STUDIES ON OTTOMAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

I

edited by

Sinan KUNERALP

2021
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THE ISIS PRESS
ISTANBUL

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

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The Isis Press Ltd
Şemsibey Sok. 10
81210 Beylerbeyi - ISTANBUL

First published in 1987

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

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STUDIES ON OTTOMAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

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Jean-Louis BACQUÉ-GRAMMONT

PADICHAH ET CHAH. AU SUJET DE QUELQUES MANŒUVRES DIPLOMATIQUES PEU CONNUES AU DÉBUT DU XVIe SIÈCLE

Mis en chantier en 1973 et achevé dix ans plus tard après de multiples remaniements, un volumineux ouvrage dont j'annonce depuis trop longtemps l'imminente publication va enfin voir le jour sous le titre *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins. Contribution à l'histoire des relations internationales dans l'Orient islamique de 1514 à 1524*, tome LVI des publications de l'Institut historique et archéologique néerlandais d'Istanbul[1]. Je suis vivement reconnaissant à mon ami Sinan Kuneralp de m'offrir l'occasion d'en exposer les principaux points dans le tome inaugural d'une publication à laquelle il convient de souhaiter longévité et prospérité.

La trame événementielle de la crise politique et religieuse qui, en août 1514, aboutit à l'écrasement des Têtes-Rouges de Şah İsmail par l'armée du sultan ottoman Selim 1er sur le champ de bataille de Çaldıran, est assez bien connue dans son ensemble. Certes, l'étude des facteurs qui la déterminèrent, puis la précipitèrent, ainsi que de la hiérarchie des rôles qu'ils jouèrent, peut toujours offrir matière à controverse. L'examen des sources accessibles m'a amené à avoir à ce sujet quelques opinions exposées plus loin, que je modifierai bien volontiers s'il se trouve quelque évidence du contraire. Mais la plus grande partie de l'ouvrage en question est en fait consacrée aux lendemains de Çaldıran jusqu'à la mort de Şah İsmail, une décennie plus tard, des notations éparses dans les sources les plus directement accessibles m'ayant très tôt amené à subodorer qu'au cours de cette période, les relations entre le sultan et le chah avaient dû être beaucoup plus complexes que ce qu'on pourrait croire de prime abord. Le recours systématique à divers types de

[1]. Il s'agit d'une version revue et considérablement élargie d'*Ottomans et Safavides au temps de Şah Ismail. Thèse pour le doctorat d'État ès-Lettres et Sciences Humaines*, présentée à l'Université de Paris I et soutenue le 11 juin 1980. C'est à la copie de soutenance que réfère Mademoiselle Palmyra Brummett dans l'article *supra*.

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sources (chroniques ottomanes, safavides et mamloukes, documents des archives de Turquie, rapports vénitiens et chroniques européennes) m'a permis de projeter un éclairage multiple sur diverses zones d'ombre et d'y faire quelques découvertes venant s'ajouter au connu et au vraisemblable. De proche en proche, des fils conducteurs se sont révélés d'eux-mêmes, menant à une interprétation cohérente des facteurs et des faits qui sera exposée ici de la manière la plus schématique.

Au cours des premières années du XVIe siècle, le succès rencontré en Anatolie ottomane par la propagande des missionnaires de Şah İsmail s'explique par des facteurs tant socio-économiques que religieux. Entre sa clientèle — des populations profondément turques dans leurs traditions, nomades et semi-nomades attachés à leur mode de vie et leur privilèges anciens — et la Porte ottomane, centralisatrice et strictement sunnite, coupée depuis des lustres du milieu duquel elle était issue, le divorce était consommé de longue date. Pour ces *etrâk* (pluriel arabe de *türk*, employé de manière péjorative par les sources ottomanes du temps) incompris des sultans, le chah, sa doctrine rien moins que dogmatique, l'État *etrâk* qu'il offrait en modèle dans le "pays d'en-haut" exerçaient une véritable fascination. Considérée depuis les profondeurs de l'Anatolie, la suite éblouissante de succès qu'il remporta jusqu'en 1510, de la Mésopotamie au Khorasan, auréolait en outre le souverain divinisé d'un charisme auquel Bayazıd II, prématurément vieilli, las et velléitaire, n'avait pas grand chose à opposer. Issus des élites urbaines ou du *devşirme*, ses représentants locaux auxquels les *etrâk* avaient affaire semblaient pour ceux-ci venus d'un monde étranger, contrairement aux missionnaires du chah, qui dans ce milieu et ces conditions favorables, sapaient par leur action l'autorité du sultan dans ses propres États. La crise latente déboucha, au début de 1511, sur une révolte de grande ampleur, celle de Şah Kulu, que la Porte eut le plus grand mal à réprimer : le grand vizir et plusieurs beylerbeys y laissèrent leur vie, le prince héritier Ahmed son prestige. L'ordre ne fut pas rétabli pour autant et les rivalités des fils de Bayazıd en vue de s'assurer le trône du vivant même de celui-ci plongèrent bientôt l'Anatolie dans un chaos complet. Şah İsmail y poussa habilement ses pions au mieux de ses intérêts.

Le seul fils de Bayazıd II qui parait avoir eu très tôt une claire conscience des périls auxquels menait la conjonction de la crise anatolienne, de l'action du chah et de la prévisible rivalité entre prétendants au trône ottoman est le Şehzade Selim, gouverneur de Trabzon jusqu'au début de 1511. Les raids que, dès cette époque, il lança contre le territoire safavide voisin, montrent bien qu'il savait d'où venait le danger principal. Mais, morigéné par un père peu soucieux de se laisser entraîner dans des aventures militaires en Orient — fût-ce même pour la défense de l'orthodoxie sunnite dont le chah et ses zélateurs transgressaient de beaucoup les limites, — Selim dut se résoudre à ronger son frein dans sa lointaine province pontique, rageant de voir

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l'incurie paternelle laisser l'Anatolie se gangréner pour le plus grand bénéfice de l'adversaire. De ces années d'exaspération date la haine qu'il voua à celui-ci jusqu'à son dernier jour : la solution de la question anatolienne exigeait l'élimination du chach et de ses partisans. Tel est l'unique objectif qui déterminera son action tout au long de son règne et, en vertu d'une logique rigoureuse, l'amènera sur des champs de bataille fort éloignés de l'Azerbaidjan.

En 1512, le prince Selim, fort de l'appui de l'armée, contraint son père à l'abdication et monte sur le trône. Un an plus tard, le dernier compétiteur, son frère Ahmed, éliminé, il est le seul maître de l'Empire ottoman. Dès ce moment commencent les préparatifs d'une expédition de grande ampleur contre Şah İsmail. Le choc a lieu le 23 août 1514 près de Çaldıran, au nord-est du lac de Van. Les canons et les arquebuses des Ottomans fauchent les Têtes-Rouges dont l'extraordinaire pugnacité fait pourtant dans leurs rangs de terribles ravages. Le chah parvient à s'enfuir, le sultan se lance à sa poursuite. De l'Anatolie Orientale à l'Azerbaidjan, tout au long des routes que devait suivre l'armée ottomane, nombreuse et alourdie par son charroi, les coureurs safavides laissaient un pays dévasté : l'opération "terre brûlée" avait été facilitée par un été particulièrement sec. Sur les poursuivants s'abattit soudain un hiver précoce et rigoureux. Les janissaires refusèrent d'attendre le printemps à Tabriz C'est une armée matériellement et moralement très éprouvée qui revint quelques mois plus tard prendre ses quartiers d'hiver à Amasya

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* *

Les janissaires n'étaient pas sans éprouver d'équivoques sympathies envers le chah. Répugnant à le combattre, ils avaient connu en peu de temps le carnage de Çaldıran, la faim, la soif, le froid. Tout cela en vain puisqu'il paraissait évident que ce qui faisait la supériorité absolue de l'armée du sultan, son artillerie, imposait une marche lente et que, dans ces conditions, tenter de rejoindre la rapide cavalerie du chah dans les immensités mal connues du plateau iranien était parfaitement illusoire : instruite par le précédent de Çaldıran cette dernière refuserait désormais d'accepter le combat en bataille rangée. Dès lors, l'armée ottomane, incomparablement plus puissante, mais hantée par ces souvenirs, devait se montrer rétive devant toute perspective de nouvelle campagne contre les débris des Têtes-Rouges. Il faudra à Selim beaucoup d'habileté pour rendre à ses hommes confiance en eux-mêmes, mais jamais il ne put leur faire reprendre la route de l'Orient.

En route vers Çaldıran, Selim avait envoyé à Şah İsmail une lettre qui devait être la dernière. Dès lors, l'adversaire et ses adeptes mis au ban de l'Islam par *fetva* du *şeyhü-l islam* et les sommations d'usage ayant été faites, le sultan ottoman refusa obstinément jusqu'à sa mort de renouer le dialogue sous quelque forme que ce fût. Pour mieux rejeter les Têtes-Rouges de la communauté des Croyants, il avait décrété la fermeture de ses États à

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tout trafic vers ceux du chah ou en venant. Croire ces mesures de guerre à outrance dictées par le seul souci de défendre l'orthodoxie sunnite contre l'hérésie limiterait singulièrement l'idée qu'on peut se faire de Selim grâce aux nombreux témoignages concordants dont on dispose sur le stratège et, surtout, le fin politique mûrissant dans le secret des actions à long terme, réalistes et plus ou moins retorses, qu'aurait assurément appréciées à leur juste valeur son contemporain Machiavel. Croyant à la foi peu discutable, mais sans rien de la bigoterie de son père, Selim, néanmoins, mena avant tout la lutte contre Şah İsmail pour sauver ses propres États des périls internes qui les minaient. Mais l'éradication définitive des Tête-Rouges n'ayant pu être réalisée à la faveur du premier choc, des voies détournées et lointaines allaient devoir être suivies. Provisoirement, l'armée safavide, réduite à des effectifs dérisoires, ne constituait plus une menace. Le chah avait lui-même fait de larges zones de l'Anatolie orientale et de l'Azerbeidjan un *no man's land* dévasté tandis que le Khorasan connaissait la famine. À ces difficultés internes, le blocus ottoman venait ajouter un facteur de crise économique : coupé des débouchés traditionnels de son commerce extérieur (Bursa, Alep, Trabzon) et des moyens d'approvisionnement en produits qui lui manquaient (minerais et vivres d'Anatolie), l'Iran safavide se trouvait véritablement asphyxié et devait dépérir pour le plus grand profit de son adversaire. Du point de vue de Selim, les affaires de l'Est pouvaient demeurer en l'état : le temps jouait en sa faveur.

En 1512, la bataille de Gac-Davan, en Transoxiane, avait constitué le premier revers d'importance subi par l'armée de Şah İsmail : les Özbeks l'avaient taillée en pieces. À Çaldıran, peu de Têtes-Rouges avaient pu en réchapper, Selim ayant ordonné l'exécution systématique des survivants capturés. Si l'on en croit le rapport d'un espion apparemment bien informé, en juillet 1516, l'effectif total des troupes safavides s'élevait à 18.000 hommes, dont 10.000 seulement pouvaient être considérés comme de bons combattants. Combler les vides était chose malaisée les meilleurs soldats, ceux qui chargaient sans crainte face aux armes à feu, se recrutaient en Anatolie ottomane, désormais sous le contrôle étroit du sultan. Une migration massive de partisans n'était en aucun cas envisageable. À une deuxième offensive de Selim, maintes fois annoncée et qui semblait imminente, Şah İsmail n'avait rien à opposer, sinon la terre brûlée, le harcèlement des voies de communication et des flancs de l'adversaire, ainsi que de divers stratagèmes dont on le voit user. Dès le lendemain de Çaldıran, il agit dans trois directions.

D'une part, la bataille de Çaldıran avait montré aux Têtes-Rouges que les canons et les arquebuses de Selim devaient les dissuader de jamais renouveler cette expérience. Elle montrait également l'importance de ces armes dont les troupes du chah étaient dépourvues, au moins en campagne, et que, de toute manière, elles considéraient avec mépris. Quelques janissaires

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déserteurs, des mercenaires européens venus peut-être des établissements portugais de l'Inde, des canons et des arquebuses récupérés sur les traces de l'armée ottomane, tout cela amena Şah İsmail à caresser l'idée de doter lui aussi ses hommes d'armes à feu. Les témoignages ottomans et vénitiens concordent au sujet de la présence de canons et d'un corps d'arquebusiers dans l'armée safavide dès 1516. La qualité du materiel et l'adresse des servants apparaissent douteuses. Ces armes à feu n'auraient certainement guère pesé en face de l'artillerie ottomane, la meilleure de son temps, mais elles existaient et, dès lors, on voit le chah les montrer avec la plus grande ostentation, à tel point que leur raison d'être apparaît plus psychologique que stratégique. Reprise et amplifiée par la rumeur, la nouvelle devait atteindre l'armée ottomane : ces Têtes-Rouges, si terriblement pugnaces à Çaldıran avec leurs seules armes blanches, étaient désormais équipées de canons et d'arquebuses ! Qu'importait que Selim, bien informé, sût lui-même ce qu'il en était, la répulsion des janissaires devant l'idée de mener campagne dans le "pays d'en-haut" ne pouvait que s'en trouver accrue. Ce stratagème, dont la réalité n'est guère douteuse, constitue un cas hautement remarquable d'"intoxication psychologique" de l'adversaire. Sans doute joua-t-il finalement un rôle non négligeable en mai 1518, lorsque, retour d'Égypte et parvenu sur l'Euphrate, Selim dut renoncer à poursuivre sa route vers l'Iran devant les réticences de ses troupes.

D'autre part, Şah İsmail tenta de conjurer le péril ottoman en multipliant les tentatives de reprise d'un contact diplomatique direct avec Selim. Trois ambassades safavides se succédèrent auprès de ce dernier (celles de Sayyed Abdolvahhab, à Amasya, en novembre 1514; de Hoseyn Beyg, à Edirne, en novembre 1515; de Saru Şeyh, à Damas en février 1518), sans compter diverses missions officieuses dont on peut retrouver la trace. Le texte ou, au moins, la teneur de plusieurs des messages qu'elles apportaient sont connus. On y voit Şah İsmail user de mille subterfuges pour proposer au sultan une sorte de "plate-forme de négociations", faite de contre-vérités évidentes, mais pouvant permettre aux deux parties de "coexister" de manière plus au moins pacifique. Tant d'artifices furent de nul effet, comme on pouvait s'y attendre. Il aurait au moins fallu que Şah Ismail consentit à abjurer solennellement sa doctrine pour que ses propositions fussent considérées avec quelque attention. Or, si contraint par la nécessité, il reconnaissait la souveraineté de Selim sur les vastes territoires que celui-ci avait arrachés et acceptait même de se considérer comme son lieutenant pour ceux "qu'avaient foulés les sabots de son cheval", soit une partie de l'Azerbaidjan, il ne pouvait rien céder sur le dogme, ni en tout cas sur la divinisation de sa personne qui lui valait l'attachement aveugle des Têtes-Rouges, soutien essentiel de son pouvoir. "L'ennemi de vieille date ne devient pas un ami. On ne fait pas une carpette de fourrure avec une peau de chien" répondait Selim en faisant systématiquement emprisonner les ambassadeurs safavides.

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Enfin, dès le lendemain de Çaldıran, Şah İsmail entreprit une action diplomatique de grande envergure auprès des adversaires possibles de Selim, afin de conclure avec eux des alliances offensives. Instruits par de fâcheux souvenirs remontant au temps d'Uzun Hasan, rendus prudents par les conséquences d'aventures orientales récentes (guerre du Péloponnèse, crise avec les Mamlouks en 1510-1512), les Venitiens se dérobèrent. Les Portugais de l'Inde tendirent une oreille plus attentive, mais des réticences mutuelles et surtout la lenteur des communications entre l'Iran, Goa et Lisbonne, ne devait jamais permettre à ces contacts répétés de déboucher sur rien de concret. Les chevaliers de Rhodes reçurent des émissaires safavides et en firent part au Pape. Des projets furent échafaudés, mais rien n'en sortit non plus, sinon, peut-être, l'envoi discret de quelques instructeurs militaires en Azerbaidjan. La seule puissance de la région dont l'armée pouvait sembler capable de tenir tête aux Ottomans était l'Empire mamlouk. Sollicité, le sultan Kansawh al-Guri, prudent, répondit de manière évasive aux sollicitations du chah, dont il se défiait. Mais, inquiet du conflit en cours au nord de ses État—qui s'étendaient alors jusqu'à Divriği, au cœur de l'Anatolie—et soucieux de ne pas laisser l'un des adversaires l'emporter sur l'autre et acquérir ainsi une puissance trop dangereuse, il tenta assez maladroitement de s'entremettre pour les reconcilier. Mal lui en prit : Selim n'attendait qu'une occasion pour fondre sur lui et, cette occasion, sans doute l'avait-il même délibérément suscitée.

Parvenu à Amasya au retour de Çaldıran, Selim annonça que la campagne suivante serait de nouveau dirigée contre le chah et, dès lors, tel fut l'objectif annoncé, quelque fussent les directions bien différentes dans lesquelles il devait mener son armée. En fait, un ensemble concordant d'indices révèle que, dès cet hivernage de 1514-1515, le programme de son action était tracé et qu'il le suivit méthodiquement : réduction des dernières poches de résistance et annexion de l'Anatolie orientale safavide, élimination du beylicat zulkadıride dont l'attitude s'était révélée ambiguë en 1514, enfin, affrontement avec Kansawh selon un scénario soigneusement misau point pour scinder les forces, assez considérables, dont celui-ci disposait. Si elles devaient le mener jusqu'aux rives du Nil et entraîner l'annexion pour plusieurs siècles d'immenses territoires, ces opérations ne constituaient cependant qu'une partie d'un plan stratégique essentiellement dirigé contre le chah. Ce dernier se trouvant pour longtemps hors d'état de lancer des actions offensives en Anatolie, il convenait d'éliminer tout risque d'intervention de l'un de ses alliés éventuels sur les flancs de l'armée ottomane lorsque celle-ci reprendrait la route de l'Iran pour une campagne définitive. D'autre part, en assurant à ses troupes une série de victoires prévisibles, Selim entendait leur rendre cette confiance en elles-mêmes que la rude expérience de 1514 avait ébranlée. Manipulé par certains des siens que le sultan ottoman s'était acquis, intoxiqué par une véritable opération de "désinformation" menée simultanément, pour des raisons opposées, par le sultan et par le chah, Kansawh fit exactement ce

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que Selim souhaitait qu'il fît : campé avec une partie de son armée en Syrie du Nord pour observer le conflit qui s'engageait entre ses deux voisins, il vit l'Ottoman fondre soudain sur lui avec toute sa supériorité en hommes et en armement tandis que, selon un plan prévu avec l'adversaire, une partie de ses propres troupes faisait défection dès le début de la bataille.

Dès lors, pour Selim, la route du Caire était ouverte, qui dans son esprit, devait mener à Tabriz. Les événements allaient empêcher la réalisation de ce savant programme : l'ajournement de la campagne d'Iran en 1518, puis la mort du sultan, deux ans plus tard, sauvèrent le chah. L'armée ottomane ne reprit pas la route de l'Azerbaidjan avant 1533. À ce moment, les conditions étaient devenues bien differentes et, toujours incapables de l'affronter en bataille rangée, les troupes de Tahmasp avaient pu être reconstituées, tandis que lui-même jouissait dans ses propres États d'une autorité stable, ne s'appuyant plus sur le seul "kızılbaşisme" turc de son père, étranger et bien étrange pour la majeure partie de ses sujets. Finalement, l'abandon de la campagne de 1518 assura peut-être pour plus de deux siècles la survie de l'Iran safavide et, peut-être aussi, une poignée de Kızılbaş déguisés en arquebusier, désespérément malhabiles, mais qui impressionaient tant les Janissaires, y fut-elle pour quelque chose.

Selim disparu en septembre 1520, son successeur Soliman adopta une attitude bien différente. En territoire ottoman, la lutte à outrance menée contre le chah depuis six ans semble avoir été fort impopulaire. Le blocus, s'il asphyxiait l'économie iranienne, portait préjudice aux marchands ottomans et à tous ceux, nombreux, qui vivaient du commerce avec l'Orient. La guerre avec le chah était toujours considérée par les troupes avec appréhension. Le jeune Soliman avait eu la sagesse de maintenir dans ses fonctions le grand-vizir Piri Paşa. Tous deux devaient d'emblée abroger les mesures les plus péniblement ressenties et, avec une habilité insoupçonnée, réaliser rapidement un véritable "désengagement" à l'Est. Tout au long du règne de Selim, les janissaires avaient manifesté un état d'esprit fâcheux et multiplié les tentatives de soulèvement, sévèrement matées par un sultan qui leur devait son trône et les mena de victoire en victoire sans qu'ils cessassent de maugréer. Ses conquêtes appelaient quelques consolidations stratégiques. Soliman saisit l'occasion pour mener ses troupes sus à des adversaires qui étaient enfin d'authentiques mécréants et non plus des coreligionnaires, fussent-ils aussi suspects d'hérésie que les Têtes-Rouges. En cinq années, Soliman brisa pour longtemps toute insubordination au sein de l'armée. Dans les deux premières, il réussit brillamment là où son illustre bisaïeul Mehmed II lui-même avait dû se résoudre à reculer : Belgrade et Rhodes. Encore fallait-il, tandis que l'armée ottomane allait opérer sur des fronts occidentaux, dissuader Şah İsmail de tenter aucune action offensive. Les moyens militaires de celui-étaient, certes, fort limités, mais la conjonction d'un assaut de sa part et d'un soulevemert des *etrâk* anatoliens pouvait se révéler des plus fâcheuses

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dans de telles conditions.

À cette époque, la fréquence avec lequelle les gouverneurs des provinces ottomanes frontalières envoyaient en Azerbaïdjan des agents d'information est attestée par de nombreux rapports conservés dans les archives de Turquie, faisant état des renseignements qu'ils apportaient à leur retour. Au printemps de 1521, trois espions ottomans furent arrêtés à Tabriz. Des documents concordants permettent de retracer leur aventure jusqu à l'année suivante. Deux d'entre eux étaient des agents du type le plus courant, qui servaient de guides et ne semblent pas avoir été informés du but réel de la mission à laquelle ils prenaient part. L'un fut renvoyé en Anatolie, l'autre s'évada peu après. Le troisième, lui, était un personnage de qualité : Sofı Mehmed, ancien goûteur de plat *(çaşnigir)* du Palais impérial et adjoint du bey d'Amasya, futur agha des janissaires et beylerbey. Le *vakilo-ssaltane* Mirza Şah Hoseyn, premier ministre de Şah İsmail, informé son arrivée, le fit venir auprès de lui. En une année, cette mission de Sofı Mehmed donna lieu à trois messages adressés par diverses autorités safavides à diverses autorités ottomanes, tous relatifs à une reprise des relations diplomatiques directes entres les deux parties. Un examen attentif de leur contenu et du contexte dans lequel ils se placent permet d'aboutir à une conclusion fort intéressante. Comme on l'a dit plus haut, depuis la fin de 1514, le chah avait vainement tenté d'obtenir de Selim ce rétablissement d'un dialogue minimal garantissant implicitement le *statu quo* sur le terrain et une reconnaissance de l'État safavide par les Ottomans. Les espoirs que Şah İsmail pouvait fonder sur une démarche comme la venue de Sofı Mehmed suffisaient à le dissuader de toute action agressive pendant le même temps où, de son côté, Soliman opérait en Serbie et dans le Dodécanèse. La Porte n'en souhaitait pas davantage. D'ailleurs la mission de Sofı Mehmed était entourée d'une extrême discrétion: seuls le sultan, le grand vizir et un petit nombre de personnes de confiance en connaissaient les tenants et aboutissants. Les partisans de la guerre à outrance contre le chah étaient encore influents à la Porte et un éclat de leur part pouvait ruiner l'opération, ce qui faillit bien arriver lors de l'arrestation inopinée d'un des compagnons de Sofı Mehmed à son retour en Anatolie. En bref, cette opération diplomatique à but stratégique finit par réussir, c'est à dire qu'elle traîna en longueur et que rien ne se passa. Le chah attendait toujours la confirmation de ses espérances lorsque le sultan revint de Rhodes.

Le stratagème de Soliman se révélait un succès : depuis le printemps de 1521, le chah n'avait esquissé aucun mouvement menacant. Dès lors, plus rien ne contraignait le sultan à poursuivre les pourparlers engagés par l'intermédiaire de Sofı Mehmed, revenu en territoire ottoman l'année précédente. Mais il était résolu à poursuivre discrètement le "désengagement" à l'Est. Son propre pouvoir étant solidement établi, les Têtes-Rouges ne représentaient pas un danger immédiat. Le *statu quo* en Orient pouvait s'établir grâce à un minimum de formalités diplomatiques, désormais aisées à

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accomplir, car le chah ne demandait que cela et le dernier jusqu'au-boutiste de la lutte à outrance contre celui-ci, Bıyıklı Mehmed Paşa, vizir et *beylerbey* du Diyar Bekir, était mort à la fin de 1521. Les sources se sont révélées jusqu'à présent, muettes sur les tractations qui durent avoir eu lieu en 1522-1523. En tout cas, le résultat en est bien attesté : Taco-ddin Hasan Halife, ambassadeur de Şah İsmail, arriva auprès de Soliman en septembre 1523. La lettre dont il était porteur et dont on connaît le texte, ne contient rien qui puisse surprendre ; le chah s'y répand en protestations de bons sentiments et en vœux pour le rétablissement de la concorde. Des condoléances pour la mort de Selim et des félicitations pour l'avènement du nouveau sultan y sont habilement entremêlées. Quiconque ignorerait le contexte dans lequel il se place aurait peine à deviner que ce message protocolaire, apparemment insignifiant, mettait pour une décennie, un terme à dix ans d'hostilités sans merci. La réponse de Soliman, de prime abord, n'attire guère davantage l'attention, mais sous des fleurs de réthorique n'ayant à envier à celles de son correspondant, on peut aisément discerner condescendance et désinvolture soigneusement pesées.

La mort de Şah İsmail, survenue un an plus tard, fit que les choses en restèrent là. D'autres développements intéressants auraient pourtant pu se produire : peu après le retour de Taco-ddin Halife, le chah, renouant avec des procédés qui n'avaient guère réussi jusque là, envoya des messagers auprès de souverains chrétiens, adversaires naturels des Ottomans, Charles-Quint et Louis de Hongrie, les pressant d'entrer en guerre contre ceux-ci. Mais ces interlocuteurs étaient confrontés à des affaires plus urgentes, les communications entre les alliés potentiels se trouvaient soumises à mille lenteurs et aléas, la longue période de troubles que connut l'Iran safavide après l'avènement du jeune Tahmasp, tout cela vouait à l'échec des projects d'alliance aussi ambitieux.

Ainsi prenait fin une phase bien méconnue de l'histoire politique et diplomatique de l'Orient islamique. À l'examen, ses principaux protagonistes acquièrent des traits que les stéréotypes légués par l'historiographie ottomane et safavide ne laissaient guère deviner : politiques supérieurement habiles, chacun connaissant le jeu de l'autre: ce sont finalement des hommes de leur temps, dignes en tous points des plus remarquables parmi leurs contemporains de la Renaissance.

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Palmyra BRUMMETT

THE TRANSFORMATION OF VENETIAN DIPLOMATIC POLICY PRIOR TO THE OTTOMAN CONQUEST OF CAIRO (1503-1517)

In the years preceding the conquest of Cairo, official Venetian diplomatic policy was transformed first to admit the possibility of, and later to welcome the transfer of power in the Middle East with its concomitant control of the trade routes and military responsibilities in the Red Sea to the Ottomans. Venetian diplomacy in 1503 was based on expectations that the Mamluk state would provide security for the trade routes bringing goods from the Indian Ocean to the eastern Mediterranean. Events in the following years forced Venice to recast the Ottoman state in the role of provider of security for her eastern commercial interests. The growing Ottoman naval power was the weight that shifted the balance in this transformation of Venetian policy. Modern historiography has been preoccupied with Ottoman firepower as the overwhelming factor in the balance of power in the Middle East in the early 16th century, obscuring the role played by the navy in establishing Ottoman supremacy[1]. This is the result of the role played by Ottoman artillery in the battles at Çaldıran against the Safavids and Raidanieyye against the Mamluks. For Venice, however, it was the Ottoman capabilities for providing naval firepower against the Portuguese that helped legitimize Ottoman claims to the Mamluk territories. The two major questions for Venice were: who would provide security for the commerce through the Red Sea and overland from the Persian Gulf through Syria, and would Isma'il Safavi prove a sufficiently formidable threat to the Ottomans to make him a likely ally in an anti-Ottoman alliance?

1 The treatment of the Ottoman navy in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd edition, "bahriyye" skips from 1470 to 1538 in its short account of Ottoman naval history. This is not uncommon in secondary sources. See also for the role of firearms David Ayalon, *Gunpowder and firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom*, London, 1956.

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The Ottoman-Venetian treaty of 1503 A.D. concluded a long period of intermittent warfare over control of naval and trading bases in the eastern Mediterranean[2]. Katib Çelebi found the period of relative stability in Ottoman/Venetian relations which followed this peace treaty somewhat regretable. He says that after the Ottoman expedition against Mitylene (1501 A.D.) the Ottoman fleet was employed only in protecting the Ottoman domains rather than in attacking the infidels. He adds:

> When however, the power of the Persian kings in the East began to increase, the disturbances of the Rafezis and the retirement of Sultan Beyazid Khan, on account of his great age, produced negligence in the ministers, and tended to injure the prosperity of the state; and Sultan Selim, after his accession to the throne, being occupied in matters that demanded immediate attention—in punishing the Persians, and subjugating the countries of Egypt and Syria—, the possessions of the infidels thus remained unmolested.[3]

In this characterization of the two decades of the 16th century Katip Çelebi mentions three of the four main factors which influenced the exercise of Venetian diplomacy from 1503-1517. These were: the rise of Isma'il Safavi; the development of the Ottoman navy; and the decline of the Mamluk power in Egypt and Syria. The fourth factor was the Portuguese naval expansion and the threat it posed to established trading interests. Venetian diplomacy in these early years of the 16th century was met with the challenge of redefining her commercial and political interests in response to major changes in the political and economic situation in the Middle East.[4] In the course of this redefinition, just who played the part of "infidel" depended on diplomatic necessity.

The Portuguese incursions into the Red Sea and Indian Ocean threatened Venice's commercial survival. The weakening of the Mamluk state posed a crisis for Venetian diplomacy because the Mamluks proved incapable of averting the Portuguese threat. A solution to this crisis was offered by the expansion of Ottoman naval power and of the Ottoman sphere of influence in the Middle East as evidenced by Ottoman military aid to the Mamluks against the Portuguese. The rise of Isma'il Safavi posed an alternative solution which delayed but did not stop the transformation of Venetian diplomatic policy from reliance on the Mamluks to reliance on the Ottomans as providers of security for the trade[5]. It is the purpose of this article to examine the

2 For Venice in the context of European relations and the wars with the Ottomans see Frederic C. Lane, *Venice A Maritime Republic,* Baltimore, 1973, pp. 241-243.

3 Katib Çelebi, *History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks*, trans. by James Mitchell, London, 1831, pp. 23-24.q

4 For a good analysis of the changing political/economic forces at this time see Andrew C. Hess, "The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and the Beginning of the Sixteenth-Century World ", *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* IV, 1973, pp. 55-62.

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transformation of Venetian diplomatic policy through a comparison of three diplomatic missions to the Mamluks in 1504, 1511 and 1516: the missions of the envoys Teldi, Trevisan, and the consul Venier. This analysis will include a discussion of Venice's rejection of a Safavid/Venetian alliance as illustrated by the incident of the consul Zeno in Damascus and its repercussions.

Throughout the period under discussion the primary concern of Venice in her relations with the Mamluks was the preservation of trade revenues from goods arriving overland through Aleppo and via the Red Sea through Alexandria. Venetian negotiations focused on obtaining favourable trade conditions in the form of low duties and protection from official abuses. In order to protect the trade flow Venice exerted pressure on the Mamluks to provide both military defense against Bedouin raids and naval opposition to the incursions of the Portuguese[6]. Increasingly the Mamluk regime failed to provide the trade security which Venice required. Imposts on trade increased in response to the demands of the deteriorating military and economic situation in the Mamluk state. Security for the trade routes could not be guaranteed as the regime could not always adequately enforce central governmental controls[7]. Although the Portuguese failed to blockade the Red Sea trade, it was only with Ottoman assistance that the Mamluks were able to mobilize a naval force to challenge them[8]. In the Indian Ocean, although shipping in the hands of Muslim traders continued, the hopes of the Venetians that the Mamluk sultan could rally Muslim leaders in India to defeat the Portuguese proved false[9].

The instructions given to Venice's envoy to Cairo in 1504 AD, the

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5 For Isma'il's extension of his power bases in western Persia see Faruk Sümer, *Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türkmenlerinin Rolü,* Ankara, 1976, pp. 15-40.

6 On the costs of protection see Frederic C. Lane, *Venice and History*, Baltimore, 1966, pp. 393-394, 403,408

7 George Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs 1511 to 1574*, Urbana, 1942, p. 19; Ibn Iyas, *Journal d'un bourgeois du Caire*, trans. by Gaston Wiet, vol. I, Paris, 1955, pp. 101, 123

8 See Halil İnalcık's review of Ayalon's *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom* in *Belleten*, XXI, 1957, pp. 503-506; Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, I, p. 106; Salih Özbaran, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Hindistan Yolu", *Tarih Dergisi,* XXXI, 1977, pp. 77-84; Kenneth Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)*, Volume III *the Sixteenth Century to the Reign of Julius* III, Philadelphia, 1984, pp. 19-20, 23; Duarte Barbosa, *A Description of the Coast of East Africa and the Malabar in the Beginning of the 16th Century*, Hakluyt Series 1, vol. XXXV, London, 1866, p. 22.

9 See the account of Vincenzo Quirini in Eugenio Alberi, *Le Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato durante il Secolo Decimosesto, Appendice,* Florence, 1863, pp 15-18; R. B. Sargeant, *The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast,* Oxford, 1963, pp. 41-44; E. Dennison Ross, "The Portuguese in India and Arabia", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1921, pp. 549-550; Abbas Hamdani, "The Ottoman Response to the Discovery of America and the New Route to India", *Journal of the American Oriental Society,* CI, pp. 3, 1981, 326.

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year following the Doge's approval of the Ottoman-Venetian treaty, give some indication of Venice's objectives and expectations[10]. Francesco Teldi was instructed to go to Cairo via Candia and Damiata posing as a jewel buyer. On arrival in Cairo he was expected to contact the admiral or some other official and obtain a secret audience with the Mamluk sultan. Having once obtained an audience Teldi was instructed to mention the common trade interests of the Mamluks and Venetians and to discuss possible remedies for the damage threatened to the trade because of the Portuguese navigating to India. He was to advise the Mamluk sultan that 14 Portuguese ships had recently arrived from India loaded with spices including 5,000 *sporte* of pepper[11]. Twelve other ships were in transit and 16 more were being prepared in Portugal to make the voyage to India. Further, some of the Venetian merchants wanted to go to Portugal to obtain the spices but Venice would rather not abandon the traditional routes and arrangements with the Mamluks. Venice promised that the galleys would again be sent to Beirut and Alexandria that year with the supposition that the Mamluk sultan would stop the Portuguese navigations and see that the spices returned to their original routes.

Responsibilitiy was squarely on Qansuh al-Gawri the Mamluk sultan (1501-1516) to effect this displacement of the Portuguese from the Indian Ocean. Venice protested her own helplessness saying, "We cannot remedy the navigation because not a single Christian prince will move to make war against the Portuguese." Venice demanded that Qansuh send orators to the kings of Cochin and Cananor and other places which traded with the Portuguese to persuade them not to have any dealing with the Portuguese, and to send orators to the kings of Calicut and Cambaye to encourage them to continue to resist the Portuguese[12]. In short, Venice expected the Mamluks to act militarily and diplomatically to see that Portuguese efforts in the Indian Ocean proved unprofitable. Venice feared that without Mamluk intervention the resistance of Calicut and Cambaye to the Portuguese might

10 From the Venetian Archives, Consul di Dieci Misti. Reg. XXX fol. 49 as cited in M. L. de Mas Latrie, *Traités de Paix et de Commerce et Documents Divers Concernant Les Relations des Chrétiens avec les Arabes de l'Afrique Septentrionale au Moyen Age*, II, New York (reprint of Paris 1866 edition), pp 259-263.

11 For an account of the Portuguese spice trade organization including the prices in 1506 see the account of Vincenzo Quirini in Alberi, *op. cit.*, *Appendice*, pp. 5-19. On prices also see Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho, *L'Economie de l'Empire Portugais aux XVe et XVIe Siècles*, Paris, 1969, p. 828. On cargoes to Portugal in 1505 see Geneviève Bouchon, "Le Premier Voyage de Lopo Soares en Inde 1504-1505", *Mare Luso Indicum*, 1976, pp. 66-68. For later prices and consumption see Niels Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution of the 17th Century*, Chicago, 1973. pp. 154-177. On the Ottomans and the Portuguese navigations see Salih Özbaran, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-81.

12 For relations of the Portuguese with the kingdoms in India see Buchon, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-84; Wilhelm Heyd, *Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter*, vol. II, Stuttgart, 1879, pp. 494-501.

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crumble. Conversely she hoped that pressure from Qansuh as protector of Mecca and Medina and representative of Muslim sovereignty might sway the rulers of Cochin and Cananor from their Portuguese alliances.

These were of course idle threats to a certain extent but they illustrate Venice's hopes in 1504 that a Muslim coalition (Mamluk/Indian) would be mobilized to fight Portugal. Her expectations of the Christian powers who later were the assemblers of the League of Cambrai are equally evident. It is not to them that Venice looked to protect her interests. The goal of Venice was to protect her commerce. Her objective was to avert the Portuguese threat by putting pressure on the Mamluk sultan. This would be implemented by a combination of Mamluk naval action and Mamluk diplomacy to force Indian rulers both actively to resist and passively fail to cooperate with the Portuguese. Although Qansuh did launch a small naval expedition against the Portuguese in 1507 it had little effect either on trade or militarily[13].

While the Portuguese were expanding their sphere of operations in the Indian Ocean Isma'il Safavi was establishing his hegemony in western Persia. Following on the conquest of Tabriz in 1501 Isma'il rapidly expanded both his troop strenght and the territories under his control. Sidney Fisher explains the amicable relations of the Ottomans and Venice as resulting from the preoccupation of these states respectively with Isma'il and the League of Cambrai[14]. What this analysis does not take into account is that amicable relations or not Venice took a very active interest in events in Persia. Perhaps Isma'il could provide the long sought Mediterranean base on the coast of Syria which Venice had hoped an alliance with Uzun Hasan would provide[15]. Perhaps he would pose a serious military threat to the Ottomans in which case Venice had better be prepared to capitalize on the outcome. In any case he bore watching.

Ottoman and Venetian diplomatic strategy depended in part on expectations of Safavid power. Would Isma'il be a real contender for control of Anatolia or simply a chronic aggravation in Diyarbakır where a shifting power base was customary if not desireable? It seems unlikely that the Porte would have been willing to provide guns and ammunition to the Mamluks for use in the Red Sea unless it was fairly confident that it could stop any major offensive on the part of the Safavids. Nonetheless the military aid to the Mamluks provided some insurance that Beyazid could rely at least on Mamluk neutrality in the event of a major Safavid offensive. For Venice, the threat of Isma'il lent some leverage to negotiations with the Ottomans. If Bayezid was preoccupied with events in eastern Anatolia the likelihood of an

13 Sargeant, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42; Ross, *op. cit.*, pp. 549-550.

14 Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 100, speaking of the period around 1506, describes the reason for the amicable settlement of piracy and naval disputes between the Ottomans and Venice on the basis of "the Sofi's rise and the attack on Venice by the European powers". That is, both states were threatened from elsewhere.

15 On machinations of Venice with Uzun Hasan see John Woods, *The Aqqoyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire*, Minneapolis and Chicago, 1976, pp. 127-128.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

Ottoman naval attack on Venetian possessions was lessened[16]. Regardless of actual Safavid military capabilities, the possibilty of Safavid success against the Ottomans was a determining factor in the course of Venetian diplomacy and Middle Eastern diplomacy in general at this time.

The successful campaign of Isma'il against the Zu'l-Qadr in 1507 was a major reason for Venice's expectations that the Safavids could pose a serious political and military threat to the Ottomans in the East[17]. Venice was acutely aware of the function served by the Zu'l-Qadr frontier principalty as a wedge between Ottoman and Mamluks and a stopper against Ottoman expansion into Syria. The Ottoman, Safavid, Zu'l-qadr frontier interface was not directly related to Venetian commercial interests, although the expansion of hostilities like the attack on Ala ud-Dawla in 1507 could potentially threaten the overland trade from Aleppo. Rather the Zu'l-Qadr principality was the focus of the Ottoman/Mamluk power struggle for political hegemony in southeastern Anatolia. The importance for Venice of this frontier conflict and its potential escalation was in what effect it would have on Ottoman/Venetian and Ottoman/ Mamluk relations. If Isma'il were militarily successful in engaging the energy of the Ottomans this might allow for the reassertion of Venetian naval colonial activity in the eastern Mediterranean[18].

Venice was in no position militarily or financially in 1507 to pursue this. If Isma'il were to be defined as an ally and friend of Christianity in an anti-Ottoman strategy, then the Ottomans must necessarily be defined as the enemy which was contrary to Venetian commercial interests in the Ottoman state. Further, an attack on the Zu'l-Qadr who were nominally subject to the Mamluks might provoke some form of anti-Safavid joint action on the part of the Ottomans and Mamluks[19]. Isma'il provided a locus of confusion in the

16 Donado d'Lezze, *Historia Turchesca*, trans, by I. Ursi, Bucharest, 1910, p. 268. D'Lezze says that nothing of moment occured between the Ottomans and Venetians in the years after the peace of 1502 because of the threat from the Safavids

17 Guglielmo Berchet, *La Republica de Venezia e La Persia*, Torino, 1865, p. 23. For accounts of Isma'il's campaign againt the Zu'l-Qadr see Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 114-115; Şeref Khan Bidlisi, *Cheref-Nameh ou Fastes de la Nation Kourde par Cheref-ou'ddine*, trans. by François Barnand Charmoy, vol. II, St. Petersburg, 1873, p. 578; Hasan Rumlu, *Akhsanu't-Tawarikh*, trans. C. A. N. Seddon, vol. LXIX: Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, 1934, pp. 41-42; Ghulam Sarwar, *History of Shah Ismail Safawi*, Aligarh, 1939, pp. 52-54

18 Berchet, *op. cit.*, p. 23 In a letter sent by Giovanni Morosini from Damascus on March 5, 1507 describing the Battle of Isma'il against Ala ud-Dawla, Morosini urges the Venetian senate that the time is ripe for an anti-Ottoman alliance. He says that "quello essere il momento opportuno di cospirare d'accordo fra i principi Christiani e la Persia nella santissima impresa di scacciare il Turco d'Europa". Not only does Morosini include the Persians as coconspirators in this "sacred" mission, he also includes a flattering description of Isma'il, saying that he has three Armenian priests as his advisors and that his religion is closer to Christianity than to any other religion. See Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 61 on frontier conflict; Adel Allouche, *The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (906-962/1500-1555)*, 1983, pp. 101-102, 109-110.

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determination of Venetian diplomatic policy. His rise to power delayed the process by which Venice redefined the Ottoman state in the old Mamluk role as protector of commercial security[20]. In the long run Venice settled in favour of the Ottomans, where she knew what to expect. The Signoria' unwillingness to compromise the status quo in commercial matters is demonstrated by her response to the diplomatic solicitations of Isma'il in 1509.

After Isma'il's 1507 incursion into eastern Anatolia to chastise Ala ud-Dawla, a series of events took place from 1508 through 1511 which were to have far reaching effects on Venice's relations with the Ottoman state and its opponents. The lynch-pin of these events was Pietro Zeno the Venetian consul in Damascus.

Damascus was a vantage point from which the Venetian senate could keep an eye on events in Iran. As consul, the reports of Pietre Zeno were full of news and rumors about Isma'il[21]. Zeno took his position in Damascus in November of 1508. That same month he dispatched an initial report to the Signoria describing his arrival, presentation of his credentials, the Mamluk officials in Damascus and current events in the area. The activities of Isma'il figure heavily in this first dispatch. After relating the Safavid conquest of Baghdad, Zeno mentions the many Safavid sympathizers in Syria.

News of Isma'il's defeat of Ala ud-Dawla intrigued Venice with renewed interest in an anti-Ottoman alliance. Isma'il followed up this success with efforts to acquire from Venice the founders and artillery needed to properly challenge the Ottomans. He sent an embassy to the Doge via Zeno in Damascus[22]. It was Zeno's involvement with these Persian envoys which would cause a four year disruption in Venetian/ Mamluk relations and lead to Zeno's eventual incarceration in Cairo.

The letter of Isma'il to the doge commenced with lenghty declarations of friendship and brotherly love. Safavids and Venetians were compelled to fight the Turks for the love of God. Isma'il proposed that they launch a joint attack on the Ottomans. He concluded with a request that was direct and revealing: "send an excellent bombardier, a master craftsman". True brotherly love should provide the means to found cannon![23] The Persian orator

19 Arif Bey, "Elbistan ve Maraş'ta Dhul'Kadr (Dulgadir) Oğulları Hükümeti", *Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası*, XXV-XXXVI, 1330-31, pp. 358-377, 419-431, 500-512, 535-552, 623-629, 692-697, 767-768.

20 For the articulation of Isma'il et. al. in the diplomatic correspondence see Celia J.Kerslake, "The Correspondence Between Selim I and Kansuh al-Gawri", *Prilozi za Orientalnu Filologiju*, XXX, 1980, pp. 219-233; Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, *Ottomans et Safavides au temps de Shah Isma'il*, Paris 1980, pp. 167-174; Berchet, *op. cit.*, p. 158; Setton, op. cit., p. 138; M. C. Şehabeddin Tekindağ, "Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikaların Işığı Altında Yavuz Sultan Selim'in İran Seferi", *Tarih Dergisi*, XXII, 1967, pp. 49-76

21 Marino Sanuto, *I Diarii*, VIII, Venice, 1887, p. 12. Zeno reports early in 1500 that Isma'il has taken Baghdad and its ruler has fled to Aleppo.

22 Sanuto, *op. cit.*, VIII, pp. 232, 432.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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presented Isma'il's demands: that Venice send artillery masters by way of Syria; that the Venetian navy engage Bayezid on the coast of Greece while Isma'il attacked him in Asia Minor. Venice responded sympathetically but excused herself on the basis of Venice being preoccupied with the war against the League of Cambrai. This was the most obvious reason. Neither was Venice interested in jeopardizing her trade agreements with the Ottomans and Mamluks. Nor did she wish to indirectly aid the Portuguese by providing artillery to Isma'il which might be used in some joint Safavid/Portuguese action. Meanwhile Venice protested her greatest friendship for Isma'il and animosity against the Turks[24]. However, Venice's response to the Safavids was essentialy the same one she would give to the Mamluk sultan some years later in 1511. Venice was militarily and economically debilitated by her struggle against the league of Cambrai.[25] Her promises were guarded: she would cooperate in efforts to stay the land expansion of the Ottomans and the naval expansion of the Portuguese but would prefer that the men, the money and the supplies came from elsewhere.

In September 1509 the Shah's envoys returned through Damascus having received assurances of friendship but no concrete aid from Venice. Zeno was anxious to speed them on their way expecting detection by Mamluk spies at any moment. Unfortunately after a quiet winter, the consul's worst fears were realized when Nicolo Soror, a Cypriot who had accompanied the envoys back to the Safavid court, was apprehended by the governor of Bira in company with some young merchants and two Safavid nuncios. On July 16, 1510 Zeno received word from Aleppo of their capture, along with the bad news that the party was carrying incriminating letters from Isma'il. After the governor of Bira (modern Birecik) dispatched the culprits to Aleppo, Zeno frantically sent news of the disaster to the rector of Cyprus and to Venice[26]. Acting on the assumption that information would be tortured out of Soror, Zeno also wrote to hoped-for allies in Cairo (the cadi and the dragoman Taghribirdi). He protested the innocence of the merchants and of Venice generally though admitting that Isma'il's letters requested aid from Venice against the Ottomans. Soror and one of his attendants named Zacharia were sent to Damascus in chains where Zeno urged them not to implicate the Signoria when they were interrogated in Cairo (where they were sent short days later on the 23rd of July). The damage had already been done, however, where Mamluk-Venetian relations were concerned. Isma'il's letter to Venice not only reiterated the request for an artillery master but also mentioned the exchange of letters and envoys between Venice and the Safavids[27].

23 Lucchetta, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-184.

24 Berchet, *op. cit.*, p. 25; Bacqué-Grammont, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

25 On the political machinations leading up to the formation of the League of Cambrai see Frederic Lane, *Venice, a Maritime Republic*, Baltimore, 1973, pp. 242-245.

26 Francesca Luchetta, "L'Affare Zen in Levante nel Primo Cinquecento," *Studi Veneziani*, X (1959), 185-191, dispatches IV-XXII.

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Although Venice later protested to the Mamluk sultan that this Safavid embassy was inconsequential, a request for Venetian artillery aid and military collaboration with Isma'il was guaranteed to elicit an unfavourable response in Cairo. Quansuh took an extremely dim view of a foreign consul resident in his domains acting as go-between for Safavid/Venetian "secret" negotiations. The official Mamluk position was that the Safavids were "heretics". As heretics military action against them was justified. Later events bore out that a one time heretic could become a potential ally. Just as the Ottomans used the designation of "heretic" to legitimize collaboration with Venice. One can speculate that Qansuh was smarting at the failure of Isma'il and the Doge to include him in the anti-Ottoman ruminations. In view of the account given by Ibn Iyas, it is more likely that Qansuh suspected that he as well as the Ottomans might be the object of a Christian/Safavid alliance[28]. In addition the Mamluk need for Ottoman aid against the Portuguese made it politically expedient for the Mamluks to allign themselves with the Ottomans and against the Safavids, at least for the time being.

At about the same time that the Safavid envoy passed through Damascus so did an ambassador from Beyazid to Qansuh who was reportedly going to Mecca with a large quantity of gold for the sacred city. Zeno says he has it on good information that this ambassador has come to find out about Isma'il's conquest of Baghdad and to remonstrate with Qansuh concerning the Safavid threat. He adds further that the ambassador brought money to the Mamluk sultan for this purpose (to be used against Isma'il). These simultaneous embassies reveal the interplay of power relationship at this time. The Ottomans were in a position of relative strength with both the Mamluk and Venetian states dependent upon them: Egypt for naval and military aid and Venice for peace. The Ottomans also appeared anxious to avoid conflict on multiple fronts; however, the internal tension created in the Ottoman state by the succession struggle already underway was as much a factor in the quietude of the Ottoman western front as was the fear of a Safavid attack on the eastern front[29].

27 Letters to France and to the consul were also seized along with the letter to Venice, Luchetta, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-193; Setton, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-26.

28 Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 184, 199. Ibn Iyas reports that the prefect of Bira apprehended Safavid spies bearing messages to the Christian princes. The consuls of Alexandria, Damascus and Tripoli were called to Cairo and accused by the sultan of being traitors. The messages, supposedly addressed to these consuls were said to invite the Christian princes to attack Egypt by sea while Isma'il attacked the Mamluks and the Ottomans by land. The consuls were incarcerated for interrogation. In December of 1507 Qansuh had entertained the Safavid envoy with a military display by the Mamluks in the hippodrome which he no doubt hoped would intimidate the Safavids: Ibn Iyas, *op. cit.*, I, p. 120.

29 Setton, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85. For the succession struggle see Çağatay Uluçay, "Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Padişah Oldu", *Tarih Dergisi*, IX, 1953, pp. 54-90; X, 1954, pp. 118-142; XI, 1955, pp. 185-200.

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For Venice, peace with the Ottomans provided commercial security in the form of trade agreements and political security in the eastern Mediterranean so that she could devote her military efforts to the war against the League of Cambrai. Ottoman/Mamluk relations in this period cannot be characterized as a friendly union of two Sunni states in the face of threat from the heretical Shiite Safavid state[30]. Rather, Egypt had placed herself in dependency status vis-à-vis Turkey in response to the imperative of Portuguese expansion. This dependency status served only to illustrate Mamluk vulnerability to Ottoman imperial ambitions. The need for ordinance prompted Isma'il to apply to Venice just as Qansuh had applied to Bayezid, and with the same rationale: the common foe, the heretic. Neither the Mamluks nor the Safavids were able to offer much besides good will in return for the artillery and naval support they wanted. Having already made the Mamluk state dependent on the Ottomans for military aid, Qansuh had little choice but to nominally support the Ottomans against the Safavids. The Safavids also constituted a direct threat to Mamluk interests in eastern Anatolia, a threat which had already materialized in the form of the attack on the Zu'l-Qadr principality. Only if the Ottomans and Safavids could neutralize each other in eastern Anatolia was the Mamluk frontier safe.

Zeno's position was not improved when shortly thereafter a Mamluk fleet was attacked by apparently Rhodian corsairs while transporting timber and other naval supplies from Liazzo (Ayas) which had been shipped by the Ottomans from Anatolia[31]. The deterioration in relations is detailed throughout 1510 in Zeno's correspondence, with the consul alternately hopeful that amicable relations will soon be restored...then dispairing over some new setback[32]. The Rhodian attack was particulary galling to Venice in view of the fact that the fleet was transporting materials for the preparation of a Mamluk armada against the Portuguese, an endeavour the Signoria had been urging on the Soldan. This insult coupled with the Nicolo Soror incident prompted Qansuh to order that all "franks" be detained and their goods *bollate*, (literally sealed but in this case apparently checked and impounded). The effect of this order was that the Venetian trade temporarily halted in the sense that ships could not be loaded or unloaded, goods could not be sold and there was discussion of imprisoning the Venetian merchants and diplomats rather than simply detaining them[33]. The Calendar demanded that

30 Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 67 describes the end of Bayezid's reign as showing a sudden improvement in Ottoman/Mamluk relations because of the Safavid threat and the Ottoman aid to the Mamluks. Setton, *op. cit.*, p. 25 not only characterizes the Ottomans as the Mamluks' friends, but also suggests that Venice was inattentive to affairs in Egypt because of her preoccupation with the League of Cambrai.

31 Özbaran, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-84 discusses the flow of military hardware and timber etc. from Anatolia to Egypt in terms of the economic and strategic importance of the area and trade to the Ottomans. This flow must be seen also in terms of the extension of the Ottoman political and military sphere of influence.

32 Luchetta, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-203.

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Venice make good on debts owed him, and in general the temper of hostility towards the western merchants prompted official abuses which were detrimental to trade. As negotiations failed, first the Venetian consul in Alexandria, Contarini, then Zeno were called to Cairo and imprisoned, accused of conspiring against the Mamluk state. Zeno arrived in Cairo on January 6, 1511. This episode was a lesson to Venice in the precarious nature of existence under the Mamluk regime, and, in the ease with which her investment could be subjected arbitrarily to ruin. Qansuh's intelligence operations in Damascus were apparently not as competent as they might have been since the initial passage of the Safavid orator through Damascus remained undetected. Certainly Venice's reaction, once news of Zeno's negotiations got out, was not one of support for her representative. He was officially blamed for mishandling Venice's interests and souring relations with Cairo. After his two year service in Damascus and redemption from prison he did resume his diplomatic service after a short hiatus, serving as proveditor in Cattaro in 1514 and later among other posts as orator to the Ottoman court in 1523[34]. This indicates that official censorship of Zeno was deemed necessary for diplomatic reasons and either his experience or his family connections insured that his presumed enthusiasm for a Safavid alliance did not ruin his career. In fact, Zeno's correspondence indicates that he proceeded with as much caution as possible and regreted the circumstance which imposed upon him the role of Safavid/Venetian intermediary.

Ultimately Qansuh's preoccupation with provisions to launch an armada against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean worked in Venice's favour, although it was not until Trevisan's embassy to Cairo in 1512 that Mamluk/Venetian relations resumed on a fairly even keel[35]. By September 1511, because the uncertain diplomatic environment continued to adversely effect trade the Senate decided to send special envoy Domenico Trevisan to Cairo. With her fleets arrayed before the ports of Beirut and Alexandria to remind Qansuh of her vitality and of the possibilities for large profits, Venice was ready for the reopening of the trade. Trevisan was instructed to settle for good the ill-will from the Zeno affair and to renegociate commercial treaty[36].

Contrast Venice's instructions to Trevisan in 1511 to those given to the envoy to Egypt in 1504[37]. Trevisan's mission was to be conducted with the utmost secrecy. He was to discuss with the Mamluk sultan Venice's

33 Luchetta, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-201.

34 Luchetta, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

35 Sanuto, *op. cit.*, XV, pp. 17-20, 193-207, 264-266.

36 Luchetta, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-173; Trevisan was to say that the visit was only to relate Isma'il's successes and bring messages of friendship and that no bad effect was intended. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 67. Setton, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-30 does not mention the suggestion that naval aid came from the Ottomans.

37 Mas Latrie, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 271-272 (from Consul di Dieci, Misti v. 34, fol.121). Instructions to emissary Domenico Trevisan from Senate going to Egypt, dated 30 Dec. 1511. See also Heyd, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 528-530.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

desire to eliminate the Portuguese navigations to India which were damaging to the common interests of the two powers. If the Mamluk sultan asked for artillery masters, ships, oars or such things Trevisan was to say that Venice would consider it. However, Venice claimed that the main reason for the formation of the League of Cambrai was that the League's members blamed Venice for not joining a Christian league against the enemies of Christianity. In effect, Qansuh should be greateful that Venice had remained an ally, since she had done so only at great cost to herself. Venice suggested that Qansuh seek aid from the Turk artillery, lumber, ships and all the things necessary to pursue this effort besides the lumber, that they obtain from the gulf of Giazza (Ayas) where it is abundant.

Venice also anticipated the demands and complaints that the Mamluk sultan was likely to direct at Trevisan. If the question of damages done by the Rhodians was brought up Trevisan was to explain that Venice did not support piracy and to remind Qansuh of how Venice had interceded for Arab victims of the corsairs. If there were problems with the *muda* (the state subsidized galley convoys) at Alexandria or Beirut, Trevisan was to attempt to resolve any impediments to the loading of goods. While the Council of Ten instructed Trevisan to consult with the consuls of Damascus and Alexandria—he was given full power to make the final decision in the event of a impasse.

This communication demonstrates how Venice's view of negotiations between the main components in middle eastern relations had changed. Venice was trying to patch up relations with the Mamluks in the aftermath of consul Zeno's indiscrete negotiations with the Safavid envoy. The Mamluks were not yet willing to publicly support an anti-Ottoman alliance in the form of a Venetian/Safavi/Mamluk axis. Venice was actively pursuing possibilities with the Safavids but was not willing to back such a friendship at the expense of her trade agreements with the Mamluks. Meanwhile Rhodian attacks on shipping had futher exacerbated the tension between Egypt and Venice[38]. It is worth noting here that the depredations of the Knights on Muslim shipping were nothing new and it was, in fact, the supposed secret negotiations between the Safavids and Venice which, added to the Portuguese threat, provoked the Mamluk sultan. At this point the Safavid military capabilities were still the subject of great speculation on the part of all parties. The Mamluks wished to define Isma'il in terms of an anti-Ottoman ally rather than as a party to a Safavid/Venetian alliance which might aim at squeezing the Mamluks out of Syria. Then too, the possibility of a Safavid/Portuguese coalition could not be ruled out[39].

38 John Wansbrough, "A Mamluk Letter of 877/1473", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XXVI, 1963, p. 511; Luchetta, *op. cit.*; for the later negotiations of Rhodes and Egypt see Bacqué-Grammont, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-177.

39 For the Portuguese negotiations with Isma'il see Alfonso D'Albuquerque, *The Commentaries of the Great Alfonso D'Albuquerque*, trans. by Walter de Graybirch, II,

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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The focus of Venetian negotiations with the Mamluks remained the threat of the Portuguese to the commercial revenues of both powers. However, since 1504 the situation had changed drastically in that Venice mentioned the Ottoman state as the likeliest source of relief. This was not just a question of passing the buck by a state depleted of revenues by long periods of war. This was an admission that despite the long-term enmity between the Ottomans and Mamluks, the relative weakness of both Venice and the Mamluks in 1511 justified Venice's proposal of a marriage of necessity. The decision was taken that accepting the expansion of the Ottoman sphere of influence was a calculated risk made expedient by the supposed threat of a Red Sea blockade by the Portuguese. Behind this decision to accept the calculated risk was the assumption that the Safavids would preoccupy the Ottomans in Eastern Anatolia so that neither Venice nor the Mamluk kingdom would suffer the consequences of the Ottomans becoming too powerful.

In 1510-1511 while the Venetians were simultaneously trying to smooth over relations with Cairo and explore possibilities with Isma'il they were also engaged in negotiations with Bayezid. These negotiations aimed at securing aid against the League of Cambrai and ensuring peace to protect Venetian trade through Ottoman territory. The aid was not forthcoming but the peace was reaffirmed in 1511. Perhaps it was because of this reaffirmation that Venice felt confident in urging Ottoman naval assistance on the Mamluks[40]. Later when Selim came to power Antonio Gustinian, already in Istanbul, was commissioned to congratulate the new sultan and to renegotiate the capitulations (1513). It is noteworthy that at this time the Ottoman vezirs insisted on a clause providing for provisioning of an Ottoman fleet at the ports of Venetian possessions such as Cyprus. This presages the provisioning for the Ottoman campaign against Cairo[41]. During the Ottoman-Mamluk wars of 1481-91 the Ottomans had also requested the use of Famagosta to supply their troops from the sea, but at that time Venice had refused.

The function of the Venetian diplomacy with the Porte as opposed to

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Series I, vol. 55: Hakluyt Society Editions, New York, 1970 reprint, pp. 111-118. On the Safavid/Mamluk embassies see Bacqué Grammont *op.cit.*, pp. 154-163. Bacqué-Grammont suggests that after Çaldıran Isma'il was less inclined to Portuguese proposals against the Mamluks because he now had to view the Mamluks as a possible ally against the Ottomans. Isma'il later also sent an envoy to the Grand Master of Rhodes proposing an anti-Ottoman alliance and asking him to release to him (Isma'il) the son of Sultan Cem (Murad). The Grand Master did not comply with this request. See Ettore Rossi, "Relazioni tra la Persia e l'Ordine di San Giovani a Rodi e a Malta", Rivista degli Studi Orientiali, XIII, part 1, p. 353. Also Qansuh's wrath at Venice over Zeno's secret negotiations had not prevented him from sending his own embassy to Isma'il in the summer of 1510. See Luchetta, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

40 In 1510-11 Venice sent ambassador Alvise Arimondo to Turkey: Sanuto, *op. cit.*, X, pp. 198, 343, 704, 801; XI, p. 683; Sidney Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

41 Alberi, *op cit.*, Series III, vol. III, pp. 46-49.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

that with Cairo was substantially different in that after 1503 relations with the Ottoman were fairly stable. Envoys were sent for two reasons: to reestablish the trade agreements and as was the case in 1510-1511, to request aid[42]. Venetian diplomacy vis-à-vis the Mamluks, however, was prompted by conditions of crisis rather than conditions of stability. Hence special emissaries were sent to Cairo for a set of reasons different from those for which they were sent to Istanbul. The objective of formalizing trade agreements was still the same but Venetian diplomacy with the Mamluks had other pressing concerns: the Portuguese threat in the Red Sea and the disruptions of the trade caused by Venetian negotiations with Isma'il, the attacks of Rhodian corsairs on Mamluk possessions and the Mamluk failure to provide security and price controls for Venetian trade.

In the four years separating Trevisan's renegotiation of the Mamluk/Venetian commercial treaty and Selim's march on Cairo two events occured which assured the acceleration of Venice's diplomatic policy transformation. These were the decisive defeat of the Safavids at Çaldıran in 1514 and the failure of the long awaited Mamluk armada, launched in 1515, to drive the Portuguese from the Indian Ocean[43]. After Selim's triumphal march into Tabriz the accounts of the battle in the Venetian reports gradually wound down and thereafter the dispatches were filled with "nothing" about the Great Sophy other than occasional rumors. The military capabilities of the Safavid army had left the realm of speculation in the western sources and had been proved lacking. So too the Mamluk armada on which such great Venetian expectations for the chastisement of the Portuguese had been riding. The myth of Isma'il as the unknown threat had been exploded. Despite a flurry of diplomatic activity and a paper alliance between Qansuh and Isma'il, Venice was increasingly inclined to recognize Selim as the last resort for stability and continuity of the trade flow through the Red Sea[44]. The anti-Ottoman axis had failed to materialize in any concrete form. In fact, with the Porte as the only power likely to actively challenge the Portuguese in the Red Sea, for Venice an anti-Ottoman alliance was no longer even desireable. Whatever her long-term goals or her "Christian principles" it now became necessary for Venice to adapt a diplomacy of economic expediency. This was made easiest by the Ottoman appeasement policy in the West which allowed Selim to concentrate on campaigns in the East. Only Ala ud-Dawla now

42 On other requests of European powers for Ottoman aid and on the difficulties of Venice with France and Italy see Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)*, vol. II, The Fifteenth Century, Philadelphia, 1978, pp. 534-539.

43 On Çaldıran see Rumlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-70; Bidlisi, *op. cit.*, pp. 534-535.

44 For a detailed presentation of Ottoman/Mamluk diplomacy at this time (as well as brief topical presentation of Ottoman/Venetian diplomacy) see: Selahhattin Tansel, *Yavuz Sultan Selim*, Ankara, 1969, pp. 108-221, 233-237; Sanuto, *op. cit.*, XXIV, pp. 172, 176; Rossi *op. cit.*, p. 353. See also Allouche, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-130 and Barbara von Polombini, *Bündniswerben Abendländischer Mächte um Persien 1453-1600*, Wiesbaden; 1968, p. 54.

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stood, defiant but doomed, between Selim and an Ottoman Egypt. Venice prepared to negotiate with the Ottomans the trading priviledges once dictated by Qansuh. While Qansuh mobilized his defenses in the aftermath of the disastrous loss of artillery (sunk with the fleet), Venice prepared to retain her commercial and political priviledges under a new hegemony[45].

The increasingly injurious exactions imposed by the Mamluk regime on trade deterred Venice from engaging in the *muda* for two years preceding the Ottoman conquest (1514-1515)[46]. Unstable political and economic conditions in the Mamluk empire led to brigandage and abuse of merchants by government functionaries thereby damaging Venetian trade[47]. By the fall of 1516 the Ottomans had already conquered two of the Mamluk trade depots (Aleppo and Damacus). This conquest gave Venice the advantage in her trade negotiations with the Mamluk. Still hedging her bets on the off chance of an Ottoman defeat, Venice was now able to throw the Ottoman successes in the face of the desperate Sultan Tuman (1516-1517)[48]. This is illustrated by the embassy of the Venetian consul in Alexandria, Tomaso Venier to Cairo in November of 1516.

Venier went to Cairo to attempt to resolve the commercial impasse which had deterred the *muda* for the previous two years. He found the Mamluk sultan bedeviled and demanding 10,000 ducats for the two years which had not been paid. Unruffled, Venier told the sultan that the galleys had been prepared to come every year but that the Signoria did not force her merchants against their will. The merchants claimed that galleys would not be seen at Alexandria as long as there was such an imposition. Instead they would go to Beirut since there was news from Damascus that the merchants were well treated by the Ottomans and the customs dues were low. Thus Venier advised the Mamluk sultan that Venice would deal with the Ottomans if they could not get satisfaction from the Mamluks. Grudgingly Tuman confirmed the trade agreements. The transformation of Venetian diplomatic policy was now complete. The naval failure and injurious customs duties of the Mamluks had combined to make the Venetian trade through Egypt unprofitable. The Ottomans were a viable alternative.

The good treatment accorded the Venetian merchants in these newly conquered cities along with the lure of Ottoman political stability and moderate levies on trade suggested to Venice that Ottoman control of the traditional trade routes from the east night be fiscally advantageous. As for

45 On the negotiations of Mocenigo and Contarini after the conquest see Alberi *op. cit.*, Series III, pp. 54-60.

46 Sanuto, *op. cit.*, XXIV, pp. 125, 135-137, 161.

47 For debasement of the Mamluk coinage see George Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs 1511 to 1574*, Urbana, 1942, p. 16. For 15th century Mamluk policies as they affected Venetian trade see Eliyahu Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages*, Princeton, 1983, pp. 276-300, 303-306.

48 Sanuto, *op. cit.*, XXIV, pp. 135-137.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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the political and military status quo, the Mamluks did not possess a permanent Mediterranean naval fleet and hence posed no threat to Venetian possessions or shipping[49]. The Ottoman possessed large and powerful navy which had been partially mobilized to support and provision the land campaign against Cairo. The effects of this mobilization on shipping in the eastern Mediterranean were already apparent in 1516 in the form of ship seizures for transport and Ottoman interference in the staples trade[50]. Whereas the Mamluks had shown no inclination to expand their frontiers at Venetian expense, the threat from the Ottoman navy was immediate. Conversely, in the Red Sea this same lack of Mamluk naval power to counter the Portuguese made Ottoman naval interference desireable. Unfortunately the Doge was unable to request that Otto man sea power be selectively applied in the Red Sea (against the Portuguese) and withhed in the Mediterranean.

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49 For one version of Mamluk naval policy and lack of a permanent navy see David Ayalon, "Bahriyye", *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., II., pp. 345-947.

50 M. Sanuto, *op. cit.*, XXV, pp. 15-16,59. In November of 1516 the Venetian *luogotente* in Famagosta blamed the "disturbances in Syria" for Cyprus' failure to send biscuit for the Venetian armada in Corfu and money for the galleys. The biscuit was kept in Famagosta in anticipation of an Ottoman attack. On December 15, 1516 Haidar Mustafa Aga arrived in Nicosia with a letter from Selim demanding provisions for the Ottoman army. Most of his demands were met although Cyprus protested a scarcity of provisions. The Ottomans paid well for the provisions and Haidar Aga was provided with transport and a Venetian ship to Syria.

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Jacques PAVIOT

THE FRENCH EMBASSY OF D'ARAMON TO THE PORTE: SCHOLARS AND TRAVELLERS IN THE LEVANT 1547-1553[1]

In this short paper I should like to raise some problems concerning a journey in the Levant in the first half of the 16th century. Geoffroy Atkinson[2] has shown that during the Renaissance the books devoted to the Ottoman empire were twice as numerous as those concerned with America. An important period vis-à-vis this region of the world from the French point of view is that during the embassy of d'Aramon.

AMBASSADORS AND TRAVELLERS

It was in the wake of the disaster at Pavia (February 24th, 1525) that King Francis I and the French court started to negociate an alliance with the Grand Turk Suleiman for the struggle against the Emperor Charles V[3]. The

1 This is an amended version of a paper read at the 26e Colloque international d'études numanistes, *Voyages et voyageurs à la Renaissance* (Tours, Centre d'études supérieures de la Renaissance, 30 juin-13 juillet 1983). I am indebted to Miss Sabine Theobald, Richard Sharpe and Michael E. Martin, esq., for their reading of my English version; all the remaining errors are my own.

2 G.ATKINSON, *Les Nouveaux horizons de la Renaissance française*, Paris, 1935 (reprint Geneva, 1969), pp. 10 -11.

3 On the eastern policy of Francis I, see: *Catalogue des actes de François* Ier, vol. IX, Paris, 1907, pp. 84-84; G. RIBIER, *Lettres et Memoires d'Estat des Roys, Princes, Ambassadeurs, Et autres Ministres, sous les Regnes de François I., Henry II. Francois II.*, Paris 1666, 2 vols.; E. CHARRIERE, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant, Paris,* 1848-1860, vols. I and II; DE HAMMER, "Mémoire sur les premières relations diplomatiques entre la France et la Porte", in *Journal asiatique,* vol. X (1827), pp. 19-45; E. MARON, *François* Ier *et Soliman le Grand. Premières relations de la France et de la Turquie,* Paris, 1853, J. ZELLER, *La Diplomatie française vers le millieu du* XVIe *siècle d'après la correspondance de Guillaume Pellicier, évêque de Montpellier,*

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urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

first missions were entrusted to the Spaniard Antonio Rincon; but after the arrival in France of a Turkish embassy at the end of 1534, the Sieur Jean de La Forest was sent as the first nominated ambassador to the Porte in 1535. Two years later the squadron of the Baron de Saint-Blancard was sent to the Levant to join that of Barbarossa for operations against Venetian Corfu[4]. There the poet and on that occasion, envoy, Bertrand de La Borderie joined them and went on his way to Constantinople aboard a French galley whilst the squadron went to winter harbour[5]. On the death of La Forest, in 1538, Rincon was finaly nominated ambassador and in 1540 he negociated peace between Venice and Constantinople. Assassinated in Italy by the Emperor's agents in 1541, he was succeeded by Captain Polin. Polin, while he was still in Venice on his way to Constantinople in the spring of 1542, engaged the Sieur d'Aramon[6], who was probably recommended to him by Guillaume

ambassadeur de François Iᵉʳ à Venise (1539-1542), Paris, 1880; *Id.*, *Quae primae fuerint legationes a Francisco I in orientem missae (MDXXIVMDXXXVIII)*, Paris, 1881; A. TAUSSERAT-RADEL, *Correspondance politique de Guillaume Pellicier, ambassadeur de France à Venise, 1540-1542*, Paris, 1899, 2 vols.; V.-L. BOURRILLY, "La première ambassade d'Antonio Rincon en Orient (1522-1523)", in *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, vol. II (1900-1901), pp. 23-44; *Id.*, "L'ambassade de La Forest et de Marillac à Constantinople (1535-1538)", in *Revue Historique*, vol. LXXVI (1901), pp. 297-328; J. URSU, *La Politique orientale de François Iᵉʳ (1515-1547)*, Paris, 1908; V.-L. BOURRILLY, "Les diplomates de François Iᵉʳ. Antonio Rincon et la politique orientale de François Iᵉʳ (1522-1541)", in *Revue Historique*, vol. CXIII (1913), pp. 64-83 and 168-308; C.D. ROUILLARD, *The Turk in French History, Thought and Literature (1521-1660)*, Paris (1941), pp. 105-126; I. SOYSAL, "Türk-fransız diplomasi münasebetlerinin ilk devresi", in *Tarih Dergisi*, N 5-6, pp. 63-94; *(anon.)* "Note relative aux articles franco-ottomans connus sous le nom de Capitulations de 1635", in *Ordonnance des rois de France. Règne de François Iᵉʳ, vol. VIII: 1536-1537*, Paris, 1963-1972, pp. 503-574; A. CLOT, *Soliman le Magnifique*, Paris, 1983.

4 See: Jean de VEGA, "Journal de la croisière du baron de Saint-Blancard". in E. CHARRIERE, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 340-353 and 371-383; C. de LA RONCIERE, *Histoire de la marine française*, vol. III, Paris, 1906, pp. 360 *et sqq.*; P.GRILLON, "la croisière du baron de Saint- Blancard, 1537-1538", in *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, vol.* XV (1968), pp. 624-661.

5 See: *Le Discours du voyage de Constantinoble, enuoyé dudit lieu a vne Damoyselle de France*, Lyons, 1542; new ed. in *Opuscules d'amour*, Lyons, 1547 (reprint Paris, 1970), pp. 269-346, and in *Le livre de plusieurs pieces, c'ets à-dire faict et recuelly de divers autheurs*, Lyons, 1548. On La Borderie see:V.-L. BOURRILLY, "Bertrand de la Borderie et le 'Discours du voyage de Constantinople' (1537-1538)", in *Revue des études rabelaisiennes*, vol. IX (1911), pp. 183-220; C. LIVINGSTONE, "Un disciple de Clément Marot. Bertrand de La Borderie", in *Revue du seizième siècle*, vol. 16 (1929), pp. 219-245. T. SPENCER, in *Fair Greece Sad Relic* (2nd ed., London, 1974, p. 55), following the Comte de LABORDE (*Athènes aux* XVᵉ, XVIᵉ *et* XVIIᵉ *siècles*, Paris, vol. I, 1854,p. 47) stated that La Borderie ᶜHad... no personal knowledge of the city (of Athens)"; but the fleet called at Piraeus for two days: there was time to go to Athens. And Juan de Vega wrote that the columns of Cape Sunion were similar to those of the Areopagus that remained in Athens (E. CHARRIERE, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 373).

6 Gabriel de Luels was born *ca.* 1508 at Nîmes; his father was a Doctor of Law. He married in 1526 and participated in the campaigns of Provence and Piedmont (1538) in

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urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

Pellicier, the French ambassador there. In 1543, Polin accompanied Barbarossa on his famous campaign along the shores of Italy and Provence[7], leaving d'Aramon in Constantinople as the French agent. The latter, abandoned and without money, found himself in a critical situation when Francis I betrayed his Turkish ally by signing the peace treaty of Crépy-en-Laonnois with Charles V on September 15th, 1544: the Great Vizier openly spoke of having the French representative impaled! According to the terms of the treaty, France would support the empire in its search for a truce with the Turks. This was granted as Suleiman wanted to campaign against Persia. D'Aramon, who was opposed to the French envoy Monluc who negociated this truce, came back to France, leaving the Embassy in the charge of Jacques de Cambray[8]. He was not badly received at the court, being named counsellor, major-domo, and ambassador before July 1546. His first mission then was to prevent the signing of a peace treaty between the Emperor and the Sultan, as Francis I has lost his hopes to gain some territory from Charles V. In order to enhance the image of France, d'Aramon was given a large escort of gentlemen, to which the Cardinal de Tournon, the leading political figure, added such scholars as Pierre Belon[9]. Among the ambassador's secretaries

the royal forces,.When he went home his lands of Aramon and Valabrègues had been seized. As he tried to capture them again by force, he was definitively depossessed and banished from the kingdom on August 15th, 1540. (Later he was pardoned on October 14th, 1542, but could not take possession of his lands again.) He then retired to Venice, where the ambassador G. Pellicier employed him for different missions. After his embassy to Constantinople, he retired to Provence, as Henry II has made him marquis of the Hyères Isles in April 1552. He died in 1554. (Cf. *Dictionnaire de biographie française*, vol. III [1939], col. 219-222)

7 See LA RONCIERE, *op. cit.*, pp. 376 *et sqq.;* J. LAROCHE, "L'expédition en Provence de l'armée de mer du Sultan Suleyman sous le commandement de l'amiral Hayreddin Pacha, dit Barberousse (1543-1544)", in *Turcica,* vol. I (1969), pp. 161-211. After the siege of Nice and laying up for the winter at Toulon, Captain Polin went back to Constantinople, but as "capitaine général de l'armée du Levant" on May 26th, 1544; he was in Constanople on August 10th. The chaplain of his galley, Jérôme Maurand wrote an account in italian of this cruise, (*Itinéraire d'Antibes à Constantinople 1544*) L. Dorez ed. and transl., Paris, 1901. Captain Polin, also known under his future title of Baron de La Garde, did not remain in Constantinople.

8 We know very little of this person who seems to have seems to have been interesting. Nicolay (see *infra* note 25) gave this information: "le Seigneur Iagues de Cambray, noble citoyen de Bourges, Chancelier de l'Eglise Metropolitaine de l'Université tres fameuse d'icelle, homme de grande literature, aorné de plusieurs et diuereses langues tant regulieres que uulgaires et Barbares, Grec escrit uulgaire, Turque, Arabesque, Latin Italien Francois" (*Les Quatre premiers livres des navigations...*, Lyons, 1567, préface p. 6). See too A. THEVET (see *infra* note 21), *Cosmographie de Levant,* Lyons, 1556, pp. 76-77, and *Les Singularitez de la France Antarctique,* Paris, 1558, f 36 (new ed. by P. Gaffarel, Paris, 1878, p. 97).

9 Pierre Belon was born ca. 1517 near Mans and acquired a knowledge of pharmacy first in the house of the Bishop of Clermont, then in the house of the Bishop of Le Mans. In 1540, he was in Germany, in Wittenberg, to hear the lectures of the botanist Valerius Cordius. Back in France in 1542, he entered the service of the Cardinal de

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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was Jean Chesneau who later wrote an account of the embassy[10]. Having left Paris on January 5th, 1547, the party crossed the Thirteen Cantons and reached Venice, where it embarked aboard three Venetians galleys on February 24th. In Ragusa it left Pierre Belon and Benigne de Villers[11] to continue their observations of the marine fauna; the two scholars went on to Constantinople by way of the Ionian Islands, Crete and the Aegean Islands, while the main party made its way overland by Trebinje, Gacko, Foca,

Tournon as apothecary, but this influential figure used him for various diplomatic mission in Germany and Switzerland, as he had a knowledge of several languages. After a further journey to Italy with Valerius Cordius, who died there in 1544, he became attached to the embassy of d'Aramon. He left Constantinople in 1549; thereafter he went on travelling for diplomatic or scientific purposes, visiting Italy, England, Switzerland and France, writing his accounts of natural science. He was an ardent Roman Catholic and, caught in the Wars of Religion, was assassinated in the Bois de Boulogne in 1565. (See further: P. DELAUNAY, *L'aventureuse existence de Pierre Belon du Mans*, Paris, 1926.) He wrote several books about his travel to the Levant, the most important and complete being *Les Obseruations de plusieurs singularitez choses memorables, trouuées en Grece, Asie, Iudée, Egypte, Arabie, autres pays estranges...*, Paris, 1553; enlarged ed., Paris, 1554, 1555; Anvers, 1555. See further: *De admirabili operum antiquorum et rerum suspiciendarum praestantia...*, Paris, 1553, *Portraits d'oyseaux, animaux, serpens, herbes, arbres, hommes et femmes d'Arabie Egypte... Plus y est adiousté la Carte du mont Attos, du mont Sinay...*, Paris, 1557; *La Cronique...*, Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, MS. 4651, f 88 *et sqq.*

10 Jean Chesneau was born *ca.* 1520 in Poitiers (?). He was at the court in Follembray (Aisne) while the embassy was getting ready for the journey, and "désireux de faure tel voyage" was engaged as secretary by d'Aramon. He got on badly with the ambassador's successor in Constantinople and so left. On his way back to France, he stopped at Ferrara where he entered the service of Renée de France (as she too, he seemed to have sympathy for the Reformation), when he realized his former employer had no longer any influence. He followed the widowed Renée to Montargis in France and was raised to noble rank in 1566; he died after 1573. (*See Dic. biogr. fr.*, vol. VIII [1959], col. 1038.) His account, written after 1566, remained in manuscript until the 18th century; one can find 14 copies: Paris: Bibl. de l'Arsenal, MS. 4767 (16th c.); f. fr. 22796 (extracts) , n.a.fr. 16167, Dupuy 238, Cing-Cents Colbert 332 (17th c.); Archives of the Ministère des Relations extérieures, Mémoires et documents, Turquie 2 (17th c.); R. RÖHRICHT, in his *Bibliotheca Geographica Palaestinae*, Berlin, 1890, No 680, indicates in addition: Berlin, cod. gall. 206 (18th c.); Brussels 10348 (17th c.); Editions: MENARD, *Pièces fugitives pour servir à l'histoire de France*, Paris, vol. I, 1759, p. 9-27; *Revue rétrospective ou Bibliothèque historique...*, 3rd ser..., vol. II (1583), pp. 341-370 (B.N., Dupuy 138); E. CHARRIERE, op. cit., vol. II *passim* (extracts); Le voyage de Monsieur d'Aramon..., C. Schefer ed., Paris, 1887 (Arsenal 4767) (reprint Geneva, 1970)

11 Belon wrote: "Je me suys trouué es compaignies de plusieurs gents que je pourroye bien nommer et entre autres de Benigne de Villars, appoticaire de Dijon, qui d'une obseraution express auons eu souuentes fois plaisir en plusieurs isles d'AEsclauonnie et de Grece, regardant uenir les daulphins en plusieurs de plaine mer" (*L'histoire naturelles des estrages poissons marins*, Paris, 1551, f 22). A. BAUDOT, in his *Etudes historiques sur la pharmacie en Bourgogne avant 1803*, Paris, 1905, pp. 102, 173, 203 and 213, did not notice a journey in the East.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

Prijepolje, Novi, Pazar, Nisand Plovdiv, reaching the Ottoman winter capital of Adrianople on April 6th. At the end this month, Belon arrived at Constantinople, but as the court had not yet arrived he left to tour the north Aegean Sea, visiting Lemnos, Mount Athos, the Siderocapsa mines[12], and making his way back to Constantinaople via Thrace. When Belon returned to Constantinople, he found d'Aramon assuming his ambassadorial duties; he also found the Baron de Fumel, an envoy sent by the new king, Henry II, to assure Suleiman that Francis I's policies would be adhered to. Fumal tried to be recognized as the new ambassador, but on realizing his failure he asked the Porte for leave to complete his own tour in the Levant. Belon, who could never stay long in one place, took advantage of the opportunity and embarked in early September with Fumal's party. Among this group was another scholar, Juste Terrelle[13]. They called at Troy (Alexandria Troas), Chios, Rhodes, Alexandria, then proceeded from Rosetta up the Nile to Cairo. From there they continued to the monastery of Saint Catherine on Sinaï, the Holy Land, Syria and Lebanon (Damascus, Baalbek, Homs, Aleppo, Antioch), Cilicia, the Taurus range, Anatolia, and, by Christmas 1547, were in Konya. However, Belon left the Party in the middle of the winter to stay for several months at Afyon-karahisar in the heart of the Anatolia, returning to Constantinople at the end of the spring of 1548 by the way of Bursa. On January 23rd, 1548, Jacques Gassot[14], a courier sent by Henry II, arrived at Constantinople, having followed approximatively the same itinerary as d'Aramon's party. He brought orders for the ambassador to follow the sultan in his new campaign against Persia. D'Aramon left the Golden Horn on May 2nd, 1548, with his numerous escort of gentlemen[15]; Chesneau and Gassot

12 The description of the mines had been published again by N. GOBET, *Les anciens minéralogistes de France*, Paris, 1779, 1st part, pp. 53-74.

13 Belon indicated: "Iuste Tenelle (*sic*), homme de lettres, que le feu Roy François restaurateur des sciences auoit eneoyé pour chercher des liures Grecs" (*Les Obseruations...*, ed. 1554, f 143ro; also f 207vo). Later Montaigne, on his way to Germany and Italy, met him on September 5th, 1580: "Audit lieu de Meaux, M. de Montaigne fut visiter le Thersorier de l'Eglise saint Estienne nommé Juste Terrelle, home connu entre les sçavans de France, petit homme vieux de soixante ans, qui a voiagé en Egipte et Jerusalem et demeuré sept ans en Constantinople qui lui monstra sa librerie et singularités de son Jardin" (*Journal de voyage en Italie par la Suisse et l'Allemagne en 1580 et 1581*, C. Dédéyan ed., Paris, 1946, pp. 84-85).

14 Jacques Gassot was born in 1525 at Bourges, where his father was public attorney. After a good education, he entred the service of Queen Eléonore, the second wife of Francis I, and accomplished for her the pilgrimage to the Holy Land in 1546. At the end of 1547, due to his uncle, J. Tibout, he was entrusted with the bringing of despatches to Constantinople. In 1552 he was sent to Ferrara; in 1564 he was back in Bourges, of which he became mayor two years later. He died in 1585. (See *Dict. biogr. fr.*, vol. XV (1982), col. 632.) His account is *Le Discours du voyage deVenise à Constantinople... auec elegante description de plusieurs lieux, Citez de la Grece, choses admirables enicelle...*, Paris, 1550.

15 The writer Brantôme (*ca.* 1538-1614) got information that "M. d'Aramont.. fut receu et bien venu aussi honorablement que jamais fut ambassadeur; car le Grand

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

were also among his party. After crossing the Bosporus, the French rode eastward through Nicomedia (Izmit), Bolu, Tosya, crossed the Kizilirmak river, entered Cappadocia and by way of Osmancik, Niksar and Erzincan rejoined the camp of the Grand Signor at Erzurum on June 28th. Then they went with the Ottoman army and entered Persia by crossing the Aras river; catching sight of the lake of Van at Erciz and still looking for a clash with the Persians, they reached Tabriz on July 25th by passing through Khvoy. But it was late in the season and the retreat began only five days later; the army made its way by the shore of Lake Urmia and went to lay siege to the fortress of Van. Having captured it, thanks to d'Aramon's advice[16], the Ottomans went by way of Diyarbakir and Urfa into winter quarters in Syria. The Ambassador and his escort settled down in Aleppo, on November 22nd, 1548; from there Gassot sent his account to France, on December 5th.

A short time later, doubtless with some amazement, the French discovered that one of their compatriots, Pierre Gilles[17], was a soldier in the Turkish army; he had been in the Levant since 1544, searching for old Greek manuscripts, but, as he had received no money, he had been obliged to enlist in order to survive. A young elephant captured from the Persians and acquired by d'Aramon as a present to his king brought together Gilles and the French party: on its death in Aleppo it was dissected by Gilles[18]. From then on

Seigneur, faisant le voyage de Perse, voulut gu'il vint avec luy, ce gu'il fit; et pouvoit avoir avec luy cent honnestes hommes, capitaines ou soldatz, bons et signallez François, desquelz le Grand-Seigneur voulust qùil en arborast une cornette aux armoirie de France, à laquelle il vint avoir cet honneur qu'elle marchoit à droicte" (*Œuvres complètes*, L. Lalanne ed., Paris, vol. VI, 1873, pp. 179-180) Actually Suleiman left Constantinople at the end of March and the french party followed another itinerary.

16 According to Chesneau (*Le Voyage...*, C. Schefer ed., pp. 87-88) and Thevet (Le Grand Insulaire, et Pilotage, Paris, Bibl, nat., MS f. fr. 15452, f 400v).

17 Pierre Gilles was born in Albi in 1489; he was a student there and became the preceptor of Georges d'Armagnac, ward of the bishop. Around 1521 he went to Paris but did not succeed as a scholar; he joined Georges d' Armagnac, who became his patron, in Lyons. Besides other duties, he published texts of Ancient authors, among them Aelianus, that revealed him his true vocaton. In 1533 he travelled along the Mediterranean shores of Spain, France and Italy to study the fishes (Rabelais made fun of him in the *Cinquiesme Livre*, ch. XXXI); in 1534 he published his edition of Aelianus. Following Georges d'Armagnac, he went to Rome, and his patron procured him a mission in the East in 1544. Coming back from Constantinople he was taken prisoner by the pirates of Djerba; ransomed for 500 ducats in Algiers, he died at Rome in 1555. (See E.-T. HAMY, "Le père de la zoologie française, Pierre Gilles d'Albi", in *Revue des Pyrénées*, vol. XII (1900), pp. 561-588.) His heirs published his translation of Dionysius of Byzantium, *De Bosporo Thracio* lib. III, Lyons, 1561, and a description of Constantinople, *De Topographia Constantinople de illius Antiquitatibus* libri IV, Lyons, 1561 (this last work has been translated in English by John Ball in 1729: *The Antiquities of Constantinople*).

18 See "Elephanti nova descriptio", in Aeliani *De Historia animalium* libri XVII. Quo ex integro ac veteri exemplari Graeco Petrus Gillius vestit., Lyons, 1565, pp. 497-525; one can find there other descriptions of animals observed in the Levant.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

Gilles remained with the ambassador. In the spring of 1549, as Suleiman left to campaign once more against Persia, d'Aramon did not want to follow him but wanted to make his own tour; so the French party made their way south on June 30th. The itinerary is known: Damascus, Jerusalem and Cairo, where they were in August, and then they called on the french consul in Alexandria. In Egypt d'Aromon failed in the purpose of sending saltpetre to France, that was one of the reasons of his journey there. On their way back to Constantinople, in November the party found in Jerusalem another unprovided French man, Guillaume Postel[19], who had come to the Levant for the second time (the first one having been with La Forest in 1525-1526); he was soon at odds with P. Gilles over the search for ancient manuscripts[20]. They finally arrived in Constantinople on January 28th, 1550. There André Thevet[21] was waiting for them. He had embarked in Venice at about the

19 Guillaume Postel was born in the diocese of Avranches (Normandy) in 1510. He went to Paris and was hired as a domestic at the college Sainte-Barbe; at the same time he heard lectures in Hebrew and Greek. In 1535 he went to Contantinople with La Forest; he had to buy rare objects for the king. There he learned arabic, surely from a crypto-Christian, and bought manuscripts. Back in Paris, he published Linguarum duodecim characteribus differentium alphabetum instructio (1538) that made him the father of comparative philology. In 1539 he was nominated professor of mathematics and Oriental languages at the Collège royal (now the Collège de France), but he resigned in 1542. In 1544 he went to Rome to enter the Society of Jesus but was only ordained priest. Then in 1547, he went to Venice, where he translated the Zohar and met Mother Joanna, who influenced him greatly. On June 1549, he embarked on the pilgrims galley to Jerusalem: as he was preparing a translation of the Bible, he wanted to improve his knowledge of the eastern languages and also assist the christians of Asia. He went back to Paris *ca.* 1551, and published many books, but in 1553 was forbidden to teach and fled to Basel and then to Venice. In Italy the Inquisition declared him insane; he spent four years in prison (1555-1559) and, having returned to France in 1562, was put under house of arrest in Paris, where he died in 1581. (See: W.J. BOUWSMA, *Concordia Mundi: Career and Thought of Guillaume Postel 1510-1581*, Cambrige, Mass., 1957; M. L. Kuntz, *Guillaume Postel, Prophet of the Restitution of All Things. His Life and Thought*, The Hague, 1981. From his experience of the Levant, he wrote: *De la Republique des Turcs...*, Poitiers, 1560; enlarged ed.: *Des Histoires orientales...*, Paris, 1575. (See also: F. SECRET, "Notes sur Guillaume Postel. 34. La Place de G. Postel dans la littérature de voyages", in *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, vol. 23 (1961), pp. 362-366.)

20 See CHESNEAU, *op. cit.*, Schefer ed., pp. 138-139.

21 André Thevet, born in Angoulême *ca.* 1504, studied at Poitiers, then at Paris. Before 1530 he entered the order of the Minor Friars. After a navigation in the Atlantic ocean in 1540, he travelled in Italy and in France. In 1543 he was sent to Italy "par l'exprès commandement et avec le sauf-conduit de très illustre et très excelent François Ier" and went through Nice devastated by Barbarossa. In 1545 he was in Bizerte, from where he went to Naples, besieged by Barbarossa. In the spring of 1549, again in Italy, he met the Cardinal de Lorraine (see *infra* note 29), who sent him to the Levant. Back in France he stayed with the court, but went with the expedition of Villegagnon to Brazil in 1555 as chaplain (see *Les Singularitez de la France Antarctique, autrement nommée Amerique*, cf. n. 8). Charles IX nominated him his cosmograph; he published

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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same time as G. Postel in June 1549, but had stayed for three months in Crete before going to Constantinople in November. During the year 1550 Thevet made little trips, for example to Chalcedon with P. Gilles[22] and to the column of Caesar in the Black Sea; in the boat was J. Chesneau[23]. He too met G. Postel[24] On January 1551, d'Aramon went to France, setting out again from Marseilles as early as July with the two galleys that the king had given him. Henry II also sent with him Nicolas de Nicolay[25]. After a mission in Barbary, the ambassador called at Malta before joining the Turkish fleet of Sinan Pasha, which was besieging Tripoli in North Africa held by the Knights of Saint John. After its fall d'Aramon tried to negotiate the release of prisoners, but had to flee from Andrea Doria, the Genoese admiral who was fighting for Charles V. At last the two galleys entered the Golden Horn on September 20th, after calling at Cerigo (Cythera) and Chios[26]. As the

La Cosmographie Universelle (2 vols., Paris, 1575) and *Les Vrais Pourtraits et Vies des Hommes illustres* (Paris, 1585). He died after a long life in 1592. (See: J. ADHEMAR, *Frère André Thévet. Grand voyageur et cosmographe des rois de France au XVIe siècle*, Paris, 1947.) About his travels to the Levant he published the Cosmograpie de Levant (Lyons, 1552; enlarged ed., *ibidem*, 1556; critical ed. by F. Lestringant, Geneva, 1985); one can find some materials in his *Cosmographie Universelle* and *Le Grand Insulaire, et Pilotage* (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, MS. f.fr. 15452-15453); see also: F.W. HASLUCK, "Thevet's *Grand Insulaire* and his Travels in the Levant", in *The Annual of the British School of Athens*, No. XX, session 1913-1914, pp. 59-69).

22 See *Cosmographie de Levant*, ed. 1556, p. 77; *Cosmographie Universelle*, vol. I, f 185v .

23 See *Cosmographie de Levant*, ed. 1556, pp. 81-82.

24 See *Cosmograpie Universelle*, vol, I, f 282v ; *Le Grand Insulaire...*, vol. I, f 400v (here he named Gassot too); F. SECRET, "Notes sur Guillaume Postel. 38. Postel et André Thevet", in *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, vol. 23 (1961), p. 374.

25 Nicolas de Nicolay (or Nicolai) was born in the Dauphiné in 1517. After studying (notably drawing) in Lyons, he went to the siege of Perpignan in 1542 and travelled across all Europe. In 1546 he spied on Lord Admiral Dudley, whom he approached by the means of a map of England he had drawn; this helped the French to capture the Castle of Saint Andrews in Scotland on June 30th, 1547 (see *La Navigation du roy d'Escosse Jaques cinquiesme du nom...*, Paris, 1583; he got this text from Lord Dudley). In 1550 Nicolay was in Boulogne recovered by Henry II and undertook a translation of Pedro de Medina's *Arte de Navegar*, that was published in 1553. Back from the Levant, the king granted him the charges of "géographe et valet de chambre du roi", and he travelled up to 1557-1558. From *ca.* 1565, he was in charge of a description of the provinces of the kingdom of France. He died in Paris in 1585. (See *Dict. biogr fr.*, vol, III [1939) col. 494-503, where his biography is placed quite illogically *s.v.* Arfeuille, the name of a land he bought *ca.* 1567; R. HERVE, "L'Œuvre cartographique de Nicolas de Nicolay et d'Antoine de Laval (1544-1619), in *Bulletin de la section de géographie du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques*, vol. LXVIII (1955), pp. 223-263; I am grateful to Mrs. Mireille Pastoureau, conservateur au département des Cartes et Plans de la Bibliothèque Nationale for drawing my attention to this paper. His accounts of his travels in the Levant is *Les quatre premiers livres des navigations, et peregrinations orientales... avec les figures et les habillemens au naturel, tant des hommes que des femmes*, Lyons, 1567; the second part was never published

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

ambassador was back in his office in Constantinople, Thevet left the city to pursue his own tour of the Levant: according to his own account he visited Negropont, Athens, Rhodes, spent the winter of 1552 in Alexandria, then went on to Cairo, the Holy Land and Syria. At Tripoli he embarked for France; his ship called at Cyprus, Rhodes, Crete, Malta, Corsica and finally landed at Marseilles. As for d'Aramon, he finally left Constantinople, due to illness, on September 14th, 1553[27].

THE REASONS FOR THE JOURNEY

None of the persons mentioned had to pay for his journey; each had a commission from the king or a great personage: as secretary (Chesneau), as courier (Gassot), to search for ancient manuscripts (Gilles, Postel), to prepare a translation from a work of Antiquity (Belon; Postel in order to make a better translation of the Bible for his publisher Bomberg). But can we not find anothere—more or less concealed—purpose for all these comings and goings? The life of the travellers can give us clues. Gilles and Postel, the former obsessed by Antiquity and the latter by his missionary zeal, raise no suspicions. But was Belon, with his knowledge of German used to 'crossing from camp to camp' among the hostile factions of western Europe, merely engaged in a scientific expedition on behalf of his patron the Cardinal de Tournon[28]. Thevet too had performed political missions, with the aid of his Franciscan habit and his knowledge of languages, and may here have performed another one. For it seems doubtful that when he met the Cardinal de Lorraine[29] in Piacenza, the latter intended only that Thevet should make the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, for which he provided the funds and which Thevet performed only at the end of his stay in the Levant. One may notice too that Thevet came to Constantinople just before d'Aramon came back from France, Barbary and the siege of Tripoli[30]. At least it is obvious in the case

26 See LA RONCIERE, *op. cit.*, pp. 470 and 504-505.

27 One has to note yet the journey of Chesneau to France in 1552, and back to Constantinople in 1553 following an uncommon itinerary through the Peloponnese (*op. cit.*, Schefer ed., pp. 158 *et sqq.*).

28 In the epistle at the beginning of *Les Obseruations...*, Belon wrote of the "desir que i'auoye de paruenir à l'intelligence des choses concernantes la matiere des medicaments des plantes (laquelle ie ne pouuoye bonnement acquerir sinon par une lointaine peregrination)" (ed. 1554, f a iijv ; according to P. Delaunay (*op. cit.*, p. 19 et sqq.) he had undertaken a translation of Dioscorides and Theophrastus. See also Les Obseruations... (ed. 1554, f 22r -v] where he explained, using a table, his way to learn "toutes les especes de marchandises, drogueries autres matieres qu'on vend par les boutiques de Turquie", one can wonder if he had a secret mission to draw up a state of the local and imported ressources and wealth of the Ottoman Empire.

29 Jean de Guise (1498-1550), cardinal in 1518, brother of Claude, 1st duke of Guise, was a famous intriguer.

30 One must note that it is very difficult to set up a precise chronology for the

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of Nicolay that his journeys had political significance: he had drawn up maps of the cities, castles, isles and ports of the Ottoman Empire[31], so anticipating the mission of Gravier d'Ortières in 1685-1687[32].

THE ACCOUNT OF THE TRAVELS

With the exception of the diplomats d'Aramon, Cambray and Fumel and the scholars B. de Villers and J. Terrelle, the travellers left written memoirs of their stay in the Levant. They may have been written abroad (e.g. Gassot) or in France, but the accounts appeared at differend dates: Gassot, 1550; Belon, back in 1549, privilege of 1552, printed in 1553; Thevet, back in 1552, published in 1554; Postel, written in 1551, published in 1560; Nicolay, privilege of 1555, published only in 1567; Gilles, who died in 1556, published in 1561 and 1565; Chesneau, written after 1566, remained unpublished. These accounts do not have the same form: Gassot, Belon, Tevet, Chesneau adopted a chronological order, but inserted more detailed essays in the course of the narrative: for example they described the structure of the Ottoman Empire after the description of Constantinople, or the organization of the army as an adjunct to the account of the camp of Suleiman. Nicolay at first followed a chronological order, but then described the various offices, social categories and peoples of the Ottoman Empire. Gilles wrote archeological accounts, while Postel described the present state of the Turkish empire and called for a religious crusade. The books of Belon, Thevet and Nicolay have illustrations: highly varied in Belon's (flora, fauna, costumes, maps) but limited to costume in Nicolay's.[33] Except Postel, when in classical lands all tried to follow the rule of *inuentio* (*nutrix inuentionis eruditio est*) and avowedly had as guides the Ancient authors[34], who told

travels of Belon and Thevet, as they gave very little information on dates. The one I adopt here seems the most plausible; but what might Belon have done during the year 1548-1549 in Constantinople?

31 Nicolay laconically wrote in the preface of *Les quatre premiers livres...*: "Et à moy pour certaines causes, me fut par sa Maieste tres expressement commandé de luy (d'Aramon) assister en tous lieux, tout le long de son voyage" (p. 10); indeed he drew "plus de huit à neuf cens desseins de villes, chasteaux, isles et paorts de mer... sur leslieux mesmes" (Bibl. Nat., MS. f. fr. 20008, p. 54, in R. HERVE, *op. cit.*, p. 229).

32 Gravier d'Oritières was ordered by Louis XIV to draw up the Estat des Places que les Princes Mahometans possédent sur les Côtes de la Mer Mediterranée... auec les Proiest pour y faire descente, et s'en rendre Mainstres (Bibl. Nat., MS f. fr. 7176) (See: L. DRAPEYRON, "Le Grand Dessein secret de Louis XIV contre l'Empire Ottoman en 1688", in *Revue de géographie*, vol, I (Janv.-Juin 1877), pp. 425-461, and vol. II (Juillet-Déc. 1877), pp. 35-48; H. OMONT, "Projet de prise de Constantinople et de fondation d'un empire français d'Orient sous Louis XIV", *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 1893, pp. 195-246.

33 One notes an Italian influence in his drawings, even of Michelangelo in the arm of the "Fille de l'isle de Chio" (6th figure).

34 For example, Gassot: "Ie lisoys ces iours passez en Pline au chapitre d'Eufret..."

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them what to see[35]. But one can appreciate a great difference between Belon, who was open minded, curious about contemporary realities, and Gilles, who followed in the footsteps of his masters from Antiquity. There also remains the question of what had actually been seen and what had not[36]. In the actual writing of the account, there is not only the problem of copying Ancient authors, which was acknowledged, but also the use of contemporary works, without acknowledgment. Thus Chesneau copied Gassot[37]; Gassot himself copied Benedetto Ramberti as did Nicolay for the Italians were the best informed about the Turks[38]. Belon too has been charged with having copied Gilles, and Thevet drew his information from several contemporaries[39].

(*op. cit.*, f 30v), as he was in the ancient Calliroe.

35 So Belon wrote about the egg incubators in Egypt following Aristotle (*De animalibus*, VI, ii) (*op. cit.*, ed. 1554, f 102v) Thevet went even further when he wrote: "Ie ne veus pareillement obmettre les vins dudit lieu (Tripoli in Lebanon), tant excellens que plus, desquelz Pline fait mencion combien que ie ni aye point vû de vignes"! (*Cosmographie de Levant*, ed. 1556, p. 193).

36 The question is especially relevant for Thevet: for example did he actually go to Athens (see *infra* note39 ?

37 One must note that Schefer's edition of the text of Cheneau has little value, as it is not critical; it needs to be done anew. Schefer had also read all the other texts and knew that Chesneau, who, wrote his after the death of Suleiman, had copied Gassot, but said nothing. C.D. ROUILLARD (*op. cit.*, p. 198) timidly noted: "Chesneau probably borrowed from Gassot, for some of his story must have been written as late as 1566, and if Gassot had stolen from him in 1549 Chesneau would have said so". It seems there is no possible doubt; Chesneau appears as less educated than Gassot (for example he took a great pleasure to see the jugglers). But there remains the problem of the sources for the sequel of the narrative (the journey to Egypt etc.).

38 Benedetto Ramberti seems to have written the archetypal account of the journey from Venice to Constaninople and description of the Porte for the 16th century; he accomplished the journey in 1534 (*libri tre delle cose de Turchi*, Venice, 1539; other ed. in *Viaggi fatti da Vinetia, alla Tana, in Persia, in India, et in Constantinopoli*, Venice, 1543 and 1545). In a lecture, Pr. N. Beldiceanu stated that Antoine Geuffroy seems to have used it in writting his *Esta de la court du grant Turc...* (Paris, 1542; ed. of 1546: *Briesve description de la court du grant Turc...*). As he had copied Rambert, one may wonder if Gassot actually completed the journey between Venice and Constantinople. Christophle Richer (he did not go to Constantinople, as it is stated in the *Biographie universelle* of Michaud; his work is more likely the compendium of a secretary) stated in his *De rebus Turcarum...* (Paris, 1540); the second book has been translated by himself in 1540: *Des Coustumes manieres de uiure des Turcs* (2nd ed., 1542); a complete translation exists in J. MILLET de Saint-Amour, *Conguestes, origine et empire des Turcs*, Paris,1553, but I have not been able to find this latter book: "Semina mihi collegi ex Egnatio, Blondo, Platina, Riccio, Gaguino, Paolo Iouo, Andrea Cambinio, aliisque, si non eloquentiae, maximae tamen fidei scriptoribus: utquae sparsa essent ac dissipata, in unum locummitterentur, quo propius videri possent" (p. 4).

39 Actually his *Cosmographie de Levant* has been more or less written by François de Belleforest. Joachimus Vadianus (*Epitome Trium Terrae Partium*, Zurich, 1534) and B. de La Borderie (*op. cit.*) are the most commonly used; compare for example the description of Athens in La Borderie (ed. of 1547, pp. 317-318) and Thevet (*Cosmographie de Levant*, ed. of 1556, pp. 95-100). See further the edition by F.

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THE APPROACH OF THE FOREIGNER

If the westerner who went to America found himself there in a position of conquest, of superiority, the one who went to the Levant found himself in one of dependency, of fear, of dread in a hostile world. He had to have passports, recommendations, to wear oriental dress[40]. The preconceived opinion about the Turks, as it shows through the accounts, was negative. But if one sets aside the clichés, one can find some interest, and even sympathy. Gassot marvelled at the order, the discipline, the frugality and the honesty of Suleiman's army. Even Thevet, when he stayed in a Turk's house in Damascus, forgot his resentment against this people. In spite of his hostility, Postel gave one of the most comprehensive accounts of the Ottoman Empire; he was the only one to have a true interest in the language[41]. Belon, who perhaps had the best experience of the Turkish world, presented the most positive view. He took an interest in everything: the needs of the body, of the children as well as of men and women, education, games and shows, music, medicine, religion[42].

Although d'Aramon himself was not an outstanding character, his embassy was a point of convergence for travellers who either went with the ambassador or were helped by him. One can only compare his embassy to those of Nointel in 1670-1679 and of Choiseul-Gouffier in 1784-1792[43]. It enabled the French public to discover the world of the Eastern Mediterranean

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Lestringant.

40 Cf. Gassot: "etre en Pays infideles, for estrangeset barbares, esloignezt de toute iuilité, humanité: ausquelz si l'on (n') ha support, il y fait fort mauuais, dangereux" (*op. cit.*, for 32v); Thevet: "m' eslongner de la France... pour m'accointer d'une terre inconnue, de gens infideles, ou ie n'esperois amitiés ni fiance aucune, ou conuenoit changer d'habit, de meurs, de langage" (*Cosmographie de Levant*, ed. 1556, p. 15; it is largely borrowed from La Borderie, *op. cit.*, ed. 1547, pp. 269-270); but Belon: "tout homme ayant commandement ou passeport d'un Bacha, ou du Turc, estant habillé à la mode des Turcs, menant un guide auec foy, pour servir d'interprete ou trucheman, peut cheminer seurement par tout le pays du Turc" (*Les Obseruations*..., ed. 1554, f 22r).

41 Mainly, when it is a question of religion, the call to the crusade is obligatory; but one may note that the quotation of Gassot (*supra* note 40) follows thus: "mais le tout m'ha esté pour plaisir, pour le grand contentement que i'ay d'auoir apris quelque chose, et veu si grand Pays, en esperence d'en voir de plus beau". Postel is the ony one to enclose a Turkish vocabulary: "Instruction des motzs de la langue turquesque les plus communs" (20 pages, following the "Epistre", in *Des Histoires orientales*, Paris, 1575).

42 Up to what point went this sympathy? In his *Chronique*, Belon compared the Turks to the Protestants, his foes. One may note that there were no orientalization of the travellers back in France nor an oriental fashion, as may be observed in the following centuries, although one must except Postel, who called himself "Cosmopolite".

43 See A. VANDAL, *L'Odyssée d'un ambassadeur. Les Voyages du marquis de Nointel, 1670-1680*, Paris, 1900, and L. PINGAUD, Choiseul-Gouffier. *La France en Orient sous Louis XVI*, Paris, 1887.

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that was no longer that of the Crusades and the vision it presented was wider than that of the narrow outlook of pilgrims[44]. It initiated a new interest in oriental studies and above all gave a new image, from the peoples and the places of the Ottoman Empire, that lasted fifty years, if not a century[45].

44 One can make a comparison, as there was a French pilgrim, Antoine Regnaut, who embarked in Venice at the same time as Thevet and Postel, on June 1549, and who met the party of d'Aramon in Jerusalem: "Lors (on August 11th, 1549) Monseigneur d'Arromon ambassadeur, pour la tres heureuse memoire du feu Roy Henry vers le Grand Seigneur, estoit audit lieu de Ierusalem, dudit lieu se partit pour aller au grand Caire accompaigné du Baschat de Damasce, ses Ianissaires garniz de lettres de faueur du grand Turc, lequel entra aussi dansle sainct Sepulchre auec plusieurs cheualiers François entre autres Nobles hommes Iaques Gassot Seigneur dessens (sic for de Deffens), Commissaire ordinaire des guerres du Roy. Pierre de Cochart Seigneur du cloz Lebert, valet de chambre ordinaire de sa maiesté, franchement librement sans riens payer" (*Discours du voyage d'outre mer au Sainct Sepulcre de Ierusalem*..., Lyons, 1573, p. 67).

45 Thevet published this *Cosmographie Universelle* in 1575, Belon was again published in 1605 (in Latin), Gassot in 1606 and 1684, Nicolay in 1586 and Mézeray, in his *Histoire des Turcs* (Paris, 1650; 2nd ed., 1662), edited his plates with their captions. These plates were sometimes bound in private albums of costumes throughout the 17th century.

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Virginie AKSAN

OTTOMAN-FRENCH RELATIONS 1739-1768

Eighteenth century diplomacy is characterized by a breath-taking series of reversals of alliances, audacious moves amongst a number of brilliant strategists who happened also to be monarch and ministers of states, and a gradual evolution of the puzzle pieces that were to make up the map of twentieth century Europe. While "opportunity not obligation was the keynote of the eighteenth century diplomatic practice...,"[1] the partition of Poland, the gradual dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the shift of the European power center to the east was the diplomatic result.

Istanbul throughout the eighteenth century was the center of overt and covert diplomatic intrigues which had as their primary goal the coercion of the Porte into action againt her traditional enemy, Austria, or as the century wore on, the much hated and feared Russia. The pattern was set as early as the first decade with the establishment of a permanent Russian representative at the Porte in 1700, P. A. Tolstoy, whose first responsibility was to prevent an allliance between Sweden (at war with Russia) and the Porte. To gain his ends, he sought the cooperation of France (in this case through their ambassador at the Porte, Charles Ferriol) against Austria represented by Leopold von Talman, hoping to provoke the Turk into a diversionary action. Talman was instructed by his Emperor to assure Tolstoy of Austria's interest in peace. Spuler suggests that this was the birth of the 1726 Austro-Russian agreement and that "ainsi commença l'encerclement du sultan dans le nord et le nord-ouest-- puisque la Pologne devait s'entendre à son tour avec les deux autres puissances -- encerclement qui devait dominer la politique européenne dans le sud-est de l'Europe pendant presque tout le XVIIIe siècle."[2]

Against that backdrop, France and the Ottoman Empire maintained a

1 Eric Robson, "The Seven Years War", *New Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge: CUP, 1957) VII, 480

2 Bertold Spuler, "La Diplomatie Européenne à la Sublime Porte aux XVIIe et XVIIIe Siècles," *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, 39 (1971), 10.

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fairly stable if somewhat unusual relationship "sans exemple dans l'histoire diplomatique. Il y eut presque toujours entre les deux états connivence et action concordante; il n'y eut jamais alliance au sens strict et formel du mot."[3] Certainly in the period under study, 1739-1768, Louis XV and his influential ministers, Cardinal Fleury (1726-1743) and Choiseul (1758-1770) maintained a policy of uncommitted friendship with the Porte. How beneficial this relationship was for both sides is one of the items to be examined in this paper.

French-Ottoman relations from 1739-1768 will be approached from a position which posits the following: French policy remained fairly committed to a northern and eastern strategy of alliances, with Sweden and the Ottoman Empire as the two legs of the triangle. The strategy was motivated by fear of Russia and Russia's potential access to the Black Sea, in addition to France's traditional antagonism to England. This policy coincided with that of the Porte on certain important occasions because of the Porte's growing alarm at the dual threats of Russia and the diminution of Poland.

In 1756, when the Franco-Austrian rapprochement occurred, the Porte reacted by seeking an alliance with Prussia as an alternative to French support. The reemergence of the Polish question in 1764, as well as Prussia's alliance with Catherine II in that same year, reunited the former friends and led directly to the 1768-1774 Russo-Turkish War.

Apart from analyzing a number of important diplomatic events of the period, this study will also attempt to discern the threads of an official Ottoman policy vis à vis France and how much of this was indigenous.[4] While on the one hand, Frederick II commented that "to be the ally of France was to be her slave,"[5] on the other hand, a certain independence and sophistication on the part of the Porte is visible in 1) the sustained resistance to French urging to war in Poland in 1733; 2) the Swedish defensive alliance of 1740; 3) the offer of mediation between belligerents in 1745 during the War of Austrian Succession; 4) the long negotiations between Frederick and Koca Ragıp Paşa concerning a Prussian-Ottoman alliance, and 5) the recognition of Poniatowski as the king of Poland in 1765. Other factors, of course, influence relations between states. Internal conditions, bureaucracies as well entrenched as in both the Ottoman Empire and France, public opinion, — always a potent force in Istanbul — all help to shape official

3 A. Vandal, *Une Ambassade Française en Orient Sous Louis XV - La Mission du Marquis deVilleneuve 1728-1741* (Paris: Plon, 1881), p.3-4.

4 J. C. Hurewitz, "The Europeanization of Ottoman Diplomacy: the Conversion from Unilateralism to Reciprocity in the 19th Century," *Belleten* 25(1961), p.455-466. In this regard, the whole question of Turkey's participation in the European diplomatic system is a fascinating and much under-explored question. Hurewitz's article suggest that though Turkey was not fully integrated into the European Concert until 1856, for all practical purposes, Turkey was a factor starting in 1699.

5 One om, "The Diplomatic Revolution," *New Cambridge Modern History*, (Cambridge: CUP, 1957) VII, 450.

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policy. Such factors are addressed only tangentially here. Nor will the very real influences of Persia and the Crimea be examined to any great extent. Religion and commerce, the second and third of France's reasons for relations with the Ottoman Empire, while assumed motivations, and touched upon briefly in the summary below, are outside the scope of this study.

The history of French-Ottoman diplomatic relations begins with the 1536 treaty between François I and Süleyman. Much discussion has centered on whether or not it was the first political agreement between a Christian state and the Ottoman Empire. İnalcık demonstrates that it remained in draft form and was never confirmed by Süleyman.[6] The first authentic French capitulations ('ahdname) were granted in October 1569.[7] France quickly gained the edge in Eastern trade and many nations sailed under the French flag but it was not long before competition arose: the English, granted capitulations in May 1580 and the Dutch, in July 1612. While France continued to dominate Levant trade in the seventeenth century, the English were not without privileges such as the 3% customs dues, which they acquired in 1601, but the French succeeded in obtaining only in 1673. İnalcık notes that after 1683, new capitulatory privileges were granted as "an unveiled gesture of reciprocity for political assistance."[8] Such was certainly the case of the 1740 renewal of French capitulations following the 1739 Treaty of Belgrade discussed below.

Commerce with the East was thus essential to the France of Louis XIV and Louis XV, even though by the mid-eighteenth century it had declined somewhat dramatically.[9]

France's chief diplomatic rivals were the Maritime Powers as well. France under Louis XIV was the terror of Europe and England and Holland the two largest naval powers opposing her. For all the reasons cited above and the additional one of religious affinity, they formed a bulwark against French political dominance in the Ottoman Empire. Successful mediators at Karlowitz and Passarowitz, the English and the Dutch ambassadors found themselves gradually out-maneuvered by the French, notably Villeneuve. Diplomatic dominance at the Porte certainly depended just as much on current events and the vagaries of Porte politics as upon the brilliance of any given state and its representatives. Nonetheless the "Most-favored nation" clause became one of the bargaining chips in the capitulations, in spite of evidence that the Porte did not make such fine distinctions, except when expedient.

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6 Halil İnalcık, "İmtiyazat," *EI*2 vol.32/42, p. 1183

7 *ibid*, p. 1183.

8 *ibid*, p. 1183

9 Louis-Paul Deschanel, *Histoire de la politique extérieure de la France 1806-1938* (Paris: Payot, 1936) p. 139. "...deux milions de français vivent du trafic avec la Porte, la prosperité du Languedoc et de la Provence en dépend." (this under Louis XIV) "A la mort da Louis XV, il n'en reste plus qu'un souvenir."

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Abbott colorfully characterizes the relationship of the Porte and foreign representatives as "the little sogs and the lion" before the 1700s and claims that "no European nation was more heartily detested by the Turks (than the French) and none suffered more from Turkish arrogance", due in part to continual French piracy and proselytizing.[10] There also seems to have been a singular will in all of the duly appointed French ambassadors to break through the elaborate and degrading official ceremonies of the Porte whose unilateralism and contempt had not yet, in the face of the gradual dismemberment of the Empire, been tempered with the niceties of negotiation.[11] The best example is the Comte de Ferriol who in 1699 insisted on wearing his sword to his reception by the Sultan. He was immediately ejected and lived ten years in Istanbul without presenting his credentials.[12]

A contemporary witness, Sir James Porter, English ambassador from 1747 notes: "the French Ambassadors have often pretended superiority of rank at the Porte; the Turks have as solemnly declared to others the nullity of their pretensions, and that all Ambassadors are on the same footing."[13]

Indeed, the Turkish terminology reflects the lack of distinction. While bailo, ambassador, resident, etc., were used by the European residents, Turkish knew only elçi.[14] Elaboration of the terminology only came with an understanding of the whole process of diplomacy. To the Porte, the ambassador was simply a hostage for the good behaviour of his government. As late as 1768, Obreskov was thrown into Yedikule when the Porte declared war on Russia.

That was part of the lot of the foreign representatives in Istanbul. The difficulties of protocol with the officers of the Porte, the treachery of the dragomans, the problem of communications with the home country, the discomfort and isolation of residence in Pera, and the constant dangers of plague and fire have been vividly documented in contemporary accounts and subsequent historians.[15] The permanent ambassadors, in spite of having

10 G. F. Abbott, *Turkey, Greece and the Great Powers* (London, 1916) p.18, 33: a colorful if unreliable rendition of France-Ottoman diplomacy. Vandal's introduction is much more balanced. A Turkish history has a short introduction to early relations (p.1-22). See: İsmail Soysal, *Fransiz İhtilali ve Türk-Fransiz Diplomasi Münasabetleri 1789-1802* (Ankara: T.T.K. Yayınları, 1964).

11 Hurewitz, p.455-456 adds that from 1699-1793, when Selim III set up permanent missions, "unilateralism, though continuing to provide tactical advantages in diplomatic bargaining, nevertheless became a distortion of its classical self, with the dragomans or interpreters, who by definition should have been agents, becoming in fact principals."

12 Vandal, p.39

13 George Larpent, *Turkey; its History and Progress: From the Journals and Correspondence of Sir James Porter* (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1854; reprint, 1971), p.269.

14 Spuler, p.24

15 A partial list would have to include Porter, mentioned above, Baron da Tott's

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their expenses defrayed by the Ottoman government during their stay in Istanbul, a practice apparently not common to European states,[16] were constantly beset by debts, due in part to the necessity of gift-giving and bribery at all levels of Ottoman society. By 1700, bahşiş had replaced oneupmanshin.[17] And yet, as we shall see, significant negotiation could, and did occur in this atmosphere.

1739 is universally acknowledged as the apogee of French power in the Ottoman Empire.[18] The combination of the skillful negotianting powers of Villeneuve, the tenacity of the Turkish plenipotentiaries (including Mektupçu Ragıp Paşa, later Grand Vizier and Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa, former Grand vizier, 1732-1735, patron of de Bonneval, and at the time, Governor of Bosnia)[19] and the confusion and incompetences of the Austrian generals (Eugene of Savoy died in 1736 and left a large void in leadership) led to the conclusion of a peace treaty which returned Belgrade to the Ottoman Empire.[20]

The significanse of that French-Ottoman triumph requires some elaboration. The Ottoman Empire, exhausted by the long wars with Austria which ended with Karlowitz in 1699, was most interested in avoiding more wars. Peter the Great's aggression in the Caucasus and the loss of Belgrade to Austria in 1718, simply reinforced the respect and fear of those powers, in spite of the victory over Russia at Pruth. The 1724 Treaty of Istanbul with Russia, by which the Porte agreed upon spheres of influence in northwestern Persia and the Caucasus, was a further reflection of the desire not to antagonize Russia at a time when, engaged with the Persians, the Porte could ill afford a conflict on another front. The agreement was not popular in Istanbul as it ceded Muslim land to an infidel. The Porte faced this kind of opposition from the ulema and the public alike throughout the eighteenth century.[21]

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memoirs, Lady Montagu's famous letters and the correspondence of the Italian Bailis as collected and edited in M. L. Shay, *The Ottoman Empire from 1720 to 1734* (Westport, 1978).

16 Thomas Naff, "Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789-1807," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 83 (1963), 307. Naff also notes that once Selim III did send permanent representatives, they suffered much the same financial embarrassment.

17 Abbott, p.41.

18 Information for this period is drawn primarily from Lavender Cassels, *The Struggle for the Ottoman Empire, 1717-1740* (London,1966); Vincent Mignot, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1771 IV; İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara: T.T.K., 1956) IV:1-2.

19 Uzuncarşılı, Osmanlı IV-1,289.

20 Details of the war and campaigns are well supplied by Cassels, Uzuncarşılı and Karl Roider, *The Reluctant Ally: Austria's Policy in the Austro-Turkish War, 1737-1739* (Baton Rouge, 1972).

21 G.R. Bosscha Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity: Ottoman-Dutch Relations*

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The secret alliance concluded in Vienna on August 25, 1726 by Austria and Russia was another signal for alarm at the Porte. Vandal called it "one of the gravest acts of diplomacy of the eighteenth century."[22]

From 1722-1735, the intermittent struggles with Persia kept the Ottoman forces fully occupied, with varying degrees of success. With the rise of Nadir Shah, who quickly took Hamadan, Kirmanshah and Tabriz in the summer of 1730, the diplomatic efforts of the Russian and French representatives to achieve the 1624 agreement went for naught.[23]

News of the fall of Tabriz in 1730, the amassing of troops in Üsküdar for a new eastern campaign, continuing defeats in Persia and public anger at the extravagance of Ahmed III's court led to the September 28, 1730 Patrona Khalil revolt, one of the bloodiest in Turkish history. Amongst other reasons for the revolt were the often recorded food and money shortages, religious discontent and the general malaise of the population in Istanbul. It was well into 1733 before Mahmud I and Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa had control of the capital once more.

With that kind of upheaval ("Constantinople is said to have been depleted, by death and banishment, of 50,000 people")[24] and the rekindling of the Persian battlefront, it was only with the September 1736 peace treaty with Nadir Shah that diplomatic attention turned once more to the European stage.

On September 1, 1733, Stanislas Leszczynski, father-in-law to Louis XV, was elected King of Poland. A struggle ensued between Stanislas, halfheartedly supported by Versailles for the sake of the Family, and Augustus III, backed by a show of strength of Russian and Austrian forces. Augustus III was duly enthroned in January, 1734. It is possible to observe, thanks to abondant studies on this period, the interaction of the foreign representatives with the Porte. Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa was reputedly "l'homme le mieux instruit et le plus politique de cet Empire."[25] Three times Grand Vizier, (May 1732-July 1735; 1742-1743 and 1755), he had as foreign representatives and advisors (for he was almost entirely dependant on the foreign communitly for news of Europe) Villeneuve of France, in Istanbul 1728-1741, Lord Kinnoul (1729-1735) and Lord Fawkener (1735-1746) for the English and Calkoen (1722-1744) for the Dutch. De Bonneval, the famous Humbaracı Ahmed Paşa, had been brought to Istanbul by Topal Osman in January 1732, and after Topal Osman's fall, remained in Istanbul in charge of the Humbaracı Corps, and as an advisor to the Porte.[26]

During the Embassy of Cornelis Calkoen at the Sublime Porte, 1726-1744, (Ankara, 1975) p.90.

22 A. Vandal, *Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie*, (Paris, 1882), p.101-103. "un des actes diplomatiques les plus graves au 18e siècle."

23 A.N. Kurat and J.S. Bromlay, "The Retreat of the Turks, 1683-130," *New Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge: CUP, 1970) VI, 645.

24 Kurat, p.647

25 Louis Bonneville de Marsangy, *Le Chevalier de Vergennes; son Ambassade à Constantinople*, (Paris: Plon,1894), II, 144.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

French policy under Cardinal Fleuryly, particular after the 1726 Austro-Russian agreement, remained steadfastly anti-Russian. The Russo-Turkish negotiations referred to above were discontinued by d'Andrezel, successor to de Bonnac in 1724, when he received orders "non seulement pour suspendre la médiation mais même pour traverser les Russes à la Porte de tout son pouvoir."[27] The War of the Polish Succession which led to Russian military intervention was contrary to all agreements previously concluded between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. France took the opportunity to urge the Porte to war in order to defend the rights of the Poles. Thus, in 1733, Villeneuve pressed vigorously for an Ottoman declaration of war on Russia. To strengthen his case, Villeneuve hoped to call on the Khans and de Bonneval, his countryman. He despatched de Tott to the Crimea in 1733 to negotiate with the Khan. De Tott succeeded so well that "le Khan des Tartares disoit tout haut qu'il aimeroit mieux perdre sa couronne que ne pas procurer celle de Pologne au Roi Stanislas."[28]The Grand Vizier, however, ordered the Tatars not to intervene — as some suggest — as the result of a Russian bribe.[29]

Villeneuve or Çelebizade Mehmed Said may have initially recommended de Bonneval to Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa.[30] That it was Mehmet Said seems more likely, because of de Bonneval's well-known hostility to Villeneuve, stemming from 1729, when under instructions, Villeneuve ignored his request to reenter French service.[31] Mehmed Said, son of Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed, spoke French fluently and had just returned from Sweden. De Bonneval and Calkoen reviewed the parade to the battlefront on June 7, 1736, at his house, apparently the only foreign guests.[32]

So begins the approximately eighteen months of negotiations between the Porte and Villeneuve concerning a defensive alliance with France against Russia. Simultaneously, de Bonneval began secret negotiations through Mehmed Said for a Swedish-Ottoman alliance. At a secret meeting held August 22, 1734, the Imperial Council confirmed earlier decisions not to start war with Russia until peace with Persia and a treaty with France had been secured. De Bonneval was present.[33]

Louis XV and especially Fleury would not hear of such a proposal, partially because of a reluctance to ally a Christian to a Muslim state, partially because of Fleury's secretly assumed negotiations with Austria for

26 Cassels, p.84. Topal Osman's affection for the French was well-known—having been ransomed from a corsaire by a Marsailles merchant who helped him return to Istanbul — he's said to have known some French (Mignot, IV, 368). It was a dangerous thing for an Ottoman bureaucrat to display too much knowledge of the infidel.

27 Mignot, IV, 378.

28 Mignot, IV,378.

29 Vandal, p. 201.

30 Cassels, p.90; Vandal, p.201.

31 Septime Gorceix, *Bonneval Pacha: Pacha à Trois Queues*, (Paris: Plon,1953), p.147

32 Erdbrink, *Threshold*, p.229.

33 *ibid*, p.232 (from Von Hammer, *G.O.R.* VII.448).

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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the prize of Lorraine, a preview of 1756. Vague promises not to forget the interests of the Sultan in 1734 were insufficient for the Porte. Even though Villeneuve had some chance at succass, he was instructed to abandon the cause in the middle of 1735 because Versailles had come to terms with Vienna.[34]

Franco-Ottoman relations were at a low ebb when Russia attacked Azov. The Porte was unprepared for the attack "et soumit pour la première fois sa cause au jugement de l'Europe - Le Grand Vizier (Seyyid Mehmed Silahdar, December 1735-August 1737) écrivit à l'Empereur, au Cardinal Fleury, au Roi d'Angleterre, aux Etats Généraux de Hollande, à la République de Venise ... des lettres fort dignes ou il invoquait leurs bons offices."[35] In May, 1736, the Turks declared war on Russia and early in June, as noted above, the troops left Istanbul for Babadağ on the Danube. The Porte was quite capable of its own diplomatic duplicity, as evidenced by a secret meeting early in Junuary 1736, when it was decided to mobilize all available troops on the Danube.[36]

It is worth noting that the long-time grievances between Russia and the Ottoman Empire over the Crimean Tatars were the primary cause of this outbreak of hostility, a pattern repeated many times over in the century and ending only with the annexation of the Crimea by Russia in 1783. The Porte was no doubt fully aware of the consequences of her inability to curb the raids of the Khans on Russian territory but not of Russian intentions to recapture Byzantium which were not explicit until Catherine II took the throne in 1762.

Thus, throughout 1736, the Porte sought mediation, first from the English and the Dutch. Then Leopold von Talman, the Austrian resident offered his country's mediation. The Divan was suspicious and sought French intervention, judging rightly that Talman was serving Russian as well as Austrian interests at the Porte.

In December 1736, de Tott arrived in Istanbul with new orders for Villeneuve. Fleury had reassessed the entire Eastern situation and decided that the stability of Turkey was essential to the balance of Europe, that he, Villeneuve, should do everything in his power to help the Porte.[37] By the end of 1737, the Porte was receptive to French mediation and the French willing to intercede. The events leading to the peace treaty of Belgrade are too well documented elsewhere to repeat them here at any length. It does appear that the dismissal of Yeğen Mehmed (23 March 1719), who had opposed Fleury's original mediation proposal in 1738 after some Ottoman victories, and who had used de Bonneval as an advisor,[38] and the addition of

34 Cassels, p.90

35 Ernest Lavisse and Alfred Rambaud, *Histoire Générale*, (Paris, 1894) VII, 144.

36 Erdbrink, *Threshold*, p.238.

37 Lavisse, VII, 146 and document in Vandal, p.270.

38 Cassels, p.139.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa to the plenipotantiaries (see above)[39] demonstrate the strength of the peace party at the Porte.

The Ottoman Empire was saved and even renewed by the French mediation. France achieved the 1740 capitulations. Villeneuve reaped fame and numerous rewards. De Bonneval secured the Swedish-Ottoman alliance on the 4th of January, under the auspices of Villeneuve and a reluctant Fleury[40]. While the reputation of France was high, Fleury, in pursuit of his northern strategy, risked the anger of Russia.[41]

The Ottoman Empire now entered a period of peace that was to last until 1768, in large part because of the wars in Europe, the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and the Seven Years War in Europe, (1758-1763), which though initiated by Frederick II of Prussia in a bid to carve up Maria Theresa's inheritance from Charles VI, were prolonged as a contest of shifting alliances and aggrandisement of states. "From 1740 to 1763 the salient political questions in Europe were whether Austria or Prussia would dominate in Germany and whether Russia would prevail in the Black Sea region, in Poland and the Balkans."[42]

Upon the death of Fleury in 1743, French diplomacy floundered under the misguided hand of Louis XV himself, alleviated only by the short, forceful, some say disastrous government of the Duc de Choiseul, (1758-1770). "So long as the Habsburg-Bourbon rivalry was a fact, the French policy in eastern Europe of alliance with Sweden, Poland and the Turks made good sense, for they were useful allies who could be induced to attack France's German allies in the rear. But in the first half of the eighteenth century France lost her predominating influence in Poland, and in the second half of the century her alliance with Habsburgs largely neutralised policy in eastern Europe."[43]

Ottoman internal politics were equally directionless. From the end of Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa's second period as Grand Vizier, 1742-1743, until Koca Ragıp's assumption of the office in 1757, ten men held the office, none of them particularly distinguished (with the exception of Çelebizade Mehmed Said, who lasted less than six months). This can be explained in large part by the mercifully short reign of Osman III from 1754-1757 and the dominance of

39 Uzuncarşılı, *Osmanlı*, IV-2, 347-348.

40 *ibid*, IV-2, 222,

41 Erdbrink, *Threshold*, p. 108. One final note: Erdbrink suggests that the hanging of the Porte dragoman in February 1741, and the recall and departure of Villeneuve that same year may indicate Ottoman anger at the refusal of a tripartite alliance of France, Sweden and the Empire against Austria and Russia, and a recognition that more might have been achieved at the steps of Belgrade. Regardless, Villeneuve was heaped with rewards and thanks of the Ottoman government upon his departure.

42 Thomas Naff, "Ottoman Diplomatic Relations with Europe in the 18th Century, Patterns and Trends", in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, (Carbondals, 1977) p.104.

43 Richard Harris, *Absolutism and Enlightenment*, (London, Copp Clark, 1964), p.272.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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the Kızlar Ağası, but the lack of external pressure on the Ottoman Empire from Europe, the single most cohesive factor in uniting the conflicting elements of the Empire, also played a part. Both France and the Porte faced financial difficulties; the French whose finances were in a precarious position throughout the eighteenth century, the Porte struggling as it had since the beginning of the century with cash flow, coin shortages and increasingly detrimental trade deficits. Though Ottoman trade with Europe increased after 1740, the Europeans were the primary beneficiaries of this increment.[44]

This may account for the curious Ottoman offer to mediate in the war of Austrian Succession in 1745 which caused a mild sensation and some embarrassment in the European states. Von Hammer attributes the idea to Mustafa, the Reis ül-Küttab at Nemirav and Belgrade, who conceived the idea of approaching the belligerent powers.[45] Others suggest it might have been the work of de Bonneval, though his influence seems to have declined somewhat after Villeneuve's departure in 1741 — he was to die in March 1747.[46] Von Hammer is the only source to suggest that de Bonneval opposed the move "qui ne lui paraissaient pas acceptable, puisque la Porte n'avait à sa disposition ni flottes ni armées pour donner du poids à ses paroles." The European states replied evasively, with the exception of Naples who was ready to accept the mediation.[47]

Uzunçarşılı's account of this incident is drawn entirely from the version in 'Izzi's *Tarih*. Seyyid Hasan Paşa, Grand Vizier at this time, is reported to have offered it to the French, Austrian, Swedish, Venetian, Russian, English, Dutch and Sicilian representatives at the Porte in 1745, and to have requested a reply. The text of this offer of mediation is included in the Izzi account.

The primary concern of the text is the problem of commerce in the Mediterranean and the adverse impact on the merchant fleets uninvolved in the war but trading in the ports of the Empire. The fighting of the French and English and the attacks on neutral ships in Ottoman territorial waters was preventing free trade, causing shortages of goods and weakening the economy by reducing the income from custom tariffs. Vague references to finding the source of the problem and putting an end to the quarrel follow.[48]

That this offer of mediation was motivated by economic conditions is further strenghthened by the account of another official action taken at approximately the same time, in August 1745. The problem had obviously been going on for some time as Porter notes that since the March 1744

44 Naff, "Ottoman", p.92

45 Von Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1844), III, 507.

46 Gorceix, p.213.

47 Von Hammer, *Histoire*, III, 507.

48 S. 'Izzi, *Tarih-i İzzi*, (Istanbul, 1786), varak 2la. It must be admitted that the offer to mediate is couched only in the vaguest way: this passage is from 'Izzi's explanation; the text itself is not nearly so explicit. It is called a *Nâme-i Hümayûn*.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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declaration of war between the French and English, privateers had escalated the attacks on Turkish ships. In May 1744, the Porte drew an imaginary line from Arta to the gulf of Sidra, to the east of which privateering was forbidden.[49] According to the firman issued in August of 1745, the English and the French, but especially the English, were responsible for attacks on neutral merchant ships and it was desired that such attacks be discontinued. The firman was issued to the Admiral and all the viziers in charge of the regions and towns on the Egean and Syrian coasts.[50] The Grand Vizier had called the English, French and Dutch ambassadors to the Porte and declaring the neutrality of the Ottoman government, drew up on the map the same line mentioned by Porter as the dividing line beyond which no war should be carried out. The borderline was devised by de Bonneval.[51]

The two incidents demonstrate the Porte's overriding concern with the economics rather than with the politics of mediation.

Was there a French official reaction to this offer? Gorceix says that many thought it a French manipulation and most were extremely reluctant to allow a Muslim state to intercede in a Christian quarrel.[52] Of more importance to Louis XV than Ottoman mediation may have been the upcoming renewal of the peace treaty between Austria and the Ottoman Empire, ultimately signed as "perpetual" in July 1747. A very interesting despatch of de Castellane, French ambassador in Istanbul at the time survives. The despatch dated 23 March 1747 reveals that the "French party" of de Bonneval and Çelebizade Mehmed Said still exercised some influence (though in early 1747 Mehmed Said was dismissed as *Kahya* and de Bonneval died), that d'Argenson, Foreign Affairs Minister, was pressing on them an alliance against Austria, hoping to create a "diversion" in Hungary (Austria was threatening France in Italy at the time), and that Mahmud I, whose foreign policy appears to have been to maintain peace abroad and at home and his Grand Vizier Tiryaki Mehmed Paşa (August 1746-August 1747) rejected the overtures because of fear of being abandoned in such an engagement and anger at the rejection of the 1745 offer of mediation.[53]It would appear that France was continuing her policy of benevolent expediency. On this occasion, the Porte would have none of it and renuwed the Belgrade treaty with the new Empress, Maria Theresa.

The signing of that treaty may also have been motivated by unsuccessful attempts to form an alliance with Frederick II of Prussia.

49 A.C. Wood, "The English Embassy at Constantinople, 1660-1762", *English Historical Review*, 40(1925), 555.

50 Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı*, IV-2, 584.

51 *ibid*, IV-2, 585. (from Von Hammer, *G.O.R.*, VIII, 54) "Bu hududa göre Kuzey Afrika'da Sidre Körfezi'nden Adriyatik Denizi başlangıcındaki Narda Körfezi'ne kadar olan hattın doğusundaki kısım Osmanlı suları olarak tesbit olundu."

52 Gorceix, p.214.

53 Ignace de Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les Puissances Etrangères* (Paris, 1864) II, 178-179.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

Prusso-Ottoman relations as prompted by Frederick can be dated from shortly after his invasion of Silesia, when he approached the Moldavian Prince Ghika to initiate discussions with the Porte. Ghika, de Bonneval and the Swedish ambassador Carlson sought to bring the two powers together. (Uzunçarşılı adds Castellane to this list which would suggest France's acquiescence to such a scheme.) When Frederick signed the Breslau and Dresden treaties in 1742 and 1745 with Austria, his interest in an alliance with the Porte declined.[54] This may account for Castellane's allusion to the anger of the Porte at the lack of response from Frederick II vis à vis an alliance.[55]

Carl Adolf von Rexin arrived March 19, 1755 in Istanbul on a two-fold mission: to offer Prussia's congratulations on Osman III's ascension to the throne and to secure a treaty of friendship.[56] This was refused by Osman III in part at least because of English resistance to the idea.[57]

All of these half-hearted and unsuccessful attempts at alignments paled in the face of the spectacular reversal that occurred in 1756.

The news of the convention of Westminster and the treaty of Versailles fell like a bomb among the settled policies and habits of all the diplomatists in Turkey. If Vergennes, who inherited a policy which for nearly century had been opposed to the Empire and had striven to preserve Poland from Russian influence, now found it embarrassing to explain his master's alliance with the old enemy..., Porter found it hardly less difficult to perform a volteface and become an eager supporter of the alliance between Turkey and Prussia which he had resisted so vehemently..., while the Turks themselves, whose ideas of diplomacy had never strayed beyond that rivalry of France and Austria which they had known since the days of Suleiman..., were entirely bewildered.[58]

Now, when Count Rexin returned to Istanbul in 1757 to negotiate a Prusso-Ottoman defensive alliance, it was to English backing. Frederick II, feeling isolated in eastern Europe now wished for a defensive alliance more than ever. The Colonial Wars of France and England, officially declared in May 1756, though underway for more than two years, were followed by the

54 Salahaddin Tansel, "Büyük Friedrich Devrinde Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri Hakkında", *Belleten*, X(1946) 135-136; also see Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı, IV-2, 235 and *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traitées de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution française* (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1969) XXIX, 366: "Le Roy de Prusse n'a que la cour de Vienne à craindre; il n'y a pas d'apparence qu'il voulut entrer dans une négociation et encore moins prendre des engagements avec la Porte", instructions to de Alleurs, ambassador in 1747.

55 Testa, p.179.

56 Uzuncarşılı, Osmanlı, IV-2, 234, note 2; also Tansel, p.137: "Osmanlılar'la, biri ticari diğeri tedafüi olmak üzere, iki andlaşma yapmak."

57 Tansel, p.136. Porter, the English ambassador, was able to congratulate himself on having helped once more to thwart the plans of France and her ally.

58 Wood, p.557.

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1756 Seven Years War, upon Frederick's invasion of Saxony in August of that year.

War in Europe was the last thing France had expected from her new alliance; engaged as she was in the Americas, Louis XV hoped to securs tranquility in Europe by allying herself with her traditional enemy. Kaunitz and Maria Theresa, however, were always intent on the recapture of Silesie[59] Louis XV found himself allied to the Porte's two chief enemies, Austria and Russia, when in December 1756, Russia acceded to the Versailles Treaty.

The Comte de Vergennes, the new ambassador, shortly after his arrival in Istanbul, had to face the full wrath of France's old friend. The only part of her previous policy which remained in place was opposition to England. Porter, for his part, lost no opportunity to insinuate the perfidy of the French and the advantages of the alliance with Prussia. The Grand Vizier, Bâhir Mustafa (April 1756-January 1757) needed little prodding. ın a particularly nasty interview with the French dragoman (admittedly this account of it taken from Porter's papers), the Grand Vizier requested all the documents relative to the negotiations between France and the Porte concerning Prussia and Austria to prove the good faith of the Ottoman empire. He concluded the interview by saying that France should now consider herself allied with Vienna against the Ottoman empire.[60]

Vergennes is reputed to have assured the Porte that the Franch-English war had forced the alliance with Austria but that once the crisis had passed, France would return to her former principles. That, furthermore, the alliance with Russia was simply an intent to isolate England from her allies.[61]

In February 1757, Koca Ragıp Paşa replaced Bâhir Mustafa as Grand Vizier and in October 1757 Mustafa III succeeded Osman III. The period of stability engendered by these two events can be detected in the skillful negotiating undertaken by Koca Ragıp, seeking alternatives to the traditional alliance with France. Much to Vergennes' chagrin, a commercial treaty was signed with Denmark in 1757 and secret negotiations continued with Rexin.[62] Koca Ragıp was cautious, soliciting an English guarantee of an alliance with Prussia in 1759.[63] A variety of factors prevented a defensive alliance and reduced the accord to a friendship and commercial treaty signed March 29, 1761. Amongst these factors were the lack of a guarantee by England, the traditional opposition of the ulema to an alliance with a

59 In addition to the articles by Robson and Horn, see M.S. Anderson, "European Diplomatic Relations, 1763-1790", *New Cambridge Modern History*, (Cambridge: CUP, 1968) VIII, 252-278.

60 Bonneville, I, 343-344.

61 *ibid*, I, 348-349.

62 *ibid*, I, 350: "Le coup était ingénieux et direct. Il fait honneur à la saga cité du sérail," referring to the treaty with Denmark. "L'Ambassadeur semblait pris dans ses propres filets."

63 Wood, p.558.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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Christian state and Koca Ragıp's efforts to balance mistrust of the abilities of both the Prussian and Ottoman armies with a desire to land support to Prussia and to reassure France an of abiding friendship.[64]

All foreign residents in Istanbul observed events of the Seven Years War with trepidation. It is perfectly possible that the military reverses suffered by Frederick in 1761 clinched the decision by Mustafa III and Koca Ragıp to sign only a treaty of friendship and commerce with Prussia. But Frederick's fortunes were reversed again by events in Russia. With the death of Elizabeth of Russia in January 1762, the anti-Prussian coalition was removed. Peter III signed peace immediately with Frederick on May 5, 1762, though it was never ratified. In July 1762, Catherine II's coup left Prussian relations in the balance until the final alliance of April 1764. Frederick's recurrent sense of isolation forced him to make opportunistic use of a potential Prusso-Turkish defensive alliance. Ahmed Resmi was sent as an internuncio to Berlin in July 1763, ostensibly to conduct the exchange of presents following the signing of the 1761 treaty but also to ascertain Prussia's attitude to events in Poland and to explore the possibility of Prusso-Ottoman cooperation and "to receive any propositions which might be made to him regarding an alliance." An alliance was discussed but in the end, Frederick's proposals were never anything but unacceptable to the Porte.[65]

Even before Ahmed Resmi's departure, the Porte, now guided by Hamid Hamza Paşa (April-November 1763) after Koca Ragıp's death, demonstrated its suspicion of the overtures of the Prussian court by rejecting a defensive alliance on the 24 of April 1763, a move that might have been dictated by internal politics as it occurred within 14-15 days of Koca Ragıp's death.[66] It may also have been meant as a gesture to France, to rekindle the old friendship.

For once Russia and Prussia made peace, France was at liberty to return to her previous policy of inciting the Ottoman Empire to war with Russia over Poland, something in fact that Choiseul and Vergennes attempted in 1763-1764.

In 1758, the Duc de Choiseul took over management of state affairs in France and succeeded in raising France's prestige from the ashes of the Seven Years War. Under his direction, the Spanish-French alliance, always stronger than the Austro-French alliance, flourished, with England as the chief adversary. As noted above, France's ability to interfere in affairs in Poland had

64 Tansel p.133ff - This represents a summary of this argument to which he often returns.

65 H.M. Scott, "Frederick II, the Ottoman Empire and the Origins of the Russo-Prussian Alliance of April 1764", *European Studies Review*, 7 (1977) 163-164 - he has drawn this information from Von Hammer. Scott's thesis in this interesting article is that Ahmed Resmi played a pivotal role in Frederick's negotiations with Catherine II, albeit unknowingly. How else to explain the internuncio's cordial welcome, lengthy stay and equally hasty departure once the 1764 alliance was concluded?

66 Uzuncarşılı, Osmanlı, IV-2, 349.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

considerably declined. Nonetheless, her anti-Russian spirit persisted, intensified after Russian troops entered Poland in 1764. The Ottomans were seen as the balancing factor in south-eastern Europe and their armies as the leverage to guarantee the rights of the Poles. So it was that from the death of Augustus III in October 1763 to the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in October 1768, Choiseul and Vergennes pressed intensely for Ottoman reaction, with remarkably little concern for the final outcome.[67]

Thus, in a despatch dated October 18, 1763, Praslin, then Foreign Minister under Choiseul, advised Vergennes to press upon the Porte vigilance against Prussia and Russia in the affairs of Poland, as they appeared intent on profiting from the interregnum; and support for the elector of Saxony, Frederick Christian, son of Augustus III. Vergennes accordingly sent a memorandum to the then Grand Vizier Bâhir Mustafa (November 1763-March 1765). He received a vague reply that the Porte "n'a absolument intentions que de faire honneur aux privilèges de leur libertés."[68]

In the winter of 1763-1764, Vergennes continued to press the Porte to intervene in Poland in order to prevent the election of Stanislas Poniatowski, Catherine II's choice. The premature death of Frederick Christian created disorder in the ranks of his supporters and increased the likelihood of Poniatowski's election. At this juncture, in March 1764, the Porte issued what was in essence a memorandum of neutrality to the ministers of France, Germany and Prussia: that Polish affairs should remain Polish and that the Porte "would not oppose the election of a king in the person of such Piast (native) as the Poles may judge eligible."[69] This statement was not only a clear rejection of the French viewpoint but also a fairly profound misapprehension of the real state of affairs. Vergennes chose to misinterpret it, so the Porte issued an explicit memorandum to the ambassador to make the Porte's position clear: that it would not oppose the entrance of Russian troops into Poland or attempt to influence the election of a king.

The Porte's declaration of non-intervention was quickly made public by Catherine II and prompted a similar declaration by Louis XV which basically abandoned the hopeful opponents of Poniatowski.[70] Stanislas Poniatowski was duly elected on September 7, 1764 in the face of all these expressions of the rights of states and with the military backing of Russia.

The news of the Poniatowski election was not well received in

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67 Anderson, p. 254ff, particularly the following on p.259: "In May 1763, Praslin, French Foreign Minister, cousin to Choiseul, argued forcibly in a memorandum on French policy that France had now only a vague and indirect interest in the affairs of Sweden, Poland and the Ottoman Empire, her former protégée and that even a partition of Poland would probably be of little significance to her."

68 Bonneville, II, 228, for the text of Praslin's instructions to Vergennes; II, 239 for the Porte's response.

69 *The Annual Register* (London, 1764), p.182.

70 Bonneville, II, 251-259.

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Istanbul, a measure perhaps of the dearth of information at the Porte. An interesting interview took place between Vergennes and the Reis ül-Küttab (probably Hacı Abdi Efendi Mehmed Emin Efendi — it is not clear in the text). Vergennes advised the Reis that there was no solution to this latest violation of the Polish rights except force and that the Porte was the one to use it. His satisfaction at the bellicose attitude of the Reis towards Russia turned into dismay when Muhsinzade Mehmed, the Grand Vizier, recognized Poniatowski in July of 1765.[71]

A short lull in Polish-Ottoman-French affairs now occurred, prompted certainly by the peaceful, if indecisive policies of Muhsinzade Mehmed, later dismissed because of opposition to war with Russia (September 6, 1768) and the royal deaths in both Austria (Francis I, Maria Theresa's husband) and France (the Dauphin). In mid-1766, however, the Duc de Choiseul assumed control of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. A despatch to Vergennes of April 21, 1766 makes the position of France very clear: regardless of the enfeebled state of the Empire, "c'est la guerre par les Turcs qui doit être l'unique object de votre travail et de vos médiations." Vergennes comments on the current government in Istanbul in his thoughtful reply to his chief: Mustafa III, fluctuating and uncertain; the Mufti grave and ignorant; Muhsinzade Mehmed, animated by a sincere spirit of equity and right but with little direct knowledge of affairs of state; the Reis Efendi, an honest and discreet man but unable to profit from experience. The Turks are afraid of war.[72]

Regardless of Vergennes' advice, Choiseul persisted and allocated 3,000,000 livres for the purpose of promoting war. On October 6, 1768, war was declared without the need for bribery, as it happened. "Mustafa's prompter,"[73] Choiseul, and Vergennes congratulated themselves on Turkey's disastrous entrance into a debilitating war.[74] Vergennes could exult "il est bien éloigné de s'attribuer la moindre part du mérite de l'heureuse révolution qui vient d'éclore;... la gloire en est due à la divine Providence qui seule a le droit de les produire."[75] Thus a Christian nation induces Muslim armies to sustain a Catholic federation.

Ahmed Resmi Efendi in *Hülâsat ül-İtibâr*, a history of the 1768-1774 Russo-Turkish War, touches on some of the other factors pushing Turkey into war: a bellicose public which considered it the duty of Muslims to annihilate infidels; the Khans of Crimea, who continously provoked the Russians and were a useless bunch of opium smokers and drinkers; and the worthless Potocki, leader of the 1768 Bar Confederation, who sought asylum in the Ottoman Empire with a 300-500 man private army and bled the treasury while clamoring for action; and finally, the poor choice of generals

71 Anderson, p.256.

72 *ibid*, II, 307, 311.

73 Albert Sorel, *The Eastern Question in the 18th Century*, (New York, 1969), p.24-25

74 *ibid*.

75 Testa, p.195.

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and viziers: the dismissal of Muhsinzade Mehmed who was fully aware of the Russian threat and the inexperience of Mehmed Emin Paşa, who sickened at the start of the campaign.[76] Curiously, he makes no mention of the French coercion.

The *casus belli* however, was the Russian violation of Ottoman territory at Balta in July 1768. The results are well-known and outside the scope of this study. The tone of future French-Ottoman relations for the next decade had been set. Once Vergennes became Foreign Minister in 1774, he defined France's eastern policy in the following manner: "faire de la Turquie une puissance assez forte pour pouvoir résister seule à ses ambitieux voisins. Pour cela le sultan devra accomplir certaines réformes intérieures."[77] In this regard, France would and did supply all the technical expertise required

This brings to a close the survey of French-Ottoman relations from 1739-1768. In 1739 France's policy was to sustain the Ottoman Empire as the stabilizing element in east-European affairs. In doing so, she gave the Empire a renewed lease on life and gained for herself the 1740 renewal of the capitulations. The policy which fostered war in 1768, vehemently anti Russian, was less concerned with the stability of the region and the potential outcome in Poland and the Ottoman Empire. That the fate of these latter two nations was inexorably linked is demonstrable by the first partition of Poland in 1772 which preceded and may have been necessary to any final truce between Russia and Turkey during the 1768-1774 war. It is fair to say that France suffered little in this except a further reduction of her credibility in eastern European affairs. She gained no real diplomatic or commercial benefits. In the years between the two wars, France's influence on the Porte's affairs was minimal, particularly after the failure to achieve a Franco-Turkish alliance in 1747 and the French, Austrian and Russian coalition of 1756.

The Porte successfully resisted French efforts to pull her into war in 1733 and 1756, though succumbing to popular pressure in 1736 and 1768 when Russian agression could no longer be ignored . In the years between, the evidence suggests a growing sense of the need for defensive alliances and mediation in 1736, when an appeal was made to all the countries of Europe at the outbreak of war; in 1740, when the alliance with Sweden was concluded and the French capitulations were gratefully renewed; in 1745, when an attempt was made to terminate the adverse effects of the War of the Austrian Succession; in 1757, the alliance with Denmark, and in 1761, when the treaty with Prussia was finally signed. It is a curious fact that the friendship of these two nations never expressed itself in an alliance, though, as we have seen, a number of attempts were made in this period. The Porte's indignation at France's defection in 1756 was certainly real enough, accustomed as she was to consider Austria and Russia her chief enemies.

76 Ahmed Resmi, *Hülasat ül-itibâr* (Istanbul: Ebuzziya, 1889), p.1-11.
77 Deschanel, p.146

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One further attitude on the part of the Porte bureaucracy makes its appearance as early as 1718 but definitely in 1740, in its refusal to become embroiled in the Austrian War of Succession and the offer of mediation, and the sustained and finally unsuccessful resistance to immersion in Polish affairs. To label the tendency "pacific" might be to overstate the case, but the apparently genuine desire to keep peace at home and abroad and an awareness and fear of the dismal state of the Ottoman forces jostled throughout this period with the more typical belligerence of the traditional forces. These men of peace, a few of whow have been mentioned in this paper, were greatly hampered by a lack of reliable information and an anachronistic diplomatic apparatus. The understanding of the need for reciprocal diplomacy which manifested itself in the first permanent mission in 1793, however, was based on the experience of the previous one hundred years.

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John R. PERRY

THE MAMLUK PAŞALIK OF BAGHDAD AND OTTOMAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS IN THE LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

I

When an ambassador from Istanbul to Nadir Shah Afshâr of Iran was ingratiatingly congratulating himself on having seen the two greatest men in the world, i.e. the Sultan and Nadir, the latter replied, "No — there is yet a greater, the Pasha of Baghdad, who sets us both at defiance!"[1] The pasha he referred to was Ahmed, ruler of the province of Bagdad-Basra from 1723 to 1747 and effective founder of the quasi-autonomous Mamlûk dynasty (known later as the Al-Dâ'ûd) which lasted until 1831. The aim of this study is to show how, if this remark was true in Nadir Shah's time, it was even more appropriate during the reigns of Ahmed's successors Süleyman (1749-1762), Ömer (1764-1776) and Süleyman II (1779-1802), contemporaneous with the Ottoman sultans Mustafa III and Abdülhamid I, and with the post-Nadir interregnum and the Zand period in Iran, notably the reign of Karim Khan (1751-79). This autonomous buffer zone exerted a quite disproportionate influence on the problems and policies both of its frustrated overlord, the

The following abbrevations are used to refer to British and Ottoman archival materials.

FR: East India Company, *Persia and the Persian Gulf Records*, vols VI-XIII (Factory Records)

GD: East India Company, *Persia Gulf Records*, vols VI-XIII (*Gombroon Diary*)

SP: State Papers in the Public Record Office, London (*Series S.P. Foreign Turkey*)

HH: *Hatt-i Hûmâyûn* (*hülâsalar*) [Catalogues and summaries of Imperial Decrees and diplomatic correspondence]

NH: *Nâme-i Hümâyûn* [Copies of diplomatic correspondence] The two last one to be found in the Başbakanlık Arşivi [Archives of the Prime Minister's Office], Istanbul.

1 Sir Robert Ker Porter, *Travels in Georgia, Persia, Armenia, Ancient Babylonia*, London, 1821-22, II, p. 248.

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Ottoman government, and of its unstable neighbour, Iran, and was to usurp all meaningful diplomatic — and, by logical extension, military — contacts between them for half a century.

Strictly speaking, the dynasty was founded by Ahmed's father Hasan Pasha (governed 1704-1723), who won and maintained administrative autonomy from Istanbul, established a "school" for recruitment and training of Caucasian slaves as court functionaries, and bequeathed this establishment to his son.[2] Neither of them was a slave, but the son initiated the mode of slave-succession — by each previous pasha's hand-picked *kâhya* (deputy at Baghdad) and/or *mütesellim* (lieutenant-governor) of Basra — that was henceforth to characterize the dynasty. One of Hasan's Georgian, freedmen Süleyman Ağa, went not only to serve his son but in 1732 was married to Ahmed's daughter Adila Khatun, and as *Kâhya* for the next fifteen years became as respected by the Arab tribes and as popular in Baghdad city as his patron. His vigorous suppression of tribal disorders by lightning forays earned him the nickname of Abu Layla (the "Night Raider").[3]

It will be obvious from the gaps in the above sequence of regnal dates that the succession was rarely smooth and sure. Ahmed had been removed by the Porte in 1736, but returned two years later;[4] and each of his successor's reigns is marked by a brief interlude of anarchy or of short-lived intervention by Istanbul. Thus in 1747, on the simultaneous death of Ahmed Pasha and of the greatest threat to the frontier, Nadir Shah, the Porte roused itself to reassert control over this region by appointing the former Vâli of Diyarbekir to Baghdad, and another loyal functionary to a separate pashalik of Basra. The Baghdad public, the unpaid Janissaries, and the Iraqi tribes were totally uncooperative: four successive appointees to Baghdad and the one in Basra failed to keep order. Finally Süleyman, who had been transferred to safely distant Adana, was appointed to Basra, where he immediately quelled the Muntafiq, Banu Lâm and Banu Ka'b Arabs and established a strong and popular rule. Tiryâki Mustafa Pasha of Baghdad met him in battle at Hilla and lost, Süleyman was welcomed into Baghdad and, like Ahmed and Hasan before him, included the provinces of Basra and Mardin under his sway. Again the Porte had to acquiesce by issuing a diploma in his name.

The "mamlük" nature of the administration and succession was compounded by the inordinate influence of Süleyman's snobbish and overbearing wife, Adila Khatun. Her freeborn status allowed her to dominate her husband's domestic life and establish a powerful political clique at court. More telling is Niebuhr's observation that neither she nor her sister A'isha,

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[2] S. H. Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*, Oxford, 1925, p. 184.

[3] See Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, Istanbul, 1309/1891-2, I, p. 339; Carsten Niebuhr, *Reisebeschreibungen nach Arabien und Anderen Umliegenden Ländern*, Copenhage, 1774-78, II, p. 317; Beauchamp, General-Vicarius in Babylon, "Nach-richt von einer Reise in Persien, im Jahre 1787", in *Minerva, ein Journal historischen und politischen Inhalts*, III, 1792, No. 14, p. 273.

[4] Longrigg, p. 167.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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wife of Ömer Pasha, allowed her husband any co-wife or concubine, and since neither had sons, the succession by slave-protégé was assured.[5]

Abu Layla died twelve years later, and Istanbul again attempted to appoint their own man — Sa'd ud-din Pasha, transferred from Raqqa. Again the popular support mustered by one of Suleyman's former *kâhyas*, Ali (now acting as *mütesellim* of Basra) proved too much for the "foreigner" and his troops -- as did the leverage Ali apparently enjoyed at Istanbul, for according to Niebuhr he simply "bought" the pashalik.[6] Known as al-'Ajami -- "the Persian" — Ali had been born in Iran, and was evidently not a favorite son of the mamlûk establishement; he fell foul of Adila Khatun, who encouraged a mutiny of the Janissaries, which ousted him. He was murdered as he fled the palace in disguise. His successor Ömer, titular head of the rebellion, had also been *kâhya* to Abu Layla; he was "elected" by Adila Khatun's faction and confirmed by the sultan in summer of 1764.[7] This time the Porte had no chance to intervene, and for the next twelve years the Baghdad pashalik was run by Ömer and the palace oligarchy, with Basra as a subordinate sanjaq. The *Mütesellim* there, Süleyman Ağa, was a Georgian Mamlûk of the Baghdad palace school, of a capacity and energy comparable to that of this namesake, Abu Layla. He remained in office until the fall of Basra to the Iranians in 1776, though dismissed and reinstated three times (in 1768, 1769-71 and 1773). He survived three years' captivity in Iran, and the dismissal and murder of Ömer Pasha (see below), not only to return and regain his post of Basra but to secure the vacant and hopelessly faction-ridden pashalik of Baghdad.[8]

II

Having sketched the almost monotonous regularity of a nevertheless quite intricate pattern of succession, let us turn to the internal structure of the Pashalik and its foreign relations. The Pasha's military and fiscal relationship with Istanbul is described by various contemporary visitors.[9] His army totalled a theoretical 4,000 men, comprising some 1,500 personal cavalry, an 800-strong corps d'élite, 200 other guards under the *kâhya* and other high officials, 800 locally-levied infantry known as *beratlı* and 200 foot musketeers. Separate from this was an imperial garrison of 10,000 or more janissaries with artillery, most of them stationed in the city. Over these the

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5 Longrigg, p. 169; Niebuhr, pp. 317, 322.

6 Niebuhr, p. 319.

7 GD XII, 6 August 1762; Cevdet I, p. 340

8 Al-Shaykh 'Uthmân b. Sind al-Basri, *Matâli ul-Su'ûd fî akhbâr a'lam il-wuzarâ wa-a'zamihim Dâûd* (MS in Iraq Museum Library, No. 233), pp. 82-83: SP 97/55, 259a.

9 See W. Eton, *A Survey of the Turkish Empire*, London, 1798, pp. 288-289; Niebuhr, 323ff; Guillaume-Antoine Olivier, *Voyage dans l'Empire Ottoman, l'Egypte et la Perse*, Paris, 1807, IV, pp. 339-340.

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pasha technically had no authority; they answered to their own officers appointed by their *ağa* at Istanbul. However, their pay was so chronically in arrears that their mood alternated between lethargy and mutiny; they were thus totally useless as an imperial check to the Pasha's power — though as has been seen, they could be effectively manipulated by rival palace factions. Paradoxically, as an extra "praetorian guard," they helped perpetuate the mamlûk autonomy and succession.

Observers concur that the Pasha remitted no revenue to Istanbul. His accounts showed that his income was entirely swallowed by his army and by the upkeep of long-derelict fortresses, allegedly a necessary defense against Arab and Kurdish rebels and threats from Iran. Nor did he contribute troops for the Sultan's European wars, claiming that all local levies were needed at home — a pretense illustrated from time to time by sham wars staged in connivance with the Muntafiq Arabs. Whatever the truth of this opinion, it was so rooted in certain circles (perhaps only the cynical foreign and émigré merchant communities of Basra) that it was even rumoured at the outset of the siege in 1775 that the Pasha had bribed the Iranian ruler Karim Khan to mount a show of force in order to raise his prestige in the eyes of the Porte.[10] They were soon to realise their error.

However, the Pasha — Ömer in particular — did base his precarious financial and territorial security on tacit agreements with his more unruly subjects, their frontier neighbours, and the rulers of Iran, though in more subtle ways. His pashalik, like its predecessor and successor states in Iraq, was a heterogeneous and unwieldy package. Outside the relatively docile peasantry of Iraq proper, his subjects consisted of nomadic Arab tribes whose territories overlapped Iran, Arabia, Syria and the Jazira; the Kurds of the principalities of Zuhab, Darna and Baban (Qara Chuwalân), bordering Iran; and a very large resident alien population, chiefly Iranian Shi'ites in the shrine towns and Iranian, Armenian, Indian and other traders and entrepreneurs at Basra. This latter population was swelled by political, religious and economic refugees from Iran during the troubled interregna of 1722-32 (the fall of the Safavid dynasty and the Afghan occupation) and 1747-1757 (from the assassination of Nadir Shah to the establishment in Shiraz of Karim Khan Zand). Added to this was the regular pilgrim traffic, both to Najaf and Kerbela and in transit to the Hijaz, involving at least 10,000 persons a year[11]. These related questions proved the most constant source of friction between the Pashalik and Iran. Safe conduct for Iranian pilgrims and their exemption from tolls and dues had been stipulated in the as yet unratified treaty of 1746,[12] but the pilgrims continued, as always, to "make grievous complaints of the insults and oppressions of the Turks."[13]

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10 Niebuhr, p. 323.

11 Porter, p. 201.

12 HH I, No. 2, article 5

13 George Forster, *A Journey from Bengal to England, through the Northern Part of India ... and Persia, and into Russia, by the Caspian Sea*, London, 1798, II, p. 146.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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The Pasha derived no revenue from the wealthy shrine towns with their extensive *waqf* holdings and exclusively tax-exempt pilgrim traffic.[14] The "pilgrims" in fact engaged in commerce, most presumably just to defray expenses in an age before travellers' checks, some certainly to take advantage of their duty-free status. It was Ömer's attempt to skim off some of this profit for himself by suddenly reimposing a frontier toll on pilgrims from Iran that brought outraged complaints by Karim Khan Zand to both Pasha and Porte in 1774. Iranian residents in Baghdad were likewise allegedly robbed, fined and deported in unprecedented numbers[15]. Finally, after the Baghdad plague of 1773, during which more than 700 Iranians died, Ömer confiscated their residue without redress to their heirs. An embassy from Shiraz received only evasive excuses.[16] Humanitarian considerations aside, an enormous sum in Iranian specie (estimated in 1801 at 10 lakhs of rupees)[17] regularly drained out via the pilgrim routes, and Karim Khan, who had attempted with some success to stem the specie drain through the Gulf ports by means of restrictive clauses in his agreements with the East India Company, was not prepared to see it siphoned off by the Pasha.

A parallel source of the Pasha's profit at Iran's expense was the concentration at Basra of émigré merchants and European trading companies — especially the East Indian Company, which in 1770 had abandoned Bushire, its last foothold on the Iranian shores of the Gulf, to trade exclusively at Basra. Direct appeals failed to persuade the Armenians or the British to return, or the Pasha to cooperate[18]. It was to force such concessions at both Baghdad and Basra that the Zands marched on Basra in 1775; in case the threat failed to produce results, they could conquer the Iraqi port directly and regain all the tangible and intangible wealth it had in their view stolen from Iran.

It will be obvious that the Pasha had little natural affinity with any of the local elements whose support he had to rely on. To the whole populace, he and his minions were alien "Turks"; most of the peasantry and immigrants, and some the tribes, were moreover Shi'ites, resentful of their subservience to a Sunni government; to the Porte and the neighbouring governors, the Mamlûk Pashas were insubordinate upstarts. Despite these handicaps, Süleyman and Ömer in particular managed to work out an entente

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14 Cf. J. B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880*, Oxford, 1968, pp. 35-36.

15 Muhammed Rizâ Nasîrî, "*Chand sanad-i târikhi,*" in *Bar-rasihyi Târikh* X 1354/1975-76, No. 1, p. 183; Sayyid Abdullah al-Husayni al-Shûshtari, *Tazkira-yi Shûshtar*, Calcutta, 1924, p. 165.

16 Nasiri, pp. 183-184; Mirza Muhhamad Sâdiq Nâmi, *Târikh-i Giti-gusha*, ed. S. Nafisi, Tehran, 131/1938, p. 181; Sp 97/55, 37a-38b; Cevdet, II, p. 55.

17 G. R. G. Hambly, "An Introduction to the Economic Organization of Early Qajar Iran," in *Iran*, II, 1964, p. 78.

18 Haroutioun Hovhanyants, *Patmut'iwn Nor Jughayu* (History of New Julfa), New Julfa, 1880, I, pp. 311, 312, 315, 318; FR XVII, 1061, 1063, 1065, 1071, 1078; SP 97/49, 147b; Abraham Parsons, *Travels in Asia and Africa*, London, 1808, p. 185.

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with these elements. The reins of government were virtually identical with the Pasha's purse-strings — everyone from the Pasha down paid some form of protection money to someone, sometimes via government channels, sometimes directly. Much of the province's revenue, as derived from taxes on produce and commerce — the same which, as Eton asserts, never reached Istanbul — was not so much eaten by the Pasha as actually plowed back to maintain security (as he claimed), but in the form of bribes and subsidies to local Arab and Kurdish governors and their tribesmen (as his detractors alleged). In many cases such revenue was left to be collected directly by the local ruler, in exchange for a nominal tribute: e.g., the Euphrates river-toll at 'Arja was the perquisite of the Al-Sâlih family of the Muntafig Arabs.[19] It was not so much sham wars that required extra outlay from the treasury, but rather a sham peace, an untapped tourist traffic, and widespread tax-farming that minimized state revenue in the first place.

III

The Kurdish principalities of Zuhab, Darna, and Qara Chuwalân were each governed by the current head of the ruling Lak or Kurd family. The most powerful, the Baban ruler of Qara (Qal'a) Chuwalân — who intermittently controlled Zuhab and Köy Sanjaq — bought his title of Pasha (of one tail) from the Pasha of Baghdad.[20] Geopolitically, these lands were the mirror-image of the Iranian-protected provinces of Kermanshah and Ardalân, the latter being ruled for most of this period by Khusraw Khan, who rejoiced in the obsolescent Safavid title of Vâli, or hereditary march-warden. Ardalân became tributary to the Zands as early as 1750. The death of Abu Layla and the interregnum at Baghdad during 1762-64, and the definitive establishment then of Zand power throughout the Zagros, was reflected in Kurdistan by a coup in Qara Chowalân and an invasion by Khusraw Khan, who for the next decade exercised no small influence over the "Pasha's" province.[21] In 1774 Ömer Pasha, alarmed at seeing a now strong Iranian government in complacent control of his closest frontier, resumed the "forward policy" that had been favored by Abu Layla. He sent a large force which reimposed his own protégés at Qara Chuwalân and Köy Sanjaq.[22] This in turn provoked Khusraw Khan and his Zand overlord to set about restoring the balance of power in their favour and the war of 1774-77 began on the Kurdish front.

A similar situation obtained on the Pasha's southernmost frontier with Iran, that of the Shatt ul-'Arab under the jurisdiction of the

19 Niebuhr, p. 249.

20 Niebuhr, pp. 330-331.

21 Nâmi, p. 188; Cevdet, I, 344ff; Longrigg, pp. 188-189.

22 Nâmi, pp. 178, 182.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

Mütesellim of Basra. Here the Banu Ka'b Arabs straddled the ill-defined frontier of marshes and creeks, vaguely acknowledging Iranian suzerainty but refusing tribute to either power while exacting tolls and raiding their neighbours by land and water. In 1764 the newly-appointed Ömer himself proposed to Karim Khan a joint punitive campaign against the Ka'b. The Iranians performed their task of flushing the tribesmen out of Khuzistan, but the *Mütessellim*, either through a logistical failure or deliberately, out of fear of the proximity of such a large Iranian force, not only failed to intercept the Ka'b but even withheld the boats and supplies he was supposed to send the Zand army.[23] This too was held against the Pasha in Karim Khan's complaints to Istanbul.

The Zand Khan likewise alleged that Ömer had lent aid to the Imam of Oman, at war with the Zands (who on the basis of Nadir Shah's brief occupation of Muscat regarded the "Kharijite" Omanis as rebels when they refused tribute).[24]

The Pasha's adventurism in another field was more blatant and risky, though nor apparently held against him by Karim Khan. Twice Abu Layla had given refuge and aid to Azâd Khan Afghan, the Zands' most dangerous opponent during 1753-58 — with the full consent, if not actual instigation, of Adila Khatun.[25] As early as 1751 he had also supported Mustafa Quli Khan (Nadir's envoy to the Porte, delayed in Baghdad since his master's death) and Ali Mardân Khan Bakhtyâri, Karim Khan's immediate rival for power, in an unsuccessful attempt to march on Kermashah and place a Safavid pretender on the Iranian throne.[26] By siding with an Afsharid ambassador against the *de facto* ruler of western Iran, the Pasha was here usurping a major foreign policy initiative of Istanbul.

IV

This brings us to the question of diplomatic relations between Iran and the Ottoman empire between 1747 and 1797. For both sides there was a choice to make. Which of the two Irans was the Sultan to recognise — the "legitimate" successor state of the Afsharids at Mashhad, or the growing power of the Zands, closer at hand in the Zagros? Which Ottoman government was (Zand) Iran to deal with — the distant and temporarily weak "Sublime Porte" or the contiguous and covertly aggressive pashalik of Baghdad-Basra?

On Nadir Shah's assassination in June 1747 there was at first a far

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23 Nâmi, pp. 131-133; Niebuhr, pp. 228-229

24 See Nasiri, p. 185.

25 Mirzâ Abu'l-Hasan Ghaffâri, *Gulshan-i Murâd* (British Library MS Or, 3592), pp. 68-69.

26 GD VI, 12 July 1751.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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smoother continuity in diplomatic relations between the two powers than in the internal recovery of the Iranian state. Nadir's ambassadors to the Porte, Mustafa Quli Khan, Bîgdili Shâmlu and the court chronicler, Mirza Mehdi Astarâbâdi, heard the news at Baghdad on their way toward Istanbul, and remained there as guests of the Pasha until they could be sure which way the wind would blow. Mustafa Quli sent the Shah's presents ahead to Istanbul, and was soon authorized by Nadir's nephew, who had ascended the throne as Adil Shah, to proceed with negotiations.[27] Adil Shah, Ibrâhim Shah, Shâhrukh Shah and their officers in rapid succession wrote to assure the Porte and the Pasha of their eagerness to ratify the territorial provisions of the treaty signed with Nadir Shah in 1747 (the vexed religious question was for the moment skirted) and their desire for peace and friendship, and received cautious replies in kind.[28] The very rapidity of their succession, however, plainly revealed the still unstable situation in Iran. Nervous and cautious, both Istanbul and Baghdad at first withheld their own envoys and set about mobilizing frontier troops. A personal envoy from Mustafa Quli Khan to Istanbul reassured them of the peaceful intentions of the Afsharid successor — whoever he might eventually be — and an envoy was ordered to Iran.[29] But other factors were to resolve the immediate problems. The continued internecine strife at Mashhad resulted by early 1750 in a bankrupt puppet monarchy manipulated by a military junta, with Khorasan under the shadow of Ahmed Shah Durrâni's new Afghan empire; the Afsharids had failed to reoccupy Isfahan, which together with the rest of western Iran was still disputed by at least four tribal leaders with only one Safavid pretender between them. By then, too, Süleyman Pasha had re-established Mamlûk autonomy in Baghdad. The Porte, thus doubly insulated against Iran, was content to forget about diplomatic contacts for the next quarter century.

By 1774 the situation had changed considerably. The Ottoman empire was chastened by the outcome of the war with Russia and the Treaty of Küchük Qaynarja. A strong and aggressive state had established itself in western Iran, with its roots in the tribes of the Kurdish foothills and Shiraz, its capital, virtually overlooking the Shatt ul-'Arab. The Georgian Kingdom, too, nominally still a vassal of Iran, had won a hegemony over the whole of the south-western Caucasus bordering the pashalik of Çıldır, and had contracted an alliance with Russia that was tested with some success against Ottoman forces in the war of 1768-74. The linchpin of the empire's eastern defenses, the pashalik of Baghdad, had now antagonized the Zand ruler and even bested him in the first clash in Kurdistan.[30] If this dyke were to give way, the weak government of the newly-ascended Abdülhamid I might find its eastern provinces suddenly engulfed in the wake of its Black Sea shores.

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27 HH I, pp. 138, 148, 150, 175.

28 NH III, No. 3, pp. 52-84.

29 SP 97/33, pp. 209a, 342b.

30 SP 97/51,p. 46a; HH I, pp. 135, 348a; Nâmi, pp. 178-179.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

This was undoubtedly the specter confronting the minds in the war room at the Topkapi Saray, as evidenced by the tenor of the reports and letters that sped between Istanbul and the frontier *seraskers* in 1774-75; Karim Khan, who intended merely to hold Basra hostage if he could take it, would have been flattered and amused had he known. Apart from orders to mobilize, the Porte despatched presents and circulars to the khans of the Azerbaijan and South Caucasus provinces of Khoy, Marâgha, Ardabil, Nakhchivân, Ganja, Darband, Qarabagh, Shirvân, etc. to secure their allegiance, or at least neutrality, in the event of an assault on the Ottoman frontiers by Erekle of Geargia or Karim Khan. All replied, doubtless truthfully, that they had no intention of obeying Karim Khan and would welcome an opportunity to be rid of Erekle; Erekle himself even declared, tongue in cheek, that in the absence of a shah on the Iranian throne, he considered himself a loyal subject of the Sultan.[31]

With peace concluded and his Russian allies no longer interested in cooperating, Erekle's guarentee of neutrality could probably be trusted. As he and the Muslim Khans of the region knew, Karim Khan had insufficient authority north of Tabriz to involve them even in diversionary operations. Karim, equally aware of this, created his diversion in Shahrizur on the disputed Baban frontier — whence the Porte evidently expected the main assault to materialize.

Next came the first direct diplomatic tentative: Sünbülzâde Vehbi Efendi was sent to open negotiations with what the Porte was at last constrained to acknowledge as the effective government of Iran. He left Istanbul in January 1775 and reached Shiraz in April; his journey thus coincided ironically with Sâdiq Khan Zand's march on Basra. His interview with Karim Khan was overshadowed by the onset of the siege, a move for which, incredibly, the Porte appeared unprepared. His mission was ostensibly confined to a polite offical notification of the accession of Abdülhamid. Any oral concessions he might have added, regarding the treatment of Iranian pilgrims or the Kurdish problem, were evidently insufficient, for he returned to Istanbul that September "in disgrace," bearing a reiteration of Karim's complaints against the Pasha.[32] The Zand envoy, Abdullah Khan Kalhur, reciprocated post-haste, in advance of Vehbi's return, with copies of the Zand ruler's letters to the Sultan, the Grand Vizier and the Shaykh ul-Islam.[33]

The seal was set on Vehbi's disgrace in Baghdad. Ömer Pasha, determined to undermine this initiative of the Porte in what had been his own preserve, and doubtless fearing that the envoy's report would confirm Zand

31 HH I, pp. 58a-68, 69, 79, 97; Nasiri in *Bar-rasihâ-yi Târikhi*, X, 1354/1975-76, No. 6, pp. 144-153; Cevdet, II, p. 62.

32 SP 97/51, pp. 21a. 68, 87 89b, 106; Ghaffâri, p. 190.

33 HH I, pp. 2, 5, 174a, 202, 218, 219; partly published by Nasiri in *Bar-asihâ-yi Târikhi*, X, No. No. 1, pp. 175-194 and No. 6, pp. 133-41. For the military progress of the campaigns in Kurdistan and the siege and occupation of Basra, see John R. Perry, *Karim Khan Zand*, Chicago, 1979, Chapters 11 and 12.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

complaints and invite imperial retribution, denounced him to Abdülhamid as having improperly conducted his mission. The Sultan ordered his execution, but Vehbi returned incognito and remained in hiding in Üsküdar; here, in order to refute Ömer's charge, he wrote an amusing *qaside* in which aspects of Iran and the Zand court are scathingly compared with their Ottoman counterparts. He was later pardoned and appointed Qadi of Rhodes.[34]

Ömer, apparently sharing Istanbul's misapprehension that the real threat was to Baghdad, sent only 200 Janissaries to augment the Basra garrison at the outset of the siege, and towards the end of the year despatched a token relief force which was routed at Hilla by the Zands'Arab allies of the Banu Khazâ'il.[35] The Porte was now reduced to finding scapegoats. The first was Vehbi Efendi. Later, in January 1777, the Grand Vizier Dervish Mehmed Pasha was deposed and banished, charged with misappropriating funds "destined for the prosecution of the Persian war."[36]

Unlike the conflicts of Safavid and early Afsharid times, this was not in fact a war between Iran and the Ottoman state. No imperial troops (except perhaps the 200 Janissaries at Basra) fought the Zand armies, and it was not until early in 1779 — three years after the fall of Basra and 18 months after the cessation of hostilities in Kurdistan — that the Porte sought a *fatwâ* to make war on the Iranians and issued a circular to "all the khans and notables of Iran" declaring the Sultan's intention to teach their arrogant and duplicitous ruler a lesson.[37] By the time this was delivered, Karim Khan would be dead, Iran (and Iraq) plunged into civil war, Basra a derelict shadow of its former prosperity, and the course of Ottoman-Iranian relations set back to 1747.

Unable in fact to mount an Iranian campaign, the Sultan had meantime turned his armies against Baghdad. Early in 1776 Ömer was dismissed from office and Ispanakçı-zâde Hâfız Mustafa Pasha of Raqqa was sent, backed by the governors of Diyarbekir and Shahrizur, to take over Baghdad. Ömer was to be transferred to Diyarbekir, and began to go quietly, taking his household and treasury with him. But Mustafa, either on secret orders from Istanbul or because he coveted Ömer's wealth, attacked at night and massacred the ex-governor and his retinue. Ömer's head arrived at Istanbul in March, to undisguised satisfaction at the Topkapı Saray.[38]

This made no difference to the course of the war. The Zand army under Nazar Ali Khan was unexpectedly withdrawn from Kermashah late in 1776, and an army of Kirkuk and Mosul levies under the Pasha of Mardin

34 See Faik Reşit Unet, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri* pp. 134-136; SP 97/51, p. 116; Sünbülzade Vehbi Efendi, *Divan*, Bulaq, 1253/1837, pp. 12-17.

35 Parsons, pp. 165, 170-171; Nâmi, pp. 201-202

36 SP 97/53, p. 19a.

37 NH IX, p. 90; Cevdet, II, pp. 58, 305.

38 SP 97/51, p. 70b; 97/52, pp. 8a, 11a, 21b; Cevdet, II, pp. 56, 59; Longrigg, p. 181.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

decisively defeated Khusraw Khan of Ardalan the following spring, without any help from Baghdad.[39] Basra, however, fell to the Zands only a month after Ömer's dismissal; the Porte kept this news secret for some weeks, and then feigned indifference.[40] Inevitably, the new pasha did not remain long in office. Having injudiciously kept Ömer's possessions for himself, he was in turn made the scapegoat for his predecessor's death, as a sop to popular resentment in Baghdad, and replaced by one Abdi Pacha. He reigned a week before he was in turn ousted by Ömer's former *kâhya* Abdullah. The Porte was of course constrained to acknowledge the inevitable and again shelve its schemes for direct control of Baghdad.[41] In 1777 negotiations with Shiraz were resumed, but from Baghdad, not Istanbul: Muhammad Beg al-Shawi apparently made some progress towards a settlement, and returned accompanied by Haydar Khan Zangana as the Zand envoy. But they were met at the frontier by the news of Abdullah Pasha's death. The ensuing contest for power erupted in street-fighting in Baghdad and renewed anarchy in the Kurdish sanjaqs.[42] The standard pattern of succession was completed late in 1779, when Süleyman, the former *mütessellim* of Basra, returned from captivity in Iran to take over the whole pashalik. History had repeated itself just 50 years later, even to the name of its favorite.

V

The rise and persistence of autonomous dynastic governorates on the fringes of the Ottoman empire in the late 18th century is of course a recognized phenomenon. The Jalilis of Mosul are a less extreme example, [43] and there are many similar cases in the Balkans.[44] The scope of this analogy might well be broadened to include a whole range of regional dynasties flourishing in the interstices of the crumbling Mughal, Safavid and Ottoman empire. They came in different sizes, from regionally and ethnically homogeneous principalities like that of the Kurds of Ardalan or the Banu Ka'b Arabs.[45] through heterogeneous mini-empires such as those of Erekle II of Georgia and Fath Ali Khan of Qubba (Darband),[46] and the Baghdad

39 SP 97/53, pp. 68, 126, 131b, 150a, 159b; Nasiri, in Bar-*rasihâ-yi Târikhi*, X, No. 6, p. 140; Ghaffâri, pp. 208-209.

40 SP 97/52, p. 59a.

41 SP 97/52, pp. 74b, 75a; Cevdet, II, p. 58; Longrigg, p. 182.

42 Evers, 51; Cevdet II, III, 113; Longrigg, 184-5.

43 See Robert W. Olson, *The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Perisian Relations 1718-1743*, Bloomington, 1975.

44 See Dennis N. Skiotis, "From Bandit to Pasha; First Steps in the Rise to Power of Ali of Tepedelen, 1750-1784", in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2:3 (July 1971), pp. 219-220.

45 See J. R. Perry, "The Banu Ka'b : An Amphibious Brigand State in Khuzistan", in *Le monde iranien et l'Islam*, I (1971), pp. 131-152.

46 See J. R. Perry, "Iran, Russia and the Caucasus 1747-1779", in *Actes du XXIXe*

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

pashalik, up to larger fragments of former empires in Ahmed Shah's Afghanistan and Karim Khan's western Iran. All of these tended to accept their limitations. and generally co-existed as smaller units of an outmoded empire rather than competing to restore one. As such they are in part reponsible for many of the political frontiers of the Middle East up until today.

Among these "lesser great men" of history, the Mamlûk Pashas of Baghdad remain a special case. They resisted repeated attempts by Iranian neighbours to bite off strategically or commercially valuable corners, and by Istanbul to assert more than nominal suzerainty. They conducted military and diplomatic battles with Iran nominally on behalf of the Porte, and repeatedly prevented either power from bypassing them, either to establish meaningful treaties with the central government or to pose a direct threat to the other. They were at once a curse and a blessing to both powers, who — as Nadir Shah reportedly recognized — were resigned to maintaining the pashalik while they deplored its arrogance and intransigence.

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congrès international des orientalistes, Paris, 1975, II : Iran moderne, vol, 1, pp. 141-147

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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Sinan KUNERALP

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE KINGDOM OF GREECE (1834-1840)

On 21 July 1832, the Ottoman Empire signed a treaty in Istanbul officially recognizing the independence of the Kingdom of Greece. The signature of the treaty, though putting an end to a military confrontation that had lasted over ten years, was to herald another decade of strife and conflict between the two countries as both were slow to adjust themselves to the new state of affairs: the Turks were reluctant to concede to their former reayas the status and rights of a sovereign state, while the Greeks were extremely touchy on this point and demanded from the Sublime Porte equal treatment with the European Powers. Endless disputes ensued, exasperated by Greek sensitivity and Ottoman irascibility. This article will briefly cover the first years of bi-lateral relations between the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire.[1]

The treaty of 21 July 1832 provided that (i) an indemnity of 40.000.000 piastres would be payed by Greece before the end of the year in return for Ottoman recognition of the latter's boundaries and (ii) the two powers would negociate the modalities of establishing proper diplomatic, consular and trade relations and appoint their respective agents at each other's ports.

Things were slow to start as the Greeks were in arrears with the payment of the indemnity and the Sublime Porte made its acceptance of the presence of a Greek agent in Istanbul to negociate the terms of a trade and navigation treaty contingent to the payment of the full amount of the indemnity. The Powers succeeded in convincing the Porte to receive unofficially a Greek representative in Istanbul but to withhold official

1 This article is a summary of the first chapter of a forthcoming work on Turco-Greek diplomatic relations.

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recognition till the payment is effected by the Rothschild Bank of London which was negotiating a loan for the new Greek state. Another complication arose when a Greek consular agent was appointed to Crete in February 1834 before a Greek representative had been received in Constantinople. Crete was then still occupied by Egyptian forces and the appointment had been made at the instigation of Mehmet Ali Paşa who wanted to win over Greece in his own forthcoming struggle against his suzerain.

In March 1834, Konstantin Zographos, a future minister of foreign affairs was sent to Constantinople by the Greek government on a mission to smooth over the points of discord and negociate the long awaited treaty. Though well-received, his arrival and installation in the Ottoman capital was again the source of fierce squabble between the two governments as Zographos insisted in having an audience of the Sultan in his quality of minister plenipotentiary whereas the Porte, hiding behind the established practice in usage at the Ottoman Court, made it clear that trade treaties and capitulations signed with European powers had always preceded the official reception of their representatives by the Sultan. The tension was not eased as Zographos haughtily made demands upon demands which were systematically turned down by increasingly impatient Ottoman officials. Zographos had been unwisely instructed by his own government to make representations in favour of the inhabitants of the islands of Samos and Crete who had risen against Ottoman rule. He was also to extend his patronage to all reaya Greek subjects of the Sultan.

The hostile climate prevailing during his first few weeks in Istanbul almost endangered the main aim of Zographos' mission: to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Porte. Thanks however, to the intervention of the representatives of the Protecting Powers both in Athens and in Constantinople, the Greek government tuned down its pretentions and on April 28th 1834, the Dragoman of the Divan payed Zographos a visit with the customary present which was tantamount to official recognition; the reception by the Sultan was delayed pending the conclusion and ratification of the trade treaty.

Beside the treaty there were three other points of contention between the two countries : (i) the matter of Turkish properties in the territories ceded to the new Kingdom (ii) the emigration of Samians and Cretans to Greece and the claim by many Greek subjects of the Porte residing in the Empire, to Greek nationality (iii) the question of the payment of the arrears of the indemnity. Ottoman officials, fearing Greek economic penetration delayed the start of the negociations for the treaty making it conditional to the prior settlement of these three points.

When the payment of an instalment of the indemnity was again delayed in June 1834, the Porte retaliated by impounding 60 Greek ships and taking restrictive measures against Hellenic Greeks residing in the Empire

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and some Ottoman Greeks who claimed Hellenic nationality. Once again upon the intervention of the Powers, the Greek government undertook to pay the amount due within four months and the Porte lifted its restrictions. It was now Zographos' turn to claim compensation for any damage incurred by his nationals because of the measures taken by Ottoman officials. He also demanded that an Ottoman plenipotentiary be appointed to negociate the trade treaty and that powers be sent to the Ottoman commissioners instructed with the delimitation of the border line between the two countries. In September 1834, when all arrears of the indemnity were paid, Zographos was received in audience by the Grand Vizir.

In the meantime Greece had started appointing consuls in Ottoman ports and trade centers despite the opposition of the Porte. The Ottoman government subordinated such appointments to the signature of the trade treaty and refused to deliver *exequaturs* to Greek consuls. After the French ambassador in Constantinople intervened in favour of Greece, the Porte gave in though saving its face by granting Greek consular officers not *exequaturs* (*berat*) but revocable *lettres vézirielles* (*buyruldu*) and by withholding thirteen of the requested nineteen appointments.

Negociations for the trade treaty started on October 1834 and stumbled at once on the delicate question of nationality. How to determine the conditions that entitled the Greek reayas, subjects of the Porte to claim the nationality of the Kingdom of Greece? Long and arduous discussions took place around the interpretation of the right to emigrate, the determination of the territories whose inhabitants have been allowed to take advantage of this right and the time limit granted them to emigrate as provided by the protocoles of the London Conference and the treaty of 21 July 1832.

The protocol of 3 February 1830 had recognized the right to emigrate to all Greek subjects of the Sultan. Alarmed at the mass exodus that ensued, the Porte requested some restrictions to this right and the protocol of 16 June 1830 limited it to the inhabitants of the provinces that had taken part to the insurrection and to those of the border regions. Ayvalık on the Egean coast was the only exception. The protocol provided a time limit of twelve months to take advantage of this right. This was lated extended to eighteen months by the Constantinople Conference of July 1832. As negociations over the borders were not concluded before the end of 1835, the right to emigrate was finally prolonged till July 1837. After a while, many Ottoman Greeks who had emigrated to Greece and acquired the new kingdom's nationality returned to Ottoman lands. They were joined by several hundred thousand Ottoman Greeks who had remained in the empire but had found a way — usually a dubious one — to become Hellenic subjects. Their presence had a disrupting effect on the empire's financial and social fabric as it meant a corresponding decrease of the income generated by the payment of the capitation tax paid by the reayas. Furthermore such a large number of foreign nationals claiming

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to avail themselves of the privileges of the capitulations was bound to cause friction.

Zographos requested that Hellenic subjects, according to the treaty of July 1832 should be entitled to the same treatment as the nationals of the other powers. The Porte retorted by denying these rights to those naturalized Hellenic subjects who came originally from Ottoman lands. The Greek envoy asked that exception be made at least for two categories: (i) Greeks of humble extraction who had emigrated to Greece be allowed to return and resume their activities in trade and coastal navigation as Hellenic citizens (ii) those Greeks who were born, or came from the provinces that were now part of the new kingdom and had lived in Constantinople and other cities and had exercized a trade which made them members of a guild should be allowed to retain their membership. Appurtenance to a guild in retail trade and small crafts being a coveted privilege, Zographos insisted at lenght on behalf of his fellow countrymen. The Porte was however adamant all the more that very few foreigners (some Russian Armenians and Georgians from the Caucasus employed in workshops) had been admitted into guilds.

When Zographos, in a characteristic bout of self-delusive irrealism, demanded suddenly the right of free emigration for all Greek reayas, the Porte broke negociations. Matters came to a head as the Greek government offered the inhabitants of the island of Samos land in Greece to encourage them to emigrate. When the Greek government found out that the Porte was intractable in this respect they withdrew their pretentions and negociations resumed. They were to last on and off for the following five years yielding no result as both side stuck to its own uncompromising stand.

Simultaneously with the treaty negociations conducted in Istanbul two other rounds of talks were taking place in Greece. The first one concerned the demarcation of the border line between the two countries which was to be worked out with the help of commissioners from the Protecting Powers. It proceeded very slowly inspite of the provisions of the various protocols. On 18 January 1835, the Porte stated that they will not accept the boundary demarcated by the commissioners of the Powers and sent to Thessaly its own commissioners with the request that the work starts anew. In December of the same year however, the Porte gave in with the proviso that the Powers do no make any other representation in favour of Greece.

The other point at issue, the question of land and property owned by Turks in provinces relinquished to the Kingdom of Greece was not settled before years of bitter bickering and friction. Protocols of 3 February and 16 June 1830 supplemented by the Treaty of Constantinople of 21 July 1832 provided guidelines for the settlement of this problem. *Vakıf* property was to be handed over to the Greek state. Hereditary usufructuaries were to retain their rights if they chose to remain in Greece. Should they opt to emigrate to the Ottoman empire they were to be compensated for their loses. Private

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property on the other hand was to be sold to Greek nationals within twelve to eighteen months. Both sides demonstrated an equal amount of bad faith and ill-will, the Greeks perhaps even more so as they refused to pay any compensation for Turkish owned land which they claimed had been usurped by military conquest. The Turkish commissioner, Üsküdar Mollası Hacı Ismail Bey, on his part stated that Ottoman forces would not evacuate the territories they still occupied so long as this question was not settled. The Constantinople treaty of July 1832 had provided that a settlement was to be reached by the end of 1834.

In September 1834, Şekip Efendi, future ambassador and foreign minister was sent to Athens to negociate a solution. The points at issue revolved mainly about the dates when Turkish forces had evacuated territories that reverted to Greece since the protocol of 3 February 1830 which served as a basis for negociations provided that Turkish-owned property, located in regions that had been occupied by Greek forces by that date, were not liable for compensation. Şekip Efendi was instructed to settle the question of the sale of Turkish property in the provinces of Thebes, Attica and Euboea, which the Greeks claimed to have occupied before February 1830. The Greek government appointed a commission of five members to conduct negociations with Şekip. Negociations started in a climate of tension as King Otto made a pretence not to recognize the Ottoman commissioner at a palace reception. Nevertheless, Şekip obtained the recall of the nomarque of Euboea who had been responsible for the mistreatment to which Turks still living in that province had been subjected. However, by August 1835, Şekip grown weary of the dilatory tactics of the Greeks and their unwillingness to come to terms returned to Constantinople and the negociations were interrupted till February 1836, when the Porte in a conciliatory move, sent a new commissioner, Kutsi Efendi to resume the discussions. This coincided with the acceptance by the Porte of the border line as delineated by the representatives of the Powers. The negotiations proceeded smoothly throughout the spring of 1836. By June both sides had agreed on the establishment of a mixed arbitral court to settle in last resort all contestations pertaining to the nature or sale of Turkish property. The Greek commissioners had requested from the Porte a copy of the Kanun-name of Mehmed II which governed the condition of land in conquered territories. By August the question of the vakıf properties was also settled: the ownership of these lands reverted to the Greek government against a payment of 200.000 drachmes. The arbitral court functioned diligenty, holding five sessions a week. The Greek government was proving moderate and conciliatory as it was aware of the necessity of settling this issue in order to normalize its relations with the Porte and conclude the long-awaited trade treaty. Still progress was on the whole piecemeal as the question of the province of Thebes remained to be settled.

The majority of Turkish land was located in this province which the

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Turks claimed was still completely occupied by Ottoman forces on the date of the conclusion of the Treaty of London, whereas the Greeks contended that only the county of Karababa was under Ottoman occupation. The Ottoman commissioner made his acceptance of the other points at issue conditional to the settlement of the Thebes question. The Porte's intransigeancc was partly dictated by the pressure of Ottoman refugees who accused the Ottoman government of having sacrificed both the Empire's territorial integrity and their own material property. This in turn created a climate of animosity against Zographos. In January 1837 the Turkish commissioner asked for a settlement of five million piastres in compensation for the sale of Turkish property in Thebes. The Greeks agreed to pay four million after having offered six hundred thousand piastres. The question was not finally settled before the middle of the following decade owing largely because of Greek dilatoriness and ill-will. At times, disagreements over this question threatened overall Turco-Greek relations.

Back in Istanbul meanwhile, the difficulties encountered in the settlement of the question of Turkish property jeopardized Zographos' chances of getting the Ottoman officials to sit at the table to discuss the treaty. Greek traders, still ranking in the eyes of the Ottoman administration as reayas were suffering from the lack of such a treaty. Zographos tried to play on Ottoman concerns regarding Mehmet Ali Paşa's expantionist plans, stating that the Ottoman Empire needed Greek merchants as a check to Egyptian ambitions. But the Porte was not receptive to this sort of argument. One of the stumbling points over the treaty was the determination of the customs duties to be imposed by both countries on goods imported from one another. The Turks were willing to levy a three per cent duty on Greek merchandise, thereby giving Greece the same rights as the other powers on the condition that Greece would reciprocate.

Turkish attitude respecting the Greek Treaty could be summariyzed as follows (i) Greeks, as former subjects of the Porte cannot claim to be treated on the same footing as the nationals of other powers with whom the Ottoman Empire has had treaties (capitulations) of long (ii) when these capitulations were signed, they were not transactions based on reciprocity but exceptional privileges granted through the munificence of the Sultan either for political considerations or gratuitously and with no mutual stipulations whatsoever (iii) that Turkey now is entitled as any modern state to secure herself trade advantages in return to any she may grant to other countries and that reciprocity should be the first condition of any such transaction (iv) that Greece should no withhold from Turkish ships and traders the advantages Greek ships ands traders are enjoying in the Empire (v) since this is a new state of affairs involving as it does a new state, justice demands that both countries get an equal treatment. Zographos rejected the Turkish thesis without outrightly repudiating its validity. He claimed on his part that as

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Greece belonged to Europe, she should be entitled to the same treatment as the other European powers. He based his claim on the first article of the protocol of 3 February 1830. The Porte was ready to acknowledge Zographos' demands on condition that she obtained reciprocal treatment in exchange. Reşid Bey, then under-secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and future Grand Vizier, stated in a memorandum to the representatives of the Powers in Constantinople dated 24 January 1838, that Article 1 of the London Protocol, while granting Greece the commercial rights of a sovereign state did not purport to define and specify these right or to withhold from either of the two parties the principle of equality in the defence of their reciprocal interests. On the other hand, the memorandum went on, Article 8 of the Constantinople treaty of 21 July 1832 stated clearly that both countries were to negotiate a trade treaty based on reciprocity.

The Turkish claim for reciprocity in trade caused concern in the chancelleries of the powers which had signed treaties with Greece, based on different principles. The Porte, would, if she had her way, get more favourable terms and the powers were not likely to admit this. Ottoman insistence for reciprocity was due to no small degree to a question of self-pride more than to any real or fictitious trade advantages the Porte could hope to obtain by extracting favourable terms from Greece, since Greek traders were likely thanks to their spirit of enterprise to overcome in a short time any disadvantage imposed on them. On the other hand, the Porte, was trying to prevent the desertion of her own Greek reayas who would be attracted by the advantages conferred by Greek nationality, should Greece obtain favourable terms from the trade treaty. Britain appeared to be against the Porte's interpretation of the Protocols while Russia seemed to favour it.

Greek exports to Turkey consisted of three items, *viz*., wine, tobacco and olive oil. Owing to its cheapness, Greek wine was smuggled on a large scale into the Ottoman dominions and the Porte to protect its own producers decided to levy on Greek goods a customs duty equivalent to the taxes imposed on similar local products. The Greek government retaliated by imposing similar taxes on Ottoman goods. The Ottoman stand was that Greece could not claim to avail herself of the same rights granted to the European powers who exported to the Empire manufactured goods, whereas Greek exports were in open competition with similar local products. The similarity of the agricultural production of both countries and the intermingling of the two populations made it imperative for the Porte to ensure that treaties signed with the other powers could not be used as a precedent for the treaty to be negotiated with Greece.

Progress in the negotiations suffered yet another set-back when Zographos, appointed minister of foreign affairs had to leave Constantinople in January 1838. The Porte had grown accustomed to his presence and he had managed to establish some good personal relations with a number of high-

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urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

ranking Ottoman officials including the reis efendi Akif. On the other hand, the former's arch-enemy Pertev Efendi was known to be virulently anti-Greek and opposed to any conciliation or appeasement. He was reported as saying that the separation of Greece from the Ottoman empire was but a temporary situation. The Sultan and some ministers of the Porte shared this opinion which was justified by the internecine strife that characterized Greek internal politics. Nevertheless, Zographos was received by the Sultan on his departure, not as a Greek envoy but in his quality of foreign minister nominate. This was the only amour-propre satisfaction that Zographos could derive from a stay of four years in the Ottoman capital. He left as chargé d'affaires, the councellor of the mission a former reaya called Argyropoulo whom the Porte had employed earlier in his career and had had causes to complain of in view of his untrustworthyness.

Zographos was to return to Constantinople some time later in November 1839 to congratulate the new Sultan Abdülmecid on behalf of the Greek government on his accession to the Ottoman throne. He availed himself of this opportunity to resume the negotiations with the Porte and a treaty was finally signed in March 1840. Thereupon the Porte appointed Kostaki Musurus Bey first Ottoman envoy to Greece. That the treaty was never ratified by the Greek cabinet who considered it as detrimental to their own national interests did not prevent the long-awaited establishment of proper diplomatic and trade relations between the two countries.

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Caesar E. FARAH

A SPANISH PERSPECTIVE OF THE 'SYRIAN QUESTION' IN 1844

The attention of the great powers of Europe was drawn to what Metternich dubbed 'The Syrian Question", which was at its most intense phase in the half decade following the withdrawal of Muhammad Ali, viceroy of Egypt, from the Syrian region in 1840-41.

Broadly defined, the term question is merely concealing the intent of those powers enjoying special interests in Ottoman Syria to preserve or further these interests. While France was the power traditionally enjoying a position of primacy in this region, she lost ground with the demise of the Egyptian imperium in Syria to those powers that formed an alliance to oust the viceroy, namely Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia. In accepting their assistance, the government of the sultan legitimatized their claim to a voice in the settlement of Syria's administrative and demographic problems.

While France's voice was dimmed in the counsels of the Ottoman government, she was not prepared to forsake a special privilege first granted to Francis I in 1547 by Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, namely to speak on behalf of the Catholic population of the Ottoman empire concentrated mostly in Syria and, more specifically, in Mt. Lebanon. The Egyptian hegemony over Syria was furthered through the viceroy's dependence on the powerful Shibab dynasty that headed the emirate of Mt. Lebanon, had provided France and her dependents in Syria a unique opportunity to solidify her position. But with the demise of Shibab rule that was supported by France. But with the termination of Egypt's domination, France's position was drastically compromised.

Palmerston put together the Quadruple Alliance for the purpose of restoring direct Ottoman rule over Syria. For selfish reasons he did not wish to see France, Britain's principal rival in the Mediterranean, restored to a position of primacy in Syria. Ambassador Canning took up his post in Istanbul in 1841 with instructions to serve as chief spokesman in

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safeguarding Ottoman rights in Syria. If France were to enjoy a voice in determining the administrative restructuring of the Syrian provinces, she could do so only by collaborating with the other powers.

One of the targets of reform was the protégé system that had provided France the pretext for exercising a strong influence among the powerful Catholic sects of Syria and manipulating them thereby to advance her own imperial policies in the eastern Mediterranean. As protector of the Greek sects, Russia was opposed to French support of a system of administration that put her own protégés at a disadvantage. Seeking to build a Protestant base, Prussia through Great Britain advocated freedom of choice for both Greek and Catholic Christians who might be won over to Protestantism when efforts to convert Jews and Druzes came to naught. A staunch supporter of the principle of legitimacy, Metternich insisted that subjects of the sultan regardless of sectarian affiliation owed primary and exclusive allegiance to their sultan. Little wonder then that the government of the sultan turned to Metternich for counsel and advice in combatting the centrifugal tendencies of the sects in Syria through the institution of an administrative structure that would eliminate pretexts for foreign dependence.

While France argued incessantly for the restoration of Shibab rule to Mt. Lebanon in the very person of the deposed Bashir II, Canning and his colleagues in Istanbul made it clear that they would not tolerate the restoration of a system that threatened the interests of non-Catholic sects and factions, particularly the feudals, supported by Great Britain. The intense on-the-scene maneuvering by agents of both sides led to two civil bloody struggles with the partisans of France suffering defeat on both occasions. An attempt at stabilization through the governorship of Ömer Pasha, a Bosnian convert to Islam, failed to win over the feuding factions to the principle of rule by a direct appointee of the central government with no ties to any of the Syrian factions.

Late in 1842 a compromise solution appeared to have been worked out when the dual subgovernorship for Mt. Lebanon was instituted with the blessing of the powers but not of France. Metternich himself had doubts concerning the efficacy of this mode of administration which appeared to formalize the wedge separating the northern district, dominated by a Maronite (Catholic) faction, from the southern, headed by a Druze enjoying the nominal support of the Greek factions allied with him. The Sublime Porte's preference was still for a single administrator over the whole country, an alternative that had the support of all but the Uniate sects (Maronite and Greek Catholics).

Sensing that the dual system might prove enduring, France set out in 1842 to win support amongst the Catholic powers of Europe for a policy that would restore a mono system of rule, but in the person of a Catholic from the house of Shibab, a family with long close ties to France. Since Piedmont

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through Cavour had attempted briefly in 1840-41 to replace France as the recognized protector of Catholic interests in Ottoman Syria, only Spain remained as a major Catholic country whose support France could solicit with some ease.

While Spanish travellers had journeyed to Syria in the seventeenth century, followed later by traders and other contacts, Spain for the most part maintained a low profile in the eastern Mediterranean and had little firsthand knowledge of Syria, a country traditionally regarded a French sphere of influence. In addition, Spain had little official contact with the Ottoman government, with whom for nearly two centuries it had been in direct or indirect conflict. Besides, France historically had allied itself with the Ottoman and was suspect in Spanish circles. In essence, Spain was not particularly prone to support French interests in Syria, especially under circumstances that would yield no discernible advantages but could, on the other hand, jeopardize relations with both the Ottomans and leading European powers.

To avoid being accused of having no concern for Catholic interests in the east and rather than rejecting France's overture with the attending risk of incurring the displeasure of the papacy, which regarded France as the eldest daughter of the church and the safeguarder of Catholic welfare in the Ottoman empire, Spain agreed to look into the situation in Syria before embarking on a course of action.

In a communiqué of November 9, 1842, de Castro, First Secretary of State in Madrid, instructed Lopez de Cordoba, Minister Plenipotentiary at Istanbul, to repare to Syria and observe at close hand the situation there, particularly in Mt. Lebanon where the attention of Ottomans and Europeans had been intensely focused for some years in an attempt to find an administrative solution for a politically disjointed country.

It took years for Lopez de Cordoba to complete his report. The sixty-page document which he finally submitted to Madrid embodies his meticulous observations of the entire Syrian scene, a unique compact statement coceming the country.[1]

The minister's report provides scholars a well-rounded and balanced assessment of the human, demographic, social, economic, religious and political attitudes and conditions accounting for the destabilization of Syria and its international dependence for redress. De Cordoba puts in perspective events, claims and counter claims, representations and misrepresentations, facts and distortions with a sense of detachment that could ensue only from the knowledge that for his country there was no immediate stake in the findings.

It would be difficult to capsulize the entire content of de Cordoba's

[1] The date of completion, as indicated (p. 50) is September 8, 1844. It is preserved in the archives of the Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (Madrid) in the collection *Turquia — Legaciones*, No. 263.

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observations, embodied in a carefully put together report that merits publication in its entirety for the wealth of objective information reducing a complex picture to a symmetrical whole. We shall concern ourselves with the highlights in order to show how domestic conditions had a direct bearing on the nature and extent of the foreign involvement in Ottoman Syria's internal affairs.

He rightly observes that while Syrians are intelligent and resourceful, they lack social integration, divided as they were (and still are) into a multitude of sects and cultic groupings each enjoying distinguishing customs and views, and whose narrow and special interests often led to hostility and direct confrontation with each other. He found it deplorable that a land with a great past and civilizational tradition should harbor a population lacking a common purpose and direction; that a soil so rich in yield could not sustain adequately the basic food needs of its dwellers, and that a people noted for an historical spiritual legacy should be given to hedonism, corruption and petty bickerings.

More appaling still, Syrians lived in unsanitary dwellings with poor hygiene, unventilated homes, on narrow and un kept streets, susceptible to endless illnesses sustained by pests and the lack of the rudiments of sanitation. Conditions of life were rendered still unbearable by the absence of effective policing against crime and the legacy of the harsh and largely repugnant policies of the Egyptian administration, one of the main reasons why Syrians rose against it and demanded the return of the sultan's direct authority.

Particularism appeared to prevail in the discharge of functional roles in society. Muslims were given to agricultural pursuits, as they inhabited the open agricultural districts and constituted the bulk of inhabitants in the secondary towns and villages. They shouldered, moreover, most municipal burdens, filling important posts in local administrations, and heading branch operations of the central and provincial government. They provided liaison personnel with the capital in Istanbul, oversaw coastal and marine traffic, and headed police functions. Christians and Jews served as middle men in business and banking. They acquired refined bourgeois mannerisms and put their wealth to social and domestic use in the interest of enhancing their status and enjoying the amenities of a life of comfort.

Lopez described the Syrian as basically intelligent with a special aptitude for all the known professions; determined, spirited, versatile in terms of objectives he sets for himself, yet prone to discontent, turbulence, and unrestraint. A good example cited is the sudden discovery of how good it was under the Egyptians, against whom they had revolted less than a year earlier in Mt. Lebanon, only to demand now their return and the return of their Shibab dependents as well.

The larger cities enjoyed facilities lacking elsewhere: mosques,

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synagogues, churches, primary schools to which sons of the bourgeoisie and foreign officials were sent to learn the rudiments of writing, reading and a little religion. In the interior, learning was done at home, from parents, with stress on the practical, or functional knowledge, and devolving on self interest, motivated by the instincts for survival. As a result, the inhabitants of the interior tended to be hospitable and kindly, clinging to local traditions, pragmatic in their mores and attitudes, instinctively capable but unhampered by idealism, opinionated, and insisting on the rule of reason and justice — and not because of any ethical code they sought to enforce. The element he found to be demoralized and mistreated was the Bedouin.

Access to education prevailed largely in Mt. Lebanon, with apparently most sects participating: Muslim, Druze, Alawite, Mutawali, Greek (both Catholic and Orthodox), Maronite, and some Bedouins. The prevalence of denominational schools and of those fostered by foreign missions encouraged enrollments, albeit a very small percentage of the school age children could afford to participate. Subjects taught focused on the Arabic language, even though very few books were available to students. In foreign mission schools, notably Lazarite at this time, French, Italian, geography and history were among subjects taught in addition to Arabic. Lazarites had schools at 'Ayntura in Mt. Lebanon, Aleppo, and one in Damascus connected with a primary school administered by the Sisters of Charity. Fathers of the Holy Land order operated a school in Damascus in cooperation with the Melchite Greek sect and stressed reading, writing and religion with the Arabic language as the medium of instruction. This type of curriculum was stressed in schools throughout Syria. The initiative for primary education was either foreign or denominational. Local governments showed no inclination to sponsor and maintain schools. Proliferation thus continued, with Jesuit and American Protestant missions soon getting involved on a larger scale than hitherto manifested by the older missions and expanding into the secondary level. The tolerance of the Egyptian administration had given this trend considerable impetus.

This growing dependence on outsiders, awakened the resentment of the Muslim population who lashed out against both the Ottomans for allowing it and the Europeans for exploiting a sensitive area, education, to promote their own special interests. Indeed, dependence on Europeans with rival interests seemed to encourage rivalries among their clients, *i.e.* Maronites (backed by French missions) *vs.* Druzes (backed by British and American missions). Even interdenominational struggles were reinforced by foreign backing: Latins *vs.* Greeks over control of keys to the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem witnessed Catholic powers pitted against Greco-Russian consular officials on the scene. Of all the sects, the Muslims exhibited the greatest tolerance, noted de Cordoba, even though most other minorities were pitted against them.

Such centrifugal tendencies were blamed on a weak government given

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to venality, arbitrariness, and shortsightedness. All authority e.g. political, civil, military, and judicial was in the hands of the Pasha (the vali or governor) who also served as Mushir (commander of the Syria-based Ottoman army). De Cordoba alleges that neither As'ad, vali of the Sidon province (in whose jurisdiction turbulent Mt. Lebanon fell) nor Najib (vali of Damascus), did anything to improve the common good by instituting better administrative practices. This in the minister's observations was clearly discernible in dilapidated public facilities and in the lack of trust by the governed who, at the least sign and for the most trivial of disputes, would rather seek out a foreigner for the redress of grievance than trust in the justice of their officials.

Equally demoralizing was the absence of any logistics in the movement of goods and humans with safety and efficiency. Indeed, the army was observed to appropriate at will food from the natives with little of it to spare, disrupting routine agricultural life by forced labor on public projects (namely on forts overlooking harbors, *i.e.* at Acre). Tobacco, a main product of Syria was not expected to reach Damietta in the Nile delta from Tyre along the southern Syrian coast because of poor handling facilities (1843-44). Moreover, in spite of the richness of Syria's soil, the country was unable to produce up to capacity on account of the absence of expert knowledge and capital. Besides, exasperated over the lack of an efficient administrative system, Syrians by and large were on the verge of revolt. They had placed their hope in the Turco-European alliance to help stabilize local government only to turn skeptical and to view the alliance as an instrument for cementing Turkish authority in Syria in replacement of the Egyptian they helped outst. Ottomans, on the other hand, were equally exasperated with the Syrians, and particularly the inhabitants of Mt. Lebanon, both Maronite and Druze, because they would not opt for an administrative structure that might cut off their dependence on European protectors. An attempted solution in the form of the dual subgovernorship in Mt. Lebanon, which Mustafa Pasha, overall commander of the Ottoman armies, himself had supervised into existence in 1842 did not meet with full approval on the part of either the Maronites or their French protectors, particularly since the indemnification they sought from Druzes for a war they themselves launched against them, and lost, had not been forthcoming. This was being used now as a pretext to call for the return to a single governorship headed by a Shibab. And at this juncture, observed de Cordoba, both Austria and France were clamoring for the same while Britain, Russia and the Ottoman government were opposed to the return of Shibab rule.

To enforce the dual system, the Sublime Porte was prepared to dispatch four thousand fighting men. Ministers were becoming increasingly anti Christian and anti European in spirit because of intransigence over the administrative structure in place. The attitude of the natives was violent, fanatic, and incompatible with peaceful and civilized ways as decreed by

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modern politics. Thus the situation in Syria in the views of de Cordoba did not lend itself to a positive and uncontestable resolution at this time.

In assessing the political alignments, de Cordoba observes three parties in contention: 1) the Muslim, consisting of those favoring the Egyptian over the Ottoman and those opposed; 2) the Christian, divided into Latin and eastern rites patronized by European powers rivaling each other for dominance, and 3) a feudal party, localized largely in Mt. Lebanon, seeking to hold on to traditional privileges.

The European alignment shows Britain favoring Muslim sectarians and pro-Ottoman Christians; France, adherents of Latin rites under treaty arrangements of long standing with the Sultan and Russia, Greeks and other co-religionists who look to her for support, and whose interests she promotes, but not because of treaty obligation. De Cordoba called attention to the quiet efficient ways employed by Russian officials to win the support of the Greek Christian sects in Syria and to avoid the pitfalls others could not. In his judgement, the Russians had numerous supporters, working quietly and in secretness to move in predetermined direction.

British interest in Syria appeared to manifest a much broader base, catering to Muslims, Turks, Druzes, Protestants and Jews. Part of this broad interest is dictated by increasing traffic in goods in the eastern Mediterranean with a proliferation of consular and trading outposts. Another consideration is Britain's emergence as the leading European power in the counsels of the Ottoman empire, whose integrity it now seeks to preserve. Because of this broad-based interest, Britain undertook for commercial and political reasons to consolidate European support and win Ottoman acceptance for the July 15, 1840 treaty that signaled the beginning of the end for Egyptian political and economic hegemony in Syria.

France's interests at this juncture were seen as entirely political in view of the fact that Great Britain had come to supplant her as the commercial power in this region. By reinforcing the Catholic component of her policy objective, France expected to check further British advances in Syria. Mt. Lebanon became an indirect battle scene.

The battle that ensued between partisans of both sides could not bypass the Greek sectarians who, forced into a situation of having to choose sides, would only end up casualties in a struggle that was not their own. Dependence on Russia was a foregone conclusion. Armenians, with their patriarchate headquartered in an area controlled by Russians (Ekmiadjin) likewise looked to Russians for protection. The Treaty of Adrianople of 1829 appeared to have encouraged a more active Russian role on behalf of Greek sectarians and other co-religionists. Prelates of the Orthodox church in Syria looked to the czarist government for the prestige and valor associated with enjoyment of her protection throughout the empire. They in turn knew how to cultivate their support. At the time of de Cordoba's mission, Russian

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Consul Bazili journeyed to Jerusalem personally to present to the Armenian patriarch the medal of St. Ann, which he promptly accepted without first obtaining permission from the sultan's government as the acceptance of gifts from foreign sources mandated. Nor had Bazili obtained the approval of St. Petersburg in making such a presentation so precipitously. The Russian government also enjoyed special commercial privileges not granted to other powers, namely a 3% customs levy as compared with 12% charged the British for goods they brought in.

Like Russia's and France's Austria's influence was held to be similarly political in motivation. Vienna was a signatory of the 1840 treaty which formed the Quadriple Alliance with aims purely political. In the Treaty of Karlowitz of 1699 Austria had emerged a Catholic power equal to France in the eyes of the Sublime Porte; and while France was still the officially recognized protectress of Catholics under Ottoman control, Austria's counsels were given respectful attention. Her agents at this time were manifesting direct interest in Catholic affairs in Syria through consular agents who often derived from native sects. Like France's their concern was over the labors of the Anglican bishopric newly established at Jerusalem and American missions who in the eyes of Uniate churches and their prelates constituted a direct threat to their flock in that they had become the target of conversion, as did adherents of the Greek rites, when the original mission of British and American missions to convert Jews and Druzes failed.

A case in point was the recent sudden conversion in the Hasbayya area of thirty eight families adhering to Greek orthodoxy with promises tendered them by American missionaries and supported by British consular agents. They were enticed to Protestantism with pecunary and other promises which guaranteed them employment and the prestige of being identified with English influence. Indeed, even certain Catholic missions, like the Carmelite monks, were known to show greater hospitality and friendliness towards the British than towards their official protectors. The imperious attitude of French officials in Syria did not endear them to those from whom they expected gratitude and adulation. Indeed, the Holy Land Order was openly hostile to them. They viewed the French visible concern for Catholic welfare as a vainglorious display tailored by the politics of the moment to help France regain credibility.

Sardinian agents did not help French efforts to right their image in that they sought to win over the favors of Maronite and other Uniates at the expense of French rivals. In an attempt to appease the Maronites, the Austrian government donated a large sum of money, to be distributed to Christian victims of the campaign against Egypt as a gift from the Austrian people. It was diverted instead by their clergy to finance a campaign in Istanbul and abroad with the view of gaining Ottoman and international support for restoring Shibab rule and thus humiliate their rivals, the Druzes.

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The Austrian and Sardinian position in Syria was enhanced by the fact that many of the clerics and monks serving there derived from Piedmontese origin, notably the Lazarites and Capucins. The mainstay of France's support lie with the para military organizations of the Maronites, often led by priests.

The interests of Prussia, the fourth signatory of the 1840 treaty, were secondary to those of Britain, with whom it cooperated politically in return for British support of Protestant aims being promoted by the Kaiser. Prussian agents lavished most of their attention on Protestant converts and Jews, whom they still hoped to convert. Otherwise, Prussian agents went through the motions of contributing to solutions discussed while having no real interest in them. The Prussian consul in Syria rarely displayed any initiative of his own, being content to take his clues from fellow Protestant consuls of British and American missions. The efficacity of the Anglican bishop supported by him was in serious doubt, particularly when converts made often reverted to their original faiths. If anything, the labors of the Protestant missions only served to draw Catholic and Greek sects closer in resisting their incursions.

In concluding his report, de Cordoba noted that in spite of their involvements, neither the British nor the French could hope to control Syria. Real political power rested with the Muslims, who held Europe both in distrust and in contempt. Even among Catholic parties, he noted, the French did not enjoy consistent support, with many of the Uniate priests being more mindful of Rome's than Paris' wishes. The British did not enjoy any meaningful support among any of the Syrian parties. The other powers were merely content to see the region stabilized under the auspices of the legitimately recognized authority, the Ottoman. Lopez de Cordoba saw no prospects of either France or Great Britain conquering Syria at this time. Syria, in his estimation, was destined to remain "Muslim and Turkish."

While making no specific recommendations of his own in this important document, it is indirectly implied that he would not consider it politic for Spain to become involved in Syria's affairs at this time, certainly not under the circumstances which moved the Spanish government to order his mission. Conditions in Syria were far from conducive to stability and tranquility. Besides, there was no tradition of Spanish involvement in the Syrian region nor any prospects for Spain to become an important power in the eastern Mediterranean at a time when France and Great Britain were battliing for ascendancy. The fact that Spain never responded to France's overtures for support on Catholic grounds, seem to lend credence to the inferences of de Cordoba's findings.

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Dimitris LOULES

THE POSITION OF GREECE TOWARDS THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR

(Additional data from Russian sources)

For a considerable time after the formation of the modern Hellenic state in the early 1830's, nobody could be optimist about the future of the relations between the Ottoman Empire and its former subject. The unyielding seven year war, which led to the Greek independence, had created a deep gap, difficult to be disregarded. This had happened in spite of the wish of Greece's "Protective Powers", which, more than once, had urged for the establisment of formal diplomatic relations between the Greek Kingdom and the Empire. Greece from her side was sincerely aiming at this end, hoping not only for official recognition by the Ottoman Empire but also to promote financial transactions between the two states—a condition of primary importance, particularly for the redevelopment of the Hellenic merchant marine.[1]

The government of King Othon—which had succeeded the administration of President Ioannis Capodistrias in 1833—decided to pursue a policy of rapprochement vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire, by establishing consulates and vice-consulates within the Empire, especially in those areas mostly populated by Greeks[2]. In 1835, at a rather early stage, the Greek government appointed Constantine Zographos as its official representative in the Ottoman capital. However time was not yet ripe for such a step; Zographos was recalled in Athens,[3] but four years later, with the ascension of the new Sultan Abdul Medjit in July 1839, he was again

1 From 1830 onwards, even before the Porte had officially recognised the Greek state, a considerable number of Greek vessels sailed to Ottoman ports without any obstacles at least until 1840.

2 Until 1836 in most of the important places populated by Greek were installed unsalaried consulates of the Kingdom of Greece.

3 He was subsequently appointed minister of Foreign affairs and remaind in office until his second diplomatic mission.

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despatched, and this time his mission proved fruitful. On 3 March 1840, a treaty which emphasised its commercial meaning, was signed between the two parts. However this treaty was met with strong resistance from the public in Athens and therefore was never ratified.[4] Thus the Greco-Ottoman relations—with the exception of 1841, when another revolt in Crete took place[5] remained in a wavering condition until the Revolt for the Constitution in Athens, on September the 3rd 1843, which transformed Greece into a constitutional Monarchy. This fact coincided with the shy emergence of the Hellenic bourgeoisie in the political scene of the State, which aimed at challenging the then prevailing autocratic administrative system. In that embryonic stage, the somehow ambiguous ideology of the "new" class became more concrete as regards the liberation of the Greeks still living under the Ottoman rule.

The new ideology, which was soon to give a new orientation to the foreign policy of the Kingdom, widely known as the "Great Idea", was initially expressed in 1844 by a parliamentary speech of the Greek politician and later prime minister Ioannis Kolettis: "Greece" — he pointed out —"being in the center of Europe between East and West, intends to enlighten with her rebirth the East just as her fall enlightened the West. In the spirit of this task and of that 'Great Idea', we have always seen the representatives of the Nation assembled, not only to decide on the fate of Greece alone, but on the fate of the whole Greek Nation".[6]

With the above words Kolettis summarised the policy of an eventual liberation of all, without exception, the Orthodox Christian Greeks living outside Greece, by force, if necessary.

However, the political climate reigning in the European cabinets did not favour such precarious plans, which could jeopardize the balance of power in South East Europe — as this balance was understood by Greece's "Protective Powers". Russia in particular was annoyed by the belligerent

4 This treaty produced negative reactions in Athens and was considered as 'totally unacceptable', although the Russians believed that it was satisfactory for Greek interests and pressed the Greek government to proceed to ratification, (Archiv of Russian Foreign Policy - A.R.F.P. - Secretariate, F. 9 [1841], G. Katakazy, Russian ambassador in Athens, to K. Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister, 26.10.1841). The Otttoman government responded by a note of 21.7.1840 in which Greek commercial activity was banned in the Ottoman territory, (See the text in G.F. de Martens, *Recueil Général des Traités*, Göttingen, 1843, vol. 1 pp. 206-207). For the first diplomatic contact between Greece and the Ottoman empire see also N. Moschopoulosk, "Aperçu d'Histoire Diplomatique des États Balkaniques au XIXe siècle" *Les Balkans* (1934) vol.2 p.464 and S. Kuneralp "The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece", *supra*.P. 70-78.

5 During that period the Ottoman government often complained for the anti-Turkish articles of the Athenian press. Meanwhile Russia was urging Greece to return to normal relations with Turkey, (A.R.F.P. Secr. 10, Katakazy to Nesselrode, 5.1.1842).

6 See the full text of Kolettis' speach in E. Kyriakides, *History of Modern Hellenism* (in Greek), Athens, 1892 vol. 1, p.493.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

views of certain political circles in Athens, for the foreign policy of Tzar Nicolas I was, at that time, against any attempt of dismembering the Ottoman Empire; there still existed the spirit of the Treaty of Unkiar Iskelessi (8 July 1833). Kolettis himself, who was soon to become the first elected prime minister of Greece, was obliged to show moderation. A few months later he assured the Russian ambassador in Athens that all accusations that he fostered plots against the Ottoman state, were false and that this 'misunderstanding' was based on the "chaleur de l'improvisation" of his speech and he continued:" On ne devait pas cependant me supposer assez dépourvu de jugement pour croire qu'avec l'exiguité des ressources dont la Grèce dispose et l'état délabré de ses finances, j'aie la prétention de faire la conquête de Constantinople". Almost totally neglecting his 'liberating' policy, Kolettis added that he certainly was deeply moved as far as the future of his compatriots living under the Ottomans was concerned, but he hastened to point that, "leurs destinées sont entre leurs mains. Non seulement j'éviterai avec soin tout ce qui pourrait altérer les relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage qu'il est de l'intérêt de la Grèce d'entretenir avec la Porte Ottomane, mais j'empecherai par tous les moyens en mon pouvoir que ceux qui seraient tentés de troubler la tranquillité intérieure, réalisent leurs projets".[7]

It was because of the influence of the foreign powers, but also of the prevailing bad condition of the country's finance, that for the next ten years the external policy of the Greek governments did not include any aggressive actions against Turkey.

Things were to change in 1853. Russia and the Ottoman Empire went to war and the precarious alliance among Greece's Protective Powers' — France, Great Britain and Russia — collapsed. The Crimean War produced enthusiastic feelings among the public in Greece. The Athenian press expressing at that time the general views, urged the Greek government to profit from the Russo-Ottoman conflict in order to promote the policy of the Great Idea.[8] At that uncertain moment the position of King Othon was less belligerent and this attitude was duly encouraged by the Russian Ambassador N. Persiany. The latter, just as his government did, expected that the conflict between the two empires might not lead to open hostilities. Therefore he advised Greece to keep herself in a state of 'watchful neutrality'.[9] Wishing, however, to make use of Greece as a possible ally, in case later conditions required it, Persiany informed Saint Petersbourg that almost all the political world in Greece shared the pro-

7 A.R.F.P. Secr. F. 10 (1844), N. Persiany, the new Russian Ambassador, to Nesselrode, 29.8.1844.

8 For an aspect of the Hellenic press in that period see D. Dontas, *Greece and the Great Powers during the Crimean War* (in Greek), Thessaloniki, 1973 pp. 26-27, 40-41, 64-65. "Le peuple plus que jamais porte pour la Grande Idée", reported Persiany to Nesselrode in 11.9.1853, (A.R.F.P. Secr. F. 8).

9 *Ibid.*, Nesselrode to Persiany, 7.2.1853.

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Russian and anti-Ottoman feelings of the public; these feelings aimed at paving the way for an enforced liberation of the neighboring provinces of Thessaly and Epirus[10] In early July 1853, as soon as the news of the breaking of the diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey reached Athens, war spirits were further aroused and finally King Othon shared the same views.[11]

Greece seemed irrevocably ready to go to war against the Ottoman Empire, almost ignoring the threatening attitude of the Western Powers, especially of France. According to Persiany, the French were considered in Athens as "the worst enemies of the Orthodoxy, because they were offering arms and ammunition to the Turks"[12]. Queen Amelia in particular, did not hesitate to admit openly that "les Français sont plus Turcs que les Turcs eux mêmes", and to declare that "la Russie est la seule Puissance qui nous porte un intérêt sincère".[13] Certainly in its official contacts, the Greek government had repeatedly assured the Western Powers that even in spite of the public opinion, Greece was determined to keep friendly relations with the Porte and that the military movements, which had already began on the Greco-Ottoman frontiers, aimed exclusively at stopping the local brigandage[14] . Nobody of course could believe these false assurances.

Now the position of Greece was promptly appreciated in Saint Petersbourg. Persiany was more than once authorised to inform the Royal Family that whatever would be the end of the war, "Russia would never neglect the rightful interests of the Hellenic Nation".[15] At the same time he reported that the news of the Oecumenical Patriarch's circular, in which he — perhaps unwillingly — denounced the Russians as warmongers and aggressors against the Porte, produced negative impressions within the country. "Greece"—Persiany pointed -"sought in the War a unique opportunity to achieve the liberation of Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia. The people, more than ever are bound to the principles of the Great Idea" and this in spite of the poor economic situation of the country, which the King himself had admitted in his private discussions with the Russian Ambassador.[16]

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10 "The Greeks will be careful as long as peace continues, but when hostilities began, there is no human force, which may stop them" (A.R.F.P.,F.1, Persiany to Nesselrode, 24.7.1853).

11 *Ibid.*, Persiany to Nesselrode 29.5.1853.

12 *Ibid.*, Persiany to Nesselrode 2.7.1853. See also Dontas, *op. cit.*, p.48.

13 A.R. F.P. Persiany to Nesselrode, 2.10.1853. The news on the Russo-Ottoman war declaration became known to Athens on 10.10.1853.

14 *Ibid.*, Persiany to Nesselrode, 2.10.1853; Dontas, *op. cit*,. p.115, See also E. Driault et M. Lhéritier, *Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos Jours*, Paris, 1925 vol. 2. p.380.

15 (A.R.F.P.), Secr F. 5 (1854), Persiany to Nesselrode, 17.12.1853.

16 *Ibid.* F. 5(1853) Persiany to Nesselrode 11.9.1853. "Misery dominates the country", King Othon confessed to the Russian Ambassador.

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The Russian government in the meantime, even after the critical battle of Sinop[17] still preferred not to foster the opening of another front in the south Balkans, which might deteriorate its already critical relations with the Western Powers. The Russian Chancellor K.V. Nesselrode advised King Othon, who now openly disagreed with his government, the latter still maintaining a peaceful attitude — to keep for the time being an 'expectant' position. He hastened though to remark that this should not exclude certain military movements, so that Greece could control any possible act of agitation from Turkey, a fact rather unlikely to happen[18]. This last hint may prove that Russia had never abandoned the idea of a future use of the Greek factor, in order to create serious distractions to the Ottomans, in case a military relief in the main front became necessary.

Things began to alter soon áfter England and France decided to fight on the Ottoman side and consequently declared war to Russia in late March 1854. The new serious situation, for now Russia had to face a much powerful enemy, obliged the government of Saint Petersbourg to summon allies from wherever possible. The Russian applications towards Greece became stronger by the time the war turned in favour of the enemy, during the siege of Sebastopol.

Russia suggested openly that Greece should carry a policy of constant disturbance in the frontier areas and thus to tie on the spot as many Ottoman troops as possible. Nesselrode proposed that Greek activity ought to coincide with the long expected offensive of the Russian army in spring 1855[19]. Russia did not hesitate to assist financially the insurgents against the Ottoman authorities in Epirus and Thessaly with the sum of 120.000 roubles and, if we have to believe Persiany, the additional amount of 463.320 francs was forwarded one month later.[20] Meanwhile Nesselrode had promised, once again not to conclude peace with the Ottoman government, without having previously ensured a satisfactory arrangement as regards the fate of the Ottoman Christian population in the South Balkans, and that included categorically the annexation by Greece of the long wanted provinces of Thessaly and Epirus. The Russian Chancellor promised that in case the Greeks helped Russia, the latter, in the future negotiations for peace was ready to secure for Greece, "un ordre des choses plus pacifique et plus durable que celui qui offrait la Turquie et son gouvernement. Aussi les efforts des Grecs pour l'affranchissement d'un joug étranger et odieux ne pourront qu'être secondés et appuyés par l'armée imperiale lorsque franchissant le Danuble elle avancerait vers l'intérieur de la Roumelie".[21] It

17 The news of the battle, which took place on 18.11.1853, reached Athens on December the 2nd 1853 (Dontas; *op. cit.* p. 80).

18 A.R.F.P. Secr. F. 5 (1854), Nesselrode to Persiany 24.2.1854.

19 *Ibid.* F. 6 (1854) Nesselrode to Persiany, 14.2.1854. See also Luc Monnier, *Etude sur les origines de la Guerre de Crimée*, Genève, 1977 p. 116.

20 D. Dakin, *The Unification of Greece*, London 1972 p. 84; also A.R.F.P. Secr. F. 6 (1854) Persiany to Nesselrode 24.2.1854.

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could be expected that promises would be more concrete in the course of the war. Nesselrode did his best to make himself clear, by getting rightfully the pulse of the Greek people and their hopes:

> La part active que les Grecs du Royaume auraient prise à l' œuvre de l'émancipation" — he wrote to Persiany — "les sacrifices qu'ils y auraient apportés, renforceront les vives sympathies, on pourrait presque dire, la parenté qui existent déjà entre eux et les Grecs de la Thessalie et de l'Epire. Toutes les voies seraient dès lors préparés pour que, dans la présente guerre, ces deux provinces deviennent naturellement et nécessairement des annexes du Royaume Hellénique et forment par leur réunion, si non un Etat aussi étendu et aussi puissant qu'on pourrait le désirer à Athènes, mais qui saurait se faire respecter par ses voisins.
>
> Nous parlons ici une langue pratique, en indiquant une combinaison dont la réalisation peut avoir des chances prochaines et que l'Empereur serait tout disposé à seconder par ses armes durant la guerre et à appuyer plus tard par la voie des négociations, lorsqu'une entente pourra s'établir entre nous et les Puissances qui, sans provocation ni motif réel aucun,se déclarent nos ennemis et nous obligent à interrompre dans ce moment toute relation avec elles.[22]

The interest shown by the Russians became less ardent as soon as Greco-Ottoman relations were severed. Further on the military occupation of the country by French and British troops, which lasted from May 1854 until February 1857, almost excluded Greece from any practical assistance the Russians could expect from that part of the Balkans.[23] This fact, although practically meaning a *de facto* elimination of any possible military assistance from Greece in the nearby Ottoman provinces, nevertheless did not stop public opinion in Athens and elsewhere to be strongly in favour of the war and constantly pro-Russian.[24] "The Greeks are more 'Russians' than ever", Persiany reported to Saint Petersbourg on September 1854.[25] This last remark had a special significance, as Russia had attempted to defend herself after the British Foreign Office had revealed the secret talks between Emperor Nicolas and the British ambassador in the Russian capital. The British alleged that the Tzar had assured Lord Seymour, that he did not intend to let Greece extend her territory at the

21 *Ibid.* Periany to Nesselrode 3.3.1854.

22 *Ibid.* Nesselrode to Persiany 28.2.1854. However not all Russian dignitaries shared the same views. Nesselrode was warned by Brunow, the Russian ambassador in Londan, that"... nous verserons notre sang et nous répandrons nos trésors pour que le Roi Othon gagne la Thessalie", (Monnier, *op. cit.* p. 81).

23 The French troops were the first to disembark in Pireus On 26.5.1854, (Dontas *op. cit* p. 137 and Driault-Lhériter *op. cit.* p.393-397).

24 *Ibid.* F.6 Persiany to Nesselrode 26.9.1854.

25 *Ibid.* F.6 Persiany to Nesselrode 26.9.1854.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
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expense of Turkey. Russia on her side had published on May 2 1854 a circular, in which she endeavoured to divert these accusations, but apparently, at that time, nothing could detach the Greek minds from their attachment to Russia, which was to last until the very end of the war.[26]

We may assume that the Greek leadership — apart from certain most prominent government members — and also the great mass of the people, had repeatedly misunderstood the real fact, that external policy should never be mixed with romanticism. The ideology frame of the Great Idea had certainly been adopted by the large majority of the Nation purely and sincerely,[27] since its essential purpose — the liberations of their enslaved compatriots — was righteous and sacred. But, together with almost all political leadership, the Royal Family included, they could not and did not realise that the Great Idea became at that time a means of supporting foreign interests in Greece. Perhaps one could not also foresee that gradually the Great Idea was reduced to an alternative, used by the ruling class on occasional internal disturbances, mostly of financial origin, which might threaten its authority.

Greece in the early 1850's was the object of the European States' antagonism and her so-called *Alytrotiki* (Liberating) policy, become, during the Crimean War, one of the defensive weapons of Russia against Turkey and her Western Allies. It may be certain that the offers of Saint Petersbourg were sincere, in order to secure the alliance of Greece. Therefore one may presume that had Russia won the war eventually, the results could be different for Greece too. Accordingly, it could not be fair to characterise unquestionably the external policy of Greece as 'adventurous' both towards the Greeks living in the Ottoman Empire and towards her 'Protective Powers'. In any case the somehow 'coward' and wavering attitude of the Greek government, which was not able even to support effectively the revolts in Epirus and Thessaly, did not prevent France and Great Britain from imposing to Greece an insulting military occupation, which was to last for long after the end of the Crimean War and the proclamation of the *Hatt-ı Hûmayun* (18.2.1856)[28] . Greece meanwhile was obliged to resume[29] diplomatic relations with Turkey in May 1855 and two months later a commercial treaty, this time dutifully ratified, was concluded between the two States.[30]

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26 Dontas *op. cit.* P. 110, Driault-Lhéritier *op. cit.* p. 384.

27 For a general conception of the Hellenic Great Idea, see the work of E. Driault, *La Grand Idée, La Renaissance de LJ'Hellenisme*, Paris, 1920.

28 Persiany reported to Saint Petersbourg that in Greece it was a general belief that the Ottoman reforms could not work in Christian Ottoman provinces, (A.R.F.P. Secr. F. 7b [1856], Persiany to Gortchakov, the new Russian Foreign Minister, 17.2.1856).

29 The Ottoman Ambassador Nechet Bey had left the Greek capital on 21.3.1854.

30 This treaty was signed by the Ottoman Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha and the newly appointed (March 1855) ambassador of Greece A. Kountouriotis in Kanlica - suburb on the Asian side of the Bosporus - on May the 23rd 1855, (See A.R.F.P. Secr., F. 10

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In the meantime Russia had not abandoned the Greeks. The greatest part of the Greek volunteers, who had fought with the Russians in Sebastopol, managed to return to Greece unmolested; but a number of them were taken prisoners and were later released, following the demarches of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey Boudienef[31]. A greater service, however, was offered to Greece by the Russian government during the Congress of Peace in Paris. During the negotiations the Russian delegation relied mainly on a memoir of Persiany to the Russian Foreign Ministry, in which he noted that, as a result of the foreign military presence, Greece ceased to be an independent state and that foreign interventions from England and France produced serious obstacles for Greece to follow a national external policy. Henceforth Greece should be relieved from the consequences of the Anglo-French antagonism. This could only be achieved — the Russians believed —if a) British and French troops immediately evacuated Greek territory, b) foreign intervention to stop and every unilateral act of each 'Protective Power' concerning Greece should be avoided without first consulting the other two Powers and c) Greece should be given financial assistance in order to remedy the consequences of the foreign occupation.[32]

It was thanks to the Russian insistance that Greece was finally released from the British and French troops, on the condition that, in future, she should follow a policy of peace towards the Ottoman Empire and abandon any activity which was likely to disturb the 'balance of power in the Balkans'. This decision was in practice enforced to Greece — until the end of the reign of King Othon and long afterwards — although the problems between the Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire could not be solved, since the areas claimed by the Greeks were heavily populated by their compatriots. In the present case, however, the Crimean War may be characterised as the first occasion when the Greek state attempted to promote the principles of the Great Idea through and by the antagonism of the Great Powers in the Balkans.

Persiany to Nesselrode 3.6.1855). On September 1854 the Ottoman government insisted on receiving financial compensation from Greece, because of the considerable damage in the Aegean Sea trade, before agreeing to resume diplomatic relations with the Kingdom, (*Ibid*, F. 5, Persiany to Nesselrode 26.9.1854).

31 A.R.F.P. Secr F. 7b (1856) Persiany to Gortchakov, 17.2.1856. In another occasion, on April 21st 1855 in Paris, the Great Duke Nicolas, expressed Russia's gratitude for the Greek volunteers to King Othon's aide de camp, Colonel Botzaris by the following words: "Nous sommes heureux, mon frère (Tzar Alexander II - Tzar Nicolas had died on 18.2.1855) et moi de témoigner notre reconnaissance aux braves légions de volontaires Grecs, qui ont prêté leurs concours dans les Principautés Danubiennes contre les Mussulmans, et qui payent de leur vie ou de leur liberté, leur dévouement à cause du Redempter. Nous les avons vu à L'œuvre, les Grecs sont des véritables lions", (A.R.F.P. Secr F. 10-1855- Persiany to Nesselrode 3.6.1855).

32 *Ibid*. F. 8 (1856) Persiany to Gortchakov 3.6.1856. See also Driault- Lhéritier *op. cit*. p. 411.

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Selim DERİNGİL

SOME COMMENTS ON THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ABDULHAMID II

All states with established foreign policies have always had recourse to "legitimating mechanisms" and ideologies in the ordering of their foreign relations. The Ottoman State was no exception to this rule.

The originality of the Ottoman Empire lies in the fact that it was the first non-Western state to fully adopt and assimilate the rules and institutions of Western Diplomacy. The relations of the Ottoman State and the West passed through three successive stages; clear superiority vis-à-vis the West, obligatory and grudging admission of equality, and finally attempts at the recovery of equality when confronted by clear Western superiority. Just as Europe was successfully imposing its own system on the rest of the world from the early 1500's onwards it was constantly haunted by this alien and hostile presence in its very own 'back garden':

> It thus represented a reversal of what was becoming in the sixteenth and seventeeth centuries the 'normal intercontinental — projection of power. European influence was radiating in all directions around the globe; in this one instance Asian influence had penetrated deep into Europe and refused to be shoved back...[1]

But by the 1700's the Sublime Porte was clearly on the defensive and by the early 1800's seemingly in mortal danger. The story of the integration of the Ottomans to European diplomacy unfolds within this context.

As Şerif Mardin has indicated the first European diplomatic term to be used in Ottoman transcription was "status quo" (*istatüko*). It was used by Selim III's advisor Tatarcık Abdullah Molla in drafting the 1789 treaty after the disastrous war against Austria and Russia. The next two words to

1 J.C. Hurewitz; "Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System", *Middle East Journal,* Vol. 15 (961) pp. 141-153.

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follow took forty year and they were "politique" and "diplomatie"[2].

The fact that these terms occurred when they did was not an accident. The orientation of the Ottoman State was indeed increasingly the preservation of the "status quo" as it began to lose consistently in the sumzero games of world power politics. With the Treaty of London (1841) the Ottoman Empire was at least recognized on paper as a member of the Concert of Europe. The Treaty of Paris (1856) was to determine that the Sublime Porte was to benefit forthwith from the precepts of International Law[3].

By the end of the 19th century International Law had in fact become the primary "legitimation mechanism" that the Ottomans employed in their dealings with the West. The absence of military force meant that Ottoman statesmen would turn to a very legalistic foreign policy for the pursuit of their goals. The period of the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1908) is the best illustration of this attitude. Hamidian foreign policy was to constantly emphasise "historical rights" (*kadim hukuk*) and "precedent" (*emsal*) in dealings with adversaries as it strove to preserve its polity from further disintegration. In the efforts to prevent the occurence of any precedent likely to harm Ottoman interests in the future, and in the scrutiny of international power balances of any element which might contribute to the Ottoman case, no detail was too minute and no development too obscure. The fact that these efforts failed in the long run to preserve the Empire should not prevent us from trying to evaluate them in their own context.

The use of International Law as a defence mechanism:

A good illustration of the attitude outlined above is a memorandum prepared by Arifî Paşa on 27 *Cemaziyelahir* 1298/28 May 1881[4]. In this document the Paşa pointed out that the French invasion of Tunisia in the same year could easily be shown to be a totally illegal act of aggression even by the European Powers' own criteria. The Ottoman State could put forward the argument that Tunisia was clearly shown to be Ottoman

2 Şerif Mardin: "Some notes on the early phase in the modernisation of communications in Turkey", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 3.1960-61. pp. 250-271.

3 Hurewitz: *op. cit.*

4 Başbakanlık Arşivi. Yıldız Esas Evrakı. (Henceforth referred to as Y.E.E) Kısım 11/Evrak 1128/zarf 126 karton 9. Arifi Paşa (1830-1895) was a member of most of Abdülhamid's cabinets. He represented the Ottoman Empire in the Congresses of Vienna and Paris and served in the Translation Offices of the Imperial Advisory Council (*Divan-ı Hümayûn)* At various dates he served as ambassador in Vienna and Paris and as minister of Foreign Affairs, Education, and Justice. He served only briefly as Grand Vizier in 1879. See: *Türk Meşhurları Ansiklopedisi*. p. 45

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territory in Gotha's Almanac (*Gota Salnamesi*). Nonetheless Arifi Paşa was realistic enough to add that, "the validity of rights is contigent upon their use...", implying that the Ottoman presence in Tunisia was at best symbolic[5].

In order to make full use of any maneuvering space afforded by international law, the Ottoman bureaucrats kept careful watch over any change in the international conjoncture. This was something the Sultan himself insisted upon. After the Berlin Congress, the Sultan ordered the preparation of a report giving an appreciation of his rights of control over the Straits. The report compiled by the legal advisors to the Sublime Porte gave a summary of the course of Ottoman control of the Straits from 1809 to 1878 and concluded:

> According to the precepts of international law if a state controls both shores of a Strait that Strait is not an open seaway but is under the control of that state... The Sea of Azof in Russia is an example... The rights of the Sublime Porte over the Straits are absolute and real rights[6].

No doubt this was an extremely optimistic evaluation of the Ottoman State's treaty position, but it remains an interesting example of the use of international precedents.

In other instances the Ottoman state's interests demanded an extremely rigid interpretation of treaty acts. A good case in point here is the Sultan's attitude to the Cyprus Convention of 4 June 1878. In a personal memorandum prepared on this issue Abdülhamid insisted that the revenues from the salt flats in Cyprus were to remain in his personal purse. This had been agreed with the British who were now expropriating him of this income and adding insult to injury by selling this salt back to Ottoman dominions at a vast profit[7].

The Sultan's primary preoccupation was to prevent the further restriction of his freedom of movement which was already severely curtailed. This meant that the establishment of any precedent likely to work against Ottoman interests was to be avoided at all costs. Over the issue of East Anatolian reform, the proposal that the British, French, and Russian Ambassadors approve the appointment of governors to these provinces met with the Sultan's opposition. In a memoradum in his own hand Abdülhamid stated unequivocally that such a proposal was out of the question as it was "injurious to the rights of the State and amounting to another set of capitulations..." Ottoman statesmen were directed to avoid committment on this score and steer clear of any situation which could lead

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5 *Ibid.*
6 Y.E.E: 14/414/126/9 no date.
7 Y.E.E: 5/2188/83/2 no date.

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to a "fait accompli (*fet akompli*)" in the future, particularly as a precedent might be set for Austria-Hungary to make similar demands in Bosnia.[8]

Even the most remote and obscure changes in world power balances were deemed worthy of note. In another report prepared by the Sublime Porte's legal advisors and dated 5 *Zilhicce* 1311/10 June 1894 a detailled examination was undertaken of the treaty between the British Government and the Government of the Belgian Congo regarding the partition of the Upper Nile Valley. This document specified that the area in question was in fact Egyptian territory and as such under Ottoman sovereignty. Britain was striving to unite her south African possessions with her holdings in Uganda. The legal advisors warned against the increasing tempo of what they called "the coming partition of Africa"[9].

In a similar vein, an undated report compiled by Turhan Paşa gave an assessment of the 1907 Anglo-Russian treaty determining spheres of influence in Afghanistan and Asia. This observer noted that the gainer in this arrangement was clearly Britain, who after having dispensed with French opposition in North Africa, had now secured India against Russian aggression. Particularly the clauses in the treaty giving the British Empire clear superiority in Tibet, an area with strategic bearings on China, India and Turkestan, was a great victory. However, the Paşa noted, this was not a good omen for the Ottoman state as it was an indication of the increasing speed of world partition. Also the arrangement might set a precedent for Austria and Russia to make a similar agreement regarding Ottoman territory with British consent. Therefore, Turhan Paşa concluded, the best policy was to get along with Britain until a "balance of power" could be found to oppose her[10].

As to the Ottoman preoccupation with historical rights, a good example is a report by Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, the Ottoman Commissioner to Egypt, dated 1 *Muharrem* 1323/8 March 1905. Muhtar Paşa stated that the British in Egypt had objected to the construction of Ottoman frontier outposts on the Bingazi-Egyptian frontier and were claiming the territory where these were to be constructed as Egyptian territory. The Paşa suggested that these claims could be refuted by making public the maps given to Mehmet Ali Paşa in 1841, clearly indicating the territory in question as lying within the province of Bingazi[11].

Another facet of Abdülhamid's relations with Europe was his effort to project his image in the European press as a legitimate autocrat like the Kaiser or the Tzar. There is a draft article in the Yıldız collection, penned by

8 Y.E.E: 1/156-XX/156/3 no date. It is worth noting here that *fet akompli* had long since joined *istatüko* in Ottoman diplomatic parlance.

9 Y.E.E: 5/2115/83/2.

10 10 Y.E.E: 14/1337/126/10. Turhan Paşa served as ambassador in Madrid and St. Petersburg as well as Foreign minister.

11 Y.E.E: 5/2127/83/2.

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Selim Melhameh, a trusted aide-de-camp. Although Melhameh obviously set out to flatter his master, the document is interesting precisely because the writer knew what sort of image the Sultan desired to project. Melhameh claimed that the article would appear "in the most influential Paris newspapers". The piece gives extensive details of the good works undertaken since the Sultan's ascendence of the throne:

> Before His Imperial Majesty's reign the contacts between the European rulers and the Ottoman Empire were confined to the Sublime Porte, thus in the absence of direct communications, relations became cold and distant. In previous practice the Porte was almost entirely under the influence of the Great Powers' Ambassadors who easily imposed their wishes... But now His Imperial Majesty can deal direcly with European rulers and thus settle all the most difficult problems...[12]

But increasing polarisation and the division of the Great Powers into two rival camps at the turn of the century made Abdulhamid's policy of non-alignement increasingly difficult. It is indeed possible to discern a certain pessimism and cynicism in the utterances of Ottoman statesmen in this era. Said Paşa wrote in a report dated 6 *Zilkade* 1308/14 June 1891...."All international guarantees given to the Ottoman State change in keeping with the context of the times..."[13]

Another one of the Sultan's viziers, Kâmil Paşa, stated in a report dated 10 *Muharrem* 1306/17 September 1888:... "The gist and validity of all treaties is at all times contingent upon interest..."[14]

As the freedom of movement of the Ottoman State continued to decrease Said Paşa gave an assesment of the difficulties in the way of a neutralist policy:

> As the Sublime finds itself stuck among Christian powers, even if our material and diplomatic strengths were unlimited we would still be obliged to seek the aid of some of the Great Powers... All aid among states however is based on mutual suspicion and calculated interest..[15]

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12 Y.E.E: 14/88-39/13 The date is given simply as "1891", Selim Melhameh was one of Abdülhamid's Arab subjects whom he had promoted to hitherto unprecedented heights. see İ. Ortaylı "Osmanlı İmparatorloğunda Arap Milliyetçiliği" *Tanzimat'dan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. p. 1033.

13 Y.E.E: 39/1784/131/116. Said Paşa served nine times as Grand Vizier during Abdulhamid II's reign: see İ.K. İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*. Vol. 2.p.989.

14 Y.E.E: 39/1873/131/116. Kâmil Paşa served as Grand Vizier in both the Hamidian and Young Turk governments and was known for pro-British leanings see: *Son Sadrazamlar* Vol. 1.p. 196. Y.E.E: 31/1950 mükerrer /45/83:22 *Zilkade* 1299/6 October 1882.

15 Y.E.E: 31/1950 mükerrer /45/83:22 *Zilkade* 1299/6 October 1882.

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Conclusion

An examination of the documents of the Hamidian era might easily leave the researcher with the impression that the Ottoman statesmen were desperately clutching at straws. The evoking of such seemingly flimsy supports as "Gotha's Almanac" or, "the right of the Sultan in the Congo" or "Anglo-Russian relations in Tibet" may appear futile if viewed out of context and with hindsight. But seen in context they furnish important clues as to the thinking of specialists in late Ottoman foreign policy. As put by Mary Wright in her study of similar problems in a Chinese setting :

> For study of these problems of loyalty dissidence and social cohesion what men say is as important as what they do. A doctrine in which belief is widely and consistently professed is usually a surer key to the ethos of an aye than a list of lapses from that doctrine...[16]

16 Mary. C. Wright. *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism* Stanford, 1957 p. 204.

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İlber ORTAYLI

UNE PROCLAMATION UNIVERSELLE DU KHANAT DE CRIMÉE DE JANVIER 1711

La guerre et la paix de Prout, en 1711, n'ont pas entraîné de modification importante de l'équilibre des forces entre la Russie et l'Empire Ottoman; — plus justement, la paix de Prout a offert une occasion de compenser les pertes subies par l'Empire Ottoman au profit de la Russie lors de la paix de Carlowitz. Pourtant, la paix de Prout reste un évènement qui représente un tournant important sur l'échiquier politique européen et l'équilibre des forces en Europe, et détermine la diplomatie à venir. À Prout le bloc constitué de la Suède et de l'Empire Ottoman, de la Pologne, et de l'allié naturel de cette alliance, la France, enregistre des reculs en Europe de l'Est au profit des Habsburg et de la Russie. En particulier, après la paix, l'influence et la force du khanat de Crimée comme de la Pologne commencent à reculer. De ses réactions, on comprend que le khanat de Crimée était au fait de ces développements historiques, et on le voit partisan d'une politique anti-russe plus radicale que celle préconisée par la Porte : dans un avenir proche, on le verra suivre dans ce domaine une politique différente de celle de la Porte. La géographie politique de l'Europe de l'Est au XVIIIe siècle se présente ainsi : l'émergence de la Russie comme force, la modernisation en cours de l'Autriche par les Habsbourg, l'affaiblissement de l'Empire Ottoman, le recul de la Pologne et de Venise. Ce tableau est valable pour les aspects militaires et diplomatiques, et il serait difficile d'en dire autant en ce qui concerne les aspects culturels et économiques.

Au début du XVIIIe siècle la question de la succession au trône de Pologne est devenue une question européenne. Les candidats au trône intéressaient de près le bloc Romanov-Habsburg d'une part, de l'autre la France, son allié Ottoman et en particulier le Khan de Crimée. Au XVIIIe siècle, la plupart du temps on constate un soutien réciproque entre la Pologne et le khanat de Crimée, dirigé contre la Russie : *volens nolens*, cette politique rapproche le khanat de Crimée de la France. Dès 1707, Kaplan Giray n'hésitait pas à dire que la Crimée comprenait mieux la diplomatie française que la Sublime Porte, et que cette politique française constituait

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pour eux-mêmes une voie parfaite.[1]

De fait, les représentants dépêchés par l'ambassade de France à Istanbul, et les missionnaires jésuites envoyés au khanat contribuaient à cette identification du Khan à la politique française. G. Veinstein a étudié en détails ces relations : elles sont le signe de l'existence d'un échange diplomatique d'idées et d'informations entre les deux parties.[2] Le khanat de Crimée voyait la Russie se développer en Europe orientale, et avec le parti anti-russe en Pologne et les cosaques de Zaporozhie penchait pour une politique anti-russe plus subtile et plus active.

Après la victoire de Pierre le Grand à Poltava, Charles XII s'était réfugié à Bender, en terre ottomane. le basbug des cosaques qui l'accompagnait, le hetman Mazepa, mourut à l'automne 1709, et Philippe Orlik fut choisi comme hetman à sa place. Il était évident qu'Orlik allait continuer la guerre et son alliance avec Charles XII. Un autre allié était aussi déterminé et appuyait la guerre avec la Russie : le khan de Crimée Devlet Giray... Aujourd'hui encore les connaissances dont nous disposons ne nous permettent pas de suivre les développements et le succès de la diplomatie et de la tactique politique suivies par Stanislas Poniatowski à Istanbul pour pousser l'Empire Ottoman à la guerre contre la Russie. Sur ce sujet Hammer et les historiens contemporains qui répètent ce qu'avait écrit Sumner dans ses recherches sur les relations entre la Russie et l'Empire Ottoman... en particulier il faut accueillir avec réserve des vues comme celles qui mettent en avant le rôle influent de Poniatowski et du médecin juif du Palais Fonseca.[3] En novembre 1710 la déclaration de guerre à Pierre le Grand par Ahmed III apparaît avant tout comme une victoire de Devlet Giray et de ses partisans. Pourtant le seul motif de la guerre n'est pas cette influence et cette pression. Après Carlowiz la Porte est dans un état d'inquiétude extrême face à l'alliance austro-russe. De fait, tout au long du XVIII° siècle, l'existence de cette alliance constitua l'un des principaux problèmes. À la veille de Prout c'est pour éviter le renouvellement de cette alliance que la guerre a été proclamée contre la Russie. Un autre facteur de cette déclaration a certainement été constitué par la politique de pénétration en Moldavie de la Russie. Déjà en 1709 le gospodore de Moldavie Michel Rakovitz avait été remplacé par le phanariote Alexandre Mavrokordato. Quelques temps après, ce dernier fut remplacé par le célèbre Dimitri Kantemir. La Porte n'était pas sûre de la Moldavie, et l'influence de la Russie dans cette région était l'une des raisons de la guerre.

À la fin de 1710 l'unité de la politique menée par le roi de Suède et le

1 G. Veinstein "Les Tatares de Crimée et la second élection de Stanislas Leszczynski ", *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* XI/1, 1970, p.40.
2 G. Veinstein "Missionaires jésuites et Agntes Français en Crimée au début du XVIII° siècle "*Cahiers du Monde Russe*.. X/3-4, 1969, p. 414-458
3 B.H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire*, Oxford 1949, voir aussi Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte*..., XIII, p.212.

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khan de Crimée se manifeste constamment, et est illustrée lors de chaque évènement. Une fois la guerre déclarée, Devlet Giray Khan rentre d'Istanbul et arrive à Bender, où se trouvait Charles XII, le 10 décembre. Zinkeisen décrit ainsi son arrivée au camp :

tous ceux qui se trouvaient là (il veut dire les cosaques et les soldats suédois) se portèrent à la rencontre du grand Khan avec des manifestations et des transports d'affection interminables et l'accompagnèrent jusqu'en présence du roi. Devlet Giray Khan et Charles XII eurent alors un entretien secret qui dura quatre heures. Des plans pour le développement de la guerre furent élaborés et les mesures nécessaire arrêtées. Le lendemain le Grand Khan rentra sans tarder en Crimée pour pouvoir donner les ordres nécessaires à son armée (horde dans le texte). Tout au long de l'hiver on dressa 20. 000 Tatares contre Moscou. Les Princes d'Empire (les princes de l'Empire allemand) et tous ceux qu'inquiétait le bloc franco-suédois s'étonnaient de ce déploiement. Les Allemands en particulier craignaient que Charles XII allait utiliser ces forces contre eux. Pourtant il est connu que le roi de Suède concentrait son action contre la seule Russie [4].

Le roi de Suède écrivit à Bender un manifeste le 28 janvier 1711.[5] Ce manifeste est en fait daté du même jour que la déclaration universelle du Khanat de Crimée qui constitue notre sujet. Le roi y parle de la nécessité de sauver la Pologne de l'influence moscovite, en écartant du trône Auguste, et en y replaçant son détenteur véritable Stanislas. Il annonce que "dans ce but il s'est allié au Sultan et au Grand Khan". En fait il faut dire que bien plus que la Porte c'est Devlet Giray Khan qui suivait une politique en harmonie avec celles du roi de Suède.

La Porte n'avait pas une position aussi radicale que le khan de Crimée quant au soutien à apporter à l'un des partis en Pologne ou chez les Cosaques. Avant la guerre de Pologne, dans le cadre des préparatifs pour renforcer la flotte de la mer d'Azov, le tsar Pierre fit une tournée d'inspection de février à mai 1709 à Varonezh, Azov, Taganrog, et impressionna les assistants avec une démonstration navale en ordre parfait sur la mer d'Azov. L'ambassadeur ottoman y était. La réponse du sultan face à cette démonstration de la flotte est intéressante. Il interdit à Devlet Giray Khan d'aider le hetman Mazepa et les cosaques de Zaporozhie, et enjoignit au khan de ne pas trop se compromettre avec les plans de Charles XII.[6]. On se rend bien compte que la Porte n'était pas disposée à suivre une politique anti-russe aussi radicale que celle de la Suède, de la France ou du Khanat. C'est pour cette raison que le Khan de Crimée voulait imposer sa politique en matière de

4 J. Wilhelm Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa*, Gotha, 1857, vol.5, p. 407-408

5 *Ibid*. p. 408-409, Lamberty, *Mémoires*, T. VI, p. 434

6 Sumner, *ibid*, p. 25

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guerre et la déclarer, aux Polonais et aux cosaques de Zaporozhie d'abord, et en fin de compte à l'Europe entière. On trouve peu de référence dans la littérature à cette déclaration du khan de Crimée datée du 28 janvier 1711 : seul A. N. Kurat parle d'une telle proclamation universelle, rédigée en langue polonaise et précise qu'il s'agit d'un document manifestant des sentiments de loyauté à Stanislas, en tant que roi du peuple polonais et ukrainien, et au hetman Philippe Orlik.[7] Pourtant le fait que des copies imprimées du document en latin et en allemand aient circulé doit être l'expression d'une politique de plus grande envergure. Il explique les fondements de la politique du khanat de Crimée et probablement manifeste ainsi qu'il n'a aucune intention contre le Reich. La proclamation a été faite à Bender au nom du Grand Khan Devlet Giray par son fils Mehmed Giray Khan. (*Universale filli nata minoris chane. Tartarorum — Datum in castris ad Benderam, die 28 Januarii 1711*) On peut en résumer ainsi les principaux points d'après l'une des copies imprimées:[8]

Nous, Sultan Mehemmed Giray, fils du Grand Khan des peuples de Perekop, de Crimée Bucak déclarons que face à ceux qui veulent mettre sous tutelle la république de Pologne et faire obstacle au roi Stanislas, qui a accédé au trône par des élections libres, et à ses soldats ; à ceux qui veulent faire des provinces des cosaques de Zaporozhie et de la petite Russie (l'Ukraine), toutes deux libres, des prisoniers de Moscou en les soumettant au pillage et au meurtre, nous nous dressons avec les unités du Bucak et du Nogay sous notre commandement. Dans la guerre proclamée par le Sultan, nous combattrons jusqu'au bout contre l'ennemi commun. Par cette proclamation, nous déclarons que nous n'attenterons ni à la personne ni aux biens de ceux qui se mettent au service du roi Stanislas, du grand duc du Palatinat de Kiev Joseph Potocky et du commandant en chef de l'armée de Zaporozhie et de la petite Russie (l'Ukraine), Philippe Orlick, qui combat héroiquement pour son pays ; nous prenons ces personnes et ces biens sous notre protection. Mais nous ferons disparaître les traîtres à leur pays qui ne se soumettraient pas. Comme le puissant roi de Suède l'a lui même proclamé dans sa déclaration universelle, la guerre entreprise contre ceux qui sans que soit assurée la liberté et la sécurité de ces deux pays voisins (l'Ukraine et la Pologne), livrent leurs pays au roi Auguste et au tsar de Moscou, sera sans fin. Ce manifeste de notre main sera publié, et nous ordonnons l'exécution de ses dispositions. Bender, 28 Janvier 1711

Cette déclaration universelle d'appui à Charles XII, intéressante du point de vue de la chancellerie du khanat de Crimée, donne une idée de l'autonomie du khanat vis-à-vis de la Porte pour les questions de politique étrangère.[9] Le

7 A.N Kurat, *Prut Seferi ve Barışı*, Ankara 1951, vol. I s.195.
8 Archives du Min. Aff.Etr. *C.P.Turquie* vol 51, 1711-1712 (suppl) *Ferriol, des Alleurs-Duban* consul en Crimée
9 Halil İnalcık "Yeni vesikalara göre Kırım Hanlığının Osmanlı tabiliğine girmesi ve ahidname meselesi", *Belleten* Nr.30. vol.8, 1944, p. 185-229.

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nom de l'Empire Ottoman est mentionné deux fois, pour sa déclaration de guerre. Mais la politique annoncée dans la déclaration et les promesses qui y sont faites publiquement ne sont pas sous le patronage de la Porte : elles expriment la politique du khanat et ses propres engagements. Il s'agit là d'une source intéressante pour l'étude des relations de suzeraineté entre la Porte et le khanat, la prise de décision en politique extérieure, et la titulature employée en correspondance.

Trauit du turc par Jean-Pierre Thieck

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Atillâ ÇETİN

UN IMPORTANT MÉMOIRE DE 1873 SUR LA TUNISIE

La Tunisie était jusqu'à 1881 une province rattachée à l'Empire Ottoman, mais dotée d'un statut particulier. Depuis 1705 elle était administrée par les beys de la lignée des Hüseynides. À chaque changement de bey, un firman d'attribution de la province était envoyé d'Istanbul, avec le titre de Pacha. Au XIXe siècle, Ahmed Pacha (1837-1855), Muhammed Pacha (1855-1859) et Muhammad as-Sadiq Pacha (1859-1882) reçurent le titre de "muchir". La France, l'Italie et l'Angleterre avaient des intérêts politiques et économiques en Tunisie, enjeu de leurs conflits. À partir de l'époque de Ahmed Pacha, la Tunisie fut le théâtre de mouvements indépendantistes dirigées contre la Porte.

Le mémoire confidentiel daté du 28 novembre 1873 adressé par le ministre plénipotentiaire à Rome, Serkiz Efendi au ministre des affaires étrangères ottoman Rachid Pacha, acquiert une importance de premier plan par les informations qu'elle contient sur la situation intérieure de la Tunisie, ses affaires, ses gouvernants, leurs politiques et leurs aspirations. Serkiz Efendi note qu'il a recueilli ces informations de la bouche d'"un Italien bien placé dans le monde officiel à Rome", qui a séjourné quinze ans en Tunisie. C'est cette personnalité qui aurait rassemblé ces informations et les aurait communiquées à Serkiz Efendi. Tout en mentionnant qu'il voit fréquemment le ministre des affaire étrangères italien, Visconti Venosta, il ne révèle pas son nom.

Le mémoire contient des informations sur les méthodes et le niveau d'éducation des membres de la famille Husaynide, leur vision du monde et leurs réalisations une fois arrivés au pouvoir. Il révèle la personnalité de Muhammad al Sadik Pacha, au pouvoir en 1873, la personnalité et la politique du Hasnedar Sidi Mustafa Pacha, premier ministre sans interruption de 1837 à 1873. Il examine les raisons de l'assassinat immérité de Ismail Sunni et Rachid Pacha en 1867. Il apporte des informations capitales sur l'origine, l'enfance, l'éducation, la période passée en fonction en France et la politique de Hayreddin, gendre du Hasnedar Mustafa, qui lui succède en 1873.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

Il examine l'insurrection de Ali ben Gadhaem en 1864. Il remonte à la source de la révolte de Adil Bey et Ali Bey contre leur frère Muhammad al Sadiq Pacha. Il traîte de l'influence du groupe des mamelouks, dont le rôle politique et militaire dans la Tunisie husaynide est sans rapport avec leur faible importance numérique. Il montre le remplacement du turc jusque là dominant au palais du Bardo, par l'arabe. Il parle des conflits d'intérêts entre la France et l'Italie au sujet de la Tunisie. Ce sont ces importantes données sur la Tunisie quelques temps avant le protectorat français que nous nous proposons de présenter.

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"Légation de Turquie
en
Italie

Rome, le 28 Novembre 1873

"8126" 295
Mémoire sur la Tunisie
---
1 annexe

Confidentielle
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8 6863

Excellence,

Un Italien bien placé dans le monde officiel à Rome et qui, par suite d'un séjour de quinze ans en Tunisie, connait les hommes et les affaires de ce pays, est venu m'entretenir amicalement de l'état de cette province, de ses principaux fonctionnaires, de leur politique et de leurs aspirations. Il a réunit ses intéressantes informations dans un écrit que je me fais un devoir de communiquer ci-joint à Votre Excellence.

Monsieur Visconti Venosta qui le voit fréquemment, lui a paru disposé à appuyer la Sublime-Porte dans le cas où elle croirait nécessaire de faire quelques démarches contre la politique française du hasnadar actuel.

Veuillez agréer, Excellence, l'expression de ma très haute considération.

Serkiz

Son Excellence
Rachid Pacha
Ministre des affaires
étrangères de S.M.I.
le Sultan.

*
* *

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Il est de tradition en Tunisie que c'est l'ainé de la famille d'Absenben-Ali[1] qui doit régner tandisque les autres membres ne peuvent ni s'instruire, ni fréquenter le Palais ni se montrer en public. Ils sont quelquefois admis au baise-main *(Rikiab)*. Ils restent ainsi isolés pendant le meilleur temps de leur vie, vivant dans la paresse, sans faste, d'autant plus que leurs apanages sont tels qu'ils se trouvent souvent avec leurs familles dans un état de gêne. Pleins de dettes et empêchés d'en faire davantage, ils n'ont aucune autorité, aucune influence, aucune considération et végétant dans un abandon complet dans leurs harems, sans connaître aucune langue étrangère et mal instruits dans leur propre langue et dans le Coran. Leur éducation est, en un mot vulgaire, de manière à maintenir leur ignorance héréditaire et obligatoire à leurs descendants.

Pendant que quelques ministres nagent dans l'opulence et qu'ils sont plus riches que le Pacha même, sauf à celui-ci de les dépouiller suivant son droit, de leurs richesses, c'est une chose très affligeante que de voir ces Princes mendier. Par ce qui précède il est très facile de comprendre quelle espèce de Bey doit se succéder en Tunisie.

Le successeur du régent devant être le plus agé de la famille il arrive que généralement il est plus près de la vieillese que de la virilité, et que par le fait même d'avoir souffert une longue série de privations, il se jette avec avidité sur la fortune qui lui arrive pour s'abandonner aux plaisirs sensuels.

Quand un tel Prince, après avoir été presque déguenillé, saisit les rênes du pouvoir, tous les courtisans se pressent autour de lui et les plus heureux réussissent à en faire leur chose exclusive. Avec l'éducation que ce Prince a reçu, il se laisse facilement caresser le sceptre, sauf à le soulever pour frapper à mort. Il appelle autour de lui des hommes nouveaux et de préférence ceux qui ont été sacrifiés par son prédécesseur et de suite il commence avec eux un système de représailles, de persécutions et de rapines qui souvent finissent avec l'exil, la prison ou la mort.

Il dépouille les proscrits. Sa justice n'a pas de procès, elle n'est que la grande puissance sommaire d'un seul qui accuse, juge et condamne sans preuves et sans témoins, et il n'épargne ni les ministres de son prédécesseurs, ni ceux qui le servent.

Toutes ces choses arrivent impunément sous les yeux de la population et en présence des agents de l'Europe.

Sadik-Pacha[2] a succédé à son frère Mohamed[3] et il a répété lui aussi

1 Absenben Ali : erroné; lire Huseyin ben Ali (1705-1735). Fondateur de la dynastie des Husaynides qui règne sur la Tunisie de 1705 à 1957. Il mit fin à la dynastie précédente des Muradides, et fut nommé gouverneur de Tunisie par la Porte. Huseyin ben Ali était d'origine turque. Les gouverneurs issus de la famille des Husaynides portaient le titre de bey.

2 Muhammad Sadik Pacha (1859-1882) : 12° bey de la famille des Husaynides, il est connu pour les réformes qu'il entreprit de 1859 à 1864 : réorganisation de l'administration centrale, promulgation d'une loi sur la conscription, édition du journal *al Ra'id*; fondation de l'imprimerie beylicale. En 1861, il promulgue la première

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ces traditions de famille.

Mohamed Sadik Pacha agé de 56 ans est d'un tempérament nerveux, sanguinaire, lymphatique recherché par affectation de gravité, regard fixe pour paraître énergique, scrutateur, altier, mais dissimulant difficilement la poltronnerie.

Il ne tarda pas à manifester sa nature cruelle et son éducation de famille en se livrant à une débauche condamnée. Sidi Mustafa aurait voulu lui être meilleur conseiller ou aussi censeur respectueux et dévoué. Mais qui lui garantissait la vie ? Peut-être malgré lui et avec répugnance s'est-il résigné à se taire et à approuver, même à seconder les tendances et la débauche de son maître absolu. C'est à cette seule condition qu'il pouvait le servir.

Parmi les actes du governement du Sadik Pacha il y a à noter les suivants :

En 1867 le dénuement des choses les plus nécessaires à la vie de ses frères et de ses neveux était devenu insupportable. Tous étaient harcelés par leurs créanciers européens et ils étaient tourmentés par les besoins les plus urgents de la vie sans crédit pour les satisfaire, tandis qu'ils contemplaient, soupirant et pleurant de rage l'abondance dans laquelle vivait le dernier des serviteurs ignomineux de leurs frère et oncle. Aucun d'eux n'osait faire monter jusqu'à lui leurs souffrances réelles. Un seul, parmi les frères, Sadil Bey[4], peut-être le plus intelligent en tous cas plus courageux, s'enfuit de sa maison pour s'unir aux tribus qui s'étaient soulevées contre Sadik-Pacha. Trois ans de choléra, de typhus, de disette, avaient jeté le pays dans une misère extrême, des mères musulmanes avaient été jusqu'à faire baptiser leurs enfants pour les faire secourir par la charité chrétienne. Le cri de la faim universelle qui éteignait la terreur de la peste, toucha la Turquie et l'Europe, mais non le cœur de Sadik-Pacha. Plein de terreur par cette fuite rebelle de son frère, par cette révolution terrible qui s'avançait jusqu'aux portes de son palais, Sadik-Pacha étudia de se sauver par l'artifice en excitant la jalousie mutuelle des Puissances, en s'aidant des rivalités imprudentes de leurs consuls qui le protègent toujours contre la haute souveraineté du Sultan. Le hasnadar Sidi Mustafa[5] faisait de son côté tout son possible pour parer aux malheurs de

constitution à voir le jour dans les pays d'Islam. Il fonde un conseil suprême de nature consultative. 1864 est l'année d'une grande révolte. En 1873, il nomme Hayrettin premier ministre. 1881 voit l'occupation de la Tunisie par la France. En 1869, c'est la banqueroute des finances tunisiennes.

3 Muhammed Pacha (1855-1859) : 11e bey de la famille des Husaynides. Il est connu pour ses réformes.

4 Sadil Bey : erroné ; lire Adil Bey. Frère cadet de Muhammed Sadik Pacha. Il tenta de s'emparer du pouvoir en s'appuyant sur les montagnards de la tribu des Krumir, mais sans succès. En 1867, il mourut en prison, probablement des suites d'un café empoisonné. On pense qu'il avait l'appui de certains hauts fonctionnaires du beylicat.

5 Le Hasnadar Sidi Mustafa (dans les documents ottomans *Haznedar* ou *Hazinedar Mustafa Pacha*) (1817-1878) : De 1837 à 1873 premier ministre de Tunisie sans interruption. Né à Chio en 1817, d'origine grecque, fils de Stephanis Kalkias Stravelakis,

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son pays, achetant le blé sur les marchés d'Italie et de Marseille ; il contractait un emprunt à des conditions très-onéreuses ; il multipliait les troupes et il les envoyait contre les insurgés sous les commandements des généraux Feraat[6], Ahmet Zaruk[7], Rustem[8] etc. Sadik-Pacha envoyait ensuite, pour engager Sadil-Bey à se reconcilier avec lui, un autre de leurs frères, Ali-Bey[9], accompagné de troupes. Celui-ci obtint son but en promettant solennelement le pardon. Mais aussitôt rentré dans sa famille, Sadil-Bey mourut, et cette mort fut attribué au poison, et simultanément d'autres victimes furent mises à mort.

Il est à noter que la famille dynastique en général et Sadik-Pacha en particulier sont ennemis de la nation Ottomane et ils démontrent entr'autres choses en montrant de l'aversion pour la langue qui, étant défendue depuis longtemps, n'est plus parlée aujourd'hui que par quelques vieux mameluks[10]

son véritable nom était Georges. Emmené à Izmir encore enfant avec son frère Jean, il fut vendu avec lui comme esclave pour la Tunisie. Ils se convertirent à l'Islam, et à l'époque de Huseyin Pacha (1824-1835) furent éduqués au Bardo, le palais du Bey. Georges reçut le nom de Mustapha et devint le camarade de jeu du prince Ahmed. Lorsque celui-ci devint Bey de Tunis en 1837, il prit son compagnon de jeu comme trésorier puis comme conseiller, avant de le nommer premier ministre. Mustapha Khaznedar resta à ce poste sans interruption juqu'en 1873, sous le règne de trois Pachas. Il joua un rôle important dans l'histoire de la Tunisie. Il n'avait pas reçu une éducation enracinée dans une culture particulière et connaissait l'italien. Intelligent, d'esprit ouvert, sachant s'adapter aux circonstances, il pouvait satisfaire aux désirs et aux extravagances des Beys. Sa politique financière ouvrit la voie à la banqueroute de la Tunisie. Il avait épousé la sœur d'Ahmed Pacha, la princesse Kalthoum.

6 Le général Mohammed Ferhad : Mamlouk éduqué par Ahmed Pacha, il servit dans l'armée et devint général. En 1837 il fut fait Agha du Kef. En 1860-61 il fut nommé président du Tribunal criminel de Tunis, puis en mai 1861 directeur des Affaires étrangères. Il abandonna ses fonctions en février 1862. Le 16 avril 1864, pendant l'insurrection générale de Ali ibn Ghadahum, il fut tué par les révoltés du Kef.

7 Le général Ahmet Zarruk : Le Khaznadar Larbi Zarruk était un esclave affranchi. Il devint le beau-frère de Muhammed Pacha et Muhammed Sadik Pacha par son mariage avec leur sœur Zeneiha. Nommé conseiller, il fut chargé de pacifier les régions du Sahel et de l'Arad lors de l'insurrection générale de 1864. Gouverneur de Sousse, il reçut en février 1865 le gouvernorat de Monastir, avant d'être nommé en septembre 1865 ministre de la guerre. En décembre 1869 il fut démis de ces premières fonctions, et fut nommé gouverneur d'Arad. En août 1870, il dut abandonner son poste de ministre de la guerre. D'août 1877 à mai 1881, il fut ministre de la guerre et mourut peu après.

8 Rustem Pacha (?-1866) : Mamlouk d'origine tcherkesse. À l'époque d'Ahmed Pacha, il fut éduqué à l'Ecole militaire du Bardo. Il atteint le grade de commandant dans l'armée du Beylicat. Directeur du ministère de l'intérieur et des affaires étrangères, il fut chargé pendant l'insurrection générale de 1864-65 de la pacification des régions occidentales. À nouveau aux Affaires intérieures en 1865, il partit en Europe en 1867, dans une sorte d'exil. En août 1870 il était de retour, comme ministre de la guerre, fonction qu'il exerça jusqu'en août 1878. Il devint gendre de Mustapha Khaznadar, par son mariage avec la fille de Kahredin Pacha et petite-fille de Mustapha Haznedar. Il mourut en novembre 1886.

9 Ali Bey : Prince apparenté à la famille des Husaynides. Frère de Muhammed Sadik Pacha, il déclencha une révolte.

10 Mameluk *(memluk)* : Un groupe social qui jouait un rôle important dans la Tunisie

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

survivant et contre lesquels l'entourage entièrement tunisien excite la haine du Pacha. On profita donc de cette révolution pour se défaire des deux plus distingués généraux mameluks, en les représentant comme instigateurs de la rebellion et de la fuite de Sadil-Bey. Le Pasha, très disposé à écouter ses courtisans, énivré par le succès, et sans aucune formalité, avec une injustice sommaire ordonna que ces deux malheureux fussent étranglés. A l'insu des ministres et du hasnadar Sidi Mustafa même, il ordonna à Mustafa ben Ismail[11] de pénêtrer avec des soldats dans les maisons de ces généraux Ismail-Sunni[12] et Rachid-Pacha[13], et de les ammener enchaînés au Bardo où il consomma le crime en l'appelant acte de justice ! Le premier avait été ministre garde des sceaux du Pacha précédent. Il différait des Arabes sous tous les rapports. D'origine grecque, amené de Constantinople comme esclave, il était marié à une sœur de Sadik-Pacha.

Rachid-Pacha avait été le général, commandant le contingent tunisien pendant la guerre de Crimee où il sut mériter l'estime du Gouvernement Ottoman qui le fit pacha.

Les biens des deux victimes furent de suite confisqués et servirent à Sadik-Pacha pour se construire un nouveau palais appelé par dérision Kasser-

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des Husaynides. On désignait du nom de mamelouk des esclaves qui, après avoir été achetés dans un très jeune âge et reçu une éducation particulière, étaient employés à des services appropriés. Pour des raisons politiques et sociales, les mamelouks jouent un role important dans l'histoire de la Tunisie à partir du XVIe siècle. À l'époque des Husaynides de nombreux premiers ministres, militaires et ministres étaient d'origine mamlouk. Bien que leur nombre ne dépassât pas 150, leur importance était beaucoup plus grande. Ils étaient liés à la famille des Husaynides par l'éducation qu'ils en avaient recue au palais et par les postes importants qui leur étaient confiés dans le Beylicat. Mustafa Haznedar et Hayreddin Pacha étaient tous deux d'origine mamlouk. On les trouvait parmi les sujets et les governants. Généralement ils étaient originaires des pays du Caucase ou de la Méditerrannée.

11 Mustafa ben Ismail [dans les documents ottomans : Genç Mustafa Pacha] (1853?-1887) : Premier ministre de Tunisie. Né à Tunis, d'une famille aux origines diverses. Orphelin, il travailla chez un barbier. Un officier le prit sous sa protection. Il attira l'attention de Muhammed Sadik Pacha, qu'il impressiona par son allure extérieure. Il était ignorant et enclin à la débauche. Il fut premier ministre de 1878 à 1881. À la mort de Muhammed Pacha il se rendit d'abord à Paris, puis à Istanbul. En 1887 il meurt dans la misère à Istanbul. On ne sait pas si le Mustafa ben Ismail mentionné dans le document désigne la même personne. En 1867 il devait être encore enfant : peut-être s'agit-il d'un autre Mustafa ben Ismail.

12 Ismail es Sunni : mamelouk, beau-frère de Mohammed Pacha, il était garde des sceaux. Kaid de Djerba, il fut nommé en 1860 président du tribunal de cassation. Pendant l'insurrection il fut commandant d'un détachement d'intervention. Il tombe en disgrâce peu après, et est étranglé le 5 octobre 1867 sur ordre de Mohammed Sadik Pacha. Il avait entre 60 et 70 ans. Il avait attiré sur lui les soupçons au moment de l'insurrection de Ali Bey, et fut exécuté sans jugement.

13 Muhammed Rachid Pacha : Mamlouk, il exerça de nombreuses fonctions dans l'armée. Il fut ministre de la guerre. Pendant la guerre de Crimée, il participa aux combats à la tête d'une force de 12.000 hommes. Ses succès lui valurent le titre de pacha. À partir d'octobre 1864, il n'est plus en fonction. Il attira sur lui les soupçons lors de l'insurrection de Adil Bey et fut mis à mort en 1867, sans procès.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

Said, c'est à dire palais de la fortune.

L'Europe s'émut de ces exécutions capitales et tout le monde eut un mot d'indignation et de dégoût pour le Bey de la Tunisie. Les consuls protestèrent au nom de leurs gouvernements et de la civilisation moderne, la presse se fit l'interprête de toutes les consciences honnêtes.

Le général Haïreddin[14] qui connaissait le Pacha, se faisait un mérite de vivre éloigné et cela lui permit de demeurer longtemps à Paris où il acquit une éducation française et où il tâcha de se procurer et effectivement il se procura des hautes relations politiques. Il a dans sa poche un brevet d'officier honoraire d'État-major français. Mais dans l'appréhension qu'il ne serait pas une protection suffisante contre une surprise de la haine de Bardo, il parait qu'il médite, dans son orgueil, un coup d'État d'arabe traître à sa patrie, d'autant plus que la pensée de sauver les richesses immenses qu'il a accumulés en si peu de temps le presse. Il se souvient que son caractère altier et superbe a déplu autrefois à son chef. En vérité personne plus que lui n'a raison de s'attendre à un de ces jeux dont le Pacha est coutumier. C'est pour cela que ses tendances françaises l'entraînent, si l'occasion se présentait, à donner de préférence la Tunisie et son maître à la France. Aux craintes qui pourraient bien l'y pousser, se joint le désir de tirer vengeance de son beau-père le hasnadar Sidi Mustafa. Il appréhende que le Pacha ne s'aperçoive à temps de sa trahison et n'en fasse la justification d'une exécution sanguinaire auprès des Puissances. Il est certain qu'il étudie cette trahison avec les émissaires français.

Se servant de la haine contre les mameluks, il a contribué à l'éloignement du seul ministre qui fut attaché au Pacha et qui aurait pu défendre la dynastie aussi contre des desseins contraires. Haïreddin est arrivé à s'ôter cet obstacle très-sérieux à l'accomplissement de son ambitieux plan. Il fit la guerre contre son beau-père, contre son bienfaiteur, contre ce hasnadar Sidi Mustafa dont il avait été l'esclave[15], et qui, après l'avoir émancipé, le fit

14 Le général Haireddin (Khérédine, Khéréddine ou Khayr al-Din) [dans les documents ottomans, Tunuslu Hayreddin Pacha] (1822?-1890) : Né au Caucase, il fut amené à Istanbul encore très jeune, puis envoyé à Tunis à l'époque de Ahmed Pacha. Elevé dans le palais du Bardo, il servit ensuite dans l'armée de Tunis, et jouit de la protection de Mustafa Haznedar et Ahmed Pacha. Il devint l'aide de camp du vali de Tunis. En 1846, il vit Paris pour la première fois en compagnie de Ahmad Pacha. En 1853-1856, au cours du procès de Mahmud ben Ayyad Pacha, il défendit les droits de la Tunisie. Il compléta son éducation et sa formation personnelles. Il établit des amitiés avec de hautes personnalités, et apprit bien le français. Ministre de la Marine en janvier 1870 ministre dirigeant, avant d'être nommé premier ministre le 22 octobre 1873, fonction qu'il occupa jusqu'en juillet 1877, succédant à Mustafa Khaznedar qui avait occupé la fonction pendant 37 ans. Mustafa Haznedar était son beau-père. En 1859, 1864 et 1871 il fut envoyé en missions officielles à Istanbul, et en 1878 c'est Abdul Hamit II qui l'y appela. Du 4 décembre 1878 au 29 juillet 1879 il fut Sadrazam, et mourut en janvier 1890 à Istanbul.

15 Erroné : Hayreddin Pacha n'était pas l'esclave de Mustafa Haznedar, mais du vali de Tunis Ahmed Pacha. C'est sous son règne qu'il fut amené à Tunis.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

instruire, lui donna pour femme sa fille unique[16], le combla de faveurs, de richesses et d'honneurs. Au lieu de lui être reconnaissant, il l'a fait destituer et mettre en état d'accusation, exposé à être dépouillé si quelque gouvernement n'intercède pour lui.

Haïreddin est d'origine entre l'abase et le circassien. Il avait été acheté à 13 ans à Constantinople. Il paraît que le traîtement de son premier maître en Turquie ne fut pas très-humain, car il a conservé une haine très-grande contre les Ottomans et ils les abhorre aussi dans leur langue qu'il ne parle dans des circonstances inévitables.

Il est plutôt beau, doué de talents naturels et jusqu'à 30 ans il n'avait reçu aucune instruction. Il avait lu seulement quelques livres arabes. Toutefois ce fut dans cet état et sans connaître aucune langue étrangère, ni la discipline militaire qu'il fut nommé général par la protection de son généreux émancipateur. Il ne s'était occupé que de l'administration des biens privés du hasnadar. Quand il fut nommé général effectif de cavalerie, il lui a été donné un instructeur français.[17] Il fut envoyé à Paris pour représenter les intérêts tunisiens dans le procès intenté au Bardo par le général Ben Ayad.[18] Durant cette mission, il s'acquit une infinité de relations avec de hauts personnages.

Il est certain que ses talents auraient pu faire beaucoup de bien à la Tunisie si l'orgueil et l'ambition ne l'eussent rendu plus français qu'arabe. Il tâcha au contraire de se rendre les Français favorables et certainement il doit exister entre lui et ces derniers une intelligence d'ancienne date pour satisfaire cette convoitise de la Tunisie par la France, convoitise facile à comprendre.

Porto-Farina et Biserto sont l'avant garde de la Méditerranée et l'Algérie confine avec la Tunisie et la possession de celle-ci bonifierait de la possession de celle-là. Il est connu que l'Algérie n'a pas de ports et que seulement par dignité la France ne l'abandonne pas. Sa possession lui est onéreuse sans une force de mer qui protège celle de terre. C'est donc naturel qu'on ait des prédilections pour Porto-Farina et Biserto, deux grands ports qu'avec une petite dépense, on pourrait rendre formidables et pour leur faire contenir les flottes les plus nombreuses de manière à dominer la Méditerranée,

16 Hayreddin Pacha avait épousé la fille de Mustafa Haznedar, Jenina (Lella Kebira). Ce mariage dura de 1862 à 1870, et trois enfants en nâquirent. Jenina mourut en 1870. Après cette date la rivalité entre Hayreddin Pacha et Mustafa Haznedar s'accrut. Jenina n'était pas la seule fille de Mustafa Haznedar.

17 Documents relatifs aux premières années de Hayrettin Pacha.

18 L'affaire de Mahmud ben Ayyad Pacha : Il s'agit du procès qui dure de 1853 à 1856, à Paris, entre le gouvernement tunisien et l'ancien haut fonctionnaire Mahmut ben Ayyad Pacha. (1810-1880) : né à Tunis, son importance dans l'administration tunisienne s'accroit à partir de 1847. Il était "le principal fournisseur de la cour et le fermier général de l'Etat", et grâce à la protection de Mustafa Haznedar, accumula rapidement une fortune importante. Il fut impliqué dans des détournements, s'enfuit en France, et acquit la nationalité française en 1852. Son procès se déroula alors que Hayrettin Pacha était représentant de la Tunisie à Paris. En 1857 il vint à Istanbul avec la protection française. Il se rendit célèbre par sa richesse. Il y mourut en 1880.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

Malte, la Sicile, la Sardaigne n'auraient plus une valeur stratégique contre les flottes puissantes qui possèderaient ces deux ports très sûrs. Si la France n'est pas encore arrivée à s'en rendre maître, il n'est pas certainement pour son amour platonique pour le Pacha et moins encore pour en ignorer l'importance. C'est l'opportunité qui lui a fait défaut, mais elle ne désespère pas de la trouver. Des récents malheurs s'opposent pour le moment à ses vues, mais la présence de Haïreddin au pouvoir vient de les faire renaître.

En effet déjà par son entremise l'intervention du Gouvernement français a lieu dans l'administration tunisienne depuis 1869. Le Pacha fut obligé de soumettre les finances de l'Etat à une commission exécutive dont Haïreddin fut le président,[19] assisté d'un inspecteur français[20]. Les finances de la Tunisie restent ainsi de fait et de droit entre les mains du Gouvernement français. Par ce premier acte on ota au Pacha le simulacre d'une armée qui lui restait sous prétexte d'économie. On lui fit également vendre les navires et quelques vapeurs qu'il possédait. Il permit de restreindre son pouvoir judiciaire et de se mettre sous la tutelle français.

C'est ainsi qu'Haïreddin arriva au pouvoir et il s'en servit pour faire des largesses secrètes au Pacha et à ses favoris, commençant en même temps ses insinuations contre celui qui avait été son père moral et son protecteur. Il représentait le hasnadar comme le seul obstacle à leur faire avoir les sommes demandées. Il finit par prétexter que le consul français n'était pas capable de maintenir l'influence française qu'on croyait nécessaire et qui était diminuée par celle de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie avec Sidi Mustafa, et que la France en mettant à sa place un ministre plénipotentiaire intimiderait plus facilement le Pacha, afin de paralyser l'union complexive des autres consuls inférieurs en grades. Les faits accomplirent les prévisions et le Ministre le plus capable et le plus dévoué a été destitué par le Pacha. Aujourd'hui les émissaires français, parmi lesquels le général Haïreddin entourent le Pacha.

L'Italie plus que toute autre nation a adoptée vis-à-vis la Tunisie une politique opposée. Du temps du Ministère Ménabréa la France lui demanda le concours de ses bâtiments pour transporter des troupes en Afrique, lui abandonnant cette partie de la Tunisie qui est en deça de la Megerda, l'autre partie étant trop nécessaire à ses possessions algériennes. Le Gouvernement Italien refusa, disant que l'Europe avait intérêt à ne pas augmenter les questions orientales.

De même que sous l'ancien hasnadar Sidi Mustafa, le Pacha n'est plus accessible qu'au général Haïreddin qui le tient encore plus isolé et à l'envoyé plénipotentiaire de France, le seul qui ait ce grade diplomatique parmi les

19 Commission Financière Internationale: Suite aux dettes de la Tunisie, il s'agit de la commission financière formée de représentants du gouvernement tunisien, de la France, l'Angleterre et l'Italie en 1869. Elle unifia la dette et influença les finances tunisiennes. Elle avait pour président Hayrettin Pacha, et pour vice-président le français Victor Villet. La commission fut en fonction jusqu'en 1878.

20 Victor Villet (1821-1889): Inspecteur des finances français, qui fut en fonction en Tunisie du 20 août 1869 au 25 février 1874.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

représentants étrangers.

Haïreddin fait tout son possible pour rendre mécontents les Drydes[21], tribu nomade, forte et riche, dispersée dans le pays vers les frontières, surtout dans la partie de celles avec l'Algérie. Il les provoque à un soulèvement formidable. Alors au milieu de ce mouvement insurrectionnel le général Haïreddin se montrera très embarrassé de la situation et il fera délibérer en conseil un secours toujours prié et toujours prêt du Gouvernement français du côté de l'Algérie, et ainsi qu'il est convenu, on proclamerait alors la nécessité à une occupation permanente, ce qui sera pour la France une annexion à l'Algérie.

La preuve que tel est le plan préparé par Haïreddin, se trouve dans ce qu'il a destitué le Caïd des Drydes, qui était l'homme le plus distingué de la tribu et cette destitution est expliquée par le fait que le Caïd a visité l'ancien hasnadar après sa chute.[22]

21 Drydes : Nom d'une importante tribu en Tunisie.
22 Dışişleri Hazine-Evrakı, *Siyasî kısım*, dosya no : 526

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

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Selim DERİNGİL

A DOCUMENT ON POST-OCCUPATION EGYPT: AN APPEAL TO THE SULTAN-CALIPH ON THE PART OF 125 EGYPTIAN *ULEMA*

The British invasion of Egypt is the only instance of forcible occupation of an Islamic territory under Ottoman suzerainty by a power traditionally considered to be the Empire's major benefactor and protector. Both the fact of the occupation itself and the consequences that followed upon it were to provoke a severe reappraisal of Anglo-Ottoman relations on the part of Sultan Abdulhamid II.

Ever since he ascended the throne in 1876 the Sultan had become increasingly suspicious of British intentions. The disastrous Russo-Ottoman War of 1877, the Cyprus Convention of 1876, and the failure of Disraeli in the Sultan's eyes to fulfill promises, of support at the Berlin Conference had all contributed to Abdülhamid's mounting distrust. The British bombardment of Alexandria in July 1882 and the rout of °Urabi Paşa's nationalist forces in September followed by military occupation further convinced the Sultan that Britain was the Empire's most dangerous enemy[1]. Abdülhamid may well have exaggerated the extent of Britain's malevolent intentions; recent research has proved that Britain did not actively plan the dismemberment of the Empire, and that it was more a case of shifting emphasis intermittently between Cairo and Istanbul.[2] In any case what matters is that the Sultan believed Britain had washed her hands off the Ottoman State. A major part of his policy of reaction *vis-à-vis* Western encroachments was the policy of Pan-Islamism. These two policies should be seen as distinct but related entities. Pan-Islamism was largely a

1 E. D. Akarlı, "The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909)", unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Princeton, 1976

2 Feroze Yasamee, "The Ottoman Empire and the European Great Powers. 1884-1887", unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of London, 1984; R. Robinson and J. Galleger, *Africa and the Victorians*, Chapter VII, London, 1967.

Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:5-1192015415-1191073459-14

propaganda weapon based on his position as Caliph of all Muslims for use against Christian powers with large Islamic subject populations. Islamism on the other hand was a definite effort to focus on the Islamic elements within the Empire in an effort to establish a new axis for Ottoman unity[3]. It is in the light of these two policies that the Egyptian situation has to be evaluated.

The immediate reaction in Egypt to the defeat of the ᶜUrabist movement was one of general demoralization. This took the form of involvement with ᶜUrabi and rejection of his movement even by elements who had been among his foremost supporters: "This sad chapter of indignity, servility and denunciation is, perhaps, best left uninvestigated."[4] The British dealt moderately with ᶜUrabi and his followers in order to avoid martyrizing them. They were given British counsel during their trial and exiled to Ceylon on pension[5]. Yet even ᶜUrabi's erstwhile staunch supporters among editorial cadres of the Egyptian press deserted him: "... Adib Ishaq, Salim al-Naqqush and Abdullah al-Nadim, deplored ᶜUrabi and his movement in no uncertain terms and uphold the Egyptian connection with the Sultan-Caliph in Istanbul."[6]

Disillusionment with the nationalist movement meant that now any resentment of, and opposition to, the foreign invader was to be expressed in religious terms. Abdülhamid II as the Caliph of all Muslim seemed to many to be the last bulwark against continuing European advances against Islam in Tunis, Egypt, and Russian central Asia. The Sultan himself, always a political realist, did not believe he was capable of uniting all Muslims against the Christian powers. But the political potential of his position could not have escaped him.

The purpose of this short study is not to provide an exhaustive appraisal of the tergiversations of Hamidian diplomacy in Egypt. It is simply an effort to shed some light on an interesting petition adressed by 125 Egyptian *ulema* and notables to the Sultan and the Grand Vezir on 16 April, 1883, and to place it in the broader context of post-occupation Egypt[7].

Copie d'une requête portant la signature de 125 personnes parmi les notables et les Grands Ulémas de l'Égypte, présentée au Grand Vizirat en date du 28 *Djemazi-ul Evvel* correspondant au 16 Avril 1883.

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3 Stenpen Duguid, "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 9, May 1973 p. 139.

4 A. Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!*, London, 1981, p 297.

5 A. M Broadley *How We Defended Arabi*, London, 1884.

6 P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt*, New York, 1969, p. 17.

7 F. O. 78/8508. Dispatch no. 264. Mr. Wyndham to Foreigh Office. Constantinople April 30, 1883. Secret. The text is in French (no doubt a translation) and was most probably provided by one of the many informants the British Chancellery kept at the Palace and the Porte.

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L'Égypte, étant une des Provinces privilégiées de l'Empire Ottoman ses habitants, sous les auspices des privilèges accordés par Sa Majesté Impériale vivaient en parfaite tranquillité. Leur prospérite augmentait de jour en jour au point qu'elle n'avait jamais été surpassée dans aucune époque de leur histoire. Malheurcesement le feu de la révolte contre le Khédive qui avait pris naissance de certaines fausses illusions, a annihilé notre pays. Le commencement de cette révolte ne touchait d'aucune manière l'Europe et beaucoup moins l'Angleterre. Cependant cette Puissance pour une raison ou pour une autre s'est mélée de l'affaire et a résolu la destruction de la ville d'Alexandrie et la perte de la vie de tant d'individus.

La résistance d'ᶜ Arabi se serait encore prolongée, mais lorsqu'il a été constaté qu'elle était contraire à la volonté Imperiale, on y a mis fin par la décision de tous les notables du pays. On ferme la porte de la dispute envers un Gouvernement ami de la Turquie et on le traîte dans un esprit de conciliation. Suivant une décision précédente de l'Angleterre, aussitôt que le Khédive, qui est le Représentant du Saint Khalifat avait ressaisi les rênes du Gouvernement elle évacuerait l'Égypte. Cependent on ne voit pas jusqu'à présent aucune action conforme à la susdite décision. Tout au contraire il est évident qu'elle cherche partout des prétextes pour prolonger son occupation. Or, un état précaire pareil ne peut que créer de la défiance, augmenter les motifs de sédition et détruire le commerce. Surtout par suite de l'action arbitraire de l'Angleterre, la haine et le mécontentement des indigènes envers les étrangers n'a plus de bornes. La prolongation de l'occupation anglaise en Égypte, qui ne peut que mettre la discorde entre les différentes races et porter atteinte aux intérêts, du pays, ne saurait être tolérée plus longtemps. Ainsi en conformité de notre principe 'L'Égypte aux Égyptiens', nous sollicitons la délivrance de notre pays de celui qui est notre Souverain en vertu d'actes internationaux, et en lui faisant savoir que la constitution actuelle du pays est une chose informe ; nous nous permettons de la prier que par Son Auguste Assistance, elle soit réformée en conformité des précédents Firmans Imperiaux. Si l'Angleterre quitte le pays en conformité du désir de la Sublime Porte son influence et son prestige augmenteront de beaucoup et même le faux Mehdi qui maintenant cherche à répandre le feu de la sédition et profite de la prolongation de l'occupation anglaise aussitôt que l'évacuation aura lieu, sera honteux de continuer la sédition et mettra bas les armes. Tout cela étant évident, les soussignés en vue d'obtenir de l'assistance de leur Souverain, l'objet qu'ils sollicitent et afin d'épargner aux deux partis les frais inutiles et rendre à chacun ce qui lui est dû, nous nous sommes permis de rédiger la présente requête et d'en remettre deux copies au Commissaire Imperial avec prière qu'il transmette une à Sa Majesté Imperiale et une autre à Votre Altesse.

There are several points in the above document which are particularly

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noteworthy. First the ᶜUrabist movement is characterized as being the result of "certain false illusions" which caused the destruction of the country. Thus the nationalist element in the revolt which was as much anti-Ottoman as anti-British is actively played down. Second, despite the above, what is striking is that the petitioners claim to be acting in conformity with the principle "Egypt for Egptians" which was the battle cry of the ᶜ*Urabiyin*. Evidently the 125 *ulema* and notables saw no contradiction in appealing to the Sultan as their sovereign ruler under the banner of the nationalists' slogan. Third the signatories claim that ᶜUrabi would have continued his action if he had not been stopped by the united action of "all the notables in the country," who realised that he was acting contrary to the Sultan's will. Recent research has however shown that a critical part of ᶜUrabi's initial power base was the Assembly of Notables[8]. Fourth, the signatories hold out the bait of a possible revision of the Egyptian constution so as to give the Sultan greater say in Egyptian affairs.

The above points are interesting in that they illustrate the hopelessness of the situation in Egypt where the polite mythology of an "early British evacuation" could not mask the hard reality that the British were settling in. The signatories may or not have actually believed that the Sultan was capable of, and willing to, help them. What is significant is that the appeal should have been made.

The Sultan however had no realistic ambition of incorporating Egypt once more into the Ottoman State. But even after the failure of the Drummond-Wolf negotiations in 1885, the polite fiction of British evacuation was maintained and negotiation continued in Cairo between Wolf and the Ottoman Commissioner, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa. The real power in the land however was the British Consul-General Sir Evelyn Baring (later Earl of Cromer). A proponent of Britain's Indian Imperialism, Cromer did not believe Egypt capable of self-government and felt that the Porte had committed "political suicide" by not interveninig in Egypt at the time of the ᶜUrabi revolt[9]. A famed advocate of the "White Man's burden," Cromer felt Britain had to "civilise" Egypt:

> The special aptitude shown by Englishmen in the government of Oriental races pointed to England as the most effective and beneficient instrument for the gradual introduction of European civilisation into Egypt[10].

The Signatories of the petition had also been correct in pointing out that Britain had every intention of prolonging her stay in Egypt. The formula eventually arrived at was the "Veiled Protectorate". Egypt was never

8 See Schölch, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-160, *passim*.
9 Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, London, 1911, p. 255.
10 *Ibid.*, p. 254.

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annexed outright but all key posts in the administration were occupied by British appointees :

> From Gladstone onwards British statesmen contantly asserted that the British occupation, which would shortly be withdrawn, was chiefly intended to strengthen Egypt's independence. Annexation was out of the question because England had "pledged her honour" againts it. Increasingly exasperated, Egyptians felt that open annexation might have been preferable because it would at least have shown where true responsibility for their Governments' policies lay. As it was, they were battering against a rubber wall[11]

It was just this "rubber wall" aspect of the Veiled Protectorate which was to draw the attention of the Ottoman Commissioner, Ahmed Muhtar Paşa :

> Even if the British were to end their military occupation today, their moral occupation (*işgal-i manevi*) of all this country's institutions is so thorough that it will prove more effective that military occupation.[12]

11 P. Mansfield, *The British in Egypt*, New York, 1971, p. 58.

12 Başbakanlık Arşivi, Yıldız Esas Evrakı (Yıldız Palace Archives) Kısım 39/Evrak 2168, Zarf 129, Karton 120.

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CONTENTS

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