

EAST INDIA (MILITARY).

DESPATCHES REGARDING OPERATIONS
IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND IN
MESOPOTAMIA.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.



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EAST INDIA (MILITARY).

DESPATCHES REGARDING OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND IN MESOPOTAMIA.

FIELD OPERATIONS.

No. 205.—The Governor-General in Council has much pleasure in directing the publication of the following letter from the Chief of the General Staff, dated the 2nd February, 1915, submitting despatches from Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O., and Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., describing the operations of I.E.F. "D" at the head of the Persian Gulf up to the 28th November, 1914. The Governor-General in Council concurs in the opinion expressed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief regarding the manner in which the operations were conducted and the behaviour of the troops engaged. His Excellency in Council also shares the Commander-in-Chief's appreciation of the support rendered by the Royal Navy which conduced so materially to the success of the operations.

From the Chief of the General Staff to the Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department, dated Delhi, the 2nd February, 1915.

I am directed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to submit for the information of the Government of India the undermentioned reports on the operations of Indian Expeditionary Force "D" up to the 28th November, 1914:—

- (i) Report by Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O., on the operations of I.E.F. "D" up to the 14th November, 1914; and
- (ii) Report by Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commanding I.E.F. "D," on the operations of his force at the head of the Persian Gulf, from the 14th to the 28th November, 1914.

2. His Excellency considers that the operations were conducted with skill and energy and that the discipline and steadiness of the troops reflect the greatest credit on all ranks. He desires to commend to the favourable consideration of Government the officers, non-commissioned officers and men whose services are brought to notice in the reports, and wishes specially to invite attention to Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Barrett's remarks in regard to the very valuable assistance rendered by the Royal Navy which he cordially endorses.

3. His Excellency recommends that the reports be treated as despatches and published in the "Gazette of India."

From Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding 16th Brigade, I.E.F. "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Simla, dated Camp Saniyeh, 16th November, 1914.

On the arrival of Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett at this camp and on conclusion of my period of independent command I have the honour to report as follows:—

2. The force under my command, known as I.E.F. "D," left Bombay on the 16th October in four transports, part of a large convoy. On 19th October we parted company and steered for Bahrain Islands, under escort of H.M.S. "Ocean." No. 1 Brigade, Indian Mountain Artillery, joined the force off Jask on the 21st. We arrived on the 23rd and anchored off Manama. Here we remained until the 2nd November.

3. On that date the Force sailed for the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab in compliance with instructions contained in your radio-telegram No. 6571. Pilots were taken on board off Bushire, and the Force arrived at the outer bar of the river on the evening of the 3rd November.

4. The 4th and 5th November were occupied with naval preparations and the transports themselves were prepared with bullet-proof cover on the upper decks for the use of parties detailed for covering fire.

Major Radcliffe, 2nd Dorset Regiment, returned from Kuwait on 5th with information that the Fort was in ruins but that guns were in position. A landing force was detailed for the capture of Fao, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. Rosher, 2nd Dorset Regiment, and orders issued. On the 5th the transports crossed the outer bar of the Shatt-el-Arab and anchored just outside the inner bar.

5. At 6 a.m. on 6th November H.M.S. "Odin," preceded by launches sweeping for mines, stood in and bombarded the Turkish guns outside the Fort, 3 miles south-east of the telegraph station at Fao. The hostile guns were soon silenced; they were well served for a time and hit the "Odin" twice. On the signal being made that the guns were silenced the transports "Umaria" and "Varela" advanced in that order, each towing eight boats full of troops alongside; the "Mashona" (armed launch) towed seven boats full of troops and the Royal Navy steam launches towed the detachment of Marines from H.M.S. "Ocean." Off the telegraph station the boats were cast off and made for the shore. Some 600 Infantry landed with one section, Mountain Artillery, complete with mules and one squad, Sappers and Miners. There was no opposition. When the 1st and 2nd reinforcements had also landed, Colonel Rosher assembled his force and marched south-eastwards to occupy the Fort. This was accomplished during the night of the 6th-7th, the guns were dismounted and thrown into the river and Colonel Rosher's command returned to Fao.

6. While the troops who had landed were being re-embarked on the 7th November, the General Officer Commanding with remaining transports proceeded up the river till within sight of the Oil Refinery on Abadan Island. On the 8th November the river was reconnoitred for a suitable landing place. A firm high bank with deep water close up to it was found at Saniyeh; the transports were called up and troops began to disembark. The disembarkation continued during 9th and 10th November being practically complete by evening of latter date.

7. It was proposed to advance from this camp and attack the Turks at Shamshumiya by land, but the reported advance of Turkish troops from Basrah and the necessity of safeguarding the Oil Works, combined with the absence of news from India regarding the arrival of reinforcements, decided me to remain at Saniyeh. With the intention of an early forward movement, as little baggage and supplies as possible were landed at this camp. Reconnaissances both up and down stream on the 9th and 10th failed to discover any enemy.

8. On the evening of the 10th reliable news was received from the Sheikh of Mohammerah that Sami Bey with a strong combined force of Turks and Arabs had arrived from Basrah at a point opposite Mohammerah with the intention of attacking our camp. At 3 a.m. on the 11th the Sheikh reported that Sami Bey had started to make the attack. Troops were turned out and outposts strengthened. The Turkish force, of whom over 300 were actually seen, delivered a determined attack at 5.30 a.m. on an advanced post held by one double company 117th Mahrattas with 2 machine guns. They advanced to within 50 yards of the post but were driven off by a dashing counter-attack delivered by the 20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry, with the assistance of the 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery. The enemy lost heavily in their retirement across the desert, 19 dead were counted, 14 wounded were brought in by us and 6 prisoners were taken. Abandoned rifles and equipment were found. The Turks officially acknowledged a loss of 80 men.

9. The defences of the camp were further strengthened and daily reconnaissances made. On the 14th November, Lieutenant-General Sir A. Barrett with the 18th Brigade and Divisional Troops arrived at this camp.

10. I would invite attention to the difficulties of communication in the Persian Gulf during the period covered by this report. Constant thunderstorms interrupted the wireless system. The installation on R.I.M.S. "Dalhousie" is apparently of poor quality and the operators not very experienced. This ship had to be stationed at Bushire to connect with the cable there. The wireless station at Jask was frequently in communication with H.M.S. "Ocean" in the sense that the station would answer the call of the warship but it would not take in any message for transmission. No night watch is kept at Jask.

11. Several points to which I would earnestly invite attention are mentioned in the "Notes" made at intervals in the "War Diary" which is forwarded by the same mail as this report.

12. I would mention that the stay of the Force at Bahrain was of advantage as it enabled me to have British and Indian Corps instructed in rowing and handling of boats and to rehearse the operation of a landing in force.

13. All ranks have performed their duties in a most zealous and creditable manner.

14. I would bring to notice the great assistance given me by the following officers in planning and carrying out the operations for the occupation of Fao and the landing at this camp:—

Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., Senior Naval Officer, H.M.S. "Ocean."

Commander Hamilton, Royal Indian Marine, Principal Marine Transport Officer.

15. I would also report that the masters of the various transports* gave all the assistance in their power. I would specially bring to notice the name of Mr. T. L. Mills, R.N.R., Master of the S.S. "Varela," British India Steam Navigation Company, who displayed great zeal and willingness to perform operations beyond those usually required of a master

* "Varela" }
 "Umaria" } British India Steam
 "Umta" } Navigation Company.
 "Berbera" }
 "Masunda."

of a merchant vessel. I trust that it will be found possible to recognise his services.

16. In connection with the Turkish night attack on the 11th November I would report that the counter-attack I ordered on the attacking force was carried out in a most dashing and skilful manner by the 20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry and the 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel C. Rattray, 20th Infantry.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF INDIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE "D" FROM 14TH TO 28TH NOVEMBER, 1914.

From Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, Delhi. No. 101-G, dated Basrah, the 7th December, 1914.

I have the honour to submit for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the following report of the operations of the troops under my command from the 14th to the 28th November, 1914.

2. On the morning of the 14th November, the S.S. "Elephanta," with my Headquarters, and four other transports anchored in the river opposite Saniyeh, where Brigadier-General Delamain's force was already bivouacked. The disembarkation of the troops was commenced at once. Infantry used the ships' boats and experienced no difficulty in getting ashore. The landing of the guns, wagons and horses of the field artillery and of the cavalry horses in lighters and dhows was greatly delayed by the strong tide and current, the want of proper landing places, and by the shortage of lighters and steam craft for towing purposes. Every possible use was made of all the craft available, and with the hearty co-operation of the officers and men of the Royal Navy, the Indian Marine and the transports, considerable progress was made. The hatch covers of the transports were utilised as ramps for horses and guns, while excellent work was done by the Sapper companies.

3. In the course of the day I learnt from General Delamain of the presence of a hostile force at Saihan, four miles distant, and I ordered him to attack it the following morning. A full account of the action which ensued will be found in the attached report from General Delamain. I have already mentioned, in my telegraphic report of this action, my appreciation of the skilful and spirited manner in which this attack was carried out, and of the credit due to all who were engaged. The result was entirely satisfactory, as it enabled our advance on the 17th November to take place without our right flank being harassed.

4. Our information on the evening of the 16th was to the effect that a force of the enemy would probably be met with about Sahil and Zain, while his main body was believed to be in position at Balyaniyeh. At that time the whole of the cavalry, sappers, and the infantry of the 18th Brigade had been landed, but only one battery of the 16th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery. I was informed that the Sheikh of Mohammerah was apprehensive of an attack on Failieh from the enemy's forces on the

left bank, and also that the attitude of the neighbouring Arabs would depend, to a great extent, upon our ability to make headway against the Turks without undue delay. I therefore decided that it would be in our best interests to advance at once, with the whole of the force then at my disposal, leaving the remaining field batteries to be disembarked as rapidly as possible and to follow us as soon as circumstances would permit.

5. A copy of operation orders issued for Tuesday the 17th November will be found attached.† My intention was to turn the

† Appendix 2.

enemy's right flank, and drive him through the palm groves on to the river, so that the two sloops, "Odin" and "Espiegle," which moved up the river on a level with our advance, might be able to co-operate.

6. After leaving the bivouac we moved across the open desert, the surface of which, owing to recent rain, was still very muddy in places, though fortunately free from creeks or other obstructions.

At 8.50 a.m. a report was received from the advanced guard to the effect that the enemy's position extended from a ruined mud fort, which was plainly visible, somewhat to the right of our line of advance, north-westwards through Hassanain to Zain.† At 10 a.m. the enemy's guns opened fire. I then ordered the 110th Mahratta L.I. to reinforce the advanced guard and moved up the 16th Brigade

† This report proved substantially correct, except that their position extended about $\frac{3}{4}$ mile to the S. of Old Fort along the date-palm belt.

on its right, leaving a space between the two brigades for the artillery to come into action, and retaining as reserves the 48th Pioneers and the 120th Infantry. Each of the two Brigade commanders had then at his disposal three battalions of infantry and a company of sappers, with the cavalry covering the left flank of the whole force, and the two sloops on the river to our right, though at some distance, with only the tops of their masts appearing above the belt of palm trees. The whole of the artillery, consisting of the 23rd and 30th Mountain Batteries, and the 63rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, subsequently joined by three guns of the 76th Battery, which were hurried up during the action from the landing place, were placed under the Commander, Royal Artillery.

7. While these dispositions were being made, a heavy downpour lasting for half an hour came on. The front was entirely obscured, while the surface of the ground was converted into a quagmire ankle deep over which guns and horses could only move at a walk. The enemy's guns ceased firing, and I was in some doubt as to whether he intended to maintain his position. Our troops continued to advance steadily until 11.45 a.m., when the enemy simultaneously opened a heavy gun, rifle and machine gun fire along his whole front. Our artillery and infantry also came into action. After watching the course of the engagement for some time, I came to the conclusion that it would be advisable to abandon my original intention of turning the enemy's right, which extended some distance, and was echeloned back into broken ground and palm groves. The key of his position appeared to be the old mud fort. I, therefore, sent word to General Fry with the 18th Brigade to engage the enemy's right and centre with a frontal attack, while General Delamain with the 16th Brigade turned his left flank and captured the fort. At the same time I reinforced General Delamain with a battalion from the reserve. General Delamain had meanwhile anticipated my intentions and had already commenced the turning movement. It was at this stage that a large number of casualties occurred on our right, especially in the 2nd Dorset Regiment, which had been the first to come into action, and had met with heavy fire in an exposed position, not only from the mud fort and trenches in front of it, but also from a body of the enemy entrenched on the edge of the palm groves behind and to the south of it. These Turkish regulars were using smokeless powder and were invisible from the point where the guns were in action, the latter being fully engaged with the enemy's artillery and with the long line of entrenchments on the main front Hassanain-Zain. The sloops on the river managed to put a few shells into the mud fort, but were soon obliged to desist owing to their view being obstructed by the belt of palm trees. The turning movement was very skilfully carried out by portions of the 104th Infantry, the 117th Mahrattas and the 22nd Company, Sappers and Miners, and was directed by General Delamain himself. The 18th Brigade and the main body of the 16th Brigade also pressed on steadily, supported by very efficient fire from our artillery. At 1.15 p.m. the whole of the enemy's line quitted its entrenchments and fled rapidly to the right rear into the broken ground and palm trees.

his guns covering the retirement, and finally being skilfully withdrawn from successive positions in the same direction under cover of long earthen embankments, which concealed them from view. The whole of our force advanced firing heavily and doing considerable execution, but the enemy's losses would have been much greater if the state of the ground had not precluded rapid movement, more especially on the part of the cavalry and artillery.

Two abandoned mountain guns fell into the hands of the 7th Rajputs, who were on the left of the line, and numerous prisoners were captured.

At 2.50 p.m. I thought it advisable to issue orders for the pursuit to be stopped. The enemy were then retiring through the palm groves, with banks and mud walls affording facilities for defence, and their retirement was covered by distant fire from their guns. I had to form an entrenched camp before night-fall, and to bring in a large number of wounded, who were scattered over a considerable extent of country.

The enemy's losses have been variously estimated, and probably amounted to about 2,000. Two days after the action 69 dead bodies were found lying in one portion of the position. His total strength is estimated at 3,000 Turks and 1,500 Arabs, with 12 guns.

The troops bivouacked at Sahil on the banks of the river with outposts on the line Sahil—Old Fort—to river bank.

The conduct of the troops throughout this engagement excited my warmest admiration. A very large majority of the men had never been under fire before, yet they behaved as steadily as if at an ordinary field-day, all the details of their training, as inculcated in peace time, being carried out automatically. The behaviour of the Dorset Regiment, when exposed to both frontal and enfilade fire, is especially to be commended. General Delamain has also brought to notice the 22nd Company, Sappers and Miners, who were on the right of the Dorsets.

The enemy's guns were well served and cleverly handled, but fortunately the fusing of the shells was indifferent and the elevation generally too great. Their rifle fire was also too high, and not every effective at close quarters, otherwise our losses would have been much heavier. Our artillery suffered for want of observation posts, but in spite of this their fire was highly effective, and, as was afterwards ascertained, produced a demoralising effect on the enemy.

As may be gathered from the above report, the duties of the commanders of brigades and of other units, as also of the staff were carried out most efficiently. I propose to defer bringing the names of individual officers to notice until the operations of this Force as a whole are finally recorded. At this stage I need only mention those who were especially conspicuous during the actions of the 15th and 17th, as set forth in the brigade commanders' reports attached.

The work of bringing in the wounded continued far into the night, and one ambulance party actually remained out all night, in spite of the fact that the enemy were firing on our piquets at intervals. I desire to pay a very high tribute to the personnel of the medical services, both for efficiency of organization, and for devotion to duty. In addition to our own men, a large number of wounded Turks and Arabs had to be cared for and conveyed on board the transports, at a spot where shelving mud flats and a strong current made boating operations extremely troublesome and at times even hazardous.

On the afternoon of the 17th, it was blowing a hurricane for several hours, in the course of which three large dhows lying alongside the transports, laden with stores ready to disembark, were wrecked, and 10 sepoys and two lascars were drowned.

On the 18th, 19th and 20th we were employed in landing supplies and blankets for the troops, and in reconnoitring the enemy's position at Balyanieh, which was found to be at right angles to the river, with four guns in position on the bank, commanding the north end of Dabba Island, where the S.S. "Ekbatana" and two smaller craft had been sunk to block the ship channel. The naval sloops engaged these guns from below the obstruction, and, as was discovered afterwards, placed a shell inside the battery.

I formed a plan of attack to be carried out on the 22nd in which naval and military forces were to co-operate, but on the 21st I received trustworthy information, confirmed by our cavalry, that the enemy had vacated his position. The report stated that the Turks had quitted Basrah and retired northward in boats to Baghdad, that numbers of armed Arabs had deserted, and that the town of Basrah was in danger of being looted.

Accordingly, I ordered a forced march for 8 p.m. that evening, while the naval sloops were to proceed by river to Basrah, and two battalions were hastily got on board shallow draft steamers to follow them. We started across the desert at 8 o'clock, and at 12 noon the next day we reached the outskirts of Basrah, after a march that was extremely trying to the troops. Frequent delays were caused by the high banks of water channels, which had to be levelled, and in some cases bridged to admit the passage of field guns.

On arrival at Basrah, we learned that the two sloops had got in at 9 p.m. the previous evening, and had succeeded in protecting the buildings on the river bank, to which no damage had been done, except the partial burning of the Custom House and destruction of its contents.

The two battalions had arrived at 9 a.m. on the 22nd and were then patrolling the town, which was perfectly orderly.

I therefore decided to defer making a formal entry into the town until the next morning, as the troops were badly in need of food and rest, and it would have been difficult to arrange quarters for them until the place had been more fully examined.

On the 23rd the troops made a ceremonial march through the town to a selected spot near the mouth of the Ashar Creek, where the foreign Consuls and notables were assembled to meet us, and were presented to me by Mr. Bullard, our late Consul. A proclamation prepared by Sir Percy Cox was then read, the Union Jack was hoisted on a prominent building, a salute was fired from the sloops, the troops presented arms, and three cheers was given for His Majesty the King-Emperor. The German Consul and five other Germans were placed on board transports for conveyance to India.

We were cordially welcomed by the inhabitants, who appeared eager to transfer their allegiance to the British Government.

In concluding this report, I wish to lay stress upon the very great assistance that I have received throughout from Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., the Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf, and the officers and men serving under him, without which it would have been quite impossible to bring these operations to a successful issue.

I am also much indebted to Sir Percy Cox for his advice and help on all occasions, and for the valuable and accurate information that he was able to procure for me, chiefly through the Sheikh of Mohammerah, who, at the risk of drawing upon himself the hostility of the Turks, has spared no pains to prove himself our true friend and ally.

I reserve for a future report an acknowledgment of the good services done by the officers of the Royal Indian Marine, whose duties in connection with naval transport work have been most onerous.

We have also received very ready help throughout from the officers and men of the transports belonging to the British India Steam Navigation and other companies.

The following is a list of documents that accompany the report:—

1. Extract from Brigadier-General Delamain's report.
2. Operation Order No. 1.
3. Details regarding enemy engaged 17th November, 1914.
4. Commendations for conspicuous conduct.
5. Map* 4 miles to 1 inch.
6. Sketch* map of action.

APPENDIX 1.

Extract from a Report by Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, D.S.O., on the Operations of the 14th November, 1914.

* * * * *

Information from various sources went to show that Turkish troops were concentrating near Saihan only four miles west of our camp at Saniyeh; and on the 14th November I received the Force Commander's instructions to reconnoitre and dislodge this hostile gathering without involving my own force too seriously. I thereupon issued Operation Order No. 7.

*Not reproduced.

The force under my command consisted of the 30th Mountain Battery, the 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, and the 104th Rifles, with 23rd Mountain Battery and the 20th Infantry in camp held ready to reinforce if we became engaged.

The force marched at 6 a.m. from Camp Saniyeh and on reaching the southern edge of the date palms turned westwards, the Advanced Guard (Major Clarkson, 1 Section Mountain Battery, 4 Companies 2nd Dorsets) keeping 1,200 yards from the edge of the date groves and followed by the Main Body at approximately the same distance.

The march was continued in this order till the Advanced Guard was approximately south of Saihan village and creek at 7 a.m. At 7.10 a.m. the enemy opened fire on the Advanced Guard from two positions on the edge of the date groves with rifles and machine guns and on the main body with artillery. The 104th Rifles were sent immediately to turn and capture the enemy's first position and then to work through the date groves from the east. The Mountain Battery (2 Sections) assisted the 104th Rifles and 1 Section kept the hostile guns in the Turkish second position in check. The 104th took the first Turkish position in capital style about 8.30 a.m. At the same hour the reinforcements arrived from camp.

The Advanced Guard was then reinforced by the remaining half-battalion of the 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, and extended to their left so as to outflank the second Turkish position from the desert side. The 30th Mountain Battery was put under the orders of the Officer Commanding, 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, who now commanded the Advanced Guard. The 20th Infantry (less 4 Companies) filled the gap between the Advanced Guard and the 104th Rifles on our right, leaving the 4 Companies of the 20th Infantry and 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery in general reserve under my own hand. A general advance was then made on the second Turkish position, assisted by the admirably directed fire of both the Mountain Batteries, from which the enemy suffered severely. The position was entrenched and held by the Turks with determination. It was gallantly rushed by the 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, about 9.30 a.m. The enemy made off northwards through the date palms.

In the meanwhile, the 104th Rifles on our right found the ground inside the wood very difficult owing to the numerous irrigation cuts. They pushed forward slowly till they reached the line held by the 2nd Dorsets and the 20th Infantry, meeting with strong opposition at a fortified village, where there were posted 1 gun and 1 machine gun.

The arrival of Turkish reinforcements from their force near Umm-ur-Rowais might now be expected at any minute.

In view, therefore, of my instructions not to get too seriously engaged, I ordered a withdrawal to camp, after doing considerable damage to the Turkish camp. The retirement was unmolested.

H.M.S. "Odin" co-operated in the action by steaming up the river parallel with the troops, but owing to the impossibility of observing fire through and over the belt of date palms, her fire was necessarily restricted to a minimum.

I estimated the enemy's strength at 1,200 with 4 mountain guns and 3 machine guns. From information given by prisoners the force appears to have been considerably stronger. I put their losses at 160 dead and wounded unable to move. We took prisoners 6 unwounded and 19 wounded, including a battalion commander.

Our casualties came to:—

Captain Maclean, 104th Rifles.	} Severely wounded.
Lieutenant Yeatman, 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment.	

Rank and File.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment	5	38	<i>Nil.</i>
104th Rifles	3	14	"
20th Infantry	—	2	"
No. 1 Brigade, Indian Mountain Artillery	—	1	"

The behaviour of all the troops was admirable. The co-operation between artillery and infantry was good.

I would mention that the information regarding the enemy obtained by Major H. Smyth, Special Service Officer, proved to be absolutely correct.

I bring to notice the good work done by the following :—

- (a) Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. Rosher, 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, who commanded the main attack on the enemy's position in an able manner.
- (b) Major H. A. Holdich, Brigade Major, 16th Brigade. An able Staff Officer who gave me the greatest assistance during the engagement.
- (c) Lieutenant E. B. Allnutt, R.A.M.C., in medical charge of the 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, reported as having displayed great gallantry in attending the wounded on the open plain.
- (d) Bugler Surain Singh, 20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry, reported by the Officer Commanding, 104th Wellesley's Rifles, as having very bravely set fire to a village held by the enemy.

* * * * *

APPENDIX 2.

*Operation Order No. 1 by Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.,
Commanding Force "D," dated Force Headquarters, Camp Saniyeh, the 16th
November, 1914.*

*Reference 4 miles to 1 inch map.** [**Not reproduced.*]

1. *Information.*—A considerable body of the enemy was driven out of their camp at Saihan yesterday with severe loss. Opposition may be expected from other bodies here and further north-west.
 2. *Intention.*—To march as light as possible to new camp on Turkish bank of river, all baggage, &c., being carried on ships. The Naval forces will co-operate under the orders of the Senior Naval Officer.
 3. *Ammunition.*—Infantry must carry 200 rounds per rifle on person and other arms as much as possible.
 4. *Starting point.*—The starting points are the 3 bridges south-west of the 16th Brigade camp; they will be marked by red lamps and flags by the 16th Brigade. Head of Main Body to pass at 6 a.m. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General will control traffic.
 5. *Advanced guard.*—Officer Commanding—Major-General C. I. Fry. Guide—Captain Cochran.
 - Troops.*—1 Squadron, 33rd Light Cavalry.
 - 1 Mountain Battery.
 - 17th Company, Sappers and Miners.
 - 2 Battalions 18th Brigade.
 6. *Main body* in order of march—
 - Cavalry less 1 squadron.
 - Force Headquarters.
 - Headquarters and Divisional Signal Section, No. 34 Divisional Signal Company.
 - Divisional Engineers less 1 Company Sappers and Miners.
 - Remainder 18th Infantry Brigade.
 - 48th Pioneers.
 - Divisional Artillery, less 1 Mountain Battery.
 - 16th Infantry Brigade, less 1½ Battalions.
 - Field Ambulances (Bearer Sub-Divisions only) less those allotted to Brigades.
 - 2nd Line Transport.
 7. *Flank Guards.*—Right Flank Guard, Officer Commanding—Lieutenant-Colonel McGeorge, 117th Mahrattas.
 - Troops.*—¾ Battalion 16th Brigade.
 Left Flank Guard, Officer Commanding—Major Scott.
 - Troops.*—1 Double Company 16th Brigade.
 The Right Flank Guard to march 1,000 yards west of date palms.
 8. *Rear Guard.*—Officer Commanding, Major Robinson, 117th Mahrattas.
 - Troops.*—1 Double Company 16th Brigade.
 9. *Medical.*—Field Ambulances are allotted as follows :—

16th Brigade	$\frac{17}{B}$	B. F. A.	$\frac{125}{A. B. C.}$	Bearer Sub-Division only.
				I. F. A.
18th Brigade	$\frac{16}{C}$	B. F. A.	$\frac{126}{A. B. D.}$	I. F. A.
Unallotted	$\frac{16}{D}$	B. F. A. and	$\frac{125}{D}$ and	$\frac{26}{C}$ I. F. A.
- Sick and wounded will be carried with the force by these medical units.

10. *Transport*.—Pack transport will be allotted as follows at 4 p.m. to-day.

British Infantry	50 pack mules per Battalion.
Indian Infantry	38 " " " "
Mountain Artillery Brigade ...	18
Royal Field Artillery Brigade ...	<i>Nil</i> .
Divisional Engineers	70
Pioneer Regiment	53
Cavalry	50
Field Ambulances	48 pack and 80 riding mules.
Divisional Signal Company ...	} 23
Headquarters and Divisional ...	
Section and each Brigade ...	
Section	

Reports to Force Headquarters at head of main body.

R. N. GAMBLE, *Colonel*,
General Staff Force "D."

APPENDIX 3.

ENEMY ENGAGED IN THE BATTLE OF SAHIL, 17TH NOVEMBER, 1914.

Estimated strength.

4 Q. F. Field Guns (3.25 in.).
8 Mountain guns.
3 Machine guns.
3,500 Regular Infantry.
200 Gunners.
350 Gendarmes.
Probably another 1,000 armed Arabs in the palm belt.

They belonged to the following Regiments:—

1st Battalion, 113th Regiment.
2nd Battalion, 113th Regiment.
2nd Battalion, 112th Regiment.
160 men of 1st Battalion, 26th Regiment, European Turks.
Gendarmes of Halim Bey.

Part of the 1st Battalion, 114th Regiment was probably present.
The enemy were commanded by Bimbashi Adie Bey.

Enemy taken prisoners.

Major Mahomed Ali }
Captain Raouf } of 1st Battalion, 113th Regiment.
Lieutenant Mahhi }
47 men (excluding those severely wounded).

Estimated enemy's casualties.

About 800 killed and severely wounded, and a considerable number of slightly wounded.

Captured.

Two Mountain guns and a large number of rifles.

APPENDIX 4.

Extract from the Report of the General Officer Commanding, 16th Infantry Brigade, on the operations of his Brigade up to the 20th November, 1914.

* * * * *

I recommend for reward the following officers, non-commissioned officers and men from those favourably brought to notice by Commanding Officers:—

2nd Dorset Regiment.

Major H. St. J. Clarkson, for gallantry.

Lieutenant and Adjutant F. G. Powell, for general assistance and conveying messages under heavy fire.

2nd-Lieutenant E. L. Stephenson, for commanding his company with conspicuous coolness and dash after his Major and Captain had been killed.

Lieutenant E. B. Allnutt, R.A.M.C., in medical charge, for again displaying conspicuous bravery in attending the wounded under heavy fire in the open. Many men owe their lives to this officer.

No. 3865 Colour Serjeant and Acting Serjeant-Major Delara, for coolness and gallantry.

No. 8558 Private Moores, who showed great courage in bringing up ammunition under heavy fire.

No. 7712 Private Hughes, who when the machine gun officer was wounded, took command of the one uninjured gun and under heavy fire brought it to close range where it was of much use.

No. 6591 Serjeant Drew, who, though wounded, continued to lead his men with coolness and bravery.

3rd Sappers and Miners.

Lieutenant Matthews, R.E., for gallantry in leading a mixed party of Sappers and 104th Rifles and establishing the flank attack on the edge of the date groves.

Jemadar Feroze Ali. After Captain Twiss and the Subadar were wounded, this Indian Officer was in command of about 100 men who did excellent work in spite of heavy casualties.

No. 2855 Naik Dalip Singh, No. 22 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners, behaved with conspicuous gallantry in the action at Sahil on the 17th November, 1914, when, with a party of Sappers under Lieutenant Matthews, R.E., he showed himself very forward in action and led his squad with great determination into Turkish trenches.

104th Wellesley's Rifles.

Captain Chadwick, for gallantry.

Subadar Sabal Singh (first in grove), } for gallantry with Lieutenant Matthew's
No. 2336 Lance Naik Net Singh, } party.

117th Mahrattas.

Captain and Adjutant E. G. Hall, for gallantry. This officer was severely wounded.

I regret that I omitted to bring to favourable notice the services of Mr. Bryant, the Marconi operator on board S.S. *Varela*, of the British India Steam Navigation Company. Mr. Bryant was untiring in his efforts to secure communication, and when the apparatus on the *Dalhousie* broke down, he volunteered instantly to go across from Bahrain to Bushire to set matters right. The force owed much to his skill and devotion to duty, and I trust that it may be found possible to recognise his services.

Extract from the Report of the General Officer Commanding, 18th Infantry Brigade, on the operations of his Brigade up to 20th November, 1914.

* * * * *

When all did well and where there was no opportunity for conspicuous individual action, I have no special recommendations to make.

Extract from the Report of the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, I.E.F. "D" on the operations of the Artillery under his command up to the 20th November, 1914.

* * * * *

All ranks behaved with exceptional coolness and steadiness, and I wish to bring to notice the good work done by Lieutenant-Colonel Greer, and Major Broke Smith throughout the action.

Extract from Reports of the Assistant Director, Medical Services, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," in connection with the Service under his command up to the 20th November, 1914.

I wish to bring to notice the especially excellent work done by the following Medical Officers during the engagement of the 17th instant:—

Captain Wright, I.M.S., 126th Indian Field Ambulance.
 " Hislop, I.M.S., 126th Indian Field Ambulance.
 " Lambert, R.A.M.C., 17th British Field Ambulance.
 Lieutenant Allnutt, R.A.M.C., Medical Officer, Dorset Regiment.

* * * * *

The undermentioned Assistant Surgeons and Sub-assistant Surgeons did conspicuously good work in attending the wounded under heavy fire on the 17th November, 1914, and are recommended for promotion as stated opposite their names:—

3rd Class Assistant Surgeon J. H. S. Huffton, to 1st Class Assistant Surgeon.
 4th Class Assistant Surgeon, J. H. T. Pacheco (wounded) to 3rd Class Assistant Surgeon of three years' standing.
 No. 282 1st Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon V. U. R. Pandit, 104th Rifles, to 2nd Class Senior Sub-Assistant Surgeon.
 No. 318 2nd Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Shaikh Azimud-din-Shaik Ismail to 2nd Class Senior Sub-Assistant Surgeon.

FIELD OPERATIONS.

No. 597.—The Governor-General in Council has much pleasure in directing the publication of the following letter from the Chief of the General Staff, dated the 8th June, 1915, submitting despatches from Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., describing certain operations of Indian Expeditionary Force "D" up to the 31st March, 1915. The Governor-General in Council concurs in the opinion of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief regarding the manner in which the operations were carried out and the conduct of the troops engaged. His Excellency in Council also shares the Commander-in-Chief's appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered by the Royal Navy and the Royal Indian Marine.

From the Chief of the General Staff to the Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department, No. 11854-1, dated Simla, the 8th June, 1915.

I am directed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to submit for the information of the Government of India the undermentioned reports on the operations of Indian Expeditionary Force "D," up to 31st March, 1915:—

- (i) Report by Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., on the operations resulting in the capture of Qurnah, 9th December, 1914;
- (ii) Report by Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., on an engagement north of Qurnah on 20th January, 1915;
- (iii) Officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers brought to notice by Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., for good services rendered during the operations from November, 1914, to 31st March, 1915.

2. His Excellency considers that the operations in question were skilfully carried out and that the conduct of the troops reflects credit on all ranks. He desires to commend to the favourable consideration of Government the officers, non-commissioned officers and men whose services are brought to notice in the reports, and wishes to invite attention to the valuable assistance rendered by the Royal Navy and Royal Indian Marine.

3. His Excellency recommends that these reports be treated as despatches and published in the "Gazette of India."

From Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, Delhi. Headquarters, Basrah, No. 174-G., dated 29th December, 1914.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the accompanying reports by Major-General C. I. Fry, Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Frazer and Commander W. Nunn, R.N., on the operations which resulted in the capture of Qurnah, and the surrender of the Turkish garrison with its commander, the late Vali of Basrah.

The force originally despatched from Basrah on the evening of the 3rd December for this purpose consisted of two guns of the 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, one company of Norfolks, half company 3rd Sappers and Miners, the 104th Rifles and the 110th Mahrattas under command of Colonel G. S. Frazer. Two of the transports containing these troops were armed with two field guns each, to be placed at the disposal of the Senior Naval Officer as soon as the landing of the troops had been completed.

Colonel Frazer's orders were to land at a spot, selected by Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., on the left bank of the river a few miles below Qurnah, and, acting in concert with the naval force, to clear the left bank of the enemy up to and beyond Qurnah, after which he had a free hand to decide whether to cross the river and attack the village of Qurnah, or to hold on and await reinforcements.

It will be seen from Colonel Frazer's report that the clearing of the left bank was carried out most successfully.

The enemy on this bank, after being driven from his entrenchments and from the village of Muzaira'ah, fell back to the north, while our leading troops got engaged with those holding the village of Qurnah on the right bank. Owing to the thick groves of palm trees at this spot, intersected as usual by numerous creeks, touch was lost with the retreating Turks, who were thus enabled to cross the river unmolested higher up stream; while Colonel Frazer, being unable to cross the river under a heavy fire, withdrew for the night. It will be seen from the report of Captain Nunn, R.N., that although the naval guns and the field guns on the transports were able to afford most efficient support during the first part of the action, the ships and armed launches, one of which was disabled, could not, owing to being exposed to heavy shell fire, go far enough up stream to bring an effective fire to bear upon the enemy holding this village.

I consider that Colonel Frazer accomplished all that could have been expected of him, having regard to the limited number of troops under his command. The Turks had been reinforced before the action commenced and were in greater strength than was expected.

As soon as the transports containing wounded and prisoners returned to Basrah, I ordered General Fry to take up reinforcements consisting of four more field guns, the remaining three companies of the Norfolk Regiment, the 7th Rajputs and a half battalion of the 120th Infantry.

His orders were to reconnoitre the ground thoroughly before renewing the engagement, and to let me know if he considered more troops would be required. He asked for a Mountain Battery and some transport mules, which were despatched as quickly as possible.

The further course of the action is fully described in General Fry's report, and it only remains for me to express my high appreciation of the skilful manner in which they were carried out and of the excellent behaviour of the troops engaged. I consider that the crossing of the river was a most creditable performance, and I trust that the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Campbell and the non-commissioned officers and men of the 3rd Sappers and Miners, who swam the river, will meet with due recognition.

I also wish to endorse General Fry's commendations of other officers and men who distinguished themselves during this engagement, although, as I have already mentioned in a previous report, I propose to defer bringing the names of individual officers to notice until the operations as a whole have been concluded. I much regret that the force has now lost the services of Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., and the officers and men of H.M.S. "Ocean," who have now rejoined their ship and quitted the Gulf.

List of accompaniments to despatch.

- I.—Report on the operations of General Fry's column on 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th December, 1914.
 Appendix "A."—Report on transport arrangements.
 " "B."—Order of battle for operations, 7th December.
 " "C."—Detail of ordnance and prisoners taken at Qurnah on 9th December.
- II.—Report on the operations of Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer's column on 4th December, 1914.
 Appendix "D."—Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Clery, 104th Rifles, on operations 4th December.
 " "E."—List of casualties 4th December.
- III.—Report by Commander W. Nunn, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, on the operations 4th-9th December, 1914.
- Maps and Sketches—
- Sketch map of Camp Shaib.
 - Sketch map of action of 7th December.
 - Sketch map of Muzaira'ah.
 - Sketch of crossing of River Tigris.
 - Sketch showing operations of 4th December.
 - Map of country round Qurnah, scale 4 inches to 1 inch.
 - Sketches illustrating the Senior Naval Officer's Report (Part III.).

} Not reproduced.

Enclosure No. I.

Report on the Operations of General Fry's Column on 6th, 7th, and 8th December, 1914, culminating in the Surrender of Qurnah.

The troops despatched from Basrah on the 5th December to reinforce Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer's Column (104th Rifles, 110th Mahratta Light Infantry, and section 82nd Battery) arrived at Camp Shaib at 5 a.m. on 6th December and disembarked, extending the existing perimeter camp to the north. Colonel Frazer had arranged for a reconnaissance of the enemy's position by three companies under Major Hill at 8 a.m., and during this, I and one of my staff went on board H.M.S. "Lawrence" to confer with Sir P. Cox and Captain Hayes-Sadler, Senior Naval Officer.

The enemy had re-occupied Muzaira'ah after Colonel Frazer's operation of the 4th December and appeared to be actively engaged in entrenching the position.

At 10.30 a.m. the enemy opened fire with two guns from the southern end of Muzaira'ah on Major Hill's reconnaissance, firing about six groups of two shots of well-timed shrapnel, and at 11 a.m. opened on the "Lawrence," firing six groups of two shots. They appeared to be ranging new guns.

The reconnaissance returned to camp, while the "Lawrence" withdrew a short distance down stream.

At 2.30 p.m. the Senior Naval Officer reported that about 500 enemy with two guns were advancing from Muzaira'ah across the plain. The 110th were sent forward to reinforce the outposts with two sections, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery. After some brief long range fire the enemy retired, and beyond a small affair of outposts just before dusk, when the enemy advanced too close, necessitating the reinforcement of the outposts by one double company, there was no sniping or other disturbing element during the ensuing night.

From my intelligence it appeared that the enemy had been considerably reinforced since Colonel Frazer's action on 4th, and were now estimated at 1,200 to 1,500 about Muzaira'ah with six guns, and about 800 in Qurnah with four guns.

As any forward movement from Muzaira'ah would enable the enemy to shell the camp (though the danger was a night one only), and to prevent any further reinforcement to the enemy, I decided that an early attack on Muzaira'ah, with the clearing of the left bank of the Tigris River was essential to further operations. This, however, would have been ineffectual unless I was prepared to remain in possession of captured ground. The opening of a short line of communication to Shaib Camp would be essential, and consequently 320 mules were wired for, being the minimum estimated requirement. (For the working of this line see Appendix "A.")

On 7th December the force (Appendix "B"), less one half-double company per battalion and details of other units left in camp, assembled on the further side of the creek just north of the camp at 9 a.m. Considerable delay occurred owing to difficulties experienced by the field artillery in crossing this shallow creek, filled by an exceptionally high tide.

My plan of attack was for the 2nd Norfolk Regiment and the 120th Infantry to attack the village of Muzaira'ah and the trenches south of that place, while the 110th Light Infantry, echeloned back on the right of the 2nd Norfolk Regiment, was to carry out a turning movement against the north of the village, the 7th Rajputs and 104th Rifles being held in reserve. The section, 82nd Battery, was directed to support the left attack, the two sections, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, the right attack. The Mountain Battery and transport mules asked for had arrived at camp, and I must here express my thanks for the prompt despatch of these, the latter being specially necessary for my plans. The 30th Mountain Battery at once joined the force for the action, and was placed between the field batteries to support either flank as required.

Close co-operation had been arranged for with the Senior Naval Officer. For the distribution of troops and subsequent movements *see* Sketch Map of action of 7th December.*

The advance commenced at 11 a.m. over an absolutely level and bare open plain without a vestige of cover, and at 11.15 a.m. 82nd Battery opened fire on Muzaira'ah at a range of 2,750 yards.

Ten minutes later the enemy opened rifle fire from the village and trenches covering it, and at 11.45 a.m. the 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, came into action at 3,800 yards range. Two of the enemy's guns then opened fire on the 76th Battery from the north end of Muzaira'ah, the flashes being visible, but they were silenced in ten rounds and did not re-open fire, being subsequently captured intact.

The infantry were meanwhile steadily advancing and all artillery advanced to closer ranges. As the infantry came into action each line successively dropped their blankets to facilitate movement and these were collected after the action.

The 2nd Norfolk Regiment and 120th Infantry came under some enfilade fire from trenches on the enemy's right, but the prompt switching of fire on to that flank by the 82nd Battery and guns from the ships, combined with vigorous action on the part of the 120th Infantry, reinforced by a double company, 7th Rajputs, with Maxim guns effectually checked any danger from that direction.

Meanwhile the 110th Light Infantry executed their turning movement against trenches on the north of Muzaira'ah, till at 12.50 p.m. the whole of the 2nd Norfolk Regiment being now merged in the firing line, the village was stormed at the point of the bayonet, the enemy not waiting to receive the charge.

The pursuit through the palm groves was vigorously carried out by the 120th Infantry and 2nd Norfolk Regiment, while the 110th Light Infantry cleared the trenches immediately north of Muzaira'ah. The 104th Rifles followed closely after the 110th Light Infantry and, as the latter regiment swung towards the river, moved northwards, clearing further trenches occupied by the enemy in their retirement. All the artillery moved round the north of Muzaira'ah and shelled the enemy.

At 2 p.m. two hostile guns opened fire from the north-north-east, the flashes only being visible. These were silenced in seven minutes by searching fire from 76th Battery at 4,100 yards range, and teams were seen galloping away, leaving the guns. A squadron of cavalry or even a troop during this pursuit would have been invaluable, for the two guns could undoubtedly have been captured and probably a large body of the enemy (estimated from 1,000 to 1,500) could have been rounded up, with their line of retreat up the river bank cut.

Major Maule, 82nd Battery, had meanwhile placed one of his guns in position on the left bank of the Tigris at the northern edge of the palm groves and effectually raked the river front of Qurnah at a range of 2,300 yards.

The 7th Rajputs, except for one double company reinforcement to the 120th, were in reserve throughout the action.

Through the palm groves the fighting continued till nearly dusk, the enemy bringing a heavy fire to bear from Qurnah and along the river bank.

Camp was arranged for the force in some gardens between Muzaira'ah and the palm groves, where, though within shell fire from Qurnah, it was hidden from view and covered by the glare of the burning village. By 5 p.m. all units were

* Not reproduced.

settling into camp except the 110th Light Infantry, who were covering the operation from the north-west and who came in after dark. About this time two enemy's shells were burst outside the north-west corner of camp, and at 9.30 p.m. five shells were fired over the glowing village: no damage was done and the ensuing night was devoid of incident.

The captures this day included 3 field guns, about 130 prisoners and a large number of rifles which were destroyed.

The enemy are estimated to have had about 2,000 troops on the left bank, and subsequent information places their casualties at about 200 killed and 300 wounded, but the latter is probably under-estimated. Our casualties were British officers wounded 5; Indian officers wounded 3; rank and file killed 8; wounded 112, of whom 2 have since died.

I must acknowledge the admirable support extended by the Artillery and the Navy, which seems to have paralyzed all artillery resistance.

From my intelligence this evening it appeared that about 1,500 of the enemy escaped northwards up the left bank of the Tigris and that the majority had embarked and fled north, while in Qurnah itself were some 800 regulars with 4 guns.

I decided to attempt a crossing of the Tigris without delay.

Early on the morning of 8th December the half Company (No. 17) Sappers and Miners were despatched to the northern edge of the palm groves to get a line across the river. The 104th Rifles were to reconnoitre and cover the operations from the north; the 110th Light Infantry and 2nd Norfolk Regiment were moved to the edge of the palm groves, the former to cross and the latter to cover the crossing, while the artillery moved to positions in support, and the 120th Infantry and 7th Rajputs were to distract attention opposite Qurnah itself in combination with the naval force.

The dispositions of the crossing are shown in sketch of crossing of River Tigris.*

At 11.30 a.m. Havildar Ghulam Nabi swam across the Tigris with a log line accompanied by Lance Naik Nur Dad and Sapper Ghulam Haidar, and in spite of a strong current and the possibility of a heavy fire being brought on them at any moment, they succeeded in swimming the 130 yards of river and landing on the right bank. Lieutenant Campbell, R.E., then went across and the $1\frac{1}{2}$ inch wire cable, especially brought up for the purpose, was hauled over and made fast; a difficult feat in the strong current on an ebb tide.

A dhow was secured with the assistance of two or three friendly Arabs, and being brought across, the first party of some 70 men, 110th Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer and Captain Cochran, General Staff Officer, 3rd grade, for Intelligence, successfully landed on the right bank at 1.20 p.m. under some rifle fire from dhows down stream. Though the operation was tedious, the rest of the Battalion was gradually pushed over.

Meanwhile the Navy and a Double Company of each of the 120th Infantry and 7th Rajputs were distracting the enemy's attention in front of Qurnah successfully; for the crossing did not appear to have been realized by the enemy till too late, though some rifle and ineffectual shell fire was experienced.

The 104th Rifles had earlier reported that they could cross about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles up stream by 3 dhows, the crews of which were friendly. They were directed to cross and come up on the right of the 110th Light Infantry for the advance on Qurnah, while the 2nd Norfolk Regiment detached half a battalion to replace them.

The single gun, 82nd Battery, only returned the enemy's fire, and it was not found necessary for the other guns to disclose themselves. One Section, 30th Mountain Battery, without mules, followed the 110th Light Infantry across the river, but were not employed, as Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer, meeting with some opposition north of Qurnah, decided it was too late in the day to storm the town with the probability of street fighting.

The 104th Rifles, 110th Light Infantry and Section 30th Mountain Battery accordingly went into camp on the right bank near the flying bridge. One Double Company, 110th Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Britten, however, moving down the right bank, did not get the order to retire, and entering the enemy's position on their right, enfiladed their northern defence and occupied three towers in this part of their position. This Double Company, being isolated, later withdrew to camp without casualty for the night.

To support this force on the right bank, the 2nd Norfolk Regiment were left to camp at the end of the palm groves on the left bank, other units resuming their camp at Muzaira'ah.

* Not reproduced.

The ensuing night was devoid of incident.

Our casualties this day were 23 rank and file wounded.

At 5 a.m. on 9th December, as I was about to resume operations, I received intimation from the Senior Naval Officer that a deputation of officers from Subhi Bey, the late Vali of Basrah and Turkish Commander, had boarded H.M.S. "Espiegle" about midnight, stating that the Vali was prepared to surrender unconditionally.

I met a deputation, consisting of the Chief Staff Officer and 2 Lieutenants on board at 8.30 a.m. when arrangements for surrender were made and all movements of troops stopped.

At 1.30 p.m., accompanied by Sir Percy Cox, Captain Hayes-Sadler (Senior Naval Officer) and Staffs, I landed at the Vali's house and received his surrender, returning to him his sword in recognition of his able defence.

Meanwhile the 104th Rifles and 110th Light Infantry had moved into Qurnah, and piquets were posted round the town, the remainder of the battalions being drawn up round the Turkish force which had fallen in with piled arms on the open square at the south corner of the town.

At 2.30 p.m., the Union Jack was formally hoisted and the transference of the prisoners to the paddle steamer "Blosse Lynch" was proceeded with. The detail of ordnance and prisoners taken at Qurnah are shown in Appendix "C."

General remarks and recommendations.—I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the troops throughout these operations and their steadiness under heavy fire. Their tactical formations were admirably adapted to the ground which afforded no cover, and the units were handled with marked ability.

My thanks are due to Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., for his very close co-operation with his naval force throughout these operations, which was of invaluable assistance.

The fact that there were so few casualties was due to the splendid co-operation of the field and mountain artillery. Their fire was rendered very difficult owing to mirage, but in spite of this they maintained an accurate fire on the enemy's trenches right up to the moment of assault. They also immediately silenced any of the enemy's guns which opened fire. *Major St. T. B. Nevinson*, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, acted as Commander, Royal Artillery and directed this co-operation with great skill and ability. *Major St. J. Maule*, 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, throughout showed great initiative, and his action in bringing a gun to bear on the river front of Qurnah on the 7th and 8th December had much to do with the decisive issue of the operations.

Major H. J. Cotter, 30th Mountain Battery, and *Captain E. V. Sarson*, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, gave valuable services.

No. 98166 Battery Sergeant Major H. E. Haggett, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, is noted for exceptionally able and energetic assistance.

No. 17 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners. I cannot speak too highly of the services rendered by this half Company throughout, under the command of *Lieutenant R. C. Lord, R.E.* They have had very hard work and their devotion to it has been of incalculable assistance.

Major H. E. Winsloe, R.E., acted as my A.C.R.E. and ably directed the operation of bridging the river Tigris.

Havildar Ghulam Nabi, No. 2632, swam across the Tigris with a log line accompanied by *Lance Naik Nur Dad*, No. 3743, and *No. 3898 Sapper Ghulam Haider*. There was a strong current in the river which was about 130 yards wide, and the enemy were occupying the opposite bank only a short distance down stream. Although they were not fired on, there was every reason to expect they would be, as the ground on the opposite bank was densely wooded and favoured the approach of an enemy. It was owing to their gallant action that the steel cable was got across and the flying bridge constructed. I recommend *Havildar Ghulam Nabi* for the "Order of Merit" and *Lance-Naik Nur Dad and Sapper Ghulam Haider* for the "Distinguished Conduct Medal."

Lieutenant M. G. G. Campbell, R.E., deserves special recognition for his gallant crossing over the Tigris, holding on to the log line only, when a strong current was running, to superintend the hauling over of the steel hawser and fix the running tackle for the flying bridge—he was for some time under fire while performing this difficult operation.

2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment.—This fine Regiment has throughout been an example to others, both in the field and in camp. Their cohesion and the precision in their movements showed that they have attained a very high standard of efficiency

in their peace training, the credit for which is due to *Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Peebles, D.S.O.*, who has commanded the Regiment with marked ability and energy.

Captain W. J. O'B. Daunt (severely wounded) proved himself a gallant leader.

Captain and Adjutant G. de Grey was particularly conspicuous in taking messages to the firing line, and conveying ammunition to it when it was running short.

Lieutenant H. S. Farebrother for bold handling of his machine gun section over absolutely open ground.

No. 5008 *Sergeant W. Bailey* (twice wounded) for work with machine guns.

No. 5223	Lance-Sergeant L. Snell	} for exceptionally gallant and useful work during the attack on Muzaira'ah.
" 5973	Sergeant A. Cornwall	
" 7226	Lance-Sergeant Leveridge	
" 7345	Corporal W. Fristin	
" 7521	Musician Mullinger	
" 7784	" Sharpe	
" 8049	Private A. Dawson	} did particularly well, attending to Captain Daunt when wounded.
" 8365	" F. Pryor	
" 8632	" A. George	

Captain D. Arthur, I.M.S., was particularly conspicuous in attending Captain Daunt and other wounded when exposed to heavy fire, and throughout the action.

7th Rajputs.—This Regiment was held in reserve throughout, but one Double Company under Lieutenant-Colonel Parr did well when it reinforced the 120th Infantry.

Lieutenant W. L. Harvey.—For the very efficient manner in which he brought up his machine gun section in support of the 120th Infantry; he was wounded just after adjusting a jam in one of his guns.

Subadar Brijmohan Singh handled his company in a very efficient manner when brought up in support of the 120th Infantry and acted throughout with conspicuous bravery and coolness.

104th Rifles.—This Regiment has been engaged in every action which has taken place during this campaign and has met with very heavy casualties. Their work under my command during these operations has throughout been excellent and quite up to the fine traditions of the Regiment. During the action of the 7th they were in reserve, but were thrown in towards the end of the action and carried out the pursuit well. On the 8th *Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Clery* showed great initiative in securing the 3 dhows up stream and his action greatly facilitated the rapidity of crossing.

Captain H. M. Butler (severely wounded) for exceptional skill and gallant leading of his Double Company in the attack on Muzaira'ah.

Sub-Assistant Surgeon Pundit, I.S.M.D.—During the attack on Muzaira'ah on the 7th December, 1914, Rifleman Ghos Mahammad was shot by an Arab, who was hiding in one of the huts. Sub-Assistant Surgeon Pundit called on a sepoy of another Regiment to enter the hut and clear it. The sepoy seemed reluctant to do so, and this Sub-Assistant Surgeon took his rifle and bayonet, entered the house and closed with the Arab. The sepoy followed and between them they killed him. He has also shown exceptional bravery in attending wounded under fire.

110th Mahratta Light Infantry.—This Regiment carried out the turning movement on the enemy's left flank on the 7th with great intelligence and dash and worked well on the 8th.

Lieutenant-Colonel T. X. Britten.—His action on 8th December, 1914, in capturing 3 towers on the right of the enemy's position at Qurnah shows him to be a resourceful and dashing leader.

Captain K. E. Cooper showed great dash and bravery attacking through the north end of Muzaira'ah. He approached one small house from which fire was being kept up, climbed a wall at the back and shot 4 Turks, who were occupying it, with his revolver.

Subadar Hari Savant and *Jemadar Vishun Ghone* for conspicuous coolness and ability in handling their Half Double Companies on 7th and 8th December, 1914.

No. 2089 *Lance-Naik Bhan Savant* (since killed), a young soldier who showed much dash and spirit in command of the scouts of his company.

No. 1148 Lance-Naik Haider Beg, a signaller, who on two occasions signalled an important message from the firing line to the artillery, standing up fearlessly in the open under heavy fire, doing so, as he could not see properly in any other position.

120th Rajputana Infantry.—This Regiment, consisting of only Headquarters and 2 Double Companies, acted with great boldness and spirit on our left flank and ably supported the 2nd Norfolk Regiment when the latter came under enfilade fire from the enemy's right.

Lieutenant and Adjutant W. L. Miskin showed great dash and capacity. After Captain Macready was wounded he took command of that officer's Double Company and handled it well, having twice to change direction to meet enfilade fire, and on each occasion succeeded in turning out the enemy.

Subadar Dunga Rawat for conspicuous bravery and coolness in handling his Half Double Company.

No. 978 Havildar Gunesh for marked capacity as a leader.

Medical Services.—The Field Ambulances under *Major E. Bennett, R.A.M.C.*, worked with great devotion on the 7th and were under shell fire for a short time that night.

Transport.—I must recognise the good work done by the portion of the 10th Mule Corps under *Jemadar Allah Din* and endorse the recommendations to notice of individuals mentioned in paragraph 12 of Appendix "A."

Headquarters.—Finally I would bring forward the names of *Captain E. G. Dunn*, Royal Irish Rifles, my Brigade Major, who again gave most valuable and energetic assistance in the working out of the details of the operations. His clear conveyance of my orders materially assisted in the successful issue of the operations. Also *Captain W. F. C. Gilchrist*, 52nd Sikhs (F. F.), my Staff Captain, who again proved himself an able, energetic and resourceful Staff Officer; he, in the absence of either a Supply or Transport Officer, organized and maintained an unflinching supply to the troops from my original camp at Shaib.

Captain H. G. Morrell, 119th Infantry, in command of the 18th Brigade Section of the 34th Divisional Signal Company, carried out his duties under difficult circumstances very ably and with untiring energy.

Captain G. W. Cochran, 81st Pioneers, General Staff Officer, 3rd Grade for Intelligence, worked unsparingly and the information he collected turned out to be very accurate. He also gave me much assistance in other ways.

APPENDIX A.

Report on the working of the transport between Shaib Camp and Muzaira'ah.

1. On arrival at Shaib on the morning of the 5th December, 1914, General Fry decided to get up three hundred mules, his intention being, when the village of Muzaira'ah was captured and the troops reached the left bank of the Tigris, to maintain himself there and attempt to cross above Qurnah.

2. A demand for 320 mules was therefore sent to Basrah at 1 p.m. on December 5th.

3. These mules (320) arrived on the morning of the 7th at 7 a.m. They were disembarked by 9 a.m.

4. I ordered them to feed and saddle up at 12 noon. Captain Lanyon, of the Norfolk Regiment, was put in charge of the mules to distribute them. I gave him a distribution list showing how mules were to be allotted.

5. At 1 p.m. orders were telephoned to camp to load up the mules as it was seen that Muzaira'ah would soon be in our possession.

6. About 4.30 p.m. the mules began to arrive in Camp Muzaira'ah. As it was getting dark and spasmodic firing was going on the confusion was considerable.

All the mules were unloaded, however, and in the dark assembled by the duffadars and taken back to camp.

This evening the Regiments got each :—

- 16 loads rations,
- 8 „ ammunition,
- 8 „ tools,
- 8 „ cooking pots,
- some kits,

and so were amply provided for.

7. The orders for the 8th, 9th and 10th were to send up one day's rations each day.

8. As it was feared that the horses might not be able to get full forage rations on 8th, 190 loads of forage were sent for and arrived after dark on 8th.

With them came 48 mules for duty in Muzaira'ah as 1st line mules in case of a further advance across the river. The mules this day therefore did a double trip.

9. There being ample forage in camp, the mules on 9th and 10th only brought up men's rations from Shaib, while 48 mules assisted in carrying up kits of units as they were sent across the Tigris.

10. Eventually all the mules were taken to the right bank of Tigris on the 12th, having been used to ration the troops left on the left bank and to bring up the remains of kits left in camp.

11. On the 8th, when two units were passed over to the right bank, all available mules and the 30th Mountain Battery baggage were used to send up their kits, so that by the evening the troops across the river were rationed and had their blankets that night.

12. Captain Lanyon speaks very highly of the work done by *Jemadar Allah Din* who commanded the mules. His work was of the greatest help.

The Kote Duffadars :—

2193 Busaki Ram,

6417 Jamal Din,

205 Mir Dad,

were of the greatest help to me in collecting their mules in the dark and in constantly moving backwards and forwards.

The men, of whom I saw a certain amount, were cheery and worked well, and though they were under spasmodic shell fire on 7th and 8th and had to cross the plain where bullets, though spent, were falling, behaved very well indeed.

APPENDIX B.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

Major-General C. I. Fry's Column on 7th December, 1914.

Staff	{	Commanding Major-General C. I. Fry, Indian Army.
		Brigade Major Captain E. G. Dunn, Royal Irish Rifles.
		Staff Captain Captain W. F. C. Gilchrist, 52nd Sikhs.

Attached—

G.S.O., 3rd grade (Intel- Captain G. W. Cochran, 81st Pioneers.
ligence).

A. C. R. E. Major H. E. Winsloe, R.E.

O. C. Brigade Section, Captain H. G. Morrell, 119th Infantry.
34th Divisional Signal
Company.

TROOPS.

Artillery :—

76th Battery, R.F.A. (less 1 Section). Major St. T. B. Nevinson.

82nd Battery R.F.A. { one section on each
of "Medijeh" and } Major H. St. J. Maule.
"Blosse Lynch."

30th Indian Mountain Battery ... Major H. J. Cotter.

Engineers :—

17th Company, 3rd Sappers and Lieutenant R. C. Lord.

Miners (less 2 Sections).

Infantry:—

18th Bri- gade	2nd Bn., Norfolk Regiment ...	Lt.-Col. E. C. Peebles, D.S.O.
	7th D.C.O. Rajputs (less 1 D.C.) ...	Lt.-Col. N. E. Robin.
	120th Rajputana Inf. (less 2 D.C.)	Lt.-Col. E. Codrington.
	110th Mahratta Light Infantry ...	Lt.-Col. G. S. Frazer.
	104th Rifles ...	Lt.-Col. C. B. Clery.

Unit.	APPROXIMATE STRENGTH.					Guns.	NAVAL FORCE.
	B. O.	I. O.	Br. R. & F.	Ind. R. & F.			
76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery	4	—	60	—	4	18-pr.	<i>H.M. Ships.</i> —"Espiegle," "Odin," "Lawrence." <i>H.M. Gunboats.</i> —"Miner," "Lewis Pelly," "Shaitan." S.S. "Medijieh," "Blosse Lynch." 2 guns on S.S. "Medijieh" 2 guns on S.S. "Blosse Lynch."
82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery	5	—	62	—	6		
30th Mountain Battery	5	3	—	277	6	10-pr.	
17th Company, Sappers and Miners	3	1	—	75	—		
2nd Norfolk Regiment	23	—	845	—	2	m. g.	<i>N.B.</i> —One $\frac{1}{2}$ D. C. each unit (120th details only) and details from other units were left in Camp Shaib as guard out of these numbers.
7th Rajputs	10	13	—	479	2	m. g.	
110th Mahratta Light Infantry ...	10	17	—	675	1	m. g.	
120th Infantry	9	10	—	404	2	m. g.	
104th Rifles	12	16	—	670	2	m. g.	
Brigade Signal Section	1	—	11	18	—		
Staff and Attached	5	—	3	—	—		
Total	87	60	981	2,598	10	18-pr. 6 10-pr. 9 m. g.	

APPENDIX C.

Detail of Ordnance and prisoners taken at Qurnah on 9th December, 1914.

Ordnance.—2 Krupp Field guns.

2 Mountain guns.

1 '303 Maxim-gun (recovered after its loss 4th December, 1914).

22 Officers' swords.

776 Rifles (of which some 250 were handed over to Navy at their request).

N.B.—Large quantities of ammunition were destroyed.

Prisoners of War.

Subhi Bey, late Vali of Basrah and Turkish Commander.

	Officers.	Rank and file.
1st Battalion, 26th Regiment (Anatolia)	12	353
2nd Battalion, Murrattab Regiment (Bagdad) (Amara)	13	345
1st Company, 1st Battalion 28th Regiment Artillery	2	63
Turkish Navy	1	3
Basrah Battalion Gendarmerie	7	177
Medical	4	11
Supply, etc.	3	11
Vali's Staff	1	5
Wounded in hospital	2	21
Total	45	989

Enclosure No. 2.

Copy of Report by Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Frazer, 110th Mahratta Light Infantry, Commanding, Qurnah Column, on the operations of the 4th December, 1914, dated Camp Um Rush, 5th December, 1914.

I have the honour to report as follows on the operations yesterday:—

2. My Staff Officer, Captain Branson, who was wounded, has already taken to you most of the details, and I sent you a wireless in code last night.

3. The disembarkation yesterday morning was carried out quickly and without confusion.

Two small creeks delayed the advance of the column till they could be rendered passable.

My Advanced Guard was, in the first instance, directed so as to pass well to the east of Muzaira'ah.

As all the scouting had to be done with Infantry, the advance was not very quick.

It was first reported that there was no enemy in Muzaira'ah and I then changed the direction of the Advanced Guard so that their right passed to the east of Muzaira'ah.

It was then discovered beyond a doubt that the enemy were in position along the edge of the date palms between Muzaira'ah and Qurnah.

I directed the Advanced Guard to clear the village and brought up the other $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion of the 110th on their left, and attacked the enemy on their left flank.

It then became known that Muzaira'ah was occupied by the enemy.

I sent the Norfolks, 1 D.C., to support the $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion 110th attacking the village.

Eventually the Sappers and Miners also joined the right attack.

The village was cleared and also the trenches in front of the date trees, where the 110th captured 69 prisoners and 2 abandoned field guns (9 prs.).

In the meantime, the ships had been shelling Qurnah and the date groves, and the Royal Field Artillery Muzaira'ah, and the practice of all guns seemed to be excellent.

The troops after this did not come under shell fire, but the rifle fire opposed to them was considerable.

When the troops entered the date grove I reinforced the left half of the 110th by $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion of 104th, and the enemy was driven back to the Tigris River, where they quickly effected a crossing by means of boats arranged as flying bridges.

At 2.10 p.m. I ordered a retirement to the place near where we disembarked and there formed camp.

After my Infantry entered the date grove my Field Artillery was unable to render any further assistance.

The Tigris east of Qurnah is from 200 to 300 yards wide and field guns cannot operate against Qurnah owing to the date trees.

My retirement to camp was well and steadily carried out.

I am of opinion that until guns can be brought up to demolish the houses of Qurnah, the only way to effect a landing would be to do so with country boats north of Qurnah.

All the troops under my command performed their duty most thoroughly.

Captain Branson, 110th Mahratta Light Infantry, my Staff Officer, afforded me the greatest assistance and was wounded shortly after I had decided to retire, while I was issuing the orders.

I attach a report from the Officer Commanding 104th.

The Officer Commanding 110th reports as follows:—

“Of the officers who came under my observation I should like to particularly mention Major Hill and Lieutenant Hind in the Company firing line, and Lieutenant Ball who handled the machine guns most efficiently.”

No. 959 Lance-Naik Apa Bagive displayed great bravery during the attack on the enemy's position in the date groves, and in the subsequent advance towards Qurnah. He was carrying the flag on the left of the line in order to indicate the position of the line to the warships. The flag was a very conspicuous mark, and

drew a heavy fire from the enemy. Lance-Naik Apa Bagive carried the flag absolutely in the open. Had he taken cover, the flag might not have been visible.

I am sending down all prisoners on "Blosse Lynch," "Malomir" and "Medijieh" under command of Captain Bayley, Royal Field Artillery.

APPENDIX D.

Report by Lieutenant-Colonel C. Clery, Commanding, 104 Rifles, to the Staff Officer, Qurnah Column, dated 5th December, 1914.

As requested, I have the honour to forward the names of the following officers and men of the regiment under my command, who were conspicuous for their gallant conduct during the action on the 4th instant opposite Qurnah:—

Captain E. G. J. Byrne.—This officer in the face of a heavy and accurate fire brought his machine guns right up to the firing line on the river bank opposite Qurnah. From here his fire was so galling to the Turks that they brought up a field gun and endeavoured to silence the machine guns. Several of the shells hit the parapet where the machine guns were; notwithstanding this, Captain Byrne kept his guns in action, and did not retire from his position until ordered to retire. This officer on two previous occasions on which the Regiment has been in action, has brought his detachment forward most intelligently and gallantly. On this occasion he received one bullet through his helmet and one cut his puttee.

2. Subadar Ghulam Rasul.—This Indian officer was conspicuous for the gallant manner in which he led his men forward in the face of a heavy accurate and short range fire from the Turks.

This officer was subsequently killed.

3. Jemadar Kishna Ram.—Conspicuous pluck under fire, and assisted a wounded man to rear under heavy fire during the retirement.

4. No. 2317 Lance-Naik Guman Singh.

5. " 2866 Rm. Khota Ram.

6. " 2578 Rm. Dhanna Ram.

7. " 2090 Rm. Maula Dad.

8. When ordered to retire, the two machine guns had to be carried by hand some 250 yards back to the mules under heavy fire. Not having enough men to take away all the ammunition boxes as well as guns, the machine gun officer asked four men to return to the position and recover the ammunition boxes. They did so under a heavy gun and rifle fire and brought back all the boxes to the mules, although the troops had left the trench.

9. No. 2435 Havildar Mohru Ram, when left in command of a long mixed firing line, performed meritorious service in controlling this line and opening very heavy, accurate fire on the Qurnah position, thus keeping the enemy's fire down while other parts of the firing line retired.

10. No. 1615 Reservist Jhonta Singh, "B" Coy.—Meritorious conduct during the retirement from the river, in carrying Rm. Jai Singh, who was severely wounded through the chest, on his shoulders for 600 yards under heavy fire, over a number of water nullahs, finally handing him over to some dhoolie bearers.

Reservist Jhonta Singh was previously recommended by his Double Company Commander for good work during the action of November 15th, when he carried ammunition forward to the firing line from mules that had fallen into a canal.

11. No. 2263 Bugler Narsu Singh, "A" Coy.—For meritorious conduct in taking written orders regarding the retirement under a heavy fire along the firing line on two occasions—once to extreme right and again later on to the machine guns on the left.

12. No. 3241 Rm. Sobh Singh, "A" Coy., and No. 2981 Rm. Kan Singh, "A" Coy.—For meritorious conduct in carrying between them Rm. Jat Singh, "A," who was severely wounded in the head, under a heavy fire during the retirement for some 300 yards to the dhoolie.

14. No. 3195 Rm. Ratna Ram.

15. " 2112 " Dunga Ram.

16. " 2670 " Kheta Ram.

17. " 3143 " Kema Ram.

18. " 2422 " Jowana Ram.

The above men for meritorious conduct, who, in the absence of Indian Officers

and Non-Commissioned Officers, were conspicuous in taking the place of Non-Commissioned Officers in leading their commands forward under a heavy and accurate fire.

19. No. 2463 Bugler Kala Khan, for meritorious conduct. On November 15th this man with another during retirement from Saihan carried Captain Maclean out of action. On 17th November and 4th December he again performed meritorious work in carrying messages backwards and forwards from the Officer Commanding to the officers in the firing line.

APPENDIX E.

Casualties on December 4th.

Units.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
2nd Norfolks	—	3	—
3rd Sappers and Miners	—	2	2
110th Mahratta Light Infantry	5	16	3
104th Rifles	{ 1 I. O. 13	28	{ 2 W. & M. 8 M.
No casualties, Royal Field Artillery			
2 mules killed			
2 „ wounded... ..			
1 machine gun missing, 110th			

1 B. O. wounded; 1 I. O. killed.

Indians.—18 killed.

British.—3 wounded.

Indians.—46 wounded.

Indians.—15 missing.

Enemy reported in Qurnah, 600 and 4 guns; outside, 700 and 2 guns.

Captured {
 Gunner officer.
 Infantry Captain, 2nd-in-command.
 Another officer.
 75 prisoners.
 1 gun captured.
 1 „ destroyed.

Enclosure No. III.

From Commander W. Nunn, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, to the General Officer Commanding, 18th Brigade, dated H.M.S. "Espiegle," Qurnah, 15th December, 1914.

In the absence of Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., of H.M.S. "Ocean," who was Senior Naval Officer at the time, I beg to forward a short report from the naval point of view on the Qurnah operations from 3rd December to the 9th December, 1914.

The names of H.M. ships engaged were as follows:—

H.M.S. "Espiegle"	Commander W. Nunn, R.N.
" " " " "Odin"	Commander C. R. Wason, R.N.
" " " " "Lawrence"	Commander R. N. Suter, R.N.
H.M. Armed Launch "Lewis Pelly"	Lieutenant in Command, J. F. B. Carslake, R.N.
" " " " "Miner"	Lieutenant in Command, C. H. Heath-Caldwell, R.N.
" " " " "Shaitan"	Lieutenant Commander in Command, F. G. S. Elkes, R.N.R. (killed in action).

I have the honour to report as follows on the part taken in the operations for attack and occupation of Qurnah by H.M.S. "Espiegle" under my command.

On Thursday, 3rd December, H.M.S. "Espiegle" left Basrah at 3.50 p.m., and anchored to northward of Dair, about 10 miles south of Qurnah, at 7.45 p.m., and weighed, and proceeded at 5.5 a.m., on 4th December towards Qurnah, followed by H.M. Ships "Odin" and "Lawrence" and armed launches "Miner," "Lewis Pelly," and "Shaitan" and the four Lynch's steamers "Medijieh," "Blosse Lynch," "Malomir," and "Salami," carrying the troops.

"Medijieh" and "Blosse Lynch" each had two 18-pr. field artillery guns mounted in the forepart of the deck house.

On rounding the river bend near Um Rash, fire was opened on us by two Turkish guns mounted to the south-west of Muzaira'ah village, and we at once replied, opening fire at 6.45 a.m.

The transports went alongside the bank just south of Um Rash village and disembarked troops, and at 9.20 a.m., they had disembarked and were advancing towards enemy.

The "Blosse Lynch" and "Medijieh" came up and anchored off our port quarter at 9.55 a.m., and opened fire. At this point the enemy's fire was fairly accurate, and they were firing on us from the two Muzaira'ah guns and also from Qurnah.

At 10.5 a.m., "Espiegle" was hit on port bow but not damaged, and was also hit several times later, "Lawrence" also being hit several times.

"Odin" had been left in a position to guard the camp which was formed at the place of disembarkation.

At 1.0 p.m., the armed launches were ordered up to assist in the attack as our troops were seen to have practically reached the left bank of the Tigris opposite Qurnah. The launches opened a rapid, accurate fire and a hot fire was opened on them by the Turkish guns and riflemen.

At about 1.40 p.m., "Miner" was seen to be listing and she returned towards ship and grounded just ahead of "Espiegle" and reported that she had been hit and that a shell had penetrated starboard side into engine room.

Assistance was at once sent by "Espiegle" and leak stopper placed over hole and "Miner" was, later on, able to raise steam again and proceed down river where during the night she was patched by "Odin."

All this time "Espiegle" was in extremely shallow water and unable to move nearer Qurnah. The "Espiegle's" fire had been directed on the enemy's guns at Qurnah, which had been several times temporarily silenced, also those at Muzaira'ah.

During the advance of our troops "Espiegle" and "Lawrence" also shelled the enemy's trenches.

At 2.37 p.m., extremely heavy firing was heard near the bank of the Tigris opposite Qurnah and at 3.0 p.m., a signal was received from Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer, Commanding Troops, that he had decided to retire to Shaib Camp south of Um-Rash.

"Espiegle" and "Lawrence" at once directed a heavy fire on the only Qurnah houses which could be seen plainly enough to be sure of not hitting our troops, and ordered the armed launches back at 4 p.m.

At 6.15 p.m., the retirement had been effected and "Blosse Lynch" and "Medijieh" and launches had gone down river, as "Espiegle" proceeded towards the camp and remained there for the night.

Reinforcements were asked for from Basrah and the river steamers sent down for them on 5th December, bringing up four more 18-pr. guns and two and a half battalions of troops, with General Fry in command, on Sunday morning 6th December, and disembarked on arrival.

On Sunday forenoon General Fry held a conference on board "Lawrence" during which the enemy opened fire, and in the afternoon at 2.10 p.m., "Lawrence" which was anchored just to north west of camp reported that the enemy were advancing with guns across the plain from Muzaira'ah.

"Espiegle" at once proceeded to a position north west of camp and opened fire with shrapnel on the enemy at 2 p.m., "Lawrence" also firing on them.

"Espiegle" was hit twice by enemy's shell, one piercing the side of port bow near 3-pr. gun port. This shell had been fired by enemy's guns near Muzaira'ah village. At 3.10 p.m., one of them was silenced and, it is thought put out of action by a shell by "Espiegle." "Lawrence" was also hit.

Our field artillery had also got into action and the enemy retired across the plain with considerable loss.

"Espiegle" ceased fire at 3.25 p.m., and returned to anchorage for protection of Shaib Camp. More reinforcements arrived in the river steamers about 6.30 p.m., on 7th December, and the troops left the camp at 9 a.m. to advance for attack on Turks' position in accordance with scheme arranged, so that Navy and Army could co-operate as much as possible.

"Espiegle" weighed at 9.45 a.m., and proceeded up river and anchored at 10.10 a.m., to north-west of Um-Rash with "Lawrence" astern and launches and "Odin" to south-east.

The enemy at once opened fire from the guns at Qurnah and Muzaira'ah, and we at once replied attacking the guns with lyddite and co-operating with the field guns in the river steamers "Blosse Lynch" and "Medijieh" in shelling enemy's trenches during the advance of our troops, Lieutenant A. G. Seymour, R.N., of H.M.S. "Espiegle," directing the gun fire from the mast-head.

At 11.30 a.m., a very heavy musketry fire was opened on our troops from Muzaira'ah village, and "Espiegle" moved further up the river at 11.50 a.m., and again at 2.10 p.m., although in very shallow water, in order to support the troops.

The armed launches were sent forward at 2 p.m., and at this time Lieutenant G. E. Harden, R.N., of H.M.S. "Espiegle" went in the steam-cutter to locate and sound round the dredger which the Turks had sunk in the river between us and Qurnah.

A heavy fire was being kept up by the Turkish guns and at 3.30 p.m., the "Shaitan" returned with her Captain, Lieutenant Commander F. O. S. Elkes, R.N.R., killed and several wounded, and steaming gear disabled. Her wounded were taken and treated on board "Espiegle."

The launches were recalled at 2.45 p.m., and "Espiegle" remained in the same position for the night, the enemy firing a few shells when the moon rose.

The enemy's fire had been very heavy and fairly accurate during the day and "Espiegle" was hit several times, two men being wounded by a segment of shell which hit spreader of main topmast rigging and burst over afterpart of the ship. Another shell pierced foremast cowl and lodged in netting.

Great difficulty was experienced in keeping signal communication with the Army, but we ascertained during the night that they had camped near Muzaira'ah and would advance on Qurnah in the morning.

At 8.30 a.m. on 8th December, the armed launch "Lewis Pelly" was ordered to reconnoitre towards Qurnah and was heavily fired on by Turkish guns and riflemen at 9 a.m.

"Espiegle" therefore opened fire and ordered "Lewis Pelly" back. Heavy firing in the woods indicated that our troops were engaged and we received information from General Fry that he intended to attempt to cross the Tigris above Qurnah and advance on the town.

"Espiegle" proceeded further up the river and Lieutenant G. E. Harden, of "Espiegle," placed a buoy on the outer side of the sunken lighter, and, with "Lewis Pelly" sounding ahead, "Espiegle" passed it about 11 a.m. and anchored to northward of it, opening fire on the guns at Qurnah and firing lyddite at the houses. "Blosse Lynch" and "Medijieh" also moved up and assisted, and "Lawrence" anchored some cables astern. Firing continued intermittently until sunset, and heavy rifle fire and the burning buildings indicated that the troops were progressing. The guns did not fire till after sunset and early in the middle watch a small steamer with all lights burning was observed to be coming down the river from the direction of the town blowing her siren to attract attention.

"Espiegle's" siren pipe had been cut by shell so "Blosse Lynch" was directed to sound her siren in reply, and I sent an armed boat away under Lieutenant G. H. Harden, R.N., to board her as she approached. She was found to have on board a deputation of three Turkish Officers to discuss terms of surrender of Qurnah.

They came on board at 12.35 a.m., and were interviewed by Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., of H.M.S. "Ocean," who is directing Naval operations from "Espiegle," and agreed to an unconditional surrender and to meet General Fry on board "Espiegle" at 8.30 a.m.

At 8.30 a.m. on 9th December the three Turkish Officers, viz., Major Hussain, Lieutenant Kornal, and Lieutenant Ismail Haki, returned on board and met General Fry and Staff and arranged details as to surrender.

"Espiegle" went further up the river at high water with "Lewis Pelly" again sounding ahead, and although very shallow was able to reach the deeper water near Qurnah and entered the Tigris, anchoring off Qurnah at 10.50 a.m.

In the afternoon, General Fry landed from H.M.S. "Espiegle" and received the sword of the Turkish Vali and Officers, the Turkish troops were disarmed and sent down the river as prisoners of war, and the Union Jack was hoisted over Qurnah.

From the General Officer Commanding, 18th Brigade, to the General Staff, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," dated Qurnah, 15th December, 1914.

Forwarded. In my report on these operations I have already mentioned the great assistance and co-operation extended by the Naval Force under Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N. I much admired the intrepidity shown by the Commanders of the armed launches in ascending the Shatt-al-Arab River under shell fire each day, and sincerely regret the death of one of these, Lieutenant Elkes, R.N.

From Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commanding, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, No. 204 (G.), dated Basrah, 3rd February, 1915.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the following report on an engagement with the Turks north of Qurnah on the 20th January.

Reports from naval and cavalry reconnaissances were to the effect that Turkish outposts had occupied some sand-hills about six miles north of Muzaira'ah on the left bank of the Tigris. I thought it advisable to drive them back, and to impress upon our troops, as well as upon our adversaries, that it was not our intention merely to maintain a passive defence of our prepared position at Qurnah—Muzaira'ah.

A copy of the operation order issued is attached.*

The cavalry of the advanced guard, after drawing the enemy's fire from his trenches on the sand-hills, moved eastward to cover our right flank, sending a patrol to the west to watch the villages near the river bank. The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry then advanced direct on the sand-hills, which were speedily cleared of the enemy. The 103rd Light Infantry prolonged the line to the left, with the 22nd Punjabis and 119th Infantry in second line, and the Norfolk Regiment and half a battalion of the 7th Rajputs in reserve. The Turkish guns, six in number, opened fire from a position near the village of Rotah and were heavily shelled by the "Espiegle" and by our batteries. As our infantry advanced they came under fire from the Turkish main trenches.

These were at the time believed to be north of the Rotah creek, but a comparison of reports received since the action leads to the conclusion that some of them must have been on the south bank. A large extent of ground in front of the creek was marshy, so that the men of our leading battalions were over their knees in water.

The cavalry were also in wet ground. Our artillery were in action at a range of 3,500 yards, engaging the enemy's guns and shelling his trenches and camps, which were plainly visible beyond the creek. The 4-inch guns of the "Espiegle," firing lyddite, were also within effective range, with two guns of the 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, mounted on the deck of the S.S. "Medjidieh." The enemy's guns were temporarily silenced, and some of his troops were seen to be retiring to the north-east.

At this stage I was inclined to order a general advance on Rotah village, with a view to destroying the Turkish camp, and possibly capturing his guns. But I had warned the troops beforehand that I had no intention of crossing the creek, and an advance through marshy ground without cover would probably have entailed considerable loss. I also had to consider that our force was hardly strong enough to hold a position at Rotah as well as at Qurnah in the event of more troops being brought down from Baghdad.

I therefore issued orders to stand fast and prepare to withdraw to camp. Our second line took up a position on the sand-hills and our first line withdrew almost unmolested, except for an occasional shell from the enemy's guns, their infantry fire being well kept down by our artillery and the guns of the "Espiegle." Shortly after noon the engagement ceased, and by 2 o'clock the last of our troops were back in camp at Muzaira'ah.

* Page 29.

Arab reports gave the strength of the enemy at about 5,000, and variously estimated his losses at from 200 to 300 killed, besides many wounded. These numbers may be exaggerated, but it is evident that his troops were much demoralised by our fire. Askari Bey, who had recently arrived from Constantinople to take command, was wounded, and is said to have returned to Baghdad.

I was much pleased with the behaviour of the troops on this occasion. General Dobbie handled his brigade skilfully, and the rapid and spirited advance of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry and the 103rd Mahrattas is worthy of special mention.

I am greatly indebted to Captain Nunn, R.N., for the valuable assistance afforded by H.M.S. "Espiegle" and the armed launch "Miner."

Enclosures:—

1. Casualty return.
2. Operation Order No. 17.
3. Captain Nunn's R.N. report.
4. Rough sketch of ground.
5. Map of Qurnah and district. } Not reproduced.

INDIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE "D."
CASUALTIES.

Units.	BRITISH.						INDIAN.						REMARKS.	
	Officers.			Rank and File.			Officers.			Rank and File.				
	K	W	M	K	W	M	K	W	M	K	W	M		
Force Headquarters ...	—	1*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	*Captain Cochran.
XVIIITH BRIGADE.														
1st Bn., Oxford and Bucks	—	—	—	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
L. I.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1†	—	—	—	—	3	—
22nd Infantry ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	†Subadar Rajpal Singh.
103rd Mahratta L. I. ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1‡	—	6	20	1
L. I.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	‡Subadar Krishna Rao Gadgi.
119th Infantry ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	—
XVIIIITH BRIGADE.														
7th Rajputs ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
10TH BRIGADE R.F.A.														
63rd Battery ...	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
76th " ...	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
33rd Cavalry ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Total ...	—	1	—	—	18	—	—	2	—	7	29	1	58	

OPERATION ORDER No. 17 BY GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING,
"D" FORCE.

Dated Qurnah, 19th January, 1915.

Reference 1 mile to 1-inch map issued to-day.

1. The enemy is believed to be receiving reinforcements by river at Sakhricha and north of Mazeelah, and he occupies an advanced position on the sand-hills, one mile south of the Rotah canal.
2. The Force Commander intends to attack this advanced position to-morrow.
3. The Senior Naval Officer will co-operate from the Tigris. The "Medjidieh," with two 18-pr. guns of 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, and half a double company 120th Infantry on board, is placed at his disposal. The Navy will also guard the mouth of the Shatt-al-Shaib and the Euphrates.

4. *Advanced guard*.—Officer Commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Wogan Brown.
Troops.—33rd Cavalry, less 2 squadrons.
 Half battalion, 17th Brigade.
 1 section, No. 17 Company, Sappers and miners.
5. *Rendezvous*.—Just north of the central redoubt at Muzaira'ah at 5.30 a.m.
Troops.—17th Infantry Brigade (less 1 battalion) in two lines of Company Columns.
 Xth Brigade Royal Field Artillery (less 82nd Battery and 1 section 76th Battery).
 No. 30 Battery Mountain Artillery.
 No. 17 Company, Sappers and Miners, less 1 section.
 2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment (in reserve).
- Distances 100 paces between lines, intervals 50 paces between units.
 The left hand man of the right battalion of the front line will direct.
6. One double company, 17th Brigade, on each flank.
7. The improvised Divisional Ammunition Column—
 Two British and three Indian Bearer Sub-Divisions, Field Ambulances and 50 riding mules escorted by two double companies of the 7th Rajputs—
 Officer Commanding, Captain Ogg—will follow the main body starting at 6 a.m.
- Clearing Hospital*.—1 section British and 1 section Indian Field Ambulance on the "Medjidieh."
8. Captains Cochran and Taylor will guide the Column.
9. One hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition and a havresack ration to be carried on person.
- Signalling, entrenching tools and section reserve ammunition to be carried on mules with units.
10. Reports to Force Headquarters during operations with the Royal Field Artillery.
11. The remainder of the force in garrison as follows:—
Tigris Redoubt.—Officer Commanding, Major Pocock.
Troops.—120th Infantry, less half a double company.
 1 section, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.
- Qurnah Fort*.—Officer Commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer.
Troops.—110th Mahratta Light Infantry.
 7th Rajputs, less 2 double companies and details.
- Muzaira'ah*.—Officer Commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Harward.
Troops.—48th Pioneers, less 2 double companies.
 Sirmur Sappers and details.

R. N. GAMBLE, *Colonel,*
General Staff.

Issued at 1.30 p.m.

Copy No.		Copy No.	
General Officer Commanding, 17th Infantry Brigade	1	Senior Naval Officer	2
Commanding Royal Artillery	4	General Officer Commanding, 18th Brigade	3
Officer Commanding, 33rd Cavalry... ..	5	Officer Commanding, Qurnah	6
Officer Commanding, Muzaira'ah	7	Record	8

General Officers Commanding Brigades to pass copy to Sappers and Medical Units.

Copy of a report from Captain W. Nunn, Royal Navy, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, to the General Officer Commanding, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," dated Qurnah, 21st January, 1915.

I have the honour to forward the following report on the Naval operations in the Shatt-al-Arab on the 20th January.

At 6.50 a.m. H.M.S. "Espiegle" (Captain W. Nunn, R.N., Senior Naval Officer) followed by H.M. Armed Launch "Miner" (Lieutenant in Command, S. N. Heath-Caldwell) and "Medjidieh," having on board two 18-p. Royal Field Artillery guns, proceeded up the river from anchorage off Tigris Camp.

At 7.30. the ships came under fire of the enemy's guns posted on south side of Rotah village, and at 7.58 a.m. "Espiegle" anchored in reach of Tigris beyond

Bahran village heading E.N.E. in a position in which her whole broadside bore on enemy's position, and opened fire on enemy's guns.

At 8.15 a.m. "Medjidieh" anchored as previously arranged about a quarter of a mile to southward of "Espiegle" and warped her stern round to bring her guns to bear and then opened fire.

At 8.20 a.m. "Miner" anchored off Bahran village and was attacked by twenty armed Arabs who ran out from the village. "Miner" drove them away with a well directed fire and then continued to engage parties of armed Arabs and cavalry on the right bank of Tigris.

"Espiegle's" fire was at first directed entirely on enemy's guns, of which five were plainly visible from the ship in pits south of Rotah village (just north of Rotah Creek), "Medjidieh" assisting.

Later on "Espiegle" and "Medjidieh" also shelled enemy's trenches and parties of Turks, who came forward close along left bank of river under cover of the raised bank and sniped at the ship.

After 10.45 a.m. the enemy's guns seldom fired. Their fire had been fairly good for direction, but badly laid for elevation, and shots and fragments of shell often fell near the ship but did no damage.

About 10.45 a.m. the signal arrived that our forces were retiring to camp, so "Espiegle" shelled the trenches vigorously and ordered "Miner" and "Medjidieh" to drop down river firing as they went.

A large body of the enemy's infantry were observed about 10.0 a.m. to be leaving the camp near Sakhricha marching in column and numbering between one and two thousand. They marched to south-eastward round Pear Drop bend and reinforced the trenches and position near Rotah about noon. "Espiegle" was able to put a few shells amongst them and they scattered and took cover.

On their left was a large scattered body of enemy, presumably Arabs, numbering several thousand. On our departure they appeared to march into Rotah with red and green flags flying.

At noon the "Miner" was ordered to set Bahran village on fire, which she did and took two Arabs in Turkish uniform prisoners who were fighting for the Turks; at the same time the Royal Engineers were destroying Halla village.

At 12.10 p.m. "Espiegle" weighed and followed the others down river, the enemy keeping up gun and rifle fire as we left.

From the General Officer Commanding, I.E.F. "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, India, Simla. No. 860-A., dated Basrah, 31st March, 1915.

As I am about to relinquish the command of Indian Expeditionary Force "D," I have the honour to submit, for the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the names of those officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, whose good services during the operations from November, 1914, to 31st March, 1915, I desire to bring to notice, in addition to those who have already been mentioned in my reports No. 101-G., dated 7th December, 1914,* and 174-G., dated 29th December, 1914* :—

Commanders, Headquarter Staff, etc.

- | | | |
|--|-----|--|
| Major-General C. I. Fry | ... | Has done excellent service throughout. He commanded during the highly successful engagements which led to the surrender of Subhi Bey at Qurnah in December, 1914. |
| Brigadier - General W. H. Dobbie, C.B. | | A keen and capable Brigade Commander, and a good leader of troops in the field. |
| Brigadier - General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O. | | Commanded the Force before my arrival and showed great skill and resource in his arrangements for overcoming the resistance of the Turks, and landing his troops in face of considerable difficulties. Has shown much dash and gallantry when leading his Brigade in action. |

* Published in the *Gazette of India*, dated 26th February, 1915.

- Brigadier - General C. T. Robinson. A very capable Artillery Commander. When in command of a mixed force at Ahwaz he was greatly outnumbered by the enemy, and succeeded in extricating his troops from a very difficult situation with much coolness and decision.
- Colonel R. N. Gamble, D.S.O. ... His services as senior General Staff Officer have been carried out to my entire satisfaction, and have contributed greatly to the success of the operations. He is full of tact and resource, and possesses all the qualities that go to make a good staff officer.
- Colonel L. W. Shakespear ... His duties as Assistant Quartermaster-General to the Force in connection with the landing, movement and location of troops have been of a most onerous and responsible nature, and he has spared no pains to carry them out successfully in face of many difficulties.
- Colonel P. Hehir, M.D. ... As senior medical officer he has done much to promote the general efficiency of the Force by his unceasing care for the physical welfare of the troops and followers, and for the treatment of the sick and wounded. He possesses great administrative ability and is an extremely valuable officer.
- Colonel U. W. Evans ... A thoroughly capable and energetic Engineer Commander with high abilities and full of resource. Owing to the difficult nature of the country the work of the technical troops has been throughout of a most arduous nature, and has been carried out with thorough success.
- Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. D. Fordyce. Has performed his important duties as Assistant Director of Supplies in a highly satisfactory manner. He has good administrative ability.
- Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. R. Annesley. A very competent and energetic transport officer, with a thorough knowledge of the duties connected with his Branch. Under his able direction the transport has been kept in a highly efficient state, and its organisation and work in the field has left nothing to be desired.
- Major J. H. M. Davie ... An officer of great administrative ability, whose most arduous and responsible duties as Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General to the Force have been carried out to my entire satisfaction.
- Major G. A. F. Sanders ... An officer of great talent and resource, whose general professional ability and knowledge of staff duties in the field are much above the average. I cannot speak too highly of the quality of his work.
- Major C. C. R. Murphy ... Has done valuable work as head of the Intelligence Branch. He has been successful in obtaining accurate information of the enemy's strength and movements, and his local knowledge of the country and people has been of great assistance.
- Major J. F. Tyrrell ... His most responsible duties as head of the Ordnance Branch have been performed to my entire satisfaction.

- Major d'A. C. Brownlow ... In addition to his work as Deputy Judge Advocate General to the Force, he has filled the important appointment of Military Governor of Basrah with marked success.
- Captain H. S. Cardew ... His work as Assistant Director of Army Signals has been thoroughly satisfactory. He has good abilities and considerable powers of organisation.
- Lieutenant C. K. Greenway ... As Aide-de-Camp this Officer has proved himself to be a most energetic and capable young officer.

2. The following staff and regimental officers are also worthy of special commendation :—

Adamson, Lieutenant-Colonel H. M., M.B.	Khan, Lieutenant Murtaza Landale, Lieutenant C. H.
Ali, Risalder Mahomed	Lyttle, Lieutenant W. J.
Anthony, Major W. S.	Lloyd, Major J. H.
Arthur, Captain D., M.B.	McCreery, Captain A. T. J., M.B.
Barber, Captain C. H., M.B.	Messenger, Captain H. T. K.
Browne, Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. Wogan.	Ogg, Captain A. C.
Browne-Mason, Major H. O. B.	O'Keefe, Major D. S. A., M.B.
Booth, Captain F.	Parr, Lieutenant-Colonel H. O.
Collins, Major D. J., M.B.	Peel, Captain B. G.
Cook, Captain W. K.	Pirrie, Lieutenant-Colonel F. W.
Dallas, Major A. E.	Pocock, Major P. F.
Dent, Captain W.	Pogson, Lieutenant C. A.
Donegan, Lieutenant-Colonel J. F.	Radcliffe, Major F. W.
Farmer, Major W. C. R.	Riddell, Major H. J.
Gillies, Captain F. G.	Roe, Captain J. W.
Goldsmith, Captain H. A.	Shah, 2nd Lieutenant Abdul Samad.
Grey, Captain A. J. H.	Shairp, Major H. F.
Gibbon, Captain W. H.	Shuttleworth, Major A. R. B.
Harward, Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. N.	Singh, Lieutenant Jiwan.
Hewett, Captain G.	Singh, Risalder Hukum.
Horton, Major J. H., D.S.O.	Stace, Captain R. E.
Irvine, Lieutenant-Colonel G. B.	Svkes, Lieutenant-Colonel C. A.
Khan, Lieutenant Abdul Majid (Nawab of Savanur)	Thornton, Lieutenant-Colonel C. E.
	Whiteley, Captain E. C.
	Wright, Lieutenant R.

The following departmental warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men have rendered valuable service, for which I recommend suitable departmental promotion in each case in the order named :—

Medical Services.

No. 854 1st Class S. A. S. Mohun Lal.	3rd Class Assistant Surgeon S. C. Raphael.
3rd Class Assistant Surgeon E. A. Cotton.	3rd Class Assistant Surgeon H. Vincent.
1st Class S. A. S. Ganga Ram Hariba.	1st Class S. A. S. V. Sambasiva Nayakar.

Ordnance Department.

Sub-Conductor A. T. Bardens	Conductor W. J. Chambers.
Arm. Staff Sergeant L. R. Anderson.	

Supply and Transport Corps.

Conductor S. Fowles.	Sub-Conductor F. Carey.
Sub-Conductor J. A. P. Day.	

India Miscellaneous List.

Conductor H. Joyner.	Sub-Conductor J. Bryce.
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No. 34 Divisional Signal Company.

- No. 1. Sergeant-Major J. McConville. No. 45 Private H. J. Newstead.
 No. 40 2nd Corporal W. Fletcher. Jemadar Murugesan.
 No. 48 Lance Naick Joshua.

Searchlight Section.

- Staff Sergeant J. Houghton. Sapper F. G. Pendrigh.*
 Sergeant F. N. Booth.* Sapper J. Mulhern.*
 Sapper W. J. Mooney.*

3. The following officers are specially brought to notice for gallantry in the field:—

- Major M. H. Anderson, 33rd Cavalry. In the operations from Mezera on the left bank of the Tigris on 30th January, 1915, he led a successful charge against the enemy with conspicuous gallantry and resolution—he had two horses shot under him.
- Captain W. M. Hunt, 23rd Mountain Battery. At Ahwaz, on the 3rd March, 1915, this officer displayed conspicuous coolness and bravery in repeatedly checking the enemy with his own rifle, although severely wounded, and thus enabling his section of the 23rd Mountain Battery to withdraw at a most critical stage of the fight.
- 2nd-Lieutenant H. J. Baillie, 2nd Battalion Dorset Regiment. Near Ahwaz, on the 3rd March, 1915, displayed conspicuous courage. With a handful of men he gallantly checked the advance of overwhelming numbers of the enemy and was thus instrumental in saving many of our wounded from falling into their hands.
- Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. Stack, 33rd Cavalry. Severely wounded near Shaiba on 3rd March, 1915, whilst displaying great personal gallantry and handling his regiment in a most skilful manner. This officer did extremely good work whilst commanding the Shaiba Post for over two months.
- Captain H. E. Shortt, I.M.S. ... In the operations from Mezera on the left bank of the Tigris on 30th January, 1915, this Medical Officer displayed great devotion and courage in attending wounded in the open, in face of rifle fire at comparatively close quarters.
- Captain A. R. Thomson, 7th Rajputs. Near Ahwaz, on the 3rd March, 1915, was acting as Signalling Officer on the Staff of the Column Commander. At a critical moment he displayed great initiative in collecting as many men as he could and holding a position to cover the retirement. He next gallantly led a bayonet charge against a party of the enemy who were blocking the road to camp and succeeded in clearing them out.
- Captain H. C. West, "S" Battery, R.H.A. Near Shaiba, on the 3rd March, 1915, at a critical moment of the operations, when the teams of a gun and a waggon were down, displayed conspicuous coolness and courage in keeping the enemy at bay with his revolver, whilst he enabled his defenceless drivers to escape on foot.
- Lieutenant R. H. Sheepshanks, 12th Cavalry (attached 33rd Cavalry). Was conspicuous for his gallantry and skilful handling of a small body of cavalry near Ahwaz on the 3rd March, 1915. Re-forming his troop he repeatedly charged the foremost lines of the enemy and inflicted heavy loss on them.

* Volunteers.

4. In a previous report, I mentioned the good services of the officers and men of the Royal Navy. Since the departure of Captain Hayes-Sadler, the duties of Senior Naval Officer have been most ably performed by Captain Nunn, R.N., of H.M.S. "Espiegle," whose valuable advice and ready co-operation in all our undertakings has contributed so greatly to the success of the operations.

5. I am also much indebted to the officers of the Royal Indian Marine, who have shown zeal and energy in organising a most efficient river transport service, and in making all arrangements for the berthing and unloading of the large fleet of vessels that has been employed on transport duties. The whole has been under the able direction of Captain Hamilton, R.I.M., and among those serving under him I would specially mention Captains Goldsmith and Marsh.

6. I am glad to take this opportunity of expressing my thanks to the officers and crews of the steamers of the British India Steam Navigation Company which conveyed the troops from India at the outset of the operations, while the Turks were still in occupation of the country. At this time there was much risk owing to the difficult navigation of the river, and to the fact that the banks were often held by the enemy. The one desire of the captains of these vessels was to push forward as rapidly as possible, and to afford us all the help that was in their power. The same remark applies to the captains of Lynch Bros. steamers and of the other river craft which have been in constant employment on transport duties, and have many times been in situations of considerable danger.

The following are those who are worthy of special commendation :—

Captain R. W. Coope	...	H.T. "Elephanta."
Captain G. R. Elton	...	H.T. "Umaria."
Captain J. S. Kilner	...	H.T. "Ekma."
Lieutenant S. L. Mills, R.N.R.	...	H.T. "Varela."
Captain J. S. Reddock	...	H.T. "Erinpura."
Captain C. J. Swanson	...	H.T. "Torilla."
Captain C. H. Cowley	...	"Mejidieh."
Captain E. C. P. D'Eye	...	"Blosse Lynch."
Captain F. W. Lyte	...	"Shushan."
Captain O. Sezulezewski	...	"Malamir."
Captain Hassan bin Ghulami	...	"Salimi."
Captain Tahir bin Bangool	...	"Mozaffari."

7. In a previous report I expressed my great indebtedness to Sir Percy Cox for his valuable advice and assistance. His intimate knowledge of local politics, and his remarkable personal influence over the surrounding tribesmen, have smoothed over many difficulties, and greatly assisted the military operations.

I also wish to mention the good services of Mr. E. G. Gregson, of the Indian Police, Mr. D. Gumley of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, Mr. E. Clerici, of the Postal Department, and Mr. Thomas Dexter, Personal Assistant and interpreter to the Military Governor of Basrah.

Doctor Arthur Bennett, of the American Mission Hospital, has helped us greatly by undertaking the treatment of wounded Turkish and Arab officers and men.

8. Several recommendations of Indian ranks for the Indian Order of Merit and Indian Distinguished Service Medal on account of recent acts of gallantry, which are now being recorded, will be submitted in due course.

FIELD OPERATIONS.

No. 757.—The Governor-General in Council has much pleasure in directing the publication of the following letter from the Chief of the General Staff, dated the 29th July, 1915, submitting a despatch from General Sir J. E. Nixon, K.C.B., Commanding, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," describing the operations in the vicinity of Shaiba—12th to 14th April, 1915. The Governor-General in Council concurs in the opinion expressed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, regarding the conduct of the troops engaged in the operations and the manner in which the latter were carried out. His Excellency in Council also shares the opinion of

the Commander-in-Chief that the manner in which the attack on the 14th April, 1915, was executed, reflects the greatest credit on Major-General C. J. Melliss, V.C., C.B., and on the troops engaged.

From Lieutenant-General P. Lake, Chief of the General Staff, to the Secretary to the Government of India, No. 11741-1, dated Simla, the 29th July, 1915.

I am directed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to submit for the information of the Government of India the following report:—

Report by General Sir J. E. Nixon, K.C.B., Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force "D," on the Operations in the vicinity of Shaiba, 12th-14th April, 1915.

2. His Excellency considers that the conduct of the troops in these operations was exemplary throughout, that the operations were skilfully carried out and that in particular, the manner in which the attack on the 14th April was executed, reflects the greatest credit both on Major-General Melliss and on the troops engaged.

3. His Excellency recommends that this report be treated as a despatch and published in the *Gazette of India*.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

INDIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE "D."

From General Sir John Eccles Nixon, K.C.B., Commanding Force "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Simla, No. 168-40, dated Basrah, 6th May, 1915.

I have the honour to forward for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying despatches from Major-General C. I. Fry, regarding the fighting at Shaiba on the 12th April, and from Major-General C. J. Melliss, V.C., C.B., regarding the action at Shaiba on the 13th, followed by the defeat of the Turkish forces on the 14th at the battle of Barjisiyah.

2. The Shaiba garrison on the 11th April, 1915, consisted of the troops named

6th Division. 16th Brigade.

Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O.—

2nd Dorset Regiment.
104th Wellesley's Rifles.
117th Mahrattas.

18th Brigade.

Major-General C. I. Fry.—

2nd Norfolk Regiment.
110th Mahratta Light Infantry.
120th Rajputana Infantry.
48th Pioneers.
63rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery }
(less 1 gun). } 10th Brigade, Royal
76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery. } Field Artillery.
23rd Mountain Battery.
17th Company, Sappers and Miners.
22nd Company, Sappers and Miners.
No. 34 Divisional Signal Company.

Cavalry Brigade.

Brigadier-General H. Kennedy.—

"S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.
7th Lancers.
16th Cavalry.
33rd Cavalry.

8 miles of water, and is traversed transversely by a creek too deep to wade.

3. I took over command of this Force on the 9th April at Basrah from Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., who was granted leave on the 10th by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief owing to ill health.

The same morning, about daybreak, a party of the horsemen reconnoitred close to Shaiba, but retired before our cavalry.

On the 11th it was reported that the enemy's cavalry had occupied Barjisiyah wood, and that some 4,000 infantry were moving into Shwebda; later in the day

Major-General Fry, who had succeeded to the command of the 6th Division, reported that he considered them to be the advanced guard of the enemy's main forces, and that a serious engagement was probable within the next day or two.

I ordered the 30th Brigade, reinforced by the 30th Mountain Battery, under the command of Major-General Melliss, V.C., C.B., to move to Shaiba the following morning, and since he, as senior officer, would command all the forces there, I placed at his disposal the staff of the 6th Division and ordered them to proceed to Shaiba with him.

4. At about 7.30 a.m. on the 12th, General Fry reported that he was attacked from the south in force, and at 11.20 a.m. that he was confident of being able to resist all attacks but was unable to prevent the occupation of Old Basrah by the enemy.

Meanwhile, General Melliss' Brigade, having marched from Makina Masus, commenced its crossing about 9 a.m.

The water was high and the enemy disclosed guns and infantry near Old Basrah; at about 10 a.m. General Fry sent word to say that the enemy were in force between Shaiba and Old Basrah, and that he could not spare more than two battalions to co-operate with General Melliss' Brigade.

As, owing to the distance, I was unable to cover with guns the crossing of General Melliss' Brigade, and, moreover, as he could make no use in the water of the Mountain Battery which accompanied him, I ordered him to return after he had accomplished about one-third of the journey, and to cross by "bellum" by the second route.

The boatmen refused to assist and only about 80 "bellums" were available; I therefore ordered men of the 20th Punjabis, who readily came forward, to punt them. By about 4 p.m. General Melliss, accompanied by the Staff of the 6th Division and most of the 24th Punjabis, started and got successfully across to Shaiba that evening by about 10.30 p.m. During the return journey these "bellums" were attacked by the enemy in some force.

These were the only reinforcements which I found it possible to send by the evening of the 14th. The enemy in "bellums" were in considerable force in the lagoon on the route taken on the 13th, and it was therefore necessary to organise better protection for the next day in the shape of a special guard with mountain guns placed on "bellum" rafts. This convoy got across on the 14th with gun ammunition and the remainder of the 24th Punjabis and the arrangements made would have allowed this convoy to be continued daily.

5. The actions themselves are described by the Commanders, and I will now pass on to the part played by the Euphrates Blockade Flotilla, consisting of armed launches, small steamers and gun barges on which were mounted two 4.7 in., one 12-pr., and three 3-pr. Naval guns, one 5 in. B.L. and one 18-pr. gun. This flotilla, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. Molesworth, R.G.A., was enabled to do good service, aided as it was by the valuable assistance of Lieutenant A. G. Seymour, R.N., H.M.S. "Espiegle," officers and men of the Royal Navy on this station.

When the fighting commenced round Shaiba on the 12th, this flotilla was operating off Nakhailah intercepting supplies, which were coming to the enemy across the water in "mahailas" (country boats of from 30 to 80 tons burthen).

The Officer Commanding the Blockade, having observed the action of Barjisayah on the 14th, approached Nakhailah early on the morning of the 15th and finding that many of the enemy were escaping in native craft, at once gave chase and pursued them to Ratawi, destroying 8 and capturing 4 large "mahailas"; a heavy gale on the following day forced him to lie to.

On the 17th he reached Chubashiah but found it entirely deserted. The enemy were seen retiring in scattered groups across the desert, and though he fired a few rounds at them, they offered no target. It would appear, from subsequent information, that, during their retreat, the enemy were harassed and robbed by their former allies, the Arabs, and that they fled across the desert in wild confusion, scarcely halting until they reached Kamsieh, a distance of close on 90 miles from the scene of their defeat, so thoroughly disorganised were they.

It is now known that Suleiman Askeri, the Turkish Commander, shot himself at Nakhailah after assembling his officers and denouncing the faithlessness of the Arabs.

A large quantity of ammunition, both gun and rifle, was captured upon the battlefield at Barjisiyah and subsequently at Nakhailah; this was either brought in or destroyed on the spot. The total in round numbers amounts to some—

- 1,500 shell—4.5", 15-pr., and Mountain gun.
- 400—500,000 rounds S. A. A.
- 3,000 hand-grenades, some boxes of lyddite and a number of bombs, fuzes and primers.

6. I cannot speak too highly of the steadiness, spirit and pluck shown by the troops in these actions, nor of the able manner in which they were handled by their Commanders.

In the battle of Barjisiyah our troops had to attack over open ground a superior force of the enemy, skilfully entrenched and concealed, on a front of over 3 miles.

The Turkish troops showed themselves well trained and exhibited tenacity and courage; while their musketry and machine gun fire were remarkably effective.

In driving such an enemy from his position by a bayonet charge, after a steady advance in the face of a hot fire, the British force performed a feat of which any troops might be proud.

7. The races, from which the portion of the Southern Army engaged here are drawn, have shown, in the stiffest fight which has fallen to their lot for years, a steadfastness and gallantry worthy of all praise.

Mahrattas, Dekhani Mahomedans, men from Rajputana, Gujars and Mers have earned for themselves in these operations a proud reputation. They vied with their British comrades in this field, the Royal Artillery—the Norfolks—the Dorsets, in spirit and resolution, and have added lustre to their former traditions.

8. Major-General Fry, under whose orders the defences of Shaiba had been organised, made a very successful defence against the enemy's constant attacks for the first 24 hours, during which the enemy suffered heavy losses and were everywhere repulsed.

9. I would specially bring to notice the services of Major-General C. J. Melliss, V.C., C.B., who at once seized the opportunity of taking the offensive, and, after driving the enemy from the vicinity of Shaiba on the 13th April, followed up this success the next day by attacking the Turkish forces in the strong position to which they had retired.

The determination and skill with which he handled his troops on the 14th April resulted in the complete defeat of the enemy after a very hard-fought action, and I fully endorse his recommendation that Barjisiyah be commemorated as a battle honour for the corps engaged.

10. I entirely agree with the recommendations made by Major-Generals Fry and Melliss in the despatches I am now forwarding, and I will only add remarks with regard to the following officers:—

Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O.—This officer has consistently distinguished himself in command of his brigade throughout the campaign, and has shown marked ability as a Commander.

Colonel R. N. Gamble, D.S.O., General Staff Officer, 6th Division, was Senior Officer to Major-General Melliss, who speaks most warmly of the services he rendered throughout the hard-fought and successful operations of the 13th and 14th April. I would also add that his thorough knowledge of the locality, of the troops, and of earlier operations has been of the greatest assistance to me.

Lieutenant-Colonel E. S. Cleeve, Royal Field Artillery.—This officer has shown himself an exceptionally able Artillery Commander, who, until disabled by a wound on the 14th April, handled his guns, not only to the admiration of his own side, but also to that of the Officer Commanding the opposing artillery. That Turkish officer, when taken prisoner, particularly requested that he might be presented to the officer who had directed the fire of the British guns, as our artillery fire, he said, had silenced the Turkish batteries in rapid succession in a way that he would not have considered possible.

11. In addition I wish to mention the following who prominently came to my notice, and who were not under the orders of either Major-General Fry or Major-General Melliss.

Major-General G. F. Gorringe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.—In addition to the command of his own Division, he ably commanded the local defence troops and also undertook the temporary organization of the communications and base. His experience of river expeditions rendered him most valuable in arranging the despatch of troops and supplies across the lagoon between Basrah and Shaiba.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. Molesworth, R.A., for some weeks commanded the Euphrates Blockade Flotilla, which, with the aid of the Royal Navy, often under extremely arduous and hazardous conditions, did excellent service in stopping the enemy's supplies and harassing his retreat. Lieutenant-Colonel Molesworth has shown much enterprise and energy in these duties, and also in reconnaissance work which has been most valuable.

Captain C. A. Pogson, 117th Mahrattas, has done very valuable intelligence work in connection with the Euphrates Blockade and showed much enterprise and daring. He has probably undergone more continuous hardships than any other individual in the force.

Lieutenant R. H. Dewing, Royal Engineers.—On April 15th, the Euphrates Blockade guns drove two "mahailas" (large country cargo boats) into the reeds. Lieutenant Dewing went in after them and destroyed them with explosives.

Lieutenant Commander A. G. Seymour, R.N. (H.M.S. Espiegle).—The guns and gun crews of the Royal Navy under this officer have contributed largely to the success of the Euphrates Blockade, while his advice on naval matters and constant support were most valuable to the Officer Commanding.

Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) L. H. Queripel, R.A., Deputy Director of Army Signals, Headquarters, has shown energy and capability in meeting the sudden strain thrown on the signal service by the operations round Shaiba.

Captain F. Booth, The King's Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment), No. 34 (Divisional Signal) Company.—His zeal and unremitting supervision successfully disposed of the heavy traffic that was unceasing between 12th and 16th April.

2nd-Lieutenant F. McConville, The King's (Liverpool Regiment) No. 34 (Divisional Signal) Company, from 12th to 16th April never left his station day or night, doing very valuable work.

No. 46, Sergeant A. Butcher, No. 34 (Divisional Signal) Company, between 12th and 16th constantly helped the signallers in their work besides directing traffic and supervising the repair of lines. His services were of the greatest use.

Jemadar Marugesan, No. 34 (Divisional Signal) Company, made two brave attempts on 12th April to repair the Shaiba line, but on both occasions was recalled by the General Officer Commanding, 30th Brigade. Between that date and the 16th supervised his station with unremitting zeal.

No. 370, Naik Sher Ali, 20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry (Brownlow's Punjabis) behaved with initiative and gallantry during the attack on a "bellum" convoy on night of the 12th-13th April.

Colonel P. Hehir, Indian Medical Service, Acting Deputy Director of Medical Services, materially assisted the operations by the ability and untiring energy which he displayed in the working of the important department over which he at the time was presiding.

Major H. A. Bransbury, Royal Army Medical Corps, commanded the sections of No. 19 Combined Clearing Hospital that carried out the evacuation of the wounded after Shaiba—attended himself to all cases (over 1,100 wounded, including those of the enemy) as they arrived, displaying much initiative and resource.

4th Class Assistant Surgeon H. N. Murphy, Indian Subordinate Medical Department, was attached to No. 19 Combined Clearing Hospital during the evacuation of wounded from Shaiba—worked with untiring energy and marked intelligence, proving himself to be very capable and reliable.

12. Others of the Medical Service I consider worthy of commendation are:—

Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Adamson, Royal Army Medical Corps.—(Commanding No. 3 A., British General Hospital up to 21st April.)

Lieutenant-Colonel G. B. Irvine, Indian Medical Service.—(Commanding No. 9, Indian General Hospital.)

Lieutenant-Colonel D. J. Collins, Royal Army Medical Corps.—(Commanding No. 3 A., British General Hospital after 21st April.)

Lieutenant-Colonel F. J. Palmer, Royal Army Medical Corps.—(Surgical Specialist, No. 3 A., British General Hospital.)

Major H. R. Brown, Indian Medical Service.—(Commanding No. 19 Combined Clearing Hospital.)

Captain C. C. C. Shaw, Indian Medical Service.—(No. 19 Combined Clearing Hospital.)

Captain G. F. Graham, Indian Medical Service.—(Medical Officer, 20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry, Brownlow's Punjabis.)

1st Class Assistant Surgeon W. H. Brown, Indian Subordinate Medical Department.—(In charge of Depôt of Medical Stores.)

13. In conclusion, I cannot fail to mention the great assistance I received from Major-General G. V. Kemball, C.B., D.S.O., Major-General, General Staff, and Brigadier-General W. G. Hamilton, D.S.O., Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, to whom I am much indebted for their able support; also to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Z. Cox, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., the Chief Political Officer.

REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS AT SHAIBA ON 11TH AND 12TH APRIL, 1915, BY MAJOR-GENERAL C. I. FRY, INDIAN ARMY, COMMANDING AT SHAIBA.

From Major-General C. I. Fry, Commanding at Shaiba, to Major-General, General Staff, Indian Expeditionary Force "D." No. 1815 (Confidential), dated Dirhamiyah, 21st April, 1915.

I have the honour to submit this report which deals with the first portion of the operations at Shaiba and covers the period during which I was in command of the garrison.

2. The first indication of the advance of the Turkish forces from Nakhailah was a message received from my normal protective cavalry reconnaissance at 7 a.m., to the effect that Barjisiyah Wood and Shwebda were occupied by hostile cavalry and that further troops were advancing on the latter place from the north-west.

The protective cavalry were reinforced by the 33rd Cavalry and at 9 a.m. information was received that a large body of the enemy's cavalry had been located in Barjisiyah Wood, another body behind it, a large body of Arabs to the north-west of Shwebda and a large column of regular infantry estimated at 4,000 men was advancing on Shwebda from the direction of Nakhailah. No guns could be distinguished and there were no signs of enemy in other directions.

Except for the approach of the columns on Shwebda, the situation remained unchanged till about 3.30 p.m., when our advanced patrols were driven back by hostile cavalry.

At 4 p.m., the 6th Cavalry Brigade under Brigadier-General H. Kennedy moved out, supported by a small mixed column always held in readiness for the occasion. The enemy, however, retired into Barjisiyah Wood and by 7 p.m. all was quiet.

3. My intelligence this evening pointed to an attack during the later portion of the night by a force of some

12,000 Regulars (mostly Kurds).

12 field guns.

10,000 tribesmen.

The plan of attack was said to be—

(a) An attack by the Turkish Regulars direct on the Fort.

(b) Saiyid Yezdi and his following were to attack, from Ana's Tomb, the north of our position.

(c) Ajaimi's Tribesmen on the south of Shaiba from Zubair.

(d) Yusuf, with the "beni malick," from Old Basrah.

All tents were struck and troops occupied their alarm posts.

The distribution of the garrison, which varied only slightly during the ensuing day, is given in the sketch map of Shaiba defences.*

4. The expected attack was actually made at 5 a.m., on 12th April, 1915, and turned out to be very much on the above plan. Heavy fire was opened on the Fort Section of the defences from the west and south-west just as it was becoming light, our two piquets in this direction making the enemy disclose themselves and retiring without loss.

The enemy's advanced line reached to about 900 yards of the position and were then checked.

At 5.45 a.m. enemy's gun fire was opened on the Fort from 2 guns to the westward and these were engaged by our Field Artillery.

A determined advance of the Turkish infantry was made at 6.10 a.m., supported by heavy rifle fire mainly against south salient, but their attacking line was extended round the west of the Fort up to Kiln Post.

* Not reproduced.

Large bodies of enemy's infantry were seen advancing over the horizon to the westward and masses were also seen occupying the ridge of hills immediately north of Old Basrah.

By 7 a.m. the enemy were definitely repulsed and retired leaving small parties in observation, who entrenched themselves about 1,700 yards from the west and south-west of our position. The attack against Cairn post was not very determined and broke up about 8 a.m., considerable numbers, however, collecting in the tamarisk wood to the south of that post.

5. Hitherto on the northern face of the position all had been quiet and the defences at Kiln Post and West Work had not been seriously engaged, but at 9 a.m. a large force of irregulars, with 6 standards, occupied North Mound and houses in the vicinity. Here they remained all day, and the subsequent night, making various attempts to advance on our position, but they were easily checked by rifle and machine gun fire.

6. Meanwhile further enemy's guns had opened on the position till it was estimated that they had two heavy 4.5", six field and four mountain guns dispersed mostly in pairs in an arc extending from west to the south.

Their heavy guns kept up a good and accurate fire but never exactly located our batteries, which were under cover, while their other guns did little harm, their shells in most cases bursting too high. Our artillery observing officers on Kiln Post located the flashes of the enemy's artillery and in most cases their detachments were driven off, and 6 guns were completely silenced—these guns were withdrawn in the middle of the day while the mirage rendered their position invisible. Two guns of 23rd Mountain Battery, which had been placed for the night immediately south of the Fort, were withdrawn about 11 a.m. without difficulty.

7. Preparations had been made for the despatch of a column of all arms towards Old Basrah to cover the landing of the 30th Brigade and a Mountain Battery, which were known to have left Basrah. This, however, was not put into effect as that force was recalled to Basrah.

8. The enemy resumed their attack at 2.15 p.m., mainly directed as before on the south salient, and to prevent them establishing themselves on the western portion of the Dorset position, I sent $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion 2nd Norfolk Regiment from the reserve to occupy this place, replacing them in my general reserve by $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion 2nd Dorset Regiment from 16th Brigade.

9. Up to this time nothing of note had occurred on the Eastern Defence work beyond some sniping, but at 2.30 p.m., as the snipers had become troublesome to the artillery observation post, Major Wheeler, 7th Lancers, volunteered to take his squadron and clear them. The movement was made at the gallop, but the original objective was covered by enemy's irregulars in a hidden position—these were ridden over and many lanced, while "S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, and machine guns repelled an attempted counter-attack by hostile horsemen. The manoeuvre was very effective and the squadron was admirably led with great dash by Major Wheeler, who lost only one man and three horses wounded.

10. At 3 p.m. the attack died away and sniping tactics were resorted to—and soon afterwards, about 3.25 p.m., further enemy's guns opened fire from a southerly direction, and at 4 p.m. the enemy's artillery appeared to be registering ranges on various portions of the positions with percussion fuze without doing much damage.

11. For the ensuing night I reinforced Cairn Post with a Double Company 120th Infantry from the southern portion of East Work, their place being taken by a Double Company 110th Light Infantry. The $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion, 2nd Norfolk Regiment, was withdrawn from Dorset position to their original position and the $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion, 2nd Dorset Regiment, rejoined the 16th Brigade. To increase my reserve, however, I asked General Delamain for $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion from 16th Brigade, and this, furnished by the 117th Infantry, was placed centrally between the two portions of Piquet Hill Works. During the earlier part of the night the 24th Punjabis arrived in "bellums" from Basrah and bivouacked near the Cavalry Camp.

12. About 5 p.m. a distinct rearward movement was noticed in front of our north defensive line and fourteen big "bellums" were seen going off in a northerly direction filled with Arabs from North Mound vicinity.

13. At dusk a furious attack was made from the western extremity of Dorset position, supported by fire from south-west and west, heavy rifle and machine gun

fire being brought to bear on the south salient and ground immediately east and west of the fort, but they made no progress and the attack died away to intermittent firing. The machine gun in south salient was out of action from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m., but was replaced by one from the 48th Pioneers during this time, and the searchlight here too was put out of action by rifle fire 15 minutes after it had opened up.

14. Throughout the night intermittent firing, with occasional heavy bursts with machine gun fire, took place to cover bold attempts to cut our wire entanglements, especially on south salient, where the enemy's main efforts were concentrated, though these attacks extended to the north end of the fort on our right and to Cairn Post on the left. The brunt of these attacks fell on the 48th Pioneers and 17th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners, which units with ceaseless vigilance repelled every effort of the enemy. During the heavier periods of the attacks the star shell fired by Field and Mountain Artillery greatly assisted in the defence. The machine gun of the 2nd Norfolk Regiment at the southern extremity of south salient did most excellent service throughout the day and night in a very exposed position. The 120th Infantry and portion of the 110th Light Infantry in East Work and Cairn post were less heavily engaged, but frequently repelled the efforts of wire cutters and were throughout alert for developments.

15. At 11 p.m. the enemy were heard digging off south salient and a half-double company 48th Pioneers was held in readiness to meet any penetration by the enemy, while I held one double company 2nd Norfolk Regiment ready for particular support in this direction.

16. The night thus passed with occasional lulls till 3.30 a.m., when the final attempt was made and small parties were seen close up to the entanglements (one party was heard to call out in Hindustani "Do not fire"). After this no further attacks were made and all became quiet.

17. From 4.30 a.m. Major-General Melliss, V.C., C.B., who had arrived late the previous evening with the 6th Divisional Staff, took over command of the garrison, but not being "au fait" with the defence arrangements, had left the conduct of the operations for the night to me, and my report on subsequent operations has been submitted to him.

18. The casualties during this action were comparatively slight, and were, approximately, British officers wounded, 4; rank and file killed, 5; wounded, 62.

19. The artillery expended some 1,495 shrapnel and 15 star shell during the above period of action.

20. The 6th Cavalry Brigade were not employed during the day except one squadron 7th Lancers and "S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Sykes, Royal Horse Artillery, which did good work in co-operation with the infantry and other artillery; they however came in for many casualties among their horses as, unfortunately, their camp was situated directly behind the fort section of the defence and in line with the main hostile attacks. I wish to mention:—

Major G. G. M. Wheeler, 7th Lancers.—For a gallant and admirable leading of his squadron in the charge against a body of the enemy south of Piquet Works, who had been causing much annoyance to our artillery observation post, with a most successful and effective result.

21. The artillery afforded, as had been my experience throughout the campaign, a magnificent support and their rapid location of the enemy's guns was followed by a slackening and in many cases a cessation of their fire. *Lieutenant-Colonel E. S. Cleve, R.F.A.*, most efficiently directed the artillery during the defence, as my C.R.A., and I would also mention—

Major E. V. Sarson, R.F.A.	} For their clever handling of their batteries and accuracy of fire in silencing the enemy's guns and repelling his attack.
Major H. Broke Smith, R.F.A.	
Major E. E. Edlmann, D.S.O., R.G.A.	

22. The 16th Infantry Brigade were not seriously engaged during the day or night, and the General Officer Commanding has no recommendations to make. I would like, however, to pay tribute to Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O., and his Brigade, who originally constructed the defences which the 18th Infantry Brigade were occupying.

23. I wish to bring forward to special notice the very gallant defence made by the 48th Pioneers and 17th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners, who bore the brunt of the enemy's attacks. All ranks behaved with great steadiness and their

vigilance and good shooting repelled all attempts of the Turkish forces to break through the defences. This section of the defence was admirably commanded by *Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. N. Harward, 48th Pioneers.*

The following further names are brought forward for recognition:—

No. 365 Naik Hukmi, 48th Pioneers, when at dawn No. 7 Piquet retired, refused to leave the piquet until the last man had got away safely under heavy fire.

No. 345 Havildar Harchand, 48th Pioneers, commanded No. 7 Piquet, and withdrew his men with skill and coolness so well that the enemy continued to fire into the piquet position after its evacuation.

No. 1686 Sepoy Chanda Singh,	} 48th Pioneers, stretcher bearers, brought in a dangerously wounded man to the aid post for 100 yards under very heavy enfilade fire.
No. 1406 Sepoy Narain Singh,	

24. The 17th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners (with 48th Pioneers), withstood all the shocks of the Turkish attacks, being in occupation of the south salient, with utmost coolness and steadiness and were ably commanded by *Captain E. J. Loring, R.E.*, I would mention—

No. 31125 Sapper C. A. Wells, R.E., Searchlight Section, who did excellent work under heavy fire till his light was put out of action.

Jemadar Mohammed Din, No. 17 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.—For his coolness under heavy fire, and the able way in which he directed the fire of his men under trying circumstances in a particularly exposed part of the defences.

25. The 120th Rajputana Infantry, under Major P. F. Pocock, though not very seriously attacked during the day, were frequently assailed at night in attempts of the enemy to cut their wire entanglement. They occupied a somewhat exposed position at Cairn Post and behaved very steadily and with great coolness.

26. The 2nd Norfolk Regiment and 110th Light Infantry, excepting one double company of the latter under *Lieutenant-Colonel Britten*, who were engaged during the night in repelling attempts on their obstacles, were not seriously engaged, though kept continually on the alert, especially at night, to meet developments. I mention—

Lieutenant H. S. Farebrother, 2nd Norfolk Regiment, for his skilful handling of the machine gun at south salient until seriously wounded.

No. 6592 Lance-Corporal R. Waller, 2nd Norfolk Regiment, was in charge of the machine gun at South Salient after *Lieutenant Farebrother* was wounded, and handled his gun exceedingly well and assisted largely in keeping off the attack when it was heaviest. Though wounded, he still continued to direct the work of the gun throughout the night 12th-13th.

The action of *Lieutenant Farebrother* and *Lance-Corporal Waller* has also been brought to my notice by *Lieutenant-Colonel Harward*, Commanding the Fort Section, in which this machine gun was employed in a very important and exposed position. He reports that the accuracy and intensity of the fire was remarkably good.

27. *Medical.*—I cannot speak too highly of the behaviour of the Medical Department in all its ranks. There was no flinching during the bombardment and perfect steadiness, and their work was done in a most efficient manner under the able direction of *Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hennessey, R.A.M.C.* As I have already noted during this campaign, the Army Bearer Corps and Hospital Corps behaved excellently. I would particularly bring to notice the good work done by—

Major T. G. Foster, R.A.M.C., and *Captain R. E. Wright, I.M.S.*, No. 3 Field Ambulance, who were working in the Fort Section of the defence and most exposed to fire.

28. *34th Divisional Signal Company.*—I wish to specially notice the excellent work done by the 18th Brigade Section of this company. Throughout the operations under report they were constantly engaged in the dual capacity of Brigade Signal Section and Divisional Signal Section, being the link between me and my whole force. They were consequently exceedingly hardworked and got no rest. I cannot speak too highly of their work and they were ably commanded by *Captain H. G. Morrell*, who was untiring in his exertions.

I would also bring to favourable notice—

No. 41 Serjeant F. Murphy for continuous hard work supervising both telephone and visual signalling.

No. 16 Corporal J. Steven for unremitting assistance in looking after and keeping telephones in working order. He also laid a fresh line to Cairn Piquet under heavy fire when the line was broken.

No. 47 Pte. A. Cloud

No. 44 Pte. A. Barker.

No. 53 Pte. A. Palmer.

No. 8597 Lance-Corporal J. Anderson,
Cameron Highlanders (attached).

} For continuous hard and willing work
requiring care and great coolness.

29. Finally I wish to bring to special notice the good work done by my Staff Officers, Captain E. G. Dunn, Royal Irish Rifles, Brigade Major, and Captain W. F. C. Gilchrist, 52nd Sikhs (F.F.), Staff Captain. They have had on their shoulders the Staff work of the Shaiba Force and of the 18th Infantry Brigade up to the time of the arrival of the Divisional Headquarters on the night of 12th, and have carried out their duties with untiring zeal and efficiency, especially during the enemy's attack on the 12th, when their forethought and general good staff work were of the greatest assistance to me.

I would also mention Major H. Smyth, Cheshire Regiment, Intelligence Officer, attached to my Staff. The information collected by this officer was wonderfully accurate and was of the greatest assistance to me.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS ON 13TH AND 14TH APRIL NEAR SHAIBA.

From Major-General C. J. Mellis, the General Officer Commanding, Shaiba Force, to the Major-General, General Staff, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," No. 250-G, dated Headquarters 6th Division, Shaiba, 24th April, 1915.

I have the honour to submit reports on the operations of the Shaiba Force on 13th and 14th April, 1915.

I arrived at Shaiba by "bellum" convoy at 8.30 p.m. on the 12th April with the 24th Punjabis (less 1 Double Company) and 6th Divisional Staff, placed at my disposal by the Army Commander. A general all-round night attack on the landward sides of the defensive perimeter was in progress at the time of my arrival. This attack was nowhere pressed home, but continued with varying intensity throughout the night of 12-13th, the enemy endeavouring without success to cut the barbed wire entanglement at various points.

As senior, I assumed command from Major-General C. I. Fry that night, after making myself acquainted with the distribution and disposition of the troops.

The night attack died away at 4 a.m.

The Cavalry Brigade,* in pursuance of orders issued by Major-General Fry on the afternoon of the 12th instant and approved by me that night, moved out at 7 a.m. towards North Mound in order to clear our right flank and ascertain the enemy's strength and dispositions to the north-west. The 104th Rifles (Lieutenant-Colonel Clery) followed as a support and were placed under the orders of the Cavalry Brigadier.

The Cavalry, 7th Lancers leading, remainder following in support, on nearing North Mound came under a very heavy rifle fire from superior forces advancing from North Mound, the broken ground near House A, and from House B.

The 7th Lancers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cook, made a gallant charge on North Mound and vicinity and a large number of hostile Arabs were put to flight. Trenches, however, immediately behind North Mound and House A were strongly held, and a hot fire was poured into the Cavalry ranks. A squadron of the 7th Lancers, most gallantly led by Major Wheeler, actually charged the mound itself. Major Wheeler, closely supported by Jemadar Sudhan Singh, 7th Lancers, rode at the enemy's standard planted on the mound and both were shot dead in their gallant attempt. The remaining squadrons of the 7th Lancers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cook's command, made a gallant attempt to clear the enemy from the palm groves, but from good cover the enemy's fire at short range proved so effective that the 7th Lancers had to retire, and Brigadier-General Kennedy, realizing that the enemy

* 13th April.—"S" Royal Horse Artillery, 7th Lancers, 16th Cavalry, 23rd Cavalry, 3 squadrons each unit.

in force were firmly established and that his main body (16th and 33rd Cavalry) were exposed to a severe flanking fire from entrenched infantry, decided not to press the attack and to withdraw his Brigade. I had previously instructed him verbally not to commit his Brigade at this phase of the action if serious opposition were encountered. This took place at 7.45 a.m.

The actions of the Cavalry Brigade were well supported by "S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sykes, while the 104th Rifles, posted just north of House C,* covered the retirement by a well sustained and accurate fire. I ordered the withdrawal to camp of this battalion on the retirement of the Cavalry.

From Kiln Post, where I established my Headquarters, an excellent view of the whole of the terrain to the north of Shaiba is obtainable and large bodies of the enemy were visible advancing near North Mound and to the east of it. At 8.30 a.m. I ordered Brigadier-General Delamain, Commanding 16th Brigade, to move out from the defensive perimeter with 3 battalions (2nd Dorsets, 104th Rifles and 24th Punjabis) with North Mound as his first objective, covering his advance with the concentrated fire of the 63rd and 76th Batteries, Royal Field Artillery, and 23rd Mountain Battery, whilst "S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, also co-operated. The concentrated fire of the guns and the engaging of successive enemy's targets was most skilfully controlled and directed by the Divisional Artillery Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Cleeve, whose valuable assistance throughout the operations of the 13th I particularly desire to bring to notice.

The co-operation between infantry and artillery in the attack and indeed throughout the action of the 13th was most marked, and very largely contributed to the success of the operations. By 11 a.m. Brigadier-General Delamain was in occupation of North Mound and the enemy, many of whom had clung to their trenches with great tenacity, were in full retreat to the northward. Over 90 of his dead were found on North Mound itself. Meanwhile consistent sniping and desultory attacks were in progress to the west-south-west, and south of my perimeter, and troops, computed at 3 battalions, were visible to the south-west of the Brick Kiln and a considerable force to the westward. I now decided to continue the clearing movement against this unbroken enemy, and incidentally to capture two of their guns, which their teams, owing to our accurate shell fire, had been unable to remove.

With this object I ordered the General Officer Commanding, 16th Brigade, to make a partial left wheel pivoting on North Mound, which was to be held to protect his right flank. I pushed a half Battalion 119th Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Chitty) to reinforce Brigadier-General Delamain's left and ordered 1½ Battalions of the 18th Brigade (2nd Norfolks, 2 Double Companies 48th Pioneers) under Lieutenant-Colonel Peebles to prolong the line of the 16th Brigade to the left, co-operating with their advance. The Cavalry Brigade were again moved forward and placed under Brigadier-General Delamain's orders, to protect his right flank. Supported by a sustained and accurate shrapnel fire from our batteries, the enemy, though in considerable force in well constructed trenches, were unable to withstand the *élan* of our Infantry. Many surrendered and the two abandoned mountain guns were secured. The Cavalry Brigade on the right flank succeeded in getting home into the now broken enemy and accounting for more than 100 of them.

By 2.30 p.m. the whole vicinity of the camp was clear of the enemy, but large numbers could still be seen to the southward in direction of South Mound, where two Turkish guns had been located. The General Officer Commanding, 16th Brigade, reported at 2.35 p.m. that he was advancing on South Mound, some three miles distant, and hoped to capture these guns.

I decided that at this late hour it was not desirable to undertake a general engagement with the enemy's main forces with my troops, who had been under arms continuously throughout the previous night, and were in need of a rest.

I therefore issued orders to break off the engagement for the day and ordered a general retirement to the Fort at 3 p.m.

The enemy's casualties were estimated at 1,000, many of their dead being left on the field, while over 400 prisoners, 2 guns and a standard fell into our hands.

The night of the 13th-14th, in marked contrast to the previous night, was entirely undisturbed by hostile sniping or shell fire.

From personal observation shortly after dawn on 14th April, 1915, from the Kiln Post, considerable bodies of the enemy were seen in the direction of South

* *Vide* large map No. IV. in pocket (not reproduced).

Mound some $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles south-west of Shaiba Fort, while the immediate vicinity of the Fort was practically clear of the enemy.

The exact whereabouts of the enemy's main force was uncertain. On the 12th April a large force had been reported to be at Old Basrah, while all reports pointed to the Barjisiyah Woods being strongly held, but it was evident that the enemy had been severely shaken by the action of the 13th April. I decided, therefore, to continue the offensive without awaiting the arrival of the remainder of the 30th Brigade (two battalions). These reinforcements would, I was aware, be necessarily delayed by the difficulty of transport through the area which is inundated to a depth of from two to four feet and which extends for some 8 miles between Shaiba and Basrah. Moreover, the necessary line of advance to Shaiba from Old Basrah had been, as I was aware, hitherto closed by the enemy, while reports of withdrawal from Barjisiyah Wood in a north-west direction rendered it desirable to advance without further delay.

I therefore ordered the whole force (less 104th Rifles, 48th Pioneers and three field guns as camp garrison) to start at 9 a.m. to engage the enemy wherever found.*

Operation orders were issued accordingly. Three hundred rounds rifle ammunition and water pakhals were taken by the troops, who carried a haversack ration.

The troops moved off at 9.30 a.m. in preparatory formation for artillery fire, the 16th Brigade, with the 23rd Mountain Battery, 22nd Company Sappers and Miners, and 24th Punjabis attached, moving with their left directed on a point 300 yards to the west of South Mound, while the three battalions of the 18th Brigade, with 17th Company Sappers and Miners, moved off on the left of the 16th Brigade, echeloned back, left refused. The Cavalry Brigade was moved wide on the right flank of the 16th Brigade, detaching half squadron to protect our extreme left flank, guns in rear of centre and Divisional Headquarters with the guns.

The 16th Brigade were directed on South Mound, with 18th Brigade refused on my left, as I apprehended a possible attack from the direction of Old Basrah or Zubair. The advance on South Mound took place under ineffective long range rifle fire from the enemy's advanced troops—mostly mounted men who soon gave way before our advance, South Mound being occupied and Divisional Headquarters established there by 10.30 a.m.

It now became apparent that the enemy's main force was in position in the vicinity of Barjisiyah Wood, and that Old Basrah and Zubair were not strongly held. I accordingly ordered the left of the 16th Brigade to be directed somewhat north of the Watch Tower, while I ordered two battalions of the 18th Brigade (2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment, and 120th Rajputana Infantry) to pass from left to the right rear of the 16th Brigade and the remaining battalion of the 18th Brigade (110th Mahratta Light Infantry) to remain echeloned on left of 16th Brigade. Whilst these movements were in progress I rode forward to where the Cavalry Brigade were in position on my right flank, engaged in dismounted fire action. From this point I endeavoured to make a reconnaissance of the enemy's position, but owing to the mirage this proved extremely difficult. It was not possible to locate any of the enemy's trenches, but I was able to determine that his right extended as far south as the high Watch Tower, but where his left rested I could not ascertain. On returning to Divisional Headquarters I therefore ordered General Delamain to direct the left of his advance on the Watch Tower and requested General Fry, Commanding 18th Brigade, to pass over his remaining battalion (110th Mahratta Light Infantry) to the right rear of his own brigade. My plan of operations was to engage the enemy along his front extending from a point to the west of the Watch Tower, while I drove back his left with the 18th Brigade, and thereby threatened his line of retirement towards Nakhailah. I ordered my Cavalry Brigade to co-operate with this object, while giving the Brigadier a free hand to seize any opportunity for vigorous action which might offer.

It soon became evident that the enemy occupied a very extensive front of some $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles and considerably overlapped our line. The 18th Brigade had to come up into line with and on the right of the 16th Brigade in order to engage the enemy along his front—the 110th Infantry being my sole reserve. By 11.15 a.m. I discovered definitely that the enemy's line covered over 3 miles, extending from west of Watch Tower to the north end of Barjisiyah Wood.

* Note.—63rd Battery had only 5 guns.

The 18th Brigade having come into line with the 16th Brigade a general advance from South Mound was continued for a mile without incident. By 11.30 a.m. the two battalions in the front line of the 16th Brigade (2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment and 24th Punjabis) became suddenly heavily engaged with the enemy in position at 900 yards distance from the Dorsets and 600 from the Punjabis, while on the right the 18th Brigade were also fully engaged, the Norfolks and 120th Infantry coming under heavy rifle and machine gun fire from trenches some 400 yards to their front.

The enemy's trenches were well sited and practically invisible from the front, while the glaciis-like slope of the ground trending towards the Barjisiyah Woods afforded them an ideal position for defence, and a large proportion of our casualties occurred at this stage.

At 1 p.m. I ordered the 18th Brigade to advance direct on the gap in the trees near the north end of Barjisiyah Wood and the 16th Brigade to close the gap between the 2 Brigades—both to co-operate in the attack. Heavy firing now became general all along the line, the whole of our Artillery being engaged in close support of the Infantry attack. At 11.30 p.m. three casualties occurred in the Divisional Staff, my C.R.A., Lieutenant-Colonel Cleeve, being wounded and his successor Major Edlmann being hit before he could take over his duties, while Captain Cardew, Assistant Director, Army Signals, was also wounded. At this period the General Officer Commanding, 16th Brigade, ordered the 22nd Company Sappers and Miners to prolong the right of the 24th Punjabis, and half battalion, 117th Mahrattas, to reinforce on the right of the Sappers and Miners, and with these reinforcements a further advance was effected in this part of the field. The General Officer Commanding, 18th Brigade, now pushed forward half battalion of 110th Mahratta Light Infantry on the right of the 120th Infantry, holding the remaining wing of the 110th and No. 17 Company, Sappers and Miners, in reserve, but owing to an enfilading fire from the right flank the advance of the 18th Brigade was checked.

At 2.30 p.m. I called on the Cavalry Brigade for vigorous action to assist the forward movement of the 110th on the extreme right flank. The Cavalry assisted by dismounted rifle fire, while "S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, also co-operated.

At 3 p.m. the fight was practically stationary, the enemy clinging to his trenches with desperate tenacity—while the Cavalry reported their inability to press forward on the enemy's left flank owing to severe shell fire and the mud line. The Artillery were supporting our Infantry attack to the utmost, but such support was extremely difficult to render owing to the mirage and the invisibility of the enemy's trenches. Our gunners did splendid work and I must mention one of many instances of it. The Norfolks were losing heavily and asked for further Artillery support. Lieutenant Gilpin, 63rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, went forward into the Norfolk firing line for observation of fire, and communication with his Battery Commander was maintained by Captain De Grey, Adjutant of the Norfolks, who from the firing line flag signalled back to the Battery the result of Lieutenant Gilpin's observations. Many were the gallant deeds of resolute courage by all ranks on this day, but this appears a striking example of the right kind of Infantry and Artillery co-operation.

The day was now waning and I told both Infantry Brigadiers that the enemy's position in advance of Barjisiyah Woods must be taken and that a general advance with the whole of the Artillery in close support must now be made. The troops responded most gallantly to this fresh call, the 76th Battery in action close to the Watch Tower supporting the 16th Brigade, the 63rd Battery and 23rd Mountain Battery, the 18th Brigade.

At 4.15 p.m. the 2nd Battalion, Norfolks, and 120th Infantry under Colonel Peebles and Major Pooock respectively, dashed at the enemy's trenches with the bayonet, while the 110th, also under heavy fire, pressed unflinchingly forward on the right supported by "S" Battery and dismounted Cavalry fire. Almost simultaneously part of the 16th Brigade consisting of the 2nd Battalion, Dorsets, 24th Punjabis, 119th Infantry (less 1 Double Company in reserve) and 1 Double Company, 117th Mahrattas, withdrawn from the left flank guard, made a general advance and by 5 p.m. the enemy abandoned the front trenches all along the line and fled, many surrendering.

In the meantime at 4 p.m., in view of the necessary withdrawal before night-fall, the 48th Pioneers with all available Jaipur carts were ordered out from Shaiba. The Pioneers were directed to take up a rear guard position about South Mound

to cover the retirement of the main body and the carts were also directed there to be ready to assist in the collection and evacuation of the wounded. The arrangements for the collection and disposal of the large numbers of wounded were ably arranged for by Lieutenant-Colonel H. O. B. Browne-Mason, Royal Army Medical Corps, Officiating Assistant Director of Medical Services.

The retirement timed for 5.30 actually commenced at 6 p.m. owing to the difficulty of collection and removal of the wounded scattered over a wide area. Our withdrawal was entirely unmolested and the troops reached Shaiba with all wounded by 8.30 p.m.

It is impossible to conceive a more exposed tract of ground than the plain devoid of cover over which our Infantry had to attack the Turkish trenches, cleverly concealed and sited. Our advance in the last 400 yards was down a glacis-like slope. It was on the crest of this slope that so many of our losses occurred. Splendid dash, combined with resolute courage, alone carried our men across that bullet-swept glacis. It was a sheer dogged soldiers' fight and no words of mine can adequately express my admiration of the conduct of those gallant regiments who won through, *viz.*, 2nd Battalion, Norfolks, 2nd Battalion, Dorsets, 24th Punjabis, 110th Mahratta Light Infantry, 119th Infantry, 117th Mahrattas, 120th Infantry, 17th and 22nd Companies of the 3rd Sappers and Miners.

It is gratifying to record the fact that all the Indian troops engaged (24th Punjabis excepted) are old Bombay Presidency Regiments. They have proved on this occasion that they are worthy to stand shoulder to shoulder with the best troops that the Empire can produce and I trust that these Corps may be permitted to inscribe the battle honour of "Barjisiyah" on their colours as a fitting tribute to their gallant conduct on this hard-fought field.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

I desire to bring to notice the specially good services of the following:—

COMMANDERS, STAFF, ETC.

Major-General C. I. Fry.—Commanded his Brigade to my entire satisfaction during the battle of Barjisiyah on the 14th; his Brigade behaved admirably under his direction.

Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O.—A very able Brigade Commander: handled his troops during the action of 13th and the battle of 14th with marked success.

Colonel R. N. Gamble, D.S.O.—I am much indebted to this officer for the invaluable assistance he afforded during the operations of the 13th and the battle of the 14th April. He is a Staff Officer of marked ability and character, very cool and collected. He should be in command of troops, and I strongly recommend him for promotion.

Major G. A. F. Sanders, R.E.—An excellent Staff Officer of great ability, very cool and collected. His services on my Staff during the operations of 13th and battle of 14th were most valuable to me.

Captain B. G. Peel, 81st Pioneers.—A very useful Staff Officer.

Lieutenant-Colonel E. S. Cleeve, R.A.—A very capable Artillery Commander. As my Divisional Artillery Commander his services during the operations of 13th were of great value, the handling of the Artillery on that day being a decisive factor in the success of the operations. I greatly felt the loss of his services on the 14th after he was wounded.

Lieutenant-Colonel U. W. Evans, R.E.—A very able Engineer Commander of great energy and resource. He gave me great assistance during the operations of 13th and 14th April.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. O. B. Browne-Mason, R.A.M.C.—Acted as my Assistant Director of Medical Services during the operations of 13th and at the battle of the 14th. His arrangements for evacuating the large number of our wounded during the battle of Barjisiyah showed marked ability and organising power. I feel greatly indebted to him.

Major H. A. Holdich, Brigade Major, 16th Brigade.—A cool and able Staff officer.

Captain J. H. Carruthers, Staff Captain, 16th Brigade.

Shaikh Ibrahim El Abdullah El Ibrahim of Zubair.—Regularly furnished information of the enemy's movements. The information was almost always correct, and the Shaikh must have incurred great trouble and expense in procuring it.

Major H. Smyth.—Intelligence Officer at Shaiba.

Interpreter Mirza Ali.—Headquarters, 16th Infantry Brigade.

I also desire to bring to notice the names of the following officers who throughout the day conveyed my orders to various parts of the battlefield with promptitude and despatch at considerable personal risk :—

Major A. T. S. Dickinson, Brigade Major, 30th Infantry Brigade.

Captain A. J. Shakeshaft, 2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment.

Lieutenant H. D. Hickley, 2nd Battalion, 7th Gurkhas.

Lieutenant H. H. Rich, 120th Infantry.

2nd Lieutenant Lemon, attached 104th Rifles.

ARTILLERY.

Major O. S. Lloyd, Adjutant, 10th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery.

63rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery—

Major H. Broke-Smith.

Lieutenant R. Gilpin.

| No. 52668 Gr. J. Stanley.

76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery—

Major E. V. Sarson.

| No. 55119 Gr. E. Kirk.

23rd Mountain Battery—

Major E. E. Edlmann, D.S.O., R.G.A. (Since died of wounds.)

Captain A. V. Jarrett Although twice slightly wounded and on the second occasion partially stunned, continued to command his Section with great ability and energy.

No. 535 Gunner Harnam Singh.

| No. 30 Cr.-Havildar Latif.
No. 226 Dr. Naik Sher Khan.

CAVALRY BRIGADE.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Sykes ... "S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery. Ably commanded his battery throughout the operations.

7th Lancers—

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Chesney Cook.

Major G. G. M. Wheeler (killed in action).

The initiative, dash and gallantry of this officer marked him out for special recognition had he survived. I now recommend him for the posthumous grant of the V.C. which forms the subject of a separate application.

Lieutenant and Adjutant G. L. B. Stones.

Jemadar Sudhan Singh (killed in action).

Recommended for posthumous grant of Indian Order of Merit.

No. 3574 L.-Dafadar Ram Singh.

| No. 3548 Sowar Bakhtawar Singh.

No. 1103 Kot-Dafadar Kala Singh.

| No. 2108 Sowar Amrik Singh.

ENGINEERS.

Searchlight Section—

No. 31125 Sapper C. A. Wells, R.E., Searchlight Section.

17th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners—

Captain E. J. Loring, R.E.

| Lieutenant R. C. Lord, R.E.

Jemadar Mohammad Din.



22nd Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners—

Captain E. C. Whiteley, R.E. (killed in action).	Quite an exceptionally promising officer, killed whilst gallantly leading his men.
Lieutenant K. B. S. Crawford, R.E.	Jemadar Ramswami Naidu.
No. 1930 Havildar Gangaji Rao Khanvalkar.	No. 2899 Naik Narayan Halatkar.
	No. 3955 L.-Naik Said Hussain.

INFANTRY.

2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment—

Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. Rosher (killed in action).	An able and most gallant Commanding Officer whose death is a great loss to the Service.
Captain H. K. Utterson.	No. 8328 Private Burt.
Captain G. M. Herbert.	No. 8483 Private Joliffe.
Lieutenant H. H. Dean.	No. 8662 Private Lloyd.
No. 5349 C.-S.-M. W. Warren.	No. 8406 Private Scudden (killed in action).
No. 6701 C.-S.-M. W. Daniel.	No. 9059 Private Scovell.
No. 8744 Corporal H. Scott.	No. 7909 Private Sedgbeer.

2nd Norfolk Regiment—

Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Peebles, D.S.O.	Ably commanded his regiment, which under his direction attacked with great dash and spirit in spite of heavy losses.
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Major F. De B. Bell (since died of wounds).	Captain R. D. Marshall.
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Captain and Adjutant C. De Grey.	Captain A. B. Floyd.
Lieutenant R. T. Frere.	

Lieutenant M. Burnett, R.A.M.C....	For conspicuous courage attending to the wounded in the open in the firing line under very heavy fire where his work necessitated his being very exposed. He lost his life in the firing line doing so, and his work was beyond praise.
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3rd Class Assistant Surgeon J. V. Fernandez, I.S.M.D.	No. 7040 Drummer A. Barker.
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No. 7014 L.-Corporal C. Woodward.	No. 7879 Private T. Bindley.
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No. 7609 L.-Corporal J. H. Preston.	No. 7925 Private H. Farnes.
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No. 5359 Sergeant C. Aldridge.	No. 8390 Private C. Smith (wounded).
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No. 6331 Sergeant J. Airey.	No. 7840 Private S. Chapman.
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No. 6161 Sergeant H. Solomon.	No. 8200 Private J. Chard.
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No. 5676 Sergeant J. Savage.	No. 7359 Private J. Murphy.
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No. 6789 Sergeant F. Bolingbroke.	No. 8416 Private E. Harper.
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24th Punjabis—

Lieutenant-Colonel S. H. Climo (wounded).	A proved soldier, who commanded his regiment with coolness and courage.
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Captain W. F. B. Edwards (killed in action).	I recommend him for a posthumous honour in recognition of conspicuously gallant leading of his men.
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Lieutenant M. Birkbeck.	Sub.-Major Sakt Chand Bahadur (wounded).
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Lieutenant D. Hobart (dangerously wounded).	Subadar Gul Akhbar.
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Jemadar Sohan Singh.	No. 4943 L.-Naik Lal Singh (wounded severely).
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No. 137 Naik Dula Singh, 19th Punjabis (killed in action).	No. 405 Sepoy Vir Singh (wounded severely).
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No. 514 Sepoy Pal Singh.	No. 4909 Sepoy Labh Singh.
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No. 318 Sepoy Yarak.	No. 4847 L.-Naik Bela Singh.
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No. 4886 Naik Sardar Khan.	No. 141 L.-Naik Lal Khan.
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48th Pioneers—

- Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. N. Harward | Ably commanded the Fort Section of the Defences throughout the night 12th-13th.
- Major H. J. Riddell. | Sub-Major Dula Singh.
Subadar Ganga Singh.

104th Rifles—

- Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. L. Clery ... | An exceptionally good Commanding Officer and in the field a cool and reliable commander.
- Captain A. M. Cheeke. | No. 2898 L.-Naik Teja Ram.
Jemadar Chothu Singh.

110th Mahratta Light Infantry—

- Lieutenant-Colonel T. X. Britten | Subadar Shaikh Yasin.
(died of wounds). | Jemadar Dattaji Rao Kauvilkar.
Major H. C. Hill. | Jemadar Ranchander Hase.
Captain R. Knowles, I.M.S. | No. 1498 L.-Naik Sakaram More.
Captain and Adjutant A. C. S. Hind | No. 2050 Sepoy Hari Sawant.
(killed in action).
Sub-Assistant Surgeon Keshanrao Kuperkar.

117th Mahrattas—

- Lieutenant-Colonel H. K. MacGeorge | Commanded his regiment with skill and determination.
- Captain A. W. White ... | For conspicuous gallantry when in command of his double company. This double company reinforced the Dorset left and joined in the successful assault, capturing 73 prisoners. The Officer Commanding Dorset Regiment specially remarks on the dash shown by this double company.
- Captain W. B. Benton ... | For conspicuous gallantry and coolness when working the machine gun section on April 12th, 13th and 14th. He is quite an exceptionally good officer. His name came up for gallantry at the action of Sahil.
- Lieutenant N. K. Bal, I.M.S. ... | For conspicuous bravery in attending wounded men under a heavy fire in the open. He attended the wounded of the 22nd Coy., 3rd Sappers and Miners as well as those of his own regiment.
- Subadar-Major Balwantrao Savant. | No. 1883 Havildar Vishnu Aire.
Subadar Sakharam Rao Jagtap | No. 2742 Havildar Dadu Aggave.
Bahadur. | No. 2437 Sepoy Jairam Dalbi.
Jemadar Sita Ram Sellar. | No. 2474 Sepoy Ithu Kadam.
No. 2915 Sepoy Abdul Gaffur.

119th Infantry—

- Lieut.-Colonel W. W. Chitty ... | An able and efficient commander whose regiment behaved admirably under his direction.
- Captain J. J. Harper Nelson, I.M.S. | Captain T. De B. Carey.
Lieutenant A. De St. Croix.
- Lieutenant M. Eccles ... | Successfully carried messages under fire from the Brigade Commander to his unit. Subsequently displayed great gallantry in bringing ammunition mules close up to the firing line although nine of the mules were killed on the way, and finally led a double company in the assault on the trenches.

Subadar-Major Bhairo Singh Bahadur I.O.M.	No. 3887 Naik Nathu Singh.
Subadar Uma Rawat.	S. A. S. Munishwamy Ramaswamy. I.S.M.D.
No. 3639 Havildar Uma Rawat.	No. 3846 Sepoy Ramlal Singh.
No. 4339 L.-Naik Mukna Rawat.	No. 4112 Sepoy Dhanna Rawat.
No. 4025 L.-Naik Dewa Rawat.	No. 4166 Sepoy Gokal.
No. 2940 Ward Orderly Sirlpulrao Bhosle.	

120th Infantry—

Major P. F. Pocock ...	An able leader who has rendered valuable services which are deserving of recognition.
Captain W. Andrews (95th Russell's Infantry), (died of wounds).	For conspicuous gallantry on 14th in leading a charge across the open against the enemy position with machine guns.
Captain W. L. Miskin.	
Subadar-Major Khitab Gul Bahadur.	No. 1712 Sepoy Lachman Singh.
Subadar Sri Bahadur Singh.	No. 1531 Sepoy Koom Singh.
No. 873 Cr.-Hav. Gunesh Ram.	No. 1511 Sepoy Gangadhar.
No. 1089 L.-Naik Bhima Rawat.	No. 1202 Sepoy Rawat Singh.
No. 1243 L.-Naik Suja Rawat.	No. 1800 Sepoy Padna Rawat.
No. 840 L.-Naik Panne Khan.	No. 1549 Sepoy Channan Singh.
No. 1662 Naik Seolal.	No. 1111 Sepoy Sujan Singh.
No. 1474 Naik Allah Baksh.	No. 1742 Sepoy Jagdeo (killed)

34th Divisional Signal Company, 18th Brigade Section—

No. 16 Corporal J. Sleven.	
No. 28 Sapper Abdul Jabbar.	No. 45 Sapper Rangasami.

16th Brigade Section, attached as Despatch Riders—

No. 966 Sowar Phuman Singh (16th Cavalry).	No. 1289 Sowar Nikka Singh (16th Cavalry).
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21st Mule Corps—

No. 190 L.-Naik Aladad (killed).	
No. 176 L.-Naik Sherbaz.	
No. 722 Dr. Rhoda (wounded).	
No. 796 Dr. Suchet	”
No. 632 Dr. Khwaja	”

The Dorset Regiment being in want of ammunition the General Officer Commanding, 16th Brigade, sent up 16 mules with ammunition boxes. The behaviour of the drivers of these mules has been brought to notice by the Officer Commanding, Dorset Regiment, and the Officer Commanding, 24th Punjabis, the latter describing them as heroes. Nine mules were killed. One Driver was killed, and three wounded, one escaping unhurt. The greater part of the ammunition reached the firing line, the drivers showing the greatest courage. One driver was seen holding on to his mules, some of whom wounded, although wounded himself and under very heavy fire.

MEDICAL SERVICES.

- Captain R. E. Wright, I.M.S. ... Displayed exceptional ability in handling his sub-division of No. 3 Field Ambulance throughout the day. He displayed particular initiative in proceeding to the firing line of the 18th Brigade under a heavy fire and, by ascertaining personally the position of the groups of wounded, was able to conduct a detachment of Jaipur Transport Carts direct to the place where they were most required when speedy evacuation was most essential. He afterwards superintended the main advanced dressing station at South Mound in a most efficient manner.
- Captain F. C. Fraser, I.M.S. ... Displayed great coolness in bringing his sub-division forward under heavy shell and rifle fire and was in close touch with the 16th Brigade throughout the day. I was particularly struck by the steadfast behaviour of the A.B.C. men of this sub-division and attribute it in great part to his excellent example and leading.

Royal Army Medical Corps—

Major F. G. Foster.	Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hennessey.
	Major F. C. Lambert.

Indian Medical Service—

Major L. Cook.	Captain H. E. Stanger Leathes.
	Lieutenant L. A. P. Anderson.

Indian Subordinate Medical Department—

4th Class Assistant Surgeon A. E. Phaure.	No. 972, 1st Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Sundar Singh.
No. 402, 3rd class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Shaikh Mahomed Dada Sahib.	

Pack Store Sergeants—

No. 5887 Sergeant F. Hayter, 2nd Battalion, Hampshire Regiment.

Nursing Orderlies—

No. 9166 Lance-Corporal Parkes, 1st Oxford and Bucks. Light Infantry.
No. 8601 Private E. Lock, 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment.

Pack Store Havildars—

No. 911 Havildar Ram Lal Singh, 2nd Rajputs.
No. 2154 Havildar Mahomed, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.

Ward Orderlies—

No. 2399 Sepoy Nabi Bux, 119th Infantry.

Hospital Store-keepers—

Sergeant J. A. Bloomfield, Great Indian Peninsula Railway Volunteers.
Private Moos, Poona Volunteer Rifles.
2nd Class Hospital Store-keeper B. F. Ghyara, Supply and Transport Corps.

Army Bearer Corps—

No. 9339 Bearer Samedin.	No. 9344 Bearer Dhonde.
No. 4485 Bearer Subhan Singh.	No. 1196 Bearer Ram Charan.
No. 7480 Bearer Gariba.	No. 7485 Bearer Rafawa.

Army Hospital Corps—

No. 6147, 2nd grade Ward Servant Abba Pira.	No. 6352, 3rd grade Ward Servant Gangaram Gainu.
No. 5308, 1st grade Ward Sweeper Mohan Singh.	No. 6428, 2nd grade Ward Sweeper Mohan Nathu.
No. 5207, 1st grade Water-carrier Bhondoo.	No. 6032, 1st grade Water-carrier Gainoo Baloo.
No. 263, Bhisti Rajah Piussal, Supply and Transport Corps.	No. 266 Bhisti Shaikh Amur.

2. I desire to record the valuable services of the Jaipur Transport Corps in the collection and removal of wounded from the battlefield. The transport drivers worked backwards and forwards to the firing line with great dash and devotion to duty.

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