

# A New Syriac Witness to Aristotle's *Categories* from Turfan\*

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**Summary:** Among the unidentified Syriac fragments catalogued in HUNTER/DICKENS 2014 (Appendix VII), a group of philosophical fragments still awaits to be investigated. This article provides for the first time the full transliteration and translation of the 7 fragments in question (SyrHT 255, SyrHT 285, SyrHT 389, n415, n417, n419, n420), and identifies these fragments as a hitherto unknown Syriac witness to Aristotle's *Categories*.

## Introduction

In the groundbreaking catalogue *Syrische Handschriften. Teil 2. Texte der Berliner Turfansammlung / Syriac Texts from the Berlin Turfan Collection* (2014), HUNTER/DICKENS mention a group of fragments which join up with one another (though they are sometimes dislocated) and would have come from the same manuscript. These 7 fragments (SyrHT 255, SyrHT 285, SyrHT 389, n415, n417, n419, n420) have proven to come from the only philosophical text in the findings of the Christian library in Turfan and they contain, as rightly pointed out by HUNTER/DICKENS, not a few Greek loan words. They thus provide valuable evidence for the Greek philosophical education that once existed in the ancient Syrian Christian church of Turfan.

Regrettably, these fragments remain unidentified.<sup>1</sup> This might be partly due to their state of preservation: the documents are too fragmented and too faded to be easily read. Nor is it easy to recognise the relationship between different fragments, especially to see how they join with each other and

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<sup>1</sup> See HUNTER/DICKENS 2014, Appendix II "Unidentified fragments in numerical sequence", p. 432.

which ones are dislocated. In addition, the mirror image caused by ink transfer from SyrHT 285a, n419a and n417b on SyrHT 255a, n415a and n420b complicates the picture even more. Below I try to solve these difficulties and provide for the first time the full transliteration and translation of the 7 fragments in question.<sup>2</sup> I argue that this group of fragments belongs to two separate folios of the same manuscript, which contains an unknown Syriac witness of Aristotle's *Categories*.<sup>3</sup> This further indicates that Aristotle arrived in what is today China much earlier than we previously thought.

The fragments are written in black ink, although both sides of SyrHT 285 have faded and turned into brown or faded black. As to the script, the fragments have a mixed character and exhibit characteristics of both the Estrangela (e.g. the angled bēth, gāmal and šin) and the Serṭo (e.g. the closed mīm and waw, dālath and rēš as the rounded comma form, and the hē with the vertical on the right that joins the loop from the top of that line).<sup>4</sup> Still, distinctive characteristics of the so-called East Syriac script can be clearly observed, namely the taw-ālah ligature (a short v shape that hangs below the line and then joins a straight ālah on the left) and the related v-shaped taw (like the taw-ālah ligature without an ālah component), the so-called third type of taw beyond the Estrangela and Serṭo form.<sup>5</sup> Roughly speaking, the dating of these fragments still corresponds with that of the other fragments found at Shuipang, namely the period of the Uighur kingdom of Qocho (9<sup>th</sup>–13<sup>th</sup> centuries).<sup>6</sup>


<sup>2</sup> Sample texts have been offered in HUNTER/DICKENS 2014, and they proved to be helpful for my own reading.

<sup>3</sup> See also KESSEL's review of HUNTER/DICKENS 2014: KESSEL 2018. For the Syriac versions of Aristotle's *Categories* see HUGONNARD-ROCHE 1987; BROCK 1993; KING 2010; WATT 2019.

<sup>4</sup> For a recent challenge to "the Standard Model of Syriac Scripts", see BUSH/PENN/CROUSER/HOWE/WU 2018 and PENN/CROUSER/ABBOT 2020.

<sup>5</sup> For the definition of East Syriac script and the special taw-ālah ligature, see the Syriac Paleography Lesson by BREMER-McCOLLUM in the vHMML school, Syriac Scripts. See also the table of Aramaic scripts in GZELLA 2017.

<sup>6</sup> See HUNTER 2012, p. 304: "Although there are no complete Syriac manuscripts, with a consequent absence of colophon information, the fragments may be given an overall dating between the 9<sup>th</sup>–13<sup>th</sup> centuries, corresponding to the period of the Uighur kingdom of Qocho." The same applies to the Sogdian manuscripts from this site, see ASHUROV 2015, p. 63: "Unfortunately, the Sogdian Christian manuscripts cannot be firmly dated. This is due to both the absence of 'internal evidence,' namely dates or colophons, as well as 'external evidence' such as the securely dated archaeological context or C14 examination. The general agreement is that they probably originated in the 9<sup>th</sup>–13<sup>th</sup> centuries, that is, the manuscripts were produced (copied, translated) during this period. The actual texts (the contents of the manuscripts), however, represent much earlier literary traditions." But see footnote 44 in ASHUROV 2015, p. 63: "Professor SIMS-WILLIAMS in a personal discussion on this matter pointed out to me that 'we know no Sogdian written texts of any kind that



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Fig. 1: The partial folio (in *recto* and *verso*) reconstructed from the six fragments according to HUNTER/DICKENS 2014

### On the relationship of the seven fragments

According to HUNTER/DICKENS' report, six of the seven fragments belong to the same (partial) folio (in *recto* and *verso*): One part is formed by SyrHT 285, n419 and n417 (Group 1), while the other is formed by SyrHT 255, n415 and n420 (Group 2) (Fig. 1). Given the existence of a mirror image of Group 1 on Group 2, HUNTER/DICKENS also suggest that the former should be located above the latter on the same folio:

Distinguishing marks: ink transfer from SyrHT 285, side (a), ll. 1–4 has caused a mirror image on the bottom of SyrHT 255, side (a), as a result of the original folio being folded together when the ink on the upper part (SyrHT 285, n417 and n419) had not dried.<sup>7</sup>

As to SyrHT 389, HUNTER/DICKENS report that there is no evidence indicating that it forms a join (dislocated or not) with the other six:

... palaeography suggests that the fragment is the product of the same hand as SyrHT 255, SyrHT 285, n415, n417, n419 and n420, but it does not join or form a dislocated join with any of them.<sup>8</sup>

While agreeing with HUNTER/DICKENS that Group 1 and Group 2 form separately two parts of the same manuscripts, I doubt that they belong to the same folio, nor do I believe that SyrHT 389 “does not join or form a dislocated join with any of them.” I suggest instead that, on the one hand, Group 1 and Group 2 are from different folios and, on the other, SyrHT 389 proves itself to be part of SyrHT 255b, and thus belongs to the same folio formed by Group 2.

First of all, it is worthy of note that a mirror image caused by ink transfer can be found not only on the bottom of SyrHT 255a, but also on n415a and n420b. Accordingly, not only lines 1–4 of SyrHT 285a, but also line(s) from n419a and n417b, including some vertical *marginalia*, are partially visible in the resulting mirror image. The original state of the two parts folded together can be reconstructed as Fig. 2.

The existence of the mirror image makes it tempting to suppose that Group 1 and Group 2 belong to the same folio. However, this view suffers from at least three difficulties: 1. It is hard to explain why the line lengths of the two parts from the same folio are unequal;<sup>9</sup> 2. It is also hard to explain

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are definitely later than the early 11<sup>th</sup> century.’” A Syriac service-book from the site, MIK III 45, has undergone C14 dating and the paper has proved to be 8th-9th century, between 771 and 884, see HUNTER/COAKLEY 2017, pp. 11, 273.

<sup>7</sup> HUNTER/DICKENS 2014, p. 247.

<sup>8</sup> HUNTER/DICKENS 2014, p. 342.

<sup>9</sup> See above Fig. 1, right: The line length of SyrHT 385a, n417b, and n419a is much longer than that of SyrHT 255a, n415a, and n420b.





Fig. 2: The original state of the two parts folded together

why it was the ink of the upper part but not of the lower which had not dried; 3. Since Group 1 contains a paraphrase of *Categories* (below C.) 12b40–13a7, and Group 2 C. 13a36–b12 (see below), this indicates that if Group 1 and Group 2 belong to the same folio, then between the two there should have been a middle part containing a (lost) brief paraphrase of C. 13a7–36 – a long passage which could hardly have been summarized in so few lines.

I suggest instead that the partial folio of Group 2 comes from another folio (Folio b) which follows the folio of Group 1 (Folio a), but one of the folios has for some reason been incorrectly turned upside down. The ink on the upper part of Folio a, having been wet through, then caused a mirror image on the bottom of Folio b. The possibility that the folios have been split into several parts and incorrectly put together also cannot be excluded. In fact, many Syriac fragments found in Turfan seem to have been damaged by water and thus contain obvious ink smudges, e. g. SyrHT 29, 39, 53, 54, 57, 58, 61, 72, 78, 156, 178, 200, 216, 256–258, MIK III 109, etc. Similar mirror images can also be found in fragments like SyrHT 56 (*verso*), SyrHT 72, SyrHT 294, etc.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> A passage from VON LE COQ may help explain the existence of so many water-damaged fragments and of so many small fragments: “Finally, with the increase of population came the peasants’ craving for land. Whole districts of the town had a clearance made by the gradual carrying off of the ruins, then the old sites and ground were levelled, water canals brought in to the ruined town, and with them the damp that worked such havoc. In many places the water had risen in the loess walls and done terrible harm to the



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Fig. 3: The matching relationship between SyrHT 255b and SyrHT 389a

As to SyrHT 389, it is in fact not from a separate folio, but also belongs to Folio b. As can be seen in Fig. 1, unlike all the other fragments, the *verso* of SyrHT 255 is surprisingly blank. This partially explains the peculiarity of its state of preservation in Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin: of all the seven fragments SyrHT 255 is the only one mounted on pasteboard, and its *verso*, being blank, is concealed. However, taking into account the reconstructed text demonstrated in Fig. 1, the *verso* of SyrHT 255 should have contained the beginning of the four lines on the n415b and n420a. The missing part of SyrHT 255b could nonetheless be reconstructed from SyrHT 389a (Fig. 3). The unusually clean surface of the upper part (in comparison with the lower) indicates SyrHT 255b had, for some reason, become detached from its outer layer. That SyrHT 389a is exactly the lost outer layer can be confirmed by considering

ancient relics they contained. Thus I had the grief of discovering in the Manichean shrine K a library which was utterly destroyed by water ... The whole room, into which this door led, was covered to a depth of about two feet with a mass of what, on closer inspection, proved to be remains of Manichean manuscripts. The loess water had penetrated the papers, stuck everything together, and in the terrible heat of the usual summer there all these valuable books had turned into loess. I took specimens of them and dried them carefully in the hope of saving some of these manuscripts; but the separate pages crumbled off and dropped into small fragments, on which the remains of beautifully written lines, intermingled with traces of miniatures executed in gold, blue, red, green, and yellow, were still to be seen. An enormous treasure has been lost here." (VON LE COQ 1929, p. 61). Water damage could also have been caused by a sudden storm, see p. 92 and p. 96.

the three following points: 1. SyrHT 255b and SyrHT 389a contain similar folds in the middle part; 2. the shape of the edge of SyrHT 389a matches the edge of the upper part of SyrHT 255b; 3. the *verso* of SyrHT 389 is also blank. In a word, SyrHT 389 must have originally belonged to SyrHT 255.

Below are the two (partial) folios reconstructed from the seven fragments: Folio a (above) and Folio b (below), each in *recto* (right) and *verso* (left). Folio a is formed from SyrHT 285, n417 and n419, while Folio b is formed from SyrHT 255, n415, n420 and SyrHT 389. The extant part is probably one third of the original folio, which is approximately 26.4 cm × 18.5 cm.

### Aristotle's *Categories* in Turfan

Folio a: SyrHT 285b, n419b, n417a (*recto*)

1	...	.....[.....].....
2	...	.....[.....].....
3	... it will be distinguished ...	.....[.....].....
4	intermediate ...	.....[.....].....
5	For above ...	.....[.....].....
6	For ... their intermediate	.....[.....].....
7	And not ...	.....[.....].....

As the *recto* side is too blurred to read, it is not easy to locate this passage in the *Categories*; still, given the repeated occurrence of *intermediate* – one of the central concepts –, it is highly probable that this passage has to do with either C. 11b38–12a20 or 12b26–35, and thus deals with the distinction of two types of contraries. In 11b38–12a20, Aristotle distinguishes between two types of contraries. If it is necessary for one or the other of the contraries always to belong to the things they naturally occur, then these contraries exclude any middle term (sickness/health for bodies; odd/even for numbers); if it is not necessary for one or the other to belong, then these contraries allow for a middle term (black/white for bodies). The same distinction is repeated in 12b26–35, where Aristotle remarks that privation and possession belong to neither of the contraries.

C. 11b38–12a20:

Ὅσα δὲ τῶν ἐναντιῶν τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ὥστε ἐν οἷς πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀνά μέσον· οἷον νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζώου πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ τοῦ ζώου σώματι ἢ νόσον ἢ ὑγίειαν· καὶ περιττὸν δὲ καὶ ἄρτιον ἀριθμοῦ κατηγορεῖται, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὑπάρχειν ἢ περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον· καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ γε τούτων οὐδὲν ἀνά μέσον, οὔτε νόσου καὶ ὑγίειας οὔτε περιττοῦ καὶ ἄρτιου. Ὡν δὲ γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον




Fig. 4: The two partial folios reconstructed from the seven fragments

θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον· οἷον μέλαν καὶ λευκὸν ἐν σώματι πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν τῷ σώματι, — οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ἦτοι λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἐστίν· — καὶ φαῦλον δὲ καὶ σπουδαῖον κατηγορεῖται μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀνθρώπου καὶ κατ' ἄλλων πολλῶν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ἐκείνοις ὧν κατηγορεῖται· οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἦτοι φαῦλα ἢ σπουδαῖά ἐστιν. Καὶ ἔστι γέ τι τούτων ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον τοῦ μὲν λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ μέλανος τὸ φαιδόν καὶ ὠχρὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα χρώματα, τοῦ δὲ φαύλου καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ οὔτε φαῦλον οὔτε σπουδαῖον.

If contraries are such that it is necessary for one or the other of them to belong to the things they naturally occur in or are predicated of, there is nothing **intermediate** between them. For example, sickness and health naturally occur in animals' bodies and it is indeed necessary for one or the other to belong to an animal's body, either sickness or health; again, odd and even are predicated of numbers, and it is indeed necessary for one or the other to belong to a number, either odd or even. And between these there is certainly nothing **intermediate** – between sickness and health or odd and even. But if it is not necessary for one or the other to belong, there is something between them. For example, black and white naturally occur in bodies, but it is not necessary for one or the other of them to belong to a body (for not every body is either white or black); again, bad and good are predicated both of men and of many other things, but it is not necessary for one or the other of them to belong to those things they are predicated of (for not all are either bad or good). And between these there is certainly something **intermediate** – between white and black are grey yellow and all other colours, and between the bad and the good the neither bad nor good.<sup>11</sup>

#### C. 12b26–35:

Ἵτι δὲ οὐδ' ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν λεγόμενα καὶ ἕξιν ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐναντιῶν, ὧν μηδὲν ἐστίν ἀνὰ μέσον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν οἷς πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται, θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ἀεὶ· τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦν ἀνὰ μέσον, ὧν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τῷ δεκτικῷ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ἐπὶ νόσου καὶ ὑγείας καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου· ὧν δὲ ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον, οὐδέποτε ἀνάγκη παντὶ ὑπάρχειν θάτερον· οὔτε γὰρ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἀνάγκη πᾶν εἶναι τὸ δεκτικόν, οὔτε θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν, — τούτων γὰρ ἀνὰ μέσον τι οὐδὲν κωλύει ὑπάρχειν·

Nor are cases of privation and possession opposed as contraries, as is clear from the following. With contraries between which there is nothing **intermediate** it is necessary for one or the other of them always to belong to the things they naturally occur in or are predicated of. For there was nothing **intermediate** in just those cases where it was necessary for one or the other to belong to a thing capable of receiving them, as with sickness and health and odd and even. But where there is something **intermediate** it is never necessary for one or the other to belong to everything; it is not necessary for everything to be white or black that is capable of receiving them, or hot or cold, since something **intermediate** between these may perfectly well be present.

<sup>11</sup> In this paper I quote the Greek text from the MINIO-PALUELLO edition, and I rely on the English translation by ACKRILL with slight modifications.

SyrHT 285a, n419a, n417b (*verso*)

1    ولا حريرا وباريا [لو هو منينا / لو] لا يحل لو معصم او  
 2    او صر. حجب [لو حلكا فح حلكا الحرير] انما  
 3    ومبار حج [لو حلكا معصم] لا الا لو حلكه و حله  
 4    وحصلا [لو حلكا] لو حبا حج [لو حلكا] ح  
 5    حه حج انما [لو] لو حبا او لو حلكا انما. ح حبريا  
 6    لو لو حلكا [لو] حلكا حلكه لو لو حلكا حلكا  
 7    [لو حبا حج [لو حلكا] و حلكا] و حلكا حلكا حلكا  
 8    و لو حلكا حلكا حلكا [.....] و لو حج  
 9    انما حبا حج حلكا حلكا حلكا [.....]

- 1 That it is not possible that fire [should be cold or] snow should be hot or
- 2 black. Thus [not to all the receivers] is it necessary
- 3 that one of th[ese should belong] but only to that one
- 4 to which by nature one of these [should belong]. Since the body is
- 5 not from necessity white or black, it is possible that
- 6 it could be yellow. About privation and possession, however,
- 7 also neither of [these] contraries of the sort, these
- 8 [aforementioned things, is true ...] that [it is] not from
- 9 [necessity that one of them should relate to that which receives it ...]

*Marginalia:*

either hot...	...] معصم او
that it should be...	...] حبا حج

The partially-faded text could be safely reconstructed through the mirror image contained in Folio b (see Fig. 2). This passage continues the discussion on the *recto* side and corresponds well with the *Categories* 12b40–13a7:

οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ τὴν χιόνα μέλαιναν· ὥστε παντὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τῶ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷς φύσει τὸ ἐν ὑπάρχει, καὶ τοῦτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἐν καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στέρησεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως οὐδέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθές· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἰεὶ τῶ δεκτικῷ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, —τὸ γὰρ μήπω πεφυκὸς ὄψιν ἔχειν οὔτε τυφλὸν οὔτε ὄψιν ἔχειν λέγεται, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν τοιοῦτων ἐναντίων ὧν οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀνὰ μέσον·

For it is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black. Thus it is not necessary for one or the other of them to belong to everything capable of receiving them, but only to things to which the one belongs by nature, and in these cases it must be definitely the one and not whichever chance would have. But with regard to privation and possession, neither of these aforementioned things is true. For it is not necessary for one or the other of them always to belong to a thing capable of receiving them, since if it is not yet natural for something to have sight it is not said either to be blind or to have sight; so that these would not be contraries of the sort that have nothing intermediate between them.



SyrHT 389a, n420a, n415b (*verso*)

- 1 There is truth in them (one of these)...  
 2 that a man sees; a blind man doesn't see, but is blind.  
 3 And when they are formed, then it is an affirmation  
 4 and negation. And then in these actual things there  
 is no...

This passage continues the argument on the *recto*, and explains under which conditions it is possible for possession and privation like sight and blindness to be stated in the way that one is true and the other false. That is, they are said with combination: “a man sees” being contrary to “a man is blind”. Still, the difference between possession/privation and affirmation/negation lies in the fact that in the latter case one is always false and the other true, whether the man (the actual thing) exists or not.

A similar argument can be found in 13b12–35, especially 13b27–33:

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δόξειεν ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν ἐναντίων λεγομένων, —τὸ γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν Σωκράτη τῷ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη ἐναντίον ἐστίν,— ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον αἰεὶ θάτερον μὲν ἀληθές θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος εἶναι· ὄντος μὲν γὰρ Σωκράτους ἔσται τὸ μὲν ἀληθές τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος, μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἀμφοτέρω ψευδῆ· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη οὔτε τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἀληθές αὐτοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὅλως τοῦ Σωκράτους ... ἐπὶ δὲ γε τῆς καταφάσεως καὶ τῆς ἀποφάσεως αἰεὶ, ἐάν τε ἢ ἐάν τε μὴ ἢ, τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἔσται ψεῦδος τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἀληθές· τὸ γὰρ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη καὶ τὸ μὴ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη, ὄντος τε αὐτοῦ φανερόν ὅτι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος, καὶ μὴ ὄντος ὁμοίως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ νοσεῖν μὴ ὄντος ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ μὴ νοσεῖν ἀληθές· ὥστε ἐπὶ μόνων τούτων ἴδιον ἂν εἶη τὸ αἰεὶ θάτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος εἶναι, ὅσα ὡς καταφασίς καὶ ἀπόφασίς ἀντίκειται.

It might, indeed, very well seem that the same sort of thing does occur in the case of contraries said with combination, ‘Socrates is well’ being contrary to ‘Socrates is sick’. Yet not even with these is it necessary always for one to be true and the other false. For if Socrates exists one will be true and one false, but if he does not both will be false; neither ‘Socrates is sick’ nor ‘Socrates is well’ will be true if Socrates himself does not exist at all ... **But with an affirmation and negation one will always be false and the other true whether he exists or not.** For take ‘Socrates is sick’ and ‘Socrates is not sick’: if he exists it is clear that one or the other of them will be true or false, and equally if he does not; for if he does not exist ‘he is sick’ is false but ‘he is not sick’ true. Thus it would be distinctive of these alone-opposed affirmations and negations- that always one or the other of them is true or false.

The *Categories* in Syriac: different versions compared

The Syriac philosophical fragments found in Turfan thus contain passages from “On Opposites”, Chapter 7 of Aristotle's *Categories*. The remnant corresponds roughly to C. 12b26–35 (less likely C. 11b38–12a20 due to the limited space), 12b40–13a7 (with an explanatory interpolation from 12a11–13, 17–18), 13a37–b12 and 13b27–33. This constitutes the latter part of Chapter 7 on the third and fourth type of the opposites: ἐξίς/στέρησις and ἀπόφασις/κατὰφασις. The fragments are thus very probably parts of two separate folios, one after the other, from the same manuscript.

As the first treatise to be studied in the Aristotelian curriculum, the *Categories* attracted most attention from the earliest Aristotelian commentators around first century BC, enjoyed great popularity in both the peripatetic school and the Neoplatonic tradition of late antiquity, and became one of the basic philosophical works in the middle ages.<sup>12</sup> The *Categories* has three extant translations in the Syriac tradition:<sup>13</sup>

1. A: Anonymous version, edited by KING,<sup>14</sup> probably dating from the first half of the sixth century,<sup>15</sup> preserved in a single manuscript of the seventh century (BL Add. 14658).
2. J: A late seventh-century revision by Jacob of Edessa (d. 708), the so-called standard translation in the Syriac tradition, edited by SCHÜLER (partially, up to 3b32)<sup>16</sup> and GEORR<sup>17</sup>, preserved in several manuscripts.<sup>18</sup>
3. G: A seventh/eighth-century revision by George, bishop of the Arabs (d. 724), edited by GOTTHEIL<sup>19</sup> and FURLANI<sup>20</sup>, preserved in a single manuscript of the eighth/ninth century (BL Add. 14659).

Below is a comparison of all four versions and the Greek text (both the original and the English translation<sup>21</sup>). The passages chosen here from the Turfan

<sup>12</sup> GOTTSCHALK 1987, SORABJI 1990, SHARPLES 2008, GRIFFIN 2015, 2016.

<sup>13</sup> For a detailed summary of the *Categories* in the Syriac tradition see BROCK 1993, pp. 3–4; KESSEL 2019, pp. 397–398. For related discussion, see further BAUMSTARK 1900, p. 157; HEIN 1985, p. 27; WATT 2008–2009, 2017; KING 2010, pp. 18, 21–22, 68.

<sup>14</sup> The attribution to Sergius of Rešaina has been demonstrated as unconvincing by HUGONNARD-ROCHE 1987.

<sup>15</sup> KING 2010, p. 34.

<sup>16</sup> SCHÜLER 1897.

<sup>17</sup> GEORR 1948.

<sup>18</sup> HUGONNARD-ROCHE 2004, pp. 91–97; KING 2010, pp. 283–296; KESSEL and BAMBALLI 2018, pp. 31–32.

<sup>19</sup> GOTTHEIL 1892–1893.

<sup>20</sup> FURLANI 1933.

<sup>21</sup> For A I follow KING's translation with slight modifications; for J and G the translations are my own.



Greek 12b40–13a3	Anonymous 154K. 15–19	Jacob 294Ge. 16–20	George 38Fu. 20–23	Turfan SyrHT 285a, n419a, n417b ( <i>verso</i> 1–4)
ceiving them, but only to things to which the one belongs by nature, and in these cases it must be definitely the one and not whichever chance would have.	should belong, but only [in the case of] those in which it belongs by nature, and in these [cases] it is definitely one [of the two], not at all just by chance.	to things to which it belongs by nature, and to these it is definitely the one and not whichever of them by chance.	things to which the one belongs by nature, and to these it is definitely the one and not whichever by chance.	that one to which by nature one of these [should belong].

Greek 12a11–13, 17–18	Anonymous 150K. 13–15, 20–22	Jacob 291Ge. 8–11, 15–17	George 36Fu. 13–15, 18–19	Turfan SyrHT 285a, n419a, n417b ( <i>verso</i> 4–6)
<p>οἷον μέλαν καὶ λευκὸν ἐν σώματι πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν τῷ σώματι, — οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ἦτοι λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἐστίν· ... καὶ ἔστι γέ τι τούτων ἀνά μέ- σον, οἷον τοῦ μέν λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ μέλανος τὸ φαιδὸν καὶ ὠχρὸν ...</p>	<p>اصلا و اصبلا سوا ج اصلا حصص لاصلا. ولا اخل و صب صوص سوا ج اصلا.                   له كنه صا سوا او اصلا لاصلا ... صا سببلا كنه صصص صصصا و اصلا و حصصلا. اصلا و صص سوا لاصلا. صا سوا</p>	<p>و اصب اص اصلا سوا ج اصلا حصص لاصلا. ولا اصب صا اصلا و صب صوص اصلا صصلا ج اصلا.                   له كنه صا اصلا او سوا او اصلا ... لاص صا حصصلا اصلا. و اصب اص: و سوا و اصلا. صصصا سوا</p>	<p>و اصب اص اصلا سوا ج اصلا حصص لاصلا صا اصلا و اصلا صوص سوا ج اصلا.                   له كنه صلا سوا او اصلا لاصلا. ... لاصلا و اص حصصا و اصلا و اصب اص. و سوا اص و اصلا صصلا سوا</p>	<p>اصلا كنه                  له ج اصلا [او] سوا او اصلا لاصلا. ج اصلا ج اصلا سوا [ل].</p>
<p>For example, black and white naturally occur in the body, but it is</p>	<p>For example, black and white naturally exist in a body, and it is not</p>	<p>For example, black and white naturally exist in a body, and it is not</p>	<p>For example, black and white naturally exist in a body, and it is not</p>	<p>Since the body is not from ne- cessity white or black, it is possible that</p>

Greek 12a11–13, 17–18	Anonymous 150K. 13–15, 20–22	Jacob 291Ge. 8–11, 15–17	George 36Fu. 13–15, 18–19	Turfan SyrHT 285a, n419a, n417b ( <i>verso</i> 4–6)
not necessary for one or the other of them to belong to a body, for not every body is either white or black; ... And between these there is certainly something intermediate—between white and black are grey and yellow ...	necessary that [either] one of them should be in the body, since not everything is white or black; ... And these [sorts of things] do have a middle item, for example between white and black are grey and yellow ...	necessary that one of them should belong to a body, since not every body is white or black; ... And there is certainly something intermediate between them, for example between white and black are red and yellow ...	necessary that one or the other of them should belong to a body, since not everything is white or black; ... And there is certainly something intermediate between them, for example between white and black are dark blue and yellow ...	it could be yellow.

Greek 13a3–7	Anonymous 154K. 20–25	Jacob 294Ge. 20–295Ge. 1	George 38Fu. 23– 39Fu.3	Turfan SyrHT 285a, n419a, n417b ( <i>verso</i> 6–9)
<p>ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στε- ρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως οὐδέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθές·</p> <p>οὐδὲ γὰρ αἰὶ τῶ δεκτικῶ ἀνα- γκαῖον θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν,</p> <p>— τὸ γὰρ μήπω πεφυκὸς ὄψιν ἔχειν οὔτε τυ- φλὸν οὔτε ὄψιν ἔχειν λέγεται, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἶη</p>	<p>حک و کجوسا و ج لو لوسا ولا س ج احج و انا احج هينا.</p> <p>لا حن احسا ل احرا و سوسا. حوسا و صحح سب حوسو</p> <p>وه حن ولا حص و اوسا حه سوا. لا صحسا ولا سوا حد احج و اوسا حوسا. اوسا ولا سوا سب سب سب سب سب و احصحاحا و اوسا</p>	<p>حک و کجوسا و ج هوسا. اها سوا ج احج و انا احج هينا.</p> <p>اها حن احرا اوسا و احصح احصحاحا سوا حوسو و اوسا حصسا حه.</p> <p>وه حن ولا حص حص و سوسا اوسا حه سوا ولا صحسا ولا و اوسا حس سوا حد احج: اوسا حد ولا سوسا اوسا و احصحاحا</p>	<p>حک و کجوسا و ج هوسا. ولا سوا ج احج و انا احج هينا.</p> <p>ولا حن حج اوسا و اوسا حوسو احصحاحا سوسا. اوسا و احصحاحا لا حصسا حه.</p> <p>وه حن ولا حص حص و اوسا اوسا حه سوا. ولا صحسا ولا و اوسا حه سوا حد احج حص لا سوسا و احج حص و احصحاحا</p>	<p>حک و کجوسا و ج هوسا [اها سوا ج] احج و احصحاحا و انا احج هينا [..... و احج ج اوسا سوا حص و احصحاحا [.....] اوسا</p>

Greek 13a3–7	Anonymous 154K. 20–25	Jacob 294Ge. 20–295Ge. 1	George 38Fu. 23– 39Fu.3	Turfan SyrHT 285a, n419a, n417b ( <i>verso</i> 6–9)
ταῦτα τῶν τοιούτων ἐνα- ντίων ὧν οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀνά μέσον·	ܘܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܗܘܢ	ܘܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܗܘܢ	ܘܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܗܘܢ	
<p>But with regard to privation and possession, neither of these aforementioned things is true.</p> <p>For it is not necessary for one or the other of them always to belong to a thing capable of receiving them, since if it is not yet natural for something to have sight it is not said either to be blind or to have sight; so that these would not be contraries of the sort that have nothing intermediate between them.</p>	<p>But with regard to privation and possession, also neither of these aforementioned things is true.</p> <p>For it is not always necessary that one of them should relate to that which receives [it]. Since that which does not naturally have sight is not said to be blind and [is not said to be] sighted, such that [privation and possession] are not the same [type of] contraries, the kind that have nothing intermediate between them.</p>	<p>But with regard to privation and possession, also neither of these aforementioned things is true.</p> <p>For it is also not necessary that one of them should always belong to a thing capable of receiving it. Since that which is not yet natural to have sight, it is not said either to be blind or to have sight; so that they would not be those from the contraries of the sort, the kind that have nothing intermediate between them.</p>	<p>But with regard to privation and possession, also neither of these aforementioned things is true.</p> <p>For it is also not always necessary that one or the other of them should relate to that which receives them, as the case of the contraries which have nothing intermediate. Since that which is not yet natural to have sight, it is not said either to be blind or to have sight; so that they would not be those from the contraries of the sort, the kind that have nothing intermediate between them.</p>	<p>But with regard to privation and possession, also neither of [these] contraries of the sort, these [aforementioned things, is true...] that [it is] not from [necessity that one of them should relate to that which receives it...]</p>





Greek 13a37–b12	Anonymous 156K. 22– 158K. 3	Jacob 296Ge. 9–24	George 39Fu. 27–40Fu. 12	Turfan SyrHT 255a, n415a, n420b ( <i>recto</i> )
<p>For example, health and sickness are contraries, and neither is either true or false; similarly, the double and the half are opposed as relatives, and neither of them is either true or false; nor are cases of possession and privation, such as sight and blindness. Nothing, in fact, that is said without combination is either true or false; and all the above are said without combination.</p>	<p>things that are relative, nor in the case of possession and deprivation. For example, sickness and health are contrary, but neither the one nor the other is true or false. Likewise, also double and half are contrary as being relatives, and yet neither one of them is true or false, and also none of the things that concern deprivation and possession, for example, sight and blindness. Of those things that are not said by any combination, absolutely none of them can be true or false. All the things [here] mentioned are said without combination.</p>	<p>things that are relative, nor in the case of possession and deprivation. For example, health and sickness are contrary, and neither of them is either true or false. Likewise, also double and half are contrary as being relatives, and yet neither one of them is true or false; and also none of the things like deprivation and possession, for example, sight and blindness. On the whole, of those things that are not said by any combination, none of them can be truth or falsehood. All these things mentioned are said without combination.</p>	<p>that are relative, nor in the case of deprivation and possession. For example, health and sickness are contrary, and neither is either true or false. Likewise, also double and half are contrary as being relatives, and yet neither one of them is true or false; and also none of the things that concern deprivation and possession, for example, sight and blindness. On the whole, of those things that are not said by any combination, none of them can be true or false. All these things mentioned are said without combination.</p>	



Greek 13b27–33	Anonymous 158K. 18–22	Jacob 297Ge. 27–31	George 40Fu. 26– 41Fu. 12	Turfan SyrHT 389a, n420a, n415b ( <i>verso</i> )
clear that one or the other of them will be true or false, and likewise if he does not; for if he does not exist ‘he is sick’ is false but ‘he is not sick’ is true.	or false, and likewise when he does not exist. For to the one who does not exist, ‘to be sick’ is false, and ‘to be not sick’ is true.	them is true or false, and if he does not exist ‘he is sick’ is false but ‘he is not sick’ is true.	of them is true or false, and likewise if he does not exist ‘he is sick’ is false but ‘he is not sick’ is true.	

The following facts emerge from the comparison above:

1. The Turfan fragments are not from a literal translation of the *Categories*, but rather a concise paraphrase or commentary. As already pointed out by BROCK, the Syriac commentary tradition of the *Organon* consists, on the one hand, of general introductions to the *Organon* (Syriac translation of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and other Syriac introductions written by authors in the sixth and seventh centuries<sup>22</sup>), and on the other, of diverse commentaries on individual books. The authors of the commentaries on the *Categories* include e.g. Sergius of Reš‘aina, George, Bishop of the Arabs, Išo‘bokht, David bar Paulos, Moše bar Kepha, Dionysius bar Šalibi and Bar Hebraeus.<sup>23</sup> An updated list of the extant Syriac translations of the *Organon* and the main commentary tradition can now be found in KESSEL 2019.<sup>24</sup> To my knowledge, the Turfan version doesn’t correspond with any hitherto discovered treatise in the Syriac commentary tradition.

2. The Aristotelian text in the Turfan version is occasionally rearranged or expanded for the purpose of a clearer and more efficient presentation of the original thought.<sup>25</sup> As we have seen above, lines 4–6 of Folio a *verso* are

<sup>22</sup> I.e. Sergius of Reš‘aina, Paul the Persian, Probus, Athanasius of Balad and Jacob of Edessa etc. According to BROCK some of these “concentrate primarily on the contents of the *Categories*”, see BROCK 1993, p. 5.

<sup>23</sup> See BROCK 1993, KING 2010, KESSEL 2019. Not a few Syriac commentaries on the *Categories* remain unedited; but see recently WATT 2015, AYDIN 2016 and 2019.

<sup>24</sup> See pp. 393–401. For an earlier version see appendix of BROCK 1993, pp. 12–13.

<sup>25</sup> On the “inventor” of the philosophical paraphrase, see FALCON 2016, pp. 363–366.



- a) For θερμότης, κατάφασις, λευκόν, ὥστε, T agrees with **A and G**, against J. For θερμότης, T, A and G use  $\text{لحمية}$ , while J uses  $\text{لحمية}$ . For κατάφασις, T, A and G use  $\text{ماتصه}$  (although T uses an abbreviation  $\text{ماتصه}$ ), while J uses  $\text{ماتصه}$ . For λευκόν, T, A and G use  $\text{لبيضاء}$ , while J adopts  $\text{لبيضاء}$ . For ὥστε, T, A and G use  $\text{حسب}$  (although A also uses  $\text{حسب}$ ), while J uses  $\text{حسب}$ .
- b) For ἔξις, ἐναντίος, τὰ πρὸς τι, T agrees with **J and G**, against A. For ἔξις, T, J, and G use  $\text{مقابل}$  (although J also uses  $\text{مقابل}$ ), while A uses  $\text{مقابل}$ ,  $\text{مقابل}$ ,  $\text{مقابل}$ . For ἐναντίος, T uses  $\text{مقابل}$ , the same term adopted by J and G; A, however, uses  $\text{مقابل}$ . For τὰ πρὸς τι, T agrees with J and G ( $\text{حسب}$ ,  $\text{حسب}$ ), while  $\text{حسب}$  is used in A.
- c) For ἀπόφασις, T agrees with **A**, against J and G. T and A use  $\text{ماتصه}$  (although T uses an abbreviation  $\text{ماتصه}$ ), while J uses  $\text{ماتصه}$  or  $\text{ماتصه}$ , G uses  $\text{ماتصه}$ .
- d) For ἐναντία, οὐδέτερον, ὑπάρχω, ψεῦδος, T agrees with **J** against A and G. For the plural form of ἐναντίος, ἐναντία, T agrees with J and uses the feminine form  $\text{مقابلات}$ , while G uses another plural form  $\text{مقابلات}$  and A uses  $\text{مقابلات}$ . For οὐδέτερον, T and J use  $\text{لا سببا}$ , A uses the masculine form  $\text{لا سبب}$ , and G consistently uses  $\text{لا سببا}$ , a literal rendering of the Greek original.<sup>29</sup> For ὑπάρχω, T agrees with J by using  $\text{موجود}$  ( $\text{موجود}$ ), while A uses  $\text{موجود}$  and G  $\text{موجود}$ . For ψεῦδος, T agrees with J by using  $\text{كاذب}$ , while A and G consistently use  $\text{كاذب}$ .
- e) For ἀποφατικός, καταφατικός, T agrees with **G** against A and J. For the translation of ἀποφατικός, A uses  $\text{لا}$ ,  $\text{فصلا}$ , J  $\text{لا}$ , while T uses a similar loan as  $\text{لا}$  in G and employs the adjectival suffix -āyā to create a new adjective, a technique used by sixth- and seventh-century translators.<sup>30</sup> Similar observations apply to καταφατικός.
- f) For ἀλλά, συμπλοκή, ἀναγκαῖος/ἀνάγκη, T differs from **all the other versions**. For ἀλλά, T uses  $\text{لا}$ , while all the other versions use  $\text{لا}$ . For συμπλοκή, A  $\text{لا}$ , J and G  $\text{لا}$ , while T uses  $\text{حاصل}$ . For ἀναγκαῖος/ἀνάγκη, A uses both  $\text{لا}$  and  $\text{لا}$  but indiscriminately, J “shows a surprising level of variety” but occasionally draws a distinction between the noun ἀνάγκη ( $\text{لا}$ ) and the adjective ἀναγκαῖος ( $\text{لا}$ ), and G alone uses the loan  $\text{لا}$  consistently.<sup>31</sup> T on the one hand agrees with A by using both  $\text{لا}$  and  $\text{لا}$  but indiscriminately, on the other differs from A by using  $\text{لا}$ .

<sup>29</sup> See also KING 2010, p. 47: “For the neuter plural forms which we find so often in Aristotle, A and J both tend to prefer the feminine, G often the masculine ...”

<sup>30</sup> See KING 2010, p. 51: “ὥστε =  $\text{حسب}$ , (c. 44 %) or  $\text{حسب}$  (c. 56 %) in A;  $\text{حسب}$  in G. There seems no very consistent reason behind the choice made in each case by A. It is clear, however, that J has picked up one of A’s equivalents and used it with consistency, whereas G has used the other with similar results.”

<sup>31</sup> For the translation of the noun ἀνάγκη and the adjective ἀναγκαῖος, see KING 2010, pp. 57, 242.



onward, in which much greater attention was paid to the *significant* than to the *signifié*. It is, however, most probably later than the extant earliest Anonymous version and postdates Sergius. Although not a literal translation, the Turfan version of the *Categories* can occasionally be so literal that part of the lost text can be safely reconstructed on the basis of the parallels in the other Syriac *Categories*. The author is obviously a specialist in Aristotelian philosophy, as he is very good at interpolating and extending the original text so as to make a clearer and more efficient presentation of the original thought. The remnant also provides a list of philosophical terms, including a number of Greek loans, which bears witness to the diversity of the translation techniques employed during the legendary period of the Syriac translation movement. All this valuable information adds to our knowledge of the translation and transmission history of Aristotelian philosophy in the Syriac tradition, especially its eastern branch in Central Asia and China.

Following ASSEMANI, it was believed that the “Nestorians” started to study Aristotle in Syriac in the fifth century.<sup>37</sup> The traditional standard account has been questioned in the past two decades by scholars like HUGONNARD-ROCHE and KING, who convincingly demonstrate that there is no evidence indicating that the Aristotelian studies among the Syrians can be traced back to the fifth century;<sup>38</sup> it is argued instead that Aristotelian philosophy was first introduced into Syriac literature by Sergius of Reš‘aina<sup>39</sup> and in the mid-sixth-century, Mar Abā was the first who introduced Aristotle to the School of the Persians.<sup>40</sup> Setting aside its obscure origin, it is beyond any doubt that Aristotelian studies among the Syrians flourished from the middle of the sixth century onwards in both the East and the West Syrian monasteries, with the most important centre in Qennešre in the seventh century.<sup>41</sup> Also remarkable is the fact that the interest in Aristotelian studies among the East Syrians survived the eighth century, “a barren period” for Syrian philosophy,<sup>42</sup> as can be seen from the two letters of the East Syrian Patriarch Timothy I (d. 823), who was eagerly looking for the commentaries and scholia of the later books of the *Organon*.<sup>43</sup> The keen interest of Patriarch Timothy I for the *Organon* may partly explain why the Syriac work bearing on *Categories* ended up in a

<sup>37</sup> BO III, 2, cmxlili.

<sup>38</sup> HUGONNARD-ROCHE 2004, pp. 61–62; KING 2010, pp. 3–8.

<sup>39</sup> HUGONNARD-ROCHE 2004, pp. 167ff.; KING 2010, p. 7; WATT 2019, p. 73.

<sup>40</sup> BROCK 1984, p. 22; KING 2010, p. 7.

<sup>41</sup> KING 2010, pp. 9–11.

<sup>42</sup> KING 2010, p. 14.

<sup>43</sup> Timothy, *epp.* 19, 43, 48, see BRAUN 1914–1915, HEIMGARTNER 2012.

monastic library belonging to the East Syrian tradition at Shuïpang in the 9<sup>th</sup>–13<sup>th</sup> centuries.<sup>44</sup> Due to the limited evidence we have, it is unclear to what extent Aristotle’s works were studied in Turfan; it is nevertheless true that the discovery of the Turfan *Categories* challenges our knowledge of the reception of Aristotle’s works in Central Asia and what is today China. According to the standard view, Aristotle’s works including the *Categories* arrived in China no earlier than the Late Ming (17<sup>th</sup> century),<sup>45</sup> while the existence of the Turfan *Categories* reveals that this might happen much earlier than we previously thought.

Appendix 1: Greek-Syriac glossary of terms<sup>46</sup>

Greek	A	J	G	T
ἀληθές	ܗܝܘܐ / ܗܝܘܐ	ܗܝܘܐ / ܗܝܘܐ	ܗܝܘܐ / ܗܝܘܐ	ܗܝܘܐ / (ܥ)ܗܝܘܐ
ἀλλά	ܘܐ	ܘܐ	ܘܐ	ܘܐ ܐ
ἀναγκαῖος/ ἀνάγκη	ܐܢܟܐ ܐܢܟܐ <sup>47</sup>	ܐܢܟܐ ܐܢܟܐ	ܐܢܟܐ	ܥܝܐ ܐܢܟܐ ܐܢܟܐ
ἀντιδιαίρέω	ܐܢܦܠܝ	ܐܢܦܠܝ ܕܡܚܠܐ	ܐܢܦܠܝ ܕܡܚܦܐܠܐ	ܐܢܦܠܝ (?)
ἀπόφασις	ܐܦܦܫܝܫܐ	ܡܚܘܨܝܘܬܐ ܐܦܦܫܝܫܐ	ܐܦܦܫܝܫܐ	ܐܦܦܫܝܫܐ
ἀποφατικός	ܦܫܝܫܐ ܘܐ	ܡܚܘܨܝܐ	ܐܦܦܫܝܫܐ	ܐܦܦܫܝܫܐ
εἶναι	ܐܘܢܐ / ܐܘܢܘ / ܐܢܐ	ܘܢܘܢܐ / ܐܘܢܐ / ܐܘܢܘ ܐܘܢܐ ܘܢܘܢܐ / ܐܘܢܘ	ܐܘܢܐ / ܐܘܢܘ / ܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܐ / ܐܘܢܘ / ܐܢܐ
ἐναντίος ἐναντία	ܦܚܡܦܠܐ ܦܚܡܦܠܐ	ܡܚܡܚܠܐ ܡܚܡܚܠܐ	ܡܚܡܚܠܐ ܡܚܡܚܠܐ	ܡܚܡܚܠܐ ܡܚܡܚܠܐ

<sup>44</sup> HUNTER 2012, DICKENS 2019.



<sup>45</sup> The *Coimbra Commentaries on Aristotle’s Logic* (*Commentarii Collegii Conimbriensis Societatis Jesu In universam dialecticam nunc primum*) was included in the collection of books which NICOLAS TRIGAULT (JIN NIGE 金尼閣) brought to China in 1620. It was then translated into Chinese and named 名理探 (*Mingli Tan*), which is in fact also a paraphrase of the original. See VERHAEREN 1935, FANG 1969, WARDY 2000, KURTZ 2011, MEYNARD 2017.

<sup>46</sup> For the Greek-Syriac glossary of terms in A, J and G see KING 2010, pp. 314–324.


<sup>47</sup> Also variants on ܐܢܟܐ, ܐܢܟܐ, ܐܢܟܐ, ܐܢܟܐ etc.

Greek	A	J	G	T
ἐνδέχομαι	حدرجا	حدرجا	فحدجا/حدرجا	حدرجا
ἕξις	لوصلا أوصص لوصلا	صصلا أوصص	صصلا	صصلا
θερμότης	صصصصلا	صصصصلا	صصصصلا	صصصصلا
[τὸ] ἴδιον	وحدلا	وحدلا	وحدلا	وحدلا
κατάφασις	مفصصص	مفصصص	مفصصص	مفصصص
καταφατικός	فصصا وء	فصصا	مفصصصا	مفصصصا
[τὸ] λευκόν	لوا	لواوا	لوا	لوا
[τὸ] μέσον	حدرجا	حدرجا	حدرجا	حدرجا
ὅταν	أحداب وء	أحداب وء	أحداب وء	أحداب وء
οὐδέτερον	لا مء صء	لا مءا صء	لا مءا صء	لا مءا صء
πράγμα	فصصا	فصصا	فصصا	فصصا
στέρησις	لوصصص	لوصصص	لوصصص	لوصصص
συμπλοκή	لوصصلا	لوصصلا	لوصصلا	لوصصلا
σῶμα	لوصصا	لوصصا لوصصا	لوصصا	لوصصا
τὰ πρὸς τι	أءء وءءا حءء	أءء وءءا حءء	أءء وءءا حءء	أءء وءءا حءء
ὑπάρχω	لوص	لوص (لوصلا)	لوص	لوص (لوصلا)
ψεῦδος	لوصا	لوصا/لوصا	لوصا	لوصا
ὥστε	أصصا وء حدرء	أصصا صء وء	حدرء	حدرء
ὠχρὸς	لواوا لواوا	لواوا لواوا	لواوا	لواوا (؟)




## Appendix 2



Folio b (*recto*):  
SyrHT 255a, n415a, n420b



Folio a (*verso*):  
SyrHT 285a, n419a, n417b



Folio b (*recto*):  
SyrHT 255a, n415a, n420b  
(Rotated)



Folio a (*verso*):  
SyrHT 285a, n419a, n417b

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