

ISLAMKUNDLICHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN · BAND 227

**Mohammad Moslem Adel Saflo**

**al-Juwaynī's Thought and Methodology**

**With a Translation and Commentary on  
Luma' al-Adillah**

UN

KLAUS SCHWARZ VERLAG · BERLIN · 2000









Mohammad Moslem Adel Saif  
al-Juwayni's Thought and Methodology

Klaus Schenck

Mohammad Moslem Adel Saif  
al-Juwayni's Thought and Methodology

A Translation and Commentary on  
al-Juwayni's *Ma'adim*

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**ISLAMKUNDLICHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN · BAND 227**

begründet

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von

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**KLAUS SCHWARZ VERLAG · BERLIN**



ISLAMKUNDLICHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN · BAND 227



To my father and mother

00 22 00

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## Foreword

Abū al-Ma'sū'ī 'Abd al-Malik al-Juwaynī (419/1028 - 478/1085) rejoices in the title of Imām al-Haramayn, as the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* reminds us (*EI*<sup>2</sup>, Vol. II, p. 608), "at Mecca and at Medina for four years". The same source describes him as being important "because he wrote in the intermediate period between the old Ash'arism and the school which al-Ghazālī was to call "modern" (*Ibid.*). His primary interests were *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *ʿilm al-kalām*. C. Brockelmann and E. Gardet believe that it was as a *mutafallim* "that al-Juwaynī made his deepest impression on Muslim thought; and to him goes the glory of being the teacher of Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī in this discipline" (*Ibid.*). Dr M.M.A. Saffo has done the world of Islamic studies, and in particular, those of us who specialise in Islamic theology and philosophy, a most powerful service with this study of al-Juwaynī's thought and methodology, together with a translation of, and commentary upon, that author's *Luma' al-Adilla*, a work which is rather less well-known than, for example, the *Kitāb al-Irshād* which is also a fresh point of Dr Saffo's study, for comparative purposes, in this volume. Here are many of the topics of classical Islamic theology, explored afresh in Saffo's work. This is a book which will be of interest to scholars and students, not just of Islamic philosophy and theology, but of other religions and philosophies, and the comparative study of world religions as well.

Ian Richard Netton

Professor of Arabic Studies

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To my father and mother

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Ian Richard Netton

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## Chapter Six

### The Origination of the World and the Proof of the Existence of God

#### Abstract

al-Juwaynī is one of the most famous Muslim scholars of his time. He was a jurist, politician, and theologian. This book will be concerned with the study of the methodology, views, and doctrine of al-Juwaynī in these three subjects. Although al-Juwaynī wrote many books in politics and fiqh, his fame derives mostly from theological work and views. Accordingly, this book concentrates more on the theological aspects of al-Juwaynī. We discuss his politics, fiqh and kalām, with particular attention to the Divine Attributes and the proof of creation of the world. We show that although al-Juwaynī belonged to the Ash'arite school, his thinking was, in many cases, original and independent.

The book of *Luma' al-Adillah fi Qawā'id ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah* is a book in which al-Juwaynī explains the theological views of the Sunnī creed. A translation of the book is carried out together with a commentary and a comparison between the translated book and another book of al-Juwaynī called *al-Irshād*. As the book claims to represent *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*, we discussed the position of the *Luma' vis à vis* the Sunnites.

## Table of Contents

<b>Preface</b>	i
<b>Acknowledgements</b>	ii
<b>Abstract</b>	iii
<b>Table of Contents</b>	iv
<b>Chapter One</b>	
<b>Introduction</b>	1
<b>Chapter Two</b>	
<b>The Life, Work and Politics of al-Juwaynī</b>	8
2.1. The Life and Work of al-Juwaynī	8
2.2. The Politics of al-Juwaynī.	35
<b>Chapter Three</b>	
<b>The Fiqh of al-Juwaynī</b>	56
3.1. Introduction.	56
3.2. al-Juwaynī and the Sources of Jurisprudence ( <i>Uṣūl al-Fiqh</i> ).	57
3.3. al-Juwaynī and Jurisprudence ( <i>al-Fiqh</i> ).	78
3.4. Conclusion.	84
<b>Chapter Four</b>	
<b>al-Juwaynī's Kalām</b>	87
4.1. Introduction.	87
4.2. The Method of al-Juwaynī.	91
4.3. Definition and Discussion of Some Basic Concepts.	103
4.4. The Question of the Attributes.	113
4.5. Conclusion.	117
<b>Chapter Five</b>	
<b>The Divine Attributes in al-Juwaynī's Thought</b>	118
5.1. Introduction.	118
5.2. The Problems of the Addition of Attributes.	122
5.3. The Problem of Ṣifāt al-Ma'ānī.	125
5.4. Definition of Attributes.	127
5.5. Essential Attributes.	129
5.6. Conceptual Attributes ( <i>al-Ṣifāt al-Ma'nawīyyah</i> ).	134
5.7. Revealed Attributes ( <i>al-Ṣifāt al-Khabariyyah</i> ).	149
5.8. Conclusion.	153





## **Chapter Six**

### **The Origination of the World and the Proof of the Existence of God**

	157
6.1. Introduction.	157
6.2. The Eight Arguments for Creation.	161
6.3. Creation According to Muslim Theologians.	164
6.4. The Expansion of the Argument from Accidents by al-Juwaynī.	172
6.5. The Argument for Creation as Expounded by al-Juwaynī.	183
6.6. Proof of the Existence of God Based on al-Juwaynī's First Argument.	197
6.7. al-Juwaynī's Original Proof from Particularisation.	202
6.8. Conclusion.	205

## **Chapter Seven**

### **Luma' al-Adillah: Translated Text**

## **Chapter Eight**

### **Commentary on the Luma'**

	210
8.1. Introduction.	268
8.2. Commentary to the Text of the Luma'.	270
8.3. Comparison Between the Luma' and al-Irshād.	317

## **Chapter Nine**

### **The Position of the Luma' in the Creed of Ahl al-Sunnah**

	337
9.1. Introduction.	337
9.2. Who are <i>ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah</i> ?	338
9.3. The Luma' and Tradition.	340
9.4. Conclusion.	353

## **Chapter Ten**

### **Conclusion**

### **Appendix of Technical Terms**

### **Bibliography**

354
366
369

Chapter Six	157
The Origin of the World and the Proof of the Existence of God	157
6.1. Introduction	157
6.2. The Eight Arguments for Creation	158
6.3. Creation According to Muslim Theologians	159
6.4. The Expansion of the Argument from Accidents by al-Jawhary	160
6.5. The Argument for Creation as Expounded by al-Jawhary	161
6.6. Proof of the Existence of God Based on al-Jawhary's First Argument	162
6.7. al-Jawhary's Original Proof from Particularisation	163
6.8. Conclusion	164
Chapter Seven	165
al-Jawhary's Polite Text	165
Chapter Eight	166
Commentary on the Luma'	166
8.1. Introduction	166
8.2. Commentary on the Introduction	167
8.3. Comparison Between the Introduction and the First Chapter	168
Chapter Nine	169
The Position of the Luma' in the Creed of Ahl al-Sunnah	169
9.1. Introduction	169
9.2. Who are al-Jawhary and al-Jawhary?	170
9.3. The Luma' and Tradition	171
9.4. Conclusion	172
Chapter Ten	173
Conclusion	173
Appendix of Technical Terms	174
The Divine Attributes	174
1.1. Introduction	174
1.2. The Problem of the Attributes	175
1.3. The Problem of the Attributes	176
1.4. Definition of Attributes	177
1.5. Essential Attributes	178
1.6. Conceptual Attributes (al-Sifat al-Ma'niyyah)	179
1.7. Revealed Attributes (al-Sifat al-Khawariyyah)	180
1.8. Conclusion	181



## Chapter One

### Introduction

Theology is one of the most sensitive subjects in the Islamic world. Two jurists may have opposite opinions regarding certain questions of *Fiqh* without reaching the point of enmity. For theologians, a difference of opinion may lead to one party rejecting the faith of their opponents altogether. This is due to the fact that theology has for its subject the metaphysical world, which is very closely linked with faith. Although the main source of creed in Islam is the Qur'an, this latter has not provided us with all the details which would satisfy human curiosity.

Moreover, the Tradition of the Prophet expresses some metaphysical ideas which might be difficult to reconcile with both the principles of Qur'anic foundations of faith and beliefs and with the basic common sense and logic.

There is therefore some grounds for speculation into the subjects which were ambiguous or unclear, or which were left out altogether. Theology was the discipline to carry out such speculation. But since theology is not an exact science, differences amongst theologians and the emergence of various schools of theology were a natural outcome.

Even in those areas where there are clear texts and no disagreement amongst Muslims, there was still the need to defend the Islamic faith against other religions and also against the Philosophers.

There have been many schools and trends in Islamic theology and these have



been studied and compared in a number of books.<sup>1</sup> One of the most fundamental differences between the various schools and trends is the balance between reason (*al-'aql*) and transmitted texts (*al-naql*) like the Qur'ān and the Sunnah.

For some, like the Mu'tazilites and the philosophers, reason predominates while for others, like the Traditionists, the texts have supreme priority. The Ash'arites took a middle way by attempting to find a balance between reason and texts.<sup>2</sup> Not surprisingly, they had to argue with both sides. However, what is interesting is to find out whether the Ash'arites were successful in reconciling reason with the transmitted texts and whether *al-'aql* and *al-naql* are reconcilable anyway.

In order to analyse this, al-Juwaynī seems to be one of the best candidates to represent the Ash'arites for several reasons. One important consideration is that he is known to have had different views from his predecessors in favour of reason. Another reason is that he lived at a time when Ash'arism was fully developed. Last, but not the least, al-Juwaynī left us many theological books which have been edited and printed.<sup>3</sup>

al-Juwaynī was one of the most prominent theologians of his school. He belonged to the Ash'arite school of theology and the Shāfi'ite school of jurisprudence. Although theology was his main speciality, al-Juwaynī also wrote books on *fiqh*, *Uṣūl al-fiqh* and politics.

<sup>1</sup> See for example Fakhry, Majid, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, Longman, London, 1983; Sharif M. M. (ed.), *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, 2 Vols, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1963; Henri Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, translated by Lierdain Sherrard, Kegan Paul International, London, 1993; and Wolfson, Harry Austryn, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harvard University Press, London, 1975.

<sup>2</sup> Muḥammad 'Alī Abū Rayyān, *Tārīkh al-Fikr al-Falsafī fī al-Islām*, Dār al-Ma'rifah al-Jāmi'iyyah, Alexandria, 1986, p.329.

<sup>3</sup> Henri Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, p.120.

Although the main books on theology of al-Juwaynī have been edited and published, only a few works have been dedicated to some of his theological thought. There are three books about the life and work of al-Juwaynī.<sup>4</sup> However, their accounts are limited in the description of the work and basic opinions of al-Juwaynī. We were unable to find a single book by western writers dedicated to al-Juwaynī. Most of the times, al-Juwaynī is mentioned within the context of the Ash'arite theology as in Anawati and Gardet,<sup>5</sup> Wolfson,<sup>6</sup> and Fakhry,<sup>7</sup> Badawi dedicates a whole section to al-Juwaynī in his book, but his account is very brief.<sup>8</sup>

In the edited books of al-Juwaynī like *al-Irshād*, *al-Burhān* and *Luma' al-Adillah*, brief and superficial information about the life and work of al-Juwaynī was given by the editors.

To the best of our knowledge, there are only two studies dedicated to some sections of al-Juwaynī theology. The first is Fawqiyah's thesis on the doctrine of al-Juwaynī on the origination of the world.<sup>9</sup> A version of her thesis was later reproduced in a book in Arabic.<sup>10</sup> Fawqiyah's work contains a lot of details on

<sup>4</sup> al-Zuhaylī, Muḥammad, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, Dār al-Qalam, Damascus, 1986; Ḥarbī, M. Ibn 'Alī 'Uthmān, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, 'Ālam al-Kutub, Beirut, 1986; al-Dīb, 'Abd al-'Azīm, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, Dār al-Qalam, Kuwait, 1981.

<sup>5</sup> L. Gardet and M. M. Anawati, *Introduction a La Théologie Musulmane*, Librairie Philosophique, Paris, 1970.

<sup>6</sup> Wolfson, Harry Austryn, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harvard University Press, London, 1975.

<sup>7</sup> Fakhry, Majid, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, Longman, London, 1983.

<sup>8</sup> 'Abdurrahmān Badawi, *Histoire de la Philosophie en Islam*, Librairie Philosophique, Paris, 1972, Vol.1, pp.348-381.

<sup>9</sup> Fawqiyah H. Maḥmūd, *al-Juwaynī and the Doctrine of the Origination of the World*, Ph.D thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1960.

<sup>10</sup> Fawqiyah H. Maḥmūd, *al-Juwaynī Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, al-Mu'assasah al-Miṣriyyah al-Āmmah, Cairo, 1964. Another version was published in 1970 under the title: *al-Juwaynī Imām al-Ḥaramayn wa madhhabuhu fī Ḥudūth al-'Ālam*.

al-Juwaynī's views on the origination of the world and the proof of existence of God and of creation. However, it may be safe to say that her work concentrates too much on explaining and commenting on the views of al-Juwaynī. There is little attempt to critically analyse his views and method. In addition, Fawqiyah did not discuss other important theological questions like the attributes and al-Juwaynī's methodology. The second work is Bisar's thesis on the comparison between al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī. Bisar's work was limited to the comparison between the book of *al-Irshād* of al-Juwaynī and the book of *al-Iqtisād* of al-Ghazālī.<sup>11</sup>

In jurisprudence, al-Dīb wrote a book dedicated to the *fiqh* of al-Juwaynī.<sup>12</sup> Davidson gave a brief description of al-Juwaynī's version of proof for creation from accidents. He also outlined al-Juwaynī's proof from particularisation.<sup>13</sup> A very brief account of al-Juwaynī's doctrine is also found in Tritton,<sup>14</sup> while Allard gives a useful summary of al-Juwaynī's books *al-Shāmil*, *al-Irshād*, *Luma'* and *al-Nizāmiyyah*.<sup>15</sup>

Only two books of al-Juwaynī have been translated. This makes it difficult for non-Arabic readers to have first hand information on al-Juwaynī's opinions and thought. The only translation into French has been carried out by Allard on *Shifā' al-Ghalīl* and *Luma' al-Adillah*.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>11</sup> M.A.R. Bisar, *al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī as theologians with special reference to al-Irshād and al-Iqtisād*, Ph.D thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1955.

<sup>12</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, Idārat Ihya' al-Turāth al-Islāmī, Qatar, 1985.

<sup>13</sup> H.A. Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, pp.140-146.

<sup>14</sup> A.S. Tritton, *Muslim Theology*, The Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1947, pp.184-190.

<sup>15</sup> Michele Allard, *Le Problème des Attributs Divins dans la Doctrine d'al-Ash'arī et de ses Premiers Grand Disciples*, Imprimerie Catholique, Beirut, 1965.

<sup>16</sup> Michel Allard, *Textes Apologétique de Guwainī*, Dār al-Machriq, Beirut,

The aim of this research is to fill two gaps. The first gap is the lack of a complete discussion and analysis of al-Juwaynī's theological, juristic and political thought. By bringing al-Juwaynī's thought together in various disciplines, we will be able to have a clearer and more global view on al-Juwaynī's personality and methodology. However, as the subject of the book is mainly theology, our main concern will be the theological views of al-Juwaynī. Our main contribution here will be in discussing, elaborating and critically reviewing al-Juwaynī in his methodology, his politics, the question of attributes, contingency, and the proof of the existence of God. We will also attempt to highlight the many points in which al-Juwaynī produced independent opinions which went often against his own school. Whenever relevant, we will try to scrutinize the method and views of al-Juwaynī and then attempt to suggest alternative approaches or solutions.

Our second aim is to provide a translation of a small book called *Luma' al-Adillah* which summarises al-Juwaynī's main theological views and which al-Juwaynī claims to be representative of the Sunnī creed. This book is interesting because of its brevity and because it attempts to represent the Sunnites (Ash'arites and Traditionists). Its translation into English may be useful for those who want to obtain basic information on the theology of the Ash'arites and the Sunnites without going into the deep discussions and arguments of his other books (like *al-Shāmil* and *al-Irshād*). In addition to the translation, a commentary and explanation of the text will be given. A critical discussion will also be carried out. As the book claims to represent the Sunnites, we will try to assess to what extent this claim can be validated and if not, what are the main points of departure of the book from other Sunni beliefs and methods.

This book is divided into ten chapters. Chapter 1 is a general introduction.

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1968.



The second chapter provides some background on the life and work of al-Juwaynī. His teachers, students, travels, writings and social background will be outlined. The chapter also examines the political views of al-Juwaynī. The *Imāmah*, qualities and duties of the Imām and other questions relating to government will be discussed.

Chapter 3 reviews the jurisprudence of al-Juwaynī. Both *Fiqh* and *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* according to al-Juwaynī are outlined. Chapter 4 introduces the main features of al-Juwaynī's theology. The Kalām method of al-Juwaynī will be critically evaluated together with some definition of key terms and concepts. Chapter 5 deals with the divine attributes. al-Juwaynī's views regarding the various types of attributes will be analysed. Chapter 6 outlines the origination of the world and the proof of the existence of God. The main arguments of the origination of the world are first assessed. Then the expansion of the argument from accidents by al-Juwaynī is elaborated. Other arguments proposed by al-Juwaynī will also be outlined. The discussion also includes the concepts of accidents, atoms, infinity and other related problems.

Chapter 7 is the translated text of the book *Luma' al-Adillah fī Qawā'id 'Aqā'id Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*. A brief description of the manuscripts and the edited books upon which our translation was based is given first. This is followed by the translation of the Arabic text of the *Luma'*. Chapter 8 provides a detailed commentary and explanation of the text of the *Luma'*. The second part of the chapter compares the translated book *Luma' al-Adillah* with another longer book by al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*. The main similarities and differences are highlighted.

As al-Juwaynī aims at representing *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*, it is im-

portant to assess how far the translated book is representative of the Sunnites. Chapter 9 discusses the position of the *Luma'* in the creed of Ahl al-Sunnah. We will attempt to see what the opinion of a Traditionist would be regarding the book as representing his creed. The chapter will also deal with the subject of how the Traditionist might object to al-Juwaynī's doctrine and method as a whole. Finally, we will attempt to assess al-Juwaynī in general.

Chapter 10 is a conclusion which summarises the main findings of the study. The chapter will also include an evaluation of the theology of the Ash'arites in general and that of al-Juwaynī in particular.

## Chapter Two

### The Life, Work and Politics of al-Juwaynī

#### 2.1. The Life and Work of al-Juwaynī.

al-Juwaynī was one of the most prominent scholars of his time in what is called today Islamic sciences. His books and thoughts covered almost all aspects of religious, political and theological disciplines. He has been praised by scholars as one of the greatest Imams of his time.<sup>1</sup> His full name was ‘Abd al-Malik Ibn ‘Abdullāh Ibn Yūsuf Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Abdullāh Ibn Ḥayawīyyah al-Juwaynī al-Naysābūrī.<sup>2</sup> He is also known as Imām al-Ḥaramayn Abū al-Ma‘ālī because of his visit to the Ḥijāz where he became the Imām of the two holy places, as we shall see later.<sup>3</sup> He was born on 18 Muḥarram, 419 AH/1028 AD,<sup>4</sup> but there is no consensus as to his place of birth. It is worth noting that his name being al-Juwaynī does not necessarily mean that he was either born, lived or died in Juwayn. Two places are suggested, the first is Bushtaniqān, a village on the outskirts of Naysābūr<sup>5</sup> and the second place is Juwayn.<sup>6</sup> However, Fawqīyyah argues that there is no proof as to al-Juwaynī being born in Juwayn.<sup>7</sup> It is more

<sup>1</sup> al-Zuhaylī, Muḥammad, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, Dār al-Qalam, Damascus, 1986, pp.5-6.; Ḥarbī, M. Ibn ‘Alī ‘Uthmān, *Abū al-Ma‘ālī al-Juwaynī*, ‘Ālam al-Kutub, Beirut, 1986, pp.19-20.

<sup>2</sup> al-Subkī, Tāj al-Dīn, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi‘iyyah al-Kubrā*, Dār al-Ma‘rifa, Beirut, Vol.3, p.249.

<sup>3</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, Vol.3, p.252.

<sup>4</sup> *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. B. Lewis, C.H. Pellat and J Schacht, Luzac and Co., London 1965, Vol.II, p.605.

<sup>5</sup> *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol.11, p.605.

<sup>6</sup> Fawqīyyah, Ḥusayn Maḥmūd (ed.), *Luma’ al-Adillah*, ‘Ālam al-Kutub, Beirut, 1987, p.11.

<sup>7</sup> Fawqīyyah (ed.), *Luma’ al-Adillah*, p.11.

likely that he was born in or around Naysābūr because his father was established in Naysābūr when he was born.<sup>8</sup> His name al-Juwaynī was probably given to him after his father who was also called al-Juwaynī. This can be seen when he calls himself "the son of al-Juwaynī".<sup>9</sup> He died in 478 AH/1085 AD in Bushtaniqān (near Naysābūr) on Wednesday evening 25 Rabī' al-Thānī. He was taken to Naysābūr on the same night and was buried in his house. A few years later he was moved to al-Ḥusayn cemetery where he was buried beside his father. He was so popular that it is reported that on the day of his death markets closed down and his pulpit in the mosque was demolished.<sup>10</sup> At the time of his death, he had almost 400 students and disciples.<sup>11</sup> It is common in Arab biographies to find some excessive descriptions of well known and famous personalities. al-Juwaynī is no exception to this. He is said to have been extremely pure, to the extent that his father did his best to educate him and feed him only from pure and undoubtful resources, so much so that it is reported that one day al-Juwaynī suckled from another woman and that his father made him vomit in order to purify him.<sup>12</sup> "This is why" al-Juwaynī explains, "I sometimes stammer".<sup>13</sup> It is worth giving a brief geographical presentation of the main places related to al-Juwaynī's life. Apart from Baghdad (in Iraq), Aleppo (Syria), Isbahan, and Mecca and Medina (the Ḥijāz). al-Juwaynī spent most his life in Naysābūr. This is the most famous city of Khurāsān, a region in North Iran near Afghanistan.

<sup>8</sup> Ḥarbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, p.24.

<sup>9</sup> al-Subkī, *Tabaqāt*, Vol.3, p.260; al-Dhahabī, al-Ḥāfiẓ Shams al-Dīn, *Siyar A'lām al-Nubalā'*, Manuscript no.(ḥa')12195, vol.11, p.255; quoted in al-Dīb, 'Abd al-'Azīm, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, Dār al-Qalam, Kuwait, 1981, p.24.

<sup>10</sup> Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-A'yān*, Maktabat al-Nahḍah al-Misriyyah, Cairo, 1948, Vol.2, p.343; Aḥmad Bin Mustafā (Tash Kubra Zada), *Muftāḥ al-Sa'ādah wa Miṣbāḥ al-Siyādah*, Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadīthah, Cairo, n.d., Vol.1, p.23.

<sup>11</sup> Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-A'yān*, Vol.2, p.343.

<sup>12</sup> al-Subkī, *Tabaqāt*, Vol.3, p.251; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, Vol.2, p.342.

<sup>13</sup> al-Subkī, *Tabaqāt*, Vol.3, p.251; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, Vol.2, p.342.



Juwayn, where al-Juwaynī's father originates is a group of small villages situated in Khurāsān. Bushtaniqān is a small village where al-Juwaynī died, and is situated near Naysābūr.<sup>14</sup>

### His Father.

The father of 'Abd al-Malik al-Juwaynī, 'Abdullāh Ibn Yūsuf, was a well known scholar. He was born in Juwayn and lived there for some time, and bore the title of al-Juwaynī because of that.<sup>15</sup> He is reported to have been of Arab origin, from a tribe called Sunbus.<sup>16</sup> He grew up in Juwayn, starting his education with his father (the grandfather of 'Abd al-Malik al-Juwaynī), Yūsuf.<sup>17</sup> He first learned literature from his father Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf in Juwayn. He also learnt Fiqh from Abū Ya'qūb al-Abayurdī.<sup>18</sup>

He then left Juwayn to study in Naysābūr where he became a disciple of Abū al-Ṭayyib al-Ṣu'lūki. In the search of more knowledge, he moved to Marw to join al-Qaffāl al-Marwazī, from whom he acquired a great deal of Fiqh and theology.<sup>19</sup>

He then returned to Naysābūr in 407 AH/1016 AD where he remained until his death in 438AH/1047AD.<sup>20</sup> He had many students, one of whom was his son Imām al-Ḥaramayn.<sup>21</sup>

He was a *faqīh*, interpreter of the Qur'ān, a grammarian and a literary man.

<sup>14</sup> al-Zuhaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, pp.41-43; Ḥarbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, pp.21-23; al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.23-25.

<sup>15</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, Vol.3, p.208.

<sup>16</sup> al-Suyūṭī, Jalāl al-Din, *Ṭabaqāt al-Mufasssīrīn*, Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, Beirut, p.45.

<sup>17</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, p.208.

<sup>18</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, p.208.

<sup>19</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, p.208.

<sup>20</sup> *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol.11., p.605.

<sup>21</sup> Ibn Khallikān, *Wafāyāt*, vol.2, p.250.

He was also a great teacher, given the title of al-Shaykh which was only given to those who were authorities in their disciplines. He wrote many books relating to the above disciplines, the most important of which is his interpretation of the Qur'ān called *al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr*.<sup>22</sup>

Thus 'Abd al-Malik al-Juwaynī was brought up by a father who had a strong personality, and who was a respected scientist and a good teacher. al-Juwaynī also gained from his father a respect for human analogy and logic. This can be understood from his father's book *al-Muḥīṭ*,<sup>23</sup> where the latter did not follow the Shāfi'ī school (*Madhhab*). In this book, al-Juwaynī's father used an independent view free from all four juristic schools. This book gives us a good insight into al-Juwaynī's tendency to use his own judgement, following logical deduction, and not to be constrained or bound by earlier views and writings without first looking into their content and agreeing with them.<sup>24</sup> It is likely that, like his father, al-Juwaynī, from his youth, had a leaning towards intellectual freedom and thought that is free from imitation (*Taqlīd*) and extremism. This can be easily seen in many of his books, in which he scrutinised various *fiqh* and *kalām* schools (*madhāhib*). However, there are instances where he showed some signs of excessively favouring al-Shāfi'ī over the other three Imāms (Mālik, Abū Ḥanīfa, and Ibn Ḥanbal). One book in which He showed such signs was *Mughīṭ al-Khalq fī Tarjīḥ al-Qawl al-Ḥaqq*, over which he was severely criticised.<sup>25</sup>

#### al-Juwaynī as Student and Teacher.

Since his youth, al-Juwaynī showed signs of great intelligence and good

<sup>22</sup> al-Suyūṭī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Mufasssīrīn*, p.46; 'Ādil Nuwayhid, *Mu'jam al-Mufasssīrīn*, Mu'assasat Nuwayhid al-Thaqāfiyyah, 1986, Vol.1, p.329.

<sup>23</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, p.209.

<sup>24</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, pp.209-210.

<sup>25</sup> al-Kawtharī, Muḥammad Zāhid Ibn al-Ḥasan, *Iḥqāq al-Ḥaqq bi Ibtāl al-Bāṭil fī Mughīṭ al-Khalq*, Dār al-Madīna al-Munawwara, Cairo, 1988.

memory. While teaching him *fiqh*, his father was very impressed by his speed of learning and power of deduction.<sup>26</sup> He learnt Arabic when he was young, and also learnt and understood the Holy Qur'ān and, by doing so, finished his first stage of learning in which he had already reached recognition as a great scientist.<sup>27</sup>

When al-Juwaynī's father died, he occupied the position of his father at the age of 19. While teaching, he pursued his study at the Bayhaqi school under Abū al-Qāsim al-Iskāfī al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418 AH/1027 AD), who taught him the Kalām and Uṣūl al-Fiqh.<sup>28</sup>

al-Isfarāyīnī was an authority in *fiqh* and theology.<sup>29</sup> He belonged to the Ash'arī school and specialised in debating (*munāẓarah*), legal opinion, and teaching.<sup>30</sup> However, al-Isfarāyīnī did not contribute much to al-Juwaynī's knowledge in *fiqh*, since the latter had already studied tens of volumes of *fiqh* books.<sup>31</sup> al-Juwaynī also had two other teachers, al-Bayhaqī, who specialised in the study of Ḥadīth, and al-Khabāzī who was an authority in Qur'ānic *Tafsīr*.<sup>32</sup> al-Juwaynī was Ash'arite in theology and Shāfi'ite in *fiqh*, as can clearly be understood from his books. He was a follower and defender of the school of 'Ilm al-Kalām founded by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī at the beginning of the fourth century AH (10th century AD).<sup>33</sup>

When, in 445 AH/1053 AD, the 'Amīd al-Mulk al-Kundurī, who was a

<sup>26</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, p.251.

<sup>27</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, p.254.

<sup>28</sup> Ibn Khallikān, *Wafāyāt*, vol.2, p.341; al-Zuhaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, p.60, Harbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, p.31.

<sup>29</sup> Harbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, p.31.

<sup>30</sup> Harbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, p.31.

<sup>31</sup> Harbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, p.31.

<sup>32</sup> Harbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, pp.31-32.

<sup>33</sup> See for example L. Gardet and M. M. Anawati, *Introduction a La Théologie Musulmane*, Librairie Philosophique, Paris, 1970, pp.52-57.

Mu'tazilī-Ḥanafī and vizier of the Saljuqi sultan Tughrul Beq, had the Ash'arīs and the Rāfidīs denounced from the pulpits.<sup>34</sup> al-Juwaynī, like Abū al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī, immediately left his country and went to Baghdad. In 450AH/1058AD he reached the Ḥijāz where he taught at Medina and Mecca.<sup>35</sup> He spent four years teaching and issuing *fatāwā* (legal opinions) at the holy places,<sup>36</sup> hence, the honorific title of 'Imām al-Ḥaramayn'.<sup>37</sup>

The reason behind the persecution of the Ash'arīs by al-Kundurī was his rivalry for the position of vizier with Abū Sahl Ibn al-Muwaffaq, the leader of the Shāfi'īs in Naysābūr. al-Kundurī was the vizier at the time, but Ibn al-Muwaffaq was expected to become a vizier in his place. al-Kundurī, being worried about his position, tried to find a way to persecute the Shāfi'īs.<sup>38</sup>

However, since the Shāfi'ī sect was of the four accepted Sunni sects, it was difficult, if not impossible, to criticise any Shāfi'ite for belonging to his school. Instead, al-Kundurī noticed that most of the Shāfi'īs were Ash'arīs in theology. Moreover, the Ash'arīs had many critics at the time and so he easily convinced Tughrul Beg that the Ash'arīs were *Mubtadi'a* (heretics) and that they should be punished and denied access to the pulpits.<sup>39</sup> al-Juwaynī, amongst other Ash'arīs, was excluded from the mosques and an order for his arrest and imprisonment was issued by the sultan.<sup>40</sup>

These events marked a new phase of al-Juwaynī's life. He left Naysābūr with

<sup>34</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī al-Tārikh*, Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, Beirut, n.d., vol.8, p.97.

<sup>35</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol.8, p.97.

<sup>36</sup> Ibn Khallikān, *Wafāyāt*, vol.2, p.341; al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, p.252.

<sup>37</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.37-38.

<sup>38</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī al-Tārikh*, Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, Beirut, 1967, vol.8, p.97.

<sup>39</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī al-Tārikh*, vol.8, p.97.

<sup>40</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī al-Tārikh*, vol.8, p.97.



other Ash'arī scholars. He went to Baghdad where he is reported to have met many scholars and learned from Abū Muḥammad al-Jawharī.<sup>41</sup> He then moved to Mecca where he remained for four years teaching, giving legal opinions and arguing.<sup>42</sup>

In 455AH/1063AD the vizier Niẓām al-Mulk came to power in the Saljuqi empire during Alp Arslan's rule.<sup>43</sup> He favoured the Ash'arīs and invited them to return home. He realised the importance of the 'ulamā' (scholars) as leaders of a major segment of the community and endeavoured to obtain their support.<sup>44</sup>

One way through which he achieved the 'ulamā's support was the establishment of Shāfi'ī Madāris (schools) in the major cities and towns of the central and eastern parts of the Caliphate.<sup>45</sup> He built one in Naysābūr called al-Madrasa al-Maymūna al-Niẓāmiyya.<sup>46</sup> al-Juwaynī was amongst those who returned to Naysābūr and took their place in al-Madrasa al-Niẓāmiyya. He taught in this madrasa from its inauguration until his death in 478AH/1089AD.<sup>47</sup>

By the time of his return from the Hījāz, al-Juwaynī appears to have acquired a great deal of knowledge and seems to have completed his learning and study stage. He was now ready to enter the world of scholarship as an author. al-Juwaynī contributed greatly to many disciplines. In *fiqh*, he wrote his famous

<sup>41</sup> Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, Vol.2, p.341.

<sup>42</sup> Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt al-Dhahab fī 'Akhhār man Dhahab*, al-Maktab al-Tijārī, Beirut, n.d., vol.3, p.359.

<sup>43</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol.8, p.95.

<sup>44</sup> Ibn Kathīr Abū al-Fudā', *al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah*, Maktabat al-Ma'ārif, Beirut, 1966, vol.12, p.90.

<sup>45</sup> Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt*, vol.3, pp.295,307.

<sup>46</sup> Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt*, vol.3, p.295.

<sup>47</sup> Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt*, vol.3, p.295; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, vol.2, p.342.

book *Nihāyat al-Maṭlab fī Dirāyat al-Madhhab*<sup>48</sup> where he collected the Shāfiʿī Madhhab sayings (religious creeds);<sup>49</sup> in *uṣūl al-fiqh*, his principal ideas are found in *al-Waraqāt fī Uṣūl al-fiqh*.<sup>50</sup>

His methodology is best expressed in his book *al-Burhān fī Uṣūl al-fiqh* which al-Subkī calls '*Lughz al-Ummah*' (the enigma of the nation).<sup>51</sup> However, despite the value of this book, it did not have the same success as his other books. al-Subkī relates this to al-Juwaynī's criticism of al-Ash'arī and Mālik in the book.<sup>52</sup>

'Ilm al-Kalām (theology), on the other hand' was the most important field in which al-Juwaynī achieved great success. He has left a deep impression on Islamic thought and to him goes the great credit of being the teacher of Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī in this discipline. The importance of al-Juwaynī lies in the fact that his contribution came in the period between the old Ash'arism and the modern one. The most important theological book of al-Juwaynī was *al-Irshād Ilā Qawaṭi' al-Adilla fī Uṣūl al-I'tiqād*, a general work covering the main theological doctrines.<sup>53</sup> A fuller account of the subject covered in *al-Burhān* is given by him in another book called *al-Shāmīl* (the comprehensive), but part of this latter is missing.<sup>54</sup> al-Juwaynī's third major work was *Luma' al-Adilla fī 'Aqā'id Ahl al-Sunna*. This book is a simplified and summarised version of the *Irshād* and *al-Shāmīl* and is the subject of the present research. In another

<sup>48</sup> Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt*, vol.3, p.359.

<sup>49</sup> Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt*, vol.3, p.253.

<sup>50</sup> Ibn Khallikān, *Wafāyāt al-A'yān*, vol.2, p.342.

<sup>51</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, p.264.

<sup>52</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, p.264.

<sup>53</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, edited by M. Y. Mūsā and A. A. M. 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, Maktabat al-Khānjī, Cairo, 1950.

<sup>54</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmīl*, edited by A. S. al-Nashshār, F. B. 'Ūn and Shahrīr Muḥammad Mukhtār, Munsha'at al-Ma'ārif, Alexandria, 1969.

book, *al-'Aqīda al-Nizāmiyya*, however, he expresses views which differ in some respects from those of the *Irshād*.<sup>55</sup>

### The Character and Qualities of al-Juwaynī.

al-Juwaynī was highly praised for his honorable conduct and moral values. He was honoured and trusted among other scholars and was indeed worthy of the level of wisdom and knowledge he acquired. Among the most significant qualities of al-Juwaynī was modesty. He is reported to have respected and listened to any person, and then, if he found any interesting view, he would use it and quote the person he took it from.<sup>56</sup> A good example of this is that al-Juwaynī learned a great deal from his own students and was not embarrassed to do so.<sup>57</sup>

al-Juwaynī was very keen on freedom of thought. He had independent views and was against imitation.<sup>58</sup> Indeed, since his youth, he had always checked others' views and conclusions before accepting (or rejecting) them, even if the conclusion came from his own father or one of the great scholars or Imams.<sup>59</sup> It is well known that, in many instances, al-Juwaynī disagreed with those whom he himself recognised as Imams (al-Shāfi'ī, al-Ash'arī and al-Bāqillānī) and to whom he paid a great deal of respect.<sup>60</sup> In *al-Burhān* alone, al-Juwaynī rejected the views of al-Shāfi'ī in 25 places; al-Ash'arī in 3 places; and al-Bāqillānī on 41 questions.<sup>61</sup> Another example is in *al-Burhān* where he says: "Our Imams have given a classification of mental arguments (*adillat al-'uqūl*) which we shall

<sup>55</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-'Aqida al-Nizāmiyya*, edited by Ahmad H. al-Saqqā, Maktabat al-Kulliyāt al-Azhariyya, Cairo, 1979.

<sup>56</sup> Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt*, vol.3, pp.359-360

<sup>57</sup> Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt*, vol.3, pp.359-360

<sup>58</sup> Ḥarbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, p.34.

<sup>59</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, p.251.

<sup>60</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.30.

<sup>61</sup> al-Dīb, 'Abd al-'Aẓīm (ed.), *al-Burhān*, vol.2, pp.1443-1449.

describe, show that it is wrong, and then provide our own choice.”<sup>62</sup> He also criticised his father saying “This is a mistake by *al-Shaykh* (meaning his father)”<sup>63</sup> We shall see in later chapters further instances where he differed with his predecessors.

All Islamic schools, according to him, should submit to analysis and reasoning.<sup>64</sup> In this respect he states:

“I have read fifty thousands in fifty thousands (hundreds or thousands of books), then I left the Muslims who accept the authority of these books and their apparent sciences, and sailed in the high seas and went into what Muslim scholars warned against.”<sup>65</sup>

His independent views and love for analysis, logic and reasoning were helped by his extremely good memory. It is alleged that he could remember many lectures and recite them without a single mistake.<sup>65</sup> This ‘photographic’ memory was also coupled with brightness and high intelligence. Such a combination gained him respect by the ‘ulamā’ (scholars) even when he was still young.<sup>66</sup> As we mentioned earlier, his status was already high at the age of 19 when the scholars of his school agreed to let him take over his father’s lectures at a time when Naysābūr was full of knowledgeable scholars.<sup>67</sup> In addition to his moral and mental qualities, al-Juwaynī was very patient and hard-working. While he was lecturing, he spent a lot of time learning from books and from other scholars

<sup>62</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, vol.1, p.126. See also, for example, p.102 where he criticises *al-Ustādh* (al-Isfārāyīnī) on the question of *taklīf* and p.112, where he disagrees with al-Bāqillānī.

<sup>63</sup> Ibn al-‘Imād, *Shadharāt*, vol.3, p.360.

<sup>64</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.31.

<sup>65</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntaẓam fi Tārīkh al-Mulūk wa al-Umam*, vol.7, p.1.

<sup>65</sup> Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, Vol.2, p.341.

<sup>66</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, p.252.

<sup>67</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, pp.251-252.



like al-Iskāfī (al-Isfarāyīnī) at al-Bayhaqī School and al-Khabāzī at his mosque.<sup>68</sup> It is reported that Abū al-Ḥasan b. Abī ‘Abdullāh b. Abī al-Ḥusayn once heard al-Juwaynī say: “I do not eat and sleep by habit, but I sleep if I am too tired and eat if I am hungry at any time”. Abū al-Ḥusayn then comments that his hobby, entertainment and appetite were all in learning and reading from any kind of science.<sup>69</sup>

al-Juwaynī was a knowledge seeker, who, despite believing that science and knowledge have no end, never missed any opportunity to acquire more knowledge. At fifty five, al-Juwaynī was seeking to learn grammar (*Naḥw*) from al-Majāshī‘ī al-Naḥwī who said of the Imam: “I have never seen a science seeker like this Imām (al-Juwaynī)”.<sup>70</sup>

As well as being kind and decent, al-Juwaynī also spent a lot of money on his students, helping them both materially and morally. He is reported to have spent his inheritance on his students.<sup>71</sup>

A close look at some of al-Juwaynī’s writings indicates another characteristic of al-Juwaynī, namely, confidence. al-Juwaynī seems to have been extremely confident and quite aware of his place in the hierarchy of scholars. A particular example can be found in *al-Burhān* where he says (after discussing a subject) “the reader must not think that this is the limit of our knowledge on the essence of mind (the subject), it is only that this place does not require more than this”.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>68</sup> Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, Vol.2, p.341; al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, p.252.

<sup>69</sup> Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, Vol.2, p.341.

<sup>70</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, Vol.3, p.257; Ibn al-‘Imād, *Shadharāt*, vol.3, p.360.

<sup>71</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, Vol.3, p.254.

<sup>72</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, Vol.1, p.113.

### al-Juwaynī's Teachers.

We have already mentioned that al-Juwaynī's father was his first teacher. He learned from his father (d.438 AH/1047 AD) *tafsīr* and *fiqh*, and heard Ḥadīth from Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥarith al-Iṣbahānī al-Tamīmī in his youth.<sup>73</sup>

He learned Qur'ān from Abu 'Abdullāh al-Khabbāzī (d. 447 AH/1055 AD) and grammar from Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Fadhal b. 'Alī al-Majāshi'ī (d. 479 AH/1086 AD). Other scholars from whom al-Juwaynī learned were: Abū al-Qāsim al-Isfirāyīnī (d. 452 AH/ 1060 AD), from whom he learned '*usul al-fiqh*, and Abū Sa'd 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Ḥamdān al-Naysābūrī al-Nadrāwī, from whom he learned *Ḥadīth*.<sup>74</sup> He also learnt *Ḥadīth* from Abū Ḥassān Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Mazkī, Abū 'Abd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Nīlī (d. 436 AH/ 1044 AD) and others.<sup>75</sup>

al-Juwaynī did not rely solely on his teachers, as he himself mentions, he read hundreds of books in various fields. al-Juwaynī said that he read 12 thousand pages of theology by al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr (al-Bāqillānī) (d. 404 AH/1013 AD).<sup>76</sup> During his time, there was a great number of libraries. Thus, he had access to a large number of books from which he not only learned the standard Islamic sciences, but also other sciences like philosophy. This can be concluded from what he calls "what Muslim scholars warned against."<sup>77</sup> However, we do not know what kind of philosophy books he read because narrators avoided mentioning philosophy, probably because of the antagonistic attitude of Sunni scholars of

<sup>73</sup> Yāqūt Bin 'Abd Allāh, *Mu'jam al-Buldan*, Dār Bayrūt, Beirut, n.d., vol.2, p.193.

<sup>74</sup> al-Dhahabī, *Siyar al-Nubala'*, vol.11, p.255.

<sup>75</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, Vol.3, pp.252-253.

<sup>76</sup> Ḥarbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, p.33.

<sup>77</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntaẓam*, vol.7, p.1.

the time towards philosophy.

### al-Juwaynī's Students.

The high respect that al-Juwaynī gained from his contemporary scholars may be seen from the number of students he had. It is reported that he had around three hundred students from all over the Islamic world.<sup>78</sup> Among the most important of his students were 'Abd al-Razzāq b. Ishāq al-Tūsī (459-515 AH/1066-1121 AD) who was a Faqīh and a vizier to Sultan Sanjar (d. 552 AH/1157 AD);<sup>79</sup> Ghānim b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūṣilī (d. 525 AD/1130 AD)<sup>80</sup> and 'Abd al-Karīm al-Damghānī (454-545 AH/1062-1150 AD),<sup>81</sup> both of whom were well-known scholars. In theology he taught the well-known Abū al-Qāsim al-Anṣārī who wrote a commentary on *al-Irshād*.<sup>82</sup> He also taught 'Abd al-Raḥīm b. Hawāzin (Abū Naṣr), the son of the well-known Abu al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī (d. 465 AH/1072 AD). Abū Naṣr was amongst the most prominent opponents of the Ḥanbalīs.<sup>83</sup> Many other students are mentioned by Ḥarbī, al-Zuḥaylī, al-Dīb among others.<sup>84</sup> His most prestigious and distinguished student, however, was Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (b.450 AH/1058 AD), as we mentioned earlier.

### The Travels of al-Juwaynī.

In his era, travelling was a way of seeking more knowledge and learning. Most of the scholars of that era used to travel to known scientific centres to further their studies after spending some time studying in their homeland. Such

<sup>78</sup> Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadarāt*, vol.3, p.359.

<sup>79</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.4, p.254; Rice, Tamara Talbot, *The Seljuks in Asia Minor*, Thames and Hudson, London, 1961, p.40.

<sup>80</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.4, pp.290-291.

<sup>81</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.4, p.260.

<sup>82</sup> Ḥarbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, p.37.

<sup>83</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.4, pp.249-251.

<sup>84</sup> Ḥarbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, pp.36-39; al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.45; al-Zuḥaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, pp.82-92.

centres were not only places where scholars used to learn, but were also centres for exchanging opinion and information. Even the best scholars needed to travel and meet scholars from different schools and sects in order to argue, enrich their knowledge and defend their views. However, al-Juwaynī's travelling appears not to have been by his own will. As mentioned earlier, he was forced to flee his town and travel to Baghdad, Iṣfahān and the Hijaz. Nevertheless, this forced travel proved to be extremely beneficial to him. Baghdad, despite having a low political status at the time, was still one of the most important centres. In this city, al-Juwaynī met many scholars, the most prominent of whom was al-Jawharī from whom he learned the Ḥadīth.<sup>85</sup> He spent some time between Baghdad and Iṣfahān exchanging views and learning from scholars of various disciplines,<sup>86</sup> then he left for the Hijaz where, in addition to teaching and giving legal views, he met more scholars from all over the Islamic world, especially during the Ḥajj. Ibn Khallikān mentions that he also spent some time in Medina, hence his title of Imām al-Ḥaramayn.<sup>87</sup>

### The Work of al-Juwaynī.

The fame of al-Juwaynī is not only seen from what biographers have written about him; or the large number of scholars who recognised him as one of the greatest scholars, especially in theology. Some of his students were amongst the most notable scholars of their time, and this has added to his fame. Despite the fact that Sunni Ḥadīth and *fiqh* scholars had many reservations about kalām and philosophy, fields which were al-Juwaynī's specialisation, they nevertheless recognised his importance and value. The most important source by which we

<sup>85</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.37.

<sup>86</sup> Ibn 'Asākir, *Tabyīn Kadhib al-Muftarī*, vol.2, p.75.

<sup>87</sup> He spent four years teaching in Makka and Medina. Ibn Khallikān, *Wafāyāt al-A'yān*, vol.2, p.341.



can judge al-Juwaynī is his work. Although many of his books are not available, we can still find many books relating to various fields in Islamic sciences. al-Dīb mentions more than forty books written by al-Juwaynī.<sup>88</sup> The following account of al-Juwaynī's work relies heavily on al-Dīb's account. Below, a selection of books is listed, together with brief comments. The sources where these book were mentioned are stated in the footnotes. The statement 'not available' means that no manuscript of the book in question has been found:

- *Ithbāt Karāmāt al-Awliyā'* (Proof of the Saint's Miracles):<sup>89</sup> Not available.
- *al-Arba'īn* (The Forty):<sup>90</sup> A selection of forty sayings of the Prophet Muḥammad. Not available.
- *al-Irshād fī Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Guidance to Religious Principles): This book is widely available and has been edited in at least two places. The book was first printed in 1950. There are many commentaries of *al-Irshād*, but they all seem to be still in manuscript form. This book is one of his main books of theology and will be used extensively in this thesis.<sup>91</sup>
- *al-Aṣālib fī al-Khilāfiyyāt* (Methods in Disagreements): Not Available. This was a book of two volumes and contained a discussion about disagreements between the Ḥanafites and the Shāfi'ites. The book was mentioned in many places in cluding al-Juwaynī's *al-Burhān*.<sup>92</sup>
- *al-Tuḥfa fī Uṣūl al-fiqh* (Principles of Jurisprudence):<sup>93</sup> Not available.

<sup>88</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.50-70.

<sup>89</sup> Mentioned in *al-'Aqida al-Nizāmiyya*, p.52.

<sup>90</sup> Mentioned in *Tabyin Kadhib al-Muftari*, see al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.50.

<sup>91</sup> Abū Ishāq b. Yūsuf, *Nukat al-Irshād*, 5 vols., manuscript no.2, Dar al-Kutub; 'Abdul Rahman b. Aḥmad b. 'Umar, *al-Rashād fī Sharḥ al-Irshād*, Dar al-Kutub, no. 9.7.2.b.; Abū Bakr b. Maymūn, *Sharḥ*, Institute of Manuscripts, Arab League of Nations, no. 143.

<sup>92</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.51.

<sup>93</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.52.

- *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-Karīm* (Interpretation of the Holy Qur'ān):<sup>94</sup> Not available.

- *al-Durra al-Muḍiyya fima Waqa' min Khilāf Bayn al-Shāfi'iyya wa al-Ḥanafīyya*, (The Lightening Jewel about the Argument between the Shāfi'is and the Ḥanafīs):<sup>95</sup> A manuscript of this book is available in the British Museum under No.7574.

- *al-Risāla al-Nizāmiyya fī al-Arkān al-Islāmiyya* (The Nizāmi Essay on Islamic Principles): He wrote this especially for Nizām al-Mulk. The book discusses the five foundations of Islam. Part of this book is published under the title *al-'Aqida al-Nizāmiyya*.<sup>96</sup>

- *Al-'Aqida al-Nizāmiyya* (the Nizāmi Creed):<sup>97</sup> This was taken from the introductory part of the 'above mentioned book and was printed in Cairo in 1948. The book, as we shall see in later chapters, contains a brief and original argument about creation and the existence of God called *al-Takhṣiṣ*.<sup>98</sup>

- *al-Silsila fī Ma'rifat al-Qawlayn wa al-Wajhayn 'alā Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfi'i*, (The Progression in Knowing the two Views and the Two Aspects Following the School of al-Imām al-Shāfi'i): There is one manuscript in Dar al-Kutub under no.1206.<sup>99</sup>

- *al-Shāmil fī Uṣūl al-Dīn* (The Compendium of the Foundations of Faith):<sup>100</sup> This is one of his most important books on Kalām. There are only three copies

<sup>94</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.52.

<sup>95</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.56.

<sup>96</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.57.

<sup>97</sup> al-Juwaynī, *Al-'Aqida al-Nizāmiyya fī al-Arkān al-Islāmiyya*, edited by Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā, Maktabat al-Kulliyāt al-Azhariyya, Cairo, 1979.

<sup>98</sup> al-Juwaynī, *Al-'Aqida al-Nizāmiyya*, pp.16-18.

<sup>99</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.58.

<sup>100</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil fī Uṣūl al-Dīn*, edited by Ali S. al-Nashār, Fayṣal Badīr 'Ūn, and Suhīr M. Mukhtār, Munsha'at al-Ma'ārif, Alexandria, 1969.

of this book in Dār al-Kutub (Cairo) but these copies contain holes and many parts are missing. The book is reported to have been written in five volumes which means that the available manuscripts represent only half of the original work approximately.<sup>101</sup>

- *Shifā' al-Ghalīl fīmā Waqa'a fi al-Tawrāt wa al-Injīl min al-Tabdīl*, (Peace of Mind on the Alterations Made to the Torah and the Evangel). A copy of a manuscript is available in Dar al-Kutub under no.109.<sup>102</sup> The book has been edited by al-Saqqā and printed in Cairo.<sup>103</sup>

- *Ghayyāth al-Umam fi al-Imāma* (The Savior of Nations in Leadership):<sup>104</sup> This is also known as *Ghiyāthī* and *Ghayyāth al-Umam fi al-Tiyāth al-Zulam*.<sup>105</sup>

- *Luma' al-Adilla*, which is an important book on Kalam. The book was revised by Fawqīyya and published in 1986. Its translation will be given in Chapter 7.

<sup>106</sup>

- *Nihayat al-Maṭlab fi Dirāyat al-Madhhab*<sup>107</sup> This was one of the last books of al-Juwaynī over which he took great care in writing during his last days. The book treats Islamic jurisprudence (shari'a). However, the book is scattered in various volumes each of which is found in different libraries and organisations.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>101</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmīl*, pp.83-85.

<sup>102</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.60.

<sup>103</sup> al-Juwaynī, *Shifā' al-Ghalīl fīmā Waqa'a fi al-Tawrāt wa al-Injīl min al-Tabdīl*, edited by Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā, Maktabat al-Kulliyyāt al-Azhariyya, Cairo, 1979.

<sup>104</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Ghiyāthī*, edited by A. al-Dīb, Qatar. 1400 AH.

<sup>105</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.61-63.

<sup>106</sup> al-Juwaynī, *Luma' al-Adilla fi Qawa'id Ahl al-Sunna wal Jama'a*, edited by Fawqīya Ḥusayn Maḥmūd, 'Ālam al-Kutub, Beirut, 1986.

<sup>107</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.68-69.

<sup>108</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.68-69.

## Political Life.

The Abbasid reign may be divided into two periods. The first period was the golden age of the Caliphate, and was between 132 AH/749 AD and 232 AH/846 AD.<sup>109</sup> Hārūn al-Rashīd and al-Ma'mūn ruled during this period.<sup>110</sup> After that came the second period during which the Abbasid Caliphate started to weaken and disintegrate slowly. This period ended with the destruction of the Abbasids by the Mongols in 656 AH/1258 AD.<sup>111</sup>

The period in which al-Juwaynī lived coincided with the rule of three Abbasid rulers, Aḥmad al-Qādir Billāh (371-422AH/981-1030AD), 'Abdullāh al-Qā'im bi Amr Allāh (422-467AH/1030-1074AD) and 'Abdullāh al-Muqtadir Billāh (467-487AH/1074-1094).<sup>112</sup> However, these three rulers had very little power because of the disintegration of the caliphate at the time. The process of disintegration had already started in the fourth century AH. Small states began to rise all over the Islamic state.<sup>113</sup> In the west (al-Maghrib), the Fatimids took over north Africa. Later, their influence reached al-Shām and they started to show interest in taking over Baghdad and the suppression of the Abbasid dynasty.<sup>114</sup> The whole of al-Andalus was independent from Baghdad,<sup>115</sup> but there were many small states fighting each other.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>109</sup> Ḥarbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, p.47.

<sup>110</sup> I.M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp.72-73; A Godsmith Jr., *A Concise History of the Middle East*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1983, pp.68-72.

<sup>111</sup> Glassé, Cyril, *The Concise Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Stacey International, London, 1989, p.11.

<sup>112</sup> Lapidus, *A History*, p.172; al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.17; al-Zuḥaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, pp.24-25.

<sup>113</sup> Lapidus, *A History*, pp.130-131; al-Zuḥaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, p.16.

<sup>114</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.18; al-Zuḥaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, pp.18-21; Lapidus, *A History*, p.132.

<sup>115</sup> Lapidus, *A History*, p.132.

<sup>116</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.18; Ḥarbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, p.47.



In the east, many independent states appeared. Since 261 AH/1055 AD the Samanid state had separated from the Caliphate. It then took many regions from Bukhara, Aleppo, Afghanistan, Egypt, Persia and Egypt. The Saljuqid state was also born early in that century in Turkistan. The Saljuqis begun to expand thereon until they dominated Baghdad itself in 447 AH/1055 AD.<sup>117</sup>

This deep division in the Islamic state meant that the various states spent many resources in an effort to strengthen their position with regard to other neighbouring and potential rivals. The small states did their best to have their own schools, scholars, poets and scientists in general. Although this effort by these small states was made for political purposes, it nevertheless benefited science and yielded important works in many scientific fields. Khurāsān was no exception to the disturbed political and social life which dominated the Islamic world during that period. Khurāsān broke away from the Abbasid Caliphate and was governed by Aḥmad al-Buwayhī until 434 AH/ 1042 AD. The Buwayhis were Shī'as and encouraged the spread of their creed.<sup>118</sup> Their influence reached the Abbasid Caliph himself because of the weakness of the Caliphate.<sup>119</sup> This domination is due to the fact that the many states surrounding the weakened Caliphate were often threatening and raising wars against the Caliph, which led him to seek help from the Buwayhis, who were strong enough to defend him against his enemies. However, this protection soon led to an absolute control by the Buwayhis.<sup>120</sup> The weakness of the Caliphate led to a lot of chaos and political

<sup>117</sup> Goldschmidt, *A Concise History*, p.74; al-Zuhaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, pp.20-23; Ḥarbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, pp.48-51; Lapidus, *A History*, pp.137,144-146; Rice, *The Seljuks*, p.31.

<sup>118</sup> I.R. Netton, *A Popular Dictionary of Islam*, Curzon Press, London, 1992, pp.60-61; Ḥarbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, p.50; al-Zuhaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, p.17.

<sup>119</sup> Lapidus, *A History*, p.132; Goldschmidt, *A Concise History*, p.78.

<sup>120</sup> Lapidus, *A History*, p.137; al-Zuhaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, p.16.

and social disturbances, especially those related to religious affairs. The Fatimid Caliph (a Shī'ī Ismā'īlī believer and supporter) was sponsoring and sending many Shī'ī propagandists to the east. These had the task of inciting people against the Sunnī Caliph. The first step they took, was to try to convince the numerous but small states surrounding the Abbasid Caliphate to accept their creed. They succeeded in that goal to some extent, but the Caliph was not overthrown because of the protection of the Buwayhis who, although being Shī'īs, perceived no political benefit in letting the Fatimids taking over the Abbasids because they would not be able to influence the strong Fatimids as they did the Abbasids.<sup>121</sup>

Despite their protection of the Caliph, the Buwayhis did persecute the Sunnī population and the Sunnī sect was criticised publicly. This led to many disturbances between the followers of the Sunnī and Shī'ī sects among the population. In the last years of the Buwayhis dynasty, civil disturbances were very acute both in Khurasān and Baghdad.<sup>122</sup> When the Saljuqis (who were Sunnī) came to power, life became much easier for the Sunnīs. However, as a result of a long period of religious conflict, disturbances between the various sects remained for a long time. There are many examples of such disturbances. Ibn Kathīr, for example, mentions a story which took place in 443 AH/1051 AD. Some Shī'īs wrote on a tower "Muhammad and 'Ali are the most venerable humans, those who accept are thankful and those who refuse are disbelievers". This led to a fighting which continued for about two months.<sup>123</sup> Ibn al-Athīr mentions another event which took place the same year between the Sunnīs and Shī'īs in Baghdad.

<sup>124</sup>

<sup>121</sup> al-Zuhaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, p.17.

<sup>122</sup> Harbī, *Abū al-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī*, pp.50-51.

<sup>123</sup> Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa al-Nihāya*, vol.12, p.62.

<sup>124</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol.8, p.59,64.

Conflict was not only between the Sunnī and Shī'ī sects; even among the Sunnīs there was many disputes but these did not usually end in bloodshed. In 447 AH/1055 AD, there was a dispute between the Shāfi'īs and the Hanbalīs when the latter forbid vocalising the *Basmala* in prayer and some other matters. The Shāfi'ī scholars were furious and strongly expressed their opposition which led the Hanbalīs to cancel their *fatwā*.<sup>125</sup>

However, even under the Saljuqīs, some Sunnī scholars, namely the Ash'arīs did not escape persecution and this ended, as we already mentioned, in the exile of many Ash'arī scholars including al-Juwaynī around 440 AH/1049 AD.<sup>126</sup>

However, political life saw some stable periods, especially under the rule of Alp arslan (451-475 AH/1059-1082 AD). During such periods, scholars were able to produce most of their work. al-Juwaynī returned to Naysābūr around 456 AH/1063 AD.<sup>127</sup>

### Social Background.

Obviously, the political life which the Islamic world experienced between the second and fifth centuries AH had a great impact on the social life. Political and, thus, social instability was one of main problems of the time. Security and safety were very rare, and chaos, wars and destruction were not uncommon in many places.<sup>128</sup>

However, there were also some positive sides to the social life of the time. One of the factors dominating the social life of the age was the ethnic factor. Non-Arabs proved to be an important factor in both political and social life since the early stages of the Abbaside dynasty. During the later stages of the dynasty

<sup>125</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol.8, pp.72-73.

<sup>126</sup> M. Allard, *Le Problème des Attribut Divins*, p.376.

<sup>127</sup> Allard, *Le Problème*, p.377.

<sup>128</sup> al-Zuhaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, p.26.

non-Arabs became even more dominant and the Arabs had to recognise that they were not the only rulers of the Islamic state. They had to live with the Persians and the Turks among others. As early as 132 AH/749 AD, Arabs and non-Arabs were mixed through intermarriage.<sup>129</sup> As a result, the fifth century AH witnessed a society that was a result of a blend of many races, societies and cultures.

Culture, although dominated by Islamic principles, was also a mixture of various cultures. The many races which composed the society originated from different languages, creeds and civilisations and the effect of these was still present in one form or another. The relative freedom of thought and religion helped revive religious and cultural activities in al-Juwaynī's society.<sup>130</sup> Such freedom allowed the development of the various schools, sects and creeds which existed in that society. There were many ideas which could be found in some Muslim sects that could be related to some ancient civilisation or religion. A good example of this is the idea of the return of a person such as the Shī'ite belief that the last Imām will return as al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar (the awaited Mahdī). Traditions, customs, food, clothes and all other aspects of social culture were also mixed from Arab and non-Arab origins. The relative wealth of the Islamic state at that time helped these social aspects to flourish and produce a highly civilised society.

Another important aspect of al-Juwaynī's society was that Islam was not the only religion in that region. Christianity and Judaism were two other main and important religions. Thus the society was characterised by both ethnic and religious minorities. Yaḥyā Ibn 'Adī (d. 363 AH/ 974 AD) and Ibn Suwār (d. 331 AH/942 AD) who were Christians, and Saadia (882-942 AD) and Ibn Dāwūd

<sup>129</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.18-19.

<sup>130</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.19.



(1110-1180 AD). who were Jewish were known and respected theologians.<sup>131</sup>

With the weakening of the state and its division into several smaller states dispute and argument intensified between the many sects. Moreover, as we saw earlier, it was not uncommon that some rulers adopted specific sects which they supported against any other sect. Whenever such a situation happened, it often ended with the persecution and ill treatment of opposing sects members.

In short, al-Juwaynī lived in a society dominated by ethnic and sectarian conflicts. However, from the standard of living point of view, life was much easier than in other parts of the world. Ethnic and religious conflict were among the main reasons for the development of thinking and analysis at that time. It is known that argumentation and debates in both verbal and written form were quite common during that period. This undoubtedly pushed scholars to learn more, especially philosophy, in order to strengthen their arguments against opponents.

#### *Scientific Life.*

It is well known that during the Umayyad and Abbaside dynasties, Muslim leaders (caliphs, kings, emirs etc..) supported and encouraged science and scientists. Muslims spent a great deal of effort and resources in translating sciences from other languages and nations. Within the third century AH, many of the sciences available in the world were translated into Arabic and Muslim scientists became authors, writers and inventors rather than mere translators and

<sup>131</sup> Wolfson H. A., *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harvard University Press, London, 1976, pp.80-81,98,100; Henry Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, Kegan Paul International, London, 1993, p.17; Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, Columbia University Press, 1983, p.192; Seyyed Hussein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (eds.), *History of Islamic Philosophy*, Routledge, London, 1996, pp.156,686.

learners.<sup>132</sup>

The fifth century AH was one of the richest period in science and scientists. Among these scientists and scholars were the well-known Ibn Sīnā (d. 428 AH/1037 AD), al-Bīrūnī (d. 430 AH/1038 AD), al-Bayhaqī (d. 458 AH/1065 AD), Ibn Bājāh (d. 533 AH/1138 AD), and al-Ghazālī (d. 505 AH/1111 AH).<sup>133</sup>

With the wealth that was available to that society, the early effort that previous generations of researchers and scholars had expended to learn and translate sciences from all over the world, and the deep political and religious divisions that characterised that society, it is not surprising to find that the fifth century was one of the most scientifically fruitful centuries.

With the coming of the Saljuqs, many Sunnī schools opened under the vizier Nīām al-Mulk and King Alp Arslān who showed their interest in promoting cultural and scientific activities. Many schools in Baghdad, Isbahan, Naysābūr and many other cities were opened under these rulers. These schools played a major role in establishing the foundations of Sunnism, and thus strengthening it, making it the most important sect among all other sects in Islam.<sup>134</sup>

As for theology or 'Ilm al-Kalām, the fifth century AH was marked by a large number of theologians from Mu'tazilis, Ash'arīs, Khārijīs, Qadarīs, Shī'īs and others.<sup>135</sup>

More specifically, in Naysābūr, there were many theologians contemporaneous

<sup>132</sup> Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, Longman, London, 1983, pp.xvii-xix.

<sup>133</sup> M.M. Sharif (ed.), *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1963, Vol.1, pp.480,582,587; Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, Longman, London, 1983, pp.xxi,32,182.

<sup>134</sup> al-Zuhaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, p.22.

<sup>135</sup> See al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq Bayn al-Firaq*, Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadidah, Beirut, 1973; al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa al-Nihāl*, Dār al-Ma'rifah, Beirut, 1975.

rary to al-Juwaynī. Among them was ‘Abd al-Salām b. Yūsuf Abū Yūsuf al-Qazwīnī (d. 472 AH/1079 AD) a Mu‘tazili theologian.<sup>136</sup> Among the Ash‘arīs in Naysābūr were Abū Turāb al-Marāghī (d. 492 AH/1098 AD) who was a Mufti in Naysābūr,<sup>137</sup> and Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī (d. 458 AH/1065 AD)<sup>138</sup> among others.

Philosophy was also well developed in the fifth century AH, a period which is marked by some of the most prominent Islamic philosophers of all time like al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. As Fakhry puts it: “al-Fārābī was the leading logician and expositor of Plato and Aristotle in his day”.<sup>139</sup> Despite being the founder of Arab Neo-platonism,<sup>140</sup> and a great philosopher, al-Fārābī did not have as much influence as Ibn Sīnā who had a great deal of influence on other disciplines.<sup>141</sup> Ibn Sīnā works had many expounders and commentators like al-Shahrastānī (d. 548 AH/1153 AD), al-Rāzī (d. 606 AH/1209 AD) and al-Ṭūsī (d. 672 AH/1273 AD).<sup>142</sup> His influence also reached Europe with many of his works translated into European languages.<sup>143</sup>

The Arab philosophy developed by al-Kindī and al-Fārābī, and expounded by Ibn Sīnā had a great impact on theologians. Despite their strong criticism, the vast majority of Muslim theologians benefited from the methods and ideas of philosophers.<sup>144</sup> Indeed, most of the theological subjects discussed by theologians like al-Juwaynī had already been discussed by philosophers like al-Kindī and Ibn Sīnā.<sup>145</sup>

<sup>136</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, p.230.

<sup>137</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, p.219.

<sup>138</sup> al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, vol.3, p.3.

<sup>139</sup> Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, p.107.

<sup>140</sup> Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, p.128.

<sup>141</sup> Nasr and Leaman, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, pp.231-243.

<sup>142</sup> Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, p.128.

<sup>143</sup> Nasr and Leaman, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, pp.242-243.

<sup>144</sup> Nasr and Leaman, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, p.243.

<sup>145</sup> For a review of the theological aspects of these philosophers see: I.R. Netton,

To sum up, al-Juwaynī, as has been reported by biographers, had shown, since his youth, a great deal of intelligence and interest in science. However, it must be acknowledged that every person is the product of his time and background. As a student, apart from his own native intelligence, al-Juwaynī had two main advantages. First, his father was a scholar who brought him up and educated him as few other people could have done. He had the opportunity to grow up in a moderate or middle class family, his father taught him what he knew and provided for him the best available teachers in the disciplines he did not know. Second, the era and the place where al-Juwaynī lived was full of schools and libraries. It was therefore easier for him to acquire knowledge in the best way possible. As a teacher and scholar, al-Juwaynī enjoyed the 'advantages'<sup>146</sup> of his society's social and political situation. First, his exile was very beneficial to him since he had the opportunity to learn more in Baghdad, Isbahan and the Holy places. This also gave him the opportunity to meet scholars from other creeds and schools with whom he argued and discussed, thus acquiring more ability in reasoning, analysis and argument.

al-Juwaynī also benefited from the relatively stable political life under Alp arslan and Nizām al-Mulk. This stability enabled al-Juwaynī to return to Naysābūr and gave him the necessary financial and scientific support for producing his important work which covered many areas of Islamic scientific disciplines. The presence of other religions (Christianity and Judaism), theological schools (like the Mu'tazili and Shī'ī schools), and creeds (like the Kharijis) encouraged al-Juwaynī to move away from imitation (*Taqlīd*) because he had to refute oppos-

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*Allāh Transcendent*, Routledge, London, 1989.

<sup>146</sup> These might have been regarded by him as disadvantages, like the political problems which he suffered.



ing ideas with logic and objectivity. Dispute was present even within the main four Sunnī jurisprudence schools. So al-Juwaynī lived in a society dominated by political, ethnic and religious diversity. Although this had not always been appreciated by him, because he had to escape from his country, and because, as any person does, he would have preferred people to be unified under one religion and one creed and thus avoid unnecessary dispute and fighting, it nevertheless contributed to the development of his personality and scientific work.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with the views of al-Juwaynī, one has, in the end, to recognise his great value and contribution to Islamic thought, and his strong personality through which he was able to defy many traditional scholars (mainly Ḥanbalī fuqahā') who were totally against philosophy and kalām. Despite their opposition, al-Juwaynī produced an incredible number of books covering almost all areas of Islamic sciences.

al-Juwaynī was criticised for his alleged lack of knowledge of the Ḥadīth.<sup>147</sup> However, there is no consensus as to whether or not he had a strong background in Ḥadīth.<sup>148</sup> From *al-Burhān*, however, we can see that he had a strong background in Ḥadīth although no one can claim that he was an Imām in this discipline. Although he did make one or two mistakes in *al-Burhān*,<sup>149</sup> these cannot be used to qualify him as ignorant of the Ḥadīth.

What interests us here is that, even if his knowledge of Ḥadīth was very limited, it would not be surprising because he was not an imitator (Muqallid) and his work was mainly based on reason and analysis rather than adopting what had been stated by earlier scholars. Furthermore, whenever he needed a

<sup>147</sup> al-Kawtharī, *Iḥqāq al-Ḥaqq*, p.16; al-Dhahabī, *Siyar A'lam al-Nubalā'*, vo.11, p.507.

<sup>148</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.119.

<sup>149</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.126.

text (*naṣṣ*), he relied more on the Qur'ān than on the Ḥadīth. For instance, in *al-Burhān* he used 131 verses from the Qur'ān against 88 Ḥadīth.

## 2.2. The Politics of al-Juwaynī.

Since the birth of Islam political and military issues have been a central theme to Islamic thinking. The establishment of a pure and successful state based on Islamic law and ruled by a just Imām is the very essence of Islamic ideology. For this reason, it is hardly surprising that most Islamic scholars have dealt with the state and leadership of the community. This subject is at the core of al-Juwaynī's political thinking in his book *al-Ghiyāthī*<sup>150</sup> in which he dealt in depth with various aspects of leadership.

Before dealing with al-Juwaynī's politics, however, it is worth giving a brief accounts on the Islamic theories of *khilāfah* (succession). The principles of the Islamic state are generally agreed upon by scholars; all of these believe in Islam as a way of life, religion and state. Therefore, the establishment of an Islamic state was the aim of most scholars in order to achieve social equity and the well being of Muslims. Differences, however, resulted from the use of different methods to achieve this aim. Moreover, there was a disagreement as to the requirements needed in those who were to assume the responsibility of executing these aims. The main reason behind this conflict is the scarcity of legal texts dealing with the political jurisprudence. These were limited to defining general principles that could be used universally, while *ijtihād* (opinion) was relied upon in dealing with details and practical matters like the selection, qualities and deposition of the Imām.

<sup>150</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Ghiyāthī*, edited by A. al-Dīb, Qatar. 1400/AH., p.145. This is also known under *Ghayyāth al-Umam fī al-Imāmah* and under *Ghayyāth al-Umam fī al-Tiyāth al-Zulam*. see al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.61-63.

The political conflict between Muslims started during the first four *Khulafā'* period. After the assassination of 'Uthmān in 36 AH/656 AD, a civil war broke between 'Alī on the one hand, and Mu'āwiyah, 'Ā'ishah and the Kharijites on the other. The civil war created divisions within the Muslim community which are still present today.<sup>151</sup> It was during the conflict between 'Alī, the fourth Caliph, and Mu'āwiyah, the then governor of Syria, that two new political factions emerged. The first group were the Kharijites (*al-Khawārij*) who went against both 'Alī and Mu'āwiyah, and the second group were the Shī'ites who were unconditional supporters of 'Alī. After being politically and militarily active for a brief period, these two factions turned into politico-religious sects under the Umayyads, each with its own convictions and its own belief. During the early period of the Umayyad dynasty, the Islamic world was divided into three main groups. The first group was the Shī'ites who supported 'Alī and believed that the Imām was infallible.<sup>152</sup> The Qur'ān, according to them, came to attribute the *Imāmah* (leadership) to 'Alī and the members of his house after him (*ahl al-bayt*). The second group is the Kharijites who believe in absolute *shūrā* (consultation) and general and free election of the Imām by Muslims.<sup>153</sup> The third group represents the mainstream orthodoxy known as the Sunnīs who remained more or less neutral with regard to the conflict between 'Alī and Mu'āwiyah but accepted the succession of the latter after the assassination of 'Alī. This is the largest group and is known as *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*.<sup>154</sup>

<sup>151</sup> Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, pp.55-56; Godsmith, *A Concise History of the Middle East*, pp.53-56.

<sup>152</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Ghiyāthī, Ghiyāth al-Umam fī al-Tiyāth al-Zulam*, edited by A. al-Dib, Qatar, 1400 AH/1979 AD, p.91; Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, p.58.

<sup>153</sup> Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, p.58.

<sup>154</sup> Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, p.58. There was another (less important) group known as *al-Murji'ah*. see Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic*



We saw earlier that the political situation during the time of al-Juwaynī was dominated by the decline of the Abbasid empire; the Saljūq's penetration of the Islamic state, and the rise of many small sultanates and emirates. With the establishment of the Saljūqi power there was a reaffirmation of the task of the Islamic state as defender of Muslims and their land. However, it was also a time of division and sectarian conflicts.

It is interesting to see what pushed al-Juwaynī to deal with this subject. According to al-Dīb, the conditions of the Islamic empire at that time, and the weakness of the Abbasid Caliphs, which led to many divisions in the Islamic world,<sup>155</sup> compelled al-Juwaynī to discuss this subject, to clarify the position of the Imām and how he should be strong and respected and politically capable of ruling the state.<sup>156</sup> al-Juwaynī also wanted to show the Imām's obligations towards the community.<sup>157</sup> In this, al-Juwaynī tried to redirect the rulers towards the right path by explaining the Imāmāh.

Generally, a number of jurists in the 5th/11th century and 6th/12th century continued to struggle with the question of how to assert the supremacy of the Caliph as vice-regent of the Prophet. Most of them were interested in dogmatic theology rather than politics; al-Juwaynī could be easily classified under this category.<sup>158</sup>

Because of the criticism of the Shī'a and the Kharijites that the Sunnis

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*Philosophy*, pp.38-39.

<sup>155</sup> This period was characterised by a very harsh struggle for power between the Fatimids and the Abbasids with the Saljuqs playing a crucial and decisive role. For more details, see: Ann K.S. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981, pp.103-104.

<sup>156</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.145.

<sup>157</sup> al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.145.

<sup>158</sup> Lambton, *State*, p.103.



gave allegiance to false Caliphs,<sup>159</sup> and that they accepted the rule of kings and sultans, they were compelled to develop political theories to justify their position. Al-Māwardī (d. 450 AH/1058 AD) was among the first of the Ash'arites who wrote on politics. In his *Akhbār al-Sultāniyyah* he reduces the religious and political role of the Caliph and speaks of delegation of authority.<sup>160</sup> Compromising with the political reality of their time seems to have continued with the later Ash'arites, like al-Ghazālī, who accept the presence of Sultans beside the 'Abbasid Caliph, which amounts to accepting that the Caliphate had no real power.<sup>161</sup> The fact that al-Juwaynī speaks of the Imām and not of the Caliph shows that he thinks of a system which is different from that of the early four Caliphs. Implicitly, he acknowledges that the old version of caliphate was no longer relevant and that a new theory should be devised to accommodate the new political realities.

In this section, we shall discuss and analyse al-Juwaynī's position and view about the leadership (*Imāmah*), in particular, the selection of the Imām; the role and obligation of the Imām; and the pillars and characteristics of rule in Islam.

### The Selection of the Imām.

The fundamental question on rule should be whether the designation or election of the Imām was the duty of all Muslims, and whether the selection of the Imām should be rational or based on Tradition? The opinion of al-Juwaynī in this respect hardly differed from the mainstream Sunni standpoint agreed upon since the death of the Prophet. According to al-Juwaynī the Imāmah was "a total presidency and general leadership, it deals with general and specific matters of

<sup>159</sup> Gibb, Hamilton A.R., *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1962, p.141.

<sup>160</sup> Lapidus, A History, p.182.

<sup>161</sup> Gibb, *Studies*, pp.142-143.

religion and life.”<sup>162</sup>

He also agreed with other Sunni scholars who believed that the selection should be based on Tradition<sup>163</sup> and consensus.<sup>164</sup> al-Juwaynī's views however, set him apart from preceding scholars. In particular, there was a clear difference between him and al-Māwardī, whose political theory was simply a restatement of al-Ash'arī's, al-Bāqillānī's and al-Baghdādī's thoughts.<sup>165</sup> While al-Māwardī and others were interested in the central Caliphate as the supreme office of sovereignty, al-Juwaynī attempted to legitimise “the rule of whoever was capable and willing to maintain peace and unity.”<sup>166</sup> In today's terminology, we might say that al-Juwaynī supported decentralisation rather than the centralisation of political power. Another important difference between him and al-Māwardī was that while the latter tried to give a religious status to the Imām, al-Juwaynī clearly rejected such an attempt and detached the function of leadership from any divinity.<sup>167</sup>

From the outset, as opposed to his predecessors, al-Juwaynī insists that questions relating to the subject of Imāmah are not final or irrevocable.<sup>168</sup>

The claim of the Shī'a that the Prophet had designated 'Alī is rejected by al-Juwaynī on the grounds of the uncertainty of the designation (*Naṣṣ*)<sup>169</sup> as well as the *Ijmā'* (consensus) of the community (except the Shī'a).<sup>170</sup> In the

<sup>162</sup> Lambton, *State*, p.22.

<sup>163</sup> Lambton, *State*, p.24.

<sup>164</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.424.

<sup>165</sup> Wael B. Hallaq, “Caliphs, Jurists and the Saljūqs in the Political Thought of Juwaynī”, *The Muslim World*, Vol.LXXIV, no.1, Jan 1984, p.30.

<sup>166</sup> Hallaq, “Caliphs”, p.30.

<sup>167</sup> Hallaq, “Caliphs”, p.30; al-Juwaynī, *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.22.

<sup>168</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.410; Hallaq, “Caliphs”, p.31.

<sup>169</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.419.

<sup>170</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.423; *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.27-34.

absence of designation (*Naṣṣ*), the only possibility is election and this is proved according to al-Juwaynī by *al-Ijmāʿ* (the consensus of the community). This view is similar to that of al-Māwardī and al-Baghdādī.<sup>171</sup> Nonetheless, he does not require unanimity for an election to be valid, for he permits election by a single elector.<sup>172</sup> This is the same doctrine of al-Ashʿarī which was restated by al-Māwardī and al-Baghdādī.<sup>173</sup>

al-Juwaynī agrees with Sunnī and Ashʿarī predecessors that the necessity establishing the Imāmah can only be deduced from *al-Sharʿ* (jurisprudence).<sup>174</sup> He refutes the view that, by reason alone, we can reach the conclusion of the necessity of the Imāmah.<sup>175</sup> This is slightly different from al-Māwardī who categorically rejects the role of reason in the necessity of Imāmah.<sup>176</sup>

The divergence of the ideas on whether the designation of the Imām should be by *naṣṣ* (designation, statement or text) has been in itself a source of division in Islamic thought for a long time. al-Juwaynī, like al-Māwardī, rejects categorically all claims that the designation of the Imām is by *naṣṣ*.<sup>177</sup> This is obviously directed against the Shiʿa who believe that the Prophet designated ʿAlī to replace him when he was dying. There are even claims that the Prophet designated his uncle al-ʿAbbās,<sup>178</sup> while others claimed the designation of Abū Bakr.<sup>179</sup> al-Juwaynī rejects all those ideas because he firmly believes that there was no proof

<sup>171</sup> Gibb, *Studies*, p.155.

<sup>172</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.424; Lambton, *State*, p.105.

<sup>173</sup> Gibb, *Studies*, p.156.

<sup>174</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.24; Gibb, *Studies*, p.156.

<sup>175</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.24-25.

<sup>176</sup> Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*, Mustapha al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, Cairo, 1966, p.3.

<sup>177</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.419-423; *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.27-40. See also Gibb, *Studies*, p.156, for al-Māwardī's view.

<sup>178</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.30.

<sup>179</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.30.

about the designation by *naṣṣ* and qualifies those who believe otherwise as ignorant.<sup>180</sup> Thus, like al-Ash'arī, al-Baghdādī and al-Māwardī, al-Juwaynī believes that the appointment of an Imām should be carried out through the consensus of the Muslim community.<sup>181</sup>

Briefly, al-Juwaynī's political ideas can be summarised here as follows: i. Rejection of *naṣṣ* regarding the Imāmah. ii. Preference of selection by the community represented by its elite (*ahl al-'aqd wa al-ḥall*).

*Ahl al-'aqd wa al-ḥall*, should fulfill certain requirements in order to have the power to choose the Imām. The person who chooses the Imām to be the leader and the vice-regent of the Prophet should be aware of what the community needs and who is most suitable to such a crucial task. For this reason, a woman has no role in choosing the Imām and would not be consulted.<sup>182</sup> The same rule is applicable to slaves, common people (who are not scholars) or non-Muslims living in the Islamic state (*ahl al-dhimmah*).<sup>183</sup>

### Characteristics of the Imām.

There are certain requirements that the Imām should meet, according to al-Juwaynī, and these will be divided into four categories: senses, appendages, acquired (good) qualities and necessary qualities.<sup>184</sup>

1. *Senses*. Good eye sight is a necessary requirement for the Imām; a blind man could not qualify as Imām since he could not take a crucial part in the running

<sup>180</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.419; *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.31.

<sup>181</sup> M.M. Sharif (ed.), *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, p.720.

<sup>182</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.62.

<sup>183</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.62-63.

<sup>184</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.72.



of the state because he would lack independence in his actions.<sup>185</sup> Along with eyesight, hearing is an indispensable condition.<sup>186</sup> The leader or the Imām should be able to conduct debates and councils.<sup>187</sup> Knowing especially the importance of Shūra and Ijmā' in Islam, al-Juwaynī makes a mute ineligible for the Imāmate because of the importance of fluency in debates.<sup>188</sup> Nevertheless, the Imām might be short sighted or be hard of hearing, as these latter disabilities do not really impede the Imām from being successful.<sup>189</sup>

2. *Appendages.* All parts of the body whose loss does not hinder the Imām in the procession of the Imāmah and does not lead to an obvious deformation in the appearance of the Imām are dispensable.<sup>190</sup> However, disabilities that stop the Imām from performing his duties, such as the loss of legs or hands, for example, are regarded by al-Juwaynī as being as significant as deafness, blindness or muteness. Here he looks at Ijmā' to decide the seriousness of the disability.<sup>191</sup>

3. *Necessary qualities.* He starts this set of requirements with a rather controversial condition. al-Juwaynī insists that the Imām must come from Quraysh.<sup>192</sup> The significance of that for al-Juwaynī is that in the four centuries of Islamic rule that preceded him, all Imāms had been from Quraysh. He states that,

“.... No one outside Quraysh has ever been an Imām (during all this time) bearing in mind that if it were possible, people of bravery and relief would have asked for it.... If there were a way to claim Imāmah,

<sup>185</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.77.

<sup>186</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.77.

<sup>187</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.77.

<sup>188</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.77.

<sup>189</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.77.

<sup>190</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.78.

<sup>191</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.78-79.

<sup>192</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.426; *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.79; *Luma'*, p.130.

righteous among non-Qurayshis would have taken it".<sup>193\*</sup>

To prove that, al-Juwaynī gives the example of the Fatimids who declared their independence from the Abbasids, but who had to claim a Qurayshi origin<sup>193</sup> in order to legitimise their rule.

The position of al-Juwaynī here stems from the weak Ḥadīth "the Imāms are from Quraysh"<sup>194</sup> and despite his enquiry about the ḥadīth he insisted on this condition. al-Juwaynī tries to find a way out of this dilemma by claiming that "We do not know the use of origin for the Imām, but God has chosen the house of the Prophet (*ahl al-bayt*) and he favours whoever he wants".<sup>195</sup> In *al-Irshād*, however, he agrees that there was room for doubt and disagreement about the question of origin.<sup>196</sup> al-Māwardī's discussion of this qualification also suggests the possibility for a non-Qurayshite to be validly elected as an Imām.<sup>197</sup>

In this respect, al-Juwaynī is hardly persuasive; many groups in Islam have rejected this idea. al-Juwaynī himself does not appear to be convinced of this condition. He was certainly aware of the political environment and circumstances of the time. During the fifth century AH, under the Abbasid reign for example, real power was in the hands of Persians and Turks rather than the Abbasid Caliphs who legitimised the actions of the former on the ground that they were from the house of the Prophet, and this is certainly a weakness of the "origin" claim.

Furthermore, this claim is not compatible with the spirit of the Islamic law.

<sup>193\*</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.80.

<sup>193</sup> Wrongfully according to al-Juwaynī. *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.81.

<sup>194</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.427; *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.80. The Ḥadīth is narrated by Aḥmad Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad*, III, p.120.

<sup>195</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.81-82.

<sup>196</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.427.

<sup>197</sup> Gibb, *Studies*, p.156.

It is revealed in the Qur'ān that all humans are equal and that the only reward should come through work and competence. The history of Islam itself proved the idea wrong, as so many leaders were neither from Quraysh nor even Arabs. The Mamluks of Egypt are one example among many. Having said that, even if al-Juwaynī believes in this idea he does not make it a categorical statement, and according to Lambton, it is hardly obligatory.<sup>198</sup>

In addition to Qurayshi origin, the Imām should be male, free and adult, with all his mental abilities, as well as courageous and generous.<sup>199</sup>

4. *Acquired good qualities.* These, for al-Juwaynī, are knowledge and good ethics and behaviour. Knowledge ('ilm) is the key to leadership, the Imām has to be knowledgeable as he is the leader of Muslims in religion (*al-dīn*) and life (*al-dunyā*). The Imām should be a *mujtahid* (interpreter) with the characteristics of a *Mufti*.<sup>200</sup> Furthermore, the Imām should be followed and not a follower; if he is not knowledgeable he would be obliged to follow other scholars which would be contrary to the conditions for leadership.<sup>201</sup> It is obvious that the Imāmah should be a total control of all state affairs as the Imām is, according to al-Juwaynī, the most knowledgeable and hence he is the sole decision-maker in the Islamic state. The Imām should be independent, he is the one who collects different views and decides what to do, he is also the unifier and the real force behind unity.<sup>202</sup>

With regards to good ethics, we note that in al-Juwaynī's words: "If an immoral man is not allowed to be custodian over his own son, how could he be

<sup>198</sup> Lambton, *State*, p.106. This is in contrast with al-Māwardī who insists on the importance and validity of this condition. al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sultāniyyah*, p.6.

<sup>199</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.427; *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.82-83; *Luma'*, p.130.

<sup>200</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.84-85.

<sup>201</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.85.

<sup>202</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.87.

the custodian of the whole nation.”<sup>203</sup>

The Imām should be able to deal with the most complicated matters, the aim here is to unify men with different ethics and status and ideas, and the role of the Imām would be to have people behind him in one general position.<sup>204</sup> The Imām should be an expert on armies and wars capable to deter rebellion and acquiring new holdings for the Islamic state.<sup>205</sup>

Generally, al-Juwaynī sees the Imām as a Qurayshi adult free man with all his mental abilities, *mujtahid* and courageous, capable of organising armies and defending the frontiers, and as having good judgements in managing the affairs of the Muslims. In short, he must be competent to exercise power, piety and probity.

#### Duties and Obligations of the Imām.

The main obligations of the Imām, according to al-Juwaynī, are geared towards the establishment and application of religion, for life follows religion and because the Prophet was sent to establish religion.<sup>206</sup> Accordingly, in dealing with the obligations of the Imām, al-Juwaynī classifies them into two categories: religious obligation,<sup>207</sup> and earthly obligations.<sup>208</sup>

The first duty is divided into two parts in relation to the sources of religion and in relation to its segments.<sup>209</sup> The source of religion is explained by al-Juwaynī as securing religion against deformation and falsification and the orientation of people towards the roots of Islam and its past glory, and propagation

<sup>203</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.88.

<sup>204</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.89.

<sup>205</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.90.

<sup>206</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.201.

<sup>207</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.183.

<sup>208</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.201.

<sup>209</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.183.



among non-Muslims to convert them to Islam through amicable debates, and the *jihād* (war) against the enemies of religion.<sup>210</sup> So, the role of the Imām here is to safeguard Islam for its people and to call non-Muslims to it. This makes the image of the Islamic state very clear; it is a state with no deformations of religion and, thus, with no conflict. It is also a state which invites non-Muslims to embrace Islam and which protects its citizens from aggressors.

It is noticeable here that the idea of conflict is very crucial in al-Juwaynī's interpretation of the Islamic state. His time saw the emergence of many sects and schools that al-Juwaynī saw as a diversion from Islam. In the mean time the Abbasid empire was very weak and unable to contain regional conflicts and sometimes even foreign aggressions on Islamic land. The Abbasid Caliphs, hence, were very weak, lacking competence and composure in dealing with the affairs of the Muslims. Thus, it can be argued that the effects of these events and their escalation and the ideals about how the state and the Imām should be, influenced the religious interpretation in al-Juwaynī's thought.

The aspects of religion, on the other hand, may be divided into two categories: the explicit and the implicit.<sup>211</sup> The explicit signs are those related to the gathering of a large number of people, such as Friday prayers, pilgrimage and *ʿids* (religious holidays); and those not related to these gatherings like the *adhān* (call for prayer) for example.<sup>212</sup> The Imām should not ignore the gathering of large numbers of people as it could be an invitation to disturbance and irruptions.<sup>213</sup> For this reason, al-Juwaynī insists on the existence of guards to control different groups, or to have some respectable personalities among the

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<sup>210</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.183.

<sup>211</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.198,200.

<sup>212</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.198-199.

<sup>213</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.199.

crowds in order to incite order and to avoid disturbances. al-Juwaynī gives the example of Abu Bakr, the first Caliph after the Prophet, when he was ordered by the Prophet to supervise pilgrims.<sup>214</sup> al-Juwaynī uses this example to give more credibility to his proposals.

On the other hand, in the case of the explicit signs but with a small gathering like normal prayers, al-Juwaynī thinks that if there is a group of people who hamper the proceedings (such as *adhān*), the Imām should stop it by force.<sup>215</sup> This is similar in many respects to the modern idea of public order, with a religious dimension. However, it seems that the aim behind it was to stop non-Salafi Muslim groups from posing a threat to the status quo regarding the interpretation of Islam.

In the case of implicit signs, the role of the Imām in dealing with them is not obvious apart from events reported to him in which he has to take decisions.<sup>216</sup>

For example if it is reported to the Imām that someone has stopped praying for no reason and with no intention of praying again, the Imām could order his execution, or his imprisonment and punishment.<sup>217</sup>

As to the duties of the Imām concerning life, the Imām should work continuously to enlarge the scope of influence of Islam and the way to that aim is *jihād* (holy war).<sup>218</sup>

To achieve that, the Imām should follow a strategy based on two simple factors, namely protection of acquisitions and the claim over what has not been acquired.<sup>219</sup> Acquisitions should be protected internally by spreading peace,

<sup>214</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.199.

<sup>215</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.200.

<sup>216</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.200.

<sup>217</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.200.

<sup>218</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.201.

<sup>219</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.201.

security and prosperity in global issues, based on the protection of the land of Islam against all foreign contenders, or partial ones, characterised by the resolving of quarrels and disputes (judges could deputise for the Imām here), the safeguarding of travellers against raids and robberies, the establishment of policies and penalties to purify the state from committing sins and atrocities and finally the salvation and protection of poor and wretched people by caring for children and the mentally disturbed left with no family support, and the satisfaction of the needs of people in distress.<sup>220</sup>

The protection of the state from outside should take the form of an organised defence against foreign aggressors to make contenders respect the strength and organisation of the Islamic state.<sup>221</sup> This kind of *jihād* is different from the religious one as the latter is a *jihād* not for *da'wa* (religious propaganda) but to protect the house of Islam. The second factor is the claim over what has not been acquired. This factor has not been explained thoroughly by al-Juwaynī as it is very similar to what has been mentioned in religion.<sup>222</sup> So here as well, al-Juwaynī concentrates on the holy war (*jihād*) to promote the call for Islam and to facilitate the spread of Islam.<sup>223</sup>

In order to execute these duties the Imām is helped by some assistants. al-Juwaynī insists that the adviser of the Imām should be Muslim and mature, and by saying so he rejected the idea of al-Māwardī who allows the adviser to be non-Muslim.<sup>224</sup> Since his *shahādah* (testimony) is not accepted, the same thing should be applied to his advice to the Imām.<sup>225</sup> al-Juwaynī believes that the help

<sup>220</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.201-205.

<sup>221</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.201.

<sup>222</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.207.

<sup>223</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.207-211.

<sup>224</sup> For details see *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.155-62.

<sup>225</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.150-157.

of non-believers in ruling the Islamic state is not appreciated and not accepted. Looking after the affairs of the community is considered as a religious practice ('ibādah) and so only the Muslim is entitled to it.<sup>226</sup>

To sum up, the obligations and duties of the Imām could be divided, from what has been seen, into the protection of liberties, the protection of religion and the protection of private property. In this last point, al-Juwaynī shows great respect to private property to the point that even during wars and the preparation of the army he never allowed the Imām to use people's money and funds as it was against the teachings of the Islamic law.

### The deposition of the Imām.

The characteristics which we discussed above could be used in an obvious manner in the question of the deposition of the Imām. Simply, the deposition comes as a result of the absence of such necessary characteristics and requirements. Lambton states that al-Juwaynī does not go in depth in the question of the deposition of the Imām.<sup>227</sup> This view is due to the author's reliance on *al-Irshād* alone in his analysis. Indeed, while in *al-Irshād* the subject is given little attention,<sup>228</sup> in *al-Ghiyāthī* the subject is given serious consideration. Nevertheless, it is true that al-Juwaynī, like al-Māwardī,<sup>229</sup> gives no details regarding the procedure for the deposition of the Imām.<sup>230</sup> According to al-Juwaynī, the Imām should be deposed if he alienates himself from the *Sharī'a*.<sup>231</sup>

<sup>226</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.150-157.

<sup>227</sup> Lambton, *State*, p.105.

<sup>228</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.425-426.

<sup>229</sup> al-Māwardī's view on the reasons leading to the deposition of the Imām is very similar to al-Juwaynī's. See M.M. Sharif (ed.), *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, pp.728-731.

<sup>230</sup> Hallaq, "Caliphs", p.35.

<sup>231</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.98; *al-Irshād*, p.425.



If the Imām becomes mentally ill, or loses most of his eyesight to the point that he cannot function independently anymore, the Imām should withdraw,<sup>232</sup> because, as we mentioned earlier, he should be competent to defend the Islamic state and to spread justice, equality and order.<sup>233</sup> If the Imām is weak militarily to the point that he cannot defend the Islamic state, he should be deposed.<sup>234</sup> Similarly, if the Imām falls prisoner to the enemy and leave the Imāmah empty, the people have the right to select a new Imām.<sup>235</sup> These conditions are exactly those stated by al-Māwardī.<sup>236</sup>

If the Imām wants to abdicate, however, he cannot do so unless the people find someone suitable to replace him in a way that would not harm the Muslims and the Islamic state.<sup>237</sup> As before, al-Juwaynī states that if the ruler of the day was an oppressor and could not be convinced away from his evil, the responsibility of deterring him rests with *ahl al-‘aqd wa al-ḥall*,<sup>238</sup> if necessary by force and war.<sup>239</sup> It is clear here that the role of the ‘ulamā’ is of special importance. They are the ones to decide whether a particular Imām is just or oppressor, and in both cases, al-Juwaynī attributes to them very important roles in the shaping of the society and enhancing its ethics.<sup>240</sup>

As a Sunni scholar, al-Juwaynī was interested in the idea of the less qualified Imām (*al-mafḍūl*). Unfortunately, we failed to find any clear idea from al-Juwaynī on this subject. The Sunni school and the Sunnis in general believe

<sup>232</sup> Here al-Juwaynī used the term isolate himself. *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.99.

<sup>233</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.99.

<sup>234</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.99.

<sup>235</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.112.

<sup>236</sup> Gibb, *Studies*, p.159.

<sup>237</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.129.

<sup>238</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, p.126.

<sup>239</sup> Lambton, *State*, p.105.

<sup>240</sup> *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.164-167.

that the most excellent person should be chosen as the Imām of his time, on one condition: that this does not lead to disorder. If it does, the less excellent should be chosen providing that he is worthy of the Imāmah. al-Māwardī goes further by maintaining that the election of a less qualified is perfectly valid.<sup>241</sup> This seems to be particularly directed against the Shi'ites, who reject the leadership of an inferior (i.e. non-descendants of 'Alī) person.

### al-Juwaynī and the general principles of government in Islam.

From what has been said earlier, al-Juwaynī developed his ideas about the Islamic government from the basis of interaction between the Imām, the '*ulamā*' and the people, within his main aim, which is to defend Islam and to create an Islamic state with no conflicts and divisions in society.

According to al-Dīb,<sup>242</sup> the principles of government in Islam as developed from al-Juwaynī's understanding of Politics and religion could be classified as follows:

1. The nation is the source of power, the ruler is inspired in his power and authority from the ruled and the elite of the time (*ulamā*'). Hence, the nation chooses the ruler to rule accordingly, not because of origin and genealogy or a divine designation; the ruler is elected by the nation for the nation.
2. In the Islamic state the ruler is not a jurist in the sense that he outlines laws; his role is to execute the tradition left by the Prophet and the divine Islamic constitution (the Qur'ān).
3. The ruler is not arbitrary, he is obliged to consult the *ulamā*' if he is a *mujtahid*, or obey them and execute their suggestions and advice if he does not fulfill the requirements of a *mujtahid*.

<sup>241</sup> al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sultāniyyah*, p.8.

<sup>242</sup> al-Dīb. *Imām al-Haramayn*, pp.179-181.

4. The *ulamā'* were looked at by al-Juwaynī in the same way as we look at constitutional jurists nowadays: their opinions are respected and followed by the ruler. The '*ulamā'* are the "*ahl al-'aqd wa al-ḥall*", as they decide about cases lacking a clear *naṣṣ*.
5. The freedom of the individual is protected. For this reason the ruler is not allowed to introduce punishment not mentioned in the Islamic law.
6. The funds and money of people are respected. Their dignity is incorporated in the respect of their property and so the rulers are not allowed to confiscate property as a punishment of the owner.
7. The Islamic state, as well as being based on order, takes the needs of the society into consideration by safeguarding the religion of the people and conducting a truthful *da'wah*, and ensuring protection against attempts to deform Islam. In addition to that, the Islamic state is in charge of the poor and the people in need. Consequently, Islamic law does not generate fear, as it talks in the name of tradition not abstract law.
8. The Imām, in a true *imāmah*, is not allowed to leave or resign if there is no one to replace him.
9. The ruler is not allowed to deputise his adviser regardless of the degree of trust put in him, and the circumstances that call for such deputation.
10. The people are obliged to obey the Imām. However, this obedience is not absolute; his orders are to be obeyed only if he executes the Islamic law properly.

Furthermore, it can be asserted here that the whole idea of the state and leadership in al-Juwaynī's thought stems from the Sunni school that favours tradition. The same idea was also the result of events known at his time and which influenced him towards emphasising the importance of the Imām in order to allow the Abbasid Caliphs to dominate the situation and to stop divisions and

conflicts between different sects and communities.

Nevertheless, al-Juwaynī did not go into the matter in depth, or used any analytical tools. Neither did he venture into the institutions and organisations of the Islamic state. He founded all his arguments on the basis of the protection and expansion of Islam, using dogmatic means rather than reason.

Generally, we can say that the politics of al-Juwaynī were closer to political practice than political theory. This was probably the result of the development of the situation during his lifetime, namely, the existence of two main Islamic states, the Abbasids in Baghdad and the Fatimids in Cairo. Ultimately the whole situation affected his thinking in such a way that, instead of developing a political or economic approach to the state of his time, he became more involved in a religious and political struggle with the new groups that appeared to challenge the well established Sunni school in addition to the Shi'ite resurgence. As he was born in Iran and was most likely accustomed to the Shi'a ideology, he devoted considerable time to debating their views. But the most likely reason is that the Shi'a represented a serious threat to the Sunni leadership of the community.<sup>243</sup> This has surely limited the political scope of al-Juwaynī's political thought.

#### al-Juwaynī and Political Fiqh.

In addition to al-Juwaynī's interest in *fiqh* in the Shāfi'ī tradition, he concentrated in his work on political fiqh. In other words he was involved in the study of rules governing the Imamate in Islam. As mentioned earlier, al-Juwaynī devoted his political interpretations to proving the central role that the Caliph should play in the Islamic state.

The meaning of *Imāmah* in al-Juwaynī's conception is honesty in life and in

<sup>243</sup> Hallaq, "Caliphs", p.33.



the hereafter as this *Imāmah* is behind the establishment of a strong state and the propagation and spreading of Islam beyond its borders, in addition to the improvement of the individual and society in general, which is the central aspect of the Qur'ān, Sunna and Ijmā'. The aim of all these is to protect Muslims and their wellbeing.

The political theory of Islam, that influenced al-Juwaynī, was that Islam is a belief and a general system of rule, it is religion and state combined in one doctrine to harmonise the relations between man and his creator, between man and man and man and himself, as well as the relations between the Islamic nation and other nations. Accordingly, there is no law without belief and vice versa.

There are many reasons behind the tackling of political *fiqh* by al-Juwaynī. An indirect reason is the difference between Muslims regarding the theories of *Imāmah*, the emergence of various groups and sects, and the spread of hatred between the '*ulamā*' and the rulers. This resulted in many rebellions and separatist movements claiming independence and even *Imāmah*. Because of this political uncertainty, the subject of *Imāmah*, it could be assumed, must have been a very delicate subject which writers had to approach with great caution in order not to provoke the rulers. This may have led to a scarcity of jurisprudence related to politics. The '*ulamā*' did not have a free hand to criticise openly the rulers who must have closely monitored their work.

The direct reason behind al-Juwaynī's interest in political *fiqh* is his relationship with the powerful vizier Nizām al-Mulk, for whom the book *al-Ghiyāthi* was actually written. As we saw earlier, al-Juwaynī explicitly challenged al-Māwardī.<sup>244</sup> who was a very influential social and scientific figure in Baghdad.

<sup>244</sup> *al-Ghiyāthi*, pp.140-141,155-158,205-206,301-302.

al-Juwaynī criticised his book (*al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*), attacking him for not referring to tradition and *ijmāʿ* as well as for ignoring the history of the righteous Caliphs and the use of non-Muslim political ideas.<sup>245</sup> These are the reasons that pushed al-Juwaynī to write about the Imāmah in Islam. He was a strong believer in the role of the *ulamāʾ* in advising the rulers of the day, especially in view of his close relationship with Nizām al-Mulk.

Since the birth of Islam, jurisprudence has been the basis of Islamic thinking as it was established as the best means of understanding the will of God and the Tradition (Sunnah) of his Prophet (ﷺ). For the Ashʿarī and other theologians, this is clearly understood from the Tradition and the Qurʾān. Accordingly, jurisprudence has been looked on by Muslim scholars as the way to discover the words of Islamic law. It is recognized that this branch of knowledge is al-Juwaynī's work. We have already mentioned that al-Juwaynī lived during a period characterised by religious conflicts between the various Islamic sects and creeds. Theological issues were not the only sources of conflict. In addition to these there were many differences and views regarding juristic issues and interpretations. In fact, al-Juwaynī belonged to the Shāfiʿī school (ḥanbalī) because of his attitude to the issue of the role of the *ulamāʾ*. However, as in Kāshān, that did not prevent him from being original in many aspects.

There were two approaches to the study of *fiqh*. The first was the *al-ḥanbalī* or *ḥanbalī* which (ḥanbalī) is to say that theory and aimed at linking with *fiqh*, that is to say that theory and aimed at linking with *fiqh*. This approach was adopted by the Hanafites and was called *fiqh al-ḥanbalī*. al-Juwaynī, however, followed the *al-ḥanbalī* or *ḥanbalī* which (ḥanbalī) is to say that theory and aimed at linking with *fiqh*, that is to say that theory and aimed at linking with *fiqh*. This approach was adopted by the Hanafites and was called *fiqh al-ḥanbalī*. al-Juwaynī, however, followed the

<sup>245</sup> Ibid. al-Juwaynī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*, Cairo, 1967, vol. 1, p. 100. al-Juwaynī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*, Cairo, 1967, vol. 1, p. 100. al-Juwaynī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*, Cairo, 1967, vol. 1, p. 100.

## Chapter Three

### The Fiqh of al-Juwaynī

#### 3.1. Introduction.

Since the birth of Islam, jurisprudence has been at the centre of Islamic thinking as *fiqh* was established as the best means of understanding the word of God and the Tradition (*Sunnah*) of his Prophet. *Fiqh* for the Arabs means understanding,<sup>1</sup> and this is clearly understood from the Tradition and the Qur'ān.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, jurisprudence has been looked on by Muslim scholars as the way to discover the essence of Islamic Law. It is no surprise, therefore, that this theme was central to al-Juwaynī's work. We have already mentioned that al-Juwaynī lived during a period characterised by religious conflicts between the various Islamic sects and creeds. Theological issues were not the only sources of conflict. In addition to these there were many differences and views regarding juristic rules and interpretations. In *fiqh*, al-Juwaynī belonged to the the Shāfi'ī school. However, as in Kalām, that did not prevent him from being original in many aspects.

There were two approaches to the study of *uṣūl al-fiqh*. The first was deductive and aimed at linking *uṣūl al-fiqh* with *fiqh*, that is to say that theory is formulated in the light of practical legal issues. This approach was adopted by the Ḥanafites and was called *uṣūl al-Ḥanafīyyah*. al-Juwaynī, however, be-

<sup>1</sup> *Mawṣū'at Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāsir fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī* al-Majlis al-A'lā li al-Shu'ūn al-Islāmiyyah, Cairo, 1966, Vol.1, p.9.

<sup>2</sup> Qur'ān, Hūd, v.91; al-Isrā', v.44; al-An'ām, v.65; see also al-Albānī, *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Jāmi'*, al-Maktab al-Islāmī, Damascus, 1969, Hadīth. no.1157,6611,6612.

longs to the second approach which was more theoretical and was called *uṣūl al-Shāfi'iyyah* or *Ṭarīqat al-Mutakallimūn*.<sup>3</sup>

This chapter deals with the subjects of *Fiqh* (jurisprudence) and *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (the sources of jurisprudence) in al-Juwaynī's thought. Since the main theme of this thesis is of a theological nature, we shall limit ourselves to a brief description of the *fiqh* of al-Juwaynī. The aim of this chapter is to shed some light on al-Juwaynī's attitude towards reason and scripture as well as towards other schools of *fiqh*.

The chapter is divided into four main sections including an introduction and a conclusion. Section two is dedicated to the sources of jurisprudence in al-Juwaynī's thought, while section three deals with al-Juwaynī's *fiqh*. It was found necessary to discuss the sources of *fiqh* because it is the foundation and the basis on which *fiqh* itself is shaped. The last section is a conclusion which summarises the main findings of the chapter.

### 3.2. al-Juwaynī and the Sources of Jurisprudence (*Uṣūl al-Fiqh*).

Before dealing in depth with al-Juwaynī's understanding of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, it is beneficial to start with a definition of the latter and to discuss its sources (*uṣūl*) as an established Islamic science.

Most scholars of '*uṣūl al-fiqh* (*al-Uṣūliyyūn*)' define *Fiqh* as the knowledge of juristic rules (*al-Aḥkām al-Shar'iyyah*) which lead to *Ijtihād*.<sup>4</sup> For example, al-Rāzī defines it as "The set of juristic approaches and the method in which they are used for demonstration".<sup>5</sup> al-Shīrāzī defines '*uṣūl al-fiqh*' in a similar way.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, The Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, 1991, pp.7-8.

<sup>4</sup> *Mawsū'at Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāsir fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*, Vol.1, p.10.

<sup>5</sup> Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī 'Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1988, Vol.1, p.51.



For the jurists (*al-Fuqahā'*), however, *fiqh* means the set of rules and questions related to the *Sharīah* and which is based on the Qur'ān and the Tradition.<sup>7</sup> Thus, there is a clear distinction in that, for the former group, a *faqīh* must be a *mujtahid* while for the latter he need not be.

Kamali defines '*uṣūl al-fiqh*' as "the indications and methods by which the rules of *fiqh* are deducted from their sources"<sup>8</sup> in other words, it is a science that helps the scholar to know fully about the components and the roots of Islamic Law which will help in extracting decisions in case of contrasting views. It should be obvious that giving a religious opinion or rule (*al-Ijtihād*) is hardly possible without the knowledge of *fiqh*. In short, the idea behind *fiqh* is the global rules that help us in reaching legal and religious opinions. It is the science that offers general rules to help the *Mujtahidīn* to solve past, present and future legal and religious questions.

There are many reasons behind the rise of '*Ilm al-fiqh*' as one of the leading sciences in the Islamic world. The most obvious and important reason is the protection of Islamic Law and the Islamic way of life which God had chosen for Muslims to follow. *Fiqh* has been one of the best methods to protect Islamic Law from falsification by making the components of God's *Sharī'a* known to and understood by most people. It was also crucial in avoiding the deviation from the Islamic way of life by the community through the continuous provision of religious opinion in answer to new problems and questions.

Another reason is that it was the solution to the conflict and disputation between the two Islamic approaches that appeared in the first century AH. The

<sup>6</sup> Abū Ishāq al-Shirāzī, *al-Luma' fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-d Halabī, Cairo, 1957, p.3.

<sup>7</sup> *Mawsū'at Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāsir fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*, Vol.1, p.11.

<sup>8</sup> Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, p.1.

two approaches were represented by *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* (the people of Tradition or simply the Traditionists), and *Ahl al-Ra'y* (the people of reason). The former approach was based on Tradition putting texts before ideas and reason, whereas *Ahl al-Ra'y* were strong believers in *Ijtihād* and the role of reason and logic in extracting decisions. *uṣūl al fiqh* was needed because it provided clear guidelines for the use of religious texts and principles.<sup>9</sup>

The *Fiqh* intervened to solve this conflict by setting out general rules for *ijtihād* and extraction of ideas by determining methods that should be used by the *Fuqahā'*. As a result, *fiqh* developed methods of studying divergence between various *fuqahā'* and *mujtahidīn*. Differences were explained as a natural development of *ijtihād* since all those who differed were seeking victory for Islam. It came to be generally accepted by scholars that *fiqh* is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a method which helps us to know the rules set up by God.

It is held that the religious science of *uṣūl al fiqh* was first developed by al-Shāfi'ī,<sup>10</sup> and that he was the main inspiration behind the unification of the two schools mentioned earlier. He was the founder of the general method of *Istinbāt* (deduction). Coulson calls him the 'Master Architect'.<sup>11</sup> Other sources mention other possibilities such as the Ḥanbalite Abū Yūsuf (d. 182 AH/798 AD), al-Shaybānī (d. 189 AH/805 AD), and even Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150 AH/767 AD), to whom they attribute *Kitāb al-Ra'y*.<sup>12</sup> al-Juwaynī was one of the scholars

<sup>9</sup> Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, p.4.

<sup>10</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, Idārat Ihya' al-Turāth al-Islāmī, Qatar, 1985, p.36; Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī, *al-Umm*, Dār al-Ma'rifa, Beirut, 1973, Intro. p.2; al-Bayhaqī, Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusayn, *Manāqib al-Shāfi'ī*, ed. al-Sayyid Aḥmad Ṣaqr, Dār al-urāth, Cairo, 1971, Vol.1, p.268; Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, p.4.

<sup>11</sup> N.J. Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law*, Eidinburgh University Press, Eidinburgh, 1978, p.53.

<sup>12</sup> Muḥammad Hamidullah (ed.), introd. to *Kitāb al-Mu'tamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* by Abū al-Ḥusayn Ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Baṣrī, al-Ma'had al-'Ilmī al-Firansī li

who were inspired by al-Shāfi'ī in this field. His main work in the science of *fiqh* was *al-Burhān*. This book is considered as one of the most important books dealing with *'Ilm uṣūl al-fiqh*.<sup>13</sup>

The scope of *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* is diverse. By looking at the description of *fiqh* and its main concern, *'Ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* deals with the roots and origins of Islamic law with all its branches: legal decisions, comparison between proofs and origins, the rules of extraction from the Qur'ān and the Sunna, and *ijtihād* and its requirements and conditions.

al-Juwaynī dealt with *uṣūl al-fiqh* in many of his books. Some of his books were general like *al-Burhān*, *al-Irshād fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, and *al-Tuhfa*, while others were more specific to certain areas such as *Kitāb al-Mujtahidīn*.<sup>14</sup> In his work, al-Juwaynī used the Shāfi'ī approach by concentrating on both rational and textual proofs. This is very clear in *al-Burhān* through a discussion of past arguments and the justification of his own, basing his style mainly on sophisticated and rhyming language. The effect of Kalam on al-Juwaynī is quite apparent in this book. In the introduction of *al-Burhān* al-Juwaynī summarised his approach as "to determine the sought objective", in other words, making it clear what the aim is, providing the terminology used in discussions with an unambiguous definition, presenting various views with their arguments in order to choose the most appropriate, maintaining freedom from any prejudice developed before research or any bias to any school or any idea, and keeping total objectivity in discussing the views of challengers<sup>15</sup>

One can assert, here, that al-Juwaynī was keen to establish a clear method-

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al-Dirāsāt al-'Arabiyyah, Damascus, 1965, Vol.2, p.8.

<sup>13</sup> Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, p.8.

<sup>14</sup> al-Zuhaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, pp.167-172.

<sup>15</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.57.



ology as a way of reaching results and decisions in the field of *fiqh*. Our discussion will be based mainly on *al-Burhān* since it is the single most important book of al-Juwaynī concerning *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

Concerning methodology, al-Juwaynī concentrated on the collection of methods of the Shāfiʿī school. Dealing with the subject of *fiqh*, however, al-Juwaynī was well aware of what had been written on the subject. Most of his ideas were in line with the ideas of al-Shāfiʿī,<sup>16</sup> and his work was, and still is, used as a main source of Shāfiʿī orientation and thinking. This, however, does not mean that al-Juwaynī was not an independent *mujtahid*, as he differed from al-Shāfiʿī in many issues, as we shall see.<sup>17</sup> al-Juwaynī's book, *al-Durra al-Muḍiyya*, contains many examples of his independent *fiqh* views.<sup>18</sup>

According to al-Juwaynī, *uṣūl al-fiqh* are inspired by Kalam, or the knowledge of the world and science, in addition to awareness about the prophets and their miracles as a way of believing in the power of God. The second inspiration behind *uṣūl al-fiqh* is Arabic, or the knowledge of the exact meaning of words and expressions. The third element is *fiqh* itself, which is considered by al-Juwaynī as the heart of those *Uṣūl*. *Fiqh* is the language of the scholars of *Shariʿa* who are aware of the definite proofs. As al-Juwaynī puts it "*fiqh* is the awareness of the necessity and obligation to work (*ijtihād*) any time there is a doubt."<sup>19</sup>

According to al-Juwaynī, the sources of *fiqh* are its proofs,<sup>20</sup> in other words the text or demonstrations supporting juristic opinions. For al-Juwaynī these proofs are three: (i) revelation, (ii) consensus, and (iii) deduction based on rev-

<sup>16</sup> al-Zuḥaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, p.130.

<sup>17</sup> al-Zuḥaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, pp.130-131.

<sup>18</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Durra al-Muḍiyya*, Idārat Ihya' al-Turāth al-Islāmī, Qatar, 1986.

<sup>19</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.85.

<sup>20</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.85.



elation.<sup>21</sup> The first one includes the Qur'ān and the Tradition (*sunnah*), and the third one includes analogy (*qiyās*) and inference (*istidlāl*). However, since Tradition is a very important source and because it is classified by most Muslim scholars as an independent source, we may arrange the sources of jurisprudence into four main categories:

1. The Qur'ān.
2. The Tradition.
3. Consensus.
4. Deduction.

The above classification is the view of the vast majority of Muslim jurists and Uṣūliyyūn.<sup>22</sup> It is also similar to the classification of al-Shāfi'ī.<sup>23</sup>

What follows is a brief account on the view of al-Juwaynī with regard to the above sources.

### 3.2.1. The Qur'ān.

Like al-Shāfi'ī, and in contradistinction to the majority of fuqahā', al-Juwaynī considers both the Qur'ān and the Sunnah as one and calls them revelation (*nuṭq al-Shāri'*) and defends his position by arguing that they were both transmitted by the Prophet.<sup>24</sup> He also sometimes calls it the proof (*al-Bayān*), in agreement with his Imām al-Shāfi'ī.<sup>25</sup> However, he disagrees with his Imām (and other scholars) and suggests a new classification which linked the importance of

<sup>21</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.562.

<sup>22</sup> *Mawsū'at Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāsir fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*, Vol.1, p.17.

<sup>23</sup> al-Jundī, 'Abd al-Halīm, *al-Imām al-Shāfi'ī*, Lajnat al-Ta'rīf bi al-Islām, Cairo, 1969, pp.274-294; Seeman, Khalil I., *Ash-Shafi'i's Risalah: Basic Ideas*, SH Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1974, pp.16-30.

<sup>24</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.177. Some call both the Qur'ān and the Tradition *al-Wahay*, *Mawsū'at Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāsir fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*, Vol.1, p.17.

<sup>25</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.76.

*al-Bayān* to the degree of certainty that it came from the Prophet.<sup>26</sup> Thus, the more certain we are about a text from the Prophet, the more important that text should be to the jurists. Although al-Juwaynī does not specifically mention this, it immediately follows that the Qur'ān is more important than the Sunnah since the degree of certainty is far greater with the Qur'ān.<sup>27</sup>

al-Juwaynī mentions the importance of Arabic for any jurist. Since *al-bayān* is in Arabic, it is crucial for any *faqīh* to master the Arabic language.<sup>28</sup>

We may understand from this requirement that obtaining a text is not sufficient even if we are certain of its truth. What is needed is the tools to understand such text. This is why al-Juwaynī gives the element of language a great importance in his book *al-Burhān*. In what follows we shall give a brief account of the rules linked to the element of language as described in *al-Burhān*, with special attention to his original contribution.

#### 1. The General (*al-ʿĀmm*) and the Specific (*al-Khāṣṣ*).

A general expression is one whose meaning cannot be limited to a specific case, time or place. The meaning of the specific is evident.

There is no consensus as to what a general expression can mean. However, before al-Juwaynī, there were four main views, one of which was due to al-Shāfiʿī and the Muʿtazilites.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>26</sup> 'Abd al-ʿAzīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.77-78.

<sup>27</sup> This is specifically acknowledged in most books. See for example: *Mawsūʿat Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāsir fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*, Vol.1, p.18; Abū al-Walid al-Bājī, *Aḥkām al-Fuṣūl fī Aḥkām al-Uṣūl*, p.40; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī ʿIlm Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, Vol.1, p.169.

<sup>28</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.169.

<sup>29</sup> 'Abd al-ʿAzīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.80; al-Jundī, *al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī*, pp.276-279; Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, eds. Muḥammad Bakr and Ḥasan Ḥanafī, al-Maʿhad al-ʿIlmī al-Faransī li al-Dirāsāt al-ʿArabīyyah, Damascus, 1964, Vol.1, pp.201-204.

al-Juwaynī criticizes his predecessors in their attempt to give meaning of the general expressions as a whole. Instead, he suggests dividing the general expressions into four groups or levels.<sup>30</sup>

*First Level:*

The expressions which have the clearest meaning and whose understanding cannot be changed even after questioning, revising, interpreting, attempting to specify a particular expression, and comparing it to other supporting evidence.<sup>31</sup> This is what al-Juwaynī calls *al-naṣṣ*.

*Second Level:*

The expressions which are linguistically general and which are accepted as general in the absence of supporting evidence to the contrary.<sup>32</sup>

*Third Level:*

The expressions which have a general meaning but which can be specific if there is no evidence to support their generality.<sup>33</sup>

*Fourth Level:*

This is the verbal noun and is the least general expression as it is neither specific nor can it be understood to be general.<sup>34</sup>

Unfortunately, al-Juwaynī does not discuss the authority (*ḥujjiyya*) of the general. Nevertheless, we can still deduce that what he calls a text (*naṣṣ*) is considered as an irrefutable proof and has full authority. This is because a text to al-Juwaynī has a certain source and is absolutely unambiguous.

<sup>30</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.327-328.

<sup>31</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.328.

<sup>32</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.330.

<sup>33</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.333.

<sup>34</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.333.

In regard to the exception, al-Juwaynī gives us two new views. The first is that the sentence containing the exception should not be separate from the sentence subject to the exception. In this he not only contradicts most jurists, but also the famous companion Ibn 'Abbās.<sup>35</sup> In the second view, al-Juwaynī differs with and criticises other scholars including al-Shāfi'ī.<sup>36</sup> In this second case there is a sentence with several components linked by 'and'. Then, according to some scholars the exception applies to all components, while the Shāfi'ites apply the exception to the last component only. al-Juwaynī rejects both views and maintains that there is no given rule which can be applied to all cases. He suggests that the understanding of the exception should be carried out on a case by case basis.<sup>37</sup>

In a third case of exception, al-Juwaynī sides with the Ḥanafites in rejecting the exception when it is of a different type (*jins*) from the subject of exception.<sup>38</sup> Regarding the specific, al-Juwaynī finds himself in total agreement with his predecessors.<sup>39</sup>

## 2. The Absolute (*al-Muṭlaq*) and the Conditioned (*al-Muqayyad*).

The absolute is an expression which has the widest meaning in its class, while the conditioned is an expression which has a condition that limits its wide sense. There is no disagreement here except when there is a difference between the absolute and the conditioned. Once again, al-Juwaynī disagrees with both the Ḥanafites and the Shāfi'ites.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>35</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.385-386.

<sup>36</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.388-391.

<sup>37</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.389-394.

<sup>38</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.396.

<sup>39</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.97.

<sup>40</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.433-439.



### 3. The Common (*al-Mushtarak*).

The common is an expression which can have different meanings in different contexts. In this concern, he also differs from al-Shāfi'ī and links the understanding of the common with additional supporting evidence. That is, one cannot understand the common properly without looking at the whole text in which the expression was written.<sup>41</sup>

### 4. The Command (*al-Amr*).

This is an expression which requires the ordered to do what was demanded.<sup>42</sup> al-Juwaynī does not accept the views of al-Ash'arī, al-Shāfi'ī and others regarding the form which a command should take.<sup>43</sup> In maintaining that a command can only be compulsory if it is supported by a warning against not doing it, he sides with the Mu'tazilites, as he makes clear.<sup>44</sup> al-Juwaynī also hold a similar view to the Mu'tazilites in that a command does not imply the prohibition of its opposite.<sup>45</sup>

In another related matter, al-Juwaynī rejects both the view that the absolute command is to be carried out only once and the view that it is to be carried out repeatedly. He answers the objection that he has rejected two opposite views and that there is no middle view by saying:

"The absolute form [of a command] necessitates obedience. It has to be carried out once. However, for more than that, I can neither maintain nor deny it. It all depends on the evidence that comes with it (*al-Qarīna*)."<sup>46</sup>

<sup>41</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.328-332.

<sup>42</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.203.

<sup>43</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.212-215,220.

<sup>44</sup> Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Kitāb al-Mu'tamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, pp.49-51; al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.112.

<sup>45</sup> Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, p.143.

<sup>46</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.229.

### 5. The Prohibition (*al-Nahy*).

As far as this is concerned al-Juwaynī does not say anything new. In *al-Burhān* he contents himself with refuting the views of the Mu'tazilites and the Ḥanafites.

### 6. What is Understood (*al-Mafhūm*).

*al-Mafhūm* is what can be understood from an expression.<sup>46</sup> On this subject al-Juwaynī joins the Shāfi'ites against the Ḥanafites. He reiterates al-Shāfi'ī's division of *al-Mafhūm* and discusses the views of al-Ash'arī and al-Bāqillānī without taking any position.<sup>47</sup> However, he differs from al-Shāfi'ī in the conditions which al-Shāfi'ī posits<sup>48</sup>

### 7. The Text (*al-Naṣṣ*) and the Apparent (*al-Zāhir*).

These measure the degree of clarity of meaning of expressions. In regard to this al-Juwaynī gives a completely different categorisation from his predecessors.<sup>49</sup> He even gives a different definition to the word *al-naṣṣ*.<sup>50</sup>

### 8. The Interpretation (*al-Ta'wīl*).

al-Juwaynī accepts the principle of interpretation but sides with the Shāfi'ites in the details.<sup>51</sup>

## 3.2.2. The Tradition.

The Tradition is what has been proven to have been said, done or approved by the Prophet. Obviously, the rules discussed in the previous sub-section apply to both the Qur'ān and the verbal Tradition.

<sup>46</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.448.

<sup>47</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.449-451.

<sup>48</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.453.

<sup>49</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiḥ Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.136.

<sup>50</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.329.

<sup>51</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.511-516.

al-Juwaynī only discusses the Active Tradition (*Sunnah Fi'liyya*) and the Tacitly Approved Tradition (*Sunnah Taqrīriyya*).<sup>52</sup> As we saw earlier, al-Juwaynī considers both the Qur'ān and the verbal Tradition together as *al-Bayān*. In his discussion of both kinds of tradition, al-Juwaynī defends the Shāfi'ite view.<sup>53</sup>

One of the most important subjects related to the Tradition is the authenticity of the *ḥadīth* or *khābar* (message). al-Juwaynī divides messages into three logical categories: (i) those which are absolutely true, (ii) those which are absolutely false, and (iii) those which are neither.<sup>54</sup> The first category includes the most authentic *ḥadīths*, namely: *al-khābar al-mutawātir*. Once again, al-Juwaynī differs from all scholars and does not require a large number of transmitting persons for a message to be successive (*mutawātir*). This agrees with the view of Ibn Qudāmah who does not require a specific number.<sup>55</sup> However, some scholars such as al-Bājī require a minimum of four,<sup>56</sup> possibly linking this number to the minimum witnesses required for adultery cases. Some scholars set the number variably at 12, 20, 40, 70 or 313.<sup>57</sup> For al-Juwaynī the main thing is the supporting evidence (*al-qarā'in*) that comes with it.<sup>58</sup> al-Juwaynī also stands alone in maintaining that the successive message does not lead to necessary knowledge. His prominent student, al-Ghazālī, seems to have taken this view from him.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>52</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.487-502.

<sup>53</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.489-498.

<sup>54</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.583.

<sup>55</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sa'īd, *Ibn Qudāmah wa Āthāruhu al-Uṣūliyyah*, Jāmi'at al-Imām Muḥammad Ibn Sa'd al-Islāmiyyah, Riyadh, 1987, Vol.2, p.97.

<sup>56</sup> Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī, *Aḥkām al-Fuṣūl fī Aḥkām al-Uṣūl*, p.323.

<sup>57</sup> The number of 70 is based on a story about the followers of Moses while 313 represents the number of Muslim fighters in the battle of Badr. Wael B. Hallaq, "On Inductive Corroboration, Probability and Certainty in Sunnī Legal Thought", in *Islamic Law and Jurisprudence*, (ed.) Nicholas Heer, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1990, p.11.

<sup>58</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.574.

<sup>59</sup> Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī 'Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, Vol.2, p.110.



It is worth noting that most traditionists concentrate on the classification based on the transmission (*ṣanad*) such as *ṣaḥīḥ* (true), *ḥasan* (good), and *ḍaʿīf* (weak). They spend less effort on analysing the content (*matn*) of a given *Ḥadīth*. It is clear that for the third category mentioned above, al-Juwaynī, like al-Shīrāzī, sees the necessity of looking into the contents of the *Ḥadīth* before accepting its authority.<sup>60</sup> This clearly indicates that the judgement on whether or not a *Ḥadīth* is *mutawātir* is very subjective and difficult. However, with the help of supporting evidence, al-Juwaynī seems to assert that one can reach a degree of certainty beyond reasonable doubt. Here again one finds the problem of differing opinions. It is always possible that some of the scholars accept a Tradition as successive while others do not.

The third category includes the individual message (*ḵabar al-āḥād*). For al-Juwaynī, even if the message was transmitted through more than one person, the message will not be considered as successive if it has not fulfilled its conditions. Since one is not absolutely sure about the individual message, one should be technically free to abide by it or refuse to do so.<sup>61</sup> However, based on the practice of Muslims since the early days of Islam, al-Juwaynī accepts that Muslims should accept the authority of individual messages.<sup>62</sup> This same category also includes *al-ḵabar al-mustafīḍ*. This kind of message has been suggested by one of al-Juwaynī's teachers, al-Isfarāyīnī, who says that this is a middle category between the successive message and the individual message. al-Juwaynī

<sup>60</sup> 'Abd al-Majīd Turkī (ed.), *Aḥkām al-Fuṣūl fī Aḥkām al-Uṣūl*, by Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī, Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, Beirut, 1986, p.25.

<sup>61</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.599.

<sup>62</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.599. This is unanimously accepted by the four Sunnī schools. See Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī, *Aḥkām al-Fuṣūl fī Aḥkām al-Uṣūl*, p.330; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī 'Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, Vol.2, p.170.



rejects this view and seems to include it with the individual message.<sup>63</sup> Finally, in *al-ḥadīth al-mursal*, al-Juwaynī takes a middle position between the Shāfi'ite views and other schools. While al-Shāfi'ī rejects categorically the authority of *al-mursal*, al-Juwaynī takes the view that some of the ḥadīths may be accepted while others should be rejected.<sup>64</sup>

### 3.2.3. Abrogation (*al-Naskh*).

This subject is linked to both the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. It basically concerns cases where two or more texts conflict with each other, which means that one text should abrogate the other(s). There is agreement on the cases where the authenticity and date of the texts is known.<sup>65</sup> However, in other cases preference should be given to one of them and this is called *al-Tarjih* (preference).

In many cases, al-Juwaynī sides with al-Shāfi'ī.<sup>66</sup> However, we also find that here al-Juwaynī has several original suggestions. For example, he sees that the text which was transmitted by a more trustworthy person should be preferred to another text even if it were transmitted by more than one person.<sup>67</sup> Another important view advanced by al-Juwaynī is his equating of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. Thus when it came to the question of preference between the two, al-Juwaynī argues that they both come from the same source and thus the main focus should be on the authenticity of the Sunnah.<sup>68</sup> This means that a successive ḥadīth will have the same strength as a Qur'anic verse. Here he gives a different

<sup>63</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.442-443.

<sup>64</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.632-637.

<sup>65</sup> Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī, *Aḥkām al-Fuṣūl fī Aḥkām al-Uṣūl*, p.391; Abū Ishāq al-Shirāzī, *al-Luma' fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, p.30; 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sa'id, *Ibn Qudāmah wa Āthāruhu al-Uṣūliyyah*, Vol.2, p.73.

<sup>66</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.1178-1181.

<sup>67</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.1168.

<sup>68</sup> Since it is known that the Qur'ān has the highest authenticity. al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.1186-1187.

view from al-Shāfi'ī who says that the Sunnah does not abrogate the Qur'ān.<sup>69</sup>

al-Juwaynī seems to be aware of some cases where the Sunnah abrogated the Qur'ān, as in the case of stoning.<sup>70</sup> This is contrary to the general framework of al-Shāfi'ī, who rejects the possibility that the Qur'ān and the Sunnah may abrogate each other.<sup>71</sup>

By rejecting the view of al-Shāfi'ī, al-Juwaynī sides with many of the Mālikites who agree that a Tradition can cancel a Qur'ānic verse.<sup>72</sup> al-Juwaynī's view also opposes the view of Ibn Ḥanbal,<sup>73</sup> and his view was later followed by another Shāfi'īte, al-Rāzī,<sup>74</sup> as well as other Ḥanbalites and Mu'tazilites theologians.<sup>75</sup>

#### 3.2.4. Consensus (*al-Ijmā'*).

Consensus is the second most important source of jurisprudence after *al-bayān*. Like al-Shāfi'ī, al-Juwaynī gives *al-ijmā'* a very important role as a source of fiqh. <sup>76</sup> He sees it exemplified in three main themes. The first theme is the conclusion of *ijmā'*. This is needed to answer those who claimed the impossibility of reaching *ijmā'* after the expansion of the Islamic state and the difficulty of communication between different scholars, especially after the appearance of

<sup>69</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.224; al-Jundī, *al-Imām al-Shāfi'ī*, pp.282-283.

<sup>70</sup> John Burton, *An Introduction to the Hadith*, Eidinburgh University Press, Eidinburgh, 1994, p.114.

<sup>71</sup> Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law*, p.58.

<sup>72</sup> Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī, *Aḥkām al-Fuṣūl fī Aḥkām al-Uṣūl*, p.417.

<sup>73</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sa'īd, *Ibn Qudāmah wa Āthāruhu al-Uṣūliyyah*, Vol.2, pp.84-85.

<sup>74</sup> Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī 'Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, Vol.1, p.555.

<sup>75</sup> Abū al-Ḥusayn Ibn al-Tayyib al-Baṣrī, *Kitāb al-Mu'tamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (ed.) Muḥammad Ḥamidullah, al-Ma'had al-'Ilmī al-Firansī li al-Dirāsāt al-'Arabiyyah, Dammas, 1965, Vol.1, pp.424-425.

<sup>76</sup> al-Jundī, *al-Imām al-Shāfi'ī*, p.302.

different sects and interpretations. al-Juwaynī rejects such claims and sees the conclusion of *ijmāʿ* as a possibility. However, he does not give any strong argument to justify his opinion and contents himself with reporting the argument of al-Bāqillānī.<sup>77</sup> al-Rāzī discusses this issue at length and agrees with al-Juwaynī.

<sup>78</sup> It is worth noting that the Shāfiʿites accept consensus from any generation, while the Zāhirites, like Dāwūd Ibn Khalaf (d. 280 AH/883 AD) and Ibn Ḥazm only accept the consensus of the Companions which is based on a text and reject all other kinds of consensus. The Ḥanbalites, like Ibn Taymiyah (d. 728 AH/1328 AD), accept consensus from both the Companions and the generations who came after them, but they take the view that only the consensus of the Companions is infallible. The Mālekites, like al-Bājī (d. 874 AH/1481 AD), accept all kinds of consensus, while the Muʿtazilites, like al-Nazzām (d. 230 AH/844 AD), reject the possibility of consensus. <sup>79</sup> The second theme is the fact that *ijmāʿ* is an argument if it is reached. Although he agrees that Consensus is a justification if it is reached, as opposed to the Muʿtazilites and the Shiʿites,<sup>80</sup> he differs from most of his fellow Sunnites in the way they argue for it. He rejects the use of a Qurʾānic verse by al-Shāfiʿ<sup>81</sup> on the basis that it is liable to different interpretation. He also rejects the use of some Traditions on the basis that they are āḥād (individual) and not successive Traditions. His own way to prove that consensus is binding is through reasoning.<sup>82</sup> Other scholars contented themselves with using the verses and Traditions to argue that the Muslim nation

<sup>77</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.673-674.

<sup>78</sup> Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī ʿIlm Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, Vol.2, pp.3-61.

<sup>79</sup> ʿAbd al-Majīd Turkī (ed.), *Aḥkām al-Fuṣūl fī Aḥkām al-Uṣūl*, by Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī, pp.35,47-50.

<sup>80</sup> Abū Ishāq al-Shirāzī, *al-Lumaʿ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, p.48.

<sup>81</sup> The same verse is used by other scholars.

<sup>82</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.675-682.



cannot have a wrong consensus.<sup>83</sup> The third theme is the confirmation of *ijmā'* and the ways to reach it through tradition and reason. However, al-Juwaynī is very brief and unconvincing.<sup>84</sup> He divides *ijmā'* into three main subjects: (i) the number of *mujmi'in* (those who took part in the *ijmā'*) and their characteristics, (ii) the time considered in *ijmā'*, (iii) and the methods of *ijmā'*.

In regard to the first subject, al-Juwaynī does not consider that commoners can take part in the *ijmā'*.<sup>85</sup> Like al-Shāfi'ī and contrary to al-Bāqillānī, al-Juwaynī insists that "there is no say to anyone who has not reached the position of a *mujtahid*".<sup>86</sup> Since imitation and hesitation are not allowed in *ijmā'*, commoners are not suited to take part.<sup>87</sup> In addition to that, non-religious people, even if they are in the position of *ijtihād*, would not be allowed to take part, since good behaviour is a necessity. Also, non-Muslims, slaves and women are not allowed to participate in *ijmā'*.<sup>88</sup> Thus, a *mujmi'* should be a *mujtahid*, a Muslim with good qualities, male and free.<sup>89</sup> However, al-Juwaynī disagrees with those who limit consensus to the Companions of the Prophet only.<sup>90</sup> This is the

<sup>83</sup> Abū al-Walid al-Bājī, *Aḥkām al-Fuṣūl fī Aḥkām al-Uṣūl*, pp.435-438; 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sa'īd, *Ibn Qudāmah wa Āthāruhu al-Uṣūliyyah*, Vol.2, pp.130-134.

<sup>84</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.683.

<sup>85</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.784.

<sup>86</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.787; al-Jundī, *al-Imām al-Shāfi'ī*, p.302; Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, p.173.

<sup>87</sup> This is the view of the majority of scholars as reported in 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sa'īd, *Ibn Qudāmah wa Āthāruhu al-Uṣūliyyah*, Vol.2, p.135. See also Abū al-Walid al-Bājī, *Aḥkām al-Fuṣūl fī Aḥkām al-Uṣūl*, p.459; Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī, *al-Luma' fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, pp.50-52.

<sup>88</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.789.

<sup>89</sup> An interesting view here is given by al-Shīrāzī who is Shāfi'īte. While he accepts that a *fāsiq* can take part in consensus (if he has the ability), he rejects commoners, theologians and *uṣūliyyūn* as qualified enough to be part of consensus. Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī, *al-Luma' fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, pp.50-51. Al-Rāzī agrees with the last part. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī 'Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, Vol.2, p.93.

<sup>90</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.720-721.



view of the Zāhirītes who only accept the consensus of the Companions based on a text.<sup>91</sup> The number of *mujmi*'s has not been agreed upon, and al-Juwaynī does not give a clear answer in this matter.<sup>92</sup> Ibn Qudāmah takes the view that they need to reach the number of *tawātur*. Some scholars argue that they could be as few as one, as in the case of Abū Bakr during the *Riddah* crisis. Others require at least four.<sup>93</sup>

The second subject is time which, according to al-Juwaynī, is a source of conflict and difference of opinion in questions such as whether to consider the consensus of *mujtahidīn* who have been replaced by others or whether the *ijmā'* of *mujtahidīn* who had died should be annulled. al-Juwaynī believes that if *ijmā'* was reached in normal circumstances it should not be annulled.<sup>94</sup> But if *ijmā'* was reached on the basis that one of the scholars expressed his opinion while all other Ulamas remained silent, this type of *ijmā'* would be annulled after the death of the parties taking part in it.<sup>95</sup> al-Juwaynī's own opinion is that there are two types of *ijmā'*. The first one is that which is immediately applicable because of the consensus to execute it, even if it was doubtful.<sup>96</sup> The second one is classified as the consent on a decision with an acknowledgement of a hesitation in its source; this is not considered *ijmā'* by al-Juwaynī.<sup>97</sup>

The third subject is the conclusion of *ijmā'* itself. This, according to al-

<sup>91</sup> Abū Ishāq al-Shirāzī, *al-Luma' fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, p.50.

<sup>92</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.690-691.

<sup>93</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Sa'īd, *Ibn Qudāmah wa Āthāruhu al-Uṣūliyyah*, Vol.2, p.93; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī 'Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, p.51.

<sup>94</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.694-696. This is also the view of some Mālekites. Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī, *Aḥkām al-Fuṣūl fī Aḥkām al-Uṣūl*, p.467.

<sup>95</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.694. This seems to be the view of the Shāfi'ites. Abū Ishāq al-Shirāzī, *al-Luma' fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, p.51.

<sup>96</sup> Ibn Ḥanbal and most Shāfi'ites see it as *Ijmā'*. 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Sa'īd, *Ibn Qudāmah wa Āthāruhu al-Uṣūliyyah*, Vol.2, p.151.

<sup>97</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.694.

Juwaynī, has been the subject of many conflicting views and opinions between Islamic schools. A particular subject of difference was the situation where the scholars did not reject a doubtful decision and so there were different opinions as to whether it could be accepted as *ijmā'*. According to the Shāfi'ī school, a doubtful decision could not be accepted as *ijmā'*, whereas the Ḥanafī school looks on it as a valid *ijmā'*. al-Juwaynī rejects the Ḥanafī standpoint by claiming that the reaching of *ijmā'* could not be based on *al-Qiyās* (analogy),<sup>98</sup> thus rejecting the Ḥanafī view, which gives to the silence of the Ulamas the same importance as the silence of the Prophet in hearing any opinion. al-Juwaynī defends the Shāfi'ī school by saying that the silent (scholar) does not have a say.<sup>99</sup>

One of al-Juwaynī's most original views in this matter is his solution to the question where two groups of scholars had two different opinions and then one group joined the other. al-Juwaynī, however, considers the length of time of such disagreement. If the time of disagreement was short the agreement will amount to consensus. On the other hand, if the disagreement continues for a long period of time, then both views would have the authority of opinion (*ijtihād*).<sup>100</sup> Another important objection by al-Juwaynī to the majority of jurists is that the one who rejects consensus becomes an unbeliever.<sup>101</sup>

It is apparent from the above description of *ijmā'* according to al-Juwaynī that this source of fiqh is looked on as a very important component in fiqh, as it is the expression and the explanation of the Qur'ān and the Sunna through an agreement in *ijtihād* and deduction by all scholars.

<sup>98</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.699.

<sup>99</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.701; Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, p.186.

<sup>100</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.712.

<sup>101</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.724. This is also the view of al-Rāzī. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī 'Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, Vol.2, p.98.

### 3.2.5. Analogy (*al-Qiyās*) and Inference (*Istidlāl*).

These represent the fourth source of fiqh which al-Juwaynī calls *masālik al-istinbāṭ* (deduction).

The importance of analogy in fiqh has been known to all Muslim scholars. al-Juwaynī devotes a big part of his book *al-Burhān* to the subject of analogy. In his definition, al-Juwaynī presents analogy as the essence of *ijtihād* which is the source of opinion, fiqh and methods of *Sharī'a*.<sup>102</sup> However, al-Juwaynī believes that analogy is only complementary to the main sources of fiqh mentioned earlier (Qur'ān, Sunna and consensus). al-Juwaynī takes reason and Tradition as both equally important in the formulation of analogy.<sup>103</sup> It is clear that al-Juwaynī believes that *Qiyās* is a valid argument (*ḥujjah*), which is the view of the majority of Muslim scholars.<sup>104</sup> The exception are the *Zāhirītes*, such as Ibn Ḥazm, who rejects *qiyās* in favour of logic, which he defends and uses extensively.<sup>105</sup>

When dealing with the importance of *qiyās* as a source of fiqh al-Juwaynī explores the possibility of adding it to the main sources through *ahl al-'aqd wa al-ḥall*. al-Juwaynī debates the ideas of those who reject analogy by looking at it as a rejection of the Islamic law. He argues in favour of *qiyās* by showing that in case of conflict and indecision when a clear text is lacking, the return to analogy is wiser. al-Juwaynī strongly rejects the idea that analogy is not accepted by the Qur'ān. The validity of *qiyās* is quite obvious to al-Juwaynī, since scholars (including the companions of the Prophet) despite their differences agreed on

<sup>102</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.743.

<sup>103</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.1202.

<sup>104</sup> Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī, *Aḥkām al-Fuṣūl fī Aḥkām al-Uṣūl*, p.547; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī 'Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, Vol.2, p.246.

<sup>105</sup> 'Abd al-Majīd Turkī (ed.), *Aḥkām al-Fuṣūl fī Aḥkām al-Uṣūl*, by Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī, pp.66-67.



the importance of *qiyās*.<sup>106</sup>

Once again, al-Juwaynī does not side with any particular trend. It is apparent that his own views are influenced by his principle of looking for supporting evidence in order to make a judgement on a question of analogy. On this basis, al-Juwaynī differs on many issues with al-Shāfi'ī and other scholars.<sup>107</sup>

To al-Juwaynī inference is a weaker source. It is used to reach a decision by reason and without being supported by the main sources (Qur'ān and Sunnah).<sup>108</sup> Thus, *istidlāl* can be defined as any kind of demonstration other than *bayān*, consensus or analogy. Since the time of al-Juwaynī, *al-istidlāl* has become to be known as *al-Maṣāliḥ al-Mursalāh* (people's interests). This is not far from what he used as a second term, namely *al-Istislāḥ*.<sup>109</sup> However, al-Juwaynī only accepts it if it does not conflict with the spirit of the three main sources.<sup>110</sup>

When discussing the disagreement about *al-istidlāl*, al-Juwaynī cites three opinions on the subject. The first is its negation except for taking only those senses which are supported by a source; this is the view of al-Bāqillānī.<sup>111</sup> The second is the opinion of al-Imām Mālik who accepts *al-istidlāl* if it is not in conflict with, or rejected by the Qur'ān, the Sunna and consensus.<sup>112</sup> The third opinion represents the position of al-Shāfi'ī and a number of Ḥanafī scholars who advocate the possibility of keeping the sense even if it did not rely on a source, with the condition that it should be close to the senses of the three sources of

<sup>106</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.768-770. al-Bājī gives many examples of companions using *qiyās*. Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī, *Aḥkām al-Fuṣūl fī Aḥkām al-Uṣūl*, pp.552-624.

<sup>107</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.809,820-823,826,832,1080-1087.

<sup>108</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.1113.

<sup>109</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiḥ Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.262; Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, p.267.

<sup>110</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.1121-1122.

<sup>111</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.1114.

<sup>112</sup> Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, p.271.



fiqh.<sup>113</sup> As a Shāfi'ī scholar, al-Juwaynī sides with the third opinion of conditional acceptance.<sup>114</sup>

In this regard, al-Juwaynī's main criticism was directed at Mālik who accepts inference without condition.<sup>115</sup>

In brief, al-Juwaynī is totally against any use of inference in the presence of any of the four preceeding principles. He strongly objected to increasing punishments beyond what was prescribed by the Sharī'ah on the basis of public interest.<sup>116</sup>

According to al-Juwaynī, therefore, *al-istidlāl* is quite different in its essence from *qiyās*. The latter is based on the proofs of the *Sharī'a* (the Qur'ān, the Sunna and consensus), while the former is based on interest only.

### 3.3. al-Juwaynī and Jurisprudence (*al-Fiqh*).

al-Juwaynī was famous for his work and contribution to Kalām. He was also highly regarded in fiqh especially because he had the courage to diverge from his own Shāfi'īte school. He even dared to challenge the highest Sunni masters of Fiqh such as Mālik and Abū Ḥanīfa. His main principle in the search for opinion was the argument itself rather than who raised that argument.

His first contact with fiqh was through his father, and then his famous teacher al-Isfarāyīnī had a great impact on him.<sup>117</sup> His teachers, including his

<sup>113</sup> Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, p.277.

<sup>114</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.1114. For other views on *Istidlāl* see Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī, *Aḥkām al-Fuṣūl fī Aḥkām al-Uṣūl*, pp.672-677.

<sup>115</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.1119-1121; Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, p.271; Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law*, p.91.

<sup>116</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Ghiyāthī*, pp.219,225-227.

<sup>117</sup> al-Zuḥaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, p.73.

father, were Shāfi'ites and he was one of the most ardent defenders of his school. Yet he only defended what he believed was true. This is evident from his rejection and criticism of his own Shāfi'ī predecessors.

When he left his country for Baghdad and the Ḥijāz, al-Juwaynī took the opportunity to collect more information on the sayings of al-Shāfi'ī as well as the views of other Fiqh schools.<sup>118</sup> al-Juwaynī wrote many books in Fiqh. Unfortunately, most of these books are still in manuscript form. Amongst these books are *Risāla fī al-Fiqh* (manuscript), *al-Silsila fī Ma'rifat al-Qawlayn* (manuscript), *Nihāyat al-Maṭlab*<sup>119</sup> (manuscript), and *al-Durra al-Muḍiyya* (published).<sup>120</sup>

### 3.3.1. al-Juwaynī's Method in Fiqh.

This subsection is mainly based on the book of al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, which is a comprehensive study on the *Fiqh* of al-Juwaynī. We were unable to obtain al-Juwaynī's main book in *Fiqh*, *Nihāyat al-Maṭlab fī dirāyat al-Madhhab*, which contains a considerable amount of information. Moreover, al-Dīb's study is excellent and it will be unproductive to duplicate his work, especially since our study is mainly concerned with theology. We therefore limit our task to drawing the main conclusions from some examples cited in al-Dīb.

al-Juwaynī's methodology was characterised by two aspects. The first aspect was his care in collecting as much literature as possible. This was particularly true with the collection of his school's opinions.<sup>121</sup> The second aspect is his analysis of previous opinions and views. His particular approach was to carefully

<sup>118</sup> al-Zuhaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, p.123.

<sup>119</sup> This is his most important book in fiqh.

<sup>120</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Durra al-Muḍiyya*, Idārat Iḥyā' al-Turāth al-Islāmī, Qatar, 1986; For a complete list of his work see 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.50-70.

<sup>121</sup> al-Zuhaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, p.129.

examine arguments, compare and weigh conflicting views, and use his *kalām* tools of argumentation in *fiqh* questions.<sup>122</sup> In using reason, what he was after was the spirit of the sources of jurisprudence. He did not merely rely on the apparent meaning of the texts, he searched for their real meaning, especially the purpose and rationale behind them.<sup>123</sup> However, he only used reason where the texts may be subject to interpretation and when there is no text to support any opinion.

As we said earlier, although he was Shāfi'īte, al-Juwaynī did not always side with his school. Although he gave little weight to the importance of big names like Mālik or Abū Ḥanīfa when he thought they were wrong, he did declare his agreement with them in many cases. For example, he agreed with Abū Ḥanīfa in several questions regarding *i'tikāf*, *'umrah* and *ḥajj*.<sup>124</sup> He also sided with Mālik in an opinion about the proximity to the *Ḥaram*.<sup>125</sup>

In looking into *fiqh* questions, al-Juwaynī does his best to find a text as he believes that reason has limits in *fiqh*.<sup>126</sup> However, his main tool when there are conflicting views and/or texts is reason itself. This is obvious from his lengthy discussions on questions of *Fiqh*. One striking example of his respect for textual evidence is the view that sleeping in any situation cancels ablution. Although he made clear that he preferred this view based on reason, he rejected it because it contradicts a ḥadīth.<sup>127</sup> In another question relating to invocation *du'ā'* during prayer *ṣalāh*, al-Juwaynī rejects al-Shāfi'ī's objective view forbidding some kinds

<sup>122</sup> al-Zuḥaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, p.130.

<sup>123</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.319.

<sup>124</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Durra al-Muḍiyya*, pp.320,330,346.

<sup>125</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Durra al-Muḍiyya*, p.334.

<sup>126</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, p.307; al-Juwaynī, *al-Durra al-Muḍiyya*, (Introduction: p.102m).

<sup>127</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.294.



of *du'ā'* on the basis that the known ḥadīths do not limit the invocation.<sup>128</sup>

al-Juwaynī takes great care in looking for textual evidence before giving an opinion. In one instance, he saw his teacher raising his hands and then passing them over his face during *du'ā' al-Qunūt*. He went and asked many scholars of Tradition and failed to find any text supporting such an action. On this basis he rejected it.<sup>129</sup> Although al-Juwaynī was not a scholar of Ḥadīth, he had a vast knowledge about narrators, as can be seen in one of his books in which he shows his ability to compare the authenticity of several Ḥadīths, then giving his opinion on the basis of the strongest Tradition.<sup>130</sup>

al-Juwaynī did not hesitate to declare his inability to give an opinion when he found no textual evidence of the possibility of analogy and preference. For example, he criticised those who give a definite opinion on the question whether *al-basmalah* (the opening of each Qur'ānic chapter) is part of the Qur'ān or not.<sup>131</sup>

Finally, he only has recourse to personal opinion in the absence of textual evidence, as he did in the prayer of the sick.<sup>132</sup> When he gives a personal opinion we find that it is characterised by three main features. The first is that he tends to select the lenient options. This is based on the tradition that when the Prophet had to choose between two things he always took the most lenient. Examples of his lenient opinions can be found in al-Dīb's book.<sup>133</sup> The second is his respect for custom and tradition. He considers it amongst the supporting evidence which

<sup>128</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiḥ Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.297-298.

<sup>129</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiḥ Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.305.

<sup>130</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Durra al-Muḍīyya*, (Introduction: pp.104m-114m).

<sup>131</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiḥ Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.316-317.

<sup>132</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiḥ Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.317-318.

<sup>133</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiḥ Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.357-373.



we mentioned earlier in the chapter.<sup>134</sup> The third is giving precedence to the interest of society.<sup>135</sup>

### 3.3.2. al-Juwaynī's Contribution to Fiqh.

We have mentioned that al-Juwaynī wrote one of the most important books in Fiqh. Although his views were generally Shāfi'ite, he had many independent views. In what follows we provide some examples of his contribution in Fiqh opinions.

1. He rejects the widely accepted opinion that the Imām (*prayer leader*) is a follower of the *janāzah* (dead body), on the basis that the real meaning of the whole prayer is that the Imām and his followers are petitioners (*shufa'a*) to the dead rather than his or her followers.<sup>136</sup>

2. He rejects the opinions of Abū Ḥanīfa and al-Shāfi'ī regarding the *Tashahhud*,<sup>137</sup> choosing the Ḥadīth of Ibn 'Abbās rather than that of Ibn Mas'ūd on the basis of supporting evidence.<sup>138</sup>

3. He strongly criticised Yaḥyā bin Yaḥyā when he prescribed to the Emir of al-Andalus two months of fasting instead of freeing a slave for having sexual intercourse during a day of the fasting month of Ramadhan. Although the aim behind this opinion was to prescribe a difficult penalty, since the emir could easily free a slave, al-Juwaynī was very critical, arguing that the text is clear in its priority.<sup>139</sup>

<sup>134</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.374-391.

<sup>135</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.392-420.

<sup>136</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.299-300.

<sup>137</sup> A small prayer repeated after two *rakk'as* or at the end of the *ṣalāh*.

<sup>138</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.301.

<sup>139</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.313-314.

4. Regarding *tayammum* (purification using sand or stone etc.), he rejects the view that says that it is purifying as well as the view that says it is only limited to a specific duty determined by the person who is performing *tayammum*. al-Juwaynī's view is that *al-tayammum* does not purify a person, it is merely an authorisation to perform prayer and other sorts of worship.<sup>140</sup> By this he accepts that it has the same effect as ablution but is not purifying, since as soon as one can perform ablution it becomes mandatory.

5. He differed from other scholars in that what is required in prayer is the direction of the Ka'bah rather than the Ka'bah itself.<sup>141</sup> His argument was that it was impossible for the majority of people to determine the exact location of the Ka'bah and thus it is only possible to determine its approximate direction.

6. He does not see the need to put most of the front in *sujūd* as his predecessors required. He based his view on the argument that what is meant from prayer is submissiveness and that excessive pressure on the head may disrupt concentration.<sup>142</sup>

7. al-Shāfi'ī did not allow a certain way of wearing the *'ihrām* (pilgrim's cloth). But al-Juwaynī rejects this opinion on the basis that as long as it covers what it is supposed to cover it does not matter how it is put on.<sup>143</sup>

These are a few examples which show al-Juwaynī's contribution to Fiqh. More examples can be found in his books *al-Durra al-Muḍiyya*,<sup>144</sup> *Nihāyat al-Maṭlab*, and *al-Ghiyāthī*.

<sup>140</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.317-318.

<sup>141</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.327-328.

<sup>142</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.334.

<sup>143</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Fiqh Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.337.

<sup>144</sup> This book contains 358 juristic questions in which al-Juwaynī discusses the various views of Shāfi'ī and Ḥanbalī schools.

### 3.3.3. al-Juwaynī's Impact in Fiqh.

al-Juwaynī's most famous book in fiqh, *Nihāyat al-Maṭlab*, was known by most jurists and taken as a one of the main sources of Shāfi'ite fiqh. al-Imām al-Nawawī counts it as one of the four most important Shāfi' fiqh books.<sup>145</sup>

The most important and obvious impact al-Juwaynī had was on his student al-Ghazālī, who used al-Juwaynī's book *Nihāyat al-Maṭlab* as a basis for his own fiqh books.<sup>146</sup> Other scholars who benefited from the views of al-Juwaynī include al-Shāṭibī,<sup>147</sup> al-Āmidī,<sup>148</sup> and al-Subkī.<sup>149</sup>

Most of these were influenced through al-Ghazālī.<sup>150</sup>

His other important book, *al-Burhān*, also had a great impact. al-Subkī calls it the nation's enigma *lughz al-Umma*<sup>151</sup> while Sha'bān puts it at the head of the four most important books in the principles of fiqh.<sup>152</sup> Even the Mālikī jurists in North West Africa were interested in the book, as three known scholars wrote books explaining it.<sup>153</sup>

<sup>145</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.204.

<sup>146</sup> Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī, *al-Mustaṣfā*, al-Maṭba'ah al-Amīriyyah, Cairo, 1322 AH/1092 AD.

<sup>147</sup> Ibrāhīm ibn Mūsā al-Shāṭibī, *al-I'tiṣām*, al-Maktabah al-Tijāriyyah, Cairo, n.d.

<sup>148</sup> al-Āmidī, Abū al-Ḥasan, *al-Iḥkām fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām*, Maṭba'at al-Ma'ārif, Cairo, 1332 AH/1913 AD.

<sup>149</sup> al-Subkī, Tāj al-Dīn, *Jam' al-Jawāmi'*, al-Maṭba'ah al-Maymuniyyah, Cairo, 1285 AH.

<sup>150</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, pp.188-198.

<sup>151</sup> 'Abd al-'Azīm al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥaramayn*, p.202.

<sup>152</sup> Zakīy al-Dīn Sha'bān, *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, al-Maktabah al-Tijāriyyah bi Miṣr, Cairo, 1938, p.16.

<sup>153</sup> Abū Sa'īd al-Marwazī, *al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā*, Dār al-Taḥrīr, Cairo, n.d., Vol.5, p.192.

### 3.4. Conclusion.

As far as the interpretation and explanation of *uṣūl al-fiqh* are concerned, al-Juwaynī contributed greatly to the existing literature. He clarified the work of his predecessors, discussed it and then either selected the best view or advanced his own opinion when he thought none was correct.

However, although al-Juwaynī was a Shafi'ite, he diverted in many issues from al-Shāfi'ī. al-Juwaynī was writing on this subject in the Sunni, and more particularly in the Shāfi'ī tradition. However, he appears to have paid particular attention to rejecting opponents' views. This is most obvious in the case of the Mu'tazilites in some parts of *al-Burhān*, where his long justifications and criticism of them overwhelmed the subject he wrote on.<sup>154</sup>

He was one of the main scholars of his time to concentrate on *uṣūl al-fiqh* as a science and as the basis of *fiqh*. The events of his time influenced his approach, as the rise of different sects and interpretations of *fiqh* and its sources pushed al-Juwaynī to stick to the traditional sources and enhance them through a study and criticism of other schools. However, the esteem which al-Juwaynī gives to reason is quite apparent through his defence of *qiyās*. While maintaining the traditional supremacy of the text, he did not forget the importance of reasoning which, through analogy, could help in solving many unsolved questions in jurisprudence.

al-Juwaynī's most distinguished feature, however, was his use of supporting evidence (*al-Qarā'in*). This is extremely beneficial since many texts cannot be properly understood without having further information to support the apparent meaning. For instance, knowing the reason or the time in which the Prophet said or ordered something may tell us whether the text is general or specific.

<sup>154</sup> For example see: al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, pp.87,166,174,308,599.



Another contribution by al-Juwaynī is his use of middle ground solutions. Before him, scholars of *uṣūl al-fiqh* seem to have taken one of two opposite opinions. al-Juwaynī, however, argued in many places that the truth was somewhere in between. In other places, he showed that there were cases where the truth was with the first party while in other cases the truth was with the opposite party. This is very interesting, since the truth is not always black or white.

In *fiqh*, al-Juwaynī wrote one of the most important and famous books of his time. As with *uṣūl al-fiqh*, al-Juwaynī was independent to a great extent. It seems that only truth mattered to him, despite his recognition that he belonged to the Shāfiʿī school of *fiqh*.

Throughout his discussions, al-Juwaynī gives the first priority to textual evidence. Despite this, however, he seems to be affected by his knowledge of argumentation in *Kalām*. In his discussions, he proves himself not only in his strong argumentation but in his very deep knowledge of Ḥadīth.

## Chapter Four

### al-Juwaynī's Kalām

#### 4.1. Introduction.

This chapter reviews some essential aspects of kalām in al-Juwaynī's thought. It should be seen as an introduction to a more elaborate discussion on the attributes and other questions of faith which will be dealt with in subsequent chapters.

The shape and state of kalām as we know it today has been the result of a long, largely conflicting interaction between religion, politics and philosophy. At its height, Ash'arite kalām was in the middle of an intellectual and dogmatic war between two main movements. On the one hand we have those who put their trust wholly in revelation, and on the other hand those who oppose them and advocate reason and logic to be the main road towards the truth. Ash'arite kalām seems to have tried to befriend both tendencies by agreeing, in principle, with the former group and by using the main means used by the latter group, i.e. reason. One cannot study Ash'arite kalām without reflection on three main backgrounds, namely, historical, political and religious backgrounds.

By the time of the death of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Islamic state had already expanded beyond the borders of Arabia. The Prophet was succeeded by Abū Bakr who in turn was succeeded by 'Umar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, who ruled as a Caliph without any serious political problems. When the latter died, the area which was under Muslim control was so vast that it seems inevitable that

problems would occur. Indeed, serious problems occurred during the reign of 'Uthmān Ibn 'Affān, the third Caliph, which ended in his assassination. 'Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib was then elected as fourth Caliph, but Mu'āwiya, then governor of Damascus, did not recognise him<sup>1</sup> and a conflict began between Mu'āwiya and 'Alī. In 661 AH, 'Alī was murdered, leaving the way for the Umayyad dynasty. By that time Muslims were divided into three more or less distinct groups: the followers and supporters of 'Alī (later known as the Shī'a), the Kharijites who fought with, then against, 'Alī, and then the 'rest', representing the main stream. At this time, however, these movements were only political, and it does not seem that there existed any serious difference in religious thought or creed.

It was inevitable that such political differences should lead to various religious schools and sects. By the time of al-Juwaynī, we may detect numerous creeds, sects and sub-sects. The two most important creeds, however, were the Shī'a and the Sunna. Here we focus on the latter creed because the Ash'arīs belong to it. The Sunni creed represents the politically moderate movement. During the political crisis (*fitna*) between 'Alī and Mu'āwiya, many Muslims took a neutral position, refusing to support either of the parties. These are what could roughly be called the orthodoxy of Islam. Generally, there are four schools of jurisprudence in this creed, namely the Mālikī, the Shāfi'ī, the Ḥanafī and the Ḥanbalī schools. All Muslim affairs (social, legal, religious, etc..) should be run according to the Quran, the Sunna, and then according to the views of one of the four schools. Unfortunately, life is not so simple. The human mind always raises difficult questions to which it seeks to find satisfactory answers. As early as the time of 'Alī, both the Shī'a and the Kharijites had started discussing questions

<sup>1</sup> Neither did a number of the Prophet's companions, including 'Ā'ishah, his wife.

relating to the sinner, true believers, the Imam and so on.<sup>2</sup> During the 'Abbaside era, major translations of philosophical works were carried out<sup>3</sup> and this seems to be the starting point of serious philosophical influence on Islamic thought.

There is little doubt that the availability of philosophical works in Arabic had an impact on the rise of Kalām as an independent and sophisticated branch of Islamic sciences. However, what appears to be the most important factor is the appearance of a number of difficult questions to which it was almost impossible to find satisfactory answers from the Quran or the Tradition of the Prophet.

In the Sunni sect, the Mu'tazilites were the first to form a distinct school of kalām.<sup>4</sup> It is held that this school was formed "to put Islam and its basic principles on a rational foundation."<sup>5</sup> Later, however, their rationalisation became too much for the main stream orthodoxy to accept, especially in regard to what is known as the *Mihna* of the createdness of the Qur'ān.<sup>6</sup> Rational kalām was fiercely opposed by the *fiqh* and *ḥadīth* scholars, especially the Ḥanbalite 'Ulamā' who, apparently as a reaction against the Mu'tazilite rationalisation, rejected any rational argumentation and relied solely upon the texts (ie. Qur'ān and Sunna).

In the midst of the fight between the two extremes a vacuum was created. Indeed, it should be obvious that there was a need for an orthodox kalām which would stand midway between the two extremes. This gap was filled by the Ash'arī school.

<sup>2</sup> Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, pp.38-39.

<sup>3</sup> Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, p.6.

<sup>4</sup> Henry Corbin, *Histoire de la Philosophie Islamique*, Gallimard, France, 1986, p.156.

<sup>5</sup> M. Abdul Hye, "Ash'arism", in M.M. Sharif (ed.), *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, Vol. 1, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1963, p.220.

<sup>6</sup> M. Abdul Hye, "Ash'arism", p.221.



The Ash'arī school of theology is named after Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī Ibn Ismā'īl al-Ash'arī. Although it is not clear that he was the only founder of the school,<sup>7</sup> he is certainly the most famous. As the position of the Ash'arīs was midway between two schools, they had to fight both opponents. al-Ash'arī was himself a Mu'tazilite and one of the most prominent student of al-Jubbā'ī, the head of the Mu'tazilites at the time.<sup>8</sup> But he later left the school and worked out a new theological position which gave more importance to the Qur'ān and the Sunna. He now held that the Qur'ān was the eternal Speech of God and was uncreated. He opposed the Mu'tazilites in that the anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur'ān, like the hand and the face of God, had to be accepted without specifying how, and should not be explained in their metaphorical meaning. Another important objection to the Mu'tazilites was the question of free will.<sup>9</sup> Ash'arism seems to oppose Mu'tazilism in two main principles: (i) that giving an absolute value to reason would ultimately suppress religion rather than support it; and (ii) that the Qur'ān often assumes the belief in the *ghayb* (the unknown, the invisible), but *ghayb* is beyond rational demonstration.<sup>10</sup>

al-Juwaynī is among the most notable masters of Ash'ari kalām. He has the credit of having made his school popular in the East by his vast learning and preaching.<sup>11</sup> His life and contribution to Islamic theology were discussed in Chapter Two.

<sup>7</sup> M. Abdul Hye, "Ash'arism", p.222.

<sup>8</sup> W.M. Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1979, p.82.

<sup>9</sup> Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, p.86.

<sup>10</sup> Corbin, *Histoire*, p.168.

<sup>11</sup> Muḥammad al-Zuhaylī, *al-Imām al-Juwaynī*, Dār al-Qalam, Damascus, 1986, pp.77-120.

#### 4.1.1. Definition of Kalām.

Literally, kalām is the Arabic word for speech. Some maintain that the word kalām originated from discussion over the speech of God.<sup>12</sup> In this thesis, 'Ilm al-Kalām or theology will denote the science that looks into religious matters, particularly those concepts related to beliefs and dogmas. As opposed to *falsafa* (philosophy), the kalām starts from the assumption that Islam is the true religion and then attempts to discuss matters with the help of rational means.

#### 4.2. The Method of al-Juwaynī.

al-Juwaynī was one the pillars of the Ash'ari school of theology. Although some doubt his merit and eminence,<sup>13</sup> it is generally accepted that he contributed not only to the establishment of his school but also to many aspects of the Ash'ari thought. <sup>14</sup> One of al-Juwaynī's main features was his distinct method and independent personality. In many questions al-Juwaynī rejected his predecessors' conclusions, including al-Ash'arī whom he calls *Shāykhunā*. For al-Juwaynī, truth seems to be the only thing that matters. This is evident from the fact that he changed his view in many questions. For instance, in his book *al-Irshād*, al-Juwaynī took the view of the master al-Ash'arī with regard to power (*al-Qudrah*) but in his later book, *al-Burhān*, al-Juwaynī rejected his master's view.<sup>15</sup> Also, in *al-Irshād* al-Juwaynī followed the main current of Ash'arīs in the question

<sup>12</sup> Henry Corbin, *Histoire*, p.155.

<sup>13</sup> 'Abd al-Rahmān Badawī, *Madhāhib al-Islāmiyyīn*, Dār al-'Ilm li al-Malāyīn, Beirut, 1971, p.848.

<sup>14</sup> al-Nashshār, in *al-Shāmīl*, edited by al-Nashshār et. al., Alexandria, n.d., p.76; H.M. Fawqiyya (ed.), in *Luma' al-Adilla*, 'Ālam al-Kutub, Beirut, 1987, pp.57-66; A. A. al-Dīb, *Imām al-Ḥarmayn*, Dār al-Qalam, Kuwait, 1981.

<sup>15</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, Vol.1, p.279; *al-Irshād*, edited by M. Yūsuf Mūsā and 'Alī 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, Maktabat al-Khanjī, Cairo, 1950, pp.218-219.

about the state (*al-ḥāl*)<sup>16</sup> and whether God could order humans to do what they cannot do, but in *al-Burhān* al-Juwaynī rejected the idea that God can do so.<sup>17</sup>

al-Juwaynī was not a simple follower of his school's predecessors, he had many original views. For instance, he did not accept existence as an attribute, because "existence is the essence itself".<sup>18</sup> Unlike the occupancy of space (*al-taḥayyuz*) for the atom (where the *taḥayyuz* is an attribute added to the atom), the existence of an atom is the atom itself without any addition.<sup>19</sup> He also had some reservations about some of al-Ash'arī's definitions, such as those concerning the definition of Speech (*kalām*).<sup>20</sup> When al-Juwaynī found that there is no sufficient evidence, he did not take any definite decision, even if his predecessors had a definite opinion on the matter.<sup>21</sup>

Amongst the matters on which al-Juwaynī had a different opinion from that of the scholars of his school was his view that subsistence (*al-baqā'*) was not a separate attribute from the attribute of existence. al-Juwaynī explains:

"Our scholars hold the view that subsistence (*al-baqā'*) is an attribute of the Eternal which is separate from His existence, like knowledge for the Knowing. What I see is that subsistence is inseparable from the continuous existence itself without any addition. Otherwise we would be compelled to describe the eternal attributes as subsisting (*bi kawnihā bāqiya*), then we would add to these attributes the attribute of *baqā'*. This would lead us to accepting a meaning containing a mean-

<sup>16</sup> As al-Juwaynī defines it, *al-ḥāl* is an attribute to a being which (ie. the attribute) can be described neither by existence nor by non-existence. (*al-Irshād*, p.80.)

<sup>17</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.226-228,80-82; *al-Burhān*, Vol.1, pp.103-105,130.

<sup>18</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.31.

<sup>19</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.31.

<sup>20</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.104.

<sup>21</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.138.



ing, and then if we accept an eternal *baqā'* we would have to describe it with the attribute of *baqā'* and so on."<sup>22</sup>

However, the most notable difference between al-Juwaynī and his predecessors was his interpretation of the revelation attributes (*al-ṣifāt al-khabariyya*). While al-Ash'arī (and the scholars after him) took the view that such attributes were to be understood 'without how' (*bilā kayf*), al-Juwaynī was the first<sup>22</sup> to reject the literal acknowledgement (*ithbāt*) of attributes such as the hands, the eyes and the face.<sup>23</sup> His interpretation of these attributes will be discussed in detail later.

One distinct characteristic of his method was the way al-Juwaynī proves the existence of eternal attributes. While al-Ash'arī proves the attributes using reason and revelation, al-Juwaynī limits himself to reason alone. In this, al-Juwaynī seems to be closer to the Mu'tazilites than the Ash'arīs.<sup>24</sup>

Moreover, al-Juwaynī was very keen to define the key terms clearly and discuss them from the beginning in order to eliminate any misunderstanding during later discussions.

#### 4.2.1. Means of Justification According to al-Juwaynī.

We mentioned earlier that the Mu'tazilites gave the primary role to reason which was the main way of justification for them. Although they recognised the value of revelation (*al-sam'*), that is the Qur'ān, the Prophet's Tradition, and the consensus (*Ijma'*) they seemed to limit their use. For al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār,

<sup>22</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.139.

<sup>22</sup> Ibn Taymiya, *Dar' Ta'arūḍ al-'Aql wa al-Naql*, Islamic University of Muḥammad Ibn Sa'ūd, 1403 AH, Vol.2, pp.17-18.

<sup>23</sup> Ibn Taymiya, *Dar'*, Vol.2, pp.155,157.

<sup>24</sup> Ibn Taymiya, *Dar'*, Vol.2, p.13.



a Mu'tazilī scholar, reason was the main source of the knowledge of the oneness and justice of God. He makes this clear:

“.... Let it be known that justification is [based on] four [things]: reason, the Book (Qur'ān), al-Sunna and al-Ijmā' ..... because these (ie. the Book, the Sunnah and Ijmā') are part of the knowledge of the oneness and justice of God. So, if we use one of these to justify the oneness and justice of God, we would be using a part (*far'*) to justify the whole (*mustadillīn bi far' al-Shay' 'alā aṣliḥ*), and that is absurd. The proof of that is that the Book cannot be a justification until it is proven that is it the rightful speech which cannot be lied upon, and that is part of the knowledge of the oneness and justice of God.”<sup>25</sup>

Using the above argument, al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār refuted those who prove God's attributes using revelation. However, there are questions that are proved with both reason and the revelation such as the principle of punishment (*Istihqāq al-'Iqāb*).<sup>25</sup> Finally, there are things that can only be justified by revelation.<sup>26</sup>

The Ash'arīs, opposed the Mu'tazilites and used both reason and revelation to prove not only the attributes but also the existence of God. al-Ash'arī in his book *al-Idānah* uses verses from the Qur'ān to prove many attributes.<sup>27</sup> He also includes a verse from the Qur'ān in his proof of the existence of God.<sup>28</sup> However, al-Baḳillānī seems to have a view closer to that of al-Qāḍī with regard to the

<sup>25</sup> 'Abd al-Jabbār bin Aḥmad, *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamṣa*, ed. by 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uthmān, Maktabat Wahba, 1384 AH, p.88.

<sup>26</sup> 'Abd al-Jabbār bin Aḥmad, *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamṣa*, p.619.

<sup>27</sup> 'Abd al-Jabbār bin Aḥmad, *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamṣa*, p.233.

<sup>28</sup> Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī, *al-Idānah 'an Uṣūl al-Diyānah*, ed. by Fawqiya H. Maḥmūd, Dār al-Anṣār, Cairo, 1397 AH, p.157; Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī, *al-Luma' fī al-Radd 'Alā Ahl al-Zīgh wa al-Bida'*, ed. by Hammūd Gharāba, Maṭba'at Miṣr, Cairo, 1955, pp.30,33.

<sup>28</sup> Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī, *al-Luma'*, p.19.

ways of justification. al-Juwaynī reports al-Bāqillānī's view in his *Talkhīṣ*:

"The acquired knowledge (*'ulūm kasbiyya*) that can only be achieved by proofs of reason is that which is necessary to know the oneness and the prophets (*al-nubuwwāt*) ..... What can be acquired by revelation is the whole body of jurisprudence (*jumlat al-aḥkām al-shar'iyyah*) ..... What could be known by both is anything that is not binding and anything not necessary for the knowledge of God or the prophets."<sup>29</sup> "

This view appears to have had some effect on al-Juwaynī's view on this question. However, al-Juwaynī, in addition to reason and revelation, adds a third element, namely the supernatural (*al-mu'jiza*). But this element was only introduced in *al-Burhān*. In *al-Irshād* al-Juwaynī explains that

"the principles of beliefs (*uṣūl al-'aqā'id*) are divided into: [(i)] what can be proved by reason alone (*yudraku 'aqlan*), [(ii)] what can be shown by revelation alone (*yudraku sam'an*), and [(iii)] what could be proved by both."<sup>29</sup>

In *al-Burhān* he explains more and introduces the supernatural:

"Knowledge in religion can be achieved by one of three means: one is reason (*al-'uqūl*) ....., the second is that which indicates the truth which cannot be achieved by reason and that is obtained by supernatural proofs (*mu'jizāt*), and the third are proofs of revelation (*adillat al-sam'iyyāt*) which are the Book, al-Sunnah and al-Ijma' (consensus)."<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Talkhīṣ*, ed. by 'Abd Allāh Ghulam and Shabir Ahmad al-'Amrī, Medina Islamic University, n.d.

<sup>29</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.358.

#### 4.2.1.1. Matters that can be Proven by Reason Alone.

al-Juwaynī asserts that any question of belief that comes prior to belief in the Speech of God and in so far as it is the truth can only be understood or known by reason. This is because revelation (*sam'īyyāt*) is based on the Speech of God, so anything whose proof is preceded by the proof of the Speech (such as Existence, Knowledge, Life etc.) can only be proven by reason, for the attribute of Speech can only be given to the One who has such (preceding) attributes.<sup>29</sup>

al-Juwaynī, like al-Bāqillānī, maintains that there are many attributes that can be proved exclusively by reason, namely those without which God's Speech cannot be said to be true. Those seem to be restricted to God's attributes. God, for example, cannot have a speech if He does not exist. Likewise, if he was not the Most Powerful, the Most Knowledgable, ..., he would not have a true Speech. Thus, before one even proceeds to prove that God's Kalām is true, one must first prove that He exists, that He is alive, that He is eternal, etc. When all Speech requirements are proven, then one can proceed to prove the Speech which is the main element of revelation justification. Figure 4.1 gives a graphical representation of al-Juwaynī's view on the means of justification. Having proved (by reason) the Speech of God, and that it is the truth, then anything that comes from it could be used as an argument or used to justify questions contained in it. al-Juwaynī's system can be summarised in four steps as follows:

- (i) Prove Existence using reason.
- (ii) Then prove other needed attributes using reason.

<sup>29</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, vol.1, pp.146-147.

<sup>29</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.358; *al-Burhān*, Vol.1, p.137.



- (iii) Then prove the attribute of Speech using reason.
- (iv) Having proved the existence and truthfulness of Speech, you can deduce revelation (*sam'*) and use it for justification.

There may be three main objections to the above reasoning. First, according to the above four points one could object that the difference is only in giving Speech a different name. If we reverse the process: (i) Revelation is proven by Speech, (ii) Speech is proven by reason, (iii) thus Revelation is proven by reason. We end up with the fact that everything is proven by reason, albeit indirectly. In any case, the merit goes always back to reason rather than to revelation or belief, and this weight given to reason makes al-Juwaynī very close to the Mu'tazilites and at the same time in conflict with many of his predecessors who had tried to find a balance between reason and revelation.

The second objection concerns the necessity to prove some attributes before Speech. What seems to escape al-Juwaynī is that the Speech of God upon which the revelation is founded is not an abstract idea. It is a reality, and does exist in the form of a book (the Qur'ān). It could therefore be possible that such a book contains within itself 'reasonable' proofs, ie. proofs that are acceptable to reason. If, for example, someone gives me a book on the prediction of some world events in the coming year, I would have two ways of knowing whether the book contains the truth. One is to go and ask some people who know the author about his honesty, his clairvoyance, and most importantly whether his previous predictions turned out to be true. But another way is to wait and see, at the designated time in the book, whether or not the event would occur. Likewise, the Qur'ān could be used to prove its truth. Whether the proof will satisfy everyone is almost certainly impossible, but then such is the case with the proof



from the abstract. While some may be satisfied by the extreme literary beauty of the Qur'ān and accept that no human could have written such a book, others would like to see some more satisfactory evidence.




Figure 4.1. Precedence of proofs in al-Juwaynī's system.

The third objection is that al-Juwaynī is denying the revelation the merit that it (ie. revelation) had told him (or more exactly the first person who proved attribute x) what attribute x was. One could argue with al-Juwaynī as follows. Before you can prove, by reason, a given attribute, you must know it first because you must acquire an idea about what it is. Then when did you get the idea, and more importantly the name? He would then be forced to answer that the source of his knowing of the names of such attributes was the revelation.<sup>30</sup> What al-Juwaynī is doing is assuming that the book is true, taking the names

<sup>30</sup> Obviously it would be useless for him to say that he obtained them from his teachers or other kalam books because then the question would be transferred to

and ideas of attributes from the book, proving these attributes by reason, then coming back to the very book to prove its truth. Figure 4.2 gives a simplified idea of al-Juwaynī's contradiction.




Figure 4.2. The incompatibility of al-Juwaynī's use of Speech and Reason.

4.2.1.2. Matters that can be Proven by Revelation (al-Sam') Alone.

According to al-Juwaynī, anything that can be accepted by reason (*mā yajūzu fī al-'aql*) can only be proved by revelation. al-Juwaynī explains that "What can only be perceived by revelation is the recognition of the happening of things that are accepted by reason but which cannot be decided upon without revelation, for it is not necessary to prove what is possible without a text (*illā bi al-sam'*). This section includes the whole body of duties (*jumlat qaḍāyā al-taklīf*) and related matters such as *taqbīḥ*, *taḥsīn*, *ijāb*, *ḥaḍr*, *nadb* and *ibāḥah*."<sup>31</sup>

them, an so on until we arrive at the first person who took these names directly from revelation.

<sup>31</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.358.



The argument of al-Juwaynī could be put as follows: (i) there is a number of matters which can be judged as possible by reason, (ii) for each single matter, there exists a large number of possibilities, (iii) reason cannot decide which possibility is to be taken, (iv) therefore there must be a source of decision, which is revelation, to indicate the right possibility for the right matter. For example, it is easy to accept that those who kill human beings should be punished. But when it comes to choosing what sort of punishment should be applied reason is faced with a huge number of possibilities, varying from a few words of insult to death by the most atrocious death imaginable. Here comes the role of *sam*‘ which alone can tell us what is the right thing to do.

It should be noted here that the word ‘reason’ or ‘*aql*’ is intended to be that of believers, that is those who are convinced of the existence of God and of the truth of His Speech. Again, this view also seems to be contradictory; how can we maintain that a duty like the pilgrimage can only be proven by *sam*‘ while we first had to be convinced that this *sam*‘ was true using reason? However, it is not difficult to resolve this problem because once reason has been used to prove something, its role becomes only secondary, and thus it should not be mentioned every time we use anything that has resulted from it. In terms of revelation, therefore, we first use reason to prove it, but then the role of reason ends. Revelation becomes the primary source in matters related to duties.

However, we will have to admit that reason has to play a certain role for the above matters, whether primary or secondary. Even al-Juwaynī recognises that before we prove these matters by revelation, they must first be judged possible or acceptable by reason. Yet, at the same time he ignores reason completely and states that only revelation can prove such matters. Thus, the above categories of



*taklīf* should instead come under the things that can be proved by both 'reason and revelation', because, although reason plays only a minor role, it nevertheless exists in the process of decision making.

Another argument could be advanced from within al-Juwaynī's classification. Even if we assume that there are matters which can be proved by revelation alone, there are many cases where reason must intervene because revelation might give two or more different views. Take women's dress for example. There are Traditions<sup>31</sup> which assert that the face of a woman should be covered while others allow for women's faces to be uncovered. Scholars from various schools have argued on this question. Another example is the beard which according to some is *wājib* (a duty) while to some others is only a Sunnah (which is not binding). Both parties use the same Traditions but one takes all the orders of the Prophet as binding while the other party maintains that not all of his orders are binding. It should be obvious that in such debates reason plays a major role.

#### 4.2.1.3. *Matters that can be Proven by Revelation and Reason.*

A third kind of matter according to al-Juwaynī's classification are those matters which can be proven by reason and revelation. This is not so because such matters are difficult to prove and thus need the use of two different sources together, but simply because they just happen to be provable by both. First, there are questions which can be proven by reason alone. However, their perception comes after the Speech of God, that is they are not necessary (or prior) to the proof that God has a Speech. Therefore, they can also be proved by revelation.<sup>32</sup> Examples are the possibility of seeing God and the Creation attribute.

<sup>31</sup> al-Albānī, *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Jāmi'*, h.n. 13402, 13805.

<sup>32</sup> al-Juwaynī does not mention that such matters must first be contained in



al-Juwaynī reports:

“What can be proved with reason and revelation together are those matters which can be proven by reason but are preceded by the proof that God has a true Speech. These can be proven by reason and revelation such as the seeing of God .....”<sup>33</sup>

al-Juwaynī should have added a sentence like “providing such matters are contained in the revelation”. Otherwise, one can imagine attributes which can be proven by reason, which do not precede the Speech of God, but which are not contained or mentioned in the revelation. One possible question is whether we could smell God. It could be argued that since we can see God (because we can see things with our eyes), we could equally smell God (because we can smell with our nose). But this is not mentioned in the revelation, and thus can only be proven (if ever) by reason.

It seems that al-Juwaynī assumes the supremacy of revelation, so he may not have seen the need to specify the fact that the source of all religious matters is revelation rather than reason. In line with what was argued earlier, every question, subject or matter discussed by al-Juwaynī has a source in the revelation, and al-Juwaynī appears to acknowledge this fact by not specifically including revelation in his definition.

the revelation.

<sup>33</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.359.

#### 4.2.1.4. Matters that can be Proven by the Supernatural.

The final class of questions are those which can only be proven by *al-mu'jizah*. According to al-Juwaynī, it is not possible to prove that someone is telling the truth by reason. The only possible way to prove one's truth is through the performance of supernatural tasks.<sup>33</sup> This obviously means that *al-mu'jiza* is the only means to prove the truthfulness of the Prophets.

### 4.3. Definition and Discussion of Some Basic Concepts.

#### 4.3.1. Knowledge (al-'Ilm).

al-Juwaynī defines knowledge as "the recognition of something as it really is."<sup>34</sup> This definition was used by al-Qaḍī (Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī)<sup>35</sup> before him, but this seems to be the only one he accepted. He rejects the definition "[knowledge] is the demonstration of the real nature of things"<sup>36</sup> because it does not include the eternal knowledge.<sup>37</sup> He also disqualifies al-Ash'arī's definition "[knowledge] is what makes someone a knower."<sup>38</sup> (*ma awjaba kawn maḥallihi 'āliman*) as too general to be able to define knowledge.

According to al-Juwaynī there are two sorts of knowledge: an eternal knowledge, and a temporal (*ḥādīth*) knowledge.<sup>39</sup> The first is an attribute of God, inherent to Him, and embracing the infinity of objects. Such knowledge cannot be qualified as either necessary or acquired. The second knowledge is divided into three kinds: necessary, a priori (*badīhī*) and acquired. The necessary knowledge

<sup>33</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Burhān*, Vol.1, pp.147-148.

<sup>34</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.12.

<sup>35</sup> al-Juwaynī himself acknowledges this in *al-Burhān*, Vol.1, p.119.

<sup>36</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.12.

<sup>37</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.12.

<sup>38</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.12.

<sup>39</sup> Badawi, *Histoire de la Philosophie en Islam*, p.358.

differs from the a priori one in that it is acquired following a need or damage.<sup>40</sup> The acquired knowledge is obtained voluntarily on the basis of reason.<sup>41</sup>

#### 4.3.2. The World (al-'ālam).

According to the Mu'tazilites a thing is an object of knowledge. al-Juwaynī, however, strongly refutes this in his *al-Shāmil*.<sup>42</sup> For him a thing is that which exists, the non-existent is not a thing or a being.<sup>43</sup> There are two kinds of beings, eternal being (that which has no beginning in time), and contingent being (that which has a beginning). The former represents God while the latter represents the world.

The world, according to al-Juwaynī, is every being apart from God and his necessary attribute.<sup>44</sup>

In *al-Irshād* and *Luma' al-Adilla* al-Juwaynī divides the world into two entities, viz. the atoms or substance (*al-jawāhir*) and the accidents (*al-a'rāḍ*).<sup>45</sup> In another book, however, he divides the world into three categories:

"The world consists in every actually existent other than God; it consists in bodies that are limited in number and are finite in the number of segments into which they can be divided and of accidents that subsist in them."<sup>46</sup>

From this we may understand that the world is made of bodies<sup>46</sup> which

<sup>40</sup> Badawi, *Histoire de la Philosophie en Islam*, p.358.

<sup>41</sup> Badawi, *Histoire de la Philosophie en Islam*, p.358.

<sup>42</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil*, p.127.

<sup>43</sup> Badawi, *Histoire de la Philosophie en Islam*, p.359.

<sup>44</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.17.

<sup>45</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.17.

<sup>46</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-'Aqida al-Nizāmiyya fī al-Arkān al-Islāmiyya*, edited by Ahmad Hījāzī al-Saqqā, Maktabat al-Kulliyyāt al-Azhariyya, Cairo, 1979, p.16.

<sup>46</sup> Note that the meaning of the term 'body' here is different from what is normally understood. This is discussed below.



are in turn made of segments or atoms. Note that the term "subsist in them" (*qa'imatun bihā*) is ambiguous because we do not know whether 'them' means the bodies or the atoms. al-Juwaynī seems to make no difference between the two; since one is made of the other, if an accident subsists in one it must subsist in another. This can be seen from al-Bāqillānī's definition:

"All contingent beings are divided into three categories: a composite body, an isolated atom, and an accident that exists in bodies and atoms."<sup>47</sup>

But this needs not be necessarily true. The death of a body, does not necessarily mean that all atoms are dead (eg. a human body and the body's cells).

We see here the concept of limitation or finitude in the number of bodies. Even at this stage we can see a glimpse of al-Juwaynī's position against the infinity of the world in both time and measure.

Muslim theologians use a similar concept of substance to that of Aristotle.<sup>47</sup> However, most theologians, including al-Juwaynī, reject the idea of the possibility of substance without accident. This is in fact what they understand from Aristotle's concept of matter which they call *hayūlā*.<sup>48</sup> The Ash'arite theologians did not take such concepts directly from Aristotle. Their predecessors, the Mu'tazilites, had already adopted some Greek concepts of body (*jism*) and atom or substance (*jawhar*).<sup>49</sup> However, neither Ash'arites nor Mu'tazilites can be said to have an Aristotelian system. Although there are parallels, theologians and Muslim philosophers did not confuse Mu'tazilite and Ash'arite atomism with

<sup>47</sup> al-Baqillani, *al-Tamhid*, p.41.n.7.

<sup>48</sup> Gimaret, Daniel, *La Doctrine d'al-Ash'arī*, CERF, Paris, 1990, p.36.

<sup>49</sup> Gimaret, *La Doctrine d'al-Ash'arī*, p.224.

<sup>49</sup> F.E. Peters, *Aristotle and the Arabs*, University of London Press, London, 1968, p.142.



the teaching of Aristotle.<sup>50</sup> For example, all the Mutakallimūn, with the exception of al-Nazzām, rejected the Aristotelian thesis of divisibility of atoms *ad infinitum*.<sup>51</sup> Another notion borrowed from Aristotle by the Mutakallimūn is that time consists of atoms.<sup>52</sup>

In addition to the Mu'tazilites, the Ash'arites seem to have benefited from Aristotelian concepts adopted by earlier Muslim philosophers. Aristotelian terms, such as substance and accidents, were used by al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, and Ibn Sīnā,<sup>53</sup> although philosophers like al-Kindī rejected the division of the world into atoms and accidents.<sup>54</sup> A striking similarity is also noticed between the Mutakallimūn and the Muslim Neoplatonists Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' who agree that "all things are of two types, substances and accidents."<sup>55</sup>

While in the Kalām system we speak of atoms (or substance) and accidents, in the Aristotelian system as explained by Ibn Sīnā we speak of matter and form. The combination of both produces existence. Thus, like in Kalām, matter cannot be stripped of form for otherwise it would cease to exist.<sup>56</sup>

#### 4.3.3. The Atom (Substance).

al-Juwaynī defines the atom (*al-jawhar*) as "that which occupies space", he adds "and anything that has volume occupies space."<sup>57</sup> He places stress here on the importance of volume in an atom. In *Luma' al-Adilla* he defines an atom

<sup>50</sup> Peters, *Aristotle and the Arabs*, pp.143-144.

<sup>51</sup> Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, p.53.

<sup>52</sup> Majid Fakhry, *Islamic Occasionalism*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1958, p.27.

<sup>53</sup> I.R. Netton, *Allāh Transcendent*, Routledge, London, 1989, pp.52,106,114.

<sup>54</sup> Netton, *Allāh Transcendent*, p.82.

<sup>55</sup> I.R. Netton, *Muslim Neoplatonists, An Introduction to the Thought of the Brethren of Purity*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1982, p.21.

<sup>56</sup> al-'Irāqī, Muḥammad 'Āṭif, *al-Falsafah al-Ṭabī'iyyah 'ind Ibn Sīnā*, Dār al-Ma'ārif, Cairo, 1983, pp.95-96.

<sup>57</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.17.

as "whatever has volume (*ḥajm*) ..." <sup>58</sup> Another important point brought up in the *Luma'* is the acceptance by the atom of the accident; he defines the atom as "that which receives accidents" <sup>59</sup>

The atom is not to be understood in its current scientific meaning as employed in physics and chemistry. For the *mutakallimūn* an atom means the smallest indivisible particle in nature from which all existent beings are made. Thus the atom is the source of all (except God). This, however, is not made clear from al-Juwaynī's definitions. Anything can occupy space, have volume and receive accidents, be it small or large. The size and indivisibility is not explicitly mentioned. Perhaps he assumed that the meaning of the term was self evident (in that it is the smallest particle) and that there was only the need to concentrate on the most important nature of the atom.

The idea of indivisibility of matter is extremely important for the Ash'arī school, for if we assume that matter can be divided infinitely, there remains the possibility that it (ie. the matter) holds the reason or the cause of its existence. On the other hand, if we admit that the atom is the smallest, indivisible thing, then for this atom to be determined, specified and quantified in a being, it needs a superior being. The idea of a creator God is then well founded.

al-Juwaynī explains some properties of a *jawhar* when he states:

"The isolated atom has a real portion of surface area which is not dependent on another's being contiguous to it. It has a measurable quantity but is not measured by a part, an the atom is measured only by the atom." <sup>60</sup>

Atoms are of uniform nature, the atoms of the air are the same as the

<sup>58</sup> al-Juwaynī, *Luma' al-Adilla*, trans. Michel Allard, *Text Apologetiques de Guwaini*, Dar El-Machreq, Beirut, 1968, p.121.

<sup>59</sup> al-Juwaynī, *Luma' al-Adilla*, trans. Michel Allard, p.121.

<sup>60</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Shamil*, p.159.

atoms of fire, the only difference lies in the accidents that subsist in them.<sup>60</sup> Atoms, therefore, form a single, primary and fundamental class of beings which are identical. Unlike the accidents, the atoms subsist and are not renewed.<sup>61</sup> This is a very important distinction between atoms and accidents. Atoms do not accept interpenetration.<sup>62</sup> An atom cannot exist in the space of another atom.

In summary, an atom has a volume and corporeality (*juththah*) and thus occupies space. It is capable of receiving accidents and being conjoined to another atom like itself and thus forming a body. Finally, atoms are the smallest existing beings which are identical and have the same nature.

#### 4.3.4. The Body (al-Jism).

It is important here to distinguish between the common usage of the word 'body' which we give to corporeal objects and the usage of the *mutakallimun*, particularly that of the Ash'arīs. al-Juwaynī defines a body as follows: "*Jism* in the formal terminology of the Unitarians (*al-muwaḥḥidīn*) is equivalent to *muta'allif* (adjunction = *al-ta'rif*). Thus, when two atoms are adjoined to one another they become two bodies."<sup>63</sup> In *al-Shāmil* al-Juwaynī gives a further explanation:

"The expressions used for this by our imams vary. Some say that when two atoms are adjoined to one another they form a single body. But al-Qāḍī [al-Bāqillānī] and some of our leading authorities favour the view that the two atoms, when they are adjoined to one another, are two bodies; for that which is a body is that which is adjoined, and that which is adjoined is that in which an adjunction subsists, and an adjunction subsists in each atom. Therefore,

<sup>60</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil*, p.153.

<sup>61</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil*, p.160.

<sup>62</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmil*, p.160.

<sup>63</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.17.



the multiplication of the adjoined follows from the multiplication of the adjunction, and the multiplication of the body follows from the multiplication of the adjoined."<sup>64</sup>

Obviously al-Juwaynī shares the view of al-Qāḍī.<sup>64</sup> In brief, a body is an atom in which subsists the accident of adjunction. But this brings serious conclusions. First, there cannot be a single body, for the minimum required is two atoms, but when two atoms are adjoined they become two bodies. Hence, it is impossible to obtain a single body. Secondly, there are numerically as many bodies as atoms that contain the accident of adjunction.

A body (or more precisely, two bodies) to al-Juwaynī therefore describes two and only two atoms that are immediately adjacent or contiguous to one another.

A body according to the above principle is therefore one of the basic entities or beings. Indeed, as it is portrayed by al-Juwaynī, a body is at the level which immediately follows that of the atom. In loose terms we could designate it as the second smallest particle, since a body can only be divided into two atoms. But then why bother with such a low level entity? Why not discuss, for example, a bigger and larger thing, which is composed of say a billion atoms and a large number of accidents? Indeed, to describe the world, the human mind prefers to be given a picture of the biggest and the smallest, and then something in between. In this analogy, the world is the biggest, and the atom is the smallest, but, in view of al-Juwaynī's definition, the body is by no means the 'something in between'.<sup>65</sup>

al-Juwaynī's definition of the world in terms of bodies is very ambiguous:

<sup>64</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Shamīl*, p.408.

<sup>64</sup> Gimaret, *La Doctrine d'al-Ash'arī*, p.70.

<sup>65</sup> For other views on the definition of the body see Gimaret, *La Doctrine d'al-Ash'arī*, pp.67-70.



"The world consists in every actually existent other than God; it consists in bodies that are limited in number and are finite in the number of segments into which they can be divided and of accidents that subsist in them."<sup>66</sup>

Such definition gives us the idea that a body is a being that is sufficiently large to contain a 'finite' number of segments. One possible explanation of the apparent contradiction between the above statement of al-Juwaynī and his definition of bodies is that he may have had a different idea of the meaning of body when he wrote *al-'Aqida al-Nizāmiyya*. That is probably why in his definition of the world in other works, he defines it in terms of atoms and accidents only.

But then, why discuss the notion of body altogether? The obvious reason for this is that the philosophers and the Mu'tazilites have discussed the notion of body. Both define the body in terms of length, width and depth. By doing this, they tried to give a more concrete description of the world and its components. This was particularly important to the philosophers for whom matter can be divided infinitely. Thus, a small entity which can be identified by the basic dimensional reference is very important. Bodies could be seen as the median between the infinitely large and the infinitely small.

For atomists like the Ash'arīs, however, there is no infinite. The world is limited in the number of particles it contains, and these particles or atoms are finite in their size. Suddenly, the notion of body becomes redundant because we do not need it any longer to explain the world, which can be perfectly explained in terms of atoms and accidents. So one would ask why didn't the Ash'arīs simply abandon the notion of body? It is not easy to find a satisfactory answer to this, but one possibility is that the term had long been used by the philosophers

<sup>66</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-'Aqida al-Nizāmiyya*, p.16.

and the Mu'tazilites.<sup>66</sup> so the Ash'arīs could not reject it altogether and had to give it a different definition which would be compatible with their system of atoms and accidents. However, they could not satisfactorily explain how two nonmagnitudinous atoms form two magnitudinous bodies.<sup>67</sup> It should be recognised that it is not easy to reach a precise idea about the notion of body.

This difficulty was translated in a large number of definitions varying from 'one atom forms one body' up to the requirement of 36 atoms to form a single body.<sup>68</sup>

Indeed, since the atom is the smallest thing possible, it cannot be measured by a dimension. Therefore, it is impossible to identify the number of atoms which would form a body that has the three dimensions (length, width and depth). This appears to be the reason why al-Juwaynī and the Ash'arīs reject the definition of the philosophers and the Mu'tazilites.

The definition given by al-Juwaynī (in that it is the *muta'allif*) seems to be a compromise to the above difficulty. Since we cannot know the number of atoms and accidents in a body which can be described by the three dimensions, one can easily imagine an alternative of a minimum number of atoms which can form a body. The solution is then simple: two atoms and an accident. A body, therefore, cannot be measured by any measure other than another similar body or by an atom (because it is smaller). Note, however, that for al-Juwaynī there isn't a single body but as many bodies as adjoined atoms.

Thus, it is very important not to confuse the term body with the corporeal things such as the human body or a fruit. The methodology of al-Juwaynī is

<sup>66</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Shamīl*, p.401.

<sup>67</sup> H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harvard University Press, London, 1975, p.492.

<sup>68</sup> Majid Fakhry, *Islamic Occasionalism*, p.36.

based mainly on the atoms and accidents, there are no concrete entities such as things that we can see and feel. The discussion of the notion of body by al-Juwaynī seems to have been carried out only because it was used by philosophers.

#### 4.3.5. The Accidents (al-A'rād).

al-Juwaynī defines the accident as "the entity subsistent in the atom such as colours, tastes, odours, knowledges, contingent powers and wills and their opposites, and death and life."<sup>69</sup> According to al-Juwaynī, an accident does not subsist,<sup>70</sup> which is denied by the Mu'tazilites who believe that most of the accidents subsist.<sup>71</sup>

Every existing thing or entity has one or more characteristics, or attributes. These are usually divided into essential (ie. without which a thing would not exist) and accidental. When, for example, we describe a man as being white or intelligent, we are referring to two accidental attributes, or simply accidents. Thus the qualities of being white and being intelligent are called accidents. For the *mutakallimūn*, however, the meaning changes slightly. Accidents are concrete entities (like the atoms) and thus such accidental characteristics or accidents are called 'a quantum of white' (*bayād*) rather than 'being white' and 'intelligence' (*dhakā*) which is to be understood as a psychological entity.

One may raise a quite legitimate objection to the principle of accidents. Indeed, if these are to be understood as concrete entities, then why not discard accidents and consider only the atoms? It is possible to imagine a world which can be divided into a finite number of concrete entities which we would call

<sup>69</sup> al-Juwaynī, *Luma' al-Adilla*, p.121. See also al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, p.15.

<sup>70</sup> al-Juwaynī *al-Shamīl*, p.167.

<sup>71</sup> Majid Fakhry, *Islamic Occasionalism*, p.41.



atoms. Keeping the idea in its simplest form, we would then say that what would make different corporeal things with different attributes is, for instance, the number of atoms in those things as well as the way these atoms are arranged.

However, the above thesis contradicts the thesis of al-Juwaynī who believes that the whole world is constantly maintained by the God. Since atoms do persist, there must be an additional entity, which (i) does not persist and thus must be maintained and renewed by the Powerful, and (ii) which is necessary for the atom to yield a corporeal object. In this way, every object in this world is maintained by God at each instant in time. This appears to be the main reason why al-Juwaynī, like his predecessors, proved the accidents.<sup>72</sup>

Another reason may be that while it was easy to imagine the division of material things into smaller and smaller material things, until the smallest material thing (atom) is reached, immaterial things were more difficult to imagine. Indeed, it is easy to imagine that a human body is composed of cells, and that these can be divided into smaller entities, and so on. But it is difficult to imagine how colour or death could be divided into small entities. This immaterial side of corporeal things probably gave rise to the idea of accidents.

#### 4.4. The Question of the Attributes.

One might ask why the question of the attributes was given so much attention by the Mutakallimūn. Wouldn't life be much simpler if one believed in God and does what God has ordered? At first, such questions look justifiable and Muslim theologians seem only to complicate matters. Indeed, many Muslims ask why we need to involve ourselves in what is beyond us, while the Qur'ān and

<sup>72</sup> Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, p.216.



the Sunnah contain all we need as guidance in this world. In a simplified world, such an objection looks justified. However, even those who object must have wondered sometimes how this world came to be. Many ask the basic question: If God has created us, then who has created Him? When we read some Qur'ānic verses we may read that God has a face, then into our imagination comes a picture, a face, which we quickly erase.

It is in the nature of human beings to ask for characteristics of things. If for instance I wanted to buy a computer, I would first ask if, for example, it has a colour screen, a hard disk; I would ask questions about its memory size and speed. Thus, it seems to me that accepting the idea of God without reference to His characteristics or attributes is just like going to a shop and saying 'how much a computer?' The attributes of God are thus important simply because they are at the heart of the main universal question: God.

The question of God's attributes (*ṣifāt*) had been discussed well before the advent of Islam. Human beings, in their various races and creeds, have always tried to imagine God or at least to imagine some of his possible characteristics, powers, or simply attributes. Judaism and Christianity were no exception. For example, for the Jews, God fought against Jacob<sup>73</sup> while for the Christians, the dogma of the Trinity gave rise to a lot of discussion.<sup>74</sup>

Basically, Islam does not encourage discussion in questions of religion. The Qur'ān generally avoids getting into deep arguments when discussing matters of belief. There are also many Hadīths (Prophet's sayings) objecting to *Jadal* (argument).

<sup>73</sup> The Old Testament, The Book of Genesis, 32:24-26.

<sup>74</sup> 'Alī 'Abd al-Wāhid, *al-Asfār al-Muqaddasa fī al-Adyān al-Sābiqa* 'Alā al-Islām Dār al-Nahḍa, Cairo, 1972, pp.80, 105-106.

However, the Qur'ān itself mentions many of God's attributes. Moreover, God encourages Muslims in the Qur'ān to defend their creed.<sup>75</sup> With the expansion of the Islamic world, Muslim scholars had to face scholars and philosophers from other religions and creeds and thus were bound to defend their creed using their opponents' tools. Although theological questions were not the subject of deep discussion during the time of the Prophet and the four Caliphs things were to change quite dramatically a few centuries later. Indeed, with the expansion of the Umayyad and, later, the Abbassid empires, Muslims came into contact with non-Muslim scholars and philosophers who had a long experience in pondering theological and metaphysical questions. Moreover, as a result of the deep political crises through which the Islamic world had lived for few centuries, many sects and creeds came to be established; each of which had to defend itself against the others and refute others' arguments.

According to Corbin, the Mu'tazilites' concept of the oneness of God was partly motivated by a wish to reject the Christian Dogma of the Trinity as they understood it.<sup>76</sup> They reject any attribute to the Unique Essence because, according to them, accepting such unlimited numbers of attributes would mean a multiple divinity rather than a unique divinity.<sup>77</sup> The Mu'tazilites maintain that God's oneness is unique, it is not by any way multiple. Hence, they faced the problem of the attributes; are they separated from the Unique Essence or are they part of the Essence itself? By so explaining the oneness of God, they were forced to say the the Essence of God and his attributes were the same thing.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>75</sup> "Ad'ū ilā sabīli rabbika bi al-ḥikmati wa al-maw'īza al-ḥasana", Qur'ān, 16:125.

<sup>76</sup> Corbin, *Histoire*, p.159.

<sup>77</sup> Corbin, *Histoire*, p.160.

<sup>78</sup> Aḥmad Amīn, *Ḍuḥā al-Islām*, Maktabat al-Nahḍa, n.p., 1936, Vol.3, pp.1-29.

Against the Mu'tazilites were two groups. First there were the orthodox scholars whom we may call the *salaf*. These maintained that God has "eternal attributes such as knowledge, power, will ....., without distinguishing essential attributes (*ṣifat al-dhāt*) from positive attributes (*ṣifat al-fi'l*). They also accepted revealed attributes (*ṣifat khabariyya*) such as the hands and the legs without giving them metaphorical interpretation.<sup>79</sup> The second opponents were the Ash'arītes, like al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī, who refuted Mu'tazilites' arguments.

Thus, before Ash'arism, there were two main attitudes with regard to the attributes. The first deprives God of any positive attribute, this came to be known as *ta'tīl*. Opposed to this attitude was that of the *salaf* who had rather naive conceptions of anthropomorphism (*tashbih*).<sup>80</sup> The solution proposed by the Ash'arīs was that God actually possesses the attributes and names mentioned in the Qur'ān. These are distinct from the Essence but do not have any reality or existence outside it.<sup>81</sup> However, al-Ash'arī seems to agree with the *salaf* with regard to the revelation attributes like the face, the hand and God's sitting on the Throne. He maintains that these should be understood as they are but without how (*bilā kayf*),<sup>82</sup> in other words, al-Ash'arī warns against material or physical association with God's attributes.

<sup>79</sup> al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, Dār al-Ma'rifah, Beirut, 1975, Vol.1, p.132.

<sup>80</sup> Henry Corbin, *Histoire*, p.169.

<sup>81</sup> Henry Corbin, *Histoire*, p.169.

<sup>82</sup> Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, p.86.

#### 4.5. Conclusion.

This chapter gave a brief account of the general aspects of the Kalām of al-Juwaynī. It was argued that Kalām came as a necessary result of many factors, the most important of which are the internal division of Muslims into several creeds and schools and the contact of Muslims in general with non-Muslims, especially Christians and philosophers. The basic method of al-Juwaynī was explained. Concerning the means of justification al-Juwaynī rejects the absolute supremacy of reason held by the Mu'tazilites. However, we argued that he indirectly gives a lot of importance to reason in justification. In this he seems to be closer to the Mu'tazilites than to the Traditionists. al-Juwaynī's addition in this respect is the supernatural (*al-mu'jizah*).

The main concepts used in kalām such as knowledge, the atom and the accident, were explained in the light of al-Juwaynī's definition. Finally, we gave brief account of the question of the divine attributes as generally seen by the Mu'tazilites, the orthodox and the Ash'arīs. This will be used as an introduction to the discussion of attributes according to al-Juwaynī in the next chapter.



## Chapter Five

### The Divine Attributes in al-Juwaynī's Thought

#### 5.1. Introduction.

At the end of the previous chapter, we gave some brief comment on the question of attributes and how they came to be one of the foremost matters in theological discussion. This chapter, however, is devoted to the question of attributes and al-Juwaynī's views on this question.

The idea of God and the people's conception of how He might be and what he might be is undoubtedly very old. Human views of God, the Creator, the Spirit, etc., have varied depending on time, religious beliefs, and circumstances. Thus, the problem of attributes is not new to Islam and it is well known that the question of attributes was discussed by both Christians and Jews.

Shalabi reports that the Jews, for example, do not attribute infallibility (*'iṣmah*) to God because He once got angry and swore to deprive them of the eternal life, but then regretted it because He knew it was unjust.<sup>1</sup> Jewish theologians, however, stress the difference between what is understood by the attributes of God and those understood of humans.<sup>2</sup>

The central problem of attributes in Christian thought, however, lies in the question of the Holy Trinity. Just as Muslim traditionists were not keen on rational analysis, the basic Christian attitude is similar, in that there are

<sup>1</sup> Aḥmad Shalabī, *Muqāranat al-Adyān al-Yahūdiyyah*, Maktabat al-Nahḍah al-Miṣriyyah, Cairo, 1978, p.275.

<sup>2</sup> Muhammad al-Bahī, *al-Jānib al-Ilāhī min al-Taḥkīm al-Islāmī*, Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, Cairo, 1968, pp.72-74.

certain religious matters which are beyond reason.<sup>3</sup> However, many Christians attempted to explain the nature of God and its relation to the Hypostases. One of the most famous of these is Yahyā Ibn 'Adī, who defended the Trinity against al-Kindī's attack.<sup>4</sup> al-Juwaynī reports that by existence the Christians understand the Father, by knowledge the Word, called by them also Son, and by life the Holy Spirit.<sup>5</sup> The attributes of God seem then to be one of the main common points of interest between the Islamic and the Christian faith. Indeed, one might be justified in attempting to find similarities between some Muslim attributes and the idea of Hypostases (*al-aqānīm*).

For the Muslims the question of attributes was almost inevitable. They were in continuous contact with other religious groups (mainly Christians and Jews). This contact meant that they learned many things from them, including theological and philosophical principles. Greek and Christian philosophical and theological influence can clearly be seen in Muslims writings and works.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, Muslims had to defend their faith against others and thus were obliged to learn other creeds, understand their arguments and attempt to refute them. In addition to the above, which we may call external reasons, there were internal reasons as to why Muslims were interested in the attributes. Firstly, the Qur'ān itself gives numerous descriptions of God and his characteristics. Secondly, internal divisions between Muslims led to a large number of creeds, sects, schools, and dogmas, all of which claimed to be on the right path. Whether for political reasons, or otherwise, these distinct and separated groups of Muslims

<sup>3</sup> Muḥammad 'Abduh, *Al-Islām wa al-Naṣrāniyyah ma'a al-'Ilm wa al-Madaniyyah*, Ṣabīḥ, Cairo, 1954, p.25.

<sup>4</sup> Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, pp.197-200.

<sup>5</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.47.

<sup>6</sup> Robert Caspar, *Traité de Théologie Musulmane*, Pontificio Istituto di Studi Arabi e d'Islamistica, Rome, 1987, p.128.

were bound to differ from each other, and one such difference was the question of the attributes. This very difference could explain how Muslims came into contact with philosophy and other creeds. Because each group had to defend its own creed or *madhhab* and had to face and refute the arguments of rival groups, philosophy and reason became very important.

One of the major points that make the attributes important is that many theological issues, such as the creation of the Qur'ān, the omnipotence of God, and the relationship between God's will and humans' will, are directly related to one or more attributes.

Even at the lowest intellectual level theological questions can be raised. A pleasant anecdote illustrates this. It is reported by al-Ash'arī that a certain Shu'ayb owed a sum of money to Maymūn. One day this latter asked for his money back, but Shu'ayb said: 'I will give it back if God wills.' Maymūn answered that God wills what He ordered (i.e. to be just and to pay one's debts) and does not will what He did not order (i.e. injustice). People were divided in opinion and decided to ask the opinion of an authority (a Sheikh who was then in prison). He answered: "We say: What God wills happens; what He does not will does not happen. However, we cannot attribute to God any injustice." Maymūn declares that the Sheikh was of his opinion because we cannot attribute injustice to God. Yet, Shu'ayb also claimed victory because of the first part of the Sheikh's answer (i.e. what God wills happens ....).<sup>7</sup>

The interest in attributes is reflected in al-Juwaynī's book *al-Irshād* in which he devotes a great deal of space to the discussion of attributes and related matters. He prepares the ground for his discussion with two chapters, the first

<sup>7</sup> al-Ash'arī, *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn*, Ritter, Istanbul 1929, p.94.



investigating the modes or states (*al-aḥwāl*),<sup>8</sup> and the second seeking to disprove the view held by the Mu'tazilites who deny that god has any cause, *muqtaḍī*.<sup>9</sup> This obviously is one of the premises which is used by the Mu'tazilites to show that the attributes are not distinct from God's essence.

While al-Ash'arī and the Orthodox Ḥanbalites spoke of the *bilā kayf* (without asking how)<sup>10</sup> with regard to the divine attributes, al-Juwaynī went a long way in separating and classifying them. We shall see that he divides attributes into *nafsiyyah* (essential) and *ma'naviyyah* (qualitative). The revealed attributes (*al-sifāt al-khabariyyah*), such as the hand and His sitting on the Throne, however, are treated separately because they are exclusively based on revelation.

Theologians do not give an exact definition of the essence of God. Theology only tries to describe His nature by defining His attributes and their special characteristics (*aḥkāmahā*).

According to al-Juwaynī, God has no beginning and no end; unlike created things, He is causeless; He is not body (*jism*), nor is he corporeal (*jismānī*); He is not accident, and not substance. al-Juwaynī goes to some length to prove that God is not substance (*jawhar*), arguing against the Christian idea of the Hypostases (*al-aqānīm al-thalāthah*) and explaining the connection between it and the idea of *al-aḥwāl*, in which some Muslim theologians believe.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.80.

<sup>9</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.84.

<sup>10</sup> L. Gardet and M. M. Anawati, *Introduction à La Théologies Musulmane*, Librairie Philosophique, Paris, 1970, p.66; Netton, *Allāh Transcendent*, p.26.

<sup>11</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.46-51.



## 5.2. The Problems of the Addition of Attributes.

al-Juwaynī believes that God is living, knowing, potent, etc., and that these are attributes which are caused by *'ilal* or *ma'ānī*<sup>12</sup> namely, life, knowledge, power, will, hearing, sight, and speech. He also believes that these attributes are eternal, inherent in God, and additional to (but not separate from) his essence.<sup>13</sup>

The Mu'tazilites, however, deny that the attributes are additional to the essence of God. They have two main objections to the Ash'arites' belief in attributes. First, accepting attributes which are distinct from the essence would mean that God's essence is grounded (*mu'allal*), which according to them is absurd.<sup>14</sup> The answer to this by al-Juwaynī will be discussed later. Second, to maintain that the attributes are pre-eternal and additional to God leads to polytheism. For if the attributes share in God's pre-eternity, which is His most distinctive feature, they must necessarily share in the others, including his divinity.<sup>15</sup> This refers to a comparison between the Muslims' criticism of the Christians over the question of the Hypostases in that there are other eternal beings additional to God's essence.

This is indeed a strong argument, because if we say that to affirm three eternal beings is absurd then it is illogical of us to affirm even more eternal entities. This appears to be the main reason why al-Ash'arī and most of his followers (including al-Juwaynī) said that the attributes are neither God nor other than God. In this way, the Ash'arites avoided the multiplicity of eternal

<sup>12</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.109, 139.

<sup>13</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.92, 94, 138, 143.

<sup>14</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.90.

<sup>15</sup> al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, Dār al-Ma'rifah, Beirut, 1975, Vol.1, p.55.

beings.

Regarding the latter objection, al-Juwaynī argues that it cannot be conceded that the association in the most distinctive feature necessitates participation in others. And even if that were conceded, one can dispute whether pre-eternity is God's most distinctive feature.

al-Juwaynī concludes that the attributes are additional to God's existence. His argument is based on the attribute of knowledge. According to him knowledge can be proved by reason, but only revelation shows that it is additional to the essence. Thus if it is intellectually established that knowledge exists, and if consensus affirms that the existence of the creator is not knowledge, then using reason and revelation would indicate that the knowledge is additional to God's existence.<sup>16</sup>

Having established that the attributes are additional, does it imply that they are distinct from His essence? al-Juwaynī's answer is based on the definition of 'distinct things'. His argument is that two distinct beings are "existent beings either of which may be separated from the other by time, space, existence, or non-existence."<sup>17</sup> Although al-Juwaynī prefers this definition he does not hold that the Mu'tazilites' definition of two distinct beings as "any two things" is wrong.<sup>18</sup> Strictly speaking, al-Juwaynī affirms, there is no definite rational or traditional means to define exactly two distinct entities.

Despite this, al-Juwaynī refuses to describe the attributes as other than the essence (*aghyār li al-dhāt*), or as identical to the essence itself.<sup>19</sup> He adds, "we do not avoid saying that the attributes are existing entities (*mawjūdāt*) and that

<sup>16</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.94.

<sup>17</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.137.

<sup>18</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.138.

<sup>19</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.138.

knowledge and the essence are two existing entities, and so on.”<sup>20</sup>

The same assertion is made in a later section of *al-Irshād* dealing with the names of God. He states: “Among His names are some of which it cannot be said that they are He or other than He. These include any name that indicates a pre-eternal attribute, such as the All Knowing, the Most Powerful”.<sup>21</sup>

It is unfortunate that in such a crucial question al-Juwaynī fails to offer (or perhaps avoids offering) a clear explanation as to whether or not the attributes are distinct from the essence of God. The only reason for his belief apparently is consensus (*al-ijmāʿ*).<sup>22</sup>

Like al-Ashʿarī, al-Juwaynī’s assertion appears to be guided by his desire to avoid asserting a plurality of pre-eternal beings by saying that they are not other than He (so as to avoid the Muʿtazilites’ criticism) and at the same time to avoid contradicting the main Islam orthodoxy, who believed in the attributes as real, existing entities, by saying that they are not He.

In the absence of any sound argument, the Ashʿarite ‘solution’ to the paradox of attributes looks self-contradictory and a rather cheap one. The only reason for their assertion of ‘neither nor’ seems to be their eagerness to become more acceptable to the ‘strong’ but not so rational orthodoxy while not looking so irrational and absurd as the rather ‘weak’ but more rational Muʿtazilites and Falāsifah.

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<sup>20</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.138.

<sup>21</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.143.

<sup>22</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.138.



### 5.3. The Problem of *Ṣifāt al-Ma'ānī*.

This section investigates the question of the seven attributes of God which are called by the Muslim theologians *Ṣifāt al-Ma'ānī*. Their name comes from the consideration that these attributes affirm a *ma'nā* (meaning or characteristic) in a subject in which they reside. Thus, if a subject has the attribute of, say, knowledge, this would mean that the subject is knowing which is a meaning or characteristic (*ma'nā*) of the subject in virtue of his knowledge.

Although, al-Juwaynī does not explicitly define these attributes, he affirms them as eternal and distinct attributes. The difference from other Ash'aris is that he sometimes calls them *ma'ānī* or *'ilal* (i.e. causes) and relates them directly to *al-ṣifāt al-ma'nawīyyah*. His affirmation of these attributes is implicit in statements such as: "God is willing in virtue of an eternal will"<sup>23</sup> where 'is willing' is what al-Juwaynī counts amongst *al-ṣifāt al-khabariyyah* while 'will' is what he variably calls *ṣifah*, *ma'nā* or *'illah* but what is known more generally as *ṣifat ma'ānī*. Despite the fact that al-Juwaynī does not include these attributes in his classification of attributes, he dedicates a long chapter to them under the title '*Ṭhbat al-'Ilm bi al-Ṣifāt*'<sup>24</sup> (Proof of the Knowledge of Attributes). Introducing this chapter, he says: "Now we start the proof of the knowledge of the attributes which cause the characteristics of the essence."<sup>25</sup> He obviously means *ṣifāt al-ma'ānī*.

With regard to this kind of attributes, there are two main subjects of discussion. First, there is the subject of the knowledge of these attributes and of their special characteristics. Such discussions mainly take place between the Muslims

<sup>23</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.94.

<sup>24</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.79-140.

<sup>25</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.78.



and other religions, especially the Christians. The other problem was discussed among Muslim theologians and concentrated on the question of whether or not these attributes were additional to God's essence.

It is interesting to describe briefly the main points of difference raised among Muslim theologians. The Mutakallimūn, especially, the *Ash'ariyah*, *Māturīdīyah*, and *Mu'tazilah*, and the Muslim philosophers, agree upon the description that God is powerful, willing, knowing, living, hearing, seeing and speaking.<sup>26</sup> The principle of associating the above seven concepts with God is accepted by all Muslim theologians. The difference, however, lies in the question that 'having established that God is, for example, knowing and willing, does this imply that God has such attributes as knowledge and will, and if so, are they distinguishable from and additional to his essence?' Most of the Mu'tazilites and philosophers like al-Kindī, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, maintain that it does not.<sup>27</sup>

Both groups maintain that, for instance, God is willing in virtue of His own essence and not in virtue of a distinct and extraneous attribute of will which is additional to His essence.

We can see at least two principles behind such a belief. First, rejecting distinct attributes places God in the highest possible degree of perfection because His pre-eternity requires that His essence should not be conditioned by anything other than itself in the attainment of perfection. The other reason is that accepting separate and additional attributes to God would lead to incompatibility with the oneness of God. Thus, according to the Mu'tazilites, their view leads

<sup>26</sup> Ibrāhīm Madkūr, *Fī al-Falsafah al-Islāmiyyah*, Dār al-Ma'ārif, Cairo, 1983, Vol.2., pp.39,49,57-58,81-82; Gimaret, Daniel, *La Doctrine d'al-Ash'arī*, p.259.

<sup>27</sup> al-Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Faḍl al-I'tizāl wa Ṭabaqāt al-Mu'tazilah*, ed. Fu'ād Sayyid, al-Dār al-Tūnusiyyah li al-Nashr, Tunis, 1986, p.347; Netton, *Allāh Transcendent*, pp.56-57,107,154.

to the true *tawḥīd*.<sup>28</sup>

The Ash'arites, however, hold that if we accept that God is potent and willing, then it is necessary to maintain that there are relating attributes such as power and will which are distinct from God's essence. The Ash'arite also differ in opinion: (i) Most of the Ash'arites hold that these attributes are other than God's essence, and base their argument on linguistics and revelation (i.e. Qur'ān and the Prophet's Tradition). (ii) However, al-Ash'arī himself holds that, although these attributes are additional to God, they cannot be said to be either the essence itself or other than the essence, in his words *lā hiya huwa wa lā ghayrahu* (they are neither He, nor other than He).<sup>29</sup>

#### 5.4. Definition of Attributes.

al-Ash'arī discussed *ṣifāt Allāh* without distinguishing between the attributes which are real existing entities and other positive and negative attributes which are basically characteristics of God resulting from His Essence.<sup>30</sup> al-Baghdādī classified these two kinds of attributes into *al-nu'ūt al-Dhātīyyah* (characteristics of the Essence)<sup>31</sup> and *al-Ṣifāt al-Qā'ima bi al-llāh* (Eternal Attributes).<sup>32</sup> We notice here that al-Baghdādī use a term other than attributes for al-Juwaynī's essential attributes. al-Juwaynī, as we shall see, keeps the distinction between the two types of attributes but calls both of them attributes. For the second kind of attributes, al-Juwaynī speaks of *al-ṣifāt al-ma'nawīyyah*, i.e. those caused by *ṣifāt al-ma'ānī*.

<sup>28</sup> al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Faḍl al-I'tizāl wa Ṭabaqāt al-Mu'tazilah*, ed. Fu'ād Sayyid, al-Dār al-Tūnusiyyah li al-Nashr, Tunis, 1986, p.347.

<sup>29</sup> Gimaret, *La Doctrine d'al-Ash'arī*, p.260.

<sup>30</sup> Gimaret, *La Doctrine d'al-Ash'arī*, pp.243-244.

<sup>31</sup> These are equivalent to al-Juwaynī's essential attributes.

<sup>32</sup> These are known as *Ṣifāt al-Ma'ānī*. Gimaret, *La Doctrine d'al-Ash'arī*, p.244.

We have seen that al-Juwaynī does not explicitly speak of *ṣifāt al-maʿānī*. He divides the attributes into two forms: (i) essential attributes (*ṣifāt nafsīyyah*) and (ii) conceptual attributes (*ṣifāt maʿnawīyyah*).<sup>33</sup>

The first are defined as: “any attribute affirmed (*ṣifat ithbāt*) of an essence, which belongs to the subject itself as long as the subject lasts, and which is not caused by causes residing in the subject.”<sup>34</sup> By saying *ṣifat ithbāt* he excludes the attributes of *maʿānī* because affirmation is not a meaning (*maʿnā*). Note that this definition does not exclude some negative and positive attributes used by al-Ashʿarī and some philosophers.<sup>35</sup> The expression ‘and which is not caused ....’ specifically excludes the conceptual attributes (*al-ṣifāt al-maʿnawīyyah*) because these, as we shall see, are caused by something existing within the Essence (in fact they are caused by *ṣifāt al-maʿānī*).

We shall see in later sections that these essential attributes are considered by al-Juwaynī as modes or states. al-Sanūsī makes it explicitly clear that these are modes in his definition: “any *ḥāl* affirmed of an essence and which is uncaused.”<sup>36</sup>

As an example of this kind of attributes, al-Juwaynī gives the example of the occupation of space by an atom. He says: “The space occupancy of an atom is an essential attribute, and this attribute remains with the atom as long as the atom exists. Also, it is not caused by something outside the atom and is thus an

<sup>33</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.30.

<sup>34</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.30.

<sup>35</sup> Like God is unlike anything else, He is not created, He has no second, He is Unique, and He is Eternal. For al-Ashʿarī's view on negative attributes see Gimaret, *La Doctrine d'al-Ashʿarī*, p.244; for al-Kindī's and Ibn Sīnā's views see Netton, *Allāh Transcendent*, pp.57-58,158.

<sup>36</sup> ʿAbd Allāh al-Sanūsī, *Sharḥ al-Sanūsiyya al-Kubrā*, ed. by Barakāt ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ and ʿAbd Allāh Barakah, 1971, p.150.



attribute of essence."<sup>37</sup> As we shall see, in associating these attributes to God, al-Juwaynī means essentially God's properties.

The conceptual attributes are defined as: "the affirmed characteristics of a subject (*al-aḥkām al-thābitah li al-mawṣūf bihā*) which are caused by something (*ʿilal*) residing in the subject."<sup>38</sup> In this definition, al-Juwaynī excludes the essential attributes because they are uncaused, and by mentioning 'affirmed' he excluded *ṣifāt al-maʿānī* because these are existing things while affirmation does not necessarily mean existence.<sup>39</sup> He gives an example of a person who is knowing in virtue of knowledge.<sup>40</sup> We show later that what he means by these attributes is that they are things that are neither existent nor non-existent, in other words, they are modes (*aḥwāl*) and this is made clear in al-Sanūsī's definition: "Any mode which is affirmed of an essence and which is caused by a *maʿnā* residing in the essence."<sup>41</sup> Apart from the word *ḥāl* the latter definition is virtually identical to that of al-Juwaynī.

### 5.5. Essential Attributes.

In al-*Irshād*, al-Juwaynī mentions five main essential attributes. These are as follows: he is existent, pre-eternal, omnipotent, different from contingent beings, and that he is one.

#### 5.5.1. Existence.

Although al-Juwaynī includes this description with the essential attributes, he himself does not completely agree that this is an attribute. He maintains:

<sup>37</sup> *al-ʾIrshād*, p.30.

<sup>38</sup> *al-ʾIrshād*, p.30.

<sup>39</sup> Already, al-Juwaynī shows that he does not believe that these attributes exist, but, equally, he does not believe that they are non-existent. See Section 5.6.

<sup>40</sup> *al-ʾIrshād*, p.30.

<sup>41</sup> al-Sanūsī, *Sharḥ al-Sanūsīyya al-Kubrā*, p.151.



“what is acceptable to us is that existence should not be included within the essential attributes because existence is the essence itself.”<sup>42</sup> It is not similar to the idea of an atom’s occupancy of space, because “occupancy is additional to the essence of the atom, while we take the view that the atom’s existence is the atom itself.”<sup>43</sup>

Nevertheless, existence will be discussed in the next chapter, as it is felt that this question has been given special consideration by theologians and philosophers alike. It is interesting therefore to dedicate a whole chapter to it in order to expand and discuss al-Juwaynī’s contribution in this matter in the light of other theologians’ and philosophers’ contribution.

### 5.5.2. Pre-eternity.

al-Juwaynī assumes that the existence of God has been proved. He also takes for granted that there are no infinite regressions, then he attempts to prove that God is pre-eternal. First he gives some definitions of pre-eternity as: “that which has no beginning.” He also gives al-Ash‘arī’s definition: “any existing being whose existence extended for a long time.”<sup>44</sup> The latter definition is obviously based on the Qur’ānic verse:

“حَتَّىٰ غَاذَ كَالْعُرْجُونِ الْقَدِيمِ”<sup>45</sup>

al-Juwaynī’s proof goes as follows: If God were contingent, then he would necessitate a creator (*muḥdith*). Now this creator also would require another creator and so on. This leads us to an infinite regression which al-Juwaynī takes as false.<sup>45</sup>

The only objection al-Juwaynī imagines is that in affirming a being who

<sup>42</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.31.

<sup>43</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.31.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, p.32.

<sup>45</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.32.

has no beginning, we are inevitably affirming infinite regression in time for a continued existence cannot be conceived outside time. This is obviously an easy objection to which he easily responds that time itself is a contingent and existing thing and thus we cannot enforce a condition of time, which is an existing thing, on another existence.<sup>46</sup>

### 5.5.3. Omnipotence.

By this al-Juwaynī means that God does not need space or a creator (*mukhaṣṣis*) to exist.<sup>47</sup> al-Juwaynī's proof that God is omnipotent is that if God occupied a space and needed it, it would necessarily follow that that space is eternal, and that God would be an attribute of that space. But an attribute cannot itself be described by characteristics from other attributes<sup>48</sup> and thus God does not need a space to exist.<sup>49</sup>

### 5.5.4. God is Different from Contingent Beings.

This essentially means that God is unlike any of his creation.<sup>50</sup> He is not an atom,<sup>51</sup> neither is he a body;<sup>52</sup> and finally He does not accept accidents.<sup>53</sup>

Before proceeding, al-Juwaynī discusses what is meant by 'two similar things' and 'two different things'.<sup>54</sup> However, he concludes that God may have some attributes in common with his creation.<sup>55</sup> Having said that, though, al-

<sup>46</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.32-33.

<sup>47</sup> This is the definition of Abū Ishāq, *al-Irshād*, p.33.

<sup>48</sup> وَ الصِّفَةُ يَسْتَحِيلُ أَنْ تُنْصِفَ بِالْأَحْكَامِ الَّتِي تُوجِبُهَا الْمَعَانِي

<sup>49</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.34.

<sup>50</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.34.

<sup>51</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.46.

<sup>52</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.42.

<sup>53</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.44.

<sup>54</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.34-39.

<sup>55</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.39.

Juwaynī discusses a number of things that cannot be predicated of God. These are: the occupancy of space (*tahayyuz*), being touched or sensed, and corporeality.<sup>56</sup> In general, any description which contradicts one of God's attributes cannot be predicated of Him. In this concern al-Juwaynī summarises: "If someone is asked about what is impossible for God, then the brief answer would be: anything that would indicate that He is contingent (*kullu mā yadullu 'alā ḥadathihi*)."<sup>57</sup>

#### 5.5.5. The Oneness of God.

al-Juwaynī explains that, by 'one', theologians understand that (i) God is indivisible, He is above partition or division, and; (ii) He is unique, there is none like or equal to Him.<sup>58</sup>

al-Juwaynī proves that God is indivisible as follows: If God were composed of more than one entity, then each of those entities would be independent of the other. There could then only be two cases: either only one of these would be omnipotent, knowing, living and powerful, or they would all be characterised by the same attributes. The first consideration is deemed to be absurd, because it is irrational to assume a pre-eternal Being who is not omnipotent, all-knowing, or living.<sup>59</sup> The second proposition is also rejected and al-Juwaynī argues first that it would mean recognising several gods, which is polytheism. To refute this, he limits the case to two gods only for simplicity. In his proof al-Juwaynī is inspired by the Qur'ānic verse: "If there were in them [Heavens and the Earth] other than God, their order would have been disrupted."

<sup>56</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.39-42.

<sup>57</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.60.

<sup>58</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.52.

<sup>59</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.52.

This proof is called *burhān al-tamānu'* (demonstration by exclusion), but al-Juwaynī arranges in the form of *al-sabr wa al-taqsim*.<sup>60</sup> If there exist two gods and one of the gods wills to move a body while the other wills the opposite, then there can only be impossible outcomes. For clarity we list these outcomes as follows:

(Outcome 1) If the wills of both are carried out, there will be motion and rest in the same subject (*maḥall*) at the same time, which is impossible.

(Outcome 2) If neither wills is carried out, then there will be:

(a) a subject which has neither motion nor rest, and this, like Outcome 1, is impossible; and

(b) neither god being able to exercise his will, and this also is absurd.

(Outcome 3) If the will of only one of the two gods is carried out then it would mean that the other god is impotent.<sup>61</sup>

This last outcome needs the proof that there cannot be a pre-eternal impotent being. The proof is: if we assume a pre-eternal impotent being, then his impotence must also be pre-eternal and inherent in him, and reason shows that this is impossible for one of the characteristics of impotence is that it manifests itself in preventing a possible occurrence. Thus the creation of the possible universe is incompatible with the idea of an impotent creator.<sup>62</sup>

al-Juwaynī criticises the suggestion that each god had a different competence by reducing the suggestion to the above mentioned three outcomes.<sup>63</sup> al-Juwaynī then refutes the assumption that the one god may create substances while the

<sup>60</sup> A demonstrative method in which the question is divided into all possible cases and then each case is rejected until one 'valid' case remains.

<sup>61</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.53.

<sup>62</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.56.

<sup>63</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.57.



other creates accidents, without conflict between them, using *burhān al-tamānu'* on the basis that there cannot be an atom without accidents.<sup>64</sup>

### 5.6. Conceptual Attributes (*al-Ṣifāt al-Ma'nawiyyah*.)

Before discussing these attributes, al-Juwaynī considers two main premises, namely that of the modes, and the principle that God has grounds. In line with al-Juwaynī we shall divide this section into three subsections leaving the conceptual attributes to the end.

#### 5.6.1. al-Juwaynī's Theory of Modes.

al-Juwaynī maintains that no theologian should fail to investigate the theory of modes, "whether under the heading of modes *aḥwāl*, aspects *wujūh*, or essential attributes (*ṣifāt Nafs*)."<sup>65</sup> In *al-Shāmil* al-Juwaynī gives the reason why the modes are important: "Because they explain the characteristics of causes (*aḥkām al-'ilāl*)."<sup>66</sup> According to al-Juwaynī, therefore, the theory of *aḥwāl* solves the delicate problem of the relationships between the essence of God and His attributes.<sup>67</sup>

From the outset, al-Juwaynī makes clear his intention to rely upon the theory of modes to explain the rather complicated question of attributes. Moreover, we can already understand from the above quotation that he considers the essential attributes to be modes.

However, before we discuss al-Juwaynī's classification of *aḥwāl* (modes), it is worth mentioning the classification of the founder of the theory of Modes. Abu Hāshim,<sup>68</sup> who defined the term mode as something existing in a person

<sup>64</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.59.

<sup>65</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.82.

<sup>66</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.361.

<sup>67</sup> Gardet and Anawati, *Introduction à La Théologies Musulmane*, p.67

<sup>68</sup> A Mu'tazili who produced the theory of modes as a substitute for

in virtue of which he differs from another person. He divides modes into three classes according to the form of predication; modes which are predicated of their subject (i) in virtue of the subject itself, (ii) in virtue of a *ma'nā*, and (iii) neither.<sup>69</sup>

Although the above definition of modes seems more precise than the rather vague definition of al-Juwaynī<sup>70</sup>, the above classification, however, is less precise.

According to al-Juwaynī, there are three possible states of things. He classifies all known things into three categories: (a) existent, (b) non-existent, (c) neither existent nor non-existent. The latter category is called mode or *ḥāl*.<sup>71</sup>

al-Juwaynī begins with a classification of modes into "caused" and "uncaused". Then he briefly describes the first type of modes "... it includes every predicate (*ḥukm*) affirmed of the essence in virtue of something, i.e. a *ma'nā*, subsisting in the subject. For example, the affirmation that a living being is living and that a powerful being is powerful".<sup>72</sup> Thus the caused mode is something ascribable to the essence and, at the same time, caused by it. This kind of mode is therefore any *ṣifah* or characteristic of a subject because of a quality inherent in it. For instance, the fact that a person is knowledgeable confers upon him a cause (*'illah*) which is in this case the attribute of knowledge.

At the same time, al-Juwaynī expresses his opinion that the conception of caused modes should not be limited to beings in which the *ma'na* in them has "life as a condition" for its existence. In simple terms, it should not be restricted

Mu'ammār's theory of *Ma'nā* which he criticised, see Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, pp.147-167.

<sup>69</sup> Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harvard University Press, London, 1975, p.183.

<sup>70</sup> al-Juwaynī defines a mode as an attribute of an existent being which can be described as neither existent nor in-existent. See *al-Irshād*, p.80.

<sup>71</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.82.

<sup>72</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.80.

to living beings. Rather, it should be extended to non-living beings, so that the terms "moving" and "black" predicated of a non-living body are to be called modes, the causes of which are the *ma'ānī* of motion and blackness.<sup>73</sup>

As for the uncaused modes, they are ascribable to the essence, but not caused by it or any other being.

al-Juwaynī distinguishes two kinds of uncaused modes. The first is illustrated by *al-tahayyuz* (space occupancy of an atom or a body). His definition of this kind of mode is almost identical to his earlier definition of the essential (divine) attributes.<sup>74</sup> An essential attribute is defined as follows: "any attribute affirmed of an essence, which belongs to the subject itself as long as the subject lasts, and which is not caused by causes residing in the subject."<sup>75</sup> while the uncaused mode is described as: "any attribute which affirms a subject, and has no cause outside the subject (i.e. in virtue of the subject itself)."<sup>75</sup> In the first definition, the subject is obviously God and thus the attribute is understood as a property which belongs to God alone. The second definition, however, is more general and can be applied to created things because the expression "in virtue of the subject itself" has the more general sense of 'any state present in whatever subject' or 'anything that can be predicated by definition'. An example of this is the term 'animal' given to a human being, "for animal is present in the formula that defines him."<sup>75</sup>

It may be understood that this first form of uncaused modes could be found in God as well as His creation. Both represent properties, but the difference is

<sup>73</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.80.

<sup>74</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.30.

<sup>75</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.30.

<sup>75</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.80.

<sup>75</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, p.186.



that the uncaused modes in created things have a wider definition compared to those of God.

The second form of uncaused modes is defined as “any attribute of an existence which cannot exist by itself, and which cannot be explained by outside existence.”<sup>76</sup> He illustrates this by “an existent thing (*al-mawjūd*) being accident, colour, blackness, and a state of being (*kawn*).”<sup>77</sup> We have seen in the previous chapter that al-Juwaynī divides the world into atoms and accidents and that the latter include colours, tastes, odours, life, death, knowledge, wills, powers, and *akwān*) (motion, rest, aggregation, and segregation). Going back to the above definition, we can see that al-Juwaynī starts with the word ‘accident’, which includes all remaining three descriptions. The second word, colour, includes the third blackness. This classification is illustrated in Figure 5.1 which clearly shows that this classification is very compatible with the idea of genera and species.

Genus:	Accident		
Species :	Colours	akwān	Tastes
Sub-Species :	Blackness, Whiteness etc.	Aggregation rest etc.	Sweetness etc.

Figure 5.1. Some Examples of Modes as Genera and Species.

As Wolfson maintains, al-Juwaynī was “acquainted with the terms genus, species, specific difference, and subaltern genera and species used in philosophy in connection with its classification of things.”<sup>78</sup> It seems very likely, therefore, that al-Juwaynī had in mind the kind of classification illustrated in Figure 5.1 without specifically pointing to it. Thus, what al-Juwaynī indirectly suggests

<sup>76</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.80.  
<sup>77</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.80.  
<sup>78</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.186



by his illustration of 'accident', 'colour', 'blackness' and 'state of being' as the second form of the uncaused modes suggested by him, is that the second kind of uncaused modes may be genera (like the accidents), species (like colour and state of being) and sub-species (like blackness which is a sub-species under the species colour).

It could therefore be concluded that according to al-Juwaynī, there are two forms of uncaused modes or *aḥwāl*: the first means properties while the second means genera and species. The most obvious difference between the two being their application to God, that is, only the first form may be applicable to God since He cannot be qualified as either a genus or a species.<sup>79</sup>

Although al-Juwaynī adopts the theory of modes (*aḥwāl*) he does not follow the same steps taken by Abu Hashim. al-Juwaynī was well aware of Abu Hashim's use of the theory of *aḥwāl*<sup>80</sup> and we can see that in a passage in *al-Irshād* where he reports the Mu'tazilites use of the single mode which is God's "most distinctive" (*akḥaṣṣ*) description.<sup>81</sup>

Thus, al-Juwaynī's adaptation of modes is not based on the acceptance of Abu Hashim's view of a single mode as the cause of all other modes. In *al-Irshād*, after stating that "the Mu'tazilites and the heretics who follow them agree upon the denial of attributes", he mentions a particular group who "express themselves by saying that these predicative terms are affirmed of the essence of god on account of his having a mode (*ḥālah*) which is the most proper (*akḥaṣṣ*) of his descriptions and this mode necessarily causes him to be described as living, knowing, and powerful".<sup>82</sup> According to Wolfson, the above view is "quite

<sup>79</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, pp.186-187.

<sup>80</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.174.

<sup>81</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.91.

<sup>82</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.90-91.

evidently that of Abu Hashim."<sup>83</sup>

The manner in which al-Juwaynī harmonises modes with attributes may be deduced from two chapters in *al-Irshād*, the chapter on "Attributes Necessary of God"<sup>84</sup> and the chapter under the heading "The Establishment of the Knowledge of Attributes".<sup>85</sup> In the second of these two chapters, al-Juwaynī provides a discussion on modes and answers those who reject it.<sup>86</sup> It could be inferred from these two chapters that what are referred to by al-Juwaynī as attributes are regarded by him as modes in general.

Most of the Ash'arite theologians do not agree with the theory of modes, considering that the space occupancy of an atom is identical to the existence of that atom. al-Juwaynī, however, proves modes as follows. Suppose that in the first instance a person knew that an atom existed but did not know that it occupied space. If the person later came to know that the atom occupied space, he would then have acquired a new knowledge about a thing already known; he would then possess two different items of knowledge: knowledge of the existence of the atom, and knowledge of its space occupancy. Now, the second item of knowledge is either identical with the first, or else it is distinct from it. As to the first assertion, both items cannot be identical because it is evident to any rational mind who has acquired the second item of knowledge that he knows something new. It follows, therefore, that the space occupancy of an atom or a body is distinct from its existence.<sup>87</sup>

It is interesting to see that al-Juwaynī's classification of attributes is similar

<sup>83</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, pp.176-177.

<sup>84</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.30.

<sup>85</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.79.

<sup>86</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.80.

<sup>87</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.81.

to the classification of modes. His treatment of attributes as modes emerges more clearly from a close comparison of his description and illustration of what he finds to be the two kinds of divine attributes with his description and illustration of what he finds to be the two kinds of modes.

We know that, according to him, there are essential attributes (*sifat naf-siyyah*, such as existence, and these correspond to what he classifies as the first kind of “uncaused modes”, which have a the special meaning of properties.<sup>88</sup> This kind of attributes, therefore, could be seen as modes which are neither existent nor nonexistent. On the other hand, the second kind of attributes are called *sifat ma'nawiyyah* and could easily be compared to the “caused modes”. We shall see later that the cause of these are called *ma'ānī* and it could be deduced from this that that *sifat ma'nawiyyah* mean attributes which are caused by a *ma'nā*. Thus, attributes such as powerful and living,<sup>89</sup> are modes (which are neither existent nor inexistent) which are caused by a corresponding attribute or *ma'nā* such as power or life. The latter two attributes, however, are real attributes existing in God and distinct from his essence.

#### 5.6.2. God is Justified (*ta'līl al-wājib*).

It is known that the Mu'tazilites do not prove the attributes. One of their premises which implies that is that God is not justified *mu'allal*. al-Juwaynī refutes their arguments and dedicates a whole section to discussing this question. He then proceeds to prove that God has grounds (is *mu'allal*) and that the attributes are additional to his essence. He uses two methods in his argumentation: the deduction from the known to the unknown (*qiyās al-ghā'ib 'alā al-shāhid*)

<sup>88</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, p.177.

<sup>89</sup> *Irshād*, p.80.



and *al-sabr wa al-taqīm*.<sup>90</sup>

### 5.6.3. Affirmation of Conceptual Attributes (*al-Ṣifāt al-Ma'nawīyyah*).

Having established the main bases of his theory of attributes, namely the existence of modes *al-aḥwāl* and that God is justified (*mu'allal*), the attributes are easily proved to exist. It is worth noting that conceptual attributes are modes and caused by real attributes (*ṣifāt al-ma'ānī*) described by him as pre-eternal (*qadīmah*), eternal (*'abadīyyah*) and inherent in God's essence. In our account, therefore, we use terms such as knowing (which is a mode) interchangeably with the term knowledge (which is a real attribute) because one implies the other. So in proving one, we automatically prove the other. In his arguments for proving the existence of attributes al-Juwaynī relies on generally accepted premises and on the deductions from the known to the unknown.

#### 5.6.3.1. Knowledge, Power, and Life.

al-Juwaynī takes the view that it is self-evident that the attributes of knowledge, power, and life, exist. This is because (i) it is established that God is the creator of the universe, and (ii) any rational mind aware of the world's arrangement and perfection must concede that it can have originated only from a knowing and potent being. He says, "Anyone who notices orderly lines and well-designed strokes, and thinks that it possible that they have been written by someone who is ignorant of the art of writing is beyond reason and is entering into the world of ignorance".<sup>91</sup> And if it is established that the Creator is knowing and powerful, it necessarily follows that he is living.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>90</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.84-94.

<sup>91</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.61-62.

<sup>92</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.63.



#### 5.6.3.2. Will.

The proof that God is willing is based on the method of deductions from the known to the unknown. The actions of human beings occur in particular ways and at particular times to the exclusion of other ways and times. This necessarily indicates that they willed their occurrence in a given way and at a special time. Now, if it is agreed that orderliness and perfection prove that their author is knowing, then it must be conceded that the special ways and times of events show that he is willing. This conclusion is applicable to man as well as to God by means of *qiyās al-ghā'ib 'alā al-shāhid*.<sup>93</sup>

al-Juwaynī rejects the view of “some Mu'tazilites of Basra”, that God wills to create things by a created will,<sup>94</sup> His own belief is expressed in his statement “God is willing in virtue of an eternal will.” This is also the view of his own school.<sup>95</sup>

#### 5.6.3.3. Sight and Hearing.

On the same ground that God is living, al-Juwaynī argues that He is also hearing and seeing. al-Juwaynī says: “The proof that God is Hearing and Seeing is that He is living, as we have shown, and that it is possible for Him to be so. However, if God were devoid of [these descriptions], then He would be described by such predicates as blind.”<sup>96</sup> This is based on the principle of the two opposites which have no intermediate. This means that God must be described as either seeing and hearing or their opposites. Since the latter would mean that he is imperfect, then it must be established that God is seeing and hearing.<sup>97</sup>

<sup>93</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.64.

<sup>94</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.64, 94.

<sup>95</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.94.

<sup>96</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.72-73.

<sup>97</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.73.

al-Juwaynī then raises a possible objection on the basis that God cannot be described as seeing and hearing just as he cannot be associated with colours. To refute this and other objections al-Juwaynī uses *al-sabr wa al-taqīm* and unanimity *al-‘ijmā’*.<sup>98</sup>

The most important objection, however, is that of the other senses. If we agree that God is seeing and hearing, why not describe him with the other senses such as taste and smell?<sup>99</sup> al-Juwaynī concedes that the same process of thought which proves God to be hearing and seeing should also show that He must be attributed with the reality of senses (*aḥkām al-idrākāt*).<sup>100</sup> However, he maintains that God is too elevated (*yataqaddas*) to possess the attributes of smell, taste, or feeling. He gives two reasons. Firstly, such attributes would imply that God would have certain contacts which are unworthy of God. Secondly, these attributes are not the reality of the senses (*ḥaqā’iq al-idrākāt*). Indeed, a man can say: “I have smelt the apple, but I have not sensed its fragrance,”<sup>101</sup> and this shows that there is a distinction between smelling and sensing (*al-idrāk*); the former cannot be ascribed to God, because of His perfection, while the latter shows that the former is not necessary to know the reality of the sense.

#### 5.6.3.4. Speech (*kalām Allāh*).

al-Juwaynī starts his discussion of this attribute by saying: “we have devised earlier the argument to establish that God is speaking (*mutakallim*), ...”<sup>102</sup> He continues by stating that having established that God is speaking “we now turn

<sup>98</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.73-76.

<sup>99</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.76-77.

<sup>100</sup> *al-Irshād*

<sup>101</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.77.

<sup>102</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.99.

to the nature of His (i.e. God's) speech."<sup>103</sup> This quite evidently shows that al-Juwaynī intends to give this attribute special consideration. This is probably because Speech was the subject of fierce discussion among Muslim theologians and even led to civil unrest.<sup>104</sup>

Basically, the Mu'tazilites believe that the Qur'ān (which is the Speech of God) is contingent (*Ḥādith*). They advance intellectual arguments as well as arguments from the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, arguing that the Qur'ān is not eternal and that since it is written and spoken, and since some of its verses and rules were abrogated it cannot be uncreated.<sup>105</sup>

al-Juwaynī maintains that Muslims unanimously affirm this attribute, but do not agree on its special characteristics.

The argument is this: "Miracles have proved the truthfulness of prophets, and these - after proving their truthfulness - have informed us in general that speech is attributable to God, and also of certain details concerning this speech. It is therefore necessary to ascribe the attribute of speech to God".<sup>106</sup>

al-Juwaynī reviews and discusses all the different attempts to define speech. He then gives al-Ash'arī's definition which is: "Speech is what, if present in a subject, makes the subject speaking."<sup>107</sup> However, al-Juwaynī rejects this definition and proposes his own. He says: "It is more appropriate to say that speech is the word [or saying] (*al-qawl*) residing in the essence of the subject (*al-qā'im bi*

<sup>103</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.99.

<sup>104</sup> This is known as *mihnat khalq al-qur'ān*, see for example M. Abdul Hye, "Ash'arism", in M.M. Sharif (ed.), *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, Vol. 1, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1963, p.221.

<sup>105</sup> See for example, 'Abd al-Jabbār bin Aḥmad, *Faḍl al-I'tizāl waṣ Ṭabaqāt al-Mu'tazilah*, ed. Fu'ād Sayyid, al-Dār al-Tūnusiyya li al-Nashr, Tunis, 1986, pp.156-157.

<sup>106</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.44.

<sup>107</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.104.



*al-nafs*) and which is recognised through expressions and conventional signs".<sup>108</sup>

According to al-Juwaynī the Mu'tazilites define speech as "discrete sounds and ordered letters denoting specific expressions."<sup>109</sup> This definition contradicts al-Juwaynī's affirmation of "the essence-residing speech [or essential speech] (*al-kalām al-qā'im bi al-nafs*).<sup>110</sup> al-Juwaynī reports that the Mu'tazilite Ibn al-Jubbā'ī<sup>111</sup> did affirm such speech (i.e. essential speech), but he called it 'perceptions' (*khawātir*) and that such perceptions were heard and comprehended by the hearing sense.<sup>112</sup> al-Jubbā'ī,<sup>113</sup> however, maintained that we cannot say that the discrete (*mutaqattī'ah*) sounds made intermittent by the articulation of letters are speech. Instead, he suggests that speech is made up of the letters associated with the sounds, and these letters are heard together with the sounds.<sup>114</sup> al-Juwaynī then discusses these views and refutes them, and then advances his arguments for proving *kalām al-nafs*. al-Juwaynī proof goes as follows: "If a sound man gives an order to his slave, he would certainly find in himself a necessity for obedience (*iqtiḍā' al-tā'ah*).<sup>115</sup> This feeling of obedience is translated by him and expressed in words, signs, or of writing.<sup>115</sup> This necessity (*iqtiḍā'*) is neither will nor belief. Firstly, it is not will because a person may give an order which he does not really want to be carried out, yet he feels within himself the necessity that his order must be followed.<sup>116</sup> Secondly, it is not belief, because

<sup>108</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.104.

<sup>109</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.104.

<sup>110</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.105.

<sup>111</sup> 'Abd al-Salām Ibn Muḥammad (Abū hāshim), *al-Irshād*, p.436.

<sup>112</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.104.

<sup>113</sup> Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī, a Mu'tazilite from Basra and the father of Abū Hāshim, *al-Irshād*, p.442.

<sup>114</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.105.

<sup>115</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.105.

<sup>116</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.105.



belief can either be an assumption, a knowledge, an ignorance, or any other kind of belief. But anyone who feels such a necessity for obedience has no doubt that it is not an assumption, neither is it any of the kinds of belief.<sup>117</sup>

al-Juwaynī provides another kind of proof. He says: "if a person says *'if'al* [requesting something from another person by saying: 'do'] he could be implying an obligation, a permissibility, or a desirability; it could even mean prohibition. Now suppose it is meant to indicate obligation, then the expression cannot be said to be the obligation itself because the form of the expression is exactly the same as for the other possibilities such as desirability. Thus, the implied obligation is only a *ma'na* in the essence which is manifested by a form of expression."<sup>118</sup>

The final argument of al-Juwaynī is based on the linguistic usage of the Arabs. He states that the arabs use the word *kalām* in the sense of a notion existing in the mind and the essence. They use expressions such as *kāna fī nafsī kalām*, and *zawwartu fī nafsī qawl*.<sup>119</sup> al-Juwaynī seems to favour a verse by al-Akhtal which says:

إِنَّ الْكَلَامَ لَفِي الْفُؤَادِ وَإِنَّمَا  
جُعِلَ اللِّسَانُ عَلَى الْفُؤَادِ ذَلِيلًا

(Speech lies in the heart, the tongue is made only as a guide to the heart).<sup>120</sup>

The above three arguments show clearly that, according to al-Juwaynī, the word *kalām* has a wider significance than merely a spoken word. One particular meaning, and indeed the most important is *kalām al-nafs*.

al-Juwaynī, however, concedes that the difference between him and the Mu'tazilites is simply a conflict of terms. He says: "what they have proved

<sup>117</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.106.

<sup>118</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.107.

<sup>119</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.107-108.

<sup>120</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.108.

and considered to be *kalām* cannot be denied.”<sup>121</sup> In brief, the Mu‘tazilites define *kalām* as the action of the speaker (*Mutakallim*) (and the action does not need to reside in the subject). By this they considered *Kalām* as mere words, and thus it was natural that they concluded that the Qur’ān was created. On the other hand, al-Juwaynī and other Ash‘aris have a different picture in mind. They defined *Kalām* as something residing in the essence of the speaker, and thus they were forced to deny that the speaker was the creator of *kalām*, for otherwise they would have had to concede that there could be attributes originated within His essence.<sup>122</sup> The disagreement therefore reduces to a difference in language and terminology. He explains: “When they [the Mu‘tazilites] say, ‘These expressions are God’s *Kalām*’ they mean that God has created it. While we do not deny that these expressions are His creation, we refrain from calling the creator of a speech a speaker of it.”<sup>123</sup> Both agreed on the idea, but disagreed on the terms.

Having agreed on the idea and disagreed on the vocabulary usage with the Mu‘tazilites, al-Juwaynī goes on to describe what is exactly meant by the word *kalām*. He says: “The *kalām* which the people of the truth *ahl al-haqq* describe as pre-eternal, it is the *Kalām* residing in the essence (*nafs*), and this is denied by our opponents.”<sup>124</sup>

It could be understood from al-Juwaynī’s discussion that he believed that that the Qur’ān is *Kalām Allāh*, and that it is eternal only in the sense that it consists of notions or *m‘ānī* held in his essence. This eternal thing is obviously different from the sounds of the recitation of the Qur’ān, or the written texts on paper. This Qur’ān, without any doubt, is a created thing. Thus we can say

<sup>121</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.116.

<sup>122</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.116-117.

<sup>123</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.116-117.

<sup>124</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.117.

that the (pronounced and written) Qur'ān is *kalām Allāh* only metaphorically. This means that the Qur'ān we hear and write is only a representation of a more general notion which is *kalām al-naḥs* residing in the essence of God.<sup>125</sup> al-Juwaynī argues that speech cannot be an essential attribute *ṣifah nafsīyyah*; having established that it is not a created thing then he deduced that it only remains to describe it as an eternal attribute additional to God's essence.<sup>126</sup>

#### 5.6.3.5. Post-Eternity (*al-baqā'*).

Despite the fact that al-Juwaynī's Ash'arite predecessors affirmed post-eternity as an attribute which is distinct from God's existence, al-Juwaynī went against this view and, in a way, agreed with the Mu'tazilites who denied it.<sup>127</sup> The Ash'arites before al-Juwaynī consider *al-baqā'* to be in the same category as His knowledge and power. This means that the number of attributes is eight rather than seven.

For al-Juwaynī, God is post-eternal by Himself, i.e. post-eternity is simply continued existence, and not an attribute additional to the essence. al-Juwaynī argues that if we considered post-eternity to be an attribute, we would be forced to affirm this attribute of post-eternity to all other eternal attributes which would mean we ascribe a quality to itself (*qiyām al-ma'nā bi al-ma'nā*). Moreover, if there were such an attribute as post-eternity, it would be itself post-eternal which is absurd.<sup>128</sup>

al-Juwaynī also advances the following argument: "If we accepted such an eternal attribute, it would also necessarily be pre-eternal, and this leads to an

<sup>125</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.117-137.

<sup>126</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.118.

<sup>127</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.138-139.

<sup>128</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.139.



infinite regression.”<sup>129</sup> This also is absurd.

Although both al-Juwaynī and the Mu‘tazilites do not accept that post-  
eternity is an attribute distinct from God’s essence, they disagree in that the  
former make this attribute inseparable from God’s essence, whereas al-Juwaynī  
refuses it altogether as an attribute and considers it as simply continued existence.

#### 5.7. Revealed Attributes (*al-Ṣifāt al-Khabariyyah*.)

The revealed attributes are those attributes which have been transferred  
to us through the Qur’ān or the Sunnah. Among these are the Face,<sup>130</sup> the  
Hands,<sup>131</sup> the Eyes,<sup>132</sup> the sitting on the Throne,<sup>133</sup>

The early Traditionists’ and jurists’ view about these attributes was to take  
them as they are without attempting to look into their meaning, but at the  
same time emphasising the transcendence of God.<sup>134</sup> This is also the view of the  
Companions of the Prophet and the early jurists like Ibn Ḥanbal and Mālik.<sup>135</sup>  
The latter is reported to have said to someone who asked him about the sitting  
on the Throne “The sitting is known, the way is unknown, believing in it is a  
duty, and asking about it is heresy.”<sup>136</sup> Like the Traditionists and the Salafis,  
al-Ash‘arī maintained the acceptance of these attributes on a *bilā kayf* (without

<sup>129</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.139.

<sup>130</sup> Qur’ān, s. al-Qaṣaṣ, v.88; s. al-Raḥmān, v.27.

<sup>131</sup> Qur’ān, s. Ṣād, v.75; s. al-Mā’idah, v.64.

<sup>132</sup> Qur’ān, s. al-Ṭūr, v.48; s. al-Qamar, v.14.

<sup>133</sup> Qur’ān, s. al-A‘rāf, v.54; s. Ṭaha, v.5.

<sup>134</sup> al-Qurtubī, *al-Jāmi‘ li Ahkām al-Qur’ān*, Dār al-Kutub, Cairo, 1356 AH, Vol.2, p.14.

<sup>135</sup> Ibn Taymiyyah, *al-Risālah al-Tadmuriyyah*, al-Maṭba‘ah al-Salafiyyah, Cairo, 1400 AH., p.16.

<sup>136</sup> ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Muḥammad al-Salmān, *al-As‘ilah wa al-Ajwibah al-Uṣūliyyah*, n.p., n.d., Riyadh, p.66.



asking how) basis.<sup>137</sup> However, in his *Ibānah al-Ash'arī* moves slightly away from his principle of without how and says that God has two real hands except that they are unlike ours.<sup>138</sup> al-Juwaynī's father himself held a Traditionist stand with regard to these attributes.<sup>139</sup>

The Mu'tazilites, however, reject the reality of these attributes on the basis that God does not resemble in any respect his creatures and that He is neither body nor accident.<sup>140</sup> According to them, this is the true *tawhīd*.<sup>141</sup> Moreover, attributes such as God's pleasure and anger are not attributes but modes or states.<sup>142</sup> For other revealed attributes, the Mu'tazilites use interpretation. For example, they interpret the Hand as goodness (*ni'mah*).<sup>143</sup> Ibn Ḥazm rejected both the view of the Mu'tazilites and the view of al-Ash'arī that the hands and the eyes were real. Instead, Ibn Ḥazm suggests that by the Face of God, the Hand of God, and the Eyes of God, we should understand God Himself.<sup>144</sup> Ibn Taymiyyah, argues that only God knows the true nature of His attributes, and the duty of all Muslims is to believe in what He attributed to Himself and reject what He did not attribute to Himself. Muslims, according to him, should not

<sup>137</sup> Gimaret, *La Doctrine d'al-Ash'arī*, p.324; 'Abd al-'Azī Bin Bāz and Sālah Bin Fūzān al-Fūzān, *Tanbihāt fī al-Radd 'Alā man Ta'awwala al-Ṣifāt*, al-Ri'āsa al-'Āmma li'idārāt al-Buḥūth al-'ilmiyya wa al-'Iftā' wa al-Da'wa wa al-'Irshād, Riyadh, 1405 AH, pp.20-21.

<sup>138</sup> Gimaret, *La Doctrine d'al-Ash'arī*, p.325.

<sup>139</sup> Ridā ibn Na'sān Mu'tī, *Ilāqat al-Ithbāt wa al-Tafwīd*, Maṭba'at al-Turāth, Makkah, 1402 AH, p.48.

<sup>140</sup> 'Abd al-Jabbār bin Aḥmad, *Fadl al-I'tizāl was Ṭabaqāt al-Mu'tazilah*, p.347; Ṣubḥī, Aḥmad Maḥmūd, *Fī 'Ilm al-Kalām: al-Mu'tazilah*, Dār al-Naḥḍah al-'Arabiyyah, Beirut, 1985, p.125.

<sup>141</sup> al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, p.55.

<sup>142</sup> Mir Valiuddin, *Mu'tazilism*, in M.M. Sharif (ed.), *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, Vol. 1, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1963, p.202.

<sup>143</sup> Ibn Ḥazm, Abī Muḥammad, *al-Faṣl fī al-Milal wa al-Aḥwā' wa al-Niḥal*, Dār al-Ma'rifah, Beirut, 1975, Vol.2., p.166.

<sup>144</sup> Ibn Ḥazm, Abī Muḥammad, *al-Faṣl fī al-Milal wa al-Aḥwā' wa al-Niḥal*, Dār al-Ma'rifah, Beirut, 1975, Vol.2., p.166.

venture into speculation regarding God's attributes.<sup>145</sup>

The Mu'tazilites, were not the only ones to interpret the revealed attributes. al-Isfārā'īnī and al-Baghdādī opted for the interpretation of these attributes.<sup>146</sup> al-Juwaynī, as we shall see, also adopted the interpretation of these attributes. As opposed to the founder of the Ash'arite school, al-Juwaynī did not adhere to the view of the majority. With al-Juwaynī, as Gardet and Anawati maintain, theology becomes more "liberal".<sup>147</sup>

Ibn Taymiyyah maintains that al-Juwaynī was the first Ash'arite to have interpreted the revealed attributes.<sup>148</sup> Opposing his predecessors, al-Juwaynī joined the Mu'tazilites in the question of revealed attributes. He interprets the Hands as power, the Eyes as vision, and the Face as existence.<sup>149</sup>

Those who oppose the interpretation of the Hands by power argue that God blamed Satan for not bowing to Adam<sup>150</sup> for the special reason that Adam was made by God's own Hands. Since all creatures were created by God's power there must be something special in the case of Adam which is the Hands. Therefore, the interpretation is not justified.<sup>151</sup> al-Juwaynī replies that all creatures, including Adam were created by God's power and that the bowing was not requested because of creation by hands. Moreover, there are many examples where God adds created things to His essence. He added the Ka'bah to Himself and the soul of Jesus to His Essence.<sup>152</sup>

<sup>145</sup> Ibn Taymiyyah, *al-Risālah al-Tadmuriyyah*, pp.28-33.

<sup>146</sup> Gimaret, *La Doctrine d'al-Ash'arī*, p.327.

<sup>147</sup> Gardet and Anawati, *Introduction à La Théologies Musulmane*, p.66

<sup>148</sup> Ibn Taymiyyah, *Minhāj al-Sunnah*, Būlaq, Cairo, n.d., vol.1, p.204.

<sup>149</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.155.

<sup>150</sup> Qur'ān, s.38, v.75.

<sup>151</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.156.

<sup>152</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.156.

As for the Eyes, al-Juwaynī cites an example from the Qur'ān where it is impossible to understand it as a real eye. This the case of the vessel of Noah which "drifted on under Our Eyes" (*tajrī bi A'yūnīnā*).<sup>153</sup> al-Juwaynī argues that the only possible meaning is that the vessel drifted under God's vision and care.<sup>154</sup> For the face, al-Juwaynī uses the verse "All that lives on earth is doomed to die. But the face of your Lord will abide for ever."<sup>155</sup> To al-Juwaynī it is obvious that it is not only the Face of God that is eternal. His Essence and other attributes are eternal, and, therefore, the only possible meaning is to understand the face of God in this verse as His existence.<sup>156</sup> He also mentions other examples of Arabic usage of *Wajh Allāh* which have metaphorical meanings.<sup>157</sup>

al-Juwaynī does not take the words the 'sitting' (*al-Istiwā*'), the 'coming' (*al-majī*'), the 'descent' (*al-nuzūl*), and 'proximity' (*al-janb*) in their material meanings. He maintains that they might have other meanings depending on the general meaning of the whole verse and the circumstances in which it was said.<sup>158</sup> Finally, he interprets the leg mentioned in the verse: "yawma yukshafu 'an sāq" (On the day the dread event [lit. leg] unfolds)<sup>159</sup> as pointing to the severe and terrifying time of the day of judgement.<sup>160</sup>

A very important point to mention here is that al-Juwaynī categorically rejects all revealed attributes mentioned in the Sunnah on the basis that these Aḥādīth were *Āḥād*.<sup>161</sup> As far as the revealed attributes are concerned, al-

<sup>153</sup> Qur'ān, s.54, v.14.

<sup>154</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.157.

<sup>155</sup> Qur'ān, s.55, v.27.

<sup>156</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.157.

<sup>157</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.157.

<sup>158</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.158.

<sup>159</sup> Qur'ān, s.68, v.42.

<sup>160</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.159.

<sup>161</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.161.



Juwaynī was virtually a Mu'tazilite. Indeed, like them he interpreted the attributes mentioned in the Qur'ān and rejected those mentioned in the Sunnah.

Chapter 8 discusses the view of al-Juwaynī on the revealed attributes in his *Luma'*.

### 5.8. Conclusion.

This chapter reviewed and analysed the divine attributes in al-Juwaynī's thought. He departed from the traditional Ash'arite position in three main respects.

The first departure is that he introduced a new division and classification of the divine attributes. He divided attributes into essential and conceptual. He concentrates his discussion mainly on these two types. Knowing that both of these kinds are not real entities, it is tempting to think that he was avoiding the subject of the addition of attributes to God and the internal plurality of God that such a belief would lead to. Indeed, al-Juwaynī does not specifically discuss *ṣifāt al-ma'ānī* as part of his classification but still dedicates a chapter to discussing them. The question of why he did not use a three way classification, as he should have done, is puzzling.

The second departure is his use of modes (*aḥwāl*) to explain both types of attributes. Thus, both kinds of attributes are neither existent nor non-existent. The essential attributes are uncaused modes while the conceptual attributes are modes which are caused by *ma'ānī* (things or entities) inherent in God.

The third departure from his predecessor is his distinction between *kalām al-nafs* (Speech) which is an attribute of God and which is uncreated, and the created *kalām* which is the written, spoken, and memorised Qur'ān. al-Juwaynī is therefore with both the Mu'tazilites who believed that the Qur'ān was created



and the Orthodoxy who believed that the Qur'ān was uncreated. To him, it all depends on how we see the Qur'ān. If we look at the source of the Qur'ān, then we would have to say that it is the Eternal Speech of God which is obviously uncreated. However, if we were to look at the Qur'ān in its earthly form of books, words, sounds and memory, then we would say that it is created since these books and sounds did not exist before the coming of the Prophet.

The fourth and most important departure is his interpretation of the revealed attributes. In this subject al-Juwaynī is in total agreement with the Mu'tazilites. He also tends to reject attributes revealed by single Traditions (*āḥād*).

The general view of al-Juwaynī in the question of attributes can be summarised as follows. For al-Juwaynī god has an Essence and a number of attributes. Although al-Juwaynī tries to avoid mentioning *ṣifāt al-ma'ānī* explicitly in order to avoid explaining whether these are separate from or identical to the Essence, we have deduced from the discussion in Chapter 5 the classification shown in Figure 5.2. The first entity is the Essence which has direct properties (essential attributes). These first kind of attributes are essential, uncaused and cannot be said to be either existent or non-existent (modes or states). These are existence, eternity, omnipotence, difference from contingents, and oneness. These are not entities and their usefulness is only to describe the property and nature of the Essence. It is like saying that the Essence exists and is eternal by definition. Thus, the Essence does not need to have something inherent in it in order for it to be omnipotent. However, alongside the Essence there are real, uncaused attributes as can be seen in the second column of the Figure. These were not caused by the Essence and are eternally separate. The first column

shows the conceptual attributes which are not real entities and which are caused by the attributes in column 2.

Thus, the attributes in column 1 and 4 are only an idea or a property which is not real. The essential ones are uncaused since they follow by definition. But the conceptual attributes are concepts which were the result of something real existing within God. It must therefore be deduced that God may be conceived crudely as consisting of the Essence and the Ma'ānī (the acting attributes).

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ma'naviyyah	Ma'ānī		Essential/
Caused	Uncaused		Uncaused/
Modes	Real		Modes
Speaking	Speech	E	
Powerful	Power	S	Existant
Knowledgeable	Knowledge	S	Eternal
Willing	Will	E	Omnipotent
Living	Life	N	Different
Seeing	Sight	C	One
Hearing	Hearing	E	

Figure 5.2. Attribute System in al-Juwaynī's Thought.

The obvious criticism that can be directed against al-Juwaynī is that he concentrated on column (1) and (4) which are only aspects and/or results of the more substantial and more important real entities in column (2) and (3), to which he should have given the biggest share.

From the above figure, we may deduce that to al-Juwaynī God as an entity is the combination of His Essence (column 1) with His Seven Real Attributes (column 2). What he calls essential and conceptual attributes are simply His characteristics.

Another criticism that could be directed against al-Juwaynī is that he did not mention many attributes which are unanimously accepted by Muslims. Among these are anger, the going (*al-majī' wa al-Itiyān*), and God being pleased (*al-riḍā*).<sup>162</sup>

In the next chapter, we turn to the question of the origination of the world and the proof of existence according to al-Juwaynī's.




Figure 5.2. Attribute System in al-Juwaynī's Thought. The diagram illustrates the relationship between various attributes of God. It is organized into several columns and rows. The top row lists 'Essential' and 'Uncaused'. The second row lists 'Caused' and 'Uncaused'. The third row lists 'Powerful' and 'Knowledgeable'. The fourth row lists 'Living' and 'Different'. The fifth row lists 'Life' and 'Different'. The diagram uses arrows and boxes to show how these attributes are interconnected and categorized within al-Juwaynī's theological framework.

<sup>162</sup> Ṭāriq al-Suwaydān, *Mukhtaṣar al-'Aqīdah al-Islāmiyyah*, Dār al-Da'wah, Kuwait, 1985.

## Chapter Six

### The Origination of the World

#### and the Proof of the Existence of God

##### 6.1. Introduction.

The idea of creation is found at the very heart of religious and philosophical thoughts, because it is the foundation upon which the major religions rest. The belief in the existence or non-existence of God is a serious matter in Islam and has been discussed by all Muslim theologians and Philosophers.

This chapter studies the argument for creation used by Ash'arite theologians and as expounded and developed by al-Juwaynī. We also show how al-Juwaynī proved both the existence and the will of God on the basis of the Ash'arite argument in combination with his own idea of particularisation and admissibility.

In his works, al-Juwaynī produced two main arguments for the creation of the world. The first argument stems from his predecessors' works and the accepted doctrine of *ahl al-haqq* (the Ash'aris). This argument is called 'the argument from accidents' and may be summarised in three steps as follows:

1. Divide the world into two basic components say: X and Y.
2. Show that (a) X exists, (b) X was created, and (c) Y cannot exist without X.
3. Conclude that Y also was created. Hence the world was created.

Although this argument was used by his predecessors, al-Juwaynī has expounded it with a lengthy discussion of basic principles, definitions, and proofs.



Moreover, he went to some length in refuting his school's opponents and thus strengthening his own contribution to his school of thought. His method consists of explaining his opponents' opinions then refuting them, through a series of questions and answers. What is also noteworthy is the orderly manner in which he treated the subject and his knowledge of theories and opinions available at the time.

From our reading of al-Juwaynī's books, we noticed that he often mentions the source of his statements or views. He makes it clear when the idea is borrowed, summarised or simply reproduced. This leads us to assume that in cases where he does not mention any source, the statement or view is either completely or partially his own contribution. If this assumption holds, then a careful reading through *al-Shāmīl*<sup>1</sup> would reveal that his contribution to his predecessors' argument is substantial. This cannot be deduced from *al-Irshād*<sup>2</sup> and even less in *Luma' al-Adillah*<sup>3</sup> because these books are rather brief and the discussion of the proof of the creation of the world is reduced to a minimum.

The second argument, called the 'argument from particularisation' will be discussed in Section 6.7. This argument is based on the idea of admissibility and particularisation (*takhṣīṣ*) and al-Juwaynī seems to have been the first theologian to present such an argument. We believe therefore that this is one of his independent and original contributions to his school.

The existence of God according to the Mutakallimūn in general, and to al-Juwaynī in particular, is based on two central themes, namely, the world

<sup>1</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Shāmīl*, edited by al-Nashshār et. al., Alexandria, n.d.

<sup>2</sup> al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād*, edited by M. Yūsuf Mūsā and 'Alī 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, Maktabat al-Khanji, Cairo, 1950.

<sup>3</sup> al-Juwaynī, *Luma' al-Adilla*, ed. H.M. Fawqiyah, 'Ālam al-Kutub, Beirut, 1987.

(*al-‘ālam*) and *al-ḥudūth* (creation, origination or contingency). As we shall see, these two words are very important in al-Juwaynī's discussions on the origination of the world and the proof of the existence of God.

It is therefore interesting to see what is meant by these two Arabic words in general and by Muslim theologians in particular. In general, the word *ḥudūth* is derived from the verb *ḥadatha*, meaning 'it happened', 'occurred', 'came into existence', 'began', 'newly existed for the first time', and 'not having been before'.<sup>4</sup> The infinitive is *ḥudūth* which means origination or contingency.<sup>5</sup>

There are two other related nouns: *ḥadath*, event, and *ḥādith* which means a contingent thing, an accident, which happened or came into being from nothingness. al-Juwaynī uses *ḥadath* as synonymous to *ḥudūth* in many places in his books.<sup>6</sup> Another related noun is *ḥādith* which, apart from the classical meaning of saying, speech or discussion, means modern. The verb *qaduma* and *qadīm* (eternal) have the opposite meaning. However, the specialised sense of the word *ḥudūth* as used in establishing the creation of the world and the existence of God varies between the theologians and the philosophers. First, there is the meaning given by the philosophers, who believe that existence cannot spring from nothing.<sup>7</sup> They hold that there is an eternal matter coexisting with God which preceded contingent things. God is regarded as the Prime Agent or Mover. The second meaning is given by most theologians. This meaning is based on the belief that existence can occur from nothingness. Thus creation or *ḥudūth* is not pre-

<sup>4</sup> *Lisān al-‘Arab*, Cairo, pp.142-142.

<sup>5</sup> Ibrahīm Madkūr, *al-Mu‘jam al-Falsafī*, Majma‘ al-Lughah al-‘Arabiyyah, Cairo, 1979, p.80.

<sup>6</sup> See for example Jamīl Ṣalība, *al-Mu‘jam al-falsafī*, Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, Beirut, 1982, Vol. 1, pp.433-434. *al-Shāmīl*, pp.123, 186; *Irshād*, pp.17, 19. *al-Nizāmiyyah*, p.16.

<sup>7</sup> J. W. Sweetman, *Islam and Christian Theology*, Lutterworth Press, London, 1945, Part 1, Vol. 1, p.116.

ceded by any matter; the only being existing before creation is God. Anything, besides God, may be divided into atoms (or substance) (*jawāhir*) and accidents (*a'rāḍ*), and these were created by God from nothing.

The term *al-'ālam* (the world) means 'all the creatures' or 'what is contained in the cavity of the celestial sphere'.<sup>8</sup> Theologians define the term as "every existent besides God".<sup>9</sup> They also divide the world into substance and accident.<sup>10</sup>

al-Juwaynī does not suggest any new definitions to the two words *ḥudūth* and *al-'ālam*. He seems satisfied with the already existing definitions provided by his Ash'ari predecessors.

In this chapter we examine three of al-Juwaynī's books in which he discusses the question of origination or creation of the world as well as the proof of existence of God. These are *al-Shāmīl*, *al-Irshād*, and *Luma' al-Adillah*. In these three books al-Juwaynī exposes the opinions of both *ahl al-ḥaqq* (by whom he means the Ash'aris) and their opponents, especially the Mu'tazilites and the philosophers. While refuting opponents' views and definitions, he analyses and strengthens his school's opinions with strong intellectual proofs. At the same time, al-Juwaynī does not accept all definitions advanced by his predecessors. He sometimes selects the best opinion such as saying "This is one of the strongest arguments",<sup>11</sup> and on other occasions he introduces new definitions such as "and this is the best definition."<sup>12</sup> He also rejects many of his predecessor's opinions such as "Some

<sup>8</sup> Buṭrus al-Bustānī, *Quṭr al-Muḥīṭ*, Maktabat Lubnān, Beirut, n. d. , Vol. II, pp.1431.

<sup>9</sup> *Irshād*, p.17; *Luma'*, p.86.

<sup>10</sup> *Irshād*, p.17; *Luma'*, p.87.

<sup>11</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.152.

<sup>12</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.142.



imams took a view which we do not accept."<sup>13</sup>

From both *al-Shāmīl* and *al-Irshād*, we can see a more orderly and 'academic' treatment of the question of creation. He says: "It is more convenient to start with contingent beings (*al-ḥawādith*), for the Eternal (*al-Qadīm*) cannot be known by necessity (*lā yu'lam 'idṭirāran*) but, rather, by reflection and reasoning. Reflection cannot be performed without the knowledge of contingent beings and thus it is necessary to start by these. Moreover, it should be known that contingent beings are divided into two categories . . . ."<sup>14</sup>

We can see clearly how he attempts to establish an order in his presentation by introducing the subject and highlighting the points that should be discussed in order to reach a conclusion on the main question. More importantly, we can see that al-Juwaynī intends to link his theory of knowledge with the argument for creation.

In another book, called *al-Nizāmiyyah*, al-Juwaynī provides a completely new approach for the proof of creation or origination. This will be presented in Section 6.7.

## 6.2. The Eight Arguments for Creation.

It is interesting to look at the history of the arguments for creation that were available to the Mutakallimūn. We are particularly interested in seeing what was available before and after al-Juwaynī. The listing of the the eight arguments is drawn from Wolfson who quotes two Jewish theologians, Saadia and Maimonides.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.268.

<sup>14</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.140.

<sup>14</sup> H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Harvard University Press, London, 1976, p.373.



In 933 AD, Saadia wrote a book in Arabic listing four rational arguments for creation which were used by the theologians at his time. These were:

1. *The argument from finitudes (al-nihāyāt).* This argument was known to theologians but not used by them.<sup>15</sup>
2. *The argument from analogy of things in the world.* This was used by Plato, and taken up by Muslim theologians such as al-Ash'arī<sup>16</sup> whose argument is presented below.
3. *The argument from the createdness of accidents.*<sup>17</sup>
4. *The argument from the impossibility of an infinite by succession.*<sup>18</sup> This argument was used by Saadia and al-Nazzām as an independent argument.<sup>19</sup> al-Juwaynī, however, used it in combination with the previous argument in his formulation of the proof for the creation of the world.

More than two hundred years later, another Jewish theologian, Maimonides, lists seven arguments for creation which he says were used by the Mutakallimūn.<sup>20</sup> These were:

1. *The argument from analogy of things in the world.*<sup>21</sup>
2. *The argument from the aggregation and segregation of atoms.* This argument is ascribed to al-Ash'arī by al-Shahrastānī.<sup>22</sup> However, this argument only re-

<sup>15</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.373-374.

<sup>16</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.383. Note that Wolfson states that the argument was not produced by Abū al-Hasan al-Ash'arī but by a different theologian. His statement was based on the fact that al-Shahrastānī mentioned 'Abū al-Hasan' instead of his usual 'our master Abū al-Hasan'. We know now that this argument was produced by al-Ash'arī from his own book, as we shall see in the next section.

<sup>17</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.404.

<sup>18</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.410

<sup>19</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.410

<sup>20</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.373.

<sup>21</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.374.

<sup>22</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.386.

futes eternity rather than directly proving creation.

3. *The argument from the createdness of accidents.* This argument is ascribed to al-Ash'arī by al-Shahrastānī.<sup>23</sup> This argument seems to have been very popular judging from its reproduction in many books of Ash'aris theologians as well as their opponents, including Averroes and Ibn Ḥazm.<sup>24</sup>

4. *The argument from the impossibility of an infinite by succession.*<sup>25</sup> This was used for example by al-Ghazālī, Maimonides, and al-Shahrastānī, in addition to those who preceded them.

5. *The argument from particularisation.*<sup>26</sup> This argument is owed to al-Juwaynī who uses the concepts of particularisation and admissibility to prove the creation of the world.<sup>27</sup> This argument is not found before al-Juwaynī. Moreover, both Averroes<sup>28</sup> and Shahrastānī<sup>29</sup> ascribe it to al-Juwaynī.

6. *The argument from preponderation.*<sup>30</sup> This argument was used by Avicenna.<sup>31</sup>

7. *The argument from immortal souls.*<sup>32</sup> This is the last argument mentioned by Maimonides and is due to al-Shahrastānī.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.386.

<sup>24</sup> For a discussion see M. A. Hamāyah, *Ibn Ḥazm wa Manhajuhu fī Dirāsāt al-Adyān*, Dār al-Ma'ārif, Cairo, 1973, pp.321-324; Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, pp.392-399.

<sup>25</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.410

<sup>26</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.434.

<sup>27</sup> See Section 6.7.

<sup>28</sup> Ibn Rushd, *kitāb al-kashf 'an manāḥij al-Adillah*, translated by J. Windrow Sweetman, in *Islam and Christian Theology*, Lutterworth Press, London, 1967, Part II, Vol.II, p.91.

<sup>29</sup> al-Shahrastānī (Abi al-Faṭḥ), *Nihāyat al-Aqdām fī 'Ilm al-Kalām*, ed. A. Guillame, Maktabat al-Muthannā, n. d. , p.12

<sup>30</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.444.

<sup>31</sup> See Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, pp.444-452.

<sup>32</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.444.

<sup>33</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.455.

By comparing the lists of Saadia and Maimonides we can see where al-Juwaynī stands. We shall try to show in this chapter that al-Juwaynī produced a new formulation of the third argument listed by Saadia. More importantly, we can see that he added a new item to the list of Saadia, namely, the argument from particularisation.

### 6.3. Creation According to Muslim Theologians.

It is well known that there were various theories about the creation of the world before Islam. One of these was the Platonic theory of creation out of pre-existent or pre-eternal matter.<sup>34</sup> However, all Muslim theologians have rejected this theory in favour of a theory that the world was created from nothing.<sup>35</sup>

The early Muslims do not seem to have been fully aware of the question of whether God created the world out of nothing or from something pre-existent. The Qur'ān does not clearly mention either view. Indeed, verses such as "Were they (the heavens and earth) created *min ghayri shay*",<sup>36</sup> where the Qur'ān challenges the unbelievers, may have three meanings. It could mean that God created the world out of something in which case the verse would read 'were they created from something?'. It could also mean that the world has a creator 'were they created by nothing?'. Finally, it could mean that they were created for some purpose and not without purpose.

However, the meaning of the words *khāliq*<sup>37</sup> and *badī*<sup>38</sup> (creator) in Arabic imply to bring something out of nothing. In addition, there is the ḥadīth of

<sup>34</sup> H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, p.356.

<sup>35</sup> al-Baghdādī ('Abd al-Qāhir), *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, Dār al-Funūn al-Turkiyyah, Istanbul, 1928, pp.59-60; Ibn ḥazm, *al-Fiṣal fī al-Milal wa al-Ahwā'*, Dār al-Ma'rifah, Beirut, 1975, Vol. 1, pp.8-9, 23-24, 34.

<sup>36</sup> Qur'ān, s.52, v.35.

<sup>37</sup> See for example: Qur'ān, s. 2, v. 111; s. 6, v. 101.

<sup>38</sup> Qur'ān, s. 55, v. 13; s. 10, v. 3.



the Prophet which says that there was nothing with God.<sup>39</sup> Thus it may be assumed that while not particularly aware of this question, the early Muslims understood creation in the general sense that there was a time when God was the only existing being and then He created the world.

Wolfson, after a brief discussion on the question of whether the non-existent (*al-ma'dūm*) is something or nothing and the difference between the Ash'aris and the Mu'tazilites in this question, concludes that the Mu'tazilites held the view that the world was created out of something or a pre-existing eternal matter.<sup>40</sup> Wolfson argues that the Mu'tazilites were influenced by Aristotle's theory of the eternity of the world but that because that conflicted directly with the Qur'an they settled for Plato's theory of pre-existing eternal matter.<sup>41</sup> However, this is only an assumption, for there is no direct declaration by any Mu'tazilite that he believes in Plato's theory. Neither is there a declaration by the Ash'aris that their opponents, the Mu'tazilites, believed in a pre-eternal matter, otherwise they would have been accused of association with the philosophers. al-Baghdādī himself states that the Mu'tazilites believed that God created the world from nothing.<sup>42</sup>

It is true, however, that the Ash'aris criticised the Mu'tazilites' view of the 'thingness' of the non-existent (*shay'yyat al-ma'dūm*) on the ground that would lead to many contradictions. This was demonstrated by al-Juwaynī in his *al-Shāmil*.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Maṭābī' al-Ahrām al-Tijāriyyah, Cairo, 1971, Vol. 5, p.260.

<sup>40</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.364.

<sup>41</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, p.364.

<sup>42</sup> al-Baghdādī ('Abd al-Qāhir), *al-Farq Bayn al-Firaq*, translated by Kate Chambers Seelye under *Moslem Schisms and Sects*, AMS Press Inc. , New York, 1966, pp.117-118.

<sup>43</sup> *al-Shāmil*, pp.126-131.



Even if some theologians maintained that the Mu'tazilites believed that the world was created out of something, that would represent their own interpretation and deduction from the Mu'tazilites' belief about the non-existent. This is clear, for example, in the view of al-Baghdādī that the view that God created the world from nothing is only compatible with the principles of the Ash'aris.<sup>44</sup> This simply implies that the Mu'tazilites' definition of the non-existent is incompatible with the theory of creation out of nothing. Ibn Ḥazm also deduced that the view that non-existents are things results in the Dahrites' view, who believe in things which are infinite, eternal and uncreated.<sup>45</sup> While the above theologians thought that the Mu'tazilites' definition of the non-existent led them to the belief of creation out of something, al-Shahrastānī claims the opposite, namely, that it is their belief in a creation out of something that led them into their view of the non-existent. After criticising Avicenna's view that the world was created out of eternal matter, al-Shahrastānī says: "This is the same error which led the Mu'tazilites to believe that the non-existent is something."<sup>46</sup> It is quite evident that the Ash'aris themselves did not reach a consensus on what the Mu'tazilites believed.

It seems plausible that the Mu'tazilites were influenced in many of their definitions by Greek philosophers, as Wolfson has shown.<sup>47</sup> It may also be accepted that the Mu'tazilites changed their views of the non-existent under the influence of the philosophers. But to say that from that they altered their belief that the world was created from pre-eternal matter would require stronger evidence.

What could appear to be a more reasonable assumption about the

<sup>44</sup> al-Baghdādī, *Farq*, pp.118-119.

<sup>45</sup> Ibn ḥazm, *Fiṣal*, Vol. 4, p.202.

<sup>46</sup> al-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat*, p.33.

<sup>47</sup> Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām*, pp.360-364.

Mu'tazilites belief is as follows. The Mu'tazilites believed that there was a time when there was only God. This is in common with all Muslims. Now, at that time there was (absolutely) 'nothing' according to the Ash'aris. For the Mu'tazilites, however, the view was probably that at that time the world was non-existent (*ma'dūm*), yet it was something. They could have easily defended this view by saying that it is possible that the world, although it did not exist materially, was in an unknown form (which cannot be conceived by our limited human mind). A simple example of such a possibility is that the world prior to its creation was part of God's knowledge. No Muslim can deny that God knew when, where, and how He was going to create the world. Thus the world was non-existent but it was something, albeit in the form of an idea.<sup>48</sup>

Ash'ari theologians, as we have seen, believe that existence came from nothingness, that is, absolutely nothing. They divide any existing thing (besides God) into atoms and accidents. From these two premises they build up their proof of the creation of the world on the basis of proving that accidents exist, that they are *ḥawādith* (temporal events, or had a beginning) and that substance, atoms or bodies do not precede these temporal events. Thus both constituents of the world had a beginning; hence the world had a beginning.<sup>49</sup>

al-Juwaynī, as we shall argue at the end of this chapter, has produced an 'enhanced' version of this argument. He identifies four principles upon which he proves that the world was created. But, although only the first three principles

<sup>48</sup> It should be noted that the word idea is only an example of what my human brain could come out with. Of course we are capable of understanding all our natural world, let alone what is beyond nature.

<sup>49</sup> See for example: Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, *al-Insāf*, ed. M. Z. al-ḥasan al-Kawtharī, Mu'assasat al-Khānjī, Cairo, 1963, pp.16-18; al-Māwardī (Abī al-ḥasan), *A'lām al-Nubuwwah*, ed. by M. al-Mu'taṣim bi Allah, Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, Beirut, 1987, pp.31-32; al-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat*, p.11.

are sufficient to prove that the world was created the fourth principle was used by him to refute the concept of infinity and thus prove that the world had a beginning. We saw that this fourth principle is considered as an independent argument. However, al-Juwaynī used it as a means to strengthen his version by anticipating opponents' objections through the possibility of an infinite succession.

If these four premises are proved then the creation of the world is proved along with the existence of God whose creation is regarded as one of His acts. However, there are many differences between the various Muslim sects, especially between the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'aris. Divergence between the two schools starts at the lowest levels of analysis, namely definitions of the existent, the non-existent, the atom and the accident.

According to the Ash'aris the 'existent' is defined by the 'thing' (*al-shay*).<sup>50</sup> The thing is the creation of God and the result of His Will. However, as reported by the Ash'aris, the Mu'tazilites maintain that the thing is 'what is known'<sup>51</sup> rather than 'what exists'. This obviously means that both the existent and the non-existent are things and this in turn may lead to several incompatibilities with Islamic principles, as al-Juwaynī explains.<sup>52</sup> One particularly interesting point made by al-Juwaynī is that if one knows that God has no associate, then this would imply that "God has a non-existent associate which is a thing".<sup>53</sup> This definition of a thing by the known is also incompatible with the Qur'ān. Indeed, such a definition would at least reduce or weaken the Will and Power of God for

<sup>50</sup> al-Bāqillānī, *al-Inṣāf*, p.16; *al-Shāmīl*, p.124.

<sup>51</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.124.

<sup>52</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, pp.126-131.

<sup>53</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.127.



it is said in the Qur'ān "And We have created everything".<sup>54</sup> If we assume that the word 'everything' means all God's creatures, that is, only existing things, then God's power is reduced because there are some extra things which are non-existent and which God did not create.

Another point of conflict is the definition of substance (or atoms) which is regarded by the Mu'tazilites as a combination of accidents (*a'rāḍ mujtami'ah*),<sup>55</sup> whereas the Ash'aris believe they are two different species or kinds. al-Juwaynī refutes the Mu'tazilites' view using various arguments.<sup>56</sup>

While the 'argument from accidents' is the most common amongst the Ash'aris, we also find other arguments given by scholars like al-Ash'arī and al-Juwaynī. al-Ash'arī, for example, introduced a new argument for creation based on the changing pattern (or nature) of existing things. He says: "A fully mature man was originally semen, then a clot, and a small lump, then flesh and bone and blood. Now we know very well that he did not translate himself from state to state. For we see that at the peak of his physical and mental maturity he is unable to produce hearing and sight for himself or to create a bodily member for himself. That proves that he is even more incapable of doing that when he is weak and imperfect. For if he can do a thing, when he is imperfect, *a fortiori* he can do it when he is mature; and if he cannot do a thing when he is mature, *a fortiori* he is incapable of it when he is imperfect."<sup>57</sup>

al-Ash'arī then continues his argument by saying that our observation that a man changes from a baby, to a youth, to an adult and finally to an old man

<sup>54</sup> Qur'ān, s. 6, v. 101.

<sup>55</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.148.

<sup>56</sup> See *al-Shāmīl*, pp.148-152.

<sup>57</sup> al-Ash'arī, *al-Luma' fī al-Radd 'alā Ahl al-Zīgh wa al-Bida'*, translated by R. J. McCarthy, Beirut, 1953, pp.6-7. ; see also *al-Shāmīl*, p.273.



tells us that he does not do that by himself, for otherwise he would free himself of old age and remain young and strong. This shows that he has a translator or transformer who changes him from state to state because such transformation would be impossible without a transformer.<sup>57</sup> He supports his idea by giving an example: "cotton cannot change into spun thread and woven cloth, without weaver or craftsman or supervisor."<sup>58</sup> What seems to be implied here by al-Ash'arī is that if a man (or any being) cannot even change himself from one state to another, he could certainly not have created himself because creation is far more difficult than changing natural patterns. Hence, if something does exist, it must have been created by a Creator.

It is obvious that the argument of al-Ash'arī stems from the Qur'ān's mention of semen in many verses. There are twelve verses in the Qur'ān giving such an argument.<sup>59</sup> We reproduce two verses which seem closer to the above idea: "Dost Thou deny Him Who created thee out of dust, then out of a sperm-drop, then fashioned Thee into a man?";<sup>60</sup> "Then We made the sperm into a clot of congealed blood; then of that clot We made a (foetus) lump; then We made out of that lump bones and clothed the bones with flesh; then We developed out of it another creature."<sup>61</sup>

It is quite evident that al-Ash'arī had these verses in mind when he thought about this argument. Another possibility that may have contributed to his direction towards such an argument is his opposition to the Mu'tazilite and his

<sup>57</sup> al-Ash'arī, *al-Luma'*, pp.6-7; *al-Shāmil*, p.273.

<sup>58</sup> al-Ash'arī, *al-Luma'*, pp.6-7; *al-Shāmil*, p.273.

<sup>59</sup> Qur'ān, s. 16, v. 4; s. 18, v. 37; s. 22, v. 5; s. 23, v. 13; s. 23, v. 14; s. 35, v. 11; s. 36, v. 77; s. 40, v. 67; s. 53, v. 46; s. 75, v. 37; s. 76, v. 2; s. 80, v. 19.

<sup>60</sup> Qur'ān, s. 18, v. 37, (translation by A. Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qur'an*, Amana, Maryland, 1983. ).

<sup>61</sup> Qur'ān, s. 23, v. 14.

support for (or proximity to) the orthodoxy.<sup>62</sup> We may assume that he was well aware that such an argument, which is directly influenced by the Qur'ān, would almost surely be accepted by Muslim orthodoxy.

A crude form of this argument had existed for some time before al-Ash'arī. This is the well known story of the Arab bedouin (*a'rābī*) who was asked how he knew God exists? His answer was: "When you see the camel tracks on the sand, don't you affirm that there have been camels who went through this place? Thus, how can you deny the existence of God with all these 'tracks' around us (earth, animals, planets etc. )."

However, this argument came under fierce attacks from al-Ash'arī's opponents. It is outside the scope of this study to discuss these, but it is worth mentioning that al-Juwaynī dedicated a whole section to defending this argument.<sup>63</sup> He also mentions that al-Bāqillānī explained many principles which would serve as a basis to understand this argument.

The proof from the impossibility of an infinite number was favoured by a number of philosophers, such as Philoponus,<sup>64</sup> al-Kindī and Ibn Sīnā,<sup>65</sup> and theologians, such as al-Iskāfī (d. 854 AD) and al-Nazzām (d 845 AD),<sup>66</sup> However, the standard Kalām proof was the proof from accidents. One predecessor of al-Juwaynī, al-Bāqillānī, used this proof but based his argument on accidents and bodies instead of substance.<sup>67</sup> Thus, his proof does not specify whether or not

<sup>62</sup> By orthodoxy we mean the people of *fiqh* (jurisprudence) from the four recognised Sunni schools of jurisprudence, people of the *ḥadīth*, and the Salafis (represented mostly by some ḥanbalites). See Chapter 4.

<sup>63</sup> *al-Shāmil*, pp.275-287.

<sup>64</sup> H.A. Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, p.86.

<sup>65</sup> Netton, *Allāh Transcendent*, p.67,172-173.

<sup>66</sup> Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity*, p.117.

<sup>67</sup> Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity*, p.136.

the creation was *ex nihilo* since he does not directly prove the createdness of substance/atom.

al-Juwaynī's version, however, uses substance and accidents which establishes creation *ex nihilo*. His proof was employed by many theologians, including al-Māwardī, al-Bazdawī (d. 1099), al-Ghazālī and al-Shahrastānī.<sup>68</sup>

#### 6.4. The Expansion of the Argument from Accidents by al-Juwaynī.

In this section we examine how al-Juwaynī adopted the Kalām argument from accidents. His treatment includes his predecessors' opinions and their opponents', especially the Mu'tazilites' and the philosophers'. He selects the best definitions, rejecting what he thinks wrong and offering new definitions whenever possible. He also goes to some length in defending his opinions (and those of the Ash'aris) against the Mu'tazilites.

al-Juwaynī insists on establishing a common definitional ground between all theologians because it is the only way to "understanding their aim".<sup>69</sup> He says in *al-Shāmīl* "you should know that the study of the creation of the world is based on basic principles (or premises), technical words and sentences which should be defined and explained clearly and thoroughly."<sup>70</sup> The aim of consensus over the expressions used in theology was to express "many meanings in short expressions."<sup>71</sup> Thus he starts by defining and discussing basic terminology, such as the thing (*al-shay'*), the atoms, the substance and the world (*al-'ālam*).

al-Juwaynī adopts the conventional definitions of the world as "any existing

<sup>68</sup> Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity*, p.136.

<sup>69</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.123.

<sup>70</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.123.

<sup>71</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.17; *Luma' al-Adillah*, ed. by Fawqiyah H. Mahmud, 'Alam al-Kutub, 1987, Beirut, p.86.



thing besides God". He suggests that this is the definition of the *salaf*, the early Muslims.<sup>72</sup> He also maintains that this is the conventional linguistic and juristic definition amongst *al-muwahhīdīn* (unitarians or Muslims).<sup>73</sup> He also accepts the division of the world into atoms and accidents.<sup>74</sup> al-Juwaynī tries to provide the whole picture concerning existence. He divides existence into two parts. The first is *al-qadīm* (the pre-eternal) and this is defined as having "no beginning".<sup>75</sup> This obviously means God. The second part of existence is *al-ḥādith* (the contingent, the created) and is defined as "an existent which has a beginning".<sup>76</sup> al-Juwaynī also adopts his predecessors' opinion about *al-shay'* (the thing). For him the word 'thing' can only be said of an existing entity.<sup>77</sup> al-Juwaynī dedicates four sections of *al-Shāmil* to discussing the view of the opposition, especially the Mu'tazilites, who maintain that the nonexistent is also a thing.<sup>78</sup>

In this concern, al-Juwaynī believes that the non-existent is known. al-Juwaynī seems to anticipate a possible objection that not all non-existents can be known. A person at the time of al-Juwaynī, for example, could not have known that a television did not exist at that time. al-Juwaynī therefore divides the non-existents into three categories.<sup>79</sup> (i) What existed before and ceased to exist, this is known by virtue of its early existence. (ii) What does not exist but it is known that it will exist, this is known by virtue of a prior knowledge or expectation. (iii) What did not have a previous existence and is not expected to

<sup>72</sup> *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.86.

<sup>73</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.17.

<sup>74</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.18.

<sup>75</sup> *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.87; *al-Shāmil*, p.139.

<sup>76</sup> *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.87; *al-Shāmil*, p.139.

<sup>77</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.124.

<sup>78</sup> *al-Shāmil*, pp.124-139; Ibn Ḥazm, Abī Muḥammad, *al-Faṣl fī al-Milal wa al-Ahwā' wa al-Niḥal*, p.202.

<sup>79</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.138.



come into existence; this, according to al-Juwaynī, is part of God's knowledge.

We have seen that al-Juwaynī divides existence into that which has no beginning, and that which has a beginning. The latter are called *al-ḥawādith* (created things, or contingents). These *ḥawādith* are also necessarily divided into two and only two categories. Either they cannot exist without a subject which they occupy (*muftaqirah ilā maḥall*), or they can exist without any need for a subject.<sup>80</sup> It follows that there are two basic kinds (species) of created things and these are called by theologians the atom and the accident. While the atom itself occupies space, it does not require a place to occupy. On the other hand, an accident cannot exist without a subject.<sup>81</sup> This subject is revealed as being the atom (or substance).<sup>82</sup> This is how, according to al-Juwaynī, theologians came to believe that the world is made out of atoms and accidents.

#### 6.4.1. The Atom (*al-Jawhar*).

In defining the atom (or substance) al-Juwaynī gives three definitions by *ahl al-ḥaqq*. However, he rejects one of these definitions because it defines the atom by one of its necessary attributes (characteristics).<sup>83</sup> al-Juwaynī accepts the second definition of "that which occupies space",<sup>84</sup> but prefers a third one which defines the atom as "every particle (*kullu juz*)".<sup>85</sup> This, according to him, is a better definition because "it tends to the occupancy of space (*ya'ūlu ilā al-mutaḥayyiz*) but is clearer in absolute terms."<sup>86</sup>

<sup>80</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.140.

<sup>81</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.140.

<sup>82</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.140.

<sup>83</sup> "The atom is that which accepts the accident", *al-Shāmil*, p.142. ; *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.87.

<sup>84</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.142, *al-Irshād*, p.17; *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.87.

<sup>85</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.142.

<sup>86</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.142.

al-Juwaynī reports that al-Qāḍī (Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī) defines it as “that which occupies some surface (*mā lahu ḥaḥ min al-misāḥah*)”.<sup>87</sup> However, he appears to be cautious about such a definition and hints at an alternative in *al-Irshād* where he says: “everything that has volume occupies space (*kullu dhī ḥajmin mutaḥayyiz*)”.<sup>88</sup> This may indicate that al-Juwaynī believed that the atom had three dimensions rather than two dimensions as suggested by al-Bāqillānī. Thus it may be assumed that al-Juwaynī believed that the atoms is the smallest indivisible particle that can occupy the three dimensional space.

al-Juwaynī criticises a definition given by the Mu'tazilites: “the atom is what occupies space in existence (*mā taḥayyaza fī al-wujūd*)”.<sup>89</sup> because that definition is conditional on the atom actually existing.<sup>90</sup> He also discusses the Christian definition “what is self sustaining (*al-qā'im bi al-nafs*)”.<sup>91</sup>

The necessary characteristics (*ṣifāt wājibah*) of an atom are that it accepts accidents and that it occupies space.<sup>92</sup>

#### 6.4.2. al-Juwaynī's Argument Against Infinite Bodies.

One of the characteristics of the atom is its indivisibility, which all theologians agree upon, except al-Nazzām, who agrees with the Falāsifah that there is no end to the divisibility of particles.<sup>93</sup> al-Juwaynī mentions that theologians agree with mathematicians who believe that the single atom is the geometric point.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>87</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.142.

<sup>88</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.17.

<sup>89</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.142.

<sup>90</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.143.

<sup>91</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.143.

<sup>92</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.165.

<sup>93</sup> Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, p.53; *al-Shāmīl*, p.143.

<sup>94</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.143.

To refute the belief of the philosophers and al-Nazzām al-Juwaynī gives the argument of 'the ant'. He assumes a simple body with both ends known, and an ant which is supposed to traverse this body from one end to another. Thus it is a known fact that the ant has moved from one end to another. Now, if the body were divided into infinitesimal parts we would not be able to imagine that the ant has traversed the body for completion would imply finitude (whatever is infinite cannot be conceived as being completed).<sup>95</sup>

al-Juwaynī's denial of the infinite division of bodies is based on his belief that all natural phenomena, including distances, bodies and other contingent beings, come to completion. Thus none of these can be conceived as divisible into an infinite number of atoms because "it is impossible for an infinite body to be completed in all aspects."<sup>96</sup> From this al-Juwaynī implies that nobody can reach the other end of the infinite body (however small it is), neither by walking, jumping or "even flying", <sup>97</sup> for completing the distance between the two ends of this simple body would mean traversing an infinite number of atoms and we know that the infinite cannot be completed and thus the task is impossible. Yet we know that we can actually reach the other end of the body and so the only alternative left is that the body must be divisible into a finite number of atoms.

al-Juwaynī reports that al-Nazzām attempted to answer his objection through the theory of leaping (*al-ṭafrah*).<sup>98</sup> This theory is based on the idea that the body is not actually completely traversed but the traverser (*al-qāṭi'*) actually traverses some of the body and leaps the rest.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>95</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.144.

<sup>96</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.144.

<sup>97</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.145.

<sup>98</sup> Fakhry, *Islamic Occasionalism*, p.39.

<sup>99</sup> Fakhry, *Islamic Occasionalism*, p.39; *al-Shāmil*, p.144.



al-Juwaynī refutes this theory by asking whether what has been actually traversed was finite or infinite. If the answer is that it is finite then he accepts a finite body. But if he says that it is infinite then the theory of leaping would be useless because it would confirm actually traversing an infinite body.<sup>100</sup> In addition to refuting the theory in terms of what was traversed, al-Juwaynī also refutes the idea of leaping itself. He argues that when the subject leapt the body it must have either contacted it (*mamās lahu*) or paralleled it (*muḥādhin lahu*).<sup>101</sup> There is no other alternative. The case of contact is not mentioned by al-Juwaynī as it is obvious. For the case of parallelism, al-Juwaynī argues that as the subject leaps from one end to another there must be a relation between the subject and the body through space, even if the subject was flying.<sup>102</sup>

In today's mathematical language this can be translated as follows. Suppose we take a reference point in the subject which is to go from one end of a body to another. Then whatever the method of movement (walking, flying etc.), in order for the subject to reach the other end, the reference point in the subject must have had equivalent (or reciprocal) points in the body. But the body has an infinite number of points and thus the subject cannot traverse the body, which would be contradictory. To explain this, let us assume that the body starts with the first infinitesimal point. We also assume that we can slow the movement sufficiently in time and space. Then the subject could be thought of as starting at point one, then the next infinitesimal point that should be referred to is point two etc. However, if we assume that there is an infinite number of points then we will never stop counting and this means that the subject will never reach the

<sup>100</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.144.

<sup>101</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.145.

<sup>102</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.145.



end.

Thus al-Juwaynī affirms that there must be a relation in space between the subject (the traverser) and the body (the traversed), and rejects the idea of leaping in that it attempts to ignore the spatial relationship between the subject and the body. To explain this, al-Juwaynī says “accepting the idea of leaping with neither contact nor parallelism would mean that a man could leap from the far east to the far west without paralleling earth, skies or air, and all that in no time – for leaping has no time.”<sup>103</sup> This is rejected as absurd.

At the end of the quotation, we can see that al-Juwaynī introduces another objection to the idea of leaping. al-Juwaynī believes that any movement between two points must occur within a lapse of time and rejects the idea of leaping because it occurs in no time. He gives the example of a deep well, half-filled with water, and two ropes. The first has a bucket attached to it and goes to the bottom of the well, the other has a hook attached to it and goes only half way down, to the surface of the water. If both ropes are pulled up, it is possible for the bucket and the hook to arrive at the same time. This would not mean that the bucket has leaped, it would simply mean that the bucket has travelled faster than the hook.<sup>104</sup>

al-Juwaynī further supports his view with the example of the mill-stone where the point near the centre turns more slowly than one near the circumference. al-Juwaynī concludes that since the two points move in the same lapse of time, the latter point must be moving faster, rather than assuming that it is leaping.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>103</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.145.

<sup>104</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.145-146.

<sup>105</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.146.

Thus, al-Juwaynī refutes the idea of infinite division of bodies through the idea of the impossibility of completing a task with infinite steps. Leaping was suggested as a solution to the problem of completion, in that the subject completes only some of the tasks while leaping the rest. al-Juwaynī refutes this through the idea of movement. He shows that any movement must occur in space and time and thus leaping cannot occur, because it defies the basic natural laws of space and time.

It should be noted that al-Juwaynī must have been aware of the possibility of phenomena such as leaping because of what happened to the Prophet in his *Isrā' wa al-Mi'rāj* when he 'journeyed' from Makkah to Jerusalem, then went to the Heavens.<sup>106</sup> However, this was a *Mu'jizah*, a supernatural event, an exception made by God in which He suspended the laws of nature. al-Juwaynī was concerned with the world as it is known to humans with its possibilities, impossibilities and laws. al-Juwaynī was studying the natural rather than the supernatural, for otherwise his discussion would be pointless. There is nothing absurd, contradictory or illogical in the supernatural.

#### 6.4.3. Other Qualities of the Atom.

Apart from the necessary characteristics and the indivisibility of the atom, al-Juwaynī discusses several other qualities.

##### (i) Similarity (*al-tajānūs*):

All theologians (except al-Nazzām) agree on the similarity of atoms.<sup>107</sup>

According to al-Juwaynī, two similars are those which share all essential at-

<sup>106</sup> Qur'ān, s. 17, v. 1.

<sup>107</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.153.

tributes or characteristics (both what is necessary and what is possible).<sup>108</sup> He believes that two similars may differ from one another in one or more characteristics, and that two dissimilars may have common characteristics, as long as the characteristics in both cases are not essential.<sup>109</sup> This is how al-Juwaynī shows that atoms are similar in that they all have identical essential attributes (occupancy of space (*al-taḥayyuz*) and acceptance of accidents (*qubūl al-a'rāḍ*).

Now, since atoms are similar and created things and bodies are different, theologians who affirm this quality had to explain the dissimilarity in bodies by means of accidents. al-Juwaynī explains that the atom of fire is similar to the atom of air.<sup>110</sup> The atom of air can accept the accident of fire and *vice versa*. However, al-Juwaynī gives more precision to his definition. He insists that by similarity he does not mean that two things are identical. He explains "What we mean by similarity of two atoms is that what is necessary for one of them is necessary for the other, and what is possible for one is possible for the other."<sup>111</sup> Thus we may conclude that fire is different from air, not because their atoms are different but because fire contains accidents which are different from those of water.

(ii) Shape (*al-Shakl*):

al-Juwaynī believes that the atom has no form or shape. He criticises the view of theologians who say that the atom has no shape and then contradict themselves by saying it is similar to a rectangle or a circle or a triangle.<sup>112</sup> He argues "what resembles a form is itself a form."<sup>113</sup> al-Juwaynī adds his own view,

<sup>108</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.154; *al-Irshād*, pp.36-37.

<sup>109</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.36-37.

<sup>110</sup> *al-Shāmil*, pp.154-155.

<sup>111</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.155. See also *al-Irshād*, p.34.

<sup>112</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.158-159.

<sup>113</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.159.



in that although an atom occupies some surface (*qadr min al-misāḥah*) or volume as he mentions in *al-Irshād*,<sup>114</sup> and although it has a certain 'measure' (*qadr*), it cannot be measured because this 'measure' is the absolutely smallest measure ("an atom can only be measured by another atom").<sup>115</sup>

What can be understood from this view seems very important. First the atom is a non-measurable unit, even in theory. This means that its conception is only theoretical and that we will never be able to isolate a single atom. Yet, its existence is material since two or more atoms will form a body which (at least in theory) can be measured or conceived.

(iii) Invariability (*Baqā' al-Jawhar*):

According to al-Juwaynī the atom does not undergo any change. What al-Juwaynī has in mind is the division of the world into stable and unstable. Thus he explains changes, patterns and all natural phenomena through the instability of the accidents; the atoms remaining always stable.

al-Juwaynī criticises al-Nazzām who believes in the instability of atoms.<sup>116</sup> He says that believing that atoms are continuously being renewed (just like the accidents) would lead us to accept the possibility that man can be successively in the east and in the west.<sup>117</sup>

(iv) Non-Penetrability (*'nafy al-tadākhul*):

al-Juwaynī states that *ahl al-ḥaqq* believe that atoms do not penetrate each other.<sup>118</sup> al-Juwaynī refutes the view of interpenetration of atoms because it could lead to the view that all the world came from a single particle (*khardalah*)

<sup>114</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.17.

<sup>115</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.159.

<sup>116</sup> al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, pp.36-47.

<sup>117</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.160.

<sup>118</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.160.



“which no reasonable person could accept”.<sup>119</sup> This might have been unreasonable at the time of al-Juwaynī. However, today this is more than reasonable; it is actually the most accepted theory of origination of the universe in physics and astronomy. On the other hand, even without the help of modern scientific theories, one can criticise al-Juwaynī’s denial of penetrability simply by saying that God is Powerful and thus He is capable of creating atoms which were condensed into a single particle. How can one reject the possibility of penetrability of atoms if one believes that they were created from nothing? If God was able to create atoms from nothing, the task of giving them one attribute or another would be easier. However, one can understand al-Juwaynī’s view on the basis of his belief about the atom. Indeed, if the atom is the smallest thing that cannot be divided, it is hard to imagine how it can be penetrated for, as far as we know, if something can be penetrated that thing can still be divided into smaller parts, which is contradictory.

The second objection given by al-Juwaynī is that one accident may be found in more than one atom which is contrary to the qualities of accidents.<sup>120</sup>

It appears to us that al-Juwaynī rejects the penetrability of atoms, not because it is absolutely impossible, but because it leads to many problems and unanswered questions. Indeed we could rightly ask: which atom will penetrate which? Is there a limit as to how many atoms can penetrate a single atom or not? What happens if contrary accidents penetrate a single atom through two atoms?

These are the main characteristics of atoms according to al-Juwaynī. Equally important to al-Juwaynī were the accidents, because they play an im-

<sup>119</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.161.

<sup>120</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.161.

portant role in the proof of creation.

#### 6.4.4. The Accident (*al-'araḍ*).

In Chapter 4 we briefly discussed the term accident and what was meant by it. In this section we shall attempt to expand our discussion, concentrating on the view of al-Juwaynī.

In *al-Shāmil*, al-Juwaynī first gives the non-technical meaning of the word '*araḍ*. He uses some verses of the Qur'ān to show that it basically means reference to something that does not subsist or remain in its current state.<sup>121</sup>

For theologians, the word '*araḍ* is closely related to the meaning given in the Qur'ān. al-Juwaynī gives many examples of theological definitions such as "what does not subsist (endure)",<sup>122</sup> This definition, according to him, is acceptable because it excludes atoms which subsist. However, the Mu'tazilites who believe that accidents subsist reject this definition, as al-Juwaynī reports.<sup>123</sup> He also reports another definition "that which subsists in something else (*alladhi yaqūm biḡhayriḥ*),"<sup>124</sup> but suggests an alternative: "that which subsists in the atom," which is clearer in his opinion.<sup>125</sup> al-Juwaynī's suggestion clearly emphasises the difference between accidents and atoms. In *al-Irshād* he gives a similar definition "the thing (*al-ma'nā*) subsisting in the atom."<sup>126</sup> al-Juwaynī gives some examples of accidents such as "colours, tastes, odours, knowledges, contingent powers and wills and their opposites, and death and life."<sup>127</sup>

<sup>121</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.166; Qur'ān, Sura 8, Verse 67; Sura 46, Verse 24.

<sup>122</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.167.

<sup>123</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.167; Fakhry, *Islamic Occasionalism*, p.31.

<sup>124</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.167.

<sup>125</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.167.

<sup>126</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.17.

<sup>127</sup> *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.121. *al-Irshād*, p.15.

### 6.5. The Argument for Creation as Expounded by al-Juwaynī.

This is called the argument from accidents because it is based on the idea of dividing the whole existence into God and other than God. This is represented by the world which, in turn, is divided into atoms and accidents. The argument is so called because it relies, as we shall see, more on accidents than atoms.

In proving the creation of the world, al-Juwaynī attempts to establish that its primary constituents were created, namely, that atoms and accidents were created.<sup>128</sup> This is achieved through four basic principles:

*The First Principle* is the establishment of the existence of accidents.

*The Second Principle* is the establishment of the creation of accidents.

*The Third Principle* is the establishment of the impossibility of atoms being stripped of accidents.

*The Fourth Principle* is the establishment of the impossibility of created things being without a first.<sup>129</sup>

al-Juwaynī made two significant changes to the proof from accidents which was used by Ash'arite theologians before him. The first change is that he based his proof directly on atoms instead of bodies, thus proving creation out of nothing (*ex nihilo*). The second and more important improvement he made was the introduction of the fourth principle which was not used before him.<sup>130</sup> Indeed, the weakness of the proof before the addition of the fourth principle was the objection that it is possible that a body or an atom can be joined from eternity to an infinite series of accidents.<sup>131</sup> Indeed, the three principles do not take this possibility into account, and al-Juwaynī seems well aware of this problem

<sup>128</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.17.

<sup>129</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.17-18; *al-Shāmil*, pp.166-168, 180-181, 186, 204, 215.

<sup>130</sup> Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity*, pp.140-141.

<sup>131</sup> Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity*, p.144.



when he says that he prefers to reinforce his argument through this principle in order to "shatter the views of the *mulḥidah* (heretics)." <sup>132</sup> The fourth principle, therefore, serves as a defence against any attack on the first three principles by the philosophers. <sup>133</sup>

Having established that accidents exist and that they were created, that atoms cannot be stripped from accidents, that accidents have a first (beginning), al-Juwaynī draws the conclusion that atoms cannot precede accidents, and thus that which does not precede a created thing is itself created. <sup>134</sup>

#### 6.5.1. The Existence of Accidents (*al-a'rāḍ*).

Proving the existence of accidents is the first principle (*al-aṣl al-awwal*) in the proof of the creation of the world.

al-Juwaynī proves the existence of accidents in two ways, namely, intellectual reflection and through the power of the senses (including internal feelings).

First, al-Juwaynī argues that if an atom is found in one place, it can easily be conceived of as being in another place (or simply that it has moved to another place). Then there must be a reason (which he calls *mūjib* and *muqtaḍin*) or a necessitator that made such a change possible. If so, that reason can either be the atom itself or something (*ma'nā*) additional to it. <sup>135</sup> He disqualifies the first possibility because: (i) if the 'reason' was the atom itself then the 'reason' should remain and cannot vanish, which is false. (ii) Accepting this idea leads to accepting the idea that all atoms can be grouped into a single space. (iii) Movements are known to be different and at the same time we know that atoms

<sup>132</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.25.

<sup>133</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.219.

<sup>134</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.27.

<sup>135</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.168; *al-Irshād*, pp.18-19; *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.88.



are not different, thus accepting that the reason for movement is the atoms themselves (which are similar) would mean that these movements are similar, which is false.<sup>136</sup> Having rejected the first possibility, there remains only one possibility, that the 'reason' or the cause is something additional to the atom (the accident). This additional thing can either be a free agent (*fā'il mukhtār*) or a necessitating thing (*ma'nā mujib*).<sup>137</sup> He dismisses the first possibility as impossible, and thus remains with the *ma'nā* which is the accident.<sup>138</sup>

Second, al-Juwaynī affirms that accidents may be sensed. The senses, according to al-Juwaynī, are sources of necessary knowledge,<sup>139</sup> and since many accidents (such as colours and tastes) are perceived directly by our senses the proof of existence of accidents comes as a direct result of this necessary knowledge without the need for reflection.<sup>140</sup> Now, we know by necessity when we have pain, and when the pain has vanished. Therefore, we know by necessity that what we have felt was and then was not and consequently what we have felt could not be atoms because they subsist. The only alternative that remains is that what we felt were accidents.

al-Juwaynī agrees with his predecessors on the characteristics of accidents. They cannot be located on their own, and thus can only be found in atoms. They do not remain more than one instant and are constantly changing. Two opposite accidents cannot subsist in one atom and one accident cannot be in two atoms. An accident cannot exist without an atom, and accidents cannot subsist in each other.<sup>141</sup>

<sup>136</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.168; *al-Irshād*, pp.18-19; *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.88.

<sup>137</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.19.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid

<sup>139</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.14.

<sup>140</sup> *al-Shāmil*, pp.180-181.

<sup>141</sup> al-ījī ('Abd al-Rahmān bin Aḥmad), *al-Mawāqif fī 'Ilm al-Kalām*, 'Alam

From the above discussion of leaping, a further characteristic of accidents may be derived. It was shown that al-Juwaynī believes that a body cannot traverse another body without touching or paralleling every part of it. Since the accomplishment of a movement must occur in a lapse of time then the successive accidents of movement did not occur at the same time. Hence it could be deduced that two successive accidents cannot share the same instant of time.

#### 6.5.2. Createdness of Accidents (*ḥadath al-a'rād*)

This is the second principle (*al-aṣl al-thānī*) in the proof of the creation of the world. He gives a brief argument concerning this question in *Luma' al-Adillah*<sup>142</sup> but expounds the discussion in *al-Irshād* and *al-Shāmīl*. In these books al-Juwaynī establishes the second principle through the establishment of four points.

(i) *The impossibility of the non-existence of the pre-eternal ('istiḥālat 'adam al-qadīm)*.<sup>143</sup>

In *al-Irshād* al-Juwaynī gives special attention to this point because by proving it he proves the eternity of God. He argues that non-existence of the pre-eternal at a particular time cannot be necessary; "this is evident".<sup>144</sup> There remain two possibilities: either it is possible or impossible. Now if the non-existence of the pre-eternal is possible then there should be a determinant or necessitator (*muqtaḍin*), for a possible non-existence is not possible without a determinant.<sup>145</sup> This determinant can be either: (i) a free agent (*fā'il mukhaṣṣis*), (ii) creation of the opposite, or (iii) the termination of one of the conditions of continued

al-Kutub, Beirut, n. d. , pp.100-104. ; *al-Shāmīl*, pp.190, 197, 203.

<sup>142</sup> *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.89.

<sup>143</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.194. ; *al-Irshād*, p.20.

<sup>144</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.195; *al-Irshād*, p.21.

<sup>145</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.195; *al-Irshād*, p.21.

existence. Now, for the first one it is impossible that this determinant is a free agent because non-existence is an absolute negation which cannot be associated with any agent. For the second case al-Juwaynī says that this opposite has no priority over the pre-eternal who would act as a negation to it and thus prevent it from coming into existence. For the third case, al-Juwaynī argues that if the existence of the pre-eternal is conditional, then this very condition must also be pre-eternal. Thus we would need another determinant to remove this condition's existence and so on to infinity.<sup>146</sup>

(ii) *The impossibility of the existence of an accident in another accident:*<sup>147</sup>

al-Juwaynī argues that if an accident subsists in another then the host must become an atom because the acceptance of accidents is an essential characteristic of the atom.<sup>148</sup>

(iii) *The impossibility of the existence of an accident on its own:*<sup>149</sup>

al-Juwaynī uses two main arguments. First, he uses knowledge as an example of an accident. If this knowledge occurs, it can either be known or unknown. It cannot be unknown because that would be contrary to its nature (ignorance is the opposite of knowledge). Now, if it is established that it is known, the question would be who (which) knows this knowledge? And there is no way but finding a place for this knowledge.<sup>150</sup>

The second argument uses *al-sabr wa al-taqṣīm*. al-Juwaynī establishes that

<sup>146</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.195; *al-Irshād*, p.22.

<sup>147</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.197. ; *al-Irshād*, p.20.

<sup>148</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.198.

<sup>149</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.203. ; *al-Irshād*, p.20.

<sup>150</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.203.

if an accident were to exist on its own, it would be able to accept another accident to subsist in it. Going through all characteristics of atoms, al-Juwaynī finds that the only compatible characteristic with that of accepting a *ma'nā* is the characteristic of subsistence (*al-qiyyām bi al-nafs*).<sup>151</sup> This means the only created thing that can subsist (and accept *ma'ānī*) is the atom and not the accident. This was shown in the previous point.

(iv) Refuting Latency (*al-kumūn*):<sup>152</sup>

Because al-Juwaynī proves accidents through the succession of movements, he included a refutation of the theory of latency amongst the points which prove the createdness of accidents.

al-Juwaynī anticipates an objection that both rest and movement reside in the atom. If the atom moves it means that the 'rest' has become latent while the movement has appeared and *vice versa*.<sup>153</sup> He objects on the basis that movement and rest are two opposites so we cannot imagine a moving-resting atom. Also, following his definition of atom and accident, al-Juwaynī refuse this on the basis that two accidents cannot reside in a single atom.<sup>154</sup> Furthermore, if appearance and latency are additional to the rest and the movement, this would lead to saying that an accident may subsist in another accident which is impossible.<sup>155</sup>

<sup>151</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.23-24; *al-Shāmil*, p.203.

<sup>152</sup> *al-Shāmil*, pp.204-215; *al-Irshād*, pp.22-23; *al-Shāmil*, pp.204-215.

<sup>153</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.23.

<sup>154</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.23.

<sup>155</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.203.

<sup>152</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.20.

<sup>153</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.190; *al-Irshād*, p.20.

<sup>154</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.190; *al-Irshād*, pp.20-21.

<sup>155</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.191.



### 6.5.3. Impossibility for Atoms to be Stripped of Accidents.

This is the third principle (*al-aṣl al-thālith*) used in Ash'ari doctrine of the origination of the world.<sup>156</sup> Again, al-Juwaynī demonstrates this point very briefly in *Luma' al-Adillah*, but it is discussed in more details in *al-Shāmīl* and *al-Irshād*.

In his brief argument, al-Juwaynī establishes that atoms occupy spaces. Then by necessary knowledge we know that these atoms can either be aggregated or segregated (*lā takhlū 'an kawnihā mujtami'ah aw muftariqah*). This establishes that atoms cannot be stripped of segregation or aggregation.<sup>157</sup> These two are obviously considered as accidents by al-Juwaynī. He gives other similarities such as rest and motion, and transformation (*al-intiqāl*).<sup>158</sup> A similar argument to the above one is found in *al-Irshād*.<sup>159</sup>

al-Juwaynī states that the Ash'aris believe that the atoms cannot be stripped of accidents or their contrary—if they have one.<sup>160</sup> There are two kinds of accidents; those which have contraries, such as colours, and odours; and those which have no contrary such as post-eternity. The first kind represent the vast majority of accidents.<sup>161</sup>

Philosophers, as reported by him, accept the idea that atoms can exist without accidents. Atoms are called matter (*al-hayūlā* or *al-māddah*) whereas accidents are called forms (*ṣūrah*).<sup>162</sup> The Mu'tazilites, we are told, (with few

<sup>156</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, pp.204-215, pp.22-25; *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.89;

<sup>157</sup> *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.89

<sup>158</sup> *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.89

<sup>159</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.24.

<sup>160</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.23; *al-Shāmīl*, p.204.

<sup>161</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.204.

<sup>162</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.204. See also *al-Mawrid*, Arabic-English Dictionary, by Rohi Baalbaki, *dār al-'Ilm li al-Malāyīn* Beirut, 1988.



exceptions) also believe in the possibility of atoms being stripped of accidents.<sup>163</sup>

One peculiar point in *al-Shāmīl* with regard to this third principle is that it is not directly demonstrated. al-Juwaynī seems to prove it through a long discussion with all opponents, including the Dahrites, philosophers, Mu'tazilites and other schools.<sup>164</sup> Thus it seems that in *al-Shāmīl*, al-Juwaynī establishes the third principle by refuting the opposite view.

#### 6.5.4. Impossibility of Things without Beginning.

According to al-Juwaynī most of the philosophers,<sup>165</sup> and all the Dahrites<sup>166</sup> believe that the world has always existed and every revolution of a sphere was preceded by another revolution and so on to infinity;<sup>167</sup> "every thing is preceded by something, every son by a father, every grain by a seed, and every egg by a hen."<sup>168</sup>

al-Juwaynī mentions a definitional objection to the idea of contingents (created things) without a beginning. He says: "Our Imams define the contingent (*al-ḥādith*) as: 'the existent which has a first'. Therefore, created things are those which have a beginning."<sup>169</sup> Thus, al-Juwaynī implies that, by definition, created things are not pre-eternal and must have started at a certain point.

However, al-Juwaynī does not use this as a strong argument. Instead he puts forward several intellectual objections. In refuting his opponents' views,

<sup>163</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.23-24; *al-Shāmīl*, p.205.

<sup>164</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, pp.205-215.

<sup>165</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.25.

<sup>166</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.215.

<sup>167</sup> This view obviously assumes the constancy of the universe. However, this does not alter the argument since it assumed by both sides, otherwise another example could easily be found.

<sup>168</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.25.

<sup>169</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.216.

al-Juwaynī based his argument on the impossibility of completing an infinite task.<sup>170</sup> Similarly, he takes as evident the axiom that what is infinite cannot come to an end. We call this the axiom of the infinite past.<sup>171</sup> Note that this is different from saying 'what has a beginning cannot be infinite'. This is unlikely to be accepted as a true statement unless we change the definition of things. Since contingent things, by definition, are not conditioned by post-eternity, and since one cannot look into the eternal future, post-eternity remains a possibility. This brings us to a second axiom which may be called the axiom of infinite future. This is presented in the statement: 'what has a beginning may (or may not) be post-eternal'.

In the first axiom one looks at the past and thus assumes that created things cannot have an infinite past for otherwise they would not have been able to reach the present. Thus the first axiom implies that if the world had no beginning then it could not have been created because it could not have been preceded by a creator. Thus rejecting the first axiom would lead to contradiction, because if the world was created it must have been created at a certain point in time; then between that time and now there is a 'gap' representing a number of events, years, or successions. If this gap is stretched to infinity then our existence is undermined because it would have been impossible for the events to reach the present state. But we know that we exist, and thus the gap must be finite. The only possibility of rejecting the axiom is to accept that the world is uncreated and thus co-eternal with God (or whatever), which leads to heresy.

The second axiom, on the other hand, looks at the future event. Thus if we say that the world may continue in its existence indefinitely (to eternity), this

<sup>170</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.26.

<sup>171</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.220.





would not undermine its existence because we know by necessity that it does actually exist. al-Juwaynī cites two examples explaining the difference between the two axioms. The examples are stated below.

He argues that "what is infinite cannot be represented by a number. It cannot be delimited or bounded; this is impossible by necessity (*yastahīl bi ḍarūrat al-'aql*). It is absurd to affirm that a succession of units, one by one, will end up at infinity and will actually accomplish it."<sup>172</sup>

As an example he gives the idea of infinite successive revolutions of spheres. He says: "you say there have elapsed, before the revolution witnessed by us now, an infinite number of revolutions. However, anything that is constructed by infinite successions of one unit after another cannot come to an end. But the revolutions we witness are actually at an end. Therefore the fact that they are finite proves our aim."<sup>173</sup> In *al-Shāmil* he gives a similar argument against the Dahrites: "You say that there have elapsed (*inqaḍat*) an infinite number of revolutions. If it has elapsed that means it has ended. But how can an infinite end?"<sup>174</sup>

What al-Juwaynī is against is pre-eternity of created things. He argues against an objection that if he accepts post-eternity (such as eternal life in paradise) which is infinite in succession, why does he reject pre-eternity?<sup>175</sup> He answers this objection by saying that the post-eternity of created things is not impossible for something that we are expecting in the future, because post-eternity does not enter in its definition.<sup>176</sup> He explains in *al-Shāmil*: "A contingent thing

<sup>172</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.215.

<sup>173</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.26.

<sup>174</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.215.

<sup>175</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.26.

<sup>176</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.26.



is defined as that which has a beginning. It is not defined as that which has an end".<sup>177</sup> Thus we are talking between two different things, pre-eternity contradicts createdness, whereas post-eternity does not imply pre-eternity, which means a post-eternal thing may have a beginning and thus may have been created.

al-Juwaynī summarises the difference between pre-eternity and post-eternity in two examples. The example related to pre-eternity is someone who says: "I will not give you a Dirham unless I give before it a Dinar, and I will not give you a Dinar unless I give you before it a Dirham."<sup>178</sup> In this case it cannot be imagined that the person will ever give any money to the other. For post-eternity the condition would be "I will not give you a Dirham unless I give after it a Dinar, and I will not give you a Dinar unless I give you after it a Dirham."<sup>179</sup> In this case it is possible for the person to give the money away.

Quite evidently, the difference lies between 'before' and 'after'. It is also evident that al-Juwaynī does not accept travelling back in time (or regressing the sequences) from the present point.

What seems to be the difference between the philosophers and al-Juwaynī is that the latter starts imagining the present or current state and then (unit by unit) reverse events. Following this method, we are always likely to end up with no end (or infinity) especially when we reach the limits of our intellect and imagination. If one permits his imagination to travel back in the past, he will always end up in the black-box of infinity. From his argument, it may be understood that al-Juwaynī does not accept this. For him, one has to respect the strict order of time. Thus, if one argues that something has no beginning,

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<sup>177</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.219.

<sup>178</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.26-27; *al-Shāmīl*, p.219.

<sup>179</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.27.

then he must take his imagination to the starting point of that thing and then try to reach the present point (or state). A thing which he will not be able to reach. Thus, in al-Juwaynī's way of thinking, if any current (present) event had no beginning it would not have reached its present state and thus cannot exist. However, al-Juwaynī seems to be aware of an important difficulty in the view that God has no beginning and yet exists. That is why al-Juwaynī emphasises the word *aḥdāth* in the sense of 'created things' and also in the sense of 'events'. God is neither of these and thus the argument cannot be extended to His case.

Accepting or refusing al-Juwaynī's argument may depend on whether one can accept reversal of time (or travelling through time). To explain this we give the example of a spaceship travelling through the universe in one direction. We assume that the universe contains an infinite number of stations where the ship can refuel or even change to a 'fresh' ship. We number these stations from  $-\infty$  (minus infinity) to  $+\infty$  as shown below so that the present is represented by station number 0 (assume that it is earth).

$-\infty, \dots -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3 \dots +\infty$

Now the difference between the two opinions is that the ship can travel in only one direction, from the negative to the positive. Thus if the space traveller reached us at station no. 0 and told us that it came from infinity nobody will accept this as a possibility because it would mean that the spaceship has stopped at an infinite number of stations which is absurd. On the other hand, if the space traveller told us that he was going towards the future stations and will never stop (under our assumptions), some (if not all) of us would take it as a possibility. This is the difference between pre-eternity and post-eternity.

What the philosophers would do entails the addition of a further assumption,

namely, that the spaceship can travel in both directions. Now the difference between pre- and post-eternity is similar to the space traveller declaring that he is going back in the negative direction without ever stopping (pre-eternity), or similarly going forward (post-eternity).

A unique argument against the infinity of the world is given by al-Juwaynī in *al-Shāmil*. As al-Juwaynī himself emphasises, he was the first theologian to formulate this argument.<sup>180</sup> He states:

“If we take the present, then (according to the opponent) there has elapsed an infinite succession. Suppose we go back in time by many eras and periods. The opponent would also say that there have elapsed an infinite number of successions. We may continue our imagination indefinitely but the opponent will have to take one of two positions. Either he says we end up back at the starting point so that we cannot go further back. This is false because we would ask him why did you choose this time to stop, and not the one before or the one after, for they should all have the same priority?<sup>181</sup> To show further this contradiction, let us take one event before this ‘last point’. Thus what we have chosen is finite, and any finite number cannot become infinite by the addition of one. Now, if the opponent says that our imagination will not stop, so that we cannot end up at a first, and so that events have elapsed without beginning, then he would be contradicting himself. What has no beginning cannot be imagined to have been preceded by something. Then how can we accept that this pre-eternity is preceded by some

<sup>180</sup> *al-Shāmil*, pp.218-219.

<sup>181</sup> We can add that if the opponent stops at any point, so that there is no precedent, then he has agreed that the world is finite in time.





event? This is evidently absurd.”<sup>182</sup>

al-Juwaynī declares that this is his own argument and that he has not seen a similar argument before.<sup>181</sup>

By this fourth principle al-Juwaynī concludes the argument from accidents and deduces, as we have mentioned in the beginning of this section, that the world is created (*ḥādith*). There remains, now to prove the existence of the one who created this world, which we agree to call God. This is the subject of the next section.

#### 6.6. Proof of the Existence of God Based on al-Juwaynī's First Argument.

Having proved that the world was created, al-Juwaynī turns to the question whether this world has a creator or maker (*ṣāni'*) who is God. He attempts to prove that this creator has a free will.

There are three important terms that should be explained.

1. A 'free agent' (*fā'il mukhtār*, *ṣāni' mukhtār*) is one who (that) may act (or refrain from acting) in accordance with his (its) own will. Thus if a free agent does something it is because he (it) chose to do it and not because of some external factors. We may say that, in this case, the factor that determines the action resides within the agent. This factor is called 'will'.

2. A 'natural agent' (*ṭabī'ah*) does not have a will and thus brings about a given action without a choice. Providing that certain conditions are fulfilled, and that there are no hindrances, then the action will occur. In this case, the factor determining the action are both external and internal (other than the will) to the

<sup>182</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.218.

<sup>181</sup> *al-Shāmil*, p.218.



agent. Examples may be drawn from physical phenomena such as the fire which will burn things under certain conditions. In the example of fire, the action of burning was caused not because of a free choice of the fire, but because of the internal characteristics of fire together with favourable external conditions such as the subject being wood and that it is not wet.

3. A 'necessary cause' (*'illah mūjibah*) is something from which derives an action without internal or external factors; that is, irrespective of the presence or absence of certain conditions.

In *Luma' al-Adillah* al-Juwaynī gives a very brief version of his proof. He starts by saying that it has been established that the world is created. The created has a possible (admissible) existence because it is possible to imagine its existence rather than its non-existence and *vice versa*. Thus, since this created thing came into the possible existence rather than the possible non-existence, it must have needed a particulariser or determinant (*mukhaṣṣiṣ*) who is God.<sup>182</sup> al-Juwaynī tells us that the determinant is a free agent, who has free choice and will to whom are attributed power and choice.<sup>183</sup>

In *al-Irshād* al-Juwaynī explains that once it is clear that the existence of the world had a beginning, then we can imagine a situation before that beginning. It would be clear, then, that the existence and the non-existence of this world was equally possible (admissible or *jā'iz*).<sup>184</sup> Although this idea may seem ambiguous, it can be clarified by assuming a situation before creation. At that time there was no world, which means it was non-existent and thus admissible. Also, we know that the world had a beginning, and its existence started at a certain point

<sup>182</sup> *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.91.

<sup>183</sup> *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.92.

<sup>184</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.28.

in time, thus its existence is also permissible.

al-Juwaynī continues, with regard to the time at which the world was created, that we may also say that it was also admissible that the world could have been created some time before or after the time it was actually created; "it is admissible that the creation of the world was delayed by hours."<sup>185</sup> Therefore, when one of the two equally possible outcomes occurred (i.e. existence of the world), reason concludes that there must have been something that singled it out. This is called a particulariser (*mukhaṣṣiṣ*) by al-Juwaynī.<sup>186</sup>

That particulariser, he continues, can only be one of three: a necessary cause, which represents the view of the philosophers as represented by Ibn Sīnā;<sup>187</sup> a natural agent, or a free agent.<sup>188</sup> The second case, al-Juwaynī tells us, represents the view of the Naturalists.<sup>189</sup> We may therefore deduce that the last case represents his own view as well as the views of Ash'arite theologians.

al-Juwaynī maintains that it cannot be possible that this particulariser is a natural agent. The proof of this is that this natural agent can only be either created or pre-eternal (*ṭabi'ah qadīmah*). The two cases may be refuted as follows.

(a) If it is maintained that the natural agent is pre-eternal then its result or effect would also be pre-eternal, for this agent has no choice and acts only if the conditions are favourable. But these effects (meaning the contingent world) were shown to have a beginning,<sup>190</sup> which is contradictory.

Some may object to this first argument by saying it is possible that while

<sup>185</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.28.

<sup>186</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.28.

<sup>187</sup> Parviz Morewedge, "A Third Version of the Ontological Argument in the Ibn Sīnīan Metaphysics", in p. Morewedge (ed. ), *Islamic Philosophical Theology*, State University of New York, Albany, 1979, pp.188-215.

<sup>188</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.28.

<sup>189</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.28.

<sup>190</sup> *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.91.

this natural agent is pre-eternal, such favourable conditions did not occur until a finite point in time. We may refute this objection in two ways. Firstly, since the natural agent has no free choice, then it would have been equally likely that such conditions would occur at any time up to pre-eternity. Thus, there is an equal probability that such conditions happen at, say, time  $t$  or at time  $t - s$  for any value of  $t$  and  $s$ . Thus, it is sufficient to reject the above objection by taking those possibilities where such conditions would have occurred at infinity which would mean that the world is pre-eternal.<sup>191</sup> The second refutation may be based on the principle of impossibility of infinite successions. We may say: if this free agent is pre-eternal, then there co-existed with it (in pre-eternity) certain conditions and hindrances. These were succeeded by other conditions and hindrances and so on until the point where they were favourable and thus the creation of the world. However, at the point of the creation of the world there must have elapsed an infinite successions of conditions which is absurd.

(b) If it is said that this natural agent has a beginning, then, according to the same logic, it would need another natural agent, which in turn would need another natural agent and so to infinity, which is absurd.<sup>192</sup>

al-Juwaynī also mentions the impossibility that the particulariser is a necessary cause. However, he does not give a proof of it in his *Luma' al-Adillah*. It seems that he implied it in the proof about the natural agent discussed above. This can be seen in *al-Irshād* where the proof is very similar to the one used for the natural agent. His proof in *al-Irshād* is as follows:

If we assume a necessary cause then it must be either pre-eternal ('illah qadimah) or created (hādithah). In the first case this cause would have necessari-

<sup>191</sup> But it was shown by al-Juwaynī that it had a beginning.

<sup>192</sup> *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.92.



tated the world eternally which leads to accepting a pre-eternal world. In the second case, if this necessary cause had a beginning then it would require a particulariser and so on which would lead to infinite successions.<sup>193</sup> It is seen that this is almost identical to the proof mentioned in *Luma' al-Adillah* for the impossibility of a natural agent.

Having shown that this particulariser is neither a natural agent nor a necessary cause, there remains the only alternative that it is a free agent who chose the world at that particular time, in that particular state and that particular nature.<sup>194</sup> Thus in addition to proving the existence of God, al-Juwaynī demonstrates that the particulariser who created the world at a certain particular time rather than at any other time, in a certain particular form rather than in any other form and so on, did not act by necessity, as may be implied from the philosophers views,<sup>195</sup> but rather by free choice.<sup>196</sup>

Having proved that the world has a Creator Who is God, he refutes a possible objection that the creator is non-existent. We saw earlier that the Mu'tazilites consider the non-existent as a thing which may have attributes. Thus they could advance the view that the world has a non-existent creator.

al-Juwaynī answers this by saying that non-existence is absolute negation and cannot have any attribute. Moreover, affirming a non-existent existent is self-contradictory.<sup>197</sup>

The fact that the Mu'tazilites believe in the possibility that the non-existent

<sup>193</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.28-29.

<sup>194</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.29; *Luma' al-Adillah*, p.92.

<sup>195</sup> See for example H. A. Davidson, "Avicenna's Proof of the Existence of God as a Necessary Being", in p. Morewedge (ed. ), *Islamic Philosophical Theology*, State University of New York, Albany, 1979, pp.165-187.

<sup>196</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.29.

<sup>197</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.31.



may have essential attributes seems to have directed al-Juwaynī towards rejecting the view held by all Ash'aris that existence is an essential attribute. This very argument seems to be the one that brought al-Juwaynī's attention to this important point which would suppress the possibility of a non-existent creator, even if the Mu'tazilite definitions of the thing, and their views about the non-existent, were accepted. al-Juwaynī concludes: "The acceptable view is not to consider existence amongst the attributes, for existence is the essence itself . . . the imams were being lax in considering existence as one of the attributes."<sup>198</sup>

This last quotation demonstrates his independence from his predecessors and shows that, although he was a declared Ash'ari, he was ready to uphold what he thought was right rather than continuing in his predecessors' path.

#### 6.7. al-Juwaynī's Original Proof from Particularisation.

This is called the argument from particularisation. We have not found any theologian before al-Juwaynī who has produced a similar argument. It is therefore reasonable to assume that this is one of al-Juwaynī's original contributions to his school of thought.

This argument is found in his *Nizāmiyyah*, but some traces of this argument, as we have seen, are found in *al-Irshād*. But in *al-Irshād* he used the idea of particularisation to prove the existence of God following the proof of creation of the world. In that argument, the particulariser's or God's choice concerned the point in time at which the world came into existence. In his original argument, however, the choice concerns the state or shape into which the world came.

We know that al-Juwaynī divides existent entities into God and the world. For his purpose, al-Juwaynī replaces the division of the world into atoms and ac-

<sup>198</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.31.



cidents by a new definition. He defines the world as "finite bodies, and accidents which subsist in these bodies such as colours, their forms or shapes and all their characteristics." <sup>199</sup>

This simply means that existent things are finite and that any characteristic, quality or attribute we may or may not see are due to certain accidents subsisting in these finite bodies. However, it is obvious from the beginning that al-Juwaynī does not intend to use accidents in their technical sense because he will not rely on them in his argument. The only thing he wants us to keep in mind is that there is something in these bodies that make them have certain characteristics. And this does not need reflection but could be known by necessity.

al-Juwaynī's argument comprises two premises.

(1) *Admissibility:*

al-Juwaynī argues that it is admissible or acceptable that the world or nature could have been different from what it is now. <sup>200</sup> It could be greater or smaller and have a different form. The natural world and laws could be different from what we know now.

(2) *The Admissible is Created and Needs a Creator:*

Since out of all possible states and shapes, one state came into existence, there must have been something that singled it out, which proves that the world is created. The same agent which selected that particular state is the Creator Who is endowed with a Will. al-Juwaynī argues for this second premise in three steps:

(a) The admissible needs a particulariser (*mukhaṣṣiṣ*); (b) This particulariser must have a will. <sup>201</sup> And (c) that which comes into existence as a result of a will

<sup>199</sup> *al-Nizāmiyyah*, p.16.

<sup>200</sup> *al-Nizāmiyyah*, p.16.

<sup>201</sup> Since he made the decision to make a particular choice.

must be created in time.<sup>202</sup>

As we can see, al-Juwaynī proves both the contingency of the world and the existence of God with a single argument. al-Juwaynī does not prove that the particulariser is a free agent as he did in *al-Irshād*,<sup>203</sup> possibly because *al-Nizāmiyyah* is a small book which required him to be brief. Another noteworthy point is that he implicitly takes the need for a particulariser as self-evident.

This argument appears to have two main weaknesses, both of which are in the second premise. The first weakness lies in point (a). If there were three states A, B and C and then B came into existence, then there must have been a 'selector' which/who has singled B out of the three cases. al-Juwaynī does not prove this and must have considered it as self-evident. This may be valid within the context of the Ash'arite doctrine. But for an atheist,<sup>204</sup> for example, it is not that evident and the conclusion itself needs a proof. The atheist may advance that state B came into being simply by chance. For him, the outcome of a number on a dice throw was not the result of his particularisation, nor is it the result of the will of God whose existence needs to be proved.

We might attempt to answer this objection by saying that the possible outcomes and states of all possible worlds runs into infinity.<sup>205</sup> Now the probability of each one of these states occurring is 1 divided by infinity which is effectively nil. Therefore, there is zero probability that the current state of world occurred by chance. The only option is that it occurred because something selected it to be in its present state.

The second apparent weakness lies in point (b). Even if the world was

<sup>202</sup> *al-Nizāmiyyah*, pp.16-17.

<sup>203</sup> See Section 6.6.

<sup>204</sup> Who should be the primary target of such a proof.

<sup>205</sup> That is, there is an infinite possibilities in which the world could exist.



selected by a particulariser, it is not self-evident that this particulariser has a will. An example of this is that a computer can select a number at random, but that does not mean that the computer has a will.

The answer to this objection was given by al-Juwaynī in *al-Irshād* where he argued that the particulariser was a free agent.<sup>206</sup>

al-Juwaynī was the first theologian to develop the concept of particularisation and use it to prove the existence of God and the creation of the world simultaneously. Ibn Rushd attested that al-Juwaynī was the author of this argument,<sup>207</sup> and al-Juwaynī himself confirmed that he had not seen this argument before.<sup>208</sup>

#### 6.8. Conclusion.

This chapter discussed the argument for creation as expounded and formulated by al-Juwaynī. This argument is one of several arguments available at the time of al-Juwaynī. Although this argument was discussed by al-Juwaynī's predecessors, he did not simply restate the argument, but improved and enriched it through a new formulation. In addition to using atoms instead of bodies, thus directly proving creation *ex nihilo*, he strengthened the argument from accidents by introducing a fourth principle. His reformulation of the proof from accidents was used by contemporary and later Ash'arite theologians, some Ismā'ilīs, and some Jewish theologians. It was also cited by many philosophers.<sup>209</sup>

In addition to using the argument from accidents to prove the existence and createdness of the world, al-Juwaynī combines this with another argument

<sup>206</sup> See the discussion in Section 6.6.

<sup>207</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Kitāb al-Kashf 'an Manāḥij al-Adillah*, p.31.

<sup>208</sup> *al-Nizāmiyyah*, pp.12,18.

<sup>209</sup> Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity*, p.141.



which uses the idea of particularisation (*al-takhṣiṣ*) to prove the existence of God. This is important because proving that the world was created does not necessarily imply that it was created by God as we understand it. It could well be an agent which has no will or choice at all. This view should be allowed at least until proven wrong. al-Juwaynī does just that and does not content himself with proving that the world has a creator. Rather he goes on to precisely define or show His very nature.

One characteristic of this nature is that he is not non-existent, but showing this he reached the conclusion which went against what his predecessors held, namely that existence is not an essential attribute.

It would be beneficial to end this chapter by assessing whether or not al-Juwaynī's contribution has any significance and originality in respect of the question of the creation of the world.

It is accepted that the argument from accidents existed before al-Juwaynī in one form or another. But it should suffice to show that al-Juwaynī gave it a new form in order for us to be able to assert that his contribution was important. We shall also see that he not only gave the argument a new shape, but he also strengthened it by adding a fourth principle, and by refuting anticipated objections by his opponents. Even if al-Juwaynī added nothing to the argument, he should be given credit for his proof of the existence of God, which he added as a necessary independent argument for the proof of the existence of God. Thus, al-Juwaynī did not assume that by proving that the world was created he would have automatically proved the existence of God.

One piece of evidence that al-Juwaynī's argument was amongst the strongest is the fact that Averroes chose it as a basis for his discussion and refutation of

the argument from accidents.<sup>210</sup>

In order to ascertain the originality of al-Juwaynī's work, we shall compare his formulation of the argument with that of some well known Ash'aris.

al-Bāqillānī used the same argument but used a quite different formulation. In common to all Ash'aris, he first divides the world into bodies, atoms and accidents. He then proceeds with three principles: (1) Accidents exist in both atoms and bodies. (2) Accidents had a beginning (*ḥawāḍith*). He proves their creation through the idea of motion and rest. (3) Bodies do not precede accidents, hence they are created, for what does not precede a created thing is itself created.<sup>211</sup>

This is obviously a different formulation from that of al-Juwaynī, who uses the first two principles, but changes the third principle on the basis of proving the impossibility of atoms being stripped of accidents. al-Juwaynī also reinforces his argument by his fourth principle, which al-Bāqillānī did not think of.

A different formulation, without the fourth principle, is also given by a contemporary of al-Juwaynī. al-Māwardī, gives an argument similar to that of al-Bāqillānī.<sup>212</sup>

al-Shahrastānī reproduces the same four principles given in al-Juwaynī's works. But al-Shahrastānī ascribes it to al-Mutakallimūn in general rather than al-Juwaynī.<sup>213</sup> However, we have seen that both prior to al-Juwaynī and even during his life, the argument was reproduced by some of the great Ash'arītes, using only the first three principles. The fact that al-Shahrastānī reproduced the fourth principle, which as al-Juwaynī indicates is not an integral part of

<sup>210</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Kitāb al-Kaṣḥf 'an Manāḥij al-Adillah*, translated by J. Windrow Sweetman, *Islam and Christian Theology*, Part 2, Vol. 2, pp.86-91.

<sup>211</sup> al-Bāqillānī, *al-Inṣāf*, pp.16-18.

<sup>212</sup> al-Māwardī, *'ālam al-Nubuwwah*, pp.32-33.

<sup>213</sup> al-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat*, p.11.

the argument but is rather used as an accessory, shows that he had probably obtained the argument indirectly from al-Juwaynī.

Although Ibn ḥazm used a version of this argument,<sup>214</sup> we know that he did not believe in atomism and evidently his argument was quite different from that of al-Juwaynī.

We may also refer to works before al-Bāqillānī. Saadia uses two principles only. (1) Bodies cannot be devoid of accidents. (2) Accidents are created. Therefore bodies are created.<sup>215</sup> This is evidently a different formulation but seems closer to that of al-Bāqillānī than to that of al-Juwaynī.

On the basis of the above discussion, and from what we have seen in the chapter, we may draw the following conclusions. While it is hard to maintain that al-Juwaynī's contribution to the argument for creation was extraordinary, his work was nevertheless important and may be seen as a serious contribution to theological thought. This can easily be drawn by comparing his formulation with that of his predecessors as well as his contemporaries. What is also remarkable in al-Juwaynī is his orderly treatment of the subject. All related terminology is discussed, citing his predecessors' definitions, and those of their opponents; then criticising and refuting what he thinks wrong (including his predecessors' opinions) and selecting the best amongst them. In many places, he introduces new definitions. As to proofs and refutations, he used many of his predecessors' arguments, often refining them, while in many places he produces original proofs.

In addition to his idea of combining more than one argument, al-Juwaynī added further proof which was dedicated solely to prove the existence of a free and willing God. He used his ideas of particularisation (*takhṣiṣ*) and admissibility

<sup>214</sup> Ibn ḥazm, *Fīṣal*, Vol. 1, p.14.

<sup>215</sup> Wolfson, p.404.



(*jawāz*). These very ideas were later used by him to prove the creation of the world in his original new argument. We can find clear similarities between al-Juwaynī's idea of possible existence and possible non-existence, and Ibn Sīnā's concepts of possibly existent and necessarily existent.<sup>216</sup> This suggests that al-Juwaynī was willing to accept the ideas of philosophers if they did not conflict with his own principles. We saw in Chapter 5 that al-Juwaynī agreed with the Mu'tazilites in many questions, and this leads us to conclude that he was not a strict *muqallid* in the sense that he embraced every opinion adopted by Ash'arite school.

al-Juwaynī's most original contribution is his proof from particularisation. In *al-Irshād* and *Luma'* he uses the idea of *takhṣīṣ* in time to prove the existence of God following the proof of the creation of the world. In *al-Nizāmiyyah*, however, *takhṣīṣ* is concerned with the state or form in which the world is. He uses it to prove both the existence of God and the creation of the world at the same time. There seems to be a good reason why al-Juwaynī changed from time to the state of the world. He seemed to have realised that the use of particularisation of a point in time would be easily challenged by the possibility that time did not exist prior to creation. However, no one can object to the reality of the actual state of the world and the possible different states.

<sup>216</sup> Netton, *Allāh Transcendent*, p.172; Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity*, pp.161.



## Chapter Seven

### *Luma' al-Adillah*

#### Translated Text

We have used in this translation the two available printed editions of the *Luma'*. The first was edited by Fawqiyah H. Maḥmūd<sup>1</sup> (referred to as F), and the second was edited and translated into French by M. Allard (referred to as A).<sup>2</sup> The two authors were apparently working on the same book at the same time. Allard only received a copy of Fawqiyah's edition of the *Luma'* when he had finished his own.<sup>3</sup> However, Fawqiyah's edition was first published in 1965, three years before the publication of Allard's. Nevertheless, Allard's edition is still useful as it is based on a different manuscript from that of Fawqiyah.

As the task of editing and reviewing the original manuscripts has already been carried out by Fawqiyah and Allard, the author of this thesis did not see the necessity of reviewing and editing the original manuscripts again, especially since it was not possible for the author to consult these manuscripts. Instead, the translation of the *Luma'* which follows is based on the above mentioned editions. In any case, the manuscripts are well described in both F and A.

The following information about the available manuscripts is drawn from the editions of F and A.<sup>4</sup>

The treatise of the *Luma'* by al-Juwaynī has been conserved in three

<sup>1</sup> H. Fawqiyah, *Luma' al-Adillah*, 'Ālam al-Kutub, Beirut, 1987.

<sup>2</sup> Michel Allard, *Textes Apologétique de Guwainī*, Dār al-Machriq, Beirut, 1968.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p.106.

<sup>4</sup> See Fawqiyah, *Luma'*, pp.67-72, and Allard, *Textes*, pp.101-106.

manuscripts, one of which is a commentary. The first manuscript is found in *Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah* in Cairo under collection (*Majmū'ah*) no.618<sup>5</sup> containing twelve treatises. The collection is contained in 178 pages in which the *Luma'* starts from the top of page 117v and continues to the middle of page 122r. The size of the pages is 25 by 20 cm; each page contains 31 lines and each line has an average of 12 words. The titles of chapters and some important words have been written in red.

Unfortunately, the manuscript of Cairo (referred to as C) is not dated; the end of the manuscript gives the name of the copyist without mentioning the date in which he finished copying the *Luma'*.

The beginning of the manuscript is very brief. The back of page 117 of the manuscript reads:

لمع في قواعد اهل السنة والجماعة لإمام الحرمين

At the end of the manuscript we find (page 122v):

تم كتاب اللمع في الكلام بمحمد الله و حسن توفيقه على [ يد ] العبد الضعيف الفقير إلى عفو الله تعالى محمد بن سليمان بن يوسف الشافعي غفر الله له ولمن قرأ فيه ودعا له بالعفو والرضوان

where no mention is made of the date at which the manuscript was completed.

However, since the whole collection appears to have been written by the same person, and since the *Luma'* is found between two works dated 508 AH/1114 AD and 509 AH/1115 AD respectively, it could be concluded that the manuscript was written sometime during these two years. Fawqiyyah maintains that the script is similar in all the twelve treatises found in the collection. Allard (p.107), however, does not accept this argument on the basis of the fact that the name of the copyist at the end of the manuscript seems to have been written by a

<sup>5</sup> Allard, p.103, gives no.628.

different hand. However, Allard's objection can easily be refuted because what is important is that the script found in the body of the texts of the twelve treatises is similar, especially in the one preceeding the *Luma'* and the one following it. The fact that the name of the copyist was written by a person other than the copyist himself does not prove that the manuscripts were not written by the same copyist. Moreover, Allard himself recognises that he only saw a copy of the pages of the manuscript of the *Luma'*<sup>6</sup> and, therefore, could not compare the three manuscripts. Moreover, all three manuscripts ended with the name of the same copyist, namely, Muḥammad b. Sulaymān b. Yūsuf al-Shāfi'ī. In manuscript C of the *Luma'* his name is found on page 122v.

The second manuscript is to be found in the Berlin Library under the number 2073. A copy of this manuscript is available in Cairo University Library under the number 36393. This manuscript (referred to as B) was found within another collection and starts at the sixth line of page 49r and continues to page 65v.<sup>7</sup> The size of pages is 15 by 13 cm containing 10 lines each. The name of the copyist is written at the beginning of the manuscript (page 49r.), Abū Zayn Ismā'īl al-Ghāzī. As opposed to C., this manuscript has a precise date. The copying of the manuscript was completed on Saturday 23rd of Rabī' al-Awwal 547 AH (1152 AD), 67 years after the death of al-Juwaynī.

As opposed to the first manuscript, both the beginning and the end of B are more detailed. First the name of the copyist is written at the beginning. Page 49r reads:

كتاب اللمع من تصانيف الإمام الكبير إمام الحرمين أبو المعالي قدس الله روحه العزيز  
للعبد المذنب أبو أحمد بن إسماعيل بن إبراهيم بن الفرج الغنوي اللمع فقه في الدين

<sup>6</sup> Allard, *Textes*, p.103.

<sup>7</sup> According to F. (p.69) the manuscript ends at page 63v but Allard (p.102) points out that the order of the last five pages was mixed when the collection was bound. After correction, the manuscript ends at 65v.



برحمتك يا عزيز يا غفور برحمتك يا أرحم الراحمين

On page 65v the manuscript ends as follows:

نجز هذا الكتاب وهو من تصنيف الإمام الحرمين أبي المعالي عبد الملك بن عبد الله  
الجويني طيب الله تربته فرغ من نسخه ليلة الأحد الثالث والعشرين من شهر ربيع الأول  
سنة سبع وأربعين وخمسمائة والحمد لله على . . . . . والصلاة على محمد خاتم أنبيائه  
حسبنا الله

The third manuscript is a commentary on the *Luma'* by Ibn al-Tilimsānī, referred to as T. The commentary is entitled *Sharḥ Luma' al-Adillah fi 'l-Tawḥīd li Imām al-Ḥaramayn*. However, there are three versions of this. The first may be found in the Escorial Library in Spain under no.1606.<sup>8</sup> This was written in 132 pages of 17 lines each. The text of the *Luma'* was written in red ink and no mention is given as to the date of the manuscript or the name of the copyist. The second version is to be found in the Berlin Library under the number 2074.<sup>9</sup> This manuscript contains 92 pages with 25 lines each and does not mention the date or the name of the copyist. The third version<sup>10</sup> is to be found in the Library of Aḥmad III at the Cultural Section, the Arab League, Cairo. The manuscript is found under no.9869-1240 and was written in 804 AH/1401 AD.

The three manuscripts (i.e. C, B, and T) were used by both authors (F and A), but F used the manuscript C as the main reference whereas A used B. Nevertheless, they both record the opposite version in the footnotes. Thus the only difference is that F puts C in the main text and the differences found in B and T in the footnotes, while A puts B as the main text and the differences

<sup>8</sup> Mentioned by F and A.

<sup>9</sup> This is mentioned by A only.

<sup>10</sup> This is mentioned by F only.



arising from C and T in the footnotes.

Allard<sup>11</sup> notes that the text of C is more readable than that of B, and that diacritical points are rarely left out in C but are written in many places in B. Also, both F and A agree on the similarity of the styles of B and T which may indicate that T may have been copied from B.

Our approach will be to rely on both F and A, especially when the meaning is unclear or when the two texts diverge. However, since it is not possible to translate both F and A at the same time, a choice had to be made, albeit for secondary reasons. Although the two editions are very similar, the text of F was chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, the manuscript C was written almost 50 years earlier than B. Secondly, in many passages, the manuscript B contains fewer details than C as can be seen, for example, from the Chapter on the World and its Contingency ([86,3] to [87,2]). The text in B is very brief and reads:

فَمَا اُطْلِقُوهُ فِي الْعَالَمِ هُوَ اَنْهَ كُلُّ مَوْجُودٍ سِوَى اللَّهِ

However, in C the text is more detailed. It reads:

فَمَا اُطْلِقُوهُ الْعَالَمَ فَإِنْ قِيلَ مَا الْعَالَمُ وَلَمْ يَسْمِيَ الْعَالَمَ عَالَمًا قُلْنَا الْعَالَمُ عِنْدَ سَلَفِ الْأُمَّةِ عِبَارَةٌ عَنْ كُلِّ مَوْجُودٍ سِوَى اللَّهِ تَعَالَى وَ عِنْدَ خَلْفِ الْأُمَّةِ عِبَارَةٌ عَنِ الْجَوْهَرِ وَالْأَعْرَاضِ . فَأَمَّا قَوْلُهُ لَمْ يَسْمِيَ الْعَالَمَ عَالَمًا فَأَمَّا الْعَالَمُ مُشْتَقٌّ مِنَ الْعِلْمِ وَالْعَلَامَةِ وَ إِنَّمَا يَسْمِيَ الْعِلْمَ عِلْمًا لِأَنَّهُ أَمَارَةٌ مَنْصُوبَةٌ عَلَى وَجُودِ صَاحِبِ الْعِلْمِ فَكَذَلِكَ الْعَالَمُ بِجَوَاهِرِهِ وَأَعْرَاضِهِ وَأَجْزَائِهِ وَأَبْعَاضِهِ دَلَالَةٌ دَالَّةٌ عَلَى وَجُودِ الرَّبِّ سُبْحَانَهُ وَ تَعَالَى .

We also note that Fawqiyyah has corrected many mistakes found in C such as the ف and و, and grammatical mistakes such as the plural and singular. In the above text, for example, the original text reads:

..... لَمْ يَسْمِيَ الْعَالَمَ عَالَمًا فَأَمَّا الْعَالَمُ مُشْتَقٌّ مِنَ الْعِلْمِ وَالْعَلَامَةِ وَأَمَّا يَسْمِيَ الْعِلْمَ عِلْمًا لِأَنَّهُ أَمَارَةٌ .....  
.....

<sup>11</sup> Allard, *Textes*, p.103.

but Fawqiyyah corrected the *إِذَا سَمِيَ* to the more correct expression *إِنَّمَا سَمِيَ*. Fawqiyyah also used the texts from B and T to improve the text. A good example of this may be found in F (p.121) where the editor used B and T to correct the text from:

وذلك بمثابة الفرق بين ما يقع غير مراد وإن كانت الإرادة ...

to:

وذلك بمثابة الفرق بين ما يقع مراد و بين ما يقع غير مراد وإن كانت الإرادة ...

A less important justification is that the author of this thesis prefers the style in which F produced the text of the *Luma'*. Fawqiyyah added several headings and divided the *Luma'* into seven chapters which made the text easier to read and understand. However, although we shall adopt Fawqiyyah's style, the text in A will also be used in an attempt to improve the text whenever possible.

In the translation of Qur'ānic verses we have used Yusuf Ali's translation of the Qur'ān. We have also used his translation for some religious terms (especially those relating to God).

The square brackets [ ] indicate an addition to the text which is either made by the author of the thesis or which has been made by Fawqiyyah. Additions are made either from other manuscripts (B. and T.) or made from the context in order to improve the meaning of the text. Parentheses are added when a short explanation is needed or when alternative or synonymous expressions exist.

Finally, at the beginning of each translated paragraph, we shall give a page and line reference to the Arabic text found in F. The form of this addition will be as follows: [page,line number] where the line number excludes the headings and sub-headings.

In the Name of God, Most Compassionate,

Most Merciful.

In Him is my trust, He is all-sufficient for me,<sup>12</sup> and He is enough.<sup>13</sup>

[85,1] Praise be to God the All-Knowing,<sup>14</sup> the Irresistible<sup>15</sup> and the All-Wise<sup>16</sup> to Whom eternity must be attributed and Who, in his transcendence, is impossible to describe as a being whose non-existence is possible.<sup>17</sup> **May God bless the Prophet**<sup>18</sup> who destroyed the false<sup>19</sup> and who clarified the truth with his clear signs.

[85,4] You have asked [me], may God (to whom belongs might and

<sup>12</sup> Another translation of **هو حسبي** could be: 'He suffice(th) me'. See the translation of the Qur'ān by J. M. Rodwell, *The Koran*, Everyman, London, 1994, s.8, v.62 and 64; and s.9, v.129.

<sup>13</sup> **و به ثقتي و هو حسبي و كفى**

<sup>14</sup> **العليم**

<sup>15</sup> Yusuf Ali's translation of the Qur'ān, p.293, s.6, v.18.

<sup>16</sup> Y. Ali, s.9, v.28.

<sup>17</sup> **واستحال في تعاليه تجويز العدم**. F., p.85, ll.1-2.

<sup>18</sup> The expression in bold is found in C but not in B. A comparison with *al-Irshād* clearly shows that the addition was not made by al-Juwaynī as the following expression "موضح الحق" is applied to God in the introduction of *al-Irshād*, p.1.

<sup>19</sup> **الباطل**, F., p.85, l.2.

majesty)<sup>20</sup> grant you guidance, to bring you some luminous [proofs]<sup>21</sup> of the foundations of the beliefs of the people of the Sunnah and the majority.<sup>22</sup>

[85,6] I have therefore asked Almighty God to assist me in your aim; it is He Whom we ask for help, and in Him is our confidence.

<sup>20</sup> عزّ وجلّ. This was added from B. the translation is taken from the Arabic-English Dictionary *al-Mawrid* by Rohi Baalabaki, Dār al-'Ilm li al-Malāyin, Beirut, 1988. The expression could also be translated as: 'Be he Exalted and Glorified' or 'be He exalted and full of majesty'.

<sup>21</sup> من الأدلة. This was added from B.

<sup>22</sup> أهل السنة والجماعة. This expression refers to the Sunni Muslims in general. It seems that the word الجماعة is added to indicate that they (the Sunnis) are the main community of Muslims and that anybody who is outside their sphere is outside the majority.



## [CHAPTER ONE: The World and Its Contingency]<sup>†</sup>

### Section 1.1

#### On the Contingency<sup>23</sup> of the World and the Existence of the Creator<sup>24</sup>

[86,1] You should know - may God give you success -<sup>25</sup> that it is essential to present expressions which theologians<sup>26</sup> have agreed upon, in an attempt, by them, to gather numerous meanings in brief expressions.<sup>27</sup>

[86,3] So they have used the term 'world'.<sup>28</sup> And if it is asked "what is the World and why is it called world?" We say: The world for the early schol-

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<sup>†</sup> This was added by Fawqiyyah for greater clarity. We shall reproduce her several additions in the book.

<sup>23</sup> حدوث . The term حادث (pl. حوادث) (and حدوث) used by al-Juwaynī may have several meanings. Among these are a contingent thing (contingency), a created thing (createdness), an event, something that began in time (beginning in time), and an originated thing (origination). We shall use the term contingent and contingency to describe the terms *ḥādīth* and *ḥudūth*, but we may use other terms if they appear to be more suitable for the meaning of the text.

<sup>24</sup> الصانع  
<sup>25</sup> وفقكم الله

<sup>26</sup> الموحّدون here is translated by the term theologians. One of the names of theology is *'ilm al-tawḥīd*, hence the name. The term also means monotheists, but obviously not all monotheists (Muslims or non-Muslims) know about these special expressions.

<sup>27</sup> لجمع المعاني الكثيرة في الألفاظ الوجيزة

<sup>28</sup> فما أطلقوه : العالم

ars<sup>29</sup> is an expression concerning all existing things other than God.<sup>30</sup> For later scholars,<sup>31</sup> the world is an expression concerning substance and accidents.<sup>32</sup>

[86,6] As to his saying "Why is it called world?", we say that the word 'alam<sup>33</sup> derives from [the word] banner<sup>34</sup> and [the word] sign.<sup>35</sup> The banner is so called because it is a sign for the existence of its owner.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, the world – in its substances, accidents, parts and pieces – is evidence that reveals the existence of the Almighty Lord.

[87,3] If it is asked: What is the definition of substance<sup>37</sup> and what is the true nature (definition) of the accident?<sup>38</sup> We say: The substance has been given many definitions. But we shall limit ourselves to three. Thus, we say substance

<sup>29</sup> سلف الأمة . *al-salaf* means the early Muslims or predecessors, i.e. the Companions (الصحابة) of the Prophet and their followers (التابعون). Although in general الأمة means the community as a whole, the expression سلف الأمة here means the scholars (*Fuqahā'* and '*Ulamā'*) amongst the early Muslims.

<sup>30</sup> كل موجود سوى الله

<sup>31</sup> خلف الأمة . *Khalaf* is the opposite of *Salaf* and means later Muslims in general. It is not known exactly which period al-Juwaynī means, but he probably meant the early Mu'tazilites and Ash'aris.

<sup>32</sup> The word جوهر will be translated in most places by the word substance. Although authors like Wolfson have used the word atom for جوهر the meaning of the word substance is literally closer to the word جوهر than that of the word atom. Nevertheless, the two words may equally translate the word *jawhar*.

<sup>33</sup> عالم

<sup>34</sup> علم

<sup>35</sup> علامة

<sup>36</sup> صاحب العلم

<sup>37</sup> ما حدّ الجوهر . In Arabic حدّ generally means limit or border, but it should be obvious that al-Juwaynī means definition. al-Juwaynī acknowledges the various meanings of الحدّ in *al-Kāfiyah fi al-Jadal*, pp.1-3.

<sup>38</sup> حقيقة العرض

is that which occupies space;<sup>39</sup> [others have defined it]<sup>40</sup> as: that which has volume; [and sometimes] that which accepts an accident.<sup>41</sup>

[87,8] As for the accident, it was defined as "that which subsists in the substance". It was also defined as "that which occurs within the substances"<sup>42</sup> such as colours, flavours, odours, knowledge, powers and contingent wills, and their contraries; and life and death. Another definition<sup>43</sup> of the accident is "that which cannot remain".<sup>44</sup>

[87,12] Next, you should know that the existent is divided into eternal<sup>45</sup> and contingent.<sup>46</sup> The eternal is the Existent Who has no beginning to His existence.<sup>47</sup> The contingent is the existent which has a beginning.

[87,15] If it is said: "what is the proof of the contingency<sup>48</sup> of the world?" We say: the proof is that the particles of the world<sup>49</sup> and their bodies<sup>50</sup> cannot be free from contingent accidents; and that which cannot be free from a contingent must itself be contingent.

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<sup>39</sup> المتحيز

<sup>40</sup> و قيل

<sup>41</sup> T. gives the following definitions: "that which has volume; that which occupies space; that which is not in need of a subject (المستغني عن المحل); that which accepts accidents; or that which has a surface."

<sup>42</sup> ما يطرأ على الجواهر

<sup>43</sup> و قيل

<sup>44</sup> ما يستحيل عليه البقاء

<sup>45</sup> قديم

<sup>46</sup> حادث

<sup>47</sup> هو الموجود الذي لا أول لوجوده

<sup>48</sup> حدوث

<sup>49</sup> أجرام العالم

<sup>50</sup> وأجسامها

[88,1] Objections<sup>51</sup> to the above statement may be presented in four ways:  
 The first: we do not accept the existence<sup>52</sup> of accidents;  
 [the second:] even if we accepted the existence of accidents we would deny their  
 contingency;  
 [the third:] even if we accepted their contingency we would not accept the im-  
 possibility of substance being free from contingent accidents;  
 and the fourth: how can you justify your statement "that which cannot be free  
 from a contingent must itself be contingent."<sup>53</sup>

[88,7] *The first question: Denying the existence of accidents:*

[88,8] The proof that accidents exist is that if a rational being saw a sub-  
 stance at rest and then saw the substance moving, he would realise the necessary  
 difference between the two states. Such a difference can either be attributed to  
 the substance itself,<sup>54</sup> or to something additional to it.<sup>55</sup>

[88,14] It is impossible to say that the difference can be attributed to the  
 substance itself, because the substance itself is unchanged in both cases, and  
 a thing cannot differ from itself<sup>56</sup> for a separation can only occur between two  
 different essences.<sup>57</sup> It is therefore obvious that the difference is due to something

<sup>51</sup> al-Juwaynī uses the word 'question' (سؤال), but it is obvious from what follows that he means objection.

<sup>52</sup> The term ثبوت need some explanation as it has several meanings. It derives from the verb ثبت which means to be permanent, fixed, invariable, etc; to be courageous, unmoved, etc; to maintain, to keep, etc.; and to resist, to withstand, etc. It also means to be established, positive, proved, valid, etc. This latter meaning shows that by ثبوت al-Juwaynī means existence.

<sup>53</sup> The literal translation reads: "why did you say: "that which cannot be free from a contingent must itself be contingent."? ( . . . قلت . )

<sup>54</sup> ترجع إلى ذات الجوهر

<sup>55</sup> معنى زائد على الجوهر

<sup>56</sup> والشيء لا يخالف نفسه

<sup>57</sup> لا يقع الإفتراق إلا بين ذاتين



additional to the substance; and this is what we call the accident.

[89,1] *The second question: Denying the contingency<sup>58</sup> of accidents:*

[89,2] The proof that accidents are contingent is that we observe contrasting accidents successively appearing in their subjects.<sup>59</sup> We are then certain that the most recent of these accidents are contingent because we know their existence. We are also certain that those accidents which preceded these most recent ones were contingent because they have perished. Had they been eternal,<sup>60</sup> their non-existence<sup>61</sup> would have been impossible, for eternity is incompatible with non-existence, and that which is eternal cannot be non-existent.<sup>62</sup>

[The third question:]

[89,7] The proof of the impossibility for substances to be stripped of accidents is that substances occupy space.<sup>63</sup> These substances which occupy space are not aggregated or segregated by means of a mode or a state.<sup>64</sup> Rather, it is known by necessary knowledge that they can only be either segregated or aggregated. This establishes the impossibility of substances to be free from either aggregation or segregation.

[89,11] We also intuitively know that bodies<sup>65</sup> must be associated with either

<sup>58</sup> حدوث

<sup>59</sup> تتعاقب على محالها

<sup>60</sup> قديمة

<sup>61</sup> عدمها

<sup>62</sup> ما ثبت له القدم إستحال عليه العدم

<sup>63</sup> الجواهر شاغلة للأحيان

<sup>64</sup> غير مجتمعة ولا مفترقة بحال

<sup>65</sup> Here, al-Juwaynī uses the term أجرام (celestial body) as similar to جسم or أجسام (earthly body).

motion and rest, occupancy of a location,<sup>66</sup> termination<sup>67</sup> and transformation.<sup>68</sup>

[89,13] All this clarifies the impossibility for substances to be stripped of accidents.

[The fourth question:]

[90,1] The proof of the impossibility of contingents without a beginning is as follows:

[90,2] The definition<sup>69</sup> of a contingent is: that which has a first (beginning). Therefore, the definition of any contingent thing is that it has a beginning. Since the multitude of contingent things does not exclude them from their nature,<sup>70</sup> then they all have a beginning.

[90,4] An example of this is the substance which is defined by its occupancy of space. Thus, the existence of substances in large numbers, does not exclude the substance from its true nature,<sup>71</sup> and thus all substances would occupy space. Having established the existence of accidents, their contingency, the impossibility for substances to be stripped of accidents, and having refuted the Dahrites' view that contingent things do not have a beginning, it follows that substances do not precede the contingent accidents, and that which does not precede a contingent thing is itself contingent<sup>72</sup> without recourse to reasoning or rational proof.

<sup>66</sup> اللبث في المحال

<sup>67</sup> زوال

<sup>68</sup> إنتقال

<sup>69</sup> The Arabic word used here is حقيقة which means the 'true nature', but it is obvious that means definition or true definition.

<sup>70</sup> كثرة الحوادث لا يخرج عن حقيقتها

<sup>71</sup> لا يخرج عن حقيقته

<sup>72</sup> ما لا يسبق الحادث حادث على الإضرار

## [Section 1.2]

### [Proof of the Existence of the Creator].<sup>73</sup>

[90,9] The proof that the world has a creator is that we have established the contingency of the world with the arguments that we have mentioned earlier.

[91,2] The existence of a contingent thing is possible,<sup>74</sup> for it is possible to conceive its existence rather than its non-existence. Similarly, we may conceive its non-existence rather than its existence. Since it was particularised by the possible existence rather than the admissible non-existence, it must have needed a particulariser.<sup>75</sup> This particulariser is the Almighty Creator.

[91,6] It is impossible that the particulariser of the world be a natural agent, as has been maintained by the Naturalists.<sup>76</sup> It is equally impossible that it is a necessary cause,<sup>77</sup> a view which was held by the ancient thinkers;<sup>78</sup> for such a natural agent can either be pre-eternal or contingent.

[91,9] If the natural agent were pre-eternal, its effect<sup>79</sup> must also be pre-eternal, because this natural agent, according to those who believe in it, has no free choice, and can only necessitate its effects when the unfavourable conditions end. Thus, if the natural agent were pre-eternal, its effects must be pre-eternal;

<sup>73</sup> إثبات العلم بالصانع. Added from B and T.

<sup>74</sup> جائز الوجود

<sup>75</sup> إفتقر إلى محض

<sup>76</sup> الطبائع

<sup>77</sup> علة موجبة

<sup>78</sup> الأوائل by whom al-Juwaynī means the philosophers. See section 6.6.

<sup>79</sup> آثارها

and we have demonstrated the contingency of the world.<sup>80</sup>

[92,1] If the natural agent were contingent, it would have needed another natural agent for its existence. The same reasoning applies on this natural agent and other natural agents which preceded it. And this would lead us to accept things without a beginning; a matter of which we have shown the absurdity.

[92,5] It should be clear, therefore, that the particulariser of the world, is a Creator,<sup>81</sup> a free agent,<sup>82</sup> characterised by his power and free choice.

[94,7] Having established that the Creator of the World<sup>83</sup> is Powerful, it then immediately follows<sup>84</sup> (by necessary knowledge) that He is Alive,<sup>85</sup> for it is impossible to attribute knowledge and power to something dead or an inanimate (inorganic) body. Allowing that would simply be obstinacy and intransigence.

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<sup>80</sup> It should be obvious that by 'effects' al-Juwaynī means the world. Then the refutation is simple: Eternal agent → eternal effect (world) → but the world is not eternal which is absurd.

<sup>81</sup> صانع

<sup>82</sup> مختار

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## [CHAPTER TWO: God and His Attributes.]

### Section [2.1]

[93,1] The Creator of the world has an eternal existence,<sup>83</sup> His essence is pre-eternal,<sup>84</sup> He has no originator,<sup>85</sup> and neither has His eternity a beginning.<sup>86</sup>

[92,3] The proof of that is that if He, the Almighty, were contingent,<sup>87</sup> He would, like all other contingents, need a cause (necessitator).<sup>88</sup> Then the argument on His cause (necessitator) would be carried out in the same manner, and so on. This leads us to accept events without a first,<sup>89</sup> which we have shown to be absurd.<sup>90</sup>

<sup>83</sup> ازلي الوجود

<sup>84</sup> قديم الذات

<sup>85</sup> لا مفتتح لوجوده

<sup>86</sup> لا مبتدئ لثبوته

<sup>87</sup> حادثا

<sup>88</sup> محدث

<sup>89</sup> إثبات حوادث لا أول لها

<sup>90</sup> سبق بطلان ذلك

## Section [2.2]

[94,1] The Creator of the world is Alive,<sup>91</sup> knows all knowables (things),<sup>92</sup> and has power over everything (Most Powerful).<sup>93</sup> It is self-evident that it is impossible that actions can emanate from a being who is incapable of such actions.

[94,3] It is also easy for any intellectual<sup>94</sup> to know that coherent and perfected actions, which are perfectly arranged can only originate from someone knowing them.<sup>95</sup>

[94,5] Anyone who accepts that a well written and properly arranged script can be performed by someone who cannot write, would be defying evidence and entering the erroneous domain of ignorance.<sup>96</sup>

[94,7] Having established that the Creator of the World<sup>97</sup> is Knowing and Powerful, it then immediately follows<sup>98</sup> (by necessary knowledge) that He is Alive,<sup>99</sup> for it is impossible to attribute knowledge and power to something dead or an inanimate (inorganic) body. Allowing that would simply be obstinacy and intransigence.

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حَيٍّ

92

المعلومات

93

قادر على جميع المقدورات

94

لييب

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لا تصدر إلا من عالم بها

96

كان من المعقول خارجا و في تيه الجبل والجا

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صانع العالم

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فبالإضطرار يعلم

99

كونه حيا

## Section [2.3]

### Section [2.1]

[95,1] According to the people of the truth<sup>100</sup> the Creator of the world is actually<sup>101</sup> Willing. al-Ka'bī, however, denied that He is actually Willing. He claimed that if God were willing His own actions, then it would mean that He created them; and if He was characterised as Willing the actions of human beings, then it would mean that He ordered such actions.

He (al-Ka'bī) also claimed that the fact that God Knows about the occurrence of events at specific times and with specific characteristics would eliminate the need for associating the Will [of God] with these [events].

[95,7] This is wrong, for if the fact that God was knowing dispensed Him from being willing, then His knowledge would also dispense Him from being powerful, which is not so. However, al-Ka'bī<sup>102</sup> agrees with us that the actions of contingent beings<sup>103</sup> need their [i.e. contingent beings'] will.<sup>104</sup>

<sup>100</sup> أهل الحق

<sup>101</sup> على الحقيقة

<sup>102</sup> We used the term found in B., *و قد وافقنا*, instead of: *و قد وافقونا* in C. The former being compatible with the discussion with al-Ka'bī. See Allard, p.133.

<sup>103</sup> المحدثين

<sup>104</sup> This passage is rather obscure. In *al-Irshād*, p.65, al-Juwaynī explains that if God reveals to someone that he would do so and so, such knowledge would not be sufficient; there would be a need for that person to be willing to act.

## Section [2.4]

[96,1] The Mu'tazilites of Basra have claimed that the Almighty God wills by a created will<sup>105</sup> which does not subsist in a location.<sup>106</sup> But what they have said is false, because any created thing would need a will for its creation.<sup>107</sup> If this latter will were created, it would also need another will for its creation. And this would lead us to establish an infinite number of wills.

[96,8] Having refuted these doctrines, there remains, after that, only to maintain firmly what the people of the truth have established: God the Almighty wills with a Will that is eternal and without a beginning.

<sup>105</sup> بإرادة حادثة

<sup>106</sup> ثابتة لا في محل

<sup>107</sup> الحوادث إنما إفتقرت إلى إرادة لحدوثها



## Section [2.5]

[97,1] **The Creator of the world is hearing, seeing, and speaking.**

[97,2] Indeed, it has been established that He is Alive, and that which is alive cannot be devoid from being attributed with hearing, sight, and speech, and their contraries.<sup>108</sup> But the contraries of these attributes are deficiencies,<sup>109</sup> and the Almighty Lord is exempt from any characteristic of deficiency.

## Section [2.6]

[97,6] **The Lord, Almighty, is Subsistent and His existence is necessary.**<sup>110</sup>

[97,2] It has been established – from what has preceded – that He is Pre-Eternal.<sup>111</sup> And that which has no beginning<sup>112</sup> cannot be reduced to a void;<sup>113</sup> intellectuals<sup>114</sup> have all agreed upon this. This clearly shows that He is Subsistent and that His existence is perpetual.

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<sup>108</sup> وأضدادها

<sup>109</sup> نقائص

<sup>110</sup> باق ، واجب الوجود

<sup>111</sup> قدمه

<sup>112</sup> This is also used as equivalent to قديم

<sup>113</sup> والقديم يستحيل عدمه

<sup>114</sup> العقلاء

## Section [2.7]

[98,1] **The Creator of the world is Unique<sup>115</sup> , according to the people of the truth.**

[98,2] The definition of the word 'unique' is the thing that cannot be divided.

[98,3] The proof of the uniqueness of God is as follows. If we assume two gods, two opposite objectives, and that one of the gods wills one of the opposites while the second god wills the second [objective], then there can only be three cases:

The wills of both [gods] are carried out;

or, neither wills are carried out;

or, the will of only one god is carried out.

[98,9] It is impossible that both wills be carried out, because of the impossibility for two contraries to coexist.<sup>116</sup> It is also impossible for both wills not to be carried out, because of the conflicting gods<sup>117</sup> as well as the impossibility for the non-existence of both contraries at the same time.<sup>118</sup>

[99,1] Having rejected the two alternatives, there remains only a third [alternative], which is that the will of one god only is carried out. Then, the god whose will is not carried out is vanquished,<sup>119</sup> overwhelmed<sup>120</sup> and compelled<sup>121</sup>

<sup>115</sup> واحد

<sup>116</sup> لإستحالة إجتماع الضدين

<sup>117</sup> لتمامع الإلهين

<sup>118</sup> و خلو المحل عن كلا الضدين

<sup>119</sup> المغلوب

<sup>120</sup> المكسور

[to accept what he does not will]. [On the other hand,] the god whose will is carried out is the god who has the power to obtain what he wants (wills).<sup>122</sup>

[99,5] If it is asked why cannot they (the gods) agree for ever, and never disagree? We would say: Maintaining that it is impossible that they (the two gods) oppose each other in (their respective) will would be impossible. Indeed, it is impossible that the existence of one of them (the gods) and the existence of his attributes<sup>123</sup> would prevent the second (other god) from willing what, had he been alone, would be possible for his will.<sup>124</sup> The impotent<sup>125</sup> is degraded from the class of deity (godhood). This is the content of God Almighty's word: "If there were, in the heavens and the earth, other gods besides God, there would have been confusion in both!",<sup>126</sup> which means if we assumed two beings perfectly powerful, their decrees<sup>127</sup> would contradict.

<sup>121</sup> المستكبره

<sup>122</sup> القادر على تحصيل ما يشاء

<sup>123</sup> وجود أحدهما ووجود صفاته

<sup>124</sup> The existence of the will implies freedom of choice. Thus, if both gods have freedom of choice it is possible that they both agree for ever. However, there is also the possibility that they might disagree or that the decision comes from one god only. See *al-Irshād*, p.54.

<sup>125</sup> العاجز

<sup>126</sup> لو كان فيهما آلهة إلا الله لفسدتا . Qur'ān, s.21, v.22. Transl. Y. Ali, p.826.

<sup>127</sup> احكامهما

## Section [2.8]

[99,11] The Glorious Eternal, be He exalted, is Knowing with an eternal Knowledge, Powerful with an eternal Power, Alive with an eternal Life.

[100,1] The Mu'tazilites hold the view that God - may He be far above what they said - is Alive, Knowing, and Powerful by Himself, and that He does not have Power, Knowledge or Life.

[100,3] Our proof of that is as follows: It has been established by intellectual reasoning that 'what is known'<sup>128</sup> is known by knowledge. If the Almighty God knew what is known by Himself (His Essence),<sup>129</sup> then He would Himself be Knowledge,<sup>130</sup> for anything that is related to what is known must be related to being enclosed by (associated with) knowledge.<sup>131</sup>

[100,7] Then, the Mu'tazilites imposed their conception of God's attributes and claimed that He was Knowing, Alive and Powerful by Himself,<sup>132</sup> and that He was Willing by a created<sup>133</sup> will. However, if someone reversed what they have said,<sup>134</sup> and asserted<sup>135</sup> that He is Knowing with a created Knowledge and Willing by Himself, they would fail to distinguish between what they believe and

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المعلوم

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بنفسه

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لكان نفسه علما

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إذ كل متعلق بمعلوم تعلق إحاطت به علم

132

بنفسه

133

حادثة

134

فلو عكس عاكس ما قالوه

135

زعم



what has been imposed upon them.<sup>136</sup>

[100,11] If they say: If the Almighty God were Willing by Himself, He would Will everything that is willed,<sup>137</sup> in the same way that the fact that He, the Almighty, Knows by Himself means that He knows everything that can be known.<sup>138</sup>

[101,2] We say: This is false according to your own corrupted doctrines and beliefs in that God is Powerful; for that (i.e. Power) is, according to you, an essential attribute. Then you say that God's power is limited to only certain objects of power,<sup>139</sup> and that God cannot be attributed with power over human objects of power.<sup>140</sup> But there are texts from the Book of God which clearly establish the existence of the attributes [of God]. For example, "And no female conceives, or lays down (her load), but with His Knowledge."<sup>141</sup> He also said: "[Unto thee] He hath sent from His (own) knowledge."<sup>142</sup> God Almighty said, glorifying Himself, "For God is He Who gives (all) sustenance – Lord of Power – Steadfast (for ever)."<sup>143</sup> He (God) affirms force<sup>144</sup> for Himself, and this force is His Power according to the unanimous agreement of commentators.<sup>145</sup>

<sup>136</sup> لم يجدوا بين ما إعتقدوه و بين ما ألزموه فصلا

<sup>137</sup> مراد

<sup>138</sup> كان عالما بكل معلوم

<sup>139</sup> مقدورات

<sup>140</sup> مقدورات العباد

<sup>141</sup> وما تحمل من أنثى ولا تضع الا بعلمه. Qur'ān, s.35, v.11, Y. Ali, p.1155.

<sup>142</sup> أنزله بعلمه. Qur'ān, s.4, v.166, Y. Ali, p.232.

<sup>143</sup> إن الله هو الرزاق ذو القوة المتين. Qur'ān, s.51, v.58, Y. Ali, p.1429.

<sup>144</sup> قوة

<sup>145</sup> باتفاق المفسرين

## Section [2.9]

[102,2] We have already mentioned that the Almighty God is Speaking. Let it be known that his Speech is without a beginning and eternal. The Mu'tazilites, the Najjarites, the Zaydites, the Imamites, and the Kharijis hold that God's Speech is contingent.<sup>146</sup> Some of these groups refrained from using the absolute term "created"<sup>147</sup> [for God's Speech]. Instead they called it contingent or appeared in time.<sup>148</sup> But some of the later Mu'tazilites explicitly qualified it [God's Speech] as created.

[102,9] The proof that God's Speech has no beginning is as follows: [there is a consensus that God speaks by means of a speech.]<sup>149</sup> If God's Speech were contingent (had a beginning), then we would have three cases:

- Either it (God's Speech) subsists in the Essence of God Almighty,<sup>150</sup>
- or it subsists in a body;<sup>151</sup>
- or it subsists in no location.<sup>152</sup>

[103,3] [First], It is wrong to say that it (the Speech) subsists in Him (God's Essence), for it is impossible for contingents to subsist in God's Essence; contingents can only subsist in a contingent.

<sup>146</sup> حادث

<sup>147</sup> مخلوق

<sup>148</sup> حادثا و محدثا

<sup>149</sup> This is added from B.

<sup>150</sup> يقوم بذات الباري تعالى

<sup>151</sup> يقوم بجسم من الأجسام

<sup>152</sup> لا بمحل

[103,4] [Second] His Speech cannot subsist in a body, for the speaker then would have to be that body.

[103,6] [Third] It is also false that the speech can subsist in no location, for the contingent speech is an accident, and, like other accidents, it is impossible for it to subsist in itself; saying that this is possible for one category of accidents would imply that it is possible for all accidents.

But some of the later Muslim theologians explicitly qualified it [God's speech] as contingent. Some of these groups refrained from using the absolute term "created" for God's speech, instead they called it contingent or accidental. But there are texts in the Book of God which clearly show that God's speech is contingent. For example, "And on that day we will create speech for them."

The proof that God's speech has no beginning is as follows: (103,9) The Almighty God (two) said, "Who is with me?" (103,10) If God's speech were a contingent, then we would have three cases: - contingent (had a beginning), - contingent (no beginning), - contingent (no beginning). Either it (God's speech) subsists in the Essence of God Almighty, or it subsists in a body, or it subsists in no location.

[103,3] [First] It is wrong to say that it (the speech) subsists in Him (God's

Essence) for it is impossible for contingents to subsist in God's Essence; con-

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## Section [2.10]

[103,9] The true speech in our world<sup>153</sup> is the discourse of the self.<sup>154</sup> It is this [discourse] that is designated by the established conventional expressions. It could also be designated by scripts (writings), symbols and signs.<sup>155</sup> All these are an indication to the speech subsisting in the essence. That is why al-Akḥṭal<sup>156</sup> said:

“Speech lies in the heart, the tongue is made only as a guide to the heart”<sup>157</sup>

[104,5] Further evidence can be found in the Book of God Almighty when He mentions the Hypocrites. He said: “When the Hypocrites come to thee, they say, “We bear witness that thou art indeed the Apostle of God””.<sup>158</sup> We know that God did not accuse them of lying because of their declaration. He only disapproved them because of what they hid in their own consciences.

[105,1] If it is established that what subsists in the essence is speech rather than ordered letters (characters) or discrete sounds articulated from the letters,<sup>159</sup> then any reasonable person<sup>160</sup> would be certain that the eternal Speech

<sup>153</sup> شاهدًا. *al-Shāhid* means the present or the known.

<sup>154</sup> حديث النفس

<sup>155</sup> الخطوط و الرموز و الإشارات

<sup>156</sup> Abū Mālik al-Akḥṭal, a Christian poet, born around 641 AH. He was one of the greatest poets of the Umayyad state.

<sup>157</sup> إن الكلام لفي الفؤاد و إنما جعل اللسان على الفؤاد دليلاً

<sup>158</sup> إذا جاءك المنافقون قالوا نشهد إنك لرسول الله. Qur’ān, s.63, v.1. Y. Ali, p.1550.

<sup>159</sup> و ليس هو حروفا منتظمة و لا أصواتا مقطعة من مخارج الحروف

<sup>160</sup> العاقل



is not letters, sounds, tunes or melodies. Indeed, letters succeed each other and are ordered in relation to each other. [Furthermore], Some of these letters are placed before others; and [we know that] any preceded thing must be contin-  
gent.<sup>161</sup>

[104.5] Further evidence can be found in the Book of God Almighty when He mentions the Hypocrites. He said: "When the Hypocrites come to thee, they say, 'We bear witness that thou art indeed the Apostle of God'."<sup>162</sup> We know that God did not accuse them of lying because of their declaration. He only disapproved them because of what they hid in their own consciences.

[105.1] It is established that what subsists in the essence is speech rather than ordered letters (characters) or discrete sounds articulated from the letters.<sup>163</sup> then any reasonable person<sup>164</sup> would be certain that the eternal speech

161. *al-Ma'rifah* means the present or the known.  
162. *Q. an-Nisa*, 157.  
163. *Q. al-Ahzab*, 3.  
164. *Q. al-Ahzab*, 3.  
165. *Q. al-Ahzab*, 3.  
166. *Q. al-Ahzab*, 3.  
167. *Q. al-Ahzab*, 3.  
168. *Q. al-Ahzab*, 3.  
169. *Q. al-Ahzab*, 3.  
170. *Q. al-Ahzab*, 3.

161 وكل مسبوق حادث



## Section [2.11]

[105,6] The Speech of God is read by the tongues of the readers,<sup>162</sup> conserved in the hearts of the learners,<sup>163</sup> inscribed on the pages of the Qur'ān. The reading consists of the voices of the readers and their melodies.<sup>164</sup> This [reading] is among the actions which we are ordered to perform and required to defend. We are rewarded for performing it (the reading) and may be punished for not doing so.

[106,3] The Speech of God is what could be known and understood from it (the reading). The memorising<sup>165</sup> [of the Qur'ān] is an attribute of the memoriser,<sup>166</sup> and what is memorised is the Speech of God Almighty.

[106,6] The writing consists of well arranged letters and punctuated characters<sup>167</sup> (patterns); and these are contingents. What is understood from the letters is the Speech of God; in the same way that God Almighty is written, known, and mentioned but He is other than the mention, the knowledge or the writing.

162 بألسنة القراء

163 حفظه

164 ونغماتهم

165 الحفظ

166 الحافظ

167 أشكال مرقومة

## CHAPTER [3]

### What is Impossible to Attribute to Almighty God.

Contains [several] sections.

#### Section [3.1]

[107,1] In general, anything that indicates contingency or imperfection, the Lord is exempt<sup>168</sup> from it. This generalisation is clarified in several sections containing more details. Among these is that the Lord is exempt from any specification of location (space) or attribution of adjacency.<sup>169</sup> He is not surrounded by territories or limited by lands, and He is too exalted to accept limit or measure.

[108,1] The proof of that is as follows: Anything that is specified by a location to which it is related<sup>170</sup> occupies space.<sup>171</sup> Anything that occupies space can be joined (aggregated) to or separated (segregated) from substances. That which accepts aggregation and segregation cannot be free from them (i.e. aggregation and segregation). And that which cannot be free from aggregation and segregation must be contingent, like the substances.

<sup>168</sup> تقَدَّس

<sup>169</sup> محاذاة. In B. the word is الحادثات (contingents) but we prefer the former because the context of the whole paragraph concerns space and location.

<sup>170</sup> شاغل لها

<sup>171</sup> متعَيَّن

[108,5] Having established that God is above space occupancy<sup>172</sup> or specification of location, it can be immediately deduced that He is too exalted to be in a place,<sup>173</sup> or to be near celestial or earthly bodies.<sup>174</sup>

[108,7] If we are asked about God's word: "(God) Most Gracious is firmly established on the Throne"<sup>175</sup> We would say: What is meant by 'establishment'<sup>176</sup> is domination (power, force),<sup>177</sup> triumph<sup>178</sup> and exaltedness (sublimity, elevation).<sup>179</sup> For example, the Arabs say: 'someone is established over a kingdom', that is, he has dominated it and it [the kingdom] has submitted to him. A poet<sup>180</sup> has said:

"Bishr has established himself over Iraq Without sword or bloodshed"<sup>181</sup>

172

تَحَيَّرَ

173

الإختصاص بمكان

174

أجسام و أجرام

175

الرحمن على العرش إستوى . Qur'ān, s.20, v.5. Y. Ali, p.790.

176

إستواء

177

قهر

178

غلبة

179

علو

180

و قول الشاعر

181

من غير سيف و دم مهراق

قد إستوى بشر على العراق



## Section [3.2]

[109,1] The Almighty God is exempt from accepting contingents. People of various creeds (religions)<sup>182</sup> have agreed upon this. However, a group from Sijistān called al-Karāmiyya have opposed the unanimity of the community.<sup>183</sup> They maintain that contingents may occur in the Essence of God<sup>184</sup> - may He be exalted from what they say. This is exactly the doctrine of the Zoroastrians.<sup>185</sup>

[109,6] The proof of the impossibility that contingents can subsist<sup>186</sup> in the Essence of God is as follows: if they [contingents] had subsisted in God, He would have never been exempt<sup>187</sup> from them. And that which is not exempt from contingents must be a contingent itself.

182 أهل الملل والنحل

183 الأئمة

184 تطراً على ذات الباري

185 المجوس

186 إمكانية قيام الحوادث

187 لم يخل

## [The Will of God and the Will of Humans.]

### Section [3.3]

[110,1] All contingents have been the result of the Will<sup>188</sup> of God Almighty, the useful as well as the harmful, the good as well as the bad.

[110,2] The Mu'tazilites and some of their passionate followers, maintained that the obligatory<sup>189</sup> and recommended<sup>190</sup> acts of obedience are willed by God Almighty, whether or not they have been effectively carried out. [On the other hand], the acts of disobedience<sup>191</sup> and obscenity<sup>192</sup> are carried out while God dislikes them,<sup>193</sup> not willing these acts to be carried out.<sup>194</sup> Such acts are therefore carried out despite God's dislike.<sup>195</sup> As to the permissible acts and those acts which are not obligatory, such as the acts of animals and the insane, these are carried out while He [God] is neither willing nor disliking them.

[110,9,] If we established that God is the creator of all contingents, it would then be established that He wills what he creates, and intends<sup>196</sup> to produce<sup>197</sup>

<sup>188</sup> تقع مرادة

<sup>189</sup> الواجبات

<sup>190</sup> المندوبات

<sup>191</sup> معاصي

<sup>192</sup> فواحش

<sup>193</sup> كاره لها

<sup>194</sup> غير مرید لوقوعها

<sup>195</sup> تقع على كره

<sup>196</sup> قاصد

what he invents.<sup>198</sup>

[111,1] We then say: it is established by reason that the lack (weakness) of will<sup>199</sup> and the non-carrying out of what is wanted<sup>200</sup> are the best signs which indicate the characteristics of deficiency and the attributes of incapability and impotence.<sup>201</sup>

[111,4] Anyone who is designated to be King, and then cannot execute his will over his subjects, would be considered as a vulnerable person who wastes the opportunity that has been given to him.<sup>202</sup> If this discredits the one who is designated for kingship, how can such a thing be attributed to the King of kings and the Lord of lords?

[111,8] If they say: the Almighty God has the power to bring his creatures to His obedience by force, and to show a sign before which the tyrants' necks will submit,<sup>203</sup> to that we would reply: one of your corrupted principles is that it is impossible that He [God] obliges His creatures to His obedience and constrains them to well-doing; He does not want to force their faith, He rather wants them to have a free choice, in such a way that what He wills He has no power to accomplish and what He has power to accomplish He does not will.<sup>204</sup>

197 إبداع

198 اخترع

199 قصور الإرادة

200 عدم نفوذ المشيئة

201 العجز والقصور

202 ضعيف المنة ومضاع الفرصة

203 و يظهر آية تظل رقاب الجبابرة

204 ما يريد لا يقدر عليه، وما يقدر عليه لا يريد.

This is taken from B. The text in F reads: "in such a way that what He wills He has no power to accomplish and what He has no power to accomplish He does not will ( ما يريد لا يقدر عليه، وما لا يقدر عليه لا يريد ) The text in B is more suitable for the context as we shall see in the comment.

[112,5] However, both earlier and later Muslims have agreed upon a principle that cannot be denied by anyone belonging to Islam. They say: "What God wills exists (occurs), and what He does not will does not".<sup>205</sup>

[112,7] The verses which justify the people of the truth are countless.<sup>206</sup> Among these is His saying: "If it were God's Will, He could gather them together unto true guidance"<sup>207</sup> He also said: "Those whom God (in His Plan) willeth to guide, - He openeth their breast to Islam; those whom He willeth to leave straying, - He maketh their breast close and constricted."<sup>208</sup> Another verse is: "Even if We did send unto them angels ..." <sup>209</sup> to the end of the verse.<sup>210</sup> But if they attempt to argue on the basis of His saying: "God liketh not His servants to be unbelievers"<sup>211</sup> We answer: what God meant by 'servants' are those who are willing to obey Him and those who are faithful and willing to worship Him. This is similar to the meaning of His saying: "A Fountain where the Servants

<sup>205</sup> ما شاء الله كان وما لم يشأ لم يكن

<sup>206</sup> لا تحصى . Note that in Arabic, linguistic exaggeration is allowed in certain circumstances.

<sup>207</sup> ولو شاء الله لجمعهم على الهدى . s.6, v.35, Y. Ali, p.297.

<sup>208</sup> فمن يرد الله أن يهديه يشرح صدره للإسلام

ومن يرد أن يضله يجعل صدره ضيقا حرجا

Qur'ān, s.6, v.125., Y. Ali, p.326.

<sup>209</sup> ولو أننا انزلنا إليهم الملائكة

<sup>210</sup> "... and the dead did speak unto them, and We gathered together all things before their very eyes, they are not the ones to believe, unless it is in God's Plan. but most of them ignore (the truth)." Qur'ān, s.6, v.111. Y. Ali, p.323.

<sup>211</sup> Y. Ali's translation is: "He liketh not ingratitude from His servants" which does not appear to give the meaning which is understood from the Arabic text: "ولا يرضى لعباده الكفر" . Qur'ān, s.39, v.7, Y. Ali, p.1238.



(Devotees) of God do drink”<sup>212</sup> Those servants are the friends<sup>213</sup> of God, the pious. Thus, those for whom God did not want heresy<sup>214</sup> (infidelity) did not become unbelievers.<sup>215</sup>

[113,1] They may also argue from His saying: “Those who give partners (to God) will say: ‘If God had wished, we should not have given partners to Him, nor would our fathers, nor should we have had any taboos’ ”<sup>216</sup> to: “... until they tasted of Our wrath.”<sup>217</sup> The proof that can be deduced from this<sup>218</sup> verse is that God denounced<sup>219</sup> the unbelievers’ saying: “If God had wished, we should not have given partners to Him.”<sup>220</sup> The answer to this argument is that God denounced their saying because they said what they said mockingly,<sup>221</sup> doubting the truth and rejecting the proof of God. The proof of this is His saying at the end of the verse: “Say: ‘Have ye any (certain) Knowledge? If so, produce it before us. Ye follow nothing but conjecture: Ye do nothing but lie.’ (v.149) Say: ‘With God is the argument that reaches home: if it had been His Will, He could indeed have guided you all.’ ”<sup>222</sup>

<sup>212</sup> عينا يشرب بها عباد الله . Qur’ān, s.76, v.6, Y. Ali, p.1656. The word ‘devotees’ in parentheses is the actual translation by Y. Ali which we have replaced by ‘servants’.

<sup>213</sup> أولياء

<sup>214</sup> كفر

<sup>215</sup> لم يكفروا

<sup>216</sup> سيقول الذين أشركوا لو شاء الله ما أشركنا ،  
ولا آباؤنا ولا حرمنا من شيء

Qur’ān, s.6, v.148. Y. Ali, p.334.

<sup>217</sup> حتى ذاقوا بأسنا

<sup>218</sup> in B. ‘Their proof from this verse’

<sup>219</sup> God’s denunciation in this respect means that He did not will them to be unbelievers.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.

<sup>221</sup> مستهزئين

<sup>222</sup> قل هل عندكم من علم فتخرجوه لنا إن

## [CHAPTER FOUR: The Vision of God]

[115,1] The doctrine of the people of the truth<sup>223</sup> is that God<sup>224</sup> the Almighty<sup>225</sup> is visible,<sup>226</sup> and it will be possible,<sup>227</sup> for those who can see,<sup>228</sup> to see Him with their own eyes.<sup>229</sup>

[115,3] The Mu'tazilites believe that God Almighty cannot be seen. Most of them went further and maintained that God cannot see Himself.

[115,5] The rational proof of the possibility of seeing God: is that the Lord, be He exalted, exists,<sup>230</sup> and every existent is visible.<sup>231</sup>

[115,7] We demonstrate that as follows:<sup>232</sup>

[115,8] We can see, [in this world],<sup>233</sup> substances and colours. But if a substance is seen only as a result of it being substance, †then it would follow

تَبْعُونَ إِلَّا الظَّنَّ وَإِنْ أَنْتُمْ إِلَّا تَخْرُصُونَ

قُلْ فَلِلَّهِ الْحُجَّةُ الْبَالِغَةُ فَلَوْ شَاءَ لَهْدَاكُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ

Qur'an, s.6, v.148-149, Y. Ali., p.334.

223 اهل الحق

224 In F.: البارئ; in B. and T.: الله.

225 تعالى

226 مرئي.

227 و يجوز

228 الراؤون

229 بالأبصار

230 موجود

231 وكل موجود مرئي

232 ذلك . Not in B and T.

233 شاهدا . Added from B.

† -† This portion is found in B only and is helpful in understanding this obscure

necessarily that colours cannot be seen. Similarly, if a colour is seen only because it is a colour,<sup>†</sup> then it would follow that substance cannot be seen. However, if both are seen because of their existence, then it would necessarily follow that every existent can be seen.<sup>234</sup>

[116,3] Since God Almighty exists, then it is possible for Him to be seen.<sup>235</sup>

[116,4] If they say: what is seen is only seen because of its origination in time (contingency)<sup>236</sup> whereas the Most Powerful Lord<sup>237</sup> has an eternal Essence which has no beginning<sup>238</sup> and, therefore, cannot be seen.

[116,7] The answer can be put forward in two ways:<sup>239</sup>

[116,8] The first is to say: your statement contradicts your own belief. Since tastes, odours, knowledge and the like are contingent then they can be seen [according to the above statement]. But these, according to your own belief, cannot be seen.<sup>240</sup>

[116,11] Nevertheless, a better answer would be to say:<sup>241</sup> contingency implies an existing thing which was preceded by non-existence,<sup>242</sup> but this preceded-

passage.

<sup>234</sup> The literal translation would read "should (or must) be seen" but it is obvious that al-Juwaynī meant the possibility of seeing existing things.

<sup>235</sup> فصَحَّ أَنْ يَرَى

<sup>236</sup> لِحُدُوثِهِ

<sup>237</sup> وَالرَّبِّ تَعَالَى

<sup>238</sup> أَزَلِي قَدِيمِ الذَّاتِ

<sup>239</sup> فَالْجَوَابُ مِنْ وَجْهَيْنِ

<sup>240</sup> وَعِنْدَكُمْ يَسْتَحِيلُ أَنْ تَرَى

<sup>241</sup> ثُمَّ الْجَوَابُ الْحَقِيقِيُّ أَنْ نَقُولَ

<sup>242</sup> الْحُدُوثُ يَنْبَغِي عَنْ مَوْجُودٍ مُسَبِّقٍ بَعْدَهُ

ing non-existence cannot be seen<sup>243</sup> which implies that confirmation (of sight) is reserved to existence.<sup>244</sup>

[117,3] This demonstrates that every existing thing may be seen.

[117,4] We may also argue in favour of the possibility of seeing [God],<sup>245</sup> and that it will take place in the Gardens<sup>246</sup> from the truthful promise and rightful saying of God<sup>247</sup> when He says: "Some faces, that Day, will beam (in brightness and beauty); looking towards their Lord." <sup>248</sup> The word *نظر*, if preceded by the preposition *إلى*, would mean the literal vision by eyesight.<sup>249</sup>

[117,8] If they opposed us with God's saying: "No vision can grasp Him"<sup>250</sup> [we would say:]<sup>251</sup> Some of our companions<sup>252</sup> said: God Almighty can be seen but cannot be attained (reached),<sup>253</sup> because attainment implies cognition<sup>254</sup> and perception of the subject.<sup>255</sup> But God is exempt<sup>256</sup> from all limits.

[118,1] If they oppose us with God's word, when He answered Moses, peace

<sup>243</sup> Here the passage *الرؤية لا يصحح* *والعدم السابق* is more difficult to understand than that in B which reads: *والعدم السابق لا يصحح عليه الرؤية*. The meaning was taken from the latter passage.

<sup>244</sup> فانحصر التصحيح في الوجود

<sup>245</sup> و يستدل على جواز الرؤية

<sup>246</sup> In Paradise, الجنان

<sup>247</sup> وعدا من الله صدقا ، و قولاً منه حقاً

<sup>248</sup> وجوه يومئذ ناظرة إلى ربها ناظرة . Qur'ān, Sura 75, v.22-23. Y. Ali, p.1651.

<sup>249</sup> رؤية البصر

<sup>250</sup> لا تدركه الأبصار . Qur'ān, Sura 6, v,103. Y. Ali, p.319.

<sup>251</sup> Added from B.

<sup>252</sup> فمن أصحابنا

<sup>253</sup> يرى ولا يدرك

<sup>254</sup> الإحاطة

<sup>255</sup> و درك الغاية

<sup>256</sup> مقدس



be upon him, "By no means canst thou see Me",<sup>257</sup> pretending that the negation لن is valid for all times.<sup>258</sup>

[118,4] We say: This verse is one of the clearest proofs of the possibility of vision. Indeed, if such a vision were impossible, the one who believes in it would be misguided<sup>259</sup> or infidel.<sup>260</sup> How can someone believe in what is impossible of God Almighty, especially if he was the one whom God Almighty chose for His message<sup>261</sup> and selected for His Prophecy; to whom God gave exclusive miracles<sup>262</sup> and who was given the honour of speaking to God; who was made the best of his contemporaries;<sup>263</sup> and whom God supported with His proof.<sup>264</sup>

[118,10] It is possible for the Prophets to have doubts in matters relating to the world of the unknown,<sup>265</sup> but in matters relating to the description of the Glorious Eternal, be He exalted, they are not permitted to have doubts.<sup>266</sup>

[119,1] The verse, therefore, should be understood as follows: what Moses (peace be upon him) believed possible was indeed possible. But Moses thought that God would grant him what he believed possible immediately. The refusal, therefore, was directed to Moses' request<sup>267</sup> [and not to the impossibility of his request].

<sup>257</sup> لن تراني . Qur'ān, Sura 7, v.143. Y. Ali, p.382.

<sup>258</sup> يقتضي النفي على التأيد

<sup>259</sup> ضالا

<sup>260</sup> كافرا

<sup>261</sup> رسالة

<sup>262</sup> و خصه بتكريمه

<sup>263</sup> أفضل أهل زمانه

<sup>264</sup> أيده برهانه

<sup>265</sup> علم الغيب

<sup>266</sup> فلا يجوز الريب عليهم

<sup>267</sup> فبرجع النفي في الجواب إلى السؤال

[119,4] What Moses (peace be upon him) asked his God for was a vision at that moment<sup>268</sup> and the refusal was about this very request<sup>269</sup> because the answer was issued for the purpose of the dialogue [between God and Moses].<sup>270</sup>

<sup>268</sup> the literal translation of رؤية في الدنيا would be: "a vision on earth". We believe al-Juwaynī meant that Moses wished to see God at that moment.

<sup>269</sup> لينصرف النفي إليها

<sup>270</sup> فالجواب نزل على قضية الخطاب

## [CHAPTER FIVE: God and His Creatures]

### Section [5.1.]

[120,1] God Almighty is the only Creator. There is no Creator other than He,<sup>271</sup> neither is there an Inventor other than He.<sup>272</sup> Every contingent is created (brought about) by God Almighty.<sup>273</sup>

[120,3] The Mu'tazilites said:

[120,4] Contingent beings create their actions by their own power and the Lord, be He exalted, is not credited with power over the action of human beings.

[120,6] The proof that God Almighty is the sole Creator<sup>274</sup> is His saying: "Is then He Who creates Like one that creates not? Will ye not receive admonition?"<sup>275</sup>

[120,8] The way this verse can be used in the argument is that God Almighty praises Himself for His creation and glorifies Himself because of that. If he had someone else associated with Him [in creation], such glorification would have been annulled.

[121,2] Also, we can use as evidence His saying: "The Creator of all things:

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<sup>271</sup> فلا خالق سواه

<sup>272</sup> ولا مبدع غيره

<sup>273</sup> وكل حادث فالله محدثه

<sup>274</sup> الدليل على تفرد الرب تعالى بالخلق

<sup>275</sup> أفمن يخلق كمن لا يخلق أفلا تذكرون . Qur'ān, s.16, v.17. Y. Ali, p.660.

then worship ye Him”<sup>276</sup> and His saying: “Say: “God is the Creator of all things: He is the One, the Supreme and Irresistible” ”.<sup>277</sup>

[121,4] Moreover, the intellectual proof that God Almighty is the exclusive Creator and Founder<sup>278</sup> is that actions imply the knowledge of the executer of such actions.<sup>279</sup>

[122,5] The proof that there is nothing obligatory for God Almighty is that... [121,12] That his obligation... [122,5] What explains this further is that, according to the... [122,12] Indeed, if it were possible for a human being to deserve a reward for...  
الأحكام المتعلقة بالتكليف  
من فدية الشئ

<sup>276</sup> خالق كل شيء فأعبده . Qur’ān, s.6, v.102. Y. Ali, p.319.

<sup>277</sup> قل الله خالق كل شيء وهو الواحد القهار . Qur’ān, s.13, v.16. Y. Ali, p.608.

<sup>278</sup> منفرد بالإيجاد والإختراع

<sup>279</sup> i.e. those who produce some given actions must know about such actions.

الأفعال دالة على علم فاعلها



## Section [5.2]

[121,7] A human being is not compelled to his actions. On the contrary, he has power over his actions and he acquires these actions.<sup>280</sup> The proof that a human being has this power is that a man with reason<sup>281</sup> distinguishes between the trembling of his hand and the voluntary movement of it. The meaning of him being acquisitive (able to acquire)<sup>282</sup> is that he is powerful over his action<sup>283</sup> even though such power has no influence over the hapenning of the object of such an action.<sup>284</sup>

[121,12] That [i.e. acquisition<sup>285</sup>] is similar to the difference between what happens<sup>286</sup> willingly and what happens unwillingly, although the will has no influence over its object.<sup>287</sup>

<sup>280</sup> بل هو قادر عليها مكتسب لها

<sup>281</sup> العاقل

<sup>282</sup> و معنى كونه مكتسب

<sup>283</sup> أنه قادر على فعله

<sup>284</sup> و إن لم تكن قدرته مؤثرة في إيقاع المقدور

<sup>285</sup> إكتساب

<sup>286</sup> ما يقع

<sup>287</sup> و إن كانت الإرادة لا تؤثر في المراد

### Section [5.3]

[122,1] There is nothing obligatory for God Almighty; whatever He accords is a favour on His part, and whatever punishment he imposes is justice. A human being's obligation is whatever God Almighty imposes on him, and it cannot be concluded – from reason alone – that something is obligatory. Rather, all the rules which are related to duties<sup>288</sup> are obtained<sup>289</sup> from religious jurisprudence<sup>290</sup> and on the basis of revelation.<sup>291</sup>

[122,5] The proof that there is nothing obligatory for God Almighty is that the real meaning<sup>292</sup> of obligation is what necessitates a blame if not complied with.<sup>293</sup> But the Lord – be He exalted – is exalted from that (being blamed).

[122,8] What explains this further is that, according to the Mu'tazilites, the obedience of the *mukallafin*<sup>294</sup> is imposed<sup>295</sup> as thanks and recognition to God Almighty for His benevolence. However, if obediences<sup>296</sup> were imposed as a compensation for God's favours<sup>297</sup> then it would be impossible for the one who observes his duty to merit a reward.

[122,12] Indeed, if it were possible for a human being to deserve a reward for

288 الأحكام المتعلقة بالتكليف

289 متلقاة

290 من قضية الشرع

291 و موجب السمع

292 or definition. حقيقة

293 حقيقة الواجب : ما يستوجب اللوم بتركه

294 Those who are obliged to observe religious duties.

295 يجب

296 الطاعات

297 النعم

observing his duty, it would also be possible for God to deserve recognition<sup>298</sup>  
for his grant<sup>299</sup>, even though this latter was deserved.<sup>300</sup>

[132.1] There is nothing obligatory for God Almighty whatever He records  
as a favour on His part, and whatever punishment He imposes is justice. A just  
man being's obligation is whatever God Almighty imposes on him, and it cannot  
be concluded from reason alone that something is obligatory. Rather, all  
the rules which are related to duties<sup>298</sup> are obtained<sup>299</sup> from religious injunctions  
and on the basis of revelation.<sup>300</sup>

[132.2] The proof that there is nothing obligatory for God Almighty is that  
the real meaning<sup>301</sup> of obligation is what necessitates a thing if not complied  
with<sup>302</sup>. But the Lord who He created - is created from that (being blamed)  
[132.3] What explains this further is that, according to the idealization, the  
obedience of the mawla<sup>303</sup> is imposed<sup>304</sup> as thanks and recognition to God  
Almighty for His benevolence. However, if obedience<sup>305</sup> were imposed as a  
compensation for God's favours<sup>306</sup>, then it would be impossible for the one who  
observes his duty to merit a reward.

[132.12] Indeed, if it were possible for a human being to deserve a reward for

298	بَلْ قَوْلُ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِمْ لَكُمْ	بَلْ قَوْلُ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِمْ لَكُمْ
299	الْمَالِ	الْمَالِ
300	وَمِنْ كَوْنِهِمْ لَكُمْ	وَمِنْ كَوْنِهِمْ لَكُمْ
301	أَنْ تَقُولَ عَلَى فَمِهِ	أَنْ تَقُولَ عَلَى فَمِهِ
302	تَقْبِلُ	تَقْبِلُ
303	لَمْ يَسْتَوْجِبْ لَهُ	لَمْ يَسْتَوْجِبْ لَهُ
304	تَقْبِلُ	تَقْبِلُ
305	تَقْبِلُ	تَقْبِلُ
306	تَقْبِلُ	تَقْبِلُ

298 شكر  
299 ثواب  
300 استحق

## Section [5.4]

### [On the Confirmation of Prophethood]

[123,1] It is up to God Almighty to send apostles and prophets to preach<sup>301</sup> and warn<sup>302</sup>. The Brahmins<sup>303</sup> have denied prophecy and refused the possibility of the sending<sup>304</sup> of apostles. They said: if the apostles came with what could be attained by intellectual reasoning<sup>305</sup> then their mission would be useless; and we find in the field of intellectual reasoning<sup>306</sup> what dispenses of anything else.<sup>307</sup>

[123,5] [On the other hand] If the apostles came with what cannot be attained by reason, then we cannot accept what opposes reason.<sup>308</sup>

[123,6] We would say:

[123,7] Jurisprudence<sup>309</sup> points to<sup>310</sup> what cannot be understood<sup>311</sup> by simple reasoning.<sup>312</sup> It may even affirm matters that reason cannot accept.<sup>313</sup>

301 مبشرين

302 منذرين

303 البراهمة

304 إنبعاث

305 يدرك عقلا

306 قضايا العقل

307 مندوحة عن غيرها

308 فلا يقبل ما يخالف العقل

309 الشرع

310 يرشد

311 يستدرك

312 بمحض العقول



Therefore, if there is no impossibility or irrationality in the sending of apostles<sup>314</sup>  
then we should be compelled to accept its possibility.<sup>315</sup>

Section [5.4]

[On the Confirmation of Prophecy]

[123.1] It is up to God Almighty to send apostles and prophets to preach<sup>301</sup>  
and warn<sup>302</sup>. The Brahmins<sup>303</sup> have denied prophecy and refused the possibility  
of the sending<sup>304</sup> of apostles. They said if the apostles came with what could  
be attained by intellectual reasoning<sup>305</sup> then their mission would be useless  
and we find in the field of intellectual reasoning<sup>306</sup> what dispenses of anything  
else.<sup>307</sup>  
[123.2] [On the other hand] if the apostles came with what cannot be at-  
tained by reason, then we cannot accept what opposes reason.<sup>308</sup>  
[123.3] We would say:  
[123.4] Insuperabundance<sup>309</sup> points to<sup>310</sup> what cannot be understood<sup>311</sup> by  
simple reasoning.<sup>312</sup> It may even affirm matters that reason cannot accept.<sup>313</sup>

<sup>313</sup> In F. the sentence starts with: **ولا يرد بما يقضي العقل بخلافه**. But in B.  
the sentence reads: **و ربما يرد بما تقضي العقول بخلافه** which is more acceptable  
in our view because religion can sometimes confirm what may seem illogical or  
unreasonable.

<sup>314</sup> إرسال الرسل  
<sup>315</sup> يجب الحكم بجوازه



## [CHAPTER SIX]

### [Apostlehood (*al-Risālah*), Prophecy, and Miracles]

#### Section [6.1]

[124,1] It is only through miracles that we may establish the sincerity of anyone claiming prophecy. Miracles are supernatural<sup>316</sup> actions emanating from the Almighty God. These actions appear in conformity with what the prophecy said<sup>317</sup> and represent God's challenge. Those who are challenged by the prophet are incapable of producing similar actions.

[124,4] The way miracles demonstrate the sincerity of the prophet is that they (miracles) have the same standing as believing in his word.<sup>318</sup> This is comparable in our world<sup>319</sup> to a king who receives his people and allows them to go to him.<sup>320</sup> When everyone had presented his respect to the king and took his place,<sup>321</sup> a person amongst the crowd rose and said: "O people, I am a messenger sent to you by the King,<sup>322</sup> and I am claiming such a position before his

<sup>316</sup> خارقة للعادة

<sup>317</sup> وظهرها على حسب دعوى النبوة

<sup>318</sup> تنزل منزلة التصديق بالقول

<sup>319</sup> و نظيرها في الشاهد

<sup>320</sup> و يأذن لهم بالولوج عليه

<sup>321</sup> فلما إحتفوا به و أخذ كل مجلسه

<sup>322</sup> In F. إني رسول الله إليكم but in B. إني رسول الملك إليكم which gives a better

very eyes and ears.<sup>323</sup> The sign which confirms my message is that the King will deviate from his habit<sup>324</sup> and will stand up and then sit down on my request. He then says: O King, approve me: stand up and then sit down.<sup>325</sup> If the king then does what he was asked to do, his action would be an approval having the same meaning as saying: you have spoken the truth.<sup>326</sup>

## Section [6.1]

[124.1] It is only through miracles that we may establish the sincerity of anyone claiming prophecy. Miracles are supernatural<sup>323</sup> actions emanating from the Almighty God. These actions appear in conformity with what the prophet said<sup>324</sup> and represent God's challenge. Those who are challenged by the prophet are incapable of producing similar actions.

[124.4] The way miracles demonstrate the sincerity of the prophet is that they (miracles) have the same standing as believing in his word.<sup>325</sup> This is compared in our world<sup>326</sup> to a king who receives his people and allows them to go to him.<sup>327</sup> When everyone had presented his respect to the king and took his place,<sup>328</sup> a person amongst the crowd rose and said: "O people, I am a messenger sent to you by the King,<sup>329</sup> and I am claiming such a position before his

meaning to al-Juwaynī's analogy. The King may confirm that that person is his messenger by doing what he was asked to do, but he cannot confirm that that person is the apostle of God by doing such a simple action.

<sup>323</sup> برأى منه وسمع

<sup>324</sup> يخالف عادته

<sup>325</sup> صدقني، و قم واقعد

<sup>326</sup> صدقت

## Section [6.2]

[125,4] The proof of the prophethood of our Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) is his miracles.<sup>327</sup> One of his miracles is the Qur'ān which contains many aspects which render it inimitable. Amongst these aspects is its eloquence<sup>328</sup> and its unique style which differed from all styles and rhymes of the language of the Arabs.

[125,7] He even challenged the Arabs to produce one *sūrah* (chapter) of the same quality<sup>329</sup> and said that, if they did, his claim of prophethood would be annihilated and he would also refrain from opposing them. The Arabs tried, for more than twenty years, to oppose the Qur'ān without success and this despite them being the most eloquent of speakers and the most expressive of writers.

[126,1] Other aspects of the miraculous nature of the Qur'ān is that it contains the stories of the ancients<sup>330</sup> whereas there is no doubt that the Prophet (peace be upon him) was illiterate – unable to write or read. Moreover, in all his life, he had never put himself to study and learn the books of the ancients, neither had he the opportunity to be in a position where he could have had access to the study of books.

[126,5] The Qur'ān also mentioned unknown events which were to occur in the future. These events indeed occurred as mentioned in the Qur'ān.<sup>331</sup>

<sup>327</sup> المعجزات

<sup>328</sup> الجمالة

<sup>329</sup> يعارضوا سورة منه

<sup>330</sup> قصص الأولين

<sup>331</sup> In F.: كما إتفق إنباء القرآن عنها which is ambiguous. A clearer meaning is



### Section [6.3]

[126,7] The Prophet (peace be upon him) has proofs and miracles other than the Qur'ān. Among these are: the splitting of the moon,<sup>332</sup> the praising of the stones,<sup>333</sup> he made a dumb person speak,<sup>334</sup> he made water well out between his fingers, etc.

### Section [6.4]

[126,10] Everything that has been transmitted by jurisprudence<sup>335</sup> and that reason deems possible must be accepted as truth.<sup>336</sup> Amongst what has been transmitted by jurisprudence is: the punishment of the grave, the questioning of Munkar and Nakīr,<sup>337</sup> and the return of the soul to the dead body in the tomb.

[127,2] There is also the Bridge,<sup>338</sup> the Balance,<sup>339</sup> the Pool,<sup>340</sup> the intercession for sinners;<sup>341</sup> all that is true.

found in B. with: **و إتفق كما أنبأ عنها القرآن** and the translation is based on the passage from B.

<sup>332</sup> **إنفلاق القمر**

<sup>333</sup> **تسبيح الحصى**. He made the stones speak and praise God.

<sup>334</sup> **إنطاق العجماء**

<sup>335</sup> **الشرع**

<sup>336</sup> **وجب القضاء بثبوت**

<sup>337</sup> These are the two angels sent by God to ask the dead about their God, religion, and prophet.

<sup>338</sup> **الصراط**

<sup>339</sup> **الميزان**

<sup>340</sup> **الحوض**

<sup>341</sup> **الشفاعة للمذنبين**

[127,4] Paradise and Hell are created<sup>342</sup> [and exist] in our time. God Almighty said: "And for a Garden whose width is that (of the whole) of the heavens and of the earth, prepared for the righteous."<sup>343</sup>

## Section [7.2]

### The Leadership of the Muslims

[128,1] The leader of Muslims<sup>344</sup> and the Prince of Believers<sup>345</sup> after the Apostle of God (peace be upon him) is Abū Bakr al-Siddiq (may God be pleased with him). Then came Umar al-Farūq after him; then 'Uthmān, and then 'Alī (may God be pleased with them all).  
[128,2] The Prophet (peace be upon him) did not designate anyone for the leadership<sup>346</sup> of the Muslims for if he had designated someone, the matter of designation would have been known and disseminated, as had been the designation of governors by the Prophet (peace be upon him) and as in the case with any important and crucial matter.

[129,1] It is established that leadership<sup>347</sup> was not confirmed by text<sup>348</sup> of anyone, then it would follow that the leadership was confirmed by free choice. Then the Muslims unanimously agreed upon the leadership of Abū Bakr (may

<sup>342</sup> مخلوقات

<sup>343</sup> Qur'ān, s.3, v.133. Y. Ali, وجنة عرضها السماوات والأرض أعدت للمتقين  
p.157.

## Section [CHAPTER SEVEN:] Leadership

### Section [7.1]

#### The Leadership of the Muslims

[128,1] The leader of Muslims<sup>344</sup> and the Prince of Believers,<sup>345</sup> after the Apostle of God (peace be upon him), is Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (may God be pleased with him). Then came 'Umar al-Fārūq after him; then 'Uthmān, and then 'Alī (may God be pleased with them all).

[128,5] The Prophet (peace be upon him) did not designate anyone for the leadership<sup>346</sup> of the Muslims for if he had designated someone, the matter of designation would have been known and disseminated, as had been the designation of governors by the Prophet (peace be upon him) and as is the case with any important and crucial matter.

[129,1] If it is established that leadership<sup>347</sup> was not confirmed by text<sup>348</sup> of anyone, then it would follow that the leadership was confirmed by free choice. Then the Muslims unanimously agreed upon the leadership of Abū Bakr (may

<sup>344</sup> إمام المسلمين. This is added from B.

<sup>345</sup> أمير المؤمنين

<sup>346</sup> إمامة

<sup>347</sup> الأمامة

<sup>348</sup> نصًا

God be pleased with him) and they all obeyed him. The same thing happened during the time of 'Umar, 'Uthmān and 'Alī (may God be pleased with them).

[129,5] As for Mu'āwiyah, even though he fought against 'Alī, he did not reject 'Alī's leadership, neither did he claim it for himself. He was only demanding those who killed 'Uthmān, thinking that he was right, but he was wrong. 'Alī (peace be upon them and him) was firmly holding the truth.<sup>349</sup>

## Section [7.2]

[129,8] It appears that the Righteous Caliphs are ranked in terms of virtue according to the order of succession to the leadership.

[129,10] Therefore, the best of people - after the Apostle of God (peace be upon him) is Abū Bakr, then 'Umar, then 'Uthmān, and then 'Alī (peace be upon them all). Muslims did not allow someone to take the leadership out of passion;<sup>350</sup> they only allowed whom they allowed<sup>351</sup> because they believed him to be better and more suitable for the leadership than anyone else.

349 متمسك بالحق

350 تشبها منهم

351 قدموا من قدموه



### Section [7.3]

[130,3] The leadership can only be taken up by those who satisfy a number of conditions.<sup>352</sup> One of these is that the Imām should be from Quraysh, for the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "The Imams are from Quraysh"<sup>353</sup>

[130,6] Another condition is that he should be a *mujtahid*<sup>354</sup> and from the people of *fatwā*.<sup>355</sup> He should also have sufficient physical and mental strength,<sup>356</sup> and be able to firmly conduct the politics of the [people's] affairs<sup>357</sup> and their directions.<sup>358</sup> He should be dedicated to presiding over and looking after the nation.<sup>359</sup> He must also be free and be scrupulous in his religion.

[130,9] All the above conditions were satisfied by the successors of the Apostle of God (peace be upon him). He (the prophet) said: "The succession after me will be thirty years, then there will be a corrupt kingdom."<sup>360</sup>

[130,12] The days of the Caliphs were of this duration.<sup>361</sup>

<sup>352</sup> شرائط

<sup>353</sup> الأئمة من قريش. Ḥadīth narrated by Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, III, p.120.

<sup>354</sup> A مجتهد is a religious scholar who has reached the level of being able to give religious opinion.

<sup>355</sup> فتوى: A religious ruling on new matters.

<sup>356</sup> ذا نجدة وكفاية

<sup>357</sup> سياسة الأمور

<sup>358</sup> وإيالتها

<sup>359</sup> مهتديا إلى رئاسة الأمة و رعايتها . This was added from B.

<sup>360</sup> سنة الخلافة بعدي ثلاثون سنة ، ثمّ تصير ملكا عضوضا . Aḥmad Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad*, V, p.221.

<sup>361</sup> وكانت أيام الخلفاء هذا القدر

[130,13] May God guide us to the right path.<sup>362</sup>

The book of *al-Luma' fī al-Kalām* has been completed with God's grace and the success (granted by Him) at the hand of the weak and humble believer, seeker of God's forgiveness, Muḥammad b. Sulaymān b. Yūsuf al-Shāfi'ī. May God grant him forgiveness and to whomever studied it and prayed for his forgiveness and approval.

تم كتاب اللمع في الكلام بحمد الله و حسن توفيقه على [ يد ] العبد الضعيف الفقير إلى  
عفو الله تعالى محمد بن سليمان بن يوسف الشافعي غفر الله له ولن قرأ فيه ودعا له بالعفو  
والرضوان

<sup>362</sup> والله الهادي

## Chapter Eight

### Commentary on the Luma'

#### 8.1. Introduction.

The Luma' is a brief book written by al-Juwaynī as a summary of the doctrine of the Sunnis as represented by the Ash'aris at the time. In this book, al-Juwaynī tries to bring to us the views of 'The People of the Truth' (*Ahl al-ḥaqq*) in their simplest form. The work also seems to have been intended as a résumé for students of theology at that time. The book could have been used as an introduction to more elaborate and comprehensive treatises such as *al-Irshād* and *al-Shāmil*.<sup>1</sup> To us the importance of this book stems from its conciseness and simplicity. Many of the contemporary readers, whether specialised in the field or simply interested readers, could use the book to obtain a quick and global look at the theological doctrine of the Sunnis. Those interested in al-Juwaynī can benefit greatly from the book as it follows the same method al-Juwaynī uses in his other works.

Another important point in this book is to see how close were the Ash'arites to the main stream of Orthodox Sunnites (Traditionists) who maintain that they are the only true Sunnites. It is also interesting to see how far did al-Juwaynī went to avoid direct collision with his fellow Sunnites and to what extent he was successful in finding a compromise.

The first idea a reader may have of this book may be deduced from its own

<sup>1</sup> al-Juwaynī's other major work is *al-Nizāmiyya* but despite its being original in its argumentation, it is also brief. As for *al-Burhān*, although it discusses some theological questions, the book is more oriented towards *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

title. Indeed, the word *Luma'* may be translated as 'flash' which shows, from the outset, that al-Juwaynī does not intend to provide us with a long book; neither does he want to make of it an original work. He also mentions at the beginning of the book that the decision to write such a book was stimulated by some of his readers; probably his own students.<sup>2</sup> As we shall see later, al-Juwaynī avoided many of his own views which he expressed freely in *al-Shāmil* and *al-Irshād*. This shows that he tried to concentrate on those questions in which there was a consensus amongst the Sunnis or, at least, the Ash'aris. However, he did not avoid his metaphorical interpretation of God's 'establishment' on the throne, showing quite clearly that he was not ready to go all the way to meet the requirements of other Sunnites.

It seems likely that al-Juwaynī's intentions were also academic and pedagogic. He probably wrote the book as an introduction to 'ilm al-kalām; keeping it brief and as simple as possible in order to facilitate and increase students' understanding of the subject. In today's terminology, the book could simply be called 'An Introduction to Kalām'. The aim of the *Luma'* is therefore twofold: one is that it was aimed at both Sunnites and non-Sunnites to have a brief and general view of what the Sunnites believe in; and the second aim is to use it for academic purposes as an introductory textbook.

Although in terms of choice of subjects discussed al-Juwaynī attempted to join the consensus amongst his fellow Sunnites, he did not give up his own method of relying on rational proofs and reason, especially when discussing questions of *tawḥīd*. This and other particular features of the *Luma'* will be discussed in this commentary which contains two sections. In Section 8.2 we try to provide a detailed commentary to the text while in Section 8.3 we shall compare the

<sup>2</sup> [85,4] You have asked [me] ....



*Luma'* and *al-Irshād*. An assessment of the book in light of the position held by Orthodox Sunnites, in particular, those known as *al-Salafyyīn* will be given in Chapter 9.

8.2. Commentary to the Text of the *Luma'*.

The book begins with a brief introduction which starts with the usual praises to God common to all books written by Muslims at the time. Then, al-Juwaynī gives the reason why he set out to write the book which is that some people asked him to write such a book. However, he does not specify whether it was his students or his fellow scholars. In any case, it is most likely that it was those who were around him (be it students or colleagues) who gave him such an idea.

Apart from the introduction, the book may be divided in many ways. One division was made Fawqiyah and which was adopted in our translation. This distinguishes seven chapters and is shown in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1. Classification of the *Luma'* by Fawqiyah.

Subject	Pages
(1) The world and its creation	[86-92]
(2) God and His attributes	[93-109]
(3) The will of God and the will of Humans	[110-114]
(4) The vision of God	[115-119]
(5) God and His creatures	[120-123]
(6) Apostleship, Prophecy and Miracles	[124-127]
(7) Leadership	[128-130]

There is another way of classification based on the main theological themes



which could be deduced from the book. One possibility is to divide the book into five main themes as shown in Table 8.2.

Table 8.2. Classification the *Luma*‘ by main subjects.

Theme	Pages
(1) <i>tawḥīd</i> (divinity)	[86-119]
(2) ‘ <i>adl</i> (justice)	[120-123]
(3) Prophethood	[124-126]
(4) <i>wa‘d</i> (what is promised after death)	[126-127]
(5) Politics	[128-130]

This classification is very interesting as it gives us more information about the space dedicated by al-Juwaynī to each subject. An examination of Table 8.2 gives us a rough approximation of space given to the five themes. He reserves 24 pages, 4 pages, 3 pages, 1 page, and 3 pages to the five themes respectively. On the basis of the total of 35 pages the following percentages shows the proportion of each subject in the *Luma*‘:

(1) <i>tawḥīd</i>	68%
(2) ‘ <i>adl</i>	11%
(3) Prophethood	9%
(4) <i>wa‘d</i>	3%
(5) Politics	9%

Obviously, the most important item is *tawḥīd* which occupies more than 65 percent of the text. This is not surprising since *tawḥīd* is the most important subject in Islamic theology. This importance stems from the fact that there is a



wide variety of points discussed in *tawhīd* as opposed to the other subjects. Also, there are many controversial discussions in this subject. This requires the writer to provide more elaborate proofs and refutations. More importantly, discussions of *tawhīd* are not only directed to Muslims of all sects, but also to non-Muslims. This requires lengthier discussion as the writer has to answer to both Muslims and non-Muslims. On the other hand, the remaining four subjects require less attention as they contain fewer points for discussion. Also, these subjects are directed mainly to Muslims and therefore lengthy reasoning could be shortened by the use of the Qur'ān, the tradition of the Prophet, or the consensus of Muslims.

The classification in Table 8.2 could be more beneficial when comparing different works and will therefore be the basis of our comparison between the *Luma'* and *al-Irshād* in Part II. However, for the present task of commenting on the book we use the division of seven chapters found in Table 8.1 and which was adopted in the translation of the text.

### 1. The world and its creation [86-92].

al-Juwaynī begins with the definition of some of the main terms used in the book, namely the world, substances and accidents. In defining the world al-Juwaynī simply reports his predecessors' definitions [86,3].

al-Juwaynī then moves directly to a quick definition of substance without mentioning the controversy of the definition of the 'thing' (*al-shay*) in which al-Juwaynī dedicates four sections in *al-Shāmīl*.<sup>3</sup> He gives three definitions but does not give his own view [87,3]. However, we know that the third definition "that which accepts an accident" was rejected by him in *al-Shāmīl* on the basis that it

<sup>3</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, pp.124-139.

is defined by one of its necessary attributes.<sup>4</sup> It is tempting here to speculate that the reason why al-Juwaynī gave this third definition without criticism is twofold. The first is that the *Luma'* contains no criticism of his Ash'ari predecessors. The second is that the criticism is based on his division of attributes into essential and conceptual. As al-Juwaynī avoids mention of any kind of division of attributes in *Luma'*, he probably could not use such a concept to reject the third definition. But despite this, it is still peculiar because he could have avoided it altogether.

In defining the term accident al-Juwaynī gives three definitions, two of which are very similar [87,8]. We know from *al-Irshād* that the first definition is his own<sup>5</sup> whereas the second, although very similar to the first does not exist in *al-Irshād* or *al-Shāmīl*. Other definitions given in *al-Shāmīl* and *al-Irshād* were avoided, probably for brevity.

The final term defined is the existent which he divides into eternal (that which has no beginning) and contingent (that which has a beginning) [87,12].

In proving the contingency of the world al-Juwaynī goes first to the conclusion and then refutes opponents objections. In fact, these objections are no other than the four principles found in *al-Irshād* and *al-Shāmīl*.

The proof advanced by al-Juwaynī in *Luma'* is very impressive by the fact that it is extremely concise and original. Even in the *al-Irshād* and *al-Shāmīl* al-Juwaynī gives longer discussions and proofs but without providing any brief summary for his conclusions. It is interesting to review his proof-conclusion in order to appreciate its content:

[87,16] "the proof is that the particles of the world and their bodies cannot be devoid of contingent accidents; and that which cannot be devoid of a contingent must itself be contingent"

<sup>4</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.142.

<sup>5</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.167.



We can see the three necessary principles of al-Juwaynī stated in *al-Irshād* and *al-Shāmīl*: (1) that accidents exist; (2) that they are contingent; (3) that substance cannot be devoid of accidents.<sup>6</sup> The argument used by al-Juwaynī goes as follows:

- a) Substance exists, accident exists.
- b) Accident is contingent.
- c) Substance cannot be devoid of accident.
- d) Therefore: substance is contingent.

However, al-Juwaynī must defend each of these points against possible attacks, which he does in answering the four objections. In *al-Irshād* and *al-Shāmīl* he starts directly with the four principles which in *Luma'* are reformulated in terms of objections. The fourth principle in *al-Irshād* (fourth objection in *Luma'*) is used to justify the conclusion that that which cannot be devoid of contingent is itself contingent. He does this through demonstrating the impossibility of contingent without a beginning.

(1) *Denying the existence of accidents* [88,7]:

In proving the existence of accidents he uses the same reasoning used in *al-Irshād* and *al-Shāmīl*, namely that we perceive the difference between a substance in rest and in motion [88,8]. In refusing the idea that the difference cannot be attributed to the substance itself al-Juwaynī uses the idea that the substance is unchanged in both cases and that a thing cannot make itself different. This leaves the only alternative which is that the difference is due to something other than the substance [88,14]. In *al-Irshād* and *al-Shāmīl* there are two additional ideas, probably not considered necessary in such a brief book.<sup>7</sup> A second argument

<sup>6</sup> Compare: *al-Irshād*, pp.17-18; *al-Shāmīl*, pp.166-168, 180-181, 186, 204,215.

<sup>7</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.18-19; *al-Shāmīl*, p.168.

in favour of the existence of accidents found in *al-Irshād* and *al-Shāmīl* is also avoided in *Luma'*. This is a weaker argument based on necessary knowledge and was probably left out for this reason.<sup>8</sup>

(2) *Denying the contingency of accidents* [89,1]:

In proving that accidents are contingents al-Juwaynī argues that: (1) we observe successive accidents, (2) the most recent ones are contingent because we know they exist, (3) the old ones are also contingent because they have perished, (4) therefore all accidents are contingent. In confirming point (3) al-Juwaynī affirms that, because they have perished, these perished accidents cannot be eternal simply because eternity is incompatible with non-existence. This obviously is not a satisfactory proof, it is more of a statement than a proof. However, al-Juwaynī discusses this principle more thoroughly in *al-Irshād* and *al-Shāmīl* and provides us with four supporting arguments.<sup>9</sup> It is most likely that al-Juwaynī left out these arguments because they would lengthen the text. He also seems to be giving the most important points, leaving those who want to obtain a deeper view of the question to his other more comprehensive books.

(3) *Denying the impossibility for substance to be stripped of accidents* [89,1]:

al-Juwaynī argues, very briefly, that substance can either be aggregated or segregated. This, according to him is known by necessary knowledge [89,7]. He also takes as self-evident that bodies must be associated with certain accidents [89,11], which shows that substance cannot be stripped of accidents.

(4) *Justifying: "That which cannot be devoid of a contingent must itself be contingent"*

<sup>8</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.14; *al-Shāmīl*, pp.180-181.

<sup>9</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.20-21, *al-Shāmīl*, pp.194-203.

This is the fourth objection (principle in *al-Irshād* and *al-Shāmīl*) which is answered by showing the impossibility of contingent without a beginning. Now, one might question the relationship between justifying the above statement through the proof of impossibility of infinite contingents. In fact, the relationship is so obvious that al-Juwaynī does not even mention that he answered the objection directly through proving such impossibility. In simple terms, what the above statement says is as follows:

- (i) A cannot be stripped of B
- (ii) B is a contingent
- (iii) Therefore A must be a contingent.

This is a very simple logical deduction. However, while there should be no problem in accepting (i) and (iii), the second point may be weakened by saying B may have no beginning.<sup>10</sup> That is why al-Juwaynī directly moves to proving that there can be no contingents without a first. Rather than offering the readers with the more elaborate and complicated refutation of the idea of infinite successive events as he does in his two other books,<sup>11</sup> al-Juwaynī contents himself with what might be called 'definitional argument'. His argument is that since a contingent is defined as 'that which has a beginning' then it follows immediately that it is impossible that it has no beginning. This is obviously a weak point in his argumentation since he is forcing (or assuming) us to accept his definition. In fact, al-Juwaynī tells us in *al-Shāmīl* that this is his predecessor's definition<sup>12</sup> and uses it only as a secondary argument. In both *al-Irshād* and *al-Shāmīl*, al-Juwaynī uses stronger arguments against the idea of infinite successions. However, the

<sup>10</sup> As most Philosophers (*al-Irshād*, p.25) and the Dahrites (*al-Shāmīl*, p.215) believe.

<sup>11</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, pp.215-220; *al-Irshād*, pp.25-27.

<sup>12</sup> *al-Shāmīl*, p.219.



definitional argument seems to be more suitable for such an introductory textbook as it is compact and simple. That is probably why al-Juwaynī chose to include it in *Luma*.

Having answered the four objections al-Juwaynī summarises what he proved, namely, (a) accidents exist, (b) they are contingent, (c) substance cannot precede the accident. Therefore, it follows by necessary knowledge that substance is contingent (since it does not precede the accident) [90,5].

### **Proof of the Existence of the Creator [90,9].**

Having proved the contingency of the world, al-Juwaynī sets out to prove that the world was created by God. Here, al-Juwaynī uses a very brief version of the argument used in *al-Irshād*.<sup>13</sup> The argument goes as follows:

- (1) The world is contingent.
- (2) Therefore we can conceive a state where the world did not exist.
- (3) At that state, we can easily conceive the conception or creation of the world as well as its non-conception. We can also conceive the possibility of it being created sooner rather than later, or later rather than sooner. We may conceive that it could have had a different shape, different natural laws etc.
- (4) Now, for the world to have been created at a particular time and in a particular state rather than all other (potentially infinite) states, there must have been someone, which al-Juwaynī calls a particulariser, which singled the world out. Anticipating the reader's curiosity, al-Juwaynī quickly reveals that this particulariser is God [91,2]. However, immediately after this last statement al-Juwaynī starts refuting the idea that such a particulariser could be a natural agent or a necessary cause [91,6]. To refute the first point, al-Juwaynī uses *al-sabr wa*

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<sup>13</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.28-31.



*al-taqsim*, saying that such a natural agent can be either pre-eternal or contingent. If it were pre-eternal, then its effect (the world) would be pre-eternal too because the natural agent has no free choice and can only act when the unfavourable conditions end. But the world has already been demonstrated to be contingent [91,9]. On the other hand, if the natural agent were contingent, then it would need another natural agent for its existence and so on to infinity, which is absurd (because it would lead to accepting contingents without a beginning) [92,1]. al-Juwaynī does not refute the alternative of necessary cause and goes directly to the conclusion that the only alternative remaining is that the particulariser is a Creator, a free agent who has power and free choice [92,5]. By examining *al-Irshād*<sup>14</sup> we find that the rebuttal of the necessary cause is virtually identical to that used against the natural agent. That may be the reason why al-Juwaynī left it out. However, the flow of the text could have been clearer if he mentioned the second rebuttal. We notice here that this is one of the few places where al-Juwaynī gives slightly longer treatment to a point in *Luma'* compared to *al-Irshād* (8 lines in *Luma'* against 4.5 lines in *al-Irshād*).<sup>15</sup>

## 2. God and His attributes [93-109].

This is the longest chapter (in Fawqiyah's classification) of the book. In this part, al-Juwaynī discusses the divine attributes of God. However, there are two main differences between his approach in this book as compared with his approach in *al-Irshād*. Firstly, in *Luma'* he does not distinguish between the names of God and his attributes. Secondly, al-Juwaynī passes in silence when it comes to mentioning his division of attributes into essential and conceptual. The first difference may be justified by the need for brevity in *Luma'* which led al-

<sup>14</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.28-29.

<sup>15</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.28-29; *Luma'*, pp.91-92.

Juwaynī to discard dedicating a section to God's names and include some of them directly with corresponding attributes. However, the second difference is most likely due to al-Juwaynī's intention to remain within the Sunni consensus. His claim that *Luma'* represents the views of *ahl al-sunna wa al-jamā'a* would have been jeopardised had he included his own classification of attributes which many would have rejected. We also note the absence in *Luma'* of *al-ahwāl* (modes) which al-Juwaynī uses in *al-Irshād*. He either avoids them for the same reason he avoided the classification of attributes, or simply by the time he wrote *Luma'* he had changed his mind (or was in doubt) about the concept of modes. The second suggestion comes from the fact that *Luma'* was written after *al-Irshād* but before *al-Burhān* in which al-Juwaynī categorically rejects the concept of modes.

al-Juwaynī starts the section with the assertion that God and his Essence are eternal with no end or beginning [93,1], because if He were contingent he would have needed a cause. His cause would also have needed another cause. This latter, would also have needed a cause and so on. This continues to infinity which is absurd [92,3].

Next, he establishes three attributes:<sup>16</sup> God being Alive, Knowing and Powerful [94,1]. The latter two attributes are established by the 'evidence' that coherent and perfected actions can only emanate from (i) someone who is capable of such actions (powerful), and (ii) someone who knows them (knowing) [94,3]. If God is Knowing and Powerful then it follows, by necessary knowledge that He is Alive because only a live thing can be powerful and knowing [94,7].

In the following section al-Juwaynī asserts, without any attempt of proof,

<sup>16</sup> These are classified by him as conceptual attributes in *al-Irshād*.

that God is actually willing [95,1].<sup>17</sup> He then quickly rejects the view of al-Ka'bi who believed that saying that God wills His own actions means that He created them. al-Ka'bi also believed that if we say that God is Willing the actions of human beings, then we must accept that He ordered such actions. al-Juwaynī indirectly reports what al-Ka'bi actually believes in this regard, namely that it is sufficient for God to know about the occurrence of things for such knowledge dispenses from any will. We can understand from this that al-Ka'bi believes that God is not willing.<sup>18</sup>

Although al-Juwaynī's answer to the first part of al-Ka'bi's view is not clear, his answer to the second part is simple and strong. The answer is as follows: If God's knowledge dispensed Him from being Willing, then, in the same manner, God's knowledge would dispense Him from being powerful [95,7]. In short, al-Juwaynī's logic goes as follows:

If the following statement holds: God knows something is going to occur, therefore, He does not need a will for its occurrence. Then, you cannot deny a similar statement: God knows something is going to occur, therefore, He does not need power for its occurrence.

However, this requires that al-Ka'bi believes that God is Powerful which he apparently did.

al-Juwaynī's then answers the first part, by an obscure answer, saying that al-Ka'bi agrees with him that contingents's actions require their will. It seems that al-Juwaynī answers that if contingents need their will for their actions, then we cannot say that God's will is the only source of such actions. al-Ka'bi's argument is based on the idea that if God wills certain actions made by humans then

<sup>17</sup> In *al-Irshād* he proves this by means of syllogism. *al-Irshād*, p.64.

<sup>18</sup> This is clearly indicated in *al-Irshād*, p.63.



these are not responsible for their actions, a thing that neither the Mu'tazilites nor the Ash'arites believe in. Then, the only option that seems to be available to al-Ka'bī is that God is not actually willing. It is indeed difficult to answer this question without either undermining either the Will of God or the responsibility of human beings. That is why, it appears, that al-Juwaynī's answer is indirect and rather too brief. Although he asserts the agreement between himself and al-Ka'bī in that contingents's actions require their will, he does not tell us what is the link between contingents' will and God's will.

al-Juwaynī does not answer the objection that if God were willing His own actions then it would mean that He created them. It could well be that al-Juwaynī did not think that such objection was relevant. Another possibility is that al-Juwaynī did not object to the idea that God may create His own actions. Whatever the reason, this must be considered as a shortcoming because leaving an argument unanswered may well lead the reader into thinking the author's failure to refute such argument.

In the following section, al-Juwaynī tells us that, according to the Mu'tazilites, God wills with a created will.<sup>19</sup> He rejects this as false on the basis that a contingent will needs another will for its creation, and this latter also needs a third will for its creation and so on to infinity. And we know that al-Juwaynī does not accept infinite number of successions [96,1]. Here again we see al-Juwaynī using his objection of infinite number of events to refute his opponents view.

Next, he concludes that since he refuted the above beliefs, the only remaining alternative was what *ahl al-ḥaqq* believed in, namely, that God's Will is eternal

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<sup>19</sup> Nader, Albert N., *Le Systèm Philosophique des Mu'tazila*, Les Lettres Orientales, Beirut, 1956, pp.89-90.



and uncreated [96,8].

We can see in this section, as with the previous one, that al-Juwaynī does not directly prove to us that God's Will is eternal. He seems satisfied that refuting the views of al-Ka'bī and the Mu'tazilites of Basra leads to the truth as if there were no other alternatives.

In the following section, al-Juwaynī attempts to show that God is Hearing, Seeing and Speaking [97,1]. These are another three attributes which are not classified here, but which we know from *al-Irshād* that he calls them conceptual attributes. His proof is simple but not convincing. It is based on the method of *qiyās al-ghā'ib bi al-shāhid* and uses the fact that living things can either be attributed with sight, speech and hearing or their contraries. al-Juwaynī here uses 'and' but this obviously meant 'or' because otherwise it would lead to the existence of two contraries in the same subject which al-Juwaynī rejects. In any case, in Arabic, the word 'and' may have the meaning of alternative rather than addition. Now, since the contraries of these three characteristics are deficiencies, and since God cannot be attributed with deficiencies, then there remains only to say that God is seeing, hearing and speaking. This seems to us a very primitive way of using analogy between the living world and God. In a way, al-Juwaynī is telling us that, since man speaks then God must be speaking, especially that we humans believe that speaking is a positive characteristic. One could easily ask him why he only mentions these three characteristics (or senses). If he uses the senses of humans then he should also select smelling, feeling and so on. Now, following the same steps, we would say that living things can either be attributed with smelling or non-smelling, and since the latter is a deficiency, then God is smelling. Indeed, there is a large number of characteristics which humans may

consider not having them as deficiencies and thus must be attributed to God for otherwise He would be attributed with deficiency. Therefore, if we follow al-Juwaynī's way of thinking, we would end adding to God a new attribute every time we 'discover' a new positive concept. Equally, we would discount an attribute from God every time we find out that it is deficient. In *al-Irshād*<sup>20</sup> al-Juwaynī attempts to answer such objections on the basis that the senses of smell and feeling would mean that God is somehow connected with the contingent world from which God is too exalted. This is obviously a weak argument because connectivity with the contingent world would also be the result of hearing or seeing. The only difference is that in hearing there is a connection with the vibration of air, in seeing there is a connection with light, and in smelling there is a connection of some chemical molecules. All of these are contingent matter.<sup>21</sup> al-Juwaynī uses another argument, namely, that smelling and feeling do not lead to *al-Idrāk* (grasping), like the other three attributes do. He continues with an example, saying: "A man can say I smelled an apple but did not grasp it."<sup>22</sup> This is also easily refuted, because one might say: I have heard something but did not grasp it. On this basis, al-Juwaynī then would have to exclude hearing from his list. Moreover, grasping is a relative matter when one hears something, he gets some information about that thing. If the same person hears and sees the same thing then his grasping would be better, and if, in addition to that, he smells it, his grasping would be even better. Obviously, the more senses a thing has the better his grasping of things around him. The real reason, we should suspect, is that the other senses were not attributed to God by the revelation or by his predecessors.

<sup>20</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.76-77.

<sup>21</sup> Be it substance or accidents.

<sup>22</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.77.

Instead of attempting a rational proof, al-Juwaynī should have turned to revelation, especially since such attributes were mentioned many times in the Qur'ān which is the original source of knowing the existence of these attributes. If there exists a rational proof for the above three attributes the one presented by al-Juwaynī cannot be it.

In the following section, al-Juwaynī turns to another attribute, which in *al-Irshād* he classifies as essential,<sup>23</sup> namely, that God is Subsisting (Eternal) [97,6]. The Arabic text gives two apparently different attributes, but we see that al-Juwaynī proves one attribute only which leads us to consider the expression "*bāqin, wājib al-wujūd*" as a single attribute. Here, al-Juwaynī uses unanimity of intellectuals to prove the Eternity of God. Having established earlier that God is Pre-Eternal (*Qadīm*). Now, since everyone agrees that anything that has no beginning cannot be reduced to a void, it immediately follows that God is Subsisting.

Next al-Juwaynī proves another essential attribute, namely, God being Unique [98,1]. First, al-Juwaynī gives a brief definition of the word unique and then sets out to show, using the method of *al-sabr wa al-taqsīm*, that there can only be one God. The basic idea of his argument is taken from the verse: "If there were, in the heavens and the earth, other gods besides God, there would have been confusion in both!"<sup>24</sup> To begin with, he assumes two gods and two contraries. He further assumes that one god wills one thing while the other god will its contrary. Then we have three cases:

- a. The two wills are carried out, which is impossible because two contraries

<sup>23</sup> Strangely, this attribute is put in the chapter of conceptual attributes. *al-Irshād*, p.78.

<sup>24</sup> لَوْ كَانَ فِيهِمَا آلِهَةٌ إِلَّا اللَّهُ لَفَسَدَتَا . Qur'ān, s.21, v.22. Transl. Y. Ali, p.826.



cannot coexist.

b. No will is carried out, which is also impossible because it is not possible for both contraries not to exist at the same time.

c. Only one will is carried out. This is the only alternative left, and it must therefore be true. Now if this is so, then one of the gods cannot carry out his will and therefore he cannot be a god since he is weaker than the one whose will was carried out.

There is another possibility about the two gods which al-Juwaynī anticipates, namely, the possibility of eternal agreement between the two gods [99,5]. His argument here is based on freedom of choice of both gods. What we understand from his rather obscure exposition is as follows: If one god only exists, then he would be free to will all that can be willed (including their contraries if they exist). But if another god exists and the first god cannot disagree with the second one, then there is obviously a certain number of cases which the first god would not be able to will. This diminishes him from the class of deity and he therefore cannot be considered a god. This means that al-Juwaynī believes that in such a case, neither gods would have absolute freedom of choice. Now, for the first time, al-Juwaynī supports his view with a verse from the Qur'ān which shows that al-Juwaynī believes that such gods would have to disagree sometime. al-Juwaynī's rational proof in this section is no other than a development of the verse, which shows us how al-Juwaynī uses revelation to build up rational proofs whenever possible.

In the following section al-Juwaynī turns to what is known as *ṣifāt al-ma'ānī* but which al-Juwaynī does not mention with such an appellation.<sup>25</sup> In fact, these are the *ma'ānī* which lead to what al-Juwaynī calls in *al-Irshād* *al-ṣifāt*

<sup>25</sup> He also refrains from giving them such appellation in *al-Irshād*.



al-ma'nawīyah. We have already seen in the section starting [94,1] that God is Alive, Knowing and Powerful.<sup>26</sup> Now, al-Juwaynī believes that since God is said to be Powerful, then there must be a *ma'nā* (a thing or a meaning) in God which makes Him Powerful. This is called Power. Equally, for God to be Knowing and Alive, there must be appropriate meanings in God, namely Knowledge and Power.

al-Juwaynī holds that God has Power, Life and Knowledge which are eternal [99,11]. Unfortunately, once again he leaves what we may be interested in, namely, what al-Juwaynī believed in regarding these attributes, and goes on to criticise the Mu'tazilites. As we shall see, he concentrates so much on refuting the Mu'tazilites view that he does not even tell us whether he believed that these attributes are separate entities, eternally coexisting with God, or not distinct from God. From his discussion all we can obtain is that he believed that they exist. As to their nature we know nothing from al-Juwaynī.

We believe that al-Juwaynī, at the stage of *Luma'*<sup>27</sup> still did not have any final view with regard to the problem of these attributes as entities. We know that in *al-Irshād* al-Juwaynī mentions these attributes (Power, Life and Knowledge)<sup>28</sup> as well as the Will<sup>29</sup> and the Speech<sup>30</sup> as things that are in God and which are eternal.<sup>31</sup> From his definition of conceptual attributes<sup>32</sup> we know that these are things (*ma'ānī*) which cause God to be Powerful, Live, Knowing, Will-

<sup>26</sup> These three attributes are called *ṣifāt al-ma'nawīyah* or conceptual attributes.

<sup>27</sup> The *Luma'* was written after *al-Irshād*.

<sup>28</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.79.

<sup>29</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.94.

<sup>30</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.99.

<sup>31</sup> This is understood from his saying: "لَهُ الْحَيَاةُ الْقَدِيمَةُ ..." *al-Irshād*, p.79.

<sup>32</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.30.

ing and Speaking respectively.<sup>33</sup> The attributes of Power, Life, Knowledge, Will and Speech are known as *ṣifāt al-ma'ānī* which we mentioned earlier and which we shall translate as causal attributes because they are the attributes which cause the conceptual attributes.<sup>34</sup> However, al-Juwaynī does not call them as such, but calls them simply 'ṣifāt'<sup>35</sup> or attributes.

His view about the causal attributes is briefly encountered in *al-Irshād*. His uncertainty about the problem is obvious. First, he tells us that he needs to define and determine what is meant by the 'two different things' (*al-ghayrayn*),<sup>36</sup> but soon recognises that there can be no real intellectual proof in the matter. Having failed that, al-Juwaynī resorts to what the community have agreed upon, namely that we cannot say that these attributes are other than the Essence of God.<sup>37</sup> This is advanced by al-Juwaynī without the slight use of reasoning. He continues that, equally, we cannot say they are the Essence. This is exactly what al-Juwaynī's master, al-Ash'arī, said: "They are neither He, nor other than He."<sup>38</sup> It is curious to see how al-Juwaynī criticises the Mu'tazilites and others on their intellectual arguments while he himself advances blind views without any intellectual bases.

Now as if saying that 'attributes are neither the Essence nor other than the Essence' was not enough, al-Juwaynī adds to our confusion by saying, without proof, that these attributes are existent things (*mawjūdāt*), and that Knowledge

<sup>33</sup> These are the conceptual attributes (*ṣifāt al-ma'ānī*) caused by the above mentioned *ma'ānī* or 'ilal (causes) as al-Juwaynī defines them in *al-Irshād*, p.30.

<sup>34</sup> Interestingly, these are also the attributes which caused all the controversy in Islamic theology since all Muslims agree about the conceptual attributes.

<sup>35</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.79.

<sup>36</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.137.

<sup>37</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.138.

<sup>38</sup> Gimaret, *La Doctrine d'al-Ash'arī*, p.260.

(or the other attributes) and the Essence are two existing things (*mawjūdān*).<sup>39</sup>

In addition to refraining from saying what was his view about the nature of causal attributes, al-Juwaynī does not give us his own proof of the existence of these attributes. Although in *al-Irshād*<sup>40</sup> al-Juwaynī asserts that proving one of God's eternal attributes can only be achieved by means of comparing the known with the unknown (*qiyās al-ghā'ib bi al-shāhid*), he uses three verses from the Qur'ān [101,2] to prove Knowledge and Power. Instead of positively and rationally proving these three attributes, he proves that the Mu'tazilites were wrong in rejecting the existence of these causal attributes, and seems to assume that proving that they were wrong is itself a proof that he was right.

As reported by al-Juwaynī, the Mu'tazilites reject the idea that God has Power, Knowledge or Life, saying that he is Alive, Powerful and Knowing by himself [100,1]. To refute the Mu'tazilites view, he first claims that he had established by rational proof that what is known must be known by knowledge.<sup>41</sup> It then immediately follows that if God knew by His Essence then His Essence would be Knowledge because nothing can be known without knowledge [100,3].

Now al-Juwaynī discovers a contradiction in the belief of the Mu'tazilites when they say that:

'God is Knowing, Alive and Powerful by Himself, but Willing by a created will' [100,7].

Indeed, if one exchanged one of the attributes with the will, and assuming that the previous expression is true, no one would be able to refute the alternative expression:

<sup>39</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.138.

<sup>40</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.82.

<sup>41</sup> He shows this in *al-Irshād*, pp.87-94.



'God is Willing, Alive and Powerful by Himself, but Knowing by a created knowledge'.

The reason why the Mu'tazilites do not believe that God is Willing by Himself is that He would then Will everything, including people's actions. This would lead to denying humans' responsibility for their actions, which the Mu'tazilites reject. al-Juwaynī anticipates this [100,11] but rejects it using another contradiction about God's Power. Saying that God is Powerful by Himself, would, according to the objection, mean that God is powerful over everything. Yet the Mu'tazilites believe that God's Power does not apply on certain actions of humans [101,2]. This is obviously a contradiction which can only be solved by revising the expression to:

'God is Knowing and Alive by Himself, but Willing and Powerful by created will and power'.

Now, al-Juwaynī turns to revelation and uses two verses from the Qur'ān to prove that God has a Knowledge:

- "And no female conceives, . . . , but with His Knowledge."<sup>42</sup>

- "[. . . He hath sent from His knowledge."<sup>43</sup>

As to the attribute of Power he uses one verse, namely:

"For God is He Who gives (all) sustenance – Lord of Power – . . . ."<sup>44</sup>

God mentions in the verse the word *quwwah* which, according to all commenta-

<sup>42</sup> وَمَا تَحْمِلُ مِنْ أُنْثَىٰ وَلَا تَضَعُ إِلَّا بِعِلْمِهِ . Qur'ān, s.35, v.11, Y. Ali, p.1155.

<sup>43</sup> أَنْزَلَهُ بِعِلْمِهِ . Qur'ān, s.4, v.166, Y. Ali, p.232.

<sup>44</sup> إِنْ اللَّهُ هُوَ الرَّزَّاقُ ذُو الْقُوَّةِ الْمَتِينِ . Qur'ān, s.51, v.58, Y. Ali, p.1429.



tors, means power. However, this is only an interpretation of the 'force' into the word 'power'. Although this interpretation has the backing of all commentators it does not necessarily mean that they are right for the Qur'ān could easily have stated the *qudrah* instead of *quwwah*.

It is interesting to see here that al-Juwaynī moves away from the method of *al-Irshād* by using the Qur'ān as the main argument in proving his view. In *al-Irshād* no use is made of the Qur'ān to prove the three causal attributes, but in *Luma'* al-Juwaynī finds suitable verses for two attributes but does not find any verse explicitly mentioning the attribute of 'Life'.<sup>45</sup> Here, one is tempted to think that al-Juwaynī wants to get closer to the Orthodox Sunnites (Traditionists) by using more verses from the Qur'ān in his arguments. This is particularly appealing since we know that *Luma'* was intended to represent the view of the Sunnites in general. We also know that al-Juwaynī has made many concessions in this book, such as not mentioning his division of attributes, his belief in modes and other subjects which can be found in *al-Irshād*. Yet, there are still some points in which he disagrees with not only the Traditionists, but also with his predecessors.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, this place is one of the four out of eight places<sup>47</sup> where al-Juwaynī uses the Qur'ān as a direct argument.<sup>48</sup>

One important remark about the verses is that they do not show whether these attributes were eternal or contingent. The verses do not help us to find out about the nature of these attributes.

<sup>45</sup> Although there are many verse mentioning that God is Living, there is none that tells us explicitly that He has Life.

<sup>46</sup> Like his metaphorical interpretation of God's establishment on the throne.

<sup>47</sup> In the other four places, al-Juwaynī uses them as supplementary arguments. See translated text: [99,5], [101,2], [104,5] and [112,7].

<sup>48</sup> The other three places are in [104,5] explaining the speech of the essence; Chapter Five [120,6-121,2] proving that God created everything; and in [127,4] when tells us about Paradise.

In the following section, al-Juwaynī turns to the very important causal attribute of Speech. We can already deduce its importance from the fact that while reserving the previous section to three attributes, al-Juwaynī reserves three whole sections to the Speech.<sup>49</sup> We should note in passing that al-Juwaynī does not confirm the causal attributes of sight and hearing. If we review the section beginning at [97,1] we can see that the conceptual attributes: hearing, seeing and speaking are put together. However, now al-Juwaynī singles out Speech as a causal attribute related to speaking but remains silent as to the other two attributes.

al-Juwaynī states categorically that God's Speech is uncreated and eternal [102,2]. He mentions the opposite view of the Mu'tazilites and some other sects, namely that the Speech is contingent or created. However, now he attempts to prove directly that God's Speech has no beginning [102,9]. First, al-Juwaynī claims that there is a consensus that God speaks by means of a speech. Now he uses his method of *al-sabr wa al-taqṣīm*, stating that if the Speech were contingent then there would be three cases only, namely that the speech would subsist in:

- (i) the Essence of God;
- (ii) in a body; or
- (iii) in a location.

All of these three alternatives are all impossible because: [103,3] (i) the speech cannot subsist in the (eternal) Essence as contingent can only subsist in another contingent; (ii) the speech cannot subsist in a body for the speaker then would not be God [103,4]; and (iii) it cannot subsist in no location for accidents

<sup>49</sup> There was more controversy about the createdness or eternity of the Speech of God than any other subject. This led to the well-known *Mihnah* in which the rulers persecuted those who did not believe in the createdness of the Speech.

cannot subsist by themselves [103,6].<sup>50</sup>

al-Juwaynī draws no conclusion, but it is obvious that since the three possibilities are impossible, then the only solution is that the Speech of God is not contingent for, otherwise, we would not be able to explain its location.

In the following section, al-Juwaynī continues with the problem of speech but this time he tries to define the speech as we know it in our world. He calls this the speaking of the self (*kalām al-nafs*) [103,9]. al-Juwaynī attempts to explain the relationship between the speech as a causal attribute and its effects. He distinguishes between the talking and the speech. It is the former that is designated by the writing, scripts and sounds. This means that all these effects (talking, writing, symbols, etc.) are not the speech, they are simply an indication to its existence in the essence.

It is interesting to find that al-Juwaynī gives up any attempts to reason rationally. He uses a verse of poetry from al-Akḥṭal to show what the Arabs mean by speech, and a verse from the Qur'ān where he shows that the hypocrites hid something in their hearts while declaring what they did not believe in to the Prophet. al-Juwaynī interprets what they hid in their consciences as the true speech [104,5].

Next, al-Juwaynī turns to the Eternal Speech using his above understanding of the speech of the essence as an analogy with the Speech of God. First, he reminds us that he had established that it is speech rather than letters or sounds that subsists in the essence [105,1]. It would then be easy to move this understanding of speech in our world to the Speech of God. By analogy, therefore, God's Speech is not sounds or letters or melodies.

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<sup>50</sup> al-Juwaynī believed that speech is an accident. He also believed that accidents need substance to reside in. See Chapter 1-d.



We can already understand what al-Juwaynī will tell us in the following section, namely that the reading of the Qur'ān and the script in the books are not God's Speech, they are simply an indication of it. To show that God's Speech is not letters (or sounds, etc.), al-Juwaynī adds a short argument, saying that if God's Speech were letters, then these letters would precede each other, and that which is preceded must be contingent which cannot be God's Speech because this latter is Eternal.

In the final section of this chapter, al-Juwaynī explains what he understands about the relationship between God's Speech and the reading, the writing and the memorising of the Qur'ān [105,6]. al-Juwaynī does not attempt to argue or to give any kind of proof, probably because it is simply an understanding derived from the earlier section and which he believes needs no argument.

al-Juwaynī explains that the Speech of God is read, written, memorised. However, this does not mean that the reading, writing and memorising are the Speech itself, they are simply an indication to it. Thus, the reading makes us understand God's Speech while the memorising is an attribute of the memoriser (although what is memorised is the understanding of the Speech of God) [106,3]. Furthermore, the writing is contingent and is used to understand God's Speech [106,6].

al-Juwaynī concludes that God's Speech is just like God Himself. God (as a concept or idea) is written, known, and mentioned, but He is other than the writing, the mention or the knowing [106,6].

It should be easy to understand the relationship between the Speech and its earthly representation if we used a simple example. Let us assume a distinguished scientist who, in a conference, declares his findings in a given subject. Now, what



he declared was the result of his speech of the essence.<sup>51</sup> Then if his declaration is memorised by his fellow scientists or published in journals, what is memorised or published cannot be his attribute, they can only be a form or representation of his speech. In the same manner, al-Juwaynī tries to tell us that God has revealed the Qur'ān which is the result of His Speech, but the books, reciting and reading are not the Speech, they are simply a representation of the Speech.

### **Bāb: What is Impossible to Attribute to God.**

Having finished with the last causal attributes al-Juwaynī starts a new part or *bāb* entitled: "What is impossible to attribute to Almighty God". This is the first and only time in the whole book where al-Juwaynī gives the 'title' of *bāb* to the beginning of a new subject. We do not know why the book is not arranged into parts and chapters (or chapters and sections). Whether the copyists did not reproduce them or whether al-Juwaynī did not dictate them is open to discussion. What we know, however, is that the book in its form was not easy to follow. This is partly why we used the classification of Fawqiyah in our translation in order to increase the clarity of the book. We shall see later that the part of *al-Irshād* in which al-Juwaynī treats the subject of *al-tawhīd* was divided into three categories. The first two categories were clearly indicated:

(i) "What is necessary to attribute to God";<sup>52</sup> and

(ii) "What is impossible to attribute to God";<sup>53</sup>

whereas the third category is implied from the text,<sup>54</sup> and may be called:

(iii) "What is possible for God".

<sup>51</sup> His attribute of speech may be represented by his educational background, his genes and other unknown biological and non-biological acquisitions.

<sup>52</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.30.

<sup>53</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.39; *Luma'*, p.107.

<sup>54</sup> In *al-Irshād*, from the vision of God (p.166) to the end of the book. In *Luma'* from the section on the will of God and the will of humans [110,1] onwards.

While the first category is clearly indicated in *al-Irshād*, it is not even mentioned in *Luma'*. However, we can easily deduce that all the part that precede the second category [107,1] may be entitled as "What is necessary to attribute to God." Now, there is a good reason why al-Juwaynī refrained from giving such title to the first part. First we have to go back to the idea that al-Juwaynī wanted to compromise with the Traditionists and be as close as possible to them in *Luma'*. Second, we should notice that the Traditionists in general agreed upon all attributes mentioned in the Qur'ān and the Tradition of the Prophet but do not venture into speculating on the nature of these attributes. Had al-Juwaynī called his first part: "what is necessary of God" he would have excluded all but a few of what is believed of God's attributes. This would put him in clear conflict with the Traditionists. Also, his metaphorical interpretation would have been necessary for God under such title. Thus, by remaining silent, it could be understood that the attributes which al-Juwaynī mentions are not exclusive. This leaves him some ground for a compromise in which he only mentions those attributes which he believes in, but at the same time leaves the door open for other Sunnites to believe in other attributes. One of the most notable examples is the Traditionists' belief in God's sitting, walking, hands, face, fingers (but without saying how).<sup>55</sup> Traditionists add many attributes to what al-Juwaynī believes in. Amongst these are love (*maḥabbah*), satisfaction (*riḍā*), coming (*majī'*), coming down (*nuzūl*), sitting (*istiwā'*), hearing (*sam'*), and sight (*baṣar*).<sup>56</sup> Note that the last two attributes are proved as conceptual attributes in *Luma'* but not as causal attributes. The reason why al-Juwaynī does not believe in these two

<sup>55</sup> See for example, 'Abd al-'Azī Bin Bāz and Sālah Bin Fūzān al-Fūzān, *Tanbihāt fī al-Radd 'Alā man Ta'awwala al-Ṣifāt*, al-Ri'āsa al-'Āmma li'idārāt al-Buḥūth al-'ilmiyya wa al-'Iftā' wa al-Da'wa wa al-'Irshād, Riyadh, 1405 AH, pp.20-21.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., pp.33,59.

causal attributes, it seems to us, is that accepting sight and hearing would push al-Juwaynī too close to antropomorphism which he rejects. Indeed, accepting that God has sight and hearing would lead to accepting that He has eyes and ears or something equivalent, and this would lead him to explain these metaphorically like he did with the establishment on the throne in *Luma'* and as he did with the interpretation of hands, eyes and face in *al-Irshād*.<sup>57</sup> This is yet another example of al-Juwaynī avoiding as far as possible conflict with his fellow Sunnites.

al-Juwaynī starts the first section of this chapter by giving a general outline of the things that are impossible for God. These are anything that indicates contingency or imperfection such as specification of location and adjacency [107,1]. The proof of the former is straightforward [108,1]:

Something that is specified by a location must occupy space;

which means it can be aggregated or segregated;

which means it cannot be free from aggregation or segregation;

which means it is contingent.

Since God is not contingent, it follows that He cannot be specified by a location.

Once this is shown, it could be deduced that God is not in a place<sup>58</sup> and that

He cannot be attributed with being in physical contact with celestial or earthly bodies<sup>59</sup> [108,5]. Now, because what al-Juwaynī has just said have a direct im-

plication on the belief of God's sitting on the throne, al-Juwaynī feels compelled (for the first time) to openly reject the Sunnites views and singles himself out by

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<sup>57</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.155.

<sup>58</sup> This appears to be an indirect criticism of those who believe that God is in the heavens.

<sup>59</sup> This is particularly directed to those who believe that God actually sat on the Throne.



giving a metaphorical interpretation. It is very likely that he did this reluctantly.

On the one hand he could not have canceled such an important chapter in order to avoid controversial subjects. But having started the chapter, his conclusion left him no space for compromise which we are sure he would have wanted since he did not include in *Luma'* his metaphorical description of the hands and face and feet which we find in *al-Irshād*.

al-Juwaynī introduces the problem in the form of a question in which he is asked to explain the meaning of the verse: "God is firmly established on the Throne."<sup>60</sup> In answering the question, al-Juwaynī gives an interpretation to the word 'establishment' which is different from what could be understood literally. According to him, the word means domination and triumph and tells us that the Arabs use the same word metaphorically. In support of his interpretation, al-Juwaynī cites a verse from a poem by an unnamed poet [108,7].

In the following section al-Juwaynī shows that God does not accept contingents [109,1]. He proves this using a result which is found in *al-Irshād* but not in *Luma'*. The proof is as follows:

The subsistence of contingents in God means He was never exempt from them,<sup>61</sup> and that which cannot be free from a contingent must itself be contingent. Since God is not contingent, it follows that contingents cannot subsist in Him [109,6].

We note here that the need to reduce the length of discussion has resulted sometimes in proofs which use some unknown premises. In this instance, al-Juwaynī has certainly reduced the argument to the strict minimum but, unfor-

<sup>60</sup> أَلَزَحْمَنَ عَلَى الْعَرْشِ إِسْتَوَى. Qur'ān, s.20, v.5. Y. Ali, p.790.

<sup>61</sup> At a first reading, the reader might be led to think that this is supposed to be self-evident. However, we know that this is one of the results which al-Juwaynī set up in *al-Irshād*, namely, the argument of the impossibility for substance to be free from accidents, *al-Irshād*, pp.22-24,45.



tunately, at the expense of clarity.<sup>62</sup>

### 3. The Will of God and the Will of Humans [110-114].

In this chapter al-Juwaynī engages in a new part of his book which may be entitled: ‘what is possible to attribute to God’. The first subject concerns the will. al-Juwaynī holds that everything contingent, be it bad or good, is the result of God’s Will [110,1]. The Mu‘tazilites, al-Juwaynī tells us, believe that God wills good (conscious) acts, but does not will bad acts; these are carried out while He dislikes them. As to unconscious and permissible acts God holds a neutral position as far as His Will is concerned [110,2]

To refute the Mu‘tazilites belief, al-Juwaynī uses his result that God creates all contingents.<sup>63</sup> It follows<sup>64</sup> that “He wills what he creates” [110,9]. By this al-Juwaynī means that God cannot not will (dislike) what he invents. Will must be joined with creation, because, as he asserts, reason shows that if something is carried out against one’s wish and if something is not carried out while one wills it, then these would be the best signs of one’s attributes of incapability and impotence [111,1]. God, obviously, is above such deficiencies and thus must will anything that occurs.

To explain what he means, al-Juwaynī gives an example of the king who cannot execute his will over his subjects. Such a person would not be considered as being a real king. By analogy, therefore, God, who is the King of kings, cannot be endowed with such characteristics [11,4].

The Mu‘tazilites might object to al-Juwaynī’s assertion that God indeed has

<sup>62</sup> We would not expect the reader of *Luma‘* to read *al-Irshād* at the same time in order to understand it. So if *Luma‘* was intended to be used as a stand alone book, it should at least have mentioned where the premises come from.

<sup>63</sup> Including bad acts and permissible actions.

<sup>64</sup> al-Juwaynī seems to jump to this conclusion a bit too soon. However, he explains what he means in the next few paragraphs.

the power to enforce anything He wants [111,8].<sup>65</sup> In answering this, al-Juwaynī exposes a contradictory principle which the Mu‘tazilites hold, namely, that it is impossible for God to oblige His creatures to do good acts (so that they can be said to have a free choice).

Now al-Juwaynī summarises the Mu‘tazilites’s contradiction. Indeed, if we recall what the Mu‘tazilites have said until now:

- (1) God wills good acts.
- (2) God does not will bad acts.
- (3) God neither wills nor dislikes other acts.
- (4) God has the power to bring His creatures to His obedience.
- (5) God cannot force his creatures to good acts.<sup>66</sup>

What interests us is the first, second, fourth and fifth point. Put together, they would mean what al-Juwaynī concludes:

“What God wills He cannot do (1 and 5), and what He can do He does not will (2 and 4).”

This is not only self-contradictory, but also against the unanimity of all Muslims who believe that “what God wills occurs and what He does not will does not” [112,5].

al-Juwaynī supports his argument with the use of several verses from the Qur’ān [112,7]. However, the strength of the verses in opposing the Mu‘tazilites’s view and supporting his own is doubtful. Let us take each one of these verses.

<sup>65</sup> This apparently means that even though God can submit his creatures to his Will, He chose not to do so. This would exempt Him from being weak or impotent and, at the same time, would maintain the Mu‘tazilites’s view.

<sup>66</sup> al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *Faḍl al-‘Itizāl wa Ṭabaqāt al-Mu‘tazilah*, ed. Fu‘ād Sayyid, al-Dār al-Tūnusiyyah li al-Nashr, Tunis, 1986, pp.176-177; Ibrāhīm Madkūr, *Fī al-Falsafah al-Islāmiyyah*, Dār al-Ma‘ārif, Cairo, 1983, Vol.2., pp.102-107.

The first verse: "If it were God's Will, He could gather them together unto true guidance"<sup>67</sup> simply means "if He wanted ...." which neither contradicts nor supports either views. The second verse "Those whom God (in His Plan) willeth to guide, – He openeth their breast to Islam; those whom He willeth to leave straying, – He maketh their breast close and constricted"<sup>68</sup> clearly contradicts the Mu'tazilites view. However, it also contradicts the Ash'arites' own view of *Iktisāb*.<sup>69</sup> The apparent meaning of this verse is simply that humans have no responsibility as to their belief or rejection of Islam. The next verse gives almost exactly the same meaning, telling people that they would not believe unless it is in God's plan. As to the possible objection that: "God liketh not His 'ibādih to be unbelievers"<sup>70</sup> It is obvious that the apparent meaning of (عِبَادِهِ) is all humans, good and bad. If it is so then the Mu'tazilites would be right in claiming that God does not will bad acts. However, al-Juwaynī rejects such meaning and claims that by (عِبَاد) God means His obedient servants only. He uses another verse to support his interpretation of the word 'abd, namely: "A Fountain where the Servants of God do drink."<sup>71</sup> Whether or not his interpretation is right is arguable. In any case, we cannot accept his view as a final one in this case since both opposite arguments are based on different understanding of a single word.

Another objection, which seems to us to be quite valid is the verse [113,1]: "Those who give partners (to God) will say: 'If God had wished, we should not have given partners to Him, nor would our fathers, nor should we have had any

<sup>67</sup> وَلَوْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ لَجَعَلْنَاهُمْ عَلَىٰ هُدًى . s.6, v.35, Y. Ali, p.297.

<sup>68</sup> فَمَنْ يُرِدِ اللَّهُ أَنْ يَهْدِيَهُ يَشْرَحْ صَدْرَهُ لِلْإِسْلَامِ

<sup>69</sup> Gimaret, Daniel, *La Doctrine d'al-Ash'arī*, p.369-370.

<sup>70</sup> "وَلَا يَرْضَىٰ لِعِبَادِهِ الْكُفْرَ" . Qur'ān, s.39, v.7, Y. Ali, p.1238.

<sup>71</sup> غَيِّنَا يَشْرَبُ بِهَا عِبَادُ اللَّهِ . Qur'ān, s.76, v.6, Y. Ali, p.1656.



taboos' ”<sup>72</sup> Now al-Juwaynī, once again, uses interpretation of the verse, saying that God denounced them because of their mocking. However, what al-Juwaynī seems to avoid to tell us is that what was said<sup>73</sup> was not rejected. In fact what the unbelievers said was almost literally repeated at the end of verse 149. Again, depending on the interpretation of the verse, both Mu'tazilites and Ash'arite views could be supported. The former understand that God did not intervene and that is why they chose to be unbelievers, while the Ash'arites understand if God wanted he would have guided, but He simply did not want to. Going back to human responsibility, it should be obvious that what al-Juwaynī is supporting here is that humans have no saying in being believers or unbelievers. We may generalise this and conclude that in his refutation of the Mu'tazilites using the Qur'ān, al-Juwaynī led himself into asserting that people are compelled to their actions.

In terms of argumentation using the Qur'ān, it is quite hard for us to accept that al-Juwaynī has won the argument.

#### 4. The Vision of God [115-119].

al-Juwaynī starts this by asserting the view of *ahl al-ḥaqq* that God can be seen [115,1] which is contrary to the belief of the Mu'tazilites [115,3].<sup>74</sup> al-Juwaynī uses both rational proof and revelation to reject the Mu'tazilites's belief. His rational proof is first summarised as follows:

God exists;

every existent is visible;

<sup>72</sup> ... سَيَقُولُ الَّذِينَ أَشْرَكُوا لَوْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ مَا أَشْرَكْنَا Qur'ān, s.6, v.148. Y. Ali, p.334.

<sup>73</sup> i.e. If God had wished ....

<sup>74</sup> al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, p.55; Ṣubḥī, Aḥmad Maḥmūd, *Fī 'Ilm al-Kalām: al-Mu'tazilah*, Dār al-Nahḍah al-'Arabiyyah, Beirut, 1985, p.129.



therefore God is visible [115,5].

The proof is based on *qiyās al-ghā'ib bi al-shāhid* and uses the substance and colour. We understand here that al-Juwaynī supposes that we saw, for example, a red body. Now if the substance (body) were seen because it is substance (and nothing else) then it follows that the colour cannot be seen (which is not true). On the other hand if the colour is seen only because it is colour (accident) then substance cannot be seen (which is also false). Now, if both were seen because they exist then it follows that every existent can be seen (because of its existence). This last conclusion is not clear. What can be understood is that having shown that the substance cannot be seen because of its nature, and that the colour cannot be seen because it is colour, then the only alternative that remains is that they were seen only because they both exist. Since God exists, then His vision is possible [116,3]. Here al-Juwaynī does not consider another alternative to the substance and accident being seen because of their existence. We may well assume that they can be seen because of their combination together in such a way that they would not be seen on their own. In such a case, they would only be seen because of their existence in an indirect way.<sup>75</sup> We recognise that assuming that substance can exist on its own would lead us to a reconsideration of the concepts of substance and accidents which is outside the scope of the present research. However, it may suffice at the present time to say that an existent thing may be seen because of one or more attributes (or accidents) which permits that thing to be visible, in the same manner that knowledge renders its recipient knowing and life renders its recipient alive.

Besides, al-Juwaynī's last deduction is logically weak. Saying:

*X is seen because it exists, therefore: every existent can be seen.*

<sup>75</sup> They cannot be combined without being existent.

cannot hold for all cases since the first part does not necessarily imply the last.

This can be shown by a simple example. I can say:

*I am a man because I exist*

This is logically valid (although it does not make sense in the usual way). This statement is true because I would not be a man if I did not exist. But this statement cannot be used to deduce that:

*every existent is a man.*

Therefore, it may be said that al-Juwaynī's argument for vision is not as strong as we would have expected.

al-Juwaynī mentions a possible objection that things are seen because they are contingent and that God is Eternal and, therefore, cannot be seen [116,4]. al-Juwaynī answers in two ways. First he shows a contradiction in what they say using their own belief about some accidents like tastes and odours which are contingent but cannot be seen according to their own belief. If we could take the place of the Mu'tazilites we could answer in an identical manner and say that these accidents exist (according to your own belief) and you say that every existent is visible, but they cannot be seen. The second answer is a direct answer rather than a criticism. If a thing is contingent it means that it was preceded by non-existence. Since non-existence cannot be seen, and the thing was only seen after coming into existence, then vision must be reserved to existence [116,11].

It is interesting to see how strongly al-Juwaynī is holding to his view that every existent is visible.<sup>76</sup> It seems to us that he has reversed a perfectly valid statement like:

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<sup>76</sup> This insistence, despite the weakness of his argument, can only be explained by the firm belief which al-Juwaynī got from revelation as we can see from the following verses.

*A thing cannot be seen unless it exists*

to a not so strong statement like:

*every existent is visible.*

In the next step al-Juwaynī supports his argument with a verse from the Qur'ān which explicitly states that people will see God with their own eyes [117,4]. Next he refutes possible opposition from other verses by interpreting these verses. The first verse says: "No vision can grasp Him"<sup>77</sup> and al-Juwaynī answers that God can be seen but cannot be grasped or cognised [117,8]. However, the verse explicitly states the word 'vision'. The literal meaning should be obvious: eye sight cannot reach Him, or simply He cannot be seen. But, then, this is in contradiction with the previous verse. One way is to interpret the verse as being applied to the present life rather than the hereafter. Indeed, it is believed by all Muslims that people would not be in their earthly physical characteristics. They would be in a different system. This means that the verse would not apply to them as it applies only to our present form of life. This seems to be a better interpretation which avoids playing with words and changing the meaning of an obvious verse.

The other objection uses the verse in which God said to Moses that he could not see Him,<sup>78</sup> and that the statement was valid for all times [118,1]. Here, al-Juwaynī gives an intelligent but still questionable answer. In brief what al-Juwaynī understands from the verse is that a Prophet like Moses cannot believe in what is impossible for God [118,4]. Therefore, what Moses believed (to see God) was possible because Prophets are not permitted to have doubts in important

<sup>77</sup> لَا تُدْرِكُهُ الْأَبْصَارُ . Qur'ān, Sura 6, v.103. Y. Ali, p.319.

<sup>78</sup> "By no means canst thou see Me", (لَنْ تَرَانِي) . Qur'ān, Sura 7, v.143. Y. Ali, p.382.



matters relating to God [118,10]. Hence, all that the verse means is that Moses believed that He could see God on earth [119,1] but God refused him the vision at that time [119,4]. While we may grant al-Juwaynī that the verse does not explicitly prove the impossibility of vision in the hereafter, the verse does not prove the possibility of vision on earth. Indeed, if we continue to the end of the verse<sup>79</sup> we can see that, according to the verse, it was indeed impossible for Moses to see God because the mountain became dust when God manifested Himself to it. Furthermore, Moses was misguided according to the verse since he repented at the end.

### 5. God and His Creatures [120-123]

This chapter contains four sections, two of which are directly related to the will and power of humans and their relation to the Will and Power of God. The third section gives al-Juwaynī's view about God's rewarding and punishment of humans. The fourth section was included by Fawqiyah in Chapter 5 although it should be classified under Chapter 6 because it deals with the possibility of sending prophets.

In the first section al-Juwaynī begins with the confirmation that God is the creator of everything contingent [120,1]. As we saw earlier, the Mu'tazilites do not believe so. They hold that contingent creatures create their own actions and that God has no power over these actions [120,4]. Now al-Juwaynī directly resorts to the Qur'ān where God glorifies Himself for His creation [120,6].<sup>80</sup> al-

<sup>79</sup> When Moses came to the place appointed by Us, and His Lord addressed him, he said: "O my Lord! show Thyself to me, that I may look upon Thee." God said: "By no means canst thou see Me (direct); but look upon the mount; if it abide in its place, then shalt thou see Me." When His Lord manifested His glory on the Mount, He made it as dust and Moses fell down in a swoon. When He recovered his senses he said: "Glory be to Thee! To Thee I turn in repentance, and I am the first to believe." Qur'ān, s.6, v.143, Y. Ali, p.382.

<sup>80</sup> "Is then He Who creates Like one that creates not? Will ye not receive



Juwaynī understands the verse in an exclusive manner, in such a way that if anyone had anything to do with the creation of something then God would lose His Glory [120,8]. al-Juwaynī supports the first verse with two additional, and more explicit, verses [121,2]. These are: “The Creator of all things: then worship ye Him”<sup>81</sup> and: “Say: “God is the Creator of all things: He is the One, the Supreme and Irresistible” ”.<sup>82</sup> These two verses are more obvious in showing that God created everything. Interestingly, however, these two verses could be used against the Ash‘arites and al-Juwaynī in asserting that the Qur‘ān is created, simply because the Qur‘ān is a thing (*shay‘*) and God created everything (*kulla shay‘*).<sup>83</sup>

Having used revelation to prove his point, al-Juwaynī supplements the verses with the shortest rational proof in the book. In Arabic, the proof contains five words, which makes it extremely hard to understand. What we can understand from his proof:

“actions imply the knowledge of the executer of such actions [121,4].”  
is that the Mu‘tazilites believe that God knows everything, including human actions, because His Knowledge is eternal. So before humans existed God knew these actions and, thus, He must be the creator of these actions. However, to reach the last conclusion, the sentence:

admonition?” (أَفَلَا تَذَكَّرُونَ). Qur‘ān, s.16, v.17. Y. Ali, p.660.

<sup>81</sup> خَالِقُ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ فَأَعْبُدُوهُ . Qur‘ān, s.6, v.102. Y. Ali, p.319.

<sup>82</sup> قُلِ اللَّهُ خَالِقُ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ وَهُوَ الْوَاحِدُ الْقَهَّارُ . Qur‘ān, s.13, v.16. Y. Ali, p.608.

<sup>83</sup> In fact this is one of the main evidence which the followers of Jahm used to argue for the createdness of the Qur‘ān. See the lengthy discussion in: ‘Abd al-‘Azīz bin Muslim bin Maymūn al-Kinānī (d. 240 AH), *al-Haydah*, edited by ‘Ismā‘īl al-Anṣārī, al-Ri‘āsa al-‘Āmma li‘idārāt al-Buḥūth al-‘ilmiyya wa al-‘Iftā’ wa al-Da‘wa wa al-‘Irshād, Riyadh, n.d. with Bishr bin Ghiyāth al-Marisi who used these verses as a proof of the creation of God’s Kalam.

“actions imply the knowledge of the executer of such actions [121,4].” must be reversed in such a way as to mean that if someone knows about an action then he is the creator of it. Although this would not apply to humans for obvious reasons, it may still apply to God simply because He knew the occurrence of these actions before the creation of even those who are the direct executers of such actions. But what remains ambiguous is the relationship between His Knowledge, Power and Will. In any case, the proof provided by al-Juwaynī is not clear enough to be taken seriously. It contains so little information that any attempt to expand it may lead to pure speculation.

Having introduced us to the subject, al-Juwaynī continues in the following section with humans’ freedom over their actions. We know, before we start, that the Mu’tazilites confirm the freedom of human actions but in order to be free, God cannot have power over humans actions. We also know, that the Ash’arites, while holding that God created everything (including humans actions) they hold at the same time that humans are free and not compelled to their actions. This is an obvious contradiction which the Ash’arites have attempted to solve with very obscure explanations. But why do the Ash’arites hold two contrary beliefs at the same time? The explanation may be found in the fact that they did not want to be excluded from the Sunni sect. Indeed, both the Qur’ān and the Tradition of the Prophet maintain these two conflicting beliefs. On the one hand God knows everything, creates everything, and wills everything; but on the other hand, and in order to be fair and just in punishing wrong doers and rewarding the good ones, humans must be free to choose for otherwise such punishment or reward would be unjust.

That is why al-Juwaynī, in attempting to reconcile the two opposite ideas,

gives us two very obscure passages. First he asserts that humans are not compelled to their actions and that they have power over their actions [121,7]. Now the reader might jump to the obvious conclusion: if humans have power over their actions then God does not. However, at the end of the sentence al-Juwaynī adds the expression “which he acquires” alluding to the belief in *al-Iktisāb* which was attributed to al-Ash‘arī. al-Juwaynī first proves the power of humans over their actions by giving the example of voluntary and involuntary movement of the hand. By necessary knowledge, we know that we have power over the former but not the latter. To this we could answer that what we know about our voluntary movement is simply a feeling of power, i.e. we feel that we have power over it. But we still do know who has the real power over that ‘voluntary’ movement. We do not know who initiated the prime ‘order’ for the brain to send messages to the hand to move. Thus, calling a movement ‘voluntary’ will not solve the problem, because what we want is the real responsible being, not the apparent responsible being for the action.

Next al-Juwaynī explains what is meant by ‘acquiring’ (*muktasib*). If a person is *muktasib* it means that he has power over his action but his power has no influence over the happening of what could happen (*al-maḡdūr*) [121,7]. To us it seems almost impossible to find a logical sense to this assertion. By *iktisāb* al-Juwaynī attempts to solve the delicate problem between the power of humans and the power of God. But in the end we always return to the same thing, namely, God created everything and thus humans have no real power over their actions. What is the use of having some power if that power has no influence. It should not even be called power.

In attempting to give a further explanation, al-Juwaynī gives another am-



biguous example in which he compares *iktisāb* with what happens willingly despite the will having no influence [121,12]. Once again, humans do something, but what they do has no influence on what is done.

What al-Juwaynī attempts to convince us about is that a man has power over his actions but this power is useless; he also wills his actions but his will is also useless.

The third section is linked to the previous section in that it discusses the relationship between humans and God. The discussion is straightforward and explains that nothing is obligatory for God. Anything accorded by Him is a favour and any punishment imposed by Him is justice. Revelation is the only way to know our religious duties [122,1].

Next, al-Juwaynī shows that if there were anything obligatory for God, then it would be permissible to think that God could be blamed, which he says is impossible [122,5].

al-Juwaynī rejects the view of the Muʿtazilites which says that God imposes duties on humans in return for His favours on the ground that in such a case no reward would be deserved [122,8].

The last paragraph of this section was too obscure to us to be understood [122,12]. The apparent meaning is: 'It is not possible for humans to deserve a reward for observing their duties, because, otherwise, God would also deserve recognition. But we know that it is agreed by all Sunnites that people receive rewards from God for complying with His orders. And we know also that God is thanked for His rewards. al-Juwaynī himself says at the end of the paragraph that people's recognition to God was deserved. If so then the previous sentence should also hold, i.e. people should receive reward for observing their duty. In



the end the researcher was unable to understand what al-Juwaynī meant by this paragraph.

The fourth and last section of this chapter confirms the possibility for God to send apostles, contrary to the Brahmites who denied such possibility [123,1]. Their argument for such denial could be summarised as follows: There are two cases:

- (a) If apostles come with intelligible things, then reason alone is sufficient for us.
- (b) If apostles come with what reason cannot grasp, then we do not accept what contradicts reason [123,5].

This means that apostles are refused in both cases.

al-Juwaynī's answer is based on what could be called permissibility principle. He argues that if we cannot prove that the sending of apostles is impossible or irrational then we must accept its possibility even if these apostles tell us what we cannot understand or what reason refuses to accept [123,7].

Although we do not think that the Brahmites would have been convinced by al-Juwaynī's reply, we still think that the argument is strong despite its simplicity. Indeed, because humans have many limitations, they are not expected to understand everything. There are things related to the unknown (afterlife, future, etc.) which cannot be understood but which can be true. So we should not categorically reject it since there still a possibility of it being true. It is obvious that al-Juwaynī agrees with the Brahmites that if an apostle declares something which opposes reason his declaration would make reasonable people doubt his sincerity. That is why al-Juwaynī only argues for the possibility of sending apostles and does not make it compulsory. Moreover, al-Juwaynī has in mind what

he is going to mention in the following section, namely, that miracles alone prove the sincerity of prophets. Thus, it seems that according to al-Juwaynī prophets are supported by two things: (1) their sending is possible and not impossible; and (2) their prophethood is confirmed by miracles.

## 6. Apostleship, Prophecy and Miracles [124-127]

al-Juwaynī asserts that the sincerity of prophets can only be known through miracles [124,1]. Through his prophets, God challenges people with miracles and if they cannot produce similar actions then they must believe. al-Juwaynī considers that performance of miracles stand for the sincerity of the prophet's word [124,4]. He gives an example of a person who claims to be the messenger of the king. If, on the request of the messenger, the king does what he is asked to do in front of everybody, then that would confirm that he is really the king's messenger.

Next, al-Juwaynī turns to the Prophet Muḥammad and confirms that his sincerity is proven through his many miracles. The most important miracle is the Qur'ān which is inimitable because of its eloquence, style and rhyme [125,4]. The Arabs were challenged to produce a *sūrah* like it but, after twenty years of attempts, they failed [125,7]. al-Juwaynī mentions other aspects of the Qur'ān. One of these is its content of stories of the ancients despite the Prophet being illiterate [126,1]. Another is the mentioning of future events which took place as professed [126,5].

In addition to the Qur'ān, the Prophet has other miracles such as the splitting of the moon, the praising of the stones, making a dumb person speak and making water well out between his fingers [126,7].<sup>84</sup>

<sup>84</sup> All these have been transmitted by Tradition.

The next section concerns the subject of *wa'd*. al-Juwaynī confirms his view that anything transmitted to us by jurisprudence<sup>85</sup> must be accepted as long as it does not conflict with reason.<sup>86</sup> Amongst these are the things happening in the grave such as the punishment in the grave (عَذَابُ الْقَبْرِ), Munkar and Nakīr,<sup>87</sup> and the return of the soul to the dead in the tomb [126,10]. Other matters include those found in the day of judgement such as the Bridge<sup>88</sup> the Balance<sup>89</sup> the Pool<sup>90</sup> and the intercession [127,2].<sup>91</sup>

al-Juwaynī believes that Paradise and Hell have been created and actually exist [127,4]. He mentions, without explanation, a verse<sup>92</sup> which tells us that the Garden has been prepared for the righteous. The word 'prepared' seems to be understood in the sense of 'being already created'.

## 7. Leadership [128-130]

The final chapter is dedicated to politics. three sections and themes are discussed: designation of companions as leaders after the Prophet, the ranking of the Caliphs, and the conditions necessary for leaders.

In the first section, al-Juwaynī confirms his view that the right to leadership after the Prophet comes to Abū bakr, then to 'Umar, then to 'Uthmān, and

<sup>85</sup> Which means Qur'ān and Ḥadīth as a primary source, and other secondary sources such as *Ijmā'* and *Qiyās*.

<sup>86</sup> Note that here he differs from the Sunni orthodoxy *al-salaf* who never put reason the same level of jurisprudence.

<sup>87</sup> Two angels sent to the dead in the grave to ask them about their religion, God and Prophet.

<sup>88</sup> A bridge over the Hell fire across which everybody has to go and only the good people successfully pass over it.

<sup>89</sup> Which weighs peoples' sins (سَيِّئَات) against their good deeds (حَسَنَات).

<sup>90</sup> This is a fountain in Paradise where only the best people are permitted to attend.

<sup>91</sup> It is believed by Muslims that good people may intercede on behalf of others as a favour and reward from God. The first to intercede is the Prophet.

<sup>92</sup> Qur'ān, s.3, v.133.



finally to 'Alī [128,1]. He denies the existence of a text designating 'Alī for leadership after the Prophet on the basis that if that happened nobody would have been able to hide it or refuse it because of its importance [128,5]. This is obviously directed to the Shī'a who refused the leadership of the first three Caliphs. Leadership, according to al-Juwaynī was not confirmed by text (*naṣṣ*). Instead it was confirmed by the free choice of Muslims who unanimously<sup>93</sup> agreed upon the leadership of the four Caliphs respectively [129,1]. As for those who fought against 'Alī, al-Juwaynī maintains that they did not reject his leadership [129,5]. They, headed by Mu'āwiyah b. Abī Ṣufyān, only demanded the blood of 'Uthmān. By accepting that the enemies of 'Alī were wrong al-Juwaynī confirms the place of 'Alī as the fourth righteous Caliph which many scholars refrained from explicitly declaring.<sup>94</sup> However, at the same time, al-Juwaynī does not condemn 'Alī's opponents, defending them by saying that they though they were right. Their mistake is only a misjudgment, and this means that they have not sinned. Therefore, they are not to be criticised religiously.

For the ranking of the Caliphs, al-Juwaynī starts the section with the expression 'it appears' [129,8]. This shows that he has no definite answer to the question. In *al-Irshād*<sup>95</sup> al-Juwaynī explicitly says that there is no proof on the preference of some leaders over others. Moreover, texts are contradictory in this matter. However, al-Juwaynī changes the line he took in *al-Irshād*<sup>96</sup> by declaring that the caliphs are ranked according to their succession to leadership [129,8]. This is based on the argument that Muslims did would not elect someone by

<sup>93</sup> This could be arguably valid for the first three Caliphs, but is by no means valid for the fourth Caliph. Mu'āwiyah, 'Ā'ishah and the other companions could not have fought against him if they had recognised him as Caliph.

<sup>94</sup> Such as Imām Mālik bin Anas. one of the four Imams of the Sunnite sects.

<sup>95</sup> *al-Irshād*, p.431.

<sup>96</sup> In which he only confirms the ranking of the first two Caliphs.



passion, they elected the one they thought was best for leadership.

In the final section of the book, al-Juwaynī mentions the conditions which need to be satisfied by a Muslim leader. One of these is that he should be from Quraysh [130,3]. Although al-Juwaynī supports this view by a Ḥadīth narrated by Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal,<sup>97</sup> we can see here that he contradicts his own method of giving at least equal weight to reason. Any reasonable person knows that 'being best' cannot be excluded from the whole world and kept in the genes of one relatively small tribe in Arabia. The dangers of Quraysh becoming the 'chosen people of God' are obvious.

Other conditions are more or less reasonable. Amongst these are: *ijtihād* (ability to give an independent religious opinion), physical and mental strength, political skills, and piety [130,6]. All these conditions can be found in the first four Caliphs [130,9]. Here al-Juwaynī gives a saying of the Prophet which predicts that, after he dies, the *Khilāfa* will take thirty years and then changes into a corrupt kingdom. al-Juwaynī confirms the Ḥadīth, saying that the days of the Caliphs were in accordance with it [130,12]. It is not obvious why al-Juwaynī added this Ḥadīth as it does not appear to add anything new to the question of conditions fulfilled by the Caliphs. However, one possibility is that al-Juwaynī is trying to confirm his view of the successions of the four Caliphs and that their leadership was rightful. He seems to prove this by showing that the Prophet's prediction came to be true, which indirectly means, that since the Prophet praised the period of the Caliphs before they actually took the leadership, then their leadership cannot be criticised.

To sum up, in this section we commented on and explained the views ex-

<sup>97</sup> Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, III, p.120.

pressed by al-Juwaynī in *Luma'*. We saw that more than two third of the book is dedicated to *tawhīd*. However, there are two important features about this book. The first is its brevity. The discussion is reduced to a minimum and seems to be intended for an introductory study. The second is al-Juwaynī's attempt to get as close to the Traditionists as possible. This can be seen from his avoidance of some subjects and his fierce criticism of the Mu'tazilites. In Chapter 9 we compare the *Luma'* with the belief of the Salafites.

### 8.3. Comparison Between the *Luma'* and *al-Irshād*.

In the previous section, We saw how al-Juwaynī tried to express the theological beliefs of the Sunnites. This is an important feature of the book. However, there is another equally important feature which is its brevity. In such a small book, al-Juwaynī successfully packed as many subjects and proofs as possible.<sup>98</sup> al-Juwaynī achieved the conciseness of the book in two ways. The first way was by reducing the number of subjects treated, and the second was by simplifying the arguments of each subject to the minimum. In order to show how al-Juwaynī abbreviated the book, we need to compare it with more elaborate books. Unfortunately, the most elaborate Kalām book al-Juwaynī wrote, *al-Shāmil*, is incomplete as most of it has been lost, whereas *al-'Aqīdah al-Niẓāmiyyah* is an original but short book. *al-Burhān*, on the other hand, is dedicated to *uṣūl al-fiqh* rather than *'aqīdah*. The only candidate that remains is therefore *al-Irshād*. In fact, the resemblance between *Luma'* and *al-Irshād* is so clear that one might be led to believe that *Luma'* is a simple summary of *al-Irshād*. However, as we shall see, there are many differences between the two works. We will first start with a

<sup>98</sup> Although such brevity led to ambiguities in many places.

comparison between the subjects found in each book and then we will proceed to some comparison in the length of treatment given to the subjects in each book.

It is not easy to list the subjects and titles treated in both books in their successive order. We have chosen to list the successive subjects in the *Luma'* and then attempted to match the subjects found in *al-Irshād*. However, this was not always possible as we also had to move some subjects in the *Luma'* to different places.

Table 8.3 lists all headings included in *Luma'* and *al-Irshād*. The subjects of the former are put on the left of the table while the subjects of *al-Irshād* are put on the right. At the beginning of each heading we give the number of page(s) in the respective book. Usually we give two numbers separated by a dash. For example, (3-11) means that the subject 'Principle of Reflection' in *al-Irshād* starts at page 3 and continues up to page 11. However, when the subject is treated in few lines we give the page number and the line number separated by a comma. For example, (94,1) means that the subject starts at page 94, line 1.

Table 8.3. Comparing the Contents of Luma' and al-Irshād.

Luma' Al-Adilla	Al-Irshād
(86-92) The Contingency of the World and the Existence of the Creator	(3-11) <i>bāb</i> : Principles of Reflection
(91-92) The proof that the world has a creator	(12-16) <i>bāb</i> : Definition of Knowledge
<i>faṣl</i> : No title	(17-27) <i>bāb</i> : The Contingency of the World
(93) God has an eternal existence	(28-29) <i>bāb</i> : The proof of the existence of the Creator
(94,1) God is Alive, All-Knowing, and Most Powerful	<i>bāb</i> : What is necessary to attribute to God
(95,1) God is Willing	(31-32) The proof of the eternity of God (essential attribute)
(97,1) God is hearing, seeing, and speaking	(63-71) God is Willing (conceptual attribute)
(97,6) God is Subsistant and His existence is necessary	(72-76) God is hearing and seeing (conceptual attribute)
(98,1) God is Unique	(33-34) God is Subsistant (essential attribute)
(99,11) God is Knowing with an eternal Knowledge, Powerful with an eternal Power, Alive with an eternal Life	(52-60) <i>bāb</i> : Uniqueness of God
	(79) God is Alive, Knowing and Powerful with eternal Life, Knowledge, Power, and Will
	(34-35) <i>faṣl</i> : Amongst God's attributes is his difference from attributes
	(36-39) <i>faṣl</i> : On the Similar and the Different



Table 8.3. Continued.

(107) <i>bāb</i> : What is impossible to attribute to God (This is the only place in the whole book where we find the term <i>bāb</i> )	(39-42) <i>faṣl</i> : What is impossible to attribute to God
(108,1) God is not specified by a location and does not occupy space	(39-40) God does not occupy space or location
(108,7) Metaphoric interpretation of the verse: "God is firmly established on the Throne"	(40-41) Metaphoric interpretation of the verse: "God is firmly established on the Throne"
(109,1) God is exempt from accepting contingents	(42-44) <i>faṣl</i> : God is not a body contrary to the Karamiyya
	(44-46) <i>faṣl</i> : God does not accept accidents
	(46-51) <i>faṣl</i> : Proof of the impossibility for God to be substance and the answer to the Christians
	(61-78) <i>bāb</i> : Proof of knowledge about conceptual attributes
	(76-77) God cannot be attributed with tasting, smelling, etc.
	(78-78) God has an eternal existence
	(79-80) <i>bāb</i> : Proof of the knowledge of attributes
	(80-84) Proof of Modes ( <i>al-aḥwāl</i> )
	(84-94) Justification of the necessary ( <i>ta'līl al-wājib</i> )
	(94-96) The Will of God is eternal
	(96-99) Jahm proves contingent knowledge
	(99-101) God is Speaking
(102,9) God's Speech has no beginning	(102-104) Definition and meaning of Speech

Table 8.3. Continued.

(103,9) Definition of speech of essence ( <i>ḥadīth al-naḥs</i> )	(104-108) The Mu'tazilites denied the speech of essence
	(109-118) The speaker is he who has speech
	(119-128) Objections
	(128-130) The Speech of God is eternal for the <i>Ḥashwīyyah</i>
(105,6) The Speech of God in contingent forms	(130-131) The reading ( <i>al-qirā'ah</i> )
	(131-132) The read ( <i>al-maqrū'</i> )
	(132-140) Other topics relating to the question of Speech
	(141-164) On the meaning of God's names
	(155-164) <i>faṣl</i> : The hands, the eyes and the face
	(165) <i>bāb</i> What is possible to attribute to God
	(166-173) Proof of the existence of perception ( <i>al-Idrāk</i> )
	(173-174) The five perceptions
	(174-175) Every existent can be seen
	(175-176) Obstacles to perception
(115,1) God is visible and can be seen	(176-181) The vision of God
	(181-185) God will be seen in Paradise
	(185-186) The difference between vision, smell, touch, and taste
	(187) <i>bāb</i> : On the creation of acts
(110,1) All contingents are submitted to the Will of God	(237-249) On the will of creatures
(120,1) God is the only Creator	(188-202) A human being is not a creator
	(203-208) Difference between demanding humans' colours and bodies, and between demanding their acts

Table 8.3. Continued.

	(208-210) The relation- ship between contingent power and its subject ( <i>maqḍūrihā</i> )
	(210-214) On the right guidance ( <i>hudā</i> , error <i>ḍalāl</i> , sealing [of the heart] ( <i>khatm</i> ) and imprinting ( <i>ṭabʿ</i> )
(121,7) Humans have power over their actions	(215-256) <i>bāb</i> : On the aptitude ( <i>istiṭāʿa</i> ) (contains 12 <i>faṣl</i> )
	(257-286) <i>bāb</i> : On straightening ( <i>taʿdīl</i> ) and allowance ( <i>tajwīz</i> )
	(258-268) Betterment and disliking ( <i>taqbiḥ</i> )
(122,1) Nothing is obligatory for God	(268-272) Nothing is obligatory for God
	(273-286) The question of Pains (Three sections)
	(287-300) <i>bāb</i> : On the righteousness and the more righteous
	(300-301) The question of benevolence
	(302- <i>bāb</i> : Confirmation of prophethood
(123,1) God can send apostles and prophets to preach	(302-307) Confirmation of the possibil- ity of prophethood
(124,1) Proof of prophethood through miracles	(307-315) Miracles and their conditions
	(316-323) Confirmation of prodiges ( <i>karāmāt</i> ) and their distinction from miracles
	(324-337) <i>bāb</i> : Ways in which miracles show the truth of the Prophet (p.b.u.h)
(125,4) The proof of the prophethood of Prophet Muḥammad	(338-354) On the proof of the prophet- hood of Prophet Muḥammad (p.b.u.h)

Table 8.3. Continued.

	(339-344) Cancellation ( <i>al-naskh</i> )
	(345-349) The miracles of Muḥammad (p.b.u.h)
	(349-353) Miraculous aspects of the Qur'ān
	(353-354) Signs of the Prophet (p.b.u.h) apart from the Qur'ān
	(355-337) <i>bāb</i> : Prophets in general
	(356-357) Infallibility of prophets
	(358-360) <i>bāb</i> : On revelation
	(361-363) <i>bāb</i> : Lifetimes ( <i>al-ajāl</i> )
	(364-366) <i>bāb</i> : Fortune ( <i>rizq</i> )
	(367-367) <i>bāb</i> : Prices
	(368-370) <i>bāb</i> : Ordering that which is good ( <i>al-ma'rūf</i> ) and forbidding evil acts
	(371-374) <i>bāb</i> : Repetition
(126,10) Acceptance of transcendental things transmitted by jurisprudence	(375-380) <i>bāb</i> : Some questions about the Hereafter related to revelation
	(377-377) <i>faṣl</i> : The spirit and its meaning
	(377-378) <i>faṣl</i> : Paradise and Hell
	(379-380) <i>faṣl</i> : The <i>Sirāt</i>
	(381-395) <i>bāb</i> : Reward and punishment (contains 6 chapters)



Table 8.3. Continued.

	(396-400) <i>bāb</i> : Names and rules (contains 2 chapters)
	(401-410) <i>bāb</i> : Repentance (contains 6 chapters)
(128,1) The leadership of the four Caliphs	(310-433) Leadership [an introduction]
	(411-418) <i>bāb</i> : Details of communications and stories ( <i>akhbār</i> )
(128,5) The Prophet did not designate anyone for leadership	(419-423) <i>bāb</i> : On refuting designation ( <i>naṣṣ</i> ), and proving election
	(424-427) <i>bāb</i> : Selection and requirements for leadership
	(425-425) <i>faṣl</i> : Granting leadership to two persons
	(425-426) <i>faṣl</i> : Deposing the leader
(130,3) Conditions required for leadership	(425-4425) <i>faṣl</i> : Conditions of leadership
	(428-434) <i>bāb</i> : The leadership of Abū Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthmān and 'Alī
(129,8) The ranking of the first four caliphs	(430-431) <i>faṣl</i> : The leadership of the lesser ( <i>al-maḥdūl</i> )
	(431-432) <i>faṣl</i> : The unlawful killing of 'Uthmān
	(432-433) <i>faṣl</i> : Defamation against the companions
	(433-434) <i>faṣl</i> : The fighting of 'Alī

### Comparison of Contents.

A quick examination of Table 3 reveals the first main characteristic of *Luma'*. It is obvious that the number of subjects in *Luma'* are reduced. In addition to avoiding several important subjects, al-Juwaynī also discarded many secondary subjects. In what follows, we shall compare the contents of the two books in the order found in Table 3.

To start with, al-Juwaynī discarded his discussion of the basic concepts relating to Reflection (9 pages in *al-Irshād*), and knowledge (5 pages). The first two major subjects discussed in *Luma'* are the contingency of the world and the proof of existence of God. We find these in the same order in both books. The next major subject in both books is the divine attributes. Here *Luma'* is quite distinct from *al-Irshād*. Firstly, *al-Irshād* starts the subject with a *bāb* called 'what is necessary to attribute to God' but in *Luma'* al-Juwaynī avoids using such a heading. This is probably in order to avoid imposing on God things that may not be accepted by other Sunnites. Secondly, al-Juwaynī divides the attributes into essential, conceptual and causal in *al-Irshād*,<sup>99</sup> while such division is absent in *Luma'*. Moreover, while the attributes are well ordered in *al-Irshād*, we find al-Juwaynī mixing the three kinds of attributes without any given order.

The order in which attributes are given in *Luma'* is as follows:

God is Eternal (essential attribute); Alive (conceptual), Knowing (conceptual), Powerful (conceptual), Willing (conceptual) Hearing (conceptual), Seeing (conceptual), Speaking (conceptual); Subsistent (essential), Unique (essential); Knowledge (conceptual), Power (conceptual), Life (causal). The remaining at-

<sup>99</sup> Causal attributes are mentioned simply as attributes in *al-Irshād*.

tribute of Speech (causal) is mentioned in a later section in *Luma'*.

In order to put these attributes together we had to take many attributes from various places in *al-Irshād*, moving from one section to another. While the eternity is treated in page 31, other conceptual attributes were treated starting from page 63.

An attribute that is not mentioned in *Luma'* is God's difference from attributes (*al-Irshād*, pp.34-35). Linked to this attribute is the question of the similar and different. This too is not mentioned in *Luma'*.

In *Luma'* we find that new subjects start with sections (*faṣl*) rather than parts as in *al-Irshād*. However, the only place in *Luma'* where the term *bāb* is applied is on page 107 where al-Juwaynī treats the question of what is impossible for God. Strangely, the same subject starts with a *faṣl* in *al-Irshād*, although what is called *faṣl* takes four pages while what is called *bāb* takes only two pages.

The impossibility for God to be specified by a location, to occupy space, and to accept contingents are treated in the same order in both books under the same title of 'what is impossible to attribute to God'. However, the last question of God's acceptance of contingents is expanded in *al-Irshād* in and takes three sections. The first section denies that God is a body, the second that He accepts accidents, and the third that He is substance. All these three related questions were summarised into one idea of contingency.

After this, if we look at the table we can see that many subjects were left out. One obvious subject is the distinction between conceptual and essential attributes (*al-Irshād*, p.61). We have seen how al-Juwaynī mixed all attributes together in *Luma'*. Another important subject which was left out in *Luma'* was the modes (p.80). We know that only a few Ash'arites accepted the idea of modes

(*al-aḥwāl*) and that all other Sunnites rejected it. We also know that al-Juwaynī rejected the modes in his later book *al-Burhān*. However, it is very likely that al-Juwaynī did believe in modes when he wrote the *Luma'* because this latter was written after *al-Irshād* but before *al-Burhān*. What seems more reasonable is that al-Juwaynī left it out in order to avoid stating what the Sunnites reject in their name. al-Juwaynī had to stick to the line set out by the title of the book, namely that the ideology he is exposing is that of *ahl al-sunnah*. Obviously, when his own view diverges from that of the main stream, the simplest way to avoid criticism is to leave it out.

The Speech of God is the longest single subject in both books, taking about 12 pages in *Luma'* and 41 pages in *al-Irshād*. In relative terms, however, the question of speech is equally important in both books as it takes 12 out of 130 page (9.2%) and 41 out of 431 pages (9.5%) in *al-Irshād*. In absolute terms, however, we find more details about the question of speech in *al-Irshād*. In particular, al-Juwaynī answers many objections to all his opponents in *al-Irshād* but he concentrates on the Mu'tazilites in *Luma'*.

Another important subject which is not mentioned in *Luma'* is the interpretation of the names of God (*al-Irshād*, p.141). The obvious reason is because of the controversiality of the subject. Indeed, while the Orthodox Sunnites believe that each of God's names (*asmā' allāh al-ḥusnā*) represent one of His attributes, al-Juwaynī interprets many of them as mere names, following His master Al-Ash'arī<sup>100</sup>. This again explains the silence of al-Juwaynī on this matter.

The interpretation of the hands, the eyes, and the face which al-Juwaynī dedicates 9 pages is also avoided in *Luma'*. This is due to the fact that

<sup>100</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.143-144



the Salafites and most Ash'arites reject the interpretation of the revealed attributes.<sup>101</sup> However, there remains the question as to why he mentioned the interpretation of 'establishment' in *Luma'* even though he knew that the Sunnites did not agree with that. As we showed in the commentary, the only apparent reason is that he was forced to mention it.

The following subject of God's vision is preceded in *al-Irshād* by a *bāb* entitled 'What is Possible to Attribute to God'. Again, this is not found in *Luma'*, probably because what al-Juwaynī might have thought possible could have been believed to be impossible by some Sunnites. All introductory subjects which are summarised in *al-Irshād*<sup>102</sup> are left out in *Luma'* in which al-Juwaynī goes directly to the main question of the visibility of God.

The question of the creation of acts starts with a *bāb* in *al-Irshād*. This chapter treats the will of God and the will of humans. However, there is a poor arrangement in both books. In *Luma'* the will of contingents is mentioned in page 110 first, and then the main subject of the will restarts in page 120. In *al-Irshād*, the will of contingents is left until page 237, while the main subject of the will starts from page 188. Apart from this, a general view is that both books took the question from all aspects. The only thing is that *al-Irshād* treats the question in more details. Although, we can see many titles in *al-Irshād*, most of the ideas mentioned in *al-Irshād* can be found in *Luma'*. However, four related topics which are briefly mentioned in *al-Irshād*<sup>103</sup> are avoided in *Luma'*.

The next *bāb*<sup>104</sup> is the most striking examples of how al-Juwaynī shortened

<sup>101</sup> Riḍā Mu'tī, *Alāqat al-Ithbāt wa al-Tafwīḍ*, Maṭba'at al-Turāth, Makkah, 1402 AH/1981 AD.

<sup>102</sup> The existence of perception, the five perceptions, every existent can be seen, and obstacles to perception.

<sup>103</sup> See Table 3, (210-214).

<sup>104</sup> (215-256).

his work. Although the subject of aptitude takes 41 pages and 12 sections in *al-Irshād*, the same subject is treated in less than half a page in *Luma'*.

The next *bāb*<sup>105</sup> of *al-Irshād* discusses many subjects, such as straightening and disliking which were not mentioned in *Luma'*. The only subject mentioned is 'Nothing is obligatory to God'.

In the next two *bābs* many questions are avoided. In particular, we do not see the question of benevolence or the confirmation of prodigies in *Luma'*.

The next subject in both book was about the miracles of the Prophet and the proof of his prophethood. The main difference between the two books is the extreme abstraction of *Luma'*. While the subject takes 30 pages in *al-Irshād*, it takes less than two pages in *Luma'*. Apart the subject of cancellation, all other subjects are found in *Luma'* although they are not given separate sections or titles as in *al-Irshād*.

After this al-Juwaynī drops six whole *bābs* (between 355 and 374). He then briefly summarises the transcendental things like Paradise and Hell and the *Sirāṭ*. However, the question of the spirit was not mentioned in *Luma'*. Another three *bābs* are dropped (Reward and punishment, Names and Rules, and Repentance) totalling 29 pages.

In the final part of both books we find the subject of leadership. In this part, we find that most important subjects are mentioned in *Luma'*. The subjects which were left out<sup>106</sup> were probably considered less important for an introductory book like *Luma'*.

<sup>105</sup> (257-286).

<sup>106</sup> Selection, granting leadership to two persons, deposing the leader, the killing of 'Uthmān, defamation against the Companions, and the fighting of 'Alī

### Comparison of Length of Treatment.

The second method that al-Juwaynī employed to reach the desired brevity was through the reduction in the length of each subject. A general comparison between *Luma'* and *al-Irshād* reveals that *Luma'* is not a perfectly summarised version of *al-Irshād*. Rather, it may be seen as a simplified version of *al-Irshād*. By comparing the common subjects treated in both books, we can see that in most cases, al-Juwaynī does not advance more than one intellectual argument in *Luma'* while he gives a variety of arguments and counterarguments in *al-Irshād*.

While formulas like 'and if they say', 'and if they object' are found everywhere in *al-Irshād*, we can find no more than seven instances in *Luma'*.<sup>107</sup> It is through these objections and answers that al-Juwaynī expands his own views and refutes his opponents' views. To compare the use of objection in *al-Irshād* with that of *Luma'* we can take a single *bāb* in *al-Irshād* where we find seven such objections and answers.<sup>108</sup>

In *Luma'*, al-Juwaynī concentrates mostly on criticising the Mu'tazilites, but we find him refuting the views on many other sects and creeds in *al-Irshād*.

The *Luma'* sometimes presents new arguments which are not found in *al-Irshād*. For example, in proving that God has Knowledge, al-Juwaynī uses the argument that God cannot be Knowledge<sup>109</sup> while in *al-Irshād*, al-Juwaynī uses three arguments but none uses the idea presented in *Luma'*.<sup>110</sup> On the other hand, when the same argument is used, we find that al-Juwaynī went to a great length in abstracting and summarising the longer argument of *al-Irshād*. For

<sup>107</sup> *Luma'*, pp.100,108,111,113,116,117.

<sup>108</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.52-60.

<sup>109</sup> *Luma'*, p.100.

<sup>110</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.87-90.



example, al-Juwaynī argues that God is Willing in *Luma'* in 9 lines<sup>111</sup> while he dedicates 9 pages to the same subject in *al-Irshād*.<sup>112</sup> Unfortunately, this summarising has led to many ambiguities and lack of clarity in *Luma'*. We have already discussed the obscure passages in Part I of this commentary.

In what follows, we shall review two examples of comparison of contents in both books.

### **The First Example: The contingency of the World.**<sup>113</sup>

This is one of the main chapters in both books and its importance explains why the length of the text in *Luma'*. However, the text in *al-Irshād* is still 50% longer because of the longer discussion and because of the inclusion of many objections by al-Juwaynī's opponents in the text.

Both books use the argument of substance and accidents through the four principles. But the exposition in *Luma'* is different. First, the definition of the terms substance, accident, the world take more space in *Luma'* than in *al-Irshād*.<sup>114</sup> Second, *Luma'* gives a summary of the proof from the beginning and then goes on to the details of the proof, while in *al-Irshād* al-Juwaynī exposes the four principles upon which the proof is based. Third, in *Luma'* the four principles are given in the form of objections to which al-Juwaynī answers, whereas in *al-Irshād* these principles are stated first and then defended. This is why in *Luma'* each of the four points is called question (*su'āl*) whereas in *al-Irshād* it is called principle (*aṣl*). The four principles differ in length as well as in depth in the two books and what follows is a detailed comparison of the four principles.

<sup>111</sup> *Luma'*, p.95.

<sup>112</sup> *al-Irshād*, pp.63-71.

<sup>113</sup> *Luma'*, pp.86-90; *al-Irshād*, pp.17-27.

<sup>114</sup> *Luma'* does not mention two other terms: *al-Akwān* (states), and *al-muta'allif*.



The First Principle: The Existence of Accidents.

Only half a page is dedicated to this principle in *Luma'*, while al-Juwaynī explains it in two pages in *al-Irshād*.

In *Luma'* the first principle is simplified and given a different shape. To have a better view we summarise the exposition of both books in the following table.

The First Example: The contingency of the World.	
111	<i>Luma'</i> , p. 95.
112	<i>al-Irshād</i> , pp. 62-71.
113	<i>Luma'</i> , pp. 98-99; <i>al-Irshād</i> , pp. 17-17.
114	<i>Luma'</i> , does not mention two other terms: <i>al-ʿālam</i> (universe) and <i>al-ʿālam</i> (world).
115	<i>al-Irshād</i> , pp. 67-90.

Table 4. Comparing the First Principle.

## Luma' Al-Adilla

## Al-Irshād

A substance is in rest and then moves

By necessity, there is a difference (*tafriqah*) between the two states

The difference is caused by (i) the substance itself; or (ii) something (*ma'nā*) additional to it.

It cannot be itself because a thing cannot be different from itself

Then the difference must be due to something additional, which is the accident

A substance is in rest and then moves

By necessity, we know that its moving to the new place is a possibility and not a necessity because we may conceive its staying in its original place

If any possible event is particularised by existence instead of its possible inexistence, then it must have needed a particulariser (*muqtadīn*) which particularise its existence

The necessitator can either be the substance itself

which is not possible for otherwise the substance would not have moved away from its first place

There remains that the necessitator is additional to the substance

The necessitator cannot be a void for there is no difference between denying the necessitator and between accepting a void necessitator

The necessitator cannot be a 'similar' (*mithl*) to the substance; it can only be different (*khilāf*)

The necessitator can either be a subject who has free choice *fā'il mukhtār* or something that has no choice *ma'nā mājib*

It cannot be a subject with free choice, which proves the existence of accidents

Two obvious points emerge from the table. First, the discussion is more elaborate in *al-Irshād*. In *Luma'* al-Juwaynī moves quickly to the conclusion that this additional thing is the accident, leaving behind many unanswered questions. The second is the difference in viewing the cause of motion. In *Luma'* the motion is viewed in terms of 'difference', but in *al-Irshād* it is seen as a necessitator.<sup>115</sup> Although both ideas lead to the same conclusion, they are quite different. In *Luma'* we are told that if the substance moved then we know there is a difference between the substance which was in rest and the one that has moved. Then we search for the reason for this difference. In *al-Irshād*, however, al-Juwaynī directly shows that the movement is due to something which he calls *muqtaḍi*.

The above discussion of the first principle shows quite clearly that al-Juwaynī has reviewed the manner in which he exposed some of his arguments either because his previous exposition was weaker or in order to improve clarity. But what seems more likely in this case is that in order to obtain a shorter text al-Juwaynī did well to replace the idea of the necessitator, which required more explanation, with the idea of 'difference' which is easier to understand.

#### *The Second Principle: The Contingency of Accidents.*

Table 5 summarises the way the second principle is treated in both books. In both books the proof is based on the succession of accidents. The new ones are contingents because they have occurred, and the old ones are contingents because they vanished. Here al-Juwaynī does not show in *Luma'* why it is impossible for an eternal thing to vanish, he simply states it. In addition to dedicating a section to the proof of the impossibility for an eternal thing to vanish in *al-*

<sup>115</sup> In *al-'Aqīda al-Nizāmiyya* al-Juwaynī applies the idea of necessitator on God which shows that his original proof of the existence of God probably originated from this simple argument.

*Irshād*, al-Juwaynī refutes several opposing ideas, namely: latency (*al-kumūn*), the impossibility for accidents to transfer and the impossibility for accidents to exist by itself (*taqūm binafsihā*).<sup>116</sup>

It is therefore obvious that in order to reduce the text in *Luma'* al-Juwaynī had to drop several important objections. This leads us to think of *Luma'* as an introductory teaching book where proofs are reduced to the minimum.

Table 5. Comparing the Second Principle.

Luma' Al-Adilla	Al-Irshād
Accidents succeed each other, which means that the new ones have occurred and the old one have vanished	If a substance in rest moves, it means that the movement occurred and that the rest ( <i>al-sukūn</i> ) has vanished
Those which have vanished cannot be eternal because what is eternal cannot vanish	The rest has vanished because if it were eternal it would be possible for it to vanish
	Refuting the latency ( <i>al-kumūn</i> )
	The proof of impossibility for the eternal to vanish
	The impossibility for accidents to be transferred ( <i>intiḳāl</i> )

*The Third Principle: The Impossibility for Substance to be Free from Accidents.*

The proof of the third principle is quite different in the two books. In *Luma'* the proof is very concise and uses the necessary knowledge and self-evidence *al-badīhah*.

According to *Luma'*, there is no need for reflection to know that substances can either be segregated or aggregated; in rest or in motion; etc. And this shows

<sup>116</sup> Despite al-Juwaynī's mentioning that he was going to show this last point we could not trace it in the text. see *al-Irshād*, pp.20-22.





that substance cannot be stripped of accidents.

The elaboration in *al-Irshād*, however, is far greater in *al-Irshād*. To begin with, al-Juwaynī uses the necessary knowledge only as a secondary proof to his point. He first gives a brief account of what *ahl al-ḥaqq* believe. This is basically the same idea used in *Luma'*, namely, that accidents cannot be free from accidents or their contraries if they have one. Next he provides a brief account on what the Atheists, al-Ṣāliḥī and al-Ka'bi believed in this regard.

He answered the Atheists through the idea of *akwān* and uses the *badīhat al-'aql* in that substances cannot be neither aggregated nor segregated. This is similar to the argument in *Luma'*. But, in addition to this, al-Juwaynī continues with his answer to the Mu'tazilites using *al-akwān*, consensus (*al-ijmā'*) and reasoning. He further adds a secondary point which is that accidents cannot subsist in the Essence of God.

*The Fourth Principle: The Impossibility of Contingents without a First.*

Here both books give relatively short proofs, but the two proofs are completely different. In *Luma'*, al-Juwaynī uses his own definition of Contingents<sup>117</sup> to prove that it cannot be without a first. In *al-Irshād*, however, al-Juwaynī answered the Atheists who believe in the infinity of celestial revolutions (*dawrah*). Although his proof does not seem convincing, what is important to us here is that he used a different argument in *Luma'*.

### **The Second Example: The Uniqueness of God.<sup>118</sup>**

From the number of pages dedicated to the subject in each book we may guess that the argument is more elaborated in *al-Irshād*. al-Juwaynī uses the

<sup>117</sup> That which has a first.

<sup>118</sup> *Luma'*, pp.98-99; *al-Irshād*, pp.52-60.

same argument<sup>119</sup> in both book. However, the proof is reduced to the strict minimum in *Luma'*. The first two pages of *al-Irshād* resemble to a great extent those in *Luma'*.<sup>120</sup> However, the *Luma'* is limited to the first objection found in *al-Irshād* only. The other 9 objections (covering 7 pages) have been discarded. WE should note in passing that both books use a Qur'anic verse to support the argument.

### Brief Accounts on the Difference in Length in the Subjects Shared by the two Book.

The above two examples gave us an idea on how al-Juwaynī reduced the length of text in order to write a compact and short book on the subject. By using Table 3 we can make a new table showing the length of the subjects which were shared by the two books. The results are given in Table 6.

The table clearly shows that *al-Irshād* gives more detailed analysis in the subjects which it shares with the *Luma'*. Apart from the subject of contingency and the proof of the creator where we find little or no difference, the summarising feature of *Luma'* in the other subjects is striking. For example the attributes take 16 pages only in *Luma'* while the subject takes 134 pages in *al-Irshād*. What is even shorter is the subject of leadership which takes only 3 pages in *Luma'* while al-Juwaynī dedicates no less than 122 pages to the subject in *al-Irshād*. In relative terms the percentages tell us that the most abstracted subject was the leadership with 2.5% of the text of *al-Irshād*. This is followed by the Will and apostelhood with 8% each. Contingency in *Luma'* represents about half the size of *al-Irshād*.

<sup>119</sup> *Burhān al-tamānu'*.

<sup>120</sup> Although slightly longer.

Table 6. Approximate Comparison of the Length of Subjects.

Subject	<i>Luma'</i>	<i>al-Irshād</i>	Percentage
1. Contingency	6 pages	11 pages	54
2. The Creator	2 pages	2 pages	100
3. Attributes (inc. Speech)	16 pages	134 pages	12
4. Vision	5 pages	21 pages	24
5. Will	8 pages	99 pages	8
6. Apostلهood	4 pages	52 pages	8
6. Transcendental Things	1 page	6 pages	16
7. Leadership	3 pages	122 pages	2.5

## Chapter Nine

### The Position of the Luma' in the Creed of Ahl al-Sunnah

#### 9.1. Introduction.

The title of *Luma' al-Adillah* makes it clear that al-Juwaynī is attempting to explain (and defend) the belief of *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*. However, we know that they were not a homogeneous group. Understandably any group belonging to Islam would be proud in claiming to be followers of the Tradition of the Prophet. What we call today Sunnī, Shi'ī, Khārijī, Zāhirī and Ṣūfī, all claim to be followers of the Prophet. The problem lies in the way they follow him.

Since it is practically impossible to prove who is the real follower of the Prophet, it is important to agree that the appellation does not necessarily reflect the truth. Strictly speaking, anyone who agrees to the validity of the Prophet's Tradition can belong to *ahl al-Sunnah*. Thus, apart from theology and with the exception of the Khārijites, all Muslims can be called *ahl al-Sunnah* because they rely on the Tradition of the Prophet in subjects like *Fiqh* and *Tafsīr*. The only difference concerns the authenticity of the *Ḥadīths*. However, in theology, the Mu'tazilites cannot be said to be *ahl al-Sunnah* since they reject the use of the *Ḥadīth* in theological discussions. Instead, they call themselves *ahl al-'Adl*<sup>1</sup> *wa al-Tawḥīd*.<sup>2</sup> The Shī'ah, the Salafites, the Sūfis and the Ash'arites can all be called *ahl al-Sunnah*.<sup>3</sup> With time, *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah* became known

<sup>1</sup> Because of their belief in human freedom of will.

<sup>2</sup> Because of their rejection of the reality of divine attributes.

<sup>3</sup> Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā, introd. *ʿIlm al-Kalām 'alā Madhhab ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*, by Ibn Ḥazm, al-Maktab al-Thaqāfī, Cairo, 1989, p.6.



as the Salafites or Traditionists, and the Ash'arites.

Another important point which should be mentioned is to determine the branch of Islam to which the appellation should be relevant. The main branches which concern us are: jurisprudence (*Fiqh*), theology, and *ḥadīth*.<sup>4</sup> These three are obviously overlapping. Besides, most Muslim scholars were specialised in more than one branch. What is more interesting is that scholars can belong to different schools in different branches and we can even find a scholar who is Ḥanbalī in *Fiqh* but Mu'tazilite in *Kalām*.<sup>5</sup>

Therefore, in discussing the various creeds, what will be meant is the schools of *Kalām* or at least opinions of Tawḥīd. Taking all three branches together, we can identify three main sects in Islam: the Shī'a, the Kharijites, and the Sunnis. The latter group is subdivided into four *fiqh* schools. However, theologically, the Sunnis are divided into several schools the most important of which are the Mu'tazilites, the Traditionists<sup>6</sup> (*ahl al-Ḥadīth* or *Ahl al-Salaf*), and the Ash'aris.

This chapter is about assessing how close *Luma'* is in representing the group of *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*. In order to achieve that, we shall need first to determine who are *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*. This will be carried out in the following section.

## 9.2. Who are *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*?

From the name we can assert that *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah* are the people who use the Tradition of the Prophet as the second primary sources in

<sup>4</sup> Other branches like *tafsīr*, history, and politics are relatively less sensitive to creed and can easily be joined with one of the main branches.

<sup>5</sup> This is Abī al-Wafā' b. 'Aqīl (431-513 AH). Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khatīb (ed.), *al-'Awāṣim min al-Qawāṣim*, by Abū Bakr Ibn al-'Arabī (468-543 AH), al-Maktabah al-'Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1986.

<sup>6</sup> More known today under the name of *al-Salafīyyūn*.

making a religious opinion. Historically, it is known that the Sunni sect are those who were neither *Shi'ah* nor *Khawārij*. It follows that Mu'tazilites, Ash'arīs, Sūfis and Salafīs (Traditionists) are all part of the Sunni sect. However, they are not all *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*. Only Ash'arīs and Traditionists claim to be so. The Mu'tazilites do not seem to adopt such a name because of their attitude towards the Tradition of the Prophet.

It is known that the Traditionists give little or no weight to reason and reflection, while the Mu'tazilites are the opposite. The Mu'tazilites rely on the Qur'an and the Successive Tradition (*al-Sunnah al-Mutawātirah*) in Fiqh, while rejecting categorically the use of individual ḥadīths (*āḥād*) in theology.<sup>7</sup> As we know, the Ash'arīs took a middle position, using both reason and ḥadīths in theology. From this, we can clearly see why both Traditionists and Ash'arīs call themselves *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*. By taking a middle position, the Ash'arīs made two enemies although they were more tolerated by the Traditionists. As far as the Ash'arīs are concerned, their criticism was concentrated mainly on the Mu'tazilites. The biggest enmity, however, was between the Mu'tazilites and the Traditionists as the story of the Miḥna which started during the reign of al-Ma'mūn tells us.

Today, it seems that there is a strong Salafī (Traditionist) movement which claims to be the only representative of *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*. Many current traditionist writers and scholars reject many of al-Juwaynī's views. They just manage to keep some respect for al-Ash'arī. Nevertheless, what concerns us here is the way they saw themselves about a millennium ago, and it seems that

<sup>7</sup> Ibn Ḥazm, *Ilm al-Kalām 'alā Madhhab Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*, ed. by Aḥmad Hījāzī al-Saqqā, al-Maktab al-Thaqāfī, Cairo, 1989, (Editor's introduction: p.6.)

they both accepted each other as *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*.

### 9.3. The Luma' and Tradition.

We know that al-Juwaynī did not have any doubt as to his belonging to *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*. He also must have known that the Traditionists gave themselves the same title and that they were both in the same trench against the Mu'tazilites. This seems to be the answer to the possible question: "Why did he not write the views of the Ash'arīs only in the *Luma'*?" al-Juwaynī knew that the Traditionists were also *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*, and must have believed that he was closer to them than to the Mu'tazilites. This is obvious from his fierce attack on the Mu'tazilites in his books. Another reason might be that the *Luma'* was meant to be an introduction to theology of Ahl al-Sunnah. It was therefore necessary to find a compromise between his own views, the Ash'arīs views and the views of the Traditionists.

Our interest should therefore focus on three basic questions: (i) How close al-Juwaynī was to the Traditionists? (ii) How far did he go to find a compromise between the three views? (iii) How would the Traditionists see his *Luma'*?

We shall try to answer these three questions in the following sub-sections.

#### 9.3.1. The Closeness of the Luma' to the Traditionists.

We have seen in Chapter 8 that al-Juwaynī avoided certain views found in *al-Shāmīl* and *al-Irshād*. Amongst such views were his acceptance of *al-Aḥwāl* and the division of attributes. He obviously tried to concentrate on those questions in which there was no disagreement between the Ash'arīs and the Traditionists.

However, by leaving certain subjects out, he does not provide us with a complete book. As we saw in Chapter 8, the comparison between the *Luma'* and *al-Irshād* shows that he turned away from important and controversial sub-



jects. Amongst these were the principles of reflection, God does not accept accidents, the modes, *al-ṣifāt al-khabariyyah* (the hands, the eyes and the face). The only controversial subject al-Juwaynī kept was his metaphorical interpretation of God's establishment on the throne.<sup>8</sup>

We can conclude from this that, in terms of contents, al-Juwaynī went very close to the Traditionists. Except for one subject, all the subjects mentioned in the Luma' were accepted by the Traditionists. However, the Traditionist may not agree with the absence of several important subjects in '*Aqīdah*'. For example, al-Juwaynī kept silent on the attributes which could be understood from the 99 names of God (*al-Asmā' al-Ḥusnā*). He also kept silent in mentioning many of Muslim beliefs such as the Angels, the Jinn, the middle position (*al-Manzilah bayn al-Manzilatayn*), and resurrection. His reason might be that he did not intend the book to be lengthy. He may also have been concentrating on the issues of disagreement with the Mu'tazilites.

Thus as far as the completeness of the contents and subjects regarding '*Aqīdah*', al-Juwaynī was not as close to the Traditionist approach. This is particularly true in the subject of attributes where he limits them to several attributes instead of the 99 accepted by the Traditionists. Ibn Ḥazm's equivalent book contains far many subjects despite its conciseness.<sup>9</sup> Another example of Traditionists' view can be found in *al-'Aqīdah al-Taḥāwīyyah* by Abū Ja'far al-Taḥāwī. This book contains even more view but with very little debate.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> All Traditionists agree that the Throne is a real thing created by God for the purpose of sitting. However, like Imām Mālik, they also maintain that the establishment is known the how (*kayf*) is unknown. Moreover, they strongly believe that one should not venture into speculation in this subject. See *Sharḥ al-'Aqīdah al-taḥāwīyyah*, edited by a group of scholars, Maktabat al-Da'wah al-Islāmiyyah, Cairo, n.d., pp.251-253.

<sup>9</sup> See Ibn Ḥazm, *Im al-Kalām 'alā Madhhab Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*.

<sup>10</sup> *Sharḥ al-'Aqīdah al-taḥāwīyyah*



### 9.3.2. The Compromise of the Luma'.

We have already observed that al-Juwaynī avoided many subjects which might have been controversial in his book. Except for the subject of the Throne, all subjects were in agreement with the Traditionists.

Apart from the content, al-Juwaynī compromised in his approach, especially in the subject of attributes. Firstly, he avoids the use of modes (*aḥwāl*). Secondly, he avoids naming and classifying the attributes into necessary, conceptual and causal as he did in his other books. Thirdly, al-Juwaynī uses more Qur'anic verses in *Luma'* compared to al-Irshād and al-Shāmil. For example, in *al-Irshād* he only uses reasoning to prove the attributes of Speech. In *Luma'* al-Juwaynī uses verses from the Qur'ān to prove it. Fourthly, al-Juwaynī avoids mentioning his interpretation of the hands, the eyes and the face in the *Luma'* as he knew his view did not even represent the Ash'arīs view.<sup>11</sup> Fifthly, al-Juwaynī avoided some titles like "What is necessary to attribute to God" which is found in al-Irshād but not in the *Luma'*.

First we have to go back to the idea that al-Juwaynī wanted to compromise with the Traditionists and be as close as possible to them in *Luma'*. Since the Traditionists maintained the existence of all the attributes mentioned in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah and since he mentions only a few, he had to leave the title out for otherwise he would have automatically rejected the remaining attributes in which the Traditionists believe strongly. Moreover, had he mentioned such a title, he would have been unable to leave out controversial attributes like the

<sup>11</sup> The majority of Sunnīs hold that God has hands, eyes and face since they are clearly mentioned in the Qur'ān. However, they refrain from speculating about their nature. *Sharḥ al-'Aqidah al-tahāwīyyah*, pp.180-181; Ibn Ḥazm, *Im al-Kalām 'alā Madhhab Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*, pp.73-75.

hands and the face. Thus, by leaving the chapter untitled, the list of attributes which he mentioned would not be exclusive.

Having mentioned his compromising effort, it should be mentioned that he did refrain from compromising in four main respects. The first is his interpretation of the sitting of God on the throne. This is very peculiar since his personal view hardly represents the Ash'arīs let alone *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*. The second is his inclusion of the attribute of Life and his concept of *kalām al-nafs*. The third is his virtual exclusion of using the Ḥadīth in his book. The only Tradition used was in showing that the Imām should be from Quraysh. In this respect, he is closer to the Mu'tazilites than to the Traditionists. The fourth is his extensive use of reasoning instead of scripture. By counting the verses in the translated text we find that he used less than 20 verses in the whole book. Although this is more than can be found in al-Irshād, it still does not reach the standard which would be representative of *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*. Although al-Juwaynī mentions the miracles of the Prophet and subjects like the punishment in the grave and the return of the soul to the dead, he does not provide us with the Ḥadīths mentioning such subjects. Nevertheless, we may assume here that these Traditions were so well known that he did not feel the need to include them in his book.

### 9.3.3. The Luma' from a Traditionist's Point of View.

We have seen that there are only eight instances where al-Juwaynī uses the Qur'ān as an argument. Of those only four are used as direct argument without the use of reason.<sup>12</sup> As to the Tradition of the Prophet, there is only one Ḥadīth

<sup>12</sup> See translated text: [99,5], [101,2], [104,5], [108,7], [112,7], [113,1], [117,4], [117,8], [118,1], [120,6], [121,2], [127,4].

throughout the book.<sup>13</sup>

This means that al-Juwaynī relied mostly on reason rather than scripture to prove and defend the Sunni position. Although this may be accepted by a Traditionist on the basis that at the time of al-Juwaynī, reasoning was the main tool of argument as he was not only against the Mu'tazilites who do not accept the use of Tradition and who may interpret the Qur'ān differently, but also against the Philosophers, Christians and other religious creeds. All these opponents used reason rather than scripture and al-Juwaynī and other Sunni scholars had to use the same tools used in their environment. Having said that, a traditionist would have preferred to see more scripture used alongside reason.

For a traditionist, the scripture is amply sufficient but additional arguments using reason and supporting the texts will not be rejected. al-Juwaynī, however, did very little of that.

With regard to the list of subjects, we have mentioned that Traditionists have a longer list of subjects than those discussed in the *Luma'*. Thus, from a traditionist point of view, the *Luma'* does not cover all the beliefs of *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*.

Thus, from the above we may deduce that a typical traditionist may oppose the *Luma'* as being representative of the creed of *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah* on three main points. The first is his disregard for the scripture which most Muslims use as the main basis for their belief (especially the Qur'ān). The second is his extensive use of reason, and the third is his omission of many important subjects which are important in the creed of the Sunnis.

A typical traditionist criticism of the *Luma'* may be as follows:

<sup>13</sup> See translated text: [130,3].

1. The first main problem for a traditionist is the use of terms which have not been known or used during the time of the Prophet, Companions or their followers. Terms like the accident (*al-'araḍ*), the substance (*al-jawhar*) and the body (*al-jism*) did not have the same meaning used by al-Juwaynī.<sup>14</sup> The refusal of these terms are not due to their apparent form. It is the meaning and the definition that makes them in conflict with the Traditionists. For a traditionist, anything that was not confirmed or rejected by the scripture cannot be definitely confirmed or rejected by humans. Thus by confirming a definition of the body for example we are imposing our own speculation on religious beliefs instead of relying upon religious texts.<sup>15</sup>

2. al-Juwaynī in [86] proves the contingency of the world. He could have used the verse: "Were they created out of the void? Or were they their own creators?"<sup>16</sup>

3. al-Juwaynī uses the term *Qadīm* as one of the attributes of God [93]. This is a new term which God did not use in the Qur'ān for Himself. For the Arabs *Qadīm* means old or the one who precede others. It is the contrary of *Ḥadīth* meaning 'new'. Thus *Qadīm* is only suitable for things that precede other things but which can be themselves preceded. A more appropriate term, which was transmitted to us by revelation is *al-Awwal* (the First). There is a Tradition saying: "Oh God You are the First and there is nothing before You, and You are the Last and there is nothing after You."<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Sharḥ al-'Aqīdah al-taḥāwīyyah*, p.14.

<sup>15</sup> Ibn Taymiyah, *Muwāfaqat Ṣaḥīḥ al-Manqūl li Ṣarīḥ al-Ma'qūl*, Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, Beirut, n.d., Vol.1, pp.54-55; Ibn Taymiyah, *Dar' Ta'arūḍ al-'Aql wa al-Naql*, Maṭbū'at Jāmi'at al-Imām Muḥammad bin Sa'ūd al-Islāmiyyah, Riyadh, 1403 AH, Vol.1, p.223.

<sup>16</sup> Qur'ān, s.52, v.35.

<sup>17</sup> Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Vol.8, p.78.



4. In [94] al-Juwaynī could have used the verse: “God, there is no god but Him, the Living, the Eternal One. Neither slumber nor sleep overtakes him.”<sup>18</sup> to prove that God is Alive. Other texts which could have supported his view include: “Put your trust in the Everliving Who never dies,”<sup>19</sup> “He is the Living One, there is no god but Him,”<sup>20</sup> and the Ḥadīth: “Sleep does not overtakes God, nor is it appropriate for Him to be overtaken by Sleep.”<sup>21</sup>

5. In [120] al-Juwaynī uses the right method (in the eyes of a traditionist) as he answers the Mu‘tazilites with the verses: “Is then He Who creates Like one that creates not? Will ye not receive admonition?”<sup>22</sup> “The Creator of all things: then worship ye Him”<sup>23</sup> and “Say: “God is the Creator of all things: He is the One, the Supreme and Irresistible” ”.<sup>24</sup>

Moreover, both al-Juwaynī and the traditionist agree on the unanimous saying of “What God wills occurs, and what He does not will does not”. However, both al-Juwaynī and the Traditionists do not provide a reasonable answer in compromising between their belief of God’s creation of everything (including human’s acts) and the freedom of will of humans. Only Ibn Ḥazm who is a Zāhirī recognises categorically that God creates man’s act without attempting to reconcile the contradiction in men’s responsibility towards their acts.<sup>25</sup> We have shown that al-Juwaynī’s solution of *Iktisāb* leads to the same problem. As to the Traditionists, they attempt to solve the contradiction by saying that although God creates everything, he does not like his creatures to do wrong.

<sup>18</sup> Qur’ān, s.2, v.255.

<sup>19</sup> Qur’ān, s.25, v.58.

<sup>20</sup> Qur’ān, s.40, v.65.

<sup>21</sup> Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Vol.1, pp.111-112.

<sup>22</sup> Qur’ān, s.16, v.17.

<sup>23</sup> Qur’ān, s.6, v.102.

<sup>24</sup> Qur’ān, s.13, v.16.

<sup>25</sup> Ibn Ḥazm, *‘Ilm al-Kalām ‘alā Madhhab Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah*, p.64.

This obviously does not solve the problem.

6. In [97] al-Juwaynī maintains that God is Hearing, Seeing and Speaking. A traditionist would maintain for God any attribute transmitted to him by revelation. At the same time, he would not venture into *tashbih* or asking how on the basis of the verse: "Nothing can be compared with Him. He alone hears and sees all."<sup>26</sup>

Traditionists maintain 99 attributes to God on the basis of His 99 names. They refrain to call God by names other than His on the basis of the verse: "God has the Most Excellent Names. Call on Him by His Names and keep away from those that pervert them."<sup>27</sup> Although not all 99 Name are found in the Qur'ān, there are Traditions which mention the number as well as the names.<sup>28</sup> Amongst the Names found in the Qur'ān are: Compassionate, Merciful, the One, the Sovereign Lord, the Holy One, the Giver of Peace, the Keeper of Faith, the Guardian, the Mighty One, the All-Powerful, the Most High, the Creator, the Originator, the Modeller, the Wise One.<sup>29</sup>

7. In [98-99] al-Juwaynī proves that God is One but uses one verse only as a supporting argument. Traditionists would be more keen to state the large number of verses which support the Oneness of God as this is the most important principle of the Islamic faith. Amongst these are: "Say: God is One,"<sup>30</sup> "He said: serve God, my people, for you have no god but Him."<sup>31</sup> The Prophet also said: "I was ordered to fight the unbelievers until they say: there is no god but God,

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<sup>26</sup> Qur'ān, s.42, v.11.

<sup>27</sup> Qur'ān, s.7, v.180.

<sup>28</sup> Ibn Ḥazm, *Ilm al-Kalām 'alā Madhhab Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*, p.67.

<sup>29</sup> Qur'ān, s.59, v.21-24.

<sup>30</sup> Qur'ān, s.112, v.1.

<sup>31</sup> Qur'ān, s.7, v.65.

and that Muḥammad is his Apostle”<sup>32</sup>

Here, however, one might side with al-Juwaynī since the question of Oneness of God is agreed upon unanimously by all Muslims. The argument should be directed towards those who do not believe in the Oneness of God and those obviously do not believe in the Qur’ān. Thus, there is no point in mentioning these verses to them as reasoning is the only judge between those who do not agree on scripture.

8. In [99-100] al-Juwaynī argues that God has Knowledge, Power and Life. Traditionists would only accept that God has Knowledge and Power since they only accept what has been transmitted to them through revelation. The proof that God has knowledge is the same verse reported by al-Juwaynī: “And no female conceives, or lays down (her load), but with His Knowledge,”<sup>33</sup> and “[Unto thee] He hath sent from His (own) knowledge.”<sup>34</sup>

The argument of al-Juwaynī for the attribute of Power might not be seen as acceptable by Traditionists since the ‘force’ (*quwwah*) mentioned in the verse is not the same as Power (*qudrah*).<sup>35</sup> however, they have a Tradition which proves that God has Power: “Oh God: I ask you for help by Your Knowledge, and ask you for power by Your Power...”<sup>36</sup>

9. In [103-105] introduces the concept of *kalām al-naḥs* (the speech of the essence). By this he makes it clear that he believes that the Eternal Speech of God is neither sounds nor letters. This is totally against the Traditionists who believe that the Speech of God can be heard and read. Their proof of this

<sup>32</sup> Aḥmad Ibn Ḥajar, *Fath al-Bārī bi Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, Vol.17, p.25.

<sup>33</sup> Qur’ān, s.35, v.11.

<sup>34</sup> Qur’ān, s.4, v.166.

<sup>35</sup> *إِنَّ اللَّهَ هُوَ الرَّزَّاقُ ذُو الْقُوَّةِ الْمَتِينِ*. Qur’ān, s.51, v.58.

<sup>36</sup> Ibn Ḥazm, *‘Ilm al-Kalām ‘alā Madhhab Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah*, p.72.

would be: "God spoke directly to Moses,"<sup>37</sup> "O Moses: I have chosen you of all mankind with my messages and my Speech,"<sup>38</sup> "To some [messengers] God spoke directly,"<sup>39</sup> "Peace! shall be the word spoken by a merciful God."<sup>40</sup> In addition there is a ḥadīth stating that God will look down to the people of Paradise and say to them "Peace be upon you, Oh people of Paradise."<sup>41</sup>

Thus, for a traditionist, there is ample evidence that al-Juwaynī's view is wrong and that it does not represent *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*.

10. In [107] al-Juwaynī maintains that God is exempt from any specification of location (space) or attribution of adjacency (*muḥādhāt*). This means that He is not surrounded by territories or limited by lands, and He is too exalted to accept limit or measure. Thus God cannot be near celestial or earthly bodies. This is rejected because the conclusion that can easily be reached from that is that God is not in the Heavens, that the Prophet did not ascend to Him, and that God does not come down to the lowest heaven every night.<sup>42</sup> This is categorically rejected by Traditionists since there are clear texts rejecting al-Juwaynī's conclusions.

11. In [107-109] al-Juwaynī states what is impossible for God. These are two main points: (i) that He cannot accept accidents, and (ii) that he cannot be surrounded by space. We dealt with the second point above. Now, the Traditionists would not agree with the first point because of the possible conclusions that can be drawn from it. If al-Juwaynī's point is accepted, it would mean nothing new could occur in God and this would contradict the Ḥadīth saying that: "Today

<sup>37</sup> Qur'ān, s.4, v.164.

<sup>38</sup> Qur'ān, s.7, v.144.

<sup>39</sup> Qur'ān, s.1, v.253.

<sup>40</sup> Qur'ān, s.36, v.58.

<sup>41</sup> al-Albānī, *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Jāmi'*, H. no.3363.

<sup>42</sup> Ibn Taymiyah, *Muwāfaqat Ṣaḥīḥ al-Manqūl*, Vol.1, pp.310-311; Ibn Taymiyah, *Dar' Ta'ārūḍ al-'Aql wa al-Naql*, Vol.7, pp.155-156.



God was angry as never before and never after".<sup>43</sup> Thus, al-Juwaynī would have to be in conflict with this Tradition since the anger is obviously contingent.

12. In [117] al-Juwaynī proves the vision of God with both reason and revelation. However, he could have supported his view with additional Traditions. Amongst these are: "People asked the Prophet: Will we see God in the Day of Judgment? He answered: Do you get hurt when you see the full moon? They said: No. .... He said: You will see Him like that."<sup>44</sup> "When you meet God, there will be no screen between you and Him, and there will be no need for an interpreter."<sup>45</sup> "We were sitting with the Prophet (p.b.u.h) when he looked upon a fourteen day moon and said: You will see your Lord with your eyes just as you are looking at this (the moon) without being harmed."<sup>46</sup>

13. In [120] al-Juwaynī is almost in perfect agreement with the Traditionists as he uses revelation first and then reason.

14. In [124] al-Juwaynī asserts that the only proof of Prophethood is miracles. While the Traditionists agree that miracles prove prophethood, they do not believe that they are the only proof as maintained by al-Juwaynī. As argued by Ibn Taymiyah, prophets can be known from their truthfulness. If they were not truthful, their lies will appear sooner or later. Also the deeds of a prophet may indicate his prophethood.<sup>47</sup> This is why Khadijah believed that Muḥammad was a Prophet and this is why *Hiraql* deduced that he was a prophet after hearing from Abū Sufyān a description of Muḥammad.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>43</sup> al-Albānī, *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Jāmi'*, H. no.1466.

<sup>44</sup> Aḥmad Ibn Ḥajar, *Fath al-Bārī bi Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, Vol.17, p.197.

<sup>45</sup> Aḥmad Ibn Ḥajar, *Fath al-Bārī bi Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, Vol.17, p.204.

<sup>46</sup> Aḥmad Ibn Ḥajar, *Fath al-Bārī bi Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, Vol.17, p.196.

<sup>47</sup> Ibn Taymiyah, *Sharḥ al-'Aqīdah al-Isfahāniyyah*, ed. by H.M. Makhlūf, Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadīthah, Cairo, n.d., pp.89-91.

<sup>48</sup> Ibn Taymiyah, *Sharḥ al-'Aqīdah al-Isfahāniyyah*, pp.94-99.

Moreover, miracles do not only prove Prophethood. They can be used by God to prove his existence as he did with Pharaoh.<sup>49</sup> Also, miracles may also be given to those who are not Prophets. This is obvious with the miracles of Mary and the people of the cave.

15. In [125-127] al-Juwaynī mentions the proofs of the Prophethood of Muḥammad and other transcendental matters. This is in complete agreement with the Traditionists despite the fact that al-Juwaynī did not mention the Traditions referring to these matters.

16. In [128-129] al-Juwaynī also finds himself in total agreement with the Traditionists in the subject of leadership. He adequately rejects the view of the Shī'a but fails to provide some texts supporting the leadership of Abū Bakr such as the one narrated by his daughter 'Ā'ishah to whom the Prophet said: "Call your father and your brother so I can write a book for them. For I fear that someone might say I am better. But God and the believers accept no one other than Abū Bakr."<sup>50</sup>

17. Finally, al-Juwaynī left out many subjects which are seen an integral part of the creed of the Sunnīs by the Traditionists. Questions like whether the attributes are additional to the Essence, the location of God (*al-Fawqīyyah*), the spirit, the state of spirits between death and resurrection, the signs of the day of judgement and many other subjects are ignored by him. There may be two main reasons for this. The first is that he may have had a different opinion to the Traditionists and thus avoided controversy by avoiding the subject. The second, and most likely, is that he simply followed the plan of theologians (i.e. he discussed only those subjects which were seen as important by theologians).

<sup>49</sup> Qur'ān, s.26, v.15-33, s.11, v.14.

<sup>50</sup> al-Albānī, *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Jāmi'*, H. no.247.

This is obvious from the resemblance of *Luma'* to *al-Irshād* as compared to other Traditionists' books on 'Aqīdah.

#### 9.4. Conclusion.

*Luma' al-Adillah* is a book written by al-Juwaynī to represent the creed of *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*. The aim of this chapter was to assess the position of the book within this group of Muslims.

It was argued that *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah* are not the only Sunnis. The Mu'tazilites and the Sūfis and even many philosophers were also Sunnis. What makes the difference is the extent of the use of revelation and reason in theology. In this respect, we find that the Ash'arīs and the Traditionists are the closest. The main difference between the two lies in the former's compromising position and the latter's uncompromising position *vis à vis* the use of reasoning.

In *Luma'*, al-Juwaynī seems to have gone half way to meet the Traditionists. He avoided many controversial subjects; did not mention his belief in the mode; stated the attributes without classification; added more revelation to his discussion; left out his interpretation of the hand, the face and the eyes; avoided giving controversial titles to some of the chapters. However, the other half could be seen from his insistence to interpret the Sitting of God on the Throne which is totally against the Traditionists and even against the Ash'arīs belief; his mentioning of the Attribute of Life; and his concept of the speech of the essence.

From a traditionist's point of view, the *Luma'* does not properly represent their creed. First, the book contains a disproportionate amount of reasoning compared to revelation. He could have used more verses and traditions than he did. Second, the book covers very few subjects related to their creed. Third, al-Juwaynī uses certain terms not transmitted to us by revelation. Fourth, he

interprets the Sitting on throne and the Speech of God and this goes against the belief of most *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*.

To sum up, the Luma' seems to have been an attempt to represent the creed of *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*. However, it does not appear to have been successful in achieving that aim. It contains many views rejected by the Traditionists and at the same time it left out many issues that are seen as important parts of the creed of *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*. It would have been more appropriate for al-Juwaynī to recognise that the two schools are not that close after all, and give his book a different title. Having said that, however, one has to recognise that this book is a serious attempt to combine the textual and intellectual tools to defend the beliefs of *ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah*, even if the price is not being able to comply completely with the views and methods of the Ash'arīs and Traditionists.



## Chapter Ten

### Conclusion

This book has looked at al-Juwaynī's work and method from two perspectives. One was the reviewing and analysis of his doctrine and method in politics, jurisprudence and theology. The other was through the translation of and commentary on his book *Luma' al-Adillah*.

al-Juwaynī was a famous scholar, respected by many other scholars and writers, he had famous teachers and even more famous students. His fame came not only because of his persecution and travel to the two holy places, but also because of the large number of books about the major branches of Islamic sciences he left us. Although he represented the Ash'arite school of theology, he did not always adhere to their conclusions. In one of his books, *al-Burhān*, al-Juwaynī rejected 25, 3, and 41 views of al-Shāfi'ī, al-Ash'arī and al-Bāqillānī respectively. His independence was probably the result of the influence of his father, who was himself independent from the four schools of jurisprudence. He might also have been influenced by his meetings and discussions with scholars from various schools he met during his travels to Baghdad, Isfahān and the Ḥijāz. His intellectual personality was shaped not only by the persecution he suffered, but also by the ethnic and religious diversity of his society.

In politics and with regard to Tradition and consensus as the basis for the selection of the Imām, al-Juwaynī agreed with the mainstream Sunnī standpoint. However, he differed from his predecessors in that he accepted the decentralisation of political power. He also disagreed with al-Māwardī by rejecting any

spiritual status of the Imām. al-Juwaynī, like other Sunnites, rejected the position of the Shi'a that 'Alī was designated by the Prophet. According to al-Juwaynī, political power should be acquired by election carried out by the elite of the community (*ahl al-'aqd wa al-ḥall*). Women, slaves, common people and non-Muslims were not considered as part of this elite. Seen from the modern political and ethical point of view, this seems rather deficient. On the one hand, the elite can be easily selected and manipulated in such a way that they would select one leader rather than another. On the other hand, the electorate should be composed by those who have any interest in the country whether women, commoners or non-Muslims. Moreover, al-Juwaynī does not tell us how these elite personalities were to be themselves selected.

It seems that al-Juwaynī, even four centuries after the death of the Prophet, was not able to see room for improvement of the old system. The system al-Juwaynī described was basically that of the era of the first four Caliphs. At the time the Caliphs were still religious leaders, and political leadership was still closely associated with religious duties. Moreover, the population of al-Madīnah was very small (no more than 60000), so that a few representatives were sufficient to elect a leader.

By the time of al-Juwaynī, things had changed. The leader was not religious, anymore and the state and population were by far larger than that of al-Madīnah. To speak of the elite and the traditional system should have been irrelevant at his time. This should have been an opportunity for him to put forward the idea of a political system suitable for his time. However, even if he had thought of it, he would probably have refrained from discussing it, as he would have had strong rejection from both the religious community (who, even today, maintain

<sup>1</sup> The exception is the *ḥadīth Quds* which is said in the name of God.

the old political system of the Caliphate) and the politically powerful.

al-Juwaynī sees being of Quraysh origin as a necessary condition for the leadership. This again shows his adherence to the old system of the Caliphate, despite the fact that it was almost completely irrelevant at his time. Indeed, all those who had real political power were not from Quraysh. Moreover, this view goes against the teachings of the Qur'ān itself.

The classification of the Imām's duties into religious and earthly clearly shows that al-Juwaynī still believed in the old political system. For him, the leadership had to be more religious than political. The Imām had more religious duties than earthly ones. Even these latter ones were geared towards expanding the Islamic state and protecting it from external threats. Today, this is obviously not practical, since the structure of the state has become so complicated that the leader does not have the time to perform these (public) religious duties. Moreover, today it is almost always the case that those who are not religious scholars are more suitable to hold political power. Obviously, al-Juwaynī did not realise that by his time, religion and state were already separated in practice.

al-Juwaynī viewed politics and political power as a religious matter, to the point that he did not accept that the Imām be assisted by a non-Muslim. Even at that time it should have been obvious that by excluding non-Muslims he might have missed the opportunity to use a better assistant.

Like most Sunnite scholars, al-Juwaynī did not feel at ease with the subject of the deposition of the Imām. This is probably due to the fact that none of the Caliphs were deposed (although three were assassinated).

To sum up, in politics al-Juwaynī was more of a Traditionist than a theologian. Reason is virtually absent in his political discussions. The Ḥadīth and

the political practice up to his time were the main guides for his political views. His political theory is restricted, as he did not venture into the institutions and organisation of the state.

In *Fiqh*, al-Juwaynī showed a different personality. His book *Nihāyat al-Maṭlab* was used as one of the main sources in Shāfi'ite *fiqh*. Many scholars benefited from his work in *Fiqh*, including al-Ghazālī, al-Shāṭibī, al-Kayyā, al-Āmidī and al-Subkī. In *al-Burhān*, al-Juwaynī showed his courage and independence of opinion. He not only rejected many of his predecessors' views, but also his own views expressed in earlier books.

al-Juwaynī did not make an explicit distinction between the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. Both are called *al-Bayān* by him. What is important to him, is the degree of certainty of the text. This is a weak point in al-Juwaynī, because there are obvious differences between the two. First, there is the huge difference in the degree of certainty. The Qur'ān was recited, written and transmitted by a large number of people throughout the centuries. The likelihood that it is not authentic is extremely low. The Ḥadīth, on the other hand, was not written at the time of the Prophet, nor was it recited or memorised by a large number of people throughout the centuries. There is therefore a difference of certainty inherent in the two texts. Second, the Qur'ān is the Word of God transmitted to people through the Prophet, it is a message from God to His people. In other words, a Qur'ānic verse is always sent for a permanent purpose. The Ḥadīth, however, appeared under different circumstances. We cannot be certain whether the order of the sayings of the Prophet was meant to be temporary or permanent. We do not know whether he said the substance of the Ḥadīth in his own name or in the name of God.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, if God wanted a matter to be transmitted

<sup>1</sup> The exception is the *ḥadīth Qudsī* which is said in the name of God.



to Muslims in a permanent fashion, it would not have been difficult for Him to include it in the Qur'ān.

al-Juwaynī's method in *uṣūl al-fiqh* is characterised by his clarification, discussion and selection of opinions found in the literature of his time. Although in most cases he sides with his school, in many cases he accepted his opponents' views. In some places he rejected all other views and advanced his own, while in others he took a middle position. As in theology, the school that is criticised most by al-Juwaynī was the Mu'tazilite. He dedicated a large proportion of his book, *al-Burhān*, to criticism of the Mu'tazilites.

Contrary to his work in politics, reason plays a major role in *uṣūl al-fiqh* through his defence of *qiyās*. However, what distinguishes al-Juwaynī is his use of *al-qarā'in*.

In both *fiqh* and *uṣūl al-fiqh* al-Juwaynī was to a large extent independent. Although he gives priority to authentic textual evidence, reason plays a major role whenever there is a doubtful text. The effect of his work in theology is apparent in his book *al-Burhān*.

In theology, al-Juwaynī was one the greatest scholars of the Ash'arite school. Despite being an Ash'arite, he had his distinct method and independent personality. He rejected many of his predecessors' conclusions and definitions which he might have adopted earlier in his life. Examples of this are his views on *al-qudrah* and *al-ḥāl*.

His independence is supported by his rejection of the view that existence is an attribute, al-Ash'arī's definition of Speech, and *al-Baqā'* as a separate attribute from existence.

However, al-Juwaynī's most significant difference from the Ash'arites and

Traditionists was his interpretation of *al-ṣifāt al-khabariyya* like the sitting on the Throne, the hands and the face.

Contrary to al-Ash'arī, al-Juwaynī asserted that some divine attributes can only be proven by reason alone if they preceded the Speech of God, like Existence, Knowledge and Power. Here, al-Juwaynī reiterated the view of al-Bāqillānī and our objection to this view is formulated in Chapter 4. Basically, we do not agree that there are things that can be proven by reason alone. Any human being needs prior knowledge to be employed by his reason to prove something. Without prior knowledge, reason would be equally likely to reach any kind of conclusion. If we use reason alone, we might reach a conclusion that there exists one, two or more Gods. We might conclude that there is no God or any other kind of existence that one can think of.

The only matters that can be proven by reason alone are those which are pre-organised by a system, like logic and mathematics. Even in these cases, we still have prior knowledge, axioms and rules upon which reasoning is based. In the case of theological beliefs, however, nothing can be said that reason alone can prove without prior knowledge.

In Chapter 4 we discussed the matters that can be proven by revelation alone, by revelation and reason and by the supernatural. We found that there are several deficiencies in al-Juwaynī's system of means of justification. The matters that can be proven by revelation alone are those which are deemed possible by reason. What escaped al-Juwaynī, however, is that the range of these possibilities varies from the extremely negative (bad, difficult etc) to the extremely positive (good, easy etc.). Take prayer, for example. al-Juwaynī would say that it is one possibility amongst a huge number of alternatives. Therefore

we would not be able to make a selection and only revelation can tell us the right alternative. Reason, though, can still judge whether the matter supposedly proven by revelation is good or bad. What if revelation tells me to pray 24 hours a day? Reason would immediately judge it as unacceptable. But if revelation tells me that I should pray twice a day, reason would tell me that it is acceptable. Any matter that is suggested by revelation should pass through the 'filter' of reason.

One might object by saying that good believers accept the commands of God without discussion. The answer would be that the difference is only in the degree of judgment by reason of what is acceptable and what is not. For some, praying 10 times a day is quite 'reasonable' while for others, praying even once is unacceptable.

al-Juwaynī introduced a new element that can only be proven by the *Mu'jizah*. According to him, the only thing that can prove that someone is telling the truth is a supernatural act. al-Juwaynī here meant that Prophethood can only be proven by supernatural acts. What seems to escape him is that non-Prophets can sometimes perform what appears to people to be a supernatural act. A top magician can do tricks which seem impossible. Yet, he is not a Prophet. The other even more important point is that the Prophet Muḥammad did not perform any miracle.<sup>2</sup> Even if one insists that the Qur'ān is a miracle, the answer would be that the first day when the Prophet came back to his wife *Khadījah*, he did not have a verse with him and yet she accepted him as a Prophet, and so did 'Alī and Abū Bakr.

It would be more reasonable to say that a miracle is one of the elements of

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<sup>2</sup> There are some *Ḥadīths* mentioning miracles performed by the Prophet, but these are mostly weak.

the truthfulness of a prophet. There are other important things in which reason plays a major role. For example, one can look at the message of the alleged prophet and also see his past record and behaviour.

In theology, therefore, it seems that nothing can be proven by reason alone or revelation alone. It is always through the interaction of the two that one can advance a strong or weak argument. However, we think that of the two elements, reason is the most dynamic. Revelation provides the basic foundation of a system while reason builds on it. Moreover, whatever revelation tells us, reason has the final say in accepting or rejecting it.

There is another important element which al-Juwaynī failed to mention: the element of faith. While our above discussion was independent of faith, when this comes into action the role of reason is reduced to a minimum. However, when faith is in play, we should no longer speak of proof or argumentation, we would simply be speaking of 'acceptance'. One does not need to prove something to someone who believes, one just needs to tell him/her. For instance, if you believe that Muḥammad is the Messenger of God, he would not have to prove to you that God is willing; he simply tells you that He is willing.

In the question of divine attributes, al-Juwaynī departed from the position of al-Ash'arī who accepted the reality of attributes without asking how. al-Juwaynī separated them into essential (*nafsiyyah*) and qualitative (*ma'nawiyyah*) which are caused by other kinds of attributes not explicitly mentioned by al-Juwaynī (*ṣifāt al-ma'ānī*).

Basically, al-Juwaynī believed that some attributes of God are essential and uncaused, while most of His attributes are caused by causes (*'ilal*) inherent in God. These are separate from the Essence and eternal. However, al-Juwaynī



failed to take a clear stand on whether these attributes are God or other than God. He also failed to explain the nature of these attributes in clear terms. This is one of the difficulties which the Ash'arites had to face when trying to reconcile reason with orthodoxy. On the one hand, reason states that if one believes in the oneness of God, then one cannot assert that there are many entities in God. On the other hand, the orthodox Muslims confirm that these attributes are real existing things.

In Chapter 5 we showed that the conception of God and His attributes in al-Juwaynī's thought amounts to believing that God has internal and external entities. The external entities are not real and are called modes. These are properties of God which are divided into essential and conceptual. The essential attributes, like existence and eternity, are uncaused and follow by definition from the Essence of God. The conceptual attributes are properties which are caused by real attributes inherent in God. It follows that the real attribute of Will causes a property, called mode, of God being willing. The main problem with this conceptualisation is that it leads in the end to believing that God is divided internally. Each part of Him is eternal and separate from the other parts. Although it is not difficult to imagine the possibility of such internal division, there is no evidence for or against it.

To the proof of contingency and the existence of God, al-Juwaynī contributed with his combination of the argument from createdness of accidents with the argument from the impossibility of an infinite by succession. His most original contribution, however, was the argument from particularisation which we summarised in Chapter 6. al-Juwaynī introduced some elements of the idea of particularisation in his proof from the createdness of accidents. He also advanced a

unique argument against infinity in his book *al-Shāmil*.

In Chapter 6 we analysed the main views and proofs of al-Juwaynī in respect of contingency and proof of existence of God. We emphasised his contribution in these two questions.

Chapter 7 is dedicated to the translated text of *Luma' al-Adillah*. Because some expressions and words are difficult to translate, footnotes are used to reproduce the words or expressions in Arabic. Ambiguous phrases and areas were also explained with added reference to other books by al-Juwaynī.

In Chapter 8 we explained the contents of the translated book with reference to other works by al-Juwaynī and also with reference to the Ash'arītes and other schools. We found that the subject of *tawhīd* took 65% of the book, while the remaining 35% was shared by four other subjects. This made it clear that the *Luma'* is a theology book. Each section in the book was explained and critically assessed. A detailed comparison between *Luma' al-Adillah* and *al-Irshād* was also carried out. Besides the length of the two books, the number of subjects is very limited in *Luma'*. Moreover, the discussion is far more lengthy and detailed in *al-Irshād*. In *Luma'*, al-Juwaynī seems more reluctant to reveal his independent opinion. Apart from one or two places, he avoids coming into conflict with the Traditionists. In *al-Irshād*, however, he mentions far more views which the Traditionists reject.

In Chapter 9 we discussed *Luma' al-Adillah* in the light of the Traditionist standpoint. It was found that, despite his attempt, al-Juwaynī did not go all the way in meeting the Traditionists. Although he avoided many controversial subjects, like the modes, the classification of attributes and the Hand of God, he maintained his position in interpreting the sitting (*istawā*) of God on the Throne,

mentioning the attribute of life and his concept of *kalām al-nafs*.

An orthodox Muslim would look at the book as a book with many deficiencies. The book does not contain enough texts (Qur'ān and Ḥadīth), many subjects of belief were left out, the terminology used by al-Juwaynī is alien to Muslims, and he interprets the sitting on the Throne. Most Traditionists would therefore reject it as non-representative of their creed.

The book of *Luma'* is the best evidence that the Ash'arites are too different from the Traditionists to try to identify and agree with them. Whether they call themselves orthodox, *ahl al-sunnah* or whatever else, Traditionists (*al-Salafiyyūn*) will always reject their views. By claiming to be orthodox, they only contribute to the confusion which reigns in the denomination of the various groups.

Nevertheless, we have to recognise that the gap between the Ash'arites and the Traditionists is narrower than that between the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites, the Shi'ites or the philosophers. Being close, though, does not mean identical, and it is preferable, for the sake of clarity, to differentiate among the various disciplines like politics, Fiqh and theology. In politics, there does not seem to be any independent school. In Fiqh, it is accepted that there are four independent schools within the Sunni sect. As for theology, there are far more schools, but the most important are the philosophers, the Mu'tazilites, the Ash'arites and the Traditionists.

Our approach to the study of al-Juwaynī goes beyond producing a descriptive discussion of his thoughts and methodology. Many of his positions and thoughts have been critically discussed and evaluated. Unlike previous studies, we pointed out our objections and criticism whenever we thought there was some inconsistency in al-Juwaynī's views. Moreover, this study has attempted to ex-

plore all the aspects of al-Juwaynī's work. His Politics, Fiqh and theology were all addressed. We pointed out his originality and independence in a number of Fiqh and theological questions.

Another important contribution of this study is the translation and commentary of al-Juwaynī's book *Luma' al-Adillah*. This book was compared with another more detailed book *al-Irshād*. We also discussed the position of the translated book, *al-Luma'*, in light of the Sunnī creed.



## Appendix of Technical Terms

الْأُمَّة	<i>al-ummah</i>	The Community
الْإِفْتِرَاق	<i>al-iftirāq</i>	Separation
إِنْتِقَال	<i>intiqāl</i>	Transformation
أَبْتَات	<i>ithbāt</i>	Proof
الْأَوَائِل	<i>al-awā'il</i>	The Ancients
آثَار	<i>athar</i>	Effect
أَزَلِي	<i>azalī</i>	Eternal
أَهْلُ الْحَقِّ	<i>ahl al-ḥaqq</i>	People of the truth
إِرَادَة	<i>irādah</i>	Will
إِشَارَات	<i>'ishārāt</i>	Signs
إِسْتَوَاء	<i>al-istiwā'</i>	The sitting
إِكْتِسَاب	<i>iktisāb</i>	Acquisition
أَجْرَام	<i>ajrām</i>	Particles/Bodies
إِمَام	<i>imām</i>	Leader
إِمَامَة	<i>imāmah</i>	Leadership
أَمِير	<i>amīr</i>	Commander
أَهْلُ السُّنَّةِ وَالْجَمَاعَةِ	<i>ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamā'ah</i>	People of the Sunnah and Community
الْبَاطِل	<i>al-bāṭil</i>	The false
الْبَقَاء	<i>al-baqā'</i>	Subsistence
جَوْهَر	<i>jawhar</i>	Substance/Atom
جَائِز	<i>jā'iz</i>	Possible
جِسْم	<i>jism</i>	Body
الْجَهْل	<i>al-jahl</i>	Ignorance
الْجَنَان	<i>al-jinān</i>	Paradise
الْحَقِّ	<i>al-ḥaqq</i>	The truth
حُدُوث	<i>ḥudūth</i>	Contingency
حَدِّ	<i>ḥadd</i>	Definition

حَيّ	<i>ḥayy</i>	Living
حديث النفس	<i>ḥaith al-nafs</i>	The discourse of the self
دليل	<i>dalil</i>	Proof
الذات	<i>al-dhāt</i>	The Essence
رُؤوس	<i>rumz</i>	Symbols
الرؤية	<i>al-ru'yah</i>	The vision
رؤية البصر	<i>ru'yat al-baṣar</i>	Vision by eyesight
رَسُول ، رَسُول	<i>rasūl, rusul</i>	Messenger(s)
زائد	<i>zā'id</i>	Additional
زَوَال	<i>zawāl</i>	Termination, end
سياسة	<i>siyāsah</i>	Politics
صفات	<i>ṣifāt</i>	Attributes
صفة	<i>ṣifah</i>	Attribute
شكر	<i>shukr</i>	Recognisiton
شُرَاط	<i>sharā'iṭ</i>	Conditions
الشرع	<i>al-shar'</i>	Reviewed law
الشيء	<i>al-shay'</i>	Thing
الصانع	<i>al-ṣāni'</i>	The Creator/Maker
الطَّبَائِعِيُّونَ	<i>al-ṭabā'i'yyūn</i>	The Naturalists
الْأَعْرَاضُ ، الْأَعْرَاضُ	<i>al-'ard, al-a'rād</i>	Accident(s)
العالم	<i>al-'ālam</i>	The world
الْعَدَم	<i>al-'adam</i>	Non-existence
العلم	<i>al-'ilm</i>	Knowledge
علة	<i>'illah</i>	Cause
الْعُقَلَاءُ	<i>al-'uqalā'</i>	The intellectuals
الغيب	<i>al-ghayb</i>	The unknown
فَتَوَى	<i>fatwā</i>	Religious opinion
قديم	<i>qadīm</i>	Pre-eternal
قادر	<i>qādir</i>	Capable
كُفْر	<i>kufr</i>	Heresy
ليب	<i>labīb</i>	Intellectual

الْمُوَحِّدُونَ	<i>al-muwahhidūn</i>	The Unitarian
مَوْجُود	<i>mawjūd</i>	Existent
الْمُتَحَيِّزُ	<i>al-mutahayyiz</i>	That which occupies space
مُسْتَحِيل	<i>mustahil</i>	Impossible
مَعْنَى	<i>ma'nā</i>	Thing
مُجْتَمِعَةٌ	<i>mujtami'ah</i>	Aggregated
مُفْتَرِقَةٌ	<i>muftariqah</i>	Segregates
مُخَصَّصٌ	<i>mukhaṣṣiṣ</i>	Paticulariser
مُوجِبَةٌ	<i>mūjabah</i>	Necessary
مُخْتَارٌ	<i>mukhtār</i>	Free willer
الْمَغْلُوبُ	<i>al-maghlūb</i>	The vanquished
الْمَكْسُورُ	<i>al-maksūr</i>	The overwhelmed
الْمُسْتَكْرَاهُ	<i>al-mustakrah</i>	The compelled
الْمَعْلُومُ	<i>al-ma'lūm</i>	The known
الْمُفَسِّرُونَ	<i>al-mufasssirūn</i>	The interpreters
مَخْلُوقٌ	<i>makhlūq</i>	Created
الْمَجُوسُ	<i>al-majūs</i>	Zoroastrians
مُعْجِزَةٌ	<i>mu'jizah</i>	Miracle
الْمُؤْمِنُونَ	<i>al-mu'minūn</i>	The believers
نَصٌّ	<i>naṣṣ</i>	Text, designation
وَاحِدٌ	<i>wāḥid</i>	Unique
يَحْوِزُ	<i>yajūz</i>	It is possible

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