

**HUMANIST
AND
SCHOLAR**

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**ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF
ANDREAS TIETZE**



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**THE ISIS PRESS
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DEDICATION

It is with considerable pleasure, and humility, that we dedicate this volume to Andreas Tietze, who was our teacher when we were graduate students at the University of California, Berkeley, in the 1960s and 1970s. Each of us idiosyncratically has followed the path of the center of Turkish and Ottoman studies, oddly located amongst the surfers and the lotus eaters. Years later, each one of us left immeasurably enriched and forever changed from our teacher.

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Heath W. Lowry and Donald Quataert



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DEDICATION

Emelie OLSON

It is with considerable pleasure, and humility, that we dedicate this volume to Andreas Tietze, who was our teacher when we were graduate students at the University of California, Los Angeles, during the 1960s and 1970s. Each of us idiosyncratically had found our way west to this center of Turkish and Ottoman studies, oddly-located amongst the surfers and the lotus eaters. Years later, each one of us left immeasurably enriched and forever changed from our encounters with this extraordinary human being and teacher.

His openness to students still seems remarkable, particularly, perhaps, for such a prolific scholar. Did he ever fail to greet the knock at the entry of his office/library with genuine pleasure and warmth, with a delight to see the student-visitor? Most often, in the memory of these authors, it was we who broke off the visit while the teacher seemed reluctant to lose the guest.

In those halcyon days of Ottoman and Turkish studies, Andreas Tietze directed graduate seminars of six-eight students, on topics that ranged from Ottoman chroniclers to the 1402 battle of Ankara to modern Turkish literature. Whatever the particular topic, each seminar became an open door to the entire Ottoman and Turkish historical experience. As we struggled to master these new scripts and texts, Andreas Tietze would present us with one new source after the next, showing us how to resolve the historiographic or paleographic problem of the moment. In the end, almost casually, we had been introduced to a vast range of research materials in our fields of study. These discussions truly were open-ended. Along the way, willingly or not, we also encountered European history, literature and art as integral parts of the Ottoman Turkish universe. He taught us that Maria Montessori and Rosa Luxembourgh belonged to the world of Evliya Çelebi and Mustafa Ali just as surely as did Kanuni Suleyman and the Tanzimat.

Gently, but nevertheless relentlessly, he insisted on excellence and thoroughness of preparation. We still recall the apprehension and trepidation with which we approached the seminar meetings. It really was impossible to arrive for one without having prepared to the utmost of our individual abilities. It was not a question of a reprimand since failure to respond only meant that another student would be asked. Rather, we each felt that unpreparedness would be a disappointment for the teacher.

Heath W. Lowry and Donald Quataert

DEDICATION

It is with considerable pleasure, and humility, that we dedicate this volume to Andrew Tietze, who was our teacher when we were graduate students at the University of California, Los Angeles, during the 1960s and 1970s. Each of us independently had found our way west to the center of Turkish and Ottoman studies, eddily-focused amongst the papers and the Johns papers. Years later, each one of us left unconsciously enriched and forever changed from our encounters with this extraordinary human being and teacher.

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Heath W. Lowry and Donald Quataert

Emelie OLSON
with Kurtuluş ÖZTOPÇU

IMAGES OF WOMEN IN THE POETRY OF EARLY TURKISH MYSTICS AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN TURKISH SOCIETY

Since at least the nineteenth century, a segment of the educated elite in Turkey has claimed that women in pre-Ottoman Turkish societies enjoyed a high degree of equality and freedom, and that the more restricted role and inferior status of women in Ottoman times from the fifteenth century and up to the present is largely due to Persian, Byzantine, and/or Arab influence (Abadan 1963, Afetinan, 1962, Sönmez 1970:30). Further, the ethnographic literature suggests most Turkish women in either Ottoman or republican Turkey do not match the common stereotype of the subordinate and secluded Muslim woman, and that those who do so tend to be from among the middle and upper classes (Olson-Prather 1976:218-243). Unfortunately, there is very little ethnographic data available on pre-Ottoman culture and society that can be brought to bear this issue. Given this paucity of ethnographic data, can an examination of the poetry of early Turkish mystics provide any evidence that the development of Ottoman society involved a *loss* of status and freedom for Turkish women, especially among the elite?

Given the myriad of possible relationships between a society and its literature, the researcher can never be certain of the validity of his socio-cultural interpretation of literary materials. When the subject is as abstract as "images of women" and the literature as ambiguous as mystical poetry, as in the present study, this may be doubly true. For example, the images of women in such poetry may represent not only 1) a reflection of either majority or minority values and behavior, but also 2) protest or rebellion, 3) idealization, 4) escape, 5) an independent sphere of reality, or 6) an influence on either the preservation or change of those values and behavior. However—and I don't know if we are being courageous or foolhardy—the aim of this study is to further our understanding of the position of women in Turkish society through an analysis of early Turkish mystical poetry.

The largest influxes of Turkish-speaking peoples into Asia Minor from Central and West Asia occurred between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. Most of these new inhabitants had already become Muslim due to the influences of wandering mystics and dervishes. Many pre-Islamic elements—Manichean, Buddhist, Shamanistic—survived in the religious beliefs and practices of these groups. These, when combined with various mystical, or Sufi, elements, resulted in versions of Islam markedly different from later Ottoman Muslim orthodoxy. Of the numerous Sufi orders which developed in Asia Minor, some appealed to the common people. According to scholars such as John K. Birge (1937), E. J. W. Gibb (1900), and Talat Halman (1973), some of these "folk" orders served as vehicles for the perpetuation of what they call *Öztürk* (indigenous or "true" Turkish) culture during the next ten centuries when the "alien" Ottoman culture dominated. In this view, the writings of the Turkish mystics which were adopted as part of the tradition of each Sufi order were one means for keeping indigenous Turkish culture alive.

What were the images of women in these writings? The views of women presented by the early Turkish mystical poets, and by poets of the "folk" Sufi orders contrast in several ways with more orthodox Muslim views. First, orthodox Islam is highly but unconsciously androcentric or male-oriented (not unlike the other "religions of the Book") in its nearly exclusive concern for the male segment of the Muslim community. That is, while it does not willfully exclude women, it ignores their existence except in relation to male needs. In a recent book by Fatima Mernissi, it is argued that within this general androcentric bias, there are two contrasting views of women in Islam, which she calls the "explicit" and "implicit" theories, respectively. The explicit theory is an "antagonistic" one that sees women as inferior and as wanting to be subjugated. Because of women's weakness, they must be dominated by adult males: their fathers, brothers, husbands, and finally their sons (Mernissi 1975:4-5).

In the implicit theory, expressed in the classic work of Al-Ghazali, women are strong and actively sexual. As a result, sexuality is problematic. It is good, because it permits the procreation of the Muslim community and because it provides a foretaste of Paradise for males. However, it is a potential source of *fitna* (chaos) because it tempts males to fornication and adultery which are a distraction from worship and a threat to the social community (Mernissi 1975:4-14, Bürgel 1977). In order to satisfy his passion, a good Muslim male must marry so that his sexuality will be controlled. Sexuality is also a threat to a male's Muslim piety in a second way, especially in marriage, because conjugal love may become so satisfying that it may compete with his love for God (Mernissi 1975:62-67).

However, these Muslim views are only partly appropriate to Turkish culture, not only during the pre-Muslim period, but also among the common people after Islamization. First, although there are few written accounts available which describe the culture and society of Central Asian Turks in the early centuries, the earliest pre-Muslim Turkish poetry available provides some fragmentary evidence that a marked degree of sexual equality did exist among

them. For example, there are four references to women in one of the earliest existing examples of Turkish writing, the *Orhun Yazutları* (Orxon Inscriptions)¹ of the Göktürk (Blue Turk) kingdom which stretched from the Caspian Sea to China. These writings, dating to the eighth century, are of course not mystical poetry but inscriptions on large stones commissioned by kings and a grand vizier to describe what the rulers had done for the kingdom.

The Göktürk were shamanistic, with beliefs that the sky, the earth, and fire, are sublime. One of the most important supernaturals was the Goddess Umay, mentioned in the inscription of Tonyukuk, the grand vizier (Ergin 1970:80). Further, the inscriptions reveal that the ancestral Father and Mother are considered equally important in the founding of the Göktürk Empire—the Father as *İltiriş* ("the one who gathers the people/country"), the Mother as *İlbilge* ("the one who knows the people/country") (Ergin 1970:6, Stanza #11). A later stanza refers to the Goddess sending the nation's Father-the King and Mother-the Queen to this land so that the fame and name of the Turkish nation will not become extinct (*ibid*:22, Stanza #21). Two other references refer to the ruler's protection of his people from their enemies, noting that he had protected his queen, the mothers, the sisters, etc., from becoming slaves (*ibid*:14, Stanza #9 and #22, Stanza #20).

A slightly later source is an anthology of pre-Muslim poetry from the Uyghur Period, eighth to tenth centuries, entitled *Eski Türk Şiiri* (Old Turkish Poetry), compiled by the leading Turkish Turkologist, Reşit Rahmeti Arat (1965). This poetry, although not necessarily mystical or even entirely religious, is categorized as Manichean, Buddhist and Muslim. No relevant references to the position of women are found in this group of poetry.

A third pre-Muslim Turkish source is *The Book of Dede Korkut*. *The Book of Dede Korkut* is a collection of twelve stories, partly in verse, originally told by or about Dede Korkut, "soothsayer, high priest, and bard of the Oghuz Turks". The basic material of the stories probably originated between the eighth and eleventh centuries, before the Oghuz Turks adopted Islam. However, these stories were compiled sometime after the Islamization of the Oghuz, most likely between the thirteenth and fifteenth century, and thus exhibit an Islamic overlay at various points (Lewis 1974:9-21). There is disagreement as to whether these stories had mystical meanings, merely literal ones, or both. In any case, the stories are attributed to a shamanistic character, and provide hints about the position of women.

In the original stories, contrary to Mernissi's generalizations on the dual Muslim view of women cited above, there is no suggestion that women are regarded as a threat to the community peace because of either their inferiority or their active, divisive sexuality, nor as competitors with God for a male worshipper's love and devotion. Instead, the Oghuz Turkish women are neither veiled nor highly secluded, and although there is strong sex role differentiation in most contexts, women are wise and active participants on many occasions

¹ For most names and terms, the modern Turkish form is used, rather than either an Anglicized or Arabic form, although the latter are more commonly used in Western literature.

involving both sexes. At times, women even perform feats of incredible valor in the story of Bamsi Beyrek who, in competing with Lady Chichek in riding, wrestling, etc., falls in love with her, and they marry.

Further, the contrast between pre-Muslim expectations of women and those that reflect the Islamic overlay is illustrated in a selection entitled "The Wisdom of Dede Korkut". Here, as Geoffrey Lewis notes in his edition, the original compiler presented, without comment, two contradictory images of the ideal wife. The first describes the demure, dependent wife of the explicit Muslim ideal when it says: "The lawful wife when she kneels and sits is beautiful" (Lewis 1974:193). The text then turns to pre-Muslim material, presenting a four-way classification of women. Here, the characteristics of the ideal wife are far more consistent with those of Oghuz women who appear elsewhere in the stories. The bard describes her as the "pillar of the house" who entertains and feeds a respected guest even when her husband is not there, behavior which would be unacceptable for the modest and secluded wife of the Muslim ideal. This non-Muslim ideal wife is an independent, self-sufficient, and generous manager of her household. Her good attributes are further highlighted by contrasting her to three other types of women, all bad: first, the "withering scourge" who is critical, ungrateful, parasitic, and dependent; second, the "ever-rolling ball" who is a gossip, a gad-about, a slut and an irresponsible housewife who expects her neighbors to take care of her household; and third, the worst of all, the wife who "is of the same breed as the Prophet Noah's donkey" and thus is stingy, obstinate, manipulative, and shameless (Lewis 1974:193). Together, these four types indicate positive and negative ideal images of the non-Muslim wife.

For the early part of the Islamic Period, beginning in the eleventh century, there are three major volumes of Turkish literature which include poetry. A survey of the first, the *Divan-i Lugati't Türk* (ca. 1073), written as a grammar for Arabs wishing to learn Turkish (Atalay 1939-1943), produced nothing relevant to this topic in the verse portion which includes the earlier folk material. The other two works were written in the eleventh century for the instruction of the Turks in Islam, since they were recent converts. The larger volume, *Kutadgu Bilig* (Happiness-Giving Knowledge) (Arat 1947-1959), does not consist of mystical poetry but of advice to a king in the form of some 6,500 couplets. One passage describes a set of characteristics which might be sought in a wife, notable because none of them are among those mentioned in the pre-Muslim passage from Dede Korkut. Rather, the Muslim ideal is expressed here. That is, the author advises men against marrying for wealth, beauty, or noble rank (*soyu-sopunun asil*), not because of the weakness or inferiority of such women, but because a woman who has more wealth or a higher rank than her husband will make him her slave, while a beautiful woman will be sought by everyone and make him a clown before the world. Instead, he should marry a pious Muslim woman, and he will get "all four things together": wealth, beauty, noble rank, and piety (Arat 1947-1959:324-326).

The second book in this group, the *Atabetü'l-Hakayik*, is a collection of sermons informing Turks of the proper Islamic beliefs. It does deal with mysticism, especially with the unsatisfactoriness of this world. A single couplet also provides possible evidence that by the eleventh century Muslim Turkish women had already lost their pre-Islamic position of equality through the Islamization of Turkish society.

Bilgili ile bilgisiz müsavi olur mu?

Bilgili dişi erkek, ve cahil erkek dişidir.

(Can an illiterate man be equal to a wise man?

A literate female is like a male, and an ignorant male is like a female.) (Arat 1951:86, I. 87-88)

In the next two centuries, which witnessed the growth of the Selçuk Empire centered in Konya (ancient Iconium), there is a much larger body of Muslim mystical poetry. The most famous of the Sufi poets during this period was Mevlana Celalettin Rumi (d. 1273), whose son and followers founded the Mevlevi Dervish order, and who lived in Konya, most of his life. However, he was a *divan* poet (poet of the elite) rather than a folk poet, and wrote primarily in the highly stylized literary Persian of the elite. Rumi apparently shared the Muslim view that women are necessary because they provide children and satisfy a man's passion (Arberry 1961:112). He also recognized another spiritual benefit of marriage for man: through the suffering marriage brings, he earns religious merit (*ibid*:98-99).

Feminine imagery is relatively rare in Rumi's poetry. However, he repeatedly makes positive references to woman as mother, for example, in a passage in which the mother is portrayed as reflecting the mercy of the Creator (Schimmel 1978:254), and in a couplet presenting the child and the mother as metaphors for the Lover and the Beloved:

Like a child which dies in the mother's lap,

I die in the lap of the mercy and forgiveness of the Merciful.

(Schimmel 1978:127)

But Rumi also refers less positively to the mild and meek mother, whose child would never develop if the father's reason were not also applied:

Although the mother is complete mildness,

See the Mercy of God from the father's wrath.

(Schimmel 1978:128)

In this role as meek mother, as well as that of the disobedient wife, she is the *nafs*, the carnal or lower soul (127, 257), often also described as an unclean dog (193), stressing the *nafs* connection with the base, material world.

Another great poet is the fourteenth century Seyyid Nesimi (c. 1405), whose poetry is mostly in Turkish and whose works are part of the tradition of the Bektaşî order, basically a "folk" order. A disciple of Fazlullah, the founder of the Hurufî sect, Nesimi was one of the few early Turkish poets to use mystical ideas and to be a mystic himself. As a mystical poet, he was very powerful and profound and the imagery of his poetry should not be seen as the result of a conscious decision made with an eye to literary fashion. As E. J. W. Gibb says in his classic history of Ottoman poetry, in contrast to many poets of the period, "Nesimi sings because he must, because he himself has a message that demands deliverance" (Gibb 1900:354). For the Hurufî mystic, the human Beloved is not merely the reflection of God nor is loving the human beloved the bridge to mystical love, both of which are familiar Sufî ideas. Rather, for the Hurufî, to quote again from Gibb, "the fair human form... is an incarnation of the Deity; and the love which it inspires is not a mere 'Bridge' to something else, but is itself the goal" (Gibb 1900:352). Keeping in mind the stricture that Nesimi's poetry is essentially religious poetry rather than poetry written for the sake of art or some other motive, does it nonetheless shed some light on the culture of either that period or that of successive periods?

First, is the imagery in Nesimi's poetry masculine or feminine? It has been argued, both in the above mentioned history by E. J. W. Gibb and by Turkish scholars, that Nesimi uses feminine imagery, describing the Beloved as a beautiful *woman* to be adored by the Hurufî lover.² Among scholars of Turkish literature in Turkey today, the dominant view is that Nesimi's imagery is feminine because its metaphors are those which are traditionally used for women in Turkish poetry, although the neutral pronouns of Turkish give no clues as to gender. This interpretation differs from that of other recognized scholars, for example, Kathleen Burrill, who consistently refers to the Beloved as a male youth in her scholarly treatise on Nesimi's quatrains (1972), and Annemarie Schimmel, who dismisses Gibb's feminine interpretation as merely a reflection of Victorian morality (personal communication).

Assuming for the moment that the imagery of the Beloved is indeed feminine, what, if anything, do such images in Nesimi's poetry suggest about the position of women in fourteenth-century Turkish society? It could be argued that they signify nothing about cultural and social reality, since it is well known that the choice of feminine imagery in descriptions of God does not always correlate with equality and freedom for women in secular life. For example, the female fertility figures in Neolithic Asia Minor represent an agricultural society that was apparently male-dominated. Thus, Nesimi's poetic praise of a feminine Beloved does not necessarily preclude a subordinate and restricted social status for Turkish women in the fourteenth century.

Second, this choice of feminine imagery could be dismissed as merely the natural choice because the poet is male and love of the opposite sex is to be

² Since English lacks a neutral pronoun, the neutral "o" in Turkish must be translated as either "he" or "she", which leads to possible misunderstanding of the poetry in English translation.

expected. But perhaps it is this very notion that such love is "natural" that is significant, because it is certainly in contrast with both the "explicit" Muslim view described above which said that a man's association with women can only be a relationship of dominance because of women's inferiority, and with the "implicit" view which said that a man should have sex with his wife but should not love her because he might find the latter so satisfying that he would not seek God. Some further stanzas from Nesimi's poetry make it quite clear that Nesimi is critical of orthodox Islamic belief and practice, and, presumably, rejects both the "explicit" and "implicit" Muslim view of women.

Lo, the Lovers' holy temple is the Lord God's image fair.
 How should zealot or should legist know the mysteries of they Form?
 'Say thou, God sufficeth!' When should every brute the secret share?
 (Gibb 1900:361)

Rather, it is through contemplation and praise of the Beloved that Nesimi achieves mystical rapture:

While you repel my love, there is no peace for me.
 Spurn not, o houri mine, your faithful Nesimi!
 (Ibrahimov 1969:91)

Thus, rather than sharing the Orthodox fear that the beauty of women will distract males *from* worship of God, Nesimi rejoices that the beauty of women distracts men *into* love of God. The mystic seeks to be drunk with this love, since this sublime drunkenness is the ultimate aim:

At love's most sumptuous feast was I with love made drunk—
 Is not this why to me besotted seems the monk?

Of love I took a draught, I worship at its shrine;
 Think not, o pious one, that I am drunk with wine.

...

The sky reels drunkenly; the stars, half-swooning, wink—
 Of love's sweet-scented wine a cupful did they drink.

...

Our hearts reflect the glow upon Mount Sinai;
 We who are drunk with love can happy live and die.

The Universe is drunk, for drunk 'tis meant to be—
 Thus holds the keeper of both time and destiny.

The sun itself is drunk, else would it give no light;
 'Tis clear to Nesimi, no veil obscures his sight.

The secret has he probed of love's mad drunkenness,
 And now in flaming words his knowledge doth confess.

(Ibrahimov 1969:92-93)

However, even if the imagery of Nesimi's poetry is feminine and thus could be considered as indirect evidence of relative equality and freedom for women associated with "folk" Sufi orders and as rejection of the more orthodox Muslim views by Turkish-speaking mystics in early Turkish society, another issue must be considered. Namely, to what extent is this imagery uniquely "Turkish"? Here we encounter immediate difficulty, because female beauty as the medium through which God is perceived is a motif found not only in the well known sixteenth century Turkish version of the Leyla and Majnun story by Fuzuli (Huri 1970) but also in the earlier Arabic versions of that tale. Female beauty as the metaphor for God is also used by such famous Arab Muslim mystics as the thirteenth century Ibn Arabi of Spain and Mecca and Ibn al-Farid of Egypt (Schimmel 1975:429-432). Thus although Nesimi may be unique in loving women as the *incarnation* or equivalent of God, the use of feminine imagery to symbolize divine beauty and perfection seems to be quite common in Sufic poetry, whether Arabic, Persian, or Turkish *divan* poetry. Consequently, since women in Arab and Persian societies have been and continue to be more subordinate and secluded than Turkish women, in general, this provides little evidence to support either a thesis that the imagery is uniquely Turkish or that it reflects sexual equality.

What do we find if we turn from classical poets like Nesimi and Fuzuli to the early *tekke* and folk poets who used Turkish?³ Among these the most famous is the thirteenth century humanist poet Yunus Emre, who makes virtually no mention of gender when referring to either the Sufi devotee or God. In a cursory scanning of his poetry, we found little or no evidence of imagery and metaphors referring to a male Lover and his female Beloved, although he does mention of God as the Friend and the Lover. Further, the *tekke* and folk poetry reveals less of the passion and ecstasy of a Nesimi or a Fuzuli (see also Hickman 1972).

Perhaps it would be appropriate to speculate a bit here as to the possible significance of the absence of human love as a metaphor for mystical love in the poetry of these *tekke* and folk poets, in contrast to that of Fuzuli and Nesimi. Is it perhaps indirect evidence of less androcentrism and greater sexual equality and interaction among the Ottoman people than among the elite? That is, since men and women are able to communicate more directly in everyday life, does the folk mystical poet also assume that humans of both sexes are able to learn to love

³ The *tekke* poets were members of one of the Sufi or dervish brotherhoods. They represent a kind of bridge between the elitist *divan* poets and the folk poets.

God directly as well, rather than having to approach him through a highly idealized form of human love. Second, might the less ecstatic tone of the folk poetry also reflect less romanticization of human love among the common people, since women were neither separate nor distant enough to be the source of anxiety or adulation at high levels, contrary to what would be expected if either of the two complementary Muslim views presented by Mernissi were applicable here?

In exploration of these speculations, let us turn to a poem by another *tekke* poet, a fifteenth century Bektaşî mystic named Kaygusuz Aptal. This poem, entitled "The Bad Wife" suggests that non-elite Turkish women during that period were not typically regarded as either weak or as irresistibly attractive, and certainly not always as the embodiment of Divine Beauty!

"Avradın Kötüsü"

"The Bad Wife"

Ağlar avradın kötüsü

The bad wife cries constantly

Dizini diker oturur

She sits, doing nothing

İşinin kolayını bilmez

She doesn't know the easy side of her work

Yüzünü yıkar oturur

She sits, sulking

Kocası yabandan gelir

[When] her husband comes in from the fields

O bir şahbaz avrat olur

She becomes a hawk-wife.⁴

Öğleyin bir çorba vurur

At noon she puts the soup on

Altını dürter oturur

She sits, poking at the fire.

Çiftçiler getirir demri

The farmer brings the iron

Başına bürünmüş emri

She puts on a headkerchief.⁵

Danaya yedirmiş hamrı

She allowed the calf to eat the dough

Tekneye bakar oturur

She sits, looking at the empty kneading trough.

Yata yata karnı şişer

From continuous sleeping, her belly swells

Kalkar eşik dibine işer

Rising, she pisses by the threshold

Çokeleğine kurt düşer

[Though] worms drop into the cheese she makes

Ayranın över oturur

She sits, constantly praising her own *ayran*.⁶

Uşaklar oynar aşığı

The children play "bones" outdoors

Köpekler yur bulaşığı

The dogs lick the dirty dishes clean

Kargaya kaptırmış kaşığı

The blackbird has been allowed to steal the spoon

Havaya bakar oturur

She sits, looking at the weather.

Kızını sıçırmuş dizine

She made her daughter shit on her knee

Bakar oturur yüzüne

Sitting, she scowls at her daughter's face

⁴ i.e., a dominant wife.

⁵ These lines are apparently inserted as nonsense rhymes, since they do not relate to the rest of the poem.

⁶ *Ayran*: drink made of yoghurt and water.

<i>O demde elâ gözüne</i>	And all the while,
<i>Sürmeler çeker oturur</i>	She sits, applying <i>kohl</i> to her hazel eyes.
<i>Boğazına takar akığı</i>	She puts the carnelian at her throat
<i>Aşına bulmaz kekiği</i>	She doesn't find the thyme for her dish
<i>Yepyeni turman söküşü</i>	Wearing a brand new <i>şalvar</i> ⁷
<i>Dizine takar oturur</i>	She sits, an unmended tear at the knee.
<i>Kaygusuz' um der, atılmaz</i>	My Kaygusuz says she cannot be thrown out
<i>Pazara götürsen satılmaz</i>	If you take her to the bazaar she cannot be sold.
<i>Koynuna girsen yatılmaz</i>	If you take her to bed she cannot be laid
<i>Bir manda çöker oturur</i>	She sits, hunkering like a water buffalo. ⁸

(Öztelli 1973:332-332)

In this rather crude poem, called "The Bad Wife", the poet describes a lazy, bad-tempered, slovenly wife who browbeats her husband, neglects her children, keeps a filthy kitchen, and finally isn't any good as a sexual partner. She is reminiscent of all three types of bad wives described several hundred years earlier by Dede Korkut. But even though this fifteenth century wife fails to meet *any* of the qualifications of a good wife, she cannot be cast aside or sold in the bazaar.

What are the implications of this obviously exaggerated description? Is it that women among the common folk in fifteenth century Turkish society occupied a rather strong position *vis-à-vis* their husbands? This may be so, for apparently women were expected to be as strong as their husbands; even when a wife was the exact opposite of the good wife, the husband could be helpless to remedy the situation. In a comment on an earlier draft of this paper, Michael Meeker also suggests a deeper symbolism: the "Bad Wife" might be viewed as the ultimate symbol of disorder, pollution, and death. If so, is this a sacred or profane symbol? Is the "Bad Wife" again the symbol of the *nafs*, the carnal soul, but in this case regarded as much more frightening than was the mother as *nafs* in Rumi's imagery where she was mild and weak? Here, and perhaps in Dede Korkut as well, is it the intrinsically great importance of the women's potential when she lives up to the ideals of the good wife and mother that makes this misuse and squandering of her strengths such a powerful symbol? Further, is the poem to be interpreted sociologically, or allegorically, or even mystically, or on all levels simultaneously? Probably the latter, as Annemarie Schimmel suggests is true of Kaygusuz' work in general (1975:335-336) although further study of the context might be revealing.

In conclusion, an exploration of some of the early Turkish poetry provides some clues that relationships between men and women in early Turkish society could have been those of near equals, as suggested both by pre-Muslim Turkish works and by later *tekke* and folk poets. Women were not always regarded as mysterious and fraught with anxiety as in the Muslim views outlined by

⁷ Baggy trouser, the traditional costume of Turkish women.

⁸ Taking her to bed is like trying to have sexual intercourse with a sluggish water buffalo.

Mernissi. Nor were they necessarily the embodiment of God nor even metaphors for God as in the classical mystical poetry of Nesimi and Fuzuli.

Secondly, the use of feminine imagery as a metaphor for God in the poetry of both Turkish and non-Turkish mystics may also suggest, on the one hand, that in contrast to more orthodox Muslims, Muslim mystics tended to have a more positive if sometimes idealized view of women in profane as well as in sacred realms. On the other hand, the mystical poets who do not refer to either males or females specifically may also reflect the general lack of differentiation which is characteristic of Sufi thought, leading them to use an androgynous or non-sexual model of human beings in relation to that which is sacred.

Finally, the interpretation of the imagery of Nesimi's poetry as feminine by scholars of literature in Turkey today suggests yet another topic for further investigation. Without attempting to settle the issue of how Nesimi was interpreted by his contemporaries, in the face of agreement by Western scholars today that the imagery is masculine, the insistence by scholars within Turkey that it is feminine may reflect a significant cultural phenomenon in contemporary Turkey. That is, in interpreting their cultural heritage, these scholars wish to present early Turkish poetry as extolling heterosexual, not pederastic, love as the ideal model. The historical accuracy or inaccuracy of this claim, even if it could be established, is perhaps not as important to understanding contemporary Turkish culture as is the implication that a high positive value is now placed on heterosexual love while the idealization of pederasty is regarded as an Ottoman perversion rather than an expression of indigenous Turkish culture.

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ITS LOCATION, POPULATION AND TAXATION

Nothing better serves to illustrate the deplorable state of Ottoman studies in the field of historical geography than a case study of the region known as the *Vilayet-i Keglilik*, or the "Province of the Monks". This enigmatic area of the Ottoman Balkans, while frequently mentioned in the contemporary 15th century documents, has yet to be even identified as to its location,¹ while scattered references to it in secondary literature raise far more queries than they succeed in answering. Of the four present-day scholars who have mentioned its existence (Gökhilgin in 1952,² Todorov in 1960,³ Barkan in 1964,⁴ and Beldiceanu-Steinhilber in 1967⁵) the first places it in the vicinity of Solvaik (Thessalonica),⁶ the second and third wrongly identify it as the Peninsula of Mount Athos,⁷ and the fourth makes what we shall see is a questionable linkage of its name with that of the Monastery of St. John Prodromos in the

¹ The meager level of our knowledge is attested to by the fact that such standard reference works as the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* and the recent work by Apostolos E. Vassilopoulos, *History of Macedonia 1354-1831*, Thessalonica, 1973, do not even acknowledge its existence. The most valuable work in this field is still T. Halasi-Kun's 1930 study entitled: "Avrupa'daki Osmanlı Yarı Adaları Üzerinde Arastırmalar" which appeared in *Türk Dil ve Tarih Havzında Arastırmalar* I, Ankara, 1930, pp. 63-104.

² M. Tıyyib Gökhilgin, *XV-XVI. Asırlarda Edirne ve Papa Livanı (Vilayet-i Mülkier-Maklıvalar)*, Istanbul, 1952. (Hereafter: Gökhilgin, 1952).

³ Nikolai Todorov, "La Situation Démographique de la Péninsule Balcanique au Cours des XV^e et XVI^e Siècles" (On Bulgaria with a French Summary), *Annuaire de l'Université de Sofia—Faculté de Philosophie et d'Histoire*, Tome LIII, 2 (1959) pp. 192-232. (Hereafter: Todorov, 1959).

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⁵ Irène Beldiceanu-Steinhilber, *Recherches sur les Actes des Empereurs des Séleucides, Osmans, Orkhan et Murad I*, Munich, 1967. (Hereafter: Beldiceanu-Steinhilber, 1967).

⁶ Gökhilgin, 1952, p. 591.

⁷ Todorov, 1959, p. 204; Barkan, 1964, p. 51. In the latter work also the map of the Balkans which follows p. 113.

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Heath W. LOWRY

THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY
OTTOMAN *VİLAYET-İ KEŞİŞLİK*:
ITS LOCATION, POPULATION AND TAXATION

Nothing better serves to illustrate the deplorable state of Ottoman studies in the field of historical geography than a case study of the region known as the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik*, or the "Province of the Monks". This enigmatic area of the Ottoman Balkans, while frequently mentioned in the contemporary 15th century documents, has yet to be even identified as to its location,¹ while scattered references to it in secondary literature raise far more queries than they succeed in answering. Of the four present-day scholars who have mentioned its existence (Gökbilgin in 1952,² Todorov in 1960,³ Barkan in 1964,⁴ and Beldiceanu-Steinherr in 1967⁵) the first places it in the vicinity of Selanik (Thessalonica),⁶ the second and third wrongly identify it as the Peninsula of Mount Athos,⁷ and the fourth makes what we shall see is a questionable linkage of its name with that of the Monastery of St. John Prodromos to the

¹ The meager level of our knowledge is attested to by the fact that such standard reference works as the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* and the recent work by Apostolos E. Vacalopoulos, *History of Macedonia 1354-1833*, Thessalonica, 1973, do not even acknowledge its existence. The most valuable work in this field is still T. Halasi-Kun's 1950 study entitled: "Avrupa'daki Osmanlı Yer Adları Üzerinde Araştırmalar" which appeared in *Türk Dili ve Tarihi Hakkında Araştırmalar I*, Ankara, 1950, pp. 63-104.

² M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, *XV.-XVI. Asırlarda Edirne ve Paşa Livası (Vakıflar-Mülkler-Mukataalar)*, Istanbul, 1952. (Hereafter: Gökbilgin: 1952).

³ Nikolai Todorov, "La Situation Démographique de la Péninsule Balkanique au Cours des XV^e et XVI^e Siècles" (In Bulgarian with a French Summary), *Annuaire de l'Université de Sofia—Faculté de Philosophie et d'Histoire*. Tome LIII, 2 (1959) pp. 192-232. (Hereafter: Todorov, 1959).

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⁵ Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, *Recherches sur les Actes des Règnes des Sultans Osman, Orkhan et Murad I*, München, 1967. (Hereafter: Beldiceanu-Steinherr, 1967).

⁶ Gökbilgin, 1952, p. 591.

⁷ Todorov, 1959, p. 204, Barkan, 1964, p. 31. In the latter work note the map of the Balkans which follows p. 118.

north of Siroz (Serres).⁸

The intent of the present examination is fourfold: first, to review the hitherto published references to the area; second, through analysis of extant 15th century Ottoman documents to determine the province's administrative boundaries; third, to propose an answer to the intriguing question of when and why the name ceased to be used during the 16th century; and finally, to see what happened to its former territories.

The first modern scholar to mention the existence of the area was Tayyib Gökbilgin, who in his study of the administrative areas (*livas*) of Edirne and Paşa, and more specifically, of the *vakıfs* (religious foundations) and various types of private properties found in them, published several documents which included mention of the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik*.⁹ For our purposes the most important information published by Gökbilgin is a passage from a *Mukata'a Defter* (revenue survey) from the year 1489 (h. 894). Under the heading "*Vilayet-i Keşişlik*" we are told that the area was occupied by 1,289 Christian *hanes* (households headed by an adult married male), plus an additional 249 Christian households headed by widows (*bives*).¹⁰ If we translate these numbers into population figures, it would appear that in 1489 the area had a Christian population of approximately 7,441.¹¹ The entry further provides data on the taxes these people paid on their agricultural produce, and on such manufactured items as candles and linen cloth. In short, the tax and population figures of the 1489 *defter* attest to the existence of the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik*, but never mention its location. From the fact that the *Keşişlik* entry is preceded by those of the *Vilayet-i Siroz*, *Vilayet-i Zihne* and the *Vilayet-i Drama*,¹² we may logically infer that *Keşişlik* was located near them, somewhere in south-central Macedonia. That Gökbilgin accepted this conclusion is apparent. The index to his work lists *Keşişlik* in the vicinity of Selanik (Thessalonica).¹³

In his study of the population of the Balkan peninsula in the 15th and 16th centuries, the Bulgarian scholar Nikolai Todorov used a *cizye defter* (capitation tax register) from the year 1490 which included entries for the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik*.¹⁴ This register provides the information that there were

⁸ Beldiceanu-Steinherr, 1967, pp. 180-182.

⁹ Gökbilgin, 1952, pp. 44, 144-45, 147.

¹⁰ Gökbilgin, 1952, p. 145. For a recent discussion of the various categories of taxpayers appearing in the Ottoman *defters*, see: Heath W. Lowry, *The Ottoman Tahrir Defters as a Source for Urban Demographic History: The Case Study of Trabzon (ca. 1486-1583)*, Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1978, pp. 248-276.

¹¹ While scholars working in this field have yet to reach a consensus regarding the average size of the Ottoman *hane* (household) the most commonly used figure is 5. While in no way vouching for its accuracy, I have used this figure to convey an idea of the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik's* population. To transform *hane* and *bive* figures to population data the following formula is employed: (*hanes* x 5) + (*bives* x 4) = total population, i.e., (1,289 x 5) + (289 x 4) = 7,441.

¹² Gökbilgin, 1952 ; pp. 144-45.

¹³ Gökbilgin, 1952, p. 591 (see *Keşişlik* entry).

¹⁴ Todorov, 1959, p. 204.

1,289 Christian *hanes*, 197 *bives*, and 56 *mücerreds* (unmarried adult males) in the province paying the *cizye* levy.¹⁵ Todorov simply identifies Keşişlik as *Sveta Gora* (Bulgarian: *Sveta* - holy, *Gora* - woods or mountain), the Bulgarian name for Mount Athos.¹⁶ Presumably he made this identification by simple logic: the "Province of the Monks" (Keşişlik) must be the place where the most monks were, namely Mount Athos.

Todorov's identification was accepted by the late Ömer Lûtfi Barkan in his 1964 publication of the *cizye* budget for the Balkans from the year 1489 (h. 894).¹⁷ On the otherwise useful map which accompanies this valuable study, Barkan has labeled the Athonite peninsula as Keşişlik.¹⁸ To explain his reason for so doing, Barkan cites two sources: 1) Todorov's identification of Keşişlik as *Sveta Gora*; 2) the 19th century German cartographer, Kiepert, in his *Generalkarte der Südost-Europäischen Halbinsel* (Berlin, 1885) has equated *Hagion Oros* (Greek: holy mountain) with *Monto Santo* (Italian: holy mountain). *Monto Santo* equals Todorov's *Sveta Gora* (Bulgarian: holy woods, or Mount Athos), which in turn is the same as *Aynaroz* (Turkish form of *Hagion Oros*).¹⁹ Aside from a lack of logical internal progression, Barkan's method fails to link Keşişlik to Mount Athos, not surprisingly because, as we shall see, they were two completely separate areas.

Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr recognizes Barkan's error and, in her analysis of a document granted by the Ottoman sultan Murad I in favor of the Monastery of St. John Prodromos, argues that the Ottoman *defters* of the 15th and 16th centuries establish it as the area between Serres and Zihne. As such, she claims, it corresponds to the area of the Monastery of St. John Prodromos (Turkish: Margarit), and hence its name, Keşişlik (the place of the monks).²⁰ While

¹⁵ Todorov, 1959. On p. 202 the author identifies the *defter* as OAK 214/5 (the Bulgarian Archives classification?). Despite the apparent discrepancy between the figures given here and those presented by Gökbilgin above (see footnote 10), we are clearly dealing with the same raw data preserved in two different forms. While both these accounts report that the *Vilayet* of Keşişlik contained 1,289 Christian *hanes*, Gökbilgin's source states that in addition there were 249 *bive* (widow) headed *hanes*, and Todorov's lists 197 *bives*, plus 56 *mücerreds* (unmarried adult male taxpayers), i.e., in addition to the 1,289, a total of 253 (*bive* plus *mücerred* entries). It would appear that Gökbilgin's source has simply lumped the *bives* and *mücerreds* together (probably due to the fact that they were taxed at the same reduced rate) while Todorov's has listed them separately. The difference then is between the figure of 249 (Gökbilgin) and 253 (Todorov) one which is well within the range of scribal error.

¹⁶ Todorov, 1959, p. 204. There we read *Sveta Gora* (Keşişlik).

¹⁷ Barkan, 1964, p. 31. The *cizye* budget published by Barkan in this study is the same *defter* from which Gökbilgin (see fn. 1) excerpted his figures for the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik*. For the Keşişlik data in Barkan's study, see p. 46.

¹⁸ Barkan, 1964, ff p. 118. The map is entitled *H. 894 (1488-1489) yılı cizyesinin tahsil bölgelerini gösterir harita*.

¹⁹ Barkan, 1964, p. 31.

²⁰ Beldiceanu-Steinherr, 1967, p. 181 and fn. 17. In support of her claim regarding the contents of the 15th and 16th century *defters*, Beldiceanu-Steinherr cites *Tapu-Tahrir Defter*

intriguing, this explanation overlooks the fact that the *defters* she refers to contain separate sections for the *Vilayet-i Siroz* and the *Vilayet-i Zihne*, which already account for all of the area between them.²¹ Were we to accept her proposition, we would be faced with two distinct administrative entities occupying the same territory.

However, though failing to identify the actual boundaries of Keşişlik, Beldiceanu-Steinherr's work does point us into the proper direction, i.e., to an intensive examination of the extant 15th and 16th century Ottoman *tahrir defters* (cadastral registers) covering this area of Macedonia.

Recently, in the course of a wider study of the effects of the Ottoman conquest upon former Byzantine territories,²² I had occasion to examine in detail the collection of *tahrir defters* housed in the *Başbakanlık Arşivi* (Prime Minister's Archives) in Istanbul. As one focus of the larger study is an examination of the status of monastic properties under the Ottomans, I was particularly interested in references to Mount Athos. Initially, misled by the Todorov/Barkan identification of Keşişlik as Mount Athos, I paid particular attention to references concerning the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik*. It soon became apparent that this particular Ottoman province appeared only in those *tahrirs* which have survived from the 15th century: extant 16th century registers made no mention of it at all.²³ Specifically, the province appeared in *Tapu-Tahrir Defter No. 3*, a *mufassal* (detailed) register compiled in 1465, and in *Tapu-Tahrir Defter No. 7*, a *mufassal* survey from the year 1478-79.²⁴ Both of these registers gave the names of the villages attached to Keşişlik; those of its taxpayers and the taxes to which they were subject as well as the names of the fief holders (*erbab-i tımar*) who benefited from these taxes. A cursory examination of the place names contained in these two 15th century *defters* had established

No. 7, a cadastral register from the reign of Mehmed II in the collection of the Istanbul *Başbakanlık Arşivi* (Prime Minister's Archives) (Hereafter: *TT No. 7*). As our subsequent examination will illustrate, in addition to *TT No. 7* (which is dated 1478-79) the Istanbul archives also contain an earlier *defter* covering the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik: Tapu-Tahrir Defter No. 3* (date 1465). (Hereafter: *TT No. 3, 1465*). Contrary to Beldiceanu-Steinherr, while there are extant 16th century *defters* covering the area [e.g., *Tapu-Tahrir Defter No. 70* (1519), *Tapu-Tahrir Defter No. 143* (1527) and *Tapu-Tahrir Defter No. 403* (undated: Süleyman, 1520-66)] they conspicuously lack any mention of the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik*. As will become clear in the course of this paper, their silence reflects the fact that by the 16th century, Keşişlik has ceased to exist as a separate administrative entity.

²¹ See: *TT No. 3* (1465), *Vilayet-i Siroz*, pp. 155-298 and *Vilayet-i Zihne*, pp. 422-481; also *TT No. 7* (1478-79), *Vilayet-i Zihne*, pp. 114-158 and *Vilayet-i Siroz*, pp. 220-351.

²² This research was undertaken as part of the joint Dumbarton Oaks (Trustees for Harvard University) - University of Birmingham project entitled: *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society: Case Studies from Macedonia, Lemnos, and the Pontos*. I should like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to Professors Giles Constable (Director, Dumbarton Oaks) and Anthony Bryer (Director, Centre for Byzantine Studies, University of Birmingham) for their support of this work.

²³ See fn. 20 above.

²⁴ *TT No. 3* (1465), *Vilayet-i Keşişlik*, pp. 332-420 and *TT No. 7* (1478-79), *Vilayet-i Keşişlik*, pp. 160-218.

that they were not those of sites on or near Mount Athos. I therefore decided to try to determine the boundaries of the 15th century province on the basis of the toponyms provided. Table I represents the first step in this effort. It lists the names of the villages (in the order they appear in *TT No. 3*), and the numbers of their tax-paying inhabitants (divided according to tax category). For purposes of comparison it also includes the same data from *TT No. 7*.²⁵

The *defters* contain two clues which are of particular value in attempting to locate the sites listed in Table I. First, a number of villages are shown as being attached (*tabi*) to Serres, Zihne or Drama, thus indicating that we should begin our examination in the general area of south-central Macedonia; second, several of the villages are shown as paying taxes on *dalyans* (fishing stations)²⁶ and/or *iskeles* (landing places)²⁷ indicating that they were located on or near bodies of water. Guided by these two pieces of information the logical place to begin attempting to locate Keşişlik is south of Serres, Zihne and Drama, along the shores of Lake Tahinos. That this was indeed the site of the 15th century *Vilayet-i Keşişlik* can be seen by referring to Map I: *Vilayet of Keşişlik*. There, aided by a number of 19th and 20th century maps,²⁸ I have shown the location of those 15th century sites which were still identifiable at the end of the *Turkokratia*. While not all the villages mentioned in the *defters* have been located, those whose names appear on the map account for over 70% of the region's 15th century population, and therefore allow us to state with a fair degree of certainty that the dotted line on Map I represents the approximate

²⁵ While both *defters* list the first four villages in the same order, thereafter the similarity ends. To facilitate comparison, I have matched the entries in *TT No. 7* (when possible) with the order in which the villages are given in *TT No. 3*. The column headed "NO." for the data from *TT No. 7* gives the actual order in which these villages are listed therein.

²⁶ For a description of this type of fishing station, see: Henry and Renée Kahane and Andreas Tietze, *The Lingua Franca In The Levant*, Chicago, 1958, (Hereafter: Tietze, 1958) pp. 477-481. The authors note that Gökbilgin, 1952, pp. 140-141 mentions taxes on the *dalyanhâ-yi göl Siroz* (the fishing stations on the Lake of Serres, i.e., Lake Tahinos).

²⁷ Tietze, 1958, pp. 568-572. See in particular pp. 569-570 where an example from an unpublished work of Kemal-i Zerd (ca. 1480) records the following usage: *gümrük alına cemi' iskelelerde* (a tax is to be collected at all landing places).

²⁸ Each of the sites identified on Map I appear on one or more of the following maps:

- a) Austrian General Staff Map scale: 1:500,000, Vienna, 1826.
- b) James Wyld, "A Real Map of Greece", London, 1827.
- c) Ottoman Ministry of War: "Rumeli-i şahane haritası", scale: 1:210,000, Istanbul, 1899. (For full title, see fn. 40).
- d) Austrian Staff Map, "Former Turkey in Europe", scale: 1:200,000, K und K Militär-geographisches Institut, 1903-1909.
- e) British Staff Map, "Former Turkey in Europe", scale: 1:250,000, War Office, 1908.
- f) Erhard, "Carte des écoles chrétiennes de la Macédoine", scale: 1:400,000, 1908.
- g) British Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division, "Maps of Serbia, Macedonia etc." No. 7, scale: 1:400,000, London, 1916.
- h) D. Iaranoff, "Carte de la Macédoine", scale: 1:300,000, Sofia, 1933.
- i) Greece Sheet D10, Rodholivos, scale: 1:100,000, August, 1944.
- j) Guillou, André, "Carte de la région du Mont Ménécée". See fn. 42.
- k) Jacoby, David, "Carte de la Macédoine Occidentale". See fn. 42.

boundaries of the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik*.²⁹ From the map it is clear, contrary to Beldiceanu-Steinherr, that the province was located, not between Serres and Zihne, but rather to the south of these cities along the banks of the Strymon River and Lake Tahinos.

In rejecting Beldiceanu-Steinherr's identification of Keşişlik's location, and in the process her rationale for its name as well, i.e., its proximity to the Monastery of St. John Prodromos, we are left with the question of the meaning of its name, "Province of the Monks". Where did this name come from and why was it applied to this particular region in the 15th century?

In the normal Ottoman practice the name of a province was most likely to be that of its largest town or city, i.e., its administrative center. When we look at the names of the other *vilayets* appearing in *TT No. 3* and *TT No. 7*, those of Demirhisar,³⁰ Nevrekop,³¹ Serres,³² Zihne³³ Drama,³⁴ and Selanik,³⁵ we see that they follow this pattern. But far from being a city, Keşişlik does not even appear as a village in the fifteenth century *tahrirs*. Indeed the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik* does not even appear to have had an administrative center of its own. All the sites it contained were classed as villages (*karye*), none bore the title of *şehir* (town or city), the usual mark of a *vilayet* (capital). While each of the surrounding provincial centers, Serres (population: 4,500-6,000),³⁶ Zihne (population: 2,500-2,700),³⁷ and Drama (population: 1,300-1,450),³⁸ appear in the *defters* as *şehirs*, Keşişlik's largest settlement, Ezdravik, with about 900 inhabitants, is merely a village (*karye*)³⁹ — nor are we given any

²⁹ Those sites identified on *Map I* are marked with an * on *Table I*. In *TT No. 3* (1465) they account for 1,921 out of a total of 2,694 *hanes plus bives* while in *TT No. 7* (1478-79) they represent 1,771 out of 2,484.

³⁰ *TT No. 3* (1465) *Vilayet-i Demirhisar*, pp. 1-123 and *TT No. 7* (1478-79) *Vilayet-i Demirhisar*, pp. 400-522.

³¹ *TT No. 3* (1465) *Vilayet-i Nevrekop*, pp. 124-154 and *TT No. 7* (1478-79) *Vilayet-i Nevrekop*, pp. 352-381.

³² *TT No. 3* (1465) *Vilayet-i Siroz*, pp. 155-298 and *TT No. 7* (1478-79) *Vilayet-i Siroz*, pp. 220-351.

³³ *TT No. 3* (1465) *Vilayet-i Zihne*, pp. 422-481 and *TT No. 7* (1478-79) *Vilayet-i Zihne*, pp. 114-158.

³⁴ *TT No. 3* (1465) *Vilayet-i Drama*, pp. 484-490 and *TT No. 7* (1478-79) *Vilayet-i Drama*, pp. 24-112.

³⁵ *TT No. 7* (1478-79) *Vilayet-i Selanik*, pp. 524-646. *TT No. 3* (1465) does not include a section for Selanik. This *defter* is missing its opening section which may account for this fact.

³⁶ For an article dealing with the information as contained in *TT No. 3* and *TT No. 7* pertaining to the provincial capitals of Serres, Zihne and Drama, see: Nasturel, Petra et Beldiceanu, Nicoara, "Les Églises Byzantines et la Situation Économique de Drama, Serrès et Zichna aux XIV^e et XV^e Siècles", *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik*, XXVII, 1978, pp. 269-285. (Hereafter: Beldiceanu, 1978) For the population of Serres, see pp. 271-272.

³⁷ Beldiceanu, 1978, p. 273.

³⁸ Beldiceanu, 1978, pp. 270-71.

³⁹ While there is no clear distinction, populationwise, between a village (*karye*) and a town

indication in our sources that Ezdravik or any other village in the *vilayet* actually served as a provincial capital.

Interestingly, in the late 19th century this region did contain a village named Keşişlik. As can be seen on the Ottoman Staff Map of 1899,⁴⁰ this village was located about 10 kilometers southeast of Serres, and as such fell well within the boundaries proposed for our 15th century province of the same name (see Map I). What, if any, the connection between these two Keşişliks may have been is a matter for conjecture. Noting the absence of a settlement with this name in our 15th century *defters*, it is extremely unlikely that our province was named after this village. The likelihood is greater that with the disappearance of the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik* as a distinct administrative region in the 16th century, its name was taken over by a newly established village.

Given the absence of confirmed evidence for the existence of Keşişlik as a 15th century toponym, we must assume that the normal Ottoman practice of adopting an existing place or area name was not followed, and that "Keşişlik" is a descriptive title, literally "The Place of the Monks". Against this argument is the fact that neither of the 15th century *defters* include a single reference to monasteries or monastic holdings in the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik*, while their sections on the neighboring *vilayets* of Serres, Zihne and Drama abound with references to monasteries and their properties located in those areas.⁴¹ Our knowledge of this region prior to the Ottoman conquest confirms that several of the Athonite monasteries, as well as those in the Serres region, held properties here.⁴² However, were it not for the fact that two of the monasteries of Mount Athos left their names as toponyms in the area (the villages of Iveros⁴³ and Esfamino⁴⁴) there would be nothing in the *defters* to indicate even a former

(*şehir*) in the 15th and 16th centuries, a close examination of the Macedonia *defters* shows that with the exception of Keşişlik every province (*vilayet*) had at least one *şehir* which (we may assume) served as its administrative center and gave its name to the province.

⁴⁰ Officially titled: *Rumeli-i şahane haritası. Saye-i fuyuzat-ı sermaye-i cenab-ı zillüllahide erkan-i harbiye istikşaf postaları taraflarından tashih ve erkan-ı harbiye-i umumiye dairesi beşinci fen şubesi marifetiyle tersim olunarak bu kere daire-i mezkure matabaasında tabi ve temsil olunmuştur. Sene: 1317 (1899)*, this map in 75 sections and drawn on the scale of 1:210,000 is the best available Ottoman map of the Balkans. For Keşişlik, see: #29/Siroz.

⁴¹ See: Beldiceanu, 1978 for frequent references throughout, in particular pp. 282-285.

⁴² For a current bibliography for the ongoing publications of the *Archives de l'Athos*, see the latest volume in this series: P. Lemerle, A. Guillou, N. Svoronos et D. Papachryssanthou, *Actes de Lavra III*, Paris, 1979. Specific references to individual holdings of Athonite monasteries in the Strymon are found in: André Guillou, *Les Archives de Saint-Jean-Prodrome sur le Mont Ménécée*, Paris, 1955 and Jacques Lefort, *Actes D'Esphigménou*, Paris, 1973, as well as *Lavra III*, cited above. For an overview of monastic holdings in this region, see: David Jacoby, "Phénomènes de démographie rurale à Byzance aux XIII^e, XIV^e et XV^e siècles", *Études Rurales*, V-VI, 1962, pp. 163-186; and the more recent work by Angeliki E. Laiou-Thomadakis, *Peasant Society in the Late Byzantine Empire*, Princeton, 1977.

⁴³ *TT No. 3 (1465)* p. 339 where the name appears as Iver and *TT No. 7 (1478-79)* p. 164 where it is given as Iveros.

⁴⁴ For the village of Esfamino, see: *TT No. 3 (1465)* pp. 333-334 and *TT No. 7 (1478-79)*

monastic connection.

If the name Keşişlik stemmed from a monastic attachment, we would logically assume (as did Todorov and Barkan⁴⁵) that it denoted that area of Macedonia most closely identified with monastic life, Mount Athos and its immediate hinterland, Chalkidiki. Alternatively, we have Beldiceanu-Steinherr's explanation linking the name to the important Monastery of St. John Prodromos.⁴⁶ Did this monastery not fall without the boundaries we have established for Keşişlik (see: Map I), and were it not itself included as part of the *Vilayet-i Siroz*⁴⁷ this would be a plausible hypothesis. In the process of identifying the boundaries of Keşişlik we have eliminated the most likely explanations for the derivation of its name.

It may be the very difficulty we have in tracing the origin of this name that will aid us in explaining why the province ceased to exist as such in the 16th century. The absence of a town or city to serve as an administrative center, and the province's proximity to the already flourishing towns of Serres, Zihne and Drama may have made its continued existence redundant. Its absorption into these neighboring *vilayets* by the early 16th century is attested to by the information of their relevant *tahrir defters*.⁴⁸ That this process was already underway in the 15th century can be shown by comparing the three sets of population data we possess for that period: *TT No. 3* (1465), *TT No. 7* (1478-79), and the *Mukata'a defter* of 1489 used by Gökbilgin and Barkan.⁴⁹ Leaving aside a relatively small Muslim population, for which the 1489 *defter* does not provide figures,⁵⁰ we see that while the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik* had a Christian population of approximately 12,598 in 1465,⁵¹ thirteen years later it stood at 11,735,⁵² and by 1489 it had shrunk to 7,441.⁵³ Clearly, with each new administrative survey the number of residents decreased as more and more Keşişlik villages were enrolled in the neighboring provinces of Serres, Zihne and Drama. Lacking an administrative center and its complement of Ottoman officials, the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik* simply lacked a *raison d'être*. Indeed, if we

p. 161.

⁴⁵ See above, fn. 16 and 19 respectively.

⁴⁶ Beldiceanu-Steinherr, 1967, p. 181 and fn. 17.

⁴⁷ Beldiceanu, 1978, p. 276.

⁴⁸ An examination of the village names listed under the *Vilayets* of Drama, Zihne, and Serres in *TT No. 143* (1527) pp. 53-68 (Drama), pp. 69-92 (Zihne) and pp. 93-126 (Serres) shows that the former villages of the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik* have been divided up between these three neighboring provinces.

⁴⁹ Gökbilgin, 1952, p. 145 and Barkan, 1964, p. 46 respectively.

⁵⁰ As may be seen from *Table I* there was no significant Muslim settlement or conversion to Islam in the *Vilayet-i Keşişlik*. The Muslim population accounted for only 50 out of a total of 2,694 *hanes* in 1465 (less than 2%) and for only 76 out of 2,484 *hanes* in 1478-79 (slightly over 3%). The absence of the Muslim population from the 1489 *defter* reflects the fact that they were not subject to the *cizye* levy.

⁵¹ $(2,022 \text{ Christian } hanes \times 5) + (622 \text{ Christian } bives \times 4) = 12,598.$

⁵² $(2,103 \text{ Christian } hanes \times 5) + (305 \text{ Christian } bives \times 4) = 11,735.$

⁵³ $(1,289 \text{ Christian } hanes \times 5) + (249 \text{ Christian } bives \times 4) = 7,441.$

accept this hypothesis, the major unanswered question is not why the area disappeared as an administrative unit in the 16th century, but rather, why it had existed as one in the 15th century.

MAP I.:
VILAYET OF KESISLIK
(scale 1:400,000)




TABLE I: THE VILAYET OF KEŞİŞLIK IN THE YEARS 1465 AND 1478-79.

VILLAGE NAME	Extracted From T.T. No. 3 (1465)					Extracted From T.T. No. 7 (1478-79)						
	NO.	Pg.	MUS. HAN.	CHR. HAN.	BİVES	MUC.	NO.	Pg.	MUS. HAN.	CHR. HAN.	BİVES	MUC.
*POTOLINO: #	1	332-	3	33	13	3	1	160-	5H&3M	41	4	2
*ESFAMINO: #	2	333-	0	16	5	4	2	161	0	21	4	0
*KUTZI / KOCHI: #	3	334-	0	19	14	2	3	162	0	19	7	0
*KRUSHOVA:	4	335-	0	44	9	8	4	162-	0	13	5	0
*KHENDIKE (also: Henike): #	5	337-	0	43	15	0	79	216-	0	40	22	7
(Bagat-i Eksambilyo):	5	339	0	5	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
*IVER / IVEROS: #	6	339	1	12	6	6	8	164-	1H&IM	12	0	2
KHOTOLOVA / KHOTOLIOVA:	7	340-	1	12	9	3	9	165	1	11	0	2
ZERPİYANI / ZERPILANI:	8	341	1	113	32	18	33	183-	4	115	17	11
KHOTOLOVA:	9	344	0	7	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
KALIYOVIR-KHOR:	10	344-	0	3	1	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
*ANCHESTI:	11	345-	4	111	26	7	78	214-	0	123	9	5
*VELCHESTE:	12	348-	3	88	23	6	60	201	2	88	20	7
*KOZAK / KOJAK:	13	351-	1	13	7	2	16	172-	0	11	1	0
JANOS: #	14	353-	1	68	32	12	71	210	0	55	3	5
*VETACHESHTI:	15	354-	3	35	10	4	64	205-	4H&3M	24	3	3
KOSTOROMBO / KOSOROMBI:	16	356-	1	30	11	5	65	206-	0	33	3	2
PRISHOVA / PERISHOVA: (Zihne)	17	357	0	10	2	3	66	207	0	16	1	2
SEPTZANI / SEPTZE (Drama):	18	358	0	4	0	0	68	208	0	4	0	0
EVLA KHISHTI:	19	358-	1	2	0	0	67	207	1	8	0	0
*EZDRAVIK:	20	359-	6	121	45	14	29	180-	5	99	20	8
*DOKSONOPO / DOKSOPINO: #	21	362-	1	85	35	9	46	192-	0	88	7	2
*EZDRAVIK:	22	365-	0	7	3	0	22	176-	0	5	2	1
*KESERPOLI: #	23	366-	0	4	3	0	53	197	0	4	2	1
KOSTOMBO / CHOSTONBO:	24	367-	0	45	18	4	34	185-	0	48	8	3
KHOMENKOVA / KHOMENKOR:	25	368-	0	38	19	4	35	186-	0	49	13	3
KHODNIA / KHORNIA: #	26	370-	0	6	2	0	39	187-	0	5	2	0
*ORFAN:	27	371-	2	27	13	4	12	168	1	27	0	1
*PREVISHTI:	28	372-	1	54	16	8	57	199-	4	53	7	4
*DRAHOVA (Zihne):	29	374-	0	8	3	0	58	201	0	6	1	0
*PREVISHTI:	30	375-	1	21	3	3	19	174	1	21	2	2
DRAVOCHESTI (Serres):	31	376	0	0	1	0	28	180	0	0	0	0
*KROMESH TI:	32	376-	5	50	12	5	47	194-	5	60	6	4

VILLAGE NAME	NO.	Pg.	MUS. HAN.	CHR. HAN.	BİVES	MUC.	NO.	Pg.	MUS. HAN.	CHR. HAN.	BİVES	MUC.
*GHIDERI-KHOR/GHIDER KHO	33	378	0	3	1	0	31	182-	0	2	1	0
YESNI / YESI:	34	379	1	11	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
*PETRIK:	35	379-	0	24	8	4	73	211	0	19	2	0
MEZRA-I ESTAVROS	36	380	0	1	0	0	32	183	0	0	0	0
EV RANI KASRI:	37	381-	0	34	13	4	74	211-	0	36	6	3
LONDO:	38	382	0	10	5	3	30	182	0	5	0	0
*POYLANI / BOBLANI:	39	383-	0	36	8	4	14	170-	4	31	4	2
MINOLISHI / MESINOLISHI: #	40	385-	0	60	20	4	26	178-	1	41	5	2
*ZEVARNIK / REVARNIK:	41	387-	0	25	11	5	48	195-	2	24	4	2
*NIKHORI:	42	388-	0	12	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
MEZ. AYO YORGI/BIRAKOS (Serres)43	389	389	0	0	0	0	50	196	0	0	0	0
*NOSKI / OSPIKI / OSIKI:	44	389-	0	62	10	8	25	177-	0	71	5	3
KESHANI / KESHATI:	45	391-	0	40	8	6	-	-	-	-	-	-
*GHIDERI-KHOR / GHIDER KHO:	46	393-	1	12	1	4	43	191	0	19	0	0
*KUTZI / KOCHI:	47	393	0	10	1	0	44	191	0	2	0	0
DERI SH TENITZE:	48	394-	0	19	5	4	42	190	1	25	3	3
KIRDALANO:	49	395-	0	20	4	5	45	192	3	25	2	0
*PREVISH TI:	50	396-	0	18	6	3	27	179-	0	24	4	0
*GHIDERI-KHOR / GHIDER KHO:	51	397-	0	18	3	3	63	205	0	18	3	5
PERNAR / PIRNAR: #	52	398-	3	20	11	8	11	167	5	21	3	4
DOKALISHTI / VOKALISHTI:	53	400-	0	32	17	8	61	203-	0	48	0	11
*YORGILI: #	54	401-	2	24	5	5	62	204-	1	19	6	7
MEDRAPOLID / MERDARPOLID: #	55	402-	0	22	6	4	5	163	0	23	5	0
TRVA:	56	403	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
MEZ TZIKERYONA:	57	404	0	0	0	0	6	164	0	0	0	0
MEZ. PETRA:	58	404	0	0	0	0	7	164	0	0	0	0
ALDOMESH TI / KEZOMESH TI:	59	404-	0	32	4	3	21	175-	2	35	8	3
*EZDRAVIK:	60	405	0	7	1	0	18	174	0	5	0	0
ZACHORITZE:	61	406	0	7	0	0	23	176-	0	11	1	0
ALDOMESH TI / KEZOMESH TI:	62	406-	0	20	2	5	17	173	0	18	3	0
*EZDRAVIK:	63	407-	0	6	1	0	52	197	0	10	4	3
MEZ. AGHLIFOR:	64	408	0	0	0	0	20	175	0	1	0	0
*RADILOFO:	65	408-	2	107	29	8	13	168-	6	114	22	5
*PREVISH TI:	66	411-	0	17	11	4	69	208-	2	28	6	0
MINO-KHOR / MINO-KHO: #	67	412-	1	56	9	8	10	166	0	42	3	2
*LIKOVIK:	68	414	0	5	0	0	75	212-	0	12	2	0
SOTIR-KHIR / SOTIRKHOVA:	69	415	0	10	6	0	76	213	1	7	0	1

VILLAGE NAME	NO.	Pg.	MUS. HAN.	CHR. HAN.	BİVES	MUC.	NO	Pg.	MUS. HAN.	CHR. HAN.	BİVES	MUC.
*KOMARYANI / KOMARANI:	70	415-	0	5	2	0	77	213-	2	11	0	1
SOTIR-KHO:#	71	416-	0	3	3	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
*NOSKI / OSIKI:	72	417-	0	51	5	6	15	171-	0	37	5	0
METOKHI / MINOMI:	73	418-	4	15	7	3	41	189-	2	18	2	0
*ELSHANI / ESHANI:	74	419-	0	34	4	8	40	188-	0	45	7	5
MEZ. AÇLIFOR:	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	177	0	1	0	0
MEZ. AYO KIRYAKI (Azrobit):	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	187	0	0	0	0
MEZ. RUMI / DOMI (Azrobit):	-	-	-	-	-	-	37	187	0	0	0	0
MEZ. PALO KASRI (Azrobit)	-	-	-	-	-	-	38	187	0	0	0	0
KORI:	-	-	-	-	-	-	49	196	0	9	0	3
MEZ. BAYRAKOS:	-	-	-	-	-	-	51	196	0	0	0	0
EZIKLI:	-	-	-	-	-	-	54	197-	0	32	3	0
SERA ZLO / SERACHLO (Langada):	-	-	-	-	-	-	55	198-	0	26	4	0
MEZ. PORTOVA (Langada):	-	-	-	-	-	-	56	197-	0	8	0	0
MEZ. LAPANIKI/EZNI ZE (Langada):	-	-	-	-	-	-	59	201	0	5	0	0
BÜYÜK DANIŞMEND (Gümülcine):	-	-	-	-	-	-	70	209	7H&5M	0	0	0
*MERMERA:	-	-	-	-	-	-	72	211	0	0	0	0
*KHRISOPOLI / CHRISOPOLI:	-	-	-	-	-	-	80	217-	2	76	10	0
TOTALS:	74		50	2,022	622	268	80		76/12	2,103	305	140

* Those villages located on MAP I: *VİLAYET OF KEŞİŞLİK*.

Those villages identified as paying taxes on *dalyans* and/or *iskeles*.

Ronald C. JENNINGS

PLAGUE IN TRABZON AND REACTIONS TO IT ACCORDING TO LOCAL JUDICIAL REGISTERS

The impact of the Black Death of the 14th century and the plague which continued until the 19th century had worldwide impact. It was one of the great disasters in world history. Few if any other diseases ever brought such catastrophic consequences over virtually the entire world. Western historians have long made plague a central concern in their studies, but no thorough studies of any part of the Muslim world had been attempted before Micheal Dols (1975), who searched out and studied most of the Arabic sources from the classical or medieval period of Islamic history. Dols' studies, particularly when combined with the studies of the Mediterranean and Black Sea during the whole period of plague history by the eminent French historian Jean-Noël Biraben, provide an excellent background for studying that disaster in territories that became central parts of the Ottoman Empire.

Unfortunately, very few Ottoman sources were available to those scholars. Dols concentrates on the earliest period. Despite Biraben's heroic efforts to find firsthand evidence of every kind, there are virtually no Ottoman sources that he can draw upon. Consequently, even for the long period when parts of the Ottoman empire became endemic centers of plague, Biraben has to draw almost entirely on European observers, that group whose misperceptions have long clouded the study of Ottoman history. Even Dols, who had the opportunity to uncover a small amount of Ottoman evidence, has little insight into the Turkish (and Persian, for that matter) worlds and world views. Unfortunately, only miniscule, scattered evidence has been discovered in Ottoman sources. Much of the western scholarship on the subject typically, therefore, presumes fatalism and ignorance in the attitudes of Ottoman officials and Ottoman subjects (even as they do, for example by presuming that Ottoman use of vaccination against smallpox was little more than folk medicine, that Ottomans could not understand science unless they learned it from the West, because there is no science other than that of Western Europe).

Thorough bibliographies of plague in the Ottoman Empire have been attempted recently for the 18th and 19th centuries, but unfortunately that

approach means using European sources, the reports of people very few of whom have any understanding of the nuances of Ottoman culture, medicine, or science, and anyway, that was a time when Ottoman culture and learning lagged far behind that of Western Europe. Thorough studies of plague must take those works into account because they do provide huge amounts of information, but until local evidence can be found such as what has been brought to bear in studying plague in France or some of the Italian states using local sources, Ottoman understanding of, and reaction to, plague will remain poorly known.

Such evidence is difficult to come by, but when adequate manpower becomes available to study this area, rich sources may be found. To the best of my knowledge, there is precious little about that plague to be found in published Ottoman sources. When I studied the judicial registers from Kayseri between 1590 and 1630, I did not encounter any evidence about the disease. Of course, at an elevation of 1055 meters and far from the sea in central Anatolia, Kayseri may have had a fairly healthful environment. A place that I have been studying more recently, however, Cyprus, at least starting in the 14th century, was a disease-ridden place where plague and malaria both became deeply entrenched; even when Venice controlled the island between 1489 and 1571, certain areas were considered to be so unhealthful that no one would live there, and Venice tried to attract Latin settlers to the island. I scrutinized the scattered judicial registers surviving between 1580 and 1640 without finding any evidence; and not even the mass of various and sundry imperial administrative orders provided any really good evidence. Trabzon was an important trading emporium and an international seaport, but nevertheless, it was with great surprise that I uncovered several references to plague when I was reading the judicial registers between 1565 and 1640.

Of course, it is not unusual for important differences to exist in the social, economic, and legal practices of Arabs, Persians, and Turks, so even a first-class study of Arab attitudes towards plague and disease must be treated with considerable caution before attempting to generalize. The existence of different legal traditions, and the different historical experiences result sometimes in profoundly different behavior by different Muslims. If Dols finds resignation and criticism of flight to avoid infected neighbors the predominant Arab Muslim ethos early in Islamic history, we must consider that strong grounds for considering behavior during Ottoman times. Ottoman legal practice, however, was often quite flexible, and there existed ample legal precedent for them to justify avoiding plague scrupulously.

I am unaware of any published evidence about reactions to plague during the time of the Ottoman Empire from archives or chronicles similar to what I have found in the Trabzon judicial registers. I have not found other evidence to confirm the registers, but a considerable number of consistent reports did occur over a period of almost 75 years, enough to convince me that this must have been the practice in the Black Sea province of Trabzon. Indeed, since *kadis* were not local people, according to Ottoman law and practice, but professional judges who were educated and trained in the capital, then appointed and systematically

transferred by the imperial government, from city to city, and province to province, it would be extremely unlikely if the practices described below were somehow confined to the southern shores of the Black Sea. It is impossible to conjecture anything about the antiquity of those practices, or about how long they continued to be practiced after the mid-17th century.

Plague raged in Trabzon during the years 1565 and 1566, and again to some extent in 1633. New evidence of a conclusive sort appears in the judicial registers (*sicils*). Particularly since Trabzon was a rather busy long distance port, it may have been vulnerable to plague, although frankly, references to that problem are almost entirely lacking in the court records that I have used. Why the general avoidance of this topic in the records from Cyprus, Kayseri, and even Trabzon is a puzzle, particularly since their occurrence is not infrequently reported by foreign merchants, consular officials, and travellers.¹ Unfortunately, virulent diseases and other disasters were rarely mentioned.

1565-1566

Most of the references to plague found during a perusal of the judicial registers for 1565 and 1566 concern attempts by individuals or by pious foundations (*evkaf*) to escape financial disaster on account of the severity of the calamity. No judicial registers survive before 1565 nor after 1566 until 1609, so nothing may be said about its origins or demise.

Probably the wealthiest pious foundation in 16th century Trabzon, was founded by Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror (1451-1481), who added Trabzon to the Ottoman Empire in a brilliant eastern campaign in 1461. Among its vast properties in the city were two Turkish baths. Another important foundation in Trabzon was that of the late İskender Paşa, who served several terms as provincial governor early in the 16th century, who had a quarter named for him in the eastern suburbs of the city, and whose wealthy foundation included a bath and a caravanserai. The renters and administrators of those foundations acted decisively and effectively to protect their financial interest.

The earliest references to the local effects of plague were on 17 March 1565 (14 Şaban 972) and on 25 March (22 Şaban), when in successive weeks special problems were brought to the *kadi* of the city. The next incidents occurred on the 3rd and 26th of April (2 and 25 Ramazan). Although only a single case was brought in May (30 May = last day of Şevval), five more incidents occurred in the next two months: the 8th, 25th, and 28th of June (9,

¹ In "Rural Society in the Empire of Trebizond", *Archeion Pontou* 28, 1966, p. 156, Anthony Bryer refers to "the urban exodus from the hot, plague-ridden coastal towns in the summer". According to J. N. Biraben, plague was active in Istanbul (Constantinople) in 1560-1561, 1564, 1567; also in 1628, 1629, *Les Hommes et la Peste en France et dans les pays européens et méditerranéens*, v.1, pp. 443f., Paris-La Haye, 1975. Elsewhere, he describes plague in the eastern part of southeastern Europe as on the rise after 1550, but in decline, and very low, after 1625, p. 128. In Europe generally he judged plague strong in 1557, 1564, 1580, 1629, 1636, and in remission in 1559, 1570-1575, 1584, 1633, and 1644, p. 119.

26, and 29 *Zil-Kade*) and the 16th and 29th of July (17 *Zil-Hicce* 972 and 1 *Muharrem* 973). After that only two further cases occurred which mention that plague: early January (11 *Cumadi II* 973) and late March, 1566 (10 *Ramazan*).

Apparently the winter of 1564-1565 had brought Trabzon little relief from the plague for dire conditions such as were found in March and April of 1565 must have required as least some months of severe plague to develop.

LOWERING (KIST) OF THE HAMMAM. The share (*kist*) of the hammam of Tabbak hané quarter (the *mahalle* of the Tanners) of the pious foundation (*evkaf*) of Sultan Han is in the care (*°uhde*) of İskender bn Huseyn for 194 *akçe*/month. Now, on account of fear of plague (*ta°un*), no one remains in the quarter. So the share is lowered 94 *akçe*/mo. to 100 *akçe*. İskender accepts that. Written at the request of the collector of revenue for the pious foundation (*cabi*). 17 March 1565 (1818 59-3; 14 *Şaban* 972).

LOWERING THE CARAVANSERAI (KARBANSARAY) TAX-FARM (MUKATA°A). The caravanserai of the late İskender paşa in the city is under the care of Akob v. Arutin for 16,000 *akçe* for 3 years. Now the people of the city are dispersed. Its administrator (*mutevelli*) za°im Mustafa uses clerk (*katib*) Musa kethuda, his legal agent, to give it to Akob for 500 *akçe* every 3 months. Registered. 25 March 1565 (1818 66-1; 22 *Şaban* 972).

LOWERING THE SHARE (MUKATA°A) OF THE İSKENDER PAŞA HAMMAM. The hammam was in the care of İskender of 16,000 *akçe*/yr. Now the people of the city are dispersed on account of fear of plague (*ta°un havfi*). The people want the cost lowered by administrator (*mutevelli*) za°im Mustafa, who has clerk Musa (as his agent). Henceforth it will be lowered to 1700 *akçe* every 3 months. Written at the request of İskender. 25 March 1565 (1818 66-2; 22 *Şaban* 972).

LOWERING THE SHARE (KIST) OF KULLE (KALE=INNER CITADEL) HAMMAM. Kulle hammam of the pious foundation of the mosque (*camii-Şerif*) of Sultan Mehmed Han is assigned from August 1564 (*Muharrem* 972) for 3 years to this Sufi Suleyman bn Huseyn, who gets a tax-farm (*mukata°a*) for 13,000 *akçe*. Now, when on account of the plague (*ta°un*) the people of the city are dispersed, Suleyman comes to the court and complains of oppression: in truth the people of the city are dispersed, the hammam has no customers, and the share (*kist*) is deficient. Experts (*ehl-i vukuf*), notables (*a°yan-ı Şehir*), and administrator (*mutevelli*) Mehmed come to court and confirm this. On account of this, the tax-farm (*mukata°a*) is reduced at once to 8000 *akçe*. Written at the request of the administrator. 3 April 1565 (1818 26b-1; 2 *Ramazan* 972).

DEAD OF PLAGUE (MAT°UN). Abdullah bn Kasim, Kuyum Huseyn, and jailor (*zindancı*) Şirmerd testify that Huseyn, son of Mirza, who was imprisoned (*habs*) for investigation (*teftiş*) by imperial order (*emir-i Şerifi*), has died of plague. Written at the request of the present provincial

governor's deputy (*mir liva kethudası*) Memi çelebi. 26 April 1565 (1819 9b-1; 25 Ramazan 972).

LOWERING THE HAMMAM'S SHARE. Kulle Hammam of the Sultan Mehmed Han foundation (*evkaf*) is held in a tax-farm (*mukata'a*) for 13,000 *akçe* by Sufi Suleyman. On account of fear of plague (*ta'un havfindan*), it became 8000 *akçe*; now, by decision of the people of the city (*şehir halkı*), it is lowered to 7000, after due judicial consideration (*marifet*) of the collector of revenue for the foundation (*cabi*) Mehmed. Suleyman accepts that. 30 May 1565 (1818 19b-1; *selh Şevval* 972).

The intensity of the plague affected not just the city of Trabzon but also villages and towns to the south and east.

THE PUBLIC WEIGHING OFFICIAL (KABANCI). The taxpayers (*re'aya*) of Veryan village, south of Trabzon in Maçuka district (*nahiye*), which is the *timar* of sipahi İbrahim bn İskender, made known (*i'lam*) as follows: The crops (*mahsul*) of the village are raised (*yetişub*) and it is weighing time (*kabal*, error for *kaban*, *zamani*), but our sipahi has fled on account of fear of plague (*ta'un*).² We want a public weighing official appointed before the *Sharia* (i.e., at the court). From the tax-payers (*re'aya*) of the village Todor v. Kirako is appointed. 8 June 1565 (1819 20b-5; 9 Zil-kade 972).

SURETY (EMANET). The superintendent of market dues (*ihtisab emini*) Bayram bn Abdullah, who died of plague (*mat'un*) when he became sick in Sürmene (a small town on the coast c. 40 km east of Trabzon), had given his money in surety (*emanet*) to this za'im Hayreddin. When he died, his partner (*muşterik*) Hüseyin aga had the clerk of the market dues (*ihtisab katibi*) Kurd come to get it. Before the *Sharia* 3479 *akçe* was given to Kurd. Written at the request of Hayreddin. 25 June 1565 (1819 23-2; 26 Zil-Kade 972).

THE DEATH OF THE SUPERVISOR OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES AND THE BAZAAR (MUHTESIB). Hüseyin aga's partner (*muşterik*) Bayram bn Abdullah died of plague on 21 June 1565 (22 Zil-Kade 972). Written at the request of Kurd on behalf of the aforementioned Hüseyin aga. 28 June 1565 (1819 24b-3; 29 Zil-Kade 972).

CLAIM FOR THE FINES (CERIME) OF THE POLICE (SUBAŞI).³ Sürmene police (*subaşileri*) Hasan and Arab made a claim against İskender v. Todor of Eyner zade quarter (*mahalle*), who makes cauldrons (*kazancılık*) in Sürmene: İskender had an apprentice (*şakird*) cauldronmaker (*kazgancı*) who had plague (*ma'tun*). İskender took him and left him at a forest (*orman*) and he died. We want a fine (*cerime*). According to *Sharia* there

² In order that they could estimate the volumes, the *timar* sipahis or their agents had to inspect the grain fields before villagers were allowed to harvest them.

³ One important source of the salaries of local police consisted of fines (*cerime*) assessed on people guilty of homicide. When police tried to demand those fines from a certain cauldronmaker who had led a man with plague outside of the town, there to be left to die, the police considered this grounds for assessing the fine. However the court disagreed.

is nothing that must be done in this matter; it is forbidden (*men^cve def^f*) to hear the claim of the police (*su başı*). Written at the request of İskender. 16 July 1565 (1819 31b-3; 17 Zil-Hicce 972).

THE PROPRIETOR (HAMMAMCI) OF THE HAMMAM CALLED KAFIR HAMMAM BELONGING TO THE PIOUS FOUNDATION (EVKAF) OF CAMİ^c-İ ATIK, İSKENDER, IS MISSING (GAYB). Yusuf was appointed acting proprietor (*kaym makam*) in his place. When he died of plague and the people (*şehir halkı*) had become dispersed (*perakende*), no one else would accept the hammam. It has been deserted (*battal, hali*) since 14 June 1565 (15 Zil-Kade 972). Written at the request of the collector of revenue for the foundation (*cabi*) Mehmed Çelebi. 29 July 1565 (1819 33b-4; 1 Muharrem 973).

A case involved Ömer Çelebi bn ^cAli su başı, guardian for the orphans of the late slave (*kul*) of Erz-i Rum, Bayram, who formerly died of plague ... early January 1566 (1818 126b-1; 11 Cumadi II 973).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT (İKRAR) OF THE CUSTOMS OFFICERS (GUMRUKCIYAN). Gulam Şahi ^cAli Beg, former harbor master (*iskele emini*) of Trabzon, makes a claim against Hiristodil Kaluk, Manuel v. Sodiuro, Baskal v. Yani, Kostindin Vasil, and Nikola v. Savatıyos: The accused, with 38 companions (*yoldaş*), were in a ship of *zimmi* Lazaro Zehariye from Çömlekçi quarter (the *mahalle* of the Potters). While lying at anchor off the pier (*iskeleye demur burakmuş iken*), they heard that there is plague in the city. They brought out the ship and moved it to another place (*vilayet*), and sold things there, causing me great loss. The accused reply: In truth, with all our companions (*yoldaş*) we brought out the ship and took it to another place (*vilayet*), but we gave our captain (*re'is*) the dues (*hakk*) which we owed to the pier (*iskele*). Written at the request of Ali beg. 31 March 1566 (1818 94-4; 10 Ramazan 973).

1633

Another plague flourished in 1633, although known only through a single document. Since the case involved merchant seamen and their ship, one can be quite certain that the plague in 1633 was not confined to Trabzon. Although nothing is known of the ownership, home ports, or sailing routes of that vessel, clearly the captain was a Greek Orthodox Christian Ottoman subject.

Mehmed çavuş bn Hasan, legal agent (*vekil*) for a woman named Lalezar hatun, who is guardian (*vasi*) for the girl orphan of the late börekçi Mehmed aga, who took possession of a ship (*sefine*) 25 cubits long (*arşun*) called *Mesika*, states in the presence of captain (*re'is*) Zano v. Todori: Formerly I became agent (*vekil*) to receive the ship (*sefine*) and its cargo (*alat* and *esbeb*) from Yusuf Paşa, but plague (*ta^cun*) fell upon the people of the ship, killing most of them. It was necessary to hand the ship over to captain (*re'is*) Zano,

with permission of the *Sharia*, to protect it from the Rus (Cossack pirates, who were very active at that time). So I gave the ship and 21,000 *akçe* for investment capital (*sermaye*) to Zano. Zano confirms that. July 1633 (1828 7-3; 1 *Muharrem* 1043).

1639

For 1639 the judicial records merely attributed the death of a single local Muslim resident of the old walled city to plague, and so provide no basis for conjecture about its range or virulence. When his plague-marked body was discovered, the office of the provincial governor had to investigate the circumstances.

Present Trabzon governor Hüseyin Paşa had his sergeant-at-arms (*alay çavuş*) say to the court: It was heard that Ahmed of Orta Hisar (the middle of the city's three walls) died with blood-colored eyes. (*kân eñlu etdüb*). We want someone to come and investigate (*keşf*). From the *Sharia* court scribe (*mahkeme katibi*) Esa'd çelebi, the aforementioned overseer (*mubaşir*), and the Muslims whose names are listed below came, investigated, and testified: We did not find any traces of wounds (*eser-i cerh*), but there was the mark of plague (*haşibesi*) on his face.⁴ He died (*fevt*) of plague (*mat'unen*). Written at the request of the scribe. Late April/early May 1639 (1900 16b-6; III *Zil-Hicce* 1048).

The following year a janissary officer (*yeni çeri zabiti*) in Trabzon castle (*kal'esi*) named Sefer aga emancipated Zul-Fikar bn Abdullah, his 16 year-old Georgian (*Gurci l-asl*) slave (*abd-i memlugi*), whose identifying characteristics included black eyelashes, black eyes, and the mark (*eser*) of plague (*ta'un*) on the right side of his face.⁵ Early November 1640 (1900 70-5; II *Receb* 1050).

OBSERVATIONS

The cases illustrate some of the dire social and economic consequences accompanying plague in the 16th and 17th centuries. Much of the town economy might be paralyzed as people curtailed their daily business activities sharply. Holders of tax-farms, who had paid their fees in advance, were especially vulnerable, but renters also were susceptible to heavy losses. Administrators of pious foundations demonstrated considerable flexibility and ingenuity first in lowering fees even more than once when disaster struck, and then raising them

⁴ Based on the descriptions by Michael Dols the mark of plague (*haşibe*) on the face might refer to abscesses or buboes or pustules or black sores, *The Black Death in the Middle East*, Princeton, 1977, pp. 72, 74n, 78.

⁵ The mark (*eser*) of plague (*ta'un*) on one who has survived it possibly refers to black sores, or to a blackness of complexion.

slowly as conditions improved.

In such circumstances the fluctuations in the economy of Trabzon may be attributed exclusively to the presence or absence of the disease. There are no indications of other factors such as debasement of coinage, inflation, famine, or brigandage which might have influenced conditions. Surely the economic and social consequences of the plague of 1565-1566 in Trabzon are independent of all other factors. When plague struck, the economy collapsed. When the plague moderated, conditions quickly returned to normal.

It is interesting to consider these cases in the light of the stereotypes of Muslim intransigence and fatalism in the face of disease, including plague. Some official registers of legal proceedings specifically mention local people in Trabzon, both Muslim and Greek Orthodox Christians, acting out of fear of the plague. Hammams of course through all the Muslim world were important social gathering places, especially for women, and Islamic law makes numerous requirements in regard to cleanliness. If attendance at Kulle hammam or İskender Paşa hammam dropped drastically, surely people must have had some understanding that contact with those infected by plague could cause themselves or their families to become infected. If people very much reduced their contacts with the İskender Paşa caravanserai in the city, that means that they were cutting back severely their participation in business. If people became dispersed because of the plague, that means that many of them fled the city for safety. Probably some went to the numerous villages in the vicinity of Trabzon, where they hoped to live with their families in greater security until the plague passed. Others must have established themselves in the summer pastures (*yayla*) where many of them spent their summers anyway.⁶ Certainly in a modest-sized place like Trabzon, with only 6000 or 7000 people in 1565,⁷ hundreds, or possibly thousands, of residents abandoned the city temporarily in fear.

Not only some townspeople but also some villagers followed the practice of allowing the infected to be carried to the outskirts of a town and left to die. The court judged that practice to be in accordance with the *sharia*, and the claims of police officials for the fees that they were able to collect from people of a town quarter or village when some one died under inauspicious circumstances were rejected, making the behavior of cauldron-maker İskender completely legitimate.

⁶ On the mountain life of Trabzon, see X. de Planhol, "A travers les chaînes pontiques. Plantations côtières et vie montagnarde", *Bulletin de l'Association de Géographes Français*, 311-312, 1963, pp. 2-12, and "Geographica Pontica", *Journal Asiatique* 251, 1963, pp. 293-309. See also A. A. M. Bryer, "The Estates of the Empire of Trebizond", *Archeion Pontou*, 35, 1978, pp. 374f.

⁷ Heath W. Lowry has estimated the population of Trabzon as 6,012 in 1523, 6,100 in 1553, and 10,575 in 1583, *Trabzon Şehrinin İslamlaşma ve Türkleşmesi 1461-1583*, Istanbul, 1981, pp. 53, 62, 98, and *passim*. My own interpretations of the same sources give populations in the range of 4,500 to 5,200, 4,900 to 5,700, and 6,400 to 7,500 for the same time periods. "Urban population in Anatolia in the Sixteenth Century: a Study of Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon, and Erzurum", *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 7, 1976, pp. 42-47 and p. 51.

Seamen and merchants were so wary of plague that they took themselves to another harbor rather than land at plague-infected Trabzon. Neither the point of origin of the vessel nor the alternate port that the ship found are mentioned, unfortunately, nor are the goods involved. Perhaps the goods were landed at a nearby port and sent by donkey or camel to Trabzon; perhaps another market was found for the goods. But obviously merchants and seamen thought they knew a great deal about plague and how to avoid it.

Michael Dols, in *The Black Death in the Middle East*, points to tensions in Muslim thought between God's omnipotence and human finitude. If some jurists felt that complete submission to God's will required unwillingness to flee from plague, at least some other authorities spoke out in favor of trying to avoid or escape the disease. For whatever it is worth, the important Ottoman scholar Taşköprüzade (d.1553) approved of fleeing from an epidemic of plague, arguing that changing the air is useful and that people should try to go someplace where plague is not expected, so long as they do not violate their familial or civic responsibilities.⁸

In his recent book *Plagues and Peoples*, William McNeill finds great differences in the reactions of the Muslim world and the Latin Christian world in plague. "Moslem response to plague was (or became) passive ... The effect of ... traditions was to inhibit organized efforts to cope with plague ... By the sixteenth century, when Christian rules of quarantine and other prophylactic measures against plague had attained firm definition, Moslem views hardened against efforts to escape the will of Allah ... Moslems regarded Christian health measures with amused disdain, and thereby exposed themselves to heavier losses from plague than prevailed among their Christian neighbors ... this turned into a demographic handicap."

In Latin Europe, on the other hand, "... city governments, especially in Italy, responded rather quickly to the challenges presented by devastating disease. Magistrates learned how to cope at the practical level, organizing burials, safeguarding food deliveries, setting up quarantines, hiring doctors, and establishing other regulations for public and private behavior in time of plague. The ability of city authorities to react in these more or less effective ways was symptomatic of their general vigor..."⁹

⁸ Princeton, 1977, pp. 22f, 98f, 121, 297f, 299f.

⁹ Oxford, 1977, pp. 188f, 186. The Imperial Habsburg ambassador to the Porte, Ogier de Busbecq, resided in Istanbul in 1555 when he reported that 1000 to 1200 people per day were dying there from the plague. According to Busbecq people made no efforts to avoid the disease: "The Turks entertain this opinion concerning the pestilence, that every man's destiny is written by God in his forehead; so that it is a foolish thing among them, to think to decline or avoid it..." *Travels into Turkey*, 3rd ed. Glasgow, 1761, p. 214. Cf. F. Braudel, who observes that in the 16th century between one fourth and one third of the inhabitants of a town could disappear suddenly, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, N.Y., 1972, v. 1, pp. 332f.

Very business-like vigor, and determination, occurred in 16th and 17th century Trabzon. It would be very useful to know more about how that and other Ottoman cities really did function in the face of plague. In Trabzon at that time, the behavior was not passive.¹⁰

¹⁰ In a paper on locusts which I recently submitted for publication I accumulated a considerable amount of evidence concerning Ottoman officials, and local Muslims and Christians, sometimes making extraordinary efforts to combat locusts. The judicial registers of Trabzon are preserved in the archives of Topkapı Palace in Istanbul. Cases cited in the text have been summarized selectively on the basis of their importance and relevance to the topic.

William J. GRISWOLD

CLIMATIC CHANGE: A POSSIBLE FACTOR IN THE SOCIAL UNREST OF SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ANATOLIA*

I. Climate and History

One of the intriguing aspects of history is the effect of a sudden change of weather on a specific event. A normally well prepared navy loses a battle due to unexpected high winds and stormy seas; a series of unseasonal rains leaves fields muddy thus nullifying the effectiveness of a cavalry charge. With the battle lost the activities at the treaty table usually alter the expected outcome. Without the wind or rain, we assume the political results might have differed. Historians almost never assign a single cause for such unexpected change. They are aware that short term weather anomalies perplexed the players in the drama for the moment, but that other factors lie behind the changed views at the treaty table. They very carefully avoid assigning to "the weather" any profound causes for long-term changes in political and social policy.

Not only do they avoid assigning causes, many historians have in the past ignored any role of climatic change when writing of long-term events like a great economic downturn, the ebbing of power from a once great empire, or the movements of population in revolutionary struggles. They rather looked to mundane reasons for these events. One reads of economic and social issues, problems of cultural clash, the traditional practices of leaders and their errors in judgment. Then come demographic changes, the education of leadership, the technological superiority of the opponents, and the role of the religious organizations within the society. The list can be extended — but very seldom does it mention the weather, or to be more accurate the variations of climate

*I owe a heavy debt to my colleague Bruce MacDonald of the Department of Atmospheric Science, Colorado State University, for valuable information and help in understanding some of the intricacies of climatology, as well as time spent in reading the early drafts of this discussion. He is in no way responsible, of course, for misunderstandings or errors I may have made.

which might have also taken place at the same time. Accepting that single cause explanations are shallow and inaccurate, the multi-cause explanations sometimes do not solve the problem either, and leave one with the feeling of equal inaccuracy. How does one explain, for example the movement of thousands of peasants in bloody social revolution for a period of several years or even decades, where for centuries before these people had accepted their economic and social conditions? How can docile, accepting farmers continue paying onerous taxes and suffering the duties attendant upon work on a farm in one area whereas a few hundred kilometers away a similar kind of people refuse to continue, leave their lands and responsibilities, and choose at the least a completely new way of life, and at the worst, death?

Recent research from meteorological scientists suggests that climate may indeed play a much more important role in understanding long-term historical activities than we had earlier thought.¹ With advances in the technology of such science as oceanography, glacier research, dendrochronology, meteorology, and phenology historians are beginning to tap information to throw light on what in the past they considered almost total darkness.² By studying the findings of atmospheric scientists, historians have learned that climatic changes over an extended period (say, two to three centuries) affect the amount of available moisture on the ground and the fluctuations of temperature in any given region. Thus, the climatic changes affect the generalized economic and agricultural productivity not just of a small area but of vast regions and often in measurably different ways. It seems reasonable to assume that the role of climatic change is a vital factor to consider when analyzing the courses of long-term historical changes. The problem facing the historian is how to recognize such climatic anomalies and what statistical evidence leads him to believe his assumptions are valid.

In his book, *Times of Feast, Times of Famine*, E. Le Roy Ladurie explained a long-term climatic cooling period which directly affected Europe.³ The so-called "Little Ice Age" appears to have changed Europe's climatic activities from about 1590 to about 1850. During this period of almost three centuries climatologists noted evidence of a distinct cooling of the central European region. Artists' pictures of a village show a huge nearby glacier at one period; while, some two hundred years later similar pictures show the same village with the glacier having receded.⁴ Through phenological studies scholars found trees generally planted quite far north no longer grew to fruition and were removed for hardier crops. Grapes harvested normally early in the year in one century were harvested much later in the ensuing decades, lowering the quality of

¹ Examples which greatly aided this study include H. H. Lamb, *Climate Present, Past and Future* (London, 1972), esp. Vol. II; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Times of Feast, Times of Famine* (New York, 1971); the collection of articles edited by Geoffrey McBayle, *Climate in Review* (Boston, 1973); and Stephen H. Schneider, *The Genesis Strategy* (New York, 1971).

² "Phenology is the study of the dates at which certain phenomena occur in plants....," Le Roy Ladurie, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 221-25.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Plate XIX of 1780 and XX of 1966.

the fruit. Other historians found such phenological data in village church records noting important occasions such as the annual opening of the grape harvest. They compiled the information, fed it onto computers, and confidently concluded that though the farming techniques, the sources of seed, the time of planting and the method of gathering data had not varied appreciably, the time for harvesting the ripened fruit did. Some factors caused this phenomenon all across Europe, from Greenland to the Urals. Meteorologists corroborated what the historians had only conjectured. By analyzing such quantifiable information as average sea temperatures, the movement of glaciers, even samples of pollen in sediment and comparing all this with modern information on temperature and moisture, the results appeared conclusive. Europe from about 1550 to 1850 had probably experienced a drastic cooling compared with the earlier period — a "Little Ice Age".

Because of the plethora of such exciting information some were led to jump to conclusions, even to explaining of long periods of social crisis as having climatic origin.⁵ Yet, even if we accept the importance of climatic change in European history, do these variations from the norm occur elsewhere? If one is a student of the Middle East or the eastern Mediterranean or the Caucasus, can he leap to the conclusion that similar social unrest in the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century was at its roots caused by changes in climatic conditions? Did the European "Little Ice Age" affect adjacent regions?

Cautiously, we can point to a climatological relationship which does exist between Europe and the Aegean-Anatolian region. Climatologists have long known that circulation modes, the world's jet streams and atmospheric activities, all move in interconnecting relationships. As one atmospheric scientist put it, "a kick in one spot will cause a bulge elsewhere."⁶ By comparing modern circulation modes, the way climate develops in its gross patterns, with earlier modes, one can suggest with fair accuracy certain characteristic behavior of climate, temperature change, and drought patterns of a region for past centuries. One can then compare the earlier reports with the modern in order to suggest a possible correlation between the two. With this information, the historian may draw inferences from his knowledge of Europe's "Little Ice Age". Such extremes of cold and dry climate may well tempt an explanation of certain heretofore mysterious historical events.

Can we rely on such findings? Can we "prove" certain events to have occurred because of climatic changes? Can we "fix blame" for battles lost, or

⁵ Le Roy Ladurie explains the role of the historian G. Ütterstrom and others in this process, pp. 8-11. Recently, however, several interesting articles appeared under the general theme of "Great historical events that were significantly affected by the weather," by J. Neuman: "1. The Mongol invasions of Japan," *Bulletin American Meteorological Society*, Vol. 56, No. 11 (November, 1975), pp. 1167-1171; "2. The years leading to the revolution of 1789 in France," *BAMS*, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 163-168; and "3. The cold winter of 1657-58, the Swedish army crosses Denmark's frozen sea areas," *BAMS*, Vol. 59, No. 11 (November 1978), pp. 1432-37.

⁶ Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 118. "Every place on earth is connected to some extent by the climatic system to every other place; that is, a kick in one spot will cause a bulge elsewhere."

"give credit" to political leaders who acted in ignorance but in consonance with climatic changes which worked to their advantage? What are the dangers implicit in the use of climatological data to support historical research?

The historian faces two problems: he must begin to search his own documents for information leading to suggestions of climatic anomalies, and then must utilize the sciences of climatology. In the first case the problem is one of increased powers of observation and selection. It is not enough to find that a traveling ambassador could not get to an appointment with an important official due to an unseasonal rainstorm, although such information may be ultimately useful as a check on the data. It is not enough to note that population in certain cities seemed to increase in number, and that population decreased in rural areas, though such information may be usefully quantified and analyzed. It is not even enough to obtain contemporary documents explaining the changes in agricultural techniques in a certain village, though several such reports and their accompanying data could be very helpful as corroborative evidence. Such data must be paralleled by other information, quantifiable in nature, to give acceptable veracity to the hypothesis. In Europe, tree plantings had been noted down for centuries and the painting of the same glacier over a period of several decades gave almost incontrovertible evidence of a general cooling pattern. Someone had even made measurements of sea temperatures which could be quantified and analyzed statistically. The historian of the Middle East must reach for other kinds of information. Fortunately, as we will see, such an available source for accurate data exists in the science of dendrochronology.

After he finds and organizes his data, the historian must not only show that Event A occurred at the same time as Climatic Anomaly B, but also that between A and B a functional relationship exists. This must be verified statistically, over an extended period of time, after which he should be able to deduce evidence of similar occurrences to Event A at other historical periods. He might then conjecture guesses as to the presence or absence of climatic change and the effect this latter might have on the society in question. Yet finding the functional relationship between Event A and Anomaly B may not be easy.

At a recent conference in Britain, H. A. Bridgman suggested that specialists in the field of climate and history be aware of several very important problems, among which the question of functional relationship was the highest priority. In the December, 1979 issue of the *Bulletin of American Meteorological Society*, Bridgman pointed out five objectives for specialists in the field, all of which bear repeating for historians interested in pursuing this work.⁷ First, neither climatologists nor historians have done enough detailed research in order to establish "a solid framework in which conceptual and methodological issues can correctly be placed."⁸ Historians tend to be unwilling to tie themselves to scientific anchors and their explanations are "generally probabilistic." Though such reliance on probabilities rather than certainties can

⁷ H. A. Bridgman, "The international conference on climate and history—a lesson in realities," *BAMS*, Vol. 60, No. 12 (December 1979), pp. 1429-31.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1429.

be helpful in expanding the basic assumptions for historical events, they should not be relied on for more than supplementary reasons or supporting data, to indicate probable trends in one area and something to consider in another.

The so-called "hard data" we do have, says Bridgman, should be increased and made available to more historians. At the present, for example, we have modern temperature and precipitation records available in many parts of the world, some of which reach back to a bit more than one century. Though insufficient for ideal long-term understanding of pre-modern climatic change, this data can be very useful as corroboration for other data, such as tree rings, which date back to the century of interest, and can indicate the relative moisture content of a specific area. For Anatolian studies, for example, we should make every effort to find the available data in other pre-modern societies, for example, analyzing Chinese records for moisture content, since these records continue uninterrupted for hundreds of years.⁹ The voluminous documents of the Ottoman Empire, the *Mühimme Defterleri*, should be culled for information relating to specific climate-related problems raised in the various provinces from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. The use of tree ring data has recently been much advanced by Professor Peter Kuniholm's researches in the Aegean region. All this information gathering will take time and the interest of the various governments involved. When collected, this data may possibly provide the kind of contemporary information for the Middle East as Le Roy Ladurie analyzed for Europe's "Little Ice Age."

The historian must also study the relationship of the data gathered with the social history he knows. How did the society respond to increasing cold during months which previously had been considered suitable for planting? Did the agrarian response to the lack of rain produce different farming techniques or merely a return to traditional cultural solutions such as special prayers or dances? Numerous other possibilities of study come to mind, including the question of stress factors within the society, longer confinement in the winter months, the difficulty of work in extraordinarily hot, dry weather, the increasing demands on the female for heavy labor, and the attendant effect on the nuclear family. Another aspect of this problem concerns the increasing demand of various groups: farmers, urban settled peoples, and special interest organizations such as military forces for a greater share of the available resources. What quantities of wheat and rice were demanded for use on the battlefield, thus requiring farmers' use of seed as well as the grain, with all the implications for the next planting? With a decreasing water supply, what recourse had the farmer downstream where law allowed those upstream to have first choice? At the same time, one must question the blaming of misspent energies and unrealistic objectives on "the weather." To what extent, the historian must ask, do the various social upheavals result from the inability of leaders to act rationally, to accept certain limits on their ambitions and not trust in the natural elements for a happy solution to a

⁹ Personal information from Professor Elmar Reiter, Department of Atmospheric Science, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, 80523, in April 1978.

problem of their own making?

Bridgman then suggests that historians must analyze these social upheavals as peasants' attempts to adjust to the long-term climatic changes. Did they develop technologies to overcome the problems they faced? An example of this may be certain ingenious inventions such as the early Persian *qanat* system by which water could be moved for scores of kilometers underground in a region well-known for its aridity. A perception of extreme cold in one area may not be climatic change as much as an example of a society unable or unwilling to adapt to the new realities. As in our own time, orange groves in northern Florida may have traditional and sentimental value but because of almost certain climatic variables have considerably less financial and economic certainty than some other kinds of agriculture. For historians to analyze the problem of billions of dollars' loss in light of only a climatic change is to miss an important social problem: the inability of the orchardists to respond to an obvious difficulty with a different kind of fruit, or a new technology to save their trees.

Thus, the change in annual climate patterns, over a period of a century, or more must receive attention as it affects the people of a region, as the society responds to what appears to be a temporary anomaly but later becomes the reality of a true change, a change which may last for two or three hundred years. How did societies react to these changes? The historian, says Bridgman, must wonder if such severe climatic changes always resulted in social upheaval. Some upsetness will occur inevitably. The desire for the sweetest grape will force the arborist to harvest the crop at the latest moment, and if that moment happens to be August instead of September, or late July instead of August, the wine may be inferior to grapes harvested in climatic conditions where the grape has longer to grow. Thus, if he insists on planting grapes, his wine may decrease in value. Governments which help farmers solve these problems may not face wide-spread social frustration as compared with those societies which doggedly continue the traditional patterns after significant climatic changes have occurred. Social revolution may indeed result from the climatic change in the long term, but the immediate cause may be an irrational clinging to the traditional past.

Can we rely then on the scientific data of the climatologist for answers to why societies became restless, then revolutionary, in their response to the environmental changes which affected them? The answer is yes, but with caution and certain provisions. To see a direct cause and effect relationship between a social upheaval and a period of a decade of climatic anomalies really cannot be considered certain by either the scientist or the historian. Some cases may occur, but they are rare. As Bridgman implies, changes in social practices, as the removal of monarchs or massive and bloody fighting of peasants and master, might very well have occurred in the absence of the climatic change. They may have derived from flaws inherent in the political system for such mundane reasons as lack of social mobility, injurious taxation, a rising number of jobless due to inflated prices, and so on.

Yet, climate must be taken into consideration as historians search for more accurate reasons for social upheaval. When "the weather plays tricks" on

the shepherd or the orchardist, the army general or the tax collector, societies do react. The margin of error in an economic system during a period of continued severe climate change may be so slim that excessive—or even normal—demands cannot be responded to except by frustration and rebellion. Historians should watch unusual movements of populations, from rural to urban, and then check to see if these movements resulted not only from social and political repression but some repeated change in local meteorological conditions. They must constantly question: what incites the most conservative and least mobile group of a society, the sedentary farmer, to leave his ancestral lands and rebel against his sovereign?

II. European Revolutions in the Seventeenth Century

The history of the early seventeenth century has long interested and perplexed western historians. In his book *Six Contemporary Revolutions*, Roger Merriman asserted that France, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, England, and Naples suffered rebellions and social unrest in a curiously coincidental fashion.¹⁰ All of these revolutions, occurring between 1640 and 1650 began, said Merriman, because of financial problems in the respective central governments. All the revolutionaries successfully challenged the authorities for a time, and all eventually changed the social and in some cases the political direction of their respective states. Yet, these six were not the only revolts in the first half of the seventeenth century. Other examples include central Europe which watched with horror from 1618 to 1648 as armies of Spanish, German, Danish, Swedish and French crossed and recrossed German-speaking lands in devastating religious and political struggles. Farther east massive armed movements between the Kingdom of Poland and the czars of the Muscovite state ended in frustration and mutual hatred, and led the Russians through a "Time of Troubles" after which they finally settled on a new dynasty and reorganization of their government. Truly, the fifty years of the first half of the seventeenth century in Europe were revolutionary.

Merriman, like most historians, views the six western revolutions of the first half of the seventeenth century as a breakdown of the traditional patterns of authority. This same analysis commonly is made of the Thirty Years War and the explosions of antagonism by the Poles for the Russians. Yet, knowing as we now do that the early seventeenth century in western Europe experienced severe cooling with its attendant agricultural problems, and realizing that up to 80 percent of the regions involved were agricultural, historians should consider another dimension be added to the list of causes: the possibility that the climatic changes which had taken place in Europe, making normally accepted political and social changes far more difficult or, in some cases, unacceptable. Even in the best of times these northern latitude peoples face agricultural problems far more severe than those of more southern regions. Yet, temperatures in the early seventeenth century appeared significantly lower than in previous and later

¹⁰ (Oxford, 1938). Merriman deals with each of these revolutions in detail.



decades.¹¹ Given the possibility of wide-spread climate-related social frustration from Spain to Poland, one might easily wonder if social revolutions also existed in the Middle East and, if so, were they somehow related to a generalized cooling of climatic modes?

III. Anatolian Revolutions in the Seventeenth Century

Anatolian revolution did break out in the heartland of the Ottoman Empire, but somewhat earlier than the six revolutions in western Europe. From about 1585, lasting with intensity until 1610, these rebellions continued on in a desultory fashion until after 1640.¹² These so-called *Celâlî* revolts almost destroyed the Asian dominions of the Ottoman sultan.

Why these rebellions occurred has perplexed historians for many years. Contemporaries generally viewed them as motivated almost entirely by the breakdown of central political authority and of the feudal (*timar*) system of the Ottomans. Added to this explanation are the increase of insubordination among the elite troops known as Janissaries and the weakness of administrative control of the provinces. The monarch, the viziers, the palace retinue, important advisors, and provincial administrative officials, had all become slothful and venal. According to the contemporary argument for the causes of the increasing Ottoman weakness, "the fish rots from its head."

The well-known nineteenth century German historian Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall assigned a specific event as the vital spark of the revolts: the battle of Mezö-keresztes, in 1596.¹³ There, in northeastern Hungary, an Ottoman counter-attack annihilated a Hapsburg army and secured the victory for Sultan Mehmed III. At battle's end the successful general was appointed to the highest post possible, that of grand vizier. This man then ordered all members of the Sultan's cavalry force, who had fled from what they had anticipated would be a massacre, be stricken from the lists as holders of land, *timar* holders. The number, according to von Hammer, totaled about 30,000, and these now landless armed men fled south becoming fugitives or *Firaris*. The *Firaris* joined with various roving bands of outlaws. The expertise brought by the unemployed *Firari* cavalry helped fashion the small groups into large and effective armies. With such force, and equipment obtained by pillage the *Celâlî* armies began to sack small towns. With increased success they began to attack large walled cities. Von Hammer believed the objectives of the *Celâlîs* and their *Firari* aides were political in nature: to establish a state for themselves or perhaps to unify with the Persian shah, Abbas the Great who continually attracted any trained soldiers

¹¹ Le Roy Ladurie, *op. cit.*, p. 52 where a graph shows temperatures in the French wine country, 1599-1775.

¹² William J. Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion, 1000-1020/1591-1611* (Berlin, 1983).

¹³ Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches grossentheils aus bisher unbenützten Handschriften und Archiven*, IV (Pest, 1829), p. 271, p. 304.

to fight against his enemy, the Sultan of Turkey. Von Hammer then traced the concern of the Ottoman government for this rebellious group, how the Ottomans finally made peace with the Austrian Hapsburgs in 1606, and then in 1612 with the Safavids in order to give more energy to the smashing of the large Anatolian *Celâlî* armies. This they did, rather handily, by 1615. Later the Ottomans controlled the local rebel bands which continued to annoy but did not cause excessive trouble to the central government. *Celâlî*-like armies did reappear, when supporters of Sultan Osman II revolted after that unhappy monarch's murder in 1622 by the elite Janissary troops, but by the middle of the seventeenth century, peace was established by a strong sultan, Murad IV. The *Celâlîs*, who had originated as military deserters, the *Firaris*, flourished because of the political weakness of the sultan, and were dispatched when a strong leader put the powerful force of the Empire into order.

Since the time of von Hammer's work, much historical research has proven him to have been only partially correct in his analysis. First, *Celâlîs* existed long before the *Firaris* of Mezö-keresztes. The name *Celâlî* referred to a rebellion in the early sixteenth century and had apparently become a common term for rebel or brigand by the year 1588.¹⁴ The *Celâlîs* did not spend much time besieging towns and cities in the piedmont of western Anatolia, but tended to remain in central Anatolia, the high plateau steppe region which stretches from Eskişehir in the west to Erzurum in the east. Quite opposed to establishing a separate state, they constantly appealed to the government to be allowed to return to the old Ottoman system of land ownership.¹⁵ They wanted to return to lands taken from them or gain lands in order to become elites in the Ottoman system. Only one *Celâlî* leader ever united with the Persian Shah Abbas and only to escape capture at the hands of an Ottoman army sent after him.¹⁶

Von Hammer, in emphasizing the role of the *Firaris*, did not consider that the *Celâlîs* were, for the most part, rootless farmers driven somehow to the life of brigandage. Something besides administrative ineptitude, loss of land to the government, desire to enter the elite class of Ottomans, or the love of booty and excitement aroused these farmers of Anatolia to rebellion for decades. The leadership of the *Celâlî* groups generally sprang from the movement itself. None of the major *Celâlî* leaders had fought at the battle of Mezö-keresztes or fled as *Firaris*. Leaders, although of high-born elite background came almost entirely from the rural, not urban, areas. No example exists during the *Celâlî* revolts of elite urban rebel groups, urban guerrillas, communal movements or educated elites leading angry citizens to the barricades within the city walls. The rebels remained *re'aya*, peasants, Turkish-speaking Muslims who rebelled against their sovereign monarch, the sultan.

In answering the question why Anatolian peasants rebelled, we may first ask why they would *not* rebel. E. R. Wolf suggests that peasants do not easily

¹⁴ From a petition (*card*) of 997/1588, *Divan-i Kalemî* 997-8-C in the Archives of the Prime Ministry, Istanbul.

¹⁵ Griswold, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-18.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, ch. 6.

collectivise, since they generally work alone in their fields involved with their own families, animals, and tools.¹⁷ Peasants have little time for planning seditious activities: the fields would suffer, the animals die, and their families might be in danger of being wiped out. Moreover, peasant peoples can suffer deprivation far longer than urban folk, since they can live on their produce. It may not be a feast, but even a diet of turnips can tide one's loved ones and animals over until another harvest. If dispossessed by some force, a peasant has extended family to whom he can repair rather than rebel and face almost certain disaster. Finally, the farm hand has little experience in articulating clearly his suffering or his problems. In the Ottoman countryside, farmers as taxpayers were bound to the lands they cultivated. Only by paying an annual severance tax could they legally set out for the city to improve their lives. For an Anatolian farmer, rebellion was not a practical option but only a last resort.

Yet farmers did revolt in Anatolia, and Wolf provides three possible reasons why. First, the gap between peasant farmers and the ruling elites was widening. Mutual accessibility between the two groups had decreased. Scores of plaintive requests almost bombarded Istanbul during the period, requests which surely must have gone unattended in many cases due to the extraordinary political and military difficulties suffered at the time by the Ottoman government. The elites no longer recognized the obvious signals of alarming conditions under which the Anatolian farmers lived. Peasants could be removed from their farms by new agricultural practices, such as the *çiftlik*, by which small farms were absorbed by a large landowner. Other changes in land usage resulted in the sale of lands to a new class of wealthy urbanites rather than the former *tumar*-holders, and the use of land for sheep herding and nomadic transhumance. High prices, possibly brought about by the general sixteenth century European price inflation, but also by rising demand for land, as well as the government's desire for taxes in cash not kind, to pay its increasingly expensive infantry forces, put new pressures on the Anatolian farmer. By tricks, like exceedingly high payment for the entry-fine, peasants often lost their inherited rights to lands to elite landholders, who turned the property to their own profit—and the peasant and his family out.¹⁸ Security of personal property in Anatolia constantly diminished due to the insolence of the elitist Janissary troops who were nominally in charge of keeping the peace in Anatolia. The constant drain of agricultural produce and human beings for the two-front wars increased from the mid-1580s until the first decade of the seventeenth century. Almost the entire burden of the chaotic conditions lay on the Anatolian peasant farmer—who must have felt keenly the distance between himself and his government.

Another reason for peasant revolt, generalizes Wolf, is demography: abrupt population pressures strain the cultural arrangements, rip apart kinship relationships, force the excess to find new solutions for survival. Several recent

¹⁷ E.R. Wolf, "On peasant rebellions," in Ronald Ye-lin Cheng, ed., *The Sociology of Revolution, Readings on Political and Popular Unrest* (Chicago, 1973), pp. 157-67

¹⁸ Michael Cook, *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 1450-1600* (London, 1972), p. 23.

studies provide helpful information on the evidence of population changes in Anatolia. Michael Cook's analysis of fiscal surveys in three Anatolian regions, Aydın in the west, Hamid a bit further south and east, and Tokat in the east-central region, shows a 3.3% drop in Aydın from 1529 to 1575, but a 1.7% increase in Hamid, from 1523 to 1568, and a 1.2% increase in Rum (Tokat) from 1554 to 1574.¹⁹ The research of R. C. Jennings demonstrated an abundant increase of population of five major cities of Anatolia from 1523 to 1583.²⁰ However, L. Erder and S. Faroqhi found that somewhat near the turn of the sixteenth century, the Anatolian population growth may have begun to decline. Their analysis of the central Anatolian city of Şebinkarahisar shows the population dropped about 57% in the years 1569 to 1613 though the populations of western cities increased.²¹ The research of Halil İnalcık indicates many wealthy persons fled Anatolia for "the Balkans, the Crimea, Iran and the Arab lands" for security.²² Strong evidence exists that many people pressed to gain entrance into the major cities of Anatolia and into Istanbul. A contemporary English observer in the city in April 1597 reported the Ottoman government had forced certain runaway villagers out of the capital and back (presumably to their homes) to Anatolia.²³

Wolf's third reason for rebellion is ecological: farmers revolt when they have difficulty in repaying the costs of what they have sown, when the cycle of good and bad weather to which they have grown used suddenly breaks into unreliable sequences of unexpected dry or wet periods, making difficult if not impossible, the growth of normally anticipated crops. Only the most severe crisis would lead a farmer to contemplate leaving his ancestral lands: planting crops in the usual manner which then froze in a series of cold springs or early fall frosts; using seeds from years of normal moisture content which would, during a series of dry years, produce a different crop yield, each year producing successively poorer quantity and quality. Eventually, the frustrations of such agricultural catastrophes would give the farmer little alternative to leaving the land for the city—or to rebellion.

In applying these reasons for rebellion to the Anatolian case we find evidence in the late sixteenth and seventeenth century records that certain climatological abnormalities existed, but unfortunately we have not enough data to draw any statistically valid conclusion. Contemporary evidence does indicate

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²⁰ R. C. Jennings, "Urban population in Anatolia in the sixteenth century, a study of Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon, and Erzurum," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, VII (January, 1976), pp. 21-57.

²¹ Leila Erder and Suraiya Faroqhi, "Population rise and fall in Anatolia, 1550-1620," *Middle Eastern Studies*, XV, No. 3 (October 1979), p. 335, Table IV.

²² Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire, the Classical Age, 1300-1600*, (New York, 1970), p. 50.

²³ H. F. Brown, *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in Other Libraries of Northern Italy*, IX, 1592-1603 (London, 1899), No. IX of April 12, 1597, p. 265.

problems in agricultural production levels. L. Güçer's research in the official Ottoman *Mühimme Defterleri* notes specific complaints of famine from 1578 to 1637 in forty-two regions of the Ottoman Empire. Fifteen of these were in Anatolia and the remainder in the Aegean, Black Sea, and Thracian regions. A few of the documents he studies refer to locust plagues (1579, 1586), to infestations of rats (1595), or to lack of seasonal rains (1584, 1585), but for the most part they complain only of famine conditions.²⁴ The English ambassador to the Ottoman Sultan, Sir Thomas Roe, commented in 1622 on the decrease in the number of villages in the empire. Referring to the celebrated survey of Aynî Ali of 1699, Roe remarked that of the 553,000 Ottoman villages enumerated then, the number had "decreased to 75,000 in all, which is a strange depopulation."²⁵ The question is, do such remarks indicate poor agricultural conditions, massive rains, or excessive periods of drought? The report of another contemporary, Fynes Moryson, in 1605 noted that Anatolia lacked people to till the soil even though "the ground of it selfe brings forth diverse wild fruits without tillage".²⁶ From such an observation one might conclude that Anatolia at the time experienced not a generalized cooling trend but normally expected climate for farming. Something else had led to the "strange depopulation."

If urban Anatolian populations rose in the late sixteenth century, and villages did indeed become barren wastelands, we can assume a fairly well-defined population movement off the land to the cities. Such movement could explain the strains placed on the available mechanisms to control public order reported by many of the contemporary provincial Ottoman officers.²⁷ We must also assume that as urban population increased, the cities demanded greater quantities of agricultural products from villages in the region. If nearby farms did not supply these needs, the cities would be forced to depend on ever-widening circles of food transport. We know that thousands of pack animals had been drafted for use in the two-front wars which the Ottoman government had been fighting since the third quarter of the sixteenth century. Local administrative chiefs in Anatolia commonly complained of thieves not only ransacking the homes, but "sheep, goats, horses and good camels...." in the villages.²⁸ Since transportation in pre-industrial times depended on such animals, the loss could quickly narrow the line between eating and starving. Any lack of grain would extend to animals as well

²⁴ Lütü Güçer, XVI. XVII. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Alınan Vergiler (Istanbul, 1964), Table No. 1, pp. 8-9.

²⁵ E. S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Turks: from the Beginning of their Empire to the Present Time, Chiefly Founded on von Hammer, I* (London, 1854), p. 322.

²⁶ Charles Hughes ed., *Shakespeare's Europe, Unpublished Chapters of Fynes Moryson's Itinerary, Being a Survey of the Conditions of Europe at the End of the 16th Century. With an Introduction and Account of Fynes Moryson's Career, IV* (London, 1903), p. 20 of 1605-07.

²⁷ The Ottoman national archives contain volumes of complaints and requests from the Anatolian and Rumelian provinces concerning the upset conditions of the times. A few have been transliterated into modern Turkish by Mustafa Akdağ, *Celâli İsyanları, 1550-1603* (Ankara, 1963), pp. 258-84, dating from about 972/1564 to 1012/1603. These include documents from the *Mühimme Defterleri*, *Ankara Sicilleri*, *Divan Kağıt Defterleri*, etc.

²⁸ Akdağ, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

as humans. Villagers would tend to decrease their herds as their grain supplies dwindled, proportionately diminishing the food available to the cities.

Thus the historian probes various possibilities in the quest to understand the Anatolian rebellions. Population decreased in rural areas, increased in cities. Peasants rebelled because they needed jobs; elites rebelled to re-enter the Ottoman system. Europe's money attracted grain from the empire, but Europe's general cooling trend may have slowed shipments to the capital of Balkan grain and cattle. Some contemporaries complained of drought and famine conditions, others that land would be productive if the farmers were to return. None of these sometimes conflicting issues helps us to understand the *Celâli* revolts clearly. None totally negates the others, but none stands out as preeminent. We are forced to seek other sources to verify some of this data. Such a source is the use of climatological information.

IV. *The Relationship of Circulation Patterns in Europe and Anatolia*

Did climatic changes similar to Europe's "Little Ice Age" occur in seventeenth century Anatolia? We know that Russia, Finland, and Poland suffered lengthened winters of severe cold in the late sixteenth century.²⁹ H. H. Lamb states, however, that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "Turkey, the Russian territories and China... were exceptional in enjoying population growth."³⁰ Did Turkey—the Ottoman provinces in the east of Anatolia—enjoy better growing seasons than Europe regardless of the complaints of extraordinary winters sent to the central government from Ottoman armies fighting against Persia?³¹

Did Europe's "Little Ice Age" directly affect Anatolia, that is, can we establish a climatological connection between Europe and the Aegean-Anatolian region? We know that the actual temperature of the North Sea near the Faeroe Islands, which affects inland European temperatures, averaged about 2°C during the seventeenth century, compared with the modern 7°C to 8°C.³² We also know the Guadalquivir River in Spain, which is the same latitude as Anatolia,

²⁹ Le Roy Ladurie, *op. cit.*, p. 228, and Lamb, *op. cit.*, p. 459, fn. 2, telling of the great famine which "occurred in eastern Europe (Poland, Lithuania, and Russia) ... beginning in 1568 and lasting until 1578."

³⁰ Lamb, *op. cit.*, p. 473.

³¹ W. Barthold (C. J. Heywood), "Kars," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., IV (Leiden, 1973-78), p. 670.

³² In a personal letter, dated January 4, 1977, Professor H. H. Lamb stated: "It would be surprising if Anatolia escaped the Little Ice Age, which seems now clearly established as a global phenomenon. The Arctic sea ice increased its extent until it normally blocked the coasts of even *south* Greenland and was to be found on parts of the coast of Iceland probably in most years. The sea between Iceland and the Faeroe Islands (half way to Scotland) seems to have had an average temperature about, or slightly below, 2°C., i.e., between 5°C below modern values in the Gulf Stream water which now normally dominates the Iceland-Faeroe-Shetland channel."

froze in 1602.³³ Can we consider associating these extraordinary events with early frosts mentioned in Constantinople in 1606,³⁴ or the freezing over of the Bosphorus and Golden Horn in 1621?³⁵ If western Europe felt increasing cold, was Anatolia subject to the same trends? Or did Anatolia at this time in fact enjoy relatively normal seasons, quite different from Europe, producing food even at times of increased rebellion?

To answer such questions we must first understand Anatolia's climatological relationship to Europe. Because of its geographical position, Anatolia's climatic features fall not in Europe's sphere but in the eastern-most region of the Mediterranean belt. Meteorologists place Anatolia in a mid-latitude region, considerably south of Europe's glacier action and about the same as Spain.³⁶ The Mediterranean basin has different atmospheric circulation patterns from Europe's, so climatic responses can thus be expected to differ. A certain inter-relationship exists, however. Central Anatolia, where most of the *Celâli* revolts occurred, receives almost all its winter cooling from storms originating in the east, over Russia. Prevailing winds move from west to east, however, so the *lodos* winds from the southwest move from the warmer Mediterranean bringing the vital spring rains. Any unusual change of climatic modes in western Europe or Russia *could* effect the Anatolian region over a long period. For shorter periods, however, localized circulation patterns tend to prevail.

For answers to more complex issues, such as the relationship of temperature and precipitation three hundred years ago, we must ascertain from modern records the temperatures and moisture content of the land over a period of approximately a century. Such information may easily be obtained from modern meteorological records in the Aegean and Anatolian region. We also may find useful information by studying the growth patterns of trees which lived at the same time and place, and were affected by the same climatic changes when these events occurred.

Because suitable dendrochronological data do not exist for such a locale of interest (inasmuch as many or most of the trees have been destroyed) we must rely on description of the spatial extent or pattern of droughts or cold winters, using modern meteorological data. Given a description of these patterns, it may be possible to incorporate tree-ring data from a wider region to describe the local weather or climate anomalies. Such analysis could provide a reasonably accurate depiction of climatic patterns during the period of interest and allow the historian

³³ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. by Sian Reynolds, I (New York, 1972), p. 272.

³⁴ Comte Théodore de Gontaut Biron, ed., *Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut Biron, Baron de Salignac, 1605 à 1610, correspondance diplomatique et documents inédits* (Paris, 1889), p. 104.

³⁵ I. H. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi, III*, (Istanbul, 1950), p. 279, states the Golden Horn froze completely on January 24, 1621, and the Bosphorus on February 9, 1621. However, Joseph von Hammer-Durgstall, trans., *Evliya Efendi, Narrative of Travels in Europe in the Seventeenth Century*, I (London, 1846), p. 115, states the year was 1620.

³⁶ Glen T. Trewartha, *An Introduction to Climate*, 4th ed., (New York, 1968), particularly "Subtropical climates", pp. 281-304.

to postulate with some accuracy various reasons for the social changes which occurred. First, however, we must obtain whatever dendrochronological data we can find in a place like Anatolia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A project dedicated to just such a collection of data originated a decade ago, and possibly will provide us with the information we need. Professor Peter I. Kuniholm of Cornell University in New York has developed a remarkable master tree-ring chronology for the eastern Mediterranean region. He and his assistants for many years have gathered tree cores from mosques and churches in various cities and villages in mainland Greece, the islands of Crete and Cyprus, and mainland Turkey. The gathered cores were analyzed for evidence of individual differences relative to annual growth as well as chronology. Kuniholm has established the North Greek Oak Master Chronology which runs from 1116 to 1980 AD. This extensive and accurate analysis resulted in plots of cores for a large triangular region stretching from Bosnia to Cyprus to Erzurum in eastern Anatolia.³⁷ Kuniholm feels the annual rings obtained "exhibit a recognizably similar response to climatic stimulus."³⁸ Thus a growth ring obtained in Cyprus, because of the uniformity of the climate regionally, may show similarities to trees from Anatolia. Kuniholm found that both conifers and deciduous trees respond "in a similar way to certain climatic stimuli, whatever those stimuli are."³⁹ The quest for more trees and monuments continues, and greater accuracy for checking the hypotheses will grow proportionately with the incoming evidence. Even though the samples are widely scattered over sites as far apart as 2400 kilometers, there is "enough uniformity in the climate so that recognizably similar responses for hundreds of years at a time can be detected..."⁴⁰

After acquisitions of the growth ring data and the general statistical computation to ascertain the climatic variations in the regions, the next step is to match the data with that of the modern meteorological information in the Aegean-Anatolian triangle region. In computing this, one will observe to what extent the tree growth patterns evident in the tree rings correlate with the annual growth in other areas of the region in the past century of modern data collecting. Statistically, one can examine the spatial correlation of modern precipitation and temperature data and assess the "confidence" in claiming that a change in temperature in one site will indicate proportionate variance at a corresponding site during the seventeenth century. Given enough accurate growth rings to make a statistically acceptable data base (Kuniholm puts the number of samples per year at a minimum of 10) we can plot the relationship (or lack thereof) between the triangle regions and the two time periods. We can compare modern Saloniki

³⁷ See map, Fig. 1, from P. I. Kuniholm, "Aegean Dendrochronology (Project, 1982 Summer Field and Report Fall Progress Report," (mimeographed report dated December 1982, Department of Classics, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.), p. 3, "Oak and conifer forests crossdated with Çatacık, 1981."

³⁸ P. I. Kuniholm. "Aegean dendrochonology project, expedition to Greece, 1979-1980," *National Geographic Society Research Reports, 1979-1980* (Ithaca, NY, 1980), pp. 2-3.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 4

and Erzurum with the same stations in the period 1550-1650. We can also determine that certain climatic variations occurred in areas contiguous to the major regions of data collection, and establish with a certain level of confidence that the variations in the one area closely resembled those of the other.

The results may help justify the theory that climatic conditions should be considered as an important cause of the seventeenth century *Celâlî* revolts. We can double-check governmental and other reports to note agreement concerning our findings and theirs. We can ascertain if climatic conditions degenerated to such a degree that peasant farmers or marching armies were affected by severe climate problems, or, if the conditions remained about the same, that other hypotheses must be suggested.

V. Severe Climatic Change and the *Celâlî* Revolts

Several possible scenarios may be postulated from analysis of the combination of dendrochronological and modern meteorological data in the eastern Mediterranean. None is complete, yet all have a modicum of truth and bear further study.

First, the data show fairly clearly that circulation patterns shifted in the period 1550 to 1650 in Anatolia. Farmers in 1600 doubtless found the problems of agriculture they faced more difficult than those of their grandfathers fifty years before. Times of extreme moisture followed by conditions of drought certainly could have affected agricultural patterns of behavior accustomed to more clement and dependable seasons. Although massive brigand armies faded away by 1610, they grew again in eastern Anatolia from 1620 to about 1650. Were these continuing social spasms part of the continual shifting circulation modes?

A second problem relates to the question of grain distribution. During the Great *Celâlî* revolts the annual growth shown in tree rings appears to have increased greatly.⁴¹ Does this indicate droughts had occurred previously which limited the production of grain like wheat and barley? Or does it indicate relatively normal production rates during the two decades of revolt, but with maldistribution among the needy? Was the problem not just the lack of wheat available but in truth the lack of wheat *sold* in Anatolia? Given the "Little Ice Age" in Europe, and the known fact that Anatolian landowners with wheat could (and often did) sell their grain illegally to European markets, can we not see another reason for revolt?⁴² A Ragusan market in illegal Ottoman wheat existed, bound for Christian Europe. "Turkish officials and local feudatories were often actively engaged in these activities, resulting in frequent famine in several parts of the Ottoman lands".⁴³ If Europe had the money and Anatolia the grain, could

⁴¹ See Graph, Fig. 2.

⁴² Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 5

⁴³ Nicholaas H. Biegan, *The Turco-Ragusan Relationship, According to the Firmans of Murad III (1575-1595) Extant in the State Archives of Dubrovnik* (The Hague, 1967), p. 108.



the weakened Ottoman government easily stop such illegalities? If not, much of Anatolia's critical years of political unrest may have ultimately derived from an issue of demand and supply.

Thirdly, what caused *tumar* holders of Anatolia to change their land use practice with the result that peasants were uprooted in the seventeenth century? Why did some grain-producing landowners begin at the turn of the century to go into sheep herding?⁴⁴ Why would the sale of meat and wood provide a better income for some owners than grain? Did Anatolians change from the traditional individual peasant farms to the massive *çiftlik* of the late sixteenth century which displaced many peasants?⁴⁵ Possibly a series of bad harvest years produced such poor crops that the owners decided to opt for more practical farming practices. Or, was it the other way around? Maybe production actually proved quite satisfactory for some large farms, allowing enough pasturage for sheep to graze for a more profitable sale, or for owners under the new system to produce grain which could be legally (or illegally) sold to European markets for a better profit than the legal market.

A fourth possibility exists: with the enormous demand for grains and other foodstuffs for the long wars with Persia, which lasted until 1612, much of the available grain went directly into military operations. Some seed might be kept out for planting, but if we assume that climatic conditions effectively denied bumper crops, then the granaries might become quickly empty; the poor would suffer, perhaps migrate to the cities where food would be more accessible. If they suffered long enough, such people might be induced to rebel.

A far more interesting scenario comes to mind as a fifth possibility: what if the climate was normal? What then? In order to analyze this possibility we must consider land use practices and the results if, while Europe suffered serious cooling, Anatolia found itself favorably blessed with normal growing seasons.

Let us consider possible large-scale changes in land use and agricultural practices in Anatolia. The latter may not be easily ascertained if indeed they occurred at all. Even in our own lifetimes Anatolian stick plows continued in use until the advent of mechanized agriculture. The question of changed *land use* practices should be taken more seriously, since any vast rearrangement of lands, such as deforestation on a large scale, indiscriminate well-digging, the reduction of fallow time, or over-grazing could upset the energy balance at earth's surface

⁴⁴ Letter from Halil İnalcık of December 26, 1977 to Peter I. Kuniholm: "Increasingly concerned with the difficulty of supplying the big cities, the government made every effort to stop the contraband wheat trade. It is interesting to read in the Ottoman reports that widespread contraband trade was carried on in the coastal areas: the profiteers, offering twenty percent higher than the officially set prices, amassed in their storehouses large quantities of wheat to sell to 'European ship owners'; and *tumar*-holders, governors, Janissaries, and even members of the *ulema* (religious authorities) were actively involved in this profitable trade. According to [Mustafa] Akdağ however, the real cause of long term shortage in Anatolia was not the contraband trade stimulated by higher European prices, but the spread of the *Çiftlik* (estates owned by grandees) system, which entailed the decrease of cultivated land in favor of animal breeding".

⁴⁵ Erder, *op. cit.*, p. 377.



by altering the earth's natural reflectivity of the sun's energy. Any localized widespread change in the absorptive qualities of the lithosphere could produce abnormal precipitation patterns in that local area. Thus we should recognize that extensive changes in Anatolian land use, as may have occurred with the change over from small individual farms to the large *çiftlik* estates owned by grandees, or of massive sheep herding enterprises, may well have seriously added to the political and social problems of the Ottoman government.

Such may have happened in the period under consideration in Anatolia. "Normal" patterns of rainfall may have existed from about 1560 to 1580 when certain political and social changes occurred: the existence of two-front wars with Austria and Persia, diminishing effective power at the center of the Ottoman Empire as sultans turned to the members of their entourage and to personal favorites for leadership, many of whom aimed primarily to accumulate personal wealth rather than to work for the good of the empire. With a growing market for grains in Europe (partially a result of the "Little Ice Age" conditions) an increasing number of wealthy landowners turned to illegal sales of grain to Europe; and with the diminishing quantities of livestock from Hungary and other Balkan areas (again possibly due to the conditions of the "Little Ice Age" in Europe) numbers of farms were coalesced into vast areas for sheep-herding. The lands covered by these *çiftliks* may have been extensive enough to affect critical climatological factors, particularly the reflection of the sun's energy off the surface, the albedo effect, which in certain locations may have led to drought conditions in a decade or two. One need only compare the effects of overgrazing in the African Sahel which, since 1973, has witnessed ever-increasing drought conditions due to man-made desertification. With the increasing aridity and without modern agricultural methods, the tendency would be for increased movements of population to the cities. This is revealed in the reports by travelers of famine conditions, and the sudden acceleration of hundreds, even thousand, of rootless wanderers in search of work. Add these to the armies of *Celâlîs* already in the field, all looking to pressure the government to take them back into the service of the sultan, and the stage seems set for a huge social explosion. With available arms, the technology of which was relatively simple, thousands of these men could continue under skillful leadership to test the strength of a government already totally involved with other military and police duties at the extremities of the empire. For fifteen years the *Celâlîs* could roam Anatolia at will.

This scenario does not indicate that the circulation patterns of Anatolia had suddenly changed for the worse. Quite the opposite, one can make a good case, particularly from our partial tree ring data, for asserting a relatively normal period of twenty years in agriculture in Anatolia while the *Celâlî* revolt occurred. For twenty or so years prior to 1595 the population of Anatolia may have suffered rather bad crop yields and perforce accepted the "inconvenience" of police forces. But by 1600 climate appears to have become more nearly normal for the average Anatolian farmer: he sowed and reaped as his grandfather had done. This may partially explain the success, if not the action, of the mustering out of the *Firaris* after the battle of Mezö-keresztes. Thirty thousand timariots, some


having vast acreages, were sold off to the highest bidders who, for the next twenty years, perhaps a generation, received a bountiful return on their investment, not to speak of continuing loyalty to the political system which made this new wealth possible.

Unfortunately, with the sultan's armies at the limits of the empire and the local police forces weak or nonexistent local farmers often fell prey to the roving *Celâlîs* who sought animals and grain in their forays, to replenish their mode of transportation and their food. Indeed some travellers corroborate such a possibility in noting that the Anatolian problem was not the presence of drought but the absence of people to farm the lands. Most data indicate a population increase in Anatolia's urban areas, which might explain where many of the refugees found security. (Some records tell us many people found safety in the caves of mountains in central Anatolia.)⁴⁶ Whatever the reason, they did flee, and the result certainly must have hindered the normal agricultural production of Asia Minor.

Yet after the great *Celâlî* rebellions had been put down with ferocity by Kuyucu Murad Pasha, after the breakaway Aleppan state of Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha had been eradicated in Syria, and after the treaties of peace with both the Austrian and the Safavids, by 1612, the Ottoman state gained a certain semblance of order and security for at least another two decades. Anatolian climate may not have felt the long term cooling effect of the "Little Ice Age" in the middle seventeenth century. As long as the government could give its energy to controlling the central regions and farmers continued to produce grain and livestock, rebellion tended to remain quiescent. Massive rebellion did occur after the murder in 1622 of Sultan Osman II, a revolt led by Abaza Mehmed Pasha. It soon died out under the severe discipline of Sultan Murad IV (d. 1640). By the mid-seventeenth century it was not the lack of moisture and good planting seasons that provoked the weakness of the Ottoman sultanate but the lack of leadership in Istanbul. Such a weakness would be solved momentarily by the heavy-handed rule of the Köprülü viziers, while the Anatolian countryside continued to produce its share of the men and grains and livestock to feed the armies of the sultan: ever-hungry, ever-weakening, and ever-unsuccessful.

Thus the correlation of modern and contemporary climatological and historical data helps us more clearly to judge societies in the past. We can, with considerable statistical validity, check on the available contemporary sources for corroboration of an hypothesis. We can with ever greater thoroughness search records of specific years for evidence of contemporary observations referring to regions suffering from excessive drought or moisture. We can compare with some confidence the meteorological data of the knowledge gained from dendrochronology and phenology. Finally, we can apply our best present meteorological technology to the problems of the past societies. The result is multidimensional. Supporting evidence from the climatologist and dendrochronologist mounts in ever-increasing numbers and availability. It only remains for the historian to avail himself of it.

⁴⁶ Abraham Hartvvel, trans., *The Ottoman of Lazaro Soranzo, wherein is deliuered aswell a full and perfect report of the might and power of Mahamet the third, great emperour of the Turkes now raining, etc. etc.* (London, 1605), p. 20 obv.




From P. Kuniholm, Aegean Dendrochronology Project (1982), p.3

Figure 1



ANNUAL GROWTH INDEX

(related to the moisture and temperature at the time of the growth of the ring.)



Time series of tree growth ring index composed of five samples from the Çatacık forest near Eskişehir, Turkey.

Average growth index is 100; e.g. 110=10% above normal. Indices reflect the per cent of normal growth.

From Kuniholm, 1983.

Figure 2



Figure 5

Figure 5 shows the annual mean temperature anomalies (1850-1980) for the following locations: Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev, and the Black Sea. The anomalies are calculated relative to the 1850-1900 mean. The Black Sea data is based on the instrumental record, while the other locations are based on tree-ring data.




Figure 5

From: K. V. Kovalev, 'Annual Dendroclimatology Project (1982)', p. 14



DONALD QUATAERT

LABOR POLICIES AND POLITICS IN THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE: PORTERS AND
THE SUBLIME PORTE, 1826-1896

Ottoman historians too often are intimidated by the boundaries that they themselves have erected in the periodization of Ottoman history. Scholars specializing in the events of the nineteenth century rarely venture into the period before 1826 while those concerned with the classical age infrequently research subjects relating to the "modern" era.¹ The eighteenth century, for its part, almost has been lost in the arrangement, a bastard era wanted by neither of the two major groups of historians and having scarcely any adherents of its own. The existing periodization certainly is often sensible and defensible. Too careful adherence to its delimiting dates, however, has impaired our vision of major trends that overflow from one period into the next. If the topics that Ottoman historians examine in their particular period specializations are to be truly comprehensible, then they must be placed in a broader context of Ottoman history in general.

The government's policy of maintaining its position by manipulating the constituent elements of its subject populations in various ways has deep roots in Ottoman history. To repopulate the new Istanbul capital, Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror both encouraged and compelled the migration of peoples from many parts of the empire. His successors in the late sixteenth century deported vast numbers of young cultivators, Christian as well as Muslim, to the newly-acquired island of Cyprus in order to relieve population pressures and political insecurity in overcrowded Anatolia.² Similarly, to assure domestic tranquillity or to cement its hold on new conquests, the Ottoman government frequently transported population from their home regions to new locales, hence, for

¹ An important exception is Halil İnalcık, whose work began with the nineteenth century study "Tanzimat Nedir?", *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yıllık Araştırmalar Dergisi*, I, 1940-1, and now includes the classical period as well as the eighteenth century.

² Suraiya Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia. Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650* (Cambridge, 1984), p. 283.



example, the Turkish populations in Thrace. More specifically, to obtain needed artisans and particular forms of labor, Ottoman (and Safevid) rulers forcibly moved their own peoples about while offering various inducements, including tax exemptions, to foreigners. Among the most famous cases of attracting foreigners is that of the Iberian Jewish population, brought to Istanbul and Salonica for the skills and knowledge they possessed.

Numerous examples of these kinds of policies are found in nineteenth century Ottoman history. The famous *Fırka-i Islâhiyye* campaign of Cevdet Paşa in 1865, that settled the tribesmen of the hills onto the deadly plains of the Çukurova, was a continuation of long-standing state policies that moved populations to locations that minimized their danger to the government and enhanced their economic productivity.³ Similarly, the shadow of immigration policies in past centuries can be seen both in the government programs to settle the Polish followers of Prince Adam Czartoryski in the Polonezköy community near Istanbul and in its settlement of Polish and Hungarian refugees after the failed revolutions of 1830, 1848 and 1863.⁴ The classical age pattern of settling foreigners in areas of high economic potential also is reflected in the settlement of Muslim refugees from Czarist Russia and the independent Balkan states along the recently built railroad lines of Anatolia and northern Syria. There, they filled sparsely populated areas and brought new agricultural skills just as the Iberian Jewish populations, in quite different ways, had added to the Ottoman economy several centuries earlier. These randomly selected examples underscore several important characteristics of the Ottoman government that held true over the centuries. First, it was an administration that willingly redistributed its own population while utilizing foreign talent to maintain political stability and economic growth. And, second, the Ottoman system throughout the entire period, as befitted a multi-ethnic, multi-religious empire, shuffled about Christians, Jews and Muslims (and foreigners) with equal facility and aplomb.

It is readily apparent that a number of other important government economic policies were carried over, sometimes in modified form, from the Ottoman classical age down to the very end of the nineteenth century. The imperial rescripts of 1839 and 1856 well may be crucial landmarks for Ottoman political and administrative history but they have far less significance for a study of the Ottoman economy. Economic policies, as well as the economic patterns of past eras, find considerable echoes even in the era of the Tanzimat, Âli, Fuat and Midhat Paşa and the Meşrutiyet.

Thus, it should be a matter of little surprise to see threads of continuity in Ottoman methods of labor recruitment and the mobility of labor from the age of Mehmet the Conqueror to that of Abdül Hamid II. In its Golden Age, the

³ Andrew G. Gould, "Lords or Bandits? The Derebeys of Cilicia," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (October 1976), pp. 496-500.

⁴ Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton, 1963), p. 76.

state readily drew on foreigners. To take a famous example from military history: the state tapped the skills of the Transylvanian, Urban, to build the greatest artillery the world had yet seen and bring down the walls of Byzantine Constantinople. At a more prosaic level, the state reallocated laborers, both skilled and unskilled, from one area to another as needed. In common with other great imperial edifices, erection of the great Süleymaniye complex in Istanbul during the second half of the sixteenth century required and employed workers from all over the empire.⁵ Already by that date, and certainly much earlier, labor easily moved about the Black Sea basin, both freely and under state direction. From the other side of the Balkan peninsula, Albanians in the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries regularly migrated to Istanbul and found jobs in the households and estates of Ottoman officialdom.⁶ A century and a half later, in the early 1720s, the state employed workers and materials from the Istanbul and İzmit and the general western Black Sea regions to repair the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. Later in that same decade, laborers and some materials were sent from the capital to erect and maintain fortresses in the Azov region while, at about the same time, workers from the Adana area were scheduled to work on the fortifications at Niş.⁷

As in the past, so too in the nineteenth century, did the state hire its foreign experts, for example, Helmuth von Moltke, to strengthen the military. In this new age, as before, the state relied on a mixture of compulsory and free labor to build its great public works projects. In 1872, for example, the government began to prepare the roadbed for a railroad from İzmit to Ankara, a project in fact not completed until the 1890s, when it was taken over by a Deutsche Bank-directed group. For the task, the government employed a combination of work battalions (*iş bölüğü*), apparently from the military, compulsory labor (*amele-i mükellefe*) and contract labor. Ottoman Kurds, Turks, Armenians and Greeks, as well as Slavs, Rumanians and others from the Balkans were employed on the project. The workers were provided with a daily wage as well as food rations, flour obtained by the government from nearby provinces. Weekly reports were submitted to the auditor's office listing the name of each worker and the amount due each person and each category of worker for the week's work.⁸ In the case of the Sofia railroad being built at about the same time, a similar mix of workers was utilized but even more precise records

⁵ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Süleymaniye Cami ve İmareti İnşaatı (1550-1557)*, I (Ankara, 1972).

⁶ Faroqhi, *Towns*, p. 271.

⁷ Nejat Göyünç, "The Procurement of Labor and Materials in the Ottoman Empire (16th and 18th Centuries)," in Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont and Paul Dumont, eds., *Economie et Sociétés dans l'Empire Ottoman (fin du XVIII^e - début du XX^e siècles)* (Paris, 1983), pp. 327-333.

⁸ Başbakanlık Arşivi (hereafter *BBA*), Nafia Nezareti 68-74 Demiryolları ve Limanlar, D 16 1290, 4-22, various dates, 1289/1873. These documents are part of a group of records from the Public Works Ministry for the years 1280-1293/1863-1876 that recently have been well cataloged and released for the use of scholars. They constitute an exceptional source for nineteenth century economic and social history.



were submitted stating the number of hours each person, whether project supervisor, foreman or day laborer, worked and the total amount owed to each person for the week's work, giving the number of hours worked daily and weekly, as well as the amount due, for each worker.⁹ In their specificity and detail, these records recall those kept for the great mosque-building projects of the classical age. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, European firms were given the charge of building Ottoman railways and wage labor came to predominate the construction stage. In these instances vast work gangs of Ottoman subjects, drawn from all areas of Anatolia, labored together with Italian stone cutters and other foreign workers.¹⁰ As is well known, highways in the nineteenth century, as before, regularly were built and repaired using *corvée* labor, usually employing local sources of manpower.¹¹ In the mid-nineteenth century, the state also followed centuries-old precedents of bringing needed workers from afar when it sought to exploit the newly-discovered Ereğli coal fields on the south shore of the Black Sea. It called on experienced miners from both Bosnia and Montenegro, then still part of the empire, to bore the galleries and cut the coal and also employed English, French and Italian miners.¹² To assure a continuing supply of labor to fulfill the various tasks at these mines, the government of Sultan Abdül Aziz closely followed a set of procedures that already was in force in the late seventeenth century and probably earlier, when villagers from nearby areas were compelled to provide labor for the mines. In the 1670s, villagers near Srebrenica in the Balkans were assigned work in the local mines. In the Srebrenica mines and those of nineteenth century Ereğli, the inhabitants of villages in districts near the mines were assigned certain tasks in a specific mine and labored under a system that changed remarkably little. These two groups of villager-miners were set apart by two hundred years and by different geographical locations as well. But both groups worked according to a very similar set of procedures that dictated the conditions and rotation of the labor as well as methods of reward for the services rendered.¹³

In 1826, the Istanbul regime solved a unique political problem and sought to resolve an attendant but minor labor problem using the time-tested methods of ethnic and religious manipulation. The political problem was the Janissary Corps and its effective opposition to military reform; the labor problem was replacement of the Turkish and Kurdish porters, Janissary supporters who were eliminated from their jobs following the annihilation of the centuries old military unit. Using careful planning, good strategy and good

⁹ *Idem.*, 123 Demiryolları ve Limanlar, D 19, 1290-8-18.

¹⁰ See my *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1882-1908* (New York and London, 1983), pp. 74-76 and sources cited therein.

¹¹ There literally are hundreds of archival references on the subject; for example, see BBA İradeler, Meclis-i Mahsus (hereafter MM) 4829, 18 X 1307/1889; İradeler, MM 4931, 19 II 1308-/1890 and MM 5068, 8 VI 1308/1890.

¹² See my *Social Disintegration*, pp. 40-69, and sources cited therein.

¹³ Compare *ibid.* with Rhoades Murphey, "Ma'din," *Encyclopedia of Islam*.

timing, Sultan Mahmud II destroyed the Janissary corps on June 15, 1826. Two days later, he officially abolished the corps and in the following month dissolved the Bektâşi brotherhood. While the story is a familiar one, some details relevant to Ottoman labor policies and politics need to be repeated here. Janissary resistance had taken the classic form of rebellion against the palace. On the same day that training for the *Eşkenci* corps had begun, rumors against it began circulating in the Istanbul coffeehouses. Janissary orderlies were sent into the Istanbul quarters of Tahtakale, Asmaaltı and Unkapanı and other areas to bring in mass support.¹⁴ Calling on the Istanbul populace to join them in the Etmeydanı, the Janissaries overturned their soup kettles on 15 June. "As always, the watersellers, porters and vagrants gathered to form the second ring around the soup kettles."¹⁵ That is, to underscore the obvious, the Janissaries regularly had been supported by the poorest elements of Istanbul society, including the unemployed as well as casual laborers. Most porters in fact were registered on the rolls of the Janissary corps and "joined with them in every riot".¹⁶ The Janissary-porter links date back at least to the time when the Istanbul corps was given the task of guaranteeing the safe handling of the grain, fruits and other provisions of the capital. One particular division of the corps was responsible for making certain that provisions destined for the people of Istanbul were not transported out of the city to other areas of the empire or loaded onto foreign ships. It may have been at this time that the corps saw the value of allying with the porters whose task, after all, was to move these very goods about the docks and streets of the capital. The system evolved and ultimately the Janissaries were receiving a portion of the goods "safely" transported within the city in exchange for their protection, a clear indication of close ties with the porters and their guilds.¹⁷ In the arena of politics, the Janissaries had become accustomed to the assistance of the porters and other unskilled workers and, in 1826, had expected their support again.

But the government had taken a number of steps to prevent this. Mahmud II had engineered the promotion of the reformist Rusçuklu Hüseyin (Paşa) to Janissary *ağa* and then, in late 1823, to vizirial rank. Hüseyin Paşa immediately turned his attention to what he believed were scorpions' nests—that is, the bachelor housing of the porters, day laborers and fruit pedlars belonging to the Janissary corps—in the Asmaaltı, Tahtakale and Balıkpazarı quarters of Istanbul. As part of the overall plan to weaken the corps, Hüseyin Paşa demolished these buildings along with neighboring coffeehouses.¹⁸ The

¹⁴ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti teşkilatından Kapukulu Ocakları*, I (Ankara, 1943), p. 549.

¹⁵ Enver Ziya Karal, *Nizami-i Cedit ve Tanzimat Devirleri (1789-1856)*, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, V, 2nd printing (Ankara, 1961), pp. 146-147; Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu*, 549.

¹⁶ William Knight, *Oriental Outlines or A Rambler's Recollections of a Tour in Turkey, Greece and Tuscany in 1838* (London, 1838), pp. 135-136.

¹⁷ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu*, pp. 500-501.

¹⁸ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu*, pp. 523-525.

government also took precautions to neutralize the *ulema*, the Istanbul populace and at least some of the artisans who traditionally had supported the Janissaries against the government.¹⁹ In the period prior to taking overt action, the Sultan had been careful to "counter the fears of thousands of artisans holding corps pay tickets for revenue" by assuring them they could keep them for the remainder of their lives.²⁰ Indeed, after the "Auspicious Event", although many artisans apparently had supported the Janissaries anyway, Mahmud II publicly announced he would honor the tickets of those who had not been active in the "corps' misdeeds".²¹ Such measures, combined with Mahmud's military superiority, dissuaded most Janissary allies from continuing their opposition to the government. But the Janissaries also had been supported by the Bektaşî order of dervishes. "Because the Bektaşîs were in contact with the lower classes of Istanbul, the abolition of the Janissary corps made a bad impression on these classes."²² So, within weeks of the Janissaries' annihilation, Mahmud II moved first against the brotherhood and then the "lower classes". The Bektaşî order was outlawed and, in Istanbul, some of its leaders were executed or exiled to Anatolia while a number of its buildings in the capital were destroyed.²³ Large numbers of "vagabonds", reportedly as many as 20,000, then were rounded up and exiled.²⁴ At about the same time, several groups of unskilled laborers in Istanbul who had been registered in the corps and who had refused to abandon the Janissary cause were dealt with; these, probably, either were members of the Bektaşî order or under its influence. The porters and the camel drivers who had contracts with the Janissaries, along with some other troublemakers (*müfsidler*), had managed to sign up in the new army (*Asâkir-i Mansure*) created to replace the corps. One by one these porters and camel drivers were executed publicly and a number were exiled.²⁵ Consequently, a contemporary European source reports, probably with some exaggeration, "all" Turks and Kurds who had been members of the porters' guilds were struck from the roster,

¹⁹ The contrast with the successful Patrona Halil rebellion of 1730—when the government had alienated the *ulema*, the inhabitants of Istanbul and guildsmen—is striking. See R. Olson, "The Esnaf and the Patrona Halil Rebellion of 1730: A Realignment in Ottoman Politics?" *Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient*, 17, No. 3, (1974), pp. 329-344.

²⁰ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, II (Cambridge, 1977), p. 20.

²¹ *Ibid.* A decade later, the Istanbul populace reportedly still regretted its decision to support the sultan. "One often hears in Istanbul complaints that, since the destruction of the Janissaries, the price of necessities has risen fourfold...." Helmuth von Moltke, *Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei aus den Jahren 1835 bis 1839* (Berlin, 1876), p. 50, letter from Péra, 7 April 1836.

²² Karal, *Nizam-ı Cedit*, p. 150.

²³ *Ibid.*, Shaw, *History*, pp. 20-21.

²⁴ Richard Davey, *The Sultan and His Subjects* (London, 1907), p. 168.

²⁵ Ahmet Cevdet, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, XII (Istanbul, 1309/1891), p. 187.

and "some were ferried at once into Asia" and forbidden to return to the capital.²⁶ While it is most unlikely that Kurds and Turks had been eliminated entirely from the portering business in the capital, it is clear that they had been removed from jobs they had owed to their Janissary and their Bektaşî connections.

The political danger to the state had passed but the economy of Istanbul still needed porters. From the regime's perspective, however, it made little sense to replace one group of troublemakers with another group of workers whose loyalty was uncertain. Which group of Ottoman subjects would the state use to fill the ranks of porters, now reduced by the removal of the Turkish and Kurdish allies of the Janissaries? The Bektaşî connection remained potentially dangerous to the reformist state still seeking to cement its recent gains. And so, Kurds and Turks, who were predominantly Muslim, were a risky choice. Ottoman Greeks had occupied many trustworthy positions but the ongoing Greek War of Independence made their selection impossible at the time. Perhaps by default, or because their *millet* had remained loyal while the Greeks had revolted or because many of them already were porters in the city, the Armenians were chosen. At the same time the Sultan removed the Turkish and Kurdish porters, he issued orders that these jobs thereafter would be filled by Armenians and he commanded the patriarch to provide the necessary manpower for the purpose.²⁷ Armenians already constituted an important and perhaps even dominant source for the recruitment of the Istanbul porters.²⁸ By state command, they now assumed control over sectors of the profession that Muslims, with their Janissary alliance, had dominated. Another pattern of the past had been replicated as the government discarded one group in favor of another, now installing Armenians for dysfunctional Turks and Kurds.

The subsequent political role of these Armenian porters is uncertain. It is clear that, in the days of the Janissaries, the Kurdish and Turkish porters, in their poverty and with their intimate knowledge of the Istanbul streets, often had served as shock troops against the government, to protect the interests of the corps and its artisan members. The newly-appointed Armenian porters of 1826 owed their jobs to the state and may have been used actively by it against opponents of the reform legislation. If so, they may have been part of the fundamental realignment of Ottoman politics inaugurated by the destruction of the Janissaries. Alternatively, the state, having neutralized once-troublesome porters' guilds, may have rested content and allowed the Armenian porters only economic tasks. Without more information, this important subject cannot be explored further.

²⁶ Knight, *Oriental*, p. 135.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

²⁸ Davey, *The Sultan*, 198, quotes an 1810 unpublished source in his possession that states Armenians "do all the portering of the city." Writing in the early twentieth century, Davey partially reflects the changes discussed in this article when he says his source is in error, since not all porters are Armenian "for there are many Turks among them", p. 198 n..

The broad sweep of events in the nineteenth century, however, worked to undermine the position of the Armenian porters in Istanbul, not only those who owed their jobs to the 1826 events, but the porters' group as a whole. Ultimately, their presence became a liability to the state and they too were removed, a by-product of the growing intermeshing of the Ottoman and European economies. Overall, as is well-known, European penetration of the Ottoman economy accelerated in the nineteenth century: Ottoman trade with Europe soared, European financiers controlled increasingly large portions of Ottoman state finances and Western capitalists, towards the end of the century, invested vast sums in the Ottoman private sector. These processes benefitted some groups in Ottoman society far more than others. Tensions among the Ottoman ethnic and religious communities rose and erupted in major violence, for the first time, in the Druze-Maronite wars of Syria/Lebanon during the 1860s. In the northern areas of the Ottoman Empire, conflicts began to emerge among Ottoman Turks, Kurds, Armenians and Greeks. Although the role of Muslim capital and entrepreneurs in this nineteenth century economic transformation has been grossly underrated, it nevertheless remains true that, among the Ottoman subject classes, Greeks and Armenians benefitted most of all from the changes. These economic processes triggered socio-cultural developments and the number of educated Armenians increased rapidly. Among some of these, a growing sense of self-awareness and finally the desire for a separate national existence emerged. The growing prosperity and assertiveness of many Armenians clashed with mounting government concern for their loyalty and the fears of many Muslims for their own economic and political futures.²⁹ Finally, a cycle of major violence erupted in the very early 1890s.

The spiral of terror begun at Sasun intersects with the story of the Istanbul porters at the doors of the Ottoman Bank in August, 1896. To gain international attention and support for their activities, a group of Armenian revolutionaries seized the Ottoman Bank at Galata. It seems relevant to our story to note that the revolutionaries entered the bank disguised as porters, hauling sacks ordinarily used to carry money but this time full of explosives.³⁰ That afternoon, "bands of Turks of the *lower classes*" (my stress) appeared and for thirty-six hours mobs were in charge of the streets. According to Langer's report, that is accepted as accurate by most Ottoman specialists, it is "fairly certain" that the Turkish crowds attacking the Armenians had been organized and armed by the Ottoman government. The attacks were levelled against Armenians only and, significantly, were aimed "chiefly at the lower classes in Stambul, the *hamals* or porters".³¹ In all, five to eight thousand Armenians³² perished in

²⁹ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd ed. (London and New York, 1968), pp. 454-456.

³⁰ William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902* (New York, 1968), p. 323.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

³² *Ibid.*, 324-325; *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914*, XII, Part 1

the riots, among them many hundreds of porters.³³ After the riots were over, the surviving Armenian porters were exiled from the capital and sent back to their homes. The vacant jobs then were filled by Turks but especially by Kurds who came from the same eastern Anatolian provinces as the Armenian porters.³⁴

Twelve years after these events, with the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908, a group of Armenian porters from the Van area returned to Istanbul, protested the unfair treatment they long ago had received, and demanded restoration of both their jobs and the tools that they either had abandoned or had been compelled to leave behind. These men had worked in the customs house and the quantity of the tools left behind by this group of workers gives some clue as to the number of porters exiled in 1896. Besides thirty iron wagons (*demir arabası*) and seventy tarpaulins, the porters had left four hundred porters' frames and one hundred poles onto which goods were slung and then carried. Thus, it seems, at least four or five hundred Armenian porters in this labor category had been killed or exiled.³⁵

These events of 1896 mark a decisive turning point in Ottoman labor politics, one directly related to the shrinking territorial size of the empire and to the growing poverty of its ethnic mix. For centuries, Ottoman regimes had been able to utilize the talents of its varied populations, shifting about labor resources on an *ad hoc* basis to meet economic and political exigencies. In the eighteenth and especially the nineteenth centuries, however, the state's ability to maneuver among its subject populations was reduced sharply, a simple function of the successful independence movements that wracked the empire. The often-bewildering but rich Ottoman mosaic had become relatively plain by the mid-nineteenth century and consisted, basically, of only Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Jews, Armenians, Greeks and Albanians. In 1826, the state had felt able to use its Armenian subjects against the Turkish and Kurdish porters too closely associated with the Janissaries and Bektâşis. But, by the 1890s, the Armenians had become suspect to some members of the Ottoman official hierarchy. The abundant ethno-religious options for labor recruitment that historically had been available to Ottoman administrations finally had dried up and only the Turks and the Kurds remained available for use.³⁶ And so, the evidence suggests, a deal was made between the under-or unemployed "Turks of the lower classes", who

(Berlin, 1923), p. 23.

³³ Edwin Pears, *Turkey and Its People* (London, 1911), p. 52.

³⁴ *Ibid.*: BBA Bab-1 Âli Evrak Odası 263647, 9 I 1327/ January 1909. On the Kurdish identity of most Istanbul porters, see my *Social Disintegration*, pp. 96-103 and sources cited therein.

³⁵ BBA Bab-1 Âli Evrak Odası 263647, 9 I 1327/January 1909.

³⁶ The numerous Arab population of the empire had not played any significant role in supplying labor to the capital and so established recruitment patterns on which the state could draw for new porters were not available. A similar case might be made for the Albanians. Religion may have been the reason why the state did not turn to the Istanbul Jewish community, available and experienced in the porter trade.

almost certainly were mainly Kurds, and some members of the government. These Ottoman *lumpenproletariat* became the shock troops of the Ottoman administration and attacked the Armenians of Istanbul who, some administrators feared, were or had become allied with the revolutionary movement endangering the state. They served state policy purposes and pursued their own objectives as well. Attacking Armenians in general, they focused their attacks not on the educated Armenian classes (who were the most likely to carry the revolutionary ideas) but the Armenian porters whose jobs they sought. In exchange for services rendered, the government permitted its new street soldiers to take the jobs of the dead and exiled workers. Thereafter, Kurds dominated the ranks of the Istanbul porters and their close alliance with the sultan's palace became legendary. But these porters hardly became mere tools of the state. In subsequent years, as has been related in detail elsewhere, the Kurdish porters successfully pursued goals of their own, frequently to the detriment of the Ottoman government and its economic well-being³⁷.

The 1896 Istanbul events share much in common with the "Church and King" riots of Europe studied by the great historian George Rudé.³⁸ Both the Istanbul riots and the "Church and King" riots were politically conservative affairs, dependent on solid popular support and with an element of social protest. Industrial artisans and laborers manned the English crowds, for example, while, as seen, lower class elements filled those in Istanbul. In addition, there are numerous examples of European riots in which the military authorities ignored the excesses being committed by the crowds, just as the Istanbul troops "looked on as the carnage took place."³⁹

Use of the crowd by both Middle Eastern and European governments was a double-edged sword, to be used only at considerable risk.

To give the crowd its head to teach the enemies of Church and King was one thing; but what was the guarantee that it would stop at that and not engage in a general assault on property?⁴⁰

London magistrates stopped cheering on anti-Catholic crowds in 1780 when these also sacked the homes of government and opposition supporters, fired half-dozen prisons and began threatening the Bank of England⁴¹. The Ottoman government's use of the "Turks of the lower classes" avoided some of the usual risks in the crown-crowd alliance. Attacks by this Ottoman crowd against property and the propertied could be avoided more easily than in the case of Europe. Readily available as alternate targets were Armenian porters; these

³⁷ See my *Social Disintegration*, Ch. V and VI.

³⁸ For example, see George Rudé, *The Crowd in History, 1730-1848* (New York, 1964), esp. pp. 135ff.

³⁹ Compare, for example, Rudé, *The Crowd*, p. 144 with Langer, *Diplomacy*, p. 324.

⁴⁰ Rudé, *The Crowd*, p. 146.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 59, p. 146.

were safely lower class and of a different ethnicity and religion than the newly-selected shock troops of the state.

But the price paid by the Ottoman administration was very high. In 1826, the state still possessed considerable maneuverability and could use one group of subjects, Armenians, against others, Turks and Kurds. In 1896, however, only Muslims seemed reliable. In the space of seventy years, by adopting religion as the litmus test of loyalty in its labor recruitment, the Ottoman state had taken another step away from its past as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious system and towards its future as a homogenous Turkish nation state.

IN SOUTHERN ANATOLIA

Around the world the frontier of settlement was expanding in the nineteenth century through emigration, the expansion of agriculture, improved firearms and communication, and the extension of centralized political authority. In the Ottoman Empire, as elsewhere, direct control of the individual citizen became the ideal of political sovereignty, an ideal with which nomadism and tribalism were incompatible. This paper will show how these demographic, economic and political pressures encouraged sedentarization in southern Anatolia. Concentrating on the Adana area, where the Imperial government used force to settle the tribes, it will examine the culture and talent of the transformation which it achieved, and it will consider its consequences both for the tribes and for the province of Adana.

The primary factor in the nineteenth century sedentarization of the population of Anatolia was the growth of a centralized bureaucratic administration and the corresponding expansion of state authority. The Ottoman rulers who were responsible for this development had to use the land. They sought to administer their subjects as individuals based on the land. Previously, tribes had been treated as bodies who rendered or gave up certain defined portions, and their payments, for which they gave their loyalty to the Sultan, had been regarded as the collective effort of the tribe. Now the tribes were subject to the same local administration as the settled population and their right to collective property was denied by the land laws of 1838. Already in 1840 the Sultan

¹ Each village was organized as a *nahiyeh* (district), which included a mosque, a school and market place, but the government was unable to establish a regular organized village (Deringer, vol. 1, *Konstantinopel, 1828-1838*, London, 1915, pp. 30-31). Although the government had no administrative property of a village could be granted to an owner, the government could grant a title deed (Deringer, vol. 1, *Konstantinopel, 1828-1838*, pp. 30-31) which is an evidence that the tribes sought to acquire such rights. In the land laws of 1838, tribal lands were divided by a village and not covered by a title deed which was granted to the state as well as land was granted to potential owners as private property as first land. In this way, the traditional

was rarely lower class and of a different ethnicity and religion from the newly recruited Greek troops of the state. These Ottoman *insepaprolulari* became the mainstay of the Ottoman administration and the Ottoman army. The price paid by the Ottoman administration was very high. In 1720, the state still possessed considerable manpower and could use one group of subjects against others. Taxes and *kurdu* in 1896, however, only Muslims were recruited in the space of twenty years by the Ottoman state as the luxury tax of loyalty in its labor recruitment. The Ottoman state had taken another step away from its past as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious system and towards its future as a homogeneous Turkish nation. Istanbul porters and their close alliance with the sultan's palace became legendary. But these porters hardly became mere tools of the state. In subsequent years, as has been related in detail elsewhere, the Kurdish porters successfully pursued goals of their own, frequently to the detriment of the Ottoman government and its economic well-being.³⁷

The 1896 Istanbul events share much in common with the "Church and King" riots of Europe studied by the great historian George Rudé.³⁸ Both the Istanbul riots and the "Church and King" riots were politically conservative affairs, dependent on solid popular support and with an element of social protest. Industrial artisans and laborers joined the English crowds, for example, while, as seen, lower class elements filled those in Istanbul. In addition, there are numerous examples of European riots in which the military authorities ignored the excesses being committed by the crowds, just as the Istanbul troops "looked on as the carnage took place."³⁹

Use of the crowd by both Middle Eastern and European governments was a double-edged sword; to be used only at considerable risk.

To give the crowd its head to break the power of Church and King was one thing; but what was the guarantee that it would stop at that and not engage in a general assault on property?⁴⁰

London magistrates stopped chasing on anti-Catholic crowds in 1780 when these also sacked the houses of government and opposition supporters, fired half-dozen prisons and began "looting the Bank of England"⁴¹. The Ottoman government's use of the "Tanks of the lower classes" avoided some of the usual risks in the crowd-crown alliance. Attacks by this Ottoman crowd against property and the propertied could be avoided more easily than in the case of Europe. Readily available as alternate targets were Armenian porters; these

³⁷ See my *Social Disintegration*, Ch. V and VI.
³⁸ For example, see George Rudé, *The Crowd in History, 1730-1848* (New York, 1964), esp. pp. 135ff.
³⁹ Osofsky, for example, Rudé, *The Crowd*, p. 144 with Lager, *Diplomacy*, p. 324.
⁴⁰ Rudé, *The Crowd*, p. 146.
⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 59, p. 146.

Andrew G. GOULD

THE BURNING OF THE TENTS: THE FORCIBLE SETTLEMENT OF NOMADS IN SOUTHERN ANATOLIA

Around the world the frontier of settlement was expanding in the nineteenth century through emigration, the expansion of agriculture, improved firearms and communication, and the extension of centralized political authority. In the Ottoman Empire, as elsewhere, direct control of the individual citizen became the ideal of political sovereignty, an ideal with which nomadism and tribalism were incompatible. This paper will show how these demographic, economic and political pressures encouraged sedentarization in southern Anatolia. Concentrating on the Adana area, where the Istanbul government used force to settle the tribes, it will examine the nature and extent of the transformation which it achieved, and it will consider its consequences both for the tribes and for the province of Adana.

The primary factor in the nineteenth century sedentarization of the population of Anatolia was the growth of a centralized bureaucratic administration and the corresponding expansion of rural security. The Ottoman reformers who were responsible for this development had no use for nomads. They sought to administer their subjects as individuals fixed on the land. Previously, tribes had been treated as bodies independent of geographically defined provinces, and their pastures, for which they paid taxes directly to the Palace, had been regarded as the collective usufruct of the tribes. Now the tribes were subject to the same local administration as the settled population and their right to collective property was denied by the Land Law of 1858.¹ Already in 1840 the Sublime

¹ Each village was guaranteed its common pastures, woods, threshing floors, roads and market places, but this guarantee presupposed the existence of a legally recognized village (*Düstur*, vol. I, Istanbul, 1289, pp. 188-91; Stanley Fisher, *Ottoman Land Laws* London, 1919, pp. 30-33). Although title to pasture land not the collective property of a village could be granted to one person exclusively or to several people jointly through the purchase of a title deed (*Düstur* I, p. 170; Fisher, p. 11), there is no evidence that the tribes sought to acquire such legal title to the land they used. Traditional pasture areas not claimed by a village and not covered by a valid title deed reverted to the state as *miri* land and could be granted to potential settlers as either pasture or farm land. In this way, the traditional

Porte had decided that the tribes would have to be settled in order to facilitate registration of land and collection of taxes.² By registering land directly to individuals and taxing them on that basis, the state hoped to overcome tax farmers, tribal lords and other middlemen who had always kept a large portion of the revenue. The provinces established in accord with the *Vilayet* Law of 1864 began registration in earnest and published lists of all the villages under their jurisdiction in yearbooks (*salnames*). These land registers and provincial yearbooks provide much of the raw data for the study of sedentarization.

Ottoman Efforts to Settle the Tribes of Adana

As of the early sixteenth century, when the Ottomans extended their control of Anatolia to Adana, the tribes were largely settled. During the next century, however, effective administration and security were eroded by political and social unrest, as a result of which the tribes reverted to nomadism. The Ottomans had never tried to impose alien forms of administration on the tribes nor did they do so now. As nomads they were treated separately from the settled population, tribal confederations being considered as administrative units, each equivalent to a province, with a governor and judges assigned to migrate with it. The leader of each tribe was recognized as *Bey* by the Sultan and would appoint an assistant to collect taxes and turn them over to the government. Taxes, levied both on the number of animals herded and the amount of pasture they occupied, were usually collected while the tribes were camped in their summer or winter pastures.³ Beginning in 1691, repeated efforts were made to settle certain tribes in the Çukurova (the plain surrounding Adana) to act as a barrier to possible Bedouin invasion from the south, but without success.⁴

The origins of the tribal population of the Çukurova are extremely diverse and obscure. Among the original Turkish settlers who came in the thirteenth century were the Varsak and Özerli. The former acquired a secure position in the Taurus mountains and the latter settled around Payas.⁵ The tribes which trace their origin to these settlers were partially sedentarized by the nineteenth century and migrated only short distances, but many of them were known for their brigandage. Of the tribes studied here, the Cerid, Tacirlu and Lekvanik (the Kurdish tribe which later divided into the Lek, Kırıntılı and Hacılar tribes)

summer pastures of the tribes were granted to refugees for settlement (Başbakanlık Arşivi, İstanbul (BBA)-Bab-i Âli Evrak Odası (BEO)- 758/38-1, entry 260 for 1279 (22 Za, 1279).

² Ömer Lûtfi Barkan, "Türk Toprak Hukuku Tarihinde Tanzimat ve 1274 (1858) Tarihli Arazi Kanunnamesi," *Tanzimat* (İstanbul, 1940), p. 15-19.

³ Ömer Lûtfi Barkan, *XV. ve XVI. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Zirai Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali Esasları* vol. I (İstanbul, 1943), pp. 75-86; Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretleri İskân Teşebbüsü (1691-1696)* (İstanbul, 1963), pp. 15-19.

⁴ Orhonlu, pp. 75-78.

⁵ Faruk Sümer, "Çukurova Tarihine Dair Araştırmalar (Fetihten XVI. yüzyılın ikinci yarısına kadar)," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* vol. I (1963), pp. 62-98.

moved to the area in the seventeenth century,⁶ and the Bozdoğan and related tribes (Menemenci, Kara Hacılı, Kerim-oğlu, Sirkıntılı or Berber, Karsantılı and Tekeli) shifted their winter pastures from western Anatolia to Adana in the eighteenth century.⁷ Other immigrants included the Akça Koyunlu tribe, which seems to have caused little trouble and settled in many of the same villages as the Tacirlu after the reforms of 1865.⁸ The Avşar also used the Çukurova as winter pasture, but most of them chose to settle in central Anatolia.⁹

Tribal population and herd size is impossible to determine with any accuracy. Combining the reports of the Adana council of 1847 and 1850 with the estimate made by Victor Langlois in 1852, and assuming an average of five persons per tent (for the sake of conformity with existing studies of Ottoman population), we obtain the following totals of tribal population: Tarsus - 19,400 settled, 4,500 nomadic; Adana - 5,000 settled, 56,955 nomadic; or a grand total for the Çukurova of 81,355. This is over half of the total population for the same area in 1867.¹⁰

Pastoralism was the predominant mode of subsistence. Sheep, goats and cattle were raised for their milk, fur, meat and hides. Camels were raised for transport of baggage and horses were used for hunting and warfare. In addition, some tribes practiced limited agriculture in their summer or winter pastures and others relied heavily on brigandage to supplement their economy.

The damage to crops caused by migrating animals and the habitual raiding of their masters made the settlement of the nomads desirable, but it was the central government's desire for political control which led to the first nineteenth century attempt to settle nomads. The object was to deprive rebellious mountain lords (*derebeys*) of tribal support allowing the government to collect taxes and draft soldiers from the tribes.¹¹ A portion of the Tacirlu tribe was temporarily forced to settle an inhospitable portion of the plain near Tarsus in 1850 during the course of military conscription, but little else was done to implement the plan due to a lack of military and administrative manpower.¹²

Prior to 1865 the only settlement efforts which succeeded were semi-voluntary arrangements, based on agreements with tribal chieftains, in which the tribes were allowed to continue limited migration. In this fashion the Reyhanlı confederation was established south of Maraş in 1846.¹³ Similar agreements were made with the leaders of the Bozdoğan tribe in 1849 and with those of the

⁶ For numerous references to these tribes consult the indexes in Ahmet Refik (Altınay), *Anadolu'da Türk Aşiretleri (966-1200)* (Istanbul, 1920) and in Orhonlu.

⁷ Altınay, pp. 208-09; Faruk Sümer, *Oğuzlar (Türkmenler)* (Ankara, 1967), pp. 192-95.

⁸ Ahmet Kılıç, *Osmaniye Tarihi* (Osmaniye, 1962), p. 37; Sümer, "Çukurova," p. 31.

⁹ Sümer, *Oğuzlar*, pp. 273-80.

¹⁰ Victor Langlois, *Voyage dans la Cilicie* (Paris, 1861), pp. 21, 23; *BBA-İrade, Meclis-i Valâ* (IMV)-2959, from Adana (27 M, 1264; IMV-7127, from Adana (17 Ra, 1267); *Salname-i Vilayet-i Halep*, 1285

¹¹ *BBA-İMV-2959*, from Adana (27 M, 1264).

¹² *BBA-İrade, Dahiliye* (ID)-12917, from Reis-i Erkân (9 N, 1266).

¹³ *BBA-İMV-1343, İrade* (2 Za, 1260); IMV-1696, from Maraş (*selh C*, 1262).

Sirkıntılı and Kırıntılı tribes in 1859, but they were never implemented.¹⁴

Following the Crimean War the Porte was beset by new problems which made the settlement of the tribes even more urgent: one was the immigration of hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Crimea and the Caucasus, another was the increasing concern of the European powers with the security of the Christian population in the Ottoman Empire, a concern which could easily lead to direct intervention in internal affairs. Fixing the tribes on the land seemed the only way to ensure the safety of the refugees being settled in tribal pasture areas and to protect Christian villages from the raiding which characterized nomadic migrations.¹⁵

Previously, Istanbul failed to overcome the rebellious tribes and *derebeys* of southern Anatolia because it could not or would not devote a sufficient force to the task. This changed in 1865 when a force of some 9,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, equipped with modern rifles and six pieces of artillery, was sent under the command of Derviş and Cevdet Paşas to pacify the area. Mountain passes were closed to migration, the nomads were forced to settle newly established villages and towns in the Çukurova, the rebel leaders were exiled and a bureaucratic administration under the supervision of the capital was established.¹⁶ One reason for the success of this expedition was its conciliatory strategy. A general amnesty was granted to all who had failed to pay taxes, evaded military service or been disloyal to the Sultan in other ways. The *derebeys* were offered generous salaries and government positions in neighboring provinces as an inducement to surrender, although it had already been decided that they would ultimately be exiled to the Balkans. In this way fighting was kept to a minimum.

This expedition, called the Reform Division, established towns at strategic locations to serve as administrative centers. Since settlement depended on the security of the countryside, a military garrison was the nucleus of each town. The tribes were ordered to settle in their winter pastures and were organized in administrative districts called *nahiyes*. Tribal chieftains were appointed as directors of these districts, as police officers and as members of the administrative councils formed in each new town. A certain number of families was taken from each tribe to inhabit the towns. Construction of schools, barracks, government houses and other public buildings was begun. The role of the Reform Division in choosing sites for habitation and providing for the needs

¹⁴ BBA-İMV-7474, from Ankara (*gurre Za*, 1266) and (18 L, 1267); İMV-18633, from Sirkıntılı *kethudaları* (21 S, 1276); İMV-18906, from Sirkıntılı *müdürü* (19 Ra, 1276) and from Kırıntılı *kethudaları* (11 B, 1276); İMV-19709, from Adana (11 C, 1277).

¹⁵ BBA-BEO-758/38-1, entries 260 and 266 for 1279 dated (22 Za, 1279) and (29 Za, 1279); İMV - 20949, from Adana (4 Ş, 1278), from Hafız Paşa (23 Ş, 1278) and mazbata (16 L, 1278); *İrade, Meclis-i Mahsus* (İMM)-1256, no. 26, from Maraş (21 Ca, 1280).

¹⁶ On the Reform Division see Andrew G. Gould, "Pashas and Brigands: Ottoman Provincial Reform and Its Impact on the Nomadic Tribes of Southern Anatolia, 1840-1885," (unpublished dissertation, U.C.L.A., 1973), pp. 74-118. On the *derebeys* and their exile see Andrew G. Gould, "Lords or Bandits? The Derebeys of Cilicia" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 7 (1976), pp. 485-506.

of the settlers is unclear. The exact number of villages established at this time is difficult to determine and will be discussed below, but we know that at least 78 had been created by 1869.¹⁷ The few reports still available indicate that by 1867 at least 3,841 homes had been built either by the government or with its assistance. In 11 villages settled by the Tacirlu tribe 627 homes were built and 425 yoke oxen procured.¹⁸

As for the use of force in settling nomads, we know that troops posted in mountain passes successfully confined the tribes to the plain. British military consuls reported that the Reform Division burned the nomads' tents, a claim which is supported by contemporary oral tradition, but the only reference to such tactics in official Ottoman sources is in reference to the governor of Adana in 1869. Complaints against this overzealous official claimed that he had burned the nomads' reed huts to force them into more permanent dwellings.¹⁹

Despite the apparent success of this settlement policy, tribesmen encountered several serious obstacles in their efforts to adapt to an agrarian life. The first was economic. The cotton boom of 1864, which had seemed to favor sedentarization, collapsed following the conclusion of the American Civil War. Tribesmen who had planted cotton in response to the government's urging found themselves unable to market their crop, and those who sought to borrow money were either refused or charged exorbitant interest by private loan sharks. The imposition of a relatively effective system of taxation on top of an already depressed economy created a shortage of currency such that the Agricultural Bank, which had been established to assist farmers, had no money to lend.²⁰

A more permanent obstacle to settlement was the summer heat and malarial swamps of the Çukurova. Although drainage projects undertaken by the notables of Tarsus and Adana improved the climate of those two towns, nothing was done for the upper plain where cholera and malaria decimated the tribal and refugee population. In 1870 a doctor was sent from Istanbul to care for the refugees and in 1876 they were allowed to spend the summer in nearby

¹⁷ *Salname-i Vilayet-i Halep*, 1285.

¹⁸ BBA-ID-38360, no. 2 from Payas (28 M, 1283); IMV- 25130, nos. 3 and 4 from İsmail Paşa (10 Ra, 1283); IMV-25689, no 4 from Maraş (29 L, 1283) (another copy of this is found in Yıldız *tasnifi* [Y] 18-553/183-93-34, no. 13) and no. 6 from Bulanık (26 L, 1283) and no. 8 (n. d.).

¹⁹ Cevdet Paşa, Ahmed, *Tezâkir*, edited and transliterated by Cavid Baysun, vol. III (Ankara, 1963), p. 158; Foreign Office, London (FO) 222/8/3, Bennet to Dufferin (3/22/82); contemporary oral traditions on the burning of the tents are cited in Wolfram Eberhard, "Nomads and Farmers in South-eastern Turkey: Problems of Settlement," *Oriens*, vol. VI (1953), p. 47 n. 4; on the burning of huts by Halil Paşa see BBA-İrade, *Şurayı Devlet* (İŞD)-863, *mazbata* (14 Z, 1287) and *Ayniyat defter* (Ayn.) 822, entry dated 16 M, 1288.

²⁰ On the economic depression in Cilicia in the years 1865-68 see American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), Central Turkey Mission vol. I, no. 50 (Schneider), no. 69 (Pratt), no. 80 (Powers) and no. 98 (Adams); see also reports from Consul Skene in *Parliamentary Papers* (Great Britain) 1867-68, vol. LXVIII, pp. 429-33; 1868-69, vol. LX, pp. 422-23; 1869-70, vol. LXV, pp. 306-08; 1871, vol. LXVI, pp. 1088-91 and 1872, vol. LVII, pp. 270-88.

mountains, but no provisions were made for the tribes.²¹ Some resumed migration as early as 1871 and after 1874 complaints of the destruction caused by their movement became increasingly frequent.²²

The most serious shortcoming of the government's efforts to settle the tribes was its failure to survey and register the land given them for settlement. In some of the Sirkıntılı, Kırıntılı and Bozdoğan villages of Kozan *sancak* land registration was begun as early as 1871, but in the Cerid and Tacirlu *nahiyes* of Osmaniye it was not started until 1880. This delay created a good deal of confusion and conflict in which land granted for settlement was auctioned off to others for lack of valid title. The continued pastoralism of the tribes exacerbated the situation: in summer the land they left vacant was sought by those more interested in agriculture, while in winter their flocks frequently overran the boundaries established in the time of the Reform Division. Since most of the Çukurova was still unclaimed at this time, many of these conflicts could have been avoided had the land been rationally assigned and properly registered.²³

One reason for Istanbul's failure to cope with these obstacles was the political instability of the eighteen seventies and the resulting decline in the quality of government. Another reason was the distraction of the Russian War of 1877-78, which forced the Porte to remove all armed forces from the provinces and double the tax burden.²⁴ By 1879, a British military consul reported, the immense majority of the tribes settled by the Reform Division had resumed their nomadic habits.²⁵ The previous fall, however, Cevdet Paşa had returned to the Adana area to supervise the resettlement of tribes. Realizing their need to escape the summer pestilence of the plains, he made arrangements for each tribe to have its own summer camp within its respective administrative district (*kaza* or *sancak*). Regular troops were stationed in the mountains to contain these migrations and boundaries were redrawn to simplify administration.²⁶ Abidin Paşa, governor of Adana from 1881 to 1883, did the most to promote settlement, not with force, but with conciliation and economic development. He extended arrangements for limited tribal migration while encouraging registration of land in tribal villages and letting out contracts to drain the swamps. He acquired over 10,000 acres in his own name which he operated as model farms, and he promoted the letting out contracts to drain the swamps. He acquired over 10,000 acres in his own name which he operated as model farms, and he promoted the letting out of concessions for railroads, highways, harbors and boat

²¹ BBA-Ayn. 822, entries dated 3 Ş, 1293 and 13 B, 1293.

²² BBA-IŞD-926 no. 1 (7 C, 1288); Ayn. 823, entry dated 11 S, 1291.

²³ BBA-Y-18-553/124-93-34, from Cevdet Paşa (3 C, 1289).

²⁴ Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris (MAE), Correspondance Politique (CP), Turquie-Alep 5, Bertrand to Decazes (5/21/77) and (6/18/77); FO 195/1154, Catoni to Skene (6/23/77) and (7/26/77).

²⁵ FO 424 (Confidential Print)/91, Chermiside to Layard (11/29/79).

²⁶ BBA-IMM-2843 nos. 3 and 6 from Cevdet (26 L, 1295) and *Meclis-i Mahsus mazbatası* (selh Z, 1295); IŞD-2271, *Irade* (8 M, 1296).

service to open the area to foreign trade on an even larger scale.²⁷

By this time, demographic and economic pressures were beginning to assist the government's settlement efforts. In early 1878, 7,000 refugees from the Caucasus and the Balkans arrived in Mersin and were settled in 15 villages on the upper Ceyhan River.²⁸ Some 20,000 Nogay refugees had been settled further down the river in 1858 and some had been given pasture adjacent to tribal villages in the hills, but the new arrivals were located in the midst of the tribal settlement.²⁹ In fact, some were settled in three villages previously formed by the Cerid tribe.³⁰ These immigrants were both a threat to remaining tribal land and an example of the registration and cultivation of land for profit.

Economic pressure induced sedentarization by depriving nomads of their winter pasture. The relative tranquility introduced by the pacification of the tribes in 1865 led to a progressive increase in cultivation and trade which, in turn, reduced available pasture and provided economic incentives for settlement. Some large landowners encouraged nomads to settle and till their land.³¹ This led to a double migration: the men would take their families and flocks to summer pasture and leave them there, returning themselves to the plain to earn money bringing in the harvest.³² Those not fortunate enough to be associated with a landlord often found their grazing land usurped by large farms. Consul Bennet reported in 1881:

The Adana Plain, with the exception of such portions as are liable to inundations, is rapidly being brought under cultivation, and the Christians here as elsewhere are becoming the owners of large farms and are ousting the improvident Turk. The value of land has enormously increased of late years; what could formerly be acquired at a nominal value of perhaps 10 paras (about a halfpenny) the donum

²⁷ FO 222/8/3, Bennet to Dufferin (5/5/82); FO 4246123, p. 283, Bennet to Dufferin (12/6/81); BBA-IMM-3342, *Irade* (26 S, 1300) and IMM-3344, *Irade* (21 S, 1300).

²⁸ FO 195/1201, Tattarachi to Henderson (3/25/78); MAE-CP Turquie-Alep 6, Siouffi to Waddington (3/7/78).

²⁹ BBA-Cevdet, *Dahiliye* 2899, *cedvel* (1277); *Tapu ve Kadastro Umum Müdürlüğü* (TKUM), Ankara, *Kuyudu-u kadime defter* no. 3217 for Kars-i Zulkadriye *kazası*, pasture for refugees registered in the villages of Aşağı Boz kuyu and Vayvaylı (1288 *mali*).

³⁰ According to Safa Vaisoğlu of Kadirli (interview of May 23-24, 1971) the villages of İzzedin, Naşidiye and Reşadiye, originally settled by the Cerid tribe (*Salname-i Vilayet-i Halep*, 1284; BBA-ID-46129, from Adana [3 Z, 1289]), were settled by Papak and Circassian refugees in 1878.

³¹ Mennan Bey, one of the leading notables, encouraged Turkoman tribesmen to settle the villages of Danişmend and Kızıtahtı adjacent to his estate at Akdam and the village of Yemiş near Karataş. Since this area had not been under cultivation previously, malaria was a problem. It is said that mortality among the young men who stayed in the villages during the summer to bring in the harvest was so great that their mothers prepared their burial shrouds before leaving for the mountains (Kasım Ener, *Tarih Boyunca Adana Ovasına Bir Bakış* (Istanbul, 1964), pp. 228-29).

³² Franz Schaffer, "Cilicia," *Petermann's Mitteilungen aus Justus Perthes Geographischer Anstalt, Ergänzungsband* XXX, 1902-03, no. 141 (Gotha, 1903), p. 27.



(one-fifth of an acre), is now in many instances worth a lira (18 s.) or even more; nor is this to be wondered at considering its fertility.³³

Thanks to the efforts of Abidin Paşa and his successor, not all the tribesmen were deprived of their land in this fashion. By 1885, land had been registered in 32 tribal villages. In 11 Cerid villages 927 fields totalling 141,258 *dönüm* were registered and the vast majority of these were uniform parcels of 120 *dönüm* (24 acres).³⁴ This is obviously more land than would have been required for subsistence agriculture. In the spring of 1882 Bennet found extensive cultivation in the areas recently settled by the Cerid tribe, but we do not know whether these plots were the basis for large-scale commercial agriculture or whether they were used for pasture as well as farming.³⁵

The year 1885 provides a convenient point at which to terminate this brief chronology of Ottoman settlement policy. A cursory survey of the documents for the next decade and a half yielded no sign of either any significant government initiatives or any tribal rebellion. The tribes were by no means fully sedentarized in 1885. Even after the turn of the century Franz Schaffer claimed their migrations to be the most extensive of any in Anatolia.³⁶ Nevertheless, a symbiosis of tribal and settled population, a transitional plateau between the nomadic anarchy of the days before 1865 and the total sedentarization of the present, had been achieved.

The Nature and Extent of Sedentarization

To integrate the tribes into an agrarian society required a more patient and sympathetic approach than was used by the Ottomans; it required realistic perception of the problems involved (e.g., lack of adequate land survey, swamps) and concerned efforts to solve them. Nevertheless, the forceful methods of the Reform Division were not without their effect, for they created a network of towns and villages which has been the basis of the political and administrative geography of the Çukurova ever since. Whether or not they were inhabited the year around, the tribal villages continued to serve at least one of the functions for which they were created, acting as the smallest unit of the new administrative hierarchy. In each village a mayor (*muhtar*) and council of elders were elected, who were responsible to the *kaymakam*. Even if the villagers went to the mountains for the summer, they were subject to taxation and conscription either before their departure or after their return. In this way one of the government's primary objectives, that of establishing effective centralized administration and control of the tribes, was accomplished.

³³ FO 424/122. p. 183, Bennet to Goschen (4/28/81).

³⁴ TKUM defterler 3262 and 3263 (Osmaniye, 1297-1300 *mali*).

³⁵ FO 222/8/3, Bennet to Dufferin (3/22/82).

³⁶ Schaffer, p. 30.

Villages of tribal origin can often be identified by the names of tribal sections (*oba*) which were given to the new settlements. The basic units of Turkoman tribal society are tent groups which range in size from two to ten households and combine to form *obas* of from twenty-five to one hundred households. *Oba* names, which were usually taken from the leading family of the group, are widely found as village names, suggesting that the decision to settle a given location was made at the *oba* level.³⁷

Since the tribes of the Adana area were settled in their winter pastures, mapping these areas can tell us a good deal about the size and interrelationships of the tribes before settlement. Pastures of the larger tribes on which this study concentrates were mutually exclusive and, in some cases, the tribes were split into faction, perhaps by some old feud, with separate pastures.³⁸ Smaller tribes seem to have been on better terms with the larger, as they were allowed to share their pasture and later even their villages. Their settlement suggests that they had allied themselves with the more powerful groups in a fashion typical of the hierarchical relationship of Turkoman tribes.³⁹

Patterns of landholding can also tell us a good deal about the nature of tribal settlement. Unfortunately for the tribes, registration of land was not begun around Sis and Kars until 1871 and not until 1880 in the Osmaniye area.⁴⁰ In the mean time, lack of valid title deeds created confusion and conflict over the rights of the tribesmen to the land assigned them by the Reform Division. Given their traditional distaste for sedentary life, the summer climate of the Çukurova and the financial crisis which followed the sudden end of the cotton

³⁷ For *oba* names of the Cerid and Tacirlu tribes see Ali Rıza (Yalçın), *Cenupta Türkmen Oymakları* part 5 (Adana, 1934), p. 14. For the Bozdoğan tribe see *ibid.*, pp. 48-9. The most accessible research on a Turkoman tribe is that on the Yomut of Iran done by William Irons (e.g., "Variations in Economic Organization: A Comparison of the Pastoral Yomut and the Basseri," in *Perspectives on Nomadism*, pp. 88-104). In Ottoman times the *oba* was the smallest officially recognized division of a tribe (Orhonlu, p. 13). Redhouse defines *oba* as "1. A large tent in several compartments. 2. A nomad family." (Sir James W. Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon*, Constantinople, 1921). The new edition adds "encampment" as a third definition (*New Redhouse Turkish-English Dictionary*, Istanbul, 1968), yet if, as their names lead us to assume, each tribal village was settled by a single *oba*, my estimate of mean village size of 34 *hanes* indicates that the *oba* was larger than the tent group (2 to 10 households in Irons' study) and well within the bounds established by Irons for the Yomut *obas* (25 to 100 households).

³⁸ The two largest sections of the Tacirlu tribe settled their pastures in the plains of Haruniye and Osmaniye respectively, while smaller portions of the tribe settled further afield in Reyhaniye and Elbistan. The Bozdoğan were divided by the Ceyhan River, one part settling between Kars and the river, the other settling on the lower part of the Seyhan River and south of the Cebel Nur around Yumurtalık. The division of the Sirkıntılı between the *sancaks* of Kozan and Adana may also reflect a pre-settlement tribal split or it may be only the result of a government effort to weaken the tribe by dividing it.

³⁹ The Akçakoyunlu shared 8 villages with the Tacirlu, the Varsak tribes shared 6 villages with the Kırıntılı and 2 with the Tacirlu and the Avşar who settled in the Çukurova rather than with the rest of their tribe in central Anatolia shared 5 villages with the Bozdoğan, 2 with the Tacirlu and 1 with the Kırıntılı.

⁴⁰ BBA-Y-18-553/124-93-34, from Cevdet (3 C, 1289).



boom, it seems unlikely that many of them developed a taste for agriculture. In many cases, the land they had been given was put up for auction on the pretext that they had no legal title to it.

When registration did take place, it followed two distinct objectives: one was to record land already under cultivation, the other was to stimulate new cultivation. In the former case, one would expect the fields to be of random size; in the latter, one might expect parcels of land assigned by the government to be more uniform in size due to the arbitrary nature of the survey. Examination of the registers supports this hypothesis.

The frequency of field sizes in multiples of 5 or 20 *dönüm* is evidence of the arbitrary distribution of land in areas of planned settlement. In 4 refugee villages in the *kaza* of Osmaniye 63 percent of the fields were multiples of 20 *dönüm*, in 11 villages settled by the Cerid tribe 49 percent were multiples of 20, and in villages settled by the Hacilar and Kabasakal tribes 71 percent were in multiples of 5. In 6 Tacirlu villages 58 percent of the fields were in multiples of 5. Here the nonuniform 42 percent suggests that some of the Tacirlu had already begun claiming and farming the land in random fashion and were only now receiving legal recognition.⁴¹

Terrain was also a factor in the uniformity of field size. In the Sirkıntılı villages, where land was registered at the same time as in the villages of the Hacilar and Kabasakal, the frequency of multiples of 5 was much lower, as was the mean field size. Since the Sirkıntılı villages are in hilly terrain, it can be assumed that cultivation of large tracts of land was neither undertaken nor seriously encouraged.

In the plains, where terrain posed no obstacles to the expansion of cultivation, field size, uniformity of field size and total village holdings were all greater. Of the fields registered by the Cerid tribe, 49 percent were in multiples of 60. However, we must consider the fields in combination as the total holdings of each landlord to appreciate the full extent of their uniformity. Of all landholdings in the Cerid villages, 72 percent were 120 *dönüm* in size (that is 24 acres). Apparently, 120 *dönüm* was considered the optimal size for a farm in this area and fields were laid out accordingly. Since this was many times more land than would be needed for subsistence farming, Abidin Paşa and the land registry officials must have intended these tracts as the basis of commercial agricultural development.

⁴¹ Hütteroth's study of land registers for Konya shows that 120 *dönüm* was the largest amount normally granted as a farm in this period. A team of oxen could plow 30 to 40 *dönüm* a year and an equal amount would be left fallow, but he does not explain what was done with the remaining 40 to 60 *dönüm* (Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, *Ländliche Siedlungen im südlichen Inneranatolien in den letzten vierhundert Jahren*, Göttingen, 1968). In the Çukurova, where the rich soil would not have to be left fallow every other year, farmers with 120 *dönüm* must have been expected to employ more than one team or else to follow the governor's example and purchase a steam tractor and plow. Although some of this newly registered land may, in fact, have been used for pasture, the registers state explicitly that it was for new cultivation.

A comparison of estimated tribal population with the number of people registering land in tribal villages indicates that most adult males in the villages studied must have become legitimate landholders by 1884. Although they did not acquire land in equal amounts, landholding was not concentrated in the hands of a few as it was to become in the twentieth century. In tribal villages 30 to 50 percent of the land was held by the top 10 percent. The greatest concentration of land in the fewest hands was in the non-tribal villages where random field size indicates existing settlement and cultivation.⁴²

We do not know how readily the tribes took to agriculture, but the quality of the land they settled clearly determined their future. The Cerid, who probably suffered the most from being settled in the lowest part of the plain, were eventually compensated by the fertility of the soil and the size of the farms granted them. The Sirkıntılı, whose villages in the hills to the west of Sis were somewhat removed from the swamps, combined animal herding with cultivation of small tracts and did not become involved in commercial agriculture until the mid-twentieth century. The Avşar, who chose the better climate of central Anatolia, are still barely above the level of subsistence agriculture.⁴³

The Consequences of Settlement

The effects of settlement on the tribesmen varied according to their social standing within the tribe and their readiness to register and cultivate land. Tribal chieftains preserved and even enhanced their position in sedentarized society with their new official posts as heads of tribal *nahiyes*, members of government councils and officers in the rural police force. They settled in the newly created towns and bought title to the land. Of the other tribesmen, some registered land and some did not. At first, a slip of paper from the government may not have seemed very important to the tribes, but as agriculture spread and the price of land shot up, those who had not bothered to secure formal title to their land found themselves excluded from it. Often, those who had settled without legal title could not afford to purchase it later and became sharecroppers, mere tenants on land which should have been theirs. Others who had continued to migrate found themselves denied access to winter pasture. Nomadism is increasingly anachronistic in the rich agricultural areas of Antalya and Adana, yet there are still Yürüks who are prevented from settling by the high cost of land.⁴⁴

⁴² TKUM, vol. 3052-3060, 3201-3204, 3216-3217, 3244-3245, 3262-3263, 3270-3271.

⁴³ Interview with Professor Faruk Sümer at the University of Ankara, Feb. 10, 1971; Jan Hinderink and Mübeccel B. Kiray, *Social Stratification as an Obstacle to Development: A Study of Four Turkish Villages* (New York, 1970), pp. 30-35.

⁴⁴ An example of those who settled without title is the minstrel Ali Soylu of Kozan who was interviewed by Wolfram Eberhard in 1951 (*Minstrel Tales from Southeastern Turkey* Berkeley, 1955, p. 5). An example of those who gradually lost all access to land in the plain through continued migration is the Aydınlı Yürük tribe described by Yaşar Kemal in *Binboğalar Efsanesi* (Istanbul, 1971). Although this is a work of fiction, the plight of the landless Yürük is the same as that found by de Planhol in the Antalya area (Xavier de

Within the tribes that settled, the change from animals to land as the basis of wealth has created economic and social stratification in a formerly homogeneous society. Although flocks continued to be a major form of investment until the mid-twentieth century, the introduction of more productive strains of cotton, the draining of swamps and the improvement of roads all worked together to make commercial agriculture more attractive and the stringent enforcement of Forest Laws made migration more difficult. In the villages which have turned to commercial agriculture specialization in cotton and mechanization have led to a concentration of landholding: those who can afford to specialize and buy machinery prosper and buy more land; those who cannot are forced to sell their land and become sharecroppers or field hands.⁴⁵

One consequence of settlement which none of the tribesmen could avoid was disease. British military consuls reported that over half of them had died in the first few years of settlement.⁴⁶ Besim Atalay, taking the village of İl-oğlu south of Maraş as a typical example, reported in 1915 that only thirty of one hundred Tacirlu families originally settled there had survived and that these families were much reduced in size and wealth.⁴⁷ Folk songs collected in the tribal villages of the Çukurova also complain of the decimation of the population, first by cholera and then by malaria. There is no mention of such mortality in the Ottoman archives, but population statistics in the provincial yearbooks provide a very rough outline of demographic change.

Between 1868 and 1890 the population of the province of Adana increased by 71 percent and the number of villages increased by 56 percent. However, population in the districts of Kars, Sis and Karaisalu declined by 60, 49 and 28 percent respectively. At the same time the number of villages in these same districts increased by 67, 21 and 19 percent.⁴⁸ The largely tribal population of these districts was decreasing as it was being settled. Since many of the new villages were in the marshy areas of Sis and Kars, epidemics of malaria and other diseases offer a plausible explanation of this decrease. The increase of population in Osmaniye and İslahiye, where swamps were also a problem (although to a considerably lesser degree in Osmaniye) can be attributed to settlement of refugees between 1868 and 1890.⁴⁹

Planhol, *De la plaine pamphylienne aux lacs pisidiens: Nomadisme et vie paysanne*, Paris, 1958, p. 398.

⁴⁵ Hinderink and Kiray, pp. 30-35, 52, 54.

⁴⁶ FO 222/8/3, Bennet to Dufferin (3/22/82).

⁴⁷ Besim [Atalay], *Maraş Tarihi ve Coğrafyası* (Istanbul, 1331), p. 73.

⁴⁸ *Salname-i Vilayet-i Halep*, 1285; Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie*, vol. II (Paris, 1891), pp. 4-5 (Cuinet's data is from provincial yearbooks not available to me).

⁴⁹ In his study of the nomads of Persia, Barth found a persistently high rate of mortality among the settled population and a high rate of fertility among the nomads. Over the centuries, population pressure within the tribes has forced some of their number to settle, helping to offset the deficit left by the high rate of mortality among the peasants, Fredrik Barth, *Nomads of South Persia: the Basseri Tribe of the Khamseh Confederacy* (New York, 1961).

General estimates of tribal population are probably even less accurate than the Ottoman statistics, but they are easier to use because they avoid the problem of movement between districts. After omitting the Avşar (most of whom were settled in central Anatolia) from the tribal population of Adana as of 1852 (estimated at 81,355 above), we are left with 71,355 who should have been settled. This same population had declined to an estimated 55,650 in 1890,⁵⁰ which indicates a loss of 15,705 or about 22 percent. This suggests that the loss of 20,159 shown by the provincial yearbooks in the *kazas* of Kars, Sis and Karaisalu was due in large part to mortality rather than to emigration to other parts of the province.

The only accounts of settlement as seen from the tribal perspective are a few folksongs. The following is especially graphic:

The Hemite fortress is in sight.
The tribe will never be rid of its troubles.
May the Çukurova be laid waste.
Our people were surrounded and left there.

The west wind does not blow; the flies settle.
The night is very hot; the mosquitoes bite.
The water cannot be drunk; the algae stinks.
Oh my God, if only we could return to our *yayla*!

Enough, oh agas, enough of this malaria!
When we reach Kurucak the cuckoo will sing.
There are no girls or brides left; they are all sick in bed.
Our roses will not bloom on the banks [of the Ceyhan].

In the Haruniye plain beyond Karagedik,
Three tribal beys sit and talk.
There are no conquering beys to whom we can complain.
Both our arms are broken at the elbow.

When we got to Kavkırt the sky would change.
We would spread out and camp at Suçatı.
At a word our forces would mount a thousand blue roans,
They were all skilled with the flintlock.

Our aga would set up his tent
and hang his cloak on a branch.
Each of us was match for an army.
It is a pity our people could not have died fighting.

⁵⁰ Cuinet, p. 5.

I am Dadal. When we reach those mountains,
when I see the homeland deserted, I am afraid (that)
when we reach Binboğa and spread our tents,
the *yayla* will suffer our misfortune.⁵¹

There are many other examples of this type of folksong. The original versions have been corrupted in transmission and can, in any case, not be taken as accurate historical data, but they do provide useful insight into the psychological impact of forced settlement. The total defeat and exile of all the *derebeys* was simply unthinkable to the tribesmen before 1865. For them the Reform Division was like an act of God which destroyed their old life and left them to find a new one in exceedingly difficult circumstances.

The consequences of tribal settlement for the province of Adana as a whole were far more beneficial. The transformation of the plain from marshy winter pasture to one of Turkey's richest and most productive agricultural areas was both a cause and an effect of sedentarization. Forced settlement of the tribes freed large areas for cultivation by notables and others with capital. The ensuing agricultural expansion and increasing demand for land eventually led some of the tribesmen to register land while they still could. Statistics on the expansion of cultivation in the Çukurova are not available. Increased trade through Mersin, Adana's major port, although not confined to local agricultural production, does reflect the greater safety of the roads and mountain passes. Between 1870 and 1886 the value of exports and imports was consistently two to three times its level in 1860. Increasing cotton export provides an especially good measure of pacification as it was grown entirely in the Çukurova and its long period of maturation made it especially vulnerable to damage by migrating nomads. Annual export of cotton after 1870 was at least three times its 1861 level and up to ten times this level in boom years.⁵² This does not even reflect the entire production of the area as a good deal was sent overland to other ports or used in domestic manufacture.

The importance of tribal settlement to the present demography of the province of Adana can best be appreciated by considering the number of villages settled by the six major tribes of the Çukurova in proportion to the total number of villages in each *nahiye* or *kaza*. At least 146 such villages can be found in nineteenth century sources, and of these 135 appear again among the total of 160 tribal villages listed in twentieth century sources.⁵³ Although such settlement constitute only 19 percent of the total number of villages in the modern province of Adana (724), they form as much as 93 percent of the villages in some *nahiyes*. The map following shows the number of villages settled by these tribes in each district (*nahiye* or *kaza*) and the percentage of the total for

⁵¹ Pertev Naili Boratav, "Çukurova'da Folklor Derlemeleri," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi*, vol. V, no. 3, pp. 270-73.

⁵² Gould, "Pashas and Brigands", pp. 195,198.

⁵³ For a complete list of these villages and full citation of all source materials used see the author's dissertation "Pashas and Brigands", pp. 238-48.


that district which it represents. It must be kept in mind that only the largest and most troublesome tribes have been studied here. Many smaller tribes were also settled in the latter nineteenth century and a complete study of all the villages of the Çukurova, such as has been undertaken by Safa Vaisoğlu of Kadirli, would show a far larger proportion to be of tribal origin.⁵⁴

Conclusion

As in the rest of Anatolia, economic and demographic pressures made settlement of the tribes of Adana inevitable. Istanbul, however, played a special role in accelerating this process. Although the Porte did not succeed in keeping the tribes in the plain on a year-round basis, it did succeed in destroying their power and subjecting them to centralized administration. The towns and villages established in 1865 provided the basis for this new control and for the eventual settlement of the area. As we have seen, the immediate effects of these efforts on the tribes were disastrous. Settlement, however necessary and inevitable, could have been handled in a more sensitive and humane fashion. The patterns of tribal settlement studied here are a product of what the Ottomans called reform, but the villagers can tell quite another story of needless suffering and destruction which hardly fits our utilitarian concept of reform.

⁵⁴ I wish to thank Safa Vaisoğlu of Kadirli (Kars) for sharing with me his home and the results of many years of research into the origins of the villages of the Çukurova on May 23-24, 1971. I hope this important work may eventually be published.

Villages Formed by the Settlement of Six Major Tribes in the Province of Adana between 1865 and the Present
(as percent of total villages in each *nahiye* as of 1967)



Totals shown are for each *nahiye* or *kaza* with boundaries shown thus:

kaza - - - - - nahiye

51 Percy Nallı Bostan, "Çukurova'da Foklar Üstlenmesi," *Anadolu Üstlenmesi* 23 ve 24 sayıları, İstanbul, 1971, s. 218-75.

52 Bu harita, Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu tarafından hazırlanmıştır. Harita üzerindeki yer isimleri, Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu tarafından hazırlanmıştır. Harita üzerindeki yer isimleri, Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu tarafından hazırlanmıştır.

Justin McCARTHY

MUSLIM REFUGEES IN TURKEY: THE BALKAN WARS, WORLD WAR I AND THE TURKISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

In 1912 the Ottomans entered ten years of war that destroyed the Ottoman Empire. More than three million Muslims died in the Balkan Wars, World War I and the Turkish War of Independence.¹ Almost two million Muslims became refugees. While the great political changes of the period have often been described and analyzed, little attention has been paid to the five million Muslims who suffered the effects of those changes.

Beginning in 1912, Muslims from the conquered lands of the Ottoman Empire escaped in great numbers into what lands remained to them in Anatolia and Eastern Thrace. They joined other refugees who had been fleeing from Russia and the Balkans since the beginning of the nineteenth century, a long migration that was to continue past World War II.² The lands that the Muslims fled were as much their homeland as was Turkey. In many of the regions from which they fled, Muslims had been an absolute majority. In others, they had been the largest religious group in the population.³ Yet Western and Balkan historians have traditionally considered them to have been interlopers, non-native elements who were driven back to their homeland in Anatolia. This was not, in fact, the case. Turks had indeed entered the Balkans and the Caucasus as conquerors who supplanted some of those originally there, just as they had in Anatolia. In this they were the same as the Slavs, themselves earlier conquerors and occupiers of the same lands, and the Greeks, who had also come to the Balkans as conquerors, albeit very early ones. By 1911, Turks had been settled in the Balkans for more than 500 years, longer in the Caucasus territories. After 500 years, they were surely to be considered natives. It was these native Turks,

¹ See Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: the Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*, New York, New York University Press, 1983, and Justin McCarthy, "The Population of Ottoman Europe Before and After the Fall of the Empire," in *IIIrd Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey*, ed. H.W. Lowry and R. S. Hattox, Istanbul-Washington, The Isis Press, 1990 pp. 275-288.

² The migration of Muslims actually began with the exodus of Muslims after the Ottoman loss of Hungary. However, the more modern refugee phenomena began with the end of the 1828-29 war with Russia.

³ See Table 1.

along with other Muslim peoples, who were driven from their homes and became the refugees of 1912-22.⁴

Muslim Refugees from the Balkans

The first wave of Muslim refugees in the period being considered came into Turkey as a result of the Balkan Wars. Although the population of the Ottoman Balkan provinces was ethnically and religiously mixed, Muslims were the largest single religious community (*millet*).⁵ They were, like the other native inhabitants of the Balkans, scattered throughout the area (Table 1), with sizeable Muslim communities in every area.⁶ In many districts and three entire

Table 1. The population of Ottoman Europe, 1911, by Province and *Millet*.*

Province	Muslim	Greek	Bulgarian	Total**
Edirne	760.000 (53%)	396.000	171.000	1.427.000
Selanik	605.000 (45%)	398.000	271.000	1.348.000
Yanya	245.000 (44%)	311.000	—	561.000
Manastir	456.000 (43%)	350.000	246.000	1.065.000
İşkodra	218.000 (62%)	11.000	—	349.000
Kosova	959.000 (60%)	93.000	531.000	1.603.000
Total	3.242.000 (51%)	1.558.000	1.220.000	6.353.000

* rounded to the thousands place, with some rounding error.

** includes all *millets*. (Source: McCarthy, "Ottoman Europe")

provinces—Edirne, İşkodra, and Kosova—Muslims were an absolute majority, not only a plurality. The process by which the Balkan nations became overwhelming Christian majorities was one of death or migration for the Balkan Muslims.

The Balkan Wars were a time of high mortality for the Muslims of Ottoman Europe, and fear was the main cause of Muslim emigration. Most of the Balkan Muslims simply fled the advancing armies of the Christian states, deter-

⁴ The overwhelming majority of the Muslim refugees in the World War I period were Turks (defined as those who spoke Turkish as their mother tongue), but Ottoman records did not differentiate between one group of Muslims and another. Some Slavic-speaking Muslims, especially Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks, Albanians, and Caucasian peoples are included in the counts of Muslim refugees.

⁵ Strictly speaking, the Muslim community might not be considered to have been a *millet*, but it is convenient to use that term here.

⁶ For a detailed consideration of the population of Ottoman Europe, see McCarthy, "Ottoman Europe."

mined to avoid the fate of those who had remained in their villages and died⁷:

Since the population of the countries about to be occupied knew, by tradition, instinct, and experience, what they had to expect from the armies of the enemy and from neighboring countries to which these armies belonged, they did not await their arrival, but fled. Thus, generally speaking, the army of the enemy found on its way nothing but villages that were half deserted or totally abandoned. To execute the orders for extermination, it was only necessary to set fire to them. The population, warned by the glow from these fires, fled in all haste. There followed a veritable migration of peoples, for in Macedonia, as in Thrace, there was hardly a spot which was not, at a given moment, on the line of march of some army or other.⁸

The Muslim refugees had good reason for their fears. It is impossible to ascertain which of the Muslims of Ottoman Europe were killed by the invading armies and which died of disease and starvation during their flight. However, the general mortality of the European Muslims in the period was more than 25%,⁹ and much impartial evidence exists of the murder of Muslims, the destruction of their villages, and deliberate policies of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia to force them from their homes.¹⁰ Each of the Christian Balkan nations adopted a policy

⁷ In the second Balkan War, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs treated each other with the same callous inhumanity they had shown to the Turks in the first war. It should be in no way be assumed that Muslims were the only sufferers in the Balkan Wars, nor that Turks were never guilty of outrages. All sides in the Balkan Wars acted with inhumanity. The important factor concerning refugees, however, is that the Ottomans were attacked and defeated, and that they were in retreat from the beginning of the first Balkan War. This meant that the Ottoman army, whatever its intentions might have been, did not have the opportunity to carry out against Christians the sort of atrocities that Christian armies carried out against the Turks. There is no profit in speculation on what Turkish actions would have been had they won. It is, nevertheless, important to point out the fact that atrocities committed by Turks in the Balkans and later in western Anatolia were almost entirely committed after prior Christian massacres. This in no way excuses inhuman acts by Turks, but it does contradict the popular image of the bloodthirsty Turk and the suffering Christian.

⁸ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*, Washington, D.C., 1914, p. 151.

⁹ McCarthy, "Ottoman Europe."

¹⁰ Human suffering is an inherent part of refugee migrations. In a study such as this there is a temptation to offer lists and descriptions of atrocities, and it is true that atrocities were a motive force behind the movements of refugees, who justifiably feared that the same would happen to them and ran before it did. Despite this, I see no need to retell the stories of burning, rape, and murder. I have decided only to state that there were awful atrocities committed upon innocent Muslims, and to refer those who wish corroboration to the following: The Carnegie report lists many examples of mass slaughter of Muslims. See especially chapter 2.1, chapter 4.1-3, and Appendix A. See also the extensive documentation in F.O. 371-1762 (entire class), especially the series of documents F.O. 371-1762-50000 to 54000, and F.O. 424-3-4853. The Ottoman government published "atrocities books" at the end of the Balkan Wars, as did the other belligerents, but the above American and British reports will be given more credence by many.

of "demographic warfare"¹¹ intended to make their own people an absolute majority in the areas they had conquered, a policy that was applied by Bulgars, Greeks, and Serbs to Christian groups other than their own, as well as to Muslims.¹² In addition, Muslims, particularly the Pomaks of Bulgaria, emigrated to avoid forced conversion to Christianity.¹³

During the first Balkan War, Muslims fled in great waves to three gathering points of refugees—Albania and the cities of Salonica and Edirne. Ethnically Albanian Muslims were forcibly driven from the Ottoman *vilâyet* of Kosova into Albania by Serbian troops, joining other Muslims who had fled ahead of the armies.¹⁴ Some Muslims of Yanya *Vilâyeti*, taken by Greece, also fled to Albania. However, the number of refugees to Albania remained small, a much smaller group than those who fled elsewhere, because Albania was too poor to support refugees. Refugees to Albania had few places to go. Some few probably became part of the population of the truncated Albanian state. However, given the generally poor conditions in Albania, most of them probably perished.¹⁵

The refugees in Salonica fared better than those in Albania. Salonica became the depot for Muslim refugees from areas taken by all three Christian powers—Muslims of the *vilâyets* of Kosova, Monastir, and Selanik. In Salonica, there were no organized assistance programs for Muslim refugees and disease and starvation claimed many, but groups such as the Salonica Islamic Committee did arrange for ships to take many to Anatolia. Immediately after the wars, the Greek government organized convoys of the remaining refugees and sent them to Turkey.

¹¹ To borrow a phrase applied by Marc Pinson.

¹² Although it would appear to be a wasteful destruction of their own future assets, the invading armies systematically destroyed Muslim villages so as to leave nothing to which the Muslims could return if the Ottoman armies had been victorious. Speaking of Muslim villages near Gümülcine the British representative Young stated, "The track of the invading [Bulgarian] army is marked by 80 miles of ruined villages." (Young to Bax-Ironside, Philippopoli, January 2, 1913-F.O. 371-1762).

¹³ See *Carnegie*, pp. 77, 78, 155-158. Evidence of forced conversions by Bulgarians is well-documented. See the many mentions in the British archival reports, especially F.O. 424-242 (numerous mentions throughout the class) and F.O. 424-113-5970, F.O. 424-248-7327, F.O. 424-405-8508, F.O. 424-351-8124, F.O. 424-248-7327, F.O. 424-466-5.

¹⁴ F.O. 371-1762-50886 gives detailed statistics of Muslim houses destroyed, murders, rapes, etc. in Monastir *Vilâyeti*. The British observers also reported 60,000 refugees from Monastir in Albania. "The state of these people is most desperate." (Consul-General Lamb at Valona, November 21, 1913, F.O. 371-1762-53682. See also F.O. 371-1762-55161).

¹⁵ *Carnegie*, pp. 177-185.

Table 2. Muslim Population Before and After the Wars. Areas which were taken from the Ottoman Empire after 1911 by Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.

	1911	1920s
Greece	746.485	124.460 (1923)
Bulgaria	327.485	179.176 (1920)
Yugoslavia	1.241.076	566.478 (1921)

(Source: McCarthy, "Ottoman Europe")

Edirne received the refugees of eastern Selanik *Vilâyeti* (eastern Macedonia) and Edirne *Vilâyeti* (Thrace). The refugees who escaped to Edirne were forced to flee once again when the Bulgarian armies conquered Edirne *Vilâyeti*. They went to Istanbul and Anatolia, some returning with the Ottoman armies when much of Edirne *Vilâyeti* was reconquered in the second Balkan War.

Incredibly, many Muslims seem to have remained on their lands during the first Balkan War, or to have returned to them soon after the war, only to be finally driven out in the second war. When the American Carnegie Commission of Inquiry visited Salonica during the second Balkan War they found that 135,000 Muslims had already come to the city during the second war alone, and that more were arriving.¹⁶

Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire signed a convention (October, 1913) for the exchange of Thracian Bulgarian Christians and Bulgarian Muslims, after which more Muslim refugees entered the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷ At the same time, Greece and Turkey entered into a *de facto* partial population exchange in which Muslims from Greece replaced Greek migrants from Thrace and Anatolia.

Table 3. Muslim Refugees from the Balkans, 1912-1920, with Areas of Settlement.

<i>Vilâyets</i>		Independent <i>Sandjaks</i>	
Istanbul	3,609	İzmit	6,771
Edirne	132,500	Eskişehir	9,088
Adana	9,059	Bolu	258
Ankara	10,008	Canik	3,875
Aydın	145,868	Çatalca	7,500
Haleb ¹⁸	10,504	Karasi	14,687

¹⁶ *Carnegie*, p. 151.

¹⁷ See Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey*, New York, 1932, pp. 16 and 17, and France, Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, *Les Transferts Internationaux de Populations*, p. 76 and Annex IIIa.

¹⁸ Some of these refugees to Haleb may not have ultimately come to the Turkish Republic,

Hüdavendigâr	20,853	Biga	4,033
Suriye	3,187	Kayseri	14,687
Kastamonu	257	Karahisar	280
Konya	8,512	Menteşe	855
Mamuretülaziz	242	Maraş	5,0
	Total		413,922

(Source: Turkish Ministry of Interior Statistics¹⁹)

With few exceptions, the Muslim refugees from the Balkans were supported by the Ottoman Refugee Commission.²⁰ The Commission oversaw the settlement of the emigrants all over Thrace and Anatolia (Table 3), although the greatest number were settled in eastern Thrace and western Anatolia. 413,922 refugees were recorded.

although most probably did so. To their number should be added an indeterminate number of Muslims who came to Haleb from Libya after the Italian conquest, at least 1500 by May of 1914 (Report by U.S. Consul J. B. Jackson at Aleppo, May 21, 1914, U.S. Archives 867.55/26).

¹⁹ I accept these statistics as authentic, even though they have only appeared in secondary sources. Antoniadès (*Le développement économique de la Thrace*, Athens, 1922, p. 217), Ladas (*The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey*, New York, 1932, p. 16), and Toynbee (*The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, London, 1922, p. 138) all give the same figures, listed in the same source—the Ottoman Ministry of Refugees. Moreover, Toynbee and Antoniadès gave the figures in a different form (Toynbee by year, Antoniadès by province of settlement), but the same total figures. The figures printed by Antoniadès also have the proper form for a typical Ottoman governmental statistical table. Therefore, it is most likely that these are real Ottoman statistics which, like most of the Ottoman records of the period, have not yet been found in their original form. Toynbee's figures of refugees by year:

1912-13	177.352
1914-15	120.566
1916-17	18.912
1918-19	22.244
<u>1919-20</u>	<u>74.848</u>
Total	413.922

Antoniadès estimated 500,000 refugees who were not counted in the above totals, whereas Toynbee and Ladas did not. However, Antoniadès indicated that these were "les personnes aisées et les employés du Gouvernement avec leurs familles." One can, I think, assume that the "personnes aisées" were few and that most of the number were government employees and their families. As such, the latter were not included in Ottoman population registers of natives of the Balkan provinces and thus have not been considered to be refugees here. Even so, the figure of 500,000 seems ludicrously high, unless Antoniadès included soldiers, who could be called "government employees."

²⁰ The Refugee Commission (*Muhacirin Komisyonu*) was the Ottoman agency directly in charge of assistance to refugees. In areas in which Ottoman governmental control was strong, the Commission took detailed, family-by-family and person-by-person counts of refugees, including refugees back to the period of the Crimean War.

The final emigration of the Balkan Muslims came as a result of the Greco-Turkish compulsory population exchange. 354,647 Muslims from Greek territory were officialy exchanged for 192,356 Anatolian and Thracian Greeks.

Table 4. Immigrants to Turkey, 1921-1927, as recorded.

	Male	Female	Total
1921	5,488	5,591	11,079
1922	5,189	4,904	10,093
1923	25,552	25,136	50,689
1924	120,322	115,092	235,414
1925	28,353	28,170	56,523
1926	18,481	16,570	35,051
1927	15,557	16,656	32,213
Totals	218,943	212,119	431,062

(Source: *Istatistik Yıllığı III*)

Turkish immigration statistics for the period of the Greco-Turkish population exchange were similar to those kept by the Ottomans after the Balkan Wars. They listed the refugees for each year by the province in which the refugees were settled. Since the recorded number of refugees corresponded closely to the numbers of Turkish refugees officially recorded by the Mixed Commission of the Population Exchange (388,146), it appears that almost all the refugees listed in Table 4 came from Greece in that exchange.

The third Turkish Statistical Yearbook listed immigrants (Table 4) for each year from 1921 to 1929. Because of the extensive use made of the 1927 Turkish census in this study and the need for comparable figures to the 1927 data, only the figures from 1921 to 1927 have been listed in the table. Detailed figures for immigration by province are given in Appendix Two.

Refugees in the East

The Turkish Eastern Front in World War I and the later Turco-Armenian War was such a mass of moving peoples that contemporary accounts give the impression that the peoples of eastern Anatolia and the southern Caucasus were all refugees. While this is an exaggeration, it is not a gross exaggeration. The majority of eastern Anatolians, both Muslims and Christians, either died or left their homes.²¹

²¹ See *Muslims and Minorities*, Chapter 7.

The Muslims who had come from the Russian Caucasus were part of the last act of a bloody and unregulated population exchange between Armenians and Muslims that had gone on for a century.²² The plight of the Armenian refugees has been reconstructed, often in a polemic spirit, in numerous monographs and has acquired an almost mythic aspect. The corresponding plight of Muslim refugees has gone unnoticed. Reading the events of the time in standard histories, one might assume that no Muslims had been affected by the eastern Anatolian wars.

An unknown number of the Muslims of Russian Transcaucasia must have left the area during World War I to join the Ottoman armies or simply to escape the Russians. It is known that the Russians attempted to clear frontier districts at the beginning of the war and some Muslims must have fled south at that time. However, the main Muslim migration came after the Revolution had destroyed Imperial Russia. Muslims fled as a result of Armenian-Turkish conflicts in the Caucasus and conflicts among the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijan Republics. Few of the Muslim refugees were soldiers; most were Turkish/Tatar refugees who had not participated in the wars.

An example of the cause of the Muslim migration may be found in the activities of Armenian guerilla bands and armies:

The routes south were blocked by regular Turkish divisions. Backtracking, (the Armenian guerilla leader and general) Andranik then pushed over Nakhichevan into Zangezur, the southernmost *uezd* of the Elisavetpol *guberniia*. Remaining there for the duration of the world war, Andranik's forces crushed one Tatar village after another.²³

When the Turco-Armenian, inter-Caucasian, and Bolshevik-Armenian wars ended, the ethnic groups of the Caucasus had been forcibly separated. Muslims from Armenia and, to a lesser extent, Georgia had fled south to Turkey and east to Azerbaijan.²⁴

The procedures necessary to ascertain the number of Muslim refugees from the Russian Empire²⁵ are more complicated and their answers more tentative than those employed to find the number of Balkan Muslim refugees. Unless Muslim refugees from Russia passed through Istanbul, as few did, they were not enumerated. The refugees from the Russian Caucasus travelled during wartime, across unchecked borders, and settled where they could. There were no

²² See note 1.

²³ Richard G. Hovannissian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence*, Los Angeles, 1967, p. 194.

²⁴ A number of articles and books, including those of Hovanissian and McCarthy, cited above, partially treat this phenomena. See also W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields*, Cambridge, 1953.

²⁵ The Russian Empire took a census in 1897 but the next census was not taken until the Soviet census of 1926. While the Empire registered population by religion, the Soviets did not. The Empire only used the broad ethnic category "Turco-Tatar," whereas the Soviets divided this category into many separate ethnic divisions. Such problems add to the difficulties of comparative analysis.

governmental agencies able to count them or to assist them.

Because the enumeration of the refugees in eastern Anatolia is such a matter of conjecture, and because many will perceive their numbers as unexpectedly large, the following evaluation consciously underestimates the number of Muslim refugees. Whenever a choice between a high or a low number of refugee numbers has been available, the lower has been chosen. Therefore, the results of the following should be understood to be the lower limit of the numbers of Muslim refugees from the Russian Empire. The actual numbers of refugees were surely greater. Also, in most cases one can only estimate *surviving* refugees who settled in Turkey—a much smaller number than those who set out.

The majority of the Muslim refugees from Russia settled in the area of the Turkish Republic that had been part of Russia from 1878 to 1921. This area, the Russian *guberniia* of Kars,²⁶ was the Turkish-ruled area closest to the refugees' original homes and had much available land, due to wartime mortality and Armenian emigration. In 1897, the Russian Census²⁷ listed 76,521 Muslim males in Kars Province, a corrected²⁸ population of 153,042 Muslims. Projected to 1914, at the beginning of World War I, the Muslim population was 194,628²⁹. It is impossible, because of massive migration, to find the exact number of Kars Muslims who died in the 1915-1921 wars. However, one can safely assume that the mortality in Kars was as bad as anywhere in the war zone, since Kars was on the invasion lines of both the Russians and the Ottomans.³⁰ If one assumes that mortality of native Muslims in Kars was as bad as that seen in Van *Vilâyeti*, where the wartime experience was similar³¹, 73,959 native Muslims survived to 1922.

²⁶ Often called "Kars and Ardahan," the area was ceded to Russia in 1878. Most of the land was then returned to Turkey after the Turkish victories over the Armenian Republic and the treaty with the Soviet Union. The area was divided into the Republican provinces of Artvin *Vilâyeti* (less Yusufeli *Kazası*), Oltu *Kazası* of Erzurum *Vilâyeti*, Iğdır and Kulp *kazas* of Bayazıt *Vilâyeti*, and all of Kars *Vilâyeti*.

²⁷ The 1897 Russian census was published in various forms in Russian and French. The version used here is the detailed, bilingual *Premier Recensement Général de la Population de l'Empire de Russie, 1897, Relevé Général*, "rédigé par Nicolas Troinitsky," St. Petersburg, 1905.

²⁸ Females were greatly undercounted, so male population has been doubled to approximate total population. The resulting figure is inexact, but superior to the uncorrected population numbers.

²⁹ The *Kavkasya Kalendarii* (Tiflis) of 1916, the official government publication of the Russian Caucasus, gave higher figures, but they were not based on actual enumerations.

³⁰ At the beginning of World War I, the Ottomans invaded Kars, were driven out by the Russians, then returned in 1917. Kars Province was the center of warfare between the Ottomans and the Russians and between the Turkish armies of Kazım Karabekir and the armies of the Armenian Republic, as well as intercommunal warfare between Turks and Armenians, and Kurdish attacks on everyone.

³¹ In Van *Vilâyeti*, 62% of the Muslim population was lost between 1912 and 1922 (*Muslims and Minorities*, p. 134).

In 1927, there were 340,399 Muslims in the area that had been the Russian Kars *Guberniia*. Projected back to 1922³², this means that 317,703 Muslims were in the area in 1922. Only 73,959 of these were natives, leaving 243,744 to be counted as in-migrants. These 243,744 could theoretically have been migrants from areas other than Russia. However, the relative undesireability of Kars and the presence of abundant land in the rest of Anatolia makes such internal migration extremely unlikely. In fact, many of the refugees from Russia did not remain in Kars, but went on to other regions in Anatolia themselves.

Table 5. Refugees in the Kars Area*.

Muslim in Kars* in 1922	317,703
Native Muslim Survivors from 1914 to 1922	- 73,959
Refugees	243,744

* The Provinces of Kars, Artvin (less Yusufeli), and the *kazas* of Oltu, Kulp, and Iğdir.

Only approximately one-half of the Muslim refugees labeled themselves as born in Russia, 127,988. These must be assumed to be part of the group of refugees from areas that remained in Russia in 1927. The vast majority of the 1927 inhabitants of the Kars region actually must have been born in Russia, since the area was in the Russian Empire from 1878 to 1922. Yet 212,512 of the 341,254 recorded inhabitants of the area listed themselves as having been born in Turkey. As seen above, most of those who registered themselves as being born in Turkey were in fact born in the Russian Empire, outside of even the larger 1927 Turkish borders.

The Muslim refugees from Russia did not all remain in the Kars area. They migrated and settled in a region bounded by the Turkish republican provinces of Samsun on the west and Van and Bitlis on the south. In these provinces, 14,480 were registered in 1927 as having been born in Russia. Based on the experience of underregistration of the foreign-born in other provinces, it seems likely that those who were registered were only half of the actual refugees. That admittedly inexact standard has been applied to these figures, doubling the recorded Muslim refugees from Russia to the Kars area to 28,960.

³² The number 73,959 is an estimate, but has not been rounded so that readers may check the calculations. This has been done for other estimates, below, as well.

Table 6. Surviving Muslim Refugees from the Russian Empire in Northeastern and Eastern Anatolia in 1922.

In the Kars region	243.744
In other provinces ³³	(33)28.960
Total	272.704

It is important to note that the type of enumeration of refugees in Table Six is different than the estimates of refugees in other areas of Turkey. The figures here are of refugees who survived the period of the wars, i.e., those who lived to be counted in the census. If the refugees from Russia had been counted when they arrived, their numbers would have been considerably greater. The extremely conservative assumption that one-third of the Muslim refugees from the Caucasus, approximately 135,000, died³⁴ would leave an initial refugee migration of more than 400,000.

³³ The following provinces of republican Turkey are close enough to Kars that refugees could have gone there, even on foot.

Province	Males Born in Russia
Amasya	839
Artvin (Yusufeli <i>kazası</i>)	1*
Bayazıt (-İğdır & Kulp <i>kazası</i>)	790*
Bitlis	938
Erzincan	150
Erzurum (Oltu <i>kazası</i>)	4.257*
Gümüşhane	15
Rize	80
Samsun	2.142
Şebın Karahisar	13
Tokat	2.298
Trabzon	223
Van	2.734
Total	14.480

* Only those areas that were in the Ottoman Empire after 1878.

The areas that the Turkish Republic took from Russia listed only 41 Russian citizens in the 1927 census. So those listed as born in Russia must be considered to have been refugees.

³⁴ Given the overall death rate of (a) the other Muslims in the eastern Anatolian area and (b) the Armenians in the same area, an estimated mortality of one-third is by no means excessive.

Refugees from the Arab World

The condition of potential refugees from the Arab world was considerably different than that in other areas. While a number of Ottoman citizens who were ethnically Turkish lived in Greater Syria and Iraq, there was little pressure on them to emigrate, surely not the murderous force applied to the Turks of the Balkans and the Caucasus. Therefore, there was relatively little migration from the Arab world to Turkey. Most of those who did leave are more properly labeled as returning Ottoman soldiers and bureaucrats than refugees.

Table 7. Southeastern Anatolian Provinces. Population by Place of Birth in Syria and Iraq, as recorded, 1927.

Provinces	Born in Iraq	Born in Syria
Adana	6	318
Cebelibereket	6	135
Gaziantep	1	392
Urfa	0	18
Mardin	9	10
Hakkâri	9	0

(Source: 1927 Turkish Census)

If there had been significant mass migration from the Arab Provinces of the Ottoman Empire, it should have appeared in the 1927 Turkish census under the Place of Birth category in the provinces bordering Syria and Iraq. It did not. Even allowing for the large underenumeration common in the Place of Birth statistics, the numbers recorded were small (Table 7).

INTERNAL REFUGEES

The numbers of the largest group of Muslim refugees cannot be properly estimated. They were the Anatolian refugees who fled from the Greek and Russian armies that invaded Anatolia and Eastern Thrace and from the intercommunal wars that accompanied the invasions.

Eastern Anatolia

In the East there were Muslim refugees in two periods. The first period began in April, 1915, with the Armenian revolt in Van, continued with the

Russian invasion of May, 1915,³⁵ and ended when the Russians retreated in the summer of 1915. The second came with the more successful Russian invasion of 1916, which ultimately led to the Russian occupation of the Ottoman province of Erzurum and of much of the provinces of Van, Diyarbâkir, Mamuretülaziz, and Trabzon.

The result of the Russian invasions was naturally a great exodus of the pacific, farming element of the population, both Muslims and Christians. The intercommunal war between Armenians and Turks also forced many to leave their homes, even in areas that were not on the line of march of either army. Equally disastrous was the complete breakdown of civil order in all of eastern Anatolia. Engaged in a losing struggle for survival, the Ottoman army and gendarmerie provided none of the protection from Kurdish tribes and others that was always needed by the settled populations of the east. As a result, cities and provinces to the south and west that were under more firm Ottoman control swelled with Turkish refugees. Of these, the refugees from northern Trabzon *Vilâyeti* and northeastern Erzurum *Vilâyeti* were the most fortunate. They were transported to Black Sea provinces of Anatolia—relatively stable areas under close central government control.³⁶ From there, some were sent to central Anatolia, as were refugees from southern Trabzon and Erzurum. Those who fled from more eastern areas were less fortunate. They fled south into the provinces of Mamuretülaziz, Diyarbâkir, and Van. Many of these refugees were forced to flee in stages, leaving their homes, settling in one area until the Russians advanced, then fleeing once again. Often refugees from Erzurum were forced to escape to areas as far from their homes as Maraş and Adana, travels of more than 600 kilometers on foot.

No completely accurate count of the internal refugees in eastern Anatolia was ever taken. Given the situation of the region, no census would have been possible. However, the relief agency of the Ottoman Interior Ministry did estimate the numbers of refugees who had been given assistance, transportation, or housing by the government. In the document from which the data in Table 8 has been taken³⁷ it is impossible to know if the Interior Ministry statistics were drawn from actual enumerations or from estimates made by local officials³⁸. Most probably it was both. It must be noted that the figures in Table 8 are only of officially noted refugees; the document indicates that many refugees were not

³⁵ Spearheaded by Russian Armenian units.

³⁶ Ordu, Giresun, Ünye, Samsun, Bafra, and Kastamonu.

³⁷ #1-2, 361-1445, 15-22, 15-23, "To the Office of the Prime Minister, 4 December, 1916," quoted in Military History and Strategic Studies Department of the Turkish General Staff, *Documents* (circulated by the Turkish Directorate General of Press and Information), 1982, pp. 118-124.

³⁸ It is obvious from the documents that some areas were much better enumerated than others. For example: "The number of people who took refuge in Diyarbakir is 16,901 at the central district and 16,162 at the district of Mardin. So far 40,000 refugees have been sent to Urfa." Obviously, more was known of the refugees in Mardin and Diyarbakir than of those "sent to Urfa."



included in the numbers.

Table 8. Eastern Anatolian Muslim Refugees Receiving Assistance,
to October, 1916.

From	To*	Refugees
Trabzon	Samsun	79.100
E. Erzurum		
Erzurum	Sivas	300.000**
E.&S.Erzurum	Mamuretülaziz	80.000
Van		
Van	Diyarbâkir	200.000
Bitlis		
Other		43.800
Total	659.100	

* Many went on further into Anatolia.

** "exceeding 300,000"

(Source: Ottoman Interior Ministry)

Since the pre-war Muslim population of the area taken by the Russians was 2.3 million³⁹, a figure of 660,000 indicates that more than one-fourth of the pre-war population had become refugees by 1916. A later report of the Ministry of Refugees gave a figure of 868,962 refugees by the end of World War I⁴⁰. If one considers that these data only include officially recorded⁴¹ refugees and that great numbers of Muslims were killed before the refugee movements even began, the proportion of refugees becomes much higher. More than one-half of those who survived the first battles and massacres must have become refugees. Judged on the basis of the general wartime mortality of the Ottoman eastern provinces, more than one-half of the internal refugees in eastern Anatolia must have died.⁴²

³⁹ See *Muslims and Minorities*, Chapter Six, especially pp. 110 and 111.

⁴⁰ Toynbee, p. 191.

⁴¹ The author of the Ottoman document on these refugees spoke of "an exodus of about 800,000 people," but even this may have been too low an estimate of the refugees as of 1916.

⁴² This assumes that refugees suffered higher mortality than Muslims of the area in general. For the general mortality, see *Muslims and Minorities*, pp. 133-137.



Western Anatolia

In the west, Muslim refugees also fled from invaders, the Greek army, and from the Greek-Turkish intercommunal war. Once again, as in eastern Anatolia, Muslims suffered from the lack of civil security. There were no marauding Kurdish tribes in the west, but local Greeks, capitalizing on the advance of the Greek army and the lack of security forces, attacked Turkish villagers and forced them to flee.

The Greek army, aided by the victorious Allies, landed in İzmir on May 14, 1919. It met with little initial resistance as it advanced into Anatolia. Following the principles of the Mudros Armistice, Ottoman soldiers and police in western Anatolia had been ordered not to resist, and the Allies had seized the Turks' weapons. By the end of the summer of 1919, the Greek army had seized most of the Ottoman *vilâyet* of Aydın. Greek forces advanced farther the next summer, reaching İzmit and Adapazarı, then, in October, moving east. By January of 1921, all of western Anatolia was in Greek hands.

In the region seized by the Greeks, Muslim villagers were indiscriminately slaughtered. At first, Allied observers felt that the murderous actions were those of local Greeks in quest of revenge for real or fancied wrongs. However, even the British observers, who so wanted to find in the Greeks a positive force for "Christian Civilization in the East," were forced to admit the character of the Greek atrocities:

A distinct and regular method seems to have been followed in the destruction of [Turkish] villages, group by group, for the last two months, which destruction has even reached the neighborhood of the Greek headquarters.

The members of the [Inter-Allied] Commission consider that, in the part of the *kazas* of Yalova and Guemlek occupied by the Greek army, there is a systematic plan of destruction of Turkish villages and extinction of the Moslem population. The plan is being carried out by Greek and Armenian bands, which appear to operate under Greek instructions and sometimes even with the assistance of detachments of regular troops⁴³.

Professor Toynbee, who had come to Anatolia expecting a far different situation than he found, realized the Greek intentions after viewing the massacres at Yalova and Gemlik and investigating the continuing depredations around İzmir. He, like the Inter-Allied Investigation Committee quoted above, concluded that massacres and expulsions of Turks were planned by the Greek government⁴⁴.

⁴³ Toynbee, p. 284.

⁴⁴ Toynbee, p. 367. Professor Toynbee's reporting on the Greek-Turkish conflict was more reliable than that of many others for two reasons: First, he actually saw much of what he wrote. Because of his long-standing pro-Greek credentials, Toynbee was actually writing

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The situation was the same Turks had seen in the Balkans—a Christian national army and local Christian forces killing them and forcing them out, and the intention was the same—to create a majority Christian state by murder or forced migration of the majority Muslims. To that end, a policy of State Terror was employed, beginning with massacres of Turks upon the Greek landing at İzmir and rising in intensity to a high point in 1920-21. Turks not personally attacked in the Terror were intended to hear of the massacres that accompanied the Greek army and flee to other areas. As the Greeks advanced, the policy bore results. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims fled. There is little doubt that had the Greek army been as successful in Anatolia as in Ottoman Europe, a majority Greek state on all sides of the Aegean would have resulted.

The numbers of refugees from the Greek invasion can never be known exactly. With the virtual collapse of the Ottoman government, the only agency that had effectively aided Muslim refugees, the Ottoman Refugee Commission, ceased practical operations. European observers were impressed and astounded by the magnitude of the Muslim migration, but they could only estimate the refugee numbers. British reports often spoke of Greek atrocities and Turkish refugees from areas such as İzmir, Aydın, or Yalova saying "there must be 100,000 refugees"⁴⁵ in that area alone. The Refugee Commission estimated that there were between 200,000 and 350,000 refugees.⁴⁶

Of all the estimates of refugee numbers, those presented by İsmet Paşa at the Lausanne Conference seem most accurate. He estimated that 1.5 million Anatolian Turks had been exiled or had died in the area of Greek occupation.⁴⁷ This figure appears high, but it was presented to the Conference with detailed statistics of destruction in the occupied region, and these statistics make the estimate seem probable. İsmet Paşa quoted from a census made after the war which demonstrated that 160,739 buildings had been destroyed in the region. The destroyed homes alone would account for many hundreds of thousands of refugees,⁴⁸ and not all refugees' homes were destroyed.

European accounts of refugees were necessarily fragmented, but when considered they support İsmet Paşa's estimate. The British agent at Aydın, Blair

against his own prejudices and preconceptions. It hurt him to speak against the Greeks and show sympathy for the Turks, whom he had so often damned, but Toynbee was an honest scholar. In his earlier work on the Armenian Question, however, Toynbee had relied only on the reports reaching him from pro-Armenian sources, especially information provided by U.S. Ambassador Morgenthau. Turkey was Britain's enemy and no reports from the other side were available. Unfortunately, Toynbee was not on the spot in Eastern Anatolia. However, this does not diminish his value as an eye-witness in Western Anatolia.

⁴⁵ F.O. 371-5140-1448

⁴⁶ Toynbee, p. 169

⁴⁷ F.O. 371-9061-969, İsmet Pacha to the President of the Third Commission, Lausanne, January 20, 1923, "Memorandum respecting Turkish Claims against Greece." This record contains village by village figures for many areas and includes costs of property and animals destroyed, as well as buildings. Toynbee, p. 169

⁴⁸ 800,000 at five to a building. Of course, many of the buildings destroyed may have belonged to Greeks, who made up approximately 14% of the pre-war population of the area. However, by no means were all of the houses of the Muslims destroyed.

Fish, reported 177,000 refugees in Aydın *Vilâyeti* by September 30, 1919,⁴⁹ only four months after the Greek landing. The Italian High Commissioner at Istanbul accepted an Ottoman estimate that there were 457,000 refugees by September of 1920⁵⁰, and this figure did not include the new refugees of fall and winter of 1920-21. Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, the League of Nations High Commissioner of Refugees, stated that 75,000 Turks had come to the Istanbul area alone⁵¹ since November of 1920. Such figures make İsmet Paşa's estimate all the more credible. Since more than 600,000 Muslims died⁵² in the invaded area, one can estimate that 900,000 were refugees.

A number of Muslims left Eastern Thrace during the Greek occupation of 1918 to 1923. It is known that more than 9,000 of these escaped into Bulgaria⁵³. The Greek government took a census of Eastern Thrace in 1920⁵⁴, but only counted total population, not religion or ethnic group. In 1920, the Ottomans estimated that 200,000 refugees from "Rumelia"⁵⁵ were in the Istanbul area. Of these, at least 30,000 came from Eastern Thrace⁵⁶. Muslim

⁴⁹ F.O. 371-4429-146296

⁵⁰ F.O. 371-5824-12031

⁵¹ League of Nations, *Report of the Work of the High Commission for Refugees presented by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen to the Fourth Assembly*, Geneva, September 4, 1923.

⁵² Mortality in the provinces occupied by Greek forces:

Ottoman Province	Loss
Aydın	333.230
Hüdavendigar	160.612
Biga	24.793
İzmid	12.039
Total	530.674

(Source: *Muslims and Minorities*, p. 134)

The figures above are actually of "population loss," not mortality. That is, they are the remainder when the population of each province in 1922 is subtracted from the population in 1912. Since the four provinces were affected by in-migration and some areas of Ankara and Konya *vilâyets* were also occupied by the Greeks, an estimate of 600,000 dead is reasonable.

⁵³ Consul Keel in Sofia stated (Nov. 2, 1920) that 9,000 had been counted, but that the numbers were probably greater. (F.O. 371-5253-613950.)

⁵⁴ The 1920 Greek census was inferior to all the other Greek censuses both in collection and publication. The statistics by religion and mother tongue for the region taken from Turkey have not, to my knowledge, ever been published. Only general figures of total population were printed and these often appear to be large undercounts. The census was published in various forms from 1921 to 1928. See especially Greece, Ministère de l'Économie Nationale, Direction de la Statistique, *Population du Royaume de Grèce d'après le Recensement du 19 Décembre 1920*, Athens, 1921, and Greece, Ministère de l'Économie Nationale, Statistique Générale de la Grèce, *Recensement de la Population de la Grèce au 19 Décembre 1920*, Athens, 1928. The former included statistics from the areas in Eastern Thrace occupied by Greece, but later returned to Turkey; the latter did not.

⁵⁵ F.O. 371-5284-12031.

refugees who went from Eastern Thrace to Anatolia remain uncounted.

CONCLUSION

By the time of the 1927 Turkish census, almost three million Muslims, one-fourth of the Turkish population.⁵⁷, had been refugees.

Table 9. Muslim Refugees.

International Refugees

From the Balkans	1912-1920	413.922
From the Balkans	1921-1927	431,062
From the Caucasus		272.704

Total

1,117.688

Internal Refugees

Eastern Anatolia	868.962
Western Anatolia	900.000*
Thrace	39.000**

Total

1.807.962

*includes some who were first International Refugees, then later Internal Refugees.

**including a minimum of 9,000 refugees from Eastern Thrace to Bulgaria.

The final word in a paper on refugees should be on the condition of those who fled to Turkey and what awaited them there. Unlike the Greek and Armenian refugees, the Muslim refugees were forgotten by the world. The League of Nations and western countries made extensive gifts and loans to assist Greek refugees. For the settlement of the Greek refugees from Turkey in the 1920s, for

⁵⁶ This is a very speculative figure. The British estimated 65,000 'destitute Muslim refugees' (F.O. 371-6561-14164 and F.O. 371-7931) in Istanbul in 1921 and 1922, 75,000 by 1923 (F.O. 371-9098-7663). Since most of the refugees from Anatolia did not go to Istanbul, but rather went to areas held by the Nationalists, 30,000 is a reasonable number. The British general Harrington reported to the War Office that "these [65,000] unfortunate Moslems have fled from Greek rule in eastern Thrace and the southern shores of the Marmara." (F.O. 371-7931, January 31, 1922).

⁵⁷ It is not strictly accurate to say that these refugees were one-fourth of the Turkish population, but rather that this number (2,925,650) was almost one-fourth of the number of the Turkish population. This is because many of the refugees included in Table 9 had died before the Turkish census was taken.

example, loans of £13 million were made by western countries. The Greek government itself was able to contribute £6,3 million to settlement and assistance of refugees.⁵⁸ Together, these amounts, which do not include extensive private charity donations, amount to approximately £16 per refugee. By contrast, the Turkish government was able to spend less than £1 million on its refugees⁵⁹, an average of less than £2 per person⁶⁰.

During the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman Empire, although wounded, remained intact, and some public monies were available for refugee support and settlement. As the Ottoman wars continued, however, resources dwindled until refugee assistance disappeared. There had never been much for refugees. By the time of the Turkish War of Independence, there was virtually nothing. The situation of the Muslim refugees to Anatolia was often abysmal. "The practical difficulties of distribution [of refugees] seems to be very great. The immigrants are greeted on arrival with tea and cakes, speeches and flags, and then sent up country, very often to starve."⁶¹

The assumption, one often stated by Europeans remote from the scene, was that incoming Turkish refugees would simply take over the houses and farms of departed Greeks and dead Turks. This reasoning neglected the fact that the homes had been destroyed and the fields burned. The Turkish government had little to spend and "what is spent will not go far when even the old inhabitants are in urgent need of seed, animals, tools, and often homes."⁶²

Thus the Muslim refugee migrations ended in great suffering and great mortality, as they had begun.

Appendix One Later Refugees

The Turkish-Greek Population Exchange and closed Soviet borders effectively ended refugee migration from Greece and Russia after the middle 1920s. Migration from Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia continued well past 1927. These were "deferred refugees," Muslims who had remained in Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia after their fellows had left. However, they can properly be viewed as refugees, since it was the lasting effects of the Balkan Wars and World War I and later discrimination that drove them to Turkey. The numbers in Table A1 include some who were not proper refugees (e.g., elderly Turks who "retired" to Turkey, students, etc.), but not many.

⁵⁸ Ladas, pp. 686-689.

⁵⁹ Ladas, p. 709.

⁶⁰ Counting only post-1920 refugees. Had others been counted in the refugee numbers, the amount *per capita* would have been much less.

⁶¹ F.O. 371-10184-2119. 1924 report of W. S. Edmonds, consul-general at Izmir.

⁶² *Ibid.* Mr. Henderson, sent to Izmir to report, gave a slightly better picture of Turkish efforts for the refugees, but still said that "housing is desperately needed and many died before the first harvest came in". (F.O. 371-10184-7688.)



A complete study of the continuing refugee exodus from the Balkan Christian countries would demand more detailed statistics than are presently available. The only available source for data on migration to Turkey are the limited tables published in the Turkish statistical yearbooks. Immigration statistics for the period 1921-1929, printed in the third Statistical Yearbook, were not listed by country of origin and no figures at all were printed for 1929-1933. The data in Table A1 are probably indicative of the general period 1927-1940 (immigration dropped significantly in 1941), but there is at present no way to know how indicative. The continuing significance of the immigration from Balkan countries is demonstrated by the fact that migrants from Bulgaria and Romania were 92% of the recorded 1934-1940 migrants to Turkey, 99% of the 1936-1929 migrants.

Table A1. Immigrants to Turkey, 1934 to 1940.

	Bulgaria	Romania	Yugoslavia	Other	Totals
1934	8.682	16.092	3.219	6.084	34.057
1935	24.968	21.162	3.489	1.100	50.719
1936	11.730	20.962	250	402	33.074
1937	13.490	13.110	65	87	26.752
1938	20.542	8.832	71	233	29.678
1939	17.777	3.375	154	152	21.458
1940	7.004	3.021	1.060	131	11.216

(Sources: Turkish Statistical Yearbooks)

Appendix Two.

Immigrants to Turkey, 1921 to 1927, by Province of Settlement.

Vilâyets	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927
Adana	-	-	-	5.524	1.200	407	497
Afyon K.H.	-	-	-	451	236	94	264
Aksaray	-	-	-	3.286	-	-	-
Amasya	-	-	260	1.859	897	597	-
Ankara	38	65	19	162	223	381	527
Antalya	11	-	-	2.781	639	662	610
Artvin	-	46	-	-	-	-	-
Aydın	-	-	35	6.322	88	14	25
Balıkesir	179	264	13.725	15.903	3.510	1.575	1.932

Bayazıt	136	-	-	609	2.111	-	-
Bilecik	-	-	-	2.178	1.379	569	-
Bitlis	437	-	-	-	33	1.139	720
Bolu	-	-	-	85	-	12	97
Burdur	-	-	-	383	20	2	27
Bursa	310	231	6.701	22.636	2.738	827	705
Cebelibereket	-	-	-	454	1.822	116	326
Çanakkale	747	54	219	7.866	1.778	-	192
Çankırı	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Çorum	-	-	-	1.524	-	51	-
Denizli	269	-	-	2.190	-	-	-
Diyârbekir	-	-	-	127	75	16	80
Edirne	-	44	7.593	20.224	12.224	5.314	3.937
Elâziz	-	-	-	1.220	-	232	-
Erzincan	-	-	-	-	35	62	-
Erzurum	-	-	-	-	514	581	-
Eskişehir	13	777	35	296	530	324	466
Giresun	-	10	-	516	70	-	-
Gümüşane	-	-	625	-	134	27	15
Gaziayıntap	-	-	-	-	-	1.196	91
Hakâri	-	-	-	-	16	129	-
İçel	-	-	-	679	7	295	19
İzmir	1.682	4.644	2.301	4.653	8.011	2.566	6.238
İsparta	-	-	-	-	838	56	202
Istanbul	-	-	3.647	28.106	1.020	302	2.412
Kars	458	711	1.314	-	-	29	-
Kastamonu	-	-	127	336	192	75	39
Kayseri	13	-	192	253	-	-	245
Kırklareli	-	316	135	18.718	1.067	3.965	3.053
Kırşehir	-	-	-	-	172	-	21
Kocaeli	220	2.665	3.273	10.043	2.222	755	1.292
Konya	-	-	-	2.767	380	1.097	776
Kütahya	-	-	-	485	744	553	73
Malatya	-	-	-	-	-	76	-
Manisa	26	51	399	10.477	1.395	923	553
Mardin	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Maraş	-	-	-	1.132	-	-	-
Mersin	-	-	-	2.992	-	128	210
Muğla	-	-	1.375	621	415	1.462	172
Niğde	-	-	-	15.668	-	3	-
Ordu	-	-	1.028	44	-	36	15
Rize	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Samsun	-	-	2.411	8.795	5.071	2.952	3.350
Siirt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sinop	-	-	310	873	6	-	-

Sivas	-	-	-	2.356	701	1.835	-
Şebın K.H.	-	-	-	5.779	-	-	-
Tekirdağ	6.540	215	4.828	17.315	90	527	728
Trabzon	-	-	-	45	329	29	1
Tokat	-	-	-	-	3.200	2.987	2.022
Urfa	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Van	-	-	-	-	-	-	275
Yozgat	-	-	-	-	13	13	6
Zonguldak	-	-	137	680	379	45	-
Total	11.079	10.093	50.689	235.414	56.523	35.051	32.213

(Source: *Annuaire Statistique III*)

Appendix Three: Muslim Refugees in Istanbul

It must be assumed that the Muslim refugees in Istanbul were included in the figures given above for refugees from the Balkans. Because of incomplete statistics, it is impossible to satisfactorily unravel the refugees in Istanbul from the masses of non-refugee foreign-born residents of the city. Nevertheless, it is interesting to speculate on the numbers of refugees in the city and its environs (Istanbul *Vilâyeti*).

Table A-3 lists the recorded, uncorrected 1927 population of Istanbul *Vilâyeti* in three categories—Place of Birth, Nationality, and Mother Tongue. Considering the fact that by 1927 transient refugees—Russians, Greeks, Armenians, and others—had already gone off to other lands, Table A3 gives a limited indication of the number of Istanbul dwellers who were refugees from the 1912-22 wars. Those born in the Arab world, most of whom were citizens of Arab countries, were not refugees. Approximately 6,000 claimed Iranian nationality, but only 4,000 claimed Iranian birth, and only 1,000 spoke Farsi as their native language. This demonstrates once again the undercounting in the Place of Birth category, as well as the presence of long-term (many generations) Iranian residents of Istanbul. The individuals of Iranian nationality or birth seem to have been mainly Azeri Turks who cannot be considered to have been refugees.

Table A3. Istanbul *Vilâyeti*. Population by various categories, 1927, as recorded.

	Place of Birth	Nationality	Mother Tongue
Turkey	731.873	727.696	574.592
Egypt	430	217	
Iraq	61	97	3.092*
Syria	230	158	
Iran	4.222	6.179	1.069
Albania	1.352	1.434	6.148
Bulgaria	12.189	3.545	4.985
Greece	16.283	25.666	91.902
Romania	4.863	1.113	**
Russia	9.929	5.708	**
Serbia	3.796	3.129	**

Total Population.....794.444

* Arabic-speaking

** Listed as part of 13,704 in "Other Languages"

(Source: 1927 Turkish Census)

Few of those listed as born in Albania in the census were refugees, since more were listed as Albanian in nationality than were born in Albania. The large number of Albanian speakers in Istanbul were most likely a remnant of the Ottoman Albanians living in Istanbul before the wars.

As was the case in the rest of Turkey, the refugees living in Istanbul and born in Ottoman territory later conquered by the Balkan nations usually listed themselves as born in Turkey. Nothing else would explain the low figures for those born in Greece. The excess in Istanbul of those born in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and Russia over those claiming those nationalities can probably be assumed to be the lowest possible limit of refugees from those countries (i.e., those refugees actually born in those countries, not those born in the Ottoman Empire): Bulgaria, 9,344; Serbia, 667; Romania, 3,750; Russia, 4,221. Of those, a certain percentage were not Muslim refugees, but rather Russian "Whites" and others living in the city. Some were political refugees from earlier period. However, comparison of those who spoke Bulgarian to those who claimed Bulgarian birth⁶³ indicates that most of the refugees from the

⁶³ 4,985 listed Bulgarian as their mother tongue, 3,545 were Bulgarian nationals. Subtracting the 4,985 from 12,889 listed as born in Bulgaria leaves 7,904 almost all Turkish-speakers. Although Romanian, Russian, and Serbo-Croat speakers were too few to be

Balkans were Muslim Turks.

The Muslim refugees listed above as having lived in Istanbul in 1927 must be assumed to have been emigrants escaping the Balkan Wars.⁶⁴ Anatolian refugees were not discernible in the statistics, since they were all born in Turkey. Moreover, most of the refugees from Anatolia had left Istanbul after the ultimate victory of Turkish forces over the Greeks.

Appendix Four: Sources

The analyses in this paper are based on statistics from a variety of sources. Numbers have been reproduced as they appear, but all figures given here, whether given to the single digit (e.g., 1,234,876) or rounded (e.g., 1,200,000) are to one degree or another estimates. They should be taken for the picture of the refugee phenomena they afford, not as absolutely correct numbers.

The only truly reliable sources for the demographic evaluation of the Muslim refugees were published by the governments and agencies that actually counted the refugee populations. There is a great amount of other material, primarily "eye-witness estimates," that was contradictory, unverifiable, and unusable. Such evidence was, in fact, never actually based solely on eye-witness enumeration, for who could have personally seen the hundreds of thousands of refugees? The accounts were, instead, made up of second-hand reports, of varying accuracy, on parts of the great migration, collected together. Often they were pure guesswork.

Whenever possible, an accurate analysis of the number of Muslim refugees should consider actual counts of the Muslim population, although reliance on official statistics presents its own problems. One is forced to consider the numbers of Muslims as recorded before and after the migrations in order to find how many migrated. With few exceptions no one carefully enumerated the refugees as they were migrating. The warring countries were too occupied with battle and survival to hold censuses. The exception came when refugees crossed borders, passed properly-manned customs posts, and were counted or when agencies such as the Mixed Commission for the Greek-Turkish Population Exchange or the Ottoman Refugee Commission actually enumerated their charges.

It is often necessary to base analysis of refugee numbers on official and unofficial estimates. Of these, the best were those made by the Ottoman Refugee Commission, which, even when it had not formally counted the refugees, at least had the advantage of having seen many of them, fed them, and ministered to them. Next in importance come the estimates of the Allied officials who

entered separately in the census tables, their small numbers indicate that what was true for those born in Bulgaria must have been true for them, also.

⁶⁴ Some Muslim refugees from Russia, arriving via Anatolia or the Black Sea, perhaps 3,000, are not included.

operated refugee camps in Istanbul and elsewhere. Finally, consular reports on refugees provide useful estimates, but they can be used only when they are consistent and support each others' figures.

In theory, it should have been relatively easy to count the numbers of immigrants to Turkey. The 1927 census contained a category—Place of Birth—which should have identified the immigrants. This was not the case, as was seen above for refugees from Russia. Muslims tended to list Turkey as their place of birth, no matter where they were born⁶⁵. This may have meant that the area in which an individual was born was in the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) when he or she was born, although not in 1927, or it may have been wishful thinking (e.g., a person born in southern Bulgaria who states "I am a Turk. I come from Turkey.") It also was an easy answer a naturally suspicious refugee could give to nosy census-takers. When answering the Place of Birth question Muslims in the Kars-Ardahan region faced the extra problem of deciding whether their province was in Turkey or in Russia when they were born. It had been in Turkey when their parents were born and it was again. Confusion was inevitable. In any case, the 1927 category Place of Birth is unreliable.

Table A4. Turkish Population Born in Balkan Countries, as recorded in 1927.

Born In	Population
Albania	2.245
Bulgaria	101.163
Greece	75.435
Romania	19.331
Serbia	23.750
Born in Turkey	13.189.514
Born elsewhere	458.756

(Source: 1927 Turkish Census)

Table A4 shows the magnitude of the problem. The numbers of those listed as born in Greece, for example, were a small proportion of those who had come to Turkey in the Population Exchange, much less the total number of those who had actually come from Greece.

⁶⁵ The census question was a simple "Country of Birth?" There was no instruction for census takers to ask more detailed questions, such as "City of Birth?" or "Province of Birth?", which would have helped reduce the error.

operated refugee camps in Istanbul and elsewhere. Finally, consular reports on refugees provide useful estimates, but they can be used only when they are consistent and support each other's figures.

In theory, it should have been relatively easy to obtain the numbers of immigrants to Turkey. The 1927 census contained a category—Place of Birth—which should have located the immigrants. This was not the case, as was seen above for refugees from Russia. Muslims tended to list Turkey as their place of birth, no matter where they were born.⁶² This may have meant that the area in which an individual was born was in the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) when he or she was born, although not in 1927, or it may have been wishful thinking by a person born in southern Bulgaria who states "I am a Turk. I come from Turkey." It also was an easy answer a naturally suspicious refugee could give to any census taker. When answering the Place of Birth question Muslims in the Kaymakam reports faced the exact problem of deciding whether their province was in Turkey or in Russia when they were born. It had been in Turkey when their parents were born and it was again. Confusion was inevitable. In any case, the 1927 category Place of Birth is unreliable.

Table A. Muslim Population Born in Balkan Countries, as Reported in 1927

Country	Population
Bulgaria	19,331
Romania	15,331
Yugoslavia	12,331
Serbia	10,331
Albania	8,331
Greece	6,331
Other	4,331

When possible, a systematic analysis of the number of Muslim refugees should consider actual counts of the Muslim population. The numbers of those who had actually come from Greece, those who had actually come from Russia, and those who had actually come from other countries were all gathered in one source. The warning countries were all visited and an expedition team was sent to the border. With few exceptions, no carefully documented statistics were recorded as Muslims fled to Turkey. In most cases, the statistics presented in this report were based on the reports of those who fled to Turkey in the Population Exchange, much less the total number of those who had actually come from Greece.

It is often necessary to use estimates of refugee numbers. The estimates are often based on the reports of the Ottoman Refugee Commission, which, even when it had not formally counted the refugees, at least had the advantage of having seen many of them, and ministers of state who visited the border. The estimates of the Allied officials who visited the border were also based on the reports of the Ottoman Refugee Commission. The estimates of the Ottoman Refugee Commission were based on the reports of the Ottoman Refugee Commission. The estimates of the Ottoman Refugee Commission were based on the reports of the Ottoman Refugee Commission.


⁶² The census question was a simple "Country of Birth." There was no instruction for census takers to ask more detailed questions such as "City of Birth" or "Province of Birth," which would have helped reduce the error.



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