In March 1782, a text entitled "A Magnanimous Act from Most Recent History" appeared anonymously in the Wirtembergisches Repertorium der Litteratur.¹ The author of this text, Friedrich Schiller, wrote about the distinction between two extremes coexisting within the human being, that is, the angelic and the demonic. For Schiller, who was at that time a young physician, this distinction opens up, but fails to identify and reflect upon, a potential middle ground between these extremes, that is, the possibility of becoming a magnanimous agent.² Only two years have passed since the completion of his third medical dissertation, entitled On the Connection between the Animal and the Spiritual Nature in the Human Being, in which Schiller focussed on the sensible/rational human being as an inseparable whole. He considered this unity to be the key to the understanding of humanity, not only in its physiological nature but also in its moral vocation.³ Schiller would remain driven by the possibility of reconciling the dualism of the sensible and rational in human nature throughout his life. In this paper, I concentrate on the Kallias Letters, composed more than a decade after the aforementioned medical dissertation, in which Schiller considered the human being as an entirety. These letters are mainly dedicated to the elucidation of a new theory of beauty. Nonetheless, within

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them Schiller additionally addressed questions pertaining to moral philosophy and the unity of the human being. The choice to analyse Schiller's *Kallias* was made due to the fact that these letters have been largely neglected in both the history of moral philosophy in general (within which Schiller's contributions remain relatively uninfluential) and contemporary Kant and Schiller scholarship in particular. I will show how, in this text, Schiller dealt with the difficulties inherent in explaining the nature of the human being, and how he or she should act, if one simultaneously accepts the dualistic view that humans consist in both sensible and rational being. In doing so, I will refer to an often discussed topos in the context of Kant scholarship: the alleged repugnance of Kant's ethics. The allegation of repugnance appears not only in the early reception of Kant's moral philosophy but is also to be found in recent Kant scholarship. After introducing Kant's account of the human being as a *homo duplex* in the first part of the paper, I will proceed, in the second, to focus on the *Kallias Letters* and present what Schiller defined as a repugnant element in Kant's explanation of a moral action, that is, the element of constraint, which has struck Schiller as truly "abhorrent" and plainly "disgusting"—to use the words Schiller himself directed against this aspect of Kant's theory of morals. Third, an excursus will follow in which I will draw out some illuminating similarities between Schiller's enterprise in the *Kallias Letters* and Maria von Herbert's correspondence with Kant. After additionally elucidating some distinctions that underscore the extent to which Kant's and Schiller's views differ, I will sustain the conclusion that, even though Schiller's accusation of repugnance appears to be too weak an objection to cause serious trouble for Kant's ethics, it does, however, point us towards a much more important problem inherent in Kant's dual presentation of the human being.

1 | KANT'S *HOMO DUPLEX*

One of the most pressing problems for the first readers of Kant's work was the apparent split representation of the human being as a subject divided between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom. These early receivers of Kant's work understood themselves to be dealing with a theory that supported a contrast between laws of nature on one hand and, on the other, the moral law as a law of freedom. These philosophers strove to find a way of invalidating the distinction between the sphere in which natural laws rule and the sphere in which the moral law exercises its influence. Those authors responding to the Kantian system at the end of the 18th century found themselves in the position of having to contemplate freedom in the context of a system in which severe necessity ruled the world. Such a seemingly insurmountable dualism was, of course, not a novelty in philosophical theories: after the Cartesian distinction between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, the modern philosophical debate had been preoccupied with finding a proper solution for those sorts of dualisms. Yet, after Kant's philosophical systematisation, the problem became pressing once again. How, then, might it be possible to make sense of the human being as belonging to the two worlds as presented by Kant? Kant's definition of freedom was inescapably linked to the appropriateness of the idea of the *homo duplex* in relation to his wider system. In turn, this idea naturally suggests two further dichotomies: (a) that between human freedom and natural necessity; and (b) that between the sensible and the intelligible human being.

Rousseau had already stated in the *Social Contract* that "the acquisition in the civil state of moral liberty [...] makes man truly the master of himself. For to be driven by appetite alone is slavery, and obedience to a law one has prescribed for oneself is liberty."6 Kant followed Rousseau in his definition of freedom as autonomy; a consequence of which was that it brought Kant to admit of a strong dualism in the nature of the human being. This dualism in the nature of the human being is rooted in Kant's distinction between sensibility and understanding/reason and relatedly in that between the spheres of nature and freedom. These distinctions are not solely due to the requirements of Kant's practical philosophy, but also and most importantly to the principles underlying his theoretical philosophy. Kant illustrated these distinctions in the first *Critique*, most notably in the context of his Refutation of Idealism when explicating his doctrine of Transcendental Idealism.7 In laying forth the terms of his Copernican Revolution in theoretical philosophy, which implies the impossibility of the
cognition of things in themselves and the limitation of possible speculative cognition of reason to mere objects of experience,\(^8\) Kant was careful to not exclude that things in themselves can remain thinkable for us. The difference between phenomena and noumena opened up, as Kant himself summarised in the Architectonic chapter at the end of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, a broad horizon for philosophy as the "legislation of human reason" that pertains to two objects: nature and freedom.\(^9\) The philosophical system is occupied with both natural and moral law, yet carries an internal distinction between the "philosophy of nature," which "pertains to everything that is," and the "philosophy of morals," which pertains only to "that which should be."\(^{10}\) This dualistic approach and the associated principles which underlie Kant's theoretical philosophy are therefore, in addition, central to Kant's works related to practical philosophy. The clearest exposition of the consequences, for morality, of a dualistic account of human nature is to be found right at the beginning of the *Doctrine of Virtue*. Here, while explaining the concept of a duty to oneself, Kant quite clearly endorsed a strict distinction within human nature between sensible being and rational being.\(^{11}\) In those paragraphs, Kant noted that the homo noumenon puts the homo phaenomenon under obligation. This seemed to imply (at first glance) a contradiction, since "the one imposing obligation (auctor obligationis) could always release the one put under obligation (subjectum obligationis) from the obligation (terminus obligationis), so that (if both are one and the same subject) he would not be bound at all to a duty he lays upon himself."\(^{12}\) However, this is revealed to be a contradictory move in appearance only, once one looks at the two different senses of the term "human being." Kant wrote that the human being as homo phaenomenon is a natural being that "has reason and can be determined by his reason, as a cause, to actions in the sensible world."\(^{13}\) He regarded the homo noumenon, instead, as a being "endowed with inner freedom that can be put under obligation and, indeed, under obligation to himself."\(^{14}\)

Once this is made clear, his conclusion that "the human being (taken into these two different senses) can acknowledge a duty to himself without falling into contradiction," itself becomes consistent.\(^{15}\) This solution aimed to avoid the contradiction inherent in claiming that concrete moral obligation is provided by laws which have no stable coercive force. Still, this solution entails further consequences connected to the idea of the duplex nature of the human being. This is the problem connected with the two perspectives' view, which Kant already introduced in the first and second *Critiques* and in the *Groundwork*, and which was presented most clearly in his *Doctrine of Virtue*, in terms of its consequences in the context of moral philosophy: "When a human being is conscious of a duty to himself, he views himself, as the subject of duty, under two attributes: first as a sensible being, that is, as a human being (a member of one of the animal species), and secondly as an intelligible being."\(^{16}\) The clear implication is that there are two senses of the term "human being," according to Kant. On one hand, this suggests the existence of a practically rational, lawful subject living in the world of freedom and whose actions are characterised by autonomy as self-legislation. On the other hand, the explanation refers to a sensible subject who lives in the world of nature and whose actions are sensibly determined in a natural chain of causation. This dichotomy notwithstanding, Kant did not want to leave us with this strictly divided account of the human being: one in which a battle is fought between its disparate parts so that its rational nature might subdue and determine its sensible nature. What the critics tend to overlook is that Kant specifically wanted to avoid this problem. That is why he added at the beginning of Section 4 of the *Doctrine of Virtue*: "The subject that is bound, as well as the subject that binds, is always the human being only."\(^{17}\) With this single line, Kant endorsed the unity of the human being against the duality of a subject split between rationality and sensibility. Even so, how was this unity intended to be understood? In what way did Kant believe his assertion could be justified and grounded? The answers to these questions remain unclear. One might wonder whether Kant's proposal can be grounded at all. How could Kant refer to, and argue for, the human being as a unity that is both sensible and intelligible, while simultaneously maintaining the separation necessary in order that autonomy and obligation could remain meaningful? Unfortunately, Kant's emphasis upon the unity of the human being was neither explained nor further justified. This is the puzzle that early readers of Kant's philosophy were confronted by and which is so familiar to students of Kant today. With this in mind, let us now move on to Schiller's *Kallias*.\(^{18}\)
2 | SCHILLER’S KALLIAS LETTERS

If, according to Kant, human moral action always involves the concrete expression of the obrigatoriness of the pure rational practical law, then morality is bound to an overt constraint in its actual realisation. On the basis of the homo duplex theory, we can now reappraise Kant’s assertions in the second Critique. Here, Kant states that for all finite beings that have reason the moral law always has the form of an imperative. This is because these beings are always affected by needs and sensible motives and their acts of willing are never pure. For this reason, they are incapable of reliably confining their chosen maxims to those that do not conflict with the moral law (from which the element of constraint follows).18 This element of an overt constraint in the representation of a moral action is the ground for many critics to refer to a certain repugnance in Kant’s ethics. This happened also in the context of Schiller’s Kallias Letters, in which he linked the apparent repugnance of Kant’s ethics to his theory of a homo duplex.

Studies dedicated to the philosophical relevance of Friedrich Schiller have acquired a more distinct importance in recent years, most notably thanks to Frederick Beiser’s book: Schiller as Philosopher.19 Still, scholarly interest tends to focus on Schiller’s aesthetics, the most recent studies on which are just the latest in a series of serious work that centres on the Aesthetic Letters.20 Because of the preponderance of interest focused in this area of his thought, the relevance of Schiller’s proposals in the context of moral philosophy are often undervalued or reduced to being considered a misunderstanding of Kant’s ethics.21 As already noted, there already exist important exceptions to this line of reading, like the ones by Beiser, but also Baxley, Deligiorgi, Macor and Stern.22 Still, Schiller as philosopher has far more to offer philosophy, as Houngate also notes.23 In my attempt to understand the extent to which Schiller has been undervalued in areas of philosophy outside aesthetics, the Kallias Letters provide an excellent starting point.24

The Kallias Letters were composed during Schiller’s first tenure at the University of Jena and are part of his correspondence with Christian Gottfried Körner.25 In these letters, Schiller sets out a series of philosophical reflections dedicated not only to aesthetics, but also to morality. These reflections were occasioned by Schiller’s study of Kant, and in particular by his reading of Kant’s third Critique.26

In the letter of the series dated February 8, 1793, Schiller first furnished a clarification of the concept of beauty. He defined it as “freedom in appearance.”27 In explaining his definition, Schiller distinguished between freedom from the practical, that is, moral, perspective and the concept of freedom used in his theory of beauty. He determined that the concept of freedom in aesthetics is distinct from the concept of freedom deriving from practical reason.28

In cases relevant to aesthetics, the principle of pure practical reason that gives itself a law for action, that is, autonomy, can be extended to the appearance of beautiful objects, to which the aesthetic judgement is directed. A thing that we judge to be beautiful seems to us to be free. It seems to us as if it acted or was formed by principles that it gave itself. As Schiller put it, the object is beautiful because its characteristic is that of not-being-determined-from-the-outside.29 Consequently, we can see that the concept of a moral obligation that constraints our own sensible nature seems to be incompatible with Schiller’s theory of beauty in the Kallias Letters.

By explaining the idea of beauty as “autonomy in appearance,” Schiller contended that in observing a particular natural object and judging it to be beautiful, human beings must believe it to resemble something self-determining. The human observer, therefore, seems to discover a new form of freedom in the observed object, analogous to human autonomy, and thus the object appears to be an autonomous entity. Resultantly, the observer ascribes freedom to the observed object. We can now ask: what about a human being that acts morally? Consider the following passage from Schiller: “When the form of the non-reasonable is determined by reason […], its natural determination is constrained and beauty cannot arise. […] Just at the point that reason exercises its autonomy (which can never occur in appearance), its eye is insulted by heteronomy in appearance.”30 The human being is, of course, a rational being. However, it is at the same time a natural being. When we consider the human being merely as a natural being, its moral action could have the appearance of not being “autonomous” at all—from the perspective of sensible impulses and natural inclinations. This may happen because, in the case of moral action, pure practical reason applies its form (i.e., the law) to the action, so that pure practical reason serves as a guide not only for the rational but also for the natural being. In this way, the action becomes what it should morally be, namely, a moral action as a product
of a pure act of will. However, this action appears to suspend the laws of the sensible nature of human beings. The sensible human being appears to be under a law given by something else, that is, not by a sensible law deriving from the sensible being, but rather by the rational law deriving from the rational being. No autonomy in appearance is to be observed, according to Schiller. He underlined the problematic relation involved in this case and noted that the legislative action of reason in moral cases, which appears to an observer as constraint and sacrifice, does not merely imply the absence of beauty, but that it also elicits disgust. According to Schiller, “the violence against our drives which practical reason brings to bear on our moral determination of will appears as something disgusting and embarrassing.” What Schiller suggested was that even the coercion exercised by reason is disturbing: “it disgusts (outrages) us, for whom freedom is the highest thing, that something should be sacrificed for something else, and used as a means. [...] A moral action can never be beautiful if we observe the operation through which it is won from the sensory world.” These statements made by Schiller (which might be taken by some to be a bit of an exaggeration on his part) alleged that there is something repugnant to be found in Kant’s ethics. We can reconstruct Schiller’s rationale as follows:

1. given that beauty is defined both as freedom in appearance and as the free realisation of the essence of an entity
2. given that, where constraint is to be found, there is no place for beauty
3. given that Kant’s idea of autonomy, that is, of freedom as self-legislation, is always expressed as an overt constraint in actual human action, since the moral law applies not only to the rational being but also to the sensible being
4. then it follows that lack of beauty in moral actions is unavoidable, since the constraint of the rational law on the sensible being expressly contradicts the possibility of a beautiful action. Furthermore, Schiller added that the ugliness of moral actions can be implied, since the prevention of something attaining its beauty (i.e., apparent freedom) is what gives the feeling of repugnance.

If we take Schiller’s allegation as our starting point, an even more fundamental question might be posed. The relevant passages suggest that Schiller’s concern about Kant’s ethics was not to be confined exclusively to the fact that it allows no place for beauty. A further key aspect of Schiller’s argument consists in the way he approached the very idea of freedom in general, even in moral cases. For Schiller, moral constraint is to be regarded as problematic not simply because it prevents or lacks beauty, but because it essentially threatens to violate the idea of freedom itself. This more fundamental point could be taken as confirmation that the objection Schiller raised against Kant is not primarily aesthetic. Rather, its substance is rooted in a different and definitively richer conception of the human being. Against this background, we can better understand why Schiller considered that freedom in general was compatible with any form of constraint at all, and moral constraint particularly.

To facilitate our analysis of these matters, let us for a moment put aside the implausibility of the claim that where beauty fails to arise something repugnant arises, and recall the earlier analysis of Kant’s homo duplex as it appeared in the *Doctrine of Virtue*. Even though this work by Kant appeared after Schiller’s writing of the *Kallias Letters*, we can refer to it nonetheless, since here we find Kant’s clearest exposition of a concept that had appeared throughout earlier works: the constraint exercised by the rational being on the sensible being. We must go back to the first four paragraphs of the *Doctrine of Virtue*, where Kant discussed the duties to oneself. There, Kant seemingly assumed a strict division within the human being, between sensible being and rational being. Kant noted that in the case of a duty to oneself, the subject could always release itself from the obligation, so that it appears inconsistent to speak about a self-obligation.33 He solved the apparent conflict regarding the concept of a duty to oneself by claiming that the homo noumenon puts the homo phaenomenon under obligation.34 The homo noumenon, that is, the rational being, is the one who obligates. The homo phaenomenon, that is, the sensible, natural being, is the one under obligation. This is Kant’s solution to the conflict, and, in essence, his explanation of how morality works. The rational
law that is derived from the rational being may also act on the sensible being. Every time human beings act morally, the moral law functions as a necessitation on the sensible being, so that this rational law constraints all instincts opposing it. In conjunction with this representation of the human being, Kant presented the concept of virtue as strength of soul: “Virtue is the strength of a human being’s maxims in fulfilling his duty—Strength of any kind can be recognised only by the obstacles it can overcome, and in the case of virtue these obstacles are natural inclinations, which can come into conflict with the human being’s moral resolution.”35 A human being can be virtuous just insofar as he or she is not only a rational being, but at the same time always also a sensible being. Virtue as strength of soul is the fortitude to resist sensible impulses in cases where moral action is required and where those impulses conflict with the course of action dictated by the moral law.36 Virtue as strength of soul implies a commitment to the struggle against our sensible nature. This is why a pure rational being cannot be a virtuous being, as Kant already noted in the second Critique.37 It is rather the necessary striving to comply with morality that characterises human moral actions, which, according to Kant, marks the difference between finite rational beings and beings possessing a holy will.38 For human beings, the moral law never ceases to be a duty, since it is impossible for the moral law to become our nature in such a way that the accord between the sensible being and the rational being within one and the same human being were never to be disturbed. In a way that seems to anticipate Schiller’s critique in the Kallias Letters, Kant went on to say: “it is very beautiful to do good to human beings from love for them and from sympathetic benevolence, or to be just from love of order; but this is not yet the genuine moral maxim of our conduct, the maxim befitting our position among rational beings as human beings.”39 It is not the beautiful action Kant is referring to. It is, instead, an action guided by a “discipline of reason,” rather than by the ideal illusion of being able to attain holiness of the will.40

From this point of view, the sense of Schiller’s considerations in the Kallias Letters becomes clearer: Kant’s treatment of obligation, of virtue as strength of soul, of a discipline of reason, seemed repugnant to Schiller, due to the constraint by the rational being of the sensible being.

3 | EXCURSUS: MARIA VON HERBERT’S CORRESPONDENCE WITH KANT

Thus far, I have presented some of the reasons that form the basis of Schiller’s reference to a possible repugnance in Kant’s ethics in the Kallias Letters. Henceforth, I will look towards identifying both a possible endorsement of Schiller’s considerations and a way of escaping the allegation of repugnance. In order to achieve this, I will focus on Maria von Herbert’s correspondence to Kant.

Maria von Herbert was born in Klagenfurt as the daughter of an industrial pioneer.41 Maria’s brother, Franz Paul von Herbert, left in 1789 for Jena to study Kant’s philosophy with Karl Leonhard Reinhold. At the University of Jena, Franz Paul encountered many intellectuals: in particular, Friedrich Schiller, but also Johann Benjamin Erhard, Friedrich Karl Forberg and Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer. In the Spring of 1791, he returned to Klagenfurt and started an intellectual salon where the Critical Philosophy was fervently discussed and through which Maria first became acquainted with Kant’s philosophy. Taking an active interest in Kant’s moral philosophy, she wrote a number of letters to him, three of which have been preserved. These remarkable letters touch on, among other things, the morality of suicide and Kant’s proscription of it in the Groundwork. In the contemporary scholarship on Kant’s philosophy, Maria von Herbert is commonly taken to be a “moral saint.” In her essay on “Duty and Desolation,” Rae Langton notes that Kant did not realise he was corresponding with a moral saint.42

In the context of the discussion of the alleged repugnance of Kant’s ethics and the conflict between the sensible being and the rational being, Maria von Herbert provides us a very fitting and peculiar example. In writing to Kant, von Herbert noted:
I feel that a vast emptiness extends inside me, and all around me – so that I almost find myself to be superfluous, unnecessary. Nothing attracts me. I’m tormented by a boredom that makes life intolerable. Do not think me arrogant for saying this, but the demands of morality are too easy for me. I would eagerly do twice as much as they command. They only get their prestige from the attractiveness of sin, and it costs me almost no effort to resist that. I comfort myself with the thought that, since the practice of morality is so bound up with sensuality, it can only count for this world. I can hope that the afterlife will not be yet another life ruled by these few, easy demands of morality, another empty and vegetating life.43

Von Herbert realised perfectly what Kant’s ethics, and the necessity that every human being practice a discipline of reason, consists in. She was fully aware that the realisation of a moral action presupposes the possession of the strength to struggle against sensual inclinations, which necessarily happen not to be in accord with the demands of morality on each occasion. This is the only characterisation of moral action that is attainable for a human being in this world, according to Kant. Von Herbert rightly understood Kant’s point. As Langton notes, for von Herbert “morality itself has become a torment, not because it is too difficult, but because it is too easy.”44 Indeed, “moral credit depends on the battle of the will with the sensual passions, a battle which, when there are no passions, is won merely, and tediously, by default—and where can be the credit in that?”45

Von Herbert presented herself as a morally perfect being, since there was no opposition on the part of her sensible inclinations. For her, morality required no effort at all—no overt constraint was to be seen; the rational being had no need to coerce the sensible being into acting morally. It can seem as if von Herbert’s example could furnish a way of overcoming the antagonism between rational being and sensible being and, in this way, of rejecting Schiller’s accusation that Kant’s ethics were repugnant due to his reliance on what is essentially a fight between the sensible being and the rational being within one and the same human being. Given that Maria von Herbert exemplified a possible counterexample to the difficulty Schiller pointed out in the Kallias Letters, and thus acts as a possible refutation of his repugnance objection to Kant, we might now ask: is this refutation to Schiller’s objection viable? Moreover, what should the sensible being look like, in order to sustain this solution? How should its passions and inclinations be transformed, in order to remove the dichotomy and, in this way, to avoid the allegation of repugnance?

4 | MAGNANIMITY, HOLINESS OF WILL, DISCIPLINE OF REASON AND STRENGTH OF SOUL

It is not by reading the first and only response provided by Kant to von Herbert’s letters,46 but rather by looking at some passages from the second Critique, from the Doctrine of Virtue and from the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View that I will show what Kant thought about this possible solution for resolving the conflict between the sensible and the rational being and, in this way, the accusation of repugnance.

I will start by considering a passage from the Anthropology, in which Kant brought to bear the Aristotelian concept megalopsychia (see Nicomachean Ethics, 1123a ff.) in order to address the problem as has been delineated so far: "Greatness of soul [Seelengröße] and strength of soul [Seelenstärke] concern the matter (the instrument for certain ends). Goodness of soul [Seelengüte], however, concerns the pure form, under which it must be possible to unite all ends, and so wherever it is encountered it is primordially creative, but also supernatural, like the Eros of the world of fable."47 The central concepts are thus: Seelengröße, that is, magnanimity or greatness of soul; Seelenstärke, that is, strength of soul; and Seelengüte, that is, goodness of soul. Goodness of soul is the concept that depends on the good will and which, famously, we are introduced to in the first lines of the Groundwork.48 As regards strength of soul, we are acquainted with this concept through some definitions found in the Doctrine of Virtue. In the quoted passage, we can see that both greatness of soul and strength of soul, that is, virtue, are each considered means for reaching moral ends, but only the goodness of soul as such is described as a sublime value in the manner of the third Critique, by
enabling us to comprise morally good maxims. A few pages later, Kant gives us a clear definition of magnanimity as greatness of soul, when he says that “both goodness and strength of soul must be found united in the same subject in order to bring out what is more an ideal than something that exists in reality; namely the right to the title of greatness of soul.” In this passage, he presents greatness of soul as the concept in which “culminates the moral qualification of a human being.” Again: strength of soul corresponds to the concept of virtue; goodness of soul corresponds to the proper capacity to determine moral maxims; but magnanimity or greatness of soul corresponds to the capacity through which all moral maxims correspond to the human being’s voluntary free intentions. Magnanimity is just an ideal, well exemplified by Kant’s representation of the Stoic Sage in the *Doctrine of Virtue*. The magnanimous human being has achieved the perfect noble-mindedness exemplified by the nobility of mind found in the stoic ideal of the sage. Maria von Herbert claimed to have resolved the dualism and to have reached exactly this stage. In so doing, she claimed to have actually become what Kant took to be impossible in actuality: the personified, concretely existing Stoic Sage. That is why, according to Kant, the experience described by von Herbert could not have been her authentic experience. She described herself precisely as a magnanimous agent; a state that Kant would claim is impossible for a finite rational being. Kant observed that greatness of soul is not of this human world, so that von Herbert is either mistaken or fanciful. Even her objection that there is nothing great in the idea of morality, because the obstacles to it are not so great and are easily overcome, could not correspond to reality. Kant would undoubtedly answer that von Herbert was underestimating the obstacles of moral action, as his considerations on the dangers of moral enthusiasm in the second *Critique* clearly show. According to Kant, the moral disposition in a human being (we can add: because of the finitude of this being), is always and cannot be other than a moral disposition in conflict. Regarding those agents acting upon moral enthusiasm:

not only have they quite failed to fulfil the spirit of the law, which consists in the disposition subjecting itself to the law, not in the lawfulness of the action (whatever the principle may be); not only do they locate the incentive pathologically (in sympathy or self-love), not morally (in the law); but they produce in this way a frivolous, high-flown, fantastic cast of mind, flattering themselves with a spontaneous goodness of heart that needs neither spur nor bridle and for which not even a command is necessary and thereby forgetting their obligation, which they ought to think of rather than merit.

The “frivolous, high-flown, fantastic cast of mind” here described by Kant corresponds to that attitude connected to a “spontaneous goodness of heart,” which a human being believes themselves to possess if he or she is convinced that they have become a completely rational being, rational through and through in the sense he or she spontaneously never favours oppositional inclinations over duty in an action. However, Kant added, morality for humans always implies virtue as strength of soul, in order that we may overcome the forces of our sensible nature: moral action implies a discipline of reason, rather than magnanimity as greatness of soul. Greatness of soul is not of this human world and so does not constitute a practicable solution in the context of Kant’s philosophy. Only strength of soul as virtue can be found in human beings.

5  |  CLOSING REMARKS

After the presentation of both Kant’s and Schiller’s point of view, one might wonder whether Schiller’s allegation of repugnance against Kant’s ethics in the *Kallias Letters* should constitute a problem at all. In the end, as already noted, Schiller has not given any argument for his claim that, where beauty fails to arise (as in the case of a moral action in which constraint becomes visible to the observer), something repugnant must arise. Schiller wanted to suggest that the lack of beauty in moral actions is unavoidable since the rational being’s constraint of the sensible being expressly contradicts the possibility of a beautiful appearance—and added that the ugliness of moral actions can be implied, since the prevention of something attaining its beauty causes repugnance. But the mere fact that something lacks beauty does
not seem to imply its being necessarily ugly. Eventually, we could furthermore think of Schiller as committing also a categorical mistake, because he seems to confuse the aesthetical and the moral level when considering the action at stake, when arguing that a moral action is (aesthetically) repugnant because (I repeat Schiller’s words once again), “when the form of the non-reasonable is determined by reason […], its natural determination is constrained and beauty cannot arise.” From this, it follows that also “at the point that reason exercises its autonomy (which can never occur in appearance), its eye is insulted by heteronomy in appearance.” At first sight, it even seems as if Schiller made the sense of repugnance arises from a rather cursory attempt to engage with Kant’s ethics.

However, Schiller is not merely making a point about Kant’s moral system being ugly. The essence of his objection concerns the problem that Kant did not allow a full human being to develop. In his critique of Kant, Schiller represented a new moral anthropological viewpoint. As Beiser already noted in reference to the Aesthetic Letters, and I believe this view can be sustained also with regard to the Kallias Letters, Schiller was trying to place morality “in a broader perspective, so that it becomes only one of the ends of life. He fears that if virtue alone were taken as the supreme good, then it would lead to a narrow moralism which places all human worth in the performance of moral duties alone.” Thus, we can see that, for Schiller, if we are to progress in moral philosophy, then this seemingly insurmountable duality of the human being, divided into the sensible and the rational, is a topic to which we should pay careful attention. Given his aim, it appears as if his reasons for undertaking the attempt to overcome Kant’s account of the homo duplex and, in so doing, to avoid what he took to be a repugnant element in Kantian moral action, were quite appropriate.

In the Kallias Letters, Schiller offered a first, tentative solution to the problem. His contention was that the moral act “would be a beautiful action only if it appears as an immediate outcome of nature.” This would mean that “a free action is a beautiful action, if the autonomy of the mind and the autonomy of appearance coincide. The highest perfection of character in a person is moral beauty brought about by the fact that duty has become its nature.” According to Schiller, then, in order to realise a moral and non-repugnant action, duty itself must become the nature of a unified, non-dualistic human being. This should be understood as quite different from the formerly accepted, yet now refuted notion in Schiller scholarship, which alleged that Schiller’s view implies a sort of natural savage. According to this discredited view, the entire power to guide action is given over to the inclinations grounded in the human being’s sensible nature. However, Schiller’s view in the Kallias Letters amounts to the claim that our inclinations should and can be brought into accord with the demands of duty.

What is sometimes overlooked is the fact that Kant would not object to this idea in its entirety. Kant would, though, surely want to retain the idea that our inclinations can deviate from the demands of duty and that this always will be the case in our imperfect, human life. Kant would always argue against the reachability of a perfect accord between inclination and reason: he would always wish to maintain the claim that, all these considerations withstanding, duty should continue to constrain human beings to some degree. In this regard, the above mentioned Schillerian view is in opposition to Kant’s own statements about the necessity of a discipline of reason and about the impossibility for holiness of will to be achieved in human beings. Accordingly, Kant also wished to assert the merely ideal nature of the concept of magnanimity and he concluded that inclinations “are always burdensome to a rational being” and that “even an inclination to what conforms with duty can indeed greatly facilitate the effectiveness of moral maxims but cannot produce any.”

Therefore, by presupposing the possibility that, in morally beautiful agents, inclinations never deviate from the demand of duty and duty should not continue to constrain them, Schiller’s critique in the Kallias Letters is rather addressed to Kant’s assertion that the only “proper moral condition, in which the human being can always be, is virtue, that is, moral disposition in conflict, and not holiness in the supposed possession of a complete purity of dispositions of the will.”

We could conclude that Schiller, in the Kallias Letters, against Kant, is convinced that it is not only virtue, as strength of soul, that can guide human moral action. For Schiller is interested in a life (even a moral life) characterised by strong passions, not in one filled merely with weak passions tamed by the moral law. Schiller is thus concerned with a life in which our sensuous and sensual character is strong but perfectly harmonised with the demands of duty.
He envisages a circumstance in which not only virtue, as strength of soul, but also magnanimity, as greatness of soul, is fit for the task of guiding human moral actions. And this is due to the fact that Schiller’s reflections are based on a different and richer conception of the human being. Schiller’s attempts to surmount the duality between sensible being and rational being, and his efforts to make magnanimous agents out of sensible humans, exposes a more fundamental problem for Kant’s dualistic account of the human being than the problematic and difficult to sustain allegation of repugnance.66

ENDNOTES

1 For the English translation of Eine großmütige Handlung aus der neuesten Geschichte, see “A Magnanimous Act from Most Recent History,” translated by Ian Codding, in: High (2008, pp. 9–11). This paper has received funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (Feodor Lynen Fellowship). I owe my gratitude to Gareth Paterson, who helped with the linguistic revision of my paper and commented on it, to the participants of the Paton Colloquium 2018 in St Andrews (UK), in particular to Jens Timmermann, who commented on earlier drafts of this paper, and to four anonymous reviewers, who encouraged me to improve the present text.

2 In the mentioned text, Schiller writes: “Wir schweben hier gleichsam um die zwei äußersten Enden der Moralität, Engel und Teufel, und die Mitte – den Menschen – lassen wir liegen.”

3 See Schiller (1962). On this work, see Falduto (2020).

4 However, for a convincing account of the relevance of the Kallias Letters in the context of Schiller’s aesthetics, see Acosta López (2016) and Henrich (1982).

5 See, among the many contemporary studies, the best-known article by Baron (1984).


7 See the Sixth Section of the Antinomy on the meaning of transcendental idealism (Kant 1781/1787, KrV A 491–497/B 519–525, English translation: 511–514) and Kant’s Refutation of Idealism (Kant 1781/1787, KrV B 274–287, English translation: 326–33). See also the Transcendental Aesthetic (Kant 1781/1787, KrV A19–49/B 33–73, English translation: 155–171) and the Transcendental Deduction (Kant 1781/1787, KrV B 129–169, English translation: 245–266). Throughout this paper, the citations from Kant’s works include both the common abbreviations, the volume and page numbers of the standard Akademie-edition of Kant’s works and the English translation of the work quoted. Citations from the Critique of Pure Reason are located by reference to the pagination of Kant’s first (“A”) and/or second (“B”) editions. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. The abbreviations used are explained in the reference list.

8 See Kant (1781/1787), KrV B XXVI, English translation: 115.


10 Ibidem.

11 For an analysis of the first paragraphs of Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue, see Schönecker (2010); Denis (2010); and Timmermann (2013). In order to understand this dichotomy, most critics concentrate on the first three paragraphs of the Doctrine of Virtue as explaining the apparent paradoxical idea of a self-obligation. This is correct as far as it goes, since Kant himself presents the solution to this apparent antinomy in the above-quoted passage, which involves a distinction between two worlds with regard to the human being. The first world is the one of autonomy as free self-legislation, and the second is that of nature as a sensibly determined chain of causation. Interestingly enough, none of these critics concentrates on the analysis of section 4 of the Doctrine of Virtue, in which Kant writes (see also below): “The subject that is bound, as well as the subject that binds, is always the human being only”: Kant (1797), MS, TL, section 4, AA 06:419. English Translation: 543.


13 Ibidem.

14 Ibidem.

15 Ibidem.

16 Kant (1797), MS, TL, Section 3, AA 06:418.05–13. English Translation: 543.
The division can be made only with regard to objects of duty, not with regard to the subject that puts himself under obligation. The subject that is bound, as well as the subject that binds, is always the human being only; and though we may, in a theoretical respect, distinguish soul and body from each other, as natural characteristics of a human being, we may not think of them as different substances putting him under obligation, so as to justify a division of duties to the body and duties to the soul.

Cf. the whole passage in the remark to the corollary in section 7 ("Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason"). Kant (1787), KpV, AA 05:32. English Translation: 165–166: "The fact mentioned above is undeniable. One need only analyse the judgment that people pass on the lawfulness of their actions in order to find that, whatever inclination may say to the contrary, their reason, incorruptible and self-constrained, always holds the maxim of the will in an action up to the pure will, that is, to itself inasmuch as it regards itself as a priori practical. Now this principle of morality, just on account of the universality of the law-giving that makes it the formal supreme determining ground of the will regardless of all subjective differences, is declared by reason to be at the same time a law for all rational beings insofar as they have a will, that is, the ability to determine their causality by the representation of rules, hence insofar as they are capable of actions in accordance with principles and consequently also in accordance with a priori practical principles (for these alone have that necessity which reason requires for a principle). It is, therefore, not limited to human beings only but applies to all finite beings that have reason and will and even includes the infinite being as the supreme intelligence. In the first case, however, the law has the form of an imperative, because in them, as rational beings, one can presuppose a pure will but, insofar as they are beings affected by needs and sensible motives, not a holy will, that is, such a will as would not be capable of any maxim conflicting with the moral law. Accordingly the moral law is for them an imperative that commands categorically because the law is unconditional; the relation of such a will to this law is dependence under the name of obligation, which signifies a necessitation, though only by reason and its objective law, to an action which is called duty because a choice that is pathologically affected (though not thereby determined, hence still free) brings with it a wish arising from subjective causes, because of which it can often be opposed to the pure objective determining ground and thus needs a resistance of practical reason which, as moral necessitation, may be called an internal but intellectual constraint."


See for example, Guyer (2014, pp. 466–493). And compare Schiller (1785/1786, 1795). Some of the most informed studies on the Aesthetic Letters are Böhm (1927); Bolten (1984); Düsing (1981); Lichtenstein (1939); Murray (1994); and Pott (1980).

This sort of considerations by most of the contemporary interpreters concentrate on Schiller’s Gewissensskrupel ("Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure. / Hence, I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person. / To this the answer is given: / Surely, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely. / And then with aversion do what your duty enjoins" – here quoted from Paton’s translation, that is, Paton, 1947, p. 48) from Schiller’s Xenien (1796) and focus on this text for an account of Schiller’s ideas on moral philosophy and his relation to Kant’s ethics.

Compare Beiser (2008a) and further recent studies in Schiller scholarship, among others: Acosta López and Powell (2018); Allison (1990, pp. 180–184); Baxley (2003, 2008); Beiser (2008b); Deligiorgi (2006); Guyer (1993, pp. 335–393); Houlgate (2008); Macor (2012); Moggach (2008); Stern (2012, pp. 104–135); and Waibel (2008).


Compare Pareyson (1983); Miller (1959); Beiser (2008a, 2008b); Stern (2012, pp. 104–111).

For a first account of the early Kantian influences at the University of Jena and Schiller’s relation to them, see Wundt (1932) and Henrich (2007).

Compare Alt (2000, volume 2, pp. 78–153 (chapters 3 and 4)), but also Beiser (2008a, p. 41), who rightly points at the importance of Reinhold, Fichte, Niethammer, and Erhard. For a compendium on the Early Kantianism at the University of Jena, compare Nuzzo (1994); Hinske, Lange, and Schröpfer (1995); and di Giovanni (2005).

The Kallias Letters are a cycle of letters which had to constitute a treatise on beauty, which arrived to us as a fragment, and were first published in 1874 in a collection (four volumes) of Schiller’s correspondence with Kömer. The Kallias cycle is not edited as an independent work in the context of the so-called Schiller-Nationalausgabe, the standard reference for Schiller’s text. The letters of the Kallias cycle are the ones sent by Schiller between December 21, 1792 and March 1, 1793. In what follows, I will quote from the English translation, that is, Schiller (2003) (quoted as Kallias), followed by the pages of the German edition I use, that is, Schiller (1971) (quoted in the following as Kallias, German edition). Thus see, in this particular case, Kallias, 152; German edition, 17.

"If practical reason observes of a natural being that it determines itself, it ascribes to it [...] similarity to freedom or just freedom. But since this freedom is merely lent to the object by reason, since freedom as such can never be given to the senses and nothing can be free other than what is supra-sensible – in short, it is all that matters here that the object
appears as free not that it really is so; thus this analogy of the object with the form of practical reason is not freedom indeed but merely freedom in appearance, autonomy in appearance," *Kallias*, 151; German edition, 17.

29 Compare Schiller’s letter to Körner dated February 23, 1793.

30 *Kallias*, 156; German edition, 28.

31 *Kallias*, 159; German edition, 32.

32 Ibidem.

33 Compare Kant (1797), MS, TL, AA 06:417. English Translation: 543.

34 Ibidem.

35 Compare Kant (1797), MS, TL, AA 06:394. English Translation 524.

36 The concept of virtue is at the centre of most of the general studies dedicated to the Kant’s *Metaphysics of Morals* and his *Doctrine of Virtue*. See, among the others: Anderson (1921, 1923); Gregor (1963); Timmons (2002); Denis (2010b); Euler and Tuschling (2013); and Trampota, Sensens, and Timmermann (2013). Kant’s concept of virtue is, moreover, at the centre of following works: Sherman (1997); Esser (); and Betzler (2008). This idea of virtue as the supremacy of reason over sensibility was often attacked by the early readers of Kant’s works—most famously by Hegel. Hegel refers to duty as the command of reason against sensibility in very severe words: see Hegel (1986, p. 369) ("Die kalte Pflicht ist der letzte unverdaute Klotz im Magen, die Offenbarung gegeben, der Vernunft"). On Hegel’s critique of Kant’s concept of duty, see for example, Siep (1992) and Bondeli (1997).

37 "In the supremely self-sufficient intelligence, choice is rightly represented as incapable of any maxim that could not at the same time be objectively a law, and the concept of holiness, which on that account belongs to it, puts it, not indeed above all practical laws, but rather above all practically restrictive laws and so above obligation and duty. This holiness of will is nevertheless a practical idea, which must necessarily serve as a model to which all finite rational beings can only approximate without end and which the pure moral law, itself called holy because of this, constantly and rightly holds before their eyes; the utmost that finite practical reason can effect is to make sure of this unending progress of one’s maxims toward this model and of their constancy in continual progress, that is, virtue; and virtue itself, in turn, at least as a naturally acquired ability, can never be completed, because assurance in such a case never becomes apodictic certainty and, as persuasion, is very dangerous," Kant (1787), KpV, AA 05:32–33, English Translation: 166.

38 Kant (1787), KpV, AA 05:81–82, English Translation: 168. Kant goes even further and notes that we can never carry out our duty "without respect for the law, which is connected with fear or at least apprehension of transgressing it, we of ourselves, like the Deity raised beyond all dependence, could come into possession of holiness of will by an accord of will with the pure moral law becoming, as it were, our nature, an accord never to be disturbed (in which case the law would finally cease to be a command for us, since we could never be tempted to be unfaithful to it). The moral law is, in other words, for the will of a perfect being a law of holiness, but for the will of every finite rational being a law of duty, of moral necessitation and of the determination of his actions through respect for this law and reverence for his duty" (ibidem). On the concept of obligation between Kant and Hegel (and Kierkegaard, as well, but also with a longer reference to Schiller), see Stern (2012).


40 Compare ibidem.


43 This is Langton’s translation of Maria von Herbert’s letter. See Langton (1992, p. 493). For the German original version, see Letter 554, from Maria von Herbert to Kant, January 1793. AA 11:400–403.


46 See Letter 510, from Kant to Maria von Herbert, Spring 1792. AA 11:331–332.

47 Kant (1798), Anthr, AA 07:242. English Translation: 345 (modified).

48 "It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will", Kant (1785), GMS, AA 04:393; English Translation: 49.

However, Schiller does not completely reject the idea that we sometimes have to constrain our inclinations through reason. This development is to be followed in the essay On Grace and Dignity, where Schiller further distinguishes between the heroic and the beautiful soul and clarifies his ideas about a unified human nature by reference to the concept of the beautiful soul. Compare Schiller Über Anmut und Würde. First published in Neue Thalia, volume 3 (1793). Here quoted from: Schiller (1971), that is, Anmut und Würde (see in particular 111). English translation: Grace and Dignity, that is, Schiller (2005, pp. 123–184). On this point, among others, compare Stern (2012), who offers a detailed and inspiring analysis on the concept of moral beauty in Schiller's Kallias Letters (in particular: Stern 2012, pp. 104–111) and the essay On Grace and Dignity (Stern 2012, pp. 111–125).
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