Rural Locals, Distant States: Citizenship in Contemporary Rural Georgia

Dissertation

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Dedicated to my parents

Roland and Tsitso
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Zusammenfassung

Die Bevölkerung vor Ort und der entfernte Staat:

Staatsbürgerschaft im ländlichen Georgien von heute


Methodisch stützt sich die Arbeit auf teilnehmende Beobachtung des Alltags, eine Bevölkerungsbefragung mittels eines kurzen, strukturierten Fragebogens in fast allen Haushalten des Dorfes und zusätzlich einer weiteren Erhebung in 100 Haushalten mittels eines semi-strukturierten Fragebogens. Dazu kommen detaillierte Interviews mit den Bewohnern und Vertretern der örtlichen Behörden sowie Dokumentenanalysen in örtlichen Archiven sowie Analysen von sowjetischen und aktuellen Zeitungen.


Sozialleistungen (Verdery 1996, 293). In einigen postsozialistischen Staaten, zu denen ich auch Georgien zähle, wird Staatsbürgerschaft hauptsächlich durch die Verteidigung der Ansprüche auf Sozialleistungen erfahren.


Kapitel 2 geht auf die Geschichte der Region ein, insbesondere auch auf die Erinnerung an die sozialistische Vergangenheit und das Nationalgefühl der örtlichen Bevölkerung. T’q’ibuli Distrikt, als Teil der Imereti Region, war und ist seit Jahrhunderten ein integraler Bestandteil Georgiens (Javakhishvili 2012 [1908]). Die Region ist durch knappe Ressourcen gekennzeichnet und hat oft wirtschaftliche Schwierigkeiten erlebt. Vor der Gründung der Sowjetunion waren die Einwohner sehr eng mit der orthodoxen Kirche verbunden. Die Sowjetunion hatte großen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der lokalen Wirtschaft, so dass die sozialistische Vergangenheit von der Bevölkerung in ihrer Erinnerung glorifiziert wird. Nach meinen Befunden zur historischen Entwicklung sowjetischer Staatsbürgerschaft unterscheidet
sich diese von Marshalls Logik, die vor allem auf kapitalistische Gesellschaften zutrifft. Sozialistische Staatsbürgerschaft garantierte soziale Rechte, während politische und zivilgesellschaftliche Rechte für die einfache Bevölkerung unmöglich umzusetzen waren (Alexopoulos 2006). Dennoch bestimmt die sozialistische Vergangenheit die gegenwärtigen Erwartungen der Bürger, die vom gegenwärtigen Staat die gleichen Sozialleistungen erwarten, die einst von der Sowjetunion garantiert worden waren. Die wirtschaftliche Situation des unabhängigen Staates ist zu schwach, um seinen Bürgern gleiche oder auch nur ähnliche Leistungen bieten zu können. Das unabhängige Georgien ermöglicht das Ausleben der zivilgesellschaftlichen und politischen staatsbürgerlichen Rechte, die in der Sowjetzeit unterdrückt wurden, aber die unbefriedigten Ansprüche auf Sozialleistungen vom Staat lassen die sowjetische Staatsbürgerschaft in den Augen der örtlichen Bevölkerung als höherwertig im Vergleich zur gegenwärtigen Staatsbürgerschaft erscheinen.


Kapitel 6 stellt eine Komponente sozialer Staatsbürgerschaft genauer dar, den Eckpfeiler der gegenwärtigen Sozialpolitik – Targeted Social Assistance (Gezielte soziale Unterstützung)

Kapitel 7 diskutiert Emigrationsprozesse aus dem Dorf im Allgemeinen und in Bezug auf Staatsbürgerschaftspraktiken. Die Migrationsprozesse des Dorfes haben viele Merkmale, die allen Migrationsprozessen gemein sind, aber es gibt auch einige Besonderheiten: so handelt es sich nicht um eine Form des Brain Drain; Personen ohne verbleibende nahe Verwandte im Dorf werden nicht zurückerwartet; die (Nicht)Bezeichnung als ‚Migrant‘ ist abhängig von der


Acknowledgments

A dissertation is a product of the labor, work and emotional support of many people, who directly or indirectly are involved in the process of its formation. Anthropological works involve even more people, as the fieldwork done in different corners of the world is realized by the assistance of numerous local individuals. The year spent in fieldwork is like the short life, where you go through all the stages of life: ‘birth,’ when you first enter into the site and are ‘baptized’ by locals as a ‘representative of foreign institution’ or as a ‘spy’ or just as a ‘city dweller;’ next stage is ‘intense socialization,’ when the locals ‘teach’ you what to do, where to go and how to behave; next stage is ‘growing up’, when you start to recognize the surrounding and get to know the people, their habits and ways of being there; and finally the state of ‘maturity’ comes, when you are already the ‘local,’ confident member of the community. As it is like a short life experience, anthropologists are not immune to making mistakes, which are ultimately reflected in their final results.

So first of all, I would like to express my gratitude towards the villagers of Sac’ire, where I spent a year. The wonderful nature of the village was coupled with the open and supportive character of the locals. I would like to express my great thanks to my host family, who received me as a daughter and till now has been expressing great emotional support. So, thank you Lela and George, for helping me throughout my fieldwork and for sharing their attitudes with me. I would like to also remember the grandmother of the family, who died after my fieldwork and who was very nice and beloved woman. God bless her! I would like to express my appreciation to Thea Kamushadze for sharing with me many ideas and attitudes and support for me during the field work.

Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology enabled this dissertation. So I would like to express my great gratitude to all members of the institution. The secretaries Anke Meyer and Berit Westwood, who were always ready to support; Jutta Turner, who created the map of the village as well as helped my family to improve our German language; Bettina Mann, who was always ready for solving administrative problems. I would like to express my great love and thanks to all members of the Department II, as the discussions and seminars were very helpful and strengthened my knowledge in the field as well as enriched my comprehension about postsocialist world. I would like to thank Chris Hann, who heads the Department, for his support, attention and always constructive comments. I would like to express my gratitude towards the Martin-Luther-University, for their interesting seminars. I would like to thank
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My family members were the great supporters of me during the whole process. My sons were the participants and witnesses of the whole post-fieldwork process and I would like to express my love to them for being patient while lacking the time and attention from their mother. I would like to express my greatest thank to my husband - Akaki Epremidze, who was always caring for us as well as listening, sharing and criticizing my ideas. I would like to express my great love to my parents-in-law, brother and sister, aunt, my friends who took on their shoulders the emotional support of me and my family when I was absent. I would like to thank my brother-in-law Levan Efremidze, who was the very supportive, reading and commenting my texts. And finally I would like to express my great love and devotion to my parents, Roland and Tsitso, to whom I dedicate this work and who always are my main harbor.
Notes on Transliteration

For transcribing the Georgian terms I used the ‘scholarly transliteration,’ which is used for transliteration of original poems and is familiar to specialist in Caucasian and Amerindian languages. Georgian national system of Romanization, which was adopted in 2002 by the State Department of Geodesy and Cartography of Georgia, the Institute of Linguistics and Georgian National Academy of Sciences is used only for names of people, as used for the official documentation. Below both systems of transliteration are listed.

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Map #1: The field site on the map of the Caucasus region
Chapter 1. Introduction: Theoretical issues and research questions

1.1 Introduction and Research questions

On April, 2007 towards the end of my fieldwork in Sac’ire I decided to visit a household living nearby to my host family and with whom I did not have much contact yet. When my landlady asked me where I was going, she commented with a smile: "you are wasting time, what can the old Tina tell you about citizenship?!“ For my host lady, who is a well-educated person, citizenship meant the legal status of the person, which would be used and expressed in relation with states and which would be hardly used (or practiced) in its formal sense by the uneducated people. Since I had been focusing on the meaning of citizenship for ordinary villagers, I decided to ignore her advice. I entered into a room of a two-story wooden house which was almost falling apart. There I found the two old inhabitants of the house, Tina and Ciala. They were sisters-in-law; Tina was unmarried, while Ciala was a widow, without children. Tina was 86 years old, but still able to keep an old goat, move her around for grazing, and bind the main ‘milk provider’ from one corner of the garden to another. Ciala after a stroke was bedridden for some years. After introducing myself and acquiring after their health, I explained the reason of my stay in the village and the topic of research. 'Citizenship!' Tina exclaimed and began to search something under the pillow. Soon she found the small parcel, dearly opened the handkerchief, showed the medal rewards she received in her younger years on her trembling hand and said: “Look daughter, these are the results of my whole life. You see our living conditions and poverty, but long ago I was a prized worker and the state had been promising me worriless old ages for my devotion. What does the state gives us instead now? 38 GEL (ca. 19 euros)! It is enough neither for the medicine, nor bread or sugar! God bless our neighbours, they are looking after us” (The photograph of Tina, with her medal rewards you can see in Appendix B: photo #1). Soon her neighbour came in with the pot of warm dinner. The three told me the story of their work and life during the Soviet period and their achievements as workers. Their stories involved hardly any formal concept of citizenship, but on the other hand, they were unraveling what these pensioners understood about their rights, putting claims toward the state which is not caring in such extent to reciprocate for their past devotion. The medals for the ‘heroes of the work’ and ‘successful Kolkhoznik’, were evidence of their material and emotional rewards during the socialist era, which now had only the symbolic value for its owner.
As I shall show in the following discussion, Tina’s claim for her social rights stands as an example which challenges the notions of citizenship and state, while the state had changed its social character from the socialist period. Hence the social quality of being a state is one of the central themes of this work.

The unfulfilled duties of the state were partly covered by small social groups which can be seen as central social institutions, in the setting of rural civil society; in this case the neighbours were supporting the family, in other cases the offspring, relatives and acquaintances. Support was the word most often heard in relation to the state, not only used by pensioners, but almost all people who experienced the socialist period, which compose the majority of the villagers due to the high out-migration of the young generation. While Tina and Ciala were asking for financial support, others were expecting jobs, free health care, free education and/or housing from the state.

Social rights of the citizens were the most often mentioned factor within the citizenship issue. In addition, the migration process brought in another dimension of understanding and practicing citizenship: international passports, visas and working contracts implicated a new awareness about Georgian and other citizenship regimes for those families who already had migrant members or who intended to migrate.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the economic and social problems became so overwhelming, that the Georgian residents started massive migration process. The research on the migration in Georgia is not scarce, although it is mostly conducted with sociological or statistical methods. In 2006, Tamar Zurabishvili produced the sociological research of migration in one of the districts of Georgia (Tianeti). The research was mainly based on in-depth interviews and survey and was studying the pattern of labour outmigration. The study was oriented to present the reasons of the migration, destinations, network of migrants and the remittances (Zurabishvili 2006). So far in Georgian context, anthropological studies of migrants or their families who stayed behind in the village do not exist.

The internal demand as well as international encouragement towards building a democratic state in Georgia opened up new topics of inquiry, such as civil society, rights of ethnic minorities, gender inequality and human rights, etc. The Georgian social scientists in recent years have been writing primarily about political power and democratization (Bichashvili 2001, Gogatishvili 2003, Jorjoliani, Berekashvili, & Muskhelishvili 2001, Institute of Social Studies and Analysis 2011), while drawing some parallels within the Georgian political
structures. As I mentioned earlier, the topic of civil society is also largely discussed in current Georgian scientific discourse; these revisit classical authors starting from Hegel and include the analysis of Western and Georgian societies (Muskhelishvili 2006, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD) 2003, International Centre on Conflict and Negotiation 2008, Melkadze 2004).

Nevertheless, citizenship regimes expressed as state-citizens relations remain understudied. Citizenship regimes are defined in this study not only as normative understanding of state and citizen relations, but in their practice and articulations in everyday life. In this approach, I follow the track of anthropologists who studied similar phenomena. For instance, James Holston (2011) understands citizenship as the relations of politics and social lives. Veena Das (2011) describes the processes which bring the new practices of realization of the laws and routines while studying the Indian communities. According to Pnina Werbner (2010) when citizenship practices are examined from the perspective of social anthropology, citizenship should not be imagined only as abstract ideas, but how these ideas are reinstated in practices taking place within a certain context. Thus, while studying the concept of citizenship, we should keep in mind, that it is not formal or juridical relations between the state and the individual, but it is the holistic relations of citizens with the state, which are embodied in particularities of culture, place and history (Werbner 2010: 6).

Seen from this perspective, one can highlight many different understandings of citizenship regimes. For instance, when I was explaining to friends and family in Tbilisi that I was studying citizenship and migration process in the village, the common reaction was skepticism, often suggesting that if I would like to see the state and citizens interactions I should find it primarily in the centre (which meant always, capital of Georgia, Tbilisi), where the more visible and classical processes of state-citizen interactions were taking place. My approach in this study follows the discussions of the research group ‘Caucasian boundaries and citizenship from below’¹ and aims to understand the grassroots processes and citizenship practices in Georgian society, especially those outside the capital and metropolitan space.

Anthropology has been long engaging with the question of ‘evidence’ and ‘generalization.’ Generalization problem in social anthropology has been long debated (for instance the debates which took place in 1988 arrround the topic, ‘social anthropology is a

¹ The research group at Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology consisting of five researchers worked together under Lale Yalcin-Heckmann’s guidance from 2006 until 2009.
general science or it is nothing’ see, Ingold 1996). These debates invoked the dichotomies, which exist between science and humanities, between the general and the particular. Anthony P. Cohen supports the idea of judging every general statement very carefully and "treat[ing] societies, cultures, as barely generalizable aggregates of difference rather than as fictive matrices of uniformity” (Ingold 1996: 24). Apart from being an analytical and methodological challenge, the issue of generalization has challenges in local understandings of what makes Georgian society and its social groups. Once when my sister was reading the chapter about migration, she said angrily, “you know Teona, this is not about us, people living in Tbilisi, this is only about T’q’ibulians?!”. This comment made me re-think the issues of presentation and representation and how to approach possible differences between rural areas and the capital city. Historically cities were the locus for citizenship practices and even now, when this notion is mainly discussed in relation to the nation-state, according to some authors, cities keep being the important arena for practicing citizen-state relations (Weber 1998 (1922), Holston & Appadurai 1999). Furthermore, like in most of the languages, in Georgian language the word citizenship (mokalakeoba) is produced by the word city (kalaki) and carries the idea, that citizenship practices are enacted in cities, the place where citizens live. My findings say more about the rural conditions after the Soviet era and for the new economy in Georgia. Although while talking about relations between the state and its citizens, we could find lots of similar interactions and practices in rural and urban spaces. Furthermore, the perception and practice of citizenship depends more on the past experience of the people, their social status and age than on their place of residence. So, the pensioners who were employed in the Soviet enterprises in the village and in the city might see the responsibilities of the state and their rights in a more similar way, than the ex-migrant villager, who is in his 30s. In the thesis, therefore, I discuss the perceptions and the practices of citizenship in the small society with face-to-face relations, which was strongly embodied in the Soviet economy and experienced tremendous changes brought by the new political and economic developments. Moreover, these practices and perceptions are not exclusively prevalent in rural space and could be found also in urban area.

The studies of citizenship and state traditionally take place in the framework of political philosophy, sociology or political science and are mostly based on deductive reasoning, which take general historical facts and distill normative conclusions about the nature of the state or the

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2 T’q’ibuli is the district in Imereti region, where my field site – Sac’ire village - is situated. In everyday conversations for making general statements about villagers, people do not use the village name, but the district name.
rights of the citizens. While studying the citizenship issue, Pnina Werbner suggests to step back from the three categories of people dealing with citizenship issue: from moral and political philosophers, from political scientists and from activists (2010: 2). The approach and method of social anthropology while studying the citizenship gave me an opportunity to see how the normative ideas about state and its members are accomplished in the Georgian society by people living on the periphery. The observation of everyday interactions between the ordinary citizens and the state representatives, their obedience, ignorance and adjustment to the laws and regulations, citizens’ expectations, satisfactions and frustrations about the state, proned a chance to analyze the state not as the structure and function, but as the operating mechanism, which creates the context and rules for the ordinary citizens to lead the life as ‘political’ and ‘social’ beings. The anthropological study of Georgian citizenship tells us not only about citizen-state interactions, but about the nature of the Georgian state and actual political structure of the society.

The main research question that I seek to answer in the thesis is: what types of citizen-state relations are formed in rural Georgia after the transition from Soviet system to democracy and market economy? This central question gives rise to more specific sub-questions: what happened to the citizenship regimes after the dissolution of the Soviet Union? How do citizens of Georgia feel about their belonging to the new independent state? Is the classical definition of social citizenship defined as the right ”[...] to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (see, Marshall 1998 [1963]: 94) applicable to Georgian society? How do citizens understand their social rights and what are the ways they demand social citizenship? What are the political rights of citizens in the process of building democracy and how the locals enact their rights? What are the reasons and effects of migration for the sending society? How are citizen-state relations reflected on to the process of labour migration? Thus, main topic of the thesis is about people’s perceptions about citizenship in rural settlements after socialism and after the new waves of migration. While discussing the issues of citizenship, social citizenship and labour migration, there are two main dimensions to consider – Soviet citizenship regime and small scale group solidarity. I follow both of these dimensions in relation to the main theoretical models of citizenship, social citizenship and migration and citizenship.
1.2 Theories of citizenship and state

The main concept around which the whole thesis is built on is citizenship. Several authors (Verdery 1998, Kabeer 2005, Turner 1993, Brubaker 1998) point out an increased interest towards the topic at the end of the 20th century. The transnational processes and globalization have been heavily affecting the citizenship regimes, which are not any more solely within the state domain. International organizations, human rights defenders and migrants bring in new kinds of state-citizen relations. I will come back to the challenges which the transnational processes, globalization and migration brought to the theory of citizenship, but first of all I should discuss the theory of T. H. Marshall which is most often recalled by various authors while writing about the citizenship issue.

The central idea of the article of T.H. Marshall “Citizenship and Social Class” is explaining the relations between social class and citizenship regimes, which seem to be compatible notions (1998 [1963]). The author differentiates the citizenship concepts into three components (civil, political and social rights) and assigns to each of them the corresponding institutions, as well as certain periods of their development. According to Marshall the civil rights “composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom” (ibid.: 94). The civil rights were developed in the eighteenth century and the associated institutions are the courts of justice. According to Marshall the political rights (“to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body” (ibid.:94)) were developed in the nineteenth century in England and the corresponding institutions are parliament and self-governmental bodies. The social rights (“the rights to a modicum of economic welfare and security”, ibid.: 94) were gained on the basis of citizens’ struggle in the 20th century and the institutions defending these rights are the educational system and the social services. Marshallian theory was often criticized for taking the case of Great Britain as the model, for its teleological character of evolution (Turner 1993: 7). But, on the other hand, Marshall did not intend to create the universal citizenship theory for each society and clearly noted that “there is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievements can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed” (Marshall 1998 [1963]: 102). This statement gives the citizenship its flexible character, which is changing from one society to another according to their political formation and level of development. But the writers about citizenship sometimes forget this statement of
Marshall and still ask about possible different formulations of citizenship in different social and cultural traditions (Turner 1993).

Bryan S. Turner (1993) criticizes the theory of T. H. Marshall from various points of view. First of all he is opposing the author for addressing the three elements of citizenship as being equally important, while himself emphasizing the social rights as the means for the redistribution of wealth, promoting “an egalitarian transformation of social hierarchy” (Turner 1993: 7). But we should also consider the fact that the liberal theory gives priority to civil and political rights “as the only ‘true’ rights because they promote the freedom of individual to act” (Kabeer 2005: 2). It is true that in the twentieth century social rights became the leading element of citizenship, but for Marshall the civil, political and social rights are equally important, first of all because by means of the secured political and civil rights social rights were achieved. Here, the important point is the relations between these three sets of rights. While revisiting and re-appraising the theory of Marshall, Michael Lister (2005) explains in detail the relations between civic, political and social rights, discussed by Marshall. According to him, Marshall conceived citizenship as a unified (and not unitary) category, which was based on the equality of status. While discussing the case of education, according to Lister, Marshall wanted to show the interdependence of these rights on each other; for instance, lack of education, meaning the lack of social rights, affects the political rights and a person might have problems for participating in politics; simultaneously it will affect the civil rights as persons will not use the freedom of speech when she/he does not have something to say (Lister 2005: 477). The interdependence of the citizenship rights does not mean only harmonic relations between them. Lister indicates to the stragglers and conflicts between different sets of rights, but according to him it is not paradoxical, as “[e]quality of status does not determine citizenship, but guides its development. In this way, when a principle guides activity or development in different areas, we can expect different outcomes” (ibid: 482). To go back to the critiques of Turner (1993) directed at Marshall concerning the equal importance of the civil, political and social rights in theory of Marshall, we could say on the contrary that Marshall is neither talking about the results gained after the exercising each set of rights nor to their importance, rather suggested how much these rights are intermingled and in which stage of state development it is achievable.

Turner accuses Marshall for neglecting the issue of cultural citizenship (Turner 1993). According to him, Marshall presented the development of citizenship in a narrow sense, omitting the history of citizenship development in the cities as well as the varieties of citizenship regimes in Christian Europe and Islamic world. Although we can not deny the narrow historical
analysis of citizenship development in the theory of Marshall, we still should keep in mind that he is defining citizenship as a relative concept (cf Lister 2005).

The definition of citizenship concept is also problematic in that it changes from one discipline to another. T. H. Marshall is defining the notion of citizenship as “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community” (Marshall 1998 [1963]:102). For Rogers Brubaker citizenship is membership category as well, characterising the ideal-typical membership of nation-state by six membership norms: “According to this model, membership of nation-state should be egalitarian, sacred, national, democratic, unique, and socially consequential” (emphasis in original) (Brubaker 1998: 132). But simultaneously, the author admits that these six ideal typical dimensions of the citizenship are riddled with internal tensions, historical and national variations. If these sociological definitions of citizenship are oriented to the membership category or the nature of membership, the political sciences are more accentuating the rights and duties of citizens as members of nation-states. In order to avoid this “ideological backdrop” (Brubaker 1998), we should stick to the more sociological definition of the citizenship as the “set of practices (juridical, political, economic and cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups” (Turner 1993: 2). By this definition we keep the state membership idea of citizenship, while emphasizing the dynamic character of the citizenship modified in the certain society according to time perspective. Furthermore, by accentuating the idea of practice, we are avoiding the juridical definition of citizenship as the collection of rights and duties, and focusing on the exercise of the actual rights and duties pledged in a certain state. 

Theoretical discussions about citizens’ civic, political and social rights were enlarged by Will Kymlicka by introducing the fourth element of “cultural citizenship” (Kymlicka 1998), or “national citizenship.” Will Kymlicka emphasizes the increasing challenge to understanding citizenship (as membership of nation-state), given the growing multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism in Western nation-states. He doubts the success of “common citizenship strategy” (he understands this concept as membership of a political community, as “a common identity shared by all individuals without regard to group membership,” Kymlicka 1998: 175) in multinational and multicultural societies. According to him ‘common citizenship‘ disregards the differences between ‘the people,’ the minorities should follow the cultural mainstream of the majority, while using their national educational system, law, language, etc. According to the author, taking no notice of ethnic and cultural differences, which exist in multicultural societies, might give rise to the demand of secession among minorities. He brings various historical facts
in order to show that granting self-governance to minorities prevents the desire for secession, while applying “common citizenship strategy” might provoke the danger of state unity. Using the theory of Taylor about “deep diversity” (as cited in Kymlicka 1998: 182), Kymlicka admits that the sense of difference, solidarity between the groups, and state politics, which instead of subordinating certain minorities accommodate them in the framework of state, will solve the problem of the lack of common identity in multicultural states. Besides suggesting the group-based citizenship strategy, Will Kymlicka’s theory is also interesting in regards to the identity issue. According to the author national identity is not as mythical as it was regarded by some authors, it is a stable construction; when the national identity of a group does not coincide with the national identity of a majority, the shared political or social values in the framework of ‘common citizenship’ will not decrease the longing for forming their own national society, where they can enjoy their cultural rights. Thus, Kymlicka suggests a new track of citizenship development, which is not only focusing on the issues of social rights and welfare state as was prominent in the twenties century, but to more abstract, but solid issue of identities, which affects the perceptions and practices of citizens.

Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal (1998) indicates to the declining importance of national citizenship, especially in the context of Western nation-states, where membership strategies were previously based on national belonging. She indicates to the contradictory processes which are taking place in contemporary world in relation to citizenship, nation-states and transnational organizations. Presenting national and post-national citizenship models, she shows the fields which are still under domain of nation-states and which transgress these boundaries. Soysal admits that national citizenship became a powerful construct only in the late 19th and beginning of 20th centuries and she connects it with the substantial usage of passports, identity cards and/or visas. The national citizenship entails correspondence between membership and territory, when a certain group has the privilege to reside on a certain territory. Rights under national citizenship are similar to ’common citizenship’ (used by Kymlicka 1998), when it is provided and guaranteed by and through the nation-state and are equally delivered for all members. After the Second World War population mobility between the states increased; the new waves of labour migrants, asylum seekers, refugees were coming to the West. Simultaneously, various international mechanisms for defending the rights of newcomers were developing. According to Soysal national citizenship model changed and we gradually see a new model of citizenship, which is post-national. She characterises the new model of membership as postwar, which has fluid boundaries (“holding citizenship in one state while living and enjoying rights and
privileges in a different state,” ibid.: 193), where “the universal human rights replace national rights,” although the rights and privileges of the post-national citizens are still guaranteed by the nation-state (Soysal 1998: 192). Important are the forthcoming changes in the conception of citizenship. According to Soysal the rights and identities in this modern citizenship are decoupled, rights are ascribed to universality while identities are still attached to the particularity (e.g. territories). Consequently, national citizenship in the sense of identity still is a strong mechanism, just only as ideal, which forms the belonging of a people, while the rights and privileges might be expected from a different political system. Furthermore, the nation states are obliged by the international legislation to provide the civil, political and social rights despite the national membership of a person (Soysal 1998: 196). Coming back to the classical citizenship theory of T. H. Marshall, we can see the difference more clearly. Marshall does not distinguish the national or cultural element of citizenship but refers to it as the concealing base of citizenship, on which the unity of the nation-state is based: “Citizenship requires a bond of a different kind, a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected by a common law… We see this clearly in the eighteenth century, which saw the birth, not only of modern civil rights, but also of modern national consciousness” (Marshall 1998 [1963]: 105). Thus for Marshall the national element of citizenship is not the different set of the rights, but the basis for other rights to be bound to a certain state, which is the guarantor of their civil, political and social rights. As soon as modern citizenship stops implying the national belonging of a person to a certain state as the foundation for seeking the rights and privileges of this state, than we can admit that the whole character of citizenship changes. The contemporary changes in citizenship practices oblige researchers to pay attention not only to civil, political or social rights, but also analyze the basis of these rights, which is not always national.

James Holston and Arjun Appadurai indicate to the decline of national citizenship from a different point of view. According to these authors, national citizenship depends on the ideas about common purposes, constituting common goods and shaping common life (Holston & Appadurai 1999: 6). They admit that the increasing social inequality between the citizens creates a risk to the perceptions and faith in common purposes, goods or lives. In this case the visions of procedural liberalism come to fore. According to the authors, “In this more modern version, the nation of citizens is based not on constitutive ends but on procedural means of justice that ensure that no particular end (a vision of the good life) ‘trumps’ any other…” (Holston and Appadurai 1999: 6). They criticize the concept of liberal citizenship from different points of view.
view. Similar to Kymlicka, who indicates that denying differentiated citizenship will decrease citizens’ affiliation to the state (1998), Holston and Appadurai point out the various differentiations which naturally exist between citizens, like gender, religion, culture and which are not considered by the liberal citizenship as the prior affiliations. The ignorance of these attachments “[..] leaves citizens more entangled in obligations they do not choose and less attached to common identifications that would render these obligations not just bearable but even virtuous” (Holston and Appadurai 1999: 7). The historical development of citizenship shows the exclusion of various groups due to their gender, ethnicity or social class. So, when in the modern world liberal citizenship guarantees equal status for all members of these groups, this approach raises the questions concerning the justice of their equal treatment. Should citizenship be oriented towards the procedural equality, as authors indicate to be ‘difference-neutral’ or should it be ‘difference-specific’ and serve to the elevation of differences in order to give chance to every citizen to enjoy the life of civilized being? These questions are long debated while discussing citizenship politics (see, Rawls 1998, Shafir 1998). Furthermore, this normative discussion is covered in empirical studies of various authors (Holston 2011, Walzer 1998, Das 2011). For Holston and Appadurai the differences between the historically included or excluded groups, between poor and rich, between status bearers and those who are denied of status could be seen in the cities. They discuss the cities as “[..] privileged sites for considering the current renegotiations of citizenship” (Holston and Appadurai 1999: 3). In his further writings James Holston (2011) clearly indicates to the different meanings of citizenship and urban citizenship. For him the concept of citizenship means the membership of a political structure or community which implies the relation between the politics and social lives; while under the term “urban citizenship” he understands “[..] citizenship, that refer to the city as its primary political community and concern as agenda of right-claims that address city living as its substance – issue of housing, property, tenure, transportation, day care, plumbing and so forth, largely understood to constitute a residential domain of social life” (Holston 2011: 336). We should acknowledge that cities are the space where the relationship between the state and citizens are intense, where the migrants are mainly concentrated, bringing with them the new ideas about status and obligations and giving rise to questions concerning the national character of citizenship. We cannot however deny the fact that rural places also could be the space of citizen/state relations, where locals bargain for their rights and put claims towards the state as members of the state as well as residents of the place. Furthermore, the issues discussed in the context of urban spaces are also relevant for rural areas, as rural citizens also talk about equal
or differentiated rights, about rights as residents, and as members of nation. As I will show in the thesis, the language used by Brazilian city dwellers (discussed by James Holston 2011) while striving to have rights is common also for the villagers from my field site, where the locals struggle for social rights. Thus, as I illustrate in the following chapters, the space where citizen-state relations takes place is important, as the past history, economy, way of life, type of social relations largely define the following practices of citizenship. In this regard the cities and rural communities might have developed some specific citizenship practices, but it does not mean that one is important over other and the rural communities should not be studied in relation to citizenship issues. While discussing the differentiated citizenship regimes and special treatment in Brazilian urban spaces, James Holston points out the contradiction when citizens sometimes justify unequal and special treatment for those who need this, simultaneously being worried that the elite will use this special treatment for reinforcing their preexisting superior position. An interesting point in his discussion is the new strives of urban citizens for their rights. Holston calls it ‘right-to-rights’ and admits, that the new urban citizens from working class will serve to remake Brazilian democracy as their demands for rights have legal bases, they ask for equal rights, and issues are not restricted to social problems (Holston 2011: 349).

Similar to James Holston, Veena Das (2011) discusses the struggles of the urban poor near Delhi for their rights as residents. Das shows that law is not one-sided and can be used by bureaucrats as well as by citizens differently for achieving different goals. For understanding the relations between the state, law and citizens, she is: “[…]suggesting that if we are to look at the everyday as the site on which we can track the movements of the state, performance of citizenship, and constitutive powers of law, then the everyday cannot be treated as simply the secure site of routines and habits as Marcus (1995) suggests; rather it is the space on which we can see how underlying these routines and habits there is a struggle to bring about a newness in which we can track the working of the law for better and for worse” (Das 2011: 329). By showing the case of the inhabitants in the cluster of shanties, their claims and strategies for keeping their residence and improving their access to the facilities, she shows that even when the claims of citizens do not coincide with the law, the community and the state might act in order “to preserve the life of the individuals and the community” (Ibid.: 324). If the Brazilian urban citizens were striving for their rights and it was based on knowledge of law (Holston 2011), in the case of Indian urban dwellers it was rather different strategies, based on ideas of being inhabitants, residents or representatives of a community (Das 2011). In both cases we can see that while studying the ideas and practices of citizenship, each context reveals specificity,
which is characteristic for this space and is based on cultural and historical heritage of the society.

David A. Kideckel discusses the enactment of political rights by the postcolonial and postsocialist citizens while bringing the cases of the protests in Kerala state (southwest India) and Romania (2009). Romanian history and culture gave rise to the ‘grievance based’ claims among citizens. The socialist state which produced the alienated, socially state-dependent and politically passive citizens is still shaping the postsocialist citizenship practices. While discussing the alienated protests, the premises of individual interests, expressing only complaints and demands, rather than fight for far-reaching rights, Kideckel shows, that citizenship is a continuum largely determined by the past experience. The comparison of postcolonial and postsocialist cases, shows, that while discussing the citizenship of different countries the broader context should be considered. The practices and attitudes Kideckel brings from Romania could be also found in Georgian context and this indicates to the importance of the socialist past which in various ways circumscribe the cultural reality of each postsocialist country.

In the rural community of Georgia claiming the rights from the state is also based on various ideas. While striving for the free access to the local natural resources the locals talk about the rights of human beings (who need the resources in order to survive), the rights of locals (whose ancestors were living there and were protecting the land from invaders), the rights of the heirs of the Soviet regime (who used to have free access to the resources) and finally the rights of the ethnic Georgians (who should have the superior access to the local resources in comparison to foreign investors or non-ethnic Georgians). Thus we can see that the claims and demands the citizens have in relation to the state are not only enclosed around the citizens’ rights, but involves different statuses which are believed to be important in the certain context. In the presented work I will discuss the citizens’ efforts to achieve not only the rights (as it is not commonly understood by the state and by the citizens) but access to the resources they need for leading the life of civilized social beings.

While studying the citizenship in the rural context of Georgia I divided the issue into three components:

*The normative knowledge and understanding of citizenship:* this includes the understanding of the concept by people, everyday usage, and content of citizenship while asking precisely about civil, political and social rights. The normative knowledge and understanding
of citizenship concept has much commonality with the Western understanding of the concept discussed by T.H. Marshall (1998 [1963]) as well as with the formal definition of the citizenship by the Georgian law. The locals have clear ideas about the three sets of rights and in the normative judgment (for instance during the interviews) evaluate all of them equally important for citizens.

The socialist ideas and practice of citizenship: it evolves not only the routinized practices during the Soviet times, but the ideas about citizenship originated from that period. The local residents that mainly composed industrial labour force during Soviet times remember the state rather positively. This remembrance is particularly strong in relation to the state support of various kinds (employment, education, healthcare, housing in the cities, etc.). Additionally, according to this memory, social provisions were guaranteed from birth to death and cultivated the dependency of the citizens to the state (Porket 1987). I relate this ‘positive’ evaluation of the Soviet state with Marshall's ideas of social citizenship, since to the villagers it was a state which provided them with some kind of equality. Although the socialist life came to an end, the socialist ideas about the citizens’ rights and state’s obligations seem to be at stake. The retreat of the state from the economy does not automatically raise the ability of the citizens to turn into the independent economic agents. Occasionally some of them do, but they still wait from the state the social provisions the Soviet Union was guaranteeing. For instance, petty trader does not perceive himself/herself employed, while this economic activity is not provided by the state (as socialist employment) and would ask for the social assistant, even if the financial aid is minimal and would not improve his/her economic situation. Thus socialist ideas and practices of citizenship is legacy which produces the claims of citizens in relation to the contemporary state. Furthermore, it serves like measurement for estimating the state.

Postsocialist citizenship: Here I refer to the claims and demand the citizens have toward the independent Georgian state, the actual rights guaranteed and secured by the state and enactment of these rights by locals. The postsocialist citizenship defines the ongoing relations between the citizens and state, although it covers the other two components (the normative and socialist ideas about citizenship). The Georgian state is putting forward the normative meaning of the citizenship, accentuating the importance of civil and political rights, while the nature and extent of the social rights delivered to its citizens is altered and decreased (for instance, providing the free secondary education, while the higher education is financed partially only for the successful students; delivering the limited social assistance in the form of social security only for the needy families). Simultaneously, the local people pay less attention to the political
and civil rights (because they do not have the experience of using them and they do not have much desire, since they are much concerned with basic livelihood and expect the social rights in manner the Soviet Union provided to labour force). Thus the postsocialist citizenship is the arena where we see the collisions of the past and present citizenship regimes in the changing economic and political environment.

If the citizenship topic became the focus of interest for social anthropology currently, the study of state has a longer tradition. Ernest Gellner (1983) and many other anthropologists studying the state go back to the definition suggested by Max Weber, that the state is an agency which has the monopoly over the legitimate violence. Ernest Gellner enlarges the definition of the state and presents it like a “‘specialized order-forcing institution’” (ibid.: 5) and traces the marks of statehood starting from the agrarian society. While studying the state in relation to the citizenship regime we cannot research only the ‘order-forcing institutions’ (the police and courts, as mentioned by Gellner) where the routinized rules and laws operate. As suggested by various researchers of the field (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, Das and Poole 2004, Sharma and Gupta 2006), the state should be unrevealed in everyday practices and I follow this line while studying the state in rural Georgia.

The everyday practices do not have a specific location, but might take place in the school, in the house of culture, in the administrative building of the local government or in the social agency. Everywhere where the state is putting the rules and applying the laws for control, order making, resource distribution, we can trace the state. In these places the state is represented by the teacher, who follows the state educational plan, by the artist in the house of culture, who prepares the event for celebrating the National Independence Day, by the attorney of the village, who announces about the new fishing rules or by the social agent who evaluates the economic situation of the family by the rules set by the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs of Georgia. All these locations with their employees represent the character of the state and tell us about the state applied regulations. As I indicated above, while studying the rural community of Georgia there were two premises to be considered, the Soviet experience and small scale group solidarity. These two factors determine the ways how each above indicated actor and many others, who are in public positions, make the state regulations to work. In order to make my point clearer I will bring some examples. The teacher who used to teach during the Soviet times, might formally follow the new book for the subject (prepared according to the state educational plan) and ask the pupils to buy one, but explain the lesson from the Soviet book which is familiar for her and she perceives to work better. Or the attorney of the
village although announces publicly about the new fishing rules, might ‘pretend not to see’ his neighbor, who is coming back from fishing in the morning during the season when fishing is restricted. So while studying the state in the locality, I was paying attention not only to the rules or regulations (although it was part of the task), but how the local institutions and representatives were enacting them and why was the difference between the regulations and their enactments.

According to Das and Poole the everyday practices which should be studied by anthropologists take place not in the centres of the states but in places where the state is less visible, or its policy is altered. According to the authors analysis of these kinds of societies is not driven with the desire to study the exotic different societies, as it was characteristic of the discipline in early days, but aims to present the difference between the modern nation-states and the different forms of political lives. These kinds of comparisons help to revise the relations between the centre and peripheries, between the private and public, between the legal and illegal (Das & Poole 2004: 4). For portraying these kinds of societies, Das and Poole use the metaphor ‘margins of the state.’ Margins are perceived by them as neither having concrete boundaries nor always being the peripheries, but as relations which extend the conceptual boundaries of the state by different, native regulations for seeking the survival or justice for locals. In this sense the society I am studying could be characterized as living at the ‘margins of the state’ as the locals adjust the state regulations to past experiences or to local needs.

The image of the state is regularly constructed and reconstructed in the everyday lives of locals. The state is discussed in the centre of the village, in transportation, in families and even in the fields while doing agriculture (when the locals are regretting using the pre-socialist traditional way of cultivating land by means of bulls, they talk about the decay of the state, and praises the achievements of Soviet modernization). The image of the state is shaped by these discussions as well as by the experience citizens have from everyday relations with the representatives of state institutions. Thus, during the fieldwork I was exploring the representations of the state as “the cultural constitution of the state” (Sharma and Gupta 2006: 11).

Sharma and Gupta argue that the representation of the state is offered to the people by mass media, in talks of officials, pre-election campaigns, openings of various new facilities, and in celebrations of national holidays (2006: 18). But they also indicate to the dialectical character of these representations: how is the state represented, but also how are these representations perceived by the people in the realm of their everyday activities with the state bureaucrats? In
the thesis I argue, that the representations of the state coming from above and by means of mass media, talks of officials and so on, are twisted in the imaginations of locals. The alteration of the ‘above’ image of the state in the locality can be explained by these reasons:

✓ Dissatisfaction of locals with the international and internal politics of the government (and etymologically and conceptually locals merge the notions of the state and the government);
✓ Frustration of citizens when they cannot enjoy their social rights;
✓ The Soviet experience of the state, being mainly imagined as the centre in Moscow and distant from the local people.

Due to these reasons, the local people often feel detached and alienated from the ‘above’ state, while feeling social closeness with the local representatives of the state, who are their community members and understand their problems. Taking this point into consideration we still should discuss the everyday activities of locals as being part of the state, but while analyzing the dialectic relations between the practices and representations we should be more careful.

In the small society, with face-to-face relations I was studying, the bureaucrats are not perceived as a tool of the state used for exercising its policies, but part of society itself. The reason for this is that the inhabitants perceive the local governing bodies as powerless, having no financial resources (the local budget is subsidized from the central budget) and little ability to affect the main policies applied from the centre (regulations promulgated by the legislative local branch have minor importance). Furthermore, by using patron-client relations with local representatives, citizens sometimes can ‘achieve their goals’ which do not coincide with the policy applied from ‘above.’ I do not suggest that the policy of the central government is always altered; in cases when it is executed and works against the interests of inhabitants, the local bureaucrats try to distinguish themselves from the state, in order to represent themselves as a part of the community. While restricting the activities of locals or fining them, the local officials justify their activities as unavoidable obligation: “we cannot do it in another way, it is what they from ‘above’, demand from us!” In this kind of explanations the local officials underline their closeness to people and the distance between the ‘centre’ and locality. So the local state representatives also facilitate creation of a distant image of the state.

In the final remarks about the *Anthropology in the Margins of the State* Talal Asad approves using the concept of ‘margins of the state’ and adds that neither state is rather a very solid category, nor the enactment of the state takes always the same forms. So while describing
the cases, when laws are differently understood or executed, when state policies take different directions than were intended to, we come to the conclusion that societies are not always predictable entities, but ‘marginal spaces’ (Asad 2004). This discussion leads us back to the citizenship issue, as the ‘marginal spaces’ are usually created by the citizens in relationship to the state. Thus, we can apply the approach of studying the state to the issue of citizenship as well; while considering the civic, political and social rights the state grants to its citizens, we should pay more attention to how these rights are culturally embodied, how they are enacted and how these practices reshape and reproduce the state as well as the certain citizenship regimes of the state.

1.3 Effect of migration on citizenship

The dissolution of the Soviet Union gave rise to new flows of mobility between, within or out of the postsocialist countries. The migration pattern characteristic to the Soviet republics was the movement mainly towards the centre Moscow, although different countries were practicing various patterns in different extent (for instance, Ronald G. Suny compares the migration in Transcaucasian countries and admits that Georgians and Azerbaijanis tended to stay within their homeland, while Armenians were widely practicing outmigration (1996)). Economic disasters, political instabilities, conflicts and wars, strong ethnic nationalisms were forcing thousands of inhabitants to search their living in different countries and sometimes even in different continents. According to International Organization for Migration in 2005 over one fifth of Georgian citizens were in migration (2008). Although the strong ethno-nationalist movement and wars pushed large number of non-ethnic Georgians to leave the country in 90s, the migration process I am discussing in the thesis is substantially determined by poor economy and lack of employment in the locality. In the locality every third family has at least one migrant and this number does not include the households which left the locality altogether and moved to urban spaces either within Georgia or abroad.

Migration has multi-dimensional effects on citizenship in my case study. As I mentioned earlier through the process of migration local people become more aware about their civil status and legal barriers for entry in the countries of destination, to some extent migrants’ remittances replace the state in providing social citizenship and finally it transforms local migrants into
‘passive citizens’ (Turner 2001), while they cannot enjoy their rights either in home society or in host one.

According to Hollifield passport and visa regimes were initiated by states in order to control the international migration which was primarily driven by market forces (he mainly talks about migrations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) (2004: 890). After the World War II, the creation of the United Nations, the international human rights law, alongside with various international regulations according to which the person has rights over the state borders, brought a new understanding and new practices in the international migration (ibid.: 892). According to Soysal (1998) these processes are causing the shift from a national citizenship to a postnational one. I argue, however, that citizenship in Georgia is not postnational, although migration effects the citizenship of the local society in different ways.

According to the data I have about local migrants, it appears that they hardly use the legal frameworks in order to secure their rights in receiving states. First of all, locals often enter the countries either illegally or with short-term visas and stay on without proper documents. Furthermore, these local migrants are not highly skilled professionals with high education (the migration process from the locality is not a brain drain, as the educational background of migrants and the village dwellers are almost the same), and they are not familiar with laws and international regulations. Besides, the locals are more concerned with generating financial income and less with their legal status in the place of migration. Consequently gaining civil, political and social rights in host states is less important (and often not possible) for most of them (especially it is case with migrants, who left families back in the village). In this case, they do not come to enjoy the rights in the receiving state and are not effected by postnational citizenship as suggested by Soysal (1998).

Most of the locals have some defined goals (often to support the education of offspring, to purchase property or to improve living conditions, or just to assist family members who are in the village) and think that they will accumulate capital and return soon. So, they perceive migration as a temporal phenomenon and tend less to adapt to the receiving society. Although time passes and they cannot come back either because they could not accumulate as much as was planned, or because their goals expanded and they need to accumulate more. I often heard from locals, that the main issue is to enter in the destination country. When discussing the politics of international migration, James F. Hollifield, argues that since the end of the cold war, “entry [in to new states, T.M.] rather than exit is more problematic” (2000: 143). For Georgian
citizens sometimes exit is problematic as well, because they do not want to be deported (even in case of coming back, they still want to have chance of migrating in future, in case of emergency), while without legal status or valid visa they cannot cross the border and it prolongs their stay in the place of migration.

One of the obvious influences of migration on citizenship in the locality is that the remittances help as a medium for practicing social citizenship, which is not secured by the state. First of all, remittances are used for everyday household expenses, for nutrition, health care, communal payments and donations for the community events. Further, remittances are mostly spent for the education of young family members; most of the undergraduates from the village who managed to enter universities (in 2006-2007) are children of migrants. The further profitable and widespread way of spending remittances is the purchase of flats in urban areas. This can be seen as replacing the housing system of the Soviet state, when enterprises were providing accommodation in cities as well as dormitories for students. Thus most visible effect of the migration process in the locality is the financial aid, which helps the local community members to lead the life of ‘civilized beings.’ Nora Dudwick (2011) interprets this phenomenon as migrants taking over the state’s social responsibilities.

Stephen Castles refers to several theories which emerged within the framework of social sciences and which attempted to explain migration, its driving forces and the incorporation or exclusion of migrants into the host societies (2009). According to him the migration system theory was formulated within the framework of geography and presented the states as components of the system, which is created by means of previous relations between these countries: colonization, political influence, trade and so on. The important aspect of this theory is that it attempts to study not the sole country or process, but the sending and receiving societies as parts of the system. This theory helps us to explain the case of migration from Georgia to remote parts of Russian Federation (most common route of migration from the locality was to Russia). The political influence of Russia on Georgia which lasted almost two centuries, the proficiency in Russian language which was widely used by the Soviet Georgian citizens, the past close relations (men used to go to Russia often for doing the military service, for visiting the central offices of various organizations) lead citizens to search for employment in Russia as a second choice, where the economy is not flourishing like in Western countries, but where they have some familiarity and the legal barriers are manageable for them. In this regard, we can say that the social networks and previous relations between the countries can be the primary pull factor of migration.
The migration network theory is more concerned with the micro level of the process and pays attention to resources used by migrants for mobility; in the social sciences sometimes they are called chains, sometimes network, and involve social capital (Castles and Miller 2009). Hollifield similarly notes that not only global markets, but also kinship networks play crucial role for the migration process, as it creates security for newcomers, supports them with the needed resources (2004). In the studied community network resources seem to be the most important resource, without which no villager will migrate. Having networks is the influential pull factor, which defines who, where and when he/she migrates. In the narratives of the migrants we can always trace the turning point, when the migrant decided to leave for abroad, when help was offered by the already established migrants in the places of migration. The social network is also the key provider of social security in migration. It provides information before and during migration (how to migrate, how to get visa or where to search jobs), accommodation, financial and emotional aid. That is why migrants tend to be concentrated in certain localities (for instance, from one of the village neighbourhoods most of the migrants are living in Irkutsk, in East Russia) and keep close relations.

In relation to international migration Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller point out a third theory – transnationalism (Castles and Miller 2009). This theory unites the scholars who regard migration as a source for creating transnational communities, divided identities, de-nationalized states, etc. Although Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller themselves do not recommend using such concepts as ‘transnational communities’, or ‘transnational migrants’, suggesting that a solid part of migrants are not ‘transmigrants’, as they are concerned only with their social and economic problems, keeping close relations with families back, sending money to them, without much integration in the host societies (ibid.: 32). The case I bring in the last chapter shows that labour migrants live on their own, attached to the local culture and networks, so in accordance to Castles and Miller, could not be named transnational. Furthermore, while coming back they do not bring new ideas or practices, which might serve for general development of the community (here I do not mean the financial resources). Despite rejecting the concept of ‘transnationals’, I admit that the concept of bifocality used by Steven Vertovec in relation to international migration (2004) is relevant for highlighting certain aspects of the migrants’ lives in host societies. By the concept of bifocality, he describes how the everyday lives of migrants

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3 The first time this concept was used by Roger Rouse (1992, cited in Vertovec 2004: 974) and later by Sarah Mahler (1998, cited in Vertovec 2004: 974).
are affected by “transnational practices of exchange, communication and frequent travel” (ibid.: 974). According to the author, globalization and new multicultural spaces give chance to the migrants to be attached to different places, bring ideas from different localities and practice the ways of life, they choose. Although the migrants from the village are not as mobile as the migrants described by Vertovec, they engage in transnational communication, transnational exchanges but tend to cultivate the ways of life taken from the Georgian society. Caroline Brettell refers to the case of persons residing in one society and having attachment to a different one as divided belongings. Bringing different stories of immigrant populations in Southwestern European cities, she presents how the person might have a double belonging as political and cultural ones (Brettell 2006). Presenting the cases of people, who have difficulties while refusing their citizenship of native countries, she admits, that getting the citizenship does not imply taking over the national aspirations as these people still are culturally attached to their countries of birth. Citizenship in this case is pragmatic, as getting the citizenship of the country of residence makes life of migrants easier or is a ‘right thing to do’; this, however, does not necessarily change the previous identity of the person. Her differentiation between the political and cultural belonging is close to the notion of bifocality presented by Vertovec (2004), which points out to the differentiated identities and everyday practices. In a similar way, we can explain the few cases of local migrants, who received the citizenship of host societies (mostly in Russia). Without citizenship status Georgians have problems of free movement between Russia and Georgia, difficulties for getting the residence permit, working contract and abilities to register a business in Russia. That is why legally or illegally some of the locals (the ones who are in Russia for a long time with their families) take the Russian citizenship. This does not decrease their affiliation with the Georgian nation and is not morally judged by the locals, because in the words of Caroline Brettell, they have strong cultural belonging to the Georgian locality.

When discussing the case of mass deportation of Georgian migrants from Russia in 2006-2007 (which I present in the chapter 7) the issue of state sovereignty and relations arises among the receiving and sending states. Researchers of migration admit that international migration threatens the sovereignty of the nation-state in different ways: their ability to regulate movement of the population, divided loyalties between the nation-states as mobile people sometimes have more than one identity, the strengthening power of international institutions whose regulations affect the national politics and leads to practices of global governance (Castles and Miller 2009: 12). I follow Steven Vertovec who does not see international
mobilization as a threat to nation states, since the issue of how multicultural the world might be is still managed and regulated by national governments (Vertovec 2004). In 2006 after the arrest of four Russian officers in the territory of Georgia (accusing them of being involved in a spy network), the Russian government used mass deportation of Georgian migrants for influencing Georgian politics. It is true that Georgian state brought the case to the European Court of Human Rights and in 2014 the court ruled that Russia had violated international laws by arresting, detaining and expelling Georgian nationals. The Georgian side can still be considered as being the loser, since during the time when the country took back over 4000 deportees, the remittances from Russia to Georgia were reduced or ceased altogether, Georgian products were hindered from Russian markets and all transfers between the countries came to an end. The effects of the economic damage to the country were much higher than the case won in the European Court of Human Rights. Hence even if some authors indicate to the influence of international organizations on the internal politics of state, the case brought above shows that the national state order-making mechanisms continue to be sovereign. Furthermore, we see that states use migrants for negotiating for other matters, which is not connected directly to the migration issue. Laurie A. Brand argues that migration effects the bilateral relations between sending and receiving societies and immigration-related issues might be used in other spheres of bilateral relations (Brand, 2006: 16). During the political crisis between Russia and Georgia the citizens of Georgia living in the territory of Russia were used as a weapon against the politics of Georgian government.

1.4 Socialism and Postsocialism

The interest towards the world beyond ‘the Iron Curtain’ was attracting social anthropologists to study the socialist life (e.g. Humphrey 1983, Verdery 1996, Dragadze 2001 [1988]). Besides describing the emerging realities of the socialist ways of life, the works about the Soviet Union and the Socialist Bloc usually detect the continuities of traditional cultures and ways of lives which the socialist modernization was not capable to change. However, the interest towards the Soviet life has not decreased after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and many authors have been engaged in the historical analysis of the socialist past. Anthropological works about the former Soviet Union and postsocialist countries give us rich material for
comparisons of the current reality, in order to see the how much the current lives are influenced by the past and whether we can still use the notion of ‘postsocialism’.

The term ‘postsocialist’ is used in relation to the countries which were part of the Soviet Union and the East European socialist block, who gained independence around 1990s (Hann 2005). Caroline Humphrey argues that as the generations change and the number of people who experienced the socialist life decreases, the usage of the phrase ‘postsocialism’ will disappear (2002). Nevertheless, even after more than two decades this concept continues to be relevant for studying the ideas of citizens and their practices of everyday lives of Georgian villagers, who search new ways of life, and simultaneously carry socialist ideas and practices. According to Chris Hann, “the value of anthropological contribution often consists in pointing to the continuities accompanying change” (2005: 555). So if in the anthropological studies of the Soviet Union the scholars were tracing the remnants of pre-socialist times, anthropologists studying the postsocialist countries will for a long time deal with the vestiges of socialism. In this sense, studying citizenship practices in postsocialist Georgia gives us some hints about how the citizens-state relations were constructed during Soviet times and how much they still do shape the current ideas and practices.

Throughout the thesis, I often make the comparisons with the works on Soviet or post-Soviet societies. This was in a way driven by the empirical reality. While talking about the present, the informants from the field were always recalling the Soviet life and experiences. While studying the citizenship in contemporary rural Georgia, there are some issues which should be discussed in the context of the Soviet past and one of these issues is the roots of current ethnic nationalism.

The topic of nationalism is especially important in relation to citizenship. As I argue in the thesis, due to ethnic nationalism, which has its roots in the pre-Soviet and Soviet histories, the citizenship concept does not cover fully the national aspirations of Georgians and stands as the legal category, including the three sets of rights. If the pre-Soviet ethnic nationalism led to the absence of nation-state (as Georgia was part of the Russian Empire), during the Soviet time ethnic nationalism was strengthened with the dubious national policy of the Soviet Union. Writing about the nationality and ethnicity issues in the Soviet Union, Yury Slezkine indicates to the naïve politics of the Soviet engineers who created the “communal apartment of national state units” (1994). The intellectuals were supposed to create the ‘socialist content’ under the ‘national forms’ while producing the writings about the histories of nations, their cultural
heritage and treasures. They ended up with creating strong nationalism, while there was no socialist meaning in them (ibid.). Simultaneously Slezkine draws attention to the Soviet national policy which contributed to the existence of passport nationality and republican statehood. Similarly, Karklins (1989) and Brubaker (1994) write about the differentiated understandings of nationality and citizenship in the Soviet Union, which gave the nationality concept its ethnic connotation. Regardless of naming the Soviet Union as *The Affirmative Action Empire* (Martin 2001), *Empire of Nations* (Hirsch 2005) or “The USSR as a communal apartment” (Slezkine 1994), we should admit that the Soviet Union institutionalized strong nationalist aspirations among the Soviet citizens which in early postsocialist times gave rise to tense ethnic conflicts and wars. Ronald G. Suny declares that during the Soviet times in Transcaucasia alongside the ‘official nationalism’ which was tolerated and legitimated by the central government, a counter-nationalism emerged, which was expressed by the ethnic minorities and was directed toward the ethnic majorities as a response for their discrimination (1996). According to Suny the ethnic consolidation of titular nations within the boundaries of the Soviet Union and uneven adaptation of ethnic minorities into the Soviet society and culture gave rise to various ethnic tensions, whose first sign was the conflict in Karabakh (in 1988) (ibid.: 213) and which was followed by several ethnic wars in Georgia in early 1990s.

In relation to Georgian nationalism the work of Suny - *The Making of the Georgian Nation* is important. He points out to the contradictory processes which took place in Georgia (1989): the ethnic consolidation of Georgian nation took place within the framework of the Soviet Union. This took place by means of political convergence of separate parts of feudal Georgian kingdoms and creation of Georgian cultural artifacts in the form of national history, theatres, cinemas, museums, and literature. Furthermore there was a change of demographic trends, which was first of all expressed on the enlarged share of ethnic Georgians within the ethnic composition of the country. Although the Soviet Union maintained the ethnic consolidation of the Georgian nation, Georgians still felt the threat of Russification while being part of the Soviet Union and were struggling for preserving the Georgian language, keeping their dominant position in the political structures of the republic and glorifying the national past. According to Suny Georgian people were still practicing the presocialist traditions in their everyday lives, accentuating their hospitality, practicing traditional banquets. Suggesting the unsuccessful Sovietization of the Georgian nation, he adds that “Georgian Society remains a network in which family and kinship ties, ideas of honor and trust, nepotism, and patron-client alliances provide informal links within the population and prevent penetration of outsiders…”
The importance of family ties, which despite the Soviet large-scale transformations was underlined by Tamara Dragadze in her anthropological study of the village in the highlands of Georgia (Ratcha Province) (2001[1988]). Thus both works suggest that the group solidarity among Georgians was largely cultivated during the Soviet times. Already in post-Soviet times we see that the unstable economic and political life of independent Georgia made the importance of social ties even stronger, as these social relations provide the citizens with different kinds of assistance while the state is retreating.

Other than the conflicts and tense national relations, postsocialist states were faced with the tremendous economic decline. The new economies of postsocialist countries were one of the core topics among anthropological inquiries (Hann 2005). The privatization matters were addressed by scholars of rural communities, as well as of cities (Alexander 2004, Hann 2003, Kaneff and Yalçın-Heckmann 2003). Despite the fact that most postsocialist countries chose the capitalist track of development, there are differences how the policies of privatization were applied by the new states and how the citizens accomplished them. When comparing the cases of de-collectivization in the Ukraine and Azerbaijan (Kaneff and Yalçın-Heckmann 2003) with rural Georgia, we can see that social relations among the villagers and kin largely affect the type of agricultural work. In Georgia villagers did not continue collective farming like in the Ukraine, neither were they cultivating the land through kin ties as in Azerbaijan. In Georgia from the beginning most families started some kind of household farming, but only few households manage to practice it till now. The facilities provided by the Soviet state (central irrigation system, fertilizers, transportation, the centralized market, etc.) are no longer available and independent states do not subsidize the agriculture. Due to the fact that without collective efforts and resources, it is difficult for families to do farming, most of the families left the land uncultivated. Furthermore, locals are mostly accentuating that even if they do agriculture, the profit would cover only the consumed food, while the monetary income is more crucial for living. In order to deal with the changing environment local people start to apply various economic practices and trade was one of the widespread activities among village inhabitants and especially among women. Deema Kaneff gives an ethnographic example from Bulgaria, where it is observable how trade is perceived as the source of pride for some people, but for others the same activity is not free from negative moral judgments (2002). The two cases brought by Kaneff show how the status and activity during the Soviet times affect the current perception of economic activities (ibid.). Somewhat differently, in the case of ‘my’ Georgian village here, the same traders engage in contradictory discourses: they are simultaneously sorry
for trading because they appreciate the more stable and prestigious jobs they had during Soviet times, the time when ‘spekulacia’ was shameful, but in a way they are content with trading because they have income which is crucial for their families and they live better than other villagers. Furthermore, while discussing the economic activities which were emerging during postsocialist times, locals always mention the state. They perceive trade as their own dignity; as far as trading is not an ‘official position’ provided by the state, they think that the state has nothing to do with it (they think that they should not pay taxes, should not register the business or should not be asked for quality assurance for the products they sell). Thus trade as a new economic activity might be taken as an example for not only for the emerging market economy but as an activity which might help us trace the state, its regulations and its perception among the citizens. In this regard we can see the similarities and differences between the traders from other Caucasian countries. While discussing the various layers involved in the trans-border trading, various official structures or bureaucrats, Lale Yalçın-Heckmann suggests that “the workings of markets indicate how citizens perceive their own state and how they compare the states in the past and present” (2007: 292).

1.5 Sac’ire as place of research

This dissertation is based on fieldwork carried out in North-West Georgia from August 2006 till September 2007. Sac’ire, where the anthropological research was carried out, is a village within the T’q’ibuli district, of the Imereti region with 815 persons registered (in year 2007) (photo #2). When searching for a village within the ‘district of miners’, I chose Sac’ire because of several reasons: having different kinds of resources, but being still the place of high out-migration, the administrative centre of 8 villages (called ‘Sac’iris temi’ – community of Sac’ire), and having easy access to the city (except in high snow during winter).

Sac’ire is the highest village within the T’q’ibuli district - 550 m. Because of its cold climate (in comparison with other villages), local people call it ‘Siberia’. Within the territory of Sac’ire there is an artificial reservoir (used for T’q’ibuli’s hydro-electric power plant) which was built during 1950-59, in order to support mines with electricity (see photo #3). Being on the border of the region of Rač’a (Highland Georgia, famous with health resorts), the village is also famous for having a healthy climate. Hence in 1972 there was built a sanatorium called ‘holiday cottage for children and mothers’ (See photo #4).
There is a railway which crosses the village and motorways connect it to Kutaisi (the second big city of Georgia, centre of Imerety region) and to T’q’ibuli. The distance between Sac’ire and the city T’q’ibuli is 7 km and between T’q’ibuli and Kutaisi, 37 km. So, transportation means are mini-buses (‘Maršut’k’a’) and buses. In the village there are a secondary school, an unfinished building of the house of culture and a kindergarten within it, a building for village administration, a library and ambulance within the administrative house, several self-built shops (‘commercial boxes’ as people call them) and some destroyed houses of the infrastructure from the communist times (e.g. an old supermarket (Univermag), bath, bakery) (See map #2). Only the central road is paved, while the roads connecting different neighbourhoods to the centre are without asphalt. The general household conditions of the families are poor. Most of the families do not have running water inside the house, alongside the toilets and bathrooms.

There are three versions of stories about the name of the village. According to one version, there was a church named Kašueti, where people came and brought a sacrifice (‘šesac’iri’) and from the word sacrifice the village was called Sac’ire. The second version says that in the territory of the village iron-ore was extracted, squeezed out and processed. In Georgian the word for squeezer is ‘Sac’uri’ and etymologically it is also close to the name of the village (Nishnianidze & Nishnianidze 2003: 68). The third version I have heard from some local people, saying it half seriously, that the soil is so barren, poor (‘Mc’iri’ in Georgian), that village name comes from this adjective.

Sac’ire is mentioned in historical writings already in the 11th century as a village belonging to the Gelaty monastery (this monastery in on the territory of T’q’ibuli district, main cathedral of Imereti region), settled with peasants bonded to the Orthodox Church. Later on Sac’ire became famous with smith-craft, producing church objects. Until 1930s when the city of T’q’ibuli was founded, Sac’ire was some kind of cultural centre for nearby villages, having first school, church, and during summer holiday-makers.

Officially in the village of Sac’ire 275 households are registered (2007), all of them ethnic Georgians. According to our calculation (my host, me and my assistant), however, there are 202 families actually living in the village. There are 46 empty houses (some of them are inhabited only during the summer, but some of them are destroyed). There is still another difference between the officially registered number of households and the real one: this is because during the Soviet times families were sometimes registered as different households in
order to get a personal plot. One cannot hence conclude that the decrease in the number of households who live in Sac’ire is due to labour migration alone: during communist times some students found work and lived in cities and after some time, village houses became like a place for holiday making. Some houses are completely abandoned; this happens when owner(s) are out of Georgia, or the ownership of these houses is disputed between different claimants.

Agriculture: In the past people did field-crop cultivation, and the main plant was Italian millet ( Yömi in Georgian). From XVIII century onwards they began cultivating maize and from XX century maize became the only crop for cultivation (Shavianidze 2005: 37). After the dissolution of collective farms ( kolkhoz) in 1993 each household got land plot(s), which was 7500 sq.m. Some families now cultivate the land, some use part of it, and some others left these plots even without fence. Those families working on land mainly cultivate maize, beans, pumpkin (here and there) (see photo #5). Actually the district is quite mountainous, there is not enough pasture and there are no animal herds being kept. People have few animals, in the morning these go away from the village towards the forest by themselves and come back in the evening. People commonly keep animals like cows (bulls for field), pigs and rarely goats. They have poultry as well (chicken, turkey, and geese).

Tea: Cultivation of tea plantations in T’q’ibuli began in the 1920-30s of the last century (Shavianidze 2005: 38). Everybody is – still - proud of the high quality of T’q’ibuli tea. “Of course it is labor-consuming [needing cutting, hoeing, fertilizing, T.M.], but it was profitable” (Shavianidze 2005: 38). According to an old local woman, Tina, – “coal mines were for men and tea plantations - for women. One could build a house with the money earned from a single season of tea picking.” In 1993 the cooperative enterprise of Sac’ire village inherited 131 hectares of tea plantation from the collective farm. But from this period onwards the tea plantations were left uncultivated/untended. At the time of research from 131 hectares 40 hectares were taken on lease by the T’q’ibuli tea factory. The rest was still without any care, so one can hardly recognize what kind of bushes is grown on these plots of land (see photo #6). There were two women in Sac’ire who continue the tradition of tea picking and processing tea leaves at home by hand and then selling home-made tea (the profit was minimal, ca. 30 euro per season).

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4 Usually they have 2000-2500 sq. m. garden with the house, and for the other land plot they go to different places, which frequently are far from the village. Most of the families cultivate their gardens, mainly for vegetables, greens, fruit trees, vineyards, usually all for own consumption.
Coal Industry: The major economic resource for the whole district T’q’ibuli was coal industry. The foundation of the city was also connected to the expansion of coal extraction during the 1930s. There were miners in every second or third family in Sac’ire. Although the work was complicated and dangerous, the salary and benefits miners were getting made this kind of work desirable for people. From 1990s onwards coal industry slowed down the work speed and after 1995-96 from four mines only one was still working but with minimal capacity. Many people lost jobs, miner-pensioners lost high pensions. In 2006 coal mines were sold, the owner is a Georgian holding company ‘Sakinvesti’ (See photos #7 and #8). Although the company began to renovate the infrastructure of the industry, found ways to use the coal (in cement works), and created some new work places, people are skeptical about the future of the coal industry, saying that the Georgian state or any Georgian company could not fix coal industry again. I quote Guram (72 years old man, worked 39 years in coal industry): “Generally T’q’ibuli coal was not of high quality, to compare with the coal of Russia. T’q’ibuli coal mines are full with gases, so mines need constant renovation, which is expensive. … The price of coal extraction from T’q’ibuli could not cover even half the expenses of the mine and miners…. The expenses for extracting coal increase gradually as coal reserve decreases and goes deeply into the earth… Ministry of coal industry [of the Soviet Union, T.M.] covered 60% of the expenses. The coal industry all over the Soviet Union was one whole structure, so they [the Soviet Union, T.M.] did not care about the disadvantage of T’q’ibuli mines…. ” (2006).

To support the coal industry, government renovated and set the railway (from the beginning of 2007), which had not been working the five years before. These small positive changes do not alter the whole economic picture for local residents. Talking about ongoing processes, one of the respondents pointed out to the ‘façade’ character of government’s policies: “This is a country where there is boom of fountains. They [government, T.M.] are painting front façades of houses in the centre of the city, while the house is really crumbling” (2007). Actually this was the widely spread opinion of the villagers. It was well-known that the then President Mikheil Saakashvili was fond of fountains and there were plenty of new ones all over Georgia. While renovating the train station in T’k’ibuli, they also put a new fountain before it and opened it while the president visited the locality. Although people disregard the ‘fountain culture,’ thinking that the government is spending large financial resources for the infrastructural projects and for entertaining people, while the social problems of ordinary citizens remain unsolved. Furthermore, locals were worried about superficial character of the new projects initiated by the central government. While renovating the city T’q’ibuli, houses were not actually repaired, but
only the front façades were painted (see appendix B for the picture of the building in T’q’ibuli, Photo #9).

The retreat of the state from their economic, social and everyday lives made individuals search their own ways of survival and economic practices. Out-migration became very popular as the monetary income was hardly generated from local economic activities. The popular destination of migrants were either the capital Tbilisi or Russia, for male migrants mostly doing construction work there, while for female migrants Italy, Greece and Turkey were more attractive, for work as domestic help. The economic activities of the locals are quite diverse and range from agricultural work, trade, private business, to salaried work for state or other organizations. Furthermore some receive social support from the state, remittances and support from kin and neighbors. Most of the families have several sources and they do not depend on one kind of economy, while most of economic fields do not bring in sufficient income.

1.6 Research methodology

As I indicated above, the administrative function of the village within the community, closeness to the centre, the high migration were the primary reasons for me to settle in Sac’ire. Like many other anthropologists, while searching the family, I ended up with the family of one of the local intellectuals, who had an administrative position in the village as well as being a much respected person. This fact had its positive and negative sides. Her position gave me access to different kinds of information, which would have been never approachable for me without her help. Furthermore, my landlady is like the vivid encyclopedia about the locality, people and families and there was nobody in the village or in the district with whom I would like to meet, and she could not find the connecting point. The negative side was more acute at the beginning, when I had less contact to the villagers who were more involved in agriculture or trading, but after sometimes this also changed and I met many in these occupations as well.

In order to have closer relations with the local people I started teaching at the local school, but only for a semester. From the beginning I visited the head of the local school, suggesting her to lead the course of civil education without payment and without formal employment at school (this was a new subject just initiated that year and they did not have a trained teacher). But my explanation, that I just wanted to be acquainted with the locals, was not very convincing to her and she asked me to contact to the head of T’q’ibuli Resource Centre
(this is the local department of education). I contacted the head of the Resource Centre and he agreed to my position. For the locals it usually is very difficult to get a position at school, and that my case, which was resolved very easily, was the source of different justifications. While teaching at school the teachers were looking at me as being the ‘spy’ either for the local Resource Centre, or from Tbilisi. They were very reserved in their relations with me and while I was entering the room for teachers, everybody stopped talking. Although I was giving the salary back to the history teacher, who was supposed to lead the course of civil education, my easy engagement at the school was the source of rumors about my initial motives. On the other hand, being a teacher at school gave me possibility to get to know the pupils and their families, as I was from time to time helping students for preparation of different subjects, which involved visits to their families. Another shortcoming was connected with my gender and marital status, as being an unmarried woman in locality prevented me for having access to all the situations and events. For instance I could not stand around (like men) in the centre of the village where mostly men where gathering, chatting and discussing very important issues about ongoing processes. As local women warned me that I should have been careful about my reputation and being a teacher was one of the securing ways for this. But in the second half of my field work, when I was already married and left the school, the situation changed. The teachers became friendlier to me, visiting me and inviting to their homes, as they were convinced that the school was not my initial object of ‘spying’. Very important was that I spent the winter with locals. From the beginning of my field work everybody was laughing at me, saying that during the winter I will run away from the locality; but seeing me around during the high snow and freeze, made me more trustworthy in their eyes.

My initial method for gathering information was observation. As citizenship or migration is not a very specialized phenomenon, like the church for the study of religious practice, initially I did not have concrete ideas about what and where to do the observation. I was participating in everyday activities of locals, starting from agricultural work, ending with visits to the village or district administration. Through the connections of my landlady, I was informed and able to participate and attend the main events going on in the locality, like political campaigns, visits of political figures, cultural events, concerts, funerals, weddings and on the like. Being Georgian in the locality had pros and cons for my fieldwork. I did not have problems with understanding contexts and contents of the ongoing processes or conversations, although I was more limited for asking very naive questions, because the locals immediately responded: “You are Georgian, you should know it!” In case I would pretend not to know something and
demanded further explanations, then a long speech will start either about the new generation who is forgetting about traditions, or about the urban context, which was detaching people from their cultural roots. Besides the everyday observation of local life, I was paying special attention to the self-governmental elections, the distribution of social assistance within the newly initiated Targeted Social Assistance (TSA) program, and to families of migrants and returned migrants.

In the first half of my field work, I did a census survey, which covered the whole village.\(^5\) The structured questionnaire was brief, including formal questions about family members, their age, gender, employment and marital statuses, having or not migrant members; in case of having migrant(s), their place of residence, period of migration, civil status, remittances sent by them, etc. The census survey allowed me to get to know every family, their connections to each other, kinship and neighbourhood ties, and their access to different village resources. While doing the census survey I was often regarded as a ‘social agent’ in the framework of the social assistance program, who were supposed to come and check their economic situation. So sometimes, I was witnessing how the locals were changing information, ‘cheating’ about the size of land, about property or migrant members. Also doing census survey was a good chance for introducing myself to locals.

I started doing in-depth interviews only in the second half of my fieldwork, when I already was well incorporated in the village, everybody knew me as a ‘new teacher’, although I was not one any more, or as ‘daughter of the family’. While interviewing the villagers I was always choosing to have life histories rather than operating with open-ended questionnaires, which would only cover the topic of my research. The stories told by informants about the histories of their lineages, about their parents, about their education paths, military services, marriage histories made them to be very open and later on none of the topics seemed to be sensitive or difficult to be talked about, as they had feeling that I was part of their life. I had several specific topics (coal industry, tea plantation, agriculture, extraction and usage of agate, infrastructure of the village and district, management of the village and community, social assistance program, elections, state financed institutions including school, library, house of culture, kindergarten, religion, migrants’ families and returned migrants) defined from the beginning and for each topic I was choosing the relevant persons or households (and because I already knew most of the families) and conducted with them interviews. Besides the village

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\(^5\) My assistant and I visited and filled the information for 192 families in the village of Sac’ire; there were 10 more families, whom we could not visit, either because they were not at home, did not want to take part in it, or we misunderstood the borders of the village.
people, I interviewed two ethnologists who had some information about the locality, a geographer (about the local natural resources), managers of the local tea factory and coal industry, a former mayor of T’q’ibuli, representatives of the forestry, representatives of the non-governmental organizations financing the local small-scale business or working on the issue of migration. One specific goal was to get to know the families of migrants. Besides trying to spend time with them, observing how the family members who were left behind were struggling with new and unfamiliar responsibilities, I was conducting interviews with them (I chose the ones with different demographic characteristics, to see how different household members were affected by migration). I was able to conduct some interviews with migrants who were visiting the locality (back from Russia, Turkey, Germany) and the ones who were deported from Russia during the political crisis between Georgia and Russia in 2006.

In the second part of my field work I also conducted the survey (sample size 100 households) with a structured questionnaire, which was created by the members of our research group and was used by every researcher in their field sites. The families were chosen using the random walking method. The content of the questionnaire was mostly dealing with the core questions of my study, the issues about civil, political and social citizenship, ethnicity, national belonging, imagination of state, information about migrants and their position in the host societies. During the survey I already was ‘local’ and I was not mixed with social agents, thus I was able to get more detailed and accurate data.

I did some research in the local archives and ended up with reading the minutes of the local collective farm meetings and minutes of the postsocialist collective enterprise, which existed only two years. I also studied the local newspapers, kept in the local archives as well as in the central library in Tbilisi (mainly the newspapers from 1950s till 1980s). For the study of different narratives and state discourse about the conflict between Georgian and Russia in 2006-2007, which resulted in the mass deportation of Georgian citizens from Russia, I was also studying the contemporary newspapers.

1.7 Structure of the dissertation

Chapter 2 discusses the history of the region and memory of the socialist past. T’q’ibuli district as a part of Imereti region was integral part of Georgia as far as we know from reliable data of foreign authors about West Georgia (i.e. from 4th century BC onwards, Javakhishvili
The region was characterized by scarce resources and economic disaster was not uncommon in the locality. Before the Soviet Union was established local inhabitants had the strongest attachment to Orthodox Church. The Soviet Union had tremendous influence on developing the local economy. This might be one of the reasons, why in the memory of T’q’ibulians the socialist past dominates. According to the material I have about historical development on this topic, I argue that the development of Soviet citizenship was different from the logic Marshall suggested. The socialist citizenship was guaranteeing the social rights to workers and peasants (except for the so-called ‘enemies of people’ who were sent to Gulags and stripped of citizenship all together or killed), while the political and civil ones were impossible to exercise for any citizen (Alexopoulos 2006). However, the socialist past determines the current expectation of the citizens, who expect from the contemporary state the social provisions the Soviet one was guaranteeing. The economy of the independent state however is not strong enough for providing citizens with the same or similar material benefits. It allows for practicing civil and political rights of citizenship, which were suppressed for Soviet citizens. But unsatisfied claims for social provisions from the state causes the locals to perceive Soviet citizenship superior to the current one.

Chapter 3 presents the economy and structure of the village. The economic activities of the locals are quite diverse and range from agricultural work, trading, private business, to salaried work for state or other organizations. Furthermore some receive social support from the state, remittances and support from kin and neighbors. Mostly the families have several sources of income and they do not depend on one kind of economic activity while most of economic fields do not bring in sufficient income. Kinship and neighbourhood relations are more or less equal relations in the sense of close relations, supporting each other, with contributions and everyday interaction. Informally the village is divided into five neighbourhoods and locals use the names of neighbourhoods in colloquial expressions. According to the survey results and observations the neighbourhoods differ from one another in terms of engaging in agriculture, in coal mining, or in having high education and occupying administrative positions. One reason for this is the unequal access to different kinds of resources. Besides, close relations between the neighbours determine the families’ economic activities and support the chain migration. The villagers, on the whole, identify themselves with one or the other neighborhood, and this is a small part of their identity, besides being Sac’irian, T’q’ibulian, Imeretian and Georgian. They use these different scales of identities in different contexts, to present themselves and their social characteristics.
In Chapter 4, I discuss how locals perceive the nation and the state. In the first part of the chapter I discuss the meaning of the Georgian nation in history as well as in the perceptions of local people and the history of Georgian nationalism, which starts from the second half of the 19th century, when in the absence of a Georgian state, the only ideology which nation might had, was ethnic nationalism (Tarkhan-Mouravi and Smite 2007: 11). The Soviet nationality regime was simultaneously institutionalizing and conventionally opposing the definition of nationhood, based on the one hand on territorial and political framework and on the other, ethnocultural models of nationhood. This distinction was also expressed in two categories encoded in national documents of Soviet citizens, one citizenship as belonging to the political system of the Soviet republics and second, ethnic nationality (introduced in 1932) as an “ascriptive legal category, a key element of an individual’s legal status” (Brubaker, 1994: 53). I propose that Georgian people are still operating by the mixed categories of nationality and citizenship. The locals and migrants from the locality have an emotional attachment to the Georgian nation, which formulates their nationality as Georgian, and it does not depend on their legal status of citizenship.

In the second part of Chapter 4, I discuss the place of the ‘state’ as discussed in anthropological studies. In the rural community of Georgia I was studying the everyday practices which were taking place in public and governmental institutions, and I was paying attention not only to the rules or regulations, but how local institutions and representatives were enacting them. Presenting ethnographic examples about the appropriation of woodlands by locals, I argue that local bureaucrats instead of regulating the use of natural resources according to state laws, engage in patron-client relations with the locals and support the illegal cut down of woodlands. The local residents do not perceive the local bureaucracy as part of the state, because these bureaucrats are their neighbours, villagers, members of their kin groups, or members of community and they are also co-nationals. I admit that this is the view from ‘below’, while there exists also a different ‘above’ image of the state. Being upset about the harsh politics of the state, about the unsettled foreign relations, about the lack of the social provisions locals always blame the state (which is far away in the capital). Thus the locals are alienated from this state (‘above state’) and perceive it as ruthless, which does not care about the citizens. The local bureaucrats also support the creation of some mystical image of the state, which is far and does not understand the problems of the people. That is why it is not shameful to cheat the state, especially when the state apparatus also participates in this process. And that is why the local
people have more attachment to the category of nationality, inherited from the Soviet past, than to the civic understanding of citizenship.

In Chapter 5, I describe how political rights of citizens are practiced in the locality. I use the case of election of self-governmental body to present, how elections can function as the main possibility of citizens for influencing the political processes in a Georgian district. The election process allows us to assume, that in the district political rights of the citizens would be to some degree limited. The positioning of citizens is strongly influenced through social relations between ordinary villagers and interest-bearers (who are also villagers, but party members, employed in state financed organizations or doing propaganda for a certain party). The citizens who are engaged in the pre-election campaigns or in the election process are mostly interested in getting salaries. The ordinary citizens, who are not members of political parties and are not engaged in the election processes in the framework of governmental or non-governmental organizations, make their decisions in accordance with the preferences of close people, in order not to upset them. Election results are influenced by powerful people from the government, ruling party or organizations, by means of stuffing bullets. Simultaneously they use various techniques and resources to make the impression that the election was fair. Political processes during the self-governmental election show continuities, while the tactics used by the previous governments (even, the Soviet one, in sense of patron-client relations) remain unchanged.

The whole political process going on in locality show that citizenship is a unified category like Marshall and Lister suggest and all rights are interdependent (Marshall 1998 [1963], Lister 2005). The lack of the material well-being restrain the locals from full realization of their political rights (choosing and supporting the one they prefer) or civic rights (having personal freedom). Furthermore, the central and local governments use the language of bargaining with the voters. They present the provision of social rights not as an obligation of the state, but as their benevolence, which should be answered with political support from citizens. Here we can trace the confrontation between the social and political rights, as the one set of rights (social in this case) are promised to be provided in expenses of other set of rights (political rights in this case).

Chapter 6 discusses the issue of social citizenship, namely the cornerstone of the state’s current social policy - Targeted Social Assistance (TSA), the main principle of which is to provide state resources to the poorest persons as identified by an evaluation system. Since the
dissolution of the Soviet system, state supported jobs and sufficient social support (including free medical care) are no longer available or are available only to a limited extent. This has created an uncertain economic situation which, along with the memory of Soviet practices of universal social citizenship, motivated the majority of Sac’ire’s population to apply for the new social assistance programme regardless of their financial situation. In this way Georgian citizens are trying to exercise social citizenship as a practice of bargaining for universal social rights, which are ultimately not achievable given the present state of Georgia’s economy and the government’s policy of providing social security only to extremely needy families. Thus, citizens demonstrate a conflation of the concepts of social citizenship and social security which I argue to be separate analytical categories. It is evident that local citizens claim their social rights in order to re-establish their past social conditions as well as challenge the present inequalities and they claim universal social rights, which should be provided to everybody. The state targets extremely needy families in allocating scarce social assistance, and ignores universal social rights of citizens. Furthermore, the language of communication between the state and citizens was different. In those cases where the state supplied limited social security, it was presented as if it were charity from the state and not as the fulfilment of obligations and promises. At the same time, the state tried to answer the demands of international organisations by implementing the methodology of social assistance suggested by them. However, the logic of the programme was not understandable to local people and the amount of support was not enough. The TSA programme could be seen, therefore, as a clear example of how the Georgian state tried to answer international and internal demands but could not satisfy local people, who expected to be able to practice social citizenship in the contemporary Georgian state as they had experienced it during the Soviet era.

The main goal of Chapter 7 is to discuss the migration process from the locality in general and in relation to citizenship practices. Migration process from the locality has some specificities: Migration from locality is not a ‘brain drain’ process, families who do not have closest kin group left in the village are not expected to come back, ownership of accommodation in the place of migration largely defines whether the person is ‘qualified’ as migrant or not, in host countries half of the migrants live without legal documents. The focus in this chapter is less on the migrants themselves but on how migration acts upon those who are left behind. Women who are left behind were under the general social pressure of justifying the absence of their men and the possibility of the absent men having other sexual partners in migration. These possibilities caused tensions within the conjugal and family relations as well as causing
difficulties in organizing work and social life in the village. When a woman migrates to earn their living abroad, her absence is harder to fill in and the family structure seems to become more vulnerable when having to cope with difficulties.

Migration has a strong economic impact on the villagers’ citizenship practices. For those families who are mostly dependent on remittances, it replaces social support to a large extent. Concerning their involvement in the political affairs of the state they are ‘passive citizens’ (Turner 2001), being mostly concerned in solving their own economic problems and of their families. But this is only a one dimensional view, as remittances sent by the migrants stimulates growth, reduces poverty, increases access to education, healthcare and better accommodation of family members, thus partially accomplishing the state’s social responsibilities (Dudwick 2011). Although migrants are creating social security for their families, they are lacking of social rights either in sending or receiving societies themselves.

The migration strategies are mostly individually designed and organized and are fluctuating and sometimes unpredictable. Even in the cases when the harsh politics of receiving or sending countries affect the lives of migrants (as in the case of mass deportation of Georgian migrants from Russia), migrants’ strategies hardly impact state policies. Even if migrants and others complain about the ‘dirtiness’ of international politics, there is hardly any clear collective action to express these disappointments, either to the state or to other international organizations. Their individual strategies are to use patron-client relations or corruption in relation to the low-level bureaucrats to avoid or minimize the negative effect of the state’s policy. Thus the perception of the state as well as the interaction with the state, for migrants and locals is similar. For them it is possible to negotiate and find common language with low level state apparatus, while the image of the ‘above’ states is still distant, monolithic and inflexible from them.
Chapter 2. History, society and the region

“The dominant historical formulations of citizenship both produce and limit possible counter formulations.”

James Holston

Georgia or Sakartvelo, as Georgians refer to it and meaning a place where Georgians (Kartvelebi) live is situated in the South Caucasus, bounded to the west by the Black Sea, to the north by Russian Federation, to the south by Turkey and Armenia, and to the southeast by Azerbaijan (See map #1). In 1991, Georgia became a democratic republic after the Supreme Council of Georgia reinstated independence based on a referendum. Georgia is a representative democratic semi-presidential republic, with the President as the head of state, and Prime Minister as the head of government. The Parliament of Georgia is the country’s highest representative body, executing the legislative power. The total area of Georgia is 67.9 thousand square kilometers. As of 1 January, 2014, the population of Georgia was 3.7 million people excluding the population of the occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. The capital of Georgia is Tbilisi, which had a population of 1.10 million as of January 2014. As for the ethnic composition of Georgia, the share of ethnic Georgians increased from 68.8 percent of total population in 1979 to 86.8 percent in 2014. After Georgians the second largest group are Azeri (6.3 percent) followed by Armenians (4.5 percent) (National Statistics Office of Georgia 2018: 7). The state language is Georgian (Kartuli) and it belongs to the Kartvelian (kartveluri) language group together with Megrelian, Svan, and Laz.

The famous Georgian historian and founder of the first Georgian university (1918), Ivane Javakhishvili suggested that restoring a distinct picture of Georgian political history before the first century BC is difficult, and the most reliable data comes from foreign authors and linguistic analyses (Javakhishvili, 2012 [1908]). Using foreign historical sources, Javakhishvili suggests the history of Georgia starts from the 11th century BC, when the ancestors of Georgian tribes (Mesxetians, Iberians, and K’olxians) came into political life. Besides the

7 The first Georgian National Council declared independence in 1918, and hence reinstate is used. At that time, the form of government was democratic republic. During the three years of the independent Georgian republic the main achievement was the creation of the Georgian Constitution in 1921. “Although the 1921 Georgian constitution practically did not operate, it had significant importance in the history of Georgian nation. The 1918 independence act of Georgia and the 1921 constitution were the legal basis for fighting for reinstating the independence of Georgia within the Soviet Union” (Iv. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University 2004: 65). During 1921-1991 Georgia was part of the Soviet Union as the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.
8 Before the parliamentary election of 2012 Georgia had a republican form of government, under the rule of President of Georgia.
foreign authors, material evidence suggests the existence of Georgian tribes in some kind of political unity from the 4th century BC. In eastern Georgia these tribes were united under the name *Iberia* and in western Georgia under the name *K’olxet*” (Javakhishvili 1979). Territorially and ethnically *K’olxeti* is believed to be situated in modern day Imereti, the target region of this study. From this period, the Georgian tribes experienced a wide variety of changes including dissolutions of governments, invasions, occupations, and unifications. Georgian culture echoes the diverse cultures of ethnic groups imprinted on it during these changes. When talking about the country, Georgians are very proud of the religion, history, nature, language, and culture. This enthusiasm is expressed in everyday conversations, toasts, and communication with foreigners. Some of the aspects told by locals concerning Georgian history are historical facts, but some issues are exaggerated and far from reality. Reference to the historical past was very widespread during the last decade of Soviet times and worked to preserve Georgian culture and identity. The Georgian national movement (in the 1980s and early 1990s) spoke about this issue, and it played an important role in the restoration of Georgian statehood. Passion about ‘the great historical past’ is still powerful after the reestablishment of an independent state and is a source of strong ethnic nationalism, which can be harmful to statehood, as I illustrate with my ethnography in Chapter 4.

While talking about memories of the socialist past one should consider some premises. During the socialist time the ideology of the Communist Party was overpowering over other ideologies. The main accents were made on the achievements of the Soviet state while historical facts and information were changed or hidden. The generation who would have more clear memory of the Soviet harsh politics and persecutions were afraid to talk about it and the ‘voices’ of ordinary workers who were experiencing social security and appraised positions within the Soviet Union were prominent. During the nationalist movements in 1990s the criticism of the Soviet Union was extensive. The leaders of the nationalist movements were harshly criticizing the socialist state as the occupant of Georgian territory as well as its resources. Within the discussion they mention that only the natural resources like manganese, coal or mineral water would be enough for securing the well-being of the Georgian nation. After reinstating independence the difficulties of using the natural resources rationally and establishing the private enterprises which would bring in sufficient income for the state budget and dignified working conditions and salaries for ordinary people, made the locals think that the leaders of nationalist movements were exaggerating the potential of the country and if the economy of
Soviet Georgia had been flourishing, it was due to the help and subsidies from the ‘elder brother.’ There are some areas where the nostalgia for the Soviet past or appraisal of Stalin is prominent. This kind of example is the hometown of Stalin – Gori, where the locals are still proudly talking about the ‘Great Leader,’ being against removal of Stalin’s statue or changing the name of the main street which was called after him. In order to fight against the reminiscence of ‘Glorious Socialist Past’ or ‘Great Soviet Leaders’ in Gori city the project “Unknown Soviet Past” was implemented. The aim of the project is to have the youth get acquainted with the more accurate history of Soviet past. The authors of this project indicate that “The youth has information about the Soviet Union only from their grandparents, who mostly say that ‘we were devastated after the abolishment of the Soviet Union.’ Another source is the school, where there are only few paragraphs about the repression and the WWII. […] The knowledge about the Soviet Union mostly depends on the several myths about Stalin (meeting of Stalin and Roosevelt or that Stalin had only one military tunic and was reading lots of books) which causes the unawareness of people about the Soviet regime” (Dalakishvili 2017). The same tendency is spread over T’q’ibuli district as the locals connect the establishing and development of the city and coal mines to the name of Stalin. The longing for the Soviet past is reinforced by the hard economic conditions of ex-Soviet labourers and devastation of district infrastructure and enterprises. Thus, the socialist past is mostly positively presented in the discourse of the local people as there is neither effective tool for healthy critic supported by state ideology nor accurate memories of the facts. As I do discuss the citizenship as a practice which also is affected by the previous experiences, we should look how the Soviet state and citizenship are imagined and presented by the locals.

Imereti, the region where my fieldwork was done, is situated in western Georgia. It is the largest region in Georgia and consists of twelve districts populated by 800 000 people. The centre of the region is Kutaisi, where the governor of the Imereti region is located. From 2012, the parliament of Georgia was moved from Tbilisi to Kutaisi. The population of Kutaisi is 147,635 (National Statistics Office of Georgia 2018: 70). As indicated above, the Imereti region was populated from the fourth century BC onwards and was called K’olxi. This territory included the whole of West Georgia as well as some parts of the South East coast of the Black Sea. Later the kingdom changed its name and was called Egrisi or Lazika. In the third century BC Egrisi was united with the Eastern Georgian Kingdom, although Egrisi’s independence did not prove as durable, and it was successively ruled by Achaemenid Persia, Hellenistic Pontus,
Rome, and Byzantium (Suny 1989: 11). During the Renaissance (XI-XIII centuries), Egris was united with the United Georgian Kingdom for a second time.

Imerti as a Georgian kingdom was established in the 15th century after the dissolution of the Georgian feudal state. The Imereti Kingdom lasted till the beginning of the 19th century, when it was annexed by Tsarist Russia shortly after eastern Georgia was. The history of the Kingdom of Imereti is similar to other Georgian kingdoms, in terms of socio-economic deprivation, conflict with other Georgian kingdoms, and fighting with Persians and Ottomans (Rekhviashvili 1989). The Kingdom of Imereti was situated between the north latitude 40° 50' and 42° 55' and between east longitude 59° 57' and 61° 30'. It bordered other Georgian monarchies including Kartli, Guria, Samegrelo, Lečxumi, and to the north bordering Kabardino-Balkaria. In the south the borders ran along the mountains of Vahani and Persati. Persati separated the kingdom of Imereti from the Axalcixe principality. The Kingdom of Imereti was divided into six parts, one of which was Ok’riba, currently known as the T’q’ibuli district, where the field work was carried out.

Imereti is a mountainous region. Historically the population of Imereti was involved in agriculture and livestock raising. Due to the lack of pastures there were few cattle. In the Imereti region crops like corn, barley, rice, millet, flax, and hemp were cultivated. In the lowlands, vineyards were prevalent. T’q’ibuli district was well-known for fruit-growing. Peasants mainly carried out agricultural work on lands belonging to feudal lords and their families. Agriculture related handicraft took place in Imereti, and Ok’riba was known also for iron-ore. Trading was not typical work for locals and was mostly done by Armenians and Jewish people resettled from Akhaltsikhe (Axalcixe). Urban settlements were undeveloped. In the 18th century in Kutaisi, there were only 50 households (Gonikishvili 1979). The King was the chief feudal, while princes and noblemen were below him in the social hierarchy. Ecclesiastical rank was also stratified. Church authorities were a dominant class, while feudal chiefs exploited village priests and deacons. There were three categories of peasants: peasants belonging to the king; peasants belonging to nobility; and church peasants. Church peasants were in a better position than others in that they were less exploited (Gonikishvili 1979).

In 1804 the kingdom of Imereti was abolished and together with other Georgian kingdoms joined the Russian Empire and became a Tsarist governorate (Gubernia). In the new governing system the peasants became state peasants and were subject to numerous taxes (Iv. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University 2004). From this time, the history of Imereti as an independent Georgian kingdom ended. Imereti was part of Georgia under Tsarist rule (1804-

I was inspired by the idea to include the Soviet history of the district within the dissertation during fieldwork. I felt that time in the locality was counted as if starting with the Soviet period. In the perception of locals, the ‘Golden Age’ of T’q’ibuli was during the socialist period, and this perception was intensified by the decline of the local economy following independence. If the ‘great historical past’ (i.e. the pre-Soviet past) was the part of the feasting narrative, recalling the Soviet past was part of everyday life and personal memories. Hence, together with the general history of the region, I pay attention to specific oral histories of remembering the socialist state.

The second reason for writing a historical overview of the socialist state and of Soviet citizens came from James Holston’s work (2008). I discuss the historical formation of citizenship during the socialist period, which mostly affected the current understanding and practices of citizenship. To begin with the historical overview from the Soviet period may seem insufficient but has several purposes: First, there is a lack of information on pre-socialist times. I could find neither printed newspaper nor documents about the locality before the 1930s.9 Furthermore, local people do not refer to the pre-socialist period much. Second, the information I have from that period does not have much to do with citizenship. The T’q’ibuli district was known as Ok’riba, the middle point between Rača and Imereti. The territory of the current district was not densely populated. Some inhabitants were church peasants, working in the extraction of iron ore and carrying out smith work. Other inhabitants (serfs of nobility, who later became free peasants) were seasonal laborers in lowland Georgia, as farming was not enough to live on. From the 19th century onwards, T’q’ibuli district did not have a city or city-like settlement. I could not find out what unit T’q’ibulians would have developed a feeling of membership. The strongest identity of the local people was attachment to the Orthodox Church, which was a powerful institution in the locality. During that period, T’q’ibulians could enjoy neither political nor social rights of citizens.10

All the above-mentioned reasons led me to search for citizenship practices after the formation of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia and more concretely after the 1930s. In

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9 I mean that I could not find materials in the local archive of T’q’ibuli district.
10 On March 23, 1918 the newspaper ‘Our country’ wrote about the starvation of the population because of lack of the staple crop – corn: “There is a big famine in Ok’riba. 90 percent of the population does not have corn. Each day they turn in a petition in order to get corn, but they get neither support, nor a response” (The Municipality of Kutaisi 1918, own translation).
this chapter, I highlight the ways citizens and their relations with the state were addressed in local newspapers. During the socialist times, like most districts, T’q’ibuli had a local newspaper. Being the organ of the T’q’ibuli city committee and of the Communist Party, the newspaper was one of the main tools for spreading Soviet ideas: “Spreading press within the population is one of the most important political campaigns. The native Communist Party and the Soviet state pay great attention to this business, trying to supply the broad populace of workers with newspapers and magazines – preachers of truth” (T’q’ibuli 1966: 1).

Although this was the local newspaper and published information about events in the province, it disseminated the ideas of the Soviet state. To quote Akhil Gupta, “the vernacular press … clearly delineated the multilayered and pluralistic nature of ‘the state’” (Gupta 2006: 223). To reconstruct the complicated structure of the Soviet state, an overview of the press may be helpful. Interviews and conversations with local inhabitants are a second source used to reconstruct the local history of the socialist state and the life of Soviet citizens within it in this chapter. Sometimes I refer to the current condition of Georgian citizens to show how local people compare the past and present and how the past experience works as a measure of the present.

Within this chapter, I present two perspectives, the official perspective of the socialist state and the informal, local perspective of the people. Both perspectives have biases. I do not take the press as ‘preachers of truth’, nor do I take memory at face value as people’s memory changes. The press was a tool of communist ideology, and reality, policies, and practices were different. People’s memory of past events is filtered through views of the present day. Writing about the functioning of cultural monuments Andrew Lass writes that the “user, who is once more placed in relation to the past”, acts as “a social actor (a citizen) within (national) history” (Lass 1994: 101). If during socialism the issue was remembering the events, which were changed and reflected in the mirror of socialist ideology, nowadays the dominant nationalist narratives also filter information: “[the] rhetoric of fraternal socialism has given way to the strident language of nationalism” (Watson 1994: 5). Stephen Jones, in his paper “Old Ghosts and New Chains”, points to the strong nationalist movements during the first years of independence, which also glorified the medieval Georgian state, while representing the Soviet Union as the enemy and repressor of Georgian culture and state (Jones 1994). Such attitudes were rare in everyday conversation with locals. Even more, as shown later, they glorify the socialist past. This could be for several reasons: the first years of strong nationalist movements (when Stephen Jones wrote) were over. The locality, mainly the city T’q’ibuli with its resources,
used to be fully integrated into the socialist economy and lost importance after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Further, chain migration to the Russian Federation intensified nostalgia about close relations among former union states.

To understand the socialist background of citizenship, I separate understandings of citizenship into small analytical units. First, I use the tendency of some authors (Turner 1993, Somers 1993, Yekelchyk 2006) to define citizenship as more than “merely [a] collection of rights and obligations” (Turner 1993: 2), but rather as a set different kinds of citizenship practices. The set of practices can take different forms: Somers, for instance, notes political, social, and cultural practices of citizenship (Somers 1993). Turner refers to legal, political, economic, and cultural practices. I still prefer to stay within the classical categorization of Marshall and investigate dynamic aspects of civil, political, and social citizenship (Marshall 1998 [1963]). On the one hand, to include ‘practices’ within the analysis highlights a number of interesting sides of citizenship. On the other hand, I realize the importance of discussing citizenship as a collection of rights and obligations. Analyzing Soviet citizenship imposes highlights both dynamic and static aspects of citizenship. In the Soviet Union, most citizenship rights were not realized. For instance, one cannot talk about civil citizenship – free thought and faith – if one focuses on the category of practicing civil citizenship, because having the right of free thought was difficult to practice in reality. Considering the specific aspects of my field site, I use the right and practice of this right as an analytical category.

Second I would like to verify the logic of the development of citizenship rights (from civil to social, following Marshall) in the context of my field site (Marshall 1998 [1963]). According to the material I have about the historical development of Soviet citizenship, I argue that the development of Soviet citizenship was different from the logic Marshall suggested and was common for capitalist societies. Furthermore, citizenship practices at each stage are influenced by previous experiences. Citizenship rights which Soviet citizens could enjoy determined the postsocialist demands of citizens, and these were very prominent in T’q’ibuli district.

2.1 The Soviet state as a political unity

The questions I ask within this subtopic include, what was the state like, when looked at by citizens and by the press, and how did the Soviet Union, as a political unit, secure the civil and political rights of citizens? The local newspaper emphasized several features of the Soviet
Union: open borders between Soviet republics, the cohesion of the 15 republics, the economic strength of the country, and the importance of socialist and communist ideals.

Although the Soviet Union contained different nations, the official ideology stressed the cohesion of each country within the union. Newspapers talked about the unity of the 15 republics. The permanent slogan on the title page of newspapers was from Marx and Engels: “Proletarians of every country, unite!” These ideas were part of official ideology, whose effects are carried out to day, as most informants talked about the entire Soviet space with great nostalgia. Open borders between the Soviet republics, gave many the possibility of free movement from one republic to the other for sightseeing, shopping, education, and health-care. Although, until the 1960s, the economic situation of the population was not strong enough to allow private trips from one Soviet republic to another, a number of policies increase cohesion between different republics.

One of these was obligatory military service: Soviet citizens (men) did military service on the territory of another Soviet republic, for the most part. Military service was kind of a ‘life test’, which every man was expected to pass. “Nobody [family members T.M.] will allow the marriage of a girl to a boy, who did not do military service” (Iuza, 53 years old, 2007). None of the respondents tried to avoid that duty. Moreover, some of them changed their lives during military service: They stayed on for education, work, got married, or learned the Russian language, which was one of the main skills needed for success at the time. But social scientists indicate that the military service did not have a one dimensional, positive influence that reinforced relations between the Soviet peoples. Writing about ethnic relations in the Soviet Union, Karklins highlights the double process in the military services: intensifying ethnic relations among soldiers, “by being thrown together during the trials and tribulations of military training,” but simultaneously ”the new and alien environment also reinforces ethnic identity” (Karklins 1989: 208).

Another policy for intensifying relations between nations was exchanging industrial experiences or increasing the qualification of workers. Groups as well as individuals working in enterprises were constantly coming and going to share knowledge and experience. The educational structure was also attuned to this politics of inter-republican exchange. Practical training as well as working semesters (groups of students worked in Crimea, Kazakhstan, or Siberia during summers) gave young people the opportunity to improve language skills, professional knowledge, and extend their private relations with people from other Soviet republics. From the 1960s onwards, the economic conditions of the Soviet Union improved, so
people had more resources for private trips. Marriage, work, and life alongside other nationalities developed close relations among Soviet people, which seemed to be acceptable for them as their national identities were mostly unchanged. Interestingly, villagers never complained about the former ‘Iron Curtain’. Rather, they felt uncomfortable about the current situation: “We had the possibility of travel between 15 republics. Nowadays we may go to each country all over the world, but we do not have a sufficient financial or legal basis” (Malvina, 54 years old, 2007).

Economic strength was one of the main superiorities of the Soviet Union, which was underlined in the ‘official’ perspective of the state as well as in the speeches of locals. Using Soviet economic measures (mainly national income, industrial production and agricultural production), Gertrude E. Schroeder, notes the rapid and substantial economic development of Georgia, which positively affected living standards (Schroeder 1996). Locals noted the economic growth of Georgia and the region, the industrial units working there, the high rate of employment, access to health care, and free education and improvement of living standards. Endi Sofromadze, a 75 year old woman, remembers, “There were only small wooden huts with grass roofs until the 1930s when tea and mines began flourishing. [Before that] in the rooms instead of covered floors, there was earth and the fire place in the middle. There was a huge economic improvement in twenty years. In the 1950s, when I was a student, my relative asked me to show her the village. I led her here [Sac’ire]. When she saw the two storied houses, with water inside, asphalt road and electrification, she complained: “I wanted to see a real village. Otherwise, in Kutaisi (the regional city) the conditions are the same” (2007).

The press always stressed the economic development of the country, noting the contribution of citizens in this process: ‘Our diligent workers’ created the economic resources of the Soviet Union. This kind of idea should have intensified people’s perception of this process as their own achievement. Nevertheless, people still report that ‘the centre in Moscow’ was financing everything, and it was distributing wealth around. After Georgia became independent, people got the feeling that the economic strength of the district, and sometimes of the country, was completely dependent on the Soviet Union, and that this strength slipped away together with the socialist past. The myth that T’q’ibuli mines were subsidized from Moscow was very popular among locals. In T’q’ibuli, miners say that this industry was unprofitable and Russia

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11 The national identity of Soviet citizens is discussed in detail in Chapter 4: Perceiving the State and the Nation.
was ‘feeding them’ (i.e. sending all necessary materials). The director of the Mindeli mine said that coal prices never covered the costs for extraction. When I asked what the interest of the ‘centre’ was in keeping the coal industry, he explained that in the whole economic system, the coal industry was profitable as it was one of the cheapest energy products. People do not express interest in this fact. They always stress that the industry does not make any sense, unless an ‘elder brother’ invests in it. They have a similar attitude towards agriculture. Although they are proud of T’q’ibulian tea, they think the only market for it is Russia, and that if there was an embargo on Georgian products in Russia, running a tea plantation would not make sense. Sometimes, imaginations of public wealth and economic growth were exaggerated. Some people, who are more critical about the Soviet times, remember the performative character of the Soviet economy: five years plans, changing data, etc. But, in general, locals believe that the economic structure of the Soviet Union generated economic growth in each country, which led to the accumulation of wealth in the public sector as well as in the hands of individuals.

While talking about economic conditions, private property rights deserves special attention as the rights of citizens to exercise ownership rights is part of civil citizenship. To educate and raise the ‘consciousness of people’ so that common property was given priority to individual or family property, the Soviet Union suppressed the right to it. Flats and land plots were part of the socialist property, but Sac’irians never refer to them in this way. Tamara Dragadze writes that Rač’vlians had the same perception, “Although formally these plots are not ‘private’ property in the capitalist sense, villagers nevertheless view them as ‘theirs’” (Dragadze 2001[1988]: 36). This feeling was intensified during postsocialist times. To avoid further conflicts, the bureau of privatization (in the 1990s) tried to give workers the same land plot on which they worked before. Thus, collective land plots that were ‘personalized’ (gap’irovnebuli) for individual cultivation were largely the same plots Georgian citizens privatized in 1992. However, while centralized cultivation in collective agriculture was profitable, individual cultivation requires individual economic resources (agrotechnics, fuel, fertilizers, transportation, which locals are lacking) and is now less profitable. During the Soviet period, members of collective farms had additional economic resources. Collective farm members were not limited only to his/her personalized collective land plot. They could do more work either in agriculture or in industry. Citizens of the independent state lost these opportunities. With the process of privatization, former members of the collective farm officially received land plots without having to pay for the land which they had considered as their own anyway. The changes to the form of cultivation and organization of labor caused
economic disadvantages for agricultural work and devalued the importance of privatized land. The example of Sac’ire suggests most owners left land plots behind without care.

Part of the state ideology was the spread of socialist and communist ideas. Speeches, state plans, and collective or individual prizes were filled with communist symbols and ideas. The successes of workers and groups were attached to special dates: For example, “J. Cirekiže fulfilled the plan of picking tea and devoted it to the Day of Socialist October Revolution” (T’q’ibuli 1985:1).

From school age, children were brought up to empathize with state politics. The dominant ideology became a confession for some communists, although some held the predominant ideas to gain advantages connected with political status, party membership, work position, and so forth. Some people felt greater loyalty towards the state and dominant ideas. Gurami, a 75 year old man and former miner stated, “Through working in the mines, my colleagues got 5-6 cars. I did not get one. I did not want to take it for spek’ulacia (speculation). The administration was asking me to get a car and sell it. In this way both sides would gain. But I refused. It would have been a dishonest way of behavior from my side. Real communists should not have done that.” The respondent saw the corrupt structures in the industry, but having great devotion toward the state, he led the ‘correct life’. Sometimes the ‘real’ faith in the dominant ideology, sometimes the motivation for profit from being an active party member and part of the nomenklatura made Soviet people dependent on the dominant ideology.

One way to corroborate socialist ideas was critique of the ‘capitalist way of life’. In the article “The Administrative Power of the Soviet Society” V. Klichko writes, “Experiencing serious changes and failure in internal and international politics, imperialism and first of all United States of America with political-military adventure sustain destructive (back breaking) political and ideological fight against socialist countries, communism and democracy” (Klichko, 1968). These kinds of articles served to inflame ‘civic emotions’ within citizens (Yekelchyk 2006: 531). Emotional response to political events, on the one hand, produced love and gratitude toward the state, and on the other hand, created hatred toward its enemies.

After 1991, when ‘imperialists’ and ‘enemies of people’ became best friends and what was formally damned (in this case relations with the West) became desirable, the nation state

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12 During socialist times, cars were not sold in the shops. Some organizations had waiting lists for cars. Each organization had quotas for how many cars could be given to their workers. It worked more like a housing program.

13 The administration of mines would fulfill the plan to award diligent workers with a car, while Gurami would have got the extra money.
created a new image of the ‘enemy’ from the Soviet Union and mainly from Russia. After the 1990s, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia was presented as having been repressed under the 70 year dictatorship of the Soviet Union. This seems to have become a new kind of nationalist ideology, which was useful in organizing the society for independence. However, its existence within the Soviet Union was the first possibility for Georgia since the 13th century to be a state even if it remained with the “unrealized hope of national independence” (Humphrey 1983: 442). The population of Georgia could enjoy the rights of citizens that were provided by the Soviet state. Moreover, people sometimes talk about privileges they had in comparison to the citizens of other Soviet republics and cajoling officials in Moscow with Georgian wine.

What kind of civil and political rights did Soviet citizens have and practice? Being a ‘democratic’ state, the Soviet Union formally guaranteed most civil rights (the right to own property was not accessible even formally, although locals treated socialist property as if ‘privately owned’). According to locals, they could achieve justice at courts easier than nowadays. They do not have much of an idea whether they had valid work contracts or not, but rights as laborers were more secure, “Nobody could kick a worker out.” Of course, the locals referred to the miners’ secure working positions, noting they were important parts of the work force during the Soviet Union, and did not mention cases when the locals were accused of being ‘deviant individuals’ and stripped of citizenship rights altogether (Alexopoulos 2006).

The issue of political rights of Soviet citizens is blurred. In legislation locals could exercise political power. In common sense, everybody knows that political rights of ordinary people were restricted to participation in the election, where they did not have a free choice between different candidates or different political positions. But, the local people perceive the process of political voting during Soviet times differently. The newspapers of the time devoted great attention to “preparation of the population for election[s]” as well as providing stories about politicians who through hard work achieved high positions in society. An 83 year old man, a day before the local election (in 2006) told my assistant and I that “Real elections were during the Soviet time. Candidates were doing ‘propaganda’ a half month before, going to each family, door to door.” Getting detailed (but potentially inaccurate) information and meeting with policy makers, gave people the impression that they were involved in actual political processes. Furthermore, workers were asked and obliged to become members of different kinds of unions, the (only) political party, and to participate in congresses. Although these kinds of activities did not affect the actual political process, as the main decision maker was the centre, local people nevertheless felt politically empowered and socially equal. Hence, retrospectively,
they did not pay much attention to whether they had the chance to exercise political power or not.

2.2 The Soviet state as a controller and regulator of the life of citizens

State control and regulation were not unusual or strange to socialist citizens. The state controlled, primarily but not only, the economic behavior of organizations and people. A special organization (for example, the city committee of public control) investigated different faults. Upon the detection of any defect, punishment was not enough. Public critique was a necessary part of the process. The newspaper was involved in this process as well. “Control of the masses” was one of the rubrics within a T’q’ibuli newspaper displaying different defects. The displayed violations were various: ‘add-ons’ (mic’era in Georgian) was one of the most widespread defects. As a reply to the exaggerated demands of the state, organizations or farms pretended to fulfill plans on paper (commonly called pripiski - in Russian - ‘add-ons’ in the late Sovietological writings). In the local newspaper there were articles about enterprises and collective farms, where the amount of mined and enriched coal, finished houses, cultivated land, cattle or harvested tea was ‘artificially increased on paper’ in accordance to set goals. Only in 1984 according to the T’q’ibuli City Committee of Public Control among 76 organization 46 of them had plan fraud (‘add-ons’) that consisted 92.8 thousand rubles (Kublashvili 1985). Besides increasing the amount of production, enterprises forged the quality of goods. T’q’ibuli City Committee of Public Control in 1985 detected that tons of harvested tea were picked using the scissors harsh violation of standards (T’q’ibuli 1985b). Committees of public control blamed different organizations for mistakes, the violation of working standards, unsatisfied conditions at public and educational organizations, and the misuse of electricity, water, timber or oil (Karkashadze 1985, T’q’ibuli 1985a, T’q’ibuli 1985c) Sometimes, alongside organizations, bureaucrats were personally blamed. In such a small society, blaming people in public is very shameful, as the community will remember for a long time. In the 1980s, the politics of public shaming was supplemented with self-critique on public gatherings, which was the more common method. The public speeches of bureaucrats began with, “It is true that we should do this or that, but …” and then a whole range of explanations why they were not able to do something followed.

Surprisingly, individuals were involved in the process of public control as well. On the one hand, there was an organized activity like the formation of public security forces (saxalxo
razmelebi) composed of ordinary citizens that alongside the police kept public order. On the other hand, some individuals publicly criticized different issues. For instance illegally constructed chicken farms, avoidance of electricity payment, workers’ misuse of state property, and cutting timber without permission among others were critiqued (Chiradze 1985, Giorgadze 1991 Giorgobiani 1985, Zosiashvili, Didberidze, Abesadze 1985).

The strategy of public control and blame was common for states, but the radical change of this phenomenon in the context of independent Georgia is interesting. During the first years of independence, political instability, conflict, and economic challenges led to the forgetting of practices of public control. But later, when the independent government prepared the law for public order, which was based on detecting and announcing the violations of other citizens to the police, locals evaluated it critically, saying (in everyday conversation) that this kind of law will change the cultural ideals of Georgian society. I never heard about someone accusing another of breaking the law, damaging state or private property during my fieldwork publicly. Maybe the absence of official pressure for ‘safeguarding socialist property’ caused indifference among Georgian citizens toward delinquency. Locals complain that the lack of ‘state control’ caused an increase in criminal behavior. However, they think that maintaining order in society is government’s responsibility and they do not want to take part in the process of public control, as they previously did.

Not only economic and administrative activities were controlled by the state. State regulations also affected private lives. Locals most frequently mentioned (but positively) the obligation of citizens to work in the Soviet Union. It was part of the ideology, “He, who does not work, neither shall eat.” Somebody might have perceived this right as a violation of his or her rights during the Soviet times, but even these people changed their minds during post-socialist times. The economic disaster of independence and scarcity of work led to nostalgia for the obligatory character of work: “During Soviet times every citizen had to work. Nowadays nobody requests one to work, but no jobs are available. Having no working place, our youth became alcoholic” (Mak’vala, 46 years old, 2007). Being jobless not only has a negative impact on economic conditions, but is also connected, in the eyes of the people, with negative behavior like alcoholism, drug use, crime, and so forth. According to the survey conducted for this research, jobs are the most frequently cited concept that is important for citizenship. Some of the respondents named salary and good financial conditions alongside work places as important.

14 The phrase comes from the Bible (from 2 Thessalonians 3:10), which was later used by Lenin and became part of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR.
for citizenship. I assume that having a job is not always perceived as a source of well-being. But it is important, as unemployed individuals are considered destructive to society. Furthermore, considering a job as significant in itself might be the result of socialist ideology.

When comparing the current state with the Soviet one, informants sometimes noted the absence of freedom and free speech in the Soviet period. People mostly remember the limitation in expressing their nationalist and/or religious sentiments and less the direct restraints of political rights. This is actually compatible with the absence of a political culture of exercising political rights. This position was confirmed by my landlady, saying that they, “did not have political education and could not feel the restriction of freedom” (Lela, 40 years old, 2006). The nationalist movement emphasized democratic values, the importance of freedom, and the new ideology imbued the civic and political rights of citizens with value.

People sometimes connected state control and regulation with having discipline and order within society. Locals think that the ‘strong hand’ of the state on the one hand limits the freedom of citizens, but on the other hand keeps stability in society. Diminished control of the state caused the devastation of state owned properties. Hence, “People cut electricity wires, cut iron, and wooden materials in the mines and took them home [during the first years after independence]” (Gurami, 75 years old, 2007). They sometimes mention that fear of punishment keeps order in the community. Order, discipline, security, respect of law, and peace is achievable, with harsh internal politics; therefore, the socialist state is not criticized strongly. Accordingly, in the survey, 92% of the respondents said that the state should regulate the life of citizens and that is what locals miss nowadays.

2.3 The Soviet state as a social supporter

Originally, I thought about writing about the state as a social support system. Analyzing my material led me to realize that it is not only social support that local people lack. Citizens expect the full range of benefits that the Soviet Union provided, including free education, healthcare, and state provided jobs among other services. According to the results of the survey, people over 51 have the highest expectations of the state.\textsuperscript{15} This confirms my idea that the past

\textsuperscript{15} Within the questionnaire, we asked respondents whether the state should provide six different things (medical care, education, jobs, internal and international security, private property, social services). 52.3% of respondents over 51 expected provision of all the above benefits and 36.9% expected five items out of six. People over 51 expected the more things than younger age groups.
experience of people determines their understanding and practice of citizenship. On the one hand, these people were used to getting all kinds of material guarantees from the state. On the other hand, they say that they worked for the state and now request ‘reimbursement’ for their diligent work: “I was working since 1957; I have 42 years standing. And can you imagine, I am getting 38 GEL (ca. 17 euro). It is barely enough even for bread and greens” (Rezo, 67 years old, 2007).

Pensions were the main form of Soviet social support. Giving pensions to former members of the collective farm began in about 1958-60. At the beginning, a normal pension was 12 Rubles and everyone received it. Before 1958 the collective farm distributed agricultural produce like corn, beans, and vodka instead of money. Gradually, pensions increased and became differentiated according to the length and kind of employment, varying between 60 and 120 Rubles for collective workers. There were different kinds of pensions for single mothers, veterans of World War II, the disabled, and so forth. With the replacement of the Soviet currency with the national one, inflation diminished the pensions to a minimum (for instance, in 1993 a month’s pension was enough only for one loaf of bread) and differences according to employment status were abolished. Today, the government is aware of the importance of pensions for the population and they increase pensions from time to time, using it especially as a bargaining tool during electoral campaigns. During my fieldwork, the amount of pension provided to everybody was GEL 38 (approximately 17 Euro). It is clear that citizens can hardly survive on this amount of money. In most cases, kinship and personal connections replaced the role of the state as a social supporter.

Pensioners have extreme nostalgia for the Soviet Union and are discontent with the quality of life after socialism. They perceive that they devoted their life to the accumulation of wealth in the public sector of the Soviet Union (which should have been returned in the form of a pension) and when the time for getting it back came, they lost everything. “How should I be satisfied with this life? [My] whole life I was working hard, deep under the ground, could not see daylight. I was waiting to have a pension of 270 rubles, to get a car… I had substantial savings in the bank. Nevertheless, the disintegration began and I lost everything: savings, pension, and car” (Gurami, 75 years old, 2007). This reflects the attitude of many people.

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16 In the 1980s 1 liter petrol cost 0.1 Ruble. By comparison during my field work the price of petrol was 1.4 GEL.

17 The so called “Loss of savings” is also connected to the dissolution of the Soviet Union by locals. Under socialism people having savings in the state bank lost it due to the currency change in 1993. For 1000 ruble they
Miners had very difficult working conditions which were dangerous for their health. Most workers doing these jobs made calculations about the social support they would get. High salary, nourishment at work, free transportation, facilities for going to holiday resorts for the whole family, free and high quality medical care, and a high pension from the age of 50 is an incomplete list of benefits miners used to receive. People in other professions also had enough social support to secure a life before and after receipt of a pension. Below I discuss in greater detail amenities citizens of the Soviet Union received. These amenities are sometimes used as a benchmark of a ‘good state’.

Education: There was only one primary school in Ok’riba (current T’q’ibuli district) during the pre-Soviet period in the 19th century. It was, hence, the achievement of the socialist state that there were 20 secondary, 9 incomplete secondary, and 8 primary schools in 1967. To have incomplete secondary and later complete secondary education was obligatory for all citizens. For those who wanted to get further education in T’q’ibuli it was possible to attend one of the several technical schools or do home study at the branch of the Tbilisi State Technical University. The houses of pioneers and culture, and other cultural organizations enabled local children to develop different skills. If locals wanted to obtain higher education in other places, the state provided housing and a stipend sufficient for living. The Georgian state still provides secondary education for free, but the scale and character are now different. For example, till 2012, the state did not provide books for pupils, which were very expensive and hardly affordable for some rural families. In the locality, technical schools as well as the branch of the Tbilisi State Technical University have closed down. Acquiring higher education is expensive if a student does not receive a stipend. Even if they do, the student needs transportation, housing, and food in the cities. Families quite often cannot cover all these expenses. Hence, 26% of respondents think that the Georgian state does not provide education. The Soviet state provided education and propagated the importance of it for upward mobility and success. The newspapers often wrote about how people from the village with no cultural capital could become very successful. Take for example, the article “Shepherd became academician” (T’q’ibuli 1967: 6). Khabibul Amirkhanov was born in a remote part of Dagestan. He was a shepherd, before getting a job in the Shuri laboratory. There he was interested in physics. Being fond of this subject, the

got 1000 coupon. According to the National Bank of Georgia, at the end of 1993 the coupon was traded at 102,300 coupons to the US dollar. People blame the government for this process.

18 Nowadays there are 24 schools. At some schools there are 10-15 students. Due to outmigration, villages are emptying and schools are closing down. Sometimes because of the low quality of education public schools in the villages provide, families decide to take their children to cities for education.
Soviet government sent him to Baku University. After describing his achievements, (he became an academic and the head of Dagestan’s branch of the Academy of Sciences), the newspaper writes how the government appreciates his diligent work to improve science. The article highlighted the equality of opportunity to start an education. For success, an individual’s background did not matter. The main criterion was the desire to study and devotion to work. The state would provide the necessary material support: housing, a stipend, health-care, and employment afterwards. Although the Soviet educational system was not equally accessible for all the citizens, this kind of promotion worked well. People prized education very much, as people, especially those over 40 were keen to talk about higher education they or their kin had, discussing in detail successes and grades, even showing diplomas. The transition period transformed the value of education. The young generation in the village has now fewer opportunities and less of a desire to obtain higher education. I was shocked with the view of one recent high school graduate when I asked about his future educational plans: “Why do I need higher education?! What is the profit of those having it? I’d better study trading!” (Giorgi, 18 years old, 2006).

Health care was part of the social support program during Soviet times. Hospitals, clinics, and ambulances were built in the district and free. “Of course we gave money [bribes] to the doctors, but it was our will and nobody would ask to pay first in order to do an examination or operation. Now, if you do not pay beforehand, they will kill you” (Levan, 40 years old, 2007). Full-scale state financing of medical care during the Soviet time determined the demands of citizens. Today ambulances serve people in Georgia for free. There are special medical facilities (mainly for medical examination) for individuals in need. However, it is not enough for a pensioner with frequent health problems. “They examined me for free, but if I cannot afford any further care, then what is the point of it?” (Tamara, 74 years old, 2006). Full financial coverage of health care is rarely achievable, but it is a matter of negotiation and social connection. So, those who do not have the ‘right’ social connections and skills for social negotiation depend on kin support. Sometimes, when a close group of people cannot cover all expenses, neighbors will participate in this process.

Besides material support, the Soviet Union provided prestige. The newspapers were full of articles devoted to the foremost tea pickers, miners, teachers, WWII veterans, and so forth.

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19 Since 2013, Georgian citizens have had free medical insurance. During my fieldwork, the state supported free health insurance only for poor families. I discuss this issue in more detail in chapter 6: Social citizenship: Theoretical discussions of social citizenship, case study (TSA Program).
“The labor of honest men was appreciated. Now it seems like a joke. But at that time a good miner, a good tea picker or a good stockbreeder would have become a hero of socialist work. They would get gifts as well” (Gurami, 75 years old, 2007). People who experienced Soviet life remember the state as a full provider of social support, education, medical care, jobs, and so on. Alongside material amenities, certain rewards and appreciation for diligent work satisfied their need for social recognition.

The newspapers as well as local people reconstruct Soviet history as a period of material welfare. Provision of material security was a “fundamental privilege of the Soviet citizen” (Alexopoulos 2006: 528). The generation with experience of Soviet citizenship expects the same benefits they had before from the state. The new nation state could not – at least so far – satisfy all these demands. The independent state’s provision of civil rights (free speech, faith, assembly, etc.) is considered less important and less of something to be proud of.

2.4 The state constituting special cultural patterns

Spreading certain cultural patterns was part of state ideology and newspapers as the main ‘ideological tools’ actively propagated it. These mainly included the fight against ‘detrimental customs’ and prejudices. Being difficult to abolish customs and faith that had long histories, they tried to replace them with new inventions.

Soviet ideology named religion as the ‘opium of masses’ and fought against it. From the beginning this fight was very aggressive. New communists destroyed churches in almost every village. Only those churches survived which had historical importance. Kašueti church in Sac’ire was also destroyed. However, 70 years of the Soviet regime could not suppress attachment to the church. The cemetery where the church used to be is still called ‘church’. C’isana, a 68 years old woman who noted that because of her communist education she is not a believer, told me the story connected to the local church. When communists commanded the destruction of Kašueti nobody dared to do it. Finally, one of the villagers fulfilled the command and bad things happened to him and his whole family afterwards. What happened exactly, she did not say. Another family, which took stones from the church and built a private house was very unhappy and did not have offspring. Stories about punishment from God for destroying his house seem to be widespread, as I heard a similar story in another village.

A second example suggests that even the active followers of the communist party observed some religious practices. A number of people mentioned that communists were
forbidden from dyeing eggs for Easter. This habit is not only a religious ritual. It is connected with respect for ancestors, as on Easter Sunday people go to the cemetery to put dyed eggs on the graves of ancestors. This is very important for locals. During the Soviet times, officials were obliged to prevent their dependents from performing this ritual. Heads of schools checked the hands of children on the Monday following Easter to identify families which dyed eggs. After detecting the ‘offenders’, families were rebuked. Ramazi, a 57 year old man remembers: “We knew that after Easter, the director of the school would check us. Being our close neighbor, my father sent me for something on Easter day to the Director’s house. We were so close that I entered in the house without calling and saw a big dish filled with red colored eggs. I was shocked, ran away, and cried, because for me, being a child, it was not understandable how the director could prohibit us from dyeing eggs while at home doing the same thing. When I grew up, I understood that he was performing [his] duty” (2006).

Articles concerning religious issues were frequently placed under the rubric “Atheist Discussion”. The names of articles were facetious, like “Do you still believe in God?” (Arsenidze 1976) or “Time for religious festivals is gone” (T’q’ibuli 1971). The fight against religion was carried out in the name of ordinary people. For instance, a student wrote about how she felt sorry for an old lady who sacrificed chicken to the church (Arsenidze 1976). Workers would address the administration with a petition to abolish religious festivals and impose new festivals devoted to workers (the petition of workers is kept in the archive of T’q’ibuli). One way of repression of religion was replacement of religious names with new ones. For instance, the famous shrine and mountain ‘Nine Crosses’ was renamed to ‘Mountain of Rustaveli’ (Pkhaladze 1966) or instead of 30 religious festivals, they imposed days of ‘Ilia’, ‘Shota’, ‘vineyard’, etc.

Socialist ideology was to fight against ‘detrimental customs’, like funerals, religious marriages, and baptizing children. Newspapers told people they should carry out civil activities, like civil marriage or registration of new born children in the registration office (Zuevi 1971). In contrast, customs were foggy and ‘real communists’ should struggle against them. One of the ‘detrimental customs’ was drinking wine during the ‘dry law’ period. Newspaper recommended drinking tea instead of alcohol during celebrations, and presented a photo of a

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20 This kind of control continued till the 1980s.
21 Shota Rustaveli is a famous Georgian poet from the 12th century.
22 Ilia Chavchavadze, a 19th century Georgian writer and poet, was the founder of the liberation movement from the Russian Empire.
wedding, where instead of wine guests told toasts with tea. It noted that the sweet drink would guarantee the happiness of the family (an example was taken from another Soviet republic, without indicating which one) (T’q’ibuli 1985).

Newspaper and directives of officials were not only tools for struggling against old cultural patterns and constituting new ones. Houses of culture, cinemas, and theatres served for the ‘cultural education of Soviet citizens’. Almost every village had this kind of cultural centre, which provided society with the ‘true ideals’. Movies, plays, songs, and poems were inspired by proper models of behavior: doing military service, respecting socialist ways of life, working actively for the Soviet Union, etc. At the same time, they condemned religious rituals and customs. From the 1990s onwards, the state ideology changed and the same organization started to propagate strong nationalistic ideas. However, very soon due to a lack of state funding, the cultural centres closed.

The Soviet Union had strong propaganda for socialist cultural patterns and repressed old ones. Thus, during the Soviet period, local people could not practice civil citizenship, freedom of thought or faith. At the beginning, these politics were very harsh. During the 60s it became milder, with a focus on propaganda. Nonetheless, it was interesting that everybody who experienced the Soviet life was baptized. The right of free faith was stressed, but some Soviet citizens found strength and freedom to keep the tradition and faith.

Conclusion

T’q’ibuli district as a part of Imereti region was an integral part of Georgia from the period when the first Georgian tribes came to political light. The region was characterized by scarce resources and economic disaster was not uncommon to the locality. Before the Soviet Union was established, local inhabitants had the strongest attachment to religious institutions. Citizenship was hardly present. The Soviet Union had tremendous influence on developing the local economy. T’q’ibuli was built in the 1930s alongside the mines, and the inhabitants of the villages and cities were poor and searching for better economic opportunities. This might be one of the reasons why in the memory of T’q’ibulians the socialist past is glorified even though this is uncommon in postsocialist nationalist ideology.

The target group of the research is workers and peasants who within the boundaries of the Soviet Union “received preferential treatment in justice and education” (Alexopoulos 2006:

23 Many Soviet movies represent priests as the ones cheating ordinary people for private financial profit.
488) unlike the so called ‘enemies of people’ who especially during late 1930s were accused of being deviant citizens and were sent to Gulags and stripped of citizenship all together or killed. According to Alexopoulos: “class and not geography or birth, would now determine social membership. Thus membership in the new community of Soviet workers and peasants was extended to the laboring classes of all countries and nationalities and, correspondingly, withheld from the bourgeois classes” (2006: 491). The people living in T’q’ibuli were the labor force needed for industry and had no experience of persecution.

Although locals were critical of the performative character of the Soviet economy, five years plans, the corrupt welfare system (commonly called priipiska ‘add-ons’), and the prohibition of fulfillment of religious rituals, the majority remembered the Soviet state rather positively. This remembrance was particularly strong in relation to state support. I relate this ‘positive’ evaluation of the Soviet state with Marshall's ideas of social citizenship, since to the villagers it was a state which provided them with some kind of equality. Locals reminisced about the Soviet life, against the background of their current low standard of living. Unsatisfied social claims, insufficient economic resources, and social insecurity underlay the collective remembrance of the socialist state.

The Soviet and postsocialist states differ from each other greatly, according to scale, period of existence, formation, ideology, and so forth. Both of the states guaranteed different amenities to the citizens. The economy of the independent state is not sufficient for providing citizens with the material benefits the Soviet Union used to provide. However, the independent state allowed the practice of civil and political rights of citizenship, which was suppressed for Soviet citizens. Static and dynamic aspects of citizenship are also present. States sometimes allow the practice of citizenship rights and sometimes only the right without the opportunity to use it. Discourse analysis of the locals’ perceptions of the Soviet State suggests that Marshal’s model of development of citizenship (first civil, then political, and afterwards social rights) does not apply to the Soviet Union. Laboring classes could practice social citizenship, while civil and political citizenship rested on official rights. The evolution of citizenship practices in Georgia may follow the Marshallian scheme in the future, if economic growth inspires the provision of citizens with full social support. However, the citizens of Georgia, who experienced Soviet citizenship expect material benefits from the current state. They expect compensation for the labor they invested in the former state.
Within different approaches for understanding and analyzing citizenship in social sciences, the central and shared point between all is that citizenship is a “general membership status” (Stewart 1995: 65). Membership of a community is the starting point for this chapter. When talking about community, we could say that there are two levels, one designating the community within the boundaries of nation-state and second one describing a more abstract understanding of the community, limited within the boundaries of the village but nevertheless not restricted to its physical territory (i.e. including the migrant villagers as members, hence stretching the community to different corners of the world). Within this chapter I describe the membership of the village community. The everyday relations of the community members is the platform, where citizenship is enacted at the local level; local state actors at the same time are members of the community to whom residents are in various ways connected. In order to unpack the local understanding and practice of citizenship, it is important to analyze the village as a community and the kind of relations that ties the community members together. Thus in this chapter I portray the village as a space, as a structure of neighborhoods, with kin relations, as well as the everyday economic activities of the locals. Furthermore, if we want to “enhance citizenship” (Faulks 2000: 122) from the realm of state/citizens relations, the relations between villagers, their duties and responsibilities toward each other and economic activities as the subsistence of their life, this chapter is the step for analyzing citizenship of the rural community from an ethnological point of view.

The postsocialist changes have had fundamental consequences for the position of citizens in the Georgian society. The state planned economy, state supported jobs, sufficient social support are no longer available or are available to limited extent. The retreat of the state from their economic, social and everyday lives made individuals to search their own ways of survival and economic practices. Involvement in everyday economic activities is time-consuming and includes much effort and locals think that the villagers neglect the community and public affairs. Taking this argument into consideration depends from which point of view we will discuss the community. I argue that the community in general might be neglected by the villagers, whereas the importance of kin and neighborly relations increased. The small group affiliation (including close kin, close neighbors and/or friends) is vital for the life of the villagers, while these small groups provide the financial, social and emotional supporters for the locals, sometimes replacing the state and collective. The case of Sac’ire is not exceptional
in this; as Frances Pine talks about similar processes in Poland: “The gap left by this collapse of state industry, regulated, institutionalized agriculture, and social institutions is being filled less by the emergence of new institutions of civil society than by the expansion of that domestic, private world which was formerly quite carefully protected from public scrutiny” (Pine 2002: 108). Differing from the above Polish case, the domestic, private world providing security to one another is further extended in Sac’ire and includes the close neighbours and close relatives, but definitely more than the family members alone. In the first part of the chapter, I describe the geographical characteristics of the village, division of labour and space and social connections and communications within the framework of kinship and neighbourhood. In the second part I deal with the economy and employment of villagers and give special attention to the privatization of land, as it is the ‘main gain’ after the de-collectivization of farms, while the right to own private property was re-established, although it is not often perceived as such by the locals.

3.1 Kinship in Sac’ire

When writing about kinship and marriage Tamara Dragadze emphasizes the importance of honesty and hospitality (“you must never be dishonest and you must never refuse hospitality to kin” (Dragadze 2001[1988]: 99)). Due to the economic hardship and everyday survival problems which locals face, I assume that nowadays kinship relations emphasize support even more. To secure and take care of parents, grandparents, siblings and their families is part of Sac’irians’ (an in general level Georgian’s) obligations; while more distant relatives might be also crucial, depending on the necessity and the economic and social conditions relatives have. Tamara Dragadze’s categorization and description of kinship ties applies also to Sac’ire.24 The marriage among villagers is rare, but happens if the couple does not have kin relations.25 Old people remember that marriage between neighbours never took place in pre-Soviet times, during Soviet times it was also rare. Marriage within seven generations is restricted (ideally from both

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24 Although the relationships she underlines are widespread all over Georgia, the physical closeness of Rač’a with my field site makes the cases more similar. Moreover the widespread kin groups residing in T’k’ibuli district (like Cirek ’iże, Boć orišvili, Sopromaze) are believed to have resettled from Rač’a, and possibly brought similar traditions.

25 Some families settled in Sac’ire after 1890s, when the coal industry and railway started to work; they were not connected to the villagers through blood or spiritual kinship.
sides), although marrying someone who bears the same surname is also not favourable.\(^{26}\) The kinship ties are considered equal from mother’s and father’s side. But because women marry in from other villages or cities and for years they cannot keep very close relations to their original kin group, father’s kin are more accentuated. (Contradictory is the case when a husband lives in the family of the bride. This happens if the bride’s family does not have own son.)

The close kin when they are neighbours have everyday relations, while others living far away contact each other by phone, congratulate birthdays and religious and public festivals, come together when families celebrate special events (e.g. weddings, birthdays, child birth). During general events (like funerals and weddings) at least three generations from both sides are invited (parents, grandparents, siblings with their families, uncles and aunts from both sides, at least first cousins with their families, godparents and godchildren with their families). Due to the economic hardship locals say that the relations between distant relatives became ‘colder’ as well as the visits rarer; so the events like funerals and weddings are the main occasion to reinforce and strengthen kin relations. Families do not keep written genealogies; primarily the memory keeps these relations. God parenthood or ‘spiritual kin’ as Dragadze calls it is the second kind of important and close relations, which also carries the restriction of marriage for nine generations.\(^ {27}\)

Because the village is not big (officially in Sac’ire 275 households and 815 persons are registered\(^ {28}\)), neighbours sometimes are also kin; people having the same surname are called relatives (natesavi), although none of them might remember having the same ancestor. If we forget about marriage restrictions, kinship and neighbourhood relations are more or less equal relations in the sense of close relations, supporting each other, with contributions and everyday interaction. If during the Soviet times the relations between kin and neighbours had to do with respect, honour, visits each other and feasting together, today people consider assistance more important for securing each other’s lives. The assistance to relatives is reciprocal and as I show in the chapter on migration, one always feels the necessity to pay back.\(^ {29}\) This is not always achievable however, and the unpaid support is not denounced, if one does not have the financial

\(^{26}\) During my fieldwork there was a case in a neighbouring village when a girl married a close neighbour who had the same surname, and the act was strongly denounced.

\(^{27}\) I never heard about two other types of spiritual kinship, which Dragadze (2001[1988]) mentions (milk brotherhood, sworn brotherhood). God parenthood, which implies fourteen generations of restricted marriage, in Sac’ire extends till nine generations.

\(^{28}\) Information is taken from the election registry of Sac’ire in 2006.

\(^{29}\) Paying back does not mean to reciprocate with the same kind of good or service. One pays back with whatever kind of resource s/he has.
means. Locals are keen on keeping close relations with kin people living in cities. For them it is a source for accommodation in the cities, sometimes they send their children to live with these relatives during high education. Supporting city-dweller relatives with agricultural products is equally widespread as those using the village relatives for spending summer holidays in the rural area. Economic hardship and transportation fees are the main reason for reduced close contacts with the extended close kin, when they live in different places outside the village. Nevertheless, those relatives who keep tight relations economically, emotionally and socially, support each other.

3.2 Neighbourhood relations between Sac’irians

Living in Sac’ire, I discovered that people have different names for village neighborhoods. These neighbourhoods have distinct social and economic characteristics, which result from their geographical position and after village lodgings for the railway, school and other administrative buildings had been built. The village is thus divided into five different size neighborhoods, which I describe below (See also map #2):

A) **Street of Education (Ganatlebis Kuča):** According to the local people, in this neighbourhood mostly teachers, educated people and heads of school lived and still live, that’s why they call it proudly the “Street of Education” since the 1970-80s. People say that during the late Soviet times the neighborhood was very prestigious, because the education, school and teachers were all appraised and prestigious; today people regret that education and the status of the teacher are both devaluated. Nevertheless, the neighborhood still keeps one of the esteemed positions in the village, due to its residents’ better educational and employment background. This neighborhood was constructed relatively late in 1890s, around the newly built railway; people came to settle there from different T’q’ibuli villages, from Rač’a and from other parts of Sac’ire. There are many families with different family names and they are rarely kin to each other. Besides the railway and school, the settlement is known as having the special physical condition, where the sea and mountain climates meet, curing various lung diseases. One of the villagers remembered that at the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, when there were only few houses in the surrounding of the “Street of Education,” Jews from Kutaisi were coming to spend holidays with the families there\textsuperscript{30}. As mentioned above there is the sanatorium belonging to Free Professional Union of Education and Science, which serves those people working in the

\textsuperscript{30} This practice decreased as most of Jewish families left to Israel in 1970s.
educational system during their summer holidays. The neighborhood still profits from the location, as few families have holidaymakers during summer, while others sell their home-made milk products to the “village guests.” According to the survey I did in the village in 2006, there are 34 “actually existing” households\(^{31}\) with 103 inhabitants in this neighborhood. There are few families working in agriculture; most of the households have small gardens in their backyards (around 1000-2500 sq.m.), which are enough only as kitchen garden. They have their arable land for cultivation (around 5000 sq.m.) further away. Because of the poor quality of land and distance of the plots, most of the owners have left these uncultivated. Cattle breeding and poultry are also not widespread. People who live here are usually related to school, sanatorium, petty trading, public services and so forth. One fifth of the population in this neighbourhood (20.4%) work in state institutions: for instance, the heads of the school, sanatorium, and of the house of culture, the assistant of authorized representative of Sac’ire community, head of the Informational Centre of T‘q’ibuli all live in this neighborhood.

B) The neighborhood of Lezghins (Lek’ebis ubani): Geographically this neighborhood is a central one. It has 16 households and 51 inhabitants. Inhabitants mostly have smaller backyards. According to social and economic characteristics this district is similar to the street of Education, but with the highest number of state employees and people with high education, and the lowest involvement in agricultural work. According to the locals Lezghins is used as the nickname for the surname C’irek’izhe, which composes 37.5% of the neighborhood population and kinship ties are relatively strong between the neighbors.

C) The neighborhood of Ckipurišvili (Ckipurišvilebis ubani): The name obviously comes from the surname Ckipurišvili. 34.3% of inhabitants of this neighbourhood have this family name, while others have different surnames. The size of the settlement is similar to that of the Educational Street with 35 households and 103 inhabitants. This neighborhood is tighter in terms of social connections, more than the first two neighborhoods. The population of this neighborhood has mixed characteristics: there are wealthy and poor people, peasants and service personnel, teachers and families of out-migrants to abroad and to the capital. In comparison with the previously mentioned neighborhoods, the inhabitants are less educated and only 9.7% works at state institutions. They are more engaged in agricultural work, while the arable land is

\(^{31}\) “Actually existing” households are actually present in the village with at least one member during the whole year.
closer to this locality; most of them keep livestock and half of them cultivate their arable land plots.

*Map #2: Village Sac’ire: neighbourhoods and main objects*

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**D) The neighborhood of K’vaxrebi (K’vexrebis ubani):** Alongside with the neighborhood of Lezghin, K’vaxrebi is diminutive nickname of the family name C’irek’ize and is not frequently used. It is the largest family name which comprises one fifth of the total households living in Sac’ire village. Originally they came from Rača, their previous name was C’uluk’ize and are spread all around in T’q’ibuli district. The foundation of the Sac’ire church is assigned
to their ancestors. This is the largest neighborhood with 62 households and 190 inhabitants. Due to the large area and population size, the relations between the families are not close and for the events only the closest ones are invited (around 20 close families). Within the neighborhood there is no shop, nor any administrative building. It has the most aging population within the village (33,2 % of inhabitants are pensioners) while one forth (26,8 %) has migrated. Only in this settlement are there more people leaving the country, mostly to Russia than the number of people migrating within country. Migrants to Russia live mostly in the same cities which indicates to the strong chain migration from the neighborhood. The population is less educated, with less access to state jobs, while they are more involved in agricultural work and cattle breeding. Closeness of the arable land defines the involvement in agriculture. The deserted tea plantations are near to the neighborhood and most of the families make homemade tea for own use and in two cases for sale.

E) The neighbourhood of Grove (Čalis ubani): The name is defined geographically, since a small river to the left side of the neighborhood is named Čala. The number of households is 44, and the inhabitants - 166. There are mixed family names. For agriculture this neighbourhood is most advantageous one, because the arable land is next to it, while the river fosters the survival of the crop during the dry summer time. This settlement has the highest number of families living from agriculture. Furthermore, they use the land of many households from other neighborhoods, giving the owners a small share of the harvest. Besides agriculture, cattle-raising and poultry are also widespread. People who work as laborers for other families live mainly in this neighborhood. The number of uninhabited houses is minimum as well as the number of migrants. Just the opposite, there are a number of families who returned from T’q’ibuli and Kutaisi, mainly pensioners. The neighborhood has the least number of people with high education and official jobs. Those people who still work in mines mainly live in this part of the village. The neighborhood is labeled – by outsiders - as the least educated and not prestigious place to live, while its inhabitants are proud to live true to the historical roots of the village, close to the ruins of old church.

The spatial-structural division of the village and the differences between neighborhoods underline the importance of two factors: the influence of the close relations within a neighborhood and the economic resources, which are unequally accessible for the villagers. These two factors are obviously interrelated in defining the characteristics of neighborhoods.
3.3 Relations within neighborhoods and their implications

Besides kinship, neighborhood implies closeness defined by the physical environment, communal work, and the same kinds of problems one faces in the locality. Sometimes locals put more emphasis on neighborly relations than on kinship, as expressed in the phrase: the bad neighbor is better than good kin, while s/he will run first to put out a fire, in order prevent damage to his/her own house (for a similar saying in Russia, see Salmi 2003: 159). Physical and financial mutual assistance between the neighbors is widely practiced in the village. It is most visible during funerals and weddings, when labour and work for the event is mostly organized and carried out by close neighbors (see photo #26). The neighborhood takes part also in decision-making process of these events. In these cases they host all the guests of the family, who may be coming from a distance, serve and accommodate them for the nights. One extreme case of interference by the villagers in the family matters happened during a funeral, when the neighbors demanded that the deceased man be buried in the village, next to his ancestors, while his wife wanted to bury him in the city, where she could take care of the grave better than from the distance. The final decision was taken by his close relatives, but the conflict became the subject of long disputes between the kin and neighbors. The assistance of the neighbors is very important for old aged people, who have their offspring far in the cities. The neighbors often cook or bring food for them or do other kinds of physical help. When family members come back for short periods, they try to pay back with gifts or offering meals to the neighbours, whereas sometimes the intervention of the neighbors and their frequent visits to the families becomes a nuisance for offspring, complaining not to find peace and time for communication with parents.

Tensions do not arise only between kinsmen and neighbours, but there are also disputes between the neighbors. One example I have from the summer of 2007, when both of the parents of Natela, who lived as a daughter-in-law in Sac’ire, died at the same time. Her parents were IDPs (internally displaced persons) from Abkhazia, living in a very bad economic situation. Natela’s husband was a migrant in Moscow and for the last months, he was not able to send any remittance. Natela’s close neighbor Luiza decided to collect money from the neighbors for Natela’s family. She took the paper and pen and to give an example contributed 10 GEL (ca.

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32 This was connected with the tense relations between Georgia and Russia, which will be discussed in Chapter 7: Families, Migrants, States: Georgian Labor Migrants and their Families in the Framework of International Politics.
5 euro) first, then going door-to-door asked neighbours for contribution, as much as they could. “I told them to give even 50 Tetri (ca. 25 eurocent) as it would be help for the family. Can you imagine two parents dying at the same time? Some of the families contributed, but some of them refused began to criticize me. They said behind my back, ‘who was asking her to collect the money? Does she have more money than we do?’ They even were gossiping in the minibus about me. I do not care, I collected the money and sent to Natela. It was great assistance for the family. I did my job” (Luiza, 55 years old, 2007).

Luiza perceived her assisting a co-villager as her job and was satisfied with the result, although the fact that she was denounced publicly by some in the minibus annoyed her. Her behavior for “making an example for other villagers” and her contribution of 10 GEL was immediately connected with her economic situation by the villagers. Her good will and assistance for the neighbor was perceived as showing off her better economic situation or compelling others to contribute, because if one neighbor donates money, others would feel also obliged to do so. Another aspect should be considered here: the parents of Natela were not members of the community and Natela’s husband was a migrant (hence, considered to be better off). These premises decreased the will of other community members to assist, while it would not be a case if the diseased persons were villagers with scarce economic resources. There were several cases when villagers collected money to support each other in cases of health problems, sometimes going to hospital to offer blood if it was needed. In those cases I witnessed, contributions were limited within the boundaries of the neighbourhood and did not include the entire village. Contributing to funerals and weddings is kind of obligatory, if someone is invited and there are defined amounts one should contribute.\(^33\) The obligation to contribute for cultural events is defined by the locals as “respect for enemies and friends”\(^34\)” (‘mt’er-moq’vris pat’iviscema’), which takes substantial amount from the family budget.

Conflicts between neighbors arise not only in relation to special contributions, but in everyday matters as well, like the collection of electricity payments. During the last years, the electricity companies installed new general electric meters for different neighbourhoods, (for

\(^{33}\) This is called ‘to write’, because usually there is a person during these events, who keeps the notebook, collecting the contribution and writing the names of the contributors. It is important that the family members knew who had given how much, in order to pay back during next event. This follows exactly what Yalçın-Heckmann (2001) describes for Azerbaijan.

\(^{34}\) The locals generally cannot explain why reciprocate relations during the cultural events are called “respect for enemies and friends,” but some of them connect this with the Bible and Christian ethics. Others noted that during the special events (as weddings or funerals) one should contribute even to families of enemies in order to keep the face in the society.
every 20-25 households) in order to control the practice of blocking electricity meters (when a household blocks the electricity meter for decreasing the amount of payment). Not to make every family go and pay in T’q’ibuli, the villagers appointed one person from each neighbourhood to collect the payments and bring it to the company. During my fieldwork, there were two cases, when a few villagers continued the practice of tampering with personal electricity meters. While there was a difference between the sum of personal payments and the price for the whole neighbourhood, the company cut the electricity for the whole neighbourhood. The neighbours gathered in the centre of the neighbourhood and there was a long dispute, where people accused each other for ‘stealing the electricity’. Some of the neighbours refused to pay extra 3 GEL (ca. 1,5 euro) per household because of others who tampered with the meter and for ten days the whole neighbourhood was without electricity. When the neighbours were tired of sitting in the dark, they finally paid the extra fee, although they could not find out who the cheater was. Harming the whole community for personal gain sometimes happens in the village: For instance, some people illegally cut wood in the communal forest, let the cattle and pigs into the cultivated lands or village stadium, etc. When discussing these facts, either villagers blame the ‘government’ in general, because it does not control the behaviour of people, or they say that it is because of the economic disaster (“which is because of bad government”), that people lost self-respect and do not care about the community.

The everyday relations between neighbors seem to play an important role. For illustrating the importance of the social environment for the lives of the locals, I present an example from my host family. Cisana and Avto were living in the neighborhood of Grove, in the house of Avto’s parents during the first years of their marriage. He was a technician in the kolkhoz, while Cisana was from Dabazveli (next village) working in the kolkhoz administration. When their family expanded with their three daughters and Avto’s two brothers were also living in the same house, Avto asked the village administration to allocate him a personal plot of land for building a house; he wanted a plot on the top of Educational Street, next to the sanatorium. The life of the family completely changed after they resettled in this newly built house. Cisana began to work in the Sanatorium as a cook, while later on her grown-up daughters joined her in the same work place. Avto became more interested in getting a better position and finished an institute in Batumi by correspondence and later started to teach at the school. Their two elder daughters received high education; the younger one could not get high education, as she married early and finished a technical college. Cisana once told me, “You know Teona, if we stayed in the neighborhood of the Grove, my children as well as my husband would never have received
high education.” I asked why she thought so. She replied: “There, nobody thinks about studying, all concentrate on doing agriculture. It is a very difficult job; one can not think any further than cultivating land or milking a cow. The children get involved in household work from early childhood onwards and never have time to prepare lessons. I, however, was always pushing the children to study and did not ask them to help me” (Cisana, 76 years old, 2006). While they were living in the extended family, which was doing agriculture, it was clear that they might be somehow involved in this activity, if they had stayed there. After changing the location, the family switched to a different kind of economic activity, which was more conducive to education and working in the sanatorium. The employment at the state institution still plays important role in the family of Cisana, while Lela, the eldest daughter, who with her son lives in the family, is the head of the Sanatorium, of the electoral committee in Sac’ire and used to be a teacher at school. They do no agricultural work, do not keep cattle, but only few poultry, and live on Lela’s salary, state assistance for the son and pension of Cisana. During the summer they have holiday-makers, and the rent makes up the substantial part of their family budget, which should be spent carefully till next holiday season. Although the family appreciates resettlement in the Street of Education, they use the help of kin living in the neighbourhood Grove, while those cultivate their small backyard and from time to time provide them with some agricultural products.

According to Lela, social environment and neighborhood had different kinds of influence on her career. When she was at school, most of her teachers as well as the head of the school were close neighbors and friends of her father. They were visiting her family frequently. According to her, she was hearing conversations about the importance of education, about history, science. These talks inspired her to be educated as well. Furthermore, all these people were close to her family and she would never dare to go to school not being well-prepared. Besides being encouraged by the social environment for getting high education and better employment, one cannot deny the importance of the social connections, which the children of ‘upper class’ families enjoy. During Soviet times, ‘good social capital’ of the parents obviously put their children in favorable positions for becoming party members, getting better employment or promotion at work, while children of peasant or mining families were continuing the professions of their parents. The difference which still exists between the neighborhoods in the sense of education and state employment indicates the importance of the social connections between families living close to each other. Nowadays these social connections between neighbors function for fostering chain migration, alongside kin help. The migrants often help
their neighbors to join them in host societies, continuing to live close to each other in the place of migration.

Villagers also do communal work together as in the renovation of village roads, water pipes, electricity wires or the school. Yet, these tasks are done by the ones who are more or directly related to these objects. The school, for instance, was renovated by the parents of the current pupils, while the teachers also took part. The village roads were renovated by those villagers who lived physically the closest. Those families with old aged members or without men are not expected to participate, but if they contribute financially, or by hired labour, it is highly appreciated. There are some people who are socially active and they always participate in these events, while those who are working in village administration are always perceived as persons obliged to organize the communal work and take active part in it. Three persons (the deputy of the community, the authorized representative of the community and his assistant) are the ones, who organize the work for repairing electricity wires, water pipes or fighting fire. Although it is not their direct official task, they felt obliged to do so, in order to express their responsibility for the locality.

The problems which are not related to the important everyday routines are often ignored by the community, for instance, the case of the house of culture. The half-finished building is situated right in the centre and nowadays the kindergarten of Sac’ire is situated in it (see photo #10). The walls of the basement are unfinished and the basement is filled with water and rubbish, while the rooms of the kindergarten are right above this insanitary basement. Luiza, whom I already mentioned, lives right next to the building. She said that the smell coming from the place is very strong and it is especially unbearable during summer. She once asked few close neighbor women and they cleaned the basement together. She said that after a month, the basement was back to the same condition. “People do not care about communal things, as far as they get rid of their own rubbish. I even saw my neighbor throwing out garbage during night there, but I was myself ashamed to reprove him. Additionally it would destroy our relations forever” (Luiza, 55 years old, 2007). If the communal work is not arranged with the help of administration, general problems which concern the environment, village or kindergarten get neglected by the locals. Some villagers mention that they wait for each other, even if the work does not get done; some said, people are so much concerned with economic survival that they do not care about general communal affairs. But the village centre, where there are several unemployed, working age men standing and chatting, does not prove the argument about lack of time for not participating in communal work. In order to keep smooth relations with one
another, neighbors try to avoid critique, keep silent, and overlook the communal problems, but not so, if one has to pay because of others.

The public denouncement during the collective or party meetings of offenders of public life is no more the practice. Nowadays none of the villagers will complain to the administration for neighbour’s harmful behavior, unless it is something illegal. The lack of social control is the basis for locals to qualify the society as ‘unregulated’ (mouc’esrigebelî), but they wait for the central government to regulate it and do not want to participate in the process of establishing ‘order’ in the village, like in the case of postsocialist Russia: “Many people seek order not in themselves but for themselves, that is, from powers (vlastî) conceived as above; and therefore, if the local polity does not provide order, they seek it from higher levels, culmination in the symbolic reification of an ultimate power” (Humphrey 2002a: 29). Nevertheless, I could not find any practice or desire ‘for local enactment of the state’ like it was the practice of Tušetians to defend the national border or to prevent the raids of North Caucasian neighbours as described by Florian Mühlfried (2014). To explain this difference within the same national boundary, one should consider the fact that many families arrived in Sac’ire relatively late, in Soviet times, when the region was promoted and there were plenty of jobs. Their relatively short residence in Sac’ire probably did not allow for the creation of strong community feelings in the village, which will be self-disciplined and self-controlled. Furthermore T’q’ibuli district, as the place of heavy industry, had the special support from the central government, which probably caused the higher level of ‘sit-back-and-wait-for-it’ attitude in relation to the self-organized activities like Joseph L. Porket indicates (1987).

Anna-Maria Salmi, writing about the neighbourly relations in the daily life of school teachers in Russia, claims that neighbourly relations in Russia “[are] framed as mutual help” and “part of the day-to-day pattern of survival in Russia” (Salmi 2003: 148). In Sac’ire the neighborly relations have the same reciprocal character and securing subsistence of everyday practice, but they are limited within the physical space of neighbourhood. They include lending and borrowing everyday items, money and medicine, sharing information, helping in agricultural work and for special events, supporting each other to establish social connections.

To conclude, membership of the whole village community is weaker than that of neighbourhood, since close and supportive relations are strong and contained within the neighbourhoods. Once, one of the villagers expressed this difference as follows: “If I personally ask the neighbours to help me in any kind of work, they at once come and help, while if the
general village problem should be solved they are passive and show no desire to participate” (Levani, 48 years old, 2006). Thus the neighborhoods contain the social, emotional and financial support for families, which is reciprocal and incites the villagers to be involved in it. Nevertheless the same people are less enthusiastic to share community tasks, since the community is general, intangible and cannot ‘pay back.’ Generally people are proud of their current living environment when talking to an outsider; they try to present the best side of the settlement, their close and friendly relations, while hiding the conflicts and disputes. Neighborhoods develop certain standards of relations, like judging and praising certain kinds of behavior. There are conflicts and harmony within and between neighborhoods, causing labeling each other positively or negatively. However, the villagers identify themselves with one or the other neighborhood, and this is a small part of their identity, besides being Sac’irian, T’q’bulian, Imeretian and Georgian. They use these different scales of identities in different contexts, to present themselves and their social characteristics.

3.4 Economic activities of people living in Sac’ire

The economic activities of the locals are quite diverse and range from agricultural work, trading, private business, to salaried work for state or other organizations. Furthermore some receive social support from the state, remittances and support from kin and neighbors. Mostly the families have several sources and they do not depend on one kind of economy, while most of economic fields do not bring in sufficient income. In order to be able to provide a complete picture of local economic activities I would like to discuss each of them in detail.

3.4.1 Agricultural work

Locals often mention that the landscape was mountainous and very poor, and that agricultural work was not profitable for Sac’irians for centuries, until the Soviet period, when kolkhoz system improved the agriculture and significant portions of the village population were involved in it, alongside with coal mining and state jobs.

During the Soviet times agriculture in Sac’ire was strongly diversified, from 1930s onwards with great emphasis on tea cultivation. One resident of Sac’ire, Endi Sofromadze, who was an agronom (agricultural technician) in the kolkhoz explained that the size of land including
household plots and personalized *kolchoz* plots at the beginning of Soviet period was 7500 sq. m. per household. When the administration of the *kolchoz* witnessed that after working on these plots, the workers did not have much time to work for *kolchoz* itself, they reduced the plots to 5000 sq. m. More recently established households were getting, however, only 2500 sq. m. as household plot, due to land shortage. The households were free to choose the kind of crops or vegetables they wanted to cultivate on this land, although the harvest was taken by the *kolchoz* and the families were getting some parts of it back. Each family could keep only one cow, with calves, one pig, with piglets and unlimited number of poultry (these limitations continued until 1980s). The households which were registered as peasants and with household plots had to give 40 kg. of meat, 60 eggs and some milk products to the state per year. From 1965-70 onwards these taxes were abolished. The economic situation of the villagers was poor till 1950s. If earlier the salaries and pensions were paid in kind by the *kolchoz* in natural products, from 1950s onwards the collective farms began to pay salaries and pensions in cash. Pensions in 1950s came up to 12 Ruble, which gradually increased and in 1990 the minimal amount of pension was 60 Ruble. All land was ploughed by the tractors of the *kolchoz*, and although the plots were divided and identified as belonging to different households, they could stay within the ownership with usage rights by the same household. That is why, now talking about the *kolchoz* agriculture, villagers sometimes refer to the personified household plots as their private land, similar to the situation in Azerbaijan (Kaneff and Yalçın-Heckmann 2003: 237). During the first years of tea plantations, the land was undivided, but after the WWII the tea plantations were divided between the tea pickers as privatized plots. The maximum size of such a tea plot was 2500-3000 sq. m. and it was mostly women taking care of it. There were obligatory norms, how much tea a person should pick in different seasons, to be counted as a *working day*. In 1961 the daily salary was 6.2 Ruble per tea picker. Gradually the price for picked tea increased and the workers started getting higher salaries.

To fulfill the ‘five year plans’, the *kolchoz* was forced to leave the unprofitable types of agriculture. For example, according to the *agronom* mentioned above, the cow farms were unprofitable in the locality, due to the limited land for mowing or as pasture. Yet, *kolchoz* farms were keeping 3-4 times more cattle than they could feed with their own resources. Exaggerated plans, faked documentations (*pripiska*) (see Yalçın-Heckmann 2008) and bad quality products, which the *kolchozniks* (*kolchoz* workers) were producing was common practice, yet villagers had various economic profits during Soviet times. Similar to what Chris Hann (2003: 10) reports for Hungary: “As for the villagers, many were able to modernize their village conditions to meet
urban standards, aided by investment programs in rural infrastructure (electricity, piped water, etc.), by the expansion of non-agricultural activities in the countryside, by the introduction of stable wages throughout the year, and by the incorporation of the rural population into the state’s pension and social security system.” Hence, when people remember the benefits and economic welfare that they enjoyed during socialist times, they nevertheless seem to consciously forget the limitations and restrictions they were also experiencing.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, collective farm structures in Sac’ire followed suit of the agricultural changes as in other former Soviet countries. I would like to compare the case of agricultural privatization in Sac’ire with the cases of the Ukraine and Azerbaijan, as discussed by Kanef and Yalçın-Heckmann (2003). These two villages, as authors illustrate, chose different ways of organizing agricultural work after privatization. While the Ukrainian village mostly kept the collective form of cultivation of agricultural lands, in Azerbaijan the emphasis was to change to household farming. Privatization of agricultural land began in Georgia in 1992, a year after Georgia declared its independence. In each community, for the kolkhoz land which was within the borders of several villages, committees for privatization were established. These were to decide about the land size each household should get and to organize the actual procedures for privatization, which would be later on registered in the district administration. The criteria for distributing the land were similar to the Soviet ones and the size of the plot the household had depended on the fact, if there was kolkhoznik in the family (similar to the case of the Ukrainian village above). Those households who had at least one member working in the kolkhoz could get the largest amount of 7500 sq. m. The second category, families who were involved in communal and state services got 5000 sq.m. Families, who lived in an urban area, were registered in the village and still wanted to have land, could get 1500 sq.m. Later on, households, with members working in cultural, educational, or health organizations, received land from the first category, 7500 sq. m. As the head of the T’q’ibuli land registration office explained to us, all households received the privatized ex-privatized plots and there was no conflict in Sac’ire over where the land plot actually was located. Emotional attachment to land seems to have played some role here; households did not ask for the land which their ancestors owned in pre-Soviet times, but tried to keep the privatized land plots of the kolkhoz structure which they cultivated during the Soviet period. People preferred to get the land near a road or river, but they were not competing for it with one another, if this land plot was being cultivated by a certain household for years during the Soviet period.
Households did not pay any fee for the land, while they paid 7-8 GEL (ca. 3.5 Euro) for the measurement and registration procedures.

Although the procedure of land privatization started from 1992, in Sac’ire the procedures for its implementation took some years. In 1993 Sac’ire’s kolkhoz reorganized itself and the members established an Agricultural Commercial Enterprise. The committee members were mostly the previous members of the kolkhoz administration and some ordinary members; the head of the abolished kolkhoz became the head of the enterprise.35 There are a few reports how the enterprise was functioning, but most of them discussed the problems that the enterprise was facing: lack of fuel, the unwillingness of the members to participate in the agricultural work, delay of salaries for tea pickers (because the tea factory could not sell tea), the carelessness of the villagers who let their private cattle damage the crops and tea plantations and so forth. From 1994 onwards the reports only mention the facts of privatization of certain types of property (like buildings, cars, and tractors) by the members of the enterprise. It is always mentioned that these properties were out of order and the enterprise did not have the financial resources to repair them. Those who privatized former kolkhoz infrastructure and technical equipment were mostly the ones, who were using them, like tractor or truck drivers and the construction workers of the farm building. I could not find the final report about the liquidation of the enterprise; its members mentioned that when the actual land privatization started and households started receiving their plots in 1995, while the tea plantation was given back to the state. As there was no organization which would take care of the plantations, they became wild. Some part of it now is taken on lease by a new privately owned tea factory, while the larger part was intended to be sold in auction during my stay in the village, which did not happen.

At the beginning of the privatization process, the community of Sac’ire tried to keep a kind of communal cultivation for the kolkhoz land, but it was not as successful as it appears for the Ukrainian example mentioned above. According to some accounts, the property of kolkhoz was damaged or wasted by some members of the enterprise, who had better access to these resources. Lack of fuel, the problem of selling the agricultural produce and payment in kind instead of through salaries decreased the motivation of the members to participate in agricultural work and provoked the abolishment of the cooperative enterprise. From 1995 onwards households started cultivating the land mainly using their own labour, technical and financial

35 In the registry book of the commercial enterprise, the property which was taken over from the kolkhoz was listed as follows: 130 ha tea plantation, 66 ha arable land, 11 trucks, 5 tractors, some cattle, pigs (the number is not indicated) (Commercial Enterprise of Sac’ire 1993).
resources. After the privatization of land, agriculture in Sac’ire looks like the Azerbaijani case mentioned above, but with less emphasis on extended kin’s involvement in the production process.

Local people say that at the beginning of the actual privatization process, when salaries drastically dropped, some work places were abolished, mines were closed down, and land became the main source of living. Some of the families, who had been living in cities, came back, while the natural products were crucial for survival. One of the villagers jokingly told to me: “Those times, everybody was eating only maize bread and haricot. People were so sick of eating the same food every day; they began to curse these plants. Now nature became upset and the harvest is very small” (Kakha, 32 years old, 2007). Even if we forget about the ‘upset nature’, it is obvious that the villagers reduced the cultivation of land after some years of privatization. For some, it seems that different and maybe easy sources of monetary income became more desirable and these left their land empty, cultivating only the small vegetable gardens for everyday use.

I would like to describe the difficulties that villagers face when doing agriculture. The means of cultivation, like tractor, are scarce in the village and only those villagers who have financial income from other sources (like trading, small wooden enterprises, remittances and so forth) own them. Those who do agriculture for survival keep bulls for plowing the land or for transporting the harvest, but even this is not achievable for many households. Both tractors and bulls are valuable resources, as they bring in extra money; while one finishes cultivating one’s own land, one could lend the tractor, or help others with bulls and earn money. Once I was recording how our two neighbors were cultivating land, via traditional plough and bulls. One of the villagers, who was leading the bulls marked:

Villager 1: ‘Sakashvili brought this! Who was leading bulls?!

Teona: Is it bad?

Villager 1: This is wonderful! (with irony)

Villager 2: Nothing is bad in it, my grandchild! Georgians do not deserve this!

Teona: Why do you say so?

Villager 2: We want that others do everything and we eat. Everybody should do his/her own work (See photo #12).

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36 According to the census survey there was one tractor and 5 mini tractors in the village, and 5 households owning them were living in K’vaxrebi neighborhood. 13 households have one or a couple of bulls for cultivating the land, and 7 of these live in the neighborhood of Grove.
During this conversation, the first villager added that he does not remember his parents using bulls and plough for cultivation and it means the decline of life standards, because they are using the primitive means of agriculture. The second one, however, was eager to underline the ancestral tradition and that the wooden plough is portable, healthier and does not need fuel, which is expensive. In the dialogue with these two villagers, I found out the two general voices of the villagers. The first was presenting the prominent ideas about current ways of cultivation land as backward and pre-socialist, which means decline from the socialist modernization. Caroline Humphrey talks about metaphorical imaginations of changing social world, which in the case of Russia is to present local economy in terms of pre-Soviet fiefdoms (Humphrey 2002a: XXI). In the case of Sac’ire, land was completely privatized and none of the villagers, including managers of collective farms, could create large scale private or cooperative farms. That is why the locals do not talk about fiefdoms or privileges of any of the ex-kolkhozniks. But they talk about the retreat of Soviet modernization referring to their present cultivation methods, salaries and infrastructure. The repression of “the values of individual labour, the autonomous household economy, and independence in general” is the reason according to Caroline Humphrey, for the current attitudes the peasants have toward land cultivation (Humphrey 2002b: 140). Although villagers know that the land plots are their private property and to cultivate them is their business, they still expect from the state help with technique, fuel and fertilizers and when they do not get the assistance from the state, they blame the highest power holder for the ‘decline’. The second villager was supporting the traditional understanding of peasantry, as a way of life, as autonomous and utilizing all the possible ways and means. According to my observation, however, the first attitude is more widespread among the villagers, than the second one.

Besides the lack of proper techniques, the problems of irrigation and transportation affect the agricultural work in the village. These last two aspects are the reasons for creating different structures of economic activities among the villagers. The neighborhoods of Grove, K’vaxrebi and C’kipurišvili are closer to the land plots, than that of the Educational Street or the Neighborhood of Lezghins. Kolkhoz practice to transport workers to their plots does not exist anymore and the owners should walk an hour or so or hire a car, which families living in the last two neighborhoods find difficult. Besides such problems, there is the matter of continuity of economic activities. Those who were ordinary kolkhozniks (and they mostly lived in the three neighbourhoods, near the arable land) still find ways to work the land, even when it is unprofitable. Their judgment goes like this: “it is unprofitable to work on land, but it is the
owner’s duty. The harvested crop does not cover the expenses of cultivation, fertilizers, transportation. But when you have cattle and poultry, you need crop and hay as well. If you will buy everything on the market, then why do you live in the village?” (Tamazi, 63 years old, 2007). This is the position of a man, who has some additional income and can invest in agriculture and minimizing his expenses for food makes sense for him. This is often the case in K’vaxrebi district, while in the Grove neighborhood more families depend only on agriculture. The lack of financial resources for investing in agriculture reduces the profit, and even when the harvest is good, families mainly have natural products and no cash. In the village, none of the families sells crops or haricots regularly. If you suddenly find one of the villagers selling the agricultural products to small traders in the district market (see photo #13), this is out of emergency, due to the need for cash. To sell poultry, eggs, and milk products is more common, than selling crops.

There is only one family who used to have a greenhouse, cultivating tomatoes, cucumbers and greens and selling them. They told me that it was profitable for some years, when they had gas to heat the greenhouses in winter and early spring. When the gas was cut off, the price of coal was so high that they stopped heating the greenhouses. This family is one of the distinguished examples in the village, which does a lot of agricultural work. The father, mother and three sons were constantly busy with their household’s agricultural business. Nevertheless, the lack of cash made the two sons go to Tbilisi and work as construction workers. “The sons are already grown up and they want to marry, OK. I have a house and agricultural products, but one needs cash for the wedding, for presents for the bride and so on. When we had the greenhouse, we had cash from selling the produce, but now the income is smaller and is spent for the household” (Mother Ciala, 54 years old, 2007). The last of the sons, Levani, who was considered as the main labour force in his village household, after his two brothers were gone, also declared his desire to join them: “I know that construction work is not easy either, but at least you see the result of your work. Here I work and it is only for food” (Levani, 22, years old, 2007). If the parents let Levani join his brothers, then the family will very likely have to reduce the agricultural work. The desire of the youth to have cash is related to increased conspicuous consumption as well. Sac’irians desire to be well dressed, to have fancy mobile phones (even if sometimes no money on its account), foreign cars, video recorders etc.; these are very fashionable goods for the Sac’irians, things which one cannot afford with involvement in agriculture alone.
The agricultural work on household plots is mostly carried out by family members. The number of the household members and the size of the land the household cultivates are somehow related. Around 60% of the households with one or two members cultivate 2500 sq. m. and less land. While more than half of the households with 5 and 6 members cultivate between 3500 and 5000 sq. m. land. The families with several members need more food and have more labour force, while the families with one or two members are mostly old aged people, who are not able to do a lot of the work by themselves. Although the household members are the major force in agricultural work, for general activities, like plowing, hoeing, or harvesting, families usually ask for help from the neighbors or kin (around 3-5 persons). According to the villagers, this kind of collective help is traditional and has a special name (nadi). This practice implies that neighbors help each other collectively and in rotation, while the family prepares meal and serves them at the end of the day. In such a way, several hard working men are able to finish the agricultural work in one day, and the family saves on transportation fees, rent for the tractor or bull, besides the work together is more enjoyable. Normally the role of women is restricted to taking care of the house, poultry, pigs, and cattle and tending vegetable gardens, sometimes when it is needed, one can find women and children involved in working on household plot or leading the bulls (see photo #14).

To conclude, agricultural work is one of the prominent economic activities of the villagers. For some families, the cultivation of land and cattle breeding is the main source of survival, but these are mostly the poor families and their income consists primarily of natural products. In order to engage in agriculture fully (e.g. use agricultural techniques, buy fertilizers, etc.), one needs additional financial resources; those who perceive themselves as ‘peasants’ and have other earnings, try to invest their income in agriculture. Some families, whom we asked about their land use and cattle breeding, answered with a smile: “we have nothing, we are proletarians!”

37 This is the data from census survey, which my assistant and I did in Sac’ire in 2007 (N=192).
3.4.2 Trade

Some families in the village were involved in trading. This is a relatively new space, which was as locals said unattractive during the Soviet times and I’ve never heard of somebody having been involved in the so-called ‘sp’ek’ulacia’ (trade, as referred to in the Soviet ideological terminology). Today to have a so called ‘commercial box’ (but’k’a, small cabins as makeshift shops, which are 1,5 sq. m, wood or iron self-built shops, which stand in the centre of the village) is one of the crucial economic activities (see photo #15). They mostly sell everyday products, drinks and sometimes vegetables. There is one shop which sells second-hand clothes. There are seven commercial boxes in the centre of the village. The social characteristics of the people involved in trading are that all of them are women (sometimes husbands might help wives, but the leading force are women), previously involved in such jobs, like shop-sales people, book-keepers, or commercial providers during the Soviet period, those who somehow were involved in economic transactions. These people mostly buy the products in Kutaisi or in T’q’ibuli in wholesale stores and sell them in these village shops, at an increased price. I have heard some jokes concerning these boxes, like: “they multiply like mushrooms,” or “there are more shops in the village than people.” Although, most of the villagers admit that trading nowadays is profitable, they say that one needs special skills to be successful, like flexibility, bargaining, numerous acquaintances and sometimes cheating. Those who found themselves not to have such skills gave up trading; however, most of the families tried their fate sometime in this field. Caroline Humphrey describes similar tendency in Russia, where “there is an endless sporadic flow of people into trade, prompted as much by absolute necessity as by the desire to make a profit” (Humphrey 2002a: 69).

In general, people have nostalgia for the Univermag (socialist state-store for consumer goods), a kind of supermarket at the centre of the village. This supermarket was relatively well-provided during Soviet times, it stopped working in 1994 and now the building is in ruins and the basement is full of water. When I asked why these small shops did not use the building, the locals answered, that it was difficult to find a consensus between shop-owners. The competition between the ‘boxes’ is quite high, because most of them sell the same products, while customers are few. Certain villagers buy things in certain boxes; the preferences are made due to the social closeness between the sellers, owners and customers. Nino, who used to be a seller in the Univermag of Sac’ire, was the first one who opened a ‘commercial box’ in the village. Now her box is a little bit down from the mini-bus stop and she is complaining about having fewer clients.
She said that customers come to her when they do not have money and when they want to take something on credit (they use the word nisia, from Arabic and Azerbaijani nasiya). Because she is ‘good natured’ she cannot refuse someone who does not have money but wants to buy bread. She showed me the long list of villagers who had debts. These debts would be paid back when the villagers will get pensions, salaries, or remittances (see alsoYLW-Heckmann 2008, Eli2007). Sometimes there are cases when the customers do not pay back and she has to go to their houses to ask for payment. Due to the lack of finances, she could not expand the number of goods sold in her shop well, so the bread was the main item for sale there. Because she does not have a big profit from trade, she is one of the few, who is the owner of the shop as well as the seller. This is one of the reasons, why villagers ask her for buying goods on credit, while sellers are not allowed to do so, without the owner’s permission. Some owners employ sellers for commercial boxes and pay 1 GEL (ca. 0.5 euro) daily and a small addition, if the daily purchase would be more than 100 GEL (ca. 50 euro). Of these shops only few are officially registered. People say that before Saakashili came to power (before 2003), they had to give some money to some black-market tax officers, but now the state asks them to register their shops, and to give receipts from the commercial calculator, which registers every purchase and forces the owners to pay the sales’ tax to the state. Although few owners fulfilled the demand, most of them found it exaggerated for their business. Here I quote one of the owners on this issue: “The government is pushing us to close down the boxes. Otherwise how can I cover all these expenses? The price of the receipt machine is 300 GEL (ca. 150 euro) and then taxes ... They want to take money from the small self-made wood box!” (Eteri, 53 years old, 2007)

Although the owners and sellers complain about the increased control by the state, the customers protest (but behind the back of the traders) that the state is not able to control the quality of food they sell or the conditions the products are kept. None of the shops has a refrigerator, even if they sell products which need to be kept in the fridge. Because they cannot sell the products quickly, some products get expired or rotten. Most of the villagers, including me, have at least one experience of buying rotten food. Interestingly, none of them brought the product back to the shop, although they informed the seller about the fact. Due to the bad condition the products are kept and increased prices, villagers mostly buy and consume the products from T’q’ibuli or Kutaisi and go to village shops primarily in case of emergency. Those villagers who have some extra products for sale, sell them to the market traders in T’q’ibil and Kutaisi, because the places in the market are hired by permanent traders alone. The uncontrolled but profitable kind of trade is the one from home. This mostly involves clothes. Some villagers
go to the capital city or to Turkey and bring clothes back to the village for sale. Sometimes the villagers ask them to bring whatever they need. These kinds of deals are more convenient, because consumers can delay payments, take the goods from home and try on or refuse at the end easily. For the traders it is beneficial, because they have permanent clients, and are not paying any taxes.

3.4.3 State employment

The official employment is much appraised nowadays. Even if there are a few private firms, the main emphasis is mostly on state jobs. The available state institutions in the locality are: school, kindergarten, ambulatory, library, house of culture, sanatorium, and village hall. In the city of T’q’ibilı one can find a wider range of state employment possibilities. State jobs are not well paid (between 50-200 GEL, ca. 25-100 euro), but it is crucial monetary income for the families. Besides the financial income, state employment is desired because it is perceived as a stable job, even if due to frequent reorganization of these institutions, state employees were constantly under the danger of losing their jobs. A state job is also important because of the social connections one acquires through the position. These connections are ways of gaining access to political, economic and social resources, while simultaneously it carries the possibility of being influenced through these connections, contradictory to one’s will. To get a job in a state institution, one always needs acquaintances. First of all vacancies are never announced publicly, and there are hardly places available. The practice is to dismiss people, due to reorganization and then get a new one or the same person, which mostly happens through the personal connection with the employer. The locals are aware of this fact, but do not consider this as illegitimate, because through their lives many have been involved in similar kinds of arrangements. The conflict rises when for the one position there are more than one possible employee and each of them has different lobbies, which can influence the decision. I would illustrate the school affairs, to show how the employment practice works in the locality:

The school teachers in Sac’ire are mostly from the same or nearby villages, but sometimes they come from T’q’ibilı city. To be a teacher is very desirable, especially for women, because the school job is more or less stable, prestigious, the salary is getting higher and one can always find pupils who want to have private lessons, which brings in extra income. Teachers are paid on the basis of number of hours they teach, so they try to get as many teaching
subjects and hours as they can. There were some conflicts among the teachers because of the number of hours. The problem of how to distribute the teachings subjects and hours and getting new teachers is closely linked to personal connections with the head of the school or on a higher level, having connections to the head of Resource Centre in T’q’ibuli. From time to time, the head of the T’q’ibuli Resource Centre intervened in the school affairs, which formally is an autonomous unit. To be the teacher of a certain subject sometimes depends on ‘inheritance.’ For instance, if someone’s kin is a teacher, he or she will ‘save’ the position for the ‘heir’ until this person decides to teach at the school. There were some examples of this. In one case there was a conflict of interests. Nanuli was a teacher of drawing and work (she got this position from her father after his death) at school for the last 7 years. During my stay in the village, the assistant head of school Vaxt’ang decided that he wanted this position for his daughter and demanded this from the head of school. Feeling that she might lose her job, Nanuli addressed the head of Resource Centre in T’q’ibuli in order to keep her position. As Vaxt’ang knew a lot of irregularities of school affairs, it was dangerous for the head of school to ignore his proposal, but also not to obey to the head of the T’q’ibuli Resource Centre. The head of school appeared in the middle of the interest conflict and at the end she abolished these lessons altogether.

The case of the school is not unique, because conflicts between lobbying groups happen often, as this was the case when the director for the house of culture was to be assigned. In this case, the deputy of the village said the last word, because the salary for the employee was given from the village budget. Social connections are very important for acquiring a state job, while for persons with no connection this field is almost closed. In extreme cases the knowledge about irregularities might be used as a weapon for influencing a state employee, although this act would hardly be qualified as blackmail. Besides all the economic or social calculations, locals say that employment is crucial, in order to be with the collective, to dress up and go to work every day and to lead a social life. Besides, the locals are always waiting and hopeful for better times, when the salaries will rise and the state employees will get the benefits they were enjoying during socialism. From the total number of population of working age (excluding students) 25,8 % of them are employed in state organizations. This category also includes the low skilled and low paid jobs, like maids, craftsmen or workers, although all these positions need to have acquaintances to get or keep the job.

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38 This rule has changed soon after and now teachers have the obligation to teach certain hours per week and if they teach more, they will not get salary for extra hours.
3.4.4 Workers

This group of people mostly includes those who were employed in factories and coal mine of T’q’ibuli. All factories in the district stopped working. The technocrat managers of ex-factories could not manage to privatize the factories as a whole and continue work. The most widespread scenario was that the factories were ‘stolen’ or sold in parts, by the employees of the factories (see also Alexander 2004). So except for the tea factory, where the manager was guarding to keep the factory undamaged, most of the enterprises have only ruined walls and no clients to privatize them. The coal mine was a different case. Nora Dudwick in her chapter “No guests at our table,” wrote that “in T’q’ibuli, a coal mining town 80 percent of the population were without work, a third of the remaining 5 800 employees of the local coal mines were on indefinite leave without pay, and those still working had just received salaries and pensions after a six-month delay” (Dudwick 2003: 219). Three years after this report was written, the mine was privatized by the Georgian holding company ‘Saqinvesti’. The company renovated one mine and reorganized the working collective and the contemporary number of the workers in T’q’ibuli mine is around 500 (see photos #7 and #8). Few people from the village still work in the mine, and their average salary is 350 GEL (ca. 160 euro). Although the work is very hard and dangerous and the salary small, many locals want to work there, but there are not enough jobs available. The last changes in the company and the promise of the then President Saakashvili, that they will extract more coal than it was possible during Soviet times, incited people to hope for a better future. Except for this small number of the population which work in the mines, most of the former workers are unemployed. Although they received privatized land plots in the village, they look for salaried work, and as far as it is not provided they seek employment in the capital or outside Georgia.

Besides these spheres, several families have small businesses, like scrap-iron, baking buns, wood enterprise or making jewelry from agate.39 These businesses are small-scale, and often not registered. Most of the families do not make any substantial living through this

39 From 1980s onwards to extract agate and to make jewelry from it was wide-spread activity in the locality. The products (the mineral or the handy-made jewelry) were sold to a middle-man (see photo #27). After the borders were open mostly it was exported to Turkey. From 1993, due to the economic hardship, the demand for agate jewelry decreased and now only few people in T’q’ibuli keep the tradition. The second obstacle was the lack of the license to extract the mineral. In 2004 there was a TV program about the incident that some children died in a self-made agate mine in T’q’ibuli district. After this report the government strengthened the control on the people who were extracting agate without permission.
business, but as a second income it is desirable. State social support (pensions, and the social assistance in the frame of Targeted Social Assistance program), remittances and support of the offspring for their parents fill the budget of the locals. There are families which are on the edge of survival; they can afford only nutrition and second hand clothes. Those families who have monetary income and do agriculture are better off, because they do not spend much money for food and cash is used for everyday need. There are few families who might be called wealthy, who could afford to have a foreign car, go for holidays somewhere or renovate (or buy) flats. These families mostly do not depend on local resources and have migrants.

Discussing rural identities of post-socialist peasants, Louise Perrotta states that, it is impossible “to distinguish any uni-dimensional or universalistic definition.” The reasons for this difficulty could be extended to the case of Sac’ire: “Although changes in rural political economy have opened the way for alternative enactment of production, consumption and exchange, actual practices often reflect a commitment to the old as to the new” (Perrotta 2002: 177). In Sac’ire the problem of how to define villagers is bigger, because during the Soviet times as well as afterwards, the population was not engaged only in agriculture, but in various fields. Ex-miners and factory workers were most affected through the postsocialist changes since most of them lost their jobs. They were assigned privatized land shares and vouchers after the de-collectivization. The vouchers lost their value and were sold for 5 USD. Land shares were used, at the beginning of privatization, for subsistence economy, but later they gave up cultivation as they found more profitable cash income from trade or construction work and left the locality as labour migrants within and out of the country. Former kolkhozniki somehow kept the tradition of cultivating the land, but the poor land, lack of irrigation, of technical supplies, fertilizers and transportation do not allow any of them to become successful farmers. Traders are few with the locality; furthermore credits are inaccessible and the general poverty of the consumers does not let them to expand the business and they have remained as petty traders for years. The state employees lost social benefits and their salaries became reduced, although these positions are the most desirable for locals but accessible only for those who have social connections with the heads of the organizations and higher level. Besides the structural decline of these spheres, villagers constantly shift from one field to another. Former kolkhozniki might keep their connections with agricultural land and now present themselves as peasants, but they often have other income sources like remittances, trade or social support. The migrant working as construction worker far away may come back and establish himself in the village administration or railway job, while the teacher may start trading or go for migration (like the
ex-head of the school who due to the debts went to Italy as house maid). Although the villagers are involved in various economic activities and have different kinds of income, according to the survey from 100 households 71% claim that their average monthly family income is less than 100 USD and 50% estimate their economic conditions as poor or very poor.

3.5 Conclusion

My concern in this chapter was to understand and illustrate the everyday life and economy of the villagers. To go back to the starting point about membership of community, I argue that villagers have a weak sense of belonging to the village as community, while devoting their support and activities to small groups including kin and neighbours. In her conclusion Nora Dudwick argues that: “although Georgians remain strong loyal to kin, neighbors, friends, and their immediate community, there is little sense of social responsibility to Georgian society as a whole. Respondents interpret ‘market economy’ and ‘capitalism’ to mean the pursuit of one’s self-interest without any regard for the impact of one’s actions on those outside one’s personal network” (Dudwick 2003: 256). I cannot generalize the pattern of social behavior of villagers to the whole of Georgian society, but it is clear that the responsibility toward the village as whole and those outside of one’s social circle is weak. However, I disagree with Dudwick that it is because of the interpretation of ‘market economy’ and ‘capitalism,’ and think that this is the inheritance from the socialist past. The Soviet state, with its different mechanisms was regulating the society, controlling the behavior of the citizens, while those who were part of this controlling mechanism were obliged to participate in it. Today when the state has withdrawn from many parts of the social sphere of the village, villagers felt free to behave according to their interests and there is hardly anyone who wants to take the initiative to regulate the society. The villagers like Luisa, show how support for public good may develop, but it is limited due to the fear of the damaging good relations with co-villagers. The locals do not seek the strong state only to regulate their social environment, but the state which should take active role in their economic life, provide jobs, support agriculture, and guarantee social security. Although the locals reacted to the first steps of the Georgian government to control trade and reinforce taxes, this was seen as exaggerated demands from their small-scale businesses.
Chapter 4. Perceiving the state and the nation

The history of the region, the memory of the socialist past and the national sentiments of the locals were discussed in the second chapter. In this chapter I discuss the origin of these sentiments, and how the locals perceive the nation and the state. The perspective is taken from the locality. The different perceptions of locals about the nation and the state have their historical and structural roots as well as effects on citizenship notions and practices.

The arguments of the chapter follow Rogers Brubaker (1994) and Rasma Karklins (1989). They focus on the understanding of nationality and ethnic relations in Soviet and post-Soviet successor states. Brubaker’s main argument is that the Soviet state “codified nationhood and nationality as fundamental social categories sharply distinct from statehood and citizenship” (1994: 49). He argues that Soviet nationality regime was simultaneously institutionalizing and conventionally opposing the definition of nationhood, based on the one hand on a territorial and political frame and on the other hand, on the ethno-cultural models of nationhood. This distinction was also expressed in the two categories encoded in national documents of Soviet citizens, one citizenship as belonging to the political system of Soviet republics and second, ethnic nationality (introduced in 1932) as an “ascriptive legal category, a key element of an individual’s legal status” (Brubaker 1994: 53). The proposition by Rasma Karklins that there are different categories of belonging and we shall differentiate between nationality and citizenship (Karklins 1989: 22), is further developed in this chapter.

Following this line, I propose that Georgian people are still operating by the mixed categories of nation and citizenship; understanding nationality as ethnic belonging, while citizenship as the civic status, belonging to the political units. This distinction explains the results of the survey, where I received multifaceted replies to the questions: “What does it mean for you to be a citizen of Georgia?” and “Tell us five words which are important for citizenship”. In the first case the answers indicate the existence of national citizenship, while the understanding of citizenship, expressed in the answers indicate social entitlements, understood as being the content of citizenship category.

Thus the distinction between citizenship as legal membership of a state-polity and nationality as belonging to the nation or to the country (which is more often mentioned by the locals) is significant here. The local understanding of citizenship mainly includes belonging to the political frame and underlines the entitlements of the citizens. While locals and migrants
from the locality have an emotional attachment to the Georgian nation, which formulates their nationality as Georgian, it does not reflect their legal status of citizenship. The migrants who refuse Georgian citizenship in order to get the citizenship of the host state are not perceived as being ‘less Georgian’. Although my main concern is citizenship, which seems to be empty (to some extent) from some emotional attachment to the state, we have to analyze what the content of nationality is and the history of the Georgian nationalism. The main reason for emotional detachment from the state is the disappointment about the state as it does not guarantee the full citizenship, to the full extent of the political rights and protection that can be offered to a citizen of advanced democracies. More detailed discussion of the lack of social and political rights is in chapters 5 and 6. From here on I will refer to the citizenship, as locals understand it, which is belonging to the state.

In my field site 99% of the population is ethnically Georgian. Thus, I do not refer to the issue how ethnically different citizens of Georgia perceive citizenship and nationality, although I will refer to the perception of ethnic Georgian locals towards the ethnic minorities residing on the territory of Georgia historically, as well as towards new migrants coming to Georgia (mainly from India, China, and Turkey). Furthermore, I consider that in Georgia where 13.2% of citizens are not ethnic Georgians, according to the population census data from 2014 (National Statistics Office of Georgia 2018: 9), the differentiation between nationality and citizenship may make more sense. The subjects in the study note that they would like to have in their passports a category of nationality showing that they are not Russians or Armenians. This may be an attitude ‘left-over’ from the Soviet regime, when the ‘titular’ nationalities were more praised in their national states” (Brubaker 1994: 49). Besides the Soviet legacy, in the chapter I will refer to other reasons for the strong ethnic connotation of nationality and detachment from citizenship.

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40 From the mid-1990s due to the liberal migration law, foreign citizens started to immigrate in Georgia. Certainly the number of migrants coming to the country is much lower than the rate of outmigration (for instance, in 2006 Ministry of Justice of Georgia issued 1670 residence permits (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2008)). Nevertheless, ethnic Georgians are highly concerned about ‘foreigners coming to Georgia’. The Migration Policy Centre at European University Institute indicates that the number of citizens of China, India and Turkey as well as from several African countries migrating to Georgia from year to year increases. Although the number of migrants from each of these countries do not exceed a thousand, Georgians are worried, denouncing the fact that these migrants are buying land and engage in agriculture there (mainly immigrants from India), or opening small shops (mainly citizens from China) (Migration Policy Centre, 2013).

41 The category of nationality was indicated in the Soviet passports, alongside the citizenship category and was showing the ethnic belonging of a person. It was abolished in Georgian national documents from 1997. More on this will be discussed later in this chapter.
In this section I discuss the meaning of the Georgian nation and the history of Georgian nationalism. Anthony Smith (2006) points to the existence of two notions of nation and is critical of the existing dichotomy. According to him there is a ‘Western’ civic definition of a nation, characterized by clearly demarcated territory, legal-political community, with a single, standardized legal system, mass participation, a mass public culture, the political status of sovereignty, legitimating in terms of nationalist ideologies, and a non-Western ‘ethnic’ nations, the myths of presumed common descent from an ancestor(s), vernacular culture, ‘ethno-history’, and popular mobilization (Smith 2006: 173). Smith suggests an ideal type of nation “as a named and self-defined human community sharing common myths, memories and symbols, residing in and attached to a historical territory, and united by common codes of communication, and a distinctive public culture, and common customs and laws” (Smith 2006: 175). According to him this ideal type definition which overcomes the division among Western - non-Western nations, creates a new obstacle for binding the ‘new-old’ nations, like Armenians or Jews. Although he detects some features of nations in the history of people before the 19th century, he admits that they were ethnic communities, while the age of nationalism, “brought together for a political end, the ‘re-birth’ and ‘regeneration’ of the nation, under the influence of the newly politicized ideals of popular sovereignty and cultural authenticity” (Smith 2006: 177).

The ideal type of nation defined by Smith (2006) is appropriate for describing the Georgian nation. The continuity which he suggests and which transforms ethnic communities into nations through nationalism would be the suitable marker for defining the history of Georgian nation. According to Gellner “it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round. Admittedly, nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures of cultural wealth, though it uses them selectively, and it most often transforms them radically” (Gellner 1984: 55). The history of Georgian nationalism starts from the second half of the 19th century, when “Ilia [Chavchavadze] started to solve the very difficult problem – to create simultaneously national ideology and nation” (Tarkhan-Mouravi and Smite 2007: 9). Ilia Chavchavadze,42 was mainly expressing his nationalist ideas in poems and novels.

42 Ilia Chavchavadze (1837-1907) was a Georgian public figure, poet and writer. He is regarded as the leader of national revival in Georgia, during the Russian rule of Georgia. In 1987 Ilia Chavchavadze was canonized as Saint Ilia the Righteous by the Georgian Orthodox Church. At the end of 19th century some works of Ilia
(that were easily accessible for ordinary people), as well as in his articles in newspapers and journals. Interestingly, his main concern was Georgian villages and villagers as well as Georgian landlords, who are the main heroes of his works (Chavchavadze, Glaxis Naambobi [The Story of a Beggar] 1996 [1873 3rd ed.], Chavchavadze, K’acia Adamiani?! [Is that a Man?!], 1996 [1863 2nd ed.], Chavchavadze, Mgzavris C’erilebi [Letters of a Traveler], 1996 [1971 2nd ed.]). In few cases when he refers to the city, it is expressed in a negative connotation.43 There were several reasons why Ilia Chavchavadze based Georgian nationality in the countryside: At the beginning of the 20th century, more than 80 percent of the population of Georgia (including 2 governorates (Gubernias) and 4 administrative districts (Okrugs)) were village-dwellers (Guruli 2003). If we consider the argument of Gellner, that “nationalism usually conquers in the name of a putative culture,” the peasant and village landlords were indistinguishable part of Volk or Narod (Gellner 1984: 57). The main city Tbilisi was resided by mixed ethnic groups, where the ethnic Georgians were a minority44 (Jones 2006: 254), thus ethnic mobilization or development of nationalist movement would have been difficult in the city.

Chavchavadze’s main ideas which later became the slogans for Georgian nationalist movement were: “We should belong to us!” (čveni tavi čvenadve gveq’udnodes!) and “Three kinds of treasure have we inherited from our ancestors: Language, faith and homeland” (sami saunjže dagvrča C’inap’artagan – ena, mamuli, sarc’munoeba!). If we discuss the case of Georgian national movement in the context of Gellner’s theory, we can say, that in order to create the Georgian nation, Ilia Chavchavadze used the Georgian language, faith and homeland as the “raw material [för] the cultural, historical and other inheritance from the pre-nationalist world” (Gellner 1984: 49) and thus created the nationalist doctrine for the Georgian nationhood.45 According to some authors, the main obstacle for the 19th century Georgian

43 One case concerning the public houses (Chavchavadze, Glaxis Naambobi [The Story of a Beggar], 1996 [1873 3rd edition]) and another case when the villager comes to the city and witnesses the death sentence of the person in the main square of the city and is shocked with the cruelty of the city-dwellers, who were eagerly watching the whole process (Chavchavadze, Saxrčobelazed [At the Gallows], 1996 [1879 2nd ed.]).

44 The Georgian sources are less referring to the fact that the majority of capitalists and entrepreneurs in the cities of Georgia were not ethnic Georgians. Akaki and Paata Surguladze are indicating the fact that the Georgian markets were saturated by the foreign (it is curious that Azeris and Armenians are considered ‘foreign’ here. Will you not comment this?) and especially Armenian capital and Georgian entrepreneurs were not managing the large-scale businesses (Surguladze & Surguladze 2003).

45 To give an overall picture about the work of Ilia Chavchavadze one could refer to the book of Lela Iakobashvili Letters about Georgian Identity (2007). “Although Chavchavadze had put these values as the forms of Georgian identity, he knew that to build the Georgian statehood identity, other kinds of activities were needed
nationalist movement was the absence of an independent state. “In the condition of absence of Georgian state, the only ideology which nation might had, was ethnic nationalism, while the Georgian ethnos might be formed into the nation” (Tarkhan-Mouravi and Smite 2007: 11).

On 26 May 1918 Georgia declared independence, and according to the declaration the form of the state was a democratic republic. The three years of the history of Georgian independent state is important, since national symbols and the first constitution were created. 46 Although most members of the first government were cosmopolitan Mensheviks, “they soon realized that the only ideology of those days might be nationalism, which has the power to build the state” (Tarkhan-Mouravi and Smite 2007: 11). The first independent state came to an end in 1921 and the following 70 years of the Soviet rule nevertheless strengthened ethnic nationalism. George Tarkhan-Mouravi argues that the national ideas about a united Georgian Christian nation existed in the medieval epoch among the Georgian political elites, but the history of Georgian nationalism starts in the 19th century. Furthermore, he emphasizes the Soviet period in the history of Georgian nation: “it could be said that quite paradoxically it was the internationalist Soviet regime that brought around the consolidation of the Georgian nation and the spread of the ideas of (peripheral and ethnic) nationalism among the population” (Tarkhan-Mouravi 2006: 7). This hypothesis is much supported by many who write about the creation of ethnic particularism and nationalism within the Soviet Union, mostly starting with the politics of koronizatia 47 (Hirsch, 2005; Slezkine 1994). While talking about “the making of the Georgian nation” Ronald Suny indicates that “the most complete consolidation of the Georgians as a nation came in the first seven decades of Soviet power” (Suny 1989: 318). The re-nationalization of Georgia under the Soviet rule was expressed in different forms: increase of the ethnic Georgian population within the Soviet Republic of Georgia, a cultural revival and according to the Western state structural format, it was founded on three bases: education, economy and communication.” Thus, Chavchavadze and his followers (known as ‘Samotcianelebi’– direct translation ‘60s’ as they were acting in 1860s) founded ‘Land Bank’ (Saadgilmamulo bank’i) [The land bank was giving loans to the peasants in order to buy lands, which prevented the migration of peasants to the cities and promoted agricultural sector, founded the ‘Society of spreading literacy’(c’era k’it’xvis gamavrelebeli sazogadoeba) and the network of communication – Georgian newspapers and journals (Iakobashvili-Firalishvili 2007).

46 During that period, the law of citizenship was promulgated (because the constitution was approved by the parliament later on in 21st of February, 1921), according to which all the residents registered in the territory of Georgia till 1914 became citizens of Georgia. The citizenship was acquired through naturalization, birth and marriage. The state laws as well as later created constitution were giving equal rights to the citizens of different ethnic and religious groups; all the ethnic minorities had their representatives in the parliament. The state language was, however, Georgian (Guruli 2003: 62). Although the legislation was not much used in practice as on 25th of February, 1921 Georgia was annexed and incorporated into the Soviet Union.

47 The process of indigenization, which with the help of ethnographers facilitated the strengthening of ethno-nationalist aspirations of local people.
expressed in the foundation and development of the Georgian university,\(^\text{48}\) flourishing national theatre, opera, film, folk music and dance, etc. (Suny 1989: 300). I completely agree with the author concerning the consolidation of Georgian nation under the Soviet regime and the revival of the Georgian culture, but we should not forget that support of national culture, national self-determination and language was, to use the words of Terry Martin, part of the “soft-line policy” of the Soviet Union in order to make “hard-line policies\(^\text{49}\) palatable for the larger population” (Martin 2001: 21). Furthermore, the creation of new national institutions were taking place in parallel to the actions which were attacking the local indigenous culture, religion and prosecuting the members of local elite and communities (see Hirsch 2005). Besides, the making of the Soviet Nations was part of the main plan of the Soviet Government “to transform feudal-era clans and tribes into nationalities, and nationalities into socialist-era nations – which, at some point in future, would merge together under communism” (Hirsch 2005: 8-9). Although Georgians were acknowledged as a developed nation from the beginning of the socialist times (Hirsch 2005), as well as they had the possibility of developing their culture, language, and have the primary position of ‘titular’ nation, they were still seeking political independence, using ethnic nationalism as the tool, accentuating the language, faith and land, while forgetting about the positions of other national minorities. Moreover the policy of the Soviet Union itself contributed to the construction of ethnic nationalism with the blurred categories of belonging as indicated in national passports.

Writing about the Soviet nationality and citizenship, Hirsch notes the confusion which existed between the citizens of the Soviet Union, who were members of diaspora nationalities in regard to identification of their nationality in the document. Although Soviet citizens should have had “legal right to the self-determination of national’nost,” and this category should not have to have the juridical significance, the members of diaspora nationalities “were stripped of their native-language institutions, land, and possessions, and were deported from the regime zones” (Hirsch 2005: 297). These dual categories of belonging did not have impact only on the members of diaspora nationalities, or ‘non-titular’ nationalities, but had affected the members of ‘titular nations’ by forming their ideas about superiority of their ethnic group in the country, ignoring the legal status of others. The Soviet regime was institutionalizing the “coexistence of

\(^{48}\) Although Suny mentions that the first Georgian University was founded under the independent Georgian state in 1919, he somehow connects it with the Soviet re-nationalization of Georgia.

\(^{49}\) According to Terry Martin, ‘hard-line policies’ were the essential policies of the Soviet Union, which were guaranteeing the success of core Bolshevik ideas and principles (Martin 2001).
republican statehood and passport nationality. The former assumed that territorial states made nations, the latter suggested that primordial nations might be entitled to their own states” (Slezkine 1994: 451). Based on this distinction, Rogers Brubaker concludes, that the Soviet Union was not the national-state and this “did not define the state or citizenship as a whole in national terms, it did not define component parts of the state and the citizenry in national terms” (Brubaker 1994: 52). National term was used for defining individuals according to ethnic-national belonging, while citizenship denoted the membership of territorial polities. While territorial boundaries did not overlap with ethno-cultural composition in most of the Soviet republics, this policy created an inequality between ‘titular’ and ‘non-titular’ nationalities. Besides these inequalities, which later overgrew into ethnic conflicts within and between the Soviet successor states, belonging to the state or to the nations were differentiated, even for the members of ‘titular’ nations. Rasma Karklins writes for instance that: “People living in the Soviet Union have a dual identity. [...] Citizenship is a civic identity referring to membership of the state, whereas nationality is an ethnic identity referring to membership of the people” (ibid. 1989: 22). Thus as indicated above the notion and understanding of nationality as ethno-cultural belonging to the nation developed in the Soviet Union was different from the Western model of nationality understood as the membership of the nation-state.

In order to create the independent Georgian nation-state, strong national movements were forged in the late 1980s. As these were ethnic-nationalist movements, the three treasures (language, faith and homeland) were re-visited and revived and they became the credo of the nationalist movement. The leaders of the nationalist movement were so involved in nationalist ideas and for fighting against ‘Russian imperialism’ that they ignored the fact that the Georgian language is not the native language of local ethnic minorities, neither is the Orthodox religion the confession for all of them. The Georgian scientist Zurab Davitashvili, the author of the book Nationalism and Globalization (2003), discusses the tense relations between the Georgians and ethnic minorities during the late 1980s, which are explained by him by the antagonism of ethnic minorities toward the Georgian nationalist movement. “According to the radical Georgian

50 Different authors have various views concerning the form of the Soviet Union. Hirsch for instance, talks about the state sponsored evolutionism, whose long term goal was to create the Soviet Nation, but after realizing short term goal - developing the separate nations, in order to assist rapid economic modernization process (Hirsch 2005). According to Terry Martin, “Friendship of people was the officially sanctioned metaphor of an imagined multicultural community of the Soviet Union, where the Russian and Russian culture was having the dominant position” (Martin 2001).

51 During the Soviet times the works of Chavchavadze were taught at school and since then they never lost their importance.
ethno-nationals either ethnic minorities should have supported the independence of Georgia, or should have returned to their historic homeland. The nationalism of ethnic minorities considered the nationalism of independent Georgia dangerous not only for their ethnic uniqueness, but also to their physical existence” (Davitashvili 2003: 398). These kinds of opposition between ethnic majority and minorities were intensified by strong ethnic nationalist public statements during the demonstrations: “Georgia should be only for Georgians,” “impudence of guests who became hosts in our country,” “Those who do not want to be with us, should go from where they came…” (Davitashvili 2003: 398). Thus during the strong nationalist movement large numbers of Georgian citizens, but non-ethnic Georgians, became excluded from the definition of the Georgian nation.

On April 9, 1991, after a referendum, the independent Georgian state was re-established together with the national symbols. During the first years of the Georgian independent state, the government was rightly accused of leading strong nationalist politics, especially towards ethnic minorities in Georgia. Despite the government’s nationalist politics, the constitution of Georgian state was the main law which had designed the liberal citizenship regime, different from the Baltic States for instance (see Barrington 1995), and it granted citizenship to all ethnic minorities, who were living within the territory of Georgian state when the constitution was re-established. 52 In the first stage of independent state-building, the government was promoting the idea of ‘Georgia for Georgians’, although the first president had never said it directly (Firalishvili 2007: 18). The liberal citizenship policy did not facilitate the position of non-ethnic Georgians, 53 however, and some of them were forced to leave Georgia, although they legally were members of the state. These events again support my argument that citizenship means belonging to the state, while nationality is belonging to the nation and when ethnic nationalism becomes very tense, it might become the reason for humiliating the rights of non-national citizens. Going back to Brubaker, the Soviet system of double belonging through the political and territorial frame on the one hand and through the ethnic-nationality on the other confronted Georgia, while the political boundary and ethno-national composition of the state were not overlapping with one another.

52 The “Law on Georgian Citizenship” which had further clarifications of and additions to the constitution but kept a liberal design, was promulgated in 1993.
53 I mainly talk about Russian, Armenian, Azeri, etc. ethnic minorities and exclude here Abkhaz and South Ossetians, while during that period these autonomous republics were trying to get independence from the Georgian state.
During Edward Shevardnadze’s presidency in Georgia (1995-2003), the politics toward ethnic minorities became milder, although the economic hardship of the state made some ethnic minorities seek existence in those states where they had their co-ethnics, thus ethnic Armenians were leaving for Armenia, ethnic Azerbaijanis to Azerbaijan, and so on. The Georgian language became obligatory for use in all state organizations and hence one of the obstacles for ethnic minorities to cope with. During the Soviet times, the state language was Georgian together with Russian. The ethnic minorities, residing on the territory of Georgia, had either no or little possibility of getting education on their native languages (for instance, Abkhazians had only four years of schooling in native language). The language taught and used by ethnic minorities were mostly Russian (Suny 1996), which was not any more used in the public institutions of independent Georgia. The new language policy deprived the ethnic minorities the possibility of getting employment in public sector, as well as sometime denying them getting full scale service or information from state institutions.54

In the discussion of relationship between nationality and citizenship one should mention the year 1997 (June), when the parliament of Georgia adopted the regulation, according to which the category of nationality would be deleted from national documents of identity of citizens of Georgia. There were harsh debates concerning of this topic, which lasted even until the “Rose Revolution” (2003) in the parliament of Georgia, but never was forgotten by ordinary citizens. The ordinary people, some historians, poets and leaders of the Georgian nationalist movement supported the idea of keeping both categories. Erasing the nationality category was perceived as taking away the Georgian nationality (Paichadze 2003, Dochia 2009, Chipashvili 2011). Here are some of the expressions, which were typical during that time: “We were deleted from the list of world’s nations,” “The Georgian state lost the foundation to be the ‘country of Georgians’” (in Georgian sakartvelo–meaning the place where Georgians (Kartvelebi) live), “We gave shelter to the people, who were running away from the historical disasters of their countries; now they will feel like being in their country, equal to the Georgians” [meaning ethnic Georgians] (Paichadze 2003, Dochia 2009, Chipashvili 2011). These quotes evidently carry two massages: nationality, in the understanding of people, is and should be the different from citizenship; and indication of ethnic belonging should give the priority to the members of

54 This mostly refers to ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijani people compactly living in Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti regions, as the Autonomous republic of Abkhazia and South Ossetia already declared independence, when the new language policy came to fore. For more information about the language barriers of ethnic minorities in Georgia, see Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation & Institute of Social Studies and Analysis, 2011.
‘titular’ nation to live in the country, while members of ethnic minorities should feel like guests. The members of the government and Western oriented political figures, who were the initiators of keeping only the citizenship category in the passport, were explaining to the citizens that this was important for avoiding further ethnic conflicts within the state borders. Although the category of nationality never came back in the national documents of Georgians, the issue was often revisited and discussed by the people.

Watching the news every evening was part of Sac’irians everyday life. Later they were discussing these issues with family members, neighbors or colleagues. The news was sometimes so irritating to them that they would angrily talk back to TV. Rezo, who was the average pensioner living in Sac’ire and who lost his son in the war with South Ossetia in 1992, was also very keen on watching the news every evening. Once there was a report about the purchase of a state owned factory (which was not working since the Soviet times) by foreigners. The official on TV was talking with delight, how the future investment in this factory will make this enterprise work and add to employment. Rezo had completely opposite emotions, saying that this is the next stage for the extinction of Georgians in Georgia. After asking what the first stage was, he said with immense grief: “Do not see daughter? They [meaning the Georgian government] first took our nationality from the passports, as if we are the same in this country as Armenians or Russians. Even Russians [meaning the Soviet government, T.M.] did not do this to us. Then they started to sell your property to foreigners. Chinese people are coming and settling here. Do not you know how fast they are multiplying?! We will be a minority soon in Georgia and later die out, as if there were no Georgians on this land before. I did not sacrifice my son to my country for this future” (Rezo, 66 years old). Rezo as the father of a warrior for the united Georgia, was not exception in this regard, these kinds of attitudes towards ethnic minorities, migrants, state owned property and superior rights of ethnic Georgians on Georgian land were often heard. The nationality category in the passport was perceived by locals like a hope for being in majority in Georgia, like having the ‘legitimate right’ for living in their country, which other nationalities should be lacking. The citizenship category, which gives the equal right to every bearer, does not guarantee superiority to Georgians, as it was during the Soviet times. These were the concerns of locals, while the government had other attitudes. As radical nationalist politics led to the loss of the two wars (in Abkhazia and South Ossetia)\textsuperscript{55} and

\textsuperscript{55} Alongside the nationalist movement which was taking place in Georgia from 1988, for reinstating the independent Georgian state, the informal political organizations were founded in the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, whose main goal was to support the Soviet Union, as they
the exclusion of other ethnic minorities, the Georgian government became careful in addressing nationalist sentiments. That is why the political party headed and organized by the Edward Shevardnadze was called the ‘Union of Citizens of Georgia’.  

The results of the survey support this argument. In order to understand the meaning of citizenship of Georgia for the local people, in the survey the respondents were asked the following open-ended question: “What does it mean for you to be a citizen of Georgia?” The number of given answers were reduced to three categories (see appendix A: Chart 1). The first category contains the national citizenship (43 %) and includes answers such as “proud to be a citizen of Georgia (28 %)” and “Georgians should be citizens of Georgia” (15 %). The second category is that of loyal citizenship (33 %), including answers like: “means to work for the country” (8 %), “citizenship of choice” (6 %), “poor economy, but still should be citizens of Georgia” (11 %) and “should be citizen of born and lived country” (8 %). The third category is defined as instrumental citizenship (24 %). The meaning of belonging to the state is attached sometimes to the fact that they “have no chance to become the citizens of another country” (6 %), “proud to be Georgian citizen but does not help” (6 %), or “it means nothing” (2 %), “want other citizenship” (2 %), and at last those who declare that “nationality is above citizenship for them” (6 %).

I also asked the respondents to tell me five words which are important for citizenship. In order to save the space, I will take the categories which were mostly mentioned and just conclude how often they mentioned each of them among the five most important words (see Appendix A: Chart 2). From 100 respondents 67 % mentioned “job” as the important word for perceived the independence of Georgia as the danger for them. After the radical ethno-nationalists came to power in Georgia, they started to talk about granting only a cultural autonomy to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In December, 1990, South Ossetia proclaimed the status of autonomous republic, while the government of Georgia abolished the autonomous status of previous autonomous oblast. This was the cause for the beginning of the armed conflict, which ended in 1992, when Edward Shevardnadze came to power and ceased the fire. South Ossetia announced independence, while the IDPs from the South Ossetia are still living on the territory of Georgia. The same scenario developed in the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia in 1992 (Davitashvili 2003). Today the number of registered IDPs (altogether from Abkhazia and South Ossetia from 1990s and from 2008) is 259 thousand persons (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009).

56 The political party ‘Union of Citizens of Georgia’ was founded in 1995, shortly before parliamentary elections. From 1995 till 2002 the party was winning the majority of places in the parliament of Georgia.

57 I have to mention a problem related to this question. It is possible that the previous question (“In your opinion should the state be a source of pride and loyalty for the citizens?”) somehow influenced the answers to this question. It seems that respondents connected the state with citizenship and took the attributes mentioned in the previous question. So a large part of the respondents (28 %), instead of explaining the meaning that citizenship has for them, just answered, that “Georgian citizenship is source of pride for them”. After asking for further clarification, why citizenship was a source of pride, they mentioned sometimes the “great and long history”, sometimes “holy religion”, or “beautiful nature of the country”. That is why I put such answers into the category of national citizenship.
citizenship, 63% mentioned “wealth,” 50% “health care,” 41% “caring state,” 36% “cheap products” and 34% “education”. These results are clearly indicating that most of the respondents first of all see their social entitlements in the citizenship notion (I call this group [favoring] “social citizenship”). The emotional aspect which should be the part of the national or loyal citizenship presented in the previous question was less important for this question on citizenship: 15% mentioned patriotism as an important word for citizenship and development of Georgia for 14% (I call this group [supporting] “national citizenship”). Under the citizenship concept some citizens see their civil rights - freedom for 19% and regulating state for 12% (thus, I called this group [favoring] “civil citizenship”). The words explaining the nature of the state and situation in the country had also less significance among these answers. Peace is an important word for 28% of respondents, security for 18% and “good social relations between people” (people meaning the different nations) which was mentioned by 33% of respondents (I call this group [expecting] “physical security”).

The analysis of the quantitative material also shows that the emic understanding of citizenship (mentioning the most important words for citizenship) mostly includes social entitlements (work, salary, education, health care, security) which should be provided by the government. One fourth of the population includes civil rights and rights to be secured in the country under the ethnic understanding of citizenship, but again here they put forward the obligations the state has towards them. This understanding of citizenship indicates that within their legal status people highlight legal entitlements and do not emphasize nationality and the national aspiration any further than it being the basis of their citizenship.

The policy of the last government, who came into power after the ‘Rose Revolution’ (2003), is distinguished by the efforts to attach national affiliations to the citizenship status and to raise the importance of the state as a polity requiring emotional belonging for the ethnic and non-ethnic Georgian people. Florian Mühlfried argues that the Georgian state cannot provide the citizens with sufficient social citizenship, and points out to the growing significance of ethnic and religious affiliations among Georgian population: “[...] the decline of the welfare state causes a crisis in social and individual identifications with the state, or a dilemma of

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58 I combined “regulating state” with the “civil citizenship”, because the respondents implicate under this the state which preserves their economic rights and property, and protects the right to a fair trial.
59 Florian Mühlfried is using the term social citizenship in the sense Marshall (1950) using it, comprising “everything needed to be a full member of society” (Mühlfried 2014: 120). We will discuss the issue of social citizenship in Chapter 6: Social citizenship: Theoretical discussions of social citizenship, case study (TSA Program).
belonging: the state holds to its supreme right to exercise power, but fails as a provider. As a result, group solidarities based on ethnic or regional affiliation gain in importance” (Mühlfried 2014: 120). The strong affiliations with the ethnic and religious sentiments are also visible in my field site. The weak social security provided by the state might not be the only reason for these outcomes; we should also regard them as the left-over of the socialist past; nation perceived from the perspective of ethnic nationalism and the orthodox religion as an undistinguishable part of being Georgian and the latter was imagined separately from the realm of the Soviet state, which was perceived as the guarantor of their welfare.

4.2 State and the socialization of ‘good citizens’ in Georgia

While writing about governing the population, Michel Foucault points out two tools used by government for attaining its ends – direct acts, like large-scale campaigns, and indirect acts, “[...] techniques that make possible, without the full awareness of the people, the stimulation of birth rate, directing the flow of population into certain regions or activities, and so on” (Foucault 2000: 217). The art of politics used by the government does not decrease the importance of the governed; according to Foucault the prosperity of population is the main end of the government, not the process of governing itself; that is why he names the last type of western state “the state of government,” which is “defined by the mass of population” (ibid.). The various tactics help the government to keep its position, to have the power and rule the people, even for the sake of people. In this sense campaigns and techniques which consciously or unconsciously affect the population are the strong weapon, for governor and for the governed. In this subchapter, I will present some of the campaigns and tactics used by the government of Georgia after the ‘Rose Revolution’. The ‘Rose Revolution’ became like the demarcating line for the history of independent Georgian state and the basis for further hopes of building a better state. Even if one does not want to engage at length with this political change, one cannot deny the prominence of new state policy in increasing the importance of the state and in connecting the national sentiments to the state. Furthermore, the new government developed new methods of its representation, in order to be more acceptable for the people. Even if we consider these technologies as part of governmentality we cannot deny that they have long term effect on the people’s perception of nation and state, and should be considered here. Within these policies, I will refer only those which were visible in my field site or were mentioned by my informants.
4.3 National symbols

The role of national symbols for national sentiments is unquestionable: Thomas Eriksen, for instance, citing Abner Cohen (1974b) points out that “politics cannot be purely instrumental, but must always involve symbols which have the power of creating loyalty and a feeling of belongingness” (Eriksen 1999: 101). Writing about the symbols of nations and nationalism, Gabriella Elgenius indicates several meanings national symbols carry: making a nation visible, measure its success, express complex meanings related to nationhood, raise awareness of membership, etc. According to her, the national flag is “[...] not only a piece of cloth fluttering in the wind; it makes claims to a historical territory, independence and nationhood. Flags have remained successful political symbols because they authenticate boundaries between those who belong and those who do not” (Elgenius 2011: 3). After the ‘Rose Revolution’ one of the first changes in the state system was the change of national symbols: national flag, anthem and emblem. To go back again to Gabriella Elgenius, by creating and (re)creating the national symbols regimes demarcate the boundaries with the past and celebrate the emergence of new or new type of nation-states (ibid.). Before 2004 the three colored national flag, revived from the first Georgian state (1918-21) was symbolizing the nationalist movement of the 1980s and later was connected with the first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia.60 One could not say that the first national flag did not have importance or people did not recognize it. But it can be observed that it was not yet a distinguishable part of state organizations (like schools and administrative buildings, or other public spaces), when compared to the present situation (see photo #16). “The five crosses of King David II (1089-1125) are flying over all public buildings and symbolize the irreversible break with the Soviet past, reaffirming Georgia’s Christian legacy and consequently expressing its European orientation” (Balci and Motika 2007: 336). The connection with history (the flag used by the most powerful Georgian king), connection with religion, light colors and new connotation, made the new national flag an effective symbol which is used in new and daring ways by the Georgian people. People started to decorate their houses, and walls of the rooms with this national flag as well as wearing T-shirts with Georgian national emblems. One of the villagers in the study had the national flag in his yard. He

60Zviad Gamsaxurdia was dissident, scientist and writer, and became the first democratically elected President of Georgia in October 1990 and left the post in January 1992, after a coup d’état. The supporters of the first president, after this coup were constantly appearing with these flags, demanding the resignation of the government, which later came to power by means of the coup.
mentioned that his neighbor teased him for having the flag in the yard: “I replied him, the flag does not matter, one should love the cross!” The crosses on the national flag may have increased the religious aspirations and identification of the citizens of Georgia.

The anthem is the second important national symbol, which became also very important. I remember the accusation of the Georgian national football players for not knowing the words of the first national anthem of independent Georgia and not singing it before the matches. I would say that it is the first national anthem which the Georgian citizens know by heart, and they sing it even during weddings. Besides the delightful text of the anthem (which is a mixture of a poem from the 19th century and the poem of a contemporary poet), the government was financing several video clips, where the anthem was performed by the classical and popular singers, by older generation or the young ones. Thus the government promoted the national symbols to make them acceptable for every generation which worked quite successfully.

4.4 Civil education at school for citizenship

After the independence the school text books have been gradually revised. The citations from Marxism-Leninism gradually disappeared, while texts on the Georgian history, religion and language took their place. During the Soviet times all the schools within the same language sector were using the same text books. Nowadays, for each subject teachers have the freedom to choose among dozens of available text books.

The nationalist motives dominate now the classes of Georgian history, literature, and themes during the school festivals in the secondary education. Levan Berdzenishvili61 in his public lecture argues as follows: “The majority of the teachers [of Georgian language and literature] do not know the grammar of Georgian language, do not know literature, do not care about the style of the writing, composition, artistic way of expression, symbols, metaphors, etc. Then why does s/he go to the class? What does s/he teach the pupils? S/he is teaching Georgian nationalism, which was formed during Socialist times and today carries unbelievable anachronism – that we are not Russians, that our classical writer is better than writers of others... One should admit that during socialist times these teachers were doing a good job. That time teaching of Georgian nationalism was more important, than teaching Georgian grammar and

61Levan Berdzenishvili is a former political prisoner from the Soviet times; later he became the general director of the National Library of Georgia. In 2004-2008 he was a parliamentarian. Now he is the leader of the Republican Party of Georgia and from the 2012 parliamentary elections onwards a member of the parliament.
literature, but nowadays it became our problem” (Berdzenishvili 2003: 6). To overcome the nationalist sentiments and attachment of education to more state-oriented studies was one of the tasks of the new government. According to the new policy the classes of the civil education, human rights and/or law were included in the new curriculum.

4.5 Promoting the importance of Georgian army and creating the youth holiday clubs named as ‘patriots’

One of the first aims of the government after the ‘Rose Revolution’ was to strengthen the Georgian army. It was also reflected in the state budget, which the defense budget increased by ten times after Shevardnadze’s presidency (Darchiashvili 2005: 146). The representatives of the US military forces have been training the Georgian army. Besides the actual changes, the government steered to promote the importance of having strong military forces, praising those who served in the Georgian army. Furthermore, the political and the cultural elites also supported the necessity of the militarist mobilization of Georgian society and creating works of art devoted to military subjects.

Besides the efforts of improving the conditions in the Georgian conventional army, additional strategy was developed by the government. In 2006 the parliament of Georgia promulgated the law about the military-reserve service. The idea of this law was to train people, in order to have minimal military skills, that in the time of emergency they could take part in military actions. The 18 days training became the obligatory for every male citizen of Georgia (between 27 and 40 years old; women also can take part in it) once a year. To give an example of ordinary people, the first generation of reservists were from the government, including members of the parliament, although they were free from such obligation. In 2007 the number of the people who did military-reserve service was 20 000, although the Ministry of National Guard was planning that 100 000 of citizens will be trained and re-trained till 2012 (Newspaper Resonance 31 March, 2007). To promote the military-reserve service, the National Guard prepared several video clips (with sensitive appeals showing a wife telling her husband that he should protect his homeland, his city, his house and his family) which were broadcasted by various TV channels. The political and ideological effort had its results: the better economic conditions of the Georgian army and promoted patriotic ideas behind it incited more Georgian men to complete military service which before was avoided in every possible way. In the area
of study, there were some young men who have became or planning to become ‘reservist’; all of them belonged to the district administration or the state financed organizations. Nevertheless, there were differences between and within generations. More young people (under 30 years old) declared their readiness to serve in Georgian army (those with better economic conditions were less willing), while the middle or older generation, who themselves did military service in the Soviet army, were more skeptical towards the new reforms. On the one hand the locals admitted that strengthening the national army was a mean for re-unification of the self-declared territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the other hand the large expenses for the defense annoyed them. The same person, who had the flag in his yard and loved it because of its religious meaning, while talking about the current politics denounced the large expenses on the military forces and explained it as such: “I am dreaming to live till that time that Abkhazia and Ossetia will be returned. I know that is very important to strengthen Georgian army, but he [the president] should also care for the people. Time passes and I see lots of poor people around” (Leri, 57 years old, 2007). The strengthening of the military forces of Georgia was in a way the result of international pressure on the government, who was and is eager to be integrated into the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). While this pressure was unknown (or ignored) by the population they were trying to find their own interpretation of the reforms in the military: “What do they want to teach in 18 days? Nothing! Don’t you know, how to use the weapon yourself? These reservists are created to make money! When a million men pass it, they will make huge amounts of money. They will steal little butter, little sugar [from the menu of the soldiers] and that’s it!” (Conversation in the village mini bus, 2006).

The enormous increase of the military budget sometimes irritated people, since their pensions were not getting higher. But their annoyance was reserved in order not to seem unpatriotic. Here I will cite Rezo, who had lost his son in the war with South Ossetia in 1992: “When I lost my son, I was saying that if my homeland needs it I will also take the weapon and go to the war. I am saying it even today! I brought up my son with great effort and lost him as a 26 years old man. Is this not sorrowful? We need peace! Of course we need peace, but when I go to bed with empty stomach I forget about the peace” (Rezo, 2007). The war in August 2008 showed that there is a reverse connection between strengthening the military forces and peace.

Besides promoting the importance of the Georgian army, the government created youth leisure camps called ‘Patriots’. The youth camps which were quite popular during Soviet times (and was called camps of Pioneers) had disappeared together with the Soviet regime. ‘Patriots’ were the first Georgian youth camps organized during summers within the special presidency
program. As the organizers describe, the main aim of the youth camps is nurturing patriotic aspirations, while the everyday schedule for the ‘patriots’ includes physical training, cultural, cognitive and sport events, marches and excursions (Ministry of Sport and Youth Affairs of Georgia 2011). I met several boys in the village who had participated in these ‘patriotic’ camps. They were very happy for having had the chance to take part in the youth camp and displayed it by wearing the T-shirts, caps and vests with the symbols of the ‘patriotic’ camp.

Levan Berdzenishvili, in his public lecture questions the patriotism of a person who says that s/he will not let his/her son go to the Georgian army. Simultaneously, he explains that “patriotism will not form only by being based on the efforts of citizens. The state should create the kind of army, which will be profitable and glorious for the citizens to serve in” (Berdzenishvili 2003: 9). This lecture was held before the ‘Rose Revolution’. Although the state put all its efforts to improve the image of the Georgian army and the economic conditions in it, I still met several people during my fieldwork who expressed their great love and devotion towards Georgia as a country, but searched different ways to avoid the military service. Expressing their devotion towards the nation while putting aside the main obligation towards it once again points to the gap between the understandings of a state and a nation among local people.

4.6 Orthodoxy as an element of Georgian nationality and the use of religion as a way of representation for the government

From the time of Ilia Chavchavadze, almost nobody questions the role and importance of Orthodox Christianity as an element of Georgian nationality. Religious revival took place in Georgia along with other Soviet successor states during the last decade of the Soviet regime. Orthodox Christianity was perceived as an undistinguishable part of Georgian identity (see Lilienfeld 1993). Ethnic minorities with other confessions were excluded from the imagination of Georgian nation, while ethnic Georgian but Muslim Ajarians had difficulties “to identify simultaneously with Islam and the Georgian nation” (Pelkmans 2006: 122). Gradually the significance of the church has been increasing within the Georgian population as well as within the state structure. In 2001 the constitution of Georgia added the clause on “the exceptional role of the Georgian Orthodox Church in Georgia’s history”, even if it also declares the freedom of faith and the independence of the church from the state (Georgian Constitution, paragraph 8).
In the following section I highlight the importance of religion in my fieldsite. All of my respondents declared themselves being followers of the Orthodox Church. While talking about religion, one should say that there is a dual understanding of being religious in Georgia. In the cities being religious means to attend church services, to keep a fast and to follow all the religious dogmas. If we take this understanding as the criteria for defining followers of religion, most of the villagers from my field site will not be considered as such. There is a strong religious affiliation in the village, which one could call traditional religiosity. It includes the self-definition of being a follower of a religion, doing certain religious rituals (like baptizing the child, church wedding and/or receiving the Eucharist for dead person) and celebrating religious festivals. Besides the standard religious festivals, there were two festivals in my field site which included the pilgrimage to the close religious sites, in which many villagers took part (especially the youth). The rules of behavior for this kind of pilgrimage were sometimes different from understanding of the ‘proper religious behavior’, from the point of view of the Church. For instance, the locals used to sacrifice sheep (or other animals or cocks) at these shrines (see photo #17), which includes bringing the animal to the shrine, circling the shrine several times, slaughtering the sheep and holding the feast near the shrine (in one case they would slaughter the sheep, in the other case people let the animals go, if on that day people are not supposed to eat meat). Furthermore, people put coins and cash on the stones of the shrines, light candles, or bind small cotton pieces on the ‘trees of wishes’, which are quite near to the shrines. During the festival I was attending, the priests, who were doing the service at the shrines, were teaching pilgrims how to behave ‘properly’.\footnote{Actually it is quite new that priests are doing service in the shrines. Similarly, in the case of Tusheti, described by Florian Mühlfried, these places were pre-Christian shrines and there were no churches or services before (2014).} They were telling people to give the sheep and other animals to the representatives of the church, and not to put the money on the stones but give it to certain persons (who were making lists of people, with the names) and their names will be announced during the church service, and so on (see photo #18). The difference between traditional religious behavior and what the church promoted was also visible during other religious festivals. For instance, in West Georgia, during Easter people visit the graves of their ancestors, put colored eggs there and drink the toasts in the name of the dead. In the villages it is an important day, and most of the villagers gather at the cemetery, visiting the graves of other people, and hold a big feast in the cemetery. The church actually declares that people should visit the cemeteries on the next day, the day of commemoration of dead people, while the Easter-
Sunday is the day of religious festival and has nothing to do with death. This tradition, however, is kept in the villages and most of the migrants come back for the Easter to express their respect to the ancestors.

The decline of full religious activities in the countryside during the Soviet period was a result of the Soviet atheist ideology and oppressive policy which destroyed and converted many churches to other uses (schools, warehouses or storage facilities). Tamara Dragadze writes about the domestication of religious life in the Abari village in 1970s, when “people shifted most rituals of religious significance to their homes alone” (2001[1988]: 71). The church of Kašueti in the village of Sac‘ire which had a long history (from 12th century onwards) was destroyed alongside with other churches by the communists (see photo #19). So during the Soviet times the believers had to go to the Gelati church near to Kutaisi (which belongs to T’q‘ibulî district and most of the peasants in pre-socialist times belonged to this church) which is 27 km away from the village. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the religious practices were reactivated in the public sphere, although in the village without a functioning church, the domestic unit still stays one of the important spaces for carrying out religious rites. Many families have in their houses a corner for religious items, which is decorated with religious icons, crosses, religious books or Bibles and the pictures of dead person(s) from the family (see photo #20). They also light candles there. Other than these private religious activities, the villagers have built a small shrine (with their own means) at the top of the village, next to the sanatorium, where they go, put candles and pray as they do in the ruins of Kašueti church (see photo #21). Another way of expressing religious aspirations is to hoist high iron crosses (decorated with the string of lights) in different places of the village, which became prominent practice all over Georgia. Thus from the point of view of the church, the villagers might not be ‘proper followers’ of the Orthodox Church, but the described religious behavior is an important aspect of the lives of villagers and is a part of Georgian national identity.

The members of the government, including the president, present themselves as followers of the Georgian Orthodox Church. This is one way of legitimizing their power, appropriating the image of believers, thus of proper Georgians. Here I could mention two cases from the district of T’q‘ibulî. The first was during the opening of the railway in T’q‘ibulî in 2006. The president came for the day and he opened the waiting hall of the railway station as well as being the first passenger of the new train. He was accompanied by the local bishop, who was sitting next to him. In the second case, the municipality of T’q‘ibulî district opened a new water pipeline for the city in 2007. The same bishop opened the pipe tap himself, while the head
of the T’q’ibuli municipality said that from then on the water of the city will be blessed. Both events were covered by local media. To be known as a follower of church is an important part of the political image. During my fieldwork, I have heard rumors about an official being accused of being a Jehovah’s Witness. It was clear that this kind of religious affiliation (which was based on gossips) had damaged his reputation among the population. Furthermore, when I inquired why was he perceived as such, people said that he never shows up in church or on religious festivals. To 'save their image', the members of the government try hard to take part in religious festivals and that their deeds are blessed by god (or by priests) as the water of T’q’ibuli city.

To conclude, the Orthodox Christian aspirations are increasingly associated with Georgian nationality, and the Church is trying to standardize the behavior of church followers and to regain the public influence after a long history of domestication. Simultaneously, the members of the government try to present themselves as religious individuals and associate themselves with the church. As religion is an effective way of ethnic mobilization, the new government started to link the political and social events with significant religious dates (e.g. the ‘Rose Revolution’ happened on the Saint George's Day, Aslan Abashidze, the autocratic Adjarian leader, resigned on 6th of May 2004 on second commemoration day of Saint George (Iakobashvili-Firalishvili 2007: 58)). It is a successful strategy for mystifying government and politics. However, it remains an open question, whether it will intensify the belonging of the non-orthodox citizens to the state or whether the blurred boundaries between religion and state will be a helpful strategy for building the nation-state.

The main argument of this subchapter is that citizenship means legal belonging to the state, while nationality is belonging to the nation (or to the country). People express their devotion towards the country while putting their rights over the obligations toward the state. The government is trying to improve its image using different policies: emphasizing the importance of national symbols, of the Georgian army, and civil education at schools and through close relations with the church. The last governmental policies point out the state’s efforts to further the national connotation of citizenship as well as the image of the state, which is sometimes not internalized by the citizens. But if this process continues in the same manner, one could expect that Georgian citizens might increasingly become national citizens as well, but it will take some time.
4.7 The state and government in the perception of local people

Discussing the place of the ‘state’ in the anthropological studies, Veena Das and Deborah Poole admit, that historically this discipline did not study the state as the targeted populations were often on margins of the state, being stateless, living in weak or failed states. Despite this fact, they acknowledge that anthropologists were always dealing with the state while writing about order, authority or power which were making society to work according to some rules. In order to grasp the essence of the state, where it is less visible, in the distant localities, or as they call it at the margins of nation-states, “[...] the task of the anthropologist becomes that of first sighting instances of the state as it exists on the local level and then analyzing those local manifestations of bureaucracy and law as culturally informed interpretations or appropriations of the practices and forms that constitute the modern liberal state” (Das and Poole 2004: 6). Understanding the state in this stance means studying the actual practices as well as the ideas (interpretations) about the state which exist within the targeted population. I would say that the actual practices or relations between the bureaucrats and local people are the enactment of the state, and that the main source of the political system to be present in its different corner of its territory is important; even though it may seem that the state does not affect the people in the mind of anthropologist. Then where is the picture of the state created and recreated by and for people? According to Akhil Gupta, singular persons (based on their position in the society) imagine state from different sources: “Bureaucrats, for example, imagine it through statistics (Hacking 1982), official reports, and tours, whereas citizens do so through newspaper stories, dealings with particular government agencies, the pronouncements of politicians, and so forth. Constructions of the state clearly vary according to the manner in which different actors are positioned. It is therefore important to situate a certain symbolic construction of the state with respect to the particular context in which it is realized” (Gupta 2006: 229).

In order to construct the particular context where the Georgian state is imagined by the local people, I will use another theoretical conception of Akhil Gulta and James Ferguson. In the article “Spatializing states: toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality”, the authors talk about two dimensions of the images of the state – verticality and encompassment. According to them verticality means that the state is “[...] an institution somehow ‘above’ civil society, community, and family. Thus, state planning is inherently ‘top down’ and state actions are efforts to manipulate and plan ‘from above,’ while ‘the grassroots’ contrasts with the state
precisely in that it is ‘below,’ closer to the ground, more authentic, and more ‘rooted.’ The second image is that of encompassment: Here the state (conceptually fused with the nation) is located within an ever widening series of circles that begins with family and local community and ends with the system of nation-states” (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 982). These images of the state are constructed by various actors as well as by citizens and the sources of this imagination vary accordingly. I argue that the geographical position of the communities defines how much ‘above’ they would perceive the state. Peripheries in this sense imagine the state much distanced, untouched at least for the local actors. Veena Das admits that the state as a rational entity is represented in the rules and institutions, which makes these rules work (Das 2004). Generally, enactment of law takes place in the ‘below’ level and in this process different layers participate; citizens understand and utilize these laws individually, according to the context they live in. The process of enactment of law sometimes gets different directions, than it was intended by the central government and supports the process of creating the ‘above’ and ‘below’ image of the state. The ‘above’ image of the state is an image of distanced state, which is alienated from the communities’ everyday life; this is the legislative state, which puts pressure on peripheries by producing new regulations, restrictions and policies. But if we understand the everyday activity of local bureaucrats and the enactment of the regulations and the policies under the ‘below’ image of the state, then this ‘below’ image is embodied into the local community, where the boundaries between the officials and ordinary people are blurred and the strictness of ‘above’ politics is inscribed into the ways of local life. In order to make this argument more clearly, I will refer to examples from my field site which deal with forest wood appropriation.

4.8 Local practice of forest wood appropriation

T’q’ibuli district is one of the richest regions with natural resources such as coal, granite, agate, kaolin, and timber. After the ‘Rose Revolution’ (2003) control on practice of extraction and usage of the natural resources including timber was significantly restricted, which reflected on the T’q’ibuli district as well. Despite the fact that the village Sac’ire is surrounded with a forest belt, after thorough examination it occurred that the coverage was significantly thinned. The practice of cutting down becomes more acute in winter. Although the district is constantly supplied with electricity, it is not used for heating, as the price is very high. Natural gas which is relatively cheap source of heating is unavailable in this area. In winter the population mainly
uses wood stoves for heating. On average, one truck filled with firewood costs 350-400 GEL (ca. 175-200 euro) which can be enough for a family of five throughout the whole winter, if used economically (see photo #22). Some families try to avoid this expense and gather firewood in the forest and carry them with small carts or cut down trees in their yards. During the one year of fieldwork I did not meet a single family which used local coal for heating. The population refuses to use the coal for two reasons: on the one hand the locals say that the price on coal does not differ greatly from firewood. On the other hand, they connect it with health. They consider that burning coal produces substances which cause heart diseases. These two not so solid arguments motivate the population of T’q’ibuli to engage in illegal cutting of firewood.

The regulation of forest management has changed several times since the socialist era. In 1995 on the basis of former collective farm woods, T’q’ibuli municipal woods and state woods formed T’q’ibuli forestry which was included in Forestry State department and its whole area was 31 824 hectares. In 1995, five forestry areas were defined and 54 forest protectors would have to work there. Each protector had to control 300-400 hectares of forest. Their salary was financed from the state budget and in 1995-2003 its amount contained 18 GEL (ca. 9 euro). Forest cut down was regulated by the law, according to which during a year after the protector’s consent they could cut down 10 year old timber. Despite the existence of the law, cutting down the wood has exceeded the established standards for years and was carried out with violations.

One protector confessed that woodland in T’q’ibuli is fully destroyed, though they justify the fact as follows: “the forest is destroyed… For many years it has saved the population from cold and freezing… the problem that they are destroyed is one thing, but in Soviet times they were collective forests, which were permanently used by the population. But energy problems were not so vital in those times and they had alternative means of heating – gas and electricity. Natural gas does not exist here at all, either it is expensive…” (Temuri, 45 years old, May, 2007). The protector recognizes the fact of forest destruction and justifies it with the needs of the population, as the only way of their physical survival. But he also accentuated the fact, that during the Soviet times, locals had free access to the woodlands.

Forest wood appropriation was caused not only because there were no alternative means of heating but because it was used as timber. T’q’ibuli woodland is mainly covered with chestnut and beech trees, in the north at the border of Rač’a there are mostly fir and spruce trees.

63I asked the local population to calculate the difference in price between firewood and coal. The difference contained approximately 80 GEL during a winter (ca. 40 euro) which corresponded to a monthly pension at that time.
Chestnut trees are widely used for making furniture and timber. According to my observations there are not less than two furniture shops which produce doors, windows and furniture from the valuable timber and mainly sell them in Tbilisi and Kutaisi. Local population remarked that number of trucks carried timber mostly at night time.

In 2005, there was another reform and T’q’ibuli forestry became part of Ministry of Environment Protection and Natural Resources of Georgia. Municipal and state forests were divided as well, but the forests were controlled only by local staff. The status of forest protectors was changed into rangers and their salary increased up to 120 GEL (ca. 60 euro) and their obligations grew as well (rangers have more police functions and controlled territory for one ranger is 4000 hectares). After 2005 according to the information of T’q’ibuli forestry protector, trees are not cut down for timber any more. But the population is supplied with firewood through the process of rejuvenation of damaged trees. The ranger remarked that since 2005 till May, 2007 there were 10 cases of illegal timber cutting in T’q’ibuli district. Correspondingly, legal proceedings on misappropriation were instituted. After counting the losses, these persons were sentenced to either administrative or criminal punishment or both.

During my field work I witnessed one person (out of ten) who was sentenced by the administration for cutting timber. He was upset because of the penalty, saying that the new government oppresses the population as much as they can. When I asked him about the local officials, he said: “They can do nothing! It’s the government from above who pushes them to do so; they [local officials, T.M.] get the salary for this. Furthermore, he said [meaning ranger] if I have told him beforehand, they would have ‘settled’ the case, but it was already late!” (Dato, 41 years old, 2007). The explanation of this local individual concerning the punishment for illegal behavior shows interesting point about the ‘above’ image of the state, which puts pressure on local people, while the local bureaucracy is executing their duty. The image of the distanced and unattached state, which is responsible for the promulgating strict rules, is recreated by the local authorities. When they cannot do but to execute the law or refuse the locals for the support or resources asked, they always indicate to the ‘above’ state, putting the whole responsibility on them. It is the same with the social support program. When the villagers are annoyed by the denial of social assistance, and ask the district administration about the justification, they are always pointed to the computer, which is calculating the social assistance
qualification score for each applicant. The social agents, who evaluate the economic situation of the family, try to deflect the blame away.

Since 2005 control on timber has become restricted. Accordingly, if a village resident cuts down a tree without permission, he will have problems either with local self-government bodies or ranger, and if he can’t ‘settle the problem’ the case can be referred to the court. But it does not mean that the forest is protected. Most of the population buys firewood for heating and it is difficult to say that the bought firewood is cut down legally (or it is not dried or it is the part of rejuvenated trees). It is interesting that firewood is mostly sold by representatives of self-government bodies or people working in the forest control system. In this case it is quite difficult to investigate the case thoroughly as we face the violation of law which is sheltered by the personal influence of the public officer.

Despite the fact that the law is stricter today, the strictness is not enough to stop some citizens. In May 2007 one of my informants, who is considered a very authoritative person in T’q’ibuli district, received a called. He was asked to be a mediator with the representative of authorities to give a legal document for illegal cutting down of chestnut timber. The timber was to be brought to Tbilisi. The informant was not surprised with the call and he did not have critical attitude towards the caller. When I asked why he had agreed to do the illegal and risky act, he answered that he had an obligation to the caller and could not refuse. The same kind of feeling of ‘obligation’ made the representative of local state agent to issue the document on legal cutting down of timber and in the result, it was safely delivered to Tbilisi. As it was found, my informant had done so many ‘things’ for the local state agent (in this case it was a political support) that he could not refuse and the problem was ‘easily’ settled. It became clear from our conversation that such ‘mediation’ is quite unpleasant for him but according to him: “it is impossible to live in the society the other way; each person needs the other one here” (Vakhtang, 47 years old).

Since the priority of the state is to protect natural resources, just the tool which has to serve to reach the goal, local bureaucracy (local self-governing bodies, forestry protectors) works against policy of the central government. Reorganization of the local structures, increasing of salaries or new regulations do not help much for controlling the extraction and usage of natural resources. The representatives of local self-government bodies who themselves

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64I discuss more details of this case in Chapter 6: Social citizenship: Theoretical discussions of social citizenship, case study (TSA Program)
assist cutting down and exporting of timber illegally, don’t ideologically agree with the state policy on restricting the law on natural resources. They consider that the resource must be available for the population. An authorized person of one community has his own version regarding the disposal of the forestry wood: “I consider it more reasonable to pass the forest to peasants. It was this way earlier; the so called ‘ancient’ (ancestors’) forests belonged to families. The peasants needed and they looked after it. They cut down and built what was necessary to” (David, 42 years old, 2006). Besides, such policy can be profitable for the citizens, the mechanism of forest protection is still obscure. The population still cuts down surrounding wood land explained as, “they have no other way out”. It is not clear yet what will refrain them from wood destruction if they obtain an ownership of forest.

Demand to have free access to resources is mainly connected with socialist practice, when they had free (but not legal) access to state owned property. During postsocialist times the local population has nothing left from collective farms except the privatized land. Exceptions are only some cases when apparatusiks (functionaries of the Communist Party) of collective farms bought some buildings, transport and mechanization means at minimal prices. The population has expectations, that the government should supply them with mechanization, fuel and provide access to sell their production output, while the government declares that it follows liberal policy and does its best to stay out of the affairs of the business dealings. Under the conditions of non-existence or not enough state subsidies to agriculture, local population under-utilizes privatized lands, and seeks other sources of income. Just one of the sources of income is cutting down, and processing of timber, making doors, windows and furniture. Even though the activity is illegal, the population does not criticize it. According to the locals, this kind of economic activity is a source of people’s physical survival, given that the state is not socialist and cannot provide them with jobs, free healthcare, due pensions and other social assistances. Though I often tried to connect illegal forest cut down with ecological issues, T’q’ibulians do not recognize this as a real threat.

It is important to touch on one more issue, after the ‘Rose Revolution’ one of the priorities of the government was to sell the state owned assets (e.g. factories and lands), including woodland. The population assesses the position quite negatively, perceiving it as giving away the state holdings which were created by their own labor (this was the opinion of
middle or old aged people): “What is Bendukidze\(^{65}\) selling? What has he created in Georgia? Nothing! Now he came from Russia and is selling your labor. We built these factories, these territories by our labor. They [meaning central government] say when we came there was not much left in Georgia. They destroyed and damaged the labor of 80 years. What do they sell so eagerly? And if they do, why they do not increase the pension of the people who built them? I am talking about pensioners because they built these factories” (Manana, 62 years old, 2007).

Unlike privatization of factories and plants, when the case concerns natural resources like land and forestry woods the local population becomes more critical and they consider that with land privatization the government sells inheritance of their ancestors and of Georgian people. And giving away state property to foreign investors is equal to ‘selling Georgia’ to them. The state gives woodlands away for 50 years with the right of possession and disposal putting it up for auction. In order to protect the local population’s priority the auction is held in two stages. At first stage only local residents have a right to participate in it and if there is not a buyer the second stage is held, where the buyer’s origin does not matter. The locals have no idea about this law and they still consider that their rights as members of this country are violated by the auctions.

In 2006-2007 a myth of Chinese migrants was very popular in Georgia: Chines, who came to Georgia and were allegedly granted civic rights and purchased forests and properties. The myth became stronger with the fact that migrants from China appeared, opening small shops in various cities of Georgia. During my one year fieldwork in T’q’ibuli neither local citizens nor I saw Chinese people there, even though the locals showed me boundaries of woodland that Chinese ‘had bought’. The information about the selling the state owned property was refuted by T’q’ibuli Registry office, but the myth was quite popular, increasing the nationalist aspirations among the locals and also extent of annoyance toward state officials who did not care for their people: “If we collect brushwood we will be arrested and the forests are sold to Chinese! Who gave them the right? The territories are watered with the blood of our ancestors and they [central government] sell it! May be soon we will be sold as the slaves of the Chinese! (Otar, 57 years old, 2007).

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\(^{65}\)Kakha Bendukidze was a Georgian politician and former businessman in Russia. Bendukidze returned to Georgia after the ‘Rose Revolution’ and in 2004 became Minister for Economics of Georgia. From 2004 to 2008, he was State Minister on reforms coordination, coordinating government efforts to improve the economy. Within the population he is known as the person who sold the state holdings to foreign investors.
In the conversation with locals the subject of giving them the forests in the ownership
didn’t arise. Though they mentioned that local population must have a right to cut firewood in
the forest for their physical survival. However, the boundary between firewood and sale of
valuable timber is unclear. If the woodland remains in the possession of the state, for the locals
it means the preservation of their ancestors’ inheritance and also a ‘right’ (but more correct will
be the ability) to use this resource as they used it during the Soviet times. It can be said that the
attitudes were passed on from socialist period. The locals will not go to other persons’ lots and
will not cut trees there, however they would like to do this in state forests. As they say, what
belongs to the state also belongs to people and they have a right to do it. This is an additional
reason why they are concerned about the fact of selling the forest to the ‘Chinese’, as they know
that it will be private property and it will be inviolable.

In connection with possession of woodland, we can figure out two criteria according to
which the population considers the use of the forest legal: a) physical security (it does not only
mean heating, it means economic activity which is essential for them) and b) the ‘right’ of locals
(it includes two aspects: historical - my ancestors lived here and in Soviet times the land
belonged to collective farms and we had access to use it.). These two factors are not only
arguments to justify the use of woods by the locals but by local state actors and forestry officers
as well. Sometimes illegal cut down of trees is the main source of income for local officials, as
the government pays them insufficiently low salary. Furthermore, to support local population
with the firewood and timber is a ‘social obligation’ of local bureaucrats towards the local
citizens. They are involved in a number of social relations in the district and according to one
authority they are ‘potential relatives of each other’ and one must help relatives in Georgia.

In the village context, violation of the state law is a widespread practice: “In many, if
not all, parts of the world, villagers enter into relations and cooperation with civic servants
because the latter provide access to various resources such as connections outside the village or
economic resources such as salaries or project funds. But many local civic servants not only
provide social security resources, they also depend on local resources for their own social
security. Some may receive low salaries so they engage in other economic activities, for which
they need to maintain good connections. Also, they might be from the same village and after
retirement may be in need of care. The degree of mutual dependency and social security needs
influence the establishment of closer or looser links” (Thelen, Cartwright and Sikor 2008: 3).
The close relations between local authorities and villagers among others cause occasional
violations of law and failure to implement state policy, the latter which otherwise does not have any mechanisms to administer on local scale.

The local bureaucrats represent the state on the low level, different from how central government policy may intend. The justifications of unjust behavior by locals are packaged in the framework of the local cultural behavior, involving kin ties, and around the need for security which are not presupposed by the central government. In a way this is a continuation of traditional Soviet practice; these justifications seem to give ‘legitimate right’ to locals to see and realize the local state as they see fit. Although the practice of state enactment at a lower level opposes the ideas spread by the centre, of which the locals are very well informed through mass media, the local statesmen and citizens do not feel regret as the ‘above’ image of state created and recreated by them is distanced, untouched. Now let’s focus on the above image of the state.

The state in the understanding of local people is strongly associated with the government and the etymology of the word intensifies this association. In Georgian language, state (saxelm’ipo) means the place (or country) of a ruler or king (xelman’ipe). Thus the meaning of the word itself indicates to the ruler, and in contemporary understanding the government. While the government is criticized and accused by locals for not being nationalist, as the government may be perceived as not sufficiently supporting the interests of ethnic Georgians, the state itself becomes alienated from them. The image of the state being in distance, from where only the directives come and which are against the community is the left-over from the Soviet state, whose centre in Moscow was imagined on the one hand as distributor of the wealth (and was prosperous, that’s why stealing from the state was not shameful) but on the other hand as political structure which was against the Georgian nation, against their religious, ethnic and cultural traditions. In a similar fashion, locals now perceive the current government of Georgia as a distant ruler. If the central government in Moscow was not Georgian and could have sometimes opposed the national interest of Georgia, the independent Georgian state is perceived as being led by non-nationalist\(^66\) people, who are serving not the local interests but interests of Western countries or mainly the US.

\(^{66}\) In Georgian they use the word national. But in local language national (erovnuli) does not coincides with the western understanding of the term and carries the content of nationalist, serving to the interest of ethnic Georgians. That’s why I will use the term nationalist, rather than national.
After coming to power in 2003 the leaders of ‘United Nationalist Movement’ have very clear goals, modernize and develop Georgia to the standards of Western countries. The declared goals of the government were to become an ally of the West, become the member of the NATO and the European Union, to defeat corruption in the public structures, to build democracy and civil society in the country, etc. One of the representatives of this political group, Zurab Zhvania who was a prime-minister from 2003 to 2005 even before coming to power proudly announced at the General Assembly of European Commission (27.01.1999), that he was Georgian, therefore European. These words provoked different emotions within the dwellers of capital of Georgia, some were smiling saying that the Georgian people are far from being (part of the) European nation, and some were saying that it was the historical truth as our ancestors were always looking toward the West. Looking toward the West and becoming westernized was not taken for granted by the people from my field site. There were several reasons for their skepticism: they were still looking toward Russia as the source of welfare sometimes due to having relative migrants in Russia and receiving remittances; they remembering the socialist past, when “Russia was feeding them;” sometimes they did not see other markets besides Russia for Georgian products (wine, tea, citruses, mineral water, etc.); the locals imagine the overwhelming challenges of integrating with the West (physically to go there, getting valid visa as well as the language barrier (most villagers know Russian)); they also see the cultural danger (the West is far from our nation, religion and they may change our traditions); and feeling insecurity (if we will be an ally of the West against the will of Russia, we will lose Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russia will conquer us).

One of the reasons why the government is not perceived as being ‘nationalist’ is the education of those holding high political positions. Most of the ministers were educated in the US and other western countries. But the locals were questioning these types of considerations. On the one hand, they were asking why a person who had education in Georgia was not capable to take part in Georgian politics. On the other hand, they argued that western educated people are distant from the lives of the ordinary people and that their decisions were made according to some western rules, which did not work properly or for the benefit of Georgian people. “A new generation of politicians came to power, having brought in the pro-western political

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67 The political party ‘United Nationalist Movement’ was founded in 2001 and was one of the main political parties fighting against corruption in political structures in the last period of the rule of Edward Shevardnadze. The party was one of the initiators of ‘Rose Revolution’ and won the most places in the parliamentary election in 2004 and 2008. The leader of the party, Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president in Georgian presidential elections in 2004 and 2008.
orientation, western education and western values. This is accompanied by the generational change in all areas of political public life, with young people coming forward who remember little of the Soviet past, and in general aiming at the western values of participatory democracy and the rule of law” (Tarkhan-Mouravi 2006: 205). If for George Tarkhan-Mouravi the pro-western orientation means introduction of democracy and the rule of law, for other scientists the pro-western orientation of the central government was perceived as a superficial phenomenon. Here I refer to Lela Iakobashvili-Firalishvili, who says that during the last several years, the Georgian political elite has distanced itself from Georgian values and people, while importing Western ideas and we hear from them words like, the ‘West’, ‘democracy’, which are not somehow understood and internalized by ordinary people68 (Iakobashvili-Firalishvili 2007: 5). I would say that the generational change mentioned by George Tarkhan-Mouravi, which was going on in the state administrations and state financed organizations was not as ‘velvet-like’ as the Revolution itself. The bureaucrats over forty years of age, who before were favored by Shevardnadze as he was dependent on the members of Soviet nomenclature (see Piralishvili 2007: 24), now have been dismissed and they hardly had a chance to get employed further.

The conflict between the generations expressed as the conflict between western and Soviet ideologies was visible in my field site too. The head of Resource Centre of T’q’ibuli district (the local state department in charge of educational issues of the district), Lasha was under 30 years old. He had started his career with the police and was a strong supporter of the government (which was sometimes even expressed in his physical imitation of the president), had become the head of one of the schools and later the head of the local Resource Centre. Some of the locals told me that after Lasha was appointed to the position of school director, the pupils, their parents and teachers openly protested, asking the local educational department for changes, saying that he was from ‘Enough’69 and a Jehovah’s Witness and he will ‘infect’ the new generation. He was always declaring himself as a western oriented person, although he never had the chance to study abroad. During our first meeting he told me, that when he had become the head of the Resource Centre of T’q’ibuli district, he started to fight against ‘old fashion

68 This dichotomy is fuzzy as there are no unified Western or Georgian values. Furthermore the values are constantly constructed, re-constructed and re-interpreted. But the use of this dichotomy shows the difference between the existing (local and/or Soviet) principles and the principles taken from the Western countries. Erin Koch refers to this dichotomy in the medical system of Georgia, as ‘new’ and ‘old’ (Koch 2007).

69 The youth movement during 2002-2003, organizing different types of protests against the former government. They were supporting the ‘Rose Revolution’ and were accused of being financed by the West.
school directors’. Lasha displayed a high level of authoritarianism toward the heads of schools. For instance, although he was fighting against the old fashion directors, he himself made directors wait for him for hours for his ‘training-seminars’, explaining to me that this will increase his importance and prestige, which was actually the strategy used by Soviet directors. He was using every chance to present the ‘correct western’ or ‘correct new’ kind of behaviors, even correcting the expression of the teachers. When he met the director of Sac’ire school (whom I was accompanying that day), she informed Lasha that they were having a meeting (tatbiri in Georgian) with teachers that day, asking whether he would join the meeting. Lasha looked skeptical at the head of the school and said, ‘meeting’ (tatbiri) is an old word, now you should use ‘training-seminars’ (the words are translated from English to Georgian directly). This kind of collusion between the old and new style of working was on a daily basis in the district, but the ‘Western oriented’ officials did not have much to suggest to the old generation except newly and often incorrectly adopted international terms. Since the local ‘new officials’ had mostly had a superficial orientation towards the West, it raised additional questions in the people that worked around them.

4.9 Conclusion

In the contexts of woodland appropriation and the field of education the behavior of local officials show how the state is represented. The state which is actually on the way of formation is brought down to the locals in the forms of new laws, regulations, restrictions or ways of behavior. But this new image does not support the process of encompassment of ‘above’ state with the locals or with the nation as Ferguson and Gupta presuppose it. There are several reasons for this detachment: the idea of building a western like democratic state is not internalized by people who on the one hand question the idea itself and on the other hand live with Soviet-like attitudes and have difficulties of getting used to the new political system and its standards; the local bureaucrats in charge often create the image of a mystical (like computer) or ruthless state, which does not care about the problems of local people. That is why the state as an idea or the image seen from ‘below’ does not challenge the emotional sentiments among the local citizens. However, the state enacted on the local level by the bureaucrats is closer, teachable and ‘understands’ the difficulties of the locals.
Everyday relations between the local people and bureaucrats are strongly embedded in the circles of the relationships, starting from the family, kin groups, neighbors, village community and up to level of the district. These local circles formulate the narrow layer of the community with whom the locals have strong affiliation and on the level of which the local membership category is constructed. For the people this is encompassment by the state (by means of local state actors) and is not distanced, but a part of a nation, with whom they feel strong ethnic, religious and cultural affiliations. At the same time, based on this investigation it seems that the ‘above’ state is alienated, due to its functioning in accordance with some foreign logic which is imported from the West (and is not considering the interests of the locals) and thus is not nationalist enough, it may even be perceived as alien. That is why it is not shameful to cheat the state, especially when the state apparatus also participates in this process. Furthermore, that is why the local people have stronger attachment to the category of nationality, inherited from the Soviet past and possibly from pre-Soviet system of governance and attitudes, than the civic understanding of citizenship.
Chapter 5. Practicing political citizenship in the locality

“To make a beginning, think of politics as a competitive game.”

F.G. Bailey

5.1 Introduction

When writing about political citizenship, I often recall the phrase I heard in the locality: “politics is dirty business and we should keep ourselves away from it.” The old woman, who said this once watching TV news, was well informed about political events going on, knew most of the officials from the central and local government, in the case of necessity she would go to their offices, and was always taking part in elections and attending meetings with political figures. What is politics for this woman? Should we assume that she is trying to disassociate herself from politics, like Gia Nodia argues in his article “Putting the state back together”: “The label of ‘falsity’ firmly stuck to the public sphere, and politics was a priori considered a ‘dirty business’, with the values of goodness and truth sought only in the private domain” (Nodia 2002: 435). The phrase of the woman was probably taken from a TV political discussion, and might show the distance to the ‘weak’ and ‘corrupt’ political system. But how to explain her enthusiasm for taking an active role in political events, especially in the locality? This involves the division of the ‘big’ and ‘small’ politics, which my interlocutors were using in our discussions. The ‘big’ politics take place far in the centre (in this case the capital), and within/around the central government. The experience of the Soviet regime, when the central government was far away in Moscow, and was influencing the life all over the USSR might be the reason for the imaginary distance from the central government, which had absolute power, while the government in the locality was dependent on the central one and had limited possibilities. When I asked the question, why citizens actually do not take part in politics, one of the respondents answered: “In T’q’ibuli there are no politics, people are entertained by the soap-operas.” But in other cases locality still keeps being political, because it has a self-government, administration and even for referring to district administration, locals would say: “I am going to government”. If the politics in the centre is big, the locality still has ‘small’ politics. The second time, when I have heard the evaluation of politics as dirty, was already at the polling station, when Bondo, the head of the bank, who could not convince me that stuffing

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70 A section of this chapter was presented at Tbilisi State University at the International Scientific Conference “Space, Society, Politics” and later published in conference proceedings in Georgian language (Mataradze 2013).
71 Bailey F.G. 1970: 1
ballot box was normal, used this phrase: “if you want to be fair, never ever go into politics, because it is ‘dirty business’!” Now he was talking about district politics, which at that moment did not seem to work according to the rules of the democratic state. My aim in this chapter is to discover how locals engage with this ‘small dirty business’ during and through the electoral process.

This chapter follows from the discussion of political citizenship during the Soviet Union (see chapter 2). However, I want to include a small review of the political situation, which occupied Georgia after the independence. The political rights of the citizens were actually given to the citizens of Georgia after 1991, when the Georgian state was established and was developing in order to build the democratic regime. The first decade of ethnic (in Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and civil wars and economic distress accompanied the period of implementing the democratic way of life, when people were informed by TV programs, newspapers about their rights and the way the state should be governed by ‘demos’. According to the legislation, all political rights of the citizens were guaranteed. The system of self-government, fair elections, freedom of speech, and the uncorrupted political system, where every citizen could take part was part on the state narrative, but was working to a limited extent. The changes done in the name of building democracy became “inextricably bound up with the legitimation of specific political perspectives or ideologies” (Haugaard 1997: 10). The ‘Rose revolution’, was the first case, when political rights of citizens worked against the President Eduard Shevardnadze, who created in Georgia “democracy without democrats” (Nodia 1997). In November 2003 in the name of saving democracy in Georgia thousands of the citizens took part in the demonstration in order to defend their votes. President Eduard Shevardnadze peacefully resigned and with the elected new government began to rule. The corrupt, undemocratic political system was defeated and the will of citizens succeeded. The last changes should be propitious for the locals to believe in their political rights, in changing ‘big’ politics, although the case of election, which I am discussing here shows, that ordinary citizens cannot even influence the ‘small’ politics of their province. Did the establishment of the independent Georgian state transform the formal political rights of the Soviet citizens to the effect of influencing ruling processes of the terrain? When comparing the Soviet citizenship with the current in the survey, one some of the respondents (9 out of 100) addressed current conditions as having membership of the democratic state, some mentioned the freedom of the speech (5 respondents), that the citizens of Georgia received after independence, or the multi-party system (1 respondent). Membership of the democratic state improved the political rights and awareness of the citizens, but to what extent? How do ordinary
citizens from T’q’ibuli district participate in local political events and how do they explain (or judge) their position? These questions require analysis and answers from the perspective of this small and remote village of Georgia, without necessarily aiming at some generalization. Furthermore, within the liberal democracy, where political activeness of ordinary citizens is to some extent limited to the role of voting, election becomes the main arena to be seen as the actual enactment of political citizenship.

5.2 Political citizenship and political identity of citizens

According to T.H. Marshall political rights are “[...] the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such body” (Marshall 1998 [1963]: 94). While trying to demonstrate why social scientists should re-appraise the works of T. H. Marshall, Michael Lister indicates to the unified understanding of civic, political and social rights in his writings. According to Lister, Marshall is often criticized because of presenting these rights as equally important. Lister shows that for Marshall the citizenship category was not perceived as a simple sum of different components, but as a unified category, “which underlies citizenship is the principle of equality of status” (Lister 2005: 478). In the further discussion of Marshall’s theoretical conception, Lister admits, that citizenship category is unified rather than unitarity, because there are tensions between its components, which are “mutable and negotiable” (ibid.: 482). According to the author the different rights of citizens are interdependent on each other. For the sake of discussing political rights here, I will pay attention only to the interdependence of political and social rights. According to Lister, following Marshall, political rights will not be fully realized, if social and civic rights are not assured to citizens. “In this sense, political rights, the right to participate in the exercise of power either directly or indirectly, is dependent upon both civil rights, in terms of individual freedoms and social rights, in terms of levels of literacy and material well-being” (Lister 2005: 477). This argument is very important for understanding the ethnographic material brought here. In the locality most of the inhabitants are literate, but the second part of social citizenship, material wellbeing should also be considered here. The social difficulties which became extremely overwhelming during the early postsocialist years made villagers constantly search for further material means. When some parties provide material benefits in order to gain followers, the locals support them at least superficially, while the
freedom of thought as well as the freedom of political preferences remain unrealized. The
ethnography discussed in this chapter represents this confrontation and interdependence of the
citizens’ rights in the local level, which at the end creates the unified citizenship status of
residents.

While discussing the case of self-governmental elections, we should not forget also
about the context. According to Bailey the anthropologists should “encapsulate the structures”.
Dealing with small communities, anthropologists should recognize the political structures at all
levels of the culture and compare them with each other: “Any one item in this culture – any
particular rule in the structure of political rules – is to be explained by showing that it is part of
a structure. Explanation, in this sense, is putting things into context, showing that they are part
of a pattern” (Bailey 1970: 17). Encapsulation demands covering the knowledge of
environment, which according to Bailey includes the whole range of factors starting from the
demographic and climate factors, ending with the large political system. These factors from the
environment affect and are affected by the political structure. According to Bailey “a structure
is a set of rules about behaviour: these rules list the rights and duties of particular roles; they
say what a king, a subject, a judge, a voter, a party leader, a village headman and so forth is
expected to do in that particular capacity and what he may expect others to do for them” (ibid.:
10). Because a person has various roles, these roles are interconnected and at the end influence
the political behavior of the person (Bailey 1970). In small size communities, the interaction
between local officials and ordinary inhabitants are intense, as officials are connected to local
populations with various kinds of ties. In some cases the inhabitants influence their activities
(like it was discussed in previous chapter), but ordinary locals are also affected by the will of
the officials, especially during elections. In Bailey’s theoretical conception the important part
is about the rules, which allow political actors fulfill their roles in political processes. According
to the author, there are two sets of rules – normative and pragmatic. Normative rules deal with
ethical judgment and tell which behavior is wrong and right. In political process pragmatic rules
are more important, as it includes all tactics, which guarantees the winning the political
competition or political ‘game’ as Bailey calls it: “These rules are directives for the actors in a
particular society: they are models of behavior for particular context; they are institutions; they
are part of the culture” (Bailey 1970: 16). While discussing the case of self-governmenetal
election, it becomes clear that the normative rules are just on surface, used for electoral
campaign, while the political proceses are managed via pragmatic rules, the rules which are
effective tools for winning the political game.
Before going deep into the discussion of local political processes, I will pay attention to other authors, who discuss the issues of political citizenship using the Marshallian “social action” and more recent “identity” approaches. Janoski and Gran (2008) locate the widespread discussion of citizenship as the rights and obligation at three levels: individual, organizational and societal. My interest is to focus on the individual level, which according to the authors is micro level: “The individual definition of citizenship focuses on how each person sees the relation of rights and obligations within a framework of balance and exchange. It traces the development of the ‘self’ in relation to various political groups and the state as a critical part of citizenship, especially development of social movement or community-oriented attitudes and behavior” (Janoski and Gran 2008: 14). Later in their chapter on political identity and citizenship they explain how children and adolescents gain rights and obligations. Families, schools, neighborhood and community provide the younger generation with the sense of right and obligation, knowledge about citizenship. At some stage, when a person realizes that s/he can develop independently from the family or the state (school experience), they “are doing their utmost to construct a viable self at this time that will take rights and obligations into account ” (Janoski and Gran 2008: 38). The value of the analytical model of Janoski and Gran is that they do not stick to the solid citizenship-self, which will not change over the time or is the result of one direction of socialization. The authors admit the possibility of the reverse influence of the parents by the children: “Thus, much of one’s self-construction arises around exchange with family, social network, and community” (Janoski and Gran 2008: 14).

According to the behavioral activity and value involvement, Janoski and Gran suggest a typology of six different types of citizens-selves: Incorporated, active, deferential, cynical, opportunistic, marginal citizens-selves. According to the active/passive citizen types, incorporated and active citizens are participatory types, while deferential, cynical and marginal citizen-selves do not participate in politics. The rational opportunistic citizens might be engaged or not in politics, according to his/her material interests. To see the cross-classification according to the political position, the incorporated and deferential citizens’ types have apathy towards the government, while the activist and cynical citizen-selves are alienated from the ruling power. The marginal and opportunistic citizens have more apathy towards the regime and less value involvement. Through the chapter I will discuss the case of local citizenships in the framework of citizens’ types suggested by Janoski and Gran.

During various discussions with the locals, about their political rights, some of them pointed out several activities, that they as citizens could execute (of course, some of the people
were not clear what the political right, or political citizenship meant): The freedom of expression, participation in elections, electing the government, the right to be defended by the state inside and outside Georgia, getting elected as a politician. The knowledge of their rights does not always appear to coincide with the will to use the right. Freedom of speech as the achievement of the independent Georgia sometimes was perceived as being exaggerated. “Look at the TV programs. Everybody talks whatever they would like. I am tired with listening how they [politicians] are abusing each other. There should be a kind of control of it” (Nutsa, 68 years old woman, 2006). In other cases the freedom of the citizens is addressed with irony: “Today we have only freedom, Shevardnadze joked, what else do people want, they are free” (Iuza, 47 years old man, 2006). TV programs, which sometimes are perceived as being controlled, were the main source for the local people for being informed. When discussing the formation of citizenship identity Janoski and Gran assume that: “Many citizens are not directly conscious of sales taxes, interstate highway systems, and who is receiving what from the state. Instead, most citizens read about the state in the newspapers, watch the TV news, and then engage in discussions with other citizens. The state is brought down to the personal level with announcers, newscasters, friends and acquaintances involved in interaction rituals” (Janoski and Gran 2008: 39). All the above mentioned practices to discuss and being informed about politics work in the locality with the exaggerated influence of TV news. Most of the people watched TV news at least once a day and followed the political debates. I found sometimes a strong influence of political events in the life of children. In the school sometimes during the breaks, 10 year old pupils were discussing the political debates of the previous evening, or during quarrels named their positions according to the politicians or political parties. TV news and political programs are the main sources of the satisfaction of the political interests, 60 % of locals declare to have (this is the result of the survey done in the village).

The exaggerated interest in politics is affirmed with the further answers to the survey question: should citizens take part in politics? (See, appendix A, chart #3) Most of the people answered positively, 46 % of respondents saying that citizens should always take part in politics, 28 % of the saying that citizens should sometimes do so. The explanation of the position, who said that citizens should not take part in politics (24 %) should be discussed in detail. Six

72 Most of the population had the better access to the ‘Imedi’ TV channel, which use to be in opposition of the government and had been closed at 2007 and later was re-opened but controlled by the central government. So I assume that the critical position of the local people towards the central government was party affected by the political position of this TV channel.
respondents (out of 24 who said that citizens should not take part in politics) name the politics as “fake”, so participation of the citizens cannot change anything or the attitudes of ordinary citizens anyway would not be considered. We can connect the pessimistic argumentation of the locals with the “illusory participation” of citizens in politics, which might be used to reflect on Walzer’s arguments in his article “The civil society argument”: “The rule of the *demos* is in significant ways illusory; the participation of ordinary men and women in the activities of the state (unless they are state employees) is largely vicarious” (Walzer 1998: 294). Ten of the locals (out of 24 who said that citizens should not take part in politics) perceive the politics as the sphere of activities, which includes special professionalism, while they have their own business to be taken care of. For explaining their position more clearly I list their argumentations below:\(^73\)

✓ *The bread should be baked by the bakery*;
✓ *people are a crowd, they do not know*;
✓ *Peasants do not have time for politics, they should do agriculture*;
✓ *Not everybody should become a politician*;
✓ *Our president knows five languages, but does not help much, so the ordinary citizen will not manage better than he does*;
✓ *If everybody goes to politics who does other things?*
✓ *We need good leaders; ordinary people do not know how to rule; ordinary citizens need work and then being materially satisfied they will call to government, “Bravo!”*

To go back to the position of Walzer, it might be the explanation of the respondents’ arguments: “Politics rarely engages the full attention of the citizens who are supposed to be its chief protagonists. They have too many other things to worry about: Above all, they have to earn a living. They are more engaged in the economy than in the political community” (Walzer 1998: 294). Having no clue of the politics, came up in the replies of 5 respondents (out of 24), but in the form of education. They said that ordinary citizens do not have knowledge, education or general development to take part in politics. It goes back to the debates I brought in the beginning about citizenship as “a unified concept”, where the actual accomplishment of different citizen rights affects each other (Lister 2005: 477); citizens with poor education would have difficulties in order to make correct decisions and participate into the politics, which is

\(^73\) The question “why do you think that citizens should not take part in politics?” was open-ended, so I bring the direct quotations here.
“run by well-informed elite” (Lang 2005). To have enough education to be involved in politics was connected with the social background of the person, which promises corresponding education. Talking about the possibility of ordinary citizens to participate in politics, one middle aged man said, “of course brother Kublashvili could be in politics, their father was a head of the executive committee during communist time and gave to sons the best education. My father had seen nothing but the hoe (maltock). After the school I was forced to work on the land instead of preparing lessons. Can you tell me how I can be a politician?” (Gogita, 35 years old man, 2007). The lack of education was perceived as an obstacle for citizens, who wanted to take part in politics but cannot.

The second topic I wanted to cover is the answer to the question, whether citizens actually take part in politics (See, appendix A, chart #4). The positive answer to the question comes from 9 % of the sample, who said that ordinary citizens always take part in politics and 32 %, who said that ordinary citizens sometimes take part. 9 % of the interviewee refused to answer this question. Interesting is the explanation of the position of 50 % of respondents, who said, that ordinary citizens hardly ever/never take part in politics. The lack of information and education, as an obstacle was mentioned by 5 % of the respondents. 11 % mentioned lack of financial resources: “Georgians who were not part of a network, who could not exploit vertical lines of patronage through parties, patrons, or government, became economically vulnerable and politically powerless” (Jones 2000: 66). The social connection and patronage as the primary resource for making political career is mentioned quite frequently (13 %). There argumentation goes like this:

✓ Into politics people go by connection, one needs relatives, or friends who are on high political position;
✓ Everybody has their own people;
✓ Bureaucrats will not let ordinary citizens into politics;

6 % of the respondents distrust to the government, which misleads people, and participation in politics does not change anything. Italo Prado in the introduction of the book *Morals of Legitimacy: Between agency and system*, indicates, that if the elites do not gain trust within the society, than power is lost (Pardo 2000: 22). The example of the ‘Rose Revolution’ indicated above was the example of the revolution, where the government lost trust among the

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74 At the time of my fieldwork Pavle Kublashvili was the member of the parliament from T’q’ibuli district and his brother – Konstantin Kublashvili was the chairman of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
population. The 6% of the respondents who are distrustful for the power holders is a minority and we cannot make far decisions. One respondent indicated about the authoritarian party system: “Those who are in Nationalist party could enter into politics, other people do not matter.” The influence of the ruling party was strong in the locality, but to which extent it might be is answered later.

To conclude, local people more or less have an idea about their political rights, they perceive that as members of the country they have some rights to take part in the governing process, they have the desire, but half of them see different obstacles for becoming active participants in politics. Those who say that ordinary citizens actually participate in politics usually consider the ‘small’ politics of the grassroots society.

5.3 The elections for the self-governmental body

The attention given here to elections within the theme of political citizenship might look exaggerated, but it has several reasons: to begin with, the election is the process when locals can participate in politics (e.g. by nominating themselves as candidate) and exercise political power (by voting for the desirable candidate). The election is the main political event in the locality, when the representatives of the government (I mostly refer to the central and district governmental levels) ‘come closer’ and ‘visible’ to the people (through visiting the locality and doing propaganda), who invest in improving the situation of the residents and make promises and the electors analyze the politicians’ achievements. The election as a process is also important to look at to answer the following questions: why do people vote or do not participate in elections? Why do they choose this or that candidate? How is an election as a process of choosing the desired people to govern efficient at all? I was lucky that within the period of my fieldwork I had the chance to look at the process of elections through all its stages and collect data. So I will describe events and processes, trying to highlight the most interesting parts to conclude about the political rights and identities of the citizens.

On 20 August 2006, when I finally settled in my field site, I entered into a small shop in the middle of the village which is called as centre (or sometimes as bourse). Three men were sitting before the shop, drinking beer and making toasts. The first one toasted for the President of Georgia – Mikheil Saakashvili, the second for the Head of the Parliament – Nino Burjanadze and the third one for the Minister of Defense – Irakli Okruashvili. The thing is that in lowland
Georgia toasts are always said with wine or much stronger alcoholic drinks. So when locals drink beer, they make funny toasts (see Mühlfried 2006: 87, Manning and Uplisashvili 2007: 626). So these three men were making jokes with the most important and influential figures of Georgian government, with whom the whole ruling structure was associated. During discussions with different people and in different situations, it became clear that many people were quite critical towards the central government. Besides very general problems, which they connected with the weakness of the central government, criticism was because the central government does not care about the locality and they do not visit T’q’ibuli district at all: “Our government forgot to indicate T’q’ibuli district on the map,” they told me. I mentioned already the date of 20 August because very soon within the two or three weeks the situation completely changed, as on 5 October 2006 there were elections for the self-governmental body.

The elections were planned to be in December, but the government changed it to this earlier date, explaining that during winter it is difficult to have elections in highland Georgia, inducing additional expenses for heating and transportation. Although the oppositional parties were against this, the government as the leading party and having majority in the parliament exercised its will. So the final date of the election was announced on 28 August, 39 days before the actual date of election. Oppositional parties did not have enough time to prepare and lead a proper campaign. The second peculiarity was connected with this date, as the election was not appointed for a sunday as usual, but on a thursday. If we consider the fact that in Georgian language thursday is connected with number five (xušabati), the date was on the 5th day of the week (xuti) and of the month and the number of the Party United National Movement on the list was 5, it seems to be part of the PR campaign of the United National Movement Party to effect the population with word games.75 Some of the citizens perceived it like the part of the electoral campaign, others made argument stronger, saying that, “Five is good in everything! Everybody should get five scores in every business!” Some of the voters were so affected, that instead of naming party, which they were supporting to, they were saying the number five.

As I mentioned before, it was the elections for the self-governmental body and people were voting for the members of the legislative organ, the council within T’q’ibuli district (called “Sak’rebulo” in Georgian). The election included two kinds of procedures, majority vote and

75“xušabats, xut okt’ombers šemoxzet xuti!” On Thursday, 5th of October, circle five! This was the slogan of the party United National Movement during the election. The additional importance is connected with the number 5, as it was the highest evaluation score within the educational system till the recent years and it affected the perception of the number as the best. For example, everything is like (on) 5 (q’velaperi xutianzea), means that everything is going well.
proportional election. The number of the places within the T’q’ibuli district council was 20. So, 10 places were taken by people who were elected according to the majority voting, one candidate from each of the community of villages (there are 9 communities within T’q’ibuli district) and one from the city of T’q’ibuli. Other ten places were distributed to the candidates from the parties, according to the proportions they would get in elections. In Sac’ire community (consisting 8 villages) there were two candidates: One from the party United National Movement — Besik (Beso) Kublashvili and the second from the Party Industry Will Save Georgia — Tamaz Lomtadze.

This election was also the beginning for the change of local self-governmental system in the community. The council of the Sac’ire community (which was functioning from 1991 till 2006), as the self-government system, was abolished and the governing of the community was put into larger administrative unit like T’q’ibuli district council. This change of the structure of the community’s self-government was not explained to the local people, and only those citizens, who were practically involved within electoral process were aware of the actual change of the system.

5.4 The participation of the voters and their attitudes towards the elections

The political rights of citizens to elect their government are highly internalized by the locals. According to the survey I did in the village of Sac’ire, 88% of the respondents said they always take part in elections, and all of them voted in this particular one. I found a difference between the city T’q’ibuli and the village. I do not have exact data about the political activeness of city residents but according to our election observation done in the city it is sufficiently low, even if we consider the high migration rate: from 1997 voters registered within the voter list one fourth voted. The higher rate of participation within the village compared to the city might be explained according to the closer ties between the village residents than the city ones. The interest-bearing people (who are the party members, activists, propagandist, or employees in state financed organizations), who live in the place where they are propagating certain

76 About the Political Party United National Movement you can see the footnote # 66 in previous chapter.
77 The political party Industry Will Save Georgia was set up in 1999, by the former members of the political party Industry Union: “The party, already claims (to have) 30 000 members, proposes a protectionist economic program that includes a reduction in the state apparatus, anticorruption measures, a pro-business tax environment, the promotion of self-sustained agriculture, and politics aimed at fostering the development of a new middle class” (Jones, 2000: 57).
78 The data is from the polling station, where I was an observer for the NGO “Fair Elections”.

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candidates, are neighbours, relatives or just acquaintances, who ‘should not be disappointed’. 
“They will not let me stay at home”, said Ksenia. “If I would say, I will not go to the polling station, they will bring the portable ballot box to me at home.” The social pressure to participate in the elections works more efficiently on the elder population than the younger ones, who are more reluctant unless they have a specific interest. One of the members of the electoral committee, a 21 years old man, declared that he is there because his relative is the candidate and he is protecting his votes, otherwise he is not interested in politics. The difference between the ages of voters is very visible within the survey as well: among the respondents aging between 18 and 30, 57.1 % voted always. The increase of age increases proportionally the rate of participation in elections; 85.7 % of those who were between 31 and 51 years old voted always and 95.4 % of those who were more than 51 years old always went to the elections. The influence of age on participating in elections has different aspects as well which should be considered. The younger generation is more mobile, and more of them tend to migrate seasonally or for longer periods. So the respondents who do not vote mostly indicate the reason of absence from the locality (50 %), others mentioned the lack of information (33.3 %) or lack of interest in politics (16.7 %). Are the citizens, who always vote during the election active citizens? In a way they are active, but if we consider that sometimes their electoral behaviour is influenced by the community will, we can distinguish between the voters, that who is the deferential type, who “accepts authority and the leadership of elite but does not strongly internalize the goals of the party or state” (Janoski and Gran 2008: 40).

The people who have a vested interest in elections are: the candidates and their close people, party members, propagandists, official persons like heads of the organizations and state employees. The number of the people influenced by such an interest is relatively high in the village and the political influence is stronger due to the closer relations within the community. The people whom I call interest-motivated have their own interests and/or are under pressure from the upper power-bearing people. In the first case, some of them are opportunistic citizens, oriented to “restricted exchange with time horizons focusing on short-term paybacks” (Janoski and Gran 2008: 40). The most prominent paybacks are the financial. The propagandists, party members, the committee members, as well as the observers receive salaries for their work, while people working in state jobs are forced to defend the interests of their “breadwinner” (some locals addressed to the state organizations, as employer, in such a way). In the second case we have vertical relation: “linking unequal agents in asymmetric relations of hierarchy and dependence” (Putnam 1994: 173), while the power of the patron influences the activity of
citizen. The political activeness during the elections for the ‘state job clients’ is profitable according to the principals of reciprocity, as the person whose interests are being defended is always obliged to pay back: to promote in jobs, to employ, to help and so forth. The patron-client relations in the USSR which were analyzed for the Stalinist period onwards (see Fairbanks 1996 or Willerton 1992) are prominent in the locality as well and are more visible during elections.

The high rate of political activeness of the local people has also to do with their attempt to protect their votes: “At least they will not be able to use my vote for faking”, told us a 78 years old woman. To use the vote as a way of declaring one’s position is used by the government as well in the slogans during pre-election campaigns: “Do not lose your voice, go to the election!” This has double meaning for the people, to vote for favourite candidate as well as not to give the possibility to the electoral committee to use your vote for stuffing ballot boxes. The example which my assistant Tea Kamushadze was reporting from her observation from Sac’ire polling station shows that the woman who could not vote there because of having registration in different place was very disappointed, arguing: why should the person to whom she wants to vote for, lose her vote?

The fairness of elections is often questioned by the locals, especially in the cities; although it does not decrease their enthusiasm to vote, moreover increase their participation rate in order not to leave unused votes. “Does not matter whom I vote. The one who government wants will win anyway, but I will still go and mark my favourite” (64 years old resident of T’q’ibuli, 2006). Distrust of the election results includes the problem concerning the voting lists. Herron and Mirzashvili, writing about election procedures in Georgia argue the following about elections held in 1999: “The accuracy of voter lists was also questioned, especially due to high increase in the number of registered voters in many districts and other irregularities. Many accused ECs [Electoral Committees] of including ‘dead souls’ on voter lists to facilitate ballot box stuffing” (Herron & Mirzashvili 2005: 32). Seven years later the problem seemed to be unsolved and the locals were aware of this, sometimes applying their humour in talking about this: “How can one think that elections will be fair?! They invited even dead people to come to the elections.” My neighbour Tina got angry, when she received the invitation for her husband. Her husband had died 13 years ago. How can one believe in elections when they are taking

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79 The respondent means receiving the papers, which are sent to the voters before the elections, where the number and address of their polling station, as well as the number of the voter within the voters list are indicated.
people from the graves?” said another 75 years old man (2006). The cynical position of the respondent, “bitter critics of politics and the state” (Janoski and Gran 2008: 40), could be find very often, but it does not fall within the cynical citizen type, who does not want to participate in politics.

The accuracy of the voter lists is also a matter for the type of residence. The voter lists which District Electoral Committee gave to the committee of Sac’ire village also contained many “dead souls”. The head of the committee and members, who knew the voters very well, went through it and erased the names of the dead people from it. In the city, with more voters and less familiarities between people this problem still exists. Besides dead souls voter lists consist of voters who live in other places or left the country for a long time, but are still registered there. The committee does not have the right to erase the names of these people, unless they change the residence registration by themselves. So the election committees know the voters who will never come to the election and can use these votes for falsification as it was the case in the city as I witnessed.

The general attitude of the residents of T’q’ibuli city was more critical than those in the village. I went to the city before the day of the election, when the government was organizing the concert for supporting the Nationalist Party and its candidates before the House of Culture (see photo #23). We interviewed several people before the event started. The younger generation was more prominent within the audience, but entertainment was more attractive for them that the real aim of the cultural event. Some even did not know what kind of election was on the next day or whether he or she will participate. Some of them openly said that if their family members go to elections, they will accompany them. The younger generation sometimes tend to be the deferential, towards politics “following tradition and family experience, but avoids most political activities” (Janoski and Gran 2008: 40). Old people tend to have more information about the elections, know the candidates, are acquainted with their political programs and informed about the kind of election taking place. They also gave us a clear explanation how they made their decisions: “Our lord80 [meaning the President] told us to choose number 5. We are here for supporting number 5. I do not know; they increased our pensions a little bit. It is their will. If we vote for them, they will increase pensions, if not – they will say goodbye! (gvet’q’vian kargad iq’avito!” (67 years old man, 2006).

80 In Georgian the word is “Batoni”, which was previously used for the feudal land owners and it does not have the religious connotation.
Some voters seemed to be very loyal to the opinion of others and wanted to decide according to the position of the majority of people: “I will vote for the one others vote for. If two would be against ten voters the majority wins anyway.” The position to share the attitude of majority was common for the voters in Sac’ire: “One should not prevent the others from choosing one. One should not be a pig! (ar unda iq’os Yöri!). For the whole of my life I am doing this. You should not be egoistic within the society. All these people will not choose the wrong person” (53 years old woman, 2006).

The mood of the voters from Sac’ire seemed to be more cheerful on the day of elections. At the entrance people were meeting each other, greeting as if it was some festival: “God give you possibility to attend many elections!” or “Congratulations upon the election!” In the village the election was a great event, because it brought for locals positive changes to their situation. The government began to rebuild (renovate) the main roads between T’q’ibuli and Kutaisi, T’q’ibuli and Terǯola and the railway (which was stopped between 2001 and 2007), three weeks before the election. There were intensified efforts for renovating the coal mine and from September onwards the application of the social assistance within the Targeted Social Assistant (TSA) programme started. These activities were done in order to get support for the Party United National Movement as the ruling party, as well as the majority of the party candidates. That is why the majority of the people from Sac’ire supported the United National Movement Party and the candidate from this party. They seemed to be convinced within the weeks before the elections that government will “improve the economic situation”, “increase pensions”, “rebuild roads”, “give us a stable future” or “bring the overall welfare”. The phrases manifested within the TV political campaigns people knew by heart and were voting for it. The locals knew that all these activities were pre-election propaganda of the ruling party. One of the voters argued: “it would be so nice if we have election every month; then so many things would be improved.” The temporal feature of the positive change made locals perceive the elections as a date to celebrate and enjoy (The process of voting you can see on photo #25).

Besides such activities, the United National Movement Party was doing propaganda led by official persons: for instance, Premier Minister of Georgia, Zurab Nogaideli came in to T’q’ibuli or the members of the party, such as the head of United National Movement T’qibuli branch came in to Sac’ire, having an hour’s meeting with the local people. The party had

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81 These activities took quite long. The road between T’q’ibuli and Terǯola had been finished in December 2006, and the renovation of the road between Kutaisi and T’q’ibuli was stopped after the election and was not renewed within my fieldwork period. The rebuilding of the railway was finished in next spring.
appointed the local librarian as the main activist and hired few women to do door-to-door propaganda and register (for the party) those people who should vote for the United National Movement and their candidate. So before the elections the party had approximate information on what percentage of votes they would get. Besides propagandists and actual members of the party certain officials (like the head of the school, head of house of culture, etc.) were also encouraging people to support the ruling party.

I want to highlight some aspects of the propaganda done by the head of United National Movement T’qibuli branch during their visit in Sac’ire. The meeting with him was known to people from the propagandists’ networks and was planned to take place in the assembly hall of the old building of timber industry. When the head of United National Movement T’qibuli branch came, he refused to go into the hall and preferred to meet people in the centre (See photo #24). I assume this was the imitation of the behavior of the President, who always meets people at open spaces, like squares, stadiums, etc. The propaganda of the person was similar to the talks of the President, underlining the latest positive achievements of the government, like free ambulance service, the high standards of the conditions in the army, uncorrupt police system, or success in the fight against ‘theft mentality’. He stressed more specific improvements in the locality, like putting on roofs on the blocks of flats in T’q’ibuli, renovating coal industry, roads and the railway. An important aspect of his speech was the accent on the personality of the politician in general and his idea of the characteristics of a desirable politician82:

“Person is everything, is it not? We had a President before and we have one now. Everything depends on the person. What kind of people does the government search for? The most important for the government is to have the kind of person who is honest, polite and the person about whom nobody can say bad things. In Sac’ire community the United National Movement has its majority candidate – Beso Kublashvili. Beso has these three criteria, which I mentioned. Can one say that Beso is not honest, polite and kind?!” (David Katamadze, 2006)

The United National Movement choose the kind of person who completely suited the ethical judgment and were having the kind of qualities, which were perceived by people as suitable for village representative. To stress the personal character of the candidate was also common among the voters, when they were bringing in arguments for supporting him. In the interview one of the voters argued:

82 I recorded his speech, so it is the exact quotation from his speech translated by me.
“I am not a politician, I am an ordinary person. I am talking like a resident of the village, who expects from the government positive changes, but I can not go to the government. Beso has sufficient education and ability to negotiate with the government and to ask what should be claimed. He has the ability to bring our voice to the government and tell us the government’s views on things.” (Gia, 40 years old, 2006)

The argument was clear: a person who comes from the ruling party has more affiliation with the government and could do more positive things for the locality than the one from an oppositional party. The advantage of closeness with the government was used also by the second candidate (from the Party ‘Industry will Save Georgia’), when he was arguing between close people, that he is not ‘real opposition’ of the ruling majority. The member of the electoral committee from his side was declaring that the general developmental course of the government is correct. The main problem was the lack of jobs. The development of industry was the main source which will increase the employment of the people. The importance of supporting the industry is from the political position related to the debates about lobbying businesses by politicians in Georgia, which had been debated for long times (see Jones 2000). So the position of Tamaz who was running the factory Khresili cannery was clear, even if it was not supported by the locals:

“Tamazi is an excellent person, well organized. I cannot say anything wrong about him, but according to my point of view, he has a different profession and is very talented in this profession. He could have great successes in his sphere, like business, management. He can do his business in the village; create thousands of working places for people. But I think he does not need to be in the council” (Vakht’angi, 42 years old, 2006).

The profession of the candidate which seems to be an obstacle in one case might appear as a positive side, when discussing the character of the candidate. Beso, who received his diploma from the Faculty of Arts, appears as someone ‘creative’, who has the possibility of managing politics ‘creatively’.

Positive personality, affiliation with the ruling party and diplomacy to negotiate between different poles appeared to be the main criteria for choosing the member of the council for the community of Sac’ire. The additional feature that locals did not mention, but I believe was crucial for supporting is the closeness to the people and having some acquaintance with the

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83 This factory in the nearby village had been stopped for several years and is not anymore producing.
citizens. Beso as a resident of Sac’ire, official in the administration for several years and participant of the local events got support from 83% of the residents of Sac’ire.84

5.5 Actors during the elections

The participants of electoral procedures have different social and political positions and different power to influence the results. At the first level, the lower one, are the ordinary citizens who should be the main protagonists to choose the government. According to my experience, which is difficult to generalize, citizens are active participants, but nevertheless not main decision-makers. Either their attitudes are strongly influenced with promises, close relations and even with force, or their decision is changed, when the Electoral Committee stuffs the ballot boxes. The second middle level consists of people who have a more active role before the elections, like propagandists, representatives of NGOs, oppositional parties. Their actual capability depends on their interests and skills of negotiation with the higher level. On the higher level there are people from the government, political parties or state or private organizations, officially or unofficially strongly affiliated with the government. In some cases the middle group (e.g. representatives of oppositional parties and NGOs) and higher one (e.g. people affiliated with government) can negotiate how to proceed in elections by drawing out pragmatic rules (Bailey 1970), but sometimes these rules are not shared by the opposition.

The first circle of voters and their attitudes I tried to include within the previous part. Now I would like to write about the middle and higher levels. The propagandists are local residents hired before the elections. I had the impression that they were chosen according to their good reputation within the population and ability to convince voters to support certain candidates and parties. Their salaries are not high, around 50 GEL (ca. 25 euro) for a month’s work. They go door-to-door, mostly in their neighborhood. Besides propaganda, they make kind of census, who votes for whom. The oppositional parties did not have propagandists within the locality and did not have the exact data about the outcomes of the election. The ruling party had a more precise picture, even if this may not be perfect either. This was the case in Sac’ire. Instead of 350 – expected - supporting votes, the United National Movement Party got 284, which made propagandists upset: standing before the polling station at the end of the day and discussing who from their supporters deluded them. The pre-election propaganda is not the only

84 I do not have the data about the number of the votes he got all over in the community.
job for them; the election day is important, while they should stand before the polling station all day along and check who from their lists of supporters come. The propagandists address the people like “my people”, or “my grannies.” These kinds of expressions were on the one hand indicating to the closeness of propagandists and the voters, as the used words express the blood relations, and on the other hand to the result of their work, that they already convinced those voters to vote for the favorite candidate. According to our observations, it seemed that the voters were also aware of the fact that the propagandists are doing this kind of registration. Sometimes they were ironical about this fact, saying directly to the propagandists: “Hey, mark there!” (he aYNišnet mand!), sometimes declaring publicly whom they voted for. If this is an abrogation of the law is questionable. In the polling station, none of the members of the committee did protest this fact, while an outsider, the representative of the oppositional party named this practice as an abrogation of the electoral law and compulsion of the voters: “They [meaning propagandists of the ruling party] are making unscrupulous propaganda outside! Do you not see how they force each citizen outside?” The same fact is within the framework of law for the representative of the NGO: “We do not have to control this thing. This does not break the law!” (Kakha, 2006).

In the election law it is clearly indicated that propaganda on Election Day, especially near the polling station is prohibited. But the unresolved problem is whether registering their supporter before the polling station is propaganda or not. I assume that maybe this is not direct propaganda, but it still influences the choices of the voters, but this practice is done within the pragmatic rules which are ‘normatively neutral’ (Bailey 1970). The checking, whether convinced people arrive to vote for the government or not is another type of compulsion. In the case of their absence, the hired car will bring them to the polling station. To look more closely to the propagandists, most of them have state jobs, like librarian, head of house of culture, head of school and so forth. Some of them are just ordinary citizens. Within the survey, from the 100 respondents within Sac`ire village 21 persons declared that during different times (but after 1990s) they worked for a candidate or party during the election, 20 of them doing propaganda and one of them serving with car. They are not necessarily members of the party, and 3 in the sample are not interested in politics at all. More curious is that 37 % of the party members declared lack of interest in politics. As mentioned earlier the middle group of people are either opportunistic or deferential citizens, who are influenced either thru vertical ties or material interest. The incorporated types of the citizens, who internalize the party position and do something voluntarily I could not find within these groups of people. Membership of the ruling party means being part of the government, which involves certain benefits.
The other actor\textsuperscript{85} who takes an important role during the election procedures is the NGO ‘Fair Election’. This organization is assumed to have observers in most of the polling stations all over in Georgia, to look at the election procedures, write a final report and have quite a strong position to evaluate the general picture of the elections. This NGO is one of the main institutions, which observed the election in 2003, displayed a lot of irregularities and evaluated the election as unfair and undemocratic, which became the main ground for the ‘Rose Revolution’ (see Katz 2006). The institution is well structured and has branches in every district. The heads of the branches are responsible to choose the observers, train them, organize the procedure of the observation, have a mobile group, which during the election day will visit all the polling stations and give final report about election procedures in the district. In the local branch of the NGO the observers were chosen according to personal links, however, which worked in my case as well. In order to become an official observer of NGO I used the social connections in my field site.\textsuperscript{86} In the case of T’q’ibuli district the head of the branch as well as the observers were from the locality. I did not have the chance to look closely to this institution as I was an outsider and my presence even in the training of observers before the elections for the self-governmental body was not desired, with the peculiar argument: “you do not need to be trained,” or “the other observer, who asked for appointing his friend to your position, should not see you there as complete stranger who got the position.” The interest of the participants seems to be financial; the salary for the observers during the election was 21 GEL (ca 10 euro) for the day and reimbursement of the transportation expenses. While the interest of the head of the branch appeared to be stronger, he got the official position after the election as a reward for giving a positive picture of the elections in the district. The administration of the local branch had close relations with the T’q’ibuli government and their position to defend the interests of the government was very visible, while they were afraid of writing critical reports and making protests during the election. One of the criteria for choosing the observer for the local branch was having a positive attitude towards the government. The general positive attitude to the government is assumed to work during the election procedure, while the person should support the government even in illegal actions. The behavior of the observer during the election is

\textsuperscript{85} Actually this is an institution, but so personalized, that I prefer to call it people/actors than organization. Furthermore, I do not have evidence to generalize the whole picture to all institutions.

\textsuperscript{86} From the beginning, the head of the branch was refusing because he did not know “who I am,” which meant that he did not know whether I will protest while seeing the irregularity or not. The middle man, convinced him, that I am “their person” and just need to look at the process how it works and will not be very strict. But later when the head of the branch was not able to convince me not to write the report about ballot stuffing, he asked the middle man to stop me.
strictly controlled, while before writing a critical report, it should be announced to the head of the branch who will take the final decision. The personal connection which the head of the Fair Election branch had with every observer works like forcing them to “go for a walk” during elections, not to see the actual illegalities and not to designate them. In my case, when the head of the organization did not have the influence on me, he and the members of the government used further connections, finding a person, which influenced my decision, not to protest about the illegalities. In other cases the personality of the electoral committee members works for forcing people to be reluctant about the abrogation of the electoral law. One of the villagers during the interview, which I was recording about tea cultivation in the locality, mentioned: “I was an observer of the ‘Fair Election’, when we were voting for Šalik’iani. I saw so many irregularities, I got mad. I had broken all the pens of the electoral committee; I could not do anything else. The head of the committee was a man, I respected him, and otherwise I should have written critical report” (Mzia, 32 years old woman. 2007). The respect, the fear or the desire of profit keeps the people from expressing their protest, if they feel like protesting at all.

The activities of the local branch of the NGO ‘Fair Election’ do not serve according to the mission the organization, to evaluate the electoral procedures. Close relations between the head of the local branch and the representatives of ruling party, helping the ruling party for winning the election, rather than detecting irregularities make us think that there exists an alliance between the representatives of civil society and political elite like Laurence Broers claims (2005). But it also should be considered, that this is the settled practice in the locality, when the boundaries between different institutions are blurred. The closeness with each other and the desire for promotion or material gain makes locals forget about their duties as employees of one or the other organization. Again, these are pragmatic rules and none of the locals would want to talk about.

The other observers, who are from the oppositional parties, use a similar logic. In the locality they are hired and have financial interest or are close to the members of the parties, are trained to observe the elections and have the right to write critical reports. Yet during the actual critical situation they are constrained to keep silent as well. This argument seems general, but as I have heard from the electoral committee of the district, there were no critical reports written in any of the polling stations. The local government has the power to force these people as local residents, using the means of blackmail, compulsion, or promises. In the case of my observation,

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87 The man was the candidate from the ruling party before the ‘Rose Revolution’. 
The scarce financial means seemed to be the reason of being reluctant toward the abrogation of the law: “They are forcing everybody with different means. My party is paying me 30 GEL for this observation (ca.15 euro) and this money is not worth for inciting against the government. I am not going to fight until the death for the election (ar vap’ireb tavi ʃevak’la!).” During the conversation, she did not mention how she was forced, but she was cautious to warn me: “I also suggest you to be silent, because you live here and they [meaning ruling party and their supporters] can fulfill their threats.” The interesting point is that the rules of game are the same during different periods, as soon as one has the power, s/he adapts these rules: “This situation is widespread and the same as before. During Shevardnadze time I put in 800 faked votes” [instead of 200 this time] – said the same woman. According to the number of stuffed ballots the illegality of this election seemed not to be so terrifying.

Among the middle political actors of elections, one can include the members of the electoral committees, who are defending the interests of oppositional parties and candidates. Only those parties can nominate committee members, who succeeded in the previous elections (in this case previous elections for the self-govermental body), and the number of their members was determined according to the proportion they got in the previous elections. At the polling station to which I was assigned, three members were from the Georgian Labour Party 88 and one from the New Rights Party. 89 The payment for the members of the electoral committee was 200 GEL (ca 100 euro). During the last month before the elections the members should come every day to the place of polling station, check the voter lists and take part in the meetings of the electoral committee. However, when the members were working and sometimes were officials somewhere else, how they should be spending each day at the polling station is questionable. I do not know exactly how political parties select their representatives within the electoral committee, but personal connections play great role here as well. The members of the electoral committee from the oppositional parties are aware of the fact of the possible compulsion, but are not immune to it. The woman from the oppositional party warned me beforehand about possible pressure from the side of ruling party and asked me to help them; however, at the end of the election day my right to resist the pressure was humiliated by the

88 Georgian Labor Party was founded in 1995. The cornerstone of the party ideology is to introduce democratic principles, to restore fair justice, to protect human rights, free trade market and the integration into EU. Since the day of its foundation the party has been distinguished by its active opposition policy against the Shevardnadze-Saakashvili regime (see www.labour.ge).

89 New Rights Party was founded in 1999. The mission of the party is to support personal freedom, limit the power of government, support fair justice and property rights (see www.nrp.ge),
official persons, who were also members of the Electoral Committee. The logic of pressure and influence is common in every case, the one who should defend the interest of oppositional party prefers to defend his/her private and family interest and follows the common practice of election faking. The committee members, like the ones from NGOs, follow to the technical rules of the election, are very careful to fulfill each small detail, like marking voters, checking them, their documentations, signing the registries or putting the ballots within the envelopes. They are well trained to know all the procedures and rules of election, as well as being aware of the techniques of faking election. At the end of the day, no one dares to tell the truth outside the polling station. That is why, voters who are forced to follow the procedures carefully have the impression that the elections have been managed accurately. According to the practice in polling station I observed, the representatives of the oppositional parties have limited possibilities to defend the interests of their parties.

The last higher and most powerful people within the election committee are those who are appointed by the ruling party. They are sometimes officials or workers of different organizations. During the elections they use the power of their position (for example, as officials) or the support from the government or the employers (as in the case of the woman, working in the local bank, whose administration supported the candidate). They follow general rules, to give the impression of fair elections, while they organize ballot box stuffing. The methods to negotiate with different parties of this ‘political game’ are different, according to the weakness or strength of these to resist the pressure. They are willing to cover faking at the polling station as well as in general, after the elections. We can put these modes of behaviour under the category of pragmatic rules suggested by Bailey; According to the author, “They range from rules of ‘gamesmanship’ (how to win without actually cheating) to rules which advise on how to win by cheating without being disqualified (what may be done, for example, on the ‘blind’ side of the referee in the boxing ring)” (Bailey 1970: 6). Because the same power holders are in charge of refereeing the ‘political game of election,’ they are less caring about disqualification. These pragmatic rules are known and created in the circle of power holders of the community, “[ ].. displaying a private wisdom which lies behind the public face of politics” (ibid. 7).

Interesting is also the justification of the unlawful behaviour from the side of power-holders, when it is detected. It is packed under the normative rules. To go back to the example brought by Bailey, none of the politicians will say publicly, that he did something because he enjoys being famous or being ruler, but will say that it is for common goods (Bailey 1970: 5).
In order to defend his position and justify the unlawful act, the main powerful actor of the election explained: “I am serving the people!” having the same meaning that it is for sake of people. Other kinds of techniques which are used for legitimating the unlawful act are given as an example for the common character of faking elections, as suggested in the statement “it happens everywhere including US.” In Italo Pardo’s words: “Objective circumstances in which individuals find themselves, and the belief that everybody else is doing the same, may well provide powerful incentives to participate in the culture of corruption” (Pardo 2000: 11) It is also interesting to consider how an outsider but powerful official argued about the fact of ballot box stuffing: “It is not falsification, because they stuffed the ballot box in order to increase the number of voters and votes were divided proportionally between each party. These people are doing this by themselves. Government is not involved in it. They want to have ‘high scores’ in the eyes of the government; later on, to come and demand promotion or a good job. This works like blackmail. Furthermore, you should consider that the people from opposite parties are not well educated and they will hinder the process of reforms and the general politics of government” (Malkhaz, 29 years old, 2006) This explanation is crucial, while it shows the blurred boundaries between legality and illegality. Furthermore, the culpability goes to the person, in order to protect the image of the government and party. When discussing political corruption in Italy Italo Pardo argues: “Collaboratori (people who confess and cooperate with law) powerfully embody the rationale of political will to establish the views that ‘the system’ is not fundamentally and thoroughly corrupt, and that the wrongdoings of part of its key personnel are explained less by unredeemable immorality than by the pressure of the general climate controlled and encouraged by a powerful minority” (Pardo 2000: 91). The justification for the falsification, that it happens in order to increase the number of voters does not seem convincing, because there are no barriers according the numbers of voters needed to establish the validity of the elections. The election is considered valid, even if one voter comes to the polling station. The second explanation, that candidates from oppositional parties would hinder the reforms is more curious, suggesting a position of ‘caring for the citizens’, who would not have ability to choose the right candidate. Although the effort of the official, to legitimize the illegality and save the image of the government and party makes me think that there might be some citizens of incorporated type, who “identify with party and governmental interests, and actively participate and support party goals” (Janoski and Gran 2008: 39), although the morality of their goals is under question.
5.6 Conclusion

I used the case of the elections of self-governmental body to represent, how elections as the main possibility for citizens to affect the political processes worked in one of the districts of Georgia. The process of elections gives me the possibility to assume, that in the district (the district is included since the observation was done not in Sac’ire alone) political rights of the citizens are to some degree limited, (if not humiliated). Their positions are strongly influenced through social relations which exists between the ordinary villagers and interest bearers (who are other than being also villagers, party members, employed in state financed organizations or doing propaganda for a certain party). Opportunist citizens use elections sometimes as a source of material income or personal promotion. Ordinary citizens, who do not have a direct affiliation with the party, government and/or other organization, tend to be more deferential, following the general position of community, neighbors, friends and acquaints. Seldom we had active citizens, who were in opposition to the government, but they are a minority, whose effort is fruitless. The general result is influenced by the powerful people, from government, ruling party or organization, who know the techniques how to exercise power and dominate over citizens. The presented case of elections shows how the state in the local level is ‘govermentalized’ using various techniques and apparatuses for ruling the population (Foucault 2000).

For the analysis here, I found the position of Bailey very appropriate, when exploring the elections for the self-governmental body as a “competitive game”, where the participants “agree about how to play and what to play for” (Bailey 1970: 1). Voters know that they should vote in order to fulfill their obligation, to support positive changes (even if they are temporal), and to assist their close people. As soon as ordinary voters become interest-bearers, they start to comport their own interest (financial, social or political). If one manages to go up and become a power-holder, s/he uses the power according to the rules, which previous generations used. Most of the citizens are aware of this process but are passive in protesting against it. Even worse, in this situation, they are trying to find ways of gaining something. The only person in this circle whose resistance was not understandable was me. That is why one of the officials was asking: “In whose eyes do you want to get high scores?” During playing election game major actors put their interest, so acting just as a neutral citizen, without self-interest, was not understandable.

To sum up the whole discussion of the chapter, the political rights of local citizens are partly internalized, but are limited to have actual effect on political processes. Locals know that
voting is one of the main duties of the citizens and they should participate in it. While for others, voting means not to hinder the positive changes, not to disappoint the close people, who are evolved in the process, or not to let election committee use their votes for stuffing. Inhabitants are more skeptical about the participation of ordinary citizens in politics, explaining it with their everyday problems, lack of professionalism in this field or lack of social connections with the power-holders. Political processes show some continuities, while the tactics used by the previous governments (even, the Soviet one, in the sense of patron-client relations) stay unchanged and people perceive it like normal, as they are used to it. For characterizing the political citizenship of the locals, practices alone should not be used for judging, unless we will consider their motivations, which is mostly oriented toward personal gains, for promotion at jobs, or for the short-term financial paybacks. The whole political process going on in locality shows that citizenship is a unified category like Marshall (1998 [1963]) and Lister (2005) suggest and all rights are interdependent. The lack of the material wellbeing restrains the locals from a full realization of their political rights (choosing and supporting the one they prefer) or civic rights (having personal freedom). Furthermore, the central and local government use the language of bargaining with the voters. They present the provision of social rights not as an obligation of the state, but as their benevolence, which should be reciprocated with political support from the side of citizens. Here we can also trace the confrontation between social and political rights, as one set of rights (social in this case) are promised to be provided at the expense of the other set of rights (political rights in this case).
Chapter 6. Social citizenship

6.1 Introduction

During my conversations and observation of everyday life in Sac’ire, citizenship was mentioned primarily in relation to social issues that people believed the state should solve. The free market economy and privatisation process, which were introduced in the country in early 1990s, do not seem to have much changed the citizens’ expectations from the state. What is new in the social policy of postsocialist Georgia is that it is far from being a welfare state and that it tries to depart from the Soviet model of social citizenship (even if it tries not to ignore the demands of the people at the same time). The cornerstone of the state’s current social policy is a new social assistance programme, the main principle of which is to provide state resources (or social security as I refer to it later) to the poorest persons as identified by an evaluation system.

As has been discovered in earlier chapters since the dissolution of the Soviet system state supported jobs and sufficient social support (including free medical care) are no longer available or are available only to a limited extent. This has created an uncertain economic situation which, along with the memory of Soviet practices of universal social citizenship, motivated the majority of Sac’ire’s population to apply for the new social assistance programme regardless of their financial situation. In this way Georgian citizens are trying to exercise social citizenship as a practice of bargaining for universal social rights, which are ultimately not achievable given the present state of Georgia’s economy and the government’s policy of providing social security only to extremely needy families. Thus, Georgia’s citizens demonstrate a conflation of the concepts of social citizenship and social security. The theoretical understanding of social rights (“as an absolute right to a certain standard of civilization” (Marshall 1998 [1963]: 106)) seems to work here, but the “standard of civilization” is relatively and differently understood by Georgian citizens and by the Georgian state. In this chapter I argue that social citizenship and social security are separate categories. In the process I raise such questions as: What strategies do local people employ to exercise their social rights? How does the category of social citizenship described by T.H. Marshall help us understand the claims of Georgian citizens for state support? Before engaging with these questions and theoretical

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90 This chapter was presented at the conference ‘Re-thinking Citizenship’ at Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in 2008 and later published in Citizenship Studies, 2011. no. 15 (3-4), pp. 471-484.
issues of social citizenship and social support in general, I briefly introduce the ‘Targeted Social Assistance’ (TSA) programme, which was being implemented in 2007 in Georgia.

6.2 Targeted Social Assistance (TSA) in Georgia

I first heard about the TSA programme when I began to carry out the census survey during my fieldwork. People appeared uncomfortable about answering my questions on property, income, and migration, which made me think that they were misunderstanding the aim of my visit and my work. Soon, however, I found out that the investigation into families’ economic situations for the TSA programme was going on at the same time, and villagers thought I was one of the social agents on whom their ‘fate’ depended.

The programme is the state’s most recent response to increasing poverty, which became a severe problem in Georgia soon after the country declared independence in 1991. At present, Georgia’s choice of methods and tools for solving social problems is related to political principles. The choice of social policy is also increasingly dependent on foreign guidelines for the country. The government and international organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank emphasised the need to overcome poverty. Furthermore, eradicating poverty was announced as goal number one of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. After the ‘Rose Revolution’ in 2003, overcoming poverty became even more important, as Saakashvili’s government was eager to develop close relations with the European Union. Since 2004, radical changes in the social assistance system have been made, which are reflected in the Law on Social Assistance adopted in 2006. According to this law, the main principle of social assistance is social protection of the extremely poor sector of the population. Much of the system of category-based assistance inherited from the previous period was abolished altogether, with the planned expansion of the remaining parts being suspended. A significant number of existing beneficiaries were transferred to the new TSA programme, which, in accordance with the new law, was prepared and started being implemented in 2006 by the Social Service Agency (SSA).

The main concept of the new programme differs from the Soviet social support policy in that eligibility for social support is dependent on self-evaluation and the evaluation of social
agents. First the family (or an adult member of the family) should evaluate him-/herself as poor, and then the local Social Service Agency in T’q’ibuli district evaluates the family’s economic conditions. In T’q’ibuli, the Social Service Agency has a staff of eight agents. To avoid clientelistic relations in the evaluation procedures, social agents are sent to villages other than their own home village, and there are checks on the results reported by each social agent.

According to the procedure for preparing the declaration, social agents visit and ask about the demographic situation of the family, employment, income and expenses. They also examine the living conditions of the family and the property, and include information about home appliances, furniture, curtains, and even about the health and beauty aids (such as soap and shampoo) that family members use. They also check the number of livestock, poultry, and cultivated land plots. Other state institutions like the Department of Migration or the Ministry of Internal Affairs provide additional information such as whether a family member lives abroad or has an official job. In case of false information, the family is disqualified from participating in the programme for three years. Completed declarations are sent to Tbilisi, where all the resources that families have declared are entered into a special computer programme. Household welfare is evaluated by means of proxy means testing (PMT), and each family is ascribed a ‘rating score’ that reflects the assessment of its socio-economic condition.

There are three different kinds of assistance packages that are allocated on the basis of the rating scores. Families identified as extremely poor receive the first package, which provides 30 GEL per month for the first family member and 12 GEL for each additional member of the family. In addition to the direct financial support, the families receive health insurance policies and an electricity allowance. Families receiving the second package get no cash, but they are eligible for health insurance policies and the electricity allowance. Families in the third group qualify only for the electricity allowance. If a family qualifies for one of the social support packages there are further checks before the social support is finally allocated.

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91 The procedure of supporting certain families or individuals during the Soviet period was mainly based on records and calculations the state agencies carried out and did not involve an additional evaluation process.

92 Since 2007 the TSA has undergone significant changes. For instance, the rating scores have become lower, the amount of monetary assistance increased, and the electricity allowance was abolished. Here I describe the situation as it existed in 2006-2007. For detailed information about the TSA, see the webpage [www.ssa.gov.ge](http://www.ssa.gov.ge).

93 Thirty Georgian Lari (GEL) = 15 euro. Here I use the exchange rate of 1 GEL = 0,50 euro, based on, [www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi](http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi), accessed 1.10.2008.

94 A health insurance policy includes a visit to the family doctor once every two months, coverage for prescribed examinations, medical service for pregnant women, necessary minor and major operations, and unavoidable in-patient treatments. The insurance also covers the expenses for medication used in the above-mentioned cases. The electricity allowance came in the form of a voucher worth 37 kWh per month per family, irrespective of family size.
Within the T’q’ibuli district, more than 6,000 families (30 % of the families living in the district) applied for the programme, one of the highest rates within the region.\(^{95}\) As of September 2006 around 1,300 families had qualified for the first package of social support. Approximately 2,000 families received the second package, and another 2,000 families qualified only for the electricity allowance. Approximately 700 families were evaluated as not poor and therefore not in need of social support.

6.3 Social citizenship or social security?

Poverty, living conditions, financial support, and health care are all central to the new state social policies and are key issues in discussions of social security as well. The central question we need to address then is how these categories are linked to social citizenship, and to what degree and why social security and social citizenship should be differentiated and yet linked to one another. In their work Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (1994: 12) follow the definition of social security proposed by the International Labour Organisation (ILO): “the protection which society provides for its members, through a series of public measures against the economic and social distress that otherwise would be caused by the stoppage or substantial reduction of earnings resulting from sickness, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, invalidity, old age and death; the provision of medical care; and the provision of subsidies for families with children”. As this definition is quite substantial and incorporates most kinds of social policies, it overlaps to a considerable degree with social citizenship. The classical definition of social citizenship is vaguer, asserting the rights of citizens “to live the life of a civilized being” (Marshall 1998 [1963]: 94). Marshall sees the origins of social citizenship in the Poor Law of England, but the provision of these minimal social rights was in contradiction to civil and political citizenship: “The Poor Law treated the claims of the poor, not as an integral part of the rights of the citizen, but as an alternative to them” (ibid.: 100). Hence the initial idea of citizenship, to preserve equality between those having citizenship status, is violated in the case of social rights. That the state guarantees minimum goods and services, however, does not necessarily decrease social inequality between citizens; it primarily alleviates the poverty of

\(^{95}\) The head of the Social Service Agency in T’q’ibuli district calculated the percentage according to the number of families officially registered in the district, but as out-migration is quite high, the number of families actually living in the district is significantly lower, and the proportion of families applying for the programme can be estimated at more than half.
citizens. Marshallian theory has often been criticised for taking the case of Great Britain as a representative example, for the teleological character of its evolutionary model, and because it could not define explicitly the relationship between social class and citizenship (Turner 1993: 7). Nevertheless, despite these critiques, Marshall’s work remains crucial for building social theories around citizenship issues, as I shall show below.

Some later interpretations of social citizenship are clearer in defining social rights as “free collective bargaining over wages and working conditions, insurance against unemployment and in health, and the guarantee of minimum standards of housing, education, employment, and health care” (Murray 2007: 229). Maurice Roche, when discussing social citizenship, underlines the importance of the context and complexity of social rights. He reminds us about the global context, as international organisations “recognize and promote social rights and the full complex of rights associated with citizenship” (Roche 2008: 84). The case of the TSA programme is an example of “the new patterns of benefit provision observed into ‘external’ and ‘internal’ pressures on states” (ibid.: 81). Writing on social citizenship, Bryan Turner (1993: 4) uses the idea of practice to define citizenship as “a set of social practices which define a nature of social membership”. Such an emphasis on citizenship practices helps me, on the one hand, to highlight the process of claiming social rights and, on the other hand, to distinguish social security from social citizenship.

The categories of social security and social citizenship are both concerned with the material well-being of individuals within a specific society. However, social citizenship accentuates the right of each member of the society to enjoy a certain standard of living and to have the right to demand it if necessary (i.e., from the bottom up), while social security emphasises the philanthropic foundation of the state to provide certain groups with benefits (i.e., from the top down). Social security is not for every member of society; rather, it is intended to benefit those members in need, those who have lost their jobs, been injured or disabled, or grown old, and so on. Social citizenship is the right of each individual member of a state, while social security encompasses groups of people (sometimes even of different citizenships) classified as having a special status. Furthermore, social security is a social provision for people, but the source of the provision is not necessarily defined; it might be official or unofficial, coming from the state, an international organisation, a kin group, the neighbourhood, and so forth (Burgess and Stern 1991, Drèze and Sen 1991, F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1994). To distinguish among the sources of social security, in this chapter I use the term ‘traditional social security’ to refer to all kinds of security coming from unofficial structures such as kin,
neighbours, friends, etc., and ‘state social security’ to refer to social security provided by the state.

The term social citizenship is narrower in the sense that it is limited to the formal social rights the members of a state (should) have, and accentuates state–society relations while ignoring the informal provision of economic resources (Goldberg 2001, Buğra 2007). Social citizenship, as introduced by Marshall, is formal and suggests a basis for citizens to develop official claims. These claims are made in order to acquire material and social security from the state. Social citizenship, therefore, includes social rights that citizens have gained at different stages of state development. The practice of executing or implementing social rights is part of social citizenship. Social security is the result they want to gain, but this is scarce and does not guarantee social equality.

Social practice reveals how and why locals establish their rights to access social security and force the state to support them, even if this support is insufficient. I argue that participation in the programme is more about ‘getting something from the state’ than about receiving substantial material support. There are diverse reasons for this: some families are in a difficult financial situation and they try every possible way to find a remedy. There are people who want to get state support as reimbursement for their past dedication to the socialist state. Devotion to the job (as measured by one informant as the length and complexity of work experience) was the economic investment in future pensions, which disappeared along with the former system. Nowadays, pensioners think that the current state is obliged to pay them back for the devotion and loyalty they showed towards the former socialist state. Elderly locals have kept their various rewards and their labour registry books\textsuperscript{96} to show how devoted they were and as proof of the duration of their work experience and past salaries. During Soviet times this was the basis for establishing one’s pension, but to the disappointment of the elderly locals it no longer guarantees benefits.

The pension in Georgia is non-contributory; it is called a pension, but in reality it is financed from the central budget and is a kind of social benefit as well. The current pensions are less than the official subsistence minimum, and most pensioners need other sources of income to survive. Some are supported by their offspring; some are still able to manage their own businesses or engage in subsistence agriculture. The state takes these additional sources

\textsuperscript{96} The \textit{trudovaia knizhka} was an official document that listed every job a person had held and the length of his or her employment.
into consideration in determining eligibility for the TSA programme, and those who have such external sources of support are removed from the TSA roll. In other words, the TSA program grants social security only to extremely poor families, but the general population wants this to be part of their universal social rights, and the rationale behind the TSA remains elusive for them. The strongest reason for demanding universal social rights from the state is the memory of 70 years of socialist citizenship practice. Socialist states granted full social citizenship rights “in order to ‘buy off’ demands for civil and political rights, and thus for full citizenship, which they otherwise suppressed” (Roche 2008: 72).

Both concepts of social security and social citizenship are important in understanding the process of implementing the new social policy in Georgia. The state social policy became one of targeting and guaranteeing social security only to those who otherwise were not socially secure. The state regards this social policy as fair because it guarantees the survival of extremely needy families and alleviates extreme poverty. Here we can observe the similarity to social citizenship: the TSA could be seen as “an attempt to abate the obvious nuisance of destitution in the lowest ranks of society” (Marshall 1998 [1963]: 107). However, the expectations of the population are different and all the applicants for the TSA demand the subsistence benefits as part of their social rights. According to the locals the social benefits should be distributed to all citizens despite their social rank. The villagers’ expectations resonate with Marshall, who saw the need for “an equalization between the more and the less fortunate at all levels – between the healthy and the sick, the employed and the unemployed, the old and the active, the bachelor and the father of a large family” (1998 [1963]: 108).

Financial support, health insurance, and an electricity allowance – these are part of the state-provided social security. As the provision of this social security is not based on the universal social rights of citizens, but rather on the basis of need, the TSA program can be regarded as official social security guaranteed only for some citizens, and not the ‘manifest’ of universal social citizenship. The efficiency of the programme, however, is questionable as the amount of financial support provided is minimal and medical care is uncertain and inadequate. Even if some of the provisions within the programme are at times not crucial for the survival of families, they are nevertheless part of the claims they have toward the state.

The implementation of the programme includes multiple processes and fields where the state (defined as all branches of government that initiated and implement the programme) and the society meet one another. This is the sphere of social citizenship where members make their
claims for state-supported social security. Before we discuss why and how local people ‘defend’ their social rights, we should look at the history of Soviet social policy, which partly defines today the social claims citizens make towards the present state.

Among the several works concerning socialist social policy written towards the end of the Soviet era (Beyme 1981, Porket 1987) or after its dissolution (Adam 1991, Alexopoulos 2006), the emphasis on the overstated ideology of the Soviet Union to present itself as “a classless society”, made up of “unselfish and caring benefactors” is prominent (Porket 1987). Jan Adam (1991) focuses on the inadequacy of the socialist health care system, regulated food prices, and housing policy, while Joseph Porket (1987) points out the problems of unemployment, social inequality, and clientelism within the former Soviet Union. The limitations of the socialist social policy demonstrate the distance between the imagined universal socialism and the actual one. Nevertheless, as Porket (1987: 122) notes, “Within the framework of its policy the regime provides the population with specific values. The values are not always of the quantity and quality desired or needed by the population, but are provided from the cradle to the grave and, on top of that, either without any direct financial cost to the recipient (e.g. the social security system is non-contributory) or at subsidized prices”. However, two less desirable features of Soviet citizenship developed as a result of this cradle-to-grave social policy: “Both the régime and enterprises are regarded as a milk cow, a give-it-to-me attitude and sit-back-and-wait-for-it attitude constitute two important traits of the popular culture” (Porket 1987: 122). One could say that within socialism social citizenship was more than the protection of social rights; the system designed and planned the lives of its members, thereby denying citizens choice and the exercise of free will. Furthermore the socialist social policy encouraged economic dependence on the state, which was guaranteed as long as one was loyal to the state and did not protest about the missing aspects of civil and political citizenship.

6.4 Understanding poverty and differences between state and traditional social security

As discussed above the name and the aim of the TSA are concerned with poverty alleviation. Poverty is a relational concept understood differently by social scientists, state institutions, and ordinary people. In this particular case, the state needed concrete standards for
measuring poverty. Yet lacking exact criteria to single out these kinds of cases, the government had to implement the methodology suggested by international organisations.97

After the 1990s, the amount of assistance citizens received from the new independent state was drastically reduced.98 Some families still receiving support have other means of income (or support), such as kin support, subsistence agriculture or small businesses. These secondary economic sources are not always official or stable, and the state often cannot identify them. For example, labour migrants are mostly not registered and remittances are not always transferred by bank, so the remittances often go unaccounted for. The existence of secondary income for some creates unequal economic conditions within and between the groups receiving social support, some being in real need of additional provision, others not.

In official discourse the above arguments are used to justify changes in the traditional policy of social support and the move toward identifying the target group for social support on the basis of an evaluation of living conditions. The local discourse of understanding poverty and state support, however, differs from the state’s. Local families evaluate their economic conditions according to two different values: whether they would consider themselves ‘poor’ according to their own evaluation of their economic conditions; and whether they want to be included within the state-defined category of ‘poor’ to entitle themselves to social support.

Families tend to refer to education and income, as well as two different types of comparison, when evaluating their own economic situation. Regarding education, my survey results show that respondents with higher education tend to appraise their own economic conditions as good even if they have a low income. This differs from respondents who have only secondary education or vocational training. In assessing income, families take not only official income into consideration, but also all other sources of material support. Thirdly, families assess their own economic situation through comparison with other families’, or sometimes by comparing their current living standards with those they had during the socialist era.

Local families thus often estimate their economic conditions differently than they officially declare when applying for social support. This is because they understand state-supported entitlements as a part of their social rights as citizens, and receiving state social...

97“Reforming Georgia’s social welfare system”, 2007 Reports of the International Commitments Assessment Programme. The programme is supported by the government of Finland and implemented by Transparency International Georgia (http://www.transparency.ge/ accessed on 15.09.2008).

98 For example, in 1995 the monthly old-age pension was 8 GEL (4 euro), in 1998-2004 it was 14 GEL (7 euro), in 2005 it increased to 38 GEL (ca. 19 euro).
security is a goal independent of whether these people have other kinds of social support or not. To qualify for state social security, the locals sometimes pretend that their economic situation is worse than it is in fact, concealing real income, remittances and other kinds of material resources. In Georgia, to refer to the bad economic situation of the family, people usually use the terms gač’ırvebuli (‘in need’) and, less often, Yařibi (‘poor’). However, it is not very often that people publicly admit they are in need, because this is considered shameful. It carries a stigma, especially for families who have unmarried daughters or sons. Marrying a person from a family ‘in need’ implies having low social status and an uncertain future. Declaring poverty before the state in order to get financial support, however, is not shameful, as the resulting support is not viewed as charity, but rather as an obligation of the state.

Some families and individuals do not take part in the programme. People from the younger generation, for instance, are more reluctant to ask for state social support. Firstly, they have not experienced the state as a full social provider. Secondly, they have a secondary role in the family’s economic activities. Men feel ashamed more often than women about being evaluated as poor. Traditionally, the head of the family is the senior man and he is responsible for materially providing for the household.\(^\text{99}\) This model has changed a bit due to out-migration, as certain countries provide women with employment as well as the opportunity to carry out petty trade. The widely held common opinion, however, is that a family’s bad economic situation is the fault of the man. For this reason, it is generally middle-aged women who take care of the whole process of applying for the programme and dealing with social agents. Furthermore, according to the Social Service Agency, two-thirds of the applicants for TSA are pensioners.

Another factor influencing the difference between the citizens’ actual and declared economic conditions concerns the local understanding of income. Following other research (see Dudwick 2003), my survey revealed a discrepancy between expenses and income.\(^\text{100}\) Respondents mostly reported the official amount of money they received, mainly salaries or

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\(^\text{99}\) During the socialist era, women were obliged to work as well, especially in the kolhoz (collective farm) system, but the income of women was still perceived as pocket money as the man had the status of families’ breadwinner. In postsocialist period this practice changed, as soon as the market economy sometimes suggests the better employing chances to women than man, especially in services.

\(^\text{100}\) Five percent of those surveyed said they had no income but reported spending around 100 GEL (ca. 50 euro) per month; 46.3 % reported having an official income of between 100 and 200 GEL (ca. 50-100 euro) and spending 200 to 400 GEL (ca. 100-200 euro) per month; 9 % of the respondents declared an income greater than 200 GEL (ca. 100 euro) per month and reported spending only as much as their earnings.
pensions, while excluding informal sources because these are not considered ‘income’ (šemosavali), but rather sources that they ‘earned by themselves’ (tavisit našovni). ¹⁰¹

The uncertainty of secondary unofficial sources of income motivated local people to apply for the programme in order to get limited but stable state support. This logic led to an increase in applications for the programme: people who already received some social support as a result of belonging to such categories as pensioner, veteran, and disabled applied for the program because, in some cases, social benefits from TSA were better than the category-based provisions. ¹⁰² Officially unemployed people applied for social support as well, claiming that it is their right to have jobs and until the state provides employment for its citizens, they should be financially assisted.

6.5 Methods and motivations for participating in the programme

In the course of conducting the survey in Sac’ire my assistant and I visited an old woman I call Zina. Although we explained who we were and what we wanted, Zina was not convinced and continued to consider us social agents ‘under cover’. Rather than inviting us into her home as is customary, she brought chairs outside where we sat down to fill out the brief questionnaire. She then told us that her daughter, son-in-law and their two sons were also living there. None of them had jobs and the only income was her pension. When we asked whether her family had a vehicle, she replied with embarrassment, “Yes, we have, but a very old Zhiguli. ¹⁰³ It barely runs, while other people have nice foreign cars, so this can’t really be considered a vehicle”. Soon her neighbour came, a nicely dressed middle-aged woman with dyed hair and make-up. When we told her that we would also visit her family, she replied that we could complete the questionnaire there. The woman, Nanuli, started complaining that her sons and husband did not have jobs, that they were living in a rented flat in Tbilisi, and the family was really in need. At the end of our conversation her quite expensive mobile phone rang and we left her. After talking to Nanuli, we asked where her house was. Walking by her yard we saw two newly painted houses which, we later found out, also belonged to her family. We also later learned that Zina’s

¹⁰¹ Private businesses and agricultural work are not supported by the state; the remittances offspring and relatives send back are also acquired with great effort in which the state does not participate. This is the local explanation of why these resources as seen as being ‘earnings by people themselves’.

¹⁰² For some cases the category-based social assistance and the Targeted Social Assistance are alternative to each other, thus recipients should choose between them.

¹⁰³ Zhiguli is the cheapest, most basic model produced by the Russian automobile manufacturer VAZ.
daughter, her husband, and the two sons traded at T’q’ibuli market, while Nanuli’s sons and husband owned their own flat in Tbilisi and were in the construction business.

Judging from the behaviour of these women, we see the distinction between things and positions supplied by the state and those gained as a result of self-effort: concealing something from the state does not involve moral judgments, whereas lying to or cheating friends or acquaintances would. Citizens do not perceive it as an obligation to declare jobs that are not state provided, flats that were not purchased from the state housing programme, or remittances of migrants who, following this logic, left the country because the state could not provide them with jobs and/or sufficient income.

There were further examples of cases in which people concealed their employment, income, emigrant family members and property, as well as hiding TV sets and tape recorders, mobile phones and cars while filling out the applications for the TSA programme. Of course, there were also people who completed the application honestly, sometimes having nothing to hide. People did not, however, judge their relatives or neighbours for being ‘dishonest’ concerning their declarations, even though they might complain later about unfair distribution of social support. Here it is necessary to dwell further on the importance of social support for understanding local people’s efforts to acquire it.

The amount of the financial social support is not very high, especially for a family with several members, but most families are more interested in getting the health insurance and the electricity allowance than the financial support. Leila, for instance, is the only member of her family living in Sac’ire – her husband works in Sochi (Russia) and her son is a dentist in Tbilisi. She works in a bank. When asked why she applied for the programme, she explained, “I might not ask for support, but everybody gets an electricity voucher or health insurance, and I also wanted to get them. But nothing! My score was 245,000, the highest in Sac’ire. You will be surprised to know which families are getting support. Those who really are in need are outside the support list. I really do not know what criteria are important. Is it that the computer programme is so unfair, or does it depend on somebody?”

Leila’s explanation illustrates an interesting position: she does not ask for financial support, she says, but only for health insurance and the electricity allowance. This indicates that

104 The International Commitments and Assessment of the Programme reported that up to 4000 families were disqualified due to false information given to social agents. (“Reforming Georgia’s social welfare system”, 2007 (http://www.transparency.ge/ accessed on 15.09.2008)). In the locality I did not hear about any disqualifications.

105 There were three thresholds of rated scores of the economic standing of applicants. Those families like Leila’s who have a score higher than 200,001 did not qualify as poor.
the health insurance and the electricity allowance are not perceived as social support, but rather something the state should give to each citizen for free, while the financial support is regarded as social support.

Citizens’ claims for free medical care have their roots in the socialist past. Free health care for citizens included “medical treatment, hospitalisation, preventive care, dental care, medication (with some limitations), sanatoria, health spas, etc.” (Jan 1991: 10), but it nevertheless had its own problems. Medical institutions became corrupt in order to reimburse the services of the service providers, who were not paid sufficiently or fairly by the state (Jan 1991). The need for extra tips for medical care is mentioned by locals when talking about past times, although the official tariffs for current medical care make them feel more insecure than in past times. “Now, if you do not pay beforehand, they will kill you,” said Levani, a local 40-year-old. The official medical costs are usually covered with the help of relatives, neighbours, and, in urgent situations, the community, while in cases of chronic disease the situation is often worse. Nora Dudwick, who studied poverty in Georgia, writes that the: “deteriorating public health standards and inability to pay for medical treatment had produced a rise in physical illness and psychological distress among the poor. Most respondents avoided doctors and hospitals until their illness had turned into a serious emergency” (2003: 235). The government is aware of the problems existing in the medical sphere; to mitigate people’s discontent, it provides free ambulance service. The health insurance provided by the programme, therefore, is very important for families. It reduces the insecurity they feel, although it is not a guarantee for full scale, high quality medical care.

Obtaining the electricity allowance is another motivation for participating in the programme. Payments for electricity and other types of ‘communal payments’ (k’omunaluri gadasaxadebi) were made to the state during socialist times. The word gadasaxadi (‘tax’) in Georgian is interesting because it includes not only taxes, but also payments for water, electricity, gas, telephone, and so forth. This problem of double meaning also made some people think that the amount they pay for electricity goes to the state budget as tax, despite the fact that electricity provision was privatised long ago. Taxation is not understood as part of a process of paying state institutions for social security and for future pensions. The contractual

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106 This translation issue appeared first when we were translating the questionnaire into Georgian, because we used the word gadasaxadi, which means tax as well as payments. The answer to the question “Do you pay taxes?” was generally “Yes”, but respondents were usually referring to payments for electricity. After explaining that we were interested in taxation for land and income, they admitted not paying them. In the village only those having state jobs pay income taxes.
vision of citizenship emphasises the importance of equilibrium between rights and obligations (see Stewart 1995, Faulks 2000). Locals do not have this kind of contractual vision of rights and responsibilities; they have strong claims for social rights, but do not perceive that the payment of taxes is the guarantee for future social provision. Furthermore, they are unsure about the responsible use of state resources; they suspect the tax money could go into the pocket of corrupt politicians or officially spend for luxurious life of politicians, who have high salaries and go to frequent foreign trips. Many find the tax rate high, and try to avoid it in every possible way. Similarly, having to pay for electricity is on the whole resented by citizens. The fact that poor families get an electricity allowance (not the money for the electricity) reinforces the idea that even if the state does not own the electricity supplies, it at least has the ability to control the owner and hence should prevent the rise in electricity prices.

The common understanding is that what belongs to the state should be easily obtained by the people. During Soviet times, the practice of manipulating electricity meters in order not to pay for electricity was common.107 Today it is difficult to ‘steal the electricity’ and people expect the state to reduce the price or give it to them for free. There is yet another reason why most families claim the electricity allowance, and this is very specific to the locality. Within the territory of Sac’ire there is a reservoir used for the T’q’ibuli hydro-electric power plant, which was built in the 1950s to provide the existing coal mines with electricity. Locals say that the reservoir is on the territory of the village’s former pastures, and they should therefore receive a discount for electricity. Another argument is the allegation that the climate has changed because of the reservoir. People claim that higher humidity has reduced harvests and resulted in health problems for the local population. In the 1950s the state paid the members of the collective farm for the land it appropriated for the reservoir, but people today either do not know about this or choose not to mention it.

To conclude, local people have certain notions about their economic conditions, and even if their real conditions are indeed much better than those of the genuinely poor, they still apply for social support. The motivation of those people who generally perceive their economic conditions as average or good and still participate in the programme is that they want to get the benefits (medical care and electricity allowance) that they feel they deserve as citizens of the country. To use the words of Leila, this is not asking for ‘support’.

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107 This was a widespread practice to pay for less electricity than was really used. The problem was even discussed in newspapers, explaining that it is a “citizen’s obligation to pay for the electricity he/she uses” (newspaper Tkibul 06.04.1985).
6.6 Outcomes of the programme

The results of the programme pleased only part of the population because some families did not get the desired social support package and others were refused altogether. There were different narratives concerning who applied for the programme and who received support, who the social agents were and how one should ‘behave’ during the checks and evaluations to qualify for the benefits, who decides on the final results, and so forth. Personal experiences, explanations of agents and the village administration, gossip and rumours were all indiscriminately thrown into the mix, making it extremely difficult to understand what was going on.

Knowing the economic situation of one another, locals had their own comparative criteria for determining who is poor and which families ‘deserve’ (ek’utnoda) social support and which ones do not. Within their narratives, discourses of equality and social justice prevailed. Some complained that, despite their status as a war veteran, an earthquake victim, or as head of a large family, they did not get social support. Entitlements for certain groups and categories that were created during the Soviet era and were considered secure reasons for extra help have been mostly abolished under the current social policy; nevertheless, the discourse of expectations and demands for special assistance from the state remains. Hence families who had a certain status in the previous social support system (e.g. pensioners, disabled persons, large families) and considered themselves poor according to the new criteria but did not qualify for support were upset. Such families, then, interpreted the aims of the programme differently.

The elected as well as the appointed administrative bodies in the village received the complaints of the upset people, although it was not their job. For further inquiry, the village administration sent dissatisfied villagers to the Social Service Agency in T’q’ibuli. Those who were very active went to the centre to express their dissatisfaction. The head of the Social Service Agency said that their job was simply to record the actual situation of the families, and that the further processing of the information was done in Tbilisi by computer. Such bureaucratic and administrative run-arounds helped officials accuse the ‘inhuman computer’ as the “main offender” and for misunderstanding the miserable situation of the locals. Through such explanations, complaints were diverted away from the government and the local Social Service Agency, and it became nearly impossible to know whom to blame.
Some of the local people were, however, happy about the programme. The families who received the desired social support thought that they had achieved something. Nevertheless, they still had problems understanding the actual procedures of taking advantage of the benefits. This was especially a problem with the health insurance policy. How it should work and which services were included was not explained to them in detail, nor were medical care providers sufficiently informed about which services they should provide to various categories of people according to their specific insurance policies. Locals sometimes perceived that these policies were not enough to get the health care they needed, or they thought that they should give an extra ‘tip’ anyway, like in socialist times. Tamara, a 74-year-old woman with pneumonia, complained, “They examined me for free, but if I cannot afford any further treatment, then what is the aim of it? If they would find out that I have cancer, that is it. They would not provide any further services. Thank you, but then I would prefer not to know what problem I have”. Erin Koch, writing about tuberculosis care in Georgia, points out the frustrations of patients when they come across “uncertainties over which costs are covered by the health package”, and how this has “had the unintended consequence of actually deterring patients from seeking care at health facilities” (2007: 257). The limited medical care provided within the programme did not solve the problem of chronic diseases and the frequent health problems of pensioners, as the necessary medicine was often too expensive for locals. Hence the full coverage of health care was rarely achievable.

The government, on the other hand, seemed very proud of this programme. In their dialogue with the local people the programme was certainly presented as a great success. David Katamadze, the head of the National Movement Party T’q’ibuli, who I already mentioned in previous chapter, in his electoral campaign in the village, declared the provision of social support for the local people a great victory for the government, in addition to the free ambulance service and the restoration of the coal industry and the railway: “Look people, all over Georgia there were 500,000 applications filed, and in T’q’ibuli district there were 10,000. We are really doing great work building the country and T’q’ibuli district.” During the meeting one of the villagers expressed her dissatisfaction at not receiving social support. Katamadze responded, “We are doing a lot of good work for the people but are not immune to making mistakes. Those who make mistakes are those who do things; the previous government was not doing anything.

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108 He actually exaggerated the number of applications filed in T’q’ibuli (it was in fact 6,000, not 10,000) in order to show how hard they had been working and how desperate the population was. The irony is that this was incorrectly understood by the locals as the number of families that actually received support.
but nevertheless made mistakes. Lady, please go to the Agency in T’q’ibuli, and there they can help you to correct the mistake.” The talk was not full of emotional propaganda; part of what he declared was true, but the way he declared it gave people the impression that the real problem was simply one of misunderstanding. Furthermore, Katamadze presented things done by the government as if they were charity for the people and not governmental obligations.

6.7 Conclusion

The economic difficulties of the country as a whole affected the economic situation of the families. The change in the type of economy opened new spaces for individuals to run their own businesses, but at the local level there were not many possibilities for people to adapt to the free market economy as the use of the local resources formerly relied heavily on the centralised economy. Most of the local people still work in state institutions (23 % of the respondents surveyed), receive pensions (35 %), or are unemployed (12 %). Although some families found secondary sources of income, these were not stable and people did not perceive this unofficial support and/or resource as providing the security they needed. They need and demand state social security, such as jobs, adequate pensions, medical care, and free education, which the socialist state provided. People who worked during the Soviet era want to get social support because they believe that the current state is obliged to pay them back for the dedication and loyalty they showed towards the former socialist state.

I have shown with this case study of the implementation of the TSA programme that Marshall’s concept of social citizenship is relevant for understanding postsocialist conditions of claiming social security on the basis of their understanding of social citizenship: relational notions of wealth and well-being, which Marshall was broadly underlining, shape the attitudes of local people. It is evident that citizens of Georgia claim their social rights in order to re-establish their past social conditions as well as challenge the present inequalities. The state targets extremely needy families in allocating scarce social assistance, and ignores the universal social rights of citizens.

The Soviet experience of practising citizenship was mainly oriented towards exercising social rights rather than civil or political ones (Alexopoulos 2006). The social support the state

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109 I followed up on the case of this woman. She went to the Social Service Agency in T’q’ibuli but they said they were unable to change anything because the local Social Service Agency only reports the actual situation of the families, and that the further processing of the information was done in Tbilisi by computer.
provided was the main reason that people experienced the state as provider, defender and regulator. After independence the Georgian state improved the policy of exercising civil and political rights, but the amount of social support diminished. Criticism of the current state was then mainly directed toward the unresolved social and economic issues. When the forms and amounts of social provision were altered, local people started expecting an extension of social aid to include providing jobs or low electricity prices. Furthermore, the language of communication between the state and citizens was different. In those cases where the state supplied limited social security, it was presented as if it were charity from the state and not as the fulfilment of obligations and promises. At the same time, the state tried to answer the demands of international organisations by implementing the methodology of social assistance suggested by them. However, the logic of the programme was not understandable to local people and the amount of support was not enough. The TSA programme could be seen, therefore, as a clear example of how the Georgian state tried to answer international and internal demands but could not satisfy local people, who expected to be able to practice social citizenship in the contemporary Georgian state as they had experienced it during the Soviet era.
Chapter 7. Migration as exit option, what happens when one migrates?\textsuperscript{110}

7.1 Introduction

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the mobility of the population between and out of successor states has increased. Political crises, ethnic tensions, and economic disaster made millions of ex-Soviet citizens search their ways out of their communities (either to urban centres, or to foreign countries). Although the mobility of the population within the Soviet Union was not scarce (see Sahadeo 2007), Georgians less tended to migrate out of the republic: “Georgians […] tended to stay within their homeland and had the highest concentration in the home republic (96,1 %) of any Soviet Nationality” (Suny 1996: 386). But the postsocialist economic crises, political instability and ethnic conflicts made many citizens change their place of residence. According to IOM\textsuperscript{111} (International Organization for Migration), in 2005 there were 1 024 598 Georgians out of the country (which composes 22,9 % of the Georgian population) (International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2008, 19). Taking into consideration the fact that the migration flow out of the country since 2005 has not decreased, at present time the indicated number supposedly should be much higher. The migration is one of the crucial means of fighting against the economic disaster in the locality. Migration of male household members either to the capital city or to Russia was much practiced by the village dwellers during the last 15 years, although new patterns of migration such as migration to Western countries or female migration gradually emerge.

When villagers were presenting me the area as historically valuable, famous with religious sites, having a strong economy (during Soviet times) connected with mining and tea plantations, the inevitable step was opposing the contemporary government, which had neglected the district and made people flee to other places with the contemporary one: “You should stay here in winter to see how empty and dead the whole village is. One can hardly find any man to clean the road from heavy snow” (Lena, 68 years old, 2006). Whilst discussing with one another, migration was not so distressingly talked about. Of course the absence of husbands, sons or mothers effects the lives of those who stay back, but as remittances of migrants are

\textsuperscript{110} A part of this chapter was presented at the international conference ‘Conflict and Transformation: State Rhetoric, Search for Identity and Citizenship in the South Caucasus,’ and later published in conference Proceedings, 2010.
considered to be the main strategy for survival, they do not complain much about having so many migrants. Conversations about families who have migrant(s) involve appreciation, they are perceived as those who do not have financial pressure any more. In general, stories of migration are much talked about and spread all over the locality.

Migration hence is a central theme in this work when I look at citizenship. How state and citizen relations affect the process of migration and how these matter for the belonging of migrants to the nation-state shall be explored in the first part of the chapter. The main idea of this chapter is to give a general overview of the concept of migration and common characteristics of mobility, as well as to understand its notion in the locality as long as this affects notions of citizenship. In chapters 5 and 6 I discussed the political and social citizenship exercised by the local residents of Sac’ire village. In the second section of this chapter I first discuss how migration modifies the family structure and roles of household members; according to the preferences families of migrants have, how the remittances are distributed and used. Generally, remittances appear to fill in the gap of state support in social citizenship since the contemporary Georgian state could not provide the social benefits for the citizens, or provides them to a minimal extent. Secondly, I refer briefly to the recent history of Georgian – Russian relations, paying attention to the mass deportation of Georgian citizens from Russia; the two case studies of T’q’ibuli migrants to Russia display the difficulties that illegal migrants go through in host society and the individual strategies of coping with the difficulties that their citizenship status creates for them. While economic and social factors define the migration process, in the case of migrants to Russia political and legal policy of the receiving state became overwhelming at some point. Migrants as well as their families blame the Georgian government for unsettled relations with Russia, although their attitudes are expressed in words only and do not incent them to re-cast the state after returning to homeland. Migrants are concerned mainly about their economic situation, and they see no possibility of their interests being represented in contemporary political structures.

112 Only in cases, where migrant(s) keep connection with their family. Sometimes migrant(s) abandon their family completely and those who stay back cannot get economic support.
To begin with the concept migration itself: There is no equivalent of word migration in Georgian language. So the word ‘migracia’ coming from Latin/Russian root is used. According to the *Explanatory Dictionary of Georgian Language* (Chiqobava 1958: 305) the word migration describes change of living place, without indicating if there is a different expression for seasonal or any different pattern of migration. In colloquial speech of locals the word ‘migracia’ is not frequently used either; while migrant (‘migrant’i’ in Georgian) is more widespread. During surveys, family members would say that they have migrants (‘migrant’i’ or their family members are gone (C’asulia Tbilisši an sazƔvargaret) somewhere either to Tbilisi or abroad.

The first problematic aspect of analyzing migration from the locality is the lack of data on families who moved from the village completely. There are 46 empty houses in the village of Sac’ire. To estimate roughly, one fifth of the families were gone and I was not able to collect much information about them. However, not all of them are migrants in the local sense. Some of them had left village for education and never came back. In other cases families keep connections to the village by coming there for special occasions, like weddings, burials or Easter (in order, to visit ancestors’ graves). Local neighbors also visit them for certain events. In spite of having relations people hardly expect that those families (when all members are gone to other places) would come back. But the views of people differ. I met a 57 year old man, who had left the locality with his family members in 1997 to Tbilisi and is a petty trader there. He comes back to the village every summer and for special occasions. Concerning his future plans, he said: “Of course I will come back [in Sac’ire], I will not stay in Tbilisi. This house was built by my father, so my home is here. Now I am helping my children, taking care of their home (Saxl-k’ari in Georgian).” So he was seeing Sac’ire as his ‘home’, where he will come back to in some future time.

In this chapter, I am mostly concerned with the people who have family members back in the village since these people were my informants. The number of migrants who have parents, spouses, children and/or grandchildren in Sac’ire is 101.\(^\text{113}\) I use this data only for estimating

\(^{113}\) This is data from census survey which I did in November 2006. This information can not be absolutely exact because on the one hand, people in the village are going and coming back and on the other hand family members hide, that they have/had migrants. During that period, within the TSA program social surveys were carried out in order to find out poor families and to support them financially, as I discussed in Chapter 6. Having a migrant is considered as one of the economic sources, some families, which were not able to differentiate these two inquiries, did not mention having migrants.
approximately the relative number of people who are gone. Thus, out of 202 households 65 of them have migrants. 71.3% of migrants are men and 28.7% of them are women. The distribution of age groups according to gender does not show difference and demonstrates that 84.2% of the whole migrants are from 21 to 50 years old.

This pattern of migration is not specific for Georgia alone. Discussing the same distribution model of migrants Keith Hart indicates the problem of changing demographic picture of sending societies: “Short-term migrants have traditionally been men, often unmarried men. This has sometimes led to a skewed distribution of the gender and age groups in home villages, with half or more of the able-bodied males absent at one time…” (Hart 1987: 69). If we compare the migration data to the distribution of age groups and gender among the residents of Sac’ire, the influence of migration is obvious (the comparison of distribution of locals’ and migrants’ age groups you can see appendix A: Chart #5). The obvious lack of middle aged men and multiplicity of children, women and old men, have changed the structure of labour power in the locality and the type of local economy which I shall explore later.

The comparison between the distribution of marital status of migrants and local residents shows that the proportion of groups with different status is almost the same. In connection to marital status I would like to highlight the problem connected with separation of spouses after migration and cohabitation of unmarried migrants. Scholars writing about migration agree that migration affects family structures of the sending society. Sac’ire’s case is not an exception (more detail we will discuss these issues in sub-section 7.3). Although it was painful and intimate to express, some of our respondents (5 women and 1 man) proclaimed that their spouses had abandoned them (after migration). The number of cases when migrants abandoned spouses might be even more in the locality but this was not said openly during the interview. Another issue is that of unmarried men who went away for migration and for years they have permanent partners in host societies. Although family members are informed about their sons’ private lives, having ‘traditional’ views about marriage, they do not recognize the pre-marriage sexual relationship as cohabiting (perceiving this like temporal adventure), and are permanently searching for ‘brides’ for migrant sons who might not come back for years. There was only one mother, who told us, that in Russia her son has a girlfriend and they have a permanent relationship during all these years and she would be eager to see them married.

Now some words about migrant women. Cross tabulation between gender and present occupation of migrants shows (see Appendix A, Chart #5, table #1), that 8 cases of migrant
women (27.6\%) are housewives, in the sense of accompanying their husbands and not working in the place of migration. Some of the women migrants accompanying their husbands were able to work in the place of migration (17.3\%). 24.1\% (7 women out of 29) of migrant women are ‘autonomous migrants’ (Sharpe 2001: 4), who left the village alone with the primary purpose of improving their economic situation. Among ‘autonomous migrant’ women two of them have husband and children back in the village, two of them are single and three of them are widows, who “may have experienced pressure to leave due either to the economic responsibility they bear for their children or in order to avoid social sanctions” (Reyes 2001: 276). On the one hand female migration is not desirable for local people. “If somebody has to leave for work then the man should go!” (Gia, 29 years old ex-migrant, 2007). But when family has unavoidable economic needs the traditional gender role perception may also change. Nugzari, a 48 year old man, migrant to Russia in previous times, experienced this situation when his wife became labour migrant:

“Railway station closed down, I lost my job, children were studying at university. If we were not able to cover their education fees, rent, transportation and food expenses, they would have had to quit studies and 3 years of their and our ‘labor’ would had been lost... At home we [he and his wife] discussed our financial situation and my wife decided to leave. I could not say anything. I experienced myself how difficult it is to be far away from family” (2007).

This case introduces changing gender relations within the family structure (woman leaving for work while man stays home) but at the same time, the wife is not a completely ‘autonomous migrant’, while her decision was determined because of family economic situation and in order to support husband and children. In connection to female migration Mary Chamberlain differentiates between “men and women’s language about the migration experience” (Chamberlain 1997: 97). While men could be fully independent migrants, taking decision separately, women migrants are more embedded within the framework of family, behaving according to family needs. In general, when married men decide to leave this is also counted as being according to family needs, while unmarried men tend to be more individual in decision-making process. So in Sac’ire having family might be more influential in determining migration than gender. Talking in general about female migration pattern of locality, women express more passive migratory behavior, either following their husbands or remaining in the village.
One of the interesting demographic factors is the educational background of migrants. Recent discussions on migration from Georgia highlight the process of brain drain from Georgia: “Labour migrants in the fertile age have higher education (43%). That reduces the demographic potential of Georgia and causes ‘brain drain’. Only a small percentage of emigrants are able to raise their qualification, while the rest become disqualified. They are engaged in unskilled labour as auxiliary workers, such as nurses, nannies, waiters and cleaners” (Shinjiashvili 2005: 2). Contrary to this argument, among the migrants from Sac’ire only 27.1% have high education. The distribution of the educational background of local residents and migrants is almost the same (see Appendix A, chart #6):

According to the National Statistics Office of Georgia in 2014 (when the last census survey was held) the share of the population with high education (among the whole population, including children) was 26.7%, in urban settings it was 36.8% and in rural places 13.6% (National Statistics Office of Georgia 2018: 9). Thus there is a big difference between the rural-urban population concerning the educational background. The pattern of migration from Sac’ire cannot be named as brain drain as the educational background of migrants is not much higher than of the villagers who stayed back.

After discussing some demographic characteristics of migrants let us turn to the general concepts of local people about migration and how these imaginations are implemented into the migratory practices. In conversations about migration and also the data collected during surveys I discovered some commonly shared beliefs of mobility, which determine whether locals ‘qualify’ movement of people as migration or not.114

*Period of migration:* There are two aspects: a) when the movement took place, and b) for how long the migration has been.

*Date of leaving the locality:* Usually when local people talk about migrants, they refer to those who left after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As Lilia Shevtsova has written in the article “Post-Soviet Emigration Today and Tomorrow”: “From the late 1980s onward, Soviet emigration started to take an increasingly economic nature. This includes people who left the Soviet Union fearing the further scaling down of their living standards and unemployment of those unable to find adequate application for their abilities” (Shevtsova 1992: 242).

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114 Of course these characteristics are not universal and there were few cases, when natives had different understanding of migration, but first of all I present the prevailing pattern.
Since the 1990s nationalist ideological pressure became the reason for leaving for some ethnic minorities in the country (like it was more detailed discussed in the 4th chapter). But this was not the motive for migration from Sac’ire, as Sac’ire is (and was) primarily populated with Georgians. As explained earlier, economic difficulties of the new independent state affected extremely the financial situation of the district which was fully embedded within the centralized Soviet economy and this is a major reason for emigration. During our talks about migrants, people reflected primarily on those who left because of financial problems after 1991.\textsuperscript{115} It does not mean that before 1990 nobody left the village, but either these people had already adjusted to the places or locals do not perceive the economic reasons for leaving so harsh and do not signify this movement as migration.

Research has shown that the largest number of people migrated between 1999 and 2002. During that period no further economic decline was noticed in the locality, which would determine this flow of people. The mines as well as most factories and kolkhoz were already closed down. The reason for the late migration is on the one hand the delayed effects of economic decline on the other hand the well-established networks to the places of migration, which worked like push factor. Migration of people is not only a uni-directional movement of people. Different groups of people are constantly moving back and forth. Most of the people (mainly men) whom I met in the region had some kind of migratory experience (working in Russia, Turkey or at least in Tbilisi). For years they were trying to find proper conditions of work somewhere. Those who could not adapt to new surroundings came back. A relatively high number of people leaving the village within last years (especially those who left in 2006) include migrants who have a high risk of returning soon. The migration is a phenomenon where social connections stimulate the process. Migrants who left long ago have established their lives in host societies. Their experiences function like social capital and they act like mediators for people from locality who want to go and join them. When newcomers adapt to the conditions of receiving society, they invite new chains of migrants. So the expansion of migrants’ networks raises the number of departures.

Duration of migration: In anthropological literature the duration of migration (if we consider migration as an unfinished process) is perceived as a problematic category to develop as it reflects on personal imaginations which might not come to realization. For some authors

\textsuperscript{115} I do not use the term ‘labour migrant’ for not to exclude those family members who are accompanying their spouses or parents to the place of migration as their personal and primary motive for leaving was not an economic reason.
evaluation of migration according to the temporal aspect of movement seems puzzling: “The difference between ‘permanent’ and ‘temporal’ migration is, admittedly, difficult to establish in terms of individual intentions and life careers” (Escobar, González and Roberts 1987: 42). It seems, that the community of Sac’ire, which witnessed a lot of different migration biographies (leaving seasonally and staying on for years, or going with the aim to stay long and coming back soon because of deportations or other problems) do not judge migratory process according to the length of stay. Once a person is gone in order to overcome economic difficulties, he/she is a migrant. Furthermore, the period from 1990s onwards is not as far away in perceptions of local people to talk about permanent stay of any migrant (who has left family members in local community), considering that it is something temporal and these people will come back. Whereas migrants themselves are aware of the fact, that time passes and the date of coming back is always being postponed, they also do not think about living as a migrant forever: “We have been planning to come back to live in Georgia every summer, but as you see we are still living in Russia” (Nanuli, 42 years old, migrant in Russia 2006). So according to the above mentioned two features perceiving a person as a migrant could mean a person who had been gone in migration after 1990s for months or for years.

**Destination of migration:** This issue is about differentiating migration within Georgia and outside Georgia.

**Out-Migration:** For designating the movement of a person outside Georgia as migration the exact destination does not make difference: migrants are called those who are gone to Azerbaijan, to Russia or to Greece. Of course, people have some ideas (which sometimes are just stereotypes or overstated due to the exaggerated migrant ‘success stories’) which destinations are economically more profitable or legally easily penetrable, but the decision on where to go to depends on various factors: having social connections there, employment possibilities, language skills, and so on.

Most desirable places to migrate for local people are Western countries. Since Germany, England, France or USA are legally inaccessible or very restrictive for migration, only those people are able to migrate to these countries, who participate in au-pair, green card and other kinds of official programs or have acquaintances that will support them on a legal basis for

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116 During discussions local people never mentioned lack of professional skills or knowledge of foreign language as an obstacle for going to Western countries; this was because the migrants had unskilled jobs. “The predominant type of work [for Mexican Migrants in USA] is unskilled, where even knowledge of English is not requirement” (Escobar, González and Roberts 1987: 50).
entering these countries. However entry to Greece, Italy or Spain is possible if one pays money for getting there illegally or with a short-term visa. Since some locals used these various ways of migration, villagers are informed about the means of migration and even about amount of bribes one should pay for getting to the desired target place:

“Economically the most advantageous place for men to go to is Spain, there are more jobs in agriculture, house construction and repair and salary is normal as well. For women Greece is more profitable. But to get to Spain 4 000 Euro is required... One should pay money to get visa illegally” (Gia, 29 years old ex-migrant, 2007).

Migration to other former Soviet countries and to Russia requires less financial resources, or legal basis than Western countries. To enter to some countries like Ukraine or Azerbaijan one does not need visa and for a long stay migrants manage (legally or illegally) to get some kind of registration there. Since 2006, because of the politically strained relations with Russia, this destination also became problematic for Georgians. Until autumn 2006 to go to Russia with a visa was possible and getting it was not a big deal. One only needed an international passport and money. The length of visa might be from three months till one year. In order not to pay a lot, local migrants often had been getting three months visas and entered into Russia; in order to stay longer they had been arranging registration there or remained without legal documentation. Some migrants who had better financial conditions or were more careful about legal limitations, had been taking one year visas and at the end of each year had been coming back to renew the visa. After September 2006 the Russian Federation refused to give any kind of visas to Georgian citizens and massive deportations of Georgians (of those who mostly had illegal documents but some with proper documents as well) began. The situation affected the financial condition of some villagers very soon: several migrants came back with or without deportation (some migrants came back through Ukraine out of their own will because of unbearable working conditions). Those who stayed in Russia were not able to send money any more, as banks were not transferring money from Russia to Georgia and other kinds of communication became impossible (for instance, direct flights between Russia and Georgia came to an end). Since 2006 till 2013 getting a Russian visa and traveling directly to Russia from Georgia was impossible and those who were living in Russia, either traveled through Ukraine, or did not come back at all. Hence the flow of migration to Russia reduced during these last years. But Russia still remains as the first foreign country having highest number of migrants from Sac’ire (and I assume from all over Georgia, which was the case in
2006, when the census survey was done in the village (for Destination of migration, see Appendix A, table #2).

After analyzing the cross tabulation between host countries and migrants’ legal documentation, it became clear, that only in Germany and USA do migrants have legal documentation, while in Greece, Italy, Turkey migrants do not have proper documents (see Appendix A, chart #7). In Russia there are some people having citizenship (n=7) or residence permit (n=5), but most of them (n=29) do not have legal documents.

Migration within Georgia: After Russia, the second widespread migration route is toward the capital of Georgia. The reason for defining mobility of people within same country as migration has to do with understanding local people’s notions on the one hand and account for the position of some authors writing about migration on the other. Nevertheless, people leaving for abroad have different kinds of problems (legal basis of staying in the country, language and cultural differences between the sending and receiving societies, deprivation from social support and so on); movement from rural to urban context within same country in order to improve one’s economic condition can be also labeled ‘migration’. Analyzing local understandings I found out, that movement from the village to Kutaisi (second big city in Georgia, centre of Imereti region, which is 37 km from Sac’ire) or Zestaponi (another nearby city) with some economic motivation is not perceived as migration while move to Tbilisi for the same reason, is. This fact can be explained as follows: Kutaisi and Zestafoni are closer to the village, than the capital; Tbilisi is situated in east Georgia, namely in Kartli region and regional differences might affect local perceptions; local people might have fewer social networks in the capital than in the nearby cities. Furthermore, in the last years Tbilisi became a kind of economic focus, a centre of construction, renovation, trade, industry within Georgia. In the capital there are more jobs available and the salary for the same position is higher there than in any other part of Georgia. According to the data from census survey the largest group of migrants living in Tbilisi (35,9 %) is working in construction, then in trade (15,4 %) and in ‘small business’ (12,8 %). Finding jobs in the capital is also a matter of having networks.

Unlike the local understanding those people who were once out-migrants argue that living and working in the capital is not migration. Here are some examples:

“I am not a migrant! I am living in my country, does not matter I will work in Tbilisi, Kutaisi or Sačxere!” (Sergo, 59 year old man, for years he had been working in Russia, now he came back and is working in Tbilisi as craftsman in construction, 2006)
“If there would be enough salary for family needs, of course to work at home [he is talking about working in Tbilisi] is better. But for 100-200 GEL (ca. 50-100 euro) one cannot live. We are forced to go to Russia.” (Gia, 33 years old, he is working in Russia and comes back from time to time, 2007)

“I do not think about going to Russia any more. For a 53 year old man it is already difficult to be so far from family. I intend to go to Tbilisi; I do not want to be detached from wife, children, and grandchildren.” (Iuza, 53 years old, he was deported from Russia in autumn 2006, 2007)

Despite the difference in age and situation, these three men had experienced out-migration, which made them believe that working in the capital is to be close to your family and it is like being home. While there are people living and working in Tbilisi, who feel that they have their ‘home’ in T’q’ibuli:

“I should come back to T’q’ibuli! You know saying: ‘where the bird is born, there is his Bagdad!’ So my native land (’kutxe’ in Georgian) is there. Some people think, where they will feel well that is their homeland. But every person who can think, loves his/her native land” (Gaga 27 years old, living in Tbilisi, 2006).

Considering all these different opinions and attitudes, it is difficult to make a strict designation of inner migration. Working in the capital is a relative category, sometimes perceived as being in one’s own country close to your family, and sometimes feeling far from the home and relatives.

Primary reason for migration: As already mentioned above the primary reasons for migration is generally connected to the desire to improve one’s financial situation. Yet the last push to leave might be a different thing in different cases. Studying migration in anthropology is connected to the modernization theory and is presented as bipolar structure for analyzing sending and receiving societies separately (Brettell 2000, Hollifield 2000). Some authors discussing push and pull factors affecting the process of migration jointly.

The most widespread reasons for migration is losing the job in the locality or a huge decline of salary, such that they could not cover the family expenses, the need of monetary income for securing new generation’s high education in cities is significant, similar to the death of a family member, who used to be the breadwinner. These reasons work like push factors from the society. The final decision to migrate is always stimulated with a pull factor of the host society. Social networks of migrants indeed present the most influential pull factor of migration. Having someone in one place or another, who will help to find ways to go abroad and provide
a job and some kind of ‘social security’ in the host society is immense stimulus for locals. All cases studied shows, that the last decision and even the will to migrate had been inspired with the migrants’ kin group’s suggestions. So one can predict that according to growth of the number of migrants who managed to adapt to host societies, the number of new migrants will increase. Social network is very important also for getting a job within Georgia. Most internal migrants mentioned that they got positions through the help of friends, relatives or neighbors.

Considering all above mentioned characteristics, we can define migration as movement of persons or families with intended or unintended long stay which then later becomes a long stay or temporal new residence inside (only Tbilisi) or outside of Georgia in order to improve one’s economic condition. Migration for Sac’ire villagers has some general features common to all migration process and other distinguished specificities:

**Common characteristics:**

✓ Most migrants are middle aged men;
✓ The number of women migrants are less and some of them are just accompanying husbands during migration;
✓ Migration sometimes effects (or changes) the structure of the family;
✓ Social connections in migration facilitates to take decision to leave as well as defines destination of migration;
✓ Labour market of receiving societies defines who should migrate. (If people have social networks in Greece or Italy, women will go, while in Russia more jobs are available for men);
✓ Duration of migration is a relative and unspecified category as it is a consequence of individual intentions and adaptation in hosting countries;
✓ Intense migration from Georgia as well as from most post-Soviet countries is influenced by economic and political instability of the new independent countries;
✓ Taking the decision to migrate is simultaneously influenced by different push-pull factors at different levels.

**Specificities of migration from Sac’ire:**

✓ Distribution of educational background of migrants and local people are almost the same, so we cannot talk about ‘brain drain’ process;
✓ Migrants are only those people, who left after dissolution of Soviet Union in order to improve economic conditions;
✓ Families who do not have closest kin group left in the village are not expected to come back; while having family members in the locality increases the chances of returning;
✓ In the locality there still exists ‘traditional’ views about female migration, but these attitudes are flexible toward the necessities of individual families;
✓ Children sometimes might be considered as migrants, sometimes not, according to the origin of spouse and place of marriage;
✓ Those who migrated to the capital for economic reasons, but managed to buy there accommodations are considered no longer migrants, whilst for out-migrants having property does not change their ‘status’;
✓ Out-migrants do not perceive movement inside Georgia as migration;
✓ In host countries half of the migrants live without legal documentations.

7.3 What happens to the family structure, when one leaves?

The migration picture from the village of Sac’ire has been described above. The push-pull factor of the migration which I analyzed in previous section indicated to the fact, that having connections to the migrants abroad, or certain economic resources, defines who leaves and where he/she leaves for. The common pattern of migration is that it involves mostly male, married migrants going to Tbilisi or to Russia.

Let me start with the incident I had during doing census survey in the village Sac’ire. It was my first visit to Irma’s family. After filling the demographic part of the questionnaire I asked her if there was a migrant in the family. She got completely red.

*I: Why are you asking me this question?*

*T: As I explained I am doing research about citizenship and migration (She seemed not to be convinced about my answer).*

*I: I am not the one who is left behind by my husband. My husband takes care of us, sending money, coming back. – Her eyes were filled with tears, and she left the room.*

Later on, I understood that she was the mother of the pupil I was teaching at village school. Her husband had been living in Russia for the last five years. A few days after this
incident, I met her at school. She apologized for her behavior and whispered to me: “You know there are so many women in the village, whose husbands abandoned them. They do not come back, and have lovers in Russia. My case is different; I know that my husband is faithful to me. I do not want others to think of me as an abandoned woman.” She was very sensitive about the topic. That she was alone, taking care of the family, had to face the social pressure, that she might be the one who was “left behind by her husband” stressed her. It was very difficult for me to figure out, why she was almost crying when talking about her husband, perhaps because she wanted to hide the possible relationship her husband might have with a Russian woman, or she was just worried and did not want to be perceived as abandoned woman. In her article “The virtual widows of migrant husbands in war-torn Mountainous Karabagh” Nona Shahnazaryan points out the “psychological discomfort felt by the women and their children”, while migration of a husband is perceived like a “symbolic loss”, even when the family gets remittances and is relatively well off (Shahnazaryan 2005: 251). In the case of Irma the economic success of the family was not sufficient for her to feel satisfied, as she felt that the traditional model of the family was incomplete.

Irma is not the only woman whose husband left for Russia. There are 17 other cases of wives staying behind in the village, when their husbands left for Russia. It is accepted almost like common sense among these wives that their husbands might have Russian lovers. In some cases the wives admit the fact, that their husbands might have relations in Russia, sometimes they are sure, or like Irma, they try to convince the society and/or themselves that the husband is still faithful to the family and wife. The problem of Georgian migrants in Russia having relationship with Russian women is not only a matter of female jealousy, but causes fear of losing husband, as well as economic resources and social status. The general observations and stories indicate that those migrants who have stable partners in Russia, start having ever more irregular contacts with the family and send less remittances. One case I describe below is an extreme one as the wife and migrant husband who came back from Russia openly talked about his relationship with a Belorussian woman. When we interviewed Iuri, his wife Maro was present, but this did not prevent him from telling me the story of his relationship. I asked him, why he did not take his wife along to Russia.

\[ I: \quad I \textit{never thought of taking her there. The family needs to be taken care of.} \]

\[ T: \quad \textit{But you also need to be taken care of by somebody?} \]
I: There are a lot of women there (At this point his wife Maro also entered into conversation):

M: The Byelorussian woman, with whom he was living, calls often on the phone and I normally talk to her. Life did not let my husband to be with me, when we were young, and now... [It seemed it did not matter anymore, T.M.] It seems that we send him out of the house to support us. How can I name it differently? I was asking her [the Byelorussian woman, T.M.] to take care of my husband diligently. She sent my husband ill this time! (She said this with slight anger.)

I: She was not at home, that’s why I got ill. – replied Iuri. - This woman was trading clothes at the market and getting 200-300 USD a day. We rented a room together; she was preparing food and taking care of me. My wife knew it, but I was not planning to take her home [he means, bringing her to Georgia, T.M.]. All the clothes I have were bought by her. From the socks to the jacket I have are from her. I will not need anything more for the rest of my life. When I was leaving for Georgia she put everything in the suitcase, as if I got dowry. She even sent presents for my wife. Now she is calling, asking when I will go back.

M: Nowadays girls are different. Will you bear such a case? - Maro addressed to me and I ignored the question.

T: Were you not jealous?

M: No, I was more satisfied. I had hope, that there was somebody, who was taking care of my husband.

T: Were you not afraid of losing husband?

M: He was anyway with her.

T: If he would not come back?

M: Let him be there then. As long as he was sending money... (Both of them laughed)

I: She was a very honest woman. When I was not working, she was giving money to me to send to the family. She even sent money now for the day of Valentines.

T: Was she not jealous?

I: She never asked me to leave my wife and be only with her.

This case shows that when a man migrates, the wife has to take the man’s responsibilities. To be taking care of the family means not only doing average household work that a woman without a migrant husband already does, but also adapting the role of the man. The locals were mentioning the phrase from the Georgian film, “Šerek’ilebi” [The Eccentrics]
(Shengelaia 1973), when a man going to city for trade, asks his wife: “Now you are a woman as well as a man in the family”. Frequent repetition of this phrase in the village and the reality which women with migrant men meet, shows that migration changes the roles of the family members. Managing agricultural work, care for the old aged parents, planning and spending the family budget, contributing to the community events physically or economically, planning the future of the children; this is not a complete list of the obligations which women with migrant husbands face. That is why most men going to Russia decide to be lone migrants and have their wives living at home as actual household heads.\footnote{During the survey study, the family members were indicating the old aged parents to be the household heads, or the migrants, even when these migrants were out of the country for several years. On the one hand this is due to the official registration of the household head within the village registry, and on the other hand, according to the traditional model of the family, the oldest man is the ‘manager of the household’.}

Scholars writing about migration mostly agree that migration affects family structures of the sending society and put the heavy burden on the female shoulders to sustain the household (Gulati 1993, Pessar and Mahler 2003, Peleikis 2000; Schafer 2000, Brettell 2000, Shahnazaryan 2005).

Maro was successful in managing her household work. She was caring for the father-in-law, leading agricultural work (sometimes she was hiring workers to cultivate the land), bringing food to the family of her son, living in Kutaisi and distributing the remittances her husband was sending between her family and the families of their son and married daughter. There was always a parcel of money as contribution for special occasions in the community or within the kin group. The remittances sent by her husband were the needed economic resource for the family as well as the sign of the close tie between the migrant husband and family. The fact that her husband was not spending money for a lover, but the other way around, and that he was planning to come back after some time, made Maro accept the situation and see the care of the Byelorussian woman necessary for her husband. The middle age of the husband and wife (Iuri is 53 years old and Maro is 48) and economic inevitability of migration, change the sexual roles of spouses to the roles of parents, supporters, and care takers. The fact, that the family of Maro and Iuri was well off and he had everyday contact with his family by phone, and the lover was far away in Moscow, avoided spouses to be qualified as separated. Neither Maro, nor Iuri was hiding his relationship with the Belorussian woman from the community, and it was perceived like an adventure of a migrant man, not as the abandonment of the wife.

Some other cases from the field however illustrate a different situation, where the migrant man to Russia is detached from the family and the situation is called separation by the

\footnote{\textit{During the survey study, the family members were indicating the old aged parents to be the household heads, or the migrants, even when these migrants were out of the country for several years. On the one hand this is due to the official registration of the household head within the village registry, and on the other hand, according to the traditional model of the family, the oldest man is the ‘manager of the household’.}}
wife and the community. Nana is a 40 year-old woman living in Sac’ire. Being an heir of her aunt, she had an arranged marriage with a good-looking man, who had no property and they were supposed to live in Sac’ire. After a traffic accident, their first daughter became physically and mentally disabled for some time and Nana had a nervous breakdown, which caused the disability of the second daughter. The economic needs of the family and the extra need for the continuous medical care of daughters forced Vaxtangi to go to Irkutsk for two years. But the conditions in the host society were different from imagined one. When he received his final salary the family paid debts, bought an international passport and plane ticket for him in order to travel to Sochi, in southwest Russia. From there, during the last 8 years, Vaxtangi came back only once, for the funeral of his father. Nana said that normally he sends 100 USD three times a year. The small amount of remittances and the social pensions for the disabled children make up the whole budget of the family (since autumn 2006, they receive the social support thru the TSA program described in previous chapter). Due to the health problems of her and her daughters, Nana can not work. Vaxtangi calls them once in four months, to tell the code of the money transfer. Nana said that Vaxtangi lives with a Ukrainian woman, that they are married and he is a citizen of Russia. Nana even has the picture of Vaxtangi with his Ukrainian ‘wife’: “He said to me that he is not any more interested in his previous family. That is why I am calling myself the widow of a living husband. What should I say? Women better than me are left behind by their husbands. You know, what he said when he came here? He said he cannot live here; that he needs a sauna, a nice bathroom, and a comfortable house. I suggested making it together. But he said that there he has all these in Sochi without much effort and better to go back there.” The fact, that his support was very little, that he did not contact with them even by phone and declared that he has a new wife and a new family, asserts separation of the spouses. The official status of married woman, but the real condition of being abandoned leads Nana to define herself as “widow of a living husband.”

Nana as a single mother with two disabled daughters receives social support from the state. Additional to the social support and pension the family gets, she sometimes visits the administration of the district, asking for extra support. Sometimes she gets 30 GEL (ca. 15 euro), sometimes not, it depends on the good will of the person, to whom she was addressing to. She

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118 The marriage of male migrants with local women during the migration is a widespread practice for acquiring citizenship of the host country. Sometimes it is perceived as formal marriage, in order to get official status, sometimes it turns out to be real conjugal life of migrant, who sometimes has the spouse back in the village. Interesting is that in this case Vaxtangi and Nana are not officially divorced. But it does not prevent Vaxtangi to get officially married and acquire Russian citizenship.
is more careful to ask for help from the relatives. “When the poverty (si Yaribe) is the permanent condition, I cannot ask for support from the relatives every time. If they give me something, I am thankful. But I cannot pay back, that is why I am ashamed to ask for support”. As help among relatives should be reciprocal, Nana avoids the help, because she is not able to reciprocate; while the social support seems to be the obligation of the state and one-directional assistance.

Nana’s case shows that when the migrant is detached from the family and does not support it any more, or supports very little, the family becomes dependent on state support or could not afford some expenses, like paying high education costs of their offspring. According to the survey results there is no direct correlation between migration and claiming social citizenship. The families with or without migrants ask for social support, especially if they are interested in getting health care from the state. Within the questionnaire applied for and by the state social support program, there are questions about having migrant family members. The state, hence, considers remittances as an economic resource and then reduces the social support for the families of migrants. The special status of Nana, being left behind, the disablement of her daughters and the real misery of the family created solid reasons for claiming entitlements from the state and getting more social support from the government than other families could have gotten.

In order to understand how remittances are invested in the future of the family, we need first to consider the amount of remittances the families of migrants in Sac’ire receive. According to the survey, the mean of monthly remittances sent by migrants in Russia to their families in Sac’ire is around 150 USD, if they send any money at all. The flow of remittances from Russia had ceased during my fieldwork, due to the strained relations between Georgia and Russia, which I look at later on. This cash resource is mainly used for nutrition, clothing, transport, medical care, communal payments, education expenses and contributions for various occasions concerning the neighbors and relatives. If the family was engaging in agricultural work, then

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119 I use reciprocity among kin group as Marshall Sahlins does - mutual aid. So when one party is not able to pay back to the supporter, it is “[…] putting recipient in a circumspect and responsive relation to the donor during all that period the gift is unrequited” (Sahlins 1972, 133).

120 Here I mean the contributions that neighbors and kin people make for weddings, funerals, birth of or baptizing a child and so forth. According to the closeness of the relation, the sort of contributions as well as the amount of money given differs. In the village there are small networks, including 10-15 families, who are close neighbors and when there is some social occasion, these families are invited. The families should contribute money, the amount is from 20 to 50 GEL (ca. 10-25 euro) changing according to the economic condition of the contributing family, taking into consideration the amount of contribution the family had paid in previous occasions. Within the small neighborhood networks physical help is also necessary. The members of these networks are the ones who
they would invest part of the remittances to hire labour (if men have migrated and male offspring are too young to do agricultural work, families hire workers), to buy fuel, fertilizers, forage for animals and so forth. Some locals were saying that agricultural work in the locality is not profitable, but it is shameful to live otherwise and buy agricultural products at the market. These are usually families who were engaged in agriculture previously, carry some kind of ‘peasant identity’ and think that they are obliged to cultivate land, to have ‘their’ and ‘pure’ food, even it is not profitable. For some families the economic calculation was more important than the disreputable side of giving up farming. Most of the time, the remittances are just enough to cover the above mentioned expenses.

There are some families who are economically well off and could plan how to invest money reasonably. The most desirable investment is in the education of children. The education is free in the village, but the books cost relatively high. Besides education it is also considered very important to take some extra music lessons. Those families, who could pay the fee (this is about 10 GEL, ca. 5 euro a month), send their children to private lessons of music or dancing. The practice of taking private lessons in various educational subjects started during the late socialist times and is still a wide-spread practice. The necessity for private lessons comes from the low standard of education at schools all over the Georgia, including the cities, which is not enough for passing university entry exams. So it is like a rule in the village that those who want to study at the universities in Tbilisi and Kutaisi should take private lessons from their teachers for the last one or two years. The costs for private lessons vary from 30 GEL (ca. 15 euros) to 50 GEL (ca. 25 euros) a month. During the last two years of school, families need to decide whether they will support their children to get high education, to send them to technical schools or to leave them without any further education. To study at the university depends highly on the

buy products for the social occasions, preparing and serving the guests during a banquet. Furthermore, there are cases, when neighbours and relatives give special support for family, lending money for migration, or when needed, helping with finding and establishing networks and employments in distance or in locality. The relations are perceived like the resource which needs investment, but in future gives you result. The locals never forget the support of others, as well as their own assistance. That is why as soon as one meets a new person in the locality, they start to inquire about the surname of your parents, place of residence, origin, place of study work place and etc.

121 According to the survey results there is no correlation between having a migrant and doing agricultural work. Doing agricultural work depends more on the distance between land plots and the place of residence, the education and employment of the family members, and the age of the family members who stayed back.

122 Some families who cannot afford to buy new books each school year, ask their neighbors or elder schoolmates to lend their books. Sometimes this practice does not work, because there are different exercise books, or the teacher may choose a different one. Sometimes pupils do not have any books at all.

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financial situation of the families. The costs of private lessons, possible fees of the university, the price for rent, nutrition, transportation in the cities are barriers not every family can overcome. From 18 graduates of Sac’ire school in 2007 seven of them managed to go for studying in the cities and five of them are the children of internal or out-migrants.

The socialist Georgian state, which provided students with housing and stipends, made it possible for all village graduates to get high education. Today supporting a student with the costs for rent, transportation, education fees, is possible mainly for migrants’ families. So, a visible effect of migration is that remittances often are used to finance the education of the young generation; families depending on the local economy alone could hardly afford this. If we consider the fact that the right to university education is a part of social citizenship, that state should guarantee equal access conditions for its citizens, this is not for the case in the village, and remittances present one important way to overcome this inequality.

The second kind of investment of remittances is for buying a flat in the city. Depending on the family’s future plans, one might buy a flat in Kutaisi or in Tbilisi. The price of flats in T’q’ibuli is very low (around 25 USD per sq. m. in 2007) and nobody wants to buy them, because in T’q’ibuli there are no employment chances. It is also quite near to the village and in case one finds a job there, s/he could come and go easily. The flats in main cities are, on the one hand, an economic investment and on the other, they make the move from the village to the city possible. For the families with students having one’s own flat and not paying rent is crucial. The students once they graduate can then continue living in the city and search for a job. The differences between city and village should be considered here. In the village there are hardly any jobs for university graduates, other than a few positions at school or at the village administration. Secondly, village life is considered boring, especially now, since there are no more cultural events, no cinema, no normal roads, and the housing quality has deteriorated. The village houses do not have central heating, permanent running water, toilets or indoor bathrooms. Soviet housing policy where those working in state jobs having access to flats disappeared and in order to have a flat in the city one has to pay for it. Some families, who

123 Those undergraduates who get high scores in entrance exams do not have to pay fees, but given the insufficient educational background that the village school gives, none of the undergraduates from Sac’ire got high scores in the last two years in 2006-2007.

124 According to the questionnaire most of the respondents expect the state to support education (92 % of the respondents). While asking about actual support for education by the state, many respondents say ‘sometimes’ (40 % sometimes, 26 % yes, 22 % no). The answer ‘sometimes’ often corresponded to the fact that state covered some of the educational expenses. All of the respondents know that education is free of charge at secondary school and there is also free education for talented students, but the additional expenses that pupils and students need for studying, make them to point out the partial state support for education.
depend on local resources, are more or less stuck with the locality. The remittances are the economic source which replaced the housing program to some extent. Hence successful migrants (in the sense of having accumulated financial resources) invest in the possibility for their children leaving the village, getting good education, having a flat to stay and searching employment in urban areas.

Once a flat is bought, the families start planning for improving their village houses. During the last few years there were several new houses built or old ones renovated. In two cases, big families (with parents and offspring or two-three brothers with their families) were separated and each new unit built a separate house. In other cases the families renovated or built houses with the support of migrants. In the earlier part of this chapter I presented the case of Nugzari whose wife was a migrant to Greece. The remittances she sent were around 400 Euro a month, which is quite high in comparison to the remittances other migrants send. With this money their two children were able to finish their studies in Kutaisi. In 2005, they even could afford buying a flat there. One daughter and one son, after graduating, came back to live in the village, and were constantly searching for employment in the locality or in Kutaisi. One reason for their coming back was to be with the father. The daughter partly took the role of her mother, trying to take care of the house, cooking, washing and caring for her disabled grandmother. To avoid the stress of the household care, the father hired a neighbor to help his daughter in household chores. “She is not like my wife. She [the wife] was like a fire, managing to do everything. Salome is quite weak in comparison with her mother!” Nugzari was complaining to me. After the children graduated and the flat in Kutaisi was bought, Nugzari’s family began to improve their housing conditions in the village. They wanted to renovate the village house, because the children were at the age of possible marriage and having a proper house supports the status and prestige of the family. Good housing is especially important for boys, since brides move in to live with their husbands. The absence of the mistress of the house was perceived more dramatically, than the absence of the man in other families. Due to the various economic needs, the renovation was going slowly. But Nugzari was very happy, because his son would have two possibilities: either to live in the village or in Kutaisi. This now depended on the location of his possible employment and his choice. Salome, the daughter was already engaged and the family was waiting for the mother to come back and hold the wedding. In the summer of 2008, Nugzari’s son, however, died in a car accident. The tragic event changed everything for the family. The mother left her position in Greece and came back and was not anymore thinking of working abroad again. The family seems to have lost the reason to struggle on.
Salome married, without celebrating the occasion. Nugzari and his wife are now living on his small salary from the railway, not thinking about renovating the house, nor about any financial improvement or investment.

With this sad story I wanted to present the goals of migration, the future plans and the preferences of a migrant’s family. The absence of woman from the family seemed to be very difficult for family members, although the daughter was trying hard to take care of the family, the father was still dissatisfied. Escobar, González and Roberts in their article “Migration, Labour Markets and the International Economy” on the effects of migration from Mexico argue that “men are, in several respect, more dependent on the household than women. We found no case of a single male heading a family, whereas single mothers were heads of households in about 17 per cent of the neighbourhood sample” (Escobar, González and Roberts 1987: 59).

Arranging the future of the children, giving them a good education, providing them with a flat and a proper house in the village, marrying them well, those were the main aims of the parents, who had to be separated for several years due to migration. Even if for middle aged married migrants leaving the village is not an exit option, this is the chance to establish the future of their children. Migration, however, might be considered as an exit option for the second generation, if migrants’ children get this chance with the help of remittances.

Migration does not have an impact only on the separation of spouses. There are different patterns of migration, like migration of spouses together or migration of the offspring. Both of these patterns are assumed to create fewer problems and be more advantageous for the families in the village. According to the survey material, there were only five migrant women, who accompanied their husbands outside of Georgia. Some of them have their children along, others left them in the village with grandparents. Beside the positive side that spouses are living together, women accompanying their husbands are more successful in saving the economic resources. Luiza, who joined her husband after several years of his migration to Siberia, claims that men are in a very miserable situation in migration. Being alone they spend money for eating outside, drinking and sometimes are involved in different adventures, which also increase their expenditure. Escobar, González and Roberts also mention that male migrants allow themselves to enjoy life during migration, spending half of the income for their personal expenditure (1987: 60). During the three years, when she was accompanying her husband, Luiza could save several thousands of US dollars; after she left him there alone again, he hardly sent any remittances. She was able to leave her family in the village because her daughter-in-law was the one who took care of the ones back at home. Hence some support for the family in the village is needed.
for spouses being able to join their husbands. For those parents who are left alone in the village, the migration of their offspring with their families seems to be easier: on the one hand, they do not see the suffering of their daughters or daughters-in-law from being alone, and on the other, the remittances sent by migrants fill the budgets of their families, while the pensions for old aged people are very low. The loss of the labour force for chores in the village in this case is difficult, but if the parents living alone are supported through remittances, they can hire workers for help in agricultural work or live on the remittances, doing no agricultural work. Neighbours and kin people who live closely support and pay attention to the old aged parents, whose children may be away. The problematic are those cases, when migrant families do not send any money to the parents. In such cases the parents still try to be loyal toward their children, justifying their inattentiveness with the offspring’s bad economic situation in migration. There are other cases, when migrating parents leave their child or children with their grandparents in the village. In such cases the grandparents have the burden to take care of the children and their education. This kind of planning usually lasts until the children graduate from the school. To support the future of high education, one of the parents might come back and arrange the life of their children. The migration of both spouses together then depends on family structure and does not change it so much.

Another type of out-migration involves cases when unmarried men or women migrate. The different cases I have, show that migration of unmarried men sometimes was caused by the need to acquire economic resources necessary for marriage, or by the failure of a marriage, because of family resistance, or because the young man could not find employment in Georgia. The migration of unmarried men and women is more prolonged, than the migration of people having family members in the village. The parents of migrants are more worried about the delayed marriage of their migrant children, than about them being far from the locality. Luiza, whose migrant son is already 35 years old said that she is happy that Alexandre (her son) works in Russia. The high unemployment in the village makes her think that it is better to be a construction worker in Moscow than to stand all day long in the centre of the village, drink and chat all the time. Yet she is worried that her son will not be able to marry. According to Luiza, Alexandre does not want to marry a Russian woman; he can not find a Georgian one unless he comes back, but for years he has not been back as he lacked legal travel documents. Another aspect is that Alexandre had not managed to accumulate enough for buying a house or a flat either in Georgia or in Russia. The family house belongs to the younger brother. Stories that unmarried Georgian migrants do not want to marry Russian women are widespread, sometimes
these are only the wishful thinking of the parents, but sometimes they are true. There were cases when migrants from Russia and Ukraine came back, through the arranged marriage had a wedding and after sometimes went back with or without spouses.

Migration effects unmarried youth outside Georgia differently. These are citizens who tend to stay permanently in the places of migration, especially if they marry the locals in migration. The loss of Georgian citizenship, in the sense that they often change their citizenship, reduces the chances of their return, and increases the aging village population. The well accommodated migrants who already acquired their legal documents, have fewer problems and a chance to find better employment. These migrants are still economic contributors to the families’ budget back in the village. Sometimes the remittances are not permanent, but they finance the emergency needs of their parents and siblings. The emergencies and major expenses are mainly medical needs, funerals or weddings. There were few cases of migrants having married foreign women but still wanting to come back to live in Georgia. In these cases they invest in buying housing or flats, but mainly in urban areas.

In the previous section I mentioned that conversations about migration include two aspects. On the one hand, locals regret the absence of their family members, neighbors or relatives; on the other hand, they consider migration to be the main strategy for survival. In local conversations, the last point seemed to be more crucial. The relatively better economic situation of the families with migrants, less involvement in everyday economic activities, relatively guaranteed future of the youth, ability to hire someone for agricultural labour, affording contributions for various occasions are the positive economic sides of migration, for which the sacrifice of the family member’s presence might be justified. In the case of taking part in community work, the migrant’s family might contribute more money or hire labour, instead of participating physically themselves. I have never heard any complaints from the locals that male migrants do not vote, do not participate in the community life or do not fulfill their obligations before state or community. The community ‘sends’ the labour force but ‘receives’ in return remittances, which are very crucial for the local economy. Locals were more concerned with the cases when the whole family left the village. The abandoned houses caused more sentiments within community members, starting to complain about the possible death of the village.

Permanent or temporal return of the migrants (sometimes it coincides with religious holidays or summer time) becomes real celebration for close neighbours. Bringing presents and telling the stories of migration is the main part of the meeting. Usually migrants hide the
unpleasant parts of their life stories, concentrating mainly on and exaggerating their success and positive experiences. One of the returned migrants, Avto said, for instance, that: “Migrants are creating success stories out of their migration. I met a lot of people in Moscow, who were on the edge of starvation. Before leaving Russia, they bought nice clothes and told tales to people, what a wonderful life they had in migration.” Sometimes family members are aware of difficulties migrants have, but they are not eager to discuss the problems within the community. The imagined ‘successful and pleasant life’ in migration reinforces the desire to migrate and conceals the feelings of guilt for having to send the person away in migration.

Migration therefore has a strong economic impact on the villagers’ citizenship practices. For those families who are mostly dependent on remittances, it replaces social support to a large extent. From the state’s point of view, migrants are those who could not exercise their full citizenship obligations, as well as cannot enjoy the rights they have. Young migrants do not do military service, avoiding it either with medical documents or through university education, which in some cases include several weeks of military training during the period of study, similar to non-migrants who can afford it. The migrants with Georgian citizenship do not pay taxes either in Georgia, or in Russia, as they mostly work without official contracts. Due to the minimal amount of the old age pensions, the migrants do not consider it necessary having an official job in the country of citizenship. The old age pension is guaranteed for all the citizens of Georgia, independent of the length of the employment and of the kind of job people have had. In 2007,\(^{125}\) this policy toward pensions changed and the working experience affects the amount of pension, although the difference is not important enough to influence the decision of migrants to come back and work in Georgia. Furthermore in the case of internal migrants of Georgia, most of them do not have official work contracts, so they are denied from getting these additional payments. Voting in elections is mostly impossible for the migrants who do not live in the capital of the state they migrated to, where they would have the possibility to vote at the Georgian embassy. Concerning their involvement in the political affairs of the state they are “passive citizens” (Turner 2001), being mostly concerned in solving their own economic problems and of their families. But this is only one dimensional view, as the remittances sent

\(^{125}\) In 2007, the Georgian government issued a decree on “Defining the increment of state pensions payable according to the years of service at the retirement age.” This provides for the following increments: 2 GEL (ca 1 euro) for the pensioners with up to 5 years of service, 4 GEL (ca. 2 euro) to the pensioners with 5-15 years of service, 7 GEL (ca. 3,5 euro) for 15-25 years of service and 10 GEL (ca. 5 euro) for 25 and more years of service (European Commission & Institute of Social Studies and Analysis 2011).
by the migrants stimulates growth, reduces poverty, increases the access to education, healthcare and better accommodation of family members, thus partially accomplishing the state’s social responsibilities (Dudwick 2011). But the cost which is paid by migrant citizens is high, at the expense of their absence from the households. Furthermore, although they are creating social security for their families, they are lacking of social rights either in sending or receiving societies themselves.

The government, which came to power after 2003 ‘Rose Revolution’, expressed its worries for losing the citizens. State policies toward migrants indicate that the government wants to keep migrants attached to the state, but in a way not to force them to come back, as the remittances fill the lack of the social provision from the state. One policy towards migration is the exception in citizenship law. According to the constitution citizenship of Georgia is unilateral, and a citizen of Georgia cannot be a citizen of another country simultaneously. In 2004 the president made an exception to give Georgian citizenship as a second one to those people who apply for it. Thus those who want to have Georgian citizenship as the second one should apply to the Ministry of Justice, and with the agreement of the President they are granted the status. Furthermore, the new Georgian State Apparatus for the Diaspora Matters was created in 2008. Besides other functions, the Apparatus acts to support the national affiliation between the Georgians living outside of the country. These changes indicate that the state started to care about its lost citizens and implements certain strategies to keep in touch with them and to support them.

Some of migrants I met expressed their will to have the citizenship of Georgia as the second one. One might think that the reason behind it might be the legal one, to have the opportunity of free movement in the country of their origin, but it is not only that one. Nanuli, who left the country 11 years ago, to Russia, said that having Georgian citizenship as the second one, makes her feel more loyal toward the Georgian state, while she will have the national document of Georgia. But simultaneously she is trying to get Russian citizenship first, as it is crucial for her status and life in Russia. Instead of appreciation of last changes in state policy towards migration, the locals were always accusing the state, for unsettled political, social and economic situation, which makes locals to leave. However, from 2006 there was another reason for state denouncement and it was connected to the foreign politics of the country, which has tremendously impact on the life of Georgian migrants. This case I will discuss in detail below.
7.4 Re-casting the state during and after migration (the influence of the foreign politics, in the life of migrants)

During fieldwork I often had the impression that the community qualified itself as living with remittances and depended on migrants, most of whom were working in Russia. Hence, when discussing acutely problematic Russian–Georgian relations they blamed the Georgian government for unsettled relations with Russia, and for not thinking about the future of migrants. Migrants in Russia as well as their families tend to support the idea of having close relations with the ‘sister republic’ (they still have this formula for referring to the Russian Federation in the Soviet way), which will bring them security and economic profits. Before I discuss the life of migrants and the impact of international politics on their lives, I include a brief summary of Georgian-Russian relations after 2000.

Until 2000 Georgian citizens had free entry to the territory of the Russian Federation. On 5 December 1999 the Russian law about foreign citizens entering the territory of Russia had been extended to include the citizens of Georgia: the declared reason for demanding visa from Georgians was to control the border between Chechnya and Georgia. The Russian government was accusing the Georgian state for not controlling this border and for allowing Chechen terrorists to reside in the Pankisi Gorge of Georgia (see, Mühlfried 2011). Georgia was the first state within the CIS countries\(^\text{126}\) which started a visa regime with Russia. After the ‘Rose Revolution’ (2003), however, the new government completely turned to the West and declared an explicit desire to collaborate with the USA. The Russian government reacted to the change of Georgia’s international politics harshly. The first limitation carried out by Russia was the restriction of Georgian products at the Russian markets. The mineral water and Georgian wines were rejected as having defective quality. Georgian migrants were frequently stopped on the streets of west Russian cities, were asked after their proper documents, and in case of not having valid visas, they were deported. The extreme harassment of Georgian illegal and sometimes legal migrants started in autumn 2006.

\(^{126}\)CIS - The Commonwealth of Independent States - is a regional organization whose participating countries are former Soviet Republics.
On 27 September 2006, the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs organized a special operation and arrested four Russian officers, living and working in the Russian military base. The accusation made by the Georgian side was that the Russian officers were involved in a spy network in Georgia and in criminal activities. The Russian government reacted to this event harshly and promulgated several sanctions against Georgia: the connection by air, sea and land between Georgia and Russia was intermitted. All postal orders between Russia and Georgia were stopped. The Russian government stopped giving Russian visas to the Georgian citizens as well as working permits. Furthermore it prepared a law to stop all financial operations with Georgia, including money transfers. The massive deportations of Georgian citizens with or without proper documents started. Georgian citizens were arrested on the streets (recognized from their appearance), taken to the police station, and after some days the courts were delivering their deportation sentences. The culmination of the conflict was the day, when Russian government sent Georgian deportees by cargo airlines. The Georgian government was proclaiming that they would bring the case to the European Court of Human Rights. The deportees were asked to contact the Ministry of Justice in Georgia and make their claims there about their deportation cases. Some members of the Georgian government were promising returning migrants to find employment for them. During the winter the conflict was alleviated and the deportation of the Georgians decreased. According to the Georgian Consul in Russia, the whole number of Georgian deportees from Russia from October 2006 till February 2007 was 4,634 (Mchedlishvili 2007).

Coming back to my field site, Sac’ire: the highest number of local labour migrants was in the Russian Federation. Most of the migrants are low-skilled citizens of Georgia, who used their previous or current connections to go to Russia, to live and work there. This follows the migration pattern from many other post-Soviet states (Hormel and Southworth 2006, Krasinets 2005). The massive migration flow from Sac’ire to Russia started around 1993-94. The villagers saw working in the Russian Federation their new opportunity for economic mobility. A local middle man, called Revaz, was organizing groups of construction workers among local males, taking them to the city of Irkutsk in Siberia. Revaz was receiving the orders to construct and renovate houses in Irkutsk or in the nearby territories. He was arranging the price for transportation and accommodation for workers, arranging their temporal residence permits. Before taking the groups of workers to Russia, he was explaining to the locals the conditions, the amount of salary and the duration of work. There was no legal contract between the group members and him. Being the middle man, he was taking a part of the salary of the workers and
the rest he was giving either to the migrants there, or to their family members in the village. Most of the male migrants to Russia in the ‘90s used this channel of migration. The migrants returning from Irkutsk said that this channel was convenient for them, because they had secure accommodation and employment in the place of migration. Although some of the former migrants were mentioning the late delivery of the salaries or lower salaries than promised, this allegedly was due to currency inflation. Since 2000 Revaz is not anymore organizing groups of construction workers, mainly because of the visa regime between Russia and Georgia. The migrants who were well accommodated to the environment of East Russia and found their own jobs and stayed on, but mainly without any legal documentation. Georgian migrants needed to have the Russian visas in order to enter, live and work in Russia. To get the Russian visa was not a big deal, if one could pay the ‘price’ of the visa. They could get one month, three months or at most one year visas. But to renew the visa, migrants have to come back every year, when their visas expire. Some of the migrants living in Moscow or in the western part of the Russian Federation, where control of documentations was more frequent and officials were more careful about legal status, they were coming and going with the one-year Russian visas. Those migrants who were staying in Russia with expired visas, found a way to avoid deportation when coming back to Georgia: they would come back to Georgia through Ukraine, because neither Russia nor Georgia have visa regime with Ukraine. At the Russian-Ukraine border Georgian illegal migrants negotiated with the police and could avoid deportation by paying bribes (interviewed migrants said that around 150 USD was enough for the border guards to let them ignore expired visas and avoid deportation).

The escalating political conflict between the states extremely affected the life of the Georgian migrants in Russia and their families in Georgia. During the period of massive deportations in 2007 I was in Sac’ire. The families with migrants in Russia were extremely anxious. They compared the situation with the situation of the WWII, when the families were anxiously waiting for each and any news from the front. The news about the deportation of migrants was feared to bring new economic disaster to the family and make their future uncertain. With the stop of money transfers from Russia to Georgia the remittances ceased. Most of the family members of the migrants were talking that migrants were hiding in their residential buildings, sometimes even were not able to go work fearing the police.

During this period of fieldwork I had the chance to meet some migrants, the only data I have about migrant lives are the interviews with the returnees and the daily contacts with migrants’ families living in Sac’ire. Talking about the role of narratives and migration stories
Caroline Brettell writes that “generally ethnographers and others who study migrants and the migration process must rely on migrants’ own detailed accounts of why they decided to leave, what the journey was like, what happened when they arrived in their place of destination, and, if relevant, why they returned home” (Brettell 2003: 27). As I also lacked other kind of material, the biographical narratives of returnee migrants are the main source for my arguments. I present two different cases of returnee migrants from Russia. With these I try to construct what the migrants’ lives in Russia might have looked like and how the Russian-Georgian relations affected the life of migrants and their families back in Georgia.

Case I

Avto was born in 1980. His father and mother were living and working in T’q’ibuli city. He finished school in T’q’ibuli. Those who lived in villages could live on the agricultural products, but Avto’s family was living in a flat in the city and had no land. So in 1995 Avto’s father decided to migrate to Moscow. His sister and brother-in-law were already living in Moscow. The brother-in-law called his father and suggested him to work in Russia. Everything was already planned, they found work for him. At the beginning he was working as a construction worker. He was a good electrical engineer and when the employers saw this, they promoted him. At the end he was working as the main officer for energy in the “Mempocmpou” (company for building the underground network). After 2000, when visa was needed, he came every year for renewing his visa. During that time the family of Avto was economically well off. They bought a flat in Tbilisi and he and his sister were studying at the State University. The family members never thought of joining the father, because they perceived it like a temporal condition. The mother continued living in T’q’ibuli and Avto’s sister and Avto were in Tbilisi. After graduating from the University, Avto started searching for a job, but without success. In 2003 his father suddenly had a heart attack and died at the workplace: “It was very dramatic, we brought my deceased father to Georgia and buried him in T’q’ibuli. 3-4 months I was here in T’q’ibuli, but later on went to Tbilisi, in order to search for a job. The main breadwinner was not alive anymore and I was supposed to take care of the family. I learned the profession of carpenter and found a job in Tbilisi. I worked for a year and it was quite difficult for me. I had never worked physically before. My salary was around 300 GEL (ca. 130 Euro) a month, and it was not enough for the whole family. Once, my aunt called me, saying that it would be better
for me to go to Moscow and work there, because the salary would be higher. I did not have a job there, but a relative of my mother is the general director of an organization. When I called him, he told me to come and he would give me a job. So, at the end of 2004, I got the one-year Russian visa and went there. When I called my relative in Moscow, he refused to give me a job. So for a month I was there without a job, living with my aunt. After coming to Moscow I did my registration at my aunt’s flat. It is necessary, because even for going to the shop, police was stopping me, asking for my documents. When they [the Russian police, T.M.] see a Georgian face [informants mention that the dark color of the face, hair and aquiline nose are considered to be the undistinguishable features for being labeled as Caucasian, T.M.], they always stop the person. But when I had all documents in order, they did not say anything. My aunt was working in a confectionery-shop. In two weeks’ time, I learned how to cook buns and began working there. The enterprise belonged to some Armenians. It was a nice position, the salary was sufficient and I was already quite good in cooking. But soon the Armenians sold the confectionery-shop to some Megrelians [a subethnic group in Georgia, TM]. It was officially written as belonging to a Russian citizen, because for the non-Russian citizens the taxes would have been higher and the government would ask a lot of documents from non-citizens, which would be difficult to find. The confectionary shop was already well developed, so I stayed there for work, but they brought new employees. There were five people working together, the owner was giving salary to all of us together and we were dividing it. But it was a small amount. I was working there for two months and the salary was enough just for cigarettes and transportation. In autumn of 2005 my friend and I began to make our own confectionery-shop in Widnoje, Moscow Oblast. We rented a confectionery enterprise, during the day we were working and at night the owner was working. I already knew the work, and those who were taking the prepared buns, so we contacted with the distributors. At the end of 2005, my visa had already expired. Because the business was going fine, I decided to stay with expired visa there. The Russian-Georgian relations were getting worse and I knew that I might be deported, but I stayed on. If I had 700 Ruble with me, when the police stopped me, I would not have been deported. In January it was freezing in Moscow. Everything had stopped, including our business. We could not sell our products, did not have money and stopped to cook. I had already decided to come back to Georgia, but Russian police hastened the process. I was coming back from Widnoje to my aunt to Moscow. I was stopped by a young policewoman in the underground. When she checked my documents and found out that my visa had expired, she passed it to the other colleague. They asked for 1500 Ruble and then I would be let off, but I did not have money. I
did not call anybody to bring it either. I was anyway going to come back to Georgia. They brought me to the police station. It was a Saturday and on Monday morning the police took me to the court. The judge passed the administrative judgment. I had to pay 1000 Ruble, for having violated the law on foreign citizens and they put the deportation order in my passport. I had two choices: either to leave the territory of Russia within 10 days on my own or they would keep me in the prison, where I would work until I would reimburse the expenses for my travel. I paid the fee and flight by myself. I bought ticket to Georgia. These days I was stopped in Moscow several times by police. When they saw the deportation order in my passport, they were always saying “nice journey back to Georgia!” The police always showed aggression toward Georgians and Armenians. They think that Georgians do not work honestly there, stealing or doing other illegal things. Older people, who remember Soviet times, have positive memories about Georgians and Georgia. I was deported before these massive deportations started in Moscow. I did not contact anybody here in Georgia or any state institution. It did not make sense. I know that I did not have a valid visa and how should the Georgian state help me? After coming back to Georgia I learned a new profession. I am working now and painting houses, renovating the T’q’ibuli mine. I prefer to have a stable work in Georgia, than being somewhere else. Here people think that being outside of Georgia is paradise. In my case the migration was not so bad, because I got experience for life. But generally migration is very bad, families are breaking apart, youth is going and not coming back. All of the migrants plan finally to come back, but they are waiting for improving their situation. For the state, migration is good, because all the migrants are supporting their families here. A lot of money came from Russia. Now the government is calling migrants back to work here, but these are only promises. If people could earn half of what they get in migration, they will all come back. But the government’s promises are like painted facades, while the buildings are not renovated” (Avto, 27 year old, 19/05/2007).

Case II

Iuri was born in 1954. After finishing school he went to do his military service in Russia. When he came back, he worked as fireman, as policeman and later on as technician in the cloth factory in Kutaisi. He got a flat in Kutaisi thru his job, where he lived with his family, his wife and two children. When his mother died, his wife resettled back in Sac’ire to take care of the family, while he was still working in Kutaisi coming and going to work. After 1993, when the cloth factory closed down, he began to look for a job outside Georgia. His father used to be a
craftsman, so Iuri knew this profession quite well. In Kutaisi he found the company which was
taking craftsmen to Moscow. His first migration was not very successful, as the company was
taking big amounts of money for mediating for the job abroad. After three months, his son was
getting married and he came back to Georgia. After six months he joined the group of
construction workers, organized by the Revaz in Sac’ire. He went to Irkutsk and stayed there
for a year. This period was very difficult for the family. “There was the problem of buying
certain products. The small child in the family needed some special food. This cost 3 GEL (ca.
1,5 Euro) a day. My wife was going along the street asking for money loan from every family
in the neighborhood. It happened every day, but neighbors did not have money for themselves.
My family sold everything: the flat in Kutaisi, the piano, the bed settings and etc. One child got
ill; we did not have money to take him to Tbilisi and have him properly examined. He died.
During that period I was working, but the money changed in Russia and due to inflation instead
of 350 USD per month, the firm paid 900 USD for one year. I came back, but the money I
brought was not enough to pay debts here and we had nothing to live on. After a few months, a
relative of ours called me and said that there was another job as a construction worker in
Moscow. It was the renovating job, but there was no company involved and I would earn much.
For the flight from Tbilisi to Moscow we sold the cow and took a loan with interest rate on it.
It was quite a big risk, but there was no other way. I paid 75 USD for the three months Russian
visa and went there. At the beginning I was registered there, but after three months my Russian
visa expired and I stayed without proper documents. During the last three and half years, I was
working in Moscow, sending money back to the family. People from here cannot work in the
official jobs or enterprises there, because they do not have proper documents, registration and
the only chance is to work as a worker. I was a construction worker as well, mainly painting
houses. We were four people in the group, taking private orders to renovate houses and at the
end dividing the money. This was better. When a company finds a job for you, you do the work
of 1000 USD and the company gives you 10 USD. During this time I stayed there nobody
stopped me or checked my documents. After a year my acquaintance told me that for 1500 USD
I could get the Russian passport. It was quite cheap in comparison to the price for proper
documents, but I thought it was better to send this money to the family. I never thought of staying
in Russia forever. That’s why I did not get a Russian passport. There are people, even in Sac’ire
who have two passports, one Georgian and another Russian, going and coming to Russia
without problems. When I decided to come back, the deportations were extreme. It was not
possible to come back without deportation. I had no proper documents any more. The police
was going around searching for Georgians, collecting them and sending them back to Georgia. I did not want to be caught by the police. The Russian-Georgian situation affected my situation a lot. If the international relations were not so tense, I could have paid 150 USD and come back without deportation through Ukraine. I addressed one of my Georgian friends who had acquaintances in the police, and asked him to arrange my return to homeland. He told me that this would cost 100 USD. I paid 2000 Ruble to the police to stamp the deportation in the passport and to take my finger-prints, and 1000 Ruble to the court, as the penalty, that I lived in Russia without a valid visa. If I did not pay money, I would be caught by the police and would work for this money. So I had the money in the pocket and it was better to pay directly. There was no direct flight to Georgia and through the Ukraine; all the tickets were sold out. I bought the two-way tourist ticket through Turkey. There were four of us, Georgians, who chose to be deported in the same way as I did. I knew that with this passport I could not go for 5 years anywhere. I will see, if the economic situation will not improve, then I will change my passport and go back to Russia. Now I am ill and trying to recover. Later I will look for a job in Tbilisi. If I could find a job here it would be great, to be so close to the family, children, grandchildren. I am already 53 years old and do not want to go so far. I am tired. Everything about what is going on between Russia and Georgia is a political game, but it extremely affects our situation. We do not have problem with Russian people. These are all about politics. When the police was dealing with my deportation, they told me: “Do not be afraid. What we are doing is all because of politics. From the New Year everything will change. Even these finger-prints we do not put them in the computer. But we are ordered from above to do so” (Iuri, 53 years old, 16/05/2007).

These two cases have similarities and differences. First of all the migrants are different in age and have different marital status. The economic necessity of the families made all of them to go for migration. If Iuri was supporting their families, Avto become the main breadwinner for his mother and sister after the death of his father. There are some issues which need further examination.

Migrant networks include kin ties as well as neighbours, distant relatives and/or friends. How networks facilitate the emigrational process was a broadly discussed issue around two decades ago (e.g. Brettell 2000, Boyd 1989, Koser 1997), and there is much attention to transnational networks that migrants create through their private connections and means of telecommunication (Diminescu 2008). Telecommunication creates double ties; on the one hand, it connects locals to the already established migrants who offer them the assistance in the host society; on the other hand, it connects migrants to their family members who stayed back in
the village. Although some local migrants chose the destination to Russia through a labourbroker, later on they established their own networks and facilitated others to join in migration (as in the case of Revaz). The chain migration, which sometimes is called ‘network-mediated migration’, is predominant in the case of Sac’ire. Close kin help migrants find jobs, make registration, provide them with housing and emotional support. The case of Avto shows that relative’s support is not always guaranteed and sometimes relatives might be ignorant to assist migrants, but in general “networks provide social capital” (Brettell 2000: 108) which is essential for adaptation of newcomers in the host society. Functional network, created by already established migrants, provides the newcomers with the necessary support like registration, job, caring during the illnesses and lending money.

The second main issue within the biographical narratives is the civil citizenship status of migrants. Being citizens of Georgia creates barriers for entry into the Russian territory. When discussing the politics of international migration, James F. Hollifield, argues that since the end of the cold war, “entry [in to new states, T.M.] rather than exit is more problematic” (Hollifield 2000: 143). For Georgian citizens in Russia there exists an option with deportation, if they were not following the laws of the Russian Federation for crossing the borders. The presented cases indicate that from the beginning onwards migrants cross the Russian border with long or short term visas. Having a valid visa is not enough for being legally working in Russia. The work permits and registration according to residence are the documents that most of the migrants to Russia are lacking. The improper documentation is the first restraint for migrants, for having no access to the proper and legal employment, mostly taking the jobs of construction workers (see, Baganha 2000). Furthermore, migrants have the problem of registering business under their own name. However, the migrants in Russia are aware about the illegal ways like how to avoid the legal limitation of the host society, how to register business in the names of locals, how to do registration of residence place or how to bribe the local low-level bureaucrats. They even have ‘possibilities’ of getting a Russian passport (of course illegally), but while judging this issue they always think about their migration as temporal, and do not think of paying money for the passport. On the one hand this indicates that they are reluctant about the legal restraints put by the host state (like they were used to in Georgia) and they do not have any desire to belong to the host society either socially or politically (I do not talk about cultural belonging as they belong to Georgian society), even if it will make it easier for them to stay in host state. The perception of the state from the migrants’ point of view shows the same tendency which is characteristic to the villagers of Sac’ire. Here again (like in the case of fourth chapter) we see
the division of the ‘above’ and ‘below’ state; the ‘above’ state either sending or recipient is ‘far away’ and do not consider the interests of people and the best strategy is to avoid them. While ‘below’ state, enacted by low-level bureaucrats are close to people, they remember the ‘ideal picture’ of Georgians, want to help them and if they behave against Georgian migrants (like deporting them), they are just obliged to do so.

My aim in presenting the deportation stories and the lives of Georgian migrants in Russia was to discuss how citizens without legal documents are affected thru international politics. There are two levels of analysis: macro and micro. The macro level is the independent factor which defines the present and future conditions of the Georgian migrants. To control the entry to the country or to deport a person without proper documentation is the common state policy. Nevertheless it is obvious that deportation of about 4000 migrants within a few months was not the usual state policy of the Russian government and it was affected by the tense relations with the Georgian state. Writing about states and citizens abroad, Laurie A. Brand indicates that migration affects the bilateral relations between sending and receiving societies and immigration-related issues might be used in other spheres of bilateral relations (Brand 2006: 16). While the Russian and Georgian governments were “playing big politics”, the citizens of Georgia living in the territory of Russia, became “illegal immigrant ‘card’ in negotiations over other, perhaps unrelated, issues” (ibid: 16). The Russian side tried to influence Georgia with the deportations of the Georgian citizens, while the Georgian side threatened Russia to bring the case to the European Court of Human Rights. Georgian state got plenty of deported migrants, and the amount of remittances was decreased due to the economic sanctions Russian government put on Georgia. On 26 March 2007 the Georgian authorities lodged with the European Court of Human Rights an application against Russia under Article 33 (Inter-State cases) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case essentially concerned the alleged existence of an administrative practice involving the arrest, detention and collective expulsion of Georgian nationals from the Russian Federation in the autumn of 2006.127 The court ruled that Russia had violated Article 38 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and that in the autumn of 2006, a coordinated policy of arresting, detaining and

127 It raises issues under Articles 3 (prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment), 5 (right to liberty and security), 8 (right to respect for private and family life), 13 (right to an effective remedy) and 18 (limitation on use of restrictions on rights) of the Convention and under Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property and right to education), Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens) as well as under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 (procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens) (The European Court of Human Rights www.echr.coe.int).
expelling Georgian nationals from the country was put in place in the Russian Federation. Georgia called for the Court to not only declare that the Convention had, indeed, been violated, but also award reparations and compensation. This request was rejected by a majority vote, however. The judges stated that both sides should initially discuss the issue themselves, and only in the event that they could not reach an agreement within a year would the ECHR return to its consideration (Mezyaev 2014). The case is still ongoing, but whatever declaration the court will bring, it will not compensate the economic resources that the most families of migrants in Russia lost during 2006.

The presented cases of returnee migrants show that these people suffered through the tense relations between sending and receiving societies. In the broader context of international relations the citizens are constantly searching individual ways to avoid the harsh state policies or to minimize the negative influence by using social connections, negotiations, and/or bribes. Although all of them expressed some dissatisfaction with politics, none of them attempted to bring their opinion or experience to be known at the higher political level. Furthermore, they do not even want to address a state institution, either because they take the responsibility by themselves as having abrogated the visa regime of Russia, or they do not perceive the state strong enough to provide them with assistance and job. Iuri explained to me, why he did not address the state institutions in relation to the deportation issue: “I did not even think of addressing the committee of deported migrants. It does not make sense for me. I know that they did not give a job to anybody, so I do not want to spend time and energy for running after this matter.” The migrant citizens are not eager to collaborate with the government. They are more concerned with their own economic problems. They are keen on providing their families with the financial resources and fill in the gap of the social citizenship. Exercising political citizenship, either by voting or with direct participation and negotiation with the government is less important to the migrants discussed here.

7.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown how the migrants’ families cope with the effects of migration and how gender and family roles can change during migration. The focus in this part was less on the migrants themselves but on how migration acts upon those who are left behind. Women who are left behind were under general social pressure of justifying the absence of their men and the possibility of the absent men having other sexual partners in migration. These
possibilities caused tensions within the conjugal and family relations as well as causing difficulties in organizing work and social life in the village. In some of the cases migrants’ remittances were helpful for compensating the absence of men and for accumulating some wealth and improving one’s economic status, as in the case of buying flats in other cities and being able to afford the university education of one’s children. Nevertheless, the social threat of being labeled as ‘the women left behind’ was considerable pressure on migrants’ wives, leading some of them to accept their new roles of being degraded to the ‘undesirable’.

When women migrate to earn their living abroad, her absence is harder to fill in and the family structure seems to be more vulnerable when coping with difficulties. Male migration is, nevertheless, the dominant form in this village and is considered to be the legitimate source of earning one’s livelihood and supporting one’s family in times of retreating social state. This Highlights the one aspect of ‘gendered citizenship’, which is indicating to the binary division of public/private, generally situating women in the private domain (Chari 2009).

It is harder to assess the overall effects of out-migration on the political community in the village as migration strategies are mostly individually designed and organized and are fluctuating and sometimes unpredictable. When it became a mass phenomenon as I discussed in the second part of my chapter, with the case of mass deportation of Georgian migrants from Russia, it is still difficult to see the individual strategies appealing the policy of either sending or receiving states. Even if migrants and others complain about the ‘dirtiness’ of international politics and their own interests, sufferings and difficulties being neglected and ignored, there is hardly any clear collective action to express these disappointments, either to the state or to international organizations. The migrants are operating with the differentiated conception of the state, while the ‘below state’ through the low-level bureaucrats is negotiable and closer, the ‘above’ picture of the state is monolithic, distanced and inflexible.

The level and kind of being disappointed or satisfied with the state and where one sees the state’s responsibility seems to be the key issue here. Migrants, by becoming absent citizens fulfill the state’s role for providing social and economic support for the villagers. At the same time, they allow themselves to be partly manipulated by the states of sending and receiving countries, by being taken hostage by international politics, but also by avoiding those states in every possible way of manipulating citizenship, passport and visa regimes. Their agency could be seen as being confined to their structural and legal limitations, until they “can buy another passport,” or “pay for another period of visa”.

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Chapter 8. Concluding remarks

Preliminary aim of the thesis has been to study new conditions and processes which the transition to democracy and market economy brought to the rural village of Georgia, especially in citizen-state relations. The overwhelming poverty of the population and insecure economic income make the locals to carry out different economic activities and use all kinds of sources and resources. Although they are well aware about the ongoing changes in the political centre of the country, they remain distant spectators and do neither have the possibilities nor desire to bring their voices to the central government or influence the general policy of the country. They keep leading the traditional way of life, which is full of struggles for economic welfare, creating a small comfortable space together with the close kin and neighbours, which simultaneously is the part of their security system, providing them with emotional and social support in case of emergency.

The locality is characterized as being attached to the Soviet experience. The tremendous connection to the socialist life is caused by the full embodiment of local economy to the centralized planned economy of the former Soviet Union. The coal mines employed the majority of male villagers, were directly administrated from Moscow and due to the hard type of work the social provisions for the workers were preferential in comparison to the provisions of other enterprises’ employees. The agricultural work was also developed in the framework of the local collective farm, but due to the barren lands and lack of pastures, the most widespread activity, where most of the local women were engaged, was the cultivation of tea plantations. Thus after the break down of the socialist economy, it was not possible to use the local natural resources (coal or tea plantations) and start individual economic activities. The agricultural work (cultivation of crops or keeping a limited number of animals) was more widespread in the first years after independence, as the food was crucial for the physical survival of the families. But as the local landscape does not give them chance to develop the successful individual farming, which would generate sufficient monetary income, only few locals engage in agricultural work, mainly those, who perceive themselves as ‘peasants’.

The transition to the new market economy is also characterized with continuities. Some of the locals are engaged in economic activities, which are ‘new’, like small scale trading, appropriation and procession of wood, extraction or processing of the agate, while others are leading the ‘traditional’ economic activities, like coal mining, agricultural work or working in
public sector, but at a different scale and not anymore under state ownership or as secure jobs. Most of the economic activities do not secure the livelihood of households and usually families have more than two sources of income. There are controversial discourses while judging the non-traditional economic activities, but differing from the case presented by Deema Kaneff (2002) the attitudes towards trading is not shaped by the occupation one had during the socialist times. Local villagers, without regard of their previous professions, appreciate the socialist past and secure jobs. In this context they say that during socialist times they had stable positions, statuses and did not need for instance petty trade. Although they are well aware that the Soviet life is gone and now it is the new economic world, those leading non-traditional economic activities are proud, because they have income and are able to adjust to the changed environment. In their perception the ‘new economic system’ (they hardly use the term ‘market economy’) is irregular and anything could be done for the personal gain (as suggested by Dudwick 2003). But we trace some differences between the generations. The younger villagers, who did not experience the socialist life, would argue that trading is the most profitable economic activity nowadays and it has nothing to do with shame or regret. Although as the younger inhabitants more often tend to leave for urban settlements either for education or for employment, the voices of the older generation are prominent.

The local ideas or practices in relation to democracy or market economy are confused. First of all, they do not have the clear understanding and knowledge about what market economy is, or how democracy should work. One might link their unawareness with the discourse of ‘ignorant peasants’ (Nuijten 2004, Yang 2004, Yanikdağ 2004). Although I think it has also to do with their socialist educational background and limited knowledge about the democracy and capitalism, which are represented to them like ‘Western imperialism’, and which had to be hated during the Soviet times (Yekelchyk 2006). Democracy is often perceived by the locals not as the possibility to construct the state through free and fair elections but only the freedom of expression and ability to criticize the government without fear. Listening to the harsh political debates on TV or expression of dissatisfaction with the government among each other is the only achievement brought by the new ‘democracy’, which seems to them as ‘the voice of one crying in the wilderness’. Recasting the state through political rights seems illusive to them, as they perceive themselves as people living in a place which was ‘not marked on the map of
Similarly, many believe that market economy has not brought anything positive to them. The private economic activities were somehow restricted during the Soviet times, but they do not regret it, since the ‘new economic activities’ are not as profitable as the salaried employment in the Soviet enterprises. So if the locals are involved in ‘new economic activities’, they think that ‘it is not the state’s business’, as these activities ‘are not supported by the state’ (like employment during the socialist times) and try to avoid the state interference as much as possible. That is why these small-scale businesses are mostly non-registered and the owners do not feel the obligation to pay taxes, or protest if the state checks after the quality of products they sell or asks for registering their shops, and to give receipts from the commercial calculator. Thus the market economy for locals is the ‘economy of disaster’, which has nothing to do with prosperity, freedom of activity or unplanned economy.

This strong attachment to the Soviet experience brings me to the conclusion that for discussing the Soviet successor states the postsocialist framework of social anthropology should be kept. The constant recalling of the Soviet life, keeping the socialist symbols, using socialist ideas for evaluations of current state remind us, that there are a lot of socialist remnants. If we will not consider their importance and their influence, the attitudes of the local people and satisfaction or disappointment about the state will not be understandable.

In 1998 in the T’q’ibuli city there was a demonstration of coal miners before the administrative building demanding the unpaid salaries. There were no financial resources in the district budget and for hours the administration was not able to go out, because they had nothing to say to the demonstrators. While the miners were very tired and there was no reply from the administration, they started to remember the “glorious Soviet times” and Stalin, the powerful leader, who was caring about the workers; finally demonstrators came up with the idea to ask the district administration to put back the statue of Stalin. The same statue used to be there in early Soviet times but was removed in late 1950s during the anti-Stalin movement. It appeared that the statue was hidden in the vegetable garden of one of the inhabitants for years. The mayor called Edward Shevardnadze (then the president of Georgia) and asked for advice. According to him, Shevardnadze said, that if putting back the statue of Stalin will calm down the miners, he could put there two statues instead of one. Thus in 1995 the statue of Stalin came back to the ‘city of miners‘ and stayed there till 2010 (see photo #28). The return of Stalin’s statue in the

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128 As I mentioned in chapter 5, the locals were complaining about the lack of attention from the central government and were saying that “government forgot to indicate T’q’ibuli district on the map.”
locality symbolically represents the continuities of the socialist past in the memories of the locals. If the medal rewards kept by the old pensioner (in the beginning story) maintain the symbolic meaning and importance of guaranteed, secured and appraised Soviet life, bringing back the statue of Stalin activates the collective remembrance about the socialist state with durable care for its citizens and shapes the current social claims of locals. By bringing back the statue of Stalin in the district locals expressed their preference for the Soviet life. But it is not only the preferences about the Soviet life, but the locals are often leading their lives in the Soviet manners. The strives of locals for the social rights and complaints about the current unbearable situation have a lot of similarities with the ‘grievance based’ claims of Romanian citizens, expressing only complaints and demands, rather than fight for far-reaching rights (Kideckel 2009). Similar to the Romanian case, the ideas and practices of citizenship in case of Georgian rural dwellers look like a continuum largely determined by the past socialist experience.

While discussing the state-citizens relations in rural Georgia, there are three different determinants: traditional lifestyle of the rural community, which was unaffected by the socialist regime (Dragadze 2001[1988], Suny 1989), socialist citizenship regime and citizenship regime of the independent Georgian state. The first two determinants (traditional lifestyle and socialist citizenship regime) define the expectations of the citizens, their belongings, ideas and practices in relation to the state. The last point, current citizenship regime defines the final outcomes, what the citizens get from the state and how much they can enjoy their rights.

Under the traditional lifestyle, I mainly mean the nature of the local social organizations. The membership of different scales of social organization shapes the identities of the locals. As I showed in the second and third chapters, the villagers identify themselves, with a certain neighbourhood, are members of certain lineages, and are residents of the village, district and region. They use these different scales of identities in different contexts, to present themselves and their social characteristics. But besides the representative character, the memberships of these different scale communities are used as resources for negotiating over various issues or for ‘settling cases’ and providing social security. That is why the village and district residents perceive themselves (even without any kin relations) as ‘potential relatives’ and try to help each other, because in this ‘remote place’ each person needs one another. So when we have such multilayered identities, membership of a state, which is distant and does not ‘help’, is weak.

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129 The district of T’q’ibuli is not remote place within country, but the locals often represent it as such. By “remoteness” they underline the imagined distance from the political centre (Tbilisi), its poor economy and lack of governmental attention.
The theories of citizenship in connection with the empirical data gathered during the fieldwork help us see the differences and commonalities between the Soviet and post-Soviet citizenship regimes (as an idea and in practice) and the citizenship regimes in the Western countries. As long as postsocialist citizenship is determined by the past system, it should be discussed in detail. The development of citizens’ rights within the boundaries of the Soviet Union differs from the development described by T. H. Marshall (1998 [1963]) (from civil, to political and then to social). As suggested by Alexopoulos (2006), the Soviet Union was guaranteeing the civil, political and social rights to the citizens by constitution, while the workers and peasants as needed labour force for the Soviet regime could only practice and enjoy the social rights. The socialist social policy encouraged economic dependence of citizens on the state, which was guaranteed as long as one was loyal to the state and did not protest about the missing aspects of civil and political citizenship (ibid). The practice of depending on the state for years gave rise to two kinds of attitudes towards the state – ‘give-it-to-me’ attitude and ‘sit-back-and-wait-for-it’ attitude (Porket 1987). As far as the independent state is not guaranteeing the whole range of social provisions enjoyed by the Soviet citizens, the local people disregard the citizenship of the independent Georgian state. Free education, medical care, housing, state provided jobs, this is not complete list of the provisions the Soviet citizens were getting. Of course, these provisions were not always to the quality or quantity as the state declared to be (Porket 1987, Adam 1991), but were affordable for ordinary citizens (even by means of paying bribes).

The lack of the civic and political rights in the Soviet times is not negatively estimated by the locals. First of all the locals sometimes perceive that the social rights were given by the socialist state at the expense of political and civic rights, which was actually true. That is why as I presented in chapter 5, locals address the freedom of expression with irony, perceiving that they got this right while losing their social benefits. Besides, the locals do not have much ability to use the civic and political rights, which were given by the independent Georgian state, due to the lack of social rights. In the same chapter I showed how the political rights of locals are limited to have an actual influence even on the local political processes. The state in the local level is ‘governmentalized’ using various techniques and apparatuses for ruling the population (Foucault 2000). Furthermore, the ordinary villagers, unlike the urban dwellers, do not have the habit of exercising their political rights or are loyal towards the local political actors; they are reluctant while the powerful people from government, ruling party or organizations exercise power for doing illegal acts and dominate over them. They are reluctant because from the Soviet
perspective it is ‘normal’, and because those using power are members of their community. And loyalty towards the community members is more important than exercising political or civic rights.

Besides, the socialist citizenship had shaped a different kind of emotional attachment to the state unlike in Western nation-states. The Soviet regime was based on the one hand on territorial and political frame and one the other, ethno-cultural models of nationhood (Brubaker 1994, Karklins 1989). Thus Soviet passports were indicating two different categories of belonging: citizenship - belonging to the political system and nationality - ethnic belonging to the nation. This differentiation gave rise to tensions in the multiethnic societies, where the ‘titular nations’ were believed to have primary rights, in comparison to ethnic minorities. The socialist dual citizenship policy has affected the current citizens’ perceptions. For locals citizenship still means legal belonging to the state, while nationality is belonging to the nation (or to the country) and does not depend on the legal membership of the country. Ethnic belonging to the Georgian nation is perceived like a ‘legitimate right’ to live on the territory of Georgia, while in their imagination the ethnic minorities or immigrants (despite having the citizenship or not) should not have this right. The citizenship category, which gives the equal right to every bearer, does not guarantee Georgians the superiority they as ‘titular nation’ used to have in the Soviet times and that is why they still regret the deletion of the ‘nationality’ category from the national passport (which took place in 1997). Perceived as a legal status, local migrants easily give up the citizenship of Georgia in order to get citizenship of host states and this is not morally judged by locals. Here we can trace the differentiation between the political and cultural belonging as suggested by Brettell (2006). Despite losing political belonging to the Georgian state, migrants maintain strong cultural attachment to the locality, they keep connections to the village and country, getting everyday news, coming back, sending remittances. This understanding of citizenship indicates that within their legal status people highlight legal entitlements and do not emphasize nationality and the national aspiration any further than it being the basis of their citizenship. Thus nationality in relation to citizenship is instrumental and is the basis for the citizenship, as suggested by T.H. Marshall (1998 [1963]).

The third determinant, the citizenship of the independent Georgian state is liberal, guaranteeing the civil, political and social rights, but in a different manner than the Soviet Union. The social rights, which are still a priority for the local residents, are hardly achievable as the state is assuring the social security only for the needy ones. Claiming social rights is not always conditioned by the need or poverty, but by the request of reimbursement for previous
devotion to the Soviet state, by claiming the social services which were guaranteed by the Soviet system and are not provided by the contemporary independent state.

As the locality is characterized with numerous continuities with the Soviet life, the perception of the independent Georgian state is not the exception in this regard. The state for the Soviet citizens was mainly associated with ‘Moscow’, centre of the Soviet Union, which was ‘far’, ‘non-national’, but ‘prosperous, feeding the Soviet citizens’. Although in the framework of the independent state the centre of the state is relatively close (some 230 km) and national (headed by ethnic Georgians), the imagination did not change much. There are two premises to be considered. As I presented in chapter 4, the locals often question the international politics of the current government, orientation towards the West, foreign investors, and influence of international organizations. The second aspect is that the state is not as prosperous as the Soviet Union and is unable to provide the social provisions in socialist manner. This judgment always includes the issue of social inequality, which exists between the ruling elite and ordinary citizens. Locals think that it is not the state which is poor, but the resources are distributed unequally. Furthermore, the local bureaucrats also support the construction of the ‘above’ image of the state as mystical, incomprehensible and unreachable. All these explanations strengthen the image of ‘above’ state to be perceived as distant as the socialist state.

The main theoretical outcomes in relation to the citizenship concepts are the following:

The study has shown that the three sets of rights discussed by T.H. Marshall (1998 [1963]) and other scholars of citizenship are the part of citizenship practices in rural Georgia. The locals have the understanding of their rights, but are limited while practicing them. The discussion of the political rights of locals (chapter 5) or strives for social rights (chapter 6) show how the civil, political and social rights are interdependent (as Lister suggests while discussing the theory of Marshall (2005)), and sometimes used for negotiating one over the other. Although the three sets of citizens’ rights are at stake in Georgian context, as Bryan S. Turner argues (1993), social rights are the primary rights always claimed by locals.

Although citizenship is not specifically ‘national’, we cannot trace the postnational citizenship either, as suggested by Soysal (1998) or argued by Baghdasaryan (2014). The changes described by Soysal while characterizing the contemporary citizenship in Western nation-states are not applicable for the case of Georgia. Although we see the flows of migrants leaving the country, they do not have the statuses of asylum seekers and refugees as in achieving
the rights in the receiving societies, neither do they use the international mechanisms. Furthermore, local migrants primarily struggle with the lack of statuses in the host societies, they do not influence the locality in the sense of bringing back the ideas about universal human rights or about international organizations, which might be used for securing their rights. The case of mass deportation of Georgian migrants from Russia (chapter 7) shows that neither international legislation is strong enough nor the power of international organizations in order to influence the sovereignty of the states affect their international or internal politics.

The study revealed that previous citizenship regime strongly influences the current notions and practices as suggested by James Holston (2008). The citizenship regime of the Soviet Union was distinct and different than the citizenship regimes common to Western nation-states by development, by unequal delivery of the rights and by the disentanglement of nationality from citizenship. The citizenship regime of independent Georgia by nature coincides with the citizenship regime of Western countries. But if we see the citizenship not as legal or formal framework, but as the actual relations between the state and citizens, then for describing the present citizenship regime of Georgia, we should use the concept of ‘postsocialist citizenship’. The concept ‘postsocialist citizenship’ will help us to bond in one category the liberal citizenship regime fashioned by the independent state and socialist claims of its citizens. The gap between the actual provisions and citizens’ entitlements causes the tensions between the citizens and the state and indicates to the ongoing changes and continuities which the term ‘postsocialist’ well depicts. Furthermore, the citizens’ attitudes towards the state or implementation of their rights seem to be a solid category and do not change easily from one context to another. The migrants’ behavior in the places of migration illustrates that they use the same ideas or mechanisms for achieving their goals or securing their lives, that is used in the locality.

However, during the study the differences between the generations became obvious. The citizens, who experienced the Soviet life, had a stronger tendency to practice citizenship in the Soviet manner, using the language of ‘give-it-to-me’ (Porket 1987) while demanding that the state gives social provisions, practices patron-client relations with the local officials and ‘settles their problems’. The young generation is more reluctant in demanding social rights or in practicing political rights. The younger citizens are more concerned with securing their life independently and when the local economy does not give them much chance for generating monetary income, they tend to migrate either to urban areas or abroad. Furthermore, the younger generation is more reserved for using the patron-client relations. In case of need, their
problems are either solved by the older generation, or they will follow the rules. As time passes and the remnants of socialist lives decline, we might see the emergence of new citizens, who might be less active (in the sense of practicing political rights and claiming social rights), more state obedient and who will have less ethnic affiliation towards the nation, but more civic and rights based approaches towards the state. If these processes go on, the state might be less distanced from locals and they might perceive themselves less so as ones forgotten by the state or living on the ‘margins of society’ (Das and Poole 2004).
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kart’velebis ruset’idan dep’ortac’ia. [Deportation of Georgians from Russia] Resonance, Saturday March 31st 2007
Appendix A

Chart #1: What does it mean for you to be a citizen of Georgia (%)? (N=100)

Survey done in village Sac’ire, 2007
### Chart #2: Important concepts of the citizenship (%) (N=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Job</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caring State</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheap Products</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Social Relations</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of Georgia</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulating State</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Survey done in village Sac’ire, 2007**
**Chart #3: Should citizens take part in politics? (N=100)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why do you think that citizens should not take part in politics? (N=24)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary citizens have other things to do</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because the politics is “fake”</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary citizens do not have enough education</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary citizens do not have social connections</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey done in village Sac’ire, 2007
Chart #4: Do you think citizens are taking part in politics? (N=100)

- 50% are not affiliated with the ruling party
- Lack of information and education
- Ordinary citizens distrust the government
- Lack of financial resources
- Lack of social connection and patronage
- Do not know

Survey done in village Sac’ire, 2007
Chart #5: Comparison of Age Groups of Migrants and Local Residents of the village (%).

(Locals N=398, migrant N=101)

Table #1: Present Occupation of Migrant Women (N and %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present Occupation of Migrant Women</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pupils/Students</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Autonomous Migrants’</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accompanying Husbands and Working</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from village census survey, 2006
Chart #6: The Distribution of Educational Background of Local Residents and Migrants (%).

(Local N=398, migrant N=101)

Data from village census survey, 2006

Table #2: Destination of Migration (Frequency)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination of Migration</th>
<th>number of migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  Azeraijan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Belorussia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Germany</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Greece</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Russia</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  Turkey</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  Ukraine</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  USA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Tbilisi</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from village census survey, 2006
**Chart #7: Legal Status of Migrants abroad (%) (N=101)**

Data from village census survey, 2006
Appendix B

Photo #1: The photograph of Tina (the pensioner from the I chapter) with her medal rewards, 2007
Photo #2: Sac’ire village on the edge of winter, 2006
Photo #3: Fishing in the artificial reservoir within the territory of Sac’ire community, 2006

Photo #4: Sac’ire’s Holiday Cottage for Children and Mothers, 2007
Photo #5: Cornfield in Sac’ire, 2006

Photo #6: Tea plantation in Sac’ire village: The closer tea plantation is without any care, but the one in distance is taken on lease by the T&q’ibuli tea factory, 2007
Photo #7: The coal mine renovated by 'Sakinvesti’ in T’q’ibuli city, 2007

Photo #8: One of the three mines in T’q’ibuli city, which is not working any more, 2006
Photo #9: The same building in front and behind after the renovation (T’q’ibuli city), 2006
Photo #10: Unfinished ‘House of culture’ in Sac’ire, where the local kindergarten is situated, 2006

Photo #11: Sac’ire kindergarten from inside, 2006
Photo #12: Cultivating land via traditional plough and bulls, Sac’ire, 2007

Photo #13: Agricultural market in T’q’ibuli city, 2007
Photo #14: There is no gender division of labour when the family is in need: leading the bulls, Sac’ire, 2007

Photo #15: Centre of Sac’ire: the small commercial shops, 2007
Photo #16: Singing the national anthem before the school building, Sac’ire, 2006

Photo #17: Pilgrimage to the close religious site: bringing the animal to the shrine, Gogni, 2007
Photo #18: Doing the service at the shrine “Nine Crosses,” 2007

Photo #19: Sac’ire’s graveyard and the ruins of historical Kašueti church on the right side, 2006
Photo #20: A corner for religious items, Sac’ire, 2007

Photo #21: Small shrine built by the locals at the top of Sac’ire village, 2006
Photo #22: Preparing the firewood for winter, Sac’ire, 2006

Photo #23: The concert for supporting the Nationalist Party and its candidates (city T’q’ibuli), 2006
Photo #24: Pre-election propaganda in the centre of the village Sac’ire, 2006

Photo #25: Election Poll: voters sign before getting the ballots, 2006
Photo #26: Neighbours are preparing the funeral repast in Sac’ire, 2007

Photo #27: Making agate decorations, T’q’ibuli, 2007
Photo #28: The statue of Stalin which came back in the ‘city of miners’ in 1995, T'q’ibuli, 2006