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ANALECTA ISISIANA
XXXIII

ALAN FISHER

BETWEEN RUSSIANS, OTTOMANS AND TURKS: CRIMEA AND CRIMEAN TATARS

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INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia, followed by the transformation of some of their former minorities into sovereign, majority states; the continued struggle of remaining minorities to follow suit, generally unsuccessfully to date and resulting in much bloodshed and suffering; and the appearance of a number of interesting and skillful historical accounts of both successful and unsuccessful minorities have led me to reconsider some of the work that I have done on the Crimean Tatars over the last 35 years. This introduction gives me the opportunity to survey briefly what I wrote about the Tatars and how I would do it differently today.

As I look back on my first work, written while a graduate student in both Russian and Ottoman history at Columbia University, I see that I inherited the prevailing view that large states determined historical development and rightly so. Studies of the "small peoples" were subordinate to large multi-national states — "the center" — of which they were a part. Thus, in the case of the Russian Empire, most of us examined the policies of the central government towards the "minorities"; and we gave high marks to policies which successfully incorporated the minorities within the large whole. In the Ottoman case also, we gave credit to governmental policies which we viewed as "tolerant" of minorities. In contrast, attitudes of the "small peoples" towards their rulers were virtually ignored. Even historians of the United States at the time almost completely concentrated on its dominant culture and, like their counterparts who studied the Russian or Ottoman Empires, avoided consideration of minorities within.

Indeed, most American academics who worked on Russian imperial history viewed work on the minorities which was hostile to the Russian center as unproductive, and to use a term common today, "politically incorrect". In the light of views today, it was ironic that historians who ventured into the study of non-Russian peoples within the Empire, and later within the USSR, were almost automatically portrayed as politically conservative or hostile towards the USSR. Today, after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the divisions in the old Yugoslavia, the "mainstream" has shifted to a consideration of historical development from minority or "small people" points of view.[1]

Before I concentrated specifically on the Crimean Tatars, I wrote a short piece on one episode in Russian history in which the leadership pursued a

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[1]Certainly this is true in the study of United States' history, and for history both of the Russian Empire and the USSR. It is less so in the case of Ottoman history, where focus remains on the center.

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tolerant policy towards one large minority, and concluded that this was a good example of "large-state success."[1] At the time, I intended to follow this up in my dissertation, which was initially designed around Russian policies towards the Volga/Kazan Tatars. Everything I had read in preparation for that work had led me to expect to find consistently "enlightened" and "tolerant", and thus, "successful" policy resulting in a general level of satisfaction by these Tatars' leaders within the larger Russian multi-national state.

To my dismay, after studying Russian and Ottoman Turkish, and Kazan Tatar, and reading all available secondary literature and published primary sources on the subject, I learned from my mentors that it was unlikely that I would receive research permission from the USSR authorities to conduct research in Kazan, and also unlikely that I could work on that subject in the libraries and archives in Leningrad and Moscow.

So, almost at the last moment, I decided to go to Istanbul to work in the Başbakanlık Arşivi [hereafter B. A.], in the summer of 1965. I hoped to be able to find evidence, promised by Russian and Soviet historians, for close relations between the Ottomans and the Kazan Tatars, and particularly on efforts by the Ottomans to influence the Tatars against their government.

There, again to my disgruntlement, I found that the Kazan Tatars and the Ottomans had had no close relations, indeed virtually no relations at all. The Russian and Soviet historians had misled me. I was in a very awkward position, and had to quickly change my focus to one for which there was evidence to examine, the enormous amount of evidence for relations between the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars. It was in this way that I found the Crimean Tatars as my subject for study. Fortunately I had by now the languages for this second, related area, and I was working in the Ottoman archives during a "golden" period for research.[2] Since I had already read for my initial topic in the 18th century, I decided to work in the B.A. on the last years of the Crimean Khanate, the Russo-Ottoman wars of the late 18th century, and the Russian annexation of Crimea and the Crimean Tatars. The first piece that I wrote on this subject [# 7 in this volume] was an outgrowth of that dissertation, which itself was published a few years later.[3]

While writing this dissertation, I discovered that little or nothing had been written about the annexation by Ottoman or Turkish scholars. Akdes Nimet Kurat had included this topic in his more general survey of Russian-

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[1] "Enlightened Despotism and Islam Under Catherine II", *Slavic Review,* XXVII/4, 1968, pp. 542-553. This was an outgrowth of an essay I wrote early in my graduate career, in 1963, and was published only after my work on the Tatars had begun.

[2] The B.A. archive staff, especially Turgut Işıksal and Midhat Sertoğlu, were extremely cordial, friendly, and gave me much personal assistance and attention. In those days it was even possible for a researcher to make his own microfilm copies of documents!

[3] *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970). This was subsequently published in Turkish, in installments, in the Crimean Tatar emigré journal, *Emel,* in Istanbul.

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Ottoman relations, but only marginally and without detail.[1] A number of Ottoman chronicles and accounts gave useful information, but none dealt in detail with the Russian annexation nor with the period of Crimean "independence" between 1772 and 1783.[2] Russian and Ottoman, and Soviet and Turkish historians, for the most part, had seen the two large states as the major players in events, and the "small peoples" between as peripheral, however interesting.

In addition, Turkology had been an important discipline in Russia and the USSR, and some significant studies of Ottoman history had been made by Russian historians, and in the process a few had looked at Crimean history as well, using Ottoman and Tatar chronicles, and archival sources which were housed in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Odessa.[3]

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[1] Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya: XVIII. Yüzyıl Sonundan Kurtuluş Savaşına Kadar Türk-Rus İlişikleri (1798-1919)* (Ankara, 1970); his later study, *IV-XVIII Yüzyıllarda Karadeniz Kuzeyindeki Türk Kavimleri ve Devletleri* (Ankara, 1972), treated Crimean Tatars as one of many "Turkish" groups in the North Black Sea area, and downplayed the fact that these Tatars had their own sovereign state and distinct culture.

[2] For example, 'Abd al-Gaffar Kirimî, *'Umdat al-tawarikh*, ed. N. Asim, in supplement to *Tarih Osmani Mecmuası* (Istanbul, 1343/1924); Ahmet Cevdet, *Tarih-i Cevdet* (Istanbul, 1854-1891), 12 vols., but esp. Vols I and II; Sa'dullah Enverî (mss. H. O. 101, 105, 201-202, in the Österreichisches Staatsbibliothek); Halim Giray Sultan, *Gülbün-ü Hanan Yahut Kırım Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1909); Mehmed Necati Efendi, *Rusya Sefaretnamesi* published both in Turkish (partial); F. Unat (ed.), "Kırım Tarihi veya Necati Efendinin Rusya Sefaretnamesi", *Tarih Vesikaları,* III, pp. 60-68, 137-149, 222-229; and in Russian (full), V.E. Smirnov (ed.), "Zapiski Mukhammeda Nedzhati-Efendi: Turetskago Plennago v Rossii v 1771-1775 gg., "*Russkaia Starina,* March 1894, pp. 179-208, April 1894, pp. 113-134, and May, 1894, pp. 144-169; Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netaic ül-Vukuat* (Istanbul, 1909), 4 vols.; Ahmet Resmî, *Hülusat ül-Ihtibar* (Istanbul, 1869); and Ahmet Vâsıf Efendi, *Mehasin al-Âsar ve Hakaik al-Ahbar* (Cairo, Bulak, 1830), 2 vols.

[3] V. D. Smirnov's two volumes, *Krymskoe Khantstvo pod verkhovenstvom Ottomanskoi Porty do nachala XVIII veka* (St. Petersburg, 1887), and *Krymskoe Khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom Ottomanskoi Porty v XVIII stoletii* (Odessa, 1889), were far more detailed, and sophisticated, than either his Soviet successors or A. N. Kurat's volumes. V. V. Veliaminov-Zernov and Hüseyn Feyzhanoğlu published materials on the Crimean Tatars housed in the Moscow State Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Materialy dlia istorii krymskogo khanstvo izvlechennykh iz Moskovskogo Glavnogo Arkhiva Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del* (St. Petersburg, 1864). Other Russians, who were both skilled Turcologists and historians, included A. Borzenko, V. Brun, F. Lashkov, A. Markevich, A. Negri, S. Shapshal, A. Skal'kovskii, and S. D. Smirnov. Boris Nolde included the Russian annexation of the Crimea, and the developments which led up to it, in his *La formation de l'empire russe* (Paris, 1952-1953), 2 vols. Of course there was the short survey of Crimean Tatar history by Hammer-Purgstall, though it paled by comparison with those of Smirnov: J. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte der Chane der Krim unter Osmanischer Herrschaft* (Vienna, 1856). A number of Soviet historians wrote about the Crimean Tatars, though most, until recently, were expected to present the Tatars in the most unfavorable light possible, since Stalin had attempted to eliminate them as a nationality. Among those who were Turcologists, and thus could use Tatar and Ottoman sources, were: N. A. Smirnov, *Rossiia i turtsiia v XVI-XVII vv.* (Moscow, 1946), 2 vols.; A. A. Novosel'skii, *Bor'ba Moskovskgo gosudarstva s Tatarami v pervoi polovine XVII veka* (Moscow, 1948); and M. A. Alekberli, *Bor'ba ukrainskogo naroda protiv turetsko-tatarskoi agressii* (Saratov, 1961). Important to my studies were the works of C. M. Kortepeter: "Gazi Giray II, Khan of the Crimea, and Ottoman Policy in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus," *Slavonic and East European Review,* XLIV, 1966; "Ottoman Imperial Policy and the Economy of the Black Sea Region in the Sixteenth Century", *Journal of the American Oriental Society,* LXXXVI, 1966; and, later, his book, *Ottoman Imperialism During the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus* (New York, 1973). Most valuable for my research, after the B.A., was the collection of Russian and Tatar documents edited by N. F. Dubrovin, on the Russian annexation: N. F. Dubrovin, *Prisoedinenia Kryma k Rossii: reskripty, pis'ma, reliatsii, doneseniia* (St. Petersburg, 1885-1889), 4 vols. Several Crimean Tatar historians also published important collections of documents during the short period of Tatar independent life in the 1920s, especially O. Akçokrakly and A. Özenbaşlı.

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It was in the process of writing that dissertation, that I began to see that it was important to view events, not only from the capitals of the large states, but from within the society of the smaller peoples between. I felt uncomfortable doing so, for I still hoped to be able, at some future time, to conduct research in Soviet archives, and wanted to be careful not to unnecessarily antagonize Soviet scholars, who, in those days, did not mind one concentrating on the condition of minorities in other states, but did not appreciate scholarly attention towards their own minorities. Attitudes of Turkish historians towards the topic of the Crimean Tatars were more accepting, perhaps since I was working on "someone else's" minorities.

When working on the Russian annexation, I discovered that the Crimean khan, in theory a "vassal" of the Ottoman sultan, had supervised an administration that was large and complex, and had ruled a "state" which behaved independently of Ottoman policy. One important aspect of this seemed to be tied to the fiscal relationships between the Ottomans and the Crimeans. The source materials in the B.A., and occasionally in Ottoman chronicles,[1] led to the next stage in this study (# 3 in this volume). Interestingly, I found that these relationships were quite different from those between the Ottomans and any other of their "vassals" or subjects. This evidence suggested that the Crimeans were viewed from Istanbul in a special light, as associated with them but independent.

It was an interesting discovery, and enough to satisfy me on the subject of the Crimea for several years. I moved on to other areas and I became interested in the problems "small" nations and states had in maintaining their identities in worlds where the "big states" appeared to determine historic developments. Again, the Tatars sprang to mind. How small states perceive themselves led me back to the study of the Crimean Tatars [with project # 6 in this volume], this time focusing on Crimean-Ottoman relations from the Crimean perspective. At this time, with the exception of the "French team",

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[1] I would have preferred to have combined this study with one on Ottoman-Crimean political relations, but I was never granted permission to work in the archives of the Topkapı Sarayı [indeed, that is one trove of documents which has remained closed to me] where many of those diplomatic and political materials are preserved. We are very fortunate that a group of French scholars were permitted to study the Topkapı materials on the Crimea which they published in facsimile, translation, and with important and interesting analyses. See: Alexandre Bennigsen, Pertev Naili Boratav, Dilek Desaive, and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Le khanat de Crimée dans les archives du musée de Topkapı* (Paris and La Haye, 1978). Dilek Desaive published a fascinating series of diplomatic correspondence between the Ottomans and the Crimeans in "Le khanat de Crimée et padichahs ottomans dans les registres des name-i hümayun," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique,* XIII, 1972, pp. 560-583. And Dilek Desaive and Özalp Gökbilgin wrote an account of fiscal and political relations surrounding one particular period of Crimean history in "Le khanat de Crimée et les campagnes militaires de l'Empire Ottoman — fin du XVIIe début du XVIIIe siècle," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique,* XI, 1970, pp. 110-117. All but the last of these were published too late for me to use in my project, but have been enormously helpful in the years since.

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most historians believed that the Crimean Tatars had been totally subservient to the Ottoman before 1772, and had virtually disappeared within the Russian Empire after 1783. However, evidence on the Crimean side suggested that the Tatars saw themselves as distinct and independent before 1772, and that they had continued to maintain their identity after 1783, albeit no longer independent. The nature of the fiscal relations between the Crimeans and the Ottomans had supported this view, perhaps had prompted me to rethink what I had originally argued in my dissertation/book, and now opened up new possibilities for understanding the realities of their relations.

The traditional viewpoint, and my original one, had been based on several explanations. Since Ottoman dynastic ideology made claims for Osmanli descent from Ghengis Khan, at least politically, the Ottoman government found it inconvenient to recognize the Crimean Giray dynasty of khans as the "true" successors [ideologically, politically, and perhaps even biologically] of Ghengis Khan.[1] The main problem with this argument was that Crimean chronicles and histories, which discussed the Tatars in the 16th through 18th centuries, suggested that Crimean intellectuals, sensing an Ottoman expectation of subservient status, felt compelled to defend Tatar independence, and to explain it.[2]

In 1976 I put together all of the various ideas I had come up with about the Crimean Tatars when the invitation to write a "survey" of their history arrived. In order to do so, I had to learn a great deal about the Tatar experience

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[1]Halil İnalcık's "Yeni Vesikalara Göre Kırım Hanlığının Osmanlı Tabiliğine Girmesi ve Ahidname Meselesi", *Belleten,* VIII/31, 1944, pp. 185-229, helped me understand the realities of Ottoman-Crimean relationships at the start. His "Power Relationships Between Russia, The Crimea and the Ottoman Empire as Reflected in Titulature", in Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, G. Veinstein, and S. E. Wimbush (eds.), *Passé Turco-Tatar Présent Soviétique, Études offertes à Alexandre Bennigsen* (Louvain-Paris, 1986), pp. 175-211, was published after I had moved on from this subject, but further corroborated the necessity of looking at events from Bahçesaray as well as from Istanbul.

[2]Among these Crimean works, most interesting were: Halim Giray Sultan, *Gülbün-ü Hanan Yahud Kırım Tarihi* (Istanbul 1909) — written in 1811; Özalp Gökbilgin (ed.), *Tarih-i Sahib Giray Han* (Ankara, 1973) — written soon after 1551; *Tevarih-i Dest-i Kıpçak* (published by Ananiasz Zajaczkowski as *La chronique des steppes kiptchak* (Warsaw, 1966); Kırımlı Hacı Mehmed Sena'i, *III. Islam Giray Han Tarihi* [published by Olgierd Gorka and Zbigniew Wojcik (eds.), Hadzy Mehmed Senai z Krymu, *Historia Chana Islam Gereja III* (Warsaw, 1971)] — written in the 1650s; Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, *Al-Sab' al-sayyar fi akhbar al-mulük al-Tatar* (ed by Mirza Kazembek, as Seiid Mukhammed Riza, *Asseb' o-sseiiar' ili sem' planet* (Kazan, 1832) — written in the 1750s, and served as one of the main sources for V.D. Smirnov's volumes. The many pieces written by Halil İnalcık on the Tatars and their khans have been of great help to me, as well; in addition to those cited above, in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* "Dawlat Giray," "Ghazi Giray I," "Ghazi Giray II," "Hadjdji Giray;" and in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi,* "Giray," and "Kırım Hanlığı"; "The khan and the tribal aristocracy," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* III-IV, 1979-80; B. F. Manz, "The clans of the Crimean Khanate", *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* II/3, 1878, pp. 282-309. Publication of Crimean Tatar diplomatic correspondence with other states and discussion of their language include: Z. Abrahamowic, "Dokumenty tatarskie i tureckie w zbiorach polskich," *Przeglad orientalistyczny,* X, 1954, pp. 141-148; Mary Ivanics, "Formal and linguistic peculiarities of seventeenth-century Crimean Tatar letters addressed to princes of Transylvania," *Acta orientalia* (Hungary), XXIX, 1975, pp. 213-224; and J. Matuz, *Krimtatarische Urkunden im Reichsarchiv zu Kopenhagen* (Freiburg, 1976).

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after their annexation by Russia, and I entered here unfamiliar ground. In the process I discovered the extent to which western scholarship on the history of the USSR had become politicized, for at that time, to focus on Russian minorities was seen as politically conservative. In retrospect, and with a certain wry humor, I see it is ironic, in light of the 1980s and 90s and development and attitudes towards the study of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Chechen problem.[1]

I learned a lot about the Tatars in studying their post-1783 history. I met a number of Crimean Tatars living in Turkey, and came to appreciate their difficulties in retaining their Tatar culture in a society which expected them to assimilate into the larger Turkish people. The question of acculturation, rejection, assimilation or retention of a separate identity seemed to me to be an important one, and here was a very specific example to examine. I began a comparison of the development of Crimean Tatar life in the USSR and in Turkey; in the former they experienced repression, in the latter strong encouragements for assimilation. In neither case, would Tatar identity survive easily.[2]

During 1976-77 in Istanbul I discovered a number of documents and registers containing information on that portion of the Crimean peninsula which was directly under Ottoman administration. I was particularly interested in the question: what of the peninsula was actually controlled by the Ottomans and what was under the Khan's authority? I found it extremely difficult, even with the large amount of Ottoman sources relating to their Crimean holdings, to answer this question, though I tried in #4 and #5 in this volume.[3] One of the

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[1]The book was published in 1978, the first of what would in time become the series which included works on the Volga Tatars, various Baltic and Central Asian peoples: Alan Fisher, *Crimean Tatars* (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1978); others were on the Volga Tatars by Azade-Ayşe Rorlich; Kazakhs by Martha Brill Olcott; Estonians by Toivo U. Raun; Georgians by Ronald Grigor Suny; Uzbeks by Edward Allworth; Azeris by Audrey L. Allstadt; and Latvians by Andrejs Plakans.

[2]The result was #11, in this volume.

[3]The comparable archives of the Khanate had disappeared early in this century, though some of them had been studied by F. Lashkov, "Arkhivnyia dannyia o beilikakh v krymskom khanstve," *Arkheologicheskii S'ezd: Trudy,* VI/4, 1889, pp. 96-110; "Istoricheskii ocherk krymsko-tatarskago zemlevladeniia," *Zapiski imperatorskago odesskago obshchestva istorii i drevnostei,* XXIII, 1895, pp. 71-117; "Sbornik dokumentov po istorii krymsko-tatarskago zemlevladeniia", *Izvestiia tavricheskago uchennago arkhivnago kommissii,* XXVI, 1897, pp. 24-154. French colleagues, led by Gilles Veinstein, were also working on this subject, and published extremely interesting work on the Crimea. These included: M. Berindei and G. Veinstein, "La présence ottomane au sud de la Crimée et en mer d'Azov dans la première moitié du XVIe siècle," *Cahiers du monde ruses et soviétique,* XX, 1979, pp. 389-465; *Ibid.* "Règlements fiscaux et fiscalité de la province de Bender-Aqkerman (1570)," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique,* XXII, 1981, pp. 251-328; G. Veinstein, "L'occupation ottomane d'Ocakov et le problème de la frontière lituano-tatare, 1538-1544," Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, G. Veinstein, and S. E. Wimbush, *op. cit.,* pp. 123-155; *Ibid.,* La révolte des mirza tatars contre le Khan, 1724-1725," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique,* XII, 1971, pp. 327-328; *Ibid.,* "Règlements de Süleyman Ier concernant le livā' de Kefe," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique,* XVI, 1975, pp. 57-104; *Ibid.,* Les tatars de Crimée et la seconde élection de Stanislas Leszczynski', *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique,* XI, 1970, pp. 24-92; and *Ibid.,* "Missionaires jésuites et agents français en Crimée au début du XVIIIe siècle," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique,* X, 1969, pp. 416-442.

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great difficulties I encountered on this topic was the inadequacy of "finding tools" in the B.A. in those years. Well over half my time in the archives was spent in searching for materials that were relevant to the subject. As a result, I published a "guide" to the materials that I did uncover [#2 in this volume], much of which I did not have the time to examine in sufficient detail to use in my project; yet I hoped at the time, and still hope that it would be of use to other scholars. I also hoped that others, possessing the same sort of "guide" for their own research topics, would make them available to others in the same manner. This still remains a good idea, I think, to further the discipline.

Finally, a conference at Columbia University on the Crimean Tatars, led by Edward Allworth, gave me the opportunity to consider anew the role that Ismail Gaspirali had played in Crimean intellectual development and in Islamic modernism in Central Asia, resulting in items #9 and #10 in this volume. I knew of the significant work done by Edward Lazzerini on Tatar intellectual life, and now was even more impressed with his sophisticated treatment of the subject, also presented at this conference. Should one read his work, and then these two items of mine, it will be evident that I was able to add only marginally to what we know about Ismail Bey.[1]

What more do we know now about the Crimean Tatars than when I began researching and writing about them 35 years ago? First of all, the Tatars, themselves, have transformed the subject by forcing a reconsideration of their place in Russia, and since the collapse of the USSR, in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. It is worth repeating here a portion of the introduction I wrote in 1977 for my book on the Crimean Tatars to see how much has changed in the interim.[2]

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[1]Edward Lazzerini's Ph.D. dissertation, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia," University of Washington, 1973, is a model of doctoral work, and in my opinion still deserves to be published on its own. His articles, "Ğadidism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: A View from Within", *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique,* 1975, pp. 245-277; "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii (Gaspirali), the Discourse of Modernism, and the Russians," in the same volume as my two pieces, pp. 149-169; "*Tatarovedenie* and the 'New Historiography' in the USSR: revising the interpretation of the Tatar-Russian relationship," *Slavic Review,* XL, 1981, pp. 625-635, "Ethnicity and the uses of history: the case of the Volga Tatars and *Jadidism,*" *Central Asian Survey,* I, 1982-83, pp. 61-69, and "The Revival of Islamic Culture in Pre-Revolutionary Russia: Or, Why a Prosopography of the Tatar *Ulema*?" Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, G. Veinstein, and S. E. Wimbush (eds.), *op. cit.,* pp. 367-372, continue his high level of scholarship. See also M. Mobin Shorish, "Traditional Islamic Education in Central Asia Prior to 1917," in Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, G. Veinstein, and S. E. Wimbush (eds.), *op. cit.,* pp. 317-343.

[2]Alan Fisher, *Crimean Tatars* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. xi-xii.

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"The Crimean Tatars are today a nationality living in a Diaspora. Denied the right to return to their homeland in the Crimean peninsula, their communities are scattered throughout the USSR, the Turkish Republic, and the West. Like other nationalities that have experienced the same disasters (the Jews come to mind), the Tatars' claim to national identity and a national home are based on historical, cultural, and linguistic foundations.

"Appearing first in the Crimea in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Crimean Tatars soon displaced the existing political and cultural entities with their own; they established their first state there in the middle of the fifteenth century. From that time until the Russian annexation of the peninsula in 1783, the Crimean Tatars organized and lived in a state, called the Crimean Khanate, that was ruled by their own Giray dynasty. From 1783 until 1918, the Tatars lived within the Russian Empire as subjects of the tsars.

"During the latter period, the Tatars were displaced gradually by immigrating Slavic settlers, officials, and landowners. Despite concerted efforts by their Russian rulers to eliminate Tatar culture and identity and to assimilate them into the fabric of Russian society, the Tatars were able to preserve their national awareness. With the fall of the tsarist system, the Tatars were temporarily successful in reestablishing their own state and independent society. But the advent of Bolshevik power soon put an end to their success, if not to their efforts.

"Since 1920, the Crimean Tatars have experienced one calamity after another: collectivization and its related famines, the elimination of their political and cultural elites between 1928 and 1939, the ravages of war and occupation from 1941 to 1944, and finally, their wholesale deportation to remote areas of the USSR where they now reside. [Had I the vocabulary now popular, I would have called this "ethnic cleansing."] Yet there have been developments in the Tatar community that show accomplishment in the face of adversity — developments that show that the Tatars possess almost unequaled courage to struggle for what they consider to be a just solution to their problems. Applying pressure upon the Soviet authorities who were responsible for the denial of their national existence, they have succeeded in the years since 1944 in gaining partial restitution of what was taken from them by Stalin. In 1967, in a decree issued by the Soviet government, the charges made against the Tatars in 1944 were removed; they were "rehabilitated" as a nationality. Yet their rehabilitation was virtually meaningless, for the punishments under which they suffered were not removed. They cannot return to their homeland. Their national and cultural rights remain denied to them, and their struggle for these rights continues today."

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Fortunately, I was then overly pessimistic. Like others at the time, I did not suspect that the USSR would disappear, and that this disappearance would offer the Tatars, and many other former Soviet nationalities, the opportunity to reestablish their national identity and community on modern terms. Many have been able to return to the Crimean peninsula, though their national outcome is still in doubt. There seems little likelihood that Ukraine will permit the re-establishment of an organized Tatar community there. But those Tatars who are nationally active are beginning to recreate Tatar culture.

If I were going to write a new edition of my book on the Crimean Tatars, I would cast it quite differently, as a result of what I have learned in the intervening years, both from my own research, but especially from what colleagues have written, and continue to write on the subject. First, I would place them more in the international contexts in which they lived - between two large and expansive states, and as an important part in the international economy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Second, I would let their own chroniclers and historians tell more of their story, particularly in the period before 1783, and depend less on what their Russian and Ottoman contemporaries had to say about them. Third, I would concentrate, in the 19th century, on those remaining Crimean Tatar institutions which contributed to their survival, against considerable odds. Fourth, I would include in my study of source materials for Crimean Tatar history visual and "material cultural" sources, and no longer depend so entirely on written survivals. Fifth, I would take advantage of the gradual opening of the former Soviet archives to find the Soviet side of their Tatar repression, before 1940; I would then be able to place the Tatar experience within the larger context of Soviet repression of minority cultures. And finally, I would bring their story up to date, with the beginning of their return to their homeland.

I want to thank all those who have helped me in my career, in my studies and researches, and writing. This includes my mentors: Marc Raeff, Tibor Halasi-Kun, Enver Ziya Karal who was a visiting professor, Edward Allworth, and Kathleen Burrill at Columbia; my fellow students, and subsequently professional colleagues: Gustav Bayerle, Tom Goodrich, Dikran Kouyumjian, Bruce McGowan; my wife Carol who was with me in Istanbul on all my research trips, and whose scholarship on Ottoman art showed me how important visual source material is to an understanding of a society; and our children, Elisa, Christy, and Garrett, who were with us on all but the first of our Istanbul stays. I also would like to thank my parents, Sydney and Elizabeth [Scipio] Fisher and her parents, Lynn and Margaret Scipio for making Turkey a part of my "growing-up" years—the Scipios had gone to Constantinople in 1912, remaining until 1942, where Lynn served as Dean of the Engineering School at Robert College; Sydney was a tutor there in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and taught Ottoman history until his retirement.

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OTTOMAN SOURCES FOR A STUDY OF KEFE VILAYET: THE *MALIYEDEN MÜDEVVER* FOND IN THE BAŞBAKANLIK ARŞIVI IN ISTANBUL

One need not emphasize to readers of this journal the potential value of the Ottoman sources in the Başbakanlık Arşivi in Istanbul for the study of East European and Russian history. Indeed it may well be that *CMRS* has played the most significant role in publicising their importance, and has contained within its issues ample evidence of their utilization.

Yet the work of exploring these sources has only begun. An enormous obstacle for many historians who work in these archives is the lack of scientific catalogues and references, prepared according to modern archival standards and principles. Although a massive revision of the existing catalogues has been underway for several years, it may be a few more years before the task is completed and the results made available to researchers.

It is for this reason that I want to share with my colleagues the simplified catalogue that I have made, on one subject and from one large fond of registers in the archives. I do this in the hope that (1) it will publicise the variety and quantity of documentary evidence available on this subject; (2) make it at least somewhat easier for my colleagues to approach this subject, and (3) persuade my colleagues to share their "catalogues" too.

The task of examining the Ottoman sources is so immense that only quasi teamwork will bring forth fruitful results in our lifetime. The documents and registers are so many and so difficult to find that it makes no sense to proceed in the "old-fashioned" way of withholding knowledge of this or that source "until one finds time in the future to utilize it himself". Without an increase in "team" efforts, we will each be examining and describing "grains of sand on a beach".

*

The following list of Ottoman registers is selected from the *Maliyeden Müdevver* classification in the Başbakanlık Arşivi in Istanbul and includes financial sources concerned with Ottoman holdings along the northern shore of the Black Sea, from Özü (Ochakov) to Azak (Azov), including Ottoman

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territory on the Crimean peninsula which made up Kefe vilayet. Among the places included are Soğudak (Sudak) Baliklağu (Baliklava), Mankup, Kamaniçe (Kamenets-Podolsk), Temrük, Taman, Kerş (Kerch), Or (Perekop), Kilburun (Kinburn), Aco, and Kale-i cedid (Yenikale). It includes also some sources about the Crimean Tatars.

On these subjects the earliest register I have found in this classification is # 334 (Timars for Kefe) from 903/1497. I did not include in my "catalogue" any registers for the nineteenth century, since most of this territory was no longer Ottoman. But there well may be some.

The *Maliyeden Müdevver* classification consists of some 24,000 registers, some small, others as large as 2200 folios. A three-volume typed catalogue exists, covering the dates to 1066/1655. But I have discovered quite a number of additional registers for those dates not included in the catalogue. What I have used instead as my source are the boxes of fiches organized according to the type of register. Each fiche is handwritten in Osmanlı, some are blurred and difficult to read. On poor quality paper, heavy use of these fiches will shorten their life; perhaps before the new cataloguing is completed.

The *Maliyeden Müdevver* classification includes registers on the following subjects: assignments of military units to various forts and locations, with names, functions, salaries; repairs, provisioning and construction of military establishments; tax records for all the taxes levied by the Ottoman government; accounts of government expenditures; and so forth.

*

This list has been constructed in the following way: by subject of the register arranged chronologically. Many of these registers include information and geographical areas beyond my interest at the time. Thus, under subject, if it reads: "... Azov... Or... Kefe..." it means that this register is concerned with a great many places, including Azak, Or, and Kefe; Azak follows some other places, some are listed between Azak and Or in the register, then others follow between Or and Kefe, and finally others after Kefe. The dots "..." indicate the presence in the register of other "non-Black Sea" areas in the space provided. Dates are given in both Hicrî and Christian form.

Istanbul, 1977.

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Menazil defterler

(register concerned with stopping places along a traveller's route; expenses and assignments of posts)

Date	*Register No.*	*Pages*	*Subject of register*
1123/1711	3858	71	Istanbul-Özü…
1147/1734	18425	7	Kırım, Özü…

Evkaf defter

(register of endowed pious foundations, such as mosques, medresses, etc.)

1001/1592-3	626	368	… Kefe'de camiler…

Timar, vazife defterler

(register concerned with assignment of military fiefs, government officials)

Date	*Register No.*	*Pages*	*Subject of register*
903-9/1497-1503	334	84	Timar ve zeamet: Kefe lıvasında Irgun, Soğudak, Baliklağu, Mankup
999-1144/1590-1731	18727	8	Vazife: Kefe
1024-1615	5950	20	Vazife: Kefe
1032/1622-3	1795	24	Vazife: Kefe
1059/1649	4448	84	Sursat-u zahire: Azak, Özü (Permission to export grain)

Cizye, ispence, hane-i avariz, bedel-i avariz, bakiye

(these registers are valuable sources for demographic information, and contain population and tax figures. *Cizye* and *ispence* were general taxes levied, in the Kefe and Özü region, on the non-Muslim population. *Avariz* taxes were originally extraordinary levies; later they became general additional taxes on both Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of the Empire. *Bakiye* registers contain information on tax arrears. Many of the following registers are "detailed", that is, they include tax levies by village and city)

Date	*Register No.*	*Pages*	*Subject of register*
1030/1620-1	2751	114	Hane-i avariz:… Kefe…
1032/1622-3	14921	16	Cizye: Özü vilayet
1036/1626-7	3096	56	Hane-i avariz:… Kefe…
1038/1628-9	7416	50	Avariz (bakiye): … Kefe…
1044/1634-5	3722	72	Cizye: Kefe vilayet
1048/1638	15176	49	Cizye: Kefe vilayet
1048-9/1638-9	17460	42	Cizye: Kefe ve Soğudak

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Date	*Register No.*	*Pages*	*Subject of register*
1049-50/1639-40	14674	17	Cizye: Kefe
1050/1640	3382	46	Avariz: … Kefe…
1051/1641	3093	48	Avariz: … Kefe…
1051/1641	3845	53	Avariz: … Kefe…
1053/1643	15514	2	Cizye: Kefe vilayet
1053/1643	1885	12	Cizye: … Özü
1054/1644	15898	44	Cizye: Kefe ve Soğudak
1059-70/1649-60	14680	62	Avariz: Kefe…
1060/1650	1066	48	Cizye: Kefe vilayet
1061-3/1650-3	12801	52	Cizye: … Kefe …
1062/1651-2	18160	26	Cizye: Kefe (Giray Hanı)
1063-4/1625-4	3067	64	Avariz: … Kefe…
1063/1652-3	15365	43	Cizye: … Kefe …
1063/1652-3	5281	53	Cizye: … Kefe …
1064-5/1653-5	3354	20	Avariz: … Kefe…
1066/1655-6	3847	116	Avariz: … Kefe…
1066/1655-6	7524	44	Cizye: … Kefe …
1067-8/1656-8	3850	66	Avariz: … Kefe…
1073/1662-3	2937	256	Avariz: … Kefe…
1073/1662-3	3157	124	Avariz: … Kefe…
1083/1671-2	5345	38	Ispence-i yahud: … Kefe…
1086-8/1675-7	2018	88	Cizye (bakıye): … Kefe…
1088-91/1677-80	4038	78	Cizye (bakıye): … Kefe…
1089/1678	3809	71	Avariz: … Kefe…
1096-1106/1684-95	9480	46	Avariz: … Kefe…
1097/1684-5	3231	44	Avariz: … Kefe…
1099/1687-8	15001	1	Cizye: Özü vilayet
1099/1687-8	14882	4	Cizye: Kefe (Murtaza Paşa)
1100/1688-9	3167	172	Avariz: … Kefe…
1108/1696-7	3807	105	Avariz: … Kefe…
1110/1698-9	3974	88	Avariz: … Kefe…
1111/1699-1700	3820	96	Avariz: … Kefe…
1112/1700-1	3826	90	Avariz: … Kefe…
1115-7/1703-5	19090	8	Cizye (bakıye): Kefe (Mehmed Ağa)
1124/1712	3155	242	Avariz: … Kefe…
1128/1715-6	3818	210	Avariz: … Kefe…
1130-48/1717-35	3706	14	Cizye (bakıye): Kefe
1150/1737-8	3815	224	Avariz: … Kefe…
1153/1740	3825	212	Avariz: … Kefe…
1159/1746	3153	224	Avariz: … Kefe…
1162/1748-9	3972	218	Avariz: … Kefe…

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Date	*Register No.*	*Pages*	*Subject of register*
1167/1753-4	3148	254	Avariz: ... Kefe...
1178/1764-5	3968	232	Avariz: ... Kefe...
1190/1776	2991	236	Avariz: ... Kefe...

Ahkam, berat, emir defterler

(these registers contain copies of orders, patents, privileges, ordinances, sent to various officials in the provinces from the central government)

Date	*Register No.*	*Pages*	*Subject of register*
960/1552-3	233	138	Ahkam: ... Kefe...
1031-2/1621-3	7589	170	Ahkam-ı maliye:... Kefe...
1036-7/1626-8	3457	150	Ahkam, berat: ... Kefe...
1076-9/1665-9	2745	194	Ahkam, berat: ... Kefe...
1077-9/1666-9	14800	114	Ahkam: Kefe'de iç kale...
1087/1676	20706	4	Ahkam, emir: Azak (Ahmed Paşa)
1087/1676	9853	172	Ahkam, emir: ... Azak...
1092-3/1681-2	2926	216	Berat:... Özü beylerbeği
1092-6/1681-5	3244	158	Ahkam-ı maliye:... Kefe...
1098-1101/1686-90	2949	22	Ahkam: ... Kefe...
1108-9/1696-8	3462	570	Ahkam-ı maliye:... Özü...
1118/1706-7	203	155	Ahkam: ... Kefe...
1125-6/1713-4	9901	419	Ahkam: Azak...
1125/1713	3434	590	Ahkam, berat:... Özü...
1133/1720-1	18361	16	Ahkam: Özü valisine
1149/1736-7	18451	20	Ahkam: Kırım canibinde Kapudan Haci Mehmed Paşa ve sabıka Azak defterdar
1165-75/1751-62	19308	178	Evamir-i maliye:... Özü...

Mukataa defterler

(these registers contain names of individuals to whom tax farms were assigned, the sorts of taxes, and the revenues anticipated from them)

Date	*Register No.*	*Pages*	*Subject of register*
954/1547	1088	94	Mukataa-i iltizam: ... Kefe eyaleti has ...
958/1551	71	82	Has-ı mukataa:... Kefe eyalet
1080-6/1669-75	3301	56	Mukataa: Bakiye-i zimmet: ... Özü...
1102-5/1690-4	7375	60	Mukataa: ... Kefe ...
1108/1696-7	15967	9	Mukataa: ... Kefe ...
1110/1698-9	3499	48	Mukataa: ... Kefe ...
1110/1698-9	7253	48	Mukataa: ... Kefe ...

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Date	*Register No.*	*Pages*	*Subject of register*
1110/1698-9	6249	28	Mukataa: … Kefe …
1111/1699-1700	4906	48	Mukataa: … Kefe …
1112/1700-1	3097	28	Mukataa: … Kefe …
1121/1709	12858	34	Mukataa: … Kefe …
1124-5/1712-3	2409	196	Mukataa: … Kefe …
1141/1728-9	3707	34	Mukataa: … Kefe …
1145/1732	2684	32	Mukataa: Bakiye-zimmet: … Kefe …
1155/1742	7737	80	Mukataa: … Kefe …
1158/1745	5496	84	Mukataa: Kefe …
1159/1746	4090	84	Mukataa: Kefe …
1196/1718-2	971	8	Mukataa: … Kefe …
—	3791	8	Mukataa: … Kefe …
—	1495	8	Mukataa: … Kefe …

Muhasebe (bookkeeping accounts), *varidat* (revenues), *masrafat* (expenses), *ruznamçe* (rough day-book of current financial transactions), *irad* (income)

Date	*Register No.*	*Pages*	*Subject of register*
928-32/1521-6	7668	32	Varidat:… Kefe
988-94/1580-6	5338	222	Muhasebe:… Kefe …
1015-7/1606-8	275	240	Muhasebe: Kefe
1019/1610	5956	97	Varidat: … Kazaklar…
1023-4/1614-5	5343	112	Varidat: … Kefe…
1024/1615	2725	574	Varidat: … Kırım …
1027/1617-8	7423	40	Irad:… Kefe …
1037/1627-8	20163	10	Ruznamçe: Özü
1039/1629-30	1663	16	Muhasebe: Özü
1040/1630-1	7495	58	Varidat: … Kefe …
1081/1670	1258	32	Muhasebe: … Moskov elçi …
1091/1680	4559	12	Irad: Kamaniçe
1092/1681	1812	107	Muhasebe: … Kamaniçe, Azak
1097/1687	18289	16	Varidat: Kefe …
1100-1/1688-90	2218	34	Muhasebe: Özü (Serasker Mustafa Paşa)
1110-12/1698-1701	15638	11	Varidat: … Kefe…
1114/1702-3	3186	34	Irad: … Kefe …
1104/1692-3	6003	86	Muhasebe: … Azak …
1110/1698-9	16687	8	Irad: Özü
1116/1704	3242	42	Masrafat:… Kefe …
1134-5/1721-3	3703	36	Muhasebe: Azak
1196/1781-2	19645	16	Muhasebe: … Rusya elçi
1199/1784-5	3117	232	Irad: Özü…
1204/1789-90	3250	407	Masrafat: Özü…

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Specific military campaigns or armies

Date	*Register No.*	*Pages*	*Subject of register*
991/1583	16267	1097	Ozü janissaries, with Ferhad Paşa on an eastern campaign
1030/1620-1	6727	648	Janissary salaries, for the Polish campaign
1095-6/1683-5	18631	12	Irad: for Polish campaign
1111/1699-1700	2339	50	Muhasebe: Özü Campaign
1151/1738-9	2585	40	Muhasebe: Crimean campaign
1152/1739-40	4493	32	Muhasebe: Crimean Serasker Vezir Noman Paşa

Various taxes

Date	*Register No.*	*Pages*	*Subject of register*
1045/1635-6	3854	35	Bedel-ı mekari (tax on pack horses): Kefe
1069/1658-9	2219	291	Adet-i zimmet (special tax on non-Muslims): ... Azak...
1080-6/1669-75	3301	56	Zimmet (tribute from non-Muslims): ... Özü...
1125/1713	2569	16	Zimmet: ... Kefe ...
1130-6/1717-24	4161	76	Zimmet: ... Kefe ...

Various military expenses: cebeciyan (armorers), *mühimmat* (ammunition), *tamirat* (repairs)

Date	*Register No.*	*Pages*	*Subject of register*
1036/1626-7	16458	222	Cebeci: ... Özü ...
1051/1641	16537	189	Cebeci: ... Özü ...
1051/1641	16539	128	Cebeci: ... Azak ...
1052/1642	2021	27	Mühimmat: Azak
1059-60/1649-50	21245	1271	Cebeci: Özü ... Azak ...
1090/1679	16714	208	Cebeci: Azak...
1114-74/1702-61	3221	902	Mühimmat: Kirim'da kaleler
1127-30/1715-8	12873	24	Cebeciyan: Özü eyalet
1128/1715-6	1377	15	Tamirat: Or kalesi
1130/1717-8	2854	518	Mühimmat: ... Azak ...
1131/1718-9	2858	182	Mühimmat: ... Azak ...
1146/1733-4	17070	120	Cebeci: ... Azak, Or, Özü ...
1149/1736-7	17105	79	Cebeci: ... Azak ...
1178-87/1764-73	3160	906	Tamirat: Kefe, Kırım ...

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Crimean Tatars

Date	*Register No.*	*Pages*	*Subject of register*
950/1543	329	10	Zahire icmal: Cıhangiray ben Saadetgiray Han ve ağyan, ümera, evlad ve ahvan
977-82/1569-74	6278	48	Muhasebe: ... Tatarhan çavuşlar
1012/1603	19221	18	Masrafat: ... Kırım hanları saliyane
1013/1604	3665	168	Mevacib: ... Kırım hanlarının evladini...
1018/1609	5538	482	Mevacib: ... Kırım hanı
1034/1624-5	2120	364	Mevacib: ... Tatar hanı ...
1034/1624-5	6768	368	Mevacib: ... Kırım hanı ...
1048/1638	1332	102	Masrafat: ... Kırım han zadeler
1054/1644	18186	63	At tayınat: ... Kırımgiray sultanları
1074-81/1663-70	175	22	Saliyane: Tatar sultanları
1082-3/1671-2	3726	42	Saliyane: Tatar sultanları
1086/1675	5239	44	Saliyane: Tatar sultanları
1088/1677	4904	32	Saliyane: Tatar sultanları
1088-9/1677-8	4685	31	Masrafat: Kırımhan zadeleri
1088/1677	607	43	Iskan (settlement) Kırım'dan Nogay Taifesi
1091/1680	1859	60	Saliyane: Tatar sultanları
1095-6/1683-5	18631	12	Irad: Leh seferi, Selimgiray Han, Kalga,...
1096/1684-5	183	55	Saliyane: Tatar sultanları
1100-12/1688-1700	14525	15	Has: ... Kırım tatarları...
1103/1691-2	3977	60	Mevacib: ... Tatar han tabii ...
1104/1692-3	2433	100	Saliyane: Tatar sultanları
1105/1693-4	1847	80	Saliyane: Tatar sultanları
1105/1693-4	18542	39	Saliyane: Kırım hanları
1105/1693-4	2967	424	Masrafat: ... Kırım hanları ...
1106/1694-5	2426	100	Saliyane: Tatar sultanları
1108/1696-7	184	42	Saliyane: Tatar sultanları
1108/1696-7	19560	54	Has: ... Kırım hanı ve sultanları ...
1110/1698-9	2269	60	Mevacib: Tatar han tabii ...
1110/1698-9	18546	16	Has: ... Kırım hanları...
1111/1699	2963	586	Masrafat: ... Kırım hanları ...
1114/1702	2491	354	Masrafat: ... Kırım hanları ...
1115/1703	1747	160	Saliyane: Tatar sultanları
1121/1709	2488	340	Masrafat: ... Kırım hanı Devlet Giray muhimmat-ı masraf
1122/1710	2483	374	Masrafat: ... Kırım hanı, ve Kalgai Sultan...
1123/1711	6870	12	Eşya defter: Kırım hanı ile sultanları

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1126/1714	2894	406	Masrafat: ... Kırım hanı ...
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1129/1716-7	3537	20	Teslimat: Mirzalar ile Giray Sultanların ramazanda gönderilen Mehmed Giray han...
1129/1716-7	7083	138	Mevacib: ... Kırım hanı ...
1134/1721-3	3136	407	Saliyane: ... Kırım hanı ...
1135/1722-3	3132	400	Saliyane: ... Kırım hanı ...
1136/1723-4	3135	400	Saliyane: ... Kırım hanı ...
1140-1/1727-9	8984	339	Saliyane: Kırım hanları, Kalgai ve Nureddin ...
1158/1745	6593	354	Saliyane: ... Kırım hanları ...
1158/1745	6598	298	Masrafat:... Tatar askerinin başbuğu...
1167-71/1753-8	15655	14	Saliyane: Kırım hanları
1168-78/1754-61	14368	582	Mevacib: ... Tatar sultanları ...
1168/1754-5	6307	254	Tezaker: ... Kırım hanı ...
1168-81/1754-67	19405	67	Saliyane: Kırım hanları ...
1181/1767	3140	300	Masrafat: Kırım hanı ...
1182/1768	3376	244	Masrafat: ... Kırım hanı ...
1182-6/1768-72	5970	268	Masrafat: Rus seferi, Kırım sultanları ...
1182/1768	4052	377	Kuyudat: Kırım hanları ...
1187/1773	6601	246	Kuyudat: Istanbul'a gelen Mehmed Giray Sultan ile mirzalar...
1191/1777	3012	372	Saliyane: Kırım hanı ...
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1195/1780-1	9054	771	Masrafat: ... Sabık Kırım hanı Sefa Giray Sakız adasında ikamet ...
1202/1787-8	2478	376	Masrafat: ... Kırım sultanları
1206/1791-2	2974	440	Masrafat: ... Kırım hanları ...
1207-23/1792-1808	9004	472	Saliyane: Kırım hanları, sultanları
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1209/1794-5	4385	219	Masrafat: ... Kırım hanı ...

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1026/1617	6969	726	Kefe ...
1026/1617	16405	416	... Kefe ...
1026/1617	16407	78	... Kefe ...
1027/1617-8	2203	60	Kefe, Azak
1027/1617-8	19997	115	... Özü ...
1027/1617-8	6256	48	... Özü ...
1027/1617-8	6929	590	Kefe ... Özü ... Azak ...
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1027/1617-8	6709	762	... Azak ...
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1034/1624-5	5561	572	... Or ... Özü ...
1034/1624-5	18324	108	... Kefe ...
1035/1625-6	2202	45	... Kefe ...
1036/1626-7	16459	133	... Kefe ...
1036/1626-7	17706	92	... Azak ...
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1047/1637	16518	136	Kefe ...
1048/1638	6947	772	... Kefe ...
1051-3/1641-3	7364	604	... Azak ...
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1108/1696-7	20188	7	Özü
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1183-5/1768-71	17368	122	Özü
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1001/1592-3	164	26	… Azak …
1003/1594-5	16292	93	… Kefe, Özü …
1010-4/1601-5	16410	103	… Azak, Kefe
1019/1610	16371	273	Özü …
1019/1610	16373	701	… Kefe, Azak …
1019/1610	16376	264	… Azak
1019/1610	18108	82	… Kefe
1019/1610	15835	36	… Kefe
1023/1614	16495	83	… Azak…
1023/1614	3975	52	… Kefe … Temrük, Soğudak, Taman, Özü …
1025-7/1616-8	6696	966	… Özü … Kefe …
1026/1617	17829	38	Özü …
1026/1617	6841	1296	… Azak …
1029/1619-20	6358	522	… Özü …

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1043-4/1633-4	392	53	… Soğudak, Kefe … Taman …
1047/1637	2206	37	Kerş, Kefe
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1050/1640	6045	58	… Kefe …
1050/1640	1833	104	… Kefe …
1052/1642	7272	58	Taman, Temrük, Kerş
1052/1642	19961	56	Kefe, Kerş
1052-3/1642-3	5695	34	Azak
1052-5/1642-5	6133	634	… Azak …
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1053/1643	6997	480	… Azak …
1054/1644	6934	1170	… Kefe …
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1058/1648	20183	106	… Azak …
1058/1648	6999	468	… Özü, Azak …
1060/1650	16067	69	Kefe
1060-3/1650-3	6933	664	… Azak …
1060-4/1650-4	16767	229	… Azak …
1061/1650-1	16579	586	… Azak …
1061-5/1650-5	7003	572	… Azak … Kefe…
1062/651-2	6603	256	… Azak …
1064/1653-4	6701	652	… Azak …
1064/1653-4	16874	118	… Azak …
1064/1653-4	7004	412	… Azak … Kefe
1064-7/1653-7	6391	282	… Azak …
1065/1654-5	6693	650	… Azak …
1066/1655-6	6685	1998	… Azak … Kefe …
1067/1656-7	5426	194	Kefe, Taman, Kerş, Temrük
1068/1657-8	6820	628	… Kefe … Azak …
1068/1657-8	6306	594	… Özü … Azak
1068/1657-8	6824	684	… Kefe, Azak …
1070/1659-60	7007	446	… Azak …
1070/1659-60	6998	438	… Özü …

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1073/1662-3	16635	152	… Azak …
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1076-7/1665-7	6843	1012	… Azak …
1077/1666-7	16638	151	… Azak …
1078-9/1667-8	6557	798	… Azak, Kefe …
1078-81/1667-70	16640	134	… Azak …
1082/1671	16659	63	Azak
1082/1671	6961	718	… Azak. Özü …
1082-4/1671-3	6319	898	Azak… Kefe … Kırım …
1082-5/1671-4	5979	736	… Kırım …
1083/1672	16662	22	… Kefe
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1083/1672	16665	406	… Azak …
1083-4/1672-3	16661	365	… Azak … Kefe
1085/1674	16673	152	… Azak
1087/1676	1607	57	… Kırım …
1087/1676	16693	118	Azak… Kamaniçe
1088/1677	16694	392	… Kefe … Kamaniçe
1088-90/1677-9	16697	109	… Kefe …
1089/1678	3113	28	Kamaniçe
1090/1679	16715	181	… Kamaniçe …
1090/1679	16719	122	… Kefe …
1090/1679	16720	152	… Azak …
1090/1679	16721	347	… Kırım, Aco, Kefe … Özü …
1090-1/1679-80	17435	148	… Özü …
1091/1680	16725	158	… Kamaniçe … Azak …
1091/1680	16728	84	… Kamaniçe
1091/1680	21234	236	… Kefe
1091-2/1680-1	17439	362	Azak … Kefe, Özü …
1091-2/1680-1	16738	338	… Azak …
1091-2/1680-1	791	742	Azak, Özü, Taman …
1092/1681	16742	278	Kefe, Kırım …
1094/1682-3	821	738	Özü… Azak…
1095/1683-4	18286	6	Kefe
1095/1683-4	16756	95	Azak …
1095/1683-4	16760	120	… Azak, Kamaniçe …
1095/1683-4	6936	738	… Kefe … Azak …
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1097/1685-6	11765	421	Azak …
1097-9/1685-8	6944	892	… Azak, Kefe …
1098-9/1686-8	7243	406	… Kamaniçe …
1099/1687-8	3685	40	… Azak …
1099/1687-8	16772	564	… Azak …
1100/1688-9	16775	42	… Kefe
1101/1689-90	17756	86	… Azak, Kamaniçe …
1103/1691-2	5337	8	Kamaniçe
1103/1691-2	6942	1836	… Azak … Kefe …
1103-5/1691-4	4216	800	… Azak …
1104/1692-3	16794	48	Azak …
1105/1693-4	16798	45	… Kefe, Özü …
1106-7/1694-6	4321	680	Azak …
1107/1695-6	16804	44	… Özü …
1108/1696-7	4318	720	… Özü …
1109/1697-8	16809	272	… Aco, Özü …
1109/1697-8	16810	180	… Kamaniçe, Kefe …
1109-11/1697-9	6683	1114	… Or, Kefe … Aco, Akkerman, Kırım … Özü …
1110/1698-9	16819	253	… Kefe
1111/1699	16812	353	… Özü …
1111-24/1699-1712	16953	47	Or
1112/1700-1	4325	476	Özü, Kefe
1113/1701-2	4320	394	Özü, Aco, Or …
1113-4/1701-3	4327	760	… Özü, Kefe …
1114/1702	16822	66	Kefe …
1114/1702	16825	270	… Taman … Aco … Kefe …
1114/1702	17030	18	Özü
1115/1703	6731	434	… Or, Özü … Kefe …
1115-6/1703-5	3923	806	Kefe …
1115-9/1703-7	6168	118	Kefe, Kerş, Balıklağu, Kale-i cedid, Taman
1116/1704	5727	492	… Aco, Or … Kefe…
1116/1704	21176	248	… Kefe
1117/1705	5722	488	… Aco, Özü, Akılburun, Kefe …
1118/1706	16833	33	… Özü, Aco … Kefe …
1118-9/1706-7	3960	1234	… Kefe, Taman … Özü, Or …
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1120/1708	2463	396	… Özü … Aco … Temrük … Kefe …
1120/1708	16845	289	… Aco … Özü, Kale-i cedid, Kefe
1121/1709	16854	126	… Kefe … Özü
1122/1710	17773	244	Özü … Kefe …
1122/1710	16861	178	Özü … Kefe …
1123/1711	16880	30	… Kefe …
1123/1711	16869	288	… Kefe …
1123/1711	16872	232	… Özü …
1123/1711	16875	48	Kefe … Or, Özü … Aco, Azak …
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1124-5/1712-3	3623	656	Azak, Özü, Or …
1125-8/1713-6	3666	76	Azak …
1126/1714	787	846	… Azak … Kerş, Kefe …
1126/1714	16882	112	Azak …
1126/1714	16897	317	… Azak
1126/1714	3725	46	Azak
1127/1715	7012	656	… Özü, Kefe … Or, Azak …
1128/1715-6	19826	8	… Azak
1128/1715-6	6756	28	Özü
1128/1715-6	17042	12	… Azak …
1128/1715-6	20262	322	… Azak … Or … Özü …
1128/1715-6	17772	98	… Özü … Azak …
1129/1716-7	21242	901	… Azak, Aco, Taman, Özü …
1129-30/1716-8	16926	126	Kefe … Özü … Azak
1130/1717-8	4310	924	… Or, Aco, Özü, Kefe …
1130/1717-8	835	681	… Azak, Özü …
1130/1717-8	16937	83	… Or, Özü, Azak, Aco …
1131/1718-9	2211	8	Azak
1131/1718-9	1860	68	Azak
1131/1718-9	16951	55	… Kefe, Özü, Azak
1131/1718-9	16957	16	… Özü …
1131-45/1718-32	5543	257	… Azak …
1132/1719-20	6373	508	… Azak … Özü …
1132/1719-20	17007	70	… Azak …
1133/1720-1	6958	786	Azak … Aco, Özü … Temrük, Taman … Kale-i cedid …
1133/1720-1	16974	177	… Azak …

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1134/1721-2	6844	814	Azak … Özü … Or, Aco … Taman
1134/1721-2	6571	696	… Azak … Özü, Kefe …
1135/1722-3	6960	752	… Azak, Or … Aco … Özü … Temrük, Taman Kale-i cedid, Kefe
1135-6/1722-4	6152	194	Azak …
1136/1723-4	16984	640	Azak …
1137/1724-5	6952	716	Aco, Özü, Azak, Or, Temrük, Taman, Kale-i cedid, Kefe …
1137/1724-5	19971	49	Azak …
1138/1725-6	2316	196	Azak
1138/1725-6	17004	51	Özü
1138/1725-6	16949	230	Taman …
1139/1726-7	6315	786	… Or, Özü, Soğudak, Taman, Kefe, Azak …
1139-4/1726-8	6575	1558	… Temrük, Kefe, Taman, Aco, Kale-i cedid, Azak, Or, Özü …
1140/1727-8	2542	18	Soğudak
1141/1728-9	2340	74	Azak … Özü … Kefe …
1141/1728-9	6207	72	Kale-i cedid, Kefe …
1142-4/1729-32	3949	1012	… Kefe, Kale-i cedid, Aco, Kılburun, Özü …
1143/1730-1	4369	930	… Kefe …
1144/1731-2	4370	862	… Azak …
1144-5/1731-3	4068	1522	Kale-i cedid, Kefe …
1145/1732-3	6949	1040	… Azak … Özü …
1145/1732-3	17056	114	… Özü … Azak
1146/1733-4	6328	1302	… Aco … Taman …
1146/1733-4	17061	64	… Azak … Özü …
1149/1736	6812	200	… Azak …
1149/1736	6537	1498	… Özü … Azak
1149/1736	17093	302	… Azak … Kefe …
1149/1736	17108	24	… Özü …
1149-50/1736-7	17116	464	… Kefe …
1150/1737	17111	126	… Özü
1150/1737	6679	1282	… Özü …
1150-1/1737-8	6560	680	Or … Özü… Temrük, Aco …
1150-1/1737-8	17114	264	… Özü …
1150-2/1737-9	17157	297	… Özü …
1154/1741	17177	300	… Or … Aco …

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1157/1744	1737	1800	… Taman … Kefe
1157/1744	6562	684	… Taman, Temrük …
1157/1744	6791	1270	… Or …
1158-9/1745-6	6553	936	… Özü … Kefe … Taman, Temrük, Aco, Or …
1160/1747	6548	1450	… Özü … Kefe, Or …
1160/1747	17205	259	… Kefe … Taman …
1161/1748	6291	1293	Kefe, Taman, Kale-i cedid …
1161/1748	20102	341	… Kefe …
1161/1748	6556	1530	… Özü, Or
1162/1748-9	17239	10	… Kefe …
1165/1751-2	834	1310	… Kefe …
1166/1752-3	17241	14	… Özü …
1166/1752-3	17242	10	… Özü …
1167/1753-4	20077	251	… Kefe … Azak
1168/1754-5	16751	116	… Özü …
1168/1754-5	17245	18	Aco, Soğudak, Temrük, Or, Kale-i cedid, Taman, Kefe
1168/1754-5	822	1164	… Or, Kale-i cedid, Kefe …
1168/1754-5	765	32	Özü
1168-9/1754-6	17250	131	… Azak …
1169/1755-6	5991	774	Kale-i cedid, Kefe …
1170/1756-7	17254	22	… Özü …
1171/1757-8	6689	1201	… Özü … Kefe
1171/1757-8	5720	1290	… Özü … Kefe …
1172/1758-9	5769	1214	… Or, Özü …
1173/1759-60	5766	1044	… Özü …
1173/1759-60	17272	117	… Özü …
1173/1759-60	21277	128	… Kefe …
1173-4/1759-61	17530	72	… Özü …
1173-4/1759-61	17518	171	… Taman …
1174/1760-1	5770	1192	… Özü, Kilburun, Taman, Kefe …
1174-5/1760-2	17275	264	… Özü …
1174-5/1760-2	17279	310	… Kefe … Taman …
1175/1761-2	4305	1388	… Özü, Or, Aco …
1175/1761-2	17277	162	… Kefe …
1175/1761-2	6811	1210	… Özü …
1175/1761-2	17278	182	… Özü …
1175/1761-2	17281	40	… Taman …

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Date	*Register No.*	*Pages*	*Subject of register*
1175/1761-2	17285	239	Kefe …
1175/1761-2	17293	132	… Azak …
1176/1762-3	17306	131	… Özü …
1177/1763-4	17309	453	… Özü …
1177/1763-4	6536	1216	… Özü, Or …
1177-8/1763-5	17318	20	… Kefe, Soğudak …
1178/1764-5	6541	1206	… Özü …
1178-9/1764-5	17314	396	… Aco … Or …
1179/1765	2305	736	… Kefe …
1179-80/1765-6	17324	318	… Kefe …
1180/1766	17328	203	… Kefe, Kale-i cedid, Or, Temrük, Taman …
1180-1/1766-7	17334	314	… Özü …
1180-3/1766-9	17358	46	Özü
1181/1767	19390	28	… Özü … Kefe
1183/1769	17364	168	… Özü …
1184-8/1770-4	17414	394	… Özü …
1189/1775	1723	1102	… Özü …
1190/1776	824	1134	… Özü …
1191/1777	6917	388	… Özü …
1193/1779	17467	188	… Özü …
1194/1780	17468	48	… Kefe …
1194/1780	17483	536	… Özü …
1195/1780-1	21194	158	… Kefe … Taman
1195/1780-1	17473	240	… Kefe … Özü …
1196-7/1781-3	17508	358	… Özü …
1197/1782-3	4819	14	Özü
1197/1782-3	17512	376	… Özü …
1187/1782-3	17533	434	… Kefe, Taman, Özü …
1197-8/1782-4	17516	285	… Özü …
1197-9/1782-5	17537	214	… Özü …
—	17768	48	Azak, Özü …
—	17727	164	… Kefe, Kamaniçe, Azak …
—	17813	283	… Taman, Kefe …
—	17761	68	… Kefe …
—	20114	106	… Kefe …
—	16786	546	… Özü …
—	16841	120	… Azak … Kefe …

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LES RAPPORTS ENTRE L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN ET LA CRIMÉE
L'aspect financier

Les ouvrages consacrés à l'histoire de l'Empire ottoman se contentent de donner une description trop générale de l'administration ottomane, description basée sur des sources incomplètes et insuffisantes. En utilisant presque uniquement les observations des voyageurs étrangers, les chroniques ottomanes et, de temps en temps, les *Mühimme Defterleri,* les historiens nous donnent une image par trop simpliste de l'Empire ottoman[1]. D'autre part, bien souvent les historiens ont traité l'Empire ottoman *in abstracto,* comme un phénomène uniquement islamique et turc. Ils s'intéressaient surtout aux questions suivantes : quelles étaient les origines des institutions ottomanes, byzantines ou seldjouques ? Quelles furent les raisons de la création de l'État ottoman et les méthodes employées lors de sa création ? Quel a été l'impact ottoman sur l'Europe et sur les peuples soumis ? Quelles furent les raisons du déclin ottoman ? Parmi les réponses à cette dernière question figurent traditionnellement le retard technologique, la croissance des forces économiques à l'extérieur de l'Empire, le changement des voies commerciales mondiales et les modifications administratives à l'intérieur de l'Empire.

Une approche plus objective de l'histoire des Ottomans qui consiste à comparer leur Empire aux autres grands Empires, oblige l'historien à se poser différentes questions. Comment l'Empire fonctionnait-il ? Quels territoires de l'Empire doivent être considérés comme des provinces soumises, et quels autres étaient le siège du pouvoir ? L'Empire était-il rentable ? Les provinces éloignées soutenaient-elles le centre ou était-ce le contraire ? La réponse à cette dernière question permettrait de déterminer la raison d'être de l'État ottoman. Et enfin, les changements dans les relations économiques entre quelques régions et le gouvernement central pouvaient-ils avoir une influence sur le déclin ottoman ?

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[1] Surtout A. H. Lybyer, *The government of the Ottoman Empire in the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent,* Cambridge, Mass., 1913; H.A.R. Gibb et Harold Bowen, *Islamic society and the West,* I (1-2), Londres, 1950-1957: I. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi,* Ankara, vols I-IV, 1947-1965 ; et les manuels d'histoire turque ; les plus récent, Paul Coles, *The Ottoman impact on Europe,* Londres, 1968.

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On ne pourra pas répondre à ces questions sans étudier les documents financiers et économiques qui se trouvent dans les archives ottomanes, ainsi que les archives nationales des États anciennement provinces ottomanes. Au cours des trente dernières années, des historiens ont entrepris, lentement et soigneusement, cette tâche. Ömer Lütfi Barkan édita et analysa les recensements ottomans, les listes d'impôts et les budgets. Robert Mantran édita trois budgets du XVIIe siècle; Halil Inalcik a consacré une étude à l'Albanie ; Halil Sahilioğlu édita un budget de Chypre; et Stanford Shaw, dans son travail sur l'Égypte, fournit ce qui devrati devenir une étude modèle de l'administration ottomane régionale[1]. A travers ces travaux, l'organisation de l'Empire ottoman paraît extrêmement complexe et variée, chaque région ou province détenant son identité particulière. Existait-il des provinces ou des régions «normales» permettant des généralisation sur la structure et l'administration de l'État ottoman ? De telles généralisations semblent prématurées avant que toutes les régions aient été étudiées[2].

I.- L'ORIGINE DES RAPPORTS ÉCONOMIQUES OTTOMANS-CRIMÉENS

Les rapports entre la Crimée et les Ottomans, tout comme ceux, mentionnés ci-dessus, des provinces avec le centre ne peuvent pas être considérés comme «normaux». Le khanat de Crimée n'a jamais été totalement assimilé par l'Empire. C'était un État vassal, ou client, qui subissait plus ou moins fortement le contrôle ottoman dans ses affaires intérieures. La position du khanat a pu être comparée par certains auteurs à celle des principautés danubiennes, mais un historien a remarqué que la Crimée était le seul État vassal qui ne payait pas de tribut au sultan, et qui, au contraire, en recevait des subventions régulières[3].

Le rôle joué par le khanat de Crimée dans l'Empire ottoman peut être apprécié par les changements dans leurs rapports économiques pendant des

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[1]Ömer Lütfi Barkan, «1547-1548 yıllına ait bir Osmanlı budčesi», *Istanbul Univ. İktisad fakültesi mecmuası,* XI, pp. 219-276; Ö. L. Barkan, «Essai sur les données statistiques des registres de recensement dans l'Empire ottoman aux XVe et XVIe siècles», *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient,* I (1), 1957, pp. 9-36; Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié du XVIIe siècle,* Paris, 1962; H. Inalcik, *Hicri 835 tarihli suret-i defter-i sancak-i Arnavid,* Ankara, 1954; Halil Sahillioğlu, «Osmanlı idaresinde kibris'in ilk yılı bütçesi», *Belgeler,* IV, 1967, pp. 1-33; et Stanford J. Shaw, *The financial and administrative organization and development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798,* Princeton, 1962.

[2]Les œuvres d'I.H. Uzunçarşılı nous donnent un point de vue général, mais ses conclusions se basent principalement sur l'étude des chroniques et les *Mühimme Defterleri* qui lui sont utiles pour suivre les aspects changeants de la politique ottomane ou cours des siècles, mais ne sont pas suffisants pour l'analyse de l'administration économique impériale.

[3]C. M. Kortepeter, «Gazi Girây II, khan of the Crimea, and Ottoman policy in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, 1588-1594», *The Slavonic and East European Review,* XLIV (102), 1966, p. 140.

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siècles. Avant le traité de Carlowitz, les khans de Crimée ne dépendaient pas des Ottomans en matière de finances. Bien qu'ils reçussent plusieurs sortes de subventions, la majeure partie de leur revenu provenait des profits du commerce des esclaves, et du butin pris pendant les fréquentes campagnes en Europe orientale[1]. Économiquement indépendants, les khans de Crimée n'étaient pas des vassaux et des alliés des Ottomans très sûrs, et ils avaient l'habitude de participer à une campagne seulement si elle leur paraissait profitable. Le meilleur exemple est la malheureuse expédition contre Astrakhan en 1569, où le manque de coopération avec le khan Devlet Girây a été la cause finale de son échec[2].

Le traité de Carlowitz, en 1699, défendit aux Tatars de faire des incursions dans les territoires russes et polonais. Aussi le nombre d'esclaves vendus à Kefe baissa-t-il radicalement. En 1735 les marchés d'esclaves de Crimée furent même fermés faute de marchandises. Naturellement les subventions ottomanes ne pouvaient pas compenser les revenus perdus, et le Gouvernement criméen était menacé par la débâcle économique. Cela a eu pour résultat la perte de l'autorité des khans sur les chefs des clans, notamment sur les beys de Šîrîn et de Barïn qui prêtaient de plus en plus oreille aux ouvertures de la Russie. La guerre, commencée en 1768, permit momentanément au khan de reprendre la direction d'affaires avec la promesse de butin et de nouveaux «cadeuax» ottomans. Pourtant, cela n'était pas suffisant pour permettre au khan de gouverner effectivement. Pendant les six années suivantes, cinq khans furent installés et déposés et en 1774 les relations entre les Ottomans et la Crimée faillirent même être coupées[3].

Depuis la «conquête» ottomane en 1475 et jusqu'en 1772, les Girây recevaient un soutien financier sous différentes formes : des salaires annuels (*saliyane*); des donations quand un Girây était nommé khan, *qalgha* ou *nûredîn (tešrifat)* ; des donations qui accompagnaient une invitation à participer à une campagne (*tirkeš baha*); des frais de séjour des Girây habitant les provinces ottomanes, rétribués par l'administration (*hass*) ; des soldes spéciales pour les troupes khan soutenues par les Ottomans (*segbân aqčesi*) ; et beaucoup d'autres.

La plupart des historiens de le Crimée, surtout Hammer, Uzunçarşılı, et Inalcik, décrivent ces rapports comme statiques. Dès 1484, neuf ans après la

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[1] A. A. Novosel'skij, *Bor'ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Tatarami v pervoj polovine XVII veka (La lutte de l'État moscovite contre les Tatars dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle*), Moscou, 1948, pp. 434-436. Le gouvernement de Moscou créa un office spécial, le *Polonjanicnyj prikaz,* pour racheter les prisonniers russes aux Tatars. Cf. S. K. Bogojavlenskij, *Prikanzye sud'i XVII veka (Les «prikaznye sud'i» au XVIIe siècle*), Moscou, 1947, p. 119; et aussi A. W. Fisher, «Muscovy and the Black Sea slave trade», *Canadian Slavic Studies,* VI (1), printemps 1972.

[2] C. M. Kortepeter, *art. cit.;* Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve İdil Boyu,* Ankara, 1966.

[3] Cf. A. W. Fisher, *The Russian annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783,* Cambridge, 1970.

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conquête des colonies génoises de Crimée par les Ottomans, alliés aux Girây, on offrit aux khans la mejeure partie des droits de douane de Kefe comme *saliyane*. Cela représentait entre 1 000 000 *aqče* (Uzunçarşılı) et 1 500 00 aqče (Inalcik). Cette somme était considérée comme une simple compensation pour la perte du tribut que les Girây recevaient des Génois avant la conquête. En cette même année (1484), le khan Mengli Girây reçut pour la première fois une grande donation ottomane de 40 000 *altïn* en récompense de sa participation escomptée à la compagne en Moldavie[1]. Nos deux auteurs croient que ces premiers chiffres (probablement trouvés dans les Chroniques ottomanes) sont devenus la norme. Pourtant, les archives ottomanes fournissent une image différente, quelque peu désordonnée, plus variée que l'image statique décrite ci-dessus[2].

II. - LES VERSEMENTS OTTOMANS AUX GIRÂY

I. *Saliyane*

Je n'ai pas réussi à trouver les registres des *saliyane* pour toute la période au cours de laquelle ils furent accordés. J'ai étudié ce qui semble être un lot representatif pour le XVIIe et le XVIIIe siècle (cf. Annexe, Tabl. I à VI). Il ressort de ces registres que les chiffres totaux et les sommes assignées aux khans ont beaucoup varié. Le total pour 1677 (cf. Tabl I) est inférieur à 1 000 000 *aqče* tandis que celui pour 1735 est dix fois plus grand. II n'y avait pas d'accroissement régulier d'une année à l'autre mais les totaux annuels du XVIIIe

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[1]Cf. H. Inalcik, «Yeni vesikalara göre Kırım Hanlığının Osmanlı tabiliğine gimesi», *Belleten,* VIII (30), 1944, pp. 185-229; du même auteur, art. «Giray», in *Islâm Ansiklopedisi,* 1948, IV, p. 748; I. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi,* Ankara, 1954, III (2), pp. 31-33. V. D. Smirnov (*Krymskoe hanstvo pod verhovenstvom otomanskoj Porty do načala XVIII veka/Le khanat de Crimée sous la suzeraineté de la Porte ottomane avant le début du XVIIIe siècle,* Saint-Pétersbourg, 1887, p. 294) parle d'un salaire (*žalovanie*) de 1 200 000 *aqče*; cf. aussi, du même auteur, «Izvlečenie iz tureckoj rukopisi obščestva, soderžaščej istoriju Krymskih hanov» (Extrait d'un manuscrit turc contenant l'histoire des khans de Crimée), *Zapiski Odesskogo obščestva istorii i drevnostej,* I, 1844, p. 383.

[2]Comme Smirnov, ces deux historiens paraissent induits en erreur par la phrase *mütad üzere* (« selon la coutume ancienne») qu'on trouve si souvent dans les Chroniques ottomanes et les *Mühimme Defterleri*. D'habitude les chroniqueurs mentionnent l'attribution des *saliyane* et des *tirke· baha* sans indiquer les sommes, en disant simplement qu'ils étaient accordés *mütad üzere*. Cette phrase évidemment se réfère à l'acte d'attribuer le salaire ou la donation et non pas à une somme spécifique. Voici les abrévations employées, toutes dans les *Baş-Bakanlık Arşivi* d'Istanbul :

CA	Cevdet tasnifi, Askeri
CD	Cevdet tasnifi, Dahiliye
CEM	Cevdet tasnifi, Eyalet-i mümtaze
CH	Cevdet tasnifi, Hariciye
CM	Cevdet tasnifi, Maliye
Emin H	Ibn-ul-Emin tasnifi, Hariciye
K	Kepeci defterleri
MM	Maliyeden müdevvere defterleri

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siècle sont, en moyenne, deux fois supérieurs à ceux de la dernière partie du XVIIe siècle. Les Ottomans essayaient, évidemment, de compenser la perte des sommes que les trafic des esclaves rapportait aux Girây avant le traité de paix de Carlowitz. Les *saliyane* accordés aux khans régnants montrent beaucoup moins de régularité que les chiffres totaux (Tabl. II). Il ne semble pas qu'il y eût de traitement fixe que le khan recevait avec sa charge, bien que la somme s'accroissait quand il accédait au trône. Des *saliyane* étaient accordés également aux autres Girây, notamment à ceux qui occupaient des positions officielles (le *qalgha* et le *nûrredîn*), aux khans déposés, aux parents, proches et éloignés, dont le nombre pouvait varier de trente-cinq à quatre-vingts (Tabl. VI). D'après un registre, un ancien khan, Qaplân Girây, reçut un *saliyane* supérieur à celui du khan régnant, Feth Girây[1].

Plus de moitié des *saliyane* provenait des droits de douane de Kefe ; le reste venait de quelque douze sources différentes, y compris les droits de douane d'Istanbul et d'Izmir ; la taxe de *djizye* (sur les non-musulmans) à Ruščuk, à Inedjik, à Özü (Očakov) et à Tekfurdağ; la taxe d'*adeti ağnam* (sur les animaux) de Kirkkilise et d'Edirne; et les revenus généraux d'Avlonya et de Kili. Les *saliyane* transférés d'Istanbul étaient également accordés aux Tatars choisis parmi d'autres clans que des Girây. Dans les documents d'archives criméens, actuellement à Moscou, il y a plusieurs documents signalant des sommes accordées aux membres des clans Šîrîn et Argïn[2].

L'usage du *saliyane* comme paiement, bien qu'il ne fût pas commun dans tout l'Empire, n'était cependant pas réservé à la Crimée. Le *saliyane* était d'usage dans la plupart des provinces arabes. Les documents indiquent que les chiffres totaux pour l'Égypte dépassaient ceux de la Crimée aux XVIIe siècle, alors qu'ils étaient inférieurs aux salaires des Girây au XVIIIe siècle[3]. Les registres des *saliyane* relatifs à la Crimée donnent presque toujours les salaires de la *deniz ümerasï* (la noblesse maritime) qui gouvernait l'*eyalet* de Qapudân Pacha, dans la mer Égée. En 1740, le total accordé aux Girây était de 6 594 039 *aqče,* tandis que d'après le même registre la *deniz ümerasï* reçut 24 690 891 *aqče*[4].

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[1] *K* 5610 (1149/1736) le khan Feth Girây reçut 620 000 *aqče* tandis que l'ancien khan Qaplan Girây reçut 876 000 *aqče*.

[2] Un *firmân* de 1681 accordait à un *mîrzâ* Šîrîn 41 275 *aqče* ; un autre de 1727 à un *mîrzâ* Šîrîn, 18 725 *aqče*; un de 1671 à un *mîrza* Argïn, 20 618 *aqče*. Cf. F. Laškov, «Arhivnye dannye o bejlikah v Krymskom hanstve» (Données des archives sur les beyliks dans le khanat de Crimée), *Arheologičeskij s"ezd, Trudy VI,* 1889, IV, pp. 97-103; et aussi CA 33 183 (1696) pour attribution des *saliyane* ottomans aux *mîrzâ* tatars en campagne.

[3] S. T. Shaw, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-188.

[4] *K* 5613.

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2. *Khanlik tešrifati*

Outre le *saliyane* reçu par un Girây lors de son accession au trône de Baghčesaray, le Trésor ottoman lui accordait la parure normale de souveraineté islamique, ainsi qu'une somme d'argent, toutes deux appelées *tešrifat*. Comme le salaire, la somme d'argent pouvait changer selon les règnes, et parfois pouvait s'approcher du *saliyane* annuel. Certains khans, tel Selîm Ier, qui régnèrent à plusieurs reprises profitaient financièrent de leurs fréquentes dépositions. Après 1690, un khan déposé recevait rarement une somme inférieure à celle perçue pendant son règne. Le khan Mengli Girây II reçut même une augmentation de salaire après avoir été déposé en 1730, passant de 700 000 à 896 000 *aqče*. Le *qalgha* recevait aussi le *tešrifat* à son nomination[1].

3. *Tiyiš*

Les khans de Crimée étaient autorisés à percevoir un tribut annuel des États vassaux ottomans d'Eflak (Valachie) et de Buğdan (Moldavie). Bien que les sommes n'aient jamais été très grandes, c'était un revenu que les khans s'efforçaient de garder. En 1581, le khan demanda que le tribut du Buğdan déjà échu lui fût payé si le sultan voulait qu'il participât à l'expédition contre l'Iran en cette même année[2]. Uzunçarşılı dit que le montant normal de chaque tribut était 500 000 *aqče* par an et Peysonnel indique 1 440 000 *aqče* comme total annuel des deux, au milieu du XVIIIe siècle[3].

4. *Segbân agčesi*

Depuis le milieu du XVIe siècle, les Ottomans payaient la solde d'un corps spécial de l'armée tatare, appelé *segbân,* qui formait la garde personnelle du khan, ainsi que celle d'un corps similaire, mais plus petit, attaché au *qalgha.* La

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[1]Les documents relatifs un *tešrifat* n'ont pu être retrouvés que pour les *qalgha ;* pour les khans, il a fallu se reporter aux sommes indiquées dans les comptes figurant dans les chroniques. Le *qalqha* Selâmet (1762) reçut 300 000 *aqče* (*CEM* 184); le *qalgha* Mohammed (1761) perçut 300 000 *agče* (*CH* 1073) ; le khan Adel Girây (1665), 100 000 *aqče* d'après Mehmed Ağa Silahdar (*Silahdar tarihi*, Istanbul, 1928, I, p. 395) ; le khan Hâdji Girây (1682) reçut 2 000 *altïn* (*ibid.,* II, p. 99) ; le khan Selîm Girây (1683), 1 000 000 *aqče* (*ibid.,* p. 132); le khan Selîm Girây (1692), 250 000 *aqče* (*ibid.*, p. 682) ; le *qalgha* Toqtamï· (1724), 600 000 *aqce* d'après Mehmet Rašid (*Rašid tarihi,* Istanbul, 2e éd. 1865, VI, p. 288) ; le khan Selîm Girây (1770), 1 150 000 *aqče* d'après Ahmet Vasif (*Mehasin al-asar ve haqaiq al-akhbâr,* Le Caire, 1830, II, p. 131).

[2]Eudoxi de Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor (Documents concernant l'histoire des roumains)*, suppl. I, vol. I, Bucarest, 1886, pp. 55-56.

[3]Uzunçarşılı, *op. cit.,* II, p. 434; M. de Peysonnel, *Traité sur le commerce de la mer Noire,* Paris, 1787, I, pp. 239-241.

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somme variait d'une année à l'autre et dépassait souvent 4 000 000 *aqče*. Les *segbân* devaient accompagner le khan dans ses expéditions, mais un chroniqueur ottoman indique que des versements importants étaient aussi faits en temps de paix[1].

5. *Hass*

Dès le XVIe siècle, les Ottomans entretenaient des princes Girây dans divers domaines (*čiftlik*) des provinces européennes de l'Empire, ces princes ayant le titre de *rehin* (otage). Le but original des otages était de permettre aux Ottomans d'avoir sous leur contrôle les vassaux souvent peu coopératifs. Au XVIIIe siècle, les Girây étaient entretenus dans les *čiftlik* aussi, pour permettre aux khans de régner avec plus de sécurité chez eux. Les Ottomans faisaient vivre ces otages en leur assignant une somme du *hass* (le maintien des autorités) de la région dans laquelle ils étaient tenus. Un registre du *hass* de 1688 cite, parmi d'autres autorités ottomanes, quatre princes Girây recevant respectivement 331 320 *aqče,* 99 960 *aqče,* 144 000 *aqče* et 259 560 *aqče*. On peut le comparer au hass de la *valide sultane* (la mère du sultan) qui était de 18 408 450 *aqče,* et à celui du *qapudan-i derya* (l'amiral de la flotte) de 6 296 520 *aqče*[2].

6. *Tirkeš baha*

En contrepartie de tout ce support financier, on comptait sur les Girây pour assurer la défense du flanc nord de l'Empire, et pour envoyer sur demande une armée tatare accompagner les expéditions ottomanes. Quand les Ottomans invitaient les khans à participer aux campagnes, ils éprouvaient la nécessité d'envoyer une donation supplémentaire, appelée *tirkeš baha* («le prix de carquois»). Cette donation était variable et dépendait de l'importance de la campagne, et de la grandeur de l'armée tatare que le khan devait y mener. Un registre indiquant les dépenses initiales complètes de la campagne polonaise de 1683 fixe le *tirkeš baha* à 1 090 030 *aqče*, soit des dépenses totales de 14 875 000 *aqče*[3]. D'habitude le *tirkeš baha* était en moyenne de 30 000 à

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[1] *Rašid tarihi, op. cit.,* II, p. 523 (4 800 000 *aqče*); *ibid.,* p. 535 (4 800 000 *aqče*) ; *ibid.,* IV, p. 217 (4 800 000 *aqče*) ; *CEM*, 181 (1750), 1 001 000 *aqče*; *CH* 6103 (1697) pour *segbân* du *qalgha* (960 000 *aqče*) et *CM* 9883 (1716) pour segbân d'un ancien khan (240 000 *aqče*).

[2] *MM* 14 525. Le *hass* de Qaplan Girây (*Niğbolu*) était de 160 000 *aqče* (1737) (*CEM* 675); et celui de Sa'âdet Girây, de 18 750 *aqče* (1723) (*CH* 4646).

[3] *MM* 18 631. Ce *tirkeš baha* fut partagé ainsi : le khan Hâdji Girây, 223 220 *aqce* ; son fils Devlet, 78 590 ; le *bašbuğ* de l'armée tatare, Ali Ağa, 60 000 ; le *bašbuğ* de l'armée tatare, Mustafa Ağa, 60 000 ; l'*ümera* tatar, 420 000 ; le *qalgha,* 144 420; Qïrïm Girây de la suite du *qalgha,* 76 700 ; le *defterdâr* du khan, 6 600 ; le *defterdâr* du *qalgha* et les autres, 20 600.

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40 000 *altïn* (pièces d'or). Pourtant, en 1601, le sultan envoya 100 000 *altïn* au khan avec un *saliyane* double, en l'invitant à envahir la Hongrie[1]. Özalp Gökbilgin et Dilek Desaive découvrirent des *tirkeš baha* de 15 000 à 50 000 *altïn* au cours de la dernière partie du XVIIe siècle et du XVIIIe siècle[2]. Le khan les distribuait parmi les chefs et surtout parmi les chefs de clans tatars dont l'accord était nécessaire pour pouvoir assembler une armée tatare. Tandis que ce fait n'est mentionné nulle part, il est certain que tout le butin et tous les captifs pris par le clan ou les chefs étaient gardés par eux.

III. - L'IMPORTANCE DU SOUTIEN FINANCIER DES OTTOMANS

Bien que les Ottomans disposent de bien des moyens de subventionner les khans, et que les totaux en *aqče* paraissent élevés, les khans ne dépendaient pas financièrement du sultan. Malheureusement, la plupart des documents concernant le khanat restent en Union Soviétique et les historiens russes et soviétiques s'en servent insuffisamment dans leurs recherches.

Peysonnel donne un «budget» du khan en 1743, après l'augmentation des paiements ottomans et l'arrêt du trafic des esclaves, budget dans lequel sur un total de 15 396 000 *aqče*, seuls 2 460 000 *aqče* (dont 1 440 000 provenaient des tributs de la Moldavie et de la Valachie) pouvaient être imputés aux Ottomans[3]. Selîm Girây Ier laissa une grande somme en mourant en 1704 ; Halîm Girây Sultan estime la valeur de sa succession à 2 400 000 *aqče*. Pourtant V. D. Smirnov écrit qu'il a trouvé dans les archives du khanat un registre évaluant les biens de Selîm Girây à 437 242 440 *aqče*, y compris ses terres. Sur cette somme, les Ottomans retenaient 3 543 660 *aqče*[4].

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[1]E. de Hurmuzaki, *op. cit.*, suppl. II, vol. II, pp. 42-47 ; *Naima tarihi*, III, p. 222 : (1634) 40 000 florins; IV, p. 82: (1644) 3 600 000 *aqče ; Rašid tarihi, op. cit.*, I, p. 33: (1662) 10 000 *altïn* ; Silahdâr, *op. cit.*, II, p. 312: (1688) 40 000 *altïn* ; p. 691 : (1692) 40 000 *altïn* ; II, p. 743 : (1692) 5 000 *altïn ; Rašid tarihi, op. cit.*, IV, p. 217 : (1706) 1 200 000 *aqče ; CH* 1912 (1711), 1 200 000 *aqče*; le chiffre extrêmement élevé de 19 200 000 *aqče* (1763) vient des Archives polonaises ; cf. Tadeusz Kowalski, «Jarlyk tatarski z g. 1177 H.», *Rocznik orientalistyczny*, II, 1919, p. 214.

[2]Özalp Gökbilgin et Dilek Desaive, «Le khanat de Crimée et les campagnes militaires de l'Empire Ottoman — fin du XVIIe-début du XVIIIe siècle», *CMRS*, XI (I),1970, pp. 110-117.

[3]M. de Peysonnel, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-241 (les impôts sur le sel et le *gümrük* [droits de douane] des postes de la frontière du Nord rendent compte de la plus grande partie du budget).

[4]Halim Girây Sultan, *Gülbün-ü Hanan (Le rosier des khans)*, Istanbul, 1909, p. 71; V. D. Smirnov, *op. cit.*, p. 709. La portion ottomane se trouve dans *CM* 1193.

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Avant 1699, la majeure partie des revenus du gouvernment du khanat provenait du trafic des esclaves. Les historiens russes et polonais estiment que près d'un million de captifs avaient été pris en l'Ukraine polonaise et russe pendant les deux siècles qui suivirent 1475. La plupart étaient vendus comme esclaves à Kefe et envoyés dans les diverses provinces ottomanes. En outre, les Gouvernements polonais et russe envoyaient de grandes sommes d'argent en Crimée à titre de rançon des captifs les plus importants, et comme tribut dans l'espoir d'empêcher les incursions tatares. Le paiement (*tiyiš*) des Russes atteignait une moyenne de 10 000 roubles par an, tandis que celui de la Pologne était de 30 000 pièces d'or. Entre 1658 et 1762, le Gouvernement polonais accorda 2 122 930 *zloty* aux khans à titre d'«apaisement»[1].

La seule raison pour laquelle les Tatars criméens participaient aux campagnes militaires des Ottomans, malgré tant d'appels à la solidarité musulmane contre l'infidèle, était le profit financier escompté. Après le traité de paix de Carlowitz et au XVIIIe siècle, les Ottomans trouvaient de plus en plus difficile d'entraîner les khans à mobiliser leurs forces, car non seulement les campagnes étaient peu rémunératrices, mais la politique intérieure criméenne affaiblissait l'autorité, toujours vacillante, du khan dans son propre pays. Le khan Qaplân Girây, qui conduisit une armée tatare pour le compte des Ottomans contre l'Iran en 1735, découvrit, en revenant en Crimée, que son palais avait été détruit par une incursion russe pendant son absence, et qu'une révolté des chefs tatars l'avait déposé avant même son retour[2].

Avant le XVIIIe siècle, les Girây rendaient un service particulièrement précieux aux Ottomans, bien que cela ne fût pas toujours sur l'initiative ottomane. A cause des nombreuses campagnes tatares réussies en Ukraine, et parce que les Tatars harassaient constamment la Russie, les Russes furent empêchés d'arriver plus tôt sur les rives de la mer Noire. Ce service était relativement peu coûteux pour le Trésor ottoman (comparer les dépenses pour les Girây avec celles du *deniz ümerasi*).

Après la prise d'Azaq (Azov) par Pierre Ier, les Girây trouvèrent que l'équilibre politique commençait à favoriser la Russie. Non seulement il n'était plus possible de défendre les approches de la mer Noire contre l'expansion russe, mais il devenait difficile de chasser les armées du tsar de Crimée elle-même.

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[1] Cf. A. W. Fisher, *art. cit.;* Zbigniew Wojcik, «Some problems of Polish-Tatar relations in the seventeenth century», *Acta Poloniae Historica*, XIII, 1966, pp. 87-102; E. de Hurmazaki, *op. cit.*, suppl. II, vol. I, pp. 72-76; suppl. II, vol. II, p. 419; A. A. Novosel'skij, *op. cit.*, pp. 437-439; F. Laškov, *Pamjatniki diplomatičeskih snošenij Krymskogo hanstva s Moskovskim gosudarstvom v XVI i XVII vv. (Documents des relations diplomatiques entre le khanat de Crimée et l'État moscovite aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles*), Simferopol', 1891.

[2] Cf. A. W. Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26.

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Les Ottomans continuèrent de payer des *saliyane,* du *hass* et du *tešrifat* tout au long du XVIIIe siècle et il semble même qu'ils augmentèrent le total des versements criméens. Il y avait deux raisons pour les maintenir. Les Ottoman se rendaient compte que sans une Crimée vassale, les approches du Nord seraient en danger. L'expérience devait démontrer qu'ils avaient raison. La Russie, maîtresse de la côte nord, pouvait impunément intervenir dans les provinces balkaniques ottomanes et dans le Caucase, pendant le XIXe siècle.

La seconde raison, au moins aussi importante, est le respect particulier des Ottomans pour les Girây. Prétendant descendre directement de Činqiz Khan, les Girây tiraient, comme les Ottomans, leur origine de l'Asie Centrale et pouvaient se targuer d'une généalogie aussi impressionnante que celle des sultans. Une fois même on discuta à Istanbul de la possibilité d'offrir le trône ottoman à un Girây, si la maison d'Osman venait à s'éteindre[1].

Du point de vue ottoman, le khanat de Crimée n'a jamais pu vivre de ses propres ressources. Les impôts de Kefe, *sandjâk,* plus tard *eyalet,* ne suffisaient pas à ouvrir les dépenses ottomanes à Azaq et à Özü, celles de la flotte de la mer Noire, celles de l'administration du Caucase, et enfin celles de la Crimée. Les registres ottomans montrent que les dépenses criméenes étaient préleveees sur les impôts de la Roumélie, de l'Anatolie et même d'Istanbul. Au XVIIIe siècle, quand le rendement des armées tatares s'était affaibli, les Girây sont devenus un évident inconvénient financier épuisant un Trésor ottoman déjà aux abois.

Aux cours des débats au Divan impérial pendant les années difficiles qui suivaient le traité de *Küčük Kaynardja* jusqu'à l'annexion de la Crimée en 1783, des dirigeants ottomans comme Ahmet Resmi Effendi affirmèrent plus d'une fois que la Crimée devait être retranchée de l'Empire, même si cela voulait dire l'annexion par la Russie. En 1783, le Grand Vizir Halil Hamid Pacha, accepta la prise de possession inévitable de la Crimée par les Russes[2].

East Lansing, 1972

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[1] *Silahdâr*, II, p. 340; et H. Inalcik, «Giray», *art. cit.*, p. 787.
[2] A. W. Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-139; Uzunçarşılı, «Sadrazam Halil Hamid Paşa», *Türkiyat mecmuası,* V, 1935, pp. 213-267.

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APPENDICE

TABLEAU I

Defterleri des saliyane des Tatars de Crimée,
se trouvant aux Archives du Baş-Bakanlık d'Istanbul

Date	*Classification et numéro du defter*	*Total (aqče)*
—	—	—
1088/1677	*MM* 4904	904 000
1091/1680	*MM* 1859	722 000
1095/1684	*MM* 18 631	incomplet
1096/1685	*K* 5599	2 673 219
1097/1686	*K* 5599	3 427 331
1098/1687	*K* 5599	3 732 631
1099/1688	*K* 5600	2 110 164
1100/1689	*K* 5600	3 483 966
1101/1690	*K* 5600	3 515 100
1104/1693	*MM* 2423	7 582 581
1105/1694	*MM* 18 542	4 716 039
1105/6		
1694/5	*MM* 1847	6 198 500
1106/1695	*MM* 2426	5 478 500
1107/1695	*K* 5601	5 585 804
1110/1698	*MM* 1747	6 504 132
1112/1700	*K* 5602	7 004 136
1115/1703	*K* 5603	7 114 367
1116/1704	*K* 5603	7 452 132
1119/1707	*K* 5604	6 644 187
1120/1708	*K* 5604	7 157 569
1121/1709	*K* 5604	8 674 715
1122/1710	*K* 5604	6 131 066
1126/1714	*K* 5606	6 646 240
1126/1714	*CM* 15 413	7 120 768
1127/1715	*CM* 15 413	6 289 058
1140/1727	*K* 5608	6 740 198
1141/1728	*K* 5609	8 239 612
1148/1735	*K* 5610	9 559 010
1153/1740	*K* 5612	6 594 039
1154/1741	*K* 5613	6 929 971
1166/1753	*K* 5616	7 700 794
1180/1766	*CEM* 330	incomplet

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TABLEAU II

Saliyane des khans de Crimée

Date	*Khan*	*Saliyane (aqče)*	*Source*
997-1588	Gâzi Girây II	178 571	*CEM* 404
1068/1657	Mohammed Girây IV	192 000	*CM* 15 655
1069/1658	Mohammed Girây IV	192 000	*CM* 15 655
1070/1659	Mohammed Girây IV	192 000	*CM* 15 655
1086/1675	Selîm Girây I	1 200 000	*MM* 5 239
1096/1684	Murâd Girây	400 000	*K* 5 599
1105/1693	Selîm Girây I	700 000	*Emin H* 416
1107/1695	Selîm Girây I	1 100 000	*MM* 183
1108/1696	Selîm Girây I	500 000	*CM* 26 156
1114/1702	Selîm Girây I	808 444	*K* 5602
1115/1703	Selîm Girây I	808 444	*K* 5603
1116/1704	Gâzi Girây III	500 000	*K* 5603
1119/1707	Qaplân Girây I	651 697	*K* 5604
1121/1709	Devlet Girây II	1 266 330	*K* 5604
1122/1710	Devlet Girây II	1 010 000	*K* 5604
1123/1711	Devlet Girây II	1 010 000	*K* 5604
1126/1714	Qaplân Girây I	704 000	*K* 5606 (aussi *CM* 15413)
1127/1715	Qaplân Girây I	704 000	*CM* 15 413
1128/1715	Qaplân Girây I	1 000 000	*CM* 15 413
1140/1727	Mengli Girây II	700 000	*K* 5608 (aussi *CH* 6194)
1141/1728	Mengli Girây II	700 000	*K* 5608 (aussi *K* 5609)
1142/1729	Mengli Girây II	700 000	*K* 5609
1143/1730	Qaplân Girây I	756 000	*K* 5609
1144/1731	Qaplân Girây I	876 000	*CEM* 923
1145/1732	Qaplân Girây I	876 000	*K* 5609
1146/1733	Qaplân Girây I	876 000	*K* 5609
1147/1734	Qaplân Girây I	876 000	*K* 5609
1148/1735	Qaplân Girây I	876 000	*K* 5610
1149/1736	Feth Girây II	620 000	*K* 5610
1150/1737	Mengli Girây II	1 184 000	*K* 5610
1151/1738	Mengli Girây II	1 184 000	*K* 5611
1152/1739	Mengli Girây II	1 184 000	*K* 5611
1153/1740	Selâmet Girây II	700 000	*K* 5612
1154/1741	Selâmet Girây II	700 000	*K* 5613
1156/1743	Selâmet Girây II	700 000	*K* 5613

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Date	*Khan*	*Saliyane (aqče)*	*Source*
—	—	—	—
1157/1744	Selîm Girây II	790 000	*CH* 3392
1158/1745	Selîm Girây II	790 000	*K* 5615
1162/1748	Arslân Girây	897 166	*K* 5615
1166/1752	Arslân Girây	839 624	*K* 5615
1169/1755	Halîm Girây	818 750	*K* 5616
1172/1758	Qïrïm Girây	800 000	*CH* 6812
1176/1762	Qïrïm Girây	1 000 000	*CH* 6500
1181/1767	Maksûd Girây	600 000	*CEM* 482
1183/1769	Devlet Girây IV	600 000	*CEM* 547
1185/1771	Maksûd Girây	1 015 620	*CH* 4307

TABLEAU III

Saliyane des anciens Khans de l a Crimée

Date	*Khan*	*Saliyane (aqče)*	*Source*
—	—	—	—
1084/1673	‘Adîl Girây	240 000	*Emin H* 446
1096/1684	Hâdji Girây	499 181	*MM* 183
1098/1686	Hâdji Girây	499 181	*K* 5600
1098/1686	Murâd Girây	598 359	*MM* 183
1099/1687	Hâdji Girây	500 000	*K* 5600
1100/1687	‘Adil Girây	191 728	*K* 5600
1100/1687	Murâd Girây	600 000	*K* 5600
1104/1692	Murâd Girây	600 000	*MM* 2423
1104/1692	Sa’âdet Girây	400 000	*MM* 2423
1105/1693	Murâd Girây	750 000	*MM* 1847
1105/1693	Sa’adet Girây	400 000	*MM* 1847
1106/1694	Murâd Girây	750 000	*MM* 2426
1106/1694	Sa’âdet Girây	400 000	*MM* 2426
1110/1699	Sa’âdet Girây	400 000	*MM* 1747
1111/1170	Selîm Girây	808 444	*MM* 1747
1111/1700	Sa’âdet Girây	500 000	*MM* 1747
1115/1703	Devlet Girây	400 000	*K* 5603
1116/1704	Devlet Girây	600 000	*K* 5603
1119/1707	Gâzi Girây	500 000	*K* 5604
1119/1707	Devlet Girây	710 000	*K* 5604
1121/1709	Qaplân Girây	704 000	*K* 5604
1126/1714	Devlet Girây	500 000	*K* 5606
1127/1715	Devlet Girây	500 000	*CM* 15 413
1140/1727	Qaplân Girây	704 000	*K* 5608

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Date	*Khan*	*Saliyane (aqče)*	*Source*
1140/1727	Sa'âdet Girây	808 000	*CH* 6215
1141/1728	Qaplân Girây	704 000	*K* 5609
1141/1728	Sa'âdet Girây	808 444	*K* 5609
1143/1730	Sa'âdet Girây	808 444	*K* 5609
1143/1730	Mengli Girây	700 000	*K* 5609
1144/1731	Mengli Girây	820 000	*K* 5609
1145/1732	Mengli Girây	896 940	*K* 5609
1147/1734	Mengli Girây	820 000	*K* 5610
1149/1736	Qaplân Girây	876 000	*K* 5610
1149/1736	Mengli Girây	820 000	*K* 5610
1150/1737	Feth Girây	620 000	*K* 5610
1151/1738	Feth Girây	620 000	*K* 5611
1153/1740	Feth Girây	620 000	*K* 5612
1154/1741	Feth Girây	615 000	*K* 5613
1157/1744	Selâmet Girây	700 000	*K* 5615
1157/1744	Feth Girây	690 000	*K* 5615
1160/1747	Selâmet Girây	700 000	*K* 5615
1161/1748	Selâmet Girây	700 000	*K* 5615
1162/1748/9	Selâmet Girây	700 000	*K* 5615
1163/1749	Selâmet Girây	700 000	*K* 5615
1169/1755	Arslân Girây	839 624	*K* 5616
1170/1756	Arslân Girây	839 624	*K* 5616
1171/1757	Arslân Girây	839 624	*K* 5616
1181/1767	Arslân Girây	300 000	*CM* 1175

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TABLEAU IV

Saliyane des qalgha

Date	*Qalgha*	*Saliyane (aqče)*	*Source*
—	—	—	—
1088/1677	Murâd Girây	280 000	*MM* 4904
1091/1680	Qïrïm Girây	130 000	*MM* 1859
1098/1686	Selâmet Girây	400 000	*K* 5599
1099/1687	Selâmet Girây	400 000	*K* 5600
1100/1688	Toqtamïš Girây	145 000	*K* 5600
1114/1702	Safâ Girây	500 000	*K* 5602
1115/1703	Qaplân Girây	400 000	*K* 5603
1116/1704	Qaplân Girây	400 000	*K* 5603
1120/1708	Sa'âdet Girây	541 000	*CH* 1011
1128/1715	Selîm Girây	540 000	*CM* 15 413
1151/1738	Selâmet Girây	100 000	*CH* 3847
1176/1762	Maksûd Girây	540 000	*CH* 6998
1178/1764	Maksûd Girây	540 000	*CH* 6497
1179/1765	Mohammed Girây	200 000	*CEM* 298
1180/1766	Mohammed Girây	540 000	*CH* 6499
1185/1771	Sâhib Girây	317 460	*CH* 4307

TABLEAU V

Saliyane des nûrreddîn

Date	*Nûrreddîn*	*Saliyane (aqče)*	*Source*
—	—	—	—
1084/1677	Murâd Girây	180 000	*Emin H* 445
1086/1675	Murâd Girây	180 000	*MM* 5239
1091/1680	'Adîl Girây	70 000	*MM* 1859
1114/1702	Šâhîn Girây	119 099	*K* 5602
1116/1704	Šâhîn Girây	119 099	*K* 5603
1128/1715	Gâzi Girây	60 000	*CM* 15 413
1148/1735	Feth Girây	600 000	*CD* 7184
1183/1769	Mübarek Girây	210 000	*CEM* 606

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TABLEAU VI

Defterleri des saliyane typiques de 1115/1703 (K 5603) (en aqče)

Selîm Girây, khan	808 444
Devlet Girây, ancien khan	400 000
Mohammed Girây	70 000
Küçük Girây	60 000
Gâzi Girây	50 000
Šâhîn Girây, *nûrreddîn*	119 099
Feth Girây	34 099
Qïrïm Girây	34 099
Ahmet Girây	34 099
Djihân Girây	34 099
‘Adîl Girây	34 099
Safâ Girây	34 099
Devlet Girây	130 000
Sâlih Girây	34 000
Islâm Girây	24 000
Hâdji Girây	130 000
Hamîd Girây	80 000
Djihân Girây	52 666
Mübarek Girây	52 666
Toqtamïš Girây	5 000
Azîmet Girây	5 000
Djânibek Girây	40 000
Feth Girây	180 000
Qïrïm Girây	80 000
Baht Girây	60 000
‘Adîl Girây	60 000
Mohammed Girây	20 000
Hamîd Girây	10 000
Safâ Girây	60 000
Devlet Girây	167 794
Selîm Girây	20 000
Bahâdïr Girây	150 000
Azîmet Girây	15 000
Alp Girây	240 000
Qïrïm Girây	50 000
Mengli Girây	70 000
Feth Girây	50 000
Safâ Girây	150 000
Gâzi Girây, *qalgha*	500 000
‘Adîl Girây	50 000
Mengli Girây	50 000
‘Azim Girây	50 000
Qasay Girây	50 000
Qaplân Girây, ancien *qalgha*	400 000
Ahmet Girây	195 000
Mübarek Girây	100 000
Gâzi Girây	300 000
Toqtamïš Girây	100 000
Safâ Girây	15 000
Inâyet Girây	5 000
Feth Girây	312 500
Hamîd Girây	120 000
Bahâdïr Girây	20 000
Djânibek Girây	30 000
Toqtamïš Girây	150 000
Feth Girây	10 000
Qaplân Girây	5 000
Murâd Girây	100 000
Djihân Girây	20 000
Toqtamïš Girây	20 000
Feth Girây	5 000
Devlet Girây	60 000
‘Adîl Girây	50 000
Selîm Girây	50 000
Islâm Girây	40 000
Ahmed Girây	250 000
Mohammed Girây	70 000
Feth Girây	60 000
Selâmet Girây	30 000
Inâyet Girây	30 000
TOTAL	6 895 763

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THE OTTOMAN CRIMEA IN SIXTEENTH CENTURY

In the last century a great deal has been written about the Crimea, the Crimean Khanate, and the Tatars who lived there. Especially since their deportation in 1944 and the subsequent assignment of the Crimean peninsula to the Ukrainian SSR, the number of publications related to the Crimea and the Tatars has increased.[1] Quantity in this case, however, has not brought about improved quality, and our knowledge about the Crimea has not markedly gained.

For Soviet writers (and some Western scholars) the Tatar population of the Crimea has been eliminated in all but a very negative sense. Until the Crimea's annexation, they tell us, the peninsula harbored only bandits, slave traders, and northern Ottoman Turkish outposts against the Slavic states on its borders. After the beginning of the nineteenth century, the "rightful" owners of Crimean lands regained control. Eventually, in 1944, the last of the "bandits" were removed.[2]

During the three centuries before its annexation in 1783, the Crimean peninsula harbored the Crimean Tatar Khanate, a "pre-feudal" state incorporating holdovers from the Tatar-Mongol hordes. The khanate was an instrument of Ottoman Turkish aggression against Slavic populations in Poland, the Ukraine, and Muscovite Russia. It was a place where Polish, Ukrainian, and Muscovite captives were sold as slaves. The city of Kefe (Kaffa) is represented in the same way that M. Litvin described it in the sixteenth century, as "the monster which drinks our blood."[3]

Such generalizations, and the revulsion towards a people that resulted from them, have led scholars to avoid asking some important questions about this region. Yet answering these questions could well yield important new information not only about the Crimea, but also about East European history in

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[1]For a bibliography of works on these subjects, see A. W. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford, 1978), pp. 231-55.

[2]See, for example, P. N. Nadinskii, *Ocherki po istorii Kryma,* vol. 1 (Symferopil', 1951), and vol. 2 (Symferopil', 1957); I. Chirva, *Ocherki po istorii Kryma,* vol. 3 (Symferopil', 1964), and vol. 4 (Symferopil', 1967); and V. Al'tman, "Sessiia po istorii Kryma," *Voprosy istorii,* 1948, no. 2, pp. 179-84, for expositions of these views.

[3]"Izvlechenie iz sochineniia Mikhaila Litvina, 1550 g.," in *Memuary otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi Rusi,* vol. 1 (Kiev, 1890), pp. 4-38.

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general. For example, we know very little about the khanate itself, its relations with the Ottomans, its degree of sovereignty, or the internal functioning of its society or government.[1]

The following questions must be answered to understand the history of the Crimea: (1) What was the role of the Ottoman government there and how was it established? (2) What lands did the Ottomans control and what relationship did these lands have to those controlled by the Tatars? (3) What was the nature of the Crimean economy in both its Ottoman and Tatar portions, and what were the connections between the two? (4) In its "special relationship" with the Giray dynasty, how did the Ottoman government view its own portion of the Crimean peninsula, that belonging to the Tatars, and the Crimea as a whole? (5) What officials did the Ottomans maintain in the Crimea, and what were their responsibilities? (6) How did relations between the Ottomans and Poland, Muscovy, and the Ukraine involve the Crimea?

Since none of these question has been answered satisfactorily, and most have not even been posed in historical literature, factual knowledge about the Crimean peninsula and its Tatar and Ottoman districts is at a very primitive stage. In fact, we do not know for certain where the boundary between the two districts lay, nor how it was established and changed over time. An enormous confusion exists about the Ottoman "control" of the Crimea and the khanate. Kefe is often spoken of as a Tatar rather than Ottoman city; the slave markets are usually considered part of the Crimean Tatar rather than Ottoman economy. Indeed, at some times the Tatars are described as vassals and at others, as subjects of the Ottoman sultans: which description more closely approximates reality? Were the Tatars Ottoman subjects, or did they possess the city of Kefe?[2]

The actual conquest of the southern shores of the Crimea by Sultan Mehmed II Fatih in 1475, and the subsequent establishment of relations between the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatar Girays (1475-1478) were well sorted out and presented by Halil İnalcık some time ago.[3] But the Ottomans' organization of the Crimea as an administrative unit and the steps taken to establish Ottoman sovereignty in the realms of administration, law, finance, and the military are still undetermined. A good deal more research in Ottoman archives is required before such problems can be resolved.

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[1]B. Kellner-Heinkele, *Aus den Aufzeichnungen des Said Giray Sultan* (Freiburg, 1975), gives valuable information about the inner structure of the ruling dynasty in the mid-eighteenth century. The recent publication of documents from Topkapı Sarayı on Ottoman-Tatar relations is an important contribution to this subject: A. Bennigsen et al., *Le Khanat de Crimée dans les Archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapı* (Paris and The Hague, 1978).

[2]The introduction to Bennigsen, *Le Khanat,* is the best introduction to these relations in print.

[3]H. Inalcik, "Yeni Vesikalara Göre Kırım Hanlığının Osmanlı Tabiliğine Girmesi ve Ahidname Meselesi", *Belleten* 8 [1944): 185-229.

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Certain preliminary steps, however, may be taken now. In a study in progress (of which this essay is a part) I try to discern the social and economic nature of the Ottoman portion of the Crimea during the middle of the sixteenth century, that is, during the reign of Sultan Süleyman I. This is a prerequisite, I believe, to ascertaining the role of the Ottomans in the Crimea, their relations with the Tatars, and the functions of the Ottoman Crimea within Eastern Europe and the steppe in general.

Such a study requires the use of new and different historical sources, for those used by historians to date have been inadequate in both number and kind. For instance, almost no valuable information on the Crimea can be found in the Polish or Muscovite chronicles. More surprising is that Ottoman and Crimean chronicles give few hints about Ottoman rule in the Crimea from either an administrative or economic perspective, although they do contain some data on military activities.[1] But none of the chronicles give any information about the Crimea's actual role — political, economic, or even military — in larger Ottoman policies.

Relations between the Ottoman government and the Crimean Khanate will surely be studied in the coming years, most likely by the team of scholars headed by A. Bennigsen. A fairly thorough analysis of these relations can, it seems, be done from the documents that survive; however the khanate's own archives, last studied by F. Lashkov at the end of the nineteenth century, are completely out of circulation somewhere in the USSR or have disappeared.[2]

Fortunately for the study of the Ottoman Crimea, thousands of large registers and individual documents have been preserved in the archives of Istanbul. In addition to those registers dealing with Ottoman policy in general (the Mühimme defters, or minutes of the Imperial Council), there are more than 700 registers containing information about financial and administrative affairs in the Crimea. These include registers of endowed pious foundations; registers listing tax liabilities, payments, and arrears; registers containing copies of orders, patents, privileges, and ordinances sent to various officials in Kefe province; lists of tax farms and revenues anticipated from them; bookkeeping

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[1] See, for example, V. D. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom Otomanskoi porty do nachala XVIII veka* (St. Petersburg, 1887), who thoroughly mined both Ottoman and Tatar chronicles. Published editions of some of the Tatar chronicles include: A. Zajaczkowski, ed., *La chronique des steppes kiptchak: Tevarih-i Dešt-i Qipčak* (Warsaw, 1966); O. Górka and Z. Wójcik, eds., Kirimli Haci Mehmed Senai, *Historia Chana Islam Gereja III* (Warsaw, 1971); Seiid Mukhammed Riza, *Asseb o Sseiiar' ili Sem' Planet'* (Kazan, 1832); and O. Gökbilgin, ed., *Tarih-i Sahib Giray Han* (Ankara, 1973).

[2] F. F. Lashkov, "Arkhivnyie dannyie o beilikakh v Krymskom khanstve", *Arkheologicheskii s'ezd: Trudy* 6, no. 4 (1889): 96-110; idem, *Pamiatnik diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Krymskogo khanstva s moskovskim gosudarstvom v XVI i XVII vv.* (Symferopil', 1891); idem, "Sbornik dokumentov po istorii krymsko-tatarskogo zemlevladeniia", *Izvestiia Tavricheskoi uchennoi arkhivnoi kommissii* 26 (1897): 24-154.

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accounts and day-books of current financial transactions; records of military expenses, etc.[1] The registers contain information crucial to an understanding of the Ottoman role in the Crimea, and their study should culminate in a rewriting of the region's history.

The most valuable Ottoman sources of the Crimea for this period, however, are two censuses taken of the Ottoman province in the first half of the sixteenth century. The first, from ca. 1529, is a "detailed" census, listing all heads of household grouped according to quarters in a city or by village in the various districts. It also details the tax liabilities for each group according to goods produced or services performed.[2] The second census, from ca. 1545, is a "summary" census, listing only totals of heads of households, without individual names, for each quarter or village. Their tax liabilities are given as totals, without itemization.[3] Both censuses contain local "law codes" (*kanun names*) specifying tax rates applicable in the province of Kefe for the period of the census.[4]

In both censuses, following normal Ottoman practice, the religious communities to which individuals belonged are identified, and in the "detailed" census, the marital status of the heads of household is also given, i.e., married, bachelor, and, for the non-Muslims, widowed. It is thus possible, once a decision about the "average" size of households is made, to estimate the total population of each quarter and village, the total population of Muslims and non-Muslims, and the direction of any population change.

The "law codes" for the province provide us with much information about the economic life of Kefe and the towns dependent upon it. We see that, far from depending solely upon the slave trade, the province of Kefe enjoyed a relatively normal economic life for the time. All sorts of agricultural produce, fish and meat, small artisan industries, as well as slave trading, constituted the major portion of the Kefe economy. Also, the economy of the region was

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[1] I have published a guide to those registers dealing with the Crimea in "Ottoman Sources for a Study of Kefe Vilayet: The *Maliyeden Müdevver* Fond in the Başbakanlık Arşivi in Istanbul," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 19, no. 1/2 (1978): 191-205.

[2] Istanbul, Başbakanlık Arşivi, Tapu ve Tahrir (hereafter T. ve T.) defter no. 370. Two recent studies examine some aspects of Ottoman administration in the Crimea. Mihnea Berindei and Gilles Veinstein, "La présence ottomane au sud de la Crimée et en Mer d'Azov dans la première moitié du XVIe siècle", *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 20, no. 3/4 (1979): 389-465; and I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, M. Berindei, G. Veinstein, "La Crimée ottomane et l'institution du timar," *Annali* 39 (1979): 523-562. A third study has just appeared: G. Veinstein, "La population du sud de la Crimée au debut de la domination ottomane," in *Mélanges en honneur de Ö. L., Barkan* (Aix-en-Provence, 1980).

[3] Istanbul, Başbakanlık Arşivi, T. ve T. defter no. 214.

[4] The *Kanun name* from T. ve T. no. 214 is published and analyzed by M. Berindei and G. Veinstein, "Règlements de Süleyman Ier concernant le liva de Kefe," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 16 (1975): 57-104.

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closely de-pendent on neighboring lands to the north and the Ottoman center in the south.[1]

But the *Kanun names* give only economic expectations from tax rates levied on various types of activity. In order to make sense of this data, one needs to know how much production actually took place. The censuses themselves provide this information. First, they give the taxes (in akçes) levied on the province as a whole (see appendix 1, p. 143). One notes that the tax on the purchase and sale of slaves amounts to 650,000 akçes for the year, or about 24 percent of the total of 2,759,499 akçes levied on the province for all activities. Other port-related activities (exports and imports) account for 1,365,000 akçes, or 50 percent.

All of these taxes were levied primarily on commerce and were distinguished from the taxes on the individual population. The census for ca. 1529 indicates that the taxes on the population of the city of Kefe amounted to 71,111 akçes, the bulk of which was the 52,000 akçes of the capitation tax levied on non-Muslim heads of households (*ispence*). Tithes on the production of various grains constituted the primary source of revenue from all of the other Crimean cities and towns in both censuses. It is interesting to note that the tithe on grape juice production (for both şorbet and wine) in the city of Soğudak was more than 50 percent of the taxes on that city. These data show that all of the Crimean towns participated in the very diverse economy, producing all sorts of agricultural goods.

A final type of information contained in the censuses, and perhaps the most interesting, is that of the size and shape of the province's population. In addition, from their data one can identify with relative certainty the boundaries between the Ottoman province and the Tatar khanate. It is unusual to find two Ottoman censuses from periods of time so close together; normally they were conducted only every thirty years. Perhaps Ottoman officials had noted a change in the population which effected tax revenues, and the censuses were held to determine what new human resources could be taxes.

For our purposes, five points about the population data in the censuses are relevant. First, between 1529 and 1545 the total population of the province grew by approximately 11 percent. This rise was in line with that experienced elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, and with a general population increase in the

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[1]Excellent descriptions of the economy, as evidenced in the *Kanun names*, are provided in Berindei and Veinstein, "Règlements", and in M. Berindei and G. Veinstein, "La Tana-Azaq de la présence Italienne à l'emprise Ottomane (fin XIIIe-milieu XVIe siècle)," *Turcica* 8, no. 2 (1976): 110-201.

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entire Mediterranean world in the first half of the sixteenth century.[1] Not all sections of the province experienced this increase, however. The city of Kefe, which grew by 12 percent, accounted for more than half of the total increase. The cities to the west of Kefe all declined: Soğudak by 15 percent, Mankup by 45 percent, Baliklağa by 13 percent, and Inkirman by 6 percent. Villages in the district of Soğudak, on the other hand, increased by 5 percent, whereas villages in Mankup district declined by 9 percent (see appendix 2, pp. 146-67). One can thus assume that the population was moving gradually eastward, towards the province's capital and into the capital itself.

Secondly, it is clear that there was a very large increase in the population of the districts to the east of Kefe: Kerş (Kerch) grew by 86 percent, Taman' by 732 percent, and Azak by 70 percent. The province had been conquered only sixty years before the first of these censuses was conducted, and it seems apparent that the three eastern districts were late in being populated by the Ottomans. Kerş and Taman' had been only small villages prior to the conquest, while Azak gained importance when it became the northeastern outpost of Ottoman rule against Muscovy.

Thirdly, as the population grew its religious makeup changed. The rapid rise in Muslims (+89 percent), along with declines in Greek Orthodox Christians (-6 percent), raises interesting questions about Ottoman religious policy. In the first years after the Ottoman conquest there is evidence of a conscious Ottoman policy of population administration — encouragement of Muslim movement to the Crimea and the transport of Crimean Christians southward and particularly to Istanbul — but in the second quarter of the sixteenth century this was no longer true. All the available evidence indicates that the Muslim population was rising at a much faster rate than that of the non-Muslims during the entire sixteenth century and throughout the empire.

Many Ottoman historians now believe that this change occurred through a policy of religious conversion, not actual movement of population. An excellent study of the city of Trabzon for the same period shows how the process of conversion to Islam worked.[2] As there is no indication of a policy of *forced* conversion (in fact, in the sixteenth century the Ottomans found conversion to Islam an inconvenience because Muslims paid fewer and lighter taxes than did non-Muslims), one can presume that economic and social pressures combined to make conversion attractive.

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[1]See F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World,* 2 vols. (New York, 1973), for evidence of the general rise.

[2]Heath Lowry, "The Ottoman *Tahrir Defters* as a Source for Urban Demographic History: The Case Study of Trabzon (ca. 1486-1583)" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1977).

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Fourth, the Ottoman censuses identify the Ukrainian inhabitants (called *Rusyan* in Ottoman) that were subject to the sultan, and thus subject to Ottoman taxation. In 1529, approximately 170 Ukrainians lived in Kefe and 105 in Azak. By 1545 these numbers dropped to approximately 147 in Kefe and none in Azak. Since none of the Ukrainians are identified by place of origin in the censuses, it is likely that they were all from families living in Kefe and Azak at the time of the Ottoman conquest in the late fifteenth century. (Those Jews who recently emigrated into the province from outside the empire are identified — as *Yahudi-i Efrenciyan,* from Western Europe, or as *Yahudi-i Çerkess,* from Circassia.)

Finally, in the "detailed" census of 1529, slaves owned by non-Muslims are listed under each quarter and village. Their numbers were not large, but of interest is that all three major non-Muslim categories owned slaves, most of them residing in Soğudak and Kefe. Slaves owned by Muslims were not included in the census because they were not taxable. About half of the slaves are identified as *Rus'* (Ukrainian) or *Moskoflu* (Russian), and the other half as Circassian.[1]

The censuses show that the Ottoman Crimea was administered as a normal Ottoman province. While the slave trade was important and did provide substantial revenue for the Ottomans, other forms of economic activity appear to have been more significant from a tax perspective. The province was larger than has been suspected, and included towns and villages well north of the coastal mountains, particularly in the west. Indeed, Ottomans administered villages very close to the Tatar capital of Bahçesaray. The population was heavily non-Muslim, except in Kefe city. But during the periods of the two censuses, Muslims gained considerable ground, so that by mid-century they constituted approximately 35 percent of the total population (in ca. 1529 they made up only 20 percent).

Before a more detailed picture of Kefe province can be presented, many more of the Ottoman registers for the province need to be examined. For example, the nature of the Ottoman administration there, the officials and their responsibilities, remains obscure. Relations with the Tatars north of the frontier are also unclear; for the investigation of this subject, one can only hope that the khanate's archives will reappear. What is clear already, however, is that our overly simplistic notions of the nature of the Crimea either as a Tatar "nest" or as simply an Ottoman military outpost must be revised.

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[1]This is in line with the origin of most slaves sold in Kefe. See my article, "The Sale of Slaves in the Ottoman Empire: Markets and State Taxes on Slave Sales, Some Preliminary Considerations," *Boğaziçi Universitesi Dergisi* 6 (1978): 149-74.

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APPENDIX I
Tax Assessments

I. From the Census of 1529 (T. ve T. 370)

	akçes
A. Taxes levied on the entire province and let out as tax farms (*mukataa*)	
1. fines, bride tax, fees for *muhtesib* * of markets and guilds, miscellaneous taxes	58,000
2. bride tax (on the quarter of the city of Kefe called *kale-i hakk*)	24,000
3. customs tax at the port of Kefe city	620,000
4. import tax on wine (in Kefe and Kerş cities)	280,000
5. fees levied in the grand bazaar in Kefe	300,000
6. tax on slave purchases and sales	650,000
7. taxes on guilds, miscellaneous fines and fees, tax on bazaar shops	100,000
8. tax on imports through the "Tatar Gate"	150,000
9. tax on market sales of beef in the Kefe bazaar	10,000
10. tax on *çakma* (beaten metal?) in Kefe	7,000
11. tax on sale of cloth in Kefe (Tuta-i hamr?)	100,000
12. tax on measuring and weighing cloth in the market in Kefe	10,000
13. taxes and fees for the public scales in Kefe	5,000
14. taxes and fees on the "Başhane," market for the sale of sheep heads	17,000
15. tax on the fees of hawkers in the Kefe markets	40,000
16. fees for the market inspectors of Kefe	60,000
17. tax farm on non-Muslim head tax for Kefe	7,000
18. tax on wine entering port of Kefe	15,000
19. confiscation of testamentary estates without heirs, and taxes on escaped slaves	50,000
20. tax from rents of shops in Kefe	120,000
21. income from fees of market hawkers	4,000
22. miscellaneous fees	5,000
23. tax farm on rentals of government property in Kefe	1,500
24. tax farm on head tax levied on Christian Circassians living in Otuzlu	3,000
25. tax farm on the *kale-i hakk*	20,000
26. tax farm on fishermen	100,000
27. taxes on road use	2,999
Totals	2,759,499
B. Taxes on the population of the city of Kefe	
1. head tax on non-Muslims	52,775
2. police fees (*ihtisab*)	5,450
3. tithes (on various grains)	3,600
4. vineyards (in Muslim hands)	600

*superintendent of police who has charge of examining weights, measures, provisions, etc.

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5.	vegetable gardens and orchards	270
6.	tax on sheep	3,377
7.	mills	1,292
8.	fines, inheritance fees, etc.	2,412
9.	fees collected by kadı, kethuda, ağa-i azeb	1,405
	Totals	71,111

C. Taxes on the population of the city of Soğudak

1.	head tax on non-Muslims	7,725
2.	police fees	275
3.	tithes (on various grains)	31,878
4.	vegetable gardens and orchards	825
5.	tax on sheep	2,190
6.	tax on swine, hay, and flax	3,043
7.	mills	512
8.	taxes on marriages, firewood and occasional taxes (*bad-i hava*)	3,500
9.	vineyards (in Muslim lands)	3,798
10.	market dues	1,000
11.	tax on falcon nests and wasteland	600
	Totals	55,346

D. Taxes on the population of the city of Mankup

1.	head tax on non-Muslims	3,375
2.	taxes on fermented beverages	1,110
3.	tithes (on various grains)	1,200
4.	tax on flax, hives, hay, fruit, etc.	950
5.	market dues and vegetable garden tax	270
6.	tax on wine	150
7.	sheep tax	25
8.	vineyards (in Muslim hands)	7
9.	fines bride tax	768
10.	taxes on bathhouses	120
	Totals	7,975

E. Taxes on the population of the city of Balıklağu

1.	head tax on non-Muslims	3,925
2.	tithes on grains	460
3.	taxes on fermented beverages	2,700
4.	tax on flax, fruit, etc.	315
5.	sheep tax	1,000
6.	fines, bride tax	1,250
7.	market dues and taxes	1,000
8.	vineyards (in Muslim hands)	388
	Totals	11,038

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F. Taxes on the population of the city of Inkirman		
1. head tax on non-Muslims		5,352
2. tithes on grains		10,755
3. tax on fermented beverages		8,400
4. vineyards (in Muslim hands)		666
5. tax on flax, hives, vegetable gardens		2,106
6. sheep tax		2,240
7. tax on open fields		50
8. market dues		500
9. fines, bride tax		1,564
	Total	31,606
G. Taxes on the city and district of Kerş		70,000
H. Taxes on the city and district of Taman		95,000
I. Taxes on the city and district of Azak (inns and shops)		23,155
J. Income from the state fish monopoly in Azak		250,000
K. Taxes on imports and exports in Azak		80,000

II. From the Census of 1545 (T. ve T. 214)

		akçes
A. Taxes on the population of the city of Soğudak		
1. head tax on non-Muslims		7,725
2. tithe on wheat		600
3. tithe on barley		80
4. tithe on grape juice		23,960
5. vineyards (in non-Muslim hands)		50
6. orchards		458
7. tax on hives		190
8. tax on swine		175
9. tax on flax		1,900
10. tax on hillsides		900
11. sheep tax		1,900
12. tax on mills		812
13. vineyards (in Muslim hands)		3,990
14. tax on open fields		291
	Totals	43,031

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B. taxes from villages in the district of Soğudak

Village*	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
head tax	220	550	375	1000	175	450	300	1750	850	1825
wheat	49	29	60	300	150	349	177	324	259	262
barley	12	3	3	24	40	49	20	52	40	20
grape juice	49	126	230	240		780	267	1790	2577	1405
vegetables	32		2			50	4	3		62
hives	2		2	177		53	367	64		
çift— tax on Muslim farmers	20					24		49	24	
mills	32						21		11	64
vineyards (Muslims)	240		89			32	50	160	260	251
landless	25		114	120	50	64	290	152	191	357
sheep	37	2240	450	360		509		863		793
orchards			6	12	30	3	1	63	141	49
vineyards (non-Muslim)				73		5	2	12	17	50
flax			50	91	382	727			78	32
swine					91	5	4		39	9
hillsides			11						25	506
open fields					4	27				

APPENDIX 2
Population

I. From the Census of 1529 (T. ve T. 370)

A. City and districts of Kefe (Muslims)	*Hane*	*Müc.*	*Bive*	*Total*
a. section of city of Kefe called Frenk Hisar				
1. quarter of small mosque of Bozuca Reis	10	4	—	50
2. quarter of small mosque of Hace Çanak	20	10	—	100
3. quarter of small mosque of Hace Şa'ban	3	—	—	15
4. quarter of small mosque of Mevzala	12	2	—	60
5. quarter of small mosque of Eymeni Mehmed	26	2	—	130
6. quarter of small mosque of Haci Güver	23	6	—	115
7. quarter of small mosque of Milat	—	—	—	—
8. quarter of small mosque of Çineli	35	7	—	175
9. quarter of small mosque of Mercan Ağa	61	2	—	305
10. quarter of small mosque of Haci Yani	—	—	—	—

*see below, pp. 55-56 for village names.

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b. section of city of Kefe called Kale-i Birun				
11. quarter of small mosque of Halil Bekçi	23	12	—	115
12. quarter of small mosque of Vaiz Sinan	16	6	—	80
13. quarter of small mosque of Hace Hasan	31	7	—	155
14. quarter of small mosque of Sinan Ağa	31	2	—	155
15. quarter of the large mosque (cami-i kebir)	24	8	—	120
16. quarter of the new mosque "Gölbaşı"	29	7	—	145
17. quarter of the small mosque Hatuniye-i merhum Müfti Veli der merhum şerif Sultan Mehmed	55	11	—	270
18. quarter of small mosque of Seyyid Yalçın	15	1	—	75
19. quarter of small mosque of Hace Vahi	34	6	—	170
20. quarter of small mosque of Mehmed Serdar	32	2	—	160
21. quarter of small mosque of Ferhad Ağa	39	4	—	195
22. quarter of small mosque of Akbaşı	28	3	—	140
23. quarter of small mosque of Seyyid Şırvani	22	1	—	110
24. quarter of small mosque of Çat Çat, formerly called Ayos Bekçibi	15	2	—	75
25. quarter of small mosque of Hoca Hasan	3	1	—	15
28. quarter of small mosque of Hayreddin	15	2	—	75
c. section of city of Kefe called Kale-i Hakk				
32. quarter of small mosque of Ahmed	16	1	—	80
33. quarter of small mosque Hayak Ağa	19	12	—	95
34. quarter of small mosque of Mengli Hafiz	20	4	—	100
36. quarter of small mosque Kahya Sinan Fakir	17	2	—	85
37. quarter of small mosque of Bosna	28	8	—	140
38. quarter of small mosque of Haci Idris	51	3	—	255
40. quarter of the Circassians residing in village of Baybuga near Kefe	12	2	—	60
41. quarter of Tatars residing at Sarı Gül near Kefe	7	1	—	35
42. quarter of small mosque of?	13	—	—	65
43. quarter of small mosque of Seyyid Ilyas	2	—	—	10
50. quarter of small mosque of Ahmed Efendi	10	20	—	50
B. City and district of Kefe (non-Muslims)				
51. quarter of St. Thoros (Greek)	67	10	6	359
52. quarter of St. Thoros (Armenian)	95	7	16	539
53. quarter of St. Sarkis (Greek)	51	—	7	283
54. quarter of St. Sarkis (Armenian)	73	3	25	465
55. quarter of St. Minkinar (Greek)	157	3	18	857
56. quarter of St. Minkinar (Armenian)	34	4	5	190
57. quarter of St. Iskender (Greek)	25	3	2	133
58. quarter of St. Iskender (Armenian)	108	3	12	588

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59. quarter of St. Karapet (Greek)	28	1	3	152
60. quarter of St. Karapet (Armenian)	94	7	21	554
61. quarter of Taş Taban (Greek)	22	2	4	130
62. quarter of Taş Taban (Armenian)	84	5	12	488
63. quarter of Gürcü Kabak (Armenian)	120	7	31	724
64. quarter of St. Ioanna (Armenian)	115	5	13	627
65. quarter of Aş Beğ (Greek)	20	4	3	112
66. quarter of Aş Beğ (Armenian)	134	9	18	792
67. quarter of Balıkçı (Greek)	61	—	19	381
68. quarter of Balıkçı (Armenian)	69	3	6	369
69. community of Gayri yüzbaşı in the Frenk Hisar (Jew)	58	4	9	326
70. quarter of St. Kirikor (Armenian)	134	9	22	758
71. quarter of St. Kaşot (Armenian)	176	9	22	968
72. quarter of St. Hreştakapet (Armenian)	102	3	7	538
73. community of Circassians "penah"	—	—	—	—
74. community of Rusyan	34	1	—	170
75. community of Ishak yüzbaşı (Jewish)	81	1	9	450
77. community of Jews "Efrenciyan"	11	—	—	55
78. community of Circassians residing at Otuzlu	11	—	1	59
C. Villages in the district of Soğudak				
79. Kutlak				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	7	—	—	35
80. Taşlu				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	21	—	3	117
81. Tokluk				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	17	—	2	93
82. Aya Yudin (?)				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	25	—	4	166
83. Arpadi				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	10	—	1	54
84. Kozlu				
Muslim	2	—	—	10
Greek	12	—	2	68
85. Şuma				
Muslim	1	—	—	5
Greek	24	—	3	132

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86. Kopsel				
Muslim	2	—	—	10
Greek	51	—	4	271
87. Vorin				
Muslim	2	—	—	10
Greek	23	—	1	119
88. Kapsikhor				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	56	—	3	292
89. Uskut				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	56	—	3	292
107. Monastir				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	42	—	4	226
108. Kuru Özen				
Muslim	1	—	—	5
Greek	76	—	7	408
109. Ulu Özen				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	45	—	4	241
110 Demirci				
Muslim	6	—	—	30
Greek	56	—	10	320
111. Korbaklu				
Muslim	2	—	—	10
Greek	31	—	5	175
112. Kücük Özen				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	9	—	—	45
113. Aluşta				
Muslim	9	3	—	45
Greek	128	—	13	692
Jew	20	—	2	108
D. City of Soğudak				
90. Muslims living in quarter of small mosque of Sinan	23	9	—	115
91. quarter of St. Dayalaya (Greek)	6	—	—	30
92. quarter of St. Mihail (Greek)	5	3	—	25
93. quarter of St. Agap (Greek)	9	—	—	45
94. quarter of St. Filiban (Greek)	2	1	—	10
95. quarter of St. Todor (Greek)	10	—	—	10
96. quarter of St. Nikovla (Greek)	20	2	—	100

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97.	quarter of St. ? (Greek)	25	—	—	125
98.	quarter of St. Yakoş (Greek)	36	6	—	180
99.	quarter of St. Danoş (Greek)	15	4	—	75
100.	quarter of St. Nike (Greek)	33	12	—	165
101.	quarter of St. Nikola (Greek)	11	—	2	63
102.	quarter of St. Andre (Greek)	27	—	1	139
103.	quarter of St. Fodola Beğ (Greek)	33	—	—	165
104.	quarter of Kostandin (Greek)	31	—	3	167
105.	quarter of St. Yorgi (Greek)	15	—	3	87
106.	community of Armenians in Soğudak	27	—	—	135
106a.	community of Jews in Soğudak	2	—	—	10
	E. City of Mankup				
116.	quarter of the camii-i şerif (Muslim)	10	7	—	50
117.	quarter of small mosque of kaçanma (Muslim)	11	2	—	55
118.	quarter of small mosque of Hace Seyyid (Muslim)	7	2	—	35
119.	community of Jews in Mankup	48	—	3	252
126.	community of Greeks in Mankup	80	—	15	460
127.	community of Armenians in Mankup	8	—	—	40
	F. City of Balıklağu				
154.	quarter of mosque outside the fort (Muslim)	24	4	—	120
156.	quarter of St. Minkuban (Greek)	54	—	10	310
157.	quarter of St. Mitineris (Greek)	30	—	2	168
158.	quarter of St. Nikola (Greek)	19	—	3	107
159.	quarter of St. Yani (Greek)	10	—	1	54
160.	quarter of St. Mihail (Greek)	11	—	2	63
161.	community of Armenians	14	—	3	82
162.	community of Jews	15	—	1	79
	G. City of Inkirman				
176.	quarter of small mosque of the fort in the suburb (Muslim)	35	4	—	175
177.	quarter of St. Filiban (Greek)	38	4	—	190
178.	quarter of St. Fidari (Greek)	9	2	—	45
179.	quarter of St. ? (Greek)	17	1	—	85
180.	quarter of St. ? (Greek)	32	3	—	160
181.	quarter of St. Aşliyanis (Greek)	23	—	4	131
182.	quarter of St. Mihail (Greek)	48	—	—	240
183.	community of Armenians	9	—	—	45

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H. Villages in the district of Mankup				
120. Albati				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	15	—	1	79
121. Atim Çağragi				
Muslim	1	1	—	5
Greek	3	—	2	23
122. Kirmancik				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	8	—	—	40
123. Gavri				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	19	—	—	95
124. Süren				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	58	—	5	310
125. Üçe				
Muslim	1	—	—	5
Greek	17	—	2	93
134. Markuri				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	30	—	5	170
135. Yancu				
Muslim	3	—	—	15
Greek	5	—	—	25
136. Kaklus				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	10	1	—	50
137. Bağan (formerly Cömlekçi)				
Muslim	4	1	—	20
Greek	12	—	4	76
138. Küçük Muskomiye				
Muslim	1	1	—	5
Greek	39	—	—	195
138a. Sotira				
Muslim	7	—	—	35
Greek	15	—	1	79
140. Kılınzı				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	13	—	2	73
141. Kamire				
Muslim	1	1	—	5
Greek	26	—	3	142

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142. Hayto				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	51	—	—	255
143. Gevher				
Muslim	16	4	—	84
Greek	38	—	2	198
144. Taş Iskele				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	22	3	—	113
145. Savatika				
Muslim	4	2	—	20
Greek	28	1	—	140
146. Miskhor				
Muslim	1	1	—	5
Greek	64	3	—	320
147. Has Petri				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	33	—	—	165
148. Foros				
Muslim	1	—	—	5
Greek	37	—	2	193
149. Kirano				
Muslim	4	1	—	20
Greek	25	—	2	133
150. Büyük Hisar				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	14	—	3	82
151. Baydar				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	17	—	1	89
163. Çerkeskirman				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	65	—	7	353
164. Bahadur				
Muslim	2	—	—	10
Greek	65	—	3	337
165. Uğri Kusta				
Muslim	1	—	—	5
Greek	46	—	7	234
166. Tuli				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	27	—	4	151

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167. Çorgana				
Muslim	6	—	—	30
Greek	25	—	7	153
168. Büyük Muskomia				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	43	—	—	215
169. Limona				
Muslim	2	1	—	10
Greek	22	—	4	130
170. Sembos				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	30	—	—	150
163. Sikite				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	38	—	3	202
184. Koca Salası				
Muslim	1	—	—	5
Greek	82	—	11	454
185. Vikne				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	48	—	6	264
186. Kipia				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	37	6	—	185
187. Yalta				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	48	—	4	256
188. Dere				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	41	—	3	217
189. Avitka				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	34	—	—	170
190. Marsanda				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	19	—	2	103
191. Gurzuf				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	150	—	2	758
192. Partenit (Kırkkullat)				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	114	—	7	598

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193. Lambat (Küçük ve Büyük)				
Muslim	2	—	—	10
Greek	73	—	2	353
194. Keknos				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	25	—	2	133
I. City of Kerş				
198. quarter of the large mosque "Şerif"				
Muslim	44	3	—	230
200. non-Muslim community	73	—	—	365
J. Villages in the district of Kerş				
203. Boğuk				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	3	—	—	15
204. Hafiz Ilyas				
Muslim	8	—	—	40
Greek	24	1	—	120
205. Çankazıya				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	20	—	—	100
K. District of Taman				
207. Muslim community in town of Taman: quarter of small mosque of Kasım Paşa	25	3	—	125
218. community of Circassians (Christian)	9	5	—	45
219. community of Greeks	3	—	—	15
L. District of Azak				
220. district of the Venetian fort (Muslim)	35	10	—	175
221. district of the Genoese fort (Muslim)	17	1	—	85
222. community of? in the *kale-i hakk* (Muslim)	89	4	—	455
223. community of? in the *kale-i hakk* (Muslim)	22	2	—	110
225. community of Rus in the Venetian fort	21	—	—	105
226. community of Jani Circassians in the Genoese fort (Orthodox)	17	—	2	93
227. community of fisherman and netters of Azak (Greek)	59	—	—	295
229. mustahfizan of the Genoese fort (Muslim)	66	—	—	330
230. mustahfizan of the Venetian fort (Muslim)	69	—	—	343

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II. From the Census of 1545 (T. ve T. 214)

	Hane	*Müc.*	*Bive*	*Total*
A. City and district of Kefe (Muslims)				
a. section of city of Kefe called Frenk Hisar				
1. quarter of small mosque of Bozuca Reis	7	2	—	85
2. quarter of small mosque of Hace Çanak	22	6	—	110
3. quarter of small mosque of Hace Şa'ban	3	—	—	15
4. quarter of small mosque of Mevzala	14	4	—	70
5. quarter of small mosque of Eymeni Mehmed	27	13	—	135
6. quarter of small mosque of Haci Güver	25	6	—	125
7. quarter of small mosque of Milat	3	—	—	15
8. quarter of small mosque of Çineli	63	21	—	315
9. quarter of small mosque of Mercan Ağa	38	8	—	190
10. quarter of small mosque of Haci Yani	8	—	—	40
b. section of city of Kefe called Kale-i Birun				
11. quarter of small mosque of Halil Bekçi	62	16	—	310
12. quarter of small mosque of Vaiz Sinan	21	4	—	105
13. quarter of small mosque of Hace Hasan	49	5	—	245
14. quarter of small mosque of Sinan Ağa	28	5	—	140
15. quarter of large mosque (cami-i kebir)	49	—	—	245
16. quarter of new mosque "Gölbaşı"	44	29	—	220
17. quarter of small mosque Hatuniye-i Merhum Müftü Veli der merhum Şerif Sultan Mehmed	75	26	—	375
18. quarter of small mosque of Seyyid Yalçın	34	5	—	170
19. quarter of small mosque of Hace Vahi	55	17	—	275
20. quarter of small mosque of Mehmed Serdar	66	22	—	330
21. quarter of small mosque of Ferhad Ağa	72	23	—	360
22. quarter of small mosque of Akbaşı	37	9	—	185
23. quarter of small mosque of Seyyid Şırvani	41	9	—	210
24. quarter of small mosque of Çat Çat. formerly called Ayos Bekçibi	30	4	—	150
25. quarter of small mosque of Hoca Hasan	4	1	—	20
26. community of the famous Mehmed al Din Hisarı	—	3	—	3
27. households of small mosque of the above	1	2	—	5
28. quarter of small mosque Hayreddin	34	8	—	170
29. quarter of small mosque of Hızır Zaviye	51	6	—	255
30. quarter of small mosque of Kasım Paşa	80	24	—	400
31. quarter of Demirciyan (formerly Seyyid Mehmed)	15	—	—	75

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c. section of city of Kefe called Kale-i Hakk					
32.	quarter of small mosque of Ahmed	36	24	—	180
33.	quarter of small mosque of Hayak Ağa	44	7	—	220
34.	quarter of small mosque of Mengli Hafiz	23	1	—	115
35.	quarter of small mosque of Ebu Kemal	74	3	—	370
36.	quarter of small mosque of Kahya Sinan Fakir	32	6	—	160
37.	quarter of small mosque of Bosna	40	14	—	200
38.	quarter of small mosque of Haci Idris	80	16	—	400
39.	quarter of small mosque of the fort's gate	5	—	—	25
40.	quarter of Circassians residing in village of Baybuga near Kefe	30	3	—	150
41.	quarter of Tatars residing at Sarı Gül near Kefe	18	3	—	90
44.	quarter of retainers of Sultan Süleyman	16	—	—	80
B. City and district of Kefe (non-Muslims)					
51.	quarter of St. Thoros (Greek)	76	13	6	404
52.	quarter of St. Thoros (Armenian)	77	16	16	449
53.	quarter of St. Sarkis (Greek)	31	—	—	155
54.	quarter of St. Sarkis (Armenian)	54	11	9	306
55.	quarter of St. Minkinar (Greek)	121	25	31	629
56.	quarter of St. Minkinar (Armenian)	28	2	6	164
57.	quarter of St. Iskender (Greek)	15	2	—	75
58.	quarter of St. İskender (Armenian)	84	26	16	484
59.	quarter of St. Karapet (Greek)	25	4	5	145
60.	quarter of St. Karapet (Armenian)	64	18	11	364
61.	quarter of Taş Taban (Greek)	12	1	2	68
62.	quarter of Taş Taban (Armenian)	46	10	9	266
63.	quarter of Gürcü Kabak (Armenian)	87	14	4	451
64.	quarter of St. Ioanna (Armenian)	68	10	9	376
65.	quarter of Aş Beğ (Greek)	24	5	9	155
66.	quarter of Aş Beğ (Armenian)	129	21	9	681
67.	quarter of Balıkçı (Greek)	38	9	16	254
68.	quarter of Balıkçı (Armenian)	52	10	9	296
69.	community of Gayri yüzbaşı in the Frenk Hisar (Jewish)	42	9	15	270
70.	quarter of St. Kirikor (Armenian)	127	20	16	699
71.	quarter of St. Kaşot (Armenian)	146	43	14	786
72.	quarter of St. Hreştakapet (Armenian)	112	18	10	600
73.	community of Circassians "penah"	64	—	—	320
74.	community of Rusyan	27	1	3	147
75.	community of Ishak yüzbaşı (Jewish)	81	27	15	465
76.	community of Circassian Jews	3	—	—	15
77.	community of Jews "Efrenciyan"	8	40	6	64

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C. Villages in the district of Soğudak

79. Kutlak				
Muslim	4	—	—	20
Greek	9	—	1	49
80. Taşlu				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	19	3	3	107
81. Tokluk				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	13	2	1	69
82. Aya Yudin (?)				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	37	3	3	197
83. Arpadi				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	7	—	—	35
84. Kozlu				
Muslim	2	—	—	10
Greek	9	9	—	45
85. Şuma				
Muslim	1	—	—	5
Greek	15	9	—	75
86. Kopsel				
Muslim	3	—	—	15
Greek	67	6	10	375
87. Vorin				
Muslim	5	—	—	25
Greek	20	14	4	116
88. Kapsikhor				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	38	22	6	214
89. Uskut				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	82	10	3	422
107. Monastir				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	43	25	2	223
108. Kuru Özen				
Muslim	1	—	—	5
Greek	92	25	10	500
109. Ulu Özen				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	53	5	1	269

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110. Demirci				
Muslim	5	—	—	25
Greek	44	20	2	230
111. Korbaklu				
Muslim	5	—	—	25
Greek	25	16	4	141
112. Küçük Özen				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	33	16	10	205
113. Aluşta				
Muslim	12	9	—	60
Greek	111	63	10	595
Jew	18	3	—	90
D. City of Soğudak				
90. Muslims living in quarter of small mosque of Sinan	10	3	—	50
91. quarter of St. Dayalaya (Greek)	10	1	1	54
92. quarter of St. Mihail (Greek)	5	2	—	25
93. quarter of St. Agap (Greek)	5	—	—	25
94. quarter of St. Filiban (Greek)	2	—	—	10
95. quarter of St. Todor (Greek)	6	—	1	34
96. quarter of St. Nikovla (Greek)	17	4	2	93
97. quarter of St. ? (Greek)	20	5	3	112
98. quarter of St. Yakoş (Greek)	16	3	4	96
99. quarter of St. Danoş (Greek)	13	3	3	77
100. quarter of St. Nike (Greek)	25	22	8	157
101. quarter of St. Nikola (Greek)	3	3	1	19
102. quarter of St. Andre (Greek)	17	8	5	105
103. quarter of Fodola Beğ (Greek)	46	4	10	270
104. quarter of Kostandin (Greek)	29	9	8	177
105. quarter of St. Yorgi (Greek)	12	2	2	68
106. community of Armenians in Soğudak	14	6	1	74
106a. community of Jews in Soğudak	—	—	—	—
E. City of Mankup				
116. quarter of the camii-i şerif (Muslim)	18	—	—	90
117. quarter of small mosque of Kaçanma (Muslim)	10	—	—	50
118. quarter of small mosque of Hace Seyyid (Muslim)	8	—	—	40
119. community of Jews in Mankup	35	3	—	175
126. community of Greeks in Mankup	13	6	3	77
127. community of Armenians in Mankup	8	—	—	40

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F. City of Balıklağu				
152. quarter of the large mosque (Muslim)	6	3	—	30
153. quarter of small Friday mosque (Muslim)	19	—	—	95
155. community of Tatars	6	—	—	30
156. quarter of St. Minkuban (Greek)	45	14	6	249
157. quarter of St. Mitineris (Greek)	19	9	2	103
158. quarter of St. Nikola (Greek)	12	1	2	68
159. quarter of St. Yani (Greek)	9	—	—	45
160. quarter of St. Mihail (Greek)	13	2	—	65
161. community of Armenians	18	2	2	98
162. community of Jews	11	—	—	55
G. City of Inkirman				
174. quarter of Gayri Yani (Muslim)	19	4	—	95
175. quarter of small mosque of ? (Muslim)	21	—	—	105
177. quarter of St. Filiban (Greek)	34	4	—	160
178. quarter of St. Fidari (Greek)	5	—	—	25
179. quarter of St. ? (Greek)	8	—	—	40
180. quarter of St. ? (Greek)	27	2	5	155
181. quarter of St. Aşliyanis (Greek)	20	—	3	112
182. quarter of St. Mihail (Greek)	47	—	3	247
183. community of Armenians	9	—	1	49
H. Villages in the district of Mankup				
120. Apara				
Muslim	5	—	—	25
Greek	8	5	—	40
121. Aṭim Çağbağı				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	1	—	—	5
122. Kirmancik				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	3	—	—	15
123. Gavri				
Muslim	8	—	—	40
Greek	15	8	1	79
124. Süren				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	33	—	5	185
125. Uçe				
Muslim	1	—	—	5
Greek	3	—	3	27

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134. Markuri				
Muslim	4	—	—	20
Greek	11	11	1	59
135. Yancu				
Muslim	3	3	—	15
Greek	3	—	—	15
136. Kuklus				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	11	5	—	55
137. Bağan (formerly Cömlekçi)				
Muslim	3	—	—	15
Greek	16	14	3	92
138. Küçük Muskomiye				
Muslim	3	—	—	15
Greek	32	4	9	196
140. Kılınzı				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	12	—	1	64
141. Kamire				
Muslim	4	3	—	20
Greek	22	19	8	161
142 Hayto				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	47	9	5	264
143. Gevher				
Muslim	70	26	—	376
Greek	27	13	—	148
144. Taş Iskele				
Muslim	1	2	—	7
Greek	18	9	1	103
145. Savatika				
Muslim	3	1	—	15
Greek	13	4	1	69
146. Miskhor				
Muslim	5	2	—	10
Greek	46	24	4	246
147. Has Petri				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	11	12	4	71
148. Foros				
Muslim	9	—	—	45
Greek	41	6	3	217

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149. Kirano				
Muslim	7	—	—	35
Greek	16	11	1	84
151. Baydar				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	21	5	4	121
163. Çerkeskirman				
Muslim	5	3	—	25
Greek	44	9	—	220
164. Bahadur				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	25	25	4	225
165. Uğri Kusta				
Muslim	6	—	—	30
Greek	45	4	1	229
166. Tuli				
Muslim	1	—	—	5
Greek	29	16	1	149
167. Çorgana				
Muslim	8	4	—	40
Greek	25	6	5	145
168. Büyük Muskomia				
Muslim	1	—	—	5
Greek	30	6	6	174
169. Limona				
Muslim	6	1	—	30
Greek	13	2	2	73
170. Sembos				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	31	4	1	159
171. Sikite				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	49	3	1	249
172. Küçük Sikite				
Muslim	8	—	—	40
Greek	—	—	—	—
184. Koca Salası				
Muslim	7	8	—	35
Greek	50	24	6	274
185. Vikne				
Muslim	2	—	—	10
Greek	72	9	10	400

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186. Kipia				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	35	12	5	195
187. Yalta				
Muslim	1	—	—	—
Greek	60	4	2	308
188. Dere				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	39	5	2	203
189. Avitka				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	33	5	2	173
190. Marsanda				
Muslim	—	—	—	—
Greek	14	3	—	70
191. Gurzuf				
Muslim	4	—	—	20
Greek	110	61	18	622
192. Patenit (Kırkkullat)				
Muslim	6	3	—	30
Greek	87	40	4	451
193. Lambat (Küçük ve Büyük)				
Muslim	3	—	—	15
Greek	60	34	9	336
194. Keknos				
Muslim	4	1	—	20
Greek	34	4	3	182
I. City of Kerş				
196. quarter of the large mosque of Sultan Bayezit Veli (Muslim)	50	4	—	254
197. quarter of the large mosque of Hace Sinan (Muslim)	72	9	—	364
200a. non-Muslim community	47	3	—	238
J. Villages in the district of Kerş				
202. Kamış Burun				
Muslim	19	—	—	95
Greek	28	—	—	140
203. Boğuk				
Muslim	4	—	—	20
Greek	45	—	—	225

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204.	Hafiz Ilyas				
	Muslim	18	—	—	90
	Greek	11	—	—	55
205.	Çankazıya				
	Muslim	2	—	—	10
	Greek	8	—	—	40
206.	?				
	Muslim	16	—	—	80
	Greek	—	—	—	—
	K. District of Taman				
207.	Muslim community in town of Taman; quarter of small mosque of Kasım Paşa	69	—	—	345
208.	community of servitors (hizmetkar) of the fort of Taman (Muslim)	16	—	—	80
209.	community of Muslims in fort of Taman (Muslim)	17	—	—	85
210.	community of mustahfizan of fort of Taman	3	—	—	15
211.	community of cavalry in Taman (Muslim)	11	—	—	55
212.	community of Greeks in Taman	103	—	—	515
213.	community of Greeks in Temruk	5	—	—	25
214.	community of cavalry in Temruk	4	—	—	20
215.	community of Christian retainers of the forts of Taman and Temruk	80	—	—	400
	I. District of Azak				
220.	district of the Venetian fort (Muslim)	118	—	—	590
221.	district of the Genese fort (Muslim)	78	—	—	390
224.	community of Tatars in the *Kale-i hakk* (Muslim)	170	—	—	850
227.	community of fishermen and netters of Azak (Greek)	105	—	—	525
228.	community of Greeks in the *Kale-i hakk*	10	—	—	50
228a.	community of Circassians in the *Kale-i hakk* (Orthodox)	47	—	—	235
229.	mustahfizan of the Genoese fort (Muslim)	32	—	—	160
229a.	mustahfizan of the *kale-i hakk* (Muslim)	18	—	—	90
230.	mustahfizan of the Venetian fort (Muslim)	31	—	—	155
230a.	community of shopkeepers in the Venetian fort (Muslim)	15	—	—	75
231.	? in Azak	25	—	—	125

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III. The Twenty Largest Towns in 1529 and in 1545

	1529			*1545*	
1.	Kefe	15,461	1.	Kefe	17,302
2.	Azak	1,983	2.	Azak	3,370
3.	Soğudak	1,702	3.	Soğudak	1,455
4.	Inkirman	1,074	4.	Inkirman	1,010
5.	Balıklağu	987	5.	Balıklağu	856
6.	Mankup	913	6.	Kerş	845
7.	Aluşta	845	7.	Aluşta	745
8.	Gurzuf	758	8.	Gurzuf	642
9.	Partenit	598	9.	Gevher	524
10.	Kerş	585	10.	Mankup	505
11.	Koca Salası	459	11.	Kuru Özen	505
12.	Kuru Özen	413	12.	Partenit	481
13.	Lambat	383	13.	Uskut	422
14.	Çerkeskirman	353	14.	Vikne	410
15.	Demirci	350	15.	Kopsel	390
16.	Bahadur	347	16.	Lambat	351
17.	Miskhor	325	17.	Koca Salası	309
18.	Süren	310	18.	Yalta	308
19.	Kapsikhor	292	19.	Ulu Özen	269
20.	Uskut	292	20.	Foros	264

IV. Biggest Percentage Changes in Population, 1529-1545

	Increase (+)			Decrease (-)	
1.	Kamış Burun	—	1.	Büyük Hisar	100%
2.	Boğuk	1533%	2.	Sotira	100%
3.	Küçük Özen	356%	3.	Atim Çağrağı	82%
4.	Kuzlak	97%	4.	Üce	67%
5.	Gevher	86%	5.	Kirmancik	63%
6.	Azak	70%	6.	Has Petri	57%
7.	Vikne	55%	7.	Markuri	54%
8.	Keknos	52%	8.	Çankazıya	50%
9.	Uskut	45%	9.	Savatika	48%
10.	Kerş	44%	10.	Mankup	45%
11.	Kopsel	37%	11.	Şuma	42%
12.	Baydar	36%	12.	Süren	40%
13.	Foros	32%	13.	Arpadi	35%
14.	Gavri	25%	14.	Bahadur	35%
15.	Sikite	23%	15.	Koca Salası	33%
16.	Kamire	23%	16.	Marsanda	32%
17.	Yalta	20%	17.	Çerkeskirman	31%
			18.	Kozlu	29%
			19.	Demirci	27%
			20.	Kapsıkhor	26%

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V. Biggest Changes in Population, in Absolute Numbers

	Increase			Decrease	
1.	Kefe	1,841	1.	Mankup	408
2.	Azak	1,387	2.	Soğudak	247
3.	Kerş	260	3.	Koca Salası	150
4.	Gevher	242	4.	Balıklağu	131
5.	Kamış Burnu	235	5.	Süren	125
6.	Boğuk	230	6.	Bahadur	122
7.	Küçük Özen	160	7.	Partenit	117
8.	Vikne	146	8.	Gurzuf	116
9.	Uskut	130	9.	Sotira	114
10.	Kopsel	109	10.	Çerkeskirman	108

VI. Population Changes in the Vilayet, 1529-45 (includes added Muslim widows)*

District	*Total*	*Muslim*	*Greek*	*Armenian*	*Jew*	*Other*
A. & B. Kefe						
1529	15,461	4,477	2,403	7,530	822	229
1545	17,302	8,113	1,986	5,922	814	467
C. Soğudak villages						
1529	3,954	125	3,720	—	108	—
1545	4,145	190	3,865	—	90	—
D. Soğudak						
1529	1,702	119	1,438	135	10	—
1545	1,455	59	1,322	74	—	—
E. Mankup						
1529	913	161	460	40	252	—
1545	505	213	77	40	175	—
F. Balıklağu						
1529	987	134	692	82	79	—
1545	856	173	530	98	55	—
G. Inkirman						
1529	1,074	178	851	45	—	—
1545	1,010	212	749	49	—	—

*Since households headed by Muslim widows were not taxed, these were not counted in either census. Households headed by non-Muslim widows were counted, and I have used the multiplier of 4x—a normal household of 5 less 1—for these. To make the figures for Muslim and non-Muslim populations comparable, on this chart I have added households headed by Muslim widows at the same proportion as that for the non-Muslim communities.

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District	*Total*	*Muslim*	*Greek*	*Armenian*	*Jew*	*Other*
H. Mankup						
villages						
1529	8,867	304	8,563	—	—	—
1545	8,037	1,018	7,019	—	—	—
I. Kerş						
1529	585	220	365	—	—	—
1545	845	610	235	—	—	—
J. Kerş						
villages						
1529	275	40	235	—	—	—
1545	755	295	460	—	—	—
K. Taman						
1529	185	125	15	—	—	—
1545	1,540	600	940	—	—	—
L. Azak						
1529	1,983	1,490	295	—	—	—
1545	3,370	2,435	700	—	—	—
Totals						
1529	35,986	7,373	19,038	7,832	1,271	472
1545	39,820	13,918	17,883	6,183	1,134	702

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THE OTTOMAN CRIMEA IN THE MID-SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: SOME PROBLEMS AND PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS*

What was the effect of the upsurge of Cossack raiding activity on the local Crimean population and economy? This is perhaps the most important unasked question about the Ottoman Crimea in the seventeenth century. Much has been written about the Cossacks and their relations with both Ottomans and Crimean Tatars, and a good deal of attention has been placed on their raiding activity all along the shores of the Black Sea. But little attention has been drawn towards the inevitably negative effects these raids had on the health of Ottoman possessions in the north.

That events in the seventeenth century had important political and economic result in the Crimea is well known. Problems in Ottoman domestic politics, the decline of bureaucratic effectiveness, and the virtual disappearance of able Ottoman leaders brought about important changes in all Ottoman possessions during this period.

We know that at some undetermined time between 1600 and 1750, the entire configuration of Ottoman-Crimean Tatar political relations changed completely. At the end of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Crimea was a totally separate administrative entity, with its own officials, jurisdictions, and carefully defined territorial integrity. There was a clear dividing line between the possessions of the Ottoman sultan and those of the Crimean khan. But by the middle of the eighteenth century, this dividing line was nonexistent at worst and vaguely defined at best. And by the time of the Russian annexation of the peninsula, those properties in the Crimean south not in private hands were all under the control of the khan.

What had happened in the intervening time? At the moment it is not possible to determine the exact course of events which produced these drastic changes. Neither Ottoman nor Crimean Tatar chronicles give any information

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about such political and economic matters.[1] And the treatise by Said Giray Sultan, written in the mid-eighteenth century, takes as a given the new configuration of relationships, without explaining their origins.[2]

In this essay I present one possible contributing factor to the new relationships, namely, the sharp decline in the demographic and economic condition of the Ottoman Crimea in the seventeenth century, due in large part to the raids undertaken in the Crimea by both the Zaporozhian and the Don Cossacks.

Evliya Çelebi, the noted Ottoman gentleman-traveler of the mid-seventeenth century, hinted at the Cossack responsibility for the Crimea's decline. Throughout his description of the Ottoman and Tatar Crimeans, Evliya noted the effects of Cossack raids upon town after town.[3] Inkirman he described as a small town with a castle (from pre-Ottoman times) in which there were also ten houses, all empty, an Ottoman garrison of 50 soldiers, a small Tatar suburb with one mosque and a mescid, a Turkish suburb with 250 earthen houses, and a Greek suburb with a church and 200 houses (most empty).

> "Earlier in this valley there were 40,000 houses [obviously an exaggeration]. But during the time of Tohtamış Han [ca. 1608], the infidels destroyed most of the town. At that time the unclean unbelievers came with 100 ships and plundered the city and valley. Today all here are very afraid of the Cossacks and when danger appears, all flee to the protection of the deserted castle[4]."

In his discussion of Saloniya Kale, a village "three hours to the north of Balıklağu," Evliya noted how large and populous the area had been "before the raids of the unbelievers."[5] Soğudak was a city which had seen better days. The inner part of the city (Iç Kale) was "damaged severely by the Cossacks." The quarter of the city "beneath the citadel" [Aşağı Hisar), in "years gone by had 1,000 [again an exaggeration] small churches with 40,000 houses. But now in the area around the citadel there are only 100 houses and two small mosques… There are no shops, no inn, no bath, no upper school, no lower school, no

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[1]Tatar chronicles offer nothing noteworthy pertaining to these raids; they concentrate on domestic Tatar politics and their own raids to the north. See Abdul Gaffar, *Umdetüt-Tevarih*, Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası, suppl. 11 (Istanbul, 1924), pp. 1-207; Ozalp Gökbilgin, ed., *Tarih Sahib Giray Han* (Ankara, 1973); Olgierd Górka and Zbigniew Wójcik, eds., *Historia Chana Islam Gereja III* (Warsaw, 1971); Ananiasz Zajaczkowski, ed., *La Chronique des steppes kiptchak: Tevarih-i Dešt-i Qipčak* (Warsaw, 1966).

[2]Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, *Aus den Aufzeichnungen des Said Giray Sultan* (Freiburg, 1975).

[3]See Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname,* vol. 7, Türk Encümeni Küliyati, no. 11 (Istanbul, 1928), pp. 573-706, for descriptions of the Crimea in the period 1668 to 1673. The Crimea is one of the places we know Evliya actually visited.

[4]Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname,* 7:574-75.

[5]Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname,* 7:578.

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dervish convent... And outside the town, below in the valley, is a suburb with only 200 houses."[1]

In fact, Evliya noted effects of Cossack raids in almost all of the towns he visited, except in the city of Kefe itself. In the east, near Kerç, he passed through a village called Kale-i Viran Kilisecik (Castle of the Ruined Church). Here he remarked on the devastation of recent Cossack raids from Azak.[2] Furthermore, when he arrived at the Ottoman fort of Arabat, on the south shore of the Sea of Azov but still on the Crimean peninsula, Evliya gave the story of Cossack depredations as the cause of the fort's construction:

> "Once some Cossacks from the region of Azak were captured and on the way to Kefe, escaped from the boat, and swam to the shore of Heybat. There they joined some renegade Kalmuk Tatars who crossed the sea in a shallow place and began to pillage the Crimea. Mehmed Giray Han [ruled 1641-1644 and 1654-1666] brought 47,000 soldiers, caught the raiders and punished them according to their misdeeds. The Kalmuks he killed outright; the Cossacks were tortured to death. On that shallow spot, the illustrious khan built the Kale-i Arabat.[3]"

In Evliya's time, however, the fort was under Ottoman control. Finally, in his description of the ruins of two small Ottoman forts on the north shore of the Taman' peninsula, Kale-i Anapa and Kale-i Tuzlu, Evliya reported that both "were destroyed by the Azak Cossacks during the period when Azak was in infidel hands [1637-1642]."[4]

We are given very little information of this sort in the accounts of European visitors and travelers through the region in the years just prior to Evliya's journey. Neither Dortelli d'Ascoli (ca. 1634) nor Beauplan (ca. 1650) mentioned pillaged towns nor a declining population or economy; both did discuss the existence of Christian captives and slaves in the Crimea and the successes of Cossack raiders in their attempts to free them.[5]

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[1]Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname,* 7:650-54.

[2]Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname,* 7:687.

[3]Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname,* 7:688. There is little doubt that this event took place during the second period of his reign. The Kalmuks first appeared in the area in 1648, and in 1649 they began to operate in conjunction with certain elements of the Don Cossacks. See A. A. Novosel'skii, *Bor'ba moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v XVII veke* (Moscow, 1948), pp. 358-61; and V. D. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom otomanskoi porty do nachala XVIII veka* (St. Petersburg, 1887), pp. 542-43.

[4]Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname,* 7:706.

[5]Dortelli d'Ascoli's accounts is published in "Opisanie chernogo moria i tatarii," *Zapiski Imperatorskogo odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei* 24 (1902): 89-180. Beauplan's account is published both as *Description d'Ukraine qui sont plusiers Provinces du Royaume de Pologne* (Rouen, 1660), and as *Opisanie Ukrainy* (St. Petersburg, 1832).

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An Armenian chronicle from the mid-seventeenth century, written by an Armenian living in Kefe, corroborates Evliya's dismal account of Crimean affairs, however. Xačatur Kafajeci (who lived between 1615 and 1658) emphasized the dual effects of Cossack raids, on the one hand, and fires and disease, on the other, in accounting for most of the Crimean Armenians' problems.[1] Beginning in July 1616, when "Cossacks stormed Kefe and ravaged the entire inner city," Xačatur proceeded to report the Cossack raid of April 1624 against Eski Krim. In June 1624, he noted, Cossacks in league with Nogai Tatars raided Kefe and ruined "many houses." In 1629 Cossacks "came and raided Kara Su, Çarşı Bazar, and Mankup, when they burned houses and took property... On July 3, they entered Soğudak and stormed its suburb of Otuz, taking all persons away. In the same month other Cossacks with 50 ships attacked Gözleve and burned most of the buildings.[2] In 1628 "Cossacks came and ravaged the quarter in Kefe called Kaşot and the quarter called Gürcü Kabak. They burned houses, mosques, and a tekke."[3] Still, Xačatur gave almost equal weight to natural disasters which befell his community in general during these years: fires in 1617, plague in 1619, epidemics and food shortages in 1623, a "major fire" in Kefe in 1633 which destroyed "several churches."[4]

Ottoman demographic sources for Kefe province in the first two-thirds of the seventeenth century point to a drastic reduction in the non-Muslim population. These sources, in the form of registers of non-Muslim households subject to the *cizye* tax, do not, unfortunately, give any information at all about the Muslim inhabitants, their number, or their activity.[5] When compared with figures on non-Muslim households recorded in an Ottoman census of the province taken in ca. 1545,[6] the *cizye* census figures show in almost every case a sharp decline from the previous century (see table 1-3). The period between ca. 1545 and 1638 experienced a decline of more than 28 percent in the number of non-Muslim households; between 1638 and 1649, the number dropped another 30 percent; and in the final period under consideration, the decline registered 37 percent. In a little more than a century, then, the decline amounted to 69

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[1]Published in E. Schütz, "Eine armenische Chronik von Kaffa aus der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 24, no. 2 (1975): 133-86.

[2]Schütz, "Eine armenische Chronik," pp. 139, 142-44, 146, 148.

[3]Schütz, "Eine armenische Chronik," p. 149.

[4]Schütz, "Eine armenische Chronik," pp. 140, 142.

[5]Although there are at least thirty-five existing registers containing censuses of households subject to *cizye* tax for the seventeenth-century Crimea, I have used only three for this study: Maliyeden Müdevver 15,176 for 1638; Maliyeden Müdevver 1,066 for 1649; and Maliyeden Müdevver 2,937 for 1662; all are in Başbakanlık Arşivi, Istanbul. For a complete listing of those found to date, see A. Fisher, "Ottoman Sources for a Study of Kefe Vilayet: The *Maliyeden Müdevver* Fond in the Başbakanlık Arşivi in Istanbul," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 19, nos. 1-2 (1978): 191-205.

[6]Tapu ve Tahrir (hereafter T.T.) 214, Başbakanlık Arşivi, Istanbul. Published in A. Fisher, "The Ottoman Crimea in the Sixteenth Century", *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* V/1, 1981, pp. 135-170..

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percent. Greeks dropped 67 percent, Armenians 70 percent, and Jews 73 percent. All other non-Muslim communities disappeared entirely (at least from the census).

How does the specific census data compare to the more impressionistic material found in Evliya Çelebi and other contemporary sources? In most cases the sources agree. It is only in the case of the city of Kefe that some discrepancies appear. Here are some specific agreements.

The Armenian chronicler Xačatur recorded the conversion of the Greek church of St. Nikola into a mosque in 1634-1635.[1] It was located in the city quarter of Aş Beğ, which lost its place in the *cizye* census of 1638 (see table 2, no. 65). While Armenians still lived in the quarter, by that date it had no Greek households. Church-mosque conversions normally occurred in Ottoman cities when the church was no longer used or when the quarter no longer contained any inhabitants whose religion was that of the church in question. We can see that this Greek community was already rather small in the census of 1545 (see tables 1-3). Secondly, the chronicles noted that a particularly vicious Cossack raid in 1628 ravaged the quarters of Gürcü Kabak and Kaşot.[2] The census for 1638 indicates a drop in the population of Kaşot to only 21 of the 127 households that existed there in the mid-sixteenth century (see table 2). Yet the quarter of Gürcü Kabak declined only to 48 from 87 households during the same period. Here is a possible connection, but only a possible one.

More interesting and complete are the descriptions and figures given by Evliya Çelebi for many of the Ottoman Crimean towns and cities. From them one gets a general view of the size of the Muslim population (though many of his figures are obviously estimates and some are exaggerated).

Inkirman:[3] In Evliya's time, this town consisted of a central castle area and three suburbs, one Tatar, one Turk, and one Greek. The central castle area had no taxable households, but only a rather small Ottoman garrison. The Tatar suburb had 300 houses of wood, a mosque, a mescid (dated 1523), and a medresse. In the Turkish suburb there were 250 houses of clay. The Greek suburb had 200 houses, most "empty." The *cizye* census of 1638 recorded only 12 Greek households; that of 1662, only 5. In the census of ca. 1545 there were 150 Greek households and only 35 Muslim ones (located in the "inner castle quarter"). No mention was made at that time of Tatar households. From any perspective, the Muslim population of the town had grown considerably, while that of the non-Muslims had shrunk.

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[1]Schütz, "Eine armenische Chronik," p. 149.
[2]Schütz, "Eine armenische Chronik," p. 148.
[3]Evliya Çelebi, *Sehayatname*, 7:573-76.

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Balıklağu:[1] Evliya recorded that this town was an important port of the Ottoman province; it had a customs inspector (*gümrük emini*), a military commander (*dizdar*), and a garrison of 180 soldiers living in 50 stone houses in the inner castle. The town's suburb had 200 two-and three-storied houses for Muslims serviced by a mosque and mescid, one bath, a small inn, more than 80 shops, and a customs office. There were in addition some 70 Greek houses described as "mostly empty." The census of 1638 listed 126 non-Muslim households while that of 1662 showed only 16. In the mid-sixteenth century, there were 127 non-Muslim households and only 24 Muslim. As in Inkirman, the century had brought a decline in non-Muslim and an increase in Muslim inhabitants here. In this case, however, the drop of the former had taken place after 1638.

Kadiköy:[2] Evliya recorded that this town, to the north of Balıklağu but within the Ottoman province, had only Tatar inhabitants, living in some 200 houses. The census of 1638, on the other hand, reported 7 non-Muslim households, and that of 1662 showed three. Apparently by the time of Evliya's visit, this had dropped to 0. In the census of ca. 1545, no Muslim households were listed, while there were 33 Greek households.

Çorgana:[3] Evliya recorded 150 houses, all inhabited by Muslims, one mosque, and one bath. The census of 1638 listed 10 Greek households, and that of 1662, none. In ca. 1545 there were 6 Muslim and 25 Greek households.

Mankup:[4] In Evliya's time, this rather large provincial center had three sections: the castle with 15 houses for the small garrison led by a *dizdar*, and an abandoned mosque which had been once converted from a Greek church; a Muslim suburb with only one small mosque, 100 houses, two fountains, and a bath; and a very large Jewish quarter consisting of 7 mahalles with " 1,000 Jewish houses and 80 tobacco shops. These Jews and their habitations are filthy and unclean. Most of them are Kızılbaş [i.e., from eastern Anatolia or Iran]." In the census of 1638 some 76 Jewish households were listed alongside 41 Greek households; in that of 1649, there were no Greek and only 68 Jewish households; and finally in 1662, there were 51 Jewish households. Clearly, there is a major discrepancy here: either Evliya greatly overestimated their number, or he included in their community the much larger Jewish community of Çufut Kale near Bahçesaray. The latter is unlikely, for the Jews of the Tatar capital are discussed separately elsewhere in his volume. The census of ca. 1545 listed 28 Muslim, 80 Greek, 8 Armenian, and 48 Jewish households. By any

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[1]Evliya Çelebi, *Sehayatname*, 7:579-81.
[2]Evliya Çelebi, *Sehayatname*, 7:581.
[3]Evliya Çelebi, *Sehayatname*, 7:582.
[4]Evliya Çelebi, *Sehayatname*, 7:582-84.

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measurement, however, Mankup's Muslim and Jewish inhabitants had grown in number, whereas its Greek and Armenian households had vanished.

Koca Salası:[1] Evliya mentioned that this town was exclusively Muslim and had 100 households, one rather large mosque, and a bath. All of the censuses of the seventeenth century bear out Evliya's description and list no non-Muslim households. This contrasts markedly with the census of ca. 1545, which listed only 1 muslim household and 82 Greek households.

Süren:[2] Evliya said that this town was for all practical purposes a town of the Tatar khan's, and that it was dominated by a palace belonging to Mehmed Giray Han. Strangely enough, the census of 1638 provided a list of 52 Greek households, while that of 1662 listed only 2. The next few years apparently brought the completion of the exodus (or conversion to Islam) of the Christians. In ca. 1545 Süren had no Muslim and 58 Greek households.

Soğudak:[3] Evliya's description of this town is given above. He mentioned no non-Muslims, though he did not deny their existence in the city. The census of 1638 stated that the city had 124 Greek, 119 Armenian, and 1 Jewish household; those of 1649 and 1662 mentioned none. In ca. 1545, Soğudak had only 23 Muslim, 278 Greek, 27 Armenian, and 2 Jewish households. Between 1545 and 1638 the Armenian population had grown enormously, while that of the Greeks declined; after 1638 both of these seem to have disappeared. By Evliya's time, all the inhabitants seem to have been Muslim. Did the massive and constant raids against Soğudak by Cossacks have any influence on these changes?

Kefe:[4] Evliya gave a very long, extremely detailed, and, in contrast to much of the rest of this Crimean account, quite positive description of the province's capital city of Kefe. It was generally portrayed as a thriving and populous "little Istanbul" worthy of its name. All of the mosques were reported to be in good condition, and even the churches were filled with unbelievers. Evliya gave no estimate of its total population, nor a very accurate analysis of its religious breakdown. But he said there were "altogether 60 mihrabs" (10 large mosques and 50 small ones) and the dates ascribed to many of them place their construction (or conversion from churches) in the seventeenth century. The city had more than 600 baths, 45 shops where water was freely distributed, numerous markets, more than 1,000 shops, and an active slave market. Evliya did note that there were 80 Muslim quarters (obviously some without a

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[1]Evliya Çelebi, *Sehayatname*, 7:586.
[2]Evliya Çelebi, *Sehayatname*, 7:587.
[3]Evliya Çelebi, *Sehayatname*, 7:650-54.
[4]Evliya Çelebi, *Sehayatname*, 7:666-84.

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mosque), while the unbelievers had more than 120 quarters. There were 160 flour mills, all of which were powered by horses, although the city had such a supply of "poor" that many could be and were operated on occasion by human power.

The censuses of the seventeenth century do not speak of Muslims, yet their evidence on non-Muslims seems to disagree quite substantially with Evliya's estimates of numbers of quarters. In 1638 there were 8 Greek quarters with 193 households and 13 Armenian quarters with 545 households, as well as communities of Circassians with 30 households, of Rus' with 12 households, and of Armenians "from the land of Rus" with 40 households. In the 1662 census the number of quarters and households had decreased to 6 Greek quarters with 39 households, 13 Armenian quarters with 136 households; no Jews, Rus', or Circassians were listed. Thus the non-Muslim population of Kefe city in 1662 was 22 percent Greek and 78 percent Armenian, a change from 1638, when it was 26 percent Greek and 74 percent Armenian.

The census of ca. 1545 included 7 Greek quarters with 343 households, 13 Armenian quarters with 1,074 households, and 27 Rus', 64 Circassian, and 134 Jewish households grouped in the census by community. In that year, of Kefe city's non-Muslim population the Greeks accounted for 21 percent, the Armenians for 65 percent, the Jews for 8 percent, the Rus' for 1.6 percent, and the Circassians for 4 percent. From the perspective of the non-Muslim population, Kefe was thus an Armenian city.

The censuses of the sixteenth century, which gave tax liabilities for the entire population beyond the capitation tax, indicated that the non-Muslim elements of the province were responsible for a large proportion of the economic activity from which the state derived its tax revenues. A change in the nature of the province's population, as reflected in the sources from the seventeenth century — that is, a large decline among non-Muslim and a possible rise in the general Muslim population — would have had a large impact on the economic health of the state's economy. Until those sources that provide such evidence are examined, however, no conclusions can be drawn on this question.

The fact that the Ottoman traveler Evliya and the Armenian chronicler from Kefe continuously blamed Cossack raids in large part for what both considered economic and demographic problems in the province leads me to conclude that these raids had enormous negative influences upon the Ottoman province in the Crimea and its economy. Of course, we must remember that between 1685 and 1740 there were two major invasions of the peninsula by Muscovite forces, which must have taken their toll, as well. These events, in turn, may well have resulted in the political and jurisdictional changes which

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took place by 1750 in the relationships between the Ottoman and Crimean Tatar governments. The Ottomans may have come to believe that their continued control of large areas of the peninsula could no longer bring the desired rewards.

What is clear is that both the Ottoman census of 1662 and Evliya's accounts of his visits at the end of that decade describe a region in decline. This may explain the Ottoman willingness to grant the Tatars more jurisdictional authority in what had once been Ottoman towns. Ottoman failure to gain the Ukrainian Cossacks' allegiance after 1654 and especially after Doroshenko's fall contributed to Ottoman reappraisals. Preferring to concentrate their efforts in the Crimea on maintaining isolated military garrisons, the Ottoman government turned its attention in the last decades of the seventeenth century towards the Polish Ukraine.

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TABLE 1:

NON-MUSLIM HOUSEHOLDS IN THE OTTOMAN CRIMEA SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS

	*Towns**	*1545*	*1638*	*1662*
81.	Tokluk	13	7	2
85.	Şuma	15	19	7
89.	Uskut	82	40	19
108.	Kuru Özen	92	98	27
109.	Ulu Özen	53	34	12
112.	Küçük Özen	33	61	32
113.	Aluşta	111	53	34
124.	Süren	33	52	21
149.	Kanuş	16	34	23
156.	Balıklağu	127	126	16
177.	İnkerman	150	12	5
91.	Soğudak	242	244	48
141.	Kamire	22	61	33
146.	Miskhor	46	60	14
163.	Çerkeskerman	44	31	18
185.	Dereköy	72	58	40
187.	Yalta	60	70	39
191.	Gurzuf	110	130	110
193.	Lambaz (Büyük ve Küçük)	60	42	26

*The numbers before town names refer to numbers assigned by this author to all quarters, cities, and towns in the Ottoman Crimea mentioned in two mid-sixteenth century censuses. These are presented in the previous article in this volume. The figures for 1545 are taken from T.T. 214; those for 1638 are from Maliyeden Müdevver 15,176; those for 1662 are from Maliyeden Müdevver 2,937; all are in the Başbakanlık Arşivi, İstanbul.

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TABLE 2:

NON-MUSLIM HOUSEHOLDS IN KEFE CITY

*Quarter or Community***	*1545*	*1638*	*1662*
51. Thoros (Greek)	76	20	5
52. Thoros (Armenian)	77	62	14
53. Sarkis (Greek)	31	5	0
54. Sarkis (Armenian)	54	15	9
55. Minkinar (Greek)	121	17	8
56. Minkinar (Armenian)	28	42	9
57. Iskender (Greek)	15	2	0
58. Iskender (Armenian)	84	30	11
59. Karapet (Greek)	25	27	10
60. Karapet (Armenian)	64	75	6
61. Taş Taban (Greek)	12	41	5
62. Taş Taban (Armenian)	46	60	10
63. Gürcü Kabak (Armenian)	87	48	18
64. Ioanna (Armenian)	68	28	10
65. Aş Beğ (Greek)	24	0	0
66. Aş Beğ (Armenian)	129	42	18
67. Balıkçi (Greek)	38	79	9
68. Balıkçi (Armenian)	52	9	7
70. Kirikor (Armenian)	127	21	8
71A. Kaşot (Greek)	0	2	2
71. Kaşot (Armenian)	146	21	8
72. Hreştakapet (Armenian)	112	92	8
73. Circassian Christians	64	30	0
74. Rusyan	27	12	0
75. Jews	134	0	0
75A. Armenians from Rus'	0	40	0
Totals	1,641	820	147

**The numbers before the quarter names refer to numbers assigned by this author to all quarters, cities, and towns in the Ottoman Crimea, presented in the prior article in this volume.

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TABLE 3:

NON-MUSLIM HOUSEHOLDS IN THE OTTOMAN CRIMEA ***

Religious Community	*1545*	*1638*	*1649*	*1662*
Armenian	1109 (25.8%)	775 (25.3%)	559 (28.2%)	328 (24.5%)
Greek	2894 (67.4%)	2147 (70.1%)	159 (68.6%)	959 (71.6%)
Jew	198 (4.6%)	77 (2.5%)	68 (3.3%)	53 (3.9%)
Rus'	27 (0.6%)	12 (0.4%)	—	—
Circassian Christian	64 (1.5%)	39 (1.3%)	—	—
Gypsy	—	12 (0.4%)	—	—
Totals	4292	3062	2126	1340

*** Figures for 1545 are taken from T.T. 214; those for 1638 are from Maliyeden Müdevver 15,176; those for 1649 are from Maliyeden Müdevver, 1,066; those for 1662 are from Maliyeden Müdevver 2,937; all are in the Başbakanlık Arşivi, İstanbul.

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CRIMEAN SEPARATISM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Strivings for national identity or national consciousness usually contain both positive and negative characteristics. On the one hand are the attempts to provide a new social and political framework for the nationality in which it is able to make manifest its own identity. Of equal importance are attempts to eliminate the existing social and political conditions in which nationality play a subordinate or nonexistent role. By concentrating on the first characteristic at the expense of the second, historians have come to view national movements as at least normal political developments, and even inevitable. However, the Ottoman Empire and its breakup in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries provide a set of historical cases where the second aspect of nationalism is even more important than the first.

To deal in a sophisticated manner with nationalism and separatism in the Ottoman Empire, one must first analyze the existing social and political conditions against which the nationalists or separatists were acting. Almost everywhere one looks in the Ottoman Empire, the relationships between a province and the center were different — the Danubian principalities, the North African amirates, the Egyptian Mamlukes, the Anatolian derebeyliks, the Caucasian shaykhdoms, and the Crimean khanate. Where one finds voevodas, amirs, sultans, beys, shaykhs, and khans, one also finds very different sets of ties between province and center. One could even make the point that Istanbul itself was governed as an adjunct to various government departments and later as a province, not as an imperial center. And if, as it seems clear, these relationships were very different from the start, might not the movements to change these conditions also take on very different characteristics?

In considering this question, an examination of the Crimean khanate is of special significance. On all the Ottoman provinces, the khanate maintained more of its independence and sovereignty than any other. And though its territory was not the first that the Ottomans lost, it was in fact the first self-contained province to break away from the empire (albeit with Russian help and encouragement) at a time when "nationalism" and "national consciousness" had scarcely emerged anywhere else. Finally, it was the first Muslim land to be lost irrevocably by the Muslim Ottoman sultan. To understand the significance of the Crimean separatist movement and the effect that its loss had upon the

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Ottoman government, we must first attempt to describe and analyze the realities of Crimean-Ottoman relations in the period before the 1770s, when the break occurred.

Halim Giray Sultan's *Gülbün-ü hanan yahud Kirim tarihi* [The Rose Garden of the Khans], published in Istanbul in 1909 but written in 1811, is the best known of the Tatar histories or chronicles to deal with Crimean affairs independently of Ottoman events. It was composed during a period when Crimean Tatar identity was apparently disappearing, when the Tatar homeland (the Crimea) was being heavily resettled by Russian and Ukrainian colonists and large numbers of Tatars were fleeing to Istanbul. Halim Giray's book is understandably bitter toward the Russians, the Ottoman government, and also those of his own Tatar brothers who worked hard for "separatism" and independence in the last half of the eighteenth century. It is particularly the Girays and clan leaders who ruled in the 1760s and 1770s who bear the brunt of his criticism, and his arguments do seem to strike at the heart of the ultimate failures of the separatist movement. This was the inability of the Tatar leaders to see that the ideal of Tatar independence would have to be tempered by the realities of the power of both the Ottomans (on the decline) in the south and that of the Russians (increasing) in the north. The Tatar leaders either refused or were unable to take into consideration these power shifts when they embarked upon what Halim Giray termed their "adventure in folly."

In addition to his bitterness, Halim Giray's writing reveals a good deal of sadness or sentimental reflection on what might have been. He realizes clearly that the ideas of Crimean separatism, which, when put into practice, virtually eliminated the Crimean Tatars as a distinct entity, did not make a sudden and unexpected appearance; that they had centuries of tradition and experience behind them; that really almost from the beginning of the Crimean khanate, the seeds of this separatism had existed, appearing more or less strongly at different times. He admits that his criticism has to be aimed at all Crimean history; thus the format of his work is a thumbnail sketch of the reigns of various Crimean Giray khans. It is this background to the overt movement toward separatism, not its outcome, that will be the primary concern of this essay.[1] Halim Giray would not know, of course, that his book would have a great impact on a new leader of Tatar nationalism within the Russian Empire, Ismail Bey Gaspirali, whose intellectual movement would attempt to relate Tatar and Islamic traditions to modern non-Islamic nationalist movements.

In the royal palace of the Crimean Giray khans near Bahçesaray, there used to be an inscription over the main entrance that stated: "Kirim Giray Khan,

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son of his excellency Devlet Giray, the source of peace and security, wise sovereign, his imperial star rose above the glorious horizon. His beautiful Crimean throne gave brilliant illumination to the whole world."[1] The inscription, which dates from the second third of the eighteenth century, includes some unusual terminology when one recalls that the khanate had been a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire for three centuries, that the period of the khanate's grandeur had ended long before, and that Khan Kirim Giray, like many of his predecessors, had in fact been appointed by the Ottoman sultan, in his case, Osman III. Words such as "sovereign," "imperial star," and "throne" seem out of place in an account of the characteristics of a vassal of the Ottoman ruler. A century earlier the Crimean khan bore the following title: "Of the Great Horde, and Great Iurt, of the Kipçak Steppe, Crimean State, of the innumerable Tatars and Nogays, Great Sovereign, His Excellency Giray Khan."[2] Again one meets "sovereign," but with the addition of "state."

In both the inscription and title, one finds elements of the real nature of Crimean politics in the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries and clues to the reality of Crimean Tatar-Ottoman political relations during this period. Did the Ottomans and Crimeans themselves look upon their relationships as those between sovereign and vassal, sovereign and subjects, sovereign and sovereign?

The basis for the political relationships between the Crimean Tatars and the Ottomans had two ingredients: historical tradition and geopolitical necessity. To understand the nature of later Crimean separatism, and the effect of the actual separation of the Crimea from the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century on both parties, we must first establish the main characteristics of these two aspects of their relations.

Ottoman political ideology by the middle of the sixteenth century combined three distinct traditions, all of which were incorporated within the official titles of the sultans, to wit: Islamic (protector of the Holy Places), Byzantine-Roman (emperor of the two seas), and Central Asian Turkic (khan, and padişah-i deşt-i kipçak). It was the last of the three that was significant for Ottoman-Crimean relations. Feridun Bey provides one document where the sultan, in a letter to the Polish king, even claimed to be padişah of the Tatar lands of Kefe, Krim, Deşt-i Kipçak, and Dağestan.[3] In the historical chronicles written by both Crimean and Ottoman authors, political descent from Çingiz Han was used to provide legitimacy for suzerainty over large parts of the Turkic

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[1]A. Borzenko and A. Negri, "Bakhchisaraiskaia arabskaia i turetskaia nadpisi," *Zapiski odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei* (1848), 2:295.

[2]A. Skal'kovskii, "Zaniatice Kryma v 1783 g," *Zhurnal ministerstva narodnago prosveshcheniia* 30 (1841): pt. 2, p. 3.

[3]Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961), pp. 10-14; Feridun Bey, *Münşeat-i Selatin* (Istanbul, 1849), 2:419-25, 529.

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world.[1] And in their relationship to Çingiz Han, the Crimean khans of the Giray clan could go even further than the Ottomans, since they believed themselves directly descended, not only politically but physically, from the khan of the Great Horde.[2] In this belief the Ottomans concurred, using the epithet *cingiziye,* when referring to the Girays, in almost all correspondence from Istanbul to Bahçesaray. It was this claim of genealogical descent of the khans and the sultans which was a special one, in which each often viewed the other as a sovereign. Sultan Süleyman I, when writing to Khan Mehmet Giray I, used for the latter the title "Descendant of Crimean Sultans and of Çingizid Hakhans" (Halif-ül selatin-ül Kirimiye ve şeref-ül Havakin-ül cingiziye).[3]

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was a widespread belief in Western Europe, apparently shared also by some officials in Istanbul, that this special relationship had been formalized in an agreement by which the Giray khans would be eligible to mount the Ottoman throne if the House of Osman should become extinguished.[4] But A. D. Alderson has effectively disposed of this idea, suggesting that "their claims were purely legendary, had no legal foundation whatsoever, and had probably been fabricated by different travellers out of local gossip."[5] That such a theory could have many supporters, especially in the eighteenth century when the Crimea was in its terminal period of decline, is evidence, however, that the special relationship between the Girays and the Ottomans was well known.

In the realm of geopolitical necessity as well, the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars had a special relationship. Back in the sixteenth century, on occupying the steppe area between the Ottomans, and two powerful, ambitious, and growing states, Poland-Lithuania and Muscovite Russia, the Crimeans allowed the Ottomans to concentrate their defense efforts on the borders with the Hapsburgs and the Safavids. It had been the steppe region where the Mongols had ruled, where the part of the Great Horde called the Golden Horde had derived the main sources of its strength; and it was the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries' struggle for control of the steppe that presented the greatest challenges to the maintenance of close relations between the Girays and Ottomans.

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[1]Among the Ottoman chronicles that discuss Chengiz Khan as an Ottoman predecessor, see Müneccimbaşı Ahmet Dede, *Müneccimbaşı Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1973), 2 vols.

[2]See Hasan Örtekin, *Kirim Hanlarının Şeceresi* (Istanbul, 1938), and Abulgazi Bahadir Khan, *Şecere-i Türk* (Kazan, 1824).

[3]Feridun Bey, op. cit., 1:502.

[4]H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West,* vol. 1, pt. 1 (London, 1950), p. 25; Paul Rycaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1668), p. 58.

[5]A. D. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty* (Oxford, 1956), p. 151. See also Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte der Chane der Krim* (Vienna, 1856), pp. 36-37, who raises some doubts about this theory.

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In practical terms the Crimeans served as military supports for the Ottomans on this northern frontier, for which service they received handsome financial and social rewards. I have elsewhere discussed in greater detail the financial arrangements that the Ottomans made to ensure continued Crimean participation in their military campaigns, arrangements that came to cost the Ottomans dearly in the eighteenth century.[1] First, the Giray khans received annual payments called *saliyane* that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ranged from 2.5 million *akçes* to 9.5 million.[2] In receipt of *saliyane* the Girays maintained a similar arrangement to that of the Mamluk sultans of Egypt and also the *deniz ümerasi* (naval leaders of the *eyalet* of the *Kapudan Paşa*).[3] Second, upon their accession to the throne in Bahçesaray, the khans received a large sum of money, which amounted to almost a million *akçes*.[4] The sum, called *teşrifat akçesi,* was evidently granted only to khans, setting them apart from all other Ottoman subjects or vassals.

Third, the khans were assigned personal revenues from the Ottoman *hass* administration, a common occurrence for most members of the Ottoman upper class. But what set the khans apart was the fact that their *hass* was always inscribed in the *defters* for the royal family. The names of the Giray khans (and former khans), in the *defters* that I examined, were placed just after that of the *Valide Sultan*.[5] Fourth, the khans were given a special military guard account to pay the expenses of the personal guard corps assigned to Bahçesaray, the *Sekban akçesi*.[6] One could argue that the *sekbans* of the khans were, in reality, representatives of the sultan, assigned to the Crimea as assurance of Crimean cooperation. And it is true that on occasion they participated in the deposition of a khan and the installation of another. But the khans themselves included the expenses of the *sekbans* in their lists of income and thus considered such revenues as grants from the Ottomans along with all the others.

Fifth, and most important for our discussion of Crimean separatism, was the custom of allowing the Crimean khans to collect an annual tribute from the Danubian principalities, a tribute assigned and collected by the khan's own representatives. The tribute, called *tiyiş,* was a holdover from the pre-Ottoman practice of the Golden Horde's requiring the annual payment of a tribute from all

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[1]Istanbul, Başbakanlık Arşivi, *Cevdet: Eyalet-i mümtazim;* see my article, "Les Rapports entre l'Empire Ottoman et la Crimée: l'aspect financier," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique,* XIII/3 (1972), pp. 368-81.

[2]Fisher, *op. cit.,* pp. 377-81, for lists of such *saliyane* payments.

[3]Stanford Shaw, "The Financial and Administrative Organization of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798, (Princeton, N.J., 1962), pp. 185-88.

[4]Mehmed Ağa Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1928), 1:395; 2:99, 132, 632.

[5]Istanbul, Başbakanlık Arşivi, *Cevdet: Hariciye,* no. 4646, *Cevdet: Eyalet-i Mümtazim,* no. 675; *Maliyeden müdevvere defterleri,* no. 14, 525.

[6]Mehmet Reşit, *Raşit Tarihi,* 2d ed. (Istanbul, 1865), 2:523; 4:217.

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of its subject provinces.[1] The Crimeans also collected such tribute from both Muscovite Russia and the kingdom of Poland-Lithuania. Such payments continued through the seventeenth century and represented, for payer and payee alike, a recognition of the political rights on the steppe that the Crimeans had inherited from their predecessor there, the Golden Horde.[2] Lastly, the Ottomans sent to the Crimean khans, with every invitation to participate in a military campaign, a large sum of money called the *tirkeş paha* ("quiver price").[3] That it was always considered an "invitation" and not a command provides further substance to the view that their affairs were conducted in a special manner.

In return for the *tirkeş paha*, the Ottomans expected the khans to provide loyal military service for the sultan, although it was not always forthcoming. The Ottoman contribution of the *teşrifat akçesi* and the *sekban akçesi* allowed the Ottomans to interfere directly in internal Crimean politics, especially those concerned with the deposition and installation of khans. It was this practice, which occurred more and more frequently during the last years of the seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth centuries, that led most historians to suspect that the khans were no more than vassals of the Ottoman sultans.[4] The physical force of the *sekbans* and the monetary influence (which could be spread around as bribes) gave the Ottomans the ability to interfere, but this practice was never codified or given a legal foundation. On the contrary, such increased meddling in affairs that many Crimean leaders considered purely of internal Crimean interest provided much of the impetus for Crimean separatist movements in the eighteenth century.

Although the major manifestation of Crimean "separatism" emerged only in the second half of the eighteenth century, it should then have been no surprise to anyone that the foundations for such a movement had always existed in the Crimean khanate since 1475, when the Crimea "entered under Ottoman protection."[5]

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[1]Endoxiu de Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la istoria romanilor,* suppl. 1, vol. 1 (Bucharest, 1886), pp. 55-56; and I. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi,* 2 (Ankara, 1964): 434.

[2]See my "Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade," in *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 6 (1972): 575-94, for the connection between the Polish and Muscovite *tiyiş* payments and the slave traffic in the steppe.

[3]Özalp Gökbilgin and Dilek Desaive, "Le Khanat de Crimée et les campagnes militaires de l'Empire Ottoman — fin du XVIIe début du XVIIIe siècle," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 11 (1970): 110-17.

[4]I. B. Grekov, *Ocherki po istorii mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii vostochnoi evropy XIV-XVI vv.* (Moscow, 1963), p. 153, who states flatly that "the Crimea became a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, was subject to the desires of the Sultan's will, and became one of those means by which the Ottomans began to interfere in East European Politics." V.D. Smirnov, *Krymskoe Khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom otomanskoi porty do nachala XVIII veka* (St. Petersburg, 1887), p. xxxi, says that "the Crimea was a vassal not only in theory but in practice."

[5]Halil İnalcik, "Yeni vesikalara göre Kırım hanlığının Osmanlı tabiliğine girmesi ve ahidname meselesi", *Belleten*, vol. 8, no. 31 (1944), pp. 185-229, where the evidence seems to show that the Crimea "entered under Ottoman protection," not "subjection."

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First, both the Crimeans and the Ottomans, in mutual correspondence, treated the other as a sovereign entity. Rather than the more usual *buyrultu, hüküm, berat,* or *ferman,* which were used when sending communications, from the sultan to his servants and vassals, the common form for correspondence between Topkapı Saray and Bahçesaray was the *name-i hümayun* or *name-i şerif*. Except for the Crimean case, the *name-i hümayun* was a piece of diplomatic correspondence from the sultan to the head of another state.[1] The following examples are typical of the subject matter included in such Ottoman *name-i hümayuns* to the Crimean khans. In 1687 Sultan Süleyman II sent to Khan Selim Giray I his recognition of the khan as sovereign in the Crimea and accompanied this statement "with the traditional presents."[2] In 1688 Khan Selim Giray I sent a *name-i humayun* to Sultan Süleyman II, confirming this receipt of the sultan's recognition and affirming "his loyalty to the leader of the world of Islam" but without any apparent acknowledgment of *political* loyalty to the House of Osman.[3] In 1689 the sultan sent to Khan Selim Giray money to pay for his campaigns in Bosnia.[4] Another, in 1692, from Sultan Ahmed II to Khan Safa Giray, accompanied by presents for the khan and his notables, invited him to enter a military campaign.[5] And finally, in 1696, a *name-i hümayun* from Sultan Mustafa II to Khan Selim Giray provided recognition of his "outstanding service" with a financial reward to be shared with his *Kalga* and other notables.[6] On one occasion Devlet Giray was called only "Emir of the Province of the Crimea, sincere and loyal friend of our Throne.[7]

From *their* direction, too, the Crimean khans corresponded with the sultans in a manner unusual for Ottoman vassals with their sovereign. The Girays refused to surrender their early pretensions to be lords of the steppe, pretensions inherited from the Golden Horde and, even earlier, from Chengiz Khan. Among the *cingiziye* symbols of steppe sovereignty was the right to use an official signature on their documents called the *tamga,* similar in use but not in form to the Ottoman *tuğra*. First used by the Uygurs, the *tamga* was heavily utilized by the Giray khans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries on virtually all their documents, which included those sent to Istanbul. In the latter seventeenth and through the eighteenth centuries, the khans even used their own

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[1]Dilek Desaive, "Le khanat de Crimée dans les Archives Ottomanes: correspondence entre khans de Crimée et padichahs ottomans dans les registres des name-i hümayün," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 13 (1972): 560-83; see also Jan Reychman and Ananiasz Zajaczkowski, *Handbook of Ottoman-Turkish Diplomatics* (The Hague, 1968), pp. 135-37, for a discussion of different types of Ottoman documents.

[2]*Name-i hümayün defter,* 5:1-2 (in Istanbul, Başbakanlık Arşivi).

[3]*Ibid.*, pp. 23-25.

[4]*Ibid.*, pp. 87-89.

[5]*Ibid.*, pp. 130-32.

[6]*Ibid.*, pp. 188-90.

[7]Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Les Expéditions de Devlet Giray contre Moscou en 1571 et 1572," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 13 (1972): 555.

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tuğras, accompanied by a special pear-shaped seal bearing the name *cingiziye* to signify their sovereignty.[1]

Unlike all other Ottoman vassals and government officials in the provinces, the Giray khans also conducted their own independent diplomatic relations with those states bordering on the steppe and over whom the khans claimed some form of traditional suzerainty. Although these claims were not officially admitted by the other states in question, the khans were successful in having their representatives recognized in Moscow, Warsaw, and even in Iran.[2] In the seventeenth century in Moscow, the *Prikaz* of Foreign Affairs provided permanent housing for Crimean diplomats, as they did for most other foreign states. Interestingly though, no such housing was available for Ottoman envoys. The *Krymskii Dvor,* as the Crimean "embassy" was called, was occupied almost continuously by Tatar envoys during the seventeenth century. It was used not only for the conduct of usual diplomatic discourse between the Girays and the tsars, but also as the place where the annual Muscovite tributes were paid to the khan's envoys. This tribute, called *tiyiş* in Tatar and *pomimok* in Russian, was in reality only the annual payment that the tsars made in the hopes of both ransoming Slavic prisoners held by the Tatars for future sale as slaves, and preventing the Tatars from making new raids into Muscovite territory. But it is interesting that the names used for this tribute were the same terms employed by both the Muscovites and the leaders of the Golden Horde for the annual tax and tribute payments made in the years when the Horde was the actual sovereign in the Russian lands.[3]

The Ottoman government, very interested in Tatar diplomacy, especially in Poland and Muscovy, was constantly kept abreast of its direction and accomplishments, but seems never to have tried to prevent the khans from conducting their own relations with foreign states. In the *Mühimme Defterleri* one can find innumerable copies of reports from Crimean envoys sent to Istanbul, not for approval (there is no such request or response in the reports found there) but merely for the information of the sultan's own officials.[4]

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[1]Reychman, *op. cit.,* pp. 157-58; O. Akchokrakly, *Tatarskie tamgi ve krymu* (Simferopol, 1927); A. Spitsyn, "Tatarskiia baisy," *Izvestiia Imperatorskoi Archeologicheskoi Kommisii* 29 (1909): 130-41.

[2]B. Kutukoğlu, *Osmanlı-İran Siyasi Münasebetleri* (Istanbul, 1962); and C. M. Kortepeter, "Gazi Giray II, Khan of the Crimea, and Ottoman Policy in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus," *Slavonic and East European Review* Vol. 44, no. 102 (1966): p. 140.

[3]"Istoricheskoi i diplomaticheskoe sobranie del proiskhodivskikh mezhdu Rossiiskimi Velikimi Kniaziami i byvshimi v Kryme tatarskimi tsariami s 1462 po 1533 god," *Zapiski odesskago obshchestva istorii i drevnosti* 5 (1863): 277-78, 379-80; S. Belokurov, *O posol'skom prikaze* (Moscow, 1906), pp. 78-79.

[4]For example, the report of the Crimean envoy to the Polish king (1564) sent to Bahçesaray, with copy to Istanbul, Başbakanlık Arşivi, *Mühimme Defteri,* vol. 6, doc. 97. See also Ozalp Gökbilgin, *1532-1577 Yılları Arasında Kırım Hanlığının Siyasi Durumu* (Ankara, 1973), for a discussion of this general problem.

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Thus, from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the Crimean khans acted in steppe politics as virtually independent sovereigns, carrying on their own diplomatic relations, sending and accepting envoys from Poland, Muscovy, and Iran; they were treated by the Ottoman bureaucracy more as allies than as subjects, at least so far as diplomatic affairs went. In two other areas the khans evidenced their claims to traditional sovereignty. First, the khans continued to mint their own coins until the annexation of the Crimea in 1783.[1] And second, until the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, the khans issued *iarliks* for land-holding in many areas of the Ukraine and southwestern Muscovy.[2]

A second major area in which the khans manifested a conception of separateness, even independence, was in the realm of succession to the Crimean throne. Of course, it is one of the basic requirements of an independent people that they be allowed to choose their own leaders, according to their own traditions and without outside interference. The Crimean khans and almost all their subjects believed that the Crimean throne derived directly without any break from that of Chengiz Khan, and that Crimean and Golden Horde traditions should govern the transition from one khan to the next. According to the Ottoman succession traditions, the eldest legitimate son of the ruler would inherit the throne. On the other hand, the Crimean traditions required the reigning khan to appoint his eldest brother to the position of kalga, which was that of the heir apparent.[3] The existence of this conflict allowed or encouraged the Ottomans to try to interfere in the succession process in Bahçesaray more and more frequently during the later years of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. That the Ottomans were able to find individual Girays willing to counter the traditional Crimean methods of succession so as to support their own claims did not overcome the more general Crimean feeling that their own, and not Ottoman, laws of succession should be followed. In the late eighteenth century, when the separatist movement succeeded in actually separating the Crimea from Istanbul, it was the question of Ottoman interference in internal succession matters that was to be one of the main battle cries of the independence movement.

Third, Crimean historians, chronicle writers, and intellectuals in general had paved the way in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for the ideological justifications of Crimean separatism as it developed in the eighteenth century.

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[1]Ananiasz Zajaczkowski, *La Chronique des steppes kiptchak* (Warsaw, 1966), p. 82; C. M. Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus* (New York, 1972); see also Mehmed Mubarek, *Meskukat-i Kirimiye* (Istanbul, 1900), which is a catalogue of Crimean coinage.

[2]Petrun', "Khanski Iarliki na Ukrains'ki Zemli," *Skhidnie Svit* (Kharkov, 1928), 2:170-87.

[3]V. D. Smirnov, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-11; and A. Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelqueja, "La Moscovie, l'Empire ottoman et la crise successorale de 1577-1588 dans le Khanat de Crimée," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 14 (1973): 453-487.

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In many nationalist movements it is the intellectuals who are the leaders, the groundbreakers, the consciousness raisers, whose activities precede those of the politicians and the economic interests. In the Crimea, on the contrary, the historians and writers were apparently reflecting deeply held beliefs in supporting the claims for the Girays and their subjects to have a long history of independence. Indeed, Crimean historians from the very beginning never accepted the idea of Crimean Giray *subjection* to the Ottomans in the political field, but only in the religious.

The earliest sixteenth-century Crimean historians were deeply concerned with Tatar separateness, with Tatar identity, and with traditions that were exclusively Tatar. In the first of these, the *Tarih-i Sahib Giray Khan,* written soon after the death of the khan in 1551, no pain is spared to support the historical tradition that the Giray clan is second to none in legitimacy and longevity. The author points out that the khan is "the descendant of Chengiz Khan; his ancestors have been Khans for seventy-two generations." And further, "Unless he abdicates his own power, one cannot depose the Khan of the Crimea; for generations he has been the master of power, named in the public prayers and possessing the right to mint coins." We must remember that this is written in the reign of Süleyman I.[1]

A second Crimean Tatar history, the *Tevarih-i Deşt-i Kipçak,* written between 1623 and 1640 by a Tatar living in Kefe, speaks of the sovereignty of the khans emerging from "time immemorial" and of the fact that the khans deal with the sultans as genealogical equals and that the sultans approve of the Crimean choices for succession to the throne "mütad üzere". (No mention is made of Ottoman dictation of these choices.) Those Crimean khans who acted especially independently, such as Mengli Giray, at the beginning, and Devlet Giray, whose sabotage of the Ottoman Astrakhan campaign in 1559 helped cause its failure, are treated as the real heroes of Crimean history.[2]

A later chronicle, *Üçüncü Islam Giray Han Tarihi,* composed by Kirimli Haci Mehmet Senai in the early 1650s, makes the same points as the first two about the descent of the Girays from the Chingizids and the khans' possession of all of the political characteristics of the former "Hakhans" of the Golden Horde. In its introduction, however, an inconsistent argument states that the Giray ancestors of Islam Giray had been under the "sovereignty of the Ottoman

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[1]Özalp Gökbilgin, ed., *Tarih-i Sahib Giray Han* (Ankara, 1973), pp. 20-21, where it states: "Ali Cengiz Hanidir… Kirim Hanları ma'zul olmaz eba'an ced sahib-i saltanat ve sahib-i hütbe ve sahib-i sikke padişahlardır."

[2]The text as well as French translation was published by Ananiasz Zajaczkowski, *op. cit.,* and discussed in Ananiasz Zajaczkowski, "'Letopis' kipchakskoi stepi' kak istochnik po istorii kryma," in A. S. Tveritinova, *Vostochnye istochniki po istorii narodov iugo-vostochnoi i tsentral'noi evropy,* (Moscow, 1969), 2:10-28.

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throne" and received from the Ottomans an annual payment (*saliyane*) for their services. The over-all thrust of the history, though, points to Giray and *cingiziye* traditions and glory, and plays down the connections and "sovereignty" of the Ottoman sultan.[1]

Fourth, in the 1750s Seid Muhammed Riza wrote a chronicle entitled *Asseb' o-sseiiar*.[2] This is the most interesting and enlightening of the four chronicles written during the existence of the Crimean khanate. It is by far the longest and most detailed. (Perhaps for this reason it provided the foundations for the two masterful volumes on Crimean history by V. D. Smirnov.)[3] As in the second chronicle, Rıza emphasizes, almost to the point of excluding other khans, those who acted according to the interests of the Chingizids. Such khans pursued a Crimean political policy independent of, or at least separate but parallel to, that of the Ottomans. His greatest hero is again Devlet Giray, who not only refused to endanger Crimean interests in the Ottoman Astrakhan campaign, but in opposition to Ottoman demands, conducted several major raids against Moscow. Once, in 1571, he actually was able to enter the city of Moscow and lay it waste. On more than one occasion, Riza describes Ottoman participation in the Giray succession crises as "interference."[4] Additionally, in devoting the first quarter of his history to the period of Mongol domination of the steppe, Riza is not content merely to mention the Chingizid origins of the Girays, but presents their entire history as flowing directly from that the Golden Horde.

Thus we arrive at the fifth and last of the major Crimean Tatar histories, that of the aforementioned Halim Giray Sultan, and the major criticisms that he made of the foundations of the Crimean separatist movement.[5] Halim Giray argues that the Crimean leaders, some of them members of the Giray clan, but especially leaders of the other major clans such as the Shirin and Barin, acted irresponsibly and, for Tatar national identity, disastrously, in pressing for separatism in the 1760s and 1770s during the Russo-Ottoman war in those years. He alludes to the cleverness of Russian diplomacy and the Russians'

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[1]See the published Polish edition: Hadzy Mehmed Senai z Krymu, *Historia Chana Islam Gereja III*, ed. Olgierd Gorka and Zbigniew Wojcik (Warsaw, 1971) for citations above, pp. 89-91; Turkish text, pp. 1-3.

[2]The Tatar text was edited and published by Adiunkt-Professor Mirza Kazembek as Seiid Mukhammed Riza, *Asseb' o-sseiiar' ili sem'planet'* (Kazan, 1832).

[3]V. D. Smirnov, *op. cit.;* and *Krymskoe khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom otomanskoi porty v XVIII stoletii* (Odessa, 1889).

[4]Riza, *op. cit.*, pp. 87 (katl elçi-i cingiz), 131-32, 201-2.

[5]I have not included the work edited and published by Ismail Hikmet Ertaylan, *Gazi Geray Han, Hayati ve Eserleri* (Istanbul, 1958), which is claimed to be a real "history" but which is in fact a series of poems written during the reign of Gazi Giray; nor the so-called "Tatar National Epic" published by A. Lebib Karan (in Tatar): *Tatarlarnın Tüpçigişi* (Istanbul, 1962), since its only claim to legitimacy rests on the oral traditions maintained by the Crimean Tatar exile community in Istanbul.

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ability to persuade many of the Crimean leaders that the time had come, now that the Ottoman Empire was suffering a major military defeat, to declare once and for all their separation from the sultan. Russian diplomats, acting under orders from Empress Catherine II, conducted negotiations with some dissident members of the Giray family, especially Kaplan and Şahin Giray, and with leaders of some of the Tatar clans under the suzerainty of the Girays. First concentrating on the Nogays who roamed the steppe of the western shore of the Black Sea, Catherine's agent from the Zaporozhian Cossacks was able to persuade Can Mambet Bey to sign a "treaty of friendship and alliance" with the Russians in 1770. This "treaty" was more a declaration of "independence" from the Ottomans than one of alliance with the Russians, and included the following statements:

> The Yedisan Nogay horde will remain for all eternity, free and separate from the Turkish yoke. They will become an independent people, under the authority of their own particular laws and administration.
>
> The Yedisan and Bucak hordes of Crimeans, through agreement made among themselves, have now broken away from their subjection to the Ottoman Porte, and have entered into eternal friendship and alliance with the Russian Empire.
>
> We have sworn on the Quran never to give aid to the Turks or to the Khan of the Crimea, and not to recognize the Khan unless he should submit to the same conditions, that is, to live peacefully under the protection of Russia and to renounce the sovereignty of the Porte.[1]

In first approaching the Nogays and both the Yedisan and Bucak hordes, the Russians were attacking what they perceived to be weak spots in the Crimean administration. For a long time attempts by Crimean khans to impose ever stricter authority over the nomadic Nogays had resulted in growing dissatisfaction with the Girays. It was not surprising that in this, their first attempt, the Russian diplomats were so successful.

As the progress of the war left the Ottomans in more and more desperate straits, the Russians quickly followed up their Nogay successes with attempts at "subversion" of some of the Crimean leaders themselves. In a series of letters to Khan Kaplan Giray, General Petr Panin, who had been in charge of the Nogay negotiations, wrote that "the Sultan has incorporated the Crimeans and all of the Nogays within his authority, not by the result of war or of succession, but by

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[1] *Arkhiv Gosudarstvennago Soveta,* vol. 1, part 1 (St. Petersburg, 1869), p. 56; A. Skal'kovskii, "O Nogaiskikh tatarakh, zhivushchikh v Tavricheskoi gubernii," *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnago Prosveshcheniia* (1843), 2:123; E. I. Druzhinina, *Kiuchuk-kainardzhiiskii mir 1774 goda* (Moscow, 1955), p. 108.

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his various tricks."[1] Kaplan Giray replied almost immediately in late 1770 that "we, the Crimean Khan, and other leaders of the Crimean state and Şirin mirzas, instead of obeying the Ottomans, at the present time want to take an oath to a government such as yours which is friendly to us, and which will allow us to follow our ancient political traditions."[2]

The Ottoman government, quickly learning of Kaplan Giray's "treason," sent as a Giray replacement for him Selim Giray, who had been living in the Giray yalı in Büyükdere, in Istanbul. For a short while, in the early months of 1771, Selim Giray, with Ottoman troops at his disposal, was able to "restore order" in the Crimea and to stop, for the moment, Russian diplomatic activity there. But not for long. General Dolgorukii, at the head of a large army, invaded the Crimea in the spring of 1771 and immediately issued a manifesto that was publicized by Crimean supporters of independence. It stated:

> The Yedisan, Bucak, and Canbuluk Hordes, according to the most basic of human rights, have thrown off their Turkish subjection and have taken an oath to live independently of any people, under their own ancient traditions and laws, and to enter into eternal friendship with the Russian Empire... My Sovereign, Her Imperial Majesty, has granted them permanent protection... I guarantee to all of the inhabitants of the Crimea no harm from my army if they break away from the slavery of the Porte. ... As Cingiziye you were independent; now you are under the yoke of the Ottoman state; they appoint and depose Khans as they do their own *valis*. If you act in conjunction with us, we will provide you with your former independence.[3]

The manifesto, as we can see in the light of our knowledge of Tatar interest in their past and *cingiziye* traditions, was an unqualified success. Almost all of the Giray and clan leadership agreed to support the call for independence from the sultan; and, when the Ottoman negotiators met with the Russians at Küçük Kaynarca in 1773 and 1774, they were presented with a *fait accompli,* the establishment of a Crimean independent State.[4] By emphasizing "former independence" under the great khans of the past, by pointing to the *cingiziye* heritage, and especially by reminding them of Ottoman interference in the Crimean succession process, the Russian manifesto had mentioned all the points that were important to Crimean sensibilities.

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[1]Boris Nolde, *La Formation de l'Empire Russe,* (Paris, 1953), 2:59.
[2]Necati Effendi, "Zapiski Mukhammeda Nedzhtai-Efendi," *Russkaia Starina* (March 1894), p. 132.
[3]*Sbornik imperatorskago russkago istoricheskago obshchestva,* 97:245-46.
[4]Fisher, *op. cit.,* for a more complete account of these first months of Crimean independence.

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This "independence" lasted only for eleven years, to 1783, when Catherine II formally and totally annexed the Crimean peninsula to her state and transformed it into *Tavricheskaia guberniia*. Halim Giray remarks bitterly in his history that the result was a foregone conclusion. The Girays and the Crimeans with them could have preserved their national identity only as part of the Ottoman Empire, in which they had been able to maintain their special relationships with the Sultans. The Girays were "shamefully fooled" by the clever words of Russian diplomats into believing the "non sense" of Crimean glory in the past as an independent state. Halim Giray concludes that whatever "glory" the khans of old had possessed was directly related to their connections with the Ottomans; it had been the Ottomans, he reminded his readers, who had permitted the Girays so much independence of action. This they forgot completely in the wartime years of the late 1760's, and it brought them to the tragedy of the 1770s.

The annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Empire was not the end of Crimean aspirations for identity, however. Substantial numbers of Tatars emigrated from the Crimean peninsula in several waves (1783-85, 1812-14, 1826-27, and 1854-62) to Anatolia and Rumelia, many of them settling in the suburbs of Istanbul.[1] Within the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean Tatars continuously pressed for Ottoman support for their return "to their homeland" and did not seem to be easily assimilated into Ottoman society. Those Tatars remaining in the Russian Empire, despite vigorous attempts by the government to deny their national identity, to convert them to Orthodoxy, and to move them around the empire to break their hold on their lands, retained at least a germ of national consciousness, which was renewed and which grew into a flourishing national movement in the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth.[2] And it was to be Tatar nationalist leaders, both in Russia and in Turkey, who were to have such an impact on the growth of Turkish nationalist aspirations at the end of the century.

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[1]See Mark Pinson, "Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire, 1854-1862," *Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* (Istanbul, 1972), 1:37-56 (to be continued in a later volume) for a discussion of the last of these emigrations.

[2]Ethem Feyzi Gözaydın, *Kirim: Kirim Türklerinin Yerleşme ve Göçmeleri* (Istanbul, 1948); Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *La Presse et le mouvement national chez les musulmans de Russie avant 1920* (Paris, 1964); Serge A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, 1960); and Cafer Saydahmet, *Gaspirali Ismail Bey: Dilde, Fikirde, İşte Birlik* (Istanbul, 1934).

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ŞAHIN GIRAY, THE REFORMER KHAN, AND THE RUSSIAN ANNEXATION OF THE CRIMEA

I. *The Establishment of the Independent Crimea*

The transformation of the Russian state into a far-flung multinational empire has scarcely received the attention that it warrants. In recent years Soviet scholars have become more interested in this problem and have been working hard to distinguish Russian imperialism under the Tsars from that of the western European states. Western scholars interested in the Russian Empire, on the other hand, have generally fallen into two camps: one which accepts the Soviet interpretations of either "the lesser evil" formula or the theory of positive benefits to the subjected nationalities; or one which severely criticizes Russian expansion into non-Slavic areas which were not historical parts of early Russian states. Little emphasis from either the Soviets or the West has been placed upon the actual methods utilized or the contemporary causes and justifications given for Russian expansion.

The Russian annexation of the Crimea in 1783 is a case in point. Both supporters and critics of Russian imperialism make such generalizations as the statement that the incorporation of the Crimea into Russia was an integral part of a larger "Greek Project" formulated as early as 1779[1], or the claim that Catherine accomplished "the recovery of fertile lands lost to Asiatic invaders since the days of the Kievan State"[2]. Boris Nolde included the topic of Crimean annexation within the broader framework of the building of the whole Russian Empire[3]. But Nolde was content to follow the works of the nineteenth century Russian scholar Smirnov and the German scholar Zinkeisen and provided little more than a sketch of events rather than an analysis of reasons for and methods of the annexation.

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[1]Michael, T. Florinsky *Russia: A History and Interpretation*. New York 1947, vol. 1, pp. 527-528. The author wishes to thank the U.S. Office of Education for making possible his stay in Istanbul during the summer of 1965 through their grant of a Fulbright-Hays fellowship. He wishes to express his appreciation to the government of the Republic of Turkey for granting him permission to work in the Başbakanlık Arşivi in Istanbul, to Dr. Midhat Sertoğlu, its director, and to Mr. Turgut Işiksal, a member of his staff, for their valuable help in locating documents and for aid in deciphering difficult handwritings.

[2]Nicholas V. Riasanovsky *A History of Russia*. New York 1963, p. 293.

[3]Boris Nolde *La Formation de l'Empire russe. Études, notes et documents*. Vol. 1-2. Paris 1952-1953; here vol. 2, pp. 115-195.

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Recent publications by two German scholars concern the problem of colonization by Russians in the southern steppe region during this period, and the remarkable rise in importance of the city of Cherson on the frontiers of the Crimean state during its period of independence. And finally the Soviet scholar E. I. Družinina has devoted two monographs to the study of the northern Black Sea coast in the late eighteenth century. She was able to touch only partially on the Crimean Tatars themselves since this people has become a "non-people" after World War II. No use of Ottoman Turkish sources has yet been made on the question of the Crimean annexation, although Turkish and French scholars are now beginning to use these sources for other aspects of Russian-Turkish relations[1].

The question of why Russia annexed the Crimea in 1783 awaits a satisfactory answer. Those who believe that Catherine had planned the annexation already in 1779 are hard pressed to explain the rather "soft" policy of Russia prior to 1782. The evidence suggests that Catherine tried desperately to create and sustain the Crimea as an independent state following the Russo-Turkish war of 1774 and that it was only after every possible means (in Russian eyes) of establishing Şahin Giray as an autocratic and independent sovereign had been exhausted that Catherine carried out "the final solution" to the Tatar problem.

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[1]V. D. Smirnov *Krymskoe chanstvo pod verchoventsvom Ottomanskoj Porty v XVIII stoletii*. Odessa 1889; Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa*. Vol. 1-7. Hamburg 1840-1863; here vol. 5 and vol. 6; E. I. Druzinina *Kjucuk-Kajnardzijskij mir 1774 goda*. Moscow 1955, and *Severnoe Pricernomore v 1775-1800 gg*. Moscow 1959; The Turkish scholar, Akdes Nimet Kurat has written an important two volume history of the Pruth campaign making use of Turkish as well as Russian sources, "*Prut seferi ve barışı*." Ankara 1951-1953. His conclusions appear in his article "Der Prutfeldzung und der Prutfrieden von 1711," in: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*. N. F. Vol. 10 (1962) pp. 13-66. The German works on the subject are: Hans Halm *Gründung and erstes Jahrzehnt von Festung und Stadt Cherson*. Wiesbaden 1961, particularly pp. 66-94; and Hans Auerbach *Die Besiedlung der Südukraine in den Jahren 1774-1787*. Wiesbaden 1965, particularly pp. 79-115. Two French scholars, Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, have not only been using Ottoman sources in their studies of Russian-Ottoman relations, but have been publishing in translation some of the documents which they have discovered in the Istanbul archives: Bennigsen Un mouvement populaire au Caucase au XVIIIe siècle, in: *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* vol. 5, no. 2 (1964) pp. 159-197; Lemercier-Quelquejay La Russie, La France et la Turquie à la veille de la Campagne de Russie, un document inédit des archives de l'Empire Ottoman, in: *Cahiers* vol. 6, no. 2 (1965) pp. 240-244; Lemercier-Quelquejay Document inédit sur la campagne de Pierre le Grand au Caucase, in: *Cahiers* vol. 6, no. 1 (1965) pp. 139-142; Lemercier-Quelquejay Les Kalmuks de le Volga entre l'Empire Russe et l'Empire Ottoman sous le règne de Pierre le Grand (d'après les documents des Archives Ottomanes), in: *Cahiers* vol. 7, no. 1 (1966) pp. 63-72. Perhaps even more valuable to the scholar has been their work in preparing guides to the archives and libraries of Turkey in so far as they contain material for the study of Russia: Lemercier-Quelquejay Notice sur quelques manuscrits historiques turcs concernant le Russie se trouvant dans les bibliothèques publiques d'Istanbul, in: *Cahiers* vol. 6, no. 2 (1965) p. 264-278; Lemercier-Quelquejay Les bibliothèques et les archives de Turquie en tant que sources de documents sur l'histoire de Russie, in: *Cahiers* vol. 5, no. 1 (1964) pp. 105-140.

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Until the mid-eighteenth century the Russians had looked upon the Crimean Tatars as a rather strong and unified vassal state of the Ottoman Porte. Russian and western commentators had always been impressed by the large number of troops which the Khan had at his disposal and considered that all of the Tatar raids and military actions were instigated solely by the Khan or his superior, the Ottoman Sultan. They did not take into consideration the real disunity within the Khanate, the vast difference between the settled Crimean Tatars and the nomadic Nogais, the conflicts between the authority of the Khan and the power of the large noble families. Although there had always been deep problems arising between these various forces within the Khanate, the Russians had never sought to take advantage of them — this in the face of the great success they had had in their policies of subversion within the Kazan Khanate two hundred years before.

It was General Peter Panin, in 1768 and 1769, who for the first time conceived of the idea of choosing one of these internal Crimean elements and using it to establish a state independent of the Porte and friendly to Russia. He chose the large Nogai hordes which roamed the steppe of the north-western shore of the Black Sea [the *Bucak*][1]. But the war of 1768-1774 went very badly for the Tatars and Panin's scheme was not necessary at this time to apply pressure on the Bahçesaray government. The Crimeans surrendered to the Russians in 1771 and negotiations proceeded for a Russo-Tatar treaty.

With the Russian army occupying the whole Crimean peninsula it would have been an easy matter to annex the area then and there. But in 1770, the Russian State Council had issued a policy statement, at Catherine's request, which set forth the Russian aim of creating an independent state of the Tatars[2]. Catherine had felt that "the Tatars could never become useful subjects of Her Imperial Majesty, that they would form a poor defense on the frontier against their co-religionists, the Turks, and they were not in the habit of paying the *podat*"[3].

Although by no means all of the Tatars were enthusiastic about severing ties with the Ottoman Porte, one individual recognized that Russian power was going to prevail in the Crimea, and began to cooperate with the inevitable victor. This person was Şahin Giray Sultan, a member of the royal family of the Crimea, and the *serasker* [Khan's representative] for the Nogai hordes. Şahin

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[1] A. Skal'kovskij O Nogajskich tatarach živuščich v Tavričeskow gubernii, in: *Žurnal Ministerstva narodnago prosveščenija* vol. 40, no. 11 (1843) pp. 117-120.
[2] *Archiv Gosudarstvennago Soveta* vol. 1, no. 1 (1869) pp. 43-46; hereafter AGS.
[3] Vysočajšie reskripty Imperatricy Ekateriny II, in: *Čtenija v Moskovskom obščestve istorii i devnostej rossijskich pri Moskovskom universitete* vol. 79 (1871) p. 1; hereafter *Čtenija*.

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accepted the statements set forth in Dolgorukij's manifesto to the Crimeans in 1771 which said that "as *Cingiziye* [i.e. under Chingis Khan] you were independent; now you are under the rule of the Ottoman state; their Sultans appoint and depose Khans as they do their own *valis* [governors]. If you act in conjunction with us, we will provide you with your former independence"[1].

A delegation of Tatars led by Şahin Giray proceeded to St. Petersburg in November, 1771, to arrange the formal treaty. Apparently Catherine was quite impressed by the young Tatar leader. Besides being very handsome, he had had a rich background, having gone to Venice as a boy to learn Italian where he acquired European tastes and habits[2]. In a letter to Voltaire, Catherine said of Şahin, "ce jeune prince tartare est d'un caractère doux; il a de l'esprit, il fait des vers arabes; il ne manque aucun spectacle; il s'y plait, il va à ma communauté les dimanches après diner, lorsqu'il est permis d'y entrer pendant une heure pour voir danser les demoiselles"[3]. Taking into consideration the great hopes which the Empress was to place in Şahin during the next ten years, in spite of his many failures, one is forced to conclude that she had become infatuated with him at this, their first encounter. Catherine was to display many examples of her political cleverness in dealing with the Tatars, but her great admiration for Şahin was to negate much of her accomplishment in the Crimea in the years to come.

Representing the Crimean Khan Sahip Giray, Şahin and the other Tatar deputies in St. Petersburg concluded the Treaty of Karasu Bazaar with the Russian government in November, 1772[4]. The treaty established an alliance and eternal friendship between the Russian Empire and the new Tatar state (called the "Tatar Oblast" in Russian sources) without compromising the latter's religion, laws, or independence. The Khan was to hold all administrative power and was to be freely elected by the whole Tatar population, a procedure in which neither Russia nor the Porte could interfere.

After signing the Treaty, Şahin returned to the Crimea with a charter from the Empress for the new Tatar state. Upon leaving Catherine presented him with a gold sword and a large amount of money to show her gratitude for his cooperation.[5] Şahin settled in Akmeçet, the traditional home of the second

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[1]M. Nuri Paşa *Netaic-ül-vukuat* [The Results of Events], (Istanbul, Bayezit Library manuscript no. 594) vol. 1, p. 50. Zinkeisen (*Geschichte* vol. 5, p. 953) mentions Şahin at this early date, but confuses him with the Şirin Bey, the leader of the Crimean noble faction.

[2]F. Laškov Šagin-Girej, Poslednij krymskij chan, in: *Kievskaja Starina* (September 1866) p. 38.

[3]*Sbornik imperatorskogo Russkogo istoričeskogo obščestva* vol. 13 (1874) p. 227, hereafter *SIRIO*.

[4]*Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossijskoj imperii*. First Series. Vol. 19 (1830) no. 13943; hereafter *PSZ*. The text of this teraty is well analyzed in: Zinkeisen *Geschichte* vol. 5, pp. 59-61.

[5]Dva pisma grafa N. I. Panina k knjazju V.M. Dolgorukovu-krymskomu, in: *Archiv knjazja Voroncova* vol. 26 (1882) pp. 92-101.

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ranking Tatar official [the *Kalga*], where his palace became a second home for the Russians in the Crimea. He held frequent secret meetings with Russian officials and as early as mid-1773 was mentioned as a candidate for the Crimean throne[1].

Both Catherine and the Khan Sahip Gray appeared completely satisfied with the new political arrangement, but for reasons, misunderstood by the Russians it was not to last for long. Although the Ottoman Empire had been thoroughly defeated by 1772-1773, it was still able to exert great pressures on Crimean events through those elements which remained dissident in the Crimea. By 1772, a large Tatar exile community had congregated in Istanbul, made up of former Khans and their retinues and other officials who had fled during the war.[2] These exiles provided the Ottomans with a never ending supply of willing agents to be sent to the Crimea and the Kuban and applied pressure on the Ottoman government to hold a firm line in negotiations with the Russians for an end to the war.[3]

The Ottomans began as early as 1771 to incite the Tatars against Russia and against those Tatars who showed a willingness to cooperate with the aggressors. In early 1772 they assigned one of the exiles, Mehmet Giray Sultan, to the Kuban with instructions to prevent the signing of a treaty with the Russians. And in 1773 the Porte made its most threatening move by sending the former Khan Devlet Giray to Soğucuk, a Turkish fort on the Kuban frontier[4].

These agents were successful in persuading one group of Nogais to disregard the Karasu Bazaar agreement and enticed them to "elect" a *serasker* who would not be under the Khan's authority. Nikita Panin expressed alarm at this new and unexpected development, and ordered Russian officers in the Kuban to incline the new *serasker* towards accepting the Khan's authority[5]. Troubles were brewing in Bahçesaray as well and suddenly the Khan Sahip Giray arrested Veselickij, Russian resident at the Tatar court, and seemed ready to tear up the Russo-Tatar treaty of 1772[6]. Catherine immediately ordered Şahin to flee the

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[1]N. Murtakevič Materialy dlja istorii novorossijskago kraja, in: *Zapiski imperatorskago Odesskago obščestva istorii i drevnostej* vol. 8 (1872) p. 183; hereafter *ZOOID*. *AGS* vol. 1, no. 1 (1869) p. 251.

[2]*AGS* vol. 1, no. 1 (1869) p. 187.

[3]Başbakanlık Arşivi: Cevdet Tasnifi. Hariciye nos. 4298, 5420, 5081.

[4]Ibidem nos. 407, 3461, 5388.

[5]*AGS* vol. 1, no. 1 (1869) pp. 207, 259, 262; *SIRIO* vol. 118 (1904) pp. 287, 387, 485, 489.

[6]Pismo Semena Dement'eva k knjazju Vasiliju Michajloviču Dolgorukomu, in: *Moskvitjanin* vol. 13 (1854) pp. 33-35.

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Crimea to Poltava where she could guarantee his personal safety[1]. It appeared that all was not going well with the new independent Crimean state.

The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca signed by Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1774 seemed to settle once and for all the question of the Crimea and its independence. But the Ottoman retention of Özi [Očakov] at the mouth of the Dnepr and the religious relations established between the Sultan and the new state were to complicate what Russia hoped would be the final solution to her southern boundary question.

It should not have been much of a surprise that the Ottomans held fast on the question of Özi. This fort had always been of great importance in their administration of the northern Ottoman provinces and after they had abandoned any hope of keeping Azak [Azov], Özi became doubly important.[2] Its strategic importance was great because it effectively prevented Russian access to the Black Sea from the Dnepr and Bug rivers even though Russia had received Kilburun [Kinburn] in the Crimea.

Religious sovereignty of the Sultan over the Crimea was even more important. Although the Treaty of Karasu Bazaar had given the Tatars independence so far as the Russians were concerned, this independence was now limited to the civil and political spheres. The Ottomans considered the investiture of a political leader as a religious matter and persuaded the Russian diplomats to include this in the new treaty[3].

However the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca left several question unanswered. No provision was made to define the methods for the election of Khans or for their retirement from office. Not thought at all had been given to the means by which the Khan would exercise autocratic authority in a state made up of strong elements unwilling to abdicate their power and influence. The treaty provided only the barest skeleton of a governmental organization. Although great changes in administration would be required no guidelines were created. In addition to these problems, the Russian resident had been imprisoned in Bahçesaray and the Crimean government was suddenly at odds with the Russians. There was no reason for optimism from either Russian, Ottoman, or Crimean parties that this political arrangement was to be a lasting one.

Catherine decided to take no chances with the future of this independent government and even before the treaty defining Turkish and Russian relations

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[1] *AGS* vol. 1, no. 1 (1869) pp. 258-259; *SIRIO* vol. 118 (1904) p. 470.
[2] Başbakanlık Arşivi. Hatt-i hümayun no. 712; Cevdet Tasnifi. Askerî nos. 1584, 1635, 13587, 22470.
[3] Kjučuk-Kajnardžijskij mir, in: *Russkij archiv* no. 10 (1879) pp. 141-149.

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with the new Tatar state was ratified, she began to plan the establishment of a Russian puppet government for the Crimea. Her choice for its leader was Şahin Giray who was safely hidden away in Poltava[1]. The new plan was really only a return to P. Panin's proposals of 1770, namely the creation of a Nogai Tatar state independent of Bahçesaray and dependent upon Russia for money and protection[2]. In late October, 1774, the Russian State Council announced its support for this new "independent Tatar state." It was to be under the authority of its own Khan and would possess the same powers given to the Bahçesaray government at Küçük Kaynarca. Şahin would be "elected" Khan by the Kuban Tatars with the aid of 100 000 rubles which he would divide among the Nogai leaders. The Council agreed that Şahin "would forever be indebted to us for establishing him as Khan, and under him the Tatars will always be independent of the Porte"[3].

The Nogai chief Can Mambet Bey had for several years been on good terms with the Russians and felt slighted that he had not been chosen as the Russian candidate[4]. But Catherine was pleasantly surprised to learn that in early 1775, Şahin and Can Mambet Bey had come to an agreement whereby the Nogais would submit to Şahin in return for most of the 100 000 rubles[5].

The Porte had immediately sent its investiture [*teşrifat*] for Khan Sahip Giray in 1774, but Ottoman involvement with the Tatar exiles had developed further than they had anticipated[6]. Devlet's "uprising" in the Kuban had not materially affected the outcome of the war. But this former Khan had gathered considerable support there and in late April. 1775, he invaded the Crimea. He had persuaded conservative Tatars that Sahip's administration had "capitulated to the infidels" in spite of the fact that Sahip had imprisoned Veselickij and had received the *teşrifat* from Istanbul[7].

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[1] *SIRIO* vol. 135 (1911) pp. 47-50, 101-102.
[2] Ibidem pp. 52-53.
[3] *AGS* vol. 1, no. 1 (1869) p. 293.
[4] *SIRIO* vol. 135 (1911) pp. 299-300.
[5] Ibidem vol. 135, p. 337.
[6] Mustafa Paşa *Netaic-ül-vukuat*. Istanbul 1909, vol. 4, pp. 8-9. "Since the Tatar peoples were independent, according to the requirements of the Kaynarca treaty, they could select whomever they wanted as Khan, and after the treaty was signed, the Crimean clergy and notables chose Sahip Giray for the office of Khan … The Sultan, the Caliph of Islam, sent to the above-mentioned Khan the investiture and various necessities for it."
[7] *SIRIO*, vol. 135 (1911) pp. 71, 207-208. M.S. Anderson intimates that this invasion was a Turkish one, but in fact the Turks neither sponsored it nor were they happy to see it occur, in: *The Eastern Question* (London 1966) p. 1.

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Although Russia did not welcome Devlet any more than did the Porte, Catherine decided to recognize him as Khan, at least for the present[1]. Ščerbinin, one of Catherine's advisers on Tatar affairs, had an audience with him in June, 1775, in which he addressed him as "Your Excellency Devlet Giray Khan"[2]. This formal recognition did not prevent Catherine from striving for his overthrow, for with good reason she did not trust Devlet as someone who would maintain a state friendly towards Russia.

In the Kuban Şahin wasted no time in preparing to strengthen his "Khanate." He proposed an attack against the Ottoman fort on the Taman peninsula. The Crimean government had theoretically received Taman in 1774, but the Ottomans had not removed their garrison. Devlet had requested that the Turks remain until the Russians had completely evacuated their armies, and as Catherine was keeping troops with Şahin in the Kuban his arguments were not without foundation. But the Turkish garrison was small and Şahin knew that if he could capture Taman he would have a clear road to the Crimea itself and could more easily communicate with dissident elements on the peninsula[3].

While organizing Şahin's administration in the Kuban, the Russians prepared strong military concentrations along their southern frontiers bordering at the Perekop line of defense in the Crimea. General Prozorovkij took command of this operation. Catherine commented that "Our affairs in the Crimean peninsula have fallen into such disorder that We find it necessary to take forceful measures this autumn to preserve the dignity and honor of Our Empire"[4]. Plans were thus made for another invasion of the Crimea "or restore order."

In late 1775, Devlet felt himself in a threatened position. In an attempt to strengthen his grip on the throne and to prevent a new Russian-sponsored "election," the Khan asked permission from the Porte to make his office an hereditary one. The Ottomans quite naturally refused to agree to a change which would nullify any small advantage which they had in the right of investiture. However, for this very reason the Russians felt it a good idea particularly because they planned that Şahin would be Khan before it could take effect[5]. The Ottomans had long exercised hereditary rights to their own throne but this practice had never taken hold in the Crimea. Although members of the Giray family had always occupied the throne, their family was very large. The various

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[1] *SIRIO* vol. 135 (1911) p. 394. Contemporary Turkish chroniclers called Devlet a "malignant" influence in Tatar history. Ahmet Resmi Efendi *Hulâsat-ul-ihtibar* [Summaries of Opinions]. Istanbul 1890.
[2] *SIRIO* vol. 135 (1911) p. 394.
[3] Ibidem pp. 299-300, 345-346, 360-351; *AGS* vol. 1, no. 1 (1869) p. 309.
[4] *SIRIO* vol. 135 (1911) p. 441.
[5] *SIRIO* vol. 6 (1871) pp. 353-254.

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elements of Crimean society had never been willing to renounce their right to help determine who would ascend the throne. In fact, no Khan before Devlet had ever had the audacity to suggest such a radical change. His last ditch effort in no small way helped Şahin's pro-Russian party gain support among some of the native noble families.

Elements in St. Petersburg were applying such pressure for a more aggressive Crimean policy. Many had resented N. Panin's "soft" policy towards the Tatars and had never felt that the creation of an independent Tatar state had been in Russia's interest. Chief spokesman for the "hawks" was Prince Aleksandr Bezborodko. In mid-1776 he presented a treatise to Catherine in which he reminded her of all of Russia's claims against the Tatars. Perhaps he went a bit too far in arguing that Russia had been subjected to disgraces at the hands of the Tatars since the Polovcy attacks in 967. He praised Ivan IV who "knew well the customs of these treacherous and changeable Tatars … He knew that the only means of ridding himself of the danger of the Kazan Tatars had been to take their kingdom under his control"[1]. Bezborodko argued that Russia must follow Tsar Ivan's lead with the Crimean Tatars. But Catherine was not persuaded yet to annex the area. She considered that a government in the Crimea friendly to Russia would be gain enough.

On November 21, 1776, Prozorovskij at the head of 14 500 troops took the Tatar stronghold of Or [Perekop] and met no resistance[2]. The road was now open to Bahçesaray from the north. Prozorvskij had been enjoying considerable success in creating a movement within the Crimea which favored for various reasons the expulsion of Devlet. Reports came out of the peninsula that "the whole of Crimean society is awaiting the arrival of Şahin from the Kuban. Many want him as their Khan"[3]. Many of the nobles had resented Devlet's attempt to make his throne hereditary and now pledged their allegiance to Şahin. At the same time hundreds of nobles were fleeing to Istanbul[4]. It is probable that the nobles harbored no illusions as to Şahin's future independence from the Russians. But they had real grievances against Devlet and hoped that under a new Khan they would regain their influence in internal administration. Devlet had relied solely upon his partisans within the Giray family and upon the clergy

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[1]N. Grigorovic Kancler knjaz Aleksandr Andreevic Bezborodko v svjazi s sobytijami ego vremeni in: *SIRIO* vol. 26 (1879) Prilozenie 5, pp. 339-370. Zinkeisen (*Geschichte* vol. 6, p. 170) makes a good case for calling the two parties in Russia, the ministerial party led by Panin which wanted "peace" and the court party led by Potemkin which wanted forceful action.

[2]N. F. Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie Kryma k Rossii. Reskripty, pisma, relacii, donesenija*. St. Petersburg 1885-1889; here vol. 1, pp. 116-117, 151. Anderson feels that a Russo-Turkish war was imminent at this point and was staved off only through the efforts of the French ambassador in Istanbul (The Greak Powers and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1783-1784; in: *The Slavonic and East European Review* vol. 37, no. 88 [1958-959] p. 17).

[3]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 1, pp. 80-81.

[4]Ibidem vol. 1, pp. 64-68, 72; Başbakanlık Arşivi. Cevdet Tasnifi. Hariciye nos. 3979, 5654, 6007, 6093, 6295.

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[*ulema*] for his governmental positions, and had held no *divans* [councils] in which the nobles had always enjoyed considerable power. They felt that if Şahin gained the throne it would be due as much to their support as to that of the Russians on the border. Both Crimean nobles and the Russians believed that Şahin would act as their puppet, and both were to be sadly mistaken.

Devlet saw the handwriting on the wall and fled to Istanbul in April, 1777. The Porte assigned him a residence in the Ottoman capital where he remained until his death four years later[1]. Nothing remained now which could prevent Şahin's triumphant entry into the Crimea to ascend the throne of the Khans of *Cingiziye*. The Russians who had participated in this "election" congratulated each other on their success. Prozorovskij wrote to Rumjancev that "Şahin's mounting the throne gives glory to your name which brought union, peace, and quiet to this country." Panin congratulated Catherine on the success of this "lawful election in which the Ottomans would be able to find no Russian interference and which preserved Tatar independence under their autocratic Khan"[2].

The Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamit I is reported to have said when he heard news of Şahin's victory that "Şahin is a tool of the Russians who have the intention of capturing the whole Crimea"[3]. The first period of Tatar independence had come to an inglorious end. Elements within the Crimea which refused to accept a government subservient to Russia were too strong to permit Sahip Giray a long tenure of office. The Porte's candidate "Devlet" proved to be an incompetent leader and had not been able to gain the necessary support from the Nogais or the nobles. The Russians played the game as professionals and successfully guided Şahin's every move.

II. *The Khanate of Şahin Giray*

Şahin Giray assumed the reins of power in early April, 1777. After ruling for only six months he experienced a full-scale insurrection which spread from one end of his state to the other and to which every part of Tatar society gave full support. It was to be a completely internal revolt against Şahin's reforms and his projects for a radical change in the administrative system of the new Crimean state.

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[1] Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 1, pp. 269-271, 376; Başbakanlık Arşivi. Cedvet Tasnifi. Hariciye nos. 5845, 5890, 6087.

[2] *Ctenija* vol. 96, part 1 (1876) p. 116; Pisma grafa N. I. Panina k imperatrice Ekaterine Velikoj, in: *Archiv knjazja Voroncova* vol. 26 (1882) p. 153.

[3] I. H. Uzunçarşılı *Osmanlı tarihi*. Ankara 1956, vol. 4, part 1, p. 446.

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Şahin realized that in the past the Khan had not possessed sufficient authority to govern effectively. He had observed the power which belonged to the Russian Empress while he had been in St. Petersburg and understood politics well enough to know the basic weakness of the Khan's office. The Khan had been completely subjected to the whim of the great noble families when he had wanted to raise an army. His income to a great extent had been dependent upon the generosity of the Ottoman Sultans, and now that the Crimea was no longer an Ottoman vassal, the Khan did not have access to the large sums of money necessary for "gifts" which would influence those groups upon whom he depended. Most of the Crimean lands were in the hands of the nobles and the clergy. But in spite of Şahin's correct analysis of the need for reform he was unable to recognize the fact that there were limitations which would not permit him to carry out his projects. A weak executive always has a difficult time in introducing reforms, particularly when the desired result is an increase in executive power.

The most serious problem, and the first which Şahin tackled, was the method of succession to the throne. The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca had established in the new Khanate the traditional way of choosing a successor to the Khan — election by the "people." This of course meant the aristocracy, both secular and clerical, and this was as it had always been. But now the Ottomans no longer had the opportunity of participating in the selection of the Khan and were limited to a perfunctory approval of the election once held. Thus the nobles and the clergy had received even more power than they had had before the war. The office of Khan was completely subjected to their whims and fancies. The solution found at Küçük Kaynarca thus established an unstable situation and an inherently weak Khan.

Even Devlet Giray, upon whose political wisdom one cannot place a high value, had recognized this basic flaw in the Khan's power and had tried to persuade the Porte to grant him a hereditary throne. But the stiff resistance of the nobles and the advent of the Russian candidate had ended his reign before he could implement this change. Now, immediately upon ascending the throne, Şahin announced the creation of a hereditary Khanate. The oath of allegiance taken by "all beys, mirzas, and agas" granted to the Khan a hereditary throne. "Since elections of Khans in the future will undoubtedly cause division and quarrels among us, we wish that the ruling Khan will choose from among his sons the one who will inherit the throne"[1]. One might be surprised that those who had opposed Devlet on his question should now support Şahin's request, but later events were to show that not all of the notables had signed this oath as reported by Prozorovskij. Rumjancev gave Russian approval to this change as

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[1]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 1, pp. 498-499.

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Catherine wanted a strong Crimean central government with a strong sovereign so that there would be a more stable regime on her southern frontier[1].

Under Devlet's regime, the *divan* had never met and he had kept council with only a few of his close associates. Şahin now expressed dissatisfaction with this organ's traditional composition. In the past the *divan* had included representatives of the central administration, nobles, and clergy. It had never been a creature of the Khan's own making and had been a center for opposition. The new Khan reinstated the *divan* as a regular part of his administration but appointed only members of the two most powerful noble families, the Şirins and the Mansurs, who had initially given support for his candidacy[2].

Şahin also chose leaders for his religious administration from among those few *ulema* who had not opposed his rise to power. He convened a meeting of his new *mufti, kadiasker,* and *kadis* and posed three questions: 1. may one become Khan without being appointed by the Sultan? 2. may one fight against the Ottoman army? 3. may one request help from the Russian Empire against the Ottoman Sultan? They gave affirmative answers to all three questions and it was readily apparent that Catherine had no need to fear any Crimean-Turkish relations so long as Şahin was Khan[3].

Şahin retained the provincial administration which he had inherited. Formerly there had been six *beyliks* [provinces] each under the authority of a semi-independent *bey,* and each had represented the lands of one of the four large noble families, the Khan's lands, and those belonging to the Ottoman Sultan. When the Porte lost its towns, Şahin received these as well. The new Khan changed the name, however, from *beylik* to *kaimakamlik.* In the Ottoman administration a *kaimakam* was a deputy of the sovereign while a *bey* was more independent. This change fit well into Şahin's concept of an autocratic ruler[4].

A second major reform which Şahin projected was a complete renovation of the Crimean military establishment. In the former Khanates, the Khan had been totally dependent upon the good will of the nobles to provide troops for his army. His own personal guard had been made up of Ottoman janissaries

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[1]Ibidem vol. 1, p. 596.
[2]Ibidem vol. 1, pp. 597-599; Laškov Šagin Girej p. 57.
[3]Azarja Illia Sobytija slučivšiesja v Krymu v carstvovanie Šagin Gireja Chana (perevod s sovremennoj Evrejskoj rukopisi), in: *Vremennik imperatorskago Moskovskago obščestva istorii i drevnostej rossijskich* vol. 24 (1854) p. 115.
[4]Baron Igel'strom Opisanie tavričeskoj oblasti i Kryma, in: A. Skal'kovskij Zanjatie Kryma v 1783 g. Materialy dlja istorii Novorossijskago kraja, published in: *Žurnal Ministerstva narodnago prosveščanija* vol. 30, no. 2 (1841) pp. 9-11. Igel'strom prepared this report in 1783 for Potemkin on the basis of information which he had received from Şahin's officials.

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whose commander was the Turkish *ordu ağasi* in Kefe. The Ottomans had used these janissaries more often to depose Khans or to keep them in line than to protect the Khan from native hostile elements.

While Şahin was in the Kuban he had tried to create a new elite guard made up of cavalry trained and armed in the European fashion. But this force which he called *beşli*s had not shown any great skill in the battle for Taman when the Turkish commander had been able to rout them with only a handful of janissaries who were trained and armed in the old Ottoman fashion. However Şahin stuck to a decision once made and decided that if he was to be an autocrat, he needed a regular army not subject to the decisions of the nobles. He proposed to Prozorovskij the establishment of a 20 000 men regular army to include 1000 elite *beşli*s and 2000 *sekban*s [Crimean janissaries]. The Russian general thought the idea ridiculous. Şahin's treasury was not rich enough to support such a large number, the supply of Tatar professional officers was non-existent, and even an army of 20 000 could not defend the new state against any one of its neighbors should the need arise. Russia herself had promised full protection for Şahin and his government and Prozorovskij thought this to be sufficient[1]. But for good reasons, Şahin did not trust the nobles to give continued support for his regime and proceeded to "call up" a regular army. With the aid of the 800 *beşli*s already in his service he conscripted several thousand Tatar youths. They were required to wear western military dress (presumably furnished by the Russian army still in the Crimea) and began to drill in the way Şahin had observed Russian guard units training in St. Petersburg. The Khan attempted to organize the new soldiers in the Russian manner: in thousands and hundreds[2].

For the Tatars the most startling aspect of the military reform was the Khan's order to place Christian Crimeans alongside of the Muslims in the new regular units[3]. This complaint, together with the fact that he was forcing Muslims to wear "infidel clothes" was to give the Tatar exiles in Istanbul foundation for their calls for Ottoman intervention. The Ottomans themselves, twenty years later under Sultan Selim III were to try to establish their own *nizam-i cedid* [new order] army on western models.

Another reform equally disturbing for the Tatars was Şahin's attempted reorganization of the Crimean land and tax system. His initial action involved the seizure of those lands [*vakf*] belonging to the religious institutions and

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[1]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 1, pp. 636-639.

[2]Illia Sobytija pp. 103-104. Zinkeisen (*Geschichte* vol. 6, pp. 164-165) intimates that Şahin intended to educate his Tatars through the army, and thus to change "the military character" of his people. According to Zinkeisen, it was the military reform which was to be the most crucial element of Şahin's "westernization."

[3]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 1, p. 712.

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under the control of the clergy and to hand them over to the peasants who worked them[1]. The areas belonging to the *ulema* were not inconsiderable as there were over 1400 mosques in the Crimea and each had its lands which paid for its upkeep[2]. Şahin appropriated for the state the former Ottoman lands on the southern shore and created from these the new *kaimakamlik* of Kefe[3].

Most importantly the new Khan instituted a graduated tax levied equally upon all Crimean subjects. The former Khans had received no income from that large portion of the Tatars who were vassals of the nobles. The new tax was to be assigned on the basis of one's income. The Karaim Rabbi Azar'ia Illia recounted the joy with which his flock accepted this new procedure for taxation. "Before Şahin there had been no system or law in financial matters"[4]. The tax was to apply equally to Muslims and non-Muslims and supposedly the central government would now receive an income from all Crimeans including those who had supported the nobles and *ulema*. But as Şahin did not inherit a large civil bureaucracy he was forced to utilize a tax farming system as the means of collecting his income. He sold the whole taxable area of the Crimean peninsula itself to a Christian merchant named Mavroeni for the equivalent of 215 000 rubles for the year 1777[5].

The Khan's good treatment of the non-Muslim minorities gave rise to rumors that he was himself a Christian. In his refusal to confiscate lands of the Orthodox monasteries as he had done with the mosques, Şahin appeared to conservative Muslims to be violating the tenets of Islam[6]. With the exception of the non-Muslim minorities Şahin was extremely unpopular. Not one of his reforms met with the approval of most Crimeans. His land reform had incensed the *ulema* to even greater opposition than before. His forcible conscription of Tatar youths into an "infidel army," his extravagant attempts to bestow upon himself autocratic powers, this attempt to enforce the collection of taxes, even from the nobles, and his making all of these plans without the participation of the *divan,* all created a serious discontent among the populace of the Crimean state. Only a spark was needed to set off the flames of the most intense rebellion that the Crimea had yet experienced, and it was to be the Russians who unintentionally were to provide this spark.

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[1]B. Vol'fson Prisoedinenie Kryma k Rossii v 1783 godu, in: *Istoriceskij žurnal* vol. 3 (1941) p. 61.
[2]Igel'strom Opisanie p. 24.
[3]P.I. Keppen, in: *Krymskij sbornik* (St. Petersburg 1837) pp. 74-78.
[4]Illia Sobytija p. 113.
[5]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 1, p. 569.
[6]A. L. Bert'e-Delagard K istorii christianstva v Krymu, in: *ZOOID* vol. 28 (1910) p. 66, where Archibishop Ignatij claims that his monastery near Aktiar owned 25 000 desjatins of land in late 1777. Şahin gave permission to Ignatif to build a new stone church if Russia would agree to supply the money for it. See also *Ctenija* vol. 96, part 1, pp. 126-127.

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In 1775, Aleksej Orlov returned from his Archipelago campaign and brought with him quite a few Balkan Christians who had joined his navy against the Ottomans. Catherine granted Orlov permission to settle these Christians (mainly Greeks) in the new Russian forts of Kerč and Yenikale in the Crimea. By 1776 over 1200 of these settlers had arrived and had received lands in the environs of the two Russian forts[1]. Şahin Giray was caught completely unawares by the immigration of these Greek military settlers. His relations with the Russians had grown cooler in 1777 and Prozorovskij had often complained of his frustration in not being able to influence Şahin to act more slowly in his reforms[2]. The revolt began with an armed conflict between the Albancy and neighboring Tatars who resented this immigration of privileged Christians. The Albancy, who had lived under Ottoman domination were not eager to establish friendly relations with the tatars either. The trouble near Kerč soon spread to other areas of the Crimea as dissatisfaction with Şahin's administration ran deep throughout the peninsula. His "elite guard" took their new Russian arms and formed the backbone of the rebellion. Şahin and the Russian resident fled to Yenikale while the rebels attacked and burned the Khan's palace and began to slaughter Christian merchants in Bahçesaray[3].

The Ottomans had become seriously concerned with the course of events in the Crimea. In their opinion Şahin had clearly nullified the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca by interfering in areas which the Porte considered within the religious sphere — confiscation of the *ulema* lands, violation of the *şeriat* [holy law of Islam] by equalizing Muslims with the non-Muslims. The exiles, led by former Khan Devlet, demanded that the Ottomans send an army to the Crimea and appoint a new Khan[4]. Clearly the Porte wanted to avoid a new war with the Russian Empire, but to appease the growing discontent in the capital, the Grand Vezir appointed Selim Giray, a former Khan and a leader of the exiles, to try his hand at uniting the rebels under his authority[5].

Early in the revolt Rumjancev proposed that Russia sit out the struggle, move to the coasts, and permit Şahin and his "new army" to defeat the rebels[6]. It is possible that Rumjancev hoped that each side would suffer such great

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[1]N. F. Dubrovin Bumagi knjazja Grigorija Aleksandroviča Potemkina-Tavriceskago, 1774-1788 gg., published in: *Sbornik voenno-istoričeskich materialov* vol. 6 (St. Petersburg 1893) pp. 209-210; SIRIO vol. 27 (1880) pp. 111, 124-125. The Russians called these settlers "Albancy" although it is improbable that many came from Muslim Albania.

[2]*Čtenija* vol. 96, part 1, pp. 121-123.

[3]Illia Sobytija p. 105.

[4]Başbakanlık Arşivi: Cevdet Tasnifi. Hariciye no. 4017; Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 1, pp. 614-615.

[5]Başbakanlık Arşivi: Cevdet Tasnifi. Askerî nos 24842, 31341, 32218; Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 1, p. 848.

[6]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 1, p. 791.

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losses so as to make another rebellion impossible and at the same time temper Şahin's course of action. But there had been little struggle as Şahin's troops had deserted him. It soon became apparent that unless the Russian army intervened, and quickly, the Russian favorite would stand no chance of survival.

Prozorovskij united his forces with Şahin near Akmeçet and bombarded and captured Eski Krim and Karasu Bazaar. Under General De Balmen the Albancy attacked Kefe and slaughtered over six hundred Tatars with their wives and children. After the capture of Kefe Prozorovskij ordered the Albancy to the mountains "to pillage and destroy" all remnants of the opposition[1].

In Istanbul, outraged by the news of the Kefe events the government declared Şahin to be an unbeliever. They proved him to be a Christian by arguing that "he sleeps on a bed, sits in a chair, doesn't pray in the correct way, wears and shows a cross and has a baptized name of Ivan Pavlovič"[2]. But the Porte had given his opponents no effective help and their candidate had fled the Crimea while Şahin had successfully regained control.

Şahin had a rather naive opinion of the events which had occurred. He seemed to believe sincerely that a majority of Crimeans favored his rule and that it had been only a small part of his new army which had caused the Tatars to lose their senses[3]. But Prozorovskij reported to Catherine the true extent of the revolt. It had included all of the clergy, many of the nobles including the important Şirins and some of the Giray family itself. In fact, Şahin could count on the support of only the Christian minority, his close administrative associates, and the Russian army[4].

The Crimean Khan now sent deputies to the Porte to receive a new investiture according to the dictates of the treaty. Understandably they were not well received. The Grand Vezir ordered them seized and sent in custody to the island of Rhodes[5]. The Russian ambassador in Istanbul, Stachiev, presented a complaint but the *reis efendi* was not sympathetic. The latter asked "if the sojourn of a large number of Russian troops in the Crimea is in conformity with the Crimeans' independence. The Tatars had requested that Prozorovskij leave and the Russians replied with cannon and rifle"[6].

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[1]Ibidem vol. 2, pp. 4, 92, 147; S. Safonov Ostatki Grečeskich legionov v Rossii, ili nyneš nee naselenie Balaklavy, in: *ZOOID* vol. 1 (1844) p. 218.
[2]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 1, p. 783; vol. 2, pp. 22, 33, 59.
[3]Ibidem vol. 2, p. 7.
[4]Ibidem vol. 2, pp. 12-13, 155.
[5]Ibidem, vol. 2, p. 203; Başbakanlık Arşivi: Cevdet Tasnifi. Hariciye nos. 2830, 5891.
[6]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 2, pp. 239-241.

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The Russians were very realistic in assessing the revolt and its sudden end. While Prozorovskij had suspected intrigues of the Porte, Rumjancev realized that the Ottomans had played no part in instigating the uprising[1]. Şahin had just gone too far and too fast in his program of westernization (more correctly, Russianization). Interestingly enough, with the rebellion completely crushed, Selim having left for Istanbul, and Şahin with the Russian soldiers in complete control, Catherine indicated that it might be a good idea to bring the Khan over into the Kuban where the Tatars had not so actively participated against him. She wanted "to preserve the existence of a free Tatar *oblast'* even if it cannot be done in the Crimea itself"[2]. Thus, as late as 1778 Catherine still had no intention of bringing the Crimea completely under her scepter.

There were rumblings of discontent among Russian officials in St. Petersburg and in the Crimean occupation army, as their patience with the Tatars was not as great as Catherine's. During the midst of the repression of the rebellion a rumor spread among the Russian forces that the Empress "intended to punish the rebels by taking the whole Crimea into the Russian Empire, and because of her love of humanity would send the rebels to Bessarabia or to the Kuban'," rather than kill them[3]. And in St. Petersburg, Bezborodko continued to press for annexation. "Already at the end of 1777, when the Empress brought me into political affairs, I proposed to Count Bakunin that the independence of the Crimean Tatars was a bad thing for us and that it was suitable to think about annexing this territory"[4]. But there is no reason to suspect that Catherine listened to these complaints nor that she was yet ready to consider the annexation of this troublesome peninsula. For some inexplicable reason she still wanted to have an independent state in the Crimea under the authority of Şahin Giray.

This second period of Tatar independence ended as it had begun with an invasion by the Russian army. In the first invasion Şahin had entered with the aid of considerable native support. But the Turkish chronicler Cevdet is correct in saying that Şahin enjoyed no support from the Crimeans in late 1777[5]. Prozorovskij reported that Şahin could not remain for a minute without the Russian army by his side[6]. How would Şahin react to his total dependence upon Russian strength? This was to be the story of the third and last period of Crimean independence.

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[1]Ibidem vol. 1, pp. 791, 826.
[2]Ibidem vol. 2, p. 224.
[3]Ibidem vol. 2, p. 97.
[4]Grigorovic Kancler p. 93. Zinkeisen (*Geschichte* vol. 6, p. 117) quotes the diplomat Solms at St. Petersburg who said that the "court" party led by Potemkin in December, 1777, believed that the Crimea while independent would always be a cause for discord between Russia and the Porte.
[5]Ahmet Cevdet *Tarih* Istanbul 1875, vol. 1, p. 150.
[6]*Čtenija* vol. 96, part 1, p. 125.

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III. *The failure of Şahin Giray*

After crushing the Tatar rebels one would have expected Şahin and his Russian mentors to change the policies and aims of the Crimean government so as to avoid a repetition of the civil war. But the Khan had not lost his conviction that he was the savior of the Crimean people. After all, the most advanced element of society, the Christians, had eagerly welcomed his reforms. Şahin counted on the overwhelming support of Russia for a continuation of his westernization policies. But during the first months of his second reign he was to experience the loss of the one native prop which he had, the Christian minority.

The Karaim Rabbi Azar'ia Illia wrote that the Christians were fearful of Tatar reprisals since they had aided Şahin's re-entry into the Crimea. He said that the Bahçesaray Greeks had secretly reported intelligence information to Prozorovskij during the war and that the Kefe Greeks and Armenians had added their strength to that of De Balmen's Albancy during the slaughter of Tatars in December, 1777[1]. Thus the Christians had good reason to fear Tatar retribution should the Russian army leave. The first indication the sources give of a Russian plan to remove these minorities from the Crimea is a letter from Prozorovskij to Potemkin in January, 1778, in which he disapproves of the idea because of the need for these people whenever Russia might annex the Crimea[2]. Prozorovskij had added his voice to the growing number in St. Petersburg who were pressing for a final solution to the Tatar problem.

Disregarding Prozorovskij's disapproval and without prior orders from Catherine, Rumjancev ordered Russian officials to persuade the Christians to leave the Crimea and to resettle in one of Russia's southern provinces. Catherine agreed at this point and asked Potemkin to prepare the way for the exodus[3]. Archbishop Ignatij, leader of the Crimean Orthodox community (whom the Russians began to call the metropolitan at this time) presented a formal petition to Rumjancev asking permission for his flock to settle in Russia[4]. The heads of the Crimean Armenian and Catholic churches, Peter Margos and Father Jakov, followed suit and all three received substantial monetary rewards from the Russians for their troubles[5]. There is good reason to suspect that this was not a spontaneous and enthusiastic request from the "whole of the Crimean Christians," but one written solely by Ignatij. The Karaim Rabbi suggested that many Christians (whom he calls "the Greek and

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[1]Illia Sobytija p. 108.
[2]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 2, p. 98.
[3]Ibidem vol. 2, pp. 296, 317-318.
[4]Ibidem vol. 2, pp. 556-557.
[5]Ibidem vol. 2, pp. 559-560.

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Armenian poor") did not feel threatened by the Tatars and were not anxious to leave their homes for a strange place in the north. They had every reason to expect privileged treatment from Şahin and in fact had been his close advisers at the end of the civil war. The Rabbi charged that they had tried to set the Khan against his Karaim community with claims of Karaim aid to the rebels[1].

When Şahin learned of Rumjancev's project he became outraged that Catherine should so suddenly desert him. He argued that the loss of the Christians would bring the Crimean government to a virtual collapse because of the loss of revenue. Nolde seems to have swallowed this argument[2]. But in fact during the first period of Şahin's rule he had equalized taxes on Muslims and non-Muslims and the latter's small number would result in a small percentage of the tax income. The real reason of Şahin's anger was precisely that they were the only group which had supported him during the civil war and the only ones upon whom he could count as loyal subjects. In addition Şahin felt that their talents would be necessary for the success of westernization in the Crimea.

Of course the Khan could not use this argument to justify his claims, for if Catherine had truly realized the total lack of native support for her protégé it is likely that she would have drastically changed her policy. But her almost blind confidence in Şahin's worth was to delay this recognition until another revolt in 1782. Perhaps Rumjancev shrewdly understood Catherine's weakness towards Şahin and realized that the Christian exodus would make the Khan's position untenable. More probably Rumjancev sincerely feared for the safety of the Christians and wanted to remove a possible cause for more internal conflict. In any case the plans for the Christians' departure moved swiftly to fruition and by September 18, 1778, Rumjancev learned that all who were going had left. A total of 31 098 had set out for Azov *gubernija,* many "with tears in their eyes because they had to leave their immovable families [ancestors] behind"[3].

Even with the Christians leaving, Şahin could feel fairly secure so long as the Russian army remained. They had fortified the harbors of Aktiar, Kefe and Yalta so as to prevent the possibility of an Ottoman invasion by sea. Prozorovskij kept regiments at Perekop and Arabat to preclude Turkish attacks from Özi or from across the Kuban River. Şahin repeatedly asked Catherine not

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[1]Illia Sobytija pp. 110, 113, 127. Zinkeisen (*Geschichte* vol. 6, p. 314) corroborates the fact that many of these Chrisitans did not wish to move to Russia, and that in fact they were "misled" into this action.

[2]Dubrovin *Prisodinenie* vol. 2, pp. 322, 580; Nolde *La Formation* vol. 2, p. 142.

[3]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 2, pp. 698, 710-714. These included 7178 from Kefe, 2723 from Bahçesaray, 259 from Akmeçet. Suvorov reported that only 288 remained behind "of their own request." See: Pisma Suvorova k knjazju Potemkinu, in: *Archiv knjazja Voroncova* vol. 24 (1880) pp. 291-293.

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to remove these troops and she promised to leave him protection sufficient to insure his personal safety[1].

In 1778 the Porte was to make one last half-hearted attempt to unseat the "infidel" khan. Under pressure from the conservative clergy in Istanbul, the Ottomans chose the *vali* [governor] of Trabzon, Canikli Haci Ali Paşa, to lead a fleet to the Crimea. Stachiev reported that if the *vali*'s first attempts were unsuccessful the Ottomans would sacrifice him and recognize Şahin as khan[2]. Rumjancev felt sure of his fortifications in Aktiar and expressed no concern about the expected attack. Haci Ali Paşa appeared at Aktiar with only three ships, and after a few hours of shelling from the shore batteries he withdrew. Thus ended the last Ottoman attempt to regain their former influence in the Crimea itself[3]. The Porte now settled down to negotiations with Russia which brought about the Convention of Aynali Kavak. In return for their recognition of Şahin the Ottomans received the lands between the Bug and Dnestr Rivers, lands which they had always considered to be within the province of Özi, but which the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca had assigned to the Tatars[4].

That the Porte was tired of the Tatar question is evidenced by their treatment of the exiles in Istanbul. Although the Ottomans continued to grant them salaries, the Tatars began to fight among themselves for Ottoman favor. With increased infighting and continual demands for Crimean invasions, the Grand Vezir decided to send some of the most vociferous exiles away from Istanbul. Selim Giray went to Edirne, Gazi Giray to Lemnos in the Archipelago, and Devlet who was "promising the Turks a golden mountain," if they would return him as Khan, died in September, 1780[5].

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[1]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 2, pp. 716, 745.

[2]Ibidem vol. 2, pp. 427, 430, 460, 537; Başbakanlık Arşivi. Hatt-i hümayun no. 797/e. "The Russian commander in the Crimea brought his army from Bahçesaray to Aktiar, there constructed earthenworks, armed them with cannon; all of this was in violation of the treaty; all sorts of tricks have been committed by Russia in addition to the intrigues of Şahin Giray, and for these reasons the imperial fleet will set out for Gözleve."

[3]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 2, pp. 463, 550, 653-655.

[4]Ibidem vol. 2, p. 872; vol. 3, p. 15. Anderson (*The Great Powers* p. 23) makes a case for French pressure being crucial in settling the Convention of Aynalı Kavak. The whole question of the importance of the diplomacy of western powers in the solution of the Crimean question has been summarized by Anderson (*The Great Powers* p. 41): "Negotiations which produce no tangible or at least no immediate result are not usually a subject of great importance or interest. Those in question however deserve some attention for the light they throw on the state of European politics, at this time." This writer agrees with Anderson that although European interest was high in the outcome of the Crimean question, their various complicated diplomatic maneuvers and negotiations did not appreciably affect the outcome of the question.

[5]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 2, pp. 301-302, 581, 624, 681; Başbakanlık Arşivi: Cevdet Tasnifi. Hariciye nos. 1890, 2405, 6323. Zinkeisen (*Geschichte* vol. 6, pp. 210-211) speaks of two "parties" in the Ottoman *divan*, one for peace and one for war, and states that at this time the "peace party" gained the upper hand aginst the supporters of a Crimean invasion.

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The Ottomans were now willing to recognize Şahin. The Porte sent word to its commander in Özi that peace had been made and that Şahin was Khan[1]. If the Khan had not made serious threats against the Porte, there is no reason why further conflict would have developed so soon. But Şahin's dreams of glory regained strength after the Christian exodus and he soon began to make territorial claims against Ottoman territories. In the first place Şahin did not accept the loss of lands between the Bug and Dnestr Rivers required at Aynali Kavak. He sent officers to this area to organize a tax system there. These were captured however by the *paşa* of Özi and treated as spies. At the same time Şahin sent word to the Porte that he was claiming rights over Bessarabia, Wallachia, and Moldavia[2].

That these latter lands had never belonged to the Crimean khanate was well known by both Russia and the Ottomans. Stachiev in Istanbul only half-heartedly presented these demands to the *reis efendi* and reported to Catherine that Şahin must be persuaded to drop the whole subject. But the Porte took no chances and ordered Özi to be reinforced[3]. As far-fetched as these plans were, no less so were Şahin's programs for the Caucasus. The Abaza and Cherkess tribes living across the Kuban River had been subjects of the Khan at times, and of the Ottoman Sultan at others. Their lands had not been included in the new Tatar state in 1774. But Şahin now sent officials into this region to set up a Crimean administration there. N. Panin and Catherine both warned Şahin not to act unwisely and Panin at this time described the Khan's character as "arrogant and remote"[4].

For such a far-reaching foreign policy and with dreams of a Black Sea empire, Şahin needed to reassert his authority within the Crimea. The new Russian resident in Bahçesaray Konstantinov tried to persuade the Tatars that Russia would support Şahin to the end. He used the name of the khan in all dealings with the nobles and told them that "their loyalty and devotion to Şahin are necessary for the well-being of the state"[5]. But the Khan was having problems in gaining among the Crimeans. The first blow had been the departure of his Christian subjects. The second was to be the removal of most of the Russian troops who had occupied the Crimea since 1777.

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[1]Başbakanlık Arşivi: Cevdet Tasnifi. Hariciye no. 649.
[2]Başbakanlık Arşivi: Hatt-i Hümayun no. 781/a; Cevdet Tasnifi. Hariciye nos. 2959, 4843, 6511.
[3]Başbakanlık Arşivi: Cevdet Tasnifi. Askerî no. 18480; Cevdet Tasnifi. Hariciye no. 8933; Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 3, pp. 517, 545.
[4]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 3, pp. 154-156, 179-181, 373-374, 416.
[5]Ibidem vol. 3, pp. 130-131, 139.

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Relations between the Russian occupation army and the local inhabitants had been remarkably good considering the ferocity of the fighting during the civil war. The Russians had been under orders to treat the Tatars well and "not to take anything from them by force"[1]. But at Aynali Kavak Catherine had promised to withdraw her troops from the Crimea within a year. By June 1, 1779, the Russian Empress honored her agreement with the Ottomans and "not one Russian soldier remained"[2]. Understandably Şahin did not want to see them leave but no amount of pleading could change Catherine's mind. Either she was losing interest in the young Tatar Khan or she felt that he should be able to rule without the support of her armies.

Although he felt that Catherine had deserted him on the matters of the Christians and Russian occupation troops, Şahin resumed his program of westernization. Once more the Khan attempted to form a Russian-style army. By the end of 1778 he had reestablished his *beşli* guard and had brought one thousand Nogais from the Kuban for his cavalry[3]. When his first guards deserted to the rebels in 1777 Şahin had lost all of the arms and munitions which he had earlier received from the Russians. In 1780 he tried to purchase new supplies from the Polish Count Wincenty Potocki who had provided arms to the Crimean Khan in 1769[4]. Potocki promised that it Şahin requested it he could form at least one regular army regiment made up of Poles and Austrians. But Veselickij, who was appointed Russian resident to the Khan in 1780, vetoed the idea of his hiring a mercenary army. Şahin now had to be satisfied with his small *beşli* force and abandoned his plans for a 20 000 man army once and for all.

Şahin's financial troubles mounted as the civil war had severely disrupted the failing Crimean economy. Although Catherine often contributed large sums to his treasury (100 000 rubles in February, 1778)[5], he was never able to establish a systematic way of collecting local taxes which were necessary to finance his grandiose projects. Şahin's administration had few trained officials and he found no one to purchase tax farming rights. Real trade between Russia and the Crimea, in addition to Russian handouts, had dropped drastically since 1776. In that year Russian exports to the Crimea had amounted to 370 000 rubles while by 1780 they had dropped to 130 000. Imports had increased slightly from 87 000 to 105 000 rubles[6]. Şahin made trade even more difficult

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[1]Ibidem vol. 2, p. 828.
[2]Ibidem vol. 3, pp. 192, 352.
[3]Ibidem vol. 2, p. 553.
[4]Başbakanlık Arşivi: Cevdet Tasnifi, Hariciye no. 2232 (June, 1769).
[5]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 2, p. 170.
[6]William Tooke *View of the Russian Empire During the Reign of Catherine the Second, and to the Close of the Eighteenth Century*. 2nd. ed. Dublin 1801, vol. 3, p. 384. These figures refer to Black Sea trade, all of which passed through the Crimea. Tooke imputes this drop in trade to the hostility of the Tatars and was one of the commentators who praised the annexation of the Crimea in 1783.

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with his mercantilist order that no money could leave the Crimea. If goods were marketed there, merchants could take out only goods in exchange[1].

Şahin's second reign ended as his first one had, in failure. The Khan desperately needed to establish good relations with both the Porte and Russia if he were to have any opportunity of success, but his proud and ambitious character prevented this fact from bothering him. His conviction that he should be an autocrat caused him trouble with both the Ottomans and Russians. After the civil war, Şahin had not been able to reassert his authority over the Nogais in the Kuban. His brothers Arslan, Gazi and Batir who had been his *seraskers* there in 1777 recognized Şahin's lack of power in the Crimea itself and began to act independently of Bahçesaray in 1778. This is not to say that at first they intended to create a new state or to challenge Şahin in the Crimea, but they did sever the ties of authority between the Khan and the Nogais[2].

Since by laying claims to their lands in the Caucasus, Şahin was posing real threats to the Porte, the latter jumped at the opportunity to gain influence in the Kuban region. Suleiman Ağa invited Şahin's brothers to visit Soğucuk to discuss the Kuban situation. They accepted and arrived accompanied by representatives of the mountain Cherkess and Abazas. Şahin's official in Taman reported that these deputies had been overwhelmed with Ottoman gifts and had been tricked into taking oaths of allegiance to the Porte[3]. The Khan claimed that the expedition was successful and that the whole northern Caucasus was "again" subject to the Crimean state[4]. However this was only one of the "evidences" which Şahin created to substantiate his territorial claims in that region. The Cherkess had never submitted to his authority[5]. In fact, in March, 1780, Konstantinov learned that a "large army" under the command of Şahin's brothers was preparing to leave the Kuban for the Crimea[6].

This time revolt against the Crimean Khan began in the Kuban, among the Nogais who had been the first group to recognize the sovereignty of Şahin Giray in 1775. Catherine had called the Nogais *legkomyslennye* and indeed they were. In their whole history they had never completely submitted to an outside authority and had changed their loyalty whenever it suited them. This revolt was not due so much to the interference of the Porte as to the inherent dislike by the

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[1]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 3, pp. 568, 626.
[2]Ibidem vol. 2, pp. 269-270, 714.
[3]Ibidem vol. 2, pp. 347-438, 460-461; *Čtenija* vol. 96, part 1, p. 139.
[4]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 3, p. 545.
[5]Ibidem vol. 3, pp. 553, 574-575. The Russian resident admitted that Şahin did not receive any such pledges of allegiance.
[6]Ibidem vol. 3, pp. 552, 583

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Nogai chiefs of any authority which infringed upon their own. They had before and did now pledge allegiance to any power which would help them rebel against their present sovereigns.

The Russian command again decided that they had to take strong measures if they were to preserve the Crimean state. In June, 1781, Rumjancev ordered the frontier defenses strengthened in Azov *gubernija.* In September Leškevič moved his troops against the rebels in the Kuban. He defeated a group of 500 Nogais and Cherkess and sent them fleeing into the mountains. In October Fabrician moved his regiment between two of the Nogai hordes to divide their strength[1]. Şahin proposed a more permanent division of the Nogais by forcibly resettling one horde north of Perekop and one with in the Crimean peninsula. Prince Potemkin vetoed this idea because he felt that such a move would severely disrupt the new Russian settlements in the area. Catherine agreed with Potemkin's judgment[2].

In April, 1782, Şahin's brothers prepared a long written argument for the Russians justifying their rebellion against the Khan. They charged that he had been installed on the throne only by the force of Russian arms, that he had tried to become more autocratic than the former Khans, and that he had established an army in the western fashion[3]. These were familiar arguments but ones which had not lost their validity.

At this time Catherine made one more effort to give Şahin additional stature in the eyes of the Crimean subjects. She ordered that he be appointed as a captain in the Russian Preobrazenskij guard regiment[4]. But few Tatars liked the Russians and this action only provided more fuel to the fires of revolt. Şahin told Veselickij what he was powerless to crush the rebellion because he could not even count on the loyalty of the *beşlis*. His garrison in Taman joined the rebels in May, 1782. The fact of the matter was that he needed his army in the Crimea as well as in the Kuban. The Khan's brothers Arslan and Batir entered into negotiations with elements there including some of the nobles, the *ulema,* and the *kadi* of Kefe[5].

In May, 1782, the Kuban leaders asked that representatives of the nobles come to Taman to discuss Şahin's policies. The Khan intercepted this message and replied to Arslan and Batir that "this state is not a republic. Thus they cannot go to the Kuban for such discussions. You must come to Bahçesaray

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[1]Ibidem vol. 4, pp. 107, 213-214, 272; *SIRIO* vol. 27 (1880) p. 192.
[2]Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 4, pp. 234, 270, 274.
[3]Ibidem vol. 4, pp. 426-427, 453-454.
[4]Ibidem vol. 4, pp. 235, 277, 417.
[5]Ibidem vol. 4, pp. 495-496.

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where we all can arrive at an agreement"[1]. But with good reason they feared a trap in the capital and preferred to wait and see.

One of the many Girays, Halim, whose name had not been well-known before now, appeared as the leader of the dissidents within the Crimean peninsula. With only two hundred Tatars he attacked Kefe where the Khan and Veselickij were staying, and defeated Şahin and his remaining three hundred *beşlis*. On May 14, the Khan and his retinue fled by boat to the Russian fort at Kerč. Halim moved into Kefe where his company of Tatars elected Batir Giray as the new Khan and prepared to send a delegation to the Porte for the investiture[2]. The list of officials who made up the Khan's suite which arrived at Kerč gives some indication of the support which he enjoyed at the end of his reign. It totalled less than four hundred. Out of his army of *beşlis* only 160 remained. Five nobles, several Girays, and his court officials accounted for the rest[3].

The third period of Tatar independence was nearly at an end. Halim Giray controlled Kefe while Arslan had taken Arabat. Batir was master in the Kuban and had been chosen Khan. Şahin and the Russian resident were refugees in Kerč. At the start of his first reign, when he had had the support of the Russian army and of much of Crimean society, Şahin had proved to be an incompetent ruler and had not understood that the main requirement for reform was power. In his second reign, Şahin's projects were even more ambitious than before, but what support he had formerly enjoyed was now practically nonexistent. The unkown factor as Catherine's reaction. Had she begun to realize that her protégé would never be able to rule an independent Crimea or would she try once more to place him on a secure throne?

IV. *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea*

Catherine had no intention as yet of removing her support from Şahin Giray. She ordered Veselickij to promise Şahin that "Her Imperial Majesty continues to bestow upon him Her good wishes and protection"[4]. The re-establishment of Şahin as Khan in late 1782 was almost a carbon copy of his re-entry in 1778. After an initial verbal peace feeler which received no response Catherine ordered the advance of Russian troops into the Crimea. She told Potemkin that "it is apparent that exhortation and other peaceful measures are

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[1]Ibidem vol. 4, p. 508.
[2]Ibidem vol. 4, pp. 512, 524-527.
[3]Ibidem vol. 4, pp. 529-530.
[4]Ibidem vol. 4, pp. 583-584.

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not enough to bring peace to the Crimea and to suppress the Tatar revolt against their lawful sovereign... Our troops are to enter the Crimea immediately, crush the rebels, and again install Şahin Giray as their legal Khan"[1].

By the end of October the final Russian conquest of the Crimea was over. De Balmen entered from the north, seized Perekop without a struggle, and proceeded towards Bahçesaray. Potemkin, Borzov, and Şahin advanced from Kerč[2]. Catherine replaced Veselickij with Sergej Laškarev as her resident in Bahçesaray. Laškarev had had a distinguished career as a Russian diplomat in the Ottoman Empire and had acquired fluency in the Turkish and Tatar languages. Unlike his predecessors he would not need native translators and could better determine public opinion in the Crimea[3].

Şahin no longer harbored any illusions as to broad support in the Crimea for his rule. He repeated the cruelty which he had shown in 1778 but with even more ferocity. The Khan and his remaining *beşli*s carried out a repression of all elements of Tatar society that even alarmed Catherine and Potemkin. The Empress warned that "as Our generosity and kindness are not meant only for him, but for all of the Tatar peoples, he must stop this shocking and cruel treatment and not give them just cause for a new revolt"[4]. It was at this point that Potemking began preparations for eventual Russian annexation of the Tatar peoples.

Through the mediation of a Tatar confident, Ivan Rudzevič (Iakub Ağa), who would later play an important rule in native administration under the Russians, Potemkin found some Crimean elements which were not opposed to the idea of becoming Russian subjects. In late November, 1782, Rudzevič discussed this matter with members of the Şirin family, the leaders of the Tatar nobility. Rudzevič told the Şirins of the "bliss" in which all of the peoples in the Russian Empire lived. He mentioned "the happy situation of the Kazan Tatars and of all of the Muslim peoples who had freely entered the Empire, and of the many benefits accruing to these Muslims who were subjects of the Empress"[5]. Although there is no evidence which suggests that Catherine had ordered these preliminary negotiations it was apparent that her support for Şahin was wavering. In mid-December the Empress clarified her position on annexation. She bitterly complained of the tremendous expense which the Crimea had cost since 1774. Catherine estimated that she had spent more than

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[1] *SIRIO* vol. 27 (1880) pp. 210-211.
[2] Dubrovin *Prisoedinenie* vol. 4, pp. 827, 833, 836-837, 872.
[3] S. L. Laškarev, diplomat Ekaterininskago vremeni, in: *Russkij archiv* part 2 (1884) pp. 5-8.
[4] *SIRIO* vol. 27 (1880) p. 232.
[5] Rasporjaženija svetlejšago knjazja G. A. Potemkina-Tavričeskago, in: *ZOOID* vol. 12 (1881) p. 260.

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seven million rubles and countless lives in her attempt to create a viable Crimean state. She enumerated to Potemkin several hypothetical cases in which "Our Will would favor the appropriation of this peninsula to Ourselves": if the Khan should die or if his enemies should easily drive him away (they had done this twice before); if his rule should be insecure (it had been since 1777); if Russia would not be given the port of Aktiar; if the Khan should show disloyalty to the Russian Empire; if the Porte should send troops to the Crimea or their fleet into the Black Sea (there was no treaty or agreement which forbade the latter); or if the Hapsburg Empire would seize lands in the Danubian principalities, Russia would be forced to make equal gains[1]. As early as 1773 a Russian geographer had spoken of Aktiar as the best natural harbor on the northern coast of the Black Sea, and in 1780-1782 Prozorovskij and Rumjancev had constructed permanent fortifications there. In 1783 Aktiar was to become the base of the new Russian Black Sea fleet and would eventually be renamed Sevastopol'[2].

It was during Potemkin's stay in St. Petersburg in March, 1783, that he persuaded Catherine to take the last step and publicly declare the Russian annexation of the Crimea. Most probably his news that some important Tatar elements would not oppose such a move aided Catherine in her decision. Russia had almost completed the annexation in 1778 when Catherine placed Şahin on the throne for the second time. Her armies had treated the rebels as opponents of Russia as well as the Khan. In accord with the convention of Aynali Kavak Catherine did withdraw her troops in 1779 but they remained in Kerč, Yenikale and Kilburun on the peninsula. In late 1782 her armies had met no opposition. Şahin had all along received most of his income from Russia; he had relations only with Russian officials; the Russian ambassador was his spokesman in Istanbul. When Catherine issued the proclamation of annexation on April 8, 1783, it was no surprise to either the Turks or the Tatars.

Catherine justified the annexation by pointing out that Russia had never received her "just gains" from the war of 1768-1774. "During the last war with the Porte, when the force and victories of Our army gave Us full right to put the Crimea to Our own use," the Russian Empress had been willing to create an independent state for the Tatars. But the Crimeans had rejected this independence and Catherine now felt it her right to put an end to the problem[3].

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[1] *SIRIO* vol. 27 (1880) pp. 222-223.

[2] Z. Arkas Načalo i dejstvija russkago flota an Černom more s 1778 po 1798 god, in: *ZOOID* vol. 4 (1860) p. 264; Mery to privedenii v izvestnost' Novorossijskogo i Kavkazkogo kraja, in: *ZOOID* vol. 10 (1877) p. 225.

[3] *PSZ* vol. 21 (1830) no. 15708, p. 897 and following. Anderson and most other historians repeat this theory that the Crimeans had "rejected" their independence and intimate that they preferred the Ottomans as sovereigns to the Russians. On the contrary, it was not their dislike of independence that led them to revolt, but their rejection of Şahin's attempt to create an autocratic regime in the Crimea. It was autocracy rather than independence that the Crimeans rejected.

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This brings us to the fate of Şahin Giray upon whom Catherine had expended so much hope and money. Potemkin persuaded the despondent Khan to come to Voronež with his harem and suite of followers[1]. But he never regained his pride and enthusiasm of former years. An Englishwoman travelling through southern Russia in 1786 described Şahin's situation as a pitiful one[2]. In the same year Bulgakov in Istanbul reported the arrival there of four Tatars bringing news that the former Khan desired to immigrate to Rumelia in the Ottoman Empire. After much hesitation Catherine permitted her protégé to leave and he arrived in Rumelia in early 1787 where the Porte provided him with a large estate[3]. Thus ended the career of the last Crimean Khan. With more effective outside support than any of his predecessors had enjoyed Şahin had proved to be an ineffective ruler. He had misunderstood the basic realities of Crimean society — the fact that the nobles held substantial power within the state.

Catherine's Crimean policy from 1774 until 1782 is difficult to understand. Her unlimited support for Şahin in the face of his obvious incompetence and his unrealistic, indeed fantastical, projects defy explanation unless one is willing to accept the proposition that she had become infatuated with him in 1771-1772 and had been persuaded that he could really "civilize" the Tatars. Her advisor for so long, N. Panin, had perhaps naively believed that independence and autocracy would be welcomed by Tatar society as a whole. It was only after more realistic individuals such as Bezborodko and Potemkin had gained sufficient influence with Catherine that she decided on annexation as the only way to solve once and for all her southern frontier problem. Why she thought that the Crimea could easily be unified under Şahin is inexplicable. But until 1782 Catherine had no intention of abolishing Tatar independence. She tried everything that she could think of to make the Crimea a viable state. It was only that her shrewd political sense, so often displayed in her internal Russian policies, had failed her in the case of Şahin Giray.

Many historians have felt that this annexation of the Crimea by Catherine was part and parcel of her grandiose "Greek Project," and should not be considered apart from it[4]. Zinkeisen quotes a foreign ambassador in St. Petersburg to the effect that Catherine's removing of the Christians from the Crimea to the Azov region was intended to create "a part of the patrimony of Grand Prince Constantine," and thus even this action was considered to be part of the Greek Project. But this writer has found no single source in which

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[1]Rasporijaženija Potemkina p. 282.
[2]Elizabeth Craven *Voyage en Crimée et à Constantinople en 1783*. London 1789, p. 152.
[3]*SIRIO* vol. 47 (1885) pp. 181-182; Vyezd poslednjago krymskago chana Šagin-Gireja iz Rossii v Turciju v 1787 godu, in: *ZOOID* vol. 13 (1883) pp. 143-144.
[4]See note 1.

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Catherine herself connects the Crimean question with her Greek Project and no indication that Catherine had any intention of annexing the Crimea prior to 1782, three years after the "project's" inception[1].

After 1783, the long process of assimilation of the Tatars was to begin. A great many fled to Ottoman provinces either because they could not give allegiance to a Christian ruler or because they refused to become serfs. Catherine employed sophisticated measures in fitting the remaining Tatar upper classes into Russian molds as she had done with the Muslims in internal Russian provinces. Her successors, however, were to undo much of her accomplishment and Tatar nationalism erupted again in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Soviets arrived at the final solution for the Crimean Tatars — their liquidation as a nationality after World War II.

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[1]Zinkeisen *Geschichte* vol. 6, p. 315; For a good discussion of the Greek Project see: Edgar Hösch Das sogenannte "griechische Projekt" Katharinas II., in: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*. N.F. vol. 12 (1964) pp. 168-206.

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SOCIAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF RUSSIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE CASE OF THE CRIMEAN TATARS

The Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula, whose population at the time was predominantly Turkic and Muslim, opened a chapter in the history of the Tatars that is characterized by a number of important paradoxes. They derived in large part from the fact that the Russians did not consider this annexation "the conquest of a foreign land," but as a "reunification," a "reestablishing of Russian rights to their own land." During the nineteenth century, most Russians believed that:

> "The Crimea was in no way a colony because the Crimean land was from ancient times Russian land... The economic development of the Crimea was accomplished by Russians, the towns were built by Russian workers, the fields were tilled in the great majority by Russian peasants."[1]

At the same time the Tatars experienced one of the most heavy-handed policies of Russification anywhere in the Empire. Yet it must be said that in the 1920s, the Tatars were among those Soviet nationalities who most successfully developed and maintained a system of National Communism which emphasized Tatar cultural and political identity. This paper will suggest some explanations for this paradox in Russian administrative, social, and cultural policies towards the Crimean Tatars.

Tatar society had been organized before 1783 in the conventional Muslim fashion. Tatar *mirza*s controlled more land and wealth than any other group. On their lands Muslim peasants maintained personal freedom limited only by financial responsibilities to the landowners. Within the Khanate, the Muslim clergy was responsible for the administration of justice and the system of education. The *mirzas* had been accustomed to a high level of political participation through their assemblies (*kurultay*s) and offices within the Khan's administration. The Tatar urban classes were important, too, as artisans and

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[1]P. A. Nadinskii, *Ocherki po istorii Kryma,* Simferopol', 1951, I, p. 168. He speaks of the view held atfer the Tatar deportation in 1944, but the statement could have been written in the nineteenth century.

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merchants. Yet these shared their position with large Christian minorities, almost all of whom lived in the Crimean cities.

The disorders beginning in 1768 left the traditional social bonds of Crimean society broken. The Christians were removed at the instigation of Catherine during the civil wars before 1783; agricultural production had ceased, bringing Tatar peasants to a state of complete impoverishment; the economic foundations of *mirza* power suffered from the same cause. Only the Muslim clergy escaped relatively undisturbed.[1]

Russian administrative policy in the Crimea may be summed up briefly. The Tsars simply incorporated the Crimea into the structure of the Empire, and did not consider it a *corpus separatum*. The keynote of this policy was a disinterest in the Crimea as a "special region," different from the rest of the southern frontier. Tavricheskaia oblast' in 1784, then Tavricheskaia guberniia after 1802, included areas not historically part of any Crimean Tatar entity, and served political and economic purposes distinct from their Tatar inhabitants.[2] The peninsula lost its particular identity with the annexation; its Tatar population was diluted through territorial reorganization.

Just as in Catherine's other acquisitions in the south, so in the Crimea, administrators, colonists, businessmen, and noble farmers were allowed almost unrestricted access into what were often empty lands. New ports were built and beach resorts and sanitoria constructed to attract Slavic colonization. Although some efforts were made to bring Tatars into the administrative system, the obvious distrust between old enemies remained and almost of the Tatar elite did not take part in local Crimean government after 1783. This was a result of benign indifference toward the Tatars, and more than any other factor, led to a rapid Russification of the peninsula.

Although the administration viewed the Crimea as a valuable economic resource and an exotic place to live, it surprisingly had difficulty in persuading landowners and peasants to move there. By 1802, of a total population of 185,000, there were only 4500 foreign settlers and 8700 *pomeshchik* peasants on the peninsula.[3]

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[1] *See* A. Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783,* Cambridge, 1970, for a detailed examination of these years of disorder.

[2] *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov* (hereafter *PSZ*), first series, XXII, no. 15,920; XXIV, no. 17,634; XXVII, no. 20,449; E. I. Druzhinina, *Iuzhnaia ukraina v 1800-1825 gg.,* Moscow, 1970, p. 174.

[3] P. Sumarokov, *Dosugi krymskago sud'i ili vtoroe puteshestvie v Tavridu,* St. Petersburg, 1803, I, p. 158; S. D. Shiraev, "Pomeshchichi'ia kolonizatsiia i russkie usad'by v Krymu v kontse XVIII i per. pol. XIX veka," *Krym* 2 iv (1927), pp. 169-186.

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After 1820, the government was more successful. On the southern coast, village and town settlement intensified and by 1854 there were more than 70,000 Russians in the Crimea and only 150,000 Tatars.[1]

Russian social policies in the Crimea were more complicated. At first, under Catherine, the government simply announced that the *mirzas* were the Crimean equivalent of the Russian *dvorianstvo* and granted to the Tatar nobility the privileges acquired by their Russian counterparts in 1775 and 1785. But by 1800 complications had surfaced in the application of these principles. It was soon discovered that Tatar categories of nobility did not correspond to those of the *dvorianstvo*. The years of war and invasion had so disorganized relationships between *mirza*s and land that the Russian governors could not decide which Tatars were nobles and which lands belonged to them. The *mirza*s also found it difficult to adapt to the new *dvoriane* organization and could not always perform according to the rules and regulations governing that class. They did not know Russian (which was used in all *dvorianstvo* proceedings). They felt uncomfortable sitting beside their former enemies (a feeling which was reciprocated). Consequently, they resisted attempts to fit them into the new molds.

The government had to create in 1802 a commission of *mirza*s and bureaucrats to attack these problems, to make some clear definition of Tatar nobility, and to apply the laws of *dvorianstvo* among the Tatars. The commission discovered that much Tatar land had already been seized and transferred to *pomeschclik* ownership, leaving many legitimate *mirza*s without land. Other lands had been vacated by emigrating Tatars who were replaced by Tatar collaborators, many not of traditional *mirza* rank.[2] After four years, the commission finally recommended that most of the Tatar nobility be assigned the title of *dvoriane*. But no attempt was made to restore lands seized from *mirza*s since 1783, and those with no land were excluded.[3]

Yet in spite of these recommendations, problems for the Tatar nobility persisted. In the face of Slavic colonization and land seizure, Russian official distrust, and their loss of wealth since 1783, their power and prestige steadily eroded. Although Russian laws give the impression that the rights and privileges granted to the *mirza*s after 1784 were preserved and reaffirmed

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[1]J. Schnitzler, *Description de la Crimée, surtout au point de vue de ses Lignes de Communication,* Paris, 1855, p. 67.

[2]F. Lashkov, "Sbornik dokumentov po istorii Krymsko-tatarskago zemlevladeniia," *Izvestiia tavricheskoi uchennoi arkhivnoi kommissi* (here after *ITUAK*) 26 (897), pp. 28-29, and 90-102; PSZ first series, XXVII, nos. 20,270 and 20,276; XVIII, no. 21, 275; XXIX, nos. 22,002, and 22,203; XXX, no. 23,325, and XXI, no. 24,349.

[3]F. Lashkov, "Arkhivnyia danniia o beilikakh v Krymskom Khanstve," *Arkeologicheskii S'ezd: Trudy* 6 iv (1889), pp. 96-110; F. Lashkov, "Sbornik...," pp. 24-154.

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throughout the century, the fact that one edict after another called for the "introduction of *dvoriane* rights" for them indicates that they had not received or were unable to retain these rights. For example, an 1835 edict permitted (as if for the first time) Tatar *mirzas* to take part in *dvorianstvo* elections — this some fifty years after they were first admitted to that rank. And growing pressure on Tatar landholding was applied by an ever increasing Slavic population much better able to cope with the bureaucratic system.[1]

Despite these difficulties, some of the Tatar nobles did adapt to Russian principles and served the state in both civil and military capacities. By the end of the eighteenth century, there had been three Tatar Collegiate Councilors and five Collegiate Assessors. In 1784 Potemkin had created three Tatar regiments commanded by members of the late Şahin Giray's army which took part in the next Russo-Turkish war in the battle for Ochakov. Tatar units served also in the wars with Napoleon and against the Ottomans in 1828.[2]

The critical military test for the Tatars came during the Crimean War, fought on their land against allies of their religious and ethnic brothers. Although the local governor ordered the local civilian population transported from the coast and resettled inland for security reasons, Tatar leaders did not put up any significant opposition. In fact, the *Kadı* of Simferopol' ordered local *mirza*s to provide supplies for the Russian military forces. Tatar regiments served against the French and British. Partly in recognition for their wartime service, Alexander II created a special cavalry convoy regiment in 1863, composed of these Tatar *dvoriane,* for his personal service.[3]

Yet the Crimean War proved to be the "final straw" for the great bulk of Tatar *mirza*s who had been unable to adapt to Russian service requirements. Alexander II had received faulty information that the Tatars had collaborated *en masse* with the Allies. This, influenced by his hope of using the Crimea for large-scale agricultural expansion, made the presence of the Tatars a nuisance. When Alexander announced that "it is not appropriate to oppose the overt or covert exodus of the Tatars ..., (and that) this voluntary emigration should be considered a beneficial action calculated to free the territory from this unwanted population," the "voluntary emigration" turned into panic and flight. By the summer of 1860, as many as 100,000 Tatars had left. Added to the earlier

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[1] *PSZ* second series, X, no. 8,676; other similar edicts are in XIV, no. 12,419; and XV, no. 13,304.

[2] I. Muftiizade, "Ocherk voennoi sluzhby krymskikh tatar s 1783 po 1889 god," *ITUAK* 30 (1899), pp. 1-7; *PSZ* second series, XII, no. 10,862; A. Markevich, "Tavricheskaia guberniia vo vremia krymskoi voiny," *ITUAK* 37 (1905), pp. 6-8.

[3] *PSZ* second series, VIII, no. 5,994; Muftiizade, pp. 17-18.

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emigrations after 1783, this exodus left the former Tatar "ruling class" in ruins[1].

This Crimea's population dropped to 193,000 in 1860. This development did not bode well for a future increase in agricultural and economic production, and the government decided belatedly to stop the Tatar emigration. By mid-summer of 1860, no more passports were issued to Tatars and threats were made that any Tatars who left could never return. Yet the damage had been done. A government investigator recommended at the end of the year that the government "rid itself of the idea that the Tatars were enemies of the state, a notion which had helped trigger the emigration." Yet the remaining Tatars had grown apprehensive about future government policy.[2]

Unlike the rural areas and small villages, the Crimean cities had been turned over to the Russian and other non-Tatar peoples in the nineteenth century. Except for Bahçesaray and Karasu Bazaar, the rest of the urban centers became virtual Slavic and Greek/Armenian islands in a Tatar sea. It is not difficult to see why this happened. Kefe and Gözleve, which were important under Tatar rule for the economic role which they played in the southern trade, lost their function as the Russians built new port cities. The expansion of Sevastopol', Balaklava, Kherson and Odessa served to replace the old Tatar ports in importance. The new cities were built and populated by urban groups, introduced by the government for military and economic reasons. The few remaining Tatar urban classes moved away.[3]

For Tatar culture, this development had serious repercussions. Before 1783, the Crimean towns had served the dual purpose of gathering and communications centers for the *mirza* stratum, and as the seats of Tatar consciousness. In the nineteenth century, without the catalytic effect of a Tatar urban life, the upper class found it increasingly difficult to maintain a separate culture. Only towards the end of the century did a new Tatar urban class emerge in the old Tatar cities of Bahçesaray and Karasu Bazaar, bringing with it the re-establishment of a national culture, quite different in form and content from what it had been before 1783.

The Russians had problems with the Tatar peasants too. Before the annexation individual Tatar peasants had been legally free. Catherine determined

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[1]F. Lashkov, "K voprosu…," p. 160; *PSZ* first series, XXIII, no. 17,265; M. Pinson, "Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire," *Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* 1 (1972), pp. 37-38, and 45-47; Ch. Lemencier-Quelquejay, "The Tatars of the Crimea: a Retrospective Summary," *Central Asian Review* 16 i (1968), p. 19.

[2]*PSZ* second series, XXXV, no. 36,297; XXXVI, nos. 35,063 and 35,126; XXXVI, nos. 37,859 and 38,307; Pinson, p. 55.

[3]H. D. Seymour, *Russia on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof,* London, 1855, p. 247.

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that Imperial interests would best be served if their free status would be preserved, yet found that she had to incorporate them into the Russian class of "state peasants" to do it. This created difficulties for Russian *pomeshchiks* granted titles to the peasants' lands. One local governor noted in 1823 that the *pomeshchik,* "receiving land with free Tatars on it, did not have the right to consider it his property. He could neither drive the Tatars away nor lay upon them the duties that he wished.[1]

This policy provided a motive for both *pomeshchiks* and bureaucrats to "persuade" Tatar peasants to leave for the interior where they would lose their legal status, and at the same time free up some land for serfdom. Yet the Tatars proved resistant and found that many of the local governors could be counted upon to protect them from illegal *pomeshchik* pressure. Alexander I's land commission found itself in the position of defending free Tatar peasants against claims by *pomeshchiks* for their inclusion into serfdom.[2]

When many peasants were removed from the coast during the Crimean War, *pomeshchiks* took advantage of the opportunity it afforded. They expended great effort to prevent the Tatars' return. Imposing higher taxes and duties on returning Tatars, seizing village water supplies, they forced many peasants to remain inland, or as a last resort, to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire. By this time, the government's policy of protecting the peasants had eroded, and the growing weakness of the Tatar *mirzas* and the strength of the immigrants made the peasants' exposure severe.[3]

In summary, the social policies of the government during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century compounded the ruin and uprooting of the tradition Tatar social structure taking place prior to 1783. The *mirza* class was decimated through emigration and Slavic displacement; the economic basis of their position had crumbled. That portion of Tatar nobles which had become *dvoriane* were essentially Russified, thereby satisfying official requirements for "loyalty." Thus Alexander II could at the same time both encourage deportation and emigration and also establish "loyal" Tatar military units for his own service. The Tatar urban class had diminished in size and importance, being isolated in the two central Tatar towns, both outside the mainstream of Crimean society. The peasants, after an auspicious start, suffered a collapse of major proportions as a result of the government's policies during the Crimean War. It became clear that if a Crimean Tatar national identity or movement were to appear, it would have to emerge from a new configuration of Tatar society.

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[1]Druzhinina, *Iuzhnaia…*, p. 236.
[2]Druzhinina, *Iuzhnaia…*, pp. 69-75.
[3]Pinson, pp. 40-41; *PSZ* second series, XXXI, no. 30,152.

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Russian cultural policy towards the Tatars may be divided into two parts: towards the Muslim cultural heritage and then Towards strictly religious matters. Briefly, the Russians manifested utter disrespect for the Muslim Tatar culture. Since they did not really consider the Crimea a Tatar province, most Russians saw those monuments of Tatar culture which survived the annexation to be reminders of a backward and uncivilized past. Most governors and bureaucrats made no effort to preserve any architectural remainders of the Khanate period. Foreign visitors to the Crimea were horrified by the acts of destruction which they observed in all parts of the Crimea except for Bahçesaray. The cities, once the centers of Tatar cultural life, were now an exclusive preserve of the non-Muslims. Thus there was no practical reason to preserve useless buildings.

The first acting governor of the Crimea, Kakhovskii, ordered the destruction of many of the most priceless treasures of Tatar and Italian architecture. Later in the century, the traveller Haxthausen remarked that Kakhovskii had destroyed "the finest monuments of antiquity, amongst others a beautiful tower built by the Genoese, which had served as the minaret of the chief mosque in Kefe." Even Professor Druzhinina characterized "Kakhovskii as no better than his Mongol and Tatar predecessors."[1]

On the other hand, the Tsarist government paid extraordinarily careful attention to religious matters. Pursuant to Catherine's "enlightened" policy towards Islam throughout the Empire, the new regime introduced no religious persecution. Despite the fact that they were living under a colonial regime, the Muslim dignitaries became a part of the regime itself. Regulated by the government, receiving much of their income from the Russians, they were supportive of the Tsarist system. From the annexation manifesto which stated that "all Muslim clergy, existing in the time of Khan Şahin Giray, were to remain in their positions, and to retain their former authority," the government consistently pursued a policy of allowing much initiative to the Crimean clergy.[2]

Catherine had separated religious from civil matters, and had permitted religious governance to operate on different principles from those of social and political life. She had established a "Muslim Committee" of Muslim dignitaries to supervise religious matters, and instructed Russian bureaucrats to keep their distance from strictly Muslim religious matters. It was not until 1831 that comprehensive legislation was enacted which put the Crimean Muslim

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[1]Baron von Haxthausen, *The Russian Empire*, London, 1856, II, p. 99; E. I. Druzhinina, *Severnoe prichernomor'e v 1775-1800 gg.*, Moscow, 1949, p. 139.

[2]*PSZ* first series, XXII, no. 15,708; I. F. Aleksandrov, "O musulmanskom dukhovenstve i upravlenii delami musul'man v Krymu," *ITUAK* 51 (1914), pp. 211-12.

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establishment into a form resembling other imperial institutions, yet even this edict differed in important respects from similar laws regulating Islam elsewhere in the Empire.[1] Although much happened in the Tatar Muslim community in the ensuing seventy-five years, the edict survived with only minor revisions until 1914. After repeating the philosophy underlying Catherine's decisions separating religious from civil matters, it recognized the competency of the Crimean Muslim Committee. It defined and enumerated all the positions within the Crimean clergy, including the Mufti, his chief advisor, the *kadıasker,* and the *imam*s, *mullas* , and other mosque servitors in each parish. Finally, it listed the *muderris* and *hoca*s in the local schools.

The top officials were to be selected in "elections" supervised by the Department of Spiritual Affairs in Simferopol', and participated in by the upper level of the Muslim clergy, the Marshal of the *guberniia* nobility, and the Muslim elders throughout the Crimea. The Muslim Committee on which these officials sat had within its jurisdiction all mosques, their schools and *tekkes*, as well as all *vakıf* land.

This was an unusual document because it provided for the maintenance of local particularism to a degree not pursued elsewhere in the Empire. Its closest parallel was the 1822 Code of the Steppe, but the situation in the Crimea was not comparable to that in central and eastern Siberia. Its main effect on the upper clergy was to tie it more closely to the interests of the Throne, to recruit, in effect, the "clergy" as the major instrument of Tsarist control over the Tatars, and to create a gap between the clergy and the Tatar *mirza*s. The latter, it must be remembered, were experiencing a policy of Russification on the one hand, and exclusion from local politics on the other.

By allowing the Muslim clergy a monopoly over Tatar education, the government encouraged cultural traditionalism. Since Tsarism had effectively wrecked the secular structure of Tatar society, this policy ensured that the Tatars had no *social* defense against Westernism. The Russians insisted that only a sense of traditional religious identity remain intact. When in the great reform period the regime installed among the Tatars, as elsewhere, a *zemstvo* system and western schools, the predictable result was the emergence of an intelligentsia free of the old social structures, but still consciously Tatar.

After early failures, the government after 1860 competed strenuously with the Muslim schools for the loyalty of Tatar youth. It took measures to increase the enrollment of children of lower ranking Tatars in Russian schools

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[1] *PSZ* second series, VI, no. 5,033.

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whose number greatly increased after 1877 with the aid of the local *zemstvos*.[1] These schools and other local organs of the Crimean *zemstvos* were to be the source for a new Tatar intelligentsia. Here the Tatars became in time represented in positions ranging from schools staffs to sanitation workers. It is no surprise that the next generation of the Tatar elite would lavish great praise on the *zemstvo* movement.[2]

But the new intelligentsia was not from the start revolutionary in outlook. (Here lies the difference between the Tatar development and that in Poland, where the Russians encouraged the survival, until 1863, of the old social structure.) The first generation of the Tatar intelligentsia featured İsmail Bey Gaspıralı (Gasprinskii). Emerging from an impoverished Tatar *dvorianstvo* family, he began his education in the traditional village *medrese*. With the encouragement of a friend in the city merchant guild, Gaspıralı went on to first St. Petersburg, then Paris, to learn Russian and French, returning five years later to the Crimea in 1866.[3]

His origin from the class which had suffered most during the century, his training in traditional Islamic subjects, followed by his exposure to what must have appeared as a somewhat fantastic society in Russia and France, led him to introduce among the Tatars the first internal challenges to their inherited traditions. Convinced that his own society was in danger of complete internal collapse because its traditions were too weak to resist political and social assaults from Russian pressure, he believed that only two options faced the Crimean Tatars, indeed the whole of the Russian Islamic community. The first was complete assimilation *via* Russification; the second, a renewal of Islamic and Tatar society through an acceptance of western (Russian) forms enclosing an Islamic and Tatar content.

Ironically, he felt that assimilation would be the inevitable result of permitting the Muslim clergy a continued monopoly over Tatar education. For their extreme conservatism and outmoded curriculum could not prepare the Tatars to resist Russification. Only an adoption of Russian educational and cultural methods could form a class of Tatars which would be able to retain the best of their own traditions. This put Gaspıralı in the awkward position of

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[1] A. Markevich, "Nachal'naia stranitsa istorii Simferopol'skoi gimnazii," *ITUAK* 50 (1913), pp. 236-240; *PSZ* second series, V, no. 4,167; XXXIV, nos. 34,147 and 34,647; B. Veselovskii, *Istoriia zemstva za sorok let,* St. Petersburg, 1909, I, pp. 718, and 723.

[2] C. Seidahmet, *La Crimée: Passé-Present, revendications des Tatars,* Lausanne, 1921, p. 54; *Sbornik po shkol'noi statistike Tavricheskoi gubernii* vyp. 2 (Simferopol', 1903).

[3] C. Seidahmet, *Gaspıralı Ismail Bey,* Istanbul, 1934. The best treatment of his ideas is found in E. Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 1878-1914," (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Washington, 1973), and his artilce "*Gadidism* at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: A View from Within," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* April-June, 1975, pp. 245-277.

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advocating the study of Russian, and the introduction of western (Russian) natural and social sciences into the curricula of Tatar schools. Only students who had mastered such skills would be equipped to resist Russian encroachment upon their Islamic society.

These views placed Gaspıralı in the company of such reactionary Russian officials and educators as the Curator of the Odessa School District who presented in 1879 a memorandum to Count Tolstoi which claimed that the government had been lax in its dealings with the Empire's Muslims, that these latter must be required to learn Russian. Gaspıralı of course realized the risks that such a policy incurred, a risk for the Muslims aptly reflected in Tolstoi's response that "the official aim of education for all natives must indisputably be their Russification and their merging with the Russian people."[1]

In 1881, Gaspıralı published his first important book, *Russkoe musulmanstvo,* in which he called for the total and immediate modernization of Russian Islam. He believed that Russia "would be one of the greatest Muslim states in the world," that Russia was the heir to the former Tatar possessions, and that sooner or later Russians and Tatars would enjoy the same rights. He was convinced that the government would sooner or later abandon its idea of Russification. He wrote:

> "I believe... that the Russian Muslims will be more civilized than any other Muslim nation. We are a steady nation, give us the possibility to learn. You, great brothers, give us knowledge. The sciences should be admitted to the Tatars' schools.... Russians and Muslims will come to an understanding in this way."[2]

Two years later, Gaspıralı introduced his journal, *Tercüman/Perevodchik,* on April 10, 1883. In its editorial, Gaspıralı wrote that:

> Exactly one hundred years ago, on April 8, 1783, the small Khanate, worn out by disorder and bloodshed, was made a part of the greatest empire in the world and received peace under the patronage of a mighty power and the protection of just laws....
>
> Celebrating this day together with all the other peoples (of the Russian Empire) the Crimean Muslims cannot fail to recall all of those good deeds by which they have already profited for one hundred years."[3]

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[1]I. Kreindler, "Educational Policies Toward the Eastern Nationalities in Tsarist Russia: a Study of Il'minskii's System," (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia Univ., 1969), pp. 84-85.
[2]Z. V. Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili,* Istanbul, 1947, p. 551.
[3]Cited in Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii...," p. 17.

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In *Tercüman,* Gaspıralı called for a revival of Russia's Muslims through education. In his own school in Bahçesaray, he began a "new method" of education, in which traditional Islamic subjects such as the study of the Koran and the fundamental of Islamic law remained in the curriculum in Arabic; but added to this base he introduced history, geography and mathematics in Russian and Tatar.[1]

Gaspıralı was always careful to direct his followers away from political opposition to the Russian government. Convinced that an openly hostile attitude to the imperial regime would be quickly crushed, he argued that there was no contradiction between support for Tsarism and a striving for Muslim Tatar reform and national identity. Any struggle against Russia would be impossible and Islam would actually benefit from a cooperation with Russia. This view he most clearly expressed in his essay entitled *Russkoe vostochnoe soglashenie,* in 1896, in which he wrote that "Muslims and Russians can plow, sow, raise cattle, trade and make their livings together, or side by side."[2]

With the old Tatar elite gone and the clergy in the hands of the Tsarist government, Gaspıralı had to produce a new audience for these views. This he found among the Tatar youth, attending or recently graduated from Crimean Russian schools or his own "new method" *medrese*. Not all would accept his answers, yet all found it necessary to address themselves to the problems he voiced.

There were three chronologically different groups of Tatar intelligentsia which emerged as a result of Gaspıralı's efforts. Not surprisingly, the first was closely tied to the master himself, and like him, was not revolutionary. It accepted his ideas and joined him in pressing for cooperation between Muslim and Russian. Within the Crimea this group succeeded by 1905 in establishing over 350 "national schools," in which the languages of instruction were both Russian and the Turkic of *Tercüman*. These intellectuals were closely associated with the leadership of the Russian pan-Turkic and pan-Muslim movements which had taken advantage of the 1905-1906 disruptions to press for improvement for Russia's Muslim communities. This group supported Gaspıralı's desire to work within the Russian system, to participate in the new political institutions alongside of Russian liberals. Even the reactionary electoral laws issued for the Second Duma did not dissuade Gaspıralı from

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[1] S. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia,* Cambridge, Mass., 1960, p. 35.

[2] A. Benningsen & Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, *La presse et le mouvement national chez les musulmans de russie avant 1920,* Paris, 1964, pp. 40-41; Gaspıralı found a friend in V. D. Smirnov, a Russian historian of the Crimean Tatars, who shared Gaspıralı's desires for Tatar-Russian cooperation. *See* V. Gordlevskii, "Wasilij Dmitrjiewitsch Smirnov, 1846-1922," *Mitteilungen zur osmanischen Geschichte* 2 (1926) pp. 325-33; *see* also A. Bennigsen & Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union,* New York, 1967, p. 41.

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retaining his hopes for a change of heart by the regime when times became calmer. The law stated that "The State Duma, created to strengthen the Russian state, must be Russian also in its spirit."[1]

This attitude persuaded a growing number of Crimean intellectuals that Gaspıralı's dreams were unrealistic. And the Crimean clergy was putting more pressure on the government to remove even Gaspıralı's relatively harmless group from circulation.[2] This second generation of the new Crimean intelligentsia was more revolutionary in both form and content than Gaspıralı's and reacted against what it considered Gaspıralı's political inaction. They charged that he was a bureaucratic and monarchist reactionary and a "scholastic writer" totally behind the times.[3]

Led by Abdürreşit Mehdi, the new group called themselves Young Tatars. Concerned with neither pan-Islamic nor pan-Turkic ideas, their attention was directed towards the problems of the Tatars living in the Crimea. Their political aim included an active struggle for the "national social and political liberation of the Crimean Tatar people," which would involve an "active struggle against the statist autocratic system of Tsarist Russia."[4]

Mehdi, though had not removed himself so far from support of the Russian system to reject his election as a delegate to the Second Duma, in spite of the harsh electoral law. In his only speech before the Duma delegates, he declared that:

> "Our misery proves that our riches are in the pockets of others, the treasury, the financial interests.... All (our) lands have in the past belonged to the Tatar people; all have now passed into the hands of others."[5]

The Crimean delegation to the Duma, and many Crimean Tatar members of the All-Russian Muslim movements in the next decade were more self-consciously nationalistic than Turks and Tatars from other groups, who to the end continued to speak in terms of pan-Islam or pan-Turkism. Some historians have suggested that the preference of the Volga Tatars at these meetings for cultural rather than territorial autonomy was a function of their not having an

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[1] M. Szeftel, "The Reform of the Electoral Law to the State Duma on June 3, 1907," *Liber Memoralis Georges de Lagarde,* London, 1968, p. 331.

[2] A. Krichinskii, *Ocherki russkoi politik na okrainiakh,* ch. I, "K istorii religioznikh pritesnenii krymskikh tatar," Baku, 1919, contains numerous police records with Tatar Muslim clergy reporting about Gaspıralı's activities.

[3] Bennigsen, *La presse...,* pp. 138-39; E. Kırımal, *Der nationale Kampf der Krimtürken,* Emsdetten, 1952, pp. 17-18.

[4] Kırımal, *Der nationale...,* pp. 19-20.

[5] Bennigsen, *La presse...,* pp. 141.

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easily defined territory of their own. Yet the Crimean Tatars were in the Crimea a distinct minority by this time too, and it seems that the differences in approach were rather a function of the distinctly different social and cultural policies of the Tsarist regime in both areas during the century.

Finally, a third group of intellectuals emerged after 1907. In the midst of the Young Turk movement, it included most of the Crimean Tatar exiles in Istanbul. Led by Noman Çelebi Cihan, later to be an important Tatar leader during the revolution, this group, called *Vatan* (Fatherland), worked toward the goal of an independent Crimean Tatar state. Its members engaged in continuous conspiratorial activity in the Crimea and by the beginning of 1917 had succeeded in forming secret nationalist cells in almost all Crimean towns.[1]

By the beginning of World War I, the Crimean Tatar community bore almost no relation to that which had existed in 1783. With the large number of Tatar schools pursuing a curriculum modernized under the direction of Gaspirali, a new generation of Tatar leaders was coming of age. Participation in Imperial political life in the Dumas and a close association with other Muslim groups in the Empire, had given the Crimean Tatars a broader horizon on which to view their own predicament. Yet their community was not a united one. The fact that those Tatar leaders most closely associated with the Tatar traditions, the Muslim clergy, were tied to the interests and policies of the Russian regime, forced the new intellectuals to search in other directions for their new identity. And in this search, many fell victim to the quicksand of western influences, in the process rejecting many of the elements of their past that were necessary for the national identity.

This does not mean that the Crimean Tatars were unsuccessful between 1917 and 1928 in creating the foundations for a national existence. Thanks to the peculiarities of Tsarist policy in the first half of the nineteenth century, which did the work of destroying the Tatar "old Regime," Tatar society and its intelligentsia in 1921 were more advanced in the national sense than many other groups in old Russia.

But there was a degree of shallowness in Tatar political life during and after the Revolutions of 1917 that was the direct result of the contradictions which a century of Russian policy in the Crimea had produced. The difficult questions which Tatar leaders had to answer in 1917-1921 were not unlike those which Professor Von Grünebaum identified as the stumbling blocks for Arab nationalists in the twentieth century:

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[1]Krichinskii, pp. 234-35; Kırımal, *Der nationale…*, pp. 24-25.

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"Not the perfecting of potential or heritage was the objective of the admission of Western influence, but the removal of what was felt to be an inferiority... The question was not what to adopt, whence to select, but rather, what to retain, or perhaps even, was there in the traditional culture anything worth retaining?"[1]

[1]G. E. Von Grünebaum, "Problems of Muslim Nationalism," in R. Frye, *Islam and the West*, Gravenhage, 1957, p. 25.

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ISMAIL GASPIRALI, MODEL LEADER FOR ASIA

The Crimean Tatars have been blessed with a number of outstanding leaders over the past hundred years who are in large part responsible for the remarkable ability that the Tatars have shown to survive, even thrive, as a vital nationality within the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Most recently Mustafa Cemilev has provided direction and leadership to the small Crimean Tatar nationality in the Soviet Union, especially those residing in the Tashkent region. The tasks for Cemilev are extremely difficult ones, as the Crimean Tatars over the past two decades have faced challenges to their identity much more severe than their ancestors experienced under czarist rule: official refusal to consider them as a legitimate nationality, refusal to permit their return to their territorial homeland, and refusal to give them the even limited encouragement granted to other more acceptable ethnic and national groups. Yet Cemilev's example, hard work, perhaps stubbornness, have permitted the Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union today to be among the most energetic national groups in the realms of literature, journalism, and political activities.

About one hundred years before Cemilev the most important Crimean Tatar leader was Ismail Bey Gaspirali. The challenges facing the Crimean Tatars in his day were quite different from those that confront Cemilev. Then it was a matter of survival, in the cultural sense, in the face of clear Russian political, economic, and educational superiority. Understandably, Gaspirali's responses to the different challenges were of a different order than those used, or appropriate, today; Gaspirali's emphasis lay on educational and spiritual renewal, not politics. Indeed, he found nothing wrong with the idea of close cooperation with the Russian political and cultural authorities, for he could not conceive of a set of circumstances in which the Crimean Tatars would be without a homeland. But without his efforts and accomplishments, it seems unlikely that the Crimean Tatars would have survived long enough to produce the political and national movement that inspires them today.

When Ismail Bey Gaspirali (Gasprinskii)[1] died on 11 September 1914 in Bahçesaray after a long illness, most of the important Turkic newspapers and journals in the Russian Empire and Ottoman Empire published obituaries that

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[1]Ismail Bey's name appears in scholarship and on his own published work as either Gasprinskii or Gaspirali (the Russianized or local Crimean Tatar form). I have preferred to use Gaspirali in this chapter.

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reflected an outpouring of emotion and grief about what they generally agreed was a major loss to Turkic society. In *Iqbal,* an Azeri journal in Baku, Saifi Ibrahimov wrote:

> Who was Ismail Bey? We don't yet have an answer to this question. In Russia, in Turkey, in Egypt, in Arabia, in India, in Afghanistan, in Iran, in Turan, everywhere his name was known and beloved. Ismail Bey was everything, everyone, our all, the entire nation. Ismail Bey was the genius and the conscience of our modern language, our heart, our literature, our writers, our readers, our press, our *maktabs* and madrasas, our pupils and students, the entire being of all of us.[1]

Yusuf Akçuraoğlu wrote in *Türk Yurdu* in Istanbul:

> Ismail Bey was a good teacher, a skillful journalist, a distinguished editor, a social and political intellectual, and an active member of our national societies and institutions. But all of these attributes do not add up to or even describe Ismail Bey. In the Turkic and Islamic world of the past half century, it is possible to number twenty or thirty persons whom I knew who possessed qualities worthy of eulogy. But Ismail Bey was unique — *tek adam* — who belongs among a handful of persons in the Islamic and Turkic world over the last several centuries to be singled out for especial praise.[2]

A year later, Osman Akçokrakli wrote a long essay in Ismail Bey's own *Tercüman* in which he concluded:

> In 1903 Ismail Bey wrote in this journal: "We are making progress. But our national education remains yet to be born." What is *Tercüman?* It is our national treasury. Yes, *Tercüman* is our national literature, our national education, the treasury of our modern national history. Do we have a national public library? Do we have a national public museum? Do we have a national public academy? What we have is twenty-three volumes of *Tercüman.* This is our great national treasury.[3]

Dozens of such statements appeared though the Turkic press in 1914 and the following months, as in *Vakit* (Orenburg) by Fatih Kerimov, "Great National Grief"; in *Yoldïż* (Kazan) by Abdullah Battal-Taymas, "Difficult Event"; in *Koyash* (Kazan) by Fatih Emirhan, "Small Memory of a Great Nationalist." Finally, in a very important article in *Cumhuriyet* in Istanbul, fourteen years later, Fuad Köprülü wrote about Gaspirali and his journal *Tercüman: "Tercüman* had an important effect not only on the Crimea, but in

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[1]Lead article, "Büyük ve Tarihi Millî Matem," *Tercüman* (1 October 1914), taken from *Iqbal.*
[2]*Türk Yurdu,* no. 12 (1911).
[3]"Millî hazinemiz," *Tercüman,* no. 202 (1915).

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Kazan, the Caucasus, Turkistan, Chinese Turkistan, Siberia, Romania, Bulgaria, everywhere in the Ottoman Empire, in short, in the entire Turkic world. It produced great hope, laid foundations for the accomplishment of that hope, of a national renewal for the Turks, especially for the Russian Turks. Its editor's name, Ismail Bey, is known everywhere."[1]

These were evidence of Ismail Bey's immediate legacy throughout the Turkish and Turkic world. In order to determine what might remain today, more than seventy years later, of a direct and identifiable legacy from Ismail Bey in the Turkic world, it is necessary to examine studies produced in the Soviet Union and Turkey relating to the history of Ismail Bey's period, to the history of Islamic education and renewal in and outside of Russia, and to studies of the Turkic and Tatar political and nationalist movements written in Turkey, the West, and the Soviet Union.

It is surprising that works by the leading Soviet Turkologists do not for the most part even mention Gaspirali. Muhammad Gainullin, perhaps the leading Soviet Tatar historian of Tatar literature and journalism, in his important study of the turn-of-the-century period (first published in 1966) completely ignored not only Gaspirali, but *Tercüman* and almost any author who had published in it. Because the Crimean Tatars were officially rehabilitated by the Soviet government no earlier than 1967, presumably his book about Tatar literature in the nineteenth century, published in 1975, would have rectified the earlier omission. It also seemed likely that Gainullin's revised edition of his first book, expanded and considerably changed, published in 1983, would have had something to say about Ismail Bey and *Tercüman*. But in all of his works there is total silence on the subject.[2] Ismail Bey is not credited with contributions to Turkic, Tatar, or Islamic educational reform in such works as those by M. Z. Tutaev, V. M. Gorokhov, or R. I. Nafigov, which deal specifically with the Jadidism initiated by Gaspirali.[3]

But it is not only Soviet works on the subject that downplay or avoid mention of Ismail Bey. Many of the most important works on modern Turkish history, literature, and journalism produced in Turkey and the West ignore

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[1]Cumhuriyet, 7 March 1928..

[2]Mukhamed Gainullin, *Tatarskaia literatura i publitsistika nachala XX veka,* rev. ed. (Kazan: Tatknigoizdat, 1983); Mukhamed Gainullin, *Tatarskaia literatura XIX veka* (Kazan: Tatknigoizdat, 1975).

[3]M. Z. Tutaev, *Oktiabr' i prosveshchenie* (Kazan: Tatknigoizdat, 1970); V. M. Gorokhov and V. P. Rozhdestvenskii, *Razvitie narodnogo obrazovaniia v Tatarskoi ASSR* (Kazan: Tatknigoizdat, 1958); R. I. Nafigov, *Formirovanie i razvitie peredovoi tatarskoi obshchestvenno-politicheskoi mysli* (Kazan: Tatknigoizdat, 1964).

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Gaspirali and his contributions.[1] Indeed, besides the Crimean Tatar authors and historians themselves, in their Istanbul journal *Emel,* in *Dergi* published for several years in Germany, and in *Türk Kültürü,* which devotes a good deal of attention to Turks outside of Turkey, almost nothing about Ismail Bey and his influence has appeared in Turkey either.[2]

In works by Western scholars interested in Soviet nationality affairs and history, more has appeared about Ismail Bey.[3] Almost all such studies focus on the existence and importance of Ismail Bey's journal *Tercüman*, and especially on the meaning of the motto that appeared on the masthead of the journal's later issues: "Dilde, fikirde, işte, birlik." Most have placed the importance of his work within the broader topic of Pan-Turkism.

None of the early obituaries, or even essays discussing Gaspirali that appeared in the 1920s, such as that by Fuad Köprülü,[4] mention this motto, and they certainly do not claim that Ismail Bey's chief importance lay in the political movement relating to Pan-Turkism, Turkic nationalism, or Turkic unity. Rather, they all focus on language, literature, and especially on renewal through education.

Finally, two very important studies by Western scholars focusing almost exclusively on Ismail Bey Gaspirali must be mentioned and credited with drawing our attention back to the really important elements of his work and life. These are the dissertation by Gustav Burbiel on the language developed by Ismail Bey and used in *Tercüman* and the dissertation by Edward Lazzerini on Gaspirali's ideas. No modern evaluation of Ismail Bey's contributions may ignore the information and ideas presented by these two scholars.[5]

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[1]N. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964); I. Başgöz and Howard Wilson, *Educational Problems in Turkey, 1920-1940* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968). Other studies of Turkic educational reform that ignore Gaspirali while discussing the Jadid movement include T. P. Dadashev, *Prosveshchenie v Turtsii v noveishee vremia* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1972); A. D. Zheltiakov and Iu. A. Petrosian, *Istoriia Prosveshcheniia v Turtsii (konets XVIII-nachalo XX v.)* (Moscow: 1965); Mustafa Asiler, *Türk eğitiminin ana davaları* (Istanbul: 1960); Nafi Atif, *Türkiye pedagoji tarihi* (Istanbul: 1929); Osman Ergin, *Türkiye maarif tarihi,* 5 vols. (Istanbul: Osmanbey Matbaasi, 1943-45); Nuri Kadamanoğlu, *Türkiye'de eğitim* (Ankara: 1963).

[2]The main exception is a biography of Gaspirali by Kirimli Cafer Seydahmet, *Gaspirali Ismail Bey* (Istanbul: Matbaacılık ve Neşriyat Türk Anonim Şirketi, 1934); see also Zeki Velidi Togan, "Ismail Gaspirali," *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* vol. 2, 2d ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), pp. 979-81.

[3]Serge Zenkovski, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 30-37, 81-82, 107-8; Charles W. Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets* (London: Praeger, 1957) pp. 123-30; Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 194-207; Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 38-39, 47, 78, 128.

[4]Fuad Köprülü, "Ismail Bey Gasprinski," *Cumhuriyet,* 7 March 1928.

[5]Gustav Burbiel, "Die Sprache Ismail Bey Gaspyralys" (Ph.D. diss., Hamburg University, 1953); Edward Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gaspirali and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 1878-1914" (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1973). See also Bertolt Spuler, "Djadid," *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* vol. 2, 2nd ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), p. 366.

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The first task in identifying the true legacy of Ismail Bey is to determine what he considered most important and to establish his intellectual contributions. It is possible to divide his concerns into four main categories, which, though separate, are obviously interrelated: the general question of Islamic renewal and relations between the Islamic and various Western worlds; language and its role in Islamic renewal; women's rights and emancipation as an essential ingredient for renewal; and finally, for Ismail Bey the panacea for the first three, education in a form new to the Islamic world. It is also very important to place Ismail Bey's ideas in their own context, both in the Islamic communities of the Russian Empire in which he lived and operated and in the larger Islamic world of his time. Finally, with the above at least outlined and identified, it is possible to note Ismail Bey's immediate impact at home and abroad and to make some suggestions about his possible long-term legacy.

First, Ismail Bey believed that the rapidly changing political and cultural relationships between Muslims and Western states and peoples made necessary an immediate and rapid Islamic renewal. He summarized his views on the problem succinctly in a long article in *Tercüman* in 1907, which was translated and partially published in the London *Times* by Arminius Vámbéry:

> In paying due attention to the relations of the Muslim world, we shall be grieved to notice that, wherever and under whatever rule they be, they always remain behind their neighbors. In Algiers the Muslims are superseded by the Jews, in Crete by the Greeks, in Bulgaria by the Bulgarians, and in Russia by everybody… We must investigate into the causes of this deplorable state, for admitting, for example, that the Algerian Jews surpass the Algerian Arab, it is astonishing and quite inexplicable that the poor and devout Buddhist should get ahead of the once energetic Muslim.[1]

Gaspirali's views here were aimed at encouraging the organization of a Pan-Islamic congress to meet in Cairo to discuss the broad issues of Islamic revival.

Again, Gaspirali wrote that "It is an indisputable fact that contemporary Muslims are the most backward peoples." "They have been left behind in virtually every area of life by Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Jews, and Hindus… We have remained behind them and now regard them with amazement."[2] What was even worse was the fact that a number of areas of the

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[1]Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gaspirali," pp. 109-10, cited and trans. by Lazzarini from [Vámbéry], "A Mahomedan Congress in Cairo," *The Times,* 22 October 1907, p. 15.

[2]Ibid., p. 153, cited an trans. from *Tercüman*, no. 45 (26 November 1895); and A. L. C., "Le Congrès musulman universal," *Revue du monde musulman* 3, nos. 11-12 (November-December 1907): 499.

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Muslim world that had only recently been independent were losing their sovereignty in the face of European expansion and imperialism. What were the causes of this misfortune? What remedy was available to stop the decline and recover the losses? He noted more than once that he did not accept the widespread belief in the West of his time that Christianity and Judaism had innate strengths that no other religion or religious tradition could match. Islam once had itself dominated both Jews and Christians in politics, economics, and even culture. Rather, Gaspirali placed much of the blame on Islamic religious leaders who had "stifled progressive ideas, placed thought in a vice, and closed the doors to scientific research."[1] It was not Islam as a religion or as a culture that was at fault, but its leading practitioners.

Ismail Bey's attitudes toward the West were only partly produced from his firsthand experience. He had lived for a few months in Paris early in his career and apparently could read French. But his views, for the most part, about Western-Islamic relations were the result of his experiences in Russia, from his study of Russian culture and institutions, and his good knowledge of the Russian language.

Ismail Bey wrote in the editorial in the first issue of *Tercüman* in 1883:

> Exactly 100 years ago, on 8 April 1783, the small [Crimean] khanate, worn out by disorder and bloodshed, was made a part of the greatest empire in the world and received peace under the patronage of a mighty power and the protection of just laws. Celebrating this day together with all the other peoples of the Russian Empire, the Crimean Muslims cannot fail to recall all of those good deeds by which they have already profited for 100 years.[2]

While one might note that Gaspirali needed the approval of the Russian government's censorship committee before the journal could be issued, and such an editorial might well be aimed at gaining such approval, Ismail Bey was not hostile to the idea of Russian political domination of the Turkic communities in the empire and did truly believe that the Turks there had a great deal to gain from a close association with the Russians.

Gaspirali had written a small book in 1881, in Russian, entitled *Russian Islam: Thoughts, Notes and Observations of a Muslim (Russkoe musul'manstvo: Mysli, zamietki i nabliudeniia musul'manina)* in which he called for the total and immediate renewal of Russian Islam. This could be done, indeed, had to be done in concert with the Russian government. He believed that

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[1]Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gaspirali", p. 153, cited and trans. from "Ulema-yi asiriyun," *Tercüman,* no. 40 (17 February 1913).
[2]Ibid., p. 143, cited and trans. from *Tercüman,* no. 1 (10 April 1883).

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Russia "would be one of the greatest Muslim states in the world," that Russia was the heir to the former Tatar possessions, and that sooner or later Russians and Tatars would enjoy the same rights. He was convinced that the Russian government would itself in the end come to its senses and abandon its policies that had been often admittedly hostile to Muslims and other minorities. "I believe that the Russian Muslims shall be more civilized than any other Muslim nation. We are a steady nation, give us the possibility to learn. You, great brothers, give us knowledge.... The Russians and Muslims shall came to an understanding in this way."[1]

Some years later, in 1896, Gaspirali wrote an essay in which he elaborated on these ideas. This essay was written long enough after 1883 to emphasize the point that he was writing at least in part from belief and not merely as an effort to please the censor. His essay, *Russian-Oriental Relations (Russkoe vostochnoe soglashenie*), emphasized not only agreement between and understanding of one another by Russians and Muslims, but an actual drawing closer together — *sblizhenie*. "Muslims and Russians can plow, sow, raise cattle, trade, and make their livings together or side by side.... We think that sooner or later Russia's borders will include within them all of the Tatar peoples.... If Russia could have good relations with Turkey and Persia, she would become kindred to the entire Muslim East, and would certainly stand at the head of Muslim nations and their civilizations, which England is attempting so persistently to do." Gaspirali was not in favor of nor did he believe probable the disappearance of Muslim or Turkic identity among the more numerous and more advanced Russians. "The key to the future of both the Islamic community and the Russian Empire was the active cooperation of an enlightened Russian government with an awakened Muslim people."[2]

In his views toward Russia, with his relatively positive attitude toward Russian-Muslim cooperation, Gaspirali resembled a contemporary in Central Asia, Ahmad Mahdum Donish, a scholar, poet, and for a while the court astrologer in Bukhara. Donish looked to Russia, though, not so much as a model to be imitated as a useful source of knowledge and of tools to rebuild and renew Bukharan society, to save it from total extinction at the hands of the West (Russia). Donish apparently believed that there was room for cooperation between Bukharan Muslims and Russians, even when the relationship was so unequal in power.[3]

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[1]Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam*, p. 41; Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam*, pp. 33-34.

[2]Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gaspirali," p. 14.

[3]Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 202.

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There were many Muslims of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who were highly critical of their own society and who looked at the West with some envy or at least respect. In this regard Ismail Bey was not different or unique, even within the Russian context. One can compare him, for example, with Ziya Gökalp, who is in fact often mentioned when discussions of Gaspirali are conducted. Gökalp was more circumspect, however in calling for close cooperation with the West. Of course he lived in a state where he could write about such matters with more freedom than could Gaspirali. Yet in 1911 Gökalp sneered at those in the Ottoman Empire and outside who seemed to accept European civilization unquestioningly, "like someone who buys ready-made suits.... We Muslims cannot imitate fixed models of civilization. We need clothes made to measure principles of life which fit our figure. We have to create a new civilization from our own spirit."[1]

Gökalp and Gaspirali were both accepting, perhaps without doing it knowingly or clearly, the idea of the possibility of progress and basic change, and a change with positive value. Even in the Europe of Gaspirali's time this was a relatively new idea, and the Muslim world should not be overly criticized for being slow to accept it. The discovery that institutions were capable both of novelty, which was not mentioned or even hinted at in the Bible, and of development by which one kind of institution would grow out of another were ideas that were not centuries old in the west. Indeed, one of the most important Western theoreticians of the idea of progress of this sort was Lewis Henry Morgan who died only in 1881.

The Islamic world, in Russia and outside, was in desperate condition in the minds of many reformers. Without some major change it might collapse entirely. Gaspirali saw no real danger in cooperation and growing closeness between Muslims and Russians or other Westerners. He apparently did not believe that Islam itself would have a difficult time surviving such proximity. And his prescriptions were quite different from those offered today by many within the Islamic world, who raise the same questions about danger and survival but who call for rejection of cultural relations with the West and call for a return to pure and early Islam.[2]

What were Gaspirali's specific prescriptions for survival? First of all Ismail Bey focused on language, particularly in its written form. "Everyone knows that happens to a person without a language; there is no need to explain.

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[1]Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism* (London: Luzac, 1950), p. 78.
[2]Khurshid Ahmad, "The Nature of the Islamic Resurgence," in *Voice of Resurgent Islam,* ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 218-29, especially 220.

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If it is bad for a man, it is the same for a nation."[1] "It must not be forgotten that the language of a people is no less important an element in daily life than is religion."[2] Ismail Bey was convinced that at least the Turkic Muslims of the Russian Empire must have a common literary language — the critical mass for a viable culture and society was larger than any single part of that Turkic world. Such a common language would associate Russian Turkic Muslims with Turks outside Russia — in the Ottoman Empire, in Persia, and so forth. Such contact, communication, and resulting cooperation would greatly benefit the renewal of their society.

Ismail Bey was convinced that the language he used in *Tercüman* was just such a language, that in its simplified form it would be understood by Turkic readers anywhere and would facilitate the drawing together of the Turks throughout the world. The language of *Tercüman* was, for all practical purposes however, only a simplified form of Ottoman Turkish used in Istanbul at the time. It was criticized by a number of Gaspirali's contemporaries as not being understood easily by Turks in Central Asia, even in the Volga region. What is important to note here is that Gaspirali was interested in such common literary language in order to facilitate renewal, not for any political purposes. He did often write of a Turkic nation (*kavim*), but where is the evidence that he dreamed of using this as a base for facilitating or creating a unified greater Turkic independent state or political entity?[3]

We remember that intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century grappled with the language question too. Ibrahim Şinasi, a young Ottoman intellectual and poet, had several decades before Ismail Bey published a journal, *Tercüman-i Ahval,* the name of which served as a partial model for Gaspirali's own journal. He had emphasized as Ismail Bey would later the simplification of the written language to facilitate wider readership.[4] Ziya Paşa, too, had written an article, "Poetry and Prose," in 1868 criticizing the Ottoman language as a useful literary medium for the vast majority of Turkish readers. This is ironic when one takes into account the fact that Gaspirali modeled his journalistic language on Ottoman.[5]

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[1]Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gaspirali," p. 225, citing "Can yani dil meselesi," *Tercüman* (22 January 1908).

[2]Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii," p. 207, citing "Vopros a iazyke," *Tercüman* (4 November 1905).

[3]Tadeusz Swietochowski, *Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim community* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 31-32; he argues that in Azerbaijan an average reader could understand the language of *Tercüman,* which influenced the "Ottomanization" of the Azeri press.

[4]David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908* (London: Frank Case, 1977), pp. 57-58.

[5]Ibid., p. 58.

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Şemseddin Sami, some years later, also focused attention on the necessity of creating a common literary language for Turks from Bukhara and Kashgar to the Balkans. "The first symbol of a nation and a race, its foundation, and its common property, shared equally by all its members is the language in which it speaks.... Each people and nation must therefore first of all bring order into its language.[1] Ziya Gökalp looked upon language as the foundation stone of nationality and regarded independence in the sphere of language as a necessary condition for political independence.[2]

Gaspirali's contemporaries in the Russian Empire, Muslim and Turkic, often agreed with his emphasis on language and increased literacy. But the movements toward national development among many of the Turkic people and other non-Russians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century proved to be divisive forces too strong to permit the adopting of a "neutral" common language among the Russian Turks. The Kazan Tatar intellectual Nashirvan Yanishev, who usually supported the idea of Islamic solidarity and cooperation, did not believe that Gaspirali's focus on a common literary language was useful or possible. He wrote that "no one, with the exception of the Azeris, can understand the language of *Tercüman;* the farther north you go, the fewer the people who read *Tercüman*."[3]

Policies pursued in the late nineteenth century by the Russian government helped encourage the separate development of minority languages. N. A. Il'minskii had argued that the ultimate goal of assimilating these nationalities into the mainstream of Russian culture was best and most quickly achieved by creating Russian schools for the nationalities, using the children's own language at the early stages of education to introduce them to the rudiments of Russian culture, but their language transcribed in Cyrillic characters. Ultimately Russian itself would be used at the upper school levels. (These views bear some resemblance to current policies in the United States on bilingual education.) These Russo-Tatar schools would compete with purely Muslim schools; Gaspirali himself both attended and taught in such a school.[4]

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[1]Ibid., p. 62.

[2]Andreas M. Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 108-10.

[3]Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam,* pp. 114-15, citing *Yulduz,* no. 786 (1912).

[4]Alexander Bennigsen, "The Muslims of European Russia," *Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples*, ed. Wayne Vucinich (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p. 152; Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam,* pp. 28-29; Wheeler, *Modern History,* p. 199.

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Against this negativism, Gaspirali, in some exasperation, wrote in 1912 that "The desire of each Turkic people to create its own language is in agreement with democratic principles, but it is harmful for the future."[1] To the end of his life, Gaspirali held firmly to the idea he had expressed in *Tercüman* in 1906, that "without a national language there can be no progress, because a national language, a common literary language, is the means and source most fundamental and necessary for the advancement of education, literature, religion, and national hopes."[2] The statement has a great deal of meaning today, and his focus was not off the mark, for his judgment of language's importance was sound.

A second interest of Gaspirali's, which proved important for the national development of Russia's Turks, and particularly for the Volga and Crimean Tatar communities in the future, was that of women's rights and emancipation. In the legal sphere he wrote little about women, though emphasizing the equality of women with men in matters of marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

Knowing how sensitive an issue this was among most Muslims in Russia and outside, Gaspirali made greater efforts to stress his Islamic orthodoxy. "I beg the reader to understand that I am not suggesting that the Sheriat be changed; this is impermissible."[3] Instead, he pointed out that the Qur'ân demanded equitable treatment of women. What masqueraded as Islamic law and custom relating to women was nothing more than "some Asiatic concept." Beyond the legal questions, Gaspirali raised the issue in terms that sound strikingly modern. Pointing out to his readership that more than half of the Muslim and Turkic population were female, by denying them the right and possibility to contribute to national development the Muslims were denying themselves half of their human resources.

Ismail Bey firmly believed and often stated that without female participation it would be difficult if not impossible for Islamic society to raise its level of existence to that of the West. There was an intimate connection between the assurance of a vigorous and enlightened national life and the raising of the conditions of women's lives. All of this had to begin with education, as with virtually everything else Gaspirali called for. "Whoever loves his own people and wishes it a great future, must concern himself with the

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[1]Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam,* p. 115, citing Gaspirali's statement in *Türk Yurdu* (16 May 1912).
[2]Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii," p. 225, citing "Kerain-i kerame hutab," *Tercüman* (25 September 1906).
[3]Ibid., pp. 247-48, citing "Gdie koren' zla?" *Tercüman* (15 September 1903).

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enlightenment and education of women, restore freedom and independence to them, and give wide scope to the development of their minds and capabilities."[1]

Ziya Gökalp, too, had raised the women's issue in Turkey itself. He called for women's participation in social life, especially in the economic sphere, and free and unhindered entrance into the professions. Gökalp called for the equalization of educational opportunities for men and women, just as schools for women were so important to Gaspirali.[2] Whether or not Gaspirali's and Gökalp's hopes have been realized is a matter for debate. But it seems clear that women play a more important, at least public and visible, role in Turkic-Tatar life than in most other areas of the Islamic world.

While Gaspirali's slogan "Dilde, Fikirde, İşte, Birlik" is more widely used in scholarly discussions of his legacy, the term *usul-i Cadid* (new method) more accurately reflects his importance. *Usul-i Cadid* referred originally to the new method of instruction of language — phonetic transcription, simplified grammar, and simplified vocabulary. It soon came to mean the style of instruction in all subjects used in the *maktabs*, with an expanded curriculum as well as a new method of teaching. This curriculum at the *maktab* level (which was the level of greatest importance to Gaspirali) was to include the traditional Muslim elements — □Qur'ân, calligraphy, Islamic traditions, but also a genuine ability to read in Arabic. But beyond these subjects Ismail Bey believed a student should study the grammar and literature of his native language, the history of Islam and Islamic societies as well as of other religions and other societies, geography, arithmetic, and at least enough science to make an impact on the student's own life-style. He was convinced that no genuine renewal of Turkic-Tatar Islamic society was conceivable without educational renewal. His society needed "an army of learned men," and an "enlightened public."[3]

An American's dissertation (which ought to be published) shows that the *usul-i cadid* required reform in the actual physical environment for education, relating to size of classes, a regularization of beginning and ending school years, regularized school days, and a set curriculum of courses and levels. The school itself must be designed as a school, and the teachers must be prepared specifically in the subjects that they would teach.[4] Gaspirali was convinced that

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[1]Ibid., pp. 23-27, citing *Molla Nasreddin,* no. 3 (1913), in turn cited in M. Kasumov, *Boevoi revoliutsionno-demokratischeskii zhurnal 'Molla Nasreddin'* (Baku: 1960), p. 32; Thomas Kuttner, "Russian Jadidism and the Islamic World: Ismail Gasprinskii in Cairo, 1908," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique,* nos. 3-4 (1975), p. 390.

[2]Seçil Akgun, "Women's Emancipation in Turkey," *Bulletin of the Turkish Studies Association* (March 1986), pp. 1-11, about a positive effect of American missionary schools upon the growth of women's education; Heyd, *Foundations,* p. 94; Berkes, *Development of Secularism,* p. 390.

[3]Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gaspirali," p. 172; Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam,* p. 39; Wheeler, *Modern History,* pp. 202-3.

[4]Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gaspirali," pp. 184-95; Kuttner, "Russian *Jadidism,*" p. 389.

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a sound and full *maktab* education was a prerequisite for a meaningful madrasa experience. Admission to the higher level would require solid grounding in the *maktab* "basics."

To the south, the Ottomans, too, produced educational reformers who recognized the inadequacy of their traditional system. They had made great strides in identifying educational problems and had introduced a number of innovations that would be important later on as influences on Gaspirali, who spent some time in Istanbul. The idea of *maarif*, the process of becoming acquainted with things not known, was a direct challenge to the *ilm* of the *ulema*. The introduction of *fen,* establishment of commissions, of ministries of education, all reflected deep concern, and innovative responses.[1]

There were important obstacles to overcome, however. In the decree of Mahmud II, which supposedly made primary education compulsory, it was said:

> While, according to Muslims, learning the requisites of religion comes first and above everything else and while these requisites take precedence over all worldly considerations, the majority of people lately avoid sending their children to school. This condition is the cause not only of widespread illiteracy but also of ignorance of religion, and hence, has been a primary cause of our misfortune. As it is necessary to deliver the Muslims from these worldly and other-worldly misfortunes, and as it is a religious obligation for the entire *ummah* of Muhammed to learn the affairs of religion and the faith of God, no man henceforth shall prevent his children from attending school until they have reached the age of adulthood.[2]

Again, in 1845 Sultan Abdul Mecid, in addressing the Supreme Council, discussing the foundation of a Council of Education, defined the aims of education thus: "To disseminate religious knowledge and useful sciences, which are necessities for religion and the world, so as to abolish the ignorance of the people. It is a necessity for every human being to learn first his own religion and that education which will enable him to be independent of the help of others, and then and only then to acquire useful sciences and arts."[3]

At least in the Ottoman Empire, however, the government endorsed the goals and methods of educational reform. In Russia, Gaspirali faced opposition from the existing Muslim educational profession, the teachers in traditional *maktab*s and madrasas, as well as the government. Russian officials too feared the outcome of successful Muslim educational reform, and, as already noted

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[1]Berkes, *Development of Secularism,* pp. 99-100.
[2]Ibid., p. 101.
[3]Ibid., p. 173.

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above, N. A. Il'minskii particularly opposed these reforms. He wrote, "A Muslim fanatically hostile to the infidels was less dangerous for the Russian state than a Muslim educated in the European style, with a degree from a Russian or Western university."[1] K. P. von Kaufman, governor general of Turkistan after the Russian conquest, believed that "the best way to undermine the influence of Muslim education was to create Russian schools to which Central Asian children would be admitted." This had the double advantage of drawing them away from Muslim schools, either traditional or of a new sort, and of bringing Muslim and Russian children together. He believed that the latter would assimilate the former when placed side by side."[2]

Russians established schools to compete with the very popular Cadid schools of Gaspirali. These Russian-native (*russko-tuzemnaia*) schools were for Muslims only, however, to acquaint the children with Russian culture through the medium of their own language and with elements of the Russian language. The first was opened in 1884 under the headmastership of a Russian orientalist, V. P. Nalivkin. In 1911 there were almost ninety of them in Turkistan, and by 1913 there were more than 150 in the Kazak plains. This was an important recognition of the enormous success of Gaspirali's new-method schools.[3]

There is considerable disagreement about the number of *usul-i cadid* schools established by the time of the Russian Revolution in March 1917. But it seems clear that the number exceeded five thousand.[4] Gaspirali traveled widely in the Muslim areas of the empire doing his best to persuade the local dignitaries of the importance of these new method schools. In some regions he was more successful than in others. In Kazan *guberniia,* where interest in educational reform and social renewal predated Ismail Bey's career, his new method corresponded exactly with the needs of the powerful Tatar bourgeoisie, and in the city of Kazan alone by 1916 there were more than a dozen Cadid *maktabs*. The presence of ten Cadid madrassas in Kazan *guberniia* must have reflected some years of reformist primary education. One set of statistics published in the 1920s in Kazan argued for the proposition that these reformed schools were at least as successful as their Russian counterparts, producing a claimed Tatar literacy rate on the eve of the March 1917 revolution of 20 percent compared to 18 percent for the Russians, and between 5 and 9 percent

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[1]Bennigsen, "The Muslims," p. 152; V. M. Gorokhov, *Reaktsionnaia shkol'naia politika tsarizma v otnoshenii tatar Povolzh'ia* (Kazan: 1941), pp. 201-5.

[2]Wheeler, *Modern History,* p. 201.

[3]Ibid., pp. 201-3.

[4]Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam,* p. 39; Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gaspirali," pp. 195-99.

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for the other non-Russian minorities in the *guberniia*, the Chuvash, Mordovians, Votiaks, and Cheremisses.[1]

Gaspirali visited Central Asia and under his influence Cadid schools were opened in Andijan in 1897, in Samarkand and Tokmak in 1898. These early Central Asian schools were exclusively for the local Tatar population. It was only in 1901 that the first Uzbek Cadid *maktab* was opened in Tashkent. The first Cadid school in Samarkand began operation in 1903.[2]

Ismail Bey had less success in Bukhara and Khiva, whose political leadership wavered on the issue and then succumbed to pressure from the local clergy to prevent such schools' establishment. Gaspirali made a trip to Calcutta where he claimed to have succeeded in creating a Cadid school, using Urdu.

An examination of educational literature published in India and Pakistan fails to verify any lasting result in that region; the main evidence of his achievements there appears in his own essays in *Türk Yurdu* in 1912, "Hind Yolundan" and "Hind'den Dönerken."[3]

Strong enough backing for Gaspirali's educational ideas emerged throughout the Russian Islamic political movements so that the Third Muslim Congress in August 1906 at Nizhni Novgorod adopted three resolutions, one of which was to press for school reform in Islamic areas and to conduct education in the *maktabs* in the mother tongue of the pupils and with classes in madrasas in the language espoused by Gaspirali. In May 1917 the Pan-Russian Muslim Congress held in Moscow adopted a resolution offered by Zeki Kadyrov on school reform that conformed in all important ways to the ideas of Gaspirali.[4]

A number of important Central Asian, Tatar, Azeri, and Turkish intellectuals credited Gaspirali with providing models and leadership that influenced them heavily. Modernists like Yusuf Akçuraoğlu, Akhundzada, Huseyinzade, Ahmed Maksudi, and Fatih Kerimi on the one hand, and editors of

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[1]Kushner, *Rise of Turkish Nationalism,* pp. 12-14; Tamurbek Devletshin, *Sovetskii Tatarstan: Teoriia i praktika Leninskoi natsional'noi politiki* (London: 1974), pp. 47-48; Tutaev, *Oktiabr' i prosveshchenie,* pp. 13-14, gives no mention of Gaspirali in discussing new-method schools; Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Les mouvements nationaux chez les Musulmans de Russie. Le 'sultan Galievisme' au Tatarstan* (Paris: Mouton, 1960), pp. 39-40, 59-60; Hélène Carrière d'Encausse, *Réforme et révolution chez les musulmans de l'empire russe. Bukhara, 1867-1924* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1966), pp. 137-42.

[2]Becker, *Russia's Protectorates,* pp. 203-5; Hélène Carrière d'Encausse, "The Stirring of National Feeling," *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule,* ed. Edward Allworth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 177-78, 194-95, 200.

[3]Paul Dumont, "La Revue *Türk Yurdu* et les Musulmans de l'Empire Russe, 1911-1914," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique,* nos. 3-4 (1974), p. 321.

[4]Swietochowski, *Russian Azerbaijan,* pp. 48-49; Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam,* pp. 78-79.

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journals and newspapers such as *Vaqt, Yulduz,* and *Ay Qap,* all recognized the pathbreaking of Ismail Bey and *Tercüman*[1]. The great surprise, then, in looking at Gaspirali seventy years after his death is to discover that his accomplishments are given so little credit today either in the USSR or in the larger Turkic world in general.

Ismail Bey's language reform and any idea he may have had for a cultural (or even political) unity of the Turkic Muslim world would not overcome the desires of each Turkic group, the Azeri, Tatar, Uzbek, Kazak, and Turkish peoples, to focus on local and parochial political goals. But Gaspirali's evaluation of the weaknesses of Islamic society, his directions in educational reforms, and his journalistic achievements produced immediate, dramatic, and long-lasting results. What a pity that *Tercüman* has not been republished and has not been seriously studied by scholars who would have much to learn from it. If it served in 1914 as the "treasury" of Tatar culture, it is a treasury that remains to be discovered and mined today.

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[1]Manuel Sarkisyanz, "Russian Conquest in Central Asia: Transformation and Acculturation," *Russia and Asia,* ed. Vucinich, p. 255; François Georgeon, *Aux Origines du Nationalisme Turc (Yusuf Akchura, 1876-1935)* (Paris: Editions Institut d'Études Anatoliennes, 1980), pp. 18-21, 45, 54.

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ISMAIL BEY GASPRINSKI, 1851-1914

Şura, nos 21 (1 November 1914), 22 (15 November 1914), 23 (1 December 1914), 24 (15 December 1914), pp. 641-44, 73-75, 705-8, 737-41, respectively.

This very long obituary for Ismail Bey appeared in four issues of the Tatar-language journal *Şura,* published in Orenburg in November and December 1914. Published bimonthly from January 1908 to January 1918, *Şura* was one of the most important literary and political Tatar journals in the last years of the Russian Empire. Its editor was Rizaeddin kadi Fahreddin, a reform-minded religious official. As one can easily see in the obituary that follows, "*Şura* was certainly, of all Muslim journals, the most deeply influenced by Russian culture." (Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *La Presse et le Mouvement National Chez les Musulmans de Russie avant 1920* [Paris: Mouton, 1964], p. 77.) I wish to thank Professor Edward Allworth both for informing me of this obituary's existence and providing me with a photocopy of it. Translated by Alan Fisher.

1 November 1914
Ismail Bey Gaspirali, 1851-1914

Ismail Bey was someone who was respected in the world for his preoccupation with the affairs of humanity; he was a man of ours who was revered for his writings about and on behalf on our nation; our man and our leader, Ismail Bey Gaspirali, is now at rest and has departed for another abode. It was the product of Ismail Bey's pen that gave us the route to follow for the future; he provided for us the necessary lessons to learn in order to reach the future. With the death of Ismail Bey, Russian Muslims have lost a person with "a thousand" faces, a person who himself was our educational center and institution. We are now separated from the person who was most clearly the servant of knowledge for and among our people.

He was born in a very traditional village, moved to the city and spent his life there. He had a sharp intellect, great ability, natural aptitude, courage, firmness, was a hard worker, and because of all of these, contributed as much as any one man can to the well-being of Russia's Muslims. He showed them, through his own example, what their potential for renewal is. He was the cause

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of a revolution among Russia's Muslims which was all encompassing: in science, in literature, in their society as well as in their economy. Until today there has been no Muslim in Russia who has contributed as much as Ismail Bey.

His entire adult life Ismail Bey devoted to serving his nation, his people, his society [*millet ki, halk ve cemaat ki*]. He helped all of the rest of us to develop our material and intellectual welfare and potential. He was a servant to all of us without parallel.

The lives of our people have greatly benefited from all of the years, months, days, and even hours of Ismail Bey's own life. It is unfortunate indeed that someone who is of such great service to his people and all humanity is so short-lived. Yet his good works and services remain behind as his legacy. Too often the long-lived of us contribute far less to society than does someone who has a relatively short life. Let us be grateful, though, for his short life, for it was so important to the very fiber of our existence.

Although Ismail Bey's life was not long, it was filled with "a thousand" blessings and good deeds for the rest of us. Everyone who knew him, and knew of him, recognized that everything he did was for the benefit of knowledge and the people. Let us all rejoice in Ismail Bey's life, not be too sad about his death!

All of the important people as well as the ordinary people have a great debt to Ismail Bey. He was indeed one of God's greatest gifts to mankind. Let us raise our thanks to God Almighty for this gift. Ismail Bey would have wished that we remember him most for what he did to improve the intellectual and spiritual life of our people. While there were and are many who remain pessimistic about the future of Islam and humanity in general, Ismail Bey showed us how to attain a good future.

Our nation [*millet*] will benefit forever from what Ismail Bey accomplished. He led the way in showing how to raise and educate the next generation of young people who will be the ones to serve our nation in the future.

Ismail Bey's contributions have become the guide [*rehber*] for the difficult-to-find route out of our difficult present, the warnings against mistaken policies, and the plans for our nation's future. For these reasons, it is important that his biography be written and that it be studied by all of the students in our schools. However, up to now, this has not been written. This must be written so that we can fully appreciate what Ismail Bey did and that we will be able to benefit from his accomplishments.

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Because of Ismail Bey's death, we have lost a man who was of use to our people in a thousand ways. He was a man who worked hard, remained firm in his convictions, and now he is gone. Today we feel deep grief and believe we have experienced a great calamity. But God knows best, and let us take up the paths that Ismail Bey had built, to complete the tasks that he had begun. This is the best way for us now so serve our nation.

Although some elements of Ismail Bey's biography have appeared in our newspapers and journals over the past several years, no serious attempt has yet been made to provide a complete story of his life. At *Şura* we have decided to begin that task by providing here an outline of his biography. We hope that in the future a much more serious and complete effort will be made. We have benefited in our project from the information printed in *Tercüman* by Hasan Sabri Efendi who was one of Ismail Bey's closest friends and associates.

Biography: The founder of the newspaper *Tercüman,* Ismail Bey Gaspirali, was born on 8 March 1851 (1267) in a village called Uçuköy, which was a two-hour journey from Bahçesaray. His mother came from a Crimean noble family and was named Fatma Hanim. His father, Mustafa Ağa, came from a noble family of the second rank. Mustafa Ağa had been born in the village Gaspra, which was on the Crimean Black Sea coast. Ismail Bey took the name Gaspirali from this origin. (Information on this fact was published in *Tercüman*, no. 19 [1884].) There is some evidence that Ismail Bey's ancestors originally came from the Khazar Turkish branch, but the information is unclear. We are not taking a position on this question, which does not seem very important anyway.

Ismail Bey's father and mother lived in Sevastopol' during the 1855 war and at its end moved to Bakçesaray. At this point Ismail Bey was four years old. When Ismail Bey was ten years old, he found a girlfriend named Habibe who lived in Bahçesaray. After attending a military training school in Moscow, Ismail Bey went to Istanbul and then to Paris. After his stay abroad, he returned to Russia and to his own homeland. In 1874 (1291) Ismail Bey became a teacher in Yalta where he taught Muslim adults the Russian language. Two years later he came to Bahçesaray and gave Russian lessons at the Zincirli madrasa.

In 1879 (1296) he was elected mayor [*golova*]. In this position he served four years. After that period he began what would become his life's work. He would also make a number of journeys in the coming years: in 1885 to Baku, in 1893 again to Baku and then on to Bukhara, in 1907 and 1908 to Egypt, and finally in 1911 to India.

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About his second journey to Baku, Ismail Bey wrote a short account in *Terciüman,* a portion of which we include here:

> In 1893 I found myself for a second time in Baku. On my first trip I traveled with Sefer Ali Bey Velibeyov. I passed through the Caucasus on the way to Baku, that first time. We were particularly interested in learning about trade and commerce as it was conducted by Muslims living there. Sefer Ali Bey was a merchant and was himself interested in making some investments in the Caucasus and in Baku. We met with a number of the rich merchants and industrialists. Sefer Ali Bey purchased one large establishment and decided to begin the publication associated with it of a newspaper. Those with whom he dealt could not understand the sense of starting a newspaper, which could certainly not be profitable. And few were willing to consider a newspaper that would be modeled on *Tercüman* and that would not be essentially Muslim in nature. They were not particularly interested in new forms of newspapers, of education, of literature. They said: "For us it is enough to trust in God." Happily Sefer Ali Bey persisted in his plan and the newspaper was eventually started.
>
> We also noted then that many of the educated elements of that society spoke Farsi, and the local ordinary population found it very difficult to speak with them. Now, on my second journey, I am happy to report that Turkic is being used by all, the newspaper is thriving, and the people of the area are entering a new future.

His family. Ismail Bey married in 1879 (1293), but after a number of years, he divorced that woman. In 1882 (1299) Ismail Bey married Zahire Hanim, the daughter of Isfendiyar Akçurin from Siberia. These two lived together for twenty years. (A biography of his lady appears in the book *Meşhur Hatunlar*.) Although after Zahire Hanim's death Ismail Bey married one of her sisters, it was Zahir Hanim who was his prime companion throughout his active life.

Ismail Bey had three sons: Rahmet Bey, Mansur Bey, and Haydar Bey; and three daughters: Hatice Hanim, Shafiqa Hanim, and Nigyar Hanim. He had one living sister, Zeyneb.

His education. Ismail Bey studied first with Haci Ismail. At that teacher's death, Ismail Bey entered the gymnasium in Akmescit, and after two years' study there, entered the Voronezh military academy. From there he advanced to the Moscow higher military school. It is interesting to note that Ismail Bey, who spent more than thirty-five years serving the interests of Russian Muslims and Turkish nationalists had his first educational experiences in Russian schools. Yet his nationalist activity ultimately cut him off from the Russian

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families he grew to know and love, the Russian writers, and the Russian professors.

On this touchy question, Yusuf Bey Akçurin once wrote:

> People often think that their nation, their ideas and culture are unique to them. They think it wrong to mingle with other cultures. Muslims today are among the worst in this regard. We forget that long ago, Muslims were open to other cultures and ideas. Al Ghazali was one such philosopher who was open to such foreign ideas. Ismail Bey received his very first education with Islamic tradition. But soon he branched out. Among his best friends were the Katkov family. Ismail Bey cannot be said to have suffered from these associations. He may well have benefited.

Ismail Bey found the strength to remain firm against those who were uneasy about change, against those "masters" of the past who wavered on the question of renewal. He understood better than they that true service to our religion required an acceptance of renewal. He often wrote in *Tercüman* that the old stone "walls" were crumbling and that they needed to be rebuilt with new materials. He learned from Katkov that Russia and Russians also needed renewal, that their own "walls" were in a state of deterioration. He knew that it was not necessary to pursue renewal in exactly the same way that Katkov and Russians were doing it but that one did not need to fear what they were saying solely because they were Russians. Indeed, he learned a great deal from the newspapers that such Russians were publishing, especially the *Moscow Gazette* [*Moskovskiia Viedemosti*]. Journalism needed men who were knowledgeable about the world. Ismail Bey was a man whose strength and desire combined to produce for us a useful and modern journalism that could address the needs of our people. He believed that Katkov was just such a man for the Russians too. When Katkov died, Ismail Bey showed sincere grief and in *Tercüman* offered sympathy for his family. He wrote that Katkov had provided great service to the Russian people through journalism, that he had worked hard at that task for thirty years, that Russians would recognize the true value of his service. And he concluded than he hoped, after he had completed thirty years of services that our people would consider him [Ismail Bey] in the same light.

Ismail Bey, during his time in the Moscow military academy, began to develop a great affection for his own Turkic-Tatar nation. After those years, although he traveled as far as Paris and Istanbul, he thought about the problems of our schools and our books. He decided on these trips that he would focus much of his life on improving the intellectual life of our schools and books, and would emphasize renewal of the teaching and journalistic professions.

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Ismail Bey published a book, in Russian, entitled *Russian Muslims*. With this work, Ismail Bey initiated a debate on some very important questions. He wrote, "our ignorance is the main reason for our backward condition. We have no access at all to what has been discovered and to what is going on in Europe. We must be able to read in order to overcome our isolation; we must learn European ideas from European sources. We must introduce into our primary and secondary schools subjects that will permit our pupils to have such access." Ismail Bey found the means necessary to introduce these ideas among the Turkic-Tatar people. He understood that this means was primarily the responsibility of the publishing industry.

Because of this, he published on 8 May 1881 a volume entitled *First-Born* [*Tonguç*], which was soon followed by a second, *Daybreak* [*Şefak*]. Together, these two works have been considered to be the famous "Ismail Publications." Ismail Bey, in the years since, explained that it was the reception that these two works found that persuaded him to venture the publication of his famous newspaper *Tercüman*. Although Ismail Bey was not able to gain assistance from any quarter at first, and despite the fact that such a venture was considered to be extremely bold at the time, Ismail Bey persisted and produced the first issues of *Tercüman* on his own. Ismail Bey had to travel to St. Petersburg in order to receive permission to begin publication and had to incur considerable personal expense in time and money. But on 10 April 1883 (1300) the first issue appeared. Ismail Bey continued to face one obstacle after another, but the issues of *Tercüman* continued to appear. In 1882, he also published a Turkic Yearbook [*Salname-i Turki*] and a beautiful almanac. In the introduction to the former, Ismail Bey wrote: "We have put together a Turkic Yearbook and an almanac for the benefit of all Muslims in Russia, both for the first time. We are conducting an experiment to see if what is regularly done in Russian, Ottoman, and French languages, which provide statistical and geographical information for those peoples, can also serve a useful purpose for Russian Muslims."

Throughout his life, Ismail Bey published innumerable books, brochures, essays, treatises, and collections, all with the purpose of serving Russia's Muslims. But the most beautiful and most useful of all of the things that he published was *Tercüman*. This newspaper allowed Russia's Muslims to awaken, to come out of seclusion, to enter the world. It permitted Russia's Muslims to cease being so far behind the rest of the civilized world and provided the needed remedy for many of our ills.

Ismail Bey once wrote about the costs and rewards connected with *Tercüman* in this way:

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> Today *Terciiman* enters its third year. Let us inform our readers what we see as the use and purpose of *Tercüman*, that it has aimed at improving the health and happiness of our homeland [*vatan*], of the Turks as well as other Muslims who live in Russia. We have aimed at providing the essentials for the education of our nation, of the Turks and all Muslims in Russia. When the first issue of *Tercüman* was printed, we produced only 320 copies, and we perhaps thought that we would find it difficult to have a readership warranting that many. In December 1883, though, we needed to print 406 copies. For 1884 we had to increase our operating budget, and by December we had 1,000 subscribers. Let us describe briefly who these 1,000 subscribers were. 300 were in the Crimea; 300 were in Astrakhan, Samara, Orenburg, Ufa, Kazan, and Perm; 150 lived in Dagistan; 50 were Siberian Muslims; 200 were in Central Asia and Turkistan. 150 appeared to be from the upper and wealthy classes; 300 were ordinary working people; 500 were urban merchants, teachers, artisans. Our readership comes from all over the Russian Muslim world, and includes all sorts of people. (*Tercüman* 1885)

In an editorial appearing in *Tercüman* in 1903, in the Twentieth Anniversary issue, Ismail Bey wrote the following, referring to ideas he had presented in the very first issue in 1883:

> The first service that *Tercüman* will provide is news that will be useful for our society's livelihood and information about Russian society that can be useful and important for our own society. The road ahead of us is long and difficult. We thus ask God's help and guidance, both of which we will need in abundance. But it will be our readers who will decide if our aims have been achieved, if we have proved useful to the needs of our society. In twenty years we have produced several hundred issues of *Tercüman,* and of these we believe more than a million Muslims in Russia and Muslims living within the Ottoman state have read our issues. What has been our effect, our impact? We have received much information that is very gratifying. Letters from our readers indicate a wide degree of support. And even more important, the tangible results of our efforts. Schools for Muslims in Russia are changing, are improving, and we believe some of the credit for this development belongs with what has been published in *Tercüman*. Foundations for more than one thousand primary schools have been laid, and in many of them, our "phonetic method" of instruction is employed. Our young writers and scholars have produced in these twenty years as many as three hundred scientific and literary treatises. In eight of our cities, societies have been established to work for the social and cultural benefit of our people. The spiritual and intellectual health of our world of Islam is greatly improved. We hope that God is pleased with what has been achieved. But much still remains to be accomplished. We hope very much that a Muslim university may be established and several hundred

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more social and cultural societies may be founded. With God's help *Tercüman* will continue with its efforts to accomplish these goals.

In another issue of *Tercüman*, Ismail Bey wrote the following on the matter of renewal and reform within Islam:

> Thirteen years ago there were innumerable forms of revolutionary and reform movements afoot in Russian Islam, many of them in opposition to one another. In essence, these movements raised five or six types of question: (1) Muslims who are subjects of the Russian government have to decide whether they are loyal to the czar or to some Muslim government, or are loyal to their own homeland [*vatan*] (2) What sort of education is proper and necessary for Muslims? Should it include the study of modern science? If so, is it necessary to learn Russian? Should there be Muslim schools that teach modern subjects? (3) What are the best means for training Muslims to live in the modern world of trade and industry? Should our schools branch out of our old traditional modes and offer new methods of instruction? Is this sort of education dangerous to the preservation of our culture? (4) Is it necessary that Muslims in Russia be trained in the modern methods of agriculture? Is it possible to survive and thrive economically without acquiring new scientific agricultural knowledge? (5) If we establish our own national schools, to permit our youth to acquire an education without going to the Russian schools, should our own schools be modeled on the Russian ones? Should they offer the same subjects and teach our youth the Russian language? (6) What should be the role of our newspapers and journals in all of this? Should they instruct, prod, incite, encourage? Should they take positions on these various issues? (*Tercüman,* 1895)

Toward the beginning of 1896, Ismail Bey published an evaluation of the various reform movements involving Russian Muslims:

> It is interesting to compare the situation of Russia's Muslims at the beginning of 1896 with the situation in 1880. Today there are a great many Russian Muslims, who could not read or write before, who not only read but contribute to *Tercüman*. Over these fifteen years, in Russia and especially in the city of Kazan, many books have been written and published by Muslims. Although some of them still remain textbooks written in Arabic, our "literature" has really been born, and much is written in Turkic. Before, there was not much beyond the almanacs of Abdulkayyim al Nasri Efendi and the treatises of Radlov. Today, we have almanacs, geographies, and histories. And we can sense the beginnings of the writing and publishing of poetry, dictionaries, fiction as well as nonfiction in Turkic. We no longer have to depend on learning Russian and using Russian books on these subjects. We see the birth of a "new literature" [*edebiyat-i cadid*]. But in this new literature, how much is there of genuine new ideas? We have a great many schools. But are there

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genuine scholars, researchers, inquirers among their teachers? There is not nearly enough of "new method" or "new idea" in our schools in the cities and provinces where Muslims live. In fact, it is not in our secondary schools that our Muslim youth are really learning about the modern world in which they live, it is in the factories where they work that they come into contact with modernity. The real question that all of us should be now considering is this: how will our Muslim youth value their culture and traditions when they appear to be so out of touch with the modern world. If they learn one thing in school and another in the factory, what are they to make of it? The future, the independence, the sovereignty, the survival of our nation is at stake. It is absolutely essential that we produce new ideas in our schools that are in accord with the new world into which our youth enter. Fifteen years ago, it might not have seemed possible to achieve. Today, however, there is great hope. (*Tercüman,* 1895)

After founding *Tercüman* Ismail Bey made a journey along the Volga, and then into the districts east of Itil. In Ufa he met with Selim Geri Mirza. He then traveled through the Caucasus. He learned of the current conditions of the Turkic and Tatar peoples living in these areas. He came to the conclusion that they were living in a deplorable situation, in a society that was gravely ill. Then, many years later, when he traveled to Egypt to attend the general Islamic Congress, he learned that the Turkic world was not unique in this regard, that the entire Islamic world was gravely ill. He wrote there an essay that was published in Arabic and addressed these issues. He called for a plan for all Muslims to follow, to use new methods in education as the remedy for its grave illness.

The major obstacle that Ismail Bey faced in the Turkic world in Russia, and in Egypt, was the concern that many Muslims, even educated and intelligent ones, raised about the compatibility of new educational methods with Islamic tradition, with Islam itself. But Ismail Bey was willing to go to Egypt, even as far as India, in order to carry his message and concerns.

A great many people who wished to continue to rely on Islamic traditions as they understood them and who resisted considering many of the new ideas and new methods proposed by Ismail Bey put obstacles in the way of Ismail Bey at every chance they found. Books, pamphlets, essays, introductions to other books, all were used to oppose the new methods. But Ismail Bey countered every obstacle, responded to all criticisms, with his own books, pamphlets, introductions, and essays. It is our opinion that in the contest, Ismail Bey won, and he achieved "checkmate" [*mut*] against his opponents.

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He made a journey to Bukhara to confront some of the most influential of his opponents. There were many there, in the schools both secondary and primary, who argued that his ideas and methods were contrary to Islamic culture and law. He understood that even in the madrasas of Bukhara the knowledge of the modern world had to be introduced.

Ismail Bey's road was long and difficult, but the correct one to follow. He was a modern man [*cadid bir adam*] who served truth and reality. He strove to free us from ignorance, from ideas that were both meaningless and useless. Muslim students, he argued, who attended madrasas that remained deaf to modern ideas were a national waste. He was willing to devote all of his time and energy at home and to make long and difficult journeys for no personal gain or profit, but on behalf of the possible gain and profit of all of us. The Islamic world has been restricted by the tight bonds of an outmoded past, of outmoded methods. He argued that Muslims should find themselves obligated to break these bonds, to free their imagination, to advance. Everywhere else, it was in the last century [nineteenth] that "modern civilization" was born. The Western peoples began to place knowledge and science at the forefront, to give them highest priorities. They were able to discover a great deal about nature, and with these discoveries were able to greatly improve the life of their peoples. There have been "a thousand" real benefits to humanity from these discoveries. Merchants, factory owners and workers, artisans, all have found new skills, talents, abilities, as results of these discoveries. "A thousand" great works have resulted.

Russian Muslims have tended to experience the reverse of all that we wrote above. We have not had access to the discoveries, to the science and knowledge that the Western peoples have produced. And we have not been able to add our own contributions to those discoveries. The debate has centered on two issues coming from this state of affairs: it is right that we do not contribute, and is it wrong to learn how to contribute?

Ismail Bey, and we, believe [d] that the Islamic world and Muslims in Russia have the responsibility to join the people who are producing these discoveries. The Turkic language is an excellent means to achieve these goals; those who are determined to depend on Arabic and Persian as the official languages of our past, will remain in the past. This was why Ismail Bey worked so hard to gain acceptance of a common Turkic language, "Turki."

In general, all Muslims and the Turkic people have the innate capacity to become leaders in the production of new knowledge. This action is not "against God." Rather, almighty God demands no less from human beings. We have a great inheritance from our ancestors, Turkic and Muslim. Our ancestors from

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centuries ago were leaders in the production of new discoveries and knowledge. They developed great talents and achieved great works.

The *Muqadamat* of Hariri is a good example of what we are arguing here. He wrote in Arabic it is true. But he gained his knowledge, acquired ideas, from all over. His contributions were important for his age. What Ismail Bey has worked for in our own age is similar.

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According to Tabiri, Bedri Hamdani once wrote a poem that consisted of one possible act or accomplishment after another, intended for memorization and recitation as instructions for a future leader. But according to Tabiri, this poem could be memorized and utilized only by one person in a given age or era, that its effects are meant for the one rare individual who is meant to dominate a particular time. Parts can be memorized by anyone, but the whole poem only by the one unique person. We know from other sources of such a poem, by Hariri, in the *maqam* form, written in Nishapur. This latter poem contained a story about talent and ability, and indicated that a man who has such rare talent and ability can fulfill his destiny only when his talent is used on behalf of religion and humanity.

(1) Our own age has had such an individual who could have fulfilled Hamdani's precepts, a man who possessed such rare talents and abilities, who could have memorized the entire poem, and who used these talents and abilities on behalf of this nation. This was Ismail Bey Gaspirali. There is no doubt that Ismail Bey fulfilled what Hariri and Hamdani called for. Ismail Bey is an example of the sort of servant of religion and humanity that the great poets described.

(2) Ismail Mirza himself wrote an article in *Tercüman* about the responsibilities that leaders have toward their people and all humanity. We summarize here the main points that Ismail Bey raised in that article: "Every form of useful activity for mankind and for society must be in tune with the ideal. Without forethought and planning the desired results cannot be achieved, whatever the activity. It must be carefully planned out and be in accord with the ideal."

(3) Ismail Bey saw that it was necessary for all the Turkic peoples and groups to use a common "Turki" language in order for them to advance, to coordinate their activities in line with what he believed to be the ideal.

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(4) He pressed for reform of the religious madrasas. This could be accomplished only through a comprehensive plan that instituted a common teaching curriculum using a common new teaching method beginning with the primary schools. About these matters, he wrote a great deal in *Tercüman*. One of his most important articles on this subject appeared in our newspaper in Ufa a few years ago, which we summarize here:

> Our native language can best be preserved by instructing the children in our primary schools using the "phonetic method" of instruction. Without such instruction, the next generations of our Turkic youth will not speak the same language, will not be able to understand each other, cannot conduct their activities in accord with the common ideal. In places like Penza and Tambov, it will be Russian and not Turkic that provides the means to achieve any ideal. Clearly we need to focus on the language question if we wish to preserve our future.

Ismail Bey believed that the phonetic method of teaching literacy combined with the new method of general instruction was absolutely necessary. About this subject, we summarize some idea that appeared in *Tercüman* a number of years ago:

> The foundations of the oral method were established in Bahçesaray in 1883 when the first new-method school was founded there. For the first five or six years, most of the people found it difficult to accept the innovations. But finally some began to notice that pupils were learning to read and write well after only two years of instruction in this school. They began to see the value of the new method. Now there are eight new-method schools in Bahçesaray. It is possible to establish as many as one hundred of them in our *guberniia* alone. (*Tercüman,* no. 50 [1895])

(5) A great deal on the reform of spiritual conditions has been published in *Tercüman*. Ismail Bey's ideas on this question were most clearly expressed in issue no. 60 (1898) in *Tercüman,* and may be summarized as follows:

> We have for too long existed in a situation where we refuse to consider what may actually help us recover from our present condition. We exist as if we remain stretched out in bed, without arising. Everyone should strive for a set of ideas and ideals that can permit them to achieve the greatest possible accomplishments. Everyone up to now has been satisfied to focus on one or two traditional sets of ideas. We need to have access to a thousand sets of such ideas, to be able to choose that or those that can be most useful our future. To add new ideas and ideals is not to reject what is good and useful in our national or religious heritage. Those of us who wish really to be able to serve our people must be willing to recognize what is good and useful in other sets of ideas and ideals. Our local leaders, political as well as educational, may well continue to serve

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Islam by accepting the future. Our *ulema* do not need to focus only on the past. But those who believe that it is right and proper to place all trust and hope in God can nevertheless begin to serve also the needs and aspirations of our nation. The civilized nations are not necessarily Godless in their civilizing activity. But the challenge is great. It will not be easy to persuade our *muftis* and other *ulema* that Islam is not against change.

(6) We summarize here some of Ismail Bey's ideas on the education of women as they appeared in dozens of articles in *Tercüman:*

> Muslims have tended to diverge in recent periods from some of the precepts of Islamic law. They have sometimes done it without knowing that they were violating some of the earliest precepts. One of the examples of this sort of error relates to the education and upbringing of women. Some have argued that by educating women, one is not keeping God's will, and one is in fact preventing such women from fulfilling their rightful responsibilities, that is, being married and raising children. This is absolutely an ignorant position to take. It is, in fact, itself a violation of God's will. Our young girls who pass through primary schools, and in many cases who enter gymnasiums, are *more able* to fulfill God's will than those who do not. Muslims in Kazan and in Ufa have begun to educate their daughters, and a number of them have learned to read and write. Some Muslims have cited religious reasons for opposing this development in the Crimea, but many Crimean Muslims have seen the utility in female education and have supported it. These Crimean daughters are beginning to know the requisites of living in the modern world. The condition of these Crimean daughters should give useful instruction to Muslims living in the Caucasus and in Turkistan where such developments are rare. There are too many people in the Caucasus and in Turkistan who say that what daughters need is instruction in how to fulfill God's will, and nothing more. What they do not understand is the fact that God wills both men and women to develop their minds, to be educated, to learn science and other forms of knowledge. The daughters of all the Muslims in Russia must be introduced to education, just as it is important for their sons.
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> We must not be afraid of the people, male or female. We must not permit ignorance to flourish. We must not allow our daughters to become like Chinese girls and women. In China women are not permitted to become fully human. They exist only to serve men. This is a major difference between Islam and Chinese society and traditions. Unfortunately, many of us Turks have remained far too long under the influence of Chinese culture. One of the great blessings of the Turks' becoming Muslim many centuries ago was their liberation from Chinese culture and traditions. We were pagans then, and ignorant. Islam afforded

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us the opportunity to become civilized, and the opportunity was available to both men and women.

> There are those among our Muslim men who fear that education for our women will open them to the possibility of preferring foreign men and their ideas. What they forget is the fact that Chinese culture and traditions are foreign, to us, and to Islam. The foundations of civilization are built only through education. Perhaps Chinese women will some day arise and be freed from their subjection. It is about time that we encourage our own daughters to arise !

(7) On the opening of social welfare societies and through them the renewal of society, there have been a great many articles in *Tercüman*, and we encourage our readers to consult them.

(8) In order to establish firm foundations for our national literature, it is necessary that we develop a pure, clear, and understandable "Turki" language. We have discussed this subject, and Ismail Bey's intense participation in its success, above. Here we will mention some of the problems, and successes, in this development, and draw from examples of the use of "Turki" by modern writers. Of all of the hopes entertained by Ismail Bey during his life, this one may well be the most difficult of achievement. It is very difficult to change one's language consciously. It is much easier to learn a foreign language than to reform in a considerable way one's own. But the initial steps in the reform of our literature and its expression have been achieved already.

In an article appearing in *Tercüman* in 1888, Ismail Bey noted that the most active of our writers and literary figures used a language that was for the most part not understandable by most Turkic readers in Russia. He wrote that for literary style and even language these writers owed their major debt to the past "greats" within our literary history. He hoped that in the future outstanding writers would emerge who could write in a language that the ordinary literate Turk could understand. We are happy to note that at the present time, many of our best writers have paid heed to Ismail Bey's call. Among our most active writers and literary figures today who would fit Ismail Bey's description are the following:

(1) Mirza Fath Ali Ahundov (Tiflis). He has published in the "Turki" language a number of plays. (2) Hasan Bey Melikov (Baku). He founded one of the most important "Turki" newspapers among Russian Muslims. (3) Said Ansi Zade (Tiflis). He publishes a Turkic newspaper named *Ziya-i Kafkasiya* and is the author of many short stories. (4) Celal Efendi Ansi Zade (Tiflis). The brother of Said Ansi Zade, he is a writer and publishes the newspaper *Keşkül*. He wrote the wonderful treatise "A Short Guide to Knowledge." (5) Abdulselam Ahundzade (Şuşa). He is the author of the highly respected book *The Conditions*

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Necessary for Knowledge. (6) Amiz Efendi Mekarav (Kuban district). He serves as a local *kadi* and is the author of the book *A Catechism*. (7) Ataallah Yabazidov. A writer in both Turkic and Russian of treatises on science. He is a lawyer in Petrograd. (8) Abdulkayyum Nesirov (Kazan). He writes almanacs in "Turki" and has authored five or ten treatises. (9) Şihab al din Mercani. A professor in the city of Kazan. He has written a number of important essays in "Turki" as well as in Arabic. (10) Husseyin Efendi Gaibov (Tiflis). He is a poet and has put together a number of books on the question of our national identity. He is also the *mufti* of Tiflis. (11) Muluka Bumacukov (Siberia). A poet who has published a great deal of poetry in "Turki." (12) Altinsarın (Orenburg). A Kazak poet. (13) Musi Akçibitov (Penza). A novelist of the first rank; author of the novel *Husam Mela*. (14) Zahir Bekiyev (Kazan). An author of novels in Tatar. (15) Abdulselam Kazyhanov (Kazan). He wrote and published a geography in "Turki."

Other writers who have appeared in the years since 1888 and who are contributing greatly to our national literature include: Selizazim Şirvani, Habtalla Ayşan, Abdulmunih Haci, Çukr Mehmed Ali Işasi, and a "thousand" beautiful poets. However, it is important to place at the forefront of all of the names mentioned above, the name of Ismail Bey.

Thirty years ago Ismail Bey explained to us what was necessary for us to really serve our people through writing. It involved making clear and available to our readers the most important ideas of our time. Ismail Bey was the best at doing this. One of his slogans might well have been "what is best for mankind is what is most useful for mankind." This slogan informed everything that he did.

At the opening of the General Islamic Congress that was held in Egypt a few years ago, Ismail Bey discussed these important questions openly and bluntly. He prepared a speech to present before more than three hundred guests and participants at the hotel Continental in the middle of October 1907. We summarize here the main issues that he raised, which we believe clearly focus Ismali Bey's aims at that time:

> Although Muslims throughout the world are today plagued by a condition of backwardness, there are important new ideas that are appearing throughout the Muslim world that need to be discussed and absorbed. Many newspapers and journals have been founded on every side in the Muslim world, most of which are providing genuine service to the various Muslim nationalities. But they do not hide the fact that generally throughout the Muslim world, poverty and ignorance seem to be the permanent state of affairs. In the Muslim world, madrasas continue for the most part to be institutions of the past and continue to play the part of obstacle to progress and renewal. Muslims appear to be under the

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> domination of traders and commercial interests. They appear unable to take charge of these affairs on their own. Despite the fact that there are supposed to be more than three hundred million Muslims throughout the world, trade and industry are not important among them. We have no successful commercial companies, no successful banking establishments, no leaders in international trade and commerce. We have inherited from our ancestors fertile land and rich forests and great commercial traditions. But we cannot discover how to make use of them, to profit from them. We are dependent on others, from non-Muslim lands and America. Why do we have no successful merchants and traders within our Muslim lands? Surely, in Iran and Turkey, in Egypt and North Africa, in India, there is sufficient talent. It is my belief that if the present situation continues for long, not only the traditions and values of the Muslims but their very existence is in question. It is ignorance that is primarily to blame. Greeks, Bulgarians, Jews, Hindus, all have in less than half a century made such strides in progress that they have left us far behind. It is nothing inherent in Islam that can explain this state of affairs. It is nothing inherent in Arab or Turkic culture that is to blame. Let us remember that Turks developed the highest culture and science in Samarkand, great works of civilization. This alone is proof of the fact that Turks, and Arabs, and all Muslims are capable of these achievements today. Peoples who come from the same stock as Turks — Finns and Hungarians — are far ahead of us in science and knowledge. Are Muslims, who today appear to be without knowledge, without talents, slaves of outmoded ideas and systems, to remain in this condition indefinitely? Islam is a religion that should be able to offer us a solution to the current state of affairs. Islam is a religion that fosters science, knowledge, education, progress. Islam is not a religion opposed to any of the above. Why does it seem to be so today? I do not have all of the answers to this question, the most important one we face today, perhaps the most important one we have ever faced. It will take serious, honest, bold, and blunt discussion.

After delivering his speech, a great deal of discussion and argument took place. But the essence of the debate centered around the question of whether Islam could (should) be reformed or changed, whether Islam was doomed to fail or destined to succeed and survive. Ismail Bey was roundly applauded for raising the question in such a clear fashion.

One of Ismail Bey's greatest hopes was, in fact, that Islam would succeed and survive, that it would play what he believed to be its rightful role in the development of world civilization. But to do so it was necessary that Muslim teachers, particularly those who were involved in religious and legal education, be reformed and renewed. For this purpose, new and reformed teachers' schools would have to be founded.

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It seems to us that in recent years this particular question has also been of utmost importance to the Turkic Muslim world. And it was in his last several years, when he was already becoming ill, that Ismail Bey began to focus more of his attention on the religious and spiritual education of Turkic Muslims. He was responsible for founding a special school in Bahçesaray that would concentrate its efforts on such renewal of religious and spiritual education; it utilized the "mother" Turkic tongue and has set the foundations for continued renewal in Turkic Islam.

15 December 1914
Ismail Bey's Journey to India

In order to publicize his "phonetic method" of teaching literacy, Ismail Bey journeyed to India. He was prepared to use whatever energy was necessary and to undergo considerable personal sacrifice in order to persuade others of the benefits of this teaching method. In fact, though, he was not the first "Ismail" to make such a journey to India.

In the year 1751, another Ismail, a Bukharan by birth, and a follower of Said Bişte, left Orenburg for a similar trip to India. It was one hundred sixty years later that the second Ismail, this time from Bahçesaray, also journeyed to India.

Although the first Ismail went in an official governmental capacity, had with him a great deal of gold and silver, and was accompanied by many assistants and other officials, he had a great deal of difficulty reaching India and had almost no success when he arrived. The second Ismail made the trip accompanied only by forty verses [*beyt*] and a ten-piece alphabet together with some additional school [*maktab*] materials. But this Ismail was able to meet with many of the great and important members of the Indian Muslim community. His major worry was that these important people would listen politely, would not appreciate the possibilities of this new teaching method, might not be truly interested in raising the literacy of the mass of Indian Muslims, and would put the new alphabet and method into a "museum" when he left.

Ismail Bey began his visit with a few days examining the Muslim schools in Bombay. The schools of the Indian Muslims, like those for Muslims elsewhere in the world, were in a decrepit state. The leaders of some of these schools were beginning to believe that the problem was with the use of Arabic letters and were beginning to consider the introduction of another "more appropriate" alphabet. At least Ismail Bey recognized that some of these leaders saw the need for educational reform. After attending a meeting of the *Encümen-i*

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Islam society in Bombay, Ismail Bey discussed his new method with school officials and, to the astonishment of society members and teachers, offered to demonstrate to them that he could teach illiterates to read in only forty days.

Some of these officials took up Ismail bey's offer, and on 2 March 1910, with all of the appropriate Muslim blessings made, the first "phonetic-method" school was established in India. The *Encümen-i Islam* society agreed to provide two months' funding, to allow Ismail Bey to demonstrate the effectiveness of his method.

At the end of the forty-day period a number of the previously illiterate students were able to read some simple lines, and the firm foundations for a new era in Indian Muslim education were laid. Indian Islam had in glorious centuries past produced some of the leaders of Muslim intellectual and political life: emperors like Akbar Shah; philosophers like Mirzad-al Haruni, Muhiballah al Bukhari, and Mahmud al Chunkuri; poets like Feyzi and Azat; canonical jurists like Hamdani; statesmen like Ahmed ibn Abdulrahman; mystics such as Ahmed al Sahrendi and Abdul ar-Rashid al-Chunkuri; masters like Riziya, Sekinder Bey, and Shahjihan Bey; writers like Abdullah and Sadik Hasan Han; rich merchants like Rahmetallah and Ahmed Han; it is indeed fitting that the first "phonetic-method" school was founded among the great Indian Muslims, and we can take great pride in the fact that it was a Russian Muslim who initiated this reform.

Ismail Bey said the following about his journey to India, as reported in *Ikdam*:

> I went to India to conduct some research on a project on which I have been working for three years, to examine Indian Muslim schools, to see how my teaching method might fit in their existing schools, and finally to determine if it were possible to persuade the local Muslim school officials to adopt my "phonetic method." While I was walking around Bombay, I saw signs and papers written in two scripts, one of which resembled English and the other Hebrew. There was no place where the signs were written with the Arabic alphabet. Thus Muslims could not possibly be able to read the signs without having learned a new language. And the alphabets used, strange to the Muslims, did not permit them to even "sound out" the signs. Thus, the pressures among the Indian Muslim community were rising to adopt the Latin alphabet for their own language. In the province of Bombay there are twenty million people. Should they actually adopt the Latin alphabet it will be difficult to prevent it from being adopted elsewhere in the Muslim world.

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Men whose occupations are involved with knowledge and science usually need a great deal of testing, trying, and evidence before they will give up one set of ideas for new ones, one established method for another. And it was not clear at first to such people that the new methods were in fact superior to the older ones. But Ismail Bey was extremely persistent, was willing and able to devote a long time to persuading such leaders to cease defending the old and to consider a new road or path. Of course, one of Ismail Bey's important discoveries was that any particular orthography can be closely linked to questions of national identity. Ismail Bey, throughout a career of more than thirty years, worked to protect the old orthography and the use of Arabic letters. He continued to be able to provide answers to questions raised by the opponents, within the nationalist movement, of the old alphabet and spelling. He firmly believed that it was possible to combine the old orthography with a new "phonetic method" of teaching reading. He kept this effort up till the end of his life.

Beginning with the appearance of *Tercüman,* Russian Muslims got in the habit of using the term "Tatar," despite the fact that it was not entirely appropriate for all Russian Muslims. But after 1906 they began to use more often the term "Turk" as less specific and more accurate. The change was one which Ismail Bey fostered.

Upon learning of Ismail Bey's death, there appeared in the newspapers and journals of Turkey, Egypt, and Syria a great many outpourings of sorrow and grief. We provide below a sampling of statements and testimony from journalists who were influenced by the ideas and actions of Ismail Bey, some of which appeared in print in recent years.

(1) Ahmed Midhat Efendi. This person, who was a follower of Ismail Bey, delivered a speech about Ismail Bey at an Islamic Congress held in Istanbul on 19 April 1909, in which he said:

> Gentlemen! This evening Ismail Bey honored us by appearing before our gathering and presenting us with some thought-provoking ideas. He instructed us "not to pay attention overly to how one pronounces words, but to pay attention closely to the heart of the word itself." We should all ponder this carefully. In truth, it was absolute truth that Ismail Bey spoke. None of us can have any doubt that this view is certainly true.

Ismail Bey Gaspirali is a man with a mission, with a certainty of purpose. This man was responsible for introducing in Russia twenty-eight years ago the newspaper *Tercüman*. This man began to publish *Tercüman* at a time when the Russian Muslims had little or no access to news in their own language. He also understood that in order to be able to make advances in knowledge and education, a sound system of primary schooling was necessary. Finally, he believed that for the fulfillment of a

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sound national identity, Russia's Muslims needed a common language. Toward all of these goals, this man devoted his life. Ismail Bey might well have come to the conclusion that these goals bore too high a price. A great many people doubted the benefits of renewal and unity. But the warrior Ismail Bey was victorious in these struggles and was able to overcome all sorts of slander and false accusations which his detractors produced.

(2) Cevdet Bey. This person, who was the leading journalist and one-time editor of the newspaper, *Ikdam,* wrote a long article about Ismail Bey, a portion of which we publish here:

> Ismail Bey is a man whose name one day will be a national monument. He comes from the true Turkic stock (of the Russian/northern-Turkic group). We have a number of illusions about ourselves [we Turks] and he realized what they were. In order to begin to address these illusions, he founded a school with perfection in mind. We seldom find among ourselves successful businessmen. We still live in a world of illusions and specters. This man had an idea that may well cure our deafness and insensitivity. There are many people who are fatalists, who are resigned to accept whatever God has planned for their future. He decided to challenge such people. Thirty years ago there was absolutely no one in our publishing world who would not have considered his ideas bitter-tasting. We had no one who was willing to apply great efforts to solve our difficulties. We had no problem in creating obstacles for people such as Ismail Bey.
>
> I know the goodness of this man; I have seen his works. Nothing has been published yet in modern Islamic languages that matches the works he has published to awaken Muslims to achieve modern sciences and knowledge. It is the custom among the people to place high value on inherited habits and ideas. According to this custom, Muslims tend to consider their own traditional ideas superior to all else. Otherwise intelligent people tend to call those who produce new ideas non believers. But there is a big difference between new ideas and un-Islamic ones, just as one should distinguish between bigots and zealots. Even the ancients who provided commentary on Islamic law and traditions argued that one should be guided by more than what ideas one inherited from the past. There is no doubt that there are some people who now think otherwise, but most of our leaders still believe that there should be no teaching outside of what the Qur'ân offers. Ismail Bey has presented to us a way to overcome our blindness to the present and future. He has asked our people to awaken.

(3) Huseyin Hüsnü. He is a sheikh of the Rufaiyah dervish order and has written a long article on Ismail Bey in the journal *The Nile* [*al-Nil*].

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In an article published in Bahçesaray in the newspaper *Hizmet* recently the founder and chief journalist of the newspaper *Tercüman,* the zealous, eminent, and famous Ismail Bey Gaspirali is reported to have died and to have come face to face with his ultimate destiny.

We are deeply saddened because Ismail Bey and his associates have been true servants of our millions of religious brothers in Russia. We all place our trust in true servants of God such as Ismail Bey. The death of one who is also a true servant of our great nation [*millet*] brings us a great sense of loss. We are very grateful to Ismail Bey for having done what he did for our religion and for our people.

We take great pleasure in the fact that Ismail Bey was able to struggle so effectively against the lies and misunderstandings that have plagued us Muslims. The entire Muslim world is grateful for Ismail Bey's praiseworthy service.

Ismail Bey possessed a taste free from defect. He loved simplicity and for this reason wore simple clothes and ate and drank simply. His writing reflected this simplicity. He now is simply separated from us and is at rest. He eats his simple food there, drinks his coffee there, and remains at rest there.

He used to accept guests with hospitality at his home. He would arise early, at six or seven, would drink black coffee, and after that would begin to write. After the mail arrived, he would read his letters and daily papers. He took notes from his daily reading, and marked up the papers with a colored pen. He did much of his work while stretched out on his bed [*kerevet*]. He wrote very quickly and was writing up to the time of his death.

He smoked tobacco. Around ten in the morning he would leave his room and walk to the editorial office of *Tercüman*. In his last days, he still visited his office, talked with the newspaper's staff, but would soon return to his home and stretch out on his bed. We know that now, after his death, he will still "be present" in the offices of *Tercüman*.

Both his room and his office were cheerful, nicely colored, with flowers. He liked beautiful music. He used to say, "the world is colorful and beautiful; so too should our press be colorful and beautiful."

For Ismail Bey the greatest pain and worst punishment would have been to have no work to do, to be idle. Thus he never spent a day without some productive work to be accomplished. He was constantly busy with writing or reading or speaking or thinking.

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No matter how great the difficulty, Ismail Bey's spirit was never daunted, and he never lost hope. However frail he might have appeared, he had great boldness and firmness inside. He gave spirit to those without spirit, hope to those without hope. No one could ever say that he ever was without goal or aim. He had a sensitive and compassionate heart. He constantly preached moderation in the midst of deep crisis. He gave consolation to those experiencing sorrow, even to those who went morally astray.

It the city, no matter how rich and powerful his friends or acquaintances, no matter how important the society he kept, Ismail Bey never distinguished himself from the poor, weak, and hungry. He really preferred the simple customs and traditions of his people. While being in great demand in "high society" in the cities, Ismail Bey preferred to have a simple life, to wander about the bazaar with ordinary people.

Ismail Bey did not much like food prepared in the European fashion. In culinary taste he was still an old timer. He was not in favor of replacing the old traditional customs and values with European ones [i.e. Russian] and felt pained to see many of the young Muslims adopting European taste in food and dress and abandoning what he believed to be good in the old ways.

Ismail Bey placed high value on the arts. He did like some European music, but preferred the Turkic national music as it was known and performed in typical Eastern villages.

Ismail Bey argued that even in traditional and isolated villages in the Crimea, such as Aksar Temir Dulusu and Temirlenk Maraşi, "one day there will be primary and higher schools that will produce physicians, philologists, poets, and painters. Let there be music conservatories and medical schools open to all Muslim children."

From the first week of 1914, Ismail Bey began to complain that he felt weak and ill. In February he went to Petrograd but soon found it necessary to return to Bakçesaray and then to spend a couple of weeks at the shore taking in the Crimean ocean air. By the beginning of summer, though, it was clear that he was very ill.

Throughout June, Ismail Bey was given a combination of the best waters and minerals, and its was hoped that these in combination with the wonderful Crimean air would restore him to health. Yusuf Beg Akçurin returned to be with him in the Crimea. His condition continued to deteriorate.

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Yet he was still able to get around. He had a photograph taken of himself with the staff of *Tercüman* and again with the members of his family. Experiencing a good deal of pain, he went on 27 June to a hospital in Akmescid, spent three days there, and even was able to do some writing while in bed. The doctors reported that the final stages of his illness were about to begin. But his condition stabilized, and he remained unchanged by the end of August. Every day he spent one or two hours reading the daily newspapers. He spoke on political questions. But on 8 September he lost his ability to stand up, and it became clear that he was beginning to make his final journey.

Ismail Bey called his family together, on 9 September. They prepared a special bulgar pilaf for him, and in order to show them that he was still competent and able, he read to them his last will and testament:

Since the end is growing near, I think it important to have my personal and financial matters in hand. Therefore, I have prepared and now read to you my testament and last wishes:

(1) My grave: dig it on the east side of the *türbe* of Mengli Giray Khan beside the Zincirli Madrasa.
(2) Please spend no more than forty rubles on my burial and funeral and related expenses. I want 200 rubles spent for the benefit of a *maktab* and mosque.
(3) I do not want *Tercüman* to be divided up. I hoped that *Tercüman* will continue to prosper and that the various members of my family will continue to profit from it.
(4) After me, I hope that the editorship of *Tercüman* will be taken on by Hasan Sabri Ayvazov and that all members of my family will support him.
(5) Whatever income derives from *Tercüman,* let it be divided equally among my children and sons-in-law.
(6) Please give a fifty-ruble gift to the orphan I have befriended named Zeyneb.

Around noon on 10 September the "Yasin-in Sherif" [Sura 36 of the Qur'ân] was read, and afterwards, Ismail Bey gathered together enough strength to say:

> God is great! I have lived more than sixty-three years. I have devoted more than thirty-five of them to Muslim movements and Islamic renewal. I hope my efforts have provided long-lasting benefit to my nation and that my work has helped everyone else's work too. I have one more hope. But I do not now know whether this hope will be granted. It

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is that God will be pleased with what I have done and that God will approve of what all of you do after me.

This day passed. Everyone remained in his house, fearing the worst. The next day, 11 September, he remained in bed, though early in the morning, he was strong enough to give some important advice to his close friends and family. But at around eight in the morning, Ismail Bey died. Those around him wept bitterly.

On 12 September the Friday prayers were said. The funeral service was organized by the administration of *Tercüman,* and his casket was carried by six men, and he was buried, as he had wished, alongside of the Mengli Giray Khan *türbe*.

News of his final illness and death, published in *Tercüman* and then immediately in the rest of the Muslim press, produced deep grief and mourning among the Turkic and other Muslims of Russia. But most expressed the hope that it would be his life and achievements, not his death, that would inspire what Muslims would do in the future, their hopes and service.

Ismail Bey was our master teacher. We shouldn't weep but now should take great pride in what he accomplished. Among Russian Muslims, Ismail Bey was one of our greatest. While we, at *Şura,* have received statements of consolation from a great many people, the following list gives some indication of the great variety and breadth: from the village of Çakmak, the imam and *mudarris* Mehmed Şakir Ahmed Veli Oğlu Feyzi; from Tahskent, Muhsin Efendi Şiir Mehmed oğlu Hanifa Asimet; in Kerki, Abd al Habir Abdallah; in Samarkand, Sidiqi; in Irkutsk, Habibullah Garbidov; in Kazan, Celal; and so forth. Clearly, Ismail Bey meant a great deal to everyone. We will miss him! But we will carry on.

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THE CRIMEAN TATARS, THE USSR, AND TURKEY

INTRODUCTION

Although the Crimean Tatars have not inhabited a "borderland" of the USSR since 1944, their traditional homeland lies between the USSR and the Republic of Turkey. They as a people are divided between Turkey and the USSR. These historic relationships are the primary determinants of their present predicament, which is that their existence is often denied.

On the one hand, both the Kazan (Volga and Ural) Tatars and the Soviet officials who decide nationality matters claim that these Crimean Tatars who now live in Central Asia are merely Tatars who happened to live at one time on the Crimean peninsula. The Anatolian Turks, on the other hand, look upon the Crimean Tatars who live in the Republic of Turkey as Turks who, having once lived on the Crimean peninsula, should now be nationally and culturally satisfied by living among other Turks *wherever* they may be. Neither the present Soviet government nor that of the Republic of Turkey finds the Crimean Tatar "question" an impediment to improving relations; indeed it is hardly even a subject of concern to them.

Even of one uses Stalin's wooden definition of "nation" however, there can be little question that the Crimean Tatars do exist and indeed constitute a nationality of their own.[1] Their community is historically evolved and it is based on a common language, a territory, and a psychological makeup. Though the stability of the community and its common economic life no longer exist, there is a strong surviving community of culture. This paper will recount the history and then review the present dilemmas of this people whose fate has been determined by its borderland status.

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[1] See Richard Pipes, *The Formation on the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 37-38. See Alan Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford, Calif., 1978), for a general survey of Crimean Tatar history.

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THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMEAN TATAR NATIONALITY

It is venturesome to speak of a nationality prior to the nineteenth century definition of the concept of nationality and indeed before the people in question saw themselves as a separate entity. But to find explanations of the predicament of the Crimean Tatars, one must look at distant history. The Crimean peninsula is divided by a low range of mountains just north of the Black Sea coast. In the mid-thirteenth century, the coastline was inhabited primarily by Slavic, Greek, Armenian, and Jewish populations with a growing minority of Italians in the city of Kaffa. To the north, the plains were controlled by Turkic tribes who had remained behind from the periodic nomadic incursions in the centuries before. In 1241 the entire peninsula was conquered by Batu Khan, whose East Asian followers were the first Tatars in the Crimea.[1]

Tatars did not of course displace the entire population of the peninsula right away. The Christians and Jews of the coastline survived and even regained a certain independence; but in the wake of the Tatar conquest large numbers of Seljuk Turks came from Anatolia to the Crimea under the direction of the Seljuk Izz ed Din, who received authority to govern the Crimean peninsula. By the end of the thirteenth century, Arab travelers in the region reported that the population of the peninsula was largely Turkish.[2]

During the next two hundred years, Tatars from the Great Horde and Turks from Anatolia continued to move to the Crimea. It became an important province of the Great Horde and the city of Solhat, later named Eski Kirim, became a religious center for the spread of Islam among the Tatars. Mosques, dervish monasteries, and schools were built alongside caravansaries. By 1450 almost all of the Crimean peninsula north of the mountains was Turkic or Tatar. A common language grew from a combination of the Turkish of the Anatolian Seljuks and the Chagatay Turkic of the Tatar rulers from the Volga. Culture was determined by the Sunni Islam of the dervish missionaries from Anatolia, though from the architecture of the ruined mosque of Sultan Özbek in Solhat, it appears that a good deal of Central Asian Muslim tradition was included. This period came to an end with the creation of a native Crimean dynasty, the Girays, whose first member was a Tatar invited from Lithuania by leading Tatar clans in the Crimea to form an independent government.[3]

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[1]See P.N. Nadinskii, *Ocherki po istorii kryma,* vol. 1 (Simferopol', 1951), pp. 58-59.

[2]N. A. Smirnov, *Rossiia i turtsiia v XVI-XVII vv.* (Moscow, 1946), vol. 1, pp. 18-28; and Ahmed Dede Münecimbaşi, *Münecimbaşi Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 273-274.

[3]V. D. Smirnov, *Krymskoe khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom otomanskoi porty do nachala XVIII veka* (St. Petersburg, 1887), p. 146; Halil Inalcik, "Kirim Hanlığı", *Islam Ansiklopedisi* 6 (1955): 746; and Halil Inalcik, "Hadji Giray," *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (new edition), vol. 3, pp. 43-45.

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Under the leadership of Haci Giray, the first to call himself Khan of the Crimea, several important Tatar clans emigrated from the Volga region to the peninsula. In later centuries these clans and the Tatar Girays provided the bulk of the Crimean upper classes. While they brought with them their Tatar language and social customs, it is clear that in time they adopted elements of Anatolian Turkish language and customs, too. By the end of the fifteenth century the language used by the Crimean government was apparently neither the Tatar of the Volga nor the Turkish of Anatolia.[1]

A second period of the development of Crimean Tatar identity began before Haci Giray died, with the winning of the coastline from the Europeans by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II, the conqueror of Constantinople.[2] From 1475 until 1774 the southern coast of the peninsula was under the direct control of the Ottoman government. The Crimean Tatars ruled the peninsula north of the mountains, and concentrated their political life first in Eski Kirim, and after the 1520s in Bahçesaray. There was no question now of complete Crimean independence; Ottoman power was too great to permit that. But two important factors enabled the Tatars to retain a remarkable flexibility in their relations with Istanbul.

First, the Crimea was important from the geopolitical point of view, and was hotly contested by other states of Eastern Europe. The Ottomans recognized that it was easier here (as in the Rumanian principalities north of Danube) to rule through local vassals, rather than directly. Some historians claim that during these long centuries the Crimean Tatars were merely the northernmost arm of Ottoman aggression; that they acted as marionettes in the hands of the Sultans; and that in fact they were inseparable from the Turks living under Ottoman rule.[3] Nonetheless, they did have an independent state organization, they continued to maintain their own diplomatic relations with Poland, Lithuania and Muscovy, separate from the Ottomans. They even appeared at Moscow more often than the Ottomans, and this political quasi-independence left them thoroughly conscious that they were not Ottomans.[4]

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[1]See O. Akçokrakly, *Tatarski tamgi v krymu* (Simferopol', 1927), pp. 10-14, for examples of these early Crimean Tatar writings.

[2]This complex period is most successfully unraveled by Halil İnalcik, "Yeni Vesikalara Göre Kırım Hanlığının Osmanlı Tebiliğine Girmesi ve Ahidname Meselesi," *Belleten* 8, no. 31 (1944): 185-229.

[3]Nadinskii, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-65; A. A. Novosel'skii, *Bor'ba moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v XVII veke* (Muscow, 1948), for negative judgments about Crimean Tatar legitimacy.

[4]"Istoricheskoe i diplomaticheskoe sobranie del proiskhodivshikh mezhdu rossiiskimi velikimi kniaziami i byvshimi v kryme tatarskimi tsariami s 1462 po 1553 god," *Zapiski imperatorskago odesskago obshchestva istorii i drevnostei,* 4 (1863): 277-278, 379-380; S. Belokurov, *O posol'skom prikaze* (Moscow, 1906), pp. 78-79.

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The second factor contributing to the flexibility of the Tatar-Ottoman relationship — and to the survival of a Tatar consciousness of being different — was genealogy. The ruling Tatar dynasty in the Crimea could claim some measure of direct descent from Genghis Khan and the Mongol-Tatar Empire. The Ottoman Sultans also claimed such a genealogy, which of course carried with it claims to Central Asia, politically significant in dealings with Iran and Moscow.[1] Consequently, to enhance their own case, the Ottomans granted the Tatar sovereigns certain ostentatious prerogatives which they denied to all their other neighbors, independent or subject. The resulting relationship was more advantageous to the Girays and beneficial to a Tatar self-consciousness because the Khans could correctly show direct descent from the Genghisids, while the best the Ottomans could do was to encourage chroniclers to provide legendary connections with Genghis Khan. Both Ottomans and Crimeans understood the difference between direct and legendary.

In their correspondence with the Girays, the Ottomans used the term "*cingiziye*." Even Süleyman I, in a letter to Khan Mehmet Giray I, called the Khan the "descendant of the Crimean Sultans and of Genghisid Hakhans."[2] As a result of such flattery and despite their really vassal relationship to the Ottomans, never prior to 1783 did the Crimean rulers abandon pretensions to special prerogatives and to possession of the steppe. On their correspondence with Poland, Muscovy, and the Ottomans, the Khans continued, for example, to use their own Genghisid seal (*tamga*) which was the most important symbol of steppe sovereignty.

Largely because of their special steppe heritage, the Tatars never developed an exclusive political or cultural rapport with Istanbul. Ottoman chroniclers usually discussed the Crimean Tatars with a combination of awe and strangeness. Ottoman miniature painters always portrayed the Tatars as Orientals, while depicting Ottomans with distinct Mediterranean and European features. Tatar chroniclers, on the other hand, in a dialect quite distinct from Ottoman Turkish, emphasized the independent and separate nature of their society and people and rejected the idea that they were just Turks or Ottomans or vassals of either. If one can assign one major characteristic to all Tatar chronicles it is that they present historical and ideological justifications for considering the Crimeans as a separate people and state with their own institutions derived from the Crimeans' Central Asian heritage.[3]

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[1]The Sultans, in their Imperial titles, used the terms Khan and Padişah-i Deşt-i Kipçak (Sovereign of the Desolate Steppe). I discuss this more fully in my "Crimean Separatism in the Ottoman Empire," in W. Haddad and W. Ochsenwald, *Nationalism in a Non-National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire* (Columbus, 1977), pp. 57-76.

[2]Feridun Bey, *Munşeat-i Selatin* (Istanbul, 1849), vol. 1, p. 502.

[3]See Fisher, "Crimean Separatism," *op. cit.*

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In 1772 Catherine the Great extracted independence for the Crimean Tatars from the Ottoman Sultan, and in 1783 she annexed them to her own empire. By the time of this annexation, the Tatars were in considerable disarray. Economic disasters, civil war, and repeated invasions had decimated the leadership of Tatar society, disrupted social and economic relationships on the peninsula, and left most of the population in a demoralized state. The best estimates that can be made of their population in the middle of the eighteenth century place the Crimean Tatars at around 500,000. Yet, except for the Ottoman enclave in the south, the population had produced a culture which represented neither Tatar nor Turkish elements alone. One can see this most clearly in architecture and language. The Khan's palace in Bahçesaray, destroyed by the Russian invasion in 1735-36, was rebuilt between 1738 and 1740 along styles distinctly Crimean. While showing some signs of influence from Topkapi Palace in Istanbul, it remained architecturally a distinct entity.[1] In literature the chronicle written at the court of Khan Selamet Giray II and the description and analysis of Crimean politics prepared by Said Giray Sultan are both written in a language which is a combination of Ottoman Turkish and Tatar.[2] The Khanate, even in its last years, represented the political manifestations of a clearly defined nationality.

THE CRIMEAN TATARS IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

In the negotiations between Russian officials and leaders of the Crimean Tatars in the period between 1770 and 1783, it seemed (for the Russians at least) that the Crimean Tatars were quite distinct from both the Volga Tatars, already living under Russian domination, and the Turks in the Ottoman Empire. Consistently, Russian officials spoke of Crimean Tatars, Crimean Tatar people, and the Crimean Tatar state. To be sure, their intention was to facilitate the Tatars' severing relations with the Ottoman Empire. But both sides recognized the distinctions to be made between these Tatars and the Turks.[3]

Soon after the annexation, however, the Empress Catherine II ceased to speak much of the Crimean Tatars or to mention them as a people worthy of consideration. Her main interest in the Crimea was clearly economic and political, not national or ethnic. She incorporated the Crimea into the structure of the empire and did not ever consider it a *corpus separatum*. The keynote of her policy became a certain lack of interest in the Crimea as special region,

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[1]P. I. Sumarokov, *Dosugi krymskago sud'i ili vtoroe puteshestvie v Tavridu,* 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1803-1805) for the most detailed descriptions of the Crimean palace. On the palace at Saray, see R. Balodis, "Alt Serai und Neu-Serai," *Latvijas Universitates Raksti* (Riga, 1926), vol. 13, pp. 3-82.

[2]Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, *Aus den Aufzeichnungen des Said Giray Sultan* (Freiburg, 1975); and Seiid Mukhammed Riza, *Asseb o Sseiiar'ili Sem' Planet'* (Kazan, 1832).

[3]See Alan Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783* (Cambridge, 1970).

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different from the rest of the Russian southern frontier. And her precedent set a style. The following characterization of the Crimea at the end of the nineteenth century, written in 1951 by a Soviet apologist for the 1944 Tatar deportation, expresses the prevailing opinion about the Crimea and its Tatars among Tsarist Russians.

> The Crimea in no way may be considered a colony, because the Crimean land was from ancient times Russian land, and therefore the annexation of the Crimea to Russia was not the conquest of foreign land, but was the reunification and reestablishing of the rights of the Russian people to its own land. The economic development of the Crimea was accomplished by Russians, the towns were built by Russian workers, the fields were tilled in the great majority by Russian peasants.[1]

Where are the Crimean Tatars in this description and analysis?

During the nineteenth century, the Crimean Tatars experienced one of the most heavy-handed policies of russification anywhere in the Empire. It is not surprising, thus, that the Tatars living in the Crimea had a difficult time in maintaining or developing their natural culture. In general, after the annexation Tatar society was disrupted by successive political reorganizations and by Slavic immigration.

Right at the start, moreover, the Russians acquired a solid excuse for distrusting the Tatars. After the annexation large groups of Tatars, especially from the upper classes, left the Crimea to live in the Ottoman Empire and along the western shores of the Black Sea. Educated and wealthy, these emigrants found it possible to find new social positions that were comparable to those they left in the Crimea, and in effect they melted into Ottoman society. Many Russian officials clearly believed that this assimilabity of Tatars in an Ottoman homeland was dangerous to Russia. At various times during the development of a Russian society in the south the government applied pressures of varying intensity to induce the Tatars to leave the Crimea, not for abroad, but inland away from the strategic coast. These pressures were not very successful, perhaps in part because Tatar peasant inland movement before 1863 would have meant subjection to serfdom. But neither were these governmental pressures conducive to prosperity among the Tatars.

The government also pursued a policy of russianization of the Tatars who stayed. This policy originated from Catherine II's desire to grant the Tatars the very same "rights" which their social counterparts enjoyed in the rest of the Empire. Yet the application of the laws of *dvorianstvo* to the Tatar *mirza*

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[1]Nadinskii, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

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stratum, the creation of Russian institutions in the Crimea, and the influx of a growing number of Slavic settlers in the region all combined to create enormous pressure on the Tatars to change their ways of life. To participate fully in the new institutions and to comply with the requirements of *dvorianstvo* status required a knowledge of the Russian language and an ability to act according to Russian customs. That only some of the Tatars proved willing to adapt shows the strength and persistence of Tatar customs even under inordinate pressure. Tsarist social policies compounded the ruin and uprooting of the traditional Tatar social structure that had taken place before 1783.

With the outbreak of the Crimean War, the St. Petersburg government evidenced real concern about the loyalty of the Tatars in the Crimea. This was a war fought on Tatar land against allies of their religious and ethnic neighbors. In 1855, for security, the governor of the Crimea, Pestel, ordered the local Tatar civilian population transported from the coast and resettled inland.[1]

Then the final straw came just after the Crimean War when Alexander II decided that the continuing presence of Tatars in the Crimea was a nuisance and a danger even in peacetime. He seems to have received faulty information about Tatar collaboration with France and Britain. He is reported to have said: "It is not appropriate to oppose the overt or covert exodus of the Tatars. On the contrary, this voluntary emigration should be considered as a beneficial action calculated to free the territory from this unwanted population."[2]

In 1859 he adopted a policy of facilitating and encouraging an exodus abroad and in the following years a large number of the remaining Crimean Tatar elite emigrated to the Ottoman Empire. This exodus exceeded all those which had taken place earlier. In the years between the Russian annexation in 1783 and the end of the eighteenth century 80,000 may have left. Another 30,000 may have departed during the confusing reorganizations of the political arrangements in the Crimea at the beginning of the nineteenth century. But the emigrations of the reign of Alexander II included large numbers of peasants. After them, in 1876, an Ottoman census listed the Crimean Tatars separately and reported 220,000 of them. Only some 200,000 or 300,000 Tatars remained in the homeland of their ancestors.[3] The tragedy for this people was greater because the Ottoman Empire, in the throes of a general redefinition of its social

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[1]Arsenii Markevich, "Tavricheskaia guberniia vo vremia krymskoi voiny," *Izvestiia tavricheskago uchennago arkhivnago kommissii* 37, (1905), 6-8.

[2]Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "The Crimean Tatars: A Retrospective Summary," *Central Asian Review* 16, no. 1 (1968): 19; and Mark Pinson, "Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars of the Ottoman Empire, 1854-1862," *Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 1, (1972): 37-38.

[3]Roderic Davison, "Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response," in Haddad and Ochsenwald, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

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classes and governmental functions, found it easier than ever to absorb Muslim Turkic immigrants. The Tatars who fled south quickly adopted Ottoman customs and within a generation largely disappeared as a self-conscious group.

Ironically, however, this same Alexander II also laid the groundwork for the emergence of a Tatar nationalist movement in the final quarter of the nineteenth century. In the period of Alexander's great reforms, St. Petersburg established among the Tatars of the Crimea, as elsewhere, a *zemstvo* system and Western schools. The government presumably anticipated that here, as elsewhere in the Empire, the heavy weight of the traditional social structure would prevent this secularizing measure from having any unfortunate consequences. But since in earlier decades the entire weight of Russian rule had been bent toward destruction of the traditional Tatar secular society leaving only the clergy intact, the results were just the opposite of the government's intent. The clergy had preserved, as if in fossile form, a strong sense of Tatar traditional identity in the population. And thus, when the government undermined its control, there was nothing except time to prevent the rapid emergence of Westernized intelligentsia free of the old social structures, self-consciously not Russian but Tatar.

The Tatars still faced problems, of course, as is suggested in particular by the career of their first great modern leader, Ismail Bey Gaspirali. Because of the weakness and entrenched conservatism of the leaders of his own society, he had to go outside to the Tatars of Kazan for his training and many of his ideas. During all of his career, moreover, he had to struggle with a great paradox. He feared that complete assimilation and disappearance of the Tatars might result from introducing Russian language education; yet he advocated precisely such a reform as the only means by which his people might escape clericalism. A renewal of Islamic and Tatar society, through the discovery of the West in the Russian language, was Gaspirali's difficult advocacy.[1]

Nonetheless, by the beginning of World War I, the Crimean Tatar community bore almost no relation to that which had existed in 1783. With a large number of Tatar schools pursuing a curriculum modernized under the direction of Gaspirali, a new generation of Tatar leaders was coming of age. Participation in imperial political life in the Dumas and a close association with other Muslim groups in the Empire had given the leaders of the Crimean Tatars a broader horizon from which to view their own predicament. They were not united. Because the Muslim clergy (those Tatar leaders most closely associated

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[1]The best treatments of Gaspirali are to be found in Cafer Seidahmet, *Gaspirali Ismail Bey: Dilde, Fikirde, İşte Birlik* (Istanbul, 1934); and Edward Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinski and Muslim Modernism in Russia." (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Washington, 1973), and his "Gadidism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: A View from Within," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 16, (1975): 245-277.

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with the Tatar traditions) were tied to the interests and policies of the Russian regime, the new intellectuals were forced to search in other directions for their new identity. In this search many fell victim to the quicksand of Western influences and rejected many elements of their past that were necessary for their national identity.[1] But thanks to the peculiarities of tsarist policy in the first half of the nineteenth century which did the work of destroying the Tatar Old Regime, Tatar society and its intelligentsia were more advanced in the national sense in 1914 than many other groups in old Russia.

THE GREAT WAR, THE REVOLUTION, AND THE GOLDEN AGE

The war of 1914 caused problems for the Tatars. These arose, on the one hand, because a number of Tatar intellectuals were in Istanbul participating in various Turkish and Turkic movements, and on the other hand, because the Russians adopted restrictive policies against what they believed to be a potential Muslim fifth-column supporting the Ottoman foe.

The Tatar intellectuals in Istanbul came for the most part from Crimean student groups who, after completing their studies in Russian Tatar normal schools, continued their education in Istanbul. In 1908, under the influence of the Young Turks, some Crimean students founded a Crimean Student Society (Kirim Talebe Cemiyeti). While this society remained a completely legal organization in Russia until its end in 1917, an illegal offshoot, *Vatan*, appeared in 1909. Its unabashed goal was an independent Crimean state. *Vatan*'s members engaged in continuous conspiratorial activities in both Istanbul and in the Crimea, and by the beginning of 1917 had succeeded in forming secret nationalist cells in many Crimean towns and villages. After 1910 *Vatan* issued proclamations against the "Tyranny of Tsardom," and called for the introduction of ideas of "Tatarcilik" in the Crimea to replace Gaspirali's Türkçülük."[2]

The Ottoman government was not very interested in this movement. Indeed, there never was any evidence that the Ottomans encouraged a Crimean-fifth-column during the War. While a number of the Young Turk leaders, especially Enver Paşa, became interested in the ideas of pan-Turkism, the difficulties of war and the inadequacies of Ottoman resources gave Ottoman leaders no time or energy to spare on such movements. Indeed the Tatars in

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[1]G. E. von Grunebaum, "Problems of Muslim Nationalism," in Richard Frye, ed., *Islam and the West* (The Hague, 1957).

[2]For discussions of these nationalist movements see: Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *La presse et le mouvement national chez les musulmans de russie avant 1920* (Paris, 1964); Edige Kirimal, *Der nationale Kampf der Krimturken* (Emsdetten, 1952); and Serge Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).

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Istanbul quickly became disillusioned about possible Turkish support and most returned to the Crimea before 1917 to work there for their cause. A major dispute between Gaspirali and the Pan-Turk, Yusuf Akçura, arose at that time in which the Crimean took the position that the Turks in the Russian Empire had a historical destiny separate from Turks in the rest of the world.[1]

The Russian government had a completely different perception of what was going on in the Crimea. Despite the fact that as late as January 1912 the Crimean Tatar leadership had not been in favor of the pan-Turkic movement, the Russians began to suppress all Tatar activities in the Crimea. The Russian administration took no chances. It pursued a policy of increasing attacks against Tatar cultural and national life. Police agents often interfered with Tatar religious and educational activities. Any discussion of historic Tatar ties with the rest of the Turkic world was prohibited. Newspapers and journals that had achieved such a sound foundation after 1906 were subjected to severe censorship and outright closing.

Yet during the period of the 1917 Russian revolutions, the Crimean Tatars were able to pursue with some success their nationalist aims. Tatars who had been in Istanbul and the West returned to the Crimea with the fall of the Tsarist government. Tatar intellectuals and politicians worked quickly to fill the political vacuum left by the retreat of Tsarist officials. Their movement passed through three phases during the year 1917 alone. Following the February revolution, from March 25 until the middle of May 1917, the Crimean Tatar leadership struggled to achieve cultural autonomy. Led by Çelebi Cihan and Cafer Seidahmet, both of whom had participated in Young Turk and Young Tatar groups in Istanbul, the Tatars chose a Muslim Executive Committee that proclaimed cultural-and national autonomy and tried to take charge of all national, cultural, religious, and political affairs in the Crimea.[2]

From mid-May until November the Tatars pressed the cause of territorial autonomy for all non-Russian nationalities. In so doing, however, the Crimean Tatars encountered strong opposition from some other Turkic groups in Russia, especially the Tatars of the Volga and Ural region, because the latter group had no clearly defined territory to claim as their own. The claim of the Crimean Tatars was weakened also by the fact that they constituted only a minority of the population of the Crimean peninsula, which for historic reasons they believed to be their exclusive homeland. Eventually an All-Russian Muslim Congress meeting in late May 1917, in Petrograd, adopted this statement over the Volga Tatars' opposition: "The form of government that is most capable of protecting the interests of the Muslim peoples is a democratic republic based on

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[1]Kirimal, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
[2]Ibid., pp. 36-37.

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the national, territorial, and federal principles, with national-cultural autonomy for the nationalities that lack a distinct territory."[1] In this movement the Tatars experienced extreme hostility and opposition also from all-Russian parties — whether monarchist, liberal, or socialist. It soon became clear that any government dominated by Russians would strive hard to preserve the old Russian Empire under new political forms.

The third period of Crimean Tatar revolutionary movement took the form, therefore, of a struggle to establish an independent state. Unable to find support from literally any of the Russian parties for the principle of national or cultural autonomy — the denial of which meant in no uncertain terms a support of the policy of russification — the Crimean Tatars, and a number of other nationalities as well, were forced to push their demands from autonomy to independence.

When the Bolsheviks captured the Crimea in the last months of the civil war, a large number of Crimean Tatars fled abroad, mostly to Rumania, and not to Turkey which itself was undergoing a revolution and internal disruption. Then for a while it seemed as though the Crimean Tatars were going to be able to succeed in establishing, under Soviet rule, what they had worked for during the first period of the revolution, namely national and cultural autonomy. In October 1921, following the advice of the Volga Tatar communist, Sultan Galiev, the Soviet government created in the Crimea (now defined to also include some districts north of the peninsula in the southern Ukrainian steppe) an autonomous republic, the Crimean ASSR, as an integral part of the RSFSR.[2] The resulting Crimean Bolshevik administration even achieved some autonomy. Its leader was Veli Ibrahimov, and Tatar exiles now refer to his governance as a Golden Age.

THE ROAD TO DISASTER

With the elimination of national communism in the USSR by Stalin in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Crimean "autonomy" came to an end. By 1933 the Crimean Tatar community had suffered a number of devastating blows. The sovietization of their cultural and educational life had removed all Tatars deemed untrustworthy from their posts, including Veli Ibrahimov, their most effective Communist leader. Further, a famine had been caused by the attempted collectivization of Tatar agriculture. The depletion of Tatar leadership continued unabated during the late 1930s.

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[1] Pipes, *op. cit.*, p. 77; Zenkovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-142; N.N. Agarwal, *Soviet Nationalities Policy* (Agra, 1969).

[2] Pipes, op. cit., pp. 189-190; Kirimal, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

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Then in 1938 the new Tatar Latin alphabet (which was introduced in 1928 and had itself disrupted Tatar cultural life) was replaced with the Cyrillic. This change had a disastrous effect upon the Tatar language and literature. It cut off the new generation of Tatar students from the wealth of pre revolutionary and even early post revolutionary Tatar literature that had been written and published in the Arabic alphabet. It gave the government an easy method of selecting what Tatar literature would be made available to the younger generation.[1]

The number of journals and newspapers published in the Tatar language dropped from 23 in 1935 to 9 in 1938. Many Arabic, Persian, and Turkish words were excised and replaced with Russian. The rules for assimilating foreign (Russian) words were changed so that they followed Russian rather than Turkic conventions. As Gare Le Compte wrote, the Russianization of their alphabet "increased both the flow of Russian terminology into the Turkic languages and the facility of Muslims to learn Russian."[2] During Stalin's time, at least, sovietization of native cultures mean no more and no less than Russification.

This debacle in the Crimean homeland was paralleled in Turkey where a large Crimean Tatar community continued to reside. Ever since the war Ataturk had been striving, with mixed success, to create a new Turkish nationality. A large number of the Turks living in Turkey had ancestors who had come from the Balkans and the Caucasus as well as from the Crimea. Ataturk himself was a Turk from Macedonia; but one of the hallmarks of his program had been the abandoning of any connections with Pan-Turkism or Pan-Islam, and the redefinition of the territories and people to be included in his new republic. There was no room for either territories or peoples within Russia in his new nation. Furthermore, Ataturk made it very clear that his new Turkish nationality had no Pan-Turkic aims. He intended the Turkish Republic to have firm and limited frontiers. He recognized that his new Turks had a variety of cultural and ethnic backgrounds, but he insisted that they would all have to transfer whatever former loyalties they had (religious, territorial, cultural) to the new republic. The adoption of one Turkish language and uniform education throughout the country were his two major instruments for the creation of this new nationality. As a result, most of the Tatars who lived in Turkey were by 1938 well along their way to assimilation into the larger body of Turks. No schools in Turkey taught Crimean Tatar language or literature, except in the university level.

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[1] "Çobanzade Bekir Sitki," *Emel* 46, (1968): 17.

[2] Bennigsen, *La presse, op. cit.*, p. 284; Edige Kirimal, "The Crimean Turks," Institute for the Study of the USSR, *Genocide in the USSR, Studies in Group Destruction* (New York, 1958), p. 22; Peter Potichnyj, "The Struggle of the Crimean Tatars," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 17, no. 2-3 (1975): 305; and Gare Le Compte, *Muslims of the USSR* (Munich, n.d.) pp. 8-9.

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Only in Rumania was the situation of the Tatars hopeful in the late 1930s. Living in the midst of a non-Turkic and non-Muslim people, the large Crimean Tatar community found it easy to retain its ethnic and cultural identity. In Constanta, where a Crimean National Center was established, journals, newspapers, and books were published in Crimean Tatar and about the Crimean Tatars. The political-cultural journal *Emel* [Hope] was founded in 1930 and continued to be published until the outbreak of the war. Leaders of this Crimean Tatar community were individuals who had played an important role in Tatar politics during the revolution. But their political identification went from communist to right of center, and virtually all were conscious of being grateful to Bucharest.[1]

The defeat of the Soviet armies in 1941 and the occupation of the Crimea by the Germans and the Rumanians led directly to the final debacle of the Crimean Tatars. There can be no question that many of the Tatars now collaborated with the occupation authorities, and it was for this that the entire nationality group was penalized by deportation in 1944. But in judging this "collaboration" one must keep in mind several exculpatory factors. For example, it is worth remembering that for the diaspora Tatars who now came home, the Germans were a last resort. In 1941 several of them — notably Cafer Seidahmet, Edige Kirimal, and a new leader, Müstecip Ulkusal — sought to negotiate help from the Turkish government. This was their first choice; but Ankara proved ever less willing to get involved in Tatar affairs. The Tatar leaders returned from the negotiation empty-handed, and only then did they turn to the Rumanians and the Germans (to whom, it may be recalled, they had reason to be grateful).

One may remark, moreover, that between 1928 and 1941 the activities of the Soviet government had resulted in the destruction of the Crimean Tatar native political and cultural leadership to an extent not experienced by any other Soviet nationality. Almost half of the Tatar population had already been destroyed or deported; and the Tatar masses, that is the peasants, had not experienced a single verifiable benefit from Soviet rule. They had suffered the same fate as their leadership. As Lemercier-Quelquejay wrote: "It was an enfeebled and exhausted Tatar community that encountered the final tragedy, German occupation, and later, deportation."[2]

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[1]Müstecip Ulkusal, *Dobruca ve Türkler* (Istanbul, 1955), and his article about the early *Emel*: "'Emel' ve Kirim Davası," *Emel* 76 (1973): 1-14; Mary Ellen Fischer, "Nation and Nationality in Romania," in George W. Simmonds, ed., *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe* (Detroit, 1977), p. 514. For a discussion of the Crimea under Nazi occupation, see Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars, op. cit.,* chap. 13, and Müstecip Ulkusal, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında 1941-1942 Berlin Hatıraları ve Kırım'ın Kurtuluş Davası* (Istanbul, 1976).

[2]Lemercier, Quelquejay, "The Crimean Tatars," *op. cit.,* p. 23.

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The word "collaboration" has two distinct meanings: to work together, as well as to cooperate treasonably. And the word "treason" means violation of allegiance toward one's sovereign or country. In the USSR during the war it was treasonable behavior to act in any way other than to actively oppose the German occupation. But given that a large part of the Crimean Tatar population did not consider the government in Moscow to be their "sovereign" nor the USSR to be their country, the negative connotation of "collaboration" does not completely apply to the Tatar case, except as viewed from Moscow itself.

Tatar "collaboration" with the Germans took the following forms. First, early in 1942 the Germans encouraged the creation of "self-defense" battalions of Tatars to "defend" their villages against activities of Soviet partisans in the Crimea (it must be remembered that the Tatars accounted for not more than one-fourth of the population of the peninsula). According to German records, between 15,000 and 20,000 Crimean Tatars formed these military units.[1] Second, with German aid, Tatars established local "Muslim Committees" to take over the responsibility for most nonpolitical and nonmilitary affairs in those towns which had a substantial Tatar population. These concentrated exclusively on cultural and religious matters.[2]

On the other hand, there is substantial evidence that the Tatars did not uniformly support cooperation with the Nazi occupation forces. As many Crimean Tatars fought in the Red Army on other fronts as participated in the "self-defense battalions." According to Pisarev, "nearly 20,000 Crimean Tatars fought on the front during the war; thousands were given orders and medals of the USSR. Eight were called Heroes of the Soviet Union, and one Crimean Tatar pilot, Ahmet Khan Sultan, was twice awarded that order."[3]

A recent issue of the *samizdat* journal, *Chronicle of Current Events,* reported: "Out of the total population (302,000) before the war, there were 95,000 men over 18 years. 53,000 fought in the [Red] army and 12,000 in the

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[1]Patrik von Zur Muhlen, *Zwischen Hakenkreuz und Sowjetstern, Der Nationalismus der sowjetischen Orientvolker in zweiten Weltkrieg* (Dusseldorf, 1971), p. 60; Norbert Müller, *Wehrmacht und Okkupation 1941-1944* (Berlin, 1971), *passim*. This compares with between 35,000 and 40,000 Volga Tatar "volunteers" and over 110,000 from the Caucasus. Even the Kalmyks provided about 5,000. See Joachim Hoffmann, *Deutsche und Kalmyken 1942 bis 1945* (Freiburg, 1964).

[2]Muhlen, *op. cit.*, pp. 123, 184; Necip Abdulhamitoğlu, *Türksüz Kırım: Yüzbinlerin Sürgünü* (Istanbul, 1974), pp. 51-52.

[3]S. P. Pisarev, "Iz istorii krymskikh tatar," *Politicheskii dnewnik 1964-1970* (Amsterdam, 1972), p. 701. Ironically, in a recent account of Crimean history, the Soviet author provides a photo of the Tatar Ahmet Khan Sultan without identifying him as a Tatar. Indeed, the general catagorization used in this and other Soviet volumes is: Tatar, when collaborators are meant (whatever their real nationality), and Soviet patriot (even if a Tatar) when partisans are discussed. See L.D. Solodovnik et al., *Istoriia mist i sil ukrainskoi SSR: Krims'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1974), pp. 66-67.

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[pro-Soviet] resistance and the underground. 30,000 Tatar participants in the war perished."[1]

The deportation, which occurred in May 1944 not very long after the Soviets regained mastery of the peninsula, included not only those Tatars who actually aided the Nazis, but all Tatars, young and old, men and women. Even Tatars who had fought for Soviet victory serving in the Red Army on other fronts, Tatars who were in the first ranks of the Communist Party, as well as Tatars who had been in partisan units, were swept up in the vast deportation net. Some fifty Communist Tatar writers and journalists who had distributed anti-German proclamations and newspapers in Tatar during the war were deported, too.[2] Some 40 percent of the deportees died in the process of resettlement. A year after the deportation, the Crimean ASSR was officially abolished, and the Crimea became the "Crimean *Oblast* "of the RSFSR (later to be transferred to he Ukraine).

Until today the official justification for the resettlement has been accepted by most observers of Soviet affairs. There can be no question that a large number of Soviet officials believed it. But this cannot explain the deportation of all of the Tatars, including those who had fought with the Soviet army and partisans, as well as those who had served in the Soviet underground as commissars and political instructors during the occupation. Such nationalities as the Volga Tatars and the Turkestanis provided military and political collaborators on the same levels as did the Crimean Tatars, and they were not punished in the same collective way.

The answer to this problem seems to lie in Stalin's foreign policy toward the Republic of Turkey. Recently the deportation of the Meskhetian Turks in November 1944 has come to light. This has never been officially announced or admitted by Soviet authorities, and with good reason. The Meskhetian Turks, who formerly resided along the Georgian side of the Soviet-Turkish border, did not collaborate with the German invaders; in fact, they had no contact with them at all. Yet when the Chechens and Crimean Tatars were removed for collaboration, the Meskhetians also were deported to the Soviet East, primarily to Uzbekistan. In a recent article, Wimbush and Wixman point out that these Turks were removed from the Turkish border and replaced with Soviet Armenians just before Stalin began making strong claims to increased Soviet influence in the Turkish Republic and even to control of the Straits.

In March 1945 Molotov informed the Turkish ambassador to Moscow that the USSR was renouncing the Turco-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality that had

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[1] *A Chronicle of Current Events,* no. 28-31 (1975), pp. 147-148.
[2] Kirimal, "The Crimean Turks," *op. cit.,* pp. 26-27.

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been signed in December 1925 since "this treaty no longer corresponds to actual conditions and to changes brought about by the war that require significant alterations in our relations."[1] On July 7, 1945, Molotov informed the Turkish ambassador that the USSR requested the right to establish military and naval bases on the Straits. In the same conversation Molotov also raised the question of the northeastern Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan which had been "ceded to Turkey at the end of the First World War at a moment when the Russian weakness left them with no alternative to acceding to Turkish demands." These provinces were now to be returned to the USSR. It is probably no coincidence that the Meskhetian Turks had lived on the border of the province of Ardahan.[2] When he deported them, Stalin made sure that no fifth column of Turkic nationals would stand in the way of such pressure being applied on the Soviet-Turkish border.[3]

Would the same reason hold true for the Crimean Tatars as well? Evidence for this possibility emerges from an analysis of the *Geographical Atlas of the USSR,* published in 1950, which shows that all of the other non-Slavic minorities in the Crimea (save the Armenians) were removed after 1944 also. This included Greeks and others who had not aided the Germans in any way. They were all replaced by Russians and Ukrainians.[4]

CRIMEAN DIASPORAS IN TURKEY AND THE USSR TODAY

The vast majority of the Crimean Tatars live in the Republic of Turkey. Some Tatar spokesmen there claim that the numbers reach five million, and there may be some truth to this claim. After all, the various Tatar immigrations in the nineteenth century must have left large numbers of Tatars in areas to be incorporated into the new Turkish Republic. Yet today only a fraction of this total views itself as Crimean Tatar; most have been successfully assimilated into the broader Turkish nationality. And herein lies the major problem for those Tatars who retain a sense of Crimean national identity.

As noted earlier, the national policies of the Turkish Republic have been aimed at the assimilation into one Turkish nationality of all Turks who live

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[1]Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Les Relations Turco-Soviétiques et la Questian des Detroits* (Ankara, 1968), pp. 286-287.

[2]Jonathan Knight, "American Statecraft and the 1946 Black Sea Straits Controversy," *Political Science Quartely* 90, no. 3 (1975): 452; and Erkin, *op. cit.,* pp. 300-301.

[3]S. Enders Wimbush and Ronald Wixman, "The Maskhetian Turks: A New Voice in Soviet Central Asia," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 18, no. 2-3 (1975): 320-340.

[4]Edige Kirimal, "Kirim Turkleri," *Emel* 49 (1970): 16; *Geograficheskaia atlas SSSR* (Moscow, 1950), p. 104.

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within its frontiers regardless of their place of origin or original Turkic nationality. Today all Turkish children must attend state-run public schools through the fifth grade; textbooks and teaching materials are uniform throughout the country and are prepared under the direction of the state ministry of education. All Turkish children, whether their parents were Crimean Tatar, Uzbek, Kazakh, or from the Caucasus, became in fact Turks with uniform language and uniform views about their past and heritage. Crimean Tatar, Azeri, Uzbek, and Turkmen are not used in any Turkish school as the language of instruction; books and other teaching materials appear only in the official Turkish language of the state (except at the university level). Virtually no mention is made in these Turkish schools of the history of any of these other nationalities or Turkic ethnic groups. The history texts used in primary schools (and at the lycee level) emphasize the history of the Republic and until recently neglected even the history of the Ottoman Empire. In the last few years, the history of the Ottomans has been taught, too, but the Ottoman are regarded as Turks only, not leaders of the multinational empire that was the reality.

In fact, the vast majority of Turks today do not even admit the diversity of the Turkic nationalities and ethnic groups. Turkish Cypriots are called Turks who live in Cyprus. There are also Turks who live in Thrace (eastern Greece), Turks who live in Central Asia, and so forth. The Turkish adjective *türk* does not allow the distinction between Turkish and Turkic. The Crimean Tatars are viewed by almost all Turks as Turks who lived at one time in the Crimea (remarkably similar to the view officially put forward today by Soviet authorities).

The nationally aware Crimean Tatars in Turkey are few in number and generally come from the older generation. They have organized a Crimean National Center in Istanbul and pursue a number of national enterprises. Among these are the publication, since 1960, of a bimonthly journal devoted to Crimean Tatar history and culture, *Emel,* which is published in Turkish, not Tatar. A typical issue (March 1977) includes the following articles: "Those Who Serve The Nation [Crimean Tatar] Will Not Be Forgotten, Must Not Be Forgotten"; two articles about Selim Abdulhakim, a Tatar leader in Rumania before World War II; an article on the use of fire and its symbolic meaning among early Crimean Tatars; a translation of an article on the struggle of the Crimean Tatars in the USSR written by Peter Potichnyj and originally published in Canada; a first installment of a Tatar epic poem (with Turkish translation); continuation of a Crimean Tatar play translated into Turkish; and a series of news items about Tatars in the USSR. But the publishing run of this

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journal is less than 500 per issue and the readership is almost totally from the older generation.[1]

The Crimean National Center (Kirim Milli Merkezi) in Istanbul also supports folklore groups which are more popular with the young people. Yet the Tatar youth view these activities as "folklore," not much related to their own nationality. Once year in Istanbul a "Crimean Tatar Evening" is held at a large casino. In 1977 about 500 attended. But Turkish, not Tatar, was the language in use even among the older generation. The folklore groups presented dances and music; the few talks given were practically devoid of political or national content. Assimilation, not ethnic particularism, was the major characteristic.

In a long conversation with several of the nationally active Crimean Tatars in the fall of 1976 in Istanbul I learned of their problems and goals. The unofficial leader of the group, Bey Müstecip Ulkusal, remarked that "the Jewish people, despite 2,000 years of living without a homeland, were able to retain their national and ethnic identity, so that when the opportunity arose after World War II they could reestablish their nation. The Crimean Tatars in Turkey, after only a few decades of living without a homeland, are already beginning to fall apart and to lose their identity."[2]

The policies of the Turkish Republic towards assimilation of all Turkic peoples living within the state and the relative ease for most of them to adapt makes it highly unlikely that any Tatar national movement will succeed in Turkey. It is perhaps ironic that the relatively small Crimean Tatar community living in the United States is having much more success in preserving its cultural and national heritage than is the much larger one in Turkey. In Brooklyn there is a Crimean Tatar mosque and school where the language, culture, and history of the Crimeans is studied. It is a thriving enterprise with many more applicants than places. To my knowledge, there are no lessons given anywhere in Turkey either in the Tatar language or about Crimean Tatar history and culture (even at the university level).

There are still a number of Turkish towns and villages where the Crimean Tatars predominate. The largest is Eskişehir, a hundred miles southeast of Istanbul in the Anatolian plain. There Tatar cultural activity is still quite

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[1]Two recent books published in Turkey deal with the Crimean Tatars in the USSR: Abdulhamitoğlu, *op. cit.*, about the deportation; and Mustafa Nurettinoğlu, *Kirim Faciasi ve Mustafa Camiloğlu* (Istanbul, 1976) about the Crimean dissidents. Some Turkish friends assured me they are just "anti-Soviet propaganda" in both intention and in factual content, although in fact both are reliable accounts.

[2]Bey Müstecip Ulkusal is the former director of the Crimean National Center in Istanbul; he was a Crimean Tatar representative in Berlin during the war.

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strong and youth groups from the city dominate folklore associations for the Tatars in Turkey. But when asked, they identify themselves as Turks "whose parents and grandparents came from the Crimea." I visited one small village in Turkish Thrace, Subaşiköy, which had once belonged to the Giray family well before the Russian annexation of the Crimea. Even a decade ago the town was visibly Tatar. Its mosque was a wooden one built by Selamet Giray in the eighteenth century following Tatar architectural styles, and there was a large wooden palace once belonging to a wife of a deposed Crimean Khan. But in the last two years all vestiges of its Tatar past were removed. The *imam* of the village mosque proudly said that his village was "now going to have a new mosque that looked like those in the big city [Istanbul]." His hope was that all of the village young people "who had left to live in Istanbul" would thus be enticed back to the village. But one could see that there was no hope for a Tatar future there either.

A completely opposite situation occurs in the USSR for the Crimean Tatars. There Tatar national and cultural identity not only continues to exist but is actually growing in strength and intensity, with the Tatars playing a significant role among the Soviet Union's protest movements. The reason for this is in part the fumbling effort on the part of the Soviet government to repair their injustice of 1944. In June 1954 (the same month in which the Crimea was made an *oblast* of the Ukrainian SSR), some of the restrictions placed upon the Tatars in Uzbekistan were lifted. In 1956 they were permitted to leave their places of exile, although the relevant decision stated that "the property of the Crimean Tatars confiscated at the time of their deportation will not be returned, and they do not have the right to return to the Crimea."[1] In 1957, when a number of other deported nationalities were rehabilitated by the Soviet government, the Tatars received permission to begin the publication in Tashkent of *Lenin Bayrağı [The Flag of Lenin],* the first Crimean-Tatar language newspaper since 1944.

These governmental measures do not explain, however, all that has happened. As Sheehy points out, much of the official improvement in the life of the Crimean Tatars was accomplished without national publicity. As late as 1966, after *Lenin Bayrağı* had been operating for nine years, the leading Soviet linguists were unaware of its existence. They wrote in 1966 that the Crimean Tatar language was "in the category of languages without a written form."[2] The key to the Crimean Tatars' revival is the exceptional educational level which they had achieved even before the war, compounded by cosmopolitanism and

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[1]Ann Sheehy, *The Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans: Soviet Treatment of Two National Minorities* (London, 1971), p. 12 and Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities* (New York, 1970), p. 185.

[2]Sheehy, *op. cit.*, p. 30, citing a five volume survey of Soviet languages published by the Institute of Linguistics in 1966. On *Lenin Bayrağı*'s founding, see Abdulhamitoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

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mobility resulting from the deportations. Indeed it is ironic to note that just as the repressive Tsarist policies in the Crimea during the nineteenth century helped in the long run to make the Tatars a modern nationality, so the extermination efforts of the Soviet regime in the 1940s contributed in the long run to the rebellion of the 1960s.

From 1957 until 1966, the Crimean Tatars collected and forwarded to various Soviet authorities dozens of petitions asking for complete rehabilitation and the right to return to the Crimea "in the light of Leninist nationality policies." By 1961 they were consistently able to procure more than 25,000 signatures for each petition.[1] Then, from 1962 to 1966, they moved in two other directions. First, they organized in each town and village in which they resided Tatar Committees to coordinate protest activity and instruct Tatar youth in their language and culture. Second, they began sending delegations to Moscow to present petitions and demand meetings with Soviet officials. The authorities responded with arrests and trials of Tatar leaders. Yet, like the problem of the sorcerer's apprentice, for each Tatar arrested, the local communities sent three replacements. By mid-1967, there were over 400 Crimean Tatars resident in Moscow as official delegates from the Tatar village and community committees. By threatening to demonstrate in Red Square, these representatives finally obtained word that a group of top ranking Soviet officials would listen to their complaints.

At this point the Soviet regime made a mistake. On July 21, 1967, just after a major Tatar demonstration in Tashkent, the chairman of the KGB, Andropov, Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretary Georgadze, USSR Procurator General Rudenko, and the minister for the preservation of public order, Shchelokov, met with some of these Tatars in the Kremlin. The outcome of the meeting was a promise to issue a full rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars and commitment to reconsider the question of their return to the Crimea.[2] In September 1967 the regime followed this up with a decree of rehabilitation:

> After the liberation of the Crimea from Fascist occupation in 1944, accusations of the active collaboration of a section of the Tatars resident in the Crimea with the German usurpers were groundlessly leveled at the whole Tatar population of the Crimea. These indiscriminate accusations in respect of all the citizens of Tatar nationality who lived in the Crimea must be withdrawn, the more so since a new generation of people has entered on its working and political life. The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (1) annuls the sections of the relevant decisions of State organs which contain indiscriminate accusations with respect to citizens

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[1] Abdulhamitoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-136.
[2] Sheehy, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16; Abdulhamitoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-143.

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> of Tatar nationality who lived in the Crimea, (2) notes that the Tatars living formerly in the Crimea have taken root in the territory of the Uzbek and other Union Republics; they enjoy all the rights of Soviet citizens, take part in public and political life, are elected deputies of working people, work in responsible posts in Soviet, economic, and party organs: radio broadcasts are made for them, a newspaper in their national language is published, and other cultural measures are undertaken. With the aim of further developing areas with Tatar population, the councils of ministers of Union Republics are instructed to continue rendering help and assistance to citizens of Tatar nationality in economic and cultural construction, taking account of their national interests and peculiarities.[1]

The government here admitted publicly that the charges of treason during the war made against the Tatars were in large part false. The government also indirectly agreed that the entire deportation had been a mistake — or at least its causes were different from the official justifications given after the war. The Soviet authorities admitted, finally, the existence of a separate Crimean Tatar nationality. Most of the decree spoke only of Tatars who had lived at one time in the Crimea, implying that they were part of the larger officially recognized Tatar nationality of the Volga and Ural region. But the statements on Crimean Tatar culture gave hope to the Tatar leaders of continued growth and development of Crimean Tatar identity, with the blessings of the government.

The results of this decree on the Crimean Tatar people in the USSR have been profound. Rather than taking the edge off their movement, as the Soviet authorities had probably hoped, it has given added impetus to it. Tatars in large numbers have tried to move to the Crimea; most have been forcibly returned to Central Asia because they "lack proper papers." Tatar leaders have joined the more general Soviet dissident movement, and have gained important allies from that quarter, notably Andrei Sakharov and Petr Grigorenko. The Tatar "lobby" in Moscow has persisted despite all attempts by the authorities to end it. One embarrassment after another to the government has occurred at meetings of the international communist movement. Demonstrations occur with growing intensity in Uzbekistan.

Since August 1969, moreover, *Lenin Bayrağı* has carried a special column entitled "Nobody Is Forgotten and Nothing Is Forgotten," in which reports of Crimean Tatar war heroes have been given. In 1970 it introduced another column, "Immortal Soldiers of the Revolution," which discussed the activities of Tatar Bolshevik revolutionaries during the years 1916 to 1920.

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[1] *Lenin Bayrağı*, September 9, 1967.

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Information appearing in this newspaper indicates that a textbook for the study of the Crimean Tatar language, and several collections of Crimean Tatar literature, have appeared in Tashkent. One article appealed to Tatar youth "to emulate Bekir Çobanzade, a prominent poet and scholar who loved his native language and literature, and who perished during the Stalinist purges in the late 1930s."[1] This newspaper is highly subversive from the Soviet regime's point of view, but it is not *samizdat*. It is legally published and in fact is available to western readers through the normal Soviet subscription channels.

Aside from *Lenin Bayrağı*, the Department of Crimean Tatar Language and Literature at the Nizami Tashkent Pedagogical Institute, "where the students are mainly Crimean Tatars who have taken courses in their native language in Uzbek secondary schools," is another center for the maintenance of Tatar culture. Related to this department is the section for Crimean Tatar publications in the Gafur Gulam publishing house in Tashkent. Headed by the Tatar poet, Çerkes Ali, with Seitömer Emin as poetry editor, this section in 1969 alone published more than twenty works in Crimean Tatar. Not only works by contemporary Tatar writers, but also those by a number of prewar and even pre revolutionary Tatar intellectuals are being published. Such figures as Gaspirali, Çobanzade, and the poet Çergiyev , who died in a Stalinist camp, are now represented in the firm's publication list.[2]

The aims of the Crimean Tatars are few and straightforward: complete rehabilitation as a Soviet nationality; the right to return to live in the Crimea; and the wide publication of the government's change of mind about Tatar "treason" during the war. There is no evidence that the Tatar leaders envisage a re-establishment of the Crimean ASSR (though they may dream of it), and indeed this would be difficult. There is probably room for a return — the economy of the Crimea has never regained the levels it achieved before World War II, and there is evidence of a continuing need there for additional labor force. But the peninsula was given to the Ukrainian Republic in 1954 and since then it has been thoroughly slavicized by several large waves of Russian and Ukrainian settlers. Even the limited demands of the Tatar leaders, however, have evidently seemed subversive to the Soviet government.

In the past few years, trials and repression of the more outspoken Crimean Tatar leaders have occurred and the punishments levied have been severe. The most recent trial of such a leader was that of Mustafa Cemilev, in Omsk, on April 1976. The trial was held in Omsk, not Tashkent where the alleged crimes took place, because foreign correspondents could not travel to

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[1]Kirimal, "The Crimean Turks," *op. cit.*, p. 91.

[2]Kirimal, "The Crimean Turks," *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93; Abdulhamitoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-237; Sheehy, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

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Omsk. Only because Andrei Sakharov and his wife attended and were subsequently brutalized by the local police did the Western press find the event interesting. Cemilev was sentenced to two and one-half years in a labor camp on the familiar charge of anti-Soviet slander, despite the fact that the only prosecution witness withdrew his testimony after the trial, claiming it "had been extorted from him." On April 19, Soviet historian Aleksandr Nekrich called upon his colleagues to give up their "shameful silence" on Cemilev and other persecuted Soviet dissidents.[1]

More recently it was announced that the Soviet authorities have undertaken a major campaign against the Crimean Tatar nationalist movement, and have threatened to try large numbers of Tatars for the treason during the Second World War for which they were rehabilitated in 1967. In the newspaper *Selskaia Zhizn'*, it was reported on July 24, 1977 that two Crimean Tatars were sentenced to death since it had been "established that each of them personally participated in the shooting of guerrillas, workers in the underground and peaceful citizens. For more than thirty years they were hiding from the law."[2]

In addition, it clearly suits Soviet interests to encourage quarrels among Turkic nationalities in Central Asia. It is often Uzbek authorities who are the instruments of Tatar repression in Tashkent and its vicinity. For example, in the aftermath of a Tatar celebration of Lenin's birthday on April 21, 1968, Uzbek officials such as Major General Sharaliev and Deputy Procurator of the Uzbek SSR, Bocharov, directed mass arrests and detention of Crimean Tatars in Tashkent.[3] "Scholarly" accounts of wartime activities are published by other Turks which emphasize Tatar "treason" in 1941 to 1944. An example of such a book is that by Tsarlik Saginbaev, *300 Dnei v tylu vraga* (Frunze, 1969).

Unlike the Soviet Jews, the Crimean Tatars have not been able to attract foreign support for their cause. Their decision to ally their efforts with those of the Soviet dissident movement in general in the late 1960s has not brought the desired results, i.e., Western attention. Furthermore, the most logical foreign ally for their cause, the Republic of Turkey, has had reason to close its eyes. Because the Turkish government, becoming increasingly disenchanted with its Western connections, is making tentative moves in the direction of "normalizing" relations with the USSR, it makes no political sense for that government to "interfere" in Soviet internal affairs. It must also be said that the Crimean Tatars have made serious tactical errors in Turkish internal politics.

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[1] *Christian Science Monitor* (April 15, 16, 20, 1976), written by Elizabeth Pond. The *Monitor* was the only U.S. newspaper that saw the event as having implications beyond Sakharov himself.

[2] As reported in the *New York Times,* July 25, 1977, p. 4.

[3] *Arkhiv Samizdat*, No. 77. It is interesting to note that Lenin remains the Bolshevik "hero" for the Crimean Tatars because of what they believe to have been his nationality policies; they recall that it was he who created the Crimean ASSR.

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Their general support of right-wing parties, especially that of Alparslan Turkeş which campaign on anti-Soviet and anti communist platforms, encourages other Turkish leaders to view the Crimean Tatar problem as right-wing in orientation. At the same time, the Tatar leaders deny their cause a fair hearing by the Turkish leaders in power. Ironically, the Crimean Tatars in Turkey would have much better chance of influence if they instead chose to support political parties which strive for better relations with the USSR. Only parties such as that of Bulent Ecevit, through the normalization of relations with their northern neighbor, could have some influence over Soviet internal policies. Yet even this is extremely unlikely.

The Crimean Tatars are perhaps the outstanding example of what in a certain conjuncture of circumstances might happen to any borderland nationality group in the USSR. They have managed over many difficult centuries to build up a clear modern identity and even to awaken consciousness in a broad stratum of their society. But like the Jews in the past, they have been uprooted entirely; they have lost their land. They have chosen not to assimilate into the greater society in which they live — and from which they even derive certain benefits. As a result they are ostracized. At the moment they are a thorn in the side of their rulers. But barring the disintegration of the Soviet state, they face a grim future there.

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