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UNITED STATES ARMS EMBARGO to TURKEY





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DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF
PRESS AND INFORMATION



UNITED STATES
ARMS EMBARGO



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THE SCOPE AND EXTENT OF THE UNITED STATES ARMS EMBARGO TO TURKEY

The Foreign Aid Authorization Bill adopted on December 18, 1974, by the United States House of Representatives, suspended all military aid and sales to Turkey, effective February 5, 1975.

«The legislation voted against Turkey last December is sweeping in its effect. It is more extensive than similar legislation enacted in October, 1974, with which the Administration was in full compliance. The December legislation provides for not only a total embargo on grant military assistance, and cash and credit sales of defence items by the U. S. Government, but prohibits as well the issuance of licenses to permit the export of military equipment purchased from American firms. Practically all nations of the world can purchase in this country at least some items that are forbidden to Turkey. It is now impossible for Turkey to procure most items produced in third countries under U. S. license; nor can Turkey take possession of merchandise in the United States which it paid for prior to February 5 and which is now ready for shipment.»

(President G. Ford; in his letter to Congress; July 9, 1975)

«Moreover, let me just say to you that we have discussed this issue (arms embargo) with NATO members over the last several months. They are deeply con-



cerned. I think this Committee (i.e. Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives) ought to realize that they are all still selling arms to Turkey whereas today Turkey cannot buy any arms on the American market. A Warsaw Pact country can today buy on the American market what Turkey, our close NATO ally, a loyal ally of the last 30 years, cannot buy.»

(Hon. Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; July 10, 1975)

REACTION AGAINST THE ARMS EMBARGO

«In view of these damaging developments, I urge the House of Representatives to reconsider its refusal to restore the traditional U.S.-Turkish defence relationship. Prompt, affirmative action by the House of Representatives is essential to the vital national interests of the U.S., our partners in the Eastern Mediterranean, and our allies in the Atlantic Alliance.»

(President G. Ford; in a White House statement; July 26, 1975)

«The administration has repeatedly stated that the decision to embargo aid to Turkey and the consequent closing of our bases have a very serious effect on our national security. First, because these bases are the source of irreplaceable intelligence; secondly, because Turkey is one of the key countries in NATO; thirdly, because the decision does not help the countries it is designed to help. We have opposed this decision, We have appealed to the Congress to reverse it. We do so not to win an argument with the House of Representatives,

the Senate having voted on the basis of our recommendations, but we think this is a matter of overwhelming national interest, and we hope that the House will reverse itself when it returns.»

(Hon. Dr. H. Kissinger; Secretary of State; in a press conference at Alabama; August 14, 1975)

«Turkey has been singled out with a degree of stringency that previously was only reserved for those who were thought to be incorrigible enemies.»

(Hon. James Schlesinger, Defense Secretary; International Herald Tribune; July 31, 1975)

«The embargo, imposed by Congress five months ago to try to force a Turkish compromise on the Cyprus question, has backfired so badly that even face-saving is difficult. But perhaps a lesson has been learned... If Congress persists in playing a losing game, the consequences for the U. S. position in the eastern Mediterranean could be disastrous... The best course would be for Congress to lose a little bit of face and hope that the chastening experience will teach it something about the right way to conduct foreign policy.»

(The Wall Street Journal; Editorial «The Turkish compromise»; July 15, 1975)

«What all of this demonstrates is that there are nuances in diplomacy that simply can't be understood or voiced in the politically charged atmosphere of a legislative hall. There are times when patience and restraint are called for; there are other times when toughness is called for. And whatever its inadequacies, the State

Department is better able to judge these things than Congress.»

(Chicago Tribune; Editorial «Congress and Turkey»; July 16, 1975)

«We made a mistake by interjecting the Congress in the execution of our foreign policy. Congress ought to play a larger role in the development of foreign policy, but a committee of 535, which is widely fragmented and diverse, should not be injecting itself *expost facto* in the implementation or execution of foreign policy... It is a mistake for the Congress to continue a selective embargo against a friend and ally... It is also a mistake to continue a selective embargo «to stick it to Henry». This may be good domestic politics, but it is a dangerous foreign policy tactics.»

(Hon. Talcott, Representative from California; Congressional Record-House, page H 7569; July 25, 1975)

«But the House, led by pro-Greek members, ignored the entreaties of President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that lifting the embargo against Turkish arms aid was «essential to the vital national defence interests of the United States» as Ford put it Friday... Chairman Thomas Morgan (D-Pa.) of the House International Relations Committee, who favored repeal of the embargo, said that in his 30 years in Congress, he had «never seen the kind of pressure that was put on members including myself.» He said «there was real pressure from the American Greeks.»

(Chicago Daily News; «Why House ignored Ford Turkey plea» by Peter Lisagor; July 26-27, 1975)

«Can Congress run United States foreign policy? Its recent low batting average argues that it cannot.. Exactly those senators and congressmen who have for years cried that the U. S. must stop trying to reform the world are now insisting that it continue to do so - in Cyprus, for example... It (Cyprus) became independent as a result of the 1959 London and Zurich agreements, which provided for a federal solution and for the **unilateral** right of the three guaranteeing powers, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, to intervene if the federal solution were violated. President Makarios thereafter successfully eroded the guaranteed rights of the Turkish minority. Then last year, the Athens colonels overthrew Makarios in order to annex the island to Greece, whereupon the Turks, understandably, sent in troops...

What of America's interests? It hoped that it would not have to take sides. But when it did, the White House rightly chose the Turks. Why? Turkey is far more powerful than Greece. It has been a faithful member of NATO. It controls the Dardanelles, the exit for the Soviet Mediterranean fleet from the Black Sea... Turks fought valiantly beside Americans in the Korean war.

So what did Congress do? It forced the President to embargo not only military aid to Turkey, but to forbid Turkey even to buy spare parts for its U. S. purchased civil air fleet. In short, Congress treated Turkey, its ally, worse than it has the Soviet Union and China, our adversaries.

And why? Essentially because of the Greek-American vote. The arguments for congressional action are usually not so phrased, but that is the essence of the matter.



Can the U. S. any longer afford this kind of congressional irresponsibility? No. All responsible and patriotic Americans should do what they can to help the administration to adopt an even-handed policy between Turkey and Greece and to condemn those members of Congress who so lightly flirt with U. S. security.»

(The Christian Science Monitor; «Playing politics with Cyprus» by Dr. William E. Griffith, Professor of political science at the Center for International Studies, at Massachusetts Institute of Technology; July 29, 1975)

«This forgets, for one thing, that Turkey did not start the Cyprus crisis. The late Greek junta set things off by sponsoring a coup led by terrorist fanatics bent on uniting the island with Greece. The 1960 treaty on the independence of Cyprus gave Turkey the right to prevent such Enosis. Furthermore, Congress has received evidence that arms supplied to Greece were used illegally on the Greek Cypriot side. But Congress hasn't embargoed arms to Greece... For its part, Congress seems intent on providing what a disaster a congressionally-run foreign policy would be.»

(The Wall Street Journal; Editorial «A Security Disaster»; July 31, 1975)

«Congress action has no doubt put the U. S. administration and Ford's foreign policy, in particular, at much uneasiness. U. S. military presence in Turkey, NATO's only trident into Asia and the Middle East has come to a shocking halt after almost three decades of close cooperation between the superpower and the developing ally. Turkey's taking control of the U. S. bases including the key intelligence gathering stations linked

to the chain of American early warning systems has raised pertinent questions about NATO's security and American foreign policy, and power status balance in the Eastern Mediterranean.»

(**Tehran Journal**; «NATO security questions raised»; August 10, 1975)

«Whereas, ever since Turkey acceded to NATO in 1951 and CENTO in 1954, Turkey has been a loyal and effective ally of the United States, having earlier fought at our side in Korea; and...

.....
Whereas, in a blind surrender to domestic political considerations, the 94th Congress has voted to deny Turkey military aid to include arms and spare parts Turkey has paid for; and...

.....
Be it resolved, by the 76th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States clearly and unequivocally seek to reverse this Congressional blunder and impress upon Congressional leadership the overriding strategic importance of Turkey, and the U. S. bases therein, to the United States of America.»

(Resolution No. 472 «The Strategic Importance of Turkey» adopted at the **76th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States** held in Los Angeles, California, August 15-22, 1975)

«Viewed with even modest strategic perspective, the vote against selling arms to Turkey was at best per-

plexing, at worst maniacal. Turkey has been the staunchest ally in the anti-communist NATO Alliance and is geographically as vital to the Alliance as the Mississippi River to the greening of the vertebrae of the United States.»

(Washington Star; «Turkish Arms Vote an Augur of Utter Confusion» by William F. Buckley; September 12, 1975)

«Why then did Congress vote an arms embargo in February, then reaffirm it in July - when it was Greece that violated both the Treaty of Guarantee and the U. S. Foreign Assistance Act?

«To answer that question, one must come to the conclusion that ethnic politics was involved.

«... To add almost unbelievable insult to one of America's staunchest allies, Turkey had paid cash for U. S. arms. Incredibly, in addition to the embargo, legislation requires that Turkey pay storage costs on arms sequestered by the U. S.»

(San Diego Union; «Congress Blames the Wrong Ally for Chaos on Cyprus» by Glenn Lee Smith; October 5, 1975)

THE IRRELEVANCE OF ESTABLISHING A LINK
WITH THE CYPRUS ISSUE, MAINLY UNDERMINING
TURKEY'S LEGAL AND MORAL DUTY TO
INTERVENE WHEN THE STABILITY OF CYPRUS
WAS THREATENED BY THE COUP D'ETAT
SEEKING THE UNION OF THE ISLAND WITH
GREECE

«The Cyprus problem is one where neither moral nor legal judgments, on the arms issue or any other, can be easily or lightly made.»

(President G. Ford; in his letter to Congress; July 9, 1975)

«The difficulty I see is that the embargo is a one-sided judgment of an event that took place a year ago.»

(Hon. Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; July 10, 1975)

«If Turkey did not act to protect Cyprus' independence and the Turkish-Cypriot minority, which it felt were threatened by the July 1974 coup, Turkey would be ignoring its international legal obligations under the 1960 agreements on Cyprus... Whatever its position with respect to American law, Turkey felt it was acting according to international law and the 1960 accords to which Turkey was a party... In addition, the United States law should not be selectively enforced... The United States

has furnished arms to countries which were in possession of territory of other states. There is, for example, uncontradicted evidence that Greece has transferred U. S. military equipment to Cyprus since the mid-1960's in violation of law.»

(Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, Representative from Indiana; Report of the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, Report No. 94-365, pages 25 and 26; July 16, 1975)

«Moreover, there are reports that some American-furnished arms had been used in the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios.»

(Report of the Committee on international Relations of the House of Representatives; Report No. 94-365, page 12; July 16, 1975)

«The ostensible purpose of the embargo is to punish the Turks for using American weapons in the invasion of Cyprus, and to coerce Ankara to make concessions on the deadlocked Cyprus issue. But have we forgotten who started this? It was not the Turks, but the Greek junta whose members are now on trial in Athens which overthrew the elected government of Cyprus and installed their own lackey, thereby threatening the Turkish minority on the island. The Turks, intervening, were exercising their treaty rights in protecting their own kinsmen. They used American weapons for the simple reason that the Turkish army is equipped with American weapons.»

(Chicago Tribune; «Our shuttered picture window» by Patrick Buchanan; August 3, 1975)

«Few of us, I'm afraid, remember that the 1959 Treaty of Zurich gave the signatory powers - England, Greece and Turkey - the right (Article 4), if common action is not possible, «to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.» No one questions that the present crisis was initiated by the Greek Junta acting through 650 Greek training officers stationed with the Cyprus National Guard who overthrew the Makarios government, putting in power the notorious EOKA gunman, Nikos Samson. Under the circumstances no Turkish government could have failed to respond to the pleas for protecting from the 110,000 Turkish minority... Could we have failed to react in similar circumstance - say if 100,000 Americans were endangered in Mexico, within sight of the Rio Grande... The Turks are a proud people and find it difficult to appear to be forced to action under pressure... The best argument against a continuance of the embargo is that it is counterproductive, I hope Congress will authorize resumption of shipments from the \$ 185 million military pipeline already paid for by the Turks and, as soon as justified by events, resumption of new aid and purchases. This is necessary to keep Turkish forces in fighting form for their NATO mission. This is also necessary to provide Turkey evidence that her position in Cyprus is understood in this country... Only in this way can Turkey resume her place as a bulwark of NATO and a staunch friend for the United States in the troubled Middle East. This is where our true national interest lies.»

(The Washington Post; «Perspective on Role of Turkey» by Mr. George C. McGhee, former U. S. ambassador to Federal Republic of Germany; September 1, 1975)

«There were three signatories guaranteeing the independence of Cyprus, and the Turks were one, the British were one, and the Greeks were one. The Greeks had invaded Cyprus and overthrown the government and put in a gangster of the stripe of Al Capone - and I am not exaggerating a bit and I defy anybody to argue with me that that fellow Sampson whom they installed as a dictator of Cyprus was not as bad as Al Capone ever thought about being. They put him in, and he instituted a regime of terror. The British should have intervened, but they did not have the power and they were not able to and they did not. The Turks did. I want to be fair about it. The Turks intervened in the first place to protect their nationals.»

(Hon. W. L. Hays, Representative from Ohio; Congressional Record-House, Page H 9494; October 2, 1975)

«It is now necessary to separate the Cyprus situation completely from our strategic security interests in the eastern Mediterranean.»

(Hon. Wirth, Representative from Colorado; Congressional Record-House, page H 9503, October 2, 1975)

«We have heard some talk about arms being used illegally by the Turkish Government. Maybe there have been. But there have been arms used illegally by most of the countries that we sell arms to. If I can believe the article that appeared in the New York Times on August 21, 1975, some of the military officers of the Greek Government stole some of the arms they were guarding which were earmarked for NATO. I do not condemn

them for that. All I want to point out is that we have to be evenhanded in all these matters.»

(Hon. Hinshaw, Representative from California; Congressional Record-House, page H 9511; October 2, 1975)

«With respect to the Suda base in Crete, I became aware of the fact when I was travelling in Europe this summer with my family that without the knowledge or consent of the American Government the Greek army withdrew arms. This became known only after an inventory.»

(Hon. C. W. Whalen, Representative from Ohio; Congressional Record-House, page H 9489; October 2, 1975)

« — In July 1974, the Government of Greece, in blatant violation of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee signed by Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom and Cyprus, ordered the Cypriot National Guard to overthrow President Makarios of Cyprus.

« — The objective of the Greek-triggered coup clearly was to bring about the union «Enosis» of Greece and Cyprus, a move explicitly outlawed by Article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee, signed when Cyprus gained its independence.

« — President Makarios had publicly warned that the Greek junta was plotting his overthrow. Greece's present Prime Minister, Constantine Caramanlis, has since repeatedly and publicly acknowledged that the former Greek government perpetrated the coup against the Government of Cyprus.

« — The Greek-led forces which mounted the coup employed U. S. supplied military equipment, a fact confirmed by Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.



«Thus, Greece not only violated the Treaty of Guarantee, it also violated the U. S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which states that U. S. military equipment may only be used by nations for «internal security, legitimate self-defense and to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective measures consistent with the Charter of the U. N.»

«(Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus was, in turn, not only fully consistent with the Treaty of Guarantee but equally lawful under the Foreign Assistance Act even though the Congressional ban on arms to Turkey was voted ostensibly because Turkey violated the Act.)

«To understand Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus, one must remember that the Treaty of Guarantee states that in the event Treaty's provisions are breached, the Guarantor Powers - Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom - must «undertake to consult together... to insure observation of these provisions.» More importantly, Article IV provides that: «Insofar as common or concerted action may not prove possible each of the Guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action.»

«That, exactly, is what Turkey did.»

(San Diego Union; «Congress Blames the Wrong Ally for Chaos on Cyprus» by Glenn Lee Smith; October 5, 1975)

THE DAMAGING AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE EFFECTS OF THE PROHIBITION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES TO TURKEY

WEAKENING NATO'S DEFENCE POSTURE

«Existing legislation passed by Congress last December 18 (on the arms embargo to Turkey) ... has called into question the ability of an Ally to continue to fulfill its essential NATO responsibilities, thus undermining NATO's strength in the Eastern Mediterranean.»

(President G. Ford; in his letter to Congress; July 9, 1975)

«We believe, however, that it is clearly not in the U. S. national interest to maintain an embargo that jeopardizes our NATO defences by depriving our Turkish ally of the military equipment it needs to discharge its alliance responsibilities... With respect to its NATO responsibilities, Turkey has somewhere between 450,000 to 500,000 armed forces. It is a key military force in the Eastern Mediterranean and in terms of the whole southern flank of NATO. In fact, the imposition of the embargo over the last 5 months has already been injurious in terms of spare parts and other needs. We believe that Turkey is significant because it is right there up along the border of the Soviet Union... When you consider how important Turkey is in this context, particularly if one relates it to the instability that exists in the Middle East, combined with the instability which I believe exists in the Eastern Me-

diterranean today as a result of the differences over Cyprus and as a result of what happened militarily last year, you can see why we are deeply concerned, Mr. Chairman... We want Turkey to participate as a full member of NATO, and to discharge its obligations to that organization.»

(Hon. Joseph. J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; July 10, 1975)

«The action of Congress in cutting off military aid to Turkey is contrary to the best interests of the United States and of the Atlantic Alliance, one of the main pillars of our national safety. It was a short-sighted, self-defeating act of pique, which should be promptly reversed.»

(Hon. Eugene V. Rostow, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University and President of the Atlantic Treaty Association and formerly Under Secretary of State; July 10, 1975)

«In my view the arms embargo has been detrimental to the maintenance of a strong southern flank of NATO.»

(Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, Representative from Indiana; Report of the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives; Report No. 94-365, page 25; July 16, 1975)

«Events in Portugal have already weakened NATO's southern flank enough. Both Turkey and NATO will view the easing of the embargo as a re-affirmation of the American commitment to Europe.»

(Hon. Robert J. Lagomarsino, Representative from California; Report of the Committee on International Relations

of the House of Representatives; Report No. 94-365, page 37; July 16, 1975)

«In dealing with this issue, the committee (Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives) has borne in mind that, since 1947, Turkey has relied almost exclusively upon the United States as its source of military materiel. The Turkish Armed Forces - including one of the largest standing armies committed to NATO - will be severely hampered in their effort to continue to meet their defence responsibilities if their access to U. S. sources of military hardware continues to be prohibited.»

(Report of the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives; Report No. 94-365, page 11; July 16, 1975)

«The Committee, therefore, took steps to determine why the embargo had failed to achieve the desired result and concluded that it was in the interest of United States and NATO security to permit the President to furnish to the Government of Turkey those defence articles for which contracts of sale had been signed on or prior to February 5, 1975.»

(Report of the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives; Report No. 94-365, pages 14 and 15; July 16, 1975)

«And, since our most recent vote in July, we have lost our vital military installations and the southern flank of NATO has been rapidly deteriorating.»

(Hon. Anderson, Representative from Illinois; Congressional Record-House, page H 9484; October 2, 1975)

«And NATO is suffering. The Alliance which kept the free world safe for the past 30 years is beginning to crack. The embargo which the Congress put on arms shipments to Turkey plays an important part in these developments. That is the opinion of the President and the National Security Council. That is also the opinion of the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and many newspapers throughout the country. This is also the opinion of the Committee on International Relations

which directed, by a 20-to-9 vote, that we bring this issue before the House once again... On the other hand, it is certain that if the embargo is not lifted or at least modified, U. S. and NATO interests will continue to suffer... Therefore, for the House to act now, without further delay.»

(Hon. T. E. Morgan, Representative from Pennsylvania, Chairman of Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives; Congressional Record-House, Page H 9485; October 2, 1975)

«The southern flank of NATO is in serious disarray and our allies, with the obvious exception of Greece, are unanimous in counseling that the embargo is detrimental to the alliance... In fact, there is strong evidence to suggest that the Government of Turkey, in light of the embargo experience, is beginning to look for alternative sources of support and military procurement such as Western Europe, Iran, the Arab world in general, and radical Arab States such as Libya and Iraq, in particular.»

(Hon. W. S. Broomfield, Representative from Michigan; Congressional Record-House, page H 9486; October 2, 1975)

«If the Government of Turkey is not allowed to purchase arms from the United States for defence purposes and for their various NATO responsibilities, it is foolish to believe they will not go elsewhere for such materials... I am of the strong opinion that a continued embargo of arms to Turkey could seriously weaken the effectiveness of the NATO pact.»

(Hon. Bevill, Representative from Alabama; Congressional Record-House, page H 9492; October 2, 1975)

«NATO preparedness and readiness on its southern flank has probably never been worse in the 27-year history of NATO. Except for Greece, all NATO members unanimously agree that the best interests of the organization are served by the lifting of the embargo against Turkey. It is felt that Turkey's ability to fulfill its NATO force goals is weakening with each successive month of the embargo as Turkey has had to reduce operations due to lack of spare parts and access to new equipment. If the deterioration continues, a permanent dismantling of one sector of NATO could result.»

(Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, Representative from Indiana; Congressional Record-House, page H 9495; October 2, 1975)

«Turkey's role in protecting Western security in the region is an essential one. We are deeply concerned also about the situation on Cyprus and the plight of its refugees. However, we believe both a settlement of the Cyprus problem and the vital task of maintaining the military situation in NATO's southern flank can be most effectively accomplished by the speedy resumption of military aid to Turkey. The situation is an extremely ur-

gent and dangerous one. We urge the Congress to act promptly on legislation restoring military assistance to Turkey.»

(Hon. Dan Daniel, Representative from Virginia; Congressional Record-House, page H 9497; October 2, 1975)

«Cyprus is important, but there is much more to be considered. The United States-Turkey strategic relationship is highly important. Turkish geopolitical consideration, the control of the Straits, the fact that Turkey holds critical territory immediately on the Russian southern flank cannot be overlooked. Turkey has the second largest army in NATO with historic proven fighting capacity. Turkey offers direct access to the Arab world and to the Mediterranean. They can make a deal with Turkey tomorrow if they choose and plenty of weapons assured. The United States-Turkish military partnership and Turkish commitment to NATO are essential to the southern flank of NATO: It helps to offset adverse developments in Portugal, Italy and Greece.»

(Hon. R. L. F. Sikes, Representative from Florida; Congressional Record-House, page H 9505; October 2, 1975)

«NATO has long recognised the importance of Turkey's role and dedicated participation in Western defence... As a result, Turkey's armed force is armed almost entirely with U. S.-made military equipment, and almost entirely dependent on United States for spare parts with which to maintain this equipment. Now an embargo by the same country that helped build that force is damaging it to a point at which Turkey will soon be unable to carry out its responsibilities in Western defence.»

For this reason and particularly out of concern for the U. S. national interest, I believe that it is unreasonable to continue an embargo which has proved to be tragically counterproductive and damaging to Western defence and mutual security relationships with a staunch ally.»

(Hon. Hinshaw, Representative from California; Congressional Record-House, page H 9512. October 2, 1975)

SEVERELY IMPAIRING THE TURKISH-UNITED STATES SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

«The result (of the embargo) is that a relationship of trust and confidence with this important NATO ally, built up over many years, has been seriously eroded.»
(President G. Ford; in his letter to Congress; July 9, 1975)

«What we want is action to restore the kind of traditional friendly and security relationship that has existed between Turkey and the United States.»

(Hon. Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; July 10, 1975).

«The ban is simply forcing the Turks to turn for help to other nations whose interests may not be harmonious with ours... We have had a 30-year relationship with Turkey and our mutual interests in preserving that relationship are great... We need good relations with the Turks if we are to be able to work with them on some issues that matter to us.»

(Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, Representative from Indiana; Report of the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives; Report No. 94-365, pages 26 and 27; July 16, 1975)



«I maintain that a great deal has happened, and that continued congressional refusal to ease this embargo can only be interpreted as willful irresponsibility contrary to the best interests of the United States... Relations between the United States and Turkey, a staunch friend and ally for almost three decades, have deteriorated dramatically.»

(Hon. W. S. Broomfield, Representative from Michigan; Congressional Record-House, page H 9486; October 2, 1975)

«A review of what has happened in the last 2 months since Congress last voted on this foreign policy matter makes clear that this ban ought to be lifted partially. First, United States-Turkish relations: Since July, our relations with Turkey have continued to deteriorate. Where there was once warmth and frankness, there is now more of an air of formality and coolness.»

(Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, Representative from Indiana; Congressional Record-House, page H 9494; October, 2 1975)

«If we pursue this course, not only will there not be progress on Cyprus, but we can figure we have practically destroyed any kind of working relationship with Turkey for the long term.»

(Hon. D. M. Fraser, Representative from Minnesota; Congressional Record-House, page H 9510; October 2, 1975)

IMPEDING PROGRESS TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS

«The Committee (Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives) determined that the embargo on the furnishing of defence articles to Turkey, which had been in effect for over 5 months, has not accomplished its intended purpose; i. e., a peaceful solution to the crisis in Cyprus.»

(Report of the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives; Report No. 94-365; page 14; July 16, 1975)

«The reason for the committee's recommendation is that after a more than 5 months' suspension of arms shipments to Turkey, it has become clear that in the complex circumstances of this particular case, our national interests and the cause of a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus tragedy are not being served by continuation of the total embargo.»

(Report of the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives; Report No. 365, page 11; July 16, 1975)

«Our position should be one of trying to help settle differences between Greece and Turkey rather than taking sides, which is, in effect, what we are doing by refusing to sell arms to Turkey while continuing to do military business with Greece.»

(Hon. Bevill, Representative from Alabama; Congressional Record-House, page H 9492; October 2, 1975)

«The embargo has blocked progress toward a Cyprus settlement... In short, as the parties move toward a bizonal arrangement on Cyprus, we see what is possible if only the parties are free to negotiate. With the arms embargo, successful negotiations simply do not appear possible.»

(Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, Representative from Indiana; Congressional Record-House, page H 9495; October 2, 1975)

«An end to the embargo would be a positive step toward encouraging Turkey to begin substantive negotiations on a Cyprus settlement.»

(Hon. Pritchard, Representative; Congressional Record-House, page H 9504; October 2, 1975)

«However, now, 7 months after the embargo went into effect, it is apparent that it has produced the opposite effect of what Congress had intended. Instead of promoting a solution, it has actually hindered progress by humiliating the Turks and placing them in a position in which national pride and their own political pressures prevent them from acting under the duress of total embargo. The embargo has destroyed American diplomatic leverage in trying to help both sides (Greece and Turkey) reach a peaceful agreement and has aggravated the already existing instability between the two countries over the possibility of a preemptive military action by one or the other.»

(Hon. Hinshaw, Representative from California,; Congressional Record-House, page H 9511; October 2 1975)

«Continuation of any arms embargo will make a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem difficult if not impossible. And the people of Cyprus will continue to suffer from Greece's July 1974 aggression against the Island Republic.»

(San Diego Union; «Congress Blames the Wrong Ally for Chaos on Cyprus» by Glenn Lee Smith; October 5, 1975)

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