kindnapping women for marital purposes continued to be a widespread custom in rural Turkey during the early 20th century.[42] In more recent years the numbers of convictions for the crime of abduction for marriage have declined from 2,710 in 1959, to 654 in 1977.[43] Available statistics for the years 1959 to 1962, show that about 76% of the abducted women were single, and 86% of the abductions occurred in villages. The educational data available for the years 1967, 1968, and 1974, reveal that 99% of the male abductors had only a primary school education (grade five) or less.[44] These data, along with ethnographic information, permit us to conclude that abduction is most commonly resorted to by poor rural males to acquire women over the actual or anticipated rejections of their marriage proposals. The reasons for the rejections are usually the proverty or different ethnicity of the males.[45]

In an early effort to address the poverty problem, the reformist Turkish parliament passed a law in 1925, limiting the groom's bridal gifts to two dresses and restricting wedding celebrations to one day. It also forbade the public display of the trousseau and the employment of dancing girls at weddings. The proponents of the legislation claimed high wedding expenses often prevented marriages and drove youths to elopement, kidnappings or other illicit activities. The law, which was neither observed nor enforced, was repealed in 1967. Its opponents argued it unconstitutionally restricted personal freedom and was unenforceable because the prohibited practices were so deeply ingrained in Turkish village society.[46]

The true abduction rate is most probably much higher than the conviction rate. According to the ethnographic literature, Turks generally believe an abducted girl/woman has lost her honor (virginity). Consequently, no honorable family will knowingly take her in marriage. To avoid such shame, the parents of

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[40] Özgen, *supra* note 28, at 324-25.
[41] *Id.* at 327.
[42] Ibrahim Yasa, Türkiye Kız Kaçırma Gelenekler ve Bununla İlgili Bazı İdari Meseleleri [Kidnapping Traditions in Turkey and Some Associated Administrative Problems] (1962).
[43] Özgen, *supra* note 28, at 337.
[44] *Id.*
[45] Paul J. Magnarella, Tradition and Change in a Turkish Town 113-17 (1974).
[46] Turkish Daily News, May 9, 1967, at 1.

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an abducted daughter generally try to keep news of the event from spreading. They are, therefore, reluctant to demand the prosecution of the offender.[47]

In the Turkish town of Susurluk (northwestern Anatolia), where this writer conducted research in 1969-70 and 1972, the local authorities handled abduction (actually, elopement) cases in a manner probably typical of small town Turkey. With the agreement of the "kidnapped" woman and her parents, the public prosecutor offered the captured "abductor" the option of formally marrying the woman in lieu of being charged with a crime. If the abductor agreed, he was held in jail until the completion of the civil marriage ceremony, which was conducted in his cell.

C. Selecting a Spouse

According to the Hanafi School of Islamic law, a mentally competent adult male has the freedom to choose his spouse. A Muslim woman, however, should be assisted in her selection by her parents or guardian. Neither males nor females should be forced to marry against their will, but women do not enjoy as much freedom of selection as men.[48] A woman may marry someone her father or guardian objects to, only by successfully petitioning a qadi for his permission. In his deliberations, the qadi should consider both the woman's and her parent's interests. He will not, for instance, permit her to marry someone whose socioeconomic status is beneath that of her parents.[49] According to the prevalent opinion of the Hanafi School, a woman who marries an unsuitable man without her parent's permission has not made a valid contract.[50]

The Turkish Civil Code has equalized the rights of the sexes with respect to engagement and marriage by making the consent of both parties necessary conditions.[51] Marriage promises must be made by the couple themselves; proxies are not allowed. Parents may not enter into engagements or marital agreements on behalf of the children under their authority.[52]

Despite the law, arranged marriages, without the consent of the brides, have been somewhat common in Turkey. In the Population Survey, 11.4% of the women said their marriages were arranged by their families without their consent, while 67% said they had family arranged marriages with their consent.[53]

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[47] Yasa, *supra* note 40.
[48] Rahim, *supra* note 3, at 330.
[49] Zahra, *supra* note 34, at 137.
[50] *Id.*
[51] Gürbüz, *supra* note 32, at 16-17.
[52] *Id.*
[53] Timur, *supra* note 24, at 71.

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Impressively, 49.9% of the men surveyed said their fathers or other relatives had arranged their consensual marriages. This response category ranged from 59.1% for village men, to only 15.3% for men living in Istanbul, Ankara, or Izmir, Turkey's three major cities.[54] Many of the non-consensual marriages were probably the products of a religious marriage ceremony rather than the legally required civil one. Consequently, unless the spouses have successfully petitioned to have their marriages legally recognized, they are not legally bound to each other.

D. Monogamy and Polygyny

The *Quran* (Sura IV:3) allows a Muslim male to take up to four wives simultaneously if he can treat them all justly. A woman, however, may have only one husband at time. Aside from the Sultan, who maintained a harem, late Ottoman urban society was predominantly monogamous. On the basis of his study of 17th century records from the shari'a court in Bursa, a city in northwestern Anatolia, Gerber writes that of the over 2,000 records of male estates that he examined, in no more than twenty cases did a man have more than one wife.[55] According to available Istanbul records for 1885 and 1907, only 2.51% and 2.16% of men were married polygynously.[56] Reportedly, the Ottoman elite of the late 19th century had adopted the Western European aversion towards polygyny. In 1908, the Istanbul press campaigned against plural marriage, even asserting that as a matter of moral principle the Sultan should become monogamous.[57] Count Leon Ostrorog, a European who had served in Istanbul as Judicial Advisor to the Ottoman government, wrote that during his twenty years in the Empire he had made many friends, and none of them was polygynous. He was advised, however, that polygyny existed in the Eastern Anatolian villages.[58]

The Turkish Civil Code (Art. 93) conformed to urban Turkish morality, but directly opposed Islamic law by prescribing monogamy only.[59] According to estimates, the polygyny rate in Turkey's rural areas ranged from 2% to 10% during the early Republican era.[60] A 1942 study, sponsored by the Turkish Ministry of Justice, concluded that practically all polygynous marriages involved

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[54] *Id.* at 73.

[55] Haim Gerber, *Social and Economic Position of Women in an Ottoman City, Bursa, 1600-1700,* 12 Int'l J. of Mid. East Stud. 231, 232 (1980).

[56] Alan Duben & Cem Behar, Istanbul Households 148-49 (1991).

[57] H. Timur, *Civil Marriages in Turkey: Difficulties, Causes, and Remedies,* 9 Int'l Soc. Sci. Bull. 34 (1957).

[58] Ostrorog, *supra* note 14, at 82.

[59] Gürbüz, *supra* note 32, at 119.

[60] K. Lipstein, *Reception of Foreign Law in Turkey: Conclusion,* 9 Int'l Soc. Sci. Bull. 70, 78 (1957).

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only two wives, and the most common reasons for these bigamous unions were the need for another female worker and the sterility of the first wife.[61]

British anthropologist, Paul Stirling, reported that polygyny was socially accepted, but infrequently practiced in the two central Anatolian villages he studied in 1949-50. He found four plural marriages in one village, and seven in the other.[62] Ibrahim Yasa, a Turkish rural sociologist, claimed the influence of the new civil code had erased the practice completely in Hasanoğlan, a village outside of Ankara.[63] Yusuf Kurban, a Turkish anthropologist, who studied a Thracian village (northwest of Istanbul) of 151 households in the early 1950s, found only two bigamous marriages.[64] During 1959-60, Turkish sociologist Rezan Şahinkaya collected information on 147 households in seventy-three central Anatolian villages, and learned that 4.7% of them contained polygynous families. Practically all of these had rich husbands and supposedly infertile first wives.[65] In the 1968 population Survey, 1.9% of the women had polygynous husbands. The figure ranged from less than 0.5% for Turkey's three major cities to a high of 2.7% for its villages. Regionally, 5% of the women living in remote Eastern Anatolia had polygynous marriages.[66] The survey data also showed that polygyny existed in the smaller cities (1.6%) and towns (0.4%).[67] Plural marriages in urban areas, however, may be largely attributable to immigration from more traditional villages. Most scholars agree that the frequency of polygyny has declined since World War I, as the process of westernization spread from cities to towns and more recently to villages.

E. Religious and Civil Marriage Ceremony

According to Islamic law, marriage is a contract entered into by a man and a woman (personally or through their proxies) in the presence of two male witnesses (or one male and two female witnesses). The marriage ceremony does not require the participation of a Muslim religious figure.[68] During the Ottoman era, however, the *qadi* was the official authorized to prepare and authenticate the marriage document and perform the marriage ceremony. From the 16th century on, the *qadis* delegated authority to the more numerous and ubiquitous *imam*s

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[61] This study, entitled "Attitude and Opinion Survey on Polygyny and Illegitimate Children" [in Turkish] is reported in L.F. Fındıkoğlu, *The Reception of Foreign Law in Turkey: A Turkish Sociologist's View*, 9 Int'l Soc. Sci. Bull. 13 (1957).

[62] Stirling, *supra* note 35, at 197.

[63] Yasa, *supra* note 35, at 231.

[64] Kurban, *supra* note 35, at 49.

[65] Rezan Şahinkaya, Orta Anadolu Köylerinde Aile Strüktürü [Family Structure in Central Anatolian Villages] 40-42 (1966).

[66] Timur, *supra* note 24, at 93-94.

[67] *Id.*

[68] Rahim, *supra* note 3, at 328-29.

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(prayer leaders), and the *imam*-conducted religious ceremony, known as the *dini nikah,* became established custom throughout the lands comprising present-day Turkey.[69]

In a northwestern Anatolian mountain village, where this writer conducted research in the 1970s, the *dini nikah* commonly included an *imam*, two male witnesses, and a male representative for the bride and her family as well as one for the groom. Each representative was called a *vekalet.* After the *imam* had read passages from the *Quran,* he turned to the bride's *vekalet* and said, "In the name of Allah and in accordance with the exalted traditions of the Prophet, you have been named representative of so and so's daughter." The *imam* then asked him three times: "By Allah's command, did you give this girl?" The *vekalet* responded three times: "By the power of my office, I gave her." The *imam* then turned to the groom's *vekalet* and asked: "By Allah's command, did you take this girl?" He, too, responded affirmatively three times. The *imam* then solemnly said, "Amen," and together those present recited the *Fatiha* — the *Quran*'s opening chapter. They concluded the ceremony by sipping a sweet fruit drink and praying that the couple's marital life would pass sweetly. The village *imam* told me this ceremony had been common in the area for generations and all villagers still deemed it essential for a socially sanctioned marriage.

With the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code, the customary *dini nikah* ceased being the legally sanctioned way for a couple to marry. Instead, a secular, civil ceremony became required by Article 108 of the Civil Code. The civil ceremony must be conducted by an authorized government official. In urban areas, he may be the mayor or the mayor's appointee. In villages, he is a person appointed by the elected Council of Elders. The ceremony must be performed in the presence of two adult witnesses of either sex, and generally it occurs in an official place, such as a town hall. Article 237 of the Criminal Code makes it a punishable offense for any *imam* to celebrate a marriage before the civil marriage ceremony has been performed. These regulations have created more social and legal problems than any other provisions of the Turkish Civil Code.

Since 1926, a civil marriage certificate has been the credential entitling wives and mothers to legal rights under the family law. Without it, a wife cannot sue for divorce and alimony. Her children are illegitimate; she and they can claim their inheritance only with great legal difficulty. Furthermore, such wives and their children cannot qualify for certain government benefits. Despite all these disadvantages, a Turkish law professor reported that less than half of Turkish marriages during the first several decades of the Republican era were

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[69] Nuşin Ayiter, *Children Born out of Wedlock, in* Family in Turkish Society 351, 357 (Türköz Erder ed., 1985).

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sanctioned by civil ceremonies.[70] This indifference to the reform legislation was especially prominent in small towns and villages where a vast majority of the population resided.[71] Faced with huge numbers of "extra-marital unions" and their offspring, the Turkish Parliament decided to remedy the situation by passing seven "amnesty" bills between 1933 and 1981, to legally recognize the unions and their children. The five amnesty bills passed between 1933 and 1965, legitimized 2.74 million marriages and over 10 million children.[72]

The reasons many Turkish citizens have preferred the religious marriage ceremony over the civil one involve cultural and practical considerations. For most Turks, the *dini nikah* sanctions a marriage in the eyes of Allah and of the community. In the past, especially, the secular civil ceremony did neither. Referring to the Turkish villagers he studied in 1949-50, Stirling wrote: "No girl would ever feel at all abashed to admit that her marriage is not registered with the State. The informal system of social control provides strong sanctions for the performance of the traditional ceremony, but none at all for the performance of the civil ceremony."[73]

The implementation of the civil procedure was also hindered by a number of administrative and practical obstacles:[74]

1) In order to marry officially, a couple must first submit their birth certificates to a designated government official. Generally, only persons whose parents themselves have legally married and whose births have been properly registered will have such certificates. Acquiring birth certificates otherwise involves a long bureaucratic process that many Turks prefer to avoid. A religious ceremony circumvents these problems.

2) During the Ottoman and early Republican periods, many villagers postponed the registration of their children's births two to ten years to evade the road tax and postpone military service for sons. Many others waited until their children survived the critical first few years before going through the trouble and expense of registering them. Consequently, an actual eighteen year old might be only thirteen or younger according to the register and therefore too young to marry legally.

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[70] Timur, Civil Marriage in Turkey, *supra* note 55, at 34-35.

[71] Hifzi V. Velidedeoğlu, *The Reception of the Swiss Civil Code in Turkey*, 9 Int'l Soc. Sci. Bull. 60, 63 (1957).

[72] Hicri Fisek, *Legal Studies: Introduction, in* Family in Turkish Society 288, 292 (Türköz Erder ed., 1985).

[73] Stirling, *supra* note 35, at 29.

[74] *See* Timur, *supra* note 55.

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3) To marry legally, a couple must evince that they have complied with Articles 122 and 123 of the Public Health Law. These require the couple to undergo a thorough physical examination by a medical officer to determine whether they are free from syphilis, mental disease or other disorders. Since medical officers are located in urban areas, access to them by people living in the remote villages has been unduly difficult. Furthermore, conservative families and grooms regard the physical examination of their daughters/fiancées by strange men distasteful.

4) Although certain rural officials, such as the elected village chief, are authorized to perform the civil ceremony, many in the past were illiterate or marginally literate and either could not or would not deal with the formal paper work. This forced residents of remote villages to choose between the inconvenience of going to the cities for a civil ceremony or the convenience of having a religious one conducted in their own villages by the local imam.

In his 1944-45 research in Hasanoğlan village, Yasa found that of 245 couples, 91% had had both religious and civil marriage ceremonies, 8.6% had had only religious ceremonies, while just 0.4% had had civil ceremonies exclusively.[75] Yasa commented that the villagers regarded the religious ceremony as a moral necessity and the civil ceremony as a practical one. In his restudy of the same village twenty-five years later, Yasa wrote that newly weds then regarded both ceremonies as morally significant.[76]

In her 1966-67 research, in the south-central province of Hatay, Şahinkaya interviewed 212 urban wives and 207 village wives.[77] She found that only 4% of the urban and 6.5% of the rural women had entered marriage via a religious ceremony only.[78] Just over 6% of the urban and only 0.4% of the village women had had only civil ceremonies.[79] The vast majority (90% urban; 93% rural) had both.[80] However, Şahinkaya discovered that many rural couples, contrary to the law, had their religious ceremonies first. They did so either because one or both of the spouses were officially too young to marry legally, or because they agreed to wait until a child was born before having the civil ceremony.[81] A civil marriage makes divorce difficult; a religious marriage does not.

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[75] Yasa, *supra* note 37, at 145.

[76] Ibrahim Yasa, Yirmibeş Yıl Sonra Hasanoğlan Köyü [Hasanoglan Village Twenty-five Years Later] 65 (1969).

[77] Rezan Şahinkaya, Hatay Bölgesinde Köy ve Şehirde Aile Mutluluğu ve Çocuk Ölümü [Village and City Family Happiness and Child Mortality in the Hatay Region] 28 (1970).

[78] *Id.*

[79] *Id.*

[80] *Id.*

[81] *Id.*

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The most comprehensive data on this question come from the 1968 Population Survey, which showed that the percentage of "religious only" marriages averaged just over 5% for couples in towns and cities, but rises to 21.3% for those in villages.[82] The Survey evinces that the percentage of "religious only" marriages is lowest in western Turkey (5.5%) and highest in eastern Turkey (36.6%).[83] While the West contains Turkey's most economically developed provinces (e.g., Istanbul and Izmir), the East contains Turkey's most remote and economically underdeveloped provinces. In addition, significant proportions of the eastern population are Kurds and Arabs, whose average educational levels have been comparatively low. For example, in 1975, Turkey's average literacy rates were 76% for males and 50.5% for females. However, the male-female literacy rates for three eastern provinces with high Kurdish populations were 52% and 19% (Bitlis), 41% and 8% (Hakkari), and 46% and 16% (Van).[84] It generally appears that the reception of the new Civil Code is a function of economic development, geographical accessibility, and education.

F. Spousal Relations

According to Islamic law, the husband legally dominates his wife, "because he is mentally and physically superior of the two."[85] This view is authorized by the *Quran* :

> Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because God has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband's) absence what God would have them guard.
>
> As to those women whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (next) refuse to share their beds, (and last) beat them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not against them means (of annoyance).[86]

Consequently, the *Shari'a* burdens the wife with the duty of obedience. Her husband has the right to choose the family residence, and she has the duty to live with him in harmony and to go on journeys with him if he demands. He has the right to discipline her if she disobeys along with the duty to support her by providing food, clothing, and shelter.[87] The *Shari'a* also circumscribes a

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[82] Timur, *supra* note 24, at 92.
[83] *Id.*
[84] Statistical Yearbook of Turkey (1983).
[85] Rahim, *supra* note 3, at 327.
[86] Quran, Sura IV:34.
[87] Zahra, *supra* note 34, at 144-45.

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husband's discipline. Jennings notes that the 17th century *Shari'a* court in Kayseri "supported any women who had been beaten contrary to the sharia or in an unlawful place. The wife must not be struck on the head or face, for example, and her husband must not beat her in rage."[88]

Public practices during the late Ottoman period reflected the view that women embodied a protected and dependent species. Ostrorog wrote:

> [Women] were not allowed to remain out of doors after sunset. While in the street, they were not allowed to walk in the company of men. They were not allowed to wear veils too transparent, nor mantles outlining too closely their figure. It they neglected to comply with these prescriptions, policemen could intervene...[89]

Turkey's secular codes have preserved some of the traditional spousal rights and duties, while eliminating others. For instance, the Criminal Code makes the beating of a wife a criminal offense,[90] and the Civil Code makes it grounds for a divorce.[91] The Civil Code, however, preserves the husband's predominant status. Article 152 grants him the right to choose the family residence, and the wife the duty to live with him. The husband must, however, exercise this right in good faith. His chosen residence and its furnishings must be appropriate to his economic status. The residence's location must be safe, accessible, and morally fit for a family. In 1978, the Court of Cassation held that a man who had ordered his wife to reside with him on Istanbul's infamous Mis Street, an area known for brothels, had not acted in good faith.[92]

According to Article 159, a wife needs the express or tacit consent of her husband to enter employment outside the home. Article 226 provides that the parents shall decide their children's religious educations. Should the parents disagree, the husband's choice takes priority. In general, family law of the Republican period regards the husband as the provider and final authority in most family matters. This view corresponds well with the traditional patriarchal and patrilineal character of Turkish society. Turkey's modernists, however, find certain of these provisions irksome. Some have argued, for example, that Article 159 of the Civil Code (which makes a wife's employment subject to her husband's permission) conflicts with the equal right to work clause of the

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[88] Jennings, *supra* note 27, at 91.
[89] Ostrorog, *supra* note 14, at 75.
[90] Esat Sener, *Change in the Family as Reflected in the Jurisprudence of the Republican Era, in* Family in Turkish Society 401, 403 (Türköz Erder ed., 1985).
[91] Gürbüz, *supra* note 32, at 123.
[92] Sener, *supra* note 88, at 409,

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Turkish Constitution.[93] Consequently, there are lobbying efforts to strike Article 159 from the Code.

G. Inheritance

Under the *Shari'a,* successions were divided unequally between male and female heirs. The *Quran* states: "God directs you as regards your children's inheritance: to the male, a portion equal to that of two females."[94] The *Shari'a* also assigned shares of the decedent's estate to his living parents. With respect to the inheritance of agricultural land, however, Ottoman state law (*Kanun*), not the *Shari'a,* applied. The pertinent *Kanun* provided for the direct succession of agricultural land from father to son.[95] Gerber reported that court records from 17th century Bursa, "show that males in Bursa were not unaware of the possibilities of disinheriting women."[96] However, he continued, "The kadi records... contain a large number of documents which, in effect, describe legal disputes involving women over estates and inheritances and they show that in many cases women did actually inherit."[97]

According to Turkey's new Civil Code, the estate of a person who dies intestate is divided into equal shares among his male and female heirs, with the share size being determined by degree of kinship. The surviving spouse (husband or wife) may choose either one-fourth share or a usufruct (life tenancy) of one-half of the estate, when there are also surviving children. A person may dispose of his property as of his death by a previously executed will. However, the law limits the testator's freedom to dispose by prescribing that a portion of the estate must be reserved for the decedent's spouse, children, and/or other close relatives. Parents are excluded when descendants exist.[98]

Velidedeoğlu observed that the equality of shares between the sexes and the exclusion of the parents when descendants exist have created a good deal of discontent in cities and villages.[99] This probably stems from the fact that many urban and rural businesses are family enterprises run by male relatives, especially fathers and sons. In the past, when close to half the marriages were not legal, males could keep property within the patriline with impunity. Stirling, who studied central Anatolian peasant life in 1949-50, wrote that

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[93] Deniz Kandiyoti, Major Issues on the Status of Women in Turkey: Approaches and Priorities 59 (1980).
[94] Quran, Sura IV: 11.
[95] Gerber, *supra* note 53, at 235.
[96] *Id.* at 232.
[97] *Id.* at 232-33.
[98] *See* Adal, *supra* note 22, at 91-125.
[99] Velidedeoğlu, *supra* note 69, at 64.

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villagers pass the real property on the their sons. He found no evidence that they had followed the Quranic inheritance rules in the past or the new Civil Code more recently.[100] Villagers in northwestern Anatolia, interviewed by this writer in 1969-70, said that a deceased patriarch's estate usually passes to his mature sons, who assume the duty of supporting their mother and younger siblings and of eventually paying their sisters' shares out of income and movable property.[101] The villagers stressed need and practicality, not equality. However, when this writer asked a sample of 182 men from the town of Susurluk how they thought a father with a son and a daughter should bequeath his estate, the vast majority (88.4%) replied, "equally."[102] In the spirit of the civil code, they maintained there should be no discrimination based on gender. Hence, the available information about inheritance attitudes and practices reveals a dichotomy between urban and rural peoples that existed in Ottoman times and has persisted into the Republican period.

H. Terminating Marriage

Under Islamic law, the marriage contract terminates automatically when one of the spouses abandons Islam. Otherwise, the power of termination rests primarily with the husband. He can repudiate his wife at will, without being restricted to any justifiable cause or court procedure. The *Shari'a,* as applied in the late Ottoman period, granted the wife no remedy against an unjust dismissal; she could only claim her marriage portion, if one had been stipulated in the marriage contract.[103] A man could also accuse his wife of adultery and disown any child he claimed resulted from her infidelity simply by taking an oath (swearing, "Allah is my witness" four times) before a *qadi.* The woman was deemed irrebutably guilty without further proof.[104]

For her part, a woman could divorce legally only by leave of her husband or the court. A man could empower his wife to divorce either by agreeing to such a provision in the original marriage contract or by granting her the right subsequent to their marriage.[105] Otherwise, a wife who suffered her husband's excessive cruelty could state her case in a *Shari'a* court and pray for a divorce, which the *qadi* could grant at his discretion.[106] Because the vast majority of

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[100] Stirling, *supra* note 35, at 21.
[101] Magnarella, *supra* note 43, at 126.
[102] *Id.*
[103] Ostrorog, *supra* note 14, at 81.
[104] Sener, *supra* note 88, at 403.
[105] Zahra, *supra* note 34, at 146.
[106] *Id.*

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divorces were performed outside the courts in Ottoman times, records indicating divorce rates are unavailable.[107]

Turkey's Civil Code has deprived husbands of their Islamic prerogatives. All divorces became the product of a court proceeding. The law recognizes only six grounds for divorce: adultery; plot against life, grave assaults and insults; crime or dishonorable conduct; desertion; mental infirmity; and incompatibility.[108] The evidentiary requirements are so substantial that establishing one of the recognized grounds has proven difficult.[109] A couple cannot divorce by mutual consent, and Article 134 provides that the party claiming incompatibility must be blameless.[110]

In the event of divorce, the court grants parental authority over any children to one of the spouses, and requires the other to contribute to the expense of raising them. The court may order the husband to pay his wife "maintenance" for up to one year if: a) she is in need; b) she was blameless in the divorce action; and c) the husband has the means to pay.[111] Turkish scholars have criticized the maintenance provision as unrealistic in a system where women do not have any other social security coverage and where possibilities for employment are severely restricted.[112]

Turkey's official divorce rate is comparatively low: 3.7 per thousand in 1950 and 3.5 in 1980.[113] But because so many marriages during the first few decades of the Republic were not legally registered, these rates are misleading. Turks who married by means of a religious ceremony could divorce without going to court. Stirling writes that this was the practice among the central Anatolian peasants he studied in 1949-50.[114] He also notes that village women exercised the *de facto* power of repudiation. If they felt their situations were intolerable, they returned to the protection of their natal homes, and later remarried with their elders' blessings, even though their original husbands had not divorced them either orally according to Islamic law or in court according to the modern civil law.[115] Stirling also observed that women who had married and been divorced Islamically often married another man (usually a widower) before the *iddet* (the Islamically prescribed waiting period) expired. When he brought

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[107] Jennings, *supra* note 27, at 82.
[108] Adal, *supra* note 22, at 84-90.
[109] M.R. Belgesay, *Social, Economic, and Technical Difficulties Experienced as a Result of the Reception of Foreign Law*, 9 Int'l Soc. Sci. Bull. 49,51 (1957).
[110] *Id.* at 88.
[111] *Id.* at 88-90; Turkish Civil Code, art. 144, 145.
[112] Kandiyoti, *supra* note 91, at 61.
[113] Fisek, *supra* note 70, at 295.
[114] Paul Stirling, *Land, Marriage, and the Law in Turkish Villages*, 9 Int'l Soc. Sci. Bull. 21 (1957).
[115] *Id.* at 31.

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this apparent violation to the villagers' attention, they simply responded, "Who's going to care for the children and bake the bread while we wait three months?"[116] Again, the challenges of peasant life require that practicality outweigh legal rigidity.

III. COMMENTARY AND CONCLUSION

The living family law among Turks has varied from city to village even though both were subject to the *Shari'a* during the Ottoman period and the Turkish Civil Code (modeled on the Swiss Civil Code) thereafter. While the Ottoman urban elite shared many contemporary European values and practices, the Turkish peasants of Anatolia adhered to their Turco-Islamic traditions. In both Ottoman and Republican times villagers were more likely to marry polygynously, live in large patriarchal, patrilocal extended families, pass land wealth down to sons exclusively, and arrange marriages for their children than were urban dwellers. Consequently, Turkey's 1926 adoption of the Swiss Civil Code imposed greater differences in social behavior on villagers than on urbanites.

According to post-World War II assessments by Turkish legal scholars and foreign social scientists, many, if not most, Turkish villagers were still following their Turco-Islamic customs despite the new Civil Code. Furthermore, with the development of rural-urban migration in the 1950s, many peasants carried their traditions with them into the cities. Dror maintains that basic institutions, such as the family, which are rooted in the traditional value system, are extremely resistant to changes imposed by law.[117] On the surface, this argument appears to offer a satisfactory explanation for the Turkish experience. A closer examination of the Turkish data, however, reveals systematic regional differences whose explanation requires additional considerations.

The data offered in the 1968 Population Survey illustrate these regional variations. For example, although 1.9% of the women in the sample were married to polygynous husbands, the rate varied from a low of 0.2% for women living in Western Anatolia to a high of 5% for women living in Eastern Anatolia.[118] While 15% of the women sampled had been married by a religious ceremony only, the figure ranged from 5.5% in Western Anatolia to 36.6% in Eastern Anatolia.[119] Although the average age at marriage for all women was 17.1 years, it ranged from 17.8 years in Western Anatolia to 16.3 years in

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[116] *Id.*
[117] Yehezkel Dror, *Law and Social Change*, 33 Tul. L. Rev. 749 (1959).
[118] Timur, *supra note* 24, at 94.
[119] *Id.* at 92.

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Eastern Anatolia.[120] These differences in marital practices are correlated with a series of sociocultural and economic factors.

Western Anatolia is Turkey's most urbanized, economically developed and literate region. It contains the cosmopolitan cities of Istanbul and Izmir, Turkey's first and third largest metropolises. The region has close proximity to Europe along with Turkey's most advanced transportation and communications networks. By contrast, Eastern Anatolia is a remote, economically underdeveloped and sparsely populated region with few cities of major consequence. Its people have the lowest educational levels and literacy rates in the country. Moreover, large, but unknown, proportions of the East Anatolian population are people whose mother tongues are Kurdish and Arabic. As part of its nationalistic policy, the Turkish government until recently has prohibited instruction or publications in these non-Turkish languages. Historically, many Eastern peoples, especially the women, never learned Turkish. The region's economy has traditionally been a mix of peasant farming, nomadic pastoralism, and handicrafts. The area's heavy winter snowfalls isolate many Eastern villages for weeks at a time. Owing to their remoteness, most East Anatolians were beyond the reach of educational and legal institutions during the early Republican period.[121]

Given the above facts, the transformation of Turkey's village and East Anatolian living family law towards conformity with the new Civil Code is a function of economic development, education, and national exposure. In Turkey's villages in general and in Eastern Turkey in particular, a divergence between legal prescriptions and social practices prevailed. Turkey's legal scholars have discussed the rural-urban differences, but, owing to the official government policy of downplaying ethnicity, they have ignored the East-West cleavage.

More recent information shows that larger proportions of the Turkish population are observing the new civil code. For example, only 15% of the women in th 1969 Population Survey admitted to having been married by a religious ceremony only, as compared with the estimated 50+% prior to 1950.[122] Among the numerous reasons for this greater observance are the following.

1) Over the decades the numbers of Turkish judges and lawyers trained in the new code have increased significantly;

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[120] *Id.* at 97.

[121] On Eastern Anatolia generally, see Ismail Beşikçi, Doğu Anadolu'nun Düzeni: Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller [East Anatolia's Order: Soci-economic and Ethnic Foundations] (1969).

[122] Timur, *supra* note 24, at 92.

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2) The education and literacy rates of the general population have risen markedly, indicating more people have been exposed to the new legal requirements in school or through publications;

3) The government has been able to get the message to the people over radio and television as the numbers of both kinds of receivers have greatly increased;

4) The government has associated the code with economic rewards. Income, medical, and tax benefits go to families whose marriages and children are legally registered; and

5) The country's progressively improving infrastructure of roads, transportation, government facilities, and communications enables the law to reach into areas that were previously out of its grasp.

These factors taken together with the reformist legislation have constituted the cumulative force which is transforming the living Turco-Islamic law of Turkey's countryside into the Euro-Christian system embodied in the adopted Swiss Civil Code.

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THE LEGAL, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL STRUCTURES OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS AND ABUSES IN TURKEY*

INTRODUCTION

Turkey stands as the only democratic state with a predominantly Muslim population. Although most of Turkey's territory lies in the Middle East, its political leaders have created a West European-style constitutional republic with a pro-Western foreign policy. Turkey boasts a democratically elected parliament and an independent judiciary. It is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Council of Europe, the European Community (associate member), and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Turkey is also an American ally and the third largest recipient of United States foreign aid.[1]

Despite these achievements, Turkey is currently a major target of domestic and international criticism over its human rights practices. Critics have focused their concern mainly on the following allegations: 1) torture and the suspicious deaths of prisoners while in detention; 2) disappearances and extra-judicial killings of opposition politicians, human rights activists, journalists, and Kurdish nationalists; 3) government infringements on the freedoms of speech, press and association; 4) denial of due process to persons under the jurisdiction of state security courts and in the state of emergency region; 5) the murder of Kurdish civilians and the destruction of Kurdish villages in the

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[1]For fiscal year 1993, the U.S. granted Turkey $450 million in military assistance and $125 million in economic support grants. *Human Rights in Turkey: Briefing of the [U.S.] Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe* 20 (April 5, 1993).

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Southeast by the Turkish military, and, 6) suppression of Kurdish cultural expression.[2]

During his recent visit to Ankara, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, John Shattuck, urged Turkish officials to move quickly to improve their state's human rights record.[3] Both the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have voted to send human rights fact-finding missions to Turkey.[4]

This article examines the issue of human rights in Turkey from legal, political, and cultural perspectives and offers information gathered by the author during a fact-finding trip to Turkey in April, 1994. In addition to presenting a general background to Turkey's human rights problems, the article focuses on the legal bases for human rights and the special situation of the Kurds.

I. POLITICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

After World War I, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk provided the charismatic political leadership to construct the modern Turkish Republic on the crumbled foundations of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. As head of a one-party political system, Atatürk, with the support of his Republican Peoples Party (RPP), embarked on the ambitious agenda of remaking multi-ethnic Anatolia and Eastern Thrace into a modern "nation-state." Although Turkey's population was predominantly Muslim, it was, and continues to be, ethnically diverse, consisting of such peoples as Abkhasians, Albanians, Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, Azeris, Bosnians, Chechens, Circassians, Georgians, Greeks, Gypsies, Kurds, Laz, Turks, and others.[5]

In the post-World War I Treaty of Lausanne (1923), Turkey recognized the distinct ethnic status of only Christian Armenians, Christian Greeks, and Jews,

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[2]For recent charges and criticisms by Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch, *see generally id.* For more detailed and documented allegation, *see* Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, 500-Day Report (21 November 1991 - 5 April 1993) [Ankara] (1993) [*hereinafeter 500-Day Report*], and U.S. Department of State Dispatch, *Turkey Human Rights Practices, 1993* [Washington, D.C.] (1994]. *See also* Dahlberg, Robin, et al., *Torture in Turkey: The Legal System's Response,* Report of the Committee on International Human Rights of the Bar of the City of New York (1989), and Helsinki Watch, *Paying the Price: Freedom of Expression in Turkey* (1989)

[3]*U.S. Urges Ankara to End Abuse of Kurds, INT'L HERALD TRIB.*, July 13, 1994, at 2, col. 5.

[4]*Id.*

[5]In his April 5, 1993 statement before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, historian Heath Lowry said that when the 600 year old Ottoman Empire came to an end in 1923, "there were somewhere between 35 and 45 different ethnic groups represented in what was to become the boundaries of the new republic of Turkey." *Human Rights in Turkey, supra* note 1, at 32. For ethnographic descriptions of many of these peoples, *see* Peter A. Andrews, Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey (1989); Paul J. Magnarella, Tradition and Change in a Turkish Town (1981), and Paul J. Magnarella, The Peasant Venture (1979).

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in order to appease the victorious Western powers, who apparently cared little about the Muslim minorities.[6] In the process of nation-building, the Turkish governing elite categorized all Muslims as ethnic Turks. Use of their languages in public discourse, educational institutions, broadcasts, and publications was prohibited. Turkism, the ideology that all citizens (with the exception of Jews and Christians) were ethnically Turks and should learn true Turkish (their languages were supposedly substandard variants of Turkish) was deeply inculcated in much of the population through the compulsory public schools. The existence of Muslim ethnic minorities was officially denied. The government did not tolerate non-Turkish cultural expression, regarding it as a danger to the indivisibility of the state.[7]

The strongest resistance to these cultural restrictions has come from the Kurds, a people speaking an Indo-European language (Kurdish) and claiming Turkey's Southeast as part of their traditional homeland. Today, approximately 40% of their estimated 8.5 million to 12 million population in Turkey reside in the central and western parts of the country.[8] While many of these Kurds have been Turkified and integrated into Turkish society, a large proportion of those residing in the remote Southeast have not.

The leaders of the new Turkish state had inherited the long statist tradition of the Ottoman Empire. Atatürk and his closest supporter and successor — Ismet Inönü — were products of the Ottoman tradition of an elite-directed military and bureaucratic reform aimed at strengthening the state's defenses and preventing secession.[9] The principles of Kemalist ideology — republicanism, secularism, statism, populism and reformism — provided for loyalty to a unified nation defined in terms of ethnic Turkism.[10]

Having accused Islamic-Ottoman institutions and culture of responsibility for the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Atatürk embarked on a vigorous program of secularization, abolishing the offices of Caliphate and Sultanate, disestablishing Islam as the official religion, replacing Islamic law with European legal codes, and substituting Latin letters for the Arabic script. Atatürk's principle of populism involved substituting Turkish national and state identity for Islam.[11]

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[6]Bernard Lewis, The Emergency of Modern Turkey 348-351 (1961).

[7]*See generally* David Barchard, Turkey and the West (1985). Barchard notes that "[T]he Turkish Republic has consistently been concerned to promote linguistic and cultural homogeneity." *Id.* at 13.

[8]Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds of Turkey 6-7 (1990).

[9]Lucille W. Pevsner, Turkey's Political Crisis 6 (1984).

[10]For a discussion of these principles, *see* Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics 251-348 (1969).

[11]Pevsner, *supra* note 9, at 9.

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Atatürk died in 1938, and former general Ismet Inönü succeeded him. Inönü saw his RPP suffer defeat in Turkey's first open and honest multi-party election in 1950. Over the years, Turkey's electoral system had progressively evolved. During the early years of the republic the voting franchise had been limited to males over eighteen years of age, and the national electoral had been indirect. Men voted for secondary electors who selected the actual deputies to the unicameral assembly. In 1934 women received the right to vote and to run for national office. In 1950 and thereafter elections were based on fully direct suffrage. All votes became equal; citizens cast secret ballots; and election officials counted the ballots publicly. Since 1950, citizens twenty-one years of age or older have been eligible to vote, the exceptions being military personnel below the rank of officer, persons convicted of serious crimes, and persons banned from the process by military governments.[12]

The political divisions manifested during Turkey's subsequent multi-party eras grew out of the country's diverse sociocultural and economic composition. The elitist RPP had been supported by secularists, ardent Turkish nationalists, the urban elite, civil bureacurats, military leaders and large landowers. During its period of rule, the Democrat Party (DP) appealed to the disinherited and the RPP's own disenchanted. It eased legal restrictions on Islamic religious expression and directed more ecomonic benefits to small businessmen and farmers, who comprised about 70% of the population. These constituencies returned the DP to power in the 1954 and 1957 elections. Significantly, unlike Atatürk and Inönü, neither the DP president nor prime minister had previously been generals. Consequently, they lacked the confidence and support of the military, whose fixed salaries were actually diminishing due to the high inflation created, in part, by liberal government spending. After the government repeatedly called on the military to quell "illegal" demonstrations of political protest by university students in Ankara and Istanbul, the generals decided civilian politics had failed.

Headed by General Cemal Gürsel, the military carried out a bloodless coup on May 27, 1960 and drove the Democrats out of office.[13] The ruling junta, known as the National Unity Committe (NUC), appointed a committee of liberal law professors to write a new constitution that would both act as a legal obstacle to future political abuses and institutionalize the military's involvement in politics. The resulting document created a bicameral parliament and made members of the NUC senators for life. It also created a National Security Council comprised of the armed forces chiefs, who would assist the cabinet in

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[12]For a more detailed description of the system of government and politics in Turkey prior to the 1980 coup, *see* Paul J. Magnarella, *Turkey*, in World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties, at 1032-51 (G. E. Delury ed., Vol. 2 1983.

[13]For a discussion of the coup as well as events preceding and following it, *see* Walter Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, 1960-61 (1963).

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making decisions concerning national security and coordination. In addition, the constitution provided for a constitutional court; it legalized free trade unions with the right to strike and to bargain collectively; and granted autonomous status to radio and television stations and to the universities. The constitution also guaranteed the freedoms of conscience, political belief, assembly and press as well as the right to form political parties. This, Turkey's most liberal constitution ever, went into force in 1961, after winning acceptance in a national referendum.[14]

That same year the NUC lifted its ban on political parties and allowed national elections as well as the renewal of civilian rule. During the 1960s, the military, with its establishment of the Military Mutual Assistance Association (known as OYAK), became intimately involved in the Turkish and international economies. OYAK controlled a huge investment fund accumulated through obligatory and voluntary contributions of military personnel and investment profits. It invested heavily in the automobile, truck, and tire manufacturing industries; petrochemical, cement and food processing industries, and the retail and service industries. As a result of OYAK investments, the economic security of thousands of active and retired armed forces officers and enlisted personnel became dependent upon the profitability of large domestic and international capitalistic enterprises.

The Turkish military, through OYAK became partners with foreign and domestic firms and shared with them the same concerns for profits, political stability, and labor compliance. Consequently, the military's corporate interests expanded into the areas of labor law, trade unionism, monetary policy, corporate taxation, investment banking, the media, and other related matters.[15]

During the balance of the 1960s various civilian government coalitions tried to cope with the country's growing economic and demographic problems: high rates of inflation and unemployment, labor-management strife, violent strikes and lockouts, small business bankruptcies, anti-government demonstrations, clashes between right- and left-wing students, and rapid urbanization.

Believing the civilian politicians were unable to cope with these crises, the praetorians forced them to resign and replaced them with a series of "above party" governments from 1971 to 1973. During this period, the military also declared martial law in most major cities and over a dozen provinces. It

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[14]For a comparison of Turkey's three constitutions (1924, 1861, 1982), *see* Metin Tamkoç, Inconsistency Between the Form and Essence of the Turkish Political System (1983).

[15]On OYAK, *see* Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975 280-81 (1977); Doğu Ergil, *Class Conflict and Turkish Transformation* (1950-1975), 41 Studia Islamica 12-15 (1975).

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prohibited strikes and lockouts; banned radical political publications; arrested thousands of people, including labor activists, leftists, religious activists, and intellectuals; and shut down radical political organizations, such as the pro-Islamic National Salvation Party and the pro-Marxist Turkish Workers Party. These suppressive measures, however, only temporarily lowered the country's level of agitation.

From 1973 to 1980 another series of fragile and ineffective coalition governments confronted the same problems of the 1960s, with the addition of widespread political terrorism, in exacerbated form. The situation was aggravated by an economic decline in Western Europe that put a halt to the flow of Turkish workers going abroad and reduced the remittances of those already there. In addition, the U.S. embargo on military aid to Turkey, because of the latter's 1974 Cyprus intervention, caused serious reductions in the defense budget.[16]

On September 12, 1980, the military marched into this chaotic scene and took control of the government once again. In order to bring about stability, protect Atatürk's heritage and safeguard its own economic interests, it declared martial law throughout the country, dissolved parliament, banned all political parties and political activity, and arrested thousands of suspected terrorists and criminals, along with political activists, intellectuals and labor leaders. The new junta, called the National Security Council (NSC), ruled the country for the next three years and three months as the most repressive of Turkey's praetorian governments. It came down especially hard on members of leftist trade unions and Kurdish nationalists.[17] Ruling by decree, the NSC permanently terminated all existing political parties and arrested several of their leaders. It outlawed all but one moderate labor confederation, strictly limited the right to strike, and decreed that henceforth labor unions could not engage in political activity. The NSC placed the universities and radio and television stations under direct government supervision and sharply curtailed freedom of the press. Any criticism of the coup, the NSC or its actions constituted crimes.[18]

The NSC replaced the 1961 constitution with a much less liberal document that created a unicameral parliament and a strong presidency. According to the new constitution, presidential actions are largely immune from the checks of other governmental branches. For example, Article 105 states: "No appeal shall be made to any legal authority, including the Constitutional Court, against the decisions and orders signed by the President of the Republic on his own

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[16]For a more complete discussion of this situation with an analysis of the factors promoting it, *see* Paul J. Magnarella, *Civil Violence in Turkey: Its Infrastructural, Social and Cultural Foundations*, in Sex Roles, Family and Community in Turkey 383-401 (Çiğdem Kağîtçîbaşî ed., 1982).

[17]Barchard, *supra* note 7, at 13; Martin van Bruinessen, *The Kurds in Turkey*, 121 Merip Rep. 6-12 (Feb. 1984).

[18]For a more detailed treatment of this period, *see* Pevsner, *supra* note 9.

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initiative."[19] Note that up to this point in Turkey's history, only one president had not been a retired general or admiral.

Article 125 states: "The acts of the President of the Republic in his own competence and the decisions of the Supreme Military Council are outside the scope of judicial review." Parliament ("Grand National Assembly") elects the national president, who holds office for a single, non-renewable seven year term. The constitution also provides for a prime minister, who heads the council of ministers. With the acceptance of the new constitution in the November 1982 referendum, General Kenan Evren — head of the NSC — automatically became president. Multi-party national elections followed, and civilian politicians, with the advice of military leaders, have governed the country since 1983.

II. TURKEY'S 1982 CONSTITUTION AND TURKISH CONSTITUTIONALISM

The 1982 constitution stresses the concept of an indivisible, unified state and the reforms of Atatürk. For example, the preamble (which Article 2 incorporates into the constitution) states in part:

> [N]o protection shall be afforded to thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the existence of Turkey as an indivisible entity with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values, or the nationalism, principles, reforms, and modernism of Atatürk, and that as required by the principle of secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever of sacred religious feelings in state affairs and politics; ...

Article 5 repeats the indivisibility theme: "The fundamental aims and duties of the State are: to safeguard the independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country,..."

Article 14 not only reemphasizes indivisibility, but apparently prohibitis any kind of regional autonomy arrangement for a large, distinctive ethnic population, such as the Kurds:

> None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, ... of placing the government of the State under the control of an individual or a group of people, or establishing the

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[19]This and other constitutional quotes come from the English language version of the *1982 Constitution of Turkey, amended*, printed and distributed by the Embassy of Turkey, Washington, D.C.).

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> hegemony of one social class over others, or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas. (Art. 14).

Several provisions of the constitution guarantee the rights of thought, speech and the press:

> Article 24. Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction... Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools.
>
> Article 25. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and opinion. No one shall be compelled to reveal his thoughts and opinions for any reason or purpose; nor shall anyone be blamed or accused on account of his thoughts and opinions.
>
> Article 26. Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his thoughts and opinion by speech, in writing or in pictures or through other media, individually or collectively. This right includes the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas without interference from official authorities... The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the purposes of preventing crime, punishing offenders, withholding information duly classified as a state secret, protecting the reputation and rights and the private and family life of others, or protecting professional secrets as prescribed by law, or ensuring the proper functioning of the judiciary...
>
> Article 28. The press is free and shall not be censored. The establishment of a printing house shall not be subject to prior permission and to the deposit of a financial guarantee... Anyone who writes or prints any news or articles which threaten the internal and external security of the State or the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation,... shall be held responsible under the law relevant to these offenses...

With Article 28, the constitution also provides the legal basis for criminalizing speech that criticizes governmental actions (if the speech is deemed to threaten the security of the state) or advocates a cultural rights policy for non-Turkish minorities, such as the Kurds (if it is deemed to threaten the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation).

Based on his own analysis of Turkish history, this writer concludes that the principles of constitutionalism that provide the Turkish politico-legal system

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with its essential structure and bases for action, consist, in part, of the following:

1) *Statism and authoritarianism.* The state, through the government in power, closely directs the country's economy, society and culture. "In Kemalist Turkey, reform and centralization by a cohesive center was the ideal aim of statecraft, as it had been in Ottoman Turkey. In the multiparty period [from 1946] this tradition persisted in the form of 'bureaucratic paternalism' and military imposition of reform."[20] The Turkish political scientist, Metin Tamkoç has written: "Modernization of Turkey was initiated under the authoritarian regime of Atatürk. His authoritarian political system was the product of the traditional political culture and patrimonial infrastructure."[21] '[In] Turkey there is no room for an 'opposition group.' The governing elite do not tolerate opposition to their authority or their policies."[22] The ruling elites have also shown little tolerance for criticism. For example, in her statement to the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Lois Whitman, Deputy Director of Helsinki Watch, said police had harassed, detained, interrogated, and beaten scores of journalists for their writings. Some have been tried and sentenced, having been convicted under the very broad anti-terror law of such offenses as criticizing or insulting the president, public officials, Atatürk, or the military, or of printing ant-military propaganda.[23]

2) *Military involvement in government, the economy and society.* The military elite, seeing themselves as the guardians of the state and Atatürk's heritage, intervene frequently in the economy and government, either through authoritarian advice or coups. The noted Turkish political journalist, Mehmet Ali Birand, has written that the Turkish armed forces are perceived to have the legitimate right and duty to intervene in politics and government in the name of the nation.[24] He adds that through coups and military rule, the generals "have stamped their imprint on every aspect of Turkish society for the foreseeable future."[25]

3) *Atatürk's principle of populism.* Populism stands against class-based politics and for an indivisible, unified state based on one people and one language. A component of populism is Turkification; the state, through ruling governments from Atatürk to the present, has tried to convert ethnically

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[20] Pevsner, *supra* note 9, at 9.
[21] Tamkoç, *supra* note 14, at 26-27.
[22] *Id.*
[23] *Human Rights in Turkey,* supra note 1, at 20.
[24] Mehmet Ali Birand, The Generals' Coup in Turkey 2 (1987).
[25] *Id.* For discussions of this theme, *see also* Metin Tamkoç, The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of National Security and the Modernization of Turkey (1976); William M. Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (1994).

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heterogeneous peoples into a homogeneous population of Turks. The process has involved rewriting history (e.g., the sun-language theory, which maintains that Turkish is the origin of all other languages)[26] and suppressing the cultural identity and expression of non-Turkish peoples with Turkey.

4) *Legalism*. The practice by both civilian and military governments of legalizing all the above, so as to legitimize the state's often intimate involvement in the economy, society and culture; the political and legal consequences of military intervention; and the related processes of Turkification and suppression of non-Turkish culture.

All of these principles have had serious consequences for human rights.

III. CHARGES OF TORTURE AND DEATH WHILE IN CUSTODY

In December, 1992, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture stated that over a three year period it had found abundant proof that "torture and other forms of severe ill-treatment of persons in police custody remain widespread in Turkey and that such methods are applied to both ordinary criminal suspects and persons held under anti-terrorism provisions."[27]

In her testimony before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (April 5, 1993, Washington, D.C.), attorney Maryam Elahi stated that Amnesty International has consistently documented torture of men and women in Turkish police stations over the past decade.[28] At the same hearing, Lois Whitman testified that despite promises by Turkey's then-prime minister, Süleyman Demirel, to promote human rights, the situation had deteriorated. In August 1992, Helsinki Watch conducted a fact-finding mission in four cities in Western Turkey and discovered allegations of "appalling recent torture by police in all four cities, including suspension by arms or wrists, blind folded and naked, while electric shock was applied to sensitive parts of the body, severe beatings, rapes of both men and women,..."[29] In January, 1992, Helsinki Watch issued a report detailing the police torture of nine children, ages 13 to 17, who were suspected either of ordinary or political crimes, such as distributing illegal literature.[30]

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[26] Karpat, *supra* note 10, at 55.
[27] Cited in Amnesty Int'l Rep. 290 (1993).
[28] *Human Rights in Turkey*, *supra* note 1, at 7.
[29] *Id.* at 16.
[30] *Id.*

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According to data collected by the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, during the 500-day period between November 21, 1991 and April 5, 1993, 804 persons had been tortured by police, prison officials, and security personnel. Of these, 121 were women and 14 were children; 226 had secured medical reports certifying that they had been tortured.[31] During the 500-day period, seven persons disappeared after having been detained, and 17 persons (all men) died suspiciously while in detention.[32] This record runs counter to Article 17 of Turkey's Constitution which declares: "No one shall be subjected to torture or ill-treatment; no one shall be subjected to penalty or treatment incompatible with human dignity."

In response to international criticism concerning torture, the Turkish Parliament passed special legislation to bring Turkey's criminal procedures in line with its obligations under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and to sharply reduce, if not eliminate, torture and deaths of persons in custody.

IV. CHANGES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

On November 18, 1992, the Turkish Parliament passed the bill entitled Amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Law on Establishment and Prosecution Procedures of the State Security Courts. President Turgut Özal signed the bill into law on December 1, 1992, the same day that it was published in the official gazette.[33] The Turkish government claims that this piece of legislation, known in Turkey as CMUK, "brings Turkish law into conformity with international standards in the vital areas of detention periods, arrest procedures and interrogation practices."[34] The law contains many positive, human rights elements, but its restrictions have raised concerns among Turkish lawyers and human rights NGOs. Following is a summary of the law's main articles.

Taken Together, Articles 12, 20, and 22 institute a Turkish version of the U.S. Miranda rule. Article 12 requires the police to inform anyone taken into custody of the crime with which he/she will be charged and of his/her rights to remain silent and to have a lawyer present during all interrogations. Article 20 states that a defendant has the right to meet in private with his/her lawyer and to communicate with him/her freely. Article 22 requires the local bar association to

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[31] 500-Day Report, *supra* note 2, at 32.

[32] *Id.* at. 31.

[33] Published in the T.C. Resmi Gazete [Turkish Republic Official Gazette] (no. 21422) December 1, 1992.

[34] *Turkish President Signs the Legal Reform Bill,* Turkish Embassy press release, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1, 1992.

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assign a lawyer to any indigent defendant who requests one. Article 22 also states that the Ministry of Finance will allocate a fund to the Union of Bar Associations to meet lawyers' fees. If the court finds the defendant guilty, the Union of Bar Associations has the right to charge the defendant for court costs and lawyer's fees. Article 15 stipulates that a defense lawyer must be assigned to any defendant who is either under 18 years of age, deaf, dumb, or too impaired to defend him/herself. In such cases, no request for a lawyer is necessary. Article 13 prohibits the use of torture, force or violence, ill-treatment, drugs, or false promises during interrogation and detention. This article also establishes an exclusionary rule by stipulating that any statements extracted by unlawful methods will not be considered evidence for a conviction, even if the defendant consents.

Although the police and, in rural areas, the gendarmerie have the authority to take persons into custody, Article 5 states that only a judge has the power to issue an arrest warrant. The defendant, if present, and his lawyer as well as the prosecutor have a right to be heard by the judge before he/she issues the warrant. Article 5 stipulates that the arrest warrant should state, as explicitly as possible, the defendant's identity and the reasons for the arrest, including the acts attributed to him/her, the time and place of the acts, and the laws deemed to have been violated.

According to Article 6, a person arrested on a warrant issued in absentia, must be brought before a judge within 24 hours for a judicial determination concerning continued detention. Article 9 allows the arrestee to have a defense lawyer present at this appearance.

Article 9 additionally states that the maximum period of police custody before the initial appearance before a judge is 24 hours in the case of crimes attributed to an individual and, if the prosecutor so orders in writing, up to four days for crimes attributed to three or more persons. A judge may double these times upon the written request of the prosecutor. The maximum detention periods for crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts are 48 hours in the case of crimes attributed to an individual and 15 days for crimes attributed to three or more persons. These periods may be doubled in state of emergency areas.

Article 4 restricts the conditions of prolonged pre-trial detention and may promote the right of a speedy trial. If a defendant can prove his/ her identity and residence, the court will not order detention if the punishment for the crime(s) in question requires imprisonment of six months or less. For crimes requiring imprisonment for up to seven years, the court will release the defendant if his/her trial has not been concluded within two years of arrest. For more serious crimes,

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the judge will release the defendant on bail (the amount to be determined by the judge) if his/her trial has not been concluded within two years of arrest.

Significantly, however, Article 31 states that none of the above articles, with the important exception of Article 13 (unlawful means of interrogation) applies to persons and crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of State Security Courts.

In an interview given to the author on April 22, 1994 in Ankara, Turkey, Mr. Sami Kahraman, Secretary General of the Ankara Bar Association, claimed that CMUK was working effectively, He explained that most members of the Ankara Bar served a 15-day duty period each year on a rotating basis. When the police arrest someone requiring a lawyer under CMUK, the station notifies the Bar Headquarters (located on the fifth floor of the main court building), which then assigns an on-duty lawyer from its computerized list. There is no charge to an indigent defendant for such representation. The Bar reimburses lawyers according to a schedule from funds supplied by the Ministry of Finance. Over the past year and a half, Bar members had participated in approximately 10,000 cases, many of them involving juvenile offenders, about 70% of whom were accused of either car or car radio theft. Mr. Kahraman claimed that the Ankara police had adapted to the new law quickly; there had been fewer than ten complaints by lawyers about police behavior over the past year and one-half. Mr. Kahraman said that the bar associations in other major Turkish cities, such as Istanbul and Izmir, had established similar procedures and were experiencing the same success. He also said that the Ankara police had invited Bar lawyers to give them talks about the new law. Consequently, the Ankara Bar was actively involved in education programs for the police. Mr. Kahraman explained that the major shortcomings of CMUK were that it did not apply equally to the State Security Courts, to so-called "terrorist" crimes, or to the state of emergency area of the Southeast. However, he concluded, the law is a very positive beginning.

Interviews conducted by the author with representatives of various independent human rights organizations in Ankara, such as the Contemporary Jurists Association, Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People Association (an Islamic organization), and the Turkish Human Rights Association turned up less sanguine assessments. All agreed that CMUK moved in the right direction, but certainly had not eliminated the pattern of torture in Turkey's police stations and prisons.

In his interview with a correspondent for the Hamburg newspaper, *Die Woche,* Ercan Kanar, president of the Istanbul Human Rights Association, maintained that torture is used daily in police interrogations. He said that his association knew of 500 cases that occurred in 1993 in Istanbul alone. He claimed that torture was administered by electrical shocks, hanging, blows to the

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soles of the feet and treatment with ice water.[35] In its *500-Day Report*, the private Human Rights Foundation of Turkey concluded that "torture continued to be systematically applied in police stations and particularly by political police."[36]

In his testimony on Turkey before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (April 5, 1993, Washington, D.C.), Dr. Mark Epstein, a Middle East scholar, stated that torture "persists in police detention in the first hours and days after arrest, raising a whole series of questions regarding access by legal counsel, police training, judicial reform and legislative improvements."[37] As a general assessment, he stated "[h]uman rights legislation has been passed and treaties ratified, but in many areas reform seems to have broken down in the execution."[38] Some of the most serious infringements of human rights are legalized by the State Security Courts and the anti-terrorist law.

V. STATE SECURITY COURTS AND THE ANTI-TERRORISM LAW

Turkey currently has eight State Security Courts composed of both civilian and military judges and prosecutors. They have jurisdiction over civilian cases involving acts prohibited by the anti-terrorism law, drug smuggling, membership in illegal organizations, and the dissemination of ideas prohibited by law as damaging the indivisible unity of the State. These courts may hold closed hearings. Persons accused of crimes falling under the jurisdiction of these courts may be detained twice as long before arraignment as other defendants. Defense lawyers generally have access to the prosecutor's files after arraignment, but in cases involving the anti-terrorism law and other crimes, such as insulting the president and defaming Turkish citizenship, defense attorneys may be denied access on national security grounds.[39]

The most important offenses over which State Security Courts have jurisdiction are those defined by the "Law to Fight Terrorism."[40] This law defines terrorism as "any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic

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[35] *Torture Is an Everyday Occurrence in Police Life*, Die Woche [in German] May 5, 1994, p. 17. English translation: *Human Rights Activist Says Torture Common*, Daily Rep. Fbis-Weu-94-088, May 6, 1994, at 50-51.

[36] *500-Day Report*, *supra* note 2, at 28.

[37] *Human Rights in Turkey*, *supra* note 1, at 46.

[38] *Id.* at 50.

[39] U.S. Department of State Dispatch, *supra* note 2, at 13.

[40] Entered into force and published in the Official Gazette on Apr. 12, 1991.

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system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation... by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat." [Article 1. (1)]

Under this law a terrorist is defined as:

Article 2. (1) "Any member of an organization, founded to attain the aims defined in Article 1, who commits a crime in furtherance of these aims,... or any member of such an organization, even if he does not commit such a crime, shall be deemed to be a terrorist offender."

(2) "Persons who are not members of a terrorist organization, but who commit a crime in the name of the organization, are also deemed to be terrorist offenders..."

Over the past several decades, Turkey has certainly been plagued by acts of terrorism, both by officials and private citizens. Among the non-governmental organizations engaging in terrorism are: the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), the Revolutionary Left (*Devrimci Sol*), the Turkish Peasants' and Workers' Liberation Party (TIKKO), the Turkish Communist Workers Movement (TKIH), and the Turkish Revolutionary Communist Union (TIKB). These groups murdered or assassinated 331 persons during the 500-day period from November 21, 1991 to April 5, 1993.[41] Their targets were soldiers, police officers, mayors and prosecutors, village guards and persons accused of being police agents or state supporters. Most were killed by the PKK.[42] In open clashes with terrorist organizations, Turkish security forces reportedly killed 1,156 militants, 1,079 of whom were PKK members, while the militants reportedly killed 506 military personnel, 36 police officers, 188 village guards, and 6 night watchmen. In these clashes, 66 civilians were also killed.[43] The danger of the Article 2 definition of terrorist is that overly zealous State Security Court prosecutors too frequently attach it to persons who share some of the cultural and political goals of terrorist groups, but not their methods.

Turkish authorities have alleged that a wide range of political activity, such as speeches, petitions, and peaceful demonstrations are "separatist" in nature. Consequently they have frequently indicted journalists, Kurdish nationalists, and even former members of parliament for statements which allegedly amount to "propaganda against the indivisible unity of State" and violate Article 8 (1) of this law:

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[41] *500-Day Report, supra* note 2, at 24.
[42] *Id.*
[43] *Id.*

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> Written and oral propaganda and assemblies, meetings and demonstrations aimed at damaging the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic with its territory and nation are prohibited, regardless of the methods, intentions and ideas behind such activities. Those conducting such activities shall be punished with a sentence of between 2 and 5 years imprisonment and with a fine of between 50 million and 100 million Turkish liras.

In its 500-Day Report, the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey maintains that during the period most of the 62 journalists and writers who had been tried, heavily fined and sentenced to from 6 to 41 months in prison had been convicted of the crimes of "making or disseminating separatist propaganda" (a violation of Article 81 (1), or of "insulting the state" or "insulting Turkey's security forces" (violations of Article 159/1 of the Turkish Penal Code).[44] Such oppression is not confined to press journalists. On February 11, 1994, two civilian television journalists were sentenced to two months imprisonment by a military court because they had interviewed conscientious objectors, even though they had not endorsed the objectors' views.[45] On April 21, 1994, this writer was among a handful of people allowed to attend the military trial of Mr. Ayteş Özel, one of the conscientious objectors interviewed. At the trial, held in Ankara's Mamak Military Prison complex, Özel, a former president of the Association Against War, was found guilty of "causing the public to be opposed to the military," and was sentenced to one year, fifteen days in prison and fined 210,000 Turkish Liras. The defendant claimed that his only crime was being against war.

Unlike similar sentences for ordinary crimes, "[s]entences imposed under [the Law to Fight Terrorism] cannot be commuted to a fine, converted to other measures or suspended." (Article 13). The permissible detention periods for crimes under this law are longer than those for ordinary crimes: "People detained for offenses under this law shall be presented before a judge within 48 hours [of their arrest]; in case of collective crimes, within 15 days excluding the time it takes to bring the suspect from the place of detention to the nearest court." (Article 11). During detention, defendants do *not* have the right to meet privately with their attorneys: "The defendant in pre-trial detention or convicts may have contact with a lawyer under the supervision of a detention center or prison official." (Art. 10(b)).

According to Turkish government figures obtained by the U.S. Department of State, 3,792 persons were being detained under this law at the end of 1993, and 811 persons were serving sentences for violations of its provisions.[46] The legal bases for human rights abuses are compounded where the

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[44] *500-Day Report, supra* note 2, at 40-43.

[45] Susan Litherland, *Turkey-Human Rights: Government Criticized for Press Crackdown,* Inter Press Service, Dateline: London, Feb. 11, 1994, *available in* Lexis, Nexis Library, World File.

[46] U.S. Department of State Dispatch, *supra* note 2, at 13.

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State Security Courts and anti-terrorism law are combined with the laws pertaining to a region under a state of emergency.

VI. STATE OF EMERGENCY REGION

Since 1987, the southeastern provinces with the heaviest concentration of Kurdish people have constituted a state of emergency area and have been governed by a special governor with special powers and immunities. The legal bases for this arrangement rest primarily on the Turkish Constitution and two laws: the State of Emergency Law and the Emergency Regional Governance Law.

In 1983 the Turkish parliament passed the State of Emergency Law,[47] which empowered the Council of Ministers assembled under the chairmanship of the President to declare a state of emergency "whenever there appear serious indications resulting from widespread acts of violence which are aimed at destroying the free democratic order or fundamental rights and freedoms, or violent acts causing serious deterioration of public order." (Article 3 (1) (b)). According to the Turkish Constitution, "During the state of emergency, the Council of Ministers meeting under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic, may issue decrees having the force of law on matters necessitated by the state of emergency." (Article 121 [in part]). Significantly, there can be no judicial reviews of such decrees. Even the Constitutional Court may not review decrees having the force of law issued under a state of emergency or martial law.[48]

Once such a state of emergency has been declared, "All citizens between 18 and 60 years of age, who are resident within a state of emergency region... are obligated to perform the duties imposed on them under the state of emergency." Article 8 (1). Measures which authorities may take in the state of emergency area include:

> Prohibition of people from residing in certain localities in the concerned region;... evacuation of certain areas and transfer of people to other areas (Art. 9a);
>
> Demolition of unsafe buildings, destruction of real estate and personal property which threaten health... (Art. 9f);
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> Imposition of a limited or full curfew (Art. 11a); Prohibition of any kind of assembly or procession or movement of vehicles in certain places or

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[47] Published in the Official Gazette on 27 Oct. 1983.

[48] U.S. Department of State Dispatch, *supra* note 2, at 13.

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within certain hours (Art. 11b); Authorization of officials to search persons, their vehicles or property and to seize goods deemed to have evidentiary value (Art. 11c);

Prohibition of the publication, importation or distribution of publications and confiscation of books, magazines, newspapers, brochures, posters and other publications that have been banned (Art. 11e); Control and, if deemed necessary, restriction or prohibition of every kind of broadcasting and dissemination of words, writing, pictures, films, records, sound and image bands (Art. 11f);

Control and, if deemed necessary, restriction or prohibition of the exhibition of all kinds of plays and films (Art. 11h).

In addition, "the custody periods prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Art. 128) may be doubled on a written request made by the Public Prosecutor to a judge." (Art. 26). This means that persons detained for offenses under the anti-terrorism law should be presented before a judge within 96 hours of their arrest for individual crimes, but within 30 days in the case of collective crimes. This provision appears to run counter to Turkey's obligations under the European Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In *Brogan v. United Kingdom*, a case involving U.K.'s 1984 Prevention of Terrorism Act, the European Court of Human Rights held that U.K. authorities, who had detained four Northern Ireland suspected terrorists for periods ranging from four days and six hours to six days and sixteen hours before bringing them before a judicial authority, had breached Article 5 (3) of the European Convention, which requires detainees to be brought "promptly" before a judge.[49]

Significantly, the Turkish state of of emergency law prevents anyone from using the courts to stop the governor or those acting under his authority from carrying out measures deemed to violate human rights: "The issuing of stay orders against the administrative acts of governors performed in accordance with the authority vested in them shall be prohibited." (Art. 33).

Subsequently, in 1987, the President and Council of Ministers decreed that "[a] State of Emergency Regional Governance shall be established covering the southeastern provinces of Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli and Van."[50] The decree provides that the emergency area governor shall have all private and public security forces in the region at his disposal, [Art. 2(b)], and that "he may order the temporary or permanent evacuation of villages,

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[49]Brogan v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 117 (1988).

[50]Decree 285 having the Force of Law on the Establishment of the State of Emergency Regional Governance. Published in the Official Gazette, July 14, 1987. (Article 1). Batman and Sirnak were added by Decree 246 dated 18 May 1990.

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winter stations for flocks and arable fields in areas within his territorial jurisdiction to make necessary arrangements for the general security and may order the re-settlement or unification of inhabitants in such places [Art. 2(h)]."

The decree also makes the governor immune from legal liability: "No action shall be brought in any court of law in connection with the exercise of powers conferred on the State of Emergency Regional Governor by this Decree" (Art. 7). This last article apparently runs counter to Turkey's obligations under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which holds "[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms... are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in official capacity." (Art. 13).[51]

Although human rights violations in Turkey affect a wide variety of people in different occupations and regions, the Kurdish case is especially egregious and demands particular attention.

VII. THE CASE OF THE KURDS

Most of today's approximately twenty million Kurds live in the mountainous region where Turkey, Iraq and Iran converge. They may be descendants of Indo-European peoples who settled the region about 2,000 B.C. Although their homeland has historically been known as Kurdistan, land of the Kurds, they have never had a unified state of their own.[52] They became Muslims in the seventh century A.D., and were part of the Ottoman and Persian Empires for centuries prior to World War I.[53]

The 1920 Treaty of Sevres, between the victorious World War I Allies and the Ottoman Sultan, designated the Kurdish occupied southeastern area of Turkey as an autonomous region and granted the Kurds the right to opt for independence within a year. However, when the government of Atatürk renegotiated the terms of this agreement in the Treaty of Lausane of 1923, autonomy and independence for the Kurds was dropped.[54]

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[51] At the time of this writing, Turkey was not in derogation of any of its obligation under the European Convention.

[52] Kurdish cultural and political aspirations are suppressed in Iraq, Iran and Turkey. *See Situation of Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, Report of the Commission on Security and cooperation in Europe*, Washington, D.C. (May 17, 1993).

[53] For general treatments of Kurdish history, *see* M. M. van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: On the Social and Political Organization of Kurdistan (1978).

[54] Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, 2 History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey 365-366 (1977).

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"The official ideology of the Republic of Turkey since the mid 1920s has sought to deny the existence of Kurdish people in the country... [B]oth Turks and Kurds were taught that they were descended from the pure Turkish race."[55] Kurds were referred to as "mountain Turks."[56] Even in the 1990s,

> [t]he Kurdish language may not be spoken in court or other official settings, Kurdish parents are sometimes forbidden to give their children Kurdish names, Kurdish associations have been closed, education in Kurdish is forbidden, cassettes with Kurdish songs are frequently confiscated by police, and Kurds have been detained and arrested for singing Kurdish songs at wedding ceremonies.[57]

From 1922 to 1938 there were three major Kurdish revolts against Turkey's policies of Turkification and secularization.[58] Turkish forces crushed all three. Until the 1970s, the Kurds were largely quiescent despite the fact that Turkish law prohibited Kurdish speech in public and Kurdish cultural organizations, and public prosecutors considered references to Kurds or Kurdish in the press to be illegal attacks on the integrity of the republic.

During the 1970s and 1980s, however, a number of pro-Kurdish organizations began to vigorously advocate Kurdish cultural and political rights. The most prominent of these, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), sought to create a secessionist Kurdish state through violence and terrorism.[59] In 1984 the PKK launched a violent guerrila campaign in the southeastern provinces. This led to a major counter-offensive by Turkish military forces, large scale arrests of suspected Kurdish leaders, and imposition of martial law. A state of emergency replaced martial law in July of 1987, but the violence continued unabated with estimated deaths of over 10,500 people on all sides.[60]

Jeri Laber, who went to Turkey this past spring on behalf of Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, writes that the Turkish military was employing 400,000 soldiers, police, intelligence officers and village guards to combat a PKK force of over 5,000.[61] He reported that the military contributed to escalating the war

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[55]Gunter, *supra* note 8, at 43.

[56]Geoffrey Lewis, Modern Turkey 97, (1974).

[57]Testimony of Lois Whitman, Deputy Director of Helsinki Watch, before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Human Rights in Turkey, supra* note 1, at 80.

[58]Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1989).

[59]For the detailed background of the PKK, see Gunter, *supra* note 8, at 57-95.

[60]Aliza Marcus, *Turkey's Kurds Fight on Alone,* 258 The Nation, n. 1, at 8 (Jan. 3, 1994).

[61]Jeri Laber, *The Hidden War in Turkey,* New York Review at 49 (June 23, 1994). According to a Turkish news article, the size of the PKK force in early 1994 may have been as large as 20,000. Ertuğrul Kürkcü, "Peace: a Rational End to the Southeast Conflict," Turkish Daily News, B3 (April 21, 1994).

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by "indiscriminately arresting and mistreating Kurdish civilians."[62] These observations paralleled an earlier statement by Lois Whitman:

> The human rights situation in Turkey is truly appalling. Since the Demirel Government took office [November 1991], more people have been killed in house raids, more non-violent demonstrators have been shot and killed by security forces, authorities have failed to investigate hundreds of assassinations in the southeast, brutal torture continues to be used as a standard interrogation technique, the Kurdish minority continues to suffer grave abuses, and there are continued violations of the freedom of the press, association, and assembly.[63]

Laber also noted that the *Turkish Daily News,* in its February 9, 1994 issue, had published "the names of 874 villages and hamlets in the southeast which it claims the army has 'cleansed' of their residents, burning them to the ground.[64] The large-scale destruction of villages and the forced evacuation of their Kurdish residents — an official practice that is legitimate under Article 9 of the State of Emergency Law (*supra*) — has also been documented in the *500-Day Report.*[65]

Even purely cultural efforts by Turkey's Kurds have been thwarted by officials applying the law. For example, on June 22, 1992, as required by law, the founding officers of the newly organized Kurdish Cultural Foundation applied to Istanbul's Court of First Instance for registration as a foundation. The organization's stated purpose was to promote research and publication on Kurdish language, literature, history, geography, folklore, music and ethnography. The Court subsequently denied registration to the organization claiming it was based on a race and thereby violated Article 14 of the Constitution."[66] (*See supra*).

The Kurdish Institute, founded as part of the Mesopotamian Culture Center, to research Kurdish language, history and culture, opened in Istanbul on April 18, 1992. On November 15, 1992 the police, following the directive of the State Security Court's Prosecutor's Office, raided it, detaining three persons and seizing documents, publications, films, photographs and computer disks.[67] Such state actions are premised on the allegation that these cultural organizations, activities, and materials threaten the indivisibility of the Turkish

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[62] *Id* at 47.
[63] *Human Rights in Turkey, supra* note 1, at 20.
[64] Laber, *supra* note 61, at 47.
[65] *500-Day Report, supra* note 2, at 26.
[66] *Id.* at 45.
[67] *Id.*

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state. Prosecutors base their directives on Article 8 (1) of the Law to Fight Terrorism.[68]

One of the most notorious cases is that of cultural anthropologist Ismail Beşikçi, a Turk, who has researched and written on Kurdish culture, society and history. He had served ten years in prison between 1971 and 1987 for his publications, which courts had ruled constituted separatist propaganda.[69] In 1993 he was again indicted on two counts of disseminating separatist propaganda through two of his recent books. He was tried and convicted in the Ankara Security Court under the Law to Fight Terrorism and sentenced to 20 months and fined 42 million Turkish Liras on each count.[70]

The state and military actions described above have served to generate support for the PKK. Mary Sue Hafner, General Counsel to the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, remarked that while there is no doubt that the PKK is a terrorist organization, it is equally true that such anti-state movements feed on government human rights violations, unemployment, and poor living conditions.[71] She advised the Turkish government to address the underlying political, economic, and cultural conditions that have made many Kurdish citizens sympathetic to the PKK's initial goal of establishing a separate Kurdistan or the current goal of gaining regional autonomy within Turkey.[72] Similarly, Lois Whitman has stated that on the basis of interviews with Kurds and others in Turkey's Southeast, Helsinki Watch believes that the continuing pattern of abuse by Turkish security forces, their shooting of unarmed and nonviolent demonstrators, the failure to investigate assassinations, and the excessive detention and torture of Kurds have contributed to the increased support of the PKK.[73]

Local and foreign human rights activists have accused Turkey of seeking only a military solution to the Kurdish issue and not a negotiated political one. This accusation appeared valid when, on March 2, 1994, the Turkish Parliament, under apparent pressure from the military, voted to strip six Kurdish deputies of their parliamentary immunity to allow an investigation into their alleged separatist activities.[74] Five were members of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party

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[68] *Id.*

[69] U.S. Department of State Dispatch, *supra* note 2, at 21.

[70] *Id.* For more detailed information on Beşikçi and his work, see Gunter, *supra* note 8, at 47-49.

[71] *Human Rights in Turkey, supra* note 1, at 26.

[72] *Id.*

[73] *Id.* at 27-28.

[74] *Indictment Read as DEP Trial Begins in Ankara,* Anatolia, [in English, radio] 1610 GMT (Aug. 3, 1994), Reported in Daily Report Fbis-Weu-94-150, at 39-40 [Aug. 4, 1994); Laber, *supra* note 61, at 48.

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(DEP). The Deputies were arrested and jailed while the Ankara State Security Court prosecutors prepared their indictments.

In June 1994 the Constitutional Court banned the Democracy Party, stripping its thirteen deputies of parliamentary membership.[75] On August 3, 1994 State Security Court prosecutors accused the arrested deputies of acting as part of the political wing of the banned PKK and asked for the death sentence.[76] The former deputies denied the charges.[77]

Their arrests and subsequent incarceration have stirred up international outrage. Former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas agreed to participate in their defense.[78] The president of the 32- state Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Spain's Miguel Angel Martinez, publicly expressed the Assembly's concern that such events could occur in a member country of the Council of Europe, "which is based on democratic values including freedom of expression and the rule of law."[79] Danielle Mitterrand, wife of France's President, and twelve Nobel Peace Prize winners called for the United Nations to appoint a special envoy to investigate the plight of Turkish Kurds.[80] Western criticism over the affair has become so intense that the morale of Turkish diplomats has been adversely affected.[81]

CONCLUSION

Turkey faces the dilemma of trying to reconcile two opposed objectives: its own acceptance as a truly liberal democracy and the continuation of its historic constitutional principles of Turkism, statism, and authoritarianism. As part of the policy to achieve the first objective, Turkey made many positive moves in the area of human rights. It became a party to an impressive number of international human rights conventions, including: The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (including the

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[75] *Id.* at 39.

[76] "Trial Begins for Incarcerated Former DEP Deputies," *Anatolia* [in English, radio] 100 GMT August 3, 1994, Reported in Daily Report, Fbis-Weu-94-149, at 41 (August 3, 1994).

[77] In an interview published in a Berlin newspaper, Kemal Bilget, deputy chairman of the DEP stated that "the DEP has nothing to do with the PKK. The PKK is an illegal organization that pursues an armed struggle. We, on the other hand, are a legal organization that struggles on a democratic basis; ..." "The Junta Constitution Continues to Be Valid in Turkey," *Neues Deutschland* April 14, 1994, at 7. Reported in Daily Report, Fbis-Weu-94-075, at 36 (April 19, 1994).

[78] "Roland Dumas to defend Turkish Kurd MPs," International News [Radio] Paris, March 8, 1994. [Lexis-Nexis]

[79] "Treatment of the Kurdish MPs Draws Western Criticism," 8 Mideast Mirror no. 46 (March 8, 1994). [Lexis-Nexis, no page given].

[80] Bob Hepburn, "Turkey's Civil War Heating Up; Ankara Launches Crackdown against 'Kurdish Problem'," Toronto Star at C5 (April 17, 1994).

[81] *Id.*

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right of individual petition, ratified in January, 1987, and the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, January, 1990), the European Convention against Torture (September, 1989), the European Social Charter (June, 1989), and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (September, 1990).[82] The government established a Parliamentary Human Rights Commission in 1990 and a Human Rights Ministry in 1991.[83]

On April 21, 1994, this writer interviewed Mr. Sabri Yavuz, President of the Turkish Parliament's Human Rights Commission, in Ankara. The writer was impressed with Mr. Yavuz's verbal commitment to human rights and especially with his statement that "even a terrorist is a human and must be treated as a human once he is taken into custody."

Turkey must now live up to these international obligations. When it does not, members of the international community, especially other States who are parties to international human rights treaties, have the right to object and demand explanations and remedies. Such international reaction has been noted above. Additionally, on July 29, 1994 the U.S. Congress passed the foreign aid bill tying ten percent of the assistance to Turkey to progress on human rights and a solution to the Cyprus problem.[84]

Turkey also has an active number of human rights lawyers and non-governmental organizations, even though many of their members have been attacked and killed by unknown assailants believed to be operating in complicity with Turkish security forces.[85] Many of these lawyers, especially those who are members of the Contemporary Jurists Association, represent human rights victims for little or no fee. These lawyers are becoming more aware of their ability to petition international human rights bodies on behalf of their clients when justice fails locally. In April, 1994 officers of the Turkish Human Rights Association presented this writer with a copy of their association's just-published book containing the major international human rights instruments in Turkish.[86] Both the general secretary of the Ankara Bar Association and an officer of the Contemporary Jurists Association told this writer that their organizations were about to complete manuals, to be distributed to members, explaining how to file a petition with the European Human Rights Commission.

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[82] *Human Rights in Turkey, supra* note 1, at 22.
[83] *Id.*
[84] Ilnur Çevik, *Dangerous Turn of Events for Turkey,* Turkish Daily News at A3 (July 30, 1994), Reported in Daily Report, FBIS-WEU-94-148, at 55-46 (August 2, 1994).
[85] *500-Day Report, supra* note 2, at 46-49; U.S. Department of State Dispatch, *supra* note 2, at 4.
[86] Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz *Temel Belgelerde İnsan Haklarî* [Human Rights in Basic Documents] (1994).

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According to Turkish government sources, in July 1994, there were approximately 300 individual petitions by Turkish citizens against Turkey before the European Human Rights Commission, and thirty cases against Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights. These figures became available when confidential letters between Turkey's foreign minister, justice minister and interior minister were leaked to the press.[87] In his letter, Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin, reacting to continuing criticism from the West, informed the other ministers that the large number of petitions filed against Turkey reflected the poor quality of justice in the state of emergency region. He warned that if the quality of justice does not improve, "the European Court of Human Rights will take the place of Turkish judicial organs in relation to events that take place in the Southeast..."[88].

The European Court may very well rule that parts of Turkey's state of emergency legislation conflict with the European Human Rights Convention. Because Turkey is under a solemn obligation to honor the judgments of the European Court, the legal changes necessary to promote human rights may come from that direction.

The Turkish government must act soon, before an irreparable fissure separates Turks from Kurds. One observer has noted that the government's fight against the PKK "has turned into a fight against the Kurdish nation and against human rights."[89] "Funeral services for Turkish soldiers killed by the P.K.K. are turning into mass demonstrations against Kurds."[90] Omur Lutfu Coskun, chairman of a parliamentary commission to study causes of and solutions to the problems in the Southeast, warned listeners at a press conference that despite PKK terrorism, 'sensitivity [on the part of the government and military] is necessary so as not to regard all the region's people as potential criminals."[91] For any legal remedies to become effective, most Turks may have to be reeducated to tolerate and appreciate cultural differences, to value and accept cultural pluralism as a normal characteristic of modern, liberal democracies.[92]

Journalists questioned Tansu Çiller, Turkey's first woman Prime Minister, about human rghts and the Kurdish issue during her July visit to Paris to attend the UNESCO peace award presentations to Yasir Arafat and Yitzhaq

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[87] *Ministers Respond to Çetin Letter on Rights,* Turkish Daily News at 1, A8 (July 19, 1994), reported in Daily Report, FBIS-WEU-94-141, at 42-43 (July 22, 1994).

[88] *Id.* at 42.

[89] Aliza Marcus, *Turkey's Kurds Fight on Alone,* 258 The Nation, n. 1, at 8 (Jan. 3, 1994).

[90] *Id.*

[91] *Commission Urges Tolerance with Southeast Problem,* Anatolia [in English, radio] 1425 GMT April 15, 1994), reported in Daily Report, FBIS-WEU-94-075, at 35 (April 19, 1994).

[92] One Turkish journalist has concluded that "the southeastern problem is the litmus test for democracy in our country." Cengiz Candar, *Southeast 'Litmus Test' for Democracy,* Nokta [in Turkish] at 10 (July 3, 1994), reported in Daily Report, FBIS-WEU-94-132, at 44 (July 11, 1994).

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Rabin. Çiller responded in a surprisingly positive way, saying that "[e]veryone must be included in Turkey's identity. The name Turkey does not represent any single ethnic community; it is just a name... We must make it so all ethnic groups feel comfortable in Turkey. Turkey does not represent just one ethnic community..."[93] She also stated that the Turkish parliament should debate the possibility of establishing Kurdish television channels and Kurdish language education.[94] Whether these comments were inspired by the UNESCO ceremony or by a desire to appease Western dignitaries remains to be seen. As expected, Turkey's praetorians reacted negatively. In assessing Çiller's remarks, former General Kenan Evren, leader of the 1980 coup and seventh president of Turkey, said "[if] the prime minister's intentions are realized, Turkey will drift toward splits that will lead to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state."[95] "For me," he continued, "and for the overwhelming majority of Turkey, it is impossible to approve of such a view."[96] Unfortunately, Çiller's stated views receive little, if any, support from the military or right-wing politicians. All of them should ponder the question posed by a Turkish journalist:

> Now, after having spoiled the nation's fortunes and resources for decades on guns in order to deny the identities of its Kurdish brethren, Turkey has to decide... Is not recognizing Kurds as constituents of a democratic Turkey more progressive and more humane than recognizing them as our enemies?[97]

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[93] Ertuğrul Özkök, *Çiller: I am Initiating a Debate on Kurdish Rights,* Hurriyet July 7, 1994, at 25. Reported in Daily Report, FBIS-WEU-94-134, at 53 (July 13, 1994).

[94] *Id.*

[95] *Evren Says Çiller's Policy 'Impossible,'* Yeni Günaydın July 10, 1994, at 15. Reported in Daily Report, FBIS-WEU-94-134, at 54 July 13, 1994.

[96] *Id.*

[97] Ertuğrul Kürkçü, *Peace: a Rational End to the Southeast Conflict,* Turkish Daily News, April 21, 1994, at B3. Reported in Daily Report, FBIS-WEU-94-082, at 56 (April 28, 1994).

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